THE GERMAN NATIONAL ATTACK ON THE CZECH MINORITY IN VIENNA, 1897-1914, AS REFLECTED IN THE SATIRICAL JOURNAL Kikeriki, AND ITS ROLE AS A CENTRIFUGAL FORCE IN THE DISSOLUTION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

By

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Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
In the Department of History

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ABSTRACT

Much of the historiography dealing with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary has tended to focus, quite rightly, on national conflict as the principal destabilizing force. More specifically, many historians have argued that the challenges of the dominated nations, Slavs and Rumanians, against the two master nations, Germans and Magyars, undermined the precarious political unity of the Dual Monarchy. This thesis agrees with the general assertion that national conflict eroded the integrity of Austria-Hungary but argues that the emergence and radicalization of German nationalism in Austria should be considered a significant centrifugal force.

After the 1848 Revolution and the Ausgleich in 1867, German political leaders, specifically the Liberals, created a new constitutional, centralized Austria predicated on the notion that the Germans, because of their historical position in the Empire and perceived superior culture, would lead the people out of the ‘feudal’ dark ages. However, upon assuming power in 1868, they were challenged by established groups resistant to change, the nobility and clergy, and newer groups desiring more change, the emerging Slav nations. Despite some initial success, classic liberalism lost its appeal and Franz Joseph replaced the Bürgerministerium in 1879 with a series of anti-Liberal Minister Presidents who initiated changes in favour of the Slavs, especially the Czechs in Bohemia. However, rather than reducing tension, changes intensified conflict as the Czechs wrested power from the Germans in the Bohemia. In response, liberal German political leaders increasingly incorporated a nationalist rhetoric to convince the Germans that their Nationalbesitzstand and Deutschum of Austria needed defending.

Eventually, the Czech-German battle came to Vienna and the increasing number of Czech migrants, who had historically settled in Vienna and assimilated into the Viennese milieu, became easy targets for anti-Czech sentiment. This thesis focuses on the anti-Czech campaign conducted from the mid 1890s to 1914 in the very popular satirical Viennese journal Kikeriki and demonstrates that it incorporated a defensive German national rhetoric that contributed to the erosion of national harmony in Vienna and, by extension, in Austria. Of course, anti-Czech sentiment was expressed in other German language journals, the Reichsrat, Austria’s Parliament, and the Rathaus, city hall in Vienna, but by incorporating symbolically loaded and politically charged satirical cartoons, the editors of Kikeriki were able to convey their contemptuous and caustic message simply and succinctly to a wide audience.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ............................................................................................................. ii
Abstract .............................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ iv
Table of Contents ............................................................................................. v
List of Figures ..................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables ...................................................................................................... ix
Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................... 1
Chapter Two: The Czech Minority in Vienna ..................................................... 14
Chapter Three: The German Position in Austria, 1848-1897 .............................. 33
Chapter Four: Anti-Czech German Nationalism in Vienna ............................... 58
Chapter Five: The Anti-Czech Campaign in Kikeriki ....................................... 73
Chapter Six: Conclusion ................................................................................... 152
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 158
LIST OF FIGURES

All figures used by permission of the Austrian National Library, (ÖNB), in Vienna.

Figure 1: Kikeriki, April 18, 1897, p. 1 .............................................. 55
Figure 2: Kikeriki, January 26, 1899, p. 3 ............................................. 64
Figure 3: Kikeriki, April 18, 1897, p. 4 .............................................. 67
Figure 4: Kikeriki, November 16, 1911, p. 1 ......................................... 70
Figure 5: Kikeriki, April 20, 1907, p. 1 .............................................. 75
Figure 6: Kikeriki, April 4, 1909, p. 1 ............................................... 76
Figure 7: Kikeriki, August 19, 1909, p. 1 ........................................... 77
Figure 8: Kikeriki, April 15, 1897, p. 7 .............................................. 82
Figure 9: Kikeriki, May 16, 1897, p. 4 ............................................... 83
Figure 10: Kikeriki, May 8, 1898, p. 3 ............................................... 84
Figure 11: Kikeriki, May 17, 1896, p. 1 ............................................... 86
Figure 12: Kikeriki, July 1, 1897, p. 2 ............................................... 88
Figure 13: Kikeriki, January 14, 1901, p. 2 ....................................... 89
Figure 14: Kikeriki, July 11, 1901, p. 1 ............................................ 91
Figure 15: Kikeriki, February 9, 1902, p. 1 ....................................... 92
Figure 16: Kikeriki, January 26, 1911, p. 2 ....................................... 94
Figure 17: Kikeriki, March 16, 1911, p. 2 ....................................... 94
Figure 18: Kikeriki, August 21, 1910, p. 10 ...................................... 96
Figure 19: Kikeriki, April 28, 1912, p. 2 ....................................... 97
Figure 20: Kikeriki, December 12, 1897, p. 3 .................................... 100
Figure 21: Kikeriki, December 15, 1901, p. 3 .................................... 101
Figure 22:  *Kikeriki*, June 27, 1897, p. 2 ................................. 102
Figure 23:  *Kikeriki*, August 20, 1896, p. 1 ................................. 103
Figure 24:  *Kikeriki*, October 27, 1898, p. 1 ................................. 104
Figure 25:  *Kikeriki*, January 26, 1899, p. 3 ................................. 105
Figure 26:  *Kikeriki*, June 12, 1912, p. 4 ................................. 109
Figure 27:  *Kikeriki*, December 12, 1897, p. 4 ................................. 111
Figure 28:  *Kikeriki*, July 14, 1898, p. 1 ................................. 112
Figure 29:  *Kikeriki*, February 22, 1900, p. 1 ................................. 114
Figure 30:  *Kikeriki*, February 1, 1900, p. 1 ................................. 115
Figure 31:  *Kikeriki*, February 14, 1901, p. 1 ................................. 117
Figure 32:  *Kikeriki*, March 17, 1901, p. 1 ................................. 118
Figure 33:  *Kikeriki*, November, 10, 1901, p. 1 ................................. 120
Figure 34:  *Kikeriki*, August 24, 1905, p. 1 ................................. 122
Figure 35:  *Kikeriki*, June 23, 1904, p. 4 ................................. 123
Figure 36:  *Kikeriki*, May 3, 1906, p. 1 ................................. 124
Figure 37:  *Kikeriki*, April 9, 1908, p. 1 ................................. 126
Figure 38:  *Kikeriki*, May 27, 1909, p. 1 ................................. 127
Figure 39:  *Kikeriki*, October 3, 1909, p. 1 ................................. 128
Figure 40:  *Kikeriki*, February 24, 1910, p. 2 ................................. 129
Figure 41:  *Kikeriki*, July 15, 1897, p. 4 ................................. 133
Figure 42:  *Kikeriki*, August 6, 1899, p. 1 ................................. 135
Figure 43:  *Kikeriki*, May 7, 1903, p. 4 ................................. 136
Figure 44:  *Kikeriki*, June 7, 1903, p. 2 ................................. 137
Figure 45: *Kikeriki*, April 21, 1904, p. 3 .......................................................... 139

Figure 46: *Kikeriki*, July 16, 1908, p. 4 .......................................................... 140

Figure 47: *Kikeriki*, June 12, 1898, p. 3 .......................................................... 142

Figure 48: *Kikeriki*, March 12, 1903, p. 4 .......................................................... 143

Figure 49: *Kikeriki*, March 27, 1904, p. 9 .......................................................... 144

Figure 50: *Kikeriki*, May 28, 1908, p. 2 .......................................................... 146

Figure 51: *Kikeriki*, April 5, 1900, p. 3 .......................................................... 147

Figure 52: *Kikeriki*, September 21, 1911, p. 1 .................................................. 149
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:  Population figures for Vienna, 1880-1910 with number and percentage of Czech minority ........................................... 21

Table 2:  Total numbers of the various nationalities in Vienna, 1880-1910 ... 29
Chapter 1. Introduction.

It has often been argued that ethnic nationalism was the major force which brought about the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War. According to many historians who have written about the Habsburg Empire, nationalism served as a centrifugal force which spun the nationalities away from the centre of the empire: firstly the Hungarians in 1867 and then the other nationalities in the turbulent period immediately before and after the Armistice in November 1918. While there can be little argument with the general assertion that nationalism was a powerful centrifugal force, it has also often been simultaneously suggested that it was the reaction and subversive activities of the ‘dominated’ nationalities, primarily the Italians, Rumanians and various Slav nations, against the two ‘master’ nations, the Germans and the Magyars, which provided the most powerful and pronounced destructive tendencies towards the Habsburg Dynasty. For example, C.A. Macartney opens his massive study of the Habsburg Empire with the assertion that “the peoples of the Monarchy, allied with its foreign enemies, repudiate[d] not only the character of the Monarchy, but the rule itself.”¹ Crankshaw also makes a similar assertion claiming that “growing irredentism . . . was to be one of the chief causes of the downfall of the Monarchy.”² But do arguments and conclusions such as this fully explain why Austria-Hungary so quickly and easily dissolved in 1918 and 1919? Can one emphatically and confidently continue to conclude that the nationalist movements of the ‘dominated’ nations were largely responsible for the weakening of the political structure of the Dual-Monarchy?

I am hesitant to accept these arguments because they seem to assume that the national groups that were neither German nor Magyar had developed well-defined political programs in the last decades of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which endeavoured to challenge and topple the regional Diets, the Parliaments in Vienna and Budapest, and above them the Habsburg Dynasty, which, as will be briefly outlined

below, was definitely not the case. I believe that the contribution of both German and Hungarian nationalism as centrifugal forces have often been overlooked, or downplayed, and need to be considered as culpable agents in the deterioration of unity in Austria-Hungary.

With regard to the situation in Hungary, or Transleithania after 1867, which I will not discuss in this thesis, the nationalities that were ruled by the Magyar elite, the Croats, Rumanians, Slovaks, Serbs, and Ruthenians, had not developed, and had no intention of creating, comprehensive national agendas with the ultimate goal of shattering the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. Two exceptions might be the Serbs and Rumanians who could look outside the borders of Austria-Hungary at an independent Serbia and Rumania. I would argue, based on the evidence presented by other historians, they believed that the only method of tempering Magyar hegemony was to be faithful supporters of the Habsburgs. The elites of these ethnic groups, both political and cultural, were aware of their 'nation' and its history and were able to envision some kind of future in which they could play an active role in government to initiate positive change and development. In essence, the leaders of these nations wanted to have more control over regional affairs and expanded language rights, specifically in the education system and lower bureaucratic positions, but all within the political confines of the Dual Monarchy.

However, their active role in politics was severely limited by the Magyars who dominated municipal, regional and state government. The curia-based electoral system in the Hungarian lands heavily favoured the upper levels of society which were predominantly Magyar. German-speaking Bürger, for the most part urban and middle class, also had political influence, but they had been abandoned by the Germans in

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3 Transleithania was the name given to the lands under control of Budapest, those east of the river Leitha, after the Ausgleich was ratified in 1867. Hungary will be used henceforth for convenience. See note 6 below regarding the use of Austria as a justification for this usage.

Vienna after 1867 and often voted for Magyar candidates and, consequently, supported the policies of successive Hungarian governments after 1867. The result was that few non-Magyars sat in the Budapest Parliament despite accounting for a significant proportion of the population. Moreover, they were further hindered because of the rigorous programme of *Magyarization* which intensified after 1867 and continued unabated until the end of the Dual Monarchy in 1919.

The results of this harsh programme meant that the Hungarian Minister Presidents did not initiate or pass legislation which would have guaranteed language rights to non-Magyars or to significantly modify the curia-based voting system to more equitably extend the franchise and create a Parliament in Budapest more representative of the ethnic diversity of Hungary. The Croats, however, were an exception to this general rule of Magyar hegemony. They had limited autonomy in their regional Diet because of the *Nagodba* which recognised some of their national rights and privileges. In essence, this political, cultural and economic oppression, fuelled by Magyar nationalism, played a significant role in eventually creating a reaction against Budapest and by default Vienna and the whole dynastic structure of the Dual Monarchy.

As we shall see, this was exactly opposite to what happened in Cisleithania, or more simply, Austria, after 1867. The Czechs, Poles, Italians and, to a lesser extent, the Slovenes in Austria began to play a more prominent role in politics after 1867 in city

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5 Taylor, p. 187.
6 This term is a little ambiguous but it has been used by various historians to describe the process by which the Magyar elite tightened their grip on affairs in Hungary by making Hungarian the only official language in Hungary after the Ausgleich. A series of laws passed by the Budapest Parliament made official positions and teaching positions only open to those fluent in Hungarian. Other laws included monolingual names for villages and Magyarization of family names. One contemporary quip that joked about the harshness of this program was: ‘In Hungary even God speaks only Magyar.’
7 The highest political office in Croatia and Slavonia was the *Ban*, or regional governor, who was appointed by the Budapest parliament after 1867 and always a Magyar.
8 For simplicity, I will use ‘Austria’ in reference to the western half of the Dual-Monarchy after 1867 rather than the rather cumbersome unofficial title ‘Cisleithania’ or the even more awkward official title: The Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Reichsrat. For the validity of using ‘Austria’ to represent the western half of the Austria-Hungary, see: Stourzh, G. “Der Umfang der
governments, the regional Landtage, Diets, and in the Reichsrat, Parliament, in Vienna as a result of various laws passed by a succession of Minister Presidents, especially Count Eduard Taaffe after 1879, who granted political concessions in order to obtain support for policies which challenged the centralized German dominated Austria the Liberals had constructed between 1860 and 1878.

Austrian governments and Minister Presidents from Beust to Taaffe passed legislation which liberalised press, association and education laws. The relaxation of censorship laws and the loosening of the stringent guidelines that governed the formation of clubs, for example, some dating back to the days of Metternich, allowed these non-German national groups to more easily establish newspapers and journals in their own languages, form clubs and voluntary associations and also to demand more schools to offer instruction in local languages. But again it must be emphasised that the agendas of the national groups in Austria did not intend to demolish the integrity of the Empire. For the Poles, Czechs and Slovenes, ‘Austria’ was the necessary context in which they could advance their programmes in order to achieve their political, social and economic goals. Agendas which called for outright independent states did not begin to manifest themselves until the last few years of peace, if at all. For example, in the mid-1890s, Tomaš Masaryk wrote in his monthly periodical, Naše DoBa (Our Times):

Our politics cannot be successful unless they inspire a genuine and deep interest in the fate of Austria. We must undertake a cultured and political endeavour to work for the betterment of Austria and her Government in accordance with the needs of our people.9

The Poles had a level of autonomy and control in Galicia, Austrian Poland, that their brothers in Polish areas occupied by Russia and Germany could only dream of and the Slovenes, a nation with no historical precedent of independence, looked to Vienna for guidance for their future development and progress.

The notion of independence was voiced by a very small but vociferous, and sometimes violent, minority of radical national leaders in Austria, most notably in the Czech regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Upper Silesia. However, these leaders, such as the Czech National Socialist Václav Klofač, utilised caustic rhetoric around the turn of the century more as a means to discredit his Czech political rivals, specifically 'Realist' Tomaš Masaryk and 'Young Czech' Karel Kramař, rather than to undermine the political integrity of Austria. Moreover, because of their attitude, the most radical demands and sentiments were reported far too often in the German language press as proof that the Czechs were a seditious and damaging national group, as we shall see in the fifth chapter. Masaryk's moderate line was often ignored.

In short, Slavic national leaders' demands in Austria from 1848 up to the outbreak of the war were quite modest; it was more federalism, rather than independence, that they promoted for the future direction of the Monarchy as a means of fostering peace, progress and development for all nations and classes. The exception were the Italians in the Trentino and the areas around Trieste who aspired to join the Italian state after it was confirmed in 1861 and whose agitation intensified when Venetia became part of Italy after the Peace of Prague in 1866. Again, this is not to suggest that the other groups were unaware of their national identities but the political and cultural elites as well as the vast majority of the people who were not in the educated elite were kaisertreue and verfassungstreue Austrians who sincerely believed that the Emperor and the rule of law would ultimately prevail and grant them either the political recognition that they demanded, in the case of the elite, or, for the vast majority of the people, enact decrees to make their lives more tolerable.

For two detailed discussions about the tension among the Czech parties see the following: Masaryk, T.G. The Making of a State: Memories and Observations 1914-1918. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1927; and Garver, B. "Václav Klofač and the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party." East Central Europe. 1990 17 (2): 155-178. In the former, Masaryk reminisces about the attacks he had to endure from other Czech political leaders especially regarding the Hilsner Affair and the controversy which revolved around the Králové Dvůr manuscripts which radicals claimed as original documents from the time of Jan Hus in the early fifteenth century which Masaryk proved forgeries subsequently created more than a few enemies.

If one agrees with the brief argument discussed above, then there are some additions that need to be made in the historiography dealing with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the role the dominated nationalities played in the breakdown of harmony in the Dual Monarchy. I do not deny that they played a part, but on the other hand, I believe that one needs to take into consideration some other factors in order to better understand the complexity of the national conflicts that were happening in Austria between 1867 and 1918. If one can draw the conclusion that the non-German speakers were nationally conscious, but at the same time not in open revolt against the Dynasty, then there must be other factors which developed in these years which alienated them from the rule of Vienna and eventually led to their acceptance of the idea of independence. What then caused them to realise that under the auspices of the Empire they were not to be accepted as equal citizens? I believe that the short answer to this question is that the development of radical and divisive German nationalism, which was largely defensive in nature, played a significant role. "The Slavs will take over Austria if nothing is done!" became the hysterical and exaggerated cry often repeated in the German press, the numerous political clubs and, subsequently, in the streets of the outer districts in Vienna.12

There can be no question that the Germans were the dominant nationality in the Austrian Empire. This will be discussed in detail in chapter three below, but suffice to say here, Josephian traditions were still influential in Austria and his idea that German should be the sole language of the bureaucratic administration and the military gave German speakers an inherent advantage in positions of power. Moreover, the Germans harboured a sense of cultural superiority not only because of the dominant position of the German language but also because of German achievements in the performing, fine and applied arts. As far as the Germans were aware, the other nations had no Franz Grillparzer, Franz Schubert, Johann Strauß, Gustav Klimt or Otto Wagner. Therefore, they considered it natural that they should control the reins of power and administration. As Whiteside concludes:

12 Jászí, p. 285. He labels this as a ‘fear complex’ which “grew into an almost hysterical terror which denounced every movement or organization of the national minorities as political plots or
The Germans’ dominant role in political, economic and cultural institutions gave them a special, though unformalized (sic), status in the Empire and a relationship with the imperial state which no other nationality had . . . . this is what the Germans meant when they boasted that they were the Austrian ‘Staatsvolk’ and that German was the ‘Staatssprache.’

The shock of the Revolution of 1848, and the attempt by Lajos Kossuth to establish an independent Hungary, forced Franz Joseph to introduce a revised form of Absolutism, commonly labelled by historians as “neo-Absolutism,” which put him, a few select Ministers and the Church firmly in control to maintain order and control in the Empire. The return of Metternich probably had a role in this decision. The Emperor’s actions were initially successful but as the decade progressed, liberal minded German politicians pressured him to make concessions, which included the establishment of a more substantial and influential legislative body and a constitution which he consistently refused. However, after the military disasters in Italy between 1859 and 1861, and later in Bohemia in 1866 against the Prussians, coupled with continuous and unrelenting Hungarian pressure, Franz Joseph and his Ministers had no choice; the Empire was split into two more or less autonomous halves with the Magyars the ‘master’ nation in the eastern half, Hungary, and the Germans the ‘master’ nation in the western half, Austria. This arrangement also suited the Austrian Liberals because it forced Franz Joseph to grant a constitution which would permit them to have a larger voice in the affairs of government with only the military establishment and the diplomatic service directly under the control of the Emperor. Moreover, this arrangement maintained and solidified the position of the Germans as the dominant nation in the Austrian lands.

Yet it was the success of the Liberals in the late 1860s and early 1870s which opened the Pandora’s Box of national conflict. Liberalising tendencies in Austria, specifically in regard to the extension of the franchise, allowed the other nationalities,

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*‘Pan-Slavistic’ or similar dangerous schemes.”*


14 This is the period from 1849-1859 when the government was controlled by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg and Alexander von Bach which swept away most of the laws passed by the 1848 revolutionaries and crushed the Hungarians, with Russian help in 1849.
especially the Galician Poles and the rapidly developing Czechs, to gradually become more involved in the political process and to demand more equality although the latter group refused to actively participate in the Reichsrat. As Boyer concludes: “the Germans had designed a state system between 1867 and 1879 which served . . . as a convenient point of access for their most bitter enemies [and it] soon became a sponsor of anti-German, pro-Slavic and anti-Liberal political values.” This is not what the Liberals had in mind when they pressed Franz Joseph for more concessions. This German Liberal elite sought to make changes but at the same time believed that they would maintain control over Parliament and that the Czechs and other Slav minorities would support their benevolent changes to the political and legal framework of Austria: an element of the famous, yet vague, Austrian civilising mission. They did not want the Czechs to challenge what they believed was the historical right and mission of the politically, economically and culturally advanced Germans to direct the ship of state. In essence, as we shall see in more detail in chapter three below, the German Liberals and also conservative-minded members of the civil service were reluctant to relinquish their privileged positions.

The main demand of the Czechs, however, was in direct opposition to what the German Liberals wanted. Their prime goal was to achieve a ‘Bohemian Ausgleich’ which would federalise Austria and place more control in the hands of the regional Diets. In Bohemia the coalition fighting for federalisation, and against a Vienna based centralized Austria, were, ironically, the Czech national leaders and the powerful Bohemian and Moravian Nobility, largely composed of ethnic Germans families, who were given large swaths of land by Ferdinand II, Ferdinand III and Leopold I as rewards for fighting and defeating the Czech and Moravian nobility during the opening stages of the Thirty Years War and subsequently maintaining their loyalty to the Empire for the duration of one of Europe’s bloodiest wars. The intention of this coalition was to secure the rights and

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16 Vienna also knew the political, military and social importance of granting these estates to loyal supporters. On June 21, 1621, 27 members of the ‘Old’ Bohemian and Moravian nobility were
privileges of the landed nobility against the centralizing tendencies of the government in Vienna and also to allow the Czechs to become more involved in the political process in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and also to have the Czech language recognized and afforded a similar position with the German language because Czech speakers constituted the majority of the population.

Unable to achieve their political goals in the years following the passage of the Ausgleich they refused to participate in the Reichsrat in Vienna. On one hand this allowed the Liberals to make gains, but on the other it alienated the Czechs from the political process and it radicalized their approach to dealing with the ruling Germans. When Count Taaffe became Minister President in 1879, he realised that this extremism and fragmentation could be a potential problem for tranquillity in Austria and he promised the Czechs some compromises, specifically in regard to language rights and changes to the electoral system in Bohemia, which brought them back to Vienna. He needed their support to maintain his coalition, the infamous ‘Iron Ring’, against the Liberals. Franz Joseph and other conservatives were pleased by Taaffe’s method of reducing Liberal power and influence, but it came at a cost. The concessions which he gave to the Czechs did two things: first it split the Czechs because the Young Czechs felt he had not given them enough, and second, it caused the German speakers to react against what they saw as a government acquiescing to the demands of the Slavs.

When the Taaffe Ministry finally fell in 1893, the conflict among the nationalities, especially between the Germans and the Czechs, dominated the political scene in Austria executed in Prague’s main square which all but eliminated the highest echelon of power in the two regions and loyal nobles sympathetic to the Catholic Church would also, it was hoped, restore order in Bohemia and, to a lesser extent, Moravia, which had been thorns in the side of the Emperors since the time of Hus in the early fifteenth century.

17 The specifics of these changes which Taaffe initiated in order to ‘level’ the playing field in Austria will be discussed in detail in chapter three below.

and poisoned any attempts at compromise and progress. The German Liberals were well aware that their influence and power in Austria was being challenged and in some cases they had lost the battle. Most disturbing to the Germans was the loss of control in what had been traditional centres of German power and influence. Prague and the Bohemian Diet were now dominated by Czechs while the municipal government in Ljubljana was firmly in the hands of the Slovenian majority. What was seen by the Czechs and Slovenes as a natural progression of political change was viewed by the Germans as blows to their rightful controlling position in Austria. The German reactions in these cities were hostile despite the fact that they lost none of their legal rights protected by the constitution.

Because the Germans perceived themselves as losing the battle for hegemony in Austria, a new German nationalism began to develop during Taaffe's tenure as Minister President, and it became more visible and radical as the nineteenth century drew to a close. Germans who had been in power in Bohemia cried in the Reichsrat that the situation was dire, and in response politicians in Vienna became aware of the demographic changes taking place in Vienna. Czech migration to Vienna was nothing new and it had always been a feature of the social and economic and social development of the city. As a result of the industrialising trend in Vienna, starting with the Gründerzeit period in the 1860s, when grand plans were initiated to modernize the city.

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19 Ironically, Taaffe's government fell not because of the conflicts between the Germans and the Slavs but rather because of the decision of the government to fund a Slovene language school in the Styrian town of Cilli and also because of opposition from the Poles and Conservatives in his Cabinet to approve electoral reforms to weaken the Liberals and the German nationalist parties. See: Judson, P. Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848-1914. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996) pp. 248-253. For another excellent book on the Taaffe Ministry, see: Jenks, W.A. Austria under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1965. I believe that this is still the best book about this particular period in Austrian history.


21 In the Austrian context Gründerzeit refers to the period beginning in the late 1850s when Austria experienced economic modernization and significant change especially in the development of the infrastructure. The first climax was the Liberal supported expansion between 1860 and the Stock Market crash in 1873. This is when the extensive construction programs began in Vienna began and ultimately changed the face of the city from a medieval style walled city into a modern nineteenth century metropolitan centre.
and the Empire, the numbers of migrants coming to Vienna, especially from Bohemia and Moravia, grew significantly. The Czechs were quite willing to assimilate but the process took time; previously this had not been a problem. But in German political circles, this migration was seen more as an invasion which could potentially destroy the German character of the city and ultimately put the capital, and Austria, under the control of the Slavs. German speaking political leaders and activists from the centralizing Liberals to the radical pan-German parties, who dreamed of lopping off Dalmatia and Galicia and joining the remainder, Austria, with the German Reich, vowed never to let this happen and German nationalists in all parties sounded the alarm in earnest in the late 1890s and especially after 1897 with the Badeni Language Decrees. The problem was that vast majority of the people were not concerned with the national aspect of the political struggle: to the masses in Vienna, class tensions were a more apparent reality. The German leaders mobilized their resources and with support from the press they worked to convince the German-speaking workers and the petty-bourgeoisie that the Czechs were now an internal enemy as dangerous, even more dangerous, than the traditional enemy the Jews. To their relief, the campaign became increasingly successful and after 1897 it was not uncommon to see signs in Vienna displaying the following: Czechs, Jews and Dogs not served here!

The question, then, is how did the German political leaders and their supporters make this threat seem real to the bourgeoisie and subsequently to the lower levels of society? What tools were available for the German nationalists which could disseminate this radical nationalist perspective in a manner that was easily understood by the vast

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23 This was the infamous language decree in 1897, Sprachverordnung, according to which Czech became the official second language in Bohemia and Moravia even in the regions which had a German majority. Administrative procedures were now to be dealt with in the language of the person or party filing the application. The German backlash against these proposals marked the point when the German-Czech conflict intensified and made its way to the streets of Vienna.
majority of German speakers in Vienna? Of course there were many avenues available for the German nationalists to disseminate their defensive anti-Czech commentary including in meeting halls, in coffee houses, at political rallies or in the pages of the press, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to identify and analyze all of them. No doubt, they all played a role in the propagation of German nationalist invective against the Czechs but the focus in the final chapter of this thesis will be on one particular journal which consistently portrayed the Czechs in a negative light and one in which the drawings, poems and caricatures contained symbolism which all could understand, even those who were semi-literate: the widely popular Viennese *humoristisch-politisches Volksblatt* titled *Kikeriki*, or, in English, ‘Cock-a-doodle-doo!’

Some may be hesitant to accept this argument from the outset because of a bias against satire, especially from a journal named after a child’s imitation of a rooster, equating it with something below the more serious journalism found in other Viennese journals such as the liberal-leaning *Neue Freie Presse* or the Christian Social journal *Deutsches Volksblatt*, among others. However, as Ann Taylor Allen argues in her book *Satire and Society in Wilhelmine Germany*, which analyzes the German equivalents of *Kikeriki*, *Kladderadatsch* and *Simplicissimus*, “both [contemporary] supporters and critics of the Witzblätter often attributed to them a much more active role in the formation and spread of new attitudes, images and stereotypes.” Furthermore, she argues that satire in the form of “verbal wit as pun, hyperbole, parody and allegory can also . . . create striking and unforgettable images” which contributed to the “changing attitudes, beliefs and ideologies as well.” In the following pages I will attempt to confirm these conclusions when analyzing the caricatures of the Czechs in *Kikeriki*, but will fall short of fully utilizing her wider adaptation of Freudian and Koestlerian theories which argue that humour “can serve either as a conservative force facilitating individual adaptation to

24 See: Whiteside, pp. 172-177.
26 Ibid., p. 8.
27 Ibid., p. 8.
painful circumstances or as a progressive force promoting social and political change.\textsuperscript{28} In essence, my main argument is that \textit{Kikeriki's} satirical drawings were examples and extensions of defensive and destructive German nationalist propaganda, which had begun to develop in the 1880s, and they reflected and promoted a shift in the German response to the Czechs in Vienna in the two decades before World War One. It was these changing attitudes, easily available to all levels of society that helped contribute to the disharmony among nations in Vienna, Austria and the Dual Monarchy. Rather than continuing to develop into a multi-national imperial capital, Vienna was portrayed as the symbolic 'castle' of German power which had to be defended in order to maintain their economic, political and cultural 'ownership,' \textit{Besitzstand}, of Austria, and it was one of the contributing factors in the complex series of events, both internal and external, which weakened and eventually destroyed the political integrity of the Dual Monarchy and the Habsburg Dynasty in 1918.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Before investigating the conflict between the Germans and the Czech minority in Vienna and how the Germans intensified their attacks against the Czechs, it must be shown that there was a threatening ‘enemy’ significant enough in number to cause concern within the German speaking majority in the capital. In the years just before and after the turn of the century, according to many Germans, the Czechs were a menacing horde of invading Slavs who intended to take over the capital and destroy the German character of the city. Around 1900 there was a well-known little poem that reflected this fear:

Es gibt nur a Kaiserstadt.  (There is only one Imperial City.
Es gibt nur a Wien.       There is only one Vienna.
Die Wiener san draußen,  The Viennese are outside,
Die Böhm, die san drin.29 The Czechs are inside.)

If this was such a popular rhyme in the sing-song dialect of Viennese German, then there had to be some element of truth in it. Of course, it was a trifle hyperbolic, but it shows that the perception of the Czech migrants in Vienna was undergoing a significant change. The Czechs were now considered a ‘different’ and ‘dangerous’ group, like the Jews had always been portrayed, rather than poor migrants that would pass through the difficult transitional period in their new home and then assimilate into the Viennese milieu as they had done in the past.

What will be argued in this chapter is that Vienna had always been a point of migration for Czechs; the attraction of the city was great and like many German-speakers, including the young Hitler, they considered the city the place for a better future. In essence, by 1900 there was indeed a significant Czech-speaking minority in Vienna with established clubs, a number of Czech language newspapers, schools and cultural organisations, and the numbers, as we will see, would continue to increase right until the outbreak of the War. However, it was a minority with limited political power and even less economic power to challenge, let alone displace, the German ‘character’ of Vienna

29 Zollmann, Günther. "'Europäischer Schmelztiegel' Wein." Deutschland und Europa. (39, (November) 1999), p. 29. The rhyme does not work so well in English.
and the German speakers’ domination of the city’s political, economic and cultural institutions.

Gary Cohen makes the following interesting conclusion: “Vienna attracted immigrants from nearly all parts of the Monarchy and from elsewhere in eastern Europe [and although Prague was the historic capital of the Bohemian Crown Lands and the focus of the Czech national movement, Vienna, in fact, exerted a stronger attraction for migrants than did Prague in most of Moravia and Austrian Silesia.” Karl Brousek’s statistical data confirms what Cohen concludes:

The most intensive migration to Vienna was in the 1880s. In the years from 1880 to 1890, 237,303 people travelled from their districts in the Czech lands to Lower Austria and this accounted for nine tenths of the total population loss in the Czech lands. What this seems to suggest is that in the late nineteenth century, the Czechs had other concerns and problems, which they believed could be better solved in Vienna than in Prague. In Vienna, a much larger city, many felt that they could find gainful employment to pay for food and shelter which would better serve their immediate needs. Several drew this conclusion and migrated to Vienna because this was a time when new industrial concerns were developing in the city and also when the infrastructure was undergoing significant change and expansion. Starting with the municipal statute in 1850 and extending through the Gründerzeit period and lasting until the outbreak of the war, Viennese city planners consistently maintained an ambitious programme of

32 Cohen, p. 469. Cohen presents a table showing a the population growth of Vienna, Budapest and Prague and between 1869 and 1910 Vienna consistently maintained a population at least four times larger than Prague.
33 This particular statute gave Vienna direct municipal government that replaced imperial rule which had lasted for almost three centuries. It also gave municipal politicians the ability to press for claims to develop the glacis which was met with stiff resistance from military leaders still smarting from their retreat from the city in 1848. The glacis was largely a park but still used a parade and drill ground. Promises of great boulevards, similar to those being constructed by Hausmann in Paris, to move troops and cannon and a railway (Stadtbahn) to move troops stationed at the garrison at Schönbrunn into the city eventually placated the protests of Generaladjutant Karl Grünne and the staff at the Central Military Chancellery.
construction including the razing of the old city walls, the development of the famous
*Ringstraße* stil buildings on the glacis, bridge construction, railways and stations,
canalization and building construction which required an army of workers, both skilled
and unskilled.\(^{34}\) This is not to suggest that Czechs did not migrate to Prague, but the
numbers were significantly fewer because, as Cohen argues, "Prague's industry and
central-place functions expanded, but on a significantly smaller scale than Vienna's... and
tended to attract [im]igrants from a much narrower hinterland."\(^{35}\) Vienna’s
hinterland was the *whole* Empire.

Sylvia Hahn, another excellent contemporary Habsburg historian, argues that just
the fact that Vienna was the imperial capital was enough to attract migrants from the
Bohemian crown lands.

Vienna was not only the capital city and imperial residence of the Habsburg
Monarchy, the 'pearl of Austria' as it was poetically called in verse and popular
songs; it was also *the* city to which immigrants streamed from far and wide, one
that people held dear in their thoughts no matter how far away they were. Or, as
the novelist Manes Sperber put it: 'The one syllable name of the capital and
imperial residence had a rousing effect, even in the furthest, most isolated corner
of the Monarchy.'\(^{36}\)

Yes, this was probably the case for some of the Czechs migrating to Vienna. However,
one must be cautious in accepting Sperber's romantic hyperbole: this is not why the vast
majority of Czechs migrated from their villages, towns and districts. Moreover, 'Wien' in
Czech is 'Videň': two syllables.

There can be no question that Vienna was the preferred destination of Bohemian,
Moravian and Silesian Czechs in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But why did
Czechs migrate to Vienna? After all, it was a German city which would no doubt present

\(^{34}\) For an excellent discussion on the construction programme in Vienna see: Schorske, K. *Fin de
Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*. New York: Knopf, 1979, specifically pages 24-115, Barea,
pages 239-259, and the chapter on Vienna in: Olsen, D.J. *The City as a Work of Art: London,

\(^{35}\) Cohen, p. 468.

\(^{36}\) Hahn, S. "Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants in the Multicultural Realm of the Habsburg
difficulties for an uneducated and unskilled poor Czech-speaking migrant. Surely, there had to be other reasons than just the fact it was the imperial capital.

Of course, there were economic reasons that made Vienna a destination for migrants in the mid, and especially the late nineteenth century. It was by far the largest city in Austria and the Empire and as the century progressed, Vienna and the Vienna Basin contained the highest concentration of industrial development in the Monarchy. There was a need for people to fill the jobs in the increasing number of industrial concerns in Vienna including textile mills, locomotive works, foundries, steel processing plants as well as the numerous smaller concerns which required labour to satisfy the demand of the market. What allowed this increase of Czech speaking migrants from Bohemia and Moravia to Vienna to fill these jobs was the failure of many small farms whose owners had just recently been released from the bonds of serfdom in 1859, the once ruthlessly enforced Robot, and could not make a decent living on small parcels of arable land which were often unable to provide the owners with even a subsistence living. This agrarian crisis in Southern Bohemia and Moravia in the 1870s and 1880s provided incentive to migrate to Vienna. Brousek makes this point and argues further that the lack of industrial development also enticed people in these districts to migrate. The agrarian crisis did not abate for many as the landed nobility developed larger farms which utilised more efficient farming techniques and this would bring increasing numbers of whole families to Vienna between 1890 and 1910. Moreover, because of primogeniture, younger sons had few opportunities in their rural districts and migrated to the city to fill the requirements for unskilled factory labour if they did not wish to extend their service in the Habsburg military or make their way into the clergy. In essence, these socio-

37 In regard to this statement, Ilse Barea argues in her excellent book that “Vienna was never an industrial city. The Central machinery of the state alone tied up a vast number of people, and so did other administrative headquarters, public and private.” See: Barea, pp. 332-337. I think that she has a valid argument and since she writes as a citizen of Vienna one has to take her conclusions into consideration. Moreover, the Army had a significant presence in Vienna which provided work for many civilians. However, industrial concerns in Vienna did proliferate in the latter part of the nineteenth century. For example, in Favoriten, the tenth district there were operations including: *die Werkstätten der Staatsbahn, der Wienerberger Ziegel Ofen*, as well as the Locomotive manufacturing and repair yards around the South and East rail stations. See: Schubert, W. Favoriten. (Wien: Gerold's Sohn, 1992), pp. 74-85.

38 See: Brousek, p. 22.
economic problems in these regions provided a 'push' that was a more important factor than the 'pull' of Vienna.

It must also be noted that this migratory pattern of the Czechs to Vienna should be seen as neither a new nor a shocking phenomenon in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the numbers notwithstanding. As Sylvia Hahn asserts:

[The state pursued an intentional recruitment and resettlement of labourers from other areas of the Habsburg Monarchy . . . as early as the seventeenth century (1666), the Collegium Commerciorum, the first administrative authority responsible for commerce and trade, attempted to entice specialists . . . to Vienna.]

Yes, this seems to suggest that this state funded recruitment agency searched exclusively for skilled labourers. However, when one takes into consideration that a 'migratory system' stretched from the Upper Rhine to Vienna and also included regions such as Hesse, Saxony and the Czech lands, it is safe to conclude that unskilled Czech labourers also would have also come to Vienna because, as Brousek concludes, the Czech lands acted as important 'labour reservoirs' for Vienna and over the course of the nineteenth century, and especially after 1866, "migration to Vienna was primarily from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia."

Czechs as Domestic Labour and Craftsmen.

Opportunities in the service sector and in the domestic labour market also enticed Czechs to migrate to Vienna.

Generally the service sector was expanding in the nineteenth century with a demand for labour ranging from transportation experts, finance specialists and medical and educational personnel down to female domestic servants and unskilled hands. On the whole, the possibilities of gainful employment in [Vienna] grew tremendously. Many Czechs who came to Vienna did not have the skills or education to become experts, but they met the demand for domestic servants and unskilled hands. Often upper class

39 Hahn, p. 311.
40 Ibid., p. 313
41 Brousek, p. 22.
42 Hahn, p. 313.
families had a Czech cook or nanny. Statistical evidence gleaned from the Austrian records compiled by Baron Karl Czernig von Czernhausen confirms this.\textsuperscript{44} According to Brix:

[Czernig] determined that for the year 1856 there were approximately 83,000 Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks in Vienna and a large part of them were working in private households and had not yet become part of the emerging industrial proletariat.\textsuperscript{45}

Moreover, in Vienna a significant number of young Czechs took their apprenticeship in various specialized trades, such as locksmith (\textit{Schlosser}), furniture maker (\textit{Tischler}), cooper (\textit{Böttcher}) and other such traditional crafts. After their apprenticeship, some stayed and some returned to their home districts. According to Heinz Zatschek, by the mid-nineteenth century, Bohemian and Moravian migrants were a significant proportion of the Carpenter's Guild.\textsuperscript{46} These trades still employed a significant number of workers in Vienna even as the larger industrial factories were proliferating in the suburbs.\textsuperscript{47} The most famous example would be Tomaš Masaryk who came to Vienna in 1862 to apprentice as a locksmith. He left soon after,\textsuperscript{48} but returned again seven years later to tutor and study.

In her essay, "Urbanisierung und Nationalitätenproblem," Monika Glettler rightly concludes that Vienna around 1900 attracted increasing numbers of immigrants from all parts of the Monarchy. Those who were educated came to fill governmental positions

\textsuperscript{43} Hahn, p. 317.
\textsuperscript{44} In his mammoth three volume study, \textit{Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie}, published in 1858, Czoernig, who was then President of the Austrian Statistics Commission, made the following conclusion about the Czech migrants in Vienna: "der überwiegenden Mehrzahl nach Individuen der dienenden Klasse, welche meist aus Böhmen (und Mähren) nach Wien strömen, um als Diener, Hausknechte, Köchinen und Mägde in den Haushaltungen der Wiener ihr Unterkommen zu finden."
\textsuperscript{45} Brix, E. \textit{Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation: Sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen Volkszählungen 1880 bis 1910}. (Wien: Hermann Böhlaus, 1982), p. 120.
\textsuperscript{46} Zatschek, H. 550 Jahre jung sein. Die Geschichte eines Handwerks-Nach einem Manuskript über das Wiener Tischlerhandwerk. (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik Wien 1958), pp. 144-148. In this section, he points out that the German majority in the guild was declining.
\textsuperscript{47} See Barea, pp. 332-337.
\textsuperscript{48} Barea, p. 252.
because Vienna still served its major roles as administrative capital of Austria and the Empire and the residence of the Emperor. Moreover, significant numbers of students also made their way to Vienna because it had the largest university and technical schools. But it also attracted unskilled labourers who were either temporary sojourners or those who were looking for something better than what they had come from. They believed that the capital could offer them work as the city rapidly urbanized and industrialized. Another factor that has to be taken into consideration is that Vienna was the central hub of the rail network in Austria. Vienna's five main rail stations were the point of entry for many of the new migrants to the city. For the Czech migrants desperate to improve their condition: all rails pointed to Vienna.

The Czech Population in Vienna.

Previous research into the population movement in Austria-Hungary has indicated that the absolute number of Czechs in Vienna did increase in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but an accurate number would be very difficult to defend with any level of absolute certainty. Indeed, scholars who have dealt with this subject including Brousek, Hamann and Glettler, among others, have presented approximate numbers and they have been very clear to point out that one considers them close estimates at best. Brousek, for example, uses the official results published by the Austrian Central Statistics Commission (K. und K. Statistischen Zentralkommission), which used an individual's declared colloquial language, Umgangssprache as the method of compiling the statistics and the numbers are seen in the table below: But these numbers, especially the numbers for 1900 and 1910 are definitely low. Brigitte Hamann argues: "All we know is that the number established in the census of 1910, approximately 100 000, is too low." These numbers have to be considered too low because by this time, 1910, the pressure on the Czech community, which manifested itself in administrative prejudice and in some cases

50 Brousek, p. 23.
Table 1: Population figures for Vienna, 1880-1910 with number and percentage of Czech minority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population of the City of Vienna.</th>
<th>Total Number of People with Czech as their Principal Language.</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>726 105</td>
<td>25 186</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1 364 548</td>
<td>63 834</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1 674 957</td>
<td>102 974</td>
<td>6,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2 031 498</td>
<td>98 461</td>
<td>4,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

violence, forced many of the migrants to list German as their principal language.\(^{52}\) This conclusion is valid because a report from the Interior Ministry published in January of 1911 concluded that the reason the number of 'official' Czech speakers decreased was because many felt the pressure against them (\textit{Agitation}), in the city and believed the best guarantee for progress would be to write German as their \textit{Umgangssprache}.\(^{53}\) Also, these numbers do not allow one to incorporate factors such as fluidity of movement within the migrant population while searching for jobs and accommodation as well as how quickly some of them assimilated. Conversely, I found demographic statistics published by Peterman in 1908 which could lead one to conclude that the number of Czechs speakers in Vienna was around 438 838. This number has to be considered too high because it relied on information gleaned for the 1900 census that identified where people were born, and the data makes no indication about how many of these people from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were either German or Czech speakers.\(^{54}\) Regardless, whatever the exact number, we shall see below that the Czechs were represented in significant numbers in Vienna in the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy.

\(^{52}\) Another reason why Czech migrants would write 'German' as their language of everyday speech was because it would place them in a better position to land a job. See: Jenks, W.A. "Economics, Constitutionalism, Administrative and Class Structure in the Monarchy." \textit{Austrian History Yearbook}, (3: 1967), p. 34.

\(^{53}\) See Brix, p. 141. Document titled: \textit{Bericht des Wiener Magistrats an die niederösterreichische Staathalterei vom 1.6.1911 (Z.XXI/238) über die Durchführung der Volkszählung 1910}.

\(^{54}\) See: Petermann, R. \textit{Wien im Zeitalter Kaiser Franz Josephs I.} Wien: R. Lechner, 1908. The full list of the numbers are as follows: 46.4 % from Vienna, 11.3 % from Lower Austria, 4.2 % from the other Austrian lands, 7.8 % from Hungary and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2.2 % from Galicia and the Bukovina, 1.9 % from foreign countries and 26.2 % from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.
Czech Organizations and Journals.

Beyond these official statistics, further evidence that one could utilize to argue that the Czech numbers were increasing in Vienna can be seen in the rising number of Czech clubs and organisations. After the losses in Lombardy in 1859, and the internal failures of the neo-Absolutist system of Prince Schwarzenberg and his Interior Minister Alexander Bach, Anton Schmerling was able to force Franz Joseph to pass the February Patent in 1861.\(^55\) This document will be discussed in more detail in chapter three below, but what is important here is that Schmerling and his liberal colleagues made it easier for people to establish clubs and voluntary organisations. The document reduced the restrictions of the Schwarzenberg government which decreed that “all voluntary organisations had to obtain official permission to constitute themselves by submitting their proposed statutes and membership lists to the provincial government for approval.”\(^56\) With the passing of the Austrian Constitution in 1867, Article 12 lifted all remaining restrictions\(^57\) and opened the door for the proliferation of associations ranging from educational societies to athletic clubs to political organisations. However, old habits die hard and at meetings of the latter organisations there was the ever present ‘stranger’ from the Ministry of the Interior quietly sipping a beer and taking notes. The reaction was immediate and by 1872 there were over 11 000 voluntary clubs and associations in Austria\(^58\) and the number would continue to increase until 1914.

The immediate reaction of the Czechs in Vienna was slow but like the Germans the numbers would also increase dramatically until 1914. Czech clubs had existed in Vienna for quite some time but they were few in number. Monika Glettler makes

\(^{55}\) For an excellent, and critical, summary of the February Patent and its predecessor the October Diploma, see: Taylor, pp. 95-129.


\(^{58}\) Judson, p. 145.
reference to a certain Českoslovanský Spolek, a theological club, which was founded in 1823 but lasted only for a few years and was never revived. By 1872 there were three clubs: the Lumir Singing Club, the Česko-Slovanský Dělnický Spolek, a workers' association, and the Komenský Verein, a Czech language school association which provided Czech speaking parents an institution where their children could receive instruction in Czech and German. It was largely a non-issue for the Germans for over twenty-five years, but it would become one of the rallying points of the German attack on the Czechs in Vienna as the reaction against them intensified.

The real proliferation in Czech clubs in Vienna came as the numbers of Czechs increased between 1890 and 1910. As pointed out above, these decades saw a massive influx of Czech speaking migrants and the number of clubs increased in more or less direct proportion. Rather than presenting all of the statistical data with the names and numbers of registered Czech clubs in Vienna for every year from 1897 to 1914, I have chosen four years, starting with 1897 which, I believe, will help substantiate the argument that the Czechs became a significant and established minority in Vienna.

In 1897, according to Lehman's allgemeiner Wohnungs-Anzeiger (Nebst) Handels und Gewerbe-Adreßbuch, the contemporary Viennese equivalent of the white and yellow pages phone directories, there were twenty-nine clubs listed with Czech names. This number was far more than any other nationality in the capital. In 1900, the number had increased to forty-eight clubs. Also by this time, a larger number of the

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60 Ibid., p. 18.
61 For an extensive and thorough review of the development of the Czech clubs and associations in Vienna until 1914 see: Glettler, M. Sokol und Arbeiterturnvereine (D.T.J.) der Wiener Tschechen bis 1914. Wien und München: R. Oldenbourg, 1970. In this excellent book, Monika Glettler presents the reader with an excellent overview of the clubs in Vienna and their membership numbers. She also argues that many of these clubs strengthened their political affiliations with the Social Democrats and the Czech Nationalists especially in response to the treatment they received at the hands of the German speaking population in the city.
62 Lehman's allgemeiner Wohnungs-Anzeiger (Nebst) Handels und Gewerbe-Adreßbuch (Wien: Alfred Hölder, 1897), pp. 206-240. Looking through this source I found that there were less than ten clubs of the other nationalities. But there were twenty-four Jewish clubs under the sub-heading 'Israel.'
Czech clubs held their meetings in more permanent locations. This indicates that the Czechs were becoming more established because in the listing for 1897, a significant proportion of the clubs held their meetings in a Gasthaus or Bierhalle. The listing for 1905 showed that the numbers of Czech clubs rose again: the number was now sixty-two and in 1910, as in 1900 and 1905, these clubs had moved out of the back rooms of pubs to more permanent locations and often in the newly incorporated outer districts including Favoriten, Ottakring, Hernals and Meidling.

From this data it should be clear that the Czechs were a permanent feature in the Viennese milieu. What has not been, and will not be, investigated here in detail is what exactly transpired in these clubs. However, quite briefly, many of the organizations were athletic clubs, bicycling was very popular, or reading and educational societies. As mentioned, many of the clubs were located in the outer districts, these were the poorer suburbs outside of Vienna's old second wall, today the Gürtel, and became part of the municipality of Vienna in 1890, and it is safe to conclude that they must have provided a comfortable environment for the migrants from Bohemia and Moravia who found the capital city a daunting and even dangerous place. It was probably very comforting for the newcomers to sit and enjoy a pivo in a friendly Beseda where the language was familiar and where one could get away from the stifling conditions of the chronically overcrowded flats in these areas. Others, however, were from their establishment, or subsequently, Czech nationalist organisations which provided more than just helpful hints on how to find employment and accommodation in the city. In her excellent book, Sokol und Arbeiterturnvereine (D.T.J.) der Wiener Tschechen bis 1914, Monika Glettler analyses the rise in the number of Czech clubs and argues that after 1900 some became nationally politicized by Czech radicals as places where they could plan their counter attacks to meet the threat of mounting German violence against the Czech hordes.

66 Baron Kielmansegg, Lower Austria’s Governor created this Greater Vienna in 1890 and then later included Floridsdorf on the north bank of the Danube in 1904.
invading and violating the ‘Germaness’ of their sacred fair lady Vindobona. Vienna.67 But for the most part the evidence shows that these organizations were more to provide security for their members during the intensification of the national conflict in Vienna and also to help them improve their condition in the city.68

Another indicator of the Czech presence in Vienna can be seen in the proliferation of newspapers and other journals published in Czech. In 1897, according to Lehman, of the 790 journals and periodicals published in Vienna and listed under the title, Zeitungen, six were in Czech.69 In 1900, the number grew to seven but they were being published more often. For example, Dělnické Listy went from a weekly to a daily paper and Moravský Noviny, which did not exist in the 1897 listing, also was a daily.70 This trend continued and in 1905 and 1910 the numbers were nine and eleven respectively with more issues available on a daily basis for the Czechs.71 Again, similar to the clubs, these journals met the demand of the Czech-speaking population in Vienna who wished to keep abreast of developments at home and abroad but were unable to read German without difficulty. They should have been recognized as an indication of the cosmopolitan nature of the Imperial capital and a sign that the Czech migrants were becoming more literate despite the fact that they were reading Czech papers: the latter representing part of the ideal goal of the ‘Austrian’ mission. Moreover, over time they would learn German and their ability to read would facilitate their future reading of the hundreds of German language journals published in the city and ultimately assist their ability to assimilate. However, the German nationalists did not see it this way: first, the existence of these papers, despite their relative paucity in comparison to German language journals, were thought to violate the German nature of Vienna, and second, unable to read Czech,

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67 *Vindobona* was the name of the original Celtic settlement which was in turn used by the Romans when they moved into Pannonia. *Vindobona* is the feminine symbol of Vienna much like *Libuše* is the feminine symbol for Prague. In chapter five, we will see how this symbol was used in *Kikeriki* as an allegorical symbol to represent the city.

68 Glettler, Sokol, p. 104.


radical opinion was under the impression that these visible symbols of a Czech presence negatively influenced the migrants to resist assimilation and to question the German dominance in Vienna and Austria. Michael Hainisch, an eminent Austrian politician and original member of the Austrian Fabian Society who turned increasingly German nationalist in the 1890s lamented that Czech journals and clubs created a “national self-confidence among the migrants and this makes their assimilation a serious problem [and] Vienna could gradually become like a Constantinople.” In essence, a city divided along language lines.

Political and Economic Conditions of the Viennese Czechs.

So far we have seen that a significant number of Czechs in Vienna had a notable number of clubs and journals which could indicate that they were now successfully asserting their own right as Czechs to participate within the public sphere of the Capital. But in reality this was not the case because most Czech migrants were at the lowest end of both the political and economic spectrum, which limited their ability to exert significant influence. Intent on assimilating into Viennese society, many did not wish to draw negative attention and evoke criticism. Paraphrasing what Monika Glettler argues in her mammoth study, Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900, Cohen rightly concludes:

the Czech [and] Slovak . . . immigrants to Vienna were mostly too poor, too powerless politically and economically, and too eager for social acceptance and upward mobility to resist for long acculturation and assimilation in Vienna’s German-speaking environment. The data presented above seems to warrant these conclusions, because according to the language data the number of people who wrote Czech as their principal language dropped in the census of 1910.

However, in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, the ability to assimilate into the Viennese milieu became ever more difficult because of the stringent regulations passed by the Rathaus in reaction to the high number

72 Quoted in Brix, p. 129.
of non-German migrants arriving in the city, especially the Czechs and Galician Jews. Similar to most regions in Europe, there was the Austrian version of municipal citizenship laws, the *Heimatrecht*, originally passed in 1754, which defined the legal position of an individual as being a native or a foreigner. This particular statute stated that after ten years of working and living in a town or village, the individual and his family were given the right to maintain permanent residence and to utilise the community’s various public services.\(^{74}\) This law was revised many times and from 1863 until it was modified in 1900 “only government clerks and property owners could gain the *Heimatrecht*.\(^{75}\) Before the fear of ‘Slawisierung’ of Vienna reached a fever pitch in the late 1890s, these stringent regulations were often bypassed or forgotten altogether. The migrants were needed in Vienna and, furthermore, they were considered to be good and loyal ‘Austrians’ who would learn German and quickly assimilate. Later these laws were enforced by local officials to the letter and often the revisions were able to be manipulated so that even after twenty years some migrants were unable to acquire legal status in the city. This left them in a precarious situation because without this legal status they could be banished from the city if they were unemployed or considered destitute by the authorities:\(^{76}\) a terribly harsh fate indeed in a city where the working class districts of Hernals, Meidling, Ottakring and Favoriten, with large Czech minorities, were centres of chronic underemployment, homelessness and despair.\(^{77}\)

After 1900, to the chagrin of the German leaders in Vienna, Minister President von Körber, who was concerned with the social welfare of the Emperor’s citizens, forced an amendment through Parliament to rectify this problem. Czechs who had lived for

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\(^{74}\) Hahn, p. 317.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., p. 317.

\(^{76}\) The situation for migrant women in Vienna was incredibly harsh. In an essay titled, “*Der Meldezettel,*” Karl Kraus complained that the “state harasses girls not only on the street but pursues them even into their residences” and arrests were very arbitrary. As Hahn points out, “the grounds were invariably suspicion of prostitution [and] illegal peddling” which could mean banishment from the city. See Hahn, p. 321. The *Meldezettel* mentioned was, and still is, the necessary document one must fill out in the police office in the district in Vienna they wish to reside for more than three months. If one does not have a *Meldezettel* it is impossible to gain access to public services, open a bank account etc. In essence, you do not legally exist in Vienna.

\(^{77}\) From 1911 the Czech language version of *Arbeiter Zeitung, Dělnické Listy*, which now included the following subtitle: ‘the Journal of the Czechoslovakian Social Democratic Party’, reported on the evictions and shabby treatment of Czechs by the district authorities.
many years were finally given their civic rights with the legal term ‘prescription’. This recognised an individual’s presence in the city and gave them access to services including medical care, care for the elderly and it also gave them voting rights, if they qualified in accordance with the complex curial system. However, this did not help the new migrants to the city because at the municipal level Lueger’s councillors and administrators were able to pass a law setting new residency requirements, and subsequently voting privileges, at three years. Lueger originally wanted five years, against the protests of the Socialists who argued that six months should suffice.\(^7\) This suited Lueger and his Christian Social cronies perfectly because he wanted to prevent, or rather postpone, enfranchising the new migrant Slav workers, the majority of whom were Czechs, because of the fear that they would, as members of the working class, become receptive to Socialist propaganda.\(^7\) Lueger, a man with incredible knowledge about the historical development of Vienna, was certain that after a few years in the Capital Czechs would fall prey to his charm, abandon the Social Democrats and vote, if they met the curial requirements, for his Christian Social Party. Geehr informs us that Lueger’s secondary goal, after that of preserving the position of the Germans in the city, was to “promote the success of the Slovenes and the Bohemians who settled in . . . Vienna.”\(^8\)

Coupled with this difficulty in acquiring legal status in Vienna, was the inability of the Czechs to manifest any significant political power at the polling stations. There were reasons for this situation: many of the Czechs who were working class and did not pay enough direct income taxes to vote in the third curia,\(^8\) and in 1907 Minister President Beck enacted changes in the Electoral Laws which introduced universal manhood suffrage for Reichsrat elections.\(^8\) The Czechs were too small a minority in the

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 167.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 146.
\(^8\) There was a fourth curia added for the 1903 Austrian parliamentary elections which opened the franchise to include more people from the lower middle class which would allow more Czechs to vote. However, the number of representatives coming out of this curia were very small in proportion to the number of voters. Moreover, the Czechs were even a smaller minority in this curia than they were in Vienna as a whole.
\(^8\) In the following chapter continuing development and changes in the voting laws in Austria will be examined in more detail and how it affected the relationship between the Germans and the
city as a whole and they were also outnumbered in the working class districts in the suburbs. As indicated in the table below, the Czechs outnumbered all other minority groups combined, but it must be reasonable to assume that their resources were limited in comparison with the Germans and, therefore, their ability to significantly influence the politics and economics of Vienna was minimal.

Table 2: Total numbers of the various nationalities in Vienna, 1880-1910.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of:</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>601,955</td>
<td>1,146,148</td>
<td>1,386,115</td>
<td>1,726,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs and Slovaks</td>
<td>25,186</td>
<td>63,834</td>
<td>102,974</td>
<td>98,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>4,346</td>
<td>4,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenians</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>1,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs and Croats</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population:</td>
<td>632,100</td>
<td>1,213,878</td>
<td>1,497,282</td>
<td>1,834,370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This did not mean that Czech support was not cultivated by political parties in Vienna, especially by the Social Democrats and, unbelievably, Lueger’s Christian Socials. The former is understandable given the fact that they represented the workers. In Lueger’s case it was a little different. Always the prudent politician, he had to accept Körber’s changes and convince local Czech politicians and eligible voters that a vote for his party was better than a vote for the Social Democrats while simultaneously protecting the Germans. An interesting example is that many of the Czechs living in the district of Favoriten voted for the Christian-Socials in the 1891 municipal elections despite the fact that the organization was German nationalist and anti-Semitic. The Czechs who were eligible to vote thought that to throw their weight behind this group would prove their

Czechs. Suffice to say, starting with Taaffe’s term as Minister President the requirements of individuals to vote became far easier and successively included a larger proportion of the population. However, it was still off-limits for the vast majority of the urban working class and peasantry.

83 Brix, E. p. 438.
willingness to assimilate into Vienna's German culture. This in fact became a heated issue between the German parties in Vienna. Through their newspapers, they voiced their criticism and accused each other of ignoring legitimate German demands and pandering to the Czechs in order to gain political support, however limited it may have been, in both the Rathaus and Parliament. In October of 1906, Lueger was accused of this by the editors of the German newspaper Deutsche Rundschau:

According to Dr. Lueger's most open admission no honourable German nationalist will be hired for a city job, but in contrast crowds of grim enemies of the Germans, the Czechs, streaming from their starving Heimat, find the door of city employment wide open at the streetcar system, at the gasworks, and at other municipal enterprises. The city employment assistance service has just about become a breeding ground for Czech journeymen... 85

These kind of cheap accusations may have won radical nationalists some temporary support, but according to Geehr, they were not true, and proved Lueger's shrewd political sense: "Though he posed as a friend of the 'Bohemians', avoiding confrontation with them or any Slavic group in the Capital, Lueger continued to believe that the Austro-Germans were the superior nationality and should control municipal and imperial politics." 86

But the reality of the changing situation was ignored by most German political leaders in Vienna and Austria. As the Czechs and other Slavs achieved higher levels of education, in both skilled labour and administrative and academic pursuits, they should have been eligible for jobs in municipal workshops or in clerical positions in the huge civic bureaucracy when they became available. This was the wonderful idea of the German Liberals in the 1860s and 1870s; yet again this was the 'Austrian' mission of bringing the Slavs to the same high cultural level of the Germans. Unfortunately, as the national battle intensified after the Badeni language ordinances the Germans who made the decisions in the municipal hiring offices made no effort to accept both the assimilated Czechs and those who were still attempting to integrate into their new environment.

86 Geehr, p. 268.
Conclusions.

What we have seen is that there was a significant Czech minority in Vienna in the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War; it was the largest minority in the city. In absolute numbers, there was an increase, but the percentage of Czech-speakers to German-speakers did not significantly change as the population of Vienna exploded. Moreover, the Czech migration that Vienna experienced was nothing unusual in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because the city had always acted as a magnet for Czech migrants looking for employment in craft trades, domestic service and, at the end of the nineteenth century, industrial labour, who would quickly assimilate into the Viennese milieu within a generation.

But for the German speakers the Czech minority, insignificant in absolute numbers, politically and economically weak and intent on assimilating into Viennese society as they had done in the past, became the focus of a German nationalist reaction against what they considered the erosion of their political, economic and social hegemony in Austria. The battle against the Czechs in Vienna was a microcosm of the larger battle they were fighting against the Slavs who they felt were unjustly and deviously usurping their Besitzstand of Austria and the Deutschtum foundation upon which they believed the state was founded and should continue to lay.

Nationalist politicians now had to make the people aware of the importance of the national dimension of political conflict in Austria, for which many had previously shown little interest. For them it was far too abstract a concept, far removed from the reality of their miserable lives. The primary concern of many of the people who toiled for long hours in workshops, in factories and on building sites was to keep their jobs and find decent shelter and food for themselves and their families. These problems were the same for all members of the underprivileged classes in Vienna and they transcended national lines. One felt a certain solidarity with another worker who was in a similar desperate situation. These concerns reflected the ongoing struggle of all of the underprivileged citizens in the capital. In the late 1890s and the early years of the new century,
demonstrations in Vienna against the rising prices of bread and the shortage of housing included poor labourers, German and Slav, Christian and Jew.

The German nationalists were well aware of these challenges and the focus of their endeavours was to portray the Czechs as the enemy not only in national terms but also in terms of something that the German-speaking members of the working class and petty bourgeoisie could equate: competition for jobs and housing in the growing metropolis which always seemed to have a chronic shortage of both. With this accomplished they could then move to the larger picture and depict the Czechs as seditious and unpatriotic Austrians and manipulators of the government; their mission was to demonise the Czechs. Although he is referring to the battle between the Christian Socials and the Social Democrats and how it shaped their attitudes toward the Czech minority, Boyer draws an interesting conclusion about the Czech population in Vienna which confirms my argument that the German nationalist response was indeed an overreaction to the wider Austrian political situation. Both parties did not believe in the reality of a Czech takeover; but [they] were not interested in helping the Czechs develop as a distinctive ethnic group. The Czech community in Vienna had become a pawn in the larger struggles over which it had no control.  

Below we shall see why the attitude of the Germans towards the Czechs in Austria and then later the Czechs in Vienna shifted from one of tolerance and eventual acceptance to that of discrimination and denunciation.

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Chapter 3. The German Position in Austria 1848-1897: The Rise of German Nationalism in Response to the Harsh Realities of Change.

In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the Czechs were a significant minority in Vienna according to the statistical evidence. However, despite the fact that they constituted a minority with a number greater than all other non-German speaking nationalities, they were more or less powerless. Moreover, as previously noted, the desire of the vast majority of the Czechs was to assimilate into the Viennese milieu, not to maliciously destroy and change its cultural fabric. As Hamann rightly concludes: “Most of them were apolitical and wanted to live and work in peace. Yet they got caught against their will in the machinery of the national battles.”

Nonetheless, these realities of migration and demographic change, long established in Austria and Vienna, did not stop the German political leaders and newspaper editors in the Capital from launching a scathing nationally motivated campaign against the Czech minority from the mid-1890s until 1914. This campaign seriously undermined the possibility of national co-operation and conciliation and was one of the contributing factors in the deterioration of ‘Austrian’ unity in the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy. The irony is that the goal of unity, whereby all of the diverse nations of Austria would eventually capitalize on the German-led ‘Austrian’ civilizing mission and optimistic notions of progress and prosperity, was a fundamental platform of the German Liberals from the heady days of the 1848 Revolution and one that continued when they came to power in 1868. In the words of Liberal J.N. Berger in 1861, the Germans should “carry culture to the east, transmit the propaganda of German intellecction [sic], German science, German humanism.”

However, by the time they found themselves out of power and on the political defensive in the Reichsrat in 1879, the political discourse of the German Liberals began to change radically. The Liberals did not disappear from the political picture as suggested

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88 Hamann, p. 308. She also points out that the Czech minority was used by both the radical Czech and German nationalist politicians for propaganda purposes.
89 Quoted in: Schorske, p. 117.
by some historians. Taylor, for example, concludes that as early as 1873, the year of the devastating stock market crash, the German upper-middle class “put its liberal principles in the background.”\(^9^0\) As they found themselves in the position of being just another political party with a specific agenda, which was rejected by other national and political groups, their political rhetoric became more nationally motivated. Judson makes one of the best assertions about the changes in the German attitudes in this period:

The Liberals themselves created a powerful new politics organized around national identity in order to meet the growing threats to their local hegemony, threats that were increasingly couched in nation-based (the Czechs), class based (Socialism), or race based (anti-Semitism) discourse. Liberal rhetoric about society provided a crucial ideological foundation for the later explosion of German nationalist politics at the end of the nineteenth century.\(^9^1\)

Therefore, before looking at the intensification of the campaign against the Czechs in Vienna between 1895 and 1914 and how it was conducted in the journal *Kikeriki*, some important questions need to be answered. First, what exactly was the German position in Austrian political affairs before and after the *Ausgleich*? Second, what were the changes that provoked the ire of the Germans and radicalized their national consciousness? Third, what were the German reactions to these changes which led to a transformation in their political rhetoric from one which promoted the notion of “let us have one nationality and no national divisions”\(^9^2\) to one of defence against the encroachments of the Slavs?

In the pages that follow these questions will be answered and the fundamental argument, which agrees with Judson, is that German nationalism was a response to changes that saw the Germans’ once unquestioned position of absolute hegemony in the Empire and Austria weaken. The German speaking political elite was under the impression that their dominant role in Austrian political and cultural affairs was being

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\(^{90}\) Taylor, p. 151.

\(^{91}\) Judson, p. 3.

\(^{92}\) Judson, p. 60. Actually this slogan was written in the journal ‘Wien Zeitschrift für Kunst, Literatur und Mode’ in 1848 but as we shall see this was a similar programme to what the Liberals wished to achieve when they set up the *Bürgerministerium* in 1868 after the passing of the Constitution in December 1867.
threatened by the Emperor’s Minister Presidents, specifically Count Eduard Taaffe in the years from 1879 to 1893 and his successors Prince Alfred Windischgrätz and Count Kasimir Badeni. Moreover, liberal-minded politicians such as Karl Giskra, Eduard Herbst and Ernst and Ignaz von Plener interpreted these changes as attacks against their liberal ideals and as an offensive against the centralized, German dominated Austria they attempted to create after the Ausgleich. In essence, they saw the changes as detrimental to the Deutschum of Austria and the German Nationalbesitzstand of the political, economic and cultural structure of the western half of the Monarchy.

Of course, a complete and comprehensive investigation of the transformation of the attitudes of the Germans in response to their decline in power and influence in Austria and the Dual-Monarchy would require a lengthy and detailed study which would go far beyond the fundamental argument of this thesis. Therefore, what will be shown very briefly below, is that in the period between 1867 and 1895 the German position of absolute dominance was challenged and reduced. As Austrian Minister Presidents initiated changes to include the non-Germans in the political process and state affairs, what Jászi calls the move toward national equality, the German Liberal leaders reacted. Their rhetoric changed from promotion of a centralized ‘Austrian’ Rechtsstaat, led by the Germans, to that of a more defensive brand of nationalism which stubbornly resisted new realities in order to maintain German dominance in Austria.

The German Position in the Empire 1848-1866.

There can be little doubt that after the Revolution in 1848, the Germans were the dominant ethnic nationality in Austria. Following in the tradition of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, Austria was a state that operated in the German language, was defended by an Officer Corps that was predominantly from the German-speaking nobility. The Monarchy

93 See: Judson, P. Exclusive Revolutionaries. This excellent work examines in detail how and why the German Liberals transformed their rhetoric from a universalist liberal outlook to challenge the corporate structure of the Monarchy and create a Liberal-Constitutional state to a more nationally conscious programme intended to protect their privileged position in Austrian political, social and economic affairs.

94 See Jászi, pp. 283-297.
was carefully watched and controlled by an army of administrators and civil servants who were mostly German. It was Joseph Redlich who quite correctly wrote: “This creation of Maria Theresa, the Habsburg Monarchy, and within it the Austrian State, was chiefly the work of the political and general culture of Germans in Austria.”

This is not to suggest that non-Germans were not represented in the ruling or administrative structure. For example, Istvan Deák argues that there were many non-Germans in the Officer Corps, but the soldiers, like the civil service were German in the sense that they communicated in German and defended and administered the Empire of a German Prince.

However, even at this early date, there were some indications that the Germans had to be aware of the growing threat of other nationalities making what the Germans considered absurd demands. Ludwig von Löhner, in reaction to Czech demands in April of 1848 for autonomy for the lands of the Bohemian Crown, founded the ‘Association of Germans from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.’ This club was intended to alert the German Bürger of Czech attacks on their ‘natural rights and cultural heritage.’

To be sure, this was an over-reaction in the heated atmosphere of the Revolution. Moreover, liberal-minded German leaders avoided using nationalism as a method of gaining support for the changes they hoped to make in the political structure of the Empire once the Revolution was over. From the outset of the Revolution of 1848, German-speaking Austrian Liberals were under the assumption that they would be the leaders of the new era because they were the most advanced linguistically and culturally. They softened their hegemonic views with idealistic notions of ‘Austrian nationality’ which would transcend national linguistic boundaries. This became clear in the preamble of the proposed January 1849 Constitution written during the short-lived Kremsierer (Kroměříž)

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97 In regard to the military, Erich Zöllner points out that the vast majority of the Imperial Officer Corps was German. “In fact, 78 percent of the commissioned ranks were filled with Austro-German officers.” See: Zöllner, E. “The Germans as an Integrating and Disintegrating Force.” Austrian History Yearbook. (3, 1967), p. 222. But similar to the argument Deák makes, more reserve officers came from the other national groups towards the end of the nineteenth century. But it must be noted that this was not the case for the Hungarian officers, especially after 1867, who were almost exclusively Magyar.
Reichstag. This document promised each nationality “the inviolable right to preserve and cultivate its nationality in general and its language in particular. The equality of rights in schools, the bureaucracy and public life of every language used locally (Landesüblich) is guaranteed by the state.”99 One can see that this could have led to confusion but it did not matter because in March Franz Joseph and Prince Felix Schwarzenberg dissolved the Parliament.

By late 1849, Franz Joseph and his loyal Generals Radetzky and Windischgrätz, with help from Tsar Nicolas I in Hungary, had restored order to the Empire but it would not resemble Austria of old.100 Schwarzenberg, Count Franz Stadion and Baron Alexander Bach wanted to distance themselves from the old days and a new kind of absolutism was established. In December of 1851, the Silvesterpatent was passed and nobody was satisfied: the ‘Bach Hussars’ kept Hungary in line, the Czechs and Italians were defeated and even the Germans were not happy with the arrangement, despite its centralized structure that maintained the privileged position of the Germans. The biggest problem of the new system, in the opinion of the Liberals, was that it took them out of the political process, and to their chagrin censorship again appeared and their newspapers and clubs, the few permitted to exist at this time, were carefully watched.

Towards the end of the decade neo-Absolutism was in serious difficulty. This time it was major financial problems and defeat in Italy that forced Franz Joseph to consider changes. The result was the implementation of the Oktoberdiplom in 1860 which proposed a more federal system where regional diets would have a more control in their particular districts. This arrangement, which Jászi labels a “political coup d'état of the aristocracy against the reigning German bureaucracy in Vienna,”101 lasted a very short time because of expected resistance from Austrian Liberals and the Hungarians as well as unexpected resistance from the towns that felt that the overwhelming power

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98 Judson, p. 42.
99 Ibid, pp. 64-65. We will see that a paragraph similar to this in the 1867 Constitution would lead to problems for the Germans in their attempt to maintain their hegemony in Austrian affairs.
100 For a good outline of the system of Neo-Absolutism, see: Taylor, pp. 83-95; Barea, pp. 189-237; and Jászi, pp. 100-102.
101 Jászi, p. 104.
which Count Goluchowski, a Polish landowner from Galicia, intended to give the great landowners was an outrage. Moreover, a tax strike was a possible reaction and Franz Joseph needed the revenue to rebuild his shattered and demoralized army.

Goluchowski was dismissed and after a series of negotiations, Anton Schmerling was able to pass the *Febuarapatent* in 1861. In short, the Patent revived the German bureaucratic style which had existed before the Diploma. It also maintained Franz Joseph's power in military and foreign affairs as well as his right to appoint cabinet ministers who were responsible to him alone. Franz Joseph made it clear to the Ministerial Council of the power he intended to wield with his predominantly German advisors:

> In particular you will, as a matter of duty, keep Parliament from trespassing beyond its proper field and repulse decisively any attempt on the part of this body to concern itself with the management of foreign affairs and of army affairs and the business of the higher command.

Moreover, it also created a new curial system of voting for the *Reichsrat* whereby the 343 Parliamentary deputies would be elected by the regional Diets (*Landtage*). This system, that was labelled, *Interessenvertretung* was "meant to reflect economic status as well as traditional feudal social divisions [and] it clearly favoured the interests of the upper and middle classes, most of whom happened to be urban, German speaking and liberal in their political convictions." Of course, the Hungarians and the Czechs voiced their opposition but their demands for revisions were rejected. What the Patent did was to maintain the dominant position of the Germans which was incongruent with the demographic realities in the Empire. Count Julius Andrassy was quite accurate when he declared:

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102 Schmerling was not the official Minister President but rather the State Minister. Archduke Rainer Ferdinand was given that title by Franz Joseph.


104 The way this system worked was that there would be four *curiae* which would elect the members. They included the following: 1. the owners of the great rural estates; 2. the chambers of commerce; 3. the towns; 4. the rural districts. In the third and fourth *curiae* only those who paid 10 gulden in direct taxes had the right to vote.

105 Judson, pp. 82-83.
Messrs. Bach and Schmerling committed not only a political but arithmetical fault. They put the monarchy on a basis on which there were six millions against thirty millions: they put the pyramid on its head.\(^{106}\)

But the German Liberals disregarded this kind of reasoning. It their opinion, “it was not the numbers of German speakers in the monarchy but rather their historical role in creating a common public culture in Central Europe that justified . . . their hegemonic position.”\(^{107}\) Liberal activist Lorenz von Stein reflected the opinion of many educated Germans when he wrote: “Jetzt ist seine Mission, der Träger der Civilisation in den für Europa neu gewonnenen Landen zu werden.”\(^{108}\) This system, which maintained German power in the Empire, lasted until the next crisis erupted in 1866 and, as we shall see, the system that replaced it, Dualism, was intended to preserve the status quo in Austria after Hungary went its own way.

**From the ‘Schmerling Theatre’ to the Bürgerministerium: German Liberalism Triumphant.**

When the next crisis erupted in 1866, political events in Austria gave little indication that anything had really improved. Every political force which was out of the loop of power voiced opposition to what became to be known as the ‘Schmerling Theatre.’\(^{109}\) German Liberals, German Conservatives, the Hungarians, the Poles, the Italians and the Czechs all challenged this system. From the outset, the Czechs were the biggest losers and in 1863 they withdrew their deputies from the Reichsrat and created an alliance with members of the Bohemian landed nobility, led by Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic and Count Leo Thun, and Prince Friedrich von Schwarzenberg the Cardinal

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106 Jászi, p. 105. The irony of this statement is that he had no problem doing the same thing in Hungary when the Ausgleich was passed. The system of representation in Hungary from 1867-1918 was always heavily weighted to suit the needs of the Magyars.

107 Judson, p. 103.


109 Schmerling dominated Parliament and whenever there was opposition to legislation he wished to pass, he would often sidestep the legislative procedure altogether and rely on Paragraph 13 of the Patent which allowed Franz Joseph to ratify legislation without the approval of the Reichsrat.
Archbishop of Prague, who also wanted to see Schmerling’s centralism significantly modified. Their intention was to passively resist Vienna from Prague and there they petitioned the Governor of Bohemia to suggest to Franz Joseph that more regional autonomy would be beneficial as well as Rieger’s demand that the Czech language, the majority language in Bohemia, should be recognized as an administrative language.

Of course the German centralists in Vienna as well as the Germans in Prague and other Bohemian cities vociferously rejected both of these demands. In regard to the first, Schmerling and the Liberals, who often supported him on the issue of rejecting regional autonomy, felt that federalism was a step backwards to some kind of semi-feudal past and also that it could seriously damage the centralized Rechtsstaat that they were in the process of constructing. In regard to language, resistance to Czech demands was met with the usual argument about the cultural superiority of the German language and its central role in the administrative structure of the Empire. To allow another language besides German to be used would only confuse an already complex administrative system. “After all . . . we can never achieve . . . brotherhood among Austria’s nationalities if we can’t even understand what each other is saying,” was the response of Prague University Professor Alois Brinz to the language demands.

Unable to deal with the pressures of both the Liberals, the Austrian federalists and the Hungarians, Schmerling had no choice but to resign in 1865. The next Minister President, Count Richard Belcredi who lasted until 1867 really fared no better. Continued pressure from the Magyars who wanted a return to the 1848 laws regarding the semi-independent status of Hungary, as well as his suspension of the Februarpatent on January 2, 1867, most aggravating to the centralist Germans, proved his undoing. Moreover,

110 On this point, the Czechs made a major mistake. They were under the impression that their absence would paralyse Parliament; they thought that if they stayed away a Parliamentary quorum would not be possible. This was not the case as there were enough German-speaking deputies from Bohemia and Moravia to keep business in Vienna going. This would have been impossible if the Hungarians had refused to sit in Vienna because of the great number of seats they held; Hungary had 120 of the 343 seats. Also, according to Judson, the Poles from Galicia also had the same kind of power because of their complete dominance of the Galician Diet. One thing the Czechs did accomplish was to make the business of Parliament less problematic.

111 Quoted in: Judson, p. 103.
Belcredi underestimated the power of the Germans and felt that he could govern without them if they refused to sit in the Reichsrat. The Slavs were also unwilling to co-operate with Belcredi despite his federalist leanings and his "profound distrust of Hungary," an attitude shared by many Czech leaders. Adding to this already confusing situation was the war fought against the Italians and the Prussians in 1866.

To quite briefly summarize, after a long series of negotiations between Count Ferdinand Beust, Deák and Andrássy, the Austrian Empire now became the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. For the Hungarians, the loss in the war was one of the catalysts which forced Franz Joseph to accept the Hungarian demands which had been continuously voiced in Budapest since the March Laws were revoked in 1849. Deák could hardly contain his excitement: "We lost the war! . . . we are now victorious." The big loser, again, were the non-Polish Slavs, and this was Belcredi's major reservation regarding the compromise. He believed that by not offering the Czechs a similar kind of arrangement, it would alienate them and certainly cause future problems. According to Rieger:

The rights of the imperial house over Bohemia are based on the same principles which it holds over Hungary. There is therefore no serious reason to refuse to Bohemia what has so generously been given to Hungary, that is the recognition of its historic rights and independent status.

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112 Crankshaw, p. 234.
113 I have not up to this point looked at how the wars Franz Joseph fought, and ultimately lost, had an impact on the internal structure of the Empire. I agree that the losses in Lombardy in 1859 as well as the losses in Silesia and Venetia in 1866 were contributing factors to change in the Empire, but to concentrate on them would be beyond the scope of this particular argument. For an interesting discussion on the impact that these wars, and Franz Joseph's foreign policy, had in the eventual demise of the Habsburg Monarchy see: Kohn, H. "Was the Collapse Inevitable?" Austrian History Yearbook, 3 (1967), pp. 250-263.
114 I must admit that I have not included very much about the negotiations which brought about the formation of the Dual-Monarchy, but again, it is not necessary to go into a long-winded discussion of this agreement. Suffice to say, for the purposes of this thesis, the Ausgleich, as we shall see below, strengthened the German position in Austria with the Magyars and the peoples inhabiting the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen being governed from Budapest.
115 Jászi, p. 106.
116 Quoted in Bled, p. 165.
Unfortunately, Rieger’s arguments regarding the legal aspect of the compromise were sound but they fell on deaf ears and Beust defended his decision in terms of Realpolitik:

I am quite aware that the Slav peoples of the Monarchy will view the new policy with mistrust; but the government cannot always be fair to all the nations. Therefore we have to rely on the support of those with the most viability (Lebenskraft) . . . and those are the Germans and Hungarians.117

Even Franz Joseph, who despised any kind of radicalized form of nationalism in his Empire and considered himself an Austrian first and foremost, saw the compromise in terms of a necessary German-Magyar power axis. He expressed this in a ministerial council meeting in February 1867:

I do not conceal from myself . . . that the Slav peoples of the monarchy may look upon the new policies with distrust but the government will never be able to satisfy every national group. This is why we must rely on those which are the strongest . . . that is, the Germans and the Hungarians.118

Despite the increased level of independence and freedom of action they had been granted by Vienna in regard to the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen, the Hungarian political elite in Budapest felt that they had been short-changed. Many felt that Deák and Andrássy had been too hasty in their negotiations and had not secured the best deal for Hungary. The major complaint of the most nationalist Hungarian leaders was that Andrássy had agreed to Franz Joseph’s demand that the Empire have a common Foreign Minister which was out of tune with the March Laws of 1848. They felt that this stipulation, Article 1a of the Austro-Hungarian Constitution, “diminished the Hungarian right to self-government.”119 This complaint was absurd because in all reality Budapest now more or less independently directed almost all legislative policy in Hungary with little interference from the Hofburg and Schönbrunn and virtually none from the Parliament in Vienna. Only the ‘Pragmatic Affairs’ of military expenditure, financial

117 Quoted in Beller, p. 98.
118 Quoted in Bled, p. 152. I also would like to point out that by this time, Franz Joseph realized that under his leadership, the Habsburg Dynasty would not be able to assume leadership in Germany. It became increasingly difficult for him to convince other German leaders of his commitment to German aspirations because of the multi-national complexion of the Empire. Prussia was in a much better position to convince other German Princes that their vision of a united Germany was better for the German Volk.
119 Fichtner, p. 58.
affairs which affected the whole Empire, the aforementioned Foreign Ministry and the Administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1878 required dialogue between both Vienna and Budapest. Moreover, Hungary received favourable conditions in regard to the common Ministries responsible for only 30% of the total imperial expenses.

In essence, with the Magyars free to pursue their own policies in Hungary from the Budapest Parliament, and seemingly removed from meddling in Austrian affairs, the Ausgleich strengthened the position of the Germans in Austria. Moreover, some prominent German Liberals viewed it as a means of avoiding potential Slav unification in the Empire which could eventually put the minority Magyars and Germans on the defensive. President of the lower chamber Moritz Kaiserfeld expressed these sentiments in a letter to his Hungarian peer Agostin Trefort in March of 1866:

> If a general Reichsrat could have been established for the entire monarchy it would have remained a battleground for national hegemony; there could have been no purely political majority in such an institution . . . . In fact, the otherwise geographically and politically disparate Slavs would have used such a Reichsrat as a means to unite and establish their own hegemony over the Empire.

The possibility of this happening at this time was highly unlikely because the number of Slavs with the right to vote and the number of deputies they could send the Parliament was too low to challenge German dominance in Austria.

After the Ausgleich was ratified in the Reichsrat the German Liberals were able to work with Beust to convince Franz Joseph that Austria needed a Constitution. They constituted a majority in the Parliament and were supported by the Poles who were promised a significant degree of autonomy in Galicia and given the understanding that Polish would be the official language in the province. The Germans had no problem giving the Poles what they wanted because of the very small number of Germans living in the province even including military personnel and bureaucrats. Eventually, Franz Joseph acquiesced and accepted the draft of the constitution in December of 1866. The

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120 Unfortunately for the German-Austrians this would not be the case. The Hungarians would subsequently meddle in Austrian affairs especially when it came to granting rights to the Czechs. The Hungarians vehemently argued against any attempts by the Austrian Minister Presidents to even consider granting Bohemia and Moravia a status similar to Hungary in the Dual-Monarchy.

121 Quoted in Judson, p. 108.
*Dezemberverfassung*, as it was often called, allowed the German Liberals to finally set up the kind of centralized state that they wanted and Franz Joseph, despite his mistrust of the liberal ideas, tolerated most of the policies as long as they gave him what he wanted in regard to the military and foreign policy.\(^{122}\) The system was not as democratic as the Liberals probably wanted because the Emperor still chose the Minister President and appointed Ministers. Nonetheless, the Liberals, in their glee, accepted these flaws and were happy “to climb on to the driver’s seat of the state coach.”\(^ {123}\)

This *Bürgerministerium*, as it became known, now embarked on an ambitious programme of modernizing the internal structure of Austria. As Schorske points out:

> The principles and programs which made up the liberal creed were designed to supersede systematically those of the ‘feudals’ . . . . Constitutional monarchy would replace aristocratic absolutism. Science would replace religion [and the] German nationality would serve as the tutor and teacher to bring up the subject peoples, rather than keep them as ignorant bondsman as the feudals had done.\(^ {124}\)

In essence, the German Liberals intended to lead from the centre, Vienna, and distribute the rights and concessions to the lower orders and also the Slavs once they had proven they were deserving of these rewards. Karl Giskra made this quite clear in 1868 when he said: “Just because you were born human beings does not mean that you have any right to vote. You will earn this right [only] when you have a real interest in it, an interest indicated by your payment of direct taxes.”\(^ {125}\) Of course, in the third and fourth *curiae* the majority who paid these taxes were Germans. But, what must be noted is that throughout this period, the German Liberals refused to use nationalist rhetoric as a means of gaining support for their policies because they sincerely believed that what they were doing was beneficial to everyone in Austria.

Unfortunately, for Karl Giskra, Ignaz von Plener, Johann Berger, Leopold Hasner, Rudolf Brestl, Eduard Herbst and their bourgeois supporters, their wonderful ambitions and goals were met with resistance and opposition. This was because their drive towards

\(^{122}\) Beller, p. 102.

\(^{123}\) Taylor, p. 139.

\(^{124}\) Schorske, pp. 116-117.

\(^{125}\) Quoted in Judson, p. 117.
a rational and modern Austria was a frontal assault on long established bases of power in Austria whose members were unwilling to see it simply signed away with new legislation. The Nobility, especially the great landlords, the Church and the bureaucracy made life for the Liberals very difficult. Moreover, the Emperor had the ear of the first two groups which Minister President Prince Karl Auersperg’s good liberal Doctors had attacked. If anything, Franz Joseph’s attitude towards the new cabinet was aloof and, some might suggest, icy which led Plener to sadly conclude: “how little His Majesty agrees with the new laws . . . and how little he actually sympathizes with his present government.”

The Emperor’s tacit approval of Beust and Taaffe’s negotiations with the Czechs regarding a possible federalist compromise angered the Liberals and further weakened their position.

Another disappointment for the Liberals were those Articles of the Constitution, which they believed would maintain their position, and at the same time convince the people that they should support them in the future. This would eventually have the opposite effect and kick them off the driver’s seat of the state coach. Unfortunately, these legal guarantees opened the door to a proliferation of associations and newspapers that were not always kind to what the Liberals were trying to construct in Austria. In essence, opposition from below began to increase as their term continued. Demonstrations in the capital regarding extension of the franchise to the workers were met by refusal from the Liberals, especially from Interior Minister Giskra, who encouraged them to form self-help societies to reach political maturity and economic self-

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126 For a good outline of the power the Catholic Church had in Austria see: Jászi, pp. 155-161. He convincingly argues that after the Army, the Church was the most solid pillar of the Dynasty. Personally, I agree that the Church was a strong pillar. But I believe that the bureaucracy was what kept Austria functioning as long as it did especially in the last decade before the war when Parliament was at a standstill and Minister Presidents relied on Law 14 to rule by decree.

127 Quoted in Judson, p. 134. Plener made this comment after an episode when Franz Joseph commuted the sentence of the Bishop of Linz for inciting opposition to the government. The incident revolved around the so-called May Laws of 1868 which secularized education and marriage. The Church saw this legally as a violation of the Concordat signed in 1855 but in all reality an attack on their traditional bases of power and influence. This Bishop, Francis Joseph Rudigier, published pamphlets and used the pulpit to openly condemn the government. To be certain he was not the only one engaged in such activities indicating that the Liberals had a difficult battle ahead of them in trying to convince the people that liberalism should be supported.

128 The Austrian Constitution, quoted in: Fichtner, p. 155. The specific Articles were 12 and 13.
sufficiency. Like the Nobility and the Church, the people viewed some of the changes the Bürgерministerium made as far too radical and upsetting to their traditional patterns of life. And it would not be much of a stretch to presume that many people were influenced by their local Clergyman or Landlord that liberal ideas were those of ‘Godless’ devils in Vienna.

The other Article that would haunt the Liberals, and the Germans in general in the future, was number 19 and when used in conjunction with the other Articles of the Constitution it proved to be the most troublesome in the subsequent political developments in Austria. The Article had idealistic origins but at the same time it exposed German naivety about what Slav leaders were hoping to achieve in the future: specifically the Czechs who had a well defined national program by this time that aspired to achieve regional autonomy for Bohemia. This specific clause concentrated on the language issue and confirmed the equality of all of the languages in Austria in education, public offices and public life. What the German Liberals hoped this article would accomplish was that the educational development of the lower orders in German and non-German areas would convince them that the goals that they were trying to achieve would benefit them in the future. The ultimate liberal objective was to educate away centuries of superstition, fear and ignorance which would then lead to the acceptance of a rational and centralized Austria. Judson concludes that


130 The exact wording of Article 19 is as follows: All the races of the State shall have equal rights, and each race shall have the inviolable right of maintaining and cultivating its nationality and language. The state recognizes the equality of the various languages in the schools, public offices and public life. In the countries populated by several races, the institutions of public instruction shall be so organized that each race may receive the necessary instruction in its own language, without being obliged to learn a second language. Quoted in: Fichtner, p. 156.
Teaching individuals to free themselves from the grasp of religious, localist, and nationalist interests would diminish the dangerous influence of those forms of difference and introduce citizens to liberal, universalist principles of tolerance. Eventually the schools might even imbue children with a specifically Austrian identity, one completely free from the trammels of nationalism and localism.\footnote{Judson, p. 141.}

However, the rights extended to the Czechs in the Constitution had the opposite effect and they prompted the Czech leaders to be more aggressive in their demands. Nothing short of a Bohemian *Ausgleich* would convince them to co-operate with the Germans in Vienna; they had little faith in German goodwill.\footnote{Taylor, p. 142.}

In this politically charged atmosphere, the German Liberals found that they were increasingly under attack. The Cabinets of Baron Alfred Potocki and Count Karl Hohenwart in 1870 and 1871 both attempted to create a compromise with the Czechs. The Liberals rejected these attempts at federalist solutions and they angered Franz Joseph who “turned his back on German liberals and German centrists alike and brought into being a brand new Ministry of unknown men with a federalistic turn of mind whose main purpose was to reach a working agreement with the Czechs.”\footnote{Crankshaw, p. 253. Although this book may be a little dated, many of his conclusions are still valid especially regarding the thorny relationship between Franz Joseph and the liberals.} In essence, federalism was seen as a serious challenge to what the Liberals had accomplished after 1868 but even more disturbing for the Germans was that what Potocki and Hohenwart wanted to achieve had the potential of significantly reducing German power in Bohemia and Moravia and, by extension, in Austria as a whole. Dr. Albert Schäffle’s *Fundamentalartikeln*, labelled the Destructive Articles in Vienna, had serious implications because a planned bilingual administration would have significantly reduced the German control in Bohemia.\footnote{Jászi, p. 113.} However, the attempts failed because the Liberals were still able to muster enough influence to defeat it. One important point to notice here is that their reaction to these articles foreshadowed their eventual use of nationalist...
rhetoric both in the press and the Reichsrat to win support. Also, the Hungarians rejected the notion of a Bohemian Ausgleich which would have required their acceptance before it became law.

For now, the Germans maintained their hegemony in Austrian affairs. The Ministry of Prince Adolf Auersperg, the Doktorministerium, which lasted from 1871 to 1878, was a mix of parliamentarians and liberal-minded bureaucrats, but it relied on the Liberals for support. Moreover, the electoral reforms of 1873 helped also to solidify the German hold on power because now deputies would be elected directly rather than through the regional Diets. This was despite the stock market crash in May of 1873 and accusations of corruption and graft which made people question the integrity of the Liberal leaders. Karl Giskra even had the audacity to defend his acceptance of 100,000 florins with the statement: “in Austria it is customary to accept gratuities.”

However, the days of the Liberals in power were numbered, and by 1879 they found that they were knocked off the driver’s seat of the state coach. The demise of the Liberals and their control of centralized German Austria was sealed with their opposition to external events. In 1878, following the Russo-Turkish War, the Treaty of Berlin gave Austria-Hungary the right to occupy and administer the two Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. For Franz Joseph this was to be a victory to end a nasty string of defeats in Italy and Germany. When 112 Liberals defiantly voted against the ratification of the Berlin Treaty in January 1879 he reacted

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136 Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries, p. 141. See also Taylor, pp. 144-148. The potential establishment of this Bohemian-Moravian-Silesian Diet was disturbing for the Hungarians because it would have reduced their power and influence in Imperial affairs and had the potential of awakening the non-Magyar nations in Hungary to demand a similar arrangement for themselves. Moreover, Hungarian leaders had to reject this proposal for fear of angering the Magyars, many of whom were still unconvinced that the Ausgleich had been the best deal for Hungary. Fortunately, they were able to argue, successfully, that this arrangement was illegal under the parameters of the 1867 compromise.
137 In the election, the liberal parties and their supporters numbered 228 against 125 for the opposition groups of which 33 were Czechs who still refused to sit in the Reichsrat.
138 Quoted in Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries, p. 182.
angrily. This was the final straw; previously he had at best tolerated the Liberals but with this incursion into his sacred domain of foreign policy they were doomed. Unaware that they had provoked the Emperor, Liberal leaders were under the assumption that they would be summoned to the Hofburg and requested to form a new cabinet with Auersperg’s resignation. However, Taaffe had other plans because “as Interior Minister, he had already arranged the return of the Czechs to active parliamentary politics” in order to defeat the Liberals whom Franz Joseph wanted out.139 With the support of the Emperor, a long time friend, he convinced the Czechs, the Poles and prominent members of the landowner curia to support him. Moreover, the Liberals were a fragmented party by the late 1870s and this played into Taaffe’s hands. With his appointment as Minister President in 1879, the German Liberals lost their supremacy in the Reichsrat and were forced to abandon their former ideals and change their political rhetoric to save their political lives and German hegemony in Austria: a negative defensive German nationalism would replace the German-led drive for a cohesive Austrian identity and develop into a centrifugal nationalistic force in Austria.

**Taaffe’s Iron Ring and the Germans: the Genesis of Defensive German Nationalism.**

Upon his confirmation as Minister President by Franz Joseph, Taaffe made it clear what he intended to accomplish. First, in defiance of the centrist Liberals, he spoke of himself as a Kaiserminister and in such a position he would follow the will of the Emperor. This was disturbing because it indicated that the Parliamentary institution could be bypassed and with it opposition to any future legislation in Austria. But even more disturbing for the Liberals was that Taaffe’s Kaiserministerium wished to accomplish what other Ministers before him had been unable to do: he wanted to put an end to the national squabbling and create good loyal ‘Austrian’ citizens. In his mind the best way to achieve this goal was to equalize the power among the nationalities in Austria and his vision was shared by the Emperor and his inner circle, especially the Kronprinz Rudolf who confided in Moriz Szeps, the editor of the liberal oriented Neues Wiener Tagblatt, that a better arrangement for the Slavs in the Monarchy as well as a revised Ausgleich

139 Beller, p. 112.
would benefit the Dual Monarchy in the future. Taaffe declared: "None of the various nationalities is to obtain decisive predominance." 

It is not difficult to see who the losers were going to be in Taaffe’s system if the existing structure was to be adjusted to better accommodate the interests of the various nationalities in Austria. What we shall see in the following pages is that in reaction to Taaffe’s policies, especially those that concerned Bohemia and Moravia, German nationalism started to become a fundamental plank in the rhetoric of the German political parties. They believed that it was the best way to convince the people that something they had so long taken for granted, German dominance in Austria, was in danger of being lost as Taaffe opened the doors for more Czech involvement in politics and in spheres that had previously been administered almost exclusively by Germans. To accomplish this they had to invent something that many, for the most part, had been unaware of, a German national identity in Austria which was different from, and superior to, the other nationalities in Austria.

True to his word, Taaffe immediately began to pass legislation which fit his vision for the future development in Austria and challenged the liberal centralized Rechtsstaat which rested on German hegemony. In April 1880, the Stremayr Ordinances were passed and with it came a German reaction that would be repeated throughout Taaffe’s fourteen years as Minister President. The Ordinances proposed by Dr. Karl von Stremayr in 1879, made Czech an official administrative language (Landessprache) in Bohemia and Moravia rather than just an ‘in-use’ (landesüblich) language. They were functional because they would allow Czechs to conduct business with the government in their own language, but their passage was also a reward to the Czechs for their support of Taaffe in the Reichsrat. The German reaction in Vienna against the Ordinances was swift because they were considered a challenge to the dominance of the German language in the civil

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141 Taylor, p. 156.
service despite the fact that all business conducted between imperial bureaucrats was to remain German.¹⁴² Eduard Herbst and Count Wurmbrand then put forward a resolution designed to terminate these language compromises and make German, de jure not just de facto, the administrative language for all of Austria, but the motion was defeated.¹⁴³

In 1882, Taaffe enacted further legislation which caused the German Liberals concern. He made changes in the voting arrangements in both the Bohemian Diet and the Reichsrat which were intended to act as levellers for the Czechs and also to reduce Liberal representation in both bodies. The curia system in the Bohemian Diet was reformed, which transformed a “hitherto German majority [into] a predominantly Czech majority.”¹⁴⁴ He then lowered the direct tax qualification for Austrian elections from ten guilden to five guilden. The intention of this was to enfranchise small businessmen, framers and artisans who had not been satisfied with the laissez faire of the Liberals in the 1870s. Moreover, the changes also enfranchised more Czechs than Germans in Bohemia and Moravia who would, he hoped, support his Czech political allies and reject German liberal politics.

Believing that Taaffe would continue to enact changes which would further facilitate a decline of German dominance in Bohemia and Moravia, German political leaders, many of whom were from these two provinces,¹⁴⁵ mobilized their resources to create a discourse extolling the virtues and specific attributes of being part of the German community.¹⁴⁶ Many Liberal leaders now became more receptive to using a nationalist based discourse to challenge the Government and win support from the newly enfranchised voters which, as mentioned above, they had avoided in the 1860s and 1870s.

¹⁴² Beller, p. 122. ¹⁴³ In fact, it was one of the closest votes on anything during Taaffe’s Ministry. ¹⁴⁴ Beller, p. 123 ¹⁴⁵ Prominent German Liberals who were from Bohemia and Moravia included Karl Giskra, Ernst von Plener and Heinrich Friedjung, a contributor to the Linz Programme which will be discussed below. ¹⁴⁶ For an excellent argument of this change in Liberal political rhetoric see: Judson, P.M. “‘Not Another Square Foot!’ German Liberalism and the Rhetoric of National Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Austria.” Austrian History Yearbook. 26, (1995), pp. 83-97.
German Liberal strategies included a buttressing of the political associations that had been established in the late 1860s. This is where the German political leaders began to use the term *Nationalbesitzstand* to convince the people of the imminent dangers of Taaffe’s system against the German people’s rightful and privileged position in Austria *vis-à-vis* the other nationalities.¹⁴⁷ One of the most successful of these voluntary associations which carried a German national message was the *Deutscher Schulverein* established in 1880 by Engelbert Pernerstдорfer. This association was again a defensive reaction to recent changes and its *raison d’être* was to establish and maintain German language schools in border areas where German was a minority language. The success of this organization was phenomenal with 980 branches and 107,835 members by 1886 with the vast majority being in Bohemia and Moravia, (570).¹⁴⁸ This trend became quite common among the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia. Other associations which trumpeted the new nationalist line promoted by the Liberals included the *Böhmerwaldbund* and the *Bund der Deutschen Nordmährens* who employed the slogan: ‘Not Another Square Foot’ which symbolically represented their resistance to Czech incursions on their claim to ownership in Moravia.¹⁴⁹ Reaction of a defensive nature also included the release of the so-called pan-German Linz Programme in 1882, which, among other things, demanded that German be the official language of the military, representative bodies and public offices and further insisted that anybody in public office be fluent in German.¹⁵⁰

Unfortunately for the German nationalist politicians, who united to form the *Vereinigte Deutsche Linke* as an oppositional front to the ‘Iron Ring’, these declarations and associations failed to impress Taaffe or force him to reconsider his policies.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 84.
¹⁵⁰ This document never became the official document of the German Liberals in reaction to Taaffe because in its final form Georg von Schönerer insisted on the anti-Jewish paragraph which disturbed others who had been involved in its original formulation including future Socialist leader Viktor Adler and Engelbert Pernerstдорfer, creator of the *Deutscher Schulverein* and editor of the nationalist journal *Deutsche Worte*. However, for the purposes of this paper it confirms the development of the defensive nature of German nationalism.
Moreover, despite the numbers in the various German clubs and associations, which could have provided grass roots opposition, Taaffe and his Ministers passed legislation intended to stifle potential opposition from these associations and satisfy the people in order to maintain their support. These included better labour laws, insurance acts and other state financed welfare programmes. The other reason for these programmes was to head off the rise of the Socialists, who were banned in 1886 but still managed to maintain a substantial underground network and excellent leadership under Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner.

Continued fears that Taaffe intended to make Bohemia a completely Czech province forced the Germans to accept fate and try to see what they could salvage with a Bohemian compromise which was in conflict with their previous rhetoric which demanded a centralized Austria. The negotiations were held between the German Liberals and the Old Czechs and the premise was to divide Bohemia into German and Czech speaking areas. "In Czech Bohemia let them do as they like; in German Bohemia we shall do as we like," was the German understanding of this compromise. How it could have been achieved in areas with significant German populations, such as Budweis, Pilsen and even Prague, never really seemed to have been a concern. In short, the negotiations came to nothing because of opposition from both Czech and German radical politicians. The strongest opposition came from the Young Czechs who capitalized on Czech antipathy to the compromise, and they soundly defeated the Old Czechs in the 1891 elections and renewed their efforts to make Bohemia exclusively Czech much to the chagrin of German leaders.

Unable to hold the 'Iron Ring' together, largely because of proposed electoral reform which all groups opposed, Taaffe was dismissed by Franz Joseph in November 1893 and replaced by Prince Albert Windischgrätz whose Ministry accomplished little

152 Taylor, p. 163.  
153 The Germans made it quite clear that they would not give up Prague despite the fact that by 1890 they were a very small minority which became even smaller with the incorporation of the suburbs after 1891. See Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival.
and lasted only sixteen months. Following his resignation, Franz Joseph appointed another noble friend as Minister President, a Pole from Galicia, Count Kasimir Badeni. Badeni, like Taaffe, felt that he could solve the national problems and that his successes in Galicia were experience enough. However, Galicia was not Bohemia, Moravia or Lower Austria. In this province, the Ruthenian challenge to Polish hegemony was incredibly weak and their national ‘awakening’ was still in a very primary stage of development; it was quite easy to quell grumbling peasants led by a maverick priest. His solution to equalize affairs in Austria, which was hastily and inadequately planned and badly executed, was to pass the Sprachverordnung in April of 1897, which decreed that both German and Czech would be the languages of the inner service. The ordinances required that matters brought before government officials should be conducted in the language in which they were submitted. Moreover, by 1903, no one was to be appointed to a government position until they passed an examination in Czech. For the Czechs the bilingual nature of the ordinances were not a difficult hurdle considering that most educated Czechs learned German because it offered a chance at upward mobility. The case for the Germans was the opposite as few Germans bothered to learn Czech.

This was a serious blow to the Germans and this further radicalized German nationalism. Reaction was swift because “German leaders were stunned, believing that the form in which the new regulations had emerged represented a betrayal of the Premier’s earlier assurances that their traditional position of ‘first among equals’ would be respected.” On the front page of the April 18, 1897 issue of Kikeriki following, a very concerned Kikeriki, standing in front of Badeni’s Easter present, issued the warning of what was now coming to Vienna, the Czech allegorical equivalent of the German Michel: Wenzel! This was the point when the battle spilled out of the Reichsrat and erupted in Vienna as middle class citizens demonstrated against the ordinances. Previously, the Germans in Vienna had not been overly concerned with national battles in Bohemia and Moravia, but now they became increasingly receptive to nationally charged

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154 Strangely, Badeni did not feel that this type of equalization was necessary in Galicia for the Ruthenians considering that since 1869 Polish was the normal language of government.

155 Whiteside, p. 162.

156 Kikeriki, April 18, 1897, p. 1.
Badeni's Easter egg. Yes, yes! Wenzel is coming, Wenzel is coming!
rhetoric. The Czech threat was on the doorstep; it had to be met and defeated. In the words of Liberal Theodor Mommsen: "The brain of the Czechs does not understand reason, but it understands blows. This is a struggle of life and death."\textsuperscript{157} The Capital would be defended and rid of any Czech influence.

**Conclusions.**

What the evidence above has attempted to show is that the development of German nationalism was a response to what the German speaking leaders including Giskra, von Plener, Herbst, Count Wurmbrand, Pernerstdorfer Schönerer, and even Adler in the early 1880s, among others, considered encroachments on their perceived sacred rights as the dominant nation in Austria - historic rights that had existed from Maria Theresa and Joseph II. What we have seen is that the Liberals, once driven from power in the 1880s, re-evaluated their position and incorporated nationalist rhetoric into their appeals for voter support. For them, Taaffe’s Ministry implemented policies through parliamentary manipulation, or occasionally through the exercise of law 14,\textsuperscript{158} which unjustly eroded their political, economic and cultural hegemony. German political leaders, nationalist members of the intelligentsia and, later, the middle and lower levels of the bourgeoisie interpreted the liberalisation of language laws and the extensions of the franchise in 1882 and changes to the Bohemian Diet as beneficial to the Czechs and detrimental to their continued political and social hegemony in Austria. For example, changes opened the doors for Czechs in the civil service which had previously been the exclusive realm of German speakers and as Beller rightly concludes: "In Cisleithania Taaffe’s Iron Ring system had severely undermined the position of the Germans as the state people [and] German interests were on the defensive, and [they] had lost their clear political hegemony."\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{157} Quoted in Taylor, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{158} I have not discussed law 14 in detail and how the Germans often complained in Parliament that it was used far too often to solve deadlocks especially about government expenditure on military projects.
\textsuperscript{159} Beller, pp. 126-127.
We have also seen that as Taaffe attacked the *Deutschtum* of Austria and, simultaneously, the German *Besitzstand*, the German Liberal leaders broadened their appeal. As Cohen rightly concludes: “the older national liberal formations radicalized their own nationalist programs to keep or win constituents.”^160^ They did this in opposition to the ‘Iron Ring’ and by founding and supporting clubs and associations which worked to defend German hegemony. Previously, because of the restrictions on who could vote, the battle was fought at a level above the vast majority of society: a battle fought by the German middle class intelligentsia against an increasingly confident Czech middle class intelligentsia and their federalist noble allies. Now the German leaders appealed to a wider community as they became players in the political game when the franchise was extended and the curia system, which had heavily favoured the Germans, was amended.

What we shall see in the next chapter is the changes proposed by Badeni brought the battle to Vienna. The Germans now made their last stand, so to speak, and if complete control of Austria had been reduced, then they would maintain power in the capital. Vienna would be the German stronghold and the place to launch their attacks against the Slavs, especially the Czechs, in a bid to hold onto power in Austria.

Chapter 4. Anti-Czech German Nationalism in Vienna.

Es braust ein Ruf wie Donnerhall
Badeni sitzt im Schweinenestall.
Da ruft der deutsche Wolf hinein:
Badeni, du bist ein grosses Schwein!161

(It roars a sound like thunder
As Badeni sits in the pig pen.
The German Wolf calls to him:
Badeni, you are a big pig!)

This little song, sung to the tune of Wacht am Rhein,162 which became very popular among German speaking children, shows how quickly the negative German reaction to Badeni developed and spread. These language ordinances, proposed by a Slav, a Pole, from the ‘backwoods’ of Galicia which had the potential of completely leaving Bohemia in the hands of the Czech majority, was immediately seized by the Germans as an indicator that they were again under attack. Rather than accepting these changes, the Germans believed that these particular ordinances had the potential of being far more damaging to the German Besitzstand than the ‘levelling’ legislation passed by Taaffe during his fourteen years as Minister President and they reacted accordingly. Badeni was immediately under attack in the Reichsrat by most members of the German parties, except Schönerer’s, who formed a loose alliance, the Gemeinbürgschaft, to challenge the Sprachverordnung, even those not from the danger zones of Bohemia and Moravia.163 In that venerable institution of Austrian democracy, the Reichsrat, German representatives hung cards on their desks that displayed nasty epithets against Badeni including: “Government flunkey, Polish horse trader, bootblack, Polack swindler, among others.”164

161 Quoted in Bahm, K. “Beyond the Bourgeoisie: Rethinking Nation, Culture, and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Central Europe.” Austrian History Yearbook. (29, 1998), p. 30. The Wolf referred to in the poem was Karl Hermann Wolf, leader of the German Radical Party who distinguished himself during the Badeni crisis as a defender of German interests in the Sudeten area, where his seat in parliament was from, in the Bohemian Diet and also in Vienna where he made it known that the Czechs were the main enemy of the Germans. See, Hamann, pp.261-293.
162 Wacht am Rhein was the song often sung by the German nationalists in Vienna at their meetings, rallies and pilgrimages to sacred German sights in Lower Austria. They also incorporated pieces from Wagner’s operas to emphasize their Germanness and also for dramatic effect. Originally this song was sung by the German nationalists who wanted to cast off Galicia, Dalmatia and Hungary and join the Hohenzollern Reich.
163 Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries, p. 257. One of their achievements was the creation of the Whitsun Program in 1899, which laid out the language demands of the Germans.
In this short chapter, it will be seen that anti-Czech feelings did exist in Vienna prior to 1897, but they were largely confined to pan-Germanist fringe organizations and German student organizations. Moreover, these sentiments did not penetrate into the psyche of the majority of the population because they felt that liberalism and its connection to capitalism, and the Jews, in all their manifestations as money and stock exchange Jews, press Jews, ink Jews and beggar Jews, who represented everything evil to Catholic Vienna,\textsuperscript{165} were more problematic to their everyday survival in the Capital. In essence, conflict and tension in Vienna were largely class-based and anti-Semitic rather than nation-based. But, what we shall see is that the Badeni \textit{Sprachverordnung} became the catalyst which awakened the Germans in Vienna to the threat that the Czechs posed to them in the Capital and Austria. It led many of the German political leaders in Vienna, particularly the pan-German leaders, to incorporate a nationalized rhetoric and the Czech minority became the target of their campaign which would eventually influence the political rhetoric of the Christian Socials and the Socialists. As Whiteside rightly concludes: "They [the pan-German politicians] bent all their energies towards arousing the fears of the masses that a great calamity was about to engulf them."\textsuperscript{166}

\textbf{Concerns in Vienna before Badeni.}

Prior to the mid-1890s, Vienna and municipal politics were largely unaffected by the national conflicts that were taking place between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and Moravia and between the Slovenes and Germans in Styria and Carniola. As mentioned, the population had more immediate concerns to worry about than problems which seemed too far away from them to affect their everyday existence. For many of the lower orders, finding adequate housing, employment, over-taxation and avoiding the dreaded Vienna disease, tuberculosis, were their prime concerns and in the 1870s and 1880s they laid the blame for their plight on the Liberals and the 'Stock Exchange' and 'Railway'\textsuperscript{167} Jews who were perceived to be their main supporters.

\textsuperscript{165} Hamann, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{166} Whiteside, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{167} The term 'Railway' Jews became a popular derogatory tag during the \textit{Nordbahn} affair in 1884-1885 when German politicians called for the nationalization of the ostentatiously named
The chronic shortage of adequate shelter was a major problem in Vienna in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. As the population ballooned, as a result of increasing migration and the inclusion of the suburbs in 1890 by the Governor of Lower Austria, Count Erich Kielmansegg, it became increasingly difficult to build enough housing in the outer districts of the city to meet the demand. Moreover, the houses that were built were often shabby affairs with very primitive facilities and overcrowded. As Ilse Barea notes:

Most of the houses . . . had three floors. On each floor, a corridor would run along the rear wall facing a small courtyard [and] none of the tenants had a water closet or privy of his own; ten or fourteen tenants with their families would share one, either in the passage or across the yard. If there was running water the tap too was in the corridor. Otherwise it would be a pump in the yard.

One contemporary observer was disgusted at the overcrowding in the workers districts of Favoriten, Ottakring, Hernals, Meidling and Brigittenau noting that a flat in these areas was home to from four to fifty-two people. Moreover, the shortage of housing led to the proliferation of the Bettgeher or Schlafgeher who would pay to sleep in a bed for eight hours after shifts but not allowed further access to the flat.

In addition to these horrible conditions, rents were incredibly expensive, even in these shared flats with one fifth of a man’s wages going to the landlord. Because of this situation, the landlords became the enemies of the poor, and it created resentment.

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Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway. Politicians wanted this line, which was very profitable, to be taken from the private control of the Baron Rothschild whom they accused of inflating prices, and returned to the public ownership.

Between 1860 and 1900 the population grew by an incredible 259 percent and only Berlin had a larger increase at 281 percent in the same years.

Barea, p. 336. The housing situation in the working class districts did not significantly improve in the years leading up to the First World War. For an excellent essay that investigates the continuing problems in Vienna see: Maderthaner, W. and Musner, L. “Vorstadt-die enten Gründ der Moderne.” Jahrbuch des Vereins für Geschichte der Stadt Wien. 52-53, (1996-97), pp. 195-228. Only after the war did the housing situation improve when the Social Democrats took control of the city council and embarked on an ambitious campaign of constructing social housing in the outer districts with such names as: Viktor Adler Hof, Lassallerhof, Jean Jaurez Hof, Karl Marx Hof, and George Washington Hof among others. These housing developments still exist and are masterpieces of modernism and quite impressive displays of positive government action to solve the problem of providing adequate and affordable shelter.

Jenks, p. 37.

Hamann, p. 139.

Powell, p. 19.
among the people against these liberal capitalists and the Jews who were reported by the anti-Semitic press to be the largest land speculators in the city; a charge that was false. Moreover, the press included sensational stories about families being thrown onto the street by the evil landlords who cared little for their plight since they lived in villas near the vineyards of Grinzing or Hietzing. One solace for the working class is that they could find a warm place to sit in the back room of one of the many cafes and taverns that dotted the streets. These reading rooms were often supported by some anti-liberal political organization whose cadres educated them about municipal and national politics.

Rent increases and taxation also became problematic for people in Vienna who were members of the petty-bourgeoisie and they also blamed the Liberals and the Jews for their deteriorating situation. Like the poor, many were forced to accept renters and cut back on their expenses to pay the rent. Liberalism had held out the promise that adherence to a capitalistic system would benefit them in the future and because it failed to do so, many of the petty-bourgeoisie looked to a different political ideology which would be more responsive to their plight. In the late 1880s they became receptive to the Mayor, Karl Lueger, who increasingly rejected his liberal roots and now “appeared in the role of David against the mighty Goliath of ‘international capital.’” It was this lower-middle class who would become the biggest supporters of his Christian Social movement when it formed in 1889.

This very brief outline indicates that the population of Vienna exhibited a class-based and anti-Semitic agenda against the prevailing situation in the Capital. Housing, food and jobs, in essence survival, were their prime political motivations. And these problems became more pressing as the city’s population expanded at a fantastic rate in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Although national tension in Vienna was not in the foreground, the possibility of an eventual explosion loomed in the background

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173 Hamann, p. 138.
174 Schorske, Fin de Siècle Vienna, p. 138.
175 It is interesting to note that Lueger did not start the Christian Social Party. The movement was founded by Baron Karl von Vogelsang, a Prussian Lutheran who had converted to Catholicism, in 1887 when he started the Christian Social Club. But as Jenks, Schorske, Geehr and others have concluded, Christian Socialism after 1890 was Karl Lueger. See also: Powell, p. 21.
because of the large number of migrants coming to the Capital, the vast majority of whom were Czechs, who represented competition for jobs and housing. Until Badeni, the Jewish migrants who largely settled in Leopoldstadt and the Jewish population in Vienna, which increased to around 118,500 in 1900, were viewed as the major pariahs in Vienna by politicians and the people.\textsuperscript{176} But as we shall see, as German nationalism manifested itself more prominently in Vienna after 1897, the Czechs began to rival the Jews as the objects of nationalist hatred.

\textbf{The Seeds of German Nationalism in Vienna.}

It must be noted that German nationalism was not as spontaneous a development in Vienna as may be concluded from what has been presented above. One of the initial points where German nationalism found an outlet was at the University as early as the 1848 Revolution. Reacting to the Frankfurt Parliament the Burschenschaften clubs that incorporated ancient German names including Teutonia, Saxonia, and Walhalla were receptive to the notion of a great and unified Greater Germany and consumed with German Völkish ideology\textsuperscript{177} and committed to the notion that the University in Vienna would remain an exclusively German institution. However, for the most part, their activities were limited and, despite the relaxation of the rules governing freedom of association in 1859 and later in 1867 their influence beyond the University was minimal. Moreover, the Liberals passed laws according to which the continued existence of these "societies would only be permitted if they were non-political and not organized for any illegal purpose or for any activity that endangered the country's security."\textsuperscript{178} It must be noted that these restrictions were mainly in place to limit their dissemination of pro-Hohenzollern sentiments which Liberal leaders knew Franz Joseph increasingly distrusted after the defeat at Königgrätz in 1866.\textsuperscript{179} Even though they did not have the resources to extend their nationalist ideology, some of these student activists would become politically active after their university days, and some would reject classic liberal

\textsuperscript{176} See Hamann, pp. 325-359.
\textsuperscript{177} Whiteside, pp. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., pp. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{179} Hamann, p. 95.
ideals and become active German national leaders in the days of Taaffe and then to lead the fight against the Czechs.

One of the characters who reacted against his old liberal ideology and had the ability to disseminate a defensive form of German nationalism in the 1870s and 1880s was Georg Ritter von Schönerer. His reaction endeared him to a group of young university intellectuals who “adopted him as their parliamentary representative”\(^\text{180}\) for his challenge to the *Alten*.\(^\text{181}\) He was a fine orator and street fighter of the highest order which made him popular with many who saw him as the representative for the little man. In the 1870s and 1880s, Schönerer’s speeches were largely comprised of pan-Germanist and anti-Semitic sentiments, but increasingly he was indoctrinating his followers about the threat of the Czechs both to Austria and Vienna which was a reflection of what he had proposed in the 1882 Linz Programme. In a speech he gave at the *Politisch-Favoritner Bürgerverein*, Political Citizen’s Club of Favoriten, in March of 1885 just after the creation of his new party, *Verband der Deutschnationalen*, Party of German Nationalists, he attacked both the Jews and their Liberal lackeys, while outlining his party’s platform, and also attacked the Slavs, specifically the Czechs, who would eventually ruin the German-Austrian workers economically.\(^\text{182}\) What is also interesting to note about this particular speech is the location where it was given: Favoriten, Vienna’s tenth district which had the highest number of Czech speakers in the city.

\(^{180}\) Schorske, *Fin de Siècle Vienna*, p. 126.

\(^{181}\) The *Alten* alluded to here were the traditional Liberals who were vital in creating the constitutional *Rechtsstaat* discussed in the preceding chapter. In the late 1860s, their classic liberal ideology was being challenged by a younger more dynamic group of University intellectuals who became known as the *Jungen*. For an excellent summary of the battle between the two groups see: Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*, pp. 167-174.

\(^{182}\) Whiteside, p. 115. The second and fourth points of the platform indicate that the battle against the Slavs in Vienna needed to be more vigilant. They were as follows: 2. Opposition to the excrescences of Capitalism and to the de-Germanization of the city of Vienna; 4. Doing away with cosmopolitan politeness towards medium-sized and smaller nationalities. In essence, the government needed to make it clear that the Czechs and other Slavs must accept German dominance in Vienna and Austria.
After a brief stint in jail, five years exclusion from politics and the retraction of his noble title, Schönerer continued his diatribes against everything that was, in his opinion, non-German. Fortunately for him, Badeni provided him with new ammunition to continue his destructive nationally charged oratory in the Reichsrat and it spilled into meeting halls in Vienna where he was often enthusiastically received. However, after his brief moment of fame in the immediate wake of the Badeni Ordinances, he became a more comic figure and his party drifted into obscurity into the ultra-radical margins of political life in Vienna and Austria. We can see indications of his fall as early as 1899. The following cartoon, published in January in the satirical journal Kikeriki, which we shall see was sympathetic to German nationalist rhetoric in the Austrian context, attacked and ridiculed Schönerer’s anti-Catholic, and by extension anti-Habsburg, beliefs and his celebrated love of the bottle.

Figure 2: Kikeriki, January 26, 1899, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Away from Rome – Yes! Away from Rum – Never!

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This was because of his assault against the editors of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt in March of 1888 when he and a group of followers smashed up the offices because the paper had the audacity to pronounce Wilhelm II’s death a few hours too early. The problem for Schönerer was that this paper was edited by Moritz Szeps who was, as we have seen, a close confidant of Crown Prince Rudolf.
The problem was that his rhetoric, despite being widely respected by some politically conscious peasants and urban workers, represented something that the mass of the people found distasteful. As Whiteside concludes: "Most peasants were anti-capitalistic, anti-liberal and anti-Semitic, but were repelled by pan-German agnosticism, anti-clericalism and repudiation of the venerated emperor."185 Also disturbing to many people was his insistence that German in Vienna be 'purified' which meant that popular Viennese expressions like 'Servus' and 'Prost' were to replaced by the Old Germanic 'Heil.'186 Nonetheless, he played an important part in raising the profile of the Czech threat to the city of Vienna and contributing to the intensification of the reaction against the Czech minority in the city.

Probably the most important political figure in Vienna from the mid-1880s until his death in 1910 was Karl Lueger and his Christian Social Party. Although unwilling to appeal to nationalist sentiment early in his career, he would play a key role in transforming the class-based and anti-Semitic battle in Vienna to a conflict that moved the Czech-German battle from the lower house of the Reichsrat to the foreground in the Rathaus and onto the streets of Vienna.

Although he was originally a Liberal like Schönerer, Lueger was also a very astute Viennese politician with a keen ear to what the people in his Vienna saw as their main problems. Increasingly he made it known that he rejected liberal policies and lobbied for the extension of the franchise in Vienna to include the five-guilden men. Once this law was passed in 1885, Lueger was on the rise and he saw his goal, the mayorality of Vienna, in sight. As Beller argues, he was successful because he "employed a scapegoating, anti-Semitic demagoguery which resonated with many sectors of Viennese society, especially - but not only - among the economically squeezed urban

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184 Kikeriki, January 26, 1899, p. 3.
185 Whiteside, p. 127. One of the major problems for Schönerer was his anti-Catholic views which were out of tune with the majority of people in Austria, Germans, Italians and Slavs alike. As Powell concludes: "During the final decades of the nineteenth century Catholicism exercised a strong influence on public life . . . . On Sundays the churches were full to overflowing as they had not been for a generation." See Powell, p. 21.
186 Hamann, p. 244.
At this time the Jews were represented as the major problem in Vienna and he used the slogan "Greater Vienna must not turn into Greater Jerusalem" which struck a receptive cord with a wide range of people in Vienna. Moreover, as pointed out in chapter two, he also appealed to the Czechs who could vote indicating that the struggle between nations in Vienna was at best a secondary concern.

Lueger dominated the Rathaus in Vienna and continued his invective against the Jews and, by default, the Liberals into the 1890s in the city council. In 1895, he managed to capture the second curia and this meant that only the rich first curia, predominantly Liberal, opposed him but they did not constitute a number large enough to present a candidate for Mayor. However, because of his demagoguery Franz Joseph refused to accept Lueger as Bürgermeister three times and exercised his veto until 1897 when the pressure from the Viennese became overwhelming. Now der schöne Karl entered the Rathaus, triumphant at last. Kikeriki, reflecting its editorial line and the will of the people, celebrated the confirmation in dramatic fashion as seen in the picture on the following page.

Unfortunately for Lueger, at almost the same time as his confirmation, Badeni released the Sprachverordnung and immediately he was in a difficult dilemma. As mentioned, he distanced himself from nationalism but Badeni forced him to now incorporate nationalist rhetoric to maintain support of the Germans in Vienna. However, this was not what he wanted to do. As Geehr concludes:

His policies were aimed at fostering the prosperity of the German Austrians, to him the fundamental nationality. A secondary goal was to promote the success of the Slovenes and Bohemians who settled in German Austria, and especially in Vienna. They were the backbone of the metropolitan workforce.

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187 Beller, p. 141.
188 Hamann, p. 281.
189 Schorske, p. 144.
190 It must be noted that one of the reasons for Franz Joseph's about face was because of the intervention of Badeni who struck a deal with Lueger. The latter made it clear that he would make no problems for the Emperor and tell his Viennese to do exactly the same.
191 Kikeriki, April 18, 1897, p. 4.
192 Geehr, p. 146.
The Emperor's grace is the people's fortune and full of thanks, Christian Vienna reveres its Emperor.
At first he tried to maintain this position, but it became increasingly difficult as the reaction to the Ordinances manifested itself in violence in the streets. Moreover, he realized that if he did nothing the pan-Germanists under Schönerer could make life difficult for him. In November, the situation became so bad that Vienna became like an armed camp and Lueger informed the Emperor that he could no longer guarantee order in the capital. Franz Joseph accepted Badeni’s resignation and the state of siege was lifted in Vienna. However, the reaction to the Sprachverordnung shocked Lueger. As Jenks concludes:

The Burgomeister had almost lost his political neck by misjudging for the only time in his life the temper of the Viennese. That they could be roused to hatred of the Czechs more effectively than he and others had been able to turn them against the Jews was astonishing.\(^{193}\)

From this point on, Lueger also adopted an increasingly nationalist rhetoric in order to maintain political support and it was directed primarily against the Czechs. In speeches he declared that Vienna was, and would always remain, a German city. The Jews would still be an enemy, but increasingly the Czechs were singled out as the force that posed the biggest potential threat to the Germanness of the city and the number of Czech immigrants made them susceptible to an increasing number of nationally motivated attacks between 1897 and 1914.

**Failure of Social Democracy.**

One political organization that tried to stay out of the Czech-German conflict was the Social Democratic party under the leadership of Viktor Adler, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. The goal of the party was to establish solidarity among the working classes of Austria regardless of nationality. All realized the damaging potential national conflict could have within the party and their journals *Gleichheit* and its successor the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, appealed to the workers to stand united in order to challenge social, political and economic inequalities in Austria. This was confirmed at the *Hainfelder Parteitag* in

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\(^{193}\) Jenks, p. 55.
December of 1889, just prior to the expiry of the law banning them in 1891, which was not extended.

For some years there was optimism in the party and they managed to maintain their supranational position and the party leadership promoted the rights of the minorities in Vienna and Austria. Moreover, some Social Democratic activists attempted to alleviate national tension with the establishment of societies which hoped to provide education for the workers. One particular organization was the Apollo Workers' Educational Club in the Ottakring district established by ribbon-maker Franz Schuhmeier in 1889. The particular club was very successful and included in the curriculum were Czech courses for Germans and vice versa. However, the Sprachverordnung shook the national solidarity of the Social Democrats. German members of the party complained that the Czechs were keeping down wages and working as scabs and damage control measures outlined in the 1899 Brünner Programme, which called for a reorganization of Austria as a democratic federal state consisting of various nationalities, proved to be only temporarily successful at keeping the lid on disharmony among many workers. Moreover, Viktor Adler complained in a letter to Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretician of Germany's Social Democratic party, that the Czechs were to blame for the conflicts between the workers by forming their own organizations and not being grateful to the Germans for paying for the ‘whole international shtick.'

Once universal manhood suffrage was passed in 1906, there was a renewed enthusiasm among the Social Democrats. They were confident that they could gain significant power in the Reichsrat and be more active in the Reichsrat to help solve the national problems. Boyer concludes: “the Social Democratic leadership assumed (or at least hoped) that universal suffrage would regenerate public life by enabling the proletariat of all Austria's nations to execute what Otto Bauer called an 'evolutionary national politics.' For the proletariat the reform of the suffrage would be an etatistic

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194 See Barea, pp. 338-340. However, I could not find any data that provides an indication how popular these courses were.
195 Hamann, pp. 317-318.
196 Quoted in Hamann, p. 319.
A name change for the Austrian Social Democrats or: hostile neighbours.
solvent which would ameliorate the tensions of nationality." 197 Unfortunately for the Social Democrats this did not work and very soon the tension in their party caused a split along national lines in 1910. Even the Czech version of Arbeiter Zeitung which was published in Vienna, Dělnické Listy, changed its subheading from Orgán strany socialně-demokratické, paper of the Social Democratic Party, to Orgán československé socialně-demokratické strany dělnické, paper of the Czech and Slovak Social Democratic workers, indicating that they would be appealing to this particular group exclusively.198 Kikeriki, never a supporter of the Social Democrats, which reflected its consistent bürgerlich, bourgeois perspective, published the front-page cartoon on the previous page which ridiculed the party and its inability to reconcile the problem of national conflict.199

It is interesting to note that even in this party, we see shades of a defensive German nationalism: German leaders running the show from Vienna were reluctant to grant some decision making power to the Czech leaders. Moreover, most of the violence that would be directed against the Czechs in Vienna in the years after the Sprachverordnung happened in the working class districts which should have been bastions of working class solidarity regardless of nationality.

Conclusions.

As shown above, with the passing of the Sprachverordnung in 1897, German political leaders and the population of Vienna suddenly became aware of the threat posed by the Czechs. The reaction was swift and violent as the German politicians proposed laws and passed legislation in the Rathaus designed to protect the city from increasing Czech influence. In all reality this was highly unlikely considering that they were, as pointed out in chapter two above, a small minority in Vienna and, furthermore, their social position largely excluded them from voting in municipal elections even before

198 Dělnické Listy, January 13, 1911, p. 1. It must be noted that my investigation of this particular paper was fleeting at best. My intention while looking at this paper was to see how this paper reacted to the split in the party along national lines. In the future, this may be an interesting topic to investigate in more detail.
199 Kikeriki, November 16, 1911, p. 1.
Lueger and his council members continually made the playing surface more skewed to favour the Germans. In essence, after 1897 the tradition of defensive and disuniting nationalism, which had been part of the German political rhetoric since the days of Taaffe, became popular and widely disseminated in Vienna.

But the question is how did this corrosive anti-Slav and, more specifically, anti-Czech nationalism find a receptive audience in the general population of Vienna? Also, how did the people suddenly become convinced that the Czech migrants in Vienna, who had a long history of migrating to the city and assimilating, represented a threat to the German character of the city? One way in which people became aware of the problem of the Czechs in Vienna was in debates in the Rathaus. Moreover, after 1897 many people visited the Reichsrat to view the poisoned atmosphere acted out live as conflicts among the representatives of the various nationalities increased to an alarming degree which often forced the Minister Presidents to suspend proceedings; fist-fights and obstructionism were the most common features of this institution in the years leading up to the First World War. But the most common way in which the people in Vienna became acquainted with the threat of the Czechs, and German national reaction against them, was in one of the many journals published in the Capital. Both high and lowbrow organs brought the national battle to the people in the cafes, ale houses, wine gardens and meeting halls in Vienna. In the following chapter the defensively motivated campaign in the journal Kikeriki will be examined and we shall see that in this journal between 1897 and 1914 the nationalist editors consistently published images to the German-speaking Viennese which were intended to show them that the Minister Presidents were wrongly pandering to the Czechs, to warn them of the Czech threat to the city and the Empire, to convince them that Germans were superior to the Czechs and to encourage them to fight against this Slav menace. All of which helped further contribute to the damaging and destructive disharmony within Austria-Hungary.
Chapter 5. The Anti-Czech Campaign in Kikeriki.

In this final chapter, the journal Kikeriki will be examined and by analyzing the satirical cartoons, which comprised a significant portion of its pages, it will be seen that it has to be considered one of the prime factors behind the anti-Czech demonstrations and violence which intensified in Vienna after 1897. What we shall also notice is that the editorial line reflected in these cartoons was an extension of the defensive German national rhetoric which started during the period when Taaffe was Minister President.

Of course, these assertions beg some important questions: how can one prove that this journal, a journal some might equate with the ‘Grub Street press,’ had significant influence on shaping people’s opinions about the reality of the threat that the Czechs posed to Vienna, and Austria, and, furthermore, how the Germans should react to this threat? Moreover, how can one prove that this journal was proactive or reactive in regard to the battle waged against the Czech minority in Vienna between 1897 and 1914? In essence, did what the editors of Kikeriki publish reflect or influence the opinion of the German speaking Viennese? Or did they manage to accomplish both? The short answer to these questions, I must admit, is that one cannot.

However, in response, the questions I pose are these: why did the opinion toward the Czechs in Vienna change so radically in this period leading to an increasing amount of violence against them whenever they met? As Hamann points out by 1910, "every gathering of Czechs was threatened by violence"\textsuperscript{200} and Boyer informs us that anti-Czech riots occurred with “monotonous consistency.”\textsuperscript{201} Why was Budweiser beer boycotted and the pubs which served it consistently smashed?\textsuperscript{202} Why did Czech shopkeepers now heed the advice of the police and replace their Czech signs with German ones? Why did people Germanize their names? Spontaneous acts of violence are rare so one should be able to conclude that something had to be behind these actions.

\textsuperscript{200} Hamann, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{201} See: Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis, pp. 211-235. In these pages Boyer talks quite extensively about the violence against the Czechs in Vienna.
\textsuperscript{202} This action seems quite odd because Budweiser was from Budweis which was one of the few cities in Bohemia where the city council was still largely German and also the brewery was owned by Germans.
As I pointed out, people were exposed to the exaggerated Czech threat in many ways whether it was by attending Reichsrat and Rathaus debates or by reading nationalist journals such as the *Alldeutsches Tagblatt, Der Hammer, Ostdeutsche Rundschau* and *Unverfälschte deutsche Worte*. These journals were very caustic in their attacks against everything they considered to be non-German or pro-Slav and they were all anti-Semitic. However, these papers were organs of particular political parties, often fringe parties, and they had a limited circulation. *Alldeutsches Tagblatt* and *Unverfälschte deutsche Worte* were connected to Schönerer, who, as we have seen, enjoyed a brief period in the spotlight but faded from political prominence quite soon after the Badeni crisis. *Der Hammer* was the paper of Franz Stein, leader of the pan-German labour movement which was a poor challenger to the Social Democrats. *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* was Karl Wolf’s journal that originally followed the line of Schönerer, which dreamed of joining with the German Reich; however, he magically transformed and the paper became increasingly pro-Habsburg and vehemently anti-Czech but still the party was a fringe organization unable to tap into the Catholic and German electorate which the incredibly powerful Christian Socials of Lueger controlled.

The paper of the Christian Socials, *Deutsches Volksblatt*, had a much higher circulation than any of the aforementioned papers and “refused to despise the Czechs [but emphasized] that the Czechs coming to Vienna have to adapt to their environment and Germanize.” We have seen that this policy was criticized in other journals which accused Lueger of being too soft in regard to the Czech threat in Vienna and sometimes *Kikeriki’s* editors, who faithfully supported Lueger as we saw in the previous chapter and again see in this picture below commemorating his tenth anniversary as Mayor in 1907, and in the cartoon on the following page celebrating his victory in the 1909 campaign, occasionally had to give him a reminder that he could not let his guard down. For example, the next picture shows an excited *Kikeriki* warning Lueger that the *Powidl*, a sort of plum jam popular with Czechs and often used to symbolize them, is

203 Hamann, p. 274.
204 *Kikeriki*, April 20, 1907, p. 1.
Figure 5: Kikeriki, April 20, 1907, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).
After the re-election. Lady Vindobona: “Lueger, I know no one worthier than you. You must again for the good of the people carry a heavy burden.”
In the Vienna kitchen. *Kikeriki*: “Hey chef (Lueger) the Powidl is overflowing!”
Anyway, the point here is that people were made aware of the Czech threat because it was identified as a problem to Vienna in the city’s many journals, excluding, of course, the Socialist journal *Arbeiter Zeitung*, which emphasized the class conflict and attempted to put a lid on national tension within its ranks which, as I pointed out above, ultimately failed.

However, one must consider *Kikeriki* as a more influential journal because of a few very important factors. First, the paper, which was established in 1861 by O.F. Berg, had a very high circulation, up to 25,000 twice weekly which would make it commonly available at many newsstands throughout the capital, and at fourteen hellers an issue it was quite affordable. Second, it was written in the Viennese dialect, in gothic script and often with very simple and short captions, stories and poems which were easily understood by people with varying degrees of literacy. Third, it relied on satirical cartoons, rather than dense text, to convey its message which would have been very effective not only because they could be understood by people with minimal reading skills, but also because, I believe, that people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were very aware of visual symbolic allegory. Most of the people were Catholic and they were no doubt very aware of the visual symbolism which they experienced in their local churches. Moreover, the city, especially an imperial capital like Vienna, was filled with sights loaded with symbolic meaning: art work in museums; public monuments; public buildings; and flags, standards and banners. A corollary to this third point is that *Kikeriki* “avoided censorship by the use of metaphor, allegory, or symbol” which was still practised by the ever-diligent officials from the *Innenministerium*. The result was that it was under less scrutiny when it published its provocative statements by using the excuse that it was only humour.

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207 The information on the exact circulation of *Kikeriki* was difficult to find so I had to resort to the Austrian *Lexicon* for these numbers. Also, in all of my research I could not find any book or article that looks at this paper in detail during this particular period. One Ph.D. dissertation was published at the University in Vienna but it investigates the period when Berg was the editor which was from 1861 until 1867. Moreover, I found the names of the editors from 1897 to 1914, but I was unable to find any details on these men in the *Wer ist Wer* for Austria.
208 Allen, p. 54.
Here I return to what was pointed out in the introductory chapter, the satire of *Kikeriki* created and perpetuated stereotypes which contributed to the shifting attitudes towards the Czech minority in Vienna. For example, because the vast majority of the Czech migrants were from rural districts and were poor, many Viennese would have seen them in the streets in their peasant garb. They were recognizable and *Kikeriki* consistently played on this image. The editors, as will be seen, wanted to emphasize that the Czechs in their city were backward ‘hicks’, so to speak, who lacked urban polish or that they were uneducated children who required German leadership. One can see how this image would have been an effective method of portraying *all* Czechs because assimilated Czechs would have been invisible: they spoke German and had become part of the urban milieu.

But the next question is how was *Kikeriki* able to convince its readers that they needed to reconsider their attitude towards the Czech migrants? I believe that the reason the editors were effective was because this journal consistently touched on issues that were close to the hearts and minds of Vienna’s bourgeoisie including support of Lueger and challenges to the Social Democrats. But we can also see this in the little character of *Kikeriki* himself. As we have seen previously, and we shall see more below, our little friend was often drawn in a manner which symbolized the middle class *Bürger* which was important because it gave the readers the impression that the editors were indeed concerned with their problems. Moreover, for the theme of this thesis, this universal symbol was intended to emphasize, especially after 1897, the notion that there was a collective German identity which was increasingly under attack from the Czechs.

Although *Kikeriki* was predominantly directed towards an audience which consisted of bourgeois and petty bourgeois Viennese, we shall see that the campaign against the Czechs was also intended to reach a wider audience in the German speaking members of the working class. As pointed out in the previous chapter, *Kikeriki* opposed socialism and the conundrum was to convince workers that supporting middle class parties, specifically Lueger’s Christian Socialists, would be in their best interest. The editors wanted to persuade the workers that only Lueger could protect their interests, jobs and accommodation, while the Socialists, until 1911 anyway, worked for conciliation
between the Slavs and Germans. Here I turn once again to what Allen argues. Her assertion is that the “effectiveness of Simplicissimus [Kikeriki in the Viennese context] as an advocate of cooperation thus illustrates the role of humor in promoting group solidarity by providing common objects of ridicule.” Kikeriki’s editors made it quite clear that the prime objects of ridicule were to be the backwards, child-like, uneducated and alien Czechs who were damaging to the national interests of the Germans in Vienna. In essence, their goal was to transcend class lines and emphasize the larger picture that all German interests were under attack and needed to be defended.

Therefore, taking these factors into account, the cartoons published in Kikeriki which will be analyzed in detail below have to be considered important contributors in the development and intensification of the defensive reaction against the Czech migrants in Vienna and also to the Czech nation in Austria. I believe that we shall see that the cartoons in Kikeriki, like its German counterparts “Simplicissimus and Kladderadatsch urged their middle class readers not only to criticism but to activism.” One last point that needs to be made is that for the sake of simplicity, I will use a thematic rather than a chronological approach in the analysis. I have chosen this method because it could become somewhat convoluted trying to cover all of the aspects simultaneously.

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209 Ibid., p. 95.
210 Ibid., p. 69.
The \textit{Sprachverordnung}.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that Badeni's language laws were the catalyst that brought the national battle to Vienna. In the third chapter, the front-page cartoon from the April 18, 1897 issue of \textit{Kikeriki} was included in order to indicate how the Germans initially interpreted the \textit{Sprachverordnung}. The artist's image of a smiling Czech holding a book of Czech grammar, \textit{Kikeriki}'s concerned visage and the text warning that 'Wenzel is coming' work together to symbolize that the Germans were faced with another threat to their hegemony in Austria. Below, more drawings relating to the \textit{Sprachverordnung} will be analyzed and the argument is that they represent a defensive German reaction to the ordinances.

When Badeni passed the ordinances in April of 1897, it did not take long for the Germans in Vienna to react, as indicated, and criticism from the pages of \textit{Kikeriki} was almost instant and unrelenting. The cartoon on the following page, published on the back page of the April 15, 1897 issue, clearly suggests the potential damage ordinances could cause German speakers. In this picture, a distressed \textit{Kikeriki} attempts to study Czech grammar in preparation for an administrative career while a bemused and devious looking Czech stands in the background. This symbolizes the difficulty of the Czech language, and that it has the potential of taking bureaucratic jobs from good middle class Germans by placing them in the hands of Czechs who were often bilingual. What is also interesting about this cartoon is that it also symbolizes German superiority and Czech inferiority. It ridicules the Czech language as nonsense because in the book \textit{Kikeriki} is reading the famous Czech phrase of sticking your finger down your throat, \textit{strč prst skrz krk}, which contains no vowels, is displayed on the open page.

The defensive reaction to the ordinances continued and the next cartoon published in May of the same year symbolizes the damage the Badeni government was causing to the Germans. In this full page drawing, a neglectful mother representing the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[211] \textit{Kikeriki}, April 15, 1897, p. 7.
\item[212] \textit{Kikeriki}, May 16, 1897, p. 4.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Kikeriki’s preparations for a career in the civil service on the occasion of the Language Ordinances.
Father, Mother and Child. Hey stop that, and rescue your child!
government is beating Karl Lueger, a symbol of the middle class bourgeois German identity and power, with the Sprachverordnung, a symbol of the Czech threat, while the baby, the innocent German Volk, are on the edge of the abyss. ‘Stop that and rescue your child!’ is the rough translation of the lower caption. This picture probably would have struck a receptive chord in Vienna because it is their beautiful Karl, who had only been recently confirmed as Mayor, who is receiving the thrashing and this could be interpreted as symbolizing the possibility that German Vienna would soon see Czech introduced as an administrative language and the Germans would suffer a terrible fate in the abyss: a diminished level of power.

Figure 10: Kikeriki, May 8, 1898, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

The Czech stomach expansion. Ultra-Wenzel not only has the German bread but also demands to have the German identity in his stomach!

As 1897 progressed, German deputies obstructed parliament to protest the ordinances and the number and intensity of demonstrations in Vienna did not abate. Franz Joseph had no choice and he sacked Badeni in November. However, the ordinances remained in place and Kikeriki continued to attack them. Their editorial line did not change as seen in the cartoon above from May of 1898.213 Again we see a concerned

213 Kikeriki, May 8, 1898, p. 3.
bürgerlich Kikeriki watching the Czech contently devour German bread while clutching the Sprachverordnung. The warning here is obvious: the existence of the ordinances was going to slowly transform Austria into a Czech dominated state because of the gluttonous posture of the Czechs who wish to consume everything. A further problem for the Germans now was that Badeni was replaced by Prince Franz Anton Thun-Hohenstein, who had been the Governor of Bohemia and sympathetic to Czech demands. Fortunately for the Germans he lasted only a year and a half before being replaced by Count Manfred Clary-Aldringen who repealed the Sprachverordnung in October of 1899 to the delight of the Germans and the chagrin of the Czechs who, following the precedent set down by the German parties at the height of the Badeni crisis, perfected the art of obstructing parliament and were subsequently strongly criticized in the pages of Kikeriki as we shall see later.

What we have seen above is that the artists of Kikeriki reacted to the language ordinances in a manner that indicates a continuation of defensive German national response to the Czechs. It is recognized that these drawings do not directly show that there was an intensification of anti-Czech German nationalism in Vienna. But prior to the ordinances, as I argued in the last chapter, reaction against the Czechs in Vienna was limited to the radical German publications. Moreover, in my research into anti-Czech reactions in Kikeriki, I found no direct reference to the Czechs as a negative element in Vienna. The Czechs were attacked to be sure, as seen in the cartoon below from May 17, 1896, but Kikeriki ridiculed the Czech demands for autonomy in Bohemia and recognition of the Crown of Saint Václav or, as in the picture following, the close relationship the Czechs maintained with the Minister Presidents. Here we see Badeni having no problem being caged with Brunsvik of Prague's 'vicious' two tailed lion, the symbol of Bohemia. However, beginning in the Spring of 1897, the editors of Kikeriki

215 How the two-tailed lion became a symbol of Bohemia, of course, has many interpretations. The story, according to the legendary Czech story teller Uncle Otik, is that this cat, which somehow found his way to Bohemia, was fighting a hydra-like beast and Brunsvik of Prague assisted him. They became companions and dealt with all that was bad and evil in Bohemia with the help of Brunsvik's magic sword. Somewhere along the way Brunsvik cut the tail in two, lengthwise, which must have been painful, to prove that he was the master; the story about this is
There is space in the smallest of hutch for Badeni and the ‘vicious’ lion.
saw that there was an enemy in their midst which they had ignored while they were attacking the Jews, and the potential threat that they represented had to be exposed and challenged. In essence, the responses to the *Sprachverordnung* in Kikeriki marked the opening offensive against the Czechs in Vienna.

not quite explained. After Brunsvik’s death, his faithful companion died of a broken heart but became the symbol of Bohemian nobility as a symbol of power and strength and also faithful service to the lands of Father Čech. When on Charles Bridge in Prague, the two are immortalized in stone on south of the bridge on a column on Kampa Island. My apologies to readers for this terrible summary. See Jirasek’s *Old Czech Legends* for the story in more detail.
Reactions to Czech Migration.

As argued in the second chapter, Czech migration to Vienna, and subsequent assimilation into the Viennese milieu were regular and normal features of internal movement in Austria. Moreover, prior to the mid 1890s, the Czechs migrants were not seen as a potential threat to the German character of the city. What we will see in the drawings below is that opinion changed radically and rather than being seen as people coming to Vienna to peacefully settle and eventually assimilate, they were portrayed as a migrating horde of vagabonds coming to Slavicize the fair German Vindobona.

Figure 12: Kikeriki, July 1, 1897, p. 2. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Soon after the passing of the Sprachverordnung the attack against the migrants intensified in the pages of Kikeriki. In the cartoon above, which was the first reference that I found which negatively portrayed the Czech migrants, the artist gives us an
excellent example of how opinion was changing. Here we see a Czech family recently arrived in Vienna saying how it is better than in Prague.216 This little picture is incredibly revealing from the title to the details in the drawing. First, the title of this particular drawing, ‘Sad but true,’ indicates that Czech migrants coming to Vienna represent something which is terribly upsetting to Vienna. Second, the picture is also interesting because they are standing in front of a Beseda, which in German would translate into Verein. This is meant to symbolize a permanent Czech presence and an attraction for the migrants because the presence of ‘Besedas’ makes Vienna seem just like home. This little detail is further revealing because it gave the readers an indication that the Czech migrants had no intention of learning German and quietly assimilating. One last point that needs attention is the way in which the Czechs were drawn. The family is meant to represent a poor, uneducated peasant class of migrants who had nothing positive to offer their new city and we shall see that the Czechs were consistently portrayed in such a manner.

Figure 13: Kikeriki, January 14, 1901, p. 2. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Anxious fear. Kikeriki: “It seems to me that she wants to place Körber’s child in front of the door!”

216 Kikeriki, July 1, 1897, p. 2.
These types of attacks against the Czech migrants continued and the message consistently followed a similar pattern. In the cartoon, above, from 1901, the editors again drew attention to the negative influence the Czech migrants were having on Vienna. Here Kikeriki is in a state of distress as he watches the poor woman with her baby migrating to Vienna. As we can see, it follows a pattern similar to the cartoon above. The woman is portrayed as a poor peasant on her way to Vienna, which in itself is bad. However, the artist has included some things in this little drawing that need further attention. First, her dress represents the coming of the Czech 'Staatsidee' to Vienna which obviously was a concern to the Germans because, as argued the chapters above, if Bohemia and Moravia were given autonomy, the hegemonic position the Germans enjoyed in the two provinces, and Austria, would be seriously affected. Moreover, in the sack carrying the baby, the artist has written 'Gross Prag' symbolizing that she is carrying Czech influence from Prague, now dominated by the Czech majority and the centre of Czech national activity, into Vienna. The reference to Körber is also interesting because the Minister President was considered too overly receptive to Czech demands and negligent to those of the Germans as seen in this front page cartoon from July, 1901. On the following page we see Kikeriki's criticism reflected by the suggestion for a new relief which should be included on a frieze to decorate Parliament portraying the Minister President being led around by some devious looking Czechs on their way back to the house.

Further warnings about Czech influence in Vienna was repeated again in the cartoon on the following page from 1902. This time rather than stylized and anonymous Czech peasants, we see Václav Klofač, leader of the Czech National Socialists, as an

217 Kikeriki, January 14, 1901, p. 2.
218 Kikeriki, July 11, 1901, p. 1.
219 Klofač as leader of the Czech National Socialists was seen by the Germans as the most dangerous of the Czech politicians in parliament. His party were rabble rousers in a similar vein of the radical German nationalist parties of Schönerer, Wolf and Stein, and often led the noisy Czech obstructionist tactics in Parliament following the repeal of the Badeni Ordinances. Although the party failed to gain significant support at the expense of the Young Czechs under Kramár, they were an easier target for the Germans because of their radical outlook, attacks on Germans in Bohemia and criticism of the Habsburg Monarchy. For an excellent overview of the anti-German campaign in Bohemia see: Mills Kelly, T. “Taking It to the Streets: Czech National
Design for a new relief for our Parliament. Dr. von Körber as conqueror in the Czech return.
Figure 15: *Kikeriki*, February 9, 1902, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

“Czech-Vienna.” Wenzel comes to Vienna, when he has nothing to eat in Prague. And when he sees Vienna, he calls out: “That is our supply house!”
invading vagabond smiling as he makes his way to Ceska-Viden. He himself symbolizes a negative influence coming to Vienna because of his caustic style of politics and anti-German attitudes, but in the larger picture he represents Czechs coming to ‘Czech’ Vienna in increasing numbers to ‘feed’ in the Viennese ‘supply house.’ What is interesting to also point out at this point, after seeing a number of the drawings published in Kikeriki, is that the Czechs were almost exclusively drawn as peasants indicating that the editors wanted the Viennese to equate them with wandering vagabonds which could be interpreted as a warning that they are the new wandering Diaspora as dangerous as the Jews and, moreover, that they lack an urbane polish which is a criticism of Czech culture in general. This criticism will be discussed in detail below. In short, Kikeriki’s editors wanted it to be understood that the Czechs should be considered damaging invaders rather than potential citizens.

The next two cartoons also reveal the changed attitudes towards to Czech migrants. The first from January 1911 shows a group of Czechs from the Bohemian city of Čáslav coming to Vienna. Again they are portrayed as poor vagabonds and they have a large complement of children in tow. The caption here is revealing because it represents German concerns that Czech strangers are coming to Vienna in significant numbers to take the place of those born in Vienna who are leaving, and the children symbolize the future generation of the city which will become increasingly Czech. A warning that the German character of Vienna is diminishing but again a considerable change from the attitudes toward the Czech migrants prior to 1897.

The second picture is more of the same kind of warning but it has some interesting details that go beyond just the threat of increased migration. We see from this picture, published in March of the same year, that there are workers in the crowd making


220 Kikeriki, February 9, 1902, p. 1.
221 Kikeriki, January 26, 1911, p. 2.
A decrease of those born in Vienna and help from Czaslau.

Reliable rule. "Here they come."
their way past the ‘Tabor’ Line on the way to Vienna.\textsuperscript{222} The warning here is that the Czechs are not only coming in large numbers which will disrupt the ‘Germanness’ of Vienna but they are also coming as workers intent on stealing the jobs from German Viennese hands. This kind of picture would have been effective because, as indicated above, the challenge to survive in the city was very difficult and by portraying these migrants as competitors surely had the potential of creating a reaction against them.

Stepping back one year to August 1910, this next drawing, which was a full size picture on the back page, is an excellent example of anti-Czech sentiment which would have been effective in convincing people that continued Czech migration to the city has consequences which could be potentially damaging.\textsuperscript{223} Here, \textit{Kikeriki} dressed as an Austrian border guard, a reassuring symbol of benevolent authority and control which was probably favourably received by the German-speaking Viennese bourgeoisie, is telling the group of Czech migrants that they cannot cross the line into Vienna, seen in the background and surely included to emphasize the point, with their dangerous cargo, the pot of \textit{Powidl}, the oft-used symbol of Czech culture and influence. The editors have equated Vienna with Troy, again a familiar symbol, which is in danger of being conquered from within if the dangerous cargo is allowed to pass into the city. Another point that should be made about this picture is that \textit{Kikeriki} refuses to let them cross the ‘Tabor’ line which reveals an increasingly vigilant attitude on the part of the editors because they seem to suggest that the best way to reduce Czech influence in the city is to stop it outright. The swindle of the Czech migrants, to pose as innocent tourists, has been revealed! As we can see, this drawing certainly signifies a major shift in the Viennese attitudes towards the migrants from Bohemia and Moravia that had existed before 1897 when Czechs speaking migrants had been summoned to the city or had been accepted without such hostile receptions.

Here, I should shed some light on the symbolic meaning of the Tabor line mentioned in the previous drawings and how it confirms that the German reaction to the

\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Kikeriki}, March 16, 1911, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Kikeriki}, August 21, 1910, p. 10.
Wien, das moderne Troja.

"Go back, we already know your trick!"

Vienna, the modern Troy. Kikeriki: "Go back, we already know your trick!"
Czechs was anything but welcoming and urbane. The line has a double meaning which may or may not have been recognized by all of the readers of *Kikeriki*. In the local Viennese context, the one which would have been most identifiable, the Tabor line refers to the Am Tabor parish on the northern fringe of Vienna on the south bank of the Danube river and essentially the gateway into the second district, Leopoldstadt, which the editors are emphasizing should be guarded to prevent the admission of the damaging Czech element. The second, and larger, Austrian context refers to the city of Tabor in south central Bohemia which was an area where many Czech migrants came from, as mentioned earlier in chapter two. This seems to suggest that not only does the migration need to be stopped on the threshold of Vienna, but it also must be checked earlier in the region where the Czechs began their migratory journey to Lower Austria and Vienna.

**Figure 19: Kikeriki, April 28, 1912, p. 2. (Used by permission of ÖNB).**

This last picture I found directly relating to Czech migration was published in April of 1912. In this picture, below, the Czechs are pictured as a swarm of birds flying towards Vienna and are creating a shadow likened to a solar eclipse. The symbolism in this drawing seems to suggest that the Czech migrants are dark horde preparing to attack and engulf the city. The symbol of darkness is also revealing because it indicates that

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224 *Kikeriki*, April 28, 1912, p. 2.
they represent something evil and menacing. Moreover, I believe that one can take this symbolism a step further and suggest that the picture was meant to symbolize the negative influence of Czech culture in Vienna because they are black which is the furthest away from light, and hence, knowledge and enlightenment. In essence, this picture not only attacks the migration to Vienna but also the Czechs in general by again suggesting they have little to offer the city.
Criticism of Czech Culture.

One problem for the editors of *Kikeriki* was to change the opinion of how the Germans in Vienna saw the Czechs in their city in order to intensify the reaction against them. In essence, they had to create an image of the Czechs as being both different and inferior to the Germans which would make Germans more receptive to notions that they were a negative element both in the city, and in Austria, whose goal was to usurp the power of the Germans: a goal that had to be challenged with stiff resistance. The task would be difficult because, as mentioned above, the Czechs were considered to be an industrious "group of tailors, shoemakers, fiddlers, cooks, furniture craftsmen, coachmen, domestic servants and wet nurses"\(^{225}\) who would eventually learn German and become good Viennese citizens which most of them did. This was also the opinion of Karl Lueger who firmly believed that the Czech threat was exaggerated by his political opponents, and that the Czechs had no intention, or power, to alter the German character of the city.\(^{226}\)

Moreover, many people living in the working class districts were in the same boat, despite nationality, and had other more pressing concerns to deal with on a daily basis. As we shall see below, *Kikeriki* published cartoons which intended to change German opinion of the Czechs.

The first attack against the inferiority of Czech culture came late in 1897 just after the most violent demonstrations against the *Sprachverordnung* in November. In the following drawing, the artist shows a group of Czechs standing in front of a display of what their nation will contribute to the Paris World Exhibition coming in 1900.\(^{227}\) It may be difficult to see in the picture but the sign below the display announces "Czech Culture at the end of the nineteenth century." Here Czech culture is ridiculed in various ways. First, is the style in which the artist draws the Czechs: they look like a group of simple-minded clods, following the pattern in images seen above. Second, the items on display, which include, clubs, stones, a brick and a box of matches symbolize that the Czechs have not progressed to anywhere near the same level as the Germans. Also interesting is

\(^{225}\) Jenks, p. 66.
\(^{226}\) See Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis*, pp. 211-235.
\(^{227}\) *Kikeriki*, December 12, 1897, p. 3.
how they are responding to this particular display with wide-eyed amazement at what they have accomplished. German Viennese would also find the articles on display amusing and typical examples of industries where many Czechs worked and what they manufactured. The bricks are a reference to the massive brickworks in the Favoriten district in Vienna where many Czechs were employed, the Ziegelböhmnen, brick Czechs, as they were called, and the matches, sirky, which were manufactured at many factories in Prague.

Figure 20: Kikeriki, December 12, 1897, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

For the next World Exhibition in Paris in 1900.

In 1901, this interesting picture was published that challenged the notion that the Czechs deserved recognition as an important contributor to Austrian culture and also to the wider European culture. What we see in this picture is the Czech Pegasus devouring various classic European works and dispensing, shall we say, ‘Original Czech Works.’ What is also revealing here is that the Pegasus is drawn as a donkey indicating something inferior to a horse and it is also quite emaciated suggesting that it is not full of cultural achievements which would allow it to be represented as a large, robust and majestic symbol. Moreover, we see a play on words here that is insulting to the Czech

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228 Kikeriki, December 15, 1901, p. 3.
nation and its cultural achievements. In the caption, they use the word ‘ration,’ alluding to what the Czech Pegasus is devouring, but readers would be aware that the word ‘nation’ is implied here. In essence, the editors are ridiculing the Czech artistic community as being little more than a group of pretenders who are stealing ideas from the ‘great nations,’ past and present, and attempting to present their inferior copies as significant achievements. German speaking Viennese would agree with this picture because, besides probably Dvořák and Smetana, they were unfamiliar with Czech achievements in the performing and visual arts largely because they were unable to understand the Czech language; famous poets and writers such as Jan Neruda, Karel Mácha and Božena Němcova, among others were ignored. Moreover, even at the highest levels, Czech achievements were not recognized as comparable to German ones even after the First World War. The great historian A.F. Pribram argued that Dvořák and Smetana could not be compared with Brahms and Wagner.229

Figure 21: Kikeriki, December 15, 1901, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

"Czech art must appropriate the successes of other ‘rations’ to become authentically Czech," said Prince George Lobkowitz recently in the Czech Academy in Prague.

229 See Taylor, p. 156. I have a problem with this because in my opinion the works of Brahms were very similar to Mozart and Beethoven which the Viennese were receptive to and this increased his popularity in the city. I do not want to suggest that they are bad, quite the opposite, they are very nice, but I believe that the symphonies of his contemporary Anton Bruckner had more depth and feeling. Bruckner also suffered from not being Viennese, he was from Ansfelden in Upper Austria, and was often labelled the ‘provincial Parsifal’ by the snobby Viennese. In regard to the Czech composers, Smetana’s operas the Bartered Bride, Dalibor and Libuše as well as his symphonic poems, Má Vlast’, My Fatherland, have to be considered some of the best works of the period between 1860 and 1880.
Kikeriki also made it clear that Czechs had no business attending institutes of higher learning. In a large half page drawing published in March of 1904, Czech students were drawn as a destructive rather than a constructive element. The title of this particular picture was "Die Kopfarbeit der tschechischen Studenten," 'The thinking power of the Czech students,' with the caption below quoting Kikeriki: "Mir scheint, die Tschechen mit ihren Torpedo-Schädeln wollen unsere Universität einrennen." 'It seems to me the Czechs wish to crash through our University with their pointed heads.' The suggestion in this image is that they have no intellectual ability and rather than enhancing their own personal progress and contributing to Austria, they are intent on destroying the institution with hard-headed and malicious chauvinistic intent.

Figure 22: Kikeriki, June 27, 1897, p. 2. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Closely connected to the theme discussed above is this drawing which had been published a few years earlier that also ridiculed the Czechs as not worthy of education. Above, we see an agitated Wenzel, again in his stereotypical peasant clothing, demanding that the Czechs be given educational equality with Africans. This relates to the issue of

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230 Kikeriki, March 20, 1904, p. 9.
231 Kikeriki, June 27, 1897, p. 2.
authorized Czech language public schools in Vienna but what is significant here is that
the Czechs are pictured as less worthy of education than Africans which in the late
nineteenth century would have been a very strong insult for Europeans.

Figure 23: *Kikeriki*, August 20, 1896, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Another way in which Czech culture was attacked as inferior was in regard to the
notion of Czech demands that their nation deserved recognition which would put it on the
same level as the German-speaking crown lands, or even Hungary. The pictures which
have been analyzed up to now have given an indirect indication that the editors of
*Kikeriki* wanted to project an image of the Czechs as inferior. We have seen this in the
way they were drawn, the way Czech culture was symbolized as excrement or plum jam,
the derision of their language and one detail which I have not discussed which relates to
the Czech demands that the Crown of Saint Václav be recognized which had been a
Czech demand since the days of the Revolution and continuously rejected by all Minister
Presidents from Belcredi in the 1860s to Count Karl von Stürgkh who was Minister
President from 1911 to 1916. Often, the Czech nation was symbolized as a two tailed
Bohemian Lion with a cooking pot on his head which ridicules the validity of the Crown
A shot of cold water. *Kikeriki*: “Hey my friend, you cannot spell very well: one writes stupid [dumm] with two ‘m’s!”
as seen in the drawing above from 1896 which depicts Badeni thumbing his nose at the very subdued, sad, and passive looking pot crowned lion, indicating that even Badeni, who was often accused of supporting the Czechs at the expense of the Germans, would have none of their ridiculous demands.

Criticism of the idea of the Czech nation can be seen in the drawing on the previous page which was prominently printed on the front cover in October 1898. Here Kikeriki has to give the Czechs, once again depicted as daft looking simpletons, standing in front of their ‘National House’, Narodni Dom, a shot of cold water by informing them that they have made a spelling mistake and should add another ‘m’ because stupid, dum, requires the letter ‘m’ twice. The suggestion here to readers is obvious, the Czech notion that they constitute a special nation is an obtuse concept which needs to be rejected and extinguished.

Figure 25: Kikeriki, January 26, 1899, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Design for a new double eagle. From painter Svatopluk Przihal. Wenzel: “It is an incredibly beautiful symbol.”

233 Kikeriki, October 27, 1898, p. 1.
The last drawing to be analyzed in this section that was intended to ridicule the Czech culture and identity was published in early 1899. Although this particular picture may be interpreted as representing the Czechs as an unpatriotic element of the Austrian population, a theme which will be discussed later, because the Czech artist, who has been given a typical and symbolic Czech name, has cleaved the poor German Michel in half to take the place of the orb and sceptre in the claws of the Habsburg double eagle, it was also clearly intended to symbolize Czech cultural inferiority.234 I think this is a valid interpretation that German speakers in Vienna would have also seen in this drawing because here we see that the best Wenzel can create to symbolize the contributions of the Czechs to the great Austrian Habsburg identity is limited to beer, plum schnapps, slivovice, plum jam, and daft looking buffoons.

234 Kikeriki, January 26, 1899, p. 3.
The Czechs as an Economic Threat.

Above, it was argued on a few occasions that one of the reasons why German nationalists had a difficult time creating anti-Czech feelings among the German speakers in Vienna was because both German and Czech speakers had similar problems to deal with in order to survive in the city and also because the capitalist Liberals and the Jews were considered to be their major antagonists. Kikeriki’s editors realized this, as well as the fact that the Social Democrats were working to maintain national harmony among the working class. To remedy this situation, they had to appeal to very basic instincts in order to reveal to the Germans that the Czech workers in the city were significant challengers for their jobs and hindered their future improvement. To be succinct: the Czechs were stealing their livelihood.

Compared to other attacks against the Czechs, Kikeriki was a little slow in portraying migrants as challengers for jobs which were the property of good Germans who needed them. I did not find one until 1901 and it depicted both Italians and Czechs as challengers for work in the city. In this picture, the artist included both a defiant and menacing looking Czech and Italian with tools in their hands ready to work. The sarcastic title for this drawing was „Beschäftigungslose Wiener freut euch!“ with the caption „Denn der Bau der Wiener Wasserleitung gibt genug Arbeit für die Böhm und Italianer.“

‘unemployed Viennese cheer up! Building the Vienna water works will provide enough work for the Czechs and the Italians.’ I understand that this picture was a warning to the people in the city administration who were giving the jobs to Czech and Italians who were willing to work for less money, but it also symbolizes the fact that these migrant workers were taking the jobs of native Viennese workers which certainly had the potential of creating negative defensive reactions against them.

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²³⁵ Kikeriki, May 30, 1901, p. 3. Again, I do not have an example of this picture but I hope my explanation is adequate here. The Wasserleitung refers to the massive project that Lueng’s city government commissioned for the building of a new fresh water source for Vienna at the turn of the century. This was another achievement of the Austrian Gründerzeit programme in Vienna.
However, the picture above from March 16, 1911, which was analyzed as a reaction to the Czech migration to Vienna was also a symbolic representation of Czechs as economic competition. In that picture, some of the migrants standing by the Tabor line ready for the journey to Vienna are a devious looking lot of tool-carrying workers. Kikeriki’s editors were probably certain that this detail would have been recognized by its readers and interpreted as a reflection of the sad reality that these migrants were indeed coming to steal their jobs and upset the stability that at least a job offered them in the terrible, squalid, over-crowded and tuberculosis-ridden conditions of Vienna’s working class districts.

Another picture that makes this point was published in April of 1912. In this picture under the title: „Tschechische Bescheidenheit,” ‘Czech modesty,’ a group of Czech workers, again stylized as hard-headed buffoons, are standing defiantly in the Viennese brick factory and the drawing gives an indication that they are controlling it like a closed monopoly: they are not permitting the Germans an opportunity to come inside and work. What is also interesting about this is that it criticizes the Czechs as being an arrogant and impudent group who should be happy that they are allowed in the city in the first place and, furthermore, it suggests that they should have to humbly and politely request the opportunity to work.

In this last picture from 1912, Kikeriki moves away from the working class and focuses on the Czechs monopolizing administrative positions. This was a concern of the German nationalists since the days of Taaffe and also one of the major reasons why the Badeni Ordinances created such a stir in 1897. The fear was that Czechs, because of their bilingual ability, were going to overrun the bureaucratic service in Bohemia and Moravia and eventually replace the German hegemonic position in the civil service. In this drawing Kikeriki, dressed in his very bourgeois finery, satirically shows readers who were representative of this class, how the system of advancement in a bureaucratic career functions if you are a German: one must wait behind one dozen Czechs. The picture is

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236 See the picture referred to by footnote number 222.
237 Kikeriki, April 28, 1912, p. 4.
238 Kikeriki, June 12, 1912, p. 4.
revealing for a few reasons, not only because it indicates that the Germans are being left behind in the promotion process which is negative in itself, but also because the Czechs in the drawing standing before the smartly dressed German gentleman are portrayed as stereotypical clods who really should not be eligible for jobs in the civil service.

Figure 26: Kikeriki, June 12, 1912, p. 4. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

The German civil servants in Austria can count on advancement, after that of a dozen Czechs.
Czechs as a Nationalist and anti-Austrian Group.

One method to cause a reaction against a particular group is to give people the impression that the ‘others’ are different and as such stand in opposition to your particular set of values and beliefs: us versus them. The editors of Kikeriki were no doubt aware that inventing this kind of impression of the Czechs would be a valuable means of increasing the awareness of the Germans in Vienna that the Czechs were a damaging influence to the city and to Austria. What we shall see below is that Czechs were consistently portrayed as a nationalistic, chauvinistic and unpatriotic group pursuing their own radical and potentially damaging agenda. In the opinion of the editors, as seen in the drawing below from late in 1897, ‘Czech modesty’ was a demanding attitude, unwilling to compromise and one which would inflict pain on Austria as symbolized here with the Czech Crown cutting into the finger of the state hand. A further suggestion of this drawing is that the Czechs intend to bite the hand that feeds them.239

Almost immediately after the Sprachverordnung riots in Vienna, the situation in Parliament deteriorated into a running battle mainly between the German and Czech parties which together comprised the largest number of representatives. The Galician Poles did have a sizeable number of representatives in Parliament, but often chose to avoid conflict with the Germans to ensure that their power in Galicia was not questioned or challenged, and the Slovenes, who numbered fewer than twenty representatives, often sided with the Czechs in debates even after the settlement of the elementary school issue in Styria and Carniola which had been a German concern before 1897. Often debates became so heated that the honourable deputies resorted to throwing missiles, noisy exchanges or filibusters which hindered any possibility of constructive work being accomplished or actual physical violence which often required the presence of the police to separate the combatants.240 Kikeriki wasted no time in laying the blame for this

239 Kikeriki, December 12, 1897, p. 4.
240 These battles were a normal occurrence in Parliament up to the War and as Count Stürgkh remarked to the Swiss Ambassador in 1914: “My most famous deed was to transform this house into a hospital.”
Czech modesty. Give Wenzel the finger and he demands the whole hand—full.
squarely on the Czechs, despite the fact that the original obstructers in the Abgeordnetenhaus had been the German parties reacting to Badeni’s ordinances.

In this cartoon from 1898, we see that Kikeriki wanted people to see the Czechs as the major instigators of obstruction. In this picture, the artist is showing an unknown Czech deputy provocatively lifting the glass to release the devious looking Czech troublemaker into the Parliamentary debate. What is revealing here is that the provocation the artist is referring to is the perceived Czech reaction against the Lex Kolisko which was a law proposed by German deputies to make German the sole language of instruction in all schools in Lower Austria and Vienna. Of course, the Czech parties in Parliament voted against this law, demanding that language rights in

Figure 28: Kikeriki, July 14, 1898, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

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241 Kikeriki, July 14, 1898, p. 1.
242 For details see: Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis, pp. 211-235, and also Hamann, pp. 315-317. Up until the war, German deputies tried on many occasions to have this law passed but it was always defeated either by votes or by Minister Presidents bypassing Parliament altogether and relying on Law 14.
schools should be the same as the guaranteed rights German language schools had in Bohemia and Moravia, which were quite extensive. However, the German parties insisted the law was necessary to safeguard the rightful dominant position of the German language. In reality an overreaction to actual Czech numbers in both the province and the city, but again another example of defensive national rhetoric. A further revealing feature of this picture is the Czech under the glass. Similar to what we have seen above, he is portrayed as a poor peasant indicating that he is not a gentleman and therefore, not worthy of sitting in the esteemed house. But what is also significant is that he is clutching a clarinet symbolizing both his coming obstruction tactics which will create such a clamour in the house that the good German deputies will not be able to execute governmental work for the people and also that he expects the Germans to dance to the Czech tune.

This particular style of criticizing the Czechs was a constant theme in Kikeriki right up to the War. In the drawings on the following pages, both from February 1900, readers were exposed to the arrogant and demanding nature of the Czech deputies in Parliament. In the first, the 'spook' of Parliament is represented by an oversized and agitated Czech dominating the chamber and complaining that there are no more spaces available while a woman, the allegoric symbol of Vienna, lady Vindobona, looks anxiously into the chamber which indicates Viennese apprehension in regard to this Czech impudence. Also interesting is the caption 'Reconciliation' which is suggesting that the Czechs have no interest in working with the Germans to find positive solutions to Austria's national problems but would rather dominate proceedings in order to forward their national agenda. This is further emphasized with the writing on his trousers which label him as a stereotypical example of Czech Parliamentarians as the 'Sprit of Disharmony.'

244 In another front-page picture from June 21, 1900, Kikeriki again gave readers a symbolic representation of troublemaking Czechs in Parliament. Under the title: 'In unserem Parlament' a Czech is standing in the house armed with horns and other noise making machinery.
Figure 29: Kikeriki, February 22, 1900, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

The reconciliation: I can see that there is no more space here for me!
In the reconciliation era. A job it will be to achieve an understanding with them there [in Parliament]!
The second picture, above, from a few weeks before also plays on the same theme. Here the artist has drawn a typical Czech, this time complete with the ears of a donkey, standing defiantly like a pouting child blinded and deafened to the needs of Austria with Czech chauvinism, ridiculous notions of Bohemian autonomy and Slavic darkness which suggests a regressive outlook. The symbolism here is that the Czechs are part of the plot to take over Austria with their misguided, chauvinistic and narrow-minded political agenda. Moreover, it is significant that Kikeriki’s editors chose to place these drawings on the front pages as if to emphasize that these traits should be the conclusion that the Germans must draw of the Czechs.

In 1901, this theme was again prominently displayed on the highly visible front page. In the cartoon below from February, the artist has drawn Klofač mischievously filling the bowl in front of a stupefied Minister President Körber, representing the government agenda, to overflowing with Powidl which in this case are indicative of Czech demands for Bohemian state recognition as seen on the jar. The symbolism here is that on the occasion of the Throne speech, the Czechs are yet once more disrupting parliamentary business with their relentless demands for Bohemian autonomy which consume far too much time and detract from government business that Kikeriki’s editors considered to be more important.

Even when the Czech deputies in Parliament ceased their obstructionist tactics, albeit briefly, in the heated atmosphere of the Reichsrat in the hope that they could achieve some of their goals through debate and compromise they were attacked as seen in this drawing which suggests that the Czechs are a lot that cannot be trusted. This is seen in the cartoon that appeared later in 1901. In this drawing a surprised looking Kikeriki stands in disbelief at the metamorphosis of Brunsvik’s little lion, sitting at his chair in the chamber, nicely groomed, attentive, and with his trumpet off to the side apparently not interested in causing problems. This sight, the Czechs willing to eliminate obstructionist tactics is something that he, the Germans, do not recognize.

246 Kikeriki, February 1, 1900, p. 1.
248 Kikeriki, March 17, 1901, p. 1.
At the Throne-speech. So then only a little bit of Povidl!
Figure 32: Kikeriki, March 17, 1901, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Metamorphosis. (On the elimination of obstruction.) Kikeriki: “Oh, my friend! I do not recognize this!”
This brief interlude did not last for long and the attacks against Czech representatives were soon renewed. In the next drawing from November, we see a malicious little Wenzel, again armed with his trusty noisemaker, carrying out what the editors interpreted to be the main task of the Czechs: to thwart the plans of the government and create a "Friedhof," cemetery.\textsuperscript{249} In essence, the Czechs again stand accused here of killing all necessary work in Austria, necessary in the opinion of Kikeriki's editors, as symbolized in the governmental documents he is festooning with crosses including the Ausgleich negotiations, tax reform, the economy, unemployment and, very significantly, Austrian and German politics.

This notion that the Czechs were to blame for nothing being accomplished in Parliament was made clear to the Viennese in an earlier picture from February titled, "Seifenblasen Politik,“ ‘Soap bubble politics.’ In this cartoon, a concerned Kikeriki warns Minister President Körber, "Plag’ Dich net, Bubi, der böhmisch Wind geht z’ stark!" ‘Don’t bother my friend, the Czech wind is blowing too strong!’ and the picture shows Körber blowing bubbles representing government work being vigorously blown away from the house by a naughty Wenzel.\textsuperscript{250}

As we can see, these attacks were relentless and the theme was repeated again in December of 1902. Under the title of „Czechische (sic) Falschheit,“ ‘Czech falseness,’ the artist drew Wenzel symbolically disrupting the work of government by turning upside down figures representing „Verfassung, Österreich, Körber and Parlamentarismus,“ the Constitution, Austria, Minister President Körber and Parliament.\textsuperscript{251} I believe that by this time, late 1902, many readers of Kikeriki were probably now convinced that the Czechs were the major instigators of obstruction that led to government inaction and Körber’s reliance on Law 14 to pass necessary legislation.

Although this is quite a jump in years, the next depiction relating to the Czechs hindering business in Parliament is seen in the drawing on the next page from 1905. In

\textsuperscript{249} Kikeriki, November 10, 1901, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{250} Kikeriki, February 14, 1901, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{251} Kikeriki, December 28, 1902, p. 3.
The main task of the Czechs is, as Kramář says, to thwart the plans of the Government! And so they wish to have a cemetery!
this picture stereotypical Czech deputies jeer and smile menacingly at poor Minister President Baron Paul Gautsch locked in the political padded cell. They have the key to the situation and this suggests that before they will release him he must acquiesce to Czech demands.

Besides indicating that the Czechs are disrupting progress being made in Parliament, this picture also suggests that the Czechs had a manipulating influence on the Austrian Minister Presidents from Badeni right up to Count Richard Bienerth that produced results viewed as detrimental to German interests. We have seen indications of this in a few of the drawings above, when Badeni was attacked for the *Sprachverordnung* and its potential damage to German hegemony.

Körber was also attacked for following what the Germans perceived to be a similar policy and was not spared criticism as seen in the drawing from 1904. Here his role of a mediator in the Czech-German conflict, pictured as a marionette theatre, is to steady the innocent and powerless German rabbit to be bashed by the hammer wielding Wenzel as a group of Czechs in the audience laughs heartily. What is also significant about this picture is that the reconciliation as directed by the Minister President is labelled as a 'sausage' comedy, Viennese slang for utter nonsense, that one would expect to see along the freak show midway in the Prater exhibition grounds.

Gautsch received similar treatment in the next picture from 1906 when he proposed his Austrian election reforms to introduce universal manhood suffrage. The editors of *Kikeriki* opined that these changes were going to be the end of German representation in Parliament, and the destruction of the German speaking bourgeoisie, as symbolized by a very *bürgerlich* looking Michel, complete with the dunce cap the condemned were often forced to wear, being led to his execution by Gautsch enthusiastically supported by Wenzel and Stanislaus, the allegorical symbol of the

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253 *Kikeriki*, June 23, 1904, p. 4.
On the [Parliamentary] situation. The key to the situation lies in the hands of the Czechs.
Körber's mediating role in the new reconciliation 'wurst' comedy.
Proposal for the May Execution. Perhaps it would arouse more interest once Gausch introduces his new election reform!
In 1908, Beck was also criticized in a similar manner. In the next drawing he is pictured as a trained dog being coaxed by Wenzel to jump through the hoop representing Czech privileges.255

The editorial line always maintained this consistent course because this style of drawing echoes a caricature of Badeni in April of 1897 with him and the Czech lion as animal trainers forcing the German Michel, stylized as a poodle, to jump through a hoop.256 Bienerth also received criticism in a front-page cartoon from 1909, where he is shown to be far too conciliatory to the Czechs. Here an apprehensive Kikeriki is asking Lueger what he thinks about the impudent attitude of the Minister President who has removed the muzzle from the little Bohemian lion, complete with his pot crown, and feeding him a sausage symbolic of language privileges for the Czech clubs in Vienna.257 The removal of the muzzle is also significant in that it represents the willingness of Bienerth to acquiesce to the outrageous demands of the Viennese Czechs. The other meaning of this picture relates to the theme which will be discussed below, that of the Czech presence in the city. German speaking Viennese who were regular readers of Kikeriki would have believed that this picture spoke the truth about the Czech numbers in the city and that the complacency towards this and the disinterested attitudes of the Minister Presidents in regard to the Czech challenge to German hegemony needed to be rectified immediately.

As we can see, these cartoons all suggest that the Czechs were negatively influencing the Minister Presidents and Parliament to serve their own agenda in opposition to the agenda of continued German political hegemony and hence an agenda for the good of Austria. In response to the threat that this potentially meant to the Germans came a drawing in late 1909 suggesting that the Czechs were trying to selfishly

254 Kikeriki, May 3, 1906. The reforms were passed and the 1907 election was the first election that eliminated the Curia system which had favoured the Germans.
255 Kikeriki, April 9, 1908, p. 1.
256 Kikeriki, April 22, 1897, p. 1.
Figure 37: Kikeriki, April 9, 1908, p. 1. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

The Parliamentary situation. Beck stands on the verge—like so.
In the Vienna Restaurant. *Kikeriki*: “Hey waiter, what do you say about this impudence?”
So this would be the goal of the Czech masters. Michel: “May I take a brick?”
advance and hinder the Germans. Here Kikeriki's editors are trying to make this clear by showing that Michel must humbly beg for a brick to continue building Austria from a dominant and defiant looking Czech who is controlling, with his faithful guard lion, the symbolic workshop of Austria, indicative of German tax dollars, to serve the Czech nation exclusively.

Figure 40: Kikeriki, February 24, 1910, p. 2. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

The appointment of the Cabinet in accordance with the wishes of the Czechs.

The last cartoon to be analyzed relating to the negative influence the Czechs were having on the business of government was printed in 1910. This little drawing is incredibly revealing and loaded with symbolic meaning that attacks not only the attitudes of the Czech representatives in Parliament but also incriminates and criticizes the whole Czech nation. Under the title of “the Construction of the Cabinet as desired by the Czechs,” the Czechs wish to fill the posts to pursue their damaging programme. The Railway Minister, Eisenbahnminister, symbolizes the Czechs wishing to have a monopoly on all of the positions. The Justice Minister, Justizminister, is ‘Young Czech’ representative Kramar turning justice on its head presumably to illegally serve Czech needs. The Minister of Public Worship and Instruction, Kultusminister, is a Czech attacking German interests by smashing up the German Casino in Prague suggesting

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259 Kikeriki, February 24, 1910, p. 2.
these attacks have now become an essential part of the Czech’s damaging nationalist policy. The Defence Minister, Landesverteidigungsminister, is Klofač standing on the Serbian Border, which was engaged in the nasty and trivial Pig War with Austria, which suggests anti-Austrian treachery. And, lastly, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Handelsminister, is a Czech greedily taking all the goods for himself.

Although most of these cartoons refer to the actions of Czech politicians in Parliament and manipulation of the Minister Presidents, they must be considered to be major influences on the changes in Viennese attitudes towards the Czechs in the city. These cartoons symbolized that the interests of the Czechs were pitted against those of the Germans and Austria, which surely helped create and sustain a level of resentment against them and made the Germans aware that ‘others’ lived among them and had to be challenged. Of course, the attitudes of the Czechs in Vienna were never taken into consideration because regardless of their actual opinions in regard to Austria and their desire to peacefully assimilate into the Viennese milieu, they were by default associated with these kinds of negative depictions of the Czech nation in Austria.
Czechs in the City.

Prior to 1897, the Czech threat to the city did not even register as a major concern in the pages of Kikeriki. Surely this had much to do with the fact that Lueger, who had yet to be confirmed as the de jure Mayor, although he held the title de facto, had assured his faithful Viennese that the city was German and would maintain its German character. Lueger held the belief that Vienna was a world of its own in Austria but also believed that “anyone who was a good Viennese was also a good German [and insisted] newcomers acknowledge and accept the values and cultural practices set down by the original owners.”260 Moreover, in the early years of his almost absolute authority in Vienna, he consistently avoided creating controversy by attacking the Czechs who were established in the city because, as we have seen, they often supported him. Moreover, he also resisted attacking the new migrants coming to the city because, as a Viennese and a shrewd politician, he knew that they would eventually assimilate and that maintaining a benevolent attitude toward them it would mean votes for his party in the future.

However, beginning with the Sprachverordnung there was a shift in opinion towards the Czechs in the city. They became the enemy within with the potential power to upset the German character of Vienna. Referring back to Chapter two, we can see that this notion was absolute nonsense in reality when we analyze the statistical data which would lead one to the conclusion that they could have never usurped the power of the Germans in Vienna even if that had been their ultimate goal.

Despite Lueger’s assurances that Vienna would remain a German city, buttressed by new laws that required those who came to the city to swear an oath to accept and preserve the “German character of the city,”261 many felt that not enough was being done to protect the city from losing its Germanness. Much of this, again, was a reaction to the tension in Vienna which had happened in the summer and autumn of 1897, but even people who were aware of the reality of the situation in Vienna in regard to the actual

260 Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis, p. 215. See also pp. 211-235 for Lueger’s opinions about the German character of Vienna.
261 Ibid., p. 216.
Czech numbers overreacted and warned of the danger that the city would lose its German character and become more of a national polyglot. For example, Michael Hainisch who was familiar with the actual statistics considering that he wrote two books on the Germans in Austria, and should have been more objective, commented in 1909: "It would be very unpleasant for us if Vienna at this time became like Constantinople." What we shall see below is that Kikeriki negatively portrayed the city’s Czech population in order to make people aware of the threat that they posed to its German character. No longer were they seen as an industrious and hard-working minority striving to find their niche in the Viennese milieu.

As mentioned, 1897 was the year when attitudes towards the Czechs transformed and commentary against them began almost immediately in Kikeriki. In the drawing below from July 1897, the artist has drawn two Czechs happily constructing some pilgrimage memorials outside Vienna which is seen in the background. The picture symbolizes the ordinances, being decorated with the Bohemian lion, and Baron Count Kielmansegg’s Administrative decrees were being happily received by the Czech population of the city. The interesting point here is that they are drawn as pilgrimage points, which suggests that there are significant Czech numbers in the city who will happily come to visit these memorials symbolizing their rising influence in the city at the expense of German interests.

In 1898, a small cartoon on the third page gave the Viennese further notice that the Czechs were a powerful and wrongly influential force in the city. In this cartoon under the title: "Die Czechen (sic) in Wien müssen sich bessere Positionen erringen," ‘the Czechs in Vienna must achieve a better position.’ In this little drawing the artist

262 "Es wäre für uns höchst unerfreulich, wenn aus Wien mit der Zeit eine Art Konstantinopel würde." Quoted in Brix, p. 129.
263 Kikeriki, July 15, 1897, p. 4.
264 Kielmansegg was the Governor of Lower Austria and he passed this decree which opened the door for bilingual Czechs to be eligible to apply for civil service jobs in the province. He had been earlier criticized by most civic parties in 1890 when he created Greater Vienna which they felt would benefit the Social Democrats. How this would happen when most workers were in the lowest and underrepresented fourth curia is a mystery.
265 Kikeriki, March 10, 1898, p. 3.
Wiener Marterln.
has drawn a stereotypical Czech pointing to the scene behind him depicting a group of Czechs riding around triumphantly in the carriage of the mayor of the city of Vienna. In the opinion of Kikeriki the Czechs have improved their position far too much. A drawing similar to this was published in 1909 without a title or a caption, but the picture contained enough symbolism to get the very disturbing point across to the Viennese that the Czechs had achieved a significant level of influence. The drawing shows a humble Kikeriki doffing his hat and bowing graciously to a Czech as he passes by on his way to city hall pictured in the background.

In 1899 a revealing drawing, again prominent on the cover page, was published. It was meant to warn people of the number of Czechs in Vienna and their negative and intrusive influence. In this picture, Kikeriki, speaking to a contented looking Lueger, points to a package symbolizing Czech propaganda in Vienna and implores that he must look up and see the signs of Czech influence all around him, in his city, and insists that he must stop it. The message here is quite explicit, Czech presence in the city is everywhere symbolized by the Czech happily holding a Socol (sic) flag, a sign advertising a ‘national house’ and on the wall Beseda is written. It seems that this picture had a few purposes: first to show people what indicates a substantial Czech presence and, second, to convince people that they should also mention to the good Bürgermeister that he must be more vigilant when dealing with the Czech population in Vienna who pollute the city with their highly visible presence. We saw above that Kikeriki also made this friendly warning to Lueger in August of 1909 with the drawing of the overflowing Powidl in the Vienna kitchen.

266 Kikeriki, August 29, 1909, p. 2.
267 Kikeriki, August 6, 1899, p. 1.
268 See notes 191, 204 and 205 above. I do not think that there can be any doubt that Lueger was consistently supported by the editors of Kikeriki despite these drawings showing him to be unconcerned with the Czech problem. I have shown in a few drawings that he was hailed as the saviour of the city and his tenth anniversary and death in 1910 were celebrated with extended editions of the paper. Moreover, as mentioned, he made it almost impossible for them to have any significant political power. This is best seen in the October 23, 1904 issue of Kikeriki with a full-page picture congratulating the Mayor on his 60th birthday as well as 4 pages of wishes from his faithful Viennese.
Look up Mr. Mayor (Lueger)- could you stop this!
The highest theatre! At city hall. In the Carl’s Theatre.
The other drawing above is indicative of the warnings Kikeriki’s editors were making to Lueger and the people in 1903. In this picture the artist has drawn an upset Viennese complaining to Lueger who in turn promises in the Rathaus that he is protecting the German character Vienna. However, when our good German Bürger makes his way to the Imperial and Royal Carl’s Theatre on the Praterstraße he sadly turns away because the performance is in Czech.

In June of the same year there was this little drawing alluding to the Czech numbers in the city and their influence. Under the title „Ein Vindobona=Museum nach tausend Jahren,“ "In the Museum of Vienna in one thousand years time," we see two stereotypical Jews being denied access to the Rathaus and Klofač holding a donation pot for the Sokols, the Czech equivalent of the Arbeiterturnvereine, workers athletic clubs, which were suspected by German nationalists in Vienna of disseminating pro-Czech and anti-German propaganda. This alone is important because it indicates that the Czechs had the audacity and ability to solicit donations under the noses of the Germans. However, the most important symbol is the figurine in the middle, the people’s tribune from the tenth district, Favoriten. Here the artist has drawn a typical Czech as a political leader.

Figure 44: Kikeriki, June 7, 1903, p. 2. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

\[269\text{ Kikeriki, May 7, 1903, p. 4.} \]

\[270\text{ Kikeriki, June 7, 1903, p. 2.} \]
symbolizing that when visitors come to the museum at some time in the future, they will see this little figure and conclude from this archaeological evidence that Czechs, not Germans, maintained a powerful political influence in that district which was untrue.

Two more drawings which emphasized the point about the Czechs in Favoriten were published in 1906. The first, under the title, "Vor der Favoritner Remise," 'In front of the Favoriten coach house,' the artist has drawn a group of Czechs dominating the scene with no sign of anything German. This picture is significant because, despite the fact that it is only a coach house, it suggests that the Czechs have significant numbers in the district. But also important is that it indicates that the Czechs have now infiltrated a very large, well-established and powerful Viennese institution, the guild of the Fiaker drivers which numbered well over a thousand by this time. These drivers were legendary in Vienna and to think that Czech migrants were taking these jobs from good German-speaking Viennese would have created a sensation not only among the people but also it would have made the guild more aware that the German character of this institution must be preserved.

The second drawing indicating that Czech numbers in Favoriten were dangerously high was published in July. Under the title, "Auf der Südbahn," 'at the south station,' which is located in the tenth district, a rowdy looking group of Czechs are dominating the first class sections of the train symbolizing the level of power they have achieved at the expense of the Germans. Yes, this particular district did have the highest total number of Czechs in the city. In fact Favoriten had a Czech version of the Prater exhibition ground which existed in the second district, Leopoldstadt, der böhmischer Prater, but as argued in chapter two above, they were predominantly poor workers and newly arrived to the city with minimal political influence, economic power and little desire to cause a stir.

Returning to 1904, Kikeriki included this drawing, following, which was meant to emphasize that Czechs were in the city and that they were a negative minority with little

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271 Kikeriki, May 20, 1906, p. 2
272 Kikeriki, July 26, 1906, p. 3.
to contribute and no intention of respecting the German character of Vienna. In this picture under the title ‘Provocation,’ the artist has drawn a representation of the statue that the Czechs should erect on their clubhouses in the city which is the Bohemian lion savagely attacking a defenceless Michel. The symbolism here is again quite clear suggesting that the Czechs are a provocative, aggressive and destructive force in the city intent on establishing themselves permanently and then attacking the Germans from within.

Figure 45: Kikeriki, April 21, 1904, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

Provocation! When one complies and then allows the Czechs to build a club in the middle of the heart of the city, then the Viennese demand that the Czechs decorate their club with this symbol.

The last drawing relating to the negative Czech presence in the city comes from 1908. Here the editors were again emphasizing the point that the Czechs have achieved a level of power in the city at the expense of the Germans and, furthermore, it was probably intended to convince the German Viennese that the Czechs are a little too brash. In this

273 Kikeriki, April 21, 1904, p. 3.
274 Kikeriki, July 16, 1908, p. 4.
drawing under the title of 'Serious situation,' the artist has drawn the Bohemian lion placing his 'crown' on the steeple of St. Stephen’s Cathedral in the centre of Vienna. The symbolism here is that the Czechs are now represented in such numbers that they have the ability to extend their national ambitions into the heart of the city and conquer and desecrate the sacred Viennese Stefl.\textsuperscript{275}

Figure 46: Kikeriki, July 16, 1908, p. 4.  
(Used by permission of the ÖNB).

This notion that the Czechs were usurping power from the Germans in Vienna was, as I have argued above, false and it represents an extension of the larger theme of defensive German nationalism since the absolute number of Czechs was too low and the economic position of the vast majority would never have permitted them to challenge the Christian Social domination of the Rathaus. Lueger’s voting laws and the continued existence of the curial system in Vienna insured this. However, when people are exposed to false information long enough, they sometimes come to believe that it may be true and the violence against them which continued to increase after 1897 is indicative of these changed attitudes.

\textsuperscript{275}This is the diminutive name the Viennese use for St. Stephen’s Cathedral in the heart of the Inner city.
Kikeriki's Calls for a German Response.

So far, the discussion has focused on how the Czechs in Vienna, as well as those migrating to the city, were depicted in Kikeriki which, in short, consistently portrayed them in an unflattering and negative manner. They were seen as an unpatriotic and nationalist horde of manipulating simpletons intent on overwhelming the city, stealing employment and altering its German character. In essence, a dangerous group whose threat had to be challenged and ultimately defeated: The castle must be defended!

In this last section, we will see how the editors contributed to this defensive campaign and by both supporting actions against the Czech minority and also by persuading the German Viennese that the best way to meet this threat was to attack the Czechs and make them realize that Vienna was a German city and it was going to stay that way. What was suggested to the Germans by the editors of Kikeriki would not always be blows as advocated by Mommsen, but the journal consistently maintained a defiant and vigilant defensive posture.

Once again, our point of departure to analyze the German defensive campaign was with the Sprachverordnung. The first drawing related to this theme was published in June of 1898 and it was meant to symbolize that Austria was German and it would stay that way. Here the artist has drawn a confident Kikeriki showing a stunned looking Klofač, carrying a pick-axe and shovel symbolizing the Sprachverordnung, that the house of Austria is resting on what a very solid and robust German foundation.276 What the allegory here is meant to represent is that radical Czech nationalism, as symbolized by Klofač, and its tools, the language ordinances, although often shown as being potentially damaging, would be rather pitiful implements to challenge German hegemony in Austria.

Closely related to this was a cartoon published a year later in June of 1899. Under the title and caption, "Die tschechisch Stimme, zum deutschen Programm," 'the Czech voice responding to the German programme,' Michel plays an organ grinder with the

276 Kikeriki, June 12, 1898, p. 3.
The “House of Austria” rests on a German foundation.

‘Program of the Germans’ written on it while the Bohemian lion wails in obvious pain.277

In essence, both of these drawing suggest that German Austria will not acquiesce to Czech demands and, furthermore, compromise with the Czechs will not be included in the German programme.

As I pointed out above, Czech businesses in Vienna became targets for the more radical elements of the German nationalists. However, violence was not the only means of defence incorporated by the Germans in their battle against the perceived Czech invasion of their city. For many, violence was distasteful and so nationalist leaders had to incorporate a tactic that would not put people in compromising positions with the local police which could taint their reputations, something the Viennese carefully guarded, or result in a hefty fine for property damage. What the nationalists resorted to was a call to boycott establishments owned by Czechs with the intention of driving them out business which would then force them out of the neighbourhood and, hopefully, the city. As a

277 Kikeriki, June 4, 1899, p. 3.
Figure 48: Kikeriki, March 12, 1903, p. 4. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).
result, the slogan, ‘Don’t buy from Czechs!’ became increasingly common.\textsuperscript{278} In the drawing on the previous page from March of 1903, we can see that Kikeriki condoned this method of defensive action.\textsuperscript{279} Here Libuše, the female symbol of the Czechs, smiles happily as she tosses her coin into a Czech bank. The warning here is that the Czechs invest their money exclusively in Czech banks and the call to the Germans is to not patronize these institutions because it permits them to strengthen their position \textit{vis-à-vis} the Germans with German money!

Another theme found in Kikeriki calling the Germans to action against the Czech threat came in the form of suggestions that they should be dealt reprimands for their obtrusiveness. In a drawing from 1901, prominent on the first page, Kikeriki is suggesting that a good method of dealing with the Czechs is to keep them quiet. Under the title and caption, „Für Klofač und Consorten, kan Beißkorb, aber a Canalgitter,“ ‘a sewer grate would be better than a muzzle for Klofač and his colleagues.’\textsuperscript{280} The symbolism here is that first of all, radical Czechs, as represented by Klofač, should be muzzled, and second, it would be far better to use a large iron grate suggesting that they are spewing offensive

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure_49.png}
\caption{Kikeriki, March 27, 1904, p. 9. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{278} Hamann, p. 308.
invective against Austria and to prevent it requires something large and powerful. This could also be interpreted as a call for the German speakers in Vienna to meet the Czechs in the streets whenever they demonstrated and to use force to keep them quiet which many thugs did with increasing regularity in the years leading up to the War.

The drawing above which appeared in March of 1904 is an excellent example of Kikeriki supporting a violent response when dealing with the Czechs. The title and caption urge their readers that, following a Viennese expression, 'Whenever the Czechs complain, then it should rain,' and the picture is quite explicit showing a group of Czechs being pelted mercilessly with missiles. Again, the suggestion here from the editors is that the best way to deal with Czech agitation and indignation when they demonstrate is to meet it with force. It is as though the editors wish to transform this modified expression into an aphorism which would be automatically stated and instantly understood by the German Viennese.

In later issues of this journal, we see this theme often repeated. In a cartoon from August of 1905, the artist called people to action with a drawing evoking a symbolism Austrians would be familiar with. In the picture a group of Germans are throwing some Czechs out of the window of their clubhouse referring to what the Czechs did to two German officials just before the battle of White Mountain in 1618: the famous Defenestration of Prague, when Emperor Ferdinand's ministers, Count Wilhelm Slavata and Count Jaroslav Borzita von Martinic were tossed out of the windows of the Hradčany palace in Prague. Similar to the pictures analyzed above, this drawing seems to condone the use of force, but it further suggests that another way to deal with the Czechs in the city is to forcefully remove them. Opinions like this were eventually repeated in ‘respectable’ and popular Viennese papers like the 'Illustrierte Kronen-Zeitung,' and in

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279 Kikeriki, March 12, 1903, p. 4.
281 Kikeriki, March 27, 1904, p. 9.
282 Kikeriki, August 22, 1905, p. 1. Both survived the fall and depending on what you believe they were saved either by the Virgin Mary, because of their faithful work for the Emperor Ferdinand, the defender of Catholicism, or by landing on a dung heap which cushioned their fall.
1909, the editors suggested to German employers that “throwing out 200 Bohemians is a better national deed than 300 protest rallies and 1,000 shouts of Heil.”

This type of rhetoric, that of removing Czechs from the city, did not abate in the pages of Kikeriki and the theme was revisited in 1910. This drawing under the title, „Nach dem Kometbesuch,“ ‘After the visit by Halley’s Comet,’ an excited Kikeriki calls out to the comet: ‘Hey! You could have taken these also,’ while pointing at a Czech and a Jew standing behind him. The symbolism here is clear: the two scourges of the city must be removed.

The notion of force resurfaced in the journal twice in 1908: one symbolizing thrashing the Czechs in the city and the other suggesting that they should be caged up. The first is a small drawing, below, from May of 1908. Here the artist has drawn an agitated lady Vindobona, striking a Czech who has the impudence to clutch ‘Czech Vienna’ in his hand. As indicated in the title, this is the best settlement for the matter of Vienna and the proliferation of the Czechs in the city. In essence, power must be

Figure 50: Kikeriki, May 28, 1908, p. 2. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

![Cartoon](image)

The best settlement of the matter concerning the Viennese Czechs.

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283 Quoted in Hamann, p. 309.
284 Kikeriki, May 26, 1910, p. 2.
exercised against them to make them comprehend the fact that the Germans control Vienna. The second from June, with the caption, "Im Interesse der Sicherheit," 'in the interest of safety,' shows a 'Viennese' cage with a group of seditious and maniacal looking Czechs trapped within suggesting that if they cannot be removed then they should be vigorously controlled by the city authorities.286

Another aspect of the drawings relating to the German defence of Vienna, was the notion that the city needed to be rescued from the potential Czech takeover. The first drawing relating to this was published quite early after the Sprachverordnung and it referred to excluding the two most potentially destructive elements from the election process, the Czechs and the Jews, thus limiting their power and ability to challenge the Germans. Here Kikeriki is praising Lueger for sanctioning new laws to keep the new migrants out of the voting process as symbolized by him locking the door to the Rathaus.

Figure 51: Kikeriki, April 5, 1900, p. 3. (Used by permission of the ÖNB).

The new municipal voting laws are sanctioned! Lueger: "That is a firm bolt which will protect us from the intrusion of the nomadic elements!"
with these new laws while a stereotypical migrant Jew and Czech look in sadly from the outside.\textsuperscript{287} For the most part, these laws were definitely an over-reaction to the actual level of influence the Czechs could muster to promote their candidates in municipal elections, as we have seen in chapter two, but they gave assurance to the Viennese that potentially harmful elements were barred from forwarding their agenda in the Rathaus.

The next drawing is from 1911, which may seem like quite a jump and indicate that rescuing Vienna, so to speak, was ignored for about ten years, which was not the case as we have seen from the drawings which were interpreted above. Kikeriki's response to the Czech minority as a threatening group in the themes discussed above all contributed to the notion of rescuing Vienna whether it was warning the population of the threat, making them aware who was the enemy, or suggesting that to defeat the 'invader' required a relentless vigilant attitude. I believe that by 1911, many readers of Kikeriki had to be aware of the Czech threat because of the number of times it was a subject in the journal since the Sprachverordnung fourteen years earlier. In my research, I found that it was a subject for Kikeriki's artists one hundred and four times.

In this drawing below from September, we see that Kikeriki is contributing to the cause. In the picture, the mayor, who is now Josef Neumayer, calls out and asks what he, Kikeriki dressed in the uniform of a Viennese Gendarme, is doing there to which he responds that he is removing the white and red Bohemian flag and putting up the red and white Viennese flag where it belongs: flying over city hall.\textsuperscript{288} The symbolism here is quite revealing. The idea of the Czechs as a different and threatening group is symbolized by the fact that the Bohemian flag flew over city hall at all, and the rescue of Vienna is symbolized by a very martial looking Kikeriki preparing to triumphantly re-establish the symbol of German Vienna on its most powerful institution. It is almost as though Kikeriki is declaring victory in the battle against the Czech minority which had been underway

\textsuperscript{286} Kikeriki, June 14, 1908, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{287} Kikeriki, April 5, 1900, p. 3. I referred to these laws in chapter two above. These laws which the Christian Socials passed set three years as the time one must live in the city before being eligible to vote in municipal elections.
\textsuperscript{288} Kikeriki, September 21, 1911, p. 1.
Also a show exercise. Mayor Neumayer: “My dear Kikeriki, what are you doing there?” Kikeriki: “I am taking down the flag of Bohemia and putting up the flag of Vienna where it belongs!”
since 1897. By this time, people were well aware of the Czech threat and an element of
the population was fighting against it wherever they could and often winning, but with
incredibly favourable odds. As pointed out above, after 1909, violence against the Czechs
in Vienna was a common occurrence and it happened all over the city: in the centre
around the Ringstraße and in the suburbs like Fünfhaus, Rudolfsheim Favoriten,
Simmering and Erdberg. Moreover, German associations were fighting for the cause
by distributing propaganda. In a circular letter published in Meidling by the Non-Political
Aryan-German Club of Meidling, they implored the Germans to demand that only
German be spoken and warned the Czechs that there would never be a bilingual
Vienna.

Reactions of this type, by ‘German’ groups, were no doubt welcomed by the
editors of Kikeriki and I believe that we can conclude that the discussion above helps
prove that these editors from 1897 to 1914, Josef Strecha, Karl Ptak, Johann Schröder,
Karl Eisner and Rudolf Sperl, must have played a significant role in creating this divisive
atmosphere which affected not only Vienna, but also in Austria. Of course, as I have
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, it is impossible to provide specific evidence
that would verify my argument that the nationally motivated invective in Kikeriki’s satire
had a major influence on how the German speaking Viennese negatively reacted against
the Czech minority. But here I return to what Allen effectively argues: satire or
‘aggressive joking’ is more than a “harmless release of tension but [a] positive incentive
to group solidarity and thus, in some cases, to collective action.” As we have seen, the
campaign was sustained and consistent, and over time we should be able to argue
effectively that at least some people became increasingly receptive to the propaganda and
accepted it as true. Prior to 1897, the Czechs were another one of the many immigrant
minority groups in the city and afforded the opportunity to make the difficult adjustments

289 In regard to this point I have decided to omit details, but according to Boyer, Jenks and
Hamann, violence against the Czech community was very common. At any of the established
Czech clubs or institutions, a police presence was often necessary to keep the sides divided.
However, despite often being outnumbered, the Czechs, especially the bigger lads connected to
some of the more radical Sokol organizations would fight back which, when reported by the
press, would sway more of those who had maintained an indifferent opinion against them.
290 See Brix, p. 130.
291 Allen, p. 7.
to fit in. However, with the Sprachverordnung German leaders in Vienna imitated the nationally motivated defensive campaign which had previously caused serious damage to Czech-German relations in Bohemia and Moravia and hindered any possibility of cooperation amongst Germans and Slavs in Parliament. Conversely it also contributed to Slav suspicion and mistrust of the motivations of the Germans which they interpreted as resistant to any change or progress if it challenged in any way or form their continued hegemony in Austria. Even Masaryk, who for so long tried to be the voice of reason in the heated Czech-German debates in the Reichsrat, recognized that the German strategy was defensive rather than one of compromise and evolution. As Selver, Masaryk’s first English biographer noted:

> From 1911 onwards, Masaryk’s speeches in the Reichsrat became increasingly mordant as he realized more and more that all his pleas for an enlightened approach to the Austrian administration were useless.\(^{292}\)

The result was that the likelihood that some sort of compromise could be achieved became more and more of a remote possibility, which resulted in Austria becoming a boiling pot of conflicting interests rather than a ‘Schmeltziegel,’ a melting pot, which promoted a common ‘Austrian’ identity which accepted cultural, specifically linguistic, diversity.

Chapter 6. Conclusion.

This analysis is intended to show that German nationalism, as manifested in the malicious campaign of defamation in *Kikeriki*, has to be considered a contributing factor in the deterioration of the relationship between the two largest ethnic nations in Austria, the Germans and the Czechs, which in turn inhibited a cooperative relationship among Austria's and the Habsburg Empire's diverse peoples. We have seen that as a result of changes in the Austrian political structure which increasingly included the non-German nations, German politicians changed their political rhetoric to incorporate a more strongly nationalist line when their attempts at liberalising and centralizing Austria were challenged and ultimately displaced by Franz Joseph's Minister Presidents beginning with Taaffe. German politicians and their supporters perceived that their hegemonic position was in danger and in an effort to maintain their position they made their case of Czech inferiority and sedition as well as exaggerated threats of a potential Slav takeover of positions of power and influence through the pages of this particular journal. Fortunately, their case was aided in Vienna because there was a sizeable minority in the Capital, which could be targeted as the enemy within despite the fact that most of the migrants who came to Vienna, or who had come previously, quietly assimilated.

To be sure, *Kikeriki*, true to its mission as a *humorisches-politisches Volksblatt*, tackled other issues in its pages in the years between 1897 and 1914. The editors ridiculed individuals, states, religious groups, foreign leaders, but never the person of Franz Joseph. Moreover, it also made its readers aware of what it opined to be ludicrous acts of the government which would have been major concerns for its largely bourgeois audience. For example tax increases, especially to pay for frivolous military projects, or challenges to the reliance of the Minister Presidents to use Law 14 to pass legislation were consistently attacked. But as I pointed out in the last chapter, the subject of the Czechs was the number one issue on the minds of the editors between 1897 and 1914.

Unfortunately, the Czech leaders were unable to convince the Germans that political change would be beneficial to Austria. In his 1895 book, *Česká Otazka*, the
Czech Question, Masaryk confirmed that the Czechs should continue to support the Austrian state despite the difficulty they had in convincing the Germans that proportional representation and equality were necessary requirements for the future development and progress of Austria and the whole Dual Monarchy. He made it clear that federalism in Austria-Hungary was not only necessary but also a moral obligation.

By uniting various and European and even Asiatic nations, Austria is humanity on a small scale; the Austrian state is justified only when it brings to realization an idea, that of equality among the given nations and historic lands. Politically speaking, neither a centralistic nor a dualistic, but only a federalistic constitution can justify Austrian existence.293

Even Young Czech leader Kramář, who was often accused, like his more radical peer Klofač, of sedition against the Dual Monarchy because of his connections with the Pan-Slavic movement never really wanted the destruction of the Monarchy but “thought of attaining a . . . federative reorganization of the imperial administration,” according to Hugo Hantsch.294 Unfortunately, rational arguments such as these were ignored by most of the more nationalist-minded political leaders and their supporters in the press and as we saw in the analysis of the drawings published in Kikeriki the last thing the German middle class parties wanted was change that would recognize the Czechs as equal partners in the political evolution of Austria. As Boyer rightly concludes: “all [parties] shared a perverse willingness to forgo positive changes . . . in order to make negative choices ‘against’ their rivals.”295 In essence, “the system became defensively reactive.”296 My intention is to show that Kikeriki, a popular journal, is an extension of the defensive reaction of the German-speaking bourgeoisie as they were the people who were casting the votes in the elections which would give the German parties sufficient numbers in the Reichsrat to thwart the plans of the Czech leaders and the Minister Presidents who consistently tried to enact legislation aimed at conciliating all of the parties involved in the national conflict.

296 Ibid., p. 214.
In the opinion of many Czech political leaders, the reactions of the Germans to the Badeni Decrees and the subsequent radicalization of German agitation against them, made them become increasingly receptive to more radical responses and later to notions of independence. In essence, their support of Austria waned because they could not accept the attitude of the Austrian Germans which was "eaten up with Herrenvolk notions," and driven by a new Kultur "represented by hate complexes, boastfulness and vulgarity." Of course, there was an inherent arrogance within the mind of the German political elite that the Czechs were inferior and thus should have not been granted concessions by the Austrian Minister Presidents which infringed on the Germans' near monopoly of positions of power in Austria; but I believe that the manner in which the Czechs were portrayed in Kikeriki played a part in reinforcing these opinions among the elite and simultaneously creating a negative atmosphere among the Germans in Vienna, specifically the bourgeoisie, which vilified the Czechs. The result was that during the war, the level of mistrust reached crisis proportions and firmly pitted the Czechs and Germans in a struggle for their future goals: independence and a slightly modified version of the status quo respectively.

If one doubts that the situation for the new Czech migrants as well as those who were established in Vienna became increasingly uncomfortable for them as a result of the intensification of the German reaction after 1897, then some statistical evidence may help justify the assertion that German nationalism as manifested in journals such as Kikeriki was a disintegrating force. In the years following the War and the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Czech population in Vienna decreased dramatically. Once Czechoslovakia was recognized as an independent state, the exodus from Vienna was massive. According to Zollmann "after the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic around 200 000 Czechs and Slovaks returned to the newly established ČSR." Yes, enthusiasm for the new state was definitely a pulling force, but the level of discomfort which the defensive national campaign caused for the Czechs in Vienna definitely must be considered a centrifugal force.

297 Whiteside, p. 187.
298 Zollmann, p. 31.
At a dinner given by Johann Strauss, the younger, in the late 1880s at his magnificent palace in the auf der Wieden, the menu was a culinary symbol of ‘Austrianness’ and it consisted of the following:

- Risotto-suppe auf der Triestiner Art
- Fischpökelt-Ungarisch
- Braunbraten mit Zwiebeln-Polnisch
- Seviettenknödel-Böhmisch
- Bachhendeln mit Gurkensalat-Oberösterreich
- Apfelstrudel-Wiener Idealgericht
- Weine: Tokayer, Donauperle; Sliwowitz.  

The suggestion here is that there was indeed a reality of ‘Austria’ as all would have been instantly familiar with all of these dishes and the drink. However, food as a metaphor to represent a common cultural identity had little influence on how the political leaders of all nationalities envisioned the future of the Austria and the Dual Monarchy. One can also extend this to music where everyone in the Monarchy was familiar with the tunes of the Strauss family, or Mozart, or Brahms played by the local garrison band in the central market squares of countless towns in Austria-Hungary. However, as Otto Basil asserted in his essay ‘Panorama of Kakania’s Decline’ written just before the Second World War, there was limited applicability of the expression ‘an Austrian by training’ because the national tension which manifested itself in the political sphere, specifically in regard to language, “a powerful and generally unambiguous national marker,” was stronger than potential unifying elements as ambiguous as food or music and even religion. Even the almost universal reverence for Franz Joseph was unable to alleviate the discord among the nations, much to his dismay. Solomon Wank argues in an excellent recent essay that “there was no coherent Staatsidee that bound together the diverse

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299 Powell, p. 19.
300 Kakania was the slang name adopted by some writers to describe Austria-Hungary, especially Karl Kraus. The name refers to a child’s term for feces and plays on the official title given to Austro-Hungarian governmental organizations: K. und K, kaiserlich und königlich, Imperial and Royal.
301 Quoted in: Powell, p. 16.
domains of the Habsburgs,"\(^{303}\) and referring to a letter written by the Austro-Hungarian military attaché in 1887, Major Ulrich Klepsch we see this concern emphasized: "It seems to me as if only the love of the peoples for the person of the Emperor was the bond, the only one, which held Austria together . . . . That is not good."\(^{304}\)

And in the nineteenth century, when political power was closely associated with the concept of nation and the solidifying and expansion of national identity and influence, the Dual Monarchy had no chance. Austria, with its ethnic national diversity, could never be considered a homogeneous nation and therefore it was weakened and eventually crumbled under the persistent force which nationalism exercised especially in the years leading up to World War One. What helped unite European powers such as France, Britain and Germany had the opposite effect on the Habsburg Empire. Also, the national conflicts within Austria-Hungary foreshadowed the nationally motivated tension that undermined wider European cooperation and ultimately led to the outbreak of War in August of 1914, which would be far more devastating and costly that anything hitherto in the violent history of Europe. Surely, the Dual Monarchy had external enemies which contributed to its defeat in the war and dissolution by the victors in 1919-1920, but I strongly believe that the deterioration of its internal unity which laid the foundations for the ease in which it was chopped up and significantly redefined the map of Central Europe along national lines, however misguided and inaccurate they were in reality. Maybe Karl Kraus was not so far off the mark in the early 1900s when he wrote in his journal *Die Fackel* that the Dual Monarchy, consumed with national tension, was the testing ground for the end of the World.

The ultimate question to ponder at this stage is this: what are the questions that this thesis answers? Moreover, how much does this thesis contribute to the historiography of Austria-Hungary and more specifically to the previous research which has been conducted on the role of nationalism as a contributor to the ultimate dissolution of the Dual Monarchy in the aftermath of the First World War? And finally, does this analysis


\(^{304}\) Quoted in: ibid., p. 139.
answer all of the questions which one may have about the dissolution of Austria-Hungary? In short, I believe that what this thesis has successfully shown is that German nationalism has to be considered a culpable agent in the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and as such it has added to the work recently published by Judson about this particular subject. Yes, it is understood that some may be hesitant to be fully convinced that a satirical journal such as *Kikeriki* could have played such a large role in the transformation of German opinions about the Czechs in Vienna. However, I believe that its sustained and consistent campaign, its easy accessibility for all levels of society, and its use of biting satire, coupled with other forms of propaganda of course, must have at least made people more receptive to the negative picture the Germans wished to paint of the Czechs. I am fully aware that there are some questions that need to be answered, specifically, what was the reaction of the Czechs in Vienna to this increasing level of pressure and did the Czech minority in Vienna conduct themselves in such a manner that the German speakers in the city had no choice but to react with invective and in many cases violence? These answers I do not have but maybe in the future they could be investigated. However, in the case of Vienna, with its long history of immigration and assimilation, I believe that it would be difficult to argue effectively that such a small minority initiated attacks on the German character of the city. If anything when they did fight fire with fire, it was largely a means of protecting themselves and their property.
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