The Role of the Military in Politics: Yugoslavia As A Case Study

by

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B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1995

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
AUGUST 1997

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Abstract

The thesis proposed here will focus primarily on the political role of the military sector in Yugoslavia during the period from 1945 to 1991. Socialist Yugoslavia was a highly diverse multiethnic state which also had a unique regime that was 'non-aligned' and was undergoing the process of economic modernization. The country therefore provides an interesting setting in which to analyze the military's role in politics. Special attention will be devoted to the evolution of the Yugoslav military's primary "mission" and subordinate roles, and also to its particularly decisive role in Socialist Yugoslavia's disintegration. The first section of the thesis will place the study in comparative perspective through an examination of major social science approaches and theories regarding civil-military relations. The second and principal section of the thesis (chapters 2-5) will provide a detailed analysis of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia as a case study. The last section of the thesis will summarize the major findings of the study in light of the various approaches to the field of civil-military relations.
This thesis is dedicated to my family
Acknowledgements

This thesis was a product of a lot of hardwork. It would have been a lot more difficult without the support and encouragement of others. I would like to thank Professor Lenard J. Cohen who over the years has taught and helped me understand the country I was born in. I would also like to thank Professor Alexander Moens for being my second reader and Professor Andre Gerolymatos for being my external examiner. There are also other people who encouraged and supported me throughout this endeavour. I would like to thank my family, particularly my brother Roy, Davina, who was always there, and Pat.
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Chapter One: The Study of Civil-Military Relations Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives

Introduction

The military establishment in any society constitutes a distinct branch of the political system and public life. Defending the polity is typically the primary role of the armed forces. However the special features of the military sector, i.e. the possession of key instruments of force and the legal ability to use them, give the armed forces the potential to transcend their assigned or constitutional role within the political system. Claude E. Welch maintains that "though the armed forces have features common to bureaucracies everywhere--for example, hierarchies of position, sociological roles that are defined within these positions, criteria for advancement, different levels of responsibility for separate positions--they are unique in their centrality to the state and their relationship to violence."\(^1\) How the armed forces interact with the civil leadership constitutes the focus of the field of civil-military relations.\(^2\)

Civil-military relations underwent complex changes during the three-and-a-half decades of Tito's domination over Yugoslav political life (from 1945 until May 1980). The thesis will trace the Yugoslav military's political role in both the Titoist and post-Titoist periods. While the post-Tito leadership transition was relatively smooth and successful, the country soon descended into political paralysis, economic stagnation and rising ethnonational ferment. Before Tito died in 1980, a good deal of speculation within and outside the country revolved around the military's role in society. The thesis will discuss the military's "role orientation," and the particular role assumed by the military as the country's crisis deepened. Indeed as the country began to break up the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) found itself deeply immersed in the politics of disintegration. However, before embarking on a discussion of the role of the military in Yugoslavia this chapter will

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2 ibid., 10.
place the study in comparative perspective through an examination of major social science approaches and theories regarding civil-military relations.

The first chapter will consider the role of the military in politics with reference to three classic models of civil-military relations―professional, penetration and praetorian. The first part will explore the Western professional model. Samuel Huntington's thesis will be addressed as well as some criticism's of this approach. The second part will examine the Praetorian model, which is characteristic of much of the Third World, a region where the military intervene in politics relatively frequently. This section will also address such issues as military intervention, the military and modernization, military regimes and military development. The last section will explore the Communist penetration model as well as various other approaches that have been developed to more adequately explain party-army relations in such systems.

Professionalism

The prime representative of the professionalism school is Samuel P. Huntington. In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington maintains that the "existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives a unique cast to the modern problems of civil-military relations." Huntington contends that a professional officer corps did not exist in most countries before the early nineteenth century. But by the beginning of the twentieth century such bodies existed in most states. As a consequence of the emergence of a professional officer corps, "the problem in the modern state is...the relation of the expert to the politician." Huntington's primary goal is to examine the most effective method of controlling the

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4It should be noted that in studies of civil-military relations definitions for various terms such as model, approach, paradigm, perspective and conceptual framework are not defined in a precise way. This paper will not try to make any distinctions between these terms and they will be used interchangeably in this paper.
6ibid., 19.
7ibid., 20.
armed forces without weakening the basis of national security. Huntington's solution is that the military can be properly controlled, not by increasing civilian power, but by increasing military professionalism.

Professionalism, according to Huntington, can be understood as a combination of three elements—expertise, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty to fellow officers—which together form the core of military subordination to civilian authorities. First, the expertise acquired by a professional officer is the "management of violence," which involves comprehensive formal education and a long training process. Second, professional officer corps acquire a sense of social responsibility to their client, i.e., the state and the government. The principal responsibility of this corps lies in its obligation to the state as expert advisors. "They should not impose decisions upon their client which go beyond their competence."

The third element of professionalism is corporate loyalty. Huntington maintains that "officership is a public bureaucratized profession" and the legal right to practice the profession "is limited to members of a carefully defined body." The commission granted to a professional military officer is similar to a license given to a doctor. Entrance into this unit is confined to those with the proper education and training. In addition, various levels of competence are marked by the hierarchy of rank, as well as the hierarchy of office. However, the professional character of the officer corps "rests upon the priority of rank over the hierarchy of office." Huntington states, "rank inheres in the individual and reflects his professional achievement, which in turn is measured by experience, education, seniority and ability."

Modern armed forces may be characterized as technicians in the management of violence; with a powerful corporate tradition and organization; and a strong sense of

\[\text{\footnote{\text{ibid.}, 11.}}\]
\[\text{\footnote{\text{ibid.}, 16.}}\]
\[\text{\footnote{\text{ibid.}, 11.}}\]
\[\text{\footnote{\text{ibid.}, 12.}}\]
\[\text{\footnote{\text{ibid.}, 17.}}\]
responsibility to their client -- the state. Thus, by using this definition, modern armed forces can be defined as a profession. "Adoption and utilization of this strict definition of military professionalism would indicate that a purely professional soldier is excluded from national policy formulation not directly related to the means of the national security."13 Huntington declares that professional military men usually are a restraining "voice to the formulation of state policy"14 but they are "open-minded and progressive with respect to new weapons and new tactical forms."15

After arguing that military officers should be considered a profession because of military expertise, social responsibility and corporate loyalty, Huntington claims that there are two kinds of professional subordination of the military to civilian control: "subjective" and "objective". Subjective civilian control involves no distinguishable boundaries between civilian and military spheres. Huntington maintains that "subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military."16 It does this by reducing military autonomy and professionalism "in order to maximize the parallels between civilian and military thought."17 From this perspective, militaries that share values and beliefs with civilians would be expected to be less inclined to act in a interventionist and politically repressive manner.

In contrast, Huntington contends that civilian control of the military is best achieved through "objective" means where the military's autonomy and professional separation from civil society are promoted. Thus objective civilian control entails firm boundaries between civilian and military authority. These are present when "recognition of autonomous military professionalism exists."18 According to Huntington objective control is achieved when the military is made "politically sterile and neutral."19

14Huntington, 69.
15Ibid., 71.
16Ibid., 83.
18Huntington, 81.
19Ibid., 84.
forces would therefore be less likely to influence political decisions about security, both outside of the country and within it, as well as being less inclined supplant the government.

Huntington summarizes the "military mind" as "pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist... It is, in brief, realistic and conservative." Since Huntington's concept of the "military mind" emerged from his definition of military professionalism, the "two terms appear to be identical for the most part, and tend to reinforce each other". Therefore it is not surprising that Huntington concludes that with the maximization of military professionalism, the more immersed the officer corps become in their own technical world, and the less likely they are to become involved in political issues that does not directly affect them. In the end Huntington see's a flaw in professionalism: "professional success breeds its own downfall by stimulating political involvement. Nonetheless, the professional man who pursues the values of professional competence and obedience and the political man who pursues power as an end in itself are two distinct types." In a subsequent publication Huntington widened his explanation of military intervention to include external factors, such as political decay, in countries where political institutions are lacking or incapable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political conflict.

Huntington maintains that it is not necessary to examine Western history prior to the early 19th century to comprehend contemporary patterns of civil-military relations. Welch maintains that Huntington's explicit historical limitation is paralleled, however, by a geographical limitation--with the exception of Japan Huntington utilizes industrialized European and North Atlantic states. As a result, Huntington's conceptions of civil-military relations bear the stamp of their origins in the modern 'first world', in which the armed forces are usually confined to clearly subordinate roles in governance. Huntington

20 Brown, 16-17.
21 Huntington, 95.
maintains that the general theory of civil-military relations advanced in *The Soldier and the State* was "illustrated primarily by reference to the American experience."24

Following Huntington's study of military professionalism and its role in politics, academics have continued to debate his classic theory, which posited that higher the level of military professionalism, the less likely is the military willingness to intervene in politics.25 The opposing view, advanced by Janowitz,26 holds that professionalism "makes the military group-conscious, instilling the ability and the will to intervene and remain in power in order to protect its corporate interests and its institutional ethos and standards."27 In effect, military professionalism discourages withdrawal from politics. For Samuel Finer elements of military solidarity built in the process of professionalization make the armed forces anxious to defend their privileged position. As Finer states, military professionalism, "in fact, often thrusts the military into a collision with the civilian authorities."28 To inhibit this tendency the military must believe in an explicit principle--the "principle of civil supremacy."29 This is defined by Finer as the acceptance among military men of the major policies and programs of government.

26 Janowitz views professionalism as inhibiting civilian control. Professionalization may enhance the possibility of undue military influence or even overt military intervention in politics. Janowitz has different core attributes from Huntington that differentiate the military from other professions. He lists characteristics that make the military a profession as expertise, long period of education, group identity, ethics, standards of performance. See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).
28 S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 22. Finer lists three tendencies that push the military into a collision with civilian authorities, all stemming out of professionalism. First, the military's consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to look upon themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power. Finer contends that "the moment the military draw this distinction between the nation and the government in power, they begin to invent their own private notion of the national interest, and from this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of this view for that of civilian government; and this is precisely what we have defined as the very meaning of military intervention." A second motive for intervention rooted in professionalism may be described as military syndicalism. A third reason why professionalism may result in intervention is the military's reluctance to be used to coerce the government's domestic opponents. Finer, 22-23.
Huntington's characterization is an ideal type and it has, as can be seen from above, engendered criticism. Nevertheless, David Albright maintains that Huntington's conceptualization has informed most of the research and writing on civil-military relations. Wiatr maintains that "such criticism, however, does not rule out the usefulness of studying the political role of the military from the perspective of the sociological characteristics of the military profession." Indeed, Kurt Lang pointed out, "the concept of professionalism provides a useful framework for the analysis of many aspects of the military ethos and of officer behavior, including how willing they are to limit their political role to expert advice of strictly military issues."

**Praetorianism**

Ideally, patterns of civil-military relations are rooted in public law or constitutional tradition, which grant control of the military to the civilian government. This formal relationship is observed by the government and accepted by the armed forces as part of the military ethic. However, much of the pre-19th century military political history and the twentieth century of the Third World has been characterized by a form of civil-military relations usually called praetorianism. Eric Nordlinger defines praetorianism as a situation in which military officers "threaten or use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena." Praetorianism can also be examined by analyzing the context in which military

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30 Luckham maintains that in general "ideal types have been criticized for mixing definitions with empirically testable hypothesis; for defining ideal-typical social structures, social situations or combinations of ideas in terms of a complex of different variables some of which may be logically connected or derived from each other, but others of which may be no more than empirically related or conceivably even may show null or negative correlations. The construction of typologies is thus not the best way to derive empirically testable propositions. But it can be used...to call attention to the combinations of variables and sorts of interrelationships between them that are likely to be of interest for further empirical analysis; and not merely to satisfy the tidy instinct of a botanical mind that everything should be classified." A. R. Luckham, "Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition* 6 (Winter 1971): 9.


interventions occur. Edward Feit, for example, describes the "praetorian polity" as one based on two features: (a) "a perception of scarcity" and (b) "a general sense of distrust and misanthropy."35 Huntington also describes the same phenomenon, i.e., as a situation in which there is the direct confrontation of political groups and weak political institutionalization.36 Thus, "a praetorian situation permits or induc~es the military to act outside its 'normal' sphere of activity and competence and assume political functions."37

Military Intervention

Military intervention has been a dominant concern of scholars interested in the politics of changing or developing societies in the Third World. A number of theoretical constructs have been asserted to explain such behavior: a loss of legitimacy on part of the supplanted regime, lack of political institutionalization, political decay, a weakly developed political culture, ethnic and factional strife, and professional military concerns.38 In general, students of civil-military relations have asserted two broad explanations for the causes of praetorianism: one external or societal and the other internal or organizational.39

The external or societal explanation views military involvement in politics through an examination of factors such as political decay, economic backwardness, corruption, factionalism and loss of legitimacy.40 Huntington maintains that the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political, and "reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society." Therefore, he concludes that "military explanations do not explain military interventions."41 Praetorian polities have low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation. In these societies, Huntington contends,

36Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies , 197.
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 194.
"social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict."42 The praetorian society, in which the military acts independently, is characterized by political decay, not political order. Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith maintain that a prevalent theme in Huntington's observations about the praetorian society is that its civilian political institutions are always weak. "A vacuum in institutions and leadership impels groups to arrogate control for their own ends, and the armed forces count among many potential contenders for power."43

Those who seek to explain military interventionism in terms of the internal or organizational characteristics of the military focus on such factors as the level of military professionalism or perceived threats to the military's corporate interests44 as the "real culprits of intervention."45 This school of thought, inspired by Janowitz, has primarily focused on the military's willingness and capacity to intervene in order to explain military takeovers.46 While Huntington maintained that properly regulated training could make the officer corps "politically sterile and neutral" other observers pointed to the role of highly professional officers in coups d'état. In reality, the political climate of Third World politics often resulted in professionalism serving as a stimulant for military intervention. For example, Deborah Norden maintains that the notion of professionalism, in the Latin American context, has been interpreted differently than the original concept described by

42Ibid., 196.
44Henry Bienen maintains that the development of the concepts of professionalism and corporate identity in the work on the sociology of militaries in industrial societies grew out of a concern for civilian control of the military. Bienen contends that a "military's own understanding of its corporate interests is critical to its very definition in society and its relationship to the state. And its self-definition is important for the ways that corporate interests get structured. Levels of professionalism affect the missions of the military, both internal and external." Henry Bienen, "Armed forces and National Modernization," Comparative Politics 16(October 1983): 10.
45Danopoulos, From Military to Civilian Rule, 3.
46In an earlier work looking at civil-military relations Morris Janowitz, who was concerned with the so-called new nations, the countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, that had achieved political independence since 1945, emphasizes such internal characteristics as organizational format, social recruitment and education and professional ideology as important. See Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
Huntington. This was demonstrated by the "puzzling appearance in the 1960s and 1970s of military regimes in the South American countries with the most highly professionalized armed forces."\textsuperscript{47}

Alfred Stepan also argued that this new breed of military intervention can be explained by shifts in military doctrine.\textsuperscript{48} In "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion" Stepan suggests that these shifts toward broader conceptualization of security changed the meaning of professionalism in Latin America. In Latin America the process by which the military came to define its mission primarily in terms of dealing with threats to internal security was hastened by destruction of the conventional Cuban army by Castro's guerrilla force. Stepan maintains that:

In Brazil and Peru, where the military was highly institutionalized, the perception of threat to the internal security of the nation and the security of the military itself led to a focusing of energies on the "professionalization" of their approach to internal security. The military institutions began to study such questions as the social and political conditions facilitating the growth of revolutionary protest and to develop doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements. As a result, these highly professionalized armies became much more concerned with political problems.\textsuperscript{49}

As security came to be defined in terms of a broad array of social, economic and strategic factors, with emphasis on domestic affairs, the military's view of its role also changed. Responsibility for security thus came to include concern with politics. "These concerns provided a professional justification for military intervention, yet with a form of professionalization that went far beyond the technical proficiency implicit in a more narrow definition of the term."\textsuperscript{50}

Some critics have pointed out that the internal/external dichotomy is "more apparent than real".\textsuperscript{51} Ulf Sundhaussen maintains that this "controversy has at times assumed

\begin{verbatim}
\textsuperscript{49}Stepan, 50.
\textsuperscript{50}Norden, 17.
\textsuperscript{51}Danapoulos,From Military to Civilian Rule,3.
\end{verbatim}
dimensions of mutual exclusiveness which were certainly not intended or approved by the initial chief protagonists."

"To explain military intervention " external variables must not be emphasized to the exclusion of internal variables." Morris Janowitz, regarded as one of the leading internalists, prefaced the second edition of his *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, by endeavoring to extricate himself entirely from the externalist/internalist debate: "I do not know of any empirically oriented study of civil-military relations that would accept or limit itself to one of these approaches. Certainly, that was not the strategy of my original essay, which focused on the interplay between military institutions and societal processes."

Samuel Finer presents a comparative investigation of the role of the military in politics and analyzes societal conditions that may prompt the military to intervene. Finer questions the common assumption that it is natural for the military to obey civilian power. Finer closely links military intervention to the political culture of a nation. He places societies into four categories: mature, developed, low and minimal. He further lists four modes of military intervention: influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantment of civilian regimes. The lower the level of political culture, the more involved the military can become, until it eventually supplants the civilian regime. In contrast, when public sentiment towards civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak.

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53 Welch and Smith, 34. To explain military intervention they look at external factors such as "the extent and nature of class or ethnic cleavages; the effectiveness and stability of political organizations and procedures; the extent of public support for political institutions staffed by civilians. The propensity of military leaders to usurp governmental roles is also affected by factors internal to the military: its sense of mission; the nature and depth of its political awareness, the degree of organizational complexity and the level of autonomy attained by military institutions; the recruitment patterns and cohesion of the officer corps." Welch and Smith develop a typology of the various roles the armed forces can play in politics based on (1) the extent and nature of political participation of the populace; (2) the strength of civil institutions; (3) military strength; and (4) the nature of military institutional boundaries. See Welch and Smith, 34.
54 Danapoulos, *From Military to Civilian Rule*, 3.
56 Brown, 19.
He observed that in order for intervention to occur, military elites must possess both the disposition to topple the government and a suitable opportunity to act on their intentions.\(^57\) By disposition Finer means "a combination of conscious motive and of a will or desire to act."\(^58\) He lists five motivations: the national interest, the class interest, the corporate interest, the regional or particularistic interest and personal interest. For Finer military intervention is not a unicausal explanation but results from the juxtaposition of motives or moods and opportune occasions that appear due to certain political conditions of society.\(^59\) If there is only disposition --because the political system is working and capable of handling problems-- a coup would not succeed; and if there is just opportunity--systemic weaknesses or poor performance on part of the civilian elites-- and no disposition intervention is unlikely.

Eric Nordlinger contends that "the coup d'état is a consciously conceived and purposefully executed act."\(^60\) In answering the question why do soldiers intervene in politics, he suggests that the most common and salient interventionist motive involves the "defence or enhancement of the military's corporate interests." When do soldiers intervene, the other issue Nordlinger discusses, is traced to the civilian government's performance failures and a resulting loss of legitimacy. "Performance failures lead to the deflation of governmental legitimacy within the politicized stratum of the civilian population." It is this factor that prompts and permits the officers to "act upon their interventionist motive."\(^61\) The military's corporate interests consist of "adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing their internal affairs, the preservation of their responsibilities in the face of

\(^{57}\) Finer, 224.
\(^{58}\) Ibid., 230.
\(^{59}\) Luckham puts Finer in the categorization of scholars who explain military intervention by external variables. He maintains that to be "sure Finer does not ignore the organizational qualities of the military any more than do Janowitz and Huntington ignore the influences of civilian values and institutions. But they are in the main taken into account respectively as qualifying or complicating factors rather than as an elaborated part of the theory(with the possible exception of Huntington's analysis of subjective control of the military establishment). A.R. Luckham, "Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," Government and Opposition 6(Winter 1971): 9.
\(^{60}\) Nordlinger, 63.
\(^{61}\) Ibid., 65.
encroachments from rival institutions and the continuity of the institution itself."62 The praetorians usually claim performance failures as the explanation of why they overthrew the government. Nordlinger contends that the three most common civilian performance failures that military junta's cite are unconstitutional and illegal behavior (particularly widespread political corruption), responsibility for economic downturns or inflationary spirals, and an inability to deal with political opposition and discontent.

Nordlinger maintains that alterations in government legitimacy are an important explanation for attempts at coups. The "presence of a legitimizing mantle sharply inhibits the translation of interventionist motives into coup attempts."63 Soldiers do not intervene when a moral barrier is present, when their actions would be condemned as "usurpations" of power. Nordlinger further suggests that although the moral barrier to intervention set up by the population is significant, "it is by no means decisive."64 He also claims what is more important is that soldiers are not keen to supplant legitimate governments because such acts are not only sure to damage military cohesiveness, they are also likely to prove unsuccessful.

_The Military and Modernization_

The civil-military relations literature also includes studies which analyze the performance of the military establishment as political decision makers and particularly the military's role in such important areas as regime legitimacy, social change, national integration and modernization. Huntington maintains that in the 1960s "scholars spent much ink and time debating whether the military play basically a progressive or a conservative role in modernization."65 To account for the roles of the military in much of the Third World there have been two general and opposing views advanced by students of civil-military relations and of military intervention. There are those who view military institutions as energizing and modernizing forces—that is, the military is seen as a champion

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62 ibid. 65.
63 ibid. 94.
64 ibid.
65 Huntington, _Political Order in Changing Societies_, 219.
of middle class ambitions, social change and development. On the other hand, the military elites can also be viewed as unsuccessful promoters of social change and development. Janowitz doubted this modernizing potential and pointed to the lack of sufficient resources as well as to inadequate training skills. A different perspective has been advanced by Huntington. He maintains that the military acts as a modernizing agent only when the interests of the middle class are concerned, but deters social change as soon as the lower classes become politically mobilized. In this case, the military become both repressive and conservative. Thus the middle class is the modernizing force and the military's role is merely to help them enter the political arena.

Jerzy J. Wiatr maintains that the "debate continues, with scholars opting for or against the theory of the modernizing role of the military, largely in keeping with the selection of countries they study." There have also been cross-national aggregate studies which attempt to correlate military rule with various socioeconomic and political indicators. Henry Bienen maintains that "for the general treatments of the military as a positive or negative actor for raising standards of living and increasing economic growth and general development, the cross-national aggregate data work carried out in the 1960s and 1970s created problems, for this literature frequently failed to find broad and strong correlations between industrial growth and modernization and military rule." Indeed, Wiatr contends that "if anything however, the statistical approach has so far demonstrated that there is no clear evidence either for a 'modernizing' or for an 'anti-modernizing' interpretation of the impact of military intervention on social change."
Military Regimes

Finer maintains that while scholars have explored the causes, courses and immediate consequences of the military coup, interest has finally turned to the kinds of regime that result from their action. Andrew Ross has pointed out that students of praetorianism, in their efforts to emphasize the extent and form of military involvement in political regimes, "have identified numerous variations in civil-military relations, thereby expanding our understanding of praetorianism."71 Robert Pinkney contends that the classification of military governments has always been "an imprecise business, if only because most of them rule without constitutions, or with constitutions which are not adhered to."72 Thus, Finer concludes that the terms 'military regimes,' 'military government' or 'military dictatorship' are "terms of art, not scientific categories." 73

In analyzing the military in the political development of new nations Janowitz proposes five types of civil-military relations based on the degree of militarism and/or civil control of the military: (1) authoritarian personal control; (2) authoritarian mass party control; (3) democratic competitive systems; (4) civil-military coalitions; and (5) military oligarchy.74 In his typology, Amos Perlmutter distinguishes between three types of military regimes--the Arbitrator, the Ruler, and the Neo-Arbitrator.75 In a subsequent article Perlmutter's classification concentrates more on the interaction between civil and military groups rather than the existence of formal structures. He argues that any classification of military regimes should use four criteria to explain the differences between various types:

73 Finer, 301.
74 Janowitz, Military in the Political Development of New Nations, 6-7.
A. the nature of the relationships between the military and the civilian elites and structures.

B. the scope of the military and civilian organisational and institutional autonomy in the military regime.

C. the nature of the political and administrative instruments employed by the military regime to achieve modernization and legitimacy: bureaucratic structures, commissions, political parties, interest groups and...the military itself.

D. the classes or groups penetrated by the military regime and the class it seeks to co-opt or collaborate with.\textsuperscript{76}

He developed five types of military regimes: corporative, market-bureaucratic, socialist and oligarchic, army-party and tyrannical.\textsuperscript{77}

Nordlinger maintains that when praetorian officers take control there are three types of executive arrangements among military regimes: "(1) the predominantly military executive, in which at least 90% of the cabinet positions are held by officers; (2) the mixed military-civilian executive; (3) and the exclusively military council along with a mixed cabinet."\textsuperscript{78} Finer generated one of the most comprehensive classifications. He pointed out that the class of "military regimes" embraces a number of distinct subtypes which merge, gradually into civilian regimes. He goes on to state "where we choose to draw the line is stipulative."\textsuperscript{79} Finer generated a fourfold classification: military supported, intermittently indirect-military, indirect military and military regimes proper.\textsuperscript{80} Noting that analysts must examine both supreme policy making authority and the penetration of the bureaucracy, Finer generated four subsets of military regimes proper: military juntas, in which political parties and legislatures were suppressed; military juntas with parties or legislatures as basic auxillaries or appurtenances; the personalist-presidential regimes where militaries act as support but do not take upon themselves an active policy-making role; and the authoritarian


\textsuperscript{77} ibid.

\textsuperscript{78} Nordlinger, 109.

\textsuperscript{79} Finer, 281. Finer also criticizes some of the earlier authors regimes classification discussed in this paper. See Finer, 253-254.

\textsuperscript{80} This was a reformulation of an earlier typology which was based on two criteria: first, the extent to which significant societal policies are controlled by the military(either fully, partially, or discriminatingly) and second, the degree of openness or overtess with which they do so(either openly, half openly or covertly. So the military may fully control or partially and discriminatingly control policy and do either thing openly, half openly or covertly. The effect is to generate five major categories of military regime: direct rule, either open or 'quasi-civilianized,' dual rule and indirect rule, either continuous or intermittent. See Finer, 149-151.
regimes, where the military support the chief executive who himself is hampered by institutions.\textsuperscript{81} Ross contends that "despite the theoretical and analytical richness these analysts have brought to the study...the much-maligned, traditional dichotomy between civilian and military regimes retains its heuristic value."\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Military Development}

Recently, as the armed forces of many Latin American, Asian and African countries began to restore some kind of civilian rule, civil-military specialists devoted more attention to analyzing the causes and processes of military withdrawal or disengagement from politics. Disengagement refers to the substitution of praetorian policies and personnel by regimes having recognized civilian authorities who control the military.\textsuperscript{83} It should be noted that despite widespread praetorian conditions, in the Third World some countries in the region have maintained governmental control over their military forces, a necessary element for liberalization and democratization. But there are potential obstacles to the establishment or re-establishment of civil governments in developing countries.\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{82}Ross maintains that "our ability to identify distinct types of praetorianism does not mean that the larger distinction between military and civilian regimes is no longer analytically useful. This simple dichotomization between civilian-and military-dominated political regimes can be utilized to indicate the degree to which the political role of the military has been on the rise. While this approach reveals only the most overt form of praetorianism, it is unlikely that other less overt, more subtle forms of praetorianism are declining if this overt form is ascending." Ross, 572.


\textsuperscript{84}It should be remembered that the distinction between "civilian" and "military" is not a simple dichotomy "where the presence of either group in government signals the absence of the other. As a result, it is not clear what constitutes a "successful withdrawal." It is imperative, therefore, to accept that military withdrawal from political power is rarely absolute or complete. Given the military's role in national defense and security, the armed forces will always be associated with and have an interest in politics, even when the soldiers withdraw to the barracks." Kostas Messas, "Democratization of Military Regimes: Contending Explanations," \textit{Journal of Political and Military Sociology}, 209 (Winter 1992): 243. Welch maintains that much murky thinking about civil-military relations lies in overemphasizing two extremes: on the one hand of total military control and total civilian control of the government. Welch contends that "a great deal of contemporary political life falls into the gray between 'military intervention in politics' and 'civilian control of the military'. The simple dichotomy between these terms neglects a major area of interactions, which I have called 'military participation' in politics." See the spectrum of military involvement in politics, Welch, \textit{No Farewell to Arms}, 13.
\end{footnotesize}
Nordlinger maintained that when governing officers lack political skills, they can manage only superficial or temporary change and are not able therefore to eliminate the factors that perpetuate praetorianism. The average lifespan of governments installed by military intervention is five years. Return to the barracks are usually promised and often achieved, but they are rarely maintained over extended periods. Nordlinger contends that there are three usual paths by which military regimes give way to civilian regimes: (1) the praetorians are forced to give up their power due to significant civilian opposition; (2) the military office holders are overthrown by officers outside the government who then turn power over to the civilians; (3) the praetorian rulers "voluntarily" withdraw with or without pressure from civilians. Less frequently strong civilian pressure returns power to civilians, or intramilitary revolt against governing officers results in quick recivilianization; voluntary disengagement is the most common form of military withdrawal. Nordlinger sums up the reasons for this:

the desire to retain governmental power and its related privileges is less strongly felt by military than by civilian incumbents; most military governments are headed by guardian-type praetorians whose limited governing objectives can be realized within a short time span; the praetorians can usually disengage in the expectation that the successor governments will be reluctant to contravene their interests and views; some officers want to return to the more attractive life of the 'professional' soldier after encountering unexpected difficulties as governors; a return to the barracks is intended to preserve the armed forces declining reputation and disengagement may best restore military unity and hierarchy.

Because there is no substantial change in sociopolitical conditions, Nordlinger maintains that, "the most common aftermath of military government is military government." Finer is not optimistic regarding successful transitions of countries which have low or minimal political culture, in other words, under praetorian conditions. These states consist of "latent chronic crises where opinion is feeble and often self divided." Therefore these states require a strong executive and to this extent all these states are ones whose

85 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 139-147.
86 I.bid., 139.
87 I.bid., 147.
88 I.bid., 210.
89 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 286.
governments are "abnormally dependent on their armed forces." And this is precisely why such regimes have experienced military intervention. Finer suggested four conditions necessary for the establishment of a new civilian government under military auspices: (1) the leader of the junta must want the armed forces to quit politics; (2) that the ex-military leader, now head of the state, must establish a regime able to function without direct military support; (3) the new government must have the support of the armed forces; and (4) the armed forces must have confidence in the new government leader. As examples of cases he mentioned such countries as France, Turkey, South Korea and Mexico. However, he maintains that "the most likely outcome of one military coup and one military regime in the Third World is a second coup and a second military regime, separated by bouts of indirect military rule, monopartism and feebly functioning competitive party politics."  

Huntington maintained that there were significant differences between praetorian and civic societies. "Intermittent military intervention to stop politics or to suspend politics" is, according to Huntington, "the essence of praetorianism." Huntington contends that an army that intervenes has several options—to retain power or return it to the civilians and expanding political participation by societal forces, or restricting it. For example military elites can: return power and restrict participation; return power and expand participation; retain power and restrict participation; retaining power or expanding participation. Huntington stresses the important role of the political and social environment. Military leaders can be "builders of political institutions... most effectively in a society where social forces are not fully articulated." There are various factors which may assist a military in having a positive impact on political life. For example a military establishment wishing to disengage from politics must consciously reduce the possibility of ethnic or class conflict.

90Ibid. 91Ibid., 227. 92Ibid., 288. 93Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 243. 94Ibid.
Huntington emphasizes the institutionalization of political values and participation for military disengagement. The support of the rural elements is needed prior to the development of civilian political institutions by a military regime. An effective political party is also important. Huntington maintains that if military officers try to rule the state without parties, they may "cut off the one major way in which they could hope to move their countries out of their praetorian conditions." Naturally, Huntington is not positive that ruling military junta's will initiate such changes on their own.

Welch maintains that there are built-in limits to disengagement by a military. "In particular, officers balk at encouraging broader political participation--unless this occurs through channels approved by them. Their non-political model of nation-building has meant...a desire to control popular awareness and guide it through movements not under the thumb of former politicians. Governing officers' abilities to democratize thus has inherent limits." Sundhaussen describes military disengagement from politics as "rare, blurred, incomplete, temporary and codependent on extra-military actors." He contends that armed forces return to barracks for three reasons: opposition to their staying in power, pressures from outside the particular state, and reasons internal to the military, for example, belief of military rulers about the desirability of re-establishing civilian control.

Sundhaussen contends that an "absolute precondition" for disengagement is that "all groupings within the military capable of unilateral political action agree that it should relinquish power". Interests which the military leaders consider important must be satisfied. But the most important precondition is "the availability of what the military consider to be 'viable' political alternatives." Sundhaussen maintains that the option least likely to result in renewed military involvement in politics is retention of power by the

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95Ibid.
96Ibid.
97Welch, No Farewell to Arms, 17-18.
98Sundhaussen, 544.
99Ibid., 547-548.
100Ibid., 549.
101Ibid., 549-550
military and expansion of political participation. In the resulting military-civilian coalitions, power passes gradually to their civilian partners until (as in Mexico) officers' influence becomes hardly noticeable.

Welch argued that disengagement of the armed forces from direct political roles can be approached through two strategies-- short term and long term-- concentrated exclusively on military and political institutions. The first strategy emphasizes the military itself and their relations with government sectors. Mutual restraint on the part of officers and politicians, and not adopting policies that threaten the military's vital interests (such as large budget reductions) can facilitate disengagement in the short term. The second strategy, however, necessitates greater government effectiveness and legitimacy—that is, the strength of political institutions determine how successful the disengagement.102

Welch in a subsequent book compared paths to liberalization and democratization in six Third World countries--Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. Welch posits six hypotheses about planned returns to the barracks. These hypotheses relate to factors internal to the military (role perceptions, funding and internal management, and mission and deployment) and factors related to the broader characteristics of the entire political system (levels of internal strife, economic trends and leadership, notably in terms of "acceptable" successors)103. Welch concluded in 1987 that "for several decades to come, however, armed forces will continue to play central roles in the politics of African states, and to a lesser extent in Latin America."104 Successful disengagement has proven to be a difficult process. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, who did a comparative study of armed forces disengagement from direct political roles, found that civilian control was rarely re-established, unless a fundamental transformation took place. Maniruzzaman states "the factors and trends in any particular society that lead to military intervention have to be

103 Claude E. Welch, No Farewell to Arms, 196.
104 Ibid., 204.
eliminated and reversed if that society ever hopes to achieve military withdrawal from politics."\textsuperscript{105}

Kostas Messas advances a body of theoretical explanations that derive from the characteristics of the military institution, or from characteristics of domestic, regional and international environments. Of the factors discussed, "the military's concern for their corporate interests, pressure from civilian groups, the military's economic performance, and reduction in material incentives by a foreign benefactor have been found to be associated with military withdrawal from politics more frequently than the others."\textsuperscript{106} Messas maintains that scholarly discussion of these factors has yielded a number of hypothesis, the majority of which have been rarely tested empirically. The two approaches (the military organizational and environmental characteristics) he posits to understand military withdrawal have rarely been considered together. Therefore "it is necessary...to test and verify those theoretically-justified hypotheses using a broad, empirical data base."\textsuperscript{107}

The preceding section has examined several explanations of why military intervention occurs, and also the connection of military regimes and military disengagement. The next section of the thesis will discuss several models of civil-military relations which apply specifically to communist political systems. In many of these cases the communist party and communist military structure functioned closely as a result of their ideology and also their close association in the guerilla struggle which led to the regimes creation (e.g. Yugoslavia, Cuba, China, Vietnam, Cambodia).

Civil Military Relations in Communist Regimes: The Penetration Model

Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande contend that the role of the military in Marxist-Leninist political systems seems inherently contradictory. "The typical Leninist party adheres to the classical Clausewitzian dictum "that politics is supreme to military

\textsuperscript{106} Messas, 251.
\textsuperscript{107} ibid.
action, and communist states have ideological proscriptions against military interference in
civil politics which are as strong as those in Western pluralist systems." But on the
other hand the military in communist states are almost without exception, politicized
institutions which participate in politics more directly ... than armed forces in any Western
state." While "no completely satisfactory theory has emerged to explain the basic
similarities and differences in Communist civil-military relations," a number of models
have been advanced that attempt to enhance our understanding of party-army interactions.
The classic model of civil-military relations in communist political systems is known as the
penetration model.

The model of communist penetration is characterized by direct control and
surveillance by the one party states civilian officials over military officers. The penetration
model can be broadly seen as stemming from revolutions where party-led indigenous
guerrilla troops emerged victorious in a civil war or one that is imposed due to the
occupation of Soviet troops. The model assumed that civilian elites achieve loyalty and
obedience by penetrating the military with political ideas and political personnel. Together
with the indoctrination of military personnel with political ideas, civilian supremacy is
maintained by the broad use of controls, surveillance and punishment. Nordlinger

108 Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-
Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," American Political Science Review 76 (December
1982): 778. These authors maintain that two general assumptions confirmed in the case of democratic
systems are mainly irrelevant in communist systems: "(1) that there is a clear division between civilian and
military elites that makes elite conflict among them an inter-institutional conflict between civilian and
military structures;(2) that either civilian or military elites (or both civilian and military elites) subscribe to
the norm that the military ought to be apolitical"—that is, it should not inject itself into political debates in
ways that challenge or compete with civilian authority. Ibid., 780.


110 Huntington and Janowitz expounded such a model in the 1960s. They "stressed that the party vigorously
subordinated the army to its will and checked its potential power." Their theory stems from the concept of
totalitarianism developed by Arendt, Friedrich, Brezinski and others in the 1950s. Ibid., 2. Janowitz
concluded, the totalitarian model rests on political control of the military by a centralized and authoritarian
political system. Political control is "enforced by the secret police, by infiltration of party members into
the military hierarchy, by the party's arming its own military units, and by control of the system of officer
selection." Janowitz maintains that "while he helps fashion defence policy, the organizational independence
of the professional officer is weakened and he is eliminated from domestic politics." Janowitz Military in
the Political Development of New Nations, 4. Janowitz's totalitarian model merged with Eric Nordlinger's
penetration model. See Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 15.
maintains that the "army is differentiated from the civilian sphere in terms of professional expertise, but congruent with it in terms of a shared ideology." Thus the "totalitarian/penetration model" assumed that (1) in the process of Communist revolution, traditional militaries are replaced by (2) armed forces that have been successfully penetrated by civilian political organization and personnel, resulting in (3) an ideologically based, civilian-dominated, integration of party-army leadership. The penetration model assumes total party control over the military and domination of society. Zoltan D. Barany maintains that the problem with this model was "that its rigidity could not accommodate the apparent changes within Soviet-type societies and proved to be of especially little value when applied to Communist countries dominated by Moscow." Other observers tried to reconceptualize the role of the army in Communist states in light of the inadequacies of this penetration/totalitarian model. Andrew A. Michta maintains that "in Western scholarship, the discussion of civil-military relations under communism generally follows one (or a combination) of three paradigms: (1) the interest group model (Roman Kolkowicz); (2) the participatory model (Timothy J. Colton); and (3) the historical-institutional model (William E. Odom)."

Roman Kolkowicz's work on Soviet civil-military relations "began the long list of theoretical studies in this area." His model, known as the "institutional/conflict" or the "interest group" model, described the army and party in constant conflict. In this view the professionalism of the military generates perpetual tension between the army and the party as the military constantly tries to enlarge its autonomy in the management of its

111 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 15.
115 Barany, 83.
internal affairs. Both institutions espoused separate value systems and acted as distinct institutional entities. In order to illustrate the contradictory and incompatibility of certain basic military characteristics with the features espoused by the party, Kolkowicz provides a juxtaposition of factors:

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<tr>
<th>&quot;Natural&quot; Military Traits</th>
<th>Traits Desired by The Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elitism</td>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional autonomy</td>
<td>Subordination to ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Proletarian internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment from society</td>
<td>Involvement with society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroic symbolism</td>
<td>Anonymity</td>
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</tbody>
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The officer group in such a communist regime supports values such as heroism, obedience, duty, and bravery; it functions as an elitist group that enjoys its societal exclusivity—that is, it acts like a special interest group.

The Communist party, on the other hand, with the traditional Marxist Leninist fear of Bonapartism, resisted some of these aims and intended to control the military as much as possible. There are a number of controls at the party's disposal. Kolkowicz stressed the role of MPA (Main Political Administration) as the communist Party's main lever of control over the armed forces. Under such conditions the Communist Party officials monitor, manipulate, and constrain the activities of professional military commanders. The interest group approach demarcates a solid border between the party and the military. It tends to depict "the political apparatus in the armed forces as a foreign, hostile element resented by regular officers." Consequently, the relationship between the party and army is characterized by continuous conflict resulting in political instability, adverse effects on morale, and loss of military efficiency.

118 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 88-98.
119 For the party it is important that it insures that the armed forces remain entirely loyal to the regime. Barany maintains from their creation, Communist armed forces have been watched over by an entire organization of political officers whose primary duty was the maintenance of ideological purity within the military. The Main Political Administration (MPA), as the intramilitary organization is customarily called, was one of the most important—if not the most important—part of the armed forces from the party's perspective. Some other methods of control were a system of dual command and dual elites. Barany, 80-81.
Kolkowicz's interest-group model was criticized by William E. Odom with regard to a number of points. Odom's own "institutional congruence" model or "historical institutional" approach depicts the party-army relationship as consensual rather than conflictual. Odom criticizes Kolkowicz for assuming that important Party values (such as egalitarianism) are opposed to those of the military and finds "value congruence rather than conflict in Party-military relations would seem closer to the mark." Odom insists that the party and the military profess similar value systems such as upholding the virtues of ideological purity, belief in the vanguard role of the party, and socialist internationalism. Odom criticizes the significance of Kolkowicz's military professionalism variable and claimed that the relationship between efficiency and party control was not inverse. In contrast, Odom does not see the political apparatus as an alien and dysfunctional body within the military. He contends that political officers are as much a part of the military structure as are regular line officers. Unlike Kolkowicz, Odom maintains that the political officers' role may in fact increase military effectiveness rather than impede it. Multiple lines of authority and control within a single institution can provide the top leadership with different avenues of information relating to the functioning of the organization.

Odom's institutional congruence model is critical of the interest group model's lack of attention to the interlocking linkages between the military and the party. Odom proposes that the party-army relationship was essentially symbiotic and that the military is primarily a political institution in a communist state. He also points to the need to study hierarchical conflict within the military bureaucracy. Military officers are implementers, just as are the leading party cadres, and their policy making influence is bureaucratic and administrative, rather than competitive with the Party. Odom rejects Kolkowicz's stress on tension between the army and the party; instead he posits that the conflict is intra-

122 Ibid., 31.
123 Ibid., 43.
institutional (the lower levels of bureaucracy against the higher levels) rather than interinstitutional. Odom further maintains that the Soviet military's political life was primarily bureaucratic in character. While "personnel cliques and coalitions of cliques took shape in bureaucracies" they differed generically from interest groups insofar as they could "not formalize themselves and thereby institutionalize the pursuit of an interest."

Odom's analysis is based on an historical/institutional approach which holds that civil-military relations in the Soviet Union were rooted in the tsarist traditions of civil-military relations. Odom highlighted the Russian historical experience and stated that, as in earlier periods of Russian history, the development of a separate military perspective on major questions is doubtful. Thus, it followed from his argument that there was no fundamental political cleavage in Soviet civil-military relations. Odom did not claim that he has provided a comprehensive model of Soviet civil-military relations; it is at best an adumbration of an alternative conceptualization.

A third model developed by Timothy J. Colton presents a contrasting view of Soviet civil-military relations. Colton's "participatory" model does not, like Kolkowicz, stress party control over the military nor, as did Odom, a symbiotic party-army relationship but views the military's participation in politics as the main feature of Soviet civil-military relations. The military is an institution, and has its own interests. Colton suggests utilizing the concept of participation rather than that of interest groups in order to achieve analytic flexibility. Colton does not assume that the main actors, army and communist Party, should be put into dichotomous categories. He brought more than one level of complexity to the study of the issue. Colton also highlights another factor relating to army-party interaction that was overlooked by both Kolkowicz and Odom. He suggests that co-

\[\text{footnotes}
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\text{124}ibid.
\text{125}ibid., 48.
\text{126}ibid., 41.
\text{128}ibid., 63.
option between the organizations is reciprocal. On the one hand, the party co-opted military forces personnel into important positions within the party hierarchy. On the other hand, military officers could and did co-opt political officers (whose formal function was to supervise them). Thus, in Colton's interpretation, the Main Political Administration in the Soviet military serves the military interests rather than being an instrument of civilian party control over the armed forces. In the participatory model, the army is the source of expert advice for politicians and participates in the bargaining process with the party leadership.

Thus for Colton, the civil-military relations are characterized not by conflict or consensus, but by the interpenetration of the two institutional apparatuses. Colton's model does not emphasize the notion of tension in the relationship nor does he see an extensive control problem. The participatory model posits that the military is satisfied with the political role which the party leadership assigns it; the officer corps takes part in decision-making and in the adoption of internal and external political goals. The party also permits the military to solve its internal problems, thus increasing the army's sense of responsibility. In order to retain military support, the Party leadership ensures that its policies are in line with those of the military. While the military obviously does have the ability to intervene by force to pursue their corporate interests, Colton stresses the fact that "in many ways these interests have been well served by Party policy." Using the Soviet case as an example, Colton claims that, as a rule, the military's participation in communist politics was confined to intramilitary issues and to giving expert advice to the party. Overall the army has not challenged the party's supremacy.

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129 Colton provides a matrix on the patterns of military participation in politics. It includes on one axis the scope of issues and on the other axis, the means employed. The scope of issues ranges from minor matters appropriately within the internal control of the military to institutional, intermediate, and societal issues. Wide variation also exists in terms of the means that officers use in politics. Military officers can take advantage of official prerogatives, proffer expert advice, utilize political bargaining, or use force. Ibid., 65. See also Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian-Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), 243.

130 Colton, "The Party Military Connection," 73.

131 Michta, 3.
Barany concludes all three major approaches of Soviet civil-military relations can contribute to our understanding of the subject." However, as a method of explaining actual behaviour, none of the models proves to be ideal. "The models above cannot account for the clear differences of Soviet civil-military relations in various periods." The authors make no claim for the applicability of their models to all communist systems. Michta maintains that "that the three paradigms... are best applied to the discussion of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, that is, to country's characterized by state sovereignty and relative autonomy of the two principle actors." The task becomes more complex when examining civil-military relations in Eastern Europe Soviet client states. "To a large extent, the additional complexity of party-army relationship in these states is a consequence of the Soviet domination of their politics and military establishments and their drastically different histories and politico-military cultures." Several theoretical attempts have been made to explain the differences of civil-military relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Barany contends that none

132Barany, 85.
133Adelman sees several problems with these models. He criticizes Kolkowicz's model as offering little guidance for understanding the minimal and passive role of the Soviet army in the period from 1917-1953. Odom's approach argues for an army party symbiosis that is based in the czarist, and even Petrine, civil-military relations. Adelman contends that he does not show how these traditions were transferred from a traditional czarist army to the revolutionary Red Army led by Communists and commissars. "This approach ignores the strong tensions in army-party relations characteristic of the Stalinist era, which saw the Great purges decimate the officer corps. It downplays the genuine fear of Bonapartism that played a role in the purges of Trotsky(1925), Tukachevsky(1937), and Zhukov(1957). This approach, too, considerably underestimates the power achieved in the last two decades by the Soviet military-industrial complex. Colton's participatory model also has little explanatory power for the Stalinist era and fails to explain why the Soviet army might not use the power that is available to it." Adelman, 3-4.
134Barany, 87. Albright attempted to account for alterations in civil-military relations in communist states. He eschews the notion of army-party conflict, opting instead for a continuum approach ranging from total cooperation to total conflict between army and party. Albright see's seven variables as significant in explaining differences in Communist civil-military relations: "(1) circumstances under which the government came to power; (2) relations with other states;(3) the extent of functional specialization among upper-echelon elements of the ruling elite;(3) the extent of functional specialization among upper-echelon elements of the ruling elite;(4) the degree of factional strife with the governing elite;(5) the amount of bureaucratization of politics;(6) the country's military doctrine;(7) the extent of domestic order." Albright, 575. Adelman maintains that Albright was unable to "specify the relative importance of each variable and the interrelationships between variables. All seven variables obviously cannot account be of equal importance." Adelman, 5. See also Barany, 87.
135Michta, 3.
136Barany, 87.
of them can explain the varieties and differences of such relations in East European Communist systems, but they can help enhance our knowledge. The work of Ivan Volgyes and Dale R. Herspring emphasized the application of the notions of political socialization to understanding civil-military relations in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{137} Their work also emphasized the party's political control over the military as the main focus of party-military relations in a communist political system, and the role of political officers is allowed to play in this relationship. The model usually centers on the dynamic nature of the relationship and suggests that a significant factor behind such changes is the degree to which the party has already "succeeded, at any given point, in socializing the officer corps into accepting the Party's value system."\textsuperscript{138} The greater the degree to which the Communist party is successful in this endeavor, the less resort to explicit party controls.

Volgyes and Herspring identify three phases as being important--"transformation," "consolidation," and "system-maintenance."\textsuperscript{139} In the first stage or the transformation phase, a wide number of values are shared between the Party leadership and the military elite. The second phase or the consolidation period, is marked by an intensification of the supervisory control functions of the party over the military, in addition to a greater emphasis on the politicization of all aspects of military life. Once the party has achieved what it considers to be a satisfactory level of value internalization on the part of the military, "the process of political socialization becomes less active, less revolutionary, and less demanding as the system enters into the system-maintenance period."\textsuperscript{140} This model implicitly suggests that Kolkowicz's conflict approach may be appropriate in the transformation and consolidation phases of civil-military relations, but becomes less significant as the armed forces internalize the Party's value system. Odom's institutional congruence model, which assumes a symbiotic party-army relationship, may be more


\textsuperscript{138}Herspring, "Introduction," 210.

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid., 210.

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid.
significant for the system-maintenance period. Herspring pointed out that Volgyes and Herspring limits the applicability of their model to the East European experience.

Alex Alexiev conceives of party-military relations in Eastern Europe going through "stages of conflict, accommodation, and participation, leading ultimately to a symbiotic relationship." He believes that while East European military establishments preserved their national orientation, the East European Communist parties remained subordinated to the Soviet Union. The domination of East European regimes by Moscow had an effect on their armed forces in the following ways: "1) subordination to the Soviet military and denial of the nation-state function; 2) diminished political role and clout; 3) divergent perceptions of national versus ideological desiderata." These specific characteristics of the East European political environment had a decisive influence on the shape of party-military relations throughout the region. In particular, these features provide for a model of conflict, or accommodation, between the party and the military that is quite distinct from the Soviet vision. Alexiev enumerated these desiderata as an "ideal typology which was unlikely to occur in a real life situation." For example, a considerable change in party ideology, including foreign-political emancipation, could possibly lead to a party-military accommodation, and even alliance, founded on a new consensus regarding national goals.

Jonathon R. Adelman proposed an "historical development model" that may "help rectify the ahistorical tendencies of most-Soviet based theories." He suggests that the decisive factors in determining the nature of civil-military relations in the region were the

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<tr>
<th>Military Desiderata</th>
<th>Party Desiderata</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist values</td>
<td>Universalist values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty to national political factor</td>
<td>Loyalty to external political factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National military prerogative</td>
<td>Supranational military prerogative</td>
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<td>National military autonomy</td>
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<td>High domestic political input</td>
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142 ibid., 202.
143 The divergent institutional desiderata of the East European military establishment and an orthodox Leninist party, aside from those issues of conflict that are common to all Communist states, could be contrasted as follows: Military Desiderata | Party Desiderata
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<td>Nationalist values</td>
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ibid., 203.
144 Adelman, 5.
nature of revolutionary development and the degree of external Soviet interference. He argues that the path to power has fundamentally shaped the nature of civil-military relations in the first two decades after the takeover of power. He called attention to the existence of three major patterns of civil-military relations in the region, derived from different paths of revolutionary development. First, a powerful political role for the military connected with the nature of the revolutionary path to power and the resultant civil war (China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia). Armies in these communist countries have become politically significant and highly valued by the ruling regime. Second, minimal political influence exerted by the army. This pattern, predominant in Eastern Europe, was strongly connected to the way the party took power and extent of external Soviet control. Power was handed to the local communists in the wake of the Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe during the closing phases of World War II. "Under these circumstances the average, relatively ineffectual East European army, feared for possible Bonapartism and political disloyalty, would play a minimal political role."\(^{145}\) The final pattern is that of the Soviet Army, with a minimal but significantly increasing political role. Under Stalinism the army was relatively passive, but later evolved as a legitimate interest group in Soviet policy making under Khrushchev and particularly Brezhnev. Barany maintains that "none of these models discussed could anticipate, much less explain, the collapse of the party-military relationship that characterized the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states during the revolutions of 1989". The revolutions of 1989 demonstrated "that the armies retained their national orientations and were, more often than not, enthusiastic to embrace their new role as the defender of the nation state."\(^ {146}\)

Constantine P. Danopoulos maintains that while scholars disagreed with respect to the exact nature of Communist Party control and the relationship between party and military elites, they subscribed a priori to Mao Zedong's maxim that in Marxist/Leninist regimes "[power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Our principle is that the party commands the

\(^{145}\)ibid., 8.
\(^{146}\)Barany, 94.
gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party."  

This statement implied that in time of threat to the Communist party's hold on power the military in many, if not all, of these societies would come to their rescue. However, when the Communist regimes came under attack the military proved unable or unwilling to rescue the crumbling Marxist/Leninist regimes, and even when they tried to some extent, they did not succeed.

After 1989 the military in Eastern European societies would be in search of a new role and identity in a substantially changed environment. After 1991, that quest would also extend to states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia. Danopoulos maintains that the main issue is whether the "heavily-burdened and as yet unconsolidated regimes in these new, and not so new, states" that emerged from the debris of the former Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia "will defy the type of praetorian politics which characterized their Third World counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s." The countries that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are faced with numerous problems such as economic underdevelopment, social, cultural, ethnic and religious fragmentation, questionable national attachments, and weak traditions of independence and statehood. The successor regimes recognize these realities and are aware that their democratization and even nation-building pursuits are threatened unless civilians are in control of the military. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl state that "democracy is in jeopardy if military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the capacity to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisions made by the people's representatives."  

The politicization of the armed forces will remain a concern to the elected representatives of the people in these countries, particularly in time of war, chaos, and

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148 The military traditionally did not intervene in intraparty conflicts, but whenever it did interfere (e.g. in the Soviet Union in 1957 and 1991 or in Poland in 1981) it did so as the representative of the party and not in a military role; "in other words, it acted as the party in uniform." In times of transition, the military could play a critical function (e.g. Romania in 1989). In other cases, it took a noninterventionist stance, "thereby acting as a silent kingmaker" (e.g. Poland in 1970). Barany, 81.
150 Ibid., 261.
uncertainty. Philippe C. Schmitter maintains that the problem in the Yugoslav and Soviet successor states and in Latin America (and elsewhere in Africa and Asia) will be "democratization and military power." Schmitter maintains under present day conditions it would be very difficult to disband the military outright. Thus it is necessary to begin with the assumption that the military must be given -- or forced to accept -- some stable, legitimate, institutionalized position within the evolving democratic order. Schmitter also maintains that this requires the satisfaction of three conditions:

1. The armed forces must somehow be induced to divest themselves of any self-image they might have required as ultimate guardians of social order, as messianic agents for accomplishing national glory, and/or as exclusive definers of the national interest;
2. They must be given a credible and honorable role in defending the country and accomplishing (but not setting) national goals;
3. They must be neutralized against enticements of civilian politicians who might turn to them for support when frustrated in the advancement of their own partisan interests by democratic means.

He maintains that fulfilling these conditions can only be, in the medium term, the result of a reinforced learning experience on the part of present military officers and, in the long run, a process of selective recruitment and explicit indoctrination of a future generation of officers. He doubts these can be accomplished by some coalition of political forces, disbursements of material rewards, alterations in legal norms or simply appointing civilian ministers of defense.

Danopoulos, however, maintains that the newly isolated and suffering post-totalitarian military forces may come to the same conclusion the armies of Third World countries reached a few decades ago: "that the armed forces have the capacity, indeed the obligation, to step forward in order to save the nation from the whims of demagogic and unprincipled politicians." Thus, the military of the majority of post-Communist countries are likely to follow the praetorian like "Kemalist model." "That is, the trappings of civilian rule will continue but the military will act as a watchdog from behind the scenes. Whenever

152Ibid., xiv. The military establishments are also motivated to make fundamental changes in their operation because civilian party leaders hope to satisfy requirements that are laid down for potential membership in the NATO alliance.
the civilians deviate the military will bring them back to the "right path" by either intervening temporarily or threatening to intervene."\textsuperscript{154} What role the militaries in post-communist societies assume, whether they adopt a position similar to the Kemalist model, or follow a democratic path in which the armed forces are clearly subordinate to civilian authorities remains to be seen. But military elites are sure to be an important actor, in the future development of postcommunist political systems.

\textbf{Chapter Summary}

This chapter provided a review of various theoretical models of civil military relations. The major approaches were the professional model focusing mainly on Western societies, the Third World oriented praetorian model and the penetration model focusing primarily on communist states. The first part of the paper dealt with Huntington's thesis of professionalism. He defines the concept in terms of expertise, responsibility and corporateness and stipulates that professional soldiers concentrate their efforts toward perfecting their fighting ability. However, as was seen, others have argued that professionalism is a stimulant to intervention.

The second part of the chapter examined the notion of praetorianism as well as several subtopics: military intervention, military and modernization, military regimes and military disengagement. The main factors which were offered to explain military intervention in politics included the armed forces concerns with its own corporate interests, the level of the political culture, and the level political institutionalization in a society and the militaries professional ethos. Several explanations of how military disengagement can be achieved were also addressed.

The last section of the chapter focused on the penetration model certain aspects of which has considerable relevance to the case study focus of this thesis, namely the former Yugoslavia. While this model was regarded as inadequate by many authors, some observers reconceptualized the character of army/party relations in communist political \textsuperscript{154}ibid.
systems in a fruitful manner. Roman Kolkowicz's "interest group model", William E. Odom's "institutional congruence model", and Timothy J. Colton's "participatory model" were summarized as were various criticisms of these approaches. Because these models proved inadequate for examining civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, other models were also presented.

In the following chapters the theories and concepts discussed will be selectively employed to highlight the evolving relationship between the armed forces and civilian leadership during the political life of the second Yugoslavia (1943/44-1991). The following chapters will focus particularly on the political role of the military sector in Yugoslavia during the period from the end of World War II to the disintegration of the state at the onset of the 1990s. Special attention will be devoted to the evolution of the Yugoslav military's primary "mission" and subordinate roles, and also to its particularly crucial role in Socialist Yugoslavia's collapse. Before turning to the communist period, the next chapter will examine the Balkan civil-military relations in historical context.
Chapter Two: The Political Role of the Military in Balkan Political Culture

The unification of South Slavs in the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed in Belgrade on December 1918. The new Kingdom brought together an amalgamation of ethnic groups with different historical experiences which profoundly shaped and differentiated the formation of their respective political cultures. For example, the Serbs lived for many centuries under Ottoman rule, while the Croats and Slovenes were part of the Austrian Empire and later the Austro-Hungarian empire. These varied political experiences had a significant impact on the unfolding political tactics of the two largest nations in the new state, the Serbs and Croats. Before turning to a discussion on civil-military developments within the First Yugoslavia (1918-1941) it is important to very briefly describe the South Slav elite and popular attitudes toward the proper use of military force in the state and dealing with foreign political occupation.

The Serbian Traditions

The most significant pre-modern historical phase of the Serbian political heritage was the Serbian Empire which reached its peak under Stefan Dusan. He was crowned emperor in 1346, but soon after his death in 1355 his empire broke apart into smaller kingdoms and principalities. The already crumbling medieval empire soon fell to the advancing Ottomans who routed the Serbian army in 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo Polje and conquered all of Serbia by 1459. The Battle of Kosovo marked the beginning of Turkish dominance in the area, and was accompanied by the emergence of a rich epic tradition of oral poetry which described trials and tribulations of the Serbian people. Epic tales of past Serbian glory and the sacred commandment to avenge Kosovo became ingrained in Serbian political culture. Ironically, though the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat for the Serbs, legends of valor and heroic acts by Serbian fighters served to memorialize the battle as a seminal event in Serbian military history.1 Montenegro, the remnant of the

medieval Serbian principality of Zeta, would continue to resist Ottoman rule for some five centuries.

By the nineteenth century the Serbs developed a political culture that put considerable importance on the use of military force to confront the pressure of foreign powers, not to mention the use of arms to liberate the Serbian people from Ottoman rule. The Serbs, "whose nineteenth century history reads like a serialized epic of repression and revolt" relied heavily on strong leaders and violent tactics to achieve their goals. Thus throughout the nineteenth century, the Serbs turned to armed struggle to free themselves from Ottoman rule. Led first by Karadjordje Petrovic in 1804 and then by Milos Obrenovic in 1815, the two principle--and feuding--leadership cliques, the insurgents eventually forced the Sultan to recognize Serbia as an autonomous principality in 1830. This, however, was only the beginning of the struggle for national liberation.

In 1844 the Serbian foreign minister, Ilija Garasanin, produced a memorandum (Nacertanije) which advocated the renaissance of his ethnic groups legacy--i.e., the restoration of the old medieval empire of Tsar Dusan. Serbia was to serve as the core unit for the unification of all the lands Serbs have previously lived, including Montenegro, Vojvodina, Bosnia and Hercegovina. This enlarged or restored Serbia would reach again to the Adriatic sea. In order to achieve this goal Garasanin had to transform Serbia into a powerful state with an efficient centralized administration and standing army. Charles Jelavich maintains that in the half century before the First World War, a decisive role in Serbian politics was played by the Serbian army. "Steeped in the tradition of the hayduk and cetnik, who fought the Turk at every turn, the Serbian army had one purpose only--

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3In 1876 Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey in support of the peasant uprisings in Bosnia-Hercegovina. And a year later these countries allied with Russia, Romania and Bulgarian rebels to defeat the Turks. At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Habsburgs received the right to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina, though formally it remained within the Ottoman Empire. Serbia and Montenegro were also internationally recognized in expanded borders and received complete independence from Turkey.
liberate the lands claimed by the Serbs which were still under foreign domination." Politicians or monarchs who ignored the Serbian military did so at their own peril. In June 1903, King Alexander Obrenovic and his wife Queen Draga were killed in a military coup d'etat. Analyzing this event Michael Boro Petrovich maintains that it was simply "not the patriotism of the young officers that was offended, but the pride of a military caste[that had been] recklessly slighted by King Alexander." The exiled Peter Karadjordjevic, who had been in touch with the rebels, returned to Serbia and was crowned King Peter I.

Following the coup the army played a prominent role in the life of the Serbian Kingdom. This partly stemmed from the fact that military officers had deposed King Aleksandar. Petrovich maintains that "ever since 1903 there existed a precarious balance between the civilian and the military authorities in Serbia; King Peter let the political parties rule, while the military conspirators who had murdered King Alexander had the final word in Army matters." Moreover, when Austria-Hungary made a move to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908 (which it had occupied since 1878) it was the military elite who advocated going to war. When the Serbian government was forced to make a statement in March 1909 in which it accepted Austria-Hungary's annexation of those provinces and promised to reduce the Serbian army and disband all volunteer groups, many Serbian army officers were disgusted, as were many civilians.

The intensification of Serbian national sentiment prior to World War I had led to the formation of two secret societies. The first, the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense), was founded in December 1908 at the time of the annexation crisis. The society set up a network of agents in the South Slav lands. The second organization was formed in 1911 and called Ujedinjene ili smrt (Unification or Death), commonly known as Crna Ruka (The

7Petrovich, 608.
Like the Narodna Odbrana, the Black hand had a pan-Serb program. Primarily under military direction, the Black hand was headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, who was known by his pseudonym Apis. He had been one of the conspirators in the coup of 1903. In 1913 he was chief of intelligence of the Serbian General Staff.

After the Serbian military's victories in the Balkan Wars, the army's prestige soared. Serbs and Montenegrins fought both in the First Balkan War in 1912 and also in the Second Balkan War in 1913. In the Balkan Wars, the Turks were expelled from Europe, and the Serbs regained lands lost in medieval times. Turkey was finally expelled from Macedonia, Kosovo and the Sandzak by an alliance of Balkan states. Serbia and Greece took the majority of the spoils at the expense of Bulgaria, and only Habsburg opposition prevented Serbia from acquiring an outlet to the sea. National euphoria reached unprecedented levels with the 1912 capture of Kosovo --the cradle of the Serb nation. After five centuries the defeat at Kosovo Polje had finally been avenged. The performance of Serb and Montenegrin armies during the Balkan Wars stimulated the consciousness of Serbs and other South Slavs still living under Turkish and Austro-Hungarian rule.

Following the Balkan Wars a major conflict developed between the Serbian military and the government headed by Nikola Pasic. Colonel Dimitrijevic-Apis and his military cohorts were openly hostile to the civilian leaders of Serbia, who they accused of being "cowardly and unpatriotic." The army was the center of strong national solidarity and identity. The military elite particularly disliked the Radical party, which they saw as a group of corrupt politicians endangering the state. The climax of the conflict between Apis and Pasic came in the spring of 1914, over Macedonia and the so-called Priority Question.

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10 Petrovich, 610.
The issue was whether the civil or the military authorities were to have control in the territories acquired by Serbia during the Balkan Wars. The Pasic government was in favour of civilian control, a position which infuriated the conspirators in the military ranks. Military leaders placed enormous pressure on King Peter, both directly and through their ties with the opposition in the Assembly. On June 2, 1914, Pasic resigned. King Peter dissolved the assembly and asked Pasic to withdraw his resignation as Prime Minister. Not long afterward King Peter was forced for reasons of health to hand over his authority as regent and commander and chief of the army to his second son, Alexander. Serbia thus faced a domestic crisis in the spring and summer of 1914 "a major ingredient of which was the question of the ability of the government to control the military."\textsuperscript{12}

On 28 June 1914, the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, the archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo. The main assassin was Gavrilo Princip, who with his fellow conspirators had been assisted in their preparations by Apis, and they had also received their weapons from Serbian government arsenals. The Habsburg government leaders were convinced that the assassination had been directly plotted by forces within the Serbian government. On July 23 Vienna issued an ultimatum to Belgrade, which was designed to be rejected. Five days later, Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia.

\textbf{Croatian Traditions}

The Croats did not have an independent state throughout modern history. But they did have a strong memory of an earlier sovereign kingdom. It was King Tomislav in the first half of the tenth century who laid the foundations of the medieval Croatian state. But Croatia's sovereignty had been limited since its 1102 acceptance of the Pacta Conventa with King Koloman of Hungary. Soon both Hungary and Croatia came under the Habsburg monarchy. In 1527 the Croatian nobles elected Ferdinand of Habsburg, Archduke of Austria, as the king of Croatia. From that point to the First World War Croatia

\textsuperscript{12}ibid.
became subject to Hungarian or Austro-Hungarian rule. Despite their dependence on the Hungarian diet and the Habsburgs over many centuries, the Croatians consciousness of the medieval kingdom remained quite intense. 13

Unlike the Serbs, who turned to armed rebellion in the nineteenth century to obtain liberation from foreign rule, Croatian elites sought political over military solutions. The Croatian nobility, and later the Croatian intelligentsia, attempted to achieve as much autonomy as possible, even if the reality was that their territories were the sovereign domain of Hungarian kings and later Austrian emperors. Over the span of time other external influences effected the territories of Croatia, including the Venetian, Turkish, Napoleonic conquests, "but by and large the fortunes of the Croatian nation and Croatian territories rested in the Croatian-Hungarian-Austrian triangle."14 In 1848, in the face of Lajos Kossuth's rising in Hungary, the Austrian emperor conceded to the Croat leader, Baron Josip Jelacic, the right of the Croats to form an autonomous unit under the imperial crown (comprising Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia). In return for this promise Croat troops helped in the struggle against Kossuth. But the Croats were disappointed when Vienna's promise was not upheld and they were placed under Austrian control.15 "Croatia always felt the consequences of the shifting balance of the Austro-Hungarian relationship, but at all times had as its principal goal the upgrading of its level of autonomy by siding with one against the other, or skillfully using deadlock."16

In 1867 the Habsburg Empire was reorganized following military disaster in Italy and Germany. To strengthen his rule the Habsburg Emperor allied with the main opposition group namely the Hungarians, and effectively divided his Empire into two halves, one ruled by Vienna, the other by Budapest. The "compromise" or Ausgleich, of 1867 created the dual monarchy whose constitution was to remain in effect until the

16 Crnobrnja, 25.
disappearance of the empire in 1918. Under this compromise the Slav peoples of the empire were divided between Austria and Hungary and Croatia was again placed under the authority of Hungary. In the following year the Hungarians also made a new arrangement with the Croats. The Nagoda (Agreement or Compromise) between Hungary and Croatia in 1868 formed the basis of Croat-Magyar relations until the disintegration of the Hungarian state. It recognized that Croatia was "a political nation possessing a special territory of its own" and it provided for provincial autonomy under the Croatian diet. Budapest however was able to retain a strong hold through the Ban, who was appointed by the central government and through the control that was exercised over the finances. The years after 1868 were distinguished by continual friction with Hungary and Croats were annoyed by evidence of Magyar control which led to periods of rioting. Indeed, the Croats political experience under Austro-Hungarian aegis generally consisted of warding off Hungarian attempts to impose Budapest's hegemony over Croatia throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Croats also resented the establishment of the Vojna Krajina or military frontier earlier on in their history. The frontier zone of garrisons was organized by the Habsburgs at the beginning of the 16th century as a separate military command, directly subject to the Austrian throne. Since the Croatian nobility and population in these regions were not numerous enough to form an effective defence on their own, the Habsburg military authorities invited and settled a large number of Serbs wanting to leave occupied Turkish lands. These Serbs were given a status that made them responsible directly to the Austro-Hungarian crown and the recruited "frontiersman" had no responsibilities or commitments towards the Croatian nobility, the Ban (Governor) or the Sabor (Croatian Diet). The Croats disliked these limitations of territorial sovereignty put in place by Austria and Croats strove to reclaim the Frontier within the civil administration of Croatia. The military frontier, despite Croat opposition, was not abolished until 1881 and subsequently the area then fell

under the authority of the Croatian Ban. However, the tradition of the frontier remained powerful and "long after 1881, a high percentage of officers in the Austro-Hungarian army continued to be drawn from the old frontier regiments." Even up to the war of 1914-1918, those regiments displayed firm loyalty to the emperor, despite the significant increase of Croat national feeling in neighbouring areas.

**Royal Yugoslavia**

In 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was one of the most complex of states created after the First World War, bringing together a number of nationalities and political units. The new state was troubled from the start by conflict among its constituent ethnic groups, particularly the Serbs and Croats. Both nations would transfer into the new state political attitudes that they developed over many centuries. The subsequent conflict between the Serbs and Croats over constitutional organization of the Yugoslav state would become the defining characteristic of country's political life during the interwar period. In the two years following the unification, the country was governed from Belgrade under what was in fact an extension of the Serbian administrative system. The Serbian military, civil service, monarchy and numerous politicians identified with the larger state, but their Yugoslav ideas were "permeated with Serbian traditions, historical memories and loyalties." They transferred into the new state the tradition of a centralized, unitarian statehood that they had applied during the nineteenth century development of their nationally homogeneous state. Many Serbs accepted the new state mainly because "they perceived it as a Serbian creation, led by the Serbian monarchy, in which the Serbs were finally united."

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19 Darby, 30.
22 Ibid.
Most Croats viewed Yugoslavia in the mould of the dualist system of Austro-Hungary. "They had known pacts, agreements and contracts, Ausgleich and Nagodba, in their constant struggle with Vienna and Budapest to preserve a degree of Croatia's autonomy at least notional statehood." This same attitude was transferred to Belgrade. In view of the fact that Serbia was an independent kingdom, and also because of the Serbs contribution to the Allied side in the Great War and as well as Serbs numerical superiority, some level of Serbian predominance by them in the new states power structure was to be expected. The Croats right from the start viewed the Serbian establishment as a manipulator of the Yugoslav idea, using it as tool for the establishment of its dominance in the new state. Srdjan Trifkovic maintains that the:

Serbian establishment erred by default, rather than design. It was faced with the numerous challenges of nation-building--from obtaining recognized borders and defending them, to establishing a national currency, regulating economic, educational and judicial systems, solving issues of multinationality and minorities. All this demanded new thinking and a departure from established pre-war approaches. And yet, such old approaches prevailed.

Despite strong opposition, especially from the Croats, Nikola Pasic, the leader of the Radical party, and the dominant personality of the Radical-Democratic coalition, managed to get Radical-Democratic constitutional draft pushed through the assembly's committees and formally adopted by that body on June 28, 1921, the day of the Serbian national holiday, Vidovdan. Thereafter it became known as the Vidovdan Constitution.

Aleksa Djilas maintains that the centralist Vidovdan constitution, "primarily the creation of leading Serbian parties, brought an open rupture between centralists and (primarily Croatian) anticentralists." Indeed, Stjepan Radic's Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP), refused to take their seats in the Constituent Assembly and thereby guaranteed Croat animosity to the new constitution. The Serb leadership in the

24 Ibid., 531.
25 Vucinich, 9.
26 Djilas, 60.
Constituent Assembly proved to be unenthusiastic about supporting any federalist or decentralized state. The Vidovdan Constitution proclaimed Yugoslavia to a constitutional parliamentary monarchy and provided for a unicameral legislature (Skupstina) and high levels of democracy in regards to issues concerning civil rights and parliamentary procedure. Also, the constitution provided for administrative centralization and excluded self-government to ethnic territories and historical provinces. Stevan K. Pavlowitch contends that the "whole political development of the modern Serbian state had taken place in a centralistic mould, and Serbian politicians of the old kingdom mistrusted the very notion of federation, of which they had no experience."28

"Greater Serbian hegemony" in the interwar period, meant the predominance of the political, military and administrative elites of Serbia proper-- that is, the pre-Balkan Wars kingdom of Serbia. Serbs from other parts of Yugoslavia had become marginal from the standpoint of political power.29 Also, Vojvodina and Montenegro, which had a tradition of self-rule independent of Serbia, had no autonomous institutions or political influence. Only one interwar government was headed by a non-Serb prime minister, and for the most part only Serbs were given the key portfolios in the government. All seven prime ministers of the twenty-four cabinets holding office between December 1918 and January 1929, the period of parliamentary democracy were Serbs. In the subsequent period, from January 1929 to March 1941 there were fifteen different cabinets having 73 ministers out of a total of 121 who were Serbs.30 The Yugoslav army was dominated by Serbs, who formed an absolute majority of its officer corps.31

abortive coup on the life of the Prince Regent Alexander, and then the successful assassination of the Minister of the Interior. Quickly suppressed by the regime the Communist party (whose 58 deputies) were expelled from Parliament was forced to go underground where its members spent the next twenty years working for a political revolution. Cohen, 98. See also Ivo Banac for the earlier period of Communist activity, "The Communist Party of Yugoslavia During The Period of Legality, 1919-1921," in Ivo Banac, ed., The Effects of World War I: The Class War after the Great War: The Rise of Communist parties in East Central Europe 1918-1921 (New York: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1983), 188-230.

29 Djilas, 60.
30 Vucinich, 10.
31 Between the two world wars the army at least (for the navy was staffed mainly by Croats from the Dalmatian coastal area) kept its old Serbian structure, while it lost some of its homogeneity of character by
The period from 1919 to 1928 was marked by frequent parliamentary crises, sharp interparty conflicts and continued antagonism between the proponents of centralism and federalism. The political opposition of Radic, his party and the majority of the Croatian people to the Yugoslav state was a major cause of the interwar regimes continual crises, and its failures to develop any real cross-ethnic legitimacy. The political passions generated by the antagonism between the centralists and federalists climaxed on June 20, 1928 in a shooting incident in the national legislature in which two Croatian deputies died and Radic was mortally wounded. The responsibility for the shooting fell on a Montenegrin Serb deputy and member of the Radical Party. The incident in June 1928 provided King Aleksandar with a pretext to dissolve parliament, suspend the constitution, and drastically circumscribe the activities of political parties. Djilas maintains that the establishment of a royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929, the Orthodox Christmas Eve, "was merely the final episode in the decline of parliament and of liberal democratic institutions between 1918 to 1929."33

On the morning of January 6, 1929, the king issued the proclamation which introduced personnel rule over the country. The commander of the royal guard General Petar Zivkovic, was made Prime Minister and was directly responsible to the king. The king proclaimed himself to be the source of all legislative and administrative authority. Under the dictatorship the press was censored, opponents of the regime were persecuted

absorbing elements from the former Austro-Hungarian land forces. Joseph Rothschild maintains that of the 165 generals on active service on the eve of the Second World War, 161 were Serbs, with 2 Croats and 2 Slovenes. See Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between The Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 278-279. Stevan K. Pavlowitch maintains that these figures appear to be for 1938, not 1941, and can even be traced back to 1933. Pavlowitch calculates that there were 230 general officers, of whom 3 admirals. He was able to establish a list of 31 non-Serbian general officers(13.48% of the estimated total of 230): Croats 21 and Slovenes 10. See Stevan K. Pavlowitch, "How many Non-Serbian Generals in 1941?" East European Quarterly, 16(January 1983):448. For the view that the Yugoslav Army's ethnic composition was changing in favour of the non-Serbs, see M. Deroc, "The Former Yugoslav Army," East European Quarterly, 19(September 1985): 364-365.

32 Cohen, 129.
33 Djilas, 80.
and the number of political prisoners rapidly multiplied. King Aleksandar sought to forge a national Yugoslav identity out of the country's several regions. The country was formally renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on October 3, 1929 and almost from the start of his personnel rule he mandated the members of his government "to renounce their ties to the old regionally or confessionally oriented political parties and to participate in the affairs of state as Yugoslavs."

The attempt to suppress different nationalisms by inducing unitary Yugoslavia from above by force, instead of repressing the opposition, merely intensified ethnic feeling. The Croat leader, Vladko Macek who headed the Croat Peasant Party (CPP) from 1928 to 1941, had initially welcomed the royal usurpation of power against the Vidovdan Constitution and the "Skupstina assassins as equal to release from a badly buttoned vest and as obliterating a boulder that was detrimental to positive political development and ethnic reconciliation." He therefore came to see the dictatorship, for all its Yugoslav rhetoric as a cover for Serbian rule. The CPP considered its main goal to be the fight for Croatian autonomy and independence rather than for the restoration of parliament. The party's interest in liberal democratic political institutions rested largely on the extent to which such institutions were considered useful for the achievement of Croatian national goals.

The constitution of September 1931, granted by King Aleksandar, made the crown the "primary constitutional factor and fulcrum of all political life." The constitution abridged civil liberties, institutionalized non-parliamentary monarchical rule and granted the monarchy significant political rights. All ministers, for example, were appointed by

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35Djilas, 80.
36Bigelow, 162. The official renaming of the country was paralleled by a territorial-administrative reorganization of the thirty-three departments into nine provinces called banovine. The Yugoslav royal regime named its new administrative units after rivers, except one, which contained a large part of the coast and was named Primorska banovina (Coastal Banovina), and banished historic, but allegedly centrifugal, terms as Croatia and Serbia.
37Rothschild, 239.
38Djilas, 80.
39ibid., 80.
the king and the government was accountable to himself. The predominantly Serbian military remained an important buttress of the royal government. The organization of political parties and the nomination of candidates were subject to strict regulations under the terms of the 1931 constitution. Extreme ethnic, religious or regional parties were banned. The 1931 constitution was not only intended to reinforce centralism but also to create a Yugoslav national consciousness. "The king hoped to solve the national question by simply abolishing it."40 Aleksandar's hold over Yugoslav affairs was brought to an end with his assassination in October, 1934, at the hands of a Macedonian terrorist working in collusion with the extreme Croatian nationalist Ustasha.

Prince Paul, a cousin of the king, became regent for his eleven year old nephew, King Peter II. Prince Paul held the same autocratic powers that the 1931 Constitution had bestowed on King Aleksandar. In June 1935 he appointed Milan Stojandovic, the minister of finance, as prime minister. Srdjan Trifkovic maintains that it was Stojadinovic's lack of progress on the Croat question led to his dismissal 41 Prince Paul "combined a reactionary attitude toward parliamentary pluralism and social and economic reforms with a realization that one should look for a compromise with Croatian demands."42 On February 4, 1939 Prince Paul demanded the resignation of Stojadinovic's government. Stojandovic successor was Dragisa Cvetkovic 43 On April 3-4, 1939, Cvetkovic soon initiated discussions with the Croats. After months of haggling over the shape of the new state unit, the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement (Sporazum) of August 20, 1939 attempted to reach a compromise between the Serbs and Croats.

A new unit Banovina of Croatia was created which was given a large amount of autonomy. The central government, retained control over national security and defence, foreign affairs and (partly) finance. On the day of the Sporazum's publication, the Croat leader Macek and four of his colleagues entered the Cvetkovic central government--he

40Ibid., 81.
41Trifkovic, 536.
42Djilas, 129.
43Trifkovic, 536.
became vice-premier, the others were given ministerial posts. The settlement did not go far enough in its recognition of Croatian sovereignty or territorial extension to satisfy Croatian nationalists or to diminish the strong national sentiment on part of Croatian public opinion. Meanwhile the Serbian political parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church and armed forces were strongly opposed to the Sporazum. These conservative institutions felt that any concessions to the Croats would hinder the unity of the Yugoslav state and put Serbian interests at risk. Thus, limited progress was achieved in reaching an agreement between Serbian and Croatian elites, but such belated political experimentation was sidetracked by growing external threats to the regime's survival. On 27 March 1941 a group of predominantly Serb officers successfully carried out a coup d'état in protest over the government's signing of the Tripartite Pact with the Axis powers two days earlier. This coup once again demonstrated that at a crucial moment of state crisis there was strong support for military intervention not only in the military elite itself but also in mass opinion. Of course, the impulse for military action was limited to the Serbian portion of the elite and general population and not to the roughly 60 percent of the citizenry who were of non-Serbian ethnic affiliation. The coup itself was a pretext for Hitler's army to attack without a declaration of war on April 6. This was quickly followed by the conquest, occupation and territorial dismemberment of Yugoslavia by Germany, Italy and their pro-Axis allies. King Peter and his government went into exile in London.

Chapter Summary

In the first two decades of Yugoslavia's existence, both Serb and Croat elites failed to find an adequate constitutional arrangement that would allow them to build a viable South Slav state. Immediately after the establishment of the new kingdom Serb leaders merely expanded the apparatus of the old Serbian state to encompass territories outside of Serbia. Moreover, in the Vidovdan constitution of 1921 they dismissed the

44Vucinich, 31.
notion of a federal political arrangement. The political stalemate over the Croat question, eventually, undermined democratic institutions and allowed King Aleksandar to establish a dictatorship. In the 1930s, the Croat Peasant Party allowed itself to be increasingly infiltrated by the extremist separatist elements. Throughout the entire interwar period the predominantly Serbian military establishment of Yugoslavia followed its old traditions of praetorianism and political watchfulness. Military leaders in civilian uniforms were particularly visible after 1929 when the King established his royal dictatorship. Finally when the country's civilian leaders were forced into an alliance with fascist Germany and Italy, the already coup prone military elite directly assumed power. The state building failures of the Serb and Croat elites did little too prepare the country for Hitler's onslaught in early April 1941.

The Axis occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941, together with the national liberation struggle and civil war which went on for nearly five years in the country, totally destroyed the interwar power structure. By the end of the war, the Communist party was the main political force in the country. The communists owed their success to a combination of organizational skill, genuine military effectiveness and some external support (mainly from Western allies rather than the beleagured USSR), and the appeal of their political program which stressed both ethnic and social equality." The next chapter will concentrate on the takeover of power by the Communist party and the subsequent evolution of civil-military relations within the Yugoslav state.

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46Cohen, 103.
Chapter Three: The Role of the Military in the Titoist System

The third chapter is devoted to examining civil-military relations within Titoist Yugoslavia (1945-1974). In particular, this chapter will address the development of the National Liberation Army (NLA), and the transformation of this body into the Yugoslav Army (JA) and later the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The military was the instrument for the Communist party takeover of the Yugoslav state after the Second World War. The portion of the chapter which examines the postwar period will address the interaction between the Party and the armed forces. Considerable emphasis in this chapter will be placed on the political role of the military in Yugoslavia. The chapter will examine several periods in the history of civil-military relations which include the development of the National Liberation Army, the postwar consolidation of the Communist regime and the Tito-Stalin conflict, the demobilization and modernization of the army, the military and the territorial defence forces, and the 1971 Croatian crisis and its aftermath.

The National Liberation Army

The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) had its origin in the communist led Partisan guerrilla bands that began operations against German occupation forces during the summer of 1941. The National Liberation Army (NLA) was created by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to fight what Tito and his colleagues in the CPY leadership envisioned as a dual war for national liberation from Axis occupation and for social revolution. "Tito fully recognized the overwhelming attractiveness to Yugoslavs of the cause of liberation (as opposed to revolution) and skillfully exploited that appeal in developing the Partisan movement; the Party downplayed both its control of the Partisans and its revolutionary objectives." ¹ National equality was stressed in the development of the Partisan army; the party's slogan of 'brotherhood and unity,' symbolizing opposition both to Serb

predominance of interwar Yugoslavia and the bloodletting of World War II, was another element to the Partisans' success.

After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June 1941, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) began preparations for armed action. On 27 June, in Belgrade, the Politburo formed from its members a General Staff of the National Liberation Partisan Detachments with Tito as Commander-in-Chief. On 4 July the CPY announced a call for the organization of armed groups to fight against the occupying Axis forces and their allies. Partisan Detachments of irregular guerrilla forces were formed, "although many of those forces, following a long Balkan tradition of insurrection, appeared in a spontaneous and ad-hoc fashion, and took part in the 1941 Partisan uprisings in Western Serbia, Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia." In addition to the Axis powers, the NLA also came into armed conflict with the military forces of the Independent State of Croatia. NLA military opponents also included elements of the Royal Yugoslav Army--Serbian Chetniks led by Draza Mihailovic and the military forces organized by the Axis in German controlled Slovenia.

In late 1941, the Communist-led-Partisans lost control of western Serbia, Montenegro and other areas, and their command withdrew into Bosnia. The CPY leadership, then located at Foca(Eastern Bosnia), reorganized its Partisan Detachments. In Communist Yugoslavia the official "Day of the Armed Forces" is 22 December 1941—the day when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia formed the "First Proletarian Brigade." In fact the proletarian brigade was formed on 21 December 1941, which was Stalin's birthday. That brigade's statute indicated that "the proletarian people's liberation shock brigades are the military shock formations of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

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under the leadership of the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{4} The National Liberation Army (NLA) would evolve into a larger and more fully organized military organization.

At the time of the Foca reorganization in 1941, Tito was planning to openly emphasize the communist nature of his Partisan forces but he decided, for tactical reasons, to abandon his policy in early 1942. As the Partisans moved into the Bosnian mountains, they were able to tap a source of manpower for their resistance struggle. The Partisans essentially encountered Serbs in the mountains who had fled into the woods to escape being massacred by the fascist Ustasha regime in the so-called 'Independent State of Croatia.'\textsuperscript{5} However these potential Serbian recruits lacked a political or military leadership and were mostly young peasants without any political ideology, who simply wanted to defend their villages against the Ustasha regime.\textsuperscript{6} The Partisans "organized and led these mobilized peasants and modified their own Communist program to emphasize a national, rather than a class, revolution."\textsuperscript{7} In 13 February 1942, Vladimir Dedijer described in his diary the situation that the Partisans discovered in these primitive regions:

Last night we had a party conference. Tito came to it... In the volunteer units, former Chetnik units [who joined the Partisans] and in the partisan units 99% of the fighting men are peasants and, what is more, men who are politically backward... We are likely to have most success among youth, first because they have not been under fifth columnist influence, and secondly because they most readily respond to the call to fight. The older Bosnian peasants are good partisans so long as they are defending their own villages. As soon as they get away from home they weaken. At Gorazde, ten-day courses of training in each company have begun, so as to educate them politically and militarily.\textsuperscript{8}

Throughout World War II, the NLA was mostly composed of regional units, directed mainly by officers of the respective region and local ethnic group, subordinated to regional commands. Each unit usually employed the respective regional language or dialect for command. The only demographic anomaly occurred in Croatia where few ethnic Croats

\textsuperscript{4}Fred Singleton, \textit{A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 195.
\textsuperscript{5}This state also included most of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
\textsuperscript{6}For the Ustasha Movement see chapter four in Aleksa Djilas, \textit{The Contested Country}, 103-127; and Vladimir Dedijer, \textit{The Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican} (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1992).
\textsuperscript{8}Vladimir Dedijer, \textit{With Tito Through the War Partisan Diary 1941-44} (London: Alexander Hamilton, 1951), 68.
were initially attracted by the Partisan cause. In Croatia the Partisans major initial support came from the Serb minority concentrated in Lika, Kordun, and Slavonia. That minority was the object of a policy of physical extermination by the ultranationalistic Ustasha formations that were the backbone military elements in the Axis oriented 'Independent State of Croatia'.

By the fall of 1943 the British and Americans had all but abandoned the Royalist Serb forces centered around Mihailovic and the Chetniks, and allied military assistance began to arrive to the Communist led Partisans in late 1943. Allied support to the Partisans was motivated by the NLA's active resistance against the German occupiers. Although predominantly Communist in their ideological orientation, the Partisans were able to mobilize the population on a pan-ethnic--a Yugoslav orientation- basis that while downplaying the Marxist-Leninist beliefs of Tito and the CPY's top leaders. In 1944, superior NLA numbers and arms, coupled with the withdrawal of German forces from the Balkans and the entry of the Red Army into the region, enabled the NLA Supreme Command to switch from classic guerrilla warfare(with small units) to conventional frontal warfare(with division/army size formations). This culminated in the joint NLA-Red Army liberation of Belgrade in October 1944. "By 1945, the [NLA] had grown into a force of some 800,000 soldiers organized in 48 divisions and four armies." This force which would become the basis for the standing army in the post-war Communist state and eventually to be referred to as the Yugoslav People's Army(JNA).

The NLA sought to gain wideranging appeal across ethnic groups, but it remained under absolute control of the CPY. Most wartime officers lacked previous military

9 Johnson, "The Role of the Military Yugoslavia," 182.
experience and were elevated from the ranks of the Partisans.\textsuperscript{12} At the beginning of the war the NLA, like other revolutionary armies, was not hierarchically differentiated and indeed formal ranks were implemented only in 1943. The CPY organized the NLA and it maintained its influence over the NLA through numerous avenues. As the creator and supreme command of the wartime NLA, the CPY leadership ensured it kept firm political control over its military forces throughout the war. The NLA grew in size from 12,000 members in 1941 to 140,000 members in 1945 (with only 3000 of the 1941 contingent surviving the war).\textsuperscript{13} CPY control of the NLA was exercised in a number of ways. At the highest level, Tito personally headed both party and Army. The NLA's supreme command, organized by Tito in 1941, was coterminous in membership with the Party Politburo. The same principle also applied in all regional NLA commands. Trusted CPY members were appointed as political commissars at all levels of the NLA and shared operational powers with all unit commanders—establishing a Soviet style "dual command" system.

In order to protect the autonomy of CPY party cells in all NLA units, party secretaries were secretly appointed at all levels of the NLA. It was not until 1952 that CPY membership became public. These CPY party secretaries were designated as deputy political commissars, although their identity were often unknown to the political commissars above them. "A system of mutual surveillance, and effective cross-checking, was thereby created, which enabled the CPY leadership to exercise absolute political control of the NLA, down to its smallest units. That surveillance also greatly aided the ruthless weeding out of politically unreliable or incompetent elements who got into the

\textsuperscript{12}Important organizational talent came mainly from "the Spaniards," those prewar Communists who fought in the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War. This elite fought together with prewar military officers, who dominated leading posts in the navy and Partisan airforce and a large number of formerly inexperienced officers selected from the ranks of the fighting forces. Robin Alison Remington, "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia: The Partisan Vanguard," \textit{Comparative Communism} 11 (Autumn 1978): 254. About 29 "Spaniards" became NLA generals during the war, including Koca Popovic (first postwar Yugoslav Army Chief-of-Staff) and Peko Dapcevic (member of wartime NLA Supreme Command). See footnote 41 in Cohen, \textit{The Socialist Pyramid}, 140.

\textsuperscript{13}Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia," 182.
Lastly, the CPY central committee emissaries were appointed to all brigades (3 emissaries per brigade) and in mid-1943 to divisions (4-5 emissaries per division), whose function was to organize political sections. Such sections were the most important instruments of CPY control of the NLA, at brigade and divisional command levels, during the war. It was this Political Section, working with the commissar, the party secretary and the youth organization secretary that served as the link for sending political directives to military units. These political sections existed in the NLA until the end of 1944.

The CPY leadership also developed another tool in which to establish control over the NLA. In 13 May 1944, OZNa (Department for the Protection of the People, 1944-46) was formed under the command of Aleksander Rankovic, and one of OZNa's prime duties was to keep the NLA under close surveillance. This para-military secret police body organizationally formed part of the NLA and later the Yugoslav Army (though reporting directly to Tito), until it was replaced by UDBa (State Security Administration, 1946-64) in 1946. Following the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, OZNa/UDBa would prove to be indispensable for the Tito regime in the upcoming battle with domestic political opponents and pro-Soviet elements.

Postwar Consolidation and the Tito/Stalin Split

The National Liberation Army, created by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and commanded throughout the war by Josip Broz Tito, had a close

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16 Political work was crucial in the NLA—which was the creation of the CPY. Political sections initially operated at the brigade level and below. Later, when divisions were formed, they also had political sections. However, these sections did not exist above the divisional level (although political commissars were attached to commanders in the corps, armies and Supreme Staff). "Political sections were not only counselling bodies. Their tasks included explaining the party line within the relevant unit of the NLA, organizing meetings and conducting courses on political matters. They were also enjoined to secure the political-military integrity and morale of their unit. Moreover, their concerns were not restricted to the strength of the existing unit; these sections were also responsible for the mobilization of new adherents to the army." James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 38.
17 Marko Milivojevic, *The Yugoslav People's Army: The Political Dimension*, 2. However, in March 1946, OZNA was separated from the Yugoslav Army and placed under the political control of the newly created Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs. To mark the important organizational change, OZNA was renamed UDBa at the same time. In February 1946, Rankovic became Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs.
symbiotic relationship with the CPY when the new CPY regime seized power in Yugoslavia in late 1944. Unlike the other Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, which were installed by the Soviet Army, the establishment of the new CPY regime in 1944 owed a great deal to the military prowess of the NLA against its foreign and domestic political enemies in the national liberation/civil war. This war ended with a complete CPY-NLA victory, which was to give the new CPY regime confidence thereafter, as well as proclivity for independent action internationally, whose consequences would, eventually, lead to the historic Soviet-Yugoslav split.

After the Second World War, the CPY adopted a federal structure, but the Yugoslav state had, in its concentration of real power, a unitary system of government. The army remained a political force with an elaborate network of Communist control and education through political commissars and ideological courses. It was, however, through the security forces "that ultimate control was guaranteed, for in that revolutionary period, when the country had not yet been pacified, Yugoslavia was a Stalinist police state." The CPY intended to base its seizure and monopoly of power on the euphoria inspired by victory in the liberation from the Axis, and also systematic political terror carried out by the secret police. As the CPY regime was consolidating its totalitarian political power, the role of OZNa (later renamed UDBa) became ever more important. The secret police were particularly ubiquitous in the Yugoslav military. At the end of the war the CPY began a

18The first post-World War II constitution, passed by the communist controlled Constituent Assembly in January 1946, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The six republics—Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia—held the symbolic title of "states," while Vojvodina was an autonomous province and Kosovo-Metohija (later Kosovo) an autonomous region within the republic of Serbia. In effect, Yugoslavia was a centralized one party state. "In such a state, the borders between the federal units were of little practical importance. In any case, the new federal structure ensured that the largest and most dispersed nation in the country, the Serbs would not be given so large a republic as to be able to dominate the others." See Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 50.
20Ibid.
21In 1964, UDBa became the SDB (State Security Service). However, since UDBa remains the preferred nomenclature for the political intelligence and security service in Yugoslavia, this is the name that will be used throughout the rest of this study. Marko Milivojevic, Tito's Sword and Shield: The Story of The Yugoslav Intelligence and Security Community (London: South Slav Reserach and Study Centre, 1989), 36.
brutal liquidation of political and military opponents in order to secure their political monopoly. The leading role in all of this was played by OZNa. Its mission, as defined by Tito, was "to strike terror into the bones of those who do not like this kind of Yugoslavia." OZNa tactics included the harassment of non-communist politicians, farcical trials (such as those which preceded the execution of Draza Mihailovic, the Chetnik leader) and the incarceration of political dissidents (Croatian Archbishop Bishop Aloysius Stepinac) and the use of labor camps for real or alleged enemies. All these measures produced an atmosphere of fear, which helped the regime establish its monopolistic hold on power.

After the war, some elements of the guerrilla type organization were retained (e.g. ethos, ideology, party, or organization). But some wartime features were abandoned. New innovations were adopted such as the separation of the two groups of professional personnel--party and army-- and most importantly the institutional subordination of the professional military to civilian leadership. The separation of party and army personnel was a result of professionalization particularly among the military." The NLA became the Yugoslav Army (JA) on 1 March 1945 (on 22 December 1951 it was renamed the Yugoslav People's Army, JNA). The JNA evolved from a revolutionary Partisan army into a standing army, that constituted a conventional and professional military institution. On 5 March 1945 the Defence Ministry and JNA General staff were formed. After the war the decentralized command structure of partisan days was abandoned and replaced by hierarchical military arrangement. All Partisan detachments --the remnant territorial units-- were now disbanded and the forces in the main structure of the army greatly reduced. This left the Yugoslav Army about 400,000 strong at the end of 1947. This core was

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24 For convenience the abbreviation JNA will be used to refer to the Yugoslav Army and the Yugoslav People's Army.
"installed" in barracks, and along with the secret police was partially involved in the "struggle against traitors and quislings, although perhaps only as a last resort." Otherwise the Yugoslav Army was concerned with its own identity. For example, during 1946 and 1947, several laws were adopted to institute the new army, including its organization into three service branches--land army, navy and airforce. The Yugoslav military was no longer formed on a volunteer basis, but based upon the conscriptive military duty of all citizens.

Strict party control of the army was maintained through political channels: unified party-political controls in the JNA were subordinated to its Main Political Administration (MPA) which was a section of the CPY Central Committee, and was initially headed by CPY Party Secretary Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo. Political commissars continued to function in all military units. As was the case with its wartime precursors, the MPA exercised great power in the JNA. Even after the war the CPY's political apparatus in the armed forces was far more powerful than the military command structure, with the notable exception of the civilian Supreme Commander, Tito. At the top of the state hierarchy, political-military leadership remained fused, with Tito holding the posts of supreme commander (until his death in May 1980) and secretary of defense (headed by Tito until 1953).

Yugoslavia's army would become directly involved in the dispute between Stalin and Tito. Ross Johnson maintains "that Tito had successfully insisted to Stalin in 1944 that none of the Soviet forces that had helped to liberate parts of eastern Yugoslavia remain after the war." But Yugoslavia rapidly became dependent on the USSR for military training and equipment. Soviet military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia in large numbers. Most senior Yugoslav officers went to the USSR for training, and Tito looked to Moscow for help in modernizing the JNA. But Soviet assistance had its costs. In tried and true Stalinist fashion Moscow's help also meant Soviet political domination. Disputes quickly emerged.

26Gow, 41
between Soviet and Yugoslav military personnel. Indeed by 1947 Tito viewed such Soviet behaviour as part of a general strategy through which Stalin hoped to obtain control of the JNA. In December 1947, Tito was unwilling to compromise on issue of the JNA's independence --"the first issue so confronted in the developing general conflict with Stalin."28 Soviet advisers were sent back to Russia. 29

The Soviets clearly tried to penetrate the two main instruments of the Yugoslav power structure--the Party and the army.30 It was at this point that the tight CPY-OZNa/UDBa control of the JNA proved highly useful to Tito. For example, Tito was kept informed of Soviet espionage activities in the JNA through UDBa surveillance of the armed forces. The Soviet inspired Cominform Resolution, on 28 June 1948 started the public phase of the conflict between Belgrade and the Moscow-dominated international Communist movement. The Comintern's most serious charge against Yugoslavia alleged that CPY leaders "have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist parties within the information Bureau, have taken the road of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people and have taken a nationalist position."31 At the same time the Comintern and Moscow called on "healthy elements" within the CPY to overthrow Tito's leadership.

Thus, for Stalin and the Soviet leadership the political health of the Yugoslav Communists would be assessed by their eagerness to overthrow Tito's leadership. Stalin seems to have provoked the conflict confident that an alternative Yugoslav leadership could easily be found. But when he failed to provoke the overthrow of the CPY leadership through the manipulation of the Yugoslav central committee, Stalin turned to organizing a military conspiracy. The public emergence of the Stalin/Tito conflict led to several high-level, pro-Soviet defections within the Yugoslav military. JNA General Arso Jovanovic, an

28Ibid.
30Adam Ulam, Tito and the Cominform(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,1952), 82.
ex-NLA Chief of Staff (and later of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army), and Major General Branko Petricevic-Kadja and Colonel Vladimir Dapcevic, both serving on the staff of the army's main political directorate, attempted to escape to Romania after they unsuccessfully worked to arrange a military coup d'etat.\textsuperscript{32} General Jovanovic was killed by a Yugoslav frontier guard at the Romanian border and his military compatriots and co-conspirators were eventually arrested.\textsuperscript{33} This "mutiny hardened the Yugoslav Communist regime's stand against internal pro-Soviet forces."\textsuperscript{34} No chances were taken in consolidating the position of the regime.

Stalin showed no sympathy to his former Yugoslav comrades. The year 1949 witnessed Soviet renunciation of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty, the staging of troop maneuvers in neighbouring satellite countries, a series of border incidents, an economic blockade, and show trials of condemned east European Titoists. Yugoslavia faced the possibility of Soviet military invasion.\textsuperscript{35} On the Yugoslav side the JNA was redeployed and enlarged to meet the Soviet threat. A domestic arms industry was established in the interior of the country. "By 1952, Yugoslavia was devoting nearly a quarter of national income to defense, and the JNA had been expanded to a half-million men."\textsuperscript{36} One of Communist Yugoslavia's main foes the United States directly after World War II now became an important ally for Tito in his struggle to survive. From 1950 to 1955 total US, official economic aid amounted to 598 million US. dollars (only 55 million of which were in repayable loans and the rest in grants); and US military aid totaled 588

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32}Banac, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{33}Dedijer, \textit{Tito Speaks}, 397 or see Vladimer Dedijer, \textit{The Battle Stalin Lost} (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 33.
\item \textsuperscript{34}Banac, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{35}Stalin shopped short of invasion, as Phyllis Auty maintains, because the United States was influenced by the Truman Doctrine and cold war attitudes, had the monopoly of nuclear weapons and her forces were still strong in eastern Europe. Subsequent action by the United States showed their resolve to act as in the Korean War and the psychology of resistance in the Yugoslav people was also a mitigating factor in Stalin's potential decision to intervene. Phyllis Auty, "Yugoslavia and the Cominform: Realignment of Foreign Policy," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., \textit{At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective} (New York: Brooklyn Press, 1982).
\item \textsuperscript{36}Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia," 183.
\end{itemize}
million dollars. The aid and related defense preparations were the responsibility of the JNA. Doctrinally and organizationally, the JNA now completely emphasized conventional defense with little reliance on the than the Partisan type operations used during World War II.

Within Yugoslavia political support from Moscow was termed Cominformism. Although no party or state institution was immune to Cominformism, such sentiments were particularly threatening in the police and the army, which the Tito regime relied on for the defence of the political system. The absolute loyalty of UDBa chief Aleksandar Rankovic and his closest associates in the police apparatus, coupled with effective UDBa counter-intelligence operations, ensured that the Soviets had very little success in penetrating the security structure. The military was an entirely different matter. "Pro-Soviet defections within the JNA touched off an extensive political search for possible 'Cominformists' within the JNA. This approach "initially strengthened the hand of political officers" within the military ranks. Although an extensive number of Cominformists officers were members of the infantry, Cominformist infiltration was reportedly "most dramatic in the airforce." The defecting general Jovanovic was the most famous and the highest ranking of the Cominformist officers. His attempted flight to Romania in August 1948, with Petricevic and Dapcevic, was unsuccessful, thus ending the major military conspiracy that the Soviets initiated against Tito. Yet three other generals displayed pro-Cominform inclinations. With their removal or isolation, open Cominformist influence evidently ended in the army high command. Nevertheless, "the Cominformist crisis induced the party leadership to rely on various material incentives to foster loyalty in the officer corps."41

37 Pavkovic, 54.
38 But "as early as February 1949, the formal authority of the commander vis-a-vis the commissar was elevated." As the YPA grew in size in the early 1950s, the prerogatives and authority of its professional commanders were bolstered. Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia," 183.
39 Banac, 162.
40 These Generals were Slavko Rodic, Sredoje Urosevic, and Radovan Vukanovic.
41 Banac, 163. Privilege and differences in rank were apparent in the Partisan army as the war ended, and the Resolution put an end to any idea of egalitarianism. "The lavishing of wartime ribbons and honors in return for party loyalty showed a new kind of army to old Partisan fighters who were unschooled in the politics of merit." Ibid.
Goli Otok (the naked island), a small and isolated island on the Adriatic, was selected as the location for the internment of men and women charged with Cominformism. The prisoners on Goli Otok were severely treated but it was only years later that the full extent of torture, and humiliation took place on the island became widely known. In 1951, at the beginning of a number of a series of campaigns for 'stricter legality,' Rankovic himself admitted that during the previous year, "47% of arrests had been 'unjustified' and 23% were for crimes of 'minor significance." The entire judicial system, he said, "had been guilty of converting ordinary crime into political criminal offences, indiscriminately and wrongly depriving people of their liberty." That a communist secret police chief should admit this in public was of political importance. Since its foundation in 1944 the secret police had not been in any way answerable to the country's laws. Rankovic's admission was but one indication of the major economic, political and ideological changes that took place in Yugoslavia, in the early 1950s, as the regime sought to politically and ideologically legitimate itself in the wake of the 1948 split with the Soviet Union.

Yugoslav Communists had come out of World War II as a firm supporter of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe. After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, the Communist regime entered a wrenching period of ideological reevaluation. Both politically and economically the Stalinist model would no longer satisfy the Yugoslav communist elite. Having rejected the Soviet model, Yugoslav leaders sought to fill the political-economic void with an ideologically acceptable alternative. As a result of this quest for a new legitimating formula that the self-management model, introduced in 1950, became the cornerstone of the Titoist system. "Initially, self-management stimulated the development of small and middle-sized enterprises. It also provided the opportunity for producers to participate in the decision-making process." For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to consider self-

42Rusinow, 15.  
43Robin Alison Remington, "Yugoslavia," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, eds., *Communism in Eastern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 181), 218. "In principle workers in each factory or enterprise became the trustees of socially owned property. As such they elected workers'
management's impact on the Communist regime. The process of decentralization after 1950 would gradually result in a general liberalization of the regime that would have far reaching consequences for the CPY leadership. Briefly the logical political implication of self-management was increased autonomy of decision making at the republic and commune levels of the state, a process that stimulated the increasing significance of the republican party organizations.

At the historic Sixth Party Congress in November 1952, the Titoist elite moved to reconfigure the political system. The Communist Party's "leading role" was restricted to political and ideological education. The Congress's resolution called for open party meetings, decentralization of the Party and increased autonomy for local Party branches. At this time leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia also changed their organizations name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), symbolizing the organizations decentralized structure. The Party's 1952 statute and program replaced the Soviet Stalinist party organization with a less coercive and more broadly based type of organization. However, the relaxation of control of everyday life did not mean the relaxation of the Party elites grip on political power. "Behind the facade, the political monopoly was preserved, together with the nomenklatura for 'certain key positions of power.'"\(^4^4\) While keeping the power secured by political monopoly, the party could not escape the effects of decentralization. The "ideology of self-management legitimized efforts to reduce the powers of the federation and to increase those of the republics."\(^4^5\) Self-management was the basis for the gradual devolution of power throughout the 1950s, and also the basis for a reform movement that developed in the 1960s. That movement, mostly centered in Slovenia and Croatia, promoted the cause of economic and political decentralization. The movement also

councils, which in combination with management boards decided what and how much to produce, at what prices and for what wages. These decisions were expected to take into account demand (market), production costs and general rules laid down by the government in the form of annual and medium range social plans."


advanced demands for "republicanization"—that is, for large portions of political control to be given to the republics.

In February 1953, as a direct consequence of the 6th Party Congress directives to remove the party from a direct command role in Yugoslav society, the Soviet-inspired system of unified party-political control organs was dismantled. The Main Political Administration (as a Party Central Committee section) was abolished, as was the position of commissar at all levels. "This general political imperative to redefine the party's role in the military was doubtless reinforced by the military requirement of more authority for the command hierarchy, given the extent and nature of the JNA buildup that was then underway."46 The political organs of the JNA were now subordinated to military commanders up and down the military hierarchy; the military party organization also was strongly influenced by the commanders, and its deputies for political affairs assumed the post of Party secretaries.47 Thus with the 6th Party Congress redefining the party's role in society, and with the massive conventional military buildup in the face of Soviet threat—the JNA became increasingly autonomous and, throughout the 1950s, more professional. This trend outstripped developments in many other Yugoslav institutions.48 In addition to the

46 Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia," 184. Gow maintains that the parallel operational and party vertebrae of command obtained a single form. "Either a duplicative irrelevance where the two officers worked symbiotically or 'complex[that is, problematic] relations' where they could not, the abolition of commissars represented a more efficient form of command." Thus, party influence remained but the lines of command were simplified. Gow, 44.

47 Milivojevic, The Yugoslav People's Army: The Political Dimension. 3. Until 1953 the YPA has remained effectively remained under party control. But the way that control is exercised has changed. Since 1953 it has been exercised "from above," through the command echelon, rather than through commissars placed at each level of the hierarchy. The commissar was replaced by an assistant to the Commanding Officer with responsibility for 'moral-political' questions.

48 Anton Bebl er maintains that while the balance between the needs for overt politicization and growing pressure of professional expertise has been maintained, the style of military professionalism underwent subtle changes at the top of military hierarchy. In the early postwar years, Tito appointed himself—a civilian party leader with small amount of military training and general education but with a substantial wartime experience of command— as defence minister. In 1953, Ivan Gosnjak became defense minister. He was also a civilian communist elite, who had brief military training in a Soviet officers schools at Riazan and gained experience of war in Spain and Yugoslavia. "As in the USSR and elsewhere in East-Central and South-East Europe, the principle of civilian domination was softened and made more palatable to military professionals by giving senior civilian party officials high military ranks and corresponding uniforms." Following the mid-1960s, "the discontinuance of lateral movement of civilians into high military positions, ideological homogenization and growing professionalism among the military has led to the practice of appointing professional military officers (with military political background) as ministers of defence, deputy ministers and assistants." Every Yugoslav Defense Minister since 1967 (when Gosnjak
relaxation of Party control, the Yugoslav road to socialism came to epitomize a foreign policy of nonalignment, that is, rejecting an alliance with either of the two existing military and political blocs.

**Demobilization and Modernization**

Confronted with the threat of Soviet military intervention, the Yugoslav government from 1948 to 1953 kept a half-million strong conscript army at a high level of combat readiness. Following Stalin's death in 1953 and Khrushchev's conciliatory visit to Belgrade in 1955, there was a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. As Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved, "defense expenditure was reduced and the JNA greatly limited in size, so that by 1968 Yugoslavia devoted less than 6 percent of national income to defense, and the JNA had been reduced to nearly 200,000 men."49 Early retirement of JNA officers was encouraged after 1956; by 1968 26,000 officers had retired, including 2,500 officers (and 38 generals) in 1967-8 alone.50 Social tensions were a consequence in such a rollback and some of the retired officers, regretting the loss of their positions, opposed party policies which stressed economic modernization and social differentiation. In keeping with its nonaligned policy Yugoslavia also developed self-reliance in armaments and military equipment. Even before US. military aid was terminated in 1958, the Yugoslav arms industry had enlarged considerably. Most of the military equipment from the 1960s onwards, except for heavy armor, advanced aircraft and missile defences, were produced within the country. Military links with the West, which had been very close between 1951 and 1955, became progressively less important and Yugoslavia again became dependent on the USSR for advanced weaponry (although it accepted these armaments on terms compatible with its independence) and resumed exchange of official military delegations with the Soviet bloc. "Virtually all the JNA's air, naval and ground forces became very

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50 Ibid.
dependent on the Soviet Union for their heavy armaments during the 1950s and 1960s, although Yugoslavia had also made great efforts to develop its own armaments industries ever since the early 1950s.⁵¹

With the improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations "a certain smug complacency set in, both in the JNA high command and in the regime as a whole," regarding the Soviet danger to Yugoslavia's security.⁵² However, the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 reawakened Yugoslavia to the reality of the Soviet threat. The shock of Czechoslovakia caused Yugoslavia to take its defense more seriously. A move toward renewed massive military buildup was problematic for several reasons: "pressing economic difficulties; the more decentralized political system of the late 1960s; and the military inadequacy of whatever conventional force Yugoslavia might organize to meet the threat presented by the massive and highly mobile Soviet military establishment." ⁵³ Returning to the concept of a 'nation in arms' and going back to the Partisan heritage, Yugoslavia developed its system of total national defense.

The Yugoslav People's Army and Territorial Defence

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the direct cause of a revolution in military organisation and tactical doctrines in Yugoslavia. The Territorial Defence Force (TDF) and the system of Total National Defence (TND) was born in Yugoslavia in 1968. The national defense law of 1969 gave legal sanction to territorial defence units created ad hoc in the autumn of 1968. The adoption of 'total national defense' established on republican lines territorial defense forces as units of citizen-soldiers. Every person, including women, from 15 to 65 years of age was made subject to military or civil defence call up. A second tier territorial defence force (TDF) was formed of reservists and armed from local arms depots. The TDF is comprised of "small factory-defense units, company size local units, and larger, well equipped mobile units intended for use throughout the

⁵²Ibid.
TDF units are placed under local and republican defense commands; throughout the hierarchy TDF commanders are responsible both to local political authorities and to superior TDF command.

Implementation of total national defense thus entailed a significant alteration in the role of the regular armed forces, the JNA. This is distinguished from earlier practice by the fact that the JNA is no longer the Yugoslav military institution, but now is complemented by the larger TDF, which is doctrinally and legally on an equal plain—even in wartime—with the JNA. Thus there were two co-equal components in the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslav doctrine does not involve, as in the Swiss pattern, changing the JNA into a professional training corps for a single militia of citizen soldiers. In the two tiered system of defence the active JNA must be able on its own both to resist a limited incursion and to delay a massive attack thus buying time for mobilization of the countrywide territorial organization. These changes were put in place during the resurgence of nationalism in Yugoslavia at the turn of the 1970s. Thus the regional character of the TDF was initially stressed to the detriment of JNA influence, even though TDF commands were from the start staffed mostly by JNA reserve or, in some instances, active officers. More significant, was the fact that the TDF chain of command originally extended directly from the Supreme Commander, Tito, to the republican commands, sidestepping the Federal Secretariat of National Defense and the JNA General Staff.

The Croatian disturbances of 1971-1972 (see below), however, led to more emphasis being placed on the role of the TDF as part of a "unified defense system". In May 1974 a new defence law was promulgated which introduced a significant alteration of the 1969 Defence Law. An earlier trend toward limiting the responsibility of the JNA in the implementation of TND has been altered. The decentralization of national defense to the republics was partially reversed in the early 1970s, when the JNA pushed for clearer lines of command and control among the branches of the military establishment. Although a dual

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54 Ibid., 185.
55 Ibid., 48.
structure remained, the JNA's greater influence was evident. The emphasis on a "unified command system and the main importance this accords to the Federal Secretariat of National Defense, and through it to the JNA, as well as the stress on integrating the system of defense, with the JNA in the dominant role,"56 restored the primary position of the JNA in the country's defence. 57

The JNA's Political Role

Following the Communist consolidation of power in 1945, the JNA became a more conventional military establishment; "the revolutionary multinational army was transformed into an exclusivist, professional, supranational 'Yugoslav' institution that was almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of Yugoslav society."58 The JNA still remained an important tool by which conscript youths were socialized into the values of the Yugoslav Communist system. The JNA continued to promote its role as the founding instrument of that system. "Yet for two decades it remained outside the mainstream of Yugoslav Party-political life. Defence Secretary Ivan Gosnjak and his military subordinates were responsible only to Tito for military affairs, but they played little role in party debates on socio-economic policy in the 1950s and 1960s."59 As with other communist militaries the JNA was not excluded from politics. Soldiers were always an integrated part of the political community. Since they had been so involved in the resistance and revolution. The army could hardly view its role as being limited to the defence of the frontiers and ignore the question of defence of the political system.60 However, the military did not engage in

57 The steady erosion of regional authority in the Territorial Defence Force was completed shortly after the death of Tito in May 1980 with the establishment of the Council For Territorial Defence. This body answered only to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, which was made up of military personnel, and of which the minister was the most senior JNA officer, the council's establishment signified a concentration of JNA control.
59Ibid.
politics with a high profile for most of the post-war period. The JNA was kept in a politically subordinate position by Tito, both in relation to the party/government and the secret political police. In mid-1960s, the army began to play a discrete political role in the ouster of Internal Affairs Chief Aleksandar Rankovic and later in the resolution of the 1971 Croatian crisis.

UDBa's role was more discreet in Yugoslav society during the 1950s, it remained an important weapon in Rankovic's hands during a prolonged and bitter struggle for power that began in 1961. The most important set of events were those relating to the development of the economic reform process, from 1961 onwards, which were the cause of bitter political conflict between the reformers and ideological hardliners such as Rankovic. Rankovic, a Conservative Serb centralist, was opposed to the liberalization of the economy, which was greatly extended in 1963 when the new constitution became operative. The national liberal coalition, mostly based in Croatia and Slovenia, aimed at the control of their own republic's economy. Rankovic and his followers adopted a policy of blocking the implementation of the reform process using his control of UDBa as his principal political weapon.61 In particular, Rankovic and UDBa, was interfering, "through its system of security vetting, with appointments and promotions of the Party cadres in the republics which the republican Party bosses considered their exclusive domain."62 By late 1965, pressure began to mount for Rankovic's removal from office.

On 1 July 1966, Aleksandar Rankovic was dismissed at the famous 4th plenum of the LYC central committee, which met for the purpose on Tito's island, Brioni(also, therefore, known as the Brioni plenum). It emerged that the JNA high command, and KOS(Military Counter-Intelligence Service) in particular, had played "an absolutely critical role in the removal of Rankovic and his top [UDBa] associates in 1966."63 In particular, JNA Colonel General Ivan Miskovic (KOS Chief, 1963-66), who was the brother of Milan

61Milivojevic, Tito's Sword and Shield, 28.
62Pavkovic, 65.
63Milivojevic, The Yugoslav People's Army: The Political Dimension, 8.
Miskovic, the Croat interior minister appointed by Tito in 1965, was important in getting the evidence needed by Tito to dismiss Rankovic and his top UDBa associates in July 1966. JNA Colonel General Ivan Miskovic was rewarded for his efforts. From 1966 to 1973 he became the UDBa chief. After 1966, UDBa's domestic political power declined, and in the Yugoslav intelligence and security community (YISC) the power of KOS, and the JNA in general, increased.

Rankovic had been not only Tito's potential successor and head of UDBa, but also president of the Veterans' Union between 1947 and his forced resignation in 1966. Rankovic had been the veterans' key contact at the highest Party levels, provider and protector of their benefits. His removal in conjunction with economic reforms stressing new priorities severely undermined the veterans powerful political-bureaucratic position and threatened their economic security. Their patron gone, the veterans fell victim to new imperatives in elite recruitment policy. "The veterans' organization had been the pool from which Party, Army, state and economic cadre were recruited, and veterans monopolized the country's elite." The veterans having once occupied a favored place in society, grew disaffected during the mid-1960s as a result of personnel policies which sought to minimize

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64 The evidence reportedly illustrated that Rankovic's secret police had been bugging all the country's top political leaders, including Tito since the late 1940s. See Rusinow, 185.
65 In 1971 Miskovic also became Special Adviser on Security to the State President and Secretary of the Council for State Security Affairs of the Presidency of the Federation. In June 1973, however, Tito dismissed Miskovic as UDBa Chief, for UDBa failings during the Croatian crisis of 1971-72, but in fact due to his fears of having another Rankovic to deal with, which could have happened given the large amount of power Miskovic accumulated as the country's internal security chief. With Miskovic gone in 1973, the YPA high command did not suffer, as the new SDB Chief was YPA General Stjepan Domankusev. For Miskovic possibly becoming an another Rankovic, see Dean, 40-43.
66 The increasing power and influence of the YPA, relative to the LYC and UDBa, was partly reversed in 1969. In June 1969, the YPA, which had played a critical role in the removal of Rankovic in 1966, was placed more fully under Tito's control, in order to prevent its top leaders gaining any political independence after the events of 1966 and the 1968 disorders in Kosovó. The Federal Secretary for National Defense, YPA General Ivan Gosnjak, was removed from office, as was the YPA Chief-of-Staff, YPA General Hamovic. However, the already mentioned UDBa Chief, YPA Colonel-General Ivan Miskovic, was not affected by these changes, which suggested that the rehabilitation of UDBa in 1969, along with the removal of Gosnjak and Hamovic in the same year, did not go as far as the re-establishment of the pre-1966 status quo ante in the YISC, whereby UDBa overshadowed KOS." Milivojevic, Tito's Sword and Shield, 41.
68 Dean, 31.
participation in the partisan war as the criterion for political and social mobility. "Politically disenfranchised, veterans not only lost their unique accessibility to the political, administrative leadership, but were gradually replaced in favor of younger men distinguished by their education or professional expertise." The veterans' organization, a traditional source of highly conservative political, economic and ideological views, did not reflect the more moderate and flexible views of the JNA high command at the time which increasingly came to accept the economic and political reforms of the 1960s.

By the time of the reforms of the mid-1960s, the army had become largely autonomous. As the decentralization of the Party and state authority proceeded in the latter 1960s, it remained something of an "institutional anomaly--monolithic, hierarchical, centralized-immured against reforms associated with 'self-management'." The JNA had become an exclusive and supranational body, because the characteristics associated with military bodies--organization, hierarchy, discipline, responsiveness to command--gave it the ability to more easily transcend or submerge political or ethnic differences. The usual image of the Army as the only "all-Yugoslav" institution does not mean that it has a political(or ethnic) consensus. Rather, the military's characteristics have given it the means by which to submerge or transcend political differences that could not be obstructed in the Party or in the society at large.

While the military had largely been forgotten in the processes of self-management and devolution, the JNA did not escape reform. After 1966 party reformers forced on the JNA an "opening to society" to reduce the exclusiveness of the military establishment. Party reformers concluded that the isolation of the military might pose a future military threat to the economic and political reforms underway in Yugoslavia at that time. The armed forces were encouraged to participate in local communities. Under pressure from the Republics, the JNA adopted the aim of securing fully proportional national representation in the officer corps. Also, "the principle that 25 per cent of any national contingent should

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69Dean,32.
70Ibid., 24.
be based on 'home' territory was assumed; formerly it had followed a policy of almost exclusively cross-regional postings.\textsuperscript{71}

More importantly, the JNA was complemented after 1968 by the republican-based territorial defense forces; the latter enlarged the interactions with the JNA officers and other Yugoslav political actors and helped to reduce the relative political isolation of the JNA. For many years the JNA had resisted such a move. With the economic reforms of 1961 and, even more strongly with the 1965 reform, military allocations had come under closer scrutiny and there had been pressure to introduce a Total National Defence (TND) system. The Federal Assembly began to openly question the defense budget. There was an economic need for the military to introduce a less costly system. Indeed, as early as 1966, there was pressure from "nationalist minded" elements within the military itself, as well as from republican party leaders in Slovenia and Croatia, for a return to a more egalitarian concept of partisan struggle, namely, to national units, units that defended their own territory and were headed by a commander of their own ethnic groups and speaking their own language.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, for republican officials who wanted more power for themselves, the continuance of a centralized, pan-Yugoslav JNA was seen as a danger to the rights of Yugoslavia's constituent republics. The JNA's earlier position had been to protect the military from these decentralizing pressures by stressing its institutional exclusiveness; the hierarchical nature of the military institution and its need to maintain an integral pan-Yugoslav character. This pan-Yugoslav orientation contradicted organizational structures based on self-management. It was the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia, that "compelled the generals to put aside the traditional pride, prejudice and acquisitiveness of their profession."\textsuperscript{73} The JNA's independence was also further reduced as "coequal" in joint command structures that were established. Although the professional military was forced to acquiesce in the trends toward decentralization, there were signs the military elite

\textsuperscript{71}Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia," 187.
\textsuperscript{72}Remington, "The Military as an Interest Group," 187.
\textsuperscript{73}Gow, 48
were unhappy with having to share its institutional and functional role with the TDF. 74 TND "neatly embraced an effort in existence since 1967 to reduce the exclusivist character of the JNA and to enable greater republican influence in military affairs."75 Thus by the 1970s there was "festering discontent"76 both in the the professional military or its auxiliary veterans' organizations. Concern in the top military ranks that political decentralization had gone to far in the country, and that the organizational weakening of the JNA's role as defender of the country's cohesion had been undermined would soon become a crucial factor in Yugoslav political life.

The Military and the 1971 Croatian Crisis

The Croatian disturbances of 1971-2, which were the most serious internal threat to Tito's regime since the events of 1948-53, further increased the power and influence of the JNA in Yugoslav politics and society. During the late 1960s Croatian nationalists—both communist and non-communist had become more active in advancing the interest of their ethnic group and the Croatian republic. Some Croatian nationalism had taken on separatist overtones with demands including that Croatia should have its own army and membership in the United Nations. By 1971 various nationalistic pressures resulted in proposed constitutional amendments, radically decentralizing the country. The proposed constitutional amendments strengthened the arguments of those favouring self-management in the army -- a line of reasoning that was interpreted to mean tipping the balance still further to the side of the territorial defense forces. Demands for a Croatian army in particular would become a major factor that eventually would lead to Tito's decision to take strong measures against Croatian nationalism. 77 In March 1971, for example, a Croatian JNA General, Janko Bobetko, said that the JNA "must become a part

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74 Remington, "The Military as an Interest Group," 190. The JNA was not unsympathetic with regard to the economic arguments—although there were inevitable divisions. See Roberts 157-8. However, the system adopted was not favoured by the army. "General Ivan Gosjak, a former Secretary of Defense, offered support for a TND system in which a limited range of functions would be taken over by, for example, communes; however the JNA would predominate. This was also the view of Gosnjak's chief of staff." Gowell, 48
75 Dean, 24.
of self-management society." He made this claim during a session of the Croatian Central Committee, insisting that "society should acquire full control of the JNA." Ethnic demands concerning the Yugoslav Army become part of the rising tensions in the country. Though the JNA has always insisted that it is a "Yugoslav" institution, it was traditionally dominated by Serbs, whose numerical position in the JNA officer corps is all out of proportion to the number of Serbs in the country's population as a whole.

In April 1971, Tito publicly denounced Croatian nationalism. Eight months later, he instigated the replacement of the Croatian party leaders. An anti-nationalist campaign had begun. During the pre-December 1971 period, military leaders became increasingly visible as spokesman on internal affairs. "Rumor abounded that a military putsch had either been attempted or was being planned. Statements of the Army's qualified willingness to intervene appeared, registering the military's alarm." Such statements showed that the Army both was prodding the civilian leadership and was prepared to contribute to "internal stabilization" in Croatia if necessary. The military felt that its priority attention must be given to the possibility of domestic strife rather than foreign aggression. An opinion poll conducted by the Yugoslav Defence Ministry in 1971 revealed that a large majority of officers and NCOs singled out nationalism and chauvinism as the main dangers to the country; very few thought foreign aggression was the greatest danger for Yugoslavia.

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78 Ibid.
79 In certain areas of Yugoslavia (especially Serbia and Montenegro) far older cultural/historical traditions, which saw soldiering as a honourable profession partly explain why Serbs, for example, have always been so numerous in the JNA officer corps. For this issue see Bogdan Denitch, The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), 113-120. To understand some of the warrior values of Montenegrin culture see Milovan Djilas, Land Without Justice (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1958).
80 Dean, 29. Dean cites Lt. Gen. Djoko Jovanic, Commander of the Zagreb Military District, who told his officers that the YPA had "a clearly defined role: to fight foreign enemies. Therefore, there is no real danger that the army could become an instrument in the solution of internal difficulties, except in the case where constitutional order is threatened." This was quoted in Vjesnik, 28 April 1971, see footnote 53, ibid.
81 "Some 54% of high-ranking officers (from the rank of major up), 40% of low-ranking officers, and 47% of NCOs stated that nationalism and chauvinism were the greatest dangers facing the Yugoslav socialist community. In sharp contrast, only 13.5% of high ranking officers, 10% of low-ranking officers and 11.7% of NCOs said that a possible foreign aggression was the greatest danger for Yugoslavia." Roberts, 200.
The Yugoslav military leaders did not take an independent stand in the Croatian crisis, giving Tito an ultimatum to replace the nationalistic Croatian party leaders. But as the atmosphere of crisis increased in December 1971, "their entreaty was a significant element in hastening his intervention in Croatia". The army did not intervene directly in the Croatian crisis. While the JNA remained under civilian control, "it is increasingly evident that individual if not official pressure by members of the armed forces, particularly by what one might think of as a retired generals' caucus, led Tito to resolve the conflict." In addition, JNA leaders provided the information Tito needed to end the mass national movement in Croatia.

On 1 December 1971, at Karadjordjevo, Tito made a speech criticizing various trends in the LCY in general and in Croatia in particular. He said: "We must seek to explain and, wherever necessary, even to purge." This meeting was attended by the Secretary of the LCY committee in the army and President of the Veterans' Union. On 9 December, sixty-three prominent Croatian veterans wrote a letter to Tito arguing for action against "those directly responsible for the difficult political situation in Croatia." Following this on 11 December, still at Karadjodjevo, Tito received "a party of active and retired generals, the highest leaders of the Yugoslav People's Army and Territorial Defence." This meeting was followed by Tito's strongest statement on the importance of the army's role in Yugoslav matters.

In a 22 December 1971 speech, delivered in the Bosnian town of Rudo on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the JNA, Tito spoke on the problem of Yugoslavia's unity and the JNA's role as the guarantor of that unity. He maintained that the JNA played

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83 Stoyan Pribichevich maintains that in November 1971, "at a secret meeting at Bugojno, Bosnia Yugoslav Army leaders showed Tito suppressed TV reels of Croatian Communist mass meetings, with only Croatian flags and with Croatian nationalist and anti-Tito slogans, songs, shouts, and signs. See Stoyan Pribichevich, "Tito at 80: An Uncomplicated Marxist," New York Times, Thursday May 25, 1972, 45. Gow maintains that the army made Tito confident about using his authority particularly after this incident. "The army did not intervene overtly but it seems to have been [active] behind the scenes that prompted Tito to resolve the crisis." Gow, 58.
84 Roberts, 201.
an internal political, as well as external security role in Yugoslavia, and would be used, if needed, to put down a nationalist or domestic threat to the unity of Yugoslav state and the continuance of party rule. He maintained that:

There is also the question of the army's role in preserving the achievements of our revolution. Although its primary task is to defend our country against foreign enemies, our army is also called on to defend the achievements of our revolution within the country, should that become necessary. It cannot be otherwise. I say this, although I believe that we have sufficient forces outside the army to be really able to ensure our peaceful development, and I believe that there is no need to fear any great excesses. But if it comes to shooting, the army is also here. This should be made clear to all.85

While the purged Croatian officials were accused of planning various counterrevolutionary activities, especially Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, the insistence of some that the JNA should be divided into separate republican armies, was also rebuked by Tito:

Little by little to take the army into their own, Croatian hands... they will have to wait a long time for this. I believe that the Sava [a river that runs from Slovenia through Zagreb and flows into the Danube at Belgrade] will first have to start running upstream toward the Triglav [Yugoslavia's highest mountain, in Slovenia] before that happens... [that] we have rescued our army and preserved it, that we have preserved it from the influence of all elements of the class enemy, that it has remained united at such a high level of consciousness.86

Tito complimented the party organization in the JNA, "with which I have not the least quarrel."87 Tito asserted that he would not permit a situation of domestic strife to break out or to remain unchecked, and that he would call upon the Army, the "ultimate means" to establish order. This trend was set despite the reversal at the Second Party Conference, where Tito returned to the more orthodox view that the Party, not the army "is the chief guardian of revolution. The army's task is to defend the borders."88 Thus in the early 1970s, the civil-military relationship that the party desired in the late 1960s with the "opening to society" was altered. The LCY leadership re-emphasized the internal political, as well as external security role of the JNA "as a loyalist, orthodox institution providing an antidote to permissive nationalism and liberalism, and, at a more fundamental level, as the custodian and ultimate guarantor of the Yugoslav state and Communist system."89

85Stankovic, 35.
86Ibid.
87Ibid.
In the Croatian crisis an important role was played by military organizations. This was particularly clear in the case of the Veterans' Union and its various constituent parts. As early as May 1971 a number of veterans' leaders in Croatia expressed their dissatisfaction at growing signs of Croat nationalism. A number of senior veterans became leaders in a political campaign against reform-minded leaders of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC). The veterans showed themselves capable of acting independently of republican Party organizations, and possibly in response to Army influence. The Croatian disturbances of 1971-2 greatly strengthened the political position of the veterans' organizations which was obviously delighted to see Tito's purge of the Croatian nationalists in 1972, and the increasing power and influence of the JNA that came with it.

While the principle leaders of the mass national movement -- Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar -- in Croatia were forced to resign, many of their supporters were purged from their party and managerial posts. Nor was the army immune from the Croatian developments, as the dismissal of Generals Janko Bobetko and Vladke Murak...

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90 The formal title is Union of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War of Yugoslavia. Besides actual veterans it includes the half-million members of the organization of reserve officers and NCOs, whether or not they served in the liberation war. In all the Veterans Union had 1,348,056 members in 1969. Over half of the members were less than 55 years old. The members include a large amount of officers and NCOs who were retired from the army before reaching pension age, especially in the late 1950s when improved relations with the Soviet Union led to cutbacks on military expenditure. Roberts, 200.
91 ibid., 201. Roberts cites in that month one leading member of the Praesidium of the Veterans' Union Federal Committee spoke of "dangerous nationalistic agitation in Kordun (Central Croatia)... which caused great anxiety among the veterans and population...many veterans in Kordun regret that they disarmed after the war." General Nikola Vidovic, in Borba, Belgrade, 21 May 1971. Not all veterans' leaders in Croatia took a militantly anti-nationalist stance, even after Tito's December 1971 decision to purge the leadership of the League of Communists of Croatia. "But in general the veterans were against Croat nationalism. Apart from all the other reasons, the fact that the first fighters in Croatia in 1941 had been largely Serbs being persecuted by Croat nationalists explains their allergic reaction to events thirty years later." ibid.
92 Dean, 31.
93 Milivojevic, The Yugoslav People's Army: The Political Dimension, 26
94 Remington, "The Military As An Interest Group," 193. Sabrina P. Ramet maintains that "in the aftermath of the crisis, literally tens of thousands of members were expelled from the party, most for failure to toe the party line. In the higher echelons of political authority, 741 persons were stripped of their posts and expelled from the party, another 280 party members were merely compelled to resign their posts, and yet another 131 functionaries were demoted." See Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 131.
indicated. Nevertheless, the veterans' organizations insisted on 'stronger measures' against 'counter-revolutionary' nationalists and 'liberals,' and for more centralized power. The LCY responded by publicly criticizing the veterans and their strategy of operating against Party policy and organization. Indeed, Tito argued that the veterans' organization should be the "vehicle of the stands of the LC and must operate within, and not outside the Party." Tito at the same time positively commented on their steadfastness and immunity to deviations, a tribute to their independent political weight." With the purge of the Croatian Communist Party, Tito also purged the Slovenian and Macedonian Party leaders. The Serbian communist leaders, Latinka Perovic and Marko Nikezic, accused of 'liberalism' and 'technocratism' resisted the purge by rallying their communist cadres from all over Serbia. After Tito's Letter of October 1972 which led to the purge of the Serbian Communist leadership, the veterans' organization put enormous pressure on the authorities to seek the resignations of liberals throughout Yugoslavia from public positions. This led in 1974 to a major reorganization of the veterans' organizations leadership, when Army General Kosta Nadj, then semi-retired, became head of the

95 Janko Bobetko, a Croatian, was Chief-of-Staff of the Army Area of Zagreb, while the commander was Djoko Jovanovic, a Serb. Tito removed Bobetko from his position and later expelled him from both the Army and the LCY. At the same time, General Vladko Murak was expelled from the Army and sentenced to a prison term together with a half dozen higher army officers, all Croatians. All of them were sentenced for "nationalism" which is considered "counter-revolutionary." Drago Chas Sporer, "Politics and Nationalism Within The Yugoslav People's Army," *Journal of Croatian Studies* 20(1979): 123. The purging of top Croat YPA figures indicated in some analysts, that the YPA high command split along national lines during the most serious internal crisis in postwar times in Yugoslavia. This could have an adverse implication for the YPA, and its high command in particular, if elements of the latter tried at some point in the future to make a direct bid for political power in conditions of serious internal crisis. Robin Alison Remington, "Political-Military Relations in Post-Tito Yugoslavia," in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 58. Calls for a Croat army seemed according to some reports, to have had the covert support of the then YPA Chief-of-Staff, General Viktor Bubanj (a Croat), who allegedly hinted to various politicians and YPA Generals that each republic should have its own army with its own commanding staff. Bubanj died suddenly in Belgrade in 1972. See Sporer, 128.

96 Dean, 33.

97 For a detailed discussion of the purge of the Serbian Communist party, see Burg 167-87. After Perovic and Nikezic were replaced by Tito loyalists, roughly 6000 of their supporters throughout the Party and managerial posts were also purged. Pavkovic, 68-69.

98 The so-called "Tito letter" called for "(1) the reintroduction of democratic centralism, (2) a further purge of individuals alien to the party's ideology and policy, (3) increased ideological work at all levels, and (4) consolidation of the LCY's role and influence in cadre policy in the economy, education, the media, public administration, the security organs, and courts." Dean, 57.
veterans' union, as "part of an effort by the party to dampen pressure that had emanated from parts of the veterans' organization in 1971-72 for stronger measures against nationalists and liberals, and for more centralist policies."\(^{100}\)

Tito's purge and arrest of many nationalistic oriented Croatian communists in late 1971 and early 1972 and the subsequent purging of liberal political forces in several other republics revealed that the regime "remained an essentially single party dictatorship when it came to fundamental issues of power and self-determination."\(^{101}\) Along with Tito's party recentralization, the political influence of the army was also strengthened. Ross Johnson lists various "political generals" who emerged in the 1970s.\(^{102}\) An active duty general, Ivan Kukoc, was named to the twelve member Executive Committee (which replaced the eight member Executive Bureau), the LCY's highest executive body. Two generals, General Nikola Ljubicic who held the position of Federal Secretary for National Defense from 1967 onwards, and Dzemil Sarc retained their positions on the thirty nine member LCY Presidium, the latter in a newly established ex officio capacity. Colonel-General Franjo Herljevic occupied the key position of Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs giving the JNA direct political control of UDBa (1966 gave it operational control only). Major General Vuko Gozze-Gucetic became the Public Prosecutor.\(^{103}\) The appointment of generals to such posts "reflected the Tito leadership's heightened concern with terrorist and subversive threats to Yugoslavia in the early 1970s."\(^{104}\)

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\(^{99}\) Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia" 190.

\(^{100}\) Ibid.


\(^{103}\) Dean, At the Ninth Congress (1969) only two Army representatives were members of the LCY Conference (i.e. Central Committee). At the Eighth Congress (1964) ten military delegates sat on a one hundred and fifty-five member Central Committee, comprising 6% of the total. ibid.

\(^{104}\) Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia," 190.
A general increase in the political weight of the military was seen at the 10th Party Congress in May 1974 when the two hundred and eighty member LCY Conference was replaced with a one hundred and sixty-six member Central Committee (abolished as such at the Ninth Party Congress of 1969), the latter composed of twenty representatives from each of the six republican Party organizations, fifteen each from the two provincial Parties and the JNA party organization. This change granted to the army party organization the same status of constituent suborganization granted in 1969 to the republican party organizations. Since two other active military men were included in Central Committee representations from individual republics and provinces, total military representation on the 1974 Central Committee was 10% of the Central Committee membership.\(^\text{105}\) The military was not to be incorporated as it had with the "opening to society" of 1968, "rather it was being coopted on the premise that it would impart a measure of its own cohesion, stability and strength to the Federation."\(^\text{106}\)

Although the Eleventh Party Congress in 1978 did away with the Executive Committee, the military still had representation on the new 23-plus-Tito Presidium (the Presidium has three members from each republic, two from each autonomous province and one from the army) and the 166 member Central Committee. The new party statutes kept the same proportional representation on the Central Committee, but in terms of the Party Presidium, the armed forces were represented by Defense Minister Ljubicic--that is, one representative rather than the two allotted to each of the autonomous provinces. Johnson maintains that on balance, "the greater influence attained by the military in the first half of the 1970s was consolidated, but not significantly expanded, in the second half of the decade."\(^\text{107}\) Tito's reference to the JNA as his most important and most effective instrument

\(^{105}\) ibid., 191.

\(^{106}\) Party membership in the officer corps has always been very high (96% of officers, 76% of non-commissioned officers in 1964), jumped up to an all-time high in 1977 (98.5% of officers and over 90% of NCO's). Cohen, Socialist Pyramid, footnote 32, 181.

in preserving the unity of the state was not accidental. "The JNA is the group most loyal to the Yugoslav state."108

Chapter Summary

The JNA was not "a classical military organization." It was professional--it was expert, corporate and responsible. But, contrary to the argument made by Huntington regarding western professional military establishments, the JNA was willing to participate in the political system. Tito maintained that "it is no longer sufficient for our army to be familiar with military affairs. It must also be familiar with political affairs and development. It must participate."109 While the JNA's influence in the political process increased, it was not praetorian. In a praetorian regime, the military periodically intervene in government--usually imposing, or supporting a leader who the military chooses. Tito and the party called on the military to play a more active political role.

In principle, Yugoslavia does fit the totalitarian/penetration model of civil-military relations. Control of the armed forces is formally in the hands of a centralized, authoritarian political party. The Communist Party's political direction is secured by party members posted from highest to the lowest levels of the military hierarchy. However, Remington maintains that the model does not fully fit Yugoslav reality. The nature of Tito's Partisan struggle against the Germans created a virtually symbiotic relationship between the Party and the army. The political and military leadership were one and the same. Both drew their rank and file from politically backward peasants who had very limited political training. The wartime NLA was the founding instrument of Tito's postwar regime and put in place a generation of men who were bonded together by their partisan resistance to German occupation.

The majority of the Party and military supported Tito in his dispute with Stalin. This gave the JNA of great political stature in post World War II Yugoslavia, both as defender of the country's independence and as the ultimate guarantor of its communist

108Stankovic, 50.
political system. The nature of party control had also gradually changed. After 1953 party control has been exercised through the command echelon, rather than through political commissars placed throughout the military hierarchy. The military elite developed a strong loyalty to the Yugoslav state and to the Yugoslav Communist political system.

In the 1960s there was a decline of external threats to Yugoslavia and with the adoption of an economic reform process, budgetary allocations to the military came under attack. Following a move to Total National Defence, in response to the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia, the JNA was also confronted with a functional rival in the form of territorial defence forces. This stimulated festering discontent that transformed the JNA and its auxiliary veterans' organization into a pressure group. During the Croatian crisis the threatened corporate interests of the military proved to be stimulant to greater political interventionism on part of the military elite, although JNA intervention stopped far short of any coup attempts or efforts to replace the party. Formal recognition of the military's political role followed the rise of Croatian national movement in the early 1970s. Following the domestic political turmoil of 1971-72, the JNA's mission was to protect, as servant of the party, the integrity of the Yugoslav Communist system and the Yugoslav state against domestic, as well as external, foes.

During the 1970s the military's influence grew with increased military penetration of the party and state political institutions. Thus there was a progressive institutionalization of the JNA as a legitimate political actor in the Yugoslav system. Throughout this endeavor "Tito's personal imprimatur ... served as an essential ingredient insuring the legitimacy of these efforts. The deference which the military has shown for political and civil institutions during this period, therefore, flowed at least in part from Tito's presence."110 The next chapter will concentrate on the army's role in politics during the post-Tito era. But before going on to this matter, it is important to briefly discuss the legacy of the 1974 Constitution.

110Dean,47.
Chapter Four: The Military's Role in Flux

This chapter will examine the military's role in Yugoslavia's politics from the period of the adoption of 1974 Constitution to the last Extraordinary (Fourteenth) Party Congress of the League of Communists of January 1990. The position of the JNA within the new decentralized governmental structure that was elaborated in the 1974 Constitution, will receive special attention. Tito died during May of 1980, and the leadership succession to the new collective state presidency was relatively successful. Tito's death deprived the JNA of its principle reference model for moral leadership, not to mention its supreme commander-in-chief. A large part of the chapter will deal with the military's role in the post-Tito era.

In the post-Tito era Yugoslavia entered a multi-faceted crisis--ethnic, economic and political. There was ethnic unrest in the Serbian province of Kosovo, a growing economic crisis that resulted in hyper-inflation, and dissension among the country's top political leadership. The rise of nationalist elites, the growing political pluralism in the country and the disintegration of the LCY at the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress in January 1990 brought the communist state that Tito had established to an end. This chapter will focus on the military's role in politics in the post-Tito era especially its reactions to the wider crisis' that afflicted Yugoslavia in the 1980s. How the military would reorient to the pressures of the post-Tito era will constitute a major portion of the discussion below.

The Military's New Vision and the Decentralist Model

The new Yugoslav constitution promulgated in February 1974, established regionally balanced "collective" state and party leadership bodies at the federal level, as well as procedures for the frequent rotation of top officials. Particular attention was placed on obtaining unanimity among all republics and provinces in the federal policy making process. The highest two bodies were the nine person state Presidency (representing the six federated republics and the two autonomous provinces along with the president of the
LCY\(^1\) and the Party Presidium of 23 members (representing the constituent Party organizations of the republics, of the provinces and of the armed forces). The State Presidency became the top decision making body following Tito's death. The 1974 constitution contained articles calling for equitable regional representation (on a parity rather than a proportional basis) and for interregional negotiations and consensus formation. This effectively created a semi-confederative political structure.\(^2\)

Since the state presidency had to reach most of its decisions by consensus, each republic and province possessed a veto power, which could be effectively overridden by only Tito. The only areas in which republican leaders lacked authority, were those which Tito had traditionally dominated, that is, the military and foreign affairs. In addition, Kosovo and Vojvodina, the two constituent provinces of Serbia, were given increased autonomy, including de facto veto power over decision making in the Serbian parliament. Thus "Serbia proper", i.e. the territory of the republic outside of the two provinces, was forced to bargain with the two provinces in order to adopt any legislation. Thus in "practice, the republic of Serbia was virtually federalized; the provinces had full legislative autonomy and their legislatures could, in principle, veto Serbian legislative acts by refusing to endorse them.\(^3\) In the constitution of 1974, the communist leaders in each republic and province were given constitutional assurances of complete control over their own republics and provinces. Yugoslavia was still a one party state but it now functioned as essentially a model of elite pluralism, with six republican and two provincial elites having considerable and increasing influence.

The armed forces constituted the only institutional sector that did not have a collective leadership structure with a rotating central command.\(^4\) Thus, except for the army, below the level of Marshall Tito all other major political structures were headed by a

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\(^1\) After the death of Tito, both the party statute and the Constitution were changed to allow the membership only of an unspecified representative designated by the party. That practice was discontinued in 1988, which reduced the state Presidency to eight members.


\(^3\) Pavkovic, 70.

\(^4\) Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia*, 22.
collective or collegiate executive. Furthermore, Tito had pointed to the armed forces as the "bastion, not only of the country's independence, but of its social and political system as well." Tito had nurtured the image of the army as the defender of the federation against both internal and external enemies. During the Croatian crisis Tito had stressed the army's role in preserving "the achievements of the revolution" within the country and implied the threat of more direct army intervention to stop the growing nationalist unrest in Croatia. Thus, the Croatian events made it clear that the army was a reserve force that could be used if need be against internal threats to the regime. Following the 1971 crisis in Croatia and particularly after 1974 there was an increase in the military representation in party bodies. Older more conservative military personnel were given a higher profile in political life. This was "clearly related to the support that Tito and the party center received from the armed forces during the political crisis of 1971-72." It appeared that the whole constitutional structure was being redesigned by Tito to prepare for the period after his departure from the political scene. It should be noted that in many respects the army and Party were not two distinct groups. Observers have noted that "the army is but the Party in arms, or the armed forces of the Party." As in other communist dominated states, the army had always been politicized in Yugoslavia. Of the JNA's 240,000 men in 1978 around 100,000 were members of the LYC. All JNA commanding officers were members of the LCY; "membership of the JNA is a condition that has to be met by anyone who wishes to be considered for officer status in the JNA." Professor Jovan Djordjevic maintains that "the army always remains one of the important organs of the system, an instrument not only of the country's defense but also of its politics, particularly of sociopolitical organizations [party]."

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8 Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia*, 22.
9 Stankovic, 51.
Tito’s Death, Succession and the Military

The politics of Yugoslavia from 1974 until Tito’s death in 1980 was marked by the “continuity of the rule of his chosen coterie of functionaries as well as by a proliferation of legislation codifying increasingly arcane and complex self-managing practices.” Tito was 82 years of age in 1974 and was increasingly distracted from active participation in routine political matters. While his close comrades in general ruled their own republics as "personal fiefdoms", Tito kept control of the center of the political system and over the military establishment. Tito’s prolonged illness--from January to May 1980--provided overall party leadership with an opportunity to organize a smooth post-Tito transfer of power to the collective state and Party presidencies which they dominated. Indeed, the successful political leadership transition following Tito’s death on 4 May 1980 seemed to "confirm the value of the novel institutional legacy bequeathed by the regimes founder."

After Tito died on 4 May 1980, the new state President and Vice-President were chosen from among the eight representatives of the republics and regions in the collective Presidency. Ten days later, the first rotation in the Presidency took place without any problems and on schedule (yearly on May 14), and later that month a systematic order of rotation among the leaders was announced. "Similarly, the presidium of the LCY, the arbiter in domestic policy deadlocks, and the Federal Executive Council (FEC), the executive body of the Federal Assembly whose combination of knowledge of issues and power over the agenda placed it at the center of political power in Yugoslavia, functioned smoothly in terms of rotation of power." This enabled Tito’s successors to maintain the functioning of the Titoist political system. But the economic crisis to which the country plunged in 1980 and the escalating national conflict in the province of Kosovo proved to be

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10 Pavkovic, 70.
11 Ibid.
12 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 38.
unmanageable within the semi-confederal self-managing political system they wanted to uphold.

Tito's death had deprived the JNA of its idol and supreme commander-in-chief. His successor in that role was the country's top political body, the collective state Presidency, which now became the technical head of the armed forces. The State Presidency, which was a collective leadership, with the president of this body rotating annually among the six republics and two autonomous provinces. The president of the Presidency changed every year and could not "direct and command the armed forces" in the same way that Tito once did-- i.e. by one person on a permanent basis. However, Article 316 of the 1974 Constitution states that the post-Tito State Presidency "may transfer specific affairs concerning the administration and command of the armed forces of the SFRY to the Federal Secretary for National Defence." The Federal Secretary for National Defense was an ex-officio member of the State Presidency. According to convention the Federal Secretary for National Defense was also a member of the LCY Central Committee. At Tito's death the incumbent Federal Secretary General Nikola Ljubicic, was also a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the LCY. Ljubicic's successor as Federal Secretary For National Defence, Admiral Branko Marnula was not a member of the Presidium, although he was a member of the LCY Central Committee. In 1982 Marnula, who had been army chief-of-staff since 1979, became Federal Secretary for National Defence.

Thus following Tito's death the loyalty of the JNA was no longer directed at an individual but rather to the constitutional arrangements of the Yugoslav federation. Throughout the history of the Yugoslav Communist regime the military establishment of the JNA had viewed itself "as a principal force ensuring the country's cohesion and territorial integrity." That sentiment increased with Tito's death in 1980 and was

14 Stankovic, 45.
bolstered by the escalating ethnic and regional divisions that developed over the next decade among the country's leadership. Moreover, as the schism between the republic's deepened throughout the 1980s, the influence of the Communist party elites weakened. Indeed after Tito's death, the country entered a multi-faceted crisis which began with Yugoslavia having serious foreign debt servicing problems, and violent disturbances breaking out in the predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo (April 1981).

**Economic Troubles**

The Yugoslav economy started to take a downturn in the late 1970s. In the 1970s growth was spurred by loans from Western banks and governments. "An artificial prosperity had been achieved by a combination of rapid modernization and readily available foreign credits." In 1982 the foreign debt reached over 18 billion US dollars, which accounted for half of Yugoslavia's annual social product. Foreign loans were put into non-productive or unprofitable enterprises which made the repayment of a large debt particularly troublesome. Moreover, beside the falling production and a huge foreign debt, from 1981 the Yugoslav economy was hampered by increasing inflation. The periodic and short-lived price and/or income freezes implemented by the federal government "only accelerated the pace of inflation and discredited the government." Gale Stokes maintains that the "Yugoslav government spent most of the 1980s stumbling from austerity program to currency devaluation to restructuring plans to price and wage freezes to bridging loans in a fruitless search for stabilization." By 1982 there was already general agreement, as witnessed in the appointment of a commission of experts and politicians to draft a comprehensive reform program. It was felt "that an economic system based on the latest unworkable version of self-management and quasi-markets should be fundamentally

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17Gow, 62.
18Pavkovic, 77.
19Ibid.
reformed and partially dismantled. But conflicting interests and preferences among eight regions and leaderships made both consensus and reform impossible.\textsuperscript{21}

A large part of the continuing economic difficulties in Yugoslavia was found in the autarkic policies of Yugoslavia's regionally based political elites.\textsuperscript{22} The six republican and two provincial elites exploited the decentralized authority for their own respective narrow interests. The consequence of this 'feudal socialism' was disastrous for the economy:

investment projects are duplicated, enterprises in one republic or province are protected from competition from enterprises in other republics and provinces, there is more trade with the outside world than with other republics or provinces within the country, obstacles are put in the way of financial flows across republican and provincial borders, and each republic and province tries to hold on to as much as possible of the foreign exchange for 'its' exports.\textsuperscript{23}

Each regional leadership protected its own interests at the expense of the country as a whole. Even where the leaderships could come to an agreement on a solution for economic problems, there was "little real commitment to making it work, because that would have meant the sacrificing of republican interests deemed important by the republican elites."\textsuperscript{24}

As prices rose, living standards fell, and discontent in the population emerged a series of strikes arose throughout the country." The number of sporadic workers' strikes was steadily increasing until 1987 at which point 1570 strikes involving 360,000 workers were recorded, four times more than in 1985.\textsuperscript{25} But the economic decline and the resulting social turbulence were not the only indicators pointing to the potential downfall of the Yugoslav political and constitutional system. More worrisome was the rise of nationalism's which threatened to upset the division and balance of power established in the 1974 constitution. Throughout Yugoslavia, the economic disenchantment of the 1980s became intertwined with growing ethnoregional nationalism. The following year after Tito's death, Albanian nationalistic riots broke out in Serbia's economically backward

\textsuperscript{21}Dennison Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup," \textit{Foreign Policy} (Summer 1991): 147.
\textsuperscript{22}Cohen, \textit{Broken Bonds}, 33.
\textsuperscript{24}Gow, 71.
\textsuperscript{25}Pavkovic, 78.
province of Kosovo, "setting in motion a pattern of ethnic conflict that intensified throughout the decade." 26

1981 Kosovo Riots and Ongoing Albanian Unrest

In 1981 there was an outbreak of Albanian nationalism in the autonomous province of Kosovo. These protests by the ethnic Albanian population resembled the Croatian disturbances of 1971-1972, since they included the development of a mass nationalist movement supported by the local LCY political structure. The new protests were more violent, involving large demonstrations, riots and numerous deaths. "Arising from student protests resulting in 21 arrests and 35 injuries (12 of which were police officers), the riots became an uprising involving tens of thousands of people." 27 The demonstrator's central demand was the transformation of Kosovo into a dejure republic, "a demand that by then was almost symbolic, but enormously important as such for both Albanians and Serbs." 28

The number of ethnic Albanians killed and injured during these violent events is difficult to determine. The Yugoslav government claimed that nine people were killed and 257 injured, but such figures are hard to verify. Western sources cited figures of over 1000 dead and thousands more injured. 29

Following the revolt, Kosovo was subject to martial law. Federal militia and JNA units were moved in to control the province. In the disturbances, the JNA, aided by Serbian, Macedonian and Slovenian units of the Workers State Militia, was largely involved in suppressing the disturbances in Kosovo, "with some emigre reports claiming that upwards of 25% of the JNA's total peacetime strength being permanently stationed in Kosovo after the disturbances of 1981." 30 The problems of Kosovo did not go away during the rest of the decade. Indeed, they erupted again in 1989. The Kosovo problem turned out to be politically useful for the JNA military elite, "who used it as proof that the [JNA] was

26 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 46.
27 Gow, 64.
28 Rusinow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup," 149.
30 Ibid.
the ultimate guarantor and saviour of the Yugoslav state and its present political system.”

Although the JNA could suppress the problem of Kosovo by force on orders of the LCY regime, it could not provide a long term political solution to the ethnic strife in that province. Besides the sometimes violent and separatist strand among Kosovo's majority ethnic Albanian population, nationalism also had other manifestations. Serbian nationalism has been a backlash to Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. Serbian nationalism supported the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to the leadership of the Serbian League of Communists and ultimately to the Republican state presidency. Milosevic's nationalist policies would result in the reconfiguring of Serbia's two provinces constitutional structure in order to eliminate the autonomy enjoyed by Kosovo and Vojvodina. Ultimately, this provoked more riots by the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo during the late 1980 and early 1990s as well as a constitutional crisis throughout Yugoslavia.

While the economic crisis and political problems intensified, the League of Communists, as Lenard J. Cohen maintains, developed a dual crisis of legitimation:

- A vertical crisis, as party members and citizens lost confidence in the party elite's capacity to resolve the country's difficulties and maintain Yugoslavia's territorial cohesion, and a horizontal crisis, as each of the eight republican and provincial party organizations and elites grew more autonomous and unwilling to implement the countrywide decisions that had been hammered out between their representatives in federal decision making bodies.  

Besides the economic and political crisis' of the 1980s there was a significant alteration of personnel within Yugoslavia's political elite. In the second part of the 1980s, the new generation of communist political leaders --particularly in Serbia and Slovenia-- "sought to garner political support for themselves and their respective reform proposals by directly appealing to the parochial ethnic and regional concerns of their local communities."  

**Army and Political Disunity**

The Yugoslav crisis of legitimacy and the Polish precedent in 1981 for martial rule in a communist system led to speculation that a "Yugoslav Jaruzelski" might appear "to

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31ibid.
32Cohen, Broken Bonds, 47.
33ibid., 50.
stop the creeping chaos...nationalism and regional chauvinism".34 But Admiral Branko Mamula maintained that "we are a people's army rather than a putsch army. As a people's army we are the supporters of the political system."35 Mamula rejected "certain speculations about a military coup on the grounds that the military role, as part of the system is "provided for in the Constitution" and "certain speculation going beyond this has no foundation."36 This formalized, legitimate political role was rooted in the belief that the JNA would provide a "pan-Yugoslav" voice in politics.37 Tito emphasized this:

Brotherhood and Unity are inseparably linked with our army... I believe that our army is still playing such a role today... our army must not merely watch vigilantly over our borders, but also be present inside the country...there are those who write that one day Yugoslavia will disintegrate. Nothing like that will happen because our army insures that we will continue to move in the direction we have chosen for the socialist construction of our country.38

The JNA's pan-Yugoslav outlook was the basis for the JNA's role as an important part of the Communist regime.39 That role was to "bind the various elements of the Yugoslav political mosaic as best they could; the JNA was a cohesive element amid disarray."40

As Yugoslavia's wider crisis deepened members of the JNA officer corps and general staff periodically spoke out in increasingly critical terms about the need for "order" in politics and society as a whole. During Tito's lifetime, he was the one who criticized party and state leaders while the army generals generally remained silent. Following Tito's death in May 1980 senior officers have become more critical of both state and party leaders. Admiral Mamula, Federal Secretary for National Defence, praised the army as the "backbone" of the system, and harshly criticized those who stressed ethnonationalist interests above wider Yugoslav interests.41 General Milan Daljevic, a Serb who was an

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36 Stankovic, "Yugoslav Defence Minister Denies New Military Role," 1.
37 Gow, 73.
38 Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Politics," 189.
39 Gow, 73.
40 Ibid.
assistant secretary in the Ministry of Defense, advised the authorities that "it is necessary to settle accounts with the advocates of nationalism and the disintegration of the country," while General Metodije Stefanovski, a Macedonian who is also attached to the ministry, has drawn attention to the part that Tito designated the army:

The army must be united, regardless of its nationalities; it must be united as far as the further development of socialism goes. This involves more than merely combating nationalism, although combating nationalism is always very necessary. Nationalism is an ugly disease that, like cancer, treacherously eats away at the organism not merely of an individual but of entire organizations and social spheres as well. We must be very vigilant in preventing any such thing from happening in our army.

While the JNA keenly supported the economic stabilization program, Mamula warned both state and party leaders against various "inconsistencies in implementing the agreed policy as well as the pronounced one-sideness in the activity of the League of Communists and other organized socialist forces in society." Mamula added:

members of the army react most [negatively] to the slowness and certain inconsistencies in implementing the agreed policy and to the widely spread practice of giving preference to special interests at the expense of common, general Yugoslav interests.

The JNA was feeling the consequences of the lengthy economic crisis by the mid-1980s. Meanwhile the JNA's manpower and budgetary resources were scaled down due to economic austerity.

The military establishment was, in fact, criticizing the party itself. The JNA's concern was about the LCY's suffering legitimacy due to the inability to provide decisive leadership, as it was seen to be "losing the trust and confidence of the people." At the 23 October plenum of the LCY Central Committee top military leaders such as Colonel General Petar Gracanin, the Chief of the General Staff of the JNA described the situation as serious and deplored the disunity among party leaders. He maintained that "such differences disorient and confuse not only the people but also party members; they are an

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43Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Defense Minister Calls The Army the 'Backbone of the System,'" 5.
44Gow, 102.
expression of our powerlessness." In brief, the League of Communists had to "transform itself and be capable... of justifying its leading social role also in the new stage of our development." However, the rise of nationalist elites would not only threaten the unity of the LCY but the survival of the whole country.

The Milosevic Phenomenon and the Rise of Nationalist Elites

Slobodan Milosevic was the most successful Yugoslav communist functionary to use ethnic nationalism as a political tool during the second part of the 1980s. The main document of revived Serb nationalism in the 1980s was the draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. In late September 1986, a Belgrade newspaper, Vecernje Novosti, published parts of a draft "Memorandum" of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU). It espoused two main nationalist themes--"the victimization of Serbia and the Serbs and the conspiracy of non-Serb communist leaders against Serbia." The document, originally intended for the highest Yugoslav and Serbian party bodies, saw the whole Titoist policy on the national question as particularly harming Serbia and promoting inter-ethnic and inter-regional antagonism within the country.

The Memorandum's authors decidedly rejected the constitution of 1974, which divided Serbs among various republics, and argued for the reunification of Serbs within a newly reconfigured Yugoslavia still ruled by the Communist party. Only at its very end, "did the document concede that if other nations in Yugoslavia do not accept this solution, Serbs should consider alternative options apart from the reintegration of Yugoslavia." The authors who wrote the Memorandum maintain that it was not written for Milosevic but it was "the honest opinion of the majority of Serbian intellectuals."
In May 1986 Milosevic became Chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (1986-1989), and Ivan Stambolic, who gave up that post, became president of the Republic of Serbia. It was not until Milosevic assumed the post of party chief for the entire republic, that he focused his attention on Serbian grievances, particularly Serbian concern with increasing Albanian nationalism in the province of Kosovo. In Serbia, Milosevic took up the problems of Serbs in Kosovo and used the issue to stage an inner-party coup, replacing liberal party and state leaders, "who were equivocating on the issue of Kosovo." Milosevic's role as an ethnic spokesperson became defined after a visit to Kosovo's Serbian community in 24 April 1987. The meeting was supposed to be for delegates of the LCY, but about 15000 Serbs and Montenegrins tried to force their way in to vent their grievances but the police (mainly Albanian officers) used force to prevent them from entering using clubs to beat them back. Then Milosevic "appeared on the balcony and shouted the words that would transform his image from faceless bureaucrat to charismatic Serb leader: No one has the right to beat the people". Milosevic met with a delegation of the demonstrators -- a meeting that was to last twelve hours. It was at this point that Milosevic came to fully appreciate the strength of nationalism as a political resource. Milosevic would use the Kosovo issue to solidify his control of the Serbian Party. By making the Party the protector of Serbs in Kosovo he was able to restore its legitimacy in the Serbian republic. Milosevic after Kosovo Polje was "a different man." Milosevic's actions in Kosovo would soon adhere him to Serbs within and outside Serbia. Gale Stokes observed that the common people throughout Serbia reacted to the image of Milosevic "standing up for the Serbs." 

The encounter with the Serb demonstrators convinced Milosevic of the need to take steps to settle the Kosovo crisis, by force if necessary. The inability of the Stambolic faction--in particular one of Stambolic's closest aides Dragisa Pavlovic--to resolve the

53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
56 Stokes, 233.
lengthy ethnic dispute provided an opportunity for nationalist hawks in the LCS led by Milosevic. Milosevic gained full and undisputed control in Serbia after the Eight Session of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists in October 1987. The Eighth Session turned into an intense and lengthy debate between Serbian Party moderates and Milosevic's supporters. Thus at the conclusion, Pavlovic was removed from the Serbian Party Presidium and in the middle of December 1987 Milosevic was able to remove Stambolic from the Serbian State Presidency (a position Milosevic took over on May 8, 1989).

The removal of Pavlovic was accompanied by a massive purge in the League of Communists of Serbia. Milosevic in a campaign called "differentiation" purged the Serbian Party of those who would not give their solemn word of loyalty. Announcing Pavlovic's removal from the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS, Zoran Sokolovic, a Milosevic ally, declared, "we have to ensure by all means that the disunity of action does not have negative consequences on the unity of ideas forged at the meetings of the Central Committee. In this particular moment we will ensure that by using the process of differentiation."57 After having purged the LCS, Milosevic began to fire editors and writers of Serbian newspapers and personnel from television and radio stations. Milosevic's supporters decided to attack anyone who did not totally support him, branding them as opponents of party unity or as being anti-Serb. In Kosovo itself, Milosevic displaced party members who were known to be "soft" on what Serbs called "Albanian irredentism." Milosevic benefited from a Serbian political tradition which favours strong leadership, and in fact he has prided himself on bringing "strong arm" rule in Serbia.

Six months after the eighth conference of the LCS, Milosevic's followers were in control of almost all public life in Serbia. Once in full control of the LCS Milosevic named as Serbian President Petar Gracanin, a former Chief of Staff of the JNA. John Lampe maintains that Milosevic carried on an "initial flirtation with market reform codified in a

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report by the liberal Belgrade economists quickly appointed to what was called the Milosevic Commission. But Milosevic and his new party leadership emphasized only the need for recentralizing authority first in Serbia and then throughout the country. Milosevic needed the armed forces on his side and would take a calculated approach towards the military as he figured it would be a useful ally:

Before Slobodan Milosevic undertook to consolidate his power in Serbia beginning in 1986, he had never shown any interest in the army, nor was the army ever known to have registered his existence. Once he began his power play, however, he realized that success would depend on having his army on his side. To this end he opted for subtle tactics of a discreet courtship. He avoided any criticism of the army himself and discouraged it among his staff, associates and the Serbian media, on which he quickly clamped his control. Throughout 1987 and 1988, Milosevic virtually never missed a chance to make public and favourable mention of the minister of defence, Admiral Branko Malmula, and he carefully echoed the army position on all issues afflicting the seriously ill Yugoslav community. Little by little, in this way, he brought the army around to supporting him on issues critical to his ambitions.

However, the JNA should not be portrayed as a willing instrument of Milosevic, whose nationalist policies were unsettling to many officers. A number of generals were privately voicing their dislike of the evolution of events in Serbia after 1987.

Milosevic soon called for new constitutional provisions, that would alter the Constitution of 1974 and restore Serbian control over her autonomous provinces—Kosovo and Vojvodina. He asserted that Serbia was not equal to the other republics and that the powers contained by the autonomous provinces were extra constitutional. Milosevic used the tactic of organizing mass demonstrations to force leaderships to resign. The slogan became “strong Serbia, strong Yugoslavia”. Milosevic's supporters outside Belgrade would use his nationalist rhetoric and populist methods to bring down communist elites in Vojvodina (October 1988), Kosovo (November 1988) and Montenegro (January 1989).

On 6 October 1988, after tens of thousands of pro-Milosevic protesters walked off their jobs in Vojvodina's capital, Novi Sad, the leadership of the province gave in to their demands and resigned. These leaders who were, eager to preserve the autonomous status

61 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 228.
of the province, were replaced by politicians who, like Milosevic, wanted a strong, centralized Serbia. The federal authorities did not know how to react. At the peak of the protests in Vojvodina the federal President, Raif Dizdarevic, "warned that he might have to impose a state of emergency, but backed down rather than risk civil war as more than 350,000 people rallied in Belgrade to denounce the interference of the federal government."62 On 8 October 1988, between 10 000-20 000 people met in the Montenegrin capital of Titograd to seek the resignation of the republic's leaders, voicing their support of Milosevic and urging strong cooperation with Serbia. Unlike in Vojvodina, the leadership of Montenegro did not want to relinquish power. Instead, the police were sent in to end the demonstrations. 63 In January 1989, Milosevic's supporters in Montenegro again organized demonstrations against the republican leadership, who finally resigned, and making way for politicians who supported Milosevic's policy of reconfiguring Yugoslavia along the lines of a more centralized federal system.

As Milosevic moved against Kosovo, the federal LCY decided that its best strategy was to not to do nothing. "Non-Serbian communists were terrified by the upsurge of nationalism in Serbia and convinced themselves that by sacrificing Kosovo they might satisfy Milosevic's ambitions, while simultaneously hoping that Kosovo might yet prove his undoing."64 As a result Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari, Kosovo's Albanian leadership, were dismissed in November 1988 and replaced with Milosevic's appointees. The dismissals provoked widespread demonstrations among the province's Albanians which by February 1989 had escalated into a general strike as well as an underground hunger strike by 1,300 miners from the Trepca lead and zinc mines. On February 27 the federal collective Presidency had announced "special measures to protect the constitutional system, public order and peace" in Kosovo.65 The Federal presidency sent more than

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63Lukic and Lynch, 155.
64Bennett, 100.
10,000 troops to Kosovo to maintain order in the area, which had been besieged by ethnic turmoil. The last such show of military strength in the province had been in 1981. The miners forced Milosevic to replace the former police chief who he had put in place to succeed Vllasi. But they could not stop Kosovo's autonomy from being taken away the following month, nor Vllasi's long detention on charges (eventually dropped) that he had started the February strike.

After the assemblies of Vojvodina and Kosovo had approved amendments to the constitution of Serbia—under pressure from Belgrade—the Serbian Assembly passed them too, 28 March 1989. In doing so, it aggregated important responsibilities of the two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. In this process, important elements of the provinces autonomy—including the police, the civil defence, the judicial system and official appointments—were taken away. However the passage of the constitutional amendments in the Kosovo provincial assembly on March 23 provoked mass demonstrations among the Albanians. Violence escalated, however, on March 28. The protests were put down by force, twenty four people were killed in clashes between ethnic Albanians opposed to the promulgation of Serbia's constitutional amendments and also to the police and federal militia. Unlike the situation in 1981 where army units and armoured vehicles engaged in direct battle with demonstrators, official reports claim that the army did not intervene in quelling the 1989 protests. However, the military was highly visible, and there were reports of military aircraft flying over some of the trouble sites. While Milosevic was able to solidify his control of the Serbian republic, and at the same time take control of the two provinces votes in the eight-member federal Presidency, recentralizing the Yugoslav federation would be a far more difficult task. The Slovenes were not interested in a centralized federation, but were actively advocating much weakened central government and party control.

\[66\text{ibid.}\]
Slovenia and the Military

While Milosevic was consolidating his power in Serbia, the Communist authorities in Slovenia were developing a more liberal model of party control. Milan Kucan was elevated to the head of the Slovenian party in 1986. "In Slovenia the policy of protecting and enhancing Slovene sovereignty by opposing all federal institutions that seemed to interfere with republican rights and were not founded on parliamentary and republic sovereignty linked up with a campaign of radical young people and intellectuals against the JNA."67 The Slovenian Communist leadership cooperated with the newly emerging social and political forces in there republic to move in the direction of a more pluralistic order.68 When controversies erupted with Serbia over Kosovo or with the JNA over Slovenian civil rights, Kucan "would follow where they led, even into ethnic politics and a campaign for independence that few had imagined from the start."69 Developments within Slovenia in the late 1980s confirmed the military elite's negative view of the growing political pluralism. Already in 1986, the JNA had become the object of particular criticism from Slovene nationalist intellectuals and radical youth. The radical youths weekly publication, Mladina, targeted the JNA and its position in Yugoslav society. Milos Vasic maintains that by 1987 the "voices of liberal dissent in Slovenia were growing stronger: the JNA was their favorite target, because of its ideological stiffness and what young Slovenian journalists and intellectuals perceived as its obsolescence."70 In Kosovo the JNA had to deal with hostility from the ethnic Albanian population, including armed attacks by local militants.

On 3 September 1987, in what became known as the "Paracin Massacre," a young Albanian soldier entered an army barracks in the Serbian town of Paracin, killing

69Lampe, 342.
four of his sleeping colleagues with a machine-gun, severely wounding six others, and then killing himself. In turn, this was seen as an extreme illustration of wider anti-JNA feelings in certain quarters in Yugoslavia, which had disturbed the JNA leadership throughout 1987. Admiral Mamula, for example, even before the Paracin massacre claimed that:

members of the JNA have increasingly expressed their displeasure with malicious articles published principally in a number of papers and periodicals for young people; they have also protested against individual, responsible leaders who, in their public speeches, have expressed exaggerated, unacceptable and subjective ideas full of negative allusions to the JNA.

Those 'responsible leaders,' included such LCY figures such as France Popit, President of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, who criticized JNA leaders in a 5 July 1988 speech for failing to create "civilized" armed forces permeated by all the country's nationalities. Popit also argued that Yugoslavia "should be defended in a partisan-like way." The JNA weekly Narodnja Armija, interpreted this view as questioning the very need for the JNA. According to these "new strategists, some of Yugoslavia's regions could defend themselves alone [in a partisan-like way]. If we follow this logic it would appear that the Yugoslav peoples army is not needed at all." 71 Moreover, politicians such as Popit encouraged several Slovenian youth publications whose suggestions were critical of the JNA such as that a civilian hold the position of Federal Secretary for National Defence, and young people be allowed to perform a civilian alternative to compulsory military service, which many young people--especially in Slovenia--found very objectionable. 72

Mladina even targeted the Federal Secretary of Defence, Branko Mamula. It dubbed him the "Merchant of Death" for selling weapons to the government of famine-stricken Ethiopia. The magazine revealed how JNA conscripts had built the admiral a large villa in Opatija, a famous Adriatic resort town. In another article Mladina denounced the army as "an undemocratic institution, always ready to stage a military coup." 73

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Mamula and his top JNA colleagues, however, any criticism of the JNA was unacceptable. Such criticism contrasts with the situation that existed for most of the post-war period in Yugoslavia, when the JNA was above any sort of public criticism. On 15 May 1988 Mamula resigned, seven months before his already announced retirement date, with little explanation; "it seems reasonable to judge that the cause was the fallout from Mladina's broadsides." 74 He was replaced by General Veljko Kadijevic. As criticism of the JNA increased, the military decided it was time to take action.

On 31 May 1988 Janez Jansa, a senior Mladina writer on military affairs and candidate for President of Slovenia's Youth Organization was arrested on suspicion of betraying military secrets. Soon after, two other Mladina journalists and a non-commissioned officer were also charged with disclosing military secrets after classified documents were found at Mladina's offices. Although the arrests initiated widespread anger in Slovenian intellectual and political circles and triggered huge protests, the accused were prosecuted in closed trials in Ljubljana and sentenced to prison terms varying from five months to four years. At their subsequent military trial, the accused did not have the right to be tried in the Slovene language. "In the event, they all served reduced sentences under what were, by Yugoslav standards and given the gravity of the alleged crimes, exceptionally lenient conditions."75

In the aftermath of the trial of the "Ljubljana Four," as they came to be known, relations between the JNA and Slovenia continued to deteriorate amid constant rumours of a military coup d'etat. Kucan maintained that there was no turning back from the process of reforming the economic system and further democratization of the country. He maintained that the "abandonment and stagnation (of the reform process) would undoubtedly mean a catastrophe... which would undoubtedly lead to military communism."76 In January 1989, Admiral Petar Simic, head of the Communist Party organization in the military and a

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74Gow, 79.
75Bennett, 105.
member of its top executive organ, speaking at a plenary session of the Central committee of the party issued stern warnings to politicians:

the military will confront with all its power and means any one who wants to play hazardous games with the achievements of our liberation struggle and our Socialist revolution...if some one has declared a battle for Yugoslavia, it will not be fought without the Yugoslav Liberation Army and millions of working people who have Yugoslavia more at heart than certain blinded and bureaucratically numbed groups of individuals hungry for power and wanting to break up Yugoslavia.  

On the second day of the plenum, Deputy Defense Minister Rear Admiral Stane Brovet, assured the CC that the military was prepared "to defend Yugoslavia but that the military leadership would not defend individuals and groups or their narrow interests." Brovet added that "in some parts of the country the situation is getting out of control, and chaos is starting to prevail." He blamed the country's grave situation on party disunity and warned that "Yugoslavia can only survive as a true federation" and that the forces trying to break up the country "should be stopped by political, as well as all other, means." The statements by Simic and Brovet were indicative of the growing concern among military leaders about the rapid deterioration of political order and the economy.

However, as one analyst maintains, the JNA "hectored, yet was unable to catalyze decision- making processes and effect the unity of political will for which it aimed." The army leadership retreated during 1989 to a "less combative and more conciliatory position on Slovene demands for local postings, language, nationally homogeneous units, and control over some weapons stockpiles." But the army's legitimacy was further eroded. "The conflict with the federal army unified Slovene public opinion behind the republic's Communist party and government leadership without destroying the seeds of political pluralism."

The trial of the "Ljubljana Four" functioned as a catalyst to unite Slovene nationalism and "strengthened Slovene sensitivities over the fate of provincial autonomy

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79Gow, 75.
80Woodward, 96.
An already tense situation was aggravated by the resurgence of Serb nationalism and Milosevic's assault on Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo. Since the JNA's officer corps was largely Serb and Montenegrin and the language of command was Serbo-Croat, Slovenes increasingly viewed it as a purely Serbian institution concerned only with Serbian interests. While Slovenia's communist leadership still hoped to strike a deal with Milosevic, the republic's opposition made it clear that its sympathies lay with Kosovo's Albanians. "Albanians formed a similar proportion of the total Yugoslav population to Slovenes, and if the JNA was going to intervene in Kosovo it might just as easily move against Slovenia." On 27 February 1989 Slovenia's opposition organized a rally at Cankarjev Dom, Ljubljana's cultural centre, to show solidarity with Kosovo's Albanians and, due to extreme public pressure, the republic's communist leadership decided eventually to become part of the demonstration. Leading Communists, including the President Milan Kucan, shared the stage with the non-communist opposition. The leadership of Slovenia proclaimed that "the miners at Stari Trg [in Kosovo] were defending the concept of Yugoslavia." Kucan called the miners' strike a defense of AVNOJ Yugoslavia—the 1943 federal arrangement that had come to symbolize to Serb nationalists the division of the Serb nation among various republics.

After the Maldina trial and the federal clampdown in Kosovo (the suppression of a people equal in size to the Slovenes though much poorer), the Slovene leaders, supported by the population, drafted amendments to the Republican Constitution. On 27 September 1989 Slovenia's parliament passed 54 amendments to its constitution formally renouncing the League of Communists' monopoly of political power and including the explicit right to self-determination. These amendments were criticized by the Yugoslav army and

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82 Bennett, 105.
83 ibid., 106.
84 Crmobnja, 112.
challenged by federal bodies, but federal authorities, the ruling party in particular, were unable to prevent their adoption.

Various military leaders strongly and publicly objected to the republic's new constitutional amendments—including the one restricting the Federal State Presidency's jurisdiction in declaring a state of emergency in Slovenia, and by implication from deploying the armed forces in the republic, without prior consent of the Slovene National Assembly. Colonel General Stevan Mirkovic, who until September 21 served as the JNA's Chief of Staff (he was replaced as Chief-of-Staff by Lieutenant-Colonel General Blagoje Adzic), told the Belgrade tabloid Vecernji Novosti that the army recognized "only the federal constitution; and under it, we shall carry out the orders that we receive from the State Presidency." According to Mirkovic, the controversial amendments to the Slovenian constitution with regard to defense were "not under any circumstances binding on the federal organizations and, consequently, on the [JNA] as part of the federal state." At the 27th LCY Central Committee plenum on September 26 and 27, Vice Admiral Petar Simic, President of the Central Committee of the JNA's party organization, judged that amendments were in contradiction to the federal constitution. Instead of issuing an open warning to Slovenia, however, Simic asked the republic to be "more realistic[by] familiarizing itself with the grave consequences for Yugoslavia that could result from the disputed amendments."85

Slovenia's constitutional amendments appear to be causing the Yugoslav military more concern than changes that were made to Serbia's constitution in March 1989 and subsequently incorporated into its new constitution adopted September 28, 1990. The changes to the Serbian constitution were aimed at increasing that republic's control over its two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Military leaders claimed that the army was an all-Yugoslav institution devoted only to the country as a whole, and "that they [were] not willing to be manipulated by anyone." Indeed, they continuously

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maintained that the army belonged to Yugoslavia and that it was "equally Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian, Slovenian, Moslem, Montenegrin and [representative of] all the nationalities in our country." 86

While the new prime minister, and dedicated market reformer, the Croatian Ante Markovic, and the federal government attempted to ignore the disunity in the League of Communists and to push ahead with the economic reform program, the erosion of single party control was unsettling to the JNA military elite. "The military took the stance that while reform was necessary, multiparty democracy was out of the question, and the LCY would remain the pivot of any process of democratization."87 The dangers of "bureaucratic nationalism" became a constant theme of military spokespersons, who thought in terms of restoring "the unity of the LCY and its leadership, as well as the full affirmation of Yugoslavia as an equal, socialist community of all nations and nationalities." In the military's view "the League of Communists must continue to be the leading ideopolitical force in society."88

The military remained opposed to a multiparty system. At a television roundtable at the end of October 1989, top ranking officers explained their positions. Assistant Defense Secretary Lt. Gen. Simeon Buncic, told a television audience:

We favor political pluralism, but not of the multiparty type. The introduction of a multiparty system would imply the depoliticization of the JNA, which would then lose its popular character, and have to become a professional, mercenary, apolitical army in the service of whichever party was in power...[And consequently,] the LCY organization in the JNA, which numbers almost 80,000[members], would also have to cease to exist.89

The conservative Slovene officer, Deputy Federal Secretary for National Defence Vice-Admiral Stane Brovet maintained the Yugoslav military was against multiparty pluralism for various reasons:

First of all, the programmatic reorientation of the majority of groups and movements who pretend to come into being as parties in our country, contain elements of nationalism, antisocialism, confederalism, and also separatism. Secondly, it is a question of a struggle for

86 ibid.
87 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 245.
88 ibid.
89 ibid., 246.
power, but a struggle for power, in our opinion in these conditions cannot extricate us from the crisis, but in contrast can dangerously cause the crisis to deepen or even sharply threaten the integrity of our country.⁹⁰

Meanwhile, relations between Serbia and Slovenia were further strained in November 1989 after a decision by the Slovene government to block the entry into their republic by Serbs who planned to hold a protest demonstration in Ljubljana on 1 December. The protest in Ljubljana, the Slovene capital, had been described by its organizers as a "rally for truth" that would promote the Serbian cause in Kosovo. The Slovenes, however, felt that the real aim was intimidation, and thus banned the rally.⁹¹

The Serbian communist leadership responded by canceling all government and business ties with Slovenia. More than 300 Serbian businesses terminated contracts and broke off business links with Slovenian firms.⁹² Despite its opposition to Slovenia's amendments, the military also criticized Serbia's economic blockade of Slovenia as "inappropriate in the view of the political and economic consequences it was having."⁹³

The disintegration of communist political hegemony and the adoption of competitive party systems throughout East European states during the fall of 1989 sped up considerably the political evolution in Yugoslavia. In December 1989 the Croatian communist leadership admitted it had been slow in recognizing "the historic exhaustion of the single party system" and demanded the implementation of a multiparty system in the country.⁹⁴ The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) had already been formed the previous February without authorization, under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman. At the end of December, the Slovene League of Communists, announced that it would "strive for the creation of a multiparty system" and "that all communist party organizations in state enterprise and government institutions would be dissolved."⁹⁵ As regimes throughout

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⁹⁰Cohen, Broken Bonds, 87.
⁹²Lampe, 346.
⁹³Romet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 246.
⁹⁴Cohen, Broken Bonds, 83.
⁹⁵Ibid.
central Europe and northwestern Yugoslavia adopted liberal positions on pluralism, even the Milosevic regime was pushed to adopt the idea of multiparty political pluralism, although his Serbian official support was qualified with threats against the development of "anti-socialist" political parties.  

By December 1989, as pressure for political pluralism increased, the military began to adopt a more flexible stance. The military leadership sought to adjust to the pace of change. For instance, Major General Ivo Tominc, assistant commander of the Fifth Military District for Political and Legal Activities, told a press conference that month that "the JNA would not interfere in developments, would not slow down democratic change, and would adjust to all changes in the political system." While turning more conciliatory to Slovene demands during 1989, the JNA leadership pushed for an extraordinary LCY congress in order to reestablish the authority of the federal League of Communists.

The Military and the Fourteenth Congress

The Extraordinary 14th Congress of the LCY, which the JNA had been urging since 1986, opened in Belgrade on 20 January 1990 in the presence of 1654 delegates. At the congress, Slovenia advocated an end to the LCY as a federal party organization and the creation of both a confederated Yugoslavia (which the Slovenes called an "asymmetric federation", and a new alliance of the republican and provincial units in the League of Communists (referred to as a League of Leagues). Thus, Susan Woodward maintains:

The army's objective backfired, however, when the congress became an opportunity for the next step in the Slovene goal of transforming the country into a confederation of states--in this case, by transforming the country into a confederation of 'free and independent republican communist parties' and then accepting the end of its constitutional status by adopting multiparty elections.

Milosevic was determined to arrest the process of the further decentralization of the LCY. He called for a unified LCY and a stronger Yugoslav federation. Slovene leader Milan Kucan accused the Serbian communists of trying to impose a "unified centrist state" on

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96 ibid.
97 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 246.
98 Woodward, 115.
99 ibid.
Yugoslavia, and he opposed Serbia's argument that the LCY and the federal army were the only remaining integrating forces in country. Milosevic replied that "a unified party is essential because we are for a unified Yugoslavia." While the delegates from Serbia and Slovenia, continued to quarrel, the JNA delegation seemed determined to prevent the state from collapsing.

The army delegation had a total of 68 members: 32 Serbs, 8 Montenegrins, 8 Croats, 10 Yugoslavs, 3 Muslims and 2 Slovenes. The JNA delegates to the conference were very concerned with proposals for further decentralization. Deputy Defense Minister Rear Admiral Stane Brovet, a Slovene, said that "if republics become states with all the attributes of statehood, it will be impossible to talk of the statehood of Yugoslavia." He further added, "I think that neither the LCY nor any of its members should adhere to such stands." Brovet's statements were a clear indication to the Slovenian Communists that the party organization in the JNA remained a strong advocate of a united, federative Yugoslavia. Col. Dr. Dimitrije Baucal, chairman of the Committee of the LCY in the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, while reservedly accepting pluralist politics insisted that such pluralism must not harm Yugoslavia's integrity. Moreover, he decisively rejected the JNA's depoliticization "in all respects." The military elite had serious concerns about the possibility of depoliticizing the JNA. For example, there was a fear that a non-political-military establishment would result in the exclusion of the party members in the JNA from social and political life. From the presentations of the military delegates there emerged an "unambiguous support for the federal state in which the Yugoslav military would continue to have a political role in a Yugoslavia capable of making policy and paying for defense."

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101Ibid.
102Ibid., 35.
When the Slovenian delegation failed to win support for its reform proposals, it walked out of the congress three days later. The Croatian party leader, Ivica Racan, took the position that his delegation should abstain until the Slovenes returned. The congress was divided in two. One side contained Serbia, its two provinces, and Montenegro. That side was led by Slobodan Milosevic, who pushed for the congress to continue without the Slovenes, and the recalculation of voting procedures accordingly. The other side was formed by the newly assertive and more liberal Croatian Communist party organization with the two other republican (Bosnia and Hercegovina and Macedonia) party entities and the army. When the Slovenes did not return, the Croats and their allies voted for adjournment. After the adjournment, Rear Admiral Petar Simic, then president of the JNA party committee, later reported to the LCY committee in the JNA that the outcome of the Congress "came as no surprise to us." He maintained that:

the system at work in the country over the last 15 years or so has allowed the republics and provinces to develop and consolidate their narrow, national interests with their representatives evolving into bureaucratized leading elites who tended to neglect the interests of the whole for the benefit of particular interests. In an increasingly serious economic crisis, conflicts of interests penetrated the LCY... producing negative effects on not just the economic but also ideological and political spheres.  

He singled out the LC of Slovenia for its "ultimatum-like attitude toward the congress." Simic maintained that the party organization in the army does not accept the "LCY's fragmentation into several parties, or the LCY’s transformation into a social democratic party with a name change."  

With the collapse of the LCY at its fourteenth and, as it turned out, final Extraordinary Congress in January 1990, the JNA was deprived of political organization which had formerly guided military activity, namely the central communist party organization. But if the party had disintegrated, at least the centralized state appeared to be functioning. How would the military elite respond to this radical change and what political role would they now assume? Thus a few days after the congress ended, on 1 February,

105 FBIS-EEU, 16 February 1990, 72.
106 Ibid.
the federal state presidency ordered the mobilization of the army --whose legitimacy depended on the League of Communists-- in the restive province of Kosovo.107 This show of force, as demonstrations continued in several towns, resulted in twenty-eight dead and 97 injured and further eroded the neutrality upon which the military's own authority would have to be rebuilt if it was to retain any support among its opponents. "A debate unresolved since the nationalist events in Croatia in 1971 over the role of the army to preserve internal order was, under threat of system collapse, bound to revive and to escalate the growing political confrontation."108 The use of military force against the domestic population to maintain order stimulated controversy. Consequently, on February 4 1990, Slovenia followed through on its promise of the previous summer to withdraw its contingents from the federal police forces, which were already situated in Kosovo. Croatia also followed suit.109

Vice Admiral Petar Simic maintained that the JNA was an army that would "not accept any role as a depoliticized force confined to its barracks." 110 The insistence on maintaining a political role that had no legitimate means of expression after January 1990, together with the dislike of the JNA high command for the idea of genuine political pluralism, was to be the source of political hostility between the military and those it regarded as its "enemies" throughout 1990. As the ruling League of Communists "fractured and atrophied in a context of ethnic quarreling and continued economic crises, speculation increased about potential military intervention in domestic politics." 111 But it was highly doubtful that any Yugoslav military leader could provide a "Bonapartist" solution to the country's economic and political problems. The JNA, who traditionally

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107This deployment resulted in about 15000 troops being sent to Kosovo, most of whom were from Serbia(Nis), Macedonia(Skopje) and Montenegro(Titograd). They were supported by 2000 extra paramilitary troops from Serbia's Internal Affairs Ministry. See Milan Andrejevich, "The Yugoslav Army in Kosovo: Unrest Spreads to Macedonia," Report on Eastern Europe, 23 February 1990, 38-40.
109Ibid.
111Cohen, Broken Bonds, 88.
advocated conservative centralist views, recognized that increased military involvement in
the political sphere would be a dangerous exercise, possibly igniting a violent and
unmanageable reaction in different parts of the country. Considering that there existed
territorial defense forces, who were the responsibility of the republican secretariats of
defence, any attempt by the JNA to seize power would be a bloody affair. Cohen maintains
that "the predominantly Serbian military elite, already deeply involved in the costly and
difficult suppression of Albanian ethnopolitical dissidence in Kosovo, undoubtedly
recognized the intense reaction and political opposition that direct military intervention
would engender in areas such as Slovenia and Croatia." Moreover, even if the military
succeeded in seizing power and putting down any opposition to such intervention,
military elites would still have to deal with the same economic and political problems that
Yugoslav political elites had to contend with throughout the 1980s.

The JNA was devoutly Titoist and committed to the preservation of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. As in other Communist ruled regimes, the army was
"loyal to the party and accepted Communism as its official ideology." With the effective
dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist party in January 1990, the military officer corps,
left without the political and ideological guidance it had before, had to look for the
legitimation and definition of their task elsewhere." John Zarnetica maintains that "the
looming introduction of political pluralism and capitalism would no doubt radically
transform the JNA—it would not destroy it. But a break-up of Yugoslavia could".

Chapter Summary

The Yugoslav Communist military had traditionally portrayed itself as the main
element ensuring the country's cohesion and territorial integrity. During the post-Tito era
this sentiment was strengthened when Yugoslavia entered a multi-faceted crisis that began
in the early 1980s. Yugoslavia had began experiencing serious foreign debt servicing

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112ibid.
113Crnobraj, 121.
114Pavkovic, 129.
115Zametica, 42.
problems and was also afflicted by the resurgence of nationalism in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

As Yugoslavia's wider crisis worsened members of the JNA officer corps and general staff periodically spoke out in increasingly strident terms about the need for "order" in politics and society as a whole. As the civilian government failed to resolve the country's crisis, the military began to play a greater political role. The armed forces repeatedly expressed concern about the increasing deterioration of public order and issued tough warnings that the army would not allow the country to fall into anarchy and civil war. But the JNA was unable to catalyze decision making processes and to bring about the unity of political will for which it desperately sought.

The military establishments' way of dealing with the Slovene media and politicians would eventually provoke support for independence in that republic. The trial of the "Ljubljana Four" united Slovene public opinion behind the republic's Communist party and government leadership. The JNA's tough approach to Slovene pluralism and the military elites' refusal to allow for Slovene language during the trial intensified the conflict between the JNA and Slovenia. Thus, the "homogenization" of Slovene opinion resulted from the JNA's actions.

As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate after Tito's death, the JNA emerged as the main force, together with Serbia, advocating the continuance of the Yugoslav federation. Of course the JNA was also simultaneously Yugoslavia's armed forces and the military wing of the LCY. The military's role as an integral part of the regime was also provided for in the constitution. The JNA's role was not only to defend Yugoslavia from external attack, but also to protect and maintain the country's social and political order from internal disintegration. Consequently, the military elite strongly opposed the notion of multi-party pluralism—a concept which was totally foreign to an officer corps imbued with communist values. The JNA's support for the maintenance of the Titoist system put military leaders at odds with political leaders in Croatia and Slovenia who favoured a more pluralistic policy.
The JNA elite, in large part was naturally allied with the Serb political leaders who also wanted to retain a stronger federation. At the same time, however, the JNA leadership was suspicious of efforts by Slobodan Milosevic to use Serb nationalism for his own political purposes.

With the collapse of the LCY at its fourteenth Extraordinary Congress, the JNA was deprived of its former political master. As the Yugoslav League of Communists dissolved, the military officer corps had to look for legitimation and definition of their role elsewhere. While the army eventually recognized that reform and political pluralism were necessary, it was slow in recognizing the multiparty political reality that was emerging in the wake of the revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe in 1989. While the military would eventually reverse its position on the issue of pluralism, their stated record of anti-pluralist views made the armed forces future role in the country's democratic transformation highly problematic. Throughout 1990 multiparty elections were instituted in all Yugoslav republics, and when political elites failed to reach a compromise on the constitutional organization of the Yugoslav state, the country eventually disintegrated. The military's dramatic role in socialist Yugoslavia's fascinating collapse and tragic death throes will be examined in the next chapter.
Chapter Five: State Collapse and Military "Intervention"

Following the essential collapse of the one-party regime in January 1990, the rise of anti-federalist and nationalist elements, and the diminished external threats to the country, the JNA was forced to reorient itself and find a new justification for its existence. The JNA attempted to preserve internal peace and political stability but it failed to keep the country together. The military establishment also became directly involved in the rising ethnopolitical conflicts within and among the various regions of the country. Thus once the breakup of Socialist Yugoslavia began, the military quickly lost its earlier position as a neutral stabilizing force and was forced to take sides, as were the various members of the military leadership and the conscript army. This chapter will closely examine the role played by the members of the military elite as the country underwent its agonizing final stage of political development.

Depoliticization

Multiparty elections were held throughout Yugoslavia's republics from April to December 1990. In several republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia) the ruling Communists lost to non-Communist, center-right parties. In other areas (Serbia and Montenegro), former Communist elites and party organizations held on to power. However, the newly elected political authorities and opposition forces "were committed to programs of regional and ethnic nationalism that seriously challenged the power of the federal system." If Yugoslavia were to develop as a multiparty system, then the military elites would have to abandon having a governmental role. Formerly their political role stemmed from their association with the LCY. But the traditional association with the Communist party could not realistically provide political longevity:

Clearly an ideological army cannot survive as the fist of a phantom party. Nor can it survive as a participant in the contention among republics. To survive, if that is at all possible, it must depoliticize itself, assume a purely defensive posture, and stay above the political fray.  

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The army adopted a cautious approach to the LCY’s demise. JNA official spokesman, Col. Vuk Obradovic, made clear that the LCY in the army "would be dealt with in relation to new constitutional and legal provisions for a multiparty system. Until such measures were enacted the federal defense secretariat would abide by the existing constitution under which LCY organizations are active in army units and headquarters." Meanwhile, the JNA began to alter its position on political pluralism. On February 26, Federal Assistant National Defense Secretary Colonel-General Simeon Bunicic said that he did not see any reason for the JNA to oppose the introduction of a multiparty system, since Yugoslav society had agreed "by consensus" that the country needed such a system. Bunicic suggested that the army had only been "drawing attention to the negative aspect of the multiparty system and the lessons of history has taught us in connection with it." He added that the JNA is of the opinion that Yugoslav society can "lose more than it would gain [if] multiparty pluralism were introduced at the current stage of development." The JNA's insistence on maintaining a political role was to be a cause of serious political conflict between the army and those it saw as its enemies. During the election campaign in Slovenia the JNA's nervousness in regards to Slovenia's pluralist development was apparent when the military judicial authorities tried, unsuccessfully, to have DEMOS leader Pucnik prosecuted for a campaign poster that offended the JNA. At the same time, another provocation took place when the federal secretary of national Defense Veljko Kadijevic went on an unwanted "inspection tour" in the republic, which is part of the 5th Military District.

In late September the party announced that the LCY would end all party cells in all federal agencies by November 5, 1990. This decision related to all federal ministries, such

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3Robin Alison Remington, "The Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition," 162.
5Ibid., 91
as Internal Affairs and Foreign affairs, but it excluded the JNA. At a press conference in early May Colonel Obradovic tried to set boundaries beyond which systemic change was objectionable to the army, insisting that the JNA supported "democratization and reform short of subverting the constitutional order, retailoring the internal boundaries or breaking up the country." On the eve of Serbia's first multiparty elections since World War II, Yugoslavia's Federal Defense Minister, Veljko Kadijevic gave a interview in which he publicly endorsed Milosevic's Socialist party. Kadijevic claimed that he personally and the "communists in the army" supported "an all-Yugoslav and socialist orientation" consistent with the views of the newly formed League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia. Such indirect military intervention in politics was viewed negatively by the anti-communist opposition in Serbia.

Besides the proclamation, on December 13, 1990, that LCY cells within the military would be dissolved, several active and retired generals, including the current Federal Ministers of Defence and the Interior (both generals) and the current Chief of Staff, came together to form a new communist party -- League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (LC-MY) -- which was organized in mid-November, holding its founding convention on December 21. The professional military members were invited to join the new LC-MY (nicknamed "the generals" party) as individual members outside the barracks. Anton Bebler maintains that this slow response to Slovenian and Croatian calls for the JNA's depolitization "was in fact faked departization with no depolitization." The "ban on party activities in the barracks" was aimed at all parties other than LC-MY. The LC-MY proclaimed itself the heir to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The LC-MY had political links to Milosevic. His wife, Mirjana Markovic, had an important place at the top of the new party hierarchy. However, the LC-MY "was met with very little

7Remington, "The Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition," 162.
8FBIS-EEU, 3 December 1990, 63.
enthusiasm by officers of the JNA."12 The LC-MY was "a non-starter"13 and the majority of the High Command generals and the officer corps stayed away from this or any other political party.14

The JNA's New Mission

Since the formation of the Yugoslav federation in 1945, the JNA had been the strongest element of Tito's authoritarian one party rule. Through the years the JNA built up a strong vested interest in the Titoist framework:

- its privileged access to federal treasury (as it used to be under Tito);
- its wide internal autonomy;
- its system of extensive political surveillance over the entire state; the absence of effective oversight by any civilian institution;
- its far ranging control over the Yugoslav military-industrial complex; [JNA's] internal political-ideological set up and centralist unitarian orientation.15

The JNA thus saw its corporate interests mixed together with the desire to preserve the Yugoslav federation. Before early 1990, the legitimacy of the JNA stemmed mainly from its constitutionally assigned role to defend the country and, necessarily, the one-party regime. The ending of the LCY, the rise of anti-federalist and nationalist forces in several republics, and the diminished external threat to the state as the Cold War came to an end required that the JNA develop a new legitimating formula that could support its undertakings and also its defence budget.16 "Having lost its rational for existence and the political backing of the communist hierarchy, the military establishment thus embraced a new mission of preserving internal peace and order."17 Thus due to this new mindset by early 1990 the military elite saw the nationalist parties in Slovenia and Croatia that were contesting the elections not only as threats to Yugoslavia's cohesion, but also as the state's main security problem.

During the early spring of 1990, the military elite impounded weapons designated for the republican territorial forces in Slovenia and Croatia. It later did the same in all other

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12 Vasic, 124.
13 Magas, 269.
14 Pavkovic, 130.
15 Bebler, 120.
16 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 183.
17 Ibid.
republics except Serbia. With the predicted victory of nationalist, non-communist and anti-communist parties in the elections, the JNA leaders wanted to deny them the possibility of their own armed forces. Thus between mid-April and mid-May, JNA leaders secretly planned to bring the TD units located in Slovenia and Croatia under their direction through the transfer of weapons from TD armories to JNA armories. Impeding the possible theft of arms served as the cover for the removal of military equipment. This operation was only partially finished when the newly elected Slovenian authorities realized what was taking place and ordered it stopped. The federal military managed to get control over the majority of the TD weapons in Croatia. In Slovenia, the army's impoundment of territorial defence equipment managed to confiscate only 40% of the republic's military hardware, although most of its heavy artillery was taken. This left Slovenia with a solid foundation in which to build republican armed forces. In Croatia, however, the army seized most of the republic's military material, including 10,000 artillery pieces, 200 rocket systems and 200,000 automatic rifles.  

The "Log Revolution"

The new post-communist Croatian government--still part of a republic and that was not yet a sovereign state--was forced, from the summer of 1990, to deal with an armed Serbian rebellion in the Knin area and with Serbian secessionism also in several other areas. The electoral victory of Franjo Tudjman and his nationalist HDZ party in Croatia was upsetting to the Serbs in Croatia who were "still traumatized by the genocidal killings in the Second World War, committed by the Croat quisling Ustasha regime." The Croatian regime did not help the matter "by their heavy handed, haughty and tactless approach to the Serbs of Croatia." These fears were also heightened by Serb nationalist propaganda, under Milosevic's command.

In response to a series of Croatian constitutional changes passed by the Croatian legislature in July 1990, the Serb parties in Croatia formed the Serb National Council and

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19 Vasic, 122.
passed a Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of Serbs in Croatia. In August the newly formed Serb National Council organized a referendum of Serbs in Croatia. Most Serbs voted in favour of the proposition that the Serbs be given cultural autonomy in Croatia and that if Croatia left the Yugoslav federation, the Serbs should be given political autonomy. In response to the attempts of the Croatian police to gain control of Serb-held towns and police stations, Serbs took over police stations and TDF stores for weapons in several Serb-populated municipalities. Serbian militias built road blocks with logs, hence the name of their insurrection--the log revolution. On 17 August 1990, two days before the referendum was due to begin, Tudjman dispatched three helicopters filled with armed police to quell the region but on their way to Knin they were intercepted by two Yugoslav airforce MIGS and forced back to base. By the middle of August, areas around Knin were no longer under Croatian control. While Croatia initially did not have the military manpower and hardware to take on both the JNA and Serbian militias, it started, along with Slovenia, to form proto-armies. To replace and build up stocks for independent armies, the two republics began purchasing arms on the international market during the fall of 1990. Woodward maintains that:

For the most part, these purchases were made surreptitiously through Austrian intermediaries; such transactions were easy because of huge stocks of arms scheduled for conventional force reduction (especially in Germany) that were sitting in warehouses of weapons producers in the east, such as Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia.20

This showed that these republics would fight for their independence if necessary. This, however, raised the matter about how many armies a state should possess and about the stance of the Yugoslav People’s Army.

JNA and the Republican Armies

Croatia and Slovenia formed their republican armies quite differently. Croatia built up its special (para-military) and reserve police units. At the end of 1990, its police units were designated "combat organizations." About 50,000 reservists were mobilized and the

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20 Woodward, 137.
size of the Interior Ministry's Public Security Service grew from 25,000 to 75,000. Slovenia used its territorial defence structures to build an army of 60,000, 10,000 of which were professionals and the remainder conscripts serving between six to eight months. Some difficulties Slovenia had to confront was a lack of manpower for its professional cadre, without which there could be no Slovene army. "At the beginning of 1991, there were only 1,100 Slovene officers in the JNA; most of these were serving in Slovenia, but it was not clear how many would join a Slovene army, or under what circumstances. In practice, Slovene officers remained in the JNA, initially at least, and reserve officers formed the head of the officer corps." However, in Croatia and Slovenia, those who were given the job of developing the republican armed forces did not suffer from a lack of experience. Croatia had an ex-general as President, an ex-general as Defense Minister and a former intelligence chief as Interior Minister. Thus the retired Yugoslav general Croat Martin Spegelj, the first HDZ minister of defence, organized separate Croatian armed forces. The organizer of Slovenia's forces, Janez Jansa, the Minister of Defence, and Jelko Kacin, his deputy, were defence specialists.

As multiparty elections continued in the fall of 1990, the JNA elite attempted to consolidate its control over the armed forces by increasing pressure on the new governments already established in Croatia and Slovenia. The military leadership tangled first with the government in Slovenia. One of the amendments made in September 1990 transferred the republics Territorial Defence Forces from the jurisdiction of the federal State Presidency to that of the Slovenian Presidency. The Yugoslav Secretariat for National Defence issued a statement, on 28 September, that republican military units would no longer be able to function beyond the control of the federal military structure. When Slovenia reacted by dismissing the commander of the Slovenian TD forces, Yugoslav Army Colonel General Ivan Hocevar (a Slovene) and put in his place a person deemed

22Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," 300.
loyal to the republic, Army Reserve Major Janez Slapar, the Yugoslav presidency, under pressure from the JNA elite in Belgrade, moved to regain control over Slovenia's TD units. On October 2, Yugoslavia's collective State Presidency ordered the federal armed forces of the JNA's fifth Military District, comprising both Croatia and Slovenia, to reestablish their control over the Slovenian Territorial Defense Forces. On 4 October federal military police took control of the headquarters of Slovenia's TD forces in Ljubljana, and senior JNA officers pointed out that if need be further military action would be taken to reassert federal control over the republic's military structure. 

In early December 1990, interview in Belgrade, General Kadijevic criticized developments in Slovenia and Croatia. He maintained that the situation in the country has been "seriously deteriorating" and that civil war has become "a real possibility." Kadijevic maintained that territorial defense that was developed from end of the 1960s was "a great deceit" that was originally formed and now being used as the foundation of republican armies. He added that:

> The greatest danger for the integrity and security of the country is to be found in the intensive development of purely national armies... what would these armies be used for? Against whom would they be moved? They can only plunge us into the abyss of fratricide. No state in the world has several armies. Yugoslavia should not and will not be like Lebanon... All armed formations established outside the uniform forces as defined by the SFRY Constitution will be disarmed. Those who constituted them will be accountable before the law.

In Zagreb, Kadijevic's remarks were taken as the signal of an impending military coup. His strong words were notable due to their ideological tone. The defense minister maintained that "the socialist idea cannot be rejected because of the crude failures of the real socialist model... the idea of socialism, viewed historically, belongs to the future."

The position of the JNA commanders was evident in a document entitled Information about the Current Situation in the World and in our Country and the Immediate Tasks of the Yugoslav People's Army issued by the JNA's political administration. It

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24 However, the Slovene authorities anticipating the move, earlier in the day had moved the defence force command to temporary offices elsewhere in the city.
26 ibid., 63.
was read to Army commanders throughout Yugoslavia on 25 January 1991 and leaked to
the press on 31 January. It documented the army's determination to hold Yugoslavia
together and its desire to bring the communists back to power. It supported the slowing
down of the reform movement in the Soviet Union and the growing strength of
conservative faction in Soviet politics. It attacked the West for supporting "disintegrative
tendencies" in the Soviet Union and accused Western governments of trying to overthrow
socialism in Yugoslavia. There were three important tasks the document outlined for social
forces: first, to ensure the completion of economic reform; second, to maintain the
operation of the federal state because a"a confederation is factually not a state, nor can it be"; and third, to make the newly formed LC-MY party "the main political force in the
Yugoslav space" as this "is a condition for the survival of our Army's unity and integrity."
The document attacked those whom it saw as agents of Western imperialism--by
implication the governments of Slovenia and Croatia who were seeking greater autonomy
or independence:

Our basic task must be the creation of conditions for the functioning of the Federal state. This
means, first of all, the liquidation of all breaches made in the field of unity of the armed
forces: i.e. disarming and liquidating all paramilitary organizations in Yugoslavia.
Implementation of this task will create the basic conditions for a peaceful resolution of the
 crisis and a democratic transformation of Yugoslavia. At the same time, it will inflict a
powerful defeat upon nationalist-separatist politics and practice, while encouraging forces
working for the preservation and development of Yugoslavia on socialist
foundations.\textsuperscript{27}

Indeed, the nationalist forces in Zagreb and Ljubljana were now characterized by
the JNA leadership as Yugoslavia's primary enemies. By the end of 1990 the military
counter-intelligence (KOS) had material evidence "of illegal arms' imports into Croatia
and(on a much smaller scale) in Slovenia; video tapes, audio tapes, documents,
witnesses."\textsuperscript{28} The General Staff asked for a meeting of the collective Federal Presidency in
its capacity of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. A federal Presidency session took
place in mid-winter, 9 January 1991. Under pressure from the military, a majority in the
collective federal presidency outvoted representatives from Slovenian and Croatia and

\textsuperscript{27}For the whole document see Magas, 271-274.
\textsuperscript{28}Vasic, 123.
called for all illegal paramilitary groups to disarm voluntarily within ten days. This time, the main target of the presidency's decision was Croatia, which had been equipping the special reserve police with secret arms imports and had been making plans for a republican based armed forces.29

As federal military forces moved to a state of alert in preparation for carrying out the presidency's order, the Croatian government announced that it intended to resist such measures and placed its own forces on alert. On January 15 the federal Secretariat Of Defence released a statement that warned that it was "determined to carry out the presidential decrees."30 On January 17 the US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, met Yugoslav president Jovic and told him the US would not accept any use of force. A democratic solution had to be found through peaceful negotiation.31 Slovenia and Croatia refused to obey, however, claiming their forces were legal and that the order would imply JNA rights to interfere in their domestic security. On January 25, Croatia's president Tudjman met with members of the federal collective presidency, Prime Minister Ante Markovic, and military elite in an effort to avoid civil war. At the end of the meeting a compromise was finally reached. General Kadijevic agreed to call off the military alert at army bases in Croatia and Tudjman, in return, agreed to disarm the reserve police forces in Croatia. Earlier in the day the federal military police arrested five men involved in the distribution of weapons in Northern Slavonia, Croatia. However, despite the formal agreement Tudjman declined to disband any of the units or to turn over any of their weaponry to the army.

On January 30, the federal military prosecutor's office in Zagreb ordered the Croatian police to arrest and turn over Martin Spegelj, minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, to the federal authorities on allegations that Spegelj had made preparations for armed insurrection in Croatia. But Croatian authorities refused to arrest Spegelj, who was

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30 Ibid.
reportedly being kept in a Croatian government building under heavy guard. In any event, the JNA returned to its barracks, the militia was not disarmed and the Presidency took no further action. The establishment of republican armed forces added to the problems the JNA faced in preserving its all-Yugoslav identity. Ostensibly the JNA remained a multinational fighting force, "though the attitude of non-Serbs in the military was ambivalent and the High Command unwilling to risk all-out war in case the JNA fell apart."32

Prelude to State Disintegration

On March 9, 1991 when opposition parties called a demonstration in Belgrade to protest President Milosevic's monopoly control of television and newspapers, Yugoslav president Jovic (the Serbian representative to the presidency) also called on the army to interpose troops between the crowds and police to protect civil order in Serbia. The army deployed initially, but quickly withdrew. Milosevic was the first republican elite to ask the army to intervene in a domestic dispute. Slovenian President Kucan observed that "the army, a federal institution, has for the first time intervened in an internal quarrel in a republic between the government and the opposition."33 This led to a dramatic crisis in the federal presidency. Jovic would attempt to declare a state of emergency that would enable Milosevic to deal with his political opposition and also to allow the military to crackdown on Croatian separatism.

On March 12, federal state president Jovic—a close ally of Milosevic and top army officers—presented the collective Yugoslav presidency with a plan drawn up by the military would require the state presidency to declare a state of emergency if, after forty eight hours, the Slovene and Croatian governments did not implement the January 9 decision calling for them to disband paramilitary units and restore JNA authority over the TDF's and army recruitment. However, the collective presidency refused to accept proposals to this effect, even though they were supported by President Borisav Jovic. The majority of the federal

32 Bennett, 166.
33 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 203.
state presidency, saw this effort by Jovic and Milosevic as a legal attempt to engineer a coup d'etat at the summit of the state hierarchy. Vasil Tupurkovski, the Macedonian member of the Presidency maintained:

It was a proposal for a legal takeover. Legal because it would be by a vote of the presidency and it had the prerogatives to do that, but a takeover because the army would have been the main actor, the main factor of that situation.34

When a majority of the representatives in the eight-member federal presidency (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Kosovo) again refused to adopt the military initiative (on March 12 and March 14) Jovic quickly resigned from his post. President Jovic resigned in protest, followed by members from Vojvodina and Montenegro, and to punish, the representative from Serbian controlled Kosovo who chose to vote against emergency powers the Serbian assembly withdrew his authority. On the night of 15 March, a statement from the Supreme Command said: "the Army would consider what measures to take after its recommendations aimed at preventing inter-ethnic armed conflict and civil war were voted down by the Presidency with a majority of votes."35

On March 16, Serbian President Milosevic told a television audience that Serbs would no longer recognize federal authority in the republic if the army was not permitted to protect the constitutional order. Milosevic maintained that the failure of the presidency to take action against Slovenia and Croatia illustrated that "the plan for the destruction of Yugoslavia had entered its final agonizing stage." Arguing that Serbia's vital interests were threatened, Milosevic also proclaimed the mobilization of Serbia's police reserve units.36 Bebler maintains that "probably never after 1941 was Yugoslavia closer to a military coup then in mid-March 1991, immediately after this Serbian walkout. The ensuing Serbian obstruction of the presidency was probably designed to instigate a military intervention in the suddenly created vacuum at the helm of civilian power."37 The Serbian move however

35Ibid, 139.
36Cohen, Broken Bonds, 204.
37Bebler, 143.
proved to be in vain. After a three day public silence and internal discussions—during which Minister of Defence Kadijevic had refused to attend sessions of the rump presidency—the JNA top command categorically rejected any involvement in political debate about the country's future, and thus ended speculation about an imminent coup. Making clear the role of the armed forces in keeping civil order when necessary, however, the statement said that the armed forces would not allow intranational armed clashes to develop in Yugoslavia, and that no inter-republican dispute would be allowed to explode into violence. Any threat to any of Yugoslavia's internal or external borders would be resisted. Slowly but surely the military was becoming more directly involved in the politics of state dissolution.

The military's decision not to use force reportedly stemmed from a split in the high command. Chief of the General Staff Adzic wanted to take military action with or without an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the collective Federal Presidency. Defense Secretary Kadijevic and his deputy, Admiral Brovet, were opposed to the use of military force without definite instructions from the top civilian authorities. It was also reported that federal Prime Minister Markovic had pushed for military noninterference and warned Kadijevic that should the military intervene in internal politics, the government would cut monetary assistance to the armed forces.38

With the Collective State Presidency continuing to sit without a quorum for decision making, and with the armed forces continuing to recognize its legitimacy, the Serbian leadership recognized the failure of its maneuvering. Accordingly, the Serbian assembly voted on March 20 to reject Jovic's resignation, and to restore the Serbian members on the Collective State Presidency. Milosevic made concessions to the political opposition regarding its access to the media, and Vuk Draskovic, leader of the anti-regime demonstrations, backed down from further confrontation. "The JNA high command remained true to its Yugoslav convictions and its self-proclaimed internal mission to

38Cohen, Broken Bonds, 205.
safeguard the country's fragile interethnic unity, but at least for the moment it was unwilling to become Milosevic's pawn and unilaterally engage in the costly and potentially risky business of full-scale military action against the northwestern republics." However, the Yugoslav army having already lost its political master, was now also in the stage of losing its civilian commander. The presidency has never recovered from the events of March 1991. It has become a body without any authority. Cohen maintains that:

Any pretense of a viable federal authority dealing with the country as a whole as its paramount concern was ended by the polarization and immobility in the federal presidency and particularly by Serbia's blatant manipulation of its representatives and allies. Although Jovic resumed his post as state president, most of the country viewed him as a Milosevic puppet.

The JNA's increased political role and autonomy, working closely if still not exclusively with conservative political forces in Serbia, had clearly increased during the opposition protests in Belgrade, during the temporary vacuum in the state presidency, and as a result of the growing ethnic violence in Croatia. While many of the top leaders of the JNA had earlier shown no sympathy for Milosevic's Serb nationalist rhetoric and mass mobilization and rallies, in the period from 1990 and 1991 the military elite and the Serbian leadership shared a common interest in preserving Yugoslavia as a centralized state. Slovenia and Croatia, however, declared their intention to become independent states and continued to buy arms from international suppliers for their local proto-armies. Meanwhile, the Serbs in Croatia were moving to disassociate themselves from any future independent Croatian state. Already in January 1991 Serb controlled districts in Croatia had already formed the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina, and on 28 February 1991 the Serb national Council in Krajina declared the "disassociation" of Krajina region from Croatia and its intention of remaining within Yugoslavia.

By the spring of 1991 the Krajina Serbs' rebellion had spread. Milan Babic and Milan Martic were, respectively, the political and military leaders of the uprising. There

39 ibid., 206.
40 Magas, 269.
41 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 206.
42 ibid.
43 Pavkovic, 131.
were numerous skirmishes between the Serbs in Croatia and the Croatian special police units. On 31 March, two people died in a gun battle between Serb separatists and Croatian police in Plitvice National Park. The events at Plitvice were a turning point for the military. Borisav Jovic, the Serbian representative on the federal presidency, maintains:

the army started to change its opinion. It realized that the only role that it had, at that time, was to protect that part of Yugoslavia where the people saw it as their own army, where they did not have to fight with the people. Basically, that is the line of the Serb territory in Croatia. From that time onwards, we started preparing for the decision [of the Federal Presidency] that was to be adopted in May -- the decision to use the army to protect the Serbs in Krajina, and to act as a buffer between the Croat and the Serb sides.44

Hostilities were beginning to escalate. At Borovo Selo on May 2, which involved fighting between locals -- in a Serb-majority village and factory town near Vukovar in eastern Croatia -- and Croatian police, eventually led to the killing of twelve Croatian police and three Serb civilians.45 The eight member Federal Presidency met on 4 May, in special session and condemned the Borovo Selo incidents and authorized the JNA to intervene to separate the two sides in disputes. Tension was further heightened on May 6 when a Macedonian army recruit was murdered, during a mass demonstration against the army at the naval academy in Split. The National Defense Secretary Veljko Kadijevic claimed that Yugoslavia was already in a state of civil war.

Slovenian representatives warned that the Supreme Command of the JNA had begun "distancing itself" from the presidency's control.46 Slovenia's Defence Minister Jansa, meanwhile, argued that the JNA had come under the grip of General Adzic and Serbian extremists and Jansa predicted that in the case of a full-fledged civil war in Yugoslavia the military would disintegrate.47 In May, the first group of Slovenian recruits was told to report to the republics own barracks rather than to the facilities of the federal army for training. The foundation of an independent Slovenian army was also starting to be established, "as long predicted and feared by the federal military elite."48 Croatia’s

44 Silber and Little, 145.
45 Woodward, 142.
46 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 213.
47 ibid., 214.
48 ibid.
president Tudjman observed that because the JNA was supporting local Serbian militia's in the Krajina, his government had taken measures to change "political forces into national guard units" to "fight terrorism."49

At the end of April and the beginning of May, while the federal Defense Secretary Veljko Kadijevic was in the hospital, Chief-of-Staff Blagoje Adzic ordered the JNA to deploy in parts of Croatia. The Croat deployments were designed to protect armed Serbian civilian insurgents who had blockaded Croatian police from entering areas under their control. The JNA's presence prevented Croatia's Interior Ministry forces from taking over these areas and restoring order. The fact that these moves took place in the Defense Minister's absence was notable because Kadijevic and Adzic had earlier disagreed over the federal presidency's failure to implement JNA proposals for declarations of state of emergency. As the situation deteriorated in the first week of May 1991, Kadijevic returned to his position and proposed a further declaration of emergency, which was again rebuffed by the presidency.50

While the collective federal presidency was severely discredited by its previous failures to work out the country's long standing crisis and divisions, and especially by the Jovic resignation in mid-March, it still constituted the top civilian body in the state and also commander-in-chief of the armed forces.51 However, on May 15 Serbia and its two provinces, with Montenegro abstaining, voted against the officially scheduled rotation of Croatia's Stipe Mesic into the one-year term of president of the federal presidency. The Milosevic inspired Serbian coalition's explanation was that Mesic, the first prime minister of Croatia under the HDZ, from May to August 1990, had devoted himself, as president of Yugoslavia to advancing Croatian independence and the destruction of Yugoslavia. The four to four split in the collective presidency made it inoperable, and without a sitting president, the constitutional status and impact of this collective head of state and

49 Ibid.
50 Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," 301.
51 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 214.
commander-in-chief of the armed forces was severely undermined. "As a result of the
deadlocked and headless presidency, however, there was little doubt that the political
autonomy of the top military elite, which had already been growing incrementally for
several months, had considerably expanded."52

On May 19 the Croatian referendum on independence was approved by a majority
of the electorate. The referendum was boycotted by most Serbs of the Krajina autonomous
region, who had held their own referendum on May 12, approving overwhelmingly the
decision to join the republic of Serbia, and to remain within Yugoslavia. In Slovenia,
which had already voted for independence in a referendum in December 1990, announced
on May 8 that it would secede from Yugoslavia by June 26. Slovenia's resolve to proceed
with its own plans for independence became even more pointed after an incident in late
May 1991, when the Commander of the East Styrian (Slovenia) Territorial Forces was
kidnapped by the JNA. This happened during talks between Slovene defence officials and a
JNA delegation over the activities of the JNA around the Slovene National Defence
Training Centre at Pekrc. Slovene authorities reacted by cutting electricity supplies and
telephone lines to JNA barracks in the republic. The captured commander was let go 14
hours later. Observers maintained that "the conclusion of this incident did little to relieve
tension, however, because many came to the conclusion that the JNA had abolished itself
as a Yugoslav Army."53

During the first week in June 1991, Slovenian legislators debated the specifics of a
law on independence that was to be announced in June 26 and also proclaimed the
formation of Slovenia's own armed forces. During the first six months of the year, the
Yugoslav republics held numerous conferences to try to find some formula for the new
constitutional arrangement of the state. However, the country's leaders failed to reach a
compromise on an acceptable model for keeping the territorial units of the existing
federation together in some kind of common state, or interstate, framework. On June 15

52 Ibid., 215.
53 Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," 302.
Slovenian and Croatian leaders held a meeting in Ljubljana in which they both planned to proclaim their republic's independence no later than June 26, 1991. On June 25, 1991—a day before the deadline—first Croatia and then Slovenia declared their secession from Yugoslavia. Despite all the efforts of the JNA to forestall this development and obstruct the efforts of nationalist politicians, the post-Tito socialist state had not been able to sustain its existence. Military threats and indirect forms of military intervention no longer sufficed. It was a moment of truth for the JNA elite.

The JNA and the Wars of Yugoslav Secession

On 21 June, four days before Croatia and Slovenia were to declare their independence, the US Secretary of State, James Baker passed through Belgrade. Baker stressed that Washington wanted to see the difficulties of Yugoslavia resolved peacefully through negotiations. Baker's opposition to "unilateral actions" by Slovenia and Croatia "may have been deliberately misinterpreted by the JNA high command as a green light for taking military steps to forestall secessionism."54 Four days after Baker's visit (and a day before originally planned) Croatia and Slovenia followed through on their intent to declare their independence.

Up to this point, the JNA was without a Supreme Commander, and the state was without a president, because Serbia had blocked the normal rotation of Croatia's Stipe Mesic to the head of the collective state presidency. On June 25 the parliament and cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ante Markovic, ignored constitutional niceties, since only the Presidency can order the army to act, and ordered the JNA to intervene to protect Yugoslavia's borders. This decree empowered the Defence Minister and the Interior Minister to "deploy the frontier units of the JNA with the aim of safe guarding the state

54 Cohen maintains that "it still remains unclear whether an ambiguous message from Baker actually contributed to subsequent orders by the JNA high command for military intervention, whether the JNA elite simply ignored a strict injunction from Baker against the use of the army to deal with the northwestern republics under any circumstances, or whether—in another plausible scenario that has been suggested—the top brass was given the nod by Baker behind the scenes to use force, but only if it became absolutely necessary."Cohen, Broken Bonds, 220.
frontiers at the border-crossings."\textsuperscript{55} The actions in Slovenia, although hardly a full blown civil war, damaged the relations between the government and the army. Prime Minister Markovic proclaimed, as soon as the fighting erupted, that the decree had never been intended to authorize the Federal Army to use force against the Slovenes. In a closed session of the Federal Executive Council the Prime Minister accused the army "of acting on its own."\textsuperscript{56} Following this denial, Kadijevic "launched a bitter attack on the Prime Minister accusing him of lying and shirking his responsibility."\textsuperscript{57} But whatever Markovic's intention --almost certainly under severe pressure from the Army elite --two of his most senior ministers, Kadijevic and Gracanin, the Defence and Interior Ministers, had used the decree opposing Slovene independence as the constitutional authority on which to base military action.\textsuperscript{58} However, the Slovenes were well prepared for any JNA moves to obstruct their independence bid.

Before the independence declaration Slovenia's Defence Minister, Janez Jansa, had prepared the republic's defences with the view of a limited war against the JNA in mind. He had also established a network of Slovene officers who were supportive of Slovene independence, who kept him apprised of JNA plans and allowed him to keep one step ahead of the federal military elite. In addition to weapons belonging to the territorial defence force, Jansa had bought enough arms to give him the firepower "to bloody the nose of the JNA in a short war, though not enough to defeat it."\textsuperscript{59} Prior to the independence declarations Jansa had been working together with Martin Spigelj, Croatian Defence Minister, and expected Croatia to come to Slovenia's aid if war broke out. As soon as the JNA battle with Slovene forces began, Spigelj wanted to join Slovenia in a full-scale independence war but, "in a stormy session of the Croatian cabinet," Spigelj was met by strong opposition on the part of President Tudjman. The result of the meeting

\textsuperscript{55}Silber and Little, 155.
\textsuperscript{56}Remington, "Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition," 164.
\textsuperscript{58}Silber and Little, 170.
\textsuperscript{59}Bennett, 157.
was that Spegelj was "overruled and sacked." General Martin Spegelj has claimed that he distanced himself from this strategy as early as Autumn 1990. In Spegelj's judgment a great mistake was made by the Croatian leadership:

which believed that from the beginning of the war, and to some extent even today[early 1994], war could be avoided, or later stopped, exclusively through Serbian-Croatian negotiations. This was a mistaken strategy, as it postponed preparations for the defence of the country. At the same time, by internationalizing the conflict, Croatia has brought in France and the United Kingdom, which was detrimental to Croatian interests.

Tudjman later claimed that he knew that the war

with the Slovenes was not a real war... that the doors were open for the Slovenes to leave, and that if we had joined the attack on the Yugoslav army, this would have provided the Yugoslav Army with the opportunity to use--with the help of the international community--all its weapons in a swooping attack on Croatia and to eradicate and destroy Croatia. This was the reason why I did not accept this.

The JNA operation in Slovenia was a limited one. Early on 27 June, the JNA forces were deployed in order to secure the republic's borders. Twenty thousand JNA troops were stationed on Slovene territory but only 2000 were deployed in the effort to secure borders for the federal government. As JNA troops attempted to retake control of federal border, Slovene forces engaged them in combat. The JNA underestimated both the strength of emotions in Slovenia and the republic's military capacity. That the JNA did not perform well in Slovenia can only be partly attributed to the miscalculations about Slovenia's capacity to wage war. More importantly, it was due to the lack of morale among JNA troops and bad preparation on part of the High Command. Many of the soldiers who were sent to regain control of Slovenia's borders were teenage conscripts, including some who had been in the JNA for less than a month, and they had not been told who their enemy was supposed to be. They were surprised when Slovene units started shooting at

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60 Ibid.
62 Lukic and Lynch, 186.
63 FBIS-EEU, 25 May 1997, 47.
64 Glenny, 96.
them. Moreover, the entire offensive seemed to have been planned in less than a week.

Slovenian President Milan Kucan commented on the Army's action in Slovenia in the following terms:

the federal army and Markovic's government which provided a legal cover for military action, have entered into a war with Slovenia completely unprepared. To let tanks roll for several hundred kilometres on the roads of Slovenia, without infantry support, could be done only by laymen who want to display a military force in order to intimidate the adversary.65

Slovene territorial defence forces also moved to surround the JNA bases in Slovenia. Electricity and water supplies were cut. Telephone lines were disconnected. Two days after fighting broke out the troika of Foreign Ministers coordinating EC foreign policy flew to Belgrade and Zagreb to try to resolve the conflict, and put together a cease-fire agreement. But the EC delegation quickly flew out and the deal fell apart. Sporadic fighting continued with claims and counterclaims as to who was responsible and late on June 29 General Marko Negovanovic, a member of the JNA high command appeared on television to warn Slovenia to stop fighting or face "decisive military action." This incited the concern that the JNA was no longer accountable to the federal government. On 30 June, day three of Slovenia's ten-day war, Serbia finally withdrew its support for the JNA's attempt to hold Yugoslavia together. The JNA wanted to launch a full-scale invasion, and occupation of Slovenia. At a session of the council for the defense of the constitution, Borisav Jovic, on Milosevic's behalf, vetoed this option. Jovic, argued that in regards to Slovenia "we could not use a war option in Slovenia...I said we should allow Slovenia to leave Yugoslavia and pull the JNA out."66 Ironically ,on 1 July, the Croat Stipe Mesic was finally elected to be Yugoslavia's head of state, that is, to preside over a country which no longer existed.

On July 2 on Belgrade television, General Blagoje Adzic, chief of the general staff, himself a Serb and a leading military hawk, emerged briefly to eclipse his boss, the Defence Minister Kadijevic. Adzic angrily repudiated a third ceasefire, arranged on the

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65Lukic and Lynch, 184.
66Silber and Little, 161.
same day by the collective presidency under Mesic, who had been installed under EC pressure, and said the JNA would wage war until it had regained control of the country. He said: "we will make sure that the war that has been forced upon us is as short as possible." However, a final ceasefire was negotiated. As the first EC brokered deal failed to halt the fighting, the EC cut arms sales and economic aide to all Yugoslav republics and sent a delegation back to the Balkans. On 7 July the Brioni Accord, was concluded bringing the war in Slovenia to an end. The accord simply postponed Slovene and Croat bids for independence. Under this agreement the Slovene police were given control of the border-crossings, as long as all customs revenue was handed over to the Yugoslav federal reserves; the JNA were withdrawn to barracks; and the Slovene forces were "deactivated" and withdrawn to base. The agreement imposed a three-month moratorium on the implementation of the Slovene and Croatian independence.

The military elite in Belgrade apparently calculated that a strong show of force would have a shock effect and intimidate both secessionist republics. By taking action in Slovenia, the JNA had taken a calculated risk, for example. But such reasoning proved incorrect. Frustrated General Adzic accused Slovenian forces of fighting a "dirty and underhanded war," and he rebuked the presidency for subverting the activities of his JNA forces by negotiating an agreement for the ending of hostilities with the Slovenes. Casualties in the Slovene-JNA war were not heavy on either side. "Only a dozen members of the Slovenian forces were killed and 144 were wounded; the equivalent figures for the JNA were 37 killed and 163 wounded. Over 3,200 JNA soldiers, however, were forced to surrender to the Slovenian side."

On July 18 the full federal state Presidency voted late at night to withdraw the JNA from Slovenia over the next three months. Within a day, the JNA withdrew the troops it had sent to Slovenia during the ten-day conflict (All JNA forces were not completely

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67 Ibid.
68 Woodward, 257.
69 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 228.
70 Ibid.
withdrawn from Slovenia until October). This decision, which was made quite independently of the EC-sponsored negotiations, was a victory for the Slovenian government: "with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav federal army, the last link with the Yugoslav federal government was severed and Slovenia had de facto seceded from the federation."\(^\text{71}\) The EC troika's success did not indicate any real recognition of the EC's peacemaking capabilities by the Balkan protagonists, but rather the willingness of the Serbian representatives in the Yugoslav state presidency and the federal army high command to abandon Slovenia.\(^\text{72}\) Kadijevic claimed that the JNA did "not attack Slovenia."

He maintained that the JNA:

> just wanted to re-establish control of the borders and we did that. What happened was that all Slovenia attacked us, not just the Slovene Army. Then the Supreme Command did not suggest keeping Slovenia under conditions of terror. They said why should Serbia and Montenegro send troops to keep Slovenia only to leave it later--then it was clear to me that this was the definitive end of Yugoslavia. From that point on we moved to the second concept of creating the new Yugoslavia. When the Croats started to attack the Serbian people in Croatia we co-operated with the TO in these areas and gave people weapons and so on... as for borders there was a clear idea, that is that they should be where there was a majority of Serbian people. If Croatia wanted to go that was okay but they could not take the Serbs with them.\(^\text{73}\)

Although the European community was able to broker a ceasefire in Slovenia, from the perspective of civil-military relations the humiliation of the JNA in Slovenia was of more significance. Thus during the Slovenian war, "moderates in the JNA lost ground, while hard-liners more and more openly supported the activities of Serbian irregulars battling Croatian militia."\(^\text{74}\) When the JNA went to war in the weeks that followed, its withdrawal from Slovenia meant that it was no longer able to do so in the conviction that it was defending Yugoslavia's integrity. The JNA's emerging metamorphosis from a "Yugoslav" army into a Serbian army had gained momentum.

**War in Croatia**

Kadijevic maintained that starting in the summer of 1991, the JNA's initial aim in Croatia was the "defense of the Serbian people from attacks by Croatian armed forces," and

\(^{71}\)Pavkovic, 137.

\(^{72}\)Ibid, 138.


\(^{74}\)Remington, "Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition," 165.
to provide the Serbs with the chance "to consolidate their military self-organization for defense." Nevertheless the JNA, once heavy fighting started in Croatia and Croatian forces began offering strong resistance, "would adopt a far more expansive strategy." Thus between July and December 1991, JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces, "working in close cooperation, consolidated their control over almost one-third of the republics' territory."76

The military elite were guided in their conduct by geostrategic aims and by a desire to enlarge the territories Serbian rebels controlled. For example, one of the army's main targets, the city of Vukovar--with almost about the same amount of Serbs and Croats--has one of the biggest ports on the river Danube and is located on the border with Serbia. While the strategic importance of Dubrovnik is limited, the widely televised though sporadic shelling of Dubrovnik by the Yugoslav army and navy was a public relations disaster and was "successfully presented abroad as a symbol of the barbarity of the Yugoslav federal army."77

The war in Croatia hastened the metamorphosis of the JNA into an essentially Serbian military force, "which became almost completely autonomous from civilian and federal control."79 As Slovenes in the JNA quickly resigned during the war in Slovenia, they were quickly followed by Croats in the JNA. On July 5, 1991 during the war in Slovenia, JNA General Adzic had already invited all "non-Yugoslav-oriented officers" to desert the JNA.80 In August-September 1991, several thousand Croat officers, including the commander in chief of the Yugoslav air force General Anton Tus and vice admiral Pavle Grubisic, joined the Croatian government forces.81 Croats who resigned their

75 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 229.
76 Misha Glenny maintains that during "the first five weeks of war in Croatia--in certain areas(notably Krajina, southern Lika and Dalmatia), Serb paramilitary forces and the JNA worked hand in glove. In other areas(northern like, western Slavonia, Kordun, Banija and partly eastern Slavonia), the army saw its role not as a combatant but as a peace-maker."Glenny, 101.
77 Judah, 182.
78 Pavkovic, 141.
79 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 230.
80 Ibid.
commissions in the JNA simply enlisted in the Croatian National Guard (Zbor narodne garde or ZNG), that had been formed in May 1991. That guard was initially formed from interior ministry reservists and organized by the Croatian Ministry of Defense to serve as the core of a standing army. A significant number of Slovene officers in the Yugoslav federal army worked for the Slovenian defence ministry even before the war started in Slovenia in June 1991. The highly visible departure of these and other non-Serbian officers (especially Moslems and Macedonians) who left the JNA leadership structure, was rapidly accompanied by the increasing desertion of non-Serb conscripts. As the war in Croatia escalated during the second half of 1991, and as refugees moved away from the fighting and flooded into adjacent areas of Croatia and Serbia, it also became very difficult for the JNA to mobilize Serbian troops. "The ethnic disintegration of the JNA removed one of the last and most important institutions that had maintained and symbolized Yugoslavia's multinational character." In late August 1991, the Croatian government openly accused the Yugoslav federal army of helping the Serb rebels and announced the blockade of Yugoslav army barracks throughout the republic. Croatian forces closed access to over 100 barracks of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia, cutting off their water, electricity and food supplies and firing on the guards in an effort to persuade the soldiers blockaded to surrender and hand over their arsenal. The JNA military elite saw this as a declaration of war and directed its units first, to resist and, later, to try to move out of the blockade, using force if necessary. The staff of the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav armed forces warned Croatian authorities that "for each attacked and seized Army facility, a facility of vital importance to the Republic of Croatia would be immediately destroyed." At the same time it started to mobilize reservists in Montenegro and Serbia, for the war in Croatia. Markovic tried to stop the war from spreading in Croatia and in an open letter to the Serbian President

82 Bennett, 166.
83 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 231.
Milosevic, Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic pressed the latter to rescind the Serbian order of mobilization. Markovic wrote:

I am addressing you because the proclamation of general mobilization in the republic of Serbia will directly serve the purposes of civil war and the aggression of one republic against another, using the JNA... revoke your mobilization order. You are the head of the largest republic in Yugoslavia, and for that reason alone, your responsibility for the future of this country and the possible life together is enormous. If you fail to do so, you will not be able to avoid responsibility. 

In late September 1991 the JNA units moved from Serbia and Montenegro into Croatia to destroy Croatian communication lines and relieve some of the blockaded garrisons. The top civilian authorities did not authorize these actions. On 18 September Markovic, the federal prime minister, opposed these moves and demanded the resignation of his minister of defense, Kadijevic, and his Slovene deputy, Brovet. Meanwhile, the Croat president of the Yugoslav state presidency, Mesic, refused to call a meeting of the presidency. By refusing to resign and accusing the prime minister of treason in September 1991, the military elite finally had completely rejected the authority of Markovic's federal government.

Only in early October 1991 did the four remaining members of the Yugoslav state presidency who were controlled by Milosevic proclaim an imminent war danger and authorize the Yugoslav army to restore order. In response President Mesic, condemned the Serbian move, which he declared a coup d'état. He maintained that the four members acted in accordance with provisions that allows the Presidency to act without a quorum during a war. Mesic added, however, that this move had no validity because war had not been actually proclaimed. In reply to Mesic, Branko Kostic, Vice President of the Yugoslav Presidency, said "at this moment, when extensive fighting is going on in

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85FBIS-EEU, 1 October 1991, 53.
86Pavkovic contends that "he also alleged, on the basis of secretly taped telephone conversations he had acquired, that the Yugoslav federal army generals together with Milosevic and Serb politicians outside Serbia had prepared a plan, code named RAM("frame"), of military operations leading to the creation of a new Yugoslavia or greater Serbia which would incorporate all Serb-populated areas. This allegation, denied by the Yugoslav army generals." This was publicised by the Belgrade weekly Vreme. See Footnote 9, Pavkovic, 211.
87Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 267.
88FBIS-EEU, 4 October 1991, 36.
Yugoslavia, we have--even with great delay--used the constitutional possibility of eliminating the blockade of the Presidency's work, which has occurred due to the obstruction by some of its members." And General Kadijevic maintained that:

the SFRY Presidency confirmed the existence of immediate war danger and gave its support to the measures and actions that the [JNA] are taking in this situation. The accusations that the chief destroyers of Yugoslavia are launching at the expense of the army and its leadership--accusing it of allegedly conducting a military coup--are thus refuted in the most direct way... once the existence of immediate war danger is established, all legal norms that apply under such conditions concerning mobilization and other actions in connection with the defense of the country come into effect.

Kadijevic claimed that the JNA had "been left without a state." That meant danger for the JNA as an institution. "Operating in a federal political vacuum, the army became a corporate entity in a race for its own survival." Not only were the barracks and JNA personnel in danger in Croatia, but the various republics were refusing to send their soldiers into the JNA, and at the same time stopped contributing to the military's financing. "Serbia and Montenegro were the only republics to 'honor' their financial commitments and it was logical that the link between the JNA and Serbia, strong to begin with, was to grow even stronger." As the federal army became more and more identified with Serbia, the question of its relation with the government of Serbia-- that is with Milosevic, in effect--became more crucial.

On 7 October, the three-month moratorium on Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence expired and both republics proclaimed their intentions to depart from the Yugoslav federation. On the same day, Prime Minister Markovic was almost killed when a federal air force plane bombed the presidential palace in Zagreb,

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89 ibid., 35.
90 ibid., 37.
91 ibid.
92 Remington, "Yugoslav Army: Trauma and Transition," 165.
93 Crnobrnja, 169.
94 What were civil-military relations in Serbia? Who was running whom? Did the army have an agenda different from, in defiance of, Milosevic?...The answer seems to be that a virtual identity of aims existed between the officer corps and Milosevic and broad agreement on the strategy of territorial link up...As for military tactics and methods at the front, the army command appears to have done more or less as it liked. This approach was convenient for Milosevic because it gave him room for international maneuver and scope for 'deniability.' J. F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 254.
when the federal prime minister was meeting with Croatia's President Tudjman and federal state President Mesic. Prime Minister Markovic accused Kadijevic of "attempted murder" and announced that he would not come back to Belgrade until Kadijevic was replaced. Mesic, who was not able to maintain control over the military elite or to end the war in Croatia, quit as Yugoslavia's state president on 5 December. On 20 December, 1991, Markovic also abandoned his post as prime minister, maintaining that he could not accept the new budget—86% of which was directed to the JNA war effort.

On October 18, at peace conference talks in the Hague, the EC proposed a plan for the future disintegration of Yugoslavia, roughly based on its own framework. Earlier the rump collective State Presidency, controlled by Milosevic, had said that it would not accept any decision reached by the peace conference. But at the actual peace conference Serbia was the only one of six republics to reject the proposals' for reorganizing Yugoslavia, even Montenegro accepted. On October 22, General Kadijevic, responding to the EC initiative for state dissolution, claimed that this implied:

> the disappearance of Yugoslavia as a common state, and by implication, of all institutions of a Yugoslav character, including the Yugoslav People's Army...under the most serious threat are the unity and interests of the Serbian nation, whose considerable sections will be separated from each other, reduced to the status of a national minority, and exposed to the danger of being exterminated...Germany is about to attack our country for the third time this century...preparing first for an economic and then a military onslaught.

Meanwhile, in the late fall, Hans Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, refused to back down on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, on December 17, the EC foreign ministers announced that any Yugoslav republic that wanted to be independent had to apply for recognition by December 23 and they would be judged according to various criteria-- for example, protection of rights of minorities. Germany went ahead and recognized Slovenia and Croatia on December 23 but agreed not to open official diplomatic relations until January 15. On January 15, despite a report from the arbitration committee

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95Cohen, Broken Bonds, 232.
96FBIS-EEU October 23, 1991, 43.
led by Robert Badinter that Croatia did not meet the conditions for recognition, the EC recognized both Slovenia and Croatia. Macedonia, the arbitration committee stated, also met requirements for recognition but Greece blocked Macedonian independence at this time.

The EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia made an overall political settlement more difficult but at least provided a groundwork for a viable ceasefire. The Croats had achieved recognition but faced a situation in which a large portion of territory remained outside Zagreb's control. Weakened and desiring some breathing space Croatia agreed to a ceasefire and presence of UN troops on its territories. The Serbs and the JNA, having also accomplished their main goal, the "liberation" of Serb lands in Croatia, also accepted the presence of UN troops. On 2 January 1992 UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, was able to negotiate an effective ceasefire which came into effect on January 2, 1992. The peace accord called for the establishment of a major peacekeeping force in Croatia. It was not until January 8, that the Security Council, under Resolution 727, sanctioned the sending of 50 liaison officers to supervise the latest ceasefire and to lay the foundation for a larger operation.

Despite the shooting down of an EC helicopter by the Yugoslav federal air force, which resulted in the death of five crew members preparations for the arrival of the UN peacekeeping troops went forward. Kadijevic resigned in January when he accepted full responsibility for the airforce attack on an EC helicopter monitoring the cease-fire in Croatia. The UN was to disarm the militia and supervise the withdrawal of the JNA. However, the leader of the Serbs in Krajina opposed the deployment of the peacekeeping forces in this region and especially the disarmament of the Serb paramilitary units. He was

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98 For the impact of Slovenia's and Croatia's recognition as international state's on the principles of self-determination see Peter Radan, "Secessionist Self-Determination: The cases of Slovenia and Croatia," in Aleksandar Pavkovic, et. al., Nationalism and Communism (Sydney: Dartmouth, 1995), 141-157.
100 Jonathon Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons From a Failure (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), 58.
also in opposition to the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia. In effect the JNA was slowly retrenching its involvement in Yugoslavia's dissolution. It had retreated from Slovenia and now was pulling out of Croatia. But many Serb officers in the JNA remained in Croatia to assist the Krajina Serbs in their rebellion against Zagreb, although there was officially a ceasefire in place (one of the JNA officers who had achieved fame in Croatia, General Ratko Mladic, was transferred to duty with the JNA in Bosnia). Thus the JNA was beginning to dissolve into different Yugoslav successor states but also into different Serbian areas.

The ceasefire agreement obliged the federal military command to pullout all its troops from Croatia, which were to be replaced by UN peacekeepers. On February 21 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 743, which approved the sending of a UN Protection Force to Croatia. By 26 March 1992, the federal troops had also completed their withdrawal from Macedonia. Both sides noted that the transfer of JNA troops, facilities and equipment had proceeded without serious incident. The process had been set in motion on 15 March with the handing over of border crossings to units of the newly formed Macedonian army. In Bosnia, the third war of Yugoslav secession was about to begin. As the war in Croatia wound down, political tensions were heating up in neighbouring Bosnia.

**War in Bosnia**

Since the fall of 1990 Bosnia had been governed by an uncomfortable coalition of three nationalist parties: the predominantly Muslim SDA headed by Alija Izetbegovic; the Croat HDZ led by Mate Boban; and the Serbian SDS, headed by Radovan Karadzic. In late 1991 the Muslim and Croat parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina moved to disassociate the republic from the Yugoslav federation. On 15 October 1991, the Muslim and Croat deputies proceeded to adopt --despite the walkout from all Serb Democratic Party deputies--

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101 Ibid, 40.
a "Memorandum on the Sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina". This in essence "ineffect cut the republic's ties with the Yugoslav federal bodies, proclaimed its neutrality in the war in Croatia as well as 'an aspiration' to demilitarize the republic."103 The Serb deputies responded by forming a Serb National Assembly and organizing, on 9 November 1991, a Serb plebiscite in the municipalities under their control. An overwhelming majority of Serbs voted for their territories to remain within Yugoslavia and threatened the independence of Serb controlled areas when and if the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina is recognized."104

However, the Bosnian Muslim and Croat leaders followed the example of the Croatian and Slovenian governments and, in response to an EC invitation, in December 1991 they asked for recognition of the independence of their republic. Following the recommendations of the EC Arbitration Commission, on 28 February 1992 Muslims and Croats also organised a referendum on the independence of the republic. Bosnia-Hercegovina was a complex mixture of ethnic communities-- in 1991 it consisted of 43.7 percent Moslem, 31.4 percent Serb, 17.3 percent Croat and 5.5 percent Yugoslav.105 In the referendum held at the end of February 1992, Moslems and Croats voted unanimously for Bosnia-Hercegovina’s independence-- with the Serbs boycotting the referendum. On 6 April 1992 the United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia and, together with European Community, extended recognition to Bosnia-Hercegovina. The EC foreign ministers declared that the decision would help end the fighting and help to preserve the unity of the republic. On 7 April 1992, the Serb representatives left the presidency and the government and the Serb parliament proclaimed its Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) independent. From this point on Bosnia-Hercegovina had no government that had the support of all three major national parties. Soon fighting broke out in almost all regions of the republic.

103Pavkovic, 155.
104Eyal, 61.
105Cohen, Broken Bonds, 236.
On 8 April 1992 President Izetbegovic ordered the mobilization of the republican territorial defence force. He gave the numerous militias which existed in Bosnia one week to integrate into that new force. Izetbegovic had few resources for holding Bosnia-Hercegovina together. The arms embargo the United Nations imposed on September 25, 1991 also made matters difficult for Izetbegovic and his Muslim supporters. As in Croatia, the initial organizational framework for the Bosnian military was the Ministry of Interior and its police reserves. When war began in April 1992, the important battles around Sarajevo were fought by well-trained Bosnian police special units supported by volunteers. Izetbegovic gave priority to forming his regular Bosnian defence force, based on Muslim and Croatian TDF personnel. "The consensus estimate of the probable strength of the[Bosnian defence force] was about 100,000, but no one knew exactly, not even the Bosnian Ministry of Defence in this early formation period."106 The Bosnian defence force was also supported by various irregular armed Muslim party militias, such as the 'Green berets,' and the Patriotic League. 107

Izetbegovic was relying upon the bulk of the Croat population in Bosnia to support him and the Muslims in maintaining a multiethnic republic. He also needed the Croats to help him fight Serb insurgents. On 8 April Croatian Defence Council (HVO-Hrvatsko Vjece Odbrane) was set up under Mate Boban. His HVO militia had not yet integrated into the predominantly Muslim Bosnian defence force, which Izetbegovic was fashioning. But the Bosnian Croats had their own political agenda. At first the Bosnian Croats, led by Boban and his militia, gave lukewarm support to the Izetbegovic government, and did not fully engage themselves in fighting the Serbs. They also formed (on 3 July 1992) a "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna" bringing together all territories controlled by the HVO. On 5 July 1992 the Bosnian government proclaimed the formation of the Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina(ABH- Armija Bosna i Hercegovine) as the main force of the Bosnian

107Ibid.
state. This was done after the HVO had rebuffed a proposal to regroup with the Bosnian territorial army under a single command.

In Bosnia, the Serb military forces had a great advantage over the Muslims and Croats—that is their close connection with the JNA. By early 1992, the JNA had withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia, mostly moving to Bosnia, where the bulk of the socialist Yugoslav military industry was based. After the withdrawals from Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the main area of concentration for JNA personnel and material. With the withdrawal a vast amount of military hardware was located in Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to the JNA's theory of defense against foreign attack, developed since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, Bosnia as a mountainous central republic was the best area for defending Yugoslavia. "For geopolitical, geological and historical reasons, Bosnia-Hercegovina had been the heart of the country's defense. Mainly located in the hinterland of Yugoslavia with the natural resources of mountainous terrain, Bosnia-Hercegovina was ideal for the location of military production—coal, iron, timber, metallurgy, steel, hydroelectric power, armaments, and industrial crops." 

It is noteworthy that almost 80% of the JNA manpower in Bosnia-Hercegovina was made up of Bosnian Serbs. Thus, while the army was fighting a war for its own integrity and state, it would be very difficult for the military to remain a neutral party in Bosnia-Hercegovina or desert its own ethnic allies and economic base:

in the 1980s, when the army was being substantially downsized, 40 to 55% of the Bosnian economy was tied to military industries; 50 to 55% of its industry was federally mandated investment for that reason; and 40,000 people were employed directly in military production. Sixty to 80% of the army's physical assets (armaments factories, supply routes, airfields, mines and basic raw materials, stockpiles, training schools, oil depots) were located in Bosnia-Hercegovina. On the eve of the war, 68% of the federal army's 140,000 troops were stationed in the republic.

108 Zametica, 44.
109 Woodward, 259.
110 Zametica, 44.
111 Woodward, 259.
The bloody interethnic war that began in Bosnia-Hercegovina in mid-1992 led to more casualties than in the war that had just ended in Croatia.\textsuperscript{112} While savage interethnic war in Bosnia-Hercegovina was being waged, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, was proclaimed by Milosevic on 27 April 1992. Milosevic had been moving to bring the JNA more directly under Serbian control. What Milosevic wanted was not ideological officers devoted to the Titoist ideal of brotherhood and unity but rather loyal Serbian cadre who could do Belgrade's bidding. The purge of the Titoists, or Partisan faction, of the more Yugoslav oriented JNA started only after Kadijevic resigned. For example, twenty generals in February 1992, and thirty-eight in March.\textsuperscript{113} On 4 May, FRY citizens serving in the JNA were recalled from Bosnia-Hercegovina and on May 8 the new Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije, VJ) retired thirty senior officers known as Titoists.\textsuperscript{114} "This was the death knell of Tito's army."\textsuperscript{115} Woodward maintains that "the JNA had not been adopted by the new Yugoslavia; those of its officers who had not gone to their home republic[outside of FRY] were being further purged by Milosevic, to create a more malleable instrument."\textsuperscript{116} Most of them had been disgraced by military incompetence and, more fundamentally, "associated with a Titoist 'Yugoslavism' which had no future in Serbia."\textsuperscript{117} The purge affected almost one quarter of the Yugoslav officers of general rank, including colonel General Blagoje Adzic, the acting Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff and Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, army commander in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Kukanjac was replaced by General Ratko Mladic the openly pro-Serb militant from Bosnia who had been in Croatia

\textsuperscript{112}Cohen, \textit{Broken Bonds}, 245.
\textsuperscript{113}During the next eighteen months, between the spring of 1992, when the Yugoslav Army was formed and April 26, 1993, when the retirement of 42 generals including the chief-of-staff, Colonel General Zivota, was announced, 170 generals and admirals were officially retired, leaving only 7 on active duty.
\textsuperscript{114}Silber and Little maintain that Milosevic had issued a secret order in January to start transferring all JNA officers native to Bosnia back to their republic. By the time the JNA made its formal withdrawal from Bosnia in May 1992, the majority of officers who remained there were actually Bosnian Serbs. Silber and Little, 218.
\textsuperscript{115}O'Ballance, 43.
\textsuperscript{116}Woodward, 292.
\textsuperscript{117}Zametica, 45.
commander of the Knin corps of the JNA. Colonel-General Zivota Panic, who had been commanding officer at Vukovar, was appointed the new Yugoslavia's Chief of the General Staff. Thereafter, Milosevic's Ministers of Defence were civilians. This was a way Milosevic could maintain political control of the military elite, a group he still fundamentally distrusted. Only a week after Panic claimed that the JNA would stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina at minimum five years, he ordered its withdrawal from the republic. Milosevic and his Serbian elite wished to give the appearance that members of the Bosnian Serb military were no longer connected with the new Yugoslav Army (VJ). However in practice extremely close ties still existed between Serbian officers in FRY and the Bosnian Serb military (who previously had worked together in the JNA).

On 19 May 1992 the formal withdrawal from Bosnia of the JNA was announced which resulted in the departure of the 20 percent of its personnel who originated from Serbia and Montenegro. Natives of Serbia and Montenegro were withdrawn, as well as some armaments and technical or production facilities. The bulk of the weaponry--tanks, helicopters, airplanes, heavy artillery, etc.--were transferred to the Bosnian Serbs. These were largely provided to the territorial defense forces of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" the core of a new Bosnian Serb Army formed on May 13 1992. The creation of an Army of the Serb Republic (VRS-Vojska Republike Srpske) brought together units of the JNA, the territorial defence organisations of the Serb autonomous regions in Bosnia and a multitude of local Bosnian Serb militias. Most of the latter forces operated in small almost independent groups, including the Tigers, the White Eagles etc. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic only exercised direct control over a portion of Bosnian Serb fighting forces. Most such forces looked to Belgrade and the military elite of the new Yugoslavia for guidance and resources (although many small paramilitary groups were

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118 Vasic, 130. From September 1992 to March 1993 Milan Panic was Prime Minister as well as Minister of Defence. From March 1993 on, Pavle Bulatovic became Minister of Defence.
119 This Bosnian Serb Army continued to get supplies from Milosevic's government until October 1994 when the latter imposed a blockade which lessened the amount of supplies.
mainly loose cannons). \(^{120}\) A number of JNA officers, born in Bosnia-Hercegovina, remained as the new officer corps of the Bosnian Serb army, most notably General Ratko Mladic, "who had gained fame for his fearless and ruthless conduct in the previous war in Krajina."\(^{121}\) Promoted to a major-general after the Serbo-Croat war in 1991, Mladic chose to remain in his native Bosnia and become the commanding officer of the new army.

External factors also contributed to the growing violence in Bosnia. Several extreme ultranationalist paramilitary groups based in Serbia were engaged in the fighting. Zeljko Raznjatovic, a.k.a. Arkan, and his group the Tigers, for example, helped fuel the start of hostilities between Serbs and Moslems in Bosnia during April 1992 when they took over the town of Bijeljina. A large number of Croatian paramilitary forces--some directly controlled by the Tudjman government and the Croatian Party of Rights (HOS) --were supporting the local Bosnian Croats and functioned mainly in the Croatian region of "Herceg-Bosna." A formal agreement on cooperation between the Croatian and Bosnian governments, signed in June 1992 by presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic, led to an increased Croatian supply of arms to the Muslim Bosnian army, and to closer ties to the regular Croatian army functioning in Bosnia-Hercegovina. "Although the Moslem forces were the most modestly equipped and internationally isolated at the beginning of the struggle in Bosnia," they would eventually receive considerable material assistance from Islamic states and also from Islamic volunteers coming from Iran, Afghanistan, and other Middle Eastern countries.\(^{122}\) The UN and EC, disapproving of the links of the Belgrade regime to the Bosnian Serb actions against Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, imposed harsh economic sanctions against Serbia in May 1992. In Resolution 757, adopted on May 30--for example, there was a trade and oil embargo, freeze on assets and ban on financial transactions and transport and cutting of sport, cultural and scientific ties.

\(^{120}\) O'Ballance, 50.  
\(^{121}\) Crnobrnja, 181.  
\(^{122}\) Cohen, Broken Bonds, 248.
By the end of 1992 the Serb forces, although numerically smaller, had gained the upper hand in the military struggle. In large part this was due to their superior artillery and armor and much of which they had inherited from the JNA. By this time they had come to militarily control nearly 70% of the Bosnia's territory. As Woodward maintains "Mladic's military campaign to keep eastern and northern Bosnia within Yugoslavia so as to create a corridor between Serbia and the areas claimed by Serbs in the Croatian krajina and a strategic buffer along the Drina River had become explicitly Serb nationalist in its motivations, attached to the Bosnian Serb party (SDS) leadership and its political aims." The Croat ambition to dismantle Bosnia-Hercegovina also became quite apparent when Croat forces began openly to clash with their allies the Muslims during the spring of 1993. Following the collapse of the Croat-Muslim alliance the use of detention camps, as well as ethnic cleansing and atrocities, "would become tactics more widely employed by all three major ethnic groups in Bosnia."

Chapter Summary

When Yugoslavia began to disintegrate the JNA attempted to maintain the cohesion of the country. However during the early 1990s, the JNA's new mission of preserving internal peace and political stability would fail to keep the country together. These efforts to maintain the Yugoslav regime were motivated primarily by the military's corporate interests, and partly by the military's desire to ensure the preservation of the Yugoslav state. This military elite's desire coincided to a large extent with the goals of Serbia's leadership under Milosevic. Although Milosevic's Serbia was the JNA's natural ally in preserving Yugoslavia, this political relationship, i.e. of the largely Serb JNA officer corps and ostensibly Serb nationalist regime in Belgrade, undermined the JNA's reputation in many parts of Yugoslavia, and particularly in Slovenia and Croatia. The JNA by directly interfering in politics and by failing to transform itself along pluralistic lines, jeopardized

123 Crnobrnja, 181.
124 Woodward, 262.
125 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 248.
and eventually eliminated its role as an all-Yugoslav institution able to protect Yugoslavia's unity.

The failed attempt by the JNA to stop Slovene independence was the last genuine operation of the Yugoslav military as a multinational institution. After the fighting in Slovenia the Yugoslav federal state structure disintegrated, and what remained of its institutions became primarily identified with Serbian national interests. For the majority of the JNA's officer corps, this presented no real dilemma since almost 70% of that elite group was ethnically Serb and Montenegrin. But for the remainder of the JNA particularly the members from other nationalities, the process of state dissolution involved a decision on identity and political allegiance. Most non-Serb elements in the JNA decided to leave the organization and relocate in the various successor states. Desertions were to increase rapidly among all ethnic groups as the Yugoslav civil war intensified. Two months after the war in Bosnia began the JNA personnel were withdrawn to Serbia in order to become part of the new VJ army. In Serbia and Montenegro, however, Milosevic was busy purging the military so in order to ensure that they had no "Yugoslav" orientation, that is, loyalty to the old Titoist model of interethnic tolerance. Thus, ironically, the Yugoslav Peoples's Army, heir to Tito's Partisan struggle, completely dissolved just as Yugoslavia itself.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

The legitimacy of the Yugoslav military establishment and structure stemmed from the communist regime itself, which the JNA helped to establish during World War II. The National Liberation Army, created by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and commanded throughout the war by Josip Broz Tito, had a close symbiotic relationship with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which took power in Yugoslavia in late 1944. The political and military leadership were one and the same, and both largely drew their rank and file from the politically backward peasantry. These peasant soldiers supported the party leadership just as much or more for its military leadership in the anti-occupation struggle, as for the communist devotion to revolutionary goals. Near the end of the war, although all ethnic groups were represented at the highest command level, the ranks of the JNA and middle level command were mainly Serbs and Montenegrins.

After the Second World War, the army still remained a political force with a complex network of Communist control and education through political commissars and ideological courses. It was through the security forces that ultimate control was guaranteed, as Yugoslavia became a Stalinist police state. The CPY began a harsh campaign to eliminate all political and military opponents who remained in the country and a leading role in this was played by the primary intelligence operation OZNa and later known as UDBa. The JNA quickly evolved from a revolutionary Partisan army into a professional military establishment. Yugoslavia closely approximates totalitarian/penetration model of civil-military relations described in chapter one. Under that model control of the armed forces is formally in the hands of a centralized, authoritarian political Party. The Communist Party's political direction is maintained by party members placed at the highest to the lowest levels of the military hierarchy. However, the penetration model breaks down when applied to Yugoslavia, as Remington maintains, due to the continuation of the symbiotic relationship between the part and army in the postwar period which was reinforced due to the external threat flowing from the Soviet Union.
After the Tito/Stalin split in 1948, the Yugoslav ground forces were deployed along the borders of neighboring Communist countries to protect against any Soviet threat. The majority of the Party and military supported Tito in his dispute with Stalin (1949 to 1952). During this stage there was a massive mobilization and defense budgets rose. While there were attempts to rid the military of "pro-Soviet Cominformists", as early as 1949 the position of the military commander was strengthened vis-a-vis the political commissars. After the Sixth Party Congress of November 1952 there was a relaxation of party control. In February 1953 the Soviet inspired system of unified party-political control was dismantled and the JNA became increasingly autonomous, and throughout the 1950s more professional. However, the JNA still retained assistants for political affairs at all levels of command. The existence of commissars is not necessary for the politicization of an army. Moreover, party control can be maintained through regular commanding officers and political assistants, provided they are devoted to the party. The communists in the military were the most ideologically trained members of the Party and included practically the entire officer corps.

Following Stalin's death in 1953 and Khruschev's conciliatory visit to Belgrade in 1955, there was a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. With the removal of the external threat, the JNA was partially demobilized and modernized. As with other communist militaries the JNA was never totally excluded from political life. However, the military did not engage in politics with a high profile for most of the post-war period. The JNA was kept in a politically subordinate position by Tito, both in relation to the party/government and the secret political police. In mid-1960s, the army began to play a more overt political role in first, the ouster of Internal Affairs Chief Rankovic, and later in the resolution of the 1971 Croatian crisis.

By the time of the reforms of the mid-1960s, the army had acquired a significant degree of autonomy. Despite the JNA's special status the organization could not completely escape reform. For example, military allocations came under attack. Once a
move to Total National Defence in response to the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, the JNA was also confronted with a functional rival in the form of the new territorial defence forces. Within both the professional military and auxiliary veteran's organization there was discontent with developments throughout the 1960s. Remington has argued that these grievances transformed the military into a bureaucratic interest group. This military pressure would prove important in connection with the renaissance of Croatian nationalism in the late 1960s and Tito's reaction to that development in 1971-1972.

By 1971, rising ethnonationalism in Croatia was a matter of concern to military professionals and also to the political leaders of the regime. The JNA still remained under civilian control. However, it is evident that individual if not official pressure by the members of the military elite military and, particularly, the veterans' organizations motivated Tito to resolve the conflict. In addition, the military establishment provided information that Tito in order to terminate the mass nationalist movement in Croatia. The purging of top Croat officers in 1971 indicated that there were splits in the JNA high command along ethnic lines. This signified to the military elite that any attempt by the JNA to make a direct bid for political power would have adverse consequences for the JNA and for its high command in particular.

Formal recognition of the military's political role followed the rise of the Croatian national movement in the early 1970s. The military's influence grew during the 1970s, as indicated by increased military representation in the Central Committee, and particularly the influence of older more conservative military personnel. The re-emergence of the symbiotic relationship of the party and the military which had originated in the Partisan resistance, signified the Tito regime's displeasure with the reformist political leaders who had assumed power in many of the republics during the 1960s. During the mid-1970s the professional armed forces and the Territorial Defence Units's once again became referred in the 1974 Constitution as a "integrated, unified whole." Following the domestic political
turmoil of 1971-72, the JNA's mission was to protect, as servant of the party, the integrity of the Yugoslav Communist system and the Yugoslav state against domestic, as well as external, challenges.

Samuel Huntington defined professionalism in terms of expertise, responsibility and corporateness and advocated that professional soldiers devote their efforts toward improving their fighting ability. Professionalism makes the military "politically sterile, neutral," and ready to obey the dictates of any civilian regime which garners legitimate authority within the state. The JNA was not "a classical military organization" in Huntington's terms. It was professional-- that is, i.e. expert, corporate and responsible. But, contrary to the argument made by Huntington, the JNA was required and willing to actively become involved in the political system. During the mid-1970s, the JNA's influence in the political process significantly increased. However, the JNA was not a classically praetorian organization. In a praetorian regime, the military periodically intervene in government--usually imposing, or supporting a civilian leader who the military selects. Tito and the party called on the military to play a more active political role. Thus before Tito died in 1980, increased military representation in top decision making bodies had greatly strengthened the political role of the Yugoslav military. This military penetration of party and state political institutions was intended as an element of state cohesion. But in practice the military involvement in political life would become controversial and destabilizing to the polity.

Increasingly, toward the end of Tito's life (he died in May 1980) the military portrayed itself as the main element ensuring the country's cohesion and territorial integrity. In the post-Tito era this sentiment was strengthened when Yugoslavia entered a multi-faceted crisis after the country began experiencing serious foreign debt servicing problems and also the resurgence of nationalism in the province of Kosovo. Although army and security units restored order, during the early post-Tito period such military successes created more problems than they solved in terms of the role of the military in politics. As
Yugoslavia's wider crisis' would develop (deepening divisions among the republics, economic downturn, the rise of nationalist leaders, etc.) members of the JNA officer corps and general staff periodically spoke out in increasingly strident terms about the need for "order" in politics and society as a whole. The armed forces repeatedly expressed concern about the increasing deterioration of public order and issued tough warnings that the army would not allow the country to fall into anarchy and civil war. But the JNA was unable to fashion political decisions in the desired manner and to bring about the unity of political will for which the military elite so frequently advocated.

One effect of the growing Kosovo crisis in the post-Tito period was to increase Slovene dissatisfaction with allocation of funds for the defense budget. The Slovenes were particularly unhappy with planning by the JNA elite to remove the pluralistically minded Slovene leadership. Indeed, the trial of the "Ljubljana Four" united Slovene public opinion behind the republic's political leadership. The JNA's tough approach to Slovene non-conformism and the military's refusal to permit use of the Slovene language during the trial intensified the conflict between the JNA and Slovenia.

The military's role as part of the system was provided for in the 1974 constitution. The JNA's role was not only to defend Yugoslavia from external attack but also to protect and maintain the country's social and political order from internal disintegration. The military also was strongly opposed to the notion of multi-party pluralism. The JNA's support for the maintenance of the Titoist system and also its anti-pluralist sentiment put the military elite at odds with Croatian and Slovenian public opinion which favoured a more pluralistic policy. Thus the JNA leaders also found a natural ally in the political leadership of Serbia which also advocated the elaboration of a stronger federation. At the same time, however, the JNA leadership was suspicious of efforts by Slobodan Milosevic to use Serb nationalism for his own political purpose. While the army eventually recognized that reform and political pluralism were necessary, it was slow in recognizing the multiparty political reality that was emerging in the wake of the revolutions that swept
across Eastern Europe in 1989. With the collapse of the LCY at its Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress, in January 1990, the JNA was deprived of its former political role (JNA political power had been exercised through representations in party organizations).

The dissolution of Yugoslavia's League of Communists was accompanied by the rise of anti-federalist and nationalist elements. Such developments together with diminished external threats to the country, forced the officer corps to look for new legitimation and definition of their mission. In the early 1990s, the JNA developed a new role to preserve internal peace and political stability. That task was made more difficult after the multiparty elections held during 1990 and particularly after the election of parties and regional elites committed to programs of regional and ethnic nationalism. The military establishment also became directly involved in the rising ethnopolitical conflicts within and among the various regions of the country. These efforts derived mainly from the military's corporate interests, but were also partly motivated by the military elites desire to ensure the preservation of the Yugoslav state. This desire coincided to a large extent with the interests of Serbia's political leadership under Slobodan Milosevic. Although Milosevic's Serbia was, as pointed out earlier, the JNA's natural ally in assuring its survival, the Milosevic-military relationship harmed the JNA's reputation in many parts of Yugoslavia (particularly in Slovenia and Croatia). By taking very controversial political positions and by refusing to take steps to transform itself, in line with changes taking place within society, the military endangered its own existence as a pan-Yugoslav institution.

Tension between the JNA and nationalist politicians in Slovenia continued throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as nationalism increased in Croatia, civil-military relations in that republic also suffered. In mid-April and mid-May 1990 JNA leaders confiscated weapons from territorial defense armories in those republics and brought them to JNA armories. The "log revolution" in Knin also began in the summer of 1990, and the JNA intervention in that region of Croatia prevented an attempt by new post-
communist Tudjman government to establish its rule in rebel Serb areas. The JNA's role in Croatia convinced the authorities in Zagreb that the military was basically a tool of Serbia. Both Slovenia and Croatia embarked on building up quasi-republican armies. The JNA increasingly became embroiled in local conflicts. The first occurred in Slovenia in September 1990 and involved control of the territorial defence headquarters in Ljubljana. At the start of 1991 the JNA also failed to prevent the formation of a Croatian militia, a development which JNA leaders saw as the emergence of a defacto national army. The JNA also failed to arrest the Croatian Defense Minister Martin Spegelj when it appeared he was deeply involved in the Croatian republican army. By 1991 the JNA was operating largely autonomously, while the collective presidency was moving from paralysis to an almost comatose state. All of these intervention like moves by the JNA pushed the military further and further in a praetorian like direction. Essentially civilian political leadership was disintegrating and military leadership had moved in to fill the vacuum. At this point in time a military coup did not seem imminent.

In March 1991, military proposals for a state of emergency were rejected by the collective state presidency, leaving the military leadership divided between Defense Secretary Kadijevic and Chief of Staff Adzic--the former arguing for action by the constitutional authorities, the latter advocating military measures. If a state of emergency was not to be proclaimed then the possibility for a coup was limited. Because constitutional authorities did not seem to be moving towards a state of emergency, it appeared that the military would have no basis for taking action on its own. The existence of republican defence forces also gave pause to those members of the federal military elite who might want to carry out a coup d'etat. Moreover, the composition of the army also never supported use of the army to impose rule throughout Yugoslavia. Thus that the army was made up mostly of conscripts from different ethnic groups was an obstacle to those secretly hoping for a military coup. Such a multiethnic force was almost unusable by a military elite seeking a reliable and cohesive military organization that could carry out a
coup d'état. Moreover any attempt to politically seize control of the country would have to rely upon regular soldiers, who numbered only 45,000. That force was simply too small to viably control the whole country. Moreover, despite the mainly Serb character of the officer corps, the high command, functioned in terms of a "national key" principle, which meant that the top posts were distributed in proportion with the size of various ethnic groups. Misha Glenny maintains that the 1991 March events "cemented the alliance between the JNA and Serbian leadership." Glenny is referring to the use of the military to break up civilian protests against the Milosevic regime. Whether or not Glenny is correct the military elite issued a statement after the March events ruling out an imminent coup, but warning that they would not stand by as armed interethnic conflict or civil war erupted in the country. As incidents of interethnic violence escalated in the spring of 1991 and socialist Yugoslavia began its slide towards disintegration, the military quickly lost its earlier position as a neutral stabilizing force and was forced to take sides, as were the various members of the military leadership and the conscript army.

The failed attempt by the JNA to stop Slovene independence in June 1991 was the last real undertaking by the Yugoslav military. From then on the Yugoslav federal government disintegrated, and what was left of it became primarily identified with Serbian national interests. For the majority of the JNA officer corps, this was not a major problem since they were mostly Serb and Montenegrin. But for the rest of the army, who belonged to different ethnic groups, state disintegration became a major test of allegiance, which many of them solved by deserting. Desertions were to increase among all nationalities as the Yugoslav civil war intensified. Two months after the war in Bosnia began (during the spring of 1992) the JNA personnel were withdrawn to Serbia in order to become part of the new VJ army. In brief, the Yugoslav People's Army, had dissolved much like Yugoslavia itself.

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1 Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," 301.
2 Glenny, 61.
Civil-military relations underwent complex changes in Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991. Such relations in Tito's Yugoslavia were not static but were consistently changing due to either external or internal factors. In a theoretical sense no single theory of civil-military relations can fully explain the Yugoslav reality. However various theoretical concepts used in this thesis shed considerable light and helped the analyst understand the evolving relations between the military sector and the civilian establishment. The preceding study of civil-military relations in Yugoslavia provides a useful foundation for any consideration of the military sector's future role in the newly independent successor states that emerged from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Remington has reminded us that "armies, like states, have a genetic relationship to the political cultures and historical experience of societies they serve. They are scarred by the birth pangs of the state, products of its birth defects, molded in the crucible of threats to its survival." Discussing the role of the various militaries in the states established from the disintegration of Titoist Yugoslavia is beyond the scope of this thesis. But further research needs to be done to evaluate the successes and failures of civil-military relations in the successor states of Yugoslavia. These societies will have to struggle to find the most appropriate role for the military in their emerging post-communist regions. Only time will also tell if the militaries become organizations subject to civilian control and avoid praetorian political pattern which has characterized military development in many third world country's during the 1960s and 1970s.

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