AID & TRADE: THE EUROPEAN UNION-AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, & PACIFIC GROUP OF STATES FRAMEWORK WITHIN A MULTI-LEVEL EUROPE

by

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B.A. (Hons.), Bishop’s University, 2007

PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

In the Department of Political Science

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Summer 2009

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ABSTRACT

This project demonstrates how the European Union’s aid and trade relationship with the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) group of states fits within the context of a multi-level Europe. The analysis draws on the multi-level governance (MLG) typology designed by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, and the earlier intellectual endeavours of G.P.E. Walzenbach and colleagues to explain the EU governmental and policy process policies in aid and trade with ACP. By examining the nature and evolution of European Union policy processes regarding international trade and development with ACP countries through the Type 2 model of MLG, it is the intent of this author to show how the European Union and its member states can coordinate their actions effectively, whilst maintaining individual sovereignty and without having to fit directly into the more hierarchical Type 1 model of MLG which applies to the overall structure of the European Union.

Keywords: Multi-level governance; European Union; International aid; Development assistance; Economic assistance; Official development;

Subject Terms: European Union; European Union countries – Politics and government; Decentralization in government – European Union countries;
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my examining committee and with special thanks to Alexander Moens, my senior supervisor, for consistently providing extensive and helpful feedback throughout the past year and a half. I have greatly appreciated his patience and professionalism.

I am intellectually indebted to the earlier works of Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, G.P.E. Walzenbach et al. Without their contributions to multi-level governance and European integration studies I would not have known how to address the unique EU-ACP framework.
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1. AID, TRADE & MULTI-LEVEL EUROPE

1.1. Aid & Trade with the Developing World

Member states of the European Union maintain their own national Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs, either through their own development agency or directly through their respective department of foreign affairs. This is in addition to what they contribute to the European Union budget which provides funding for the majority of EU operations (including some of those involved in development and humanitarian aid) as well as what they pledge separately towards the European Development Fund (which largely goes to African, Caribbean, & Pacific (ACP) states, as will be discussed further). Through these multiple layers the member states are involved in many facets of international development. By far the largest portion of their development assistance is in the form of their direct ODA, but a significant amount is also contributed to the varying EU schemes. The EU member states provide roughly 45 percent of all global ODA while the EU, with its funding from member states, contributes almost 10 percent of the world’s development assistance (Holland, 2002, p.109).

The individual actions of the 27 member states of the European Union warrant enough interest alone, in terms of their involvement in international development, to necessitate significant study. However, it is their collective efforts, under the mandate of the European Union that warrants special interest, as it attempts to complement and coordinate their individual national policies. The European Union is not merely another regional intergovernmental organisation; it is something beyond that, possibly the first
supranational organisation. It has features that reflect other intergovernmental organisations and further features that are more representative of what appears to be a completely separate entity in its own right (Cini, 2003).

The European Union is a global economic player, as evidenced by its own seat on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and carries a significant amount of clout in many financial circles as it represents one of the largest markets for consumer goods in the world. Politically it is also a major force in international relations as its 27 members are all relatively strong democracies (allowing some lenience for newer members) and carry influential legal and moral authority. Long-standing members such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom are highly powerful members of groups such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Group of 8 (G8), and except for Germany, hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.

Collectively the European Union is considered an potential check on the claims of the United States of America to global hegemony. When a major entity such as the European Union decides to tackle significantly difficult global issues such as the environment, human rights and development it is worth investigating what effects it may bring about.

In the EU-ACP framework, there is a specialised partnership between developed and developing states in the area of economic development and international trade. The ACP states are not just the beneficiaries of European aid, but are partners in the decision-making process regarding their development in economic and trade capacity. In the use of Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes to individualise the planning of aid implementation there is a novel approach to development assistance as
the recipients are encouraged to bring all stakeholders to the table, including non-
governmental organisations and other civil society actors. Along with the input of donor 
concerns and with the assistance of European Commission development officials, the 
overall planning of European aid to the ACP is remarkable in its uniqueness. By allowing 
numerous decision-makers to be involved throughout, from the planning to the 
implementation stage, it has dispersed authority across many levels. This is certainly 
unparalleled at this scope within international development; however it is not necessarily 
surprising within the realm of the European Union, which as a mixed intergovernmental 
and supranational institution regularly devolves authoritative power through the principle 
of ‘subsidiarity’.¹

1.2. Dispersing Authority

Different schools of thought on governance have each attempted to provide answers on 
how authority is/ought to be dispersed. In the realm of federalism and 
urban/municipal/local government there are many options on hand, ranging from focused 
single unit bodies to myriad overlapping special-purpose units designed to give citizens 
alternative options and flexibility (e.g. Chisholm, 1989; Keating, 1995; Lowery, 2000; 
Ostrom, 1972). In European integration studies, these questions are raised in regards to 
how much authority ought to be given to Brussels and what authority rightfully belongs 
in the hands of the 27 member states? It is a critical matter in addressing the continued 
growth of the European Union. While it may never fully amount to a single European-
state, other options abound. Those that support a European federalism (Joerges, Mény &

¹ This entails that the European Union only acts in areas that individual member states cannot 
fully achieve on their own (Kersbergen, van & Verbeek; 1994).
Weiler, 2000) would allow each member state to continue to exist but belong to a unified and hierarchical European structure. In this system, the so-called *acquis communautaire* or body of laws and procedures that govern the Common Market, imply that the same rules and processes would exist in each member state equally. States would not necessarily lose complete sovereignty, as they would still be responsible locally for some policies. Another approach is the idea of 'variable geometry' or 'à la carte' integration where member states can pick and choose which policies they would like to participate in (Eichenberger & Frey, 1996; 1999; 2000). This would allow for states to opt-in for policies that they feel they would benefit from (e.g. the common market) while opting-out of policies that they feel would not benefit them (e.g. the euro). While the new member states of the ‘big enlargement’ of 2004 and the subsequent addition in 2007 have all been required to follow the *acquis communautaire*, there are some exceptions. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden are examples of EU member states that have applied ‘variable geometry’ in their integration experiences, being selective with their level of participation in Europe, most notably by opting out of the European Monetary Union.

Within European studies literature, especially in the past decade, as the European Union continued to evolve as an institution, scholars began to examine the impact of supranationalism on the authoritative decision-making process. Stemming from ideas on federalism, these scholars have developed the concept of ‘multi-level governance’ (MLG). It is the intent of this project to demonstrate how the EU-ACP aid and trade framework fits within a multi-level Europe and how despite dispersed authority the European Union manages to have a coordinated, complementary and cohesive approach.
1.3. Defining Multi-Level Governance

Originally, multi-level governance was defined as a “system of continuous negotiation among nested\(^2\) governments at several territorial tiers - supranational, national, regional and local.” (Marks, 1993, pg. 392; Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). This has now been applied to the European Union more generally (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Walzenbach, 2006). Some European scholars have also examined the dispersion of decision-making to more informal arrangements and policy networks (Ansell, 2000; Christiansen & Piattoni, 2003; Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999; Peterson, 2001). While some scholars even stretch so far as to consider multi-level governance as a substitute for traditional hierarchical government, others view the so-called informal policy networks as being entrenched in the existing framework of formal institutions (Rhodes, 2000; Peters & Pierre, 2000). This, with the prominence of globalization, has brought discussion on how MLG aids in dispersing authority from national actors to regional or international institutions (Kahler & Lake, 2003; Donahue & Nye, 2000). Governance at the international level has also seen the rise of participation of non-governmental organizations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995). Not-for-profits and large corporations play increasingly significant roles in an anarchic international arena where the absence of an absolute higher authority calls for private actors to largely self-regulate and set industry standards.

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\(^2\) Nested, in this context, refers to long-standing governmental frameworks that are likely to be permanent, such as municipal councils, provincial governorships and federal bureaucracies. Its meaning becomes more evident below when discussing the differences within Hooghe & Marks' typology of multi-level governance frameworks and the addition of Type II jurisdictions which may come or go, as policy dictates.
Multi-level governance in this theoretical setting may appear to be a broad concept with a variety of definitions and accompanying connotations. However, Hooghe and Marks (2003) have attempted to bundle these various thoughts from amongst different disciplines into what appears to be a simple binary typology. The basis for these types comes from a series of dichotomous relationships: communities v. problems, bundled v. specific, limited v proliferated, lasting v. fluid (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Upon further review of this typology, it becomes apparent that it may also be a useful analytical tool. As analysis involves the detailed examination of the constituent elements of a structure and typology is a way of classification, the two concepts are interrelated. Multi-level governance, as presented by Hooghe and Marks, could be considered a blend of both.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE I</th>
<th>TYPE II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General-purpose jurisdictions</td>
<td>Task-specific jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intersecting memberships</td>
<td>Intersecting memberships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictions organised in a limited number of levels</td>
<td>No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels</td>
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<tr>
<td>System-wide architecture</td>
<td>Flexible design</td>
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Type I multi-level governance describes jurisdictions at a limited number of levels. These jurisdictions - international, national, regional, meso, local - are general-purpose. That is to say, they bundle together multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities, and in many cases, a court system and representative institutions. The membership boundaries of such jurisdictions do not intersect. This is the case for jurisdictions at any one level, and it is the case for jurisdictions across levels. In Type I governance, every citizen is located in a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions, where there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale. Territorial jurisdictions are intended to be, and usually are, stable for
periods of several decades or more, though the allocation of policy competencies across jurisdictional levels is flexible (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 7-8).

MLG used in this way entails a structural framework of institutions that remain embedded for a long period of time and are flexible in the adaptation and reformation of policy without restructuring the framework itself. This is essentially an elaboration upon the foundations of federalism. Accordingly, federal governing systems, such as those found in Canada and the United States can be considered Type I frameworks.

Type II multi-level governance is distinctly different. It is composed of specialized jurisdictions. Type II governance is fragmented into functionally specific pieces - say, providing a particular local service, solving a particular common resource problem, selecting a particular software standard, monitoring water quality of a particular river, or adjudicating international trade disputes. The number of such jurisdictions is potentially huge, and the scales at which they operate vary finely. There is no great fixity in their existence. They tend to be lean and flexible - they come and go as demands for governance change (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 8).

These jurisdictions are created for specific policy issues and accordingly can shift, or even disappear as issues evolve. Type II jurisdictions are functionally based and reflect the current needs of stakeholders, rather than necessarily considering previous or long-term future concerns.

The relationship between the two is not mutually exclusive as it can be argued that Type II governance is a complementary arm of a ‘nested’ Type I structure. Examples of this can be found throughout the world as in the United States where there is a clear hierarchical federal structure with each level consisting of enduring system-wide institutions such as the legislature, executive and judiciary over a particular geography (Type I) while there might be functionally specific jurisdictions with cross-boundaries
and which target key issues, such as the Port Authority shared by New York and New Jersey (Type II; Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p.10). It may be suggested that Scotland fits into this second category as it has its own parliament in Edinburgh while also sending members to Westminster, though admittedly this may fall closer to traditional federalism.

Overall the European Union would be described as attempting to be a Type I framework. Within this overall framework there exist manifestations of Type II governance on European soil (such as river authorities on the Danube or Rhine), but these are not necessarily clearly associated with the European Union. However, there are some Type II structures that are more closely integrated such as the EU-ACP framework as will be argued below.

This basic typology provides an interesting analytical tool upon which to measure the flexibility of policy networks and governance structures. It may also be useful as a descriptive tool in order to understand and explain evolving policies as affected by the ever-expanding jurisdiction of the European Union and its relation to member-states' sovereignty. While it has primarily been used as an analytical/descriptive tool of the exterior structure (that is between geo-juridical levels of local, regional, national, international levels) it can also be transferred into new areas of research.

1.4. Exercises in Multi-Level Governance

In 2006, G.P.E. Walzenbach published an edited volume on multi-level governance, entitled *European Governance: Policy Making between Politicization and Control*. Its fundamental goal, as stated in the preface was to be “an exercise in intellectual conservatism” (Walzenbach, 2006, p. ix). Each of the contributing authors was to take
multi-level governance and apply it to old, new and emerging areas not necessarily within the sole realm of integration studies. For Walzenbach, the primary concern was to maintain that all authors left from a single departure spot in terms of how to define and use multi-level governance (MLG). The variety would come from the subject matter and not the interpretation of MLG.

Walzenbach introduces the reader to the essential problem facing his colleagues: a general understanding of multi-level governance is hardly solidified within the literature. He creates a continuum that ranges from ‘pure description’ or ‘approach’, to ‘model’, to finally a fully-fledged ‘theory’ (p. 1).

Multi-level governance can be seen as merely an “organizing metaphor” that allows for categorization and attempts to remedy cluttered events and interactions amongst the “open-ended nature of the integration process” (Ibid). This view resonates with those that identify it as a concept that fits once a broader framework of governance is applied to the European Union (see: Nugent, 2006).

Hooghe and Marks (2001) see it as a model, by which the European Union has weakened the power of the centralised state. The positive overtones that accompany the usage of a ‘model’ (as opposed to a more neutral ‘example’) reflect Hooghe and Marks’ normative views on the virtues of decentralising authority. For them, multi-level governance is not merely a description (explaining what is happening) but is more closely related to a prescription (explaining how something ought to happen).

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3 Included in this group are Rosamond (2001), John (2002) and Cram et al. (1999). Cram (1997), particularly focuses on the use of “conceptual lenses”.
While Hooghe and Marks are strong proponents of the usage of multi-level governance as a model, they do not go so far as to claim that it is a ‘theory’. There exists a small group of supportive MLG authors who suppose that it is already a coherent system of ideas on how the European Union has been organised or that it is possible to create a sound theory with the identification of “different ‘modes’ of interaction across multiple levels of decision making” (Walzenbach, 2006, p. 1).

In the end, Walzenbach and his peers chose to adopt the Hooghe and Marks definition of multi-level governance in an attempt to evaluate the merit of MLG as an analytical tool and heuristic device (Walzenbach, p. 2). Some questions that Walzenbach raises in his introductory chapter are important in addressing the appropriateness of using multi-level governance. He asks three primary questions: “to what extent is MLG an instrument to analyze variation in EU policies?” (p. 3), “where is political control exercised in a system of MLG?” (p. 5), and “does MLG politicize policy-making at the European level?” (p. 7).

The first question is one of methodological significance. If multi-level governance is to be useful theoretically it requires the ability to explain variation in policy-making in the European Union, otherwise it falls into the trap of being solely descriptive. As decision-making is dispersed among EU, national, and sub-national authorities, an understanding of how they cooperate and coordinate their decisions on a daily basis has led to multi-level governance gaining explanatory use on the issue of policy creation. Particularly, Walzenbach cites a trend amongst German scholars (Scharpf, 2001; Héritier, 2002; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2004) to use it in this fashion. He goes on to assert that this method provides an abundance of “new conceptualizations” drawn from federalism.

notably in the works of Hueglin (1999), Marks et al. (1996a) and McKay (1999). Walzenbach feels that some of these case studies have been unsuccessful in contributing to a larger theoretical framework. Trying to find a clear fit between domestic and international policy-making style is also strenuous and has found some disagreement in how national and supranational actors may not fit into a singular common style of policy creation (Bauer, 2002; Hix, 1998, p. 41; Hix, 2005). Walzenbach relates this to the broader ambiguities of ‘networks’, which according to others (Peterson, 2001) give imbalanced precedence to national actors, which makes any multi-tiered understanding imperfect.  

The second question is of normative and philosophical importance. As policy decision-making is without a strict hierarchical structure in a multi-level governance model, it leaves open the question of who is in control? This can be difficult to answer as the numerous actors effectively take on some responsibility, but without any clear indication as to who the captain of the proverbial ship may be. For critics of governance, as a concept opposed to government, there is an unnatural absence of democratic accountability. This can be seen in international trade where consumers are left with no clear identity as to who is regulating what. In multi-level governance, because of the numerous (almost simultaneous) decision-makers, attempting to place blame on a failed policy is virtually impossible. Proponents to the democratic nature of multi-level governance implicit in its structure point to the ability for multiple stakeholder groups to

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5 'Networks' in this context, can refer to the interaction of individuals coalescing around a common interest. In a policy network, these generally include academics, non-profits, and other interested parties interacting with the formal policy structure, centred on public service policymakers. Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan (1997, p. 17) give a spectrum of networks from centralised to de-centralised, but they uniformly give precedence to governmental actors.
involve themselves in the policy process, similar to Dahl’s pluralism. Dahl (1982) argues that having such a large entity requires mutual controls over the direction of that entity in order to prevent the dominance of one group.\textsuperscript{6}

The third question, is of a practical nature, and may have changed as the European Union has changed over time. As elected political bodies such as the European Parliament grow in responsibility and ability, so too, does the possibility for a politicization of European policy. Until the 1990s, European policy has been arguably less political than thereafter. Before the Treaty on European Union, the technocratic interests of the bureaucrats in the Commission held great sway.\textsuperscript{7} The Council has of course always been a political body, but here also there was more policy convergence in the Community earlier decades where Christian and Social Democrats often agreed on broad EC policy though for different reasons.

Hooghe and Marks (2001) make the case that the defining politicization comes from the inclusion of ‘diverse groups [that] have mobilized directly at the European level’ (p. 120). These groups essentially embed themselves in the decision-making process in the consultation stage, which is reflected by final policy decisions and then legitimated by parliamentary assent.\textsuperscript{8} Also, the rise of anti-EU sentiment across European voters has led to an abundance of protest parties occupying seats in the European Parliament, which

\textsuperscript{6} Dahl (1992, pp. 123-124) describes “mutual control” or reciprocity as being akin to love or friendship in the way that in it each participant maintains equality in the relationship by possessing a portion of control over the other. Otherwise, if any relationship is unilateral, he argues, it is bound to be exploitative.

\textsuperscript{7} Hix (1998) argues that the EU can be seen as a ‘system of multi-level, deliberative and apolitical governance’ or a more traditional ‘democratic political system’.

\textsuperscript{8} Wallace (2005, pp. 74-75) points to a formal structure for inclusion of ‘socio-economic’ groups within the Economic and Social Committee (and the Consultative Committee for the ECSC) that has been largely ineffectual as these groups find other “more direct points of access” into the process.
using its role of oversight, conceivably has the ability to nudge, if not fully influence, policy in favourable directions to them or disrupt parliamentary procedures. Such groups are more likely to receive attention at the supranational level than national and sub-national interest groups which must contest for policy in relatively isolated spaces, leaving the make-up of the Parliament ineffectual (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 2004, p. 102). However, with all these differing interests arguing for policy outcomes at the EU level it may, as Thomasson and colleagues (2004) assert, lead to a “moderating effect” as the competing groups will have to settle for a compromised solution.9 Because of the complex nature of multi-level governance, Walzenbach draws on the conclusion from others10 that EU structures, such as the Commission and Council, are designed to depoliticize issues by breaking them down into “manageable components” (p. 8). Reverting back to a somewhat more technocratic view of European policy-making, Walzenbach asserts the view of Vervaele (1999, p. 139) that governance relies heavily on “pragmatism, expert judgements and technical deliberation in order to ‘de-nationalize’ bargaining processes successfully” (Walzenbach, 2006, p.8). This may not be as benevolent as it sounds, as Cini (2002) rightfully outlines the evolution of the Commission from Monnet to Santer and the resignation of Santer’s Commission over issues of transparency and the subsequent attempt to reform the culture in Brussels.

9 Regional (or sub-national) groups have also mobilised in Europe, leaving Marks, Nielson, Ray & Salk (1996b) asking questions about multi-tiered identity in a multi-level governance framework and whether these groups will be moderated by policy or other incentives.

2. THE EU-ACP PARTNERSHIP

2.1. European Union Decision-Making Framework

The European Commission is a hybrid form of the executive branch and the bureaucracy of government. While it does not have actual legislative duties, the Commission, much like national executives, is responsible for agenda setting or legislative, budgetary or programme proposals (Egeberg, 2003, p. 131). This mixed form of government is composed of a political and an administrative branch.

On the political side there are 27 Commissioners, including the President of the Commission. This is referred to as the College of Commissioners (Egeberg, 2003, p. 136). The College is the decision-making arm of the Commission, much like the cabinet of a government, with each Commissioner holding the portfolio of a ministry (directorates-general). As the College follows the principles of collegiality, they are collectively responsible for decisions made, unlike most national government cabinets in which it would be assumed the minister would have relatively more room to manoeuvre (Egeberg, 2003, pp. 136-7). Each Commissioner surrounds himself with a cabinet of advisors. These cabinets, led by the chefs de cabinet, are responsible for policy ideas transitioning between the services below (directorates-general) and the College above.

11 Egeberg wrote of 20 Commissioners, as that was the number for the Prodi Commission from 1999 to 2004. After the 2004 and subsequent enlargements, it was an ever-changing number with the accession of each new member and varied in how many Commissioners each state received. The new format with 27 Commissioners has been set to reflect one Commissioner for each member state, until the accession of further member states at which point the Treaty of Nice stipulates that a rotation will occur among all member states to cap the number. (European NAVigator, www.ena.lu, 2008)
(Egeberg, 2003, p. 139; Nugent, 2006, p. 158). The actual mechanisms for decisions start further down the hierarchy than the Commissioners themselves. Initial policy drafts originate within the directorate-generals by mid-ranking officials who often draw upon outside assistance from experts, usually academics or NGOs as well as unions and industry groups in the field. The draft then makes its way upwards through the hierarchy of superiors, within the cabinet of the Commissioner to the chefs de cabinet and eventually up to the College itself. At this point the College of Commissioners may reject or accept the proposal, ask for a redraft from the directorate-general, or choose to make no decision (Nugent, 2006, p. 163). Obviously this is the idealised structure of decision-making and other processes do occur, but for the purposes of this paper this is the formalised structure that will be envisioned.

Following the further approval of a decision by the Council and in some cases the European Parliament, the administrative responsibilities for the Commission are then handed to the collective directorates-general, more similar to a national bureaucracy, with each directorate-general structured like a ministry. Each directorate-general consists of numerous directorates, with each directorate consisting of numerous units, leading to a very hierarchical structure (Egeberg, 2003, p. 141). The hierarchy is set so that each unit is run by a head of unit who reports to his director (who runs the directorate) who in turn reports to the director-general responsible for the directorate-general, and who finally reports to the Commissioner (Nugent, 2006, p. 162). As each directorate is organised either thematically or functionally, there are several seemingly overlapping issues that cross bureaucratic boundaries, as will be discussed further in the case of the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) group of states’ relations with Europe.
The European Parliament is the second of the tripartite power distribution at the European Union. It is composed of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are directly elected from the member states, reflecting a roughly even population distribution (with some error allowed for microstates such as Luxembourg to be overrepresented). Although these MEPs are elected from the member states they do not sit in the Chamber based on nationality. In the European Parliament seats are arranged by ideological ties and/or party affiliation (Scully, 2003, p. 172). This is another demonstration of the supranationality of the European Union. The main role of the European Parliament is to provide oversight. Increasingly, it is involved in the legislative function of government in the EU. Especially the co-decision procedure set up in the 1990s give the parliament increasing input into what the European Council of Ministers ultimately decide as final law.

The Parliament has the power to force changes on substantive issues, including the budget, on the Council. This requires a two-thirds vote (Scully, 2003, p. 168). In regards to the Commission, it has the authority to oversee its operations and has even had a Commission dismissed (the Santer Commission in 1999 resigned prematurely to preempt the actions of the Parliament), setting a precedent of power by the Parliament that was acknowledged by the incoming Prodi Commission (Scully, 2003, p. 169; Nugent, 2006, pp. 251-254). Concerning the ACP, the primary role of the Parliament is to approve budget allocation and supervise Commission actions. The European Parliament has many permanent committees that cover areas of policy as well as oversight simultaneously. The Development and Co-operation Committee is charged with the task of oversight for the
conduct of development policy, including ACP policy, as well as actually performing a legislative role in amending proposals (Scully, 2003, p. 173).

The third in the tripartite leadership of the European Union is the Council. While the European Parliament and Commission can be seen as truly supranational institutions within the European Union framework, the European Council (or Council of Ministers) is considered to be more intergovernmental in nature, much more similar to other international organisations than other features of the European Union. The reason for the intergovernmental nature of the Council is its composition. Seated on the Council are representatives from each of the member states' governments. When the Council is dealing with a specific issue at hand, for example Agriculture, the respective Ministers of Agriculture from each member state will be present (Lewis, 2003, p. 149). These sessions are referred to as sessions of the Council of Ministers. When heads of state or government convene it is called the European Council and functions much the same, though only two times per year.

The Council’s two main roles are legislative and executive in nature. The Council is the highest legislative body, endowed with the sole power to pass legislative acts. While the Commission may in theory create legislation it is only at the discretion of the Council to actually pass the legislation into EU law. The executive nature of the Council is to truly make authoritative decisions, with the assistance of the Commission and the Parliament ("co-decision"), on the pace and direction of European integration (Lewis, 2003, p. 149; Nugent, 2006, p. 191). The decisions of Council require one of the following types of votes for approval: unanimity or qualified majority voting (QMV). In areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy unanimity is required, meaning any one state
(regardless of size) may veto. In other areas, which use QMV, there needs to be a weighted support for a vote to pass, with each member state allocated a certain weight for their vote, reflecting population size. It has been noted, though, that often formal voting is unlikely to occur unless on a very divisive issue, as the EU typically works on consensus (Lewis, 2003, p. 156).

Beneath the Council is also the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) that features the national delegations of member states. These national representatives are based permanently in Brussels, similar to an embassy to the EU (Nugent, 2006, pp. 198-199). A Permanent Representative, the senior diplomat of the group, heads these delegations and is supported by numerous officials, generally split evenly between personnel from the diplomatic corps and the other national ministries such as Agriculture, Trade and Finance (Nugent, 2006, p. 199). The main role of COREPER is to prepare work for the Council. While Council ministers meet once a month, COREPER meets weekly, making it the major de facto place of negotiation (Lewis, 2003, p. 157). COREPER is actually split into two COREPERs, I and II, with II being the Committee responsible for Development issues.

In regards to the African, Caribbean & Pacific group and their relations with the European Union there are some joint institutions that create the formal decision-making structure of the overall relationship under the mandate of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement (although passed down from the 1975 Lomé Convention).

The first of the three major bodies is the Council of Ministers, which is formed by the members of the European Union Council, a member representing the Commission, and a
member representing the government of each ACP country. The (ACP) Council meets once a year to address whatever major issues arise. All decisions are made by “common agreement” (Nugent, 2006, p. 516). The second major organ is the Committee of Ambassadors, which is composed of a representative of each EU state, a representative of the Commission, and a representative of each ACP state. The Committee meets twice a year, in order to advise and assist the actions of the Council. Finally, the last body is the joint Assembly, which is composed of equal numbers of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and ACP members of parliament or national representatives. It also meets twice a year and acts as in a general advising capacity (Nugent, 2006, pp. 516-7). As can be inferred from their infrequent nature, these formal meetings in reality are not as important as the project cycle (discussed further), where the bulk of decisions are actually made.

2.2. The ACP: From Rome to Lomé

The EU-ACP relationship is thus notable in that it does not constitute a common market, free trade area or a political alliance, although elements of all are included – it provides a trade regime and political issues are raised by the ‘dialogue’. Furthermore, it is more than simply an extension of EU member states’ bilateral aid relationships in that it is a formalized, negotiated agreement rather than a series of ad hoc agreements over aid programmes. Finally, it is an institutionalized relationship established by sovereign states on the basis of legal equality of the parties. Lomé and its successor are thus extensive agreements that institutionalize political and economic relations between two groups of states across the North-South divide (Brown, 2002, p. 3).

This follows the sentiments of many who have since the initial 1975 Lomé Convention seen ACP-EU relations as a possible model for how to cooperate with the developing
The novelty of a contractual partnership between developed and developing states was hoped to be a trendsetter in how relations ought to be. However this model of partnership has gradually changed from being a trendsetter to a follower. Much of the European Union’s development goals have shifted from the ideals of Lomé, created in the nascence of the New International Economic Order, to the standardised development model trumpeted by the Bretton Woods institutions most notably the International Monetary Fund (Arts & Dickson, 2004). Aid for all has given way to political conditionality and proper fiscal management. But before any analysis is conducted a historical account is necessary.

Europe has had a relationship with the developing world long before the formation of what is now the European Union. Its obvious lengthy colonial history need not be elaborated on within this paper. However, since the beginning of the current era of European integration, relations with the developing world have been important enough to warrant formal attention.

In 1956, the Treaty of Rome was signed that established the European Economic Community (EEC, later the European Union). Within Article 38 was recognition of the “associated states” or more specifically the colonies of EEC member states, most notably of France (Whiteman, 1998, p. 30). What this did was normalise relations with the colonies of member states while still maintaining a unique relationship amongst the European members. The major elements of this special arrangement included trade access to the EEC (with reciprocity, as these were all still colonies and protectorates) and the

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12 Whiteman (1998) writes of such optimism in the delegations of the signatories of Lomé themselves.

13 Lister (1997) provides an extensive critique of European colonial history.
establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF) which was to become the staple of European external aid. The EDF was to be funded one-third each from France and Germany, despite the fact that the beneficiaries of the fund were almost exclusively French territories, with Germany acquiescing as the French had made the inclusion of the associated states a precondition to signing the Treaty of Rome (Hewitt & Whiteman, 2004, pp. 133-4).

In 1963 the Yaoundé Convention was signed, marking a preferential relationship in aid and trade between some parts of the developing world (once again former Belgian and French colonies), while not others (Whiteman, 1998). Although there appeared to be little change in who the recipients of the European Development Fund from Yaoundé are, the substantial difference is that the Yaoundé Convention marked the first agreement reached between the EEC and newly sovereign states. It came in the wake of the independence of almost all of France’s colonies in 1960 and created a need to reformulate the terms of their relationship. It was with France’s negotiations (backed by the Italians and Belgians) that the EEC signed Yaoundé, which extended trade access to the newly sovereign states. The major coup for the signatory states was an increase in aid in the second round of the European Development Fund (Hewitt & Whiteman, 2004, p. 134).

In 1969 in conjunction with the second Yaoundé Convention, the Arusha Convention was signed which brought in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. The second Yaoundé Convention was aligned with the third round of the European Development Fund and the Dutch and Germans made it a precondition of their involvement that the Fund go beyond former Francophone colonies. With the extension of aid and trade access to the East African Community this widened the relationship from one of solely French and Belgian colonies
to a more inclusive one. Some suggested that it is not by coincidence that Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya bordered on many of the “associated states”, or that these former British colonies (despite the UK not yet being a member of the EEC) reflected economic interests for members of the EEC, including Germany who were upset for their earlier exclusion (Whiteman, 1998, p. 30). Regardless of the motives for inclusion, it marked a significant change.

When the United Kingdom eventually joined the EEC, the continuation of special arrangements followed, as the first Lomé Convention in 1975, created a partnership between the EEC and the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) states, a largely mismatched and geographically sporadic group that was almost entirely a reflection of former colonies. Because of the extent of the British Empire it created a much larger grouping than the previous under Yaoundé, featuring around 45 states compared to the 18 or so that marked much of the previous relationship (Whiteman, 1998, p. 31). This group presently consists of 79 states ranging from the tiny island state of Niue to Nigeria (African, Caribbean & Pacific Group of States, 2005).

The Lomé Convention was significant because of the context it was created in and the content it contributed to the North-South dialogue. It was cast within the context of the OPEC Oil Crisis, the New International Economic Order and the concurrent waves of post-colonialism that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Whiteman, 1998, p 31). There was a genuine, if overly optimistic, view that the developing world could play a major role in world politics. In this context the European Community engaged the ACP as ‘partners’. Whether they considered the ACP states as legitimate partners, feared the geopolitical context of the day, or were merely catering to the discourse of partnership, as
a form of lip service is much unclear. Whatever the motives on behalf of the European Community, there was a genuine welcoming of partnership on the ACP side for Lomé (Whiteman, 1998, p 31). It was felt that if partnership was to be codified in a long-term agreement such as Lomé this could be seen as secure and would eventually benefit the ACP states as they developed (Ibid.). Lomé created a substantial benchmark in addressing non-reciprocal trade concessions and extensive aid contributions to the developing world.

2.3. The European Development Fund & the Project Cycle

When it comes to ACP development, the most important arrangement is the project cycle. It is in this process that the dispersion of authority amongst a variety of actors can best be examined. The project cycle features five main phases: programming, identification, formulation, implementation and evaluation (ACP-Programming, 2007).

The programming phase at a national level is best exemplified through the creation of National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). These are created in cooperation between the EU Directorate-General Development (DG DEV) and the partner state.\textsuperscript{14} This phase of the project begins with government officials, local stakeholders, NGOs, and other members of civil society meeting with EU officials and creating a national strategy (Hurt, 2003, p. 172). Once these strategies are solidified, they become an overall National Indicative Programme. These NIPs are meant to be an indicator of what the developing state plans to do with the aid and other resources that it receives, as well as its own sources of revenue and provide some sort of short and long-

\textsuperscript{14} See Appendix A for the Directorate-General Development Organigramme.
term vision. Simultaneously, the European Union, through the Directorate-General Development creates Country Strategy Papers for each ACP state based on their respective capacities and capabilities. From these strategy papers the ACP states are given an indication of what type of development the European Union is interested in funding through its aid.

Beyond the national level, DG Development is also working with ACP states at the regional level, emulating the same process with Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs). There also exist Strategy Papers for Thematic Programmes, which tackle issues such as Human Rights, Democracy, Environment, Food Security, and Migration, which would be of importance to all states regardless of geographic location or proximity (European Commission: DG Development, 2007c). The stated mission of the Directorate-General Development is the promotion of “sustainable development, democracy, peace and security” in order to “reduce and ultimately to eradicate poverty in the developing countries” (European Commission: DG Development, 2007a). It states that its mandate is to “enhance the development policies.... [Provide] policy guidance on development policy and [oversee] the programming of aid in the ACP countries” (European Commission: DG Development, 2007b).

Following the programming phase is the identification phase. This is when an elaboration of the initial programming begins. State officials, civil society actors and other stakeholders from the programming phase, as well as any other interested parties continue to meet with European Union delegates to fill out the details of their proposed
projects. National Indicative Programmes and Country Strategy Papers are revised in the event they are not in sync with partner (ACP state) and EU goals. This is also likely to be the phase in which feasibility studies are commissioned for specific projects.

The third phase is the project formulation phase. This is when a detailed project design as well as a financing proposal is delivered. Also involved in this phase are the terms of reference, and/or technical/administrative provisions for implementation. It is at this stage that the European Development Fund Committee, as the body responsible for allocating funds, actively participates within the process.

As has already been mentioned, since the Treaty of Rome, the funding for ACP-EU relations comes directly from the European Development Fund (EDF). The European Development Fund is not funded by the European Union’s regular budget, but pledged individually by member states of the EU and subject to its own regulations. As this is the bulk of support for ACP states, it is significant that it does not fall under the general auspices of EU finances, but is instead at the discretion of individual members. Each cycle of the European Development Fund is roughly five years in length and carries with it certain programming themes. For the current EDF cycle, the ‘Tenth EDF’ (2008-2013), a total of roughly $28.9 billion has been budgeted, with almost the entirety ($27.6 billion) being allocated for the ACP states (European Commission, 2007). What makes this interesting is that the European Development Fund Committee, which is composed of all

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15 EuroStep (2006), a civil society watchdog on development assistance, criticises the involvement of non-state actors as being nominal at best.

16 The previous cycle (the Ninth EDF) allocated roughly $14.4 billion in addition to a remainder of $12.4 billion of undisbursed aid from earlier cycles. All figures are given in 2006 US Dollars for statistical comparison (as this is the constant currency value the OECD currently uses).
EU member states, makes all final funding decisions, with no ACP representation, and
the criteria for making decisions are generally not made public (Brown, 2002, p. 59).

Implementation is the actual operative phase of the project cycle when programmes
begin. The implementation of projects, while being managed by ACP states, is often
contracted out. Actors such as non-governmental organizations, engineers, and
construction companies perform studies, works, supplies or other services. Throughout
the implementation phase, the European Union delegations are responsible for oversight,
monitoring, and periodic evaluation. They may create annual operational work plans,
which adjust under the changing circumstances of the project, periodic progress reports
(indicating whether the project is on target or not), and other reports, including a
completion report when a project ends.

The final phase in the project cycle is evaluation. Depending on whether it is a specific
project or a country/regional strategy the evaluation stage proceeds in two ways. In the
event of a specific development project, EuropeAid\(^\text{17}\) or EU delegations in the partner
country will examine the project against the initial objectives (dating back to the
programming or identification phases). They will then draw lessons from the project
experience and make an assessment of whether it was a success. This is then submitted in
a final evaluation mission report to the Evaluation Unit within EuropeAid. Depending on
the timing and circumstances of the report it may be used to continue, terminate, or
modify the project or related policies. At the country/regional strategy level, the process

\(^{17}\) EuropeAid is the implementing arm for development (European Commission: EuropeAid,
2008). See Appendix C for the EuropeAid Organigramme.
is similar, with the exception being, that oversight and evaluation are done directly by the Evaluation Unit.

2.4. Lomé: Trade as Development

In addition to the development side of things, the Directorate-General Trade has had a significant role to play in terms of interaction with the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) states as a major component of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements involve(d) trade arrangements for the developing states with the European common market. Also because of the common market, individual member states of the EU are unable to make separate trade agreements with third party states as all trade agreements are under the jurisdiction of the European Union (Smith, 2003).

Under Lomé, goods were traded under non-reciprocal arrangements that clearly had the potential to benefit the ACP states in excess of normal reciprocal free-trade agreements. These arrangements, largely under the mandate of DG Trade, allowed for ACP states to collect duties and tariffs on European goods being imported, while having almost unlimited access to Europe. Essentially it was one-sided free trade that benefited the ACP countries. As they were able to trade almost 100% of their manufactured goods to Europe without any added cost while collecting an income from European imports, the developing states were operating in a system that gave them not necessarily a competitive advantage, but something of a balancing effect. As they were overwhelmingly disadvantaged in terms of development and state capacity the policy of non-reciprocity

\[18\] The Directorate-General Trade organisation is outlined in Appendix D.
was seen as one method of attempting to close that gap. In the eyes of Europe it was not just a trade policy but interlocked with their overall idea of trade and aid policy. By giving some meaningful concessions in trade it was thought that the benefits would emerge in development (reflecting the root notion of what aid was meant to entail).

An excellent example of how this preferential arrangement benefited ACP states is the case of the Sugar Protocol, which is a separate, but related, arrangement to the general agreements of Lomé (it is found in Protocol 3 of Lomé because it falls under the separate category of agriculture). The Sugar Protocol basically allows for ACP producers of sugar a certain quota (generally favourable) into the European market at an agreed upon price that would match the Common Agricultural Policy prices (above the global average price). While this is not exactly free trade it is beneficial for producer states. This essentially allows for states such as Fiji to produce agricultural products in a developing country and sell it at a favourable rate in an industrialised market. There have been arguments that this favourable form of trade, typical of the Lomé era of ACP-EU relations, has had a positive impact on the socio-economic conditions of Fiji (Prasad & Akram-Lodhi, 1998, pp. 47-48).

2.5. ACP Relations Post-2000: From Cotonou Onwards

Before Lomé was to expire, a new agreement was necessary to shape future relations between the European Union and the developing world in general. While some countries were agreeable to remaining with a preferential arrangement for some developing nations (a continuation with the ACP grouping) other members of the EU felt that this arbitrary
delineation between ACP and non-ACP states was inconsistent as a development policy and clearly followed colonial ties which at this point (as the European Union had expanded to then 15 members) did not reflect general membership of the EU (Forwood, 2001, p 427). Some discussion was held on how best to structure Europe’s relations with the South, even going as far as to debate whether or not to continue a partnership with the ACP. In the end, no change in terms of a formal partnership occurred and following the conclusion of the Lomé Convention in 2000, the ACP and European Union entered into a new treaty, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in the capital of Benin.

Within the ACP, differentiation has been introduced stemming from the Cotonou Agreement, dividing the group into two subsets, those of the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and Non-Least-Developed Countries (non-LDCs). This division is based on OECD classifications and is meant to identify which states will benefit under continued non-reciprocal trade relations and those that will need to enter into reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). This change in policy, in effect, has altered the original conception of the ACP states being equal actors in their relations with the European Union. However, because the EPAs have only recently come into practice (in 2008), it remains to be seen how they will affect the long-term structure of the ACP group of states.

The reason given why the European Union has focused on EPAs and reciprocal trade is that it is consistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) policies (Hurt, 2003, p 174). The European Union as a global trader does not wish to suffer from any repercussions

19 Forwood (2001) provides an enlightening account of the multitude of options the EU could have explored.
from the WTO. What has struck some as peculiar is the fact that the combined size of the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific states would obviously have a large voice in any WTO policy decisions, if they so wished (Ibid.).\(^{20}\) It should also be noted that the European Union still had the option to ask for waivers from the WTO, as they had done previously.

Some critics (Hurt, 2003; McQueen, 2002) posit that the move to reciprocity is a step backwards for development. Others (Hinkle & Schiff, 2004; Borrman, Busse, & Neuhaus, 2005) make endorsements for the move towards Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that Cotonou entails, ranging from the hesitant to the enthusiastic, though all respectively acknowledging the difficulties. EPAs are the method that the European Union, post-Lomé, has preferred for trade relations with developing states, hoping to emulate its own success of regional economic integration. The EU has said that Economic Partnership Agreements will be the new way that Europe trades with the developing world (Forwood, 2001). This follows the idea of “new trade politics” (Young & Peterson, 2006), where international trade policies are changing to conform with domestic regulations and vice versa. What these EPAs will entail is cooperation amongst the developing states to form effective regional blocs and to work with DG Trade in establishing relations between these blocs and the European common market.\(^{21}\) The European Union has stated that EPAs will not be mandatory for those states classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Forwood, 2001). This distinction between Least

\(^{20}\) Meunier & Nicolaidis (2006) suggest that the EU is in fact a “conflicted trade power” and does not easily exert trade pressure.

\(^{21}\) Ghana, as an example, expresses itself favourable to the move towards EPAs, but raises concerns about the ability of its neighbours to coordinate (and keep up). See: European Commission & Ghana (2006).
Developed Countries and non-Least Developed Countries appears to be somewhat arbitrary when comparing the Human Development Index\textsuperscript{22} of so-called “Least Developed Countries” such as Samoa (0.747) to non-LDCs such as Nigeria (0.456). It will remain to be seen how successful the new distinctions will be (Hurt, 2003, pp. 166-7).\textsuperscript{23}

Ending all bilateral free trade arrangements, the European Union has focused its attention on regional integration and has declared that the EPAs will be agreements between the EU and six trading blocs of ACP states (Hurt, 2003, pp. 173). Critics argue that the EU has not worked with pre-existing trading blocs but has ‘suggested’ which states or regions the ACP trading blocs are created around (\textit{Ibid}). They have also stated that for these EPAs to be effective the trading blocs must have the capability to collect a common customs tax, implying that the level of economic integration be at least at the level of customs union, which of their suggested regions would currently only apply to the Southern African Customs Union (SACU; \textit{Ibid}, p 169). Once again, this is quite difficult as the SACU features several countries that are at a varied level of development, with separate and different trading agreements with the EU (Hinkle & Schiff, 2004, pp. 1326-1327). Ultimately it appears that DG Trade has a substantial amount of work cut out for it in the future with these ambitious plans which will require further cooperation with the ACP states and policy coordination from DG Development and others. An early indication of the strength of current EU-ACP trade was an 8.5% annual growth rate in imports to the EU from the ACP in 2006. Likewise, exports to the ACP from the EU

\textsuperscript{22} The Human Development Index is a normalized measure of education, literacy, standard of living, life expectancy and GDP per capita developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2008).

\textsuperscript{23} Hurt's full table is found in Appendix E.
increased by 11.3% in the same year. Overall, $144.6 billion in total value of goods were exchanged between the two blocs. The surprising result was that it was the European Union, despite having the higher rate of annual growth that carried a small trade deficit of $4.2 billion (Xenellis & Pongas, 2007).

2.6. Humanitarian & Bilateral Aid with the ACP

The European Community Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO) is the directorate-general responsible for humanitarian and crisis-related aid. It falls under the portfolio of the Commissioner for Development & Humanitarian Aid, who also oversees the Directorate-General Development, as mentioned above as the directorate-general responsible for ACP relations.

Within the general structure of the Commission the portion responsible for ACP relations within ECHO is Unit A1-Africa, Caribbean, Pacific, under Directorate A-Operations. Nearly half of all ECHO aid in 2006 was allocated to ACP states, the largest portion of the ECHO budget (European Commission: DG for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), 2006). Its budget comes directly from the European Commission general budget, with the exceptions (such as 2006) when it draws upon European Development Fund resources, which are not directly linked to the Commission budget, and from Emergency Aid Reserve (EAR) funds (which are set aside from regular budgeting in the event of excessive needs).

Unlike the European Development Funds, which are established as long-term programmes, ECHO aid is linked to humanitarian needs and its budgets are programmed

\[24\] Appendix B features the organised structure of ECHO operations.
annually based on what current crises are in need. One of the interesting things to note is
the flexibility with which it operates, responding to unforeseen crises by increasing its
intended budget by drawing on irregular resources (once again the EDF and EAR funds).

As it is noted in the 2006 year-end financial report, ECHO spent 38% of its final budget
on unforeseen events (European Commission: DG for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), 2006).
Many of these unforeseen events occurred in Sub-Saharan African ACP states such as
Sudan, Chad, Niger, Kenya and Congo. As these cases were caused by possibly
preventable events such famine, drought, and civil war, it is illustrative of the important
link between humanitarian and development aid.

One issue raised in terms of humanitarian aid, especially with respect to ACP states, is
the often-unpredictable nature, not only of when disasters are to occur, but whether it will
be presented as of interest to Europe to act. In 1999, with Kosovo receiving a huge
amount of interest in the media and the general European public, it is striking to note that
‘former Yugoslavia’ received 55% of total ECHO aid, whilst Africa, which normally
received the bulk of ECHO aid, only received 17% that year (Olsen, 2004, p. 88).

As mentioned earlier, member states of the European Union maintain their own national
Official Development Assistance (ODA) programmes, either through their own
development agency or directly through their respective department of foreign affairs.
This is beyond what they contribute to the European Union budget which provides
funding for the majority of EU operations (including some of those involved in
development with non-ACP states and humanitarian aid) as well as what they pledge
separately towards the European Development Fund. It is interesting to note that the
member states are involved in many layers of international development. By far the largest portion of their development assistance is in the form of their direct ODA, but a significant amount is also contributed through the European Union. EU member states provide roughly 45 percent of the world's ODA on their own; while through the supranational institution they contribute approximately another 10 percent (Holland, 2002, p.109). This means that Europe is collectively responsible for at least 55 percent of all (global) development assistance, an astounding figure by any account.

One reason for the involvement of member states in addition to the European Union is that of traditional links to the developing countries, especially in the case of former colonial powers such as France. Even states that have little to no history of colonialism would like to have separate ODA programmes and subsequent say in the EDF as these can be seen as politically beneficial as a type of clientelism (Claeys, 2004, p. 116). In addition to this, it has been suggested that a reason for individual member states maintaining national official development assistance programmes is because it is a way of differentiation from the European Union, while trade relations fall strictly under the auspices of common market policies:

"French development policy remains largely neo-colonial, Italy follows a more commercial approach, the UK stresses good governance whereas the Nordic states focus principally on the alleviation of poverty" (Holland, 2002, p.171). It is inferred from this comment that France remains focused on former colonies (which includes a degree of paternalism), Italy is pragmatically more interested in securing investment opportunities, the United Kingdom is focused on democracy and governance issues whilst the Nordic countries are genuinely more interested in addressing the humanitarian root causes of
poverty. If these states have differing views on what is the crucial mission of developmental policy how might we expect them to coordinate and cooperate at a European Union level?
3. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE EU-ACP RELATIONSHIP

3.1. Assessing EU-ACP Policy

This project shows that international aid and trade between the European Union and the ACP group of states cannot be clearly separated. Aid and trade between the two partners are both agreed upon within the terms of the Cotonou Agreement (as they were in Lomé before). Unlike other regions of developing countries that primarily have bilateral aid and trade relations, the ACP group has collectively negotiated with Europe (for better or worse). The ACP states (Africa primarily) have relied upon historical ties to Europe to foster positive relations. In the past, they have held the position of most favoured trading partners and have long been the primary recipients of European aid. In the Cotonou partnership, these two are intertwined in both implicit and explicit ways. Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes are the ways in which recipient states address how they intend to spend their aid money. A significant amount of money is allocated to infrastructure related to economic development, implicitly demonstrating the understanding on the part of recipient states as to the preference of how donors best wish their money spent. The introduction of regional Economic Partnership Agreements funded by European aid is the most recent example of this connection.

While at first glance, as presented earlier, it may appear that there is little clarity or coherence in terms of how Europe and the ACP states interact, upon further review it is possible to create a clearer picture. The ACP trades two ways with Europe. The first is
through a reciprocal relationship of free trade, whether it is bilateral or through the new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The second option is through non-reciprocal trade. This option, as described earlier, is now only open to those countries classified as the Least-Developed-Countries (LDCs). Therefore, aside from the logistical problems that may ensue if an LDC was to join an EPA (essentially enjoying the benefits of free and non-free trade simultaneously)\(^{25}\) there is a clear vision of how the European Union wishes to interact economically with the ACP.

In terms of aid, there are indeed multiple ways in which funds are transferred to the ACP. As mentioned, there is the bilateral aid of member states, humanitarian aid from ECHO, and finally community aid to the ACP through the European Development Fund (EDF). While it may seem as though this is scattered and not focused, it is actually just that. First, the community aid to the ACP through the EDF is the most focused aid within the European Union. It is programmed over five year periods and targets the needs and projects outlined in country and regional strategy papers. Its primary concern is long-term economic development and is closely linked with trade. Secondly, the humanitarian aid from ECHO is targeted at alleviating the effects of natural and unforeseen disasters. Its primary concern is short-term relief and should not be considered in the same policy discussions as development assistance as they target very different needs. Finally, while each member state of the European Union is able to maintain its own aid relations with developing states, this national activity tends to support the goals of the European Union. For the European Union, whose goals concerning the developing world are to eradicate

\(^{25}\) Incidentally, it is unlikely that a LDC would be able to maintain its non-reciprocal status if it were the member of a functioning EPA. Either the other members of the EPA or the EU itself would deny it these privileges in order to ensure the integrity of trade relations between both blocs.
poverty, promote economic development and foster democratic ideals (remembering that economic development is the primary concern), the addition of aid from its member states can only be seen as beneficial.

The EU as an institution is created to serve the interests of the member states. Therefore, if the EU has stated goals concerning development they are likely to be reflected in their members’ goals and vice versa. Earlier we discussed the perceived priorities amongst the member states towards certain parts of official development assistance (ODA). It was inferred that some states favoured creating mercantile ties, others wished to use aid to push for democracy and good governance, and others still for the alleviation and eradication of poverty. As can be seen, all of those objectives are included in the EU’s aid, allowing each member state to focus its own ODA towards their own priorities. This creates a supplemental (even symbiotic) aid relationship. Either states feel as though their primary aid goals are being addressed through their personal ODA and are being supplemented through community aid or it is the inverse: that their primary aid goals are being addressed through community aid and they are supplementing this with their national ODA. In sum, this ought to be complementary to the aims and actions of the European Union and its member states.

In sum, member state ODA and EU aid and trade policies are mostly complementary. The focus of European Union development assistance to the African, Caribbean & Pacific states is on the distribution of the European Development Funds through Country and Regional Strategy policies. We will now apply the multi-level governance analytical tools discussed above to this policy area with as key purpose to show how the model
categorises the different relationships with the EU and within the EU-ACP organizational set up.

3.2. Analyzing the EU-ACP Framework Through the Structure of Multi-Level Governance in Europe

After reaching an introductory understanding of the theoretical background in governance and a description of the policy processes of the European Union in regards to international aid and trade we are led to our primary questioning. Is the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) states an example of multi-level governance (MLG)? If so, what form of multi-level governance does it best fit from Hooghe and Marks’ typology? Finally, does the MLG model offer any value for EU members in their policy goals, and could it thus be considered of some prescriptive value?

Because the primary objective of European Union aid to the African, Caribbean & Pacific states is economic development (and this is interdependent with trade) we can say that their relationship is task-specific multi-level governance.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE I</th>
<th>TYPE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General-purpose jurisdictions</td>
<td>Task-specific jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intersecting memberships</td>
<td>Intersecting memberships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictions organised in a limited number of levels</td>
<td>No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 It is task specific because it addresses one (or two) issue(s) almost exclusively and would have no reason to exist should that task be accomplished. In other words, if the ACP states were to develop there would be no need for an EU-ACP aid/trade framework as it currently exists.
This is the Type II form of MLG that Hooghe and Marks describe as existing within the larger structure of a nested Type I framework. This form would fit best as the European Union as a whole not only suits the Type I framework, but is the theoretical inspiration for integration theorists such as Hooghe and Marks. The European Union fits the criteria of a Type I framework perfectly (by design) as it is general purpose, has non-intersecting membership, a defined limited number of jurisdictional levels, and system-wide architecture. The European Union-ACP relationship on the other hand is more indicative of a Type II framework. It is task specific, has intersecting memberships, no limit to jurisdictional levels, and a flexible design. It also fits the assumption that it is embedded within the nested structure of a Type I framework.

The European Union covers a large number of areas and purposes. Like a nation-state, it addresses all issues considered of relevance to its constituents. As it is composed of 27 member states, the diversity of its constituency actually has it cast a wider policy net than any of its individual members might. There is arguably not one single policy that can be said to define the European Union, as the numbers and size of most are significant.

Members of the European Union are clearly identifiable and membership is not easily attained. There are strict criteria that potential members must meet to join and existing membership controls entry into the Union. Membership in the European Union because of its partial supranational nature (i.e. the application and supremacy of EU law) is not possible to be intersecting with any other similar organisations (though none currently exist). Obviously, the benefits of a closed community (e.g. single market) cannot be fully

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE I</th>
<th>TYPE II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System-wide architecture</td>
<td>Flexible design</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reaped if any member was to have dual-membership in competing communities. Aside from a few exceptions such as the opting out of the European Monetary Union by the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, the European Union attempts to maintain a consistent and non-intersecting membership.

Within the European Union, there are clearly defined tiers of government at the supranational, national, regional and local levels, limiting the number of jurisdictions. While this may differ from traditional units of government within a member state, they have been standardised to allow for administrative efficacy and integration. European integration cohesion policies are the most indicative of these administrative units.

By far the best indication of the European Union existing as a Type I framework is the existence of a system-wide architecture. Clearly, the permanent existence and daily functioning of the European Council, Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice, and Central Bank are proof of the nested and long-standing intentions of the European Union. Rather than exist from treaty to treaty to maintain its survival, the European Union (and its forebears) have used each treaty to grow, solidify and evolve. The EU has continually developed by deepening its policies (while simultaneously broadening its policy reach) and widening its membership. In economic terms there are now too many “sunk costs” for an event such as the rejection of an EU Constitution to cause the immediate downfall of something that is larger than what might otherwise be called an institution.

As mentioned, the primary task of the European Union-ACP relationship is to provide economic development assistance and open trade opportunities. This is the main reason for the existence of the African, Caribbean & Pacific group of states as an organised
bargaining unit. Without the specific task at hand (and the historical links with Europe) this widely diverse group would be unlikely to organise themselves. Once these groups are economically developed, we can assume that the existence of this framework would be redundant in its present capacity and would dissolve.

The membership within the EU-ACP aid and trade framework is intersecting. What this means is that the European Union does not necessarily have any exclusivity in its aid and trade relations with the ACP. While it does have specialised trade relations (in terms of free trade agreements) these are not exclusive, meaning that any ACP state could simultaneously have free trade arrangements with any EU or non-EU state. Likewise, in development assistance, all ACP states receive aid from various EU and non-EU states. Therefore, in theory, the EU-ACP framework, while nominally exclusive, do involve other participants. Canada, for example, could partially fund a project in Nigeria that the EU has sponsored. At the stakeholder level, identities may also be intersecting. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may have people on staffs that are of one nationality working in another country for an organisation based in a third country.

Because of the intersection of stakeholders, donors and recipients there is virtually no limit to jurisdictional levels. Donor aid can be sent to recipient national budget support, allocated to a policy area such as healthcare, or to fund a specific project like a well. Depending on where aid is implemented it may face any number of jurisdictional levels. Similarly, any specific project may have numerous donors, each with their own monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Who is responsible for each amount of money is completely relative to the specific project in a case-by-case manner.
Finally, the concluding indicator of the European Union-African, Caribbean & Pacific framework being of Hooghe and Marks' second type is that it is of a flexible design. While it has been stated that the European Union, as a Type I 'nested' framework, may have changed over the years, it has been by deepening policy competencies and widening membership. Rather than having a flexible design, it has intentionally developed a system-wide architecture of institutions that are meant to last. The EU-ACP arrangement, however, was created as a flexible arrangement from day one. Pre-Lomé, it was initially an arrangement to allow for specialised relations between largely Francophone Europe and its colonies. Following the enlargement of the European Union (then Community) and the decolonisation period, this relationship changed to include other (mostly former British) partners in the creation of the African, Caribbean & Pacific group of states. Throughout Lomé’s existence, at regular intervals, the nature of that relationship changed to suit the needs and interests of the day. A telling reminder of the flexible (and non-permanent) nature of the EU-ACP partnership comes in Forwood’s (2001) account of the debate within EU member states about the long-term options concerning their relations with the developing world. Some EU members believed that it was illogical to have separate relations with ACP and non-ACP developing states and wished to completely abolish any differential partnership. Ultimately, the creation of the Cotonou Agreement and its insistence on reciprocal trade relations and the implementation of regional Economic Partnership Agreements shows just another shift in a flexibly designed framework.

The flexible nature of Type II multi-level governance has suited the interests of European Union member states reasonably well over the course of its existence, which is one
reason why rather than abandoning the current partnership, as was debated in Forwood’s account, the member states chose to continue a specialised relationship with the ACP. Because of the devolved nature of control in a multi-level governance structure, EU members, such as France (with close ties to its former colonies), may continue to pursue their own Official Development Assistance policies. These national ODA plans, as mentioned before, can supplement the actions of European Union aid, or be supplemented. With member states retaining control over their size of contributions to the European Development Fund, unlike the European budget, they are able to manage their finances, and by extension, their interest and control.

Collectively, this arrangement of dispersed authority in a multi-level Europe is complementary to the principle of subsidiarity. Member states are thus free to pursue their own development assistance programs to the extent that they are able to meet their own goals (recalling that national ODA represents roughly 80% of government aid) and then to have a common European policy for broader, larger aims that are too difficult to achieve on their own (such as establishing regional economic partnerships). Also, having a multi-level governance arrangement allows for a reconciliation of policy, where national governments are still given some freedom to pursue national policy objectives, while remaining committed to a common European market, which hinders substantially the economic flexibility member states have. To this end, the member states assuredly must welcome any amount of independent authority they have with regards to their trading partners.
3.3. Conclusion

Each member state of the European Union (EU) maintains its own national Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. In addition to this, members contribute towards the European Development Fund, which primarily supports the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) group of states on behalf of the European Union. This partnership with the ACP states features a unique relationship focused on the interconnectivity of aid and trade. Furthermore, the structure of this relationship allows for dispersed authority in regards to how decisions are made. Applying the work of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, the EU-ACP framework can be seen through the lens of multi-level governance (MLG) as taking a Type II, or a task-specific and flexible, form.

Clearly, the European Union is (by design) the prototypical Type I multi-level governance framework. However, the structure of the EU-ACP resembles Type II. It is not a completed form, as there remains a primary focus on state and EU actors. EU Member-state governments clearly benefit from the policy flexibility, financial control, and dispersed authority that EU-ACP structure and policy process offers in the area of development aid. To some extent, Hooghe and Marks’ suggestion that Type II has a prescriptive or instructive quality can also be seen as it offers EU member states an advantageous arrangement to finetune their individual and corporate development policies. But it is not only national governments that achieve their objectives. The Type II model allows input from non-state actors, even though, perhaps, the relative weakness of civil society in many developing countries dictates that in actuality they are not quite ready or able to fully participate. Nonetheless, these measures exist, and following
Hooghe and Marks' model, as partners gain capacity, the current framework will allow further flexibility in authority.

The interaction between the European Union and its partners in the African, Caribbean & Pacific states demonstrates the expansive nature of EU policy within its system. It shows the active participation of its member states in development, concurrently with their own aid programmes; the influence of the non-political Commission in policy; and how surprisingly there appears to be elements of coordination, cohesion and complementarity.

While multi-level governance calls for dispersed authority amongst decision-makers, the current framework is imperfect due to certain stakeholders lacking capacity. Future research will be necessary to evaluate the on-going progression of this dispersal. Will the relationship follow the prescribed path of Hooghe and Marks and lead to a broader policy circle as capacity rises? Likewise, as the Economic Partnership Agreements have only been recently implemented, an evaluation of their impact on the EU-ACP partnership would be highly valued.
Appendix B: ECHO Organigramme

Source: (European Commission: DG for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), 2007)
ORGANISATION CHART FOR EUROPEAN AID CO-OPERATION OFFICE (15/11/07)

Director-General
K. Richelle
Deputy Director-General
K. Molitor

Direction A
Europe, Southern Mediterranean, Middle-East and Neighbouring Policy
M. Contino

A1. Geographical coordination and supervision for Europe
B. Lock

A2. Geographical coordination and supervision for the Mediterranean and Middle-East
J. Muylhoven

A3. Centralised operations for Europe, the Mediterranean and Middle-East
C. Morlais

A4. Nuclear Safety
P. Joffia

A5. Finance, Contracts and Audit for Europe, Mediterranean and the Middle-East
J. Ville

A6. Multi-country programmes

Direction B
Latin America
A. Caspary

B1. Geographical coordination and supervision for Latin America
C. Gonzalez Casahon

B2. Centralised operations for Latin America
D. Papadopoulos

B3. Finance, Contracts and Audit for Latin America
F. Mendesdo Amoriz

Direction C
Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean, Pacific
G. Nicole

C1. Geographical coordination and supervision for ACP's
J. L. Trinido

C2. Geographical coordination and supervision for ACP's
B. Vicens

C3. Coordination intra-ACPs and OQTs, gas-African issues and sub-regional aspects
D. Daim

Direction D
Asia and Central Asia
E. Miller

D1. Geographical coordination and supervision for Asia and Central Asia
J. L. Trinido

D2. Centralised operations for Asia and Central Asia
V. Miler

D3. Finance Contracts and Audit for Asia and Central Asia
M. DeCricco

Direction E
Quality of Operations
F. Kalmann

E1. Co-operation advisers
G. Doucet

E2. Central management of administrative support units PA RELIEF
J. Lioise

E3. Business, trade, and regional integration
J. Van Bormans

Direction F
Thematic operations
H. Bourgate

F1. Relations with civil society and coordination
A. Boukal

F2. Central management of thematic budget lines PA RELIEF
S. Thesilimulation

F3. Central management of thematic budget lines PA DEV
R. Raddi

F4. Finance, Contracts and Audit for thematic budget lines
H. Stavridis

Direction G
Human resources
M. Levkina

G1. Programming and budgetary matters
J. Spata Arenal

G2. Coordination of ICs and methodology for ex post evaluations and audits
J. Reis Vitor

Direction H
Training and knowledge management
M. Lefrere

H1. Information systems and office technology
J. Siliart

H2. Documents management and office infrastructure
J. Bélanger

H3. Financial and contractual matters, and legal affairs
R. Scire

H4. Relations with the Council, the EP and the Int. Org., staff of Major committees
M. Perignon

Note: This unit is common to the 3 Directorates Generals AIDCO, DEV and RELEX and ensures the evaluation function in these 3 DGs. Administratively located in DG AIDCO, this Unit directly reports to the Commissioners Ferrero-Waldner and Michel.
Appendix D: DG Trade Organigramme

Source: (European Commission: DG Trade, 2008)
### Appendix E: Table of ACP States

**CO-OPERATION AND COERCION IN THE COTONOU AGREEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less-developed countries (LDCs)</th>
<th>Non-LDCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td><strong>ACP state</strong></td>
<td><strong>ACP state</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>HDI (1997)</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>HDI ranking</strong></td>
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*Source: (Hurt, 2003)*
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http://www.acp.int/en/acp_states.htm


