JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE QUESTION OF ITS LIMITED PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING

by

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B.A. Simon Fraser University, 1990

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Japan's Foreign Policy: The Question of its Limited Participation in United Nations Peace-Keeping

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the foreign policy of Japan, delving specifically into the reasons why it participates in United Nations peace-keeping operations (UNPKOs) in a limited capacity. The fact remains: Japan is a bona fide member of the United Nations and derives benefits from this membership, but is less than fully active in the realm of the UN’s first and foremost mandate, that being the preservation of global peace and security. The purpose of this study is two fold. First, to comprehensively expose the reasons why the state does not fully participate in UNPKOs. Second, to chart where Japan (an economic superpower) is concentrating its efforts in peace and security issues in a rapidly changing post-Cold War system.

There are three main reasons for Japan’s limited role in UNPKOs. First, there exists a legal institutional framework which Japan must consider when dealing with peace and security issues in its foreign policy. Second, since the early post-World War II period the state has endured a systemic leadership problem. This problem, it is argued, has thwarted the few attempts made by various administrations to change Japan’s docile foreign policy related to global peace and security issues. The third reason why the state has yet to fully participate in UNPKOs is due to its
preference in concentrating its efforts towards an Asia-Pacific economic as well as peace and security strategy rather than UN programs.

The methodology applied to this study has not followed conventional theoretical models often used when analysing issues in Japanese politics. Conventional theoretical models cannot offer a complete analytical framework to answer the questions put forth in this study. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the question posed earlier has been incorporated into this study.

In sum, it is argued that although Japan remains a member of the United Nations, it has chosen to incrementally change its policy to become more active in UNPKOs. Due to rapid changes in our post-Cold War era, Japan has chosen to reformulate its foreign policy focusing on the Asia-Pacific region rather than relying on the global peace and security agenda of the United Nations.
DEDICATION

To my life partner Nancy-Lee Gould, who has given me continued support and encouragement throughout my academic career. To my precious children, Nauvme and Aidan, who have filled my being with complete joy and happiness. And to my parents and sisters, who have given me ever lasting inspiration.
Let us all, dear reader, think well before we make promises we do not plan to keep. If, in our greed, we give less than we promised, we may get more than we bargained for.

A poem by Robert Browning, from The Pied Piper.
Sincere thanks and gratitude must be offered to a number of people. First, I wish to extend my deep gratitude to Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, who provided me with his advice and positive criticisms during various stages of this research. Thanks are also in order to Professor Theodore Cohn for overseeing my work. Deep gratitude is in order to Professor Emeritus A.H. Somjee and Dr. G. Somjee who offered me continued support and inspiration as well as advice during all stages of my work. Special thanks is in order to my external examiner, Professor Frank C. Langdon from the University of British Columbia.

Many thanks to Professor F. Quei Quo for his initial assistance and inspiration regarding my research topic. Deep gratitude is in order to my colleague and close friend Loganathan Masilamani for his full support and never ending dedication in assisting me to complete my research. Thanks are due to faculty, staff and fellow colleagues of the Political Science Department at Simon Fraser University. Special thanks to Zarine Dastur and Amy Shah for their assistance with this work. Finally, I want to extend my appreciation to my friends, colleagues and students in Yokohama, Japan for inspiring me to endeavour in studying Japan politics.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-H</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSJP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Japan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Mutual Security Treaty</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace-keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>Peoples' Republic of China</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self Defence Forces</td>
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<td>SDPJ</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPKOs</td>
<td>United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>The United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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PREFACE

Since the culmination of World War II, significant changes have taken place within the world system. During the Cold War, the bipolar balance of power equilibrium between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union shaped the world system into two major ideological camps. With the demise of the Cold War, states have had to re-align themselves at both the international and regional levels. Presently, Japan is considered an economic superpower at the edge of having to face the hardships of formulating and implementing an independent foreign policy. Although the United States of America remains a comprehensive superpower at the political, economic and military level, in recent times it has begun to slowly retract its influence from various regions of the world. Its political and military influence in Asia is slowly being withdrawn. Due to this withdrawal, Japan has had to face the burden of taking on a greater share of responsibility in the areas of national, as well as, regional peace and security.

However, Japan faces a foreign policy quagmire which requires study. Japan remains a bona fide member of the United Nations. The UN's pre-eminent mandate is the preservation of global peace and security for member states. Global peace and security measures
sometimes require the need for active involvement at 'flashpoints' around the world. For this purpose, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (UNPKOs) troops are deployed to preserve peace and security at regional conflict zones. Member states are requested to partake in UNPKOs to maintain global peace and security.

For the most part, Japan has difficulties in actively partaking in UNPKOs. Japan faces a number of constraints that hinder its ability to more actively partake in UNPKO endeavours. Thus a 'comprehensive analysis' of the various reasons why the state does not fully participate in such activities is the core element of this study. Interestingly, Japan is embarking on a more multilateral political and military foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region, less dependent on the United Nations for its own national security concerns. Despite the many constraints Japan faces in its desire to maintain global peace and security through UN auspices, the state has made inroads regarding peace and security for itself and the Asia-Pacific region. This dual foreign policy requires study as well.

Through this study a better understanding of where Japan finds itself regarding peace and security issues in an ever changing world system will be revealed. Such a study will in the end offer a comprehensive answer as to the road Japan is taking toward international, regional, and national peace and security.
CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War era has seen significant change at both the international and regional levels. Globally the bipolar balance of power equilibrium between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union has disappeared with the demise of the latter state. This has left the United States as the leading dominant power on the international stage, with Japan as a close economic and security ally. At the regional level, the emergence of multilateral economic and security blocs has blurred the dichotomy of ideology since the Cold War years.

Within this changing world system, Japan is charting a new role as a peace and security leader in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, in recent years, is undertaking bold new steps in developing a feasible and suitable foreign policy to fit the changes of the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, Japan has implemented the United Nations Peace-Keeping Cooperation Bill. As well, Japan has also taken security initiatives within the Asia-Pacific region with its membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). These policy changes by Japan point to a new role that Tokyo is pursuing at both global and regional levels. Japan is trying to undertake a two-track approach in
formulating its foreign policy. One track still maintains close ties to the United States. But, Japan is also trying to create a leading role in the Asia-Pacific region for itself through the multilateral regional groupings such as the ARF and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Such a re-orientation has tremendous repercussions for states in the region, as well as for states outside this area.

Despite these changes and despite its recent United Nations Peace-Keeping Cooperation Bill, Japan remains a non-active and reluctant participant of United Nations sponsored peace and security initiatives. The purpose of this study is to understand its relative inactivity specifically in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (UNPKOs). The reasons for such inactivity are several. First, there remain internal and external legal-institutional constraints. Within this broad heading, the specific factors are (1) the Japanese constitution, (2) the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) with the United States, and (3) its precarious position in the United Nations Charter. Second, the problem of leadership within Japan has also hindered Japan's participation in global security ventures. For the most part, post-World War II Japan has had weak political leaders. Although there were a few strong prime ministers, such leaders could not make a long-term change for Japan to take a more active role on peace and security issues at the global and regional levels. Thirdly, Japan's
regional predisposition—namely, the Asia-Pacific region as the central focus of Japan's foreign policy—has negatively affected its involvement as an active participant in UNPKOs. Factors such as the region's history, Japan's economic self-interest, and Japan's preference for creating regional alliances before embarking on global security affairs, have all inhibited Japan's role at the United Nations.

II. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING LITERATURE

Conventional writings on Japan maintain an expectation that given Japan's economic power, it will or should be re-arming more and pursuing its military goals more actively including in the area of UNPKOs. Such an essentially realist argument is extended by Kenneth Waltz and other writers.¹ Realists believe that an economically strong Japan will in the end also possess military might fitting a superpower status. Realists predict that Japan will begin to behave like other rising powers in history, converting some of its enormous economic strength into commensurate military capabilities and even eventually seeking to replace the United States as the new hegemonic power.² Yet, realism


cannot explain the reality: Japan is not pro-actively pursuing the tasks of UNPKOs. The present thesis tackles this puzzle left by realism.

Why is Japan security policy not proactive, particularly in the context of UNPKOs? One answer is Japan's domestic institutions and culture. After the end of World War II, Japan was guided by the United States to implement a pacifist constitution. This constitution has transposed such pacifist sentiments to Japanese society. According to Thomas Berger, political culture of anti-militarism was "originally developed under the aegis of a benevolent US hegemon during the 1950s and 1960s." On the specific issue of UNPKOs, it follows, Japan has taken a limited reactive posture because of its political institutions and culture. The push from the United States that Tokyo should incur responsibility for global political and economic stability has forced Japan to undertake the initiatives for UNPKOs. But Japan did so only reluctantly because of its pacifist political institutions and culture. From this perspective, therefore, the realist approach to the question of

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3 Ibid., p. 120. Ironically, the United States is now actively influencing Japan to become more active in international peace and security. According to Berger, "Japan's anti-militarism in its present form could not survive both a weakening of its alliance with the United States and the emergence of a new regional security threat" (Ibid.). The Japanese-US alliance was recently re-evaluated after the Okinawa debacle. The insistence by Japan that US military forces on the island should be down-scaled was a stark revelation that Japan is now empowered enough to engage in a policy of greater self-directed security. On the issue of a new regional threat, the aggressive nature of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the instability of the Korean peninsula are issues that Japan must concern itself.
Japanese security policy is limited precisely because it ignores the following factors: (1) there are domestic political institutions that have guided Japanese security policy in a pacifist or non-aggressive manner; (2) there is no public consensus on Japan's military policy; and (3) there is a political culture of pacifism in Japan. As Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara put it, "[c]haracteristic of Japan's political culture is the fact that a pacifism deeply ingrained in a substantial segment of the Japanese public has a very complex relation to the constitutional mandate imposed by Article 9." These domestic variables are seldom taken into account in the realist explanations of Japan's security policy.

The pacifist ideology is materialized in what is now called the Yoshida Doctrine, initiated by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the late 1940s and in the early 1950s. The main elements of this doctrine includes a close alliance with the United States, a focus on economic development, and the maintenance of a minimal military establishment. Such a doctrine continues to be a main foundation of Japanese foreign policy. Although involving in UNPKOs can be seen as a significant departure from the pacifist mentality, Japan's recent Peace-Keeping

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Operations Bill has certain safeguards that limit the control of the military in such operations:

The new law limits the number of personnel dispatched overseas to 2000, requires Diet approval before any mission, prohibits the use of weapons except for self-defense, and restricts the dispatch of Japanese personnel to situations where there is already a cease-fire in place.5

Here, civilian guidance of the military is enforced by the Japanese government: "Japanese defense policy making continues to reflect the deep suspicion with which much of [the] Japanese political system views the Self Defense Forces."6

Although the above domestic factors contribute to the apathy that Japan has toward global security--and even toward its own security needs--other factors are also important. Although the above answer focusing on domestic institutions and culture is correct in themselves, it is insufficient to understand the seeming paralysis of Japan's security policy. These other factors that this thesis addresses include: (1) the broader legal-institutional framework of Japan's security policy including international institutions (domestic institutions and culture are part of this larger framework); (2) the problem of political leadership and political

5 Berger, "From the Sword to Chrysanthemum," p. 143.

6 Ibid., p. 146.
dynamics within Japan; and (3) regional alternatives to Japan's global security. These three factors shape Japan's reluctant policy attitude toward UNPKOs.

The problem when analyzing Japan's security policy is the aspect of a comprehensive and multi-dimensional nature of such a policy. Economic and political factors are intertwined with security issues in Japan. Further, the security policy is "characterized by a variable mix of policy flexibility and rigidity."7 Hence, the complexity of the issue must be appreciated before a proper evaluation of Japan's security policy is conducted. By examining all the above mentioned factors, this thesis will present a more comprehensive analysis of the factors that have shaped Japan's policy toward UNPKOs.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

At the core of Japan's relative inactivity on global peace and security questions lie legal-institutional constraints surrounding the state. Chapter 2 of the present thesis tackles this issue by first delving into the birth of the 1947 Constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, as well as Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), is specifically analyzed. As for international institutions, the MST between Japan and

the United States and the United Nations Charter will be analyzed as another set of legal-institutional factors influencing Japan's less than active global security policy. Although it is difficult to delineate the actual impact of the United Nations Charter on Japan's security policy, clearly the Chapter argues that Japan's stigmatized position in the United Nations subtly influences Japan's decision against entering more military activities under the banner of the United Nations. In short, Chapter 2 reveals a legal-institutional framework that cannot be bypassed even if Japanese politicians contemplate changes in their foreign policy.

Chapter 3 explicates, in a chronological format, the systemic leadership problem that Japan has experienced. It is argued that due to this systemic problem, which reached crisis proportions in the late 1980s, Japanese leaders for the most part have not been able to achieve foreign policy successes at a global level. As a result, although Japan is an international economic power, it has not evolved in a manner commensurate with its potential to be a global leader in the peace and security field. For the most part, Japanese leaders have not been able to catapult the state out of its role as a subordinate and docile player. The lack of stable and strong political leadership from the late 1980s to the
early 1990s, when Japan was compelled to face international challenges such as the Gulf War, stands as a case in point.

Chapter 4 examines Japan's predisposition toward maintaining and further developing its relationships with its Asia-Pacific neighbors. It is argued that although Japan has successfully achieved global economic multilateralism, its peace and security goals are more regionally oriented. As a result, despite its membership in the United Nations, Japan has chosen to strengthen its ties with Asia-Pacific states and its regional organizations. In other words, for Japan, a regional alternative for security is more attractive than a global option for security (that is, UNPKOs).
CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF JAPAN

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to analyze the legal-institutionalized constraints affecting Japan's involvement in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (UNPKOs), it is necessary to evaluate three predominant reasons for the state's present policy regarding participation in such operations (UNPKOs). Of the three reasons, the first deals with domestic constitutional constraints which, it is argued, have had a lasting influence on Japan's ability to change its policy course regarding UNPKOs. Second, the influence that the United States has on Japan's foreign policy agenda through the MST is another reason why Japan is slow to change in its policy for UNPKOs. The third reason why Japan has not enthusiastically embraced changes in its PKO policy is due to its precarious position in the United Nations, reflected within two articles of the United Nations Charter itself. The three above-mentioned reasons for Japan's less than active participation in UNPKOs fall within the area of legitimized legal-institutional frameworks. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of these three factors together is necessary to understand Japan's avoidance of actively pursuing global peace through UNPKOs.
The issue of constitutional constraints requires analysis first. Japan's present avoidance of active participation in UNPKOs is directly linked to Japan's post-World War II (WWII) pacifist constitution. Second, it will be argued that the Japanese-US alliance forged immediately after World War II has allowed Japan to "shy away" from potentially hazardous international obligations. The third legal-institutional constraint Japan faces lies in its precarious status within the United Nations Charter. Although Japan's less than bona fide status within the United Nations is a cause for concern, which may in fact induce Japan to avoid active involvement in UNPKOs, this third legal-institutional constraint is considered a secondary reason for the state's inactivity in UNPKOs. For the purposes of this analysis, the first two legal-institutional constrains are considered to be crucial in our understanding of Japan's policy on PKOs. This chapter argues that these three institutions--the 1947 Constitution, the Japanese-US alliance, and the United Nations Charter--constitute one unified framework discouraging Japan to pursue active involvement in UNPKOs.

II. THE BACKGROUND: THE BIRTH OF THE 1947 CONSTITUTION

In the months after World War II ended, Japanese politicians were requested by allied occupying forces to re-write the state's constitution. US
General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Allied Occupation Forces, instructed Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro to create a constitutional draft and submit such a draft to him. In February 1946, MacArthur was informed that the content of the new draft followed, for the most part, the original framework of the Meiji Constitution. MacArthur had different ideas as to what should be in the new constitution. He sought a lesser position and less power for the emperor, a complete national renunciation of war, newly formed rights and duties of the people and a new parliamentary system based on a unicameral legislature. With the intention of creating a democratic Japan without Soviet intervention as to the overhaul of the Japanese government, MacArthur directed,

the Government Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to put together a constitutional draft of its own. [As a result], on February 13, General Courtney Whitney director of SCAP's Government Section, delivered the so-called MacArthur draft to the [Shidehara] cabinet.

The provisions sought by MacArthur were finally accepted by the Shidehara cabinet with one major exception. The prime minister requested

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10 Ibid.
the preservation of a bicameral legislature; the request was approved. On November 3, 1946, the new Constitution was promulgated by the emperor and took effect on May 3, 1947.

The United States had two major goals when it imposed the 1947 Constitution on Japan and executed the democratization program and radical reforms. The first goal was to once and for all disarm Japan and completely destroy the economic and social structure that had enabled Japan to wage war.11 Ironically, of course, Japan later rearmed and has built an economic structure that is the envy of numerous states. With the passage of time, Japan has become once again a strong sovereign state capable of wielding enormous economic influence in the world system; it has also accumulated military capabilities that cannot be under-estimated. The second goal through the US Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers program (SCAP) was to bring Japan into the US-led world order while allowing it the privilege of state sovereignty. Following SCAP's occupation, the Japanese-US alliance was forged, which up to present times has endured despite various changes and sometimes strong general opposition.

A. Problems Within The Meiji Constitution

The Allied Forces rejected Prime Minister Shidehara's constitutional draft because it was a minor modification of the Meiji Constitution. Thus, it would be instructive for us to examine briefly the nature of the Meiji Constitution and the social environment of the Meiji era (1868-1912). Although the Meiji era is often depicted as a time when Japan catapulted itself toward modern statehood, a number of problems arose during this era which had a long lasting impact on Japan's political and societal evolution. The first set of problems is concerned with the ambivalence of the Meiji period in terms of how to strike a balance between modernization and democratization. That is to say, although a number of democratic initiatives took place during this period, for the most part, this era was marked by oligarchic governmental rule. Furthermore, despite the advent of rapid modernization, it did not lead to the development of the principles of democratic government.\footnote{For an in-depth look at Japan's modernizing process refer to F. Q. Quo, "Democratic Theories and Japanese Modernization," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1972), pp. 17-31.} The second set of problems concerns militaristic elements in the Japanese polity when war was thought to be a legitimate act. The Meiji Constitution embodied these two sets of problems.
B. Modernization and Democratization

Through various reforms, the Meiji government attempted to transform Japanese society from an agrarian feudal society to a modern society. Included in these reforms were the breakdown of warrior class privileges and feudal domains, loss of control of land by lords, the abolition of legal class delineations, and the establishment of universal education. Greater occupational mobility was tolerated. The institutionalization of the military, the infusion of the meritocratic system for those aspiring toward economic or national political prominence, and the borrowing of western educational techniques were implemented. Westernized monetary and legal systems, and fostering of by government controlled subsidization programmes were also introduced.

Aside from these reforms, reforms of an authoritative nature were also implemented. With the emergence of the Meiji era, those who came to constitute the Meiji oligarchy sought to further strengthen central power. This was accomplished "first by transferring sovereignty over the land and people from the feudal lords . . . to the emperor (1869) and then by abolishing the feudal domains and establishing a centralized prefectural system (1871)." 13 Hence, greater power now rested with a few leaders who controlled a centralized system in the name of the emperor. Political as

13 Kishimoto, Politics in Modern Japan, p. 2.
well as military opposition, from shoguns and feudal lords, was systemically eradicated. Policies "fostering strong nationalistic sentiment centered on the emperor [and the goal of] . . . achieving rapid modernization [were also aggressively thrust upon the people]."\textsuperscript{14}

The Restoration government brought to life a system of constitutional government as well as the institutionalization of governmental bureaucracy, the military and a new legal system. Nowhere, however, was there evidence that within such a constitutional government, western-style representative democracy (citizens using elections to choose representatives to make decisions for them) was to flourish. Instead, the pre-World War II governments' inspired ideals of "Rich Nation and Strong Army" began to take root.

The major thrust of these policies collectively referred to as bunmei kaika ["civilization and enlightenment"], was summed up in the slogans "Enrich the country, strengthen the military" and "Increase production, promote industry."\textsuperscript{15}

With an increase of centralized power achieved by the Meiji oligarchy, coupled with domestic shifts in policies since the Tokugawa era, "the Meiji modernizers' strategy of easing the acceptance of the dramatic

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
changes . . . [was achieved] by cloaking them in the guise of tradition."\textsuperscript{16} This thrust toward modernization was cloaked by "the Meiji oligarchy exploiting traditional symbols and cultural norms to minimize unrest while liberating and focusing mass energies on the task of industrial development."\textsuperscript{17} Strategies used were as follows: the promotion of emperor divinity, Japan being labelled the land of the Sun, propagating traditional Japanese virtues; inducing nationalism at the school level and within the media; and maintaining traditional rural life, in spite of dramatic socio-economic and foreign influences taking place in the urban centers. The Meiji oligarchies wanted to stay in power through the maintenance of a large "reservoir of loyal subjects in the countryside [fuelling military reservoirs when necessary and using] industry workers for the urban factories,"\textsuperscript{18} and this policy was designed "to fuel Japan's accession toward becoming Asia's first urban industrial nation."\textsuperscript{19}

The Meiji Restoration, therefore, led Japan toward modernization under the guise of dualism - modernization cloaked by traditions from past periods. With the advent of modernization, however, principles of


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Kishimoto, \textit{Politics in Modern Japan}, p. 3.
democratic government did not surface. Democratic theories did surface during the Meiji time, and since then democratic principles have been attached to certain policies initiated by the Meiji oligarchies. For the most part, however, theories of democracy in pre-war Japan were used as tools of manipulation by the Meiji leaders to modernize Japan. Those struggling for power also abused democratic theories to promote their cause. According to F.Q. Quo:

four essential reasons can be given for the failure of democratic theories in pre-War Japan. First . . . was the absence of normative commitment on the part of theorists and consequently the abortive attempt to present democratic theories as instrumental values in the process of modernization. Second was the misconception of the essence of democracy. . . . Third was alienation from the masses because of a non-pragmatic approach to social problems. Democracy from above [was not plausible]. . . . Finally, the international environment provided no encouragement for development towards a democratic political system as the protective of imperialism and colonialism continued to remind nations of the world of the best of survival as having modernization not democratization.20

The 1889 Meiji Constitution internalized these problems. "Interpreted in a liberal way . . . [it] could have provided a constitutional monarchism with some democratic practices such as responsible party

politics with greater emphasis on the actual welfare of the populace."21 The constitution is, however, also "capable of being interpreted as allowing irresponsible, absolute rule by the Emperor himself."22 Because of this ambivalence, scholars like Quo even claim that the Meiji Constitution "signified the end rather than the beginning of the development of democratic political theories in pre-War Japan."23

C. Militarist Elements in the Japanese Polity

It was the Meiji era's failure that allowed militaristic elements within Japan's polity to emerge as a central political force, leading Japan down the path to Pearl Harbour. Specifically, the Meiji Constitution itself allowed militarists to wield power. To begin with, three major problems within the Constitution constituted major obstacles in the development of parliamentary democracy in Japan.

These were [1] the location of sovereignty in the person of the emperor rather than the people; [2] the failure of the Meiji political structure to subordinate clearly the military to the civilian authorities; and [3] the failure of the pre-war constitution to integrate the political structure

21 Ibid., p. 25.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 23.
and decision-making processes or establish clear lines of authority and responsibility.\textsuperscript{24}

While all of the three weaknesses are relevant to our concerns, the second and third ones are especially important. As we will note later, militarists exploited the emperor's sovereign power--including his absolute veto power over both the upper and lower houses of parliament,\textsuperscript{25} and his ability to exercise a high level of legislative power through the use of emergency ordinances when the Diet was not in session. Although the Meiji Constitution proved to be a flexible document, allowing the growth of party power, official amendments never surfaced. Richardson and Flanagan summarize that it was

\begin{quote}
this intended flexibility [that] was one of the constitution's principal strengths because it permitted marginal adjustments in the laws of decision-making authority in response to a shifting distribution of resources among contenders for power.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

In reality, however, this intended flexibility allowed military power to escape from accountability to the civilian sectors of government.

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{24} Richardson and Flanagan, \textit{Politics in Japan}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{25} It is important to note that the Meiji Constitution was protected from amendment due to the fact that any revisions could only be initiated by the emperor. Historically, the Meiji Constitution was never amended until the occupational authorities revised it in 1946. Richardson and Flanagan, \textit{Politics in Japan}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 9.
\end{flushleft}
Consequently, from 1900 to 1945, Japan's initial move toward liberal democracy was short lived as militant elements in government changed the course of Japan's political development from a fledgling democracy to a repressive militaristic state. Since the military was not accountable to civilian sectors of government, and due to the military's direct access to the emperor to attain imperial seals of approval for planning, administration, and combat operations, power held by militarists in government became enormous. For example, "the military could intervene in civil governmental and political affairs by withdrawing [its] . . . ministers from cabinet and refusing to supply a replacement unless its demands were met."27 Thus, successive cabinets were always at risk of being toppled if the military chose to withdraw its various ministers from cabinet. By the early 1930s, with economic depression and international isolation taking hold, "the predominance of the [political] parties was openly challenged by the military."28 Using tools of coercion, intimidation, the assassination of leading opponents, foreign land acquisition and nationalist propaganda campaigning, the military was able to displace parties completely and seize

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27 Ibid., p. 10. Although the years 1924 through 1932 marked an era of party-led governments, these parties never led Japan towards a system of true representative democracy. Power was never centralized into one office whereby civilians and the military were made accountable to one another (see: Ibid., p. 14).

the dominant position in the governing coalition during the years 1936-45.\textsuperscript{29}

Japan's governmental structure fell victim to oligarchic authoritarian leadership. The Meiji Constitution's weak accountability and authority structure, enabling the military to gain power without being accountable to civilian sectors of government, was "successfully exploited by the military to move Japan abruptly in the direction of a fascist model of government in the 1930's."\textsuperscript{30} Japan's road toward Pearl Harbour was now on course in the name of the Emperor, symbolically leading the Japanese people toward planned conflict.

To sum up, the Meiji Constitution symbolized two kinds of problems for pre-World War II Japan: weak democracy and a strong military. Because of these two problems, General MacArthur promptly rejected Prime Minister Shidehara's plan to revise the Meiji Constitution. Due to Japan's occupied position at the time, the prime minister and his cabinet had no options but to accept the US-written constitution. At the core of this 1947 Constitution is Article 9, which in turn is related to the Japanese-US Alliance and Japan's Self-Defense Forces.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 14.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 15.C
III. ARTICLE 9, THE JAPANESE-US ALLIANCE, AND SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

To combat inherent militaristic tendencies to be found within Japan's political military structure, Article 9 of the Constitution clearly and emphatically enforced the principle that Japan would never again wage military war against any state.

Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.31

With the complete renunciation of war and its inability to wage war, Japan was faced with the prospect of complete vulnerability to external threats. Initial options available to Japan to alleviate this vulnerability varied from a potential alliance with the Soviet Union, or dependence upon the United Nations to uphold its mandate to maintain international peace and security. Another option was to ally with the United States by way of granting it access to land, sea and air bases within Japanese territory. The last option was chosen, US guardianship being quickly accepted and emulated by Japanese politicians as the better option available to protect

31 Refer to Appendix K for the Constitution of Japan.
Japanese territory from potentially belligerent neighbours. At the same time, membership in the United Nations was seen as a subordinate second option available to Japan in case Japanese-US relations soured.

The alliance forged a relationship between the two states, which today, despite fluctuations in compatibility, has survived for over fifty years. Specifically, the Japanese-US military alliance became legitimized through the creation and implementation of the MST. To alleviate Japan's well-founded fear of repercussions against its territory from states subject to its wartime actions, and for it to be able to survive Cold War tensions while at the same time adhere to Article 9, Japan entered into the MST with the United States. The MST has up to the present time channelled the ways in which successive Japanese governments have conducted their external relations. Strict adherence to Article 9 constraints has been feasible as a direct result of the MST. F. Q. Quo postulates that the MST—Article 9 compatibility, in essence, "enabled Japan to concentrate her national efforts on economic reconstruction in the 1950's [as well as] relieve . . . [the state] of worries regarding both internal and external security."

grants the US (and the US accepts) the right to dispose of US land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan, not only for the security of Japan but also for international peace and security in the Far East, and furthermore, the US forces could be utilized, at the request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan.33

Reliance on the MST by successive governments allowed for their energies to be focused on economic prosperity. National security issues did come to the forefront of governmental concerns during heightened Cold War tensions, specifically with the United States' heightened interests in Asia, namely its campaign in Korea, US political protection of Taiwan against the PRC, and its bungled attempt to keep Vietnam from entering the communist hold. Japan, however, continued its set course toward economic prosperity. By the 1960s, Japan's trading partners expanded beyond the Southeast Asia territory to include the People's Republic of China (PRC) and various Latin American states.34

The MST was revised in 1960, and it was strongly opposed by the Socialists. Revisions of the MST allowed Japan greater participation in the decision making process regarding implementation of the treaty for

33 Article 1 of the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, September 8, 1951. The clause concerning internal riots was later deleted in 1960, as will be noted later in the text.

34 Refer to Table 1 in Appendix A and Table 2 in Appendix B for a look at Japan's trading practices and rapidly increasing trade figures with certain regions in the world.
Japan's own security and for peace and security to be maintained in the Far East region. Of great impact was the omission of the provision found in the original treaty: US Forces would no longer be called upon for domestic security (i.e. internal riots), since Japan was then on its way to rearming itself.\textsuperscript{35} The major reason why the provision was not included was that the Japanese government believed that provision was a symbol of Japanese dependence on the United States. This dependence was considered humiliating. The Article 9 provision in the 1947 Constitution that land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained, however, remained unaltered. Thus, the MST continued to allow Japan to honor the spirit of Article 9, shielding Japan from the harsh realities of the Cold War. Thanks to the MST, Japan could use tactics of political fancy footwork: Japan could maintain armed forces on a relatively modest scale, called Self-Defense Forces. Successive LDP governments as well as more recent weaker coalition governments could argue that Self-Defence-Forces are not maintained for potential external projectile capabilities but more so for self-defence needs.

Thus, during the Cold War period, there was a coherent legal-institutional framework composed of the 1947 Constitution (Article 9 and

Self-Defense Forces as its "sub-product") and the Japanese-US MST, which guided Japan to take a passive security posture. The question remains: Can this framework still be viable for post-Cold War Japan? In the post-Cold War period, Japan's political side-stepping, that is, using the MST as a shield for not re-arming itself, is becoming difficult. With the recent withdrawal of US military guardianship in Asia (for example, base closures in the Philippines as well as in Japan), Japan now faces the inevitable prospect of re-arming itself to a greater level than already achieved.36 Thus far, the mandate of the Self-Defense Forces has been to ensure the safety of Japan from outside threats only. This mandate, however, has recently

36 The fear that a dormant imperialist Japan in the northern Pacific, waiting for the opportune time to once again re-surface as the region's sole hi-tech militarized superpower, does not sit well with Asian states scarred by Japan's actions during World War II. Nor is the United States ready to once again enter an arms race, this time with Japan, which has an economy and manufacturing capability to rival US military armament manufacturing. (Through the MST, Japan and the United States have exchanged military technology information as well as armaments with each other. For example, during the late 1980s, Japan acquired the rights to build its own short-range fighter jet dubbed the FSX. The blue print for the FSX was the American F16 jet fighter. As of early 1995, the first FSX jet fighter prototype was completed. Production of these fighters is scheduled for 1996.)

The United States has just recently found itself the primary victor of the Cold War. However, as a result of Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, Japan has also reaped enormous benefits in being the United States' most coveted ally in Asia, as Donald Hellmann pointed out in his recent guest lecture at Simon Fraser University. With its global political and military supremacy at the end of the Cold War, the United States is strangled with the self-imposed obligation of maintaining peace and security for the world, with the United Nations at its side. For its victory, however, the United States has paid an enormous economic price. Restructuring part of the present US manufacturing industry, which to a large extent focuses on military technological innovations, to a new broader consumer product manufacturing base will undoubtedly impact its economy and its future military prowess. In contrast, Japan's primary focus on the manufacturing of products has relied heavily on civilian consumption not on military armament. Japan's military budget has for the most part remained just below or above its government-set one percent ceiling of annual GNP. Also, refer to Table 3 in the appendices for a close chronological look at Japan's defense expenditures.
come under strains, due to actions taken by past LDP governments in meeting the United Nations' requests for Japan to actively partake in UNPKOs around the globe using Self-Defence-Forces. Japanese mine sweepers being sent to the Persian Gulf as well as non-combat forces being sent to Cambodia to ensure fair elections to take place have changed the way in which the nature of Self-Defense Forces is interpreted. Since 1991, Self-Defence Forces have numbered around 250,000 personnel with an annual budget of 25-30 billion US dollars annually. Nevertheless, the powerful inertia of the Cold War legal-institutional framework persists and continues to constrain Japan's security policy.

This inertia is helped by the fact UN operations are not always politically neutral peace "keeping" activities, as some idealists might characterize them. They are often politically biased, peace "making" activities. The recent Gulf War is a case in point. The war was a US-led mission under the banner of the United Nations, not vice versa. US desires to maintain its influence in the region were retained. The net result of the Gulf War for the United Nations, however, was a somewhat tainted image that the international organization was after all a tool of a great


38 Refer to Appendix P for a definition regarding Peace-Keeping, Making and Building.
power, a cover for US "peace-keepers" against Iraqi troops. With its massive forces in this war, the United States used United Nations mandate to achieve its own military and political objectives in the Persian Gulf region. (Presently, Japan imports about 70 per cent of its oil from the region. 39) The "dirtiness" of actual UNPKOs does not encourage Japan to come out of its comfortable cocoon of the Cold War legal-institutional framework.

The inertia of Japan's Cold War legal-institutional framework is also due to a number of failed UNPKOs. For example, the United Nations protection force agenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) has been fraught with various problems in monitoring cease-fires amongst warring groups, delivering humanitarian relief to inhabitants, and safeguarding six United Nations designated safe areas.

After 32 months of the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the fall of Hitler's Third Reich, it has come to this. The failure of international will against Bosnian Serb aggression amounts to a political and moral collapse . . . crippling the United Nation's credibility in managing the use of force . . . The World body teeters on the verge of abandoning its humanitarian-intervention mission in Bosnia. 40


In another example, the 1992-93 United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) saw United Nations troops being ambushed and murdered by indigenous political factions. The UNOSOM mandate was to secure the passage of humanitarian relief to Somalians. Instead, due to a lack of a clear mandate, United Nations troops found themselves caught in battle against various militarized indigenous groups.\(^{41}\) Thus far, the United Nations has sponsored twenty nine peace-keeping operations since 1946.\(^{42}\) However, recently, the organization has been allegedly issuing misguided mandates, putting its troops into jeopardy. The questionable mandate of recent UNPKOs reinforce Japan's reluctance to actively participate in UNPKOs.

These hard and somewhat disappointing realities of UNPKOs are in sharp contrast to an idealist image of the United Nations found in the Japanese Constitution and held by Japan's general public. The Constitution envisages pacifist settlements of disputes; it is based on an idealist, non-conflict-oriented moral stand. Thus, the argument that Japan

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\(^{42}\) Gareth Evans, Co-operation for Peace (Victoria, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 101. For an in-depth look at each UNPKOs refer to the above mentioned source, or refer to Appendix H and Appendix J.
should not consider becoming a more active player in UNPKOs, due to its "morally correct" constitution can be quite powerful--at least at the level of emotion--in Japan. In fact, Japan's pacifist constitution is in direct harmony with the United Nations' "first option" for dispute resolution. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter specifies that member states of the organization are to adhere to principles of pacific settlement when disputes arise. This point leads us to Japan's position in the Charter in question.

III. JAPAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states that members are to maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures to prevent or remove threats to peace. As well, member states must suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. Article 51 gives member states the "inherent right of individual or collective self defence." Seizaburo Sato brings to the forefront an obvious dichotomy. Japan's Article 9 provision, renouncing the right of collective self defence, is in complete conflict and a clear abdication of its responsibilities as a United Nations member. Japan, as a United Nations member offering its

43 Charter of the United Nations, p. 3. See Appendix I, for Articles 1 through 51 of the Charter.

support and deriving benefits from its membership, has an obligation to adhere to the United Nations' mandate. Within its own Constitution (Article 98), Japan is compelled to adhere to treaties which it has signed. As a member of the United Nations, Japan is bound to accept and apply the principles of the organization when called upon to do so. As a sovereign state, Japan, however, remains hesitant to participate in UNPKOs even though it has a legal obligation to adhere to Article 98, and thus to the Charter of the United Nations.

As a former enemy of the victorious wartime Allied Forces, Japan was officially deemed an enemy of the then newly created United Nations. Through Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter, present day Japan remains politically stigmatized, it is simultaneously an official former enemy yet a legitimizd member of the United Nations. One may argue, therefore, that Japan's member status and influence in the United Nations remains precarious. Although it remains difficult to quantifiably argue that Japan's precarious status in the United Nations directly correlates to its selective participation in UNPKOs, the issue of its current

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45 Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established law of nations shall be faithfully observed.

Refer to Appendix K for the complete text of Japan's present Constitution.
official "former enemy" status within the United Nations should not be disregarded.

Rather than through military means, Japan has supported the United Nations through financial means. This is also true for UNPKOs. Let us first see Japan's general budgetary contribution to the United Nations. "For the 1990-1 biennium," according to Peter Baehr and Leon Gordenker, "the UN [United Nations] budget to which member governments are obliged to contribute totalled some $12.6 billion US". The largest contributors on an annual basis in 1992 are as follows: The United States paid for 25 per cent of the United Nations' annual budget; Japan 11.38 per cent; the former Soviet Union 9.99 per cent; a united Germany at 9.38 per cent; France 6.25 per cent; the United Kingdom 4.86 per cent; Italy 3.99 per cent; and Canada 3.09 per cent. Japan was the second largest contributor. As for expenditures for UNPKOs, recent demands for more UNPKOs have resulted in an alarming increase in peace-keeping budgetary expenditures:

In the last two years [May 1991 to May 1993] the annual United Nations peace-keeping budget grew five fold, from $600 million in 1991 to $2.8 billion in 1992. . . Operations . . . envisaged in

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47 Ibid., p. 60.
1993 [were to] bring the annual budget to $4.3 billion.48

Gareth Evans tabulates the 1993 "annual peace-keeping budget at 3.7 billion and the six-week Gulf War peace enforcement coalition at more than $70 billion."49 Japan contributed approximately $13 billion toward the Gulf War. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait were the top three contributors, with Japan being the fourth largest financial contributor.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

It is clear that Japan has the monetary and military capability to partake in active UNPKOs. Yet, Japan's participation in various UNPKOs has been only in the form of monetary assistance, diplomatic manoeuvering, and the limited deployment of non-combatant Self-Defense Forces personnel to certain regions in the world. One significant overall reason for Japan's cautious approach to UNPKOs lies in the state's legal-institutional framework composed of the 1947 Constitution, the Japanese-US MST, and the United Nations Charter. This framework, more broadly conceived than in the existing literature on Japanese security policy cited


49 Evans, *Cooperating For Peace*, p. 178.
in Chapter 1, has constrained Japan against actively forging ahead in the field of UNPKOs. Its origins go back to the early post-World War II period; it has persisted and still constrains contemporary Japan.

Within this legal-institutional framework, Japan's security policy was and is formulated through political dynamics centering around successive Japanese prime ministers. Such political dynamics will be the topic of the next chapter. While the framework is a constraint against Japan's active participation in UNPKOs, political dynamics have also encouraged Japan's passive security policy.
CHAPTER THREE: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

I. INTRODUCTION

Democratic politics through the Japanese legislature, although superficially well entrenched in the government's day to day activities, remains in its infancy. Only since 1946 has democratic consensus style policy-making come to be one of the principal methods used by government to act on issues. During the 1920s, democratic reforms were considered, and to some extent implemented; however such reforms were short-lived. Nowhere is there greater tension in the creation and implementation of policy than between consensus seekers and authoritarian elements in government regarding issues of national security and global peace-keeping.

Since Japan's political reconstruction after World War II, twenty five prime ministers have made their mark with various domestic as well as foreign policies. For the most part, a growing number of policy analysts subscribe to the general belief that successive Japanese governments often

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50 For information regarding Japanese authoritarian style government from the fourth or fifth century up to the 1500s, read Kishimoto's Politics in Modern Japan. Discussion of authoritarian style governance during the Tokugawa era is found in Richardson and Flanagan, Politics in Japan.

51 For a comprehensive list of Japan's prime ministers from 1885 to 1987 refer to Appendix M.
create foreign policy that generally "shies away" from making key decisions at necessary times. Past and present "shying away" policies have significantly restricted Japan's ability to deal with foreign policy issues. Slow to react, "wait and see" foreign policies have not benefited Japan's international image as an emerging great power in today's world. Japan's foreign policies have not matched the potential power that it wields as a member of the global community. This chapter builds upon this general insight and presents a specific argument regarding Japan's policy toward UNPKOs in the early 1990s.

This chapter proposes that, despite Japan's vast economic power having far reaching influences upon various states across the world, its foreign policies, including its policy toward UNPKOs, have remained slow to change, ad hoc, and reactive. Japan's domestic political dynamics has hindered the capabilities of strong leadership of prime ministers. This weakness is systemic in the sense that it is deeply rooted in the nature of the post-World War II Japanese political system. In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the systemic leadership problem has been affecting Japan's security policy. The systemic leadership problem existed before the late 1980s, as the prime minister's leadership

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for a more active security policy was hindered by perennial factional politics within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Corruption scandals, and strong pacifist sentiments of the Japanese public that were represented effectively by the opposition parties also hindered more active security policy initiatives. Only strong-willed prime ministers (and those with a strong factional position within the LDP) could overcome these obstacles for a more active security policy. But this systemic problem deteriorated to a crisis point in the late 1980s when the rapid succession of prime ministers became the norm.

Compounding this problem were subtle influences of Japan's traditional political culture regarding political leadership. On the surface, the concept of individualized national leadership is clear. One person, either chosen to lead or through undemocratic political battle, becomes leader, supposedly taking on the task of executive leadership for the state. In reality, however, the locus of leadership is not clear in Japan. This state often grapples with two types of leadership -- symbolic and real. For example, from an omnipotent divine leadership, Emperor Hirohito's role, which many argue was only symbolic, allowed the pre-World War II military oligarchy to control and lead Japan's destiny. In post-World War II Japan, despite democratized electoral processes, various prime ministers
have remained symbolic, incapable of carrying the state toward well-planned foreign policy objectives.

The weak leadership of Japanese prime ministers, therefore, directly stems from tractable political dynamics, but at the same time, is subtly influenced by the intractable context of Japanese political culture. The problem in any analysis of political cultural influences upon state leaders is the lack of quantifiable data available to prove that such influences affect leaders. In this chapter, therefore, the effects of political culture upon Japan's leadership crisis are cautiously applied to some situations and are not considered as a definitive, core element contributing to Japan's leadership problem.

This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, the issue of political culture is defined and discussed in the context of Japan, so that the nature of Japan's leadership problem can be put in a proper context. Second, Japan's leaders and foreign policy will be reviewed prior to the late 1980s, that is, during the Cold War period. In this section, we will shed light on leadership patterns: strong, active leaders have had strong foreign policies, despite the systemic obstacles for policy change, while passive leaders have, for the most part, maintained "shying away" and slow to change foreign policies. The third section deals with the post-Cold War period, with a special focus on Japan's reaction to the Gulf War that
eventually resulted in the United Nations Peace Keeping Cooperation Bill. This is the period when Japan could not fundamentally depart from its past passive security policy, because the leadership problem had deteriorated to a crisis point due to the rapid succession of prime ministers.

II. POLITICAL CULTURE IN JAPAN

Michael Tucker defines the term "political culture" as follows: "By 'political culture' we mean simply the distinctive attitudes and approaches of a people towards politics as these attributes have been shaped by historical traditions, demography, and geographical circumstances."53 On the other hand, Sidney Verba states: "Political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place."54 When analyzing political culture, attention must also be given to "what phenomena . . . [and] what the significant beliefs are, and how they are related to other aspects of politics [i.e., the creation of policy]."55 Verba


55 Ibid., p. 226.
thus emphasizes 'beliefs' in his concept of political culture: "the term political culture . . . refers to the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions."56 Political culture, defined as such, "regulates who talks to whom, . . . who influences whom [and] regulates how formal institutions operate."57 For our purposes, therefore, the term "political culture" simply means the beliefs, values and actions of a certain society towards political situations that arise over time.

The creation of domestic policy influenced by Japanese political culture, according to Langdon, retains a "high degree of group emphasis . . . compared to western countries."58 This group emphasis, however, does not solely maintain traditional roles and encourage the reincorporation of old group attitudes; this group emphasis remains dynamic, creating "new forms of organization, even under industrialization and modernization."59 For example, traditional values, beliefs, and emotions of the political culture from the 1890s to 1947 (as Langdon calls the transition period) did not merely follow "ancient modes of political organization . . . . They were and have become very prominent in the most modern types of associations

56 Ibid., p. 227.
57 Ibid., p. 228.
59 Ibid.
and organizations."60 This mixture of tradition and modernity can be found in the clash between the ancient belief in harmony and the modern expression of open competition. Although "the proliferation of pressure groups and other associations is an expression . . . of a more modern society . . . [O]pen competition is usually avoided for . . . traditional accommodation and surface harmony."61 Frank Langdon surmises that: "[The] Japanese social experience does not provide sufficient socialization in the ritualized hostility that lies behind the operation of party politics in western countries."62

Post-World War II Japan is a collectivist society, where the individual today may "still . . . suppress . . . personal preferences for the sake of group goals."63 Such behaviour has an impact on politics. Although a great amount of discretion is said to be left to Japanese leaders who do not necessarily defer to their followers to the same extent as their counterparts in western countries, Japan's general tendency is toward group orientation.64 Since the 1960s, leaders have had to walk a "tight-rope,"

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 73.
63 Ibid., p. 74.
64 Ibid., pp. 74-75. Langdon subscribes to the notion that "the discretion . . . of leaders is so broad and support of followers so uncritical, serious abuse has occurred in party politics". In an extreme case before World War I, deference to leaders was so strong. Footnote Continued on Next Page
considering ministerial goals, political party factions, pressure groups, and influences of other associations. The resulting diminished power of Japanese leaders leads to reactive foreign policies. At best, therefore, Japan's foreign policy is characterized by "a shrewd pragmatization and, at worst, by an irresponsible immobilism."65 Langdon, in part, attributes problems found in Japan's foreign policy due to "excessive social stability." That is to say, "[b]asic social attitudes are so persistent . . . that they prevent desirable political change at the present time."66 Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in MacArthur's attempt to alter Japan's political culture. Although foreign occupation (1945 to 1952) by the United States, via the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur forcefully implemented political structural changes (for example, liberal-style party government, interest groups, and unions); his greatest challenge was the attempt to reform traditional social attitudes in society. On October 11, 1945, MacArthur informed Prime Minister

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that, during the Inukai incumbency, an admirer stated, "he was a man of strict integrity and never tried to please his constituents." Until the 1960s, Japanese political cultural roots adhered to the belief that political leaders were to be given a great amount of freedom and such leaders were supposed to: "Be willing to risk unpopularity on a particular issue if need be, or be free to go their . . . own way, provided . . . supporters' long-run interests [were] looked after" (ibid.).


66 Langdon, Politics in Japan, p. 197.
Shidehara that "[i]n the achievement of the Potsdam Declaration, the traditional social order under which the Japanese people for centuries have been subjugated will be corrected." In short, attempts were made to substitute equality and individualism for socially accepted authoritarianism and paternalism.

MacArthur did in fact complete Japan's so-called political modernization in terms of creating a popular-style government with a new constitution but his quest for social reform has not fully materialized. To some extent, the principles of western-style equality, individualism, and open competition have penetrated Japan's political system. On the other hand, traditional modes of accommodation, surface harmony, and group dynamics still prevail. Langdon reiterates a common western perspective that:

Despite considerable social change, the development of individual behaviour at the informal level is not changing enough, and that the proportion of traditional elements in the political sphere may continue to be high.

Caution must be used when applying Western political cultural principles to a state such as Japan where different principles have existed for some

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67 Ibid., p. 265.

68 Ibid., p. 95.
Perhaps, a better way to characterize Japan is a "marriage," so to speak, of new ideas and the traditional cultural mental framework, the latter remaining dominant. Thus, "the relative success of pluralistic politics in Japan today is not surprising since . . . group competition has long been great [in Japan]."70 The case of Japan, in other words, confirms the perspective that each political culture is a mixture of tradition and modernity.

The impact of Japanese political culture upon the state's foreign policy cannot be denied. Traditional group dynamics often prevail over powerful individuals, in spite of great deference given to particular leaders. This group emphasis, however, is not static but dynamic, changing and coping with industrialization and modernization. The modern western ideals of individualism, equality, and open competition, in some circumstances, have penetrated Japan's political structure and culture; however, traditional ideals maintaining surface harmony and accommodation still prevail. Japan's need to improve its international status, its anxiety over being internationally isolated, its inferiority complex, and its desire to conform to world trends all help to explain why

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70 Langdon, Politics in Japan, p. 282.
Japanese foreign policy remains reactive. Seizaburo Sato reveals that Japanese foreign policy remains ad hoc, reactive and equivocal due to:

- a strong sense of belonging to Japan and the Japanese race coupled with deep feelings of inferiority;
- an intense concern with improving the country's international status;
- a deep anxiety over being isolated internationally;
- a desire to conform to world trends;
- and an emotional commitment to Asia.

Political change is also slow due to excessive social stability, resulting in continued, less than dynamic foreign policy. Although many political changes may be attributed to the influences of the US occupation forces, traditional political cultural influences still prevail. Political cultural influences have not remained static but have in fact adapted to modernization.

Despite the general tendency toward immobilism, Japan has witnessed some strong leaders and they have moved Japanese security policy toward the activist direction. Political culture, therefore, is a constraint that can be overcome by some exceptional figures. Japanese security policy is better understood in this bifocal perspective. The rest of

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71 For an in depth look at this argument look at Sato, "The Foundations of Modern Japanese Policy."

this chapter, will examine the fluctuations in political leadership styles dealt with the legal-institutional framework identified in Chapter 1. In this analysis, Japan's immobilist culture recedes to the background.

**III. THE COLD WAR PERIOD**

**A. Early Post-World War II Period**

From Japan's military defeat in 1945, to the end of allied occupation on April 28, 1952, the era of "escape from international politics" (aptly coined by F.Q. Quo) took root. Despite the government's self-directing appearance, directives from a new dominant group--the US Occupation forces--were adhered to. Domestic issues and foreign policy were controlled by the Occupation forces. As a result, the stage for reactive foreign policy was well entrenched in Japan's political structure from the beginning of US Occupation to its end. External pressure from allied forces laid the foundation for "profound" changes in the country's political structure as well as political culture. At this time, constitutional changes, the creation of representative government, legalizing labour movements, stripping the emperor of all sovereign powers, and attempts at political cultural remodelling took place.

Pacifism, symbolized by Article 9 of the new constitution, held an air of legitimacy, due mainly to the consequences of defeat and devastation at that time, not solely as a result of forced policy by the United States.
Hence, pacifism blossomed and to this day maintains an air of political legitimacy. The political legitimization of pacifism has even in recent times been used as a powerful tool in dealing with Japan's failed attempts to take a more active part in peace-keeping missions sponsored by the United Nations. In summary, Japan's 'Escape from International Politics era' was marked by its adherence to occupation directives, . . . [later to become] constraints upon Japan's choice in its subsequent domestic development as well as its relations with other nations."73 In addition, this era saw the legitimization of pacifism, which was enforceable through Article 9 of the constitution.

Japan achieved political independence from occupation forces on April 28, 1952, after signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the MST on September 8, 1951. The two treaties set in motion Japan's era of political and societal independence vis-à-vis the West. The treaties inexorably linked Japanese politics and national security with the West but, at the same time, alienated the state from the Soviet Union and the PRC. The rise of the PRC in 1949, the Korean War in 1950, the increasing burden upon the United States to supply Japan with raw materials, the repair of war damage, the control of inflation, and the Cold War between

the United States and the Soviet Union, all led the United States to shift its Japan policy from mere democratic reform to that of economic rehabilitation. The concept of a stable and prosperous Japan, allied to the West, as an island in the sea of encroaching communism, set the stage for a strong bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States. Prime Minister Yoshida--a charismatic leader--and his five successive cabinets set the tone in which Japanese foreign policy . . . remained strongly influenced by the United States but decreasingly so. [His] foreign policy was fiercely anti-communist with the resulting close alignment with the United States and Taiwan and poor relations with the Communist states.74

F.Q. Quo attributes the Japanese-US MST to be the cornerstone of Japan's post-World War II external relations. The security treaty aligned Japan with the West, especially the United States, and allowed for developing relations in Southeast Asia. The MST "in essence, relieved (Japan) of worries regarding both internal and external security . . . therefore, also enabled Japan to concentrate her national efforts on economic reconstruction."75

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74 Langdon, Politics in Japan, p. 277.

75 Quo, "Japan and the Pacific Rime: A Historical Review," Politics of the Pacific Rim, p. 60.
Regarding policy planning and implementation, Japanese groups often seem locked in factional bickering and rivalry against out-groups.\textsuperscript{76} Sometimes:

\begin{quote}
in the context of an outside threat Japanese groups seem to be able to transfer the intense loyalty and dedication of purpose displayed within the in-group to ever broadening group boundaries that build up pyramidaluntil, if the threat is foreign, the entire nation is combined into one 'we Japanese' group.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

During the Yoshida era (1946-1954), one may infer that Japan had cohesive "group oriented" foreign policy and that there was a weak sense of "we Japanese" versus outsiders. In order to avoid national ostracization from the world system, Japan had to embark on a quest for new alliances. Foreign policy goals in those years were relatively clear cut. As a result, Japan's foreign policy sided with that of the United States. Fervent anti-communist policy alongside similar US policy was adhered to. Japan's signing of the MST in 1951 solidified its anti-communist philosophy. Resumption of trade with some Western allies and its quest to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) further solidified its Western alliance especially with the United States. Interestingly, however,

\textsuperscript{76} See Richardson and Flanagan, \textit{Politics in Japan}, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
unified group-oriented foreign policy initiatives and planning, as well as implementation were not characteristics of this era. On the contrary:

Not only was there no national consensus or bipartisan foreign policy during this period, but even those who belonged to the same party differed violently with each other on the nation's external relations.\(^{78}\)

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 not only boosted Japan's economy, but allowed Prime Minister Yoshida the good fortune and opportunity to show allegiance if not deference to Japan's new ally, the United States. Subsequent signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the first Japanese-US security pact in 1951 demonstrated Prime Minister Yoshida's commitment to the United States. Clearly, Japan's leaders during the early 1950s were not in a position to flex individualistic leadership goals in Japan's foreign relations outside the framework of the Japanese-US alliance. Many argue that the Prime Minister, in fact, "cowtowed" to US desires. Prime Minister Yoshida, however, is credited with the creation of Japan's National Police Reserve, which has evolved to become Japan's Self-Defence Forces.

In short, the Yoshida campaign set the stage for successive leaders having to battle divisive domestic disputes as well as show allegiance to

\(^{78}\) Quo, "Japan and the Pacific Rim: A Historical Review," Politics of the Pacific Rim, p. 61.
external powers in its foreign policy ventures. This combination of factors would take an enormous toll on successive leaders. With allegiance to US governmental objectives regarding curtailment of communist expansion in Asia, Japan gained its security. Within this security framework, successive leaders could now expend most of their energies toward re-building Japan's weakened economy. Security issues were eventually settled. But it was not until 1960--the revision of the original MST--when this "settling down" process started.

From 1954 to 1960, three prime ministers took office. Prime Minister Hatoyama vowed to progressively remilitarize the state as well as draft an independent constitution. Hatoyama did not fully begin Japan's remilitarization campaign; nor did he create Japan's own constitution. Hatoyama's successes in foreign policy were the achievement of normalization in Japanese-Soviet relations and Japan's entry into the United Nations in December of 1956. The succeeding Tanzan Ishibashi cabinet was short-lived, due to the new leader's sudden illness.

In February 1957, Nobusuke Kishi formed the first of his two successive governments. The stalemate over constitutional revision continued, despite attempts made by the Kishi governments to change it. Kishi's main success, however, was in the revision of the Japanese-US MST. Ironically, Kishi sought a more reciprocal treaty between both states
but his cabinet used undemocratic means in the Diet to revise the MST. Prime Minister Kishi is one of the few post-World War II Japanese prime ministers to have possessed the ability to successfully combat group dynamics. After all, deference to leadership in government does occur sometimes in Japanese politics. Prime Minister Kishi is one good example of such a case. By allowing the use of undemocratic means in the Diet, Kishi, however, paid a heavy price. Heavy political and public pressure forced his resignation from office. Kishi’s reign is typical of short lived, strong, individualistic leadership traits which impacted Japanese foreign policy in a positive manner.

B. The Era of Leadership Stability

Political leadership through the 1960s, specifically July 1960 up to November 1972, can be typified as stable. Hayato Ikeda headed three administrations in July-Dec 1960, 1960-1963, and 1963-64. Eisaku Sato formed three cabinets (1964-1967, 1967-70, and 1970-72). He served as prime minister for seven years and eight months. His time in office remains the longest continuous administration in Japan’s constitutional history. This stable leadership era should not be mistaken as a time when both leaders used charismatic charm to hold office successfully. Both prime ministers were Yoshida’s protégés who sought a greater mercantilist
course for Japan. Ikeda saw an open window in Japan's newly revised MST with the United States. Mercantilist ventures were now attainable without heavy emphasis on security issues.\textsuperscript{79}

Ikeda's reign symbolizes Japan's rapid ascension toward global economic prosperity. Ikeda wore the badge of a standard bearer of mainstream conservative politics. Ikeda's motto of "tolerance and patience" and avoidance of confrontation was put in motion, resulting in Japan's industrialized power base set by 1964. No domestic unrest during this time came from the public, or from political adversaries, due mainly to rapid increases in living standards as well as individual earning capacities. Ikeda's foreign economic policy was successful. Prime Minister Ikeda successfully negotiated Japan's GATT status as an open economy by ascending to Article 11 status in 1963. In 1964, Japan further strengthened its ties to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and also joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the same year. In 1964, the state held the Tokyo Olympics which symbolized Japan's ascension as an industrialized power.

With all his successes, Ikeda resigned shortly after the Olympics, due to illness. Ikeda's reign was mired in his administration's lack of

\textsuperscript{79} Refer to Table 1, Appendix A, Table 2, Appendix B, Table 6, Appendix F, and Table 8, Appendix H, regarding Japan's rapid rise in trade with various states based on a regional analysis.
politicized foreign policy. Foreign economic policies gave Japan a new industrial power image but left Japan in its typical void. Japan is a state willing to accept peace and security from its allies but not yet ready to take on obligations of maintaining greater peace and security for states in need. From 1960 to 1964, the world was mired in superpower nuclear competition. Japan, like all other states, made no independent moves to diffuse US-Soviet confrontation.

Prime Minister Sato's reign lasted approximately seven years and eight months. Through three successive administrations, Sato followed the Ikeda plan for national economic prosperity. Annual economic growth rose by approximately ten per cent during Sato's tenure and "by 1968, Japan became the second largest economic power in the free world, after the United States, in terms of gross national product." The Sato era can be described as a time where conciliatory leadership traits prevailed. At this time, security issues for Japan were inexorably linked to US foreign policy. For the United States, the curtailment of communist expansion in Asia was a core issue that was to be addressed immediately. The island state of Japan, "in the sea of encroaching communism," was typically the perfect example of Japan doing its fair share in maintaining peace and security in Asia. Sato's domestic policies helped the state attain high economic

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growth, but in the area of foreign policy Sato fell victim to regrettable US actions. Sato neglected to act on a number of international issues that were to impact Japan. More specifically, the two 1971 Nixon shocks hit Sato hard: United States recognition of China and the US President's "set of dollar-defence measures" that resulted in an abrupt rise in the value of the Yen. Soon after the two "shocks," Sato's reign came to an end.

During the Ikeda and Sato eras, security issues remained a domestic concern. At this time, security concerns and policies were oriented towards protecting the homeland in a defensive capacity only. Japan was not poised to interact as a global peace and security player. Instead, domestic and economic concerns were emphasized by both prime ministers.

**C. The Dirty Politics Era**

Leadership instability, from 1972 to 1982, was a clear departure from the 1960s whereby two uncharismatic yet talented leaders took Japan to new heights. The 1970s can best be described as the beginning of the dirty politics era where inner party (LDP) factional infighting and power jockeying led to a quick, untidy succession of leaders.

In 1973, Kakuei Tanaka rose to become Japan's new style commercialized, business-oriented prime minister. Tanaka can be characterized as one of Japan's few bold and charismatic leaders. Tanaka
broke a number of established norms in the process of how the prime minister was selected. The Tanaka regime garnered strong foreign policy successes by normalizing relations with the PRC but without subjecting Japanese-US security arrangements to any form of instability. The high profile success in his foreign policy paved a new road for Japan's Asia policy, by appeasing both US capitalist interests as well as Chinese communist interests. The Nixon shocks left Japan vulnerable to changing US policy. By normalizing relations with the PRC, every successive Japanese government would be in a position to play its "China card" when Japanese-US relations cooled. The United States was no longer at the helm of Japan's new fledgling and bold if short lived foreign policy.

Despite Tanaka's foreign policy successes, various factional infighting, miscalculations, and allegations of unethical political manoeuvring, coupled with resignations of two inner cabinet ministers who would later become prime ministers, led to his resignation from office in December of 1974. Regarding peace and security issues, Tanaka paved the way for Japan to once again be considered a potential Asian leader in this area. To attain the office of prime ministership, three of Prime Minister Tanaka's own inner cabinet ministers were now poised to do battle, through inner party factional feuding in the forthcoming years. The charismatic Takeo Miki succeeded Tanaka in 1974. Miki is one of the few
post-World War II leaders who sought mass public appeal. Miki's reign was unfortunately riddled with domestic issues pertaining to the cleansing of party politics and government. General elections held in late 1976 were the worst in LDP history at the time. That same year ex-Prime Minister Tanaka and various ministers were arrested in the ever popular Lockheed scandal, further tainting the Miki administration.

Peace and security issues, which under the Tanaka reign had begun a self-directed platform, fell from the Miki government's agenda. Japan was once again in the throes of reactionary foreign policy. Ironically, entering as a "clean" leader, Miki resigned office in late December 1976, tarnished by dirty politics despite his attempts to clean up the government.

D. Japan's Foreign Policy Goes Omni-Directional

Miki's successors, Fukuda, Ohira and Suzuki, all centred most of their attention on domestic issues; nevertheless, Prime Minister Fukuda's foreign policy success in securing a Sino-Japanese treaty must be recognized. By the late 1970s, despite two oil shocks, Japan emerged as a stronger industrialized state, no longer subject to overnight natural resource deprivations and no longer in need to acquiesce to US desires. The United States concerns over Japan's post-industrialized economic power base, amassing massive trade surpluses with the United States, led to talks over Japan's so-called closed market economy. By now, Japan had
faced a number of shifts of the "US pendulum" concerning itself only to fade away as the pendulum would shift in the other direction.

The 1970s were riddled with a number of problems between the United States and Japan. Prime Minister Sato's "wait and see" leadership style, especially in foreign trade policy with the United States (over the issue of textile exports to the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s), not only "irritated and angered President Nixon, [but also] . . . exemplified the unreliability of the Japanese leaders to him."81 The issue of textile exports to the United States and Japan's slow movement in new policy regarding the issue may have been at least a catalyst which "precipitated the Nixon economic sanctions of August 1971, when the US administration temporarily adopted an almost openly hostile policy toward Japan for the first time since the second world war."82 The fact remains that by 1972, the "swing of the pendulum" with the United States and Japan easily collaborating in all spheres of interaction was over.

Once again, Japanese priorities swung back towards greater ties with Asia. Out of preference or necessity, the uncoupling of collaboration between Japan and the United States enhanced Japan's interests with other states. Adapting to this change, the various administrations in the

81 Frank Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 192.

82 Ibid.
Japanese government during the 1970s pursued an "omnidirectional or equidistance policy."\textsuperscript{83} Japan came to recognize Asian states as important regional allies. Its response to increased trade with these states in the 1970s, however, remained passive. Tadayuki Okuma attributes this passivity in part to the quick succession of prime ministers--Sato, Tanaka, Miki, and Fukuda--leaving Japan without concrete decisive foreign policy towards these Asian states.\textsuperscript{84}

Thus, Japanese foreign policy during the 1970s was marred by uncertainty, as a result of political cultural influences as well as by international events. Indecisiveness, inaction, and mere reaction to various events in the international arena can be attributed to Sato's leadership philosophy. A quick succession of various leaders also hindered any chance for the establishment of policy aimed at the future. Prime Ministers during this era were compromisers and accommodators rather than bold leaders. This is exemplified by the fact that:

Each successive new LDP government thus consists of cabinet members representing all factions. The leader's policy has to be more omnidirectional, offending no vociferous faction if not pleasing every one of them. In the arena of foreign


policy these tendencies lead to dual diplomacy
and indecisiveness in action.\textsuperscript{85}

In sum, group dynamics prevailed over those holding the prime
minister's seat. The Nixon shocks left Japan conspicuously vulnerable to
the whims of US policy, despite its contemporary tradition of "leaning to
US policy," since the end of World War II. With the split in Japanese-US
relations, the spirit of nationalism was further reinforced. Reaction to US
rejection culminated in a "swing back" to Asia policy or omni-directional
policy. Due to de-stabilizing factors within the LDP, various leaders,
concerned about accommodating certain groups within party ranks,
pursued policy which had a tendency to drift rather than steer towards a
pre-determined course. Despite such a decade of uncertainty and to the
astonishment of numerous critics, the LDP maintained an air of domestic
legitimacy and efficacy, not solely due to LDP strength but due to the fact
that:

with one party domination and [no] viable
alternative, political force in sight, the public
[was] not . . . able to enforce a system of political
responsibility, except to give the ruling party a
larger or smaller majority of seats according to
the circumstances.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{85} F. Quei Quo, "The Impact of Domestic Politics on Japan's Foreign Policy," in Gail
Lee Bernstein and Haruhiro Fukui, eds., Japan and the World (Hong Kong: MacMillan,

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 191.
E. Cold-War Peace and Security Issues

Prime Minister Suzuki was fully aware that despite swings of the pendulum toward Asia, Japan's very survival was based on domestic and international economic prosperity, not military might, and thus, the road towards alignment with the United States was pursued. The fact remained that "there [was] no substitute for the massive economic interaction with the United States." Soviet aggression towards Afghanistan once again refuelled domestic fears and revealed the geographic realities of how close the Soviet Union was to Japan. In 1981

Suzuki [became] the first Japanese prime minister in the postwar period to accept Washington's insistence that Japan guard its sea lanes and increase defense expenditures.88

With economic prosperity and security issues at stake, "there was a common realization by the end of the 1970s that there was no alternative to the relationship with the United States."89 The Suzuki administration


89 Ibid., p. 79.
was short-lived. In 1982, Yasuhiro Nakasone emerged as Japan's new politically charged and charismatic prime minister. Nakasone was predisposed to enhancing Japan's foreign policy. The Japanese-US Ron-Yasu (President Ronald Reagan-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone) connection enhanced the collaboration between these two strange bedfellow states despite continued strains over economic as well as defence issues. Contrary to perceptions that Japan was once again becoming a US surrogate, through Nakasone's personal prowess, the government's goal "was to achieve a restructuring of Japanese-American relations by making Japan a 'political power' in international circles." Nakasone's urging that Japan do more for its own defense, plus his support in the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe was aimed at politicizing Japan's independent role in the international community. It was at this time that Japan began to fully tackle the issue of the role that the state should play regarding global peace and security. Japan's traditional political deference to US interests seemed to continue: Nakasone's objectives were also those of the United States. However, now, Japan's policies clearly revealed its independent stance within the international community. By

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90 Ibid., p. 81.

91 Although Prime Minister Nakasone tried to redefine Japan's foreign policy to become more active in international politics, Masuro Tamamoto's 1994 article, "The Ideology of Nothingness," aptly discusses Japan's renewed reluctance to enter responsible international activity.
coincidence or not, at the same time as dredging Japan's road towards international political maturity, Nakasone appeased US motives by pursuing a similar policy via harmonious interaction and accommodation. Mutual collaboration between these two giants was finally moving from idealism to reality. Traditional predominant interaction in the sphere of economics remained; however, various rifts began to emerge. For example, the issue of Japanese automobile penetration into the United States reached its height as 1980 and 1981 sales soared. "In 1980 . . . Japanese auto exports more than doubled to 158,375 units."92 Consequent friction arose, in turn politicizing the issue. Trade figures, revealing that "in 1982, [Japan] exported about five and a half million [units] and imported under forty thousand,"93 did not help matters.

Until today, Nakasone remains an anomaly, compared to previous post-World War II leaders. Nakasone can be credited for Japan's strong foreign policy during the early 1980s. Nakasone's successor, Noboru Takeshita was nominated by Nakasone himself to become prime minister in 1987. Quo succinctly elaborates one key reason for Japan's ongoing leadership crisis. That is what can be called the "genro system":


93 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
The continued presence and repeated intervention of the elders have deprived actual leaders of the authority though not the power necessary for exercising the duties of their office. Taking advantage of their long experience and political connections, these elder statesmen have often cast long shadows over the incumbent party leaders.94

During the Nakasone period and the Nakasone-backed Takeshita period, defence spending was boosted. The Nakasone-Takeshita era witnessed the lifting of the one percent ceiling on defence spending in relation to the state's gross national product.95 This time was also marked by growing discontent with the United States over economic as well as defence related issues. Burden sharing for Japan's security, as well as US peace and security obligations in Asia, had to be faced by these two leaders.

Although the Nakasone era can be described as a period of "leadership maturity" and a time marked by clear foreign policy objectives and subsequent triumphs, Takeshita's reign did not have the same good fortune. Scarred by scandals between government ministers and private corporate kick-back schemes, Takeshita merely held onto power reacting to new occurrences as they arose. Subsequent foreign policy, as a result,


95 Refer to Appendix C for a chronological expose of Japan's defense spending vis-a-vis rising GNP figures.
was reactive and often too late in coming for any positive results to arise. Poor foreign policy because of Japan's systemic leadership problem, had by then permeated well into the 1980s.

Japan's surge towards economic supremacy did modify the way in which the United States and Japan interacted. Mutual collaboration was finally taking root. Nakasone's personal prowess restructured the alliance, by politicizing Japan's power in the international community. The US governments' concurrent attitude towards Japan, that it should share a greater role in global security issues, allowed for greater harmony and accommodation between the states. The amicable Ron-Yasu connection further enhanced such collaboration. At the same time, economic "hot spots" in trade disparities continued. With Japan's move towards economic supremacy, its participation in international politics increased, thus, slowly but steadily shedding its label as a "political pygmy." With such economic might, Japan is now in a position to pursue a more realistic "omnidirectional" foreign policy, while maintaining its necessary alliance with the United States.
IV. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Since the Takeshita government, Japan's leadership problem has reached epidemic proportions. Since Takashita's resignation in mid-1989 and up to November 1994, seven politicians have held the prime minister's seat. Prime Ministers Sousuke Uno and Toshiki Kaifu were empowered to lead the state and came to power through usual LDP back room politicking. The Uno incumbency was very short lived, as allegations of his previous womanizing endeavours began to soil an already battered public image of his incumbent party (LDP).

In August 1989, Toshiki Kaifu became Japan's new leader. Heralded as a "clean" politician, Kaifu surprised many large factional groups as to his resilience in maintaining power. The Kaifu government's largest challenge was in facing the issue of whether or not to send Japan's self-defence forces to support the US-led military operations in the Persian Gulf sanctioned by the United Nations. During his administration, domestic as well as international expectations for Japan to change its international image and prowess emerged. For the first time since the state's defeat in World War II Japan was forced to face a fundamental crisis situation and to reconsider its role as an active militarized power capable of flexing its military power on a global scale.
For the Kaih administration, the following policy choices were available. The first option was status quo "shying away" policies, mimicking past governmental foreign policy decisions. Another was sharing financial burdens of the UN operations. Limited participation in the peace-keeping operations were also contemplated. Finally, the most difficult policy alternative was to actively participate in the Gulf War. This final option was hotly debated, for and against, in the Japanese Diet.

Since Cold War competition has ended, Japan has had to once again find its place in a new world order. During the Cold War, the state's fervent pro-US alliance versus its anti-communist stance stamped Japan as an unconditional US ally. In the post-Cold War new world order, Japan's role is not so clear. Alliance with the United States is maintained; nevertheless it will never be the same as in previous years. The active and positive role of the United Nations was expected in the very early post-World War II period; the expectation once again resurfaced in the post-Cold War period. But problems encountered by the United Nations in recent peace-keeping missions leaves Japan sceptical of the United Nations' ability to respond to a global crisis. By considering and partaking in UN-inspired peace missions, with US acceptance and encouragement, Japan is slowly but steadily creating its own self-directed foreign policies. It was the Gulf War that pushed Japan into a challenging position.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Kiyofuku Chuma states that "[This] awakened Japan from a long period of complacency over its passivist ideology." Until the Gulf crisis, Japan felt no urgency to re-formulate its future role as an active peace-keeper in a new world order. In following the initiatives of the United Nations, Japan quickly took political action. One day after the Iraqi invasion, the Kaifu government issued a statement condemning the Iraqi act as a violation of international law. Japan also took part in the trade embargo against Iraq sponsored by the United Nations. As the United States and other states quickly assembled their national troops to act as United Nations-sponsored multinational forces which were then hastily deployed to Saudi Arabia, Japan vacillated. A previously planned goodwill tour of the Middle East by Kaifu, slated for mid-August, was hastily postponed. Instead of being one of the first leaders of the leading industrialized states to go to the crisis area and make some diplomatic gestures to alleviate tensions or show strength on behalf of United Nations, Prime Minister Kaifu chose to stay at home.

Kaifu was already feeling the strains of failing public support for his actions regarding the Gulf crisis. Inner party factional re-alignments were also underway, thus compelling Kaifu to hold his ground on "the home front," rather than to jockey for diplomatic success in the Gulf crisis.

Nevertheless, the Kaifu administration made a bold attempt and proposed a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in the Diet so as to legalize the use of Self-Defense Forces outside Japan. The bill was submitted to parliament in October but was abandoned after the ruling party was unable to persuade opposition parties to vote for the bill in the Upper House.97 In July 1989, the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House but held onto power in the important lower house after the February 1990 election. The government failed to reconcile the deployment of Self-Defense Forces with an international projectile mandate with Japan's post-World War II peace Constitution which does not allow the use of force to settle international disputes. As Kaifu's bold, active Self-Defense Forces initiatives lost ground, mounting pressure from the United States over Japan's chronic indecisiveness over the question of UNPKOs ensued. Kaifu's immediate policy options narrowed. With a parliamentary stalemate as to what role Self-Defense Forces personnel could carry out, the incumbent leader decided to take on financial burden sharing with the United States. By the end of the crisis, "Japan [had] contributed . . . thirteen billion US dollars toward the direct and indirect costs of the Gulf War and . . . sent

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minesweepers to the Gulf." No matter how much Japan spent during and after the crisis, Kaifu's policy for UNPKOs was in line with previous governmental foreign policies. The old adage "reactive foreign policy," "too little too late," applies to Prime Minister Kaifu's attempt to include Japan in the Gulf crisis.

A. Political Side-Stepping

Prime Minister Kaifu opened the channel for future more active Japanese involvement in UNPKOs. At the end of the Gulf War, the Persian Gulf was left with numerous Iraqi mines in its waters. Germany dispatched its mine sweepers to the area. With pressure mounting, Prime Minister Kaifu announced Japan would do the same. On April 24, 1991, Japan's first active peace-keeping mission, with its own Self-Defense Forces, was deployed to the Gulf. The Kaifu government carefully side-stepped the Article 9 provision by invoking Article 99 of the Self-Defense Forces Law which states: "The Maritime Self Defence Forces will by order of the Director-General take charge of the removal and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects at sea." Kaifu's justification for SDF

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deployment was that a cease fire was, at the time, in effect and no danger of SDF involvement in militarized conflict would arise, and thus such deployment did not constitute the use of "force" under Article 9 of the Constitution.

Prime Minister Kaifu's endeavour partially appeased the US government and defused the US frustration about Japan's commitment toward maintaining global peace and security. Business interests in Japan also sought the deployment of Japanese mine sweepers to ensure the speedy passage of oil to Japan and near future reconstruction ventures in battered Gulf states. As Courtney Purrington analyzes, Japanese public support for the deployment of mine sweepers was a drastic change of opinion from previous times where Japan contemplated the deployment of Self-Defense Forces.100 This new opinion challenged the strict conventional interpretation of the Article 9 provision. Regarding the Gulf crisis itself, Purrington argues that Japan had three concerns: its lack of recognition regarding its thirteen billion US dollars cost sharing burden; its concerns over potential ostracism by the international community over its "too little too late" policy; and its recurring fears of worsening relations with the United States.101 To appreciate this third concern, it is instructive for us to

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.
examine the US media's unrelenting Japan bashing agenda, exemplified by one US magazine, *US News and World Report*:

Tokyo dithered over such seemingly simple things as sending four-wheel drive vehicles to help transport the foreign troops pouring into Saudi Arabia. Far worse, a paltry offering of $1 billion to help defray the cost of defending Japan's energy life-line was boosted to $4 billion only after sizzling US congressional criticism.  

One can speculate as to the motives behind the LDP government's active pursuit in becoming more involved in peace-keeping missions. First, the Kaifu administration may have sought to change the course of Japan's indecisiveness in foreign policy. Second, Kaifu himself was an embattled leader aware of his prime ministerial demise in the near future. Interestingly, "as the SDF [Self-Defense Forces] mine sweepers made their way slowly to the Gulf, this historic instance of Japanese global involvement seemed to invoke growing national pride."  

By invoking a chord of much needed national pride, Kaifu may have held onto power longer than envisioned by back-room factional bosses. Third, the notion of *Gaiatsu* (external pressure) from United Nations member states, specifically the United States, cannot be ignored. We do not have enough

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evidence to ascertain the weight of these motives. But the fact remains that successive governments and the Japanese public have recognized that the past conventional policies will no longer suffice. As a result, Japan continuously endevours to take on its obligations as a United Nations member capable of maintaining global peace and security. Eleven months after the beginning of the Gulf War, "the majority (71%) of Japanese ... believe[d] that the SDF should be sent [to global hotspots], under the control of the United Nations, for non-military purposes." 104

Regarding re-armament and the more active capabilities of Self-Defense Forces under United Nations supervision, the Japanese people over the past forty-four years remained consistent in their views that the peaceful settlement of global disputes should be the foremost objective pursued by Japanese government. The deployment of Japanese fighting personnel outside the framework of protecting Japan itself was still not widely accepted. This public sentiment was echoed through surveys taken over the past four decades. 105

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Kaifu's foreign policy agenda in the case of the Gulf crisis, although revolutionary compared to that of past leaders, was "too little too late." Japan's thirteen billion US dollar contribution to the Gulf War ranked the state as the fourth largest contributor behind the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. To be sure, the deployment of mine sweepers portrayed Japan as a partially active peace-keeping player, along with Germany's partial involvement in the crisis. Nevertheless international criticism of Japan doing "too little too late" haunted the Kaifu administration.

B. The Leadership Crisis Continues

Japan's endemic and systemic leadership crisis, influencing its foreign policy, remains as virulent as ever. The leader following Kaifu came from inner LDP party ranks. As a result of the "genro system," back-room factional infighting and compromise, Kiichi Miyazawa became Prime Minister. Aside from many pressing domestic issues, Prime Minister Miyazawa (a foreign policy expert) had a clear foreign policy agenda. An active peace-keeping mandate was at this time in order, and Prime Minister Miyazawa, in pursuing such an agenda, would eventually pay the

Japan strictly for the purposes of defense. Fourteen years later (1964), in another newspaper survey, 75 percent said "yes" to rearmament for self-defence but, in another survey given the following year, the majority showed strong opposition to US participation in the Vietnam War, fearing the involvement of Japan.
ultimate price: factional alienation and eventual ousting as prime minister of Japan.106

For the Miyazawa administration, the issue of just maintaining the conventional dealings with peace-keeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations was not an option. The main issue was what "new role" Japan should play as an "active" peace-keeping player and what "new" interim security role the state should pursue. Activity in future peace-keeping missions was specifically at issue. "Japan has participated in several PKOs [peace-keeping operations] . . . albeit only in election-monitoring and using civilian personnel. Japanese teams and individuals were deployed in this role in, among other places, Afghanistan and Nicaragua."107 For Miyazawa, the degree of active involvement in future peace-keeping missions was at issue. Miyazawa put his emphasis away from civilian participation to more contentious militarized active involvement in future missions.

A seasoned veteran in foreign affairs, as well as a fluent English-language speaker, Miyazawa was capable of observing the negative effects


of vacillating foreign policy regarding peace and security issues. During his long political tenure, this new prime minister had seen successive US governments growing increasingly discontented with Japan's reluctance in dealing with global peace and security issues. After the Gulf crisis, Miyazawa quickly learned that no matter what level of burden sharing Japan undertook or what level of civilian support was offered during any particular peace-keeping mission, key member states in the new international world order would not view Japan's peaceful endeavours as sufficient. External pressure for Japan to become a combat-ready peace-keeping participant is the order of the day. As well, LDP factional king pin Ichiro Ozawa, slated as a future strong factional boss and in turn a future prime minister, has been actively seeking to redefine Japan's Constitution. Ozawa has directly challenged the constraints of Article 9 that has left Japan's global peace and security obligations in a state of flux. Ozawa is one of the few new potential leaders pursuing new collective security packages for Japan.

With these two pressures, Miyazawa gambled and finally won approval in the Lower House allowing Self-Defense Forces troops to more actively partake in overseas peace-keeping missions. For the Self-Defense Forces contingents, the term "active participation" requires clarification.

The June 15, 1992 legislation:
attempts to draw a distinction between UN peacekeeping "forces" and "operations". It puts a freeze on participation by the Japanese military in UN Peacekeeping "forces"—meaning military operation—but allows participation in "operations"—apparently meaning support activities outside combat zones.\textsuperscript{108}

The distinction between peacekeeping "forces" and "operations" is ambiguous, allowing for wide interpretation by parliament before the Lower House authorizes any dispatch of Self-Defense Forces. Miyazawa's bid at redefining Japan's Self-Defense Forces' role under the sponsorship of the United Nations is best described as "more active" than past peace-keeping attempts by Self-Defense Forces.

With new legislation in place, the Miyazawa government tacitly gave the order for Self-Defense Forces to prepare for the United Nations' next major peace-keeping operation. The 1992 UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission gave Japan the opportunity to participate in the largest peace-keeping activity to date. A total of 22,000 UN troops and civilians were deployed to Cambodia to "supervise in government functions and elections, and to supervise the disarmament and demilitarization of

rival armies, supervise [the] repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees [and] monitor human rights."\textsuperscript{109}

For the first time since World War II, Tokyo was in a domestically legitimized position to prepare Japanese troops for deployment outside the realm of national self-defence. Specific activities of Self-Defense Forces (use of engineering corps) and limited troop deployment numbers, however, have been clearly stated within such new legislation. The law allows up to 2,000 troops to be sent to areas designated by the United Nations to function in "no combat" situations. In addition:

Japanese forces must remain strictly neutral and . . . a cease-fire agreed to by all belligerents must be in place before they are dispatched. SDF troops would be authorized to carry small arms, and vehicles could be equipped with other weapons as authorized by the UN but use of weapons would be limited to self defence or to safeguard other UN personnel.\textsuperscript{110}

Although the Peace-Keeping Operations Bill won approval by a vote of 329 in favour and 17 against in the Lower House after being cleared by the Upper House one week earlier, public opinion did not reflect overwhelming support for the bill. A Reuter's report that was printed in \textit{The Vancouver Sun} in early February 1992 revealed that 55 per cent of the

\textsuperscript{109} Gareth Evans, \textit{Cooperating For Peace}, p. 102.

Japanese public opposed the bill, while 32 per cent favoured the peacekeeping legislation.

Prime Minister Miyazawa's foreign policy success is attributed to a number of factors. After twenty months of battle led by the LDP, Prime Minister Miyazawa had the good fortune of using the LDP's majority in the Lower House to "ram" the contentious legislation through parliament. Kaifu did not hold a clear LDP majority in the Lower House and did not have the factional support necessary to carry the initial bill. Kaifu was unexpectedly confronted with the Gulf War. His ad hoc piecemeal policy for UNPKOs was seen by both domestic and international groups as "too little too late." Miyazawa, upon ascending to prime ministership, took a bold pro-active approach to the issue of UNPKOs. In using his past foreign policy expertise, an LDP majority sitting in parliament, and a conciliatory approach to various LDP factions and growing opposition forces, the Prime Minister succeeded in passing legislation allowing Japan a "more active" role as a new international global peace-keeper. In passing this piece of legislation, Miyazawa, for the interim, appeased US concerns over Japanese "free riding". At the same time, such a new move on the part of Japan has rekindled concerns in Asia regarding Japan's potential re-armament and militarized influence over its immediate neighbours.
Japan's pre-World War II imperialist actions leave Asian states concerned about Japan's present military capabilities.

Despite Miyazawa's foreign policy success, he paid a heavy price for such a volatile piece of legislation. One can postulate that the issue of UNPKOs eventually hurt the Miyazawa regime. The Japanese public did not accept Miyazawa's policy. The legislation remained vague, the future implementation of the policy concerning Japanese troop activities is not clearly defined. When Atsuhito Nakata became Japan's first casualty in the Cambodia mission (killed on April 8, 1993), the incident did not help Miyazawa's new peace-keeping policy. At the time, domestic opinions ranged from withdrawing the approximately six hundred Japanese personnel from Cambodia to a less active undertaking within UNTAC. One may speculate that in achieving such landmark policy, Miyazawa compromised with factional leaders and the opposition too much. The issue also left the LDP divided. Pacifists, versus "new age realists" within the party fought leaving the party fragmented.

Robert Delfs charted Miyazawa's steady leadership demise from as early as December 1991:

In scarcely more than a month in office, Miyazawa has presided over the destruction of the LDP's unofficial working coalition with the
The three way coalition enabled the LDP to pass new legislation through the Upper House after the 1989 election in which the LDP lost its majority. The destruction of the coalition left the LDP and its reigning leader vulnerable to the new powerful Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in the Upper House. Before long, embarrassing questions regarding Miyazawa's involvement in the late 1980s Recruit Cosmos Scandal, (politicians accepting low purchase prices of unlisted shares of the company) were tabled in parliament. Following the Recruit affair came an alleged bribery scandal, named the Sagawa Kyubin affair. The surprising political demise of the late "back-room politician" Shin Kanemaru in October 1992 left the LDP in turmoil. Kanemaru was responsible for Miyazawa's re-birth into politics after his 1989 (Recruit scandal) resignation from the Finance Minister portfolio in the Kaifu cabinet and subsequent rise to ultimate prime ministership. The departure of Kanemaru and subsequent criminal charges against the back-room leader sealed the fate of the old LDP power base and its external and symbolic embattled leader, Prime Minister Miyazawa.

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The Prime Minister's attempts at political electoral reforms to clamp down on dirty political dealings were "too little too late". On June 18, 1993, a no confidence measure created by the LDP's own rebel members was tabled in the Lower House. After the vote of no confidence passed 255-220 aided by 35 dissenting members of Miyazawa's own party—the prime minister stood up and bowed briskly.\textsuperscript{112} The LDP lost its ruling majority for the first time in thirty eight years. As a ruling minority party and fragmenting as the days passed, the LDP, led by Miyazawa, disintegrated within sixty days. Prime Minister Miyazawa resigned from office on August 5, 1993.

Miyazawa's political demise, alongside the LDP's debilitating defeat, plunged Japanese politics into complete disarray. Subsequent "new image," cleaner politicians have emerged. The virulent leadership crisis, however, has transcended political party ranks of the LDP itself. Since Miyazawa's departure in August 1993, Japan has seen three prime ministers. Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa tried to restore political stability. Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata held power under a new party banner, as did Hosokawa, but both leaders lost power over recurrent allegations of past involvement in political electoral scandals and illicit profit-sharing schemes. Hata's reign, made up of a loosely built coalition of

systematically entrenched politicians and new "rebels," could not effectively hold his coalition together.

C. Shift in Recent PKO Policy

Tomiichi Murayama became Japan's first socialist Prime Minister since Tetsu Katayama took office in April 1947. The importance of the PKO issue was exemplified by the new leader's quick reversal of his party's fifty-year-old platform that had sought a military-free, pacifist Japan. One of the prime minister's first concerns was to calm down US worries about Japan's domestic political instability. Sensitive to Asian concerns, Murayama also stated that in pursuing a permanent UN security council seat, "Japan should assume the seat only if it had the complete understanding of other Asian nations."113 Faced with an appreciating yen and a growing trade surplus with the United States (sixty billion US dollars), as well as new domestic forces seeking an expanded role for Japan as an international player, Murayama revealed his party's new foreign policy platform.

Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama reversed his long opposition to the participation of the Japanese military in United Nations Peacekeeping

operations [and] turned his back on his party's traditional support of North Korea.

Mr. Murayama conceded that his party had voted against every resolution to reestablish a UN peacekeeping operation. But he said that now "a track record is being built up" because Japan sent peacekeepers to Cambodia and that he would follow the model elsewhere.114

Successive leaders are fully aware that political inactivity or policies "too little too late" have had enormous effect on Japan's economic and political status. Leaders since the late Prime Minister Tanaka have all tried, in some fashion, to push Japan's foreign policies to become internationally acceptable. National security and global peace-keeping policies, however, for the most part, have been ineffective or minimally successful. Successive policies on the question of UNPKOs have changed, but not fast enough to tackle new emerging global hotspots requiring immediate action and support from capable member states of the United Nations. In short, the Murayama statement on Japan's future peace-keeping role is again "too little too late." The next UNPKOs will probably require new modes of peace-keeping.

114 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
V. CONCLUSION: JAPAN'S LEADERSHIP PROBLEM SUMMARIZED

In assessing why successive Japanese governments have had a difficult time in reformulating Japan's national security and global peace-keeping agenda, particularly during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, a number of factors have been discussed in this chapter.

The underlying factor is Japan's political culture regarding the role of political leadership. Divergent political cultural leadership traits, i.e. low key consensus builders versus strong charismatic leaders garnering very strong deference to their authority by politicians and the public, have not allowed for a concrete stable leadership base to be formed. Another underlying, yet significant factor, is the public opinion in Japan. The Japanese public, for the most part, has not accepted Japan's new role as a "more active" participant in international politics--and the policy platforms of the opposition parties traditionally reflected this perspective. Public polls, drawn out at different times, reveal a strong, consistent pacifist element within the public's national identity. Some political cultural analysts speculate that the Japanese public suffer from "war guilt." The issue remains volatile amongst pacifist-oriented politicians and emerging political realists who believe that Japan is obliged to take on more responsibility for peace and security. Successive incumbents (Prime
Ministers) have so far not been able to reconcile these two almost equally balanced opposing political groups. The net result has been compromising foreign policies regarding security matters. In addition, the Japanese public may be opposed to more active participation in UNPKOs due to the fact that in the post-World War II period, Japan has rapidly evolved into an economically prosperous state with living standards rising as time progresses without active participation in global security affairs. In other words, prosperity has come without facing the cold reality of power politics: the Japanese public fears that the contentious issue of peacekeeping may well destabilize continued prosperity.

More direct factors causing passive Japanese security policy are concerned with the state's policy making process. Since the Tanaka incumbency, transfer of executive office duties to successive prime ministers has not been smooth, despite most successors coming from inner party LDP ranks, with the exception of ex-Prime Minister, Murayama. As well, the political environment immediately surrounding prime ministers are not conducive to active and coherent security policy. In this category, one can include party infighting, the "genro system," and back-room picks of future prime ministers by factional bosses jockeying for future power. Under the circumstances, each leader has had to calculate personal costs versus benefits for each policy decision in order to stay in
power. Japan's security policy has been inadequate, due in part to each leader having to face factional influences.

Japan has a lingering leadership problem, which has reached a crisis point recently, resulting in weak performance on the issue of UNPKOs. The question of how Japan should participate in UNPKOs has become one of Japan's main unresolved and contentious foreign policy problems. Ironically, in its policy concerning UNPKOs, consistency has remained: the policy has basically been to avoid international obligations, to offer minimal physical assistance, and through parliamentary debate, to reveal to other states and international organizations that Japan "wants to change."

How long Japan continues its "navel gazing" remains to be seen. But the question of Japanese security policy is not a subject for Japan alone; it is also for Japan's Asian neighbors that have not forgotten what Japan did to them during World War II. This point leads us to the next chapter's topic, the relationship between Japan and its neighbors.
CHAPTER FOUR: JAPAN'S ASIA STRATEGY

I. INTRODUCTION

The main focus of this chapter is to analyze Japan's self-directed plan at preserving its own national security in Asia. Although Japan is being pressured to more actively partake in UNPKOs to maintain international peace and security, it has embarked on a quest to strengthen its regional power base as a mechanism to preserve its own national security, rather than strengthen its global position with the United Nations. The analysis of Japan's diplomatic ties, both bilateral and multilateral, reveals Japan's predisposition to strengthen ties within Asia thus affecting its role within the United Nations rather negatively.

Historically, Asia was the central focus of Japan's security concerns; Japan understands Asian security by heart; UNPKOs, a more global activity, is more remote to Japan. Moreover, Japan's Asian security policy has basically been successful despite some minor problems. A membership in the newly established ASEAN Regional forum, the ARF, which was established in July 1993, is paving the way for Japan to offer and attain national security protection on a regional basis. In sum, when the availability of a better, more attractive, regional alternative (that is, strengthening security ties in Asia) exists for Japanese security policy, it is
not surprising that Japan is not too enthusiastic about expanding its role in UNPKOs, a task which is far from easy as we have examined in the previous chapters.

Here, it is important to note that security for Japan includes economic dimensions. Economic survival over the past one hundred years, during Japan's rapid industrialization, compelled Japanese governments and businesses to expand their economic horizons. Asia has been targeted and for some time has fuelled some of Japan's raw material needs and ever-expanding mercantile ventures. When compelled to expand its horizons beyond its natural geographic borders, Japan has always chosen Asia to fuel its industrial needs and expansionary political objectives.

This chapter first outlines Japan's preference or bias in favor of Asia when it comes to security issues. It then examines the perceptions of Japan held by its neighboring states.

II. JAPAN LOOKS FIRST TO ASIA

In its history, Japan has never implemented a grand global expansionary mission.

While many expect Japan to be active as a leader; . . . the Japanese have never wanted to be anything more than a mediator for peace in Asia. Throughout history, the Japanese have never developed any scheme or theory of world order which can be considered equivalent to "Pax
Britannica*, "Middle Kingdom", or "Guardian of Democracy", or "Policeman of the World".\textsuperscript{115}

Japan has only actively pursued influencing or controlling Asia through "ideas such as Pan Asianism, the imperial way, and the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."\textsuperscript{116} Participation in global peace-keeping and maintenance of world security does not fit easily into the Japanese psyche.

Therefore, although Japan is a member state of the United Nations, it does not intrinsically embrace the United Nations' principal purpose of maintaining global peace and security. Japan still holds a regionalist outlook. Japan has an inherent interest in retaining its historically based regional predisposition. Historically, Japan's greatest trading bloc has always been in Asia. Although the United States ranks as Japan's present pre-eminent trading partner, the Asian bloc as a whole holds great promise for Japan.

Japan's regional design is not a recent foreign policy option. During the 1930s various Japanese politicians, the late Japanese post-World War II Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi included, voiced their opinion that "Japan's national interests would be best served by trading with the whole

\textsuperscript{115} Quo, "Japan and the Pacific Rim: A Historical Review," \textit{Politics of the Pacific Rim}, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
world." Post-World War II economic regionalism was also pursued by Prime Minister Miki in 1967 for a Pacific Free Trade Area. In the 1970s Prime Minister Ohira sought a Japan-Australia inspired Pan-Pacific Organization. During the 1980s, regional economic blocs were being emulated and institutionalized by some states. The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement followed by the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States, and Mexico placed Japan in a position of potential vulnerability regarding the threat of potential trade blockades from the American-Pacific bloc. Japan's active participation within APEC comes at a time when trading blocs such as the European Union (EU) and NAFTA are already in place.

The future of Asian states looks bright. Daphne Bramham elucidates the present and future potential power of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan included. The Asia-Pacific region "has a combined population of two billion or about a third of the world's population. Its combined economy is $14 trillion US, twice that of the European Community." The region is fast

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119 Daphne Bramham, "The Centre of Gravity Shifts East," *The Vancouver Sun*, November 13, 1993, Section B, p. 1. Note, the fifteen member states that make up APEC are as follows: Australia, Brunei, Canada, The Peoples Republic of China, Hong Kong, Footnote Continued on Next Page
emerging as the foremost economic bloc of our times. The six-year-old fledgling APEC, comprised of fifteen members, is at the helm of this region's collaborative economic success. The APEC group has "the potential to forge a lasting alliance that outstrips even the Group of Seven industrialized nations in economic clout. The G7 had a combined economic output of $15.7 trillion last year."\textsuperscript{120} APEC's main mandate is economic in nature. All member states are in the process of agreeing to dismantle trade barriers that presently exist. Such barriers are to be dismantled sometime after the years 2015 to 2025. To further understand the potential power of the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to keep in mind the following information.

By the end of the century, it [Asia-Pacific region] will account for 60 per cent of the world's population, half the global production, 40 percent of total consumption and half of the global economic growth.\textsuperscript{121}

Thus, in the Asia-Pacific region, security and economic interests go hand in hand for Japan; for its global activities, Japan focuses on the economic dimension. It is therefore not surprising to see Japan as an

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
active member of various multilateral economic organizations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the OECD, and the G7 to name a few. In addition, as of December 27th 1994, Japan "became the first of the top four trade powers to finalize its agreement to the establishment of a new World Trade Organization (WTO) that will replace GATT." Japan's global economic plan has been clearly revealed in a recent government statement. A statement issued by the Japanese mission (in Geneva regarding the WTO signing) said the launching of the WTO on January 1, 1995 "is an epoch-marking event in further strengthening the multilateral free-trading system." The government mission to Geneva further added that the Japanese government "will fully support the WTO and make its utmost effort for the steady development of international trade." Japan's seeming enthusiasm for global multilateral institutions for economic affairs must be qualified, however. Even in the field of international economic relations, multilateralism with "Asia centrism" best typifies Japan's economic preference.

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122 For a concise evaluation of Japan's approach toward multilateral economic organizations, see Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's Role in International Affairs," Survival, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 71-87.

123 "Japan Becomes First Nation to Toe WTO Line," The Vancouver Sun, December 28, 1994, Section D, p. 3.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.
As a global economic giant, Japan is now poised to experiment in creating a more diversified multilateral plan. In the past, positive and negative swings of the Japanese-US foreign relations pendulum have occurred. Each negative swing has left both states wary of each other. The United States has an immense economic market which presently has an insatiable appetite for Japanese manufactured products. Although Japan and the United States fall victim to self-inflicted economic quagmires, the enormity of the US market alone is a reason good enough for Japan to maintain friendly relations with the United States. Nevertheless, the finalization of the NAFTA, and to a lesser extent, the European Union, has left Japan wondering about which economic bloc it should contemplate alliance with or whether it should pursue membership in a strong bloc within Asia proper. Thus far, Japan’s active participation in APEC is deemed a hedge against potential future trade blockades. The membership of the United States in APEC is welcomed by Japan because the inclusion of the United States will allow Japan to maintain a good relationship with the United States.

Indeed, the future of Japan’s foreign economic policy (or Japanese economic security, to be more precise), to a great extent, depends on the United States. Despite increasing trade tensions between these two states and continuing trade imbalances especially over the past ten years, both
states have yet to break ties with each other. Tensions will continue to increase as trade imbalances do not show signs of decline. As recently as late 1994, "the [US] bilateral deficit with Japan soared 23.9 per cent to a record $6.66 billion," and it "eclipsed the previous record shortfall of $6.4-billion in trade with Japan set in October, 1986." As Japan continues to expand its global economic prowess and the United States continues to show a steady decline in its overall global economic position, Japan's regional economic approach will continue to be implemented further.

Moreover, the future of Japan's military-security policy largely depends on the United States. Japan's less than enthusiastic approach to global peace and security issues is tied to its regional Asia-Pacific security concerns, and more specifically, to its alliance with the United States. The Japanese-US MST provides both states with a number of positive alternatives. With the US economy in decline compared to new heights for the Japanese economy, the United States sees in Japan an ally ready to "partially fill" the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the US forces in the Asia-Pacific region. A more symmetrically shared burden of leadership is probable between the United States and Japan regarding Asian security.

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The MST in the 1990s benefits the United States because Japan takes on an increased share of security burdens. Also for Japan, the benefits derived would be for a more powerful position in Asia itself, not only economically but also politically. In addition, the MST also maintains the present military power positions between both states. By keeping the MST, the United States can maintain its hegemonic position with Japan in the area of defence. Thus Japan's need or desire to contemplate unilateral arms build-ups may also be staved off. In addition, "[The] alliance is one basis for an American role in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific that protects Japan's economic interests and sea transport routes."127 Also with drastic political and socio-economic changes taking place within Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as in the PRC, the MST acts as a deterrent against either state contemplating future militarized campaigns in the Asian region.128

In sum, it is clear that Japan has a global multilateralist economic plan. Regarding the Japanese government's foreign policy on multilaterally based global peace and security, however, Japan remains reluctant to

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participate in such a grand plan. For Japan to become an active player in UNPKOs is more a matter of international obligation and prestige than a matter of survival and immediate security. The latter concerns deal with the MST with the United States, as well as commitments to the ARF. Historically, Japan is more adept at pursuing peace and security on a Pan-Asia scale. Never has Japan implemented a grand global expansionary design for itself. The global objectives of the United Nations for peace and security do not fit within Japan's Asia-Pacific regional plan. Through membership in APEC, Japan is securing its future economic prosperity, which it hopes, through regional affiliations and membership in organizations such as the ARF, will also ensure peace and security in the region. "Japan is aware that its security and prosperity [is] closely tied to those of others, especially . . . [its] allies."129 Tranquillity in the Asia-Pacific region will benefit Japan enormously. "Instead of the pre-war 'Rich Nation and Strong Army' [motto], Japan's new goal has been 'Rich Nation, Secure and Free.'"130


III. NEW STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR JAPAN IN ASIA

Japan’s main security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region are concentrated in Southeast Asia and also the South China Sea. Tokyo also has secondary security concerns with the Northern Territories with Russia and also the Korean peninsula.

The main reason for such Japanese concern in these areas is primarily due to the withdrawal of US forces from Asia. Especially in recent times, US withdrawal from the Subic Naval Base and Clarke Air Base in the Philippines has left a security vacuum in the region.

Territorial disputes are still present in this post-Cold War period and have taken on a new dimension due to re-alignments in the region. Such instability may have a profound impact on the Japanese economy, as Tokyo depends on Southeast Asia for most of its transfer of imports and the region is also a large export market for Japanese products. The Southeast Asian region is an important security concern for Tokyo because of the strategic importance of the Straits of Malacca. Via this waterway Japan receives most of its resources. Another concern for Japan lies in the Spratly Islands territorial claims and counter-claims among the PRC, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. Because of the Spratly’s strategic sea-lanes importance, Japan has a
stake in ensuring stability for these waterways. Thus, Japan’s “comprehensive security”\textsuperscript{131} is at stake in Southeast Asia. When it comes to the sea lanes Japan’s position is:

the ASEAN countries occupy important geopolitical positions along routes [used] for the supply of raw materials to Japan and have strong economic ties with Japan. Therefore, the security of ASEAN countries is essential to the security of Japan and Japan is watching developments there with great concern.\textsuperscript{132}

A. The Malacca Straits

The Malacca Straits\textsuperscript{133} allow for sixty per cent of Japanese crude oil from the Middle East to pass through these Straits. This route is sometimes referred to as the “petroleum road,” whereas shipping through the other route is the “iron ore road,” which starts in Western Australia and proceeds Northward to Japan.\textsuperscript{134} Kinju Atarashi states that:

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{133} See the location of the Malacca Straits in map included in the appendices p. 161.

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This is the reason why Japan established the Malacca Straits Council, whose activities involve hydrographic surveys, navigational aids and tidal and current studies, in order to improve navigational routes and ensure the safety of shipping passing through the Straits.135

B. The Spratly Islands

The other security threat in the region is the Spratly Islands dispute. Contradicting claims and Chinese adventurism with regards to the Spratlys have and will cause problems in the near future for Southeast Asia and also Japan. Such Chinese adventurism has led to clashes with Vietnam in the past and also with the Philippines navy in recent times. Japanese reluctance to assume its security responsibility in the region may cause the PRC to accelerate its military build-up.

Samuel Huntington argues:

In modernizing its military forces so that they can project power far from China’s shores, Beijing had unprecedented regional latitude as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the diminished military posture of the US and the persistent reluctance of Japan to assume a conventional security role in the region.136

The Spratly Islands group consists of over 230 islets, reefs, shoals and sand banks, located in the South Eastern part of the South China Sea

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and covers an area of about 250,000 square kilometers. This area is both a strategic and an economic prize, as it is situated astride the major sea lanes between the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, and also is very rich in fishing and mineral-laden seabeds. Besides oil and natural gas, offshore minerals such as tin, manganese, copper, cobalt, nickel and other metals, are likely to be found on the broad shelf areas of South East Asia and specially the South China Sea. The islands are economically vital to the countries that claim them; further, it is of strategic importance to the Chinese. As Esmond D. Smith argues:

A glance at a chart shows what Chinese control of the Spratly Islands mean to the maritime interests of the United States and our Asian friends. Naval bases capable of supporting submarines and surface combatants in the Spratlys would provide China with a capability to maintain and potentially to interdict shipping

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137 For a detailed analysis of the geographic location of the Spratly islands and the various names given to the respective islands, atolls, and reefs see, Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea, (Otto Harrassowitz, Hamburg, Germany, 1976), pp. 17-19. Also see maps of the Spratly Islands in the Appendices.


of any nationality transiting the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{140}

An indirect impact of the Spratly dispute and China’s determination in staking its claim is the potential for an era of escalation, that is, an arms race in the region. In 1992, the ASEAN claimants hurriedly tried to build-up their respective navies in response to China’s naval build-up.\textsuperscript{141} The increased arms purchases by ASEAN states can be “seen as a statement of concern over the heightened tension in the South China Sea and their seriousness in enforcing their claims if necessary.”\textsuperscript{142} There was no response from Japan at this time.

During the Cold War, as well as, Post Cold War times Japan is still facing the prospect of security threats due to the ongoing territorial disputes for the Kurile territories with Russia. In addition, the instability of the Korean peninsula continues to be a secondary security concern for Japan, especially due to recent US withdrawal from the region.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{140} Esmond D. Smith Jr, “The Dragon Goes to Sea,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 44. The referred chart is included in Appendix.


\textsuperscript{143} See Edward Olsen, “Japan,” in Asian Defence Policies: Great Powers and Footnote Continued on Next Page
Presently, the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most dynamic in the fields of economics, politics, and security. Most countries in the region are faced with the new emerging global role that Japan is trying to achieve. Japan is becoming the main economic superpower in the Asian region. Economics and security aspects are significantly linked in the region. As Inoguchi postulates: "Not surprisingly, many of Japan's neighbours--the two Koreas, China (PRC), the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong--are apprehensive about Japan's growing economic influence."\textsuperscript{144} Such economic influence transcends regional security affairs. Japan's economic might is directly correlated to its military build-up in recent times, and such increased military expenditures have increased the level of Asian suspicion of Japanese motives in the region.

Japan's defence spending doubled from US dollars 5 billion in 1976/7 to US dollars 10 billion in 1979/80, and has since risen by an average annual rate of five to six per cent. By 1992, it totalled US dollars 34 billion, compared with the United Kingdom's US dollars 41 billion, France's US dollars 35 billion, and Germany's US dollars

\textit{Regional Powers}, Mohan Malik (ed.) Deakin University, Australia, 1994, pp. 127-141, for a complete discussion of these issues.

\textsuperscript{144} Takashi Inoguchi, "Japan's role in International Affairs," \textit{Survival}, p. 75.
31 billion. However, if calculated according to the NATO definition (including retirement pensions and other auxiliary costs), Japan's defence budget reached US dollars 40 billion in 1988 (or more than US dollars 10 billion above Japan's own figures), compared with the UK's US dollars 35.7 billion, France's US dollars 32.4 billion and West Germany's US dollars 31.7 billion. Thus, for the past five years, despite restricting its defence budgets to roughly 1 per cent GNP, Japan has established itself at the forefront of spending among second-tier military powers.145

Interestingly, Japan's military build up corresponds with increased expenditures by other Asian countries.146

The problem, however, lies in the lack of a co-ordinated regional security organization in the Asian region. The nearest security body is the newly founded ARF, which Japan and other Southeast Asian states are members. The ARF has to be considered as a sub-regional security body which is in its infancy, requiring significant development, for it to gain a global or even regional status of importance.

145 Peter Polomka, Japan as Peacekeeper: Samurai State, or New Civilian Power (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1992), p. 67.

It is necessary to examine how Asian countries perceive the new Japan. The Asian region can be divided into two groups. North Asia encompasses Russia (its Asian region), the PRC, Japan, Taiwan, the two Korea's, and Hong Kong. Southeast Asia encompasses the six ASEAN countries, which are, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Brunei.

At present, Russia is looking towards Japan for economic aid. Japan has linked such aid with the successful completion of talks about the return of the Kurile islands.\textsuperscript{147} This issue is one of the main points of conflict between these two countries. Since the days of the Russo-Japanese War, there has been a very cool relationship between these two countries. But, Russia does not seem too apprehensive about the present rise of Japan.

The PRC is quite worried about the status of Japan. It has developed close economic relations with Japan. Japan, wants to see a stable PRC, via economic prosperity. Past events (World War II atrocities committed by Japanese troops against the Chinese) have entrenched Chinese suspicions about Japan. Such suspicion may well continue into the near future. The

\textsuperscript{147} For an up-to-date synopsis of diplomatic talks between Russia and Japan regarding trade, aid, territorial reclamation and World War II-related political apologies, refer to Hiroshi Kumura and Hisahuko Okazaki, "Yeltsin's Ice Breaking Visit," Japan Echo, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 72-76. For information regarding the strategic importance of the Kurile Islands, refer to Sheldon Simon, The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration, pp. 56-59.
PRC also remains quite uncomfortable in having to deal with Japan on a dichotomous platform. Tied to the United States in military capabilities, Japan through its "MST Card" has kept Chinese territorial aspirations at bay.\(^{148}\) On the other side, the PRC and Japan have retained ever increasing economic ties and trading practices over the past twenty five years.

South Korea, since the end of World War II, with the help of the United States, has developed close relations with Japan. Also, the nuclear capabilities of North Korea have encouraged South Korea to lean towards Japan. Pre-World War II Japanese imperialism, however, has not been forgotten. North Korea's communist regime does view Japan with great suspicion, as it believes Japan to be a surrogate of the United States. North Korea sees Japan as a launching point for any future United Nations or US offensives. Thus, North Korea is quite reluctant to see Japan take on a regional role.

Hong Kong and Japanese relations are very much dominated by economics. Japan has maintained close relations with Hong Kong, so as to broaden its own economic base and prepare an economic launching pad into a modernizing China. Taiwan has significant economic relations with

\(^{148}\) See Shin'ichi Kitaoka, "Putting Old Diplomatic Principles into New Bottles" for Japan's influence over the PRC.
Japan. But Japan's treatment of Taiwan during World War II is not easily forgotten (the same is true for South Korea). Thus, the economic relations of North Asian states with Japan continue to prosper, but Taiwan, like other states in North Asia, is not yet ready to see Japan as a regional security leader.

Let us turn our attention to ASEAN, and its perceptions of Japan. Indonesia, the unofficial leader of ASEAN, was invaded by Japan during World War II. Thus, it has bitter memories of the past. But such memories have been put on the back burner, due to its increased trade with Japan. Japan is one of the biggest "aid" contributors to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{149} Recently, Japan has been accused of disguising its foreign aid programs and encouraging its companies to expand into specific regions.\textsuperscript{150} It can be argued that Japan's foreign aid programs are strategically based to directly benefit the homeland.\textsuperscript{151}

Indonesia and Malaysia are beneficiaries of Japanese foreign aid.\textsuperscript{152} Although, Indonesia needs Japan's economic help, it is reluctant to see

\textsuperscript{149} See Appendix E for an analysis of Japanese foreign aid to various Asian states.

\textsuperscript{150} For a criticism of Japan's foreign aid programs, see Jimmy W. Wheeler, "Japan's Security Role in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 46-47.

\textsuperscript{151} Sheldon Simon's The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration, p. 45 exposes that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei supply Japan with about 20 per cent of its oil.

\textsuperscript{152} See Appendix E for a detailed perspective of Japan's foreign aid disbursements to various states.
Japan take on a new regional role. Indonesia was favourable that the ASEAN region would be a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This is an ASEAN concept which was adopted in treaty form in 1976 by all ASEAN members. This is also closely related to Indonesia's position in the Non-Alliance Movement (NAM). Malaysia, which was also invaded by the Japanese in World War II, since the early 1980's has been looking toward Japan for economic aid. It does not view Japan with great suspicion, as the population was treated quite well during the occupation period. It was the Japanese who laid the foundation for independence from the British in Malaysia. It was the Chinese segment of the Malaysian population who were harshly treated by the Japanese during World War II.153 Thus, it is very doubtful that Malaysia would object to the new role of Japan.

Thailand was the only state that was not occupied by the Japanese during World War II. Thailand and Japan signed a treaty that prevented occupation in return for raw materials and small portions of land. Thailand would like to see a regional Japanese leadership. Thailand did not oppose Japanese SDF troops being involved in the action in Kampuchea

153 The Chinese segment of the population was approximately 30 per cent. See Donald Snodgrass, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 24, Table 2.1.
sanctioned by the United Nations. Thailand does not carry any bitter legacy from World War II.

Singapore, on the other hand, has bad memories of Japanese occupation during World War II, and it still maintains that Japanese cruelty during World War II will not be easily forgotten. The Chinese majority in Singapore suffered greatly during the Japanese occupation. This attitude may slowly change, as Japanese leaders are now apologizing for the actions of their World War II occupation forces. Ironically, Singapore still has very strong economic ties with Japan.

The Philippines was also invaded by the Japanese. The treatment of the population was not as harsh as in other Southeast Asian countries, and it is highly unlikely that it would be against a new regional role for Japan, if such a role is supported by the United States. Lastly, Brunei, which was also invaded by the Japanese, also has strong economic links with Japan. This oil producing state is quite vital to the Japanese economy. And it would also support a new regional role for Japan.

However, ASEAN as a whole might have a different position on Japan. "The ASEAN governments have tended to take the view that Japan's expanded political-security role need not entail the expansion of defense spending and military build-up."154 ASEAN countries would not

154 Prasert Chittiwatanapong, "Japan's Roles in the Posthegemonic World: Footnote Continued on Next Page
want to see Japan fully occupy the military vacuum left by potential US withdrawal from the region.

The region does see Japan as a tremendous economic ally, but memories of Japan’s World War II actions have not been completely forgotten. Thus, the region would like to see Japan as a peace-keeper, but not as an independent military force with offensive capabilities.

V. CONCLUSION

Japan has a grand global economic plan based on extensive multilateralism. Despite such a global plan, Japan is more akin to developing greater ties with its Asia-Pacific neighbours. Japan’s political re-birth in the Asia-Pacific has rekindled old war memories amongst all the Asian states mentioned. There remains no general consensus among these states that Japan should once again attain regional dominance, politically or militarily. Although Japan is more comfortable with regional expansion, it will have to chart a careful course not to offend its past national victims. Whether Japan has the ability or the will to move beyond “cheque book” diplomacy remains its biggest challenge within the United Nations.

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CONCLUSION

This study has presented a dynamic and comprehensive analysis of specific factors that have shaped Japanese foreign policy with regards to Japan's involvement or limited involvement in UNPKOs. The main argument presented in this study goes beyond the traditional realist perspective that argues that economic domination by a state results in its increased military growth and the subsequent use of such power. The realist perspective applied to Japan fails to take into consideration other variables that have shaped Japan's approach to involvement in the global peace and security process. This thesis has singled out the following factors: Japan's legal-institutional framework, leadership problems, and the "Asian alternative." In doing so, this analysis has gone beyond the traditional arguments for Japan's lack of enthusiasm for active participation in UNPKOs.

The legal-institutional framework of Japan significantly affects its role in the United Nation's peace-keeping operations. In the past, the pacifist constitution and especially Article 9 provided the legal-institutional barrier preventing Japan from undertaking peace-keeping operations under UN auspices. As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, Article 9 is contrary to the obligations to being an active player
pursuing global peace and security along with other states under UN mandate. In addition, the United Nations has stigmatized Japan in Articles 53 and 107 of its Charter, which accord Japan an official UN status while recognizing Japan as a former enemy of the allies during World War II.

The above two factors together with the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, have provided a national security blanket for Tokyo over the last five decades. Thus, direct Japanese involvement in UN military operations has been curtailed. Hence, these legal-institutional constraints have put forth a psychological and to a greater extent a legal buffer for Japan. Such a buffer has prevented Japan from taking a more proactive involvement in UNPKOs. But with the new PKO Bill being passed by Japan, together with the insistence by the United States that Tokyo should share greater burdens of being a UN member that can economically afford participating in UNPKOs, this barrier is slowly coming down. Japan is being pushed by domestic and external forces to come to terms with its economic superpower status. Such status has required Tokyo to consider more active participation in UNPKOs.

The third chapter of this study analysed Japan’s domestic leadership problem affecting Japan’s role as an active player of UNPKOs.
The lack of continued strong leadership throughout the post-World War II period has prevented Japan from becoming a participant in UNPKOs. The frequent leadership changes of consecutive LDP governments were not conducive for Tokyo to undertake the complete formulation and implementation of a strong foreign policy platform aimed toward global peace and security, using the United Nations to achieve such a goal. Successive administrations were not willing to venture into such uncharted territory. Many of these governments were riddled with accusations of corruption; as well, state building after World War II took precedence over foreign policy aimed at achieving global peace. In addition, it is speculated that Japan's political culture and perhaps the sense of war guilt has hindered Japan from taking an active role in UNPKOs.

Finally in this context, a consistent pacifist public sentiment over the past fifty years has kept leaders from boldly pursuing greater activity in the maintenance of world wide peace and security. Leaders have had to continually face Japan's past World War II legacy; the public at times has been loath to the prospect of Japanese troops overseas being used in a military capacity.

Chapter Four of the analysis discussed the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asian regions to Japan, as an alternative
to global security. The Southeast Asian region which was a major Cold War frontier between the superpowers, was one of the early recipients of the benefits of the conclusion of the Cold War. Stability in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to Japan, as it provides the needed resources and also is the main sea route via which most of Japan’s products are imported and exported.

Japan is now actively engaging in multilateral endeavors in the Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are prime examples of Japan’s proactive involvement in multilateralism. Japan is steadily expanding its influence into the Asia-Pacific region in order to ensure its survival and to ensure that its political, economic, and strategic influence remains strong in the region. Although Japan is in a position to influence greater global peace and security through its membership in the United Nations, it chooses to forge ahead and reinforce its influence within regional alliances. Such new involvement in Asia can be attributed to two potential vulnerabilities for Japan. First, due to US withdrawal from Asia, Japan is now facing heightened vulnerability regarding the security of the Malacca Straits through which Japan’s products travel. Second, the PRC’s renewed claim to the Spratly Islands has placed Japan in a position to take a new political stand against the PRC.
Some analysts argue that Japan is re-implementing the Fukuda Doctrine of the 1970s, with regards to Tokyo's relations with Southeast Asian states. The Fukuda doctrine stated Tokyo's three principles toward Southeast Asia. These were

that Japan rejected the role of a military power and, as a nation committed to peace, was resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of South-east Asia and of the world community; secondly, that as a true friend of the countries of South-east Asia, Japan would do its best to consolidate a relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on a 'heart-to-heart' understanding with these countries in wide-ranging fields. . . that Japan would be an equal partner to ASEAN and its member states and cooperate positively with them in their efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience. . . .155

This re-assertion of the Fukuda Doctrine, the active involvement of Self-Defense Forces in the Cambodian peace process,156 the enactment of the PKO Bill, and its support for the expanded activities of the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference all point to a Japanese strategy to start a process of trust-building in the region. The PKO Bill did cause some initial

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156Japan has been actively helping to rebuild Indochina. The Japanese Prime Minister in 1993 proposed that ASEAN and Japan come together and help reconstruct the Indo-Chinese peninsula and war ravaged Cambodia. See The Straits Times, 17 January 1993, p. 15. Also see The Star, 18 January 1993, p. 22; The Star, 21 January 1993, p. 17. 

Footnote Continued on Next Page
concerns within ASEAN. But after careful consideration ASEAN lent its full support for the Japanese initiative.\textsuperscript{157}

The post-Cold War era has seen tremendous changes in economic and security relations between states. The end of the Cold War brought about a complex set of dynamics in regional and global arenas. The old era of bipolarity has come to an end to be replaced by the multilateral links between states in the region. The post-Cold War has seen a global move towards multilateralism in the areas of trade and security, and this phenomenon is also taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. With regards to Southeast Asia, the divide between communist and non-communist states has blurred with the inclusion of Vietnam as the seventh member of ASEAN.

As the Cold War ended, it took along with it the existing patterns of established superpower relations. The present era of relative peace and stability has been marked with the implosion in the former Soviet Union, the withdrawal of Soviet influence, the American reduction of its military presence in the region, the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, and China's warmer relations with Vietnam and South Korea. Such events have not only relatively decreased the security tensions in the region, but have also


Footnote Continued on Next Page

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provided a stable environment for new and innovative regional and global relations to take root. Japan has taken bolder steps in ensuring regional stability.

The fact remains: Japan looks first to the Asia region for continued prosperity. Japan receives benefits as a bona fide member of the United Nations. But Japan does not offer full active participation commensurate with its position in the United Nations and its economic capabilities. Interestingly, such a regionalist policy stance has enabled Japan to continue its course toward economic superpower status without delving into precarious uncharted areas requiring active involvement in international peace and security situations.
### APPENDICES

#### APPENDIX A

Table 1: Japan Export Trade With America, South East Asia, and the European Community.

(In Billions of Yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>S.E. Asia</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>E.C.</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2138</td>
<td>12.45</td>
<td>1765</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3312</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>3723</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>12.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7118</td>
<td>38.06</td>
<td>7007</td>
<td>32.84</td>
<td>3766</td>
<td>20.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>15583</td>
<td>84.65</td>
<td>7960</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>4768</td>
<td>10.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>11487</td>
<td>-40.96</td>
<td>8597</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6003</td>
<td>12.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12816</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>10118</td>
<td>15.21</td>
<td>6578</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13057</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>11942</td>
<td>18.24</td>
<td>7734</td>
<td>11.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Overall, Real Percentage Increase for Regions from 1955 to 1990.
- America: 128.93%
- S.E. Asia: 116.8%
- Europe: 77.05%
**APPENDIX B**

Table 2: Japan Import Trade With America, South East Asia and the European Community.
*(In Billions of Yen)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>S.E. Asia</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>E.C.</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>1085</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>3142</td>
<td>20.57</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5558</td>
<td>21.17</td>
<td>7241</td>
<td>40.99</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6213</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>7255</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5388</td>
<td>-8.25</td>
<td>6125</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>3083</td>
<td>9.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>6632</td>
<td>12.44</td>
<td>7268</td>
<td>11.43</td>
<td>3870</td>
<td>7.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7586</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>7872</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>5071</td>
<td>12.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Overall, Real Percentage Increases for Regions from 1955 to 1990.
- America: 73.07%
- S.E. Asia: 76.33%
- Europe: 50.37%
**APPENDIX C**

Table 3: Japanese Gross National Product as Compared to National Defence Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Defence Expenditure (Billion of Yen)</th>
<th>Gross National Product (Billion of Yen)</th>
<th>Annual Defence Exp. as % of GNP</th>
<th>Real Annual Increase in Def. Exp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>15,998</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>32,706</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>73,345</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>148,957</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>7.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2266</td>
<td>240,176</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>8.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3170</td>
<td>320,419</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3728</td>
<td>371,429</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.58</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>3970</td>
<td>395,844</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>2.42</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>4259</td>
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<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4380</td>
<td>460,800</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Defence Expenditure Increases from 1960 to 1991 in overall real percentage terms is 42.22%. Last Column reflects the annual growth of defence expenditures compared to the previous year due to annual GNP increases.
**APPENDIX D**

Table 4: Foreign Aid to the Asia-Pacific by the United States (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: It is assumed that the numbers quoted are percentages of trade activity with respective states.
APPENDIX E

Table 5: Foreign Aid to the Asia-Pacific by Japan
(Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Year</th>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: It is assumed that the numbers quoted are percentages of trade activity with respective states.
### APPENDIX F

**Table 6: Foreign Investment Positions of the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Total Late 1960s</th>
<th>% Total Early 1980s</th>
<th>Stock 1990 (Million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Province</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Ministry of Finance, Japan: Survey of Current Business (various years); national investments boards. Taken from Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1993*, pp. 501-525.

**Note:** It is assumed that the numbers quoted are percentages of trade activity with respective states.
## APPENDIX G

### Table 7: Foreign Investment Positions of Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Total Late 1960s</th>
<th>% Total Early 1980s</th>
<th>Stock 1990 (Million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Province</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>197473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Ministry of Finance, Japan: Survey of Current Business (various years); national investments boards. Taken from Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Re-organization of the Pacific Political Economy," *World Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1993, pp. 501-525.

**Note:** It is assumed that the numbers quoted are percentages of trade activity with respective states.
### APPENDIX H

**Table 8: Chronological List of Peace-Keeping Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1948 to date</td>
<td><strong>UNTSO</strong> United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1949 to date</td>
<td><strong>UNMOGIP</strong> United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1956-Jun 1967</td>
<td><strong>UNEF I</strong> First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1958-Dec 1958</td>
<td><strong>UNOGIL</strong> United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1960-Jun 1964</td>
<td><strong>ONUC</strong> United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1963-Sept 1964</td>
<td><strong>UNYOM</strong> United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1964 to date</td>
<td><strong>UNFICYP</strong> United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1965-Oct 1966</td>
<td><strong>DOMREP</strong> Mission of the Representative of the Security-General in the Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 1965-Mar 1966</td>
<td><strong>UNIPOM</strong> United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Mission Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Oct 1973-Jul 1979  | **UNEF II**
|                    | Second United Nations Emergency Force                                               |
| Jun 1974 to date   | **UNDOF**
|                    | United Nations Disengagement Observer Force                                         |
| Mar 1978 to date   | **UNIFIL**
|                    | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon                                               |
| Apr 1988-Mar 1990  | **UNGOMAP**
|                    | United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan                       |
| Aug 1988-Feb 1991  | **UNIMOG**
|                    | United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group                                     |
| Jan 1989-Jun 1991  | **UNAVEM I**
|                    | United Nations Angola Verification Mission I                                        |
| Apr 1989-Mar 1990  | **UNTAG**
|                    | United Nations Transition Assistance Group                                           |
| Nov 1989-Jan 1992  | **ONUCA**
|                    | United Nations Observer Group in Central America                                     |
| Apr 1991 to date   | **UNIKOM**
|                    | United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission                                      |
| Jun 1991 to date   | **UNAVEM II**
|                    | United Nations Angola Verification Mission II                                       |
| Jul 1991 to date   | **ONUSAL**
|                    | United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador                                       |
| Sept 1991 to date  | **MINURSO**
|                    | United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara                         |

UNAMIC
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia

Mar 1992 to date

UNPROFOR
United Nations Protection Force

Mar 1992 to date

UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Camboodia

Apr 1992-Apr 1993

UNOSOM I
United Nations Operation in Somalia I

Dec 1992 to date

ONUMOZ
United Nations Operation in Mozambique

May 1993 to date

UNOSOM II
United Nations Operation in Somalia II


Notes: The U.S. inspired Gulf War, which was sanctioned by the UN is not reflected in this list as it was not a peace-keeping mission as defined by this study.
APPENDIX I

Table 9: Overall UN Budgets Compared to Specific UN Peace and Security Budget (1974-1995, in US Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UN Overall Budget</th>
<th>UN Peace and Security Budget</th>
<th>Percentage of Peace/Security Budget as compared to Overall Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>612,550,00.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
<td>789,488,900.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>811,795,100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>1,267,793,200.00</td>
<td>59,258,000.00</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>1,506,241,800.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>1,587,159,800.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1987</td>
<td>1,711,801,200.00</td>
<td>94,625,400.00</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>2,188,370,000.00</td>
<td>118,837,200.00</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>2,375,425,300.00</td>
<td>109,223,600.00</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


## APPENDIX J

### Chart 6  UN peace keeping operations 1946–1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Keeping Operations</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Mandates and Numbers Deployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)</td>
<td>1948–</td>
<td>Supervise the truce in Palestine; supervise the observance of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria; observe ceasefires in the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal; assist and cooperate with UNIFIL and UNDOF (600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)</td>
<td>1949–</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I (UN Emergency Force)</td>
<td>1956–67</td>
<td>Supervise ceasefire and withdrawal of forces from Egypt; separate Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai (6,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL (UN Observation Group in Lebanon)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Monitor infiltration of arms, troops and materiel into Lebanon from Syria (600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC (UN Operation in the Congo)</td>
<td>1960–64</td>
<td>Ensure withdrawal of Belgian and other forces; assist law and order; maintain Congo's territorial integrity; provide technical assistance (20,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTEA (UN Temporary Executive Authority)</td>
<td>1962–63</td>
<td>Administer W. New Guinea in the transition to its transfer to Indonesia; including a UN Security Force to maintain law and order (1,500—UNSF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM (UN Yemen Observation Mission)</td>
<td>1963–64</td>
<td>Monitor disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)</td>
<td>1964–</td>
<td>Maintain law and order; from 1974, secure a buffer zone, monitor the de facto ceasefire and provide humanitarian assistance (6,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMREP (Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic)</td>
<td>1965–66</td>
<td>Observe the ceasefire between two de facto authorities (also monitored by OAS Inter-American Peace Force) (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM (UN India–Pakistan Observation Mission)</td>
<td>1965–66</td>
<td>Monitor ceasefire along border, except the state of Jammu and Kashmir; supervise withdrawal of all armed personnel to positions held by them before 5 August 1965 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF II (UN Emergency Force II)</td>
<td>1973–79</td>
<td>Supervise the ceasefire and redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and control buffer zone in the Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai (7000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force)</td>
<td>1974–</td>
<td>Supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights; supervise disengagement and separation of forces (1,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)</td>
<td>1978–</td>
<td>Monitor withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon; assist restoration of Government authority (7,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP (UN Good Offices Mission—Afghanistan and Pakistan)</td>
<td>1988–90</td>
<td>Monitor withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Afghanistan and non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other's affairs (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIIMOG (UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group)</td>
<td>1988–91</td>
<td>Supervise the ceasefire; monitor withdrawal of all forces to recognised boundaries (400)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **UNAVEM I**  
| (UN Angola Verification Mission) | 1988–91 | Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces (70) |
| **UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group)** | 1989–90 | Supervise transition of Namibia to independence; organise and supervise elections (8,000) |
| **OUNCA (UN Observer Group in Central America)** | 1989–91 | Monitor arms flows and infiltration of troops in Central America; monitor demobilisation of Nicaraguan contras; monitor Nicaraguan ceasefire and separation of forces (1,000) |
| **UNIKOM**  
| (UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission) | 1991– | Monitor buffer zone along the Iraq–Kuwait border  
| (Ch VII mandate, but not itself an enforcement operation) (1,440) |
| **MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in W. Sahara)** | 1991– | Conduct referendum on independence or integration with Morocco (500) |
| **ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador)** | 1991– | Monitor human rights and verify implementation of peace accords (1,000) |
| **UNAVEM II**  
| (UN Angola Verification Mission II) | 1991– | Monitor ceasefire and creation of new joint armed forces; observe and monitor elections (1000) |
| **UNAMIC (UN Advance Mission in Cambodia)** | 1991–92 | Advance mission for UNTAC |
| **UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia)** | 1992– | Supervise government functions and elections; supervise disarmament and demobilisation of rival armies; supervise repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees; monitor human rights (22,000) |
| **UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force)**  
| Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (B–H), and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) | 1992– | Monitor ceasefire in Croatia; supervise withdrawal of Yugoslav forces; ensure UN Protected Areas demilitarised and inhabitants protected. Support UNHCR delivery of humanitarian relief in B–H, ensure security and functioning of Sarajevo airport; protect UN personnel including in the six safe areas in B–H (Ch VII mandate). Preventive deployment in FYRM (26,500) |
| **UNOSOM (UN Operation in Somalia)** | 1992–93 | Monitor the ceasefire; assist provision of humanitarian relief (1000) |
| **ONUSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia II)** | 1993– | Ensure maintenance of secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (authorised under Chapter VII), including by disarmament; foster national reconciliation and restoration of national institutions (25,000) |
| **UNOMULR**  
| (UN Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda) | 1993– | Monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border; verify non-transit of military assistance to Rwanda (105) |

Notes:  
- Numbers deployed are indicative only, and data on civilian elements is not available in all cases.  
- UNOSOM II has a Ch VII peace enforcement mandate, and part of UNPROFOR's mandate is explicitly based on Ch VII, but both are treated as if they were peace keeping for UN budgeting and administrative purposes. UNIKOM, established after the Gulf War, has a Ch VII mandate, but it deployed as a peace keeping, not enforcement, operation.  
- As at mid-August 1993, further UN peace keeping operations were in prospect for Georgia and Liberia.

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Chapter I. The Emperor

Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be dynamic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet.

Article 3. The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.

Article 4. The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.
The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law.

Article 5. When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a Regency is established, the Regent shall perform his acts in matters of state in the Emperor’s name. In this case, paragraph one of the preceding article will be applicable.

Article 6. The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet.

The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.

Article 7. The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people:

1. Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties.
2. Convocation of the Diet.
3. Dissolution of the House of Representatives.
4. Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet.
5. Appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers.
6. Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.
7. Awarding of honors.
8. Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law.
9. Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers.

Article 8. No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made therefrom, without the authorization of the Diet.

Chapter II. Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Chapter III. Rights and Duties of the People

Article 10. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.

Article 11. The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights.

Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

Article 14. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.

Peers and peacocks shall not be recognized.

No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.

Article 15. The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them.

All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof.

Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials.

In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made.

Article 16. Every person shall have the right of peaceful petition for the redress of damage, for the removal of public officials, for the enactment, repeal or amendment of laws, ordinances or regulations and for other matters; nor shall any person be in any way discriminated against for sponsoring such a petition.

Article 17. Every person may use for redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.

Article 18. No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.

Article 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.

Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.

No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.

The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

Article 21. Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.

No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means or communication be violated.

Article 22. Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.

Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate.

Article 23. Academic freedom is guaranteed.

Article 24. Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.

With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.
Article 25. All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.

In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.

Article 26. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.

All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free.

Article 27. All people shall have the right and the obligation to work.

Standards for wage, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law.

Children shall not be exploited.

Article 28. The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed.

Article 29. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable.

Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare.

Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor.

Article 30. The people shall be liable to taxation as provided by law.

Article 31. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.

Article 32. No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.

Article 33. No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended, the offense being committed.

Article 34. No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel.

Article 35. The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided for by Article 33.

Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued by a competent judicial officer.

Article 36. The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden.

Article 37. In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.

He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and he shall have the right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf at public expense.

At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State.

Article 38. No person shall be compelled to testify against himself.

Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be admitted in evidence.

No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession.

Article 39. No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy.

Article 40. Any person, in case he is acquitted after he has been arrested or detained, may sue the State for redress as provided by law.

Chapter IV. The Diet

Article 41. The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.

Article 42. The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

Article 43. Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people.

The number of members of each House shall be fixed by law.

Article 44. The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income.

Article 45. The term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be four years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up in case the House of Representatives is dissolved.

Article 46. The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, and election for half the members shall take place every three years.

Article 47. Electoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses shall be fixed by law.

Article 48. No person shall be permitted to be a member of both Houses simultaneously.

Article 49. Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate annual payment from the national treasury in accordance with law.

Article 50. Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt from apprehension while the Diet is in session, and any members apprehended before the opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of the House.

Article 51. Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House.

Article 52. An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once per year.

Article 53. The Cabinet may determine to convokes extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on such convocation.

Article 54. When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of members of the House of Representatives within forty (40) days from the date of dissolution, and the Diet must be convened within thirty (30) days from the date of the election.

When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may, in time of national emergency, convokes the House of Councillors in emergency session.

Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.

Article 55. Each House shall judge disputes related to qualifications of its members. However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.
Article 56. Business cannot be transacted in either House unless one-third or more of total membership is present.

All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as elsewhere provided in the Constitution, and in case of a tie, the presiding officer shall decide the issue.

Article 57. Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution therefor.

Each House shall keep a record of proceedings. This record shall be published and given general circulation, excepting such parts of proceedings of secret session as may be deemed to require secrecy.

Upon demand of one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes.

Article 58. Each House shall select its own president and other officials.

Each House shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a member, a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present must pass a resolution therefor.

Article 59. A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.

A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law.

Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, when in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors.

Article 60. The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives. Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the period of recess excepted, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

Article 61. The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet approval required for the conclusion of treaties.

Article 62. Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records.

Article 63. The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations.

Article 64. The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying these judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted.

Matters relating to impeachment shall be provided by law.

Chapter V. The Cabinet

Article 65. Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

Article 66. The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.

The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians. The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

Article 67. The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business. If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree and if no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or the House of Councillors fails to make designation within ten (10) days, exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

Article 68. The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet.

The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.

Article 69. If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days.

Article 70. When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the first convocation of the Diet after a general election of members of the House of Representatives, the Cabinet shall resign en masse.

Article 71. In the cases mentioned in the two preceding articles, the Cabinet shall continue its functions until the time when a new Prime Minister is appointed.

Article 72. The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches.

Article 73. The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions:

(1) Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of state.
(2) Manage foreign affairs.
(3) Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet.
(4) Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law.
(5) Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet.
(6) Enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law.
(7) Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

Article 74. All laws and cabinet orders shall be signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned by the Prime Minister.

Article 75. The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, shall not be subject to legal action without the consent of the Prime Minister. However, the right to take that action is not impaired hereby.

Chapter VI. Judiciary

Article 76. The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.
No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.

All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.

Article 77. The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs.

Public prosecutors shall be subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts.

Article 78. Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency.

Article 79. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law, all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.

The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner thereafter.

In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.

Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law.

The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law;

All such judges shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

Article 80. The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.

The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

Article 81. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.

Article 82. Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.

Where a court unanimously determines a law to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the rights of the people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in question shall always be conducted publicly.

Chapter VII. Finance

Article 83. The power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall determine.

Article 84. No new taxes shall be imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as law may prescribe.

Article 85. No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself, except as authorized by the Diet.

Article 86. The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to the Diet for its consideration and decision a budget for each fiscal year.

Article 87. In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet.

The Cabinet shall act upon the Diet for all payments from the reserve fund.

Article 88. All property of the Imperial Household shall belong to the State. All expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the Diet in the budget.

Article 89. No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority.

Article 90. Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be audited annually by a Board of Audit and submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, together with the statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately following the period covered.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law.

Article 91. At regular intervals and at least annually the Cabinet shall report to the Diet and the people on the state of national finances.

Chapter VIII. Local Self-Government

Article 92. Regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.

Article 93. The local public entities shall establish assemblies as their deliberative organs, in accordance with law.

The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities.

Article 94. Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations within law.

Article 95. A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.

Chapter IX. Amendments

Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurrent vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereafter be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.

Chapter X. Supreme Law

Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have sur-
Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial edict or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.

The treaties concluded by Japan and established law of nations shall be faithfully observed.

Article 99. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

Chapter XI. Supplementary Provisions

Article 100. This Constitution shall be enforced as from the day when the period of six months will have elapsed counting from the day of its promulgation.

The enactment of laws necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, the election of members of the House of Councillors and the procedure for the convocation of the Diet and other preparatory procedures necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may be executed before the day prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

Article 101. If the House of Councillors is not constituted before the effective date of this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall function as the Diet until such time as the House of Councillors shall be constituted.

Article 102. The term of office for half the members of the House of Councillors serving in the first term under this Constitution shall be three years. Members falling under this category shall be determined in accordance with law.

Article 103. The Ministers of State, members of the House of Representatives and judges in office on the effective date of this Constitution, and all other public officials who occupy positions corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution shall not forfeit their positions automatically on account of the enforcement of this Constitution unless otherwise specified by law. When, however, successors are elected or appointed under the provisions of this Constitution, they shall not forfeit their positions as a matter of course.
APPENDIX L

Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

WE THE PEOPLES OF
THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.
Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

Chapter I
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful methods, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1 shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.

2. All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Chapter II
MEMBERSHIP

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United States is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Chapter III
ORGANS

Article 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.
Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

Chapter IV

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

Article 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall not have more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
   a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
   b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council: these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.
2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.
Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

Article 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting

Article 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(e) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

Procedure

Article 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Article 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Chapter V

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, and to the purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.
Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurrence of the permanent members, provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.
2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

Chapter VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any disputes request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Chapter VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers, types and forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members of the Security Council and groups of Members, and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Control on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself controlled with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII

REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence or regional arrangements or agencies dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Chapter IX
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

Chapter X
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of the year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.
Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connexion with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting

Article 67

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 68

The Economic and Social shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

The Economic and Social shall invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that matter.

Article 70

The Economic and Social may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Chapter XI

DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature.
relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

Chapter XII

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;

b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
c. territories voluntary placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part of all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without the prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.
Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

Chapter XIII
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:
   a. those Members administering trust territories;
   b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
   c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.
   2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Powers

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:
   a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
   b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
   c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
   d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting

Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.
Chapter XIV
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93
1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement.

Article 95
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96
1. The General Assembly of the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal actions arising within the scope of their activities.

Chapter XV
THE SECRETARIAT

Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100
1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.
2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101
1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Appendix: Charter of the United Nations

Chapter XVI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall, as soon as possible, be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.

Chapter XVII

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorised as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

Chapter XVIII

AMENDMENTS

Article 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

Chapter XIX

RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

Article 110

1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory States of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.
<table>
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<th>Prime Minister (cabinet number)</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Age on taking office</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Ichirō Hatoyama (first)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Takijiro Motonaga</td>
<td>May 6, 1951 – Aug. 8, 1952</td>
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<td>41. Kōki Hirota (sixth)</td>
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<td>42. Kōki Hirota (seventh)</td>
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<td>47. Kōki Hirota (twelfth)</td>
<td>May 22, 1947 – May 21, 1948</td>
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<tr>
<td>52. Kōki Hirota (seventeenth)</td>
<td>May 22, 1947 – May 21, 1948</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The ages are based on the time of serving as prime minister.
SUMMARY OF TERMS AND SCOPE OF THE PEACEKEEPING LAW

The Prime Minister must receive Diet approval each time Self Defense Forces personnel are sent on any of the following peacekeeping operations:

- monitoring compliance of ceasefire arrangements;
- supervising the disarming, withdrawal or redeployment of troops;
- patrolling in a buffer zone;
- checking the movement of weapons;
- collecting, maintaining or disposing of discarded weapons;
- assisting in ceasefire line demarcation;
- assisting in exchange of prisoners of war;
- engaging in other tasks similar to these activities specified by a government ordinance.

However, a ban will remain in force on the above peacekeeping activities pending further legislation.

When the Diet is adjourned or the Lower House has been dissolved, the Prime Minister must seek Diet approval without delay as soon as the next legislative session convenes.

When the government extends participation in peacekeeping operations beyond two years, it must receive Diet approval again.

Diet approval is unnecessary for participation by Japanese personnel in other peacekeeping operations such as:

- providing medical care;
- searching for; and rescuing refugees;
- providing refugees with food, clothing and medical care, etc.;
- setting up of shelters for refugees;
- reparations/ construction of basic life-supporting facilities;
- assisting removal of contamination and other damage to the national environment;
- provision of transport and communications facilities, storage of materials, construction of all sorts and provision of machines and equipments.

The total number of personnel to take part in peacekeeping operations or in international humanitarian relief activities will not exceed 2000.

Without Diet approval, the government can provide necessary goods free of charge, or at prices lower than market price, to the UN and other parties or organisations that are engaging in peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief activities.

Without Diet approval, the government can use ships or aircraft of the SDP or the Maritime Safety Agency to transport displaced people and goods for humanitarian relief activities and for some peacekeeping operations.

In unavoidable situations, individual members on a peacekeeping mission can use small arms to protect themselves or other members. Use of the weapons must be within a rational limit dictated by the circumstances.

The government must review the law three years after it has gone into effect.
APPENDIX P

DEFINITIONS AND KEY TERMS REGARDING PEACE-KEEPING,
BUILDING, AND MAKING

Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field ... with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peace-building (is) action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

APPENDIX Q

UN CHARTER MANDATE

As an international organization, the UN has a clear mandate. In June 1945, the victorious Allied states created an unprecedented international organization. The United Nations had three primary objectives to implement. These three objectives are still the primary focus of the UN. The first and foremost objective of the organization is to maintain international peace and security. The second objective is to promote international economic and social cooperation. The final objective is to promote human rights for all people.158

GUIDELINES AND OBLIGATIONS OF UN MEMBER STATES

The UN Charter, however, was drafted in order to outline members' relationships and UN programs available to such members as well as in order to present guidelines and obligations of member states to each other. The Charter emphasizes the principle of sovereign equality of all its (UN) members, which is based on the principle of "one state, one vote.159 Size, power, or wealth a state possess is not supposed to allow one state to

158 Reference to the three principle objectives of the UN are stated in the Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles, Article 1, (Department of Public Information, New York: United Nations), pp. 3-4.

159 A. Bennett, International Organization: Principles and Issues. (New Jersey: Footnote Continued on Next Page

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have greater power over other member states. The provision for sovereignty entails the notion that individual states even as members of the UN still possess the ability to make ultimate decisions alone. The Charter holds a number of important provisions. Based on international peace and security, UN member states must refrain from threats or the use of threats inconsistent with UN provisions. International disputes require peaceful settlement. If enforcement actions by the UN are implemented, members are to refrain from giving assistance to states that are the recipients of the enforcement action.

Of the six major organs of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly have the duty to pursue the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council functions continuously and is prepared to consider

all decisions quickly and effectively so as to bring into operation the enforcement of the Charter whenever international peace and security are threatened.\textsuperscript{160}

There are five permanent Security Council members. (USA, UK, the Russian Republic, the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC), and France). Within the UN, these five founding members have since the UN's

conception given themselves special voting and veto rights because at least during post-WWII restructuring, these states were considered great powers and thus took on self-imposed responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Goodrich aptly reveals that one of the main predispositions of "the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security exercised via pacific settlement and enforcement action." The General Assembly plays a number of roles.

Article 2 states, for example:

All members shall refrain in their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

If the parties to the dispute fail to agree to some kind of conflict resolution or fail to subscribe to a Security Council recommendation that might contribute to peace and security, the Security Council, through Chapter VII, may use enforcement powers. Such powers can be invoked if the Security Council "has previously determined that there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression." Article 41

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allows the Security Council to decide on measures to be used not involving armed force and may strongly recommend member states to apply such measures. If all non combat measures fail to halt aggressions by conflicting partners, Article 40 empowers the Security Council to use force. Article 43 allows the Security Council to call upon member states to make ready "on its call ... armed forces, assistance and facilities including the right of passage necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."164

The concept of using force to maintain the peace cannot be confused with conventional UN peace-keeping activities such as separating combatants, supervising of withdrawals of adversaries, and patrolling precarious lines where conflicts may erupt. Chapter VI of the Charter delineates the lines of procedure for conventional peace-keeping forces and their mandates.

**The Evolution of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations**

Of the twenty nine UN peace-keeping operations over the past forty eight years (1946-1994), all such missions have differed. Each conflict situation has dictated different peace-keeping operations mandates.

In general terms, there has never been any perfect UN PKO model to follow. David Malone cites three marked periods of PKO changes. First,  

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traditional missions found UN peacekeepers in the role of making peace amongst warring parties. Success was subject to warring parties seeking resolution. Conflicts in the Middle East between Israel and various Arab states in 1948, 1956-67, and 1973-79 were defused by applying traditional methods of peace-keeping.

New PKO trends have placed UN troops, having to face a series of domestic crises. Involvement in domestic crises and civil wars, despite UN Charter limitations, supposedly not allowing outside interference regarding internal sovereign state acts, are justified in the quest to protect civilians based on humanitarian grounds. It is this new trend, in which the UN has no clear mandate. Recent peace-keepers were sent to civil strife ridden Angola, Somalia, El Salvador, Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. So far, the Somalia and former Yugoslavia experiences have been anything but successful.

Malone's third PKO period is best described as the time of "international involvement of PKOs." Numerous UN member-states are increasingly becoming involved in new PKOs. In March of 1994, PKO

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troops, worldwide, numbered approximately seventy three thousand. In 1989, approximately 20,000 troops were deployed to Namibia, the largest troop deployment since 1964. As of 1993, eighty five thousand troops were deployed across the globe.

Peace-keeping missions have become ever increasingly diversified, large and complex. Promotions of peace and security have filtered into promotions of democracy, the organization of elections, the protection of international human rights, and development, leading to stability in volatile nation-states.

Over the past four years, alongside the rapid increase in PKOs worldwide, various missions have met with difficulties. Japan's already slow to change foreign policy, in all probability, will not place SDFs into missions where the UN itself is not confident with the outcome.

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169 Evans, Cooperating For Peace, p. 100. For specific numbers of troop deployments over the past forty eight years refer to Chart 5, p. 100, in the above titled book. See Appendix N for a complete chart. For an even more in depth look at each PKO missions, costs, sizes of troops deployed, and more, refer to United Nations Peace Keeping.

Figure 5.1: South East Asia, Showing Main Shipping Routes

APPENDIX S

APPENDIX T

Map 2: Occupation of the Spratly Islands

Occupied in 1995 by:
- China
- Malaysia
- Philippines
- Taiwan
- Vietnam

Marked by:
- China (but not occupied)

APPENDIX U

SPRATLY ISLANDS: OCCUPATIONS
(according to recent sources from China)

Mainland China (number of occupations: 7): Yongshu Jiao (Fairy Cross Reef), Chigu Jiao (Chigu Reef), Zhishi Jiao (Subi Reef), Huayang Jiao (Cuarzon Reef), Nakaun Jiao (Gaven Reefs) and Dongmen Jiao (Hughes Reef). China recently admitted to having built fishing shelters at Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef).

Taiwan (1): Taiping Dao (Hu Aba Island)

Vietnam (27): Hengtou Dao (Namtie Island), Namzzi Dao (Southwest Cay), Dunqian Shazhou (Sand Cay), Zhong Jiao (Central Reef), Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island), Jinghong Dao (Sun Cove Island), Anbu Shazhou (Ambonya Cay), Ranjing Shazhou (Grierson Reef), Bisheng Jiao (Peason Reef), Bei Jiao (Barque Canada Reef), Xi Jiao (West Reef), Wumie Jiao (Tennei Reef), Riji Jiao (Ladd Reef), Daxian Jiao (Discovery Great Reef), Dong Jiao (East Reef), Liurun Jiao (Alison Reef), Nanhua Jiao (Cernwallis South Reef), Chaunlan Jiao (Petley Reef), Naihu Jiao (South Reef), Guihan Jiao (Collins Reef), Qiong Jiao (Len Dao), Fungda Dao Jiao (Bombay Castle), Guangya Jiao (Prince of Wales Bank), Wannan Tan (Vanguard Bank), Xiwai Tan (Prince Conson Bank), Lishun Tan (Graniger Bank), Renjun Tan (Alexandra Bank).

The Philippines (8): Mahuan Dao (Nanhan Island), Shuanhuang Shazhou (Lea lần Nan), Feixiu Dao (Flat Island), ZhongyicDao (Thitu Island), Nanyao Dao (Leash Island), Feizii Dao (North Reef or Northeast Cay), Xiyou Dao (West York Island), Shiheng Dao (Commode Reef).

Malaysia (5) Danwan Jiao (Swallow Reef), Nanlui Jiao (Manvels Reef) and Xinggangzi Jiao (Adalser Breakers). Malaysia also set sovereignty signs in six other reefs and banks.

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