ON THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN IMAGINATION AND EDUCATION: PHILOSOPHICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

by

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Abstract

Imagination is one of the few terms which can induce reasonably strong reactions from many people. And in almost all cases today, the reactions are approving; people generally say that imagination is important for education. However, upon closer scrutiny, most people's idea of imagination's role in education is vague or confused. One of the reasons lies in the nature of the concept of imagination itself: its vagueness and complexity.

The various arguments that have been made about imagination and about imagination's role in education are described and analyzed. The programs that have been recommended for implementing various conceptions of imagination in practice are also subject to analysis and their plausibility assessed.

Some of the more influential ideas in this field are found in the work of John Dewey, the American pragmatist philosopher. These ideas have in turn been influenced by such philosophers and educational theorists as John Locke, J.-J. Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. The path of these ideas from these early philosophers into Dewey's work is described in some detail, as is the path from Dewey's work into more recent attempt to implement "imaginative" educational programs.

The thesis concludes with a somewhat new conceptions of how imagination and education should properly be connected. The thesis shows how this new conception can be articulated from some contemporary educational ideas, in particular ideas derived from the work of Donald Schöen. By extending these ideas, and relating them to others from the literature the thesis examines, the new conception is built. Even though features of contemporary ideas remain contentious, it is argued that the new conception of imagination in education is, at least, plausible.

While a thesis is not the place to lay out details of practical implementation, it seemed desirable to provide an overview picture of how the new conception might work in practice, both in terms of a curricular structure
and of teaching practice. This overview picture is tied into the history of ideas about imagination in education.
To my families and friends
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When I reflect on my educational experience, I cannot help but appreciate how fortunate I have been. What little intellectual merit I might have is but a tiny part of the reason for my achievement. I have been able to accomplish this much mostly because of the lucky encounters I have been privileged to have throughout this journey. I will never forget those fortunate encounters and the generous support I have received, and on this occasion, I would like to express my indebtedness to, and appreciations of, those who made this particular project—my Ph.D. thesis—possible.

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Ch.1 Introduction

1. The theme: imagination and education

The topic of this thesis is the connection between imagination and education. Imagination is one of the few terms which can induce reasonably strong reactions from many people. And in almost all cases today, the reactions are approving; people generally say that imagination is important for education. They share certain ideas or images of education, particularly of schooling today; schools in which lessons and teachers emphasize the coverage of standardized materials, are not stimulating or practical, and fail to motivate students to learn. I think that many people like the idea of imagination because the term suggests what seems to be missing from ordinary classrooms; kids excited about learning.

However, upon closer scrutiny, most people share little beyond these vague images of imagination's role in education. One of the reasons lies in the nature of the concept of imagination itself: its vagueness and complexity. Thus, when we substitute such similar terms as creativity or intuition for imagination, we find people responding exactly the same way. An interesting fact is that the
idea of imagination has almost always been treated in a similar fashion. Simply stated, people have little more than a vague image of what the concept means; usually, what they understand it to be is, first, a capacity or power to have images in the absence of real objects (usually, vividly), and second, an antithesis to something else.

First of all, when people say that imagination is important for education, they hold two distinguishable senses which may or may not be connected. Some people mean that the development of imagination or imaginative capacity is an important aim of education. If we push this logic, it would suggest that children do not have imagination, or that their imagination is immature, and, consequently, that it needs to be developed by some educational means. Others mean that children's imagination needs to be engaged in the process of teaching and learning, and that the failure of today's schooling is due to the failure in engaging this native resource which every child has. This position suggests that children have imagination, and may also suggest that people lose imagination as they grow up or as they go through schooling.

What I will do in this thesis is, first, to present a bird's eye view of the discussions, both past and present, on the connections between imagination and education so that those who are interested in the topic will be able to locate themselves in the broader context of discussions. I will also present my own idea of how imagination and education should be connected. In doing so, I will show that the contemporary discussions on imagination and education are a continuation of a major strand of modern educational thought, and that though its assumptions and implications are contested for various reasons, it is still plausible today. Though I will venture to discuss some practical implications in the final chapter, I present them as suggestions which require empirical examination and analysis. My ideas on practical issues of schooling (curriculum construction and classroom teaching) are still sketchy. This is partly because I do not yet have adequate theoretical tools to analyze some of the issues, and partly
because there is much more room to explore. Therefore, I stopped at pointing out some aspects of educational principles and practices which are, for various reasons, missing from schooling today.

As such, my thesis will be mostly conceptual. Of course, this is not to say that I shut my personal experience and cultural background out of my mind when I theorize, but I will keep my experience as the ground against which my conceptual argument should be a figure.

Before I go into the detail, I will describe the general ground or context of my thesis below.

2. Three criteria of education

I have to explain the outer boundary of my thesis. I will mostly confine my thoughts to the aspect of education which takes place between the teacher and the student via subjects. Thus, I will generally not discuss such aspects or themes of education as administrative organization.

Having said that, it is necessary to explain my general concern with today’s educational practice. I will put it in the form of a question: Are the instructional processes and activities (1) engaging, (2) useful, and/or (3) worthwhile?

The meaning of the term "educative" or "educational" is usually divided into two, "useful" and "worthwhile". The two terms are not necessarily coextensive. For example, art education may be worthwhile but it is not useful for many people. Conversely, memorizing lots of historical facts may be useful on some occasions, but it may not be worthwhile by itself if it only produces something like a quiz-whiz. I do not mean to say that all subjects taught in school need to be both worthwhile and useful, but I certainly mean to say that educators, whether curriculum planners or teachers, need to consider if a given subject or instructional activity is worthwhile, useful, or both.
What I want to suggest further is this; an educator may be justified to teach something in the classroom or include something in the curriculum when it meets the criterion of being useful and/or worthwhile, but it needs to be experienced by the student as educative; for this, curricular contents and instructional methods need to meet the third criterion of being "engaging" for the student. Some contents may be worthwhile or useful for educators, but they may not turn out to be so for students. So what makes some particular content educational for one and not so for another? How does an educator communicate to students that certain material is worthwhile, useful, or engaging?

I think that one of the most serious problems of education lies in the lack of proper understanding of the criterion of "engaging". This criterion tends to be either neglected or misunderstood. It is neglected as some people think that it is desirable but not necessary for instructional processes and activities to be engaging, because the content of education is often considered to be the most important issue. It is misunderstood when people think that "engaging" merely means being "fun" or "amusing" and that it is a sufficient criterion by itself, as in the extreme form of child-centred pedagogy or as in a classroom in the hands of extremely laissez-faire teachers. Both these positions are misguided; the latter is obviously wrong but the former, though not so obviously, is mistaken too. By engaging, I do not necessarily mean "enjoyable" or "fun", but I mean that children feel that what they are experiencing or learning is real, that it is relevant to their lives, or that they can feel emotionally connected to it. So understood, the criterion of engaging is a necessary condition to make processes or activities intended to instruct something truly educative.¹

One of the keys which I can think of is the role of imagination in teaching and learning. Imagination has a crucial role in making lessons useful, worthwhile, and engaging. I will examine this connection in what follows.

¹ Cf. van Manen, "A subject that interests me is a subject that matters to me" (p.196).
3. On the philosophical approach to education

Philosophy may mean to some people the study of the history of ideas, and to others, a linguistic/logical analysis of ideas and concepts. While I think that both of those are relevant parts of philosophy, it is more important for me to think of philosophy as a matter of philosophical attitude. It means a commitment to continue thought and conversation, in a systematic way, on issues that concern us. The part, "a systematic way", includes the history of ideas as well as conceptual analysis, but one may think also of other approaches.

I observe that there are two types of philosophers (though the distinction is a matter of emphasis). Some philosophers tend to engage in exploring new topics and perspectives and in building new vocabulary in order to discuss issues that concern them. Others are more interested in traffic control, so to speak, of the arguments and concepts, and in examining the historical and conceptual context of various ideas.

I am rather inclined to the second type of theorizing, though I do also engage in the first task in the following pages. Thus, I intend my thesis to be groundwork for future studies in the importance of imagination in education; I tried, in the greater part of the thesis, to sort out what kinds of viewpoints and concerns exist in both historical and contemporary theories of imagination and education.

A conceptualization of imagination requires a historical and analytical examination of the idea: how various people thought and talked about it; how the idea came to be what we understand today, and what meanings and connotations are attached to the term. Imagination does not exist as a program in a computer or an organ in one's body does; but we certainly have a capacity to imagine as somewhat distinguishable from other modes of thinking and mental functions. Thus, while it is not possible to identify and analyze the imagination as we do
with an object or an entity in the world, we are certainly justified to talk about the examination of the imagination.

4. Overview

In Chapters 2 and 3, I will put my thesis in the context of Western philosophy and educational theory. Chapter 2 will be on the general theoretical background, and I will identify a major theme which educational theorists of imagination are following. In Chapter 3, I will clarify my own position on the connection between imagination and education, and argue that my idea is in line with the general theoretical orientation.

In Chapter 4, I will review some critical perspectives on the kind of view which has been presented in the previous chapters. I will argue, however, that the connection between imagination and education as I establish it in Chapters 2 and 3 is worth supporting.

Chapters 5 and 6 are on the specific areas in which the imagination is crucial. I will discuss social or moral imagination in Chapter 5, and aesthetic imagination in Chapter 6. The foci will be slightly different in these chapters. In Chapter 5, I will focus on the idea of imagination as an educational end, while in Chapter 6 I will mostly talk about imagination as a means of education.

In the final two chapters, I will examine some practical implications. In Chapter 7, I will discuss the implication of taking imagination seriously in curriculum planning. In Chapter 8, I will suggest some ways that teachers may be able to contribute to the development of imagination by engaging students' imagination.
5. Note for the reader

(1) I will sometimes use such expressions as "our culture" and "our education" to refer to the culture and system of education which have been developed in the West in general, and in North America in particular. Although I come from a different tradition, and am aware of the differences which exist in various aspects of the cultures of education between my country and Western countries, what I am concerned with in this thesis is an aspect of education which stems from the same sources. Besides, Japanese education has been heavily influenced by educational values, principles, and practices born in the modern West during the last century or so. Therefore, unless I say that I am referring to some aspects of Japanese culture, readers can take it that I am referring to the issues and problems we share on both sides of the Pacific.

(2) Square brackets within quotations [...] mean my addition and explanation.
Ch. 2 The History of Ideas about Imagination

1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical background to the understanding of contemporary discussions on the connection between imagination and education. The chapter will proceed in the following order.

In section 2, I will briefly present a preliminary discussion of problems in studying an idea, in this case, imagination. These problems are, first, the problem of the relation between the word and the idea, and second, the problem of translation.

In section 3, I will examine how the idea of imagination came to be the way that it is understood today. Although it was in general philosophy and literary theory that the idea of imagination was developed, I will try to put educational theorists' discussions in this context as much as possible. There are theorists whose work fits in both areas like Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, but not many. In this section, I will take up three major themes of imagination. They are (1) imagination and the mind, (2) imagination and freedom, and (3) imagination

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and images. Themes (2) and (3) are, generally speaking, constant ones from ancient times to today, but the first theme is largely idiosyncratic to modern Western thought.

In section 4, I will examine contemporary theorists' conceptions of imagination, in contrast to theorists up to, roughly, the 19th century. By doing so, I will try to show that our conception of imagination is particular to our cultural and historical contingencies. Our understanding of the connection between imagination and education reflects a particular direction in which educational ideas in the West have developed for the last few centuries.

2. Studying the idea of imagination: a preliminary discussion

2-1. Word or idea

We need to be aware of the problems in studying an idea, which comes from the fact that an idea often takes the form of a word. In doing research on imagination, I may, on the one hand, follow the word "imagination" and look for definitions, discussions, and so on, about the word. On the other hand, I may follow the kinds of ideas which may be indicated by the word "imagination"; in this case, I have to define or delineate what kinds of ideas I want to pursue and look for discussions which may not take place under the name of "imagination".

The word "imagination" has its history in the English-speaking world and has been used as a translation of such foreign words as the German *Einbildungskraft*. In the English language itself, for example, in the 17th century, "imagination" and "fancy" were used almost interchangeably (e.g. Hobbes,
Locke). Though we see the distinction between imagination and fancy made most explicitly in Coleridge's work in the 19th century, the difference was originally a matter of mere etymology: Latin *imaginatio*, and Greek *phantasia*. The casualness of the distinction is indicated by Hobbes using the terms to mean exactly the opposite from their use by Coleridge (Engell, p.173). The point is that I cannot just look for the word "imagination" in studying the idea of imagination.

On the other hand, I may define what "imagination" means at the beginning and look for ideas which fit this definition; this will not make me less arbitrary because I would have to cast off various meanings attached to the word by various people in other times and places. Also, depending on the definition I give, I may need to treat such terms as "abduction" (Peirce), "intuition", and "creativity" equally. In the end, it may be questionable to call my paper an investigation into imagination.

For example, take a look at the case of Locke. If one looks for his use of and attitude towards the words, "imagination" and "fancy", he obviously did not think highly of them. In his essay on education, he recommends that we "distinguish between the wants of fancy and those of nature" (*Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, section 107). He thought that imagination, along with guessing and belief, always fell short of knowledge, ending up in opinion (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Ch. 1-2); and at best, he thought that imagination or fancy was useful only for such frills as recreation (*Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, section 108) and oratory (*Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, section 32). However, as I will explain later, the way he thought about the human mind was actually a very important source for succeeding writers who elaborated the idea of imagination.3

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2 Though the distinction is usually associated with Coleridge's name, it was gradually made throughout the 18th century. See Engell, p.172.
3 See section 3-2 below.
As some writers suggest, the idea of imagination is diverse and some uses are quite contradictory to others. Engell says that the idea of imagination was formed like a coral reef which "spread from various centers, then merged to cover a vast area" (p.3). Similarly, Sutton-Smith says, "our current view of the imagination is a patchwork of historically derived textures" (in Egan and Nadaner, p.3).4 Thus, trying to single out one defining characteristic or definition of imagination is futile, and we should avoid implying a form of essentialism, which implies that there is a timeless core of imagination, like the old concept of imagination as a faculty of the mind. Nonetheless, the idea of imagination is not totally random and there are a few central features that are almost invariably involved.

2-2. Translations, similar concepts, and related concepts

The words which tend to be translated into English as "imagination" are, for example, Einbildungskraft (German), and imagination (French). In the context of the history of ideas, Engell's almost encyclopaedic work shows that there were a dozen or so words that may be translated as "imagination" and that the well-known writers on imagination (e.g. Coleridge) borrowed the ideas without necessarily using the words of the original writer. Leibniz's vis activa or la puissance active; Christian Wolff's Facultas fingendi; Dicht- words in German thinkers (Dichtkraft, Dichtungskraft, Dichtungsvermögen; Wolff, Johann N. Tetens); Johann G. Herder's Bildungstrieb, to name a few.5

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4 Cf. also Degenhardt and McKay, in Egan and Nadaner, p.239; Kearney, pp.16-7.
5 Engell says that most of these terms (particularly Dicht- words) came to be unified in Einbildungskraft by the time of Schelling. When a distinction among the kinds of imagination (e.g. whether including intellectual content or not) was necessary, Einbildungskraft and Phatasie were used to suggest the distinction in German-speaking world (pp.178-9).
For example, Engell writes about Tetens' idea of *Dichtungsvermögen* (he used other words as well) and the product of this capacity: "It possesses something unique in itself that is not present in the individual listing of its components, and is thus far a new representation; but also a *simple* one for us, because we differentiate far less of the multiplicity in it than we do in the constituent parts out of which it is formed" (p.121; italics in original). This sounds very much like Coleridge's (mis)understanding of *Einbildungskraft* as a power of "shaping into one" (Warnock, p.92; *Biographia*, Ch.X) and his idea of secondary imagination ("it struggles to idealize and to unify"; *Biographia*, Ch.XIII).6

Indeed, McFarland suggest that the origin of Coleridge's ideas on imagination (including the tripartite distinction between fancy, primary imagination, and secondary imagination) can be traced through David Hartley, Friedrich Schelling, and Tetens to Leibniz (pp.100-7).7

Depending on the definitions, other terms can be used interchangeably with imagination.

(1) If we define imagination as a capacity to form mental pictures or images, Bruner's "iconic thinking" may be akin to imagination (cf. Kirkpatrick's use of imagination).

(2) If we define it as a type of thought which is not like a consecutive or step-by-step reasoning; intuition (numerous writers from Descartes to Bruner, Noddings, etc.; cf. Jagla's uses of intuition and imagination), Buddhist's idea of enlightenment (*bodhi*), suggestion (Dewey), abduction (Peirce), *nous* (Aristotle),

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6 Warnock writes that Coleridge misunderstood "Ein" of German *Einbildungskraft* to mean "one", which in fact means "in" and *Einbildungskraft* means a power of "forming a picture in the mind".

7 Cf. also, Engell, pp.25-32.

8 E.g. *Toward a Theory of Instruction*.

the inner sense (Shaftesbury); the internal sense (Francis Hutcheson), and insight.10

(3) If we define it with an emphasis on innovation or something new, creativity and originality (cf. Rugg's idea of imagination).

(4) Several other words may also be used to mean what the word "imagination" and "imagining" may mean; pretending, supposing, Ah ha!, etc.11

Analytic philosophers from Ryle (1949), Furlong (1961), Barrow (1988, 1992), to White (1990) sift through these terms and now (roughly, after the 1980s), most writers who write anything on imagination usually take this sort of linguistic or conceptual analysis into account. It is not always possible or even necessary to distinguish these concepts from each other clearly, but a certain level of conceptual clarification and historical study of their interrelations should be done.

10 The idea of "intuition" is sometimes very hard to distinguish from the idea of imagination. Some notions of intuition are separable from sensory content (e.g. Descartes), but there are also other ideas of intuition which include perceptual content. The idea of Anschauung in German tradition from Kant, to Herbart and Froebel has this notion. Usually, in Kant, Anschauung is translated as "intuition", while in Herbart, it tends to be translated as "sense-impression" or "concreteness". In the case of Kant, for example, in The Critique of Pure Reason, it implies perceptual content without concept, but in the case of Herbart, it implies both conceptual and perceptual elements.

3. History of ideas about the imagination

3-1. An overview: imagination and Romanticism

It is usually said that the idea of imagination is a product of Romanticism. It is true that Romanticism was to a large extent responsible for popularizing the term, and that the idea of imagination was the quintessential Romantic concept. However, there are a few issues to be clarified, particularly when it comes to the connection between the idea of imagination and educational theories of imagination.

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12 Though not large in number, a few extensive historical studies of imagination are available. For the ancient and medieval periods, Bundy's *The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought*; from the Enlightenment to Romanticism, Abrams' *The Mirror and the Lamp* and Engell's *The Creative Imagination*; Warnock's *Imagination* discusses from Hume to the 20th century philosophy (phenomenology, existentialism, and analytic philosophy); McFarland's *Originality and Imagination*; Kearney's *The Wake of Imagination* includes from ancient theories to postmodernism; White's *The Language of Imagination*, though historical survey is not his central concern, deals from Aristotle to Ryle. Generally speaking, in general philosophy and literary theory, there is a continuation of argument from the ancient times to today. There is a recognizable line of gradual sophistication – if I may call it so – of the concept (towards analytic consistency) from the 17th century to today. But this is not so obvious in educational theory.
3-1-a. What we inherited from Romanticism

First, the truth is that, it is more accurate to say that the idea of imagination created Romanticism rather than that the latter created the former (Engell, p.4); the idea itself was born much earlier than historical Romanticism. Engell says, "Each generation must struggle with the words it uses to act as symbols for its most important ideas" (p.183), and "imagination" worked for the writers in the early 19th century as a symbol to represent the Zeitgeist. Although the idea of imagination became the symbol of the reaction to the thoughts and values of Enlightenment philosophy and the kind of society which was born with it (e.g. the Industrial Revolution), the ideas which constituted the umbrella idea of imagination had existed before Romanticism. For example, an important assumption behind the idea of imagination, that the mind was active rather than a passive recipient of perceptual data, emerged in literary works and criticisms before academic philosophers and Romantic poets started to discuss it (Abrams, p.58; Engell, p.1).

Though it is generally correct that the Enlightenment philosophers did not appreciate imagination as much as the 19th century Romantics did, and that the conception of imagination in the Enlightenment was somewhat different from that of Romanticism, it is not true that philosophy in the 17th and the 18th centuries was negligent of, or hostile to, the idea of imagination. The 17th-18th centuries' conceptions and attitudes toward imagination were much closer to the Romantic attitude than the ancient and medieval conceptions and attitudes. Engell says that in classical British empiricism, "the imagination becomes less diametrically opposed to reason and more the working partner of reason" (p.20), while in ancient and medieval times, imagination represented, rather, irrationality. He further suggests that British empiricism paved the way for German Idealism and Romanticism by taking up the study of what is going on
inside the thinking and perceiving subject (p.98). The same is true with the French *philosophes*, the Enlightenment counterpart in the continent. Chambliss (1974) says that, contrary to popular perception, they did not undervalue imagination as opposed to reason. He writes:

The *philosophes'* approach to developing sciences in the various subjects was no narrow rationalism. They sought to understand the "Sciences of Man" as well as the "Sciences of Nature". And, in doing so, they considered "memory" and "imagination" to be powers of the soul along with "reason". Their efforts along these lines stand as the best reply to those who claim that the *philosophes* were concerned with reason at the expense of imagination. (p.45)

Thus, it seems safe to say that Romantic writers were not the inventors of the idea of imagination.

If the claim that the idea of imagination is a product of Romanticism is to be accepted, it is because of the symbolic meanings which Romanticism gave to it.

For example, imagination is a symbol for the conception of the human mind as active; in educational theory, this conception gave birth to such notions as children as active learners with curiosity and interest.¹³ The epistemology of the 18ᵗʰ century was not quite accommodating to this view. The 18ᵗʰ century philosophers, even those who took up imagination, such as Berkeley, Condillac, and Hume, thought that imagination was a mechanism of the mind which almost automatically works in processing atomistic "ideas" and "impressions" coming in through the senses and arising from the memory.¹⁴ According to these

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¹³ See sections 3-4 below on the principle of self-activity, which is an important Idealistic-Romantic notion.
philosophers' ideas, the Romantic notion that the mind projects as well as receives, or that the object of sense has already been transformed by the subject who perceives, is hard to find. Thus, a shift in the way people conceived the nature of the human mind lies behind the idea of imagination; the eighteenth-century "mirror" to the nineteenth-century "lamp", as Abrams writes.

A significance of the usage of the term, "imagination" or "imaginative", lies in its symbolic meanings; imagination is used to express what it is not, rather than what it is; an expression of rejection, challenge, and critique. Thus, the term is used as an antithesis to the overemphasis on such things as intellect, logos, analysis, formalism, etc., and symbolizes emotion, eros, synthesis, playfulness, etc. Here we find the romantic theme of imagination as a matter of attitude.

3-1-b. What we did not inherit from Romanticism

Second, though it is true that some dictionaries and articles today use words to define and explain imagination which are not too different from those of the Romantic era, what the writers actually mean by these words and the

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15 Warnock, p.126; Abrams, e.g. pp.53, 57-8, 66-8. See for example, "O lady, we receive but what we give" (Coleridge, Dejection: An Ode, 1802) and "that thou must give / Or never can receive" (Wordsworth, The Prelude, Book XIII, 1850).

16 Similarly, Berlin writes on the shift from the Enlightenment to Romanticism:

...there is a body of facts to which we must submit. Science is submission, science is being guided by the nature of things, scrupulous regard for what there is, non-deviation from the facts, understanding, knowledge, adaptation. The opposite of this, which is what the romantic movement proclaimed, may be summarized under two heads. One of these..., namely the notion of the indomitable will: not knowledge of values, but their creation, is what men achieve. (p.119)
philosophical assumptions behind the terms have changed substantially over the years.

In a typical dictionary, imagination is explained as essentially a capacity to rearrange, reproduce, and create images and ideas. From the Enlightenment to the 19th century, imagination was primarily conceived as a perceptual mechanism of processing the mental copies of external objects; and as such, it was not quite conceived as a crucial part of rigorous thought. However, now, imagination is conceived as a part of sophisticated thought, even though it can, and may sometimes, involve perceptual aspects.\footnote{The tendency to think of imagination as a perceptual function (imagination as a capacity to form "mental imagery" is, even in the 20th century, relatively strong among psychologically oriented writers (e.g. G.H.Mead, E. Kirkpatrick).}

Also, in Romanticism, the subject who imagines was conceived as an isolated or \textit{a priori} entity. On the other hand, after pragmatism (e.g. Dewey, Mead) and the emergence of new psychological trends (e.g. Vygotsky), the self who imagines is at least in part conceived as (1) a construct and not given \textit{a priori}, and (2) a product of social interaction.

Thus, we should bear in mind, on the one hand, that our understanding of imagination today is in some important ways different from the romantic understanding of it, while on the other hand, that there are some romantic themes attached to the idea of imagination.

\textbf{3-1-c. Some connections between today's educational theories and Romanticism}

The continuation and difference between the Romantic idea of imagination and today's idea of it is particularly visible in educational theories of

\footnote{The tendency to think of imagination as a perceptual function (imagination as a capacity to form "mental imagery" is, even in the 20th century, relatively strong among psychologically oriented writers (e.g. G.H.Mead, E. Kirkpatrick).}
imagination. On the one hand, there are some echoes of the Romantic conception of imagination; a reaction against such things as academic formalism, rigid organization, a dichotomy between human beings and nature, an over-emphasis on a particular human capacity, and the undervaluing of the child's spontaneity. On the other hand, some aspects of Romanticism are not quite visible in today's conceptions of imagination, for example, an awareness of "something mysterious and unfathomable" (McFarland, p.93). Berlin writes on the Romantic notion of the mind or its power:

Whenever you try to understand anything, by whatever powers you have, you will discover ... that what you are pursuing is inexhaustible, that you are trying to catch the uncatchable, that you are trying to apply a formula to something which evades your formula, because wherever you try to nail it down, new abysses open, and these abysses open to yet other abysses. (p.120)

It is true that 20th-century writings on imagination emphasize that there is no final or absolute answer to learning, inquiry, and experience, but they do not sound quite like the image of "abysses". With a few exceptions, the idea of

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18 Cf. Engell, p.5; Chambliss (1974), p.58; These themes are sometimes discussed in relation to such notions as "holistic", "wholeness", or "balance". Cf. Sloan, Cobb, Pratt.
19 A similar viewpoint is found in Rousseau's philosophy which is both an important source of Romanticism and a critique of the mainstream Enlightenment notions of human nature (particularly as it is manifested in the Encyclopaedists). Charles Taylor points out the aspect of Rousseau's view which is fundamentally incompatible with Enlightenment philosophy. Taylor says that Rousseau rejected the assumption which was commonly held from Descartes to the Encyclopaedists that "we are in principle transparent to ourselves, and only fail to know ourselves through confusion" (p.356). This sounds resonant with McFarland's and Berlin's point about the Romantic conception of the human mind that there is a depth which we cannot know even if it is part of ourselves.
20 See also the following remark in the introduction to a collection of Romantic tales:
imagination, particularly as it is taken up by educational theorists today, is more rational and, in a sense, manageable. As Sutton-Smith says, "Our modern imagination supposes itself to be more rational and orderly, even when it is being nonsensical" (in Egan and Nadaner, p.6). Sutton-Smith's contrast in this quote is to oral cultures and not to Romanticism, but it seems true that the images of imagination in today's discussions do not quite emphasize the notion that it could be disturbing and irrational which writers up to Romanticism seem to have had.\(^{21}\)

Romantic writers did not underestimate the importance of reason, or dichotomize reason and imagination (on the contrary, they tried to unify these notions\(^ {22}\)), but they were more conscious of the dark side of the imagination. The conception of imagination as espoused today has even stronger emphasis on its connection to rationality. In the remaining part of this section, I will elaborate the characteristics of today's conception of imagination by following three major themes of imagination.

Contemporary society found it difficult to cope with Romanticism's uncomfortable tendency to centre on the Nachtseite, 'the darker side' of human existence, the inexplicable self that Enlightenment had sought to force towards the light of day. The Romantic mind revelled in the unknown, the uncanny, and actively pursued relations with a nebulous past filled with indefinite and infinite possibilities – not least, the mysterious world of the fairy tale. (p.xiii)

I observe that the notion of imagination today at least in educational literature tends not have this sense of "the darker side".

\(^{21}\) Psychoanalysis has inherited the romantic notion of abysses or the Nachtseite of the imagination. However, psychoanalytic theories of imagination do not seem to be playing a major role in educational theories of imagination today. An exception may be the role psychoanalysis played in the child-centred pedagogy of the early 20th century.

3-2. The significance of imagination (1): from soul to mind

A major theme which is visible throughout the history of the idea of imagination is above all (1) a symbol of a distinctive human characteristic that indicates the power, at least to some extent, to choose one's own destiny (freedom, creativity, and originality).

This distinctively human characteristic used to be explained theologically as a matter of soul, but as part of the modern reaction against arbitrary authority, both secular and religious, it was replaced by the epistemological explanation as a matter of the mind (McFarland, p.151). If I may simplify the matter; in a theological explanation, it must be through God's grace that human beings could accomplish anything. Thus, imagination as a symbol of freedom was seen negatively or even as heretical, from the ancient to the medieval era (cf. Kearney, Part I). After the emergence of individualism in the Renaissance and, in a different sense, in the Enlightenment, however, this attitude changed; human beings were now believed to be capable, in however humble a way, of improving themselves and avoiding to some extent determination by Nature. This capacity for freedom and choice was thought to reside in the mind as the organ of rationality, which distinguishes human beings from the rest of the world. Therefore, (2) in the modern era, the study of imagination came to be mainly in the realm of epistemology and psychology.

Another important issue is that imagination tends to be regarded as a sort of medium. (3) From its etymological origin, a central function of imagination is

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23 A reasonably modern example of this view is found in Comenius in the 17th century. He writes, referring to the Bible, "Whenever His people went aside from His laws to the snares of man's imagination, God used to blame not only their folly in forsaking the fountain of wisdom (Baruch iii. 12), but the twofold evil that they had committed, in forsaking Him, the fountain of living waters, and hewing them out broken cisterns that could hold no water (Jer. ii. 13)" (p.234).
often understood to be implicit in how an image mediates between various other functions. This connection in turn brings to light the strong connections between image and affect/emotion, which have been reasonably consistent throughout history and across cultures.

In the remainder of this subsection, I will discuss the second point, that is, imagination as a matter of the mind. The problem of mind -- in epistemology and psychology -- is crucially important in understanding modern Western thought and, especially, educational theories. Epistemology and psychology ask about the possibility and means of knowing, which constitute an important part of educational theory.

The kind of epistemology or psychology which gave birth to the distinctively modern idea of imagination is typically seen in Descartes and Locke. Warnock says, "It was, above all, Descartes who set philosophy in the habit of raising the question 'what are we aware of?' in a general form, and of answering that we are aware of the content of our consciousness" (p.13; italics in original). And it was Locke who answered this question by saying that the content a person was aware of when s/he thought and perceived were the "ideas" in the mind (succeeding philosophers, such as Berkeley and Hume, generally followed this line of thought). By forming the problem in this way, these philosophers introduced a paradigm of conceptualizing the psychological processes in which a third item, i.e. the idea, was introduced between the knowing subject and the known object. This paradigm continued until it was challenged by phenomenology and analytic philosophy in the 20th century, and in the old paradigm, imagination was generally regarded as a mechanism of dissociating and associating the "ideas" in the mind.

Although research into and discussion about imagination became prominent among philosophers who wrote in response to Locke (e.g. Berkeley, Leibniz, Hume, Condillac), who had not written approvingly of imagination or fancy, some scholars suggest that Locke himself gave an impetus to postulate
imagination as a mechanism of the mind. Locke's empiricism was not as radical as that of, for example, Condillac and Hume, for he gave the mind a sort of active power to manipulate "ideas" (Abrams, p.63; Engell, p.18). Locke writes:

As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together I call 'complex'... (Essay, Book II, Ch.12, Section 1; cf. Engell, p.19; my emphasis)

Locke himself did not elaborate on the nature of this power or process of combining; other theorists named it "imagination" and tried to explain it (Engell, p.19).

The idea of the mind's active power brought about the kind of signification which we attach to the idea of imagination today, and it was, somewhat contrary to popular perception, partly an elaboration of Lockean epistemology and partly a reaction to it.

There were influences from various other traditions such as neo-Platonism and Leibniz. Among them, German Idealism consolidated the

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24 Condillac and Hume tried to resolve the inconsistency or half-heartedness of Locke's empiricism. Condillac's position is sometimes called sensationism because he tried to get rid of Locke's notion of "reflection", which accommodates the notion of the active power of the mind, by reducing everything to sensation (cf. Chambliss, "Condillac"). Also, see Deleuze's account of Hume's idea of imagination (p.23). Interestingly, though Hume gave a prominent place to imagination in his explanation of how the ideas and impressions are combined and separated in the mind, his theory of imagination may be interpreted as not particularly promoting the conception of the mind as active; in Hume, imagination is a function of ideas and not exactly a power of the mind.
notion of the mind as active, or at least provided the notion that the mind had something to contribute in the process of perception, as well as being simply a receiver of impressions. For example, Kant says:

Imagination is the power of presenting an object in intuition even without the object's being present. Now, all our intuition is sensible; and hence the imagination, because of the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. Yet the synthesis of imagination is an exercise of spontaneity, which is determinative, rather than merely determinable, as is sense... (Critique of Pure Reason, p.191; italics in original)

He also had an idea of the "productive imagination" which included the "willed imagination" in distinction from the "reproductive imagination" which is an automatic associative mechanism.27

Various ideas which Romantic writers (e.g. Coleridge) adopted from German Idealist philosophers have been pointed out: for example, the similarity between Schelling's "In-Eins-Bildung" and Coleridge's "essemplastic" (Engell, p.122). Both McFarland and Engell trace the origin of Coleridge's tripartite distinction of the imaginative capacity through Kant to Tetens (McFarland,

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25 E.g. Plotinus' idea of "emanation" (Abrams, p.58). Abrams suggests that neo-Platonism influenced the formation of the idea of imagination via the Cambridge Platonists (He says that, more accurately, they should be called Plotinists; p.59).

26 Abrams, p.202; Engell, pp.29-30; McFarland, p.36.

27 Engell, p.138; See Kant's distinction between the "reproductive" and "productive" imaginations, Critique of Pure Reason, pp.191-2; cf. also, Murdoch, p.308.
A couple of new notions, between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, are summarized in Kant. First, the perceiving/thinking subject does not just receive perceptual data ("intuitions") but has something to contribute. Second, imagination is connected to the understanding (and concepts) as well as to the senses (and perceptual data). Third, part of imagination works with the will, that is, the imagination does not always work automatically.

For a long time, theories of imagination relied on the vocabulary of Enlightenment philosophy (e.g., idea, impression, faculty, etc.). Even in twentieth century books and articles, definitions of imagination are sometimes almost the same as those of Descartes, Kant or Coleridge. However, the reading of actual contexts suggests that today's authors do not necessarily follow these old languages literally. The problem with philosophers up to the early 20th century

28 There are other suggestions as well. McFarland suggests that ultimately the origin of the tripartite ideas goes back to Leibniz's *vis activa* (pp. 116–7). He also says that Coleridge's tripartite distinctions were not satisfactory to Coleridge himself, and suggests the connection between Coleridge and Schelling: "Coleridge has been following Schelling's line of reasoning, found himself unable to reconcile it with the threefold distinction — which neither comes from nor paralleled by anything in Schelling — and so he wrote himself a letter promising a later rethinking, while leaving as a down payment, as it were, the statements about primary imagination, secondary imagination, and fancy" (p. 92); a promise which Coleridge never kept. Engell suggests also that Coleridge's "threefold distinction bears directly upon Kant's three final objects of human reason; the freedom of will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God" (p. 89).

29 For example, Kant's definition in *The Critique of Pure Reason* is: "Imagination is the power of presenting an object in intuition even without the object's being present" (p. 191; emphases in original). Even today, imagination is defined, for example, as "The capacity to consider sensible objects without actually perceiving them or supposing them that they really exist." This does not sound very different from Kant's definition, but usually writers are aware of, and trying to make, the differences. The following explanation is added to the latter definition: "Philosophers have disagreed over whether or not acts of imagination necessarily involve mental images or ideas" (*A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names*).
was that though they might have been aware of the wrong assumptions and logical confusions in earlier definitions and arguments, they did not elaborate the analysis.30

It was phenomenology and analytic philosophy that clarified the assumptions and languages of earlier philosophy.

Phenomenology challenged the notion of the third item of perception and thought; Descartes and Locke’s assumption that we are aware of the content of the mind is rejected by phenomenologists as unnecessary. The old philosophy rigidly separates perception (a matter of receiving ideas and impressions) and thought (a matter of the "Understanding" which applies concepts)31. For example, an abstract concept is to be had as a result of comparing similar elements embedded in the ideas of various perceived objects, while imagination always deals with particulars and does not reach the level of abstraction and generalization.32 However, phenomenologists think that there is no separation between them. They say that when we perceive something, we perceive the object and not a mental copy (an idea) of the object. As Warnock writes vis-à-vis Husserl, "In seeing, we immediately see an object as instantiating a concept"

30 We have to note, though, that some writers suggest that even these early writers did not follow their own languages literally. White argues that they were so caught up with “a connection between imagination with imagery” that they did not realize the contradiction between their definition of imagination as a capacity for processing quasi-visual images and their actual use of it (p.6).
32 E.g. Rousseau writes, "...and the difference between the two is that images are only absolute depictions of sensible objects, while ideas are notions of objects determined by relations. An image can stand all alone in the mind which represents it, but every idea supposes other ideas. When one imagines, one does nothing but see; when one conceives, one is comparing" (Émile, Book II, p.107).
(p.144). The same point was made by some psychologists too. An important consequence of these views is that, the imagination in the sense of Hume or Kant at least partly loses its place, for there are no ideas, impressions, or intuitions to be dissolved and assembled (Warnock, p.148). Though, metaphorically speaking, separation and combination of perceptual elements may occur in creating an image of something which does not exist in reality, this is no longer a primary meaning of imagination.

In another new approach to philosophy, philosophers like Wittgenstein and Ryle analyzed the definitions and uses of terms such as "to imagine" or "having an image of" and pointed out the confusions and contradictions in them. Imagination is typically discussed as if it is a power to have various and vivid images, and an image tends to be defined as a mental picture or a quasi-visual perception, like a photograph without a material sheet of paper. Against this, they argue that an image can be visual or perceptual, but not necessarily, or even primarily, so. An image of Mr. Smith may be, in a sense, visual, but an image of Mr. Smith is not the same as that of his twin brother even though they are visually identical; then, what makes an image of Mr. Smith what it is is not its visual characteristics. It is one's intention to think of it as an image of Mr. Smith. Similarly, an image of the world without war is not necessarily perceptual; it is rather a hypothetical thinking that the world would be like such and such if there was not a war. Thus, to use one's imagination, or to imagine, implies a way of thinking, and not a perceptual mechanism.

33 For example, Arnheim demonstrates that the separation of concrete vs. abstract, perception vs. thought, and word/concept vs. image, are often false, and says that "the cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of mental processes above and beyond perception but the essential ingredients of perception itself" (p.13). He further argues that rational and productive thinking takes place in concrete forms (e.g. pp.108-9).

34 See, for example, Ryle, Warnock, White, and Egan (1992).
These arguments add up to the idea of imagination as we have it today. Having an image of something means a way to think of it (similar to Wittgenstein's idea that seeing something as such and such is akin to having an image of so and so; Warnock, p.190). To imagine something means to think of it in a certain way, rather than having a quasi-visual mental picture of it. Imagination becomes a matter of having a capacity for a certain mode of thinking. To be imaginative becomes a matter of having an ability and tendency to engage in a certain way of thinking. Thus, as Egan (1992) writes, it is better to think that imagination implies a particular flexibility of the mind, that is, a capacity to think of things in a manner not tightly constrained by the actual (p.36). Or as a few other writers say, in different expressions but with substantially the same meaning, imagination means a capacity to think of alternative/multiple possibilities, to break with the habitual/mechanical, or to go beyond the given in order not to fall victim to what is simply given which often contains false alternatives (e.g. Dewey, 1916/1985, 1934a/1987; Warnock; Bailin; Greene, 1995; Garrison; McCleary). In short, imagination now implies more than a mechanism of the mind and does not imply any special power distinct from other psychological functions. But rather, imagination implies a certain mode of thinking which accommodates more than usual diversity and flexibility.

3-3. The significance of imagination (2): freedom

The idea of imagination, whether ancient or modern, implies some sort of freedom. In this section, I will examine the particular manifestation of this connection in the modern West.

In the Enlightenment, the idea of freedom came to be related to rationality or reason. Freedom was, first of all, a matter of freedom from arbitrary things. This theme appears in educational thought with dual faces. On the one hand, it
implies the development of a person's intellectual and moral freedom from social/cultural norms, values, and opinions. On the other hand, it implies the development of a person's capacity for self-mastery (i.e. freedom from blind instincts, arbitrary desires, and appetites). Though it is not necessarily so, these two may point completely opposite directions; the latter may suggest conformity to existing social or cultural norms, values, and institutions, while the former may suggest non-conformity to them. Educational theories of such modern thinkers as Comenius, Locke, and Rousseau, all have dual aspects. Even today, the balance between these two is a contested issue.35 Whichever side the emphasis was on in each thinker's mind and writing, imagination was discussed in relation to the issue of self-mastery most of the time, and regarded most likely as a hindrance to it. In typical dichotomous distinctions of mind/body, reason/sense, and abstract/concrete, imagination tended to be categorized in the latter set (body, sense, and concrete) and associated with other items subsumed under the same set (e.g. appetite, desire, emotion, impulse, etc.). Thus, imagination was, generally speaking, seen with suspicious eyes.

If the Enlightenment meant what Kant suggested36, it can be interpreted as primarily an educational project, and the achievement of autonomous rationality was its chief aim. This theme became clear in Rousseau's writing (and it is said that Kant read Émile with such enthusiasm that he missed his regular walk which was claimed to be more regular than clocks) in his emphasis on the development of rationality both as a capacity not to be merely complacent with societal norms and opinions, and as a capacity to be free from whims. In conformity with general atmosphere of his time, Rousseau thought that

35 E.g. Hanson, in Egan and Nadaner, p.137; cf. also, the conflict between the Platonic ideas and socialization in the "three incompatible ideas" of education in Egan (1997).
36 See, the first paragraph of Kant's What is Enlightenment? [1784]. He says that the Enlightenment means to exit from the state of immaturity, i.e. "the incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance of another" (Basic Writings of Kant, p.135).
imagination in tandem with passion would inflate irrational desire. However, it was also in Rousseau in which the notion of where imagination may be important became explicit. It is true that Rousseau denounced inflating or stimulating the children's imagination in order not to let them expect more than what Nature gives them (Émile, Book II, pp.80-1), but, he also says that moral sentiment is impossible unless the person's "imagination is animated and begins to transport him out of himself" (ibid., Book IV, p.223).

It is hard to show if there are causal connections or to name a specific time or a thinker, but somehow, in the process of overcoming dichotomous thinking, some human characteristics which used to be considered as irrational came to be accepted as a legitimate part of rationality. In earlier days, for example, Descartes and Locke thought that the best form of thinking to reach truths was, first, to break the process of reasoning into the smallest possible steps, and second, to ensure absolute certainty at every one of these steps (Descartes, Discourse, part II; Locke, Essay, Book IV, Ch. II-7). Descartes thought that imagination may help reasoning in some cases (e.g. geometry) but hinders it in other cases (e.g. metaphysics); but in any case, he did not think that imagination was essential for understanding or rationality (White, pp.21-2; Descartes, Meditations, Meditation VI); and Locke disliked fancy, guess, and belief, because they always come short of knowledge (Essay, Book IV, Ch. I-2).

By the time of Descartes and Locke, however, the emphasis had already moved somewhat from the ancient and medieval belief in rational intuition which was supposed to grasp the absolute truth immediately, to the modern belief in the humanly best possible certainty (a capacity for judging impartially or without relying on arbitrary sources). Though in Descartes, priority was still given to the immediate grasp of truths and deductive reasoning, the empiricism of Locke and others took a step further to a point of accommodating first-hand non-arbitrary
knowledge, which usually meant knowledge gained through the five senses. In this scheme, on the one hand, imagination was not given a prominent place; it implied primarily wandering from knowledge into the realm of opinion, because it lacks empirically confirmable evidence. At best, it was given an auxiliary function of connecting perceptual data gained through experience to concepts or abstract ideas in the mind. On the other hand, however, by introducing empirical aspects as a legitimate ground for knowledge, Locke initiated a huge step toward the reconciliation of the dichotomy; what belongs to the body and the senses, as opposed to the mind or reason, was now given a legitimate status in achieving rationality.

Imagination had a stronger association with the body or its senses, so, it was, by definition, antithetical to reason. However, the old conception of reason as a power of direct intuition/apprehension of Nature, Law, or what is arranged by God (since Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, and to some extent Locke), was eroded by newly emerging confidence in sense-experience; and this process started almost at the same time as modern dichotomies were created. Combined with other elements, the revision or expansion of the notion of rationality gradually gained momentum.

By the early twentieth century, the notion of reason came formally to include guessing or the imaginative grasp of a tentative conclusion (hypothesis)

37 E.g. Comenius liked knowing or judging "not by the intellects of other men, but by his own" (Keatinge, pp.82, 148). Locke said, "We should not judge of things by men's opinions, but of opinions by things" (Conduct, section 24). Rousseau said that "since everything which enters into the human understanding comes there through the senses, man's first reason is a reason of senses" (Émile, p.125). Cf. also, Locke, Essay, Book IV, Chapters II-III.

38 For example, Comenius writes, "all knowledge begins by sensuous perception; then through the medium of the imagination it enters the province of the memory; then, by dwelling on the particulars, comprehension of the universal arises" (p.135). Similar ideas are seen in Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, etc.

as seen in Peirce's notion of "abduction"\textsuperscript{40} and Dewey's notion of "suggestion" (cf. 1933/1986, Ch.7) counterbalanced by that of verification which is a continued theme from traditional empiricism.\textsuperscript{41} Also, as evident in Dewey, felt uncomfortableness came to be regarded as a legitimate element to initiate reasoning initially. Psychologists too started to recognize some aspects of human mental life which cannot be reduced to scientific (or more accurately, cause-effect) explanation, for example, William James, Lev Vygotsky, and Carl Jung.

On the surface of it, the belief in reason or rationality as a principal means for achieving freedom may be unchanged, but the notion of what reason or rationality means and includes has changed significantly; the inclusion of imagination or an imaginative aspect of thought is a major part of the change. Similarly, on the surface of it, the Enlightenment project to be free from arbitrary things has not changed, but some assumptions or beliefs, for instance, the existence of objective knowledge and the transparency of language, were now challenged, and a capacity to think of alternative possibilities to what seems to be true started to be appreciated (a critical or skeptical attitude, multiple perspectives).

These connections had been at least to some extent implicit throughout the development of modern Western philosophy, but became explicit only in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century to the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

Now, some postmodernists may argue that such modern notions as the autonomous subject and imagination, are untenable and should be discarded. Some may argue, as Kearney writes of Lacan and Althusser, for "a postmodern deconstruction of the human subject as origin of meaning" (p.264). If the idea of

\textsuperscript{40} Or "retroduction"; See "Abduction and Induction" in Philosophical Writings of Peirce.
\textsuperscript{41} Cf. for example, from the following quote from Descartes: "...nevertheless I can avoid error in the other way, which depends solely on my remembering to abstain from making judgments whenever the truth of a given matter is not apparent." (Meditation, Meditation 4, p.41). Guessing is the surest way for mistake in Descartes' view.
imagination is a symbol of human freedom to choose our own destiny or that of our capacity to create something new, some postmodernists would certainly cast doubt on these notions. They would argue that we are not free to choose or create, because, as products of social, cultural, and historical (and sometimes our unconscious) contingencies, we are not autonomous subjects in the modernist's sense. Moreover, the very idea of creation presupposes the possibility of telling its originality, but in the web of influences, it may be impossible to establish the criterion of originality.42

However, today's theorists of imagination, while being critical of various aspects of modernism, do not tend to go that far. While they see some problems in what may be called modernism, they do not try to throw away everything (e.g. Kearney, pp.360-1; Greene, 1995, p.197; Johnson, p.220). The very foundation of the idea of imagination, i.e. the idea of autonomous subject as a centre and originator of meaning, for example, may need to be de-cantered, but not to be discarded. As Kearney writes:

So that while accepting that the 'humanist imagination' does indeed require decentering – in so far as it tends to sustain the untenable claim that the autonomous individual is the sole master and solitary center of all meaning – we must insist on the possibility, in the wake of deconstruction, of restoring some notion of a properly human imagination. (pp.360-1; italics in original)

The idea of imagination was formed gradually in the process of re-centering and de-centering, so to speak, what human beings can achieve: re-centering from God's grace to human capacity; and de-centering from Platonic or Aristotelian notions of intuitive reason (*noesis* or *nous*) as immediate grasp of the Truth to the modern notion of humanly possible rationality as a matter of probability and empirical certainty (as opposed to *a priori* certainty), and to the

42 Cf. also, Bowers (1995).
contemporary notions of multiple possibilities and perspectives. While it is impossible to have absolute certainty, we sometimes become dissatisfied with what we have here and now, imagine and want that things could be otherwise. And whatever influences or contingencies we knowingly or unknowingly have to live with, it is still each one of us who chooses and decides and no one can take over his/her place in choosing and deciding (cf. Greene, 1995, p.70).

3-4. The significance of imagination (3): imagination and image

Etymologically, imagination (and fancy) suggests a capacity to have images, and an image usually implies a visual image or a mental picture. To imagine something is very often understood as to have a visual image of something rather than to have an idea or concept of something.

The pre-literate world was aware of the power of image (Egan, 1988; 1992, pp.10-12; Sutton-Smith, 1988). For their concreteness and vividness, images were thought to have a power to arouse emotional associations. In ancient times and in oral cultures, people used vivid images to transmit cultural knowledge (thus, imagination in terms of image-forming was retrospective and conservative43). Moreover, very importantly, in oral cultures, imagination or image-forming was not primarily a function of the individual mind, but rather "the mnemonic or historical requirements of group preservation" (Sutton-Smith, 1988, p.5). However, in abstract philosophical systems which came with literacy or in the dominance of Christian theology, this power of arousing strong emotion was commonly considered liable to be misleading and dangerous. Philosophers of education in the early modern era, such as Montaigne and Comenius, had this

43 For example, Aristotle's concept of phantasmata is, according to White, not a capacity to depart from the actual (p.9).
tendency of seeing images as dangerous and misleading.\textsuperscript{44} The fear of imagination's power to stir emotions became less emphasized as time passed by, and the use of imagination as an image-forming faculty, which was a useful but relatively feeble aid for connecting the concrete and the abstract came to the fore.\textsuperscript{45}

Descartes wrote, "imagining is merely the contemplating of the shape or image of a corporal thing" (\textit{Meditation}, Meditation II, p.20). Imagination as a power to form mental pictures was thought to be able to provide only concrete examples, and not abstract ideas or concepts which only "reason" or "understanding" could provide. From the days of Plato and Aristotle to the early twentieth century, the use of the image was seen as a sort of visual aid to scaffold the individual who was not yet capable of abstract thought.

Until recently it was exactly this aspect that was thought to be the major function of imagination, particularly in the context of educational theory and practice. Those who wrote about the use of imagination in education in the early twentieth century (e.g. McMillan, Kirkpatrick) still thought that the major part of imagining was imaging. And in the latter part of the twentieth century, it was exactly the notion of image as visual that was challenged, most conspicuously by analytic philosophy.

Usually, an image was contrasted, first, to an abstract idea or concept (an important purpose of education), and second, to a mere word or book-learning (a principal method of instruction). In modern educational theories from Comenius

\textsuperscript{44} Montaigne even writes about the cases where powerful images had physical effect on the people who had them. Cf. "On the Power of the Imagination" in his \textit{Essays}.

\textsuperscript{45} Today, though the connection between imagination and emotion is important (as an antithesis to the kind of view which considers rationality or intelligence entirely separable from other aspects of human experience, such as affect/emotion and body), the kinds of emotion or feeling are not dangerous or disturbing in most cases; wonder, pleasure, excitement, passion about knowing, etc.
to Pestalozzi and Herbart, the importance of having first-hand experience was emphasized as an antithesis to the type of learning based on second-hand knowledge (recitation, book-learning, etc.). The modern emphasis on first-hand knowledge, that is, knowledge with evidence – it usually means the matching of ideas or words and what is perceived through the senses -- implies a certain level of trust in the five senses of human beings. This view contributed to the formation of the modern educational principle and practice which logically did not insist on the rigid dichotomy of mind/body and reason/senses. Just as in Kant's famous observation -- "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (Critique of Pure Reason, Book I, Part II, Transcendental Logic, p.107) -- while theorists of education thought that the ultimate aim should be abstract, generalizable knowledge (concept, idea, principle, etc.), they thought that abstract knowledge by itself was useless and meaningless. As matters of epistemology and instructional methodology, they thought that images were the media which gave concrete contents to words or concepts and helped memorization.

This notion about the use of imagination as image-forming which supplies content to abstract ideas or concepts is found in the 19th century educational principle of Anschauung.46 In their theories of Anschauung, Pestalozzi and Herbart insisted on the subordinate status of imagination (image-forming) to well-trained Anschauung, which partly included a power to understand the abstract ideas behind concrete examples (Pestalozzi, p.89, "merely sensuous

46 This German term does not have an English equivalent. In the context of Kant's works, it is usually translated as intuition (as opposed to concept), and in the context of the educational theories of Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel, it is usually translated as "sense-perception" or rather awkwardly as "concreteness". It usually means concrete examples (i.e. examples which can be captured by the five senses -- mostly the visual sense) which illustrate abstract ideas.
As far as I know, they do not use the word imagination very often. In their writings, Anschauung, which in normal usage means "perception", "view", or "concrete examples", overlaps with image-forming; but imagination, besides its connection with images, is not given a high status, primarily because it is not by itself connected to reason or rationality, i.e. a capacity to handle abstract, general ideas. They thought that the core of education should be to develop the capacity to see patterns or meanings behind the concrete examples (the art or method of Anschauung), and did not appreciate mere receiving of perceptual data or images (mere Anschauung). This theme becomes gradually clear in the process of going beyond earlier (empirical) educational theories, for example Rousseau's theme of letting Nature and things themselves teach while avoiding verbal lessons. In Pestalozzi and Herbart, Nature is thought of as presenting materials in a raw state which are usually confused. Pestalozzi writes:

The world ... lies before our eyes like a sea of confused sense-impressions, flowing one into the other. If our development, through Nature only, is not sufficiently rapid and unimpeded, the business of instruction is to remove the confusion of these sense-impressions; to separate the objects one from another; to put together in imagination those that resemble or are related to each other, and in this way to make all clear to us, and by perfect clearness in these, to raise in us distinct ideas. (p.85)

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47 Herbart may be distinguishing imagination or fancy (as image-forming when not strictly following abstract concept) from Einbildungskraft (in Kant's sense, i.e. a power between conception and intuition). Cf. Eckoff, Ch. I, section III.

48 Cf. Pestalozzi writes, "If we consider sense-impression as opposed to the art of sense-impression or Anschauung separately and by itself, it is nothing but the presence of the external object before the senses which rouses a consciousness of the impression made by it" (p.144; italics in original).
Pestalozzi and Herbart thought that the images or concrete examples which children receive were by themselves confused and needed to be sorted out in a systematic method.

Their idea of Anschauung has another important point which shows their Idealistic-Romantic orientation as well as empirical orientation. The notion of sorting the sense-impressions or images went hand in hand with the notion that children's minds are not blank or passive. Adopting the Idealistic-Romantic notion that the subject has something to contribute to what s/he perceives, they thought that children had some capacity not to be mere receptacles. The important point is, though they acknowledged that children had potential to sort the sense-impressions, they also thought that a systematic method to guide them was necessary. And they called it the method (or art) of Anschauung.

It is interesting to note that these theorists of education from Rousseau to Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel, have some Romantic ideas, such as their emphasis on growth or development according to Nature. Their ideas of the methodological uses of Anschauung (though Rousseau did not use the term) tend to go with a belief in the active nature of the learner (child), which is usually referred to as a principle of "self-activity". Silber, in her biographical study of Pestalozzi, writes, "The most important and essentially new principle of his [Pestalozzi's] time is that of spontaneity or self-activity" (p.140). She says:

It [the principle of self-activity] implies that the child should not be given ready-made answers but should arrive at solutions himself and that, in order to enable him to do this, his own powers of perceiving, judging, and reasoning should be cultivated, his self-activity encouraged (ibid., p.140).

49 Cf. also, Froebel, *The Education of Man*, Section 9.
Such a claim has unmistakably a mark of Idealism and Romanticism. However, their appreciations of sense-experience, image-forming, and self-activity did not add up to the appreciation of imagination as we understand it today. Their primary concern was developing the capacity to acquire abstract knowledge (though with concrete content), which was still not very different from Descartes' and Locke's notions of clear and distinct ideas.

In the early twentieth century, the image and imagination came to include a stronger sense of thought rather than perception. Though in terms of conceptual or linguistic analysis, it was still vague and confused, we see a prototype of today's conception of imagination, for example, in Dewey and Peirce's view of imagination.

In Dewey and Peirce, imagination is discussed as, first, hypothetical thinking in the process of scientific thought ("reflective thought" in Dewey's term) along with the process of verification; and second, as an antithesis to (1) the mechanical and the habitual as well as (2) the merely fanciful.50

First, both Dewey and Peirce think highly of the role of imagination in good thinking; Dewey, more or less in general, and particularly in connection to education, and Peirce in the context of scientific thought. Dewey, for example, speaks of a person who is "logical", "thoughtful" or "reflective", as opposed to the one who "wanders aimlessly", "shifts his topic without being aware of it", "skips about at random", and "not only jumps to a conclusion (all of us have to do at some point), but ... fails to retrace his steps to see whether the conclusion to which he has jumped is supported by evidence" (1933/1986, p.175). Dewey's point about one's thought which is not "at random" but is "supported by

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50 I am taking up only one aspect, though an important one, of Dewey's theory of imagination. He also discusses imagination in the context of sense-making, and in this context, he sometimes (particularly in his early writings) writes as if imagination is the same as visualization. See for example, the chapter on imagination in his *Psychology* (1887), and his lecture on imagination in 1902. I am not aware of other contexts in which Peirce talks about imagination.
evidence" is usually mentioned as the gist of "reflective thought" in pragmatism. However, as he puts it in parentheses -- "all of us have to [jump to a conclusion] at some point" – the process of such jumping, so to speak, is also an important aspect of reflective thought. He says:

These imaginative enterprises often precede thinking of the close-knit type and prepare the way for it. In this sense, a thought or idea is a mental picture of something not actually present, and thinking is the succession of such pictures. (ibid., p.115)

Though he uses the expression, "a mental picture", what he means is not necessarily visual or perceptual, for he says that the "imaginative enterprise" which precedes "thinking of the close-knit type" is a matter of "suggested possibility" (ibid., pp.118-9). Peirce also writes, "When a man desires ardently to know the truth, his first effort will be to imagine what that truth can be" ("The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism", in Philosophical Writings, p.43). And, he goes as far as to say, "It is not too much to say that next after the passion to learn there is no quality so indispensable to the successful prosecution of science as imagination" (ibid., p.43). Their points about hypothetical thinking or the leap of imagination in reflective/scientific thought is the rejection of the old view that the most reliable thought happens in successive steps of absolute certainty (cf. ibid., p.45). So, the major part of good thinking and intellectual education is, as Dewey says, "the formation of wide-awake, careful, thorough habits of thinking" (1933/1986, p.177) which includes an attitude not to "take observations at their face value" (ibid., p.175) and "to give full attention to alternative possibilities; to recognize the possibility of error even in the beliefs that are dearest to us" (ibid., p.136).

Second, in Peirce and Dewey, imaginative capacity is an antithesis to, on the one hand, mechanical or habitual thinking, and on the other, the merely fanciful or imaginary thinking. Dewey says, "The peculiar quality of the
imaginative is best understood when placed in opposition to the narrowing effect of habituation" (1934a/1987, p.273; also, 1916/85, p.244). He also writes:

The proper function of imagination is vision of realities and possibilities that cannot be exhibited under existing conditions of sense perception. Clear insight into the remote, the absent, the obscure is its aim... Imagination supplements and deepens observation; only when it turns into the fanciful does it become a substitute for observation and lose logical force. (1933/1986, p.351)

As to the fanciful and the imaginary, they both write these are not the same as the valuable function of imagination (Dewey, 1933/1986, p.289; Peirce, pp.43-4). Dewey criticizes the school whose "chief aim is to establish mechanical habit and instill uniformity of conduct":

Unfortunately, reaction against this mechanical administration of education is often merely a reaction. Novelty is treated as if it were an end in itself, when in fact it is simply a stimulating occasion for the exercise of observation and inquiry. Variety is carried to the point where it is incompatible with the continuity that is essential for good thinking. (1933/1986, p.155; italics in original)

The most important point is that while they emphasize the connection between imagination and inquiry into reality, they are aware that the inquiry into reality needs to go beyond the immediate and entertain various possibilities. In the old scheme of Descartes and Locke, the attempt to see reality more accurately was done via intuitive certainty and empirical observations which are bounded by the immediately given. On the other hand, the kinds of notions which Dewey and Peirce had about imagination (in relation to good thinking) seem quite in line with our current view of imagination as a capacity to think flexibly.

Similar arguments are found in other areas, for example, in the psychology of Vygotsky. Though his definition of imagination still suggests perceptual
aspects, his elaboration of the topic clearly indicates elements of thought (1987, p.339). My reading of some twentieth-century writers on imagination and education, from Dewey, Vygotsky, and McMillan in the early 20th century, to Greene, Johnson, and Egan today, is that their reasons for taking imagination seriously are not due to the function of imagination as a perceptual mechanism, but the connection between imagination in terms of a particular mode of thought and such educational values as rationality, social critique, empathy, and creativity.

By the mid to late twentieth century, the idea that concrete images cannot be rigidly separated from abstract or general concepts/thoughts became almost taken for granted, at least in academic writings. As Warnock says, "perception cannot be separated from interpretation" (p.10; cf. also Nadaner, in Egan and Nadaner, p. 109). The idea of imagination as a capacity to "reproduce" or "represent" images by dissociating and associating "ideas" and "impressions" must be re-interpreted as a capacity for sense-making, interpretation, and understanding which goes beyond "visual" images, remain in the concrete, or get stuck in the here and now.

3-5. The uses of the imagination

In the older theological schemes, and in conservative political regimes and social arrangements, the creative power or freedom of human beings was mostly regarded in terms of its potential for leading to rebellion against authority.

Skeptical attitudes toward imagination continued, particularly in educational theories, even while general philosophy and literary theories increasingly appreciated it. Under the dichotomy of body vs. mind, sensation vs. reason, imagination as a curious mediator between the two was regarded at best as a useful device for memorization or for such frills as recreation, but at worst,
as a hindrance to reason and rational self-mastery. As late as the 19th century, Herbart said that there were three attitudes in children; "desiring", "observing" and "fancying". Regarding which of these three should be encouraged and become dominant, he indicated not the first and the third, because "out of desiring and fancying originates the controlling power of whims and delusion," while "From observation ... originates a knowledge of the nature of things" (Eckoff, p.137).

There was a gradual shift in the attitude toward what may be called the imaginative capacity during the modern era, for example, from Locke's view that "the exercise of rationality is the way we take part in God's plan" (Taylor, p.242) to Froebel's view that considered creative activity to be what God intended. However, it was only when imagination was conceptually related to a central part of rationality that it started to be seen as of educational value. In educational theories, this did not happen until the early twentieth century in pragmatism (e.g. Dewey) and new psychological theories (e.g. Vygotsky).

Here, I should add a little explanation, because the association between imagination and the pragmatism of Dewey would sound odd to some readers. Usually, pragmatism is associated with such ideas as "instrumental" or "pragmatic" in the common meanings of the term; or sometimes, Dewey is criticized for being too "scientific". However, when we take into account pragmatism's project to challenge the notion of absolute certainty or the dichotomy of theory and practice, it would not be so surprising. Diggins writes, "pragmatism ... offered the promise that modern man could somehow study the world scientifically and live it spiritually" (p.11). Pragmatists like Dewey, while believing in the scientific method, tried not to fall into reductionistic, cause-effect thinking; they appreciated imagination and refused to disconnect the aesthetic, moral, and intellectual domains (cf. Garrison, p.63; Johnson, p.208). Dewey says that the imagination "designates a quality that animates and pervades all processes of making and observation" (1934a/1987, p.271), which sounds like
Wordsworth's "Imagination is ... Reason in her most exalted mood" (The Prelude), and Egan's idea today, "Imagination ... is a particular flexibility which can invigorate all mental functions" (1992, p.36).

Compared to other traditions, pragmatism at least tried to synthesize various threads of thought discussed in this chapter: the Enlightenment project of developing rationality and subsequent revisions or expansions of it in, particularly, German Idealism and Romanticism; the Romantic reaction to formalism and systematization; the new conception of the mind as a "lamp"; the Romantic emphasis on growth (metaphorically suggesting the nature of a plant) in conjunction with the Darwinian idea of evolution. Chambliss is one of the scholars who mention the existence of some Romantic themes in Dewey's pragmatism, which are seen, for example, in his criticism of the tendency in the early twentieth century to quantify learning. Chambliss quotes Dewey, "What already exists by way of native endowment and past achievement is subordinated to what may become" ("Romanticism" in Encyclopedia).

I do not mean to say that all contemporary theorists of imagination are pragmatists. Obviously they are not; except for such individuals as Johnson, Greene, and Garrison, who explicitly acknowledge their indebtedness to pragmatism (particularly Dewey's brand), there are many others who do not even mention pragmatism. Among other theoretical sources, Rudolf Steiner's educational ideas and psychoanalytic tradition may be relatively well-known. But they are either not quite visible in contemporary educational theories of imagination or tend to be seen as relatively exotic alternatives (See Ch.4). This may only show how pervasive the influence of pragmatism is in North America, where most of the literature I have used was produced, but I sense something more than that.

51 See for example, Dewey's comment on Froebel in Democracy and Education, pp.62-3.
4. What imagination means and why it is important: contemporary discussions

4-1. Comparisons

On the surface of it, there are various interpretations of what imagination means and why it is important, but it seems to me that there are a few central concerns. For example, compare the following remarks:

...the imagination is not simply a capacity to form images, but is a capacity to think in a particular way. It is a way that crucially involves our capacity to think of the possible rather than the actual. (Egan, 1992, p.4; cf. White, p.184)

...of all our cognitive capacities, imagination is the one that permits us to give credence to alternative realities. It allows us to break with the taken for granted, to set aside familiar distinctions and definitions. (Greene, 1995, p.3)

Most realists present themselves as tough-minded, task-driven doers. Ironically, they are often just docile conformists with weak imaginations. For without imagination, people are slaves of the actual. (Garrison, pp.76-7)

Their conceptions of imagination all imply rejection of mere compliance to the actual or the taken for granted. They do not take up imagination as a way to escape from the actual, but as a way to become aware of reality in a better way.
After analytic philosophy made conceptual distinctions between imagination and other concepts, theorists seem to have become concerned about the distinctive meaning of imagination as a part of justifying why we should take imagination seriously. They are now more cautious about the use of such expressions as "to imagine", "to be imaginative", and "to use one's imagination", and a sort of core seems to be imagination as a flexibility of thought. Rather than regarding imagination as an escape from reality (mere fancying or merely imaginary), they tend to see imagination as a way of thinking and understanding which grasps reality more critically by becoming aware of hidden or alternative possibilities. As Greene quotes from Sartre, who emphasized the meaning of freedom in relation to imagination, we cannot realize the defects of actuality until we realize alternative state of affairs (1995, p.5).

I think it reasonable to say that the major motive behind today's appreciation of imagination is a reaction against the narrow view of reason and rationality which is usually associated with the idea of modernism, particularly its narrow conception of science as exemplified in positivism and behaviorism. This theme seems to be common regardless of different theoretical backgrounds. It has a closer relation to grasping reality more accurately, and less tied up with the uncontrollable or obscure, such as dreams, the collective unconscious, and religious spirituality. It is, therefore, not popular among today's educational theorists of imagination to talk about imagination in the context of Jungian analytical psychology or Rudolf Steiner's Anthroposophy. There is a theme of reaction against over-systematization, but not anything so drastic as Romanticism's sense of "abysses".

In summary, today's theory of imagination has the following characteristics:

(1) A tendency to see imagination as a part of rationality.
(1-a) Educational theories of imagination tend to disregard irrationality, dream, fantasizing, and childishness (as opposed to childlikeness) as a central issue.

(1-b) Imagination is seen as a crucial part of the healthier (or more balanced) notion of rationality. This is, on the one hand, a theme since the time of Romanticism, but on the other hand, some Romantic notions are not exactly what today's theorists of imagination want to suggest.

(2) A tendency to see the issue of imagination as an individual disposition.

(2-a) Today's theories of imagination are different from conceptions of the imagination as a collective concern (e.g. imagination in oral cultures).

(2-b) Theorists today appreciate imagination as a continuation of the modern Western valuing of autonomous reasoning and moral decisions. However, they also incorporate recent philosophical and psychological perspectives which reject the rigid separation of the individual and society (e.g. Pragmatism and Vygotskian psychology).

(3) A strong emphasis on social, moral, and political uses of the imagination.

(3-a) While society tends to present various images and information, individuals must raise their awareness to see hidden possibilities beyond what is immediately given.

(3-b) Thus, even when things like art become a concern in relation to imagination, it tends not be art for art's sake, but for the sake of criticizing the one-dimensional view of social, political, and moral inquiry, in
traditional divisions and hierarchies of disciplines.

I suggest that the general orientation of the discussion on the connection between imagination and education is in line with contemporary North American educational theory which has been strongly influenced by pragmatism. It is important to think whether we need to or want to include other traditions and conceptions, but before that, we must see where we stand.

4-2. **Kinds of research: issues included and issues not included**

Although not large in number, there have been constant publications on educational theories of imagination for the last century or so.

There are numbers of issues related to the idea of imagination and education. It is impossible to classify these books and articles in neat categories, but below are some of the major themes.

The most common and conspicuous theme is to create a "healthy conception of human intelligence and morality" (Cobb, p.18). This has been a common theme over a much longer time-span; first, in the Romantic reaction against the Enlightenment conception of the human mind, second, the movement, in philosophy, psychology, and educational practice, in the later nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, against the predominant intellectual atmosphere based on positivistic conceptions of science and academic formalism, and third, today, against the remnant or reincarnation of narrow conceptions such as are embodied in standardization, emphasis on memorization, etc. Often, these arguments for imagination are made in the name of the critique of what may be called modernism. Some examples of the aspects of modernism which are criticized are: (1) conceptions of human rationality (cf. Johnson, Murdoch), (2) the devaluing of children's distinctive mode of learning
and thinking (cf. Cobb, Egan, Eisner), and (3) cultural values which are embodied in the hierarchy of subjects, for example, trivialization of art (cf. Greene, Swanger).

Another theme which is quite widely shared is the development of imaginative capacity as a part of social criticism (e.g. Swanger, Greene, McCleary, Kearney). This is an on-going movement against the elements in our society which limit the development of our intellectual, moral, and aesthetic capacity, such as rigid systematization, bureaucratization, standardization, commercialized and political images. This is a continuation of the project of the Enlightenment (i.e. a belief that becoming aware of the situation in which one lives and its hidden possibilities is the key to a life worth living; cf. Greene, 1995, p.182). But it also implies a break with the Enlightenment project; for example, the rejection of Enlightenment assumptions about "the innocence of both observable facts and transparent language" (Lather, p.104), and the possibility of telling truth from falsity, original from copy, the imaginary from the real (Kearney, p.345). (See Ch.4-3 below.)

Yet another theme is the uses of imaginative capacity in the very process of developing it. Some (e.g. Jagla, Garrison) argue that teachers need to be imaginative to see, not just what children already are, but what they might become, and others (e.g. Egan) argue that children's imaginative capacity must be engaged and stimulated in the process of instruction.

Research which has not been done so far is on how major theorists of education in the past conceived of the idea of imagination in relation to their theories of education. In the tradition of educational theories, it is interesting that such relatively well-known theorists/practitioners of education as John Dewey, Margaret McMillan, Harold Rugg, and Lev Vygotsky are interested in the
idea of imagination. However, their ideas of imagination, as well as earlier philosophers', such as Rousseau's, are not widely known or studied.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} Chambliss' work (1974) may be in this category.
Ch. 3 The Concept of Imagination

1. Introduction

In this chapter I shall argue that the development of the person's imagination\(^1\) must be a crucial part of education. This argument is, of course, based on a particular view of imagination and of education. My observation is that, while the development of imagination must logically be a necessary part of achieving the educational goals which we inherit from the educational ideas of the modern West, this connection is not particularly made explicit or appreciated in educational principle and practice today except by a few educational theorists. One of the major reasons seems to me a conceptual confusion, and therefore, I will try to make it clear. I certainly do not intend to say that the legacy of Western educational thought should be accepted in its entirety, or that it is necessarily superior to other traditions, but I suggest that some central values are worth supporting and the development of imagination constitutes a crucial part of this project.

\(^1\) I will use "imagination," "imaginativeness," and "imaginative capacity" interchangeably.
Although the development of imagination is not a direct function of intention and control (not a product simply of instructional input, personal effort, or amount of information), it is not totally outside our control (not simply a matter of divine gift, genius, or natural unfolding), either. In order for the development of imagination to be a justifiable educational concern, it must be shown, first, that imagination is a worthy and necessary part of educational values, and second, that it is possible for instructional processes and activities to influence its development. My response to both these claims is affirmative. First, I think that such educational values as understanding with breadth and depth, rationality, and morality by definition require imaginative capacity. Second, one cannot become imaginative without knowledge or skill, which are acquired through experiences that include instructional processes.

Conceptual clarification of imagination in such a small space will inevitably be an attempt to follow a particular strand of the idea of imagination among various equally valid conceptions of it. However, I believe that, overall, my understanding of the connection between imagination and education reflects a major strand of the contemporary arguments on the connection, which, in turn, are founded on the particular thoughts and values regarding the idea of education developed in the West for the last few centuries. The time frame which I am thinking of is what may be called the "modern" period in the history of educational ideas. A defining characteristic of the modern, according to one interpretation, is that educational theories are concerned with individuals who are now (at least in principle) separated from their ascription.² This has been the case roughly since around the Enlightenment, and this period coincides with the

² Cf. Hara (1999), p.9. A good example of this view (though not at the beginning of the modern era) is Rousseau's assertion that Emile must be a man before anything else (any person of particular class or occupation): "Prior to the calling of his parents is nature's call to human life. Living is the job I want to teach him. On leaving my hands, he will, I admit, be neither magistrate nor soldier nor priest. He will, in the first place, be a man" (Émile, pp.41-2).
emergence of the kind of epistemology which gave birth to the conception of imagination as we know it today.

As we saw in Chapter 2, the story of imagination is not so simple, because even in that period (not to speak of the ancient and medieval era), the development of imagination was not considered to have a part to play in achieving such major educational values as rationality, and this attitude toward imagination did not change until, roughly, the beginning of the twentieth century, when pragmatists regarded imagination as part of rationality and some psychologists began to overcome reductionistic psychology (classical empiricism, behaviorism, and Herbart's psychology of presentations).

2. The Connection between imaginativeness and educatedness

2-1. Introduction

The purposes of this section are, first, to present my basic thesis that an educated person must be, at least to some extent, an imaginative person; and second, to show that, while there are various ideas on what imagination means, modern Western culture has a certain preference for a certain kind of imagination.

Richard Kearney (1994) argues that when talking about imagination we should avoid both extreme essentialism and extreme nominalism (p.16). The former implies that there is an identifiable core or timeless essence of what imagination means. This position is typically and historically called the faculty conception of the imagination, and it is based on philosophical assumptions
which have been challenged for the last century or so. The latter implies that imagination means anything we like to call by that name, and it leads to an extreme form of relativism. Although various writers have mentioned imagination (or equivalent terms or translations of the term) and various definitions, meanings, implications, and emotional tones have been attached to the idea, the idea of imagination is not totally random as an extreme nominalist position may suggest. There is a certain level of agreement on what it means and why it is important, and I understand that the major parts of the shared meanings and implications are strongly connected to what we today regard as educational values to be pursued.

In 2-2, I will define my use of the concept of imagination which I believe echoes fairly common definitions of the term among the contemporary theorists of imagination. In doing so, I will also try to get rid of some misguided assumptions and language historically attached to the concept of imagination. In 2-3, I will show in what ways an educated person must be an imaginative person.

2-2. Defining imagination

I define imagination, following Kieran Egan (1992), as a flexibility of the mind (p. 36). By flexibility, I mean that a person has the ability and tendency to think of things in a way that is not tightly constrained by the actual, such as conventions, cultural norms, one's habitual thought, information given by others (cf. ibid., ch. 1). In conceptualizing imagination, I draw on two theorists (one of

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3 For example, Rugg (1963) mentions, Galileo's "il lume naturale", Gauss' "sudden lightening flash", Goethe's "daemonic voice", Whitehead's "prehension", and the common term "Ah ha!" (p.x). Also, Engell examines uses, from Latin "imaginatio" and Greek "phantasma", Leibniz's "la puissance active" and "vis activa", to German "Einbildungskraft" and "Dichtkraft".
whom is Egan), but I also want to stress that, though I borrow particular words and expressions from the two individuals, the ideas themselves are widely shared among the theorists of imagination today (and to some extent by historical figures too).

Here, as preliminary, I want to distinguish imagination from two similar terms: creativity and critical thinking. Essentially, I think that the distinction is a matter of context. Creativity implies imaginativeness in the context of production of objects and ideas, for example, aesthetic creativity and problem solving (cf. Egan and Nadaner, introduction, p.xi); critical thinking implies imaginativeness in the context of sense-making or understanding, e.g. social and moral understanding, and literary criticism. These distinctions are, however, not rigid.

2-2-a. Kieran Egan and the "flexibility of the mind"

The first theorist is, as I mentioned in the definition above, Kieran Egan, who claims that, "Imaginativeness is not a well-developed, distinct function of the mind, but is rather a particular flexibility which can invigorate all mental functions."4 By taking up the way Egan conceptualizes imagination, I want first, to point out certain reasons why imagination has attracted some educational theorists, and, second to get rid of some misleading philosophical assumptions

4 Egan, 1992, p.36. See also, White (1990) who writes, "An imaginative person is one with the ability to think of lots of possibilities, usually with some richness of detail" (p.185). Egan draws very much on White in his definition of imagination. For similar definitions of imagination, see, for example, Dewey (1934a/1987), p.273 (imaginative as opposed to "the narrow effect of habituation"); Frye, p.22; Warnock, p.195; Hanson in Egan and Nadaner, p.138; Singer and Singer, pp.268-9; Johnson, p.109; McCleary, pp.50, 134; Bailin, p.109; Greene (1995), p.19; Garrison, p.77.
and language which have been historically attached to the concept of imagination.

First, above all, one of the major attractions of the idea of imagination is to emphasize the distinctive nature of human cognition (learning, thinking, etc.), and Egan is probably the strongest advocate of this aspect. The idea of imagination has always symbolized freedom of human thoughts; and epistemologically, it symbolizes the active nature of the mind, as opposed to the view which regards the mind as passive and mechanical, such as (1) the Enlightenment empiricists and sensationists (e.g. Locke, Condillac, and Helvetius), (2) the behavioristic view of the human mind (a view which reduces the functions of the human mind to the relation between stimulus and response) and (3) the practical application of the behavioristic principle, i.e. over-emphasis on rote-memorization (it regards the human mind as something like a floppy disk).5

One of the important ideas born in the modern era is the belief in the educability or perfectibility of human beings. As seen in Locke's *tabula rasa* or Helvetius' belief in the omnipotence of education, modern educational theorists tried to show that individuals, separated from particular community or class, can acquire, by education, what they essentially need in their lives as human beings; and that these individuals can be made into beings who can contribute to the construction of a new society free of prejudice resulting from particular social or cultural traditions. However, the other side of the coin was the conception of the human mind (learning) as passive, which overemphasizes manipulability from the environment. As a reaction to this view, particularly in the Romantic

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5 Cf. The human mind and distinctively human mode of learning is nowadays considered as "narrative" which is crucially different from traditional way of conceptualizing them in the metaphor of *tabula rasa*, the floppy disk, the behavioristic view, or a view which sees the mind as a mechanism of categorization. See for example, Bruner (1986), Singer and Singer, Sutton-Smith, and Egan (1992).
movement, a new conception of the human mind was born, and the idea of imagination was the most characteristic idea. In this period of time, as Abrams (1953) argues, the metaphor of the human mind changed from "mirror" to "lamp", that is, from a mechanism which merely receives and reflects what is given from without to an organism which projects as well as receives; or as McFarland (1985) says, while the idea of the soul as the divine element (i.e. creative faculty) in human nature rapidly lost its explanatory force as a corollary to the decline of religion and theology (as part of the Enlightenment rejection of arbitrary authority), the idea of imagination took up the epistemological explanation of creative capacity. In educational theories, this shift in the view of the human mind manifested itself as the emphasis on children's curiosity and interest, their distinctive modes of learning, and the belief that mere presentation of objects is not enough to secure educational results.

However, for a long time the idea of imagination, though appreciated in general philosophy and literary theory, was not seen as relevant to the new perspectives in education. Throughout the nineteenth century, when many influential educational ideas were formulated, educational thinkers continued to see imagination as, first, a faculty of manipulating images, and second, a hindrance to reason for its rootedness in bodily senses and desire. Instead, the new conception of the human mind and learning was encapsulated in the concept, Anschauung, which implies our capacity to grasp the pattern or meaning of what we perceive through the senses, and this concept was, somewhat misleadingly, carried into the instructional principle of the "object lesson", a reaction to book-learning and a prototype of experience-based education. The

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⁶ This kind of view on imagination did not change from Comenius in the 17th century (cf. Keatinge, pp.6,135) until the time of Herbart in the 19th century. Among major philosophers of education, Rousseau may be an interesting case to examine. While he appreciates the importance of imagination, for example, in morality (e.g. Émile, Book IV, pp.221, 223), he on the other hand is opposed to arousing the imagination of a child (e.g. Book II, pp.80-1).
way this concept was concretized to some extent incorporated the active nature of
the learner, but did not yet reach the point of appreciating the importance of
entertaining various possibilities (as it is done so now), primarily because the
principal objectives of education/instruction were to discipline the person's
rationality (as opposed to groundless thought, arbitrary desire, etc.) and to
develop a capacity for sound judgment by accumulating presumably "objective"
knowledge on the clean slate (i.e. the mind).7

Second, there is some misleading language to be eliminated, and Egan's
definition is the result of doing so. They are, (1) the "faculty" conception of the
imagination, (2) an almost exclusive connection between imagining and imaging
(visualization), and (3) the confusion between imaginative and imaginary.

(1) The faculty conception. Traditionally, imagination has been regarded
as a "faculty" (or "power") of the mind which generates images ("mental
pictures") by associating and dissociating "ideas" and "impressions". However,
as a result of twentieth-century philosophy and psychology, the faculty
conception and the kind of language which tend to go with it are now avoided
except as a metaphorical explanation.8

One implication of the faculty conception is to make us think that it is
possible to identify a special means to develop the imagination per se just like
there is a way to develop a specific muscle, because the term "faculty" or "power"

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7 See for example, Herbart's emphasis on disciplined or methodologized way of paying attention
and perceiving rather than "fancying and play". Herbart's ABC of Sense-Perception: and Minor
Pedagogical Works, 1896, p.137.

8 Engell suggests, however, that the faculty conception was not as strong as many of us tend to
think (p.20). Perhaps, we should not pay too much attention to the classical writers' formal
definitions of imagination. As White suggests, there are discrepancies between their formal
definitions and their actual uses of the term; they tend to define imagination as a faculty to create
images in terms of mental pictures, but in actual sentences or contexts in which they refer to
imagination, the things imagined are not necessarily visual or perceptual (p.6).
implies that there is something specific (a specifiable part of the mind or brain) which we can work on and influence. However, imaginative capacity seems unlike that.

(2) Imagination, imagining, and imaging. Historically, the idea of imagination has been categorized into two sorts, and they are still found in typical definitions of the term in dictionaries. The terms themselves may be acceptable, but we have to get rid of some misleading assumptions.

It is usually said that imagination has two kinds: a reproductive imagination and a productive (creative) imagination. The former is an ability to separate and combine various images or perceptual data so that the whole makes some sense. The underlying assumption is that these data come through the senses to the mind in the form of atomistic elements (e.g. Locke's "simple ideas"). The productive imagination does similar operations but it creates new images that do not exist in reality or have not been thought of before. These classifications have been around for a few centuries at least. Some of the philosophical assumptions underlying them have been challenged, particularly by 20th-century philosophy and psychology (e.g. phenomenology and analytic philosophy) and are now largely discarded.

For example, the epistemological assumption of the rigid separation between perception and thought, which underlies many modern philosophers' theory of imagination, is not accepted today. Arnheim contends that "the cognitive operations called thinking are not a privilege of mental processes above and beyond perception but the essential ingredients of perception itself" (p.13). He gives the following example:

A box, partly covered by a flowerpot, is seen as a complete cube partly hidden. This means that perceptual organization does not limit itself to the material directly given but enlists invisible extensions as genuine parts of the visible. (p.34)
Some of the old epistemological languages are no longer taken literally; they are either used as metaphorical explanations of our process of thought or terms to describe analytic distinctions (as opposed to ontological distinctions).

The close connection between imagination and perception is not likely to be worth keeping except for certain special cases such as the use of metaphor. For example, when we try to understand objects or phenomena, we may use metaphors, trying to relate what we have immediately to something else that is not with us immediately, and this may be called an imaginative process. In this case, imagination may have perceptual elements to a considerable extent. But what we imagine beyond here and now is not necessarily (or even primarily) perceptual.

The tight connection between imagining and imaging is now broken. Today, philosophers and psychologists argue that an image means much more than visual images (or "mental pictures"). Earlier theorists and some psychologically oriented theorists (e.g. McMillan, Kirkpatrick) tend to either largely identify imagining with imaging (visualizing), or to focus on imaging (visualizing) as the most important aspect of imagining. However, more recent thinkers (e.g. Warnock, White, Egan, Greene), particularly those who are familiar with analytic philosophy are very clear about the distinction and tend to give imagining different significance. For example, White (1990) writes, "The imagery of a sailor scrambling ashore could be exactly the same as that of his twin brother crawling backwards into the sea, yet to imagine one of these is quite different from imagining the other" (p.92). So, he says, "Imagination does not imply imagery since much imagination is of what is non-sensory..."(ibid., p.88). It is better for us not to associate imagining exclusively with imaging or imagery. As Egan vis-à-vis White suggests, being imaginative implies more than being able to
have vivid and various mental pictures; an imaginative person is one who can think, feel, and perceive with a large degree of flexibility.\(^9\)

(3) Imaginative and imaginary. As is seen in the distinction between imagination and fancy (e.g. Coleridge, Murdoch, Egan and Nadaner), or imaginative and imaginary (e.g. Dewey, 1916/1985; Vygotsky, 1987, 1992; Frye), the distinction between kinds of imaginative capacity tends to suggest that there are certain preferences about the imagination worth pursuing. For example, the kind of imagination we appreciate is different from mere dreaming or fantasizing as a way of wish-fulfillment. Rather, imagination is discussed as a means to become aware of the actual world more accurately (e.g. Frye, pp.77-8; Cobb, p.18; Warnock, p.10; Egan, 1992, p.59; Greene, 1995, p.3; McCleary, p.133). Or as some theorists who are more morally or politically minded would say, being imaginative is a necessary part of being critical of actual society, which implies a heightened awareness of reality (e.g. Johnson, p.3; Greene, 1995, p.3; McCleary, pp.133-4).

2-2-b. Robin Barrow and the criterion of "unusual and effective"

The second theorist I draw on is Robin Barrow (1988, 1992), who defines imagination as an ability to think of something that is both "unusual and effective". He says, "The criteria of imagination are, I suggest, unusualness and effectiveness. To be imaginative is to have the inclination and ability consciously to conceive of the unusual and effective in particular contexts."\(^{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) Barrow (1988), p.84. His view of imaginativeness has a strong emphasis on the product of thought rather than the process. For similar emphasis, see, for example, Bailin.
By taking up Barrow's argument, I want, first, to get rid of the assumption that there is a generic capacity called imagination which can be used across domains, and, second, to emphasize that the criteria of imaginativeness include consciousness, intention, or will, and, third, to suggest that there is a certain preference in our culture among various conceptions of imagination. The third issue implies that the value of imagination is relative to other educational values; imagination is not valuable on its own.

(1) It is hard to sustain an argument that there is a non-specific, general power called imagination; it is hard to think that there are persons who are generally imaginative, except when we emphasize the attitudinal aspect of imaginativeness (See sections below). This is so, because all forms of thought including imagination (also, for example, "critical thinking") need contents of thought, and contents usually means knowledge and skill which are to a large extent specific to the field of research or activities.

According to Barrow, imaginative ideas and acts are not merely the ones that are peculiar. They must also be excellent and effective in light of standards in the respective field. (Of course, there are cases in which we call someone "imaginative" ironically.) An imaginative play (e.g. soccer), an imaginative painter and an imaginative teacher are not called so just for the sake of unusualness. A person who is imaginative in one area of activity may or may not be so in different areas of activity (an imaginative painter may or may not be an imaginative teacher of art).

(2) When we apply the term imaginative to a product or to an idea, it implies that they are the result of an intention to produce that effect even if some accidental elements are involved. Something that merely happens to be so is not usually called imaginative. Although, linguistic or conceptual analysis may not show much other than the linguistic habit of those who use the language, this
interpretation of the term imaginative seems relevant, because, for example, if we eliminate this criterion of intention, the issue of imaginativeness becomes simply a matter of divine inspiration or luck, which is, beyond instruction.

(3) If Barrow's argument about the context specificity of the imagination is acceptable, it should also be accepted that there is a problem about what kind(s) of imagination (i.e. imagination in what context) should be valued. (Though the idea of context, i.e. areas of activity, may need to be revised. The "areas" are not as clearly demarcated as it used to be supposed by theorists like Paul Hirst.\(^n\))

One widely shared concern is moral imagination, and it tends to be discussed in relation to such concepts as empathy and care (cf. Greene, Johnson). I am not depreciating imagination in other areas, say, music; but I want to suggest that, first, in education, particularly in terms of schooling, the development of imaginative capacity in certain areas seems to matter more than in others, and second, indeed there seems to be certain preferred areas among contemporary theorists of imagination.

2-2-c. Imagination as a combination of several factors

I think that imaginativeness is a combination of several factors rather than a result of a single power of the mind, and that a person is imaginative in some area(s) and not in general. In order for a person to be imaginative, s/he needs knowledge, skill, curiosity, and various other factors which may be innate or acquired, conscious or unconscious, though the entire list of these factors has not

been, and probably will never be, identified. There are various conditions of imaginativeness discussed by various theorists, for example, knowledge, unconscious (or non-conscious), emotion, etc. There is no definitive answer to these issues, and I certainly do not intend to give one (because I cannot). I present what I think imagination means and what are the possibilities and conditions of developing the imagination through instructional activities and processes.

However, one concession should be made. It is what may be called an attitudinal aspect of imaginativeness, and I may describe it as a playful attitude, a fondness of experimenting with various ideas. In describing the criteria of imaginativeness, Barrow says that the imaginative person has the \textit{inclination} as well as the ability to be both unusual and effective. The term "inclination" may be

\[12\] There are various factors which theorists suggest as the conditions of imagination. For example, knowledge (factual information), experience, rationality, emotion/affect, unconscious sources, somatic condition, habit, etc. An important point seems to me, as Bailin says with regard to creativity, fulfilling these conditions may be necessary but not sufficient condition for producing imaginative results (p.83).


\[14\] E.g. McMillan, p.44; Dewey (1934a/1987), pp.79-80, 82, 270-1; Rugg, pp.xx, 39, 43, 89, 133, 228; Cobb, p.90; Sloan, p.144. The two terms "unconscious" and "non-conscious" are not synonymous. Psychoanalysis may prefer "unconscious", but Rugg prefers "off-conscious" as well as "non-conscious" and distinguishes it from psychoanalytic unconscious. What Rugg means by the "off-conscious" is a state of the mind where, after intensive striving for working out solution, the subject is setting the task aside for a while and letting ideas come. Rugg writes, "I prefer to locate the creative worker at the critical threshold of the conscious-unconscious border, the transliminal state. In linear terms this is between Dewey and Freud" (p.43). This is similar to Cobb's "receptiveness" (p.90) or McMillan's (vis-à-vis Theodule Ribot) "incubation or fermenting of ideas before Eurika" (p.174). For Rugg's view, see Ch. 4 below.

\[15\] E.g. McMillan, p.184; Kirkpatrick, pp.57-60; Rugg, p.xx, Frye, pp.23-4; Cobb, pp.24, 27, 28, 91, 93; Warnock, pp.202-3; Egan (1992), p.3.
interpreted to mean the frequency of producing some products (ideas or objects) that are both unusual and effective, but I think that it implies something of the person's favorable attitude toward entertaining a variety of ideas and perspectives. This aspect of imaginativeness may not be specific to the context or content, and may also to some extent be transferable from one area to another. (I will return to this issue in Ch.6.)

2-3. An educated person must be an imaginative person

Education is, on the one hand, a process of socialization, acculturation, or conventionalization, since it is almost impossible to consider a person "educated" if s/he is devoid of knowledge, conventions, etc. that characterize a given society or a culture. The purpose of education may also include the development of the capacity to distance oneself to a certain extent from the values and patterns of thought of a particular society (For example, morality, which is an important part of education, means more than following cultural conventions or societal rules), but it certainly is not to produce a misfit who is not aware of what is going on around him/her.

Considering these, I want to suggest that there are at least three ways in which an educated person must be imaginative. (I want to stress that these criteria of educatedness are not completely arbitrary; they are based on reasonably shared views on educational values.) What people mean by being "educated" varies according to such conditions as cultural background and individual temperament, but I think that the following aspects of educatedness are, first, shared reasonably widely, and second, worth supporting; and they have imaginativeness as their crucial part.

First, educated persons must not only know a lot of facts but also understand factual information in context, and be able to use the factual
information which they already have in order to make sense of new or unfamiliar things and events. For example, Barrow and Woods (2000) speak of "the contrast between being knowledgeable and being educated," and say, "It [the contrast] lies behind the criticisms leveled at much traditional schooling where very often the aim seems to be no more than to impart relatively recherché information for memorization and subsequent regurgitation in written examinations" (p.17).

From this point of view, I want to suggest that educated persons must be able to understand the meaning or significance of what they experience or know by placing it in a larger context which may not be given in the immediate facts, information, or data. This implies that such individuals must have a sense that there is something beyond what is immediately given. This sense may very well lead to, or require, a sense that there are alternative possibilities to what they have here and now.

Second, overlapping to some extent with the first characteristics of educatedness, and as is seen in such phrases as "life-long learning," "learning how to learn," or "education as growth", educated persons must have an ability and willingness to pursue further education. Being able and willing to pursue further education logically means that the individuals can see alternative possibilities, that is, possibilities that they may be mistaken, that there are other ways of interpreting the facts and events, or that there is more to see in the world. Warnock, for instance, writes about what education can give, saying that education gives the sense "that there is always more to experience, and more in what we experience than we can predict" and does not let people "[succumb] to a feeling of futility, or to the belief that they have come to an end of what is worth having" (pp.202-3; italics in original).

Third, educated persons must be moral persons in terms of, at least, moral understanding. Morality involves various factors. In order to be moral, we need to have knowledge, affection, will, and so on, for which, I think, imaginativeness is crucial. For example, an ethic of care, which is widely discussed as a theory of
morality and moral education, says that care is not complete unless it is received by the one cared-for.\textsuperscript{16} This implies, I think, in order for us to care about another person, we need to work out what is good for the one we care about, for which mere sentiment is not enough.\textsuperscript{17} This requires the one who cares to step out of his/her own value and perspective, and try to understand those of the one about whom s/he cares. Thus, moral persons must be able to go beyond their own perception, thoughts, and feelings, and see things from other persons' points of view.

The third criterion, morality, may not be included in the criteria of educatedness from an analytic point of view based on the common usage of the term "educated" in English (like Barrow and Woods). Also it is not always valued from a utilitarian point of view (utilitarian, not in the sense of a philosophical school but from a perspective which emphasizes schooling to be directly and immediately useful to living in society), as typically seen in the emphasis on factual and testable knowledge. However, there are some strands of educational theories both in the past and present which give as much emphasis to morality as to such things as academic adequacy. First, in the history of education, moral education has always been a major concern of education (e.g. education as Bildung), and it may be arguable that the priority given to useful skills and knowledge (as is seen in our society from Herbert Spencer's appreciation of science for utilitarian reason to the "back to basics" movement) may be an exception rather than a norm. Second, I appreciate the criticisms against the primacy of (a particular type of) academic adequacy over other values, notably by

\textsuperscript{16} For example, Noddings writes, "How good I can be is partly a function of how you – the other – receive and respond to me" (1984, p.6; italics in original).

\textsuperscript{17} See Raywid (1981), which is a response to Noddings' paper; also Noddings, 1984, pp.171-2, "I reject the label [her view as 'affectivist'] because such labels are often affixed simplistically, and the notion arises that one who insists on recognizing the affective base of morality must, therefore, minimize the role of cognitive activity."
Nel Noddings' ethic of care\textsuperscript{18}, and want to suggest that morality should be included in the criteria of educatedness.

Thus, I observe that the widely shared conception of educatedness by definition implies the necessity of imaginativeness, and I propose that we should keep the three criteria, whatever else may be added, as minimum criteria of educatedness. The imagination as a capacity to transcend actuality is a crucial factor in all of them.

3. The relations between education, schooling, and imagination

3-1. Imaginative development and education

While instructional processes or activities which do not develop the imagination are a failure, imagination apart from other educational values is not of much worth. There may be cases where a person is highly imaginative in a certain area (let's say, playing chess) but s/he is terrible in other respects. In such a case, imaginativeness does not seem to be particularly valuable in light of the person's overall education. Karen Hanson (1988) says:

We want the child not just to be imaginative, but also to be, in some sense, conventional, to learn and to some extent participate in our shared thoughts, our

\textsuperscript{18} For example, Noddings (1992), p.162. This is, certainly, not an isolated view. Historically speaking, we may even want to say that moral education has always been more important issue than intellectual education.
shared form of life. This shared social foundation may be, in fact, what supports the vault of imagination. (in Egan and Nadaner, p.137)

Educational values are determined, to a large extent, by social, cultural, and historical contingencies, and the reason why imagination is valued or what sort of imagination is valued, is also partly determined by our particular social contingencies. The idea of imagination as an epitome of human freedom reflects our hope to transcend these limitations (cf. Greene, 1995, pp.51, 163), but we have, whether we like it or not, certain preference about the kinds of imagination which has close connection with our cultural values. It is in the context of schooling where this issue becomes explicit, because school is the place where cultural and social values are presented, both explicitly and implicitly, to individual children, while education, though depending on how it is defined, can be more personal.

I am aware that the way I conceptualize the imagination would sound very much like Rousseau's conception of reason when he says, "of all the faculties of man, reason, which is, so to speak, only a composite of all the others, is the one that develops with the most difficulty and latest" (Émile, p.89). I may be interpreted to be saying that children do not have imagination. Not exactly so. What I want to suggest is similar to Chambliss' (1974) understanding of Rousseau's view of reason in childhood. Chambliss argues that Rousseau is not saying that children do not have reason, but that children are yet to develop a particular sort of reason (p.52). I would apply this logic to imagination. Although children have imaginative capacity, it is not to be regarded as the kind of imaginative capacity which educational theorists tend to appreciate in relation to other educational values such as reflective capacity and empathy.

That being said, there are two issues I want to discuss.

First, the imagination as a flexibility of the mind may exhibit itself as fantasy or play, and these phenomena are more abundant in childhood. This sort
of imagination may be valuable and charming, but it is not by itself the kinds of imaginativeness which is seen in such educational values as broader understanding and morality. Treasuring and keeping alive children's imagination, as such theorists as Cobb, Singer and Singer among others suggest, may be a key to the imagination in a highly developed sense. However, the connection between these must be examined in order not to fall into unfruitful and simplistic rhetoric or to end up with mere slogans.

Second, overall, the kind of imagination we value has a strong connection with rationality, not in the sense of scientific thinking in positivism or in the classical sense of reason as an intuitive faculty to grasp the universal truths. The reason I have in mind is more akin to pragmatism's expanded notion of reflective capacity. For example, Peirce writes, "When a man desires ardently to know the truth, his first effort will be to imagine what that truth can be" ("The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism", Peirce, 1955, p.43), which is a hypothetical thinking in scientific thought. Or, as Dewey says, imagination is what "makes any activity more than mechanical" (1916/1985, p.244), which is similar to the notion of imagination as a flexibility of the mind. Coupled with the importance of verification, pragmatists regards imaginative aspect of thought as a necessary part of good thinking, and this inclusion of imaginative capacity as part of rationality is relatively new.

Today, by and large, imagination is seen as a part of healthier or more balanced rationality. There may be other ways of conceptualizing imagination, but I believe that the imagination as conceptualized as such is a crucial part of educational values. That being said, there are a few kinds of arguments or rhetoric to be avoided.
3-2. Kinds of rhetoric to be avoided

The first is a view which sees education and imagination as antithetical to each other. The second is the view which sees education and imagination as irrelevant to each other. These views are typically seen in the overly romantic view of imagination and childhood. These arguments tend to suggest that imagination is at its peak or in its ideal form in childhood, and will be lost as children grow.

Education, or more accurately, the instructional process, is sometimes talked about as if it is antithetical to imagination. This is typically seen in the positions and arguments which over-romanticize certain types of imaginative and creative activities done by children or by certain sort of artists. One of the earliest examples of this view (though it is not my intention to suggest that he is responsible for such an over-romanticized view) can be seen in Wordsworth (1807), when he praises a child by calling him "Thou best Philosopher" and sings, "Heavens lies about us in our infancy! / Shades of the prison-house begin to close / Upon the growing Boy". An example of this belief applied to educational theory is Lev N. Tolstoi, who thought that the development of artistic creativity will be done if only materials and stimuli for creation were given to children, and said that children were closer than adults to the ideal of truth, beauty, etc. (in Vygotsky, 1930, pp.90-1).

In many -- probably all -- domains of experience, it is impossible to exhibit one's imaginativeness without having requisite skills and knowledge in the field. A soccer player cannot move imaginatively unless s/he knows certain rules and standard tactics, and is capable of certain movements. In many areas in which we tend to think that imaginativeness is crucially important, things which can be acquired through education and experience are necessary. For example, being imaginative about a social issue, say, as a part of empathizing with the fate of
refugees in a foreign country, means next to nothing, unless one is able to think of what their situation is really like or what they really need. This requires lots of information and understanding (history, politics, economy, nutrition, psychology, etc.), because otherwise, one will end up projecting his/her own values which tend to be widely off the mark of the real needs of the people in the tragic situation.

Moreover, there is a danger in the logic and rhetoric of regarding the development of imagination (or other intellectual, moral, and aesthetic characteristics) as a matter of releasing children's inborn potentials. Diggins' account of Dewey's growing disenchantment from the child-centred practice expresses this concern nicely:

To allow the student to follow his own "desires" is to assume that learning springs mysteriously "from uncontrolled haphazard sources." In truth there is no spontaneous germination in mental life. If he does not get the suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody or something in the home or the street or from what some more vigorous fellow pupil is doing. (p.312; quotes are from Dewey, "Individuality and Freedom")

This is not to say that school or systematic teaching is always right or a guarantee to imaginative development. But it seems to suggest that the development of imaginative capacity as part of rationality needs education in terms of systematized instructional processes and activities.19

Education is also talked about as if it is irrelevant to imagination, or vice versa. Education tends to be considered incapable of contributing to making people more imaginative. Similarly, imagination tends to be considered incapable

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19 Vygotsky is an interesting case to examine. He says that children (infants) before they acquire signs/symbols do not have imagination. See, Mind in Society, Ch.7, "The Role of Play in Development".
of contributing to making people more educated. The former problem seems to be rooted in the conception of imagination as a single, innate, or transcendental, capacity: imagination as a "power" of the mind which is separate from such educable factors as knowledge and skills. The latter problem seems to be mainly from the traditional association of imaginative activities with artistic activities: a view which sees imagination as mostly concerned with art, and art as a frill in education.

These kinds of misguided arguments are not so common in academic writings, but very common in less formal discussions and arguments. On the surface, the idea of developing the imaginative capacity through art is shared by many theorists, for example by Dewey, Steiner, McMillan, Cobb, Swanger, Johnson, and Greene, but their arguments are not simplistic; they do not say that encouraging children's artistic activities in terms of free expression would guarantee the development of imagination, and they are aware of the distinctive nature and limitations of art. Compared to them the following argument is simplistic. In an article titled, "Art Education Means Business," Carol Sterling writes:

> Art education builds the skills businesses need in their employees. The world of work has changed dramatically in the last two decades. Routinized behavior is out, and the ability to adapt, diagnose problems, and find creative solutions – even at the most basic levels of production and service delivery – is now crucial. *(Education Week, June 22, 1994)*

Then, she continues that the "skills" which businesses these days need, and art education can build, are "how to imagine and how to apply [the] imaginations to real business problems". This argument seems to overlook the distinction between art and business, and also is not explicit or clear about what imagination means.
Another example is found in an article by Brenda Casey (BBC Education Online). Though she acknowledges that "imagination is not something that children are born with" (and hence needs education), she associates imagination too closely with play. She says, "Very young children are fascinated by their fingers and toes. Old favourites like 'Two Little Dicky Birds', 'Round and Round the Garden', and 'This Little Piggy' are guaranteed ways of engaging the imagination." She concludes by saying, "Remember, the child whose imagination is fulfilled will grow to be resourceful and creative adult." I do not think that the development of creativity (whatever she means by it) is "guaranteed" by "fulfilling" the child's imagination (as she conceives it).

These problems can be, and need to be, overcome by clarifying (1) what we mean by imagination, (2) what elements constitute imagination, and (3) how education can contribute to the development of these elements. Since imaginativeness is not a result of a single faculty which we are born with, it is on the one hand, at least to some extent, educable, but on the other, we cannot just train it in, say, art, and expect that it could be transferred to other domains.

Therefore, I think that education, to a larger extent than it is usually considered, has a very important role to play in making people imaginative, and imagination in making people educated.

I do not think that the romanticized view of imagination and childhood is without reason or pointless, because it is true that there are some cases in which education (particularly schooling) imposes a certain pattern of thought or a certain value system. It is commonly observed that children lose enthusiasm about learning or what seems to be a flexible, lively way of thinking and feeling as they grow up. It may be a valid argument to praise the children's "imagination"

\[\text{References:}\]
\[\text{Egan (2002), ch.3.}\]
or "creativity" as an antithesis to society's tendency to mold children's thought to a certain pattern, or as a warning against the dominance of commercial and political images which are intended to guide our thought in a certain direction. However, imagination or creativity in such a sense is not by itself worthwhile unless it is made into a part of other intellectual, moral, and aesthetic traits. The task for educators is, then, first, to make clear the connection between children's imaginative tendencies and educated imaginativeness, and second, if there is such a connection, to figure out ways to keep what seems to be an imaginative tendency of the children while connecting it to other educational values.

Here again, we have to be cautious about the meaning or implication which we attach to the term imaginative. For example, while I think that many of the artworks by children are simply unskillful ones, there are people who praise them, regarding them as products of children's imagination. I am not suggesting that we should not praise children's artworks in any sense. I think that children's paintings or poems might be described as imaginative, but we need a caution here. The judgment that children's works of art are imaginative – usually a judgment that they are different from adults' conventional works – is possible only from the adult's point of view; it is a judgment possible only for adults who have seen many works of art and are familiar with (and probably tired of) conventions. Children are likely to be merely utilizing whatever perspective, skills, or vocabulary are available to them, and are not necessarily conscious of their unusualness. (It may be a contentious issue whether or not to include a clause, "being aware of one's own unusualness," in the definition of imaginativeness. Barrow is clearly including this in his definition of imagination, but others may disagree.) As Barrow suggests, unusualness or peculiarity alone does not constitute imaginativeness.

Thus I propose to distinguish two uses of the expression imaginative.

One is what I may call an objective sense, which is close to Barrow's use; when we call, for example, a scientist, an athlete, or a teacher, imaginative, we are
suggesting that the person exhibits both unusualness and effectiveness in his or her performance in the respective field. This sense of imaginativeness is concerned mainly with objective evaluation of the quality of an idea or a performance.

The other is what I may call an educational sense; when we call some children imaginative, we are not always concerned with the objective excellence of their achievements. Rather, when calling the children or what they do, "imaginative", we are likely to be suggesting the fact that they seem to be surpassing what they have already achieved. The children may not be doing anything unusual or effective in light of objective standard, but still, what they are doing may be regarded as surpassing what they have achieved so far (thus, "unusual and effective" for themselves). Or, we are praising the children's enthusiasm, lively curiosity, or passion for the subject, because it seems to suggest that the children would develop a sustained engagement with the subject, and possibly produce a really imaginative product some day. The imaginativeness in this sense may not mean much to people other than the children's parents or caretakers, or unless we have a good reason to believe that the children's imaginative tendency will lead them towards significant imaginative achievements. The significance is, in short, educational (or "formative" as opposed to "summative", borrowing Michael Scriven's terms22). As Jerome Bruner says, first-rate scientists working at the frontier of their fields and a child working at their own frontier have at least this in common; each is trying to surpass what they have achieved so far (1960/77, p.14; 1962, p.126). And this attempt to go beyond what they have achieved so far is a crucial factor which leads to intellectual, aesthetic, and moral development. In this sense, what appears to be trivial may be educationally meaningful to the children themselves and to those who are concerned with their education. As Dewey says, "We are

22 Eisner, pp.173, 198.
concerned with originality of attitude which is equivalent to the unforced response of one's own individuality, not with originality as measured by product" (1916/85, p.312).

Although contemporary theorists of imagination define imagination as a capacity to be flexible in thought – and I certainly agree with them – there are some suggestions that imagination does not exactly fit the definition as a capacity – they suggest that imagination includes something more or that it has something different. For example, Dewey says that imagination "designates a quality that animates and pervades all processes of making and observation" (1934a/1987, p.271); Bailin includes "free play" and "exploration" as well as "the generation of ideas" in her idea of imagination (p.121); Singer and Singer think that imagination, distinct from creativity, "is fun in its own right whether or not it contributes to a public product" (p.270), and is "a playful, creative spirit" (p.268). It is true that many theorists and writers distinguish imagination or imaginativeness from mere fancy or fancifulness, and that they generally appreciate the imagination for its capacity to see things more accurately. Today, philosophers and educators argue that seeing things accurately (a value which has traditionally been opposed to imaginative capacity) implies seeing things flexibly or from diverse perspectives. However, some people, not limited to the writers quoted above, suggest an aspect of imaginativeness which cannot be quite categorized as capacity. This aspect may be close to something like spirit or attitude; it may not make sense from the perspective of conceptual analysis, but I do not think it is wise to simply dismiss it.

It is common to say that children are, in some respects, more imaginative than adults. There are some problems with such a way of speaking, but it seems to contain a degree of truths. In order to be imaginative, we need a certain perception of what the actuality is. So it may be justified to say that children are less imaginative because they do not have experience or knowledge by which to perceive the actual. However, we know that children tend to have much more
lively curiosity than adults, or a strong tendency to strive to go beyond what they have already acquired. Moreover, they are much less conventionalized than adults. So it may also be justified to say that children are generally more imaginative than adults. The point is that we have to be careful about the context in which we apply the term.

Further, somewhat contrary to Bruner's view mentioned above, there are arguments which regard children's way of thinking and feeling as fundamentally different from adults'. One example is found in Egan (2002). He says that there are "trade-offs" as a person grows (p.92). He says that the process of growth or education is not simply a matter of one-directional progress or accumulation. There may be something that one loses as s/he grows up. This is not certainly an isolated view (e.g. McMillan, pp.76, 113-5; Rugg, p.71; Singer and Singer, p.266; McCleary, p.55), and though I think that the kind of imaginativeness we tend to pursue requires instructional processes, there may be cases that the very instructional processes restrict the development of imagination. For example, McMillan makes a good point when she says that the grasp of new vision, which I understand as the same as what we mean by the grasp of alternative possibilities or creative/new ideas, is not caused by experience and observation, even though they may help (pp.140-1). If imaginativeness develops cumulatively because of instructional processes, imaginative capacity is supposed to increase as an individual has more experience and observation. However, this is not always the case. So, it seems reasonable to gather that there may be something like "trade-offs", besides the support from some people's observations. An example of the trade-off kind of view is Edith Cobb's argument that highly creative persons tend to attribute their creativity to their experience of a certain type of sensation which they felt in childhood. Cobb says, "The ability to maintain plasticity of perception and thought is the gift of childhood to human personality; the truth is sorely abused, in our attitudes not only towards the child in society, but also towards the child in ourselves" (p.35). Her argument is based on her research on biographical
and autobiographical materials of highly imaginative/creative persons around the world. Though it is not exactly a scientifically testable claim, I think that it still deserves to be taken into account, because such empirical observations may very well show what conceptual analysis cannot show.

4. Imagination and modern western education

Education as we know it today (particularly as it has been developed in the modern West) is founded on an assumption about what we should expect from our lives. It is a belief that "becom[ing] increasingly mindful with regard to [one's] lived situation – and its untapped possibilities" (Greene, 1995, p.182) is the key to a life worth living, and that education is central to this quest. The life in the state of Nature (Rousseau), though it may be comfortable, is not worthwhile. The same can be said about the lives of the people of "silver" or "brass" as opposed to those of "gold", in Plato's Republic, although this scheme may be effective for the achievement of a particular kind of society. Besides such purposes as reformation of society, rational control of one's self, and acquisition of useful knowledge and skills in life, becoming aware of one's own situation and its hidden possibilities (hidden by custom, prejudice, social arrangement, ignorance) emerged gradually as an important value which one should achieve through education. What is more, it is believed that the realization must be done by and for oneself. This seems to be one of the consistent themes of education from the Enlightenment philosophers through 19th-century educational theorists to contemporary theorists, though the ideas about what is required for such awareness only gradually evolved, and appreciation of imagination as a necessary part of it appeared much later.
As early as in the 16th century, Michel de Montaigne preferred wisdom to knowledge. He thought that the capacity to use what one knows in order to make right decisions rather than mere book-knowledge was more important. For example, as to history, he wrote, "Let him be taught not so much the facts of history as how to judge them" (p.62). His preference suggests that each individual must penetrate the stories and information given by others in order to see by him/herself what situation and possibilities s/he has.

Educational philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries such as Comenius, Locke, and Rousseau, argued also against book-learning, mere opinions, dependence on custom or arbitrary authority, and emphasized autonomous judgment based on one's first-hand knowledge. What Chambliss writes on French philosophes seems to be applicable to them as well:

Understanding is the most fundamental aim of human beings; it is good in itself and it holds forth the prospect of future goods. Understanding does not guarantee human happiness, but we shall not gain happiness unless we understand the nature of things remembered, things reasoned, and things imagined. (p.46)

The notion that happiness is impossible without understanding seems crucial. To know and to be aware of one's life situation and possibilities, as opposed to ignorance, knowing through others, or by unexamined opinions, became a key to a worthwhile life.

Herbart in the 19th century thought that one of the major purpose of education was to create diverse interest in the students. This also suggests the importance of pursuing deeper understanding and the sense that there are always more possibilities to be realized. He said:

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23 He liked "a well-formed rather than a well-filled intellect". See, Essays, Ch.26, "On the Education of Children," p.54.
It is of course a familiar precept that the teacher must try to arouse the interest of his pupils in all that he teaches. However, this precept is generally meant and understood to denote the idea that learning is the end and interest the means to attain it. I wish to reverse that relationship. Learning must serve the purpose of creating interest. Learning is transient, but interest must be lifelong. (quoted in Hilgenheger, pp.7-8; italics in original)

All these views seem to point to an importance of awareness of one's lived situations and its untapped possibilities, or a sense that there is always more to see in the world. Although later generations critiqued some aspects of these writers' specific practical recommendations or philosophical assumptions, they seem to support, at least in principle, the basic educational value of awareness and understanding as a key to a worthwhile life.

The earlier theorists did not think that imaginativeness is a crucial part of the achievement of the basic value. It is in part because of their epistemology; (1) their belief in the existence of objective knowledge, and (2) their assumption that sharpening the rational faculty (combined with senses) is all that is required in order to see objective knowledge. Flexibility of mind and the playful/experimental attitude do not have much role to play in this scheme.

Some ideas which look like an appreciation of imagination or creativity are nevertheless found in these early theorists. However, their ideas and appreciation of imagination is half-hearted, so to speak. For example, Herbart, along with Pestalozzi and others, appreciates the imagination as an image-making faculty, but his theory places the imagination as a preparation for the formation of clear and distinct concepts. He was not so appreciative of the free-play of imagination. Froebel thought highly of creativity, but his idea of imagination and creativity was rather a symbol of divine nature embedded in the human nature which would develop by itself (as a seed grows into a flower as long as a proper environment is there) than something to be developed by such artificial means as
instruction. He understood imagination or creativity as a manifestation of the divine seed in human beings which is most lively in childhood.

The appreciation of imaginative capacity as it is conceived today emerged around the late 19th century to the early 20th century. Dewey is one of the principal figures in this transition, or, at least, a figure who happened to work in that period of time and made arguments which were in line with what we understand to be the idea of imagination. Either way, Dewey is one of the authors most commonly referenced among the theorists of imagination today.

I do not mean to say that all educational theories of imagination today are the consequences of Deweyan pragmatism. However, they have a strong resonance with some aspects of it. The emphases on understanding (as opposed to mere knowledge), continuous and self-motivated learning, and alternative perspectives all indicate that a life worth living is not a matter of personal pleasure or comfort but a matter of awareness as a social being. And Dewey's understanding of the connection between imagination, rationality, and social life is one of the prototypical arguments which accommodate this perspective.

Hanson's words echo this view; her view seems to indicate the kind of imagination which the western tradition of educational theories values. She writes:

We do not thus merely escape in thought the bounds of reality; we know that something other than this immediate temporary reality is possible — and we may then be excited to effect changes in the world. Imagination may be a form of escape, but insofar as that escape is to the sight of possibilities beyond the immediate, it can be a path to personal and social freedom. (in Egan and Nandaner, p.138)

The way we value imagination is a continuation of an important strand in modern education. Today, it is said that society may offer false choices, that there is no guarantee that one will reach any ultimate truth, and that there are diverse
and competing perspectives, stories, values, and information about which one cannot simply tell truth from falsity. Nonetheless, somehow, one must be able to estimate one’s situation reasonably accurately and see the possibility that things could be otherwise.

I do not mean to say that the connection between imagination and education, as I have described it so far, should be the only connection; I recognize the socio-cultural contextuality of the view presented.

Being aware of it, nonetheless, I suggest, first, that the picture I have drawn is a fairly reasonable summary of the general line of arguments among contemporary theorists of imaginative education, and second, that we should pursue this connection, because it is so tightly connected to the values we believe in. The theory of imagination as it is discussed by contemporary scholars is interesting, because on the one hand, it is a continuation of the legacy of Western education from the Enlightenment, while on the other hand, it is trying to go somewhat beyond the scope of it as seen in the rejection of some philosophical assumptions.

Although some assumptions and language of the modern era may need to be critiqued and rejected, I do not believe the general project of education born in that era should be casually discarded (cf. Greene, 1995, pp.2, 70, 197; Johnson, p.220).

5. Conclusion

The idea of imagination is elusive, as we have seen, and it tends to lead toward confused arguments. The idea of imagination started to attract theorists as a conceptual device to criticize the principles and practices of education of the late 19th century to the early 20th century, which were based on the older understandings of the human mind. Today we have to think about what sort of
education we want for the future, and I suggest that we should keep a certain part of the modern educational project which we inherited while refining or revising some aspects of it. The conceptual connection between imagination and education is a key which I propose for this project.

Though there are many competing views about what imagination means and why it is important for education, there seems to be a relatively stable center of concerns among the few theorists who consider imagination as educationally important. In this chapter, I presented what I understand to be one of the major centers of their concerns, and suggested that it is a continuation of the project of modern Western education. Unless we are to discard the project itself, I believe, the development of imagination must be a necessary part of our education, and we have to work out the way to implement it in practice as well as to clarify it conceptually.

As I have shown in the present and the previous chapter, it is impossible to identify the one defining characteristic of the idea of imagination; indeed, we do not need to. However, there should be justifiable reasons for taking up imagination seriously (which I did in this chapter), and in this concluding remark, I want to add one reason I chose the term "imagination" over others with regard to its practical implications.

For me (here, I am taking a point of view as a classroom teacher), the choice of the term "imagination", in distinction from other similar concepts, particularly "creativity", is due at least in part to a sense of expectation it conveys. We sometimes apply the term "imaginative" to a person because we sense in him/her a potential or tendency to give effective surprise to people, and not to be tightly constrained by immediate actuality, standard procedure, or cliché. The idea of creativity, on the other hand, is too tightly connected to the idea of the product (Bailin), but the idea of imagination is closer to the disposition of a person (cf. Barrow, 1992, p.108).
The idea of imagination also has stronger connection to the idea of playful spirit. Being imaginative suggests being in pursuit of ideas driven by curiosity and fascination about the subject/task without being too much concerned about the judgment given by others; if the product happens to be judged excellent, it would be nice, but it is merely incidental.

As a symbol of the romantic spirit, imagination implies a rejection of the application of existing norms. In the context of classroom teaching, teachers sometimes intuitively think that a student has some imaginative potential even though s/he is not particularly good in terms of scores and grades. It is very hard to justify such a judgment in light of commonly accepted criteria for excellence, but I do not think that this kind of intuitive judgment should be dismissed or repressed. And usually, this intuitive judgment is a reflection of the teacher’s expectation that the child some day will blossom, maybe not in the exact subject which the teacher is teaching or even academically, and it justifies the teacher’s effort not to give up on the child. Also the judgment makes the teacher reflect on, and sometimes revise, his/her own teaching method, curriculum, requirements, etc., and give the child a little more flexible space to explore. Therefore, imagination in educational practice suggests an effort to become more mindful of what the student may be able to achieve and how the teacher may be able to make changes in assisting the student’s quest.

As I showed, our conception of imagination has a strong connection with rationality. Imaginative rationality, so to speak, is a valuable thing to pursue, while we tend to think of rationality (and other educational values) in terms of something explicable (predominantly verbalizable and quantifiable). The idea of imagination implies existence of something which always escapes accepted norms, standards, and verbal description. While the emphasis on the product (as in the concept of creativity) suggest that we are able to evaluate the product (idea or object), the idea of imagination put forth the sense that, even if we may not clearly explicate or evaluate it according to the accepted norms, we may find
some possibility for educative experience in what individuals (primarily students) produce; and this sense implies the need for exploration of hidden or not so obvious possibilities.
As I showed in chapters 2 and 3, there is a certain direction which contemporary educational theories of imagination are taking, and also there are some assumptions on which these theories are built. What I am going to examine in this chapter are some alternative foundations of, and critical perspectives on, the general theoretical orientation which I described in the previous chapters.

First, I will discuss critical perspectives which come mainly from psychoanalysis and Waldorf education (section 2). In the following section, I will discuss some critiques of the idea of imaginative education within the tradition of Western philosophy. In the last section, I will briefly touch on Eastern perspectives on the importance of imagination or creativity.
2. Alternative foundations

2-1. Introduction

In this section, I will discuss two theoretical foundations which present critical perspectives on the principles and practices of public education today. I will discuss them by focusing on two specific issues; first, the unconscious, and second, the whole person.

While there are remarks on the unconsciousness or on related issues by the theorists whom I referred to in the previous chapters (e.g. McMillan, pp.44, 19, 174; Dewey, 1934a, pp.58, 79-80, 82, 270-1; Cobb, p.90; Noddings and Shore, p.85; Greene, 1995, p.53; McCleary, p.22), the overall tendency among them is to discuss imagination in its connection with rationality and intentional/conscious thought.

Psychoanalysis, when it was introduced into North America in the early twentieth century along with the social atmosphere of that time (e.g. bohemianism and radicalism), had a rather strong influence on some child-centred educators (e.g. Caroline Pratt, Margaret Naumburg; See, Cremin, Ch.6, esp., sections IV and V; Sato, 1990/94, Chs. 4 and 6; Sato, 2003). Those child-centred educators were reacting against the overemphasis on scientific efficiency in education because it implied that the end of education was to adapt children to existing society as it was (Cremin, p.196; Sato, 1990/94, p.105). In reacting to such social atmosphere they contended that children's inborn curiosity and creativity should be the ultimate guide for education. Children were understood in an analogy with artists, and it was asserted that education's first duty was to provide the environment to allow children to express themselves in constructive
or creative activities. For example, it is said, "He [a child] is dominated by a desire to clarify this idea for himself. It is incidental to his purpose to clarify for others" (Pratt and Stanton, quoted in Cremin, p.205; italics in original). Although people like Dewey and some other progressive educators were critical of the existing social order and of education geared to that order, they were sometimes criticized for not being mindful enough of the true resource of education. At one time these child-centred educators' theory and practice attracted a significant number of supporters (which culminated in the establishment of the Progressive Education Association in 1919), but the movement did not last very long; for example, the PEA came to an end in 1955 (Cremin, Ch.7). Cremin points out that these radical educators "expanded one part of what progressive education had formerly meant into its total meaning, and in so doing they wrought a caricature that was quickly taken up as the ultimate meaning of the movement itself" (p.202).

Interest in the significance of art in education, which was an important part of those educators' theory and practice, survived the demise of the progressive education movement. However, its radicalism was lost in the educational theories and practices of the mid-twentieth century (e.g. the life-adjustment movement), and emphasis was placed on such purposes as the "health of emotion" and "integration of personality", or the use of art became merely instrumental to other "higher" goals such as excellence in scientific or academic disciplines (Sato, 2003, p.18). Today, there is some renewed interest in the critical or radical perspectives which arts can provide, but the status of arts among other subjects is not yet high enough in those theorists' eyes who are interested in arts' educational potential.

The meaning of art will be discussed further in Ch. 6. Here, I will briefly review some issues which theorists who are influenced by psychoanalytic perspectives raise. Though not from the psychoanalytic tradition, I will bring
Rudolf Steiner's ideas into the discussion, because his ideas have some thematic similarities with the issues with which psychoanalytic perspectives are concerned.

2-2. The unconscious

There is a question about how much of our thought is under conscious or rational control. That is to say, the content and process of our thought which come to our awareness may be only a tip of an iceberg; as to imaginative thought, the occurrence of it may be caused in part by unconscious mechanisms. And some people argue that educational theories for the last few decades, under the strong influence of cognitive theories of the Piagetian line, have envisioned development of the individual in a certain way, and ended up ignoring or overlooking the ideas and values which some alternative traditions and perspectives emphasize. From a philosophical perspective, for example, Imai, points out that though cognitive or developmental theorists expanded their concerns to such things as aesthetic experience and creativity in children, they are almost always interpreted and appreciated in their relevance to the ideal of development in the Piagetian line (e.g. how de-centralization of thoughts and perspectives appear in children's artistic production), while the question of how children experience the arts is not asked (Imai, in Sato and Imai, 2003). There are several traditions and approaches to this kind of issue (for example, Imai discusses a phenomenological perspective), but let us take up the psychoanalytic tradition here. From a psychoanalytic perspective, Jung says:

[Unlike our understanding of our physiology in which we admit things which go contrary to our conscious choice] when it comes to psychology, it seems to us that everything is voluntary and subject to our choice. This universal prejudice arises from our tendency to identify the whole psyche with the conscious phase of it. There are,
however, many extremely important psychic processes which are unconscious, or only indirectly conscious. *(The Collected Works, Vol. 17, p.59)*

Psychoanalysis (or analytical psychology, the denomination which Jung preferred in distinction from the Freudian school; See, ibid., p.50) is originally a therapy, and it is generally regarded as a supplement to what normal life cannot provide. However, when we consider some of its theorists' and practitioners' concerns with the vision of psychological health, we may be justified to say that its intention is as educational as the writings of the philosophers and theorists whom I mentioned in the previous chapters. Their concerns include some aspects of our life which, though unknown even to ourselves, seem to be affecting the ways in which we feel, think, and behave. For example, the Jungian school has an idea called the "active imagination"; this is, in a nutshell, a method to restore psychological health by confronting, understanding, and coming to terms with the images and stories which one's unconscious life produces.¹ The assumptions are, first, that our unconscious has its own life and mechanism, so to speak, which are not accessible even to ourselves by normal means, and second, that the understanding of the content and mechanism of the unconscious, nonetheless, is an important aspect of our education. Also, some psychoanalytic theorists in fact apply the term "imagination" to the person's unconscious life which produces ideas and images in various forms (dreams, sudden flash of insight, etc.), and their idea of imagination deserves to be included in my discussion since I am trying to take an overview of various conceptions of imagination and their connections to education. Psychoanalytic theorists and those who have been influenced by psychoanalysis in fact discuss both imagination and education.

¹ See Hannah.
As an example of a theorist who has some interest in such issues and perspectives, we might take a look at Harold Rugg’s idea on imagination. While it seems justified to regard him as the one who supplemented the educational theory of the Deweyan line, he tried to expand the horizon by drawing on various other sources (including psychoanalysis). He draws on a wide range of resources in this regard – religion, mysticism, meditation of the East and the West, recent psychological research and philosophical traditions, and autobiographical accounts of highly innovative scientists and artists. Egan and Nadaner (1988) say that Rugg’s theory of imagination draws heavily on psychoanalysis, and this type of view was common in the child-centred pedagogy and the theory of self-expression in art (Introduction, p.xi). However, we should note that Rugg distances himself, to some extent, from both "pragmatic psychology" and "classical psychoanalysis". He says, "The key to the creative act lies neither in the conscious mind nor in the deep unconscious. It lies in the threshold antechamber between them" (p.213). He does not quite like the "unconscious" and his idea of "off-conscious" ("the antechamber" of the mind) is somewhat different from psychoanalytic accounts of the unconscious (Cf. Rugg, Ch.3).

Rugg’s concept of imagination is almost synonymous with creativity; he defines it as "a flash of insight" (e.g. p. xi). And he is concerned to secure the occurrence of the flash of insight in the age when innovation, scientific or humanitarian, is so necessary (Introduction to Rugg’s Imagination, by Benne, p.viii). He systematically sought to find the process by which the flash of insight happens. In this topic, he made a little correction to the popularized version of Deweyan theory of reflective thinking. He pointed out that a phase among the five phases of reflective thinking, i.e. the occurrence of an idea ("suggestion"), was somewhat undervalued in Dewey’s thought. Rugg goes on to describe how innovative ideas typically occur. According to him, the production of creative ideas require three stages or phases and they are, (1) concentration of attention on the task or problem, (2) relaxation, which culminates in (3) illumination or
flash of insight. The most significant aspect of Rugg's theory is the second phase, relaxation, and he says that it is so because relaxation lets the "off-conscious" mind work on the material.²

This kind of view is not typically incorporated into today's culture of education and schooling; we may remember Mary Warnock's observation that we tend not to appreciate "the importance of solitude, comfort with being alone, comfort with a kind of silence in the mind – free from incessant bombardment by talk, entertainment, radio and TV, noise, and so on" (quoted in Egan, 1992, p.159, from her Schools of Thought, 1977). I do not say that today's educational theorists of imagination are necessarily hostile to such views because there are a few suggestions which sound similar to Rugg's point on the necessity of relaxation in the process of creative thought; but they do not go beyond suggestions on this issue.

Psychoanalytic perspectives and concerns with the unconscious are typically mentioned in relation to artistic creativity or aesthetic imagination, which in turn is related, also typically, to what may be called art therapy; the restoration of psychological health by engaging in artistic activities.

Adam Blatner, writing on the connection between the unconsciousness, imagination, and art therapy ("The Place of the Creative Arts in Psychotherapy"), asserts the importance of the integration of the unconscious aspect and the conscious aspect of one's life. Thus, perspectives on the unconscious are not limited to therapeutic purposes. He seems to come from a Jungian background rather than Freudian, and says that the unconscious is the seat of artistic genius and imagery as well as suppressed feelings and weaknesses of the person. From a psychoanalytic perspective, one's consciousness is the seat of a habitual mode of thinking, feeling, and valuing, and it, by preventing ideas, images, and feelings

² For similar viewpoints, see, McMillan, p.174; Dewey, Art as Experience, pp.58, 79-80, 82, 270-1; Noddings and Shore, Awakening the Inner Eye, p.85; Sloan, p.144.
which are uncomfortable or disturbing to the person who wants to maintain a well-ordered, rational life, sometimes ends up suppressing potentials which may lead to a greater integrity of his/her life, and innovative works. According to Blatner, the problem with many neurotic people is that they "tend to become overly serious not only in the sense of experiencing genuine distress, but also in becoming more fixated in their own habitual ways of thinking, behaving, and feeling." Thus, the point of psychological therapy is to make their perspectives, feelings, and thoughts multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional, by unleashing the communication between their consciousness and unconsciousness. He says, "Once the person has become sensitive to the ongoing messages from that internal source, the unconscious becomes a guide who will warn, remind, encourage, or reflect, depending on what is needed in the moment." Artistic activities facilitate this process, because:

The arts offer various channels for this communication [between the conscious and the unconscious], different vehicles for accessing those subtle intuitions, images, associations, and feelings which are easily suppressed and over-ridden by conscious attitudes and familial or cultural conditioning.

A major problem which he seems to find in many people, both normal and neurotic, is that they "live their lives with an implicit attitude that there are no alternatives." By confronting, and coming to terms with what has been hidden in the unconscious, one gains an attitude of accepting alternative possibilities. Artistic forms are suited for this purpose because they present ideas, feelings, and values in metaphoric and imagistic ways; those hidden things may be hard to articulate in words because they are not abundantly clear and are sometimes uncomfortable for the person. He writes:
It's only partly true that the mind tends to disguise the inner feelings which it cannot permit itself to face; it's also true that some of the things that the unconscious needs to communicate to the conscious mind are paradoxical, many-dimensional, and are better communicated in the poetic, dream-like forms of art; indeed, they couldn't be expressed fully in mere words. Dreams are often strikingly direct demonstrations of the present state of some aspect of the unconscious, and require only a little poetic elaboration and a receptive attitude to understand their messages.

Thus, according to Blatner, people who integrate their conscious and unconscious lives achieve greater receptivity to such things as imagination and emotion, by exercising their imaginative capacity, with the assistance of some technique.

In asserting the importance of one's unconsciousness and imagination, and the use of artistic activities and art works in regard to them, he also emphasizes the importance of, first, what he calls "mental flexibility" (i.e. "shifting points of view", and a "capacity to examine one's own behaviors and the underlying assumptions which influence it"), and second, "self-expression" and "spontaneity" as a means to achieve the first.3

The first point indicates that he shares, at least in part, a similar idea of imagination with many philosophers and educational theorists today, i.e. imagination as a flexibility of the mind. The only difference is the ends to which the "flexibility" is applied; one end is, generally speaking, concerned with intellectual and moral development, and the other with psychological integrity. The second point is somewhat different from those of many educational theorists

3 "The unconscious will express itself and allow itself to be perceived by the conscious, if it doesn't have to make explicit the shameful or uncomfortable ideas, but rather can express them in metaphoric form, such as in art, music, song, dance, poetry, or in a role of an imaginary character." For the communication between the unconscious and the conscious, he mentions, for example, "psychodramatic techniques" and Jungian "active imagination".
who discuss imagination. For example, Blatner’s line of argument assumes that what is important already lies in one’s unconsciousness, while educational theorists tend to think that what counts as a major part of the imaginative capacity must be acquired.

Blatner’s view is just an example to show how diverse today’s views on educational ends and means are, compared to even a few decades ago. Imai points out, in the postscript to Imaginative Power of Children (Sato and Imai, 2003), that education is concerned with how to construct paths to the world, and that, today, the whole culture of education and schooling, which is predicated on the traditional subjects as the sole legitimate paths to the world, is questioned; many people have started to recognize that the paths to the world are diverse (p.344).

The psychoanalytic perspective suggests that we might sensibly consider that there are factors in one’s thoughts, behaviors, and attitudes that are affected profoundly by what may be called the "unconscious" which is, according to a psychoanalytic perspective, formed through one’s early relationship within a family; and considerations of its importance may require educators to understand their students in a much more diverse context, including their experience with their immediate family. Jung says:

The prime psychological condition is one of fusion with the psychology of the parents, an individual psychology being only potentially present. Hence it is that the nervous and psychic disorders of children right up to school age depend very largely on disturbances in the psychic world of the parents. All parental difficulties reflect themselves without fail in the psyche of the child, sometimes with pathological results. (The Collected Works, Vol.17, p.53; cf. Also, Ch.VI)

This is, of course, a contestable claim, but his view seems to be worth examining and it has some educational implications. For example, personal
development and education have been traditionally considered as matters of the individuals' (independent from their family) and of their consciousness, but Jung's idea implies that the development and education of persons should be considered in a larger context which includes the psychological life of their parents. And this presents us with a rather different picture of how education should be envisioned. This is not usually called a post-modern critique, but it is certainly a critique of modern Western educational principles on which many educational practices are built; a view which considers teaching and learning as a matter of an individual whose "mind" acquires knowledge, and a view which regards knowledge as an entity or substance separable from the context of the person's emotional involvement, activity, life, and culture.

Whether or not, or the extent to which, the views of Rugg or Jung are valid requires further examination, but examination of their views illuminates at least what the principles and practices of our public schooling tend to ignore. Discussions on "the whole person" is an example of a critique of our public education made in this spirit.

2-3. The whole person

There have always been some theorists of education who have pointed out the problem with exclusively limiting the ideas and ideals of education. They say that the backdrop against which intellectual and moral development takes place should be more carefully considered. For example, Anna Freud, from a psychoanalytic perspective, said that a too narrow view about the purpose of education, one that fails to take into account children's instinctual world, would
fail (in Suppes, 1995). This kind of concern tends to be voiced by the idea of the "wholeness" of human beings.\footnote{An earlier example is Pestalozzi's claim about the education of the head, hand, and heart. Some progressive educators in the early twentieth century, such as Dewey and Pratt argued for the whole person. Many non-Western cultural traditions, for example, the Japanese, avoid separating the acquisition of factual knowledge from other aspects of education.}

I want to point out issues about the self, identity, and the whole person. Although I occasionally have some problems with the ambiguity of the meanings of these terms, particularly the term "the whole person", which would include various things from the "unconscious" to "spirituality", I appreciate these terms in that they point out the limitation of the ideas of education we have today which focus primarily on the intellect, the rational, and the conscious. I observe that the students sometimes do not see the point of learning what they are told to learn because they do not see how it may be connected to what they are going to become or to their lives in general (van Manen, pp.189-90; Saiki, 1995/1997; Ikuta, p.4). Some students wonder why they need to learn, say a math formula, because they do not understand what the formula has to do with what they think or hope to become. Or, some immigrant students dislike the idea of learning some aspects of the country's culture which they have moved into, feeling that it would uproot them from their cultural backgrounds.

I can think of two examples; Steiner's educational idea and Jungian analytical psychology. Although Jung was not concerned with the issues of intellectual education and he may not be satisfying to some who are concerned with the problem of education in the context of schooling, he was interested in the issue of education taken broadly. The Jungian concern is to establish (or restore) the wholeness of one's existence by negotiating the relation between one's conscious life and his/her unconscious life (The Collected Works, Vol.17, Ch.VII; cf. also, Hannah). Similarly, Steiner says that we "must learn to understand the whole man, spirit, soul, and body" (Lecture 2, p.34).
Although I suggested my concern about the ambiguity of the expression, "the whole person", I do understand the problems it poses to us. Those who use it are concerned with the limitation of our educational practices (particularly schooling) and the principles on which they are founded. Those who have this concern and mention "the whole person" sometimes turn to Waldorf education and Steiner's philosophy among others. For example:

American schools are having a crisis in values. Half the children fail according to standard measures and the other half wonder why they are learning what they do. As is appropriate to life in a democracy, there are a handful of alternatives. Among the alternatives, the Waldorf school represents a chance for every child to grow and learn according to the most natural rhythms of life. (Raymond McDermott, quoted in the homepage of Rudolf Steiner College in Fair Oaks, California)

In the homepage where the above quote is found, a few other words on Steiner and Waldorf education by scholars are quoted. It is not difficult to notice that they frequently mention such terms as "imagination" and "the whole person". When people mention the education of "the whole person", they oppose it to the current practice of education whose narrow focus is on academic excellence and cognitive development. Views of people like Steiner and Jung are recognized as alternatives to the ideas and practices which dominate today's education.

As to Jung, though he does not discuss schooling extensively, there is no doubt that he is concerned with it. For example, he says that school is where children should grow out of a largely unconscious primitive state of the mind and achieve "the integration of consciousness" (The Collected Works, Vol.17, p.52). The teacher plays an important role in this transition; from the state of "fusion with the psychology of the parents" to "the adaptation to the world" and the establishment of their own personality (ibid., p.55). As such, the teacher "must
not be satisfied with merely pouring the curriculum into the child; he must also
influence [the child] through his personality" (ibid., p.55). He continues:

It would be different if the only thing that mattered in school life
were the methodical teaching of the curriculum. But that is at most
only half the meaning of school. The other half is the real
psychological education made possible through the personality of
the teacher. (ibid., p.56)

For this kind of education, he argues, teachers need a profound
understanding of their psychological life, which is made possible in part by
understanding their unconsciousness (pp.58-9). He says that the adult "has lost
the extraordinary plasticity of the child's mind, and has acquired a will of his
own, personal convictions, and a more or less definite consciousness of himself,"
the adult is less amenable to the direction by others. Therefore, his/her education
toward greater self-understanding must be done largely by him/herself (ibid.,
pp.57-8). In Jung's view, dreams are extremely useful for this self-understanding,
because dreams "[reflect] certain vital tendencies of the personality, either those
whose meaning embraces our whole life, or those which are momentarily of most
importance" (ibid., p.62), because we are, when asleep, free from the tighter grip
of conscious/voluntary control of the mind's activity, and are "robbed of the
possibility of deceiving ourselves" (ibid., p.59).

Along with the points I made in section 2-2, a rather different picture of
education is suggested here; the education of the persons with whom children
have close relationship (in this case, teachers) constitutes an important part of
the children's education.
2-4. Problems with the alternative perspectives

It is understandable that ideas from psychoanalysis or anthroposophy are hard to incorporate into the theory and practice of public education. It is telling that, often, Waldorf education, which is based on Steiner's anthroposophy, is in practice not radically different from mainstream schooling (though some may argue that the difference is in fact radical); Waldorf principles such as the emphasis on artistic activities and postponing of reading is not radical enough to my eyes, because the ends which these means serve are not really different from those of other schools. The treatment of the idea of imagination is an example in this regard. While in Steiner's philosophy, imagination connects a person's psyche with life after death (Lecture 2), I do not believe that there are teachers, even in Waldorf schools, who make this connection operationally meaningful in the actual classroom.

People like Steiner, Jung, and Rugg are drawing on various philosophical, religious, and spiritual traditions not limited to modern Western philosophy, modern empirical science, and Christianity. The width of their foundations make their theory and practice obscure to the perception of some people as well as attractive to those who are frustrated with the limitation of modern Western philosophy and science.

One of the problems is their interest in things which we cannot observe. Psychoanalysis specifically focuses on psychological processes which analytically oriented philosophers would contest (Cf. "On the Relation of Analytical

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5 It is safe to say that Steiner's educational principles at least share some of the same educational objectives as many other educators, and he is proposing a better means to go about it. I will discuss this point on Steiner further in Chapter 6, Section 3-3.
Psychology to Poetry," [1922] in The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, vol. 15, pp.65-83). For example, regarding the study of art from a psychological perspective, Jung writes, "Only that aspect of art which consists in the process of artistic creation can be a subject for psychological study, but not that which constitutes its essential nature" (p.65; italics mine; cf. Rugg, p.xiii, for a similar point). What we discuss regarding the process of a person's thought is inevitably a matter of interpretation based on observable phenomena (in words or in deeds); it may not pass the criteria of empirical/observational science or of logical analysis, but it does not mean it is without any criteria of validity.

Psychologically oriented theorists tend to be interested in the process as opposed to the product, while philosophers (particularly analytic philosophers) tend to find the talk about the process separated from the product problematic.

I would imagine that it is extremely difficult to justify anything about the process of what is going on "in the mind" of a person. However, though it may not be generalizable as a theory of, let's say, physics, I do not want to discard talk about what is going on in the mind or inside the person. In the field of education, we have to remind ourselves that we are not looking for the same kind of certainty as physics. Ricoeur says that history may not have the kind of regularities or laws in an observable science, but its methodology leads to a certain understanding which is compatible to that of natural science (p.374). Similarly, I would say that such theoretical devices as psychoanalysis or Waldorf perspectives give us plausible ways of understanding and thinking about educational issues. This consideration does not automatically mean that discussions on such invisible things as "unconsciousness", "spirit", and "imagination" are admissible or pertinent, but it makes us realize that there is

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6 Cf. Ricoeur, p.345.
7 Cf. Ricoeur, p.374; Jung, The Collected Works, Vol.17, p.59 (See the quote from him in Section 2-2 above).
much more to see in education than what can be verified in the manner of empirical sciences.

There is also a problem with the religious and spiritual language in views like Steiner's and Jung's. Today, there is a revival, so to speak, of spirituality due to the appreciation of cultural diversity which includes traditions of indigenous cultures and Eastern traditions (e.g. Zen Buddhism). However, we have to note that religious neutrality or secularity has been one of the major principles of modern education (cf. Condorcet), and people tend to be cautious about views and ideas which imply religious or spiritual themes.

When people use such terms as "spiritual" and "unconscious", it is relatively clear what they are opposing it to, but it is not quite so with what they actually mean. Particularly when we cannot see with our own eyes or experience, for example, what Steiner calls "the spiritual world" or life before birth and after death, it is questionable if we should put his idea about such a life into the language of our theory and practice of education. The ideas of Jung and Steiner seem to be free of religious fanaticism or dogmatism, but they have some implications which some people find problematic.

When modern educators thought it better to leave religions out of the sphere of public education in general and of moral education in particular, they had a good reason to do so. They thought that, in the situation where families were under the influence of various religious denominations, an official installation of a non-sectarian moral education would cause more problems than worked for the establishment of social ties. So, for example, Condorcet at the time of the French Revolution thought that religious/moral education should be left to families. Today, most public schooling retains this principle.9

9 See, for example, Condorcet's Premier Mémoire in his Cinq Mémoires sur l'instruction publique: Nature et objet de l'instruction publique (1791).
On the other hand, we have another concern which is no less important; that is, the problem of recognition. Many people today argue that the idea of the individual abstracted from his/her cultural heritage, which includes religious or spiritual matters, is neither a proper conception nor educationally sound. This issue is particularly important in such multi-cultural societies as Canada and the United States where minorities have been in some degree deprived of their cultural heritage and neutralized into the culture of the majority.

We have to work out some balance between these two poles. Avoiding Steiner or Jung merely for the religious or spiritual tones in their ideas would not be a solution.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10} However, I have some concerns too. I observe that some people expect of such things as Zen Buddhism and Native American cultures something like what Enlightenment philosophers expected of reason, i.e. a neutral ground for dialogue. While I agree to some extent with the criticisms of the ideal of disembodied rationality, I am concerned about the kind of expectation and rhetoric about these alternative approaches. For example, it is said:

\textit{Zazen [Zen meditation] is not a religion. But it awakens religious principle, which means, literally, "to link" – to link humans with nature and the cosmic system. Zazen, practice of body and mind, awakens our vital force. It balances our cerebral functions as well as our nervous system; it balances the material and the spiritual; it harmonizes men and nature. Zazen balances our lives. (from the homepage of Association Zen Internationale; retrieved at http://www.zen-azi.org/html/why_e.html)}

It may be acceptable that Zazen or Zen aspires to something that transcends things merely material or intellectual, but to expect it to transcend sectarianism in religion should be taken with a caution. For those who believe in other religions, Zen is a sectarian religion. Conversely, I wonder if we repeat the same mistake when we expect something -- Zen Buddhism or else -- to discard or transcend its cultural roots, be it religious or dogmatic dimension, or otherwise.
2-5. From Romanticism to psychoanalysis

In chapter 2, when I examined the historical connections between the romantic imagination and contemporary educational theories of imagination, I pointed out that some aspects of Romanticism are not quite visible in the latter. One of these aspects is what I may call the Nachtseite (the dark side) of the imagination (See Ch.2, notes 20 and 21).

As a few other writers similarly point out, contemporary educational theories of imagination do not quite take up this side of imagination; imagination as absurd, destructive, and negative (Sutton-Smith, 1988).

My observation is that the Nachtseite of the imagination is dealt with by psychoanalytic tradition, while the "mainstream" educational theories of imagination tend not to deal with it. For example, Jung says that "the understanding of dreams has opened up an almost limitless vista showing how consciousness develops out of the remotest and darkest depths of the unconscious" (The Collected Works, Vol.17, p.68; my emphasis).

Charles Taylor says that a doubt about the conception of "the unitary self" - i.e. "a tight center of control which dominates experience and is capable of constructing the order of reason by which we can direct thought and life" -- appeared after Romanticism in the writings of such figures as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (p.462). In other words, an awareness about "the flux which moves beyond the scope of control or integration" came to be acknowledged by some anti-Enlightenment philosophers. This sort of acknowledgement about the aspects of the human life, which falls outside of what Enlightenment thinkers emphasized, was made by some philosophers after Romanticism who had an anti-Enlightenment stance; and it was inherited by psychoanalysis in the twentieth century. For example, Taylor suggests that the Schopenhauerian
concept of "will" is the ancestor to Freudian "id" (p.446). This point about the will reminds me of Berlin's suggestion of the Romantic principle of "the indomitable will" (The Roots of Romanticism, p.119). As we have seen in the previous chapters, Western educational theories emphasized rationality (or reason), which had two principal implications: one was the capacity to grasp the order of things (the order of things given by Nature or God), and the other was the capacity of self-mastery as a being who, above other earthly things, has the capacity to understand the order of things. This view about the connection between reason, human nature, and education shows some traits of Judeo-Christian views and values too, though they are secularized to some extent. Romanticism and the subsequent traditions, as is particularly evident in Nietzsche's life and thought, posed the problem of the dark, unfathomable, and untamable aspects of things, and particularly of the self. Imagination, in this context implies the manifestation of dark images and dangerous tendencies of the self and the society. Most educational theorists do not take up the theme of positively dark, dangerous, absurd aspects of life which may exist in childhood. On the other hand, the psychoanalysis of, for example, Freud, does deal with the theme. As Sappes (1995) argues, psychoanalysis provides us with the perspective that conflicts are a natural part of education and development, while "[o]ne of the most important mistakes of classical pedagogy is to think that development can be a peaceful process."

Along with the concerns with the integration of the conscious and the unconscious, and with the whole person, the view that the Nachtseite and deep psychological conflict as natural part of psychological life tend to be overlooked in typical educational theories. These perspectives are valuable for our understanding of what education involves beyond the scope of modern Western thought.

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3. Critical perspectives on the idea of imaginative education

3-1. Introduction

(1) It is possible to challenge the kind of connection between imagination and education which I described in the previous chapters from a conceptual-analytical point of view, though we have to bear in mind that some important contributions with respect to the connection have been made by analytic philosophers (e.g. Ryle, White, and Barrow). Some analytic philosophers may question whether I, or anyone, really need to use the term imagination, and point out that the use of the term imagination does more harm than good for it misleads people to think that there is a substance or direct referent to the term (like the faculty conception of imagination). For example, some of them may criticize the use of the concept of imagination by saying that the concept of imagination is misleading just like the concept of the mind is; "imagination", like "mind", has no direct referent, thus to use the term "imagination" (or "mind") misleads one to wrongfully assume that there is a thing pointed to.

However, at least three counterarguments can be made. First, not every concept or word has a direct referent. On the contrary, many important concepts have no direct referents. (e.g. The concept of love has no such entity to be designated but it is still important). Second, though the term "imagination" may suggest a thing or an entity because it is a noun, contemporary theorists of imagination seem to derive its meaning from its adjectival form, and the use of the noun is mostly for stylistic reasons. Third, by using the term, we can make a meaningful distinction between an imaginative education and an unimaginative
one, and this distinction, I believe, can distinguish what other concepts cannot do or cannot do so well.

(2) It is also possible to take what may be called a postmodern perspective and to contest the importance of imagination. This perspective would carry the critique of the appreciation of imagination beyond the linguistic/conceptual critique of the analytic point of view. Analytic philosophy, as developed in the English-speaking world, is based on the common usage of the language, and it implicitly assumes the world-view and values of those who use it. Post-modern perspectives are certainly not as coherent as analytic philosophy, but their concern with cultural or socio-historical specificity and the limitation of any perspective provides profound critiques in some cases. They are particularly strong when they excavate some implicit assumptions inherent in various ideas developed in the modern West.

Since the ideas of education and imagination I examine in this thesis are largely the product of modern western thought, I should take postmodern critiques seriously. My examples in this regard are C.A. Bowers (1995) and Richard Kearney (1988). Bowers' book is not directly on the idea of imagination, but he takes up the idea of creativity which has some bearings on the discussion of imagination.

3-2. C.A. Bowers' challenge to modern education

C.A. Bowers (1995) does not specifically deal with the idea of imagination, but he critiques the modern ideas/ideals of creativity and the autonomous individual (which to some extent overlaps with the idea of imagination; See Bowers, Ch. 3). He writes:
Like the educator's ideal of individuals who decide their own values, the current ideal of the creative individual now needs to be radically reconstituted in a way that decenters the individual as the primary creative agent of change. (p.42)

Bowers particularly dislikes such modern notions as a "subjectly-centered, product-oriented view of creativity" and "the linkage between the autonomous individual, creativity, and social progress" (p.46). He thinks that such modern ideals as autonomous individuals and creativity are epistemologically unsound and ideologically destructive.

He says that "the image of the individual who achieves greater freedom and self-direction through the development of autonomous judgment, which meant learning to think and value independently of traditional norms" (p.75) are both epistemologically and ideologically problematic. Epistemologically, this sort of view is problematic because it is based on the mistaken view that the individuals learn how to think, value, etc., independent of their culture and society (particularly its language). Ideologically, the modern view is damaging to all existences in the eco-system, because it separates human beings (as individuals) from society and the natural environment, and make us lose sight of the fact that we are part of the larger eco-system.

I appreciate his argument about the importance of ecological education and his critique of modern epistemology, since it is true that any of us cannot learn, develop, or live in separation from society, culture, and the eco-system. However, I still believe that some modern educational values and some of the logic and rhetoric of modern education (e.g. the education of autonomous individuals) are worth supporting (cf. Greene, 1995, pp.2, 70; Johnson, p.220). It is true that the individual learns to think and value in the context of a particular culture or through the interconnectedness with other individuals and social/cultural factors, but Bowers' argument downplays the fact that it is ultimately the person him/herself who has to decide when s/he is in the situation.
in which some decision has to be made. It is important to become aware that there are various factors and a complicated history behind one’s decision-making, thoughts, and feelings, but at the same time every individual has to become able to judge independently from what other people say. We might as well recall Rousseau’s distinction between the "will of all", which means the consensus reached by the majority (this may or may not be correct or better than other alternatives), and "the general will", which is the thing that is of everyone’s interest or the truth; whether or not a thing is in everyone’s interest or closer to the truth is logically separable from the consensus of the majority (cf. The Social Contract, sections 2.3, 4.1-2). We may want to encourage individuals to be autonomous, and to be able to tell the "general will" from the "will of all".

I think that each one of us should respect cultural traditions which survived a long history and the wisdom which has been accumulated; they are more than what any one individual can learn in an individual lifetime. However, it is one thing for one to listen to what others have to say, and another for one to give up a critical attitude. Along with respect for other people and long-lasting traditions, one must strive to retain the attitude that one stands against or apart from the crowd based on his/her principles and judgments, if need be.

3-3. Richard Kearney’s postmodern concern

If the idea of imagination has a root in modern Western epistemology as one of its crucial parts, one may be skeptical about its feasibility. Some of the recent philosophical schools and movements (e.g. deconstructionists and postmodernists) are particularly hostile to the use of logic and rhetoric which imply modern assumptions (e.g. the use of such terms as "truth" and "originality"). The logical distinctions which these terms entail -- the distinctions between the truth and falsity, original and copy – may not be helpful, and may
even be oppressive, in some cases, because these distinctions often privilege one particular viewpoint or value system to the exclusion of the values and perspectives which minorities and underprivileged groups of people have.

One may be justified to ask, then, if it makes sense to talk about imagination. Against the ideal of an autonomous individual who can think of or find something original (uninfluenced, undistorted), a post-modern perspective may throw doubt on such a way of thinking because it doubts the modern presupposition that it is possible to distinguish the original and the copy (falsehood, mere appearance, etc.). Richard Kearney's *The Wake of Imagination*, is one of the books which specifically deal with this issue. While many theorists of imagination criticize some aspects of modernity (its social theory, epistemology, etc.), very few go so far as to face postmodernism's arguments.

Kearney traces the genealogy of the idea of imagination from ancient myths in Hellenism and Hebraism through modern philosophy to contemporary postmodernism (particularly in its manifestations in arts: novels, plastic arts, and movies). As to the definition of imagination, he rejects the extremes on both sides, extreme nominalism (imagination is anything that we choose to call it) and extreme essentialism (there is a timeless essence of imagination), and says that to define imagination is to tell the story of imagination (pp.17, 390).

He casts doubts on the humanist/modernist idea imagination ("its belief in the inevitability of historical progress and its almost messianic claims for the idealist subject," "the autonomous individual is the sole master and solitary centre of all meaning"; p.360), because in the postmodern society of ours, "the distinction between the imaginary and the real, the imitation and the original" is abolished (p.345). Where there is no distinction between original and copy, or real and imaginary does not make much sense, "[i]f ... one still wishes to speak of a postmodern imagination..., one would have to speak of an imagination which is no more than a parody of itself" (p.276).
However, he suggests that there is a danger in "the postmodern obsession with the demise of imagination may consolidate the growing conviction that human culture as we have known it ... is now reaching its end" (p.359). While he thinks that it is not wrong to debunk the overrated potential of the "humanist imagination", he also says that "we should be wary of slipping from such healthy scepticism to denying the creative subject any role whatsoever in the shaping of history" (p.360).

What we can and have to do now, he suggests, is to restore the "notion of a properly human imagination" (p.361; italics in original). He writes, "Given the specific characteristic of postmodern culture, which daily confront us and which cannot be wished away, such a revised version of imagination will differ of necessity from its humanist predecessors" (pp.361, 387).

Kearney nonetheless admits the use of the imagination. He says, "If deconstruction has committed an error it is, above all, its tendency to eclipse the ethical dimension" (p.365; cf. p.388). Imagination allows us to think of things otherwise, and this is what we still need. He proposes that in order to have ethical imagination, we need to have poetical imagination, and in order to have poetical imagination, we need to be able to allow the play of the imagination (pp.366-71). He writes:

After the disappearance of the self-sufficient imagination, another kind must now reappear – an imagination schooled in postmodern truth that the self cannot be 'centered' on itself; an imagination fully aware that meaning does not originate within the narrow chambers of its own subjectivity but emerges as a response to the other, as radical interdependence. (p.387)

Thus, to imagine no longer means to create some original ideas out of one's head, in the sense that it is totally unthought of in the past and by others. What we come up with comes up in a mesh of thoughts, ideas, and perspectives,
of the interactions. Being aware of the limitation of one's originality, we can still believe in, and need, the imaginative capacity.

4. An Eastern perspective: Is imagination more important than other educational goals?

This section also deals with a critical perspective to the idea of imaginative education, but it will do so by drawing on a different tradition. I take up an Eastern perspective; to be specific, a Japanese perspective. Although I am not an expert on the philosophical traditions of the East (Japanese or otherwise), I venture to discuss how the connection between imagination and education may be understood from a Japanese perspective.

The Japanese perspective which I will discuss is the culture of learning and teaching in Japanese traditional arts; tea ceremony (sa-do), classical theatre art (no), martial arts such as archery (kyu-do) and swordsmanship (ken-do). The culture of teaching and learning in these arts may not be too obvious in today's Japanese classroom, but I would say, first, that they are still present (this is particularly so when Japanese ideas and practices of education are compared to Western ideas and practices), and second, that both Japanese and Western educators may learn something from the culture.12

To put it bluntly, Japanese traditional arts do not put too much emphasis on individual imagination or creativity, that is, engaging and developing the imagination or creativity of the learner. However, I should add the following to avoid misunderstanding. First, Japanese culture does value imagination and creativity as an educational end, but it does not generally think of them as a

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12 However, I do not want to exaggerate the differences excessively. I will explain, in Chapter 8, that similar ideas and practices are found in some aspects of education in the West.
realistic aim for the majority of people. Second, terms like "imagination" and "creativity" do appear in contemporary documents and discussions on education, but they are primarily translations of Western ideas and do not seem to be digested well enough.\textsuperscript{13}

In the West, it is generally believed that the development of imagination or creativity is most likely done by stimulating and engaging them through play or constructive/creative activities. On the other hand, in Japanese traditional arts, imagination and creativity are assumed to come only after the mastery of the arts. The assumption is that even the mastery of the basics is a life-long pursuit, and that very few, if anyone at all, can master the art to the level that they may exercise their originality (in terms of being both "unusual and effective"). So, arousing imagination or creativity in children should be avoided until they become mature, knowledgeable, and skillful enough to think of their ideas or any ideas in broader context; one should be humble in front of the tradition of the discipline.

That being said, I will discuss in the following a specific aspect of the culture of education in Japanese traditional arts. It is the idea of \textit{kata} (form) and in Japanese traditional arts, there is a belief (and practice) that learning must be done through acquisition of \textit{kata}. I have just translated Japanese \textit{kata} into the English "form" (depending on the context, I might use "Form"), but this needs an explanation. \textit{Kata} exists and is discussed at various levels and can be translated into such words as "type", "pattern", and "style" (Minamoto, p.11). \textit{Kata} can be the "style" of an individual performer's way or technique of performing, or it can also be a more generalized or perfected "pattern" of doing something. We may think of the following example; although there are individual variations ("styles")

\textsuperscript{13} In this section, I use "imagination" and "creativity" almost interchangeably. This is because, in Japanese, they tend not to be distinguished; their verb forms sound (and are written in phonograms) exactly the same (\textit{souzou}), though when Japanese people apply Chinese ideograms they are different.
in playing a sport or performing an art, there are recognizable essences of excellence (in other words, they are standards, essence, or criteria of excellence which the majority of observers, e.g. referees, agree on in appreciating and evaluating performances, say, of ice skating), which may be called "patterns" or "forms" in contrast to individual "styles". Moreover, and more importantly, kata also means a way of understanding, appreciating, and living the art; and in Japanese tradition, what may be called a spiritual aspect of art is particularly emphasized (compared even to other Eastern traditions; Minamoto, p.49). The arts I mentioned above - Tea ceremony, archery, and fencing - all have in their Japanese names a part do (to which the same character as the Chinese tao is applied), as opposed to mere technique (jutsu in Japanese). The part do implies

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14 A similar point of view may be found in Lave and Wenger's (1999) idea of "situated learning" in which they argue that learning is done through the learner's participation in the community of the art or trade, and the process of learning is a process of becoming a full member of the community or culture of those who practice it.

15 For example, Daisetz Suzuki writes as follows in his forward to Herrigel's Zen in the Art of Archery.

One of the most significant features we notice in the practice of archery, and in fact of all the arts as they are studied in Japan and probably also in other Far Eastern countries, is that they are not intended for utilitarian purposes only or for purely aesthetic enjoyments, but are meant to train the mind; indeed, to bring it into contact with the ultimate reality. Archery is, therefore, not practiced solely for hitting the target; the swordsman does not wield the sword just for the sake of outdoing his opponent; the dancer does not dance just to perform certain rhythmical movements of the body. The mind has first to be attuned to the Unconscious.

If one really wishes to be master of an art, technical knowledge of it is not enough. One has to transcend technique so that the art becomes an "artless art" growing out of the Unconscious. (p.vii)

The word translated as "the mind" in Japanese in kokoro or seishin, and it implies much more than what Western "mind" means; the Japanese word is closer to what Western people understand by "heart" or "spirit".
that the art is a way \textit{(tao)} to train oneself toward the spiritual and cultural value which the art represents. The idea of \textit{kata} includes all these aspects. However, what I want to focus is on the significance of \textit{kata} as pattern or form.

In the culture of teaching and learning in these Japanese traditional arts, the "pattern" or "form" aspect of \textit{kata} has a significance as a principle of teaching and learning. Anyone who wants to learn an art is expected to go through, step by step, the acquisition of numerous patterns of movement or technique in a graduated way.\textsuperscript{16} Eugen Herrigel, who learned under one of the greatest masters of Japanese archery in the early 20th century, made the following observation on teaching and learning in Japan:

\begin{quote}
\textit{To use the expression "step by step" or "graduated" may cause a misunderstanding. Unlike the Western tradition, say, in learning how to play the piano, the Japanese tradition does not have as clear or coherent an idea of steps or stages of learning as in the West, such as from easier, simpler technique to more difficult, complicated ones. Although the Japanese tradition has some idea of what is simpler or better suited for the beginner, it rather goes about teaching in the following way. The master demonstrates a unit (e.g. an entire song or dance), which by itself has some wholeness of meaning rather than a segment, tells the learner to imitate it. Learning goes on from one unit to another, and the choice of what unit to be learned at what point of time or stage of advancement is not clearly defined as in the case in Western arts. However, after the learner has gone through various units, s/he is expected to revisit what s/he has learned before to perfect each one of them, and at every revisiting, s/he is expected to widen and deepen the appreciation of the meaning of the individual techniques, pieces of work, etc. In the West, when individual techniques or pieces are taught, the coach usually explains the merit of them (why they are important and how they may be useful), but in Japan, the master seldom explains and does not expect his/her student to understand the merit of the technique or piece right away. The learner is expected to find the meaning of them, and widen and deepen the appreciation of the art by him/herself in the process of, first, learning by imitating what the master demonstrates (i.e. acquiring the \textit{kata} as pattern, which is learning at a level of phenomenon), and second, learning by revisiting the repertoire over and over (i.e. mastering the \textit{kata} as the entire culture of the art; learning the way of living the art). See, Ikuta, Ch.1.}
\end{quote}
Far from wishing to waken the artist in the pupil prematurely, the
teacher considers it his first task to make him [the pupil] a skilled
artisan with sovereign control of his craft. The pupil follows out this
intention with untiring industry. As though he had no higher
aspirations he bows under his burden with a kind of obtuse
devotion, only to discover in the course of years that forms which he
perfectly masters no longer oppress but liberate. (p.41)

An interesting point is that the mastery of basic skill or knowledge will
lead the student to liberation. In other words, greater freedom in one's skill or
knowledge requires structure; the absence of structure is not educational. This
points deserves some elaboration and explanation.

First, it is not true that Japanese traditional arts are totally negligent of or
hostile to the idea of engaging the imagination of beginners or children. For
example, in one of the classic treatises on Japanese theater arts (no), the writer
and master no-performer, Ze-ami, writes that the master should encourage the
youngest novices (up to the age 12 or 13) to perform freely, first, because the
youngest ones have their natural beauty in their performance, and second, lest
they acquire distaste toward the art. However, he assures that the beauty at this
stage is not real beauty; he says that real beauty comes with art.

Second, the emphasis on the acquisition (copying or imitating) of kata is
done from an educational concern. To our eyes, master performers (in any sport
or art) look as if they are playing or performing so naturally or effortlessly. An
excellent swimmer may feel, may look in others' eyes, and even may say to others,
that s/he feels as if s/he is a part of the water, not needing to fight with the water
for air or to struggle against the current to move forward. However, s/he can do
or feel that way only because s/he has gone through a long process of training,
and it is educationally irresponsible for this master swimmer to ask beginners to

17 Cf. also, Sen Soshitsu's afterword to Okakura's The Book of Tea, p.140.
18 Ze-ami's Fu-shi Kaden (originally written in the early 15th century).
do and feel what s/he has achieved after a long process of training (Cf. Minamoto, pp.33, 57). This is particularly so in the learning of arts which involves fairly complicated techniques.

Thus, from the preceding points we may say the following. First, while Japanese traditional arts appreciate the idea of engaging the imagination, it is not really appreciated or integrated into the method of teaching and learning; it is rather a preparation for later serious training. Second, the idea of imagination or creativity as an educational end is connected to concrete context or content (just like Barrow's view), and thought possible only for those who have mastered the arts to perfection. In order to reach the level of perfection, learning through rigorous acquisition of *kata* is necessary, and at this level, what seems to be stifling is not really so. From these consideration, it can be said, further, that the idea of engaging students' imaginations may be a dangerous rhetoric if it is not accompanied by the emphasis on the difficulties of learning the content in which the imaginative capacity may be exhibited.

A similar perspective is found in Western ideas on education, and along with a further consideration of the implications of these Japanese perspectives, I will return to this discussion in Chapter 8.

5. Yet, imagination is important

All theorists of imagination, at least in the last one hundred years or so, are critical of some of the philosophical foundations of Western modernity. Virtually all educational theorists of imagination today in one way or another take a critical perspective on modernity. The idea of imagination is in a precarious position, because it is a modern concept, and yet those who use it attempt to go beyond the boundary of modern ideas. Thus, today's theorists of imagination try very hard to discard some of the metaphysical, epistemological,
and ideological assumptions which they regard as unsound (and in some extreme cases inhumane).

However, it is also the case with virtually all theorists of the imagination that they are not quite agreeing to the radical form of the postmodernist position. For example, Johnson (1993) writes:

It would be a serious mistake to think that we could or ought to discard altogether these ideas [autonomy, universal moral personality, respect, and universal laws of reason] on the grounds that they arose within a philosophical framework that is no longer defensible. To throw out these ideas wholesale would be to deny and reject our tradition, our history, our community, and thereby our identity. Yet we cannot keep these ideas unchanged, for as they now stand, they are seriously at odds with our moral experience, our social needs, and our current understanding of cognition and knowledge. (p.220; italics in original)

From the examination of a few alternative and critical perspectives on the connection between imagination and education, I may say the following:

First, the use of the term "imagination" causes certain unwanted associations. The long-lasting association between imagination and the concept of "mental faculty" was rejected in the previous chapters. Now, in the current chapter, it has been pointed out that there is another unwanted association; imagination, when associated with "creativity", may imply the uni-dimensional view and value of progress which to the eyes of many people today, has caused some destructive and inhumane results (e.g. environmental destruction, social injustice).

Second, the development of imagination, or some similar capacities which in part overlap with it (e.g. creativity), seems to the eyes of some individuals to be just one of the various educational values, hence it is questionable if it should be privileged. It is believed by some that the state of being imaginative or creative
can be achieved by only a very few people while there are a number of equally or more urgent and achievable educational objectives.

These critical perspectives deserve our attention. Nonetheless, I suggest that the idea of imagination is crucially important. I say so because certain aspects of education are highlighted by taking into account the idea of imaginativeness, which other concepts cannot do or cannot do so well. Imagination could mean originality, innovation, or creativity which is directly connected to the modern ideology of progress; but imagination has a certain aspect which cannot be reduced to any of these alternative expressions, and it is not necessarily connected with such ideologies as progress.

I do not mean to say that the imaginativeness which is relevant for innovation (as Rugg highly values, and Bowers objects to) is necessarily wrong. I think that we need highly imaginative-innovative minds. However, this kind of imaginativeness is, by definition, not relevant for all of us; though it does not seem wise to stifle those who may possess imaginative-innovative inclinations (as some systems and atmosphere of educational arrangement seem to be doing so, like the school to which Einstein went when he was very young). Moreover, this kind of imagination is not what I am concerned with here; what I am concerned with in this thesis is the kind of imaginativeness which everyone should have. If education is for everyone in our democratic society, a certain sort of imaginativeness should be achieved by everyone through the kind of education we have. My point is that our view of education does not quite address this connection today. If imaginativeness simply means innovative, i.e. being able to come up with what others have not come up with, it would turn out to be relativistic; an imaginative torturer or an imaginative crook will be counted as valuable as an imaginative social reformist. This is not what I want to suggest. The imaginativeness which I suggest to be of educational value is a particular kind of imaginativeness.
In the chapters so far, I have argued what this sort of imaginativeness should not be confused with; In the following chapters (Chapters 5 and 6), I will examine what this sort of imaginativeness consists of.
1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine the idea of the development of imagination as an educational end. The development of imaginative capacity may be relevant to all areas or subjects, but my concern here is with social and moral imagination, because, first, they seem to be among the commonest concerns of the theorists of imagination, and second, this is where, I think, imaginative capacities are especially important.

The development of the ability to think autonomously and critically has been a major part of education since the time of the Enlightenment. Although the validity and possibility of achieving this ideal are increasingly seen with skeptical eyes, particularly by those who are critical of the Enlightenment assumptions of knowledge and rationality (e.g. "disinterested knowledge" and "the referential, innocent notions of language"), and accordingly, some of the traditional

\[\text{1 Lather, p.6; Cf. also, Bowers, for similar points.}\]
languages and concepts are seriously challenged, a certain level of belief in such an ideal is still found in contemporary discussions on education. It seems to me that the belief in the Enlightenment project, which appears in a somewhat modified form in contemporary discussions, has come to a point where it may need serious reviews of its major assumptions, though here I will be accepting the common belief that it should not be simply discarded.

That being stated, two issues must be addressed; one is what sort of discussion actually addresses the importance of autonomous and critical thinking, and the other is what we should be critical of and why.

First, contemporary discussions highlight the importance of imagination or imaginative capacity. One of the major parts of contemporary discussions on the significance of imagination in education is to expand our conception of human intelligence or rationality. By including an ability or aspect of the mind which has been considered as irrational in modern western epistemology, the theorists of imagination are trying to construct a more balanced view of human intelligence. They conceive of imagination, at least in part, as an ability to think of the possible without being tightly constrained by the actual (e.g. Egan, 1992), or, in a slightly different expression (but substantially the same meaning) as an ability to conceive alternative/diverse possibilities (e.g. Greene, 1995). They argue that the participants (citizens) of democratic, humane society must have such an ability, because such a society is not something that is achieved once and for all, hence, it needs constant reevaluation and reconstruction. Those who participate in this process must not be blind adherents to such things as authority and tradition.

Second, we should be critical of elements in our society which may interfere with our freedom (intellectual and moral, as well as physical). Modern philosophers thought that, for example, people must be, and can be (if properly

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2 E.g. Egan (1992), Johnson (1993), McCleary (1993), Greene (1995), Garrison (1997). Though Garrison's focus is not on imagination per se, the idea of imagination is an important part.
educated), free from such hindrances to the individual's freedom as authority, tradition, and dogmatic belief. Theorists today, while acknowledging that the modern philosophers' goal should be valued, have come to doubt the plausibility of the means they proposed. They find it problematic to assume that there are unbiased ("clear and distinct") ideas, on the one hand, and neutral minds which can acquire these ideas, on the other; and the modernist claim that the acquisition of the unbiased ideas by the mind (the mind as the "mirror") makes impartial and rational individuals is now called into question. The assumption that individuals will be able to see the parochial values from a universal point of view by acquiring clear and distinct concepts now seems implausible. However, in order to construct a livable, humane world, we must somehow transcend, at least to some extent, the limitations imposed on us by our particular upbringing. This requires some sort of flexibility or freedom of the mind.

There are, of course, other purposes for which theorists argue for imagination (e.g. aesthetic creativity), but I will, in what follows, focus on the issues of social and moral imagination, because I find it both interesting and important to examine the connection between the legacy of Enlightenment beliefs in education and the emerging theory of imagination. The theory of imagination is unique in that, while inheriting the project of the Enlightenment, it significantly expands and revises the philosophical and psychological assumptions underlying it. I observe that, however, there is a challenge to those who are trying to construct a theory of imagination. It is a challenge to examine whether they need to, and if necessary, are able to, go beyond the language of modern western philosophy. Whether they – or we – can construct a workable theory of the development of imagination depends on our becoming aware of the scope and limit of philosophical language which we inherit and employ.

3 E.g. Johnson, Chapter 5.
The point at which I start tackling this problem is John Dewey's philosophy of education, and I have two reasons for this choice.

First, although some people argue that Dewey did not pay enough attention to either enhancing or inhibiting sources of imaginative thinking – his theory being too "scientific" or "instrumental" and concerned almost solely with empirically verifiable things and practical tasks -- his conception of desirable human intelligence for the betterment of the society is, I would argue, one of the major references of contemporary theorists of imagination.4

Second, I locate Dewey's philosophy somewhere between the tradition of the Enlightenment philosophy and the kind of philosophy which tries to go beyond that tradition. The recent revival of pragmatism, most notably Richard Rorty's revisiting of Dewey, takes this interpretation.5

In this chapter, I will examine the connection between the education of autonomous and critical individuals and the idea of imagination, particularly Dewey's conceptualization of it. I will try to clarify Dewey's ideas and philosophical assumptions by contrasting Dewey and one of his critics, Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971). I choose Niebuhr because his view makes an interesting contrast to Dewey's in some important respects while he is also in agreement with Dewey at the most basic level; they both believe in the validity of educating the autonomous individual.

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4 For example, people like Randolph Bourne and Lewis Munford criticized Dewey's "philosophy of intelligent control" for lacking "poetic vision" (Westbrook, pp.367, 380-2). For counterargument to these views, see Johnson, Greene (1995), and Garrison. E.g. Garrison, p.98. He argues that Dewey is the one who tried to overcome the theory-practice dichotomy and suggested the alternative conception of intelligence which includes intuition, emotion, and imagination. (pp. xix, 158).

5 E.g. Rorty's introduction to The Later Works, vol.8, in which 1933 edition of How We Think is included. See also, Johnson, pp.220, 244.
2. Dewey on imagination

2-1. Dewey's theory of imagination (1): Did Dewey neglect imagination?

Many theorists, from his contemporaries to today, criticize Dewey's theory of "reflective thinking" for being too scientific, and also for his belief in the applicability of it to human or social problems. The problems with the "scientific" model are its inattention to, for example, (1) unconscious aspects of the mind/individual (psychoanalysis), (2) the political nature of knowledge and the issue of power (Marxism, reconstructionism, and poststructuralism), and tragic aspects of life (existentialism). However, I suggest that Dewey's theory of reflective thought is an archetype of the contemporary theories of imagination, and that the criticism of Dewey, which implies that he is too scientific in the sense that positivism is scientific, is misguided.

One of the early and interesting cases is an argument made by Harold Rugg in his posthumously published *Imagination* (1963). Rugg criticizes the typical followers of Dewey for their "uncritical acceptance" of his "scientific method of inquiry", which led to the distortion of Dewey's work (p.21). It is astute of him that he recognizes the distortion to Dewey's philosophy and appreciates what Dewey tried to communicate. But part of the blame goes to Dewey himself.

He explains Dewey's five phases or aspects of reflective thinking as follows (*Imagination*, p.22):

(1) "a felt difficulty,"
(2) "its location and definition,"
(3) "suggestions of possible solutions,"
(4) "development of reasoning or the meanings of the
suggestions," and
(5) "further observation and experiment leading to acceptance
or rejection, that is, the conclusion of belief or disbelief."

Rugg classifies the first three into what he calls the "act of discovery"; the
identification of what the problem and the solution might be. The other two he
calls the "verification"; to verify, by observation or experimentation, if the ideas
which one came up with are valid or workable. For Rugg, Dewey did not do
enough in emphasizing or explicating the "act of discovery" which involves the
"flash of insight," i.e. imagination in Rugg's sense. Rugg says that Dewey simply
subsumed the "flash of insight" into the first three phases, thus he minimized the
difference between recognition/formation of problems and problem solving
(p. 22).

To the criticism that Dewey overlooked or undervalued the importance of
imagination, there seems to be clear evidence in his work that he did not.
Throughout his career, and in almost all areas of his major interest, imagination
is one of the key concepts. We may discern two major senses of imagination
which he uses. One is an image-forming or sense-making capacity, and the other
is a capacity to be flexible in thought. The former does not only mean the capacity
to visualize or to form mental pictures but also a capacity to create the wholeness
of meaning from discrete facts and data. Some early examples of this sense are
found in his *Psychology* (1887) and also in his 1902 lecture on imagination, and
it is developed later in his theory of art (See next chapter). The latter is what
concerned Rugg and is our main focus in this chapter.

Dewey does understand and appreciate what Rugg may call imagination.
First, he thinks that the "jump from the known into the unknown" is an
important aspect of reflective thinking (*How We Think*, revised edition, 1933,
p.191; hereafter, HWT). Second, similar to Rugg's view (1) that imaginative/creative thought works in "the critical threshold of the conscious-unconscious border" (Imagination, p.43), and (2) that imaginative/creative thought requires a period of relaxation, or of "let[ting] them happen" in the mind, after conscious and intense period of working on the task (ibid., p.133), Dewey says that "[sub]conscious maturation precedes creative production in every line of human endeavor" (Art as Experience, p.79), and that "between conception and bringing to birth there lies a long period of gestation" (ibid., p.82).

However, Dewey does not elaborate on the mechanism behind the "jump", and just mentions that what ideas may occur to one's mind depends on (1) the experience of the person which, in turn, is dependent upon "the general state of culture of the time," and (2) "the person's own preferences, desires, interests, or even his immediate state of passion" (HWT, p.191). It seems as if Dewey is saying that the process of what ideas may occur to one's mind is in a sense uncontrollable; or that what one can do for the occurrence of ideas is indirect (e.g. providing content knowledge). Rugg is not satisfied with the implication of Dewey's argument, for he does not want to leave the occurrence of "the flash of insight to chance" (Kenneth D. Benne, Preface to Rugg's Imagination).

I think that the problem is not that Dewey neglected or overlooked the importance of imagination; it is rather that he did not elaborate on how it occurs. In other words, Rugg elaborated what Dewey merely hinted at.

Examination of Rugg's research on imagination may be of its own value but what I am concerned with here is to show that Dewey's philosophy did include imagination as its crucial element. Thus, a few words seem necessary to explain how he placed imagination in his allegedly "scientific" view of human intelligence.
2-2. Dewey's theory of imagination (2): "reflective thought" and the expanded notion of rationality

In a nutshell, Dewey's theory of reflective thought consists of the dialectic interaction of observation/verification (facts) and inference (ideas).

Usually, constant verification of ideas by testing them against observable or obtainable facts is emphasized as the core of reflective thinking. Indeed, this is the revolutionary aspect of pragmatism's epistemology. Epistemologies before pragmatism tried to find some incorrigible foundations (Descartes' cogito, Locke's ideas, etc.), but pragmatism starts with a philosophical assumption that there is no such thing as incorrigible foundations of human thought.\(^6\)

Dewey, along with his fellow pragmatist Charles S. Peirce, believed in public criterion of the validity of knowledge, that is, "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real" ("How To Make Our Ideas Clear" in Philosophical Writings).\(^7\) The public criterion is important because it makes it possible to transcend the limitations of individual thoughts, which now is denied an incorrigible foundation. Both Dewey and Peirce believed that "truth and reality are accessible only to a scientific community of inquirers that would carry on investigation indefinitely, formulating hypotheses, testing theories, and revising ideas" (Diggins, p.236). This is obviously the way natural scientists think and work.

However, somewhat contrary to the popular interpretation of pragmatism, I think that the important point for us to notice is that, in the pragmatism of

\(^6\) Cf. Rorty (1979). He does not use the word "fallibilism", but he says that Dewey's philosophy/epistemology is anti-foundational.

\(^7\) Cf. Hanson, 1986, p.3; Kloppenberg, p.319; Rockefeller, p.406.
Dewey (and of Peirce as well), this process includes an imaginative phase as a crucial part, which, because it had been regarded as "irrational" rather than "rational," had not been recognized as a legitimate part of rational thinking. Importantly, Dewey does not regard imagination as merely fanciful; he distinguishes the imaginative from the imaginary, and appreciates the imagination's capacity to help us becoming more thoughtful.

In Dewey's "five phases" of reflective thought, what may be called imagination, i.e. conceiving of possibilities which may not be obvious immediately, occupies a very important part. Dewey says that the "imaginative enterprises," i.e. the intuitive grasp of what could be the nature of the problem, possible solution, etc. (what he calls "suggestions"), "often precede thinking of the close-knit type and prepare the way for it" (HWT, p.115). He also says that the process of inference, which includes "foresight, prediction, planning, as well as theorizing and speculation", and which "proceeds by anticipation, supposition, conjecture, imagination," is "characterized by excursion from the actual into the possible" (ibid., p.198).

In addition, even in the process of verification, he thinks that we undertake a "test in thought" for consistency of ideas (as well as a "test in action", i.e. actual experimenting), and we may call it an experiment in imagination (ibid., p.193).

To appreciate the change in epistemological assumptions, we might compare John Locke's view of good thinking on the one hand, and Peirce's and Dewey's on the other. Locke advocates a step-by-step inductive reasoning, and the important point for him is the absolute certainty at every step of the process of reasoning (e.g. Essay, Book IV, Ch.II, Section 7). Thus, for him, imagining or fancying is the prime obstacle to reach truths, reality, or knowledge (e.g. ibid., Book II, Ch.XI, Section 15). On the other hand, Peirce and Dewey advocate the importance of imagining, emphasizing that it is not merely fanciful (See Ch.2, Section 3-4).
We find resonances with Peirce and Dewey in contemporary scholars' views of imagination. For example, Egan writes, "The imagination thus should more properly be seen as one of our major tools in the pursuit of objective knowledge, and indeed as establishing the very conditions of objectivity" (1992, p.59).

Other aspects of the human mind in Dewey's conception also suggest points with which contemporary theorists of imagination may agree; for example, the attempt to bridge the gap between intellect and emotion. Dewey writes:

> This sympathetic [as opposed to merely "cognitive"] interest provides the medium for carrying and binding together what would otherwise be a multitude of items, diverse, disconnected, and of no intellectual use. The result is a social and aesthetic organization rather than one consciously intellectual; but it provides the natural opportunity and supplies the material for conscious intellectual explorations (HWT, p.316).

Thus, I think it safe to say that in Dewey's philosophy, imagination occupies a prominent place. He tries to overcome the tendency of modern philosophy, which unreasonably narrowed the notion of rationality and intelligence. The appreciation of imagination is an important part of it. What have been neglected in modern philosophy are aspects of thought which, on the surface of it, appear to be irrational (hunch, imagination, emotion, etc.), and are analytically separable from intelligent or rational thought, though in practice are intertwined with it.
2-3. Dewey's theory of imagination (3): educational implications

Dewey's "Copernican revolution" in education (*The School and Society*, p.34), that is, appreciation of children's daily experience, is an educational implication of his philosophy. He says that "the business of education might be defined as emancipation and enlargement of experience" (*HWT*, pp.27-8). He says so because, while the "naive, wondering, experimental" attitude of childhood should be appreciated, it needs to be attuned to the new world of people and nature (ibid., p.278). Therefore, education should both "preserve and perfect this attitude" (ibid., p.278).

He thinks that our experience, including children's, has some elements to go beyond itself, and, arguably, children may be more likely to entertain such elements\(^8\), though it needs to be supplemented.\(^9\) What Dewey has to say regarding imagination and education is found in a paragraph in *How We Think*. There he says; what education can do is to emancipate the person's intelligence from parochial values, thoughts, and feelings. The core of this intelligence is, "imagination seeing familiar objects in a new light and thus opening new vistas in experience," by which a person breaks the "inert routine and lazy dependence on the past". Human beings become able to go beyond what their immediate experience suggests, or to see familiar things from different perspectives, by using the tools acquired through education (ibid., pp.277-8).

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\(^8\) "The imagination is the medium in which the child lives." (*The School and Society*, p.61)
\(^9\) Dewey warns just before the quote in the previous note; "We hear much nowadays about the cultivation of the child's "imagination". Then we undo much of our own talk and work by a belief that the imagination is some special part of the child that finds its satisfaction in some particular direction – generally speaking, that of the unreal and make-believe, of the myth and make-up story." (*The School and Society*, pp.60-1)
Dewey suggests that "the attitude of childhood" may be considered imaginative and that it should be valued ("Right methods of education preserve[s]..." – my emphasis), but he also suggests that it should be "perfect[ed]" lest it ends up being merely "fanciful". Dewey says:

The proper function of imagination is vision of realities and possibilities that cannot be exhibited under existing conditions of sense perception. Clear insight into the remote, the absent, the obscure is its aim. ... Imagination supplements and deepens observation; only when it turns into the fanciful does it become a substitute for observation and lose logical force. (ibid., p.351)

Thus, cultivating the ability to see things differently so that diverse and alternative possibilities may be conceived is both a crucial element of his reflective thought and a valuable educational end.

There have been criticisms of Dewey's educational theory. Critics usually agree to Dewey's ideal (development of reflective thought which includes the development of imaginative capacity), but they tend to doubt the possibility of achieving the ideal given Dewey's method (e.g. Bruner, 1962).

I think it important to examine Dewey's assumptions about how a person becomes a reflective/imaginative thinker. But it is not his specific prescriptions so much as his philosophical assumptions that call my attention. I suggest that his assumptions would become clear by examining Niebuhr's criticism of Dewey.

A possible problem seems to lie in Dewey's epistemological assumptions on which his theory of imagination rests (and it also has a strong connection with his socio-political theory, i.e. his theory of democratic life10). The assumptions

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10 Dewey extended the idea of the community of investigators to the democratic public (Diggins, p.236). For Dewey as well as for Peirce, scientific attitude and method are very likely to bring about social unity "since communal and collaborative inquiry would require individuals to subjugate their pride and difference for the cause of truth" (Diggins, p.162).
are; (1) the development of reflective capacity, in which imaginative capacity constitutes an important part, needs the sort of associated living which Dewey calls democracy, because, according to him, a person needs to internalize others' points of view in order to go beyond the limitations of his/her individual thoughts, and (2) reflective thinking is engaged and developed in problematic situations (or uncertainties) where one's habitual thought or belief is challenged.

As I observe, Reinhold Niebuhr is the one who exactly challenged these assumptions. Therefore, I will examine Niebuhr's challenge in the following sections. I think this task crucial for us, because there is a possibility that we are accepting Dewey's argument for the development of imagination without noticing the counter-imaginative logic inherent in his assumptions. If contemporary attempts to construct a scheme of education for the development of imagination is to some extent drawing on Dewey's ideas, we should try to understand their assumptions and logical implications as much as possible. As is sometimes suggested, it is extremely hard to recognize the flaw in the system from within the system. Also, it is very hard to compare two extremely different systems. Conveniently, Dewey and Niebuhr have both similarities and differences regarding the same problems.

3. Niebuhr's criticisms of Dewey: the limitations of imagination and intelligence

As Niebuhr later remarked, he was not aware that he shared much more common ground with Dewey at the time of their theoretical conflict (Rice, p.xvii). Dewey was one of the major targets of his criticism, and Niebuhr's point of view shows an interesting contrast to Dewey's so-called optimism on social, political, and moral issues. To put it rather schematically, Dewey inherited the
Enlightenment position that the key to the construction of a more humane society was at its core the elimination of ignorance. Thus, the improvement of intelligence, becomes crucial. Niebuhr did not accept this argument, saying that Dewey was too naïve in not taking into account the issue of power and openhandedly trusting the basic goodness of human nature. He says that "[o]n the whole, social conservatism is ascribed to ignorance" in Dewey's thought, and it is "a viewpoint which states only part of the truth and reveals the natural bias of the educator" (Moral Man and Immoral Society, p.xxvi). Niebuhr argues that Dewey's theory, on such naïve premises, does not seem plausible.

Niebuhr's direct critique of Dewey starts in the publication of Moral Man and Immoral Society in 1932 (hereafter, MMIS). After a series of debates, the direct confrontation ended, though it is suggested that Dewey, in his seventies and thirty years older than Niebuhr, and regarded as one of the most influential figures in the intellectual scene in America, did not take Niebuhr's attack seriously (Rice, p.xviii). Also, according to Hayakawa (2001), Dewey refused to continue having debates with Niebuhr after a while. But Niebuhr, until much later, seems to have continued to have Dewey in mind when he wrote.

Niebuhr's later admission that he and Dewey must have shared much common ground seems to be reasonable (Note that Niebuhr in the above quote from MMIS, p.xxvi, admits that the elimination of ignorance being a solution to social problems is at least partly true). For example, Rice writes that Niebuhr "argued for the kind of "intelligence" that transcended mere "rational" intelligence as a way to restore the imaginative-spiritual dimension of life" (pp.11-2). The expansion or reconceptualization of rationality or intelligence was what Dewey tried to do.

As Davis and Good remark, "Niebuhr ... has disparaged neither reason nor science. His position is that these instruments ought to be understood and used, not worshipped" (Editor's introduction, p.vii). Dewey's attempt to expand the
notion of intelligence with hopes for its application to social problems seemed to Niebuhr an unhealthy worshipping of intelligence and the scientific method.

Dewey was aware of counter-imaginative or counter-reflective tendencies in society. He says, "They ["singular persons", i.e. individuals] are subject to all kinds of social influences which determine what they can think of, plan, and choose" (The Public and Its Problems, p.75; italics in original). However, he argues that ultimately "singular persons" are "the medium" through which decisions are reached and resolves are executed when public issues are concerned (ibid., p.75; cf. Westbrook, p.433). This is an interesting point about Dewey, which has something to do with my point that Dewey may be going beyond the modernist legacy while keeping its project. In making decisions and carrying them out, a person is "singular", that is, s/he must be an autonomous decision-maker and actor. However, he also says that what the person can "think of, plan, and choose" is not his/hers alone; s/he receives all kinds of influences from society. On the surface of it, let's say, if we take a look at the moment that the person decides about something and acts it out, it is his/her decision; however, if we observe the process through which s/he reaches that decision, it is the result of social interaction. Thus, the autonomous person is at the same time a "medium" of social processes.

We may sum up Dewey's position as follows. First, he keeps the project of modern education, that is, the education of autonomous individuals. And second, he believes that autonomous individuals develop their intellectual and moral capacity to deal with social/moral problems by living in society.

Some of Niebuhr's lines of argument show clear contrast to Dewey's. Niebuhr has serious reservations about the second position above. The central contention lies in his doubt about the attainment of moral ideals in society. He argues this on the basis of two limitations; one is the limitation of human nature, and the other is the fundamental difference between natural and social sciences.
On the first limitation; while Niebuhr does not deny the achievement of ethical ideals (e.g. altruism) in individuals, he doubts such an achievement at the level of collective human life (as the title of his book, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, suggests). He writes:

Individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own. ... But all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. (MMIS, p. xxv)

We may further make the following contrasts. First, while Dewey believes that human beings need to live in society for intellectual and moral development, Niebuhr believes that living in society exaggerates the evils in human nature (Rice, p.19). Niebuhr says, "It is naturally easier to bring order into the individual life than to establish a synthesis between it and other life. The force of reason is frequently exhausted in the first task and never essays the second" (MMIS, p.30). Moreover, he says, "A perennial weakness of the moral life in individuals is simply raised to the nth degree in national life" (ibid., p.107; italic in original). This is quite a contrast to Dewey's position in, for example, *The Public and Its Problems*, where he writes:

To learn to be a human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values. (p. 154)

Second, while Dewey believes that from uncertainties (or problematic situations) intelligence or rationality emerges, Niebuhr believes that irrationality
is more likely to emerge from uncertainties. As Diggins points out, Dewey was aware of the "precarious character of existence," but instead of deploring such a condition in which human beings live, he celebrated it as an opportunity for their intellectual growth, to develop their ability to deal with problems (pp.222-3). He also writes, "Where Dewey believed the instabilities of existence challenged the mind and brought out its best qualities of rational intelligence and scientific control, Niebuhr saw in the dread of insecurity the origins of power and aggression" (ibid., p.287).

On the second limitation; Niebuhr insists on the fundamental difference between natural and social science, and argues that the kind of objectivity, neutrality, and disinterestedness is unattainable in social problems (MMIS, p.xxvii; Rice, pp.137-46).

Niebuhr's major criticism of the contemporary political, social, and moral theories was:

...directed against the moralists, both religious and secular, who imagine that the egoism of individuals is being progressively checked by the development of rationality or the growth of a religiously inspired goodwill and that nothing but the continuance of this process is necessary to establish social harmony between all the human societies and collectives. (MMIS, pp. xxv-xxvi)

Particularly, he points his finger at Dewey when he says:

The most persistent error of modern educators and moralists is the assumption that our social difficulties are due to the failure of the social sciences to keep pace with the physical sciences which have created our technological civilization. (ibid., p.xxvi)

\[\text{\textsuperscript{11}}\text{ Cf. Westbrook, p.80; Rockefeller, p.387.}\]
Niebuhr is critical of the so-called "methods of science", "impartial scientific inquiry" or "scientific objectivity" (in Davis and Good, p.43). On the other hand, Dewey was, as is well-known, considered as the champion of the scientific method. Though one needs caution when understanding Dewey's emphasis on the "scientific method", to call him the champion of the scientific method is to some extent justified; it is true that Dewey attributes the cause of the inability of social sciences to deal with social problems to its failure to keep up with the principle and method of natural sciences.\textsuperscript{12}

Dewey was not as optimistic or naïve as Niebuhr thought, and as Hayakawa says, Niebuhr's reading of Dewey was not very accurate in this regard.\textsuperscript{13} For example, Dewey does not seem to assume the "complete objectivity" of which Niebuhr accuses him (See, for example, MMIS, p.xxvii).\textsuperscript{14}

When we face the problem of method in relation to a new social orientation, the place of intelligence looms as the central issue. I cannot agree with those who think that making intelligence central in education signifies a neutral, aloof, and "purely intellectual", not to say mechanical, attitude toward social conflict. ("The Crucial Role of Intelligence")

\textsuperscript{12} For example, he says, "Men have got used to an experimental method in physical and technical matters. They are still afraid of it in human concerns" (\textit{The Public and Its Problems}, p.169).

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. also, Robert Westbrook's and Steven C. Rockefeller's recent biographies of Dewey. For example, Rockefeller writes, "Niebuhr criticized Dewey for ignoring the role of class interest, class conflict, and coercive force in political affairs and for overestimating the role of intelligence and education can play in social change. ... In other words, the Dewey that Niebuhr attacks is something of a straw man which Niebuhr set up for polemical purposes" (p.463). See also, Rice, p.18.

\textsuperscript{14} E.g. Dewey's "The Crucial Role of Intelligence", where he questions the neutrality of intelligence and discusses the influence of economic forces on education.
As to a concrete problem, Dewey continues, commenting upon the issue of "the educational force of the press":

It is not surprising in an economic order based on business enterprise for profit that the press should itself be a business enterprise conducted for profit, and hence carry on a vast and steady indoctrination in behalf of the order of which the press is a part. (ibid.)

In these quotes, Dewey's realistic grasp of social problems is clearly seen, while Niebuhr does not appreciate Dewey's realistic side. Niebuhr's style of argument was "typological" or polemical (Daniel Day Williams, in Rice, p.18), that is, he selected and highlighted certain aspects or tendencies of the persons whom he was criticizing, and Dewey's case was no exception. Thus we should not lose sight of the fact that Niebuhr's line of thought and argument sometimes sounds very similar to Dewey's despite the criticism (e.g. concerns with the expanding the notion of human intelligence are common to them both).

Recent interpretations of Dewey tend to confirm the point that Dewey was not scientific in a narrow sense. It is true that Dewey says that science in terms of its methodology and attitude is a very important key to the problems which human beings have. However, first, his notion of science is not positivistic or scientistic in the sense that suggests nothing is meaningful unless it can be verified empirically, or that all problems can be solved by science (Diggins, pp.10-11; Westbrook, p.187, p.269). Second, his emphasis in arguing for the scientific attitude and method is on the rejection of speculative thinking whose focus is on logical consistency rather than on the facts (Garrison, pp.xix, 27). In The Sources of a Science of Education, Dewey makes explicit his awareness about the use and limitation of science, by saying that while some sciences are important in

\[\text{To be fair to Niebuhr, we should note that Dewey was "typological" or polemical too.}\]
building a bridge, they would not tell us, for example, whether to build a bridge (The Later Works, vol.5, p.17; See also, Ryan, pp.98-9); and in The Public and Its Problems, he says that art can reach "a deeper level" of our lives (p.183).

Thus, Niebuhr's understanding of Dewey was neither very accurate nor his critique of Dewey very fair. Nevertheless, Niebuhr's insistence that the Deweyan scientific approach would never get the better of the problems of power and partial interest should be taken seriously. Even though Niebuhr's assessment of Dewey was inaccurate in some places, it is true that Dewey thought that the development and use of intelligence was almost the only hope. Dewey believed that what he calls "intelligent sympathy," "good will" and "cultivated imagination" are what we have for "breaking down the barriers of social stratification which make individuals impervious to the interests of others"; and for the development of them, "socialization of mind" is crucial (Democracy and Education, pp.127-8). Democratic society and its "embryonic community," i.e. school, were the primary place for the development of intelligence.16

At one place, Niebuhr criticizes Dewey and those who follow in his footsteps, for example, Harold Rugg, for their project "to save society by increasing the social and political intelligence of the general community through the agency of school," or for promoting "political redemption through education," or for their belief that "education can really achieve a significant critical detachment from a contemporary culture and its official propagation in the public schools" (MMIS, pp.212-3). In contrast, Niebuhr believes that reason (or intelligence, rationality) is, at least to some extent, always "the servant of interest in a social situation," therefore, "Conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by power" (ibid., p.xxvii).

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16 Dewey says, "An intelligent understanding of social forces given by schools is our chief protection" ("The Crucial Role of Intelligence," p.10).
4. Niebuhr's view of intelligence and imagination

At this point, it is interesting to focus specifically on Niebuhr's conception of human intelligence and imagination, in contrast to Dewey's.

Niebuhr seems to regard reason and imagination as separate; he takes imagination as a part of the "ultra-rational forces of life," which is more basic to a person's life than the "infrarational forces" (i.e. reason or rationality in a narrow sense) and gives him/her a vision of a better world and the energy to pursue the vision ("The Spirit of Life", quoted in Rice, p.12). On the other hand, as we have seen, Dewey does not separate reason and imagination but thinks that the latter is an integral aspect of the former. Though Niebuhr is different from Dewey in that he distinguishes imagination from reason or intelligence, he is in agreement with Dewey in regarding imagination as having a part to play in a conception of alternative possibilities.

Overall, the difference seems to be a matter of emphasis; While Dewey emphasizes the use or positive aspects of the imagination and its possibilities, Niebuhr emphasizes its undesirable aspects and limitations. Niebuhr repeats the limitations of human imagination and intelligence (e.g. MMIS, pp.xxx, xxxii, 6, 230), and the aspect of imagination which "extends [human beings'] appetites beyond the requirements of subsistence" (ibid., pp.1, 44). He writes that human beings are unable to "transcend their own interests sufficiently to envisage the interests of their fellowmen as clearly as they do their own makes force an inevitable part of the process of social cohesion (ibid., p.6).

However, Niebuhr's position concerning the relation between the "infrarational forces" and the "ultra-rational forces" is a bit more intricate. Obviously, he does not say that rationality or intelligence is unnecessary; he just estimates the power of it a little less generously than Dewey. The same with imagination; he writes that we are "gifted and cursed with an imagination" (MMIS, p.1).
He is, on the one hand, worried that imagination or any aspects of the human mind are too limited to be free from such corrupting forces as interest and power. On the other hand, however, he is equally worried that too much emphasis on rationality may well destroy the forces more fundamental to human beings, without which even rational capacity does not work ("The Spirit of Life," in Rice, p.12). It must have seemed to Niebuhr that Dewey's approach was too rational to the extent that it would destroy the very foundation on which rationality itself was based.

Niebuhr seems to find a little hope in what he calls the "religious imagination", that is, the sort of imagination inspired by the "sense of the absolute" (MMIS, p.52). He says, "The religious imagination, seeking an ultimate goal and point of reference for the moral urges of life, finds support for its yearning after the absolute in the infinitude and majesty of the physical world" (MMIS, p.53).

Though he was critical of the "moralists, both religious and secular" (my emphasis), hence, not a religious fundamentalist who sought salvation only and necessarily through religious faith, he did not find hope in the kinds of argument that seemed to lead us towards "relativism" or "opportunism" (ibid., p.222). Considering that Dewey opposed any form of absolutism, Niebuhr must have thought that the kind of logic which Dewey deployed would lead to relativism. Niebuhr says, "The absolutist and fanatic is no doubt dangerous; but he is also necessary" (ibid., p.222). What he feared seems to be the loss of direction, hence he minimized the importance of taking direction as a hypothesis or suggestion which is to be revised constantly. Thus for him, in contrast to Dewey, the ideal of education was to create conditions for people to live "lives of purpose and direction" (Rice, p.13). He says:

There is no way of measuring the perils of fanaticism against the perils of opportunism; but it is rather obvious that society as a whole is more inclined to inertia than to foolish adventure, and is
therefore in greater need of the challenge of the absolutist than the
sweet reasonableness of the rationalist. (MMIS, pp.222-3)

Considering the danger of oppression and inequality which goes without
being noticed and that of the political conservatism which tries to maintain the
status quo under the name of stability or reasonableness, Niebuhr's argument has
some convincing force, particularly when we remind ourselves of his basic
pragmatic orientation; We can be assured that his argument in favor of extreme
positions is not to be taken literally, and it seems safe to say that he is doing so in
contrast to the danger of the other extreme, that is, the danger of relativism,
inertia, despair, and nihilism.

Dewey was aware of the limitation of the human intelligence. That is why
he thinks highly of the importance of the process of verification in
scientific/reflective thought. However, he seeks the correction of the limitation of
individual human intelligence within human/social interaction, that is, within the
experience of human beings. This is unlike what Niebuhr may be suggesting
when he emphasizes the importance of something absolute or religious.

When we consider the popularity of Dewey (though misguided
interpretations of his ideas are also abundant), it seems necessary for us to
examine if Dewey's logic and rhetoric lead to these states of the individual and
society which Niebuhr so detested.17

17 Niebuhr's concern is shared by some other writers. For example, Bowers warns about the
typical modern mentality and values, that is, the moral choices considered as the outcome of an
individually-centered rational process. Despite the claim for universality, the individually-
centered rational process is, in Bowers' view, predicated on modern Western values, and as such,
is contingent on the historical, social, and cultural context of the modern West. Thus, when the
common ground is no longer shared: "A critical issue raised by the rational, individually-centered
approach to moral education is whether it can avoid the problem of nihilism where shared moral
norms are relativised as individuals decide in accordance with their own reflections and emotive
responses." (p.8)
5. The significance of social and moral imagination

Niebuhr was particularly critical about the possibility of Dewey’s logic and rhetoric leading towards relativism and undue optimism about human nature. Unlike Dewey’s faith in rationality and imagination, Niebuhr maintained an ambiguous attitude toward these capacities, particularly toward the Deweyan notion of combining them. On the one hand, he was skeptical about what rationality and imagination might be able to achieve (i.e. tackling social and moral evils). On the other hand, acknowledging the vitality of the imagination as part of the "ultra-rational forces", he feared that too much emphasis on the conceptual connection between rationality and imagination would misrepresent the significance of imagination. Niebuhr, in short, held a Nietzschean notion of what the significance of imagination consists of: the capacity to stand out of the crowd at the risk of the possibility of being irrational or absurd. Rationality in part implies reasonableness, which in turn means compliance with societal and cultural norms. However, what we expect from imaginativeness is a capacity to make a leap or break from such norms occasionally. There is no guarantee for such a leap to be always effective or reasonable. Niebuhr seems to be suggesting that we have to accept the risk that imagination may turn out to be unreasonable, absurd, or even destructive. Niebuhr’s view seems to embrace the sense of risk
which may follow the appreciation of imaginativeness, and this sense is hard to find in Dewey's view.18

Precisely because Niebuhr recognizes the influence of imagination as a species of the "ultra-rational forces" which is more fundamental than scientific intelligence, he is worried that imagination without regulation would turn out to be destructive. Although the solutions he suggests, such as, power against power and imagination induced by the sense of the absolute, may produce even more problems, his caution deserves serious attention.

An important thread which runs through modern educational ideas in the West is summed up nicely in Maxine Greene's point about the importance of enabling a person "to become increasingly mindful with regard to [one's] lived situation — and its untapped possibilities" (1995, p.182). This seems to be one of the most important implications of the education of autonomous individuals. Whatever ideas are associated with autonomy (e.g. freedom from such arbitrary things as mere custom, paternalistic authority, and impulsive desire, or the pursuit of such goals as happiness, freedom, and equity), the most fundamental belief is that the values in life should be chosen by and for oneself, and that in order for a person to be able to choose his/her own value(s), s/he must be able to choose among alternatives. This is why the development of the imaginative capacity as a part of rationality or intelligence is considered to be crucial particularly in social and moral issues.

18 Cf. "He [Dewey] was, in general, more interested in making children competent members of their society than in encouraging the very cleverest to scale the highest intellectual peaks. ... That ethical individualism, that ability to stand out against the crowd, is something Dewey never sufficiently emphasized in his educational writings. It is as though he thought the main hazard that children faced was that of estrangement from their surroundings — and in 1890s Chicago and pre-1914 New York he had every reason to do so — but forgot that one of the resources we want children to acquire from their education is the ability to put up with estrangement from their fellows when sufficient intellectual or moral reasons demand it." (Ryan, pp.148-9)
Rationality had been thought of as a capacity to see things accurately or to know the universal/objective facts/truths. Typically, this meaning does not include a capacity to play with alternative possibilities. However, around the time of Rousseau, this conception somewhat changes. As Taylor suggests, this changed notion becomes a norm around the time of Romanticism (Rousseau being an important source; Taylor, pp.362-3), and now it is the most valuable thing that each individual creates and determines his/her own values, goods, and objectives.19 In this scheme, imaginative capacity, defined as a capacity to see alternative possibilities, becomes significant.20 It is understandable that rationality now includes imaginative capacity and that the imaginative-rational capacity is considered to be particularly important in social/moral issues today; it is so because social/moral issues are directly concerned with the search for goods and values. Against the traditional notion of rationality as a capacity to grasp universally valid/valuable things (e.g. the Kantian notion of morality), we now tend to think that the things to be seen may not be universal, or that what I find right or good may not be what someone else would find right or good (e.g. the Ethic of Care).

Among the theorists of imagination, for example, Johnson (1993), Greene (1995) and McCleary (1993) are most obviously concerned with social/moral issues, but others as well write that it is because of moral and social issues that they think the development of imagination is important. In this line of thinking, imagination is thought of as part of a rational kind of thinking and valuation,

19 Cf. Taylor's argument about the modern "inwardness," particularly about the modern "expressivism," i.e. "each person has his or her own original way of being" (p.184). See, Taylor, Part II.
20 Rousseau had an ambiguous attitude toward imagination; while he appreciated the importance of imagination (e.g. Émile, Book IV, pp.221-3), he still saw it with suspicion because imagination may lead astray individuals by showing them more than what Nature gives them (e.g. Émile, Book II, pp.80-1).
rather than, for example, destructive, disruptive, or anti-social kinds of thinking and valuation. This is in line with the Deweyan view of imaginative-reflective capacity, and in fact, many writers draw on Dewey. Niebuhr's understanding of the relation between imagination and rationality, and his critique of the Deweyan perspectives on social/moral issues present a useful critique of this major theoretical trend.

Although I think that Niebuhr's misread Dewey in some places, his fear that Dewey's logic may possibly degenerate into relativism, ungrounded optimism, or irrational attitudes seems to deserve serious concern. This is so, because, for instance, in our presumably democratic society, it seems that many people, facing problems arising from diversity, either resort to irrationality and unimaginative ways of thinking and valuing, or take a relativistic attitude of "anything goes", rather than try to develop a reflective/imaginative way of coping with it.21

Dewey argued that developing the social and moral imaginations requires interaction among individuals in democratic society, because it implies that the person becomes aware of diverse points of view, which, in Dewey's view, is acquired only through experiencing diversity of thoughts, feelings, and values. Niebuhr, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the individual's being able to take a certain distance from the crowd and ensure that his/her imagination is not compromised by relativism devoid of a sense of direction.

In this chapter, I discussed the importance of imagination as an educational end, and included, vis-à-vis Niebuhr, a critical perspective on the typical way we think of how it can be achieved.

21 An example of this tendency is discussed by A. Schlesinger Jr. He points out a tendency that people become reactionary to different values and perspectives, and adhere to what seems to allow them to feel good about themselves (Ch.3).
In the next chapter, I will discuss the importance of imagination as a means of education. A typical way that the importance of imagination — engaging students' imaginations — is discussed is in the context of aesthetic education. In taking up this theme, I will discuss two aspects of the connections among education, art, and imagination. The first issue is the critique of the typical ways in which aesthetic education is discussed. The second is the importance of the aesthetic quality of experience rather than the use of artistic objects and activities.
When the importance of students' imaginative engagement is mentioned, it is more likely to be associated with art than with such academic subjects as science and history; and art in this context typically implies, first, something trivial and recreational, second, a matter of self-expression, and third, fine and literary arts. It is true that art is somewhat different from other academic subjects, but its contribution to education is not trivial at all. In fact, I think that the examination of aesthetic experience will provide us with a hint for
considering the conditions for truly educative experience. I discuss aesthetic education, also because it is typically mentioned with regard to the connection between education and imagination, and it typically is where misleading arguments are made.

As I suggested above, what I mean by art is not limited to fine and literary arts. It is rather a kind of experience marked by the characteristics which John Dewey puts in the notion of "aesthetic experience" (1916/85, 1934a/87). I will try to show that it is what may be called an aesthetic quality of experience that is indispensable to educative experience, rather than the use of artistic objects and materials.

In this chapter, I will first review arguments regarding the relation between imagination, art, and education (Section 2), then, I will examine in some detail the nature of aesthetic experience.

2. Imagination, art, and education – why art?

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1 The distinction between merely being engaged in an activity and having an educational quality of experience via the activity is an important point, and it is particularly emphasized by such writers as Dewey (1916/85, 1934a/87) and Eisner (2002). For example, see Ch.10 of Eisner’s *The Educational Imagination* and his concept of "educational connoisseurship". Both writers discuss the distinction in relation to aesthetic experience. Eisner says that educational experience is fundamentally qualitative. Commonly used assessment tools in education (e.g. standardized exams), which are quantitative and scientific (rather than qualitative and aesthetic), show only an aspect of what happened in the student’s process of learning or thought. It often happens that the two individuals who had very different experience and have different understandings receive the same score in such exams.
2-1. Introduction

There are two major strands of arguments regarding the connection between education, art, and imagination.

First, it is said that there are some ideas or ways of perceiving which are accessible through art but are not accessible through rational examination (e.g. scientific approaches, discursive reasoning). For example, some writers argue that art has the power to raise our awareness of social and moral issues, and that it may be done more effectively in art than in such traditional approaches as social sciences and moral philosophy.

The themes of social criticism and moral imagination have been dealt with in the last chapter. While in the last chapter the focus was on the power of imaginative intelligence as it appears largely in social science, I will deal with, in the present chapter, a tradition of arguments which emphasize the power of aesthetic imagination in social and moral issues. A famous example of this line of argument today would be the direction which philosophers like Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum are taking; that literary works may be even more insightful and informative than social science or philosophy in the traditional sense with regard to social/moral issues (Greene, 1996). In fact, this orientation to go beyond the rational, intellectual, or scientific approach in philosophical, social, and moral issues is rapidly gaining momentum. As Greene (1995) writes, "Literature ... always has the potential to subvert dualism and reductionism, to make abstract generalizations questionable" (p.35).

Second, art also tends to be taken up by those who criticize the imbalances in education. The strength of art which they appreciate is the power or tendency of art which integrates artificially fragmented aspects of what is supposed to be the whole; for example, reason and emotion, abstract and concrete, and nature and human being. In the field of education, some people criticize overemphasis
on academic excellence, which is allegedly an example of the fragmentation in modern thought and values.

Notwithstanding the effectiveness of science in improving a certain sort of understanding, it seems, at least to some philosophers, that art and aesthetic experience are necessary in order to provide a more balanced view of how human beings experience the world. Many educational theorists, such as Dewey, Steiner, McMillan, and Cobb, to name a few, argue for the importance of such a synthesis, and aesthetic education is usually considered as a key for such a restoration of balance.

Both these arguments have some conceptual connections with the idea of imagination, and some writers specifically take up the relation between art and imagination. As I will frequently mention below, Maxine Greene is probably one of the best-known theorists in this regard, and she says, for example, "It is my conviction that informed engagements with the several arts is the most likely mode of releasing our students' (or any person's) imaginative capacity and giving it play" (1995, p.125).

2-2. A short history of imaginative education through art

Since the time of the Enlightenment, the dominant concern of education has generally (and sometimes overwhelmingly) been on the development of a particular sort of rationality. However, though located somewhat off the central stage, there is almost an equally strong tradition of arguments which criticizes the overemphasis on rationality on the ground that it tends to constrain, first, the educational values to be pursued, and second, the conception of human capacity and the process of development and learning. This counter-tradition tends to hope for the restoration of a balanced picture by emphasizing such concepts as
art and imagination. This sort of criticism and hope were typically seen in the Romantic movement.

An early example of the advocates of education through art is Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), in his *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795), who criticized the view, "The dead letter takes the place of living understanding, and a good memory is a safer guide than imagination and feeling" (6th Letter²), and argued that the only way to correct that wrong was an education through art.

One of the major causes of the birth of modern educational theories and practices, which are in turn the foundations of schooling today, was a reaction against what may be called the scholastic method of teaching; its verbalism, and its deductive and authoritarian teaching. In the modern era, major theorists of education have emphasized the importance of experience as the basis of learning. However, when mass schooling started in the 19th century, the problem of verbalism lingered for various reasons (historical, institutional, etc.). Education was conceived predominantly as a matter of imparting and inculcating factual knowledge. Both the content and method of instruction privileged discursive language and deductive explanation, and what students were supposed to do was verbal memorization or recitation. Thus, education was not hospitable to the idea of art.

I do not mean to impose today’s criteria of good education when I appraise the education of those days; there were reasons that the kinds of principles and practices of education were dominant. For example, in those days, the improvement in basic literacy (teaching of the three R’s) was of the utmost importance, and it could be done adequately by the old methods without much trouble. However, it is also true that some educators perceived that verbal and deductive teaching was too rigid, ineffective, or under-representing what needed to be done in the name of education. Thus, along with the development of

² This book is written in the form of 27 letters.
schooling there have always been critiques of it, and art has been one of the fields in which the battle was fought.

The argument for art and imagination can be interpreted as a curious continuation and criticism of modern educational theories and practices.

It is a continuation in the sense that it argues for the necessity of developing the capacity to see things without being tightly constrained by arbitrary things (e.g. mere custom, tradition, and opinion). Those who argue for art tend to find similarities between children and artists in their ability to see things differently from conventional people (ordinary adults). They hope that society can be re-vitalized or reformed through fresh ways of thinking and feeling which children and artists may offer. This is in line with, for example, Locke's appreciation of tabula rasa and Rousseau's scheme of education according to Nature; the point of both being to prevent a growing person from becoming socialized into a corrupt society and its parochial values and points of view.

On the other hand, the argument for art and imagination is a critique of modern education in the sense that it suggests that the ideal which modern education launched cannot be achieved by the means which it itself proposed. The notion of rationality in modern philosophy tends to exclude aspects of the mind or of human capacities which are not explicable in logical thought and discursive language. There have always been questions about whether "critical" is synonymous with "scientific" and whether critical capacity can be developed only or primarily through scientific/rational approaches. As I argued in previous chapters, more and more people came to argue, first, that rationality may include
what tends to be regarded as irrational (imagination, feeling, intuitive leap)\(^3\), and second, that a person does not become rational merely by staying within the realm of what is typically privileged as rational (e.g. science, logic, abstract/discursive thought).\(^4\) Those who argue on behalf of art education tend to emphasize the peculiar quality of art and aesthetic experience which engages the whole person, and not just a limited part (the parts which are privileged in modern philosophy). They argue that disembodied objectivity, intellect, and rationality, as separate from such things as emotion, intuition, and imagination, are impossible to achieve. They think that, therefore, it does not make sense to limit educational values to rational and scientific approaches, and that artistic approaches need to be included in education.

This sort of argument leads to two types of further arguments. First, as seen in pragmatism, scientific or intellectual subjects in fact involve elements which earlier thinkers did not think were involved in these subjects. Second, other thinkers thought that even if scientific or intellectual subjects involve some human elements, they are still limited, and alternative approaches (e.g. art) must be emphasized more.

In educational theory, the dominance of the rational, the intellectual, and the scientific reaches its peak in the late 19\(^{th}\) century to early 20\(^{th}\) century; such schools of thought as positivism and behaviorism are the epitomes of this position. (They have, as theoretical positions, declined, but in practice, their

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\(^3\) Philosophers as early as Vico and Leibniz were aware of the inconsistency of the opposition between rationality on the one hand and such things as imagination and affect on the other. For example, Leibniz's acknowledgement of "petite perceptions" (McFarland, p.36). Another example, dated a little later, may be Alexander Gerard (1728-95) who thought that judgment is a part of the work of the imagination (Engell, pp.81-2). His ideas influenced German Idealism and Romanticism (Engell, pp.83-4) as well as Leibniz; See, also, McFarland, p.109.

\(^4\) One may well remember Rousseau's point, where he specifically criticizes Locke, that it is like putting the cart before the horse to try to develop rational capacity by teaching children in the way that presumes rationality already in them (\textit{Émile}, Book II, p.89).
dominance is still prevalent, though partly for institutional convenience; due to the demand for what is measurable, quantifiable, and observable.) The revolt against and critique of behaviorism became quite visible almost at the same time. In the late 19th to early 20th centuries (or even earlier as in the case of Froebel in the early 19th century, though the extent of the influence of such thinkers is arguable) with the emergence of such theories as progressivism in the United States, which in turn was part of the educational movement called the New Education. The New Education and progressive education are interesting transitional movements, because they unmistakably emphasize the importance of science (for example, Herbert Spencer\(^5\)). However, it is their logic, rather than the use of the term "science", that matters; they thought that the education of their day was not meeting what science shows; to their eyes, bookish learning and inhumane practice, prevalent in those days, were not scientifically justifiable. Thus, while the new educational movement highly valued a scientific approach (e.g. child study), it also emphasized such things as the spontaneous activities of children (See Ch.2, Section 3-4) and developmental approaches to education/instruction (as opposed to mere cramming, recitation, etc.). Appreciation of children’s artistic/creative activities is one example of such new attitudes, and we find many educators who supported the new approach in the late 19th century to the early 20th century (Froebel, Dewey, Steiner, McMillan, etc.).

It does not seem to be a mere coincidence that educational literature which focused on imagination became visible in the early twentieth century, and much of it mentioned the connection between imagination, art, and education. Though some people went to extremely romanticized views of children's imagination and artistic expression (cf. Dewey's critique of progressive education

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\(^5\) Spencer is famous for his belief in science and it tends to give him a wrong image. Spencer advocated progressive or child-centred views which we typically associate with the name of such figures as Dewey. See Egan (2002) and Takaya (2003).
in his *Experience and Education*, 1938), these extreme views are not taken seriously by such contemporary theorists of imagination as Greene.

In the remaining part of this section, I will overview the strengths of art, as well as some misleading arguments about art.

**2-3. The strengths of art (1): art as a means of social criticism**

The idea that art can be a powerful means of communication and expression can be traced to Plato's *Republic*. The idea that art can be powerful in one way or another is found in other historical times as well, but what characterizes today's recognition of art as powerful in education is the idea that it is probably the best means of challenging what we may call the systematizing and prescribing ideology which lies behind the inhumane principles and practices of domination, discrimination, and oppression. Plato, however, while acknowledging the power of art, thought that art should be conservative (Swanger, p.12; cf. *The Republic*, Ch.IX). On the other hand, contemporary theorists of education tend to consider art as radical. Swanger, for example, says that "while ideology systematizes and prescribes, art individualizes and invents," and that "ideologies are conservative (to a lesser or greater degree) by definition, while the idea of art is always radical" (pp.9-11). He further argues about the significance of art, by comparing art and physical education. Both of them can be, and typically are, considered non-utilitarian, recreational, or therapeutic, but physical education is widely accepted while art is underprivileged. The reason is that physical education does not challenge societal norms or ideologies while art does (p.74).

One of the best-known examples of this line of argument is in the work of Maxine Greene. She writes "that meanings that emerge from the transactions between schools and the existing socioeconomic order tend to have more to do
with channeling than with opening opportunities, with constraining than with emancipating, with prescribing than with setting persons free" (1995, p.51). Thus, she advocates releasing the imagination, which she defines as a capacity "to look at things as if they could be otherwise" (p.19), through informed encountering with artistic works. The strength of art, as she sees it, is that "the arts offer opportunities for perspective, for perceiving alternative ways of transcending and of being in the world, for refusing the automatism that overwhelms choice" (p.142). By becoming able to imagine that things can be otherwise, people become able to freely choose what they want to be or how they want to live. This is certainly in line with the themes of such educational thinkers as Dewey (refusing to be immersed in the habitual; cf. Dewey, Art as Experience, p.273, for his idea of imagination as opposed to the habitual) and Freire (1970; refusing to be "named" by others), as she frequently refers to them.

However, I want to make a remark of caution. When Galileo tried to convince the theologian-scientists of his time about the existence of satellites around Jupiter, he asked them to look through a telescope. He asked them to do so, because he believed that it would only take actually seeing the fact with their own eyes for them to be convinced. However, the problem was that they refused to look through the telescope.6

My point is this: To present or to point out the existence of problems or facts does not by itself necessarily have a power to make someone see them. What if the person refuses to see? The means (media) of communication or presentation, whether in art form or in scientific form, do not necessarily make a difference. In order to understand the message in the works of art, one needs as

6 "In vain did Galileo try to prove the existence of satellites by showing them to the doubters through his telescope: they either declared it impious to look, or if they did look, denounced the satellites as illusions from the devil." (From A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, by Andrew Dickson White, from http://www.worldzone.net/family/johnanderson/galileo.shtml, Retrieved on May 27, 2003)
much training as in other areas. Then, the question is, whether art can make any
difference, or is there anything special about art which makes people "see"?
Greene's (1995) answer to this question is affirmative, but I do not think that she
is naïve or simplistic. She says:

> It is my conviction that informed engagements with the several arts
is the most likely mode of releasing the students' (or any person's)
imaginative capacity and giving it play. However, this will not,
cannot, happen automatically or "naturally" (p.125).

Then she adds, "The point is that simply being in the presence of art forms
is not sufficient to occasion an aesthetic experience or to change a life" (ibid.,
p.125). It is a very important point that in order to make a difference, "informed
engagements" (my emphasis) are necessary; I believe that in this respect, art is
no different from other ways of experiencing and knowing. While she says that
artistic activities require the mixture of cognition and affection, pleasure and
rigor (ibid., p.27), cognition and rigor tend to be forgotten in discussions about
the educational influence of art.

As long as art is considered as antithetical to the idea of discipline, that is,
as long as art is almost exclusively associated with free expression, a matter of
spontaneity, or recreation, as if anyone can understand or appreciate works of
art, the use of art will not make much difference. Typically, inflated claims about
children's imagination and creativity go hand in hand with such understanding of
art, though some corrective arguments are made these days (e.g. Discipline Based
Art Education; See, for example, Arnstein). We will have the problem if we
merely like artistic presentations (e.g. to read novels) and dismiss scientific,
conceptual, or factual presentations; art can be just as abstract and remote from
reality as other modes of presentation if it is taken up in isolation.
2-4. The strengths of art (2): synthesizing power of art

Capacities which are required and engaged in art are often considered in opposition to such things as cognition, intellect, rationality, and abstraction which constitute the modern ideal of disinterestedness and objectivity. Many people argue that these modern values are still dominant in today's education, and that the modern ideal needs to be revised or overcome.

Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke thought that achieving rationality should be the ideal of education. Rationality was understood as a capacity to be "objective", that is, not influenced by "subjective" elements, such as one's temporary mood (e.g. anger), passion (toward a particular person, object, or point of view), dogmatism (i.e. one's attachment to a particular tradition or belief), and fancy (random thought). They had timely reasons to pursue that ideal, but today it is believed that the Enlightenment conception of rationality needs serious revision. For example, it is argued that objectivity in terms of impartiality with respect to any one particular point of view or detachment from one's own feeling or emotion is impossible. However, it is still common to see the process of learning as primarily a process of acquiring disembodied factual knowledge and of training objective thought.

The emphasis on art is in part a critique of such a narrow conception of learning. It is an antithesis to passivity on the part of the student and to the devaluing of feeling and personal involvement in the process of learning, knowing, and thinking as they typically happen in schooling predicated on modern ideals. Although it is true that the pendulum sometimes swings to the other extreme of uncritical appreciation of so-called free-expression and creativity which means little more than mere excitement, many educators nowadays admit the importance of elements which tend to be dismissed or neglected in the Enlightenment ideal of education.
The epistemological aspect of the idea of imagination is also a reaction against the over-privileging of a limited part of the human mind and capacity. Against such dichotomies as reason vs. emotion, intellect vs. sense, and mind vs. body, and the privileging of the former set, the idea of imagination suggests that the dichotomy is untenable in fact even though it may be useful in logical/conceptual analysis, and that the neglect or devaluing of the latter leads to an unhealthy view of human capacity, development, and life.

Thus, theorists of imagination try to counterbalance the overemphasis on reason, intellect, and the mind by emphasizing the importance of such things as emotion and feeling (e.g. desire, passion, curiosity, wonder, excitement, agreeableness, fear), and somatic/bodily aspects. Art is appreciated precisely because it is an area where both of the dichotomized elements apparently work together. For example, Dewey (1934a/1987) says, "The work of art is so obviously sensuous and yet contains such wealth of meaning," and, "The imagination, by means of art, makes a concession to sense in employing its materials, but nevertheless uses sense to suggest underlying ideal truth. Art is thus a way of having a substantial cake of reason while also enjoying the sensuous pleasure of eating it" (p.263).

If imagination means at least in part a capacity to have images, one thing that is certain about images is that they are concrete. However, they can be weak; they may not arouse much feeling or emotional response from the one who has them. Images may also be unsubstantiated; they are not of much help for thought or conduct because lacking in substance, e.g. information, background experience. For example, people living in luxury may have an image of a life as a refugee; but the image may be very weak because they are indifferent, or the problems of refugees are somehow not real to them. Another example; some

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7 With regard to emotion, see for example, McMillan, Frye, Kirkpatrick, Rugg, Cobb, Warnock, Sloan, Jagla, and Bailin. With regard to somatic or bodily aspects, see for example, McMillan, Kirkpatrick, Rugg, Cobb, Sloan, Bailin (regarding skills), and McCleary.
people may have an image of a pyramid, let's say its shape and the color of the surrounding desert; however, they may not have an image of its size or the climate of the place, the length of history that it went through which they would feel if they have really stood beside it. A third example; I may have an image of a dribbling technique of a soccer player; however, without much experience in playing soccer myself before, I cannot use that image in trying to figure out how to move my legs or how to balance my body.

Despite these problems, having an image implies that we have some sense of wholeness, that is, a feeling of "making sense", which merely knowing bits and pieces of information is unlikely to give us. On the other hand, chances are good that merely knowing a statistical datum, unless one is a statistician, is not likely to give us the feeling of "making sense" nor will it arouse the feeling of personal involvement or engagement. So some people tend to use the expression that art, in which images are abundant, is more holistic. However, if they suggest that an "holistic" nature of art implies that art is necessarily superior to science and rationality, it is a hyperbole. It may be true that artistic/aesthetic ways of experiencing and inquiring have been somehow underestimated until recently and this attitude should be changed. However, art can complements the imbalance, not supercede other modes of experience.

Images in art, when they are had properly, i.e. with supporting information and training, are strong enough to engage the person's emotional and/or somatic response, either as a creator or as an audience. This is not a categorical difference, but the "engaging" or "image" part of experience is what seems to be gained relatively abundantly in art (as I shall explain later not only in fine arts but also in such areas as traditional arts) and missing in other academic subjects. Whatever we may want to call it, be it feeling of wholeness, vivid images, or the sense of being real, it is the feeling which makes our acquaintance with the subject (understanding, knowing, etc.) beyond indifference. This is what Dewey called the "aesthetic quality" of experience, "consummatory experience" (in Art
as Experience), or "appreciation" (in Democracy and Education), and what various other theorists have in mind when they speak of, or suggest, emotional engagement with the subject.

2-5. The strengths of art (3): imaginative attitude – playfulness and seriousness

As I explained in Chapter 3, I am critical of overly inflated and romanticized claims about what art can do in making people imaginative. The problem is, as Barrow (1992) says, the "tendency to see mental qualities as processes, and to largely ignore the context in which they operate" (p. 95); imagination is considered by many as one of such mental qualities. The problem in the relation between art and the development of imagination is that it is often assumed that artistic activities are the best means to develop the imaginative capacity in general; or, sometimes it is also argued that by engaging in artistic activities, imagination applicable to other field(s) of activity is developed.

That being said, I also think that there is an important element of imaginativeness – since I believe that imaginativeness is a combination of various elements – which may be to some extent generalizable. My suggestion is that artistic activities and aesthetic education provide us with a model of how this element may be fostered. This element is what I may call an attitudinal aspect of imaginativeness. In order to examine this possibility, I want to take up Barrow's argument (1988, 1992) again since he is adamant about rejecting generalizable aspects of imagination.

Barrow, first, suggest that the noun, imagination, is derivative from the adjectival form, imaginative (rather than the other way around). Then he says that in order for a person to be called imaginative, s/he must have "the tendency and ability consciously to conceive of the unusual and effective in a variety of
particular contexts" (1992, p.107; cf. also, 1988). He unpacks the definition as follows: (1) the definition is "in terms of product or achievement, and not in terms of experience or process" (ibid., p.108); (2) "Imagination ... presupposes consciousness of what one is doing" (ibid., p.108); (3) imaginativeness is "some consistent and long term tendency", in other words, it is "a dispositional term" (ibid., p.108).

What I want to consider here is the third point that imaginativeness is a dispositional term. I think that in order for people to show imaginativeness, i.e. unusualness and effectiveness, at least to some extent, consistently, they need to be willing to produce and encounter, or be interested in, unusual ideas. They definitely need to have solid ground to achieve effectiveness, and to recognize the unusualness of their ideas. However, unusualness is not likely to be achieved unless they like to entertain ideas which may not seem effective or even, in some cases, which appear to be contradictory to accepted standards. Since Barrow's point is to challenge the popular argument which seems to overrate unusualness, he stresses the effectiveness criterion, saying that "we do not mean by imagination simply the capacity to produce unusual but bizarre, absurd, or useless ideas" (ibid., p.108). However, other parts of his argument, especially his criterion of imagination as disposition, imply that the person must not be dismissive of ideas even if they may appear to be "bizarre, absurd, or useless"; rather, s/he should be able to enjoy, at least to some extent, entertaining those apparently ineffective ideas. And I think that this is a matter of attitude rather than capacity.

I define this attitudinal aspect of imaginativeness, somewhat following Barrow's style, as a dual criterion of seriousness and playfulness. This sort of attitude is found particularly in the cutting-edge practitioners in every field, be it science, business, or sport. Arguably, it is also found in many children. People on the cutting-edge of any field, who are in love with what they do, be they athletes, artists, or business persons, are first, serious about what they are doing, or about
the respective goals in their respective fields (producing the results, e.g. scoring 
goals, producing works of art, making profit), but at the same time they are 
playful, meaning that they enjoy what they are doing, and enjoy also 
experimenting with new ideas, approaches, and methods. In other words, they 
are highly trained, and aware of, the fundamentals of their respective fields, but 
they are not rigid adherents of these basics. In the case of children, the 
qualification of being trained in, and aware of, the basics (Barrow's 
"effectiveness") may be a problem, but many of them exhibit both a serious and 
playful attitude. Many people have observed that children are likely to be more 
open to experimenting. And I think that what some people's talk about children's 
imagination logically means is this attitudinal aspect.

For instance, in any sports, the kind of problem which too often hinders us 
from winning or performing well is that we cannot do what we normally do 
because we are too nervous or too worried about the results and other people's 
perception of our performances. In other words, in a game or a match, we must 
beat ourselves before beating the opponents or other contestants. It may sound 
paradoxical, but usually, if we can set aside the concern about the results and how 
we appear to others, and can simply concentrate on and enjoy the activity itself, 
the result naturally follows. What I observe is that this becomes harder as we 
grow up or become more experienced. It is impossible for children or beginners 
to beat more advanced/experienced athletes (except by accident), but somehow, I 
sometimes feel that children and beginners are closer to the spirit of the game for 
their naiveté.

In academic disciplines, many people hesitate asking questions because 
they are afraid of appearing stupid, lacking comprehension, without knowing the 
basics, etc., and learn to suppress what their inner voice tells them to ask. On the 
other hand, I hear that good researchers do not hesitate to ask if they do not 
know or understand; in other words, they keep the simple-mindedness or open-
mindedness of children.
The way art is taught and learned may encourage this child-like attitude. One thing which some theorists of aesthetic education point out is that in principle art does not say "you ought" or "you ought not" (Frye, pp.77, 136; Swanger, pp.66-7; Jung, "Psychology and Literature"). If we over-generalize this and give way to the rhetoric of self-expression, it would be too much. However, it is true that, in art, the attitude of tolerance to various possibilities is encouraged; in art, one is not expected to be dismissive of apparently bizarre ideas.

I am suggesting two related things here. First, typically, the way in which subjects other than art are taught/learned is not favorable to the development of the imaginative attitude; these subjects, typically, are taught as if they are a collection of factual information or procedures to be memorized and recollected on demand. Therefore, it tends to be encouraged that your response (e.g. an answer to a question) is better when close to what was given by the educator. Second, I want to suggest that the qualities of art which are favorable to the development of an imaginative attitude should be found in other subjects at least more than they are currently found. This argument, I am afraid, may be taken as a way of learning with minimal stress on the acquisition of the shared basics (knowledge, skill, etc.); but contrary to the perception of some who have an extremely romanticized notion of art, art is not devoid of the basics or discipline. Art is just as rigorous as other subjects, hence it can, if done with a certain purpose, be much more than a mere recreation or diversion.

Barrow (1992) says, "It is true that, in order to promote creativity and imagination, we must encourage students to display these qualities, we must allow them to exercise and practice them, and set up an environment in which they feel free to take risks and experiment" (p.122). He seems to have in mind some subjects in which imagination (and creativity) need to be developed and encouraged (e.g. arts, history, and literature; cf. p.111). So what he means by the development of imagination is imagination in these fields. My concern, on the
other hand, is that all subjects should be taught in a way that the students "feel free to take risks and experiment".

2-6. The wrong arguments

2-6-a. Art as frill

There are some misleading arguments about the value and status of art among subjects in school, and the idea of imagination has the same problem. First, some people regard art as a frill, meaning that art is only a recreation or diversion from more serious academic subjects. Advocates of art education criticize views which regard arts as "mere entertainments, without practical use" (Greene, 1995, p.134) and treat art "as purely affective, without any cognitive or intellectual dimension" (Arnstine).

To such a view, I respond in two ways. On the one hand, art is certainly as serious, and maybe as useful as well, as other subjects and approaches. We have just seen the power of art with regard to social and moral issues, and we can see the importance of aesthetic quality in every subject. On the other hand, it may be an advantage that art is somewhat separated from direct utility, because the educational effect of art may lie in a somewhat different place than in other academic subjects.

Against the claims which consider art as a frill, there are many objections. For example, Richard J. Deasy and Harriet Mayor Fulbright (2001)\(^8\), in order to "[counter] the all-too-frequent tendency to push the arts to the margins of the

school day," argue that "studying the arts engages students in a "constellation" of learning that interacts in multiple ways with learning in other school subjects as well as in other dimensions of the students' emotional and social lives." They continue, "Further research to probe these interrelationships among arts and the other discipline is certainly needed, but there is little doubt that they exist." In my view, their point that art should not be a frill may be acceptable, but the latter part of their claim (that art as "constellation") needs to be challenged. There may be such "interrelationships", but I do not think that they are as extensive as they may be suggesting. This problem leads to the next subsection.

2-6-b. Art as teaching something useful and transferable

There are also some people who make inflated claims about art. For example, some of them argue that creativity or imagination is an important asset in every walk of life and that it is best developed through art.

Ellen Winner and Louis Hetland (2001)⁹ caution researchers to distinguish "core justifications for teaching the arts" from "bonus justifications". They say:

We found no support at all for the most commonly heard claim that taking art classes, or being in a class in which the arts were said to be integrated with the academic curriculum, leads to higher academic performance as measured by standardized verbal and mathematics test scores or overall school grades.

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⁹ "Does Studying the Arts Enhance Academic Achievement?," in Education Week, November 1, 2001.
They say that, except for the case of classroom drama, they found no strong support for the claim that learning in the arts enhances learning in other academic subjects. Improvement in learning other subjects which studying the arts may or may not affect is what they call "bonus justifications". Although they suggest that there are some potential links which should be carefully examined, they argue that if art educators and researchers continue to argue for the cause of art on these "bonus justifications" to the neglect of "core justifications for teaching the arts," arts will eventually lose out.¹⁰

Winner and Hetland argue that the two most important reasons for studying the arts are, first, "to enable our children to be able to appreciate some of the greatest feats humans have ever achieved," and second, "to give our children sufficient skill in an art form so that they can express themselves in that art form." These may sound like art for art's sake arguments, but I think they are suggesting much more. Their claim seems to be suggesting the importance of expanding the traditional notion of cultural transmission; valuable things to be passed on to the next generation should be found not only in traditional academic subjects (history, science, etc.) but also in things expressed in artistic forms.

Thus, the educational significance of art should be claimed for art's distinctive characteristics, and not for art's alleged utility in improving performance in other areas. There are some concessions to be made, as I suggested, with regard to attitudinal aspects of imaginativeness, but this sort of claim about art's utility and its educational effects which I would like to endorse is much more modest and less direct than popular claims.

¹⁰ I referred to an example of such arguments (by Carol Sterling) in Chapter 3.
There is a fairly common mistake about the connection between art, imagination, and education, and the mistake is twofold; first, imagination (imaginative capacity) is best developed through art (rather than academic disciplines), and second, art is a matter of releasing and expressing what each individual, particularly a child, naturally has. This kind of view is in part a reaction against some tendencies of modern education and schooling which (1) overemphasize a limited portion of life and experience (e.g. bookish learning, verbalism, memorization, rational/scientific approach), and (2) instill certain characteristics in the learner (e.g. receptivity). However, the reaction sometimes goes too far and ends up in reinforcing dichotomous thinking. This is too often the case with the connection between imagination, art and education; the idea of developing the imaginative capacity through art typically implies the idea of expression, which in turn implies rejection of the idea of discipline. In this connection, the idea of imagination is often used interchangeably with the idea of creativity. It is sometimes argued that the idea of imagination went along with an extreme form of child-centred rhetoric in reaction against the academic formalism of the day.

This sort of connection between imagination/creativity and art became visible in the 19th century and became popular in the early 20th century. Although there may be a problem with the interpretation of the relationship between particular sentences and the overall intention of the author, Froebel, for example, provided an example of such a logic/rhetoric. According to him, every being has a divine potential and in the case of human beings it is evident in our creativity (e.g. The Education of Man, section 23). This way of conceptualizing would imply a certain view of what education should consist of, that is, education as a matter
of not interfering (or interfering as little as possible) with the process of the development of the divine potential. Some theorists and practitioners of the early 20th century, in some radical forms of child-centered pedagogy, took this way of thinking too literally.

Recent authors who write on the importance of imagination do not seem to take this sort of over-romanticized view. It is hard to prove, but in popular or casual conversation imagination is typically taken as a matter of free-expression, while educational theorists typically do not argue in that line and usually criticize such popular notions.

Dewey, for example, criticizes the tendency for art to be associated with mere "emotional indulgences", "emotional discharge", or "stimulations of eccentric fancy" (cf. Democracy and Education, p.143; Art as Experience, p.67). A number of other writers criticize the separation of the creative/imaginative capacity and activity in art from such things as tradition and basic skill/knowledge (e.g. Bailin, Greene).

Margaret McMillan (1923) may be an interesting case. She sometimes sounds a bit romantic about imagination, for example, when she says, "Imagination is not merely the heart of Reason. It is often its substitute" (p.13). However, immediately after this quote and after acknowledging that children have an imaginative capacity, she also writes:

Yet if the child is allied to the seer and the genius on one side he is also allied to the madman – always in virtue of his active creative power. Just because he is a child he is apt to become the slave of his own creations. "Freedom" in the sense of liberty to follow all his own whims and fancies is apt to drive him into a very cruel order of prison – where he turns and turns, vainly seeking outlet. It is the aim of education not to destroy or repress, but to direct. And to this end in earliest childhood, the preparation for art appears to be the ideal means. (p.13)
The separation of such things as basic skill and knowledge on the one hand, and imagination and creativity on the other, is an overgeneralization of the rhetoric of child-centered pedagogy. The separation on the one hand overly narrows the conception of knowledge and skill (Bailin, p.113), and on the other, overlooks the significance of imagination in learning any subject.

3. Imagination, aesthetic experience, and educative experience

3-1. Introduction

In this part, I will examine how aesthetic education may be able to contribute to general education. Though I use the word "art", my argument is not about the production and appreciation of artistic works. The foci of my argument are as follows.

(1) The use of artistic works does not necessarily constitute what I mean by art, because it is possible to use artistic objects in the most unaesthetic and unimaginative way. Thus:

(1-a) My focus is rather the quality of experience which some educators who emphasize the significance of art tend to find educationally valuable, and

(1-b) I expand the notion of art to include what may be called recreational activities as long as I find that they involve an artistic/aesthetic quality of
experience as a significant aspect. I prefer "aesthetic experience" rather than "arts" because the latter too often implies fine and literary arts to the neglect of other kinds of arts.

(2) Some educators find that the engagement of the student's imagination is a crucial part of such an aesthetic dimension of experience; I find an example of such a conception in Dewey's concept of "appreciation".

The following consideration is the continuation and expansion of what I started in sections 2-4 and 2-5.

As I argued in the previous sections, the popular argument that art is a good way to make people imaginative is founded on too vague an assumption and is exaggerated. On the other hand, as I shall argue below, the arguments by such educators as Dewey, Steiner, and Cobb, are better supported. I will take up the three educator's idea of aesthetic education in order to understand what they mean by art or the aesthetic and why they think that art is educationally significant.

I will argue that if we understand the merit of experience and learning in the arts, it should be found in all areas of the curriculum. Therefore, my argument in this part is not that one becomes imaginative in an area, such as morality, by studying art; rather, I want to suggest that the aesthetic quality of experience is the key to making learning more than a matter of mere recognition of words or that of transmitting mere factual information.

Egan (1992) says that imagination is a particular quality which invigorates our thoughts and feelings; when someone is imaginative, his/her thoughts and feelings are invigorated, not in the sense of wild excitement but in the sense of Wordsworthian "reason in her most exalted mood" (The Prelude). In order to bring about this state of the mind in the student, the issue, problem, or content of a lesson must engage him/her in some way. Each of the following theorists dealt
with this issue, though from different perspectives; Dewey on the nature of aesthetic experience, Steiner on the aesthetic foundation of intellectual development, and Cobb on children's distinctive mode of experiencing.

3-2. Dewey: aesthetic experience reveals the nature of meaningful experience

Saiki (1995/1997) points out that, in discussions on education, everything tends to turn into a discussion on the content of instruction (what to teach) to the neglect of other equally important issues, for example, the examination of what learning means and how the content of instruction should be experienced (pp.6-7). I appreciate Dewey's educational theory precisely because he deals with such issues. He was concerned about the quality of experience rather than specific contents and methods of instruction. Thus, if we read Dewey for specific contents, objects, and methods to be employed in the classroom, we would be misled or confused.11

Although being a philosopher with a strong interest in scientific method, Dewey had an acute sense of the limits of such things as linguistic/conceptual analysis and the scientific approach. Thus, he emphasizes the significance of direct (immediate) experience (as opposed to language and discourse) and art (as opposed to science).12 He says:

11 Interestingly, Dewey adopts similar rhetoric in discussing three of the most important topics of his philosophy; education, art, and religion (e.g. he does not define education, art, and religion in terms of specific contents, but in terms of educational, aesthetic, and religious qualities of experience) and emphasizes the importance of imagination in these fields of experience (cf. Dewey, 1916, 1933, 1934a, 1934b).

12 Though, on the other hand, we have to note that Dewey rejected to absolutely dichotomize these things.
Language comes infinitely short of paralleling the variegated surface of nature. ... The unique quality of a quality is found in experience itself; it is there and sufficiently there not to need reduplication in language. The latter serves its scientific or its intellectual purpose as it gives directions as to how to come upon these qualities in experience. (Art as Experience, p.219)

When he writes about education, he does so with an awareness of the distance between what he can point to by language/theory and what the students and teachers have in their actual educational experience. A similar logic is found when he distinguishes the formal content and method of the instruction and what the students actually experience and learn via the content and method. Although Dewey did not particularly appreciate German phenomenologists, his attempt to "give an account of experience as experienced" is very phenomenological (Ryan, p.252; italics in original).

He deals with the quality of experience when he mentions the idea of "appreciation" in his educational books (e.g. 1916/1985, 1933/1986), and elaborates the point as an issue of aesthetic experience in his Art as Experience (1934a/1987).

Just like numerous other educators in the modern West, Dewey is critical of merely verbal instructions. He proposes an education which is based on, and utilizes, children's experience. However, what he advocates are not necessarily hands-on activities. Instead, he points out the importance of enabling each individual student to have an "appreciation" of the content. In short, to appreciate something means to understand it with imaginative and emotional engagement. I may venture to use (as Dewey himself does) a catchy phrase that appreciation means learning which involves the whole person. Dewey in the following quotations explains, first, that while appreciation implies more than
mere verbal recognition, it should not be understood to be devoid of intellectual content, and second, that appreciation is learning with personal involvement.

There is however, a definite opposition between an idea or a fact grasped merely intellectually and the idea or fact which is emotionally colored because it is felt to be connected with the needs and satisfactions of the whole personality. In the latter case, it has immediate value; that is, it is appreciated. (1933/1986, p.340; italics in original)

Appreciative realizations are to be distinguished from symbolic or representative experiences. They are not to be distinguished from the work of the intellect or understanding. Only a personal response involving imagination can possibly procure realization even of pure "facts". The imagination is the medium of appreciation in every field. The engagement of the imagination is the only thing that makes any activity more than mechanical. (1916/1985, p.244)

Dewey says that he cannot define the idea of appreciation except for referring to such synonyms as "coming home to one," or "really taking in" (ibid., p.241). The significance of the idea of appreciation in the process of learning becomes clearer when we understand the connection he establishes between appreciation and imagination.

An important point of imagination in Dewey's view is that it defies mechanical response; he says, "The peculiar quality of the imagination is best understood when placed in opposition to the narrowing effect of habituation" (1934a/1987, p.273). And when and how does this happen? It is when one recognizes the meanings of the fact, thing, or phenomenon, or when one renews the meanings by "seeing a familiar object in a new light"(1933/1986, p.278). Dewey says, "When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination" (1934a/1987, p.271), and it is true that we have occasions in which we realize the meaning of something, have a feeling about it, or have an image of
it, by relating the phenomenon or object, which so far meant little or nothing, to what we have experienced before. In these occasions, we are imaginatively associating the old and the new, or the here-and-now and something beyond it.

Dewey elaborates the idea of appreciation as a matter of aesthetic experience in his *Art as Experience*. Here, he introduces the concept of "consummatory experience"; this means an experience with a special quality which separates that particular experience from other experiences, for example, a meal which one had at a certain time and place with someone and not just meals in other occasions (cf. Chapter 3). Dewey contrasts "what is fundamentally ineffable (unknowable), final, consummatory, and aesthetic" with "what is knowable and instrumental" (Rockefeller, p.392), and thinks that the former qualities are necessary in order for any experience, including educational experience, to be meaningful, memorable, and worthwhile. Thus, in elaborating the idea of experience-based education, he, in later works, came to believe that philosophers must turn to aesthetic experience in understanding what experience is (Westbrook, p.393; Dewey, 1934a/1987, pp.278, 285).

An important characteristic of aesthetic experience is that it is worthwhile in itself. Another is that aesthetic experience is sensuous. These characteristics do not necessarily oppose art and aesthetic experience on the one hand to other modes of experience, for example, scientific inquiry. However, in too many practices of education, the aesthetic quality of experience is separated from academic or intellectual contents; too many classes do not have the consummatory quality of experience; they just fail to engage the student. Dewey says:

The spontaneity of art is not one of opposition to anything, but marks complete absorption in an ordinary development. This absorption is characteristic of esthetic experience; but it is an ideal for all experience, and the ideal is realized in the activity of the scientific inquirer and the professional man when the desires and
urgencies of the self are completely engaged in what is objectively done. (1934a/1987, pp.284-5)

Thus, instead of separating arts from sciences or academic subjects, Dewey focused on the nature of the aesthetic quality of experience and argued that they should be had on all occasions in order for the instructional activities and processes to be educative.

Today, most of our curricula are justified by their utility. However, I think that the contents to be learned will be useful if, and only if, they are understood and absorbed by the students. Superficial recognition of words and concepts (the so-called outcome of learning which is testable and measurable in a typical exam) does not guarantee that the allegedly "learned" things turn out to be useful. Dewey's concern is, aside from what curricular contents are justifiable, how to ensure the quality of experience which is engaging and memorable. His answer, or his suggestion for us to consider, is to look for aesthetic experience where the students imaginatively connect various things.

3-3. Steiner on the aesthetic foundation of intellectual development

Akin to Rousseau's idea of negative education (Émile), Steiner's theory proposes that we should not hurry children by cramming factual information or by giving them the results of what others found or invented. Rather than giving children the results of learning, he wants them to experience the process of learning, and this is in line with many educators, for example, Dewey and Bruner. Instead of making children memorize, he wants them to experience; instead of concepts, he wants them to have images. Although he does not neglect the importance of memorization and conceptual understanding, he thinks that these
can come later much more easily if children have a foundation of rich experience with images.

It is well-known that Steiner emphasized the importance of imagination in education. An example is found in a line in the motto which he wanted every teacher to follow, "Imbue thyself with the power of imagination" (p.190). Although his formal definition of the imagination is hard to follow, and may even sound occult (cf. Lecture 2), his concrete ideas about the significance of the imagination are fairly easy to understand. It is, above all, the capacity to have images. So, his point about the use of imagination in the process of instruction is to let children have rich images before words and concepts.

An interesting point in this regard is what he has to say about concepts. He says that concepts should change as the learner grows:

The educator must aim at giving the child concepts which will not remain the same throughout his life, but will change as the child grows older. If you do this you will be implanting live concepts in the child. And when is it that you give him dead concepts? When you continually give the child definitions, when you say: "A lion is ..." this or that, and make him learn it by heart, then you are grafting dead concepts into him; and you are expecting that at the age of thirty he will retain these concepts in the precise form in which you are now giving them to him. (pp.131-2; italics mine)

Instead of "definitions", Steiner recommends that teachers make "characterizations", that is, to "characterize things ... from as many standpoints as possible" (p.132). Characterizing an animal means to show, for example, "how men have gradually come to know about this animal, how they have come to make use of its work, and so on" (p.132).

The principle of instruction understood in such a way by Steiner is aesthetic, that is, it involves the engagement of the senses, body, and emotion. Although it does not suggest that the intellect and abstraction should be
neglected, the intellectual and the abstract as they are usually understood, that is, a matter of verbal description (what Steiner calls "definition"), does not constitute the primary part. In fact, Steiner often uses the words "art" and "aesthetic" explicitly (e.g. p.155; in reference to the teaching of reading and writing).

However strange Steiner's original ideas (most of them were records of his lectures), when he relates his philosophy to concrete educational principles, his ideas share a lot with contemporary scholars on imagination (e.g. Egan, 1992; Piner, et al., p.569). The most important point I get from him, in regard to aesthetic education, is that he does not recommend instruction through art merely for the kind of logic which suggests that artistic activities would nurture children's creativity and imagination. He locates the importance of engaging the imagination in aesthetic experience in the process of intellectual and moral development. Along with Dewey and Cobb, Steiner does not confine aesthetic education to activities and products usually categorized as art. Rather, he emphasizes the significance of the aesthetic foundation of education.

3-4. Cobb's idea of the ecological sense in childhood

In the field of education, there is a strong tendency to understand and evaluate growth, learning, and development from a linear point of view; a matter of linear progression from the immaturity of childhood to the maturity of adulthood; or from the irrationality of childhood to the rationality of adulthood (cf. McNiff's "Introduction" to Cobb, p.ix; Imai, 2003).

As a reaction to such a mindset which is prevalent in educational theories, there are arguments which praise the artistic genius, imagination, or creativity of children; and some of them suggest that the genius, imagination, or creativity is lost as children grow up. The problem with this reaction is that, as I argued
before, it is adults who tend to praise, for example, children's artistic works for being imaginative or creative, i.e. for showing something different from what adults' conventionalized perspective and technique tend to show; but it is a different question if children themselves experience them as different (I suggest that it is very unlikely); some adults may have some sort of aesthetic experience (that these pieces are imaginative, unconventional, etc.) when they are exposed to the children's works of art, but it does not necessarily mean that the children would feel, or have intended, it (cf. Imai, ibid.).

That being said, nonetheless, I do not think it wise to simply dismiss those who suggest that children experience the world in distinctive ways, which may be found in their artistic works. And there may be ways of experiencing, which are no longer accessible to many of us adults, but are the key to the development of imaginativeness. At the very least, such theorists as Cobb, and Singer and Singer think that there is. Among them, Cobb seems to pursue the topic, a distinctive characteristic of imagination and creativity in childhood, most consistently.

The major source of Cobb's research and argument in her *The Ecology of Imagination in Childhood* (1977) is her large collection of biographical and autobiographical materials from both historical and contemporary figures, and from the East as well as from the West. She also draws on various disciplines such as psychology, anthropology and literature. She noticed in the biographical and autobiographical materials that many highly creative adults attributed the source of their creativity to their imaginative experience in childhood; it is "their early awareness of some primary relatedness to earth and universe" (pp.16–7).

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13 We should be careful when we read the following remarks: Picasso, as quoted in Herbert Read, said, "When I was the age of these children I could draw like Raphael. It took me many years to learn how to draw like children" (quoted in Fineberg, p.133). And, Tolstoi's words on education, "Who should learn to write from whom, the peasant children from us or we from the peasant children" (quoted in Simmons).

14 This sort of idea itself is much older. For example, we may find one in Wordsworth.
Cobb sometimes uses "imagination" and "creativity" (and also "genius") interchangeably, but in general, she thinks that the "imagination" is the cause of "creativity".

Cobb's concern is not what may be called the "gifted" child, but it is the "natural genius of the child" (she borrows the phrase from Erik Erikson; cf. Cobb, p.17), which some highly creative adults tend to retain as a source of their creative works but somehow is lost from most ordinary adults. She thinks that the root of this natural genius is the children's unique state of being in which they are connected strongly to nature, while most adults have lost a sense of connection with it; she calls it "the child's ecological sense of continuity with nature" (p.23). Then she makes the following points.

First, the genius of childhood manifests in "[t]he unique patterns of sensory learning and the passionate form-creating striving of each and every child" (p.16); thus, children naturally want to express and create their unique way of experiencing the world in some form.

Second, as various thinkers since Plato mentioned, the driving force to move people to inquiry and creative work is the sense of "wonder" (p.27ff). As Cobb writes, "THE SENSE OF WONDER is spontaneous, a prerogative of childhood" (p.27, emphasis in original); while it is retained by creative persons, most adults tend to become numb. In her thought, the sense of wonder is at its root the physiological/nervous system of animal species, and it is "the need to organize the environment" (pp.39-40). In childhood, before the acquisition of language, the sense of wonder is predominantly perceptual and sensuous.15 According to Cobb, creative artists and scientists can relive this sense of wonder in childhood.

Third, Cobb points out that the language of modern Western culture is that of conquest; in society in general, it is the conquest of nature, and in

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15 There is much research which testifies that language acquisition affects and shapes our way of thinking and perceiving. E.g. Luria (1976), Ong (1982).
education, the conquest of childhood. She continues that we must overcome "the negative attitude toward both the child mind and nature", and replace the language of conquest with that of "reciprocity" and "ecology" (p.24).

Not immersed in culture, all children are by and large physiological beings, and have a strong drive for creating their own image and sense of the world in predominantly bodily and sensuous ways (pp.58-9). This "unmediated vision" of the world "remains as a part of man's formative impulse," but "most strongly demonstrated in the realms of art" and "in the life of every child" (ibid., pp.58-9). Children show this drive in their "creative play" and "play art" (ibid., p.56), and what they create, though not expressed in words, exhibits their distinctive ways of thoughts and feelings, and forms the source for creativity in its fullest sense.16

Like Steiner and Dewey, Cobb is concerned with the aesthetic quality of experience. However, she emphasizes a little different point than those of the other two; she suggests that the aesthetic quality of experience in childhood is lost from ordinary adults, and those adults who can relive it can be creative and innovative. Therefore, for her, in order to be imaginative and creative in adult life, the quality of experience in childhood needs to be recovered. An important point is that she does not say that childhood aesthetic experience is inaccessible; it can and should be recovered.

3-5. The educational significance of art

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16 We should note that Cobb distinguishes the creativity in childhood from adults' creativity; the latter means the originality and inventiveness which moves human lives forward (p.35).
The characteristics of aesthetic experience, as opposed to merely intellectual or rational knowing, may be summed up as follows. First, it is embodied. Aesthetic experience is neither merely abstract nor merely concrete; it involves meanings in sensuous forms. Second, it involves the whole person. Aesthetic experience is not just a matter of the mind; it involves the person's body and heart (so-called conceptual art is superficial in this regard). Both of these characteristics are necessary to engage students' imagination, because imagination is not merely rational as formal logic is, and imagination works when people can relate to the objects of their thought emotionally, morally, etc.

Aesthetic education should not be understood as merely a matter of the use of artistic objects in educational settings. We may remember Dewey's following remark:

> It is not the subject per se that is educative or that is conductive to growth. There is no subject that is in and of itself, or without regard to the stage of growth attained by the learner, such that inherent educational value can be attributed to it. (1938/1991, p.27)

What is important is, rather, a particular quality of experience, which, as the etymological origin of "aesthetic" suggests, involves the interaction of the sensuous and the intellectual, the concrete and the abstract, and the bodily and the mental, which must be worked out in concrete educational interactions. I will suggest that any subjects and activities of instruction involve aesthetic aspects as long as they involve the interactions of these elements; and that all subjects should involve aesthetic aspects, because it is the most promising way to engage the students imaginatively.

I include in the arts not only fine and literary arts, but also other types of arts such as dance, sports, and traditional arts (e.g. Japanese archery, tea ceremony) as long as they give the participants (in either performing or appreciating) what I called the aesthetic quality of experience. My notion of arts
may seem very similar to recreational activities, but the meanings and significance I attach to these activities are much more than what the term "recreation" suggests. The tendency to refer to the significance of various arts as recreation reveals the popular perception that these activities are subordinate to the presumably central tasks of education. It is perfectly valid to take these activities as recreation, but their educational significance should not be limited to their value as diversion.

There still is a strong tendency or mindset among the majority of people to think of, for example, Dewey's experience-based learning as mere "hands-on" learning or "sugar coated" instruction; Bruner's "discovery learning" as a mere tactic to motivate students; and aesthetic education as a matter of mere "creativity". However, the significance of the art model in which emotional and sensual elements are equally valued as intellectual elements -- in which the process of learning is as important as the conclusions to be memorized -- lies in the fact that it considers both discipline and pleasure equally integral to the idea of educational value. The educators I mentioned in this section do not merely focus on what is identifiable as instructional (the part of instruction which deals with concepts, factual knowledge, etc.), but on the very foundations on which the formal instructional/disciplinary aspect will be built.

Dewey says that, when an experience has an aesthetic quality, "the experience itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement" (Art as Experience, p.45). I suggest that a truly educative experience must possess this quality, and that educators must consider this perspective seriously.
1. Introduction

The theme of this chapter is the principle of instruction which would engage and develop students' imaginations. However, I am not going to describe or prescribe detailed examples of curriculum or lesson plans. Rather, as I have done throughout the preceding chapters, I will limit my task to providing a theoretical perspective to think about the curriculum.

By curriculum, I do not necessarily mean a province-wide or district-wide course of study. What I mean by curriculum is rather various levels of planning, from the one by individual teachers to the one developed by the state, or from something like teacher's general ideas about what to be covered in what sort of order in a given semester to a more explicit plan for the year.

Though I am aware of the recent trend to consider curriculum as a totality of what people have experienced in their educational process, or curriculum as *currere* (Piner et al, Ch.10; Eisner, p.77), and though I do not exclude the case that teachers revise and modify their curriculum in the course of actual teaching,
I primarily mean by curriculum a plan for teaching. Thus, I will talk mostly about perspectives on curriculum development and planning.

I will start this chapter by describing one of the major threads of thoughts on curriculum; I shall overview, first, a general theme of progressive education, and second, the development of Jerome Bruner's educational theory. The thread of thoughts which runs from early modern educators through John Dewey and progressive educators to Jerome Bruner is seeing children's experience and academic disciplines as a continuum. These educators reject the idea that there is a large discrepancy between children's experience and the world of academic disciplines, and the idea that instruction is a process of filling the heads of children with scientific/academic materials. Today, children's experience, thoughts, and perspectives are considered to already contain some elements which are connected directly to science and academic subjects.

Then, as a recent example of this kind, I will examine Kieran Egan's curriculum theory. Though he has some reservations about, and critiques of, certain aspects of progressive education\(^1\), his educational theory can be understood as a continuation of the major theoretical thread which I have just mentioned. He precisely points out that the crucial element which connects children's experience and thoughts on the one hand, and academic subject matter on the other, is imagination.

2. A theoretical thread

\(^1\) See his latest book, *Getting it Wrong from the Beginning* (2002).
2-1. Progressive education

It is commonly said that progressive education had two aspects; one was so-called child-centred education and the other was social reconstructionism. Child-centred education intended to construct the principles of curriculum and teaching based on the psychological lives and mechanisms of children, which was believed to be discovered either by scientific research (e.g. child study; cf. Cremin, pp.100-5) or observing children's spontaneous or creative activities (e.g. psychoanalysis; cf. Cremin, p.210). This aspect of progressive education is a continuation of the educational theories of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel, in the sense that it tried to construct the principles of curriculum and teaching based on the psychological mechanisms of children rather than on the logical principles internal to academic disciplines and subjects. Herbartian principles of cultural epoch and Hall's recapitulation theory helped the formulation of this theoretical perspective, but, among others, Dewey's writings seems to be the most influential. However, Dewey was not the most radical child-centred educator and he also had an orientation for social reconstructionism, which stressed the importance of social aspects of education. The reconstructionists, some of whom had been influenced heavily by Marxist ideas (though Dewey was not), by no means emphasized the socialization of children to the existing social order (they thought social reform was a crucial aspect of education) but they did not subscribe to what seemed to be the overemphasis on the individualistic and laissez-faire orientation of child-centred education. On the other hand, some of the child-centred educators were not very sympathetic to the reconstructionist (or any social) orientation of education; they celebrated children's natural curiosity or desire for learning, and disliked inculcation of adults' perspectives and values, which the reconstructionist position to some
extent implied. Theoretically, they drew on psychoanalysis and expressivism (which were popular among some radical individuals and artists in New York then in the atmosphere of radicalism and bohemianism) as well as on theorists like Dewey.

Putting aside the details, the bottom line for these progressivists was that they tried to found curriculum principles on the psychological lives of children, which they believed are quite distinct from those of adults. We may discern two aspects in the development of curricular principles in progressive education which criticized the artificiality and superficiality of school curricula in those days (e.g. emphasis on "recitation", "efficiency", "scientific management", etc.). The progressivists' focus was on whether the curriculum was relevant and real, i.e. whether it reflected the reality of the world and society (which, they thought, artificial divisions of disciplines did not), and whether it was relevant to children's needs and interests (which, they thought, was not met by the traditional curriculum). From these perspectives, some tried to integrate the various subjects around a core subject (usually social sciences). Others tried to find a core in children's experience and to arrange some subjects around it to make lessons relevant. Kilpatrick's "project method" may be the most famous example, but numerous attempts were made in the first half of the twentieth century to create lessons and curricula according to these principles.

There were criticisms against these projects of progressive education. For example, it was pointed out that while it is not too difficult to work out individual lessons or units which by themselves excite or engage children, it is a different question whether these lessons can and should have a unifying vision or sequence which runs through them (Sato, 1990/94, p.212). Similarly, there were worries

2 For example, Marietta Johnson's educational principles and her practice in Organic School. See, Cremin, pp.147-53; Sato (1990/94), pp.94-105.
3 Cf. Cremin, pp.201-215; Sato (1990/94), Ch.6; Sato (2003).
that, where lacking proper scope for the ends of education or a sequence in learning, "instructional" activities which emphasize children's "self-expression", "play", or "spontaneity" would end up in laissez-faire "education". Throughout the 20th century, when there were attacks on schools, these progressive principles became the target of criticisms; Educational practices based on these principles worked well in the hands of excellent teachers such as the founders of some progressive schools, but it did not seem to work well in the hands of many average teachers, and also these principles increasingly turned into empty slogans (cf. Cremin, p.152).

Thus, while many educational theorists continued to criticize academic formalism and rigidity which provided neither relevant nor real educational experiences to children, some of them had a critical attitude about the meanings of some progressive ideas. One of the principal figures who had such an attitude was Jerome Bruner. It depends to some extent on to whom one compares Bruner, but he could be understood as either the one who supplemented Dewey's and some progressivists' ideas with more sophisticated psychological research, or the one whose theoretical orientation contains a radically different perspective than Dewey's. He was at least concerned about some critiques of the child-centred principles and practices which Dewey himself was critical of toward the end of his career. For example, Ryan explains Dewey's concern about the child-centred rhetoric as follows:

Against the old emphasis on rigid stages in presenting educational material, Dewey insists that there is no essential quality of most of the work one does at school that picks it out as fifth-grade work or ninth-grade work, but at the same time he insists that there is a logic to learning most subjects and that children need to be allowed to absorb information and skill in a progressive sequence. (p.283)
Similar to the concern about education being vulgarized as it is democratized (Cremin, p.345), Bruner pushed the concern with the internal logic of each subject area a bit farther than Dewey and progressive educators. At the same time, Bruner found that children's minds were much more accommodating to academic and scientific ideas while child-centred educators tended to emphasize the artificiality of these ideas. The child-centred criticism that academic/scientific subjects as presented in the curriculum are distant from children's minds became increasingly deviant from the ideas which Dewey and other modern educators formulated. Cremin points out "the negativism inherent in" any social reform movement (including progressivism), and says that progressivism was good at protesting and not so good at programming:

Shibboleths like "the whole child" or "creative self-expression" stirred the faithful to action and served as powerful battering rams against the old order, but in classroom practice they were not very good guides to positive action. (p.348)

Whether Bruner's critique of Dewey in a similar line was accurate or not, he tried to balance his criticism of the old, rigid, and inefficient practices of education (i.e. education that fails to engage children) on the one hand, and substance and workable program (i.e. education that is useful and worthwhile) on the other.

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5 Cf. Cremin, p.181: "By the 1950's the enthusiasm, the vitality, and the drive were gone; all that remained were slogans."
2-2. Jerome Bruner's theory of education: from early Bruner to later Bruner

2-2-a. Introduction

Though a psychologist by training, Jerome Bruner has always been, and still is, one of the leading figures in education. His theory of education in the 1960s and 70s (characteristically seen in his The Process of Education, 1960) directly influenced the programs of education we had during those decades (e.g. Head Start, "discovery learning," and the "structure of the discipline movement"). The influence of his theory after the 80s seems to be less direct, and some who read his latest book on education, The Culture of Education (1996), may have an impression that he has changed.

This impression may be justified to some extent, but as Bruner himself suggests, his basic belief has not changed, and we can see influences of his theory everywhere. As I read his books and articles, this constancy is apparent at least

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6 Bruner’s influences are seen also in England (e.g. Plowden Report, 1967) and in Japan (the structure of the curriculum movement in the 60s and 70s).

7 See, for example, Kieran Egan’s Educated Mind (1997). There are at least two signs of his indebtedness to Bruner’s theory. First, his major concept "cognitive tools.” We can find an early form of this concept in Bruner, and we may trace it through Bruner to Lev Vygotsky whose works were introduced to and appreciated in the English-speaking world for the first time by Bruner among a few other theorists. Second, there are a few remarks made by Egan which explicitly refers to Bruner. For example, when Egan explains his concept of "binary opposites" as a useful method for teachers to make the content of curriculum "engaging and meaningful to children".
in two of his most central beliefs. First, he believes that human beings becomes what they are only by learning the relevant knowledge, customs, values, etc. of the culture in which they live, and the function of education is to help them in this process. Second, he believes that the motivation for active participation in this process of cultural acquisition can be created in the students, by the culture itself, though it needs a special form of presentation.

In the following sections, I will examine the change and constancy of Bruner's educational theory. Bruner has always been one of the most influential educational theorists for the last fifty years. Reviewing his ideas over half a century itself seems to be worthwhile. But it also seems to me that Bruner is a history of educational theories in the latter half of the twentieth century personified. I observe (1) that there is a difference between early Bruner (in the 60s and 70s) and later Bruner (in the 80s and 90s) in some respects; (2) approximately at the same time as Bruner has been influential (i.e. from the 60s to the present), a change has occurred in the way we deal with educational

Jerome Bruner has been criticized for his claim that "any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development" (Bruner, 1960, p. 31). I suppose this section of my discussion could be read as an additional argument supporting Bruner's claim. (p.44)

8 As to this belief, the title of his autobiographical book, In Search of Mind: Essays in Autobiography (1983), is very suggestive. He seems to be criticizing what philosophers call "human nature" or "transcendental ego" as well as behaviorists' mechanistic view of the human mind. With these two extremes in mind, he examines the construction of the human mind.

9 The following remark in The Culture of Education makes his constancy clear.

I still hold firmly to the view expressed in my earlier work about subject-matter teaching: the importance of giving the learner a sense of the generative structure of a subject discipline, the value of a "spiral curriculum," the crucial role of self-generated discovery in learning a subject matter, and so forth. (p. 36)
theories, or what we expect from educational theories, and I think (3) that there
is a parallel between these two, that is to say, the broader theoretical/historical
change which took place in the latter half of the twentieth century is encapsulated
in the change in Bruner's theory.

As noted above, Bruner's theory of education has always been an
important theoretical source to many educators. But I observe that the way his
theory is used in discussions about education seems to have changed, roughly
speaking, from direct guidance to indirect reference. I suppose that this change
results to some extent from the logic of Bruner's theory itself, as well as from
socio-historical contingencies. This hunch of mine, I hope, will be substantiated
in the subsequent discussion.

If we focus on the particular concepts he uses or favors, we find changes
very clearly. In the 60s and 70s, he favored such concepts as "structure,"
"discovery," and "intuitive thinking,"; after the 80s, "culture," "meaning-making,"
"narrative," and "intersubjectivity". However, if we focus on his intention or
belief behind the use of these concepts, we will notice constancy. He has always
been trying to understand the way culture shapes or equips the human mind. He
has always considered culture to be a "tool" (or a set of tools) which individuals
who live in the culture need and make use of in order to live there as well-
functioning individuals.10 And, he has always been concerned with the way
individuals acquire these tools, or the way education helps individuals acquire
them, though in recent years, he seems to dispense with the clear-cut separation
between individuals and culture. Consequently, he seems to be less concerned

10 "The point of view animating the present discussion is that intelligence is to a great extent
internalization of "tools" provided by a given culture." (Relevance, p. 22) Also we should notice
that he notes there that he discussed this issue in his essay in 1964.
with the idea of education as an individualized process, and that of learning as an exclusively individual achievement.  

### 2-2-b. Early Bruner: 1960s and 70s

In those decades, particularly in the 60s, Bruner was involved in educational reform in the United States. The 60s are marked by the fact that America was in urgent need of educational reform, most notably caused by the Sputnik Shock of 1957. As a result of this incident, America was made to realize that it was lagging behind the Soviet Union in preparing scientists, and also citizens well educated in such areas as science and math, from whom future leading brains would emerge. The blame was largely placed on the inadequate educational principles and practice based on the progressive/empiricist education whose theoretical origin was John Dewey's philosophy of experience.

Although Bruner shares Dewey's criticism against a mechanistic view of the human mind, he criticizes the so-called experience-based education which was too often associated with the name of Dewey. Bruner thought:

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11 As Bruner himself writes, he has been a little off the main stream of psychology from the beginning. For example, in 1977 preface to Process, he writes that the book was a reflection of "structuralist" (as opposed to "empiricist") view of the human mind, as seen in Piaget, Chomsky, and Levi-Strauss. See also in his autobiographical essay (In Search of Mind), when he looks back on the atmosphere and the research trend at the time when he was in the undergraduate program (Duke University) and in the graduate program (Harvard University).

12 Cf. "a long-range crisis in national security, a crisis whose resolution will depend upon a well-educated citizenry" (Process, p. 1)
(1) A person becomes what s/he is only by internalizing the culture, but this acquisition of culture happens by learning the essences of culture which are encapsulated in each subject or academic discipline taught in school (though he was not satisfied with the existing curriculum).

(2) The principles and logic of the so-called experience-based education were inadequate. Particularly problematic were the points (a) that the educational program could motivate children for learning if the activities and subjects in school were connected or based on the daily experience which children have outside school, and (b) that experience-based education could expand children's perspectives (or, as Dewey says, it would bring about "growth").

Later in the 80s, his commentary on Dewey almost disappears from his books, but it seems that he had Dewey in mind when he was vigorously writing about the importance of educational reform in the 60s and 70s. This is apparent

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13 This is very Vygotskian. We should remember that he was among the first scholars who introduced and appreciated the value of the works of Lev Vygotsky (and A. Luria). He wrote the introduction to Vygotsky's *Thought and Language* in 1962. Bruner writes that he encountered Vygotsky's works in the late 40s (*In Search of Mind*, p.139), and that Jean Piaget and Vygotsky were the two figures who made him realize the fascination in studying the development of the human mind (ibid., p. 136). As to the difference between Piaget and Vygotsky, and the attractiveness of Vygotsky over Piaget, Bruner describes in *Culture* as follows.

I recall particularly visits with Alexander Luria, that enthusiastic exponent of Lev Vygotsky's "cultural historical" theories of development. His ebullient espousal of the role of language and culture in the functioning of mind soon undermined my confidence in the more self-contained, formalistic theories of the towering Jean Piaget, theories that had very little room for the enabling role of culture in mental development. (Preface, xiii)

14 See for example, his *Man, A Course of Study* (1965), in *Toward a Theory of Instruction*. 
in his small essay, "After John Dewey, What?" (1961, in On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand, 1962). This essay was written as a criticism of Dewey's view of education based on Dewey's "My Pedagogic Creed" (1897). Since it was not based on Democracy and Education (1916) or a few other works which show a more mature view of Dewey and are more typically referred to as his major works of education, it might not be entirely fair to Dewey, but these two papers show good contrast between the two.

Bruner seems to be in agreement with Dewey's point, "all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race" ("My Pedagogic Creed," Article I; On Knowing, p. 116), but he also says that this view, if developed as in Dewey's theory, has a possible defect or a limit in scope. Bruner writes:

But education must also seek to develop the process of intelligence so that the individual is capable of going beyond the cultural ways of his social world, able to innovate in however modest a way so that he can create an interior culture of his own. (ibid., p. 116)

He thinks that the education which "proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race" and which was, in Bruner's view of Dewey's position, made possible or more effective by connecting experiences outside and inside school, may very well hinder the full development of the individual, particularly the development of the capacity to "go beyond the cultural ways of his social world." Bruner thought that this would undermine Dewey's point about education as continual growth. Bruner says:

But education, by giving shape and expression to our experience, can also be the principal instrument for setting limits on the enterprise of mind. The guarantee against limits is the sense of alternatives. Education must, then, be not only a process that
transmits culture, but also one that provides alternative views of the world and strengthens the will to explore them. (ibid., p. 117)\textsuperscript{15}

Conceived in this way, the view about knowledge and knowledge acquisition in Dewey's philosophy (and also in progressivism) is insufficient and inadequate. He thought that knowledge and education were conceived of as follows in Dewey/progressivism.

A generation ago, the progressive movement urged that knowledge be related to the child's own experience and brought out of the realm of empty abstractions. A good idea was translated into banalities about the home, then the friendly postman and trashman, then the community. It is a poor way to compete with the child's own dramas and mysteries. \textit{(Instruction, p. 63)}

In contrast to this, Bruner thinks that:

...the unity of knowledge is to be found within knowledge itself, if the knowledge is worth mastering. To attempt a justification of subject matter, as Dewey did, in terms of its relation to the child's social activities is to misunderstand what knowledge is and how it may be mastered. \textit{(On Knowing, pp. 120-1)}

So, the goal of education, in Bruner's terms, becomes "disciplined understanding" (ibid., p. 122).\textsuperscript{16} By emphasizing "understanding," rather than "performance," he means that it is not sufficient to have information (in the sense that it is simply displayed in multiple-choice or short-answer questions); information or knowledge must be "structured" so that the individual can (1)

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. also, \textit{Relevance}, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{16} Also "excellence" \textit{(Process, pp. 9, 70; On Knowing, p. 119)}, i.e. "optimum intellectual development" \textit{(Process, p. 9)}.  

expand and deepen his knowledge more efficiently, and (2) go beyond what is simply given. As a method to achieve this goal, Bruner proposes his famous "spiral curriculum" and "discovery learning."

Bruner seems to think that the academic disciplines or topics have a tendency to arouse curiosity in human beings in general (including children). When he says, "Interest can be created and stimulated," (On Knowing, p. 117), he means that the subject matters (or academic disciplines) have intrinsic attraction, and they do not always have to be related to children's daily experience in order for children to be interested in learning. So he says that "intellectual activity anywhere is the same, whether at the frontier of knowledge or in a third-grade classroom" (Process, p. 14). Thus, educators need not make subjects or topics more accessible or palatable by presenting them in real-life settings of children's daily experience. Instead, subjects and topics must be presented according to the "structures" of the academic disciplines which are the essence and reflection of accumulated human curiosity. A child, for example in learning history, in this scheme, must be treated as a historian inquiring into the issues and problems of history. Referring to his famous proposition, "any subject can be taught to

\[17\] For Bruner, knowledge is not a mere collection of information. He writes, "Knowledge is a model we construct to give meaning and structure to regularities in experience. The organizing ideas of any body of knowledge are inventions for rendering experience economical and connected" (On Knowing, p. 120).

\[18\] Bruner believes that "cognitive or intellectual mastering is rewarding" (Instruction, p. 30).

\[19\] "In a word, the best introduction to a subject is the subject itself." (Instruction, p. 155; Relevance, p. 60.)
anybody at any stage in some form that is honest" (On Knowing, p. 108) may help us understand his belief.20

Later, in Culture of Education, he describes his theory or position at that time as follows:

A long time ago, I proposed the concept of a "spiral curriculum," the idea that in teaching a subject you begin with an "intuitive" account that is well within the reach of a student, and then circle back later to a more formal or highly structured account, until, with however many more recyclings are necessary, the learner has mastered the topic or subject in its full generative power... I had stated this more basic view... "Any subject can be taught to any child at any age in some form that is honest." Another way of saying the same thing might be to say, "Readiness is not only born but made." (p. 119)

As I wrote at the beginning, Bruner thinks that individuals become what they are only by learning the essence of the culture in which they live, and this essence of culture has a potency to intrinsically motivate children. His thought that the "structure" of a discipline would facilitate the learning process; and that "discovery learning" and "spiral curriculum" would allow students to be active participants of their own leaning, and so would make lessons meaningful.

He meant much more. Besides economizing education, he also wanted the students to acquire the capacity to go beyond what was given in the culture. This is much more ambitious than merely to aim for educating the capable citizen.

20 This proposition has several variations, but the one that I quoted seems closest to what Bruner wants to say. In Process, Bruner writes, "the foundations of any subject may be taught to anybody at any age in some form" (p. 12), and "any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development" (p.33); in Relevance, "any subject can be taught to anybody at any stage in some form that is both interesting and honest" (p. 18). Words as "effective" "honest" and "interesting" have been added and eliminated, but his major point seems to be in the word "honest" which means intellectual honesty. Cf. On Knowing, p. 124 where he explains what he means by "honest".
This concern has always been one of Bruner's major concerns.\(^{21}\) The following point seems to make his vision clear to us: He asks, "What do we mean by an educated man [person]?" and answers that, though an educated person does not necessarily need the most sophisticated, latest knowledge in all areas, s/he should know (1) the level of his [or her] own knowledge, and (2) how to acquire knowledge (On Knowing, p. 109).\(^{22}\) Thus, for example, he explains about "discovery learning" in the following way: "Discovery teaching generally involves not so much the process of leading students to discover what is "out there," but rather, their discovering what is in their own heads" (Relevance, p. 72).

He has always appreciated the significance of "meta" cognition, that is, being conscious of how one's own mind works in knowing, thinking, and learning. Or, put slightly differently, being able to look at oneself (one's knowledge, thought, and cultural values) from another's point of view. This interest leads to his later interest in such concepts as "narrative," "intersubjectivity," and "meaning-making."

But in the 60s and 70s, he was much more concerned with individual learning and the traditional categorization of academic disciplines. Participation in culture, in the context of education, almost exclusively meant for the students

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\(^{21}\) He writes, in In Search of Mind, that throughout his career (especially in educational reform), what he ultimately meant to convey has been the belief that to recognize what one can do will affect what he/she actually does (p. 8).

\(^{22}\) "I think that, at the very least, an educated man should have a sense of what knowledge is like in some field of inquiry, to know it in its connectedness and with a feeling for how the knowledge is gained. An educated man must not be dazzled by the myth that advanced knowledge is the result of wizardry. The way to battle this myth is in the direct experience of the learner — to give him the experience of going from a primitive and weak grasp of some subject to a stage in which he has a more refined and powerful grasp of it. I do not mean that each man should be carried to the frontiers of knowledge, but I do mean that it is possible to take him far enough so that he himself can see how far he has come and by what means." (On Knowing, p.109)
to learn academic subjects (which were considered to be the essence of human achievement) as scientists or scholars did.23

2-2-c. Later Bruner: 80s and 90s to the present

In his *Culture of Education* (1996), Bruner reflects on the way he thought three decades ago.

It now seems to me in retrospect, some three decades later, that I was then much too preoccupied with solo, intrapsychic processes of knowing and how these might be assisted by appropriate pedagogies. I’ll summarize the main points of that initial effort. Educational encounters, to begin with, should result in understanding, not mere performance. Understanding consists in grasping the place of an idea or fact in some more general structure of knowledge. (Preface, xi-xii)

Also he says, looking back on the Head Start Program, that the conception of "deprivation" was based on the notion of the mind as *tabula rasa* (*Culture*, p.

23 It is interesting to note that Theodore Brameld (1971) categorized Bruner’s theory as basically "essentialism" which takes "education as cultural transmission," rather than, for example, "progressivism." We should also note that this evaluation was done in 1971. Brameld’s categorization is based on Bruner’s emphasis on the "structure" of knowledge, "excellence" and "disciplined understanding," which imply the importance of the acquisition of a pre-determined knowledge. He writes, "However insightfully he [Bruner] at times supplements progressivist concepts such as reflective thinking, one may wonder, in fact, whether he does not actually invite regression rather than progression in his interpretation of knowledge and knowing" (p. 234).

I agree with this interpretation. Whatever his intention was, Bruner’s argument in the 60s and 70s seemed to imply that the process of learning was a process of acquiring knowledge that existed in culture independent of the individual’s use or interpretation of it.
80). So, how did this change affect his educational theory? I think that an example can be seen in the following remark in Culture; "Now, school is a culture itself, not just a "preparation" for it, a warming up" (p. 98).

Along with his point about the departure from "solo" psychology, a departure from "preparation" seems significant. We have to examine two points about his earlier view.

First is his "discovery learning." Even in those days, Bruner thought highly of participatory methods or models of learning, rather than the mere receiving of information, knowledge, or skill. So he emphasizes that a child learns, for example history, as a historian does. He says, "There is no difference in kind between the man at the frontier and the young student at his own frontier, each attempting to understand. Let the educational process be life itself as fully as we can make it" (On Knowing, p. 126). And the virtues of this sort of learning are twofold:

The virtues of encouraging discovery are of two kinds. In the first place, the child will make what he learns his own, will fit his discovery into the interior world of culture that he creates for himself. Equally important, discovery and the sense of confidence it provides is the proper reward for learning. It is a reward that, moreover, strengthens the very process that is at the heart of education -- disciplined inquiry. (ibid., pp. 123-4)

We notice in the remark above Bruner's assumption about learning as basically an individual business ("make what he learns his own," "interior culture of his own"). This point is also clear in his concept of "structure."

Bruner wrote, "No person is master of the whole culture"(On Knowing, p. 116), so the issue about the structure of knowledge was mainly about the cognitive capacity (or limit) of an individual. He explains about the structure as follows: "Grasping the structure of a subject is understanding it in a way that permits many other things to be related to it meaningfully. To learn structure, in
short, is to learn how things are related" (*Process*, p. 7). Grasping the structure of a discipline would (1) simplify information; (2) generate new propositions; and (3) increase the manipulability of a body of knowledge (*Instruction*, p. 41). There is a point made about generating the new propositions, which may lead an individual to new discovery or creativity or going beyond something given, but the most important point about the structure is the efficiency in learning and coping with a vast amount of information in contemporary society.¹⁴ (Probably this emphasis comes from the context of American education in the 60s.) So, Bruner, in these books in which he often mentioned the concept of structure (from *Process* in 1960 to *Relevance* in 1971), suggests that the urgent task for education is to prepare "a well-educated citizenry"(*Process*, p. 1). He also uses such words as "excellence" and "disciplined understanding," but what he had in mind at that time was:

One thing seems clear: if all students are helped to the full utilization of their intellectual powers, we will have a better chance of surviving as a democracy in an age of enormous technological and social complexity. (ibid., p. 10)

Nevertheless, we cannot but notice, particularly in his interest in Vygotsky's work, his orientation toward the construction of human mind via interaction with other human beings and culture. For example, in the 1979 preface to *On Knowing*, he writes that "interior intellectual work is almost always a continuation of a dialogue."

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¹⁴ cf. In *Process*, he writes,"The main objective of this work has been to present subject matter effectively -- that is, with due regard not only for coverage but also for structure" (p. 2. my emphasis).
Bruner was, from the early stages of his career, influenced most notably by Vygotsky, and was interested in the way culture shapes the human mind. This has been consistent from the time he emphasized such concepts as "structure" though he was, at that time, more concerned with (1) what individuals acquired, or what they become able to do, as a result of education, and (2) the objective nature of the "structure" of knowledge. His shift of focus from individual to communal (or, his departure from "solo"), and from objective/subjective to intersubjective can be seen some of his works even in the 70s. For example, he writes, "Man's intellect then is not simply his own, but is communal in the sense that its unlocking or empowering depends upon the success of the culture in developing means to that end" (Relevance, p. 7, my emphasis).

He says that though essentialism or realism, in which the self is thought of as something like substance or essence, was dominant in psychology, alternative views of the self had already existed in other areas such as cultural anthropology and philosophy (Relevance, p.21, where he mentions F. Boas (1938), M. Mead (1946), and B. L. Whorf (1956); also, Meaning, p. 107). According to this alternative viewpoint (Bruner quotes from D. Perkins), a "proper person is better conceived ... not as the pure and enduring nucleus but [as] the sum and swarm of participations" (ibid.). Bruner, in psychology and education, introduced this conception of relation (or mutual dependency) between the human mind (or the self) and the culture. His departure from his earlier "solo" orientation became

25 See for example Chapter 6 of Vygotsky's Thought and Language, where he explains his famous "zone of proximal development" and how "scientific concepts" bring about a leap in children from "spontaneous concepts." Vygotsky writes:

Scientific concepts, in turn, supply structures for the upward development of the child's spontaneous concepts toward consciousness and deliberate use. Scientific concepts grow downward through spontaneous concepts; spontaneous concepts grow upward through scientific concepts. (p.194)
apparent in the 80s and 90s, for example in *Acts of Meaning* (1990). He writes, "It is man's participation *in* culture and the realization of his mental powers *through* culture that make it impossible to construct a human psychology on the basis of the individual alone" (p. 12, italics in original). He also says, "To treat the world as an indifferent flow of information to be processed by individuals each on his or her own terms is to lose sight of how individual are formed and how they function (ibid., p. 12). So his shift: from the subjective/objective (individuals' learning the "structure" of academic disciplines) to intersubjective (stories or narratives).\(^{26}\) In *Acts of Meaning*, he writes:

> It [interpretivist view] takes the position that what makes a cultural community is *not* just shared beliefs about what people are like and what the world is like or how things should be valued... But what may be just as important to the coherence of a culture is the existence of interpretive procedures for adjudicating the different construals of reality that are inevitable in any diverse society. (p. 95; italics in original)

One of Bruner's strengths is that he is an intellectual, not exclusively limited in one area of research, and can borrow the latest insight or research results from other areas.\(^{27}\) This is obvious in his favorite concepts (e.g. "structure"). His departure from "solo" may very well be the result of this tendency. For example, in order to make the point about the mutual dependency of the mind and the culture described in *Meaning* above, he quotes C. Geertz, "there is no such thing as human nature independent of culture" (ibid., p. 12). So

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\(^{26}\) We have to note, however, that Bruner does not subscribe to relativism. For example, he writes, "It is a foolish "postmodernism" that accepts that all knowledge can be justified simply by finding or forming an "interpretative community that agrees" (*Culture*, p. 59).

\(^{27}\) He says that he is "a fox rather than a hedgehog, preferring to know many things rather than one big thing" (*In Search of Mind*, p.8).
he proposes that we should study "folk psychology" or "cultural psychology," i.e. how human beings (or the human mind) are shaped by, or function in, the culture. This view overcomes the 19th century view which assumes that the "nature" (or biological part) is the basis of us and the cause of our behavior, and the culture is just an added superstructure (Meaning, pp. 20-1), or the notion of the transcendental self prior to any experience.

2-2-d. Observations

I am not in a position to judge the validity of Bruner's psychological research. But I think that his move away from the "solo" conception of the human mind weakens the impact of his suggestions as a guide for educational practice. Now we need to view his theory in a different way. He does not seem to be interested in prescribing what should be done to effect development or growth of the individual human mind any longer; he seems to be more interested in describing what is happening when human beings learn things such as language. After all, if learning processes are not seen to be exclusively individual, it brings about a rather dramatic change in a large portion of our basis for education; our system of education depends to a large extent on the assumption that learning is an individual activity, i.e. an individual's acquiring a set of knowledge, skills, and values which exist in society. If the process and the result of learning are distributed throughout the culture, it is very difficult to assess and evaluate what
an individual has learned. This does not necessarily mean that the evaluation of an individual student's achievement is impossible, but means that it would make less sense to evaluate individual achievement in a traditional framework (i.e. how close the person has got to the pre-established goal). Our modern education is in essence the education of an individual. The logic of Bruner's recent theory may undermine, and require us to re-examine, the very logic or assumptions of our modern education. As William Doll Jr. (1993) suggests, Bruner's educational theory may be considered as "post-modern." This may be why his theory of education in recent years seems to have less direct influence on our education because we may not be able to incorporate his scheme into the existing system of education.

In his latest book on education Bruner writes that education tends to work well when learning is (1) participatory, provocative, communal, collaborative, and

28 I think that much of our notion of knowledge, on which our system of education, particularly of evaluative processes, depends, is based on the notion of what Bruner calls a "propositional knowledge" of an individual. He has always criticized this notion of knowledge and learning, because it does not allow the "[a]ctive interpretation or construal" on the part of an individual (Culture, p. 56). Bruner's early criticism against this notion of knowledge and learning appears as his emphasis on a "procedural" notion of knowledge. For example:

For the basic assumption is that physics is for processing knowledge about nature rather than a collection of facts that can be got out of a handbook. ...when one learns physics, one is learning ways of dealing with givens, connecting things, processing unrelated things so as to give them a decent order. (Relevance, p.109)

But more importantly, I think that, in Bruner's view, at least today, the current notion of knowledge and learning is deeply flawed because it does not incorporate the distributed, constructive, and narrative conception of knowledge.

29 Cf. William Doll, Jr., p.13. I am not sure if I should use the word "post-modern," but I certainly think that taking Bruner's theory seriously requires us to re-examine the principles of our education which are largely based on the modern epistemology.
(2) seen as the process of constructing meaning rather than receiving (Culture, p. 84).

At the same time, he suggests that the role of the teacher, rather than the system, will become more important (ibid., p. 85). Thus, the system, for example a formal curriculum, becomes less important compared to the role of the teacher, and the actual activities and interactions which take place in the classroom. He says:

The means for aiding and abetting a learner is something called a "curriculum," and what we have learned is no such thing as the curriculum. For in effect, a curriculum is like an animated conversation on a topic that can never be fully defined, although one can set limits upon it. (ibid., pp.115-6; italics in original)

This position is, in a sense, consistent with earlier times. For example, he wrote in 1977:

A curriculum is more for teachers than it is for pupils. If it cannot change, move, perturb, inform teachers, it will have no effect on those whom they teach. It must be first and foremost a curriculum for teachers. If it has any effect on pupils, it will have it by virtue of having had an effect on teachers. The doctrine that a well-wrought curriculum is a way of "teacher-proofing" a body of knowledge in order to get it to the student uncontaminated is nonsense. (Process, Preface, 1977, p. xv.)

His position is basically consistent, but it seems to me that he believed, even in 1977, that he could and should develop a "well-wrought curriculum," while now he does not seem to feel a necessity to do so. For example, when he wrote The Process of Education in 1960, one of his discontents with the curriculum and education in general in the past fifty years was:
For the most part, however, the scholars at the forefront of their disciplines, those who might be able to make the greatest contribution to the substantive reorganization of their fields, were not involved in the development of curricula for elementary and secondary schools. *(Process, p. 3)*

Curriculum used to be, and still is, thought of as a course to run (from its etymological origin), so to speak, in which the goal is set, and all that individual runners (learners) are supposed to do is to reach the goal by following the fixed route. Bruner's current notion of the curriculum as "an animated conversation" does not seem to fit well with the old notion of education and curriculum.

It does not seem plausible to me that we can create a curriculum based on his theory today. Even if we try to make one, I wonder how different it could be from the one based on his earlier theory. The point of issue which the change in Bruner's theory addresses is the way we should see the curriculum or how we may make use of it, not the content or structure of the curriculum itself. Now the problem (or emphasis) is not whether "the scholars at the forefront" or "first-rank scholars" are involved in making the best curriculum, but (our reflection upon) how the curriculum can be used to bring about an animated conversation in the classroom.

### 3. Kieran Egan's idea of imaginative curriculum

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*Cf. Also, "I see the need for a new type of institution, a new conception in curriculum. What we have not had and what we are beginning to recognize as needed is something that is perhaps best called an "institution for curriculum studies" – not one of them, but many. Let it be the place where scholars, scientists, men of affairs, and artists come together with talented teachers continually to revise and refresh our curriculums."* *(On Knowing, p. 125)*
3-1. Comparing Bruner and Egan

In his response to Floden, Buchmann, and Schwille's critique of experience-based education ("Breaking with Everyday Experience", 1987), Egan (1987) critiques the pervasive tendency in educational circles to polarize between "traditionalists" vs. "progressivists". The traditionalists (of whom Floden, Buchmann, and Schwille are a part) emphasize the importance of breaking with children's local and self-centered perspectives, thought, and values by the force of academic disciplines, while the progressivists point out the futility of teaching the academic disciplines if they are not made relevant by connecting to what children experience on a daily basis. One of the contested points is the popularized progressive curricular principle (or slogan), "starting where the students are," and the traditionalists' reaction against it. As seen in Bruner's critique of Dewey, the idea of "where the students are" tends to be understood as things "near" or "around" their household/community or things simpler in terms of human being's historical development (an idea akin to associating children with primitive people). Egan thinks that this whole debate misses the point; he says that we should look into what is actually involved in children's thoughts and experiences. He says that children's thoughts and experiences involve things which we do not find in our daily environment (in terms of physical presence), and that children experience them in their imaginations (p.511). He writes:

Children's mental life brims with wicked witches, star-warriors, and a vast menagerie of half-human, half animal or half-alive, half-dead creatures such as ghosts, spirits, hobbits, talking middle-class bears, and so on. If the topic is breaking with experience then perhaps something may be learned from the vigorous everyday mental activity of children in which breaks with everyday experience are commonplace. (p.511)
His subsequent theoretical work is centered around the elaboration of this perspective on what constitutes, or what is involved in, children's experiences and thoughts, among which imagination is an important part. Consequently, he proposes to construct curricular principles based on the insight into children's imaginative lives. He defines imagination as "a particular flexibility" of the mind (1992, p.36), but supplements this definition (to avoid too much emphasis on intellectual or cognitive aspect) by saying that it is "a particular flexibility which can invigorate all mental functions" (ibid., p.36), which gives our minds energy and vividness. As such, children have imaginations, which may in some places be livelier than those of adults, but at the same time, he thinks that imaginative capacities develop by acquiring "cognitive tools" available in culture. In fact, he believes that education should facilitate the acquisition of these tools while keeping children's imaginations alive.

Egan points out that there is nothing in the traditional curriculum (e.g. Ralph Tyler's principles) which necessarily hinders the engagement or development of children's imaginative capacity. However, he also points out that there is nothing, either, in the traditional curriculum which encourages them (1992, p.92). Among other issues, Egan is interested in the construction of the curriculum or clarification of a curricular principle which takes into account students' imaginative lives. He says:

Everyone accepts that engaging and developing children's imagination is an important educational aim. But it is an aim that seems usually to receive casual acceptance but little further attention. Application has relied largely on individual teachers' intuition and ingenuity. (IERG, Conference Program of the 1st International Conference on Imagination and Education, p.12)
Thus he undertakes the task of exploring "how we might more routinely engage students' imaginations in learning, and what might be some of the consequences of taking development of the imagination seriously as a central educational aim" (ibid.). He thinks that in order to develop students' imaginative capacity, it is necessary to engage their imaginative capacity, and he elaborates on how this may be done in his work since the 90s to the present. While Egan's program to enhance students' flexibility and vitality of thought by engaging their imaginative lives resembles Bruner's emphasis on enabling students to "go beyond" the culturally shaped perspectives by means of arousing their curiosity and by the means of learning academic disciplines, there are certain differences between Egan and Bruner in their approaches to curricular principles and frameworks.

For example, Bruner, particularly in the 60s and 70s when he was interested in curriculum and educational theory, thought that the low quality and ineffectiveness of instruction in school was due to the fact that the first-rate scientists and intellectuals were not involved in curriculum construction (1960/77, p.3). However, one of the major problems which educators face is that an excellent curriculum may work in the hands of excellent, charismatic teachers, but the number of such teachers are very few and the problem is what ordinary teachers can do.31 Egan is more concerned with the way that almost any teacher can construct engaging and worthwhile curriculum. His ideas are interesting in this respect for he deals with ordinary school subjects and tries to work out curricular principles which would make mundane curriculum imaginatively engaging.

I think that Egan's emphasis on what every teacher can and should do is, first, reasonable particularly when the problems in the past attempts at curriculum development have been taken into account, and second, interesting,

because I am concerned with the quality of experience and do not believe that the development and engagement of imagination is a matter of the content (as some advocates of art education have suggested). He elaborates his ideas on imaginative education in the subject matters which all of us are familiar with. He does not resort to radically different subjects or topics; rather, he uses the areas and subjects with which almost all of us have grown up or been educated in.

Another point which needs to be noticed is that while Egan tries to make curriculum work for ordinary teachers, he seems to be asking these teachers to work a bit harder on creating their own curricula and teaching strategies instead of relying on something that denies teachers' expertise (such as teacher-proof curriculum). I think that some essential elements of successful education are available only to teachers who actually interact with the students and observe such things as what they need and how they experience the curriculum. As I pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, there are various levels of curriculum. Following Egan's view, I think that individual teachers should take part in curriculum construction by using formal curriculum (such as the one given by the state, district, etc.) as one of the resources. In sections 3-2 and 3-3, I will review a few curricular principles which Egan proposes and on which his readers tend to focus.

3-2. Developmental stages of children's imaginative lives

Egan thinks that if imagination means a particular mental flexibility which invigorates our mental activities, what does the invigorating is different in the different stages of our mental lives. However, in making this point, he does not suggest a Piagetian stage-development theory which emphasizes the development of cognitive capacities propelled by internal maturation; rather, he draws on a Vygotskian perspective, and connects psychological changes with the acquisition
of linguistic and cognitive "tools" which children acquire as they grow up. In other words, how persons think at a particular stage is shaped by the particular cognitive tools which they use. For example, children before they start reading written/printed symbols think in a way characteristic of pre-literate culture, i.e. narrative form, which is quite different from individuals who have acquired written/printed symbols and can think conceptually and analytically. The difference comes from the nature of the kinds of language; in contrast to orality, we can do things like conceptual analysis because we have written or printed symbols in front of us and analyze the meaning of, say, a sentence, by going back and forth; without written symbols, words disappear as soon as they are uttered, so different mechanisms are required to handle this type of language, for example, rhythm and metaphor occupy a more prominent place in the oral stage.

Egan says that, for example, "developments in literacy bring with them other intellectual tools for making sense of the world and of experience, which reduce somewhat the prominence of the story form for students in the eight-to-fifteen age group" (1992, p.71).

Along with this theoretical perspective, he draws on common observations of children's mental characteristics (at least in the West or in North America). For example, he describes what kind of things are likely to engage children imaginatively who have begun to use written symbols but do not think quite analytically or theoretically yet (typically, ages from 8 to 15). His explanations of the imaginative characteristics of these children are as follows:

(1) The typical children at this stage admire human qualities in things; aspects of drama, wonder, romance, courage, compassion, etc., in the world and in human experiences. Thus, purely theoretical, logical, and analytic presentations of materials do not work well with students of this age group.
(2) Children at this stage tend to be fascinated with matters of detail and extreme. An example may be that they like to have exhaustive collections of things. Thus, if their curiosity is aroused well enough, they will undertake extensive and intensive inquiries.

In a sense, Egan's description of the psychological or intellectual characteristics of this age group is similar to Whitehead's stage of "romance" before the stages of "precision" and "generalization"; in fact, Egan uses the word "romance" to describe one of the qualities which children of this ages find in things.\textsuperscript{32}

The bottom line for effective lessons, that is, the effective way to engage their imaginations, seems to be to present materials in the context of human experience. Egan writes, "The point is not to get the symbolic codes as they exist in books into students' minds. ... Rather, the teaching task is to reconstitute the inert symbolic codes into living human knowledge" (p.86). And "a primary tool necessary for this transmutation from codes to living knowledge is the imagination – the students' capacity to think about the decoded content as part of some possible human world" (p.87).

To sum up; Egan proposes to present the instructional materials (or to construct curricula) in a way to humanize the knowledge, that is, not in a way to present the materials as a jumble of decoded, disembodied facts. A good form to do this is to present the materials as a story form; to present facts and ideas as a story.

\textsuperscript{32} Egan, 1992; Whitehead, pp.17-8.
3-3. Story/narrative

Egan proposes, vis-à-vis Sutton-Smith and MacIntyre, "to think of lessons and units as good stories to tell rather than as blocks of knowledge to be sorted, graded, and sequenced" (1992, p.70). A large part of the failure of today's typical school instruction is the failure of engaging students' emotions. The principles and practices of our schooling exclusively focus on cognitive and intellectual aspects of learning, and downplay affective aspects. It is crucial to stimulate emotional or affective responses in the student when we teach; it is simple common-sense that we must make students wonder, admire, intrigued, or sympathize in encountering the materials. A story form does precisely this. Egan makes "the uncontentious observation that students' imaginations are more readily stimulated by content that engages their emotions rather than by content that doesn't. The tool we have for dealing with knowledge and emotions together is the story" (pp.70-1).

Egan's major contention is the point that teachers must not let students be apathetic or indifferent, a failure which, I observe, many teachers do. The failure might not be entirely the teachers' fault, but there is room for change and improvement. A change in perspective – to think of a lesson as a good story to tell – seems to be a good start for such a change.

We might as well take a look at a concrete example. How might a teacher translate a curricular material such as the one below by using Egan's perspective? Below are the required learning outcomes for History 12 in the province of British Columbia. Since this is a list of outcomes, it needs to be translated into the ways that teachers choose concrete materials and organize them for classroom teaching.
The Study of History

It is expected that students will:

- analyse historical evidence to:
  - assess reliability
  - distinguish between primary and secondary sources
  - identify bias and point of view
  - corroborate evidence
- demonstrate the ability to conduct research using print, non-print, and electronic sources
- evaluate the significance of cause-effect relationships
- develop and present logical arguments
- evaluate the significance of economic and geographical influences on history
- draw conclusions about the influence of individuals and mass movements on historical developments
- demonstrate historical empathy (the ability to understand the motives, intentions, hopes, and fears of people in other times and situations)
- apply knowledge of history to current issues
- demonstrate an awareness of career opportunities related to the study of history

33 Retrieved at: http://www.bced.gov.bc.ca/irp/his12/apa.htm
As is clearly seen, what Egan counts as elements relevant to imaginative engagement are included, for example, "the ability to understand the motives, intentions, hopes, and fears of people in other times and situations". Besides, relevance of the subject in terms of, for example, practical use and concerns with students' lives in society is clearly mentioned; as such, this subject is not taken or presented as a mere collection of facts. We may safely say that there is nothing that hinders the engagement of students' imaginations in this list of outcomes.

The content to be covered in the process of achieving these objectives are organized as follows:

- Conflict and Challenge: The World of 1919 (I) and (II)
- Promise and Collapse: 1919-1933 (I) and (II)
- Turmoil and Tragedy: 1933-1945 (I), (II) and (III)
- Transformation and Tension: 1945-1963 (I), (II) and (III)
- Progress and Uncertainty: 1963-1991 (I), (II) and (III)

Under these headings, individual items are listed, for example:

**Promise and Collapse (I)**

*It is expected that students will:*

- summarize the basic features of various political ideologies, including different forms of:
  - fascism
  - communism
  - democracy
- explain factors that contributed to the rise of dictators in the period between World War I and World War II
- evaluate methods used by Stalin to transform the USSR into a world power
- describe the relationship between colonial rule and nationalism in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent.

Here, teachers need to use their imaginations in order to think of how they may possibly make use of these items in order to engage their students and enable them to have deeper, broader, and imaginative ways of understanding the world in this period of time. Teachers may use anecdotes and illustrations in order merely to facilitate students' memorizing historical dates, individuals, and concepts, which may be subsumed under these headings above; this may be considered as an instance of engaging students' imaginations (because abundant images are utilized in teaching and learning), but its connection to the development of imagination is not so clear.

If we fill the list above with more concrete items (e.g. who is involved in such and such an event, where it took place, etc.) and add short biographical accounts and other anecdotes of people involved, and some illustrations, charts, pictures, it would look pretty much like a typical textbook. If teachers cover the list of items in such a manner, they would be just doing the same as reciting a textbook and making little additional effort to make the memorization process easier for students. However, what Egan is asking seems to be much more; for example, he is, along with many other educational theorists, opposed to making students mere recipient of input from educators. He says, "I do not wish to suggest that students should be expected to be merely passive recipients of this teacherly activity: as though they are to sit like automata waiting for teachers to
evoke and stimulate them to imaginative life" (1992, pp.112-3). Therefore, I
would interpret him as saying that the issue is how to make use of these items so
that the student may experience the intentions, hopes, and fears of the people
who lived in those times and places imaginatively, and broaden and deepen the
student's understanding of the socio-historical mechanism which moved the
world in those times and places. Moreover, students should be enabled to relate
their understanding of these times to their own lives here and now, and in the
future. The objective should not be to make use of some tricks in order to make
students cover these items as if to memorize the whole text effectively, but to
make use of these items to expand students' historical understandings and
imaginations.

As Egan himself points out, such recommendations of his as paying
attention to the characteristics of students' imaginative lives and using
story/narrative forms may be understood as a trick to make students memorize
given materials, (1992, p.87). However, if we pay attention to his emphasis on
both engaging and developing the imagination, his concrete recommendations
should not be taken as mere "hooks" to teach given materials effectively. As he
says, teachers should present materials by utilizing the characteristics of
students' imaginative lives, but it should be done "to expose a puzzle in such a
way that it calls to something within us to answer it" (ibid., p.98), not to supply
an answer to the puzzle. Teachers need to use their imaginations, as well as their
knowledge of the subject and observations of their students, in order to think of
what would induce their students to perceive puzzles in history; or as Warnock
puts it, we should make students think that there is more to see in the world, and
history is a way to expand and deepen the way they see the world.
3-4. Some critiques

Egan's ideas are, in some important senses, continuations of what various educators in the past from Rousseau to Dewey to Bruner have tried to do. In relation to, for example, Bruner's ideas, his emphasis on what ordinary teachers can do with ordinary subjects seems a step forward because the implementation of an idea into practice in common classrooms is a big concern, yet very few theorists stress it sufficiently or can give a coherent view of it. By incorporating recent theoretical knowledge and perspectives -- the transition in them has been shown in the comparison between Bruner's earlier and later views -- Egan tries to implement them in order to construct a better notion of education (the development of imagination as an important end) and a better means to achieve that end (engaging the student's imagination). However, we may worry about the case that the latter aspect of his ideas (engaging the imagination) is emphasized over the former, because of his interest in practical application and the popularity of some of his terms (e.g. "story") in discussions on education today.

First, we may worry about the story form of presentation, because a story usually has a storyline, which is a coherence or consistency which threads through the individual items within the story. Thus, presenting materials in a story form may end up indoctrinating students into the way of thinking, feeling, and valuing which the presenter has.

In his discussion on some progressive curricula, Sato (1990/94) raised an issue concerning the use of data or factual information. He said that there are two ways of using them; the first is to illuminate the point which the teacher wants to make, which is basically for the purpose of efficiency of teaching; the second is to enable students to solve a problem by using the data/information or to find a
problem in them (p.91). I think that this perspective can be applied to examine Egan's idea of the instructional use of stories or narratives.

Mere presentation of factual information or data cannot engage students as it stands, unless it has, as its context, some perspective, issues, or problems. On the other hand, a strength of the story-form is to engage students' imagination and emotions, but it is in a sense self-contained. Then, the trick may be to lead students to inquire more while engaging them emotionally as well as intellectually. In other words, teachers have to engage students' imaginations so that students would think of, and eventually inquire into, various aspects of the issue or diverse points of view on it. Egan is not oblivious to the importance of factual information (1992, pp.155-6), but the relations between presentations in a story form and understanding of factual materials should be examined more. Though he writes the following, there is a lot more to be worked out by individual educators, researchers or classroom teachers.

Our introduction to the topic is designed to expose a puzzle in such a way that it calls to something within us to answer it. It presents the puzzle in such a way that the response "who cares?" does not arise. While individual students are not going to set out on a persistent quest to solve the puzzle, they will want to know the resolution of the narrative thus begun. (ibid., p.98)

Usually, a story is used as an anecdote to illuminate the factual information, but it is also possible that factual information is used as a mere example to illuminate the storyline. Unless the story motivates students to inquire more, the virtue of the story-form, i.e. its power to engage the audience, fails as a means to educate and to make students more imaginative.

Second, from my experience, a story, like any other forms of presentation, works well, i.e. engages our minds in the hands of excellent storytellers, but it is
the most boring form if it is done poorly. On the other hand, a "chalk and talk" style of lesson can engage students very well in some cases; even if the teacher may not be presenting the materials as a story intentionally, they could be relating beautifully as a sort of story in the presentation and in the minds of students. If I may expand the perspective on the quality of experience (See Ch.6), what matters is not necessarily a story form, or structuring a lesson as a story which has beginning, middle, and end, and heroes and villains; the issue is rather how to enable students to construct their own interpretations when they see various layers and aspects of the material. Therefore, Egan's reference to the word "story" or "narrative" should not be taken literally; I do not think it necessary to create a curriculum or structure a lesson as a story by using characters and plots. Rather, the issue seems to me to find elements and aspects of human dramas, concerns, fears and hopes which affected the shaping of the understanding we have about the subject.

Third, I want to make a conceptual distinction between education and entertainment, because, though making a lesson engaging is a crucial condition to have an educational experience, it can be taken as an end in itself.

I believe that education should not be replaced by, or confused with, "mere" entertainment, however important it is to engage students. Although it may be impossible to categorically separate education and entertainment in practice, it seems to be possible and useful to distinguish conceptually education from entertainment (e.g. appreciation of art needs a certain training which may not be always pleasant). One possible distinction between education and entertainment is that the latter does not challenge the audiences' or participants' framework of thought and value (e.g. assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes).

According to the dictionary I have at hand (Oxford Concise English Dictionary, 9th Edition), to "entertain" means to "amuse; occupy agreeably". So, when something entertains you, it pleases you by giving something agreeable.
Thus, entertainment, by definition, gives you what fits your current understanding; even when it surprises you or, as in some cases, disgusts you on the surface (e.g. watching a horror movie), it is really giving you what you like. As a result of having "mere" entertainment, you need not change, for example, your taste.

On the other hand, education by definition means changing/transforming you by giving something that you do not have yet (e.g. new knowledge, new perspective). This process of changing does not guarantee that it is always agreeable. While education should not be blind to what students bring with them (their interests, experience, etc.), and it should not give them countless hours of boredom for nothing, it should not be mere entertainment either.

Egan's claim for stimulating and engaging the student's imagination may be mistaken for a mere entertainment of the student at the expense of education. Or, it may be used as a rhetoric which justifies one's judgment that students are engaged simply because they are excited. If imagination implies an ability to think of something in the form not tightly constrained by the actual, as Egan suggests, mere entertainment has little to do with stimulating or engaging students' imagination, because it fails to make them reflect on and challenge what they have here and now.

So, for example, taking our students to Disneyland on a field trip, showing them Hollywood movies, or having them listen to jazz (rock or rap), in place of, or in addition to, textbooks or lectures on, say, American culture, may or may not be valuable as education. If the activity is presented in a form that stimulates and engages the students' imagination, chances are good that they turn out to be educative. If it is intended merely for giving students "fun", and does not challenge what they expect that America is known for, chances are good that they are not really educative.

34 Egan himself is aware of this possibility. See, 1992, pp.162-3.
I do not want to suggest that teaching pre-determined objectives is necessarily wrong or that memorization of facts is necessarily meaningless. But, it may be justifiable to say that, if mere entertainment should be distinguished from education, due to its failure to challenge students' thought and values, mere presentation of factual information is equally miseducative for it fails to engage students in active reflection and inquiry.

Therefore, we are well advised to be cautious about rhetoric of "engaging" students when it implies a mere technique to make memorization easier. An example of this kind of attempt is so-called "educatainment". For example, in the opening page of the Lucas Learning website, George Lucas says:

"Interactive technology offered an alternative to some of the traditional approaches to education that did not work for me as a youth. As a result, I've been committed to finding ways to capture kids' natural interest in learning and engage them more actively and productively in the learning process. (My emphasis)"

Good so far. However, in the page, "Letter to Educators," it is said:

"Our supplementary CD-ROM Star Wars-themed products offer a highly engaging form of practice and exploration that complements regular classroom instruction. These products allow students to enter an imaginative world filled with familiar characters and settings and participate in carefully crafted learning activities. Students can explore and experiment, achieving their goals in many different ways. Whether applying simple physics to build a droid and complete a challenging mission or using complex logic to solve a difficult puzzle, these games offer opportunities for high quality learning in a fun and entertaining environment. (My emphasis)"

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35 Retrieved at: http://www.lucaslearning.com/
Little more concretely, lessons are: "To a child, the activities are about exploring a cave finding Gungan relics, playing and singing Anakin's favorite songs, or helping solve puzzles to program C-3PO. Yet, if you look more closely, you'll find that there's more than meets the eye."

In *Explore a Naboo Swamp Cave*, students practice following directions using left, right and the cardinal directions. The cave doors are designed to reinforce concepts such as "above", "below", "next to", "all", "many", "few", "single", "group."

I wonder how different these might be from just playing in a video arcade or visiting Disneyland. It seems to be the case of what Sato describes as the use of material for efficiency; it seems to be a hook to facilitate acquisition of some facts rather than a means to lead students to inquiry. It seems to me, students may well visit an *imaginary* world, rather than an *imaginative* world by engaging in these programs. It does not seem to me that these programs particularly challenge or expand the students' thoughts and values.

Perhaps, the point is not so much in the kind of programs or activities at the level of design, as in the way that the teacher makes use of the materials so that they may stimulate and engage the students' imagination.
Ch.8 Imaginative Teaching

1. Introduction

How may teachers make their classrooms more imaginatively engaging and how may they help develop their students' imaginativeness? There are various ideas on these issues, but I will explore one particular view or a type of educational practice, which is, in a sense, counterintuitive to many people who are concerned with imaginative education. I will name its characteristics by using the terms, "coaching" and "apprenticing". This type of education has been largely ignored or, sometimes, even fought against, in the development of modern Western education, but it is still practiced today in such areas as arts, sports, and professional/technical training, and some people have started to recognize its more general value. Donald Schön (1987) is a good example and I will draw on his theory of "reflective practitioners" in the subsequent discussions among others.

By taking up this type of education, I want to contest very common (mis)beliefs that the engagement and development of imagination is incompatible with, first, structured and organized content, and second, the
importance of the teacher or teaching. Notwithstanding the fact that teaching, in practice, is often done in a way which hinders the engagement and development of the student's imaginative capacity, it is wrong to assume that structured teaching inevitably restricts imagination. Although it is wrong to assume that students are learning only when teachers are teaching, teachers' role in education is crucial.

I put this chapter in the conclusion because I believe that it is ultimately teachers who come closest to ensuring that the quality of students' experience is educationally meaningful and engaging.

2. Implications of the conceptual analysis — Summary of the preceding discussion

2-1. Introduction

I proposed to understand imagination primarily as a particular flexibility of thought, and not as wild thought. I also argued that this understanding implies the importance of the products of thought, and of the concrete content and context in which such thought should be engaged. Thus, the kind of imagination which we are concerned with is not antithetical to the idea of systematic, reflective, rational, organized, and structured thought. It may occasionally break free of such things as structure and reasonableness, but it does not deny their importance. From these points of view, the kind of education which encourages and enhances the imagination is not a laissez-faire type of education which fails to distinguish between children being excited and children having meaningful experience. We should be aware of the dangers of rhetoric, for example, of child-
centred education and interdisciplinary instruction, which sometimes go too far to the *nominally* opposed end of what they criticize; what teachers plan and implement, and what is involved in academic disciplines and subjects, are not inevitably arbitrary or rigid.¹

2-2. The importance of educating the imagination

Virtually all theorists of imagination I have referred to in the preceding chapters agree on the importance of *educating* the imagination. Imagination is not an innate endowment which unfolds naturally.

There is another issue on which I want to make my position clear. Given the understanding of imaginativeness as a capacity for which concrete contents are crucial, the following question may arise in the reader's mind. Is it not that what education can do for the development of imaginative capacity is to provide content knowledge? If imagination is not a faculty of the mind on which educators can work directly, just as one identifies a part of the body and exercises it in order to strengthen it, what else other than giving content knowledge can education do to develop the imagination?

¹ Cf. For example, Westbrook writes, on behalf of Dewey, to point out that he did not support mere *laissez-faire* education. He writes:

Romantic progressivism was, in effect, a celebration of negative freedom, in this case freedom from the restrictions of the traditional classroom. But it offered children little guidance and left them at the mercy of their spontaneous impulses (a failing of progressive schools nicely captured in a famous *New Yorker* cartoon in which a gloomy child in such a school asks her teacher: "Do we have to do what we want today?"). For Dewey, here as elsewhere, negative freedom was to be valued not in itself but as an opportunity to develop "effective freedom." (p.503)
To this question, I would answer as follows. Of course, providing content knowledge is important. However, my concern is that it is possible to give content knowledge in a way that constrains the student's imagination rather than develops it. There are cases that a particular content or method which the teacher chooses is likely to restrict the student's imaginative development, while the content, taken by itself, is valuable.

I might as well refer to my own experience in order to make this point clear. I recently led, as a TA, discussion sections of a course at Simon Fraser University. The major aim of the course was to analyze, by using some concepts, the social mechanisms which are working in schooling and education in our society. One of the concepts was "reproduction". In one of the lectures, according to my memo, the instructor explained the concept of "reproduction" as follows; Schools often not only reflect but also actively replicate divisions that exist in the larger society. This explanation or definition of the concept reflects the idea of reproduction as discussed by such theorists as Bowles and Gintis (Schools in Capitalist America, 1976) and Bourdieu and Passeron (Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture [La reproduction, 1970]).

The concept was meant to enable the students to have a tool to analyze the mechanisms that are working, often hidden from casual observations, in our society. It seems reasonable to say that the effect of introducing the concept would be the development of the students' social imagination. What happened, in my observation, was that many students started to apply the term, "reproduction", to what they often see in school. In other words, they took, in the foregoing definition of "reproduction", only the part, "Schools often not only reflect but also actively replicate" and ignored the kind of things that are replicated according to reproduction theorists, i.e. "divisions that exist in the larger society". So, many of my students talked about "reproduction" when something seemed to be "reproduced" in students' behavior or in classrooms; for example, "reproduction" of bullying. There is nothing wrong with analyzing
bullying in terms of "reproduction", but what bothered me was that virtually no one bothered to establish what "divisions existing in the larger society" were "reproduced" in the phenomenon of bullying or what structure, practice, or mentality of schooling is "reproducing" the bullying behavior. In short, many of them merely applied the word to phenomena they saw or experienced. Some, if I remember correctly, said that bullies were "reproducing" what they experienced outside school, say, abusive fathers' or authoritarian teachers' behavior, in the act of bullying; this may be an interesting hypothesis but unless, at least, the students examine actual cases of bullying to see if this connection can be established, the use of the concept (or the word) narrows their perspective rather than expands it, because it makes them satisfied with the seeming explanation which the term allows.

I am not referring to this anecdote in order to blame my students for failing to examine the meaning of the concept carefully; it may be my fault that they were not led to think more about the meaning and use of the concept. My point is that it is possible that the content knowledge by itself may be of value—the theory of reproduction significantly expanded our understanding of the mechanisms of educational institutions --, but depending on the way the teacher uses it, it may work against the imaginative development of the student.

2-3. The importance of teaching in educating the imagination

Casual conversations on the importance of imagination often downplay the importance of teachers' teaching because it appears to be an imposition and constraint on the children's putative "imagination"; instead, many people simply associate the importance of imagination in education with "play" or "artistic/creative activities".
On the other hand, virtually all theorists on whom I have been relying in this thesis argue otherwise. For example, Dewey's ideas are sometimes used as an inspiration for a romanticized version of child-centred education, but it was not what he wanted to suggest. Westbrook, one of the recent biographers of Dewey, contests such a popular view:

...Dewey's educational theory was far less child-centered and more teacher-centered than is often supposed. His confidence that children would develop a democratic character in the schools he envisioned was rooted less in a faith in the "spontaneous and crude capacities of the child" than in the ability of teachers to create an environment in the classroom in which they possessed the means to "mediate" these capacities "over into habits of social intelligence and responsiveness." (pp.108-9: cf. My Pedagogic Creed)

Appreciating the role of teachers should not be taken as praise of what some teachers regard as the gist of their expertise, namely, classroom management or caretaking, as separate from the subjects they teach. As I will show later, it requires them to consider a different set of issues. My point here is like van Manen's line of argument, who says that though meaningful educational experience may "often occur on the margin or on the outside of the daily curriculum experiences of the classroom," it is a mistake to suppose such experience "is not fundamentally connected to the central processes of curriculum and teaching" (p.4). He also points out that teachers need to have a certain understanding of "how a child experiences the curriculum" and a certain ability to appraise "the strengths and weaknesses in a child's learning," and that they "[need] to know how to assess a child's present abilities as well as potentialities" (p.93). I do not mean to suggest that teachers, in practice, can always have the best grasp of these concerns, but I would say that, at least, they are best situated to observe students very closely and see what is relevant for individual students; and this is not an ability that something as objective and
formal as a curriculum has. Though there are concerns about the lack of individual interaction between teachers and students for various reasons (Boyer, pp.148–9), I believe that we should emphasize the significance that teachers can and should possess.

We also need to remember that theorists from Dewey and Bruner to Egan, as I examined in the previous chapter, are not child-centred in the sense of dichotomizing and opposing children's experience against academic disciplines or subject matters. On the contrary, one major thread of thought on curriculum and instruction is to conceive of children's experience and academic subject matter in a continuum, which had not been done by the dominant theories until the early twentieth century.²

There may be some arguments regarding what kind of content would stimulate and engage the students' imaginations better. However, it is generally agreed by these theorists that imaginativeness is not an abstract process or faculty which works regardless of the concrete content and context, or which develops when given a free rein.

2-4. Then, how?

It would be reasonable at this point to ask what, concretely, instructional activities which engage and develop students' imagination might look like, and what might be the teachers' role in them. I will show a possible direction by pointing out some elements which are missing from those educational practices

² Sato (1990/1994), in his study of the development of curricular principles and practices in the United States, points out that Dewey theoretically connected children's experience and systematized experience of human being (i.e. academic disciplines and school subjects), which had not been really done in the popular learning theory of Herbartian tradition (p.56).
which do not engage or develop students' imagination. This will be done by contrasting the principles and practices we have today with those which we have largely lost or ignored.

The framework of thought on educational principles and practices in the modern West has moved in the direction of isolating the learning process from the context of life-experience.\(^3\) A good example is learning theory derived from individualistic psychology. In this view, learning takes place in the mind independent of the context of the person's experience which involves emotion, desire, and bodily experience. In contrast to this model, apprenticeship education involves the totality of experience; the apprentice learns skills and knowledge by sharing life and experience with the master, thus absorbing the atmosphere which constitutes the context in which particular skills or knowledge are employed and make sense. This ancient form of education has been replaced by disembodied classroom instruction done only or mostly through the medium of discursive language because the ultimate goal of learning was believed to be the acquisition of abstract and general concept.\(^4\) One of the major corollaries of this kind of education is that the image of the teacher was altered to that of a conduit who merely transfers factual information from the source (e.g. textbook) to the student. Here, the context in which learning occurs has little significance. For example, what teachers or students bring to the situation of learning has little significance. Teachers are expected to supply contextual or additional information, but their views and passions about the subject are not important. What matters is, first, the amount of information which the teacher possesses, and second, the teacher's ability to present the information in a memorable way.

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\(^3\) Recent philosophical, psychological, and anthropological perspectives on learning regard the context in which learning (or experience in general) takes place as essential. Ideas on the "narrative" nature of the mind (e.g. Bruner, 1990, 1996; Egan, 1988; Sutton-Smith, 1988) and "situated learning" (Lave and Wenger; 1999) are examples of such perspectives.

\(^4\) Cf. Ikuta, p.3.
And in extreme cases, the teacher's point of view is considered not only unnecessary but also positively misleading.

I am not saying that we should return to apprenticeship as it existed historically; I just want to point out a certain aspect of the educational process which has been largely forgotten. My argument in the sections below comes from observations on the significance of the intimate and personal interaction between the teacher and the student. It seems that teaching and learning, be it of skill or knowledge, are successful more often where teaching is closer to what we understand as coaching. I may also point out that while many people complain about how rigidly structured the teaching of academic subjects is, many fewer people complain about the strict discipline and structure in arts and sports; so, I may surmise that it is not necessarily the structure or seeming rigidity that makes people dislike the activity or lesson, but something else.

Today it is argued that the Enlightenment ideal of objectivity is unattainable. It is also argued that teachers are no longer the primary sources of knowledge or information; there are other sources such as TV, books, and the Internet. In response, I suggest that the role or function of teachers is not primarily to impart information as an authoritative source of knowledge, but to guide students in the process of inquiry by coaching them not only in skills and knowledge but also in attitudes which are required for the pursuit of the subject. Teachers are in a double-bind, in a sense, because they have to show students that some knowledge and skill are essential for their pursuit, but they somehow must also guide them not to believe blindly what they are taught. In this task, I think that teachers should exemplify reflective, critical, imaginative individuals; this kind of persons are, as I showed in the previous chapters, not merely knowledgeable but also critical of their own thoughts and values, and passionate about learning more. In short, I suggest that teachers should embody imaginativeness, just as excellent sport coaches show exemplary sportsmanship
as well as exhibiting skill to their students and guide them to acquire such attitudes and skills.

3. From teaching to coaching

3-1. Introduction

No one would explicitly support the idea that teachers should be mere conduits of knowledge and that students should be mere receptacles, but there are numerous principles and practices which do not make sense unless we suppose that they are built on these notions. For example, policies about teachers' "accountability" suggest that teachers are supposed to be accountable to the public for the success of students' education as measured by how efficiently teachers make students memorize certain prescribed facts.

Van Manen puts it: "The teacher does not just pass on knowledge to the students, he or she embodies what is taught in a personal way" (p.77). Teachers care, judge, and imagine what is good for the students, show and embody the values which they want to instill in the students, interact with individual students, and coordinate various ideas, expectations, institutional norms, etc., in the process of planning lessons for actual classes. Considering these numerous factors which affect teaching and the complexity of the activities and thought processes which teachers must engage in, the image of the teaching profession seems to me much more than what "teaching" is often taken to suggest. It seems more appropriate to understand teaching in terms of what we usually think of as

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5 Cf. also, Lave and Wenger, who say "learning is never simply a process of transfer or assimilation" (p.57).
"coaching" (and learning in terms of "apprenticing"). This is not to suggest that we have no use of teachers' "chalk and talk" or students' memorizing factual information; but I want to suggest that they are neither accurate nor sufficiently comprehensive in describing what is actually going on in the process of teaching and learning.

An interesting case to examine may be the culture of teaching and learning in non-academic fields, such as in the arts, sports, and technical matters. Teaching and learning in these fields tend to be considered in terms of training (rather than education), devoid of thinking, reflection, and imagination. Usually, it is considered that the teachable parts in these areas are simple and identifiable skills, and learning them consists of mechanical repetition; and those who excel, in these fields, beyond the level of the application of basic skills are considered to be "talented", which implies that the excellence cannot be entirely taught.

However, I do not think that these perceptions are justified. First, teaching and learning in these fields involve much more than mindless repetition of basic skills and procedures; and second, while teaching in these areas is often structured by tradition to a larger extent than that of the ordinary classroom, the structure is not as rigid as it is usually assumed. As Hanks writes in his foreword to Lave and Wenger's Situated Learning:

...structure is more the variable outcome of action than its invariant precondition. Preexisting structures may vaguely determine thought, learning, or action, but only in an underspecified, highly schematic way. And the structure may be significantly reconfigured in the local context of action. (pp.17-8)

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6 Cf. Peters, Ch.1.
My argument needs to be examined empirically in the future, but I will show that teaching with structure and content does not inevitably work against the engagement and development of imaginativeness.

3-2. Schöen's idea of "reflective practitioners"

I will describe Schöen's idea of "reflective practice" (or "practitioner") in some detail so that we may appreciate how reflection and imagination are involved in practical activities and the process of training in them.

Although Schöen does not explicitly mention the term, "imagination" or "creativity", his idea of "professional artistry" includes what he calls "wisdom", "talent", and "intuition" (terms which are often used interchangeably with imagination), which excellent practitioners in various areas (e.g. law, medicine, architectural design, and musical performance) possess. This fits well with the idea of imagination I have described so far. He describes "artistry" as the "competence in the indeterminate zones of practice" (e.g. p.18), and says that it is possessed and exhibited typically by highly successful professionals. The idea of artistry satisfies the criterion of the "effectiveness" and "unusualness" of imagination which Barrow describes, or what Egan calls the "flexibility" of the mind. Schöen's artistry implies ingenuity in concrete situations, founded on solid understanding of the material.

Schöen says that, traditionally, "systematic, preferably scientific, knowledge" (p.14) and "the propositional contents of applied science and scholarship" (p.16) have been privileged as the gist of professional practitioners' expertise (the type of view which has traditionally been called "technical rationality"; cf. pp.78-9). However, Schöen contends that the expertise of professional practitioners does not consist in the straightforward application of systematic, scientific, and propositional knowledge to problematic situations. The
real problem is that the problem does not appear in a clearly determined/determinable way so that specific knowledge could be "applied". Rather, he argues that the core of professional expertise lies in the way that the practitioners combine reflection and action in the actual indeterminate situation, drawing on, but not determined by, the repertoire of concrete knowledge and skill which they have acquired. The integration of reflection and action constitutes their artistry.

The "indeterminate zones of practice" are messy and do not allow the straightforward application of knowledge. Coping with such situations requires that the practitioner reflectively and imaginatively frames the problem and works out possible solutions by drawing on their extensive knowledge in the respective field ("repertoire"). For example, a good teacher has a repertoire of several ways to explain an idea to students according to such variables as the particular student's learning style or level of understanding. The knowledge aspect of this process of on-the-spot analysis of the task, choice from the repertoire, and improvisation is explained by Schön as "knowing-in-action". And the thought process associated with it is explained by him as "reflection-in-action", which is the practitioner's "thinking what they are doing while they are doing it" (Preface, p.xi). An expert practice is not just an instinctual response to the stimulus (cf. also, pp.25-8), and even if a particular "knowing-in-action" and "reflection-in-action" may appear to be an instantaneous response, it involves highly complicated thinking. Moreover, practitioners' ability to reflect on their own patterns, ways, and frameworks in coping with the problem is also important.

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7 Cf. also, Jagla, p.18.
9 Schön says that "knowing-in-action" means the "strategies, understandings of phenomena, and ways of framing a task or problem appropriate to the situation" which we use in the problematic situation or to the task we are familiar with. He also writes, "The knowing-in-action is tacit, spontaneously delivered without conscious deliberation" (p.28).
("reflection on reflection-in-action"; p.26). He does not foreclose the understanding of the nature of artistry away to the zone of mystery by explaining it with such obscure terms as "wisdom" and "intuition". Rather, he tries to examine how artistry is employed, how it works, and how it can be taught and learned. He writes, "We should start not by asking how to make better use of research-based knowledge but by asking what we can learn from a careful examination of artistry, that is, the competence by which practitioners actually handle indeterminate zones of practice..." (p.13).10

A large part of the problem with examining the nature of artistry is that some aspects and processes of artistry cannot be described or explained in words even by those who possess it (p.22). Professional artistry is not dependent on practitioners' ability to "describe what [they] know how to do or even to entertain in conscious thought the knowledge [their] actions reveal" (p.22). The artistry of a given field can be learned only by actually practicing it, and the part that can be taught and learned via discursive language and logical explanation are limited. Thus, those who want to acquire the artistry of a field must be trained in the "practicum" rather than through lecturing and note-taking.

Experiencing/doing something actually establishes the broader context in which learning via the medium of language occur. He wraps this up by saying that artistry is "learnable, coachable, but not teachable" (p.158).

10 Cf. also, Eisner, p.156.
3-3. Teaching as coaching

3-3-a. Context

I propose to understand teaching in terms of coaching because the idea of coaching conveys the appreciation of the broader context in which instruction takes place. When a teacher's teaching results in a student's learning, beyond the level of mere regurgitation, it includes the student's sharing the teacher's way of experiencing the subject. For example, when a teacher is trying to teach a historical fact or a mathematical equation, it is done against the backdrop of how the teacher interprets, understands, appreciates, and is passionate about the subject. A process of teaching and learning involves, for example, the selection of what facts to teach on the part of the teacher (which involves the act of interpretation), and the interpretation of the teacher's message, on the part of the student, which involves the student's experience, imaginative associations, and emotional response. Thus, the teacher's act of teaching should be understood as involving much more than mere handing over of words and symbols, and the student's act of learning should be understood as involving much more than what such words as copying, imitating, and memorizing usually suggest. What the teacher intends to teach is never learned by the student in its entirety, as an object, say a coin, is passed on from one person to another. The teacher can explain and demonstrate to the student, but things explained and demonstrated would almost never be received by the student in the way that the teacher

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There are few references to the idea of teaching as coaching; for example, Boyer (1983), Sizer (1984); also, Bruner when he says, "The teacher is not only a communicator but a model" (1960, p.90).
intended. Student selectively and reflectively listen to, interpret, and imitate what the teacher explains and demonstrates, but what they will learn is inevitably limited by what they bring to the situation of learning; for example, temperament, prior knowledge, interest, and imagination. In fact, I believe that an essential part of good teaching lies in the teacher's skill in making students selective, reflective, and imaginative in understanding what the teacher tries to communicate. However, in practice, classroom instruction is often done in a way which negates these aspects for various reasons. Many people—students, parents, teachers, and administrators—are satisfied with the "success" of instruction at the level of regurgitation (or at the level of "recognition" rather than "appreciation", as Dewey and Eisner say12).

The idea of coaching, i.e. teaching and learning through the sharing of experience, by actually doing it, and through a web of interpretations, was imbedded in the traditional mode of education, i.e. apprenticeship, thought it was not consciously formulated in a theory. Today, this mode of education is found in non-academic and professional/technical fields. In these fields and activities, the instructor, at least in the beginning, appears to the novice as a model to copy, and a model embodies and communicates not only skill and knowledge but the way of living the practice. A good example may be how adolescents imitate the fashion and the behavior of their favorite sport players or their coaches; it is not just skill, but also style and attitude.13 Another example might be how novice teachers choose in the method and style of teaching; they often imitate the teachers they experienced as students.

13 Cf. Lave and Wenger write that "learning is an integral and inseparable aspect of social practice" (p.31).
3-3-b. On the characteristics of the coaching/apprenticing relationship (1): the importance of non-verbal elements

Below, I will describe a few characteristics of the culture of learning in the fields where understanding teaching in terms of coaching is typically appropriate.

First, coaching and apprenticing neither underestimate nor underutilize such non-verbal elements as feeling, intuition, and appreciation.

For example, Schön explains how feeling or an intuitive grasp is involved in a coaching situation. He says that there are "outer" (i.e. observable) signs of competence which even a novice or a lay person can recognize (p.87), and that there are also feelings which arise from doing things properly ("the inner feelings"; p.88). One of the major tasks in acquiring artistry is to become able to connect the outer signs and the inner feelings, and the coach must help facilitating this process. In almost all cases, novice learners in arts, crafts and technical areas, have some intuitive understanding of what good performances look like. It is not so hard to have some images of what kind of skills are considered excellent (on TV, for example). Therefore, they can tell to some extent what the targets are even if they cannot attain them by themselves or cannot describe what concrete skills or processes are involved. Thus, coaches can start by assisting the novice to have a feeling which everyone supposedly has when things are done properly, and afterwards lead them step-by-step. Schön refers to the following example:

A tennis teacher of my acquaintance writes, for example, that he always begins by trying to help his students get the feeling of "hitting the ball right." Once they recognize this feeling, like it, and learn to distinguish it from the various feelings associated with "hitting the ball wrong," they begin to be able to detect and correct their own errors. But they usually cannot, and need not, describe what the feeling is like or by what means they produce it. (p.24)
The learning through *kata* (form) in Japanese traditional arts (as we briefly saw in Ch.4) follows a similar principle, though somewhat different explanations of what is going on may be given. For example, Minamoto writes on one of the significances of *kata* as a perfected form of performing the art (Schön does not particularly emphasize this aspect of learning by imitation). He says that *kata*, exhibited by a master performer, on the one hand, impresses the audience or novices who watch it as beautiful, and would make novices desire to imitate the form, and on the other, gives a clue for learning the art, by showing an intuitive image of what looks good in the art (p.29). Then, what happens is that the apprentice is expected to copy the master’s movements or ways of doing things by endless repetition. On the surface, imitation and repetition of the model may seem to be an example of rigid formalism and authoritarian teaching, but in fact it is not, because the learner has consented to the desirability of what the master exemplifies (Ikuta, pp.27-8, 32).

Ikuta gives a more intricate explanation of this. Apprentices at a beginning stage learns *kata* of the art as a procedure (patterns of movement). As they advances in learning, they start to be able to understand the meanings of what they copy (*kata* as a form of cultural expression), and to reflect on their performances as if the master sees them (pp.60-2). At this stage, they are able to detect and correct their own errors.

Novice learners typically find themselves in a situation like Meno’s paradox14; often novices are not certain what to do to start with, or wonders if doing such and such would lead to mastery, but they must plunge into the practice. What concrete items to learn and how to learn them will become clear by actually starting to learn. The kind of assumptions which people like Frederick Taylor and Franklin Bobbitt had – the possibility and importance of identifying

14 Schön, p.83; Plato, *Meno*, 80c-80e.
specific purposes beforehand – are not really useful or plausible in many educational settings (Eisner, pp.15, 115, 155-6). Although I talked about the relative abundance of intuitive ideas or images of what expert practices may look like which novice learners have in certain areas, it does not mean that how to go about concrete items of the practice is always clear; in many cases, concrete how-tos must be taught by the instructor one by one. In such a situation, the coach's guidance through a relatively formalized process of learning while having an intuitive image or feeling of the goal seems to be effective.

3-3-c. On the characteristics of the coaching/apprenticing relationship (2): demonstration and imitation

Second, demonstration and imitation. Schön says that coaches "employ a multimedia language of demonstration and description" (p.209), and emphasizes the importance of telling/instructing "in the context of the student's doing [i.e. working on a concrete task]" as opposed to didactic lecturing (p.102; italics in original). In "telling" he includes "giving specific instructions", "criticiz[ing] a student's process or product", "analyz[ing] or reformulat[ing] problems" (p.101). The crucial thing is that there are dialectical interactions, with regard to the concrete material on which they are working, between the coach's telling and demonstrating on the one hand, and the student's listening, imitating and doing, on the other. Schön says, "Verbal description can provide clues to the essential features of a demonstration, and demonstration can make clear the kind of
performance denoted by a description that at first seems vague or obscure" (p.112).

Japanese traditional arts put more emphasis on doing because of their awareness of the limitation of verbal explanations. For example, they sometimes use written materials for an instructional purpose; there are some descriptions of the essences of the arts. In many cases, however, these materials do not make sense unless one has mastered or, at least, has been engaged in the practice itself to a reasonable extent, and it is sometimes explicitly pointed out, in the course of the description of a specific technique, that apprentices should practice with their master because it cannot be described fully in words.

I find Japanese traditional arts' emphasis on kata convergent with what Schön describes in learning by doing. In order to become able to utilize the art freely, one needs to master various techniques in the field to an extremely high level. This is done only through the "untiring industry" (Herrigel, p.41) of mastering the skills. Only after going through this, one may be able to use the skills almost automatically, naturally, or freely. However, it is a big mistake for those who have mastered the skills to ask novices to perform in the same psychological state (Minamoto, p.33). The learning through kata, or what Schön describes as learning by imitating, is an educational device to help novices. If teachers give their students complete freedom, it is like throwing them into a sea and asking them just to swim; teaching through kata or imitating is like teaching how to breast stroke and then gradually expanding the repertoire of various other

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15 We may also consider Lave and Wenger's description of the two functions of "talk". One is for procedural purposes (exchange information, focusing or shifting attention, etc.) and the other is for cultural purposes (such as "stories" and "community lore", which "[support] communal forms of memory and reflection, as well as signaling membership"; p.109). What Schön calls "telling" is close to the procedural aspect of talk in Lave and Wenger, but we should understand the coach's "telling" to include cultural aspect too.

16 For example, Miyamoto's Go-Rin-Sho and Yagyu's Heihou Kaden-Sho. See also, Ikuta, p.12.
ways of swimming. The choice of, for example, breaststroke may be arbitrary to some extent, but it helps the beginner by giving the starting point toward effective swimming.

An important concern with learning by apprenticing is that, on the surface of it, this relationship between the coach and the student may look like a pure imposition from the coach and a mere submission on the part of the student; this image of the instructional relationship is usually disliked because it goes against the idea of autonomy which modern educational ideas especially value. Of course, as it cashes out in practice, it is often true that there are authoritarian teachers who impose and make arbitrary demands, and those who write about the importance of imitating and copying are aware of this (e.g. Minamoto, pp.52, 58). However, a few points need to be made.

(1) As Schön says, though the idea of imitation is disliked, the practice of learning inevitably involves imitating (p.121). Schön writes, "The invitation to imitation is also, in its way, an invitation to experiment; for in order to "follow" [The coach's gesture of "Follow me!"]], the student must construct in her own performance what she takes to be the essential feature of the coach's demonstration". He says that whatever the coach tries to communicate by explaining it by words (telling) or by action (demonstrating), it needs to be interpreted by the student when the student actually puts it into practice. Thus, educators should be aware that "[i]nstructions are always and inevitably incomplete" (ibid., p.103). Also as Ikuta points out, when learners imitate what their teachers do, it involves a judgment or approval on the part of the learners that what their teachers do is worth imitating (pp.27-8, 32). Thus, as the saying goes, you can take a horse to the water but cannot make the horse drink it; to think of imitating as pure imposition is questionable, because teachers cannot

17 Cf. also, Minamoto, p.43.

18 Schön, p.214; also, pp.120-1 where he talks about "reflective imitation".
impose unless students consent to accept. Learning by imitating, in an important sense, is rather built on the learner's autonomous judgment.

(2) Autonomy, in fact, does not mean much unless it is disciplined freedom (Schön, pp.122-3). Schön makes these points because imitation inevitably involves interpretation and what results from imitation and suspension of disbelief is greater autonomy and freedom; as some of the coaches in Schön's examples suggest, the students who have successfully imitated their coaches can always "break it open" or open up the new possibilities (e.g. pp.151-4). This point resonates with Barrow's perspective; it is absurd to talk about imaginativeness or creativity if one is to produce something unusual but ineffective; to be truly imaginative (and to have real autonomy) one cannot do without being effective.

From a Japanese perspective it is pointed out that learning through kata is not a commendation of mannerism (Minamoto, p.43; Ikuta, p.24). Though Japanese traditional arts emphasize the importance of copying the perfected form demonstrated by one's master, it also emphasizes that one should, eventually or ideally, go beyond it, and that there is freedom from copying which is possible only for those who have copied to perfection.¹⁹

¹⁹ In Japanese traditional arts, it is commonly said that the ideal path of learning is a three-stage progression of shu, ha, ri, which means; (1) copying masters' kata or their ways of performing/doing, (2) breaking with masters' kata; but at this stage, learners have not totally achieved their own style in that they are trying to break free of their master's influence (they are psychologically not independent yet), and (3) the creation of their own kata (Cf. Minamoto, pp.30-31; also, Ikuta, pp.45-7).
3-3-d. On the characteristics of the coaching/apprenticing relationship (3): issues of personal relationship

Third, the factor of personal relationships between the coach and the apprentice (Schön, pp.166-7; Minamoto, p.57). Learning by apprenticing is learning through the master/coach (Minamoto, p.56). As such, some relational and personal factors play a crucial role in making teaching and learning possible.

For example, Schön talks about the "willing suspension of disbelief" on the part of the apprentice. Learners are expected to trust their coaches for a reasonably extended period of time and invest their time and effort to learn whatever the coaches tells them to do, even if they do not see the tangible result immediately (Cf. also, Minamoto, pp.56-7).

A downside of this arrangement is that there are possibilities of "a learning bind" (Schön, p.125-37), where the relation between the coach and the student is jeopardized because of miscommunication and resulting mistrust; a learning bind typically happens when coaches fails to see the problems and difficulties which their students are having, insisting on their (the coaches') criteria, methods, and perspective, and when students take coaches advice as a personal attack, failing to appreciate the coaches' educational intention. In these cases, both sides tend to become defensive, taking what the other says as an attack, rather than a constructive criticism.

Unlike business transactions, the end-results of an educational relationship are hardly clear when it starts. Here, trust in the coach needs to be built up, and this is an aspect of interpersonal relationship which some major principles and practices of education tend to disregard or avoid. Conversely, this implies that teachers must strive to become those who deserve trust from their students and from their parents (Minamoto, p.57).
3-3-e. An implication of Schön's inner/outer signs of competence

Our criterion for judging competent practitioners from incompetent ones tends to be the product or result of the practice. But Schön thinks that excellent practitioners have characteristic *processes* of performing the task (p.211). He says that "a physician who regularly makes accurate diagnosis or a lawyer who regularly wins cases has a characteristic way of going about the process of diagnosis or litigation" (p.211). Schön's attention to the process has an important implication to understanding the nature of education. The value of education/instruction tends to be measured by the tangible product (as typically seen in standardized exams). People tend to look to the product, because it is tangible, measurable, and explicable. However, Schön's perspective calls our attention to things that are not so tangible. Things that are largely implicit are given theoretical recognition in his idea. Part of what I am trying to do in this thesis by invoking the idea of imagination is precisely this; to find some educational meaning in what is not so tangible or obvious. The particular choice of the word "imagination" as opposed to such words as "creativity" (as I explained in Chapter 3) is to emphasize this aspect, because the latter term has stronger connection with the result or the product.

4. Conclusion: Teachers should embody imaginativeness

Now we might as well examine general education in school by using the previous discussion.

First, in contrast to the fields where coaching/apprenticing is common, there are not many models to imitate in typical classrooms and in academic
subjects. Teaching and learning in academic subjects in the ordinary classroom is constructed in such a way as to eliminate the human elements which teaching and learning in the arts and sports are built around. For example, teachers' passion about the subjects or their personal views and attitudes toward the subjects are considered, at best, irrelevant, and at worst, a hindrance to the teaching and learning of them. For various reasons, it is in fact hard to find good models in ordinary school subjects who show what it may look like to be a passionate practitioner in the field.\textsuperscript{20} I often hear and observe that teachers, while preaching the virtue of intellectual activities, do not practice it themselves; rather, they excuse themselves from the rigor and joy of intellectual/academic activities, saying that the rationale for the teaching profession is care and/or so-called classroom management. Ikuta points out that in the areas where teaching and learning take place in master-apprentice relationships, the master is also a learner who is in pursuit of the art. The learner/apprentice is introduced into the culture of the art. In contrast, in typical classrooms today, teachers are not themselves learners who appreciate and seek to understand the culture of the subjects (p.160).

Second, in the educational scheme where students' learning is measured only by multiple-choice or short-answer exams, the dialectical relations between the teacher's telling/demonstrating and the student's interpreting/imitating are not necessary. The popular practice of assessing the student's mastery at the level of verbal recognition and reproduction may be convenient because the "product" of teaching and learning can be measured in a tangible form, and because it saves time and energy when a teacher is teaching a large number of students. However, this practice brings about numerous problems which we commonly observe in

\textsuperscript{20} I recall when Jostein Gaarder's \textit{Sophie's World; a novel about the history of philosophy} was published in the mid-90s and the subsequent surge of interest in reading philosophy among lay people. I think that the book appealed to the public because it presented a picture of what a philosopher or doing philosophy might look like.
schooling. One of them is that neither the teacher nor the student can be sure, even to a reasonable extent, whether the things supposedly "learned" are really learned (To be able to use a certain word does not necessarily mean that it is understood). Another problem might be that the significance of the "process" of learning is disregarded, merely because it is not tangible.

The third point I want to make is, as Garrison says in his *Dewey and Eros*, that teaching "requires personal connection" (p.170), because the values in education must be found out in concrete situations and interactions. Educational theorists have written about this from various perspectives; Dewey's idea of an end as an "end in view" (1916, p.112) and Schön's rejection of "technical rationality" speak to this problem. Teaching is not a one-way giving of valuable things from the teacher to the student. As van Manen puts it, education occurs in "a triadic relation" among the teacher, the student, and the subject matter (p.76). For example, in the relationship to the subject, what a teacher sees as the use and meaning of the subject may not be the same as their students see; so teachers must examine both the subject and the student in constructing and conducting their teaching.

Thus, while coaching/apprenticing emphasizes solid structure and content, it does not intend to be a one-way imposition which predetermines what the student will achieve. Exploration and experiment on the part of the learner have a certain place in this mode of education. Good coaches often let learners experiment (though it may be within a certain boundary), and they guide their students through concrete activities. Eisner, too, uses the term "artistry", and thinks it important to see teaching and classroom activities in terms of it. His focus with regard to the idea of artistry is a bit different from Schön's; Eisner is in agreement with Schön in opposing artistry to the rigid following of prescribed content and methods of teaching, but his emphasis is on the point that "teachers who function artistically" can "provide a climate that welcomes exploration and risk-taking and cultivates the disposition to play". Eisner believes that the
disposition to play is what lies at the root of educationally meaningful experience, be it in science or in art. Moreover, Eisner says that for a disposition to play to be cultivated in students, teachers must have a disposition to play and act on it themselves (p.162).

Garrison points out that teachers' "caring" about their students should not imply mere sentiments.21 He says, "Mere sentimentality is often simply an escape from hard work and harder thinking. There is a logic to loving well" (p.59). I take this to mean that it is not enough for teachers to be merely sympathetic or affectionate; teachers, motivated by their affection and sympathy toward their students, must open the possibility for their students by helping them acquire tools to become educated. With regard to the subjects taught in school, I think that the subjects which teachers teach are particular tools which they can give to their students for this purpose, because the subjects are, while there are some arbitrary or institutional aspects, each in different ways, the tools which human beings have worked out (and continue to do so) to enlarge their experience and possibilities; each subject is, in a different way, a way to understand and appreciate the world and society in which we live. Teachers should be passionate about the subjects they teach, and they should help their students feel some sense of their passion.

Further we might as well say the following. As the ultimate purpose of learning through kata or structure is to go beyond them, teachers need to be creative; teaching requires something "beyond systematic and proven knowledge of actual existing facts and truths" (Garrison, p.78).22 In the context of general education in school, Garrison says that teachers need "wisdom", "creative intelligence", or "imagination" by which one envisions and examines the possibilities beyond the actual situation (ibid., p.27). The key to making a material or activity engaging is to stimulate students' imagination so that they

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21 Garrison, pp.59, 68-9; also, Takaya, 2000.
can see its relevance to their lives. The educator's duty, as Egan points out, is not to let students say, "Who cares?," when they experience the material or activity, but, sadly, students today often say, "what does it have to do with me?," when they sit in classroom. Teachers can and should observe carefully what their students are concerned with, and how the subjects they teach may contribute to helping their students cope with the issues they have. As I said before by following Greene, one of the major concerns of education is to enable students to see their untapped possibilities. The subjects, materials, activities in school are supposed to be the tools for this purpose.

We have also to bear in mind, however, that there are cases in which some students may not be successful in standard subjects or do not respond to what teachers try to communicate. This may be a mere lack of motivation and hard work on the part of the student but it may mean something more or something else. In these cases, teachers need to be perceptive, creative, and imaginative. Sometimes it is rash to label the students as a case of failure simply because they are not doing well in particular subjects. The students may be finding it hard to subscribe to what the curriculum or the teacher's instruction is representing because of the discrepancy between what they have (e.g. cultural background) and what they are expected to become. Society sometimes presents false choices. At the same time, to judge that the subject one teaches is meaningless or useless merely because some students are not engaged is rash too. Students' "needs" may not be apparent to the students themselves.

Conscientious educators - curriculum planners or teachers—constantly ask whether the subjects they teach are useful and/or meaningful, and they also ask whether the subjects are engaging for the students. Many of them are aware of the issue which Bruner raised, that is, a curriculum cannot inspire students unless it can inspire teachers first of all. This is why recent theorists like Egan

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23 For concrete and detailed discussions on this topic, see for example, Kohl's I won't learn from you (1994), particularly his ideas of "not-learning" and "creative maladjustments".
take account of the human element in curricular principle; to consider why people find the subject, be it history or mathematics, worth pursuing, and why the subject fascinated people long enough to turn it into a subject area which is considered worth teaching in school. Certainly there are these elements, in each subject, which people find engaging, useful, or meaningful, though the educational significance of each subject is not as timeless or universal as an essentialist position may suppose. However, these aspects of each curriculum are not communicated to students in many cases; although people nowadays talk about incorporating human or romantic elements in the curriculum—a biographical account of the person who invented a mathematical formula as opposed to just presenting it and making students master how to use it --, it still lacks a power to stimulate many students. I think that this is because the human or romantic elements are not presented in an embodied form. In other words, though students often hear or read about the human elements of the subjects, they do not see them in real life through how their teachers approach the subjects. In other words, the issue of human or romantic elements of the subject is not a matter of using stories and illustrations, but a matter of the teacher showing a living example of these elements.

There are teachers who are fascinated by the subjects they teach but very poor at explaining the material to students or fail to engage students; the kind of teachers who cannot see the material from students' point of view. Nevertheless, I find it more serious that many teachers do not embody the fun, utility, and value of the subjects they teach, and do not present themselves as being in pursuit of the subjects. This seems to be the biggest difference between the teaching in academic subjects in school and the teaching in the arts, sports, and professional areas. Many learners start learning by imitating the models they see, and they not only imitate concrete skills or learn information but also imitate and learn the whole culture the models embody. In contrast, for various reasons, school subjects are disembodied and cultureless; students typically do not find anything
that they want to imitate. This is why mastery of the content of many subjects, when students are made to do them, looks like arbitrary imposition. Learning in school does not engage students' imaginations, because students do not believe that they will become something more than what they are now by learning these subjects. They do not see the image of an educated and imaginative person they may be able to become. The key to engage and develop students' imaginativeness, therefore, seems to be whether teachers are able and willing to embody the imaginativeness and educatedness which their students want to acquire.
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