"THE QUEEN WISHES HER RED CHILDREN TO LEARN THE CUNNING OF THE WHITE MAN": THE MYTH OF EDUCATING INUIT OUT OF "PRIMITIVE CHILDHOOD" AND INTO ECONOMIC ADULTHOOD

by

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"The Queen Wishes Her Red Children to Have the Cunning of the White Man": The Myth of Educating Inuit Out of "Primitive Childhood" and Into Economic Adulthood

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to outline some of the sources of difficulty in modern Inuit-White relations especially as they relate to education.

Some observers have suggested that teaching and learning should be seen as cultural activities distinct from institutionalized education. These commentators have also noted a tendency of professional educationists to discern the presence of nascent versions of their institutions in so-called primitive cultures. In this educationists are not alone; colleagues in other professions claim to be able to detect incipient religious, health, military, justice, and economic institutions in non-industrialized societies.

The presence or absence of an institutional form of education is relevant to an exploration of the social difficulties crippling modern Inuit society. There is some evidence to show that the southern industrialized style of compartmentalizing social functions and human services has contributed to the dissolution of bonds which used to sustain Inuit civilization. The resulting social problems have been well documented.

This thesis argues that it is the "Great Transformation", that is, the nineteenth century birth of industrial capitalism, that was the formative influence in the molding of the modern European and Euro-Canadian character. This paper argues that the "White way of life" represents a new form of civilization, one dominated by its disembedded market, in bondage to an all-pervasive system of money-value, and motivated primarily by an ideology of property-based individualism.
This paper describes how this civilization developed a ranking of societies based on economic and educational characteristics which placed the disembedded market culture on the top rung of the ladder of civilizations, and placed so-called primitive non-monetized, non-commodity-intensive societies at lower levels of social evolution.

Finally, this paper examines how institutional education was and still is used as an instrument of "development" as well as a benchmark for dividing "Stone Age" from "civilized races".
Dedicated to my parents,
George and Dayle,
and to my brother Grant
But you, who are wise, must know that different Nations have different Conceptions of things and you will therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas of this kind of Education happen to not be the same as yours. We have had some experience of it. Several of our young People were formerly brought up by your Colleges of the Northern Provinces: they were instructed in all your Sciences; but, when they came back to us, they were bad Runners, ignorant of every means of living in the woods... neither fit for Hunters, Warriors, or Counsellors, they were totally good for nothing. We are, however, not the less oblig'd by your kind Offer, tho' we decline accepting it; and to show our grateful Sense of it, if the Gentlemen of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their Sons, we will take Care of their Education, instruct them in all we know, and make Men of them.

—Response of the Indians of the Six Nations to a suggestion that they send boys to an American college, Pennsylvania, 1744 (Brody, 1991: 5)
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In February 1997, as a consultant to the Baffin Regional Chamber of Commerce, I convened a two day conference with Inuit elders to solicit their views on the design of Canada's fourteenth legislative capital building destined for Iqaluit, capital of the new territory of Nunavut. The elders were all unilingual Inuktitut speakers with little proficiency in syllabic writing. They had all spent their childhoods 'out on the land' before the establishment of the town site, and they were still adept at traditional subsistence life skills. I left those meetings more perplexed than at any other time during my six years in the north. I didn't have a clue what they were saying. Yes, we did have excellent translators present, but the cadence and inflexion of the elders' speech, their long preambles detailing family lineage, their even longer silences, their body language, and most of all their 'presence' suggested to me that they had a different understanding of the world—one that my book-learning did not equip me to enter.

My perplexity was compounded by the faint echoes of a view obviously not expunged from my mind that says that Inuit are less advanced than us; us meaning European-descended 'southerners'. Aren't our scientific and economic achievements evidence of our superiority? And yet, if we're so superior, why are we polluting the planet and obsessed with consumerism? Nonetheless, shouldn't our philosophic understanding be up to the job of figuring out what these people from oral cultures are on about? Why doesn't their wisdom seem to fit into any of the categories of our 'information explosion'? Why don't many of the current generation of educated Inuit
educated Inuit seem to have the type of understanding and presence evident in their elders? Doesn't being an elder just mean knowing a lot, being smart? How did they get to be wise without going to school? This thesis is an attempt to chip away at some of these questions.
INTRODUCTION: DIFFERENCES IN WORLD VIEWS

This thesis is an attempt to outline some of the sources of difficulty in modern Inuit-White relations especially as they relate to education. Some observers have suggested that teaching and learning should be seen as cultural activities distinct from education, an institutional phenomenon only extended to the majority of citizens of modern Euro-American cultures in the past hundred years (Illich, 1971; Postman, 1982). These commentators have also noted a tendency of professional educationists to discern the presence of nascent versions of their institutions in so-called primitive cultures (Illich, 1992). In this educationists are not alone; colleagues in other professions claim to be able to detect incipient religious, health, military, justice, and economic institutions in non-industrialized societies. There is a relevant distinction to be made here because some well-meaning White proponents of education use an appeal to the cultural universality of their institution to gloss over whether it actually exists or should exist in Inuit society; and instead they leap directly to mulling over what curricula or instructional methods would best serve Inuit needs (Williamson 1987; Darnell and Hoem, 1996).

The presence or absence of an institutional form of education is also relevant to an exploration of the social difficulties crippling modern Inuit society. There is some evidence to show that the southern industrialized style of compartmentalizing social functions and human services has contributed to the dissolution of bonds which used to sustain Inuit civilization (Malaurie, 1982; Dickason, 1992). The resulting social problems have been well documented: loss of language and cultural traditions, twenty-two per cent of Inuit are non-wage labour employed, the suicide rate is six...
times the national average, the incarceration rate is three times the national average (Simpson, 1998).

With all these "practical" issues in mind, it may seem like somewhat of a diversion to turn one's attention to the nineteenth century birth of industrial capitalism during what has been called the "Great Transformation". But it is from these beginnings that two important themes of this thesis emerge: how did we develop the trademark characteristics of modern Europeans, that is, what marks us as "southerners" when we are traipsing around the north?; and how did we develop a view of Inuit—one that persists to this day—as "Stone Age" people? As I will try to show, these two thematic questions converge around a third question, one related to the birth of wide scale institutional education: how did education come to be seen as an instrument of "civilization" as well as a benchmark for dividing "primitive" from "civilized races"?

Organizationally, the bulk of this paper is devoted to exploring how we came to be modern Euro-Canadians and how we came to see ourselves as such, and it includes an examination of our prevalent form of social organization—the bureaucratic organization—and its particular educational manifestation. Perhaps a word about this "we" is in order here. As many of the authors cited here attest, "we" are the members of a new form of civilization, one dominated by its disembedded market, in bondage to an all-pervasive system of money-value, and motivated primarily by an ideology of property-based individualism. Given that this peculiar form of civilization emerged in nineteenth century Europe, the words White, Western, European, Euro-Canadian are employed to denote its closest parentage and its place of birth, not the skin colour of its current adherents nor its geographical limits. The very fact of the spreading dominance of the disembedded market
system means that many of its most aggressive proponents today may no longer be White or European. Obviously, this "we" is not monolithically evil, nor did it spring from some sort of premeditated cultural break where everyone agreed that "we" should stop being social human beings and instead turn into economic automatons. The changes—which are outlined in Chapter One--accumulated over two or three centuries; but today when Inuit or members of other less monetized societies perceive White people as different from them, it is this economic part of our identity that they most commonly remark upon.

As for the White perception of Inuit, that is the subject of the last chapters in this paper. In this section, it is argued that much of the European view of "primitiveness" is rooted in educational and economic attitudes resulting from "the Great Transformation"; in particular, the view that saw education as a force which could propel a so-called primitive people "up" the ladder of civilizations. It was this view that influenced Alexander Morris, lieutenant governor for the North-West Territories in 1874, to promise to send schoolmasters to the First Nations people, because "the Queen wishes her red children to learn the cunning of the white man" (Ray, 1996: 236). The final section of the paper examines the fallout from the Inuit's first encounter with this European education, and examines whether a moderated form of institutionalized education can become the salvation of Inuit society that many northerners are seeking.

Much of this paper relies on a presentation of history from a perspective that may be unfamiliar to some readers. This perspective draws heavily on the writings of Polanyi, Illich, Kuper, Kolko, Sachs and Williams; none of whom could be accused of representing the mainstream of their
fields (respectively: economics, education, anthropology, history, ecology, linguistic history). Terms like "buro-org", "disembedded economy", "disabling professions", "societas", are borrowed from these writers and combined in order to help present a picture of modern life that illuminates some assumptions that could be taken for granted by prevailing liberal views of "progress".

Although this thesis focuses primarily on differences between Inuit and Euro-Canadians, it does include references from other First Nations--under the assumption that, as Hugh Brody says, "the differences between them and us, rather than the myriad differences among themselves" is the more important contrast for this analysis (Brody, 1987: xvi).
CHAPTER 1: HOW DID WHITE FOLKS TURN OUT THIS WAY?

1.1 You're So European...

My boss for most of my time that I worked at the Baffin Chamber of Commerce was Jerry Ell. Jerry is an Inuk; he is the same age as me. He is respected as an accomplished hunter and provider of country food (particularly walrus) to his community. Jerry is also a skilled businessman and CEO of a large Inuit-owned firm with interests in fishing, construction, and shipping. I recall one day Jerry coming into our office and relaxing into a chair; he was wearing a beautiful sealskin jacket that his wife Eulalie had sewn. I was sitting at my computer checking e-mail, with the phone on hold in one hand and sending a fax with the other. Neither of us said anything. Time passed. Then Jerry spoke slowly, "Derek", he said, "You're... so... European." And he smiled, got up, and left. The first section of this thesis is an attempt to figure out what he meant.

1.2 The Rise of the Disembedded Economy

In conversation with Inuit, they often express surprise that we southerners can so easily uproot ourselves and move north, away from our families and homes. This "placelessness", as it might be called, is one of the "European" traits that Jerry was referring to; six other symptomatic attitudes are listed in Chapter Three. If there is an underlying unity to this sample of "European" characteristics, it would appear that it lies in how they all spring from economic motives or effects. It would perhaps be useful therefore to
turn our attention, briefly, to the history of "economic man"; since he appears to embody many of the attributes of "Europeanness" that Inuit seem to be noticing in Whites.

"Economic Man" is a result of what economist Karl Polanyi called "The Great Transformation" in his 1944 book of the same title. Although Polanyi traces the beginning of this transformation to 1800 A.D., Wood has argued that the first seeds of economic change are evident as early as the eleventh century in Europe (Polanyi, 1957; Wood, 1986). Polanyi argued that for most of human history "neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there... a separate economic system in society" (Polanyi: 71). But with the convergence of various trends in nineteenth century Europe this changed and "instead of an economy being embedded in social relations, social relations" became "embedded in the economic system" (Polanyi: 57). Man was no longer a social animal, he was, in Mauss's phrase, "an economic animal" (Maybury-Lewis, 1992: 73).

1.3 Supply and Demand Are Not "Natural"

In 1940, Polanyi had noticed an overlooked text from ancient Greece in which Aristotle is described as noticing a new economic phenomenon: supply and demand. "Aristotle relates his shock that his fellow Athenians have begun to behave like... sausage vendors at the forum, who let prices go up when there is much demand and no more fried sausage is available, and let them drop when they want to sell off the last already burned remains of their sausages. He was deeply worried by the fact that decent, virtuous Athenians behaved that way" (Cayley, 1992:191). This led Polanyi to study the evolution
of commodity arrangements through history and conclude that "there is nothing natural about supply and demand" in human social relations; supply and demand is a characteristic of merchants, not of traders. Traders "arrive with products of a foreign land which they exchange at a politically fixed rate" whereas merchants, a more recent class, "use markets to render scarce commodities that are supposedly in demand" (Cayley: 192). At least in Europe, for almost 2000 years after Aristotle, market activities were "carefully regulated and kept in place... You may engage in these activities on Saturday, when the market is open from six till noon, or down at the brothel, or over there at the bar, but otherwise, we don't want any of that" (Cayley: 192). But the Great Transformation disembedded the market and gave rise to the single most pervasive phenomenon of recent history: industrial commodity production under the assumption of scarcity (Illich, 1981: 123).

1.4 Scarcity

"Scarcity" may seem like an odd issue to raise since a commonly held view is that all societies throughout history have had to struggle with shortages, whereas ours seems to be swamped in surpluses. This confusion arises for us because our way of viewing encourages us to completely merge the object we are looking at with its value-symbol, namely money (Leiss, 1988: 64). In fact, say some economic anthropologists, our luxurious civilization is completely "dedicated... to the proposition of scarcity"—scarcity of money, but an abundance of "things" (Sahlins, 1972: 3; Polanyi, 1957). "Inadequacy of economic means is the first principle of the world's wealthiest peoples" (Sahlins: 3). As Illich has argued, "Economics always implies the assumption
of scarcity, "because "what is not scarce cannot be subjected to economic control" (Illich, 1981: 123).

Scarcity that in other societies coloured a few well-defined values--such as foodstuffs in spring and wartime, arable land, pepper or slaves--now seems to affect all values of public concern... This kind of scarcity which we take for granted was--and largely still is--unknown outside of commodity-intensive societies.

(Illich, 1981:123)

The market-industrial system institutes scarcity; in a manner completely unparalleled and to a degree nowhere else approximated. Where production and distribution are arranged through the behaviour of prices, and all livelihoods depend on getting and spending, insufficiency of material means becomes the explicit, calculable starting point of all economic activity.... That sentence of 'life at hard labour' was passed uniquely upon us. (Sahlins, 1972: 4)

1.5 The Three Fictitious Commodities: Land, Labour, and Money

Polanyi identified three "fictitious" components--land, labor, money--united in a market "disembedded" from society and given dominance over it (Polanyi, 1957: 68,178). These three "fictitious" commodities were combined with the "hugely fictitious bodies called corporations" in an outline of modern European civilization strikingly different from that of Marxist critics who tended to focus narrowly on the commodification of labour (Polanyi:130, 280). Marxists also tended to agree with capitalists that capitalism was a "scientifically inevitable" social phenomenon (Clark, 1984: 62-3). Polanyi made a convincing case that private ownership of portions of the earth's surface by individuals of one species was neither inevitable nor "natural" (Polanyi: 178). With his claim that the root fault lay with the enclosure of the commons (whether by centralized state apparatchiks or by private enterprise capitalists), Polanyi echoed warnings made first by Rousseau and Pascal, and
later by Spenser, Wallace, and Proudhon--the last coining the expression "property is theft" in 1840 (Barzun, 1958: 204).

The change from regulated to self-regulating markets at the end of the eighteenth century represented a complete transformation in the structure of society. The self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic and a political sphere...Such an institutional pattern could not function unless society was somehow subordinated to its requirements. A market economy can only exist in a market society...A market economy must comprise all elements of industry, including labor, land, and money... But labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market.

( emphasis added; Polanyi 1957: 71)

1.6 Land: The Wierdest Fiction of All

The process that began to define Europeans as "modern" was the "commercialization of the soil"--what Polanyi called the "wierdest" of all undertakings (Polanyi, 1957: 179). Starting around 1200 A.D., the "enclosure movement"--the conversion of land into economic property--destroyed the "cooperative village communities" of rural England (Wood, 1986: 200).

"What we call land is an element of nature inextricably interwoven with man's institutions...Traditionally, land and labor are not separated; labor forms part of life, land remains part of nature, life and nature form an articulate whole. Land is thus tied up with the organizations of kinship, neighbourhood, craft, and creed--with tribe and temple, village, gild, and church... (Land) invests man's life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons. We might as well imagine his being born without hands and feet as carrying on his life without land" (Polanyi, 1957: 178).

Britain became the world leader in the (wool) trade, and subsequently all trade, by "enclosing" village commons across the isle and expropriating small farmers from their land to make room for large-
large-scale sheep farms...Britain's leading-edge process of privatizing people's shared land continued for almost 300 years, from the 15th to the 18th century. This large-scale expulsion of the people from their land was serendipitous for the 'international market' because...it also provided the source of propertyless labour for masters to employ for wages. Workshops and eventually factories flourished, with bountiful supplies of "free labour" after the penalties of mutilation and capital punishment for unemployment had discouraged alternatives such as "vagabondry".

(McMurtry, 1998: 226-7)

The enclosure movement in seventeenth century England was "the watershed which transformed people's relationship both to nature and to one another. It replaced the customary rights of people to use the remaining commons by laws of private property" (Shiva, 1997: 211). "The commons, which the Crown in England had called wastelands, were not really waste," they were fertile lands with wild fish, fowl and berries for food, and grazing pasture for animals, as well as timber and thatch for dwellings. "These areas supported large numbers of peasants by means of these common rights" (Shiva: 210).

The assault on the "commons", begun in medieval England and still underway in parts of the Third World today, prompted Illich to describe the modern age as that of "an unrelenting 500-year war waged to destroy the environmental conditions for subsistence and replace them by commodities produced within the frame of the new nation state" (Illich, 1981:139). This did not occur without resistance, however; as late as 1881 Alfred Wallace, the co-inventor of the theory of evolution, sent a letter to Darwin promoting a plan to return the commons to the people as a "remedy for chronic poverty and unequal wealth". Wallace was President of the Land Nationalization Society, and told Darwin that "the ultimate defense of private land, the notion of inevitable struggle, was wrong and the belief that 'some have a"
better right to existence than others' immoral. Malthus might apply to
animals, but not to people" (emphasis added; Desmond and Moore, 1991: 653).
As an absentee landlord in Lincolnshire himself, Darwin of course disagreed
(Desmond and Moore: 421).

1.7 Labour: The Second Fiction

Left without land to support them, dispossessed Europeans moved into
cities in search of opportunities to sell their labour, or to the colonies seeking
free land (emigration was defended as an evolutionary drive to spread the
"most favoured race" by one of the theory's progenitors, Scottish timber
merchant Patrick Matthew (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 266). Europe's social
"failure" in the nineteenth century witnessed the uprooting and emigration
of 34 million of her people, the largest emigration in history; and it resulted
in the widespread acceptance of the "inevitability" of wage-labour societies
(Kolko, 1984: 67). The success of the expanding market economy would
depend on its participants being convinced to demand "rights" to wage-labour
rather than rights to the requisites of life (Illich, 1981: 107). Unfortunately, not
all labour could be sold for money, since the market tended to value
"quantifiable utility" (Latouche, 1997: 260). This tended to confuse even its
strongest proponents, the Reverend Thomas Malthus for instance:

If the exertion which produces a song, whether paid for or not, be
productive labour, why should the exertion which produces the more
valuable result of instructive and agreeable conversation be
excluded?...Why indeed should we exclude any exertion, the object of
which is to obtain happiness or avoid pain, either present or future?
And yet under this description may be comprehended the exertions of
every human being during every moment of his existence"
(Latouche, 1997: 259).
Although wage labor had existed since antiquity (Aristotle includes it with commerce and usury as the three "unnatural" modes of "wealth-getting"), its "numerically dominant form" is "a social relation of extremely recent date" says Braverman (Braverman, 1974: 52-3). "(A) substantial class of wage-workers did not begin to form in Europe until the fourteenth century, and did not become numerically significant until the rise of industrial capitalism...." (Braverman: 52).

"Both 'work' and 'job' are key words today. Neither had its present prominence three hundred years ago. Both are still untranslatable from European languages into many others. Most languages never had one single word to designate all activities that are considered useful...Neither the Greeks nor the Middle Ages had a term resembling our work or job... The abhorrence of wage labor still fits the outlook which might be shared by today's world majority. But with the current dominance of economics in everyday language, people lack the words to express their feelings directly" (Illich, 1981:101-3)

1.8 Money: The Third Fiction

Paper money is the circulatory system of the disembedded economy: it represents disembedded "value". Just as paper books represent an "external memory system" (in Merlin Donald's words) and they can tend to lead toward an atrophying of human memory, so too paper money represents an external value system, one that leads to an atrophying of human morality. Our simplified day-to-day view of things is that "knowledge" is found in books, and value is found in money. An atrophying of morality ensues as humans increasingly believe that they can thrive independent of an embedded moral view rooted in particular human or natural connections. (One might speculate that our graduation from paper forms of "knowledge"
and "value" to their digital or electronic forms may also lead to unanticipated changes in human memory and morality.)

"Money is the most abstract and 'impersonal' element that exists in human life" argued Weber, "no personal bonds of any sort exist" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 331). What we see as "freeing", however, aboriginal traditions see as "alienating". Provincial Judge Murray Sinclair, an Ojibway, says that "aboriginal intellectual traditions" view life as more of a series of concentric circles of "dependencies": moving outward from the earth and waters, at the centre, to the plants that depend on them, then to the animals that depend on them, and last "come humans" because "nothing whatever depends on our survival" (Ross, 1996: 61). As Sinclair points out, this view is "diametrically opposed" by the Western view that sees human arrangements as paramount, and that views money as the lifeblood of these arrangements. For Europeans, life is ruled by the "rational economy" which is completely "oriented to money-prices" (Gerth and Mills: 331). Never before have so many humans suspended their involvement with the requisites of life--food, shelter, clothing, medicinal plants--in favour of belief in the exchange of coloured bits of paper. Under a disembedded market, the vast majority of our human interactions are money-driven encounters (co-workers, store-owners, service providers). In fact, some observers believe that the exaggerated importance of the nuclear family today may be traced to the fact that it remains one of the few sites where people can give to and receive from others without having to use money (Hillman and Ventura, 1992: 14). The family is one of the few venues left where true generosity can still be practiced; but the "pervasive influence of the market" reduces the likelihood that "domestic life" alone will be able to provide a "haven in a heartless world" (Lasch, 1991:166).
The hallmark of a gift, as opposed to a commodity, is that the gift must be reciprocated or given away to someone else. It cannot stand still; it cannot be hoarded or accumulated or stored up as capital wealth. Whole civilizations...have been founded on the economy of the gift, rather than the economy of the market exchange. (Needleman, 1991:230)

In our market-dominated civilization, however, money only has value if it is scarce. Capitalism is sort of like a game of musical chairs in this respect: "value" can only be added to something if it wasn't there before--someone has to be left without a chair if the game is going to work. This exposes a flaw in the environmentalist argument that says that capitalism can be softened by extending monetary value to nature ("natural capital")--$60 billion for Canada's biodiversity, for example (Mosquin, 1994: 37). Modern Europeans and North Americans may protest about it, but our system is predicated upon scarcity of worth; if everything is worth a lot of money, the market economy collapses, so some "unmeasureables"--like childrearing, clean lakes, domestic labour, for example--necessarily fall outside of the priced realm. As Latouche notes, some of our "most cherished social treasures"--communal solidarity, "cultural gestures"--are considered unworthy of "dollarized" representation (Latouche, 1997:260). These contradictions could be characterized as conflicts between the "priced" and the "priceless". Modern "Europeanism" encourages the extension of monetized values into every corner of life. This is the logic of the disembedded market; it is unsympathetic to initiatives to re-establish human and natural values, reciprocal giving and generosity, the bonds that link and create meaning between people, and between people and nature. Money replaces these type of values; it is disembedded value.
Corporations were an invention of the Dutch that were perfected by the British. They offered a way of uniting property-mongering individualists and collectivizing their capital within a largely responsibility-free entity legally enshrined as an individual.

Essentially created by the Crown as a vehicle to amass the capital needed to loot the wealth of its colonies...this "joint stock" connivance was a devilishly radical scheme. For the first time, ownership of an enterprise was separated from responsibility for the enterprise....The corporation is a legal fiction that lets investors who own the business off the hook whenever the business behaves badly (read: steals, kills, poisons, pillages, corrupts, and so on), avoiding individual responsibility for illegal actions done in their name.... (Hightower, 1998: 59)

Caldwell reminds us that not only were Asian and Arab societies unconducive to hyper-individualism they were also inhospitable to the invention of corporations. "Islamic law, Chinese law, and Japanese law were all defective, judged from the commercial point of view, and their defects undoubtedly hindered sustained vigorous evolution of business activities." (Caldwell, 1977: 54) Meanwhile British, European, and eventually American law charged on. In the West, if only individuals, not collectives, were deemed to have rights under the law, then how were these new greed-teams called corporations going to protect themselves? Well, they became individuals, "natural persons" under the law, with all of the rights, and as Hightower notes, none of the responsibilities of real people (see also Dobbin, 1998:30-1).

The myth of the "corporate person" not only nullifies individual responsibility for harms done to others, but also receives protections of individual freedom in pursuing its non-individual interests of maximizing money profits. Its special legal and economic status resembles that of a medieval sovereign... (McMurtry, 1998: 137).
CHAPTER 2: A PHILOSOPHY FOR A "DRASTICALLY ANOMALOUS TIME"

2.1 What Philosophy Guides All This? Possessive Individualism

To review our presentation so far: according to the views of the writers in the previous section, previously social humans have adopted a set of anti-social arrangements that have transformed them into "economic humans". These writers suggest that this "Great Transformation" should be seen as the defining characteristic of our modern "Europeanness". But why, in the first place, did a whole bunch of people in Europe start thinking that owning pieces of the planet was possible, let alone reasonable? To repeat a question posed by Harvard theology professor Harvey Cox: how did we get to the point where we see the "market as God"? Cox evaluated its qualifications and concluded that the disembedded market satisfied all the requirements for a religion: omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and an ability to punish transgressors and label non-belief as blasphemy (Cox, 1999: 18-23). An examination of the roots of this unifying ideology may explain why Europe in the middle ages was the only society to experience a full-blown arising of the market, even though its key components--private land, wage labour, stock ownership, currency, the notion of scarcity--had all existed (to a lesser degree) in other civilizations. Historian Michael Wood provides a good summary of the argument:

This brings us to one of the most fascinating questions in the story of the rise of the West: How is it that such small-scale countries and economies could end up dominating the world as they've done? As late as 1550, England only had 2.5 million people. China and India, with their vast and highly developed economies had passed 100 million centuries before; they'd made all the great inventions necessary for scientific and industrial revolutions.... Across Northwestern Europe... records of birth, marriage, and death suggest
that as early as the twelfth century a distinctive character was emerging: of late marriage and small nuclear families, but of also a possessive, property-based individualism and a free-market philosophy which seems uncannily like the seeds of later Western ideology. Of the ideology which through the English, French, and American revolutions became the dominant philosophy of the West, and rules our lives even today.

It was the start of a revolution in values which would see the West diverge from all traditional societies: the first signs of Western individualism. And individualism is the key to the Western conception of freedom, an idea which comes not from ancient Athens but is rooted here in Western Europe. Here a property-based conception took shape early on--the beginnings of capitalism. So here, for the first time, we meet modern Western people: economically free, property-owning, upholders of individual rather than collective values. It was a philosophy which would inherit the world. (Wood, 1991)

Credit for inventing this world-dominating ideology must go to Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, the founding "fathers of modern consciousness", according to educational theorist C. A. Bowers (Bowers, 1995: 52). Being the first to apply Bacon's "resolutive-composite" scientific method to a study of society (basically breaking it down into bits and putting it back together again), Hobbes recognized the need for a "common Power" to contain all this competitive individualism (Macpherson, 1964: 20). In Leviathan, Hobbes described a model of society "so fragmented" and so "anti-social", said Macpherson, that it might be better termed a "model of non-society" (Macpherson: 22, 47). Hobbes's famous remarks about human life as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short", occurring amidst a war of "each against all" were mistakenly assumed by some observers to be a description of the natural state of primitive man (Macpherson: 23, 24). As Macpherson showed, Hobbes actually derived "the natural proclivities of men by looking just below the surface of contemporary society" but with "all law enforcement and contract enforcement removed" (Macpherson: 26, 19). Hobbes admitted
that this was an "Inference made from the Passions" which described "what manner of Life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare", but he suspected a close approximation of his inferred model existed among the "savage people in many places of America" (Macpherson: 20). There is a fair amount of anthropological evidence today that suggests he was wrong (Sahlins, 1972; Bookchin, 1982). [NB: Stannard, Wood and Williams seem to embrace Macpherson's conclusions, but they are not uniformly accepted; see Lasch: 197-203].

Nonetheless, Hobbes was the first philosopher to begin persuading Europeans that all humans have "a 'natural' tendency... to invade and destroy each other" as they compete for privatized "cultivated land and convenient seats." (Macpherson, 1964: 22-4). This must have appeared self-evident to Hobbes's contemporaries. The social conditions of the common person had been altered in such a way as to "leave him or her no other way to gain a livelihood" (Braverman, 1974: 53). Thus the common person could be induced to clamor for waged labor (and less often for common land) as long as he or she "could see no alternative to the possessive market society" (Macpherson: 98). Hobbes said that all that was necessary,

"is that the common people be instructed in it...by 'setting a part from their ordinary labor, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them...(for) the Common-peoples minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted on them" (Macpherson: 99, 98).

The people were to be convinced that any instinct they may feel to cooperate and assist each other did not represent their true "nature". As Malthus would later colourfully assert: "cooperative progress is pie-in-the-sky" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 266).
Hobbes had made a start at persuading Europeans of the "naturalness" of burgeoning market relations, but a full elaboration of this philosophy of possessive individualism had to wait until the arrival of Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*:

"... As much Land as Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product, so much is his Property. He is by his Labour does, as it were, inclose it from the Common' (in Stannard, 1992: 234).

Echoing Martin Luther, Locke asserted that the "ability to exercise such individual acquisitiveness" was what made man "fully and truly human" (Stannard, 1992: 234).

This is only a brief account of a few of the ideas contained within the philosophy of possessive individualism, but it should be obvious that these ideas are not completely irrelevant to the later development of the theories of population, natural selection, and "survival of the fittest" (the work of Malthus, Darwin, and Huxley respectively). Although the Swiss botanist De Candolle has been named as Darwin's source for the idea of "war among competing species", Polanyi-seeking the source of the first "biological" justifications for market society—traced the "dog-eat-dog" story from Darwin back to Malthus back to Condorcet, and finally back to Townsend's apparently unauthenticated 1786 account of a dog-eat-goat story from Robinson Crusoe's island—ah, the vagaries of "science" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 43; Polanyi, 1957: 113).

"The more we learn about history, the more the rise of industrial capitalism in the West appears to have been the product of a unique conjunction of circumstances... (an) outcome that gives the appearance of inevitability only in retrospect..." (Lasch, 1991: 163).
As Lasch says, a key trait of any undefeated empire— not just our modern European one—is the perhaps deserved smugness of its people who feel that they represent the apex of civilization. Inuit commentators have remarked on this attitude in whitemen since first contact. Francis Fukayama has assessed our current situation and declared that we have indeed reached the end of history: capitalism is a success— where did everyone else go wrong? (Fukayama, 1992). This might appear to some observers to be a premature declaration of victory; somewhat akin to our controlling the puck for two minutes in the middle of a hockey game and thereby concluding that we win. To continue this crude analogy: it may be that other teams have had the puck for much longer, and it may be that the game isn’t over yet; so perhaps we should not be so hasty to celebrate. In fact, there are several schools of thought that suggest that our civilization’s propensity for militarism, nuclear pollution and environmental despoilation may mean that we do not see the game through at all (Chomsky, 1982; Bertell, 1985; Rifkin, 1991). Writing in 1941, Burnham addressed the two most common assumptions about market-dominated civilization:

"The first assumption is that society has always been capitalist in structure— and, therefore, presumably always will be. In actual fact, society has been capitalist for a minute fragment of total human history... The start of capitalist social organization on any wide scale can scarcely be put earlier than the fourteenth century; and capitalist domination must be put much later than that."

"The second assumption is that capitalism has some necessary kind of correlation with "human nature". This is the same assumption as the first but expressed differently. To see that it is false... it is enough to observe that human nature has been able to adapt itself to dozens of types of society, many of which... have lasted far longer than capitalism. (Burnham, 1966: 30-1)
"Sustainability" is one of the few public policies being advanced to promote the longevity of disembedded market so prized by Fukayama; yet in an influential article, economist Paul Ekins argues that a sustainable consumer society is "a contradiction in terms" (Ekins, 1991: 243; Ekins, 1993; Worster, 1993). Ekins marshals considerable evidence to show that the commodity intensive market system is unsustainable; this news should concern all of us in the industrialized world, because a collapse of this system would be much more devastating than the financial collapse the West experienced 70 years ago. At least in 1929, forty percent of southern Canadians still lived on farms; and most families built and furnished their own houses, raised livestock and poultry, baked bread, and grew, pickled and canned their own food "without recourse to the market" (Braverman: 272-7). Today the number of Canadians living on farms has dropped to three per cent; if those grocery trucks stop coming over the border from California it will be "extremely messy" in southern Canada (Ekins, 1991: 243; Keating, 1997: 71-3).

To continue the comparison with 1929, Kenneth Courtiss, Deutsche Banks chief economist in Tokyo, made this gloomy prediction three months ago concerning the health of our financial institutions: "the 500 largest banks in the OECD, the rich country club, have $2.4 trillion(US) in loans outstanding and $1.6 trillion (US) in equity" but that could drop to $800 billion in equity since Japanese banks now "are technically insolvent". We may be facing a "contraction in global lending, a convulsion worse than the 1930's" he added gloomily" (Francis, 1999: D3).

As an antidote to any overconfidence we might have that the world's financial leaders will react intelligently to this precarious situation one might take note of the International Herald Tribune report on America's veto of a $100 billion (US) bailout of Southeast Asian economies proposed by Japan
that probably would have averted that region's disastrous 1997 financial meltdown: "Treasury Secretary Rubin ...was furious that the Japanese had not consulted him on it...He fumed on the Air Force jet carrying him to the meeting in Hong Kong" while his aides "nibbled on nachos". Aides now admit "In hindsight, it was a mistake"--the veto that is, not the nachos (Kristof, and WuDunn, 1999: 16).

2.3 Our "Drastically Anomalous Time"

Burnham suggests that our civilization is a very young affair. As Mauss said in his 1925 "Essay on the Gift", despite efforts to "antique" our pedigree, "it is only recently that our western societies turned man into an economic animal" (Maybury-Lewis, 1992: 73). Illich believes that efforts to trace the roots of "economic man" back to ancient times may represent an attempt "to make industrial work appear to be a prolongation of what people always did". He calls this a "mystification"; the ancient Greeks were not economic men (Illich, 1981: 115). Even "democracy" as Williams points out, is given a somewhat false Greek ancestry when in fact the word was a "strongly unfavourable term" up until the nineteenth century, denoting as it did "ignorant mob rule" (Williams, 1976: 83).

Snyder suggests that the best way to illustrate the unusualness of our relatively young industrial culture (500 years-old at the outside) is by contrasting it with that of 'mature', 5000-10,000 year-old cultures. (By using the term 'mature' we sidestep some of the derogatory connotations associated with terms like 'primitive', or traditional.) These mature cultures are parallels of 'climax ecosystems' which are culminations of hundreds of generations of social and biological trial and error. Egyptian civilization
lasted in a recognizable form (same basic styles of dress, building, agriculture, politics) for at least 2000 years; Mesoamerican Native civilization, 2500 years; India's civilization perhaps 4000 years. If we Euro-Canadians date ourselves from the birth of "property-based individualism" then we are a perhaps a 500 year-old civilization; however if we were to judge by continuity of methods of production, building, agriculture, styles of dress and politics, it might be more accurate to date us from the industrial revolution to now, in which case we are a 250 year-old culture. Measured in terms of being an urban culture (in 1851, 87 % of us lived on farms, today that number is 3%) we are perhaps only 70 years-old (Keating, 1997: 71-3). Amongst some Native peoples Europeans are seen as the youngest, the most recently created of the races; the "boisterous adolescents who act primarily on impulse and do not yet understand either the richness or the fragility of life..." (Ross, 1996: 273). Brody notes that "urban industrial consciousness" has such a "brief history" compared to "the cultures of the north that have evolved over millennia" (Brody, 1987:241).

The cave tradition of painting, which runs from 35,000 to 10,000 years ago, is the world's longest single art tradition. It completely overwhelms everything else. In that perspective, civilization is like a tiny thing that occurs very late.

The last eighty years or so has been like an explosion. Several billion barrels of oil have been burned up. The rate of population growth, resource extraction, destruction of species, is unparalleled. We live in a totally anomalous time. It's actually quite impossible to make generalizations about history, the past or the future, human nature, or anything else, on the basis of our present experience. It stands outside the mainstream. It's an anomaly. People say, 'We've got to be realistic, we have to talk about the way things are.' But the way things for now are aren't real. It's a temporary situation." (Snyder, 1980: 112-5)
2.4 "Societas"

We are inching toward an elaboration of Jerry’s remark at the beginning of this thesis about “Europeans”. As described above, Europeans and Euro-Canadians are products of this new version of “society”, one subordinate to its economy; one which Polanyi claims is really no society at all (Polanyi, 1957: 196). As Europeans, we tend to believe that we alone “determine own fate”, while “society and its social determinants (are) eclipsed” (Seabrook, 1991:37). The British commentator Jeremy Seabrook said that this was “so much so, that by 1987 Mrs. Thatcher had found it possible to declare that there was no such thing as society, but ‘just individuals and their families’” (Seabrook, 1991:37).

Of course, Mrs. Thatcher was correct; in order for it to be properly economic, our civilization has to encourage anti-social behaviour, reducing it to the status of a “non-society”, “unreal society”, “anti-society”, or “counterfeit society” in the opinions of various commentators (Macpherson, 1964: 47; Polanyi, 1957: 196; Latouche, 1997: 259; McKnight, 1994). In recent times, Fromm queried this arrangement: “Are we confronted with a tragic, insolvable dilemma? Must we produce sick people in order to have a healthy economy...?” (Fromm, 1968: 2). Unfortunately yes, answers Canadian economist McMurtry:

The collective security of a human community in which each supports all and is supported in turn, a community evolved over millennia, is now replaced by the closed...growth cycles of money. It is a mistake to imagine...that this new order of the market system...can be understood in a “value-free” way...Its rules of prescription and obedience are backed by armed forces across the world, and every society can soon face the financial threat of ruination by currency speculators for any deviation from the value program’s demands. The global market system is a more totalized regime of prescribing how to live than any in history. (McMurtry, 1998: 288, 279)
In deference to both Snyder's view that the modern age is discontinuous with prior ages, and to the above authors who seem to feel that our society does not quite fit that terminology, would it perhaps be worth restricting our use of the word "society" to those groupings that actually evidence social behaviour? According to Raymond Williams this word "society" came into English in the fourteenth century, from the Latin societas, the root of which is socius--companion. Hume used the word "in the old sense" in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), taking it to mean "a company of fellows", and a group with "face-to-face relationships" (Williams, 1976:246). In the eighteenth century, however, it changed its meaning, becoming the very abstract sense of "that to which we all belong, even if it is very general and impersonal"(1976: 243-5).

Society1751 vs. Society1999. In this paper I will use "society" in the old sense in order to differentiate a group of people in one place over time sharing mutual reciprocal bonds from a cluster of individuals temporarily abiding in proximity to each other for the purpose of selling their labour for money. The latter large anonymous human arrangements may be civilizations, but they are not societies.

By avoiding the use of "society" in reference to its modern approximation, I am trying to avoid the implication that "society" still exists after most of its functions have been appropriated by bureaucratic organizations or disembedded by the market. Lasch, for example, expressed concern that bureau-orgs had usurped the role of the family and contributed to the dissolution of society (Lasch, 1977). A restrained deployment of this word may be useful later on when we come to discuss "socialization" as a function of schools.
CHAPTER 3: THE SEVEN NOT-SO-WONDERS OF THE WORLD

At last: light at the end of (this) tunnel. What follows is a suggested list (far from exhaustive) of what one might call emotional themes of modern "Europeanness". These are not structural traits or biological facts, they are more like flavours that have coloured our modern character ever since the advent of the "Great Transformation". "To be modern", says Berman, is to experience the promise of "adventure, power, joy, growth" at the same time as feeling swept up in "maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal" (Berman, 1988: 15). These tones of Europeanness are what I believe my Inuk boss Jerry found so amusing to notice. For the sake of levity, I have titled them the seven not-so-wonders of the modern world.

3.1 Placelessness

A type of homelessness on an unprecedented scale. Never before have so many humans attempted to exist without any sense of multi-generational abiding in a meaningful, historical locale. What James Kunstler has called the "geography of nowhere". Over ninety per cent of Canadians live in cities. We move, on average once every six years, and have little or no sense of relation to our natural surroundings, fellow animals or plants over the seasons (Berlin, 1997: 20). Professor of Urban Studies, Kingsley Davis said that "the large and dense agglomerations comprising the urban population... exceed in size the communities of any other large animal; they suggest the behaviour of communal insects rather than of mammals." To which E.F. Schumacher added: "For mammals to behave like communal insects may be described as a new and fundamental step in their social evolution, but it is
not immediately apparent that it is a step in the right direction" (Schumacher, 1998:162). In which case, does the word "civilization" even apply to us, asks Coomaraswamy, since "the primary meaning of the word [is] that of making a home for oneself?" (Coomaraswamy, 1967: 29; Partridge, 1958: 101).

We no longer have a home except in a brute commercial sense: home is where the bills come. To seriously help homeless humans and animals will require a sense of home that is not commercial. The Eskimo, the Aranda, the Sioux—all belonged to a place. Where is our habitat? Where do I belong?... We know that the historical move from community to society proceeded by destroying unique local structures—religion, economy, food patterns, custom, possessions, families, traditions—and replacing these with national, or international, structures that created the modern "individual" and integrated him into society. Modern man lost his home; and in the process everything else did too. (Turner, 1996: 34-35).

3.2 Mono-species Existence

Never before have so many humans attempted to live so far removed from other naturally occurring species. If we look outside our city homes right now how much of what we see is alive? How much of what surrounds us would maintain itself if humanity suddenly disappeared? The way we live is dramatically different from mature cultures that live embedded in a multi-species environment, thankful to the insects and birds, and plants and rivers that sustain and nourish all the denizens (Evernden, 1985; Rogers: 1994). As emphasized by Sinclair earlier, aboriginal traditional hierarchy of life places earth and water at the top followed by plants and animals, and last "come humans" because "nothing whatever depends on our survival" (Ross, 1996: 61). Our biopsychic self, says Snyder, was formed not in cities, but in "bands of people living in relatively small populations in a world in which
there was lots of company: other life forms, such as whales, birds, animals.... (Snyder, 1980: 114). Writing in 1972, Raymond Williams warned:

When nature is separated out from the activities of men, it even ceases to be nature in any full and effective sense. Men come to project onto nature their own unacknowledged activities and consequences. Or nature is split into unrelated parts: coal-bearing from heather-bearing; downwind from upwind. The real split, perhaps, is in the men themselves: men seeing themselves as producers and consumers. (in Sachs, 1993: 197).

3.3 Extinction of the Moderate-Sized Human Group

Humanity could be seen as having four sizes: individual, immediate family, small group, large agglomeration. For hundreds of societies over thousands of years the small group has been the building block of enduring cultures. As Margaret Mead said: "for 99% of the time humans have lived on this planet we've lived in tribes—groups of 12 to 36 people" (Utne, 1992: 2). For 1000 years the Inuit managed to preserve their culture in the hostile climate of the Arctic using the small group as the critical building block. Modern Euro-American civilization has seen the extinction of that third level of human society, and the dramatic exaggeration of the first and fourth. Focus on first level exacerbates individualism, and focus on the last drives homogenization—abandoning us to the options of atom or automaton. Bureaucratic organizations are one result of the need to homogenize the atomized members of urban agglomerations. Never before has humanity tried to "go it alone" without the convivial bonding and communal memory of the small group. After studying other societies in Asia, historian Louis Dumont concluded that "The concept of an autonomous, bounded, abstract individual existing free of society yet living in society is uncharacteristic of
"Asian civilizations"; the idea in the West of thinking of "each person... as a particular incarnation of abstract humanity" is highly unusual (Schweder and LeVine, 1984:190-1). This creates a very isolated culture, which is a form of social control, according to Chomsky: "People are really alone to an unusual extent. That's a technique of control. I mean if you're sitting alone in front of the tube, it doesn't matter a whole lot what you think" (Cogswell, 1996:143).

3.4 Monogenerational Existence

"Old people today are not generally appreciated as experienced "elders" or possessors of special wisdom....Old people are respected to the extent that they can behave like young people, that is, to the extent that they remain capable of working, enjoying sex, exercising, and taking care of themselves." (Meyrowitz, 1985: 153). Because the illusion of the self-directed, autonomous individual is one of the most firmly entrenched root metaphors in modern society, all those persons who appear less autonomous, more reliant--the young, the sick, the elderly--are kept out of circulation--warehoused away in schools, hospitals, or old age homes--where they won't remind us of our fundamental (inter)dependency.

Coomaraswamy noted also that literacy is age-specific: books are divided into books for children, youth, adults, the elderly. Whereas "the traditional oral literatures interested not only all classes, but also all ages of population" (Coomaraswamy, 1964: 22).
3.5 **Monolingualism**

The rise of literacy and numeracy and the demise of mass fluency in non-conceptual pattern-languaged understanding fosters a type of monolingualism. American educator Chet Bowers includes art, architecture, clothing and adornment as 'metaphorical' languages, and suggests that the use of natural phenomena as analogs for understanding human events is a hallmark of "sustainable cultures" (Bowers, 1997: 4). Bowers argues that the tendency of our education systems to narrow our conceptions of knowledge and language to those that fit our predominately literal understanding is one of the roots of present ecological problems. Our education promotes a monolingual culture: not everyone has to be able to dance or draw to graduate from school, but we are all expected to be fluent in literacy and numeracy. Is it possible that our literatized minds have overlooked a broader type of polyglot, a type that still exists in less literatized cultures? Drawing, dance and architecture are specialized languages in our culture, only specialized classes in our society are conversant with these expressive tools. By contrast, in traditional society there is a much broader familiarity with the "pattern languages" of "built space", design, dance, music and adornment (Alexander, 1977). Meaningful communication, even within the monolingual sphere, is further degraded by the increasingly pervasive influence of "plastic words", the bureaucratic "buzzwords" which infect government and corporate domains, words which sound impressive but are interchangeable and largely meaningless (Porksen, 1995).
3.6 Speed

Never before have people tried to do so much in so little time. In 1997 a Dutch design conference attempted to make speed a political issue, arguing that it is one of the dominant factors in the modern world, defining our products, our environment, our way of life and our imaginations. The issue is not simply "whether speed is good or bad", said a participant concerned about the accelerated pace being forced onto the Third World, "but whether the world of the future will allow a variety of speeds"--or will it adopt a "monoculture of speed" (Walljasper, 1997: 45). Wolfgang Sachs argues that our current ecological crisis is a clash of different time scales, industrial time colliding with geological time. Each year the industrial system burns as much fossil fuel as the earth took one million years to store up. The rhythms of nature have been taken hostage by the high-speed economy: the cultivation of plants, animals and forests is all forcibly sped up through chemical and genetic manipulation in order to produce faster profits. Attitudes like caring and friendliness can not be sped up and are therefore deemed less important; just as fostering an informed citizen democracy is much too time-consuming to bother with (Sachs, 1998: 45).

3.7 Pastlessness

Pastlessness is the feeling of wallowing in the "context of no context" (Trow, 1997: 44-5). Pastlessness results from our loss of a "felt sense" of an embodied history, and the thinness of its modern replacement--science. Two of the themes mentioned earlier--an overemphasis on literacy and
monogenerational existence—have been noted by Berman and Martin in their explanations for the evaporation of a sense of embodied history (Berman, 1990; Martin, 1992). With the rise of books—our "external memory devices" as Merlin Donald calls them—the need to exercise our internal memories dwindles; something which has been noticed in recently literatized Inuit culture (Malaurie, 1982: 196; Harper, personal communication: April 1999). The decline of orality contributes to this atrophying of memory, and a loss of a feeling of personal connection to relevant history. Pastlessness has also been fostered by the decline in our reliance on face-to-face time with our elders as a principal way to acquire wisdom. Emphasizing the importance of "ageless truths" 1600 years ago, Saloustios said, "these things never happened; but they always are" (Martin, 1992: 95). This captures the sense of the importance of the past as something which is present right now. For modern Euro-Canadians and Americans this visceral sense of history seems to have been replaced by efforts to "biologize" or "scientize" history (Lewontin, 1992).

Saying that the "thinness" of science contributes to pastlessness in no way denies that science is a very helpful form of understanding based on using a restricted form of language to test the falsity of theories. However, scientists have been prone to a certain philosophical sleight of hand ever since Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, and Tyndall announced that they were going to wrest "the entire domain of cosmological theory" from the "old buffers" and "spider-stuffers" in the Anglican clergy (Desmond and Moore, 1991:611, 433). Most of Darwin's pals were not as well-off as he was, and they had figured out that they would have to establish a "tightly knit, highly regulated profession" if they wanted to get "decently paid" (Desmond and Moore: 433). In 1833 they invented a name for themselves: "scientists" (Sachs, 1992: 221).
A "cosmological theory" is certainly what people thought they were getting from this new profession when they bought Darwin's latest book: *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (1859) Unfortunately, the book did not deal with the origin of species at all; it actually concerned itself with the elimination of individual members of species by death due to maladaptation to changing environments (Gould, 1996: 139; Barzun, 1958: 27). Similarly, as Postman says, science purports to tell us the "truth" about things when in fact its methods are confined to establishing the falsity of theorems. With this philosophical sleight of hand science purports to tell us what *is*, when in fact it is telling us what is *not*. Pastlessness ensues when our grand narratives and myths are swapped for the thin gruel of science.

Neither quantification nor empirical observation alone make a study scientific; anyone can count things, that's not necessarily science, and "empirical" just means "experiential", anyone--"except maybe a paranoid schizophrenic"--can make "empirical" observations (Postman, 1992: 194). The essential work of Freud, Marx, Weber, or Mead was not science, but it is no less important for *not* being science; these folks were doing "something else entirely"; they were "documenting the behaviour and feelings of people as they confront problems posed by their culture." (Postman: 153). That they hankered after the respectability of scientific recognition for its 'objectivity', may have had more to due with avoiding the "shame" connected with anything "subjective" or "moralizing" (Williams, 1976:235, 263; Postman: 158). This leisurely hankering has turned into a stampede for the lifeboats, however, as scholars abandon cultural narrative for the cramped confines of physics and biology (on biology as ideology see Lewontin, 1992; for the argument for turning history into a science see Diamond, 1998: 408, 425).
CHAPTER 4: THE BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS

4.1 "Buro-orgs"

The bureaucratic organization—"the fundamental organizational instrument of our time"—is abbreviated to buro-org by Gouldner (but it may just as easily be abbreviated to "borg") (Gouldner, 1979: 50, 70). Understanding "borgs" might be easier if we use a crude analogy: industrial "society-making" is a bit like industrial bread-making. Non-monetized society is sort of like whole wheat bread with all the bran and 'nine essential nutrients' left in. Because it is so big and needs to be financially efficient, industrial money culture attempts to refine all the essential nutrients out of a human agglomeration and then put them back in separately. This is what "borgs" are for; they distill the various human functions out of the group and add them back in separately according to the whims of the money cycle (public or private money). In the interests of financial efficiency these "borgs" also tend to gravitate toward being "radical monopolies" (Illich, 1981: 148). Here are some examples of disembedded social functions and the buro-orgs which now have near monopolies on their delivery: teaching and learning—Education; health—Medical System; justice—the Courts; nature—Conservation agencies; protection—the Army and Police; social decision-making—Government; spirituality—Organized Religion.

A "buro-org" is a form of human co-ordination which "separates, in understanding and potential for collective organization, what it makes interdependent in functioning" (Peattie, 1984; 34). Large concentrations of people and a money economy are the preconditions for the birth and growth
of borgs (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 204). Buro-orgs are an extreme result of the Victorian fondness for mechanistic speculations social anatomy. For example, Spencer defended the social division of labour with a questionable appeal to biology arguing "that what was true for animals held for society: progress came through specialization" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 394). Bertrand Russell also embraced this hybrid bio-mechanistic view: "When we are exhorted to make society 'organic' it is from machinery that we shall necessarily derive our imaginative models, since we do not know how to make society a living animal"(in Williams, 1976: 191).

Once a society comes under the sway of "the market" the multi-purpose social activities that used to be embedded in and define the cohesive group labeled "society" are now distilled out, cordoned off, and claimed as the official domains of groups of professionals. In embedded societies, for example, spiritual activities are not easily distinguishable from food provisioning or teaching or traveling (Ortiz, 1990: 77).

(T)here is no aspect of our physiological requirements (the famous basic needs for food, shelter, and so forth) that has not always been firmly embedded in a rich tapestry of symbolic mediations. Likewise what are called the higher needs–love, esteem, the pursuit of knowledge and spiritual perfection–also arise within a holistic interpretation of needs and are not separated from the material aspects of existence. (Leiss, 1988: 65)

Borgs initially were created by the state to more efficiently organize workers on behalf of the market. Drawing on work by Weber, Durkheim, and Burnham, Gouldner's thesis suggests that public and private buro-orgs are more similar than dissimilar. They share a "common commitment to efficiency", and both types of buro-org function according to "general and impersonal rules"; and they both subscribe to the "ideology of
professionalism" (Gouldner, 1979: 37, 16). It is only in recent times, under the umbrella of a disembedded economy, that such a complete "network of coercive institutions" has hived off and usurped the authority for social functioning (Noam Chomsky, personal communication: December 15, 1998). When buro-orgs have completely usurped the social functions their power is "unshatterable" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 228). Each buro-org attempts to establish a "radical monopoly" of the social function(s) under its purview (Illich, 1981: 123). Most human social functions used to occur as part of face-to-face relations within the society—in fact these functions were what defined the group as a society (Williams, 1976: 246). Following in the footsteps of the market, and usually obedient to its wishes, the buro-orgs have disembedded most social functions.

4.2 Buro-orgs and Scarcity

Buro-orgs arise to administer to our "needs". As Leiss has argued, our "needs" and their symbolic correlates are inextricably linked (Leiss, 1988: 64). We may have the need for knowledge, or health care, but money (public or private) is scarce. In reality, the raw materials to transfer knowledge—humans willing to become teachers, concrete to build schools—may not be scarce, but due to human decisions the medium of exchange to pay for them is limited.

The assumption of scarcity has penetrated all modern institutions. Education is built on the assumption that desirable knowledge is scarce. Medicine assumes the same thing about health, transportation about time, and unions about work...This kind of scarcity which we take for granted was—and largely still is—unknown outside of commodity-intensive societies (Illich, 1981:123).
4.3 *Buro-org as Radical Monopoly*

The most paralyzing trait of buro-orgs is how they monopolize our thinking about a social function. Each buro-org grows into the dominant religion in its field; and as with the church, citizens come to believe they can only attain salvation—educational, locomotive, medical, judicial—within its doors, or on its terms. Private buro-orgs cooperate in oligopolies to reduce alternatives to their services. Once simple roads have been walled in, paved, and posted with 80 km per hr signs, alternatives like streetcars and bicycles are squeezed out (Illich, 1976: 35). The modern world gets divided up between "large corporate... and large public bureaucracies" (Galbraith, 1994: 236).

Suggestions that humans could choose to arrange things differently may be labeled vigilante-ism or quackery.

Illich, however, thinks that we can grade institutions along an axis from conviviality to the radical monopoly (Cayley, 1992: 16). Convivial institutions are so imbedded in the society that they are almost unfindable; they represent the non-monetary give-and-take of community members helping and being helped, usually without formally designated intermediaries. When a community member dies in a convivial setting, for example, other members gather together to comfort the family, wash and prepare the body (perhaps under the guidance of a respected elder aunt, someone who everyone tacitly agrees is the knowledgeable one for this situation) and then conduct a wake, and bury or cremate the deceased. When a buro-org monopolizes "death-care" (a term created by the funeral industry) a physician will certify the death of the 'patient', funeral home workers will move and prepare and bury the body, and 'griefworkers' will comfort the
family. The professional monopoly, in Illich's words, "expropriates" a particular field of meaning from the community, cutting off some of the vital ways people form bonds with each other (Illich: 1977). The repeated daily sharing in 'small acts'—sharing food, shelter, transport, pain, joy—is the glue that bonds a 'civil society' together (McKnight, 1995: 117-23). Professional monopolies, on the other hand, dissolve society and 'disable' their clients, according to John McKnight (McKnight: 1994, 1995).

4.4 Buro-org as "Disabling Profession"

What Gouldner refers to as buro-orgs McKnight and Illich label the "disabling professions". They assert that the disabling professions tend to emphasize citizen deficiencies (rather than "gifts") as they seek out new niches that might increase their client base; they use "deliberately mystifying jargon", they "ridicule popular traditions and self-help", and they paralyze their clientele, rendering them dependent on the service-providers (McKnight, 1994, 1995; Illich, 1977, 1981: 148). This disabling aspect of dependency is of particular importance to Inuit, who are "one of the most heavily assisted, administered, and studied groups on earth" (Dickason, 1992: 398).

4.5 The Buro-org Dialect: "CCD"

Where old-style bureaucracies used to exert control through "ordering and forbidding", buro-orgs are more likely to "seek control by rewarding persons for conformity" to their rules, and by "educational indoctrination"
and by "communication" (Gouldner, 1979: 54, 64) Their "special linguistic variant" is the "culture of critical discourse (CCD)" (Gouldner: 27)

The culture of critical discourse is characterized by speech that is relatively more situation-free, more context or field independent... (it) devalues tacit, context-limited meanings...while it authorizes itself... as the standard of all "serious" speech.... CCD experiences itself as distant from (and superior to) ordinary languages and conventional cultures... (it ) is conducive to a cosmopolitanism that distances persons from local cultures, so that they feel alienation from all particularistic, history-bound places and from ordinary, everyday life.... (Gouldner,1979: 28-9, 59).

Gouldner warns that CCD "is a lumbering machinery of argumentation that can wither imagination, discourage play, and curb expressivity". A borg tends to monopolize "truth and make itself its guardian". The "examined life (their examination)" is the only life worth living (Gouldner, 1979: 85). And the examination of life becomes something to be carried out in a buro-org designed specifically for that purpose: education.
CHAPTER 5: EDUCATION AS BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION

[Schooling] makes you believe that learning can be sliced up into pieces and quantified, or that learning is something for which you need a process within which you acquire it....The idea that competence in the world derives from being instructed about it, taught about it, is an idea which from the seventeenth century on slowly takes over. (Illich, in Cayley, 1992: 66-68)

Before Education can arise as a bureaucratic organization with a convincing claim to be offering something not present in society, there have to be several distillations: separating reading from talking, separating learning from doing and separating knowledge from understanding. These separations were made easier by the growth of the "ideology of literacy" (Illich, 1992: 168-177).

5.1 Separating Reading from Talking and Learning from Doing

Until the advent of spaces between words in written sentences (something that apparently arose in the seventh century in order to speed the "acquisition of Latin vocabulary by 'thickheaded Scottish novices'") people generally had to read aloud in order to understand a text (Illich, 1992:113-114; Egan, 1997: 257); but with the advent of widespread silent reading comes the dawning awareness of an activity that had hitherto not gathered much attention: interior mental thinking. Obviously people had been thinking all along, but for our purposes, however, what is significant is that folks began to get the idea that a human could be doing something without it looking like they were doing anything (except moving their eyes). It is possible that this marked the beginning of the feeling that people could learn something
without doing something. Eisenstein may have been making the same point in her comment on the "shift from learning by doing to learning by reading" in her history of literacy (in Meyrowitz, 1985: 263). The dilemma behind this separation was conveyed quite clearly by John Holt in his musings on learning to play the cello. Holt wanted to know: where was the line where learning to play the cello stopped, and actually playing it started? (Holt, 1976: 13). A view that places these concepts in sequence--learning then doing--allows us to think not only about specific places to do things and people who do them, but also about specific places and people to help us to learn things before we do them.

5.2 Separating Knowledge from Understanding

Once we are comfortable with learning something separated from doing it, the next question is: what is the "something" we are learning? Well in most cases, this "something" is "knowledge". The idea of discrete transferable knowledge also co-arises with the advent of literacy. Books, these ink and paper inventions which can stimulate invisible mental activity, they represent knowledge. "Without this visualization of the text," Illich says, "there is no idea of 'knowledge' that is laid down and deposited in books, of knowledge that can be reproduced and communicated... thus conceiving the idea that an absolute identical knowledge exists somewhere behind two individual copies" (Illich, 1992:114; Innis, 1951; Havelock, 1986). Toynbee offered an example of this conception: "Human culture...is a mental tool that is transmitted, held, and operated... it is detachable and variable" (Toynbee, 1963:119). The idea of knowledge as a thing apparently does not exist in many oral cultures where the concept of some fixed thing, known or learned, is
approximated by verb representations rather than nouns (Ross: Chapter 6; see also Holt, 1978: 184).

5.3 Seeing Education Everywhere?

With these three conceptual separations satisfied, modern education can come into being as a distinct activity set apart or dis-embedded from the stream of life, a separate process in which learning can be undertaken separate from "doing". A proviso: if education does depend on a tacit acceptance of these separations, then educational historians may be mistaken in their claims to have discerned the presence of nascent educational institutions in rural or so-called primitive cultures (for example: Prentice, 1977: 15; Atkinson and Maleska, 1964: 6-7). "Wherever the historian of education finds a poetry ritual, an apprenticeship, an organized game," said Illich, "he smells educational activity" (Illich, 1992: 115). "Our colleagues are unwilling to recognize that education is a concept... inconceivable in other societies..." They assume "the need for education as an a-historical given..." (Illich, 1992: 114). To paraphrase Burnham's earlier comment on capitalism: "the assumption is that society has always had education and, presumably, always will have.

5.4 Education and Scarcity

Once the concept of 'knowledge' as an object has firmly taken hold, it can be combined with the flourishing concepts of 'utility' and 'commodity value'. One knowledge is now seen to be more valuable or useful than another, and access to that knowledge is limited, or scarce. In 1860 Spencer
asked "what knowledge is of most worth?"—given that we have limited time
to "expend" (Spencer, 1963: 83). In this he echoed Comenius who
admonished his readers 200 years prior not to "waste this short life" on
"useless studies"; instead, ensure that students "learn nothing but what is of
value" (Comenius, 1963: 37). There is a tone of urgency here. Knowledge is
vast, time is short, somethings are better to know than others, hurry up and
choose. You can only fit so much knowledge inside one head (to use the
"brain as container" and "conduit" metaphors; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 10-11).
Recognizing his debt to Polanyi, Illich suggests that all members of a
possessively individualistic society are driven by a powerful unspoken
assumption that will always underlie discussion about education in a
monetized culture: scarcity (Illich, 1981:123). You have a short life and only
have one brain to fill up. You have. Individually.

However, if, as in Inuit society, you see your life as part of a continual
stream of becomings reaching back dozens of generations in your community,
then the limiting confines of one life and one brain may not concern you as
much (Amagoalik, 1980: 167). Wisdom cannot be conferred on another; it is
not so much scarce as slow to develop (Basso, 1996: Chapter 4).

But the industrialized ideology of scarcity confers a kind of frantic
-funnelling and filtering on educationing. Knowledge is transferred out of the
big container of the world, through the funnel of school and the filter of
teachers into the smaller containers of students' minds. After some time has
passed, tests are applied to determine the purity of the knowledge residue
still residing in the students' brains and a (scarce) credentials are distributed
which permits one access to scarce wage employment and money. Teachers
become dispensers of credentials, entitlements which restrict "the supply for
[waged] positions and" monopolize them for "the owners of educational certificates" (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 241; Collins, 1979:3).

Education is "the remedy of a defect, the supply of a deficiency", said one of the founders of this nation's educational system, Egerton Ryerson, in 1871 (Prentice, 1977: 180). Education is built on the assumption that desirable knowledge is scarce, says Illich--note that not all knowledge-as-object is scarce, only that which is desirable or valuable, that which someone will pay to acquire from you. Today, the idea of supply and demand permeates the educational debate: "A crucial issue related to the social functions of education and inequality is the link between the supply of and demand for adult education..." (Rubenson, 1989:65).

5.5 Education: a Radical Monopoly on Learning

From 1846 until his success in 1871, Upper Canada's Chief Superintendent of Schools, Egerton Ryerson, lobbied for legally compelled school attendance "to protect children against" the "cupidity and inhumanity" of negligent parents (Prentice, 1977: 175). Critics "deplored" Ryerson's amassing of "regulatory powers" to the fledgling buro-org. They complained that "schools would undermine parental responsibility in educational matters (Prentice, 1977: 179). School proponents argued in response that the "right of the parent to direct any action of his children was not 'a natural one'. Every person living in a civilized society enjoyed certain benefits as a social being and, in return, the society had the right to demand reciprocal benefits" (Prentice, 1977: 179). Furthermore, the "public" should not interfere with "society's" representatives, the teachers, as they go about delivering these "benefits". According to educational advocates, "the family
(was) educationally inadequate" (Prentice, 1977: 61). A modern representation of this opinion is Smith's view that members of the public aren't allowed to tell other professionals--doctors or engineers for example--how to do their jobs, so why should they be allowed to "harass" teachers (Smith, 1986:247). Ryerson himself warned that any attempt by the public to deliberately remain "ignorant" bordered on criminality: "If ignorance is an evil to society, voluntary ignorance is a crime against society" (Prentice, 1977:51).

Ryerson's attempts to stake a claim to many of society's functions should give pause to educationists today who complain that too many demands are being "heaped" on "a system increasingly asked to substitute for the church, social worker and parent" (Lewington, 1999: C4). As this history shows, in many cases school promoters sought to take these roles away from their conventional providers, they were not asked.

As the bonds of society have dissolved under pressure from the disembedded market, and as the components of our culture have been compartmentalized and usurped by buro-orgs, the task of serving as some sort of social glue has fallen to the school. Ivan Illich's first book, unfortunately titled by the President of Harper and Row as Deschooling Society, might have been better titled: Schooling for the De-societized (Illich, 1992: 162). As a result, a significant part of the school's responsibility is to serve as a homogenizing agent.
5.6 **Individualization or Homogenization: the Educational Choice?**

Russell and Egan have noted that the mission of the school is generally divided into three types: the personal growth (Rousseauian) scheme, the Platonic wisdom scheme, and the socialization scheme (Russell, 1963: 213-4; Egan, 1996:7-18). This presentation fits well for education in a possessively individualistic culture. In "varying proportions" these three types represent the range of educational possibilities within "every system that actually exists" in monetized cultures (Russell: 213). (Although Polanyi and others might have objected to the term "socialization" for the function of producing worker-consumers.)

A difficulty may arise, however, if we attempt to make the non-institutionalized teaching and learning of Native societies fit into this framework. None of these three options necessarily represent how people are learning to "be" in non-individualistic, non-acquisitive cultures. Liberal schooling since the industrial age has served to transmit the ideology of property-based individualism argues Bowers; it either teaches that all changes reside within the individual, or that the individual must be subsumed within the monolithic group (Bowers, 1995: 68). Society is presented as "bounded by institutions and individuals" (McKnight, 1995: 164).

It is obvious, upon briefest reflection," says McKnight, "that the typical social... map is innacurate because it excludes a major social domain—the community" (McKnight, 1995: 164).

For Native educators, says Couture, there "is a characteristic sense of community, of 'the people', a collective or communal sense which contrasts sharply with western individualism and institutional forms based on private
ownership" (Couture, 1985: 6). In particular, socialization-as-homogenization may not be a fair representation of teachings which aim to evoke this "communal sense". Couture says, rather, that these teachings aim to evoke a sense of "mind-in-relation", "mind-in-community", or "intersubjective self" (Couture, 1991: 58, 59; Bowers, 1997: 157). To assume that by dropping the first two individualistic aims (Rousseauian and Platonic), one is left with an accurate representation of non-Western learning, may be treading the same dangerous path as Hobbes (mentioned earlier) who thought Amerindian society would be driven by similar competitive, acquisitive drives as European society but with contract enforcement removed.

But as Ross illustrates, neither individualization nor homogenization are the aims of non-institutionalized Native teachings; rather, family or clan stories, ceremonies, and contact with elders, seem designed more to draw forth nascent "attributes and skills", and to encourage person's view of themselves as a "relational being", rather than to force them to conform to the group (Ross, 1996: 83-90). For Inuit, this "relational" stance extends to the surrounding landscape, captured in inuktitut terms which convey the meaning "I am I and the environment" say Stairs and Wenzel (Stairs, Wenzel, 1992: 1-3). This relational outlook is quite similar to the "experientialist" approach proposed by Lakoff and Johnson as an escape from the subjective-objective dichotomy in Western philosophy. In their view, the "experientialist" understanding emerges from "constant negotiation with the environment and other people" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 230).

In First Nations contexts, then, it may be helpful to separate the idea of socializing from homogenizing. Socializing, in this context, might be more profitably perceived as developing the attributes and capacities to facilitate
one's harmonious interactions within a group; and social harmony doesn't depend on making everyone alike any more than conversational harmony depends on making everyone use the same words.

5.7 Aries: Literacy, Education, and the Invention of Childhood

One final "separation" must be noted before we depart this section of the thesis. Historian Philippe Aries posited the notion that the "invention of childhood" can be detected in the sixteenth century with a major shift in attitudes toward children (Aries, 1962). Until that time, argued Aries, post-infant young people were not differentiated from adults; they wore adult dress and they participated in adult tasks and games. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries a growing number of distinctions were being made between childhood and adulthood; increasingly childhood came to be seen as an innocent and special time. Even more than Aries, Eisenstein linked these changes to the spread of literacy (in Meyrowitz, 1985: 262-3). Postman found it "astonishing" that this connection has been largely unnoticed by educationists (Postman, 1982: 46). Books allowed one to learn to read in "stages", and this "developmental process" helped to mark the change between childhood and adulthood (Meyrowitz, 1985: 263). We believe that a child "evolves toward adulthood by acquiring the sort of intellect we expect of a good reader", said Postman, notably:

a vigorous sense of individuality, the capacity to think logically and sequentially, the capacity to distance oneself from symbols, the capacity to manipulate high orders of abstraction, the capacity to defer gratification (Postman, 1982: 46)
Children were encouraged to learn to "think abstractly and without interest", then they would "better adapt to the way things are" (Sampson, 1981: 738; Kozol, 1990: 133-4). Meanwhile, the "weakness and incapacity of the young", was used as another argument to bolster the intervention of schools; "it was not safe to leave children to their own devices" (Prentice, 1977: 34).

What is most interesting to note for the purposes of this paper is that many of the qualities that were being attributed to children at that time were also being attributed to so-called primitives. Both were illiterate, irrational, innocent, and untamed. And they both could be raised out of these deficient states by the civilizing intervention of education. The child and the primitive were both invented at about the same time, and so was the agent of their improvement.
CHAPTER 6: EUROPEANS DISCOVER NORTH AMERICA AND
"THE PRIMITIVE"

6.1 The Modern Stone Age

To this point this paper has focused on enumerating one set of characteristics that may approximate the classic "Qallunaat" (Euro-Canadian) qualities some Inuit see as common to all "southerners". I have proposed that these attributes may be seen as overlapping fairly closely with those of "economic man" as he came to be defined in the 1920s and 40s by some historians. To some extent the same developments that delineated economic cultures also defined and demoted non-economic ones. The latter point is the topic of this section of the thesis; namely, what marks Inuit, even today, as "Stone Age" people in our eyes? The ability to evaluate a people as "primitive", is a right that has been claimed by Europeans throughout 500 years of occupation of North America. Originally a religious judgment, for the past 300 years this evaluation has been made based on European theorizing about the social progress of "races"; but more to the point of this paper, it was also made on the basis of the presence or absence of education. As I will try to show at the end of this section, literacy, rationality, and acquisitiveness were propounded as educational values to alleviate the savagery of Natives right from the very first days of mass schooling in Canada.
6.2 The Invention of Primitive Society

As Kuper’s book of the same title notes, primitive society was invented as part of the same eighteenth and nineteenth century social theorizing that first took notice of Economic or Industrial society (Kuper, 1988). The concept of "culture" also acquired its modern sense at this time (Williams, 1983: ix). What is interesting to discover is that some of the same cast of players that created the justification for a disembedded economic civilization then used that civilization as a benchmark to judge the progress of others while attributing economic motives and mechanisms even as far as to the natural kingdom that they were exploring. Much of this theorizing is miscategorized as "Darwinian", when, in fact, it was propelled just as much by Spencer’s Lamarkian approach to evolution (Kuper: 2). Marx, Spencer, and Huxley also drew on the economic theorizing of Malthus, as well as Ricardo and Bentham, who themselves drew on the work of Condorcet, Montesquieu, Comte, Hobbes, and Locke (Barzun, 1958: 25-86; Polanyi, 1957: 111-30).

Giambattista Vico, in his Scienza Nuova (1725), was the "first to conceive a distinctly evolutionary scheme of history", by proposing the "exceptional idea that society is manmade" and therefore as he said: "open to modification" by "our own human minds" (Barzun, 1958: 39; Highwater, 1981: 21). With Vico we get possibly the first explanation for the existence of "savages": they were Noah’s lost sons who "wandered away after the flood" forgetting culture and language and descending "to the level of wild beasts" (Highwater: 22). It is also from Vico that we get the cliché of the
cavemen who "forcibly seized their women" and dragged them to their caves to have their way with them. Ahem. (Highwater: 22).

With Turgot, the French economist, we get the first hints of "progress" slipping into the story of "historical continuity--change with regularity". But it was Turgot's friend, Condorcet, rotting away on death row during the French Revolution, who was the first to optimistically assert that mankind's intellectual evolution was "unalterably progressive" (Barzun, 1958: 39, Highwater, 1981: 23). Condorcet's *Equisse d'un tableau historique des progress de l'esprit humain* (1795), or "march of civilization", argued that "humanity is absolutely perfectible, and can never regress"(Highwater, 1981:23, Drinnon, 1972: 43). This good news may have been inspired by Hobbes's view that "Life it selfe is but Motion" (Macpherson, 1964: 33). Condorcet posited progress to be a self-propelled force, moving "forward with or without human collaboration, leading humanity inevitably" through fixed stages ever upward along a "narrow, vertical path" to the pinnacle of the "utopian state" (Phew!) (Highwater, 1981:23). Here we find the first formulation of what Darwin would later call the "ladder of civilizations". This is also the beginning of the idea of Western civilization as a benchmark, against which all other races are to be ranked.

6.3 *Invention of Stone Age*

While Condorcet languished, Saint-Simon was thinking up his "law of three stages" which would describe human progress from Ancient Egypt to the "age of science and industry" (Barzun, 1958: 49). Saint-Simon's model of three ages might have been on the minds of visitors to the new Copenhagen Museum in 1816 when they observed the museum's remarkably prescient
display of primitive artifacts. The volunteer secretary for the museum, C.J. Thomsen, a member of a prominent Danish shipping family, had been preparing for the museum opening for several years, cataloguing and organizing exhibits. He was "a rank amateur", who just happened to display "objects of stone, bronze, and iron" in three separate cabinets (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990: Vol 19: 781). After the museum opened, the volunteer was deluged with letters complimenting his brilliant classification of three ages according to tool use; Thomsen was promoted to curator, declared himself an archeologist and wrote a book (published in Danish 1836, English 1848) presenting his three age hypothesis--namely (surprise) the Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages.

In 1843, Thomsen's assistant Worsaae wrote his own book further refining and promoting the three-age system, and by 1865 Darwin's neighbour, Sir John Lubbock, had weighed in with two more divisions: the Paleolithic and Neolithic Ages. Unfortunately, there was a lack of good old skeletons to augment this taxonomy says Eisely, so "the contemporary races of man...came to be regarded as living fossils" to compensate. "The past, so to speak, had been quietly transported into the present--assigned to living actors without their consent" (in Highwater, 1981: 18-9).

Meanwhile, across the back lane, Lubbock's older neighbour Mr. Darwin had returned from his South American travels where he had found his embryonic evolutionary beliefs sorely tested.

6.4 Education: a Leg Up on the Ladder of Civilizations

Darwin had little trouble accepting the idea of the 'descent of man' from the apes, but, while traveling on the Beagle, Darwin had seen "men
barely above beasts"—the "naked, degraded savages" of Tierra del Fuego. How could he reconcile the Fuegians being "essentially the same creature" as a Victorian "civilized gentleman"? (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 222, 580). Earlier thinkers like Montesquieu had posited climate as an explanation for racial differences, but these views received less credit in Darwin's time.

Explanations of old were not of much help. "Heathen" was a spatial term for those "outside the Kingdom of God" (Sachs, 1992: 104). It shared the same origin as "heather"; heath was wasteland, and heathen was "he of the (remote) country districts" (Partridge, 1958: 283). For the Greeks, "barbarians" were the "babblers", those who spoke an "uncivilized, brutish tongue", that is, not Greek (Jennings, 1984: 39). So heathen was a spacial term, and barbarian was a linguistic term; but "savages" denoted something different: they were "primitive", and "primitive" was a "chronological term" (Sachs:104). "So the savage was defined as one who would grow up and enter the stage of civilization" (Sachs:104; Dickason, 1997). In the same era that discovered the separateness of "childhood", "primitiveness" was invented.

Primitive societies grew from ignorance to knowledge: "every underdeveloped people is like a child learning to grow up", waiting for the "opulent society to emancipate (them) from backwardness" (Dorfman, 1983: 164).

Darwin had an answer to his question. As he told the world in his second-last book:

*The Descent of Man* ...told the arm-chair adventure of the English evolving, clambering up from the apes, struggling to conquer savagery, multiplying and dispersing around the globe...Each race moves along the ladder of civilization, propelled by natural selection...'with selfish instinct giving way to reason, morality and English customs'...Darwin ended the book...praising the real heroes, the animals...'For my own
part' he confessed 'I would as soon be descended from them as from a naked degraded savage' (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 580-1).

And from his cousin Galton, Darwin perceived the instrument of the Englishman's evolutionary success: education. As he revised Descent of Man, Darwin added more of his cousin's ideas. With "civilized nations" the "winnowing" of natural selection still went on as effectively, but without the "violent" "exterminations" of the "savage tribes", said Darwin. Amongst the civilized the most important factor was now one's "mental inheritance". "Progress now depended on a 'good education during youth whilst the brain was still impressible'. (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 609) For humans "as with horse and cattle", said Galton, better breeding would ensure that the "nobler varieties of mankind prevail over the feeble". Civilization could "be saved... by the rise of scientific 'master minds' to power." (Desmond and Moore: 557).

In contrast, Alfred Wallace, the co-inventor of evolutionary theory, "held savages in high esteem". Drawing on his experience in the Amazon and the far east, Wallace said: "'The more I see of uncivilized people, the better I think of human nature'. 'While living among the Dyaks in Borneo, Wallace judged that "the Dyaks had developed 'a higher morality than the colonists trying to exterminate them'" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 569-70).

Unfortunately, Wallace's views were a minority opinion in the nineteenth century; and they were in even shorter supply 400 years earlier when the first Europeans set foot in the land of the "savage", the so-called New World.
6.5 "We Could Not Conceive That They Would Not See the World as We Do"

When Europeans waded onto the shores of the Americas they encountered some of the most affluent civilizations in existence (Sahlins, 1972: 1-11). The people that the Europeans were about to meet, numbering between 75 million to 100 million were divided into 1000 cultures, speaking 500 languages (Stannard, 1992: 11; Bryson, 1994: 26). Because each of these societies often bordered on a half-dozen others, they considered pluralism as one of their defining traits. So in many cases the arrival of Europeans was treated as the appearance of one more culture to share in the abundance of the land and sea. (Moyers, 1989: 466). And the land was abundant: native agriculture had a sophistication that European husbandry could not begin to compete with. Through complementary planting (for example beans with corn) Indians "replenished the land" and "enjoyed a constant bounty" while settlers "struggled" (Bryson: 181). In the temperate zones over 2000 food plants were being harvested and cultivated; in the words of one historian: "The first settlers had come upon a land of plenty. They nearly starved in it" (Bryson:180).

In the North, people ate quantities and varieties of meats that might have made European royalty jealous. Compared with European explorers, "the Inuit, Dene and Cree were well fed and healthy. Their lives must have been much more secure than those of the mass of the European peasantry and urban poor. Yet whites regarded northern hunters as destitute and marginal" (Brody, 1987: 65).

Native people were surprised by this derogatory view; Amagoalik relates how Inuit could never understand why White people insisted on
viewing their land as a "waste land" (Amagoalik, 1998: 13). Gwich'in elder Clarence Alexander disputes the "subsistence" label northern people have always lived with:

As long as you keep using the word subsistence I have a mental block... I don't subsist. How can I? It is a word that was created to create animosity... (It's) about supplementing or dividing up the little bit left over... (But) there is no resource problem here. None. I was born into heaven here! A heaven of its own! It's all here.
(in Andersen, 1998: 40)

6.6 Holocaust in Heaven

But the first Europeans did not notice the riches. They didn't see the 1000 cultures when they landed; they didn't see even one culture. Europeans saw gold, empty land, and savages. With much the same logic that they had already used at home, Europeans "enclosed" and expropriated the land (Polanyi, 1957: 178-9; McMurtry, 1998: 226-7). Martin Luther had already popularized the argument that "the possession of private property is an essential difference between man and beasts" (Stannard, 1992: 234). And Thomas More's Utopia, published in Latin only 24 years after Columbus's landing, envisioned the founding of a colony "wherever the natives have much unoccupied and uncultivated land. More advised: "if they resist, wage war against them" (Stannard: 233).

Using the principle known as "vacuum domicilium", the British colonists in New England "seized the shared common lands of the Indians" (Stannard, 1992: 235). Although, even as early as 1643, colonists had recognized that the Indians were "very exact and punctual in the bounds of
their Land", this did not amount to "private property" as the British saw it (Stannard: 236).

[I]t is true that probably no native people anywhere in the Western Hemisphere would have countenanced a land use system that (in R. H. Tawney’s language) 'allowed a private individual to exploit the land with a single eye to his own pecuniary advantage, unrestrained by any obligation to postpone his own profit to the well-being of his neighbours.' And thus, in the view of the English, were the Indian nations "savage" (Stannard, 1992: 235-6).

Meanwhile, the colonists poured into the New World in what was the largest wave of emigration in human history; and for this, too, there was a justification to be found in evolutionary theory (Kolko, 1984). Patrick Matthew, a Scottish Timber Merchant and pre-Darwinian evolutionist, argued in *Emigration Fields* (1838) that the dispossessed British poor should be directed out to the colonies so that the British "race itself would be invigorated", because

'change of place...seems to have a tendency to improve the species equally in animals as in plants...It therefore cannot be doubted that the increase of the British race...and their extension over the world, and even the vigor of the race itself, will be more promoted by this colonizing system" (Desmond and Moore, 1991:266)

Darwin asserted that the more civilized European nations had beaten the aboriginal people of Australia and the Americas just as "the more civilized so-called Caucasian races have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle for existence"; he defended "the elimination of the lower races' by 'higher civilized races'" as an inevitable Malthusian struggle" which would "push mankind onward" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 653). Writing 18 years after Darwin's manifesto *The Descent of Man* had been published, John McLean applied similar insights to Canada:
"It is a well recognized fact that the physical features of a country... have much to do in developing... the race as a whole... The stunted Eskimo and Lapp are not to be compared to the stalwart Indians of the plains... Tribes, physically and intellectually well-developed, are not found in the remote places of the earth. War, famine, or crime has driven the cowardly, weak, or immoral to seek shelter out of reach of their enemies" (McLean, 1889, 1970: 304).

Accustomed as they were to sharing the land amongst different peoples, the Native civilizations did not put up much resistance. As Dene leader (and current NWT cabinet minister) Stephen Kafkwi recounts, "We trusted what the [Whites] said, for that was the way we had lived amongst ourselves." "We could not conceive that they would not see the world as we do", or that they "would say that somehow they owned the land that we had always lived on" (Brody, 1987: 200). Forced away from their lands, starved, murdered, or infected with disease: nine of every ten Native people died. It was the worst "demographic disaster" the world has seen to date (Maybury-Lewis, 1992: 14) Stannard's thoroughly documented account refers to the event as a "holocaust". And Stannard takes issue with the view promoted by Harris, Crosby and Diamond that says that the deaths were mostly "inadvertent", that the Indians--in Crosby's words in 1991--"just didn't wear well"; the view that displaces "the responsibility for mass killing onto an army of invading microbes" (Moyers, 1989: 467; Stannard, 1992: xii, 287; Diamond: 210).

Darwin was well aware that colonists were the "harbingers of extinction to the native tribes"; and he predicted that all "aboriginal nations" would probably be "wiped out within a century" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 266). John Quincy Adams, the intellectual father of Manifest Destiny, near the end of his life, admitted that he and the rest of America's leaders "had
been involved...in a crime of 'extermination' of such enormity that surely God would punish them for these 'heinous sins' (Chomsky, 1993: 56).

6.7 A "Primitive" Idea Discredited

The "aboriginal nations" persist. So do ideas about "primitiveness". A precedent-setting legal case in Baker Lake, NWT, in 1979, classified Inuit as "low on the scale of evolutionary human development" (Culhane, 1998: 93-7). At Nunavut Arctic College today, one can still hear southerners refer to Inuit as "Stone Age people" who we're trying to bring into the Computer Age. We're still fond of this system of classification born hundred years ago in Victorian England (Harris, 1977). It helps us to feel relief that we are not "huddled in caves...besieged by saber-toothed tigers" (Harris: ix). In modern anthropology, however, these views have been discredited. Today, the accepted wisdom in the field is "that there never was such a thing as 'primitive society'...The theory of primitive society is about something which does not and never has existed" (Kuper, 1988: 8). In anthropology today "there is no single culture that is put at the top of a single hierarchy and used as a model. The idea that some cultures are higher or better than others is no longer scientifically respectable" (Koh, 1992: 125). Contemporary scholarship tends to agree that "the mentality and emotional make-up of Homo Sapiens of the Stone Age were remarkably similar" to that of modern humans. "The great chasm that Western civilization has built between itself and 'primitive' people is part of the complex mythology of the West" (Highwater, 1981: 38). This metaphor of the "chasm", however is alive and well in Canada's Arctic. Diamond Jenness, one of the classic profilers of "Eskimo life", framed the
"problem" with exactly this term in his 1960s reports for the Government of Canada, saying that the "chasm" between Eskimos and ourselves has "widened" in the "age of automation", "so that the bridge it now needs must be longer and stronger" (Jenness, 1966: 123). And the bridge-builders were ready to answer the call.

6.8 Education as Bridge and Benchmark

The "good news" that Euro-Canadian southerners seem to think they are bringing to Inuit is that this "chasm" can be bridged. There are no hard-wired racial differences that should prevent Inuit from reaping the "benefits" of White life. The "benefits", things that address the "deficiencies" that Ryerson and others claimed to perceive in Natives, are things like rationality, literacy, emotional restraint, and the concepts of property ownership, independence, and "performance". These are to be conferred through education.

Without education, said the father of Canadian public schooling, Natives lacked the "concept" of private property, the very factor that "distinguished savage from civilized societies", and "the respectable from the lower classes" (Prentice, 1977: 81). "The urge to acquire property, according to Ryerson "was co-existent with the dawn of intelligence in the individual. The savage knew little, and therefore wanted little; but as his knowledge increased, so did his desire for exchange" (Prentice: 82). The "doctrine of opportunity in education" was to be,"a mere silhouette of the doctrine of economic individualism" (Williams, 1983: 240). McLean, however, warned his fellow academics not to set their hopes too high. "It has taken several centuries" said McLean, to reach "the high standing of civilization enjoyed by
the white race" today, and yet "ignorantly we look for as great a development in the red race... in the space of a single century" (McLean, 1889, 1970: 279).

Educators were not to be dissuaded. An educational program that taught literacy, emotional control, and an incremental responsibility for property-ownership might bring savages into cultural adulthood much quicker than naysayers could foresee. Much of this modified version of the myth of the primitive was a form of neoteny, according to Dorfmann. We now sought out "infantile echoes" in "undeveloped" peoples, projecting onto them "a universal category--childhood" (Dorfman, 1983:203). Non-industrialized culture was like "an unfinished incomplete being waiting to unfold", waiting to "evolve toward the same adulthood"--the "marketplace" (Dorfman: 202).

Just as it had been prescribed for "wild" children, intellectual development was recommended to soothe the savages. Both the Indians and the labouring classes, said Ryerson, were "controlled by their feelings... in proportion to the absence or partial character of their intellectual development" (Prentice, 1977:29). At the same time, the Journal of Education for Upper Canada was remarking on the "innocence of childhood one minute and the need to repress its wild passions the next." (Prentice:32). Childhood and primitiveness were muddled together; both were coloured by presence of innocence and dreaminess, and the absence of intelligence, emotional restraint, and property-ownership.

The view of educators then and now, was that conferring literacy on members of an oral culture, would make them, in Havelock's words, "wake up from the dream" (in Stuckley, 1991: 78). Stuckey calls this the "superiority-from-literacy" argument; which says that "Nonliterate must be brought into fuller life." (Stuckey: 80-83). In this view, literacy not only "makes minds", it
"makes minds intelligent" (Stuckey: 78). As with children, "primitives" were to be encouraged to ascend through the levels of "symbolic achievement", until they could "think abstractly and without interest"; then they would "better adapt to the way things are" (Postman, 1982: 42; Sampson, 1981: 738).

Fifty years ago, Ananda Coomaraswamy, a Ceylonese-American scholar, took issue with views of this kind in his writings in defense of ancient Asian cultures. He stated that "to impose our literacy... upon a cultured but illiterate people is to destroy their culture in the name of our own"; instilling literacy 'destroys the memories' of a people, he warned (Coomaraswamy, 1967: 21, 20). Coomaraswamy argued that it was in order to suit our "meaner...'imperial' interests", that we proposed "to educate" the "vast unindustrialized and unlettered" peoples of the world (Coomaraswamy: 20). In his view, modern civilization used "three typical forms" to impress "itself upon older cultures", said the scholar, "reading ..., bigoted religious ideas, and... narrow utilitarian views" (Coomaraswamy: 24).

The fundamental religious deliverance that economic man has to offer Inuit today is the amalgamated version of evolution-development-progress first embodied in Darwin's *Descent of Man*, the ideal of the "unfettered individual, pursuing his self-interest in a freely competitive society" (Desmond and Moore, 1991: 625).
CHAPTER 7: INUIT CIVILIZATION ENCOUNTERS THE EUROPEAN 
LADDER OF EDUCATION

7.1 The Fall of the Boreal Wall

For Inuit, the wall fell in the 1950's. Attributed variously to the rise of Cold War strategic attention, oil and gas exploration, or the climactic consolidation of "a single Arctic fur trade", the buffer of neglect that had isolated Inuit from the most aggressive representatives of the southern disembedded economy was breached by the middle of that decade (Dickason, 1992: 383; Bell, 1999: A19; Goehring, Stager, 1991:677; Brody, 1987: 199; 1955 in nearby Greenland as well according to Malaurie, : 417). One historian fixes the date at 1953: the year of the forced relocation of Inuit to the High Arctic (one of at least eight relocations), and the year that the federal Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was established (Dickason: 397,383).

From the 1800s to the 1950s, Inuit had been balancing a land-based culture with the partially commodity-dependent exchange culture of the fur trade (Pryde, 1971:300). They had managed to keep the "money and subsistence spheres" of their society separate (Graburn, 1969: 231). Although this way of life already involved some of the "forms of addiction" (tea, sugar, alcohol, tobacco) used by traders and whalers to encourage allegiance to their corporate dynasties, whaling and trapping still offered a "certain dignity", and took advantage of "the nature of respect, sharing and spirituality...rooted in the hunting way of life". (Brody, 1987: 193-9, 201, 205). This was about to change. Lured into fixed settlements by promises of welfare, free or low-cost housing in perpetuity, and money for each child delivered to school, Inuit
faced accelerated destruction of their "social cohesion and group laws". They "ceased to treat the market as a separate subsystem and have allowed themselves to become fully market dominated" (Graburn: 232). Inuit submitted to forcible relocation and the kidnapping of their children by a government that did not deem them worthy of the right to vote. (Harper, 1999; Gleeson, 1999: B9; Malaurie, 1982: 415). Monetized life brought about the "dispossession and impoverishment" of the people" (Malaurie: 417).

Not all communities were affected to the same degree; although focused around settlement life, residents of some Baffin communities managed to avoid buro-orgs and monetization until the 1970s. The twenty year study of health trends in Igloolik is instructive. In 1970, about 500 people lived in Igloolik, maintaining about 500 dogs for travel and hunting by komatiq; snowmobiles and TVs were rare. By 1990, the population had doubled, there were 240 snowmobiles and ATVs, every house had a TV and most had Nintendo machines. And Inuit health indicators had plummeted: 90-150% increase in subcutaneous fat; strength measurements and aerobic efficiency had dropped 15-40%. Sugars and refined foods were replacing country foods in peoples' diets. The major causes singled out for the health decline were loss of exercise related to operating a dog team, and increased sedentary lifestyle (Rode, Shephard, 1992: 3-9; Bell, 1999).

The past few decades for Inuit "have been characterized by rapid change, fragmentation, ephemerality" (Goehring, Stager, 1991: 671). Land-based Inuit civilization had no such experience as modern poverty; the "concept of value as our industrial societies know it was utterly foreign" to Inuit, says Malaurie. Poverty starts, as Abe Okpik said, "when a person is bewildered" and feels powerless in a new situation (in Dickason, 1992: 398). Once the disembedded economy and its accomplices gained access to an area,
dependency, addiction, disease soon followed. Monetized values embodied in an "individualistic, capitalistic system of profits and markets ran counter to Eskimo tradition and rules" (Malaurie, 1982: 416-7).

Property changed from being "conceived as a moral entity" to being viewed as "a possession always convertible into cash" (Malaurie, 1982: 417). Almost overnight, Inuit were initiated into the White man's way of viewing their lives and land: that is, as a "wasteland of nobodies" (Amagoalik, 1998: 13). Under the "capitalistic colonialist system", as Malaurie describes it, the continuity of Inuit civilization dissolved, everything tended to become "one-generational", and "moral unities are dissolved with each death" (Malaurie: 417). Throughout this process, Whites in the North clung to a highly opportunistic interpretation of the fictions of land ownership, human rental, and money. Inuit were encouraged to embrace these concepts quickly and to alter their way of life to suit the disembedded market; however, they were "of course" barred from receiving any financial compensation for the land now claimed by Ottawa precisely because "they had no concept of land ownership and rent in their culture" (Graburn, 1969: 202; Lyell, 1979: 232). The fact that the land, nonetheless, did have a price value to Europeans is proven by Canada's purchase of the entire 1.5 million square miles of "Rupert's Land" from the Hudson's Bay Company in 1867.

7.2 Was There Inuit Teaching and Learning Before Whites?

The heading above is phrased in this manner to illustrate a point: of course there was teaching and learning in pre-contact Inuit society; but can we affirmatively answer that question without then leaping to paint in the
outlines of the process? This is a difficult thing for economic humans to resist. Can we accept that cultures are learned, healthy, just, safe, without succumbing to the urge to pull apart the strands of the society and quantify them? Could societies have these qualities without buro-orgs to manage them? Or do we believe for example, "that learning is something for which you need a process within which you acquire it"? (Illich, in Cayley, 1992: 66).

Falling under the latter view that learning only happens by "educationing" leads us back into monetized thinking where only increases in funding can make "access to learning a question of desire, not of money" (President of Canadian Colleges Association in Lewington, 1998: A8). If learning is not separate from life, then living beings needn't have to gain "access" to anything.

Presented briefly below are some examples of cultural heritage passed on in Inuit civilization; but they should be perused cautiously, they do not represent a precis of a rudimentary curriculum.

Before the erection of school houses and the introduction of professional teachers to whom Western civilization entrusts the minds of their children, education was growing up in a village. Education was done in the home with the father, mother, grandmother, grandfather, brother, sister, uncles, aunts, cousins, and friends. Education was also given by the weather, the sea, the fish, the animals and the land... We did not worry about relating learning to life, because learning came naturally as a part of living...
(Yupiktak Bista, Alaskan Inuk, in Darnell, Hoem, 1996: 254)

Rankin Inlet Elder Mariano Aupalardjuk, speaking through a translator, relays how his father taught him how to "hunt and fish and make the tools ....build a sod house and an igloo, read the weather, the ice and the snow, and ....the myriad of other skills survival in the Arctic hinged on" (Gleeson, 1999: B9). For Inuit women, sitting together sewing or telling stories was the way that "traditional values were learned", that is, as part of
"daily camp life" in "interactions among people who lived... closely linked to the land" (O'Donaghue, 1998: 402). "Deeply nuanced traditional knowledge", says Jackson, is usually acquired "second nature", almost automatically as part of daily living. Because it is "not all that complicated to internalize", it can appear "simple" to Euro-Canadians who are used to expending a lot of effort to learn something. Knowledge learned in books and classrooms may not be all that more complex, but our methods of formalized discovery may make it feel more complicated (Jackson, 1987: 14).

Although acquisition of traditional knowledge may seem simple, mastery of it may involve a lifetime of effort--mastery cannot be expected after the equivalent of only six or ten semesters of application. And yet, interestingly enough, "mastery" is the closest English translation for the Inuktitut root word for "learn": "ilit" (Mick Mallon, personal communication, April 1999).

Lest we assume that these Inuit traditions have died out, Brody asserts that "even in the largest and most modern of today's Arctic settlements, social and cultural practices still exist that are distinctly from an earlier and more traditional time". "Many elements" of the "unusual and distinctive pattern" of Inuit family life have endured (Brody, 1987:215,213).

(These) teachings are not just seen as a means of restoring social and individual health in Aboriginal communities. They go much deeper than that. They are understood to be the source of meaning, identity, purpose and fulfillment in life. Further, they are not seen as being in any way out of date, or useful only to those who live in the bush. Instead they are considered to be more important at this time than ever before and for people living urban as well as rural lives (Ross, 1996: 60).

An example of one of the most important aspects of the traditional Inuit teachings is the "handling of emotion"(Briggs, 1970: 4). There is much attention to "the patterning of emotional expression", and a sophistication in
"the ways in which feelings, both affectionate and hostile are channeled and communicated... (I)n deed the maintenance of equanimity under trying circumstances is the essential sign of maturity, of adulthood" (Briggs: 4). In Inuit philosophy, says Malaurie, maturity can be measured according to the presence or absence of "isuma"—sometimes loosely translated as "reason", although it also encompasses traits like modesty, good-humouredness, calmness, wisdom (Malaurie, 1982: 131). Those without isuma are "those who are unaware of their responsibility for their actions to the human race, such as small children, the mentally ill, or dogs—all those that give way to immature emotions, such as bad temper or frustration or aggression" (Burnford: 200). For this reason, Whites may be assessed by Inuit as lacking isuma says Burnford (Burnford: 201). Traveling with Inuit at the beginning of this century, Knud Rasmussen related how they told him that amongst Inuit "it is generally believed that White men have quite the same minds as small children...they are easily angered...and moody, and like children, have the strangest ideas and fancies" (in Burnford: 200).

The traditional method of coping with "moody" individuals, especially those wielding enormous power over Inuit life has been for Inuit to adopt an attitude of wary "compliant friendliness", connoted by the Inuktitut term "ilira" (Brody, 1991: 171-2; Kuptana, 1993; Qitsualik, 1999). Since Whites often appear to Inuit to be "emotional and unpredictable" (Brody: 172), and to "take criticism badly", while ignoring "the subtle, quiet expressions of criticism" that Inuit generally use, "ilira" becomes necessary (Brody: 172, 176). As Brody, Kuptana, and Qitsualik have pointed out "ilira" does not mean "afraid"—as it used to be translated—but "awe, such as the awe a strong father inspires in his children or the fear of the Qallunaat previously held by Inuit" (Kuptana: 7).
A review of the Qallunaat imposition of institutionalized education on Inuit civilization shows that this wariness was well-warranted.

7.3 First Try: Bestowing the Cunning of the White Man

Starting in the 1950's, the federal government began moving Inuit off the land and into "permanent" settlements; it also began compelling Inuit to attend school (Gleeson, 1999: B11). The Inuit quickly "became one of the most heavily assisted, administered, and studied groups on earth" (Dickason, 1992: 398). One in seven Inuit were shipped to distant non-Inuktitut residential schools. Compulsory schooling weaned the young from the language and habits of their parents, as Ryerson had recommended, and attempted to train them in "essentially foreign" ways, branding them as "failures" when the students ended up halfway between two worlds and successful in neither (Brody, 1991: 233, 209-10; Pryde, 1971: 307).

As predicted with Gouldner's model of the "structurally differentiated educational system", the buro-org insulated the young "from the family system", prevented the acquisition of the local language, and exerted a "major cosmopolitanizing influence on the students, with a corresponding distancing from localistic interests and values" (Gouldner, 1979: 3). Put simply: "the Inuit family was torn apart" (Gleeson, 1999: B11). Some of the Inuit who vigorously protested these erosions eventually came to see their complaints as "wrong", according to one non-Inuk writer due to their increasing "sophistication" after a "few more years of contact with the white man" (Graburn, 1969: 201).
The decline in the Inuik civilization seemed to come as much of a surprise to "well-meaning, professional educationalists", who were confused by the "strange paradox" of rising levels of school enrollment paralleled by rising levels of unemployment for graduates (Pryde, 1971:307; Goehring, Stager, 1991). "The irony of their position" said Prentice about these Southern approaches, "was that many of their desired changes--accelerated development of industry...and commerce--were intimately connected with the social disorders so frequently deplored by the most vocal of the promoters of schools" (Prentice, 1977: 46). As Spretnak has noted in another context: "modern schooling, which teaches children competitiveness and regimentation in order to prepare them for scarce modern jobs" transforms a society of "self-sufficiency and cultural pride to one of broken connections and shame, especially among young men, over their nonmodern traditions" (Spretnak, 1997: 123).

Although there were some elders who encouraged Inuit to undergo the White educational process, there were also many who warned that true Inuktitut learning could never go on inside schools (Pryde, 1971: 304). Asked about what should go into a traditional curriculum, Malaya Nakasuk laughed and said "you could not teach traditional values from a book" (O'Donaghue, 1998: 402). In fact John Holt (in a poke at Kohlberg) once compared any effort to teach values through staged classroom discussions to playing poker with plastic chips; "You only learn morality, like poker, by making choices in which you have something to lose", said Holt (in Sheffer, 1995: 247).

Elders also didn't believe land skills and traditional knowledge could be taught in the classroom, and in any case they considered the classroom to be "boring" (Larose, 1991: 88). In the words of one Inuk interviewed by Brody, "There are some Inuit things and some White things, and there are some
things that just do not fit together...." (Brödy, 1991: 210). Insight like this did not deter school promoters, however:

Few of them appeared to see any contradiction, however, between the search for material growth and prosperity in... free enterprise terms, and the search for social order. Rather, they sought solutions to social ills... in institution-building...." (Prentice, 1977: 46)

7.4 Second Try: "Tremendous Faith in the Power of Education"

Many Arctic residents "feel as I do that the ancient values of Eskimo culture must not be sacrificed", said Duncan Pryde in 1971. "Whites and Eskimos alike have put tremendous, and I hope justified, faith in the power of education to accomplish this" (Pryde, 1971: 304).

Twenty-eight years later, with the creation of Nunavut, northerners seem to have put even more faith in the power of institutionalized education to cure ills and conserve culture. "Schools are indeed one of the answers to improve the circumstances of despair among the Inuit, and sooner or later if we all try hard enough, the possibility of making school relevant and useful to all Inuit children will be achieved...." (Williamson, 1987: 68) In the words of Canadian Inuk and Arctic Ambassador, Mary Simon: "It is important that (in) northern education systems...students be taught the skills, attitudes and knowledge necessary to achieve success both in subsistence and wage economies." (Darnell, Hoem, 1996:176)

Those that would "Inuktut-ize" bureaucratic education seem to have two aims: modify the antiquated white curriculum and methods (represented by Ryerson) to produce capable Nunavut civil servants, and second: deliver Inuit content in Inuktitut through "bi-cultural" teachers (Damude, personal
communication, February 1998; Gleeson, 1999: B14). As yet, any achievement of these aims appears to be far off. Public school instruction is delivered in Inuktitut only to Grade Three, and approximations of "southern curricula" still dominate in the schools despite efforts to 'nativize' them, a southern process one teacher has nicknamed "putting teepees into textbooks". (Damude, 1998; Brody, 1991: 167).

Still, in what way do these institution-building exercises, as Prentice calls them, address the concerns expressed earlier by elders; namely, that "ancient values" should not be sacrificed; that Inuit social and cultural practices could not be taught from books or classrooms, that these are learned by all ages, often in an extended family context out on the land? What of the view that "some things don't fit"? What costs might be incurred by uprooting bits of traditional knowledge for transfer through bureaucratic education? If the goal of an Inuit curriculum were to be achieved, would the costs and trade-offs imposed by European bureau-org education be too high? Can the vast web of interdependencies and meanings be communicated through the theoretical concepts of books and curricula?

Schooling is the ritual of a society committed to progress and development. It creates certain myths which are a requirement for a consumer society. For instance, it makes you believe that learning can be sliced up into pieces and quantified, or that learning is something for which you need a process within which you acquire it" (Illich, in Cayley, 1992: 66).

What of the concerns of Illich, Holt, Gouldner, and Bowers that institutionalized education is a vehicle for the transfer of monetized values and consumerist hankering, individualism, and competitiveness? (These views are rarely discussed in teacher education programs; see Gabbard, 1993). They suggest that the container itself might taint the contents; that the bureau-
org vehicle itself should be subjected to scrutiny, not merely the route it is on, or the language the driver speaks. The idea that the "medium" and not just the "message" could be altered needs to be raised more often in Northern and Southern teacher education programs. Although any proposal for a less prominent role for bureaucratic education is not likely to win too many converts in these programs.

The prospect of limiting buro-org education is beyond the pale even for "progressive" educators like Herbert Gintis. In the South, he and Pearl have warned that any effort to deinstitutionalize education would lead to "deinstitutionalizing everything" and eventually into "social chaos" and "the law of the jungle" (Gabbard, 1993: 59). How did cultures get along before the arrival of Messrs. Pearl and Gintis? Institutionalized mass education was not introduced until the last 100 years; are Gintis and Pearl saying that every society alive today that doesn't yet have it, and every civilization that didn't have it before ours, was racked by social chaos and the law of the jungle?

For Southern-raised Euro-Canadians, the insistence on disembedding Inuit learning from living, or learning from the land may blind us to the ways that our (sometimes) well-intentioned interventions can harm their way of life. Our modern emphasis on individual success, achievement and evaluation weakens collective effort and group bonds, and this weakening has far more deleterious and wide-reaching effects among Inuit than among Euro-Canadians who have already adapted to atomized lives. In the words of Alaskan Inuk, Yupiktak Bista:

Today we have entrusted the minds of our young to professional teachers who seemingly know all there is to know... But they are not teaching the child the most important thing. Who he is: an Inuk... with a history full of folklore, music, great men, medicine, a philosophy, complete with poets...Now this culture and subsistence
way of life are being swept away by books, patents, money and corporations (in Darnell, Hoem, 1996: 254).

Some of these young professional educators, Inuit and White, use terms steeped in Freirean ideology which seem to indicate that they view themselves as liberators of Inuit (Gleeson, 1995: B 14). Bowers, however, notes that both "emancipators" and "technocrats" put forward pedagogical programs that run counter to the world-views of "land-based" cultures. For these "traditional" cultures "living in harmony with the patterns of sustainable ecological order" are what comprise "a moral life". "Notions of emancipation from group knowledge, empowering the authority of critical reflection (i.e., individualism), and expanding the horizons of freedom would be viewed as fragmenting and subverting this spiritual order" (Bowers, 1993: 144). Oral storytelling, "dance, song, initiation rituals...and mentoring relationships" also run counter to the "singular focus on critical reflection" (Bowers: 144).

Both "emancipators" and "technocrats", says Bowers, embrace the key dualisms of modern culture: "the mind/body and "man"/nature distinctions" (Bowers, 1993: 135). But most importantly, both educational attitudes are founded on the guiding myth of modernity: progress (what Rozak calls a "God word"). "Freire, Giroux and Greene" are examples of the emancipatory view, one which equates "rationally directed change with progress" (Bowers: 141).
7.5 "Some Things Don't Fit"

Before going too much further with Nunavut education, let's recap the Euro-Canadian world view. First off, we have disembedded economic man who is hounded by scarcity, corporations, buro-orgs and obsessed with the three fictions--owning parts of the planet, renting humans, and exchanging "coloured paper". Next we have buro-orgs, extricating formerly inseparable human social functions and monopolizing them, creating a clientele dependent on "disabling professionals" for service delivery. The end result of all this is someone who looked like me in my office that day when Jerry came to visit. A picture of the seven not-so-wonders of the world: living away from my parents and grandparents--pastless, placeless, monogenerational, monolingual, monospecies mono everything... you get the picture.

The next question becomes, are these attitudes above similar to "ancient Inuit values". It seems obvious that they are not. Most Inuit have a keen sense of multi-generational abiding rooted in a sense of place. Throughout most of the Nunavut territory there is no private land ownership (although Ottawa claims title to it). The disembedded market now plays a dominant role in the North, but the 'subsistence' lifestyle is still visible and still plays a significant role in Inuit culture.

Are the buro-orgs dominant? Unfortunately yes, to a far more pervasive extent than is experienced in the south. As mentioned earlier, Inuit are "one of the most heavily assisted, administered, and studied groups on earth" (Dickason, 1992: 398).
So. Are Inuit and European world views compatible? Some Inuit, for example the Inuk who said "some things don't fit", would say "no". For those who think that these are incompatible attitudes: do they believe that Inuit world views threaten to harm the White way of life? Obviously not. There is a fair amount of agreement that it is the White way of life, namely monetized individualism, that has been, and still is, eroding Inuit civilization (Malaurie, 1982: 417; Pryde, 1971: 300). This view is shared by non-monetized cultures around the world which face being swallowed up by what Shiva and Sachs call the "global monoculture" (Sachs, 1990; Shiva, 1993). If Inuit want to resist the encroachment of this monoculture and its bureau- orgs, what should they do? Even those Inuit who think that the White way can be accommodated believe that Inuit traditions and values should predominate. How can this be accomplished?

As a Euro-Canadian, it is difficult for me to make suggestions that are not tainted by my own world view. But there are examples of Inuit efforts to wrest back control. Some families have chosen to return to outpost camps to pursue more traditional lifestyles removed from the influences of the monetized culture. None, however, go without taking sugar, flour, guns, ammunition, gasoline, snow machines and outboard motors.

Inuit have established a parallel government structure to represent their interests in social and economic matters. Although more collective in nature and more responsive to the needs of individual Inuit than the Yellowknife bureaucracy, these organizations are largely corporate and European in design and function (Mitchell, 1993). The question remains, how can Inuit establish a firm footing on which to resist the disembedded market and its encroaching monoculture?
[The] West will have to abandon...its 'proselytizing fury',... the activities of all the distributors of modern 'civilization' and those of practically all the 'educators' who feel that they have more to give than to learn from what are often called the 'backward' or 'unprogressive' peoples; to whom it does not occur that one may not wish or need to 'progress' if one has reached a state of equilibrium that already provides for the realization of what one regards as the greatest purposes of life...To many this 'fury' can only suggest the fable of the fox that lost its tail, and persuaded the other foxes to cut off theirs. (Coomaraswamy, 1967: 60).

7.6 Abandoning our Proselytizing Fury

Southerners are encouraging Inuit to repeat the choices we've made. We say: drop the oral traditions and get on with writing your stories down. Stay in town. Send your kids to school. Hunt for recreation. Get cable TV. Learn English. Move to Iqaluit. Get a government job. Put your old folks in a home.

If the West cannot stem its "proselytizing fury", then Inuit may have to proscribe some limits. Maybe banning alcohol, candy, tobacco, TV (or limiting it to one day per week--I've heard that parts of Greenland do this); scale back hunting at certain times except by dog team. Why should the right of Mr. Bronfman and his Seagram's shareholders to hoard "coloured paper" supersede the rights of an Inuit civilization?

The elders' views on Education could be honoured and used as guidelines:

Those who go to school all the time will never learn anything of the Inuit way. No doubt those who work full-time will be like Whites....They will (not) know what Inuit do, how Inuit live. They do not learn that in the school....If you are an Inuk...and if you can't work the White way, then you can always be a hunter. But if you spend all your time in school you might not learn enough of those ways. (Brody, 1991: 209-10)
Perhaps Inuit should prohibit the teaching of their traditions inside schools; only permit elders councils to choose who will teach land skills and who will teach in the disembedded schools. Ban school during the spring hunting season. Limit school to three months per year.

These may seem like drastic measures. But they are nothing compared to the extreme measures exercised by Europeans who exiled an entire generation of Inuit youth to residential schools, smothered a people's language, and relocated people away from their common land. Even as recently as twenty-seven years ago, Canada's current Prime Minister mused about a "forced southern migration" for all Inuit. *That was drastic.* (Brody, 1991: 246).
At the start of this paper I talked about a meeting held with Iqaluit elders to discuss the design of the Nunavut legislative building. I was perplexed. The elders were wise, but not book-wise like I was used to. Why did I sense there was so much more going on in that room than I could see?

So I set out to get un-perplexed, and perhaps learn about Inuit culture and world views along the way. Now, at the end of this process, I don't think I learned very much about Inuit. But I did learn a lot more about what European assumptions and attitudes I carried into that elders’ meeting. And maybe hints of the Inuit world view became evident because it was so different from the European one.

Compared to Euro-Canadians, Inuit are still part of an embedded interwoven society. This is apparent in every HTA meeting, community feast, or social gathering. After one meeting that was particularly frustrating and perplexing for me, Al Woodhouse, a long-term northerner, took me aside and told me what I wasn't seeing. "Most of the meeting goes on outside here", he said. He explained how people get together for tea and visit and discuss things randomly before the scheduled meeting. When the meeting finally happens, various opinions are expressed about a whole range of irrelevant-seeming topics, stories are recounted, people chat. At the end of all this, someone might stand up and give a brief answer to the question at hand—an answer that was probably reached several nights earlier. But, the meeting itself was an excuse for all sorts of other important things to happen: old and young sharing, old feuds getting patched up or tested once again, wounds'
healed, a form of "group therapy" almost—the group was reconnecting, re-establishing cohesiveness.

Now, if you're eager to get a quick decision on things, like I usually was, a get-together like this can feel like a big waste of time. But, as Al pointed out, think of its efficiencies—even in European terms: less need for psychotherapists, counselors, nurses and all sorts of other disembodied professionals that we White folks usually end up going to see after careers full of "quick", "efficient" meetings. My Euro-Canadian worldview, shaped by ideas of scarcity, time-is-money, and buro-orgs, prevented me from seeing the multiplicity of societal functions in that gathering. I expected an efficient, goal-focused, fast-talking meeting that reflected my cultural beliefs about time, money, and productivity.

The elders... seem to live within a larger, relationship-based... view of the world... I often feel that I live a 'blunt' existence by comparison...on the surface of human interaction, preoccupied with the trivial business of particular issues (or products'), neglecting entirely the larger ones connected with the mental, emotional and spiritual health of the group as a whole (Ross, 1996: 89-90).

World views can be root metaphors, ways of looking at the world that are so deeply ingrained that we may not even be aware of them (Pepper, 1961: 91; Brown, 1977). The trouble is that these views can force us into seeing things in such a way that only certain solutions are possible. In an important essay back in 1979, Schon told the story of a American judge in the 1950s who handed down a ruling about an urban renewal project in which he praised the efforts of "experts" to deal with a "diseased area" (Schon, 1993: 144-161). But, by seeing the area as "cancerous", officials could think of only one solution: the community was bulldozed and the "cancer" cut out. Schon says that a world view "frames" things in such a way that it "selects out for
attention a few salient features...from what would otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality" (Schon: 146).

Our world view may be preventing us from seeing how we can select certain details out of the background, ignore others, and come up with inappropriate solutions. The "backwards", or "primitive" framing that Whites still use when trying to "help" Inuit is an example. Development, development--for Europeans that's our mantra in the North. We believe that we are helping Inuit to grow out of infantile "underdevelopment" and into the same monetized "adulthood" of our civilization.

What if Inuit culture has been "adult" all along, and monetized life is actually a step backwards into cultural juvenile delinquency? Coomaraswamy was right about Europeans: we've cut off our tails and now we're trying to convince everyone else to do the same. Are we really that blind to the newness of our weird civilization? We want everyone to join in--purchasing parts of the earth's surface, renting their bodies or minds to others, hoarding "coloured paper"--because we believe we are at the top of the ladder of civilization. We ought to be reminding ourselves: every other civilization on earth up until 250 years ago was morally based, not money based. We are the first to try this.

Speaking to a group of 500 mostly business delegates at the Northern Development Conference in Edmonton in 1985, the Inuk Member of Parliament, Thomas Suluk, said:

Look at me, I'm standing here in a three-piece suit, talking an alien language... I have been forced to adopt the ways of the dominant society in every sense of the word. I battled my fellow Inuit for the right to speak for them, and in so doing I alienated many of them. I have become irrevocably involved and assimilated into a much larger battle. The greatest effect of aboriginal rights will paradoxically be the
acceleration of the assimilation of Inuit as a distinct people. This realization will force me to draw inward as the only means of survival... I am trying to give a warning signal, that we’re just sick and tired of having to adopt a second face... It’s like trying to live in two different cultures at the same time. Why should we always have to do it your way? (Smith, 1993: 149-50).

Our dominant Western world view prevents us from seeing that we are pushing Inuit out of a relatively embedded culture into a disembedded culture. Our concept of economic development means disembedding the market and putting it in the drivers seat. Next comes the commodification of land and labour. Next we disembed value; currency comes to represent more and more of what is valuable, until all our moral decisions become money decisions. After these triplets are separated from their mother--the society--all the other social functions are encouraged to leave home and grow up into buro-orgs.

One of the most powerful of these buro-orgs is education. The education borg relies on two root assumptions: first, that learning can be disembedded, and second, that this is a better way to do things. From these assumptions all the other steps of borg growth occur: structure, content, service providers, and clientele. The very “conduit” nature of this set up serves to remind us at every moment that learning can and should be disembedded: there is this thing (called learning) that we can separate from society, there is someone who provides it, someone who receives it, and a building where this all goes on.

The problem with the stubborn elders is that they keep saying over and over that the Inuit way of life can’t be taught in books or classrooms. They may not have the same word for it in Inuktitut but they keep saying that learning can’t be disembedded. Their ideas seem quaint and are ignored. We
tramp all over the snow and blot out their footprints. The tracks of the elders are being lost. Maybe it's time for White folks to reign in our institutions and give the civilization that was here first some space. Maybe we could also stop and take a look at the world views we've been blindly imposing on others, and stem this "proselytizing fury".

But to Inuit I would say: Beware of our delusion. A White man who wakes up every morning expecting his "coloured paper" to be worth the same as yesterday and expecting to be able to exchange it for food and shelter is living almost entirely on faith. An Inuk who understands--yea even enjoys--the movement of wind and animals across the land and sea is not "primitive" or "backwards" or living in a dream world. Present Inuit civilization is at least 1000 years old, White civilization 500 years at the outside. We would like to turn you into Arctic versions of ourselves--living by the three fictions, dominated by money. But there is no proof that our civilization will outlast yours, and plenty of reason to suspect that it won't. Therefore: beware of our virus. We infected and almost wiped you out 100 years ago. Erect some kind of social quarantine. Inuit are not yet completely monetized. Preserve and resuscitate your civilization.
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