COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE
TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY:

THE SOUTHEAST FALSE CREEK EXPERIENCE

by

Tracy Vaughan
B.A., Carleton University, 1993

PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF URBAN STUDIES

In the
Urban Studies Program

© Tracy Vaughan, 2008

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Spring 2008

All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.
Name: Tracy Vaughan
Degree: Master of Urban Studies
Title of Thesis: Collaborative practice towards sustainability: the Southeast False Creek experience

Examining Committee:

Chair:

Peter Hall
Assistant Professor, Urban Studies Program
Associate Director, Centre for Sustainable Community Development

Karen Ferguson
Senior Supervisor
Associate Professor, Urban Studies Program and Department of History

Anthony Perl
Supervisor
Director and Professor, Urban Studies Program

Eugene McCann
External Examiner
Assistant Professor, Department of Geography

Date Defended/Approved: April 2nd, 2008
Declaration of Partial Copyright Licence

The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.

The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection (currently available to the public at the "Institutional Repository" link of the SFU Library website <www.lib.sfu.ca> at: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/handle/1892/112>) and, without changing the content, to translate the thesis/project or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work.

The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies.

It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author's written permission.

Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence.

While licensing SFU to permit the above uses, the author retains copyright in the thesis, project or extended essays, including the right to change the work for subsequent purposes, including editing and publishing the work in whole or in part, and licensing other parties, as the author may desire.

The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive.

Simon Fraser University Library
Burnaby, BC, Canada

Revised: Fall 2007
STATEMENT OF ETHICS APPROVAL

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this work, has obtained, for the research described in this work, either:

(a) Human research ethics approval from the Simon Fraser University Office of Research Ethics,

or

(b) Advance approval of the animal care protocol from the University Animal Care Committee of Simon Fraser University;

or has conducted the research

(c) as a co-investigator, in a research project approved in advance,

or

(d) as a member of a course approved in advance for minimal risk human research, by the Office of Research Ethics.

A copy of the approval letter has been filed at the Theses Office of the University Library at the time of submission of this thesis or project.

The original application for approval and letter of approval are filed with the relevant offices. Inquiries may be directed to those authorities.

Bennett Library
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada
ABSTRACT

This project examines collaborative processes used in the development of the sustainable community Southeast False Creek in Vancouver, BC. It traces the power relations at play during the opening of influential policy windows. Many theorists and practitioners alike find hope in implementing sustainability principles through structured, inclusive dialogue. However, political will and power imbalances direct the effectiveness of collaborative processes. The SEFC story explores the degree to which collaborative planning practices influenced the sustainability agenda and reflects on the extent to which the goals of sustainability were advanced in SEFC.

Keywords: sustainable community; collaboration; citizen participation; power; urban planning; Southeast False Creek

Subject Terms: Sustainable development -- British Columbia -- Citizen participation; City planning -- British Columbia -- Vancouver -- Political participation; Sustainable development -- British Columbia -- Vancouver -- False Creek; Community development, Urban
DEDICATION

To Noam and Zohar

May your futures be filled with hope
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe much of the success of this project to my husband, Roy. I could not have completed this without his enduring support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Tannis for her timely return to Vancouver and Nicky for her constant inspiration.

Much gratitude is extended to the faculty and staff of the Urban Studies program at Simon Fraser University. Essential guidance was provided to me by my Urban Studies advisors, Meg Holden and Karen Ferguson; and UBC professors, John Robinson, Bill Rees and Larry Beasley.

I would like to thank those individuals that offered their time and efforts in interviews with me. Special thanks go to the Southeast False Creek Stewardship Group. May your progressive work live on in a lasting legacy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ............................................................................................................................ ii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... iii
Dedication ......................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. vi
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... viii
List of Acronyms .............................................................................................................. ix
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Collaboration and Power in Sustainability .................................................. 3
  1.1 The Need for and Practice of Sustainability ......................................................... 3
  1.2 Investigating Collaborative Planning ................................................................. 5
  1.3 The Role of Power in Decision Making ............................................................... 10

Chapter 2: Research Design ......................................................................................... 13
  2.1 Approach and Data Collection ........................................................................... 13
  2.2 Research Questions and Analysis ...................................................................... 14

Chapter 3: Southeast False Creek Case Study ............................................................ 15
  3.1 SEFC Project Overview ...................................................................................... 15
  3.2 Window One: The Urban Problem ...................................................................... 20
  3.3 Window Two: The Creekside Landing Plan ......................................................... 24
  3.4 Window Three: Creation of the Policy Statement ............................................... 27
  3.5 Window Four: An Olympic Bid .......................................................................... 33
  3.6 Window Five: Political Change ......................................................................... 42
  3.7 Window Six: A New Player .............................................................................. 47
  3.8 Stewardship Finale ............................................................................................ 54
  3.9 Epilogue .............................................................................................................. 56

Chapter 4: Overall Conclusions and Discussion .......................................................... 57

Appendices ....................................................................................................................... 62
  Appendix A: Interview Questions .............................................................................. 62
  Appendix B: Southeast False Creek Working Group – Core Members ................. 63
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: SEFC geographical context, looking north .............................................. 15
Figure 2: Irwin’s SEFC participation structure .......................................................... 28

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Chronology of events for SEFC ................................................................. 18
# LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Advisory Group (SEFC policy statement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Coalition of Progressive Electors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Design Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEED</td>
<td>Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRMP</td>
<td>Land and Resource Management Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRSP</td>
<td>Livable Region Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEU</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Energy Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Non-Partisan Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Official Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEF</td>
<td>Property Endowment Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEFC</td>
<td>Southeast False Creek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEFC WG</td>
<td>Southeast False Creek Working Group (NGO coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Stewardship Group – SEFC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

I joined the Southeast False Creek Stewardship Group (SG) in the spring of 2005 out of a sheer sense of idealism and desire to learn more about the application of sustainability in planning. I met a wonderful group of capable, dedicated and energetic people who were striving toward the development of a sustainable community. A sustainable community, as defined by Roseland, (1998:14) is a community that is "continually adjusting to meet the social and economic needs of its residents while preserving the environment's ability to support it."

I discovered that as the Southeast False Creek (SEFC) project progressed, the SG's sustainability agenda competed with other stakeholders' agendas for this valuable piece of land – one of Vancouver's last downtown waterfront properties. It became increasingly clear that the concept of sustainability in this project was slowly changing as it was operationalized. The SG did its best to contribute within the limits of the circumstances, yet this did not dim the inescapable sense that the group's collaborative contribution was going to end. It was really this sense of inevitability that triggered the writing of this paper.

This project explores the degree to which collaborative planning practices influenced the sustainability agenda and reflects on the extent to which the goals of sustainability were advanced in SEFC. I use a narrative style to disclose some of the power relations that surfaced at key points in the project, which affected decision making and the collaborative process. Two themes are traced within the storyline: the first is the changing definition and application of sustainability as it moved from

---

1 In this paper power is considered to mean not only having influence on decision making and policy-making, but having direct effect on the outcome of those decisions. To be able to see the results of participation empowers the participants involved.
the policy stage to implementation. The second is the effectiveness of the SG's civic collaborative framework in influencing decision-making and its comparison to the expert-based collaborative design processes that was also a part in the planning of SEFC.

I use Kingdon's (1995) concept of policy windows to frame the narrative. Policy windows are key moments within the decision making process when the agenda can be influenced. The SEFC project has gone through three important development processes that form the foundation for its implementation: the SEFC Policy Statement, the Official Development Plan and the Rezoning stage. From a municipal perspective, these planning stages offered windows of opportunity for the public to respond and possibly redirect the planning agenda found in the plan. Policy windows also occurred in our story during civic elections, with Vancouver's 2010 Olympic bid and with the selection of a developer. My intention is to investigate whether it is possible to incorporate collaboration more effectively into planning processes in light of existing power imbalances, in order to serve all three imperatives of sustainability: the ecological, the economic and the social.
CHAPTER 1: COLLABORATION AND POWER IN SUSTAINABILITY

1.1 The Need for and Practice of Sustainability

From the seminal Bruntland Report, submitted by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, to the Johannesburg Summit report in 2002, a series of global reports have documented the degradation of our environment. These highlighted the ways in which the introduction of non-renewable energy sources during the industrial revolution and the exponential growth of the human population (among other factors) have driven our impact on the earth beyond what it can sustain (Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). According to the almost 2,000 scientists that contributed to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005), resource consumption and waste production have already exceeded the planet’s carrying capacity. While environmental degradation triggered international concern, subsequent reports by the United Nations (UN, 2005) have merely reiterated what the Brundtland Commission has already made apparent: social inequity and abject poverty were both a cause and a result of environmental degradation (WCED, 1987). Environmental degradation is ultimately intertwined with social degradation.

The Bruntland Report, Our Common Future, offers sustainable development as a potential panacea to our environmental and social degradation. Defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs", the definition has been criticized for its vagueness. This is because the term ‘development’ is still largely equated with

---

2 The carrying capacity of the earth relates to its ability to regenerate resources and assimilate waste – see Wackernagel & Rees, 1996
growth despite the fact that our growing consumption is a determining factor in the problem. Furthermore, the term 'needs' is subjective at best (Wheeler, 1998; Robinson, 2004). While there is a general shared understanding that the term 'sustainability' refers to a balance of environment, society and economy, there are often trade-offs involved at the expense of one or more of these aspects. Robinson & Tinker (1997) argue that if the notion of sustainability is to mean anything it must inherently include the simultaneous reconciliation of three imperatives:

1. The ecological imperative is to stay within the biophysical carrying capacity of the planet;
2. The economic imperative is to provide an adequate material standard of living of all; and
3. The social imperative is to provide systems of governance that propagate the values that people want to live by.

The substance of these imperatives, however, is still rather open-ended, especially when it comes to defining values. The concept of sustainability thus remains discursive: its definition changes with each application as the values of one group outweigh those of another. In light of this discursive understanding of sustainability, I am not attempting to propose a definition of sustainability or sustainable development here. Rather, the problem of its fluidity informs my project. In the case of SEFC, the vagueness of the concept results in the devaluation of the social imperative whose economic trade-offs are not as easily reconciled as those within the environmental imperative. This is a familiar story.

The conceptualization of sustainability is at an advantage in SEFC's urban environment where density and social dynamism allow for more cost-effective and innovative practices to take root (Rees, 1999). It is this municipal arena that provides the platform for change 'on the ground', and subsequently where community members have the most effect (Roseland, 1998). In understanding sustainability in
the context of municipal planning, where development policy is set and implementation methods defined, Wheeler (2000:143) suggests that achieving sustainability goals requires a strategic, long-term approach. This approach would involve a combination of: vision development; plans and indicators linked with policy frameworks; effective political coalitions supporting sustainable planning facilitated by planners and politicians; regional institutions with decision-making power that reduces jurisdictional fragmentation; higher government support with intergovernmental incentives, and; participatory planning and long-term public education.

The common thread that binds these strategies is the requirement of some form of collaboration. The emergence of collaborative planning models, according to Nelson (2003), was a response to the failure of traditional, centralized and expert-based planning models – specifically the rational comprehensive model – to manage the increasing and complex environmental problems that sustainability addresses. Collaboration and integration of multiple stakeholders, while complex, allows planners to take advantage of and learn from diversity and divergence.

1.2 Investigating Collaborative Planning

The benefits of collaborative planning processes are two-fold. The first benefit is that they have the potential to empower communities by giving them the capacity to take control over their own future. I will delve into this later. The second is in providing the opportunity for integrated thinking by inviting a variety of perspectives into the dialogue. Both of these benefits open the opportunity for

---

3 I have chosen the term 'collaborative' planning deliberately over 'participatory', another common term, because by definition, to participate means to share or take part, whereas to collaborate means to work jointly, to actively contribute. Participation may result in tokenism whereas collaboration assumes a certain amount of 'citizen power' as its participants are empowered with a higher level of decision-making ability (see Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen participation.)
collective learning that is essential for greater behavioural change, which I will expand on later.

For sustainability, integrated thought is necessary to obtain a whole systems understanding of how different physical and social elements interact with one another. This requires the collaboration of traditionally separate municipal departments such as engineering, planning, transportation, housing and parks to work together in consultation with the community (Forester, 1999; Sandercock, 1998). Moving away from well-defined departmental roles to a more collaborative process allows municipal staff to see a project from diverse perspectives, to be challenged to consider consequences they had not thought of, and to find courage to be innovative with the support of others.

With the understanding that systems affect one another we see the emergence of the structured Integrated Design Process (IDP). IDP requires the collaboration of professional disciplines in the early design stage of a project in order to address issues of code and develop a holistic final product (Reed & Gordon, 2000). Within the municipality’s regulatory system, flexibility of code and departmental cooperation are key to seeing ideas turn into reality.

In general, IDP comprises a series of facilitated events structured to predict and resolve critical conflicts in the early stages of a development project. These events are goal-driven by specific sustainability objectives and targets, are professionally collaborative (but not restricted to traditional experts) and are iterative (recognizing that as we continue to learn our decisions can be refined). The focus is holistic or systemic with a whole budget-building perspective, recognizing that early integrated design reduces costly changes later (Zimmerman, 2006). The City of Vancouver attempted to utilize IDP in both structured and non-structured ways throughout the process of designing SEFC.
While I believe the integration of IDP into planning process is important in this story, it does not represent the entirety of collaboration as illustrated above. The focus of IDP is on the functional environmental and economic aspects of sustainability, and does not necessarily include the social. This is where civic collaboration comes in.

As shown earlier, meeting the social imperative requires an understanding of the shared values of a community. Thus in order to plan sustainably, the community must have a voice in defining what those values are. Forester’s (1999) influential deliberative planning model calls for the transfer of power to the subjects of government planning and active public collaboration in problem-solving. Forester emphasizes that public deliberation must welcome diverse and marginalized participants in order to take advantage of local practical knowledge in an equitable manner. McDaniels, Gregory and Fields (1999) argue that local environmental and social issues are often best solved by those who live in that environment, using local knowledge to set the necessary indicators. In many cases, solutions that were never considered by the planning experts can be revealed this way (see also ICLEI, 2002).

In the bigger picture, collaboration may enable the changing of values that would encourage a balanced reconciliation of the three imperatives. According to Bowers (1992: 18), "there is no single cause for any aspect of the ecological crisis, but there are complex and interconnected cultural patterns, beliefs, and values that collectively help to introduce perturbations into ecosystems, causing them to go into decline." He argues that our most fundamental challenge is in addressing the ways in which our cultural beliefs contribute to the accelerating degradation of the environment and social well-being. Ideally, collaborative planning provides the opportunity to build awareness and understanding. By developing a shared vision of a sustainable future, accountability is expected and the public becomes a
watchdog for the sustainability values they share. Innes and Booher (1999) argue that communicative planning techniques like collaborative dialogue could be the key to establishing new discourses and adapting to new norms:

A complex adaptive system emerges in nature when the environment is unstable, but not completely chaotic...At the edge of chaos - a good analogy to the current period of social transformation - innovation and dramatic shifts in activity patterns can occur, and systems can move to higher levels of performance. Such innovation however, depends on information flows through linked networks of agents. Consensus building can provide such links and help participants to do their individual parts in the larger system. (1999: 417)

Wheeler points out that unstructured public involvement (as a tool for greater democracy and social sustainability) will not inevitably lead to greater ecological sustainability. Citizen involvement in municipal affairs is often oppositional and can result in a paralysis of process. “At its worst public involvement opposes any change to the status quo and preserves the advantages of small groups at the expense of regional needs” (Wheeler, 2000:142). He argues that structured processes such as those described by Innes and Booher are essential. Combining a facilitator with experts and public stakeholders can ensure that participants understand all alternatives through a more controlled process that may result in eliciting useful information for complex decision-making (see also McDaniels et al, 1999). The key here seems to be the structure of the dialogue itself.

Innes and Booher (1999) believe that Habermas' Theory of Communicative Rationality\(^4\) provides a fruitful theoretical framework for structured collaboration based on ideal conditions for discourse. They emphasize the importance of process management to producing a plan that has a stronger chance of implementation, as well as fostering trust, building new relationships and challenging pre-existing

\(^4\) Habermasian and Foucauldian concepts used in this paper are done so through the lens of planning offered by Innes and Booher (1999) and Flyvbjerg (1998b), I do not attempt to delve into their philosophical history or genealogy.
assumptions. For this to emerge from collaborative planning, organizers must meet and uphold a number of process criteria throughout a project. Such criteria are the inclusiveness of all affected stakeholders - especially those with less power; full representation and equal opportunity to be heard; education of stakeholders; public outreach; and the establishment of effective implementation and monitoring processes (see also Frame et al, 2003).5 In Habermas's ideal, existing power differences must be neutralized in order to democratize decision-making. This emphasizes the importance of an inclusive dialogue where all stakeholders have equal opportunity to speak and to influence a decision – a structure that would need to be supported and maintained by the larger democratic institutions controlling the decision-making arena. In British Columbia, for example, the province established the Commission on Resources and the Environment in 1992 to "catalyze rural sustainability" (Day, Gunton & Frame, 2003:23). A consensus-based, shared decision-making process was established in the creation of land and resource management plans (LRMPs) where a wide variety of stakeholders with opposing views were included. Key to the success of the process was that senior government representatives at the table could not block an agreement reached by nongovernmental representatives – transferring power from the Ministry of Forests to all relevant stakeholders. This resulted in plans that got significant buy-in from all stakeholders groups involved.

Flyvbjerg (1998b), taking a Foucauldian approach, argues that Habermas' ideal falls short in understanding how power can be neutralized throughout the life of a project. In fact, collaborative processes are prone to the same 'realpolitik' that dominates more institutionalized forms of decision-making. Inconsistent government commitments and policy direction, for instance, have created implementation challenges to the above-mentioned LRMP project (Albert, Day &

---

5 A compiled list of criteria to evaluate collaborative planning can be found in Appendix E.
Gunton, 2003). Despite the increasing dialogue around sustainable practices and the use of collaborative methods, a gap persists between policy and plan implementation (Lee & Perl, 2003). This suggests that there is a distinctive, substantial difference in the decision making structure of policymaking and plan implementation. Wheeler (2000:141) recommends that we make certain that "participatory planning aimed at promoting sustainability-related goals is in fact linked to the institutions and political coalitions that can ensure that carefully developed consensus plans are actually implemented". This emphasizes the political nature inherent in policy development and plan implementation but it is not explicit in describing what this 'link' might look like.

1.3 The Role of Power in Decision Making

Forester (1984) is hopeful that power imbalances found within the political structure can be resolved through critical planning. The first step, he argues, is for planners, who are the conveners of the public, to recognize the conditions of the decision making environment that are defined by bounded rationalities. He identifies a series of boundaries that would interfere with fulfilling Habermas' ideal speech acts, giving recognition to the fact that the information required for decision making is often ambiguous and incomplete. In more complex decision making environments (found in the pursuit of urban sustainability for example) he argues that structurally distorted bounds, understood as political-economic bounds, emphasize structures of inequality and differential resources where time favours the 'haves'. Information is selected to serve the agenda of the person using it which results in "self-serving presentations and misrepresentations of likely project consequences" (Forester, 1984:28). Planners, he argues, must anticipate misinformation and counteract structural inequalities through political and community organizing. The end goal is to create a democratic planning process that
counteracts distortions of communication in order to uphold the integrity of collaborative process.

However Flyvbjerg (1998a), guided by a Foucauldian approach, argues that the modernist concept of democracy cannot dissolve the traditional hierarchies of class, tribe and privilege that are embedded in our society - and ultimately in the planning process. In his case study of the Aalborg Project, he uncovers a series of power struggles that display the inevitability of power struggles in decision making in democratic systems. Insofar as power struggles are inevitable he finds that, in the case of Aalborg, power defines what counts as knowledge and rationality, and ultimately, what counts as reality. Therefore, “rationality is context-dependent, the context of rationality is power, and power blurs the dividing line between rationality [as universal category] and rationalization [as social process]” (Flyvbjerg, 1998a: 227). In sum, Flyvbjerg argues that the subordination of rationality to power is a “fundamental weakness of modernity and modern politics, administration and planning” (1998a: 234). This means that the very conditions by which dialogue takes place under the shared objective of rational decision making are determined by power positions.

Flyvbjerg is hopeful, however, that while democracy cannot dissolve traditional power, institutions of democracy may be utilized to regulate power if one understands how they work. This does not fall far from Forester’s recommendations except that Forester puts the onus on the planner to understand how the institutions work as they facilitate public input. Flyvbjerg calls for more civic reciprocity in public decision making suggesting that this has the potential to be effective if it is practical, committed, and in the Foucauldian approach that he takes, “ready for

---

*6 The Aalborg Project is an internationally known urban renewal project seeking to address the problems of land use, transportation and the environment in Aalborg, Denmark. Flyvbjerg (1998) provides a narrative of the city’s award-winning attempt at sustainable planning in the municipal setting.
conflict", as opposed to Habermasian models that are "discursive, detached, and consensus-dependent" (1998a:235-236).

Flyvbjerg’s emphasis on conflict would then differ from recommendations made by Innes and Booher who promote consensus processes in collaboration. His argument comes from a Foucauldian view in which creating space for conflict is seen as an expression of freedom. Social conflict is seen as a pillar of democratic society in its capacity to catalyze change. He tells us that “in practice democratic progress is chiefly achieved not by constitutional and institutional reform alone but by facing the mechanisms of power and the practices of class and privilege more directly, often head-on” (1998a: 236). Something that the municipal planner is generally not in a position to do. Unlike the structured collaborative process, this requires participants to embrace the political nature of decision making and build political coalitions that are ready for conflict.

Robinson (2004:382) advocates that the concept of sustainability actually invites conflict and provides a ‘discursive playing field’ in which contradictions can be debated. Solutions for sustainability are context-dependant and value-laden. This, he argues, inevitably leads to multiple conflicting views of sustainability, which cannot be reconciled. Just as there is no single, correct approach to sustainability, providing a variety of environments that allow for contradictions and multiple voices to be expressed and evaluated is an essential aspect of the process. Robinson suggests that sustainability is necessarily a political act and that the way forward involves the development of new forms of partnerships and new tools for creating political dialogue that involve many people in the conversation. It is in this light that I examine the effectiveness of collaborative processes in the SEFC story.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 Approach and Data Collection

I have taken a case study approach because it provides a "focused, detailed investigation of a single instance of some social phenomenon" (Babbie & Benaquisto, 2002: 489), which in turn allows for multiple sources of evidence to be used in the collection of data, the final goal of which is to seek convergence across the evidence (Yin, 1998). Using what Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls a narratological approach, in which the series of events that make up the case study are sequentially and contextually recorded, my goal in what follows is to give meaning to past experiences while hinting at alternative futures. While each case study is unique in its context, generalizations can be made about the application of sustainability in urban developments. Lessons can be learned about the institutional characteristics of the stakeholders involved – the planners, politicians, developers and civil society.

Being a member of the SG, naturally my account is neither neutral nor entirely objective. However, my primary data of participant observation and individual interviews is triangulated with secondary data found in relevant city documents, media and academic articles. I hope that the combination of all sources will provide a more complete picture.

My participant observations took place at Stewardship Group meetings and public events. I also conducted six semi-structured, personal interviews with key players within the municipal staff and Stewardship Group to record personal experiences and attitudes about the SEFC project collaborative process (interview questions can be found in Appendix A).
2.2 Research Questions and Analysis

Grappling with the issue of implementation in sustainable development I ask what is the interplay of power and collaboration in pursuing this goal? The SEFC story makes for an interesting case study because while the planning of SEFC has reflected the changing politics of the city, the project’s focus has explicitly remained one of sustainability. Collaborative planning processes were used intermittently – yet regularly – throughout the project. Consequently, I ask whether collaboration advanced the sustainability agenda in SEFC? The outcome in the first phase of the project (as of 2008), however, has been contentious. While advances in green building and infrastructure development have been successfully implemented, conflict looms large over the lack of social sustainability. Did the collaborative process fail in the end? What factors influenced the SEFC decision-making process?

To answer these questions I have structured the SEFC story using the concept of policy windows adopted from John Kingdon (1995). In understanding how decisions are made in government, Kingdon focuses on pre-decision processes known as agenda setting. While Kingdon looks at U.S. federal agendas, his concepts are transferable to the smaller municipal scale relevant in the SEFC story. According to Kingdon, the decision-making agenda can be influenced during the opening of policy windows. He describes two types of policy windows: Political windows are created by generally predictable events such as administrative change or a new budget cycle. Problem windows are created by unpredictable events such as a massive wind storm. Kingdon argues that the majority of windows open in a predictable, cyclical manner. However, the opening is narrow and policy alternatives must be coupled with a recognized pressing problem and a ripe political climate in order for them to be selected. I have identified a series of windows within the SEFC story as a framework for understanding the temporal aspects of power relations involved in decision making.
CHAPTER 3:
SOUTHEAST FALSE CREEK CASE STUDY

3.1 SEFC Project Overview

Southeast False Creek (SEFC) is one of the last waterfront properties to be developed in Vancouver's metropolitan core. Located on False Creek basin it comprises a total of 88 acres, 50 acres of which is owned by the city.

Figure 1: SEFC geographical context, looking north

© 1994, City of Vancouver, by permission.
In 1990, city council identified it as a "let go" industrial area and in 1995 adopted recommendations to develop it as a model sustainable community (Vancouver, 2002). Accordingly, the project is organized around four guiding principles that were defined in its policy statement (Vancouver, 1999b):

1. Implementing Sustainability: SEFC should promote the implementation of sustainable development principles in an urban setting.

2. Stewardship of Ecosystem Health: The SEFC plan should improve the health of the False Creek Basin and encourage resource conservation and waste reduction.

3. Economic Viability and Vitality: SEFC development should ensure viability without subsidy and encourage a vibrant and vital community.

4. Social and Community Health: SEFC should be a livable, complete community supporting social networks and enhances quality of life for all in the neighbourhood.

The SEFC Official Development Plan was enacted on July 19, 2005. Its main objectives are to (Vancouver, 2005b):

- Establish a foundation of urban design principles, sustainability principles, and environmental, social, and economic sustainability strategies to enable the development of SEFC as a complete community, and to serve as a learning experience for application of such principles and strategies on a broader scale.

- Develop a mixed use neighbourhood focusing on a diversity of residential uses to accommodate all incomes, with family housing as a priority, where people live, work, play, and learn in a neighbourhood designed to maintain and balance the highest possible levels of social equity, livability, ecological
health, and economic prosperity so as to support their choices to live in a sustainable manner.

The first phase of the project is to develop a portion of the city-owned lands as an Olympic Athletes' Village for the 2010 Winter Games (sub-area 2A). In the second phase – after the Games – the Olympic Village will be converted to residential housing, and the remaining public lands east and west of the Olympic Village will be developed (with completion expected by 2018).

Key community amenities include (Vancouver, 2005c):

- Approximately 25.8 acres of park land, including habitat, playgrounds and opportunities for urban agriculture;
- 20% affordable housing and some modest market housing;
- A new bus route and three greenways / bikeways;
- A 30,000 sq ft community centre and non-motorized boating facility;
- 3 licensed childcare facilities, 2 out-of-school care facilities and a K-7 elementary school;
- Restoration of heritage buildings and heritage elements;
- Public art.
Table 1: Chronology of events for SEFC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Clouds of Change targets SEFC</td>
<td>Report recommends SEFC area for energy efficient community design</td>
<td>NGO and academic task force</td>
<td>Election: G. Campbell Mayor: NPA (6), COPE (5); NDP defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>CityPlan</td>
<td>Compact housing plan adopted for Vancouver neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Facilitated public dialogues create housing vision</td>
<td>NPA Mayor Campbell and 3 COPE seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Feds withdraw from housing</td>
<td>Federal government withdraws from social housing subsidies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Election: Owen Mayor: NPA (10), COPE (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Livable Region Strategic Plan</td>
<td>Plan adopts compact development option across the region</td>
<td>Wide-spread public involvement</td>
<td>Regional initiative directed by Vancouver leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-97</td>
<td>Creekside Landing Plan</td>
<td>Kwok’s controversial SEFC plan leads to public outcry</td>
<td>Self-organizing public lead the attack</td>
<td>City real estate department is Kwok’s client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-97</td>
<td>SEFC Advisory Group</td>
<td>Civic group formed to develop SEFC policy statement</td>
<td>Membership is diverse and representative</td>
<td>Lead by planning department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-98</td>
<td>Policy Statement Review</td>
<td>Public review aided by visualizations of the statement created at a design charrette</td>
<td>Public meetings, Design charrette</td>
<td>Park lobbyists gain large park component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-99</td>
<td>Final Policy Statement</td>
<td>Statement adopted by council</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owen Mayor: NPA (9), COPE (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-00</td>
<td>Stewardship Group</td>
<td>Advisory Group morphs into SG to act as policy 'watchdog'</td>
<td>Unchanging membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-03</td>
<td>Olympic Bid</td>
<td>Bid will utilize SEFC for Olympic Village</td>
<td>Public involved in unofficial vote</td>
<td>Election: Campbell Mayor: COPE (9), NPA (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-03</td>
<td>Preliminary ODP Submission</td>
<td>VIA’s tower/podium submission does not meet sustainability goals</td>
<td>Internal IDP focused on infrastructure, not form</td>
<td>VIA serving interest of city real estate department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>DETAILS</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-04</td>
<td>Revised ODP</td>
<td>Revised design still considered weak</td>
<td>Extensive public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-04</td>
<td>Choices and Directions</td>
<td>Council requests options for more</td>
<td>Extensive public</td>
<td>COPE see SEFC as their legacy project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>progressive strategies</td>
<td>feedback</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-05</td>
<td>Project Manager appointed</td>
<td>SEFC PM hired to act as city’s ‘developer’ for</td>
<td>No public involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the project</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-05</td>
<td>Final ODP enacted</td>
<td>ODP considered progressive in its</td>
<td>Public show</td>
<td>NPA councillors opposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>housing and green building strategies</td>
<td>support at</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hearing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-06</td>
<td>Amendments to ODP</td>
<td>New council reduces housing and childcare</td>
<td>Long public</td>
<td>Election: Sullivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>targets as site prep begins</td>
<td>hearing does not</td>
<td>Mayor: NPA (6), Vision (4), COPE (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>deter council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>decision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-06</td>
<td>NEU approved</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Energy Utility for False Creek</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lead by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-06</td>
<td>Millennium is developer</td>
<td>Millennium group is awarded development of</td>
<td>No public consultation</td>
<td>Highest bid wins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Olympic Village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-06</td>
<td>IDP Workshop</td>
<td>Municipal staff and development team</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>CMHC sponsored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>begin new relationship</td>
<td>collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-06</td>
<td>SG Review</td>
<td>SG reassesses structure and purpose</td>
<td>Membership diminished,</td>
<td>Requested by council &amp; lead by planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not representative</td>
<td>dept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-07</td>
<td>Rezoning complete</td>
<td>Developer succeeds in gaining more density and</td>
<td>Public concerns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>height</td>
<td>mollified by staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-07</td>
<td>Sewer heat recovery</td>
<td>City pressured after public backlash</td>
<td>Developer ignites</td>
<td>GVRD requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>finalized</td>
<td>against biomass</td>
<td>public debate</td>
<td>extensive public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>consultation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-07</td>
<td>SG disbanded</td>
<td>Council no longer see utility in the group</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sullivan leads the inquest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-07</td>
<td>Millennium Water units</td>
<td>Expected market value of $1.2 billion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 Window One: The Urban Problem

Vancouver's housing crisis and the looming impacts of urban growth on livability were catalyzed by the city's international spotlight and acted as the driving forces behind the centrality of sustainable development to the municipal agenda. These conditions opened a problem window that invited a variety of solutions from various groups (Kingdon, 1995). In this instance, according to Kingdon, those solutions that are politically acceptable become absorbed into the decision making agenda.

For the City of Vancouver the problem played out in a struggle between residential developers and local residents. While the developers were focused on building megaprojects as a solution to urban growth, the residents were skeptical and feared the degradation of their neighbourhood's character and the livability of the city. Participatory practice was used as a tool to confronting and calming residents' fears, functioning as a venue to encourage high-density solutions to the problem that would be politically acceptable to the community.

The City of Vancouver and the greater regional district were historically open to participatory planning as exemplified in the visionary work of Walter Hardwick and Ray Spaxman (Harcourt & Cameron, 2007; Punter, 2003). In this context, civil society's fight against a proposed freeway in the 70's is held up as a demonstration of the city's activism and marks a seminal point at which the public became engaged in planning processes. The vision statement from Metro Vancouver's strategic plan, Choosing our Future: Greater Vancouver Livable Region Strategic Plan, says a great deal about the overarching vision that provides a foundation to the SEFC project and planning in general in Vancouver (Metro Vancouver, 1996).

Greater Vancouver can become the first city in the world to combine in one place the things to which humanity aspires on a global basis: a
place where human activities enhance rather that degrade the natural environment, where the quality of the built environment approaches that of the natural setting, where the diversity of origins and religions is a source of social strength rather than strife, where people control the destiny of their community, and where the basics of food, clothing, shelter, security and useful activity are accessible to all.

In the late 80's, municipal housing projections recommended that the rate of housing completions increase and the city double its apartment supply in order to accommodate the urban growth that was expected with the internationalization of Vancouver following Expo ’86 (Punter, 2003). By 1987, planning began to move toward large-scale megaprojects. These can be seen in Vancouver’s renowned megaprojects - Concord Pacific in False Creek North (the former Expo grounds) and Coal Harbour. In order to structure this new form of development the Central Area planning team developed a cooperative planning model (Punter, 2003). The model was devised to maximize developer investment in the construction of public amenities such as parks, schools and community centres in exchange for high-density projects. To streamline the process city engineers and planners were brought into the projects at the onset, guiding the developer through the permit process. While extensive public consultation was an important aspect of the model, for those outside the process, the relationship between government and business seemed all too familiar (Makhoul, 2003). Residents were suspicious of the high-density developments and feared the degradation of their single-family neighbourhood character and the livability of the city. Affordable housing proponents criticized the projects for being geared to high income earners and investors at a critical time when Canadian cities were feeling the funding gap left by fading federal and provincial support for housing (Mitchell, 2004; Punter, 2003).

Fear of the effects of globalization on local residents was the root of civil dissatisfaction as Vancouver actively encouraged Pacific Rim investors (Mitchell, 2004), while the development debate played a central role in the November 1990
civic election (Mitchell, 2004). The left-wing COPE (Confederation of Progressive Electors) platform was focused on neighbourhood empowerment while the pro-business NPA (Non-Partisan Association) platform was focused on progress for the ‘better good’. Days before the election a seven part series of articles titled “Future Growth: Future Shock” was published in the Vancouver Sun. While publicly the series’ authors were urban planning academics, the articles were commissioned by developers interested in curtailing the participation of residents in urban policymaking. As Mitchell points out:

The series discredited supposedly chaotic and individualist urban movements by private individuals and groups, and depicted more positively the holistic and professional vision of planners and politicians, and the neutral, rational, efficient workings of the (global) market. (2004: 134)

Here you see the potential distortion of information noted by Forester and Flyvbjerg as powerful business players leverage the ‘objectivity’ expected from academics and media to serve their own agenda. This was deliberately staged prior to the elections when the political direction of the municipal agenda was malleable. Although NPA Mayor Gordon Campbell retained his position in that November election, COPE gained three seats. The election result indicates the strength of both issues under debate: while those in favour of expansion retained council majority, those protesting the changing character of the single family neighbourhood gained noticeable representation on council.

Meanwhile, an international conference held in Toronto in 1988, Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, confirmed that air pollution and atmospheric change were a threat to public health in Canadian cities. In response Vancouver council created the Task Force on Atmospheric Change to study the impact of air pollution in Vancouver and to investigate strategies for action. The final report, Clouds of Change, adopted by council in October 1990, recommended
planning initiatives that brought housing and employment together, increased housing adjacent to the downtown, and, with respect to SEFC, incorporated principles of energy-efficient community design in the area plan (Vancouver, 1990).

In June 1992, city council, pressured by concerns about urban growth, neighbourhood protection and environmental health, approved the preparation of a citywide plan. To appease the public's interest in active participation, Mayor Gordon Campbell encouraged public ownership of policies by creating the 'kitchen-table' concept: "Mayor Campbell's idea was to get citizens to talk face to face to understand the issues and to find solutions in a non-confrontational way" (Punter, 2003: 155). It was a politically astute move given that any citywide program of intensification requires the active support of its voter base (Punter, 2003). According to the then assistant manager of the Economic Development Office: "There's 75,000 RS-1 houses in the city, and that of course is where the biggest voting block is" (Mitchell, 2004:131). It follows that while the 'kitchen table' model for public participation was rather time-consuming for the planning staff, it was successful in providing a venue for professionals to supply citizens with the technical details involved in planning choices and the latter's consequences from an environmental, economic and social perspective. Altogether, the kitchen table concept formed an effective public education strategy, a necessary ingredient in collaborative processes (Innes & Booher, 1999).

The CityPlan project that resulted from this process created a future vision that, despite the debate on neighbourhood protection, encouraged a concentration of growth in neighbourhood centres in order to increase housing choice and reduce regional sprawl (Punter, 2003). Residents that previously fought density with an attitude of NIMBYism displayed a greater concern for public well-being as a whole through the 'kitchen table' process, an important achievement in collaboration and a significant step toward sustainable development. Civic distrust and developer
interest were reconciled under an overarching common goal, as the CityPlans not only recommended intensification but also demanded creative solutions that did not centre on the megaproject model. I believe this had a fundamental influence on the way the public later viewed the SEFC project and its potential for addressing urban growth problems.

3.3 Window Two: The Creekside Landing Plan

The next influential window that opened was during a public hearing for SEFC’s first development proposal. While environmental concerns had become a priority for Vancouver’s planning department in the early 90’s (Punter, 2003), the political agenda was directed by a conservative NPA majority. Council sought a profit-driven proposal for SEFC to offset site cleanup costs but found opposition at the public hearing. A self-organized and active public was combined with the sustainable design interests of planning professionals to influence the municipal agenda. This coalition of interests worked together in this instance to leverage the opening of the political window that was provided by the public hearing and impress upon council the community desire for sustainable development in SEFC as one solution to the pressing urban growth problem. This resulted in a political commitment to creating a sustainable community in SEFC. Finances were directed toward a structured collaborative planning process and sustainability research.

By the end of 1995, after little had been done to implement recommendations made by the Task Force on Atmospheric Change in 1990, a status report was submitted to council which recommended SEFC as a model sustainable development that could be showcased to the world (Vancouver, 2002). This sparked the creation of the Southeast False Creek Working Group (SEFC WG) by the EcoCity Network, a group of local activists committed to raising public awareness of sustainability issues (Carr, 2004). The SEFC WG, a coalition of twenty social and
ecological non-governmental organizations (see Appendix B for list of members), met monthly and coordinated a large outreach campaign that eventually included three annual sustainability festivals and a series of sustainability lectures at Langara College (Irwin, 2004). Its mission statement stated:

The Southeast False Creek Working Group is an inclusive coalition of individuals and organizations seeking to represent a diversity of age, gender, colour, class, culture and ability. Under a non-hierarchal organizational structure, we work cooperatively to ensure equitable access to information, participation, and decision making... The mission of the SEFC Working Group is to create equitable and sustainable urban communities in Southeast False Creek and surrounding neighbourhoods through education, communication and advocacy.

Meanwhile, the city manager and the city’s real estate department retained Stanley Kwok in mid-1996 to prepare a development proposal for SEFC. Because SEFC had been an industrial site there was concern about the cost of cleaning up the contaminated soil. Kwok was chosen for his success in increasing real estate value in the renowned megaproject Concord Pacific on the north side of False Creek. ‘Sustainability’ was not in Kwok’s terms of reference when hired and in his proposal principles of sustainability were “largely derived from a workshop held – not with the academic and professional sustainability experts for which the city was renowned – but with mainstream development and architectural interests and planners” who concluded that “sustainability is hard to define” (Punter, 2003: 228). Kwok refused to meet with the SEFC WG or any of its member groups claiming that he had no time to consult with the public (Carr, 2004).

Considering a 1992 survey which put the costs of site clean-up anywhere from $15-150 million, Kwok estimated a 4.5% rate of return in his pro forma analysis, emphasizing that time was of the essence if the city did not want to lose money (Punter, 2003). Kwok’s proposed plan, Creekside Landing (1997), was shaped
similarly to his luxury, high-density housing project across the water, in which "there were few concessions to any ecological principles of site planning" (Punter, 2003:229). The consultants felt that the urban development formula used for Concord Pacific was the best scenario for generating the capital needed to clean up the polluted site.

While Kwok's plan was in the making, the city's planning department hired a summer student (and member of the EcoDesign Resources Society) to research policies and precedents for sustainable development. While light on the social side, the student's report captured the environmental issues and provided urban development precedents where these existed (Punter, 2003). The Vancouver Planning Commission and Simon Fraser University then sponsored a conference called *Cents and Sustainability* in early 1997. It attracted over 300 delegates consisting of planners, politicians, academics and consultants, who concluded that a sustainable community was a valuable option for SEFC (Makhoul, 2003; Punter, 2003).

At the same time, Vancouver's citizens held a conference of their own. Organized by the SEFC WG, *Springfest* was successful at raising public awareness about sustainable community and its potential in SEFC. "The event was well organized and received sympathetic media coverage" (Carr, 2004:223).

Subsequently, pressure was on city council to push the sustainability agenda. When Kwok's plan was presented to the public at a council meeting in March 1997:

About thirty-five people made informed critiques of Kwok's concept plan, which lacked any definition of sustainable development. To its credit, council listened to the presenters, who asked that council consider sustainability more seriously. Later, at another council meeting packed with activists, Councillor Price frankly admitted that what the city got for its $300,000 consultant fee for Kwok was "a lot of waste". (Carr, 2004:224)
It was largely due to the outreach efforts of the SEFC WG that the city rejected the development proposal from Stanley Kwok. The public outcry in response to the Kwok proposal proved the importance of transparency in the development process (Carr, 2004; Irwin, 2004). This public activism set a concrete agenda for sustainable development for the SEFC lands and led to a structured collaborative policymaking process.

Two actions resulted from this event: a policy Advisory Group (AG) of citizens was formed in September 1997 (later to become the Stewardship Group); and in October 1997, a sustainable development consultant, the Sheltair Group, was selected after an open call for proposals (Vancouver, 1997). The Sheltair Group provided clarity on the issue of sustainability for the AG and over the next year generated recommendations for environmental and social performance targets, a database of case studies and precedents and a full-cost accounting framework in a report titled *Visions, Tools and Targets: Environmentally Sustainable Development Guidelines for Southeast False Creek* (Sheltair, 1998). While not adopted as official policy, much of the study's information was later incorporated into the final SEFC Policy Statement by city staff.

### 3.4 Window Three: Creation of the Policy Statement

The mandate to empower a citizen advisory group to guide the sustainable vision for SEFC was an astounding accomplishment. The collaborative process that followed was well-structured and resulted in an innovative policy statement. Its public evaluation opened a window for a pioneering collaborative design process and extensive public involvement. These review processes set a precedent for the way the SEFC project would be assessed for the next few years.
Central Area planning staff selected the AG participants first among stakeholders who had already put some effort into the project. Then they filled in the gaps of representation, inviting experts in real estate, finance, ecology, neighbourhood representatives, etc. (see Appendix C for AG membership) with the intention of including a wide variety of stakeholders with opposing views.

In his analysis of the policy process, AG participant John Irwin (2004) illustrated stakeholder involvement with the following diagram:

![Figure 2: Irwin’s SEFC participation structure](image_url)

He noted two groups that were underrepresented - Aboriginal and Downtown Eastside interests. The SEFC land is traditionally Musqueum territory and was settled by Snaúq, a small Squamish band, which has pressed land claim issues to date. As well, the property is a close neighbour of the Downtown Eastside, more so, the SEFC WG argued, than the Mount Pleasant community that was actively involved in SEFC’s development. SEFC WG members who were part of the AG complained about this hole in representation, however, they were not empowered to make changes to the AG participant make-up. In order to ensure
transparency and inclusiveness Innes and Booher recommend that collaborative processes be self-organizing so that participants have the power to shape the process. Irwin (2004:ii) concluded that while it was "an example of a reasonably good communicative participation process that was deep and long-term, [it] did not involve the broader community as well as it could have."

The AG worked closely with city staff and Sheltair to design a policy statement which would serve as a guide for the ODP and subsequent rezoning of SEFC. According to all interviewed AG members, development of the SEFC policy was an example of a truly collaborative process. At first the group was dissatisfied because they felt that they were being "fed" presentations and being asked to respond as individuals instead of as a group. Then facilitator Fiona Crofton, president of the ORCAO Group, a Vancouver-based firm specializing in sustainability-oriented change and development, was brought in to help the group define its process. Her facilitation skills were well respected and she created an environment of trust and mutual respect within the group. As noted by one member, "Fiona cleansed the ideological and political agendas from attendees. This led to a tremendous degree of respect for other members." Satisfaction was reached in the way city staff and public advisors worked together to "hammer out" common positions; "it's a rare occasion for city staff to work so well with public stakeholders", stated another AG member. Within this facilitated process barriers were taken down and apparently a Habermasian environment was created where stakeholders' voices were heard and empowered in the decision making process, everyone was given the opportunity to talk and honesty was expected. According to the members interviewed, mutual respect and trust were a true outcome of this AG process.

Not all voices had equal opportunity, however. Representatives concerned with ecology were the most outspoken about what they wanted to see on the site,
while representatives of the city's real estate department wanted to know, "How much more will this cost?" In one member's opinion, the real estate department concentrated on incremental costs and neglected long-term payback and savings. This attitude would eventually have a significant effect on meeting SEFC's social imperative. Indeed, the tension that existed around economics was to undermine the very definition of sustainability.

On defining social sustainability, civic activists spoke about a 'sense of place', access and affordability, while city staff spoke of 'public realm'. Drafts of amenity checklists were created and eventually preference was given to aspects of social sustainability that could be physically demonstrated such as urban agriculture and housing mix.

The AG's final policy work was edited by city staff. According to one member, the AG's version took "quite a beating". The policy statement was broken down into objectives and restructured to suit the various project stages like ODP, infrastructure, rezoning, etc. Planner-speak like "density" was introduced and according to some AG members, the result of the editing was a watered down version of the original. While the final product was not an exact representation of the work created through the AG's collaborative process, the innovation developed through that process was obvious, creating an exciting precedent for development in Vancouver. Irwin (2004: ii) summarizes the policy process:

The process outcome, the policy for Southeast False Creek, was found to make marked progress toward ecological sustainability, and marginal movement towards economic sustainability. The policy was found to be quite lacking in terms of social sustainability, although it was given more consideration than in previous development policy in Vancouver... Although the sustainability policy was found to be quite weak overall, it did lead towards greater sustainable development in Vancouver, and increased awareness about sustainability in the development community.
In July 1998 the draft statement was released for public review and city planners spent the summer meeting with a diverse range of groups for input. The public review opened a window for the introduction of an innovative collaborative design process that would bring a design perspective into the emerging policies and test their feasibility. A closed four-day design charrette was organized in October 1998 at the planning department’s request. Like the IDP, charrettes are “interdisciplinary, creative events in which participants [usually professionals] strive to reach a mutually agreed upon solution to a set of complex problems within a short period of time” (Condon, Proft, Teed & Muir, 2002:25). They are considered a particularly effective tool for understanding integration in complex systems and for overcoming institutional barriers, regulatory gaps, and public distrust that commonly exist in sustainable development scenarios.

The coordinators, including Fiona Crofton, formed three multi-disciplinary teams to pursue alternative development scenarios for the site. The charrette resulted in four agreed upon design themes: incremental/phased development to take advantage of lessons learned and changing technologies, flexibility/adaptability of built forms, working ‘green’ from a systems perspective, and multi-functionality of space (Vancouver, 1999a). Participants wrestled with economic feasibility and life-cycle costing and the charrette “became a venue for exploring how to reconcile the gap between currently established practices for determining the economic potentials of a project and emerging economic models grounded in sustainability theory” (Condon et al, 2002:28).

The resulting three design proposals were used to help stakeholder groups, developers and city staff visualize the outcomes of the policy objectives. The design alternatives were also a testament to the flexibility inherent in the interpretation of the policy statement. A coalition of Mount Pleasant community members, neighbours to the SEFC site, disputed the designs. They gathered 700 signatures in
support of a large park for the site claiming that park space was at a sad minimum in their area. They lobbied the Parks Board and well-known community figures like environmental advocate David Suzuki, who in turn condemned the concept in an open letter to council. In his letter Suzuki wrote:

Vancouver’s population of people and cars already exceeds anything that is sustainable. Our ecological footprint is huge. To talk about 'sustainable housing' for 5,000 more people is an oxymoron. It fails to recognize what sustainable means. I support you in your efforts to make an urban forest in that area. (Blore, 1999)

This special interest coalition utilized the window of opportunity given to them through the public consultation process. That window was limited, however, because a great deal of council-supported work had already been put into the SEFC policy and the inevitability of urban growth could not be ignored. More studies on soil contamination and remediation took place. As a compromise, council approved a residential development with a large park component, specifically 11 hectares of parkland – over half of city-owned land being dedicated to park space (Vancouver, 1999a). The result was a “loss of 100,000 square metres of floor space, but this reduced remediation costs from $30 million to $15 million to make such changes ‘economic’” (Punter, 2003:231).

The final policy statement was adopted by council in October 1999. The statement was considered “unique in that it provides additional guidance in addressing the ecological, social, and economic aspects of building a sustainable community” (Vancouver, 1999b). The AG’s role was held up as exemplary of collaborative process. Their influence on the final product is unquestionable but there was still room for special interests to further shape the policy.

The sustainability objectives in the statement were expected to result in a lower rate of return for the real estate department in order to accommodate the ‘experimental’ nature of the project. However, the consideration of using of full cost
accounting along with a “suggested seven-year time frame to measure how capital costs can be recouped from operating efficiencies produced by enhanced environmental performance” remained unresolved (Punter, 2003: 232). This inability to move beyond our traditional economic paradigm seems to be a fundamental problem in sustainable development projects and continues to give voice and power to profit-centered business interests. In the case of SEFC, the AG and charrette processes helped to infuse essential sustainability principles into the project. However, those principles would prove to be rather malleable.

3.5 Window Four: An Olympic Bid

The fourth window of opportunity for the sustainability agenda was opened with Vancouver’s bid for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. The Olympic bid alone was not sufficient impetus to advance SEFC’s sustainability agenda, however. Kingdon (1995) points out that the problem, accommodating an international event, and its associated solution must be coupled with the political will for that solution to be added to the decision making agenda.

After a period of stagnation, green building proponents were able to leverage the Olympic’s sustainability focus for SEFC in the wake of a newly elected left-wing council. Sustainability initiatives matched the new council’s general agenda for a more socially conscious and livable city. This ODP period was characterized by a zenith of collaborative design processes and advancement of social sustainability. While the AG, now stewards of SEFC’s principles, had influence with the generous COPE council and keen staff, the design professionals directed the shape of the SEFC community during this period.

In May 2000, as directed by policy 23.3 in the SEFC Policy Statement, a Stewardship Group (SG) was established by the city in order to provide ongoing
guidance and to monitor project performance through sustainability indicators during development and beyond (Vancouver, 2000). The SG's role was never explicitly defined beyond this according to SEFC's senior planner. The same members that formed the AG agreed to form the new SG in order to maintain the respectful cooperation that had been established. Interestingly, where advisory groups usually ask for endorsement from council, the SG chose to stay autonomous. This is significant because the group felt it was important to be politically impartial so as to safeguard their activist card and remain objective to the sustainability needs of the project. Without council support the SG risked not being taken seriously. However, the group had sufficient staff support to ensure a place for their voice in further policymaking, exhibiting an essential characteristic of Kingdon's policy entrepreneur – having a "claim to be heard".

Progress on the project slowed significantly between 2000 and 2002 partially due to a six week civic strike in October/November 2000 (Clayton, 2000) and because city staff were already overwhelmed with residential developments. According to one SG member, there was no rush to build on SEFC while Concord Pacific provided significant market competition. In 2002 the SEFC project was spurred on again during the preparation of an Olympic bid. Hopeful of receiving provincial and federal funding for the required remediation work and other Vancouver infrastructure projects, proponents suggested delivering a sustainable Olympics with SEFC as its home. The International Olympic Committee had made environment one of three formalized pillars of the Olympic Movement, along with sport and culture. As such, the Games represented a strategic opportunity for Vancouver to demonstrate to the world British Columbia and Canada's expertise in social, economic, and environmental sustainability.

Meanwhile, just prior to the 2002 civic elections, three-term NPA mayor Philip Owen was forced to step down from leadership after an internal power
struggle with councillor Jennifer Clarke. Former chief coroner Larry Campbell announced that he would run for COPE and assured the political centre that the socially conscious COPE could be fiscally responsible. In an environment of voter dissatisfaction and desire for change after Owen’s long and conservative tenure, Clarke lost to the charismatic Campbell in a landslide. For the first time, left-wing COPE won council majority and the NPA were reduced to two council seats (“COPE city council”, 2002). To prove that COPE cared what the public thought, they held a referendum on the Olympic bid, which the new Liberal party (elected in 2001 ousting the long-standing New Democrat Party government) was eager to host. Residents were asked whether they accepted the responsibilities of a host city should Vancouver win its bid and 64% of those who voted answered “yes”. As a result, the SEFC project became the focus of a potential Olympic Village and international showcase for sustainability, putting its development high on the municipal agenda.

Development of a preliminary ODP began in February 2003 led by VIA Architecture, a local multidisciplinary design firm that represented the real estate department. In February and March 2003, consultant and staff design teams were asked to attend a series of IDP workshops with the environmental consultant reSource Rethinking in order to integrate sustainability objectives into the SEFC ODP (Vancouver, 2004b). While the importance of ongoing dialogue between the consultants and the SG had been noted by staff to council (Vancouver, 2002), the SG had minimal representation in the IDP sessions. As policy moved to site-specific infrastructure, focus was centered on the community’s physical features which was seen to require technical solutions and expert opinion. The SG’s influence on the decision making agenda was slowly waning.

During the IDP workshops SEFC’s senior planner recalls that the teams naturally fell into a process of integrated design in order to grapple with the
complexity of the issues, although the process was still new and sometimes surprising.

We involved the storm water people during ODP design and they were shocked. We had workshops with staff, organized through reSource Rethinking, bringing all the experts together on energy, storm water, transportation, water, you name it... Site-wide approaches began to land there to create a multi-layered design... This kind of approach was not common and hadn’t been done before by our team in this way.

The planner added that the city’s multi-disciplinary approach to all projects helped make the IDP more successful, “A lot of cities don’t even have that. It is really a best practices approach.”

It was the IDP process that helped the city devise an infrastructure plan that minimized environmental impact. However, the process was marked by conflict over economic objectives and technical feasibility. The real estate department wanted to serve its mandate to protect the economic interests of the city, while the planners were pushing to create a unique demonstration model. Conflict also existed between the planners and engineers, where the planners were focused on innovative design and the engineers on traditional functionality.

While collaborative efforts led to an integrated infrastructure plan, the preliminary ODP submitted by VIA in May 2003 on behalf of the real estate department was not as progressive (Vancouver, 2003). An ODP reflects community layout and building form and VIA’s proposal, while incorporating broad sustainability principles, was unsatisfactory to the planning department. The connection that the municipal planners saw between urban form and social sustainability, focusing on the fine grain elements such as ground orientation, gathering places and connectivity, was not, in their opinion, expressed well enough
in VIA's tower/podium proposal. Planning staff rallied the design community and the SG to respond to the submission.

The SG, disappointed by its reduced decision making role, wanted the ODP to be more explicit in incorporating the principles formed in the policy statement. According to one planner, while there was a great deal of buy-in from staff and public on the importance of the policy statement as a framework, the SG still had to "kick and beat the city" to this end. At the SG's appeal, council, many of whom were advocates of environmental and affordable housing, gave a directive to staff to incorporate the principles of the policy statement into the actual ODP so that a framework could be maintained (Vancouver, 2004e). Many of the councillors saw SEFC as a profile project that they could 'put their stamp on' and make a statement with. To this end, the proponents for sustainability such as the SG, had substantial political support. While staff seemed to be less inclined to incorporate the SG into their technical ODP design process, the SG felt they still had the ear of council.

Throughout May and June 2003, the planning department conducted a thorough public consultation process that incorporated a mix of open houses, public workshops and a professional design charrette (Vancouver, 2004b). The approach was broad-based and well advertised with additional targeted presentations to groups that expressed interest. During this public process, Vancouver won its Olympic bid to host the 2010 winter games which brought further public attention to the Olympic Athletes Village component of SEFC. A requirement for 600,000 sq.ft. of housing for athletes had to be integrated into the ODP proposal (Vancouver 2004b). Staff received a tremendous amount of public feedback on the proposed ODP design. They reviewed all the comments, pulled out themes and consolidated them at their discretion in order to provide feedback to VIA for integration. Staff presented the summaries at a 'wrap-up' Open House July 2003 and posted them on the city's website so that the public could review the process.
Through the public consultation, five themes were identified as needing further work in VIA's preliminary ODP submission: park and private lands integration, a more animated waterfront, heritage chronicling (VIA wanted to move the current heritage buildings), small grain development for building variety, and distinctive urban form (VIA wanted to use traditional densification models through height that neglected the physical form of the site deemed important in the 1998 charrette). Early the next year a revised ODP proposal incorporating public feedback and the directive to use the policy statement as a framework was submitted to the planning department (Vancouver, 2004a). Two open house meetings were held to review the revision at downtown public venues. Conflict still existed over issues of affordable housing and small grain development. UBC's James Taylor Chair in Landscape and Liveable Environments, Patrick Condon (2004), describes the potential connection of small grain development and affordable housing:

A small lot strategy would allow ... individuals or groups of citizens a chance to buy their own lot, hire their own architect, and work with their own developer in bringing to life their dream home or co-housing project. In short, it would keep the money local, and draw on the talent pool and resources of British Columbians...

However, he knew there were challenges to this approach:

...the experts say otherwise. They say that 1 million is the most you can get and that the only building you can profitably sell in Vancouver is a high rise. They say that only big developers and big projects are marketable: "This is the market in Vancouver! That is what people want!"

In an environment where severe homelessness was a growing concern, the SG and the Designers for Social Responsibility held their own workshop called The Root of Living in March 2004 at Emily Carr Institute with the help of AG facilitator Fiona Crofton. A variety of community activists, professionals and students were
invited and the event was attended by some city staff as well as COPE councillor Fred Bass. The intent of the workshop was to review and further develop the aspects of social sustainability within the context of community building that seemed to be lacking in the VIA proposal. Three themes were proposed as priorities: experiencing nature, building community and creating social equity through affordable housing, urban agriculture, and sense of place (DSR, 2004). A set of designs and a synthesis of ideas were sent to council and city staff and presented at a special council meeting in July 2004.

Prior to the public hearing the planning department provided council with a Choices and Directions report, which identified the issues and ideas brought forth through public consultation (Vancouver, 2004d). At the request of council, the report proposed strategies that were more progressive. The planning staff made recommendations in the areas of affordable housing, height and density, park space, transportation, heritage building location and community centre size. Since the intention was for SEFC “to influence all development in the City [in order] to improve [its] standards of environmentally and socially sensitive development”, recommendations that were outside the standard model of development were emphasized in terms of their potential for replication in other parts of the city (Vancouver 2004b).

Staff provided choices that fluctuated between a higher or lower return for the city’s Property Endowment Fund (PEF). The fund, set up in 1975, had about $1 billion in real estate investment and generated $13 million a year in lease revenues and land sales for the city. The PEF contributes 50% of its net annual income (approximately $7 million) to the city’s operating budget for programs and strategic site purchase (including non-market housing properties), and the other 50% is left as an endowment to future citizens and long-term development (Lee, 2004). A lower return on the PEF’s SEFC investment would result in more amenities such as
affordable housing, childcare facilities, community centre, parks and other social services that the city would provide to the site. A higher return would keep the city’s credit in good standing and provide opportunity for investments in other parts of the city.

The most significant amendment put forth in the report involved an increase in affordable housing from the proposed 20% affordable to 1/3 affordable, 1/3 modest and 1/3 market housing. This model reflected the successful False Creek South neighbourhood developed under Hardwick in the 1970s, which had undertaken this housing mix while provincial and federal governments were still supporting affordable and non-market housing. Through False Creek South Hardwick had intended to move Vancouver away from the ‘executive city’ direction he felt it was moving in (Harcourt & Cameron, 2007). The city-owned False Creek South development was unique as well in that there was “no expectation of any return for the city’s investment in the land” (Vancouver 2004c). However, without senior government support, the 1/3 scenario in SEFC was expected to result in a $28 million loss compared to a $4 million loss for just 20% affordable housing. At the same time, the 1/3 scenario was seen to better reflect the needs of the region and the goal for community diversity in SEFC.

On July 26, 2004 council formally heard from a long list of public speakers (including SG representatives), the majority of whom spoke out in favour of report recommendations that improved SEFC’s social sustainability (Vancouver, 2004e). The COPE council carried forward all the recommendations made by staff where the expectations of return to the PEF would be significantly reduced and sustainability goals increased. This included the provision of a 1/3 housing scenario, an increase in childcare facilities, a larger community centre, and a lively waterfront which opened the issue of False Creek sediment clean up. The two NPA councillors were the only
opposing voices to these motions as they felt council's actions were fiscally irresponsible (Johnson, 2004).

At two open house meetings in October and November 2004, the majority of public participants supported the new design strategies that incorporated the significant changes approved by council. This included a lower but dense built form, a lively waterfront with “green fingers” extending into the neighbourhood, a larger community centre and more affordable housing, with 85% of participants supporting sustainability directions (Vancouver, 2004f). The framework then informed and led to the final ODP By-law, which, after two more public hearings, was enacted in July 2005 (Vancouver, 2005a). Council also approved a minimum building requirement of LEED® Silver minimum for SEFC with an objective of LEED Gold for the Athlete's Village. According to Makhoul (2003), “This decision [made] Vancouver the first North American municipality to include these protocols as a requirement in the development process”.

The major point of contention remained the $50 million that would be taken from the PEF to partially finance the now $183 million set of social benefits. While COPE councillors remained committed to the ideal of SEFC being a showcase model, no matter the cost, the city manager and NPA councillors publically opposed the move (Bula, 2005). This tension reflects and reproduces the larger struggles within the very notion of sustainability – the trade-off model which is unable to reconcile the three imperatives. This is a prime example of the inherent difficulty in calculating the true cost of social sustainability – defined here as public amenities like housing, childcare facilities and community centres – since an increase in these is seen as a loss in profit, discounting future generations. If an effective model for

---

7 LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) was created by the Green Building Rating System, the U.S.'s benchmark for sustainability. During the construction and design process, merit points are accumulated and certification granted according to the number of verifiable points tallied when a project is complete.
full cost accounting was available, calculations would have to include the positive outcomes that often occur as a result of these amenities, such as improved health, a decrease in crime and community cohesion for instance. SEFC’s senior planner admitted that making the numbers work was a point of apprehension, "The problem the city faced was that there was no fully evolved tool for full-cost accounting and we lacked expertise within. It is really a troublesome area for the city."

Where was the SG in all of this action? While some city staff remarked that they had worked closely with the SG on the ODP draft and on the formation of the public consultation, the SG was not completely satisfied with the process. According to SG members, internal conflicts in the city, mainly between the planning and engineering departments, made it difficult for the SG to be productively involved. SEFC’s senior planner noted that the SG was frustrated by the targets and indicators created for monitoring as they were basic and did not deal with issues such as affordable housing and how they are valued. As its volunteer effort became less valued and demoted to a consultative role [described by Arnstein (1969) as a form of tokenism], SG participants began to turn their attention elsewhere and the SG faced internal structural challenges. From that point on, the SG, while maintaining good ties with the city staff, found itself directly appealing more and more often to council to have its voice heard. Fortunately, at that point in time, the council had a sympathetic ear for the SG. But that would not remain the case.

3.6 Window Five: Political Change

According to Kingdon (1995), one of the most predictable policy windows occurs during a change in administration. The new political leaders are eager to implement their general agenda and are open to policy alternatives that will help them do that. Neither the alternatives offered nor the problem may be new, they just need to be available and respond to the new political situation in order to
redirect the agenda. In Vancouver a fiscally-minded NPA majority looked to the protectors of the PEF to reverse decisions made by the COPE administration and redefine SEFC's social goals. Collaborative process had no place during this period and all citizen advisory committees were under review to determine their usefulness.

Prior to the 2005 elections, internal division within COPE over a proposed rapid transit line and casino divided the party. Campbell formed Vision Vancouver with three other council members in the months leading up to the election but then dropped out of the mayoral race when he was offered a seat in the federal Senate. The new Vision party was coined "COPE Lite" for their moderate views compared to their left-leaning colleagues from "COPE Classic". With the charismatic Campbell out of the picture and COPE's overspending a hot election topic, the NPA managed to win a slim majority. A number of Vision councillors were elected and NPA leader Sam Sullivan became the new mayor. One of Sullivan's first actions on council was to reinvestigate SEFC spending. His second action was to begin a review of all citizen advisory committees, including the SG. He actually attempted to freeze the committees' work during the review but other councillors opposed the move (Cooper, 2005). The effect of this review for the SG will be covered in a subsequent section.

With the Olympic deadline looming, council asked staff to prepare a range of options to improve the economic sustainability of SEFC in December 2005 with a goal of recovering the estimated $50 million in land value. Council limited the range of options to the housing mix and public amenities package so that there would be minimal impact on the delivery of the 2010 Olympic Village and its environmental and affordable housing legacy. Despite the recent study by Demographia International Affordability Survey, which showed Vancouver to be the least
affordable city in Canada when it came to housing (Dobbin, 2006), recommendations were brought to council in January that included reduction of modest market and affordable housing in SEFC.

After a review by council the following amendments were proposed:

- reduce the minimum affordable housing requirement from 33% to 20% across the entire site, but maintain the objective of continuing to aim for 33% affordable housing units [i.e. seek alternative sources of funding such as Development Cost Levies (DCLs) or senior government].

- remove the requirement to have modest market housing in sub-area 2A [the Olympic Village], while retaining the 33% requirement in sub-areas 1A and 3A [to be developed later].

- reduce the required minimum number of licensed childcare facilities from five to three, but maintain the objective of five as a target to strive for over time. (Vancouver, 2006c)

Previous amendments that increased the size of the community centre and park remained untouched. The redefining of the social imperative implied by this move was summarized by Vancouver-Fraserview NDP MLA Gregor Robertson, as follows:

Putting two and two together, the city manager is making an outrageous recommendation, that the property endowment fund be tapped to pay for amenities but not housing ... so the people who can afford to live there will have all the best amenities, but the neighbourhood will exclude everyone else. (Bula, 2006a:B1)

In March 2006, the month that the city’s Sustainability Group launched its 30 Days of Sustainability campaign, council heard from 25 speakers, the majority of whom opposed Sullivan’s amendments. Citizens expressed their concern that there had not been enough public involvement regarding the reduction in social amenities and that a short public hearing was not representative enough to make changes to
the ODP. One speaker warned that “holding on to the PEF while not addressing poverty and homelessness will undermine prosperity in the long run” (Vancouver, 2006c). However, the amendments were carried forward with the justification that further delays to the Olympic deadline and the developer selection process that was underway would be detrimental. In a swift move, social long-term goals were substituted by economic short-term gains with no collaborative decision making process.

NPA councillors were confident that innovative developers could be convinced to find social housing solutions through the cooperative planning methodology utilized in recent megaprojects. The city had the leverage to demand amenities because Vancouver’s residential market was hotter then ever. Without senior government commitments on housing it was deemed necessary to rely on market forces. The councillors worried that creating a precedent of using PEF principle for social housing would be detrimental to the fund. However, relying on market forces for affordable housing had already failed in Vancouver: the previous voluntary request for 20% social housing in Concord Pacific was sadly unmet, achieving only 15% (Dobbin, 2006).

In one SG member’s opinion, the ODP process was ultimately mismanaged because there was no single champion to oversee the project from the onset and throughout. Over the years, SEFC went through many planning and engineering staff changes that degraded stakeholder cohesion. A strong champion, the SG member felt, with sufficient influence may have prevented the swinging effect of political winds. According to another SG member, economic viability was a major issue for SEFC. While COPE was progressive in supporting social sustainability initiatives, he felt they did not understand the financial implications and made broad sweeping choices that would eventually have a negative impact on the project.
as a whole, ultimately leading the next council to sacrifice its social viability for economic short-sightedness.

In April 2006, as infrastructure construction began onsite, Millennium Group was awarded the contract to design and build SEFC’s first phase, sub-area 2A, otherwise known as the Olympic Village. The development team led by local giant Merrick Architecture, comprised 17 firms including former city consultant reSource Rethinking (see Appendix D for full team). It was agreed that Millennium would pay the City an unconditional $193 million for transfer of market housing and commercial development on a freehold basis (Vancouver, 2006d). The developer would also design and manage construction of the affordable housing units and public amenities. Despite council’s removal of the modest housing component in the RFP, Millennium’s team kept an element of this in their plan as they knew it would put their proposal in a good light with city planners. However, the affordability of their modest market scheme would later be questioned by the public. Their proposal included a green building strategy and a commitment to provide jobs and business opportunities for people in the Downtown Eastside.

The selection process was closed to the public and to the SG and the traditional highest-bid method was employed in selecting the developer. All candidates met ODP requirements in their proposals but Millennium offered, by far, the highest purchase price. While the planners and council could rationalize that the decision was made based on Millennium’s ability to meet sustainable development needs the reality is that they outbid their competition by quite a bit. This offer was then leveraged to gain more market density in the project. According to an SG member, the Village grew without any public discussion during negotiations with Millennium. The proposal also guaranteed that the city would carry no financial risk in the development of the Olympic Village. There was no open, collaborative process involved in this decision, just a cut and dry assessment of owner financial
benefits. This process demonstrates the typical relationship of dominant planning practice and economic mechanisms, which, even within an environment of sustainable development, takes over important decision making processes. There seems to be less openness for collaboration and empowering the public in decision making when the decisions carry immediate financial consequences.

3.7 Window Six: A New Player

With the selection of a developer came a new set of dynamics. This is another predictable window – new decision makers will inevitably find ways to direct their own agendas in the established process. The pending Olympic deadline and the complexity of implementation acted as a pretext to direct decision making attention to the ‘experts’ and away from the public. Collaborative design still played a role in this process but it was eventually replaced by negotiation as more traditional power struggles between the planners and developer shaped the final character of phase one of SEFC. The SG had little or no influence and the group was essentially dismantled by council. The final product, at least for phase one, characterizes the Olympic Village as a holiday resort that will not have a consistent and vibrant community to use its many recreational amenities and transportation services.

Shortly after developer selection, city staff invited the development team to participate in a two-day IDP funded by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and coordinated by local NGO Light House Sustainable Building Centre. According to staff, the developers were eager to participate. The core city team, the developer, two SG representatives, the project office, and 15 – 20 sustainability ‘experts’ were invited.

The goal of the IDP was to build consensus on the sustainable design objectives for SEFC while encouraging effective and open communication between
all team members as the first step in an iterative, ongoing integrated design process. As an important lesson in the pursuit of a discourse on sustainability facilitator Bill Reed reminded participants that “everyone is a co-learner in the process” (LHSBC, 2006). City staff felt that the IDP gave them the opportunity to get to know Millennium and their consultants and Millennium learned how committed people in Vancouver were to sustainability, including their own engineers.

The major outcomes of the two days were the development of measurable sustainability performance targets, an integrated process and clear lines of accountability. Detailed outcomes included the establishment of a core management team (between developer team and city staff); the commitment to establish a SEFC community association (essentially a modified version of the SG); and the commitment to develop an indicator feedback system with a whole range of performance metrics for energy, water, materials and other areas (LHSBC, 2006).

The SG chair noted how valuable the event was for Millennium to meet with members of the community, like the SG, who had been working on the vision for SEFC for ten years. The chair commented that the success of the IDP workshop,

\[
\text{can be measured in the richness and consensus of ideas and goals expressed during our two days of discussions. The task is to hold on to that richness as we engage in the day-to-day challenge of building the sub-area 2A neighbourhood over the next three years. (LHSBC, 2006)}
\]

The latter comment reflected concern for the integrity of the project as it entered the implementation stage and became market-oriented.

Critical conflicts were flagged in the event around energy and built form and were addressed immediately after in follow-up meetings. These issues exemplify the way in which transparent collaboration turned to internal negotiation between city staff and Millennium. The SG was informed about the negotiations surrounding energy and massing that occurred after the IDP but they had no substantial input.
On the issue of energy, IDP participants agreed on the value of a district energy system for SEFC but there was disagreement on the optimal system type with city staff favouring the more 'traditional' high temperature system and the development team favouring a low temperature ambient system. One month prior, council had approved the creation of a Neighbourhood Energy Utility (NEU) for False Creek using a high temperature sewer heat recovery system. Given the imminent tendering of documents and completion of construction drawings for the NEU, the ambient system argument was at a disadvantage. Millennium team member, Cobalt Engineering, reluctantly agreed to go ahead with the city’s high temperature system (LHSBC, 2006).

However, the issue re-emerged later when Millennium found out that the city was changing its focus from sewer heat recovery to biomass. The Millennium Group, still bitter about the loss of its ambient system, rallied many of SEFC’s sustainability experts, including the SG, upon hearing about engineering’s request for an emissions permit from Metro Vancouver\(^8\) for biomass energy in spring 2007. Here we see a brief changing of alliances as the SG supports Millennium in opposing city staff. The developer, however, not the SG, actively pursued this alliance.

The dominant argument was that the public had not been provided with enough information or background on either heating option (SG, 2007b). Previously city staff had utilized public input to advance their interests in sustainable design and now we see it being used by the developer to oppose the city. This shows a certain lack of public autonomy. Metro Vancouver’s air quality district director put the ball back into the city’s court stating that they would not be rushed by the city’s deadlines and that residents needed more information (Rossi, 2007). Under pressure of the Olympic deadline, the city was not able to collect adequate public feedback to

---

\(^8\) Metro Vancouver is the regional board, previously called the GVRD (Greater Vancouver Regional District).
satisfy Metro Vancouver and in April 2007 council instructed staff to go with sewer heat recovery for phase 1 of the district energy project - SEFC sub-area 2A (Vancouver, 2007a). When implemented in 2009, the sewer heat recovery system will be the first of its kind used for district heating in North America, the potential for national recognition of this would have been part of council’s decision making. In sum, while Millennium had to concede to the city on the optimum heating system they still found place to remind the city of their discontent by leveraging the issue of transparency and creating a temporary alliance with the SG.

On the topic of built form, the developer acknowledged to IDP participants the decisions accomplished through exhaustive public consultation. However they were concerned that not enough thought had been given to passive design elements such as natural ventilation, daylighting and solar access/orientation that increase energy performance but subsequently also increase building mass to incorporate elements like wider corridors. The development team also attempted to push the envelope for increased heights and views, a traditional point of negotiation between developers and the city. The developer argued that there was a need to recoup the expected losses from construction costs that had skyrocketed with the awarding of the Olympic bid as well as losses that would result from voluntarily meeting modest market housing targets. The two teams met on a weekly basis for full day private design sessions in order to resolve the issue. The result was some concession by staff for more height in ‘strategic’ sections on sub-area 2A. It is likely that the development team leveraged their higher bid in this decision making process to get an increase in density. Since this was done behind closed doors it is easier to rationalize the decision on the basis of professional technical considerations and the ‘unpredictable’ market. According to current market predictions, the Olympic Village will end up having a $1.2 billion dollar sale value (Sorensen, 2007).
While Millennium Group was successful in gaining more density for the site from the planners, its expression in the built form required negotiation through the rezoning process. Since the SG was cautious and saw rezoning as a roadmap for private developers and future development of the SEFC site, they struggled to get insight into the rezoning process before decisions were made. However, they were brought into the fold only when the general public was also informed. In August 2006, Merrick Architecture submitted architectural plans for Millennium’s rezoning application. Public open houses were held throughout the month of August to review the application. There was a great deal of apprehension over the 220,000 extra square feet of density staff had committed to Millennium on top of the 1.1 million that were already approved. Vision councillors were at the front of this apprehension (Bula, 2006b). However, the planning department rationalized the density by explaining that a portion of it would be going to larger affordable housing units and modest market units. According to the planners, Millennium Group would only receive 78,000 extra square feet for market housing density for which they paid over $200 per sq. ft.

Millennium’s spokesperson and co-founder of Merrick Architecture, Roger Bayley, met with the SG at the request of city staff throughout August as an outcome of the IDP. Through open dialogue with the SG, Millennium was able to convince its participants that the increase in density would allow for better design of passive systems as well as increase the potential of modest market housing. As a result the SG tentatively supported the increase in density to council for the express purpose of passive design. However, the group noted its extreme disappointment with the developer’s marketing direction, which would not foster the kind of community envisioned for SEFC (SG, 2006). Bayley had openly reported to the group that the target market of SEFC was expected to only reside in the community three to four months of the year and require at least two parking spaces. The SG was appalled
and speechless by the reality they were faced with. The collaborative process which had created a shared vision for a vibrant, thriving community was overpowered by market forces which were shaping the site into a holiday resort. While there would be much public and academic criticism of this outcome, it would remain unchanged for phase 1 of SEFC. This shows how the SG’s participation, while still sought out, was relegated to a form of tokenism at this point in the project.

The planning department recommended the approval of Millennium’s rezoning application, conditional to the developer’s acceptance of a long list of design criteria identified by the city’s urban design panel. These included meeting LEED Gold, meeting or exceeding CBIP’s (Commercial Buildings Incentive Program) energy efficiency targets, as well as provision for green roofs on 50% of the rooftops and parking for co-operative vehicles (Vancouver, 2006g). At the public hearing in October 2006 Bayley strategically emphasized to council the pressure for time and thanked them for their diligence (Vancouver, 2006h). Council heard from a handful of speakers (including two SG members) concerned about the expected community make-up and the realistic affordability of market rental as a solution for modest market housing. The event was tellingly described by Millennium’s marketing manager, ‘condo king’ Bob Rennie: “In packed meetings for Olympic Village, the hackles were up, and the split was crystal clear: ‘suits’ on one side, ‘bike helmets and backpacks’ on the other” (Macdonald, 2007).

Staff mollified speaker concerns with assurances that there would be a focus on housing affordability and the application was approved by council (Vancouver, 2006h). While public interest was still high in the SEFC project, the public voice was no longer regarded with the same authority as it had been in the creation of SEFC’s policy. The degree of influence was inverse to the advance of the process. As implementation got closer, costs and profits became tangible and the decision making realm became narrower. Those stakeholders with no direct financial impact
on the project were reduced to glorified spectators. The socially conscious
environment that gave birth to an innovative policy statement and generous ODP
proposal was replaced with a developer-centered process. This is not to say that the
developer had free rein. City planners were able to use their position to ensure that
a number of environmental and social sustainability targets would be met through
the utilization of the public process and the urban design panel. However, this was
done in an ambience more and more leaning towards accommodating the developer.

Interestingly, on the eve of the public hearing for rezoning, councillors also
received an update on the PEF that informed them of a significant estimated return
for SEFC due to the increase in land values. The 2004 estimation of a $4 million net
income had increased to $64.5 million, just surpassing council's goal of recovering
$50 million (Vancouver, 2006f). Thus the PEF depletion by housing feared by the
NPA councillors might not have been as detrimental as it had been thought to be.
The real estate department downplayed this increased return, however, cautioning
that costs for soil remediation and water decontamination may still increase.

The negotiation for height did not stop with rezoning approval. Millennium
requested an amendment to increase height for a luxury residence a few months
later. Local architectural icon, Arthur Erickson, was brought in to redesign a major
waterfront building in order to create an "iconic building befitting the site"
(Vancouver, 2007b). To the discontent of the SG, this amendment would create
unhealthy shade in the community garden, which had already been separated from
the community centre in previous revisions during the ODP process. The
amendment was passed despite the SG's opposition. Erickson's reputation offered
significant persuasion in approving the extra height. While the community garden
was significant to many members of the SG in encouraging community cohesion, it
would seem that the health of the community was low on the SEFC development
agenda for both the developer and the city.
3.8 Stewardship Finale

As mentioned previously, part of Mayor Sullivan’s immediate revamping of COPE’s legacy in early 2006 included a review of all citizen advisory committees (Cooper, 2005). In February 2006, the director of Central Area planning sat down with the SG to discuss the group’s future and how it would evolve (Vancouver, 2006b). The SG endorsed a review and at their request the city manager hired former AG facilitator, Fiona Crofton, for a one-day workshop, which included city staff in July 2006. The purpose of the workshop was to review the SG’s mission and operational approach and discuss ways of reaching out to new members. The SG had significantly reduced its size over time as members became frustrated with the ODP and subsequent rezoning processes where they were not as actively empowered as they had been as an advisory group. This degraded the representational value of the SG and reduced the motivation of active members.

The environment of collaboration that defined the AG had been replaced with tensions between the SG and city staff. The new project office had intense Olympic deadlines to meet and SG activities were often seen as interventions that cost valuable time. Relationships with new city staff had become less amicable and sometimes confrontational. It was obvious that a new mode of operation was needed between the two.

The general consensus was that the importance of the group as ‘watchdog’ for the policy statement’s principles of sustainability still held true. However, the city had not developed a thorough list of indicators that the group could monitor. The SG also believed that a shift in focus toward public education and a framework for a future SEFC neighbourhood association was also necessary (Vancouver, 2006e). SG members recognized that if this sustainable community was going to ultimately succeed it would be dependent on the people that lived in the community as well as those that visited it. This is why they were so upset to find that wealthy pensioners
and vacationers would predominately occupy the first phase of SEFC. Hardly the diverse and dynamic community they had envisioned.

The group struggled for more facilitation support from the city but council wanted them to prove their importance. Since the SG chose to provide a non-political, volunteer service to the city it is likely that this lack of political backing and coalition building robbed the group of much decision-influencing power, especially once they began to lose their support and alliance with city staff, the SG’s main allies and vehicle to council. In an effort to downplay this political gap and express the importance of the group, a plea was made to the city manager in a letter by the SG:

An important feature of the SG work is that it is a joint enterprise between a diversity of voluntary citizens together with City Staff. The SG represents a diversity of opinions and expertise that are independent, objective, non-political and open. SG has strength in part because members have nothing to gain politically or socially. While development experts are easily bogged down in the details, the SG provides a broad based view that refers to the larger vision of the SEFC project. (SG, 2007a)

Despite this plea the city manager openly shared with two SG members in the spring of 2007 that council questioned the relevance of the group and was threatened by its public ‘influence’ over the project. The history and commitment of the SG interfered with council’s goal to claim SEFC as its own. The SG was left to fend for itself with no support from the city manager’s office and currently the group has disbanded.

In summary, the group went from shaping decisions, to intervening on decisions made and to finally having no effect at all. Internally, the group fell apart as frustration from this degradation took its toll. While members remain proud of what was accomplished and of the fact that the group lasted longer than predicted, they are nonetheless saddened by the final outcome and equally fearful for the future of the project.
3.9 Epilogue

Millennium received approval on all of its development applications between January and June 2007, and building construction began early in the year. Residential buildings will range from three to 13 stories and will include 697 market units, 252 non-market units and 121 rental units. Green building features will include rainwater capture for toilet water and landscaping, green roofs, FSC certified wood used in construction, and solar thermal hot water collectors. Building orientation will allow residents to utilize the sun for heating and light and the breeze from the water to cool homes (Sorensen, 2007).

Millennium’s marketing manager, Bob Rennie, remarked that real estate buyers appreciate green features for their resale value. He predicts that the consumer will soon begin to demand many of the environmental features seen as innovations on a property today (Sorensen, 2007). This attitude, however, did not prevent the inclusion of air conditioning. At the IDP, Rennie commented that no one was going to pay top dollar for a suite with the no air conditioning, despite Vancouver’s moderate climate. It makes one wonder just who they are marketing this ‘sustainable community’ to, which in the advertisements looks no different from the glass towers of the elite North False Creek community.

Millennium has already sold its phase of market units. Prices started at $460,000 to $3.5 million for the three parcels that are the furthest away from the water. $600,000 will get the buyer 725- to 759 square-feet with marginal view. The website displays luxury lifestyles in modern, fully equipped premium suites. A quote by Alan Thein Durning on the site states: "...accepting and living by sufficiency rather than excess offers a return to what is ... family, community, good work and good life". The choice of quote seems contradictory to suites decorated with premium fixtures.
CHAPTER 4:
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

My intention in telling the story of Southeast False Creek was to explore the collaborative processes used in the development of the sustainable community and to learn from its successes and failures. By tracing some of the power relations at play during the opening of policy windows, the story revealed the effectiveness of collaboration in light of power imbalances and the subsequent effect this had in serving all three imperatives of sustainability. A distinct degradation of inclusive collaborative practice emerged as the project neared implementation and this was paralleled by a devaluation of the social imperative.

At the onset of the SEFC project, a strong coalition between civil society and planning professionals enabled the formation of a structured civic collaboration process endorsed by the municipal government. This structured dialogue -- represented by the citizen advisory group -- resulted in a comprehensive policy statement that successfully intertwined the three imperatives of sustainability -- the ecological, the economic and the social -- to the satisfaction of the stakeholders involved. The final statement, however, was open to interpretation as it moved into the design stage and the advisory group, in its new and vague role as steward, had little influence on this. During the ODP process, when collaboration was centred on professional design, public input was leveraged in favour of sustainability strategies when the political agenda matched the sustainability agenda. However, with the swinging of the political pendulum, those collaborative processes were deemed insignificant and the interpretation of the policy statement in ODP design continued to change. Finally, when the project reached more concrete stages of implementation, the public voice, most notably the SG's, was relegated entirely to
the periphery while power struggles exclusively involved the planners and the developer. Furthermore, even this collaboration between professionals was reduced to negotiation in the face of tangible costs and profits. The outcome was a careful balancing of the ecological trade-offs for economic 'health' and a devaluation of the social imperative.

In today's economy, environmental aspects of sustainability are easier to sell than social ones as the "environment" has enough mainstream leverage now that the economic trade-off it requires is not as substantial as it as once was. What is generally lost, then, without models for full cost accounting, is the social aspect of sustainability whose pursuit requires considerable political capital that most citizen groups lack.

The growing gap between how the SG interpreted the policy statement's sustainability objectives compared to other decision makers' understanding eventually robbed the group of its political capital. SG members found themselves more and more isolated as their agenda differed more and more from that of those in power. As per-issue power alliances took precedence over SEFC's planning process, the collaborative framework that underwrote the SG became obsolete. SG participants became disempowered by their lack of influence on decision making, which led to the eventual implosion of the group.

If incorporating public voice and citizen values in order to serve the social imperative of sustainability is to be successful throughout a project's life, there must be flexibility and adaptability in the frameworks used. As Robinson (2004) argues, sustainability is necessarily a political act, and the way forward involves the development of new forms of partnerships and new tools for creating political dialogue that involve many people in the conversation. The SEFC experience suggests that a structured, collaborative process that is endorsed and organized by the municipality can be fruitful in the creation of a general policy or vision for a
sustainable development project. This inclusive environment is more likely to successfully neutralize power when the economic stakes are low and it can create an environment of innovation to push the envelope of planning practice. However, what works at the beginning to establish a persistent framework for dialogue may lose its value as the project moves toward implementation. As implementation nears, a project must move beyond the big picture vision and its corresponding framework to incorporate the nitty-gritty detail of construction and management.

In SEFC, planners fell back on a rational comprehensive approach to manage the complexity of implementation under the consistent belief that expert-based models are still the most efficient. IDP allowed participants to infuse a level of professional collaboration into the implementation process. However, the model could not be considered inclusive as the professional voice took precedence over the public voice. While elaborate public involvement in decision making is not practical at the detail-oriented implementation stage, effective civic monitoring can ideally ensure that the original sustainability framework is upheld. This was the role of the SG. However, it was a watchdog without teeth.

The SG depended on the municipality to empower it as the city had done in the SG's original advisory role. City staff, however, never sufficiently defined the role of the SG. The group eventually attempted to revisit its own structure but only when pushed by council. This happened too late in the process, at a time when the council was really only interested in disbanding the group. The SG's static structure resulted in disinterest that plagued the group as it became disempowered - a typical reaction from those who are not able to see the results of their work. The SG members' mistake was to continue to rely on the municipality to empower them. The reality is that the municipality, as institution, is fully embedded in the traditional economic paradigm and when the money is 'on the table' there is more pressure to follow traditional patterns of behaviour. Unable to maintain the support
of municipal staff or council the SG needed to reassess its structure and search for a variety of strategic partnerships during the ODP stage when its members first realized the lessening of their power. New alliances that could leverage political capital were needed in order to find voice in the micro-politics that characterized the project closer to implementation. The SG’s desire to offer a non-political, broad-based view was not possible at this point.

When there is a need to *regulate power* in order to push for more equitable sustainability goals (a constant need according to Flyvbjerg), Kingdon (and Flyvbjerg) would tell us that civil society’s best strategy is to create a coalition of similar interests outside of the institutions of democracy, find political backing and a dedicated and skilled point person, and then wait for the moment to “strike while the iron is hot” *within* the institutions of democracy. And keep on striking. And since the SEFC story is not over, with two more phases waiting to be planned and developed by new stakeholders, there will be more windows of opportunity during which an organized coalition of citizens may affect and indeed improve upon SEFC’s sustainable character. Let us hope that they benefit from some of the hard-learned lessons of the near past. The biggest challenge will likely be getting buy-in and support from the elite residents of the Olympic Village to craft a truly sustainable community.

Despite the limits of collaboration demonstrated by this case study, the SEFC example still upholds the value of collaboration because the original policy statement did remain a consistent framework for the project and has helped push the envelope of innovation. What we learn is that trade-offs, of the environmental for the social in this case but potentially vice versa, occur as a project nears implementation and can mar the sustainable development process. If collaboration is to play a significant role in reconciling all three imperatives of sustainability throughout a project’s life, its structure must be dynamic and cannot always rely on
the same institutions and strategies. A consensus-based collaborative process is effective in creating a larger vision at the onset of a project. However to keep the social imperative from being discounted, civil society must engage in the micro-politics that make up the implementation stage later on through coalition building, a conflict-based form of collaboration. This can provide a model for the next two stages of SEFC’s development and a re-imagining of the SG. According to SEFC WG outreach coordinator, in building sustainable communities, “we don't need more experts, what we need is political will, and political will comes from the public. And so, we need people to get excited. We need people to be concerned” (GVTV, 2002).

It must be noted that neither the approach of consensus nor conflict, however, deal with the issue of motivation. Both approaches require voluntary and exhaustive participation by civil society as experienced by the SG. Participants must be engaged and they must be able to see the fruit of their efforts in order to maintain their engagement. The imposition of power is inevitable and as stakeholders lose their drive to participate over time, power players can hold stronger sway over the decisions made. This results in a further depletion of civic motivation as participants lose their faith in the process. Like sustainability, this challenge is not solved by a single solution and was certainly an influential factor in the fall of the SG. Despite the weaknesses apparent in collaborative dialogue, however, it is worth attempting as power is not static and if we are to have any effect on our collective systems of belief it will come through constant political dialogue that engages everyone.

*We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.*

Albert Einstein
APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview Questions

1. Tell me about yourself and how you got involved in the SEFC Project?

2. Generally, what is your picture of 'success' for SEFC?

3. Do you agree that the creation of an Advisory Group and later Stewardship Group as well as efforts to work within an Integrated Design Process were an attempt at collaborative decision-making for SEFC?

4. What would be your definition for an effective collaboration process?

5. Overall, how would you describe the collaborative process for SEFC?

6. What were the key strengths of the collaborative process?

7. What were the key weaknesses of the collaborative process?

8. Has collaboration enhanced or hindered implementation of the project's sustainability goals?

9. Did you feel that you were an active player in the decision-making for SEFC?

10. Overall do you feel empowered by the collaborative process in SEFC? Please explain.

11. If there was a feeling of loss of power, what events triggered this to occur?

12. What are your personal lessons learned from the process so far?

13. Would you like to make any additional comments?

14. Who else would you recommend I speak to?
Appendix B: Southeast False Creek Working Group – Core Members

Source: Irwin, 2004

Better Environmentally Sound Transportation (Best)
Brewery Creek Historical Preservation Society
BC Women’s Housing Coalition
Carnegie Community Action Project
David Suzuki Foundation
Downtown Eastside Residents’ Association
Designers for Social Responsibility
EcoCity Network (ECN) (a network of over 300 individuals and organizations)
Ecodesign Resource Society
End Legislated Poverty
Environmental Youth Alliance
Evergreen Foundation
Farm Folk/City Folk
Innovative Housing
Lower Mainland Network for Affordable Housing
Main and Hastings Community Development
Mole Hill Living Heritage Society
Mount Pleasant Community Centre
Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood Association
No to APEC!
Social Change Institute
Tenants’ Rights Action Coalition (TRAC)
Urban Youth Alliance
Wondertree Foundation for Natural Learning
Appendix C: Southeast False Creek Policy Advisory Group

Source: Vancouver, 1999a

Ronald Bain - Architect: Ecodesign Resource Society
Ed Ferriera - Commercial Real Estate Consultant
Dr. Fiona Crofton - Facilitator of the Advisory Group: The ORCAD Group Inc.
Jeanette Frost - Engineer: Keen Engineering
Rob Gritten - Real Estate Consultant: Avison Young
Jeff Herold - Development Consultant: Herold Development Services Ltd.
John Irwin - Student: SEFC Working Group
Ga Ching Kong - Urban Youth Alliance
(Ms. Kong was primarily involved at the beginning of the process)
Bob Laurie - Real Estate Manager: Finning Intl.
Barbara Lindsay - Vancouver City Planning Commission
Patrick Mooney - Director of UBC Landscape Architecture Program
Jennie Moore - Regional Air and Energy Advisor
David Osborne - False Creek South Community Representative
Mike Overholt - Landowner Representative
Eva Riccius - Student: SEFC Working Group
Gavin Ross - Mt Pleasant Community Association
Alice Sundberg - Exec. Director: BC Nonprofit Housing Association
Joe Winkler - Landowner Representative
Tana Worschester - Student: Environmental Youth Alliance
Source: City of Vancouver, June 1999
Appendix D: Millennium Group Core Team Members

Source: Millennium Properties Ltd.

DEVELOPER
Millennium Properties Ltd. - Peter Malek, Director
Millennium Properties Ltd. - Shahram Malek, Director
Millennium Properties Ltd. - Hank Jasper, Project Manager

ARCHITECTS
Merrick Architecture Borowski Lintott Sakumo Figg - Paul Merrick
Merrick Architecture Borowski Lintott Sakumo Figg - Roger Bayley
Gomberoff Bell Lyon Architect Group - Stu Lyon

LANDSCAPE ARCHITECT
Durante Kreuk Ltd. - Peter Kreuk

SUSTAINABLE DESIGN/LEED™ CERTIFICATION
TBKG Consultants - Andy Kesteloo

CONTRACTORS
MetroCan Construction, Ltd. - Don Voth
Norson Construction, Ltd. - Wayne Davies

STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING
Glotman Simpson - Geoff Glotman

MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
Cobalt Engineering - S.K. Lai

ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
Acumen Engineering Ltd. - Glenn Granstrom

CIVIL ENGINEERING
Vector Engineering - Vic Sagorski

ENVIRONMENTAL
Keystone Environmental - Bill Donald
Aqua-Tex Scientific Consulting Ltd. - Patrick Lucey

CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL
Pioneer Consultants Ltd. - Ken Chow

BUILDING ENVELOPE
Morrison Hershfield - Dave Fookes

TRANSPORTATION
Ward Consulting Group - Ryan Stokes
Appendix E: Collaborative Planning Criteria

Source: Frame et al, 2003:69

Process criteria and descriptions

1. *Purpose and Incentives:* The process is driven by a shared purpose and provides incentives to participate and to work towards consensus in the process.

2. *Inclusive Representation:* All parties with a significant interest in the issues and outcome are involved throughout the process.

3. *Voluntary Participation and Commitment:* Parties who are affected or interested participate voluntarily and are committed to the process.

4. *Self-design:* The parties involved work together to design the process to suit the individual needs of that process and its participants.

5. *Clear Ground Rules:* As the process is initiated, a comprehensive procedural framework is established including clear terms of reference and operating procedures.

6. *Equal Opportunity and Resources:* The process provides for equal and balanced opportunity for effective participation of all parties.

7. *Principled Negotiation and Respect:* The process operates according to the conditions of principled negotiation including mutual respect, trust, and understanding.

8. *Accountability:* The process and its participants are accountable to the broader public, to their constituents, and to the process itself.

9. *Flexible, Adaptive, and Creative:* Flexibility is designed into the process to allow for adaptation and creativity in problem solving.

10. *High-Quality Information:* The process incorporates high-quality information into decision making.

11. *Time Limits:* Realistic milestones and deadlines are established and managed throughout the process.

12. *Commitment to Implementation and Monitoring:* The process and final agreement include clear commitments to implementation and monitoring.

13. *Effective Process Management:* The process is co-ordinated and managed effectively and in a neutral manner.

14. *Independent Facilitation:* The process uses an independent trained facilitator throughout the process.

Outcome criteria and descriptions:

1. *Agreement:* Process reaches an agreement accepted by parties.
2. Perceived as Successful: The process and outcome are perceived as successful by stakeholders.

3. Conflict Reduced: The process reduces conflict.

4. Superior to Other Methods: The process is perceived as superior to alternative approaches.

5. Innovation and Creativity: The process produced creative and innovative ideas and outcomes.

6. Knowledge, Understanding and Skills: Stakeholders gained knowledge, understanding, and skills by participating in the process.

7. Relationships and Social Capital: The process created new personal and working relationships, and social capital among participants.

8. Information: The process produced improved data, information, and analyses through joint fact-finding that stakeholders understand and accept as accurate.

9. Second-order Effects: The process had second-order effects including changes in behaviours and actions, spin-off partnerships, umbrella groups, collaborative activities, new practices or new institutions. Participants work together on issues or projects outside of the process.

10. Public Interest: The outcomes are regarded as just and serve the common good or public interest, not just those of participants in the process.

11. Understanding and Support of CP: The process resulted in increased understanding of, and participants support the future use of CP approaches.
REFERENCE LIST

Books, articles and other publications


Blore, S. (1999, June 5). Betrayed by the prophet. The Vancouver Sun, pp. B1


Bula, F. (2005, February 2). Speakers turn out to debate city role in megaproject. The Vancouver Sun, pp. B1

Bula, F. (2006a, January 16). False Creek plan would make “playground for the rich”: MLA. The Vancouver Sun, pp. B1

Bula, F. (2006b, September 27). Olympic village development moves forward to a public hearing on rezoning. The Vancouver Sun, pp. B3


Clayton, I. (2000, November 16). Vancouver’s six week civic strike ends. The Vancouver Sun, pp B3


COPE city council must keep to the centrist path. (2002, November 17). *The Vancouver Sun,* pp. A14


Millennium Waters website: http://www.millenniumwater.com


**Municipal Documents**

Most sources found online on the SEFC project page:
http://www.city.vancouver.bc.ca/commsvcs/southeast/

And SEFC and Olympic Village project office page:
http://vancouver.ca/olympicvillage/index.htm


- (2005c). Southeast False Creek Public Information Session. Vancouver Public Library. October


- (2006c). Special Council Meeting Minutes. 7 March. Vancouver, BC: City of Vancouver


- (2006h). Special Council Meeting Minutes. 17 October. Vancouver, BC: City of Vancouver
