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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the attempts of various Turkish governments to construct two independent narratives, for two separate audiences, around a single site, the Gallipoli peninsula, and the battle that took place there in 1915 between Ottoman military forces and French and British imperial units. Using archival records from Britain and evidence collected at Gallipoli, this study will demonstrate the production of an unusual type of narrative - a narrative of reconciliation - aimed at drawing foreign populations to Gallipoli. Complicit in the production of this reconciliatory narrative, the Turkish government simultaneously constructs a Turkish nationalist narrative of the battle of Gallipoli for its own citizens. This thesis will examine the reasons for and processes of dual narrativization undertaken by successive Turkish governments between the early 1920s and the present, as well as the subsequent, unforeseen consequences of this endeavor.

Key Words: Gallipoli; Memorialization; Narrative; Memory; Nationalism; Turkey.

Subject Terms: Cemeteries -- Turkey -- Gallipoli Peninsula; Memorialization; Narrative; Nationalism -- Turkey -- History -- 20th century; Turkey -- Politics and government -- 20th century; Turkey -- Foreign Relations -- Europe.
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INTRODUCTION

The Çanakkale victory is the greatest evidence and the most glorious sign of the fact that the Turkish nation will fight for its homeland no matter what the circumstances. The memories of our martyrs, who came from different parts of the country to stand against enemy forces and defend this soil at the cost of their lives, continue to be the greatest source of inspiration and make us aware of our nation’s existence. Once again we commemorate those heroes who sacrificed their lives for this nation by fighting shoulder to shoulder with gratitude, appreciation and praise. We will carry the legacy of the spirit of Çanakkale as a holy trust in our hearts and pass it on to the next generation.¹

- Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 2008

There can be no doubt that 25 April 1915 was the defining date in our history, and a defining moment for the Turkish forces... And from that campaign [Gallipoli] grew a sense of respect for foes, and friendship developed between nations. This memorial stands to honour the friendship of our nations forged as a result of the Gallipoli campaign.²

- Australian Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Bruce Bilson, at the unveiling of a memorial to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Canberra, 2007

Gallipoli, it would seem, is both muse and mother to a variety of narrative myths.

As Bruce Bilson’s quote suggests, the Turkish peninsula and its history are assumed to have spurred the genesis of a unique relationship between Turkey and the other nations represented during the First World War campaign. The brutal 1915 battle on the peninsula at the southern end of the Dardanelles saw the deaths of tens of thousands of soldiers during the First World War but strangely, it is thought to be the basis for friendship between enemies. Far from being an exclusively Australian sentiment, Turks

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² Bruce Bilson, Speech at the unveiling of the enhanced Atatürk memorial, Canberra, Australia, (23 April 2007) http://minister.dva.gov.au/speeches/2007/apr/unveiling_enhanced_Ataturk_Memorial.htm
too have embraced their former foes. 

Simultaneously, as many Turkish nationalists claim, the 1915 Battle of Gallipoli was the progenitor of the Turkish nation and Turkish national identity. For instance, Atatürk Today, a popular website detailing the achievements of Atatürk, claims that, “It was here [Gallipoli] that the foundations of the Turkish nation were first laid and the enduring unity of a nation sprang forth.” Indeed, in recent years, the Battle of Gallipoli has been framed as one of the founding myths of the Turkish nation-state. It was at that battle, Turkish nationalists have often argued, that Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], the “founder” of the Republic of Turkey, first distinguished himself not only as a military commander but also as a Turkish national hero against the mightier armies of France and the British Empire.

Yet, although they have often been framed to the contrary, the peninsula and the 1915 campaign are as incapable of giving virginal birth to the aforementioned sentiments as they are of giving birth to the Turkish nation. Sentiments of Turkish nationalism and reconciliation were not the inevitable, natural by-products of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign. As will be shown, these sentiments were the semi-calculated consequences of

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3 For example, an online Turkish newspaper called Turkse reported that, “The most important characteristic of the Çanakkale Battles which should be emphasized today is that Turks, Australians and New Zealanders do not harbor feelings of hatred or enmity towards each other, in spite of the loss of thousands of people. On the contrary, they have firm and close ties of friendship derived from the Çanakkale Battles which constitute a turning point in the history of the people of these three countries.” “Çanakkale Battles and their Global Reflections”, Turkse (April 2006) http://www.turkse.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=669&Itemid=46

4 In reference to the campaign, Turks use the name Çanakkale instead of Gallipoli. Çanakkale is a town on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. It was also used as the Turkish name for the Dardanelles. Since Turks view the naval battle on the straits as the most significant event, they have chosen to name the battle after the strait.

5 “2015 will honor foundations of the Turkish state laid at Gallipoli”, Atatürk Today http://www.ataturktoday.com/Resim/Canakkale/1915.htm

6 See, for example, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Republic of Turkey, “Biography of Atatürk: Atatürk, Founder of the Turkish Republic and the First President of the Republic”; http://goturkey.turizm.gov.tr/BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D3130239EEA0FCDF038B3183B17125FC74AB
two constructed narratives – a Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli and a
reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli.\textsuperscript{7}

That Gallipoli is the locus of multiple narratives is undisputed.\textsuperscript{8} The exceptional
ability of the peninsula to support a multitude of narratives appears to stem from the fact
that it contains memorials for soldiers of varied national origins. The responsibilities for
constructing and maintaining these foreign memorials have been given – by international
treaty - to the country under whose flag the buried had fought.\textsuperscript{9} In a sense, Gallipoli has
become a shared space, teeming with various nationalities, seemingly conflicting
sentiments, and a narrative-inducing power. Just like the sentiments, these narratives
were not simply born of Gallipoli. The particulars of the battle and the various war
memorials of the peninsula certainly provided a good deal of narrative material. But, the
formation of narratives requires the presence and participation of actors and with its
plethora of nationalities and nationalist narratives, Gallipoli has several. This thesis,
however, is primarily interested in one: the Turkish government.

The ‘Turkish government’ is a difficult concept to discuss in this regard. When
discussing the Turkish government in this thesis, it might often appear that the
‘government’ is a monolithic actor devoid of internal conflict and contradiction,
seamlessly moving towards a mutually shared goal. On the contrary, this thesis

\textsuperscript{7} In this thesis, a ‘narrative’ will not merely denote the imposition of a sequence - with a beginning, middle,
and end - upon events, facts, or people. Rather, a ‘narrative’ shall refer to a way of representing the
past in a particular way for a particular purpose, i.e., to facts and events that have not simply been put in
sequence, but arranged to give import to particular ideals or values.

\textsuperscript{8} In addition to the reconciliatory and Turkish nationalist narratives mentioned above, Australia and New
Zealand have also constructed nationalist narratives of or including Gallipoli. See Alistair Thompson,
Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994; Bruce Scates, Return
to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006;

\textsuperscript{9} For more information on the allocation of land to other nationalities, see Philip Longworth, The Unending
recognizes that the Turkish government was not a wholly unified body, but was in fact made up of several conflicting and often competing groups and interests. The lack of Turkish archival sources, however, makes the analysis of these different groups very difficult and thus it is often impossible to describe the internal struggle behind the scenes or to attribute particular policy decisions to a ministry or individual within the government.

Still, in this thesis, the Turkish government will take centre stage for several reasons. First, its role in the narrativization of Gallipoli is understudied. Secondly, perhaps more than any other national government, the Turkish government is complicit in the production of the reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, due to Gallipoli’s status as a shared space, the Turkish government has been put in a precarious position. On the one hand, the government works to produce a reconciliatory narrative for foreigners that frames Gallipoli as a shared site. On the other hand, the government is the master craftsman of a nationalist narrative that positions Gallipoli as the Turkish national birthplace; of course, this narrative takes Turkish citizens as its target audience. The dual narrativization of Gallipoli by the Turkish government is thus rife with contending attitudes, sentiments, and audiences.

The following chapters will examine the dual narrativization of Gallipoli by the Turkish government and the consequences of narrativizing Gallipoli for both foreign and domestic consumption. An effort will be made to situate the treatment of Gallipoli by

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10 As the reconciliatory narrative involves multiple nationalities, it also has multiple national actors working towards the expression and promulgation of reconciliatory sentiments. In particular, both the Australian and New Zealand governments have reason to engender Gallipoli-centered sentiments of reconciliation amongst their own citizenry. Certainly, the multi-national configuration of the reconciliatory narrative indicates a certain amount of dialogue and interchange between actors. This thesis, however, is focused on the Turkish government and, as such, will not directly deal with Australian and New Zealand narrativization of Gallipoli.
successive Turkish governments in the political, economic, and social context of Turkey from the early 1920s to the present. As circumstances in Turkey change, so too will the narrativization of Gallipoli. Chapter One explores Gallipoli’s role in the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish republic. Far from being considered the birthplace of the Turkish nation or a reconciliatory space, it will be shown that during this period, Gallipoli was not even being narrativized by the Turkish government in any significant form. Apart from providing background for future chapters, Chapter One will reveal the constructed nature of the narratives and the sentiments they inspire. In Chapter Two, an investigation into the beginnings of Turkish government narrativization shall expose its underlying political and economic motivations. More specifically, the chapter will begin to flesh out the symbiotic relationship between the Turkish government’s nationalist and reconciliatory narratives. Attention shall be paid to the construction of memorials, the establishment of memorial ceremonies, and the commencement of joint pilgrimages to the memorials of Gallipoli. Chapter Three expands upon the findings of Chapter Two by discussing the development of mass tourism in Turkey and its effects on dual narrativization. Although the construction of memorials and memorial ceremonies shall remain a focus, this chapter will also discuss museum exhibits, commodification, and artistic expressions of Gallipoli to reveal the contradictions within and conflicts between the nationalist and reconciliatory narratives.

It must be said that this thesis is only the beginning of such an analysis and thus has set boundaries. To begin with, other political and non-political actors do impact and shape the Turkish government’s nationalist and reconciliatory narratives. For example, nations like Australia have a direct stake in the reproduction of the reconciliatory
narrative. While cognizant of this fact, this thesis will focus on the narrativization undertaken by successive Turkish governments. Additionally, this thesis is about narrativization, not collective memory. As such, the focus is on the attempt by Turkish governments to produce collective memory and identity, but not on collective memory itself. The subject matter deals with the attempted construction of memory, not on how it is received by others. Lastly, this thesis does not use Turkish archival sources despite its focus on the Turkish government. Certainly, the addition of all these elements would provide a far richer study of Gallipoli’s narrativization, but with brevity in mind, this thesis has limits to its analysis.

Gallipoli Studies

For the most part, English language monographs on the Gallipoli campaign have been singularly focused on the particulars of the battle itself. The most renowned writers on the Gallipoli campaign - Alan Moorehead, Les Carlyon, Tim Travers, Robert Rhodes James, and Michael Hickey, among others – are all exemplary of this literary trend.11 In recent years, the popularity of the campaign’s memory in Australia has prompted the production of a vast number of academic and non-academic studies on the Battle of Gallipoli. With a few variances between them, the vast majority of authors in this body of literature have tackled the same fundamental questions: Was the operation poorly planned by the British? How great were the odds against the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) who fought at Gallipoli? For the most part, this body of literature has also

reproduced the same conclusions: the battle was a tragedy of epic proportions, the Allies never had a chance, and the Anzacs fought bravely and respected their enemy. Not only do these monographs wholly neglect a critical evaluation of the Gallipoli campaign’s narrativization, they produce and reproduce elements of the reconciliatory narrative. Several of the authors use soldiers’ journals in order to demonstrate the courage of the average man, to display the fondness that developed between Anzacs and “Turks”, and to lay bare the senseless tragedy of war.\footnote{The term “Turks”, though often used by authors, is problematic since these were Ottoman soldiers fighting at the Battle of Gallipoli. This matter will be discussed at greater length in future chapters.} Most are also complicit in the reproduction of an Australian nationalist narrative of Gallipoli.

The Anzac legend lies at the heart of these battle accounts. English language experts on Gallipoli have generally written from the Anzac perspective, with occasional homage being paid to the British view of events. The strategies, considerations and structure of the Ottoman army are rarely treated as important. In fact, Edward Erickson’s \textit{Ordered to Die, A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War} stands as one of the only major English language books to examine Gallipoli from the Ottoman point of view.\footnote{Edward Erickson, \textit{Ordered to Die, A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War}. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001.} Of course, since Erickson was attempting to cover the entire First World War, Gallipoli forms only a portion of the book’s subject matter. Two other books by Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Basarin, and Hatice Basarin also discuss the Ottoman army at Gallipoli, but their contribution to the strategy, execution and composition of the Ottoman side pales in comparison to \textit{Ordered to Die}.\footnote{Hatice Basarin, Vecihi Basarin, and Kevin Fewster, \textit{A Turkish View of Gallipoli: Çanakkale}. Richmond: Hodja, 1985; Hatice Basarin, Vecihi Basarin, and Kevin Fewster, \textit{Gallipoli: The Turkish Story}. Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2003.} A few authors have broken the mold and looked beyond the specifics of the
campaign itself. In recent years, the memory of Gallipoli has become an exciting new topic, but given the penchant of authors to focus on Gallipoli’s Anzac contingent, it is no surprise that even these authors remain steadfast in their commitment to examining and re-examining the Australian and New Zealand perspectives. Bruce Scates and Jenny MacLeod have respectively produced reputable work in this regard. Scates’ *Return to Gallipoli, Walking the Battlefields of the Great War* is a thorough examination of Australian pilgrimage to Gallipoli from the early 1920s up until the present.\(^\text{15}\) Utilizing journals, oral interviews, and archival documents, Scates reveals the development of an Australian nationalist narrative of Gallipoli.

For her part, MacLeod has produced two monographs on the narrativization of Gallipoli. In *Reconsidering Gallipoli*, MacLeod compares and contrasts the memories produced by official histories, journalists, soldiers, and early authors of the campaign.\(^\text{16}\) Taking both British and Australian perspectives into consideration, MacLeod observes the purposeful and accidental production of a ‘heroic-romantic’ myth of Gallipoli and the Anzac legend. MacLeod also edited *Gallipoli: Making History*, a collection of essays on the remembrance of Gallipoli. The collection is illuminating in several regards, but of all the articles, only one discusses the construction of Turkish memory, albeit in a none too thorough form. “Gallipoli as Contested Commemorative Space” by John McQuilton touches on the contemporary Turkish interest in Gallipoli, but McQuilton apparently did not see Turks as major contestants over Gallipoli’s memory. Instead, he fixates on a competition between two groups of Australian nationalists.\(^\text{17}\)

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\(^{15}\) Scates, *Return to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War*.

\(^{16}\) MacLeod, *Reconsidering Gallipoli*.

Fewster and the Basarins are the exception in this case. Both their collaborations were created to elucidate the Ottoman role during the campaign. Still, *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story* at the very least points to the contemporary construction of Turkish nationalist and reconciliatory sentiments. Fewster and the Basarins acknowledge that Turkish nationalist pride in Gallipoli is a recent phenomenon, but fail to date its emergence.\(^{18}\) While they do date the establishment of reconciliatory sentiments to the mid-1980’s, their assumption in this regard is somewhat erroneous, although this will be discussed in future chapters.\(^{19}\) Most importantly, their monographs do not discuss narrativization per se. Although *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story* acknowledges that the sentiments are contemporary constructions and alludes to their content, the book does not delve into how, when, why, and by whom such sentiments were constructed.

With the exception of Erickson, Fewster and the Basarins, English language monographs on Gallipoli have displayed an overwhelming bias in favor of Australian content. Clearly, this has to do with the national origin of several of the authors, the language barriers they face, as well as Gallipoli’s immense popularity in Australia. But, Gallipoli lies on Turkish soil and considering the campaign’s growing popularity in Turkey, there is indeed a significant research gap. Given the upsurge in Turkish remembrance activities in recent years, it is surprising that the development of a Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli has gone relatively unexplored. Moreover, the multi-national composition of the reconciliatory narrative suggests that Australian authors should be tackling its explication, yet its examination has been limited to the mere acknowledgement of reconciliatory sentiments by Fewster and the Basarins.

\(^{19}\) Basarin, Basarin, and Fewster, *Gallipoli: The Turkish Story*. 9.
With its plurality of nations and narratives, Gallipoli is a rare case. Authors and academics have occasionally discussed Gallipoli’s narrativization, but they have studied Gallipoli’s narratives in isolation. For example, by studying the Australian nationalist narrative of Gallipoli in isolation, these authors tend to have ignored one of Gallipoli’s unique features: the existence of multiple national narratives, a cosmopolitan reconciliatory narrative and the interplay between them. This thesis aims to expound on several much neglected issues, most notably the construction of a Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli and the construction of a reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli. More than that, however, instead of studying the narratives in isolation, this thesis seeks to reveal the relationship that is created between the two narratives by the Turkish government’s dual narrativization of Gallipoli.

**Nationalism, Narrativization, and Memorialization**

Hayden White once said that narratives have the power to teach people how to be moral beings. Logically then, by their content and tone, narratives also have the authority to decide what constitutes morality. Governments have often sought to harness this power through the construction of nationalist narratives. Narrativization, which Carola Conle describes as the addition of “contexts and feelings, agents and histories, to

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21 This thesis will use the term ‘nationalist narrative,’ although an equally apt term is ‘statist narrative.’ ‘Statist narratives’ are those which are generated or shaped by the state or government. Although this term certainly applies to the government-sponsored narratives which this thesis discusses, the term ‘nationalist narrative’ will be used instead. As both the reconciliatory and nationalist narratives are statist, in that they are imposed by the government, it is necessary to use the term ‘nationalist narrative’ to maintain the distinction. ‘Nationalist narrative’ connotes the sentiments the government wishes to inspire. For more information on statist narratives, see Richard Roberts, “History and Memory: The Power of Statist Narratives”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33 (2000): 513-522. For a more elaborate definition of the term nationalist narrative, see E.A. Tiryakian, “When is the Nation No Longer?”, in A. Sturm, M. Young, and E. Zuelow, eds., *Nationalism in a Global Era: The Persistence of Nations*. New York: Routledge, 2007: 55-74.
facts, events, ideas, and people,” allows governments to create stories, exemplars and sentiments which indoctrinate citizens to adhere to government-approved morality and behavior.22

That many governments have attempted such narrativization is evident by the vast amount of academic literature on the subject. Since Benedict Anderson first wrote about how national communities are imagined, academics have sought to build on his work. Five elements of nationalism and nationalist narratives directly influence this thesis’ subject matter and analysis: As a starting point, it must be acknowledged that the establishment and preservation of nation states depends, as Bernard S. Cohn notes, “upon determining, codifying, controlling, and representing the past.”23 Secondly, for Anderson, in constructing narratives of the past, nations appropriate wars, battles, martyrdoms, and other traumatic violent acts, and as he eloquently states, “to serve the narrative purpose, these violent deaths must be remembered/forgotten as ‘our own’.”24 Thirdly, this concept of ‘our own’ is brought out in Thongchai Winichukal’s illuminating analysis of Thainess: “Basically an ethnic identification is a dynamic mechanism defining or demarcating the sphere of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ In many cases the idea of who we are is possible only by identifying those characteristics which do not belong to us.”25 The task of ethnic identification is especially prevalent for this thesis as it focuses on a nation which seeks to delineate national identity on ethnic lines while simultaneously sharing the ‘national’ space at Gallipoli with other ethnicities and nationalities.

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Fourth, Winichakul observes that the binary of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is often expressed through the manipulation of space and geography. Territoriality, “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over geographic area,” is instrumental in this process.26 On this point, E.A. Tiryakian notes that through nationalist narratives, governments often sacralize space, endowing its present, privileged inhabitants with the responsibility of protecting and cherishing it.27 For it to be useful to a nationalist narrative, space must be represented as the exclusive property of a nation and national population; Gallipoli’s space, however, cannot be claimed as exclusively Turkish property. Lastly, as early as 1882, Ernest Renan stated, “Forgetting, I would even go as far to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.”28 André Brink saw the same phenomenon occur in the creation of an apartheid-era South African narrative of nation. To form a cohesive narrative meant that Afrikaners had to “forget large tracts of the South African past…and to suppress the key roles played by ‘outsiders’.”29

Governments might use nationalist narratives to sacralize space and construct identity, but they also use space to aid in the construction of nationalist narratives. The conjunction of trauma, sacralization, erasure and space in the formation of nationalist narratives has often led academics to the study of memorialization. The construction of

27 E.A. Tiryakian, “When is the Nation No Longer?”, 62.
memorials and the performance of memorial rites by governments are often seen as integral to nationalist narratives; the edifices and rituals are, of course, meant to be nationally exclusive. The vast majority of literature on nationalist narratives and memorialization has not only discussed the role of monuments and memorials in propping up government-sponsored nationalist narratives, it has also raised the issue of counter-hegemonic narrativization; in other words, groups who counter-narrativize sites or events for their own purposes in ways contrary to the government or hegemonic group.³⁰

This thesis both builds on and deviates from this body of literature. In terms of analyzing the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli, past studies of nationalist narratives and memorialization are vital for its comprehension. One caveat as to the term nationalist narrative in this thesis should be noted: in effect, this thesis discusses two nationalist narratives. There is a Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli which selects, organizes, and sentimentalizes events and persons from the 1915 campaign. Then, there are Turkish master narratives of nation into which the nationalist narrative of Gallipoli can fit. Sometimes, Gallipoli is presented as the birthplace of the nation, or as Atatürk Today put it, where “the foundations of the Turkish nation were first laid and the

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enduring unity of a nation sprang forth.\textsuperscript{31} At other times, Gallipoli is merely another cog in the master narrative of the Turkish nation, while other events, places or historical periods take its place as the national birthplace. Gallipoli’s shifting status within the master narrative of the Turkish nation is not unusual. Richard Werbner argues that, in narratives of nation, “the origin myth is effectively plural. There is not one form for fixing the national imagination forever. Quite the contrary: the ideological effectiveness of the origin myth is in the semblance it gives of singularity in the actual presence of plurality.”\textsuperscript{32} Just as there are multiple origin myths shifting their roles within a narrative, likewise, other components appear to vacillate in their position and occasionally vanish altogether.

Additionally, while previous studies on nationalist narratives have focused on narrative promulgation by national governments and the subsequent counter-narrativization that occurs by groups within that specific national context, this thesis will take a different tack. Instead of framing this study as one government narrative versus one or many non-government narratives, this thesis will investigate a situation in which a government itself constructs two seemingly separate narratives around a site. It will be shown that, in a sense, the Turkish government counter-narrativizes its own narrative. Furthermore, although the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli largely conforms to the nationalist paradigm of previous studies, the reconciliatory narrative is a case exclusive to Gallipoli. As mentioned, a narrative of that specific ilk has not been researched in any significant detail. The fact that the nationalist and reconciliatory

\textsuperscript{31} “2015 will honor foundations of the Turkish state laid at Gallipoli”, 	extit{Ataturk Today} http://www.ataturktoday.com/Resim/Canaakkale/1915.htm

narratives are produced by the same political entity, and come to form a relationship with one another serves to make this a very original case of narrativization.
1. IGNORING THE PAST: THE LACK OF TURKISH GOVERNMENT NARRATIVIZATION OF GALLIPOLI, 1915-1938

The biopolitics of remembered identity in the nation-state have never been the same since the First World War. With that watershed in modern warfare, marked by conscription and mass death in trenches, came new, modern ways of memorializing the common soldier...The state no longer tolerated that unsacralised oblivion for the dead which left common soldiers anonymous, missing without a trace. and, worse still, beyond the pale of the commemorated nation.

- Richard Werbner

It is shameful for a civilized society to expect help from the dead.²
- Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], 1925

Considering Gallipoli’s revered position within contemporary Turkish society, it is curious that during the thirty years after the battle, large scale Turkish government interaction – both in the sense of construction of memorials and memorialization - with the space that comprises an alleged national birthplace did not take the form of reverence. In actuality, during the three decades following the Battle of Gallipoli, Turkish contact with the site of “their” great victory very rarely translated into forms of memorialization, celebration, or even mourning for the tremendous loss of life. Likewise, Turkish friendship with their former enemies did not blossom after the 1915 Battle of Gallipoli. Official enmity might have withered, but no real reconciliation actually took place.

This chapter will endeavor to demonstrate how the respective Gallipoli-centered

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sentiments of reconciliation and Turkish nationalism were not the inevitable, spontaneous products of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign. As a corollary, it will be shown that though the respective narratives of reconciliation and Turkish nationalism must have been constructed at some juncture, the Turkish government was not even attempting to fabricate any narratives of Gallipoli during this period. Lastly, through an examination of Ottoman and Turkish government interactions with Gallipoli and its foreign visitors, it will be possible to understand what the space and its history meant to Turks in the thirty odd years after the battle.

Gallipoli as Military Outpost - From Ottoman Rule to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne

Approximately eighty kilometers in length, the Gallipoli Peninsula is by no means a tremendous mass of land. Its narrow chute largely conforms to the shape of the Anatolian coastline to which it is adjacent, separated only by the Dardanelles, a narrow strait which ranges from a mere one to six kilometers in girth. The peninsula’s western coast looks out to the Aegean Sea and the Turkish island of Gökçeada. While today, the peninsula’s rugged terrain and natural splendor serves as the foil for the many memorials, monuments, and military outposts which dot its coast and inland, at the time of the 1915 battle, the space was largely untamed with few wooded areas but large amounts of dense and stubborn shrubbery. Moreover, the area was sparsely populated with only four major villages or towns, signifying a lack of overall development and resources on the peninsula.  

The peninsula has a rich and noteworthy history as a strategic military post for

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two major reasons. First, it sits as a watchdog over the Dardanelles which divide Anatolia or Asia Minor from Europe. Sitting on the European side of this divide, Gallipoli becomes both literally and figuratively Europe’s last line of defense in the region. The imagined separation between East and West is symbolically maintained or broached on Gallipoli’s shores. Secondly, and just as significantly, Gallipoli guarded the gateway to Constantinople, or Istanbul as it is now known, as well as the Black Sea. Gallipoli thus had both military and economic importance as it guarded vital and lucrative trade routes.

Dating back to antiquity, Gallipoli and the Dardanelles played a crucial role in military history. In 334 BC Alexander the Great crossed the Dardanelles to invade the Achaemenid Empire. Approximately a century and a half earlier, the Achaemenid ruler Xerxes I had crossed the strait to invade Greece. According to lore, the Gallipoli Peninsula was also a site of battle for the ancient Greeks. During the 1915 Battle of Gallipoli, a British officer, Sergeant-Major R.S. Jones, reported finding a Greek inscription on a piece of pure white marble. Apparently, the inscription relayed gratitude from the inhabitants of the peninsula to King Attalus II of Pergamum for saving them from Thracian invaders. The purported date is assumed to be from the second century BC.4

Gallipoli became an even more significant military outpost during the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. In 1353, the Byzantine Emperor John VI invited a group of mercenary ‘Turks,’ as they are referred to in the historical account, to occupy the fort of Tsympe on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The mercenaries subsequently pledged their

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allegiance to Orhan I’s (r. 1326-1359) son, Süleyman Paşa.\(^5\) It was the Ottomans’ first stronghold in Europe.\(^6\) After Orhan I’s death, his son and successor Murat I (r. 1359-1389) in the 1360s used Gallipoli as a base to conquer and capture Adrianople (Edirne), forcing the Byzantines to pay tribute. As part of a Byzantine counter-attack, Murat was driven out of Europe by the Count of Savoy, but significantly managed to hold on to the Gallipoli Peninsula. Murat’s own counter-attack from Gallipoli was successful in recapturing Adrianople, and in the 1370s he conquered much of Bulgaria, bypassing Constantinople because of its superior defenses. Constantinople did not fall to the Ottomans until 1453, but nevertheless it is possible to trace the roots of Ottoman domination in south-eastern Europe to the seizure of Gallipoli.\(^7\)

During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire increasingly came into conflict with the Russian Empire over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. The Russians, desiring access to both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, made several attempts at expansion. In 1832, Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, revolted against his master, Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839). Fearing that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would provide Russia’s principle imperial rival, Britain, with an opportunity to gain a foothold in an area vital to Russian interests, Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855) of Russia mobilized his fleet and occupied the Dardanelles. The Ottomans, though having granted Russia access to the Dardanelles in the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, had never authorized foreign military vessels to pass through the

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\(^6\) According to Justin McCarthy, John VI gave the fort as a present to Orhan I, his brother-in-law, as a bribe to secure his allegiance. In either case, the important point here is that the Ottomans did gain their first European foothold on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997), 45.

straits. In the 1841 Straits Convention in London, the Great Powers – the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia – agreed that both straits would be closed to foreign military vessels, thereby denying Russian naval access to the Mediterranean. Ottoman sovereignty over the straits had thus been maintained, but only by the acquiescence of the Great Powers.

After the fall-out of the Crimean War (1854-1856), there was no doubt as to the enmity between the Russian and Ottoman empires. The hostilities resumed in 1877 when the Tsar declared war on the Ottomans after several crises in the Balkans aroused Russian sympathies. Russian forces made considerable advances into the Ottoman-held Balkans, and by March 1878 they had progressed as far as San Stefano on the outskirts of Istanbul. Embarrassingly for the Ottoman Empire, it took British intervention to halt the Russian advance. Significantly, the British, wary of the expansion of Russian influence, had anchored their fleet in the Dardanelles and threatened military action against their Russian counterpart should they attempt to occupy Istanbul. The city was saved, but the strategic centrality of the Dardanelles to Ottoman sovereignty was once again reinforced in the minds of the Ottomans. Had they so desired, the British, being in control of the Dardanelles, could have laid siege to Istanbul. As it was, the British forces were seeking to hold the Ottoman Empire together as a stopgap to Russian expansion, but that did not stop them from rewarding themselves with a small piece of Ottoman territory, the island of Cyprus, which subsequently became one of Britain’s most important naval bases in the

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Considering its history as a strategic military outpost, it should come as no surprise that at the outset of the First World War, the Ottoman government stepped up its militarization of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Çanakkale Fortified Area Command which controlled a string of older, outdated forts and artillery regiments, was reinforced with infantry divisions, cavalry units and artillery regiments previously stationed around the Sea of Marmara. Nevertheless, despite these hasty attempts to strengthen Ottoman positions on the peninsula, it was clear that the area was by no means impenetrable to the onslaught that was to come.

The importance of the Dardanelles was apparent, as well, to the Ottomans’ most important adversary during the war, the British. It is said that, having had no prior discussions, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, Secretary to the War Council Colonel Maurice Hankey, and Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George all independently suggested that an attack on the Dardanelles was in the best interests of the British Empire, especially given the stalemate on the Western Front. The British hoped that by controlling the Dardanelles, it would subsequently become possible to wrest Istanbul from the Ottomans, forcing their opponents out of the war, and opening up the Black Sea to aid Britain’s ally Russia.

British naval incursions into the Dardanelles began in February 1915, but it was

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11 Ibid, 75.
12 Although this thesis takes the Battle of Gallipoli as one of its main subject matters, it shall not seek to provide a blow by blow account of the 1915 battle between the Ottomans and the combined forces of the French and British Commonwealth. Instead, this particular section shall endeavor to unearth only such information that provides additional evidence of the nature of Ottoman/Turkish interaction with the peninsula.
13 Erickson, Ordered to Die, 76.
not until March 18th of that same year that a combined Anglo-French fleet made its first concerted effort to take the Dardanelles. The vast majority of Ottoman forts lining the Gallipoli coast were silenced after receiving heavy fire from British and French warships, yet the 150mm howitzers of the Ottoman 8th Artillery Division continued to harass the fleet as it advanced. The existence of mines in the Dardanelles was recognized by the British as an inconvenience to be disposed of by their minesweepers. Yet, unbeknownst to the British and the French, the Ottoman minefield had been laid in an unconventional, perpendicular pattern. Three Allied battleships were sunk almost immediately; three others were markedly damaged. With their naval attack repulsed, the Allies were left with little recourse: a plan for an amphibious landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula was already in the works.\[15\]

On 25 April 1915, Allied amphibious landings were supposed to surprise Ottoman positions in Gallipoli and advance vigorously until high ground had been captured. Instead, due to the foresight and planning of both the German Major General Otto Liman von Sanders and the Ottoman Major General Esat Paşa, Ottoman defenses had already been prepared. Bloodied and often demoralized by the Ottoman defenses, the Allies were nonetheless successful in landing all of their divisions by April 28th on beaches and locations whose names are well-known today: Cape Helles, Anzac Cove, and eventually Suvla Bay.\[16\] Although the fighting was fierce, in most cases the entrenched Ottoman

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\[15\] Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 79-80.

\[16\] Edward J. Erickson, "Strength against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915", *The Journal of Military History* 65 (October 2001), 1008.

It should also be mentioned that at this early juncture, Mustafa Kemal was a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of commanding the Ottoman 19th division, including the famous 57th Regiment. He led Ottoman forces at Maydos, Kabatepe, Conk Bayiri, and other famous battlegrounds. Kemal was highly successful at Gallipoli. He was awarded the Ottoman order of Imitiyaz (Distinguished Service), the German Iron Cross, several medals and rose to the rank of Colonel. For more on Atatürk’s exploits at Gallipoli, see Andrew Mango, *Ataturk* (London: John Murray, 2001), 140-156.
troops were able to capitalize on their defensive positions and consistently win the crucial battle for higher ground. When, in the rare instance, Allied troops were able to win the high ground – as was the case with the New Zealanders at Chunuk Bair – Ottoman counter-attacks re-took the positions even while incurring massive casualties. Gallipoli was to be held at all costs. The battle was also significant because, as mentioned previously, it was there that Mustafa Kemal gained his initial fame and success.\(^{17}\)

Hostilities continued until the Allies’ last offensive in August 1915 failed. It took months for the Allied evacuations to proceed and not until January 9\(^{th}\), 1916 did the last

\(^{17}\) Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Republic of Turkey, “Biography of Atatürk: Atatürk, Founder of the Turkish Republic and the First President of the Republic”, http://goturkey.turizm.gov.tr/BelegeGoster.aspx?i7A16AFE50572D3130239EEA0FCDF038B3183B17125FC74AB
British troops leave the peninsula. For the moment, the Ottoman army at Gallipoli had ensured the sovereignty of the empire, but at a significant cost. Casualty figures from the 1915 battle have varied from source to source. On the extremities of this discussion, Robert Rhodes James has claimed that the combined Allied and Ottoman losses numbered close to 500,000. Most historians’ estimates are far more conservative. Andrew Mango lists the number of Ottoman dead at 76,000. Edward Erickson prefers the numbers provided by contemporary Turkish historians who cite the number of Ottoman dead and missing at approximately 68,000 compared to Allied losses of 47,000. Whereas before the battle, Gallipoli was inhabited by a mere four villages, by 1916 it had become home to tens of thousands of dead Ottoman, Australian, New Zealand, French Imperial, and British Empire soldiers.

By all accounts, the 1915 Battle of Gallipoli was a resounding victory for the Ottoman Empire, and in the aftermath, the Ottoman government did attempt to commemorate the battle. In the immediate wake of the battle, Ottoman soldiers had built a few unofficial memorials on the peninsula, but it is unclear whether they received any assistance or encouragement from the government. For its part, in 1917 the government released a set of three commemorative stamps respectively depicting an Ottoman

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19 Mango, *Ataturk*, 156.
21 Contemporary accounts of the battle often ignore the fact that the Ottoman army was multi-ethnic, and not simply Turkish in composition. Even Erickson, whose monograph on the Ottoman army stands as the penultimate English language account, is guilty of using the terms “Ottoman army” and “Turkish army” interchangeably. Most notably, the contribution of Arabs from Ottoman provinces is completely ignored by academics and often erased by Turkish nationalists. Jonathan Gorvett provides a minor account of the Arab role in the Ottoman army. Gorvett estimates that there were approximately 300,000 Arabs serving in the Ottoman forces in 1914. Jonathan Gorvett, “The Forgotten Arabs of Gallipoli”, *Al Jazeera* (16 February 2004) [http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?Archiveld=762](http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?Archiveld=762).
howitzer, an Ottoman trench, and a map of the peninsula. 

But, of course, the First World War continued, and the Ottoman government and armed forces had far more pressing concerns. As a result, the Ottoman government’s commemorative activities on the peninsula appear to have been limited over the remaining years of the war. Ottoman forces were slowly relocated to other areas, leaving only a diminished Fifth Army to guard the peninsula and the Dardanelles. Yet, with the end of hostilities in the area, the local inhabitants slowly returned to their villages, bringing with them unintended consequences for the graves of men left behind.

When the last Allied troops had pulled out of Gallipoli, Australian attention immediately turned to the matter of the graves of Anzac soldiers. During the battle, cemeteries on the peninsula had been created, maintained, and documented by the Anzac Chaplain Walter

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24 Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 94.
Dexter. With no Anzac watchdog or presence left in Gallipoli, the Australian press was soon rife with stories of grieving fathers worried that ‘heathen’ Turks would desecrate the graves of their sons and other soldiers. As the sensationalism grew to a frenzy, a papal envoy was sent in 1916 to investigate the alleged crimes of the Ottoman inhabitants upon foreign graves. Upon hearing the news of a papal envoy arriving on Gallipoli’s shores, the Ottoman Ministry of War immediately sent laborers to neaten the appearance of foreign graves grown over with grass and shrubs and whose crosses had been burned for firewood. Foreign graves were marked by mounds and stones, and the papal envoy noted the satisfactory appearance and maintenance of graves. It should be noted that the Ottoman laborers only returned to care for foreign graves.

In October of 1918, the Armistice of Mudros was signed, officially ending the fighting between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied forces. One month later, the Allies moved into Istanbul, although the city did not officially come under Allied administration until 1920. In 1919, the Greeks occupied Smyrna (Izmir). Ottoman forces were to be demobilized and stripped of their weapons. The Allies’ dream of partitioning the Ottoman Empire amongst them was slowly coming to fruition; Ottoman sovereignty appeared to have slipped away. Sultan Mehmet VI’s appeasement of the French and British, combined with the perception that the Entente was abusing their power, mobilized certain segments of the population to organize “societies for the defense of national rights.” A fragmented resistance movement emerged under the general leadership of the Committee

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25 Scates, Return to Gallipoli, 36.
27 Ibid.
28 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 146-147.
   The city was called Smyrna during the Ottoman Empire, and would subsequently become Izmir after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.
of Union and Progress (CUP). Eventually, the movement would come under the control of Mustafa Kemal.

That same year, the War Graves Registration Unit (WGRU) was established by the British government, and with British predominance in the Dardanelles, assuredly went ashore to Gallipoli. Initial reports from the multi-national unit – that did not, however, include representatives of the Ottoman government - were scandalous: One WGRU officer testified that, “Not content with rifling the bodies, [the Turks] have apparently been playing marbles with the skulls and tip-cat with the bones.”

Australian and New Zealand fury over the reports was the most pronounced, with charges of conspiracy being laid against the Ottoman government, but once again reality had been overshadowed by a few fantastical reports. C.E.W. Bean, an Australian war correspondent, was charged with investigating the nature of the accusations. Bean was instrumental in refuting the allegations against the Ottoman government. Crosses had been removed, but Bean made clear that this ‘desecration’ was more the result of desperation and survival. Soldiers and citizens whose supply lines had been cut were forced to use the crosses as firewood or risk freezing. Furthermore, although Bean acknowledged that graves had been robbed, he denied the vicious claims that such work was part of a larger systematic desecration or Islamic abhorrence of Christians. Once more, he ascertained that desperation and poverty had played a far greater role than religion or enmity.

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29 There is, of course, a much more complicated history behind the resistance movement(s) in Turkey at this time. For an excellent breakdown of contributions of the various groups in the resistance movement(s), see Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Nationalist Movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden: Brill, 1984.
30 *Scates, Return to Gallipoli*, 37.
31 Ibid, 38.
The Australian government, while recognizing that the initial reports of desecration were exaggerated, was nonetheless under intense pressure from its media and citizenry to protect the sanctity of Australian graves. So began a campaign to press the British government into ceding the entire area where Anzac troops had initially landed on Gallipoli – today known as Anzac Cove – to the Australian government. Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes personally wrote to his British counterpart, David Lloyd George, to make Australia’s case:

The amount of territory actually involved at Anzac [Anzac Cove] is not very great and is quite unsuitable for agricultural or other purposes. If vested in the Graves Commission it would not deprive anybody of useful or valuable territory but would merely ensure the safekeeping of graves which, to the Australian people, are very dear.\(^{32}\)

Hughes found the territory to be of no practical value, but his words denote a specific disregard for Ottoman claims to sovereignty (most notably those coming from the forces led by Mustafa Kemal). With Australian concerns in mind, the British Foreign Office composed a draft of a treaty to be given to the Ottoman government which included a clause for the ceding of territory on the Gallipoli Peninsula.\(^{33}\)

That particular draft would eventually evolve into the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which contained stipulations for the cession of territory on Gallipoli and other parts of the Ottoman Empire, but additionally called for the internationalization of both the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. Section One, Articles thirty-seven through sixty-one specified how both military and commercial vessels of any nationality would be allowed to pass through the straits. More importantly, control of the straits would fall to an

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\(^{32}\) The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 608/116, Letter from William Morris Hughes to David Lloyd George, 3 April 1919.

\(^{33}\) The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 608/116/6, “Draft Treaty with Turkey” produced by the British Foreign Office, 11 April 1919.
international commission which would decide upon budgets, anchorages, pilotage, as well as the administration of Constantinople’s (the treaty does not refer to it as Istanbul) port. According to Article 40 of the treaty, the Turkish government – the term Ottoman was also not used in the treaty - would not be a part of the commission until it was accepted by the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{34}

By this juncture, two centers of power had already emerged on the Ottoman side. Desperately clinging to power, Sultan Mehmet VI agreed to the territorial demands of the Allies on the condition that he held onto Istanbul. In Ankara, the Representative Committee of the Ottoman Parliament, under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal and other nationalists, refuted the Allied claims to land. As the sultan looked on helplessly, the nationalists took up arms against the Greek forces in Smyrna (Izmir) and the French forces in the south. A detailed description of this tumultuous time is not possible here, but suffice it to say the nationalists were successful in repulsing the foreign invaders.

In 1922, the nationalists succeeded in driving the Greek forces back to the coast and crowned their victory with the capture of Izmir in September of that year. Under pressure by nationalist guerrillas and unwilling to sacrifice troops, the French and British governments acquiesced to the demands of Mustafa Kemal and the nationalists in that same year, although they held out on fully recognizing the new government.\textsuperscript{35}

Eventually, the Treaty of Sèvres was abandoned, the sultanate abolished, and the Treaty of Lausanne concluded. The new treaty guaranteed the sovereignty of the new Turkish state that would soon be proclaimed the Republic of Turkey. But Article 23 of Section I maintained the freedom of passage and demilitarization of the Dardanelles that


\textsuperscript{35} Mango, \textit{Ataturk}, 355-357.
was first put forth in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. More importantly, in regards to the Gallipoli peninsula, the Lausanne agreement included a surprising provision. Section II, Article 128 stated:

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant to the Governments of the British Empire, France and Italy respectively and in perpetuity the land within the Turkish territory in which are situated the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries or memorials of their soldiers and sailors who fell in action or died of wounds, accident or disease, as well as those of prisoners of war and interned civilians who died in captivity. The Turkish Government will also grant to those Governments the land which the Commissions provided for in Article 130 shall consider necessary for the establishment of cemeteries for the regrouping of graves, for ossuaries or memorials. The Turkish Government undertakes further to give free access to these graves, cemeteries, ossuaries and memorials, and if need be to authorise the construction of the necessary roads and pathways. The Greek Government undertakes to fulfil the same obligations in so far as concerns its territory. The above provisions shall not affect Turkish or Greek sovereignty over the land thus granted.

The Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC), the organization responsible for the maintenance of the British Empire’s graves, believed it would be granted significant portions of Gallipoli, most notably the Anzac area and Cape Helles, and could do whatever it wished with such land. Indeed, this is how the treaty was initially interpreted. But, the treaty states that foreigners would receive only that land on which cemeteries, graves, ossuaries and memorials lay or were built; the Turkish government would retain sovereignty over the general area of Gallipoli. The ambiguous wording of this document would cause controversy in later years. Nonetheless, as historian Bruce Scates notes, “No such arrangement had ever been made before with the government of a former enemy.”

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38 Scates, *Return to Gallipoli*, 39.
**Allied Interest, Turkish Dispassion: Memorialization on Gallipoli in the Inter-war Period:**

While the Treaty of Lausanne gave the new Turkish republican regime time to deal with the various issues of state and nation-building, it also allowed particular members of the Allied states to turn their attention to the commemoration of those lost during the Battle of Gallipoli. As early as 1919, the British and Australian authorities initiated plans for cemeteries and memorials at Gallipoli. Sir John Burnett, a Scotsman, was selected as the main architect for the IWGC and visited Gallipoli in 1919. During the 1920s, an effort was made to Australianize the landscape by planting wattle, gum, and rimu. All except the gum died, and as Bruce Scates states, “then (as in 1915) Gallipoli’s winter drove back foreign intruders.”

By the time the WGRU had returned to Gallipoli in 1919, several of the British Empire’s graves had forever been lost due to the removal of crosses and passage of time. Still, after vigorous efforts to survey the area, thirty-one cemeteries were found containing 19,000 graves in all - only 6000 of which could be identified. Those missing in battle numbered 27,000 and would be remembered on six separate memorials built throughout the 1920s. A few such memorials are worthy of description as they demonstrate the high level of dedication exhibited by the IWGC to Gallipoli during the 1920s.

As the main British memorial dedicated to the Battle of Gallipoli, the memorial at Cape Helles on the tip of the peninsula also commemorates Australians who went missing at Helles, as well as British and Indian soldiers from all over Gallipoli whose

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39 Ibid, 40.
graves were never found. Situated on the highest point of the cape, and at the centre of the memorial, is a pure white obelisk standing approximately thirty metres high. Its imposing physique looks out to the Asian side of the Dardanelles. Burnett specifically designed the Cape Helles monument so that it would be visible to ships passing through the strait.\footnote{Holt and Holt, \textit{Major and Mrs. Holt’s Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli}, 93.}

At Lone Pine, the Anzacs had managed to hold the line against a massive three day attack by Ottoman military forces in August 1915. Today, the battleground is the site of Australian memorial ceremonies on Anzac Day, and with good reason. Named for the singular pine tree which stood in the centre of the battleground and still stands today, the pure white memorial rises behind the tree offering a poignant contrast of life and death. The obelisk behind the pine is adorned with a simple cross and the names of dead Anzac soldiers.

French efforts at commemoration on the peninsula were also of a dramatic nature. Situated at Morto Bay, and taking seven years to complete, the French memorial is one of the largest at Gallipoli. The ground at Morto Bay is perforated with simple metallic crosses. A gigantic obelisk serves also as an ossuary, over-looking the cemeteries as well as Kum Kale on the other side of the Dardanelles.\footnote{During the 1915 battle, French troops had first landed on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, at Kum Kale, as a diversionary tactic, before arriving on the Gallipoli Peninsula.} A telling inscription was inscribed on the obelisk below the words “\textit{Ave Gallia Immortalis}” (“Greetings to you, Immortal Gaul”):

\begin{quote}
\textit{Gloire à notre France éternelle}
\textit{Gloire à ceux qui sont morts pour elle}
\textit{Aux Martyrs, Aux Vaillants, Aux Forts}
\textit{À ceux qui enflamme leur exemple}
\textit{Qui veulent place dans le temple}
\end{quote}
The French cemetery includes graves of soldiers from all over the French Empire. Graves of Christians, Muslims, and Jews were all adorned with a cross inscribed with the words “Mort pour la France.”

Upon touring the peninsula in 1925, one Turkish visitor observed, “Only the foreign cemeteries were like white flower gardens on the sides of hills close to the sea. The only visible traces are not of those who won but those who were defeated.”

Figure 3: The cemetery at Lone Pine. In the background, it is possible to see the bleachers that have been built in recent years to support Anzac Day crowds.

43 Inscription, French Memorial, Morto Bay, Gallipoli Peninsula.
44 Basarin, Basarin, and Fewster, Gallipoli: The Turkish Story, 25.
and French memorialization in Gallipoli was extensive during the 1920s, and hence it is strange that at the same time there was little to no Turkish memorialization of its own deceased on the peninsula. The battle had been a huge victory for the Ottomans over supposedly superior forces. Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of the Republic of Turkey since 1923, had proven himself during the Battle of Gallipoli, winning a number of important battles that eventually helped him launch his political career. Both factors are now central to the production of the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli. So why the lack of Turkish memorialization during the inter-war period?

One obvious reason would be the lack of funds available to the new Turkish state in the 1920s and 1930s. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey was recognized as the partial successor to the Ottoman Empire and thus was obliged to pay a majority share of the former empire’s debt. Moreover, although the output rate of the manufacturing industry grew between 1923 and 1929, the sector remained marginal in scope. The deportations and deaths that resulted from the First World War had also depopulated the rural areas of Turkey, which significantly reduced agricultural productivity. More than anything, vast reconstruction costs also left the Republic ham-strung, making the contruction of memorials appear a low priority.

Reconstruction was, of course, occurring on multiple levels. Perhaps the necessity of re-building a shattered economy and infrastructure, as well as constructing a new state and nation, left little time or energy for the memorialization of Gallipoli. On the physical level, reconstruction of the country’s damaged railway system absorbed both time and

Debt was also re-distributed to the new states that had emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.
much of the thin Turkish budget.\textsuperscript{48} Insurrections by Kurdish rebels in 1924 and 1925 also proved distracting for the new government.\textsuperscript{49} The economy required resuscitation and on a social and cultural level, it would appear that Atatürk’s goal of revolutionizing Turkish society left little time to be spent on memorialization. After all, changing the way people thought about the nation, its leaders, gender relations, ethnicity, and modernity meant the creation of new institutions and laws. In addition to (re-) building the infrastructure of Anatolia, significant efforts went into turning Ankara into the capital of the new Turkish nation-state and into rebuilding and reshaping the cityscape of the country’s second most important commercial city, Izmir.

The lack of funds and the focus on reconstructing society are significant factors in the lack of Turkish memorialization of Gallipoli, but they obscure a deeper truth: Gallipoli simply did not fit the symbolic needs of the Turkish state in the 1920s and 1930s, whereas other areas did. The Turkish government was in the process of constructing a Turkish master narrative of national birth, but Gallipoli was not the focus. One site of this new nationalist narrative was the city of Izmir, known to the Greeks as Smyrna. In May 1919, in the wake of the armistice that ended hostilities, Greek troops marched in and occupied the city. The nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal re-took the city in 1922, but four days later a mysterious fire broke out in Izmir’s Armenian quarter and burned the city’s commercial and cultural center as well as the Greek and Armenian districts to the ground; the cause of the fire is disputed to this day.\textsuperscript{50}

In 1924, Izmir’s municipality commissioned an urban plan for the city, yet due to various reasons, the plan was not initiated until the early 1930s. First, Republic Square was constructed at the heart of the city and was opened to the public in 1932. Central to the square was a conspicuous monument of Atatürk on his horse with a hand pointing towards the Mediterranean. At the base, engravings depicted the evacuation of the Greeks from the city. By 1936, an enormous park, the Kültürpark, was created behind Republic Square, exceeding the grandeur of the simpler plan of 1924. The park was not simply a center of recreation but comprising an area of 430,000 square meters, the Kültürpark dominated the formerly Greek Smyrna, making it unmistakably ‘Turkish.’ All gates and facilities were named for events or people from early Republican history, and state-owned museums proliferated throughout the park.51

Although one can imagine why the Turkish government would want to create monuments and museums with early Republican imagery, the question of location still exists: Why not build in Gallipoli? The answers to this question are varied. Firstly, there were practical concerns. The Gallipoli Peninsula held only four small villages at the time of the First World War, and those villages had been left relatively unscathed by the fighting. The peninsula did not require any major reconstruction and certainly did not need modern buildings. Izmir, on the other hand, was a major population centre that had been completely destroyed by fire. Thus, the sparse funds of the Turkish government would be better spent on a city that required re-building anyways.

Secondly, due to the fire, Izmir was an open space, a blank canvas that would far better serve the symbolic and metaphoric purposes of the new Republic of Turkey. All

vestiges of Christian and Greek presence had been wiped out, and with it the last remnants of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. The space was ideal in that it allowed the Turkish government to expose the public to new Republican imagery, while diverting attention away from their Ottoman past. In a 1923 speech, Mustafa Kemal himself denounced the Ottoman past: “The new Turkey has no relationship to the old one. The Ottoman government has disappeared into history. A new Turkey has now been born.”

In this vein, Biray Kolluoğlu Kirli argues that “the destruction of Ottoman spaces and the redefinition and reconstruction of new cityscapes and public spaces were an integral part of the process of the construction of Turkish nationalism in the 1920s.” A story of national rebirth in Izmir could easily be woven due its allegorical and literal blankness.

Crucial to this new Turkish nationalism were concepts of modernity, progress, and breaking with the Ottoman past. In Atatürk’s Turkey, progress meant emulation of Western nations which he, and other nationalists around him, regarded as hallmarks of civilization. In his article entitled “Displaced Memories, or the architecture of forgetting, and remembrance,” Güven Arif Sargin demonstrates how both the Turkish government and the Turkish elite focused upon Western urbanism as a means to achieve progress and change. In the 1930s, the construction of tall buildings based upon modernist architecture signified a Turkey that was moving towards the West, and thus making progress. The more common nationalisms of the time were, as Yael Navaro-Yashin describes, “based on primordialist claims to represent the unitary and original ‘culture’ of...

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53 Biray Kolluoglu Kirli, “Forgetting the Smyrna Fire”, 27.
circumscribed pieces of territory,” but the new Turkish Republic did not wish to re-assert its Ottoman ties. Instead, early Turkish nationalists denied their Ottoman heritage by formulating a nexus between Turkish territory and the ‘Western culture’ of Turkic groups in Central Asia.  

Similarly, the construction of the Kültürpark, complete with artificial lakes, recreation areas and a casino-restaurant, was consistent with a break with the Ottoman past. Sibel Bozdoğan notes that in Turkey, as in other countries during this period, the construction of large urban parks put special emphasis on youth and health. Such values stood in stark contrast to paradigms such as ‘the old empire’ or ‘the sick man of Europe.’ These efforts at urban modernization can also be seen as part of a larger movement to ‘socialize’ and transform formerly Ottoman subjects into progressive, modern Turkish citizens. Lastly, as part of Anatolia, Izmir fit with the Anatolia-centred Republic of Turkey, drawing attention away from the old Ottoman capital of Istanbul and the sultan and caliph that had dominated it. Anatolia had been the site of the War of Independence and with the majority of urban reconstruction being undertaken in its quarters, the area was being redefined. According to C.S. Wilson, doctrines, like the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ and the ‘Sun Language Theory,’ helped recreate “Anatolia as a natural location for the Republic of Turkey and a conception of the Turkish race as its natural population.” Anatolia could now claim to be birthplace of the Republic of Turkey, as well as the historic homeland of Turkish peoples.

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57 Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building, 145.
58 Ibid, 75.
59 C.S. Wilson, “The Persistence of the Turkish Nation in the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk”, 95. For more on the erasure of the Ottoman past and the rise of an Anatolian-centered Republic of Turkey, see Michael Meeker, A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002.
Gallipoli clearly did not fit with this particular form of reconstruction and nation-building of the 1920s and 1930s. Firstly, the sparsely populated peninsula was quite inaccessible to the vast majority of Turkish citizens during the 1920s and 1930s, nor did it lend itself to the construction of large, modern buildings. As such, it made a poor symbol for this particular nationalist narrative; tucked away from view it could not impact political, social or cultural ideals in the way a major urban centre could. Izmir, it would appear, could touch the lives of a far greater number of people, and thus play a more effective role within the larger context of government efforts at nation-building.

Secondly, sitting on the European side of the Dardanelles, Gallipoli could only watch Anatolia transform into the showcase of a modern, sovereign nation. By its history and layout, the peninsula could not represent the values of the new Turkish nation. Ana Maria Alonso argues that, “Modern forms of state surveillance and control of populations as well as of capitalist organization and work discipline have depended on the homogenizing, rationalizing, and partitioning of space.”60 By this point in time, Gallipoli was already partitioned and shared with foreign powers thus making homogenization impossible. Since the Turkish government was attempting to create a new, specifically Turkish identity – an identity which often eschewed foreigners - for their citizens, Gallipoli defied their vision of what a national space should include and exhort.61

61 Turkish nationalism and solidarity was and often is to this day based on ethnicity. During the early republic, there were a number of reforms that sought to consolidate the ethnically Turkish character of the new nation; foreign schools were restrained, certain professions were restricted to ethnic Turks, and numerous Turkish language reforms served to persecute or hinder non-Turkish citizens. Armenians, Jews, and Greeks also faced displacement when particular areas – including the area of the Straits – were designated for inhabitants of purely Turkish origin. In 1935, the government passed a law compelling all Turkish citizens to adopt surnames. One of the effects was to put considerable pressure on non-Turkish citizens to renounce their traditional surnames and adopt new Turkish ones. For more information, see
Perforated with non-Turkish meaning, the site would have been inefficient in representing a united, sovereign, and independent nation, capable only of confusing the new Turkish citizens of their role and duty. Finally, at its most basic definition, memorialization is the process of remembering and looking back. To memorialize Gallipoli, at this juncture, would have meant to rehash an Ottoman victory, thereby raising questions of Turkish ties to an Ottoman past. Atatürk’s vision of Turkey as a modern, progressive nation appears to preclude looking back to the past for moral inspiration.

Major developments usually came in the form of urban reconstruction projects, but the Republican government also made a point of improving domestic tourism to areas of natural beauty. Gallipoli with its rugged cliffs and picturesque views of the Dardanelles and the Aegean sea appear to epitomize Turkey’s natural beauty, but once more the promotion of the peninsula was passed over for other projects. Distance and accessibility were, as mentioned, major hindrances to the development of tourism to Gallipoli, yet the issue was once again Gallipoli’s location on the European side of the Dardanelles. In 1933, Ülkü, the Ankara People’s House journal, wrote:

Other than history, the easiest and most effective solution to make our citizens love their country is to introduce them to its natural beauty. In Anatolia, there are locations, mountains, forests, and lakes of such beauty that stand in comparison with the most exquisite places in the world; to look upon them and not love them, not feel attached to this land, is simply not possible.... In order to make people feel attached to the land, we are obliged to make these places known to them.  


62 Quoted in Arzu Öztürkmen, “Turkish Tourism at the Door of Europe: Perceptions of Image in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 41 (July 2005), 607.
The inference is clear. For Ülkü, Anatolia did not simply take priority over the European parts of Turkey; Anatolia was Turkey. Republican efforts during this period were actively seeking to reorient Ottoman subjects to be good Turkish citizens. As part of this transformation, a new vision of the Turkish ‘homeland’ had to be established. Home, it was made to seem, was not located on the shores of Gallipoli, where men had bled for the Ottoman Empire. Home lay in the heart of Anatolia where the Turkish nation had secured – arms in hand – its independence against its enemies and where the power of Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) was concentrated.

By contrast, on the shores of Gallipoli, Turkish interaction with the land continued in the same manner as it had for the previous six centuries. While the Allied powers built memorials to honour their dead, in 1936 the Turkish government once again began to build military installations on the peninsula so crucial to the maintenance of their sovereignty. By 1935, Italian territorial ambitions in the Mediterranean had forced Britain to take notice. The Turks, for their part, had been petitioning the British and the French to allow for the remilitarization of the Straits since 1932. All in all, British assessments concluded that the remilitarization of both the Dardanelles and the Bosporus were favorable to the political climate at the time. In June 1936, the Montreux Convention was signed by all signatories of the Lausanne agreements, with the exception of Italy. The agreement allowed merchant shipping to pass through the Straits, but put restrictions on the amount, weight, and type of military vessels allowed passage, depending on whether it was a time of peace or war. Most significantly, the Turkish government gained the right to remilitarize both the Straits and the surrounding land, as

well as receiving full dominion over the previously defenseless areas.\textsuperscript{64} For the first time in over a decade, Turkish soldiers marched onto the Gallipoli Peninsula - now filled with foreign symbols - and prepared to defend the Straits, Istanbul, and the sovereignty of their homeland once more.

 Atatürk died in 1938 and with tension growing in Europe, the Turkish government forged ahead to bolster its military in the event of an attack on the nation’s sovereignty. The Republic was in no way prepared for the hostilities. As a result, defense spending in 1938 was raised to forty-four percent of the government’s total expenditures. Still, the military remained woefully ill-equipped for modern warfare. That same year, the Turks received armaments credits from the British totalling six million British pounds, followed by another twenty-five million the subsequent year. The German Reich, the Ottoman Empire’s former ally in the First World War and ruled since 1933 by Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers’ Party, attempted to woo Ankara with loans only to be rebuffed by the Republican government.\textsuperscript{65}

 For the entirety of the Second World War, Turkey’s new president, Ismet Inönü, managed to maintain the neutrality – and territorial integrity - of the Turkish state by stalling its entrance into the war until February 1945 when victory for the Allies was ensured.\textsuperscript{66} Yet, the fate of the Straits was once more in jeopardy. Statements by Stalin that the Montreux Convention was ‘unsuitable’ to Soviet interests renewed Turkish suspicions of Soviet expansionism.\textsuperscript{67} Subsequent attempts by the Soviet Union to

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{64} Hugh Pope and Nicole Pope, \textit{Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After} (London: John Murray Publishers, 1996), 72.
\textsuperscript{65} Hale, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000}, 65.
\textsuperscript{66} For more on Turkey’s policy of neutrality, see Çağlar Keyder, \textit{State and Class in Turkey} and Selim Deringil, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An ‘Active’ Neutrality}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
\textsuperscript{67} Hale, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000}, 101.
\end{footnotes}
pressure the Turks into negotiating bilaterally without the support of the other Allied powers failed, and the Straits remained an important point of contention in the Cold War that was to follow, changing the nature of Turkish government relations with the Allied powers, and interestingly its relationship to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The lack of Turkish memorialization of Gallipoli during the period discussed can be seen as part of Turkish government efforts to construct and maintain two interrelated concepts: nationalism and sovereignty. In regards to its own citizens, the Turkish government worked fervently to turn them from “traditional” Ottomans into progressive and modern Turks. As part of this transformation, the eyes of the nation had to shift from Istanbul, the epitome of a multi-ethnic Ottoman city, to Ankara, the distinctly Turkish city located in the heartland of the former empire. Urban reconstruction in Anatolia was undertaken in order to “Turkify” citizens, bombarding them with imagery of both Republican values, as well as the correlating ideals of Western modernity and progress. Perhaps, the government in Ankara hoped that by inhabiting these cities, citizens would have no choice but to live the Atatürkian vision and hence become part of the new Turkish nation.

Distant, inaccessible, and sparsely populated, Gallipoli simply did not lend itself to the task of manufacturing acceptable concepts of Turkish citizenry during this time period. Additionally, permeated with the symbols and monuments of other nations, the

It is significant that the British and French acquiesced to Soviet demands of renegotiating the issue of the Straits, in order to keep the Soviets happy and fighting. A betrayal not lost on the Turkish government. For example, Sibel Bozdoğan notes that Turkish architects and city planners during the 1930’s rejected Ottoman revivalist architecture in favor of the European Modern Movement and ‘cubic architecture.’ The simple and austere nature of much of this new architecture was meant to signify the rationality, practicality and progressive nature of the Turkish Republic in contrast to its decadent Ottoman predecessors and to counteract the West’s Orientalist vision of Turkey. In addition, parks were constructed so that people of all classes, ages, and genders could meet. The presence of women was especially important as it was meant to have freed Turkish women from their oppressive past. For more information, see Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic, 56-80.
peninsula reeked of something that the founders of the republic were intent on distancing themselves from, namely the precarious nature of Ottoman sovereignty compromised as it was by large measures of European Great Power influence. The novelty of Turkish nationalism, centred on Turkish ethnicity and culture, was far too vulnerable to be exposed to these variant nationalisms, religions, and cultures. The choice of Anatolia as symbolic homeland and birthplace for the nation was logical for another reason. At the center of Turkish territory, Anatolia was cushioned by the outer regions of Turkey. This buffer zone enabled reforms and social revolutions to occur relatively unhindered by outside interference. Rarely, if ever, did Ankara come under threat of attack from foreign interests. On the other hand, with its long and storied history of foreign invasion, Gallipoli was an unstable and potentially dangerous locale.

Yet, Gallipoli did have an important part to play in the nation's concept of itself. While Turkish citizens were oriented to look inward to Anatolia, the government was forced, under threat of attack, to look to both the interior and exterior of the Turkish nation. Although Anatolia was relatively safe from attack, for Turkification to occur, the nation's sovereignty had to be ensured. Analysts of the region have often discussed the existence of the so-called “Sèvres Mentality” in Turkey. According to the theory, after Allied Powers attempted to dismember the Ottoman Empire following the First World War, a certain paranoia of future dismemberment took hold of Turkish government officials. The paranoia – sometimes delusional, sometimes valid – created a frenzy over Turkish issues of sovereignty and a mistrust of foreigners.69

Maintaining the integrity and wholeness of Turkish territory became vital to

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inculcating Atatürkian concepts of nationality and nation. The construction of the Turkish nation could not occur unless the physical and metaphoric Turkish nation-state was maintained in its entirety. As an outer region with considerable strategic importance, Gallipoli formed one of the last lines of defense for Anatolia. But, in addition, Turkish sovereignty over the peninsula and the Dardanelles was required for Turkish sovereignty as a whole to exist. In this sense, issues of sovereignty and defense, which in normal circumstances primarily become a concern of foreign policy, henceforth became intertwined with domestic conceptions of Turkish nationalism and sovereignty.

As seen earlier, the reconfiguration of space – the construction of parks, monuments, and buildings – and the production of a Turkish nationalist narrative of birth were essential for the making of a new Turkish citizenry and a purely ‘Turkish’ space. Turkish sovereignty issues in outer regions, on the other hand, were countered with demonstrations of military strength and presence. With the ceding of territory through the Treaty of Lausanne and the construction of foreign memorials and monuments on Gallipoli, the former Allied Powers of the First World War had in some ways compromised the sovereignty of the Turkish nation. The Turkish government’s response, however, did not include the construction of memorials. Instead, after remilitarization was authorized in 1936, the government simply sent the military back to guard Gallipoli against its enemies. The move, of course, was made to protect Gallipoli and the Dardanelles from further attacks, but was impotent against the symbolic violations of Turkish space that had already occurred.
Foreign Relations and the Lack of Reconciliatory Rhetoric

Today, the narrative of Gallipoli as a site of reconciliation is as prevalent as any Turkish narrative of national birth. Certainly, it is widely believed that the roots of this enduring friendship between former enemies had indeed taken hold during the 1915 campaign, and was the basis upon which amity was advanced progressively throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Upon visiting the memorials of Gallipoli on Anzac Day 2004, one Australian reporter stated, “The walk helped me realize just how special the friendship is between Turkish, Australian, and New Zealanders. It’s a bond that has survived almost nine generations which we can still learn from today.”

Similarly, during the 2007 Anzac Day Dawn Ceremonies at Gallipoli, the throngs of Australians and New Zealand pilgrims were consistently regaled with stories of Turkish-Anzac camaraderie that stretched back all the way to the campaign.

Material for the reconciliatory narrative is plentiful these days, and can be found on several of the countless, contemporary Australian or Turkish websites dealing with the 1915 campaign. For example, a popular Australian website, Digger History, contends that the friendship began on 24 May 1915 when an informal truce was arranged between the Anzacs and the Ottoman military forces to bury the dead. Digger History quotes C.E.W. Bean, Australia’s official historian of the campaign, in order to make their point:

A friendly attitude developed between the soldiers of the two hostile sides who were supposed to kill each other. They were giving the buttons they tore off their uniforms to us as a war memento, and in return they were asking for something else. Our soldiers were not allowed to give their buttons because of the military regulations of the time. They looked for other things, and in the end tokens like coins changed hands. At the same time, the soldiers were offering chocolates and sweets to each other while trying to communicate in sign language. The truce commission tried to prohibit this sort of friendship,

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but as soon as the commission observers left, shows of friendship continued.71

Several other stories are recounted year after year at the Anzac Day Celebrations. One of the most popular tales is that of the old Ottoman batman who was allowed to leave the trenches to hang laundry in no-man’s land. The Anzacs, it is said, loved seeing him emerge and would not fire upon him. Perhaps the most famous story involves an anonymous Ottoman soldier who upon seeing a wounded British combatant in no-mans land, bravely strode out, lifted the man into his arms and safely delivered him to the enemy trenches. The veracity of these stories is not in question. Undoubtedly, the majority of these tales have some factual basis. Instead, much like the prior section, the goal here is to question the existence of sentiments or narratives that trace their origins to the 1915 campaign. Although stories of friendship might be true, they did not directly result in any reconciliation between the governments of Turkey and the various Allied powers.

Before looking at the post-war period, two aspects of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign warrant attention. Firstly, the campaign has often described by historians and the media as the “Gentlemen’s War,” in reference to the apparently civilized manner in which the combatants treated their enemies.72 Yet it remains to be shown how the Gallipoli campaign was any more ‘gentlemanly’ than other battles during the First World War. For example, the truce observed between Anzacs and Ottomans is by no means unique. Historian Malcolm Brown notes that such truces, involving the exchange of gifts and kind words between enemies, have a long history in European warfare. The Gallipoli

truce is not even the most famous truce of the First World War; that distinction being
given to the 1914 Christmas truce between the British and German military forces on the
Western Front.  

Moreover, as with any arena of warfare, Gallipoli was not free of brutality. Dysentery, starvation, and high death tolls all tarnish its image as an example of civilized warfare. More importantly, there are many stories of unsavory behavior. For example, as Anzac soldiers bathed and relaxed in the oceans, Ottoman soldiers would often snipe their unarmed victims. Thus, while the stories of friendship and camaraderie are true, there is more than enough evidence to suggest that stories of brutality and disrespect exist as well. And yet, the stories of brutality have conveniently been overlooked by the Turkish government in recent years.

The post-war period was no different; in fact, the evidence suggests that the tensions between the former enemies were as high as ever. In 1919, the War Graves Registration Unit arrived in Gallipoli, and as described in the previous section, disparaged the “Turkish” nation and its people. The description of “heathen Turks” violating the graves and bodies of dead Australian soldiers, obviously cast the “Turkish” nation in a less than positive light. Without a doubt, the sight of desecrated graves was enough to raise the ire of Australians, but tensions went above and beyond those particular circumstances. In fact, certain members of the WGRU felt genuine animosity to the “Turkish” nation even prior to discovering the alleged desecrations. This is evident from the very first action the WGRU took on the peninsula. When the WGRU came ashore, they encountered a small, makeshift Ottoman monument created by Ottoman

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soldiers, celebrating the Anzac’s departure. Members of the WGRU measured the monument, took pictures of it, and then proceeded to blow it to pieces. Fragments of the destroyed monument were then sold in Sydney, Australia, to pay for the medical costs of crippled veterans. Relations were clearly strained between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied nations at this juncture. The First World War had only recently ended, and resentment on both sides was understandably still present. Yet the destruction of the Ottoman soldiers’ monument, as well as the besmirching of Ottoman involvement at Gallipoli, clearly speaks to the lack of reconciliation at this time.

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne is often assumed to be further evidence of this reconciliation between former enemies. To some contemporary scholars, the startling, beneficent cession of land on Gallipoli to the Allies is irrefutable evidence of the friendship Mustafa Kemal desired with the Allied powers. Certainly, Atatürk wished to establish cordial relations with the British and the French, but why would the new Turkish nation, which had fought so vehemently to maintain the physical integrity of Turkish soil, suddenly relinquish parts of a prized military outpost? Other than the friendship hypothesis, most scholars have been at a loss to explain the Gallipoli clause. Muammar Kaylan appears to suggest that the substantial concessions of Lausanne – including Gallipoli – were an example of ver kultur or washing one’s hand of something. In this case, Kemal concedes land, thereby washing his hands of the Ottoman Empire and allowing his new nation-state to come to fruition.

Perhaps the simplest explanation is that in the aftermath of the First World War, the Republic of Turkey was a fledgling state devastated by war and factionalism. It is

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75 Scates, *Return to Gallipoli*, 138.
not inconceivable that Atatürk saw the cession of graves on Gallipoli as a more than acceptable loss if said loss would ensure the stability of his country while at the same time cultivating diplomatic relations. After years of warfare, Turkey needed time to recover; Lausanne could provide that time. Viewing the ceding of territory as a practical sacrifice rather than a symbolic gesture of friendship has credence. To a significant extent, the treaty of Lausanne normalized relations between the new Republic of Turkey and the Allied states, and gave the new state some breathing space and time to deal with internal matters.

Diplomatic relations might have been improved by the ceding of territory on the peninsula, but the transaction did not re-create Gallipoli as a site of reconciliation between enemies. With the construction of foreign memorials on the peninsula in the 1920s, Gallipoli became a minor centre of pilgrimage for Britons, Australians and New Zealanders. The dedication shown by foreign veterans and their family members once more stands in stark contrast to the strictly strategic approach of the Turkish government and its citizens to Gallipoli. But, more than that, the documentation of these pilgrimages, which include the first-hand accounts of pilgrims, reveals that there was no such reconciliation between Turks and foreigners at Gallipoli; in fact, even interaction between Turks and foreigners appears limited. The lack of interaction might have been due to Turkey's foreign policy at the time. Feroz Ahmad states that “The foreign relations of the early republic reflected the desire of its founders to isolate themselves from foreign adventures and interference in order to create a new Turkey.”

As early as 1923, small foreign pilgrimages were making their way to Gallipoli. Far

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from encouraging pilgrims to interact with Turks, the organizer of the 1923 pilgrimage recommended that the tourists guard their rugs and wraps lest they be stolen by locals.\textsuperscript{78}

In 1926, a British delegation of veterans and family members made a pilgrimage to Gallipoli and Salonika. The organizers, the St. Barnabas Church, and the pilgrims clearly had high praise for the IWGC and the work it had undertaken. Their reviews of their Turkish hosts, however, were far from glowing. Despite receiving official permission from Ankara to land boats at Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay, the delegation encountered what one pilgrim dubbed the ‘mulish obstinacy’ of the local Turkish authorities.\textsuperscript{79} The landing was denied, much to the chagrin of the pilgrims. The tension between local authorities and pilgrims notwithstanding, the St. Barnabas report is a notable document for another reason. Throughout the entire forty plus pages of personal testimonies, not one kind word is spoken about the Turkish government or people nor are kudos given for the bravery of Ottoman soldiers during the 1915 campaign. Reconciliation, it would appear, was not on the agenda for the pilgrims of St. Barnabas.

Every recent manifestation of the reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli has mentioned Atatürk’s 1934 dedication to the foreign dead in Gallipoli. In response to the growing number of foreign visitors to Gallipoli, Atatürk wrote:

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives...you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmet to us, where they lie, side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers who sent their sons from faraway countries wipe away your tears. Your sons are now lying in our bosom and

\textsuperscript{78} Michael Hickey, “Early Tours to the Peninsula”, \textit{The Gallipolian} 103 (Winter 2003/2004), 50.
\textsuperscript{79} Imperial War Museum Collections (London, United Kingdom) - Misc 53 (816), Description of the St. Barnabas pilgrimage to Salonika and Gallipoli, August – September 1926, 36.
are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land, they have become our sons as well.\textsuperscript{80}

The quote was and continues to be lauded as a great gesture by a great man. Today, it is assumed to be another indicator of the long and special relationship Turkey developed and continues to develop with Gallipoli’s various foreign representatives.

 Atatürk’s words might indeed have been designed to reconcile differences with Gallipoli’s foreign devotees, but the words do not depict Gallipoli as a shared space. In varying statements, Atatürk mentions that the soldiers are lying “in the soil of a friendly country,” “here in this country of ours,” and “in our bosom.” Lastly, Atatürk appropriates foreign soldiers, claiming that they are now Turkish sons as well. The homily does not condone the violation of Turkish soil on Gallipoli nor does it imply sharing Gallipoli with foreign powers. Instead, it reifies Turkish sovereignty over the land and the bodies of foreign soldiers as well. This is not to say that the speech’s main priority was to confirm Turkish sovereignty over the peninsula; clearly there is a diplomatic purpose.

In particular, Atatürk’s words emphasize his desire for Turkey to share and partake in the civilization and modernity of “the West”; an ideal he consistently sought to publicize amongst foreign diplomats and Turkish citizens alike.\textsuperscript{81} But, to suggest that the speech forms part of a long history of reconciliation on the peninsula is misleading. In fact, in the wake of Atatürk’s speech, it appears that interactions in Gallipoli between the Turkish government and foreign pilgrims continued as they had in the previous decade. Upon visiting Gallipoli in 1935, an Australian mother commented that hotels were dirty,

\textsuperscript{80} It is often thought that Atatürk personally delivered the speech to the foreign pilgrims at Gallipoli. In actuality, he sent someone to relay the message to a group of visiting Australians. Today, these words are inscribed at Anzac Cove. Basarin, Basarin, and Fewster, Gallipoli: The Turkish Story. 24.

\textsuperscript{81} Mango, Atatürk, 331, 474,
the staff was rude, and goods and services were blatantly overpriced.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Conclusion}

This chapter has demonstrated that despite recent Turkish government efforts to present Gallipoli and its history as the progenitor of the Turkish nation and of reconciliation with former enemies, in reality, it was not considered as such during the inter-war period. In terms of narrativizing Gallipoli, Turkish government involvement with the site in the twenty-four years after the 1915 campaign was chiefly limited to practical, strategic concerns. For Turks during this period, Gallipoli was not produced as a site of national birth or pride. Paradoxically, in spite of its apparent value to nationalist agendas (i.e., Atatürk’s victories, defeat of the Allies, defense of sovereignty), Gallipoli was ignored for other nationalist projects in Anatolia. The Turkish government actively sought to construct Anatolia as the site where the Turkish nation and nationalism were born; Gallipoli was figuratively and literally peripheral to this Anatolian-centred nationalist narrative. Thus, during the period in question, there appears to be little to no narrativization of Gallipoli on the Turkish side.

Similarly, after the 1915 campaign, there was minimal reconciliation being undertaken at Gallipoli. Material for the reconciliatory narrative – stories of truce and amity, Atatürk’s 1934 dedication, etc – did exist, but it was not narrativized at this juncture, nor were the particulars expounded in any detail by foreign pilgrims. That the first-hand accounts of pilgrims mention no praise or admiration for Turks or the Turkish nation suggests that Gallipoli was not reconciling former enemies. Furthermore, the Turkish government made little to no effort in courting foreigners in Gallipoli; instead,

\textsuperscript{82} Scates, \textit{Return to Gallipoli}, 99.
through its actions, the government often heightened tensions between itself and foreigners on the peninsula.

The lack of Gallipoli-centered narrativization by the Turkish government during this period suggests that the relationships, sentiments and bonds that the contemporary narratives inspire were not the natural, inevitable products of the 1915 Battle of Gallipoli as they are often presented to be. Subsequently, it must be assumed that the narratives were constructed at some point in time. Lastly, the fact that the Turkish government did not attempt to construct the narratives in the thirty years after the 1915 campaign suggests that Gallipoli was not perceived as useful for the purposes of nation-building or fostering foreign relations.

Yet, as demonstrated, the lack of Turkish narrativization of Gallipoli during the first twenty-four years after the campaign did not signify Gallipoli’s lack of importance to the Turkish government, but simply a different kind of importance. Treating Gallipoli strictly as a military outpost was due to its significance in maintaining the physical integrity of the Turkish nation. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the Second World War and the Cold War that was to follow would drastically alter the nature of Turkish government interaction with the peninsula and its foreign inhabitants, spurring the true beginnings of Turkish narrative construction.
2. THE REASONS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF TURKISH GOVERNMENT NARRATIVIZATION IN THE COLD WAR ERA, 1939-1979

As the previous chapter demonstrated, during the early years of the Turkish republic, Gallipoli and its history were treated as ineffectual in or superfluous to cultivating notions of citizenry and nationalism for the Turkish public. For the most part, it was also neglected as a tool in propagating sentiments of reconciliation between Turkey and its former First World War enemies. Yet, as will be shown, the Second World War and the Cold War that were to follow would alter the relationship of the Turkish government to the Gallipoli peninsula. This chapter will focus on such alterations as well as on the uneven development of Gallipoli's nationalist and reconciliatory narratives by successive Turkish governments.

One of the main purposes of this chapter is to demonstrate how Turkish government memorialization and narrativization of Gallipoli arose out of and conformed to the domestic and foreign politics of the Turkish Republic in the wake of the Second World War. Gallipoli can be seen as a microcosm of Turkish domestic politics and foreign relations. Activities and interactions on the peninsula certainly do affect political life in Turkey as well as relations with the foreign powers represented there. But more than that, Gallipoli provides a forum in which both national politics and foreign affairs are conducted, negotiated, and constructed. Secondly, despite the contemporary inclination to view the nationalist and reconciliatory narratives as separate entities, this chapter will show that they are in fact inextricably linked.
In his book *Suits and Uniforms*, Philip Robins elaborates on a duality inherent in Turkey's approach to foreign relations:

On the one hand Turkey is earnest, desperate almost, in its commitment to being a European state... At the same time, Turkey is also profoundly suspicious of Western Europe and what it regards as the political agenda of neo-Imperialists, Christian Democrats, and liberal humanists alike, which it fears will risk if not result in the weakening and even the dismantling of the Turkish state.¹

In the former instance, Turkey remains committed to Atatürk's vision of the nation as a European state, and a vital part of Western civilization. With this in mind, many Turkish politicians have played up Turkey's role as a bridge between East and West. Yet, in the latter case, due to paranoias such as the Sèvres Mentality, as discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey has what Robins has termed a “thin-skinned nationalism.” As a result, Turkish politicians are quick to perceive insult, injury, or threat whenever Western powers are perceived as overstepping their bounds or endangering Turkish sovereignty; subsequently, relations quickly deteriorate.²

A paradox was thus created. While Turkish policymakers consistently tried to befriend, attract, and collaborate with Western nations, they often subsequently viewed them as manipulative, intrusive and potentially dangerous. The result is twofold: First, it becomes impossible for Turkish policymakers to separate foreign relations from national, domestic politics because the perceived presence of foreigners or foreign influence almost inevitably denotes a potential attack on

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¹ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 100.
² As Robins makes clear, however, these sentiments are not consistently manifested or harbored against Europeans. In fact, as will be shown, the time period immediately following the Second World War actually tempered any of the negative feelings that Turkish policymakers might have felt towards their European counterparts; a phenomenon that was not to last. Ibid, 100, 141.
domestic interests. Secondly, although these policymakers consistently try to integrate with Europe and the international community, their distrust of foreign powers leads them to over-assert their dominance over Europeans and other foreign nationals in the domestic sphere. The paradox becomes especially prevalent at Gallipoli due to the large, fixed foreign presence on the peninsula.

Democratization, Amicable Foreign Relations and Turkish Narrative Nascense on the Gallipoli Peninsula, 1939 to 1957

After the 1936 Montreux Convention, foreign pilgrimages to the Gallipoli peninsula came largely to a halt. As the Second World War loomed over Europe and threats to the Straits from the Italians and the Soviet Union concurrently increased, the Turkish government blocked access roads, re-militarized the Dardanelles and re-armed their forts on the peninsula. Even the IWGC, though guaranteed access by the Treaty of Lausanne, was restricted to particular areas and forced to work under the watchful eye of the Turkish military. The re-militarization of Gallipoli by Turkish authorities was not surprising given the tense climate and the historical proclivity of the Turkish government in dealing with the peninsula strictly as a strategic military outpost. Indeed, as the Second World War began in 1939, one would have expected a similar treatment of Gallipoli to go on unhindered.

Yet, during the Second World War, while the Turkish government continued its program of re-militarization on Gallipoli, it also began to infuse the peninsula with symbolic meaning by constructing various small memorials. In 1939, the Gözetleme Tepe Cemetery and Memorial was constructed on the site of a former Turkish observation post.

3 Scates, Return to Gallipoli, 134.
The inscription on the memorial’s tower read: “With pride, how happy is he who can say ‘I am a Turk’.” Subsequently, in 1941, an obelisk-shaped memorial was erected to honour the former Field Marshall and Chief of the General Staff, Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak. Çakmak, who passed away in 1940, had commanded troops at Gallipoli but was more renowned for his work during the Turkish War of Independence in which he supported Mustafa Kemal and won a number of important battles against the Greeks. Only two people in the history of the Turkish Republic have ever received the rank of Field Marshall: Çakmak and Atatürk. A memorial was also built in 1943 at the Zığındere Dressing Post to commemorate Kemal Bey, Staff Commander of the 2nd Division, as well as soldiers of the 25th and 26th Infantry Regiments. Lastly, in 1944, almost thirty years after the Battle of Gallipoli, the Turkish government finally set plans in motion to build a major memorial on the peninsula. An architectural contest was won by three Turkish citizens, but financial problems delayed the eventual construction.

For most of the first three decades of the Turkish Republic, Gallipoli had been considered by the Turkish government to be a mere military post, though one of significant strategic importance. So why, with the onset of the Second World War, was President İnönü changing course and constructing new memorials and cemeteries on the Gallipoli peninsula? One possible reason might be that although Turkey would maintain its neutrality in the war until 1945, it was nonetheless forced to prepare in case its

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4 Holt and Holt, Major and Mrs. Holt’s Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli. 127.
5 Ibid. 69.
6 Ibid, 72.
7 Ibid, 121.
8 It should be noted that some of the memorials built on Gallipoli during the Second World War were not funded directly by the Turkish government. A prime example would be the Nuri Yamut Memorial. Built in 1943, the private memorial honours the approximately 10,000 soldiers who were killed near Zığındere. As the story goes, General Nuri Yamut sold his house in Istanbul to fund the project. Governorship of Çanakkale, “Some of the Monuments in Gallipoli Historical National Park”, (2006) http://www.Canakkale.gov.tr/eng_monuments.htm
participation became inevitable. Preparations did not simply include re-militarization, but also entailed bracing a potentially unwilling population for another World War. The Turkish public’s unwillingness to go to war was well-known to the government. A 1943 position paper drawn up for President İnönü by the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated:

Every layer of the population, even the army which in each state is most anxious for war, is opposed to war. Every Turk has understood, today, that Turkey has nothing to gain by entering the war, and that she would enter the field of battle only to protect her own sovereignty, that entry unprovoked by an actual attack or threat against our freedom could only bring our land still more misery, hunger, illness, yes even death and destruction.\(^9\)

Thus, commemorating the Battle of Gallipoli might have been an attempt to revive the memory of a great First World War victory in order to stoke the patriotic fires of Turkish citizens and make involvement in another war more palatable.

Moreover, even without direct participation, the exigency of being in a state of perpetual readiness was causing severe hardships for the Turkish population. Throughout the war, the Turkish armed forces were kept fully mobilized in an attempt to deter foreign attacks.\(^10\) In the agricultural sector, almost one million males were extracted from the labour force, farm animals were confiscated for military purposes, forced labour was instituted, and crop prices were forcefully maintained at a low rate despite the inflationary trend in other industries.\(^11\) In the industrial sector, the declining importation of raw goods and machinery caused the manufacturing output to drop which in turn brought about a rise in stockpiling and profiteering. Furthermore, sky-rocketing inflation caused a deterioration in living standards in both urban and rural areas. The ultimate

\(^11\) Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, 110
consequence was widespread dissatisfaction with government policies. The 1942 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) was perhaps the most infamous wartime measure. In an attempt to raise funds, the Turkish government gave taxation responsibilities to local commissions which would assess the payment capabilities of individuals. Non-Muslims were targeted, often paying at ten times the rate of Muslims and losing their businesses if they could not afford the payments. The government received large windfalls and Muslim profiteers gained new businesses, but the overall damage to the business community and general morale was devastating.

Amidst these highly unpopular measures, the construction of memorials on Gallipoli might have been a way of shoring up support for the Turkish government. The Battle of Gallipoli was not simply an example of a great victory; it was also exemplary of the type of voluntary sacrifice during a time of war that the government desperately needed from their citizenry. By highlighting the plight of Turkish soldiers who followed commanders to their deaths for the sake of the Turkish homeland, perhaps the government sought to provide a model for everyday citizens whose economic hardships paled in comparison. In any case, when the Second World War came to a close, the Turkish government had only just begun to tap into Gallipoli’s symbolic potential. At the end of the war, changed circumstances and new policy decisions would intensify the

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13 Punishments for not paying the tax were often severe. According to Alexis Alexandris, by January 1943, several non-Muslim businessmen were convicted of unwillingness to support the nation and sent to a labour camp at Aşkale in a remote area west of Erzurum. Many others were simply deported. The Allied powers did notice these discriminatory practices, but in their desire to convince Turkey to join the war against the Nazis, refrained from wholly condemning the Turkish government. International faith in Ankara was, however, severely damaged. Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974 (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 222-224.
14 In particular, the Turkish bourgeoisie became aware of how vulnerable they were to the government and grew suspicious of its activities. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey. 114; Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 207.
Turkish government’s interaction with the peninsula.

With the beginning of the Cold War era and the emergence of a new bi-polar world order, Turkey was forced to orient itself towards the United States and its allies. Towards the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union officially retracted its 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey. The Soviet Union’s leader, Joseph Stalin, did offer his friendship, but it was apparent to the Turkish government that any official documentation of amity would be contingent on certain concessions. First, it would be necessary to discard the 1936 Montreux Convention which gave Turkey dominant control of the Straits. Secondly, a new Straits convention with only two signatories, Turkey and the USSR, would be negotiated. Lastly, the new convention would allow for the free passage of Soviet warships, the construction of Soviet bases along the straits, and the cession of parts of eastern Turkey to the Soviet Union.  

The prospects of losing territory and a Soviet military presence on Turkish soil were alarming. Turkish fears of Soviet aggression were than exacerbated by the Soviet takeover of Bulgaria. Many in Turkey thought that with the Soviets on their border, it was only a matter of time before an attack on the Straits would take place.

In 1945, with Soviet threats in mind, and in the hope of gaining protection from the United States as well as membership in the newly created United Nations (UN), Turkey joined the war on the side of the Allies, participated as a founding member in the San Francisco Conference, and by signing the UN charter committed itself to democracy.  

Subsequently, in May of 1945, President İnönü declared that Turkey would move towards democracy and, one month later, announced the need for a major

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15 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000, 111-112.
16 Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, 281.
17 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 208.
opposition party.\textsuperscript{18} The move to a multi-party system can be seen as a result of Turkey's increasing need for the United States, the defeat of totalitarian regimes in Japan and Germany, as well as part of that program of westernization begun under Atatürk. But, it was also due to the vast discontent of the Turkish public towards the Turkish regime. As mentioned earlier, particular policies of the Turkish government during the Second World War had impoverished, persecuted, and angered many segments of the Turkish population. Cem Eroğul notes that the long period of single party rule combined with the harsh measures of the CHP during the war had focused all discontent on the government. Thus, in an effort to divert such frustration to other avenues, the Turkish government opened up the political system to allow new actors onto the stage.\textsuperscript{19}

Democratization and the cultivation of foreign relations with the former Allied Powers were obviously significant events but their relation to the memorialization and narrativization of Gallipoli requires explanation. In January of 1946, Celâl Bayar resigned from the CHP and founded the Democratic Party (DP).\textsuperscript{20} Initially, the DP espoused virtually identical values to the party which had dominated the state and politics under the auspices of a single-party system since the republic’s establishment. Yet, tensions between the two parties soon rose, and in an increasingly competitive atmosphere, ideological and political differences emerged.\textsuperscript{21} Without any competition during the single party era, the CHP - though intent on creating new concepts of citizenry and nationalism through a range of measures including architecture and art - did not have to vie for votes or pander to the public. Yet suddenly, the Turkish people, devoid of a

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 102.
\textsuperscript{20} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey: A Modern History}, 211-212.
\textsuperscript{21} Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975} (London: Hurst, 1977), 14.
political voice for several decades, had a choice in who would lead their nation. Democratization thus meant that the parties had to court voters and take an increasingly populist tone.\(^{22}\)

Of course, democratization in Turkey was, in part, being undertaken to get closer to and eventually become part of the Western bloc. As discussed, diplomatic pressure on the part of the Soviet Union was a major factor in spurring Turkish relations with the United States, but moreover, with the launch of the Marshall Plan in March of 1947, Turkey saw an opportunity to address its economic woes.\(^{23}\) In dire need of funds, Turkey began to court the United States and Britain by democratizing and by seizing various opportunities to meet the representatives of these powers and establish cordial relations.

In March of 1947, a British naval squadron visited Cape Helles on the Gallipoli peninsula despite strict restrictions on mobility still being maintained. In contrast to the pre-World War Two descriptions of Gallipoli visitation, the British delegation reported being cordially greeted by Turkish military authorities.\(^{24}\) Turkish authorities might have been cordial but they were still charged with protecting the sovereignty of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. In August of that same year, the Turkish government, citing the Montreux Convention, seized land on the peninsula that contained French war cemeteries, denied access to French groundskeepers, and proclaimed the area a military


\(^{24}\) Holt and Holt, *Major and Mrs. Holt’s Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli*, 44.

It is worth noting that no Turks were invited to the April 25\(^{th}\), 1946 ANZAC Day celebrations at the Cenotaph in London, England. In attendance were delegations from Australia, New Zealand, France, India, and of course Great Britain. Thus, although the Turkish government was beginning to see Gallipoli as a potential site of reconciliation and amity, the other nations represented at Gallipoli clearly did not share the same sentiments at this juncture. For more on this list of invitees, see The National Archives of the United Kingdom - DO 35/1130, “Position of Representatives Prior to Laying Wreaths” prepared by the Dominions Office, April 1946.
The following year, however, an Australian delegation was granted permission to perform a pilgrimage to Gallipoli for Anzac Day and also reported cordial relations. Even though participants had to conform to strict regulations on mobility, transportation, and photography, the pilgrimage was a success. Afterwards, Arthur Longmore, Air Chief Marshall for the IWGC stated that "The friendliness of the Turks, whether Governors or military officers, has been most noticeable and this aspect no doubt will leave a lasting impression on all members of the party on return to their respective countries."

In 1950, the DP shocked the CHP by winning a landslide victory in the Turkish general elections. Seeing the CHP as anachronistic, the DP under the leadership of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes abandoned statism, re-interpreted Kemalism, and aggressively began suppressing the CHP and other opposition parties. Moreover, although the CHP under İnönü had attempted to grow closer to the former Allied powers since the end of the Second World War, Menderes and the DP were insatiable in their quest to become an ally of the United States and other NATO countries. In the same year he was elected, Menderes had no qualms about sending five thousand Turkish troops across the world to fight in the Korean War; this stands in stark contrast to the policy of the CHP whose position was to maintain neutrality throughout the Second World War unless Turkish sovereignty was threatened. Additionally, during the 1950s, the DP made tourism a part of state policy; undoubtedly, the institutionalization of tourism can be seen as a strategy

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28 Kemal Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays (Boston: Brill, 2004), 10.
29 Arzu Özürkmen, "Turkish Tourism at the Door of Europe: Perceptions of Image in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives", Middle Eastern Studies 41 (July 2005), 609.
to increase foreign travel to Turkey by improving Turkey’s image abroad. For example, in 1951, the Turkish government began construction on a luxury hotel in Istanbul which would be leased and operated by Hilton Hotels International. The following year, the Turkish government initiated a program to clean up Istanbul, which according to one author had, for the previous three decades, “been allowed to run to seed.”

Although foreign aid was slow in coming to Turkey, the DP nonetheless forged ahead in its quest to attract foreign capital to the country. According to Feroz Ahmad, the DP “believed that it was only necessary to change the psychological climate in the country in order to attract large doses of foreign capital.” With altering the ‘psychological climate’ in mind, the budding relationship between Turkey and the West was increasingly framed in symbolic terms for both the Turkish public and Western audiences. In a 1952 speech to the Academy of Political Science, the Turkish ambassador to the U.S., Feridun Erkin, laid out Turkey’s new foreign policy and its conception of its place in the world. According to Erkin, Turkey was now part of a “community of destiny,” which shared, “a spirit of international and human solidarity.” In practical terms, Erkin was referring to Turkey’s 1952 induction into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); but conceiving of NATO as a ‘community of destiny’ allowed the Turkish government to frame the practical, security issue in a more palatable symbolism. Turkey’s newfound partnership with the U.S. and other NATO countries was in large part based upon the utilitarian needs of the Turkish state. Indeed, after Turkey’s acceptance into NATO, the Americans provided the Turkish government with enormous amounts of

financial and military aid, even going as far as reforming Turkey’s military schools. But, to become a part of this ‘community of destiny’ and receive all the subsequent benefits necessitated more than the functional exchange of aid and strategic military assistance. In addition to pragmatic monetary and security concerns, the re-orientation of Turkey’s place in the world necessitated a shift on an ideological and symbolic level.

Gallipoli was an especially attractive option for the DP government in its quest to alter the attitude of Turks to their government, of Turks to foreigners and vice versa. On the European side of the Dardanelles, Gallipoli provided both literally and figuratively a bridge between the Asiatic and the European, between East and West. Already permeated with the symbols of foreign, Western countries, and an established site of pilgrimage, Gallipoli was an ideal location for improving Turko-foreign relations. Additionally, as Annie E. Coombs has rightly noted:

Monuments are animated and re-animated only through performance and that performances or rituals focused around a monument are conjunctural. The visibility of a monument is in fact entirely contingent upon the debates concerning the reinterpretation of history that take place at moments of social and political transition.

Thus, for their own monuments to be useful, the government needed Turks to view them. With this in mind, for the first time, the Turkish government took it upon themselves to both organize and finance a pilgrimage to Gallipoli by Turkish veterans in 1952.

More than a simple national memorial ceremony, the August 1952 pilgrimage offered the Turkish government the opportunity to break bread with their powerful new

34 Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 96.
36 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/101894, “Anniversary of the Turkish Victory at Çanakkale in the Gallipoli Campaign: Details of the Pilgrimage Organized by the Turkish Ex-Servicemen’s associations” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 23 August 1952.
allies. Hence, in another first, the Turkish government invited several other governments
to jointly take part in the pilgrimage. British and French delegations were invited and did
attend, but the Australians and New Zealanders, though invited, were not present at the
event. The vast majority of nationalities and ethnicities who fought at Gallipoli—East
Indians, South Africans, Arabs, etc—were not invited to the 1952 event. Instead, Turkey
invited a delegation from the United States; a nation that did not participate in the 1915
Battle of Gallipoli but was the major foreign financier of the new Turkish government.
The invitation of the Americans, and the neglect of the countless other nationalities that
fought at Gallipoli delineates the extent of Turkey’s conception of the ‘community of
destiny’ in which they now took part.

Along with the foreign delegations, the Turkish government had invited four
hundred Turkish veterans, as well as several members of the Turkish press and Reuters
foreign agency. In several speeches, various Turkish veterans of the 1915 campaign and
government officials paid tribute to the role played by Atatürk and to the heroics of
“Turkish” soldiers. Simultaneously, they applauded their opponents. At one point
during the ceremony, the Turkish General ihsan Eric referred to the British soldiers as
“gentlemen fighters;” in return, one British officer proclaimed that the Turkish soldier
was a “high-minded combatant.” At the end, it was hoped that the joint pilgrimage would

37 During the early 1950s, the Menderes government worked hard to appropriate the memory of Atatürk for
its own purposes. In 1951, the government passed Law number 7872, “Crimes Against Atatürk,” which
punished all those who insulted the former leader. In 1953, the government institutionalized the practice of
pilgrimages to Atatürk’s mausoleum in Ankara. Gallipoli, the site of Atatürk’s first well-known victories
could be seen as part of the DP’s ploy to resurrect Atatürk’s memory for reinforcing nationalist sentiment
or restoring faith in and loyalty to the government. For more information see Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the
State, 188-190; Wilson, “The Persistence of the Turkish Nation in the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk”, 93-114.
become an annual event.\textsuperscript{38}

Was the 1952 pilgrimage merely a show to attract and befriend foreigners? Or was it a ploy to engender new concepts of Turkish nationalism, citizenship as well as loyalty to the new DP government? As a matter of fact, the 1952 Turkish memorialization of Gallipoli could not help but be both nationalist and diplomatic in purpose. If the Turkish government desired to use Gallipoli to reconcile or improve relations with foreign powers, it had to do so while celebrating its own participation at the site. Odes to the honour and valour of Turkey’s former foreign opponents had to occur while celebrating the Turkish victory because, of course, the Turkish government could not celebrate the fact that the Allies invaded.

On the other hand, the DP government was also commemorating the great Turkish victory at Gallipoli partly because of its propagandistic value. At this juncture, Menderes and the DP were using any excuse to dazzle the Turkish public with, as Cem Eroğul states, “continuous foundation-laying ceremonies.”\textsuperscript{39} But, to celebrate the national victory at Gallipoli had to involve some recognition of foreign powers due to the large volume of foreign memorials which vastly outnumbered and outsized their Turkish counterparts. Most importantly, praising its former opponents allowed the Turkish government to acknowledge the presence of foreign symbols and pilgrims and incorporate them into a nationalist celebration while simultaneously acclimatizing the Turkish public to the DP’s exceptionally pro-Western foreign policy. On this note, it is worth mentioning that according to the British government’s representative in Istanbul, the Turkish press gave

\textsuperscript{38} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/101894, “Anniversary of the Turkish Victory at Çanakkale in the Gallipoli Campaign: Details of the Pilgrimage Organized by the Turkish Ex-Servicemen’s Association” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 23 August 1952.

\textsuperscript{39} Eroğul, “The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71”, 111.
preference in coverage to the statements of British veterans over those of their Turkish contemporaries. The statements by British veterans showed the magnanimity of foreigners while simultaneously extolling the heroism of “Turkish” soldiers. Thus, the statements had the dual effect of promoting Turkish nationalism, while simultaneously integrating Turkey’s new foreign friends and foreign policy into a narrative that exalted the Turkish nation; the admiration of and cooperation with foreign powers henceforth could become an integral part of official Turkish politics and a commendable quality for Turkish citizens to emulate.

In a larger sense, however, the respect shown to foreigners at Gallipoli could also be seen as an attempt to control the foreign presence on the peninsula in a non-military manner. The previous chapter demonstrated that prior to 1939, the Turkish authorities often sought to counter and control foreign pilgrimages with their military presence and by constraining the mobility and access of foreign visitors. Combining Turkish pilgrimages to Gallipoli with those of other nations allowed the Turkish government to exercise a certain amount of control over foreign movement on the peninsula. The foreign delegations were received with military honours which once more confirmed Turkish military superiority and sovereignty over the peninsula. Foreigners were also escorted around the peninsula by the Turkish army and navy. As a result, a constant vigil was maintained over the foreign presence and the government-produced itinerary stipulated where foreign delegates could and could not venture.

40 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/101894, “Anniversary of the Turkish Victory at Çanakkale in the Gallipoli Campaign: Details of the Pilgrimage Organized by the Turkish Ex-Servicemen’s Association” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 23 August 1952.
41 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/101894, “Anniversary of the Turkish Victory at Çanakkale in the Gallipoli Campaign: Details of the Pilgrimage Organized by the Turkish Ex-Servicemen’s Association” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 23 August 1952.
Following the 1952 pilgrimage, the Menderes government resurrected its plans for the construction of a major memorial on the Gallipoli peninsula. The timing was, of course, questionable. Tasman Malcolm Millington, the IWGC’s Area Superintendent at Gallipoli, questioned why the Turks would suddenly after so many decades finally decide to construct a memorial on par with the ones maintained by the British Commonwealth countries. During the pilgrimage, Turkish politicians and veterans had commended France and the British Commonwealth on the construction of their memorials. Moreover, according to the British Consul-General in Istanbul, the Turkish government appeared ashamed and disappointed that no suitable Turkish equivalents existed. Subsequently, the Turkish press seized on the issue and frequently commented on the disparity in memorialization. Seemingly embarrassed by being outdone on its own soil, the Menderes government appears to have had no recourse other than to go ahead with the construction of the stately memorial that its predecessor had planned in 1944. The existence of foreign memorials more grandiose than their own thus appears to have been a major factor in accelerating, intensifying and constructing nationalist sentiments around Gallipoli.

Yet, it must be remembered that this newfound focus on Gallipoli as a nationalist site did not truly occur until contact between the Turkish and foreign governments was

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42 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, Leslie Pott to Miss S.M. Musos, 2 December 1953.
43 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/101894, “Anniversary of the Turkish Victory at Çanakkale in the Gallipoli Campaign: Details of the Pilgrimage Organized by the Turkish Ex-Servicemen’s Association” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 23 August 1952.
44 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, “Turkish ex-Servicemen’s Pilgrimage to the Dardanelles, August 10-12, 1953” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 18 August 1953.
45 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, “Turkish ex-Servicemen’s Pilgrimage to the Dardanelles, August 10-12, 1953” prepared by the British Consulate General Istanbul, 18 August 1953.
established during the 1952 joint pilgrimage. Although contact between the Turkish
government and foreigners had occurred at Gallipoli in the past, the relationship had
lacked a common basis. Foreigners had come to commemorate and memorialize
Gallipoli’s memory while the Turkish government was there in a military capacity to
protect the sovereignty of the Dardanelles. In 1952, however, the two sides came together
for a mutual purpose: the commemoration and memorialization of the 1915 Gallipoli
campaign. Suddenly on the same playing field as the foreigners, the Turkish government
found itself competing with them over Gallipoli. Since the competition took place on its
own soil, this was a contest that the Turkish government could not afford to lose.

The construction of a large Turkish memorial soon became a top priority, but
funds for the project were so low that the construction was discontinued several times.
After the 1952 pilgrimage, however, the Turkish government was resolute in its quest to
raise funds for the memorial’s construction. The appeal for funds was met through
informal channels by the British Legion in Turkey who donated 2,450 Turkish lira.\textsuperscript{46} The
Turkish newspaper \textit{Milliyet} also started a national fundraising campaign for the
memorial, but the very act of receiving funds from foreign powers for a national
memorial suggests an even tighter linkage between the promotion of Gallipoli as both a
nationalist and reconciliatory site. Moreover, just as Turkey was wooing foreign, Western
powers for international aid in restoring their economy, the Menderes government was
similarly utilizing the reconciliatory appeal of Gallipoli to raise foreign funds for a
national memorial project.

Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, the memorialization of the Gallipoli

\textsuperscript{46} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, A.C. Maby to L.T. Colonel T.L. Binns,
12 February 1953.
campaign slowly expanded. The 1953 pilgrimage was similar to its 1952 predecessor: praise was exchanged, both the Turkish and foreign press were present, and the Turkish government provided the itinerary and the military transportation. There were, however, two notable occurrences. First, while the Turkish government brought approximately the same number of Turkish veterans, they additionally paid for a large party of Turkish students to attend as well.\(^{47}\) The addition of students to the Gallipoli commemorations suggests that the Turkish government saw Gallipoli as a powerful educational tool. The presence of students also provided a wonderful opportunity for the press to photograph the youth of Turkey learning about a pivotal moment in ‘Turkish’ history. Secondly, the Turkish government again directly requested that Australian and New Zealand delegations be present the following year.\(^ {48}\) Invitations might have been given in order to expand Turkey’s Western base of support, to bring Australia’s and New Zealand’s pilgrimages under Turkish control, or to appease the Australian government which had expressed concern over the construction of the new Turkish memorial on the peninsula.\(^ {49}\) In any case, the Turkish government was looking to expand the joint pilgrimage ceremonies on the peninsula.

The Turkish government was not simply interested in furthering the reconciliatory opportunities that Gallipoli offered, but was also moving quickly to cement Gallipoli’s nationalist appeal. In 1954, the first stone was laid at the \(\text{Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial - the main Turkish memorial under construction.}^{50}\) For the fortieth anniversary of the

\(^{47}\) The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, “Turkish ex-Servicemen’s Pilgrimage to the Dardanelles, August 10-12, 1953” prepared by British Consulate General Istanbul, 18 August 1953.

\(^{48}\) The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, “Turkish ex-Servicemen’s Pilgrimage to the Dardanelles, August 10-12, 1953” prepared by British Consulate General Istanbul, 18 August 1953.

\(^{49}\) The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/107591, Author Unknown to N.J.A. Cheetham, 27 February 1953.

\(^{50}\) Holt and Holt, \textit{Major and Mrs. Holt’s Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli}, 121.
Gallipoli campaign in 1955, a set of four commemorative stamps depicting scenes of the battle was issued by the Turkish government. On the 60 kuruş stamp, Atatürk was shown standing in one of his iconic poses with the words “Çanakkale 18 Mart (March)” written below. The famous “Turkish” minelayer The Nusret sailed across the 30 kuruş stamp, while the 15 kuruş stamp featured a map of the Gallipoli peninsula. Finally, and most interestingly, the 20 kuruş stamp depicted the celebrated Colonel Seyyid loading a six hundred pound shell into a Krupp gun in a feat of superhuman strength.  

Figure 4: The set of four stamps released in 1955 by the Turkish government in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the Battle of Gallipoli.

Moon, “Gallipoli Commemorative Stamps”, 17.
For the official photo taken after the battle, Colonel Seyyid actually held a wooden projectile dummy because he was allegedly incapable of lifting the six hundred pound shell. There is now a statue of Colonel Seyyid at Kilidbahir.
In addition to the growing presence of Gallipoli pilgrims, the DP was also successful in increasing foreign inbound tourism. 71,331 tourists visited Turkey in 1954; that number would rise to 114,220 in 1956. The Turkish government was offering several incentives for tourists including rate reductions on state rail and cruise services for tourist groups, student discounts, and new hotels. Most significantly, although the official rate of exchange in 1956-1957 stood at 2.8 Turkish liras to the US dollar, the Turkish government devalued their currency and offered tourists 5.25 liras for every US dollar.52

During this period, the Turkish government began to narrativize Gallipoli amidst smooth foreign relations, rising tourism and a relatively stable domestic atmosphere. The narrativization of Gallipoli for foreigners might have sped up and intensified the production of a Gallipoli-centred Turkish nationalist narrative, but nonetheless, relations on the peninsula with foreign pilgrims and visitors essentially mirrored those in Turkey at large. Yet, the positive atmosphere in which the DP narrativized Gallipoli for both foreigners and Turkish citizens was not to last. Changes at the levels of both domestic and international politics would destabilize Turkey, deteriorate relations with NATO countries and unavoidably alter the narrativization of Gallipoli.


In the latter half of the 1950s, the DP government’s popularity began to wane. Among several other problems, their focus on obtaining foreign aid had proved a major failure due to the lack of capital entering Turkey, as well as the poor expenditure policies of the Menderes government. In July 1958, Turkey’s Western allies agreed to rescue the

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government by consolidating $400 million in debt and by providing a $359 million loan. The loan provided temporary relief but was incapable of preventing the fall of the government. A group of junior officers and, eventually, some generals decided to intervene because they were convinced that Menderes was about to establish a one-party dictatorship and because they perceived him as not sufficiently committed to reforming the military. In May 1960, a military coup overthrew the Menderes government with the stated aim of re-establishing stability and order to the Turkish state.

The Turkish state might have been in chaos, but for the major Western powers the coup was not a cause for panic. In fact, from 1959 to 1963, positive sentiments from Western European countries — with the exception of France and Italy — were abundant due to the European Economic Community (EEC) negotiations that were taking place. Ever-increasing offers of aid to Turkey from the Soviet Union had made Western European countries eager to accept Turkey into the EEC. Turkey’s position, unaltered by the military coup, was to continue its progression towards full acceptance as a European nation as well as to cement its status in the community of the Western bloc.

Moreover, the Turkish government continued to make improvements to the country’s tourism industry. In 1959, the government further devalued the Turkish lira to the point where tourists got nine lira to the US dollar. The Turkish Tourist Board in

53 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, 140.
55 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 177.
56 Eugene Krieger, “Turkey’s Frail EU Perspectives Since the 1960s”, in Hans Lukas-Kieser, ed., Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 168. According to Feroz Ahmad, Turkey decided to join the EEC in the 1950s after Greece applied for membership, but EEC membership also had many economic incentives. During this period, Europe had become a major consumer of Turkish products. Secondly, approximately three million Turkish workers had migrated to Europe and the remittances sent home to Turkey were becoming a vital part of the economy. Lastly, Ankara’s decision to join the EEC came, at least partially, as a result of a desire to lessen Turkish dependency on the United States. Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, 167. Also see, Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 276.
57 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 175.
Ankara was also involved in organizing local transportation options.\(^\text{58}\) The following year, the government also did away with much of the red tape hindering tourists; customs regulations were relaxed, traveler’s cheques were accepted at major banks, and foreign cars were allowed into the country. The government even hired Italian tourism experts for advice at the cost of three million US dollars.\(^\text{59}\) Subsequently, in 1963, the sponsorship of tourism became officially institutionalized in the new Ministry of Tourism and Promotion.\(^\text{60}\)

Gallipoli’s role in the early 1960s appears to have remained on the same course as well. Despite the coup, Gallipoli’s status as a national icon continued to be developed by the new government, now under the control of an interim military junta calling themselves the National Unity Committee (NUC).\(^\text{61}\) In August 1960, the same year as the coup, the Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial was finally finished and opened to the public. Measuring approximately forty metres in height, the memorial stood seven metres higher than the British Cape Helles Memorial. Dominating the skyline, four thick pillars were capped by a thick concrete slab. At night-time, the memorial was flood-lit making it

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\(^\text{60}\) Öztürkmen, “Turkish Tourism at the Door of Europe: Perceptions of Image in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”, 609.

\(^\text{61}\) The NUC was composed of thirty-eight military officers, who had played large roles in undertaking the 1960 coup, and represented various factions within the armed forces. General Cemal Gürsel was chosen as the president, prime minister, head of state, and commander-in-chief. There were two main factions: a radical group which wanted to hold onto power and restructure Turkish society and politics and a group of moderates who wished to restore power to a civilian government. The factionalism was largely ended in November 1960 when the moderates ousted fourteen of the radicals. In 1961, a new constitution was created and had vast repercussions for the Turkish state. A bicameral parliament was formed, with a lower chamber of elected deputies and a partially elected Senate; all members of the NUC were made life-time Senators. The new Constitutional Court guaranteed many rights and freedoms, including freedom of thought, association and expression. Additionally, the new constitution legislated the formation of the National Security Council (NSC), a conglomerate of representatives from the armed forces, whose task was to “assist” the cabinet. The powers of the NSC were so broad that it was capable of interfering in virtually all areas of Turkish political and economic life. Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 119-123.
visible to ships.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, in terms of Turkish contact with Gallipoli's foreign visitors, the new Turkish government actually made visitation easier by lifting the military restrictions on mobility in 1962.\textsuperscript{63} The creation of the new Ministry of Tourism and Promotion in 1963 reflected the heightened importance that the Turkish government attached to tourism.\textsuperscript{64} That same year, the Governor of Çanakkale travelled to London to the delight of the the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.\textsuperscript{65}

In the immediate aftermath of the 1960 coup it appeared that Turkey would remain on the same course, however, numerous foreign policy incidents between the Turkish and U.S. governments would heighten tensions and place the Turkish side in a precarious position by 1964. In 1962, the United States decided to remove their Jupiter missiles from Turkey without consulting the Turkish government, again under the control of Ismet İnönü and the CHP. The missiles had been aimed at the Soviet Union and were part of NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence. But, the build-up of Soviet missile installations in Cuba and the subsequent crisis that occurred had made the Jupiter missiles a valuable bargaining chip during U.S.-Soviet negotiations. In fact, as William Hale notes, the removal of the Jupiter missiles was the direct result of "a Turkey-for-Cuba trade", whereby the Soviet Union would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States took similar actions in Turkey.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{62} Holt and Holt, \textit{Major and Mrs. Holt's Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli}, 121.
\textsuperscript{63} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/532, Report on the state of Commonwealth memorials at Gallipoli prepared by Dr. C.G. Thornton, 3 December 1971.
\textsuperscript{64} Öztürkmen, "Turkish Tourism at the Door of Europe: Perceptions of Image in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives", 609.
\textsuperscript{65} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/169556, Author Unknown, CWGC to R.G.H. Watts, 22 March 1963.
\textsuperscript{66} Hale, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy}. 135.
That the U.S. President Lyndon Johnson would make a security decision of that magnitude without deliberating with the Turkish government was alarming. But, two years later the U.S. government would draw the full ire of the Turkish nation. In 1963, the government of the Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios attempted to gain more power and land for the Greek community on Cyprus. Consequently, communal violence on the island broke out.67 As the Ankara government threatened invasion, U.S. President Johnson sent a letter implying that if the Turkish government intervened on Cyprus, they

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67 The Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960 after several years of negotiations between Turkey, Greece, and Britain. The rights of the Turkish Cypriot community were guaranteed and a power-sharing agreement had been reached. Makarios, however, stated that the constitution was unworkable and that the power-sharing agreement was unfair. His attempts to amend the constitution in favor of the Greek-Cypriot community were met with protests by Turkish Cypriots. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 140.
could not expect NATO’s help and that furthermore they were not allowed to use any military equipment received from the United States.68

The Turkish government was alarmed; the United States, Turkey’s principal ally, now seemed unconcerned about Turkey’s strategic sovereignty concerns and was restricting Turkey’s use of its own military. After being leaked to the press, the Johnson letter set off several anti-American riots.69 Anti-Americanism and a larger anti-Western outlook had been brewing since the 1960 coup due to the liberalization of the political system promoted by the coup’s leaders. Liberalization had allowed for the emergence of several leftist and Islamist movements, both of which were complicit in the rise of anti-American and anti-Western riots in Turkey.70 As a result of the growing pressure of anti-Western movements as well as security and economic concerns, the İnönü government attempted to move away from its dependence on the Western bloc by diversifying its allies and trading partners. The government began to make overtures to both the Non-Aligned Movement as well as the Soviet Union which resulted in the signing of several cultural and financial agreements.71 In terms of Ankara’s relationship with the U.S. and other NATO countries, Cem Eroğul states that after the 1964 Cyprus incident, “Turkey stopped being a well-behaved ally who promptly and enthusiastically fulfilled all demands made by the West and particularly the United States.”72

Given the English language sources that are available, it is difficult to assess the impact of these foreign policy developments on memorialization at Gallipoli during the

69 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 131.
71 Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 132.
1960s. Certainly, the Turkish government did not attempt to block or restrict foreign movement on the peninsula. Nor is there any evidence of negative rhetoric towards the foreign visitors of Gallipoli. There is, however, one occurrence that perhaps suggests that not all was well on Gallipoli. In the lead-up to the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the Gallipoli campaign, there appeared to be much anticipation among the British, Australian and New Zealand governments. Indeed, the British government was genuinely excited at the prospect of sharing another pilgrimage with the Turks.\textsuperscript{73}

But in December 1964, the Turkish government asserted that it would not be attending any foreign memorial ceremonies in 1965. Instead, the only official government-sponsored pilgrimage and memorial ceremony would be held in March.\textsuperscript{74} The Turkish government stated that they would still provide all transportation for the foreign pilgrimages. But, the decision to avoid participating in foreign memorial ceremonies on the fiftieth anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign is indeed surprising given that only eleven years prior the Turkish government was leading the charge in organizing joint memorial ceremonies. Again, it is difficult to say for certain, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that the unwillingness to participate in the foreign ceremonies might have been spurred by Turkey’s new foreign policy and the anti-Western unrest in the country at large.

The lack of a Turkish government presence notwithstanding, the 1965 foreign memorial ceremonies were an enormous success in terms of reconciling old enemies. Although members of the Turkish government did not attend, the Turkish War Veterans

\textsuperscript{73} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/175010, Rex Palmer to Mr. Wood, 21 April 1964.
\textsuperscript{74} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/180168, M.I. Mackie to Mervyn Brown, 21 December 1964.
Association made the trip all on their own in order to partake in the foreign pilgrimages and ceremonies.\textsuperscript{75} Turkish press headlines read “Old enemies embrace each other,” “50 years ago with arms; 50 years later with flowers,” and “ANZAC fighters find in ANZAC Cove not the bayonets of Turkish soldiers but arms extended in heartfelt warmth.”\textsuperscript{76} As in the past, praise and embraces were exchanged between the veterans, but it appears that, in contrast to the pilgrimages of 1952 and 1953, the positive sentiments were not intended to glorify the Turkish state. One Turkish reporter wrote,

\begin{quote}
Wars are not fought by those who want them, but by those whose opinions were never asked. The ANZACS who fought in Gallipoli were not regular soldiers, but volunteers, and their losses in the First World War were devastating. But the fact that even after 50 years, people can think back on the futility of a World War, and use the memory to seek each other out in friendship, is a major achievement for humanity.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

Without the presence of Turkish government representatives, the sentiments of reconciliation appeared to have deviated from the previous government-sanctioned script and taken on a life of their own. The reporter’s initial statement on wars and the people who fight them even takes a subtle jab at the governments which start, order and glorify wars that, in turn, common men pay for with their lives. Instead of framing the 1915 Gallipoli campaign as a glorious epic, the veterans and reporters framed it as a tragedy.

The Turkish government, however, was not interested in the tragic aspects of Gallipoli. After the October 1965 elections, the government came under the fragile leadership of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the Justice Party (JP). Still heavily influenced by President Gürsel and the military, the government attempted to maintain

\textsuperscript{75} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/180168, M.I. Mackie to Mervyn Brown, 21 December 1964.
\textsuperscript{76} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FO 371/180168, “Istanbul Press Summary: Sunday and Monday, April 25 and 26, 1965”, April 25 and 26 1965.
Gallipoli’s significance as a bastion of nationalist pride and to use the site and its history to undo the damage the DP had caused to the significance of the military in Turkish society. As Orhan Erkanlı, a leading officer in 1960 coup stated, the Democrat Party had, trampled on all the rights of the people...Moral values were forgotten and people were made oblivious of them...The pride of the Turkish Armed Forces, which are the only organized force in the country, was hurt on every occasion; the uniform which is the real legacy of our history brought shame to those who wore it.78

Feeling neglected and shunned by the DP, the military had reasserted its role in Turkish society during and after the 1960 coup. Although the coup leaders would quickly give up their power and restore democracy, the military’s importance in forming domestic and foreign policy remained great.79

Thus, by 1965, even though the military had been successful to a certain degree in making their presence felt in the public sphere, they nonetheless continued to assert the military’s prominent role in Turkish society through the subtle re-interpretation of events, sites, historic figures, and objects. For example, during the 1960s, Turkish schoolbooks re-interpreted the images of the Turkish flag as being the reflection of the star and crescent in a pool of blood shed by a dying Turkish soldier.80 The schoolbook’s interpretation of the flag was an obvious ode to the sacrifices of the Turkish military. More than that, Kemal Karpat notes that the military placed an enormous emphasis on nationalism which they thought could be cultivated through the remembrance of past Ottoman military victories. Of course, the victories would be attributed to the presence of

78 Quoted in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975. 147.
79 Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 250.
80 Gunter Seufert, “The Sacred Aura of the Turkish Flag”, New Perspectives on Turkey 16 (Spring 1997), 55.
Turks; the failures of the Ottoman Empire would be ascribed to “foreign elements.”

These attempts to appropriate Ottoman history for the purpose of celebrating the achievements of the Turkish nation intensified during this period.

As the site of the Ottoman Empire’s last great victory and of Atatürk’s first great victory, Gallipoli was an ideal locale to vindicate and glorify the military’s preeminence in Turkish society. In 1965, the Turkish government issued a new set of three stamps for the fiftieth anniversary commemorations. The 130 kurus stamp displayed the Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial with an oversized Turkish flag flying above. Even more instructive as to the government’s use of Gallipoli, the 90 kurus stamp depicted what appears to be a Turkish soldier, a British soldier and an Anzac soldier staring in reverent silence at the Turkish Mehmetcik Memorial. The militaristic impressions of the Gallipoli campaign revealed in the stamps were in keeping with the new regime’s attempts to fine-tune the Turkish citizen’s respect of and pride in the military. While still acknowledging the presence of British, Australians, and New Zealanders, the stamps depict all the soldiers gazing at the Turkish monument in a state of quiet reverence.

The Turkish government was still trying to maintain good relations with their NATO allies and maintain the pace of the country’s growing tourism numbers. Yet, events in Turkey as well as those abroad were limiting their ability to improve their relationships. In 1967, U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, U.S. support for Israel during the Arab-Israeli War, and a pro-U.S. coup in Greece all served to heighten anti-Western sentiments. In July 1968, violent Turkish demonstrators confronted the U.S.

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81 Kemal Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays (Boston: Brill, 2004), 253.
83 Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 131.
Sixth Fleet in Istanbul; several people were killed.\textsuperscript{84} Two years later, the Turkish government responded to the economic crises in the country by deciding to move closer to full membership in the EEC. Yet, tackling Turkey’s economic woes by getting closer to “the West” only exacerbated problems by alienating the growing Islamist movements on the right, along with those on the left who already considered Turkey a pawn of the

\textsuperscript{84} William Hale, \textit{Turkish Politics and the Military} (London: Routledge, 1994), 178.
At this juncture, Turkish society had experienced increasing polarization due to political instability, economic strife, labour battles and the Turkish government's relations with the West. Two major camps emerged among the Turkish public: a radical anti-Western, anti-capitalist left and a pro-Islamic, conservative right. Kidnappings, bombings and other violent activities threw Turkey into chaos, and on 12 March 1971, the Chief of the General Staff issued an ultimatum: If the Demirel government did not resign or end the anarchy, the military would take over. After Demirel and the rest of his cabinet had resigned, the new junta set about its mandate of restoring order by shutting down all organizations it deemed extralegal, declaring martial law in several provinces, persecuting intellectuals and journalists, and by torturing political dissidents. Overall, an attempt was made to end the political fragmentation, unite the country and strengthen government control over the state.

Despite the anti-Western sentiments, the Turkish government continued to improve its tourism industry. International tourism to Turkey unsurprisingly showed very little monetary growth in the 1960s and 1970s due to the various crises and violent incidences. Foreign inbound tourism actually increased every year from 1960 to 1966, but the government continued to lose money despite their numerous concessions to tourists. As a result, the Turkish government initiated a new five year plan, costing 266 million dollars U.S., aimed at developing the country’s tourism infrastructure. Hundreds

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86 Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, 130.
87 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 258.
88 Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, 135-136.
of European and American travel writers were invited on fully funded tours, including a
week long cruise along the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.91

The Turkish government’s activity on the peninsula during this period was
especially interesting given the new emphasis on tourism. Gallipoli was, of course, more
than a mere tourist destination for Britain, Australia, and New Zealand; the peninsula was
a quasi-sacred place holding the honoured remains of deceased soldiers. Thus, interest in
Gallipoli by these foreign powers remained consistent despite Turkey’s internal turmoil.
Foreign interest in Gallipoli would skyrocket, however, when the land claims of a
Turkish citizen brought issues of Gallipoli’s sovereignty and ownership into question.

In 1968, Ali Çelik bilek cultivated a portion of land in the Anzac area (An Burnu)
that remained under the jurisdiction of the CWGC. Subsequently, another man, Fevzi
Gürses, seized a different portion of the Anzac area. When taken to court, Gürses
produced a petition citing possession of a title deed from 1896 in the name of a Mr. Hafiz
Ahmet, a relative of the defendant. According to Gürses, the Turkish government had
failed to provide compensation when they appropriated the land and thus with the
possession of the title deed, Gürses was the rightful owner.92 Initially, the Court of the
First Instance at Eceabat sided with both Çelik bilek and Gürses. Citing the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne, the CWGC demanded that control of the land be restored to their jurisdiction.
Upon appeal, a higher Turkish court, under pressure by the Turkish government’s
Finance Officer, sided with the CWGC and revoked all claims on the land by Turkish
citizens.93

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91Smith, “Turkey Eager to Play Host”, 480.
92The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/390, “Land Maintenance – Turkey” prepared by
the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 2 January 1970.
93The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/390, J.F. Skinner to J. Dodds, 9 October 1970.
Why did the Turkish government side with the CWGC against its own citizens?

The decision appears to demonstrate the government’s dedication to the Treaty of Lausanne and to its foreign allies on the peninsula. Practically speaking, however, it was much easier for the government to silence two of its own citizens than the CWGC which could have raised the issue of treaty violation at the United Nations. But more importantly, by siding with the CWGC, Ankara was essentially dissuading other citizens from making similar claims on the land. After all, the Turkish government had its own memorials on the peninsula and a burgeoning tourism industry to think of. It thus appears that ruling against its own citizens was paramount to the maintenance of government control over the area and its subsequent exploitation.

That the Turkish government was more interested in serving its own interests and in establishing control over the peninsula rather than in “siding” with foreigners was made apparent by its actions on Gallipoli in 1971 and 1972. In December 1971, the British government discovered that a Turkish museum was being built at Kabatepe and that the Turkish government was planning to build several memorials without conferring with the CWGC or the British Foreign Office. Upset over not being consulted, the British government subsequently learned that the Turkish side was building a new memorial exactly adjacent to the existing New Zealand memorial on Chunuk Bair. The British made it clear that all new Turkish memorials “should harmonize with their own memorials and landscaping.” In other words, any new Turkish memorials should be

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94 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/532, Report on the state of Commonwealth memorials at Gallipoli written by Dr. C.G. Thornton, 3 December 1971.
95 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/532, F.M.M. Swan to Dr. C.G. Thornton, 23 December 1971.
96 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/532, Report on the state of Commonwealth memorials at Gallipoli written by Dr. C.G. Thornton, 3 December 1971.
built on land adjacent to their own existing memorials and not on land given in perpetuity to the CWGC under the Treaty of Lausanne. Specifically, the British were upset over Turkish government memorialization of the Anzac area – the area which the Turkish government had prevented its own citizens from developing.

In response, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited the last line of Article 131 of the treaty which ensured that all lands not being used for graves and memorials would be returned to the Republic of Turkey.\textsuperscript{97} This amounted to a very specific reading of the treaty which meant that every inch of land not covered by foreign memorials or graves actually belonged to the Turkish state; hence while the CWGC might retain control of a monument, the grass that fringed the edifice was subject to the whims of the Turkish government. In addition to the museum at Kabatepe and the Turkish memorial adjacent to the New Zealand memorial, the Turkish government was also planning to construct memorials flanking the Nek cemetery, the Ari Burnu cemetery, and the Baby 700 cemetery all of which were under CWGC jurisdiction in the Anzac area.\textsuperscript{98}

In 1972, both the Australian and New Zealand governments expressed their concern over Turkish plans which now included the construction of a memorial park encompassing the entire Anzac area.\textsuperscript{99} The Australian government went so far as to issue a stern warning; the Australian ambassador to Ankara claimed that problems would ensue “if no adequate action were taken,” and foresaw “trouble for Australia and Turkey, taking in particular the form of trouble for Turkish immigrants, if the Turks continue to ride

\textsuperscript{97} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/532, Report on the state of Commonwealth memorials at Gallipoli written by Dr. C.G. Thornton, 3 December 1971.

\textsuperscript{98} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/532, Report on the state of Commonwealth memorials at Gallipoli written by Dr. C.G. Thornton, 3 December 1971.

\textsuperscript{99} The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/591, N.V. Farrell to Dr. C.G. Thornton, 19 September 1972.
rough-shod over Anzac interests." According to the Australians, the drive for development was coming solely from the Turkish General Staff and the situation now necessitated a greater Australian role. As CWGC and Australian investigations proceeded, it was discovered that in addition to the memorials and park, the Turkish government had made plans to build roads, hotels, electrical lines, and illumination devices for the Turkish memorials. Worst of all, it was believed that Ankara was contemplating fencing the entire memorial park in order to assure that admission fees could be charged to all visitors.

Clearly, the Turkish government saw Gallipoli as a potential hot-spot for tourism and wanted to exploit it for monetary gain. In fact, the construction at Gallipoli appears to conform to a larger trend in Turkish land management and tourism. From 1958 to 1976, no less than sixteen new national parks were established throughout Turkey. One case is particularly edifying with respect to Gallipoli and the apparent disregard of the Turkish government for its own citizens. In 1968, 6,838.5 out of a total of 8,500 acres of arable land on the island of Imvros were expropriated, simultaneously reducing the island’s grazing land by approximately 10,900 acres. Many citizens of Imvros were removed from their land so that their government could build national parks and reforest areas.

Subsequently, it would appear that the disavowal of Turkish citizens’ claims on the land as well as the development of the Gallipoli peninsula in ways contrary to the wishes of

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100 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/591, Confidential British report on Australian concerns at Gallipoli prepared by Mr. Harrison, 1972.
101 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/591, Confidential British report on Australian concerns at Gallipoli prepared by Mr. Harrison, 1972.
102 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/591, Developments in the Anzac Area prepared by the Director General of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 19 April 1972.
the British, Australians, and New Zealanders were part and parcel of the Turkish
government’s desire to improve its weak tourism infrastructure.105

Who exactly was the Turkish government trying to attract – foreigners or their
own citizens? The British seemed to believe that Ankara wished to improve facilities for
their own public’s commemoration of the Turkish deceased.106 Certainly, the very act of
erecting Turkish memorials suggests that the government was looking to attract its own
citizens. The fact that these memorials were being constructed directly adjacent to
CWGC memorials also indicates that the Turkish government was seeking to match up to
the numerous foreign memorials on the peninsula. Thus, when Turkish tourists or
pilgrims visited the popular sites on the Gallipoli peninsula, they would not see foreign
memorials standing alone; all the popular foreign edifices would be matched by Turkish
structures that were equal or superior in stature. Turkish hegemony over the peninsula
would thus be assured in the minds of Turkish citizens.

Yet, it is certain that the Turkish government was developing the peninsula for
foreign consumption as well. Knowing that the site was sacred to particular nations, it
could be assured that foreign attendance was not going to halt. The construction of hotels,
car-parks and the charging of admission fees at Gallipoli would inevitably absorb a large
amount of foreign capital brought in by pilgrims and tourists alike.

Beyond the purely economic benefits, the development of Gallipoli appears to

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105 At this time, the Turkish Tourism and Information Office in New York had also initiated an
advertisement campaign in the New York Times. One advertisement is particularly interesting: The caption
reads, “TURKEY, The NEW Old World...of modern resorts, ancient wonders, and Europe’s lowest
prices.” Alongside the caption were pictures of a belly-dancer, a European couple tanning on the beach, and
a panorama of the historic rock houses of Cappadocia. Below the pictures, brief descriptions of Turkey’s
nightlife, souvenirs, and historic sites were provided. Gallipoli was not included in the list of historic sites.
106 The National Archives of the United Kingdom - FCO 47/591, Report on Turkish plans for construction
at Gallipoli prepared by J.E. Paton, 3 October 1972.
also be symbolic in nature and representative of Turkey’s foreign relations at the time. It is hard to imagine that these controversial developments would have been undertaken under the DP government of the 1950s. During that period of time, as Adnan Menderes desperately sought the approval of the United States and other NATO members, Gallipoli was imagined by the government purely as a site of reconciliation; a site capable of bridging the differences between Turkey and the West. Moreover, Turkish citizens were being conditioned to accept the Western presence and the accompanying amiable relations between Turkey and the West as part of the Turkish nation’s essential character.

As Philip Robins has pointed out, however, Turkey’s “thin-skinned nationalism” does not deal well with perceived Western deception, manipulation or rejection. The events of the 1960’s – the 1964 Johnson letter, Cyprus, the growth of leftist and Islamist movements, military nationalism, to name a few – all contributed to growing anti-Western sentiments that were shared by large segments of Turkey’s population. As such, the development of Gallipoli’s nationalist potential sans consultation with the CWGC became possible, but was also a gesture of Turkish government defiance in the face of increasingly unpopular Western powers. As seen, the construction of Turkish memorials adjacent to CWGC memorials could be viewed as a statement to Turkish citizens as to who controlled the land. But, the production of Turkish structures in close proximity to their foreign counterparts was just as much a statement to foreign pilgrims and tourists. In spite of everything, it was all but assured that foreigners would visit Chunuk Bair and the famous cemeteries of the Anzac area. The proliferation of Turkish memorials can thus be seen as an attempt to assert Turkish presence and sovereignty over the area.
After all the rumors, negotiations, and bickering, the Turkish government did not institute admission fees or build car-parks on the peninsula, but development did occur slowly. New memorials commemorating the Turkish deceased were built alongside several CWGC memorials. Roads – a source of major discontent in later years - were constructed to improve accessibility and electrical lines were installed in certain areas. Although the memorial park encompassing the Anzac area was never realized, in 1973, the Turkish government established the Gallipoli Peninsula Historical Park. Covering approximately 33,000 hectares – including but not limited to the Anzac area - the park was designated a national heritage site and was added to the United Nations List of National Parks and Protected Areas.\textsuperscript{107}

\textbf{Conclusion}

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Turkish government began to memorialize and narrativize Gallipoli for both foreign and domestic consumption. This chapter has endeavored to explore the implications of these efforts. First, in a similar vein to the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the current sentiments of reconciliation and Turkish nationalism that Gallipoli inspires were not born out of the 1915 campaign. Although material for the current narratives did exist, the Turkish government did not attempt to form such material into a narrative during the twenty-four years following the 1915 campaign. During and after the Second World War, however, successive Turkish

governments did make attempts to utilize Gallipoli and its history to further nationalist sentiments in Turkey, on the one hand, and reconciliation with foreigners on the other.

By themselves, these attempts at narrativization reveal that the narratives and the sentiments they inspire were constructed elements. Additionally, the inconsistent utilization and propagation of these sentiments by successive Turkish governments in the Cold War period is significant: If the sentiments were indeed the progeny of the 1915 campaign, their survival and proliferation would not depend on whether the Turkish government was controlled by the DP, CHP, JP or the military. Turkish government memorialization and narrativization of Gallipoli after the Second World War fluctuated according to Turkish domestic politics as well as foreign relations. Gallipoli, in a sense, proved to be an arena in which larger issues of Turkish nationalism and foreign relations were played out. Far from being a mere microcosm, however, activities and relations on Gallipoli in turn affected other realms of Turkish politics and society.

Secondly, Gallipoli’s unique situation seemed to present the DP government with the opportunity to court both foreigners and Turkish citizens in a controlled environment. Yet the presence of foreign memorials and the contact with foreigners on the symbolic level had unintended effects. The foreign presence became a major factor in the acceleration and intensification of nationalism. For example, superior foreign memorials meant that the Turkish government had to construct memorials of equivalent size and majesty in order to inspire nationalist sentiments in their own citizens. Thus, although reconciliation and nationalism on Gallipoli appeared to be comfortably disjointed, nationalist pride in Gallipoli in part depended upon the foreign presence for its manifestation, escalation and articulation.
Moreover, while the Turkish government initially controlled the narrativization of Gallipoli, there are signs that this control was diminishing. As seen, the government’s activities were impacted by political events, but also by the changing mood of the Turkish public. The evidence from this period suggests that sectors of the Turkish populace and foreign pilgrims were beginning to narrativize Gallipoli in a subtly different manner than the Turkish government. During the 1965 pilgrimage, a Turkish reporter took Gallipoli’s reconciliatory rhetoric in a different direction than his government. Rather than glorifying the Turkish and Commonwealth armies and governments, the reporter highlighted the tragic aspects of the 1915 campaign and delicately admonished the governments who both started and lionized war. It could be said that narrativization of Gallipoli was becoming a contested issue.

Lastly, the introduction of tourism brought a new element to the narrativization of Gallipoli. The DP government made tourism a part of state policy in 1950, but it was not until the 1970’s that the Turkish government truly began to exploit Gallipoli’s nationalist and reconciliatory narratives for the purposes of increasing tourism. Prior to the 1970’s, the narrativization and memorialization of Gallipoli by the Turkish government had been undertaken mainly to improve relations with the Western bloc, foster Turkish nationalism, and inculcate loyalty to particular regimes. By attempting to increase foreign and domestic tourism to Gallipoli, the Turkish government would begin to alter the appearance of the peninsula for two reasons: First, the site required certain practical additions – roads, power, lodging, etc - if it was to support large quantities of visitors. Secondly, the expectation that Gallipoli would become a mass tourist destination meant that the Turkish government became even more preoccupied with how the site reflected
the values of the Turkish nation. The implications of tourism on the narrativization of Gallipoli will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

As the Turkish government sought to increase domestic and foreign tourism in the 1970s, a number of obstacles hindered its progress. Political fragmentation, economic stagnation, and both right-wing and left-wing terrorism destabilized the country, and in conjunction with the already rampant anti-Americanism of the Islamists and the left, made Turkey a poor option for foreign tourists.¹ The military coup of 1980 sought to end Turkey’s domestic strife, and as a minor corollary enhance Turkey’s tourism appeal amidst the chaos and violence. Indeed, Arzu Öztürkmen notes that in the early 1980s, the Turkish government opened its doors to mass tourism; in other words, tourism “where a large number of tourists are drawn to the country via low prices.”² Mass tourism meant that tourists stayed in a “closed-circuit system” which limited their exposure to Turkish peoples and their culture.³

Turkey’s success as a mass tourist destination depended on presenting the country as a safe and viable destination for foreigners, but it also meant catering to a growing class of young, urban, and upwardly mobile Turkish professionals whose sudden increase

¹ For more information on Turkey’s economic hardships, the terrorism of the National Action Party, and the political fragmentation of the country, see Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey. The 1970’s also witnessed heightened tensions between Turkey and the United States due to the lack of U.S. support given during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the American ban on Turkish poppy production. For more on these issues, see Fiona B. Adamson, “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, Political Science Quarterly 116 (Summer 2001): 277-303.
² Öztürkmen, “Turkish Tourism at the Door of Europe: Perceptions of Image in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives”, 609.
³ Ibid, 609.
in wealth resulted in a growing desire to take holiday vacations. As this chapter will demonstrate, the introduction of mass tourism to Turkey, and by proxy Gallipoli, had several consequences for the Turkish government’s narrativization of Gallipoli.

Previous chapters have focused on the political and economic circumstances within Turkey that led to the production and reproduction of particular narratives by the Turkish government. While this chapter will indeed discuss some political and economic issues on the Turkish political scene, it will not focus on matters such as tensions or relations between Turkey and “the West.” This does not denote these issues’ lack of importance in the post-1980’s time period; certainly they did play a role in shaping the narratives in question. Rather, this chapter will look at issues of Turkish government narrativization from a different angle, namely the effects of mass tourism on the narrativization of Gallipoli.

The growth of a domestic Turkish tourism industry and the promotion of international tourism to Turkey complicated the narrativization of Gallipoli, leading to alterations in the content and cogency of the narratives as well as paving the way for new actors to participate in the narratives’ promulgation and reproduction. The Turkish government played a prominent role in instigating these changes, but the unforeseen consequences of their actions would inevitably cause them to react against those very same transformations. As this chapter will demonstrate, the conflicts over narrativization that emerged during this period are significant because they expose the conflicts and inconsistencies between and within the narratives themselves.

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Outsourcing Narrativization and the Alteration of the Reconciliatory Narrative

Since the 1980s, there has been a significant growth in heritage tourism around the world. Perhaps as an outgrowth of this larger trend, Yael Navaro-Yashin notes that during the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish government tried to manipulate and utilize historical and cultural sites in order to enhance the state’s power. An initial sign of this trend came in 1982 when the Turkish government passed the “Law for the Encouragement of Tourism” which sought to provide a framework for tourism development and set particular standards for those seeking to profit from the tourism industry. The law, which would be administered by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, introduced certificates to be obtained by foreign and Turkish investors and establishments seeking income from tourism. The law also delineated the types of tourist destinations to be developed, of which three were directly related to the Gallipoli peninsula:

b) “Cultural and Tourism Preservation and Development Regions”: The regions having a high potential for tourism development, intensive historical and cultural importance, that are to be evaluated for the purpose of preservation, utilization, sectoral development and planned improvement and boundaries which are determined and declared by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Ministry.

c) “Tourism Centres”: The parts or places specified to be developed on a priority basis within or outside the cultural and tourism preservation and development regions, and are of importance for tourism movements and activities, locations, sites and the boundaries of which are determined and announced by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of the Ministry.

i) “Cultural and Tourism Preservation and Development Sub-Region”: Lands which contain various tourism types with at least one or more of the following technical and social infrastructures such as culture, education, training, entertainment, trade, housing, determined by a scale of 1/25 000 or less and those can be divided into sub-lands.

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6 Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State, 132.

7 Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Republic of Turkey, “Law for the Encouragement of Tourism”, http://kultur.gov.tr/EN/BejgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D3130239EAA0FCDF038B3C1A5398CDEBDC

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This was a significant step for Turkish tourism and had many implications for the development and governance of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The new law outlined specific types of tourist destinations for development, but more importantly, it officially outsourced responsibility for the advancement of particular tourism support structures – lodging, consumer kitsch, tour groups, etc – to Turkish and foreign companies and citizens. The involvement of Turkish and foreign citizens in the international tourism industry obviously took considerable pressure off the Turkish government; instead of dealing directly with tourists, the Turkish government could now merely set the standards by which tourists were dealt with. Additionally, citizens could now profit from foreign capital and redistribute that wealth into the Turkish economy. These practical elements could indeed be implemented at Gallipoli, yet the past narrativization of the site by the Turkish government meant that the outsourcing of tourism structures to Turkish citizens entailed more than a mere redistribution of tourism income and responsibility. In essence, by redistributing the rights to profit from international tourism to Gallipoli, the Turkish government had partially redistributed the rights to the reproduction of the nationalist and reconciliatory narratives.

The 1982 law might have improved tourism structures but was ineffective in drawing more tourists to Turkey given the country’s unstable domestic circumstances. In

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9 The 1982 law and the overall development of mass tourism coincides with Turgut Özal’s policies of economic liberalization. Özal was a pro-Western businessman who had worked in the World Bank and was well-respected in the Turkish business community. In 1979, he had launched an economic reform program and was kept on as a “super-minister” after the coup. Since the coup’s leaders were primarily concerned with re-establishing political and social order, Özal was left in charge of the economy and continued his program of economic liberalization. His Motherland Party (MP) won a clear majority in the elections of 1983 and Özal assumed the post of prime minister. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 282-283; Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 150-155.
1984, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) transformed itself into a paramilitary organization and commenced attacks upon the Turkish government and foreign tourists.\textsuperscript{10} Terrorist attacks outside of Turkey also had an impact on tourism. In 1985 and 1986, attacks on airliners and cruise ships in the Mediterranean deterred many foreigners from traveling to Turkey and kept inbound tourism numbers low; these attacks, however, were not perpetrated by the PKK.\textsuperscript{11}

Beginning in the mid 1980s, the Turkish government began to alter the reconciliatory narrative, possibly as a result of low tourist numbers to Gallipoli. On Anzac Day in 1984, only three hundred Australians and New Zealanders were present at the dawn ceremony at Gallipoli.\textsuperscript{12} In 1985, the Turkish government invited several Australian and New Zealand veterans and delegates to Gallipoli for the seventieth anniversary celebration of the 1915 campaign. In a grand symbolic gesture, the Turkish government revealed that they had officially renamed An Burnu Beach. The area would henceforth be known as Anzac Cove – the name that had been used unofficially by Australians and New Zealanders for decades. A memorial at the site was inscribed with Atatürk’s famous 1934 speech.\textsuperscript{13} In the past, the Turkish government had been more than willing to host and praise the foreign presence on Gallipoli, but it had never given credence to Australian and New Zealand claims over the Anzac area; in the 1970s, it had even gone so far as to threaten fencing the area off in order to charge admission fees. Yet, in 1985, they were willing to symbolically give a portion of Gallipoli to the Australians

\textsuperscript{10} Sevil Sonmez and Ercan Sirakaya, “A Distorted Destination Image? The Case of Turkey”, 187.
\textsuperscript{11} Sukru Yarcan, “Coping With Continuous Crises: The Case of Turkish Inbound Tourism”, \textit{Middle Eastern Studies} 43 (September 2002), 783-784.
\textsuperscript{13} Basarin, Basarin, and Fewster, \textit{Gallipoli. The Turkish Story}, 11-12.
and New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{14}

In reciprocity, the Australian government renamed a beach in Canberra and a stretch of coastline in Albany after Atatürk. For their part, the New Zealand government dedicated a piece of land near Wellington Harbor to the founder of the Turkish republic.\textsuperscript{15} That same year, the Turkish government opened the Kabatepe War Museum and Information Centre to the public. Containing several small exhibits and a gift-shop, the museum is now a major hub on the peninsula, providing information and directions to tourists of multiple nationalities. Clearly, Ankara was attempting to develop and draw on the reconciliatory power of Gallipoli to enhance foreign tourism to the area.\textsuperscript{16}

Of course, the museum was also a hub for domestic Turkish tourists for whom sites and memorials continued to be built. It is not surprising that during this same period the Turkish government was steady in its promotion of Gallipoli as a site of national pride and glory. In 1985, a Turkish monolith memorial was built near the Kabatepe Museum with the inscription, “On 6-8 August 1915 the Gallipoli and Bursa Gendarme Hero Battalions stopped the English forces, consisting of two brigades, on Karakol Dağı and Kireçtepe, and defended northern Anafartalar.”\textsuperscript{17} Another memorial was erected in 1986 at the ruins of the Seddulbahir Castle, which was a major site of conflict during the 1915

\textsuperscript{14} Of course, the Turkish government did not give up any more land on or jurisdiction over the peninsula. Ari Burnu became Anzac Cove only in name. The Australians and New Zealanders did not gain any official jurisdiction over the area that they did not already have.
\textsuperscript{15} Basarin, Basarin, and Fewster, Gallipoli, The Turkish Story, 12.
\textsuperscript{16} In 1987, an Australian, Dr. Ross Bastiaan, initiated the “Plaques Project” to erect commemorative plaques in English on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Most of the plaques were created after 1990 and were a great boon to tourism on the peninsula. The case of the “Plaques Project” is important because it is yet another reminder that the reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli was not created or impacted upon solely by the Turkish government. Other nations and citizens of non-Turkish nationality were also complicit in its production and development. For more on the “Plaques Project,” see Holt and Holt, Major and Mrs. Holt’s Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli, 132.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 217.
naval attack on the Dardanelles. Lastly, the discovered remains of a deceased Ottoman soldier allowed the Turkish government to establish its own Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

While the events of 1985 had improved relations on the peninsula between the Turkish, Australian and New Zealand governments, Gallipoli had yet to become a high volume tourist destination capable of attracting thousands of visitors each year. Receiving delegates and veterans was good for Turkish foreign relations, but Gallipoli was being vetted as a site of mass tourism. The peninsula would exceed all expectations during the seventy-fifth anniversary commemorations in 1990. Official delegations from Australia, New Zealand, Britain and France were joined by approximately 12,000 young Australians and New Zealanders – an astounding increase in numbers considering the modest pilgrimages of previous decades. As on previous important anniversaries, the Turkish government circulated a new stamp depicting the Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial. But, although the ceremony was attended by Turkish veterans and government officials, there is no evidence to suggest that Turkish citizens participated on any significant scale. Thus, the Turkish government appears to have succeeded in drawing large numbers of foreign tourists, but was unsuccessful in luring Turks to the site at this juncture.

As in the past, the superior attendance and patriotism of foreigners appears to have spurred the Turkish government into action. Numerous new Turkish memorials were planned and several old ones renovated. The year 1992 saw a proliferation of

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18 Ibid, 112.
memorials and statues glorifying the Turkish role in the Gallipoli campaign.\(^{21}\) A statue of the famous Colonel Seyyid – the man once depicted on the Turkish stamp carrying the 600 pound shell – was built near the Mecidiye Cemetery and Artillery Memorial.\(^{22}\) Another statue entitled “Respect to the Turkish Soldier” was constructed next to a tower memorial commemorating the soldiers of the 57\(^{th}\) Regiment, none of whom survived the war.\(^{23}\) The Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial Complex was expanded to include memorial gardens, fountains, and a group of statues depicting Atatürk surveying his soldiers on the battlefield.\(^{24}\) Across the Dardanelles at the Çanakkale Naval Museum, a life-like model of the famous minelayer, The Nusret, was added as an exhibit.\(^{25}\)

Despite the promising numbers of the 1990 Anzac Day commemoration, international tourism numbers fluctuated over the next several years due to PKK terrorism, the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq, and the conflict in Yugoslavia. The PKK was the largest bane of the Turkish government’s tourism efforts as its extensive media coverage allowed the organization to openly dissuade European tourists from visiting Turkey.\(^{26}\) Nonetheless, the Turkish government continued to memorialize and develop Gallipoli in the face of adversity. In 1994, a major forest fire did severe damage to the Gallipoli peninsula and several of its memorials. A restoration project was set up and in a new twist, the Turkish government built a statue honoring a contemporary Turkish citizen.

\(^{21}\) There was, in Nasuh Uslu’s opinion, a spike in Turkish nationalism in the 1990’s. See Nasuh Uslu, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2000), 9. Additionally, according to Yael Navaro-Yashin, during the 1990’s there was a revival of Atatürk in the public sphere. Not only were his sayings popularized, but his very image was commodified and reproduced. The memorialization of Gallipoli might have been impacted by these trends considering Atatürk’s larger than life position in the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli. Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State, 86, 199.

\(^{22}\) Holt and Holt, Major and Mrs. Holt’s Battlefield Guide to Gallipoli, 64.

\(^{23}\) Ibid, 176.

\(^{24}\) Ibid, 121.

\(^{25}\) Ibid, 233.

\(^{26}\) Sarcan, “A Distorted Destination Image? The Case of Turkey”, 187.
Talat Göktepe, the Çanakkale Region Director of the Ministry of Forestry who had perished while battling the flames of the 1994 fire. Göktepe provided an apt analogy to the soldiers who fought in the 1915 campaign; he had sacrificed his life for the preservation of Turkish soil and nationalism and hence was seen as worthy of commemoration. Amidst these various hindrances, foreign attendance at Gallipoli’s Anzac Day celebrations actually rose every year from 1995 to 2000."

Gallipoli thus seemed capable of attracting foreign tourist dollars even when Turkey’s Mediterranean beaches and ancient sites could not. The peninsula’s allure was clearly not lost on the Turkish government. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Turkish government was persistent in its restructuring of Gallipoli as a site of international importance. As in prior evocations of the reconciliatory narrative, Gallipoli’s significance in resolving old enmities was elaborated upon. Yet, more importantly, building on the events of 1985, the Turkish government would emphasize Gallipoli as a site to be shared with other nationalities. Two international competitions initiated by the Turkish government would most noticeably exhibit this new trend.

The clearest manifestation of this new policy of sharing Gallipoli was the Turkish President Süleyman Demirel’s 1997 decision to commission the creation of the Gallipoli Peninsula Peace Park. While the initiative to restructure and redesign the park was significant in itself, Demirel went a step further by authorizing an international competition to design the new park. The objective of the competition was to:

- design a place devoted to peace and harmony, to reshape the landscape, respecting the site and the natural environment, and to define its identity through the creation of atmospheres in which visitors would have a sensitive

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27 Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Australia, “Concept – what is the Anzac Commemorative Site and why was it built”, (June 1999) http://www.anzacsitewebsite.com.au/building/concept.html
experience of the very idea of peace.\textsuperscript{28}

Contestants included artists and architects from Australia, Norway, England, the Netherlands, Israel, Turkey and a host of other countries. Strangely, the contest’s winners would not be subject to the approval of the Turkish government. Instead, contest rulings were made at the discretion of an international jury of ten people. Though the jury contained two Turks, it was presided over by the Australian architect Glenn Murcutt.\textsuperscript{29} In the end, two Norwegians won the competition, with a quartet from the Netherlands coming in a close second.

In 2003, the Turkish government initiated another international competition: “The Gallipoli Campaign (Çanakkale Wars) International ‘Peace Songs’ Contest.” In the words of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism,

The Gallipoli Campaign (Çanakkale Wars) are [sic] one of the most important, vast and significant wars of the [sic] history. From this point of view, it will be very meaningful to realize various activities based on the dimensions of humanity, international peace and reciprocal relations. This war can not [sic] only be evaluated with the participation of the nations or from their point of view, but the problem can be handled with a humanist approach as on the basis of the fact of what war has given to us as “citizens of the world”....With the creation of new songs having the context of love and peace in order to reflect the identity of this war between all nations, it will be very useful to remember this historical event as a positive and permanent trace for the humankind.\textsuperscript{30}

As per the stipulations of the contest, contestants were to create songs about Gallipoli based on two themes: peace and love. Interestingly, the contest was restricted to nationals of Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, England, France, India, Pakistan, Ireland, Canada,

\textsuperscript{28} International Union of Architects, “UIA/International Competitions/Results/Gallipoli – Peace Park (Turkey)”. (1998) \url{http://www.uia-architects.org/texte/news/2a1a4d.htm}
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
Germany, and South Africa.\textsuperscript{31}

The 1997 Peace Park competition was significant because it temporarily transferred decision-making over the remaking of the peninsula from the Turkish government to an international jury. The internationalist objective of the competition combined with its international personage, aided the Turkish government in endorsing its reconciliatory narrative, but it also recreated Gallipoli as a site to be shared between all nationalities. During the competition, maintenance and development of the land became a subject for discussion and negotiation between Turkey and other nations, rather than an issue to be decided by Turkish policymakers alone. Likewise, the Peace Songs contest only strengthened the view that Gallipoli was a shared site. The contest portrayed Gallipoli as a ‘humanist’ project. According to the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the peninsula and its history could teach the entire world a universal lesson about war and thus transcended nationalist claims to the land. As such, the Turkish government once again effectively universalized Gallipoli, making other nations believe that the peninsula was a shared space and that the reconciliatory narrative was a communal project.

The eighty-fifth anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign in 2000 was a record year for the peninsula. Spectators at the ceremonies estimated that upwards of 15,000 Australians and New Zealanders made their way across the globe to pay their respects to their ancestors.\textsuperscript{32} It is difficult to say whether the Turkish government’s attempts at


In the second chapter, the list of nationalities included in memorial ceremonies and other remembrance activities at Gallipoli was significantly smaller. The addition of other nations into the reconciliatory narrative suggests that the Turkish government was attempting to expand Gallipoli’s international tourism base or create new ties with the governments of other countries.
narrativization were the key factor in stimulating foreign tourists to visit Gallipoli—certainly events and political circumstances in Australia and New Zealand were of great help. It can be said with some certainty, however, that the increase in foreign visitors to Gallipoli spurred both the Turkish government and its citizens into action and brought the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli to a whole new level. As tour guide Kenan Çelik stated, “When so many Australians started coming Turkish people felt some kind of shame. If 17,000 Australians come to pay respect, why don’t we?” In 2004, reporters from the journal The Gallipolian stated that there was a marked increase in the amount of Turkish tourists from two years prior. They also reported that there were new Turkish memorials that were not there before. By the summer of 2007, it appeared that Turkish tourists overwhelmingly outnumbered their foreign counterparts on every day except April 25th. On a summer weekday afternoon at Anzac Cove, there were only two tour buses with foreign citizens compared to five exclusively Turkish tour buses.

Thus by the mid-2000s, Gallipoli was drawing thousands of foreign and Turkish tourists to its soil. It thus appeared that the Turkish government’s narrativization of

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35 All the observations of Gallipoli from 2007 are from this author’s own experience on the peninsula or in Turkey at large. In addition, according to one Australian tour guide, particular Turkish political parties were even paying for the travel costs of Turkish tourists to visit Çanakkale. Many Turkish tour buses did contain large advertisements for political parties or figures. If true, this suggests that the parties saw Gallipoli as a powerful socializing tool capable of inspiring nationalist sentiments or party loyalty. With Gallipoli’s popularity skyrocketing amongst the Turkish populace, the parties could also endear themselves to the tourist by sending them on a vacation to the peninsula. Pheroze Unwalla, Interview with Peter Robb, 26 April 2007, Çanakkale, Turkey.
36 In terms of its promotion for international audiences, Gallipoli’s role as a significant, prominent site is elaborated throughout the year, especially in reference to Anzac Day. When the site is promoted on Anzac-specific tour company websites, the significance of the 1915 campaign and the sentiments it is purported to inspire are explained at length. In these cases, Gallipoli is the central focus of all tour itineraries with Ephesus, Troy, and other nearby sites being included as peripheral. Yet, when it comes to the packaging of tours to Gallipoli by non Anzac-specific tour companies, the site is framed on a more even keel with other
Gallipoli had been successful in attracting foreigners and Turks to peninsula, and the success in turn had spurred even greater narrativization. Yet, the narrativization of Gallipoli was no longer under the iron hand of the Turkish government. The Turkish government’s 1982 tourism law had enabled and encouraged other Turkish citizens to narrativize Gallipoli for their own gain.

**Commodifying Gallipoli**

On April 25th, 2007, thousands of young Australians and New Zealanders gathered at Anzac Cove as they had for the past several years to observe a moment of silence at dawn. After spending five hours being battered by the stiff night winds of the Aegean and the equally taxing inexhaustible preaching of politicians, the restless crowds gladly rose to their feet as the sun rose over Anı Burnu beach, ready to honour those Anzac soldiers who had stormed that same beach ninety-two years ago. It was the pivotal moment of the 2007 ceremonies. As the crowd came to a hush and the minute of silence commenced, only one sound could be heard: “Çay, çay, çay…” A Turkish vendor, obviously oblivious and indifferent to the special moment at hand, was taking advantage of the sudden silence to peddle his tea.

Large scale commodification in Turkey had been taking place since the 1980s when, as mentioned, Turgut Özal’s program of economic liberalization invited sites which are in relatively close proximity to the peninsula. For example, a Turkish tour company, All Istanbul Tours, offers a tour itinerary which includes Istanbul, Gallipoli, Troy, Ephesus, Pamukkale, Hierapolis, and Cappadocia. Gallipoli is only one stop on a diverse tour of historical, archaeological, and mythical sites. For an example of the former case, see Gallipoli Tour, [www.gallipolitour.com](http://www.gallipolitour.com). For an example of the latter case, see All Istanbul Tours, [http://www.allistanbultours.com/Gallipoli-Troy-Ephesus-Pamukkale-Cappadocia-Tours.htm](http://www.allistanbultours.com/Gallipoli-Troy-Ephesus-Pamukkale-Cappadocia-Tours.htm).

The event was dominated by Australian and New Zealand politicians, such as New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Australian Minister for Defense Dr. Brendan Nelson, who also made several subsequent speeches at different locales on the peninsula. A recorded message by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was also played on several of the big screens set up at Anzac Cove.
privatization and a free market economy. Yael Navaro-Yashin notes that, during this period, new businesses emerged and new products materialized in Turkish stores.\textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, large shopping malls, based on American and Western European models, were constructed, replete with American-style fast food and brand name products. Most importantly, as the customer base expanded, Turkish businesses began to produce new goods which sought to capitalize on Turkish patriotism and identity. Produced in various forms to appeal to a wide base of consumers, “Turkish nativity,” was manufactured and sold in shopping malls and markets throughout Turkey.\textsuperscript{39} Even Atatürk, the cult of whom in Turkey has been studied at length by Navaro-Yashin, became a valuable commodity in the 1990s with posters, badges, statues, busts, photographs and portraits depicting images of the former president in iconic poses being produced in large quantities.\textsuperscript{40}

Unsurprisingly, the 1915 Gallipoli campaign has not been ignored in this quest to commodify “Turkish identity,” especially given Atatürk’s role during the battle. Since the moment the Turkish government opened Gallipoli’s doors to mass tourism, the narrativization of Gallipoli has been subcontracted by the Turkish government to a number of entrepreneurs and small business holders who in many cases did not comprehend or care about Gallipoli’s value for foreigners. The “çay” incident at the 2007 dawn ceremony was one such example. With profit as his sole goal, the vendor did not care that he intruded upon the narrativization of Gallipoli. Of course, the narratives upon which he trespassed were the Australian and New Zealand nationalist narratives of Gallipoli; although there were glimpses of the reconciliatory narrative, there were no real interruptions of it.

\textsuperscript{38} Navaro-Yashin, \textit{Faces of the State}, 80.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 90.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 188.
There appears to be a difference, however, between tea vendors who seek to profit from Gallipoli without paying attention to the reconciliatory or nationalist narratives, and those businessmen who do. Gallipoli kitsch has become a booming industry on and near the Gallipoli peninsula and many Turkish and non-Turkish citizens have sought to profit from the reproduction of Gallipoli’s image or the use of its lore. For the most part, the dealers of this kitsch have toed the narrative line in the hopes of maximizing profits. Clothing, tourism literature, and novelty items have all been manufactured with the reconciliatory narrative in mind. Perhaps most exemplary of these entrepreneurial efforts is the Pax Mey or Peace Wine. Grapes from Turkey, Australia and New Zealand were brought together to create a wine that, according to one advertisement was “for the sake of peace and friendship that has started with the war.”

Yet, in the new millennium, it is not just the foreign masses that commemorate Gallipoli; the peninsula has now become a major draw for Turkish tourists as well. 

Image provided by author.

Figure 8: A poster advertisement for Pax Mey found in a youth hostel in Çanakkale.
More than that, despite the rhetoric of sharing and commonality that abounds from the reconciliatory narrative, Gallipoli is very rarely a shared experience. Merchants sell souvenirs and literature specifically for Turkish tourists.\textsuperscript{41} Specialized tours for Turks take different routes, visit different sites, and hear different stories than foreign tour groups.\textsuperscript{42} There are even hostels and hotels in \cankale and \eceabat that are specifically for foreign tourists. The commodification of Gallipoli illustrates that, in almost every sense, there is an attempt, conscious or subconscious, to maintain a clear separation between the reconciliatory and nationalist narratives. Thus, while Turks might participate in the reconciliatory narratives with other nations, other nations are prevented from intruding upon the Turkish nationalist narrative, at least in terms of what is commodified.

**Disputing the Turkish Nationalist Narrative of Gallipoli**

The commodification of Gallipoli by Turkish merchants and vendors for the most part conformed to the values of the Turkish government’s nationalist and reconciliatory narratives. Such consistency was beneficial for both parties; merchants and vendors could maximize their profits by targeting tourists who had already internalized the narratives. The Turkish government, on the other hand, could rest easy knowing that the state-approved visions of Gallipoli were being reproduced without their direct involvement. Yet, with Gallipoli’s popularity rising in Turkey and the apparent willingness of the

\textsuperscript{41} To a large extent, this has to do with language differences. Yet, there are souvenirs such as t-shirts with Turkish flags or pictures of Atatürk that clearly target Turkish citizens. Of course, there are t-shirts with Anzac images being sold as well.

\textsuperscript{42} For example, foreign tour groups frequent popular Anzac or British sites such as Lone Pine, the Nek, and Cape Helles. They do not, however, normally visit the \cankale Martyr’s Memorial Complex or other specifically Turkish memorials. There are a few memorials where Turks and foreigners both visit: Anzac Cove and Chunuk Bair being the most prominent. Both sites, however, have both Turkish and foreign memorials and are not designed for one nationality exclusively.
Turkish government to ‘share’ Gallipoli with the world, the narrativization of Gallipoli would not be limited to the profit-seeking actions of merchants and vendors.

Increasingly, artists and authors began to produce their own visions of what Gallipoli signified and what could be learnt from the 1915 campaign. Occasionally, these artistic productions ran counter to the narratives sponsored by the Turkish government. For example, author and poet Osman Arslan created Düșmeyen Sancak. 57 Alay (Translation: “The Flag that doesn’t go down. The 57th Regiment”), a Turkish comic book about the famous 57th Regiment at the Battle of Gallipoli. 57 Alay is the seventh installation in a ten part series entitled “True Stories from Turkish History. The Çanakkale Epic 1-10.” Arslan also wrote the lyrics for the Çanakkale March which was accepted by the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry in 2005 and has since been used at official commemorations.

According to the back cover, all the comic books in the series are based on historical fact and documents. Yet, 57 Alay appears to be a simple reproduction of the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli. Atatürk is shown commanding loyal “Turkish” soldiers who willingly charge into battle; the Turkish identity of the soldiers is made apparent through references to the soldiers as “Turks”. Although the depiction of “Turkish” soldiers is largely consistent with the vision put forth by the Turkish nationalist narrative, the portrayal of the Anzac armed forces is wholly inconsistent with the vision put forth by the reconciliatory narrative.

43 This is not to say that all artists and authors narrativized Gallipoli in a different manner than the Turkish government. Indeed, many Turkish books and films appear to reproduce the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli in almost exact terms.

Through the images presented by the reconciliatory narrative, the Anzac soldier is constructed as a brave, reluctant combatant who honors and respects his Turkish opponents. In contrast to this noble image, 57 Alay illustrates Anzac soldiers with cold, dead, white eyes and wicked, war-mongering grins; the Turkish soldiers, on the other hand, are drawn as serious, dutiful characters with big, brown eyes, ready to sacrifice their lives for their homeland. The actions of the Anzacs in 57 Alay also stand in contrast to their noble representation in the reconciliatory narrative. Laughing at the destruction they are causing, Anzac soldiers are shown stabbing Turks in the back and cowardly fleeing when outnumbered. As one Anzac soldier states to the “Turkish” soldier charged with planting his nation’s flag, “He He He! What are you going to do now, Turk? Drop that flag and surrender! Soon you will die! ...” In the final scene, the same “Turkish” soldier – who was shot in the back by an Anzac soldier – is shown lying dead amongst several other bodies with his flag planted firmly in the ground. The caption below reads:

They faced an army of true believers who found a life without a fatherland and a flag meaningless ... The all-out assault of the 57th Regiment was too much for the enemy and forced them to withdraw ... The English were bewildered ... The new ANZAC forces prepared to meet their deaths... 45

On the one hand, the author of 57 Alay has taken the Turkish government’s nationalist narrative of Gallipoli and slightly altered it to illicit a more anti-Anzac response. On the other hand, it is a clear affront to the Turkish government’s reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli. The anti-Anzac imagery of 57 Alay is all the more disconcerting considering the claim that the content of the comic is based on historical fact. The comic book both reproduces the set nationalist narrativization and counter-narrativizes the reconciliatory narrative at the same time.

45 Turkish material from 57 Alay was translated by Dr. Thomas Kuehn.
is, of course, written in Turkish. The comic’s anti-Anzac imagery might have influenced Turkish views of Australians and New Zealanders, but its influence was localized by its monolingualism. In other words, its effect on foreigners was non-existent. The reconciliatory narrative was aimed at drawing foreigners and foreign capital to Turkey. Unless translated versions of the comic book suddenly became available, the Turkish government did not have to concern itself with the possibility of Australians and New Zealanders getting offended or with the subversion of its narrative of reconciliation. Yet, as mentioned previously, with Gallipoli’s rising popularity in Turkey and with more and more foreign tourists making their way to the peninsula, the Turkish government had been unrelenting in its promotion of Gallipoli as a site of great nationalist pride and worth, while simultaneously publicizing the peninsula’s internationalist appeal. Their insistence that the 1915 campaign provided humanist lessons against war was a great inspiration for authors and artists alike. These internationalist visions of the campaign do not directly refute the Turkish nationalist narrative, but they do subvert Turkish claims to glory and victory by rejecting war in general.

For example, British author Louis De Bernieres’ epic novel *Birds Without Wings* deals with the Gallipoli Campaign in an altogether different manner from the Turkish nationalist narrative. As Karatavuk, a main character who fought in the battle, looks back on his time at Gallipoli, he states, “Whenever I think about the military glory we won…I also remind myself of the inglorious groaning and sweating and shitting blood and slime.”[^46] De Bernieres showed the battle to be spattered with brief episodes of glory and “Turkish” nationalism but overall his writing elucidates the viciousness of combat, the futility of war, and the loss of morale on the “Turkish” side. By focusing on Karatavuk’s

negative individual experience and subsequent trauma, De Bernieres shatters the notion of “Turkish” grandeur at Gallipoli and undoes the image of the willing, sacrificing Turkish soldier. For De Bernieres, soldiers at Gallipoli were not to be glorified; they were to be pitied.

In the same vein, Tolga Örnek’s much-acclaimed film Gelibolu (Gallipoli) is the most recent and perhaps most famous artistic endeavor to cast doubt on the Turkish government’s nationalist narrative of Gallipoli. Örnek is the founder of Ekip Films, a prominent Turkish film production company which has produced several internationally renowned feature length documentaries. Gelibolu is the first film on the campaign to be presented from multiple sides, including the perspectives of soldiers from several different nationalities. More than simply international in its content, Gelibolu was created in consultation with scholars, artists, and researchers from Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Russia. Though of Turkish origin, Örnek made it clear that this would not be a film focused on the Turkish side. From the very first days of production, the film attained an international quality that rejected the right of Turkey to exclusively dictate and produce the memory of the campaign and peninsula. Still, the film was funded mostly by Turkish corporations such as Akçansa, Banvit, Çalık Holding, Deva Holding, Garanti, and many others.

Several themes within the film run counter to the Turkish nationalist narrative’s vision of Gallipoli as the site of a glorious, heroic, and wonderful victory. The movie

47 All references to the film can be found under the citation: Gelibolu, DVD. Directed by Tolga Örnek. Turkey: Ekip Film, 2004.
begins with a scene of destruction overlaid with melancholic music and the somber ruminations of Jeremy Irons – the narrator of the English version along with Sam Neill (Turkish actor Zafer Ergin is the narrator of the Turkish version). Cross-cutting between the scenes and sounds of devastation, the audience is introduced to the main characters of the film - the soldiers. The soldiers' backgrounds are varied: an eighteen year old British miner named Joe Murray, a Turkish commander Salahaddin Adil, and an Anzac, George Bollinger. Their stories, and those of many others, are told against the background of sad worn faces.

Several elements of the reconciliatory narrative are described and reproduced: the exchange of gifts, the legendary ceasefire that supposedly began the friendship between Anzacs and “Turks,” the Ottoman soldier who ventured into no man’s land to save the wounded Anzac soldier, and the elderly “Turkish” man who was allowed to hang laundry on the barbed wire in no man’s land. One “Turkish” soldier, Ahmet Mujib, described his enemies as follows: “These boys with their clean shaven and endearing faces...Their sight aroused in us both feelings of revenge and compassion.” While attempting to affirm the camaraderie between “Turks” and Anzacs, Gelibolu denies the glory that the Turkish government envisions in its nationalist narrative. Depictions of death and suffering play a prominent role throughout the film. The audience is forced to bear witness to the stories of men and boys being savagely bayonetted, drowning in their own feces, and crying for their mothers. The elderly Turkish man who hung his laundry on the barbed wire was eventually shot and killed by the Anzac forces; a fact that was peculiarly absent from all 2007 memorial services that describe the man.

Perhaps even more disturbing than the images and stories are the words of the

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49 Gelibolu, 37:32.
soldiers themselves. Excerpts from soldiers' letters home give a sense of utter despair. An artist from London, Ellis Silas, wrote “I can only hope I shall be able to forget it all. In my heart I know I am done.”50 Percival Fenwick, a New Zealand medic, stated “I shall certainly have eternal nightmares.”51 The British miner Joe Murray recounted a particular horrifying tale of a wounded British teenager trapped in no man's land: “Poor old Horton. He kept crying for his mother. I don't even think he was sixteen.”52 In a seemingly preemptive censure of the nationalist glorification of the campaign today, an enraged George Bollinger rebuked “Newspapers have the audacity to claim we like this life.”53 Most illuminating for this thesis are the letters of Ottoman soldiers in the campaign. While the contemporary Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli presents the soldiers as willing, battle-ready patriotic heroes, Gelibolu shows a different type of combatant. An exhausted “Turkish” lieutenant, Mehmet Faci, wrote, “I'm twenty-one but my hair and beard are already grey. My face is wrinkled and my body is rotting. I can't tolerate these hardships and disasters any longer.”54 Finally, in a seeming admonishment of those nationalists who glorify war, the film ends with the longest surviving letter of the battle written by the Turkish soldier Mehmet Tevfik. With hopelessness and resignation, Tevfik wrote, “Dear Father, Beloved Mother...I do not hope to survive...I am writing these lines so you will have something to remember me by. You are my heart. You are my soul...I entrust my beloved wife and dear son to you.”55 Tevfik was killed in combat two weeks later.

50 Gelibolu, 53:56.
51 Gelibolu, 1:00:59.
52 Gelibolu, 46:45.
53 Gelibolu, 1:04:19.
54 Gelibolu, 1:42:36.
55 Gelibolu, 1:50:04.
The film is indeed fragmentary as it shifts from locations on the peninsula and from nationality to nationality in no particular order. Primacy is not given to the Turkish nationalist narrative or to any other country’s narrative of Gallipoli. By focusing on the negative individual experiences of soldiers, Örnek undermines the collective ideal of willing sacrifice for the nation. Secondly, *Gelibolu* scorns the romanticization of the battle that has taken place in recent years. In describing the experiences of the soldiers he researched, Örnek stated: “It was the end of the romance of war.” The director sought to accomplish a similar deromanticization through *Gelibolu*:

I wanted to examine Gallipoli to understand armed conflict and make a more general statement on what war entails...History, especially Gallipoli, stopped being about numbers and dates and began to be about people. I began to notice how terrible war was; how it destroyed lives, families, and countries’ futures. And it did this with indifference to race, religion, nationality and the motivation for being there...What started out as a war documentary based on personal accounts became a strong anti-war project warning us on the perils of war.

For Örnek, the Battle of Gallipoli was not to be celebrated as a paragon of nationalism or as a national birthplace; the destructive nature of war in general precluded such celebrations.

*When the Reconciliatory Narrative Works Too Well...*

When the Turkish government began to depict Gallipoli as a site to be shared with all nationalities, it was expected that the sentiments inspired by this new reconciliatory narrative would draw tourists and their money to Gallipoli’s shores. Perhaps, in this

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57 Ibid.
regard, the Turkish government was successful. In the new millennium, Gallipoli has certainly become a major attraction for foreign tourists. Narrativizing Gallipoli as a shared space, however, has had one notable consequence: whereas the Turkish government meant to portray Gallipoli as symbolically communal, other nations appear to have understood the reconciliatory narrative to include the physical sharing of the peninsula.

The majority of disputes over the physical space of Gallipoli have occurred between Turkey and Australia, a country which has its own fervent, Gallipoli-centered nationalist narrative. In recent years, the vast influx of Australian battlefield tourists descending upon Gallipoli has strained the site's capacity. The park was ill-equipped for the tens of thousands of foreigners who concurrently visited the site on Anzac Day. Furthermore, it was feared that the expected record numbers for the 2015 centennial memorial would cause irreparable damage to the memorials and their environment. Thus, a vast reconstruction process has been undertaken in order to improve roads, capacity, and accessibility in general.

Though the site is under Turkish sovereignty, the efficacy of the reconciliatory narrative has emboldened countries such as Australia to act as if their own national sovereignty extended to Gallipoli. In 2005, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard openly condemned the Turkish government for the construction of a wall at Anzac Cove - the infamous beach where Australians landed - because in his opinion "it would alter the

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58 Australia, which traces its own birth as a nation back to Gallipoli, clearly has their own agenda on the peninsula and remains deeply concerned over how the site reflects their own national values. Their demands at Gallipoli are as much a reflection of their own political situation under Prime Minister John Howard, as they are about the sentiments inspired by the reconciliatory narrative.

appearance in a very significant way and we don't want that." That very same year, the Turkish government again came under fire during the road-works controversy when Anzac remains were allegedly dug up by Turkish bulldozers. With a similar result to the 1916 desecration allegations, outrage in Australia was widespread and a wholesale condemnation of the Turkish government ensued despite the absence of concrete evidence that remains had been unearthed. Senator Christine Milne was one such outraged Australian: "But I was horrified — I could not believe my eyes when I saw bulldozers ripping into the cliff face behind Anzac Cove. I could not believe it." Howard and other nationalist Australians also displayed their displeasure at the Turkish construction efforts and insisted that Australia be given more authority and input on the site's overhaul. An official Australian government inquiry – one of many into the event – stated that “Future roadworks must be subject to detailed scrutiny to ensure that no damage is done to any military heritage.” The inquiry also called for greater Australian involvement at the site and made a point of noting that the Australian government donated a large amount of money for Gallipoli's upkeep each year.

Even more alarming to the Turkish authorities was the Australian Prime Minister's boldness in tacitly claiming Gallipoli as Australian territory. From 2003 until 2007, John Howard vehemently insisted that the Gallipoli Peninsula Peace Park be listed as an Australian Heritage site, thereby breaching the sovereignty of the Turkish nation.

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63 Ibid
over the peninsula. As Howard stated, “Although it’s not on Australian territory, anyone who has visited the place will know that once you go there you feel it is as Australian as the piece of land on which your home is built.”64 Of course, this declaration speaks to Australia’s own nationalist narrative, but its boldness could only have been encouraged by the Turkish government’s assertion of the site as a shared space.

Under Attack, On the Attack: Re-asserting the Turkish Nationalist Narrative

The Turkish government had been caught in a trap of its own making. By opening the door for others to narrativize Gallipoli and by promoting Gallipoli as a shared space, the Turkish government had unwittingly allowed for their own nationalist narrative to be undermined. With Gallipoli’s popularity rising among the Turkish populace, the Turkish government could not afford to look weak in protecting Gallipoli’s memory and sovereignty. Thus, rather than permitting these encroachments on the nationalist narrative, the Turkish government responded to the trespasses in the same manner they had to the superior memorials and pilgrimages of foreigners. When confronted with a perceived slight, the government reacted by re-affirming Turkish nationalism and sovereignty.

In terms of Howard’s attempts to assert Australian sovereignty over the site, the Turkish government was firm in its response. The government issued a prompt refusal to allow Gallipoli to be added to a list of Australian heritage sites. The road-works controversy elicited an even firmer rejoinder and damaged Turkish-Australian relations.

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Emma Griffiths, “No Heritage Listing for Gallipoli”, ABC Australia (27 April 2005) http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1354193.htm
as well as the reconciliatory narrative. In several retorts to Australian allegations, the
Turkish authorities vehemently denied that they had caused any damage. In one press
release, the Turkish Environment and Forestry Ministry stated:

The widening and arrangement operation of the coastal road on Anzac Cove
has been carried out with the greatest of care and fastidiousness. No remains
have been disturbed during the construction process...Reports by various
press organizations claiming that road construction efforts have damaged or
altered historical graves are baseless. 65

In another response, the Turkish Ambassador to Australia, Tansu Okandan, confirmed the
statements of the Environment and Forestry Ministry: “I believe it was a bit exaggerated,
because that road has been constructed upon the request of the Australian
government...The Turkish authorities have been careful because there is that
consciousness - in Turkey definitely - to keep the environment as it is.”66

Perhaps the sharpest – and slyest – retort came from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the
Turkish Prime Minister at the time of the road-works controversy. One might recall that
Atatürk’s 1934 dedication is one of the most commonly cited elements of the
reconciliatory narrative: “You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries,
wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After
having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well [emphasis added].”

In a speech addressed to the Australian public, Erdoğan gave his own twist on those
famous words: “And you can rest assured that your sons are our guests. And they lie side
by side with our sons who have fallen there.”67 Though subtle, the switch is palpable;

65 “Turkey Denies Damaging Gallipoli Graves”, Turkish Daily News (12 March 2005)
66 “Turkey Fires Back Over Gallipoli Road”, The Age (25 April 2005)
http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Turkey-fires-back-over-Gallipoli-
road/2005/04/25/1114281492217.html
67 James Grubel, “Old Battle Scars Dominate Australia-Turkey Talks”, (9 December 2005)
instead of being sons of the Turkish nation, Anzac soldiers had now become guests who were there at the discretion of the Republic of Turkey. As mentioned, the statement’s timing coincided with the road-works controversy. Erdogan’s speech appears to be a sharp rebuke to the Australian government and public, intimating that Gallipoli was Turkish soil and the Anzac deceased - and Australian tourists - were there only by the grace of their Turkish hosts.

On the domestic front, Tolga Örnek’s Gelibolu, though receiving widespread critical acclaim abroad, did not get the same wholesale approval in Turkey. Several Turkish nationalists disparaged Örnek’s internationalist vision of the conflict. Murat Tuna, a top government official in Altınoluk, a city south of Çanakkale on the Aegean Sea, filed a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office and demanded that the screening of Gelibolu be banned in Turkey because it was neither representative of the 1915 campaign nor of the spirit of the Turkish people. Tuna was also upset that Atatürk’s role was limited to only six minutes in the film. Tuna, however, was not representative of the Turkish people; for the most part, Örnek’s film was received well in Turkey. But, his reaction was a perfect example of a nationalist government official over-reacting to an alleged attack on the memory of the 1915 campaign.

On the whole, however, the Turkish government’s response to the increasing intervention of foreigners and counter-narrativization by various artists did not involve spoken words, but a cunning manipulation of space and ritual. Museums are an apt example. In discussing state-funded museums, Patricia Davison notes that museums are a

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tool through which nations represent themselves to their own citizens and to other nations.⁷⁰ Even before the advent of mass tourism, the Turkish government had always been self-conscious of how Gallipoli reflected the state-sanctioned values of the Turkish nation. By choosing, framing, and ordering particular exhibits, Turkish curators in state-funded museums could define what was historically important, shape public perceptions of the past, and reproduce state-sponsored narratives in a controlled environment.

Although a thorough analysis of Gallipoli’s representation in Turkish museums is not possible in this limited space, it is of value to this thesis to briefly discuss the 2007 exhibits of two Turkish museums.

The Kabatepe Museum on the Gallipoli peninsula and the Istanbul Military Museum are exemplary of the type of state-funded museums alluded to by Davison. Both museums strictly adhered to the Turkish government’s nationalist and reconciliatory narratives of Gallipoli. The foreign presence on the peninsula was represented by the exhibition of various weapons, flags, and souvenirs captured or recovered by the Ottoman forces at Gallipoli. Photographs of foreign troops showed the soldiers in troop formation, in scenes of fun and play, and occasionally being captured by Ottoman soldiers. The scenes of brutality and anguish depicted in Örnekk’s Gelibolu were conspicuously absent. Erased from the Turkish government’s sanctioned reconciliatory narrative, the campaign’s vicious instances could not be displayed in the museums.⁷¹ After all, the museums were not just for Turkish citizens but foreign tourists as well.

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⁷¹ Erasures of the past are not uncommon in museums. Ted Swedenburg noted the exact same phenomena in Israel at the Acre Citadel. The curators of the citadel had ‘erased’ particular items and events from the museum, most notably the violent acts committed by terrorist organizations like the Irgun and Stern Gang. For more information, see Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 40-41.
The museums' interpretations of the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli also contained erasures. Most notably, the museums transformed the multi-ethnic Ottoman forces at Gallipoli into a purely Turkish military force, erasing the Arab contingent of the Ottoman army. The disavowal of the Ottoman past and the Turkification of the Ottoman army have already been discussed in previous chapters. The erasure of Arabs from the museums' depictions of Gallipoli fits with this trend, and conforms to the nationalist narrative's vision of a purely Turkish army fighting at Gallipoli. All religious references are also erased to maintain the purportedly secular tradition of the Turkish nation.72 Again, there are no scenes of overt brutality. Atatürk and Ottoman soldiers are always depicted in photographs and paintings in stoic, often iconic, poses and are never shown in positions of weakness. Overall, the sense is given that the ‘Turkish’ forces at Gallipoli were always in complete control of the battle and in a position of total superiority to the foreign invaders.

This sense of control and dominance was reified at the 2007 Turkish International service. On April 24th, a day before the Anzac Day celebrations, the Turkish government memorialized the ‘Turkish’ and foreign forces of the Battle of Gallipoli at the Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial or as it often now called, Mehmetçik Abidesi (translation: Turkish Soldier’s Monument).73 Although the ceremony was called the Turkish International Service, it was evident by the audience in attendance that this was a ceremony for Turkish citizens; the foreign presence was limited to a few diplomats, their families and

72 It is well-known, however, that Ottoman soldiers often prayed to Allah. The narrators of Gelibolu often quote lines from Ottoman soldiers’ journals praising or asking for help from Allah.
73 The Turkish government actually holds two ceremonies. The main ceremony is held on April 24th and is for a strictly Turkish audience. But, the government runs another memorial service on Anzac Day (April 25th) at the 57th Regiment Memorial. Close to Lone Pine, this ceremony is easily visible and accessible to foreigners.
reporters who were there to pay homage to the Turkish role at Gallipoli. Furthermore, all foreigners were positioned at bleachers on one side of the ceremony, while Turkish citizens were segregated on the opposite side. Several elements of the reconciliatory narrative were discussed, but in an atmosphere of Turkish control.

The environment and setup also ensured that symbolic Turkish control would be maintained. Set in the large stone square in front of the imposing memorial, the service was surrounded by images of Atatürk. Enormous pictures of the former leader in iconic poses loomed over the procession. The podium at which diplomats gave their speeches was positioned in front of a large stone engraving of Atatürk leading Turkish soldiers into battle. In a veritable sense, Atatürk and his soldiers were keeping a close eye on Gallipoli and the foreigners who visited it, much as they had done in the past. High above the pictures, a gigantic Turkish flag was flown, dwarfing the regular sized flags of other nations in attendance.

During the flag raising ceremony, a Turkish band played each nation’s anthem while the respective national flag was flown. The giant Turkish flag was raised first, but instead of only one flag being flown, three additional Turkish flags went up in procession. The three Turkish flags were followed by New Zealand’s and subsequently Australia’s flags and anthems. The flags of other nations, including Bangladesh, Canada,
Figure 9: A Turkish soldier watches over the crowd during the April 24th Turkish ceremony at the Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial. In the background, an enormous Turkish flag is flown over a giant picture of Atatürk.

Figure 10: Two Turkish soldiers in traditional military garb stand guard in front of an engraving of Atatürk shaking hands with an Anzac soldier.
France, Germany, India, Ireland, Pakistan, South Africa and the United Kingdom were then raised in alphabetical order. This set a strict hierarchy with Turkey clearly taking precedence, followed by New Zealand and Australia. Interestingly, once more the Arab contribution to the battle was ignored; no flags from any Arab country were raised.

The heavy military presence was perhaps the most revealing factor in the Turkish desire to reassert control. Turkish soldiers, in both traditional and modern garb, surrounded the event. Far from playing merely ceremonial roles, the soldiers were heavily armed and guarded the site through a series of checkpoints. Two foreign diplomats were given the chance to speak: New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters and Australia’s Minister of Defense Dr. Brendan Nelson. They were escorted to the podium by Turkish guards; their own bodyguards were forced to remain in the bleachers. Interestingly, their speeches were not translated into Turkish. After the two foreign diplomats had spoken, the Turkish Minister of Culture addressed the crowd in Turkish; no translation was given for foreigners.

In a final dazzling display of military might, the ceremony was capped off by the sonic booms of red and white Turkish fighter jets which weaved through the sky leaving white trails in their wake. The entire spectacle not only prompted the usual expressions of wonderment from the crowd, but again served as a constant reminder to foreigners that they were indeed on Turkish soil, and at the whim of the Turkish government. Of course, the entire production was not put on solely for the foreign diplomats. In fact, the scant number of foreigners present and the military escort of the few foreign diplomats in attendance sent a very particular message to the Turkish audience: Gallipoli is a Turkish peninsula and the Turkish government is in control of its destiny.
The most fascinating part of the ceremony was the separation that was maintained between Turks and foreigners. Divided by the enormous stone square in front of the Çanakkale Martyr’s Memorial and situated on separate bleachers, Turkish and foreign citizens could not interact. Moreover, the speeches by foreign and Turkish diplomats were not translated for the other audience. Seemingly bored by their inability to comprehend the foreign diplomats who were speaking, Turks in attendance often talked amongst themselves until the English speeches concluded. This separation demonstrates again that friendship and unity between Turks and foreigners is perhaps not as prevalent as the reconciliatory narrative of Gallipoli would make it seem.

Conclusion

As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence and perceived superiority of foreigners at Gallipoli usually resulted in a defensive response that spurred nationalist sentiments and increased Turkish memorialization of the site. This chapter has demonstrated that from its inception, mass tourism in Turkey did not hinder this relationship between Gallipoli’s reconciliatory and nationalist narratives. Rather, mass tourism engrained the reconciliatory narrative’s effect on the Turkish nationalist narrative. The presence and perceived threat of foreigners still caused a nationalist reaction that facilitated the production and expression of the Turkish nationalist narrative of Gallipoli. In fact, by vastly increasing the number of foreign and domestic tourists to Gallipoli’s soil, the onset of mass tourism would accelerate the nationalist narrative’s promulgation due to the corresponding increase in Turkish government anxiety over whether the site accurately reflected the state-approved values of the Turkish nation. All
in all, this resulted in an over-compensation in representation. That foreigners and Turks were in some cases seen to be ‘attacking’ the nationalist narrative only exacerbated the Turkish government’s response. Increasingly, it became possible to observe separations and divisions appearing – or being maintained - between foreigners and Turks on many different levels. All of these factors highlighted the contradictions and conflicts between and within the narratives during the post-1980s time period.
CONCLUSION

On Anzac Day, 2007, the New Zealand ceremonies were being held at their usual position at Chunuk Bair. Much like the Australian and British ceremonies that preceded it, the New Zealand memorial service started with the national anthem and was followed by speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, and some prominent members of New Zealand’s armed forces. In fact, the New Zealand ceremonies would have been no different than any other foreign service if it had not been for the presence of approximately two hundred young Turkish boys recently discharged from the Turkish service that had concluded nearby. Wearing identical red t-shirts with the Turkish flag’s star and crescent, the boys marched right past the New Zealand ceremony chanting at the top of their voices in unison. The New Zealand ceremony went on, but its spectators were clearly perturbed.

What spurred the boys into action? Was it a spontaneous manifestation of Turkish nationalism and pride? Or the machination of a higher power? A better exploration of contemporary Turkish attitudes to and memories of Gallipoli would undoubtedly provide another important dimension in the explication of Turkish government narrativization. Indeed, understanding the collective memory of the Turkish public will be of crucial importance to predicting the future of Gallipoli’s narrativization. If the aforementioned example is any indicator, the Turkish government should be careful what they wish for. The nationalist narrative of Gallipoli and the Gallipoli-based master narrative of nation appear to have succeeded in arousing Turkish nationalism, but at what cost to the
reconciliatory narrative?

Certainly, as this thesis has tried to make clear, the narrativization of Gallipoli and the attitudes towards its memory are impacted by the prevailing political, social, and economic circumstances of the time. Relations between Turkey and the EU will inevitably play a large role in shaping Turkish attitudes towards foreigners on and off the Gallipoli peninsula. For instance, Turkey’s consistent setbacks in its quest for full EU membership have left several groups in Turkey disillusioned with the organization; as a result, many are now intent on steering Turkey onto a more independent path. And, as Nasuh Uslu correctly points out, Western criticism of Turkey, in terms of the country’s lack of democratization and human rights, have only sharpened Turkish resentment of foreigners, with the added effect of buttressing the Sèvres Mentality in Turkish consciousness. If Turkey and its citizens continue to feel rebuked and disparaged by “the West”, relations on the Gallipoli peninsula might take a turn for the worse. When narrativizing Gallipoli, the Turkish government must henceforth be aware of both the political circumstances in which they operate and the ramifications of stoking Turkish nationalism, lest they let their profitable reconciliatory narrative wither.

While the upshot of excessive nationalism might be to impair the effectiveness of the reconciliatory narrative, this thesis has worked to prove that the opposite occurs when looking at the relationship in reverse. It would be too strong to assert that the nationalist narrative grew out of its reconciliatory counterpart. After all, the Turkish government began constructing memorials at Gallipoli during the Second World War, approximately thirteen years before the first joint pilgrimage. But, it is safe to say that there is indeed a

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2 Uslu, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period*, 15.
strong cause and effect relationship between the reconciliatory and nationalist narratives. In a sense, the reconciliatory narrative acts as a type of nationalist accelerant. Since the very first joint pilgrimage in 1952 when symbolic interaction between Turks and foreigners initially occurred, the presence and perceived superiority of foreigners and foreign memorials has caused the Turkish government to hasten the construction of major memorials and increase Turkish participation in memorial services. The advent of mass tourism in Turkey helped to significantly increase the foreign presence at Gallipoli which unsurprisingly resulted in a corresponding increase in Turkish memorialization. The more foreigners that came to Gallipoli's soil, the more vehement the nationalist narrative became.

The Turkish government has thus put itself in the intractable position of having to encourage foreigners to come to Gallipoli despite the problems it causes for their own nationalist narrative. Large tourism revenues and improved relations with particular members of the international community are strong incentives for the Turkish government to narrativize Gallipoli as a site of reconciliation. The government wants more foreigners to come, but as it succeeds in drawing them in, three events occur: First, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the content and diffusion of the reconciliatory narrative encourages particular groups to create their own visions of Gallipoli which occasionally subvert the Turkish government's official narratives. Secondly, it arouses in Turks the deep-seeded paranoia over foreigners that has over time become a relatively consistent feature of Turkish-foreign relations. Thirdly, and partially as a result of the latter point, the presence of foreigners triggers a defensive response that expedites narrativization of a nationalist narrative that in many ways cannot help but repudiate the
presence of foreigners.

Gallipoli might be a shared space in many senses, but it still lies on Turkish soil and the attempt to use the space for the construction of a nationalist narrative has several consequences. After all, as Ana Maria Alonso observed, nationalism requires a contiguous national space placed under the jurisdiction of an exclusive ethnic or national fraternity. With its interrupted space and multi-national, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious brotherhood, Gallipoli appears to disrupt the consistency to which the Turkish nation aspires. Turkish claims to territoriality at Gallipoli are disputed; the site rejects the attempt by the government to control and delimit space which, according to Tiryakian and Winchakul, is crucial to the establishment of national identity and nationalism. The demarcation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is also muddled by the rhetoric of sharing brought about by the reconciliatory narrative.

Still, the Turkish government cannot allow foreigners to outshine or hamper their Turkish hosts. Any perceived Turkish inferiority at Gallipoli reflects poorly on the Turkish nation. Fully cognizant of this fact, the Turkish government wishes the site to be a showcase for the values and strength of the Turkish nation with both foreign and domestic citizens as the target audience. Of course, due to the peculiarities of Gallipoli’s history and the large tourism revenues the site attracts, the Turkish government cannot simply expel the foreign presence. Nor can they erase the foreign presence for the benefit of their nationalist narrative as they have done to the Ottoman army’s Arab conscripts or as was done for them during the 1922 fire in Izmir. All the government can do is attempt to surpass the achievements of foreigners on the peninsula, escalate memorialization of

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the site, and heighten Gallipoli’s nationalist appeal to the best of their ability. Coming full circle, the resulting nationalism sometimes results in unforeseen consequences, such as a horde of Turkish boys screaming during a foreign memorial service.

This study is by no means exhaustive but it has attempted to broach the subject of Turkish government narrativization of Gallipoli. Gallipoli is a unique space and the area’s growing popularity in Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand will ensure that the peninsula and its history remain topical. Future studies on the Turkish side at Gallipoli could look at collective memory or undertake more intensive investigations of counter-narrativization, commodification, and museum exhibits. But, it is hoped that at least some of these works will consider how the presence of foreigners and foreign memorials on Turkish soil affects the way in which Gallipoli is remembered and forgotten.
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