CHANGE IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

by

Nicole Duncan
Bachelor of Arts, University College of the Cariboo 1999

RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Department of
Political Science

© Nicole Duncan 2004

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

June 2004

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL

NAME: Nicole Duncan

DEGREE: Master of Arts (Political Science)

TITLE OF PROJECT: Change in the Theory and Practice of Democratic Citizenship in a Globalizing World

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

CHAIR: Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki
Associate Professor

Professor Maureen Covell
Senior Supervisor

Professor Sandra MacLean
Supervisor

Professor Anil (Andy) Hira
External Examiner
Department of Political Science
Simon Fraser University

DATE APPROVED: ____________________________
Partial Copyright Licence

The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.

The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies.

It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author’s written permission.

The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive.

Bennett Library
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada
ABSTRACT

The theory and practice of citizenship in western liberal-democratic states is changing as a result of globalization and the influence of neo-liberalism. Globalization and neo-liberalism are challenging the post-WWII consensus on the role of the state and encouraging a shift in power from the state to the market and transnational institutions. The consequence of this shift in power corresponds with a reconceptualization not only of the role of the state but also of the theory and practice of democratic citizenship within the state. In other words, the changes associated with this shift in the role of the state brought about by globalization and the influence of neo-liberalism are reconfiguring the citizen-state relationship: challenging the social rights of citizenship theorized by T.H. Marshall and practiced in the Keynesian welfare state policies of the post-WWII period. In practice, global economic integration challenges traditional notions of state sovereignty and policy autonomy, and as a result the notion of accountability of the state to its citizens. This shift in the citizen-state relationship is also creating a new notion of citizenship many scholars refer to as the "consumer citizen". At the very least globalization has encouraged one to rethink citizenship within the state, but it also has resulted in forms of citizenship beyond the state which presents new possibilities for both inclusion and exclusion. The European Union and the development of a European citizenship is one such site of potential citizenship beyond the state. The role of civil society is also considered vis-à-vis its ability to redress the democratic deficit created as decision-making moves beyond the state where democratic citizenship is practiced to international structures without comparable levels of democratic legitimation. This project argues that citizenship is a useful perspective through which to gain insight into the condition of democratic governance in a globalizing world; and acts as a catalyst that encourages one to begin a normative discussion regarding the future direction of globalization in relation to the theory and practice of democratic citizenship.
DEDICATION

For my mom, Grandpa and Grandma, individuals who lead with their hearts and their minds.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my senior supervisor, Maureen Covell for her enthusiastic interest and valuable guidance throughout the duration of this project. Thanks also to my second supervisor Sandra MacLean for her encouragement and keen attention to detail. Last but not least, thank you to my brother Caj, for his advice and assistance proof-reading.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ............................................................................................................................................... ii  
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... iii  
Dedication ........................................................................................................................................... iv  
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ v  
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................... vi  
Quotations ........................................................................................................................................... vii  
INTRODUCTION: Change in the Theory and Practice of Democratic Citizenship in a Globalizing World ................................................................................................................................. 1  
   Organization of the Project .................................................................................................................... 4  
CHAPTER ONE: Conceptualizing Globalization, Neo-liberalism and Citizenship .................................... 8  
   Citizenship: An Evolving Notion ........................................................................................................... 8  
   Globalization and the Influence of Neo-liberalism .......................................................................... 16  
   The Globalization Debate ..................................................................................................................... 18  
   Globalization and Democracy ............................................................................................................. 20  
   Neo-liberal Economic Globalization, the State and Policy Autonomy ............................................... 21  
CHAPTER TWO: Reconfiguring the Citizen-State Relationship ............................................................. 25  
   The Shifting Citizen-State Relationship ............................................................................................... 25  
   Neo-liberal Economic Globalization, the State and the Challenge to Social Rights ......................... 33  
   Neo-liberalism, Marketization and the Citizen-Consumer .................................................................. 40  
CHAPTER THREE: Citizenship Beyond the State: The Case of the European Union ............................ 44  
   The Architecture of EU Citizenship: Inclusion and Exclusion ......................................................... 45  
   EU Integration and Citizenship Beyond the State? .......................................................................... 49  
   Democratic Deficits and the Future of a European Citizenship ....................................................... 57  
   The Role of European Courts in the Development of EU Citizenship ............................................. 63  
CHAPTER FOUR: Democratic Deficits and The Role of Civil Society ............................................... 67  
CONCLUSION: The Condition of Democratic Citizenship in a Global Context: Consequences and Future Possibilities ......................................................................................................................... 79  
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................... 83
[It is the relationship between sovereignty and subjectivity that is,] so clearly the source of the most difficult conceptual and practical dilemmas of modern politics...modern politics might even be defined in terms of the multiplicity of struggles to establish an appropriate grounding for this relationship, and to refine and restructure it in response to all the demands and pressures of modernization and internationalization that have ensued...(R.B.J. Walker.ix).

The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is solved (Immanuel Kant,47).
INTRODUCTION:
CHANGE IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Changes in the theory and practice of democratic citizenship have been an integral part of
the development of the liberal democratic state. In western liberal democracies,
citizenship as a concept and practice has grown up in relation to the nation-state. In this
context, the influence of economic, political and cultural globalization and the transfer of
political authority outside the state to international structures or through integration in
transnational bodies like the European Union raises the question as to the extent to which
these changes also require us to reconceptualize citizenship both in theory and practice.
Certainly the dominant influence of neo-liberalism on the process of globalization
encourages a reconceptualization of the role of the state in relation to the market and as a
result has a direct effect on the theory and practice of membership within the state:
citizenship. This impact requires us to assess both the normative and empirical
implications of a theoretical and practical change to citizenship.

While it is not the purpose of this research project to advocate state-based notions of
citizenship, it is necessary to realize that the very foundations of modern western
democratic governance rest on notions of citizenship developed around membership
within the state (Tilly, 1997; 1999). Political theorists from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
Hegel, Mill, and Marshall all developed notions of citizenship in relation to the state. As
has been well documented, globalization poses considerable challenges to the role of the
state (see Strange, 1996; McBride, 2001; Clarkson, 2002). While the state is still the
primary granter and guarantor of the rights and obligations of citizenship, in the context
of globalization the dominance of the state over both the notions and formal practice of
citizenship is no longer absolute. For instance, global migration, the rise of transnational
issues like the environment, the creation of supranational bodies like the European Union
and World Trade Organization (WTO) and the codification of international human rights norms have prompted an increasing recognition of citizenship as a transnational matter. In this context it is necessary to investigate the actual and potential empirical and theoretical implications of globalization in its various forms for citizenship. While an in-depth discussion of the extent to which globalization constrains or challenges state autonomy is beyond the scope of this project it is important to both recognize that this debate is ongoing, and acknowledge that it provides part of the context of the following research, in so far as challenges to state autonomy also have the effect of transforming the citizen-state relationship and traditional notions regarding the structuring of political authority and accountability of the sovereign to its citizens. Further, this project is not so much concerned with engaging in an in-depth analysis of debates regarding the extent to which the state has lost power or why states voluntarily implement and take part in international agreements or institutions; but rather with the effect of such actions on the citizen-state relationship, and thus the theory and practice of citizenship which is derived in relation to membership within states.

One thing that studies of globalization highlight is that the condition of citizenship both in theory and practice is being changed. Many studies of globalization focus on describing global relations and structures. However, few studies explicitly utilize citizenship as a framework to investigate the meaning and impact of globalization; nor do many studies actively pursue an analysis of the changes to citizenship brought about by globalization and neo-liberalism, the dominant ideology associated with global development. It is the purpose of this research project to explore citizenship theory and practice in relation to the influence of globalization and neo-liberalism. This analysis is primarily concerned with the evolving nature of citizenship in western liberal democracies such as Canada and the European Union. In particular, the advent of European Union citizenship has increased interest in the concept of citizenship as a framework for analysing the relationship between globalization and democratic

---

1 It is important to recognize that an ongoing analysis of the extent to which state power is constrained by neo-liberal globalization is essential in relation to citizens' capacity to effectively formulate their demands and determine who or what institutions they should direct them to.
governance. Debate surrounding a perceived decline of state sovereignty and policy autonomy in the face of globalization and the adoption of neo-liberal approaches to governance raise questions about the relationship between the citizen and state. The resulting debate focuses on the normative question of whether the state is the only legitimate source through which to conceive and maintain democratic citizenship. Some of the central questions that I address include: If state autonomy is being challenged by globalization what are the alternatives to notions of democratic citizenship defined and practiced within the state? Do these alternatives threaten or enhance the practice of democratic governance and citizenship? Are new or other forms of inclusion and exclusion and rights and obligations produced as a result of the effect of globalization and neo-liberalism on the theory and practice of citizenship? The following analysis will show that both the theory and practice of citizenship, as conceived in relation to the democratic welfare state are being transformed, both by globalization and by the dominant neo-liberal ideology associated with it. This shift provides both constraints on and new opportunities for the expression of citizenship.

A central assumption of this analysis is that, while globalization and neo-liberalism affect notions of citizenship on the level both of theory and of political practice, and while these changes may reshape notions regarding citizen rights and obligations and provide opportunities for both inclusion and exclusion, the state remains the primary agent for the expression of democratic citizenship (through which citizenship rights and obligations are achieved and maintained). The state is still the primary locus of legitimate authority in so far as supranational institutions have not developed structures with comparable levels of democratic legitimation to be considered a viable alternative through which citizenship rights may be achieved and maintained. While supranational institutions wield

2 Debate regarding liberal democratic citizenship focuses on the moral principles governing admission to membership. The liberal conception of citizenship focuses on questions of formal membership, inclusion and exclusion, or how one becomes a citizen (e.g.: what entry requirements must be met). According to Ronald Beiner, at best a liberal theory of citizenship can envisage a more extensive civic membership, but what is needed is theoretical reflection, in the tradition of the classic theories (e.g. Aristotle and Rousseau), on possibilities of a more intensive civic experience (Ronald Beiner,112). Thus the meaning of inclusion and exclusion can be extended to include not only consideration of formal membership, but as an analytical tool to highlight normative questions regarding what the rights and obligations of citizenship should be and who should be included in them.
authority in so far as their ability to impose obligations on states and by extension citizens, a comparable set of rights is not extended by supranational institutions to state citizens. Instead, the rights guaranteed by supranational institutions are extended mainly to transnational corporations. For instance, the form of global integration which involves the power to impose obligations on states primarily entails economic integration and the entrenching of the economic rights of capital through regional or global trade arrangements. This extension of the rights of capital is supported by the development of powerful international institutions which enforce them (e.g., International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Bank) (see Falk, 2003). While the extension of citizenship rights at the international level does exist, it is still in its infancy and so far deals mainly with rights against rather than rights to. For instance, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art. 14, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Art. 24(3), International Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) and the Geneva Refugee Convention (1951) are all part of the international extension of citizenship rights. However, the application of these international norms depends on the willingness of states to enforce them. The European Union is the only transnational institution that is developing a model of integration on more than simply an economic or security rationale. However, the theory and practice of European Union citizenship is also still in its infancy. Therefore, the EU will be assessed in terms of its potential for developing a notion of democratic citizenship beyond the state, in light of the existence of a democratic deficit at the European level, and the influence of neo-liberalism on the direction and rationale behind integration.

Organization of the Project

The first chapter of the project presents an examination of globalization, neo-liberalism and citizenship, the main concepts which provide the context of the project. The first section includes an analysis of the concept of citizenship as an evolving notion and addresses some of the major theoretical premises associated with this concept. A central assumption of the analysis is that citizenship is an evolving notion that develops in relation to the political, economic, social and cultural context in which it is played out. While citizenship provides a useful perspective from which to analyse many social
problems and questions, there is agreement that citizenship is a contested concept. Its meaning has never been unequivocal. The evolving meaning of citizenship in western liberal democracies will be considered in the context of the development of the state and an ongoing contest over the proper allocation of political authority. In other words, insofar as citizenship is an evolving notion so too is the state.

The following sections focus on the nature of the debate concerning the meaning and influence of globalization and neo-liberalism on democratic governance. These sections attempt to define globalization and neo-liberalism, discuss the relationship between the two and point to their influence on state autonomy and democratic processes. The final part of this chapter addresses neo-liberal economic globalization as it relates to the issue of a possible decline in state policy autonomy. While international agreements and law have the potential to produce negative and positive outcomes with regards to the theory and practice of citizenship these arrangements challenge notions of democratic accountability, consent of the governed and citizen participation in, and democratic control over decision-making. The capacity of citizens and their governments to influence the national economy for their collective economic and social purposes is reduced. In other words, the notion of a 'national community of fate' that both rules itself and should be answerable solely to itself has come under strain (Crawford and Marks, 82).

The second chapter highlights the changing nature of both the state and citizenship. Since modern notions of citizenship have developed in relation to the state, a shift in the role of the state also has an effect on the theory and practice of citizenship. Specifically, since the late 1970's the redistributive Keynesian welfare state model has been challenged by the growing influence of neo-liberalism's market model of the state. In light of this shift in the role of the state, the chapter outlines a corresponding shift in the citizen-state relationship away from T.H. Marshall's notion of social citizenship which was the guiding principle through which citizenship was restructured after WWII. Marshall's vision of social citizenship is contrasted with the neo-liberal view of the citizen-state relationship and the corresponding challenge to citizen's social rights and the rise of the citizen as consumer.
The third chapter considers the EU experience in so far as it may serve as an example of the potential implications for the theory and practice of citizenship in a situation of both formal economic and growing political integration beyond the state. The creation of a transnational form of governance as expressed in the EU is considered vis-à-vis its effect on democratic citizenship at both the national and European levels. First, an assessment of the formal rights and entitlements associated with EU citizenship provides some insight into the extent to which citizenship at the EU level challenges national dominance over the articulation of citizenship. This chapter argues that although EU citizenship has created some opportunities for inclusion, national dominance over the formal definition of citizenship remains largely intact. The chapter also considers EU integration through two analytical lenses. This first lens focuses on the ad hoc nature and dominance of neo-liberalism on EU integration. This lens highlighting the fact that a transfer of authority away from the state to an economically motivated EU challenges member states’ policy autonomy (e.g.: specifically economic policy), which threatens both the basis of democratic accountability in the state-citizen relationship and the notion of social citizenship that developed after WWII. The second lens regards the EU as a constitutional federation of states. This lens highlights the democratic deficit inherent in EU institutions and the extent to which a transfer of national policy-making autonomy to the EU level undermines the principle of sovereignty, endangering the basis of democratic governance. In this environment both lenses also illuminate somewhat unexpected opportunities for citizens to challenge current conceptions of their rights and obligations and the basis of inclusion and exclusion within the state. The final section in the chapter addresses the influence of the European Courts on the theory and practice of democratic citizenship in the EU. This section finds that although European Courts may play a role in protecting citizen’s rights, at present it provides limited protection for state-bound citizens.

The last chapter, on civil society, considers the extent to which proposals based on the involvement of civil society to redress democratic deficits created by the proliferation of decision-making at the multilateral or transnational level (which lack democratic legitimation) are sufficient. In terms of civil society acting as a replacement or substitute
for the institutions that allow for the exercise of democratic citizenship or a representative of citizens in multilateral relations, two main problems arise: first civil society is not directly accountable to citizens, and second, the state is not directly accountable to civil society. In other words, civil society involvement in its current state cannot replace or act as a substitute for institutions that allow for the exercise of democratic citizenship.
CHAPTER ONE:
CONCEPTUALIZING GLOBALIZATION,
NEO-LIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship: An Evolving Notion

In this last section the meaning of citizenship in western liberal democratic states will be considered. A central assumption of the analysis is that citizenship is an evolving notion that develops in relation to the political, economic, social and cultural context in which it is played out. Our era has been described in various ways including “postmodern” and “global”. Whatever the value of these definitions, the fact that they highlight economic, political, social and cultural transformations is important since during such times of transformation, citizenship defined as both theory and practice becomes contested. In other words, as Isin and Wood suggest, “...when there is a contest in the field of political and social power, a similar contest takes place in the field of theory and ideas” (Isin and Wood, 6). While citizenship provides a useful perspective from which to analyse many social problems and questions, there is agreement that citizenship is a contested concept. Its meaning has never been unequivocal, but has been the subject of considerable debate over time. In the following section the evolving meaning of citizenship in western liberal democracies will be considered.

According to Engin Isin and Patricia Wood citizenship can be described as both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a set of rights and duties (civil, political, social) that define an individual’s membership in a polity. Citizenship is not only a set of legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of their membership in a state, but also the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights (Isin and Wood, 4). Further, the make-up of civil, political and social rights and the sphere of culture, symbolic and economic practices vary from one state to the other (Janoski 1998 in Isin and Wood, 5). Thus, differing notions and practices of citizenship have emerged in
specific places in response to specific struggles and conflicts. Isin and Wood remind us that in practice any sense of the existence of some kind of universal concept of citizenship should not be interpreted as natural but rather contingent and political (Isin and Wood, 5). Throughout history citizenship has been an unstable concept and a highly contested and constantly changing institution (Mann, 1987, Turner, 1993b in Isin and Wood, 6). Citizenship does not exist in a bubble, shielded from the changing political, economic, social or cultural circumstance in which it operates.

Modern notions regarding democratic citizenship are intimately tied to the nation-state (see Marshall, 1950). When western states consolidated from indirect to direct rule between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries they did not so much absorb earlier forms of local or regional citizenship as subordinate, or even eliminate them in favour of relatively uniform categorization and obligation at a national scale (Charles Tilly, 254). Thus, citizenship is understood to be a relationship between an individual and a state. The nation-state is just one historical phase in the development of states (city-state, empire, the feudal state, federation, theocratic state, etc.) (Albrow and O’Byrne, 69). In modern western liberal democracies, the sovereign state is the agency that successfully claims the monopoly of the use of force within a specific territory. However, states do not establish a solitary or impermeable citizenship contract. The rights and obligations linking citizens to states have formed through struggle against the state and for control of the state. A state’s need for both compliance and resources from citizens encourage it to engage in bargaining with citizens over the rights and obligations of citizenship (Tilly, 255). In addition, citizens also acquire rights and obligations by mobilizing to demand that the state re-distribute state-controlled resources. In this way the nature of citizenship develops through ongoing negotiation between the state and its citizens.

Charles Tilly describes citizenship as a contract in drawing visible lines between insiders and outsiders while engaging third parties to both respect and enforce its provisions (Tilly, 253). However, according to Tilly, citizenship differs from most contracts in that it binds whole categories of people rather than individuals to each other: and involves differentiating among levels and degrees of members: and directly engaging a
government's coercive power (Tilly, 253). According to Tilly, citizenship is a necessary condition of democracy, since without citizenship, no government can provide sufficient equality, binding consultation, or protection of participants in politics to qualify as democratic (Tilly, 254). For example, eligibility for public office, voting rights, payment of taxes, public education, and access to public services are all aspects of democratic citizenship. Yet, as Tilly also points out, citizenship is not a sufficient condition for democracy (Tilly, 254). For instance, bargaining over the means of western state expansion started to generate institutions of citizenship involving extensive rights and obligations binding whole categories of national populations and the state together long before equalization, consultation, or protection of political and social rights reached levels one may call democratic (Tilly, 257). For instance, women were bound by the authority of the state long before they received the right to vote, considered by most today to be the most basic of citizen rights in advanced democracies. Thus, the nature of citizenship is vitally important to any assessment of the condition of democracy. Fundamentally, citizenship reflects a tension among the different elements that articulate the political and collective identity of the members of a democratic society.

One of the classic texts on citizenship is T.H. Marshall’s essay on *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950). In his essay, Marshall highlights three types of citizenship which emerged during the past three centuries in such a way that each type was building on the one before it. In other words, each advance of citizenship rights created the context for additional political claims for dismantling unjust exclusion. First, during the eighteenth century civil citizenship established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as property rights, concepts of personal liberty and justice. Second, in the nineteenth century, political citizenship encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. Finally, in the twentieth century social citizenship emphasized the citizen’s right to economic and social security. Social citizenship was expressed through the redistributive ethic of the modern welfare state developed in Western Europe. With these categories in mind, Marshall argued that civic, political and social citizenship depended on the other for its full expression; so that the right to protection under the law was inadequate in the absence of the additional ability to participate in the law-making
process, and the right of political participation was insufficient unless citizens had access to the social resources which make it possible to exercise what would otherwise remain merely formal rights. According to Marshall *social citizenship* marked the last stage of the development of the ideal citizenship, since it would ensure the full participation of the individual in the community. In the proceeding chapters Marshall’s ideal conception of citizenship provides the basis of the analysis of changes in the theory and practice of democratic citizenship bought about by neo-liberal globalization.

It is important to point out that unlike political rights established in a negative (freedom from) way, social rights are formulated in a positive way (freedom to). Van Steenbergen argues that social rights imply an active and interventionist state, giving the formal status of citizenship a material foundation in that a certain level of material well-being is guaranteed, which enables the citizen to exercise their rights to full participation in the community (Van Steenbergen, 3). Importantly, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon suggest, Marshall never questioned the notion that the introduction of social citizenship would be the final and crowning stage in the historical development of citizenship in the national context, nor that the social citizenship project would continue unabated (Fraser and Gordon, 1994, Ch. 1). Again, the effects of neo-liberal globalization on the social rights of citizenship, as envisioned by Marshall and carried out in the post WWII institutions of the welfare state will be investigated in the following chapter.

Formal citizenship refers to the legal attributes attached to a citizen according to a written or unwritten constitution (Janowitz, 2). Formal citizenship corresponds with T.H. Marshall’s notion of civic citizenship. By contrast, substantive citizenship refers to the capacity of individuals to exercise those powers in actual debate and in the resolution of political issues (Petras and Veltmeyer, 70). Thus substantive citizenship corresponds with Marshall’s conception of political citizenship. For example, one observes an aspect of formal or civic citizenship in the legal requirements for achieving and sustaining citizenship within a state. By contrast, substantive or political citizenship refers to citizens’ ability to utilize their formal powers in actual political debate and decision making. Substantive citizenship may be measured through an analysis of the bases of
power in the political system and the actual institutional mechanisms available, through which citizens may take part in political decision making. For instance, analysis of the process of electing representatives or holding them accountable reflects substantive citizenship. It may also be measured by the degree to which a state tries to suppress citizen attempts to exercise formal citizenship rights or express dissent. In this sense, citizenship encompasses the protection the state provides for its core members and the opportunities a state creates for them to participate politically (Janowitz, 2). This project primarily focuses on neo-liberal globalization’s challenge to aspects of substantive, or political and social citizenship.

One claim that states make is the authority to say who is and who is not a citizen and thus who has access to the rights of citizenship. The issue of inclusion and exclusion is a long-standing concern of individual citizens and non-citizens engaged in debates with the state over the rightful basis of citizenship, and it is central to any study of modern citizenship in relation to the emergence of a new underclass, the emancipation of minority groups, attacks on the welfare state and questions of participation and accountability. Debate regarding liberal democratic citizenship focuses on the moral principles governing admission to membership in the polity. The liberal conception of citizenship focuses on questions of formal membership, inclusion and exclusion, or how one becomes a citizen (e.g. what entry requirements must be met) (Beiner, 112). However, in addition, a discussion of inclusion and exclusion highlights normative questions regarding what the rights and obligations of citizenship should be and who should be included in them.

In so far as citizenship is an evolving concept the theoretical and practical conditions for inclusion and exclusion change over time. In fact, Marshall suggested that the possibility of enlarging the rights of members of a political community was immanent in societies that utilized the concept of citizenship to constitute a social bond, since tensions between the egalitarian claims inherent in the language of citizenship and actual inequalities have repeatedly generated resistance on the part of marginal groups (Marshall in Linklater, 124). As discussed above, states differentiate between citizens and place restrictions on their access to rights. For instance, in the twentieth century initial steps to enlarge
citizenship generated a form of second-class citizenship which was a catalyst for additional calls for full membership in the political community. The ability of both citizens and non-citizens to make claims for inclusion in the rights of citizenship, or call for the creation and enforcement of new rights depends in part on the political, economic, social and cultural environment in which this claims making takes place. Thus, one might expect that changes in the economic, political, social and cultural environment brought about by globalization and neo-liberalism would also impact the theory and practice of democratic citizenship.

Citizenship as a form of nation-building has been viewed as integration into a political community, which presupposes the existence of an essential culture in a nation-state. In this sense, if citizenship is viewed in relation to integration within a political community, then those that do not integrate become outsiders, non-citizens. In this way, citizenship is as much about exclusion as inclusion (Hooghe and Marks, 47). Citizenship, as conceived in western liberal democracies suggests a shared identity, although some citizens may not fit into that identity or may want to avoid its consequences. In other words, citizens contribute to the creation of a community, yet not all persons who reside within the same geographical space enjoy the same citizenship privileges. While in terms of international relations, citizenship has been the dominant criterion for inclusion and exclusion in a polity, many theories of citizenship ignore its exclusionary nature. In other words, many studies look at citizenship in terms of its formal criteria but fail to explore the rationale behind such criteria; or to recognize that by virtue of the existence of formal criteria which explicitly include some, others who do not fit into that criteria become excluded. All states differentiate between their citizens, whether through categories of adult and minors, native born and naturalized, or by setting requirements which delineate between citizens and non-citizens and restrict access to certain rights (e.g. residency requirements for temporary residents, restrictions on suffrage and property qualifications for access to certain rights like eligibility for public office). According to The Hague Convention on Matters of Nationality (1930) it is for each state to decide under its own law who are its citizens. Thus sovereignty extends to the rules under which individuals may acquire
citizenship at birth or through naturalization and to the conditions for voluntary expatriation or involuntary denaturalization of emigrants.

The nature of contemporary citizenship is debated among scholars, political leaders and citizens (Wiener, 1997; Kymlicka 2002; Steenbergen, 1994; Tilly, 1997, 1999; Turner, 2001). Citizenship represents the notion of participation in public life. T.H. Marshall’s definition of the ideal citizenship as full participation in the community with an emphasis on the citizen in relation to the state, sparked a post WWII shift from a strict political definition of a citizen, to a broader definition emphasizing the relationship of the citizen with society as a whole (Bart Van Steenbergen, 2). Isin and Wood argue that for at least two decades before the fall of the Berlin Wall political struggles in western democracies had no longer been waged solely in the name of socialism, with redistribution and equality as its main principles (Isin and Wood, 1). Instead a cultural politics emerged where groups demanded rights ranging from political representation to affirmation of group difference. The growth in migration to western liberal democracies during the 1970’s resulted in increasingly heterogeneous populations in which the existence of ethnic communities did not always fit neatly into the establishment of a homogeneous national community in the context of a territorially defined state. In this context, many groups and individuals alike have argued that behind the veil of universal citizenship and equality before the law there are systemic forms of domination and oppression that misrecognize and marginalize them (Isin and Wood, 1). According to the authors, cultural politics describes historically and politically diverse movements primary because they used culture as their battleground and challenged the prevailing conceptions and practices that made capitalism possible (Isin and Wood, 1).

It is clear over forty years after Marshall formulated his ideal conception of citizenship that new types of citizenship have developed as a result of developments related to globalization and neo-liberalism. The notion of social citizenship is also being challenged as a result of these developments, especially since the 1980’s. Marshall’s conception of citizenship will be taken up again to analyse changes to social citizenship and the citizen-state relationship. Further, Marshall did not take into account the possibility of citizenship
developing in a broader context than the nation-state. However, new concepts of citizenship will also be considered such as those associated with citizenship beyond the nation-state (e.g. European Union citizenship). As Antje Wiener points out, EU citizenship is complicating notions of citizenship by creating rights that transfer from state to state which may bind whole categories of Europeans not to the state in which they reside but to the EU (AntjeWiener,195).

Other important changes have also affected the citizen-state relationship. In a study of five advanced western democracies, Dalton suggests that a new style of citizen politics is emerging in advanced western democracies whereby socio-economic changes over the last century have encouraged the development of a set of characteristics that together represent a new form of advanced industrial or post-industrial society (Dalton,6). He stresses the unprecedented expansion of wealth in the second half of the twentieth century, restructuring of the labour force (decline of agricultural sector, stable or declining industrial sector and growth of the public sector employment), decline in rural populations and growth of urban populations, changing social organization and interaction, expanded educational opportunities, increases in information resources available to the public at large (electronic information processing, Internet, etc.) increase in government involvement in society after two world wars and the Great Depression (Dalton,7-8). Dalton argues that,

as the socioeconomic characteristics of these nations changed, so too have the characteristics of the public. More educational opportunities mean a growth in political skills and resources, producing the most sophisticated publics in the history of democracies. Changing economic conditions redefine citizens’ issue interests...weakening of social networks and institutional loyalties...this development is closely tied to the spread of protests, citizen action groups, and unconventional political participation...[m]ore people now take democratic ideals seriously, and they expect political systems to live up to these ideals (Dalton,9-10).

In the context of globalization and influence of neo-liberalism the capacity of both citizens and the state to respond to these changing conditions and reconceptualize the citizen-state relationship will to a great extent determine the future direction of democratic governance and citizenship. “If citizenship is historically variable and
detachable from any particular state form, so too is the state” (Albrow and O’Bryne, 76). While citizenship is primarily conceived and practiced within the state, challenges to the state’s monopoly over the definition of citizenship may be beneficial in so far as it encourages the reduction in tensions between obligations to the state and obligations to the rest of humanity (sense of moral duty to human beings outside state boundaries); but it is also important that the transnational realm which is created upholds democratic principles about rights and entitlements and regarding participation which are essential to the practice of democratic citizenship.

**Globalization and the Influence of Neo-liberalism**

Before moving on, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of globalization and of neo-liberalism, the dominant ideological position associated with globalization. Both globalization and neo-liberalism provide the context for this projects analysis of the theory and practice of democratic citizenship. While globalization has been used in many different ways to mean very different things, it does capture important elements of change in the modern world. As James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer point out, “globalization” in an economic sense refers to “cross-national flows of goods, investment, production and technology” (Petras and Veltmeyer, 26). However, globalization should not simply be thought of as an economic phenomenon. According to David Held, globalization can be understood as a set of processes, “which shift the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (Held, 1995, 94). Held’s definition is useful in the sense that it does not focus only on globalization’s economic significance, but also illuminates the political and cultural aspects of the phenomenon. Manfred Steger also explores the political and cultural aspects of globalization. Most of the debate over political globalization involves the analysis of evidence with regard to political challenges to the power of the modern nation-state. This analysis includes issues pertaining to the principle of state sovereignty, the impact of intergovernmental organizations and the prospects for global governance. However, much of this analysis fails to adequately consider the consequence of these shifts for the theory and practice of citizenship.
Steger also stresses the influence of neo-liberalism as the dominant ideology associated with global integration. He effectively distinguishes between globalization on the one hand and neo-liberalism on the other, but argues that, "[a]cademic efforts to capture the nature of globalization apart from the ongoing ideological claims made in the public arena reinforce...the dominant globalist project that alternatively masks and transmits a neo-liberal worldview" (Steger, 41). As Claude Ake puts it, [g]lobalization, is driven by a vigorous, triumphant capitalism which is aggressively consolidating its global hegemony" (Ake, in Cunningham, 141). In other words, the nature of globalization can not be fully uncovered and understood without recognition and analysis of neo-liberalism as the dominant ideology driving the process of globalization. Behind such observations is the assertion by many scholars that the political-economic dimension is not simply one aspect of globalization but the dominant aspect (Ake, 1997; Strange, 1996).

Neo-liberalism is a doctrine that dominates the current form of global integration. According to David Coburn the main assumptions of neo-liberalism are: markets are the most efficient allocators of resources in production and distribution; societies are composed of autonomous individuals (producers and consumers) motivated chiefly or entirely by material or economic considerations; competition is the major market vehicle for innovations (Coburn, 28). Neo-liberalism is primary concerned with using what they see as the superiority of the market as an efficient means of allocating resources. Another central aspect of neo-liberalism is its determination to shrink and revise the role played by the state in human affairs, by emphasizing market mechanisms and the individual rather than collective approaches to dealing with economic and social inequality (McBride, 14). Hence, in the neo-liberal view, the welfare state interferes with the normal functioning of economies and brings about results inferior to those that would have been achieved by the free operation of markets (McBride, 14). Critics of neo-liberalism assert that neo-liberal’s do not adequately consider inequality which may result from their theoretical presumptions (Coburn, 28). Further, neo-liberalism acts to restrict the reach of politics by encouraging individuals themselves to solve issues acting within an open market (McBride, 14). Thus, the current form of globalization is also a political
phenomenon with its own ideology: neo-liberalism. When analyzing the effects of globalization on the theory and practice of citizenship one must be careful to distinguish between factors of globalization and factors of neo-liberal globalization. Many critics of globalization are actually critics of neo-liberal globalization, not globalization per se. For example, some within the so called “anti-globalization” movement are opposed to the dominant neo-liberal philosophy associated with current global development but not necessarily with globalization in a different form. In fact, the so called “anti-globalization” movement has globalized in that its organization and operations are transnational and global in scope.

**The Globalization Debate**

Globalization is often discussed in terms of the interdependence of states, the integrated nature of their economies and thus the mutuality of their interests and shared benefits of their exchanges (Petras and Veltmeyer, 29). Most use the term globalization to describe the growth and spread of investment, trade and production, the introduction of new technology and the spread of democracy (Schaeffer, 1). Others argue that globalization also includes the spread of environmental pollution, commercialization of culture and languages, cross-border migration, transnational crime and political protest movements opposed to globalization (Schaeffer, 1-2). Some analysts of neo-liberal globalization argue that the range and degree of these flows have created a “New World Order”, with its own institutions and power relations that have replaced, or at the very least pose a challenge to the previous structures associated with the state. The late Susan Strange argued that globalization has seriously eroded the justification for state authority in three areas: defence, finance and the provision of welfare-and therefore the justification for states’ claims on society has seriously declined (Strange, 40). Strange argued that societies are now at the mercy of big business that operates at the expense of the most vulnerable citizens and the environment (Strange, 36). Importantly, Strange also pointed out that the predominance of the state as the principal authority over society and economy may turn out to have been a time limited phenomenon (Strange, 39). Looking over a longer historical perspective, multiple sources of political authority were more the norm. Further, Strange acknowledged that some who perceive a decline in state authority over
the past several decades do not assume that decline will continue into the future but simply do not know (Strange, 39). According to David Cameron and Janice Gross Stein, however, constraints imposed by globalization on the state are less restrictive than some analysis suggests. Further, not only are the constraints exaggerated but the state has significant freedom in the way it reconfigures itself in response to globalization (Cameron and Gross Stein, 2002; see also McBride, 2001; Clarkson, 2002). In relation to the theory and practice of citizenship the question becomes not simply what are the options states have, but what are the consequences of their choices for society and the citizens which constitute them?

Debate over the meaning and significance of these changes revolves in part around whether one asserts globalization is a new development (hyper globalization school) or simply a continuation of the past (sceptical school) (Schaeffer, 1). Analysts who define globalization in terms of internationalization often view the process as a recurrent trend that is not new but that was also visible in the high levels of trade, investment and migration at the end of the nineteenth century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996 in Scholte, 19). However as Held argues, for the purposes of the following analysis, it is not a matter of saying there was once no globalization, and now there is, rather one must recognize that forms of globalization have changed over time (Held, 1995, 94). Held argues that one can understand the historical evolution of globalization in relation to: “(1) the extensiveness of networks of relations and connections; (2) the intensity of flows and levels of activity within these networks; and (3) the impact of these phenomenon on particular bounded communities” (Held, 1995, 94). In other words, according to Held, globalization is associated with the intensification of social, political and economic activities across borders; the growing magnitude of networks and transnational flows of trade, investment, culture, etc; velocity of global interactions due to innovation in transportation and communication technologies, and thus the diffusion of ideas, information, goods, capital and people (Held, 2003, 306). Cameron and Gross Stein suggest that the speed and intensity of global connection and integration in the last twenty years have provoked serious debates about the cultural and social consequences of these processes, and concern about the continuing capacity of the state to provide social justice (Cameron and
The impact of these developments on states and their citizens will be explored below.

Globalization and Democracy

According to Leo Panitch, "[d]emocracy is not a fixed set of institutions achieved and fixed once and for all, but rather something to be extended, renewed, and developed so that all people might learn through democracy how to rule and be ruled" (Panitch, 6). In other words, the nature of democracy evolves over time in relation to the changing political, economic, social and cultural environment. As such, as David Held argues, the changing relation between globalization and the modern state can be characterized by five disjunctures, which suggest important questions about the changing nature of democratic political community (Held, 2003, 307-8). First, the idea of a self-determining national collectivity which defines and forms a community can no longer be simply located within the borders of a single nation-state. Second, it can no longer be assumed that the locus of political power is situated in national governments and the nation-state. Instead, states are now entrenched in complex networks of political power at regional and global levels (see Rosenau, 1998). In other words, since political power is shared and negotiated among forces from the local to the global levels the link (direct accountability of political authority) between effective government, self-government and the sovereign state is being significantly altered. Third, while states maintain significant authority, this authority is expressed in an environment of new and evolving types of political authority. While the entitlement of states to rule within defined territories-their sovereignty- is not on the edge of collapse, the practical character of this entitlement-the actual capacity of states to rule is changing (Held et al., 1999). Fourth, in some respects the protection of the public good requires coordinated multilateral action to ensure security or prevent economic recession and to resolve transboundary issues like transnational crime and environment degradation. Finally, as the former examples illustrate, it is no longer clear cut what constitutes an internal domestic issue as opposed to an external foreign issue. As states increasingly transfer political authority through membership in regional or global arrangements political authority becomes diffused. In this context,
...the meaning of accountability and democracy at the national level is altering. In circumstances where transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national communities...powerful international organizations...make decisions for vast groups of people across diverse borders, and where the capacities of large companies can dwarf many a state, the question of who should be accountable to whom, and on what basis, do not easily resolve themselves (Held, 2003, 308).

Essentially the link between democracy and citizenship is such that if one is challenged so is the other.

**Neo-liberal Economic Globalization, the State and Policy Autonomy**

As has been discussed, a well documented criticism of neo-liberal driven economic globalization is that it threatens democratic processes. A shift toward global neo-liberalism or market directed flows and outcomes in place of state-directed flows of goods, services and capital is taking place (George DeMartino, 343). In this environment corporations are now geographically mobile, freed to a large extent from national capital controls. States compete with one another to attract capital and avoid capital flight, while national governments are at the mercy of international bond rating agencies. The rights of capital are entrenched through international free-trade agreements and at the expense of the autonomy and power of the state, workers, and citizens (Nayyar, 371). “Policy autonomy” refers to the state’s ability to implement and sustain a policy of its own choosing, independent of the policy choices of other nations, in order to achieve its objectives (DeMartino, 344). Following DeMartino, it is important to point out that while state sovereignty, or the formal right of a state to pursue a certain policy may remain intact, its ability to do so, or its policy autonomy is constrained by neo-liberal economic globalization. The point of this distinction is that a dwindling of either sovereignty or policy autonomy may result in a loss of “state capacity” or the ability of the state to achieve some objective that it sets for itself, such as equality among its citizens or security (DeMartino, 343).

It should be noted that this is not to argue that global economic integration makes particular policy outcomes inevitable. As David Coburn and others note, national business classes lobby for global neo-liberalism to enhance their own power both
nationally and internationally (Coburn, 28). In this way, neo-liberal economic globalization is as much "a political project as an economic inevitability" (Coburn, 28). Yet clearly, the pressures of global economic integration, as illustrated by constraints on state policy autonomy posed by international trade agreements, present serious questions as to the continued validity of traditional notions of the sovereign state-citizen relationship. At issue are notions of democratic accountability, consent of the governed and citizen participation in, and democratic control over decision-making. In other words, the notion of a 'national community of fate' that both rules itself and should be answerable solely to itself has come under strain (Crawford and Marks, 82). The capacity of citizens and their governments to influence the national economy for their collective economic and social purposes is reduced as a result of the pressures of current global economic integration on state policy autonomy.

In *Uncle Sam and Us*, Stephen Clarkson points out,

> [t]he WTO's commitment to erase government regulation in the name of the free market trumped other values, such as environmental sustainability, better labour conditions, and human rights. The WTO increased the property rights of stateless capital while decreasing the social rights of state-bound citizens (Clarkson, 410).

For instance, although it is still too soon to tell, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) interpretation of Canada's obligations under future General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules governing "services as trade" may further undermine the ability of citizens to influence the domestic effect of neo-liberal discourse on health policy. When health care is considered a service that can be bought and sold in the marketplace, it encourages the provision of health care on the basis of ability to pay and access to health care is no longer considered a right (Laurel and Arellano, 1996). The significance of this potentiality is that healthcare policy has long symbolized for Canadians the social rights of citizenship. According to Suzanne Peters' review of Canadian public opinion, "Canadians view many social programs as vital and are uncomfortable with the idea of reducing spending on them. Programs such as health care, education, Unemployment Insurance, and Old Age Security are viewed as entitlements (Peters, 8). The necessity of fiscal restraint is widely accepted,
however...[t]hey want to temper any cuts with a sense of collective responsibility tied to their national identity" (Peters, 8).

Each of the agreements also has particular exceptions and "reservations", which many argue provides permanent protection for long established local rules. For instance, under NAFTA, "social services established or maintained for a public purpose" are exempt from the terms of the agreement. Successive Canadian governments have argued that this reservation protects the public health care system from the full force of NAFTA’s provisions and means that services that existed prior to the agreement are protected. However, there is no clear definition of what constitutes a "social service" or what determines whether a service is established for a "public purpose" (CCPA 2002, 8; Johnson 2002 in Romanow Commission³ Final Report, 236). Further, there has been no formal declaration on what is or what is not protected by the reservation under NAFTA. Similarly, many of Canada’s obligations under the GATS apply only to those services or sectors that are explicitly made subject to the agreement. To date, Canada has chosen not to make hospital services and a whole array of health services subject to the GATS or to open them to foreign private investment or delivery by foreign-based companies (Romanow Commission Final Report, 236). However, while NAFTA appears to protect the current health care system, there is some uncertainty around the question of whether it protects future changes that could be made in the health care system (Epps and Flood 2002 in Romanow Commission Final Report, 237).

Under these circumstances governments may go as far as to avoid domestically popular policy choices out of respect for agreements with supranational organizations. This undermines the idea of a democratic state as an independent and accountable centre of power; in this case, able to foster a national identity through sustaining a national culture. Further, faced with citizen disapproval over public policy choices governments may utilize globalization in a manner which promotes the view that the state is powerless in the face of obligations under global trade arrangements. The focus of these concerns is

³ The Romanow Commission was set up by the Canadian government in 2002, to investigate the state of the Canadian healthcare system and make recommendations for improvement and a future policy direction.
primarily on NAFTA and agreements negotiated under the auspices of the WTO. Both the binding nature of the dispute resolution process and the potential for differing interpretations of the agreements' text add validity to such concerns. In a review of the impact of international trade agreements on national sovereignty and policy autonomy, David Easton concluded that not only do these agreements restrict local policy autonomy, but also usually require that each national government pit its trade obligations against local priorities (Easton,117). Further, Easton suggests that in the absence of international structures of accountability political action (so-called “anti-globalization” protests in Seattle, W.A. and Genoa, Italy, etc.) and the process of trade dispute resolution are the only safeguards to local autonomy besides regulatory protections in trade agreements (Easton,119).
CHAPTER TWO:  
RECONFIGURING THE CITIZEN-STATE RELATIONSHIP

The Shifting Citizen-State Relationship
This chapter examines the changing relationship between the state and citizens in the context of challenges to the post WWII Keynesian welfare state and the notions of social citizenship expressed by T.H. Marshall, brought about by globalization and the dominance of neo-liberalism. Both the role of the state and the theory and practice of citizenship within states are shifting as a result of these challenges. Again, a central assumption of this analysis is that the state plays an integral role in defining the theory and the formal practice of citizenship. The state remains the central medium around which questions regarding the nature of political obligation are framed and debated, and political democracy is practiced. Theorizing regarding modern democratic citizenship by early modern thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, and Mill is inextricably tied to the development of the state. In Europe from the sixteenth century onward political power became increasingly concentrated in more strictly defined territorial boundaries. By the eighteenth century this had become formalized in notions of territorially-defined sovereignty. This sovereignty was first embodied in the monarch and emerging national identities which highlighted shared features such as history, culture and language that united the people of one state, distinguishing them from other people from other states. The state system is often seen as enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which culminated in ideas of sovereignty: sovereign equality among states, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and states’ consent as the basis of legal obligation became widely accepted principles (for a description of the process and its consequences, see Dillon, 1999).

Sovereignty is a relational concept of international political obligation which concerns the authority of a state to rule without the intervention of foreign states or regional or global governmental bodies; however some authors limit sovereignty to a relationship of
state authority over persons living within its territory (Darrell Moellendorf, 103). It is important to recognize that sovereignty also represents a relationship between a sovereign state and its citizens. Thus the way in which political authority is structured directly effects the meaning or essence of citizenship. With the advent of representative democracy within states (whereby people exercise democratic authority and accountability through elected representatives), questions about who could participate in elections and other democratic practices were answered by reference to the state. Those within state borders, who were recognized by the state as citizens, are the democratic constituency, and are entitled to democratic representation in which politicians are accountable.

However, while the state remains the main mode of political organization and representation for both domestic and international purposes, it is increasingly required to share its sovereignty with other actors (Raboy, 113-14). This sharing of sovereignty takes place in the context of the globalization of the world economy and the challenges brought about by the increasing number of issues that the state can no longer address on its own (global environment, spread of disease, etc.). This sharing of sovereignty often takes place at the level of international institutions (e.g.: World Trade Organization, World Bank, European Union) and international agreements (e.g.: North American Free Trade Agreement), and has a significant effect on the way in which political authority is structured. Studies of globalization often focus on sovereignty in the sense of the sovereign equality among states, ignoring to a significant degree globalization's effect on sovereignty in the context of political authority, within the state and on the basis of obligations between the citizen and state. Thus, a challenge of late-twentieth century globalization is not simply to rethink our conception of sovereignty and the role of the state, but also to attempt to understand the implications of such a reconceptualization on the theory and practice of citizenship.

R.B.J. Walker asserts it is the relationship between sovereignty and subjectivity that is, so clearly the source of the most difficult conceptual and practical dilemmas of modern politics...modern politics might even be defined in terms of the multiplicity of struggles to establish an appropriate grounding
for this relationship, and to refine and restructure it in response to all the demands and pressures of modernization and internationalization that have ensued...(Walker.ix).

The significance of this observation lies in the fact that in exchange for giving up our individual freedom to the sovereign authority of the state, the state provides certain protections. This relationship between the rights and obligations attached to citizenship in relation to the states' legitimate exercise of authority is the essence of the citizen-state relationship. In modern democratic states this theoretical relationship is often discussed in terms of a social contract. The contractual approach asserts that government arrangements are only justified if they could or would be accepted by signatories to a hypothetical contract (Weithman,314). Thus, political institutions in democratic countries are justified only if they are effective instruments for enacting laws and policies which conform to principles of justice agreed to in a properly specified social contract (Weithman,318). As has been discussed, the development of this relationship between the state and its citizens involved struggle since states did not always see things this way. As power shifts from the state to transnational and international institutions, without struggle for and construction of comparable structures of democratic accountability and legitimacy, concerns rightly arise over the ability of citizens to hold the state accountable and influence the development of citizenship rights and obligations.

According to Walker,

Theorists of international relations have become used to thinking that nothing could be more irrelevant than questions about the relation between subjectivity* and whatever goes on between states. Yet contemporary politics seems to be characterized by struggles in which questions about sovereignty and subjectivity have clearly spilled over into spatiotemporal realms that seem to defy any easy division between a politics inside and mere relations outside (Walker,xii).

* According to Walker, both accounts of sovereignty and subjectivity are dimensions of the forms of cultural and political identity established in early modern Europe. Subjectivity refers to the basis on which individuals become subject to the legitimate political authority of the sovereign state (the basis of political obligation). Or the ways in which we reconcile our claims to be both free autonomous individual/collective subjects and also subject to the ultimate authority of the sovereign (Walker,x).
Therefore, in the context of globalization it would be a mistake to separate international from national political and social development. Much scholarly research has focussed on the challenges globalization poses for the sovereignty and political autonomy of states, thereby only indirectly raising questions about the role of the state as the principle institution through which notions of citizenship have, and continue to be, organized and conceived. It is increasingly difficult to sustain the conventional accounts of what the relationship between sovereignty and subjectivity should be. Questions about what it means to express some form of subjectivity, and legitimate authority in relation to the free flow of capital, global governance or regional integration, the borderless nature of the environment, and mass migration are not easily resolved in terms of discourses developed in relation to solitary communities living within territorially defined sovereign states (Walker,xii). The long struggle for liberty and accountability gradually made some states accountable to those considered citizens residing within its territory. But as some scholars suggest, globalization by shifting power from states, has undermined that accountability since none of the new non-state authorities are accountable or even transparent (Strange,38). Yet, the nature of citizenship is still primarily defined and theorized about within the context of sovereign states.

With this connection between citizenship and the state in mind, several questions pervade the following discussion: If the state’s ability to make autonomous decisions has been constrained by aspects of globalization then what is the effect of this development on democratic citizenship since the state has been the primary source of democratic membership? Further, citizens’ ability to influence state actions is at the core of citizenship demands and democratic notions of accountability. Again, if the state is losing (willingly or involuntarily) its centrality vis-à-vis defining notions of citizenship, what are the implications of global or regional structures’ influence over future developments in this area? Further, how does the dominance of neo-liberal ideology over global integration affect the theory and practice of democratic citizenship?
As Axel Honneth points out,

Well into the late 1980s, the dominance of Marxism in Europe, and the widespread influence of Rawls\(^4\) in the USA, ensured that there could be no doubt as to the guiding principle of a normative theory of the political order. Irrespective of differences in the detail, they were in agreement on the imperative to remove any form of social or economic inequality that could not be justified on rational grounds (Honneth,43).

The significance of this statement is that in the post WWII political environment the prevailing approach to economic governance was that the state, in one way or another should be involved in redressing social and economic inequality through intervention in the economy and redistribution of resources. According to George DeMartino, during the inter- and post-war periods several approaches to economic governance emerged across western capitalist countries (domestic neo-liberalism and social democracy, which may be distinguished by the degree and type of state involvement) (George DeMartino,344-5). Though broadly committed to the institutions of private property and market organization, capitalist western liberal democracies diverged on the fundamental question of the role of the state in managing economic affairs. While in the neo-liberal view the role of the state is to support the market and to correct isolated market failure, by contrast social democrats question the adequacy of the market as a regulatory institution and argue that the state must regulate the market which is prone to instability and unjustifiable inequality (DeMartino,345). In relation to citizenship, the theoretical roots of post-WWII notions of social justice through state-led redistribution rest on T.H. Marshall’s theory of citizenship as outlined in *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950).

Marshall’s notion of citizenship, which included a civic, political and social component coincided with the development of the Keynesian welfare state and was a guiding principle through which citizenship was structured after WWII. His concept of citizenship described its development in terms of hierarchies of power, which still

\(^4\) Rawls developed a theory of justice for domestic societies (based on membership within the state) that is characterized by two principles that require respecting civil and democratic rights and limiting inequalities in the distribution of resources. The implication of the limits on socio-economic inequalities is debated among Rawls followers. Further, Rawls claimed that the political regime must not be "directed by the interests of large concentrations of private economic and corporate power veiled from public knowledge and almost entirely free from accountability (John Rawls,24).
resonates with contemporary circumstances in western democracies. To recall, Marshall divided citizenship into three components: the civil, political and social. He illustrated how the evolution of these three components was shaped by the development of modern capitalism. The civic component was necessary to secure individual freedoms, and included such elements as freedom of speech, the right to own property and the right to justice (Turner, 190). The political element was defined by the right to participate in the exercise of political power, specifically the right to free elections and a secret ballot. Finally, Marshall defined the social component as the right to “a modicum of economic welfare and security and the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being” (Marshall, 69). Marshall’s theory of citizenship focussed on the class barriers. As sociologist Bryan Turner points out, “[a]longside these three components, there existed a set of institutional structures that gave these rights social expression, namely...the courts of justice [civic], parliamentary government [political], and the welfare state [social]” (Marshall, in Turner, 2000, 190). In this way, Marshall’s citizenship model legitimated the post WWII commitment to reconstruction through state-led Keynesian redistributive policies.

In western liberal democracies there was a general post WWII consensus that it was legitimate, if not imperative to use the state to achieve collective goals. The importance of Marshall’s notion of citizenship is that it supported the claim that state-led redistribution modifies the negative impacts of the capitalist market through a redistribution of resources on the basis of rights. This reflects the argument that there is a permanent tension between the principles of equality that underpin social democracy and the inequalities of wealth and income that characterize the capitalist marketplace. In an article titled *Equality versus Inequality* Robert Dahl analyzes political equality and

---

5 Critiques of liberalism diverge largely on the extent to which theorists feel that capitalism is inherently exploitative and creates inequalities. Both historical structuralists and realists criticize the liberal claim that the market will produce equal benefits for all. Historical structuralists often criticize liberalism for legitimizing inequalities by deceiving the working class into believing that they will share in the wealth created by a market system and reaped by the capitalists class (Cohn, 112). Further, liberalism tends to avoid the issue of power and the creation of asymmetries between groups in the market. Another related criticism of liberalism is that it places too much faith in the market disregarding the importance of the role of the state in redressing asymmetries (Cohn, 113). Liberals that advocate a minimal role for the state usually only view the state's role in terms of performing tasks that the market does not perform.
inequality, arguing that democracy and market capitalism are incompatible on the level of theoretical interpretation and justification, and at the empirical level of historical experience. As Dahl puts it,

[the theoretical vision of democracy focuses on persons as citizens. The standard theoretical interpretation of market capitalism focuses on persons as consumers of goods and services...In practice, market capitalism makes political equality all but impossible to achieve. At the same time, however, polyarchal democracy makes a strictly free market economy all but impossible to achieve (Dahl, 645-6).

In other words, social democracy and market capitalism are at odds with one another. A market economy does not by itself eliminate inequalities in economic resources and thus cannot eliminate political inequalities deriving primarily from such resources. In fact, a market economy is considered by many to create or increase inequalities in economic resources and thus facilitate political inequality. It is important to recognize that the Keynesian welfare state model of social democracy that developed after WWII, based on Marshall’s notion of social citizenship, was unprecedented in the history of western liberal democracies. For the first time, class based inequalities derived from the capitalist system were recognized as something that the state could and should redress.

The issue of market failure figures prominently in any analysis of the theoretical shift in the role of the state and the concepts of public production and public goods. Market failure describes a situation where the market is unable to provide necessary goods and services, as the cost for doing so is too great or the profit too small (Shields and Evans, 57). In this situation it is considered outside the responsibility of business to ensure the provision of certain public goods. Thus, a purely market orientated environment does not guarantee the production or delivery of crucial products and services. According to Rawls, while the market is orientated around efficiency, the main objective of politics is justice (Rawls, 360). This point highlights the significance of a shift towards a more market driven state, in that efficiency becomes a guiding principle or raison d'être of the state. Government can play a central role in ensuring that key goods and services are

---

6 Polyarchy, meaning ‘rule by the many’, was used by Dahl to describe a representative democracy with substantial interest-group influence on government.
delivered to the public regardless of whether or not it is sufficiently profitable to do so. This principle is tied to both Keynesianism and Marshall’s theory of the social rights of citizenship in that it recognizes that in order to redress social or economic inequalities government intervention may be required. Therefore, market failure is one way government intervention can be justified. However, the public provision of many public goods (e.g. health care, education, policing, correctional facilities) is increasingly questioned as neo-liberal’s point to government failure and promote market based alternatives.

This shift from the Keynesian welfare state to neo-liberalism began in the 1980’s, in the wake of growing economic pressure (e.g.: global recession after 1974, growing national deficits and high cost of Keynesian welfare state programs and full employment policies). Specifically, the crisis of ‘stagflation’ in the 1970’s (the coexistence of a stagnant economy, high inflation, and high unemployment) called into question the validity of Keynesianism (Clarkson,130). Exponents of privatization were able to convince many people that market discipline was necessary for making public services and regulatory activities of government efficient and responsive (Magnusson, 337).

The theoretical roots of the current shift to neo-liberalism can be found in the work of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman who placed the highest priority on competitive markets and the efficient allocation of resources, and saw economics and politics as being even more separable than the early proponents of orthodox liberalism, such as Adam Smith (Cohn,99). In 1962, Friedman wrote that “the kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power” (Friedman, 1962 in Cohn,99). In other words, in the neo-liberal view, political freedom is best achieved through individuals engaging in a free market, uninterrupted by government interference. Further, in the neo-liberal view private initiative and free enterprise rather than government intervention are more likely to result in full employment, rising wages and a higher standard of living (Cohn,100). At a political level, the revival of orthodox liberalism in the 1980’s was led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Britain and
President Ronald Reagan in the United States. This market approach contrasts with the government led intervention into the economy and redistributive goals established during the Keynesian period, and its spread was itself part of the globalization of governing ideologies.

It is important to recognize that although it may not be a matter of returning to the good old days of Keynesianism and big government, there are consequences of a shift to neoliberalism which go far beyond simply redressing problems of big government associated with the welfare state. In 1959 in Some Social Requisites of Democracy, Seymour Lipset points out that, "[e]ven though universal citizenship opens the way for the challenging of remaining social inequalities, it also provides the basis for believing that the process of social change towards equality will remain within the boundaries of allowable conflict in a democratic system" (Seymour Lipset,100). The consequence of an increasingly market-orientated view of the role of the state vis-à-vis citizens may be to fundamentally alter what is considered allowable conflict and ideas about what citizens may justifiably demand of the state, the meaning of the common good and responsibility to one's community.

**Neo-liberal Economic Globalization, the State and the Challenge to Social Rights**

The spread of trade and commerce outside national borders tends to undermine today the economic authority of the state which once helped consolidate it. The political authority of the state was strengthened and justified in the process of expansion of the national economy (Bhaduri,23). This created an economic nationalism that complimented territorial nationalism (Bhaduri,23). The state’s political authority must be legitimized in one form or another and its ability to influence the economy for collective economic and social purposes is one essential mechanism through which the state is legitimized and can respond to citizen’s demands. In other words, economic nationalism works to ensure the loyalty of citizens to the state, in so far as the legitimacy of the government in power depends on the economic performance of the country. As discussed in the last chapter, participation in the global economy constrains a state’s ability to regulate its economy by
placing restrictions on the range of possible policies the state may employ. Further, as I argued above, state action has traditionally been regarded as necessary if social justice was to prevail over inequalities caused by the laissez-faire approach prevalent in a free market capitalist economy. As Clarkson points out, in the case of Canada, as attention turned towards the challenges of international competition, the primary goal of public policy shifted from focussing on the demand side of domestic markets to expanding trade and attracting investment (Clarkson, 128). According to Clarkson, in this climate the possibility of interventionalist policy became curtailed both by internal detractors (e.g. national business lobby) and the influence of supranational bodies (Clarkson, 129). The public policies which resulted are characterized by privatization of state run services, and state retrenchment from the area of social policy.

The political realization of the neo-liberal agenda leads to further strain on the political and social institutions that may subject market forces to public control (Steger, 45-6; also see Melanie White, 1999). In this context, the post WWII ideal of social citizenship is challenged. For instance, there has been a significant shift away from the idea of universal publicly provided services as a right of citizenship. Changes within the public sector provide one example of this shift toward the common good based on market orientated values such as self-reliance, efficiency and competition (Brodie, 57). As Janine Brodie points out, key governing instruments of the Keynesian welfare state such as crown corporations and social welfare programs are, according to neo-liberal rhetoric, “re” privatized to the market or the home, creating the illusion that they are simply being returned to where they naturally belong (Brodie, 53). Privatization of public assets and publicly delivered services, originally created for the benefit of all citizens, are increasingly carried out under the assumption that they are better provided by the private sector. In the process, they are removed from the sphere of political negotiation and subjected to market orientated rather than political or normative evaluative criteria (Yeatman 1990 in Brodie, 53). Colin Mooers asserts we are witnessing a “transformation in the sphere of rights as older notions of social citizenship are giving way to a form of “lean citizenship”: the attempt to strip citizenship of any collective or social attributes in favour of a wholly privatized and marketized notion of rights” (Colin Mooers, 288).
Jessop also sees this process as a shift from Marshall’s notion of social citizenship as reflected in the Keynesian welfare state to a neo-liberal dominated paradigm he calls the “Schumpeterian Workfare State (SWS)”. This would be a state and an administration system of considerably reduced size and function. Jessop argues that the Keynesian Welfare State “tried to extend the social rights of citizenship, [whereas] the SWS is concerned to provide welfare services that benefit business with the result that individual needs take second place” (Jessop, 3). By contrast the Keynesian welfare state reflected a commitment to economic growth and social stability but also the institutionalization of a set of social values which included a commitment to social justice, universality and collective responsibility for individual welfare (Dave Broad and Wayne Antony, 9-10).

The neo-liberal theory influencing the restructuring of the public sector is public choice theory which refers to “the economic study of non-market decision-making, or simply the application of economics to political science” (Kernaghan and Siegel in David Johnson, 275). Public choice theory focuses on the motivations of decision makers. In An Economic Theory of Democracy, early public choice theorist Anthony Downs (1957) asserts that all actors involved in political decision-making are motivated by considerations of material self-interest and act in rational, systematic, and self-serving ways to maximize their own interests (Downs, 282-5). According to the theory, a public bureaucracy can not be relied on to promote the public interest because its members are seeking to promote their own self-interest. In order to overcome this problem the application of market solutions both to the structure and workings of the public bureaucracy and the public policy solutions it employs is recommended. In other words, a market-centred public sector is promoted as the best means for preventing government failure.

A related neo-liberal philosophy of government administration known as New Public Management (NPM) turns “citizens into customers, public services into products, and policy goals into measurable outcomes…” (Clarkson, 411). Thus, NPM poses a structural and philosophical challenge to social democratic notions of citizenship tied to the welfare
state. For advocates of NPM, better management will be an effective solution for a whole range of economic and social issues. Since NPM is imbued with the assumptions of neo-liberalism, better management refers to the application of market driven solutions (private sector management styles) to public sector management. These theories reject the argument of the importance of the state as a guarantor of social rights as a means of redressing inequality created by the capitalist system. In an article titled *Public Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do*, Barry Bozeman suggests market driven assessments of the value of public policy have flourished largely because the alternatives have little analytical precision, and that a public-failure model is required that underscores the need to consider public values that may not be easily gauged by using market measures (Barry Bozeman, 157). This point highlights the need to address the consequences for citizenship of casting aside former distinctions between the ethic of public service and that of private profit-making business.

While Keynesian redistributive notions regarding the role of the state and public administration provided a fairly effective solution to the problems of market failure, movement toward neo-liberalism bring into question the very concepts of public goods as the theory of market failure competes with public choice theory's concept of government failure (LeGrand in Shields and Evans, 58). Since citizenship is primarily conceived and practiced within state structures, the consequence of the influence of neo-liberal discourse on state organization is to downgrade the status of "citizen" to that of mere "consumer". If the state is inefficient and ineffective and should be modelled after the private sector then the role of the citizen is also altered to reflect that of a consumer. Thus in this view, consumer sovereignty was the key to efficient and responsive government (Magnusson, 337). This changed status has the effect of altering Keynesian welfare state notions of citizen rights and obligations. The provision of a limited range of public goods is seen as legitimate in neo-liberal discourse, but only as a means of ensuring sufficient social and economic stability to allow for effective conduct of commerce (John Shields and Mitchell Evans, 57). According to neo-liberal analysis of how to promote democratic

---

7 According to Bozeman public failure occurs when "neither the market nor the public sector provides goods and services required to achieve core public values" (Bozeman, 150).
citizenship, one must go beyond Marshall's notion of citizenship as rights and entitlements and focus instead on people's responsibility to earn a living (Kymlicka, 304). Since the welfare state erodes this responsibility the safety net should be cut back. Further, any remaining rights should have obligations tied to them (e.g.: Workfare programs in the US, Employment Plans in British Columbia, Canada). For instance, the British Government's *Citizen's Charter* in 1991 outlined a "Third Way" which focuses on individual self-reliance and "no rights without responsibilities" (Citizen's Charter in Cronin, 148). Themes such as quality, choice, standards and values were implemented through privatisation and contracting out services and by introducing performance related pay and performance targets in the public sector. These shifts defined the rights of the citizen as those of the consumer and taxpayer (Miller, 1993 in Cronin, 148).

The tension between the individual and the collective and the public and private in liberalism, while always present, has re-emerged as a defining feature of neo-liberalism. The marketization of citizenship or market-citizenship suggests that citizens no longer need the state for the realization of their citizenship rights. Instead, consumption is being promoted to alleviate the problems of society. The consequence of this discourse is a state less able or less willing to respond to the class-based issues of citizens. In this environment, social rights which redress inequality are recast as unessential. This changes the meaning and significance of citizenship, the commons, and limits the possible expectations citizens may have of the state (Brodie, 56). The social rights of citizens envisioned by Marshall and practiced in the social democratic institutions of the welfare state (which included many formerly excluded groups in the social policy process and encouraged a sense of collective responsibility for individual welfare) are replaced by a neo-liberal approach to citizenship which focuses on individual liberty and responsibility to oneself and possibly one's immediate family (see Broad and Antony, 1999).

Services formerly provided by the state and increasingly carried out by the private sector allow the state to distance itself from responsibility to citizens. In the course of the private provision of public services while government has a link through contract law to
the private sector supplier, the citizen has no direct link to the supplier as either a citizen or as a consumer. In this contractual arrangement the private sector supplier’s customer is government that enters into the contract (Albo,24). Further, this situation changes the contractual arrangement between citizens and the state in so far as government is only responsible for policy and is no longer responsible to citizens for the public service provided. In a recent study of the consequences of public-private partnerships, Joan Boase warns “financial and legal responsibilities must be clearly articulated and lines of accountability easily discerned...in the larger cases we have examined, transparency has been resisted and contractual privacy embraced” (Joan Boase,90).

As Joan Boase points outs, literature addressing private sector public service delivery tends to focus on defining the characteristics of various forms of these arrangements rather than on assessing the implications and consequences of actual examples (see Boase, 2003). For instance, in the case of public-private partnerships, when public services are provided by private companies, these services by virtue of their private provision are no longer subject to a means of ensuring that government is transparent, and that the state is accountable to citizens through public scrutiny guaranteed by such mechanisms as Freedom of Information (FOI) guidelines (Alfred Aman,18). According to Aman, “[w]ithout predictable judicial and legislative standards, the public risks being shut out of the privatization process. Without public awareness, public oversight of the operation of privatized governmental operations will be inadequate...Private enterprises serve managers, owners and shareholders, not taxpayers” (Aman,18).

Colin Crouch studies the increasing commercialization of education in the United Kingdom through the “introduction of market analogous, the contracting out of educational services, including increasingly the teaching of students in schools to private firms” (Crouch,27). This type of delivery challenges the universality of education as a fundamental social right of citizenship. As Crouch points out, powerful economic interests are actively pursuing a project of bringing potentially lucrative citizenship services into the marketplace (Crouch,58). In this environment, it is difficult to address inequality or any special issues that do not correspond with neo-liberalism’s consumer-
citizen ideal. Citizens-consumers are left to choose from options determined by the state or market for them not with them (Broad and Antony, 11). Specifically, government increasingly enters into contracts with private providers which make it dependent on the private provider for the quality of service. While contracts may include performance targets or penalty clauses for non-delivery, these can be defined only for those needs and objectives which can be foreseen when the contract is entered into. Further contracts are legally binding documents which are not easily adaptable to changes over time in the needs and expectations of citizens.

In fact, Adam Smith argued that business could corrupt politics just as much as politics could corrupt business was taken seriously; beginning in the late nineteenth century (at the height of unrestrained capitalism) attempts were made to create an ethic of government action in which politicians and public servants were expected to maintain a sense of the public interest which was based on more than individual business ambitions (Crouch, 17). In the social democratic ideal of the state this ethic was expressed in the notion of the state as the servant of the universal citizen (Crouch, 17). While state centred citizenship focuses on citizen rights and obligations, market based citizenship focuses on individual liberty and responsibility to oneself and maybe one’s immediate family. Citizens are less equal members of the political community and more workers and consumers who interact in the market as individuals (Robert Ware, 299). For instance, according to Brodie, “the new welfare thinking is premised on a human resources model which sees joblessness as an individual rather than a structural problem” (Brodie, 58). In this context, many groups excluded from the social policy process prior to the Keynesian welfare state find themselves excluded again. Through a neo-liberal lens, equality-seeking groups, such as the women’s movement in Canada, are simply self-interested lobby groups, which threaten representational democracy and should not be supported financially by government or given ‘special treatment’ (Brodie, 69-70). As Melanie White points out,

...if one of the undeniable features of modern capitalism is that individuals and groups are unevenly situated in the market, then the idea of economic rights, understood in terms of equal access to the market,
seems at odds with a conception of social rights that seeks to secure an equality of outcome (White, 59).

**Neo-liberalism, Marketization and the Citizen-Consumer**

The changes discussed in the previous section reflect a shift which is part of a larger international trend that has been identified as the “marketization of the state” (Johnson-Redden, 121). Neo-liberal globalization involves the shift in the role of western liberal democratic governments as distributors of social justice through the Keynesian model of redistribution of resources, while “marketization of the state” refers to the assertion that the state should conform to market-like practices. The post-war notion of social citizenship suggested that poverty was not always an individual’s fault and that all citizens had the right to a basic standard of living guaranteed by the national community (Brodie, 57). Further, the public could enforce limits on the market so that people were not forced to engage in market activities which endangered their dignity or safety (Brodie, 57). By contrast, in a marketized environment the new good citizen is one who recognizes the limits of state provision and embraces his/her obligation to become self-reliant. According to Brodie, this ‘new welfare thinking’ is premised on a radical individualism that locates the causes of social problems in individual failure and identifies social change with individuals who act to maximize their self-interest (Brodie, 58).

The neo-liberal justification for the marketization of citizenship is based on the principle of supply and demand, in which citizens can voice their demands via their purchasing power. The use of public services becomes a consumer choice, rather than a citizen’s right (Cronin, 149; also see Broad and Antony, 1999; Melanie White, 1999). As Cronin points out, “the notion of choice comes to be framed as both duty (to the self and nation) and as a right (expressing the self’s potential)” (Cronin, 152). Thus, in the neo-liberal framework the market will both best provide public services and reflect citizen’s demands. Critics assert that instead of solving issues associated with “control from above” management of the welfare state, private contractors often simply replace the state in a monopolistic position, so the ability of citizens to utilize their consumer power and choose an alternative provider does not exist (Albo, 25). For example, in a British
study which carried out interviews with social service providers, all of those interviewed were sceptical of the extent to which user choice existed. One agency threatened by the possibility of short term funding offered to the cheapest bidder, was amazed that anybody would make a connection between this kind of competition and user choice asserting, "[w]hoever the contract is awarded to, that's where the client will have to go" (Hudson, 218). When a choice does exist, its utilization may be dependant on the user’s ability to utilize their market power in order to pay for another choice. In the process, formally public goods are transformed into private goods in which only those with purchasing power are able to obtain or purchase choice. This raises problems regarding new barriers to access for citizens without sufficient market power. In addition, citizen complaints to elected representatives regarding contracted out service delivery often fail to have an effect since the contractor is not accountable to government departments and thus to representative bodies except in terms of the contract (Albo, 25).

Neo-liberal discourse applied to the citizen-state relationship affects the meaning of political community both in terms of identity (consumer or market citizenship) and the rationale for community membership. As Kymlicka points out, the market cannot teach those civic virtues specific to political participation and dialogue, nor a sense of justice or social responsibility to one’s community (Kymlicka, 305). Further, if a political community can no longer control the fate of its members through a state apparatus within which decisions about the distribution of resources are accountable to citizens and work to achieve the common good, according to its members not the market, then what becomes the point of membership? A regular feature in arguments by state governments to both justify and defend the dominance of neo-liberal discourse and policies are assertions regarding the inevitability of neo-liberal globalization. Complementing such claims is the assertion that neo-liberal discourse and policies are necessary and adequate for increased human well-being. As Steger argues, when people accept the claims of globalism (that economic globalization is inevitable, irreversible, driven by "The Market", benefits everyone and encourages the spread of democracy), they also accept significant parts of the political, economic and intellectual framework of neo-liberalism.
Thus the ideology of globalism goes far beyond the task of providing the public with a narrow explanation of the meaning of globalization...globalism is a compelling story that sells an overarching neo-liberal worldview, thereby creating collective meanings and shaping personal and collective identities (Steger, 45).

As more neo-liberal policies are enacted, the claims of globalism become even more firmly rooted in the public mind. These ideas solidify into what French social philosopher Michel Foucault calls a solid "ground of thinking" (Foucault in Steger, 45). In the movement towards hegemony and the creation of an historic bloc or "false consciousness", Antonio Gramsci identified three levels of consciousness: the economico-corporative, solidarity or class consciousness and the hegemonic. The hegemonic brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms (Antonio Gramsci, 180-195). According to Gramsci, the movement towards hegemony is a "passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures" (Gramsci, 180-195). In other words, hegemony involves moving from the specific interests of a group or class to the building of institutions and expansion of ideologies. Further, these institutions and ideologies will be universal in form, thus not appearing to be those of a particular class and giving some benefit to the subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership and interests of the hegemonic class.

As the number and scope of sites of global deliberation and rule making are multiplying, a shift from the national to the transnational as the principle site of governance is taking place. Debate surrounds the extent to which this shift is voluntary or involuntary, positive or negative. This chapter has highlighted the dominance of neo-liberalism at the national level and on the direction of this shift from national to transnational governance as it relates to notions of citizenship within the state. This development requires us to think

---

8 In The Archaeology of Knowledge. Michel Foucault explores how knowledge is created, or the ways in which the ‘field of facts’ of discourse becomes truth. Foucault is interested not so much in how certain knowledge persists, but rather how continuities of knowledge become displaced. Foucault posits that there are discontinuities, displacements and transformations of concepts that show that the history of a concept is not entirely the result of its ‘progressive refinement’ or its increasingly rational evolution; but instead a concept is the result of the ways in which it is constituted, “its successive rules of use [and]...the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured” (Foucault, 4; also see 57-64).
historically about the ways in which governance regimes have been used in different times throughout human history and particularly during times of fundamental change. In North America, globalization has so far largely focused on neo-liberal economic integration formalized through trade arrangements, which predominately extend rights to transnational corporations rather than citizens. In Europe, a regionally integrated economy increasingly operates under a common set of rules which apply not only to economic matters, but also to social and political realms within and between member states. The similarity between North American and European integration is that both developed out of an economic rationale, directed by the motivations of member states and currently driven by a neo-liberal outlook.

The next chapter examines the European Union in respect to its potential both to influence the theory and practice of citizenship within member states and to promote a form of citizenship beyond the state. Although EU integration is not based on a purely economic rationale, the extent to which neo-liberal economics has dominated the process to date places significant constraints on future developments in the theory and practice of citizenship both within member states and at the European level. As in the Canadian case, the dominance of neo-liberalism at the European level challenges notions of social citizenship which developed out of the post WWII welfare state and places constraints on the policy autonomy of member states. However, current and future EU development also provides opportunities to rethink the theory and practice of citizenship. This process may provide some citizens with unexpected new avenues for inclusion while resulting in the exclusion of others.
CHAPTER THREE:
CITIZENSHIP BEYOND THE STATE: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Globalization influences notions of democratic citizenship on a new level which transcends state and local community dominance over such notions, by creating a form of regional membership, although largely undefined and not formalized, across states and beyond the local community. It is instructive to look at the European Union (EU) experience, since it, to a greater degree than any other current arrangement, has formalized governance beyond the state. The EU experience may serve as an example of the potential implications for the theory and practice of citizenship in a situation of both formal economic and growing political integration beyond the state. In this chapter, the creation of a transnational form of governance as expressed in the EU will be considered vis-à-vis its effect on democratic citizenship at both the national and European levels.

Assessments of the formal rights and entitlements associated with EU citizenship provides some insight into the extent to which citizenship at the EU level challenges national dominance over its articulation and may encourage both inclusion and exclusion. Further, two lenses predominantly guide this analysis of the EU. Through one lens the EU is seen as an international institution developed through a process of ad hoc agreements and driven by an economic rationale. This lens highlights the dominance of neo-liberalism in the EU integration project and the corresponding challenge to state policy autonomy and the state-citizen relationship as expressed in the notion of social citizenship and the development of the welfare state after WWII. Through the second lens the EU is regarded as a constitutional federation or confederation of states. This lens highlights the democratic deficit inherent in EU institutions and the extent to which a transfer of national policy making autonomy to the EU level undermines the principle of sovereignty, thus endangering the basis of democratic governance. This lens also illuminates the rationale behind support for, and objections to the development of a
European polity such as benefits for minority rights and the risks associated with renewed nationalism.

Interestingly, the formation of European institutions and citizenship beyond the state also provide opportunities for citizens within member states to rethink the theory and practice of citizenship and challenge current conceptions of rights and obligations and forms of inclusion and exclusion. Formal rules governing membership in a European citizenship regime, the unexpected consequences of EU rules and influence of European Courts, create some opportunities to rethink and challenge formal rules governing inclusion and exclusion in the rights and obligations associated with both national and European citizenship. For instance, the EU Courts are seen by some as a site for European citizens to protect existing rights or achieve new rights.

The Architecture of EU Citizenship: Inclusion and Exclusion

Serious discussion of a European citizenship which would confer “special rights” on the citizens of the original nine member states was first seriously mentioned at the Heads of Government meeting in Paris 1974. This was one of the first times that the word “citizen” instead of “national” was used in Community texts (Guido van den Berghe,32). Stemming from this initial meeting the Commission of the European Communities set about to consider the problems arising from the granting of special rights to citizens of the member states. These findings were published in a document called “Towards European Citizenship”. The main conclusions of the Commission were:

(i) that the special rights which it is envisaged that each Member State should grant to nationals of other Member States are certain civil and political rights, the granting of which would be based on a principal parallel to that on which the Community Treaties are based, i.e. equality with nationals of the host country in economic matters; (ii) that the special rights of a political nature are essentially the rights to vote, to stand for election and to hold public office” (“Towards European Citizenship”, Bull, EC, suppl. 7/75, p.25 in van den Berghe,32).

Further in the plenary session of the European Parliament in November 1977, the head of the Political Affairs Committee asserted that,
the Committee regards Community protection of civil and political rights of its citizens against possible infringements even by the governments of the Member States, as the foremost special right to be granted to the citizens of this community (Debates of the European Parliament, Annex 223 to the OJ, November 1977, p.108-9. in van den Berghe, 34).

The rights of EU citizenship are those of free movement and residence within the Maastricht Treaty (1993) Article 8a, of diplomatic protection outside the EU provided by any other member state (Article 8c), the rights of political participation: the franchise for the European Parliament and local elections (Article 8b), which includes the right to stand as a candidate in local elections in other countries and for the European Parliament and the right to petition the Parliament or to appeal to its Ombudsman (Article 8d). Maastricht also introduced the concept of "subsidiary", which was later defined more fully in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) identifying the EU as marking a new stage "in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen" (Amsterdam Treaty in Hoskyns,195). Although the meaning and significance of subsidiary is uncertain, it may justify a more multilayered governance which is more open and participatory.

In a study of EU citizenship, Rainer Baubock argues that the EU remains underdeveloped and limited to a national framework, applying it to three aspects of EU citizenship: "its content of rights, its range of inclusion and the ideologies of a European collective identity which are meant to underpin it" (Baubock,6). According to Baubock, apart from the franchise for the Parliament, the rights included in Article 8 amount to a version of external citizenship (diplomatic protection in a third country and free entry for Union citizens coming from there) and denizenship (free movement and residence within the Union and the local franchise). Thus, EU citizenship only becomes significant once a person lives in another member state of the Union or in a third country. Importantly, the rights set out in Article 8a-d apply only to nationals of an EU member state (Maastricht Treaty, Article 8). The great majority of migrants living in EU territory are not members of a Union state. Since the rights of EU citizenship apply only to citizens of member states, access to EU citizenship is dependent on the rules for acquisition, transmission and loss of citizenship determined by states’ national citizenship policies. Further, according
to Baubock, the EU has neither defined minimum standards for acquisition, transmission or loss of citizenship nor attempted to harmonize standards across member states (Baubock, 7). Thus the principle of free determination of nationality by sovereign states has been left unconstrained.

Baubock suggests that as long as the rights conferred by the Union add little to citizen’s national citizenship,

there will be little pressure for common standards of admission to national citizenship and thereby also to that of the Union. In this sense its architecture is supranational rather than transnational or postnational. It is like a thin roof resting on the separate and differently-shaped columns of national citizenships (Baubock, 7).

Member states may even opt out of certain provisions of Article 8. For instance, in recent local municipal elections in Berlin and Vienna foreign EU citizens could only vote at the level of municipal districts but not for the local parliaments. The reason for this exclusion was that these cities are also federal provinces and EU citizenship does not confer the franchise at provincial levels (Baubock, 7). In addition, with regard to the possibility of possessing multiple citizenships of member states of the EU, several member states including Germany, Austria and Luxembourg have policies designed to restrict multiple citizenship resulting from naturalization (7). While the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No.166; Strasbourg, 6 November 1997 in International Law: Conventions of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 1999) proposes more liberal standards for naturalization and multiple citizenship, signatory states are able to opt out of most provisions (Article 29-Reservations). Further, in Article 2 of The European Convention on Nationality (ETS No.166, 1997) nationality is defined as “the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin;”. According to Baubock, this definition reinforces the fact that the dominance of state sovereignty in determining nationality remains unchallenged even in relation to European integration. While in theory EU citizenship disregards nationality by extending EU citizenship to all citizens of EU member states, in practice member state control over determining membership rules vis-à-vis nationality limits its effect. In this context, the
potential for formal inclusion and exclusion for third country aliens at both the national and European levels will be considered below.

As was discussed briefly above, the great majority of migrants living in EU territory are not citizens of an EU member state. The current EU architecture regarding EU citizenship negatively affects third country aliens who remain outside its framework. Baubock asserts that these negative impacts fall into three categories: 1) missed opportunities of improving their position throughout the Union; 2) increased inequality of their position between the different member states; 3) relative deprivation of their status within member states (Baubock,8). The first negative outcome for third country aliens vis-à-vis the current Union architecture pertaining to citizenship is that it does not provide any improvement of denizenship for immigrants. One may have expected EU citizenship to break down national constitutional barriers excluding foreign immigrants and even native-born foreigners from voting rights or access to civil service, since both categories of peoples are residents of Europe and provide a potential source of support for the EU. However, the constitutional amendments that became necessary with the Maastricht treaty and overruled previous definitions of these rights as the exclusive privilege of national citizens reaffirmed the strict connection between national and EU citizenship and emphasized that such rights were based on formal citizenship; yet this move stripped the traditional conception of rational arguments that has been offered in its support (Baubock,8). In other words, the mere existence of a category of citizenship beyond the state, challenges the traditional discourse surrounding the basis of national citizenship. Making birth in the territory, or common descent, shared history and culture the defining criteria of nationhood has been defended on the grounds that people who share such characteristics are more likely to feel mutual obligations of solidarity and to acquire the knowledge necessary for participating in national political decisions. Baubock argues that citizens of other EU member states are not any more likely than third country aliens to be well-informed about another member state’s society or committed to the common good (Baubock,8).
In addition, instead of easing the inequality of their position among the EU member states, the inequality of rights of denizenship has been further highlighted by adding the unequal access to EU citizenship. For instance, if a family splits up, migrating to Sweden and Germany, those family members in Sweden are naturalized and thereby acquire EU citizenship. These family members are now free to live, work and vote in local and European Parliamentary elections, while their relatives who migrated to Germany will remain in a considerably weaker position. In other words, different national rules of naturalization and acquisition of citizenship at birth previously meant that the same group of emigrants would have unequal opportunities of becoming citizens in their host countries.⁹

As an assessment of the formal basis of EU citizenship suggests both opportunities for inclusion and potential for exclusion have been created by the current integration project. Moreover, the principle of sovereignty and the rights and obligations of citizenship are still very much linked to membership within a state. At the EU level the commitment of EU legislation to neo-liberal economics challenges notions of social citizenship which developed alongside the Keynesian welfare state after WWII. According to Ulrich Preub, some analysts have called the EU ‘a market without a state’ in order to emphasize its purely economic function (Preuβ, 138). The economic motivation behind EU integration is further highlighted by the focus of EU citizenship rights on the free movement of labour.

**EU Integration and Citizenship Beyond the State?**

EU integration has been studied through two distinct analytical lenses. The first views the EU as an international regime, like the United Nations or NAFTA. In this way the EU can be seen as an organization created, sustained and dominated by national governments. This lens focuses analysis on intergovernmental bargaining and why

---

⁹ It is worth pointing out that this situation does also introduce the possibility of third country migrants achieving citizenship in certain EU member states indirectly by taking advantage of another member state with more favourable naturalization and acquisition laws.
governments create these regimes.\(^\text{10}\) The second lens treats EU integration as the development of a federal constitutional order. Through this lens the EU is often compared to other federal regimes such as Canada or Germany, in which institutional arrangements that link constituent governments to the centre. Issues such as constituent government and central government interrelations and representation often are addressed. Much of the debate that results focuses on the consequences of European integration for the autonomy of the member states. Both lenses help to shed analytical light on the structures and policies of European integration and their effect on the theory and practice of citizenship both within member states and at the European level.

According to Hooghe and Marks the European Union is a consciously constructed set of institutions so it is tempting to draw comparisons between it and other modern constitutional political systems, especially federal systems (Hooghe and Marks,\(^\text{35}\)). However, there is a fundamental difference,

\[\text{[t]he [EU] is not patterned on any blueprint for a workable system of government...the Treaty of Rome did not try to settle fundamental questions of governance according to some overall plan based on principles such as protection of minorities, justice, equality, or political stability. This is not to deny that European integration has taken place within an ongoing debate among alternative conceptions of the European polity, encompassing for example, a "Europe of the Regions" in which states would wither away, a federal Europe combining member states, or a free-trade Europe composed of sovereign states. But these conceptions have not dictated the process of integration. They are used as normative guidelines for future development or to describe what has already taken place (Hooghe and Marks,\(^\text{35}\)).}\]

The treaties which make-up the EU are simply agreements among member states to achieve specific ends by creating particular institutions at the European level (Hooghe and Marks,\(^\text{36}\)). The institutional structure of the EU is the result of the accumulation of

\(^{10}\) It is important to remember that in the early moves toward European integration a level of supranationalism was largely accepted as a necessary price to pay for peace and prosperity. Economic motives dominated the process and the EC developed an idea of economic interdependence as an elite activity that separated the economic from the social and political. In general there was little recognition of the significant political and social effects EC policies would have on the citizens of member states. However, there were some exceptions to the marginalization of social issues. For instance, the EU developed a policy on equal treatment of women in the 1970's.
bargains about specific policies and their institutional frameworks. The development of the EU as a result of the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty can be conceived as a process which had little to do with the uniting of Europe (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Moravcsik, 1991 in Hooghe and Marks, 36). The critical objective leading up to the SEA was the goal of creating a more integrated European market in the expectation that this would facilitate the tapping of unexploited economic productivity. For instance, key actors such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, supported the SEA because it was an effective way to achieve certain economic goals, not because they were interested in the creation of a European polity. Further, the logic of the treaties, including Maastricht, is that of policy orientated problem solving in which institutions are a means of solving problems rather than goals in themselves (Hooghe and Marks, 38).

According to Jean-Marie Guehenno, the norms that are being promoted by EU institutions are based on the need for a free market and competition (Guehenno, 222). For instance, in the case of France decisive steps toward European integration began in the early 1980’s with the goal of building the credibility of the franc and soon reached the conclusion that the external discipline imposed by integration would be the most efficient way to modernize France (Jean-Marie Guehenno, 215). The macroeconomic policy choices that were made in order to enable the creation of a single European currency confirm a vision of the role of government as ensuring balanced budgets, limiting public debt and scaling down the state bureaucracies built up after WWII. Today, over fifty percent of economic regulation in France is EU derived, while a growing number of national laws are being enacted to implement EU directives (Guehenno, 220). Even the conditions for privatization of French state owned companies are also closely monitored by the EU directorate responsible for competition policy (Guehenno, 220).

Importantly, the debate over what constitutes a “service public à la francaise” puts the French authorities in a defensive position against the EU Commission. The French concept of “service public à la francaise” includes the notion of equal access and suggests that public institutions have a specific role in promoting shared values. However, this is challenged by Article 16 of the revised treaty establishing the European Community.
Article 16, while taking into account "the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion," still forces national governments to prove and justify any limitations placed on the free market principle (Guehenno, 221). This severely undermines the policy autonomy of the state, and the capacity of citizens and their governments to influence the national economy for their collective economic and social purposes, thus challenging notions of social citizenship. According to Greven, one reason for the relative disengagement of member state citizens at the EU level is the abstract scope of European policies: welfare benefits, taxation and issues like abortion are still not regarded as issues which are dealt with at the EU level (Greven, 49). Thus, the constraints posed by EU legislation on the possible social policies undertaken by member states may not be apparent.

Also important are the principles of 'direct effect' and the 'supremacy of Community law' over national law. Direct effect means that provisions of EU law must be applied by member states national courts without prior transformation into national law through the Parliaments of member states (Preuß, 138). The principle of supremacy means that EU law prevails over conflicting national law provision (Preuß, 138). Again, in this context, the dominance of a neo-liberal economic model of integration at the EU level not only reflects a challenge to state policy autonomy, but fundamentally alters the basis of post WWII notion of social citizenship and the role of the state vis-à-vis its citizens. National standards and market restrictions are being erased or reduced to the lowest common denominator since the introduction of the European Common Market (ECM), whereby social programs such as health care or in the area of job security are nothing more than obstacles to the growth of a free market in Europe (Greven, 46). The dominance of neo-liberalism in EU policies constrains member state's policy choices and encourages an emphasis on the individual rather than the community. This shift changes the relationship of accountability between the state and its citizens. In this environment while state authorities in theory remain the sole manifestation of sovereignty, in practice member state authorities are not free to carry out the expression of popular sovereignty by upholding the basis of social citizenship. In other words, the notion of a 'national
community of fate' that rules itself and should be answerable solely to itself has been challenged (Crawford and Marks, 82).

Beyond the challenges posed to the citizen-state relationship by the dominance of neo-liberal economic globalization within the EU, the dominance of an economic motivation influences the development of a European citizenship. Specifically, the dominance of economic motivations may be an impediment to developing democratic institutions at the EU level which could facilitate the development of a meaningful European citizenship. Since the process of European integration over the past two decades has mainly been driven by economic goals, the limitations to developing a democratic political community at the European level are not simply, for instance, that ethnic and cultural heterogeneity is far greater than at the level of the member states, but that European integration has been driven by economic goals (Hooghe and Marks, 51). As will be taken up in the next section, even if the EU is viewed from the perspective of any other international institution it has to a significant extent successfully established itself as a government relatively independent of any national government, however the legitimacy of its political authority is not grounded by any democratic polity.

The development of the EU took place largely in the absence of widespread public support for shifting authority to the European level. Interestingly, according to Hooghe and Marks, the EU project is similar to modern western state-building in that in many ways as the state's role grew not because those in power thought this to be intrinsically good but because ruling groups set aside their opposition to the principle of state regulation for ad hoc reasons. In the case of EU integration, those who favoured creating a European polity often referred to as integrationists, downplayed the implications of their proposals and, instead, usually emphasized the economic benefits of particular proposals that had as their by-product the piecemeal creation of a European polity (Wallace, 1982 in Hooghe and Marks, 39). For instance the growth and reorganization of EU administered cohesion policy, were the by-products of this initiative.
It is in this context that one can identify opportunities for citizen inclusion in rights and entitlements at the national level which derive themselves from the EU level. In other words, while EU integration has primarily been driven by an economic rationale, unexpected opportunities for citizens to challenge conceptions of rights and obligations and forms of inclusion and exclusion may be created. For instance, although EU law mainly aims at creating a uniformity of market conditions, it may also work to limit the ability of devolved governments to discriminate (Keating, 57). For instance, the Catalan language law is phrased to avoid conflicting with European single market regulation (Keating, 57). Further, according to Keating, in some cases Europe has worked to guarantee a greater equality of rights than exist in some states. For example, in 1997 the British government ruled that students from England, Wales and Northern Ireland would pay higher tuition fees at Scottish universities while students from the other fourteen EU member states would pay the lower Scottish rate (Keating, 57).

Also, interestingly, Michael Keating suggests that since Europe has not gone far in defining and entrenching collective rights (there are charters of minority languages and the Council of Europe has been involved in the field of cultural minorities) “as the question of individual rights is taken out of the hands of the state it is divorced from nationality so that national minorities can subscribe to universal principles without surrendering their identity” (Michael Keating, 57). For instance, while individual European states are reluctant to grant legal recognition to Islamic religious practices, some Islamic minority communities have appealed to the universalism of the Western rights tradition and sought support for such appeals from EU institutions (Soysal, 162). Rather than rejecting the Western political tradition, Islamic communities are demanding participation within it and are invoking Western concepts of rights to justify their participation. For instance, the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between People (MRAP) has assisted families in filing a case before the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) claiming violation of their right to freedom of religion (Open Society Institute, 94). As Bhabha notes, “Habermas views the EU as a supranational political mechanism for delivering democratic citizenship and a liberal political culture
without the prerequisite of homogeneity and cultural uniformity” (Habermas in Bhabha, 599).

Antje Weiner suggests some opportunity for minorities within Europe to bargain has been created as a result of European Union attempts to attract popular support and as both individual member states and the EU itself compete for citizen loyalty (Weiner, 1997, 529). However, in this context, Wiener makes critical distinctions between the rhetoric of citizenship rights, the practice of rights, and the relationship between the two. The rhetoric of citizenship is universalist in emphasizing the common rights of individual citizens. As Weiner points out, the practice of rights is only ever partially achieved (Weiner, 1997, 529). Within the EU, as within its constituent states, laws cast in universal form are only inclusive of certain groups, and laws granting rights to everyone are only accessible by some (Weiner, 1997, 529). The extent to which the EU may facilitate the inclusion of minorities within EU member states remains to be seen. However, as will be explored in a later section, the European courts may provide one means of achieving such inclusion. Overall, as long as EU citizenship is predicated on national controls, and EU directives remain focussed on economic aspects of integration its capacity to encouraged inclusion is limited.

There remain questions as to the potential for developing a European collective identity which would support a more transnational politics and which provides opportunities for inclusion for citizens at all levels of membership. Opinion is split regarding both the desirability and potential for a European collective identity. According to public opinion data, Europeans have little attachment to the European system and rely for protection on the structures of their state (Hoskyns, 200). Further, many citizens excluded from national political institutions are also declining to take full advantage of EU institutions. For example, despite ample theorizing regarding the possibility for inclusion presented by the EU, most French Muslim movements have not utilized EU agreements as part of their strategies to obtain citizenship rights. Statements of Muslim association leaders reveal that they are aware of the potential, and the limitations of the European-level institutions and legislation in addressing the issues and problems they confront at the domestic level:
Concerning the representativeness of Islam, the veil, places of worship there will be an encouragement to arrange all these things in France, as the European framework is in favour of it ... the European Court of Human Rights represents a hope for Muslims. Muslims are informed about European legislation, but for the time being they do not see the necessity to call upon non-national authorities...They wish first to solve conflicts at the national level. Thanks to Europe, Muslims can hope to be better understood and recognised in France (Interview with the director of La Réussite, 21 May 2002, in Open Society Institute, 138).

Political parties at the EU level may be one way to encourage a “European Awareness”, encourage participation and express the political will of citizens (Lambert and Hoskyns, 113). In 2000, eight transnational political parties were represented in the European Parliament, however, they are not cohesive (Hooghe and Marks, 43). Members of the European Parliament bring with them regional and national views which frame the various issues that they confront. Political parties at the national level also do not fulfil this representational role linking citizens to decision making at the EU level. However, in some member states European integration has become a central issue in national party competition, especially among extreme right-wing parties. Also, the Ombudsman, set up by the Maastricht treaty and empowered to investigate complaints about maladministration by Community bodies, may help increase citizen identification and involvement at the EU level (Hoskyns, 196). Further, Meehan and others suggest that the development of common values and sense of a European community may be advanced through developments toward social citizenship (“cohesion policy” refers to redistributive policies between EU member states, e.g: EU Employment Policy) (Meeham, 23). However, ironically the willingness of an electorate and their political representatives to support redistributive measures depends crucially on the existence of a sense of “togetherness” embedded in a common political community (Greven, 43). Hooghe and Marks suggest that cohesion policies are currently under pressure as a result of funding issues and difficulties in reaching agreement on policy in these areas (Hooghe and Marks, 109). Yet if Marshall’s notion of citizenship development, in which each advance of citizenship rights created the context for additional political claims, is applicable in the EU case, then without civic and political rights, social rights are unlikely to arise.
As discussed, the growth of transnational political institutions such as the EU may provide a potential new source of citizenship, and a means to question the dominance of the state as the only source through which to conceive citizenship. As a result, the EU may facilitate opportunities for inclusion and exclusion in the rights and entitlements of citizenship at the national level. However, this does not mean that the state has lost its dominance over notions of citizenship. But the dominance of neo-liberal economic motivations in EU integration challenges the basis of social citizenship within member states, and places constraints on the future validity of its role vis-à-vis the development of democratic citizenship at both the national and supranational levels. Considering the significant transfer of policy autonomy from member states to EU structures which do not have comparable levels of democratic legitimation; one should be concerned about the consequence of a loss of state autonomy on the standard of democratic citizenship; and rethink the theory and practice of democratic citizenship at both supranational and national levels. In the democratic sense, citizens exist only as citizens of member states and thus are only subject to the EU’s rulings-they do not have any substantive opportunity to participate in formulating them (Greven, 50).

**Democratic Deficits and the Future of a European Citizenship**

Within EU member states a debate over the future of the EU is taking place in the press and among political parties. In fact in some countries European integration has become a central issue in party competition, especially among extreme right-wing parties (Guehenno, 221). Many criticise EU institutions for being insufficiently democratic since EU structures lack mechanisms that would ensure their transparency and accountability to state-bound citizens. For instance, the two most important decision-making institutions are the European Commission and the European Court, and neither has representational legitimacy. The Commissioners are selected by national governments. Since 1999 the European Parliament has extended its formal power over the Commission, whereby the selection of the executive is based on a parliamentary majority. However, the Parliament does not have the standing of a national parliament and does not have the power to initiate its own legislation. Further, EU treaties do not require ratification in the European.
Parliament. The European Council, the most important legislative body of the EU, does not sit, debate or make decisions in public. As a characteristic of international negotiations this secrecy may be understandable, however, the outcome in many cases establishes European legislation. While the national leaders that make up the Council have a legitimate national mandate as legislators, they do not have any legitimacy as European legislators (Greven, 51). These democratic deficits at the level of the EU have serious implications for the development of a theory and practice of democratic citizenship at both the national and transnational levels. Governance at the EU level falls short of even an elite model of representative democracy\(^\text{11}\) (Greven, 54). These arrangements challenge modern notions of popular sovereignty: democratic accountability, consent of the governed and citizen participation in, and democratic control over decision-making.

In this context of change in the theory and practice of democratic citizenship a fundamental question must be addressed: why do governments want to shift their authority to other levels? The assumption that government leaders seek to enhance, not weaken the state, has led some scholars to conclude that European integration, despite appearances to the contrary, must strengthen states in one way or another (Moravcsik, 1994 in Hooghe and Marks, 71). According to Hooghe and Marks, in liberal democracies, maintaining political authority through winning elections does not depend on centralizing power, but can occur in the context of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks, 72). In fact, diffusing some political authority may increase a government’s bargaining leverage in international and domestic negotiations, insulate a particular policy from attempts to change it by the next elected government, and may relieve government leaders from responsibility for particular policy decisions (Hooghe and marks, 72).

For instance, Maastricht Treaty targets for budget deficits, national debt, inflation and interest rates committed government leaders to neo-liberal policies they already

---

\(^{11}\) According to Greven the EU model lacks a common political space in which competition among elites and elections for government could take place; a polity of citizens it would be responsible to; a political space of its own in which policy debate and formulation could take place and be recognized by the governed (Greven, 54).
supported, giving them an external justification for resisting domestic pressures that most wanted to resist anyway (Oatley, 1997 in Hooghe and Marks, 72). Further, shifting decision-making power over certain policy areas to supranational or subnational levels (in which it is difficult to change later) allows governments to limit the policy choices available to citizens and future governments. For example, political parties in EU member states that support more growth-orientated monetary policy or state ownership of certain sectors like telecommunications cannot implement these policies once in political power unless they change the constitution of the European Central Bank or constrain the European Court of Justice on competition policy (Hooghe and Marks, 73). Also, by shifting authority to other levels governments often can avoid potentially negative political consequences of certain policy choices.

Conversely, there is also the possibility that when political leaders do want to maintain central state authority there may be situations when this is inconsistent with other goals, in which case they may decide to sacrifice state authority. For instance, in the context of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) which introduced majority voting in the Council of Ministers on policies related to market integration, the environment and social policy (this meant that EU law would no longer be dependant on the consent of each national government), former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, while interested in maintaining state authority, was in the end more committed to market reforms and thus supported SEA (Hooghe and Marks, 74-5). In addition, a shift in political authority from the state to the supranational level may occur as a result of attempts by national leaders to suppress pressures from national parliaments, subnational governments, national interest groups or other subnational actors by shifting decision making to the European level (Hooghe and Marks, 77). In opposition, national actors in jeopardy of being cut out of the decision-making process may respond in various ways. For instance, subnational actors may set up their own offices in Brussels and connect directly with Commission officials (e.g.: on EU cohesion policy), intensify their contacts with each other by creating transnational or transregional associations, demand recognition of subsidiary in EU treaties and legislation, or campaign for direct representation in the Council of Ministers.
(Hooghe and Marks, 78). Many of these tactics are aided by EU officials who wish to gain support within member states.

In this context, Sue Cohen suggests that the potential for a European domestic politics exists since many people and organizations are affected by and seek to influence EU policies (Cohen, 14). Yet, to the extent that states have transferred decision-making authority to the EU, and then in order to maintain its dominance over citizens, decline to promote EU democratization raises serious questions regarding the possibility that a meaningful political space will develop at the EU level (Cohen, 15). On the other hand, EU citizenship is significant in terms of its potential to challenge state-based notions of citizenship and facilitate new possibilities of inclusion and potential for exclusion. As Catherine Hoskyns suggests, the introduction of aspects of formal democracy in Maastricht Treaty (1993) and Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the most important of which is the recognition of EU citizenship, moved the EU on from its early concern with people only in their capacity as economic actors towards a view of its constituency (Hoskyns, 195). In other words, the formal rights allocated to European Union citizens under Maastricht and Amsterdam were developed in such a way as to include not simply mobility rights of workers but also political rights of participation in the EU political process.

However, still, many criticise EU structures for being insufficiently democratic. While regulation at the supranational level continues to expand, the institutional and societal roots of its democratic underpinnings remain weak. This democratic deficit at the EU level has an effect on future developments in the concept of citizenship at both the national and supranational levels. In this environment, there are two main models pertaining to the future of EU integration. The first model justifies the separation of the international from the national. Of this perspective, Andrew Moravscik uses the term “intergovernmentalism” to describe a situation where national governments use the supranational level to achieve goals seen to be impossible by other means, and/or as a way of diverting political opposition. Moravscik sees the economic outcomes of European integration as justifying the means, and suggests that the EC’s democratic
deficit may be an essential source of its success (Moravscik, 518). In other words, within a more democratic governance regime, it would be more difficult to both formulate and implement certain policy objectives. Others like Sverker Gustavsson justify the separation of the international and the national based on general scepticism regarding the feasibility of democracy at the international level and a desire to preserve democracy as it exists at the national level. Conversely, others maintain that national governments’ power is becoming diffused by the need to bargain and compromise at the EU level and because governments are losing their right to mediate all domestic interests in the international arena (see Marks and Hooghe, 1996).

As Gustavsson points out, public involvement, indifference or dissent suggests that the public must be convinced of the legitimacy of EU structures by either reasserting national control in more visible ways, or enhancing democratic accountability at the European level, all which involve risks (Gustavsson, 40). For most citizens living in their states of origin, EU citizenship may seem insignificant as long as the democratic relevance of voting for the European Parliament is diminished by Parliament’s lack of legislative powers coupled with the lack of fundamental civil and social rights which define common standards enforced by judicial arrangements at the Union level. For instance, low voter turn-out in the June 1999 European elections (49.9 percent, inflated as a result of some states mandatory voting laws) raises questions concerning the level of public engagement and their perception of the importance of the European Parliament (Lambert and Hoskyns, 114). One must also consider that the rights attached to Union citizenship pale in comparison to those which are tied to EU member states.

Gustavsson suggests that the maintenance of existing democratic deficits is to be preferred to attempts to overcome it, in so far as such attempts may jeopardize democracy within member states without re-establishing comparable levels of democracy at the EU level (Gustavsson, 56). Kymlicka also suggests that attempts to create a more democratic form of transnational citizenship could negatively affect democratic citizenship at the national level (Kymlicka, 314). For instance, extending power to the elected European Parliament would also take away the veto power of national governments over most EU
decisions since decisions made by the European Parliament, unlike those of the Council, are not subject to the national veto (Kymlicka, 314). In this case the EU would not be accountable to citizens through their national legislatures, but instead a citizen of an EU member state would have to change the opinion of a significant number of the citizens of every other EU member state. Given the difficulty of establishing a meaningful and effective level of democratic participation at the transnational level one must be mindful of the condition of national democracy. Thus, as Kymlicka asserts, the net result of increasing direct democratic accountability of the EU, through for example, an elected European Parliament may be to undermine democratic citizenship at the national level. Ezra Suleiman also suggests that the democratization of the EU could adversely affect democratic stability within individual member states by encouraging renewed nationalism (Suleiman, 67). In many countries renewed nationalism and various movements associated with this renewal have already sprung up (e.g. anti-integration movements in the U.K.).

To democratize the EU would likely mean the creation of a federal system. Like the Canadian federal evolution, could the EU start out more centralized and become more decentralized over time? Or is this an unlikely comparison considering a united EU is made up of already developed and unique political units? All such systems face the issue of how to reconcile suprastatal decision making and accountability of office holders. However, governance within the EU differs from the typical way that suprastatism and accountability are combined in so far as decision-making is suprastatal and largely beyond the reach of collective accountability (Gustavsson, 41). Further, in justifying the absence of a democratic politics within the EU, some argue that democracy depends on the existence of a self-aware demos, and that in Europe this only exists at the level of the member states (Hoskyns, 178). In other words, a democratically accountable political authority need not be fostered at the level of the EU since a self-aware polity does not exist and is unlikely to exist at the European level to hold it accountable. Further, if member states are democratic and the EU is a creature of the member states, then why should the EU replicate democratic means that already exist at the national level? Some authors argue that given the dominance of an economic motivation on EU integration, a
European identity was never intended to replace national identities. However, even if in fact the EU was never meant to be a polity resembling the liberal democracies of its member states, or if in fact by virtue of an increase in the level of democracy at the EU level, democracy at the national level is impaired; as the EU gains more and more power over areas of policy once controlled by national governments the issue of direct democratic accountability (civic and political citizenship) becomes all the more important, as does the EU's impact on the nature of social citizenship currently defined and practiced within member states.

The Role of European Courts in the Development of EU Citizenship

The EU involves the transfer of decision-making power from the state to shared or merged institutions where decisions become part of the EU treaties and are approved as international legal obligations by each state (Hoskyns, 182). Also, other legislation adopted under treaty becomes part of the EU's supranational legal order, to which member states are bound (Hoskyns, 182). Normally, international treaty obligations result from rather closed negotiations, like those involved in EU treaty negotiation, and have little direct effect on citizens (James Crawford and Susan Marks, 72). These treaties are considered legitimate if the state approving them is seen as legitimate by their citizens. However, in the case of EU the scope of treaty obligations and corresponding legislation increasingly has a direct effect on the concerns of state bound citizens. Since there is little in the way of direct consultation and debate with citizens in the formation of EU treaties, the potential role of the European Court of Justice in shaping the effects of integration and legislation on state bound citizens is worthy of examination.

However, before considering the potential role of the European judiciary in influencing the effects of EU legislation on state-bound citizens one must address several criticisms of this judicial involvement. First, judicial decisions at either the national or EU levels may foreclose democratic involvement in policy-making and thereby weaken the identification of citizens with the rights they imply (Bellamy and Castiglione, 161). Also, in so far as EU integration is dominated by an economic rationale, judicial rulings at the
European level may reflect this underlying principle. Further, the extent to which EU law has come to appear increasingly open-ended, corresponds with a tendency for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to both extend the scope of its jurisdiction and to interpret rights in a largely market manner that shows little respect for national constitutional values (Bellamy and Castiglione, 172). These two criticisms relate to the inherent conflict between the application of national constitutional orders and a quasi-constitutional order at the EU level. The problem is that even if all the member states support the same set of rights and democratic values, they may have legitimately different interpretations of the scope and relative importance of such rights and democratic values. However, these differing interpretations and the resulting protections may restrict areas that the EU seeks to defend such as the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services. In this context, critics point out that since democracy has to be practiced among the people who could influence each others opinions and impact on those that govern them; and the EU possesses neither a demos nor mechanisms of effective democratic control over its decision-makers, ultimate judicial control over either national or EU laws pertaining to the national community must remain at the national level (MacCormick, 1995 in Bellamy and Constiglione, 170).

In terms of political and social rights, EU member states have accepted equal treatment of men and women in the workplace and a range of rights guaranteed through the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, member states may opt out of certain provisions of the ECHR. Also, while the ECJ has been the central enforcer of economic rights, it does undertake the enforcement of ECHR provisions. In fact, some ECJ rulings have worked to expand the rights of individuals against their member state governments (Clarkson, 155). However, according to Ewa Biernat the interpretation of the notion of 'individual concern' from Article 230 (4) EC, by the ECJ and the restrictions imposed by the Treaty itself on the possibility of challenging Community acts by individuals are against the principle of effective judicial protection and in some cases lead to the denial

---

12 According to Greven, the legal system of the EU has a strong bias towards dealing with the four so-called liberties of the Common Market (free movement of goods, services, people and capital), but in not effective in providing citizens with rights and legal support against the impact of EU governance (Greven, 37).
of justice (Bienat.3). Further, Stefania Ninatti’s examination of ECJ case law on the democratic nature of the community decision-making process and finds that,

the democratic principle used by the ECJ judges seems, at least initially, to need to rediscover itself in the constitutional traditions common to the member States. A sign of that osmosis occurring between the Community level and the national one: the Court finds supports in the classical theory of representative democracy as the living experience of the legal orders of the Member States (Ninatti,3).

Ninatti concluded that the Court does not address substantively the problem of popular representation but, instead focuses on the democratic process within the boundaries of the institutional relationships, as reflected in the jurisprudence of the ECJ and strengthening of the role of the European Parliament (Ninatti,40). In terms of the role of European courts, EU integration, by challenging the autonomy of states, has in some cases encouraged a more inclusive citizenship within member states. For instance, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which gives private citizens access to the Court, has resulted in challenges to the French state on the basis that French courts failed to provide defendants with due process of the law, and subjected them to excessive time delays in passing judgements (Guehenno,221). Also, significant insights into the role of law in shaping the theory and practice of European citizenship may also be gleamed from an analysis of the outcome of ongoing EU constitutional debates. Further, at the EU level, the adoption of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights like the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada may help to bolster European identity. In the Canadian case Christopher Dunn argues that the Charter has protected minority groups against state discrimination and strengthened national institutions by providing a set of rights that is uniform across the country; and that these rights cut across regional cleavages encouraging common identities across provincial borders (Dunn,74-77).

The influence of the European Courts on the effects of supranational decision-making on the theory and practice of democratic citizenship are significant and certainly worthy of additional research. However, like other EU institutions, it has not yet provided a solid
basis for the development of citizenship beyond the state. An alternative basis has been put forward by the proponents of the role of national and international “civil society”, and this alternative will be discussed in the next chapter.
The proliferation of civil society organizations and their increasingly prominent role in governance at the national and international level can be viewed in the context of two major themes. First, at the national level in the context of state downloading policy responsibility to local levels of government and state downsizing and retrenchment from areas of social service provision, civil society is increasingly involved in the provision of social services previously carried out by the state. In addition, increasingly complex issues involved with the growing pluralization of society brought about by mass migrations after WWII, has also led to a significant increase in the role of civil society organizations as mediators of diverse interests, experts and representatives of various interests within society in their interactions with the state. This plurality within society is coupled with a general loss of faith by citizens in the traditional political institutions of most liberal democratic states. In light of this loss of faith, civil society may provide citizens with a new means to participate. While some advocate a return to local forms of citizenship akin to town-hall democracy (see Magnusson, 2000), others propose that forms of quasi citizenship within civil society will offer alternatives to state based citizenship (Beiner, 122). Albo suggests that popular movements tend to emphasize (at least implicitly) a notion of democratic citizenship in the sense of equal entitlement to the consumption of collective goods and services, and the right of participation and control over the planning, administration and distribution of these same goods and services (Albo, 19). These suggestions play down the importance of a citizen’s direct relationship to the state and highlight citizen’s relationship to substate forms of community (Beiner, 122).

Second, states increasingly engage at the international level regarding issues which are transnational in nature, or that can no longer be addressed in a purely national context.
(environment, spread of disease, mass migration, etc.). In addition, states increasingly engage in transnational relations within international institutions in the process of economic globalization. By virtue of this engagement states lose some of their political autonomy. Further, the ad hoc nature and dominance of neo-liberalism in transnational relations has led some to express concern over a democratic deficit at the level of transnational relations and international institutions (in so far as citizens are subject to the political authority of international institutions yet these institutions have not developed comparable levels of democratic legitimation to qualify as democratic). In this context, the involvement of a proliferating global civil society at the level of multilateral relations and international institutions is seen by some as a means to address this democratic deficit at the international level.\(^{13}\)

In an article in *Foreign Affairs* called "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector", Lester Salamon argues that an "associational revolution" is taking place throughout the world, and that these civil society organizations "may be permanently altering the relations between states and citizens" (Salamon,109). This article stemmed from a 1990-1995 study conducted by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project into the character and functions of domestic civil society. A recent international study of civil society in industrial democratic states concluded that civil society has become a powerful actor in the making and remaking of national governance systems throughout the world, as the proliferation of civil society organizations in recent years has begun to alter the relationships not only between the state and citizens, but also among the state, the business sector, and citizens (Tadashi,21).

Many associate the rise of civil society organizations at least in part with globalization as manifested in the increasing number of issues that national governments could, or would no longer deal with. Some scholars argue that civil society associations operating at the national level play an increasingly important role in addressing complex policy issues

\(^{13}\) Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali civil society is "a basic form of popular representation in the present day world. Their participation in international relations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of those international organizations" (Boutros-Ghali quoted in Kohler,232).
confronted by democratic societies, and provide an alternative sphere for citizen participation (Shields and Evans, 1998; Steger, 2002). In addition, as outlined above, “...there has been a shift in recent decades to free market principles and neo-liberal thinking, leading to reduced government spending on social services and accelerated privatization of the economy” (Tadashi, 16). In this context, increasingly civil society has replaced, or acts as a substitute in areas of social service delivery once carried out by the state.

The significance of the growth of civil society for citizenship is tied in part to scholars utilizing the concept of “civil society” to study democratic governance and citizenship in the context of democratic reform (see Agh, 123). More specifically, recent studies have concluded that civil society plays an important role in forcing national governments or occupying authorities to accept a democratic system of governance (eg: The 1996 Japan Centre for International Exchange international study called “Globalization, Governance and Civil Society”) (Tadashi, 21). On the other hand, civil society presents another possible option for citizens, especially those excluded from, or disillusioned with state representative institutions to bypass formal representative institutions and focus citizenship on non-traditional social organization. In an article called “Death of Politics” published in the Globe & Mail on November 30, 2000 pollster Michael Adams wrote,

[the lesson for Canada's parties and governments is not to attempt to restore traditional faith in their authority, but to offer constructive engagement. Canadians as individuals, and our civil society's institutions will take on more responsibility to maintain our much vaunted quality of life in partnership with the governments that did the job in the past.

At the national level one consequence of increasing citizen participation in non-partisan institutions is that it creates problems for democratic legitimation. According to Kymlicka, civil society theorists may demand too much of voluntary associations by expecting them to be the main source of, or a small scale version of democratic citizenship (Kymlicka, 306). The importance of civil society's role in sustaining a vibrant democracy should not be underestimated; however, the increasing emphasis on the role of civil society as a replacement or substitute for the institutions that allow for the
exercise of democratic citizenship must be critically assessed. In other words, to expect that these groups, which exist for a multitude of reasons, can also effectively support democratic citizenship is debateable. In terms of civil society acting as a substitute for the institutions that allow for the exercise of democratic citizenship or a representative of citizens in multilateral relations, two main problems arise: first civil society is not directly accountable to citizens, and second, the state is not directly accountable to civil society. While civil society may act as a force of reform and a mediator of the diverse interests and issues advanced democracies confront, considering the growing extent of their influence one should be critical of their role. There is no direct public accountability built into the functioning of civil society which would ensure that they act in the interest of the common good. Further, ultimately it is still the state that has the power to both grant and guarantee the rights and obligations of citizenship. The parallel capacity of civil society to carry out this function is limited. Control over public resources is still primarily located in the hands of the state, thus the allocation of those resources is dependant on the will of the state.

The exclusionary nature of civil society itself is an important aspect of its relationship to citizenship. For instance, in terms of civil society’s representational capacity those who make-up civil society associations tend not to be representative of the majority of the demos. Some authors have argued that beyond the fact that there are no built-in accountability measures internal or external to civil society associations, and that civil society may not act as an alternative source of political expression for citizens, but simply foster the status quo. In fact, as many studies regarding the relationship between the state and civil society point out, the state, for instance through its control over resources, may simply co-opt civil society organizations treating them as subsidiaries of the state (see Della Porta and Diani, 1999).

The growing awareness by states about the utility of civil society organizations, coupled with the absence of a strong financial base for most of these organizations makes them even more dependent on the state for their very existence (Tadashi, 25). Potential co-optation may have both negative and positive effects on the ability of these civil society
organizations to achieve their aims. However, in terms of democratic accountability, the state may also use these organizations to distance itself from its responsibility to citizens. For instance, to the extent that civil society organizations have taken up responsibilities in areas of social welfare provision that governments have left unattended (e.g. as services providers contracted by the state), government may distance itself from its responsibility and accountability to citizens. As discussed in chapter two, the provision of public services by members of the private sector may transform the premise upon which public services are provided, placing citizens in the role of consumer and altering the expectations citizens may justifiably have of the state. The above critique is not limited to civil society acting in the national context. Many of the same issues arise at the level of global civil society.

The meaning of "civil society" at the international level has been ambiguous in that it has been used to mean different things over time. According to Theodore Cohn, civil society describes a range of nongovernmental, non-commercial organizations outside of official circles that seek to reinforce or alter existing norms, rules and social structures (Cohn,442). Scholte refers to civil society as the activities of voluntary associations to shape policies, norms and or social structures; whereby civil society is formally organized and officially registered as opposed to other civic activities which are ad hoc and informal (Scholte,2000,277). Further, according to Scholte, global civil society can be identified when one or more of the following characteristics are present: 1) organizations address supranational issues like global ecological change or transborder capitalism; 2) they utilize suprateritorial communications like email or fax; 3) they manifest a transborder organization with coordinated branches in various locals around the world; 4) they operate on the basis of suprateritorial solidarity such as between women or workers (Scholte,2000,277-8).

The nature of the democratic deficit at the international level is the absence of representative democracy in multilateral relations and international institutions. For instance, global integration through trade arrangements or through formal political integration as in the case of the EU has provoked concerns regarding both the democratic
deficits inherent in the structures of global institutions and in relations between states and
global institutions. With regards to the latter, in so far as integration poses a challenge to
state autonomy, a democratic deficit may be created since a challenge to the political
authority of the state also changes the nature of democratic accountability and obligation
in the citizen-state relationship. In addition, globalization has rendered old formulas of
state-centric democracy inadequate as a result of the proliferation of complex
transnational issues such as the environment and by posing a challenge to state policy
autonomy through integration. Further, state relations with global actors often lack
sufficient democratic controls. In this context it has been suggested that solutions to
global democratic deficits may be found in the “third sector” of global civil society
(Korten, 1990; Falk, 1995 in Scholte, 2000, 277). The central premise of this assertion is
that global civil society may overcome domination in government and exploitation in the
market.

Other related reasons for the rise in civil society include the emergence of serious cross
border global issues which have encouraged the development of civil society networks,
which in turn creates a means for both domestic and international actors to have input
into domestic governance. Some cosmopolitan theorists suggest that a “global civil
society” is emerging, bound together by shared values including human rights,
democratic participation, the rule of law and the preservation of the global environment
(see Falk, 2003; Kohler, 1998). Referred to as “transnational social movements”, “global
civil society” or “civil society networks”, this type of political activism has become a
signal of the possibility for those who see it as a means of political participation linking
individuals at the local level to issues of global concern (see Deibert, 88). Further,
theorists like Falk look to the networks of global civil society in their assessment of the
possibility of developing a notion of transnational and ultimately global citizenship.
According to Falk, global civil society impacts on current territorial conceptions of
citizenship and involves a non-territorial conception of identity and community (Falk,
15, 95). These civil society networks are facilitated in part by communication technology
such as the advent of the Internet. In fact, according to Ronald Deibert,
Almost every imaginable political or social campaign has its electronic listserv component. As a consequence, the Internet has become as vital to global civil society as telecommunications are to transnational corporations. So closely linked now are civil society networks to the Internet that among more optimistic observers the Internet itself has often been portrayed as a nearly mystical generator of democratic social change (Ronald Deibert, 88).

The increasing need for national governments to participate in regional and international organizations to deal with common domestic issues, such as the growing pluralism in many societies brought on by large waves of immigration has increased the importance of civil society (Tadashi, 19). In other words, national and global civil society organizations fill a public space that governments struggle to address or have left unattended. While civil society at the national and global levels play a role in redressing increasingly complex issues of a plural society at the national level and global democratic deficits at the international level, they also form transborder networks to address issues (like the environment or workers’ rights) that are at once global and local in nature. For instance, the broadly based international coalitions of the sort that converged to protest at the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle illustrate the growing transnational or global nature of civil society organizations. This popular opposition to the current form of economic globalization was followed by other similar protests in cities around the world where the leaders of economic globalization, both corporate and governmental held their meetings. According to Falk these protests constitute a “globalization-from-below”, in so far as they signal the start of a worldwide political movement against “globalization-from-above”; this is unique in its composition of “grassroots constituencies, transnational social forces, and political activism without a territorial base” (Falk, 192). The potential transborder nature of civil society action creates a new political space through which to engage in actions that may affect policy at both the national and international levels. The transnational campaign against the Multilateral Agreements on Investment (MAI) is one example of the lobbying efforts of civil society networks which rallied together diverse organizations and succeeded in pushing the MAI off the agenda of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Deibert, 89).
Global governance rests on different types of international coordination, cooperation and collective decision making with international organizations taking on coordination functions and contributing to the development of a global culture of cooperation (Franz Nuscheler,160). This situation prompts the question: How can public policy be democratically developed in a context of shifting decision-making power from the national to the transnational and global levels? The Commission on Global Governance envisions a form of global governance which does not only involve states and international organizations but also the cooperation of governmental and nongovernmental actors from the local to the global level. The Commission on Global Governance, comprised of twenty-eight experts, and endorsed by the UN Secretary General and funded through two trust funds of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), nine national governments, and several foundations, including the MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation issued a report entitled "Our Global Neighbourhood". The report addresses the need for the development of a global political community to increase the level of democratic governance at the global level. The Commission recommends the creation of two new bodies of the United Nations: an “Assembly of the People” and a “Forum of Civil Society” which would consist of “300-600 representatives of organizations accredited to the General Assembly (NGOs)...” (Our Global Neighbourhood,1996). The Commission aims to institutionalize civil society participation and in theory enhance democracy in global governance by assigning its organizations a legal status.

The 1996 report presented by the Group of Lisbon (mainly composed of social-democratic intellectuals), proposed that in order to rein in the destructive potential of the market, a system of cooperative global governance should be created in which international civil society as well as elites would be involved alongside global agreements (Nuscheler,168). One of the global agreements envisioned by the Group would include a democracy pact aimed at the involvement of civil society in cooperative global governance, democratization of the UN system and convocation of a “global citizens assembly” (Nuscheler,169). As Nuscheler points out, the idea of a democracy pact signifies a core problem of multilateralism: specifically how are decisions to be
legitimated that have been removed from the sphere of competence of democratic states to the multilateral level? Further, to the extent that civil society is able to make-up for democratic deficits associated with multilateralism: who among civil society should be represented, how will they be elected and what rights should they have?

Again, at the level of international governance, global civil society is playing an increasing role in attempts to redress democratic deficits. Under the auspices of the United Nations at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights and Development, the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen and the Beijing Conference on Women and Development, parallel meetings of transnational activists marked early attempts to engage both state and market decision makers and establish a new sort of global participatory politics (Falk, 201). However, as Falk points out, the leading state response to this engagement at Rio and Vienna was a co-optive one; then later at Cairo, Copenhagen and Beijing these transnational activists were seen as unwelcome adversaries (Falk, 201). Further, there emerged a refusal by leading states to fund and organize global conferences on controversial policy issues under the auspices of the United Nations (201). Importantly, in this context, civil society associations may have to decide whether or not their interests are best met by focussing their efforts on supranational organizations or local, regional or national governments.

The development of a global civil society may provide opportunities for developing a transnational sense of citizenship beyond the state (vis-à-vis the educational or consciousness raising function civil society organizations may carry out; further participation in a global network of organizations may encourage a global identity and sense of membership in a global community). In addition, participation in global civil society may provide a means for state-bound citizens to effect decision-making at the international level. Still, there are significant constraints on the role of civil society at both the national and international level. The extent to which civil society involvement will address global democratic deficits is debatable. Global civil society may stimulate debate and challenge status quo policies and interpretations regarding globalization and
add legitimacy to global governance by giving stakeholders opportunities to speak on and debate policy options. Global civil society may also give a voice to groups marginalized at the national level (e.g. youth or indigenous peoples) and provide non-hierarchal structures of participation. The legitimacy of civil society involvement in part depends on the level of expertise its members hold. Also, civil society actors can establish their legitimacy on moral grounds by pursuing the public interest, common good or acting as a “global conscience” (Scholte and Schnabel,6). However, global civil society’s legitimating function is limited as organizations often lack sufficient consultation mechanisms, transparency and public accountability (Scholte,2000,279). In terms of transparency and public accountability many associations do not issue annual reporting of their activities or make them available to their boards of trustees, funders or the general public (Scholte,2000,280). In addition, professionalized global civil society associations tend to conduct only limited consultation with those they claim to represent. To be democratically legitimate civil society actors would also need to be suitably representative of the affected public (Scholte and Schnabel,5).

Further, there is very little research currently available that addresses issues related to the nature and actual influence that civil society has on the institutions and policy outcomes of global governance. In other words, how and to what extent does civil society actually affect the institutions and policies of global governance? Research along this line may shed light into how well civil society organizations are able to act as effective representatives of citizens beyond the state. In a recent study of civil society engagement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jan Aart Scholte found that civil society initiatives in regard to the IMF have involved both direct and indirect (pressure on national governments or campaigns through the mass media) contacts with the Fund itself (Scholte,2002,1). However, overall, the extent of IMF engagement with civil society remains limited, and the IMF does not have an explicit policy concerning these relations (Scholte,2002,1). Further, the IMF has generally maintained greater contacts with more sympathetic civil society associations (e.g. economic research institutes and forums of big business) rather than more critical associations (e.g. trade unions and various NGOs) (Scholte,2002,2). In terms of the effect civil society has on IMF policy and institutions,
Scholte found that civil society involvement has encouraged the IMF to change several institutional procedures including measures related to public consultation, transparency and policy evaluation (Scholte, 2002, 2). Also, civil society actions have affected some substantive policies of the IMF regarding debt relief and loan conditionalities. According to Scholte,

[i]f relationships between civil society associations and the Fund are handled well, they can help to reduce the severe governance deficits that have marked contemporary monetary and financial globalization. On the other hand, if the links are handled poorly, they can exacerbate deficits of efficiency, stability, ecological integrity, social equity and democracy in global governance through the IMF (Scholte, 2002, 3).

The state’s monopoly on the definition of citizenship has begun to be questioned in the context of globalization and the renewal of notions of cosmopolitan democracy and “globalization from below” (see Held et al, 1995; Falk, 2003). The growth of participation in a global civil society illustrates the increasing importance of definitions of public goods beyond the state. The rise of issues that are at once local and global in nature and require cooperation across states and communities challenges the dominance of the state over policy-making. Global civil society in this context is seen by some as a mode of political participation and activism linking individuals at the local level to issues of global concern. However, as decision-making power increasingly shifts to structures beyond the state (which remains the primary site of political democracy in so far as international institutions have not developed comparable levels of democratic legitimation), one must be aware of the effects of this shift on democratic citizenship.

Further, one must be critical of the validity of civil society’s role in redressing democratic deficits at the multilateral level given that civil society involvement in its current state cannot replace or act as a substitute for institutions that allow for the exercise of democratic citizenship. Specifically, civil society is not directly accountable to citizens, and the state (which has a monopoly over resource allocation) is not directly accountable to civil society. Also, to the extent that civil society may be utilized by the state to carry out the provision of public services and is largely dependent on the state for funding, it may be co-opted by the state. In this context, civil societies advocacy and educational
functions may be jeopardized in favour of a purely service delivery role. Finally, again as Nuscheler points out, to the extent that civil society is able to make-up for democratic deficits associated with multilateralism: who among civil society should be represented, how will they be elected and what rights should they have?
CONCLUSION:
THE CONDITION OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: CONSEQUENCES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Citizenship is an evolving notion that develops in relation to the political, economic, social and cultural context in which it is played out. While citizenship provides a useful perspective from which to analyse many social problems and questions, there is agreement that citizenship is a contested concept. The evolving meaning of citizenship in western liberal democracies is carried out in the context of the changing role of the state and an ongoing contest over the proper allocation of political authority. Thus, in so far as citizenship is an evolving notion so too is the concept of the state. There is agreement that the role of the nation-state as it has been understood in relation to welfare state is being challenged by globalization. Many commentators see this as a problem yet few agree as to what the problem actually is. Some commentators emphasize the diminishing significance of political autonomy. Others point to the inability of the state to regulate the economy, which operates in an increasingly borderless free market. Still others point to the loss of national culture as the central problem of the challenge to the nation-state. Importantly, globalization should not be understood as a singular monolithic process headed towards a certain outcome, but instead as a process with multiple dimensions and multiple possible outcomes. What is interesting is that with multiple forms of globalization come multiple possibilities for the reconceptualization of not only the state but citizenship within the state. Given that the nature of citizenship is defined in relation to the state, the debate surrounding globalization's effect on the role of the state and future viability of state sovereignty must not stop at a structural analysis devoid of any connection to the corresponding significance for the theory and practice of citizenship. The normative basis of the relationship between the sovereign and subject is one aspect of this much needed analysis. To re-imagine the project of globalization requires us to connect this process with the consequences on the ground for citizens.
From this perspective, neo-liberal globalization’s challenge to the redistributive role of the state as it was expressed during the Keynesian era also impacts the theory and practice of citizenship which developed during this time. Social citizenship is changed, and the practice of citizenship is transferred to the market and notions of the citizen-consumer. While globalization challenges the policy autonomy of the state, neoliberalism dominates the policy choices available at the national and international levels. The neo-liberal project of economic globalization through global trade arrangements among other things, increasingly inhibits the policy autonomy of states. The capacity of citizens and their governments to influence the national economy for their collective economic and social purposes is reduced. While global agreements and law have the potential to produce negative and positive outcomes, with regards to the theory and practice of citizenship these arrangements challenge notions of democratic accountability, consent of the governed and citizen participation in, and democratic control over decision-making. In other words, the notion of a ‘national community of fate’ that both rules itself and should be answerable solely to itself has come under strain (Crawford and Marks, 82). If citizens acting within the state can no longer control their fate through democratic control over decision-making, the resulting disconnect between the citizen and the political authority exercised by the state requires further consideration. As does the extent to which state power is actually constrained by these arrangements.

Even at the level of the EU where integration has arguably gone beyond a purely economic model to include a form of political membership, the theory and practice of citizenship is constrained by the dominance of economic motivations behind integration. To the extent that the EU has granted a form of formal citizenship to citizens of its member states, this citizenship is largely limited to a national framework and focuses inclusion largely on citizens in their capacity as workers. EU integration although dominated by an economic rationale does create some unexpected opportunities for citizens and others to challenge the basis of inclusion and exclusion and the nature of rights and obligations at both the national and European levels (e.g. minority rights). EU citizenship also allows one to begin to re-conceptualize citizenship outside the state.
although it remains unclear as to the future direction and desirability of EU integration in terms of the practice of democratic citizenship in light of democratic deficits at the EU level. Overall, the lack of democratic legitimacy at the EU level, and the dominance of a neo-liberal economic rationale behind an increasingly significant array of policy areas either affected by or transferred to the EU level, should raise serious concerns over the continued validity of democratic citizenship still bound to the state.

While citizens utilize various strategies in order to shape the rights and obligations under which they are bound, including bargaining, protest, lobbying and constitutional protections interpreted and enforced by the judiciary, some recent research suggests that global civil society can play a significant role in addressing the challenges brought about by globalization and a lack of democratic legitimacy in multilateral relations. However, the extent to which global civil society can fulfil this role, especially vis-à-vis inherent democratic deficits is debatable. One must be critical of the validity of civil society’s role in redressing democratic deficits at the multilateral level given that civil society involvement in its current state cannot replace or act as a substitute for the institutions that allow for the exercise democratic citizenship. Specifically, civil society organizations are not directly accountable to citizens, and the state (which has a monopoly over resource allocation) is not directly accountable to civil society. Thus, in terms of the democratic nature or potential for governance beyond the state civil society plays a role in redressing democratic deficits at the international level; but one should not overstate civil society’s role as it can not act as a substitute for the institutions that allow for the exercise of democratic citizenship and which must exist for a democratic polity to function.

It is certain that we are in the process of a reconceptualization of democratic governance as it has been conceived in relation to the state, and by virtue of this, democratic citizenship is also being transformed. The outcome of this reconceptualization is not predictable, but instead depends on many factors including the vision of political leadership and citizens alike. What is certain is that the character and evolution of democracy depends on our understanding of, and interest in, the nature of citizenship.
Critical analysis of the current condition of citizenship provides us with an opportunity to rethink notions of citizenship and restructure our political and social spaces in new ways. Questions regarding the nature of state sovereignty in an era of globalization and current back-tracking vis-à-vis social and political rights, may create an environment in which more citizens of advanced western democracies reengage and become a part of the normative discourse regarding the future direction of democratic governance. Once this reengagement takes root the question thus becomes will citizen organization at the local, national or global levels be most effective in promoting and producing a renewal in democratic citizenship? Certainly the effect of state downsizing and devolution to lower levels of government has encouraged attempts to renew local forms of governance and participation which may provide one potential framework for reengagement. As research on global civil society suggests, the development of a global vision of citizenship is one potentiality. Its relevance is fuelled by the growing range of issues and problems which do not fit neatly into a national framework for action. However, its ability to sustain a future democratic theory and practice of citizenship remains questionable and should be apart of an ongoing analysis.

In the context of neo-liberal globalization and its challenge to state-based theory and practice of social citizenship, research into the prospects of a transnational social policy must be undertaken. In addition, as in the past, judicial guarantees may be a means for the protection and realization of social justice. Future research is required to assess the potential role of international law and suprastate courts like the European Court of Justice, in managing transnational arrangements, interpreting the actual meaning of citizenship rights and obligations in situations of transnational membership and addressing issues of inclusion and exclusion. However, the dominance of neo-liberalism on the process of globalization encourages a reconceptualization of the role of the state in relation to the market and as a result has a direct effect on the theory and practice of membership within the state: citizenship. This impact requires us to assess both the normative and empirical implications of a theoretical and practical change to citizenship. The future condition of democracy depends on this reassessment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gustavsson, Sverker. “Reconciling Superstatism and Accountability: A View from Sweden” in Catherine Hoskyns and Michael Newman (eds.) Democratizing the


