POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY:
A CASE FOR INDIGENOUS SCHOLARSHIP

by

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Political Development Theory: A Case for Indigenous Scholarship

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During the 1950s, political theorists turned their attention away from examining Western and Communist development, and began investigating non-western development processes. However, scholars soon realized that the concepts designed to examine Western societies were of limited use when investigating non-western ones. Consequently, political development theorists embarked on several rounds of theory construction designed to create new approaches for investigating non-western political societies. This thesis explores the history of political development theory from the 1950s to the present. In order to do this, texts which exemplify different approaches are critically analyzed. This analysis identifies an effective approach for the study of non-western development and isolates important methodological problems which impair theoretical accuracy. Finally, it offers correctives for some of the persistent methodological problems. The thesis begins by exploring the confusion surrounding the meaning of political development. This exploration is followed by a critical analysis of texts from the universalist -relativist debate. Chapter Two examines the political change approaches, and the dependency critique of political development theory. Chapter Three investigates the
political choice approaches and attempts at the rejuvenation of development theory itself. These examinations concluded that, at this stage, a relativist approach is the most appropriate for the study of non-western political societies. It was also concluded that 'ethnocentric bias' is at the root of political development theory's inability to accurately describe non-western development. Consequently, Chapter Four questions if A.H. Somjee's relativist approach is capable of circumventing 'ethnocentric bias'. The chapter begins by examining the impediments to 'objectivity' in social science research. Next, it explores hermeneutic theory as an alternative to scientific methodology. Finally, it offers a hermeneutic analysis of Somjee's relativist approach. These investigations enable us to arrive at three conclusions. First, because of the nature of social science research, it is impossible to have an 'objective' model of political development. Secondly, hermeneutic theory offers an alternative to scientific methodology. Finally, there is a case for combining indigenous and non-indigenous approaches as a corrective to 'ethnocentric bias'.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my brother James C. Albertson Jr. For without his sacrifice, I would not have been able to escape the social boundaries of my race, class, and gender.
"Though science and truth know no national boundaries, it is probably new generations of scientists from the underdeveloped countries themselves who most need to and best can, devote the necessary attention to these problems and clarify the process of underdevelopment and development. It is their people who in the last analysis face the task of changing this no longer acceptable process and eliminating this miserable reality."

— Andre Gunder Frank

"Yet it is important to remember that a Connecticut Yankee in Arthur's court will see things as a Connecticut Yankee and not in the same way as one of the knights of the round table."

— Richard E. Palmer
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When I began the formal study of Political Science, I was amazed at how few students shared my interest in political theory. Apparently, most of my young colleagues were more interested in what they considered 'application', than what they were applying. While it may be true that the 'application' of political theory is much more exciting, than its construction, it is equally true that without the construction of sound political theory, its application to all areas of practice will be flawed. Moreover, the neglect of political theory will eventually erode the already tentative basis upon which the study of politics is considered a science at all. With these consequences in mind, I encourage political science students to take up the challenges that political theory offers. Only a renewed interest in political theory will lead to improved application and to the creation of a strong scientific foundation for the study of politics.

During the same time, it became apparent that in a world where cultural survival depends on economic and military power, many non-western societies seem destined to be relegated to history. In order to prevent such a fate, Western nations must recognize and correct the 'ethnocentrism' which prevades their policies toward and treatment of the non-western world. Of equal importance, is that non-western scholars be heard by Western academics, because it is these young intellectuals who will translate traditional non-western values into their modern reality. It is with the hopes that political theory will once again be the centre of political studies and that non-western political theory will take its rightful place in that body of theory, that this volume is offered.

- Kim Gaines-Baran
INTRODUCTION

The concern of this thesis is a critical analysis of political development theory. Political theorists have always been interested in social change. This interest initially culminated in theoretical constructs designed to explain and predict the effects of rapid social, economic and political change on the fabric of European society. During the nineteenth century both Marxist and Liberal theorists developed such explanations. Later, scholars became interested in American and Soviet political development. Shortly after World War II, however, political theorists turned their attention to the rapid social changes occurring in the less developed areas of the world.

During the 1950s it became apparent that the legal-formal approach used by scholars to examine Western political development was of limited use when examining non-western political development. This realization led scholars such as Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye and Samuel Huntington to search for new approaches to the study of non-western politics. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s this search resulted in two consecutive rounds of theory construction and one external critique. The first round of theory construction was dominated by the Universalist-Relativist debate. This debate centered on whether
natural science methodology or area studies would produce the most appropriate approach for the study of non-western political development. On the one hand, the universalists use quantitative and behavioral methodology to emphasize the elements common to all political systems. On the other hand, the relativists use a cross-disciplinary approach to area studies in order to emphasize the uniqueness of each polity. These approaches, broadly speaking, are exemplified in the works of Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye, respectively. Since this round of theory construction was criticized for being 'static', because of its inability to describe the dynamics of change, the second round of theory construction focused on political change.

During the debate on political change several models that described both the causes and outcomes of political change were proposed. Examples of these models are A. K. F. Organski's sequential stages of political development and Samuel Huntington's examination of political development and decay. While this round of theory construction had successfully tackled the problem of 'static' analysis, it also pointed out the need to investigate elite choice, or decision-making and the foundation for public policy. Before this next debate could begin, however, the sub-field was confronted by an external critique.
That critique was offered by Dependency Theory. This body of theory has its intellectual roots in Lenin's notion of imperialism and Raúl Prebisch's idea of unequal exchange. Scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank, and Osvaldo Sunkel investigated the impact of imperialism and international economics on the process of non-western development. These scholars also suggested solutions to what they perceived as the dependent condition of some non-western countries. In short, the Dependency critique revealed two significant shortcomings of political development theory. The first shortcoming was that political development theory had overlooked the negative impact of the international economic system, and imperialism on the development of non-western countries. The second shortcoming was that these theories lacked economic analysis and were incapable of generating relevant public policy. While this critique did not result in a paradigm shift, it nevertheless influenced the third debate in political development theory.

In the mid-1970s a third round of political development theory construction was attempted. This time the focus was on political choice. In other words, models were constructed to examine the roles which elite choice, decision-making and public policy play in the process of political development. Apparently this focus was an
attempt to make political development theory capable of public policy analysis. Among the several models created to investigate political choice, Almond, Flanagan and Mundt's multifactor approach and Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson's elite choice approach made significant contributions.

Unfortunately all three attempts at theory construction were criticized for their 'ethnocentric bias'. That is to say, non-western societies were being judged not only by western standards of stability and order, but also by western democratic values and development priorities. The inability of scholars to deal with 'ethnocentric bias' in their models brought into question the usefulness of the concept political development. Despite this disillusionment, scholars such as Harry Eckstein and David Apter agreed that the concept was worth rescuing. The attempt to save the concept of political development, and to generate a theoretical renewal constitutes the current debate in political development theory. This conceptual renewal is represented by the works of David Apter and A. H. Somjee. On the one hand, David Apter examines the governability of modern western society. On the other hand, Somjee investigates the normative issue regarding non-western political development left unresolved by previous attempts at theory construction. Thus, these four
rounds of theory construction followed by their respective criticisms constitute an intellectual history of political development theory.

This thesis will examine such an intellectual history of political development theory and critically analyze representative texts from each round of theory construction. These representative texts also indicate specific approaches to the study of political development theory. Some of them also argue that it is inadequate in describing non-western development processes. The thesis will then examine the case for supplementing political development theory with the development experiences of the non-western world. Moreover this examination will also emphasize the fact that we have to come to terms with the problem of 'ethnocentric bias'. It will also argue that while 'ethnocentric bias' is impossible to remove from political development models, scholars can, nevertheless, pay greater attention to the critiques and arguments of those who point out the shortcomings of such biases. These criticisms are generally from the point of view of the historical experiences, cultural influences, and normative backgrounds of non-western societies. These criticisms can both correct and supplement Western approaches. Moreover, such an approach will be more inclusive with an incremental possibility of being truly
universal in the sense of being meaningful to societies with different normative backgrounds. Such an approach will require a constant dialogue between, what is claimed to be universal and what is significant to different societies' specific experiences.

In order to achieve the above goals, Chapters One and Two of this thesis will trace the intellectual history of the body of political development theory. To do so, representative texts from different approaches will be critically examined in a chronological fashion. After the critical analysis of each debate, the scholarly criticisms of that round of theory construction will be discussed. Chapter Three will continue to trace the intellectual history of the current body of political development theory. Once again, this will be accomplished through a critical analysis of representative texts from important debates in the sub-field. Chapter Four will begin with an examination of the impediments to 'objectivity' in social sciences research. Next, a brief history of hermeneutic theory and its influence on the social sciences will be offered. Finally, the hermeneutically influenced social theories will be used to analyze the ideas of a scholar who approaches the problems of relativism-universalism from a fresh perspective.
The concern of this chapter is a critical analysis of the body of Political Development Theory. Political Theorists have often disagreed not only on the appropriate approach to use when studying political development, but also on the actual nature of political development itself. For instance, Samuel Huntington suggests that a country's level of political stability is an indication of its degree of political development. In contrast, in their joint work, Huntington and Nelson consider mass political participation as an important element of the political development process. As a result of these disagreements, scholars have constructed several approaches to the study of political development. Initially, Gabriel Almond and James Coleman offered a Structural-Functional approach in order to facilitate comparison of different political systems. Then, Barrington Moore Jr. suggested that a class analysis would allow for an understanding of the direction political development would take. Later, Binder et al. claimed that a country's development was the result of its government's reaction to specific types of crises.

With these varying concepts and approaches in mind, it is the purpose of this chapter to trace the early intellectual history of the study of political development.
This examination will also reveal an appropriate approach for the study of non-western political development. These tasks will be accomplished by critically examining an important debate that occurred in the discipline during the 1950s through the late 1960s. However before this examination can begin, it is necessary to investigate the 'semantic confusion' which exists in the study of political development.

IS IT SIMPLY A MATTER OF SEMANTICS? An examination of the many definitions of Political Development:

The study of Political Development is a relatively new sub-field within the broader discipline of Political Science. As a result, scholars working in this sub-field rarely agree on what constitutes political development. This lack of consensus does not mean, however, that no agreement exists at all. For instance, most scholars would agree that a country's political development is part of a more encompassing process of its modernization. Most observers would also agree that freely held elections and mass participation in those elections are reasonable indicators of a country's political development. Here, unfortunately, is often where the agreement ends. Scholars continue to disagree on whether to treat political development as a dependent or independent variable. For this reason, some scholars suggest that a country's
political development occurs as an extension of its economic and social development, while others contend that political development can occur independently. More importantly scholars disagree on whether political development is the outcome of efficient state institutions, or a politically capable participating citizenry.

Because of this lack of consensus on the use of the term and concept of political development, it is necessary to critically examine as many different definitions as possible in order to understand the concept. This examination will not only clarify, but also help us to arrive at the definition of political development used in this thesis.

Lucian Pye - Identifies the Semantic Confusion:

In his article, "The Concept of Political Development", Lucian Pye examines the "Semantic Confusion"(1) surrounding the definition of the term Political Development. Initially the term was used by economists to describe a political system that was capable of sustaining economic growth. Pye claims that this definition came under attack because it was too general and lacked criteria for measuring the amount of economic growth. Hence, political development could denote any political system that was
capable of sustaining any amount of economic development.

Pye goes on to critically analyze nine other definitions of the term political development, three of which suggest that political development is part of a more encompassing social process. In these definitions, political development is perceived as a by-product of such social processes as industrialization, modernization and social change. Another four definitions equate political development with the effective functioning of a state apparatus. Here, it is the outcome of nation-building, organization-building, the establishment of stability, or efficient political system performance. Lastly, two definitions perceive political development in terms of political culture. In this case, it results from increasing popular participation in the political process, or upholding the underlying values of an ideology.(2)

Pye contends that although this 'semantic confusion' continues to exist, there are several basic themes which run through the literature on political development. One prominent theme is equality. Another concept which permeates the thinking on political development is the "capacity of the political system". (3) The final theme which is often addressed is the differentiation of the division of labor within government.
Karl von Vorys forwards an entirely different notion of what political development involves. According to von Vorys the political systems of developing countries lack longevity, because they also lack a national social system. This void stems from the lack of available alternatives to traditional tribal and kinship politics. The problem has also been exacerbated by the inability of nationalist movements to mobilize the masses or focus on national politics. The artificial nature of these nation-states has also added to the problem. Consequently, national integration efforts have failed. (4)

For von Vorys the remedy lies in re-establishing authority over the direction and pace of social and economic change. Apparently in developing countries the government is the only national organization with the available resources for such a task. Unfortunately in functions where mass compliance is required, the governments of developing countries have little success. For example, few are capable of enforcing the laws of the land or extracting taxes from the population. In order to harness social forces, the governments of developing countries must increase their 'capacity to control'. That is to say, the government must increase its ability to
persuade its citizens to follow proposed civic plans. In addition, it must increase its coercive ability to enforce the laws of the land. Despite the need to increase both components of government control, von Vorys points to obstacles which prevent the governments of developing countries from achieving this goal. These obstacles range from the popular aversion to public violence to problems of inadequate infrastructure. Von Vorys points out that the interdependence of governmental coercion and persuasion also represents an obstacle. In other words, if governments concentrate on increasing their persuasive ability, then the problem of eliciting voluntary compliance becomes evident. Because there is a lack of money to create jobs or improve roads and other public facilities, the government's persuasive powers are low. These lack of resources are also a reflection of its inability to extract taxes from the population or guarantee the public protection against theft. Consequently the government's ability to persuade is dependent on its ability to coerce. On the other hand if the government concentrates on increasing its coercive capability, then the implementation of public policy becomes the problem.(5) For von Vorys the only solution is a balanced development of governmental controls by incremental increases in its capacities to persuade and coerce.
While a state which is capable of controlling and directing social forces is an important component of political development, it is not the only component. Apparently, a state which is unable to elicit voluntary compliance from its citizens has a problem of a more fundamental nature. That problem is one of legitimacy. If, as Lucian Pye pointed out, questions of legitimacy are related to political culture and commitment to the system,(6) then a definition of political development which focuses on changes in political culture would be more appropriate when studying non-western development.

**Gabriel Almond - A Systems Approach to Political Development:**

In comparison, Gabriel Almond uses functional analysis to define political development. That is to say, a functional-dysfunctional dichotomy is used to examine the components of a political system and determine whether they are stable or changing.(7)

For Almond, functional-systems theory identifies several functional levels. The first examines the entire political system as it interacts with its surroundings. Almond terms this "...performance of the political system in its environment as the political system's 'capabilities'."(8) The second level examines the internal 'conversion' process of the political system. The political system also
has maintenance and adaptation functions. In order to maintain the system new members must be recruited. They also must be 'trained' in the requirements of political roles. In the political system these two functions are called recruitment and socialization. Almond goes on to suggest that these functional levels and their interactions be used as categories for comparing different political systems. With this in mind, Almond suggests that political development consists of an increase in a political system's capabilities, conversion processes, maintenance or socialization functions.

Although systems analysis can be useful when examining politics, the notion of a functional-dysfunctional dichotomy is not sensitive enough to indicate the quantity, quality or direction of social change. For example, dysfunction denotes a break-down in the normal functioning of a system. However the concept is not sensitive enough to detect whether the break-down results in disabling the entire system. More importantly, a functional-dysfunctional dichotomy assumes either a negative, or a static role for the forces of social change. Thus, this definition of political development does not adequately deal with development which implies change.

Because of this definition's limited ability to detect positive change in a political system's environment, it is
not the most appropriate definition for the study of non-western political development.

Alfred Diamant—Political Development as the Ability to Manage Change:

Alfred Diamant expounds still another perspective on what constitutes political development. He contends that, "Political development is a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations." (9) For Diamant, this process requires a centralized and differentiated government structure. Furthermore, the government must have control over the extraction of resources from society, as well as the ability to influence most of society. Thus Diamant suggests that a government's ability to cope with a number of goals and demands at the same time is the 'mark' of modernity. (10)

While it is agreed that the state's ability to successfully meet changing demands and goals is an important element in political development, this definition is limited in its ability to describe African political development in particular. This is because of its emphasis on the previously acquired capabilities of centralized and differentiated government structures, as well as the persuasive and extractive abilities of the state. These
characteristics often exist in more advanced societies. Many African states have simply not yet acquired these capabilities. This particular definition of political development would be more appropriate when examining Asian development.

Samuel Huntington - Political Development as Political Institutionalization:

Samuel P. Huntington takes a considerably different stand on the nature of political development. He claims that political development is associated with the strength or weakness of political organizations and processes. For this reason, he focuses on the study of political institutionalization. (11)

For Huntington the general association of political development with modernization not only limits the term's scope, but also places a time constraint on it. In this case the concept can only describe a single political system, that of a modern nation-state. This equation categorizes such political systems as the Chinese empires and the Roman republic as underdeveloped. (12) Thus, theory does not reflect reality.

In order to dissociate it from modernization, Huntington defines, "... political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and
Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. (14)

Huntington goes on to elaborate the range of each criterion. Adaptability, for instance, is contrasted with rigidity. Huntington sets complexity on a continuum with simplicity. An organization's degree of autonomy or subordination also indicates its level of institutionalization. The more autonomous the political system is from other social systems, the more developed it is. The final criteria for judging an organization's level of institutionalization is its degree of cohesion or disunity. For Huntington cohesion is dependent on the consensus of the participants. (15)

Although the level of institutionalization within a political system may be one indication of political development, it is not the only one. Once again, this definition emphasizes the systemic elements of political development while ignoring those changes which reside in the domestic political environment.

A.H. Somjee - Political Development as a Capable Participating Citizenry:
The definition of political development which is most appropriate for use in this thesis is one which is particularly sensitive to changes in a society's political environment. In his book, Political Capacity In Developing Societies, A. H. Somjee has presented such a definition. For Somjee, political development is viewed as the growth of a people's ability to hold their rulers accountable for their political actions. Somjee has called this ability, 'political capacity'. With this definition changes in the political attitudes of traditional societies can be examined. If a society's attitude toward political authority changes from submission to active participation, then both political capacity and political development have increased.(16)

Somjee contends that the validity of this definition lies in its ability to describe the differences between Western and non-western political development. On the one hand, Western political development occurred gradually over 300 hundred years. During this time political institutions adapted to the increased popular demand for participation. On the other hand, the political institutions that developing countries have transplanted grant these basic rights to an often unprepared citizenry. It is this historical circumstance which accounts for the difference in the level of political capacity of many non-western
Now that this survey of the many definitions of political development has been completed, and the appropriate definition for uses in this thesis defended, it is now possible to trace the early intellectual history of the study of political development.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

Like many modern disciplines, the study of political development may be traced back to ancient times. In fact, Plato contemplated the subject and later Machiavelli also added to the discourse. Although the study of political development has been a lengthy one, it did not emerge as a sub-field of political science until the 1950s. Since that time, scholars working in the discipline have produced a sizable body of literature. Included in this discourse are theoretical approaches to the study of political development, as well as case studies of specific regions and nations. This section will trace the early intellectual history of the discipline by examining the major debates which occurred from the 1950s to the early 1970s. This examination will also reveal an appropriate approach for the study of non-western political development. In order to accomplish this task, representative texts will be critically analyzed in a
Before the 1950s the study of political development was dominated by the description of the functions of what Robert A. Packenham called, "a legal-formal constitution that prescribes such features as equal protection under the law, the rule of law, regular elections by secret ballot, federalism, and/or the separation of powers." (18) This approach was used by Western European and American scholars when examining their respective societies. Similarly, the study of Western Democracies, and the Soviet Bloc also dominated the sub-field. However, immense changes were on the horizon.

THE UNIVERSALIST-RELATIVIST DEBATE:

Prompted by the emergence of many new Asian and African states in the 1950s and onward, scholars began to realize the limitations of the legal-formal approach when applied to non-western political development. Because there was often a large discrepancy between the ideals written in non-western constitutions and their implementation, the legal-formal approach began to appear less useful when studying non-western societies. This realization fueled a search for new approaches to the study of non-western politics. According to Fred Riggs, this search took two directions. The first was based on
quantitative and behavioral methodology, while the second used a 'cross-disciplinary' approach to 'area-studies'.

The former approach is termed universalist because it emphasizes the elements common to all political systems. The latter approach, on the other hand, is termed relativist because it stresses the unique aspects of each society's politics. The debate between scholars on which of these two approaches is most suited for the study of non-Western political development represents the first step in the intellectual history of the sub-discipline.

The Universalists:

In his book, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Daniel Lerner not only identified the high correlation between urbanization, literacy-media exposure and political participation, but also suggested its universal implications. He argued that:

...the Western model of modernization exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global. Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; raising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increased media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting).

For Lerner, the sequential evolution of these components results in the emergence of modern participant society.
Lerner also claimed that if modern institutions were to be successfully adopted by a society then they must be supported by an equivalent change in the individual's 'personality matrix'. The psychological mechanism which allows traditional life-styles to give way to modern ones, Lerner termed 'empathy'. This empathetic ability enables individuals to rearrange their self-systems on short notice, in order to cope with rapid social change. According to Lerner, European physical mobility or the individual's choice to relocate in order to improve his, or her life, fostered social mobility. In time these notions became the foundation of social institutions based on voluntary participation. This led to the development of a system of values which perceive social change as a norm. Consequently empathetic individuals are able to have opinions about matters which are beyond their control, or do not affect them directly. In contrast, Lerner believed that the traditional individual possesses a constrictive self-system which does not contain a mechanism for experiencing alternative life styles and that restricts their opinions to local and familiar situations. As a result, the traditional individual is unable to handle new demands.

The diffusion of 'empathy' throughout the world has been hastened by what Lerner called the "...mediated"
experience of mass communication". (24) That is to say, exposure to radio, movies and television has given individuals in traditional societies the chance to experience new and different life styles. This process has created a transitional individual who has acquired some of the skills and desires of modernity, but not all of them. A transitional individual, for example, may listen to the radio, attend the cinema and be somewhat empathetic, but he or she may not be literate. (25) For Lerner the existence of transitional individuals heralds 'the Passing of Traditional Society'.

Unfortunately, the model which Lerner proposes appears too simplistic. While increased urbanization may increase literacy and increased literacy may raise media exposure, "how does media exposure affect economic participation"? In this case the notion that increased media exposure 'goes with' wider economic participation does not clarify the relationship between these components. Moreover, "what is the role of industrialization in this evolutionary sequence"? Lerner's model also focuses on the positive aspects of urbanization and its effects on non-western political participation. He has, however, overlooked the negative consequences of urbanization. If for instance, a country's industrial growth does not keep pace with its urbanization, then large portions of the urban population
may be marginalized. Certainly, marginality has little positive affect on political participation except to increase anomic activity.

Moreover, the acquisition of empathy may be sufficient to enable individuals to have opinions about matters which do not concern them, however simply having opinions does not guarantee political action. It seems that there must be other psychological and social factors which combine with empathy to produce a modern participating citizen. For instance, citizens must also believe that their opinions matter to those in government and that government officials can be held accountable for their actions. Consequently, notions of political efficacy may be an important part of this formula.

Another universalist approach was put forward by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman in their work, The Politics of the Developing Areas. In the introductory text Almond attempts to systematically compare the political systems of developing countries by applying a universal set of criteria. He first suggests that the theoretical development of political science has not kept pace with the advent of modern political culture and institutions in the West. In order to provide a new conceptual direction, Almond offers a 'behavioral approach' to the study of comparative politics.(26) Accordingly, all political
systems have four features in common. These features include the degree of structural specialization, function, multifunctionality, and the mixture of traditional and modern elements. Almond devised these common features on the basis of several assumptions. The first is that all political systems can be compared on the degree of structural specialization. The second is that all political systems perform the same function in society, despite differences in structure. These functions may be compared on their frequency, style and on the structure performing them. The third claims that all political structures have multifunctions. That is, although political structures may be specialized, they always maintain more than one function. The fourth assumption states that all political systems have a mixture of modern and traditional elements. Consequently, the difference is reflected in the ratio of elements or the dominance of one element over the other.(27)

While Almond recognizes both Easton's and Lasswell's efforts to develop structural-functional theory, he claimed that functional theory in political science was still lacking. This reality led him to state, "... no one in political science, prior to very recent and very provisional efforts, confronted the problem of political function and structure in a direct and systematic way"(28)
In order to fill this void, Almond offers functional categories designed to compare entire political systems. These categories include political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication. The government also has functions which include rule-making, rule application, rule adjudication.(29) To Almond, a functional approach to comparative politics allows for the statistical and mathematical formulations which increase precision. As a result of this increased precision, political science will be rendered closer to the natural sciences.(30) This elaboration of structural-functional theory was then followed by five case-studies which apply this theoretical framework to South East Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East and Latin America.

Because this model focuses on organized and institutional political behavior, it is only sensitive to those forces of social change which become codified as inputs. Consequently, only formal political interactions between the system and its domestic environment can be examined. As Daniel Lerner has pointed out individuals in modernizing societies undergo a psychological change from traditional 'life-ways' to one which is empathetic.(31) This particular model would not be able to detect such a change until it was completed. For example, individuals in
non-western countries may be engaging in informal interest aggregation behaviors, long before the emergence of political parties.

The Relativists:

In his work, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity*, Lucian Pye employs a 'cross-disciplinary' approach in order to examine the problems of Burmese nation-building.(32) He contends that although Burma possesses all the economic resources necessary for development, it has failed to construct an effective modern nation-state. Pye attributes this failure to factors which are both endogenous and exogenous to Burmese society. In the former instance, he suggests that the Burmese socialization process is unable to instill in Burmese individuals the level of human trust required to operate modern organizational forms. In this instance, Burmese children are given enormous freedom of action. However, the Burmese mother seems to give the child attention and then retract it for no apparent reason. As a result, Burmese children learn not only that there is no cause and effect relationship between their behavior and other's responses, but also that human relationships are unpredictable. For Pye, this socialization process leaves the Burmese with a feeling of impotence regarding their ability to control their social environment.(33)
In the latter case, Pye believes that the infiltration of 'World Culture' values into Burmese society has caused an identity crisis for Burmese individuals. That is to say, Western notions of a secular state, industrial organization, rational decision-making, justice and merit have undermined the traditional values not only of Burmese society, but also of other transitional societies. More specifically, the Burmese political socialization process has become synonymous with acculturation to the world culture. While Pye believes that some exposure to the world culture is required in order to learn about the elements of nation-building, this same exposure produces psychological responses that become obstacles to nation-building. These responses are reflected in the Burmese political elite's identity crisis. Pye further suggests that the greater the acculturation influence, the greater the decline in political effectiveness. Thus the political effectiveness of the Burmese political class has been diminished by the diffusion of world culture transmitted during the British colonial period. This experience has left them not only ambivalent, but also incapable of the actions required for nation building. (34)

Consequently, the destruction of their social value system and their unsupportive socialization process has left the Burmese with a psychological problem. This problem, according to Pye, is manifested in a vicious cycle of fear
which leads to the failure to establish an effective nation-state. In short, Burmese administrators and politicians were immobilized by fear and indecision when faced with either general public policy decisions, or decisions regarding the future of Burmese development. This fear was reflected in their ambivalence over what constitutes modernization and progress; a lack of effective communication among bureaucrats; perplexity over the role of ritual and rational policy making. More importantly, the Burmese political elite appear to be torn between defining and assuming a modern role in Burmese society and defending the traditional Burmese culture. Consequently, Burma's political elite suffer from, what Pye calls, an 'identity crisis'.(35) Although Pye recognizes that transitional societies suffer from many real economic problems, he believes that the psychological barriers to effective action form a greater obstacle to political development. These obstacles have led the Burmese to accept a stagnant economy, an authoritarian government, as well as military rule.(36)

Pye delineates his 'cross-disciplinary' methodology by first explaining the connection between nation-building, political culture and individual psychology. He claims that,

The problems of nation building thus seem to
reside in that complex of attitudes and practices which we call the political culture and which reflect both the historical evolution of the society and the psychology reactions to social change of the society's political actors. (37)

Furthermore, by focusing on the relationships between the socialization process, acculturation process and the individual's personality, Pye argues that these affect the ability of people to work effectively together in modern organizations. (38) Through the use of lengthy personal and open interviews with important political actors, Pye set out to examine the impact of early socialization and acculturation processes on the Burmese ability to operate a modern state organization. (39)

While Pye's focus on political culture and the socialization process does allow for the examination of changes occurring in the domestic political environment, another more fundamental problem exists with this model. Pye has overlooked the possibility that the social science concepts which he is using may be culture specific. As Leonard Binder points out, there have been attempts made to apply concepts (and even sweeping theories) to these countries attempts made by highly respectable social scientists who have disregarded the possibility that their conceptual apparatus may be culture-bound. (40)

The Western sociological and psychological theories which Pye uses were designed to describe the Western individual's
social and psychological experiences. These experiences are not only not the same, but are not prioritized in the same manner for non-Western individuals. Pye has overlooked the possibility that the individual's identity may not be valued as highly in non-western societies as in the West. Certainly, Japan's economic success has proven that a more 'collective' rather than an 'individualistic' identity may be well suited to the operation of modern economic organizations. For the same reasons, the level of trust required to operate modern political organizations can not be measured by western standards.

In another relativist study, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, Leonard Binder uses systems analysis in order to identify changes in Iranian politics. Unlike Almond and Coleman's model, Binder's system is based on its dominant concept of legitimacy. In order to investigate the legitimization process, Binder offers a typology which includes Traditional, Conventional and Rational systems, as well as their respective political processes: bargaining, hierarchical and polyarchical. Once these processes are identified, it becomes apparent that they are forwarded by specific political actions. These actions differ from system to system, but remain constant in each system. Thus "Binder's system, then is comprised of power relationships which are exploited in a
limited number of ways, in order that legitimation may be won." (43)

He contends that although Iran's political system is basically traditional, its faulty system maintenance activities have caused it to change. That is, Iran's rationalization of its bureaucracy and military in response to external demands has resulted in the emergence of new forms of legitimacy. (44) These new forms of legitimacy not only compete for the loyalty of Iranian citizens and create what Binder calls 'legitimacy confusion' but also force the political system to change. Apparently, when contending notions of legitimacy exist within a system, they interact intermittently in the citizens' minds. This interaction results in either continued support for the existing legitimacy or ideological change. (45) He states, "...it is obvious that this activity forces the pace of political development while providing but partially for its environmental prerequisites" (46) Binder also found that there is a small but growing middle class which criticizes the traditional system. This segment of the Iranian population is the one most exposed to development. As a result, it demands from the government effective legitimation of its equality. (47)

Binder believes that such a 'legitimacy confusion' is reflected in the incompatibility of power relationships and
legitimizations. That is to say, the new power relationships require effective and rational legitimization, while Iran's legitimization process remains traditional. (48) These incongruences eventually lead to either administrative reform, or dissatisfied social groups explore new political techniques. (49) In the former case, the Shah's government implemented partial rationalization by adopting a constitution and other conventional political institutions. In addition, they created a chamber of commerce and varied professional organizations. (50) However, these institutions had little if any power and were tightly controlled by the Shah. (51) In the latter case, dissatisfied groups such as the middle class demonstrated their exploration of new political techniques by joining extremist parties and engaging in non-cooperation. (52) Moreover, the Iranian system exhibits characteristics of not only traditional but also conventional and rational systems. Binder also concludes that despite changes in leaders and constitutions, the traditional social power structures remain intact. Furthermore, the social values reflected in the notion of legitimacy are not the same values which are institutionalized. (53) Binder has identified the source of Iranian instability as all elements which decrease the "effectiveness of traditional political techniques and alter the pattern of traditional legitimizations." (54) For Binder this includes all
rationalizing policies. The most significant is the rationalization of the social power structure. That is the civil service and the military. These faulty system-maintenance activities have caused the systems to change. (55) Consequently, the activities which were implemented to ensure the traditional system's continuation caused it to move toward a transitional system.

While Binder's choice of legitimacy for the basis of his systems analysis is an appropriate focus for the study of non-western political development, systems analysis itself is the problem in this case. Once again, systems analysis emphasizes the examination of formal political organization and activities. These institutionalized political behaviors change only after there have been profound changes in the political environment. In this instance, further investigation of the Iranian middle class and its demands for equality are in order. Consequently, an approach which emphasizes changes in legitimacy as they result from the domestic political environment may be more appropriate for the study of non-western political development.

During the early 1960s both the Universalist and Relativist approaches produced a sizable body of literature which forwarded the understanding of non-western politics. However, by the mid-1960s criticisms of both approaches
began to appear. The following section will examine the major criticisms of these approaches.

THE UNIVERSALIST-RELATIVIST DEBATE IN RETROSPECT: Critiques from Within the Perspective.

In fact, some of the most important criticism came from scholars working within the discipline of political development theory itself. This section will examine the major 'in-house' criticisms of these approaches, and explain how they set the stage for the second debate in the history of the study of political development.

The significant 'in-house' criticism of the Universalist and Relativist approaches took two forms. The first was aimed at the normative basis of the universalist approach. Although the advocates of this approach had been striving to create a more 'objective' political science by adapting biological and mechanical concepts to it, they were unable to eliminate its normative content. Consequently, non-western societies were being judged not only by western standards of stability and order, but also by western democratic values and development priorities. This oversight was labelled 'ethnocentrism'. For example, because these processes were positive elements of western development, both Lerner's social process approach and Almond's structural-functional analysis claim a positive role for urbanization and interest aggregation.
respectively.

Chilcote points out the ethnocentric elements of concepts such as a "linear path toward modernization". (56)

In this case the linear path is synonymous with the Western path. Somjee also agrees that

The ethnocentric element in political development reached its highest expression in the ecological theory of Lipset and Lerner. They were inclined to treat political development largely as a function of a prior social and economic development. It was a position which was arrived at in the light of Western political experience and then projected in terms of its global relevance. (57)

Somjee further believes that because structural-functional analysis focuses on inputs and ignores outputs, it universalizes the ease with which western political systems implement their public policy. Non-Western systems, on the other hand, have a much more difficult time with implementation. (58) Furthermore Huntington suggested that Lerner's process approach assumes that modernization is a systemic process, rather than a discrete one. In fact, modernization may be a discrete process which only affects one social sector and does not result in modernizing the entire society. (59) Despite the attempt to purge comparative analysis of its normative content, this content continues to obstruct a clear view of non-western political development.
The second form of criticism from scholars within the perspective focused on the methodological problems inherent in the universalist approach. For example, Gouldner held that structural-functionalism was still too close to its biological and mechanical parents. That is to say, social systems are more autonomous than biological or mechanical systems. Consequently, notions of equilibrium, independence and change are not the same. Hempel also took exception to the incomplete operationalization of the functional-dyfunctional dichotomy.\(^{(60)}\) The most profound methodological error, however, was in the 'static' nature of these approaches. When used as a framework for analysis the universalist approaches revealed a 'still picture' of a society. Consequently, transition or movement from one level of development to another could not be identified. Moreover the mechanisms which cause political change had been ignored. Chilcote credits Don Martindale with the observation that structural-functionalism had failed to address the notion of social change.\(^{(61)}\) Other scholars, such as Leonard Binder, David Apter, and Samuel Huntington echoed this criticism.\(^{(62)}\)

Similarly, the critics of the relativist approach also focused on its normative content. In this instance, relativist approaches which study aspects of a society's uniqueness were expected to circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'. 
This belief is exemplified by Lucian Pye's contention that this approach has the ability to counteract ethnocentric biases present in the Western dominated field. While this contention may be partially true, Binder pointed out earlier, that many concepts used by scholars may be culture-bound. In this case, western concepts may not be capable of describing non-western political development. This criticism pointed to the continuation of ethnocentric bias even in relativist approaches.

Another criticism of the relativist approach focused on its effectiveness as a prescription for development. Even, Pye argued that although a relativist approach may be useful when studying non-western countries, its ability as a prescriptive tool is limited. Thus, non-western societies are unable to find a guide to national development from this approach.

The final criticism of the relativist approach was also aimed at its methodology. While this approach was more capable of describing the actual state of non-western political development, it too was a 'static' form of analysis. Once again, mechanisms for political change had not been uncovered by this approach.

Even though both the criticisms of 'ethnocentric bias' and 'static' analysis were taken seriously by scholars, the
resolution of normative issues was placed on the 'back-burner'. This reality was emphasized by Chilton's statement that "why add to our burdens, however? Why should social scientists enter the morass of normative argumentation when, as Huntington (1971) pointed out, the study of 'change' offers a firm, alternative path to the same issues?"(66) Consequently, the next important debate in political development theory sought to attack 'static' analysis by focusing on political change.

Some General Observations:

The investigation of the 'semantic confusion' has revealed that the political development definitions which focus on the political system are incapable of investigating changes in the domestic political environment. Because changes in the greater society may provide the impetus for political development, the most appropriate definition for this thesis is one which is particularly sensitive to such changes. Consequently, in this thesis the term political development refers to the citizens' ability to hold their rulers accountable for their political actions.

In general, the examination of the universalist -relativist debate and its internal critique has revealed two observations. On the one hand, the universalist
approach not only emphasizes formal political behavior, but also suggests a singular pathway toward development. This emphasis however, is not able to account for informal changes in the domestic political environment. In contrast, the relativist approach emphasizes the examination of a country's historical experiences, political culture, notions of legitimacy and other aspects of its tradition. Consequently, this approach is capable of investigating the informal political behavior that may provide the impetus for political change in non-western societies. For this reason, a relativist approach, initially, is more appropriate for the study of non-western political development. On the other hand, both 'static' analysis and 'ethnocentric bias' were identified as problems for political development theory construction. However scholars chose to ignore the more complex normative issues in favor of investigating political change.
CHAPTER I


2. Ibid., p.84-89.

3. Ibid., p.90.


5. Ibid., p.17-18.


10. Ibid., p.92.


12. Ibid., p.389-393.

13. Ibid., p.393.


15. Ibid., p.394-405.


17. Ibid., p.19.


21. Ibid., p.46.

22. Ibid., p.78.

23. Ibid., p.47-51.

24. Ibid., p.52.

25. Ibid., p.49. Lerner also suggested that 'empathy' could be illustrated by an increased news-range of the respondents. These individuals listened to international newscasts and were interested in matters beyond their family and local issues. Empathy was also indicated in their wider 'opinion range'. That is to say, the respondents ability to formulate and express opinions on a wide variety of topics, not directly concerning them. Ibid., p.69-70. To Lerner this indicates "...a widespread sense of deference toward vox populi... which is a major channel of access from the governed to their government."(Ibid., p.99)


27. Ibid., p.11.


29. Ibid., p.17-54.

30. Ibid., p.64.


approach draws on theories from the various social sciences. In this case, Pye uses political science, sociological and psychological theory to construct a methodology for studying Burmese nation-building. Ibid., p.1-50.

33. Ibid., p.181-200.
34. Ibid., p.211-230.
35. Ibid., p.213-266.
36. Ibid., p.vii-xv.
37. Ibid., p.xvi.
38. Ibid., p.54-55.
39. Ibid., p.62.


41. That is to say, Binder's political system is based on the notion that social groups and individuals petition the government in order to make their power relationships permanent. Ibid., p.30-33 These petitions take the form of regularized political behavior. Binder claims that it is, "these types of behavior, organized and institutionalized in political processes, challenging or maintaining the legitimacy of an existing distribution of values, which comprise for us the political system." (Ibid., p.15).

42. Ibid., p.36.

43. In this case, Binder assumes that the power relationships among competing or non-competing groups within society can become institutionalized by the government. In this way certain power relationships in society become permanent. In fact, Binder claims that the legitimization of social power relationships is the government's primary, but not only function. Consequently, a political power relationship is a request for the government to transform an existing power relationship into a permanent one. Thus, the classification of requests which end in legitimization represent the political procedures and methods which dominate any particular system. Binder also contends that the formal process of legitimization and the content and continuation of important power relations in society are linked together in an input-output relationship. Ibid., p.30-36.
44. Ibid., p. 48-49, p. 62, p. 90.
45. Ibid., p. 15.
46. Ibid., p. 51.
47. Ibid., p. 51.
49. Ibid., p. 91.
50. Ibid., p. 177-181.
51. Ibid., p. 29-31.
52. Ibid., p. 286-291.
53. Ibid., p. 48-51, p. 344-345.
54. Ibid., p. 346.
55. Ibid., p. 347-350.
58. Ibid., p. 7-8.
64. See Ibid., and Binder, Leonard, IRAN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, p. 5.
65. Pye, Lucian, POLITICS, PERSONALITY, p. 83.
CHAPTER II THE APPROACHES TO POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE DEPENDENCY CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY.

This chapter is concerned with the continued critical analysis of the body of political development theory. As was mentioned earlier, the second debate in the sub-field was an effort to overcome the 'static' tendency of earlier theoretical attempts. Consequently, this debate focused on political change. During the late 1960s scholars such as A.K.A. Organski and Leonard Binder devised models to describe political change. For various reasons, however, these models were no more accurate at describing non-western political development than their predecessors. Despite such a shortcoming, the debate on political change did lead to a more fruitful dimension, namely, political choice. In other words, political choice, in the form of decision making and public policy, was identified as an important component of political development. As a result, the third debate would centre around political choice itself. However, what plagued the scholars through the first, as well as the second, round of theory construction is the persistance of ethnocentric bias. Moreover, a significant methodological problem was identified by Mark Kesselman and others. They claimed that political change approaches had overlooked the role of imperialism and the effects of international influence on non-western development. In this way, the 'in-house' critique of
political change left the sub-field open to external criticism. This external critique was provided by dependency theory. Consequently, the debate on political change, the dependency critique and political development theorists' response will be examined in this chapter.

THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL CHANGE:

By the late-1960s it had become apparent that the post-independence experience of most Asian and African countries had been less than stable, and certainly not democratic. Obviously, the descriptive and prescriptive models designed by Western scholars had not completely grasped the complexity of the non-western political development process. This realization, coupled with the criticisms of the mid-1960s, led scholars to embark on a new round of theory construction. It was Samuel P. Huntington who captured the essence of the challenges facing political development theory during this period. He claimed that until the late 1960s, political theory had avoided an in depth study of political change. This lack of interest in the subject stemmed from the fact that modern political science had primarily examined Western Europe and North America where change, spread over two to three centuries, had presented little difficulty. The tendency to ignore political change was also exacerbated by
the prevalent notion that politics was a dependent variable. This assumption led theorists to search for the understanding of political behavior through the study of more fundamental social, economic and psychological phenomena. If the foundation of change in these basic behaviors could be understood, then an understanding of political change would easily follow. (1)

Initially this interest took the form of investigating the idea of political development. However, Huntington points out that, "[i]n the late 1960s, the focus on political development in turn yielded to broader efforts to generate more general theories of political change." (2) Thus, the second debate in the intellectual history of the study of political development theory emerged. This section will critically analyze representative texts in this debate. The analysis will focus on the ability of these models to describe non-western political development.

The Comparative History Approaches to Political Change:

A.K.F. Organski's seminal work, The Stages of Political Development, employed both comparative history and economic theory in order to formulate a concept of political change. He suggested that the fundamental character of government changes along with its functions when a nation progresses from one stage of political
development to another. (3) In fact, Organski maintained that there were four distinct stages of political development that all nations must pass through. The first stage is primitive unification. At this point the primary role of government is to establish a unified administrative machinery, economy and nation. The politics of industrialization is the second stage of development. The primary role of government, at this stage, is to facilitate economic modernization. The politics of national-welfare represents the politics of a completely industrialized nation. Unlike the second stage when the government's role was to aid economic development, its primary role in the third stage is to provide a network of social services and to maintain the economy. The final stage is the politics of abundance. The government's role in this new era will be to absorb the shock of "social reorganization". In addition to this function, the government not only will facilitate the transition to an automated economy, but will also make the new economy responsible to the government. In this case, because the labor force is reduced, so is the government's tax base. According to Organski, the masses will become more dependent on the government for economic support and social services, while the government will become less in need of economic support from the masses. As a result the relationship between the masses and the government may become less democratic. (4) Thus, the role of
government changes as a polity progresses through the stages of political development.

Organski goes on to explain the other characteristics of the stages of political development. While he admits that these stages are not inevitable, Organski argues that there is a common direction to the development process throughout the world. This direction is toward industrialization, political complexity and efficiency, greater economic productivity, and a greater reliance on the state. Skipping stages is also impossible because the government's future function depends on the foundation it constructed in the previous stage. It is possible, however, to increase the rate of change from one stage to another or to condense or overlap stages. Moreover Organski believes that the new nations have choices to make regarding which route they take in each stage. For instance, in stage two the choices are to industrialize according to the Bourgeois, Stalinist or Syncratic models or to find a new method. By taking the bourgeois model as the mainstream method of industrialization, Organski identifies two moments when a country can make choices which cause deviation from that model. At the onset of industrialization a powerful traditional elite and a low productivity economy inhibit a country's progress. At this point a country can make one of two choices. It may either
oust the traditional elite, or slow industrialization until the industrial elite gains the power to unseat the traditional elite. The former choice is exemplified by the Stalinist states, while the latter choice approximates the bourgeois model. However, because of the differences in the composition of the new nations' traditional and modernizing elites in comparison to European ones, Organski claims that the Stalinist choice is not a viable one for the new nations, unless industrializers turn to the Stalinist model in response to their country's low economic productivity. That is to say, totalitarian methods may be the only method of wringing savings from an extremely impoverished society. The second moment when a country can choose to depart from the bourgeois model is at the mid-point of the industrialization process. In this case if the industrial and agricultural elites are equally powerful, then the 'syncratic compromise' is possible. Of course this possible compromise is made even more viable by the workers demand for participation. While Organski believes that these conditions do not abound in the present era, the 'syncratic compromise' is still possible. For Organski, the desire for rapid industrialization, and the increased political awareness of populations of the new nations decreases their chances of choosing bourgeois development. In fact both these factors push the new nations toward the Stalinist model and repressive methods
of enforcing low consumption and mass compliance. Organski also points out that, during the relatively stable third stage, bourgeois democracies progress toward mass democracies and Stalinist nations move in the direction of a communist welfare state. Consequently, the politics of national welfare is dependent on the choices made in the previous stage. Thus, for new nations the choices made in stage two will determine whether they become democratic or not.

Even though he recognized that many national cultural variations exist which may affect these choices, Organski believed that under certain circumstances some choices become more plausible than others. In the final analysis, Organski concluded that low economic productivity, strong traditional elites, a rapid rate of change and mass political awareness all militate against the development of bourgeois or mass democracy in the new nations. (5)

Although the sequential model proposed by Organski is a plausible means of depicting political change over time, this particular model suffers from at least one, if not more, shortcomings. In this case, the model assumes that the political system and the greater society form an integrated whole. Such an assumption stems from the organic relationship between Western European societies and their respective states. In short, the Western state is a
reflection of the political culture, tradition and values of the greater society. This, however, is not the case for most non-Western countries. In fact, these societies have two sets of political cultures, traditions and values. On the one hand, government institutions and political elite reflect Western political values, while the greater society adheres to its traditional ones. Because of this lack of integration, a sequential model which does not include vertical, as well as horizontal unification will not represent a significant 'stage' of non-Western political development.

Another work which employs a comparative history approach is Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Through the examination of European, American and Asian history, Moore identified three different paths toward modernization. He also contends that these routes are dependent on not only the class configuration of the modernizing country, but also the cooperation and conflicts between the landed class and the peasantry. (6) The first path to modernization which Moore termed 'capitalist from below' was taken by countries such as England, France and, later on, by the U.S.. This particular path results from an economically independent nobility and a disenfranchised or extremely exploited peasantry. The conflict and cooperation between these two
classes led to evolutionary political change in England and revolutionary political change in France.(7) In the French case, Moore states, that "the 'Sans-Culottes' made the bourgeois revolution; the peasants determined just how far it could go."(8)

The second route to modernization, at the hands of 'capitalists from above', results from the merger of the aristocracy and a weak bourgeois class. This path was taken by Germany and Japan. Even though the government managed the modernization process in both countries, it did not remove their old feudal institutions. The lack of revolutionary removal of feudal institutions resulted in a Fascist form of government. Although the Fascist government was able to rapidly increase the productive forces in society, it was achieved at the expense of the lower class and participatory institutions in general.(9)

The third and final path toward modernization is Communism. Again, the lack of commercial impulse on the part of the landed gentry resulted in extreme oppression of the peasantry.(10) Moore claims that the revolutionary zeal of the peasantry in China and Russia resulted from three factors. First, the relationship between the feudal lords and the peasantry was weak. Then the peasants' misery was worsened by increased taxation. Finally, a large degree of solidarity existed among the peasantry. The move toward
Communism was completed by a coalition between the peasantry and the Communist Party. (11) Thus three different paths toward modernization exist.

In contrast, Moore is unable to find a place in his scheme for the Indian peasantry. Moore attributes the lack of revolutionary impetus of Indian peasants to their Hindu religion and the traditional social system. (12) Furthermore Moore suggested that India's economic stagnation resulted from its history. He states, "no class grew up with any very strong interest in rechanneling the agricultural surplus in such a way as to get the process of industrial growth started." (13) However, Moore overlooks the role of the 'Panchayat' in Indian politics. The principles of debate and consensus present in this traditional institution are contrary to Moore's notion that, an oppressed peasantry will eventually establish Communism. (14) In India's case, Moore's narrow focus on economic conditions does not take into consideration other social factors which inhibit the revolutionary impulses of the peasantry. In general, this model accurately describes the political development of countries with well defined class structures, but it has a limited ability to explain African political development, and other systems in which class structures are less well defined.

A Normative Approach to Political Change:
In The Politics of Modernization, David Apter offers a model which uses normative and structural-functional analysis to investigate political change in the new nations. Initially, Apter defines modernity as the ability to perceive life in terms of choices and alternatives. For this reason, a government's choices determine the moral goals of society. (15) Then, he classifies political systems based on their kinds of values and degree of hierarchical organization. The former criterion is measured in terms of the degree that religion affects political action. For Apter, values refer to notions of morality that are provided by a society's religion or belief system. In some traditional societies most actions have religious meanings associated with them. These societies exhibit predominantly consummatory values. Apter defines consummatory as the satisfaction which is derived from performing actions with transcendental values associated with them. In other traditional societies, most actions are perceived as simply functional. These societies reflect the dominance of instrumental values. Apter defines instrumental as the satisfaction which is derived from reaching a goal or end. The latter, on the other hand, reflects the level of centralized authority present in the system. (16) According to Apter, "the two extremes of these factors combine to form four models of which two, the secular-libertarian and the sacred-collectivity are the
most interesting.” (17) These ideal-types are approximated by the reconciliation and mobilization systems respectively. He characterizes a reconciliation system as one in which public policy results from conflicts between groups or individuals within society. In contrast, the political elites of a mobilization system are creating a new value system. The other two models are autocracies or neomercantilist and theocracies. He also suggests that the reconciliation and mobilization systems form two end points on a information-coercion continuum. Between these two points are hybrid systems. Consequently, each system has its own ratios of instrumental to consummatory values, and information to coercion. (18) In fact, Apter argues that the change from one type of political system to another is caused by a change in the ratio of information to coercion employed by its government. (19)

When examining African traditional societies, Apter found that societies which were dominated by instrumental values and exhibited hierarchical authority were the most receptive to innovation. In contrast, those societies with predominantly consummatory values and pyramidal authority resisted change. (20) Apter credits these underlying values for the Buganda's successful modernization and Ashanti's failure to modernize. (21) Consequently some traditional societies are more receptive to modernization than others.
Because a political system must balance its need for information against its use of coercion, Apter concludes that neomercantilist systems are best suited for the problems associated with early modernization. In this instance, whether a polity begins as a reconciliation or mobilization system, as modernization progresses both systems migrate toward each other. That is to say, the reconciliation system increases its use of coercion, while the mobilization system increases its need for information. The result of this migration is a neomercantilist system. (22)

The mobilization system, on the other hand, is best suited for the transition from late modernization to early industrialization. This system relies on central planning and publicly owned enterprises, rather than private initiative needed by the reconciliation system. Finally, the reconciliation system is the most appropriate for advanced industrial societies. (23) This reality made Apter claim that, "...the general process of modernization will be accompanied by periodic changes in types of political systems." (24)

While an examination of the normative basis of a society may reveal its degree of receptiveness to modernization, Apter has overlooked the significance of other social components. In fact, he has not found a place in his model for the important struggle between the rural
and urban factions of a modernizing society. This particular criticism was leveled by Pasquino when he stated,

Apter—with, for that matter, Rostow—forgets or greatly underestimates the importance of the relationships between the agrarian and industrial sectors. In particular, Apter never deals with the pattern of transfer of political power from agrarian groups to urban ones and with how this transfer affects the modernizing process.(25)

Because most non-western societies have most of their population living in rural areas, an approach which allows for the analysis of political change stemming from the rural-urban conflict is imperative.

An Institution-building Approach to Political Change:

Samuel P. Huntington, in Political Order in Changing Societies, was the first to suggest that the modernization process could lead to either political development or decay. For Huntington, political decay in the form of political instability was evident anywhere weak, traditional, political institutions encountered modernization. As a result the post-independence experience of most modernizing countries had been filled with military coups and civil strife rather than democracy and stability.(26) Huntington believes that this political instability results not only from rapid social change and increased political participation, but also from low levels
of political institutionalization. In the past, modernity, embodied in such social forces as urbanization, social mobilization and literacy, was expected to increase the stability of a polity. Huntington argues that while modernity may bring stability eventually, the process of modernizing actually causes political instability. In fact, this instability is the direct result of the faster rate of social change experienced by newly modernizing countries compared to those experienced by the West. (27)

By identifying levels of institutionalization in terms of adaptability, autonomy, complexity and cohesion, and relating it to the expansion of political participation, Huntington offers a typology designed to classify political systems. Huntington suggests that political systems may exhibit either high, or low levels of institutionalization. Conversely, they may reflect three different levels of popular participation. At a low level of participation only a small elite is politically involved. In a system with medium participation the middle class is politically active. In the case of high participation, the greater population is involved in political activity. (28) He labelled political systems with low levels of institutionalization and varying levels of political participation, 'praetorian societies' (societies which are managed by unelected ex-army people), while those with high
proportions of institutionalization to participation were considered 'civic societies'. The resulting six-system typology was then applied to non-western countries. (29)

While Huntington argues that traditional societies with strong political institutions are able to adapt to accommodate the increased political participation created by modernization, most traditional societies lack such strong institutions. (30) In fact, systems which lack institutions to accommodate increased political participation, such as modernizing monarchies, will not survive modernization. This dilemma stems from the fact that in order to reform his or her society, the monarch depends on his or her legitimate authority. Needless to say, the more successful his or her reforms, the more the monarch's legitimacy is eroded. Similarly, the 'praetorian society' will continue to be caught in the vicious cycle of civilian rule followed by military intervention precisely because its military leaders are not effective political organizers or institution-builders. (31) As a result, the creation of strong institutions that can modernize and accommodate the increased political participation modernization unleashes, is left to either a revolutionary or reform process. (32) Unfortunately, either path leads to political instability.

Huntington concluded that in order to circumvent
political instability the modernizing polity must establish one strong political party or a party system early in the modernization process. In this way, the increased political participation created by modernization can be channeled through the political system. (33) He also concluded that in a modernizing country, different groups of the political elite have choices to make at each point when political participation is expanded. (34) For instance the modernizing monarch must choose to undermine his or her own legitimacy in order to transform his or her country into a modern polity. (35) Similarly, in the praetorian society, if the oligarchy or military choose to establish political party organizations, then their society may move toward a civic order. (37) In the case of newly independent countries, their political elites must choose between a two-party and dominant party system. These types of systems will ensure both stability and the accommodation of new groups into politics. Thus, the key to political stability and modernity is political organization. (37)

Although it is agreed that strong institutions, whether traditional or modern, may contribute toward the progress of political development, they are not indicative of the process itself. The values that are institutionalized in a society are those which are well established and widely held. In feudal Europe, for
instance, the practice of charging interest on a loan was perceived as 'usury'. This widely held belief became institutionalized in the law of the land. However, as R. H. Tawney argued, it was the non-institutionalized value which regarded 'interest on a loan' as the same as 'rent on land' which constituted the impetus for social change in Europe. In fact, this non-institutionalized value led to a change in the 'usury' laws which liberated finance capital and supported the emergence of capitalism. Thus, the economic development from feudalism to capitalism was aided by changing the institutionalized values, not by strengthening the existing ones. The same may apply to political development, especially in Africa where both traditional and modern political institutions are weak. In this case, it may be more profitable to examine the non-institutionalized values of non-western societies. These values may provide the impetus for political development.

A Crisis Management Approach to Political Change:

In The Crises and Sequences of Political Development, Binder et al., contend that under a particular set of conditions, parts of the modernization process come into conflict with each other. This conflict may intensify until it is considered a political crisis. Through historical and theoretical analysis, the authors identified
five such crises. They are the identity, legitimacy, political participation, penetration and distribution crises. (40) The authors also believe that the ability to resolve these crises is demonstrated by the constant interaction and adjustment of the political system's structural differentiation, equality imperative and capacity. (41) Despite efforts by the political elite to balance their interaction, the system's components often conflict. For instance, the establishment of a hierarchy which increases structural differentiation also decreases the system's level of equality. These inherent contradictions, coupled with differences in rates of change, account for the differing levels of political modernization present in the world today. (42)

According to the authors, these crises may be resolved by increasing the general performance of the political system. This increase is achieved through progressive leadership, public policy and institution building. For example, Lucian Pye suggests that in order to resolve an identity crisis, the political elite must embody the essence of the new identity by performing in an effective manner. (43) Similarly, the legitimacy crisis' resolution depends on the guidance of dynamic leaders who focus on improving the existing political system's performance. (44) In a similar fashion, Myron Weiner suggests that a
participation crisis can be resolved by the creation of political institutions which effectively channel participation into the political system.\(^{(45)}\) The resolution of the penetration crisis also depends on adaptive institutions and capable administrators or military intervention.\(^{(46)}\) LaPalombara believes that the distribution crisis is best resolved by raising literacy levels, and elite commitment to, as well as participation in, economic austerity programs. Moreover, political elites must critically examine any model of economic development before implementing it. Otherwise an uncritical implementation of economic policy may lead to economic disaster, rather than growth. Thus, political development becomes the political system's ability to resolve these crises.

Sidney Verba concludes that the creation of a clear, concise and cohesive sequential model is still in the future. He does suggest that one could be based on the creation of institutions to deal with these crises. For Verba, the creation of a new institution is historical evidence that a crisis existed.\(^{(47)}\) Because of the interconnection of the five crisis areas, a probable sequence would be, "the creation of institutionalized capacity to generate identity directly affects legitimacy which facilitates the institutionalization of legitimacy..."
which in turn facilitates penetration and so on." (48)

Although this sequential model is attractive, it
overlooks the reality that most non-western societies do
not face development problems in a sequential manner.
Unlike the West, many non-western societies face all five
crises simultaneously. While LaPalmobara alludes to such
problems as extreme 'crisis loads', no attempt is made to
prescribe a list of priorities for countries dealing with
concurrent crises. Despite the fact that this sequential
model may accurately describe Western political
development, its sequential design is inappropriate for the
examination of non-western political development.

Despite the fact that this investigation has not
revealed an appropriate approach for the study of
non-western political development, it has pointed out the
direction of the next round of theory construction. All of
the above approaches, except Barrington Moore's, have
emphasized the role choice has played in the political
development process. For example, Organski believes that
the new nations have choices to make regarding which route
they take in each stage of political development.
Similarly, Apter contends that modernity embodies not only
the choices of individuals, but also governments. For this
reason, theories which explain how choices are made become
central to the study of modernization. Huntington also
concluded that in a modernizing country, different groups of political elite have choices to make at each point when political participation is expanded. In fact, whether or not an elite group chooses to establish a political party or party system determines if the polity moves toward a civic society. Finally, for Binder et al. the crises of political development may be resolved by increasing the general performance of the political system. This increase is achieved through progressive leadership, public policy and institution building. Thus, elite choice or decision-making and the basis of public policy become the foundation for the third debate in political development theory. However, before this more current debate can be examined, it is important to review the scholarly criticisms of the debate on political change.

THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL CHANGE IN RETROSPECT: Critiques From Within The Perspective:

By the early 1970s, scholars working in the field of political development began to find fault with the theoretical constructs created during the debate on political change. This section will examine the major criticisms of these approaches and explain how they set the stage for an external critique of the study of political development.
Although the second round of theory construction had successfully tackled the charges of 'static' analysis, its models of political change came under attack for both similar and different reasons. In a similar fashion, the models of political change encountered normative problems. For instance, Chilcote claimed that Organski's model still resembled the Western development experience too closely. (49) Kesselman argued that Huntington's and Binder et al.'s efforts were "permeated by an implicit belief in the superiority of American political values, institutions and processes." (50) Apter was also criticised for ethnocentrism by Pasquino, who argued that models derived from the Western development experiences are not only ethnocentric, but also irrelevant to the explanation of non-western experiences. (51) Thus, charges of ethnocentrism continued to plague the study of political development.

In terms of methodological problems, Alan Arian claimed that Organski had overlooked the importance of inputs in his model. In fact he suggested that an examination of political parties and interest groups would increase the effectiveness of Organski's model. (52) On the other hand, Rothman pointed out that Barrington Moore's evidence regarding the English enclosures was misleading. Rothman believed that the enclosures did not have as profound an effect on the British class structure as Moore
claimed. (53) Pasquino also argued that Apter's definition of modernization was too broad to operationalize. (54) Similarly Huntington's methodology came under attack by Donal Cruise O'Brien. He suggested that Huntington's model simply contrasted Praetorian society against democratic ones, and was unable to examine the internal process of Praetorian politics. (55) Robert Holt and John Turner pointed out that Binder et al.'s notion of system's capacity was difficult, if not impossible to measure. (56) These are some of the more perfunctory methodological problems which beset the models of political change. The most significant methodological problem, however, was identified by Mark Kesselman. He suggested that both Huntington and Binder et al. had overlooked the role of imperialism and the effects of international influence on the development of non-western countries. (57) This particular criticism was also leveled at Apter, Moore and Organski by Pasquino, Skocpol, and Campbell respectively. (58)

Once again, scholars placed the concerns about 'ethnocentric bias' on the backburner. Instead they focused on the more tangible problems surrounding elite choice or decision-making, and the foundation for public policy. This new round of theory construction had been clearly indicated by the results of the debate on political
change. Thus the next debate in political development theory would be on political choice. However the 'in-house' critique on political change had left the field open to external criticism. That external critique is the subject of the next section.

THE DEPENDENCY CRITIQUES:

At the same time as the debate on political change was unfolding in the body of political development theory, another entirely different perspective on development was emerging. That perspective was Dependency Theory. Although this new body of theory had its intellectual roots in Lenin's notion of imperialism and Raul Prebisch's 1940s formulation of 'unequal exchange', it did not appear in Western scholarship until the mid-1960s. In fact, it was not until 1966 that Andre Gunder Frank proposed that capitalist development led not only to the development of some areas of the world, but also to the underdevelopment of others. Because this new perspective was capable of examining the role of imperialism and international economic influence on the political development of non-western countries, it presented a vehicle for answering some of the 'in-house' criticisms of the debate on political change. Those criticisms had pointed out the neglect of these and other factors in political development.
While dependency scholars agree that imperialism and international factors were overlooked, they also contend that political development theory had ignored economic analysis and was incapable of generating relevant public policy. For these reasons, James A. Caporaso stated that, "At the most general level, it [Dependency Theory] may provide a critique of other development theories..."

The purpose of this section is to examine this critique. This objective will be achieved by investigating the notions of imperialism and international economic influence as stated by two intellectual ancestors of dependency theory. Then by examining the Marxist, non-Marxist and combined approaches which stem from these origins, the proposed causes and solutions to dependency will be discussed. Finally, the charge that political development theory had ignored economic analysis, and is, therefore, incapable of generating relevant public policy, will be investigated. The combined effects of these external criticisms influenced future debates in political development theory.

The dependency critique of political development theory took two forms. Both sets of criticisms reside under the general category of economic analysis. More specifically, the first set points out the effects of
imperialism and international economic influence on non-western development. In fact, scholars with such diverse approaches as Osvaldo Sunkel, Andre Gunder Frank, and James A. Caporaso agree with Raymond B. Pratt that

There has been a serious failure in political science development literature to appreciate the crucial importance of the international context of underdevelopment and its historical dimensions. Roots of contemporary underdevelopment often lie in colonial relations established nearly 500 years ago. (62)

And with Pratt's suggestion that

It seems clear that comparative politics of development could benefit from a strong infusion of ideas reasserting the primacy of political economy - a "turning on its head" of the corpus of theoretical approaches emphasizing subnational, noneconomic factors characteristic of the political science of development of the last decade. To understand the nature of economic dependency and underdevelopment, political scientists must break out of the limitations of conventional approaches emphasizing subnational and national levels of analysis to seek out intersystemic linkages through which underdevelopment is perpetuated. (63)

Thus dependency theorists agreed, with the critics of the debate on political change, that political development theory required additional analysis. This analysis would examine the effects of imperialism and international economics on the development of non-western countries.

Despite this clarity of criticism regarding the political development theories, there is little consensus
among scholars on what constitutes, or causes dependency. This reality led Chilcote to state that "[i]ndeed no common theory exists: the literature on dependency moves in many directions..."(64) In spite of this diversity, there are at least two distinct intellectual ancestors of the modern notion of dependency. These ancestors are V.I. Lenin and Raul Prebisch. For Lenin, imperialism

[gave] rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Not only are the two main groups of countries, those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves, but also the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch.(65)

Lenin believed that at the most advanced level of capitalism both the means of production and finance were consolidated into monopolies. Unlike the earlier stage of capitalism when only products were exported, this advanced stage also saw the export of capital and the connection of domestic economies to a world market. According to Lenin monopoly capitalism is reflected in the appearance of industrial cartels, syndicates, and monopoly control of primary products. It is also exemplified by a monopoly of finance capital "which throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present day bourgeois society without exception".(66) The final evidence of monopoly capitalism
is the struggle of the great powers for colonies. These colonies provide raw materials and export capital. (67) Thus, Lenin became the first Marxist scholar to identify the dependent condition.

Another intellectual ancestor of dependency theory is a non-Marxist scholar by the name of Raul Prebisch. Through his 1940s formulation of 'unequal exchange', Prebisch uncovered the international economic influence which caused underdevelopment. He suggested that within the single international economic system there existed two components. These components were the 'centre' and 'periphery'. For Prebisch these components formed a hegemonic relationship in which the 'centre' deprived the 'periphery' of a portion of its wealth. (68) Accordingly, developing countries produce primary products in order to earn foreign currency, while developed countries produce manufactured goods for their foreign exchange currency. These different products earn unequal terms of trade on the international market. Manufactured goods not only receive higher prices in the marketplace than primary products do, but also the price of manufactured goods is more stable than that of primary products. That is to say, the price of primary products is more vulnerable to a decline in demand than that of manufactured goods. At the same time, the price of primary products does not respond positively
to increased production, as does that of manufactured goods. Consequently, the earning ability of the developing world is unequal to that of developed countries. Thus, Raul Prebisch became one of the first non-Marxist scholars to identify the international economic inequality which impedes non-western development. (69)

Because Lenin and Prebisch perceived the causes of dependency and its solutions in different lights, they became the founders of two distinct approaches to the study of dependency. In fact, Chilcote offers a classification of most of the literature on dependency based on Marxist and non-Marxist categories. In this case dependency theories which include the notion of capitalist diffusion throughout the world. Chilcote contends are non-Marxist. These approaches have been put forward by such scholars as Raul Prebisch and Osvaldo Sunkel. (70) Whether Prebisch's notion of 'unequal exchange' or Sunkel's concept of 'dependent state capitalism', these scholars clearly perceived dependency as a passing condition. (71) Therefore dependency can be transcended through reform of either the present capitalist international economic system, or domestic development policy. On the one hand, Prebisch recommended that dependent countries maintain high tariff barriers against foreign manufactured goods, follow a policy of import substitution, and receive preferential
access to advanced industrialized markets. (72) On the other hand, Sunkel recommended agrarian reform, using the income from agriculture to finance industrialization, and reorienting industrial production toward basic commodities. All of these goals will be accomplished by nationalizing industries, or renegotiation with their foreign owners. (73) These reforms would remove the obstacles to non-western development.

In contrast, Marxist dependency theories perceive the solution to dependency in terms of the class struggle for ownership of the means of production and the creation of socialism. This perspective has been used by such scholars as Andre Gunder Frank, and Theotonio Dos Santos. Whether the underdevelopment of the periphery is perceived as the outcome of surplus extraction as Gunder Frank does, or in terms of the creation of internal dependent structures as Dos Santos believes, both concur that socialism is the answer to dependency. (74) Dos Santos states that continued dependency will lead to

...a long process of sharp political and military confrontations and of profound social radicalization which will lead these countries to a dilemma: governments of force which open the way to fascism or popular revolutionary governments, which open the way to socialism. Intermediate solutions have proved to be, in such a contradictory reality, empty and utopian. (75)

Thus, for Marxists the reforms suggested by Prebisch and
Sunkel will not improve the conditions of dependent countries. Instead, the oppressed classes in all countries should destroy the capitalist state through revolution and establish socialism.

The final category of dependency theory that Chilcote describes is a combination of non-Marxist and Marxist approaches. This approach is represented by Fernando H. Cardoso's work. For Cardoso the problem of dependence is the result of imperialism. However his idea of imperialism differs from Lenin's concept. He contends that modern imperialism is the result of the activities of multinational corporations instead of finance capital, and of industry instead of primary products. In a similar fashion to non-Marxists, Cardoso perceives that capitalism causes underdevelopment, however only in a limited sense. That is to say, capitalism causes underdevelopment only in segments of the dependent society which are not associated with multinational corporations and international capital. Consequently, any and all classes and sectors of society associated with the international economic system are capable of 'dependent capitalist development'. Unlike Marxists, Cardoso does not believe that the national middle class and state can curb the international economic system's influence upon national development. For this reason, his solution is non-revolutionary.
Although many other notions of the causes and solutions to dependency exist, the authors presented here have clearly indicated that imperialism and the international economic system have had a profound effect on non-western development. That effect has been one of underdevelopment. Thus, the dependency critique identified the negative impact of capitalist development on non-western countries.

The second set of criticisms put forward by Dependency Theorists pointed to political development theory's lack of economic analysis and inability to generate relevant public policy. For Raymond B. Pratt, the political development literature fails to explain the growing economic inequality between developed and developing countries. Moreover this body of theory has failed to provide direction for the creation of national public policies aimed at reducing this economic inequality. (78) Pratt points out

[t]hat these are both political and economic problems seems obvious, it suggests that political scientists working in the development area should speak of the political economy of development. (79)

These failures, he maintains, result from political development theories' inability to examine the costs and benefits incurred by various social groups involved in the development process. In other words, public policy
analysis must focus on which groups profit or lose from specific development strategies. While Pratt credits such scholars as Mitchell and Mitchell with beginning this work, he suggests that further study must examine the influence of multinational corporations, and the effects of international organization's policies on the development process.(80) In order to promote creative policy solutions to the international economic inequality, Pratt argues that

[p]olitical science developmentalists must move in the direction of a new political economy of development which, while recognizing costs and benefits of different allocative strategies and policies and the importance of a calculus of choice, does not rest within the limits of what is.(81)

Thus, Pratt urges political development theorists to add economic factors to their analysis and create visionary public policy.

In short, the dependency critique revealed two sets of significant shortcomings in political development theory. The first set was that political development theories had overlooked the negative impact of the international economic system, and imperialism, on the development of non-Western countries. The second set was that these theories lacked economic analysis and were incapable of generating relevant public policy. Both sets of criticisms influenced future debates in the intellectual history of
political development theory.

The Political Development Theorists' Response:

According to Richard Higgott, during the late 1960s and early 1970s the Marxist notion of dependency put forward by Andre Gunder Frank and others gained considerable currency in Western scholarship. This growing influence was the result of what Higgott describes as "the crisis of American liberalism"(82). Apparently, both the lack of post-independence stability in the new nations, coupled with the U.S.'s inability to win the war in Vietnam, resulted in a re-evaluation of development theory. However this new interest in dependency theory did not culminate in a change of paradigm. That is to say, the problems of neo-Marxist theory construction and its inability to convert massive numbers of western scholars to the fold, precluded a paradigmatic change.(83) While Higgott believes that dependency theory was not influential enough to cause a drastic change, it did however influence the third round of political theory construction.

Some General Observations:

Although the models developed during the debate on political change did not provide an alternative to the relativist approach, they did point out the need to examine
the role which choice plays in the process of political development. While critics of these models indicated that they had successfully described change, the models of political change still suffered from 'ethnocentric bias'. At the same time, these models were criticised for overlooking the role of imperialism and the effects of international influence on the development of non-western countries. Thus, an opportunity was opened for an external critique.

An examination of the external critique offered by dependency theory revealed two criticisms. Even though dependency scholars agreed with the 'in-house' critics that imperialism and international factors had been overlooked, they also argued that political development theory had ignored economic analysis and was incapable of generating public policy. Moreover, whether dependency scholars took a Marxist or non-Marxist approach, they illustrated that imperialism and the international factors had affected non-western development. That effect has been one of underdevelopment. Consequently, the dependency critique identified the negative impact of capitalist development on non-western countries. For these reasons, dependency theorists suggested that political development theorists should include economic factors in their analysis, and create innovative public policy.
The investigation of political development theorist's response to the dependency critique illustrated that, despite its popularity during the 1960s and early 1970s, dependency theory did not influence the discipline enough to cause a paradigm change. However, it did influence the third debate in political development theory. That influence and the third debate will be examined in the next chapter.
NOTES

CHAPTER II


2. Ibid., p.285.

3. A.K.F. Organski, THE STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1965), Organski defines political development, "...as increasing governmental efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources of the nation for national goals." (Ibid., p.7). Consequently, the fundamental role of the government must change when the nation progresses from one stage of political development to another. Ibid., p.vii-7.

4. Ibid., p.7-14.

5. Ibid., p.212-221.


8. Ibid., p.110.

9. Ibid., p.433-442.

10. Ibid., p.178-180.

11. Ibid., p.201-223.

12. Ibid., p.330-341.


17. Ibid., p.22.

18. Ibid., p.36-39.
19. Ibid., p.240.
20. Ibid., p.85-86.
22. Ibid., p.360-397, p.409.
24. Ibid., p.393.
27. Ibid., p.33-59.
28. Ibid., p.78.
29. Ibid., p.80.
30. Ibid., p.399.
31. Ibid., p.155-244.
32. Ibid., p.298-299, p.344-378.
33. Ibid., p.397-460.
34. Ibid., p.262.
35. Ibid., p.155-191.
36. Ibid., p.262.
37. Ibid., p.423-461.
40. Apparently, the first of these is an identity crisis. For Lucian Pye this crisis exists when a society's
foundation for unity is brought into question. Ibid.,p.103-104. The second is a legitimacy crisis. Pye described this crisis as a population's inability to reach a constitutional agreement, or the government's performance fails, or is conceived differently. Ibid.,p.136 Another crisis Myron Weiner identified as one of political participation. Accordingly, this crisis exists when the political elite consider the demand for expansion of participation, or the methods used to achieve that expansion as illegitimate. Ibid.,p.186-187. Still another crisis is one of penetration. Joseph LaPalombara contends that penetration "refers to whether [the political elite] can get what they want from people over whom they seek to exercise power."(Ibid.,p.209). As a result, a penetration crisis describes changes which challenge the political elite's organization, technological or diplomatic abilities. Ibid.,p.206-209 The fifth crisis is a problem of distribution. According to LaPalombara a distribution crisis exists when a polity's political elite intervenes in its economy in order to increase material production, or to reorder the distribution of its wealth. Ibid.,p.235-245.

41. Binder et al. define structural differentiation as a component of modernization which increases the number of specialized roles within society. Thus the more developed a polity, the more differentiated roles it exhibits. They define equality as a component of modern political culture which implies, citizenship rights and responsibilities, equality of all citizens before the law and the distribution of political, and bureaucratic roles according to achievement criteria. They also define capacity as a political system's ability to integrate society, respond to participation and distribution demands, and manage and adapt to changes. Ibid.,p.74-78.

42. Ibid.,p.82-83.
43. Ibid.,p.112-134.
44. Ibid.,p.137-158.
45. Ibid.,p.187-194.
47. Ibid.,p.280-301.
48. Ibid.,p.311.


57. Kesselman, Mark, "Order or Movement?.", p.148-149.

58. For example, Pasquino suggests that "Apter's models seem to work in 'vacuo' and never to be influenced by external events." (Pasquino, Gianfranco, "The Politics of Modernization."p.311.) Pasquino also levels this critique at Moore by saying that, "Social Origins Of Dictatorship and Democracy is a very good example of the dominant tendency." (Ibid.,p.311). Similarly, Theda Skocpol contends that Moore has overlooked the effects of "a world-historic intersocietal process," on the modernization process of each nation-state. (Theda R. Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", POLITICS AND SOCIETY IV Fall 1973:1-34 p.30.) Finally, Alex Campbell believes that Organski has not only overlooked external factors but also the role of military power in his model. (Alex Campbell, "A Critique of Organski", NEW REPUBLIC Vol.23 #154 April 23, 1966:p.23.)


62. Raymond B. Pratt, "The Underdeveloped Political Science of Development", COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 8 (1) 1973:p.88-111.p.94. For example, Osvaldo Sunkel claims that "In the conventional approach to underdevelopment, the unit of analysis has always been the national economy in isolation, treated as if it existed in an international vacuum. Myrdal, Singer, Nurkse, as well as Prebisch and numerous economists from underdeveloped countries and U.N. agencies such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have emphasized the significance of the foreign trade structure of these countries - raw material exports and manufactured imports - as causing instability, stagnation, deteriorating terms of trade and balance-of-payments difficulties. They have also pointed to foreign financing and technical aid as having a significant influence on the rate of growth and the equilibrium of the underdeveloped economy." (Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and Dependencia" A Latin American View", FOREIGN AFFAIRS L April 1972:p.517-531,p.519.) In a similar fashion, Andre Gunder Frank suggests that "...most studies of development and underdevelopment fail to take account of the economic and other relations between the metropolis and its economic colonies throughout the history of the world-wide expansion and development of the mercantilist and capitalist system. Consequently, most of our theory fails to explain the structure and development of the capitalist system as a whole and to account for its simultaneous generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts and of economic development in others."(Gunder Frank, Andre, "The Development of Underdevelopment.", p.17.) Furthermore, when James A. Caporaso examined, what he called 'mainstream' development theories, he declared, "What is remarkable about all of the above approaches to development is how little they contribute to constructing explanations of change based on factors residing in the external environment." (Caporaso, James A., "Dependency Theory Continuities and Discontinuities in Development Studies.",p.612.)

63. Ibid.,p.95.


67. Ibid., p. 323-324.


70. Chilcote, Ronald H., THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE, p. 296-311.

71. Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and Dependencia.", p. 517-530.


73. Sunkel, Osvaldo, "Big Business and "Dependencia.", p. 530-531.


75. Dos Santos, Theotonio, "The Structure of Dependence.", p. 236.

76. Chilcote, Ronald H., THEORIES OF COMPARATIVE, p. 296-311.

77. Ibid., p. 303-304.


79. Ibid., p. 88.

80. Ibid., p. 89-90.

81. Ibid., p. 107.


83. Ibid., p. 9-10, p. 65-73.
CHAPTER III.

THE APPROACHES TO POLITICAL CHOICE AND THE RENEWAL OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY.

The concern of this chapter is the critical analysis of the current body of political development theory. Despite the fact that the initial efforts at theory construction had yielded little success, scholars continued to search for more accurate approaches to the study of non-western political development. As both the results of the debate on political change and the dependency critique had indicated, in the 1970s these new efforts were channeled toward elite choice and public policy approaches. By the late 1970s, however, scholars working in the field found little success for their efforts. The models created during this round of theory construction were also criticised for ethnocentrism. This inability to purge ethnocentrism from their theoretical tools led theorists to seriously consider abandoning the concept of political development. Against the backdrop of statements which declared "the death of political development", scholars such as Harry Eckstein argued that the concept was worth saving. Consequently, the early 1980s to the present represents an attempt at theoretical renewal and rethinking, the results of which form the basis of the fourth or current debate in political development theory. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the debate on political choice, and the renewed exploration of political
development theory construction and assess their results.
These tasks will be accomplished by a critical analysis of representative texts in the debates which occurred from the mid-1970s to the present.

THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL CHOICE:

During the mid-1970s scholars working in the subfield of political development theory were responding to two similar sets of criticism. These criticisms, however, emanated from different sources. On the one hand, the 'in-house' critique of the debate on political change had indicated the need to examine the role that decision-making played in political development. In fact, Higgott noted

"that the issue of choice should emerge as central in this new political economy is not surprising in the light of the influence of early modernization theorists. The concept had been used in the literature of the mid-1960s without ever having been well articulated.(1)

On the other hand, Higgott points out that the dependency critique of political development theory had focused on its inability to include economic analysis and generate relevant public policy. This failure was the result of political development theory's diverse and explanatory nature. Moreover, its lack of an empirically grounded problem-solving methodology did not allow for public policy analysis. Consequently, earlier political development
theory was not capable of solving practical development problems. (2) Higgott also suggests that this new interest in rational theory represents the "growth of a 'new political economy of development' which caught on during the early 1970s and which, since the late 1970s, has been evolving into a public policy approach". (3) Apparently, this focus was an attempt to make political development theory capable of public policy analysis. (4) These criticisms and observations set the stage for the third debate in political development theory. Thus the debate on political choice emerged. The analysis of two representative texts in this debate will help evaluate the ability of this approach to describe non-western political development.

A Multifactor Approach to Political Choice:

An important work which focuses on political choice is Almond, Flanagan and Mundt's Crisis, Choice and Change. In this volume the authors contend that early attempts at political development theory construction have been not only monocausal, but also determinist. More specifically, the social mobilization and structural-functional approaches explain political development in terms of either a single social factor such as increased urbanization, or increased political system capacity. Similarly, both approaches are determinist because they are unable to
examine the role which individual choice plays in the development process. (5) Almond credits both Dahl and Downs with recognizing the importance for political theory of factoring down structural-functional patterns to individual choice behavior or working up from individual choice patterns to structure and process patterns. (6)

In order to construct a more accurate model of developmental causation, Almond et al. incorporate structural-functional, social mobilization, rational-choice and individual leadership analysis into a multifactor approach. (7) By applying each approach to time periods occurring before, during, and after a country's specific historical crisis, the authors attempt to relate historical time to changes in development variables. Accordingly this multifactor approach would account for the changes which occur in a political system during a developmental period. Although operationalization of this model was difficult and required lengthy adjustment, it was eventually applied to several historical case studies of England, France, Germany, Mexico and Japan.

When applying this framework to the historical case studies, the authors found several instances where theory did not reflect reality. For example, in the past, structural-functional theory had assumed that as a political system develops, it moves from equilibrium to
disequilibrium and back to equilibrium again. However, the authors found that in reality a political system never reaches complete equilibrium. Instead, stable systems reflect a state of ‘dynamic’ equilibrium in which conflicting trends continue to exist. These continued conflicts often indicate the direction of change, or the possibility of recurring crises. Social mobilization theory was also found lacking when applied to reality. Here, the authors had to differentiate between not only domestic and international influences, but also security and economic influences as well as those created by the ‘demonstration effect’. Furthermore it was discovered that while long-term social change may, or may not affect the degree of political demand, short-term changes appear to ignite political crisis. In contrast, environmental changes may also alleviate a crisis. Hence, social mobilization theory was advanced to a higher level of complexity. Still more problems surrounded the operationalization of coalition theory. Even after components such as actors, political resources, and issues were identified and the problem of measurement resolved, the authors recognized that an accurate choice of coalition could not be made without considering leadership, decision-making and chance. Unfortunately, the leadership component of analysis of these historical cases was not fully developed. In essence, it was left for further
study.(8)

Through comparative analysis of the case studies' 'causal constellations and sequences' of development, the authors found several significant factors. These factors either identify a political system crisis, or help the system survive one. For instance, the structural-functional examination of the pre-existing systems revealed that in every system there were structural and cultural elements which at least one of the contenders for power objected to. These disagreements may become a crisis, if issue distances increase, or the distribution of political resources shifts. They also observed that pre-existing systems with high degrees of legitimacy weathered crises with fewer structural and cultural changes. Consequently, India, Britain (1832), and Mexico all survived their crises with modest structural, electoral, or public policy changes, while Japan, Germany and France required constitutional, or revolutionary changes. Thus, two models of political development were identified

first, the gradual, limited, and perhaps 'insufficient' response of highly legitimate systems; and second, the more extreme adjustments characteristic of systems relying more heavily on short-term effectiveness of performance.(9)

The analysis also revealed that contrary to previous
assumptions, the number of critical issues is not directly related to the degree of a crisis' intensity. In most of the cases studied, there were many critical issues existing simultaneously, or within a short period of time. Hence, the authors concluded that the most important factor was the intensity of important issues and not the volume.(10)

When comparing the effects of environmental factors on the crises, the authors found that, of the indices examined, war, or the threat of war, had the most influence on political system stability and change. In contrast, all the domestic variables had a destabilizing effect on the political system. Economic factors played the most important role in this instability, while social mobilization factors ranked second. In short, international security and/or domestic economic variables may provide the necessary conditions for political system crisis or change.

The examination of coalition options and sequences revealed that in most cases coalitions shifted in one direction. This shift was in reaction to changes in resources and issue distances. That is to say, either new groups come to power, or the old groups try to influence the new policy outcome. Mainly, however, the authors perceive choice as a compromise between power and policy, as well as resources and issues. For this reason, they
conclude that new coalitions which planned to change the constitution drastically would have the least chance of acquiring power. Because innovation often alienates more conservative political actors, new elites are expected to give up innovation for safer ground. Thus, risk-taking becomes the important variable in coalition formation.

Finally, the comparison of leadership skills indicated that an estimate of leadership qualities must be analyzed against the backdrop of the historical event. Hence the context of decision-making must always be considered. Unfortunately, an in-depth study of leadership qualities and choices was left for future study.(11)

The authors concluded that this multifactor approach improves upon the 'oversimplified and determinist' historical models offered by Barrington Moore Jr. This improvement was achieved by reasserting the role of human choice in the political development process. Consequently, this multifactor approach improves the explanatory ability of political development theory.

While this multifactor approach expands on earlier approaches by adding both politics (choice) and external (international) variables to the equation, its ability to explain the traditional and cultural obstructions to development is limited. Once again, the systems and elite
focus of this approach does not allow for an examination of the more subtle changes or lack of changes in the daily lives and attitudes of non-western individuals. For example, if lower caste Indian individuals begin to perceive their neighborhood as politically more important than their caste association, then a small but important step in political development has occurred. Unfortunately, this multifactor approach would not be capable of detecting this attitudinal change until the individual was capable of demonstrating greater changes such as social mobility, or economic protest. Furthermore, it may be too early for a multifactor approach simply because single causes for development are not well understood.

An Elite Choice Approach to Political Participation:

Another seminal work which focuses on choice is No Easy Choice, by Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson. In this book the authors examine the factors which affect political participation in developing societies. They believe that, the liberal model of development avoided the problem of choice by claiming that all desirable values could be maximized. But it has turned out not to be a realistic or relevant choice for most modernizing countries. They are, instead, forced to choose some variant of the other models. (12) Consequently, the authors contend that political elites,
groups and individuals have choices to make regarding the expansion, or uses of political participation to reach their respective goals. (13) While the authors recognize that individual characteristics such as social status and education, as well as group features such as class and group consciousness affect political participation, they perceive that in both cases the decision to act politically or 'exit' is based on rational choice. Huntington and Nelson also believe that individual and group attempts to influence the government are dependent on the alternatives available to solve their respective problems. More specifically, if non-political avenues are more accessible and successful in resolving their problems, citizens and groups will not use political action. Examples of such 'exit' behavior for the individual are horizontal or vertical mobility, while groups may direct their efforts toward self-help endeavours. In this case, horizontal mobility refers to the individual's relocation from a rural to an urban setting, while vertical mobility requires increased education and social standing. Huntington and Nelson also found that lower class citizens will only resort to group political participation if upward mobility is blocked or no self-help remedies exist. Whether individuals choose upward mobility
or group organization, either avenue results in an increase in their political efficacy. Although the choices of groups and individuals have an impact on levels of political participation, it is the political elites who choose the development priorities for their countries.(14)

Thus, Huntington and Nelson focus on elite choices.

Through the use of theoretical and statistical analysis, the authors have identified four different development models from which the political elites of developing countries may choose. These models are based on the relationships among such development variables as economic development, economic equality and levels of political participation. Apparently, during the early or phase I stage of economic development, economic inequalities increase between urban and rural communities, as well as upper and lower classes. According to Huntington and Nelson, at this point the political elite may choose between a 'bourgeois' or 'autocratic' model of development.(15) Although the 'bourgeois' and 'autocratic' models may deliver short-term political stability and economic growth, they both have a limited ability to include the lower classes in the political process. In contrast, phase II of development entails the problems surrounding lower class participation in the political system. Accordingly, these problems can be dealt with by
either the 'technocratic' or 'populist' model. While these models promote either economic growth or lower class participation, both lead to repression and civil strife.

When examining the relationships among economic development, economic equality and political participation, the authors found that more complex relationships exist than was previously believed. In the past, the liberal model assumed not only a linear relationship between levels of socio-economic development and political participation, but also a causal relationship between increased socio-economic equality and political participation. Although the authors agree that levels of political participation do increase as economic development increases, some types of political participation vary independently of socio-economic development. For this reason, levels of political participation within a country may vary considerably over short periods of time. Moreover, they observed a causal relationship between economic equality and political participation that was opposite to the one they had expected. That is to say, increased levels of political participation cause greater economic equality. Hence, the factors which affect political participation interact in a more complex manner than was once believed.

Huntington and Nelson concluded that a country's
political elites, groups and individuals make choices regarding the expansion or use of political participation based on 'cost-benefit' analysis. They further concluded that while the expansion or use of political participation by the elite or masses is rarely a primary goal, it is a by-product of economic development. Consequently the new groups and political demands that are created by economic development restrict the choices available to the political elite. As a result, the political elite must channel political participation instead of suppressing it. Thus both increased wealth and political awareness increase political participation. (19) Finally, the authors maintain that elite choices regarding the development priorities of their country determine the parameters of choice for the groups and individuals within that society. In a similar fashion, group choices set the limits of individual choice. This 'cascading effect', according to Huntington and Nelson, shapes the extent of political participation in a society more sharply than other social and economic factors. Consequently, over short intervals of time, abrupt changes in levels, forms, and bases of political participation within a country are the outcome of elite choice.

While this study's focus on political participation is appropriate for investigating changes in the domestic
political environment, its concentration on the political elite is not. In this case, the governing political elite is a component of the political system and not the environment. For this reason, the elite choice approach may describe the acceptable parameters of political participation for a particular political system, but it is incapable of describing the citizens' ability to demand accountability from that system. Even though Huntington and Nelson point out the social conditions which compel individuals to join organizations, they have overlooked two realities. First, the act of joining an organization is an advanced political behavior. That is to say, once the individual has joined either a political party, union, or an interest group, she or he has already completed the transition from a passive citizen to an active participating one. Therefore it may be more profitable to examine more basic forms of political participation such as anomic behavior or voting patterns. Secondly, the authors have used western indicators such as class and education to evaluate organization joining behavior. Instead, an examination of a society's history, tradition and culture may reveal its propensity to foster, or obstruct the individual's political participation and demands for accountability.

Although the examination of the third debate has not
revealed an appropriate approach for the study of non-western development, its 'in-house' critics have identified a continuing problem for political development theory. That problem is explored in the following section.

THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL CHOICE IN RETROSPECT: Critiques from within the Perspective.

By the late 1970s-early 1980s, scholars working in political development theory began to criticize the approaches developed during the debate on political choice. This section will examine the major criticisms of these approaches and explain how they contributed to the current debate in political development theory.

Even though the third round of theory construction had successfully examined the role which choice plays in the process of political development, its approaches suffered some of the same problems that plagued earlier attempts. The 'in-house' criticism had pointed out the continuation of ethnocentrism. For instance, Higgott perceives that elite choice and policy analysis continue the negative image of tradition as an obstacle to political development. This view had been fostered by earlier development theories. These approaches also suggest that traditional institutions must be destroyed for development to progress. (20) He goes on to state that
[t]here is also an ethnocentrism in a view which sees improvement in the policy-making process as greater centralisation, bureaucratisation and technological control. Issue has to be taken with the all-embracing nature of a view which does not recognize the importance of such factors as the nature of a specific policy or opposition to policy might be rationally based as opposed to stemming from a blind support of tradition. (21)

Higgott also argues that the public policy approaches which focus on elite choices and decision-making processes make another ethnocentric assumption. In the Western sense, elites are perceived as making decisions, "...on behalf of all citizens and not solely in the interests of the ruling, decision-making elite. Such an assumption is questionable ..."(22) in non-western countries.

In addition to the normative difficulties discussed above, the political choice approaches encountered several methodological problems. In general, Higgott cautions that the 'transferability' of policy oriented approaches may be limited when applied to non-western states. This limitation stems from the fact that system's analysis is not suited to understanding the weak non-western government structures. Furthermore, these approaches emphasize incrementalism which is based on competition among conflicting interests within Western societies. However, this focus thwarts the efforts at comprehensive planning that are required for non-western development.(23)
In contrast, Brian Barry criticises the framework offered in Almond et al.'s *Crisis, Choice and Change* in a more specific manner. Barry contends that although this volume professes to examine cases of 'political crisis', in two cases no crisis exists. Thus the British 1931 and Indian 1960s case studies are outside the parameters of the proposed framework. Other flaws which he points out include the lack of a clearly defined concept of political development and the inability of this framework to break way from Almond's earlier less logical attempts. (24) Barry states, "Almond, at any rate, seems to be temperamentally unable to grasp the importance of clearly and consistently defined terms, sharply stated logical relationships and so on." (25) Despite this lack of rigor, Barry credits the authors with two attempts which advance the field. The first is recognizing the importance of rational-choice theory for the study of political development. The second is the application of a variable-sum game to existing or historical episodes. Barry believes that simple criteria extrapolated from game-theory can be used to 'forecast' political coalition formation. (26) He states, "I feel sure that this is where work is most needed." (27)

Richard Sandbrook also finds fault with the framework proposed by Almond et al. He suggests that while this volume was meant to synthesize four discrete approaches
into one, it has managed to simply line them up sequentially. Furthermore, when Almond's complex analysis of coalition formation breaks down, the leadership factor is brought in to account for the outcome. The most obvious use of this technique is in the Mexican case study. Moreover, despite the authors' claims of advancing the accuracy of political development theory by offering this model, it has little if any explanatory ability. For example the model's sequential pathway designated by environmental, systemic and structural changes does not explain anything, because changes may occur in any one of these sectors without affecting the others. Sandbrook also argues that this multifactor approach has generated few "verifiable hypotheses". The relationships which are postulated are "usually thinly disguised tautologies". These tautologies are exemplified by such statements as "The more extreme the policy preferences of the ruling coalition, the greater its polarization from other actors, and the likelihood that other actors will not join or support the coalition." and "The higher the legitimacy of the pre-existing system, the more limited was the extent of structural and cultural change in the outcome." Such truisms do not advance the explanatory ability of political development theory. Finally, Sandbrook believes that because this model is based on the value-free notion of science, it is incapable of designating criteria for
differentiating between important and unimportant development variables. Thus, the Almond et al. model becomes a "a check-list of variables which any competent historian would already carry as part of his intellectual equipment."(31)

On the one hand, Fred Riggs agrees with Sandbrook that the coalition and rational choice theories are the most creative part of the Almond et al. model, and that no clear concept of development is offered by this model. On the other hand, Riggs disagrees with him on the weakness of this work. Riggs perceives that structural-functional and systems analysis were not developed fully. He states, "[c]ertainly a major weakness in the volume is its failure to examine governmental structure as a serious independent variable,...".(32) More importantly, Riggs maintains that because this model was only tested on 'developed polities' it has little use when applied to less developed ones. In these countries, 'role occupancy' carries a greater weight than the incumbent's views on the issues. For this reason, Almond et al.'s model is best suited to examining developed polities with greater issue/occupancy ratios than those of less development countries.(33)

Both Aristide Zolberg and A. H. Somjee also found methodological problems in the model suggested by Huntington and Nelson's No Easy Choice. In the first
instance, Zolberg argues that the four models offered in this work are too broad to increase the theoretical accuracy of political development theory. For this reason few scholars would agree on the appropriate designation of countries to each classification. Moreover, Zolberg believes that the foundation for this typology is unclear. That is to say, is the selection of the type of political system dependent on the political elite's intention or an observable result of their choices?(34) In the second instance, A. H. Somjee maintains that this model's focus on elite output, either in a constitutional or institutional sense overlooks the 'human' aspect of the political participation equation. Here, he contends that institutions must not simply be judged by the effective functioning of their specialized operations, but for their ability to respond to the citizenry as well, especially in non-western states where there is a large gap between the political elite and the greater population.(35) Somjee claims that

...the central problem is one of the growth of human political capacity to get responses from those in public institutions rather than be served by impersonal, but non-responsive, specialized institutions. Consequently, central to the notion of gradual enjoyment of either political participation, equality, or differentiation, is the notion of political capacity.(36)

Thus the establishment of institutions to provide political
participation is not enough. These institutions must be accompanied by an increase in the population's ability to contribute to the formulation of public policy and to demand accountability from those who rule. Furthermore, he suggests that more effort be made to uncover the obstacles to increasing the individual's political capacity. These obstacles reside in each country's history, culture, and other aspects of its tradition.(37)

Once again, the normative basis of approaches to the study of political development was brought into question. The elite choice and public policy approaches, based as they are on the most objective mathematical and statistical analysis, failed to remove 'ethnocentric bias' from political development theory. Consequently, normative issues became one focus of the fourth or current debate in political development theory. Thus the current round of theory construction exemplifies an attempt at rethinking the foundation of political development theory itself. This process is the topic of the next section.

THE RETHINKING AND RENEWAL OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY:

By the early 1980s scholars working in the subfield of political development theory became incredibly disillusioned. This disillusionment stemmed from the fact that two decades of theory construction had yielded little
if any success. The continuation of both ethnocentric bias and other methodological problems seemed to place the achievement of an accurate body of theory out of reach. For these same reasons, few, if any, practical guidelines for non-western development had been offered. After having travelled the intellectual distance between grand theory and elite choice and public policy approaches, several theorists began to question the usefulness of political development as an explanatory tool. Initially, Samuel Huntington suggested that the concept's lack of aggregative value, made it 'superfluous'. Fred Riggs also claimed that the confusion surrounding its definition and use made the notion political development simply a 'catchword', and not a concept at all. In a similar fashion, Harry Eckstein professes that there is a 'muddle' regarding the term's definition and conceptualization.(38) More precisely, David Apter commented that "if political development is not dead it is certainly in a peculiar intellectual condition."(39) Despite this apparent disillusionment, many scholars agreed with Eckstein that the concept of political development was worth saving. Eckstein contends that because the present body of political development theory does not reflect 'developmental' thought accurately, its potential to answer difficult questions has not yet been tapped. Consequently, the essential problems which form the foundation of developmental thought have not been solved by recent
history. That is to say, 'what is social history?' Is social history being expressed by a picture of organic growth and decay? These types of questions remain salient. In fact, for Eckstein, the purpose of political development theory is to find the location of our society and others on a social time-line and to reflect these locations in a theoretical manner. For these reasons Eckstein advocates that political development theory undergo a theoretical renewal. (40) He states

the study of political development thus is at a critical juncture. One can let it decay further or, not much different, choose to abandon it—... Or one can try a project in conceptual and, through it, theoretical renewal. (41)

It is this attempt at rethinking and renewal which constitutes the fourth, or current debate in political development theory.

According to Eckstein the problems of development and modernity remain quite salient. However, the rethinking of political development theory will have to take into account not only non-western development, as it has in the most recent past, but the problems of governing postindustrial societies as well. (42) Based on this reality, the process of rethinking political development theory took at least two directions. The first direction was the re-examination of the governability of advanced industrial societies. The
second direction was to tackle the normative issues regarding non-western development that were left unresolved by earlier attempts at theory construction. This section, which constitutes the fourth debate in development theory, will examine some of the representative works which engage in 'rethinking'.

A Re-examination of Western Development:

In his book, *Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency, and Postmodern Politics*, David Apter contends that development follows a curvilinear path, rather than the unilinear one suggested by both Marxist and Liberal theorists. In other words, this lack of accuracy is due to development theories' focus on large explanations for change. Such explanations include expansion of choice, rules of distribution and cost-benefit analysis. The results are not only a progressive evolutionary view of development but also the denial of any negative consequences stemming from the process itself. Thus, both Marxist and Liberal development theory's unilinear approaches have distorted the consequences of development. In contrast, Apter believes that while systematic development will produce democracy, it also produces violence which endangers the very existence of the state. (43)
Because of the strengths and inadequacies of what Apter calls Modernization I (liberal development theory) and Modernization II (Marxist dependency theory), he suggests that a new framework for analysis be created. This new framework would combine elements of liberal and dependency theories. In fact, Apter states that...

...liberal modernization theorists emphasize the growth of a generalized middle class as a result of development, whereas dependency theorists stress polarization. Yet both processes can be correct simultaneously. Combining both approaches to a next stage of development analysis has certain advantages.(44)

More specifically, Apter suggests that functionally differentiated roles be applied to class polarization.(45) He maintains that development creates two distinct classes based on their role in the process. The first class is a functional elite which supplies the innovation, technical skill and knowledge for industrial production. Apter calls this class the 'knowledge workers'. Another class that is created by this process is a marginalized one. In this group, the individuals have no functional significance to industrial society. According to Apter, postmodern society is composed of these two multibonded, rather than Marxist classes. That is to say, individuals within each class are voluntarily associated, allied or affiliated with members of other classes. These voluntary associations include such organizations as political parties, and
interest groups. Because of this cross-cutting of class
cleavages, class struggle does not occur, instead there is
a propensity for violence toward the state. In other
words, marginals do not direct their violence toward a more
privileged class, but toward the state. Along with
mobilized support, marginalized groups may create a new
'mytho-logic' for a new society. This historical and moral
narrative becomes the justification for revolutionary or
terrorist violence against the state. Consequently,
development produces violence which may threaten the very
existence of the state. Not only is this a problem for
modernizing societies, but increased violence is especially
a concern for postmodern ones. In fact, for Apter,
controlling violence becomes the focus of postmodern
development. (46)

By applying this combined approach to postmodern
societies, he identified three root causes of
'extra-institutional' protest and terrorism. In the
Japanese case, extra-institutional violence was caused by
the marginalization of farmers. (47) In England, violence
has resulted from the marginalization of industrial
workers, or what Apter calls 'deindustrialization'. In the
inner cities of the United States violence stems from the
pariah status and marginalization of Afro-Americans. In a
similar fashion primordial terrorism is the outcome of
marginalization, dispossession and displacement of ethnic or religious groups such as the Palestinians (PLO) and Irish Catholics (IRA). Whatever the source, all terrorist groups must find popular support if they are to flourish. For this reason Apter advises governments to become more attuned to popular demand, in order to shift support away from terrorist organizations. More importantly, he advises postmodern democratic governments "[to read violence as a social text, and act accordingly, [this] is the best line of defense a democratic society has...". (48) Apter also found that the postmodern state has been unable to solve the problems of slowing productivity, deindustrialization and rising social costs, all of which contribute to increased social polarization. Thus the inability of the state to bridge the gap between its theory and practice has made it the focus of violent attacks by marginalized groups. These conditions pit society against the state. This is what Apter calls a 'disjunctive moment' when a new mytho-logic emerges. This new mytho-logic threatens the existence of the state. (49)

Apter drew several tentative conclusions from this investigation. First, unmediated social polarization coupled with poor government policy results in haphazard violence, extra-institutional protest, terrorism or, worse, revolution. Secondly, because social polarization and its
resultant violence are the negative products of developmental innovation, most postmodern democratic societies are experiencing increased violence. Thirdly, curvilinear development may cause the overextension of the state. This overextension weakens its ability to solve the problems of this stage of development. Although Apter cautions against premature speculation regarding the death of the nation-state, he does suggest that in order to prevent the conditions which foster terrorism, a redefinition of both the liberal and Marxist state may be necessary. Apter points out that, "the larger question posed by terrorism is whether the state as we know it is becoming obsolete." (50)

Although Apter's combined approach may hold advantages for the analysis of postmodern societies, it offers no new insights for the examination of non-western ones. In fact, the realization that primordial attachments may furnish the moral justification for violence against the state has been demonstrated by such earlier works as Political Order In Changing Societies. In addition, Barrington Moore demonstrated the significance of class polarization and its resultant violence against the state. More importantly Apter's model does not offer any new solutions to class polarization in modernizing societies. His information versus coercion formula still lacks analysis of the
urban-rural conflict which often dominates non-western development. For these reasons, Apter's approach is best suited for the analysis of advanced industrialized states rather than modernizing ones.

Confronting The Normative Basis of Western Political Development Theory:

In his work, Parallels and Actuals of Political Development, A. H. Somjee refutes the notion that developing countries will undergo political and historical experiences similar to those of Western countries. For Somjee this faulty assumption has led scholars to search for analogs to Western political experiences, rather than examining the realities of non-western political development. Accordingly this misplaced focus results from the use of theoretical concepts which were developed to explain the political development of Western countries. Although Western political development theory may accurately describe Western political development, it is inadequate when used to describe the development of non-western countries. For this reason, Somjee suggests that Western political development theory requires improvement if it is to accurately reflect both Western and non-Western political experiences. (51)

Through the use of critical and theoretical analysis Somjee uncovered the assumptions and biases inherent in
Western political development theory. These biases are the foundation for the ethnocentric nature of this body of theory. He found that the assumption that developing countries would undergo similar political experiences to those of the West denies the existence of non-western cultural and historical traditions. He states

such an argument presupposes an empty cultural space within which forces of modernization, the Western state system, borrowed political ideas and emulated institutions and practices operate. (52)

In fact, Somjee contends that each country's culture and history interact with borrowed political institutions in a unique manner.

Another assumption which Somjee disputes is the idea that traditional societies must be destroyed before modernization can occur. On the contrary, he found that developing countries have selectively absorbed Western political ideas and institutions. The institutions which these countries have chosen are those which do not disturb their fundamental nature. Thus countries such as India and China are modernizing without totally destroying their traditional cultures. Somjee concludes that these realities present a challenge to the universal application of Western political development theory.

Somjee also identified the value, reductionist and
diffusionist biases inherent in Western political development theory. In the first instance, the value bias is reflected in the false polarity between the notions of modern and traditional societies. Here modern is equated with superiority, while traditional is synonymous with inferiority. In light of this polarity, the concepts of modernity and tradition become value judgements, rather than objective instruments for examining non-western societies. The reductionist bias, on the other hand, results from the rigid classification system of functional analysis. In this case, the complexities of non-western societies are reduced for the sake of comparative analysis. Finally, the diffusionist bias assumes that a world culture will eventually destroy the traditional societies which it encounters, leaving in its wake an identity crisis. Somjee believes, however, that neither the traditional society, nor the individual suffers from such an identity crisis. Even in the most extreme cases of India's urbanization process the individual's family and ethnic ties remain intact. More importantly traditional societies are absorbing new values without disturbing their fundamental nature. For this reason, Somjee concludes that traditional societies are more resilient than Western scholars believe.

Somjee further concluded that because of the diversity of non-western historical, traditional and cultural
experiences, transplanted political institutions would function differently in each society. In fact, the interaction between the indigenous culture and Western institutions would create a unique development process for each non-western country. (53) Despite this obviously relativist preference for the study of non-western societies, Somjee argues that a universal standard be established to evaluate the public life of all countries. This universal standard, Somjee calls the 'public minimum'. This standard should consist of elements of democracy such as popular participation, elections, and guaranteed civil rights. In addition, elements of non-western political cultures and traditions should contribute to this universal standard. By instituting such a standard, a higher quality of public life can be reached for all societies, regardless of their cultural tradition. (54)

Although the prescription of a universal standard for evaluating public life may be premature, Somjee does point out the need to examine each country's history, culture and tradition in order to understand its unique development process. With this relativist approach, cultural elements which either foster or impede the individual's political participation and demand for accountability may be investigated. More importantly, Somjee has uncovered the reason for the conceptual inadequacy of Western political
development theory. The normative biases present in western political development theory obscure the reality of non-western development. Somjee also suggested that non-western value systems may contribute to improving the quality of public life for both western and non-western societies. For these reasons, this relativist approach is capable of explaining non-western development. Moreover, the concept of a 'public minimum' used as a heuristic tool, may identify non-western contributions to political development theory. Despite this acceptance of A. H. Somjee's Relativist-Universalist Approach, one important question remains. That question is, "Does A. H. Somjee's Relativist approach truly circumvent ethnocentric bias?"

Some General Observations:

The examination of the debate on political choice revealed that these models focused on elite and systemic choices. As a result, they are unable to investigate traditional and cultural factors that impede or promote the individual's political participation and demands for accountability. For this reason, neither model offers an alternative to the relativist approach. Moreover, the 'in-house' criticism of these models pointed to the continuation of 'ethnocentric bias'. Thus, normative issues became one focus of the fourth or current debate in
political development theory.

The examination of this current debate has revealed that David Apter's combined approach is appropriate for investigating advance industrial societies. However, it holds no new insights for non-western societies. In contrast, A. H. Somjee's examination of the normative basis of western political development theory revealed its inherent assumptions and biases. This normative foundation obstructs a clear view of non-western development. His solution is to examine each country's unique history, tradition and culture as well as their interaction with transplanted political institutions.

THE POVERTY OF WESTERN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY:

This examination has revealed that throughout its intellectual history, the study of political development has been impoverished by the continuation of 'Western ethnocentric biases'. Moreover, A. H. Somjee's relativist approach is the most appropriate for the study of non-western political development. In addition, the universal component of Somjee's model, the 'public minimum', may be used as a heuristic tool to identify non-western concepts. These non-western political ideas may contribute to broadening the normative basis of political development theory. However it remains to be
seen whether or not A. H. Somjee's Relativist-Universalist model truly does circumvent ethnocentric bias. This question will be explored in the next chapter.
NOTES

CHAPTER III


2. Ibid., p.11-22., p.100.

3. Ibid., p.22. Higgott credits Uphoff and Ilchman with accepting "economics as the science of choice and political economy as the analysis of the "economic effects of political choices and the political effect of economic decisions". (Ibid., p.25.) For Higgott, 'public policy' loosely describes social values and consequences as well as choices and procedures. Ibid. p.26.

4. Ibid., p.100.


6. Ibid., p.16.

7. Ibid., p.20-36.

8. Ibid., p.619-621.

9. Ibid., p.626.

10. Ibid., p.621-629.

11. Ibid., p.630-649.


13. Ibid., p.17.


15. If the 'bourgeois' model is chosen, then political participation will be expanded gradually to include first the middle class and eventually the lower classes. On the
other hand, if the 'autocratic' model is chosen, then the middle class demand for political participation is quelled and socio-economic equality is emphasized by the political elite. The government also institutes land reform measures designed to gain support from the lower classes. If land reform programs are successful, economic inequalities may be diminished. Ibid., p. 21-22.

16. If the political elite choose the 'technocratic' model, political participation is decreased by repressive means in order to promote economic growth. While this model does increase economic growth, it also increases the economic inequality between classes. For this reason, the authors believe that the implementation of this model results in a 'vicious cycle' of non-participation-economic growth-economic inequalities-repression. In contrast, if the 'populist' model is chosen, political participation increases along with government services, while economic disparities shrink. Unfortunately, the rate of economic growth also slows. As a result, there is an increase in social conflict, because citizens are attempting to share the profits from a stagnant economy. Thus, the 'populist' model leads to civil conflict. Ibid., p. 23-24.

17. Ibid., p. 42-52.
18. Ibid., p. 64-72.
19. Ibid., p. 159-171.
21. Ibid., p. 33.
22. Ibid., p. 31.
23. Ibid., p. 36-37.
25. Ibid., p. 105.
27. Ibid., p. 110.
29. Ibid., p.175.

30. Ibid., p.175-176.

31. Ibid., p.176.


33. Ibid., p.294.


36. Ibid., p.121.

37. Ibid., p.122.


41. Ibid., p.452.

42. Ibid., p.468.


44. Ibid., p.28.
55. Unlike scientific theory that describes, predicts or explains a phenomenon, heuristic theory is an experimental procedure of trial and error. As defined by THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY NEW EDITION, Edited by J.B. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). This thesis draws on the concept of heuristic theory offered by Gabriel A. Almond in POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ESSAYS IN HEURISTIC THEORY (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970). In this work, Almond maintains that heuristic theory is intended to "...facilitate research, to lay out variables and hypotheses about their relations, to suggest why a particular approach or method might be useful in the development and testing of political theories." (Ibid.,p.4) Moreover it is "a demonstration of what might be done in the field of comparative politics if we had had an accepted and satisfactory theoretical framework to begin with and if we had been able to draw upon a fund of reliable knowledge which we would need in order to test and demonstrate its utility." (Ibid.,p.18) For this thesis a heuristic tool or theory refers to questions which either generate hypotheses, or open new directions for research.
CHAPTER IV. INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES AS AN INITIAL CORRECTIVE TO ETHNOCENTRISM:

This chapter is concerned with the hermeneutic analysis of A. H. Somjee's relativist approach as an initial corrective to 'ethnocentric bias'. An important question remained unanswered at the end of chapter III, that is, "Does Somjee's relativist approach truly circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'?". In order to answer this question a more fundamental problem must be investigated first. This problem surrounds the incremental correction of 'ethnocentric bias' from political development models in general. In other words, "Is it possible to construct models of political development which balance out, or reduce, or gradually eliminate 'ethnocentric biases'?"

Certainly both the history of political development theory and the inability of scholars to eradicate 'ethnocentric bias' from their models, indicate the importance of answering such a question. Because of problems concerning 'objectivity' in social science research in general, it is the contention of this chapter that an 'objective' model of political development is impossible to achieve. If this is the case, then "How does Somjee's relativist approach try to circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'?" This chapter will also illustrate that through relativist analysis, given the advantages of familiarity with the indigenous culture, Somjee's model may have some value in circumventing
'ethnocentric bias'. Consequently, in order to circumvent 'ethnocentrism' in the construction of political development models, attention should be paid to what indigenous scholars have to say about their own society and politics. That will then help us complement perspectives which are those of non-indigenous scholars with those of scholars who have indigenous understanding.

With these intentions in mind, the first section of this chapter will examine the impediments to 'objectivity' in social science research. The goal of this investigation is to substantiate the contention that an 'objective' model of political development is impossible to attain. The second section will offer a brief intellectual history of hermeneutic theory and its influence on the social sciences. The purpose of this investigation is twofold. Initially it is expected to support the idea that hermeneutics offers an alternative to scientific methodology. Next, it will indicate that the hermeneutically influenced social sciences are capable of providing the conceptual tools for understanding societies with different cultural backgrounds and evaluating a political development model's ability to circumvent ethnocentric bias. In the third section, the methods which Somjee employs as a corrective for 'ethnocentric bias' will be explored. These correctives will be referred to as the
'Somjee Method'. In the fourth section a number of hermeneutically influenced social theories will be analyzed and the claim to reducing 'ethnocentric bias' will be examined. This examination will reveal that through relativist analysis and a familiarity with cultural background, Somjee's approach has the advantage of being aware of a whole range of 'ethnocentric biases'. This investigation will also point to the need for combining efforts by both indigenous and non-indigenous scholars in identifying biases which distort social and political analysis.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CREATE AN 'OBJECTIVE' MODEL OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT? An Examination of the impediments to 'objectivity' in Social Science Research:

Before Somjee's relativist approach can be evaluated on its ability to circumvent 'ethnocentric bias', a more fundamental question must be answered. That is to say, "Is it possible to create an 'objective' model of political development?" In order to investigate this problem, it is important to examine conditions under which biases may influence political science research. While many scholars have investigated the problem of bias in social science research, in general, such scholars as Max Weber, Gundar Myrdal, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have examined impediments to 'objectivity', in particular. Consequently,
this section will draw on works which investigate the problem of 'objectivity' in social science research and relate it to attempts at creating 'objective' political development models.

There are several moments during the process of social science research when a social scientist's values may influence his or her research. Initially, Max Weber perceived that lapses in 'objectivity' may arise from the inherent difference between its application to the natural and social sciences. More precisely, bias may occur as a result of the nature of social science research itself. Later, Gunnar Myrdal suggested that bias may stem from the scientist's intellectual tradition. In short, a scholar may choose a particular theory over another because it coincides with prevailing scientific notions. Still later, Thomas Khun claimed that biases may occur because of the scientist's personal preferences, or life experiences. Whether 'ethnocentric biases' enter political development models as a result of the political scientist's intellectual tradition, or from personal preferences, the consequences are the same. The political development model will not only lack 'objectivity', but will also be incapable of accurately describing other cultures' development processes. Thus the recurrence of 'ethnocentric bias' in political development models is an
indication of lapses in 'objectivity'.

With these observations in mind, it is the purpose of this section to analyze critically four major works on 'objectivity' in the social sciences. The findings will then be related to attempts at creating 'objective' political development models. The goal of this section is to support the contention that an 'objective' model of political development is impossible to achieve.

Objectivity and the Nature of Social Science Research:

In his article, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy", Max Weber examines the relationship between social scientists' need for objectivity, together with their need to make value judgements regarding social policy. Weber contends that this relationship represents one obstacle to the achievement of 'objectivity' in the social sciences. He believes that the social sciences arose from the need to evaluate social policy. For this reason, the methodology used in the natural sciences was applied to the social sciences. However, Weber points out that this application was achieved without distinguishing between existential and normative knowledge. That is to say, no distinction was made between 'what is' and 'what ought to be'.(1) This lack of distinction resulted in the misapplication of scientific methodology to the social
sciences. In contrast, Weber maintains that the purpose of social science is not to furnish binding moral standards for practical action. Instead, science can only inform people of the costs and benefits of alternative decisions. Thus, science informs and people choose.

Weber also claims that the social sciences are less 'objective' than the natural sciences for several other reasons. One of these is that social scientists' personal values often influence their scientific work. Not only have social scientists concealed their value-judgements, but they have also allowed these judgements to affect their perception of causal relationships between facts. These biased perceptions have resulted in conclusions being drawn which satisfy the scientist's personal values.(2) Another reason for social sciences' less 'objective' status, is that their goals surpass the traditional discussion of the standards which govern social life. For Weber "[o]ur aim is the understanding of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move."(3) These realities led Weber to conclude that

There is no absolutely "objective" scientific analysis of culture - or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes - of "social phenomena" independent of special and "one-sided" viewpoints according to which - expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously - they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes.(4)
Still another reason for social sciences' lack of 'objectivity' is that when an object is chosen for scientific analysis, a judgement has already been made. In other words, the object has been judged to be worth knowing. Consequently, the social scientists' interest begins with a culturally bound value judgement. Weber further claims that it is senseless to begin empirical research without considering the presupposed values present in society. Because these values give the research findings meaning, or 'cultural significance', the knowledge acquired by social research becomes the basis for relating the historical significance of a phenomenon to its uniqueness. This correlation becomes the foundation for a causal relationship. If this relationship is determined in a scientific manner, then it becomes 'objectively possible'. However, because people bestow meaning and significance on cultural events, the purely reductionist approach used in the natural sciences is meaningless in social science research. Therefore the culturally relative nature of social science data renders its conclusions less universal than natural science data. (5) The sum total of these observations led Weber to conclude that "[a]ll knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view." (6) As a result, social science knowledge represents knowledge from a 'particular perspective'. 
Weber concludes that because it is impossible to know all the motives behind social behavior, it is impossible to create concrete laws of social action similar to those in the natural sciences. In fact, trying to do so has led social scientists to misconstrue the role of theory in their disciplines. In other words, instead of trying to isolate social and psychological impulses such as acquisition, social scientists should use theory in an heuristic and expository manner. In this way new hypothesis would develop. Owing to these limitations on 'objectivity', Weber maintains that in the social sciences the only theoretical construct possible is an 'ideal-type'. That is to say, the accentuation of one viewpoint of a phenomenon into an intellectual construct. This construct is not present in real life. Unfortunately, the use of ideal-type analysis always leaves a schism between the concept and reality. This schism stems from the utopian nature of this form of analysis. Despite this flaw, Weber believes that ideal-type analysis is a valuable conceptual tool for the purposes of comparison. However, he cautions that the comparative use of ideal-types should not be confused with either value-judgements or historical analysis. If either of these confusions occurs reality will be violated. (7)

Weber has indicated that the application of scientific
methodology to the social sciences has failed to make the distinction between 'what is' and 'what ought to be'. That is to say, despite attempts to portray 'objective reality', social scientists have been unable to remove the normative content from their models. Especially in the case of political development models, this normative content is the driving force behind the idea of progress and development itself. Consequently, the concept of political development denotes movement toward a 'better' political life. As the first three chapters have indicated this 'better' political life is synonymous with a liberal democratic one. Moreover, all political development models are examples of Weberian ideal-types. Consequently, whether the political development model makes use of structural-functional, political culture, or multifactor approaches, the results will always differ from 'objective' reality. It is in this schism that the model's normative content or biases reside. Because this normative content can not be removed from ideal-type models, an 'objective' model of political development is impossible to construct.

Objectivity, Prediction and the Sociology of Knowledge.

In his book, The Poverty of Historicism, Karl Popper contends that it is impossible to predict the future direction of human history. In other words, he refutes the historicist notion that human history is governed by
inexorable laws similar to those governing physics. (8)

Popper's examination of the anti-naturalist doctrines of historicism revealed several criticisms. These criticisms surround the application of scientific methodology to the social sciences and history. For instance, historicists believe that unlike the constant laws of physics, the laws which govern sociology vary from place to place and era to era. For this reason, sociological regularities are dependent on particular historical and cultural conditions. This historical relativism places sociology outside the methodological parameters of the natural sciences. Also, the historicist contends that the social sciences' complexity presents a problem for natural science methodology. In this case, the complexity of social science events is demonstrated by both their inability to be reduced by artificial isolation, and that human sociology is based on human psychology which is based on biology which can be reduced to chemistry and physics. (9)

Moreover, historicists point out that because of the principle of indeterminacy', or the doubt created between an observer and object, social science research can not attain the level of 'objectivity' that the natural sciences enjoy. Popper credits Bohr with the observation that
... nowhere is the fact that the scientist and his object belong to the same world of greater moment than in the social sciences, where it leads to an uncertainty of prediction, which is sometimes of great practical significance. We are faced, in the social sciences with a full and complicated interaction between observer and observed, between subject and object. (10)

Thus, by predicting events, the social scientist may have effected their outcome according to his, or her personal preferences. This reality destroys the 'objectivity' of prediction.

Finally, the historicist contends the objective search for truth exhibited by the natural sciences is subverted by biases and preference in the social sciences. They claim where predilections and interests have such influence on the content of scientific theories and predictions, it must become highly doubtful whether bias can be determined and avoided. (11)

Consequently, in the social sciences there are as many theories as points of view. In order to substantiate this view, historicists point to the prevailing social attitudes of an era. Apparently, there will exist simultaneously social theories which influence such social attitudes. Therefore, social theory can facilitate or retard social change. Whether social theory acts as a facilitator or inhibitor of social change depends on whose interests are being served during a particular era. In this way, prevailing social theories serve the interests of
particular economic classes and historical trends. This concept is the underpinning of the Sociology of Knowledge.(12) Despite Popper's disagreement, these reasons substantiate the historicist claim that natural science methodology is not applicable to the social sciences and history.(13)

In terms of prediction, political development models assume that if the non-western state simply increases its capacity, or non-western citizens increase their participation, then a democratic situation will ensue. In other words, these models reflect the Western political scientist's desire that non-western polities become democracies. In fact, these models are meant as prescriptions for democratic success. Thus, Western political scientists are attempting to affect the outcome of political events in other countries, to their own desired ends. Similarly, the historicist ideas surrounding the Sociology of Knowledge are particularly significant for political development models. Most of the development models were created during the Cold War Era. Indeed, most of these models were designed to help Western countries, the United States in particular, formulate their foreign policy toward the non-western world. The aim of this foreign policy was to sway non-Western countries in the direction of democracy and to enable them to 'withstand'
communism. Thus, the underlying interests of an era and of the American middle class, in particular, are apparent in these models. Because the personal desires of Western political scientists, and the interests of both an era and a class provide the motives for the creation of these models, the search for 'objective' truth is subverted.

Objectivity and Theory Choice:

In his article, "Objectivity, Value-Judgement, and Theory choice", Thomas S. Khun dispells the notion that scientists choose theories in an objective manner. While there are 'objective' criteria for choosing a 'good' theory, such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness, they are often too vaguely defined to allow scientists exact precision. Moreover, when used together to evaluate a 'good' theory, these traits may contradict one another. For instance, one theory may offer consistency, another fruitfulness. For these reasons, scientists dedicated to the same set of criteria may inevitably draw varied conclusions regarding theory choice. Thus, Khun suggests that simply knowing the characteristics of a 'good' theory does not explain theory choice. Instead, Khun contends that a scientist's choice of theories is contingent upon both objective and subjective criteria.
In fact, Khun found that several subjective factors influenced individual scientist's theory choice. One such factor is the scientist's personal work experience. Other factors included the field of study, duration of work, and amount of success he or she had attained. Khun also found that theory choice is affected by whether or not a new theory challenges the concepts used in the scientist's work. He further claims that extra-scientific factors affect theory choice. For instance, the effects of German Romanticism inclined Kepler to accept the notion of energy conservation. In a similar fashion, social attitudes in 19th century Britain fostered the acceptance of Darwinism. Khun also discovered that a scientist's personal preferences affect her or his theory choices. In this case, some scientists prefer to take risks for the sake of originality, while others prefer theories with a limited scope. All of these subjective factors led Khun to conclude that

...the choices scientists make between competing theories depend not only on shared criteria-those my critics call objective—but also on idiosyncratic factors dependent on individual biography and personality.

Thus, theory choice is only partially dependent on scientists' shared criteria. Theory verification, on the other hand, can only be explained in terms of each scientist's personal characteristics.
For Khun, scientists not only realize the subjective nature of their theory choices, but also rationalize the continued use of this method. These rationalizations take two forms. First, they claim that although total objectivity is difficult to attain, it is an 'ideal-criterion' which is worth striving for. Secondly, some scientists believe that the subjective element in theory choice allows for innovation. That is to say, subjective choices form the basis of new theories. Consequently, objectivity only becomes important when scientists test, justify, or judge a theory.

Because Khun asserts that the differences between innovation and judgement are simply a figment of 'textbook science', that is teaching theory application as proof of its truth, he offers another method of evaluating theory choice.(16) Instead of criteria as rules for theory choice, the concepts of values and norms are used as influences on that choice. He states that "...the criteria of choice with which [he] began function not as rules, which determine choice, but as values, which influence it."(17) This perspective allows for a description of scientific thought which is unacceptable to the scientific community. For Khun criteria perceived as values, rather than rules increases the efficiency of theory choice.(18)

Khun has pointed out that scientists' theory choices
are influenced by both their personal work experiences and preferences. These subjective criteria are a culmination of many other social factors which mould the individual's life experiences. Such factors include personal interests, educational experiences, class background, level of self confidence etc.. Certainly it can be argued that in Western society few (if any) uninterested, poorly educated, impoverished and withdrawn people become political scientists. Consequently, political scientists' theory choices are influenced by his, or her class, race, gender and psychological conditions. Hence, the political development models chosen or constructed by political scientists will exhibit their personal biases. Moreover data interpreted through biased theories will yield inaccurate results.

Objectivity and the Problem of Value:

In his work, Objectivity in Social Research, Gunnar Myrdal refutes the notion that social science research can obtain the same degree of 'objectivity' present in the natural sciences.(19) Because social scientists succumb to the same value conflicts present in their respective societies, the research which they compile is biased. Myrdal claims that social scientists must free themselves from three major constraints before their research may be considered 'objective'. First, they must purge the effects
that their socio-economic, political and cultural environment have on their research. In addition, the social scientists must remove any biases originating from their own personal life experiences. Finally, they must eliminate the moral values inherent in their intellectual tradition. In the Western case, these values are based on utilitarianism and the philosophy of natural law. (20) Myrdal believes that unless social scientists effectively remove these influences, the resulting research will be biased. These biased conclusions then become the foundation for false-knowledge. (21) For these reasons, Myrdal contends that the values which direct both theoretical and practical social research should be real values, openly and clearly stated. These values must also be examined for their pertinence to the society being studied. Other criteria for a 'value premise' include value compatibility and adjustability. Thus a 'value premise' must decide the appropriate approach and determine the concepts required in order to study any given society. (22)

By applying critical analysis to his own research, Myrdal uncovered one of social science's most naive assumptions. That is to say, if social scientists remove any evidence of speculative or transcendental thought from social theory and refuse to draw policy conclusions from
it, then a body of value-free social theory would be left. Myrdal calls this 'naive empiricism' because,

\[
\text{facts do not organize themselves into concepts and theories just by being looked at; indeed except within the framework of concepts and theories, there are no scientific facts but chaos. (23)}
\]

In other words, all scientific research is initiated by questions. These questions reflect not only scientists' interest in their surroundings, but also the values inherent in their society. Consequently, at the most basic level scientific questions represent valuations. For this reason, Myrdal argues that

\[
\text{valuations are thus necessarily involved already at the stage when we observe facts and carry on theoretical analysis, and not only at the stage when we draw political inferences from facts and valuations. (24)}
\]

As a result, all social science research begins with a value laden agenda.

Myrdal also found that social scientists in any given intellectual community move as a group. That is to say, they refrain from bringing into question the basic values which they hold in common. This need to rationalize social values effects the investigative process, from the choice of concepts and theories used, through the collection of data, to the interpretation of results. Thus, the entire
approach is affected by these commonly held values of an intellectual community.

Not only had social scientists concealed their commonly held values, but they had also concealed the values which determine their research. (25) Hyrdal states that

[our whole literature is permeated by value judgements, despite prefatory statements to the contrary. But these conclusions are not presented as inferences from explicit value premises; rather, in the age-old fashion, it is claimed they are evident from the nature of things: as part of what is presented as objective data. (26)

According to Myrdal value-laden terminology is evidence of such bias. In other words, such terms as equilibrium, stable, lag and function provide the connection between objective and prescriptive analysis. Subsequently, concealed valuations are at the foundation of biased research conclusions.

Myrdal concluded that in order to create more objective social sciences, the underlying values which determine their research must be stated clearly and openly. Myrdal also recognizes that there are many problems when formulating a 'value premise'. One problem is the inherent conflict in the individual's valuation. These conflicts make the observation of valuations and their influence confusing. Another problem is the poor methods for
determining the values of a society. In essence, values are determined by poorly designed opinion polls, or the social scientist's general impressions. For these reasons, Myrdal suggests that a few sets of value premises be used. Despite the difficulties in their formulation, 'value premises' must guide all social science research.(27)

According to Myrdal, value-premise guided research is not biased because it is determined under conscious control and with the aid of explicit valuations. This closes the door to arbitrariness, as it is the implicit but hidden valuations that lead to the inconclusiveness in conventional research, making biases possible.(28)

Thus by using the value-premise, social science research becomes more 'objective'.

Myrdal agrees with Weber, Popper, and Kuhn that biases may enter social science research from three major sources. These sources are the social scientist's social and personal values, their life experiences, and their intellectual tradition. However, unlike Weber's suggestion that an ideal-type is the closest to 'objectivity' that social science models can come, Myrdal offers a method for circumventing these impediments to 'objectivity'. He suggests that a 'value premise' be applied to both the approach to and the results of social science research. Thus the question becomes, "Have
political development models been created with a 'value premise' in place?" From the examination of the political development models done in chapters one through three, the answer to this question is no. If a 'value premise' were in place would these models become 'objective'? Once again the answer to this question is no. Despite Myrdal's admission that a 'value premise' is difficult to formulate, it is exactly this difficulty which is the problem. Not only are the methods of determining the values of a society left to the political scientist's general impressions and speculation, but also the scientist's own value conflicts may interfere with this process. Both of these methods of determining a society's values continue to allow the political scientist's biases to enter the analysis. Thus even if a 'value premise' is used the values which it expresses may be those of the political scientist and not of the society being studied.

In general, this examination has illustrated that because of the nature of social science research, the normative content can not be removed from ideal-type models. Because political development models are all ideal-types, their normative content is inherent. Unfortunately as Max Weber, Karl Popper, Thomas Khun and Gunnar Myrdal have indicated these values are most often provided by the political scientist's biases and not the
society being studied. Whether these biases stem from the political scientist's cultural background, intellectual tradition or personal preferences, the results are the same. The political development model will lack 'objectivity' and will be incapable of accurately describing other cultures' development processes. Consequently, the recurrence of 'ethnocentric bias' in political development models is an indication of lapses in 'objectivity'. Moreover, the inherent nature of these biases, coupled with the poor methods designed to identify and remove them, leads directly to the answer for the question posed earlier. That question was: Is it possible to construct an 'objective' model of political development? From this investigation the answer to this question is "No", in other words, an 'objective' model of political development is impossible to create.

Since a truly 'objective' model of political development is impossible to attain, then "How does Somjee's relativist approach minimize or circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'?" Because natural science methodology has been shown wanting when applied to political development models, to answer this question an alternative method of analysis is required. This alternative method is provided by Hermeneutics, that is to say, the science of interpretive understanding.(29) However, in order to use it
effectively, more needs to be known about hermeneutics. Consequently, the next section will investigate the intellectual history of hermeneutics and its influence on the social sciences.

Why Hermeneutics? A Brief Intellectual History of Hermeneutic Theory and Its Influence on the Social Sciences:

In order to evaluate whether or not a political development model can minimize or circumvent 'ethnocentric bias' a particularly difficult problem has to be faced first. That problem is, "How can we truly understand the political actions and behaviours of societies whose normative bases differ from our own?" Hermeneutics, the science of interpretation offers methods for such an analysis. Because hermeneutic theory developed from the need to understand texts written in different historical periods from the present, it has dealt extensively with the problems of understanding cultures with different normative foundations. In order to understand these cultures hermeneutics makes use of many theoretical tools. Of these tools, three are particularly useful for political science analysis. First, the text being interpreted must be placed in its historical context. Secondly, the medium of tradition or language in which the text appears must be well understood. Third, it is important that the text
presents itself, rather than being manipulated by a method of examination. For these reasons, hermeneutics offers an alternative to the subject-object methodology of the natural sciences.

However, in order to answer the question posed above, a more detailed knowledge of hermeneutics and its influence on the social sciences is needed. Consequently, this section will briefly examine the intellectual history of hermeneutics and its influence on the social sciences. This goal will be accomplished in two ways. Initially, Wilhelm Dilthey's notion of the 'historicality of understanding' and its influence on the Sociology of Knowledge will be delineated. Next, Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of the 'linguisticality of understanding' and its influence on Jurgen Habermas's social science will be explored. It is hoped that this examination will substantiate three contentions. The first is that hermeneutic theory offers an alternative method to scientific analysis. Secondly, hermeneutically influenced social sciences offer methods for examining societies with different normative foundations. Finally, these same social sciences offer conceptual tools for evaluating a political development model's ability to circumvent ethnocentric bias.
Despite his true interest in furthering literary theory, Richard E. Palmer's book, *Hermeneutics*, presents an intellectual history of hermeneutic theory. Palmer contends that although the use of the word 'hermeneutic' can be traced back to the Greeks, its development into a body of Biblical interpretative theory began in mid-17th century Europe. At that time, Biblical interpretation itself was separated from the guidelines used for it. Along with the emergence of rationalism, hermeneutic theory came to be used as a philological method. In this case, man's reason was believed to be capable of discovering the 'great moral truths' of his existence. These truths were obscured by the New Testament's different historical context. In order to reveal these truths, an historical understanding was required. This historical method would comprehend the text's hidden meaning and re-interpret it in rational terms. Consequently, both grammatical and historical analysis became the interpreter's functions. As a result, hermeneutic theory lost its purely theological use and became more generally associated with the literary and language studies known as, philology. (30)

According to Palmer, these broadening and refining trends were furthered even more by Schleiermacher's desire
to create a 'science or art' of understanding. For Schleiermacker, the act of interpretation was the same despite the differences in the text's subject. Because all interpretation required language and grammatical analysis, these elements formed the foundation for understanding. That is to say, the act of understanding is the basis of hermeneutics. With this contention, Schleiermacker directed hermeneutics toward a science.

Schleiermacker's efforts were carried still further by the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. In fact, Dilthey argued that, the 'art of understanding' called hermeneutics was capable of providing an epistemological basis for all the social sciences and humanities. To Dilthey the interpretation of human expression, whether in the form of human, or historical action, law, art, or literature, was germane to all of these fields. (31) Dilthey's goal, as Palmer points out was "to develop methods of gaining 'objectively valid' interpretations of expressions of inner life." (32) Palmer also maintains that Dilthey was reacting to the positivist trend in philosophy. This trend proposed that natural science methodology be applied to the study of man. While Dilthey perceived little difference between the natural and social sciences in terms of ways of knowing, he did perceive a difference in their content. Even though the social sciences use facts and objects in a similar
manner as the natural sciences, they are placed in the context of inner human experience. In the natural sciences, this reference to human encounters is conspicuously absent. (33) For this reason, Dilthey recognized that neither the ahistorical and reductionist categories of the natural sciences, nor the speculative techniques of German Idealism could capture the completeness of human life. Consequently, neither method could provide a foundation for the social sciences. Instead, Dilthey believed that "concrete, historical, lived experience must be the starting and the ending point for the 'Geisteswissenschaften'" or cultural studies. (34) Thus, the social sciences must be based on real life experiences.

For Dilthey social science methodology must be grounded in epistemological accuracy, a more indepth awareness of history, and an understanding of human expression from real life experiences. Unlike the Kantian epistemology for the natural science, which focused on the theory of knowledge and 'pure' reason, Dilthey claimed that the epistemology for the social sciences should rest on types of self-interpretation and historical reason. (35) This is clearly illustrated by Palmer's assertion that

The problem of understanding was for Dilthey one of recovering a consciousness of "historicality" (Geschichtlichkeit) of our own existence which is lost in the static categories of science. We experience life not in the mechanical categories of 'power' but
in complex, individual moments of 'meaning', of direct experience of life as a totality and in loving grasp of the particular. These units of meaning require the context of the past and the horizon of future expectations; they are intrinsically temporal and finite, and they are to be understood in terms of these dimensions—that is, historically.(36)

More importantly, Dilthey perceived that it was impossible for man to remove him or herself from history. For him self-interpretation is achieved through history. From these notions Dilthey asserts that "man is what he is in and through history".(37) This historical relativism results in an conception of history as a series of world perspectives, with no criteria for judging one perspective over another. In the end, both meaning and understanding become temporally bound.(38) Hence, Dilthey proposed a new interpretative methodology for the social sciences. This method was founded on real life experience, categories of 'meaning' and history, rather than speculation, power and mathematics.

In, Understanding Social Life The Method called 'Verstehen', William Outhwaite contends that Dilthey's distinction between the role of causal explanation and understanding in describing natural and social phenomenon continues to plague these modern sciences. In order to substantiate this contention Outhwaite sketches the influence of Dilthey's hermeneutics on generations of social scientists and examines their understanding of both
causal explanation and 'verstehen' or interpretative understanding. These social scientists included Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and Karl Mannheim. Each of these social scientists advocated a form of interpretative understanding similar to Dilthey's. For example, Weber believed that all human actions and expressions were able to be interpreted according to their meaning. Similarly, Parsons believed that a human action is meaningful because of the system of action directing values or norms that it belongs to. This system exists outside the actor's consciousness but is perpetuated by their actions. For Mannheim, the conclusive meaning of a creation is lost when it is removed from its subjective origins. Mannheim also suggested that all cultural constructs have an objective, expressive and documentary meaning.\(^{(39)}\) From these beginnings, over time, what can be considered the hermeneutically influenced Sociology of Knowledge and the Sociology of Literature came into being.\(^{(40)}\) These hermeneutically influenced branches of social science emphasize the importance of examining the historical context of social concepts and actions in order to understand their meaning. Outhwaite contends that

To discuss the 'meaning' of an action is not necessarily...to indulge speculative philosophy of history; it is part of the very basic process of identifying actions which must precede any formal, or informal social theory.\(^{(41)}\)
Therefore by examining the historical context of social concepts and actions, their meaning is revealed.

Consequently, in order to understand the political concepts and actions of cultures with different normative foundations, their historical context must be examined. For this reason, the Sociology of Knowledge offers theoretical tools for analyzing societies with different normative foundations. Moreover, in order to circumvent ethnocentric bias, the effects of the scientist's intellectual tradition and life experience must not distort the meaning of the political actions being studied. Because the Sociology of Knowledge is capable of placing the scientist's concepts and life experiences within their larger intellectual tradition and era, it is able to evaluate their ability to understand other traditions and eras. For example, if the scientist's intellectual tradition and life experiences are similar to those of the society being studied, then a basis for understanding exists. On the other hand, if the scientist's intellectual tradition and life experiences have no similarity to those of the society under study, then little basis for understanding exists. It is this situation which allows ethnocentric biases to enter political analysis. In other words, the Sociology of Knowledge is able to pinpoint the exact moment when the misunderstandings stemming from the
scientist's biases occur. Thus the Sociology of Knowledge also offers useful tools for evaluating a political development model's ability to circumvent ethnocentric bias.

More Recently, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas' Social Science:

More recently, philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer continue to influence social science methodology. Once again Richard Palmer offers an in-depth examination of Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Palmer contends that in *Truth and Method* Gadamer forwarded not only a critique of modern aesthetics and a theory of historical understanding founded on Heidigger's principles, but also a new philosophical hermeneutics. This new philosophical hermeneutics is founded on the ontology or being of language. Although Gadamer's critique of modern aesthetic is compelling, this examination will concentrate on his theory of historical understanding and new philosophical hermeneutics and their influence on the social sciences.

Despite its later influence on social science methodology, Gadamer's *Truth and Method* was intended to question whether method would truly reveal truth. Because method takes the subject's awareness and ability to reason as its ultimate reference for the human knowledge, Gadamer
 contends that it is not capable of revealing new truths, but only those inherent in the method. Instead Gadamer uses a dialectical approach to understanding similar to the Greeks. This approach to knowing is lead by the essence of 'what is being understood'. In this case the object or situation offers the question and the subject answers. In this way Gadamer's dialectic is phenomenological, that is the object or being discloses its essence to the observer. Thus thinking becomes an integral part of being. (43)

According to Palmer, Gadamer's question was, "how is understanding possible, not only in the humanities but in the whole of Man's experience of the world?". (44) Thus, Gadamer examines the ontology of understanding.

For Gadamer, history is not a group of facts which can be objectively examined. Instead he perceived history as a moving stream in which people live. Moreover, the individual participates in history by the act of understanding. This understanding is based on a reflection of his or her own historical life or self-interpretation. Consequently these presuppositions are the foundation for the process of historical understanding. For this reason, the removal of presupposition from understanding is not only impossible, but also undesirable. As a result, tradition becomes a medium through which people exist. Ultimately, this tradition is communicated through
Hence, Palmer claims that Heidegger and Gadamer agree that,

language is the reservoir and communicating medium of the tradition; tradition hides itself in language, and language is a 'medium' like water. For Heidegger and Gadamer, language, history, and being are all not only interrelated but interfused, so that the linguisticality of being is at the same time its ontology—its 'coming into being' and the medium of its historicality. Coming into being is a happening in and of history and is governed by the dynamics of historicality; it is a language event.

Thus, Gadamer suggests not only that an objective view of history is impossible, but also that understanding can only be reached through language.

Despite Gadamer's opposition to the subject-object methodology of scientific analysis, his ideas surrounding the historicality and linguisticality of understanding have a resultant methodology. This methodology directs the interpreter to listen to, and hear, 'what the text is conveying', rather than observe, or master the text itself. Consequently, the interpreter becomes a participant in the text's tradition.

Like those of Dilthey before him, Gadamer's hermeneutics have also influenced contemporary social scientists. Of these Jurgen Habermas is the most controversial. According to Anthony Giddens', Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, Habermas has managed to combine
not only the Frankfurt School's critical theory and Marxism, but also Hegelian philosophy and hermeneutics into provocative social and political theory. While Habermas does not agree with Gadamer's contention of a universal hermeneutic, he does perceive that hermeneutics is useful in areas not associated with science. That is to say, hermeneutics is concerned with the context and particulars of daily social life. In contrast, positivism is concerned with predicting and controlling events. For this reason, it focuses on generating technically useful knowledge. Habermas believes that either focus results in partial knowledge. He further suggests that by combining components of each philosophy, both may be surpassed. (47) Giddens points out that Habermas, like Gadamer, perceives that communication in everyday language is the medium for understanding. However Habermas connects this notion to social theory by examining the social action which results from such communication. For Habermas human interaction or 'communicative action' is controlled by the 'consensual norms' of a community. These norms not only define the appropriate mutual conduct of social actors, but also form the basis for understanding and recognizing social interactions. (48) Habermas contends that in order to learn the norms controlling 'communicative action' an individual "internaliz[e] traits of personality" (49) In other words, like Durkheim and Parsons,
Habermas's account of the evolution of normative frameworks of interaction is based upon the thesis...of a homology between personality and social development. The forms of consciousness, and the stage of their development, of the individual member of society are the same as those characteristic of society as a whole.(50)

Hence, the individual's personality is a reflection of the society in which he, or she lives.

Because human interaction in the form of communication, or language is based on the normative consensus of a community, the language skills of the interpreter become paramount to understanding. In short, the interpreter must be fluent in the language of the culture under study, in order to understand fully the nuances of its political concepts and actions. For this reason, Jurgen Habermas' social theory regarding communication offers tools for examining cultures with different normative foundations. More importantly, this understanding can only be arrived at through the intersection between the values and experiences which shape the personalities of both the interpreter and the individuals in the culture studied. In this instance, if the interpreter and culture under study have similar values and experiences that form personality, then understanding will follow. If these personality forming values are drastically different, then misunderstanding is the result. It is this misunderstanding which allows the political
scientist's personal preferences or biases to enter the analysis. Thus Habermas' ideas on societally formed personality offers tools for evaluating a political development model's ability to circumvent ethnocentric bias.

From this examination, it is now possible to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section. That question was "How can we truly understand the political concepts and actions of societies whose normative bases differ from our own?" Because hermeneutic theory developed from the need to understand texts written in different historical periods from the present, it has dealt extensively with the problems of understanding cultures with different normative foundations. Three hermeneutic concepts are particularly useful in this regard; they are the self-revelation, historicality, and linguisticality of the text. Because of these concepts, hermeneutics offers an alternative to scientific methodology. Moreover, because the Sociology of Knowledge and Jurgen Habermas' social theory use forms of interpretive understanding stemming from hermeneutics, they also offer an alternative to the subject-object methodology of the sciences. Thus by applying the Sociology of Knowledge and Jurgen Habermas' social theory we can not only understand the political concepts and actions of societies with different normative
foundations, but also evaluate the ability of a political
development model to circumvent ethnocentric bias. In
fact, both social theories will now be used to evaluate
Somjee's ability to minimize or circumvent ethnocentric
bias with a relativist approach.

How Does A. H. Somjee's Relativist Approach Try To
Circumvent Ethnocentric Biases? An Analysis of a Political
Development Model.

With the hermeneutically influenced social sciences
providing the concepts, it is now possible to investigate
the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. That
question was, 'How does Somjee's Relativist model minimize
or circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'? In order to circumvent
ethnocentric bias, a model must be able to not only extract
significantly meaningful information from a society's
materials of knowledge, but also neutralize the effects of
the political scientist's cultural environment,
intellectual tradition and personal preferences. To
evaluate whether or not Somjee's Relativist approach
accomplishes all of these tasks, the approach and points
where the scientist's biases may enter the analysis will be
analyzed. This goal will be partially accomplished by
applying Werner Stark's ideas on the Sociology of Knowledge
to Somjee's approach. Then, Karl Mannheim's concepts
regarding ideology will be applied to Somjee's cultural
environment and intellectual tradition. The goal will be completed by applying Jurgen Habermas' ideas on language and socially formed personality to Somjee's language skills and personal preferences. This investigation is expected to reveal that by keeping the scientist's normative background the same as the society under study and by employing a relativist approach, Somjee's model does minimize and at times circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'. However, before beginning the hermeneutic analysis on Somjee's model, it is imperative that we investigate the correctives to 'ethnocentric bias' which he has already instilled in his research methods.

The Somjee Method:

Throughout his lengthy research and writing career, Somjee has devised several corrective methods for the 'ethnocentric bias' in political development research. These corrective methods begin with his commitment to a critical review of postulates and assumptions used in the examination of non-western societies. Somjee offers three reasons for such a review. First, political development postulates reflect Western political development experiences. Secondly, because of their diversity and different rates of social change, the non-western world cannot be simply perceived in Western terms. Third, academic postulates and models often lack the testing phase of
research. In other words, postulates and models regarding non-western political development must be tested against the reality of non-western historical experiences. (51) For these reasons, Somjee also offers the concept of a "incremental expansion of warranted assumptions". Here, Somjee suggests that once an assumption regarding a particular society has been verified as accurate, it may be tested in the societies which surround the original society. If tests prove that the assumption is accurate in these surrounding societies, further expansion may take place. Thus, an 'incremental expansion of warranted assumptions' limits the entrance of 'ethnocentric biases' into political development model construction. Another corrective method for 'ethnocentric bias' which Somjee employs is evident in his work, The Democratic Process in a Developing Society. In this case, he embarked on a longitudinal field research study of the interaction between India's society and polity. This study extended over 11 years. (52) Hence, Somjee contends that through a critical review of postulates and assumptions, the use of 'incremental expansion of warranted assumptions', and longitudinal field research can all act as correctives for 'ethnocentric bias'.

Now that the 'Somjee method' as a corrective for 'ethnocentric bias' has been explored, it is possible
to hermeneutically analyze his relativist model.

Werner Stark on the Sociology of Knowledge and its Application to a Relativist Approach:

In his work, The Sociology of Knowledge, Werner Stark argues that the historian is only able to select significant political events as important for the future, because of the 'a priori' content of his or her mind'. (53) Here, 'a priori' refers to "reasoning from cause to effect, deductively; presumptively, without investigation, as far as one knows; (of knowledge) obtained by deduction without sensory experience." (54) In fact, if these evaluations or pre-judgements are missing, historians are unable to formulate their understanding. As a result, historical knowledge becomes impossible. Moreover, the historian's social 'a priori' provides a gauge for measuring a political event's degree of historical importance. It also allows the historian to develop a coherent picture of historical reality which coincides with the 'axiological system' that already exists in his, or her mind. (55) Because this axiological system, or selecting grid changes from era to era, so will the significant 'facts' selected. For Stark this idea is one of the major tenents of the Sociology of Knowledge. To clarify this relationship, Stark offers a diagram of the scope and limits of the Sociology of Knowledge. (56) They are as
follows:

The subject The Categorial layer of the mind and his The physical Apparatus of Perception approach The Axiological Layer of the Mind The concern of the

-------------------------------------------- Sociology of
The objective The Objects of Knowledge Knowledge
world The Materials of Knowledge

(57) Thus, the Sociology of Knowledge is concerned with the axiological layer of the mind and the selection of the objects of knowledge from the materials of knowledge. Stark defines the materials of knowledge as all the things that are potentially knowable, but are not known yet. All the things which exist. These objects only become knowable when they are transferred to the objects of knowledge by human interest.

Stark maintains that in order to know something, data must be transferred from the level of materials of knowledge to the level of objects of knowledge. Accordingly, this transfer is achieved through interest. (58) For Stark, these interests, "correspond to, and are determined by, our order of values." (59) Stark locates these interest-determining values in the axiological layer of the mind. He suggests that

the value-system of the society in which the historian, the seeker after human knowledge, lives. The pre-judgements or prior evaluations with which he works, and which in able him to to his work... His pre-judgements, however, are value-facts at the basis of
the contemporary social set-up which encloses him and has shaped his mind - shaped it, 'uno actu' for practical conduct and for theoretical contemplation.(60)

Thus, its purpose is the value-determined selection of objects of knowledge from the available materials of knowledge. For this reason, what is knowable about the world is dependent on the axiological values present in a given culture at a given time. This reality makes human knowledge extremely relative. Consequently, any world-view is the result of the axiological values inherent in the activities and existence of that society. The resulting relativism includes not only a society's daily activities, but also its intellectual concepts and methods.(61) Thus, world views are not only culture, but also time, bound.

Stark also suggests that in order for individuals to operate as part of their greater society, they must believe in that society's normative structure. As Stark puts it,

he must internalize this normative system and this world view though he may ring many changes on it; the only alternative to socialization of the individual mind and character is its alienation.(62)

Consequently, the individual's values are a reflection of the society to which he or she belongs. For this reason, the Sociology of Knowledge is essentially a hermeneutic method. This method is founded on the unity of man's social and intellectual existence. Because of this
foundation, the purpose of the Sociology of Knowledge is to investigate the juncture between social structures and their intellectual manifestations. For Stark such exploration will prove to be important for "understanding culture and its development." (63)

Stark goes on to examine some of the consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge. These consequences include the relativity of truth and the problems resulting from raising partial truths to universal status. In the former case, while a community remains homogenous and isolated, its notion of truth will remain unchallenged. If, however, internal classes with different world-views develop, or groups with different ideas are met, then the question of truth becomes an issue. (64) The resulting struggle between two different, but equally valid, notions of truth begs the question, "what are the implications and consequences of the fact that every society has its own particular view of reality, its own universe of thought—indeed, its own universe of truth?" (65) This question leads directly to the problems associated with raising partial truths to universal status. While each society perceives only one part of the truth, it also perceives that part as the entire truth. As a result all other societies' truths become not only wrong, but ideology. As Stark also points out scholars often succumb to this same human limitation.
This propensity for scholars to raise their particular to the universal has at least one major consequence for the study of other cultures. Stark maintains that the intellectual interaction between different societies is always fraught with misunderstanding. However it is this inability to understand other cultures which comprises the territory and materials for scholars. Unfortunately, most scholars are satisfied with describing surface appearances rather than investigating deeper cultural meaning. In other words the task becomes describing how things appear, rather than how they are. For Stark this surface description assures peer approval for the scholar, instead of the truth. That is to say, the truth which stems from understanding another culture based on its own values. (66) Stark believes that this cross-cultural understanding is difficult because on either side of the dividing line there prevails a different axiological system which, being in itself partial, is treated as if it were both inclusive and exclusive. (67)

Thus, misunderstanding between cultures is the result of both different axiological systems and their universal application.

Stark has identified several concepts that are useful when evaluating the ability of Somjee's approach to circumvent ethnocentric bias. First, Stark points out that
an individual must internalize the values of his or her society in order to function in it. Because Somjee was born and raised in India, his axiological values are a reflection of the values present in the greater Indian society. Moreover Somjee has concentrated his studies on India until recently. These realities have two implications for the relativist model he forwards. Because the scientist and the society being studied have the same values, Somjee's 'social a priori' is better able to accurately measure the importance of political events in India. For the same reason, Somjee will be able to develop a more coherent image of India's historical and political reality. Secondly, Stark contends that the axiological values serve to select the appropriate information from the materials of knowledge. This information becomes the objects of knowledge. In this instance, Somjee's model emphasizes India's history, tradition and culture and their effects on transplanted political institutions. Because these interests are determined by the same values present in the greater Indian society, the truth is being sought in terms of Indian values. Thus, Somjee's relativist model is capable of providing a much more reliable understanding of India's political development.

At the same time Stark has suggested that misunderstanding between two cultures is the result of
their different axiological systems as well as the
universal application of their partial knowledge. In fact,
he has identified the site and cause of ethnocentric bias.
In other words, the difference between the axiological
systems of the scientist and the society being studied
promote not only misunderstanding, but also allow
ethnocentric biases to enter the analysis. In the first
instance, the inability of the non-indigenous scientist's
frame of reference to grasp the significance, or meaning of
foreign political actions results in misunderstanding.
Because of this misunderstanding, the political scientist
is unable to identify or use the values of the society
under study to guide his or her research.

Owing to the fact that an objective model of political
development is impossible to achieve, political scientists
universalize their own axiological values instead. That is
to say, the political scientist first selects theories
which are consistent with his or her personality. Then the
political scientist selects the relevant information
regarding foreign political actions based on his or her own
cultural experience and value system. Finally, the
political scientist analyzes this data through the concepts
and constructs provided by her or his intellectual
tradition. Consequently, ethnocentric biases enter the
analysis. Because all of these activities take place in
the axiological layer of the mind, it is the site where ethnocentric bias occurs. In addition, it is the differences between two axiological systems and their universal application which are the cause of ethnocentric bias. Thus by keeping the axiological values, or normative background of the scientist the same as the society being studied, and by advocating a relativist approach, Somjee's model minimizes ethnocentric bias. With this contention in mind it is now possible to examine the points where ethnocentric bias may enter Somjee's analysis itself.

Karl Mannheim on Cultural Environment and Intellectual Tradition:

In his work, Ideology and Utopia, Karl Mannheim offers a method for describing and analyzing social and political modes of thought. That method is the Sociology of Knowledge. In fact, this method's central theme is that some types of thought can not be completely understood, if their social beginnings are concealed. While Mannheim recognizes that only individuals are capable of thinking, he credits the group to which the individual belongs with providing his or her frame of reference. (68) He asserts that

Every individual is therefore in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact of growing up in a society: on the one hand he finds a ready-made situation and on the other he finds in that situation preformed patterns of thought
This idea is further substantiated by Mannheim's statement that

We belong to a group not only because we are born into it, not merely because we profess to belong to it, nor finally because we give our loyalty and allegiance, but primarily because we see the world and certain things in the world the way it does (i.e. in terms of the meaning of the group in question). In every concept, in every concrete meaning, there is contained a crystallization of the experiences of a certain group. ... in every concept, however, there is not only a fixation of individuals with reference to a definite group of a certain kind and its actions, but every source from which we derive meaning and interpretation acts also as a stabilizing factor on the possibilities of experiencing and knowing objects with reference to the central goal of action which directs us. (70)

Consequently, it is this real historical-social context from which the individual's thought arises, that concerns the Sociology of Knowledge.

For a similar reason the Sociology of Knowledge also advocates understanding individual human action in terms of the group action which spawns it, rather than through abstract or contemplative techniques. In other words, individuals shape the world and society through group action. For Mannheim

It is the direction of this will to change or maintain, of this collective activity which produces the guiding thread for the emergence of their problems, their concepts and their forms of thought. (71)
As a result, individuals perceive the world from the context of the group to which they belong. Moreover, different groups foster different perceptions of the world. Thus by tracing the process of gradual refinement and specialization of ideological thought, Mannheim uncovers the role which these unconscious group interests play in their formulation.

By investigating the historical changes in the notion of ideology, Mannheim illustrates that the meaning of ideology has changed as a direct result of social and historical changes. That is to say changes in the ontological meaning of consciousness resulted in changing the definition of ideology. Here, the ordering of the world according to the subject-object method, then the rise in national identity, and finally class consciousness, changed the notion of ideology from its particular sense to a dynamic total concept. He also illustrates that the same concept of ideology can have an evaluative or nonevaluative meaning at different points in history. Whether the concept of ideology took a particular or total definition, or an evaluative or nonevaluative form, it always reflected the social environment of the respective group. In other words, both notions of ideology are a function of not only the individual's ideas but also of his or her place in the social environment.
Mannheim maintains that in the past, particular ideological analysis was limited to demonstrating that an opponent was psychologically deluded. Presently, however, total ideological analysis requires a sociological examination of the opponent's complete structure of consciousness and mode of thinking. Of course, the analyst's perspective is considered absolute. (72) Today, according to Mannheim it is almost impossible not to use the total notion of ideology, "according to which the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character." (73) It is from this general statement of the total notion of ideology that basic ideological theory becomes the Sociology of Knowledge. Mannheim maintains that

what was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally. To begin with, a given social group discovers the "situational determination" (seinagebundenheit) of its opponent's ideas. Subsequently the recognition of this fact is elaborated into an all-inclusive principle according to which the thought of every group is seen as arising out of its life conditions. Thus, it becomes the task of the sociological history of thought to analyse without regard for party biases all the factors in the actually existing social situation which may influence thought. This sociologically oriented history of ideas is destined to provide modern men with a revised view of the whole historical process. (74)

Mannheim concludes that by investigating the problems surrounding the social determination of thought and the
intellectual tradition underlying different world perceptions, a new basis for the scientific examination of politics is possible. While he agrees that examining the object will still reveal the truth, this examination cannot be carried out in isolation of the unconscious group values which motivate the individual's actions. In the social sciences these values provide the interest required to generate questions, hypotheses and approaches for research. As these unconscious values are brought to light, it will be possible to control the presuppositions which form the foundation of each perspective. Thus by being aware of and controlling evaluations the social sciences will achieve a 'new objectivity'.(75)

Mannheim agrees with Stark that the concepts of social determination of thought and the intellectual tradition underlying different world views play a large part in forming the individual's thought and social action. In fact, Mannheim was the first scholar to identify and clarify these ideas. These concepts are useful when evaluating Somjee's ability to circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'. In terms of the social determination of thought, the individual's frame of reference is provided by the historical-social context of the groups to which he or she belongs. If the society under study and the political scientist have different cultural environments, then the
scientist may have difficulty identifying the pattern of political thought and conduct of that society. As a result, the political scientist often universalizes his or her political thought and conduct. Consequently the political scientist's ethnocentric biases enter her or his analysis. Owing to the reality that these biases cannot be removed from political development models, the only way to circumvent them is to keep them constant. Thus, because Somjee was not only born into the ready-made situation that is Indian society, but also studies Indian political development, the effects of cultural biases are kept constant. For this reason, Somjee's indigenous cultural environment allows him to be aware of his bias.

However, the effects of intellectual tradition on the individual's thought and social action, are more difficult to assess. According to Mannheim, the ideology or intellectual tradition which underlies a group's world view, arises out of that group's life conditions. And for the reasons elaborated above, the individual's ideology is a reflection of the groups to which he or she belongs. Consequently, Somjee's Liberal/Socialist ideology has resulted from his belonging to two distinct groups. On the one hand, Somjee belongs to a generation of Indian intellectuals who not only experienced the strong democratic and pro-Indian forces of the Indian Independence
movement, but also experienced the practical problems of creating a democratic country. On the other hand, Somjee belongs to a group of Western educated Indian intellectuals which often questions biases. These intellectuals were greatly influenced by the socialist notions prevalent in Western European educational institutions (e.g. London School of Economics). After their education many of these young Indian intellectuals returned home to take up important political, administrative and academic posts. Because Somjee shares these groups' world views, the normative content of his ideology is the same as that of the most entrenched generation in Indian politics today. This constant normative content, allows him to not only be deeply aware of India's intellectual tradition and value thrusts, but also to accurately describe them.

Jurgen Habermas on Language Skills and Personal Preferences:

In his work, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Jurgen Habermas contends that social investigation needs an historical-hermeneutic as well as a critical methodology. For this purpose he offers a three level research agenda, or critical theory. The foundation of this critical theory is a generalized theory of communication or what Habermas calls 'a universal
pragmatic'. Upon this foundation Habermas builds a generalized theory of socialization by focusing on the acquired skills of communication competence. At the final stage he forwards a social evolution theory. This theory is presented as a reconstruction of historical materialism. This concept refers to changes in the mode of production and exchange which cause changes in social classes and their relation to the means of production. The different class interests which result from these different relations cause class struggle. (76)

Initially, through an investigation of psychoanalysis, Habermas found that its systemic theory of misinterpreted communication assumed a broad theory of correctly interpreted communication. For this reason, the normative and theoretical basis for a critical theory must lie in the medium of life, human language. For Habermas, the 'universal pragmatic' describes not only the correct pronunciation of words and proper ordering of sentences, but also linguistic and communicative competence. As a result, Habermas suggests that communication competence is as universal as linguistic competence. Thus, a broad theory of communication competence, or speech action would describe the basic speech complex that an adult must negotiate in order to successfully employ any language.

Habermas also maintains that the 'ideal competent
speaker' is not only capable of producing and understanding sentences, but is also capable of establishing and understanding the methods of communication and links with the external environment through which speech is possible. These pragmatic rules for locating sentences in speech action surround the relationship to reality that each grammatically correct sentence acquires when it is spoken. In other words, the speech act places a sentence in a particular relationship to external reality. (77) This reality, for Habermas, is the 'universal pragmatic'. The universal-pragmatic may function simply to describe existing conditions, or the internal reality of the speaker's intentions or the normative reality that both participants recognize as a legitimate interpersonal interaction. In short, the speech act entails raising, perceiving, and recovering 'validity claims' or a claim to truth.

According to Habermas, it is the third function of the universal pragmatic which is paramount for the creation of a theory of communicative action. Here, the establishment of a legitimate interpersonal relation may succeed or fail. If the speech act succeeds, then the speaker has not only made his or her intentions clear, but the hearer has also understood and accepted the spoken content. (78) Whether or not these actions succeed or fail, Habermas claims that
communicative actions are related to a context of action norms and values. Without the normative background of routines, roles and forms of life—in short, conventions—the individual action would remain indeterminate. All communicative actions satisfy or violate normative expectations or conventions.(79)

Thus, all communicative actions reflect the normative foundation of their respective societies.

Then by examining moral development and ego identity, Habermas suggests that there is a correlation between, forms of socialization, standard types of adolescent answers to their problems, and the types of identity built by these young people. For Habermas, ego identity is not simply a descriptive term, but a normative concept. Because there are gauges for ego strength, and psychoanalysis manipulates the relationship between the ego and other parts of human consciousness, the normative overtones of the concept are apparent. According to Habermas this reality indicates that "psychoanalysis also singles out certain personality structures as ideal."

Although Habermas does not totally disavow autonomous ego as Adorno does, he suggests that a series of both societal and individual determinates shape the ego identity.(81) Thus Habermas attempts to analyze what he calls 'this dialectical concept of ego identity' with social action theory.
By restating the stages of moral development offered by Lawrence Kohlberg and Jane Loevinger within a general action theory, Habermas emphasizes that "moral development represents a part of the development of personality that is decisive for ego identity."(82) For this reason, he argues that ego identity demands both the ability to communicate in general and to express internal needs. Thus it is through the expression of both social norms and internal needs that the individual reaches freedom.(83)

Habermas argues that children's moral and identity development go through three stages. At stage I, children's actions are directed and integrated by notions of pleasure and pain. During this stage the child possesses a 'natural identity'. In other words, the child is only capable of differentiating between its body and the surrounding environment. At stage II, children begin to satisfy their needs through affections for family and recognized social groups. At this point, Habermas claims the "motives for action acquire the form of culturally interpreted needs; their satisfaction depends on following socially recognized expectations."(84) At this level, the child's natural identity is transformed into what Habermas considers a 'symbolically supported role identity'. During this time the child's identity is role dependent. Later, at stage III, children become capable of criticizing and
justifying needs. Only at this stage does the young person's role identity change into an independent ego identity. With this change the young person is capable of distinguishing between norms and principles. Moreover, the young person is able to assert his or her identity unfettered by roles or norms. Thus, the young person takes on an ego identity and becomes an individual.

Finally, by investigating historical materialism and the development of normative structures, Habermas claims that a circular relationship exists between societal and individual learning processes.\(^{(85)}\) In fact he states,

To be sure one could argue for a primacy of social over individual structures of consciousness on the grounds that the rational structures embodied in the family have first to be absorbed by the child in the development of his interactive competence.\(^{(86)}\)

Habermas concludes that the sameness and yet individuality of ego development is a reflection of the interdependence of both society and human nature.\(^{(87)}\)

Jurgen Habermas has identified two concepts that are useful for analyzing whether or not ethnocentric biases can be circumvented, a question which we are exploring with reference to Somjee's work. In the first instance, the universal-pragmatic's third function is to describe the normative reality that both participants recognize as a
legitimate interpersonal interaction. Here, the operative word is recognize. If the participants in the speech act are indigenous speakers of two different languages, then both their normative realities and the notions of legitimate interpersonal relationships will be different. Obviously this situation obstructs the raising, recognition, and recovery of validity claims. It is this situation which is also fraught with misunderstanding. Once misunderstanding occurs, it presents an opportunity for the political scientist's own values to be universalized. As a result, the political scientist's ethnocentric biases enter the analysis. However, as one participant becomes more proficient in the other's language the process of recognition becomes easier. Of course with increased fluency comes a greater degree of recognition. Thus it can be argued that the indigenous speaker has the greatest possible ability to raise, recognize and recover the validity claims of a participant speaker of the same language. In that sense, Somjee represents a generation of scholars who by virtue of highly developed linguistic skills, shared social and academic experiences of the developed and developing world, become highly sensitive to the ethnocentric biases of both worlds. Consequently, his genre of scholars who have grappled with and written on ethnocentrism, with all their shortcomings, need to be taken seriously.
The second concept that is useful when analyzing Somjee's ability to circumvent ethnocentric bias, is Habermas' notion of societally formed personality. In this case, Habermas suggests that during stage II of a child's personality development, he or she learns to satisfy his or her needs through socially and culturally acceptable means. In other words, the child is socialized in that society's values and conventions. This socialization takes place in the family and other relevant groups. Despite later personality development that allows the individual to become independent, this dependent phase of the socialization process inprints a sameness on all members of a given society. For this reason, many aspects of an individual's personality are determined by the society in which she or he was raised. It was suggested earlier that a major source of ethnocentric bias stems from the political scientist's personal preferences. While these preferences have been perceived as the sole preserve of personal idiosyncrasies, Habermas has indicated that they reflect the values and conventions of the society in which the individual was raised. As a result, many political scientist's personal preferences are a reflection of his, or her cultural values. Thus the political scientist's cultural values regarding class, race, gender and psychology will effect his or her theory choice and model construction. Once again if these values are not the same
as the society under study, their difference will allow the scientist's 'ethnocentric biases' to enter the analysis. Because these biases cannot be removed from political development models, the only way to control them is to keep them constant. Owing to the fact that Somjee was raised in and studies Indian society, the personality forming societal values are kept constant. For this reason, Somjee's plea for overcoming ethnocentric biases acquires special significance, given his extended theoretical critiques of western approaches.

From this application, it is now possible to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section. That is to say, "How does Somjee's relativist approach minimize or circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'?" Because his relativist approach was formulated with the same values present in Indian society, it is able to extract significantly meaningful information from India's materials of knowledge. Thus, Somjee's relativist model is capable of providing a much deeper understanding of India's political development. Moreover, owing to the fact that Somjee's axiological values are the same as the society which he studies, the normative content of the study is held constant. This normative consistency neutralizes the effects of biases stemming from the scientist's cultural background, intellectual tradition, language and personal preferences.
Thus by keeping the political scientist's normative background the same as the society being studied, and by using a relativist approach, Somjee is in a better position to be aware of biases stemming from the two sides of his scholarly persona.

Some General Observations:

The investigation of the impediments to 'objectivity' in social science research has revealed that its ideal-type theoretical constructs, subject-object interaction and interest driven goals prevent social science research from achieving the same level of objectivity present in the natural sciences. The examination has also demonstrated that these same factors impart to political development models a normative content which can not be removed. This normative content is more often a reflection of the social scientist's cultural, intellectual and personal biases, than the values of the society being studied. For these reasons, it was concluded that not only is the continued presence of 'ethnocentric bias' in political development models an indicator of lapses in objectivity, but also that it is impossible to remove. Thus the construction of a truly 'objective' model of political development is unattainable.

In general, the examination of the intellectual
history of hermeneutic theory has pointed to several important observations. First, because of its Biblical interpretive beginnings, hermeneutics developed the concepts required to understand cultures from different historical periods, and with different values. Secondly hermeneutics' interpretive method, which includes the concepts of self-revelation, historicality and linguisticality of the text, offers an alternative to the subject-object methodology of the natural sciences. Thirdly, the social sciences that have been influenced by hermeneutics not only use interpretive methods, but also emphasize the examination of social actions' historical context, in order to understand its meaning. Consequently, the hermeneutically influenced social sciences offer conceptual tools for investigating societies with different values and evaluating the ability of a political development model to minimize 'ethnocentric bias'.

The examination of the 'Somjee method' has illustrated that throughout his research career, Somjee has established several important checks for the occurrence of 'ethnocentric bias' in political development research. Initially, Somjee urges that a critical analysis of postulates and assumptions should precede their use in non-western studies. Then, he contends that the concept of 'incremental expansion of warranted assumptions' should be
employed when examining the non-western societies. Next, Somjee uses longitudinal field research in order to test his postulates and assumptions regarding non-western political development. Hence, these three methods for checking 'ethnocentric bias' already exist in Somjee's relativist approach.

Generally speaking, the hermeneutic analysis of Somjee's relativist model and the points where 'ethnocentric bias' may enter his analysis uncovered several interesting observations. Because Somjee is an indigenous Indian scholar who also studies Indian political development, his relativist approach was created with the same values present in the greater Indian society. Hence, the model's emphasis on the history, tradition and culture as well as their effect on transplanted political institutions was chosen through Indian values. Consequently, Somjee's relativist approach is capable of not only selecting the most appropriate information from the available knowledge, but also a more indepth understanding of the information selected. Moreover, due to the fact that the axiological systems of the subject and object of study are the same, the misunderstanding which allows 'ethnocentric bias' to enter the analysis is avoided. Thus by keeping the study's axiological values constant and by employing a relativist approach, the
cultural, intellectual, and personal sources of ethnocentrism are controlled. These factors combined with the 'Somjee Method' allow his model to minimize or circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'. Towards that, Somjee's work may be said to have thrown some light.
NOTES

Chapter IV


2. Ibid., p.54-55.

3. Ibid., p.72.

4. Ibid., p.72.

5. Ibid., p.72-82.

6. Ibid., p.81.

7. Ibid., p.87-103.


9. Ibid., p.5-34.


11. Ibid., p.16.

12. Ibid., p.16-17.

13. Ibid., p.62.


15. Ibid., p.329.


17. Ibid., p.331.

18. Ibid., 330-332.

20. Ibid., p.43-46.

21. Ibid., p.3-4.

22. Ibid., p.5, p.63-64.

23. Ibid., p.9.

24. Ibid., p.9.

25. Ibid., p.50-53.

26. Ibid., p.52.

27. Ibid., p.55-72.

28. Ibid., p.71.


31. Ibid., p.84-98, p.117-118.

32. Ibid., p.98.

33. Ibid., p.104-105.

34. Ibid., p.99.

35. Ibid., p.100-101.


37. Ibid., p.117.

38. Ibid., p.117.


40. Ibid., p.36.

41. Ibid., p.16.

43. Ibid., p.164-166.

44. Ibid., p.164.

45. Ibid., p.176-206.

46. Ibid., p.177.


48. Ibid., p.99-104.

49. Ibid., p.104.

50. Ibid., p.106.


56. Ibid., p.107-108.

57. Ibid., p.108.

58. Ibid., p.109-112.

59. Ibid., p.112.

60. Ibid., p.114.

61. Ibid., p.118-120.

62. Ibid., p.142.

63. Ibid., p.143.

64. Ibid., p.152-154.
65. Ibid., p.155-156.
67. Ibid., p.158.
69. Ibid., p.3.
70. Ibid., p.19-20.
71. Ibid., p.3.
72. Ibid., p.32-69.
73. Ibid., p.69.
74. Ibid., p.69.
75. Ibid., p.4-5.
77. Ibid., p.xviii-xix.
78. Ibid., p.28-44.
79. Ibid., p.35.
80. Ibid., 70.
81. Ibid., p.70-71.
82. Ibid., 78.
83. Ibid., p.73-78.
84. Ibid., p.84.
85. Ibid., p.78-86.
86. Ibid., p.121.
87. Ibid., p.93-94.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the intellectual history of political development theory and critically analyzed representative texts from its major debates. Chapter I examined the 'semantic confusion' surrounding the definition of political development, the Universalist -Relativist debate and its internal criticism. The investigation of the 'semantic confusion' revealed that at least nine definitions of the term are commonly used in the literature. After a critical examination of the political development definitions offered by such scholars as Karl von Vorys, Gabriel Almond and Samuel Huntington, an important point was concluded. That is, political development definitions that focus on the political system are unable to investigate changes in the domestic political environment. Because changes in the greater society may provide the impetus for non-western political development, a definition that is sensitive to those changes is required. Owing to the fact that Somjee's definition of political development offers such a focus, it was chosen for use in this study. Consequently, in this thesis, political development referred to the citizens' ability to seek response from and hold their rulers accountable for their political actions.

During the 1950s it became apparent that the legal-
formal approach used to study political development was limited in its ability to describe African and Asian development. Consequently, the search for new approaches to the study of non-western political development resulted in the Universalist-Relativist debate. The investigation of this debate demonstrated that the formal emphasis of the Universalist approaches offered by Gabriel Almond and Daniel Lerner is unable to examine changes in informal political conduct. These informal changes in a society's political behavior may foster political development. As a result, the Relativist approach's emphasis on political culture and normative traditions was considered the most appropriate for the study of non-western political development.

By the mid-1960s, the criticisms from within the perspective had indicated that both the Universalist and Relativist approaches suffered from 'ethnocentric bias' and 'static' analysis. The examination of these critiques has illustrated that scholars avoided the more difficult discussion of 'ethnocentric bias' in favor of correcting the 'static' tendency of their analysis. This choice was reinforced by the lack of stability and democracy in African and Asian nations at that time. These criticisms and choices not only left the problem of 'ethnocentrism' to be discussed at a later date, but also led to a new round
of theory construction on political change.

In the final analysis, this examination of the Universalist-Relativist debate and its internal critiques has indicated that a Relativist approach is the most appropriate for the study of non-western political development. It has also identified a problem that obstructs the accurate construction of political development models. That problem is 'ethnocentric bias'.

Chapter II continued to trace the intellectual history of political development theory and critically analyzed the representative texts from its major debates. This chapter examined the debate on political change and its internal criticism, the external critique offered by dependency theory, and the political development theorists' response. The examination of the debate on political change pointed out that the sequential and causal models created by such scholars as Organski and Binder et al. had successfully attacked the criticisms of 'static' analysis. However, because these models were unable to identify the need for vertical integration, or solve the concurrent crisis occurring in non-western countries, they did not offer an alternative to the Relativist approach. However, the debate on political change did point out the direction of the next round of theory construction. That is to say, most of the scholars working on political change had
identified the importance of elite choice, decision-making and public policy in the process of political development. Consequently, the next round of theory construction focused on political choice.

Early in the 1970s, scholars began to criticize the models created during the debate on political change. The examination of these 'in-house' critiques pointed out that political change models continued to suffer from 'ethnocentrism'. At the same time, Mark Kesselman and others claimed that the political change approaches had overlooked the role of imperialism, and the effects of international influence on the development of non-western countries. Thus, the 'in-house' critique on political change had left the sub-field open to external criticism.

This external critique was provided by dependency theory. The examination of both the Marxist and non-Marxist critique of political development theory revealed two sets of criticisms. The first set was that political development theories had overlooked the negative impacts of the international economic system, and imperialism on the development of non-western countries. The second set was that these theories had not included economic analysis and were incapable of generating relevant public policy. Both sets of criticisms influenced future debates in the intellectual history of political
development theory.

This investigation of the debate on political change did not identify a more accurate approach to the study of non-western political development. Thus the Relativist approach remained the most appropriate for this purpose. Moreover, the problem of 'ethnocentric bias' continued to plague the study of political development.

Chapter III traced the current intellectual history of political development theory and critically analyzed representative texts from its internal debates. This chapter examined the debate on political choice and its internal critique, as well as the current debate. During the mid-1970s scholars working in the sub-field were responding to the internal criticisms of political change models and the external critique offered by dependency theory. The combined effect of these criticisms led to the debate on political choice. The examination of this debate disclosed that the multifactor and elite choice approaches created by Almond et al. and Huntington and Nelson focused almost exclusively on elite and systemic choices. As a result, these models are unable to investigate traditional and cultural factors that impede, or promote the individual's political participation and demands for accountability. For this reason, neither approach was deemed suitable for the study of non-western political
development.

The examination of the internal critiques of political choice models illustrated that they had successfully explored the role which choice plays in the political development process. However, these approaches were criticized for 'ethnocentric bias' regarding their 'transferability' to non-western conditions. This problem pointed to the inability of the political choice approaches to transcend normative issues. Consequently, normative issues became one focus of the fourth or current debate in political development theory.

By the 1980s scholars working in the sub-field became disillusioned because of their lack of success. The continuation of both ethnocentric bias and other methodological problems placed an accurate body of theory out of reach. Thus theorists began to question the usefulness of political development as an analytical tool. In spite of this disillusionment, many scholars agreed that the concept was worth saving. Thus an attempt to generate a theoretical renewal constitutes the current debate in political development theory.

The examination of the current debate has demonstrated that this process of rethinking political development theory took two directions. The first direction was
explored by Apter's re-examination of the governability of advanced industrial societies. Although this approach is able to examine the social polarization which leads to violence in postmodern societies, it holds no new insights for non-western societies. In contrast, Somjee's exploration of the normative basis of western political development theory revealed its inherent assumptions and biases. Because this normative foundation obstructs a clear view of non-western development, Somjee maintains that each country's unique history, tradition and culture and their interaction with transplanted institutions should be examined. This approach is also capable of identifying historical, cultural and traditional elements of a society that may obstruct, or facilitate a peoples' ability to hold their rulers accountable. At the same time, Somjee offers a universal standard or 'public minimum' for evaluating any country's public life. Even though this prescription may be premature, used as a heuristic tool it allows for the identification of non-western political concepts. These non-western political ideas may contribute to broadening the normative basis of political development theory. For these reasons, Somjee's relativist-universalist approach is the most appropriate for the study of non-western political development.

Thus two conclusions can be drawn from this
examination of the intellectual history of the study of political development theory and its major debates. On the one hand, the study of political development theory has been impoverished by the continuation of Western 'ethnocentric biases'. On the other hand, Somjee's relativist approach opens up scope for research into the actual development experiences of non-western societies. However, it remained to be seen whether, Somjee's model helps us to deal effectively with the persisting problem of 'ethnocentric bias'.

Chapter IV was concerned with the hermeneutic analysis of both Somjee's relativist approach, and the points where 'ethnocentric bias' may enter his analysis. The purpose of this analysis was to answer the question, "Does Somjee's relativist approach truly circumvent 'ethnocentric bias'?" The first section of this chapter examined the impediments to objectivity in political development theory construction. By critically analyzing the works of Max Weber, Karl Popper, Thomas Khun and Gunnar Myrdal on 'objectivity' in the social sciences, and by applying the findings to the creation of 'objective' political development models, several important conclusions were reached. First, due to the complex nature of social science research, the normative content of political development models can not be removed. Moreover these
values most often stem from the political scientist's cultural background, intellectual tradition, and personal preferences, rather than the society being studied. Hence, the recurrence of 'ethnocentric bias' in political development models is an indication of lapses in 'objectivity'. Finally these lapses are compounded by the poor methods designed to identify and remove these biases. Thus, it was concluded that an 'objective' model of political development is impossible to attain.

As a result of the above findings, the next section dealt with the problem of understanding the political actions and behaviors of societies whose values differ from our own. Through a brief intellectual history of hermeneutic theory and its influence on the social sciences, several important conclusions were drawn. Because hermeneutic theory developed from the need to understand texts written in different historical periods, it has dealt with the problem of understanding cultures with different normative foundations. Owing to the fact that the hermeneutically social sciences employ an interpretive method, they offer concepts for both understanding the political ideas and actions of societies with different normative values, and evaluating a political development model's ability to circumvent ethnocentric bias.
The final section of this chapter began by exploring the Somjee method for correcting 'ethnocentric bias' in political development research. It was found that through a critical review of postulates and assumptions, the use of 'incremental expansion of warranted assumptions', and longitudinal field research can all act as correctives for 'ethnocentric bias'. Then, Werner Stark’s ideas on acquired knowledge, Karl Mannheim’s notions regarding cultural and intellectual tradition, and Jurgen Habermas’ concepts of communication and socially formed personality were applied to Somjee’s model, and to the points where ethnocentric bias may enter his analysis. This analysis came to two conclusions. On the one hand, because Somjee’s model was formulated with the same values present in Indian society, it is capable of providing a true understanding of India’s political development. On the other hand, by keeping the political scientist’s normative background the same as the society under study, Somjee’s relativist approach spares him from both the non-indigenous normative presuppositions, and the difficulty of getting at the actualities of non-western development themselves.

Thus this examination of the intellectual history of political development theory has contributed to the evidence that western political development theory alone is incapable of accurately describing non-western political
development. Moreover, it has substantiated the contention that the continuation of 'ethnocentric bias' in political development theory construction is at the root of this inability. It has also shown that 'ethnocentric bias' is impossible to remove from political development models.

The investigation has also substantiated the contention that to circumvent 'ethnocentric bias' the political scientist must be sensitive to the normative background of the society under study. For these reasons, this study supports the increasing participation of indigenous scholars in studies relating to their societies. In this way, political development models will provide a more balanced picture of the societies under study.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY CONSTRUCTION

This study has observed several trends in political development theory construction. These trends resulted not only from the unfamiliar cognitive terrain of non-western political development, but also reflect the discipline's lack of desire, or inability to grapple with the fundamentals of theory construction. One of these fundamentals, as Thomas Khun pointed out, is accuracy. Another fundamental is the investigation of factors that may inhibit accuracy. In fact, the first trend is an example of both of these factors. That trend is the gradual movement away from grand theory construction and toward medium and short range theory construction. In other words, to use the terms offered in the intellectual history, from universalist to relativist theory construction. This trend is a positive indication that political development theorists have recognized their error in deciding to create grand theory before gathering knowledge of the particular. In fact, this is not a new idea. Other sciences including the natural ones began by codifying particular characteristics before creating more general categories, classifications and comparisons. This 'proper' approach to theory construction was clearly the intent of Werner Stark's claim that
Once again it must be said that we can only reach the absolute (the universally human) by laboriously working through the relative (the human in its historical specification). (1)

Another trend is a transition from the early simple monocausal models of political development to more complex multifactor ones. This trend indicates that political development theorists were replacing the naive assumption that, economic development would automatically lead to political development, with a more realistic understanding of this complex process.

Still another trend is the result of both the internal critiques of political change and the dependency critique of political development theory. Before both of these critiques, political development models dealt almost exclusively with autonomous domestic development, as if a country developed in isolation. After the two critiques, however, exogenous factors such as the international economic environment were taken into consideration by most political development models.

One more trend is the early treatment of political development as dependent on economic development. This trend was followed by the movement away from economic factors and toward more fundamental ones such as sociology, history and psychology as the cause of political development. More recently, however, the sub-field has
moved back toward economic factors as the impetus for political development.

However the most important of all these trends is the one which this thesis explored. That is to say, the continuation of 'ethnocentrism' in the construction of political development models. This trend has two important implications. First, the examination of non-Western political development on the basis of 'ethnocentric models' has led to the accumulation of defective, or even 'false knowledge'. In other words, the knowledge that we have gathered by using these models is knowledge from a particularly Western perspective. This type of investigation subverts the honest quest for truth. Secondly, in the 1960s 'ethnocentric bias' was clearly identified as a problem for theory construction. However, investigation of the problem did not begin until the 1980s. This 20 year period of time indicates that political development theorists have been unwilling to confront the most difficult problem in theory construction, the problem of value. Unless a concerted effort is made to take on this difficult problem, political development theory, as well as political science theory in general, will remain culture bound. Thus, political development theory in particular, political science in general must broaden its normative basis. By doing so, they will be
better able to accurately describe, explain and make effective policy proposals for both Western and non-Western countries.

In order to facilitate an effort to broaden the normative basis of political development theory two recommendations are offered. The first was expressed earlier. The accurate study of any society depends on the accurate identification of its value system. It was found that opportunities for the entry of 'ethnocentric bias' into political development analysis arises from the interaction between two different value systems. For this reason, all scholars should rely heavily on indigenous scholarship regarding the society under study, when formulating their research postulates and assumptions. This reliance on indigenous scholarship will not only help to accurately identify the values of the society, but also act as one corrective for ethnocentrism. Once a society's values have been accurately identified, then more reliable knowledge of its political behavior is possible. With this method for gathering knowledge of the particular in place, the next level of theory construction should proceed in a more effective manner. In other words, the creation of categories and classification of political systems will prove more accurate. Even later, more general and universal theory may emerge from these more accurate
investigations. Thus by truly starting at the beginning (by identifying particular political values), universal political development theory will be possible. Secondly, until more indigenous scholarship on political development theory emerges, scholars working in the sub-field should take the utmost care in determining the political values and behaviors of the non-western societies which they study. The accurate determination of these values will be facilitated by the political scientists' ability to undertake longitudinal studies to understand the realities of the society under study. These studies should pay special attention to indigenous scholarship which explores that society's culture, language and value system. For only with the accurate determination of non-western political values can the normative basis of political development theory in particular, and political science in general, be broadened.

Notes


Huntington, Samuel P.. POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968.


