AN ANALYSIS OF BOLIVIA’S NEW FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REGIONAL INTEGRATION

by

Jason Tockman
B.A., Ohio University

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the
Latin American Studies Program
of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology

© Jason Tockman 2008

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Spring 2008

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author, except for non-profit and research uses.
APPROVAL

Name: Jason Tockman
Degree: Master of Arts
Title of Thesis: An Analysis of Bolivia’s New Framework for Social, Political and Economic Regional Integration

Examining Committee:
Chair: Dr. Eric Hershberg
Professor of Political Science and Director, Latin American Studies Program

Dr. Hannah Wittman
Senior Supervisor
Assistant Professor of Sociology

Dr. Andy Hira
Supervisor
Associate Professor of Political Science

Dr. Maureen Covell
External Examiner
Professor of Political Science

Date Defended/Approved: April 3, 2008
Declaration of Partial Copyright Licence

The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.

The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection (currently available to the public at the “Institutional Repository” link of the SFU Library website <www.lib.sfu.ca> at: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/handle/1892/112>) and, without changing the content, to translate the thesis/project or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work.

The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies.

It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author’s written permission.

Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence.

While licensing SFU to permit the above uses, the author retains copyright in the thesis, project or extended essays, including the right to change the work for subsequent purposes, including editing and publishing the work in whole or in part, and licensing other parties, as the author may desire.

The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive.

Simon Fraser University Library
Burnaby, BC, Canada

Revised: Fall 2007
STATEMENT OF ETHICS APPROVAL

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this work, has obtained, for the research described in this work, either:

(a) Human research ethics approval from the Simon Fraser University Office of Research Ethics,

or

(b) Advance approval of the animal care protocol from the University Animal Care Committee of Simon Fraser University;

or has conducted the research

(c) as a co-investigator, in a research project approved in advance,

or

(d) as a member of a course approved in advance for minimal risk human research, by the Office of Research Ethics.

A copy of the approval letter has been filed at the Theses Office of the University Library at the time of submission of this thesis or project.

The original application for approval and letter of approval are filed with the relevant offices. Inquiries may be directed to those authorities.

Bennett Library
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada
ABSTRACT

Bolivia's approach to a post-neoliberal political economy includes reimagining practices of trade and integration. Drawing on indigenous and economic nationalist ideological currents, Bolivian social movements were successful in demonstrating against existing trade agreements and inserting alternative proposals into Bolivian integration policies under the Morales government. These include incorporating principles of cooperation, solidarity, complementarity and national sovereignty into existing trade fora and Bolivia's 2006 TCP-ALBA accord with Venezuela and Cuba. This agreement generated expanded social programs and several development projects, but has not demonstrated significant economic improvements. This thesis argues that Bolivia's new paradigm for integration is limited by endogenous structural, institutional and political impediments. Additionally, the integration strategy proposed by the Morales government risks a new form of dependency, centered on Venezuelan support and high energy rents. However, this study also suggests it is possible to advance a redistributive agenda at the margins in the emergent multi-polar world.

Keywords: Bolivia; global trade; integration; neoliberalism; social movements.

Subject Terms: Bolivia – Economic policy
Bolivia – Politics and government – 21st century
Neoliberalism – Bolivia
Social Movements – Bolivia
Dedicated to Jim Jontz (December 1951 – April 2007), who committed his life to the search for a more just integration, and touched so many of us in the process.
Pessimism of the mind; optimism of the will.

～Antonio Gramsci

Your ‘order’ is built on sand. Tomorrow the revolution will rear its head again, and, to your horror, will proclaim...

I was, I am, I will be!

～Rosa Luxemburg

I will return and I will be millions.

～Tupac Katari
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In completing this thesis, the deepest appreciation I can express goes without question to Hannah Wittman, the type of supervisor for which every graduate student hopes. Hannah has been a constant source of support, guidance and encouragement, and a great friend. I also extend my gratitude to Andy Hira for his constructive and always-punctual guidance, his dedicated commitment to students, and for always pushing me with the question: “Okay, so what does this mean?” Eric Hershberg deserves acknowledgement for playing the lead role in rescuing SFU’s Latin American Studies Program from a likely death, not to mention teaching the most useful and compelling course I have ever taken. His vision, commitment, inclusiveness, and genuine compassion to people at all levels of the academy have enriched the institution beyond what any of us imagined. Graduate Secretaries Kelly White and Mickey Naisby were extraordinary in gracefully helping me navigate the University’s bureaucratic maze, and Jeanne Persoon, Karen Payne and Joan Byron have also been very helpful. And I truly appreciate my small but supportive cohort—Christina Hanson, Lorenza Gallia and Liliana Castaneda—who aided me in innumerable ways, and whose camaraderie made the Masters experience more enjoyable. I am also grateful to Mike Toews for his help in finalizing this document.

The generous help of several people in Bolivia has been invaluable: Nick Buxton, Linda Farthing, Ben Dangl, Tom Kruse, Felix Muruchi, Verónica Villarroel and Cecilia Chacon each took the time to assist me in understanding Bolivian events, actors and history. Thanks to my dear friend Gretchen Gordon for accompanying me on the ‘emergency flight’ that introduced us to Bolivia, while all the other foreigners were fleeing the country, and for editing my first article on Bolivia.
I owe a debt of gratitude and an enormous apology to the greatest victim of my Masters endeavor: Chicory. You deserved so many more walks, and better food than a graduate student can afford, and I still feel awful leaving you in Ohio for the first year of my studies. Thanks to Cat Cutcher and Joe Beres for taking care of Chicory during that time, and to Shani Danzig, Sofi Hindmarch and Lian Beveridge who served as Chicory’s surrogate parents while I was away doing my field work. The partnership, support and intellectual musings of Hilal Özçetin have been the source of joy and inspiration, especially during the difficult final stages of thesis writing and my defence. And I suspect my sanity was maintained in no small part due to the numerous kayaking excursions, day hikes and phone calls with my closest confidant and partner in deconstruction, Cedar Morton. Nonetheless, the deepest acknowledgement is reserved for my Mother, who always taught me to question authority and challenge injustice, and who gave me my earliest lessons in political economy, such as her explanation about who wins judicial contests: “the person who pays their lawyer the most money.” I must have been 10 at the time.

Finally, I wish to thank the Teaching Support Staff Union for ‘having my back’ during my work as a Teaching Assistant, and the Union’s Membership for affording me the wonderful experience of serving as Coordinator while I wrote my thesis.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotations</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures and Tables</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Competing notions of integration</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Research methodology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Summary of findings</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Human-centered integration moves from proposal to program</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Actors in the integration debate</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Social movement articulation of an alternative model</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Movement proposals influencing state policy</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Operationalizing human-centered integration</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 TCP principles</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Principles in existing fora</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 The TCP-ALBA</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 1: the agricultural sector</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 2: Bolivian health care</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 TCP-ALBA results and obstacles</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 The promise and limits of Bolivia’s new political economy</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Research methodology</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 3.1  Comparison of Bolivia's principal trade and integration blocs.................43
Figure 3.1 Sign at site of coca industrialization facility.............................................51
Figure 3.2 Coca industrialization facility under construction.....................................51
Figure 3.3 Hospital in Villa Tunari.................................................................56
Figure 3.4 Sign at entrance to hospital wing.........................................................56
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APDH</td>
<td>Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos (Permanent Human Rights Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATPDEA</td>
<td>Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral investment treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Comunidad Andina (Andean Community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Cámara Agropecaria del Oriente (Agriculture Congress of the East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDLA</td>
<td>Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (Centre for Development, Labour and Agrarian Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPAL</td>
<td>Comisión Económica para América Latina (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPB</td>
<td>Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (Bolivian Private Business Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CET</td>
<td>Common External Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIOEC</td>
<td>Coordinadora de Integración de Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas (Coalition of Economic Farmworker Organizations Integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COB</td>
<td>Confederación Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers' Confederation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSC</td>
<td>Comité Pro-Santa Cruz (Pro-Santa Cruz Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSUTCB</td>
<td>Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (United Federation of Bolivian Farmworkers' Unions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEJUVE</td>
<td>Federación de Juntas Vecinales (Federation of Neighborhood Organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNMCB-BS</td>
<td>Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia &quot;Bartolina Sisa&quot; (&quot;Bartolina Sisa&quot; National Federation of Women Farmworkers)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FTAA  Free Trade Area of the Americas
IBCE  Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior
        (Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade)
ICSID  International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
IDA  International Development Association
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ISI  Import substitution industrialization
MAS  Movimiento Al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism)
MDRAyMA  Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural, Agropecuario y Medio Ambiente
        (Ministry of Rural Development, Agriculture and Environment)
MERCOSUR  Mercado Común del Sur (Market of the Southern Cone)
MPM  Ministerio de Producción y Microempresa
        (Ministry of Production and Small Business)
NEP  New Economic Policy
ODA  Official Development Assistance
TCP  Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (Peoples' Trade Agreement)
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USTR  United States Trade Representative
WTO  World Trade Organization
1 INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1990s, political spaces have emerged in Latin America in which several left-leaning governments, described by various scholars and journalists as the 'pink tide' due to their support of a stronger economic role for the state, are collaborating toward the construction of a 'post-neoliberal' political economy. Several factors contribute to this opening, including widespread popular discontent with free market reforms, high international prices of energy commodities, and United States inattention to Latin America in emergent multipolar geopolitics. Included in Latin America’s political economic shift is a different conceptualization as to what constitutes “integration” for countries of the region, and how the issue of trade is addressed within integration frameworks. The Peoples’ Trade Agreement (TCP in Spanish), which forms the basis of Bolivia’s approach to trade and integration, represents a case study of state policy formulation and implementation in this newly emerging political economy. This paper explores the TCP, in principle and practice, discusses its outcomes and limitations, and analyzes what it means for Bolivia and other countries of the periphery that seek to break with the hegemony of the free market.
1.1 Competing notions of integration

The concept of integration in political economy and development studies, which is often synonymous with ‘regionalism’, entails the creation of interstate blocs that collaborate to accomplish social, economic or political objectives vis-à-vis non-participating countries (Mittelmann 2000).

Liberal or ‘trade-centered’ integration

The ‘traditional’ liberal model of integration, which was implemented in Bolivia between 1985 and 2005, includes trade liberalization as the primary integration mechanism for delivering economic objectives. Grounded in neoclassic economic theory, Bolivian free trade advocates have promoted bilateral and multilateral agreements that contain market-enabling rules, such as the elimination of barriers to trade like tariffs or quotas, diminishing the economic role of the state (de Soto 1989, Hachette and Luders 1993, IMF and IDA 1998, Rosenbaum et. al. 2000, Chong and López-de-Silanes 2005). Though liberalization proponents in Bolivia and internationally argue that this type of ‘trade-centered integration’ will improve social conditions, their principle aims are economic, and success is measured mainly through economic growth, trade flows and foreign investment trends (Grupo Nueva Economía 2004, Coordinación del Tratado de Libre Comercio 2005).
In Bolivia a traditional liberal model of integration was initiated in 1985 by President Victor Paz Estenssoro and his Minister of Planning Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. In response to an acute economic crisis and one of the worst inflation rates in world history (Anderson et. al. 2006, Hylton and Thomson 2007), the Estenssoro Government implemented a broad series of free market structural reforms called the New Economic Policy (NEP). The “rapid and strict application” of a free market model “all at once” was delivered in the *paquete* of Executive Decree 21060 (Conaghan et. al. 1990: 18), dramatically reducing the state’s role in the economy through the liberalization of trade, extensive deregulation across sectors (from the elimination of price controls to the restructuring of the mining sector), and a sharp reduction in government spending, representing the second most extensive implementation of the so-called Washington Consensus in South America, behind only Chile (Conaghan et. al. 1990, Conaghan and Malloy 1994).

The economic reforms brought a surge in foreign investment and growth in certain sectors, most notably in exported-oriented agricultural goods such as soy products, but economic benefits were not evenly distributed. While a few Bolivians were well positioned to capitalize on the reforms, most saw their economic situation deteriorate. Unemployment expanded four-fold to approximately 14 percent between 1996 and 2004 (CEDLA 2005), with the largest source of new jobs coming from informal sectors, contributing to insecurity of
labour. Bolivia’s real per capita GDP declined by one percent between 1980 and 2000, as compared to an increase of 73 percent from 1960 to 1980; by the year 2000 the poverty rate exceeded 1978 levels (Weisbrot et. al. 2000). Meanwhile, state revenues actually declined with the privatization of state enterprises, partially due to the asset-stripping that occurred when foreign firms acquired state-owned enterprises, such as airline and railroad companies, in the newly deregulated environment (Kohl and Farthing 2006). Reduced state rents in the telecommunications and hydrocarbon sectors also contributed to revenue loss; in the case of the latter, royalties paid by multinational oil and gas firms were reduced from 50 to 18 percent, while previously discovered gas fields—San Antonio and San Alberto, which would become the country’s most valuable—were re-classified as ‘new’ so as to qualify them for the lower rates (Hylton and Thomson 2007). As a result, structural reforms triggered financial insolvency at the federal level (Arze and Kruse 2004). Thus, just as tens of thousands of formal sector jobs were being eliminated, state funding for health, education and housing was simultaneously cut and taxes were increased. With the opening in trade, agricultural imports surged, weakening much of the domestic agricultural sector, with the notable exception of soybeans and soy products. Rural to urban and international migration boomed, expanding the size and populations of Bolivia’s shantytowns, especially the mostly Aymara city of El Alto. Even the IMF concurred with the shortcomings of the structural adjustment in Bolivia: “a country perceived as having one of the best structural reform records in Latin

---

1. The informal sector swelled from 58 to 68 percent of the Bolivian workforce between 1990 and 2002 (Hylton and Thomson 2007).
2. El Alto is the urban area with the highest population growth rate in the Americas, at nine percent annually (Gill 2000, Zibechi 2005).
America experienced sluggish per capita growth, and made virtually no progress in reducing income-based poverty measures” (IMF 2005).

The structural view and ‘human-centered’ integration

A very different conceptualization of integration is found in *cepalinos* import substitution industrialization (ISI) proposals developed during the 1950s and 1960s. CEPAL’s ideas were taken up in Bolivia after the 1952 Revolution and continued with subsequent Administrations until 1985, and have been resurrected by many of Bolivia’s contemporary social organizations and Bolivian President Evo Morales (2006-present) in his self-styled ‘democratic revolution’.4 This view of integration is broader than that of the trade-centered approach, and could be described as ‘holistic’, ‘deep’, ‘statist’ or ‘cooperative’. Borrowing from the literature on alternative development, which I will explore in the following discussion, I identify this approach as ‘human-centered integration’ throughout this paper. This orientation has ‘people-based’ objectives, such as poverty reduction, job creation, access to basic services, improved social indicators (especially in areas of health and education), and wealth redistribution. Human-centered integration depends upon state agency to drive the integration process, though its proponents generally accept the private market and trade between

---

3 Based in Santiago, Chile, the United Nations’ Economic Commission on Latin America (CEPAL in Spanish) exerted significant influence in the 1950s and 1960s throughout Latin America. The Commission, directed from 1948-1963 by Raúl Prebisch and composed of a heterodox collection of economists and social scientists, theorized that the region’s development was circumscribed by its role as a producer of primary products at the periphery of the global economy, and that this position could only compel a progressive diminution in terms of trade. The *cepalinos* developed their ideas around the dialectic of centre and peripheral countries, calling for more regional integration, South-South cooperation, and state intervention to guide market forces.

nations as instrumental to accomplish social, economic and political goals. Such a perspective falls within a broader economic nationalist persuasion, which argues for a significant economic role for the state, and therefore advocates trade and integration policies that enable government action (Prakash 2001, Wade 2003: 623, Solón 2004, Shadlen 2005).

Though the ISI model advocated for protection of what List called “infant industries” (1841), the strategy was not isolationist. ISI embraced a regionalist model of integration in which neighboring countries pursued complementary industrial development. The original framework for the Andean Community (CAN in Spanish), founded in 1969 and initially involving Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, pursued regional integration based upon reciprocity and cooperation in the process of industrial development, while affirming national autonomy and an active yet flexible role for the state in economic affairs. Toward these objectives, the CAN incorporated various cooperative social and industrial development programs, including a development corporation and an Andean university, and provided preferential treatment to the smallest economies, Ecuador and Bolivia (Rodriguez 2002).

The ISI period was one of relatively strong economic growth for Latin America, with GDP per capita growing by 75 percent from 1960 to 1980 (Weisbrot et. al. 2000: 2); however, the inward-oriented development strategy was not without its

---

5 One interviewee I spoke with during my field research described the CAN during its first two decades as “nationalist... an integration between countries that had a state capitalist economy”; interview with representative of Bolivian think tank (La Paz), April 2, 2007.
problems. The authoritarian and corporatist manner in which the ISI model was imposed contributed to the high level of inequality in the region, both in terms of income groups and in favoring urban over rural development. Moreover, by the early 1980s, much of the region was beset with unmanageable debt and hyperinflation as a result of the rise in interest rates that followed a surge in ‘petrodollar’ loans extended to Latin American countries by US and European banks (Hershberg and Rosen 2006). Bolivia, for example, experienced an inflation rate that approached 25,000 percent per year in the early 1980s (Anderson et. al. 2006, Hylton and Thomson 2007). These shortcomings spurred the abandonment of ISI and the embrace of the latest iteration of trade-centred integration: neoliberalism. The liberal political economic climate of the 1980s prompted scholars like Francis Fukuyama to declare “victory of economic and political liberalism” and “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives” (1989: 3).

Alternative development

The wide-ranging body of ‘alternative development’ (AD) literature makes a useful contribution to the discussion of integration policy formulation. Rejecting modernist development models that are constructed based on the experiences and strategies of Western nations, alternative development frames the debate instead with human-centered or people-based objectives (Shiva 1989, Brohman 1996, Pieterse 1998, Peet and Hartwick 1999, Sen 1999). AD theorists emerged from an array of ideological foundations, including Marxism, feminism and post-modernism (the latter generally choosing to abandon the term ‘development’ altogether) and have not arrived at a consensus around a specific set of trade and
development policy prescriptions. What they have in common is support for bottom-up democratic participation in the formulation of strategies for development \(^6\) (Shiva 1989, Escobar 1995, Brohman 1996, Peet and Hartwick 1999, Sen 1999).\(^7\) Like the cepalino model, an AD approach supports a broad range of state interventions. However, different from traditional ISI proponents, it insists upon a movement away from elite and exclusionary ‘professionalization’, and toward a participatory democratic process where people are the “agents of their own development” whose “knowledge and interpretation of the world” translate into strategies for development (Escobar 1995, Brohman 1996: 327-328).\(^8\)

The articulations of leading Bolivian indigenous, labour, campesino, women’s and youth organizations around issues of integration since 2002, as well as by Morales since his election, represent a convergence of aspects of the ISI-era economic nationalism with an endogenous indigenous ideological current. These social actors and the Morales Administration have advocated for a model of state-led development in which market forces are coordinated within a context of regional cooperation (Bolivian Movement 2006). Despite their opposition to

\(^6\) Veltmeyer poignantly captures AD as a heterogeneous process that “can and should take multiple forms; that people should construct their own development on the basis of autonomous action of community-based local or grassroots organizations; that development be participatory in form, human in scale, and people-centered” (2001: 3).

\(^7\) Participatory policy making was also discursively taken up by the World Bank and the IMF, who, as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, proposed to expand the role of social actors in the development of poverty reduction strategies; however, critics have derided the process as merely cosmetic, highlighting the inflexibility of donors and administrations to accept ideas that did not adhere to a pre-established program of fiscal austerity (Morrison and Singer 2007).

\(^8\) Though not central to the cepalino school, the importance of citizen participation was acknowledged by Prebisch, who – 20 years after writing his cardinal industrialization manifesto – criticized top-down policy development and implementation, arguing that such an approach does not give due weight to “the rising generations’ legitimate desire to take part in the solution of the major problems of community life” (1971: 242).
contemporary free trade agreements, these groups and the Morales Administration support regional integration accords, which may even include certain trade liberalization measures as instrumental to achieve primary objectives, such as development, poverty reduction, job creation, wealth redistribution, social inclusion and democracy. However, the type of human-centered integration proposed by Bolivian social organizations and Morales differs from the Bolivia's previous ISI program in three principal ways, as it is informed by both the collapse of ISI model and the experiences with trade-centered integration implemented between 1985 and 2005. First, it has moved away from inward-oriented development strategies, placing greater weight on the exportation of Bolivian goods, including products of industrialization. Second, contemporary integrationists seek alternative means of financing productive development projects, particularly in light of the problems associated with the loans extended during both the ISI and neoliberal periods. Finally, an array of social actors—campesino and indigenous groups, women's and student organizations, informal workers, and neighborhood associations—have demanded, and Morales has been receptive to, their participation in Bolivian debates around issues of development and integration.

9 Several contemporary Bolivian integrationists have argued that the trade-centered integration strategy is actually antithetical to the very idea of development, because it locks countries of the periphery into the position of exporters of primary products, restricting national autonomy and foreclosing intra-Latin American complementary production (Solón 2004, Solón 2006, Lora 2006a, Buxton 2007).

10 Productive development involves investments and policy instruments that enhance medium- or long-term economic and social capacity, such as access to and transfer of new technologies, training of personnel, improvement of infrastructure, and strengthening of production linkages.

11 One response, albeit a still-incipient one, is the Banco del Sur, established on December 9, 2007 in Buenos Aires. Founded by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela (LADB 2008), the Bank creates a credit-lending program with favorable terms to the recipient countries, expanding upon Venezuela's recent practice of extending condition-free loans to many countries in the region.
1.2 Research methodology

I examine the Bolivian approach to regional integration since the January 2006 inauguration of President Morales. My mixed research method centered on 36 semi-structured interviews, complemented by observation and analysis of textual and archival sources. I had assistance from two key informants, one who was based in La Paz and affiliated with a non-governmental organization (NGO) and acquainted with various social movement and NGO actors, and the other who served as the rector of a public university in El Alto. I conducted interviews in the cities and towns of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Villa Tunari, Shinahota and Santa Cruz between March 20 and May 8, 2007.12 Interviewees represented various sectors of Bolivian society that I identified as having a stake in, or a critique of, the country’s integration policies, including members of Bolivian government ministries and agencies, private firms and business associations, social movements, NGOs and institutes, as well as scholars and trade policy analysts. I engaged in observation at 10 sites and events between March 23 and April 29, 2007, including public meetings, medical clinics, rallies, and a coca industrialization facility construction site.13

12 Throughout the course of my fieldwork in Bolivia, I requested 46 interviews. Of these, 36 were granted, while 10 people either declined to be interviewed, did not reply to my request, or were too busy to grant an interview.
13 A more extensive description of my research and methods is provided in the Appendix.
1.3 Summary of findings

In the political economic contestation that spanned the years 2000-2005, Bolivian social actors that resisted the austere free market program articulated proposals for an alternative integration paradigm. Many of these ideas were adopted as state policy with the ascension of Evo Morales to the Presidency, serving as the basis for his trade and integration program, the "Peoples' Trade Agreement." Morales has sought unsuccessfully to insert the TCP principles of cooperation, solidarity and asymmetry into existing trade fora; however, the principles have taken root in a 2006 tri-lateral accord between Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba, and which was later joined by Nicaragua and the island nation of Dominica.14

This accord, the "Peoples' Trade Agreement – Bolivarian Alternative of the People of Our America" (TCP-ALBA in Spanish), has improved conditions for some of the most vulnerable members of Bolivian society, principally through enhanced social programs. It has also initiated a series of productive development projects, including the extension of low-interest credit for more than 500 small-scale and several ‘large-impact’ projects. However, the accord has run into various difficulties in achieving its objectives, and many of its aspects that could most effectively transform the Bolivian economy and society remain incipient or stalled. Furthermore, the accord has not substantially accelerated trade between Bolivia and Venezuela or Cuba.

14 Shortly after the January 2007 inauguration of Daniel Ortega as president, Nicaragua became a signatory of the agreement. In January of 2008, Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit of Dominica adhered his country to the bloc. Ecuador's President Rafael Correa has indicated potential interest in joining the accord.
The future of the TCP-ALBA is significantly tied to Morales's broader political economic program, in part due to the mutually reinforcing nature of the Administration's integration regime and its domestic agenda. Thus, the findings in this paper are useful for understanding the larger political economic contestation at play in Bolivia. Though Bolivia's TCP program modifies a free market framework, my research indicates that it is not poised to replace it. At present, there is a tense coexistence of two contradictory models where the neoliberal one is still very much dominant. The human-centered paradigm for integration remains limited by endogenous structural, institutional and political impediments, as well as external pressures from market-oriented governments and the private firms that wield influence over them. However, the present study of the TCP-ALBA also indicates that space exists for countries of the periphery to pursue alternative forms of political economy without necessarily breaking with the dominant free market order. Bolivia's experiment suggests that it is feasible to advance cooperative or reciprocal objectives at the margins in the emergent multi-polar world.
2 HUMAN-CENTERED INTEGRATION MOVES FROM PROPOSAL TO PROGRAM

2.1 Actors in the integration debate

The form of integration Bolivia pursues has wide-ranging social, political and economic impacts, with greater or lesser implications for virtually all Bolivians; however, certain groups are more affected by and responsive to issues of trade and integration. Those groups most involved in the contemporary Bolivian contestation over approaches to integration are those that perceive themselves to benefit from or be harmed by the integration regime advanced by the country. In this case, who wins or loses from integration extends beyond the question of material gains and losses, as it entails a consideration of Bolivia's history of extreme inequality and social exclusion of a great part of the population, namely indigenous and rural peoples (Klein 2003, Morales 2003, Gamarra 2007).15 As such, various social actors are involved in the debate due to their perception that pursuit of more cooperative and reciprocal forms of integration is key to changing the social and economic dynamics of Bolivian society. The most organized and vocal groups that fall into this category are indigenous groups, labour unions, campesinos, informal sector workers, women's organizations,

15 Indigenous people constitute 62.2 percent of the population, according to the 2001 Bolivian census.
students and youth groups. Often these interest groups overlap; for example, *campesino* and labour groups, such as the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) and Coordinadora de Integración de Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas (CIOEC),\(^{16}\) are principally indigenous in membership. Additionally, leading protagonists include think tanks such as Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA), intellectuals and NGOs that work on issues of development and human rights. The present iteration of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) political party, itself an outgrowth of the *cocalero* movement, is a coalition of labour and indigenous organizations, has also been a party to the debate over integration.

Those supporting trade-centered integration include Bolivia’s business and export interests, and the many associations they have formed. Chief among these are the Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior (IBCE), the Cámara Agropecuario del Oriente (CAO), and the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB). In this category, Bolivia’s upper class factors prominently, as do the three traditional political parties – Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario (MIR), and Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN) – each of which played key roles in implementing trade-centered integration in Bolivia (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 79). Bolivia’s private news outlets, principally newspapers and television, also play an important role, and are closely linked to the business community. Many

\(^{16}\) *Campesino* describes ‘one who lives in the countryside’; a *campesino* is often but not necessarily a farmworker, and may own the land on which they live or work.
international actors representing financial institutions, multinational companies, foreign embassies and development agencies are based in Bolivia and play a role in debates over trade and integration. Finally, some sectors within the Bolivian working and middle classes have at times be mobilized around questions of trade and integration, depending upon their perceptions of how their interests are affected.

In this integration contestation, there is a general divide between eastern and western Bolivia, reflecting the broader national schism between the predominantly indigenous western departments of the Andes and the four more affluent and mestizo eastern lowland departments dubbed the media luna (half moon, centered in the easternmost department of Santa Cruz) due to their geographical configuration. Santa Cruz in particular has historically benefited from significant state support for the expansion of export-oriented agriculture, especially during the regimes of René Barrientos (1964-1966, 1966-1969) and Hugo Banzer (1971-1978); consequently, the Santa Cruz agricultural elite 'strongly supported' the economic liberalization measures of the 1990s (Eaton 2007: 77-82). These export interests, often acting through a 'civic committee' called the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz (CPSC), maintained a strong influence over Bolivian politics through successive democratic and authoritarian regimes, which on occasions has included appointments to 'high-level' government positions (Eaton 2007: 77). Conversely, social actors not linked to business or export interests, especially between 1985 and 2005, experienced considerable barriers to social participation in the development of Bolivia's approach to integration, as was the case in other areas of public policy formulation (Gamarra 2003: 311).
2.2 Social movement articulation of an alternative model

The poor performance of the Bolivian economy and the failure of the free market (neoliberal) reforms to deliver on what was promised by reformers combined with the withdrawal of previously available corporatist mechanisms for accessing state resources to create an explosive situation. Various social actors spontaneously mobilized to protect themselves from the deleterious effects of the expansion of the market, fitting what Polanyi described as a 'double movement' (1957). The most profound challenges came from the cocalero federations, radical neighborhood associations (most significantly the Federación de Juntas Vecinales del Alto, FEJUVE), and regional trade union federations, including many that represented informal sector workers; however, they were joined by students, progressive intellectuals, street youth, campesinos, miners, teachers, police, pensioners and other sections of the middle class (Kohl and Farthing 2006, Hylton and Thomson 2007). These diverse social groups, uncoordinated and in disarray during the early years of the structural reforms, were increasingly able to mobilize on a national level, tapping into unexpected reserves of "radical traditions of organizing" that were rooted in "non-liberal forms of collective organization" and anti-colonial struggles (Hylton and Thomson 2007: 21). This coalesced in a social movement mobilization that in April 2000 forced the state to rescind the World Bank-backed privatization of the state-owned water system of
Bolivia's fourth-largest city, Cochabamba. That a grassroots movement in Cochabamba could defeat a major international firm that was backed by global financial institutions gave strength to Bolivian social movements (Solón 2004), which between 2000 and 2005 maintained a near-constant state of mobilization.

The 'Bolivian Movement'

The 'Movimiento Boliviano de Lucha contra el ALCA' (Bolivian Movement of Struggle Against the Free Trade Area of the Americas, henceforth 'Bolivian Movement' or 'Movement'), a self-described "social collective," was launched at the 'First National Meeting on the Impacts of the FTAA,' held on May 18-19, 2002, in Vinto, Cochabamba (Solón 2004). This founding meeting gathered representatives of 234 organizations institutions, many of which had played a part in Cochabamba's Water War. Since its founding by the groups present at the Vinto meeting in 2002, the Bolivian Movement has been Bolivia's principle locus of mobilization and articulation around issues of trade and integration among indigenous, campesino, labour, women's, youth and human rights organizations.

17 Under pressure from the World Bank, the Bolivian government sold Cochabamba's public water company SEMAPA to Aguas del Tunari, an international consortium led by the US firm Bechtel Corporation and Edison of Italy, in late 1999. While some Cochabambinos saw their water rates increase—by as much as 200 percent—others that had collected water from community wells or rain gutters were suddenly required to pay the company for the resource. In what has come to be known as the 'Water War', public rejection of the privatization spurred a series of escalating protests, blockades and strikes, as well as popular assemblies and a referendum by civil society groups that rejected Aguas de Tunari. On April 10, 2000, city officials bowed to public pressure, rescinding the water contract and restoring the former structure under SEMAPA (Dangl 2007).

18 The 'internal rules' of the Bolivian Movement establish that decisions are made on the basis of consensus (Bolivian Movement 2006).
The organizations and institutions that comprise this coalition are distinct in their histories, objectives, tactics and constituencies, but they have joined together to form a "broad, democratic, horizontal and non-partisan articulation that places itself at the front of the fight, without replacing nor putting itself above other organizations that already exist" (Bolivian Movement 2008, translation by author). Between 2002 and the present, more than 200 organizations have consistently participated in the Bolivian Movement, which has leaders present in seven of Bolivia's nine departments.19 Some organizations have played more prominent roles in the Movement. One leading participant has been the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB)20 the "principal labour organization" to represent Quechua, Aymara and Guarani and other campesinos since its founding in 1979 (CSUTCB 2007).21 Another principal group, the Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia "Bartolina Sisa" (FNMCB-BS),22 is Bolivia's largest and most important indigenous women's organization, with a membership of more than 100,000 operating in a "trade-union structure that reaches from the national executive directors to community-level producer's associations" (Monasterios 2007: 36).

The Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDH), has been

---

19 Those departments that have lacked Bolivian Movement leaders are Pando and Beni; interview with a participant in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 30, 2007.
20 Interview with a representative of a Bolivian NGO, who has been active in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 29, 2007.
21 The CSUTCB was founded at an annual meeting of the Confederación Obrera Boliviana (COB), and remains an affiliate of the COB. Though prominent during the early 1980s, with over 200 local affiliates representing every department, the CSUTCB has seen a decline in its influence, along with that of the COB (Gray Molina 2003, Van Cott 2005, Hylton and Thomson 2007).
22 The FNMCB-BS has been active in the Bolivian Movement both at a national level and through local affiliates in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Tarija. The FNMCB-BS was founded in the late 1970s within the CSUTCB, and has maintained links to the latter, despite a movement within the FNMCB-BS to separate due to perceptions of "sexist ideology and patriarchal structures" of the CSUTCB (Monasterios 2007: 36).
another active participant (Bolivian Movement 2005, Bolivian Movement 2008a), as has Red Nacional Tinku, an intercultural ‘popular’ youth-based network (Red Nacional Tinku 2008). Finally, one of the most central organizations has been the Fundación Solón,24 a La Paz-based group that engages in policy analysis, grassroots organizing and public education on issues of trade, water and discrimination against women and indigenous people. Until the middle of 2006, the Fundación was led by Pablo Solón,25 a central figure in the convocation of the Bolivian Movement and one of its most articulate intellectuals.26

At the 2002 meeting, the associated organizations united in their general opposition to free trade agreements, and began to outline a framework for integration that posed an alternative to Bolivia’s trade-centered approach (Solón 2004, Bolivian Movement 2006, Bolivian Movement 2008). One interviewee who participated in the Bolivian Movement from the early stages described that meeting: “In Cochabamba, many organizations participated – all representative social organizations, institutions and NGOs of the country. And there it was outlined that what would come with the FTAA was very grave. It was necessary to have an articulation to confront it, and this could not be a campaign; it could

23 The Red Nacional Tinku (National Tinku Network), centered in Cochabamba, has worked on themes of human rights, culture, the environment, and indigenous rights since 1998 (Red Nacional Tinku 2008).
24 According to the organization’s website, the Fundación Solón principally works on the theme of “historical memory... the recovery and reincorporation of the experience and practices of social movement history” (Fundación Solón 2008, translation by author).
25 Pablo Solón is also the son of the well-known Bolivian muralist and human rights advocate Walter Solón Romero (1923-1999); the Fundación Solón seeks to preserve and continue the late Solón’s work and ideas (Fundación Solón 2008).
26 Interview with two trade policy analysts associated with a Bolivian NGO (La Paz), March 24 and 29, 2007.
not be a program; it had to be a movement.” Solón further explained the Movement’s strategy for social transformation: “...to link protest with proposal, the slogan with the technical analysis, the denunciation with alternatives. To walk a path not only in pursuit of future horizons but searching for concrete achievements, present and palpable victories that strengthen organization and mobilization” (2004: 307, translation by author).

Following the 2002 meeting, the Bolivian Movement organized a series of oppositional campaigns against the World Bank’s dispute resolution system, the FTAA, and a proposed free trade agreement with the United States (Bolivian Movement 2008). It specifically rejected the incorporation of certain themes into existing trade fora, including the rights of foreign investors, government purchasing, the privatization of services, intellectual property, and other areas that members of the Bolivian Movement argued would compromise state sovereignty (Solón 2004). In 2003, 3500 people attended the Bolivian Movement’s second national meeting, which was inaugurated by a march of an estimated 10,000 people (Solón 2004). During the broader national mobilizations of February and October of 2003, the Bolivian Movement succeeded in placing opposition to Bolivia’s participation in FTAA negotiations alongside the other primary issues of contestation—resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada, nationalization of the country’s hydrocarbons, and convocation of a Constituent

27 Interview with a participant in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 30, 2007.
28 The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is a branch of the World Bank which handles judicial cases related to trans-border investment controversies.
Assembly to draft a new constitution (Hylton and Thomson 2007). The Movement claims partial victories in the defeat of the proposed Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the protection of Bolivia’s government purchasing standards, the prevention of an underground water exportation project from Potosí to Chile, and the denial of compensation to Bechtel, the firm expelled from Cochabamba (Bolivian Movement 2008).

A representative sample of the integration alternatives proposed by the Bolivian Movement can be seen in the *memoria* for the ‘Third Bolivian Meeting against the Free Trade Agreement and the FTAA’ (henceforth the Third Bolivian Meeting). Held on October 6-8, 2004, in the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba, El Alto and Santa Cruz, the Third Bolivian Meeting brought together more than 1200 people to debate trade policies and articulate alternate visions for integration. The principal conclusions to emerge from the series of events were that integration must seek to correct existing economic disparities among countries through cooperative mechanisms; the Bolivian state must maintain sovereignty in the face of economic and military pressures, especially from the United States; the neoliberal model in place since 1985 must be replaced by a “mixed economy with state hegemony and social control”; public services (most notably water, health and education) and state purchasing must be protected from trade liberalization; and intellectual property should be excluded from trade agreements.

Additionally, meeting participants posited that a significant component of integration agreements must be of a ‘social’ nature, characterized by cooperation.

---

29 Interview with a participant in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 30, 2007.
and solidarity instead of competition and individualism, and that ‘food sovereignty’ must be protected from importation of agricultural goods and enhanced by support to campesinos (Third Bolivian Meeting 2004: 2-16). The Bolivian Movement's integration proposals can be distilled to the following four components: (i) integration must be governed by the principles of solidarity, cooperation and reciprocity, recognizing existing asymmetries, (ii) Bolivian sovereignty must be placed at the center of integration agreements, (iii) the process of integration must be transparent and subject to 'social control', and (iv) integration should nurture Bolivia’s 'solidarity economy' that has as its base cooperatives, small businesses and campesino economic organizations.

In April of 2006, the Movement modified its name to 'Bolivian Movement for Peoples’ Sovereignty and Solidarity Integration - Against the Free Trade Agreement and the FTAA.' The new name reflected a stronger focus on articulating its “visions and proposals for another form of integration, in search of new models that respect and promote the well-being of people, national sovereignty and care for nature” (Bolivian Movement 2006: 2). In the Bolivian Movement’s own words, it has sought to “pass from a highly defensive trench to a more pro-active position of generating integration proposals that rescue solidarity and cooperation, pre-Columbian cultural values that still live in our people” (Bolivian Movement 2008, translation by author).
Indigenous and nationalist ideological currents

The principles articulated by the Bolivian Movement reflect two strains of anti-colonial ideological thought that converged during the insurrectionary period of 2000-2005: a katarista tradition of indigenous resistance that can be traced back to the 1781 failed uprising against the Spanish Empire, led by Tupac Katari and Bartolina Sisa, and a national-popular trajectory of the 1952 Revolution (Kohl and Farthing 2006, Hylton and Thomson 2007). The indigenous tradition of political struggle periodically erupted throughout Bolivia’s colonial and republican periods until 1952, an epoch when the country’s indigenous majority was subjugated by a small mestizo and creole elite, and denied full rights of citizenship (Hylton and Thomson 2007). Dunkerley describes the Bolivia of those periods as an “occupied country” in which “a relatively advanced, export-oriented capitalist sector—in this case mining—co-existed and inter-related with an archaic, stagnant and predominantly provincial organisation of agriculture” (1984: xii, 6). Various scholars have described the indigenous current as informed by anarchistic notions of self-organization and collective decision-making (Hylton and Thomson 2007, Rivera Cusicanqui 2007). For example, Oscar Olivera, a labour leader in Cochabamba and one of the leading protagonists of the Water War, proposes “communal self-government based on assemblies and town meetings in which all of us are empowered to discuss social issues, where we all decide on our course of action, and where we all take responsibility for
putting our decisions into practice” (Olivera and Lewis 2004). In the context of the propositions forwarded by the Bolivian Movement, these indigenous-anarchist ideas are expressed in the principles of cooperation, solidarity, complementarity and social control (Lora 2006b: 97).

The latter ideological strain commenced with the MNR’s entrance to power after the 1952 Revolution, an armed insurrection that counted on support from militant tin miners (Dunkerley 1984, Hylton and Thomson 2007). Though the MNR’s most extensive reforms—universal suffrage, one of the region’s deepest agrarian reforms, and nationalization of the country’s mines—were implemented in the MNR’s first 18 months in power (Dunkerley 1984, Arze and Kruse 2004), their national-popular trajectory set in motion an economic nationalism that would be sustained for more than three decades. The MNR established a “mixed model of state capitalism” (Hylton and Thomson 2007: 21) based upon an ISI strategy (but lacking significant industrialization) through a highly corporatist and corrupt structure (Morales 2003: 227, Anderson et. al. 2006, Kohl and Farthing 2006). Under the MNR’s national-popular program, indigenous people were recast as campesinos, simultaneously denying them their ethnic identities in the eyes of the state, while for the first time granting them citizenship rights, namely access to land and education (Kohl and Farthing 2006). Democratically

---

30 This anarchist current of thought found praxis in the character of the mobilizations that proliferated between 2000 and 2005, as captured by Uruguayan journalist Raúl Zibechi, who wrote, “The key to this overwhelming grassroots mobilization is, without a doubt, the basic self-organization that fills every pore of the society and has made superfluous many forms of representation” (Zibechi 2005). Writing on the Gas War, Bolivian sociologist Pablo Mamani argued, “During the uprising, the state was broken; it stopped existing. It died in El Alto” (Dangl 2007: 151).

31 Garreton et. al. describe the prevailing sociopolitical matrix as ‘statist-national-popular’ (2003).
elected presidents and military dictatorships throughout this period maintained clientelistic structures by which certain social groups, namely labour unions and campesinos, were able to access the resources of the state. Despite its autocratic shortcomings and continued de facto economic and political exclusion of much of the population, the corporatist state did provide for the first time a vehicle by which many social actors could make demands of their national leaders. Although I came across no evidence that the Bolivian Movement advocated for a return to the corporatism of the ISI period, the Movement has resurrected some of the central pillars of the that era: state sovereignty, economic nationalism and South-South integration. Indeed it is an indication of the paucity of legitimacy of the neoliberal model in Bolivia that the two historically distinct ideological currents—national-popular and katarista—could converge in a single insurrectionary juncture. In the context of the Bolivian Movement’s campaign against free trade, the two strains were also able to coexist due to the deliberately horizontal and pluralistic nature by which the Movement was constructed.

2.3 Movement proposals influencing state policy

The principles and proposals advocated by the Bolivian Movement were disregarded by neoliberal governments between 1985 and 2005, as were most of

32 Through the state’s vertical integration of the leaders of social actors, previously excluded groups were able to compel successive gestures by the state in the realms of agrarian reform, social services and infrastructure development. This is most evident in Bolivia’s agrarian reform, which from 1953 to 1974 redistributed 30 percent of the country’s agricultural land, appropriating most of the large haciendas throughout the western highlands and central valleys and redistributing the land to rural collectives (Dunkerley 1984, Sobhan 1993, Klein 2003: 236). Rural education and literacy programs, especially during the Bánzer and Barrientos dictatorships in the late 1960s and early 1970s, were another outcome of corporatist relations (Gray Molina 2003).
proposals generated by civil society groups during the period (Gamarra 2003: 311). This changed with the December 2005 presidential election of cocalero and labour leader Evo Morales who pledged to curtail the "colonial and neoliberal model" during his inaugural address. According to participants in the Bolivian Movement, Morales has "taken up" their integration proposals and translated them into his present trade and integration policies. In the course of my interviews, several representatives of the Bolivian Movement and other organizations drew a connection between the Administration's acceptance of Movement integration proposals and the presence of Pablo Solón in a prominent role within the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Solón, who had played a central role in the Bolivian Movement's process of developing an alternative integration model, was permitted to bring to the Ministry a team of Movement activists. It is thus no coincidence that the present integration agenda of the Morales Administration bears a strong resemblance to the Movement's proposals. As one interviewee explained, "If you read government [trade and integration] policy documents, they could have been written by the Bolivian trade movement a year ago". Movement activist Miguel Lora of the Fundación Solón wrote that the Peoples' Trade Agreement "...launched by Morales Government is the concrete product of thousands of hours of deliberation in labour unions, campesino associations and regional and national workshops of the Bolivian Movement of

---

33 Morales made this declaration on January 21, 2006 to indigenous leaders gathered at the archaeological site of the ancient city of Tiwanaku, one day prior to assuming the position of President of Bolivia (Hylton and Thomson 2007: 15).

34 Interviews with participants in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 29 and 30, 2007.

35 In June of 2006, Solón was appointed to the expansive position of "Representante Plenipotenciario con Rango de Embajador Extraordinario para Asuntos Comerciales y de Integración", which roughly translates to Full-power Representative with the Rank of Extraordinary Ambassador for Trade and Integration Matters.

36 Interview with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 24, 2007.
Struggle Against the Free Trade Agreement and the FTAA..." (2006b: 94, translation by author). Though there has effectively been a temporal delay between this pre-election articulation of public sentiment and the post-election development of policy, Morales’s trade and integration program closely reflects the proposals formulated by the groups that constitute the Bolivian Movement.

There are risks associated with what could be described as 'proxy' participation in policy development, where the Bolivian Movement’s articulations are acted upon through their 'representatives'—Solón and his team at the Ministry. Such an arrangement has the possibility of denying political space for those whose views are not represented by Solón and his team, or for criticism that may come about as sectors of civil society that are now in accord with the government’s policies find themselves at some point less represented by them. Proxy participation may also produce inactivity among previously organized Bolivian groups whose leaders or bases perceive issues as being sufficiently addressed, engendering a demobilization of social forces. This is especially the case where those who previously played a leading role in mobilization, such as Solón, are incorporated into state functions. One interview subject expressed concerns over what he saw as the unfolding scenario for social movements: "Since some of their leaders are in government positions, they have been neutralized... there is not an independent force that can sustain the process of transformation in the country."37

37 Interview with a rector of a Bolivian university (La Paz), March 26, 2007.
Beyond this participation by proxy, interviewees emphasized two other paths for public input into policy formulation. First, access to policy makers was widely reported by all social sectors and from varying political persuasions. Of the 23 interviewees with whom I spoke about opportunities for public participation under the current administration, 14 reported the occurrence of meetings or other fora during which civil society groups could register concerns around trade and integration policy, while seven did not take a clear position on the question. Only two interviewees indicated an absence of possibilities for dialogue with Morales or his representatives: a leader of a radical neighborhood association and the director of a business association. However, those representing business and export interests, who are generally among the social actors most critical to the Administration's trade policies, often emphasized regular access and input to Morales and his ministers (IBCE 2007a). In fact, in the course of my interviews, representatives of three such groups reported a high number of meetings with top government officials, although they sustained criticisms around the efficacy of their interventions. 38 This level of communication between government officials and sectors of civil society, including those whose opinions diverged from that of the state, differed sharply from the reported access that existed during neoliberal administrations, which many interview subjects have described as limited or nonexistent. 39 The sentiment is also prominent in the literature. For example, Adolfo Chávez, President of the Bolivian Confederation

38 Interviews with representatives of business associations (La Paz and Santa Cruz), April 10, 18 and 20, 2007.
39 Interviews with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 30, 2007; a Bolivian writer associated with an academic center (La Paz), April 4, 2007; a traditional Aymara leader (La Paz), April 10, 2007; an elected official (Shinahota), April 17, 2007; and an American pastor working for a Christian ministry in Bolivia (La Paz), March 30, 2007.
of Indigenous Peoples (CIDOB), explained, "Previous administrations believed that they were the ultimate authority. It was hard to get a meeting with them. Presidents never spoke with social organizations this way" (Dangl 2007: 213).

Conaghan et. al. argue the “exclusionary approach of the neoliberal teams... coincided with their generalized disdain for civil society” (2000: 19), echoing one interviewee’s description of a “a slow closing of spaces of participation.” Public dissent was often circumscribed by government declarations of ‘states of siege’ and periods of state repression (Gamarra 2003: 311, Kohl and Farthing 2006).

Second, several interviewees highlighted a four-day ‘Social Summit for the Integration of the Peoples’ hosted by the Morales Administration in December 2006 concurrently with the meeting of the South American Community of Nations in Cochabamba, as an important locus of public participation. Among the seminars organized were sessions on water, integration, energy, infrastructure, debt and militarization. The Social Summit was a free public event, and participants were encouraged to provide their ideas about trade and integration policies during the Summit’s sessions, including the closing forum, which was attended by four presidents and various ministers of Latin American countries. Though only a single occasion, this level of minimally mediated access is unusual and represents a marked contrast to the exclusionary nature of both neoliberal and statist-corporatist regimes of the previous half-century.

40 Interview with a representative of a Bolivian NGO (La Paz), April 4, 2007.
41 The closing session was attended by Presidents Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Presidents-elect Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Rafael Correa of Ecuador. From interviews with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 24, 2007; two activists involved in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 29 and 30, 2007; and a representative of Bolivia’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (La Paz), March 27, 2007.
42 Interviews with activists involved in the Bolivian Movement (La Paz), March 29 and 30, 2007.
3 OPERATIONALIZING HUMAN-CENTERED INTEGRATION

3.1 TCP principles

With Solón as the principal architect, the Morales Administration has formulated a series of principles for integration. These principles – cooperation, solidarity, complementarity production, democracy, fairness/recognition of asymmetry, and national sovereignty – have served as Bolivia’s basis for negotiations in all of the venues in which matters of trade and integration are contested (Agreement for the Application 2006, Government of Bolivia 2006, Government of Bolivia 2006a, Solón 2006). One document produced by Bolivia’s Ministry of Production and Small Business describes the TCP in the following way:

The Peoples’ Trade Agreement is a proposal launched by President Evo Morales that is framed within a new economic model designed to improve the living conditions of citizens, above all of those least favored economically. It searches for trade integration, reciprocity, [and] cooperation between countries, with a view toward effective poverty reduction, preservation of indigenous communities and respect for nature (MPM 2006, translation by author)

According to Solón, Bolivia seeks ‘many TCPs’ based upon these principles:

“One can sign a TCP with India, China or European countries… Bolivia would

43 In the context of the TCP, complementary production involves the creation of cooperative bi- or multi-national linkages in manufacturing processes or agricultural or natural resource development.
like a TCP with all nations, including the United States and Europe” (2006: 2). In the following section, I discuss how Morales and Solón have attempted to insert the TCP principles into prior-existing fora—CAN, MERCOSUR and ATPDEA—before moving on to a more lengthy exploration of the TCP-ALBA.

3.2 Principles in existing fora

Andean Community (CAN)

Created in 1969 with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, the CAN was initiated by political leaders to foster social and economic integration. The CAN, created during the ISI era, was designed to pursue a form of human-centered integration that promoted regional cooperation and complementary industrial development (especially in the area of natural resources), while promoting national autonomy and a broad economic role for the state. In the early 1990s, the free market reforms that swept Latin America produced an ideological shift in the CAN, which embraced the CEPAL-inspired concept of ‘open regionalism’ in which regional trade accords are intermediate steps toward integration.

44 Though the members of MERCOSUR and the CAN are exploring closer political and economic integration in the form of a proposed ‘South American Community of Nations’ (Brown et. al. 2005), its creation is unlikely to occur in the near future (Weisbrot 2008).

45 The CAN member countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; Chile is an associate member. After decades of CAN membership, Venezuela withdrew in April of 2006, protesting Colombia’s and Peru’s negotiation of free trade agreements with the United States, which Venezuelan President Chávez viewed as both an ideological challenge to the CAN’s legitimacy, and a structural impediment to the Community’s capacity for integration.

46 The CAN’s complex structure includes an Andean Parliament, Presidential Council, Secretariat, Court of Justice, and Andean Commission. Presidents of member countries serve as chairpersons of the Community on a rotating basis; the current chair is Evo Morales.
integration within the global economy (Gudynas 2005). As a consequence, the CAN of today principally functions to eliminate trade barriers between member nations in a competitive neoliberal framework (Lora 2006b).47

Presently, two competing visions of integration prevail within the CAN. Bolivia and Ecuador represent one axis, proposing a cooperative form of integration that seeks to advance complementary production amongst CAN countries, while a competitive trade-centered approach to integration is advocated by Peru and Colombia,48 both of which have pursued free trade agreements with the United States.49 The struggle over the direction of the CAN is being played out in to the Community’s negotiations toward the creation of a strategic association with the European Union, which have been underway since the two blocs jointly signed the 2004 Declaration of Guadalajara. In the context of this proposed EU-CAN ‘Association Agreement’, Morales presented a 17-point position paper that overlaps substantially with the ideas proposed by Bolivian civil society at the aforementioned Third Bolivian Meeting held 20 months earlier. Morales’s position emphasizes a cooperative integration that promotes national autonomy while recognizing asymmetry. It seeks to engender a ‘mixed economy’, while

47 Although the Community has retained some mechanisms for cooperation around development objectives, the open regionalist orientation has limited these measures to those that facilitate an insertion into the global economy based on comparative advantage.

48 Interview with a trade analyst affiliated with Bolivian NGO (La Paz), March 24, 2007.

49 On December 17, 2007, Peru signed a Free Trade Agreement with the United States; a similar treaty with Colombia has yet to be approved by the US Congress despite the strong urging of President Bush. The present balance within the CAN could be altered by Chile’s full admission, which would tilt the Community toward a free trade orientation, or the restoration of Venezuela’s membership, which would move it toward the cooperation-complementarity pole; from interview with a trade analyst affiliated with Bolivian NGO (La Paz), March 29, 2007.
maintaining state control over agriculture, investment, services, industrial policy, coca and intellectual property. Key excerpts from the Bolivian proposal read:

(10) The rules of this Association Agreement in the sphere of trade cannot be equal for both parties whilst profound inequality exists between both regions and within regions. The GDP of the EU is 50 times the GDP of CAN and in comparison with some countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia is between 300 and 1000 times greater. In order to have a just and equitable agreement the approved rules must be much more favorable to CAN than to the EU. This is not a question of a better application of ‘Special and Differential Treatment’ but rather unequal rules which allow a balanced integration of unequal realities.

(11) In terms of market access it is fundamental that the European Union unilaterally establishes a zero tariff for all CAN products especially goods with added value. In order to support the effective development of small producers, micro-industries, cooperatives, small farmer economic associations and organizations, it will be necessary not just to grant a zero tariff but also to offer secure markets for their products through the granting of preferences in state purchases by the countries of the European Union... Access to markets must be real, eliminating non-tariff barriers, technical rules and phyto-sanitary restrictions which do not allow a real possibility of a just trade exchange.

(13) We must recognize the right of states, especially those with the smallest economies, to protect their internal markets and to give incentives to national producers by means of different mechanisms such as state purchases.

(17) We must redirect the processes of integration, subordinating commercial aspects to the needs of development with sovereignty and distinctiveness in each of our nations and peoples.50

Morales’s proposal represents a radical re-conceptualization of integration, away from a trade-centered orientation and toward one of cooperation and solidarity. However, other than a general recognition of the principle of asymmetry in the joint declaration emitted from the EU-CAN XII Ministerial Meeting in April of 2007 (Joint Communiqué 2007),51 Morales proposals have not been embraced by

51 Interview with a trade analyst affiliated with Bolivian NGO (La Paz), March 29, 2007.
policymakers in the EU, Colombia or Peru. Rather, the EU Parliament has presented a negotiating document along traditional lines of trade liberalization, described by one Bolivian trade analyst as including “all sectors in the negotiations, including public services, water, etc. They want liberalization agreements more radical than the WTO.” Were Bolivia to agree to such a free trade framework within the EU-CAN Association Agreement, it would sacrifice many of the principles articulated by the Bolivian Movement and laid out within the Peoples’ Trade Agreement. Distinct from the CAN’s possible relationship to the EU, some features of the Andean Community conflict with TCP principles, such as the supra-national arbitration of the Andean Court of Justice, which limits members’ national sovereignty.

MERCOSUR

Since 1997, Bolivia has participated as an associate member in the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), a customs union and free trade area designed to advance regional integration (Morris 1996, Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002). MERCOSUR was first initiated in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and

52 In October 2007, Peruvian President Alan Garcia sought to directly negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU, arguing that the bloc-to-bloc approach “does not work” because countries such as Bolivia “are not in agreement with the same idea of free trade” (Agence France-Presse 2007). However, in January of 2008, EU negotiator Ivo Hoefkens explained that the mandate for negotiations was between the two blocs and that the EU would not carry on a concurrent process of negotiation with Peru (EFE 2008).
53 Interview with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 24, 2007.
54 Interview with a trade analyst affiliated with Bolivian NGO (La Paz), March 29, 2007.
55 MERCOSUR was first conceptualized by Argentina and Brazil’s political leaders with the aim of reducing long-standing security issues (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002, Brown et. al. 2005); however, in the founding document, the signatories stated that one of the purposes was to generate “economic development with social justice” (Treaty of Asunción 1991: 1). Venezuela has joined as a full member; Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia hold associate member status. Associate members participate in the bloc’s free trade area, but are not members of its common market, CET or the customs union (Paiva and Gazel 2004).
Uruguay as market liberalization was sweeping Latin America; as a result, the bloc complements the global neoliberal model, "putting in place reinforcing mechanisms at a regional level" (Phillips 2004: 86).\footnote{MERCOSUR provides legal recourse to both the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) process and ICSID, the former to member countries and the latter to private investors (Colonia Protocol 1994, Olivos Protocol 2002, Rodriguez 2002). However, while the modalities of MERCOSUR facilitate trade and investment flows in a manner that integrates the bloc into the global economy, it gives preference to the products and capital of its member countries. It proposes a common external tariff (CET), includes some recognition of asymmetries between nations, and accepts the limited use of protective safeguard measures.} Integration was to occur through trade and investment liberalization, the establishment of 'rules of origin' standards, the free movement of goods, services and capital among its members, the elimination of duties among member countries, the creation of a dispute resolution process, the harmonization of trade and economic policies and a common external tariff (Treaty of Asunción 1991; Carranza 2004: 320), although plans for a common external tariff have been “observed more in spirit than to the letter” (Tussie et al. 2004). MERCOSUR also created a 'safeguard' mechanism by which countries could erect limited trade barriers to prevent economic harm due to a rapid flood of imported goods. Some scholars have argued that MERCOSUR has sustained on a regional level the liberalization and deregulation that was taking place on a global level by framing neoliberal reforms within a regional context and discourse, serving to win the acquiescence of a skeptical electorate (Tussie et al. 2004: 87, Stuhldreher 2000: 14).

Scholarship on MERCOSUR often highlights the bloc's relatively modest regulatory framework and 'shallow institutionalism' (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002: 91), especially when compared to the CAN. The economic crises that engulfed Argentina and Brazil in 1999 and 2001 tempered enthusiasm for deeper
integration (Carranza 2004)—such as the development of a common currency (Stuhldreher 2000: 21)—as many feared that closer ties would heighten contagion risks. However, with the economic recovery of Southern Cone economies, the bloc has stabilized, and in 2005, Venezuela began the process of joining as a full member. In adhering his country to MERCOSUR, Chávez has proposed that the bloc be reconceptualized to “prioritize social concerns” within a cooperative and complementary framework (Wagner 2005: 1). Echoing his counterpart’s ambitions to modify MERCOSUR, Morales argued in January 2007 that MERCOSUR is “an economic instrument only for businesspeople... If Bolivia is to enter MERCOSUR [as a full member], it does so to make profound reforms” (La Razón 2007; translation by author). Morales is now pursuing Bolivia’s full inclusion in a reformed MERCOSUR based on the principles of solidarity and cooperation. Negotiations toward Bolivia’s full membership are currently underway, although the outcome is uncertain, as is the bid by Chávez and Morales to reform the union. It also remains uncertain whether Bolivia could undertake an unprecedented dual membership in both the CAN and MERCOSUR, due to the respective harmonization requirements of each bloc, such as varying common external tariffs (Vilaseca Gonzáles 2007).

---

57 Argentina in particular has seen a rapid acceleration in economic growth, consistently achieving nine percent growth rates every year from 2003 to 2007, ranking it as the most rapidly growing economy in Latin America (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007: 6).

58 In 2005, Chávez argued “Commercial integration is impossible because it is based on competition... If MERCOSUR does not transcend the mercantile vision with which it was born... there will be no integration” (Wagner 2005: 1).

59 Uruguay and Argentina have approved Bolivia’s full membership into MERCOSUR, while Brazil and Paraguay have not (ABI 2007a).
The present construction of MERCOSUR conflicts in numerous ways with TCP principles. MERCOSUR’s recognition of asymmetries is limited when compared to the standards of the TCP, and MERCOSUR’s protection of the rights of foreign investors violates the TCP principle of national sovereignty. Lastly, among a diverse array of civil society groups in Bolivia, representing both the political left and right, there is a great deal of resistance to full membership in the MERCOSUR. Full membership would bring Bolivia into the bloc’s common market and customs union, thus requiring it to abide by MERCOSUR’s common external tariff and labour provisions. Bolivian opposition is particularly prominent among businesses and exporters, who fear that they would not be able to compete with Brazilian, Argentinean and Paraguayan firms that have many export commodities in common with those from Bolivia.\textsuperscript{60}

\textit{Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Enforcement Act}

The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) is a unilateral program of the United States wherein Bolivia and other Andean countries cooperate with the US’s drug eradication objectives in exchange for trade preferences (duty free and without quantitative restrictions) on approximately 6300 products, including textiles, leather, footwear, lumber, chemical and petroleum products, tuna, agricultural goods, watches and jewelry (USTR 2002, Campodonico 2005).\textsuperscript{61} These preferences translate to a significant

\textsuperscript{60} Interviews with a representative of Bolivian private business association (La Paz), April 2, 2007, the director of a Bolivian think tank (La Paz), April 2, 2007, and leaders of Bolivian export groups (La Paz and Santa Cruz), April 10 and 18, 2007.

\textsuperscript{61} Interview with a staff member of the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations (La Paz), March 27, 2007.
number of jobs for Bolivians. Some Bolivians argue that the ATPDEA is not a useful site for discussions around integration since there is no negotiation role for Andean governments in the United States' uni-directional granting of preferential trade. Furthermore, at its foundation the ATPDEA was devised by the US to influence Andean countries' policies around coca, contradicting the TCP principle of national sovereignty. Nonetheless, in the context of the ATPDEA, the Morales Administration has attempted to modify the terms of the debate, pursuing bilateral negotiations from a conceptual frame of the principles articulated in the Peoples' Trade Agreement.

In September of 2006, Bolivia introduced a set of guidelines for a “Fair Trade and Cooperation for Productive Development Agreement” with the United States, based upon the principles of sovereignty, democracy, improved livelihoods, social inclusion, development, and environmental health (Government of Bolivia 2006).

62 It is difficult to calculate with any precision how much Bolivian employment and economic benefit is related to the ATPDEA; claims vary widely in the range of 35,000 to 120,000 jobs (Buxton 2007, El Diario 2007b).
63 Interview with a representative of Bolivian think tank (La Paz), April 2, 2007.
64 Bolivia’s presentation of these guidelines came as Andean trade preferences were set to expire three months later; the preferences were subsequently renewed by the Republican-led US Congress for six months, absent any of the TCP principles. A longer-range preference extension decision was deferred by Congressional Republicans, to be determined at a later date based upon Bolivia’s acceptance of a free trade agreement with the US. The Republican-led Congress and Bush Administration’s utilization of trade preference renewal as a tool to leverage free trade agreements was criticized by many Democrats in Congress, who won majority control of both chambers in November of 2006 (from interview with a staff member of the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations, La Paz, March 27, 2007.) Representative Sander Levin, the Democratic Chair of the key Congressional House subcommittee that handles US trade policy—the House Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee—has rejected linking the extension of trade preferences to acceptance of a free trade accord (EFE 2007). In fact, some political space for more flexible bilateral negotiations may have been opened by the change in control of the US Congress. The Democratic leadership has extended the ATPDEA until December of 2008 and been more receptive to the proposals being put forward by Bolivia, according to a negotiator for the Bolivian government (from interview with a staff member of the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations, La Paz, March 27, 2007).
2006a). As with the CAN-EU negotiations, Bolivia’s guidelines take a page from the Third Bolivian Meeting and insist upon the primacy of Bolivian sovereignty and the economic asymmetry of the two nations as the starting point for discussion. The document emphasizes that the GDP of the US is 1200 times that of Bolivia before delineating the areas that are not open for consideration in a bilateral accord, such as government purchasing standards; the privatization of public services; provisions that permit the patenting of life forms; limitations to industrial policies such as requirements for technology transfer, hiring of domestic labour and utilization of national resources; and investor protection rules above the level of national jurisdiction (Government of Bolivia 2006a).

Unlike negotiations between the CAN and the European Union, however, there has not been even a discursive acceptance by US trade negotiators of Bolivia’s proposals for cooperation and asymmetrical considerations in bilateral relations. In March of 2007, US Ambassador to Bolivia Phillip Goldberg expressed US support for a conventional bilateral free trade agreement, arguing that it would grant more benefits to Bolivia than to the US and that market liberalization was the sole contemporary path to economic development. Harkening back to Fukuyama, Goldberg asserted that the free market was the sole remaining viable economic strategy, dismissing Bolivia’s integration strategy as “largely a political document, not a prescription for economic growth.”

In each of the contexts described above—the CAN, MERCOSUR and ATPDEA—Bolivia’s proposal for a new integration framework faces major hurdles, on

foreign and domestic fronts. Externally, many of Bolivia’s ideas for integration conflict with provisions contained within the other trade agreements to which it is a party. For example, TCP principles are inconsistent with the tariff reduction schedules of the CAN and MERCOSUR, the cross-border arbitration established within bilateral investment treaties (BITs)\textsuperscript{66}, or anti-coca provisions of the ATPDEA. As a result, the Morales Administration is finding that governments like the US, the EU and Brazil are resistant to significant change, preferring to maintain existing free market frameworks. Even among the left-leaning policymakers in North America and Europe, there is only modest ideological movement on the direction of trade and integration policies, well short of what is proposed by Morales or the Bolivian Movement.\textsuperscript{67} Domestically, Morales’s integration platform clashes with the powerful, entrenched interests of the export sector in Bolivia, especially in agriculture and textiles, who argue that the resulting uncertainty is harming the Bolivian economy. Though this opposition is principally based in the Bolivian business community, there have also been demonstrations among textile workers who favor a traditional free trade accord with the United States.\textsuperscript{68} Although there may yet be openings to push the CAN, MERCOSUR and ATPDEA off their present free market foundations in a

\textsuperscript{66} Bolivia has signed a series of 24 BITs with the European Union, several Latin American countries, the United States, Korea and China, beginning in 1989 (Mayta 2006). Bolivia was also a member of the ICSID until it revoked its membership on May 2, 2007: the withdrawal was based upon Bolivia’s perception that ICSID rules are non-transparent and favor private investors over state interests, and that the cost of arbitration is prohibitively expensive for developing countries such as Bolivia (Solón 2007). Despite the revocation, the European Union-based company Euro Telecom International (ETI) filed an ICSID complaint against Bolivia on October 31, 2007, after Bolivia’s assertion of more government control over the privatized telecommunications firm ENTEL (Statement to World Bank President 2007).

\textsuperscript{67} For example, the critique of free trade agreements by Democrats in the US Congress is limited to a narrow range of issues, including labour standards, enforcement of environmental commitments, and access to essential medicines (Public Citizen 2007, Kozloff 2008).

\textsuperscript{68} “Marchan para Pedir TLC con EEUU.” Los Tiempos, December 7, 2005.
cooperative manner that recognizes and compensates for asymmetries, they do not presently serve as loci in which TCP principles can be embedded.

3.3 The TCP-ALBA

TCP principles do, however, form the basis of the integration accord Bolivia has struck with Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Dominica, the TCP-ALBA (Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos – Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América; Peoples’ Trade Agreement – Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America), which is the subject of the remainder of this paper. Signed by Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba on April 29, 2006, the TCP-ALBA established a statist foundation of cooperation, solidarity and reciprocity as the basis of relations between the three countries (Lora 2006b), following the orientation outlined in prior ALBA accords between Venezuela and Cuba. The TCP-ALBA elaborates the broad yet skeletal embryo of a strategic plan for social and economic integration of the three countries, proposing to initiate complementary development processes and chains of production, while maintaining domestic autonomy over laws and natural resources. It ambitiously sets out to create an integrated aid and trade program that, recognizing existing development asymmetries, provides the most significant benefits to the poorest country: Bolivia. Since April 2006, the TCP-ALBA document has been expanded

69 The first ALBA accord was signed between Venezuelan and Cuba on December 14, 2004 in Havana. At that time, the agreement elaborated the exchange of technology, the elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade, a discounted price of Venezuelan oil for Cuba, joint projects for health, literacy, culture and productive development, and the reciprocal establishment of state banks, among other provisions (ALBA 2007a).
through a series of at least 25 subsequent agreements, declarations and conventions.\textsuperscript{70}

The TCP-ALBA rejects the primacy of competition that is the contemporary basis of the CAN and MERCOSUR. Instead, cooperation and recognition of asymmetry take center-stage, with competition fostered instrumentally only so far as it supports the accord’s social objectives. It proposes state intervention into market activity, with an emphasis on South-South cooperation and industrialization à la CEPAL (ECLA 1950, Furtado 1964, Furtado 1970, Prebisch 1971). However, unlike Bolivia’s earlier practice of ISI, the TCP-ALBA also places an emphasis on export-based growth, does not privilege urban over rural areas, and promotes social participation in the promulgation of development policies.\textsuperscript{71}

The TCP-ALBA thus builds upon many of the fundamentals of ISI with a greater role for social actors, as promoted in the alternative development literature, to create a wholly different model. In Table 3.1, I provide a comparison of the

\textsuperscript{70} Subsequent TCP-ALBA agreements to which Bolivia is a party include: Convention for Social Development (June 21, 2006); Cooperation Agreement in the Area of Education and Sports (June 21, 2006); Cooperation Agreement in Higher Education (June 21, 2006); Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement (June 21, 2006); Cooperation Agreement in the Energy Sector (June 21, 2006); Technical Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Health and Medicine (June 21, 2006); Cooperation Agreement in Agricultural Material and Rural Development (June 21, 2006); Memorandum of Understanding on the Matter of Minerals (October 2, 2006); Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Agreement on the Matter of Educational Cooperation (October 2, 2006); Cooperation Agreement on the Matter of Productive Reforestation (October 17, 2006); Complementary Agreement on the Matter of Scientific, Technological and Innovative Cooperation (October 17, 2006); Act of Understanding for the Placement of National Treasury Bonds (October 18, 2006); Complementary Agreement on the Matter of Telecommunications (October 20, 2006); Complementary Agreement on the Matter of Defense (December 1, 2006); Joint Declaration (March 10, 2007); Fifth ALBA Summit - Project Granonal (April 29, 2007); ALBA Energy Agreement (between Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua)/ALBA Energy Agreement between Venezuela and Bolivia (April 29, 2007); Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Bolivia, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Nicaragua, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the Creation of the ALBA Bank (June 6, 2007), and six conventions related the oil and gas sector. Sources: ALBA 2007b, Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2007, Joint Declaration 2007.

\textsuperscript{71} In later writings, Prebisch and other cepalinos promoted deepened public participation, export-based growth, and greater attention to rural development (Furtado 1970, Prebisch 1971).
Table 3.1: Comparison of Bolivia’s principal trade and integration blocs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>MERCOSUR</th>
<th>TCP-ALBA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year initiated</strong></td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2006 (2004, see ‘Origin’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parties to the accord</strong></td>
<td>Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile</td>
<td>Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru</td>
<td>Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin</strong></td>
<td>‘Andean Pact’ created by governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru with Cartagena Agreement</td>
<td>Union initiated by Brazil and Argentina; Uruguay and Paraguay joined; all signed Treaty of Asunción</td>
<td>Venezuela-Cuba accord of 2004; expanded in 2006 with Bolivia’s adhesion, based on Movement proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Framework</strong></td>
<td>Trade and integration union</td>
<td>Customs union designed to increase trade among parties and improve bargaining power</td>
<td>Social and economic integration agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Founding principles</strong></td>
<td>Economic and social cooperation, equality, justice, peace, solidarity, democracy, asymmetry</td>
<td>Competition, “economic development with social justice”</td>
<td>Solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, sovereignty, asymmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principal provisions</strong></td>
<td>Market access, trade liberalization, social programs, human rights, democracy, labour mobility, rural development, foreign policy and development coordination, social and environmental projects, rules of origin</td>
<td>Market access, investment rights, services, competition, rules of origin, coordination on fiscal and monetary policy, foreign trade, capital, agriculture and services</td>
<td>Productive development projects, technology transfer, market access and purchase guarantees, financial assistance and credit, bi-national development ventures, health and education programs, cultural knowledge, defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic sectors covered</strong></td>
<td>All goods and services, including agriculture</td>
<td>All goods and services, including agriculture</td>
<td>Projects initiated in various sectors, including health, agriculture, energy, communications, transportation, education, mining and banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusions, safeguard measures</strong></td>
<td>Preferential treatment for Ecuador and Bolivia, permits protective measures if risk of serious economic damage</td>
<td>Allows members to protect domestic sectors in the case that imports pose a ‘serious threat’ in a particular sector</td>
<td>Excluded sectors: state enterprises, services, investor rights, IPR, state procurement; preferential treatment for Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dispute resolution process</strong></td>
<td>Andean Justice Tribunal in Quito</td>
<td>Review Tribunal in Asunción, recourse to WTO and ICSID</td>
<td>None specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External trade harmonization</strong></td>
<td>Partial CET, united trade positions vis-à-vis other countries and blocs</td>
<td>Partial CET, united trade positions vis-à-vis other countries and blocs</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Data is from the trade blocs’ original treaties, protocols, and subsequent amendments.
TCP-ALBA and the other major trade and integration blocs in which Bolivia participates. The APTDEA is not included here, as it is not an agreement between countries, but conditioned trade preferences determined by a foreign state.

TCP-ALBA provisions and commitments

The April 29, 2006 TCP-ALBA accord is a five-page document that contains 14 articles of 'general provisions', followed by a series of commitments made by each country, and closing with five commitments that Venezuela and Cuba jointly make to Bolivia. Among the general provisions, the countries agree to “take concrete steps toward implementing the process of integration,” amending the December 14, 2004 ALBA accord between Venezuela and Cuba (Article 1). The three countries agree to “elaborate a strategic plan in order to guarantee complementary products that can be mutually beneficial based on the rational exploitation of the countries' existing assets” (Article 2), and further commit to jointly invest in “public, binational, mixed or cooperative companies, joint management projects or any other form of association that they decide to establish” (Article 5). The specific sectors in which the TCP-ALBA proposes to implement this strategic plan are health, agriculture, oil and gas, education, telecommunications, mining, services, banking, sports and aircraft. Article 12 “acknowledges the special needs of Bolivia,” providing the country with significant benefits vis-à-vis Venezuela and Cuba, including the exchange of “comprehensive technology packages” (Article 3). General provisions commit all

72 The document's full title is "Agreement for the Application of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America and the Peoples' Trade Agreements."
countries to cooperate on the development of communications infrastructure (Article 11); exchange expertise in the fields of technological, scientific and cultural research (Articles 10 and 13); and eradication of illiteracy (Article 4). In addition to traditional financial mechanisms of credit and capital, countries may use "mechanisms of goods and services," as forms of compensation (Article 9)(Agreement for the Application 2006).

In the TCP-ALBA's 'commitments' sections, Cuba agrees to supply and pay the expenses of doctors, especially in ophthalmology, establish 20 medical centres with equipment, and provide 5000 scholarships to Bolivians to study medicine in Cuba. As well, Cuba commits to provide "experience, didactic material and technical resources necessary to implement [Bolivia's] literacy program" and "cooperate... on an energy-saving program" based upon its experiences with energy conservation. Venezuela has committed to assist Bolivia with the development of its energy, petrochemical, steel and iron sectors; provide 5000 scholarships to Bolivian students; construct an asphalt mixing facility; increase its importation of Bolivian goods; and provide "the infrastructure and equipment for air and sea transportation." Venezuela and Cuba both agree to remove "tariffs and other non-tariff barriers that apply to all [Bolivian] imports within the tariff universe"; guarantee the purchase of Bolivia oil-based (soybean) products that have lost their market due to free trade agreements; and collaborate in the development of a Bolivian state airline firm and sports facilities. Bolivia pledges to export mineral, agricultural, industrial and energy resources to the other two countries; forego utility taxes on "any state or mixed venture investments formed between Bolivia and the Venezuelan and Cuban
states"; and contribute its expertise in the study of indigenous peoples, agriculture, natural resources and traditional medicine (Agreement for the Application 2006).

The role of the state

Under the TCP-ALBA, a range of economic roles are explicitly outlined for the Bolivian state, including execution of productive development projects and social programs; exportation of mineral, energy, industrial and agricultural products; expansion of its telecommunications infrastructure; exchange of scientific, cultural and environmental knowledge; and creation of new state firms, including some that are jointly owned by other TCP-ALBA countries (Agreement for the Application 2006: 1). By leaving out of the accord many of the areas typically delimited in trade-centred integration accords, the TCP-ALBA also implicitly permits the Bolivian state to employ a broad range of industrial and developmental policy tools, including provisions related to technology transfer, domestic employment and product content, control of capital, fixing of prices, performance requirements, and support to key infant industries such as liquefied natural gas and coca-based products. However, the TCP-ALBA does not preclude private sector activity in Bolivia, nor the continuation of most market mechanisms. As such, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, the TCP-ALBA does not articulate a 'socialist' framework. Rather, the TCP-ALBA seeks a mixed economy through regional integration that has been described by some scholars

73 In a May 2006 interview with Miguel Lora, Pablo Solón stated that the accord "promotes the active participation of the state in trade"; translation by author.
as basically 'state capitalist' in nature (Lora 2006b, Spronk 2007). The TCP-ALBA largely reflects an ISI orientation in that it promotes state-led industrialization, domestic productive development and regional complementary production in the agricultural, mineral and hydrocarbon sectors.\footnote{Morales has also moved to increase tariff rates on a range of imported goods. On November 21, 2007, he signed a decree that from April 1, 2008, will change Bolivia’s tariff structure and rates, creating four categories of 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent; the present tariff rate ranges from zero to 10 percent (La Razón 2007c).} 

The TCP-ALBA contains two commitments of direct financial assistance from Venezuela to Bolivia, including a $100 million to “finance productive and associated infrastructure projects” and $30 million to “look after the social and productive necessities of the Bolivian people as decided by their Government” ((Agreement for the Application 2006: 3). Though these financial contributions are a form of development aid, they differ from the tradition of official development assistance (ODA) in several respects. First, the pledge of aid is embedded in the text of the integration accord, not part of a stand-alone commitment or donor agency project. Second, the money has been provided directly to the Bolivian government to use as it sees fit, absent agency or NGO intermediaries. Lastly, there is neither an application process nor conditions attached to the donations, other than the extremely broad language explaining the purpose of the funds. These characteristics distinguish the TCP-ALBA “solidarity” aid from that traditionally supplied by development agencies. Thus, the funds are viewed not as a form of ODA, but as a component of integration.
At the time of my research, the TCP-ALBA had been most extensively implemented in the areas of agriculture and health. In the following section, I provide an overview of the changes to the sectors as a result of the accord, emphasizing both the discernible outcomes and challenges to implementation.

**Case study 1: the agricultural sector**

As part of TCP-ALBA, Morales has intervened in agriculture through the expansion of credit to *campesinos*, provision of technical support, marketing assistance, and infrastructure development. The ‘TCP-ALBA Special Financing Fund’, jointly administered by the Ministerio de Producción y Microempresa (MPM) and the Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural, Agropecuario y Medio Ambiente (MDRAyMA), was established with funds from Venezuela (MPM 2008a). The Fund includes two financing programs, one directed toward ‘small-impact projects’ in which organizations and small business can seek up to US$15,000, and the other for ‘large-impact projects’ of US$15,000 or more. Small-impact projects are financed with a four percent interest rate to be paid back over a variable period of time, and funding is typically provided for construction, infrastructure and machinery to expand already established economic activities in both rural and urban areas (MPM 2008). According to one government technician, the Ministry maintains close oversight over all purchases, which typically includes a government agent accompanying the credit recipient to the

---

75 Venezuela has also donated 320 tractors under the accord (La Patria 2007); interview with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 24, 2007.
location where materials are acquired. According to a March 2007 press statement by then-Minister Celinda Sosa, the MPM had supported 272 projects valued at US$6 million in 2006, including 112 worth US$3.3 million in food, animal and silvicultural products exclusively with TCP-ALBA funds (ABI 2007).

In April of 2007, the MPM reported that the TCP-ALBA Special Financing Fund had committed to a total of 673 projects valued at US$15 million (La Razón 2007b). By January of 2008, the MPM's website reported that US$7.2 million had been spent from the Fund to support 537 projects (MPM 2008a).

Large-impact projects are initiated and overseen by the government, mostly in rural areas. In the country's largest such project, the government has funded the construction of a US$3.5 million public market in the 'Plan 3000' neighborhood of Santa Cruz. The facility, covering 58,900 square meters, created 2600 formal sector vending stalls for 19 organizations of vendors, many of whom sell agricultural products (El Mundo 2007). Another large project, in the northern department of Beni, involved the government purchasing outright a factory that processed Brazil nuts, the country's second largest agro-industrial export after soybean products (Newing and Harrop 2000). In this case, the Ministry negotiated the purchase of the factory for US$862,800 because it believed that the employees and suppliers were being exploited, and turned majority ownership of the factory over to the two affiliated labour federations representing 30,000 direct beneficiaries. The government has supplied the facility with a manager,

76 Interview with a TCP-ALBA project manager at the Ministry for Production and Small Business (La Paz), May 2, 2007.
77 Interview with a TCP-ALBA project manager at the MPM (La Paz), May 2, 2007.
78 Bolivia is the world's leading exporter of Brazil nuts (FAO 2005).
who maintains one-third of the decision-making authority; the labour unions each also maintain one-third authority.\textsuperscript{79}

Other TCP-ALBA funds have been directed to improve infrastructure and spur ‘productive development’, including the paving of roads in rural Bolivia and the construction of three factories designed to ‘industrialize’ \textit{coca} into licit products such as tea for export to Venezuela and other countries (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2006: 5). One of the \textit{coca} factories is being constructed in the community of Lauca Eñe, in the semi-tropical region of El Chapare (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2);\textsuperscript{80} however, according to one press report, the construction is one year behind schedule (La Prensa 2008). The facility will consume an estimated 25,200 kilograms of \textit{coca} (La Prensa 2008), directly employing 10-20 people, while benefiting 60,000 \textit{coca}-growing families.\textsuperscript{81}

The most dynamic component of Bolivian agriculture in recent decades and today has been soybean production, the dramatic growth of which has been led by agribusiness in the eastern department of Santa Cruz, although some \textit{campesinos} have been able to profit from the rapid growth of soybean exports. Between 1989 and 2004, the share of industrial agricultural products, mostly soybeans, as a percent of Bolivia’s agricultural GDP expanded from nine to 20 percent (Tuchschneider 2006: 210). On February 27, 2006, however, the US

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with a TCP-ALBA project manager at the Ministry for Production and Small Business (La Paz), May 2, 2007.
\textsuperscript{80} Observation by author in Lauca Eñe, April 17, 2007.
\textsuperscript{81} From interview with a Villa Tunari city official (Villa Tunari), April 16, 2007.
Figure 3.1 Sign in front of construction site of coca industrialization facility; second section from bottom indicates that construction has been financed by the TCP-ALBA. Photo by author.

Figure 3.2 Coca industrialization facility under construction, adjacent to sign above. Photo by author.
concluded negotiation of a free trade agreement with Colombia,\textsuperscript{82} a principal purchaser of Bolivian soy.\textsuperscript{83} Observers in Bolivia fear that if the US Congress approves the trade pact, it would favor US soy producers over those in Bolivia (El Diario 2007a, Gamarra 2007, Santa Cruz Económico 2007). Consequently, in the text of the TCP-ALBA, Venezuela and Cuba have committed to directly buy from the Bolivian government all the country's soy products that are no longer purchased by countries such as Colombia that become parties to free trade agreements, in particular with the US and EU. Bolivia's leading soy producers allege, however, that the purchasing arrangement is not working and that Venezuela has violated this commitment by limiting the importation of Bolivian soy products through a requirement that its producers acquire a 'Certificate of Non-production or Insufficient Production' to indicate that the soy products do not compete with those produced in Venezuela (Santa Cruz Económico 2007: 12-13).\textsuperscript{84} Nonetheless, by 2006, Venezuela had surpassed Colombia as the top destination for Bolivian soy. In 2007, Venezuela imported soybean oil and soy products valued at US$105 million, as compared to US$63 million by Colombia (INE 2007).

This brief overview of the TCP-ALBA's effects on Bolivian agriculture suggests that the accord's interventions are occasional, rather than widespread. It also

\textsuperscript{82} More than two years after negotiations to create a bilateral free trade agreement between the US and Colombia have been completed, the legislation to approve the accord remains stalled in the Democrat-controlled US Congress.

\textsuperscript{83} In 2003, Colombia was the destination for 56 percent of Bolivian soy and 58 percent of soybean oil exports, according to the 2007 edition of the Computing in the Humanities and Social Sciences' Trade Analyzer; accessed January 21, 2008.

\textsuperscript{84} Interviews with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 24, 2007, and the director of a Bolivian export association (La Paz), April 10, 2007. Soy producers also argue that the price they have received has dropped from US$240/ton to $190/ton (Santa Cruz Económico 2007).
indicates that the TCP-ALBA’s achievements are accompanied by new complications, including opposition from large scale soybean producers and delays in program implementation.

Case study 2: Bolivian health care

Cuban medical diplomacy is a long-standing form of South-South assistance dating back to the 1963 mission to Algeria, which involved 56 doctors and health workers, known in Cuba as ‘proletarian internationalists’ (Feinsilver 1989: 11-13). Working in dozens of countries in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere in the ensuing decades, the health workers have simultaneously served important medical roles in countries with large health care deficiencies while securing international support for the Castro regime. This type of medical solidarity has challenged traditional aid relations, as it comes absent the conditionality often associated with North-South assistance (Gonzales 2000). For example, one Bolivian physician contrasted the funds provided by USAID, which has been tied to coca eradication, with that which comes from Cuba with no policy prescriptions attached. 85

Under the TCP-ALBA, Bolivia has received medical assistance from Cuba in the form of physicians, paramedic staff, medicine, equipment, and medical facilities, mostly in the field of ophthalmology, as well as scholarships to study medicine. 86

85 Interview with a Bolivian doctor (Cochabamba), April 13, 2007.
86 This medical aid is similar to that which Cuba has provided to low-income communities in many countries around the world, although the scale of support to Bolivia outpaces all other countries with the exception of Venezuela.
This support expands on that previously committed by Cuba under a January 2006 bilateral ‘Convention for Technical Cooperation in Health and Medicine’, which responded to flooding and landslide disasters that occurred earlier that month in Bolivia. According to Bolivia’s Ministry of the Presidency, between the two conventions, Cuba opened or significantly expanded 20 hospitals and 11 eye clinics, with a total staff of 1,242 doctors and 502 paramedics as of January of 2007. At that time, the Ministry calculated that 2.96 million people had received attention at these facilities, with 58,764 patients undergoing operations (mostly consisting of eye surgeries under the program Operación Milagro), 36,255 ultrasounds and 2,705 babies delivered, as well as 3,795 lives saved. The Ministry reports 4,119 Bolivian students are studying medicine in Cuba. Venezuela has also made health contributions, including 302 scholarships to Bolivians to study medicine in Venezuela, an estimated 500,000 doses of yellow fever vaccine, and more than 44,000 pairs of eye glasses (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2006).

The presence of so many Cuban doctors in Bolivia is controversial. The La Paz office of the Bolivian Medical College argues that the Cubans are illegal, unqualified, ignorant of Bolivian traditions, and that they are depriving Bolivian doctors of work (Colegio Médico Departamental de La Paz 2006). The Medical College, which serves as the trade association for the profession, has organized protests and launched a public relations campaign against the Cubans operating in Bolivia. However, there is also a perception among many within the Bolivian

87 One of the 20 hospitals was under construction at the time of the report.
88 Venezuela has pledged to provide 5001 scholarships in medicine to Bolivians (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2006).
medical community that the state has neither historically nor contemporarily been able to meet the health needs of its citizens, and many Bolivian doctors support the work of the Cuban doctors.\(^89\) One Bolivian physician lauded the Cuban doctors as providing a critical service, praising them for "advancing the theme of solidarity for the doctors and the common citizen to see how other people can work without the necessity of pressure, conditionality or money."\(^90\) In a hospital in one rural village (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4),\(^91\) 68 Cuban doctors worked alongside the facility’s 72 Bolivian physicians, jointly attending patients and performing surgeries. Relations were reportedly highly cooperative and positive, according to both Bolivian and Cuban doctors,\(^92\) as well as local elected officials, who expressed a profound need for the physicians from Cuba.\(^93\) Another Bolivian physician, who works in El Alto, expressed that while he supported the Cubans’ presence in principle, he regretted that there had been no communication or cooperation between them and Bolivian practitioners; he also conveyed skepticism about their qualifications.\(^94\)

Bolivian doctors’ perceived need for medical assistance is affirmed by a World Bank report, which found that the Bolivian state still only employed 6.6 doctors and 3.4 professional nurses per 10,000 inhabitants in 2001, half of the Latin American average (World Bank 2004). In some rural areas, this ratio was

\(^89\) Interviews with Bolivian doctors (El Alto, Cochabamba and Villa Tunari), April 9, 13 and 16, 2007.
\(^90\) Interview with a Bolivian doctor (Cochabamba), April 13, 2007.
\(^91\) Villa Tunari is one of two principle crossroad towns in the El Chapare region of eastern Bolivia where much of the country’s coca is grown.
\(^92\) Interviews with Bolivian and Cuban doctors (Villa Tunari), April 16, 2007.
\(^93\) Interviews with city officials of the El Chapare region (Villa Tunari and Shinahota), April 16 and 17, 2007.
\(^94\) Interview with a Bolivian doctor (El Alto), April 9, 2007.
Figure 3.3 Hospital in Villa Tunari where 68 Cuban doctors provide free medical care. Photo by author.

Figure 3.4 Sign at entrance to the wing of the hospital in Villa Tunari where Cuban doctors work. Photo by author.
considerably worse, with just one physician to serve as many 15,000 people or more, according to one Bolivian doctor.\textsuperscript{95} The World Bank determined the number of health facilities in Bolivia in 2002 was insufficient to meet the needs of the population, proposing targets of one health post for each 300-2000 people, a health centre for every 2,000 to 10,000, and a hospital for populations of 10,000 to 50,000; meanwhile, staffing needed to be expanded by 14,500 health professionals (2004: 59).\textsuperscript{96} 

\textsuperscript{95} Interview with a Bolivian doctor (Cochabamba), April 13, 2007.

\textsuperscript{96} Health care recipients also underline and personalize the necessity of the Cuban physicians. One patient in his late 60s spoke of his life before and after eye surgery: “My [life] cycle had come to an end, and because I am going to be a burden to my family, better to put a bullet in myself and be done with it... The truth is that I did not believe [in the possibility of this surgery]. Because I said, ‘I am already blind and one cannot go against the will of God.’ But look: they operated on me and now you put on the ground anything you wish and I will see it” (Valdivia 2007: 8).
4 TCP-ALBA RESULTS AND OBSTACLES

The human-centered integration approach of the TCP-ALBA has improved conditions for some of the most vulnerable members of Bolivian society; however, it has run into various difficulties in achieving its objectives. In terms of its discernible outcomes, the most important results of the TCP-ALBA are related to the increased reach of Bolivia's social programs. This expansion is most evident in the access to medical attention by Bolivians living in poverty and in rural areas, which was previously less available and more costly. It would be difficult to verify or refute the accuracy of the Bolivian government's claims that 2.96 million people had received attention at TCP-ALBA health facilities, or that 3,795 lives have been saved. Certainly the Administration has a political incentive to demonstrate that its new program is showing results. However, the level of need for more medical facilities and personnel is one fact on which most observers of Bolivia concur (World Bank 2004). It is undeniable that the Cuban medical assistance, which included 1744 physicians and paramedics at the time of my research in 2006, fills a critical gap in health coverage that Bolivia has been historically unable to provide to its people, and that this support exceeds well beyond the flagship Operación Milagro eye care program. Venezuela's contribution of polio and yellow fever vaccinations will also save the lives of an undeterminable number of Bolivians.

97 Interview with a Bolivian doctor (Cochabamba), April 13, 2007.
The TCP-ALBA has provided Bolivians with a series of other social benefits, including literacy and education programs, academic scholarships, and communications and infrastructure projects. At the time of my research, 4119 Bolivians were studying medicine in Cuba, and another 539 were studying in Venezuela under program “Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho”, 302 of which were studying in medicine.\(^{98}\) Through the literacy program “Yo Si Puedo”, Cuba and Venezuela have provided approximately US$16,500, 30,000 televisions, 30,000 VHS players, 2000 solar panels, and other materials, complementing broader efforts of Bolivia’s Programa Nacional de Alfabetización (PNA) to eliminate Bolivian illiteracy by teaching 1.2 million people to read.\(^{99}\) In a TCP-ALBA project entitled “Implementación del Sistema Radios de los Pueblos Originarios,” sixteen radio stations were installed in remote rural locations, and 100 people had been trained to operate them (La Razón 2007a, Los Tiempos 2007).\(^{100}\) Bolivia has also received 320 tractors to improve campesinos’ productive capacity (La Patria 2007). Lastly, in the area of infrastructure, of the 5000 metric tons of cement for roadway improvements pledged by Venezuela, approximately 2000 metric tons had been used at the time of my research (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2007: 5-26). Together, these donations and programs represent a significant contribution toward the improvement of the quality of life of an inestimable number of Bolivians.

\(^{98}\) Under the TCP-ALBA, Venezuela committed to 5001 scholarships for Bolivians (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2007).

\(^{99}\) According to the Ministry of the Presidency, 317,782 people had participated in the PNA between April 2006 and January 2007; 76,282 had graduated (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2007).

\(^{100}\) Venezuela has pledged a total of 25 rural radio systems (Equipo de Coordinación TCP-ALBA 2007).
A final category of outcomes for Bolivia is in productive development. The most effective delivery in this area has been the extension of low-interest credit for more than 500 small-scale and several ‘large-impact’ projects, including the Plan 3000 market and purchase of the Brazil nut factory. Beyond this credit, however, implementation of productive development projects has been slow. For example, according to a news report, the Lauca Eñe coca industrialization facility – which was partially completed when I visited it in April of 2007 – and two other similar plants in the Yungas region, have run into problems with financing and had not been completed as of March of 2008 (La Prensa 2008). Also still in the development phase are several ambitious industrialization plans, in which Venezuela has pledged financial and technical assistance, including proposals to significantly expand exploration of Bolivia’s natural gas fields and construct factories for the industrialization of gas for export (ALBA 2007b). In exploration, the two countries have formed a joint venture called Petroandina, for which Venezuela has committed an initial investment of US$800 million (Walter and Craze 2007). In terms of industrialization, this involves a gas separation plant, two gas liquefaction facilities, and a 100-megawatt power plant (Walter and Craze 2007). If brought to fruition, these productive development projects have the potential to produce important economic gains for Bolivia; however, they presently remain in an embryonic stage.

The cooperative nature of these bi-national projects reflects a key difference between the human-based approach to integration and the traditional trade-based orientation. The outcomes described above, which, though they may generate political and material gains for Venezuela or Cuba, provide the
overwhelming balance of benefits to Bolivia, demonstrate the TCP-ALBA's recognition of asymmetries between the countries that are being integrated. Though construction is not complete, initiatives such as the coca industrialization and gas liquefaction plants, also illustrate how human-centered integration accepts trade as instrumental to broader goals, rather than as the end itself. However, the current state of these projects also reflects the barriers faced by the integration model. For example, in the case of the Lauca Eñe, facility, the Coca Vice Ministry's Industrialization Unit Chief Melanio Rocabado explained, “the funds became unavailable in October of 2007 when it was discovered that other TCP-ALBA funds destined to small business projects were poorly used” (La Prensa 2008, translation by author). Though it is beyond the scope of this research to determine where the responsibility lies in the mismanagement of TCP-ALBA funds, the protracted impasse reflects the institutional deficiencies for which Bolivia is reputed (Lindsay 2004). Similarly, the bureaucratic impediment of Bolivian soy exports to Venezuela, due to the latter’s requirement of a ‘Certificate of Non-production or Insufficient Production,’ supports one of the premises of trade-centered integration: the private sector is a more efficient agent than the state in some areas of market affairs.

Another limitation of the human-centered integration is revealed by the modest increase in trade between parties to the TCP-ALBA. Although Bolivian exports have increased substantially since Morales's election in 2005, with the monetary value of the county’s top three export sectors increasing from 2006 to 2007, data

101 Bolivian exports have increased at the following rates: hydrocarbons, 6.9 percent; minerals, 25.8 percent; and agriculture, 12.7 percent (IBCE 2007b).
on the exportation of Bolivian goods to Venezuela and Cuba indicates that trade flows have not been discernibly changed by the TCP-ALBA. According to a Bolivian business association, the value of Bolivian exports to Venezuela expanded only 2.2 percent between 2006 and 2007 from US$178 million to US$181.8,\textsuperscript{102} a rate considerably lower than the leading destinations of Bolivian exports, which increased by 4.1 percent (Brazil), 17.6 percent (Argentina), 14.8 percent (Japan), and 15.3 percent (United States) during the same period (IBCE 2007b). Cuba, on the other hand, is not a significant destination for Bolivian products, importing only US$106,132 worth of Bolivian goods in the first five months of 2007 (INE 2007). Beyond an examination of trade flows, it is difficult to determine the TCP-ALBA’s economic outcomes, due to the wide array of factors that contribute to Bolivia’s economic situation, which has been experiencing positive trends in GDP growth and debt reduction in recent years,\textsuperscript{103} despite a moderate increase in the rate of inflation.\textsuperscript{104}

Coexisting models of integration

Despite a profound ideological divergence between the two approaches to integration, several scholars have argued that there is not necessarily a conflict in

\textsuperscript{102} Export values are for the months of January through October for years 2006 and 2007.


\textsuperscript{104} According to Bolivia’s National Institute of Statistics, the annual consumer price index increased by 8.7 percent from 2006 to 2007 (INE 2008).
implementing them simultaneously. Indeed, my research found the TCP-ALBA functioning concurrently with Bolivia’s participation in the CAN, ATPDEA and MERCOSUR. Part of this coexistence can be explained by the gradual and imprecise nature of the TCP-ALBA’s process of adoption. The TCP-ALBA has been progressively and flexibly brought into existence through a series of conventions that are frequently augmented, in particular when a meeting occurs between heads of state. This differs from the trade-centered approach, where all diplomatic energies are directed toward achieving a single landmark rules-based treaty that comprehensively defines the various areas of trade to which the countries commit. Broadly speaking, the TCP-ALBA seeks an open-ended, state-enabling and continuously updated exchange, while the CAN and MERCOSUR seek to lock participating countries into an arrangement that discourages deviation and progressively constrains state action. This distinction is observable in the blurring of lines between the medical services rendered under the January 2006 Bolivia-Cuba Convention and those provided by Cuba in the TCP-ALBA. To the two governments, these are not distinct accords; instead they signify a continuous act of solidarity for which there are no *quid pro quo* terms of exchange. Consequently, calculations of the extent of Cuban medical aid do not differentiate between those from the Convention and the TCP-ALBA, including the statistics of the former within the latter’s accomplishments. The TCP-ALBA extended the timeframe for the hospitals and many of the physicians that initially focused on disaster response, converting their relief services to more general care. This blurring of lines between the direct aid provided under the

---

105 From statements made by Emir Sader at a public event in La Paz, March 27, 2007; and from interviews with a trade policy analyst (La Paz), March 24, 2007, and a rector of a Bolivian university (La Paz), March 26, 2007.
Convention and the terms of what is conceived of as a trade agreement unveils the conceptual and temporal flexibility of human-centered integration, as compared to the fixed, trade-centered model. Were the TCP-ALBA more rigidly and comprehensibly constructed from the beginning, it would more directly collide with various mechanisms that exist in the integration fora constructed within the trade-centered framework.

Behind the present coexistence, however, lies a tension that periodically surfaces in policy-making. This can be seen, for example in the changes the soybean sector is undergoing, as the state assumes an active role in shaping production and exportation, or in the industrialization of coca, funded by Venezuela, one expected buyer of mate de coca tea. As well, the re-orientation of Bolivian medicine toward public provisioning has been triggered by the TCP-ALBA. In the cases of soy and health care, there have been vigorous social responses from Bolivian groups—export-oriented agribusiness and the Bolivian Medical Congress—that perceive themselves as adversely affected by the new arrangement, while the expansion of the coca sector could lead the US government to curtail Bolivia's trade preferences under the ATPDEA. This tension between models can be expected to grow as the TCP-ALBA implemented, and in the case that its reach is extended through subsequent commitments by the parties.

In summary, the two models of integration coexist uncomfortably. Although the TCP, in both principle and content, is attempting to overturn the existing model of integration and create a new locus in which Morales and the Bolivian
Movement are pursuing a post-neoliberal agenda, the actual threat to the trade-centered approach remains minimal at this point. As expressed by one interview subject, "The Government of Evo Morales is still within the political scheme of neoliberalism." At best, the TCP modifies a free market framework, as opposed to replacing it, producing a tense coexistence of two contradictory models where the neoliberal one is still very much dominant.

106 Interview with a rector of a Bolivian university (La Paz), March 26, 2007.
5 THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF BOLIVIA'S NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY

Bolivia’s new model of human-centered integration has produced important outcomes in terms of expanding Bolivia’s social programs, especially in the area of health; however, economic results have been slow in coming. As of the termination of my research, the actually existing TCP-ALBA has less to do with commerce than cooperation. As one Ministry of Foreign Relations official explained to me, the TCP-ALBA should not be thought of as the “classic trade, rule-based program” in which the terms of the accord are negotiated quid pro quo by each country seeking to improve their respective positions. Instead, it is a flexible and state-driven integration accord between cooperating countries, which, in its recognition of existing economic asymmetries, has meant a fairly one-way contribution of resources to Bolivia. Thus, thinking of the accord simply as the ALBA—the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas—as do the other participating countries, better reflects the accord than its present identification as a trade agreement.

Morales’s human-centered paradigm for integration is limited by endogenous structural, institutional and political impediments, as well as external pressures from market-oriented governments and the private firms that wield influence.

107 Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (La Paz), March 27, 2007.
over them, all of which challenge the present trajectory. One major domestic barrier is the continued dominance of large-scale producers in Bolivia’s agriculture sector, who, aided by business associations like the CAO and IBCE, are fighting to maintain their position in the export sector. Secondly, Bolivia’s historically inefficient public institutions – whose competence, transparency and geographic reach are limited – have contributed to inconsistent implementation of the new integration agenda. Third, Morales faces resistance from a range of powerful political actors, including the traditional political parties, Bolivia’s many business organizations (including private media outlets), those in the medical community that perceive the Cuban doctors as a threat, and a powerful autonomist movement in the media luna, all of which reject the alliance with Chávez and Castro (Hoz de Vila 2007). These factors speak to the deep political instability in which Bolivia is presently engulfed, and which threatens to derail not just the new integration agenda, but the Administration’s entire political project.

The political cleavages that have emerged in the integration debate are a microcosm of the larger political economic contestation, providing a useful tool to assess the winners and losers of Morales’s ‘democratic revolution’. As beneficiaries of the Cuban medical assistance, literacy and educational programs and low-interest credit, Bolivians living in poverty, including much of the country’s indigenous people, are the biggest winners. Campesinos, too, have benefited from various aspects of the TCP-ALBA, including the tractors, infrastructure and productive development projects. As well, those public sector employees hired to administer the various aspects of the integration accord have
gained. Additionally, at a January 25, 2008 meeting in La Paz, the Bolivian Movement described the TCP-ALBA as beneficial (Bolivian Movement 2008a), reflecting the accord’s commonalities with their own collective articulations made over the previous six years. The prominence of Solón and others from the Movement in TCP-related government posts has contributed to this acceptance.

Those who most clearly come out on the losing side of the TCP-ALBA are company owners and workers in export sectors, including soybeans and textiles, whose capital and material prospects have become less stable in the new climate. Additionally, whether real or imagined, there is fear among business and export groups, the Bolivian Medical College, old political parties, and the small Bolivian upper class, especially concentrated in Santa Cruz, that their economic, social and political position will be damaged by the Government’s present course. Indeed, their roles in shaping Bolivia’s integration within the broader community of nations, as well as their influence over domestic affairs, has diminished with the ascension of Morales. Despite their continued occupation of a privileged economic position, the political agency of these groups has waned considerably.

Another party that has lost influence is the US, which throughout much of Bolivia’s republican history, including the neoliberal era, played a significant role in shaping Bolivian domestic and foreign policy. Bolivia’s historically dependent relationship to the US has been severed with the election of Morales, who during

108 Interview with the director of a Bolivian export association (La Paz), April 10, 2007.
his Presidential candidacy pledged to be the US’ “worst nightmare” (Morales 2007). Bolivia’s present political distance from Washington, and the financial institutions headquartered there, have netted it greater autonomy by which Morales has pursued his own project. However, there are risks to Morales’s new geopolitical alignment, as the TCP-ALBA arrangement could effectively substitute old forms of dependency with a new one precariously centered on continued support from Chávez in Venezuela and high energy sector rents. To be sure, the cooperative and asymmetrical foundation of the TCP-ALBA distinctly rejects the conditionalities of IFI structural adjustment programs or the ATPDEA’s mandate that Bolivia eradicate coca in exchange for trade preferences. Nonetheless, Bolivia’s growing reliance upon continued Venezuelan aid and favourable terms of trade renders it vulnerable to external shocks, such as another coup against Chávez or declining global prices of oil and gas. On the other hand, if the TCP-ALBA succeeds in propelling productive development projects, Bolivia would find itself in a better position to withstand such shocks.

The fate of the present integration experiment is significantly tied to Morales’s broader political economic project. If the Administration is brought down or substantially blocked in advancing its program, the TCP-ALBA will likely encounter similar setbacks. For example, much of Morales’s popularity surrounds his advancing the primary October Agenda demands of constitutional reform and hydrocarbon ‘nationalization.’ Failure of Morales to fulfil these mandates could erode his support and weaken his ability to forward any program. Conversely, fulfilment of these core promises would consolidate the MAS’s rule and insulate Morales from criticism, enabling him to move ahead
with TCP-ALBA integration. Moreover, the TCP-ALBA and many domestic policies are mutually reinforcing. For example, Morales's assertion of control over the hydrocarbon sector has provided the resources with which he and Chávez can pursue gas field development and natural gas liquefaction; in turn, the capital investment from the TCP-ALBA will play a part in shaping whether the 'nationalization' succeeds in achieving economic gains for Bolivians.

Beyond the TCP-ALBA's linkage with Morales's broader project, the future of the accord depends on the balance of winners and losers. With time, the TCP-ALBA can be expected to progressively win more public favor as additional people receive medical attention from Cuban doctors and low-interest credit from the state. However, it is profoundly premature for Bolivia to contemplate abandonment of previous arrangements – the CAN, MERCOSUR, and even APTDEA. Such a break would likely trigger a sharp decline in exports and increase in unemployment, which would have very negative implications for the future of the Administration and its program, which remains the best foreseeable regime under which those in the Bolivian Movement can forward their respective agendas. As it stands, Bolivia's present trajectory is vulnerable to challenge by those social actors it disadvantages; indeed, the current direction could be reversed if the losers oppose the new integration framework with more vigor than the beneficiaries defend it.

Considering that it was Bolivia's inimitable combination of endogenous histories, actors, ideologies and events that shaped the specific outcomes for the Andean nation, my investigation into Bolivian integration did not anticipate the
discovery of a roadmap that could be exported to other countries, in Latin America or otherwise. Indeed, I have found that the precise elements that have contributed to the present narrative—Bolivia’s large indigenous population, the country’s history of social and political exclusion, its unique variety of structural adjustment, its mountainous and landlocked geography with poor infrastructure, the presence of significant gas reserves, and the prominence of a particular plant, coca, to name just a few—preclude the extrapolation of guidelines for actuating transformative processes in other places. However, my study of the TCP-ALBA does indicate that some space exists for countries of the periphery to pursue alternative forms of political economy without necessarily breaking with the dominant free market order. This analysis also suggests that, at the present juncture, social movements can effectively mobilize to bring programmatic changes at the level of the state. Finally, despite its limitations, Bolivia’s human-centered integration approach has yielded definite material improvements for thousands of people, reflecting broader economic trends, and signifying for Bolivia a more suitable course than the former doctrinaire market orientation. Bolivia’s experiment thus suggests that it is feasible to advance a redistributive social agenda at the margins in the emergent multi-polar world. However, the Bolivian case also indicates that ‘post-neoliberalism’ is not an easy path to traverse.
The mixed method research approach I employed combined a series of semi-structured interviews with textual and archival research and observation. Many of the interviewees were identified in advance of my fieldwork in Bolivia, while others were selected through snowball sampling. I benefited from the assistance of two key informants, one in La Paz affiliated with the Fundación Solón and acquainted with various people active in the Bolivian Movement, and the other affiliated with a public university in El Alto. Through the first informant, I had the great fortune of securing accommodations with a lawyer who worked directly for the Bolivian President. Though this attorney did not directly work on trade and integration issues, she was able to connect me with some of her colleagues in the government who did. It is through these relationships that I was able to obtain some of the most useful internal government data on the outcomes of the TCP-ALBA.

The interviews, which I conducted in Bolivia between March 20 and May 8 of 2007, were done with individuals representing those sectors of Bolivian society that I identified as having a stake in, or critique of, the country’s trade and integration policies. Direct interviews were held with members of Bolivian governmental ministries and agencies, businesses and business organizations, social movements, NGOs, scholars, and policy analysts. While in
Bolivia, I conducted 36 in-person interviews in the cities and towns of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, Villa Tunari, Shinahota and Santa Cruz. On each occasion, prior informed consent was secured. In most cases, this was accomplished by explaining the purpose of my research and the interviewee's right to not respond to a question or cancel the interview at any time, and then securing their signature of consent. However, in some cases I determined that, due to mistrust of researchers, particularly one from North America, it would only be feasible to obtain consent by explaining the aforementioned details through electronic communication that interviews verbally agreed to during the interview.

I undertook observation on 10 occasions, each time recording my observations through field notes. When appropriate, I also took photographs and audio recordings. The events, locations and dates were as follows:

- Public event honoring the memory of René Zaveleta, featuring Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera and Emir Sader as keynote speakers, in La Paz. March 27, 2007.
- Two clinics in which Cuban doctors worked, in El Alto and Villa Tunari (El Chapare), April 9 and April 16, 2007, respectively.
I also drew from an array of textual sources, including books, journal articles, archival data bases, popular/grey literature, news articles, and policy analysis documents. These sources were accessed in libraries and bookstores, online, and at the offices of various Bolivian NGOs. I was also given several books by interview subjects. Two archival sources that have proven invaluable have been data collection services offered by Bolivian NGOs: the annual production of 30 Días de Noticias by the Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB), and the daily posting of Data Tr@de of the IBCE. While I had been familiar with CEDIB’s service prior to my research, it was only during my fieldwork in Bolivia that I became aware of IBCE’s resources. Additionally, the portalALBA and Movimiento Boliviano por la Soberanía y la Integración Solidaria de los Pueblos websites provided a wealth of useful information.

I began data analysis shortly after initiating my interviews in Bolivia, which continuously helped me to identify important data gaps. This early analysis also provided me with the necessary information to select the two case study areas where I would direct my research—health and agriculture—and enabled me to better steer the subsequent direction of my research by informing locations to visit and shaping interview questions. For example, as I began my research, I had the understanding that various projects had been planned under the TCP-ALBA, but I lacked clarity on which, if any, of these had been brought to fruition. Through interviews and news sources, I was able to locate those projects where construction had begun, which led me to the El Chapare region in east-central Bolivia. There, I met and talked with local officials who were able to direct me to the facility being built for the manufacture of legal coca products. The sign
adjacent to the construction site confirmed what I had been told in interviews and read in the newspapers, declaring that the facility was being constructed with TCP-ALBA funds from Venezuela. In this way, I was able to confirm to my satisfaction certain 'facts'.

Triangulation was not always so straightforward. In my effort to get to the bottom of other research questions, I had to depend upon various sources to corroborate data. For example, despite my solicitation for an interview on two occasions, I was not able to secure an interview with a representative of the Bolivian Medical College, which my interview sources (including several doctors) had describes as the principal social force opposing the presence of Cuban doctors in Bolivia. Rather than obtaining this information from the source, I had to rely on the information from the College's website, news articles and statements made by interview subjects.

Additional time will be needed to assess the full impact of Bolivia’s nascent approach to trade and integration. Although I believe my research has uncovered most of the key aspects of the TCP-ALBA and should be useful to those who want to understand the TCP, it is too early to make final conclusions about what the new framework will mean for Bolivia. Nor was it feasible for me to study how the TCP-ALBA was playing out in Cuba or Venezuela. My research design also lacked sufficient time in Bolivia to gather all of the data that I would have liked. I did not have the opportunity to do direct interviews with several key figures involved in implementing the TCP-ALBA, in technical and
ministerial positions, nor people who had received medical care from Cuban physicians. Likewise, I would have liked to visit certain sites of TCP-ALBA programs, including the Plan 3000 Market in Santa Cruz and the Brazil nut factory in the department of Beni.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Coordinación del Tratado de Libre Comercio (2005). "40 Preguntas y Respuestas para Conocer Mejor el TLC."


83


