CONSTRAINTS TO POST COLONIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA 1962-1995: A POLITICAL INTERACTION APPROACH

by

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ABSTRACT

This work seeks to explain the constraints to economic development in post colonial Uganda within the political interaction framework. The main questions we seek to answer are: Why did the anticipated post colonial economic development, predicted by economists, which politicians had also promised Ugandans at the eve of independence, prove elusive? Why was the free enterprise system within which the country had prospered during the colonial era and soon after independence thwarted by politicians? What were the economic consequences of the military regime’s policy toward the Asians? What prevented Ugandans from uniting to reconstruct the economy after removing the military dictatorship? Why did the second Obote regime and the Okello regime fail? Why could the National Resistance Movement administration establish a successful economic development policy when earlier regimes had failed?

Our investigation involved identifying the causes of political instability in post colonial Uganda. We reviewed mainstream and radical approaches which scholars used between the 1960s and 1990s to interpret the political economic environments of Third World countries. Shortcomings of the above approaches we identified led us to adopt a new eclectic method of inquiry - the political interaction framework. Using this framework we investigated the major policies of post colonial regimes and the consequences of these policies for economic development.

Our findings confirmed that domestic factors were more important than external considerations in inhibiting the country’s economic development; that national leaders who alienated important constituencies, upon which the national economy depended, are guilty of creating economic instability. In addition, the economy suffered when state leaders designed policies for self-aggrandizement rather than for rational, national economic development. Furthermore, the disrespect for impersonal rules, such as the constitution, exhibited by some leaders led to a breakdown of the rule of law and, ultimately, to economic chaos. The political and economic policies of the new rulers, with which they planned to re assure both Ugandans and the international community, of the political and economic viability of the post colonial state of Uganda, were considerably successful.

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To Irene Nakalanzi Kintu, and the folk musicians of Uganda whose recorded music has kept the flame of freedom and democracy burning in the hearts of Ugandans during times of repressive rule.
Anyone who wishes in the name of independence to become free, may do so, providing that he considers suicide as the supreme act of independence.
---Marches Tropicaux
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Map of Uganda Showing Disturbed and Ethnic Areas, Towns and Refugee Camps

An Ethnological Synopsis

The diverse peoples who comprise the present-day nation of Uganda had been living there for centuries before Speke's arrival in 1862 and the Heligoland Treaty of 1890, which established the territory as a British sphere of influence. Modern Uganda encompasses peoples of three distinct language families—the Bantu; Nilotic; and Central Sudanic (Sathyamurthy 1986, 71).

a. Bantu-speakers who are primarily, but not exclusively, agriculturalists, are found south of lake Kyoga in the east, south of the Victoria Nile and in the west of the country, and may be divided into: (i) Centralized societies (once governed by hereditary families): the Baganda. (Baganda refers to the ethnic group; Muganda to an individual; Buganda to the region; and Luganda to the language. The same set of prefixes applies to the other Bantu groups). Banyankole, Banyoro, and Batoro (Mutibwa 1992, 1); (ii) Less centralized societies (their social organization varying from local chieftainship to extended family units), including the Basoga, Bagishu, Bagwere, Banyoli, Basamia and Bagwe south of lake Kyoga; the Bakiga, and the Baamba and Bakonjo both of whom are found in the west of the country. (iii) Specialized pastoralists, the Bahima and Batutsi live among (i) and (ii). The Bahima established supremacy over the agriculturalist Bairu in Ankole. Bahima and Bairu are collectively termed Banyankole.

b. Nilotic-speakers can be categorized in two main groups: (i) Western Nilotes occupying the savanna grassland north of lake Kyoga and the Victoria Nile, such as the mixed agriculturalist Acholi, Langi, Alur, and Jonam. (ii) Southern Nilotic pastoral societies occupying the northeastern shores of lake Kyoga and northeastern Uganda like the Jie, Suk, Iteso and the Karomojong; they are originally pastoral with an acephalous or headless (without rulers) social organization based on clans and age sets (Sathyamurthy 1986, 117; Middleton and D. Tait 1964, 2; Mutibwa 1992, 1).

c. Central Sudanic-speakers like the Lugbara, Kakwa and Madi people are found northwest of the Victoria Nile in West Nile province, and across the border into Sudan and Zaire. They are agricultural peoples with segmentary organization (Middleton and D. Tait 1958, 2). Uganda's contemporary borders cut across ethnic and language boundaries, and placed together over 40 ethnic groups which formerly had little in common, which even
today may not understand each other’s languages.

Uganda’s Colonial Period History, 1875-1962 - Divide and Rule

The first British Protestant recruits from the Church Missionary Society arrived in June 1877, followed within two years by the White Fathers, who were Roman Catholics, mainly from France. For their enthusiastic evangelization campaigns, both missionary groups targeted the Baganda chiefs and members of the court of Mutesa I. Moslem influence in Buganda was already established, for between 1867-76 the Kabaka observed such Islamic rituals as Ramadan. Nevertheless it was Christianity which gave religion prominence as a factor in political rivalry. The political-religious Christians assumed further power when Mutesa I died in 1884. Subsequently, for the next six years, Baganda Moslem and Christian factions, each with their own mercenary army, fought out a battle for supremacy (Mutibwa 1992, 2). Catholics established their supremacy when they reinstalled Mutesa’s successor, Mwanga. Unlike Mutesa I, Mwanga was a prisoner of political forces (forces whose strength originated in religion), rather than their master.

The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 had established broad guidelines for the European powers involved in the ‘scramble for Africa’ (Ibingira 1973, 9). The Imperial British East African Company was subsequently formed, to provide an administration for the area that roughly corresponds to present-day Uganda, for the next five years, beginning in 1888 (Ingham 1958, 42, 44). Echoing the thinking of the time, the company’s first accredited representative, Captain Lugard, commented: “It is for our advantage [emphasis in the original work] - and not alone at the dictates of duty - that we have undertaken responsibilities in East Africa (Karugire 1980, 53).” Lugard persuaded Mwanga and the two Christian factions to sign a treaty with the company. He promoted and consolidated the Protestant faction at the expense of the Catholics. With Catholic backing Mwanga tried twice unsuccessfully to reassert his authority but was defeated and forced to make major concessions. First, in 1893 Mwanga was compelled to accept British protection, and the right to levy taxes. After an unsuccessful ‘rebellion’ in 1897, he was deposed in favor of his son Chwa. The Kabakahship was now firmly allied to the Protestant camp. The Buganda Agreement of 1900 formalized the position of Buganda within the British protectorate of Uganda (The Uganda
Agreement, 1900, vol. vi., 14).

After formalizing its relationship with Buganda, Britain continued to expand its influence in other parts of Uganda (The Ankole Agreement, 1901, vol. vi, 2; The Toro Agreement, 1900, Laws of Uganda, vol. vi, 66; Ingham 1948, 42). It did not however need to use the religious tool to divide people in the rest of the region as it did in Buganda. Twenty one years after the 1900 Buganda Agreement the protectorate included what we now know today as Uganda. The Native Authority Ordinance of 1919 transmitted the Buganda model of local administration, and Buganda civil servants, to much of the rest of the country (Laws of Uganda, vol. II, 1046). British provincial and district commissioners retained general control, with African local chiefs acting as subordinates. This system was extended by the Local Government Ordinance of 1949, which empowered the Governor to appoint district and provincial councils. This ordinance further polarized ethnic divisions, since all districts but West Nile, Bukedi, Kigezi and Toro had their boundaries drawn up to include only a single ethnic group. Low and Pratt provide testimony that colonial rule in Uganda was premised on a conscious strategy to divide and rule: "... [A]dministrators regarded it most desirable that patriotism should remain tribal, and that administrative efforts should be made to check any nascent nationalism" (Low and Pratt 1960, 260). Only the British rulers had any sense of Uganda as a national entity; this reality prompted this comment from one observer: "The establishment of districts based wherever possible on tribal residence has contributed to a sense of district nationalism and separatism that typically did not exist before the arrival of the British (Burke 1984, 14)." The increase in trade in cheap imported goods killed the pre colonial interregional trade in salt, foodstuffs, crafts, and iron products, adding to each region’s insularity.

The introduction of cash crops meant that by 1916 the protectorate was financially self-supporting (Jørgensen 1981, 63). Most of the land in the country was sufficiently fertile for subsistence and cash crop farming, which would cover the payment of government taxes and the remaining profit could be spent on essential and luxury goods (Please see Basis of Free Enterprise Policy in Chapter Four). Because of the monumental work involved in introducing a new social political system to a society, the British administrators were less attracted to the northern districts, which lacked a pre colonial centralized road and
administrative system. Barber describes the relationship between the various ethnic groups, which made the region less attractive to the British, as follows: "The relations between the tribes had, by this time, settled into a pattern of mutual hostility and raiding and counter raiding for water, grazing, and stock ... It was among such people that Major J. R. L. MacDonald signed 28 treaties, in none of which British protectorate was promised." (Barber 1968, 84). Lango, Acholi and West Nile were therefore the last districts to be incorporated in the protectorate and were the last to be developed. British government disinterest in the region helps to explain why although the northern branch of the railway reached Soroti in Eastern Uganda in 1930, it was extended to Gulu in 1956, well over half a century after the 1900 Buganda Agreement. While missionaries, particularly those of the Roman Catholic faith, established schools in the region in the early period of British rule, provisions for education were still generally poorer than in the south (Kasfir 1976, 105). Increasingly the British relied on the northern region as the main source for recruits to the coercive organizations, the army, police and prison services of the colonial state (Twining 1935, 208; Powseland 1957, 74; Omara-Otunnu 1987, 31).

Meanwhile the Bantu, and the Baganda especially, continued to prosper. Their early appreciation of the power of knowledge had led Mutesa I to invite Christian missionaries from Britain to come and establish schools in Buganda (Apolo Kagwa 1930, 27). Early introduction of western education complemented their already developed feudal hierarchy, making the Baganda a formidable political force in the protectorate. The unhealthy perception of non Baganda to Buganda prominence in Ugandan affairs is captured in this comment from Ibingira: “By virtue of history, geography, and economy it was feared [by politicians from outside Buganda] that under a federal union Buganda might get away with too large a share - certainly larger than that of any one of them, or even greater than that of all of them put together....” (Ibingira 1973, 163). Ibingira and others however did not mention the human and financial resource contribution Buganda made to the country's economy during the colonial era, and was willing to continue making under the federal political arrangements (see 'Grants Paid to District Administrations by the Government' in Chapter Six, p. 187). Ibingira's comment highlights the ease with which politicians (whose minds were focused on acquiring state power, as he was), could invoke economic disadvantage to incite
anti federal and anti Bugandan sentiment elsewhere in the country. The British soon realized that their long term interest to rule Uganda lay not in antagonizing but letting the Baganda largely rule themselves as they had done in the pre colonial era (Pinynchwa 1978, 123). Buganda’s pre colonial political, economic and social organization help account for the construction of the strong kingdom of Buganda the British found on their arrival, living at the center of the region constituting today's Uganda. This helped to place the Baganda in the position of ‘first among equals’ Buganda enjoyed during the colonial period to which we referred in Chapter Four. At independence Buganda had nearly half of the country’s graduates, businesspeople, and civil servants (Kasfir 1976, 106). Increasingly many Bantu were alienated from the Nilotics and Central Sudanic peoples as they regarded them as mercenaries of the colonial regime, as the British used them regularly to quell political unrest in different parts of the south particularly in Buganda. Because of the affluent lifestyle the Bantu enjoyed, northerners began to resent them and the Baganda in particular, as colonial favorites. This colonially-motivated north/south divide between the ‘warriors’ and ‘educated’ ethnic classes was often reflected in the country’s post colonial political power struggles. Ninety four years after their arrival in Uganda, the British demonstrated their continued disregard for the northern region. With their initial step for liberalizing national politics, in 1956, six years before independence, the colonial government had allowed Buganda, Western and Eastern provinces one representative each to the Legislative Council while the Nilotic north was ignored. One council member who was disturbed by the north/south gap made this comment: “It is our duty to see that these backward people are educated ... so that the future of this country is not put in jeopardy” (Proceedings of the Legislative Council, January 1956, 41).

The final years before independence were turbulent. Andrew Cohen, the new governor appointed in 1952, attempted to increase African participation in government and to democratize the district and local councils. His proposals for reforming the Lukiiko, (Buganda Legislative Assembly) led to a show down with the Buganda Lukiiko, culminating in the deportation of Kabaka Mutesa II, in 1953 (Sathyamurthy 1986, 328). With some concessions, Mutesa agreed on the reorganization of the Lukiiko upon his return to Buganda in 1955. By 1958, suspicious that the colonial regime was conniving with politi-
icians from outside Buganda to use the Legislative Assembly (Legco) as a tool to compromise Bugandan political interests, the Buganda parliament, *Lukiiko*, rejected the idea of Bugandan general elections to the Legco; and boycotted the five seats on the newly constituted council (Mutesa II 1967, 158). By 1960 Mengo outsiders in the Uganda National Congress (UNC) had joined forces with a Protestant splinter party, the Uganda People’s Union (UPU), to form the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) with A. M. Obote as the party leader (Jørgensen 1981, 200). Despite its formal renunciation of religious factionalism, UPC’s real reason for existence was opposition to the Bantu Catholics, and to Buganda’s claim to autonomy within the state of Uganda (Sathyamurthy 1986, 385). The colonially initiated historical differences between north and south were reflected in the political alliances that developed in the two years preceding independence.

The Lukiiko instructed Baganda to boycott the 1961 Legco elections. The 2 per cent of the Baganda who voted were largely Catholic, and they voted for DP, now under the leadership of Benedicto Kiwanuka (Ibingira 1973,191). Therefore with 19 seats in Buganda, DP won a nationwide majority over UPC, by 43 seats to 35. Kiwanuka became the country’s first prime minister when Uganda was granted internal self government on 1 March 1961 (The Uganda Constitution 1961, S. 74). However, by the independence elections held on 12 April the following year, UPC party strategists had framed a coalition with the Kabaka Yekka (KY) party that was sponsored by the Buganda government (Ibingira 1973, 235). Buganda dropped its demands for secession, and in return Buganda was allowed to conduct indirect elections through the Lukiiko. The KY party sent 21 members to the National Assembly, while elsewhere in Uganda UPC defeated DP by 37 seats to 24. Apart from their desire to maintain Protestant ascendancy over DP’s Catholics, KY and UPC were essentially strange bedfellows (Karugire 1980, 182). Commenting on the opportunist alliance between Mengo and the UPC, Karugire suggested: “[The coalition] was a collection of individuals who had come together for a single purpose ... to get into power (Karugire 1980, 188).” On 9 October 1962, Dr. Obote (The University of Long Island, in the United States, bestowed upon A. M. Obote an honorary doctorate degree when he visited that educational institution just before independence) became the prime minister of the newly independent Uganda. When Mutesa II was elected President of Uganda in 1963,
he was faced with the dilemma of having to combine his hereditary and monarchical position in Buganda with the functions of a constitutional head of state in the country as a whole (Mutesa II, 1967, 172).

Uganda’s History 1962-1980 - The Descent into Dictatorship

As the new Prime Minister, Obote found himself in an untenable office, for he lacked the natural inherited authority of a hereditary ruler, and had to depend on the allegiance of a disparate coalition of powerful politicians. He had to constantly maneuver for political survival (Low 1988, 42). Indications of future havoc soon emerged, as nepotism became routinized. The President and the Prime Minister parted company when Obote insisted on holding a referendum on Buyaga and Bugangazi, which were referred to by the federal government as the ‘Lost Counties,’ which the British had ceded to Buganda seventy years earlier. Finally in 1964 the chasm between the interests of KY and the Obote faction in the UPC widened, and the opportunist alliance was formally dissolved (Mutesa II, 1967, 170, 180).

In Chapter Four we looked at the events that led to a constitutional crisis and how Obote, while grappling with the crisis, ordered five ministers arrested on 22 February 1966. Two days later Obote abrogated the constitution and dismissed Mutesa II as president. In the same chapter we saw how this crisis introduced the military into national politics, and denigrated the sanctity of the separation of powers of the three institutions of government: the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. We traced the breakdown of law and order, and the erosion of accountability of politicians to the electorate, to Obote’s political, economic, and constitutional changes. To establish his supremacy in the country Obote ordered a ground and aerial attack on the Lubiri (the Kabaka’s palace at Mengo). After a spirited fight in which many unarmed Baganda died, the Kabaka fled into exile, where he died in London in 1969 (Ibingira, 1973, 286). We also looked at the economic and political consequences of the state of emergency Obote imposed upon Buganda, after the Baganda rejected his radical political and economic policies, which he introduced in the remaining three years of the decade.

In 1967 Obote declared Uganda a republic, abolished the four kingdoms, and cen-
ralized power around the office of the president (Barongo 1989, 80). By 1969 political detentions (generally ordered by the General Service Unit [GSU], a spy agency in the president’s office that was under Obote’s cousin, Akena Adoko) and government by repression had become routine; in the same year Obote declared Uganda a one-party state (Mutibwa 1992, 67). The widespread domestic and international opposition to Obote’s radical policies is reviewed in Chapter Four. Obote increasingly depended on the army as his ruling style became more dictatorial (Ibingira 1973, 288). In the same chapter we addressed the post 1966 military-political status quo, showing how soldiers, particularly Amin, quickly recognized the potential personal benefits that they could reap from the political turmoil, and the ensuing national economic uncertainty toward the end of the decade. While Amin beefed up the army with recruits from his home Central Sudanic-speaking area, Obote and his cousin Adoko promoted Western and Southern Nilotes as a counter move. The rift between army and government widened.

In Chapter Five we dealt with the political and economic conditions which precipitated the 1970 coup d’état. The infighting within the army in 1970, invoked by the struggle between Obote and Amin for control of the armed forces, had resulted in the murder of Okoya, the most senior officer in the pro Obote Nilotic army faction. Suspecting that Amin was behind this murder, and a plot to depose him, Obote ordered Amin’s arrest before he left for the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore (Mutibwa 1992, 81). With the help of resident foreign military advisers, Amin pre-empted the move by staging a military coup, with the help of his loyalist battalions, on 25 January 1971 (Ibingira 1973, 288). The spontaneous jubilation in the capital and elsewhere in the country that followed the 3.45 p.m. radio announcement by a warrant officer, (Class II) Aswa, an Acholi military spokesperson, of the coup, reflected the urgency with which Ugandans had wanted a change from the repressive Obote regime. The international community, led by Israel and Britain, two of the countries that had substantial investment in Uganda, and had become increasingly weary of Obote’s immigration and business nationalization policy, soon recognized the new regime.

Amin started with policies calculated to placate Obote’s political enemies. He released all political detainees, lifted the state of emergency Obote had imposed upon Buganda since 1966, and ordered the government to fund the return of the Kabaka’s body
for proper burial in the royal tombs at Kasubi (Mutibwa 1992, 86). The social, political and economic reasons and consequences of Amin’s expulsion of the Asian community in 1972, are dealt with in Chapter Five. Domestic and external challenges to Amin’s regime pushed Amin to the wall, and reacting like a wounded buffalo, he became one of the most vicious dictators to rule post colonial Uganda. In this chapter we reviewed the main influences on Amin’s style of rule. Nearly 500,000 people are believed to have lost their lives or ‘disappeared’ during Amin’s eight-year dictatorship. Amin’s military adventure into Tanzania, and the annexation of the Kagera salient in 1978, was intended to divert attention away from a chronic internal military power struggle, his regime’s ill administration of the state (Ingham 1994, 147) and the declining economy. The Tanzanian army counterattack, with the assistance of a united Ugandan exile army, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), brought the Amin dictatorship to an end. Amin fled to Libya and later settled in Saudi Arabia, and his defeated soldiers fled to their homeland in northern Uganda, and his mercenary troops scattered into southern Sudan and northeastern Zaire. Under the refugee guise, many of Amin’s associates eventually emigrated from Africa to North America. Between 1987 and 1988, the Canadian government unwittingly allowed dozens of Amin’s former hired hands to settle in Vancouver British Columbia.

Chapter Six focuses on the military and political arrangements made by Ugandan exiles, working alongside officials of the Tanzanian government and army commanders, for ruling Uganda after dislodging the Amin regime from power. We also reviewed the sources of cooperation and discord among exile groups that met in Tanzania and after the group returned to rule Uganda after Amin’s ouster. Ugandan exiles gathered in Tanzania to choose an administration to replace that of Amin. The Unity Conference held at Moshi, between 23 and 26 March 1979, was attended by delegations from 22 different Ugandan movements, including delegations with an armed wing and those of armchair anti Amin, student and political groups. Obote’s fighting group Kikosi Malumu (KM) (with 600 soldiers) and Yoweri Museveni’s FRONASA (80 soldiers) wanted to create a front of the military organizations, rather than a broad-based political alliance of disparate groups. Representatives of the non armed groups rejected this proposal arguing that no Uganda force, on its own, actually controlled any part of Uganda. Moreover, they argued, the proposal con-
tradicted the spirit of Moshi, which was to lead Uganda away from 'the rule of the gun.' The Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) was formed on 25 March to coordinate the fight to overthrow Amin. Its program was based on national unity (the avoidance of ethnic, religious and political divisions) and the promise to hold general elections within two years. In the same chapter, we surveyed some problems Yusuf Lule, the first Chair of the UNLF's National Executive Council (NEC), faced from various power hungry factions within the UNLA and the military that was partial to Obote.

The UNLA moved into Kampala to administer the country's affairs and Lule was sworn in as president on 11 April. Lule's successful encouragement of western capital as a basis for Uganda's rehabilitation was opposed by the socialist, and particularly the far left elements within the National Consultative Council (NCC). This council, which contained one member from each of the Moshi delegations, acted as an interim parliament. A controversy that arose over the interpretation of the powers of the interim executive - Lule, the NEC and the NCC - that occurred two months after the UNLF took power, culminated in a palace coup (Mutibwa 1992, 146). Once deposed, Lule was spirited away to Tanzania where he remained under house arrest; it was international diplomatic pressure that forced Nyerere to release him (Lule 1982, iv). He moved to London where he continued to monitor political developments in Uganda. Traders in the capital, Kampala, raised their prices (which they had lowered after Amin's downfall) as an expression of disillusionment at the return of factional politics.

Binaisa, Lule's replacement, though a southerner, was suspected by most Ugandans to be Obote's front-man, since he had been a staunch UPC supporter, and Obote's attorney general in the 1960s. Binaisa's regime became notorious for corruption, though Binaisa himself championed the democratic ideals of Moshi. He expanded the NCC to a total of 127 members, and he encouraged UNLF organization at grass-roots level - the 'mayumba kumi' (or ten-house cell) system. Five months after achieving its objective of removing Amin from power, the UNLA was in disarray: the original figure of about a thousand soldiers who had fought besides Tanzanian soldiers to liberate Uganda from the military dictatorship, had by now ballooned fast as various commanders worked frantically to enlarge the strengths of their factions. By 1980, Obote's KM force together with militias in
UPC strongholds in Northern and Eastern Uganda totalled about 24,000 fighters, while Museveni had enlisted around 8,000 in the FRONASA faction. The UNLF attempts to restrict UNLA to a total of 5,500 recruits drawn proportionately from the regions, were ignored by the politicians and their powerful military backers. It was likely that these well armed, but poorly paid different military factions would present a problem for the future.

By April 1980, the Binaisa-led UNLF government decided that because of the deteriorating security situation created by the abundance of both guns and 'soldiers', the elections scheduled for December of that year would be contested on a non party basis, under a 'UNLF umbrella.' Any legally-qualified Ugandan would be permitted to stand, but as an individual, rather than as a representative of a political group. Uganda People's Congress and DP leaders saw this as an attempt by the UNLF leadership to entrench itself in power. These two excluded old political parties fervently opposed the move. Nilotic Obote supporters within the UNLA leadership led by Major-General Tito Okello, and Brigadier David Oyite-Ojok, addressed public rallies with scathing attacks on the Front, and promised to 'fight if necessary' to oppose the election decision.

At the beginning of May the UNLA Chief-of-Staff, Oyite-Ojok, initiated an unauthorized search-and-impound operation in Kampala, during which 72 people, many of them journalists, were illegally detained. Binaisa responded by sacking Oyite-Ojok for 'insubordination and disobedience', and appointing him Ambassador to Algiers. On 10 May, the Military Commission (one of the three bodies that made up the NEC) whose chair Muwanga was an Oboteist, and which included in its ranks Museveni as vice-chair, Oyite-Ojok and Tito Okello, ordered the UNLA to take control of the radio station and post office and place Binaisa under house arrest at State House, Entebbe, to be guarded by Tanzanian troops. Many observers believed that President Nyerere, with his 20,000 Tanzanian troops still in Uganda, acted from the beginning as if Obote's return was the only solution to the country's problems; whatever his sentiment, he ignored Binaisa's pleas for help just as he had ignored backing Lule the previous year. Indeed Nyerere's partial withdrawal of Tanzanian troops from Kampala, allowing Oyite-Ojok's soldiers to move into the capital, had facilitated the coup. The MC finalized the coup on 12 May, when it made the following radio announcement: "The Military Commission has taken over all presidential powers."
This is an action of the Military Commission, and not the Army.” However, to many Ugandans, the two were clearly synonymous. In a subsequent proclamation Muwanga declared that “The assumption of power ... shall not be questioned in any court of law” and as an afterthought he added “It is hereby declared that the suspension of political activities is hereby [sic] lifted.” (Legal Notice No 5, 12 May 1980). The DP leaders, and Yoweri, welcomed the coup and the chance to contest the elections. Only two weeks after the coup on 27 May, Obote returned from exile in Tanzania and addressed a UPC rally in the remote township of Busenyi in Western Uganda. Adopting a bellicose stance, he referred to Okello and Oyite-Ojok as his commanders, and challenged Museveni (among others who ‘claimed to have fought’) to produce his own commanders.

Before Obote returned to Uganda Muwanga appointed a new cabinet, and informed the NCC that “the steps we have taken are irreversible.” The UNLF as formed in Moshi was by now effectively dead. During the next six months democratic rule was steadily eroded. At a June meeting attended by the MC members and representatives of the four political parties - UPC, DP, CP, and UPM delegates agreed to ban the establishment of any new parties until after the elections. Around the same time Muwanga threatened that anyone campaigning as an independent would be ‘dealt with firmly’ and warned candidates who had defected from UPC to DP to “know how to behave or else we shall teach them a lesson they will never forget” (Taifa Empya 1 June 1980). The other parties helplessly watched, aware that Muwanga was preparing for UPC’s return to power. Violence increased in many areas of the country in the months preceding the elections. Many Ugandans feared that the elections for which they had waited patiently since independence, and which had generated such fervor and affection, were about to be used by the UPC to re assume power fraudulently.

The Rwandese factor and the role of Kiswahili in Uganda.

Much has been said about the National Resistance Movement (NRM) collaboration with Rwandese in Uganda when fighting the guerrilla war. NRM detractors allege that it was not Ugandans but mercenary Rwandese, recruited from refugee camps in southwestern Uganda and other parts of the country, who had formed the bulk of the NRA guerrilla force
(Ingham 1994, 150). Other critics pointed to the heavy representation of people of Rwandese origin in the security forces, government and public services of the NRM administration for evidence that it was not Ugandans but foreigners [Rwandese] who were actually ruling the country. It is not our intention in this study to dwell in detail upon the merits of these charges. The reader should know, however, that the numbers of Rwandese in Uganda's security services dropped, when many Rwandese former NRA fighters 'deserted' their stations in the army, between 1992-1993, and joined the Rwanda Patriotic Movement (RPM), which launched a guerrilla war against the Rwandese government. The RPM took power in Rwanda in 1994.

Since the days of the bush war, NRM personnel and NRA fighters were discouraged from communicating with their colleagues in ethnic languages such as Kinyarwanda, Lunyankole, Lukiga, or Luganda. Instead guerrillas received a crash study program of Kiswahili, the language movement leaders adopted as the medium for communication in the field. It is therefore not easy to identify NRM/NRA personnel on the basis of the ethnic language used by soldiers and government officials on duty. Since Kiswahili is neither the official language [English is the official language] nor the commercial language, it is not commonly spoken outside the army, police and prison services. Until recently it was not even taught in schools. Luganda is the unofficial commercial language spoken in the major commercial centers of Kampala, Masaka and Jinja, and it is widely understood and used particularly for commerce in the eastern and western parts of the country. Few Ugandans can speak Kiswahili with any confidence (Kajubi 1991, 329).

Moreover, despite Kiswahili having originated partly from Arabic (Kiswahili is a derivative of African [mainly coastal people] and Bantu languages) it did not spread among Bantu speakers in Uganda (where it had to compete with Luganda) as it did in Tanzania and Kenya. Furthermore the colonial regime's decision of adopting Kiswahili as the lingua franca for the coercive organs of the colonial state, further alienated southerners from embracing that language. Ugandans had therefore come to associate Kiswahili with oppression. Many Ugandans (particularly Bantu language speakers) frowned when Amin decreed Kiswahili the official national language in 1973 (Mukama 1989, 181). The idea of learning to speak Kiswahili was repulsive to many people who regarded it as a tool for tyrants.
(Repression had characterized the first Obote regime, the Amin-led military dictatorship of the 1970s, the subsequent brutal second Obote regime of the early 1980s, and the blood-stained Okello regime, which replaced the new Obote regime). Kiswahili was the language used by those manning the coercive state organs upon which these four regimes depended for political survival. The Baganda and other people who rejected Kiswahili did so for similar reasons why Africans refused to voluntarily learn Afrikaans in South Africa, during the apartheid era. They associated the language too closely with their oppressors to feel free to use it with ease. Given the above background of how Kiswahili was introduced, and how it thrived in Uganda, it was not surprising that many people had mixed feelings about the NRM promotion of Kiswahili. Many people consciously resisted learning the language, which they still regarded as nothing more than the medium of oppression. The NRM government, however, has had some success in encouraging people to accept Kiswahili dispassionately.

In Chapter Four, we used Rational Choice and the Theory of Action propositions to investigate and review the colonial and post colonial economic environment of Uganda that economists had envisioned. In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, we applied J. Harsanyi’s 1994 Nobel prize for economics winning modeling of the bargaining process, depicted in the ‘Reciprocal or Bargaining Model of Power’, to our investigation. This model assisted us in investigating the economic development implications, of political bargaining in post colonial Uganda. Although the rational choice models and the theory of action were appropriate for exploring Uganda’s colonial and early post colonial economy from the economists’ perspective, we applied Harsanyi’s ‘bargaining model of power’ to our investigation in the latter chapters, since it provided us with superior explanatory powers than other models that were previously used to interpret Uganda’s political economic environment of the 1970s onwards, that influenced the country’s direction for economic development. Throughout the study we highlighted the implications for economic development which arose from the array of political permutations that characterized the political interactions of Ugandans in the first three and a half decades of independence.
CHAPTER TWO

A SURVEY OF THREE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES:
MODERNIZATION, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY, AND STATISM

Introduction

The first objective of this survey is to try to determine how appropriate the modernization, underdevelopment and dependency, and statist theoretical perspectives are to understanding policy choices in the Third World. We shall focus our attention on ascertaining whether or not these approaches are suitable for analyzing and evaluating economic policy choices for African countries, particularly those of Sub-Saharan Africa such as Uganda. To achieve our objective, we shall identify the strengths and weaknesses of these schools in general, and where suitable, we shall relate these to economic development policy. We hope our survey will explain why we believe these approaches are less than adequate in helping us to understand the political process which influences the selection of economic development policy in the Third World in general, in Africa in particular, and in Uganda specifically.

The Modernization School

The modernization school had a pioneering role in the study of African nationalism and African politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Marion Levy (1966, 11) believed the level of modernization of a society is dependent on the extent to which its members use inanimate sources of power and/or tools to multiply the effects of their efforts. He cautioned against the distinction “between relatively industrialized and relatively nonindustrialized societies,” since usually the term ‘industrialized’ means ‘factory-ized’. He reminds us that modernization analyses need not always focus on the factory concept, since many industries not usually associated with factory assembly lines, for example agriculture in the United States, operate in a highly mechanized or industrialized form similar to that of a factory (Marion Levy 1966, 11).
Survey of Modernization Theory

Scholars from economical, sociological, anthropological and political science background have all studied the phenomena of modernization. The basic idea of Modernization theory is that human societies move (progress) from traditional (a simple form of social political and economic organization) to industrial and post-industrial (more complex) human systems of organization. One of our goals in this section is to appraise the relevance of this approach to understanding the political constraints to economic development in post colonial era, in Third World countries such as Uganda. We also survey the contribution of modernization scholars such as the economist W.W. Rostow, and political science scholars such as Almond, Coleman, Apter, Huntington, to give the uninitiated reader some insight of the lines of inquiry adopted by scholars using this approach. The work done under the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics (SSRC) is also mentioned. Hout suggests that perhaps because of its simplicity, Rostow’s work has become archetypal for modernization theory (Hout 1993, 34). What follows is a summary of some of Rostow’s main ideas on modernization.

Rostow distinguished five successive stages of the process of modernization. In his view, the ‘analytic bone-structure’ of the stages of the modernization process is traceable to ‘the distribution of income between consumption, savings, and investment, ... the composition of investment and ... developments within particular sectors of the economy’ (Rostow 1960, 13). The first or traditional stage is characterized by a society in which the attainable output per capita is limited, because production is predominantly agricultural. For the second stage, preconditions for takeoff develop under the influence of scientific progress; scientific innovations are applied, for instance to agriculture, thereby increasing the funds available for investment. The takeoff or third stage is triggered off by a particular stimulus, often from outside the national society. Prior development of the society and its economy leads to self-sustained growth: investment levels are higher than before - especially in transport, which stimulates the whole economy - and important manufacturing sectors experience high rates of growth. For this to happen an entrepreneurial elite must have developed. The fourth stage, the drive to maturity, is characterized by the growth of new economic sectors, supplanting the leading sectors of the takeoff stage; he gives the example
of Europe, where new activity was mainly concentrated in heavy industry, which replaced agriculture as an important part of the economy, from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. In the fifth stage, the twentieth century age of high mass consumption, consumption instead of production occupies a central place in society (Rostow, 1960, 17-92). He sees three possible developments in this phase: the pursuit of power through investment in military strength, the emphasis on the welfare state and the expansion of consumption.

Rostow believes economic modernization is complemented by political development, which is ‘the elaboration of new and more complex forms of politics and government as societies restructure themselves to absorb progressively the stock and flow of modern technology which is essentially uniform’ (Rostow 1971, 3). He believes the process of economic growth places welfare, constitutional and security issues on every country’s political agenda.

Using a functional approach, Almond and Coleman laid the foundations of a political science theory of modernization (1960, 3-64). They analyzed the political system in terms of the functions performed. The premise of the functional approach is that all political systems have a political structure, that the same functions are performed in all political systems, that every political structure is multifunctional, and that all political systems contain elements of rationality and traditionality (Almond 1960, 11-25). Political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation and political communication are the functions distinguished on the input side of the political system. Rule making, rule application and rule adjudication are the functions on the output side. Various political structures perform these general functions. Almond believes that ‘political systems may be compared to one another in terms of the frequency and style of the performance of political functions by political structures’ (Almond 1960, 61).

According to mainstream modernization scholars such as Coleman, ‘Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the model of a modern political system’ because these polities are competitive. Furthermore, their secondary structures - structures performing formal political and legal tasks - are more differentiated and penetrate and modernize the informal, diffuse and particularistic primary structures (Coleman 1960, 533). Coleman concluded that most developing countries were far from modernity and that there
was a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness, which he saw as 'an essential attribute of democracy'.

Apter also analyzed modernization in structural-functional terms. Authority was the central element in his modernization theoretical analysis. He traced the risks involved in modernizing non industrialized societies to the lack of integration of these societies. The modernization process initiates a change in political roles: roles become less 'ritualized' and less dependent upon 'ascription'. The party politician is perceived as playing an important role in political modernization, for he believes political parties are the main instruments of modernization (Apter 1967, 179)

Huntington argued that stability or political order was a key goal during the processes of modernization. He identified a 'political gap' similar to the 'economic gap' economists identified between developed and developing societies. He believed the political violence and instability that characterized societies with a political gap 'was ... the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions', (1968, 4). Modernization, for Huntington, implied social modernization, 'a change in the attitudes, values and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world, and economic development, 'the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society' (1968, 33). Because of social mobilization people obtain higher levels of wants and aspirations, yet in developing countries the level of economic development is usually too low to satisfy these needs. The resulting social frustration leads to demands on the political system and to increasing political participation to enforce those demands. Whether political stability or instability will ensue depends on the political institutions: in societies which develop successful ways of handling the increased level of participation, stability is reached; if political institutionalization fails to keep pace with participation, instability will result (Huntington 1968, 78).

Beginning in 1963 and for the next eight years, the SSRC supervised a series of seven books which dealt with political modernization and development. Problems dealt with in the series included: communication, bureaucracy, education, political culture, and political crises. According to Midgal, although "[a]n obligatory opening footnote citing the
Committee's work [is] encountered in many monographs and articles, [there is] little evidence that it made a contribution to method of substance" (Midgal 1983, 310).

The modernization syndrome. Levy defines modernization as a universal social solvent which subverts established beliefs in non modernized countries and leads to disintegration of the status quo without any assurance that a successful process of modernization can take place (Levy Jr. 1972, ). The three central constructs of modernization suggested by Binder et al (1971) are capacity (economic), differentiation (social), and equality (cultural). When considered with regard to identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration (effectiveness of government control), and distribution, they constitute the main theme of this approach, or the modernization “syndrome” (Binder et al 1971, 56).

Historical origins and contemporary views of modernization. From a historical perspective, we see the impression of the nineteenth century’s evolution of the species theory on the philosophy of contemporary modernization school scholars (La Palombara 1971, 245). For example, proponents of modernization assume that development always proceeds on a linear path. They believed that Western Europe bore out their proposition (Binder et al. 1971, 278 ) for, according to Herbert Spencer, (1972) European history provided ample evidence that the Western World had pursued a linear path through successive stages of development. Therefore modernization theorists believed that the same evolutionary theoretical framework would work to analyze and interpret the social, political, and economic conditions of Third World societies.

Like the evolutionists from the previous century, modernization scholars believed stability to be a critical prerequisite for development. This led many to prescribe programs for development with stability as a main element. Those who made sectoral studies of Western European economic production were convinced that factory/assembly line modes of production were the products of development in the educational, industrial, urban, and other sectors. If there was stability in those sectors it would be possible, therefore, to organize a society to industrialize. These became the critical indices of modernization in the works of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1963, 25 and Huntington 1968,40);
Chazan et al summarize the modernization approach in this way:

In economic terms, modernization was seen as commensurate with mechanization, rapid industrialization, and growth; in social terms, its goals were defined as increasing individual mobility, controlling the political importance of communal identities and establishing procedures for equitable resource allocations. In political terms it implied institutional expansion, rationalization of the government apparatus, power concentration, some measure of political participation, and an augmentation of capacities in order to meet growing demands. (1988, 14)

Despite the relevance of these three features to the conceptualization of modernization, time and the post colonial record has proved them inadequate as determinants of economic development in much of the Third World. The above features may enhance but do not by themselves necessarily initiate the development process. Sandbrook described how efforts to introduce these features of development in many Third World countries met with disaster (1976, 165-185). An evaluation of data from the Country Dept. of International Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Office (1988, 243-505), on economic participation, education and literacy, and national and household income, confirms that Third World countries, particularly those in Africa, are barely if at all in the process of modernization as summarized by Chazan et al above (14). Therefore, we find plausible the critique that faults this school for placing emphasis on such prescriptions as stability, autonomy and an ultimate convergence with the Western industrialized world. However, as Chazan et al (1988, 16) do remind us, modernization theories helped to identify some principal problems faced by African political systems, and to influence many basic works on the dilemmas of independence.

Limitations of the Modernization Approach

The modernization school’s focus on the process of development soon lagged behind the rapid and problematic pace of events in much of the Third World, and in Africa in particular. The wide gap between theory and reality led many, and definitely those of the dependency and underdevelopment persuasion, to relegate the modernization school to the realm of abstraction, as one that focused on ideal goals. Criticism of this approach focuses on three detrimental qualities of this idealism: a narrow gauge level of analysis, misplaced emphases, and faulty diagnostic tools (Chazan 1988, 15).
Narrow gauge level of analysis. Given the overall unfavorable economic environment typical of many Third World countries, one may tend to subscribe to the criticism directed against the modernization school for its unjustifiable emphasis on industrialization, given the prominent role of agriculture for most African states.

Furthermore, their limitation of attention to social change and education, important subjects as these may be, unfortunately resulted in their ignoring ongoing roles of traditional institutions and norms, which still play a major role in the economic life of many Africans. These customary institutions directly or indirectly continue to influence the choice of economic development policies in many countries despite the minor role this school bestows on them. Philip Foster (1963, 153), for example, points out that the private sector (where traditional institutions still play a significant role and which generates the bulk of industrialization) is weak because most opportunities for stable employment are in the government service. The fact that recruitment into that service emphasizes educational qualifications ensures that the private sector will normally find it difficult to compete with government for the best trained personnel. Given the habitual shortage of skilled labor in many African countries, this situation entails that the private sector is endemically short of suitably trained local personnel. Moreover, when traditional constituencies are involved in officially sanctioned national economic development endeavors, they usually do so insincerely, haphazardly or marginally. Scholars in this mould contrast “tradition” and “modernity” as though the two need always be diametrically opposed. (A ‘traditional’ political-economic system is characterized as diffuse, with both particularistic, functional political and governmental structures. In contrast, a ‘modern’ political system is defined as having ‘a high degree of differentiation, explicitness, and functional distinctiveness of political and governmental structures, each of which ... perform, for the political system as a whole, a regulatory role for the respective political and authoritative functions’ [Coleman 1960, 532]. For example, they do not recognize or appreciate the significant contribution to economic development traditional constituencies can make in a developing country. The natural authority many traditional cultural leaders enjoy over specific cultural groups is a source of substantial power. These leaders do not need to coerce or bribe people with expensive gifts into
Proponents of modernization have also been faulted for an excessive preoccupation with the political party, at the cost of overlooking such crucial aspects as the processes of bureaucratization. Zolberg (1966, 9, 37, 128 passim), for example, presented what he considered to be the vital role of the party in the period of transition to independence in five African countries. In so doing, he tended to treat the state as a somewhat passive descriptive entity.

Others have made valid complaints with regard to the modernization school's disregard for vital social currents, inequities, and conflicts in the target societies. For example, modernization scholars are yet to seriously address the demands for decentralization of government responsibilities, made by increasing numbers of Third World populations. Some authors see this as a result of the school's obsession with the study of the political party (Chazan et al. 1988, 15).

**Misplaced emphases.** The alleged misjudgment about the relative importance of the various sectors of society in the process of modernization encouraged the adversaries of this school to place the reasonable charge that analyses of policies in the modernization model fostered misplaced emphases and failed to reflect many crucial processes taking place on the ground, processes which often had as much or more influence on economic development than many of those processes that modernization analysts tended to accent (Frank 1967, 20–73; Chilcote 1981, 284).

It is perhaps true, for instance, that there is a wider disparity of living standards between the rich and poor in the developing world than between the corresponding two groups in the developed countries. For example, it is typical in much of Africa to find small pockets of very wealthy entrepreneurs-cum-politicians, or bureaucrats, living amidst, or a little distance away from, the bulk of a poverty-stricken population. Huntington (1968, 40–47) and Clark, Jr. (1974, 131–132) discuss how this pyramid of poverty is repeated in many developing countries. Given the above scenario, it is not surprising that opponents have challenged the priorities built into the modernization theories.
This school "stress[es] economic growth, without a concomitant delineation of the beneficiaries of the benefits of this economic activity" (Chazan et al. 1988, 15). Moreover, many developing countries are undergoing the trauma of defining and developing a new national identity, common to all fledgling states. Under these circumstances, equilibrium and harmony, the two preconditions advanced in the modernization model as necessary to modernization, would be absent.

Given the school's reluctance to openly criticize the pyramidal composition of most Third World societies, the checkered record of colonial rule in many developing countries, and the merit of economic development based on the exploitation of non-renewable resources, it is not difficult to appreciate why scholars from the radical rival schools believed they had concrete grounds on which to attack the modernization school. These critics regard the modernization model for development as neither feasible nor desirable.

**Faulty tools of analysis.** Whether by design or by accident, the modernization scholars have only themselves to blame for failing to develop adequate tools of analysis. Scholars of rival schools, such as Richard Sandbrook (1967, 165-185), have focused their attack on this failure: for example, the absence of instruments designed to examine how transformations from traditionally organized societies to modern secular ones could take place in the midst of serious internal problems. These include: inappropriate attitude, which assumes that developing countries have to follow the Western model of development; lack of skilled labor; unavailability of local capital; scarce natural resources; overpopulation, and mismanagement of public resources (P.T. Bauer Ch 4). The modernization approach has also been unable to design procedures to evaluate the implications of ongoing processes of modernization and the resulting instability for the continued existence of the state. There is also the static nature of many analyses: the omission of the external context of African politics and the frivolous treatment of issues critical to Africans, such as racial justice, pan-Africanism, negritude and socialism (Chazan 1988, 16). According to Sandbrook, all these shortcomings provide undisputable evidence of a "crisis in political development theory" (1967, 167-185). The continental crisis in Africa of the 1980s confounded mainstream academic paradigms and cast a shadow on political hopes. Political development analysts
became less optimistic about the possibility of a rapid social economic transformation than they were in the 1960s. This situation is what Apter and Rosberg labelled the "new realism". Similar to the political interaction framework analysts, mainstream analysts incorporating the 'new realism' in political development studies are beginning to lean toward analytical eclectism (Apter and Rosberg 1994, 4).

**The Dependency and Underdevelopment Approaches**

In so far as experience is a great teacher, many scholars who grew up at the receiving end of colonial rule found that the trials and tribulations of the colonial experience were best exposed in dependency and underdevelopment theory. They believed that this theory provided an indisputable alternative to the modernization school, which focused on political development theory when probing economic development and other policies of Third World countries. Rostow defines political development as "the elaboration of new and more complex forms of politics and government as societies restructure themselves to absorb progressively the stock and flow of modern technology" (Rostow 1971, 3). The dependency and underdevelopment approaches chose rather to examine the economic relationship between the developed and developing world, which they saw as the roots of underdevelopment and dependency.

**Survey of Dependency Theory**

The 'dependency' label is used to refer to a broad range of theories. Brown used this label in a comparative review of three variants: dependencia theory, center-periphery theories, and world systems analysis (Brown 1985, 63). Hout reminds us that these three variants of dependency theory were developed in consecutive order during the 1960s and the 1970s, and were expanded and transformed in the 1980s (Hout 1993, 6).

The basic idea of dependence is that social, political and economic systems of peripheral states, or former colonies, were consciously designed to complement the capitalist interests of the center or former colonial benefactors, rather than meet the needs of societies in peripheral states. That this arrangement created and perpetuated underdevelopment in the peripheral states is another subject with which radical scholars are concerned. Dependency
theorists argue that to arrest and reverse this situation, peripheral states have to spearhead the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would promote an equitable share of world economic resources, and better terms of trade for the peripheral states, in their commercial dealings with the developed capitalist countries, than those existing.

Dependencia theory. This theory asserts that although most Latin American countries obtained independence during the nineteenth century, they have remained economically subordinate to outside powers ever since. It attributes the lack of development of these countries to their integration in the capitalist world system and resulting exploitation by colonial powers, such as Spain, Portugal, Great Britain and the United States. Theotonio dos Santos, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Celso Furtado are some notable pioneers of dependencia theory. Since the traditional dependencia theory was limited to analyzing the economic situation of Latin American countries, and its explanations focus on the internal consequences of external relations of dependence, it has limited utility as a tool for studying non-Latin America Third World dependent societies.

The center-periphery theories. Hout describes the center-periphery theories as the outcome of the spatial 'broadening' and theoretical 'deepening' of the dependencia position (Hout 1993, 6). Unlike the latter theory, the former theories do not limit their analysis to only one part of the globe, Latin America; rather, they are general, and are applicable to the whole of the Third World. Center-periphery theories emphasize the unequal and exploitative structural relationships that have developed between the different parts of the capitalist world system - the center and periphery. They highlight the negative effects of the ties between the center and periphery on the latter. Renowned contributors to this variant include Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin (1971; 1974), John Galtung (1971, 81) and Giovanni Arrighi (1969, 149). We present one example of the center-periphery model to illustrate the metropolis's exploitative relations with the satellite.

Frank's model summarizes the relationships between societies in the center and periphery. The model establishes relations among economic and social political variables.
This model was focused on the relationship between dependence and development. Those using this model assume the degree of dependence determines the position of a country in the capitalist world system and the country’s ability to exploit other countries: those countries experiencing the most intense dependence have the least opportunities to exploit other countries (Frank 1983b). The semi-peripheral countries have an important function in the context of worldwide exploitation, but they are also victims of exploitation by the developed, capitalist countries. The situation of the capitalist world system Frank’s model portrays is an important factor in determining the circumstances of individual countries. In periods of expansion, the developed nations exert more pressure on the underdeveloped ones; thereby dependence is increased. However, satellites can pursue their own development in periods of crisis since metropolitan countries are then preoccupied with coping with their own problems. For example, satellites have managed to introduce import-substitution policies in stages of world capitalist development characterized by crisis. In this model the state of the capitalist world system also influences the internal polarization in the satellites (Frank 1972a, 19-45). The existing polarization between socioeconomic groups is enhanced further in periods of crisis; the level of repression is raised as the political regime becomes more autocratic to keep potentially, and actively, rebellious groups under control. Frank’s model posits that military coups in many Third World countries are the outcome of the periodic crises afflicting the world capitalist system. The dependence-development nexus is important in the internal polarization variable of the satellite countries. He believes the degree of dependence determines the rise to power of certain socioeconomic groups that play a role in international exploitation and accumulation; the internal polarization contributes to the underdevelopment of the satellite countries, because some groups have an interest in exploiting and, hence, underdeveloping parts of their own countries (Frank 1975).

The concentration of production, or the reliance on a few commodities, is an outcome of the degree of dependence and the situation in the capitalist world system. The more dependent countries are forced into a situation approaching monoculture, the reliance on a single product or commodity, which is an impediment to achieving more development. The situation in the capitalist world system also influences the concentration of production. During periods of crisis, satellite countries try to diversify their economy by producing more
types of commodities than before. By diversifying their economies during periods of crisis satellite countries hope to curtail the possibilities of exploitation by the metropolitan countries and to reduce the level of underdevelopment (Frank 1979a).

**World system analysis.** The third variant of dependency theory is closely linked to the work of Immanuel Wallerstein. World system analysts focus on what they term the ‘Modern World System.’ Analysts such as Wallerstein have tried to determine the causes of the rise of the capitalist world economy during the sixteenth century and its spread across the world. Instead of analyzing the world in terms of a center and periphery he added a third category, semi-periphery, to the aforementioned dichotomy (Wallerstein 1974, 343). In contrast to dependencia and center-periphery theory Wallerstein’s work is more of a description and analysis of the development of the ‘capitalist world economy’ (Hout 1993, 6). Wallerstein argues that the only ‘totalities’ that have historically existed are ‘minisystems’ and ‘world systems.’ He describes the former as ‘primitive’ social systems, characterized by the existence of a single division of labor and cultural unity. Such states may be highly autonomous, with small subsistence economies. Conversely, ‘world systems’ are units having a complete division of labor and multiple cultural systems. He identifies two kinds of world systems: ‘world empires’ with a single political structure over most of the system’s area, and world economies, which contain multiple political structures (Wallerstein 1974, 347; 1979, 4). Wallerstein’s work will not be discussed in further detail since it is mainly historical, while the focus of this study is on the present, post colonial constraints to economic development in Third World countries such as Uganda.

**Contributions**

These two schools have consistently focused attention on an interpretation of African politics within a socio-economic context; the historical, economic and external limitations on the African political environment; and the illumination of social and economic inequality that underlies African political inequality. In our view, all these factors have political implications at the global level, which directly or otherwise influence the selection of economic development policies for the area of our interest in this study. The basic hypoth-
esis of the dependency school is that development and underdevelopment are interdependent structures within the global economic system.

One of the main contributions of the dependency and underdevelopment schools lies in their radical interpretations of the overall relationship between the developed and developing countries. The relationship between center and periphery assumes the form of a dependence in which some countries (the dominant) achieve self-sustaining growth while others (the dependent) can grow only as a reflection of the dominant countries. Thus the structure of dependency is synthesized and conceptualized as:

... a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. [Subsequently] [t]he relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development. (Dos Santos 1970, LX:231–236).

Scholars such as Dos Santos presented the Latin American experience to persuasively argue that the skewed regional economy was the outcome of the region’s incorporation in the capitalist world economy, directly through colonial administration and subtly through foreign trade. These two factors ensured that the region’s production was geared toward the demands of the center. This economic position distorted the periphery’s social structure so that local power was held by a small ruling class (who gained from importing for luxury consumption rather than investment), while real power was dispensed from external poles of command in dominant (‘metropolitan’) countries. Dos Santos further says that there is both an historical dependency traced to the colonial era, and a new dependency conditioned by the “exigencies of international commodity and capital markets” which require foreign currency. The new dependency which continues into the present is facilitated through international ownership of the region’s dynamic sectors, multinational corporate control over technology, and payments of royalties and profits (Dos Santos in Peete 1991, 45).

The prominence which this approach gives to contemporary economic factors which continue to delimit Africa’s options is one of the factors which distinguishes these so-called radical schools from their predecessors. According to the radical schools, the pattern of global economic relations results in an asymmetrical global exchange (Baran 1952, 66–67;
Frank 1966, vol. 18: 17-18; Griffin 1969, 38-42 and Dillard 1972, 840-842). The resulting situation means that the benefits of these ties are shared unequally between the industrialized center of the world economy (the core) and the less industrialized countries of the Third World (the periphery).

The contribution of these schools, then, has been to throw light on the premise of inequality that underlies African political activity and to place specific policy actions in a socio-economic context. They do this by focusing attention on historical and economic constraints (particularly of external origin) to development in Africa (Chazan et al. 1988, 17).

**Historical limitations to development.** In typical neo-Marxist style, all proponents of underdevelopment employed a purposeful, historical perspective in an effort to trace dependency and underdevelopment over time (Wallerstein 1974, vol. 17:7). The units by which economic policies were analyzed by these radical schools were not the individual and the state, but classes and global systems. Baran and Sweezy (1966, 251), for example, propose that international corporate capital was instrumental in the development of underdevelopment in the Third World. Frank argues that capitalism both world and national produced underdevelopment in the present economic and social system of states such as Chile and Brazil. Underdevelopment scholars use the Marxist-Leninist analytical framework to make a strong case for a reinterpretation of the Third World past based on metropolis-satellite relationship. They are critical of both Marxist as well as ‘bourgeois’ writers: the latter are blamed for ignoring the exploitive nature of the world and national capitalist system, while the former, (the pro Soviet communist parties in Latin America) are chastised for being opportunistic and revisionist.

Others, like Rodney, argued that since the fifteenth century Europeans systematically underdeveloped Africa by draining its resources, by failing to replenish reserves, and by deliberately blunting its technological achievement. Furthermore, the colonial era institutionalized the process of underdevelopment and integrated Africa into a European-dominated dependency system. Africa’s underdevelopment was, therefore, the product of systematic, exploitative power relationships (1972, 7), Rodney, however, ignored the domes-
tic political and social-cultural inputs or constraints of African societies in the creation of Africa’s contemporary economic condition. Marxist underdevelopment scholars such as Rodney analyze underdevelopment and dependency linkages in former tropical dependencies. Their work heightens our awareness of internal dimensions of colonialism which mainstream studies omit. They exhorted the former colonial peoples to rid themselves of neo colonialist relationships by restructuring their economies. The belief that underdevelopment is rooted solely in colonial rule and present external factors may lead to the misleading assumption that African societies do not contribute substantial inputs to the economic development policies of their countries.

**Economic limitations to development.** To come to terms with the dependency and underdevelopment approaches, in their analysis and evaluation of political factors which influence the selection, formulation and implementation of economic policy in Africa, one must accept without compromise the underlying assumption of inequality and disequilibrium which proponents of these approaches believe constitute the sources and illuminate the manifestations of Africa’s scarcity. (See Amin 1976, 202–203; Grundy 1962, vol. XXVIII: 62). With some justification, advocates of the radical approaches assert that Africa’s initial systemic impoverishment is linked to imperialism, which while bringing Africa into the global economy did so in a structurally unequal manner. Amin (1976, 202) and Dos Santos (1970, 231) further posit that colonial economic policies perpetuated this institutionalized vulnerability to external economic trends, and constrained the freedom of movement of Africa’s new leaders on the eve of independence. However, despite the debilitating circumstances of the imperial inheritance, evidence seems to suggest that rather than conforming to the implied strait-jacket character of always submitting to the whims of Western economic interests, many African leaders displayed substantial independence in their decisions for selecting economic policy in the first two decades of independence (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 22).

The prominence which these approaches give to contemporary economic factors, which they believe continue to delimit Africa’s options, is one of the factors which distinguishes the radical schools from the traditional schools. The radical schools’ assessment of
the unbalanced system of global economic relations has been a subject for debate. But, in our view, it is misleading to deduce, like many proponents of the non-conformist (radical approaches such as the dependency and underdevelopment schools which do not subscribe to theories of mainstream approaches) schools do, that these economic relations, despite their importance, are the only or the major determining factor in domestic economic policy selection, formulation and subsequent implementation.

With reasonable grounds, radical scholars conclude that because of the superior information, technological know-how, wealth and market advantages at its disposal, the core remains at a decided advantage in its exchange encounters with the African countries in the periphery (Magdoff 1969, 30). If the seemingly overwhelming advantages in the four areas stated above did exclusively account for the unbalanced economic exchange encounters, the same areas, one would assume, would comprise the priority agenda for African leaders. However, an analysis of the national budgetary allocations for different African countries indicates otherwise. For the majority of African countries, these areas of exchange are usually treated as less than priority areas for recurrent budgetary allocation (Sullivan 1989, 20-152).

Nevertheless, the proponents of the radical schools see this imbalance as having causes in external factors alone. Wallerstein, for example, in his spatial study of the relations between the center and periphery, concludes that “it is not possible theoretically for all states to develop simultaneously” (1974, 7). Others have also advanced the proposition that since global relations are closed and rigorously structured, if one country or area advances, then the progress of others must, perforce, be impeded (Amin 1974).

Tightly structured portrayals of global relations do remain attractive in attempts to explain the maladies that bedevil African economies. However, examples from northeast and southeast Asia of countries that have achieved considerable success in economic development, despite their location outside the original well-known developed Group of Seven (G7) capitalist enclave, tend to weaken the strength of the argument advanced by Wallerstein and Amin above --- that simultaneous development of states located in competing regions of the world is not possible.

In the process of implementing economic development programmes, the newly
industrialized countries (NICs) have been the centre of rapid industrialization, democratization, and extensive improvement in social welfare conditions. This scenario tends to diminish the assumption of a rigidly, vertically stratified global economic system such as that advanced by the two radical schools. That the NICs were subjected to similar if not exactly the same economic constraints as the rest of the developing countries is a hardly debatable fact. Hence, rather than belabouring the evils of the economic systems which African countries inherited from the colonial era, or advocating drastic change in the global economic system, the prospects for which in reality are infinitesimal, it would be much more rewarding to identify the policies that lead to success in economic development, like those which the more prosperous NICs did choose.

Some Shortcomings

Proponents of competing schools have been quick to point out the weaknesses of these non-conformist schools. A clear appreciation of these shortcomings should no doubt clarify why we and others who are similarly disposed, for example Chazan et al. (1988, 18), believe that this approach provides only a partially accurate interpretation of the forces that impact the selection of development policies, particularly the policies that affect economic development in African countries. Of particular concern is their overt uniformity, their overt pessimism and their atheoretical and apolitical stance.

Overt uniformity. The overt uniformity of systems characteristic of the underdevelopment school (though not necessarily shared by its dependency counterpart) does not adequately address the diversity of the economic potential of the African continent, which in part is due to its immense size, its large and diverse populations and political organizations. In our opinion, the political issues that relate to Africa's economic development can best be interpreted within a theoretical model which provides for discrete differences within the interplay of these three areas at the domestic, intra-African, and international level before, during and in the post-colonial era.

Some of the major resultant shortcomings of this uniformity are reflected in a lack of finesse in the analysis of foreign relations. For example, Chazan et al point out that these
schools in the preceding decades were unable to identify the “changing pattern of links between African states and specific countries in the industrialized world” (1988, 18).

**Overt pessimism.** The pessimism with which the dependency and underdevelopment schools assess African futures has been the target of the second set of criticisms (Chazan and others 1988, 18). We think the radical theorists’ worry about the high magnitude of the systemic problems, although plausible, seems exaggerated. Moreover, revolution or total global structural transformation (Amin 1974, 12), the two guidelines that these schools offer, seem unfeasible (Sandbrook 1985, 146). While we are aware that the Third World countries, particularly those in Africa, would, in most estimates, be the major beneficiaries of a world order so transformed, we also realize that the prospects of such a change are insignificant. The disappointment of the Soviet Union’s economic development experiment, which Ellen Comisso (1992, 225) elaborated on, was predicated on similar radical guidelines. When we contrast this economic development approach with the persistent and growing strength of the Western world organized along capitalist lines, it is easy to appreciate why we would discourage any present and future African leaders from anticipating total structural change of the contemporary capitalist-dominated world order in the drastic sense suggested by Wadada Nabudere (1982, 183-187). Bearing in mind the staying power of the capitalist world’s status quo, evident even way back in the 1970s, we find no convincing excuse for scholars from the radical schools failing to develop an economic development guideline for action for the Third World, suitable for adopting intra-regionally in such a scenario (Sandbrook 1985, 145).

**Atheoretical and apolitical stance.** The atheoretical and apolitical stance, two common characteristics of underdevelopment theory, are the third and final major weakness of the radical schools. Apolitical is defined in the Webster College Dictionary, 3rd edition, as “having an aversion for or no interest or involvement in political affairs.” The same adjective means “being without political significance.” Similarly, atheoretical implies an aversion to or lack of interest in or avoiding involvement in theory that affects political affairs. The work of Tetreault and Chales F. Abel demonstrates the atheoretical and apoliti-
cal nature of this approach, since the remedies for creating a NIEO do not take into account the ‘politics,’ - actual opinions, principles or policies and the corresponding theory that helps to interpret the politics by which societies in the Third World countries participate in the public affairs of their respective political communities. Furthermore the entrenchment of this approach in historical explanations for the development of underdevelopment in the Third World was at the cost of developing a comprehensive theoretical foundation. Radical scholars blame underdevelopment in the Third World states on policies of the First World (developed market economies) and Second World (developed centrally planned economies) countries, using concepts like colonialism and neocolonialism (1986, 7).

Underdevelopment scholars propose dramatic remedies, including disrupting linkages between developed and developing countries, the revolutionary transformation of the international order to one based on socialist principles, and the creation of a system of concessions on the part of advanced industrial states toward the economic activities of developing countries (Olson K. Robert 1981). By opting to be both atheoretical and apolitical, underdevelopment theorists omit addressing the crucial domestic political-economic processes which determine the selection of economic policies in the Third World, processes which are, perhaps, more important than the global structural processes that preoccupy the radical scholars’ attention. In effect, the dependency approach implies that the state is in some ways a passive descriptive entity, that African political processes are external in their derivation, execution and implication. As a result, despite the powerful explanatory power of dependency theory, it is unjustifiably apolitical in that it avoids or merely glosses over internal ongoing events and processes. (For example, in comparison to pluralist theories, Chazan et al suggest that dependency studies provide a more cogent historical and economic analytical base, for interpreting the relationship between the Third and First World, regarding such matters as trade relations, capital flows, and modes and relations of production within the capitalist economic system [Chazan et al 1988, 18]). As a consequence, by avoiding addressing local politics, proponents of the radical schools deny themselves the opportunity to scrutinize ongoing events and processes within a narrow-gauge theoretical framework.

It is to be remembered, though, that some theorists in this mold tried to escape this
predicament by returning to detailed research in the Marxist mold. For this effort, they have been credited for remaining closer to the African experience. Some examples are Nicola Swainson (1980), John Saul (1979; Arrighi and Saul 1979), and Colin Leys (1974).

Conclusion

We hope that the preceding review of the radical schools adequately demonstrates that these schools, despite pointing to significant trends, have been unable either to advance significantly the understanding of the complexities of African nations' present predicament in economic development or to trace accurately the dynamics of the processes the continent had been undergoing in the 1980s and early 1990s.

The Statist School

The Statist school study of Third World societies post-dates similar studies in the modernization and the dependency and underdevelopment schools. What distinguishes this school from the modernization school, the dependency and underdevelopment schools, and the ongoing materialist studies, is the importance the statists attach to political factors in the investigation and analysis of various factors that influence the selection of government policies (Chazan et al. 1988, 19). Materialism is the belief that the world can be explained through material causes. This implies that ideas arise not from an eternal or absolute realm as suggested by Hegel (1942; 1977) and Plato (1970) but rather from our perception of sensory objects (Heywood 1994, 4). Marx's materialist scholarship presented the 'material' conception of history. Following Marx, Marxists rejected the once conventional view that ideas fall like rain from the sky. They proposed instead that consciousness is conditioned by the most fundamental of human tasks: the struggle for material existence. Therefore in the Marxist conception of materialism, ideas, beliefs and theories are formed through interaction between human beings and the material world. This implies that ideas themselves bear the imprint of the material or economic circumstances out of which they emerge (Marx in Heywood 1994, 4). Statist scholars have concentrated on the state apparatus, its expansion, its uses, and abuses of power and its relation with domestic groups and the international economy. Statist scholars view the state as standing for the apparatus of government
in its broadest sense, for the institutions that are recognizably ‘public’ in that they are responsible for the collective organization of communal life and are funded at public expense (Heywood 1994, 36).

Definition of the State

Four definitions of the state will reveal the meaning and scope of the state from the statists’ perspective. According to Max Weber, states are compulsory associations claiming control over territory and people within them (1968, vol. 2, Chap. 9). Within the Weberian tradition Alfred Stepan defined the state as:

comprising more than the “government.” ... [T]he continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system that attempts not only to structure relations between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well (1978, xii).

Analysts in the Statist mould have elaborated how the state provides continuity to the polity by providing the “continuous...administrative...and coercive system....” “[It] structures relationships between civil society and public authority...and provides other “crucial relationships within civil society....” (Stepan 1978, Ibid. Chapter 9). This definition seems to apply to stable democratic states but not to states which are in a state of flux, a typical scenario in Africa. States in the process of change are often unable to carry out many of the functions Stepan describes. He also does not specifically identify the role of the state in national economic development.

Although they are variably structured in different countries, and may be embedded in a constitutional-representative system of parliamentary decision making and electoral contests for key executive and legislative posts, the administrative, legal, executive, and coercive organizations are the core of any state (Skocpol 1985, 7). While these may be generally the “core” organizations in an institutionalized state, this definition may mislead us to assume that the administrative, legal, and executive organizations, always function as the core of the state. In many developing countries, many of these “core” organizations have much less power and authority than the coercive organizations.

J. P. Nettle provides a definition that focuses on state sovereignty and autonomy in foreign affairs:
... the sovereignty of the state, in addition to being a unit, also generates the almost exclusive and acceptable locus of resource mobilization. Whatever the state may or may not be internally ... there have (sic) in the past been few challenges to both its sovereignty and its autonomy in foreign affairs .... ... for almost all intents and purposes the state acts for the society internationally, and internal matters relating to foreign affairs are a state prerogative (including interpretations of sovereignty-limiting norms emanating from supranational arrangements). In short the state is the gatekeeper between inter-social and extra-social flows of action (1968, 563-64).

The vulnerability, particularly in economic affairs, to external influence, a common feature in Africa, brings into question Nettle’s notion of the state as the “gatekeeper” or custodian [of the state] in the African context. For as Bretton explains, the African state must be frustrated in its gate-keeping role, since the “fences” are either nonexistent or are in poor conditions (1973, 19-31). His observation that foreign “bearers of power”, and “influence” penetrate the African state seemingly at will is a topic that has worried many Africanists including Nkrumah (1963, 173-193). These four definitions reveal why theorists working within the statist mold are generally uncritical of brutal and broadly unfair policies which Third World regimes often institute to increase their influence on economic planning and control. In fact, some scholars using this approach have worked tirelessly to define strategies which regimes in developing countries can assume in order to increase the overall power that is vested in the state.

State Making

Our objective in this section is to appraise the relevance of the statist literature to economic development for post colonial Africa. Tilly contrasts the historical circumstances of state making between developed and developing countries below:

The extension of the European-based state making process to the rest of the world...did not result in the creation of states in the strict European image.... Internal struggles such as checking great regional lords and the imposition of taxation on peasant villages produced important organizational features of the European state: the relative subordination of military power to civilian control, the extensive bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance, the representation of wronged interests via petition and of parliament.... [S]tates elsewhere [Third World] developed differently. The most telling feature of that difference appears in the military organization. European states built up their military apparatus through sustained struggles with their subject populations and by means of selective extension of the protection to different classes within those populations. The agreements on protection contracted the rulers themselves, making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, to withdrawal of credit services, and expertise.

... [S]tates that have come into being recently through decolonization or through relo-
cation of territory by dominant states have acquired their military organization from outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled... [T]he new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories. The advantages of military power become enormous, the incentive to seize power of the state as a whole by means of that advantage very strong... [T]he old national states of Europe almost never experienced the great disproportion between the military organization and all other forms of organization that seems the fate of client states throughout the contemporary world (1978, 185).

African states came into being under circumstances similar to those Tilly describes. It is true that many “acquired their military organization from outside.” For example, an alien force formed the core of the colonial army in some countries in East Africa (Lwanga-Luyingo 1989, 26). These countries, therefore, missed the opportunity for “forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled.” Evidence also reveals that “agreements on protection” such as independence constitutions lacked the institutional force to constrain the rulers, who were/are usually above the law, and rarely respect national legislatures. The overwhelming power of the military, which tends to have a limited appreciation of the subject of economic development, is an added complication to the design and implementation of development programs.

Contributions

Although the elements of the state in the definitions of Weber, Stepan, Skocpol, and Nettle, point to important aspects of the polity none of the four scholars seem to focus on economic development issues. From a macro-economic perspective, other statist scholars have contributed important ideas that inform our understanding of state apparatus, the state functions of accumulation and distribution, and the role of leaders and state power.

Accumulation. From the premise that precapitalist elites must be overthrown before capitalism can be established, Durkheim cautions that “without effectively institutionalized market exchange and the extension of the same markets to land and labor, ‘transaction costs’ will be exorbitant and the market will not allocate resources efficiently” (in North, 1979, 249-59), thus the need for state intervention in the early stages of establishing a capitalist order. In his view a dominant class has no structured interest in the transformation of the means of production. This creates a split between the dominant class and
those who control the state apparatus, which is likely to become a major element in the struggle to initiate the process of accumulation. Furthermore, since today all states operate in an international context in which political-military survival depends on attaining a competitive level of economic productivity, state managers are compelled to become involved in conflict with the dominant class (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985, 44). Some statist writers believe that this contemporary situation lends weight to the logic of state involvement in the imposition of the market exchange process during a country’s economic transformation. During the last three decades many state managers have come into conflict with the dominant class while undertaking many unsuccessful attempts at economic transformation.

The logic of “collective action” is what Olson (1965, 1-3) believes necessitates state involvement in capital accumulation. In his view collective goods will be inadequately provided, negative externalities will not be controlled, and the rate of accumulation will suffer correspondingly in the absence of an institutionalized mechanism for imposing a less atomized rationality, similar to the way that unregulated grazing of “sheep on the common” would destroy a common grazing area. The different circumstances between developed and developing countries regarding prospects for capital accumulation is what convinces some observers to view economic transformation as a state prerogative (Merhav 1969, 42). Merhav believes it is dangerous to leave decisions on accumulation to the private sector since it is disciplined only by the imperfect market structure.

Marxists deem the accumulation of surplus value as the extortion of hours of unpaid labor; as a result exchange value accumulates in the hands of the capitalist, and never in the hands of the worker (Kautsky, 1925, 185-87). This analysis of accumulation convinced Marxists that capitalism of necessity is a form of exploitation. The state must therefore play a central role in the accumulation of capital to reverse or prevent the capitalist exploitation of the workers.

**Distribution.** Besides having a central role in the accumulation process, many statist writers believe the state must also play an equally prominent “extramarket” role in the distribution process. They argue that since evidence confirms that market exchange is constituted under conditions of preexisting inequality, inequality is not likely to diminish over
time. This is particularly true in "imperfect markets," such as those often found in the Third World, because an allocational criterion and mechanism that channel and counteract market forces are often absent. In answer to the procapitalist proposal that existing market structures arising in conditions of relative equality would produce equitable distributional results, Evans and Rueschemeyer counter that this would only be possible with state intervention to achieve its distributional goals (46). There is substantial historical evidence to support the Marxist argument that without a strong state presence in the distributional process, proletarianization and immiseration will spread along with the negative consequences of an uncontrolled market.

**State power and apparatus.** Some analysts highlight the fragility of African states, which they trace to the historical mistake in the nineteenth century, when European powers created artificial states in African. In these territorial entities, inherited by the modern African state, there is usually an apparent absence of strong cross-cultural, social, economic and other linkages, which usually promote a spirit of nationalism among citizens (Mojekwu, Uchenda and Van Hoey 1977, 12). Lacking such linkages, it is easy to understand why theorists working in the statist mode assumed that the state and state actions had to compose the focal point for study, when trying to explain the roots of Africa's political and economic crises. The resulting state invariably became the primary motor force behind social and economic occurrences throughout the continent (Young and Turner 1985, 79; Markovitz 1987, 90).

Other observers have recognized that statist literature deserves credit for giving the African state vitality. This school, unlike its predecessors, recognized the state as not simply a passive descriptive entity. For statist, it is a "vigorouse actor with interests, capacities, achievements and frailties" (Chazan et al. 1988, 19). These qualities do influence the selection of a given country's economic development priorities. However, we should remember that the perception of the post-colonial African state by statist writers as "autonomous, an entity in its own right," or "the primary motor force behind occurrence" has been aggressively challenged, and with some justification, by writers from the radical schools (Griffin 1969, 76–77).
State power and leaders. Some state-centered works have portrayed African leaders as personal rulers who oversee systems of personal rule. Personal rule is defined as a system of relations linking rulers not with the “public or...with the ruled...but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the ‘system’” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 19). Such a system differs from the democratic system found in developed countries in that personal political systems are not structured by impersonal rules that are there to uphold the conception of the public interest (Huntington 1968, Ch1). The absence of impersonal rules that uphold the conception of the public interest or common good is identified as the source of many social-political and economic problems that afflict many African countries. All former colonial states in Africa started out with constitutions or impersonal rules, which were designed to safeguard the public interests. We believe it is not the absence but the erosion by post colonial rulers, of the guidelines, such as those that constituted the independence national constitutions, that is the main source of the social-political and economic ailments of many African countries. Statists offer a plausible argument that African leaders are responsible for the political and economic deterioration particularly of the last decade. They cite examples of mismanagement of state finances and corruption at the top, which ushered in military rule in countries such as Somalia (Lewis 1972, 398). They argue, for example that in countries such as Liberia during Tubman’s rule, a lack of enforcement of ethical conduct encouraged the proliferation of corruption among public servants (Clapham 1976, 59).

Some Shortcomings

Although we are indebted to the statist scholars for their contribution to the study of the African state, we hesitate to place the state at the centre of all things in our endeavour to understand contemporary African processes. Some omissions of their approach include: their definition of state, their concept of state–society relations, and the deterministic quality of their outlook.

Our survey of state apparatus and quality of systemic power in several countries of Africa (Mazrui 1980, 35) yielded results similar to those suggested by the statist model.
Our research confirmed the view, originally stated by the radical models, that the strong external influence on the African environment has often resulted in the selection of policies, particularly in the economic field, which were more detrimental than beneficial to the development of the continent.

**Definition of state.** Among the key shortcomings to which scholars from competing schools have alluded to are an inability of statist theorists to come up with a clear definition and conceptualization of the state. David Easton (1981, 307) highlights this absurd situation and recalls that in political science over 100 different meanings have been suggested by way of defining the “state.” There has also been a tendency to confuse the state and specific governments. Steven Krasner (1984, 223–346), for example, conceives of the state as comprised of four elements: government, administrative apparatus and institutionalized legal order, ruling class, and normative order. Howard Lentner (1984, 367–377), on the other hand, has come up with a scheme comprising ten elements.

**State-society relations.** The statist approach has also been accused of a cursory treatment of state-society relationships. Eisenstadt (1991, 57), for example, points out that statist scholars have failed to consider the importance of the cultural dimension in the political process, and in the formation of the state. Other scholars have expressed concern for the statist scholars’ fuzzy understanding of the relationship between state and class, especially when the state is in disrepair (Chazan et al. 1992, 20). Still others have questioned the rationale for the emphasis by statist scholars on personal rule and systems of domination at the expense of analyzing the role of the state in the actual (and not just the formal) political economy. In this regard, Jackson and Rosberg, Jr. (1982, 1–6) perceive the African state as merely a juridically defined entity, which does not meet the empirical definition of the state based on its ability to exercise control over the citizenry under its jurisdiction.

Theorists working in the statist mould have so far been unable to define the limits of state power and its relative significance. Chazan et al. (Ibid. 20) and Easton (1981, 308) mention this problem when reviewing the definitions of the state in political science.
**Deterministic outlook.** That the statist approach devotes too much energy to highlighting the external supports and the personal character of the post-colonial African states' organization and interaction is another important fault which scholars from rival schools have identified. For example, Chilcote and Edelstein (1986, 19) point to the failure of foreign penetration to transform traditional societies into stable, high mass-consumption entities resembling the United States. Instead, external input only succeeded in creating a dependent form of capitalism in former colonies. The statist model tends to avoid this kind of subject. Rival scholars have also been quick to point out that despite scrutinizing patrimonial relations and authority structures at some length, statists have been unable to make an adequate connection between public institutions and specific social groups (Weiner 1971, 175 passim). Furthermore, the deterministic outlook presumes that institutionalization along a path similar to that taken earlier by Western countries would stand a better chance if it was not for the personal latitude of political rulers in Africa. They do not appear to consider that African rulers' ability to manipulate government procedures is greatly limited by the general environmental preconditions and conditions in which the ruler must act. Power does not constellate entirely around the state. According to Naomi Chazan et al. (1988, 20), this deterministic view is likely to obscure African trends in the years to come, a view which we also share.

**Conclusion**

Our findings suggest that the assumption of extreme weakness of the African state (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 1-6) is an exaggeration: many African states have, and exercise, substantial control over the citizenry, albeit with much effort. We found that African states often have more presence than do some Western democracies at times. For example, in the West, some national and international crime syndicates often treat the law of the state with more impunity than they do in most Third World countries. Many African states exercise more control than do many states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, situations like that in former Yugoslavia, where the Serbian government has been known to dissociate itself from the horrendous actions of ethnic cleansing by its military against its own Moslem citizens, and those from Bosnia, has few parallels in Africa. Rather
than dissociate themselves from the questionable acts committed by the coercive wings of the state against civilians, African rulers usually make excuses, however implausible, as in the perennial Hutu-Tutsi ethnic conflict in Rwanda, to justify for example, the excessive use of force against political opponents, who at times may comprise an entire ethnic group or groups.

Our survey of state apparatus and quality of systemic power in several countries of Africa yielded results similar to those suggested by the statist model. Our research confirmed the view, originally stated by the radical models, that the strong external influence on the African environment has often resulted in the selection of policies, particularly in the economic field, which were often more detrimental than beneficial to the development of the continent.

**Shortcomings of Mainstream and Radical Approaches**

It is opportune to refer here to the misconception of the patrimonial perception of the state. This perception is a common shortcoming of both mainstream and radical approaches, for example: modernization's discussion of power concentration and integration, and their disregard for social currents (the general direction or course of events) such as those pressing for decentralization of state power; dependency and underdevelopment's centre–periphery dichotomy of the globe, and their argument for the need for a fundamental global structural change; and statism's view of the state as the primary motor force behind change. All ignore the fact that the state in Africa is undergoing significant changes. Furthermore, there is no justification for political scientists to persist in employing a top-down approach when studying politics in Africa, particularly when studying issues relating to Africa's economic development (Chazan 1988, 20). Most investigators should by now be aware of the fundamental changes taking place in the constitution of African societies.

In line with political interaction framework scholars, we query the misleading motives of political analysts from diverse schools who interpret political processes and political conflicts as revolving exclusively around the formal state structures, either separately, or in their international context (Callaghy 1984, 49; Mazrui and Tidy 1984, 3; Midgal 1988, 10).
Like Tilly (1978, 185) and the advocates of the political interaction framework like Chazan, on scrutinizing the intricacies of African politics, we found that these cannot be reduced easily to the activities of either the actors on the national or international scene (Stepan 1968, Chapter 9; Nettle 1968, 563-564). State institutions intersect with non-formal structures; and social organizations relate, or do not intersect, with governments depending on changing conditions.

In this chapter, we have explored some key contributions of the mainstream and radical analyses of Third World politics with a focus on Africa. Of particular interest within each approach has been the relative importance given to the treatment of issues that relate to economic development. We found that there is a serious lack of agreement not only between the polar positions of the mainstream and radical schools of thought, but also within the mainstream schools, about what ought to be the priorities of such a study. While some approaches placed economic development high on their priority list, schools such as the radical ones tended to interpret Africa’s economic development predicament in a somewhat unbalanced way. The deterministic approach to Africa’s economic development generally employed by the modernization and statist schools, in our view, also failed to present a fair picture of the realities of Africa’s economic conditions. Our reservations, arising from the shortcomings mentioned in the foregoing reviews, encouraged us to adopt the new synthesis, the political interaction framework, to which we now turn.
CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL INTERACTION FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Unlike the theoretical approaches discussed in the previous chapter, the political interaction framework is not a recognized independent school of thought. This, rather than diminishing its value, enhances it, for by looking critically at the strengths and weaknesses of each of the preceding approaches, scholars employing the political interaction framework can use the strengths of the modernization, underdevelopment and dependency, and statist schools, while avoiding their pitfalls. We feel that such an eclectic achievement would be difficult to accomplish by any scholar writing within the narrow confines of one of the other three schools of thought. The political interaction framework offers a better alternative for understanding the nature and prospects of economic development policy, because this approach addresses the opinions, principles, and policies or the politics by which people in Third World societies participate in economic affairs; we believe economic development is predicated on advancement in the political field, particularly in Africa (Chazan 1988, 21). Improvements in the political field which would facilitate economic development include the creation of universally accepted national constitutions, and introducing reliable and strict procedures for monitoring and censuring bureaucrats and politicians who may abuse state power.

The ideas upon which this assumption is based will be fully developed in subsequent chapters, where we intend to provide evidence in support of our theme that viable economic development is heavily dependent upon how tolerant the domestic and international environments are to the political-economic direction that ruling regimes in developing countries choose to follow. In our view, without the goodwill of these environments, regimes are incapable of achieving viable economic development, however much formal state power and authority they may appear to exercise over their respective jurisdictions.

The political interaction framework best highlights the fluidity of politics and surpasses the alternative approaches in tracing the vacillating political course that influences a
given country’s economic development direction and prospects, because it focuses on the
diversity of civil society and its actors. And, unlike the radical schools, it is less concerned
with assessing the reasons for past errors and is more concerned with uncovering the com-
ponents of ongoing processes and explaining the future opportunities and constraints. In
this chapter, we are particularly interested in exposing the components of ongoing proces-
ses and commenting on future prospects and checks by looking at the rational choice model;
functions of power, and environmental and historical conditions that influence economic
development in the Third World.

View of the Economist on Economic Development

Insights provided by the economist are relevant to our exploration of economic
development in Uganda. This is not a departure from our political interaction approach;
rather, the variables that constitute the economic development process we will introduce
below should be regarded as the underlying premises of our investigation of the policies
selected by leaders which influenced economic development in the postcolonial period.

In the process of gathering data for this study we interviewed many people in gov-
ernment, academic institutions, and public and private enterprises, as well as ordinary citi-
zens. Many of those we interviewed were eager to diagnose and sponsor prescriptions for
the problems of economic development with which Uganda and other African countries are
faced. One question: “What exactly do you mean when you speak of economic develop-
ment?” provoked an assortment of responses reflecting the respondents’ political-
philosophical sentiments, rather than their social-economic position. Although many
answers equated economic development with economic growth, few respondents seemed to
understand or to appreciate its relationship to the population, the economic cycle, or to the
rise in the standard of living. It was this wide disparity among opinions on economic deve-
lopment which prompted us to include this glimpse of the meaning of economic develop-
ment from the perspective of the economist. By presenting the concepts associated with
economic development from this perspective, we provide a common ground from which
those with divergent opinions may explore the subject.
**Economic development or economic growth.** People have drawn a distinction between economic development and economic growth. Although some fine distinctions can be drawn between the terms, most analysts agree that in essence the two are synonymous. I will use them in the following way: economic development is the process whereby an economy's real national income increases over a long period of time. If the rate of development is greater than the rate of population growth, the per capita real income will increase. This process implies the operation of certain forces; these forces operate over a long period and embody changes in certain variables. Details of the process vary under diverse conditions in space and time. Despite this variety there are some common basic features. The general result of the process is growth in an economy's national product—in itself a particular long-run change. The diversity of conditions that affect the process is not only that among the fifty one African political jurisdictions, but conditions also vary from regime to regime within a particular country. Economic growth refers to increase in real national income and is the general end result of economic development. Economic growth studies focus on the growth in national product and take a comprehensive view of the end result of the development process (Meir 1959, 2).

**Elements of the Process**

Significant underlying detailed process changes must take place for economic development to occur. These changes (each of a particular character) accompany the rise in output. Changes in fundamental factor supplies and changes in the structure of demand for products comprise the two classifications of the process changes (Schultz T. W. 1953, 5).

**Factor supply, and product demand structure changes.** Changes in the supply of factors of production include: discovery of additional resources; capital accumulation; political growth; introduction of new and better techniques of production; improvement of skills, as well as other institutional and organizational modifications. Factors which inform economic development that derive from the structure of demand for product include changes in: size and age composition of the population, level and distribution of income, tastes, other institutional and organizational arrangements. Changes in factor supply and in
structure of demand for product determine economic development. Process, real income, and length of period are crucial to economic development (Meir 1959, 3).

Viewing economic development as a process implies that it becomes insufficient to cite and classify a list of separate developments or to examine each development individually. Instead we must establish the causal relations among these developments. On this basis we can specify the consequences expected from certain changes. To explain how a variety of particular changes determines the course of real national income we must endeavor to understand the process by which real national income actually increases. Real national income refers to the country's total output of final goods expressed not in money but real terms. Therefore the money expression of national income must be corrected by an appropriate price index for both consumer and capital goods (Kuznets 1949, 137-172).

**Length of period.** The length of period over which the process occurs is significant; the increase in net national product must be a sustained increase to qualify as economic development. Short period expansion which occurs within a business cycle is therefore of secondary consequence. The underlying net national product is what is significant. It is not the increase within a cycle but that between cycles that denotes development. Therefore the relevant time unit is decades (in which secular trends are measured), not years in which individual cycles are measured. Some economists suggest that since the major business cycle normally spans 6-13 years, we should consider a sustained movement as spanning a period of at least twenty-five years' duration (Meir 1959, 3).

**Development as Raising Standard of Living**

Some economists believe that development implies not just an increase in aggregate output but must denote a rising standard of living. Those holding this view define economic development as a process by which the real per capita income of a country increases over a long period. Accordingly, the absolute number of people below a minimum level of real income should diminish at the same time that real income increases for the change to qualify as economic development. Viner cautions us that if there is a substantial increase in population, the number of people living close to or in poverty may have grown, consistently with
a rise in the income of the population as a whole (1953, 100). The high rate of population
growth in many Third World countries has tended either to slow the growth of real income
per capita or pushed large sections of the population to living in poverty or on the verge of
destitution.

When relating development to the problem of removing poverty, Viner uses as the
test of development the increase in real per capita income. He reminds us that if an increase
in real income was the only criterion, the standard of living may not rise despite a rise in
real income, if population growth surpasses the increase in national output, resulting in a
fall in the real per capita income; or if the increase in national income is commensurate with
an equal increase in population, under which real per capita income would remain constant
(100). Meir finds the debate of whether the definition of development should focus on an
increase in real national income or real per capita income unnecessary, since “the per capita
index can always be found by dividing the national income by population” (5).

**Emphasizing real national income.** That a large real national income is normally a prerequisite for an increase in real per capita income, is one good reason Meir provides to support an interpretation of economic development that emphasizes changes in real
national income. The desire to reduce mass poverty by raising per capita real income is the
focus of the economists who are concerned with economic development in the poor coun-
tries. They recognize that a considerable increase in national income is essential if per capita
income is to rise because the population is growing rapidly in many Third World countries
(5).

**Shortcomings of Per Capita Gauge of Economic Growth**

The selection of per capita, or per unit, conceals the population problem. Kuznets
warns:

...the choice of per capita, [the quotient] per unit, or any similar single measure to
gauge the rate of economic growth...carries with it the danger of neglecting the denomina-
tor of the ratio[the population]. ...[S]uch neglect is an inevitable consequence of the
operation: we divide the national product by total population...to eliminate change in the
former ‘produced’ by mere changes in the latter....To put it bluntly, insisting on gau-
ging economic growth by such per unit measures, economists are treating the popula-
tion factor either as an extremely simple variable that can be handled by mere
division...or what is worse, as an exogenous factor, beyond the ken of the economist as a student of economic growth....In arguing for the total volume of the national product [the numerator] rather than the per capita, I am suggesting a change that should symbolize and give effect to the real widening of the field of required attention (1955, 12-13).

Population is significant in the economic development process. It is therefore unwise to cursorily analyze the role of population in development or to regard it as exogenous to economic development in poor countries, such as those in Africa, as many economists have done.

**Quantitative or qualitative definition.** Those economists who adopt an increase in real national income as the basic criterion of development may also consider whether real per capita income also rises. They do this by comparing the amount of development, or the increase in real national income, with the change in population. However, if the focus is on real per capita income the analyst may be tempted to think that economic development means economic progress or an increase in economic welfare. Moreover, when a growth in real national income is compared with population growth, and an increase in real per capita income is found, this may tempt us to say that this constitutes progress away from poverty toward a better standard of living. At this point the term economic development no longer denotes a quantitative concept but also a qualitative one. Meir concludes that once the term becomes prescriptive “it includes the notion of economic progress or economic welfare, the definition of development becomes a “'persuasive definition'” implying that development is desirable.” (1959, 4).

From the economist’s perspective the preceding discussion introduced us to some important concepts, which inform our understanding of how the process of economic development manifests in poor countries. There has been economic development paralysis in many Third World countries. Often this is the outcome of disagreement among policy makers over what should be the priority order of the host of economic development variables to build into the development policies. For example, some policy makers emphasize factor supply changes while others emphasize product demand factor changes, overlooking the fact that the two processes are complementary. For economic development to occur,
changes in the factor supply must be targeted to encouraging structural changes in demand for products. The length of period in which to measure economic development is another source of misunderstanding. While economists regard five periods of five-year development programs as an appropriate time unit for measuring a single development cycle, many policy makers in the Third World often perceive economic development in terms of a single five-year development program. Policy makers in the Third World who seem to regard development as merely an increase in aggregate output, should heed Viner’s warning that besides output, development must denote a rising standard of living. Policy makers will do well to reflect on the pitfalls of emphasizing the per capita gauge of national income highlighted by Kuznets (1955, 12-13). It is the policy makers’ responsibility to decide the optimum balance between the qualitative and quantitative aspects Meir discusses, of the economic development process. From the economist’s perspective we shall explore how some government policies influenced economic development in the independence era.

Rational Choice and a Theory of Action

Proponents of the political interaction framework have used a rational choice (also known as the economic approach) model to explain how choices of economic development within Third World societies are conditioned (Dowding 1991, 17). Barry (1978) believes that rational choice explanations of choice surpass sociological approaches in this respect. For unlike sociological studies which address the origin, history and structure of human society, rational choice explanations seek answers to the reasons or why (my emphasis) political actors select the specified choices out of the available options. A survey of some main elements that make this image attractive to analysts of the political interaction mold does seem suitable for our appreciation of the model’s strength. Furthermore, an appreciation of the rational choice approach will better equip us to explain strategies of protagonists that help decide the direction for economic development in the Third World.

Models of rational choice. Rational choice models usually take two forms: models of actual (token) situations, (Allison 1971) or models of a ‘class of’ (type) situation (Elster 1985). Political interaction researchers use either of these two models when explain-
ing particular social outcomes. In this way they can identify features that are common to both the choice situation and the model. The inquirer searches for discrepancies between the practical situation and the model. Discrepancies are also important when they help us distinguish and explain a specific outcome. It is from this perspective that Mackie (1974) convincingly argues that:

... discrepancies [are] the main causes of the outcome rather than the features of the model itself which become the 'background conditions' an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient inus condition of the outcome rather than what is ordinarily called the cause (summarized in Dowding 1991, 21).

Hindness (1989, 66) and others object to the employment of the rational choice model in studies based on the political interaction framework. To answer critics, Elster (1983b, 25) argues that the objective of such models is not to produce causal explanations of actual political outcomes in the traditional sense of cause. Instead they model the inus conditions. Mackie (1974) used the term 'inus' to refer to the non crucial aspects of an outcome situation, which however distinguish it from other similar outcome situations. The discrepancies between the main feature of the model and the actual situation or the inus, may be very important, as these rather than the main features of the model usually cause the outcome to manifest itself in that specific way. In many Third World settings, particularly in Africa, the task of applying rational choice models to political interaction situations is often complicated or inhibited by poor information networks. The low level of technological development hampers the dissemination of information. Coercive ruling regimes often censor, manipulate or destroy items of information and where possible, information systems which distribute information that may criticize government policies. Victor Le Vine (1975) discusses the costly barriers used by bureaucrats in the Third World to deny people access to information.

**Rational choice.** One advantage of the rational choice approach (Dowding 17) is that it enables us to ask questions about society by modeling social situations. Hechter (1987, 40) reminds us of a central social-psychological tenet of this approach, the presumption that the individual (actor) is a rational egoist. Viewed this way a rational member will
seek membership of a group only if the benefits derived from access to the joint good exceed the cost of the obligation (1987, 42). This assumption is prominent in patron-client studies within the political interaction framework (Chazan 1992, 55, 180). The avaricious behavior of many actors in postcolonial Africa lends additional support to this view. However, Chazan reminded us that although the actions of many people are motivated by personal gain, like in societies elsewhere in the world, one finds people, including rulers in African societies, who place altruistic considerations above self interest (1992, 150).

As with all models, benefits derived from a token or type image will depend on its quality. According to Dowding (1991, 17) a good rational choice model specifies the relation between the players. To this we add that the importance of the credibility or reliability of the built-in assumptions used to interpret political interactions cannot be overstated; for in the past, economic development programs premised on erroneous assumptions about the behavior of individuals have led many African countries on a disastrous economic path. Despite the controversy that surrounds the notion of self-interest, summarized above, this model still appeals to political interaction analysts dealing with large groups, for as Dowding (1991, 18) points out, the larger the group studied the less unrealistic the assumptions of self-interest; for when explaining the activities of a large group, we are not interested in the complex schizoid explanations we use to explain the egoistic behavior of an individual instead we focus only on their behavior that which relates to the group.

**Shortcomings of rational choice.** Since human behavior is hard to predict, rational choice models are flawed because of their assumption that the individual’s actions are governed by the exclusive urge to maximize self-interest utility. Critics may point to Frohlich (1974 no 18, 55) and Sen (1982~) for evidence that although most people are egoistic most of the time, some people behave altruistically most of the time and only egoistically sometimes. We share the same view with those inquirers in the political interaction framework (like Chazan et al. 1992, 150) who located actors in the Third World along the entire ego-altruism continuum.

The focus on the notion of rationality also called “thin rationality” has been the model’s major target of criticism (Elster, 1983a). The main problem that Dowding (1991,
20) discusses relates to the presumption that individuals either prefer one option to another in a choice set or are indifferent between the sets. Consequently, preference schedules in this perspective assume transitivity to give consistency. However, in reality, an individual's preference schedule is not that simple. Sen (1982c) highlighted another problem with rational choice when he argued against connectedness of the actions of the individual assumed in the model. He points out that an individual may neither prefer one option to another nor be indifferent if they have not thought about either option. It is difficult, he says, to distinguish between indifference and unconnectedness of an individual's behavior. That individuals do not always necessarily have transitive preference orderings is an opinion shared by many observers in the political interaction mold.

**A Theory of Action**

Explanations of desire, action, and belief in the theory of action are useful in that they inform us about what motivates individuals to act the way they do as they interact politically in the Third World. Although the rational choice model tends to lack an explicit theory of action (Dowding 1991, 23), it operates with an implicit one. This theory assumes that individuals select from the available options those options they prefer rather than those they do not like. It also assumes that individuals attempt to maximize marginal utility/benefit. This assumption rhymes with the egoistic assumptions in the rational choice model. (Hechter 1987, 40). Accordingly a person's actions are determined by what they desire and what they believe to be possible (Davidson 1980, 14) since failing to bring about some highly desired outcome does not maximize marginal benefit. In essence maximizing marginal benefit necessitates a probability calculation by the individual.

Davidson believes that an individual's reasons for action are the proximate cause of the action. He investigates the reasons for a person's action in terms of belief and desire. Desire motivates the action; belief channels the action. Thus, action involves a triumvirate of desire, action, and belief. He asserts that reality causes actions mediated through beliefs and desires. This hypothesis of action is useful to our analysis of the actions of actors in the Third World. He reminds us that this is a behaviorist theory of action, since it studies the behavior of individuals. Behavior, in this view, enables us to understand the beliefs of the
actors (by making assumptions about their desires) or their desires (by making assumptions about their beliefs). To understand both we make assumptions about different aspects of each (Davidson 1985, 25).

Functions of Power and Authority

Power Defined

In the political interaction formulation, politics is perceived as interactive, a manifestation of the exercise of choice by multiple players within the existing parameters. Examiners define these parameters by the functions of power and authority. A review of the meaning of power in theory, and some of its manifestations within the African setting, is useful since this idea is central in our exploration of the options for economic development. B. Barry (1980, 185) goes beyond the traditional conception when he warns us to define power not merely in terms of getting outcomes, but more exactly in terms of getting outcomes despite resistance. We share his belief that:

Political power... [is]...the ability of an individual or of a group to change the outcomes of some decision-making process from what they would otherwise have been in the direction desired by the person or group, where the decisions made are binding on some collectivity (1980, 185).

Barry’s definition is useful not only because it provides for inherent resistance from within the community to holders of power, but also because it recognizes that political power is located in many segments of society, besides the state institutions. This view helps us better appreciate the form of political might within the Third World setting. As we shall see, this nature of disbursement of political power usually influences the selection of the direction of economic development for many African countries. Although they do not emphasize the aspect of resistance, Chazan et al. do provide us with a good working definition of power and authority. They perceive power as the capacity to control the valued goods of “material and normative resources, identity and interests, institutions and symbols”. Authority is the right to enjoy that power (Chazan et al. 1988, 21).

We need answers to the following questions: What is power? What is reciprocal or bargaining power? How is power configured in society? What was the colonial power sys-
tem? What is the power system in the Third World? Answers to these questions should equip us to better understand the functions of power and authority in the political interaction of postcolonial societies like Uganda.

**Reciprocal or bargaining power.** Since all the transactions of political interaction involve bargaining of one form or another, it is important that we clarify the meaning of certain ideas associated with power in the bargaining exercise. To answer the question, what is reciprocal or bargaining power, we turn to Harsanyi’s bargaining model of social power (in Bell et al. eds. 1969, 247). In this depiction, power is distributed in inverse proportion to costs and offers available among the competitors. This implies that every offer involves a cost. However, there are practical and technical problems involved in quantifying power relations. It is therefore meaningless to place actual values (on a cost-benefit basis) upon variables in the power equation for measuring power (Dowding 1991, 68).

Because influence is a fundamental component of all bargaining transactions, Harsanyi identified four types of influence techniques (1969a, 229) available to a power holder. These are supply information or misinformation, gain legitimacy, provide unconditional positive or negative incentives, and supply conditional incentives to another actor(s). The first technique, information, is important in all power relations. A rational player, Goodin (1980) reminds us, however, will forego the collection of the information if the cost outweighs the benefit of a particular information item. The same author reminds us that given the nature of things, governments and particularly bureaucrats have privileged access to information and can prevent ordinary citizens from finding it by creating costly barriers. This has been a common scenario (Victor Le Vine, 1975) in postcolonial Africa. This condition potentially improves the bureaucrat’s bargaining power compared to the ordinary citizen’s in many bargaining situations. The significance of the second technique in bargaining, gain legitimacy, is that the legitimacy state leaders enjoy over other leaders in society is a major source of power. Supply of unconditional incentives both negative and or positive, the third technique, is intended to affect the target actor(s) calculation of the opportunity cost of his/her actions. The incentives are unconditional since the actor(s) must bear the costs, or receive the advantages of the incentive whether or not s/he conforms to the wishes
of the provider of the incentive. Through this strategy politicians try to alter the incentive structures of individuals and groups. That successful threats and unsuccessful offers are both costless (however successful offers and unsuccessful threats are expensive) are the important properties of the fourth bargaining technique, supply of conditional positive or negative incentives.

All these techniques when used by an actor involve costs. The four major costs (Harsanyi 1969a, 227) that an actor must incur include: the cost of communication of the commitment, the cost of making the commitment credible, the cost of monitoring the activities of the target player or players and the cost of carrying out the commitment. With varying degree of success, holders of government power in African countries have used many of these bargaining techniques to place the economy in their favourite ideological direction, during the last thirty-two years. For example, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, leaders like Nyerere (1967, 5), Rawlings, and Sankara used many aspects of the four techniques of bargaining, to place the national economy of the respective country on their favourite ideological path.

**Asymmetry between threats and offers in bargaining.** The player planning a bargaining strategy would do well to contemplate the asymmetry between threats and offers. It is this asymmetry within the techniques that often decides the outcome of the bargaining endeavor. Offers, as Dowding (1991, 73) illustrated, cost more when they succeed and threats cost more when they fail. A player using an offer in political bargaining ought to be aware that increasing the offer tends to increase the probability of incurring the cost of success. On the other hand, increasing the threat, while it remains credible, decreases the probability of incurring the costs of carrying it out. Commonly the use of threats does seem attractive, since their only limitation is credibility. However, those seeking to use threats in bargaining should heed Schelling’s (1966, 35) advice that some threats are inherently incredible, and others are inherently credible. This dual property of threats helps to explain why, despite possessing and threatening to use the seemingly overwhelming coercive capacity of the state, many African rulers have largely failed to compel reluctant segments of the population into following the official economic development policy.
In many situations those opposed to the ruler's policies also recognize the incredible nature of the alleged threats. Therefore, opponents of the ruling regime usually do not hesitate to direct their own constituencies to disobey government orders. The opposition may reason that it would be too costly for the ruler to carry out what it considers an incredible threat. When this analysis is correct, the ruler is unable to act while the opposition, lacking military force, is also unable to secure power. This often results in an impasse with respect to the design and implementation of the national economic development policy.

**Studying Power in Society**

When we use the political interaction framework we do not study the power structure just by looking at who gets what and when; we strive to understand why. And when using this framework, we do not concentrate only upon decisions which concern those groups whose organizations explicitly lobby government; we also examine other groups (Dowding 1991, 82) in society that may not lobby government. This is particularly useful when studying bargaining power in African societies, since many powerful groups are not allowed or are not inclined to lobby government, given the uncertain political conditions that are found in many African countries.

**Systems of Power**

The preceding survey of power introduced us to an overview of the function of power in the political interaction sketch, in a global sense. We shall now consider two power systems that have existed on the African continent in the past and present that influence political interaction. The objective of this survey is to show that the power systems we present play a prominent role in informing the protagonists of the options for economic development from which to choose. We shall look specifically at the colonial and the Third World systems of power (Leftwich 1983, 133, 153, and 158).

**Colonial power system.** Radical political commentators have often blamed the colonial administration (Leftwich 1983, 133) for denying the indigenous people power over their own local affairs. When reviewing the colonial power system, Leftwich
focused on the colonial administration's arrangements for the government of colonial societies and the distribution of power within them. He is critical of the fact that frequently political power was placed in the hands of chartered companies, while in other cases settler communities were given large blocks of land and power. These two types of the colonial power setups are illustrated in the operations of Charter Companies in West Africa (Nkrumah 1963, 24-25) and in the history of the White settlers in Kenya (Huxley 1948, 59-60). He further argues that in both instances the administrative pattern was usually arbitrary and lacked substantial local participation. This pattern of administration was partly responsible, in Ali Mazrui's (1980) view, for the development of the negative collective psychological memory of colonial rule. This mood was evident in the often derisive rhetoric that politicians of the radical ruling parties in the first postcolonial governments used when referring to the colonial era (Nkrumah 1963, 7-8). The same power system is partly to blame for the rise of fragile state institutions (Amin 1974, 202, and Markovitz 1987, 90). These institutions have been a handicap with which performers must contend when designing economic development programs in the postcolonial era, particularly in Africa.

The colonial system also disturbed the indigenous power system. Strong kingdoms like that of Bunyoro Kitara, which was ruling a larger area of western and southern Uganda at the arrival of the British, were soon crippled (Ibingira 1973, 6; Mittelman 1975, 62). Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the new system of production, distribution, administration, and educational policies stimulated the emergence of new social groups within the indigenous societies (Elliot 1975, 167). The new groups consisted of junior public servants and professionals in many fields. Since many were interested in obtaining the resources of power and wealth in society (Abernathy 1969), this ambition often conflicted with traditional and colonial authorities. It was therefore inevitable that from these groups sprang nationalist leaders who spearheaded movements that led to obtaining constitutional independence after the Second World War. It is also important to remember that the new ideological philosophies—such as the radical dependency and underdevelopment, and a genre of African socialist philosophies that African political parties and politicians dabble with today started as a reaction to the colonial administrative system. Nkrumah's socialism, Nyerere's 'Ujamaa' (a form of collective self-reliance), Kaunda's Humanism, are three
examples of philosophies that were reactions to colonial rule and were inspired by the radical dependency and underdevelopment schools of thought (Chazan et al. 1988, 42, 273, 109). These philosophies culminated in the ongoing debate concerning the course for economic development that a postcolonial African country such as Uganda should follow.

**Third World power system.** When evaluating power systems in the Third World, those who use the political interaction outline allow for the direct and decisive influence of Western penetration in that region. While contributing positively to development in many ways, as suggested by Horowitz and Trimberger, the system was also responsible for the current absence of a developed constructive political culture in many African countries (1976, 233) Chazan et al. (1988, 17); Grace Ibingira (1980, 25).

Leftwich suggested that unlike the colonial system, the precolonial political power system provided a climate that encouraged local development in many Third World regions. He analyzed the precolonial subnational autonomy, self-sufficiency and balance between, and within villages, which he believes was more conducive to development than the centralized colonial administration systems (1983, 161). The colonial power system eroded the traditional power system to the extent that although there is still variety in the politics of African societies, self-sufficiency and autonomy of villages (162) have virtually disappeared. Other negative outcomes of the colonial system include exacerbation of inequalities within and between rural and urban areas, landlessness, poverty, and slums. New conflicts arose among the indigenous people, particularly concerning the direction of economic development to pursue after gaining independence. In many countries the two main political parties that contested the first postcolonial election (for example the Democratic Party, a procapitalist party, and the Uganda Peoples Congress, a procommunist party), reflected this conflict.

Whether using the political interaction formulation, or any of the other mainstream or radical school formulations, Leftwich (182) cautions us not to assume the existence of a full fledged ‘ruling class’ in many Third World societies. For example, such a class that predated colonial rule, was systematically debilitated by the political elite that inherited the colonial state, in countries such as Uganda (Mutibwa 1992, 23), and the latter was in turn
dislodged from power by a new military ruling elite. Internal power struggles weakened the military regime and eventually led to the downfall of such regimes. Military rule was followed by a period of uneasy political association between the postcolonial ruling elite and the indigenous ruling class, which filled the political vacuum created by the downfall of military rulers - since neither of the two groups was strong enough to enjoy exclusive national political power. Intractable political differences between these two groups led to a guerrilla war, followed by a civil war. A new ruling elite, composed mainly of younger people, such as the victorious guerrillas, with few if any links to the old power centers, took control of national political power. (However, some observers such as Jackson and Rosberg, [1982, 1-6, 22] argue that there is an African ruling class that is not dominated by external forces). Leftwich contends that the wide scope of external control and influence of transnational corporations and other external solicitors of the productive system of many Third World countries prevents the existence of such a class. This pervasive external presence on the African continent erodes the opportunity of players to make independent choices. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that local players enjoy much independence when selecting a path for economic development. Policy makers have often complained that such external influences as the wide fluctuation in export commodity pricing limits the freedom of African policy makers to design meaningful economic development policies (Kajura 1993). It is this vulnerability to external factors or dependency (Griffin 1969, 44), that radical critics regard as one major constraining colonial legacy.

The increase in the power of the state, the militarization of the state, struggles for its control, and the brutality often used to eliminate or suppress opposition, are all important subjects addressed in the political interaction framework. These volatile situations may be traced to the polarization of society on a wealth basis (Leftwich 1983, 187). There has been polarization of the African society, between individuals, between urban and rural, and between regions and sectors. One consequence of this situation is that political parties usually exhibit overt hostility to each other. This is so since usually rival parties represent divergent interests and present radically contrasting proposals about how resources should be used and distributed. It is these contrasting platforms presented by protagonists that we have in mind when we speak of the competing, often exclusive, paths to economic deve-
lopment that many African people have endured. Failure of players to agree on the appropriate course for economic development that a country should follow has been the major cause of the economic development lethargy that afflicts many Third World countries.

**Environmental and Historical Constraints**

**Environmental Constraints**

There are several environmental constraints that dictate the options for economic development available to players within Third World societies: heat, unpredictable rainfall, disease and pests that harm people and animals. Investigators using the political interaction framework have used a macro-economic interpretation (Karmack 1976, chp 2) of the debilitating consequences of the Third World environment when illustrating the independent variables, embedded in the ecology, which limit the alternatives available for economic development. For example, Chazan et al argue that the constraining ecological conditions Karmack compiled, along with poor tropical soils, together with a low population amidst a high growth rate have had a 'profound impact on the [continent’s] economic evolution' (Chazan et al 1988, 23).

**Historical Constraints**

The political interaction framework endorses the role historical factors (particularly constraints) play in dictating economic development for Third World countries. These constraints directly influence their options for economic development. We shall consider here colonial boundaries, economies, and the education system. Artificial boundaries are considered by Mazrui and Tidy (1984, xi) as the most dramatic and likely most enduring contribution of colonial rule. These boundaries eroded the potential for the development of those crucial networks which would have nurtured and reinforced the development of nationalism within each African country. These boundaries were a grave mistake because indigenous societies previously had mutually exclusive organized institutions (Mojekwu, Uchenda, and Van Hoey eds. 1977, 12). Although the boundary policy suited the colonial strategy of divide and rule, it made consensus difficult in the postcolonial era.
Benveniste and Moran (1962, 13) focused on the problems caused by colonial economies to economic development. In their view, colonial economies invested heavily in the small export sector, at the expense of the underdeveloped domestic sector and ignored indigenous economies in which most local people worked. They argued convincingly that cash cropping not only altered the agricultural bases of African economies, but smothered the chances for the development of local industries. It is this legacy of colonial rule, that they call the burden of economic weakness, that African countries carry. Inquirers using the political interaction framework adopt the radical view (Higgot, 1983, 35) that the colonial experience rendered local economies extremely vulnerable to external shocks, a condition independence did little to alleviate.

Radical critics blame the vertical stratification of indigenous societies on the colonial education system since it created a small Western-educated elite that existed in the midst of a large uneducated population. According to Chazan et al.,

[The educated Africans] were too few to have a forceful impact on their surroundings, too different to have strong roots in their society, and too bound to Western institutions to undertake significant transformation of their environment. In the social realm, much as in the economic, the colonial experience offered new opportunities while simultaneously curtailing the prospects for their realization (1988, 26).

This opinion gives us a good reason why Africans, particularly the educated elite, not only exhibited a negative collective psychological stance regarding colonial rule, but also could not decide with confidence which path to adopt for economic development after colonial rule ended. (Markovitz 1987, 90; Amin 1974, 4).

Chazan et al. (1988, 27) trace the absence of a constructive political culture in most African countries to colonial rule. They argue that efforts adopted by the colonial administration to democratize Africa at the eve of independence are atypical of the authoritarian pattern of government that characterized colonial rule. For one critic (Low 1962, 43), the poor colonial economies meant that fledgling political parties were usually financially strapped. This slowed the pace of development of parties as institutions. Part of the weakness of the political culture in many countries has been traced to the infancy of party politics. (For all African countries, the governing parties at independence were formed after the Second
The fragile political culture has had serious repercussions on the selection of economic development strategies for countries such as postcolonial Uganda.

There are commentators who think that the negative collective psychological memory of colonial rule is the most pervasive and difficult one (Chazan 1992, 28) to explain. Ali Mazrui (1980, 7) believes that the collective memory of the colonized peoples at independence was that of humiliation in the political, cultural, moral, social, and the physical domain. He believes that it was this humiliation that generated the backlash against foreign rule and it influenced expectations associated with the acquisition of sovereignty. We must recall this internalized bitterness when we study the political interaction of indigenous people in all countries, particularly those that have witnessed dramatic political and economic changes, such as Uganda. This psychological condition also influences the attitude of actors when designing the plan for economic development that a country should follow.

**Patterns of Political Interactions**

The political experience of African countries in the postcolonial period (Baker 1970, vol. 4 issue 1, 3-16), has yielded an array of ways of interchange between the regimes in power and their local constituencies. The frequency and nature of these relationships mirror both the relative success and failure of government attempts to penetrate the domestic social matrix; they also reflect the willingness of individuals and groups to collaborate with official agencies and to involve themselves in their activities. Chazan (1992, 220) correctly adds that the resilience of indigenous social institutions and practices has entailed that effective official designs have been filtered through local interests, needs, values, and concerns. Under these conditions (Dunn 1986, 7), the exercise of political power depends on both the resources, capacities, objectives, techniques, and political conduct of ruling elites and on the vulnerability, organization, and priorities of specific communities.

**Forms of political interaction.** Investigators have devised a useful continuum for analyzing forms of political interaction in African countries since independence. At one
extreme is the center domination, such as the type that was practised in South Africa before de Klerk; at the other extreme, large segments of the population detach themselves from contact with government, as was the case in Chad, and Uganda before Museveni, in the 1970s and 1980s. Regimes which adopted the former style of interchange were repressive, for example Rhodesia until the independence of Zimbabwe, and Burundi during the 1960s. These regimes had few structural linkages with the bulk of the population. Indigenous people lacked autonomous resources to exploit, and were very vulnerable to outside interference. In the latter form of interaction the center had only a weak control of the surrounding region during much of the postcolonial period. Disenchanted communities devised ways of disengaging from the center and its confusion. They mobilized their own resources, established autonomous systems of justice, sought protection from warlords, and reduced their association with the center. Political life was (Chazan et al. 1992, 221) unpredictable and haphazard.

Several patterns that existed between the above two extremes have also been investigated. These include: forms of individual domination, as in Doe’s Liberia, and Equatorial Guinea; state-society confrontation as in Afro-Marxist countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola; subtle forms of vertical interchange developed in countries like Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Malawi.

Cohen (19, 4, 1970: 3-16) identified crude forms of competitive interchange that developed in Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria. Holmquist (18, 1972: 60-80) observed that this fledgling competition was often of an unproductive sort. Baker (ed. 1984) identified the beginnings of participatory and reciprocity patterns in Senegal and Botswana. Ghana and Sierra Leone (Burrows 1976, and Tangri, 1985, 39) experienced intermittent occurrences of state-society transactions, whereas local communities detached themselves from the government arena in countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Ergas, 1980, 387).

### Changes in patterns of political interaction

By the 1990s, most African countries were at the brink of social and economic collapse. The unrest, decline, or stagnation that occurred in many countries were clear symptoms that most postcolonial patterns of interchange were failing or had failed. In some countries the economic crisis of the 1980s
induced adjustments: responsible financial management, cutbacks in the public sector, a relaxation of repression, decentralization, and in a few countries, competitive elections. Some analysts believe that these changes were prompted by the realization of the ruling elite that monopolization of power by authoritarian means had outlived its usefulness. Furthermore, the ruling elites were forced to accept that political problems required political solutions. It was therefore reckoning, introspection, and consultation which forced leaders to assume fuller responsibility for their predicament and move away from authoritarian forms of rule.

Conclusion

New Processes of Institutionalization

We conclude this chapter with some comments from the political interaction framework, regarding the new processes of institutionalization which were forming, and we also outline the political dynamics within Africa in the early 1990s. Observers confirm that the search for a stable and effective form of government has alienated increasing numbers of Africans from welcoming military intervention, as often happened earlier. Instead actors have attempted to institutionalize political procedures and practices based on power-sharing and reciprocity between rulers and the ruled (Sklar 1983, 26 no.3/4, 11). In the 1980s, Sklar predicted that the African process of democratization could be premised on the realization by leaders that to consolidate the center, new organized mechanisms of interchange between it and its environments, particularly in the direction of social and economic transactions, had to be created. In practice, that has led to a greater diversity in political practices and dynamics. In countries such as Kenya, Liberia, Ethiopia and Zambia, these initiatives have inspired a new constitutional process. Many viewers of the African scene agree that whether the process succeeds or fails, it has helped expand the scope of choice, especially in the selection of directions for economic development that African countries are to follow in coming decades.

Outlines of African Political Dynamics

African political dynamics, although often in flux, have, as Dunn (1986, 177)
observes, coalesced in the independence era. He depicts political centers not as striving to establish themselves, but also as trying to expand their reach. He argues that lateral transactions among formerly separate individuals and groups have increased. These manifestations are expressed through new social networks which are pressing for reciprocity in the conduct of political life. He predicts that the political challenge for African countries in the independence phase will focus on the delineation of firm criteria for accountability and construction of structures to guarantee their enforcement. It is not our purpose to review the continent’s post colonial political dynamics in detail. Those interested in reviewing developments within African political dynamics since the 1980s, from a mainstream perspective would benefit from a recent study of political development under difficult political and economic circumstances, the ‘new realism’, in Sub-Saharan Africa (Apter and Roseberg [eds.] 1994). The changing political scenery within individual African countries since independence received attention from scholars from a wide range of disciplines and political outlooks. For example, Rupesinghe (1989) edited a multi disciplinary study of conflict resolution in Uganda in which the changing political relationships among Ugandans since independence were highlighted.
CHAPTER FOUR
AN EXPLORATION OF THREE POLICY AREAS: FREE ENTERPRISE, THE MOVE TO THE LEFT, AND THE POLICY TOWARD THE CONGO, WITHIN THE ECONOMIC APPROACH, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND THEORY OF ACTION PERSPECTIVES

Introduction

We have used the economist’s guidelines to explore the prospects for Uganda’s economic development in the free-enterprise period. This spell, which had its roots in the colonial era, and lasted for nearly six years after independence (1962-1968), is what we have called the free-enterprise economic development system/policy era. Aspects of the token (Allison 1971, 28, 32); and type (Elster 1985, 10-15, 358-67) rational choice models will help us to explain the behavior of actors in the political interactions of Ugandans during that period. We highlighted the inus or inner conditions that were important in explaining outcomes that influenced national economic development policy during this period. We use the term inus to refer to the “non crucial” aspects of an outcome situation, which however distinguish it from other similar outcome situations (Mackie 1974). Discrepancies between the ideal and token situation are the crucial causes of those particular outcomes, in our view. We now explore the inus or inner workings of the political system at the national level at the eve of independence, and in the early post colonial period, to illustrate the political conditions which helped Milton Obote come to power. We shall also show how Obote used another inus feature of the national political scene, the indecision of his political rivals, to dislodge them and his political opponents from the national political scene, before imposing his radical economic policy.

Post colonial political parties. The Uganda People’s Congress was formed during the period immediately preceding the 1961 election by combining the Uganda National Congress (UNC) faction led by Obote [somewhat leftist Protestant] with the Uganda People’s Union (UPU) in the Legco (Sathymurthy 1986, 384). The UPU consisted mainly of young and vaguely radical intellectuals who formed a pressure group with nationalistic sentiments, within the Legco (393). The DP had started as a Catholic rival to the Protestant-
dominated political parties, and its membership and orientation were exclusively Roman Catholic. After the 1958 elections, the DP directed its opposition to the Uganda National Congress which DP leaders believed had a Communist political agenda (Sathymurthy 1986, 383). The KY movement was formed to pursue the interests of Buganda, by acting as a power-broker in the post colonial National Assembly. This objective led to the rejection of direct elections in Buganda, and the advocacy of electoral college status for the ‘Lukiiko’ [Legistature] in the 1962 general elections (Lwanga-Luyiingo 1989, 38).

**Early rivalry between advocates and opponents of free enterprise and the issue of Buganda’s position in Uganda.** Some individuals and groups were determined to dismantle the institutional set up upon which the economists had based their predictions for a positive post colonial economic development climate. At a UPC meeting in Mbale, Nabudere, a lawyer with communist sentiments, who was also a university lecturer and a prominent member of the radical group, once threatened that his camp would liquidate those who hindered the progress of the UPC-left. This forewarning pointed to the impending plight Obote’s opponents were to face in the future. MPs from the opposition parties took this warning seriously and demanded in the National Assembly that the government clarify what they considered as a sinister threat to their lives. Radical MPs in parliament had a difficult time trying to diminish the ominous implications of Nabudere’s statement; their explanations failed to allay the fears of the Kabaka Yekka (KY) and DP MPs (Sekanyolva 14 February 1966). The intolerance to opposition displayed by the pro Obote group on this and other occasions was a harbinger of the unpleasant future the free enterprise economic development system was to face under Obote’s rule.

On the other hand the pro free enterprise individuals and groups who had expected to guide Uganda’s economic development along the free enterprise path assumed by economists in the “ideal model,” were suspicious of one another’s motives and therefore lacked a purposeful unity. Within the group were those who considered as unpalatable the position of *primus inter pares* or “first among equals” Buganda had enjoyed during the colonial era (Ibingira 1973, 84-85). The British allowed Buganda substantial autonomy in local administration since they were convinced that the Baganda were capable of looking
after their own administrative interests, and through the The Native Authority Ordinance of 1919, the British had 'exported' the Buganda model of local administration, and Buganda civil servants, to much of the rest of the country (Laws of Uganda, vol. II, 1046). People like W. W. Nadiope from Busoga, C.J. Obwangor from Mbale and George Magezi from Bunyoro devoted their energies to demanding that the departing colonial government reverse this status quo. (Kasfir 1976, 109).

Ugandan scholars, particularly those from Northern Uganda such as Pinychwa (1978, 19), have suggested that Buganda’s prominence within colonial Uganda was the result of the kingdom’s fortuitous location at the center of the colonial state. Other scholars use Buganda as an example to highlight the colonial differential modernization, in support of the underdevelopment school’s notion of how the world capitalist system created unequal development in peripheral states, such as Uganda (Kasfir 1976, 104-108). Kasfir for example claims that colonialists developed Buganda to function as the metropolis while neglecting the rest of the country - the satellites of the peripheral state. Pinychwa and Kasfir’s explanations portray the effect (my emphasis) of colonial rule. These scholars propose, arguably, that colonial arrangements helped develop Buganda at the cost of other regions. (There are scholars who believe that since Buganda provided most of the funds for central government transfer payments, while none of the twenty one counties of Buganda [in Obote’s unitary republican constitution of 1967, in which all reference to Buganda was consciously omitted, these counties were lumped into four regions - Mubende, Masaka, East Mengo, and West Mengo - and still did not receive grants from the government] ever received funds from the central government, other regions benefited as well if not more than Buganda from the colonial arrangements (Nsibambi 1966, 12).

Both Pinychwa and Kasfir’s explanations of Buganda’s prominence are flawed and may lead us to erroneous conclusions since they fail to address the colonial regime’s fundamental justification for locating its headquarters in Buganda. Like Low we believe the British decision to place the territorial capital at Entebbe was not a random act, rather it was because they wanted to study, and take advantage of, Buganda’s pre colonial structure of administration, which they had decided to adopt when establishing British rule in the rest of the territory comprising present day Uganda. For example, the Native Authority Ordinance
of 1919 transmitted the Buganda model of local administration, and Buganda civil servants, to much of the rest of the country (Laws of Uganda, vol. II, 1046). In addition to the centralized administrative system, Barber mentions the pre colonial centralized road system as another important consideration which attracted the British to place their headquarters in Buganda (Barber 1968, 84). Pinychwa and Kasfir’s analysis may mislead the reader when they reverse the order of cause and effect (my emphasis) of the colonial regime’s attraction to Buganda. They blame the colonial state for locating most of its organs of administration in Buganda, without mentioning the perilous political conditions that were prevailing in other parts, particularly in the northern territory of present day Uganda, and they do not mention the comparative political order in Buganda when the British arrived in the territory. Yet reality entails that cause precedes effect. British government’s disinterest in Northern Uganda was partly due to the prevailing ethnic strife (cause of British disaffection) in the region that pre dated colonial rule. Barber depicts the relationship between the ethnic groups, which convinced the British that the area was not suitable (effect upon British policy) to host the colonial headquarters, as follows: “The relations between the tribes had, by this time, settled into a pattern of mutual hostility and raiding and counter raiding for water, grazing, and stock ... It was among such people that Macdonald signed 28 treaties, in none of which British protectorate was promised” (Barber 1968, 84).

Similar to Low and Barber we believe explanations of Buganda’s prominence in colonial Uganda should not ignore or attempt to downplay the vital role pre colonial political and economic development in Buganda had played in convincing the British to place their headquarters there. During the seven hundred years that preceded colonial rule Buganda had evolved into a stable, politically organized, centrally administered kingdom; this, more so than any other considerations, attracted the British to locate the colonial headquarters (Low 1988) in the “unattractive” (in European terms) steaming tropical environment on the shores of Lake Victoria at Entebbe in Buganda. Climatic conditions, proximity to European settlements, and strategic location within the British overseas territory, were usually vital considerations for selecting a site for a colonial territorial headquarters. If local pre colonial political development had not been a paramount consideration for choosing the colonial headquarters in Uganda, other locations would have been more attractive to the
British than Entebbe. For example, Mbale on the foothills of Mount Elgon in Eastern Uganda, Kabale in the highlands of Southwest Uganda, each of which place has a modified tropical (high altitude creates a temperate climate in these areas) climate similar to that of Nairobi; Jinja near the country’s border with Kenya - where the largest community of European settlers in East Africa lived, or Pakwach on the Banks of the strategic Nile close to the territories of the British empire in North Africa.

Those who were frightened of Buganda’s prominent position in Ugandan politics included the once influential Grace Ibingira, Uganda’s first post colonial Minister of Justice who came from the kingdom of Ankole. A British trained lawyer with liberal sentiments, he was a founding member of the UPC party. Despite his desire to contain Mengo’s political stature, Ibingira was sufficiently politically astute to broker a coalition with Buganda as the only sure way to guarantee victory for his party, the UPC. He was therefore one of the major architects of the UPC-KY alliance (Ibingira 1973, xii, 200-202). Although Mengo wanted a federal organization of the state, Ibingira and his friends pushed for unitary constitutional arrangements for the post colonial state (Ibingira 1973, 163). Despite the political differences between Mengo and the Ibingira group, on the political-economic level the two sides had much in common since both embraced a common economic philosophy of free enterprise.

Ibingira admitted that fear of the prospect of Buganda dominating post-colonial Uganda politically persuaded him and his colleagues from Western and Eastern Uganda to develop a rapport with Obote. They regarded Obote as politically weak and malleable, and hence easy to control, since he came from a politically insignificant Nilotic ethnic group (Lango, Obote’s home district, had only four out of the ninety-two seats in the first independence parliament) of Northern Uganda (85-86, 140-141). As king makers, Ibingira and his colleagues thought they would have a firm grip on the national government (Ibingira, 1973, 202). A wide, albeit undeclared, political-economic philosophical gap which colored the activities of the UPC existed between the Ibingira and the Obote factions. This gap became clear only when the latter faction ultimately revealed its uncheckered socialist sentiments.

We shall review Obote’s precarious policy toward the Congo and how he circum-
vented the constitution in the process of expanding his political power. These two events offered his opponents substantial ammunition to justify trying to use legal and constitutional means to remove him from office. However, those opposed to Obote’s style of ruling Uganda, who were led by Ibingira, took a long time before deciding when and how to constitutionally replace Obote. This indecision derived from suspicion and distrust within the anti Obote ranks. The inability of the Ibingira group to act was matched only by the eagerness and determination of the Obote group to grab power at whatever cost (Ibingira 1973, ix, 286; Mutesa 1967, 187-190). The struggle between the rival factions in the UPC party to control the state, and the relationship between the two factions and the Buganda government, form part of the inus aspects of the post colonial political process. Although “non crucial” or not necessarily determining the direction of the national economy, these intra party struggles and the state-region relationships, however, had a strong influence on the “outcome situation” or the final economic policy. In Mackie’s conception, the ensuing struggle within the ruling party and between the party and regional political actors such as the Buganda government, distinguish Uganda’s post colonial economic development direction from that of countries similar to Uganda but without a similar political configuration.

The token or actual situation aspect of rational choice theory aided our inquiry into the economic development policy choices that actors made in the first decade of independence. The reference to the type or model situation we made, facilitated our appraisal of the direction of post colonial economic development that analysts had predicted for Uganda. With examples we illustrated how sometimes actors behaving like rational egoists sought membership in political groups only when they reckoned that the benefits derived from membership exceeded the cost of the obligation.

We premised our investigation of the actions of Uganda’s ruling elite on the thesis that the economic development direction each ruling regime followed mirrored the social-economic background of the key figures of the incumbent government. This view departs from the conventional wisdom that public policy reflects a consensus from bargaining within a plural society (Barongo 1989, 66).
**Free Enterprise Policy/System**

**Basis of policy.** Uganda’s colonial history, particularly the land policy, encouraged the development of a strong spirit of private ownership of the means of production within the local population (Nsibambi 1989, 222). Ugandans, particularly in the southern kingdoms, learned to be self-supporting within the colonial free-enterprise system at an early stage of colonial rule (Jørgensen 1981, 48-58). Farming was the mainstay of the country’s economy. Farmers soon learned the method of surviving in a free enterprise system. For example, lacking a free public education setup, farmers had to learn all the capitalist techniques of tight budgeting, to provide for the farm and the educational needs of the farmers’ children while meeting government tax commitments (Uganda Blue Book, 1938; Jørgensen 1981, 164). A substantial portion of industrial goods manufacturing, distribution, wholesaling and retailing, and the import and export trade of both commodity and industrial products, was in private hands (187-189, 250). The colony therefore depended on private effort for its economic survival (62).

Indigenous Ugandans functioned so successfully in this system that soon Uganda had one of the highest literacy rates in the region, and a highly educated professional elite, capable of efficiently running a government, on the eve of independence (Jørgensen 1981, 160). The Christian ethos that permeated the fabric of Ugandan society, conveyed through missionary schools and churches, also promoted the spirit of individual effort, and was exhibited in the desire to accumulate wealth, maximize profit, and strive for excellency among Ugandans from most regions (Lugard 1890, 89, 112; Berkeley, 2 November 1896; Reports on Trade and Finances, 1897, No. 1844, C8277). Over 80 percent of the population of Uganda are practicing Christians (Kyemba 1977, 136-137). Therefore Ugandans embraced individualism and competition, two characteristic qualities of the free-enterprise philosophy early in the history of the colony (Sathyamurthy 1986, 167). The sizeable numbers of “free-enterprise” oriented people who came to Uganda from the Indian subcontinent during the colonial period generated more energy in the system. For example, by 1921 76 per cent of the economically active Asian population were engaged in private commercial enterprise (Ramchandani 1978, 91). Colonial treaties, particularly the 1900 Agreement, and similar agreements concluded between the colonial government and rulers of other king-
doms in Uganda, formalized private land ownership and consolidated the free-enterprise system in the country (West, 1972, 11-47; Jørgensen 1981, 49).

**Anticipating a rise in the standard of living.** Formal political independence came to Uganda on 9 October 1962. One Ugandan historian, Mutibwa, offers this poignant background of the attitudes of Ugandans from different regions of the country to independence:

... the sons of those Langis, Acholis and Lugbaras who had worked as despised laborers on farms in southern Uganda, particularly Buganda, were now among those at the helm of the new ship of state. They were the new leaders, in both the political and military establishments. The leaders from western Uganda, including the rulers of the kingdoms themselves, were somewhat unsure of where they belonged and to whom they should give their loyalties. But they trusted the Buganda leadership, especially Kabaka Mutesa who, they believed, would take care of their interests (so closely linked with Buganda’s) against any tide of those men from the north and the east who were now installed in Entebbe, Uganda’s administrative capital. For the northerners as a whole, the new world was still unknown and vague. They were cautious but at the same time watchful. They were prepared to learn, and put to good use any mistakes that their former superior brothers of the south and west might commit. Perhaps some of them, remembering their past experience, harboured a desire for revenge (Mutibwa 1992, 22).

Mutibwa’s revealing portrayal of the ethnic rivalry with which Ugandans welcomed independence, point to the subsequent bitter political feuds of the 1960s and beyond.

Independence inspired a strong expectation of economic development among most Ugandans. Development denotes a rising standard of living. As the real per capita income of a country increases, the absolute number of people below a minimum level of real income will diminish. Many people seem to have expected a quick rise in the standard of living for the ordinary citizen, similar to what Viner (1953, 100) had suggested in theory. Politicians from competing parties and the media worked hard to raise the prospective voters’ hopes for a better future during the electioneering that preceded the independence elections (Pinychwa 1978, 32). For example, the Uganda National Congress’ (UNC) slogan: “African control of the economy of Uganda” was “sufficiently populist to appeal to Africans of every stratum and region without raising the potentially divisive questions about the pace, form and direction of African control of the economy” (Jørgensen 1981, 194).
(This party basically broke up after recording a massive defeat in the first direct elections of 1958, when it won one seat in the 81 seat legislature) (Legislative Council Elections 1961, 17). The DP platform advocated rapid Africanization of the civil service (Apter 1967, 340-344). Determined not to be outdone by the rival parties, the UPC joined the competition for populism; it claimed to support the interests of the farmers, and won the support of coffee and cotton farmers mainly outside Buganda (Welbourn 1965).

Colonial Uganda had enjoyed a favorable economic climate. This prompted the positive economic assessment, along with a bright future, which the international community predicted for Uganda. (For example, an International Bank for Research and Development [IBRD 1961, 12] report that was released just before Uganda became independent had stressed that Uganda’s economic growth, though not spectacular, was steady). In summary, many Ugandans believed that the free-enterprise system would continue without hindrance and that it would lead to economic development in the independence era. In this positive political-economic atmosphere pessimists in the political and economic fields found it hard to get listeners.

Mutesa II, the late Kabaka of Buganda, was one of those who sensed danger when the Union Jack was being replaced with the flag of the newly independent Uganda, on 9 October 1962. He had a premonition that with time the new rulers would impose a different political order, dismantling the safeguards within the institutions of government which protected Uganda’s social-economic and political system. He was worried that the good image Uganda, and Buganda in particular, had in the international community, which depended on the checks and balances within the protectorate system, would end once there was a radical change in the political order. Mutesa II was aware that, despite its shortcomings, the protectorate system had ensured that a delicate peace was maintained during the political interactions of Ugandans before independence. He knew that this delicate peace could be broken if the new rulers did not handle the country’s political challenges with finesse (Mutesa II 1967, 149, 168). In essence, at independence, besides political concerns he foresaw serious impediments for the future of the free-enterprise system in Uganda.

Another prominent pessimist was the Katikiro (Prime Minister) of Buganda Michael Kintu. He was concerned that it would be difficult for the kingdom of Buganda, the king-
doms in Western Uganda, and Busoga, to forge a common political culture with the communities of Northern Uganda, which were traditionally organized on an acephalous political basis (Kintu 1977, 73). To protect regional political interests, such as the kingdom system in Southern and Western Uganda, representatives from the southern and western regions, led by Buganda, championed a federal constitutional arrangement for postcolonial Uganda during the constitutional negotiations that preceded Uganda’s independence. On this basis Kintu demanded guarantees for a federal association for Buganda and other kingdoms to the rest of Uganda, and opposed the coalition between Kabaka Yekka (KY), (the party backed by the Buganda government), and Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party (Mutesa II 1967, 157). His warnings about the divisive tendencies of party politics in a country as Uganda went unheeded, even in some sections of Buganda. He, too, realized that the free-enterprise system would be on shaky ground in a postcolonial Uganda composed of people with diametrically opposed political ideologies (Kintu 1977, 78-67).

That the expectations of the people were dashed when the anticipated glamorous future failed to materialize is well known and will not be elaborated here. Our interest in this section is to interpret in the Uganda setting, the causal relationship between supply factors and demand structures proposed by economists. Improvements in the factors of supply and in the structure of demand, according to economists, enhance the economic development process of a country (Schultz 1953, 5). We shall explore the “inus” conditions of the Uganda society at independence, to help explain why Ugandans missed the predicted opportunity for rapid economic development. Using the rational choice model as a guide, we designed a type and token social-situation model to explain the political interaction of Ugandans and the influence of this interaction on the free-enterprise system and the country’s economic development policies since independence.

**Model of the Social Situation**

Changes in the “supply of factors of production and the structure of demand for products” determine economic development (Meir 1959, 3). In our model we specify the relationship among players. We shall explore the attitude of some important players toward prospective changes in fundamental factor supplies, and the structure of demand for pro-
ducts. We shall make some assumptions about the beliefs, and the desires, of some major actors at the regional (district or provincial), and national (parliamentary) level. To understand the beliefs of actors we must make assumptions about their desires; we have assumed that the desire of the Obote faction to monopolize state power is what prompted the faction to abrogate the constitution (Low 1988, 44). To understand the desires of actors we must make assumptions about their beliefs (Davidson 1985, 25). We assumed that the Obote faction placed a low value on two state institutions, the Legislature and the Judiciary, which according to the independence constitution shared power with the Executive. The low esteem the Obote faction in the ruling party assigned to these two state institutions led it to believe that it could modify the institutional division of power and other constructions of the state, without the faction suffering severe penalties. We also assumed that Obote’s post colonial actions were informed by a fervent urge to uplift his comparatively backward northern region. It is possible that after comparing regional economic development data he indeed realized the inordinate burden of the disease, poverty and ignorance, three perennial Third World conditions, carried by his home region. This is how Kasfir analyzed the sentiments people like Obote had toward the more affluent kingdom of Buganda:

“Members of other ethnic groups became acutely conscious that they had to become strangers in the home of the Baganda to earn high incomes. They resented the fact that the development of their schools and hospitals lagged behind those of Buganda. They watched the Baganda consolidate their numerical advantage by becoming the educational and economic elite as well. By demanding a share of the benefits equal to that of the Baganda, the disadvantaged [led by Obote] intensified the ethnic basis of Uganda’s politics” (1976, 109).

He no longer had to sit and watch with envy the long strides in economic development Buganda was making. As President he now had the power to hasten the pace of development in his home region. By adopting a socialist ideology, he likely believed he would achieve quick economic results for his province.

He believed a radical political stance would greatly aid his national political fortunes; in the socialist ideology he saw a powerful tool with which to discredit the “enemies”, the “anti socialist” pro capitalist forces. After discrediting the “enemies” he hoped to marginalize them politically. Once strong rivals and opponents from the wealthy parts of the coun-

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try were out of the way, it would then be easy to invoke the egalitarian principle of redress to justify the uncontested transfer of resources from the now politically marginalized wealthy regions to his home region, to hasten the eradication of these maladies. He wanted to sell the policy nationally, particularly to what were politically peripheral parts of Uganda like Kigezi. This forced him to sugar-coat it as the policy that would foster a new “political culture”, from which all traces of “feudalism” would be removed (Low 1988, 44). An Obote sympathizer suggested that Obote’s desire to spread the values of “socialism” of his northern people, which were alien to the people of the kingdoms of Western Uganda and Buganda, in part inspired the Move to the Left (Mittelman 1975, 146).

The assumptions we make about actors will help us when reviewing their attitude to the free-enterprise system. Our assumptions about actors inform our understanding why, for example, actors from the same region, or in the same political party, sometimes held divergent opinions regarding the path to economic development that suited post colonial Uganda. We shall also investigate the erroneous assumptions about actors at the regional and national level, which misled analysts to predicting a bright prosperous future for independent Uganda. Finally, we shall argue that the faulty assumptions about, and misinterpretation of, the responses of rival actors at the two levels, misled one faction in the ruling party, led by Obote, into rejecting the free-enterprise system. Instead this faction designed and introduced the Move to the Left (ML) development policy, which was to prove the UPC regime’s undoing.

**Type Situation**

**Factor supply changes.** Mainstream analyses that prescribed a promising future were mainly based on assumptions of predicted positive changes in the factor supply of resources. Changes in the supply of factors of production include: capital accumulation, political growth, introduction of new and better techniques of production, improvement of skills, and other institutional and organizational modifications (Schultz 1953, 5). Economic reports on Uganda made in the pre independence period reveal that many mainstream economists thought that independence would usher in major improvements on the supply factor side of the economy (IBRD 1961, 12). These economists reviewed the causal relations
between “changes in factors of production, and the structure of demand for products” in the specifically Ugandan environment. Many of these economists shared the conviction, popularized by Schultz, that economic development was dependent only on changes in these two areas (1953, 5). Analysts in the Schultz mold expected that qualitative and aggregate improvements in material and social resources would initiate a change in the structure of demand for products. The prevailing opinion within this circle of economists was that, since improvements on the resource supply side on the one hand, and changes in the structure of demand for products on the other side were complementary, changes on both sides would have a multiplier effect on the economic development process. These economists believed all crucial indices indicated that economic development for Uganda in the postcolonial era was assured.

Radical economic analysts such as Nabudere, Tandon, and Mamdan, ideally expected postcolonial legislators, bureaucrats and the masses to devote their energies to removing the limitations on the African political environment identified by the radical school of thought (Wadada Nabudere 1982, 183). Radical here refers to the group of academic and bureaucratic analysts of the Uganda political-economic system, who generally subscribed to the Communist or the socialist radical Dependence and Underdevelopment approaches to development in the Third World. The same analysts expected political actors to follow the radical approach in eradicating the historical, economic and external limitations located, according to radical analysts, in the social-economic context (Amin 1974, 359-394; Wallerstein 1974, 7). Proponents of the radical economic model expected political actors in Uganda to use this model to eliminate the social and economic inequality which radical analysts had identified as underlying Uganda’s political inequality. These same left-oriented analysts, many of whom were also political actors, expected the leaders of the post-colonial state to fight against the historical dependency which analysts believe originated in the colonial era, and the new dependency, which people such as Wadada Nabudere believe is exclusively conditioned by the exigencies of international commodity and capital markets (183). Radical economists envisioned post-colonial Ugandan rulers uniting with actors from other African and Third World countries to actuate a change in the pattern of global exchange dominated by Western European and American capitalist countries. These eco-
nomists believed global exchange dominated by the Western capitalist countries was responsible for the asymmetrical global exchange between the center and the periphery (Rodney 1972, 7; Griffin 1969, 38-42; Dillard 1972, 840-842)

For some time the former British and French colonies which did not break ties with their onetime benefactor appeared to be thriving well and stable. In reality, the economies of these countries remained vulnerable to international commodity price fluctuations, since for many of these countries cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton and tobacco remained the main source of export income. Many of these countries experienced faltering attempts at industrialization, bad economic planning, corruption, and a drastic drop in commodity prices, particularly in the mid 1980s and early 1990s. This situation wiped out even the little progress in economic development in countries such as Kenya, Ivory Coast and Ghana, which had not experienced recent civil wars. Countries such as Guinea, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola flirted with communism as an ideology, then strongly advanced by the former Eastern Block and China. African countries in this category seemed to have suffered a worse fate economically. (Rudimentary technology that was found in the communist block countries meant that these countries were frequently unable to meet their own people’s food and other vital needs. Increasingly Eastern Block countries had to buy food and reliable technology from the West. Convertible currency needed for trade with the West was always scarce since the region produced few things that were needed by the West. In this economic environment, countries in the industrially weak ruble economic zone, tended to have unfavorable terms of trade in their trade dealings with the advanced Western industrial countries). Unable to look after the welfare of their own people, countries such as the former Soviet Union, East Germany and Hungary could only comfortably provide arms to their African friends with very little or no other forms of economic development aid. Friends of the Eastern Block with few commodities needed in the international capitalist economic system, such as Mozambique and Ethiopia, soon became starved of convertible currency. The above picture supports our argument that mainstream and radical political economists were wrong in their expectations that reliance on either the Capitalist or Communist camp was all it took to achieve economic development for a Third World country, such as Uganda.
Economic Activity Under The Free-Enterprise System

The country's healthy economy was reflected in the external trade surplus it enjoyed for most of the period of colonial rule (Thomas and Scott 1934, 342-346; Uganda Statistical Abstract: 1957-1964; IBRD Report 1961). Mineral and agricultural resources were available in impressive quantities and were already being exploited for export; exploration for oil had suggested the existence of an oil reserve in the western region; increased demand in the real estate industry entailed that the Tororo cement factory in Eastern Uganda was soon supplemented with a new factory at Hima in the western region. During the last decade of colonial rule and for a long time after independence, copper was the third highest export income earner, behind coffee and cotton. With an average annual growth of 9.9, between 1966-1970, the two industries, mining and quarrying, exceeded the 6.00 per cent annual average growth target by 3.9 per cent (Republic of Uganda Plan 111, Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Table 4.1). Much of this increase in production in the mining industry can be attributed to the free-enterprise era during which the maximization of profit encouraged high product output in all sectors of the economy. Improvements in the factor supply side of the economy during this period seemed to confirm the forecast that Uganda would enjoy a reasonable pace of economic development in the independence era.

The Madhvani Group of Companies at Jinja was the lynchpin in what was regionally known as the fledgling industrial center for East Africa. The rapid development of the Jinja industrial zone was impressive; it was therefore not surprising that during the period 1966-1970, twelve out of the country's sixteen leading manufactured goods were produced in Jinja (Production of Manufactured Goods, 1966-1970, Table 4.3, The Republic of Uganda 1976, 204). Consumer goods from Jinja included: sugar, textiles, confectionery and beverage products, paper and stationery material. Light and medium iron and steel products for the local and foreign markets were also manufactured at factories in Jinja. Neighboring countries such as Kenya, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Sudan provided the major markets for manufactured products from factories in Uganda. Cotton apparel, including the high quality Ugil shirts made by the Uganda Garment Industries Limited (UGIL), were significant export items to West Germany and other European countries. Manufactured exports (excluding copper exports) grew steadily, increasing by 9.5 per cent
in 1976. Exports of manufactured items to Kenya increased considerably during the free-enterprise policy period. Private enterprise was the cornerstone of the country's export earnings from the manufacturing industry during the free-enterprise era (Manufactured Export, 1966-1970, Table 4.4 The Republic of Uganda 1976, 206). Manufacturing of consumer products around other major cities, led by Kampala, was growing at a pace that rivaled that of Jinja. Evidence of the rapid development of industries in the Kampala industrial zone is revealed in table xi-2, (The Republic of Uganda 1976, 204), which shows that eleven of the sixteen leading manufactured goods were also produced in factories around Kampala.

The growth of industries was assisted by the availability of plenty of cheap hydro electricity. To encourage the expansion of manufacturing industries, the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) froze the tariff on electricity for the five-year period beginning in 1971. Without increasing tariffs the corporation could still carry out hydro electricity power capital-development projects and meet its loan commitments (1976, 292). Surplus electricity was exported to neighboring countries such as Kenya. Between one third and one quarter of the total power generated by the corporation was exported to Kenya during the period 1966-1970 (Actual and Estimated Sales and Generation of Electricity of U. E. B. Selected Years, Table 4.5, The Republic of Uganda 1976, 290).

Besides income from mining and industrial goods manufacturing, the economy was fueled with export income from several agricultural products. Uganda grew and exported nearly all crops with a known commercial value that thrived in the tropical-equatorial region. Agriculture was the country's leading industry, contributing ten out of the twelve merchandise exports (The Republic of Uganda 1976, 32). However, for historical reasons coffee, cotton, tea, and tobacco were the most widely produced crops for export. During the five-year period 1966-70, these four crops accounted for 75 per cent of the total merchandise export for Uganda (Uganda's Merchandise Exports, 1966-70, Table 4.6, 32). Rainfall, typically distributed throughout the crop growing seasons, and rich volcanic and alluvial soils were important resources on which farming depended. A systematic insect and pest control program introduced during the colonial period was very successful. The dissemination of modern farming methods improved the crop and animal stock. Forty-two agri-
cultural projects and twenty-nine projects for improving animal farming methods were included in the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry 1970 development projects (The Republic of Uganda 1976, 402-406). The country's farming industry seemed to ensure that the workforce would be guaranteed a stable supply of food. The good climate suggested that the country would be spared the perennial political instability often triggered by unreliable food production that afflicted the Sahel belt of Africa. From the economist's perspective, agricultural factor supply indices promised Uganda prosperity and economic development in the independence era. The positive analysis for Uganda's future economic development was nevertheless flawed since it omitted political factors, which evidently had a significant influence on the postcolonial economic development policies. Records of a boisterous economy during this period also fooled radical politicians into believing that the economic sector would function equally well if they were to drastically alter Uganda's economic system.

**Structure of demand for product changes.** Many analysts were aware that besides a need to adopt strategies that would improve the supply of the factors of production, certain changes in the structure of demand for products had to take place. Economists with a positive outlook for Uganda's postcolonial prospects for economic development were partial to Meir's 1959 thesis that changes in the structure of demand for products of a growing affluent population lead to demands for improvements in institutional and other organizational arrangements (1959, 3). In this perspective, once the required changes in factor supply and the structure of demand occurred, the result would be economic development. The projected changes in the demand for products were expected to lead to economic development through the multiplier effect; expansion of the size and age composition of the population would lead to greater demand for products; this would encourage the expansion of the industrial base, which in turn would result in higher employment and better levels and distribution of income. Richer workers would develop a taste for new products and this would translate in further expansion in the factor supply changes.

Using the economic approach in the preceding exercise, we analyzed the operation of the Uganda economy within the free-enterprise environment. Like the economists we
deliberately omitted including the political factor in our analysis of the postcolonial Uganda economy. We explored the resource supply and product demand indices economists used to appraise Uganda’s economy before independence. According to economists, at the eve of independence, important indices showed that Uganda was poised to make major strides on the road to economic development. In the next section, when examining the token situation, we shall highlight the political factor, which we believe was responsible for throwing the promising prognosis made by economists for Uganda’s post-colonial economic development off track.

Actual (token) Situation

Economic activity under the free enterprise system. Economists had anticipated major changes in the supply of factors of production and similarly spectacular changes in the structure of demand for products. In one analysis, improvements in the supply of factors of production and in the demand for products would translate into economic development (Schultz 1953, 5). There were however several discrepancies between the changes anticipated in theory and what actually happened. A dramatic increase in the supply of the factors of production did not occur. Besides the initial upward jolt in private capital investment, capital accumulation was slow and haphazard. For example, growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1966-1970, averaged only 4.4 per cent, nearly two percentage points below the target growth rate of 6.3 per cent per annum (The Republic of Uganda 1976, Table 4.1, 28). Fixed investment in the monetary sector declined. Plant, machinery and transport equipment, which had experienced rapid growth from 1962 to 1966, had stagnated by 1970. From 1967-1969, the value of private investment declined from Uganda Shillings USh.759 millions to USh.737 millions, because of the unfavorable attitude of the Obote regime to private investment (Ibid. 40). The outflow of private capital exceeded inflow from 1968 to 1970. In 1970, Obote’s last year in office, private capital outflow was fifteen times more than the inflow (Ryan 1971, 21).

The new and more efficient techniques of factory and farm production, introduced in the early days of independence, many of which depended on imported technology, were soon to be abandoned as foreign capital inflow dwindled. With growing uncertainty in the
supply of factors of production, programs to improve the skills of workers were gradually sidelined. Plans drawn up for expanding economic and other institutions, and organizations to cope with a growing and developing economy, were at first postponed and eventually abandoned. Projects that were dropped included the one for upgrading feeder roads, and mechanizing farming in rural Buganda (Sekanyolya 8 June 1965). Political changes caused uncertainty and dislocations in the provision of the factors of supply. The expected changes in the structure of demand for products that would lead to increased demand for manufactured products, did not materialize. There was a large gap between the anticipated process changes and the actual process changes. As a result changes in the two processes did not generate the projected multiplier effect that would lead to economic development as the economists had anticipated.

**Disparity Between Type (ideal) and Actual Situation**

Mackie utilizes the term inus to describe the inner, non crucial aspects of an outcome situation (1974). By exploring the inus or inner conditions of the Uganda political environment, we shall establish the disparity between the ideal and token or actual political economic situation. Mackie's analysis should help us appraise the discrepancies between the two situations, which we believe were the crucial causes of the radical departure from the free-enterprise course for economic development which Uganda had inherited from the colonial era. A review of the disparity between the ideal type and actual, "token situation", should enlighten us about why the predicted process of economic development did not occur along the lines suggested by economists.

Economists who predicted a prosperous economy for postcolonial Uganda presumed that economic development would be a priority item on the agendas of regional administrators and national legislators, MPs. (We referred to the party platforms of the Democratic Party [DP], UPC, and other political parties, each of which contained elaborate sections devoted to economic development. Party members often quoted populist extracts from the party manifesto, which stressed the party’s commitment to national economic development, during the pre independence electioneering, proselytizing peasant crowds). Many politicians had professed a deep concern for the low standard of living of the pea-
sants and had promised to work hard to improve it. Mainstream and radical economists, therefore, assumed that most legislators and administrators would devote most of their energy to devising development proposals and implementing economic development plans approved by the legislature, after Uganda became independent. Once carried out, these economic development proposals were likely to cause the desired changes in "factors of supply," and improvements in the "structure of demand for products." Few economists thought that most parliamentarians would devote an inordinate amount of time and attention to deliberating political issues that had little bearing on economic development. Economists had assumed that competition for scarce resources would preoccupy parliamentarians vying for grants for projects in their home constituencies, leaving them little or no time to indulge in political intrigue.

There was a remarkable disparity between rhetoric and action, particularly of those who formed the independence government, regarding the pledges they made to help the poor and their actions once they were in power. The insincerity of Onama, Obote's minister of Defense, to the plight of the poor, was conspicuous in this response: "We know the people; we are the champions of the cause of the poor [people]" (Uganda National Assembly, UNA 1962, 244). The minister made this remark when defending the government policy of reducing school fees at the secondary school level, without adjusting school fees at the primary school level as promised during the electioneering. During the same session the same minister defended a $133,000 ministerial salary raise, a raise challenged by Hon. Barisigara, the DP MP for Kigezi West (Uganda Protectorate 29 May 1962, 245). Onama, a close associate of the Prime Minister, was among the wealthiest ministers in Obote's government. His business empire included animal ranches, transport companies, and prime real estate holdings in Kampala and other cities. In many instances before and after this occasion, Onama claimed to champion the poor but he and his colleagues enjoyed a lifestyle that seemed to contradict their public utterances.

Africans had been united when demanding independence from the British. Optimists had assumed that the pre-independence tacit cooperation of Africans in all strata would continue after independence was achieved. We indicated how during the electioneering that preceded the independence election, politicians from competing parties promised to work
toward uplifting the standard of living of the ordinary citizen. It is likely economists who made positive economic development predictions for postcolonial Uganda were misled into believing the pre independence pledges made by politicians to work diligently toward improving the standard of living of the poor people. The above scenario persuaded many analysts to conclude that economic development would be the priority issue for all political actors during the independence era.

Support and Opposition to Free-Enterprise

**Advocates of free-enterprise.** According to Pinychwa, a critic of the free-enterprise system, the main forces behind it included: the colonial government, the people of Southern Ugandan particularly those in the kingdom of Buganda, and the Catholic Church. Pinychwa did not, however, mention the Asians, the Anglican Church of Uganda, and Islamic faith communities, which all had strong pillars of the free-enterprise system within their ranks (19). Support for the system cut across party lines, and tended to reflect the social-economic position rather than the social-political background of the political actors. Social-economic position here refers to the economic rank or position of an individual or group in post colonial Ugandan society. Using the ethnological synopsis of the Ugandan society we presented in the introduction, social-political background refers to the traditional political and social organization that was unique to each region and which originally moulded regional perception of post colonial national politics.

For example, while the UPC spearheaded the fight to destroy free-enterprise in Uganda, many party members, including cabinet ministers from all regions-including those from the traditionally poor (and hence partial to the socialist philosophy) regions of the country, were busy accumulating wealth (Mittelman 1975, 124). Advocates of free enterprise thought they could rely on peaceful means to ensure that the system continued to thrive in Uganda. For example, Malik Lakha, a member of the Lakha family, as the chair of the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, sought assurances from the Prime Minister that the increasingly radical policies of the government would not harm the free-enterprise system. MPs from Buganda, Ankole and other kingdoms, led by the Minister of Finance Amos Sempa, who was also the leader of the KY group in the coalition government, acted as
watchdogs. They hoped to forestall the Marxist designs the regime was couching for Uganda by exposing links between the UPC government leaders and leaders in the communist block (*Munno* 4 August 1965). Members of the official opposition, the DP, were vigilant in criticizing the leftist leanings of the Prime Minister. The pro Catholic Church newspaper *Munno* routinely carried feature articles warning Ugandans about the dangers of communism, an ideology with which, the paper warned, the UPC government was flirting (*Musizi* 31 August 1965). Obote and his colleagues assured all concerned parties that they had nothing to fear since his government was committed to protecting the free-enterprise system. However, in 1969 Obote introduced whirlwind political changes that brought the free-enterprise system to a sudden end.

**Strategy to destroy the free-enterprise system.** Lacking a specific constituency that would readily champion the socialist cause, architects of the policy had no choice but to try to create a wedge among Ugandans along an ethnic basis. For example, peasants from the major farming areas, particularly from Buganda, and the kingdoms of Western Uganda and Busoga, were labeled bourgeois property owners; those from the Northern and Eastern regions of the country were identified as the landless poor. The anti-free-enterprise group deliberately avoided mentioning the substantial share of the central government expenditures devoted to the upkeep of those in the army, police, and prison services—three coercive instruments of the post colonial state, that were disproportionately manned by ethnic groups upon whom Obote's political survival depended.

Besides attempts at dividing the country on an ethnic and wealth basis, opponents of the free-enterprise system abandoned the conciliatory bargaining political process typical of the free-enterprise era. Instead they adopted an aggressive, confrontational, non compromising stance that came to characterize the behavior of the UPC-left from the middle of the 1960s until the formalization of the Move to the Left in 1969 (Mudoola 1989, 126). For example, the partial nationalization policy Obote introduced in 1969 took effect during the President's speech. To lend the policy maximum dramatic effect legislators, the public, and those whose business interests were directly affected by the change in policy, were never consulted or even warned of the impending changes in the economic system before the
announcement of the Move to the Left prescriptions. The government showered college students from marginal areas, and malcontents with material gifts and money (Munno 6 May 1969). Since the radical policies lacked support within the public, the UPC-left relied heavily on these two groups to spread the anti-free-enterprise philosophy within the Uganda population. The government-controlled mass media spearheaded by The People, a UPC party newspaper, was also employed to spread the radical gospel. Politicized civil servants, teachers, high school students, and those outside government employment were encouraged with similar rewards to spread the same gospel (Pinychwa 1978, 212).

Problems faced by opponents of the free-enterprise system. The colonial government's relations with the Africans, though sometimes strained, were on balance not acrimonious. The decentralized colonial administrative system allowed the most economically productive and politically advanced parts of the country, such as the Buganda kingdom, a high degree of autonomy in local affairs, as it was federally joined to the rest of the country (Barongo 1989, 66). Africans in the kingdoms in Western Uganda and Busoga also enjoyed what amounted to self government during a major part of colonial rule (Sathyamurthy 1986, 481). Africans in the Northern and Eastern regions of the country, who did not enjoy as much administrative autonomy as those in the other parts we have mentioned, made up the bulk of infantry in the King's African Rifles (KAR), the precursor organization of the Uganda Army (Twining 1935, 208-209; Powesland 1957, 74). Career soldiers and their families depended on the colonial army, and hence the colonial government, for their livelihood (Pinychwa 1978, 52). With time the coercive instruments - the army, police and prison service of the colonial administration were soon filled with Acholís, Iteso, Kakwa, Madi, Langis and people from other Northern and Eastern Uganda ethnic groups (Omara-Otunnu 1987, 31-33). These colonial arrangements succeeded in convincing ethnic groups from the Northern and Eastern regions of the country that they had an attractive stake in the colonial administrative status quo. They defended it with valor, and coerced recalcitrant Ugandans and people from other parts of East Africa into submitting to the colonial authority (Martin 1974, 17-20). By the time Uganda became independent in 1962, all parts of Uganda were integral parts of the protectorate. Ugandans were conver-
sant with functioning in the free-enterprise system, having been exposed to it for the previous six to eight decades (Omara-Otunnu 1987, 32).

This relatively calm colonial political climate was not conducive for groups with extreme radical political ideas to emerge before and after Uganda attained independence. We mentioned the strong support the free-enterprise system enjoyed from the religious organizations, particularly the Catholic Church. As predominantly members of this Church, soldiers, police, and prison staff tended to share the same anti socialist ideological sentiments held by the clergy. Opponents of the free-enterprise system lacked a base of support from any recognizable segment of Ugandan society. Obote and his colleagues had earlier alienated advocates of political pluralism by abolishing multi-party politics, on the flawed excuse that Uganda would progress economically faster under a monolithic ideological political setup than under a plural democratic system. The Move to the Left Policy (which we review in a subsequent section) now alienated the narrow political base Obote still enjoyed, which was located mainly within the coercive branches of the state. Within four months of the declaration of the Move to the Left, rumors of an impending coup led by Onama (the Minister of Defense) and Amin (Chief of Defense Forces), swept Kampala (Uganda Argus, 30 September 1970).

Policy Toward Congo

In this section we shall investigate the actions of Ugandan political actors within the guidelines of the theory of action as presented in the political interaction framework in Chapter Three. We believe this theory informs our understanding of the flurry of political activity, which had a profound effect on Uganda’s post colonial economic development. Explanations of desire, action, and belief in the theory of action are useful in that they inform us about what motivates individuals to act the way they do as they interact politically.

Prime Minister’s Policy Toward Congo

Rationale, and policy toward Congo. Ideological differences within the KY-UPC alliance aligned the UPC-right and KY against the Obote led UPC-left regarding the
1964-6 Congo crisis. Obote claimed that his support for the Congolese rebels was prompted by his desire to thwart attempts by imperial powers to reassert their control in Africa (Mittelmann 1975, 105). A political crisis erupted during Moise Tshombe’s tenure as Prime Minister (1964-1965). Because of Tshombe’s strong pro Western stance, radical Congolese regarded him as a traitor to the cause of African independence and an agent of imperialist states. Some Congolese soldiers rebelled against Tshombe’s regime which they regarded as an agency of American and Belgian imperialism. Both sides in the Congo conflict had sympathisers among politicians in Uganda (Munno 4 August 1965). Dissension within Obote’s party encouraged him to devise a secret policy for Congo. Writers mention both selfish and ideological motives why Obote and a few close confidants secretly committed the regime to buy weapons for opponents of Tshombe from the international market for weapons (Young, June 1966; Ibingira 1973, 287). The Prime Minister did not inform either the cabinet or the public of his decision to give material and logistical support to the rebels. In January 1965, Obote arranged a secret meeting at which Christopher Gbenye, a leader of the Congolese rebel soldiers, met the East African heads of state at Mbale in Eastern Uganda. Two of the objectives of this meeting were to canvas regional support for the rebel cause and to help the rebel leaders acquire legitimacy as national leaders.

Several theories have been proposed about why Obote undertook that particular policy toward the Congo. These were the days when the spirit of the rivalry between the middle-of-the-road Casablanca group and the radical Conakry Group was still very much alive in African politics. The Conakry group had vowed to fight Western imperialism and neocolonialism, which evils they claimed were not only making a comeback but were also frustrating economic development efforts of many independent African states. This group lent moral, logistical and other forms of support to many freedom movements which identified with its radical philosophy. Being sympathetic to the latter group, Obote is said to have supported the anti-Tshombe rebels to gain acceptance and respect among radical African leaders (Mazrui 1975, 25). By committing Uganda to be the arms conduit for the rebels, Obote in effect was giving Gbenye’s beleaguered rebels a new lease on life. It is also likely that Obote’s search for regional recognition as a radical leader encouraged him to side with the rebels. Those holding this view argue that, in the eyes of radical pan Africanists, Nyer-
ere was the only dependable radical leader in the region. Radical pan Africanists had no confidence in the Kenyan leadership, since Kenyatta had chosen to follow a pro Western political-economic path. Obote’s decision to support the rebels was therefore inspired by a desire for recognition as another leading Eastern African radical leader. During this period Obote faced many seemingly intractable political-economic problems at home. Some observers believe that by presenting the actions of the Congolese troops that chased the rebel soldiers into their sanctuary in Uganda as Congolese state-sponsored aggression, Obote wanted to use the Congo dispute as a ruse to make Ugandans believe a common enemy was stalking the northwestern border. He hoped to divert the attention of political rivals and opponents from local politics by creating an external threat. In this way he hoped to buy time as he planned his next strategy for political survival (Taifa Empya 14 February 1965; Mazrui 1975, 26).

On the grounds of national security, the logistics of the policy to support the Congolese rebels were hatched and carried out in secrecy. However, it transpired in the subsequent Commission of Inquiry that the Prime Minister had appointed the then Colonel Idi Amin to liaise between his office and the rebel troops in the field. (Unlike many rebel groups of the time the Congolese rebels had substantial resources to swap for arms. On their own the rebels, however, found it difficult to purchase arms and ammunition from international arms merchants. Without a dependable supply of arms the rebels were on the verge of defeat). In this situation the rebels regarded themselves as fortunate when Obote offered to help them buy arms from the international arms market. Given the sensitive global East-West rivalry of the mid 1960s offloading rebel assets in the West had to be done very stealthily. Coffee and ivory belonging to the rebels could be hidden fairly easily within Uganda’s exports of the same commodities. There were, however, some complications associated with marketing the gold belonging to the rebels on the Western gold market, since Uganda was not a known gold producer. Arrangements made by Obote’s aides with private citizens to market the gold in Europe leaked to the British press. By publishing details of the sizeable gold transaction Uganda had made, Western sources in effect blew open the secrecy with which Obote had hoped to conduct his policy toward Congo.
Position of rival factions, and reaction of the legislators. While Obote’s sympathies were with the radical anti-Tshombe rebels led by Christopher Gbenye and General Nicholas Oleng, the UPC-right/ KY faction in the government implicitly sympathized with Tshombe, who had shown a strong pro-Western stance (National Assembly vol. 58, 4 February 1966: Uganda Argus, 15 February 1965). Obote had involved Uganda in supporting the rebels without the knowledge or consent of the National Assembly (Mutesa II 1967, 187). International law provided a strong ground from which to challenge the UPC government position. Many MPs opposed the government policy for Congo since it had the potential to embroil Uganda in a war with a sovereign African state. Opponents of the policy cited the principle prohibiting signatories from interfering in the domestic affairs of other African countries. They also invoked the requirement for all member states to respect the sovereignty of independent African states (Article 111 of the OAU Charter). Many representatives from different areas of the country felt that the strategy that Obote adopted to achieve his objectives was extremely dangerous to national security. Legislators representing the DP, KY, and the Uganda People’s Congress party, in the National Assembly were concerned with the clandestine troop maneuvers on Uganda’s border.

Obote’s response to criticism. Uganda was a signatory of the OAU Charter; therefore Ugandan leaders were expected to uphold the Charter’s principles. Obote found it difficult to justify the contradictions in his policy to a skeptical legislature. By supporting the rebels, Obote contravened the Charter he was required to uphold. Since Obote was a national leader he was also required to uphold the national constitution. This constitution contained checks and balances that would have prevented him from bypassing the Army commander Brigadier Opolot when dealing with the Army, particularly regarding extraterritorial security policy matters. He found himself in a tight political situation. To extricate himself from this untenable position he decided to act unilaterally, against the wishes of the legislators, when executing the Congo policy. The actions of the rebels turned what had started as a simple foreign policy adventure for Obote and his close confidants into a major political crisis at home.
The rebel strategy in the "gold and ivory affair." The rebels became disillusioned with the Uganda government after waiting futilely for fourteen months for the weapons Obote had promised them. They decided to approach the President, Sir Edward Mutesa II, and members of the rival faction, which sympathized with Gbenye’s nemesis Tshombe, within the government for help. Armed with new and incriminating information obtained from Congolese rebel sources, the rival UPC-right faction demanded that Obote put his policy toward Congo in the open. On 4 February 1966, Daudi Ocheng (KY) introduced a motion in Parliament calling for the suspension of Col. Idi Amin from military duties and an investigation into the alleged receipt of gold and ivory from Congolese rebels by Amin, Obote, Onama and Nekyon (Mutesa II 1967, 184). Political tension mounted in the country and there were rumors of troop movements in and out of Kampala. The two opposing factions within the ruling party, the Ibingira-Opolot group, and the Obote-Amin group, struggled to ensure the presence of units loyal to one faction and the absence of units loyal to the other (Uganda Parliamentary Debates Hansard vol. 58, 4 February 1966; Emergency Meeting, 15 April 1966). Soon national politics was preoccupied with what became known as the “gold and ivory affair”, also known as the “Ocheng Motion” after Daudi Ocheng, the MP who had tabled the motion.

Response of legislators to “The Ocheng Motion”. Concern for the potential damage which the “Ocheng Motion” could inflict on the stature of the Office of Prime Minister compelled legislators to demand a swift and thorough investigation of Ocheng’s allegations. Soon issues relating to bilateral relations and ethics of public servants gained prominence. They displaced domestic economic development issues as the main focus of interest in the National Assembly and in the country as a whole. The National Assembly passed a motion which placed Amin on forced leave, pending investigation of his role in the gold and ivory affair (Hansard vol. 58, 995-1064). Members of Parliament were determined to ensure that politicians conformed to the norms governing the offices they occupied. Besides wanting to protect Uganda’s good image in Africa as a friendly non aggressive country, many MPs also wanted to ensure that the ethical standard of those holding public office was beyond question. Consequently legislators recommended that a commis-
sion of inquiry should investigate key cabinet ministers, including Obote, the Prime Min-
ister. The "gold and ivory affair" attracted heated exchanges in the National Assembly
between supporters of Obote and those who opposed his policy and actions toward Congo.
The Congo issue cut across party lines; opponents of the policy included MPs from rival
parties as well as UPC stalwarts. (Those who had openly criticized Obote's policy toward
Congo were among the many casualties of the political purges of 1966. Non UPC oppo-
nents of Obote's economic policy, which he introduced three years after the failure of his
policy toward Congo, made little effort to hide their sentiments. However, the now cowed
survivors of the political purges within the party paid lip service in public to the economic
policy, while in private they worked tirelessly to derail it). In the National Assembly,
Ocheng revealed sensational detailed evidence incriminating senior UPC government offi-
cials, a military official and a prominent Asian trader, Bandali Jaffer, who was also one of
the six Asian MPs (Hansard 1966 vol. 58; Kyemba 1977, 146). Most parliamentarians did
not want Obote to drag Uganda into the conflict in Congo/Kinshasha since they regarded it
as that country's domestic affair, with little if any bearing on Uganda's national interest.

**Rebel Testimony.** Colonel Oleng, who commanded the rebel Congolese forces,
presented his testimony to the Commission. He complained that colonel Amin had delivered
a token consignment of arms, far below the dollar value of the precious metal, coffee and
trophies received from the Congolese rebels. According to Oleng, Congolese rebels had
delivered substantial quantities of gold, coffee and ivory to Colonel Amin, who was acting
as an agent of the Uganda government. Proceeds from the sale of the treasures and coffee
would purchase arms for the rebels of the Soumailot uprising in Congo/Kinshasha, on the
international arms market. Oleng claimed that top government officials had sanctioned the
arrangement. He claimed that the Uganda government had thus shortchanged the rebels by
delivering to them a paltry cache of weapons. Casting doubt over the integrity of top gov-
ernment leaders created political uncertainty and led to an unstable economic climate.
Oleng's damaging testimony to the Commission placed the credibility of key figures in the
government, and in the army, in question. The resulting political crisis nearly brought all
government business to a virtual halt (Hansard 1966, vol. 58, 91; Mutesa II 1967, 188).
Obote’s strategy to retain power. To exacerbate the crisis, the key witness for the rebel army, Colonel Oleng, was kidnaped and was never seen again. Witnesses claimed those who abducted Oleng from his hotel room came from the now defunct Military Police (Mutesa II 1967, 190-191). At the time in question, people from the Prime Minister’s ethnic group were predominant in this organization. (Taifa Empya Newspaper 4 February 1966). Daudi Ocheng, the MP who had introduced the motion that had set the process in motion which culminated in the creation of the commission of inquiry, died in the middle of the hearings. One of his sons, Temajo, later learned that men dressed in Ugandan army uniforms intervened in the protocol for his father’s treatment, in the private wing of Mulago Hospital, a few days before he died (Sekanyolva 10 February 1966). Officially it was reported that he died of complications while undergoing surgery for an eye condition (The People 10 February 1966). Ugandans were astonished when five key ministers were arrested (Barongo 1989, 79). Around the same time Obote ordered the detention of Brigadier Opolot, the commander of the Uganda Army (Mazrui 1975, 174), during a cabinet meeting on 22 February 1966. (Amin was on hand to give moral support to the para-military soldiers who arrested the five cabinet ministers). Of the arrested ministers two were from the Western province, two were from the Eastern province, and one was from Buganda. Mutesa II’s commentary regarding the arrest confirms the high political regard the arrested ministers commanded among Ugandans from different parts of the country:

They [were] law abiding men with a respect for the Constitution and basic liberties that turned out to be unrealistic in Uganda. .... they thought they had Obote under control by legal measures and did not realise he would turn to violence to save himself (188).

The cabinet meeting was considering the terms of reference for a commission of inquiry to censure Obote not only for allegedly having looted gold, coffee and ivory from Congo, but also for making secret preparations to abrogate the Uganda constitution (Ibingira 1973, 287).

This was the final desperate action Obote took to ensure his own political survival. The military policemen later admitted that, acting on Obote’s instructions, they had arrested the ministers without possessing a valid arrest warrant (Mazrui 1975,15). Ugandans were to learn later that the five ministers had wanted to replace Obote, the embattled leader,
whom they regarded as the source of the country’s political troubles. It was rumored that the five, among whom were regional and national UPC party Chairs, were considering introducing in the party caucus a motion of no confidence in Obote, who was the party President General. The UPC party constitution would have required Obote to resign from the office of Prime Minister once he lost the supreme party position (Mazrui 1975, 16). Obote also seems to have erred in thinking that promotions and monetary rewards were all it cost to appease soldiers (Gukiina 1972, 150). Obote’s reliance on the Army was a strategy that the Prime Minister, later President, was soon to regret, when the same army that propped him up in power for many years eventually deposed him.

**Amin’s role in the policy toward Congo.** Proper military procedure would have required that top-level military brass meet and plan a strategy for handling the threat on the NW border. The civilian government would have had to follow the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, this course of action was ignored by Amin on Obote’s orders.

Amin’s notoriety, sadism, brutality and indiscipline when serving in neighboring Kenya and NE Uganda [Karamoja] during the colonial days, and soon after Uganda became independent, were common knowledge among Ugandans in and outside the armed forces. For example, Kenya colonial army records showed that as a platoon Commander in Company ‘C’ of the 4th King’s African Rifles (KAR), he was responsible for wiping out a Turkana village while conducting an illegal gun searching operation. He had also used excessive force when dealing with the Mau Mau freedom fighters, and later the Karamojong cattle rustlers (Martin 1974, 18-20). Just before Uganda became independent the colonial army administration recommended that he be dismissed from the army, for the crimes he had committed in Kenya (Martin 1974, 19). The colonial governor ruled out as politically imprudent the prospect of placing Amin before a court martial on the eve of Uganda’s independence, since as a lieutenant he was one of only two African officers in the colonial army. He had Obote to thank, for, as the Prime Minister of newly independent Uganda, he recommended to Sir Walter Coutts, the departing colonial administration governor, that instead of dismissal Amin should be merely reprimanded (Martin 1974, 20). Without
Obote’s intervention, Amin’s adverse service record in and outside Uganda was likely to have dissuaded the top military officers who respected discipline in the military, from ever considering him for commanding the troops at the border with Congo. That Amin convinced Obote to give him the border command and the responsibility to handle the Congolese rebel interests testify to Amin’s power of persuasion.

Northwestern Uganda (Kakwa) is one of the five areas of Uganda where Amin was raised (Martin 1974, 17). Amin’s knowledge of this area of the country is one of the considerations which, according to Obote, influenced his decision to give Amin the responsibility to handle the military operations on the NW border, even though there were several officers with unblemished service records from the same region. These officers also knew the region equally well or even better than Amin, having been born and raised in that region. By choosing the operation commander from one of these officers he would probably have avoided many of the problems which eventually haunted his administration and led to the ultimate demise of the democratic system in Uganda. In this operation, Amin’s duties involved handling the gold, ivory and coffee that belonged to the rebels, and arranging with certain Asian traders the sale of these items abroad, and delivering to the rebels the arms and ammunition purchased from Europe.

Extension of military support to anti Tshombe rebels had earlier provoked bombings of Goli and Paida, two small remote settlements near the border with Congo. The bombings were carried out as the Congolese forces chased the rebel guerrillas into Uganda (Mittelman 1975, 104-105). Obote tried to internationalize the conflict when he characterized the bombing incidents as a Congolese aggressive attack on Uganda. He, however, failed to rally national support for his policy, and following “The Ocheng Motion” the legislature demanded a thorough investigation of his policy toward Congo (Mutesa II 1967, 187).

In early 1966 parliament established a commission to inquire into Obote’s policy toward Congo. During the commission hearings Amin corroborated Oleng’s allegations when he admitted to the commissioners that he had received well over three million dollars worth of gold, ivory and coffee, for weapons procurement, from the rebels after the Mbale meeting. He, however, insisted that he did not owe the rebels anything since he had already
delivered to the rebels the arms purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the precious metal, the ivory and the coffee. Amin chose to act outside the military hierarchy and bypassed his superior Brigadier Opolot when collaborating with Obote on the Congo/Kinshasha policy. Like Obote, Amin acted like a rational egoist. In his calculation the cost of not adhering to the military hierarchy of command was outweighed by the benefits he hoped to derive from ignoring that hierarchy and dealing privately with Obote.

**Implications of the policy for economic development.** The political intrigue at the national level generated by this crisis almost paralyzed the business of the first postcolonial government, not only at the national but also at the provincial, regional, city, and municipal levels of government. The political paralysis afflicting Uganda at the time is summarized below:

Such were the uncertainties, with one composed majority tumbling over another-five indeed in so many years-that, feeling cheated of his rightful inheritance as the man who brought Uganda into independence, now at the end of his tether with all this politicking, and wondering where any further majority he might compose could come from, Obote succumbed to the spreading African political disease, arrested five of his ministerial colleagues ... and suspended the constitution fashioned at independence (Low 1988, 42).

The policy toward Congo was couched in a period of high political turmoil that arose from the political machinations of the mid 1960s. Since then, the political situation was frequently so unpredictable that the ordinary citizen found it difficult to focus attention on economic development issues. This policy became a political crisis, which weakened the democratic political system upon which the free enterprise economic development processes were premised. Obote enlisted army support to intimidate and ultimately silence his opponents. By this action he mortgaged himself, and all civilian institutions of government, to the Army.

Soldiers soon realized the importance of the Army in Ugandan politics. Martin describes Obote’s swift manoeuvres to bolster the pro Obote faction in the Army and to gratify Amin: “During a space of nineteen days Amin, from facing the possibility of suspension ... had been promoted to Army Chief of Staff with Brigadier Opolot ... being promoted sideways to Chief of Defense Staff” (Martin, 1974, 23). Obote’s political survival now
depended on Amin. The political intrigue that was associated with Obote’s manoeuvres to stay in power diverted the attention of nearly all centers of power including the army, away from deliberating economic development matters.

Furthermore, Obote’s actions toward Congo/Kinshasha eroded his credibility as a pan-African leader. Exposure of his secret designs to abrogate the constitution caused serious damage to his claim to national leadership. Diminishing credibility made him increasingly dependent on the army for political survival (Mutesa II 1967, 188). Therefore Amin’s coup, which overthrew Obote in 1971, came as no surprise even to a casual observer of the Ugandan political scene. In Ibingira’s view: “Although the Ugandan army did not overthrow Obote until 1971, in actual fact it had been deeply involved in Uganda politics since 1966, for Obote used the armed forces to overthrow the established order of constitutional government and they were the means by which he maintained his increasingly unpopular regime”. From around 1966 many political actors were preoccupied with matters of political survival. This was a period of heightened tension in Uganda’s political climate (Ibingira 1973, 288). The systematic appraisal and implementation of economic development policies were now unimportant in the eyes of many Ugandans, particularly in the eyes of the key political actors (Mutesa II 1967, 188-190).

Obote’s policy toward Congo did not help to restore the confidence of many Ugandans, and that of many domestic and foreign investors in the regime in power. The “gold and ivory affair” is considered by some analysts as the postcolonial crisis that was first to hinder, and eventually to derail, improvements in the factors of production. It also delayed changes in the structure of demand for products. Hence the policy derailed the country’s economic development process from the route which the economists had anticipated. Speaking of the political atmosphere after Obote abrogated the Independence Constitution, Ibingira, the former Minister for Justice, observed: “...personal liberty evidently ceased to exist. He [Obote] directed and controlled every government activity, be it central or local” (Ibingira 1973, 288). Loss of confidence in the Obote regime was partly responsible for the dramatic outflow of private capital between 1968 and 1970, Table 4.2, and the shortfall of the targeted annual growth in the GDP from 1966 to 1971 (Ryan 1971, 21; The Republic of Uganda Plan 111, 40). We shall now interpret the political behavior of actors regarding the
Policy toward Congo, within the theory of action.

**A Theory of Action Interpretation of the Behavior of Actors**

Using the theory of action we assume that political actors in Uganda select from the available options those options they prefer rather than those they do not like. We also assume that actors attempt to maximize marginal utility/benefit. This assumption rhymes with the egoistic assumptions in the rational choice model. (Hechter 1987, 40). Actions of political actors are determined by what they desire and what they believe to be possible, since failing to bring about some highly desired outcome does not maximize marginal benefit. In essence, maximizing marginal benefit necessitates a probability calculation by each actor. We believe that each political actor's reasons for action are the proximate cause of the action. We therefore investigate the reasons for action of an actor in terms of belief and desire. Desire motivates the action; belief channels the action. Thus, action involves a triumvirate of desire, action, and belief. Reality causes actions mediated through beliefs and desires (Davidson 1980, 14).

**Strategy of the inner circle.** This example helps to illustrate that the inner circle in the Obote regime may have believed that the benefits it would derive from supporting the beleaguered fighters in Congo outweighed the cost of not upholding the integrity of state institutions. We have seen that Obote’s beliefs and desires prompted him to adopt a course of action that conflicted with his obligations as a head of government of a sovereign African state to uphold the provisions of the OAU Charter and the Uganda Constitution. A look at the relationship among the major players also gives us some idea of how insecure the Prime Minister was, in his fourth year of office (Low 1988, 42). An appreciation of the beleaguered circumstances in which Obote found himself helps to account for his preemptive strike against those who were planning to use constitutional procedures to resolve the crisis of credibility that arose from his policy toward Congo (Mutesa II 1967, 188). This crisis revealed that his desire to hold on to power exceeded his belief in upholding the constitution, which had brought him into power. The reality of the political situation in Uganda in the Prime Minister’s perspective convinced him that if he were to survive the political cri-
sis that arose from his policy toward Congo, he had to ignore the army line of command. Kyemba hints at the magnitude of the crisis in Obote’s estimate: “Obote established a direct link with Amin, bypassing the Army Commander, Brigadier Shaban Opolot” (1977, 24). He instead dealt secretly with Colonel Amin over the Congo and the ensuing political crisis. This crisis created tensions within the army. (Munno 4 February 1966). Safeguards in the constitution would also have prevented Obote from pursuing his policy on the Congo without the approval of the appropriate organs of the state. His desire to pursue his pet policy encouraged him to circumvent the constraints imposed on him by the Constitution. In his estimate the benefits he would have derived from conforming to the demands of the Constitution fell short of the cost of the obligation to uphold the Constitution. Despite the lofty ideals (the desire to fight neo-imperialism and colonialism that were making inroads in independent Africa) that Obote claimed to have inspired his policy toward Congo, his actions in this instance were commensurate with those of a rational egoist. By supporting the rebels he stood to gain personal political respect from the intra-African politically radical elements, at a substantial cost to the country’s reputation as friendly to its neighbors. Our findings, however, confirmed that Uganda, the Prime Minister and the UPC party incurred a high domestic and international political cost as result of the UPC-left policy toward the Congo.

**Behavior of the legislators.** To understand the beliefs of the actors we make assumptions about their desires, yearning, or longing; the forms in which beliefs are manifested. To understand their desires we make assumptions about their beliefs or convictions since these inspire desires (Davidson 1985, 25). The reaction of parliamentary representatives suggests that most of them believed the credibility of a leader was dependent on upholding a high ethical standard. They believed the obligations of a ruler to protect the constitution and treaty obligations took precedence over the incumbent’s personal beliefs and desires. Evidently, all but one legislator, Mr. Kakonge from Bunyoro, believed the likely benefits of lending their support to the inner Obote circle fell short of their obligation and desire to uphold the constitution (Barongo 1989, 79). Therefore MPs from the ruling party joined with those in the opposition in passing a near unanimous bipartisan vote to establish the commission which was to probe the sensitive matters involving the key figures
in the UPC government, and Idi Amin, then a high ranking soldier (Mazrui 1975, 13; Hansard 1966, vol. 58. 91). Cabinet ministers and MPs from the ruling party joined with representatives of the opposition parties to pass a motion that might have led to the impeachment of the Prime Minister. This act speaks volumes of how important clean government was in the perspective of legislators on both sides of the aisle.

Obote’s inflammatory rhetoric on property ownership, repressive policies, and encroaching political radicalism had, by 1966, alienated many of his political allies. It was clear to political observers that he was doing little to preserve and promote the conciliatory political approach that had helped him come to power. For example, he initiated a rivalry between regions, particularly between Buganda, Busoga, the kingdoms of Western Uganda, and the Northern province by calling repeatedly for a “struggle against feudalism” (Hansen 1977, 63). He focused his attack on the system of private land ownership which was highly developed in these three areas but virtually unknown in the Northern province. The force and deception which came to characterize his rule alienated many of those who had helped him get into power (Bagaya 1989, 117). The socialism which was beginning to creep into Obote’s policies alienated those MPs and cabinet ministers who regarded Obote the socialist and his socialist program as “atheistic and downright hostile to religion” (Mazrui 1971, 6).

**Behavior of Amin and the soldiers.** Mujaju believes that Amin developed an interest in ruling Uganda soon after Obote used him as the pitbull which he would unleash upon his political rivals and enemies from 1966 onwards. During this period Amin took lessons in oral English as though he was preparing to read speeches in English (Mujaju 1989, ). If Mujaju’s analysis of Amin’s behavior is correct, it is possible that, from 1966 onwards, Amin was looking for an opportune time to dislodge Obote from power. Viewed from the perspective of the theory of action we see that Amin’s delay in overthrowing Obote involved a probability calculation. He realized that a premature attempt to take power could place his plans to rule Uganda in jeopardy. A person’s actions are determined by what he or she believes to be possible, since failing to bring about some highly desired outcome does not maximize marginal utility/benefit (Davidson 1980, 14). So long as in
Amin's probability calculation he still needed Obote, he was willing to defer to Obote's desires. Amin portrayed himself to Obote as a loyal and obedient servant. Jørgensen traces the beginning of the close collaboration between Obote and Amin to Uganda’s secret intervention in the Congo crisis (1981, 255). Since Obote viewed Amin as just a useful tool for executing the policy toward Congo, he did not recognize that Amin too had political desires which he might one day want to fulfill. On the other hand, by only satisfying his marginal benefits (these included amassing a small fortune by diverting Congolese rebel, and Uganda Army, funds into private coffers), Amin did not appear to be a political threat in Obote’s estimate. He was therefore allowed much freedom to act without supervision. He utilized this period to recruit Nubians from Southern Sudan who owed their allegiance not to Obote or the Uganda flag, but to Amin.

The Congo policy revealed the weaknesses within the Uganda Army. Clearly troop loyalty depended more on ethnic affiliation and material rewards rather than on the obligation of soldiers to defend the state against external enemies. The policy generated tensions within the army. (Munno 4 February 1966). Soldiers realized civilian rulers could get away with ignoring state institutions that regulated political power and the army line of command without sanction. While the bulk of the soldiers came from the northern and eastern region, ethnic loyalty ensured that Obote had the support of the Acholi and Langi troops, while Amin cultivated the loyalty of the Kakwa, Madi, Alur and Nubian soldiers. The Itesot from Eastern Uganda, though ethnically affiliated to the Acholi and the Langis, were at first reluctant to side with the UPC-left, since this faction had dislodged Opolot, an Itesot, from the topmost position of commanding the Uganda army. Conflicting loyalties within the troops meant that, despite the unstable political situation ushered in by the Congo policy, neither the commissioned officers nor the regular troops believed in the capability of the army to rule Uganda. So long as the army remained divided it could not, as a unit, desire to take power from the civilian rulers.

Conclusion

Our survey of the strategies some actors adopted when devising and executing Uganda’s policy toward Congo suggests that some key political and military figures
allowed their beliefs and desires to take precedence over their responsibility to safeguard the checks and balances, which protected the sanctity of the democratic system. The democratic system had, until 1966, guaranteed the division of political power among the three national institutions: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Although these arrangements tended to frustrate and hinder the efforts of those who were determined to destroy the democratic process - the framework upon which other Ugandans hoped to hinge a strong democratic political culture. There were people from the three main political parties, the DP, KY and UPC who believed in and genuinely worked for the “joint good”: those committed to preserving and promoting the then existing democratic institutions that were created through consensus, and while facing insurmountable odds strived to raise the standard of living of the poor Ugandans. Those seeking to reap maximum personal benefits engaged in political machinations, which greatly hampered, stalled and subsequent reversed the process of economic development which was premised upon plural democratic political ideals, in the independence era. Despite the growing disillusionment of Ugandans with his rule, Obote had a strong desire to hold on to power. It is also possible that his decision to lend support to the Congolese rebels was inspired by an ambition to be recognized as a strong anti-imperialist pan-African leader. For example, the Obote regime devoted excessive attention to external affairs relating to the internal conflict in Congo/Kinshasha, yet this conflict did not threaten the integrity of Uganda in any substantial way (Ibingira 1973, 287). Obote’s need for political survival, and a desire for intra-African recognition as a leading radical ruler, were strong enough to convince him to ignore the OAU Charter and discard the Independence Constitution.

The Move to the Left Policy of 1969

Rationale for the Move to the Left Policy

Obote’s Move to the Left (ML) policy was inspired by a need to create a new source of political support rather than a sincere belief in the socialist direction for Uganda’s economic development. In Mudoola’s analysis, “the ML was the tool by which Obote hoped to gain the legitimacy he had lost when ... he abolished the kingdoms in areas such as Buganda and Western Uganda (1989, 126-129).” Obote and others in the UPC-left
believed they could achieve this objective by dividing Ugandans on an ethnic and wealth basis. The strategy of divide and rule prompted Obote to dramatise the social-economic and political gap between the regions, particularly that between Buganda and the northern region (Hansen 1977, 63). According to its architects, the policy was going to raise the standard of living of all Ugandans. For example, Obote promised to expand free social services, to introduce policies that would ensure that the income of the ordinary citizen, "the common man", would rise faster than the cost of living, redistribute national income, and restructure the economy and national institutions, so that they become responsive to the needs of the ordinary citizens (The Common Man's Charter 1969, parag. 24). Presumably the policy would ensure that the number of people below a minimum level of income would diminish. Therefore the policy was sold as an effort to redress individual and regional economic disparity to disguise its more sinister aims, which (if not hidden) could have caused Ugandans to reject it outright. Obote’s frequent attacks on Buganda left no doubts in the minds of political observers that it was this kingdom which he had in mind when he spoke of "the danger that economic development could be unevenly distributed as between regions of the country." Buganda’s comparative wealth in relation to the northern region, also made him lament the absence of "....automatic mechanisms within our economic system to ensure an equitable distribution of the national income among persons, groups of persons [Southern Ugandans] (my emphasis) or regions [Southern Uganda]" (my emphasis) (The Charter 1970, paragraph 26).

Another objective of the policy was to destroy the free-enterprise system and the private entrepreneurial spirit within Ugandans. For in the minds of the architects of the policy the system and the spirit of free-enterprise were forces beyond their ability to harness. Obote’s determination to destroy the free enterprise system is illustrated here: "It is possible, however, for the overall rate of growth to rise without affecting large masses of the population. This is a danger that we must guard against. We must not, either because of inertia, corruption, or academic love for the principle of the free enterprise, (my emphasis) fail to take bold corrective measures against this danger" (The Charter 1970, paragraph 25). Lacking the finesse to handle these powers made Obote and his friends not only uneasy but also scared of this rival locus of power. To resolve the problem UPC-left
devised the ML, a policy they believed would help them destroy both the system and spirit of free-enterprise. This is how Mudoola characterizes the political conditions that inspired Obote to devise the ML policy: “With the defeat of his opponents, the party in disarray, and a cowed Parliament, Obote was at the height of his power.” (1989, 126). He was now president, under the de facto one party state created by the 1967 unitary republican constitution. After escaping an assassination attempt, Obote took advantage of this event to strengthen his power and that of his government further by clamping down on opposition parties and declaring a de jure one party state in Uganda in 1969 (Barongo 1989, 81). Obote’s action signalled the end of the politics of institutional and legal opposition and conferred an authoritarian outlook to the central government (76).

Policy Documents

Action involves a triumvirate of desire, action and belief (Davidson 1985, 14). We shall explore the primary policy of the Obote mark (I) (We used the labels, mark (I) and mark (II) to distinguish Obote’s earlier rule - 1962 to January 24, 1971, from his latter rule - from December 1980 to July 1985) regime using the theory of action, which we reviewed within the tenets of the political interaction framework in Chapter Three. This theory surpasses other theories in informing our understanding about what motivates individuals to act the way they do as they interact politically in a country such as Uganda. The Move to the Left policy proposal was Obote’s ultimate effort to transform Uganda into a socialist state. Obote’s strategy was introduced in a series of five documents. The “Common Man’s Charter,” which became known as Document No. 1, (Obote 1969), provided the foundation for the ML policy (Jørgensen 1981, 234). In the “Proposal for National Service,” Document No. 2, Obote attempted to portray Uganda’s political development in terms of a social conflict between the elite and the rural folks (Mittelman 1975, 122; Pinychwa 1978, 205). In “His Excellency the President’s Communication from the Chair of the National Assembly 20 April,” Document No. 3, Obote strived to sharpen and give substance to the general themes expressed in the Charter. He stipulated his desire to forge a new “Uganda Political Culture” (Mittelmann Ibid.123). In Document No. 4, the President’s 1970 “Labor Day Speech”, also known as “The Nakivubo Pronouncements,” or “May Day Pronounce-
ments," he declared his intention to nationalize foreign investments in Uganda. He announced the nationalization of 60 per cent of the holdings of the 84 major foreign owned industries in Uganda, stating that the action would become effective immediately (Obote, Document No. 4). In Document No. 5, Obote revealed his ideas for electoral reform and divulged his strategy to coax the electorate into underwriting his grip on national political power (Mudoola 1989, 126-131).

**Opposition to Policy**

The policy, however, provoked a great deal of anger, shock, and resistance from the now disenfranchised majority of the population. We regard supporters of the DP and KY as practically disenfranchised after 1967, when multi party politics was banned. Together these two parties had sent forty-five representatives to parliament, compared to the thirty-seven representatives UPC had managed to send to the National Assembly in the 1962 independence elections. The number of disenfranchised Ugandans was higher if we add the four UPC constituencies outside Buganda, which were represented by the cabinet ministers Obote had ordered arrested in February 1966 (Barongo 1989, 79; Pynchwa 1978, 227). The key sources of opposition to the ML identified in Obote's biography were: religious institutions, led by the Catholic Church; British imperialism; monarchical ideologies; a general conservatism prevalent in Buganda; the Buganda Lukiiko or Parliament (Pynchwa 1978, 171, 182-186). Pynchwa did not, however, mention the cross-ethnic African, Asian and European business interests, which were responsible for divesting from Uganda most private investment capital soon after the inauguration of the ML in 1969 (Ryan 1971, 21).

**Problems with Support for the Policy**

Before the end of 1969, political observers clearly saw that Obote lacked the political authority to bring the mounting violent tendencies to a halt (Jørgensen 1981, 246). We reviewed the ML policy according to the tenets of the theory of action, which we explored within the guidelines of the political interaction framework in Chapter Three. This theory enlightens us about why Ugandans fervently opposed this policy, despite their earlier professed commitment to national economic development. (At independence Obote had allied
with the Asians against indigenous Ugandans, because his ethnic group, that controlled the post-colonial state in Uganda, was not the one that stood to benefit from Africanization [Jørgensen 1981, 251]. When Asian civil servants, manufacturers, and wholesalers allied with Obote to delay Africanization, this in effect created a barrier between Obote and Africans who were in competition with the Asians in the various sectors. Therefore Obote had few friends among Africans in business. While collaboration with Obote to delay Africanization served Asian interests, Asians were reluctant to support Obote in 1969, in advancing the ML policy, a policy they regarded as threatening their economic interests. According to Jørgensen it was not only Baganda who were weary of Obote’s rule:

... detention, low rate of Africanization, low prices for coffee farmers.... The occupation of Buganda symbolized by the renewal of the state of emergency in Buganda every six months throughout the remainder of Obote’s rule earned Obote enmity of not only the traditional Baganda aristocracy and chiefs but also the traders and capitalist farmers. (253).

Obote’s inability to resolve political and economic challenges cost him the support of the ordinary citizen throughout Uganda. For example, unskilled workers organized in trade unions’ had received limited benefits from the Obote regime. The regime was afraid that the economy would be paralyzed by striking workers, protesting against its unpopular economic policies; it therefore tried to abolish the unions’ right to strike. African traders throughout Uganda were apprehensive about the implications of the policy for private enterprise. Asian traders were disillusioned with the Obote regime when under the ML policy it restricted trading licenses, forcing traders to operate at a less profitable level. Restrictions placed on trading licenses hurt the profits of Asian merchants and industrialists who now had a reduced market to supply with merchandise and industrial manufactured goods. In this political atmosphere the ML policy proved to be a difficult item for sale (Jørgensen 1981, 271).

**Strategies of Opponents of the Policy**

We have seen how repulsive this policy was for many Ugandans. Soon violent tendencies began to mount (Jørgensen 1981, 245). Several attempts were made on Obote’s life, with a near successful assassination attempt launched soon after he introduced his ML
policy at a UPC conference in December 1969 (*Musizi* December 31, 1969). (During this incident Amin, who was now the Army Chief of Staff, went into hiding unaware that the president had survived the attempt). When both local and foreign actors who were against the policy continued to do business with seemingly minimal overt acts of sabotage of the economy, architects of the ML assumed that opponents of the policy had been defeated. However, a closer scrutiny of the economic transactions of the period reveals that far from surrendering, opponents of the policy adopted different strategies to resist the ML policy and to protect their interests. This instance illustrates that it was detrimental for the regime to misinterpret the silence of the opponents of the ML policy as surrender.

...Obote [was] a prisoner of his own success. The net effect of his success was to undermine ... those political-civilian institutions ... he so badly needed to legitimize his rule. Obote acquired a conqueror mentality as reflected in his speeches, actions and actions of his troops occupying Buganda. The Kabaka’s Palace (Lubiri) and the headquarters of the Buganda Lukiiko (Parliament) were regarded as war booty and were converted into barracks and army headquarters, .... The atrocious behavior of the troops in Buganda was a subject of bitter comments by Buganda members of Parliament ... but this only drew sarcastic barbed remarks from Mr. Onama, the Minister of Defense (Mudoola 1989, 126)

When Obote evaluated his power relative to that of his opponents, he felt quite strong. He therefore ordered the single-party legislature to ratify the Common Man’s Charter, which was the foundation of the ML policy. The cowed legislators adopted the Charter as government policy.

We can best interpret the actions of those opposed to the ML policy in relation to the precarious political climate of the time. (According to Low, the result of Obote’s draconian handling of the political disagreement he had with the kingdom of Buganda, and the monarchies from Western Uganda, in the period leading to the introduction of the ML policy, was political turmoil for the whole country):

Political uncertainty arose from the breakup of the initial alliance between UPC and the Buganda based Kabaka Yekka (KY) movement: the declaration of the state of emergency in Buganda, abolition of the Buganda monarchy along with the kingships in the western areas of the country, and the declaration of a one-party state that made Obote its president, and seemingly constitutionally unremovable (1988, 1).

Much as opponents of the ML policy would have wanted to influence economic develop-
ment policy through the legislature, the de jure opposition was no longer functioning. There was no safe legal avenue open to dissenting views, since in December 1969 Obote declared that Uganda was to be a one party state. Many opponents of the policy had either been incarcerated or were in hiding. Prominent detainees included the former Prime Minister, and leader of the Democratic Party, Benedicto Kiwanuka; members of the KY movement, and several members of his own UPC party including six of his cabinet colleagues. Newspaper editors, princess Nalinya Mpologoma, a sister of the Kabaka of Buganda, and several saza chiefs (county chiefs) from Buganda were also detained without trial. To avoid detention one only had to denounce the free-enterprise system and heap praise on the president and his new economic policy. The fact that hardly any of the prominent detainees was released during the remainder of Obote’s rule is ample testimony of the determination of the opponents of the ML policy to stand their ground. Those who remained free were forced by these circumstances to adopt covert methods of opposition to the policy, and subsequently to the regime. In their probability calculations, opponents of the policy realized that to maximize marginal benefit, reality ruled out the option of a spirited overt campaign against the ML policy.

Kyemba, who as an Assistant Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, worked closely with Obote during this period, had this to say about the circumstances in which Obote introduced the ML policy: “In a space of just a few months, Uganda had gone from a peaceful democracy to something very close to a military dictatorship” (1977, 27). The reality of the situation convinced opponents of the policy that to avoid detention or worse calamities, covert rather than open resistance was the best avenue through which to fight toward achieving their desire, the restoration of the free-market economy, and the cultural institutions symbolized in the kingships. The extent of opposition to Obote’s policies cut across ethnic lines, and plans to remove him were being hatched daily (Mutibwa 1992, 66). Kiwanuka, a leading Ugandan historian, explained how instead of accentuating the psychological distance between rich and poor Ugandans, Obote’s policies, particularly the ML policy, inspired unlikely groups to form alliances to fight his regime:

[Obote’s] claimed unity was paper thin because apart from the fact that nearly the whole of Buganda leadership was either jailed or in exile, even his northern region was divi-
ded against him. The neighboring districts of Acholi and Lango were hostile to each other to the extent that in 1968 there were rumors that the Acholi were plotting a coup d'etat with the Baganda! Prominent leaders from Busoga such as Sir Wilkerforce [sic] Nadiope and Teso [sic] were also in detention (1977, 30).

Opponents of Obote believed that time was on their side (Kiwanuka 1977). They were aware, as Mudoola observed, that a political system cannot depend for long on show of force alone; it must be backed by a core of political values, at least, among the politically significant social forces (1989, 128). Yet Obote had not only proved incapable of implanting a core of political values among the politically significant social forces, such as the insular ethnic groups; (indigenous ethnic cultures had evolved largely in isolation from one another. It is for this reason that apart from the existence of a few loosely culturally homogeneous communities in Western Uganda, the country lacks an indigenous language through which all Ugandans can communicate) he also failed to plant the same values in urban workers, farmers, and students.

**Implication of the ML Policy for Economic Development**

The "Nakivubo pronouncements" came as a surprise to many people including those in government. There was no public debate before the decision to nationalize, and the policy took effect from the time of the president's speech (Mittelman 1975, 124). Obote thought that, with the backing of the army, he had all the necessary power to overcome resistance from competing sources of power. He also assumed that the few conciliatory provisions in the Charter concerning investment were enough not to scare foreign and local capital away from being invested in Uganda. He placed a few incentives in the Charter, which in his calculations would lure more foreign capital into the economy, despite the reduced control over the investment and the lower profit margins that the ML promised the foreign investor. The flight of private capital from the country (Ryan 1971, 21) indicates that foreign investors felt that the Foreign Investment (Protection) Act (FIA), under the ML (Obote 1969, 6) policy, provided them little if any protection and no incentives to invest in Obote's Uganda.

Although the ML policy had required a 60-40 per cent split in favor of local participation, this was successfully challenged by some international investors. For example, the
government allowed Grindlay’s Bank to establish a separate international and merchant banking concern in which the government had a minority 40 per cent interest (Mittelman 1975, 157). The incentives intended to lure local participants into joint ventures with foreign investors had little effect. Private capital outflow reached a record high in 1970 (Ryan 1971, 21). While these benefits attracted investors with short term objectives, such as Asians with British passports awaiting permission to emigrate to Britain, they generated little long term private investment capital. Some Ugandan Asians transferred substantial portions of their assets to relatives or friends who held British passports. In this way they hoped to bypass the foreign currency rules, and make a quick profit once the Uganda government paid compensation for nationalized properties under the Foreign Investment Protection Act (FIA). This type of paper transfer of assets accounted for a substantial proportion of the increase in business assets of foreign investors between 1969-1970, to which Mittelman referred (1975, 158). Cautious wealthy local entrepreneurs saw the signs that an unstable political climate was unfolding; many Africans, Europeans and a few Asians were therefore reluctant to briskly expand their investment portfolios. This is reflected in the dramatic outflow of capital from the country during this period (Ryan 1971, 21). Naturally, a few opportunists took the gamble (and many lost their investments when the regime was deposed). It was mainly UPC stalwarts who participated in the joint ventures, initiated under the ML policy, between citizens and foreigners (Sathyamurthy 1986, 529).

Success for the policy depended on the commitment of those in government who were expected to lead by example, to convince others that they believed in what they preached. Unfortunately for Obote there was a sharp discontinuity between the UPC-left’s self enrichment and the purported UPC’s sudden conversion to socialism. This undermined elite and mass support for the regime. Ugandans had good reasons for being skeptical toward the policy. For example, the Minister of Defense, Onama, interpreted the Common Man’s Charter as meaning that peasants should work harder to raise their standard of living and everyone should save more to invest. He then noted that he drove a top-of-the-line luxury car as part of his effort to implement the Charter, as a servant rather than a master of the public (Hansard 1970, 304). With a perspective on the Charter such as the one which Hon. Onama often expressed, many people could not help but see the wide gap between
rhetoric and behavior regarding the ML policy of the inner cabinet and close confidants of the President. Cabinet ministers and soldiers were among those who were given or by various means acquired shares in transnational corporations (Mittelman 1975, 157-159). One cabinet minister, who had the distribution rights for the Shell BP petroleum products in the country, which was registered in his wife's name, lost a fleet of fuel trucks when the Obote regime was overthrown in January 1971 (Munno 18 August 1971). Distributing investment shares surrendered by transnational corporations among senior UPC-left party members, contrary to the policy promises of income redistribution, ensured that little if any wealth was ever redistributed to the poor. Within two years of the promulgation of the socialist economic development policy, soldiers deposed the Obote regime.

A Theory of Action Exploration of the ML Policy of 1969

**Political reality that inspired the ML policy.** Reality causes action mediated through beliefs and desire (Davidson 1985). This relation between reality and action will help us explore the behavior of some political actors regarding the ML policy. Adopting the theory of action, we argue that faced with the reality of waning popularity Obote devised the Move to the Left (ML), a policy he hoped would improve his sagging political fortunes. The theory of action surpasses other explanations of the political reality that led Obote to devise the ML policy, the response of rival political actors to the policy and the consequences of the policy to national economic development. Peasants were the alleged major beneficiaries of this policy. Obote had hoped that the economic tenets of the policy would enable him to create a cross-ethnic national constituency comprised of poor peasants and other less fortunate Ugandans. However, he made little progress (particularly at the core of the country in Buganda) to buy support for the policy. At meetings to promote the ML policy, addressed by the president, the troops and police providing protection to the presidential entourage usually outnumbered the local civilian audience. For example, when in 1969 Obote addressed a meeting at Bombo, some twenty miles from Kampala, no more than 100 people attended. The local people were probably scared into avoiding the meeting by the presence of several hundred security personnel who accompanied the presidential entourage to the meeting (Low 1971).
Southall makes a strong argument that the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union made the capitalist or free-enterprise and Soviet or communist models the only options available in the international field during the 1960s. Sagging popularity within the capitalist interest groups at home and abroad may have convinced Obote that his only chance for political survival lay in changing allegiances. He therefore abandoned the capitalist camp and adopted the philosophy of the socialist camp. In retrospect both these models failed to bring about sustained economic development in African countries such as Uganda (1988, 54).

The theory of action provides that individuals select from the available options those alternatives they like rather than those they do not like (Hechter 1987, 40; Dowding 1991, 18). We start from the assumption that Ugandans, like people elsewhere, will select from the available economic development options those they prefer rather than those they do not like. We assume that actions of both proponents and opponents of the policy were inspired and guided by their desire to maximize marginal utility or benefit. The calculations each side made of what it believed to be possible influenced the actions of each group. Assumptions we make about the desires of actors in the rival camps shall also guide our exploration of their beliefs; while the assumptions we make about their beliefs help us understand their desires (Davidson 1985, 25).

Desires, beliefs, and maximizing marginal utility/benefit, In this section we interpret the ML policy in the light of Dowding’s conception of the individual’s desire to maximize marginal utility. This theory should inform our understanding about why many Ugandans opposed this policy, although they had earlier been eager to work together for national economic development. Before Obote introduced the ML, he seems to have made an error in calculating the possible or marginal benefit. Obote mounted a vicious anticapitalist media campaign when launching the ML policy. He warned prospective investors not to decide projects on the capitalistic basis of profitability, but to engage in the government-recommended priority projects (ML par 37). He threatened to nationalize privately owned land whenever his government so desired (1970 par 39). The derisive tone of his public addresses at the time reveals a great level of frustration, the result of Obote’s failure to
achieve his radical economic development objectives or desires. Those who disagreed with the ML policy were disparagingly characterized as "capitalist lackeys," "parasites," "feudalistic," and many other undignified terms (Jørgensen 1981, 235). Persuasion is better than confrontation at eliciting cooperation. Obote therefore erred in thinking that adopting a bellicose stance would help his policy succeed in the face of the strong hostility with which it was received by Ugandans. Documents 1-5, which constituted the ML, were couched in radical, uncompromising language. This implies that Obote no longer desired or believed in participating in a dialogue with, or cooperating with those who did not share his vision for the future development of Uganda. He seems to have made the probability calculation that adopting an uncompromising stance was the best way to achieve his radical objectives. To opponents of the policy, what Obote regarded as the possible was not acceptable; in their calculation he had aimed for maximum rather than marginal benefits. Opponents of the ML were not prepared to surrender; this is the reason for the strong resistance the policy encountered. Also, they did not believe he could carry out his threats.

The Charter and the Downfall of Obote

Observers of the Uganda political scene have volunteered many explanations for the Amin coup. Most explanations of Obote’s downfall ignore or downplay the role economic factors played in inspiring the coup. Economic factors received attention in the minds of the coup plotters. This helps explain why seven of the eighteen reasons soldiers gave to justify the coup were inspired by the need to restore suitable conditions for the smooth operation of the free-enterprise system (Ibingira 1973, 289). The covert resistance to the ML policy which permeated the Uganda society had been initiated and fueled by proponents of free enterprise (Mittelman 1975, 152). The actions or maneuvers of the opponents of the ML were precipitating factors of Obote’s downfall. For example, by transferring huge amounts of private capital out of the country, they helped create an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, which lasted until Obote’s ouster (Ryan 1971, 21). National economic development was a major casualty of the failed ML policy. The unpopular ML, the prolonged “state of emergency” Obote and his colleagues had imposed on a major part of the country, and the detention without trial of political opponents, destabilized the political system. The urgent

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need to reverse these and other unpopular policies of the Obote regime was a prominent theme in the Army announcement of Obote’s removal on 21 January 1971 (Ibingira 1973, 289). The political instability, which bothered many Ugandans, helped to convince Amin and other soldiers that most Ugandans would not miss Obote if the army got rid of him (Jørgensen 1981, 268; Kyemba 1977, 32). With the Amin coup, the UPC-left’s vision of placing the country on a socialist economic development path was dealt a crushing blow from which it has so far failed to recover.
CHAPTER FIVE

SURVEYING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARD THE ASIANS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE THEORY OF POWER

Introduction

We used the theory of power as formulated within the guidelines of the political interaction framework in Chapter Three, to examine the military government’s policy toward the Asians, and the influence of this policy on Uganda’s post colonial economic development. This theory best highlights the nuances within the relationship between the two protagonists - the military regime and the Asians, and the response of other interested political actors to the policy, and the consequences of the policy for the nation’s economy. Military rule brought with it a drastic change in the political and economic organization of Uganda. Where Obote had replaced the plural political system with one-party rule, the soldiers banned all forms of political activities. Where Obote had relied on planning documents and exhortations for radically redesigning the direction of Uganda’s economic development (ML), Amin reversed Obote’s economic development policy without replacing it with a clear economic development vision. Some policies of the military regime encouraged the reestablishment of the free-enterprise system, but others revealed Amin’s desire to retain increased government involvement in the traditionally private economic sector, a policy started by the ousted Obote regime. The removal of restrictions on obtaining trading licenses in 1971 was an example of the military regime’s tendency to support the free-enterprise system. During this period Asian traders were happy with the regime’s policies since in their view the regime had restored the free-enterprise system. The new regime, however, decided to retain the properties of the Buganda government, the Kabaka of Buganda, and of the kings and kingdoms of Western Uganda, confiscated by the previous regime. This reflected the intention of the new regime to retain some policies of the fallen regime.
Policy Toward Asians

Power and Authority, Influence, and National Economic Development

We view politics as the exercise of power by many players, within the existing Ugandan parameters of power and authority. It is within this formulation that we have explored the meaning and manifestations of power in the Uganda setting. In our view, the configuration of power is central to an assessment of the options for economic development that Ugandans have adopted from regime to regime. We shall use a sociological formulation that provides that political power is manifested in the ability of an individual, or group, to change the outcomes of some decision-making process from what they would otherwise have been in the direction desired by the person [or group], to investigate the configuration of power in Uganda. That the decisions made must be carried out by all people living within the given territorial jurisdiction is a basic assumption of this formulation (Barry 1980, 185). In keeping with this definition of power we intend also to explore the inherent resistance to holders of power from within the Uganda community. We have also employed the political interaction formulation that political power is located in many segments of society besides state institutions (Chazan et al. 1988, 21). Besides exploring the source of authority or the right to exercise power in the country that a regime may enjoy, we shall also look at the influence techniques used by actors when bargaining. We recognize that this nature of disbursement of political power greatly influences the selection of the content and direction of economic development policy in postcolonial Uganda.

In this section we argue that resistance from local power centers, such as ethnic institutions, often prevents holders of political office from carrying out their pet economic development policies. We shall use the concept of inverse distribution of power (Harsanyi 1969, 247) to investigate the distribution of power among actors. We shall explore the offers made by actors and the costs incurred by individuals, groups and the governing regime in the bargaining between the Asians in Uganda, and the Military Government. We recognize that the outcome of the bargaining process depended on the asymmetry between threats and offers made by the two sides. Our investigation is also based on the understanding that the success or failure of a regime to mobilize the Uganda population to support its policies depends on the credibility of its threats and offers.
Some Precepts of Power

**Uses of power.** Some analysts interpret political power as the ability of a person or group to direct the outcomes of the decision-making process (Barry 1980, 185). Individuals or groups may, for example, use various influence techniques to change the outcomes of policy decisions made by the national legislature toward the direction desired by that person or group. However, Barry's conception of power only partially satisfies our examination of power disbursement in Uganda. He helps us identify individuals and groups that may seem to wield power at specific intervals, the “short run”. It does not address the frequently reversed or abandoned economic development policies, a typical condition in post-colonial Uganda. Frequent reversals and rejections of economic policies sponsored by state leaders suggest the existence of strong salient forces (not addressed in Barry’s definition) which successfully challenge policies they consider harmful to their interests. Examples of discarded economic development plans include Move to the Left of 1969 (Obote 1970, 1); Uganda’s Plan 111, Third Five-Year Development Plan, introduced when Amin was the President (The Republic of Uganda, 1971, 5), and Obote’s Revised Recovery Program 1982-1984 (The Republic of Uganda 1983, 12). Barry’s definition, therefore, helps us interpret the locus of political power an actor must have, to influence economic policy in the short, not long, run. In our conception long run is what economists call “the sustained movement in the business cycle”, which should span at least twenty-five years (Kuznets 1949, 137-172). Short-run expansion refers to movement occurring within a business cycle, which spans 6-13 years (Meir 1959, 3). Some observers believe that politically inspired economic development plans do not last long because architects of such plans are unable or make only feeble attempts to simultaneously win the support of both farmers, particularly the coffee growers, and of custodians of small and big business (Sathyamurthy 1986,726). This view has also been expressed by president Museveni (*Ngabo* 16 June 1986).

**Control of valued goods.** In the political interaction framework, power is perceived as the capacity to control valued goods which include material and normative goods, resources, identity, interest, institutions and symbols (Chazan et al. 1991, 23). This defini-
tion supplements Barry’s definition and aids our investigation of the long-run distribution of power in postcolonial Uganda. In the political interaction framework, analysts propose that to achieve lasting success, a ruler requires the cooperation of important centers of power. Coffee farmers generate most of the national export income in Uganda. For example, between 1979 and 1981 coffee accounted for 97 per cent of the total national export earnings (Sathyamurthy 1986, 675). The heavy reliance of the country on coffee export and tax revenue means that coffee farmers are an important center of political and economic power. The consumer goods manufacturers also possess substantial economic power. By locally producing goods that replace imports, industrial manufacturers reduce Uganda’s reliance on foreign sources for the essential consumer goods. Reduced reliance on imported goods helps to release the country’s foreign currency reserves. The governments can use the released funds to meet other pressing social-economic development programs. No leader has succeeded in carrying out his/her favorite economic programs without the substantial support of these two sections of the Uganda population.

When a successor regime realizes the limits of its power in relation to other centers of power, leaders of the regime must choose between confrontation with and accommodation of rival power centers. A new regime with prudent leaders will tend to reverse unpopular policies of its predecessor. In this way it hopes to involve those important segments of society which control resources that are vital for economic development. Amin devised a plan to win over those segments of the population disenchanted with the UPC rule. His strategy included promising to restore plural democracy, releasing political detainees, most of whom came from the coffee growing areas; he also arranged for the return of the body of Muteesa, the late Kabaka of Buganda, for burial (Kasfir 1976, 265).

**Internal and External Resources Used in Bargaining**

At different times actors in Uganda have used what Dowding (1991, 67) calls external resources: money, legal and institutional position, and internal resources such as physical strength, determination, and persuasion, when bargaining. Individuals and groups use these resources, for example, to push a preferred economic policy or political ideology in the face of proposals of rival actors. For example, Amin used institutional and legal power
to expel the Asians from Uganda. However, he consulted nobody and did not allow for a national debate of the issue (Mittelman 1975, 228). On the other hand, Asians used money to get favors from the Obote regime. With less success they tried to use the same resource to win favors from the military regime. Asians had limited recourse to Uganda’s legal and institutional resources, since these had been crippled by the fallen regime, a situation the new regime did little to rectify (Smith 1980, 82). Actors in and outside government have also used both external and internal resources to resist policies they dislike. For example, many Ugandans even within the ruling party were unhappy with the way Obote used both “external” and “internal” resources to influence economic development (Ibingira, 1973, 287).

**Inverse relationship of offers to costs in bargaining** The premise that every offer involves a cost implies that power is distributed in inverse proportion in terms of offers and costs available to each player (Harsanyi 1969, 247). This means that as a player exhausts the supply or arsenal of offers, the same player is accumulating costs. It is within this conception of power that we shall explore the offers the Asian community made and the costs it incurred, and how these influenced its political power when bargaining with the military government over immigration and other matters. We shall also show that the offers or rewards which this community had granted to the colonial and the Obote regimes, greatly affected its reserve or arsenal of offers when it commenced bargaining with the military government (Ocaya-Lakidi 1975, 92). Finally we shall comment on the influence of this bargaining endeavor on the economic development of Uganda.

**Gaining Legitimacy and Managing Political Conflict**

**Background to military rule.** The legitimacy state leaders enjoy over other leaders in society is a major source of power (Goodin, 1980). The short-lived technocratic cabinet of the early days of military rule helped to bolster the legitimacy of the regime both domestically and internationally. Some analysts believe Britain was the first country to recognize, or legitimize, the Amin regime internationally, because it was disillusioned with Obote’s harsh policy regarding Asians holding British passports (Mittelman 1975, 200;
Read 1975, 199-201). The frustration of the British with the Obote regim}
gorically that their criticism of the previous regime should be understood by the new regime as a warning for it to avoid repeating the mistakes of its predecessor. Most participants in the round-table meetings were unaware that the military rulers had no intention of resolving most of the political conflicts they inherited. When the meetings were over, Ugandans expected the new regime to start working toward resolving the social-economic and political problems participants had brought to its attention. However, the regime did not resolve the problems, but the military leaders devised various strategies to buy time. They adopted delay tactics which included procrastination, diverting the attention of Ugandans to other matters (such as a threat of an armed external invasion), and the ultimate retraction of promises to resolve the social-political and economic problems brought to the soldiers’ attention during the round-table meetings, and the political-economic problems which the soldiers had promised to resolve, on taking power from Obote. These tactics enabled the regime to yield to none but the least important demands.

Interests, Organization, and Capacity

In this section we investigate the interests, organization and capacities of one important minority community, the people originating from South East Asia, who had settled in Uganda. This exercise will assist us in appraising the power that was available to the Asian social group, and how effectively or ineffectively the group used its power when bargaining with the military regime. A minor objective of our investigation in this section is to identify the processes by which the various individual and group actors interacted with each other and with the government. This should help us assess the strength and weaknesses of actors and the likelihood of various groups to form coalitions with other Ugandans when bargaining with the military regime. This exercise will help us when explaining the outcome of the bargaining process between the regime and the Asians. The same exercise will broaden our understanding of the political interaction among actors, and the influence of this interaction on Uganda’s economic development in the 1970s.

Below we explore some interests, organization and capacity of the Asian community. This investigation will help us determine how well the group utilized the power at its disposal to achieve its aspiration, acquiring a secure home in Uganda. We shall also invest-
igate some weaknesses within the community, which the regime exploited to the detriment of the community. We regard interests as concerns of one’s own [group] advantage or profit, or matters important to a community. Organization here refers simply to the group’s social-cultural, political, and economic arrangements. Capacity is here used concerning the competence of the group, which exists on a high-low continuum and helps decide whether a group achieves its desires.

**Interests.** Two-thirds of the Asians in Uganda were British citizens (Statistical Abstract 1971). Non citizen Asians were under pressure from the Uganda government to leave the country, but Britain was reluctant to absorb them. Asians in this category wanted the British and Ugandan government to reach an amicable arrangement regarding the status of the British subjects of Asian origin in Uganda. Expressing the sentiments of the Asian community, Madhvani welcomed the promise by the new regime to reverse the radical socialist economic policies of the previous regime (*Uganda Argus* 13 July 1971; Twaddle 1975, 8). For nearly five years the ousted regime had survived by adopting an uncompromising stance when bargaining. Since the UPC-left had incapacitated the legislature and the judiciary, Asians and other constituencies which disagreed with its radical economic and other policies had no recourse (Mudoola 1988, 128). This strategy alienated too many constituencies. In the end the strategy proved too costly and contributed to the eventual downfall of that regime.

**Organization.** Although the community commanded commercial strength, socially and culturally it was weak since it lacked cohesion (Barot 1975, 74). Many Asians, particularly those who originated from the Indian subcontinent, had retained the vertical social structure of the homeland (Bharati 1965, 15). Therefore, apart from having the common interest about their residence status in Uganda, internally the community was divided. The caste system divided some Asians into rulers, traders and outcasts or untouchables. This social system remained in force despite facing strong criticism from significant segments, particularly the young, more modern members of the community (Twaddle 1975, 11-12). The Asians in Uganda regarded the country “as an out-post of India.” Another sign
of disunity is revealed in the fact that despite having come from the same subcontinent the Hindus, Ismailis, Goans and Sikhs, to name a few major groups, retained a social distance from each other. ‘... [T]he endogamous character of their social structure [did not experience] any significant change ... social reform movements and modernising influences at work in India did not have the same impact on the Asian urban resident of [Uganda]’ For example the four groups mentioned above participated in separate social-cultural and religious activities. ‘[T]hey lived as a part of their own institutionalised groupings and sub-groupings, as their relatives did in India’ (Ramchandani 1976, 249). Given these strong differences within the Asian society, it is true to say that Asians existed as a community in name more so than in practice. In Uganda distinct groups tended to conduct parallel business interests. This horizontal organization of business interests was another source of weakness for the community (Barot 1975, 74-75). Irreconcilable differences within the Asian community dampened the otherwise significant contribution of the community to Uganda’s economic development.

**Capacity.** The existence of rival groups within the community was a weakness which the regime exploited to its advantage (Kuper, 1975, 53-69). The strategy of the new regime involved exploiting the weaknesses within this vertically stratified community. According to one Asian scholar, “... it [was] impossible to deal with the Indian minority in [Uganda] en bloc; there [was] virtually nothing of sociological significance about the minority which would hold for all its constituent groups. Ideally each of these groups should be dealt with quite separately, for they form more autonomous sub-cultures than, say, the Jews and the Irish in the USA” (Bharati 1965, 15). The weak social and political organization to which Bharati referred eroded the capacity of the community to mount a purposeful challenge to the expulsion policy.

Some Asians had close business relations with colonel Amin until the 1971 military takeover. He had helped many Asian merchants secure lucrative army supply tenders while in charge of purchasing for the Ugandan army. Asians in this category hoped to strike a better deal for their subculture vis-à-vis rival subcultures in the community. Some Asians provided the regime with information which discredited rival groups, hoping to improve the
bargaining position of their group over other groups. (For example, one delegation com-
posed of merchants from the Ismaili Khoja group told the President that they were equally
unhappy about the criminal activities in which some members of the Asian community were
involved, for this tarnished the name of the law-abiding members of the community. They
promised to help the government to bring to justice other criminals within the community
who were still at large) (Munno 10 June 1971). The internal differences made it difficult for
the community to adopt a common platform when it came to bargaining with the regime. In
the end all Asian groups suffered the same fate; they had to leave Uganda.

Influence Techniques used by the Asians and the Military

**Influence techniques used by actors.** Individuals and groups use the follow-
ing four techniques to influence rival actors: they supply them with information or misinfor-
mation, strive to give legitimacy to a preferred policy position, and provide unconditional
positive or negative incentives, or supply conditional incentives to rival actors (Goodin
1980). Since influence is a fundamental component of all bargaining transactions (Harsanyi
1969, 227), here we explore the influence techniques each side brought to the bargaining
exercise to try to achieve its objectives. Each side used these techniques with varying
degree of success.

**Supplying information.** Information is important in any power relationship
since it can be used to manipulate public opinion and public policy (Goodin, 1980). It is
therefore easy to appreciate why possessing valuable information improves the prospects of
an individual or a group determined to influence others, who consider the same item/s of
information important. Therefore information that censures a rival or opponent in the per-
ception of other actors is usually valuable to an actor who is prepared to destroy the cred-
ibility of another actor/s in the politics of a country such as Uganda. When such informa-
tion is released, it may modify the power relationship between the protagonists, strengthen-
ing the position of the actor/s who released the damning information and weakening the
position of the political opponent.
Negative information supplied by the regime. With this idea in mind the military regime launched a public campaign of criticizing the Asian community for allegedly controlling the national economy. The military government released some damning information regarding the role of members of the Asian community in the national economy. Criticism of the Asians grew more stringent in a succession of decrees released from State House (Sathyamurthy 1986, 620), as both domestic and international pressure was increasingly exerted on the regime to reverse its policy to expel the Ugandan Asians. Asians were accused of conspiring to monopolize the economy (Melady 1977, 77). This allegation was not entirely accurate and was not new information. In the past political observers had not attached much importance to references to the same situation in public speeches by populist radical African politicians. It was common knowledge that many of these politicians were becoming wealthy through the intimate business dealings they had with the same Asians they castigated in public (Ryan 1973, 140). For example the Obote government's attitude to Asians was ambivalent; while appearing to take a strong line against them in public, it made sure that wealthy Asian business owners were not subject to repression (Parson 1972, 59; Sathyamurthy 1986, 530). This information sounded different, however, because the regime focused on the injustice and inequity to the African created by the Asian dominated economic system. Statistics showing the share of the economy in Asian hands were distributed through the government and mass media. These statistics portrayed grim prospects for aspiring African entrepreneurs. According to the Racial Classification of Trading Licences in some Towns of Uganda, Table 5.1, the city of Kampala issued more trading licenses to Africans than all the other seven major towns combined, but still issued five times as many licenses to Asians as to Africans between 1964-1965 (Official Records, City and Town Councils 1964-1965).

Community leaders tried winning public support by detailing the Asians' contribution to the country's economic development. They pointed to the many Asian-African partnerships and publicly traded enterprises: in manufacturing, real estate development, the service industry, etc., as evidence of Asian assistance to African entrepreneurs. This information was greeted with disdain by most ordinary Ugandans since many Asians had unwisely retained African directors in Asian firms, supporters of the ousted regime (Sathyamurthy
Asians found it difficult to challenge government accusations that they conpired as a group to monopolize the different sectors of the national economy to the exclusion of Africans. Many Africans interpreted the economic analyses made by leaders of the Asian community as attempts to justify the economic status quo in which the Asians had thrived well for so long (Editorial, Munno 12 June 1971).

Misinformation provided by the regime. The regime also mounted a misinformation campaign in which the community was metaphorically portrayed as a fifth column in the global capitalist plot to keep the country subservient to international capitalist interests as a dependent producer of raw materials. To justify expelling the Asians, the regime made some ridiculous allegations including accusing Asians of “sabotaging the economy” (Melady 1977, 87). The regime depicted Asians literally as a fifth column in the alleged impending military invasion of the country to install Asians as rulers in Uganda (Taifa Emvva 18 September 1972). At one stage the regime alleged that with the help of Western European countries Asians were plotting to depose Amin and restore Obote to power. Although some Asians may have worked covertly against the regime, it was the recently exiled Ugandans such as Obote with whom they struck a deal and not with Western European countries, when planning the removal of Amin. Many Ugandan Asians (including the wealthy Madhvani and Metha families, for example) contributed to anti-government activities of exiled Ugandans (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 43).

As in all large communities, there were some unscrupulous entrepreneurs in the Asian community. The involvement of a few unscrupulous Asian entrepreneurs in illegal and at times criminal (Ryan 1973, 142) business activities led to some high-profile court cases before and during military rule. This had tarnished, but not wholly damaged, the image of the community in the perception of the ordinary citizen (Ocaya-Lakidi 1975, 83, 97). An Asian merchant arrested at the Entebbe airport was tried and convicted on charges of attempting to smuggle 50,000 British pounds out of Uganda (Munno 7 July 1971); another Asian merchant caught with animal trophies valued at nearly US $250,000 admitted that he had been operating a network for smuggling ivory, rhino horns, leopard skins, and other animal trophies for many years (Musizi 15 June 1969). Exposure by the authorities of
criminal activities committed by a few members of the Asian community lent legitimacy or credibility to charges made by the regime that Asians were sabotaging the national economy.

**Unconditional Negative Incentives and Threats**

Unconditional negative incentives are offered to alter the individual actor or group calculation of the opportunity cost of the ongoing or anticipated action (Harsanyi 1969, 229). Many departing Asians had made plans to entrust their private and business interests to fellow Asians who were Ugandan nationals. International law did require that the regime compensate the expelled non citizen Asians with a monetary value equivalent, in a convertible currency, of their assets in Uganda. The regime reluctantly consented to this international law provision to avoid retribution from the international community. Departing Asians expected these guardians to look after their interests until the political situation would either improve to enable them to return and reclaim their property, or to help supervise these properties until the compensation process was completed. The regime soon became aware of this strategy and proceeded to dismantle it (Read 1975, 203-204). Numerous decrees were issued to create sufficient disorder to make it impossible for any businessman to pursue a consistent business policy (Mamdani 1973, 22). The decrees, intimidation and threats of physical harm were strong enough negative incentives to discourage Ugandan Asians from committing themselves to act as guardians of the private and business assets of their departing relatives and friends (Decree 1972, Decree 17; Decree 1972, Decree 30). Asians were required to leave Uganda by November 5, 1972.

**Threats and Offers made by Actors**

**Problems with security of residence.** At the beginning of military rule the Asian community requested the regime to revise the strict business and property ownership laws that were hurting members of that community who were holding the British passport or passports of other countries. Since Uganda law did not permit dual citizenship, Asians with foreign passports were often forced to sell or abandon their business properties in Uganda once they failed to renew their expired residence permits. Asians wanted the regime
to reverse these strict immigration laws. To make their request more attractive, Asians offered the new regime the same financial backing they had extended to the ousted regime. We shall investigate the “threats” and “offers” each side made during the transactions of the policy towards the minority Asians. We shall also reflect on the consequences for Asian-African relations of the offers the community had made to the colonial administration and to the Obote regime.

**Offers made by Asians to the colonial administration.** Asians had representation in the colonial Legislative Council (Legco), at the time when Africans were not allowed to participate in this colonial forum. (Africans were granted nominal participation in the Legco toward the end of colonial rule; the first direct election to the Legco in which Africans participated was in 1958) (Allen 1959, 1). Some African politicians had interpreted the Asian participation in colonial politics as an act of Asian collaboration with the adversary, the colonial government. Sathyamurthy recalls the undemocratic nature of the Legislative Council: “... the Legco was racially scarcely African. It was a forum where the dominant minority races were making decisions which already affected the interests of the Africans” (Sathyamurthy 1986, 321). Many Africans believed that the participation of Asians in colonial politics amounted to an offer to help the colonial administration perpetuate its mode of undemocratic rule (Ocaya-Lakidi 1975, 92). We summarize here the attitude of the Asians in Uganda to national politics and subsequently to Uganda’s economic development: “The Indian businessman does not bother much about things around him as long as his interests are not threatened and the system which safeguards his position is not questioned” (Ramchandani 1976, 3). The disinterest of the Asian “in things around them” was not missed by the Africans who lived all around the Asian. For example, Africans were aware that only a few Asians offered to help the Africans in the struggle that ended colonial rule (Low 1971, 3; Apter 1961, 246).

The attitude of the Asian “businessman” of expressing some interest in national political issues only when “his interests [were] threatened and the system that safeguard[ed] his position [was being questioned]” does sound like normal interest-group behavior in a stable political system. This reactive strategy, however, meant that the Asian was not only
slow when reacting to political issues, but would often end up alienating, as was the case in Uganda, those who opposed the status quo s/he previously backed. While many Africans viewed economic development as premised on development in many spheres of life including welfare, education, and others, to the Asians in Uganda economic development was synonymous with economic growth (Ramchandani 1976, 239). This difference in perception of economic development is important to an appreciation of the attitude of the two groups to national economic development issues.

From the perspective of the Asian, the community had valid reasons for demanding representation in the Legco (Tinker 1975 17; Twaddle 1975, 6; Maini 1975, 113). For example, the Immigration Restriction and Removal of Undesirables Ordinance of 1913 had restricted immigration of Indians into Uganda (Ramchandani 1976, 58). Many issues of interest to the Asian community were, however, in direct conflict with the interests of the unrepresented Africans. Although there was not much conflict between Asians and Africans with regard to operation of large scale plantation farming, conflict between the two groups was usually centered on small scale business operations "... commercial activities requiring small investment and elementary training like “duka” keeping or providing artisan skills had remained their [Uganda Asian] major occupation, and many of them found it difficult to shift to other pursuits. It was primarily in such areas that friction was rooted" (Ramchandani 1976, 239).

Costs Incurred by the Military Government and by the Asian Community

Costs for supporting the fallen regime. There were many wealthy Asians in Uganda. These included industrialists such as the Madhvani and Metha families; hotel magnates such as the Lakha family, who owned and operated a chain of five-star hotels in both Uganda and Kenya, many real estate developers, financiers, and other entrepreneurs (Mutibwa 1992, 84). To protect and increase their stake in the national economy, some wealthy Asians had offered financial and material support to individual party members and to the UPC party while it was in power. This strategy seems to have earned dividends, since many big Asian enterprises were awarded lucrative government tenders and easy access to the dwindling national reserve of foreign currency. Many Asian owned companies
grew fast in the early postcolonial period (Jamal 1991, 82). For example, the original Madhvani estate grew into an industrial empire of over seventy companies, with fifty-five companies in Uganda (Melady 1977, 78). The UPC government entered in an alliance with Asian commercial capital (Thompson 1975, 44). It appointed as distributing agents joint African-Asian companies (i.e., companies controlled by Asians with African placemen being given nominal directorships carrying substantial monetary rewards, or Asian wholesalers) (Sathyamurthy 1986, 530). The cordial relationship which some Asian families in big business had cultivated with the UPC government, though beneficial business-wise, proved to be a serious cost in the end.

After the UPC regime was overthrown Asians became a convenient target for attack. Asians who had given material and financial support to the UPC party and individual members within the party were now eager to extend a similar offer to the new regime. Opponents of the ousted regime accused Asians of duplicity (Musizi 31 May 1971). Critics further alleged that Asians were insensitive to political issues that Africans held dear. The military government added a new charge when it accused the Asians of employing predatory business practices (Uganda Argus 4 July 1972; Thompson 1975, 51). Questionable business practices, according to Ryan, spoilt the reputation of the Asian entrepreneurs in a significant way:

Uganda Asian business allowed stocks of badly needed supplies to run down and deposited funds in foreign bank accounts. There were repeated reports of collaboration among Asians to prevent establishment of African business concerns. ... [O]thers paid Africans to act as “frontmen” for businesses that remained under their original [Asian] owners. ... Asians exercised considerable leverage by hoarding goods, flooding the market with cheap supplies and smuggling commodities from Zaire and other neighboring countries. ...[T]hey purchased large quantities of food crops from African farmers when prices were low, stimulated demand by restricting supply, and resold their stocks at inflated prices. ...The introduction of exchange control in 1970 had ... minimal impact on the export of capital, profits and assets since currency could be converted [on the local Asian-run] black market at 10 or 11 shillings to the dollar (compared with the official rate of 7.14 shillings to the dollar), (Ryan 1973, 140-158).

In the early 1970s many Africans had misgivings about the Asian-UPC political and economic partnership of the previous decade (Ryan 1973, 44). Prominent members of the Asian community had had close connections with the deposed regime (Thompson 1975, 36, 41). After the coup, Asians made some effort to distance themselves from the fallen regime. For
example, the industrial tycoon Madhvani (who was also the Chair of the Export Promotion Council during the Obote days) welcomed the military regime and spoke of the commercial opportunities opening up under the new regime after “the dwindling scope for private enterprise under the former Government of Obote” (*Uganda Argus* 13 July 1971). The offer of unreserved support for the military government made by representatives of this community sounded hollow to Africans. Praises from Madhvani and his colleagues, all of whom had had close connections with the ousted president, prompted Amin to warn people to stop trying to clear their names by trying to show that they were good people now that Obote had gone (Mutibwa 1992, 84).

**Further costs incurred by the Asians.** The participation in national politics the Asians had enjoyed during the colonial period became a cost when bargaining with Africans in the postcolonial era. We mentioned the indifference of the community to national political issues during colonial rule and in the early days of independence (Ramchandani 1976, 125, 131; Apter 1961, 246). (For example, aside from Mrs. Sugra Visram, the Asian KY MP from Buganda, none of the other Asian MPs, or representatives of the community had criticized the previous regime for its repressive political-economic policies. Asians had continued to do business oblivious of the political turmoil in the country, even when the UPC government imposed emergency law on Buganda from 1966 (until the ouster of Obote in January 1971) (Doornbos 1973, 313ff; Parsons 1972, 59-72). The community's indifference to the political turmoil in Uganda cost the Asians much of the trust, friendship and confidence they had cultivated among some Africans during the previous seventy-eight years. Having earlier alienated many Africans, the community now found it difficult to rally support from among the Africans to champion the community’s cause during negotiations with the regime (Melady 1977, 89). The US ambassador to Uganda in 1972 believes that, though at times exaggerated, accusations made by Africans that Asians fixed scales, misled customers, shortchanged them and were involved in other forms of cheating, had substance (Melady 1977, 76). Many Africans began to believe that for members of the Asian community business opportunism took precedence over resolution of matters that affected national political stability; this offended many Africans and it cost the
Asians much support. It was under this atmosphere of distrust that representatives of the Asian community approached the military government to demand a review of the immigration laws relating to non-Ugandan Asians living in the country.

An unsuccessful attempt to remove the military government was launched from Tanzania by supporters of Obote and it was rumored to have been in part sponsored by Ugandan Asians. This debacle seems to have sealed the fate of members of this community who still wanted to live in Uganda (Kyemba 1977, 58). It was rumored that if the invasion was successful Obote had promised to rescind the expulsion order and would return assets to their Asian owners in return for their support. Whether the rumor was true or not, the new regime seems to have believed it (the Asian collaboration with Obote to remove the Amin regime in the late 1970s suggests that this rumor may have been valid; Asians partly financed the exile activities, which eventually helped remove the military government), (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 43), and it therefore decided to hasten their departure. Supporting an unsuccessful side may have cost the community their home in Uganda. Melady suggested that the Asians were expelled as scapegoats for a floundering economy (Melady 1977, 88). Although the economy was weak, we hesitate to wholly embrace the analysis that dramatizes the state of Uganda’s economy of the early 1970s as what provoked the military rulers to expel the Asians.

Many observers traced Uganda’s economic woes of the late 1960s to the political turmoil engendered by the socialist and repressive policies of the Obote regime (Low 1988, 44; Ryan 1973, 140; Mudoola 1988, 126-128). This analysis inspired the soldiers to promise reversing Obote’s policies. For example, soldiers expressed their solidarity with the civilians who had suffered most from the “Economic policies that [had] left many people unemployed...more insecure and lacking in the basic needs of life...” (Reason number 8). They also expressed empathy with ordinary Ugandans for the “High taxes [which ] left the common [people]...poorer than ever before. ....The big men could always escape these taxes or pass them on to the common [people]”(Reason number 9). Soldiers also identified with rural Ugandans by criticizing the government for paying farmers low prices for cash crops such as cotton and coffee (Reason number 10). Soldiers displayed an unexpected capacity to see through the rhetoric of the UPC-left, when they criticized the regime for:
“The creation of a wealthy class of leaders who are always talking of socialism while they grow richer and the common [person] poorer” (Reason number 12).

Although specific interest groups that were close to Obote were identified as greatly responsible for the political and economic problems of the early 1970s, it is noteworthy that soldiers did not include the Asians in this category. When announcing the reasons for the removal of the Obote regime, soldiers could have used the same opportunity to discredit the Asians. The new rulers would have implicated the Asians in the activities of the fallen regime had they believed or even suspected that Asians were the root cause of the economic problems Africans faced at the time. By doing so the soldiers would have gained admiration among many segments of the African society, particularly those who were hurt by the shortages of consumer goods, shortages that were often orchestrated by Asian traders; for, as we illustrated, relations between Asians and Africans were rather strained toward the end of the Obote mark (1) rule. Moreover, given the political marginality of the Asian community at the time, the political cost the regime would have incurred by denouncing the Asians from the onset of military rule would have been minimal (Ocaya-Lakidi 1975, 87). It is therefore unlikely that after only a brief period in power soldiers would believe that the Asian community, which had played a leading role in the country’s original free enterprise system, were now the worst enemies of the same system the regime wanted and had promised to restore. Our review of the public denunciations of the Asian economic record, the timing, the method of executing the expulsion policy and the manner in which the regime handled the assets left behind by the Asians, all suggest that the regime decided to expel the community for security considerations rather than as a prerequisite for rectifying the country’s economic problems.

Reasons for Expelling the Asians

Observers of the Uganda scene, particularly those who lived in Uganda during that momentous period, do not put much weight on Melady’s analysis. They argue that since Amin displayed little concern for macro-economic planning, it was highly unlikely that Amin and his military colleagues would have worried about the role of the Asians in the national economy (Jamal 1991, 85). Besides, in the past Amin had cultivated good busi-
ness relations with Asians. Records showed that a prominent Asian had acted as his referee when he opened a bank account in 1964, in the Ottoman Bank, which at the time was controlled by Asians. All along the Asians conducted their business affairs as though they were ready to continue playing the role of financial benefactors, or the milk-cow of those Africans at the helm of political power. Asians had received the military government with warmth (Twaddle 1975, 8). Amin had been quick to assure Asians that he would reverse the radical socialist programs of the Obote regime. This suggests that Amin and the Asians had each anticipated a good working relationship. Moreover, Asians were likely to be among the major beneficiaries of many new policies suggested in the eighteen reasons the military used to justify the coup (Pinychwa 1978, 232). For example, they were among the major victims of kondoism (dacoity) or armed robbery, which the military regime had vowed to stop; promises to eradicate corruption in the government would benefit Asians who dealt with various government departments as much as it would Africans (The Republic of Uganda 1971, 26-28). Furthermore, the regime did not enlist the advice of the Uganda civilian personnel in and outside the government before announcing the expulsion order. This suggests that it considered the expulsion of the Asians as a security strategy, rather than a move intended to improve the national economy. The abandoned businesses were allocated with virtually no concern for the capability of the new owner. This is perhaps the strongest evidence that other factors, probably those to do with the political survival of the regime, rather than economic considerations, as Amin claimed, prompted the military regime to expel the Asians (Kyemba 1977, 56-57; Kiwanuka 1979, 102; Jamal 1991, 85).

Use of Threats and Offers by the Protagonists

The asymmetry between threats and offers decides the outcome of the bargaining endeavor. Offers cost more when they succeed and threats cost more when they fail (Dowding 1991, 73). Owing to the inverse relationship between threats and offers, each offer or threat an actor makes involves a cost. Major costs that actors incur relate to: communicating the commitment, making the commitment credible, and monitoring the activities of target players. When threats fail to enlist the desired response from rival actor/s, the
actor/s must incur the cost of carrying out the commitment (Harsanyi 1969, 247). It is within this conception of the bargaining process that we explore the expulsion of members of the Asian community and the influence this policy had on national economic development in the 1970s. We reiterate a premise of our investigation in this section: that an economic development plan devised by a ruler can only succeed in Uganda in the long-run if it receives the dual support of farmers and big business, such as owners of small and large consumer goods manufacturing industries. Among those who have echoed this view is President Musveni (Mazrui 1988, 351).

Cost to the community of aggression in business. Actors have also used threats and offers to try to achieve their desired objectives. For example, during the Obote rule Asian traders often forced the government to release foreign currency by threatening to paralyze the economy. They would create shortages (these often led to mini sectoral economic paralysis) by hoarding consumer goods. Public criticism of the government by the Africans, who were the main victims of the shortages, would force it to buckle under pressure and release foreign currency to Asian traders. Through manipulating the supply and demand of essential commodities, with artificial shortages, the community eloquently communicated the message that it controlled the economy not only to African government officials and politicians, but also to ordinary Africans. Viewed in Harsanyi’s conception, we see that even in the face of Obote’s new socialist economic policies the Asians used their strategic position as importers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers of essential goods and commodities to make credible their threat to cripple the economy at will. They were therefore successful in obtaining what they wanted from the government, convertible currency.

The tactics Asians used to obtain foreign currency from the economic system for their business and other needs did not, however, escape the influence of the inverse relationship that influences all threats and offers actors make during the bargaining process. When Asians dramatized their control of the economy to obtain foreign currency, this action also sent a scare among Africans who realized the vulnerability of the national economy to the Asian community. Shortages of processed food products, such as baby milk formula, cooking and fuel oil, the outcome of hoarding, seriously hurt the Africans. Breast-feeding
mothers, urban and rural Africans who had come to increasingly depend on these products were not interested in the reasons Asians gave to justify their actions; they could only read the absence of compassion in the style in which many Asian merchants conducted business.

During this period ordinary Ugandans had also started experiencing problems with obtaining foreign currency from the commercial banking system when the socialist policies of the Obote regime began to take form. The UPC government introduced foreign exchange control in May 1970. By the time the UPC regime was overthrown, Ugandans who needed convertible currency for business, education and other purposes had to apply directly for it to the Central Bank. Lacking a uniform criterion for assessing applications, bank officials used subjective considerations when reviewing application forms. Under these circumstances and given the unattractive wages of bank clerks, this resulted in rampant corruption. Rich applicants, many of whom were Asians, usually had their applications quickly approved. Poor applicants, who were mostly Africans in business, who withheld or did not give generous kickbacks to bank officials, often had their applications rejected. These controls hurt Africans more than they did Asians who devised methods to bypass them (Ryan 1973, 133). This situation gradually resulted in resentment against the Asians within the ranks of those, mainly Africans, who for example may have had a bad experience with the Central Bank.

Aggressive business tactics, which included breaking the rules of the game, though good for business did not earn Asians much friendship among Africans, who were often new to the business world and were not used to the cutthroat business environment introduced by the Asians. The community’s tough approach to business also cost it friends from a wide cross-section of Africans, including those in government, business and the ordinary consumer of products of the Asian retailer. By alienating many people the Asian minority community risked exposing itself to the wrath of the majority grouping; this was a dangerous strategy for a racially visible minority to adopt, particularly in a country like Uganda which was undergoing a major political transformation during the 1960s and 1970s.

Before they left Uganda many affluent Asians devised ingenious methods of beating the limit on the assets that each family could expatriate, which the regime had imposed (Sathyamurthy 1986, 620). These included over-invoicing imported merchandise and keep-
ing the difference; canceling import orders for which funds had already been approved and diverting funds to personal or business bank accounts Asians kept abroad, rerouting goods-in-transit to addresses outside Uganda. The military government learnt of some of the methods the Asians were using to outwit the authorities. It used this information to accuse members of the Asian community of conspiring to bankrupt the country’s economy (Musizi 28 September 1972). The government alleged that Asians were illegally transferring massive amounts of foreign currency from Uganda. The regime harped on this allegation to justify its decision to expel the Asians from Uganda. Constant media coverage of the Asian issue helped focus the attention of many Africans for the first time in post-colonial Uganda on the role of Asians in the national economic development process (Uganda Argus 18 August 1972; Munno 26 August 1972). With its anti Asian propaganda campaign the government achieved some success in influencing public opinion. Moreover, it withheld information that may have tempered the turning tide of public opinion against the Asians, by conveniently avoiding to mention the lack of security of residence of non-Uganda citizen Asians, the substantive issue which had caused the panic among the Asians that led to the drain on the national foreign currency reserves.

Costs Incurred by the Regime and the State

Cost of making the commitment credible. While carrying out a commitment a ruling regime must incur these four major costs: the cost of communicating the commitment, the cost of making the commitment credible, the cost of monitoring the commitment and the cost of carrying out the commitment (Harsanyi 1969, 227). To lend credibility to its commitment to expel the Asians, the regime sent emissaries to African, Commonwealth and international organizations to justify, explain and affirm its intention to throw the Asians out of Uganda. What at first had sounded like an idle threat soon gained credibility, as delegations from the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the British Government, India, Pakistan, other countries and international organizations started pouring into Entebbe (Kyemba 1977, 241). They tried to intercede for the Asians.

To increase the credibility of its pledge to expel the Asians the regime became intransigent. As a result the regime and the country as a whole incurred a heavy cost; old
friends of the regime in and outside the country lost confidence in its ability to respect human rights when developing national policy, as in this instance (241). The dubious methods by which the assets of the Asians were handled brought into question the efficacy of state institutions supposed to protect private property of both citizens and foreigners (Kiwanuka 1979, 107). The expulsion of the Asians opened the eyes of many Ugandans to the flaw in the political system. Without a national legislature important issues such as this one could not be deliberated by a body representing the people. The expulsion of the Asians was more of a cost than a benefit to the regime. This policy earned the military government support from marginal sections of the population, while it alienated increasing numbers of people from the mainstream of the Uganda society (Kiwanuka 1979, 107-110). This was a major cost to a regime, which was striving to build a populist image.

Cost to the national economy. When it became clear to the Asian community that it had to leave the country, it resolved to transfer as much of its assets in liquid and other forms out of the country as it could. Transnational industrialists with subsidiaries in neighboring countries, particularly Kenya, diverted imported machinery and equipment still on the way from abroad to branches in Nairobi, Nakuru or Mombasa (Kiwanuka 1979, 105). A month before the deadline came into effect jewelry stores in Kampala city and the major towns were emptied; Asians rushed to convert as much of what remained of their local currency into gold, silver, diamonds and other precious stones and metals, which they would easily convert into other currencies once they left Uganda. They also moved substantial numbers of private and commercial vehicles to Kenya. In essence many Asians made every effort to transfer their movable assets out of the country before the deadline. Others decided to sabotage factory assembly lines and vehicles before they left. The sabotage, and transfer of the assets of the community out of the country, were a major cost not only to the regime but also to the country for it lost a substantial quantity of its gross domestic product (Mamdani 1973, 21). The regime also incurred a heavy cost in mounting a mass media misinformation and intimidation campaign, which was focused on preventing Africans from aiding their departing Asian friends and relatives in either hiding or spiriting away many of their assets. Africans were warned that arranging private business deals with
the departing Asians was now a criminal offence. The intimidation campaign cost the regime substantial support as many Africans for the first time began to realize that the regime had more sinister motives for expelling the Asians that it had so far kept secret. In terms of growth, the cost of the expulsion policy was high. World Bank data shows that Uganda had the worst growth performance of all sub Saharan countries between 1971-1979. Per capita GDP fell at 2.1 per cent per annum, bringing the total decline in GDP to 16.8 per cent over the period of eight years. Economic decline was all the more serious as much of it was concentrated in the period of Amin’s rule between 1972-1979 (World Bank 1989, Fig 1.2).

Cost of carrying out the commitment. For the regime and many of its supporters the expulsion of Asians was viewed not as a cost but a major gain (Pain 1975, 191). The regime soon apportioned the abandoned properties to those within its ranks, its core supporters from Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan and Moslems from various ethnic groups (Jamal 1991, 85). Most Ugandans, both ordinary people and professionals in various fields, avoided any involvement in getting a share of the bounty, since they could not reconcile the treatment of members of the Asian community with their often strong traditional ethical standard of fair play and Christian morality (Kiwanuka 1979, 94). We need not regard the actions of those who did not wish to acquire the properties of the departing Asians as an inexplicable behavioral aberration of rational egoists. Frohlich (1974 no 18, 55; Sen 1982c; and Chazan 1991, 150) help us understand their behavior by observing that although most people are egoistic most of the time, many people generally behave altruistically rather than egoistically in their social dealings. “It was with surprise, shock, and uncertainty that the elite foresaw a tumbling [expulsion of the Asians] of the comfortable structure that had existed for so long” (Melady 1976, 7).

The cost of the policy to the regime was not felt immediately. However, with time the regime began to feel the pain of reduced economic activity. Reduced economic activity led to reduced income from taxes. Reduced industrial manufacturing, international trade and commerce caused shortages of consumer commodities (Jamal 1991, 81; Mittelman 1975, 242). The regime was hurt further when it became isolated by some of its major trading
partners in Europe and North America. Western nations supported Britain’s attempts to secure compensation from Uganda. They exerted pressure on Uganda to pay by making it difficult to secure external credit and aid; creditors demanded prepayment in cash. This forced Amin to reach a settlement with the British government (Mittelman 1975, 242). African presidents including Tolbert and Mobutu went to Uganda and requested Amin to extend the three-month deadline, a request Amin turned down (Melady 1975, 15). Although the cost of the policy was high for the regime, it was even higher for the local people. They now experienced shortages of processed foods and beverages, fuel, building materials and many necessities of life that they had always taken for granted. Lateef points to some shocking statistics: Uganda’s export volume fell precipitously in the 1973-80 period averaging a loss of 9.5 per annum (1991, 25).

Response of the Local and International Community

Makerere University students were among the domestic groups that dared to organize demonstrations to oppose the expulsion policy (Melady 1977, 87). The Catholic Archbishop also appealed for humane treatment of the expelled Asians (Kiwanuka 1979, 94). Asian leaders sought external help, and enlisted the service of countries such as the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada and others to intercede for the community when direct negotiations between the community representatives and the regime stalled. Envoys of Western countries tended to premise their arguments and appeals to the regime for lenience when handling the Asian issue, within international law provisions dealing with human rights, treatment of minorities, and the law relating to property rights of both citizen and foreign minorities. They, however, warned Ugandan rulers of the prospect of international economic sanctions, when the regime’s policy toward the Asian minority threatened to violate international law. The policy contravened law provisions relating to the treatment of national minorities, and the obligation of the state to compensate foreigners whose property had been confiscated by the Uganda government. Envoys from Western and other countries in Kampala, and Ugandans, were evidently alarmed when the right to citizenship was being arbitrarily taken away from Asians who were citizens of Uganda (Melady 1976, 11).
An Evaluation of the Motives for Expelling the Asians

To answer the question, why did the relationship between the military government and the Asians not work out as expected? we have to review the lifestyle of the Asians and their relationship with the exiled Ugandans. From exile in Tanzania Obote and his men embarked on a mission to destabilize, hence weaken and ultimately overthrow, the military rulers. The regime was facing increasing criticism from both home and abroad, regarding its poor human rights record, particularly regarding its mistreatment of members of Obote's ethnic group, the Langis, their cousins the Acholis, and of soldiers that were loyal to the ousted regime. The appeal of the regime to people in other parts of the country, particularly in Buganda, was also quickly disappearing. This made the regime extremely paranoid. Through its intelligence service, the State Research Bureau (SRB), the regime got information that the Asians were in close contact with the Obote exiles in Tanzania. The exiles were using Asian couriers crisscrossing the community, to advance their anti-Uganda government campaign.

Scare literature, rife with horror stories calculated to turning Ugandans against the regime, credited to the exiles, was clandestinely widely distributed in many Ugandan towns. Articles critical of the regime carried in foreign publications were soon in high demand on city streets. To counter the exile threat the nervous military regime soon turned Uganda into a fortress state. The regime tenaciously censored all international literature entering the country. Overnight it became illegal to possess copies of magazines that were popular in the country such as: Africa, New Africa, Africa Confidential; many publications from all parts of the world, particularly British and American newspapers and journals, were also banned. Capital punishment was the maximum sentence any Ugandan faced if found with a copy of any of the banned publications.

Coming from a generally rural farming background, before the 1970s, most Ugandan Africans did not travel much beyond their ethnic and national borders. It was therefore comparatively easy for the regime to censor published foreign media information reaching the Africans. In contrast, as international traders with relatives living all over the world, Asians were world travelers. Hardly any African could read any of the languages of the Indian subcontinent. Asians took advantage of this situation to bring into the country caus-
tic reviews of the policies of the increasingly repressive regime, in Indian, Bangladesh and Pakistani publications or versions of the banned publications through Entebbe airport, and the border crossings at Malaba, Busia and Kabale. Africans increasingly depended on Asians for an update of the international perspective of the tense amorphous domestic political situation. In these circumstances, soldiers on censor duty, towering over the African custom officials at border crossings and airports, could do little or nothing to stop anti government literature from entering the country; they could only hope that those carrying Urdu, Gujarati, and Punjabi newspapers and magazines, were telling the truth when they denied that the magazines in their possession contained any inflammatory or anti government literature. Because of the Asians, the regime found it virtually impossible to prevent uncensored anti regime material originating from abroad from getting into the country.

In the early 1970s, residents of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya enjoyed a common market, and service organizations within the East African Community (EAC). The high volume of intra regional contacts of residents of the three countries, particularly through road, rail and air travel, further complicated the relationship between the military government and the Asians. Weak regimes are usually afraid of wealthy communities within their territory whom they consider as potential brokers of rival power centers. Aware of the Asian wealth, the regime was worried that the Asians would lend their considerable financial strength to Obote. The Asians were also internationally very mobile (many Asians possessed passports of two or more countries). Asian influence in international organizations, through cultural-religious leaders such as the Aga Khan, was another cause for concern to the regime. Asian contacts with exiles who were hostile to the regime, and the regime’s inability to penetrate and monitor the inner workings of the Asian community, persuaded it to regard the Asians as dangerous to its own political survival; a fifth column serving the interests of the enemies of the regime, particularly the exiles in Tanzania. For the military regime political survival meant increasing security, increasing security pointed to reducing private and official contact between Ugandans and outsiders, particularly the Uganda exiles in Tanzania. Unable to contain or control the movement of the Asians, the regime saw only one way of resolving the problem; it had to get rid of them.
Conclusion

The regime's policy toward the minority Asian community exhibited the ease with which Ugandan soldiers, just like their civilian predecessors, could get away with the blatant abuse of state power. The regime also used some illegitimate tactics when handling the Asian issue. When the government revoked or refused to renew the residence permits of convicted non-Ugandan-citizen Asians it had the law on its side. It, however, acted unfairly when it decided to cancel residence permits of law abiding non-Uganda citizen Asians, many of whom had known no other homeland having been born in Uganda. Indeed it acted illegally when it extended the same hostile treatment to Asians who were either citizens by birth or by naturalization (Read 1975, 202). In the 1969 census over 26,000 Asians had claimed Uganda citizenship (Statistical Abstract 1971). Efforts by the civilian Foreign Minister, Kibedi, to salvage the damaged reputation of the government paid partial dividends when he persuaded the soldiers to drop the last two categories of Asians from the expulsion order.

The social and cultural differences of the groups within the Asian community meant that it lacked solidarity. The relationship between the Asians and the Africans was not strong enough to inspire cooperation between the two communities to work together to resist the expulsion policy. These two conditions meant that the Asian community could only provide weak resistance to the expulsion policy. The strategy Asians had used to support power holders, though beneficial in the short run, was ultimately a major cost. The offer to participate in the colonial administration and the financial and material support which the Asians extended to the ousted UPC regime reduced their stock of offers with which they entered the bargaining exercise with the military government. The double-edged threat to paralyze the economy used by the Asians was effective. By hoarding goods and inflating prices, they demonstrated their ability to manipulate the demand and supply market forces. On the flip side, the military government pointed to the Asian control of the market to dramatize the vulnerability of the mainly African consumer, to the deception of the Asian merchants. On balance this threat backfired. Clearly the Asians controlled the commercial economy. Therefore the military government decree expelling Asians from Uganda when announced over Radio Uganda sounded incredible to all listeners. The regime, however,
effectively used many influence techniques to lend the policy credibility. Economic growth and economic development were two of the major casualties of this policy.
CHAPTER SIX


Introduction

Old political grievances, the outcome of ideological incompatibility, had resulted in suspicion and distrust of motives of rival exile Ugandan groups that opposed the Amin regime. Fear of government retribution against relatives at home had also disinclined many exiles from openly joining exile groups. This frustrated the efforts of those who tried to unite the small groups into a strong united opposition organization. The ruthless treatment of real and imaginary opponents of the regime by government soldiers and paramilitary forces discouraged many exiles from joining the guerrilla forces. Matching the rag tag guerrilla force against the well-armed state soldiers was a source of pessimism for many potential guerrilla fighters and their parents, in exile. Opponents of Amin remembered vividly how his army had trounced Obote’s guerrilla fighters in 1972. These factors combined to prevent Ugandan exiles from forming a united front to fight the gruesome Amin regime during the eight years which elapsed between the expulsion of the Asians and the eventual war that removed the regime.

Meanwhile, the frost which destroyed the Brazilian coffee crop in the mid 1970s resulted in a coffee boom for coffee producing countries in other parts of the world including Uganda. Funds generated from coffee exports, together with the financial and material support which Amin received from Arab countries, for playing the ‘Islamic’ card guaranteed the survival of his regime (Amin invented a false but effective line to lure Arab money: that Uganda was an Islamic state surrounded by hostile Christian states, which were in alliance with Israel and Western European powers to overrun it and pollute it with the decadent Western culture. This characterization of the Eastern African political scenario touched a raw nerve of some wealthy, devout rulers of Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates. Sympathetic Arab rulers unwittingly extended help to
the spurious fellow devoted Moslem Amin, ruler of the allegedly besieged Moslem state of Uganda. In reality Moslems made up only 5-6 per cent of the population (Worldmark Encyclopedia, 1984, 338). Without much concern for accountability, oil, and oil money flowed into Amin’s Uganda, to forestall the presumed Western threat. From these two sources, Amin received sufficient oil and convertible currency to withstand the trade embargo, and the withdrawal of aid by international financial institutions in reaction to the regime’s well-publicized abuse of human rights. Easy access to Arab credit offered the regime relative financial independence, and therefore insulated it from serious financial want. Arab aid rendered ineffective the international economic isolation of the regime that the Ugandan exiles had orchestrated.

To cling to power in the face of widespread domestic and outside opposition, the regime’s excesses multiplied. In 1976 Amin welcomed air kidnappers who had hijacked an Air France wide body passenger plane. On arrival in Uganda, with Amin’s connivance, the Arab hijackers had released all but the Israeli passengers on board. Several people died during the Israel mounted rescue operation. Through the international press network, Amin learned of the Kenyan collusion in the Israeli rescue operation. Amin threatened to invade and reclaim land transferred from Uganda to Kenya during colonial days, as a punishment for the logistical support Kenya had extended to the Israeli rescue mission. In 1977, the Archbishop of the Anglican Church of Uganda, along with two cabinet ministers, was murdered; soon after Amin accused them of aiding anti government exiles in smuggling weapons into the country, for allegedly destabilizing the regime. Finally, in 1978, to divert attention from internal power struggles within the army, Amin annexed the Kagera salient of north western Tanzania (Anon. 6). It was to reclaim its territory, avenge the pillage of Kagera by Amin’s soldiers and to prevent a recurrence of such an invasion that, after the 1972 invasion debacle (cf. Chapter 5), Tanzania agreed with Western sponsors to provide troops, and unite and guide Ugandan exile forces in an invasion of Amin’s Uganda. A major objective of this invasion was to remove Amin and restore civilian rule in Uganda. With only minor setbacks this time the challenge to Amin’s rule, originating from Tanzania, was successful. A new interim President, Professor Lule, was sworn in after Kampala fell on 11 April 1979.
For a background to the 1980 elections we looked at the political problems the interim president, Yusufu Lule, and the interim legislature had to confront during the intervening period before the 1980 elections. In the perception of many Ugandans, the 1980 multi party elections were the culmination of the program to restore democracy which had been hatched by Ugandans, the Tanzanian government, and their foreign financial backers two years before. In this chapter, we utilized theories of power, authority, rational choice and the theory of action, to interpret the 1980 multi party elections, the guerrilla war, which came in the wake of the disputed elections, and the Okello Regime, which overthrew the Obote mark II regime.

The political interaction framework will guide our inquiry into the manner in which post Amin political actors went about acquiring political power, gaining legitimacy, and attempted to manage political conflict. One objective of this review is to ascertain and appraise the influence techniques, threats and offers which political actors used, and the costs the same actors incurred when securing, and exercising, political power. We also reviewed the response of the people and the politicians to the multi party elections of 1980, the guerrilla war that arose from these elections, and the Okello regime which removed Obote from power. Besides giving us an insight into the issues that were of interest to Ugandans, this final exploration enables us to survey the influence of the political power struggle among Ugandans holding divergent political ideological philosophies on national economic development in the decade of the 1980s. The political image that arises from this study informs our understanding of the social, political and economic circumstances that encouraged some Ugandans to wage war against the Obote mark II regime.

The 1980 Multi Party Elections: Electoral Fraud

**Initial strategy for victory.** Using his influence with Nyerere, Obote put his supporters in important government and security positions before the 1980 elections. He also used the massive Tanzanian military presence in Uganda between 1979 and 1981 to place members of his faction in key positions within the UNLF coalition arrangement. Placements included: the Minister of Internal Affairs (responsible for police and prisons) Paulo Muwanga; Army Chief of Staff, Oyite Ojok, Army Commander, Tito Okello, and the Com-
mander of the strategically placed (headquartered near Kampala in the Lubiri, the former Kabaka's palace) 15th Battalion, Basilio Okello, and crucial field army commanders. "These Obote loyalists, who were solely responsible for law enforcement and security machinery, used their positions to conduct a relentless campaign of terror against the Uganda population (Lule 1982, 4)." According to interim president Lule members of the Oboteist faction in the security, legislative and executive branches used every opportunity to obstruct the road to 1980 elections: "...brazen and constant sabotage by the Oboteist Army Chief of Staff Oyite Ojok, of attempts by successive Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) administrations to reestablish peace, democracy and the rule of law [frustrated the democratic aspirations of Ugandans]" (Lule 1982, 4). Ojok thwarted efforts made by the National Consultative Council (NCC), the interim legislature, and Lule, the interim executive, to reestablish strong democratic institutions of government (Brett 1991, 299).

Muwanga became the civilian Chair of the Military Commission (MC). The MC, which was supposed to be an advisory committee for defense, was dominated by the Oboteist political-military faction. It became the ruling junta, when in May 1980 it deposed Lule’s successor, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) appointed President, Godfrey Binaisa, seven months before the elections. This faction was the de facto law in the country after Amin’s removal in April 1979. The MC appointed Kikira, a founder member of the UPC and a declared Oboteist, to head the constituency demarcation committee.

**Strategy of the Democratic Party.** The DP campaigned effectively and pollsters were predicting a DP landslide win, giving it 80 to 95 per cent of the seats (Tujia Empya 8 December 1980; Bwengye in Anon. 1984, 7). At campaign rallies, DP leader Semwogerere was fond of declaring that no person can prevent the downstream flow of the waters of the Nile river. He used the euphemism of the flow of the river water when speaking of the numerical strength the DP had across the country. Evidently the party leaders placed their hopes for winning the election entirely on the party’s immense popularity across the country. Democratic Party leaders also used every opportunity, at political rallies, the mass media, and church congregations, to expose potential sources of electoral irregularities they discerned or which were brought to their attention by their numerous sup-

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porters. They also demanded the presence of foreign observers to monitor the actual voting. Through these means they hoped to shame the UPC into adhering to the rules of fair political play.

**Early electoral results.** Early results of the 1980 general election, announced over the state radio, Radio Uganda (state law, which has since been amended, at the time prohibited the incorporation of private radio and television stations), were picked up by the Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and other foreign radio stations. Early returns suggested the DP was on the verge of winning its first landslide election victory ever.

**Ultimate strategy adopted by the UPC.** Uganda People’s Congress party strategists were shocked into action when the initial electoral results indicated that the party was heading for a humiliating electoral defeat. They took steps to reverse this grim situation. At this point the Military Commission (MC) panicked and decided to intervene in the flow of election results (Anonymous 1984, 7). Muwanga issued a retrospective proclamation whereby he personally took over the powers of the Electoral Commission. Pursuant to the proclamation, all returns had to be submitted to him for a decision as to whether the poll had been ‘free and fair.’ His decision was to be final, and could not be challenged in a court of law; anyone who illegally announced a purported result would be liable to five years in prison or a fine of 500,000 shillings (Radio Uganda December 10, 1980). This announcement was carried in all local daily newspapers the following day.

Other sources claimed that to ensure a UPC victory some Ugandan leaders sat up all night, and switched some DP and UPC votes (Africa Confidential, vol. 22, No 4; Guardian 13 December 1980). The MC promptly dismissed the Commissioner of Elections, placed a lengthy blackout on the remaining electoral results, then began declaring the vetted results over the radio. It offered flimsy reasons for revising some early results. It awarded seats in many parts of the country including Amin’s home territory (where due to the poor security situation at the time, elections were scheduled to take place later), to the UPC. The MC ordered soldiers of the Oboteist faction within the 15th, and other battalions of the Uganda
National Liberation Army (UNLA), (the UNLA comprised the combined forces of the guerrilla groups which had replaced the Uganda Army [UA] after helping the Tanzanian Army overthrow the Amin regime), to demonstrate the UNLA fire power. Obote's political rivals were intimidated when soldiers illuminated the tropical night in Kampala and other cities by firing an incessant barrage of live ammunition in the air, throughout election night. This reminded political opponents that the army was backing the UPC party. This show of force made supporters of other parties, particularly DP supporters, who were celebrating a premature victory, realize that the army was partial to the UPC party (Anon. 1984, 7).

**Final election results.** UPC was pronounced to have won 72 seats, DP 51 and UPM (the party to which Museveni belonged) one seat. Francis Bwengye, the former DP Secretary-General, believed that notwithstanding UPC's 17 seat original lead, the DP actually won 81 seats out of the 126 (Anon. 1984, 7). Muwanga declared his friend Obote the victor in what were supposed to have been the country's first free multi party elections since independence.

**Opinion of observers.** Corroborating the above story, the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) recorded numerous electoral fraud incidents committed by pro UPC electoral officials, brought to its attention by leaders of the aggrieved parties. Complaints included the unopposed return of UPC candidates from 17 out of the 126 constituencies. These 17 unopposed UPC seats were "a direct result of irregularities in the process of nominating candidates..."(Commonwealth Observer Group 1984, 7)" The actions of the MC prompted Lule to observe:

The Obote forces, through Paulo Muwanga, head of the Military Commission government, staged one of the most blatant frauds in electoral history. Using a decree he promulgated on December 11, 1980, Muwanga took over all the powers of the Electoral Commission and used them to reverse the humiliating defeat of the Obote group, finally announcing Obote as President, and himself as Vice President and Minister of Defense (Lule 1982, 7)!

By placing Oboteists in key security positions it was clear to critical observers that, as in the 1960s, Obote planned to rely on the coercive organs of the state to take power by force
if the voters rejected him. When UPC was declared the winner, it was clear to observers that Obote had again seized national political power, oblivious to the people’s wishes as expressed in the ballot box.

**Evaluating the 1980 elections.** These events indicated to those following the political winds of Uganda, both in and outside the country, that Obote would face serious political trouble. It appeared to many Ugandans that in 1981 Obote resumed the authoritarian rule that characterized the last six years of Obote mark I rule of the mid to late 1960s. Many Ugandans with allegiances to the other three political parties were not prepared to give up the struggle for restoring democracy in the country. These included the battle-hardened civilians and soldiers in the UNLA, particularly the anti Obote faction led by Museveni, which had fought alongside the Tanzanian Defense Forces (TPDF) to remove Amin from power. Democratic Party supporters were bitter for they were sure they had been robbed of an election victory; UPM and CP supporters were angry that the UPC had subverted the democratic process. Many members of the UPC deserted the party or became uncommitted Party card holders, having failed to reconcile their conscience with the tactics Obote had used to return to power.

Political observers realized that to achieve his declared economic development policy objectives, Obote would have to employ overwhelming force to make the evidently politically hostile majority of the population follow his policy directives (Mutibwa 1992, 148). For as Lule put it at the time: "...other political parties in Uganda, termed fraudulent the election, whose results they have refused to accept---challenging them to the extent of waging an armed struggle in order to topple [what they call] another fascist regime (Lule 1982, 7).” In the minds of many Ugandans the precarious political climate created and orchestrated by the Oboteists in positions of power pushed the subject of economic development to the back burner of priority issues. Ugandans now had first to find answers to the political question of how they were to rule themselves, before embarking on the challenges of economic development: “to ignore the solution of the political question which means the restoration of democracy, the restoration of human rights of the people; to ignore those and start hankering after the so-called economic recovery is holding the stick from the
Wrong end" (Museveni 1986, 34). Guerrilla Museveni’s response came following the praise Obote received from the international community for his strict adherence to the IMF and World Bank guidelines when attempting to implement his ‘Revised Recovery Programme for 1983-5’, economic policy.

**Position of the UPM leadership after the 1980 elections.** The UPM had no desire to participate in the degraded post 1980 political system. For the UPM leadership participating in the denigrated political system was tantamount to collaborating in the UPC conspiracy of derailing the democratic aspirations of most Ugandans (Museveni 1986, 34). A person’s actions are determined by what they desire and what they believe to be possible, and reality causes action mediated through beliefs and desire (Davidson 1980, 14). Desirous to restore democracy in Uganda, believing that they could successfully challenge the military might at the disposal of the UPC regime, yet aware of the personal risk involved, (in 1981 the Obote regime offered a one million shilling ransom for information leading to Museveni’s capture, dead or alive), Museveni and 27 colleagues ‘returned to the bush’ and launched a guerrilla war, which helped to dislodge the new UPC regime from power (Museveni 1986, 15).

**The People’s War and The Obote Mark II Regime**

**The People’s War**

Inexorably Uganda’s economic development problems under the NRM government cannot be considered in isolation from their recent historical setting, nor properly understood without reference to it. Some background information relating to the rationale, strategies, and objectives of the NRM for launching the People’s War (PW) (Museveni, 1986, 15) is essential to our understanding of the considerations which inspired the NRM’s economic development aspirations. “People’s War” (PW) was the sanitized term leaders of the Movement used to refer to the bloody guerrilla war the National Resistance Army (NRA) launched against the Obote mark II regime, on February 6, 1981.

**Rationale and strategy for the war.** Several factors came into play to con-
vince the NRM leadership of the merits of launching a PW. Leaders of the NRM, like many other Ugandans, refused to recognize the post election political system. Hindsight reminded concerned political actors, including Museveni, that Obote and his party once used force to stay in power. Practical events (the electoral fraud) confirmed that he and his accomplices had indeed overthrown the newly revived plural democratic institutions of the state (Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), December 1980, 7). Museveni was convinced that since the UPC rule thrived on the show of force they, too, would have to use force to dislodge the reconstituted UPC establishment from state power. He believed that mounting a guerrilla war would be the most effective strategy by which to get rid of Obote and others who had corrupted the democratic system. For the political reality was that the 30,000-50,000 Tanzanian soldiers in Uganda were partial to Obote and his party. Museveni was convinced that such a war would make the job of ruling the country not just difficult but impossible for Obote. He believed the PW would also persuade Nyerere to pull his troops out of Uganda once he realized the folly of supporting his deceitful and politically destitute friend, Obote (Museveni 1986, 46). National Resistance Movement leaders were among the many people who saw the folly of the DP’s decision to participate in the post 1980 election political system; by accepting the role of official opposition DP leaders lent credence to the mockery of plural democracy engineered by the UPC leadership (Ngabo 5 January 1981; Ingham 1994, 216).

By the time of the 1980 elections Museveni had had an active political life. Yoweri Museveni became involved in Ugandan politics at an early age. As a UPC youth winger he had worked briefly in the Prime Minister’s office in the 1960s. At the end of his studies in Tanzania he received a Master’s Degree, having majored in the field of Political Economy, at Dar es Salaam University. Due to the political turmoil in Uganda during the 1970s, he lived and worked in exile as a college professor, teaching political economy in Tanzania (Museveni, Vancouver Meeting 1988). He commanded the Front for National Liberation (FRONASA), which he had helped found in the 1970s, to fight the Amin regime. A close friend of the late Samora Machel, he had trained as a guerrilla fighter with the FRELIMO freedom fighters. Under the UNLF umbrella, FRONASA along with other guerrilla groups and the TPDF had fought and defeated the Amin regime. With origins in Western Uganda,
FRONASA leaders demanded and were awarded the task of liberating that part of the country during the war that dislodged Amin from power. As it drove Amin’s soldiers from the region, FRONASA ensured that Western Uganda was one of the first parts of the country to be liberated from Amin’s rule (Museveni 1986, 4). It also used this opportunity to bolster its fighting force with massive local infantry recruitment. During the Binaisa era, Museveni who was Defense Minister since the short-lived Lule government, was transferred to the less strategic ministry of regional cooperation, a post he held until the 1980 election. This move was devised by UPC strategists to get him out of the way, while preparing for Obote’s return. Museveni’s departure also ensured the monopoly of control of the armed forces by the Oboteist faction (Weekly Topic 9 May 1980).

**Launching of the People’s War**

**Political strategy of the NRM.** Leaders of the movement created the NRM, a political wing to handle political matters, and a military wing that became known as the NRA, to fight the UNLA soldiers (Museveni 1986, 5). As the war progressed, the Movement established safe zones that became popularly known as ‘liberated areas.’ Social services the NRM provided in these areas included free health services, schools, a dispute settlement system, and security. Besides providing combat training which enabled those living in the areas under NRM control to defend themselves from attacks by UNLA soldiers, the NRM also required the same people to attend general political education and intensive political economy seminars. The curriculum for these seminars usually focused on the mutual responsibilities of the government and those of the citizens in a democratically constituted state, the role of the citizen and the state in generating economic development, the responsibilities to one another of private citizens, the importance of human rights, and the rule of law (Museveni 1986, 34, 40). This was part of the NRM program to raise public political awareness and appreciation of the complementary and constraining relationship between politics, economics and the law.

**Military strategy of the NRM.** The NRM leaders formed the People’s Resistance Army (PRA) to fight against the UNLA backed Obote regime (Ingham 1994, 180). It
is this PRA which was transformed into the NRA. The Obote mark II regime was hated throughout most of the country. With this knowledge in mind the NRM strategists designed an effective program for fighting the pro Obote troops. The strategy entailed that each successive encounter between the two fighting troops raised the credibility of the NRM, and further eroded that of the government forces (Museveni 1986, 37), as an effective fighting force. Successive defeats suffered by Obote's troops further tarnished the low esteem or credibility of the Obote regime, in the opinion of many Ugandans. To become accepted and cultivate trust among the ordinary citizens, NRA fighters were required to adhere to a very strict code of military conduct. NRM fighters diligently avoided violating the human rights of the citizens, upon whom they relied for food and intelligence information, and were always polite and helpful to the civilians in the war zone (Museveni 1986, 40). National Resistance Army personnel who deviated from this strict code of conduct risked incurring severe penalties; those found guilty of committing serious crimes against civilians, could face execution under the NRA court-martial system. The disciplined behavior of the NRA soldiers was in sharp contrast to the lawless behavior of the government troops. Civilians from many parts of the country were subjected to many dastardly forms of torture (Anon. 1984, 9), for government soldiers had orders to indiscriminately terrorize by killing, raping, stealing from people in Buganda, Western, North Western, North Eastern and much of Eastern Uganda, whom the government considered as “potential guerrillas” or “guerrilla sympathizers.” In typical guerrilla warfare fashion, the NRM adopted fighting tactics that ensured that they incurred minimal casualties while the government forces increasingly incurred heavier and heavier casualties as the war wore on (Uganda Resistance News vol. I No 5; Museveni Ibid. 40).

The Obote Mark II Regime

**Political Strategy of the UPC.** Part of the regime’s strategy to cling to power involved intensifying ethnic animosity. To achieve this goal, it encouraged soldiers to use uncovered army vehicles, for all to see, while transporting loot to the Acholi, Lango, and Teso homelands. Looted or cannibalized articles from homes of suspected NRM supporters or sympathizers usually consisted of building materials, furniture, domestic appliances,
electronic equipment, and clothes. They also destroyed prime agricultural and animal farms in many areas of the country whose owners were alleged, often wrongly, to have links with the NRM or other guerrilla groups. The broad category of NRM supporters, characterized as "bandits," usually included residents of entire villages, municipalities, districts, provinces and often entire ethnic groups. Based on the claim of fighting bandits, UPC government officials gave UNLA soldiers orders to kill villagers and ransack whole districts or 'bandit territory', the term Obote and his friends used to refer to the NRM military operations area (Anon. 1984, 13; Munnansi 9 September 1984). “One of the hardest things about wielding power is knowing how to let go gracefully’ ... . Obote’s failure to recognize this in the late 1960s when he had lost popularity was unfortunate; his determination to cling to the power he obtained illegally in 1980 was a tragedy.” It was the manner in which Obote returned and wielded power which prompted the above comment from Mutibwa, an eminent Ugandan historian (Mutibwa, 1992, 148).

Military strategy of the UPC. The actions of the new regime while fighting the various guerrilla forces also revealed its lack of belief in the human rights of the ordinary citizens. The UPC government action or strategy of terrorizing civilians instead of facing guerrillas in battle caused great suffering to civilians in the Luwero triangle:

The previous heavy, military defeats, with their attendant losses of personnel and equipment discouraged further direct confrontation. Instead the UNLA employed the classic counter insurgency tactic of attempting to cut off the material and the local population. From September 1982 civilians in the Luwero Triangle were systematically driven out of their homes (Anon. 1984, 12).

The gross abuse of human rights by the Obote regime prompted Roger Winter, the Director of the US Committee for Refugees, to declare conditions under Obote worse than under Amin (Washington Post 6 August 1984). Obote’s regime lost whatever little legitimacy it still had among the legal-minded Ugandans (the legitimacy arising from holding the instruments of state power), when they realized that instead of offering protection, government troops were responsible for killing, maiming, stealing and destroying the properties of war zone residents. A 1984 UNHCR report on Uganda, under Obote's mark II government,
had referred to the regime’s internal security policy as one of ‘contrived confusion of terror.’

Government troops exhibited unprecedented ferocity when carrying out ‘anti guerrilla’ operations. The UNLA also destroyed thousands of real estate properties in both poor and wealthy neighborhoods in Buganda, Madi, West Nile, Ankole and other areas of the country (Anon. 1984, 13) This was testimony of the UPC party leadership’s determination to cling to power whatever the cost. The boldness soldiers exhibited on their numerous looting campaigns suggested that top government officials had sanctioned the cruel behavior of the troops toward residents of the war zone (Africa News September 1983). For example, in September 1980 “...after conducting indiscriminate slaughter on the population of Madi-East leaving 50,000 people unaccounted for and more than 110,000 refugees, with flutes blowing tribal war tunes of victory, Oboteist troops burned houses and looted property which they carried away on official army trucks back to their tribal areas” (Lule 1982, 6).

Commenting on the UNLA troop behavior in Buganda, one source stated:

...instances of soldiers stealing food, clothing and blankets from lorries, were hardly surprising in view of the hunger and poverty of many troops. Less acceptable, however, was the systematic ransacking of abandoned villages and homes that took place throughout the anti-guerrilla operation. Movable goods, including doors, window-frames and corrugated iron roofs were extensively looted....(Anon. 1984, 13)

UNLA soldiers would sweep the Triangle (Luwero was part of the triangular shaped territory of Northern Buganda, that formed the original base of the NRM guerrilla force. As the war progressed the guerrillas operated beyond the triangle to include much of the rest of Buganda, and Western Uganda) taking control of the trading centers. Fleeing civilians were rounded up and others who sought to remain in their homes were evicted. From January 1983 onwards those who had not fled the district entirely were being transferred to camps or ‘protected areas’ by the UNLA and Special Force. These moves served to create a ‘free-fire zone,’ inside which anyone “found at large could be safely identified and shot as a ‘bandit’” (Anon. 1984, 12). Through this strategy, government soldiers wiped out entire village, town and county populations, in areas that were politically hostile to the new Obote
regime in Buganda and other parts of the country. Like the Baganda who consistently openly defied and rejected Obote politically, a section of the Banyankole, particularly the Bahima who also rejected and challenged Obote militarily, incurred a substantial measure of Obote’s wrath:

Obote did not want to listen to the pleas for negotiations. His paranoid hatred of the Baganda (and now the Banyankole, the ethnic group of Museveni) left no room for cool and reasoned assessment of the options still open to him. He disdainfully opposed all negotiations with ‘bandit’ Museveni to end the war, in the mistaken belief that the NRM/NRA would never succeed in undermining his regime, forgetting that guerrilla warfare does not necessarily have to achieve a military victory in order to influence the political system it is fighting against (Mutibwa 1992, 161).

During the five-year civil war, the Obote led government launched 16 offensives using 7,000 soldiers at a time or a total of 112,000 soldiers (Museveni 1986, 37), but failed to flush the NRA fighters out of the civilian population. Opposition to the new Obote regime was nationwide; for example, between 5,000 and 30,000 civilians lost their lives during the retaking of Arua and Madi districts in Northern Uganda (Anon. 1984, 9).

Over the years, due to fear of persecution for belonging to what Oboteists regarded as wrong ethnic groups (those ethnic groups, such as the Baganda, and Banyankole, which fielded most opponents of the regime), due to persecution by the regime, or on ethical/moral grounds, many professionals in various fields deserted their civil/public service or private employment and joined the NRM. They contributed to the war effort by providing free educational, health, and other services to people in the ‘liberated areas’. For many, particularly the young, they were enjoying these amenities and services for the first time in their life for since the mid 1960s, successive repressive regimes had deliberately or through mismanagement of national resources, withheld these once basic services from increasingly larger fractions of the population. (Nyerere withdrew his remaining 10,000 troops in June 1981 to avoid putting them in harm’s way), (Anon. 1984, 18).

Consequences of the War: the Refugee Issue

From the launching of the PW on February 6, 1981, when NRA soldiers attacked the Kabamba School of Infantry, to 1985 when Obote was forced to flee again into exile.
Uganda incurred a massive human and material cost.

**Internal refugees.** A UNHCR report on refugees, and accounts by survivors of life in camps controlled by Obote’s soldiers provide us with a glimpse of the suffering of those who lived in these ‘camps’, in which hundreds of thousands of Ugandans perished. We learn that Obote tacitly used the army to suppress opposition; in the words of the UNHCR report, his was a policy of ‘contrived confusion of terror’, a policy that caused enormous loss of life, property, and human suffering (The Tablet 1 January 1984). At the height of the civil war there were 36 camps serviced by aid workers with a total population of between 100,000 and 140,000 internal refugees. In the Ndejje camp people lived in closely packed huts constructed within an area of 400 by 200 meters. The camp lacked medical facilities; each day people had to look for food and firewood, and fetched water from sources that soon became polluted.

“...[People] had to travel as much as 40 kilometers a day on these foraging expeditions. Serious malnutrition set in, only the arrival of the aid teams prevented starvation on a huge scale. Even then only 20 per cent of the 20-40 per cent population of camp children who were malnourished were being reached. Hunger also weakened resistance to disease and... over 100 children died [within a calendar month] when a measles epidemic swept the Ndejje camp (Anon. 1984, 13).”

After denying that his troops were to blame for the displacements, Obote added that it was necessary to keep the civilians in camps “to prepare their minds, and give them the necessary inputs to return to their homes” (The Observer, 25 September 1983). After equating the savagery of the Obote mark II regime to that of the Pol Pot regime, one analyst believes more than 500,000 were forced by the war to leave their homes in Buganda, and seek refuge elsewhere in Uganda (Lwanga-Luyiingo in Mutibwa 1992, 159).

**International refugees.** Official UNHCR figures show that over a quarter of a million people fled the country: by June 1984 195,000 refugees from Uganda had arrived in Sudan, 45,000 in Zaire, and 10,000 in Tanzania. With non official refugees, and those in Rwanda, Kenya and other countries, the real figure was estimated to be in the region of
Meaning of Political Power

Political power is ...the capacity to control valued goods of “material, and normative resources, ...identity and interests, ...institutions and symbols. Authority is the right to enjoy that power (Chazan et al. 1988, 21). Since hardly any political society has all people professing a monolithic economic development philosophy, economic development policies devised by the ruling regime often face opposition from disparate constituencies. Barry addressed the inherent resistance to power holders when he defined power not just in terms of getting outcomes, but in terms of getting outcomes despite resistance (Barry 1980, 185).

Individuals, or a group holding national political power, can change the outcomes of the national decision-making process from what they would otherwise have been in the direction desired by the person or group (Barry 1980, 185). Leaders of old political parties, the Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress, and new parties, the Uganda People’s Movement, and the Conservative Party had this ultimate political prize in mind when they vied to sway the electorate during the 1980 elections. They also wanted to fill the political power vacuum created by the downfall of the Amin regime. The UPC behavior in the 1980 elections thwarted what many Ugandans had hoped would be a civilized process of deciding which party would hold national political power for a predetermined period (Kiapi 1989, 107).

Power configuration prior to the 1980 elections. Between 1979 and November 1980, Uganda People’s Congress party leaders in the UNLF administration, took advantage of the close relationship between the party leaders and Tanzanian rulers to place party functionaries in strategic positions in key institutions of the state (Brett 1991, 299; Lule 1982, 4). After removing the UNLF appointed interim president, Godfrey Binaisa QC, Paulo Muwanga as Chair of the Military Commission was in effect the top executive for the seven months that preceded the elections. He used this opportunity, on top of other things, to gerrymander electoral constituencies (Anon. 1984, 7). During the UNLF
administration, and after the elections, Chris Rwakasisi, another UPC stalwart, headed the National Security Agency (NASA) thus ensuring that the UPC made a head start, using national resources, to build a pro UPC party intelligence network. This agency became notorious for the barbaric methods it used, which included lynching to intimidate political opponents into subservience to the wishes of the UPC party. One Ugandan law professor described NASA’s role as follows: “NASA agents did not wear uniforms. But they carried arms and did not hesitate to use them. NASA’s powers and operational code were never officially made public. However people soon learnt that these agents had enormous powers and were virtually above the law” (Khiddu-Makubuya 1989, 149).

Reciprocal or Bargaining Power used by the UPC and Rival Parties, for the 1980 Elections

All political transactions involve bargaining of one form or another. The theory of reciprocal or bargaining power informs our understanding of the efficacy of the offers UPC and leaders of other political parties made, and the costs they incurred while trying to win political converts; we shall also comment on the response of the electorate to the promises made by politicians. Political bargaining involves making offers to diverse constituencies. Harsanyi reminds us that power is distributed in inverse proportion to costs and offers available among competitors (Harsanyi in Bell et al. 1969, 247). This configuration of power implies that every promise UPC party leaders, and leaders of other parties, made to the electorate involved a cost. During political campaigning, despite the costs involved, politicians have to make offers, promise to award as gifts various resources of the state, to the hungry electorate. Campaign promises are calculated to help politicians win votes, for obtaining more votes than rival politicians is usually a crucial stepping stone to gaining state political power.

Influence Techniques employed by Politicians

The major influence techniques are: supplying information and/or misinformation; maneuvering to gain legitimacy; providing conditional and unconditional positive and negative incentives; and supplying the electorate with conditional positive and negative incen-
tives. Politicians, particularly UPC politicians in the interim UNLF regime, utilized the influence techniques to which Harsanyi referred (in Bell et al. eds. 1969a, 229). Depending on the financial, material and human resources available to strategists, rival political organizations may employ any permutation of the above techniques in their endeavor to improve the respective party's influence-hence power-over the electorate vis-à-vis rival power centers. The fall of Idi Amin created a political vacuum which politicians with competing ideological philosophies vied to fill. Since party politics had been suspended for a year from the date the UNLF took power on 11 April 1979, a constantly changing cast of politicians had been exercising state executive and legislative powers. In this amorphous political atmosphere no group was in a position to implement its pet economic development plans; therefore, very few people were engaged in substantive work relating to economic development around the country. Strategists for each of the four political parties were aware that whichever party won the December 1980 election, would control the legislative and executive powers. This would give the victorious party an opportunity to implement its economic agenda. This political atmosphere entailed that politicians focused their attention not at demanding a share of the national economic cake under the UNLF control, but upon working hard toward winning the election, the presumed prerequisite for controlling state legislative and executive powers.

**Behavior of political party strategists as rational players.** Rational players will forgo collecting those items of information appearing too costly, that is, data whose cost (in the players' conception) outweighs its usefulness (Goodin in Dowding 1991, 71). The UPC party regime's repressive policies of the previous era were fresh in many people's minds; fielding Obote as the party's presidential choice (furthermore, unlike other politicians, Obote did not stand in any constituency in the 1980 elections) troubled many Ugandans who longed for a break with the sad past (Mutibwa 1992, 145); squabbling and corruption which characterized the UPC dominated post Amin UNLA-MC-UNLF power configuration (Mutibwa 1992, 134; Ingham 1994, 162) and the endemic violence of the same period, which observers attributed to the Oboteist faction of the UNLA (Lule 1982, 4), had eroded the appeal of the UPC party in many areas of the country (Taifa Empya 5
November 1980). Uganda People’s Congress, DP, UPM and CP party strategists ignored gathering data about constituencies, which they considered too costly, or which they regarded as disadvantageous to the party’s political fortunes. For example, the insolent behavior of UPC party leaders in and around Kampala, Jinja, Masaka, North Western Uganda and other areas; the selection of Obote as the party’s choice for national president, revealed that party strategists had ignored obtaining and conveying data from the constituencies that would have helped their bosses choose a less controversial candidate. Party leaders also lacked information that would have helped them present a less arrogant posture than that exhibited by Rwakasisi, Adoniya Tiberondwa, Muwanga and other party leaders. When addressing political rallies in Buganda and other hostile regions, each of these three people admonished the Baganda and others who had vowed to prevent Obote and the UPC from retaking power. On 19 October 1980, Rwakasisi declared that since it was the UPC which had organized the initial guerrilla force, Kifalu Malum, which spearheaded the force that removed the Amin regime from power, and the same party controlled the UNLA army, nobody, could stop them from ruling Uganda (Munno 6 September 1980).

The DP strategists avoided collecting information which would have deflected the party leaders’ from promoting the traditional view that the party was primarily a vehicle for advancing the political fortunes of the Roman Catholic constituency in the country (Mutibwa 1992, 144). Party strategists regarded as too costly the process of gathering, disseminating and integrating any information that reflected the interests of the new constituency in the party’s political platform. (This constituency consisted of Ugandans who joined the party not for religious sentiments but as a strategy to unite the political forces that were determined to prevent Obote and his UPC party from usurping political power [Taifa Empya 6 October 1980]). The political pronouncements of party leaders which were often loaded with overtones of 1960s religious prejudices, revealed that they lacked a clear plan for better accommodating the new DP constituency. Democratic Party political rallies were often preceded with a brief goodwill message from the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Uganda, Cardinal Nsubuga, a short prayer, and a recap of the prayer theme of the preceding Sunday mass (Munno 17 November 1980).

Uganda Patriotic Movement leaders were better acquainted (several UPM leaders
held cabinet posts in the UNLF interim administration while the party’s leader, Museveni, was a member of the powerful MC, the security advisory council) than the DP and the CP leaders, with the UPC scheme for derailing the democratic electoral process. The UPM was formed by former UPC members who were determined to prevent Obote from usurping power (Ngabo 18 November 1980). Party strategists, however, regarded the costs of obtaining the electorate’s opinion about the likely appeal of a known UPC radical splinter party, the UPM, to the 1980 Ugandan electorate, as outweighing the likely benefits of such an exercise. It was therefore not surprising the UPM received a lukewarm reception from Ugandans when it declared its intention to participate in the elections (Munno 23 November 1980; Anon. 1984, 7). The CP favored the 1962 federal constitution of the state, and made its desires to return the country to the free enterprise economy reminiscent of the economic arrangements of the early 1960s known to the electorate. The Ugandan electorate had been subjected to repressive rule for the previous fourteen years: first under the unitary political arrangements ushered in by the 1967 republican constitution (cf. Chapter Four), then a decade of military dictatorship (Cf. Chapter Five), followed by the war that destroyed the power structure of the military dictatorship, and ultimately Ugandans had to endure the political turmoil that arose from Lule’s ouster. Conservative Party strategists considered the costs outweighed the benefits of stretching party resources by testing the appeal of its political and economic vision in most of the traditionally segmentary organized regions of the country.

**Barriers created by the UPC officials in the interim UNLF government.** Government and particularly bureaucrats have privileged access to information and can prevent ordinary citizens from finding it by creating costly barriers (Gooding in Dowding 1991, 71). Only one party, the UPC, dominated the organs of the interim UNLF administration. The UPC used every conceivable opportunity to place costly barriers in the path of politicians of rival parties who wanted to obtain information from government departments that would confirm that the democratic aspirations of Ugandans would be guaranteed in the then forthcoming elections (Lule 1982,4). Furthermore, although suspecting the partiality of many top army commanders and senior army officers to the UPC party
Obote’s opponents lacked the resources and cooperation of UPC elements in the government to mount the appropriate investigations that would prove or disprove their suspicions. An effective gambit to prevent inquisitive journalists and rival politicians from questioning the political activities of the UPC leaders in the interim administration involved claiming hero status, for themselves and the Oboteist UNLA commanders for the role they played in the ‘liberation’ war - the 1978-1979 war that removed Amin from power. This was followed by giving the soldiers unbounded powers to execute what are usually the normal duties of the police force such as entering and searching people’s homes for illegal goods and weapons (Anon. 1984, 6).

Muwanga and other UPC politicians sensitized soldiers to shun criticism by labeling as heedless or, worse, as traitors journalists and rival politicians who dared question the violence UNLA soldiers used at roadblocks, and that which frequently accompanied the UNLA’s impromptu searches for weapons in civilian neighborhoods around the country. These barriers were effective enough in preventing opponents of the UPC from obtaining sufficient information that would have exposed the party’s ultimate strategy of using military backing to usurp national political power. Uganda People’s Congress politicians orchestrated a political climate in which Ugandans were expected to venerate UNLA soldiers as blameless ‘heros’ who had liberated the country from Amin’s military dictatorship. This helps to explain why Ugandans went into the December 1980 election without concrete evidence that military force would decide which politicians and political party would wield political power after the elections. By integrating the military in the party’s equation for gaining power (Mutibwa 1992, 134) the UPC party strategists placed an indomitable barrier in the way of political rivals, who hoped to use democratic means of obtaining political power.

**Importance of legitimacy in the 1980 elections.** The legitimacy state leaders enjoy over other leaders in society is a source of substantial political power (Harsanyi 1969a, 229). Through nefarious methods UPC party strategists infiltrated and made sure that they controlled the important institutions of the state in the period leading up to the 1980 election (Mutibwa 1992, 135). By controlling state organs, chiefly the executive,
legislative and defense institutions - the three institutions which mattered most at the time - they dictated the tempo and character of the electoral process. For example, by devising, supervising, and arbitrating the pre-election electoral process, UPC leaders awarded their party a head start of 17 seats (Anon 1984, 7). On the vague basis of ‘national security’ Oboteists in the MC wielding executive authority, successfully persuaded their main political rival, the DP, to drop the party’s most eligible presidential candidate Lule. Through their control of the Electoral Commission, UPC party leaders dictated the number of ballot boxes - four instead of the one ballot box (preferred by the other three parties) - that were placed at each polling station (The Times 17 August 1984). On the night following the voting, after ordering the pro UPC troops to fire live ammunition in the air to intimidate DP supporters who were celebrating a premature electoral victory, UPC party strategists in the MC used executive powers to suspend the free flow of election results, and the liability of the MC to legal censure. Shortly afterwards UPC party leaders declared their own party the ultimate winner of the elections amid widespread accusations of fraud (Africa Confidential Vol. 22 No 4; Guardian 13 December 1980).

**Unconditional negative and positive incentives used by the UPC.**

Unconditional positive and negative incentives entail that the target constituency or individual actor must bear the costs or receive the advantages of the incentive whether or not the target actor conforms to the wishes of the incentive giver (Harsanyi 1969a, 229). Politicians dangle various state resources as incentives to try to alter the incentive structure of the target constituency or individual. Party strategists directed UPC leaders to use both party assets and the potentially unlimited government resources at their disposal, to try to alter the incentive structure, or the voters’ resolve to support political parties other than the UPC. Routine army raids, prior to the elections, of Mengo, Rubaga, Kabowa, Katwe, Nnajanankumbi and other villages surrounding the Malire army barracks (then housed in the Kabaka’s place), and in other towns and villages near UNLA barracks elsewhere in the country, were calculated to destabilize the country (Ngabo 11 November 1980). An unstable political environment, UPC party strategists reasoned, would prolong the life of the UPC dominated interim UNLF regime and smother the vision of returning to a demo-
ocratic political system, which was quickly taking root in the minds of DP members and supporters of the other two parties.

These UNLA raids were a negative unconditional incentive since all residents of alleged anti UPC constituencies became victims of nightly troop harassment irrespective of political affiliation. Uganda People’s Congress party strategists also used some unconditional positive incentives to try to penetrate the alleged DP stronghold. At the beginning of the campaign season UPC party political rallies were often preceded and concluded with festivities at which food, soft, and alcoholic beverages were served to all comers. Democratic Party, UPM, and CP strategists encouraged their supporters to attend these UPC rallies, both to acquaint themselves with their main political enemy’s party platform, to better understand it and hence better challenge it, and to enjoy the free food and drink without compromising their loyalty to their respective political party (Munno 22 November 1980). Uganda People’s Congress party strategists flooded those areas where they hoped to have a fighting chance with gifts of social services such as roads, schools, heath clinics, and public transport vehicles. Since both supporters and opponents of the UPC benefited from the free meals served at UPC party rallies and gifts of social services to alleged UPC strongholds (for non party residents of these constituencies could also use these social amenities), these two examples illustrate the use of unconditional positive incentives by UPC party bosses in the 1980 political campaign.

**Conditional negative and positive incentives supplied by the UPC.** Successful threats and unsuccessful offers are both costless (however, successful offers and unsuccessful threats are both costly) (Dowding 1991, 73). These are the important properties of the fourth influence technique; supplying conditional positive and negative incentives, which politicians holding national political power use to try to gain influence over the electorate and marginalize rival political constituencies, and political leaders. To remind political opponents of his party’s political power, at the beginning of the multi party political campaigns, the Chair of the MC, Muwanga, threatened that anyone campaigning as an independent would be “dealt with firmly” (Taifa Empya 1 June 1980). Later, Muwanga warned candidates who had defected from UPC to DP to “know how to behave or else
[Muwanga and other UPC leaders would teach them (defectors) a lesson they would never forget]" (*Taifa Empye* 4 June 1980). Muwanga’s threats, however, did not deter defectors from making scathing attacks upon the UPC party’s political-economic platform of the earlier UPC administration, and from questioning the integrity and political competence of UPC party leaders from the Obote mark I regime many of whom were preparing to participate in the 1980 elections (*Munno* 12 September 1980). The fact that fiery critics of Obote and the UPC such as Obote’s cousin, Adoko Nekyon, who had defected to the DP (he had been Obote’s Information and Broadcasting minister in the 1960s (cf. Chapter Four) was barred by a violent UPC crowd from submitting registration forms for his candidacy (*Mutibwa* 1992, 140), was proof that UPC party strategists were determined to carry out their threat to punish turncoats. Other defectors like Ntege-Lubwama were even more unfortunate as his teenage daughter was shot and killed by Oboteist troops under Oyite-Ojok’s command, who were terrorizing the area surrounding Makerere University, where Ntege-Lubwama lived. After escaping from the gunmen he fled into exile to Kenya. The UPC party strategists’s treatment of defectors from the party demonstrate the use of conditional negative incentives. Those who displeased the party bosses not only, did they like Nekyon, risk having their political careers ruined; others, like Ntege-Lubwama, placed their lives and the lives of members of their families in fatal danger.

**Offers made by the rival parties, and party leaders.** Leaders of the UPC believed that by polishing up Obote’s image they would successfully market him to Ugandans as a national hero (*Musizi* 20 January 1980). For his return to Uganda, Muwanga and his colleagues in the government and the army prepared a government funded extravaganza. Delicious food dishes were served, and fountains of wine and champagne flowed day and night for weeks, to quench the thirst of the party faithful who went to Bushenyi to prepare for the UPC hero’s 27 May 1980 homecoming party. Party leaders portrayed Obote as the person who had rescued Uganda from the grip of the Amin dictatorship. One observer notes that the UPC converted the date of Obote’s return from exile into ‘hero’s day’, and continued to celebrate it annually at the Bushenyi venue. The bill for “Hero’s day” celebrations in 1984 came to 400,000,000 shillings (just over a million dollars) (Anon. 1984, 16:
Mutibwa 1992, fn. 14, 166).

"We shall continue from where we stopped" were the first words many Ugandans heard Obote speak, in the live radio and TV broadcast of Obote's "triumphant return" from exile (Munno 28 May 1980). Although Obote's offer to return the country to the politics of the mid 1960s to the early 1970s was music in the ears of his supporters, it was a double edged sword. Whereas the UPC party leaders had advocated an explicit socialist economic ideology in the 1960s, on the 1980 campaign trail Obote and other top party spokespersons made only vague general references to socialism. Most UPC electoral candidates avoided the radical rhetoric of the prior era altogether and marketed themselves as born again emissaries of the free enterprise ethos; for the brighter candidates recalled that a radical political philosophy had greatly contributed to the fall of the Obote mark I regime. (The military had identified Obote's socialist economic policies "which had left many people unemployed...insecure and lacking in the basic needs of life....[Reason 8], when justifying deposing Obote in 1971) (Ibingira 1973, 289). In appreciation of the financial help (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 43) Asians had provided the Oboteist faction to destabilize and eventually remove the Amin regime, the UPC party dominated interim UNLF government returned the confiscated properties (cf. Chapter Five) to their former Asian owners (Mutibwa 1992, 154; Ingham 1994, 192). Uganda experienced heightened insecurity during the UNLF and MC rule (Brett 1991, 299; Lule 1982, 4); Obote promised to restore peace and security in the country if the electorate returned him to office. When campaigning, leaders of all political parties promised the electorate prosperity, and hence a higher standard of living, if elected to office (Citizen 14 November 1980; Ngabo 12 November 1980).

Unlike UPC party leaders, DP leaders did not directly control any state resources in the form of civil and public administration jobs, or commercial properties they could offer to individuals. They also lacked funds with which to comfortably back their development project offers of such things as primary schools, roads, and dispensaries in return for political support, to the numerous constituencies. The DP party leaders decided to retain 'Mazima na bwenkanya' (truth and justice), the DP motto of the pre independence era, as this had proven effective in mobilizing support in the independence elections. Museveni
thought, "... The Catholic elite elements of Buganda joined the DP to fight for "truth and justice" --- i.e. "justice" for the "elite", never for the masses" (Museveni quoted in Mutibwa 1992, 15). The party slogan was particularly powerful in mobilizing Ugandans professing allegiance to the Catholic faith, who read dishonesty and injustice in the Anglican Protestant dominated political system. Members of the Catholic faith believed that despite their numerical strength (they made up 33 per cent, Protestants 30 per cent, and Moslems accounted for 5 per cent of the Ugandan population, [Worldmark Encyclopedia 1984, 338]), since independence, Anglicans controlling the political system had conspired to prevent the DP leadership-hence the Roman Catholics, from ruling the country. One analyst remarked that Catholics and Moslems in public office suffered discrimination, while there were reports of nepotism to Obote's favorites and yes-men (Anon 1984, 5). To diehard traditional DP supporters 'mazima na bwenkanya' could only manifest when the DP formed the national government. Though 'inexpensive' (in money terms) the party motto was the most appealing offer the DP leaders could think of for mobilizing its traditional supporters. From his exile base in England, Lule had carried out an international campaign for the restoration of democracy in Uganda. As the election date drew closer, Lule had moved from England to Nairobi while awaiting the finalization of arrangements between the DP and the MC government for his return home.

In their campaign speeches, DP leaders intimated to Lule's supporters around the country, that former president Lule would be the party's presidential candidate (Ngabo 8 September 1980). (Lule had a unique background: he was born in a Moslem family, and converted to Christianity while still a child. Because of his conversion to Christianity, he got a rare opportunity at the time, for a child born into a Moslem family, of attending an exclusive Anglican boarding school, King's College Budo. He majored in history during his university studies in the United Kingdom. Later he married into an aristocratic Protestant family from Buganda. He was a member of the colonial legislative council and had joined the DP in the late 1950s. After independence, instead of continuing with a career in politics he embraced a career in public and later academic administration becoming the first African Principal of Makerere University. He held this post until he was sacked, for obstructing Obote's effort to introduce his pet radical political policies into the nation's
higher education system. After leaving Makerere University, he joined the Commonwealth Secretariat headquartered in London. He was the organization’s Assistant Secretary General at the time of his retirement). Lule’s background, and impeccable working career, cut across sectarian and ethnic backgrounds like that of no other party leader. Lule was therefore a formidable opponent, a major asset for the DP, and an attractive gift from the party to the electorate.

Influential NCC and NEC members, Nabudere, Rugumayo, Omwony Ojok and Yaspal Tandon were among those disturbed by Lule’s rising popularity with the electorate. (The local press referred to the radical cabal comprising these four people as the “gang of four” for their machinations to dominate national political power. The quartet’s tactics to entrench itself in power were similar to those used by the Chinese “gang of four,” which included Mao’s widow, that had attempted to usurp power in the 1970s after Mao’s death). Ugandans had expressed unprecedented anger when this radical group colluded with the UPC and other power hungry elements within the interim legislature to depose Lule. However, soon afterwards the “gang of four” was forced into exile after losing to the pro Obote clique in the legislature, in the power struggle that arose from Lule’s departure. The same UPC leaders were now determined to prevent Lule from returning from exile and participating in the general elections of 1980. Mudoola expressed the view shared by many Ugandans that Lule was removed from power because he alienated the king-makers of the day, “the gang of four” (Mudoola 1989, 131).

Many UPC party members were alienated by the excesses of the Obote mark I regime. Two Baganda, Kintu-Musoke and Jaberi Bidandi-Ssali, Kirunda-Kivejinja from Busoga in Eastern Uganda, and Yoweri Museveni, a Muhima from Ankole, were among the disaffected former UPC youth wingers eager to thwart Obote’s scheme to regain power. The first three had remained in Amin’s Uganda and had become wealthy influential members of the Kampala and Jinja communities. As the Vice Chair of the MC, Museveni offered the quartet a place, however tenuous, in this all powerful entity (Mutibwa 1992, 37). These four joined resources to form a left of center Uganda People’s Movement (UPM). Many of the candidates the party fielded in the elections were disenchanted former UPC members. These included former senior corporate managers, with modest political
abilities, such as the academician Erisa Kironde. Obote had once appointed Kironde to chair the Uganda Electricity Board, (UEB), which board was responsible for national electricity supply and hydroelectricity policy development. In response to Amin’s amnesty to those who were in Obote’s ill-fated entourage to Singapore, W.W. Kalema, Obote’s Minister of Commerce, returned to Uganda. He became an early casualty of the Amin regime, having disappeared without a trace soon after returning from exile in Tanzania. While the Amin regime was blamed for his death, other sources suggested that Kalema lost his life for having deserted the chief, in exile, by returning to Uganda. Kalema’s widow, Rhoda, became the UPM candidate for Mubende, while Freda Blick, the daughter of former president Lule, was the UPM candidate for a Kampala constituency. Apparently UPM offered an alternative political party to former UPC members who were disenchanted with Obote’s leadership of the party, and to those Ugandans like Lule’s daughter, who had adequate knowledge about the DP-UPC conspiracy to block Lule’s return to Uganda.

Some members of the Uganda Peoples Movement’s (UPM), the precursor political wing of the NRM, were concerned when, before the elections, the Oboteist group mounted an illegal troop recruitment campaign. They were particularly worried that the illegal troop recruitment was followed by a stepped up terror campaign in Buganda and other areas were Obote was unpopular (Lule 1982, 7). They believed that the UPC party strategists had gerrymandered electoral constituencies, and they also feared that the UPC party leaders’ insistence upon using four instead of one ballot box at each polling station was part of the party’s strategy to defraud the electoral process (The Times 17 August 1984). At this stage leaders of the UPM were acting as volunteer watchdogs, to ensure that Ugandans would have free and fair elections. With these concerns in mind Museveni approached the DP leadership, and proposed that the two parties, along with the CP, boycott the then forthcoming elections until those potentially dangerous matters were cleared. The DP leadership rejected the UPM proposal to boycott the election. The DP leadership satirized Museveni’s appeal to the DP to join the UPM and CP in an election boycott. Semwogerere, the President General of the DP, sarcastically suggested in public that leaders of the UPM and those of other parties and their followers were free to join the DP if they were not sure of the ability of their own respective party to win the then upcoming election. Rebuffed by the then most popular
party, the DP, and with CP lacking the financial and political resources to make it a useful ally, or an effective party, Museveni nevertheless did not resign himself to trust providence. He repeated his warning to the UPC, that he and his followers would “return to the bush,” and launch a war to restore democracy, if the Oboteist group derailed the democratic aspirations and objectives of Ugandans, by cheating its way back into power (*Ngabo* 17 November 1980). Museveni kept his pre election promise: after the UPC party leaders bulldozed their way into power, he launched a guerrilla war whose objective was to remove the new UPC regime and institute a democratic system of government (Museveni 1986, 15).

The CP led by Josuah S. Mayanja-Nkanji, the former Katikiro, Prime Minister of Buganda, advanced the multicultural nature of the Ugandan community. Unlike the major parties, the CP did not shy away from proposing a return to the pre 1967 federal constitutional arrangement, and the free enterprise economy of the same era. This party drew support from the more affluent parts of the country. It fielded the charismatic Katenta Apuuli, from Toro, in Western Uganda, and the future National Resistance Movement (NRM) ambassador to the United States; Apuuli was among the most eloquent candidates. The CP had substantial support from the coffee growing areas of Busoga, parts of Bugishu, in Eastern Uganda, and other parts of the country. Having endured the trauma of Obote’s failed experimental socialism of the late 1960 and early 1970s, people in these regions longed for the stable and thriving national economic life of the free enterprise period. Coffee farmers recalled that the Amin regime had lacked both an economic and political vision and direction; this had led to the devastation of the cash cropping economy. Rather than trust providence by siding with the UPM (a party that promised a bright future yet was composed of disgruntled deserters of other parties to show for candidates), many Ugandans preferred the CP, which made no idealistic claims. Its only promise was to restore what many regarded as the most blissful period of post colonial Uganda. The CP, however, lacked sufficient resources to take its message across the country. Unlike the UPC, DP, and UPM, it lacked both local and foreign wealthy backers. The CP had hoped to advance its cause through the mass media, using public broadcasting time that was initially allotted to each political party. However, when the main parties colluded to deny minor parties an equal time share of public air waves, this effectively killed the party’s chances for
promoting its political platform. In the first part of this chapter we tried to capture the atmosphere of the electoral process. At the conclusion of the election exercise, UPC leaders in the caretaker MC government declared their party the overall winner of the national elections and apportioned national political offices among themselves.

Costs Resulting From Offers Made By The UPC And Other Parties

Costs incurred by the UPC party, and the Obote mark II regime. A substantial proportion of the population comprised those who were children during the previous Obote administration. A child aged twelve years old when Obote fell in 1971 had reached voting age at the time of the 1980 elections. While still in exile, Obote’s conjecture of the Ugandan political environment was that Ugandans were “uniformly sick of Amin’s excesses and tired of war;” he believed they would “welcome wholeheartedly anyone who [would] restore order” (Ingham 1994, 150). Subsequent events proved that Obote erred in imagining that Ugandans were either so gullible and forgiving as to “welcome wholeheartedly” anyone who replaced Amin, irrespective of his/her past political crimes. Obote’s love for power blinded him from seeing the reality of Ugandan politics of the early 1980s, namely that most Ugandans were anxious to prevent him from returning to power. Therefore many former prominent UPC supporters, including founder members like George Magezi, Adoko Nekyon, Mathias Ngobi, and Micombero Mpambara, deserted the UPC and joined DP, (Mutibwa 1992, 145). The first three had been cabinet ministers in the earlier Obote regime while Mpambara had been the UPC party’s loudest zealot from Western Uganda in the 1960s. Many people believed that, if allowed to rule the country again, Obote would endeavor to establish a political system that was similar to that of the Obote mark I regime. In the eyes of many Ugandans Obote was clearly a liability rather than an asset for his party.

The UPC strategists hoped to woo those who were too young to remember the excesses of the party’s earlier rule. “We shall continue from where we stopped”: this remark, which Obote made on his return from exile provoked a scathing attack by opposition leaders upon the policy intentions of Obote and his party. Rival veteran politicians wasted no time before dramatizing the ominous implications of the above remark. Politicians
from other parties warned the electorate that Obote’s remark meant that the party planned to
turn the clock back, that the UPC if elected to office would reinstitute the repressive rule of
the Obote mark I rule (Munno 14 November 1980). Obote’s promise to return Uganda to
the political status quo of the late 1960s resurrected visions of terror, intimidation, persecu-
tion, torture and prison cells, in the minds of the victims of the earlier UPC regime. In
Chapter Four we reviewed the impact on the economic and social political climate of post
colonial Uganda, resulting from the State of Emergency, and the Move to the Left Policy of
the earlier Obote administration. The lively, energetic, voluntary participation of numerous
young adults in the DP political campaign, was in sharp contrast to the near absence of
youth involvement in the UPC political campaign, in all but the Northern region. This was
evidence that the UPC failed to penetrate the new voting community of 1980 Uganda (Taifa
Empya 16 October 1980). Young adults believed the judgment of their political mentors,
older Ugandans, and placed their bet on the DP and other parties rather than the UPC.
Obote’s promise to turn the political clock back to the early 1970s cost the UPC potential
support of the young adult constituency.

Many UPC electoral candidates abandoned the party’s radical socialist rhetoric of
the late 1960s; they now advocated free enterprise as their choice economic development
approach. This alienated the diehard UPC radical-left that had survived from the previous
era, without winning any support from the right. The generally right-oriented mainstream
electorate considered DP and CP candidates as better qualified representatives of the free
enterprise approach than their UPC counterparts, who had waited until the campaign season
to recognize the value of free enterprise. (Certain contracts were made by representatives of
the Asians and the British government, and Ugandan exiles, as a condition for obtaining
diplomatic, financial, logistical and material support for fighting the war that removed the
Amin regime). By initiating the process of returning confiscated properties to their Asian
owners, the UPC dominated UNLF, and later the MC regime, was fulfilling its contract
with the British government, and with Asians with claims to property in Uganda (Anon.
1984, 17). Obote however denies that he made any pre bargains with the British govern-
ment. According to Obote, Baganda exiles in London pressed Callaghan’s Labor govern-
ment to offer Tanzania logistical help on the condition that Tanzania did not favor Obote to
Many Ugandans, some of whom were staunch UPC supporters, were not amused when they were forced to surrender commercial and private properties, which they had occupied and looked after for a decade, and had become accustomed to regarding as their very own, to their former Asian owners. Such Africans and their relatives became alienated from the UPC as they regarded the MC and later UPC policies toward Asian properties as pro Asian and injurious to African interests. Mutibwa believes that the return of businesses to Asians since 1982 'dampened the Ugandan’s claim ---- and aspiration to be in full control of the economy' (Mutibwa 1992, 118). Party bosses in government acquired choice unclaimed Asian properties, and dished out shops and houses to their family members, and to trusted high ranked soldiers and their family members. This method of distributing Asian properties alienated the lowly ranked army and UPC party officials, who felt cheated by those they had helped acquire political power. The avaricious inclination of the UPC leaders eroded the morale of the grassroots in those regions and constituencies where the party still had some followers.

**Costs incurred by the DP.** The traditional DP constituency tried to reconcile its disappointment with the behavior of party leaders, by claiming that the UPC dominated MC had coerced DP leaders into dropping Lule as the party’s presidential candidate (Munno 15 December 1980). (According to DP leaders, allegedly for the sake of state security, UPC leaders in government had advised DP leaders to choose a presidential candidate other than Lule. Democratic Party leaders alleged that, for unspecified reasons, UPC leaders claimed that Lule’s candidacy was unacceptable to the security forces, and that Lule would have been a major liability to the DP’s political fortunes [Ngabo 16 August 1980]. Democratic Party leaders conceded to the UPC request, and replaced Lule with Semwogerere. The decision to drop Lule was made without DP leaders informing Lule, or his supporters. According to Obote it was not his UPC party cronies in the interim Military Commission (MC) executive but the former Tanzanian leader Nyerere, who issued orders that barred Lule from returning to participate in the 1980 national elections [Ingham 1994, 166]). Seasoned politicians and particularly the new DP (former UPC and KY supporters) members.
the more open-minded members of the traditional DP constituency and political analysts, argued that hunger for political power dazzled DP party leaders, preventing them from seeing the ulterior UPC party leaders' motives. Critics of the DP leadership's behavior in the Lule affair argued that the guileful UPC strategists succeeded in deceiving DP leaders into dropping the principled and politically powerful Lule to weaken the DP's political fortunes. There was a new DP constituency that comprised mainly former KY and UPC supporters, who joined the DP because they believed a united political opposition was essential if Ugandans were to prevent the military backed UPC party leaders from again usurping national political power. Abu Mayanja, a former KY, and UPC parliamentarian, and Obote's cousin, Adoko Nekyon, were among the many prominent Moslems who defied tradition by joining the pro Roman Catholic Church DP. Many Ugandans did not want to split the anti Obote vote (Ingham 1994, 172) by supporting the organizationally weak CP. People in these last two categories compromised their deeper ideological convictions by supporting the DP. Other Ugandans joined the DP because they distrusted the newly formed, largely unknown UPM, with its lofty political ideals.

Having an unblemished political career, a strong domestic base, and strong international connections, Lule would have been the strongest presidential candidate any party would have been proud to field. He was the kind of candidate who could rock the UPC boat, at home and in the international arena if the UPC were to use fraudulent techniques to regain political power. (Eventually he did embark on an a lone international campaign to expose the mercenary activities of the Obote mark II regime). While in exile, Lule had already caused the UPC leaders political migraine headaches with his constant international exposure of the ominous maneuvers UPC party leaders were developing to swindle their way back into power). Lule had already demonstrated his ability to unite previously warring KY-UPC-DP members. The DP leaders' collaboration with the UPC dominated MC to prevent Lule from participating in the 1980 elections, cost the DP an opportunity to field a formidable presidential candidate. By rejecting Lule, the party also eroded its potential chance to mount, and spearhead, a united, and credible political opposition front after the UPC bulldozed its way back to power. Both the traditional and new DP constituencies began to doubt the political competence and judgment of the incumbent DP leaders. After
the elections the DP split along ethnic lines into a Northern and Southern faction. Moreover, the Lule affair exposed the inconsistency between rhetoric and actions of DP party leaders.

The itinerary of Lule’s return that was endorsed by the DP secretariat included attending and addressing DP political rallies in Entebbe, Kampala, and Jinja. At the eleventh hour the MC government denied landing rights to the plane that was to fly Lule from Nairobi to Uganda. Despondent DP supporters who had shown up to welcome Lule home, returned to their homes unaware of the role DP leaders had played in blocking his return. None of the DP executives showed up at Entebbe to welcome Lule from exile on the scheduled date (Ngabo 7 December 1980). Commenting upon the decision made by DP leaders to elect the party’s executive in Lule’s absence, Mutibwa had this to say: “It was clear to all that Lule’s return to Kampala was being blocked because it would have led to his election as the President-General of the Party. ... [This] points to a weakness of political principle and the way Ugandans have continued to view politics as a personal preserve from which others, even when they are close to us, can be outsiders to be excluded” (Mutibwa 1992, 144). Fielding a weak candidate, Semwogerere, who lacked Lule’s charismatic appeal, was a major mistake which haunted the party after the 1980 election fiasco.

In the days following Lule’s abortive return, local newspapers revealed the conspiracy, couched weeks before, between the UPC and DP leadership, to prevent Lule from returning home. For evidence, newspapers printed Semwogerere’s, and other DP party leaders’, political campaign schedules, which included speaking at rallies in Masindi and other towns that were situated far from Kampala, on the day Semwogerere and other DP leaders were supposed to welcome Lule from exile at Entebbe Airport. Many DP supporters felt that neither ‘truth’ nor ‘fairness,’ which DP party leaders claimed to uphold, were served by the way in which party leaders treated Lule, and party members who had expected him to lead the party in the general election. Party supporters built dozens of expensive arches, across the ninety miles of road route from Entebbe to Jinja, and hundreds of thousands of DP supporters gathered along the same route to give Lule a hero’s welcome. Few knew that weeks or months before, DP party leaders had consummated the DP-UPC leaders’ conspiracy to thwart Lule’s return. Ingham discussed the role the DP and Nyerere
played in foiling Lule’s plan to participate in the elections of 1980 (Ingham 1994, 167). We should recall that political rallies held by the DP and other parties had to be authorized by government authorities ahead of schedule. The MC government leaders therefore knew in advance and had sanctioned Semwogere’s presence at Masindi, or absence from Entebbe on the date of Lule’s return as part of the strategy to foil Lule’s return to Uganda. Those who had spent their money, time and other resources, were also exposed to pro UPC UNLA harassment when preparing for Lule’s return. Many DP supporters were shocked at the callousness of their party leaders. They found it hard to believe that DP executives would direct them toward a red herring by letting them prepare for Lule’s return, when the leaders had already made a secret deal with their alleged political enemies in the MC regime, to frustrate Lule’s return. Lule’s welcome debacle cost the DP an opportunity to consolidate its grassroot support. Many disappointed party members even threatened to punish the party leadership by staying at home on voting day.

Furthermore, many Ugandans also felt that DP leaders compromised ‘truth and justice’ when they used Lule’s name and political stature to mobilize financial and political support for their party from Ugandans. At DP party rallies, one after another speakers would convey greetings allegedly from Lule in exile. Most of the alleged greetings were evidently assuring DP supporters that he would return home to lead the DP into the 1980 election (Ngabo 2 November 1980). By claiming to be in close contact with Lule, obscure politicians gained people’s attention, and hence political prominence. In this way many DP politicians used Lule’s name and stature as essential stepping stones for building, or consolidating their own political careers. Finally, despite questioning the validity of the 1980 elections result, Semwogere and the DP team agreed to sit on the opposition benches. The DP lacked either a clear political or military strategy for responding to the unstable political situation that resulted from the disputed election. This alienated many party members who believed that their leaders should have boycotted the parliament after the election, in protest over UPC’s fraudulent conduct in those elections (Mutibwa 1992, 151).

**Costs incurred by the UPM.** Leaders of the UPM had an uphill journey in their mission to convince Ugandans that their party had something to offer the electorate,
which no other party could offer. In the minds of many Ugandans UPM party leaders had been too prominent in the UNLF government not to have participated in the conspiracy that removed Lule from office. Moreover, to become vice chair of the MC, Museveni had to acquiesce in the Muwanga-Oyite Ojok coup that deposed president Binaisa (Mutibwa 1992, 138). Since the UPM leadership, and many candidates, were UPC deserters, the electorate could not help but regard them as turncoats who could not be trusted. As youth wingers, Bidandi-Ssali and Kintu Musoke, like their former boss Obote, had been fervent critics of the federal system enshrined in the 1962 national constitution Obote had abrogated (Shariat 22 November 1994). The center-left political policy position championed by the UPM party leaders sounded hollow to those who knew the extreme left position expounded by the same people in their UPC youth wing days in the 1960s. The electorate was also suspicious of the motive that inspired wealthy sponsors of the UPM into advocating a socialist political platform. The trio of Bidandi-Ssali, Kirunda-Kivejinja, and Kintu Museke owned an ultra modern publishing house. During the 1970s and 1980s the threesome were also the brains behind the influential leftist newspaper, the *Weekly Topic*. Each of the three owned prime real estate properties, while Bidandi-Ssali sponsored a major Kampala football team, and operated an up scale restaurant in downtown Kampala. This restaurant had once belonged to a wealthy Asian family (Ngaho 9 January 1980). The inconsistency of the UPM leaders’ affluent lifestyle and their radical political ideological position alienated many would be UPM party subscribers, hence costing the party valuable political support.

**Costs incurred by the CP.** When campaigning CP promoted the multi cultural (mosaic) composition of the country. The CP position sent political tremors among Ugandans from peripheral parts of the country, in the extreme West, Northern and North Eastern parts. People from these regions preferred a ‘melting pot’ vision of the country, for this vision guaranteed them a disproportionately larger share of the national economic cake than that warranted by these regions’ population and resource contribution to the national economy. They feared that the mosaic pattern of the country, envisioned by the CP (similar to the pre 1967 political arrangement, when Northern, Eastern, Western Uganda, and Buganda, had substantial autonomy in social, economic and fiscal planning) (cf. Chapter Four), if
allowed to blossom, would result in the marginalization of the less productive parts of the country. Opponents of the CP position were not prepared to listen to arguments that imbalance in regional development could be taken care of through federal resource transfers as it happens in many politically stable developing and developed countries. The CP also proposed a return to the federal constitution of the country, and the free enterprise (similar to the post 1985 NRM economic proposals) economy, (cf. Chapter Seven). The idea of a return to the federal constitution of the country was unacceptable to opponents of the CP, for the same reasons why they objected to the CP's vision of its multicultural composition.

Moreover, Obote had since the late 1960s filled public corporations and government departments with personnel based upon ethnic or political affiliation criteria. As a result, UPC elements from Northern Uganda, pro-UPC parts of Western and Eastern Uganda, came to dominate federal institutions and public corporations; later, Amin had continued the recruitment trend Obote had initiated. The CP proposals for a return to a federated Uganda scared those who feared a loss of employment should such an arrangement require a reduction of the bloated civil and public service. Those in public corporations feared losing their jobs once the inefficiently run public corporations were privatized under the free enterprise economic proposal of the CP. The CP's pro-federal constitutional position, and its support for a return to the free enterprise economy, cost it the support of those constituencies which were benefiting most from the unitary republican status quo Obote had imposed during his earlier rule. Strongholds of opposition to the federal political association could be found mainly in the non coffee growing districts 1, 8, 9, and 12 shown in Table 6.1, showing grants paid by government to district administrations between 1967 and 1969. Ankole, District no. 2, in the same table, was divided along intra ethnic lines with the majority Bairu supporting Obote and the UPC to demonstrate their political emancipation from their former pre colonial masters, the minority Bahima; the latter sympathised with both the DP and CP political programs, but their numbers were too few to influence the political leadership in Ankole through the elections. (Most of Uganda's coffee comes from districts 16-18 in Table 6.1. According to the same table these districts did not receive any federal grants between 1967 and 1969). Support for the CP political platform was strongest in these three districts and in the other two less prominent coffee producing districts: no. 13, Toro, and
district no. 3, Bugishu, both of which had not received federal grants between 1968 and 1969 according to the same table.

**Uses of Influence techniques by the UPC party-led government**

Harsanyi reminds us that influence is a fundamental component of all bargaining transactions (Harsanyi 1969a 229). Here we review the use by the UPC government of four influence techniques: supplying of information and misinformation, gaining legitimacy, providing unconditional positive and negative incentives, and supplying conditional negative and positive incentives. Below we survey the influence techniques the Obote mark II regime used in its attempt to win support from Ugandans who objected to the methods Obote used to return to power, many of whom had started to sympathize or actively support the anti Obote guerrilla forces.

**Supplying information and misinformation about the war.** Within two months of taking power, armed opposition to the new Obote regime ensued. As a result the poor security situation of the pre election period worsened. Successive successful lightning strikes made by guerrillas against UNLA positions roused the ire of UPC politicians and government troops. In their determination to capture Museveni and destroy the fledgling NRA guerrilla force, UPC politicians ordered soldiers to mount checkpoints at roadblocks, at which all travelers were required to identify themselves with picture identity cards, to security personnel, throughout Buganda, the Eastern, and the Western provinces. The poorly paid soldiers turned these checkpoints into extortion ‘points’; soldiers were soon stealing money and other belongings they found upon travelers, on the pretext that they were confiscating money and other valuable goods allegedly destined to help the guerrilla cause. Both friends and foes of the government were victims of troop harassment at roadblocks. Democratic Party leaders sought assurances from the government, in the National Assembly, that government leaders would direct UNLA soldiers mounting road blocks to stop harassing DP party leaders and supporters.

Uganda People’s Congress party leaders, and Muwanga the minister of defense, assured DP representatives in parliament, and other Ugandans, that the government had a
firm grip on the security situation. He promised to make sure that rogue troops would be punished, yet he ordered no disciplinary measures to be carried out against the lawless troops. Often, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, government leaders accused the guerrillas of the crimes committed by UNLA soldiers. They claimed that it was the guerrillas, in army uniforms, not government troops, who were responsible for nightly armed robberies, and killing of civilians near UNLA road blocks, and for stealing money and other valuables from civilians at road blocks mounted by government troops (*Taifa Empya* 8 July 1982). To place a wedge between the rest of Ugandans and the Baganda, (an effective tool for winning support from peripheral areas in the 1960s), (cf. Chapter Four), UPC leaders told Ugandans that it was the sullen Baganda, the sore losers of the 1980 elections, (conveniently omitting Museveni and the Western Ugandan factor) who were fighting Obote’s ‘popularly elected government’. According to the testimony of a UNLA deserter, government soldiers from Northern Uganda were frightened into loyalty to the regime with horrifying stories from their political leaders. In this way gullible youths from Acholi, Lango and Teso were coaxed into joining the army, to ensure that Obote and his regime did not lose political power. Many innocent Nilotic army recruits therefore came to believe that they had to kill Southern Ugandans to forestall the doom that awaited Northern Ugandans, at the hands of Southerners, particularly the Baganda (*New Africa*, June 1986, 15). (The Baganda was one ethnic group that received the brunt of UNLA harassment).

The morale of the UNLA soldiers declined, as guerrillas increasingly scored decisive military victories against government soldiers, and brought more territory under NRM/NRA control. In May 1981, Allimadi, Obote’s prime minister, claimed that the government had the power to crush the rebels and would do so (*Ingham* 1994, 182). Despite the diversionary tactics, which included making false claims of monumental gains in the war against the guerrillas, and celebrating ‘Hero Day’ as though the regime was in firm control of the country, the regime’s credibility had continued to plummet in 1984. (It eventually collapsed in July of the following year). Increasing success of the guerrilla fighters against government troops in battle meant that accurate information about the war situation would have boosted the morale of guerrilla sympathizers and anti government guerrillas.
while demoralizing UNLA soldiers and UPC supporters. The regime exaggerated its war successes while minimizing its losses in the vain hope that this strategy would demoralize guerrilla sympathizers while boosting the morale of its soldiers. Admitting that Obote's regime was losing the war against the guerrillas would also have scared away the regime's financial benefactors, including the IMF and WB. The IMF and WB are two international capitalist credit institutions reputed for imposing stiff terms upon creditor states. The two organizations are also usually reluctant to do business in high risk countries, where ruling regimes are incapable of guaranteeing the safety of their personnel. These two organizations also usually lend money to relatively stable regimes that can last long enough (despite having ways of making successor regimes assume financial debts of their predecessor regimes) to repay the loans. To keep international money lenders in the country, Obote had to lie to the international community that he was in full control of the security situation in the country.

Position of UPC leaders, and opponents of the regime on the legitimacy of the Obote mark II regime. Like other Ugandan leaders before and after the Obote mark II regime, the UPC leaders claimed that their legitimacy or right to enjoy state power derived from the national constitution. According to the constitution the party winning national elections would form the national government. The legitimacy state leaders enjoy over other leaders in society is a major source of power (Gooding 1991, 71). For example, in Uganda weak national leaders are fond of ridiculing and hence disarming, strong and popular regional leaders, by claiming that regional leaders lack the authority to address national issues, since, unlike the national executive, regional leaders represent only a fraction of the population. Obote vowed to resist any challenge to his regime since as he claimed his regime had come to power through legal and constitutional means, allegedly having won the 1980 elections. While on the verge of losing the war against the NRA and other guerrilla groups, Obote is said to have been preparing to participate in regular elections that were to take place in 1985, to demonstrate his adherence to democratic rule (Ingham 1994, 205).

There was a fundamental difference between Obote and his team, on one side, and
their political opponents, regarding the interpretation of the political legitimacy claimed by Obote’s group, on the other. Many Ugandans who denounced the conduct of the UPC party leaders during the 1980 electoral process believed Obote and his party obtained power through fraud. Ugandans questioned the legitimacy of the regime on the grounds of the menacing tactics the UPC leadership used to return to power. There were others who queried the legitimacy of the entire electoral exercise, having rejected the validity of the custom tailored constitution Obote had devised and imposed upon Ugandans during a period of political turmoil. Obote had banned rival parties, imposed martial law upon the Capital, placed all his political rivals in prison and forced others into exile before imposing his constitution upon Ugandans (cf. Chapter Four). Ugandans in these two, by no means exclusive, categories were convinced that the Obote mark II regime had no legitimate claim to state power. Apart from the first two months, the new Obote regime spent nearly its entire life fighting the guerrillas, of one faction or another. Below we encapsulate the guerrilla war before discussing the incentives the regime offered to Ugandans in an attempt to erode the good guerrilla-civilian relationship.

Other Influence Techniques used by the regime

Unconditional negative incentives provided by the regime. Positive and negative unconditional incentives are used by politicians to influence the actions of individual political actors and constituencies. The incentives are unconditional since the individual or constituency must bear the costs, or receive the benefits of the incentive whether the actor or constituency disobeys or conforms to the wishes of the incentive provider. The Obote mark II regime believed that unleashing the coercive forces of the state, under UPC party control, upon its political enemies would kill the fighting spirit, the determination to resist repression, of those who opposed the regime. Under the ‘scorched earth’ anti guerrilla strategy, government troops burned crop and animal farms, razed homes of residents of many parts of the triangle to the ground to deny guerrillas food and shelter (Munnanssi 9 July 1983). This was an instance of government use of negative unconditional incentives, since those who conformed and those who ignored government wishes and continued to provide material and moral support to the guerrillas all either suffered from impaired health,
since they had to live in substandard refugee camps, lost relatives and friends, and all lost property.

Example of conditional positive and negative incentives used by the regime.

Using conditional positive and negative incentives involves making threats and offers to individuals and constituencies. Politicians use this strategy to try to alter the incentive structure of target individuals and groups. Although successful threats and unsuccessful offers cost nothing, successful offers and unsuccessful threats are costly.

Conditional positive incentives. After the elections, the UPC and DP went through the motions of parliamentary debates; however, the political bargaining that took place in parliament was more semantic than substantive. The DP requested that the government provide food, clothes and shelter to the thousands of displaced people in the war torn parts of the country, the internal refugees. In response to the DP request Obote, Muwanga, and other UPC government leaders promised to meet the DP’s request only if DP supporters cooperated with the government to fight the guerrillas. Muwanga and Obote demanded that DP leaders should instruct their supporters to prevent their ‘children’ from joining the anti-government forces, and appeal to those already in the guerrilla army to desert the force. They also asked DP leaders to encourage their supporters to reveal guerrilla hideouts to government soldiers (Munno 17 May 1982). This is an example of the government’s use of conditional positive incentives, since the government would provide security, food, clothing and shelter only to those who conformed to its wishes. In reality the government had no way of enforcing its positive conditional incentives, since for four years it was in a tag war with various guerrilla groups over which side controlled territory in different parts of Buganda, and later Western Uganda.

Asymmetry between threats and offers used by the Obote mark II regime. The asymmetry within the offers and threats a political player makes when bargaining often decides the outcome of the bargaining endeavor. Offers, as Dowding (1991, 73) illustrated, cost more when they succeed and threats cost more when they fail. Politi-
icians had joked about Museveni's warning to "return to the bush," take up arms and fight anybody who would derail the fledgling system of democracy. Mugwisa, Obote's future Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, at a pre election UPC rally held in Kampala, jokingly declared that the new government which the UPC party would form after winning the then forthcoming election, "would cut down all the forests and burn all the bushes" (Ngabo 3 November 1980), so that those who were threatening "to return to the bush" would have nowhere to hide. A player using an offer in political bargaining ought to be aware that increasing the offer tends to increase the probability of incurring the cost of success. On the other hand, increasing the threat, while it remains credible, decreases the probability of incurring the costs of carrying it out (Schelling 1966, 35). Commonly the use of threats does seem attractive, since their only limitation is credibility. Mugwisa, whose words exhibited the confidence that the UNLA backed UPC government entertained, that it would find it easy to defeat any challenge to the Obote mark II regime, revealed a lack of knowledge of guerrilla warfare. The threat to clear the country of all the abundant savanna grassland, equatorial, and semi equatorial vegetation, the potential hiding places for the guerrillas, sounded incredible to potential guerrilla leaders, and to political observers with a basic knowledge of the country's geography. Schelling advised political actors that some threats are inherently incredible, while others are inherently credible (1966, 35). This dual property of threats helps to explain why, despite possessing and threatening to use the seemingly overwhelming coercive capacity of the state, Mugwisa and his colleagues' threats to fight and defeat the guerrillas sounded incredible, and hence ineffectual. It was therefore not surprising that the regime failed to compel political rivals, and guerrilla sympathizers, into following the official policy of preventing food, medicine, and other essential materials from reaching the guerrillas. The use of threats to intimidate political rivals into cowering away from embarking upon a guerrilla war against the new regime proved futile. Guerrillas received much assistance from the civilians throughout the four-year period of war.

Cost of Carrying Out the Commitment

From the start Obote and his Langi officers were determined to fight and to never negotiate a cease fire with the guerrillas. Throughout the war, the UPC leadership preten-
ded that things were going as planned; however, the army incurred massive casualties and material losses in the field (Museveni 1986, 37; Anon. 1984, 12). In reality Obote’s troops were incurring successive defeats and they, like their political leaders, knew what they could not admit in public (that they were losing the war); this certainty had a major toll on UNLA troop morale and accentuated the intractable divisions within the army:

The NRA attacks on UNLA soldiers accentuated the internal splits within the security forces. An internal power struggle was waged between the Acholi (who were the largest single force in the army), and the Langi/Iteso. Each group was wary of being dominated by the other, and vied for power (in this bleak climate it was critical to each group to try to dominate power, for whichever side had the edge on power would keep soldiers in its faction at a safe distance from the Triangle and order soldiers in the rival faction to mount the anti guerrilla operation). Two of the numerous plots to assassinate Obote (Kitgum 1981 and Gulu road 1982) were said to have been Acholi-backed, . . . The Acholi army commander Tito Okello and Lt-Col Basilio Okello were both at different times placed under house arrest. Otema Alimadi then an Acholi Prime Minister was severely reprimanded for failing to report developments. The predominantly Langi Special Force (cf. ) was attacked by the army, leaving five men dead, . . . On another occasion the Langi commander of the Special Force was deliberately run over by an army truck. Matters came to a head when the Langi chief-of-staff Oyite Ojok was killed in a mysterious helicopter accident, Obote delayed filling this key army post for eight months as the factions battled to nominate a new C.O.S., in the process 18 Langi officers were killed (Anon. 1984, 8).

As the war spread to other parts of the country, differences began to surface between Obote and his cronies in the civilian and army establishments. Mutibwa observed that although the consensus was to suppress the guerrilla war, and to continue in power, there was disagreement between the Obote and Muwanga factions over the means for attaining this goal (Mutibwa 1992, 161). The split between Obote’s hawks, who rejected the idea of negotiating with the guerrillas, and Muwanga’s doves who by 1984 were willing to accept a negotiated conclusion to the war, was a direct result of the massive casualties and financial cost of the war to the regime. While Muwanga and Mugwisa expressed a desire to negotiate with Museveni’s guerrillas, Obote would have none of it. Despite appeals from his political cronies Obote obstinately refused to negotiate with the guerrillas, insisting that a military solution was what he wanted. Obote’s distrust of his colleagues’ judgment cost the party its unity and eroded troop loyalty to UPC politicians. Persisting in carrying out the commitment of engaging the guerrillas in a protracted war, sapped the fighting spirit of Obote’s
Response, and costs to ordinary Ugandans of the people's war. The varied responses of ordinary Ugandans to the launching of the people's war reflected the country's diverse political scenery. While most Ugandans, those who had voted for parties other than the UPC, welcomed the news of the guerrilla war, they hoped for a quick decisive win by the guerrillas (The Nation 18 February 1981) and were not prepared for the suffering arising from a protracted war. However, in spite of, or because of the horrors to which civilians were subjected by UNLA troops who were purportedly looking for NRA fighters and NRM sympathizers, the size of the NRA fighting force swelled as people increasingly fled from the areas controlled by government troops, to either live in the friendly territory under NRA control, or join the NRA (The Standard 11 May 1984). The NRA used the area of Northern Buganda as its operations base. Because the interests of the NRM rhymed with those of the people in this area the NRA found it easy to obtain material and logistical support from the local people (Museveni 1986, 40). This area, which became known to the rest of the world as the killing fields of the "Luwero Triangle", bore the brunt of the suffering, losing more than 300,000 people (Jeff Crisp 1983; Museveni 1986, 37; Mutibwa 1992, 159).

Conclusion

In this chapter we analyzed several political aspects which influenced Ugandan economic development in the post Amin era. Our review of the 1980 multi party elections, within the reciprocal or bargaining power theory, led us to some important findings. We discovered that in their zeal to get political support, rival political parties often promised the electorate things or 'offers' before fully appraising the implications of such promises to the
Ugandan electorate of the early 1980s. As a result, by placing an unfavorable bend on ‘offers’ made by a rival political party, cunning politicians from competing parties quickly discredited one another’s policy stand. It was therefore not surprising that Obote’s promise ‘to begin where he stopped’, meaning that he would pursue policies similar to those of his interrupted previous administration, provided cannon fodder for his political enemies. Democratic Party and CP politicians found it easy to convince Ugandans that the promise Obote had made would amount to reinstating the state of emergency (martial law) in Buganda, a one party dictatorship, and an economy based on Obote’s Common Man’s Charter, (CMC). (To many Ugandans the CMC was synonymous with a command economy).

Although financial resources are a major asset for a politician who is trying to buy votes, politicians who hoped to buy their way into office were disappointed as the electorate was indifferent to material gifts. It was clear to political observers that after Amin’s departure Ugandans wanted something more than just promises, or rewards of social services, and material wealth: they wanted a return to democratic rule. This sentiment which many people shared helps to explain why the UPC party, despite controlling the state financial coffers, and using state funds to finance its political campaign, still had to resort to using force to take power once the UPC party leaders realized that Ugandans had rejected the UPC at the ballot box.

Most of the costs each party incurred had their origins in the offers each party made, and in the stubborn refusal of party leaders to part with the political mentality informed by the politics of the 1960s. Most ordinary Ugandans, particularly the younger people who had not participated in the political intrigues of the 1960s, were disappointed by the myopic view of politics veteran politicians exhibited. For example the DP derived its strength not from the ability of its top politicians, but, because of Lule, it provided a base that had united all those Ugandans who wanted to prevent the UPC from again usurping power. However, DP leaders misinterpreted the party’s newly won prominence as deriving from its traditional rivalry against the Anglican Protestant dominated political system. The religious factor convinced DP party leaders to drop Lule. By replacing Lule with Semwogerere, the party lost a trump card. This error of judgement was reflected in future decisions DP leaders made. Some questionable decisions made by DP party leaders (which we mentioned) included
agreeing to sit in the post 1980 election parliament opposition benches, after refusing to accept the election results, and joining the Okello regime. Both these decisions meant that DP leaders lent credibility to the regimes that most Ugandans had rejected. Poor political judgement hurt the party’s credibility in the country.

We used the notion of the asymmetry between threats and offers to explain why it was possible for some Ugandans to mount an armed challenge to the Obote regime. Schelling’s conception of the inherent credibility and incredibility of threats helped us to explain the failure of the regime’s threat to destroy the guerrilla habitat. We used Dowding’s postulate on the nature, function and influence of threats and offers in political bargaining to explain why the regime had to incur the massive costs of placing the nation on a full scale war footing, for years, when carrying out its commitment to overcome the guerrilla threat. We also looked at several influence techniques which included: conditional positive and negative incentives; unconditional positive and negative incentives which the new Obote regime tried to use trying to stem the guerrilla challenge to the regime. Politicians use information to try to gain power over society. The Obote mark II regime also tried to use information and misinformation to its advantage. By blaming the guerrillas for the crimes against civilians committed by UNLA soldiers, the regime had hoped to alienate the civilians from sympathizing with and aiding the guerrillas. This tactic backfired for civilians soon reached their own opposite conclusions after witnessing the disciplined behavior of the NRA fighters in contrast to the rogue UNLA soldiers. Celebrating ‘Hero’s Day’, the day of Obote’s return from exile, at the height of internal differences within the regime and the UNLA army regarding government policy toward the guerrillas, was proof that as a cunning politician, Obote believed that presenting a brave face while confronting serious adversity was an effective political gimmick. The opulence that accompanied the celebrations was supposed to tell Ugandans that it was time to party since all was well in the republic. However, UNLA soldiers, particularly the Acholi troops, were not amused as they were incurring increasingly higher casualties in the war against the NRA guerrillas. Now we will review the political and military aspirations of the Okello regime using the tenets of the theory of action.
The Okello Regime

We have employed the elements of desire, belief and reality in the theory of action to review the performance of the military regime led by General Tito Okello, which overthrew the Obote mark II regime. Of all post colonial executive Presidents, General Tito Okello, Commander of the UNLA Army, who became state President under the UNLA government, was perhaps the least prepared to rule. According to Ingham, author of one of the most flattering biographies of Milton Obote, not even his erstwhile friend Obote could comprehend Okello’s speeches (1994, 198). Used to taking commands from civilian bosses, after grabbing the reins of power he had no clue on how to formulate state policies which would unite the Ugandan society his predecessors Obote and Amin had helped polarize along ethnic lines (Ingham 1994, 208). This resulted in unprecedented insecurity (Kategaya in Watson 1991, 16). That Okello surrounded himself with people whose main interest was in acquiring wealth was part of the tragedy of his rule. He promoted dubious characters to positions for which they were not qualified; young Acholi intellectuals “saw themselves as future rulers of the country and started empire-building” (Mutibwa 1992, 173).

Okello’s Approach to Politics

On the political front he tried to fill important government positions with people from his own Acholi ethnic group. These included Olara Otunnu, a lawyer with an ambivalent political philosophy. Otunnu was Uganda’s Ambassador to the United Nations since the Binaisa days. (He was a former zealous UPC Youth Winger; during his school and college days he was fond of echoing Obote’s economic thoughts as enunciated in the CMC. In the 1960s he had energetically pushed the UPC party line, that the party would rule Uganda for fifty years [Budo Upper School Lecture/Debates, 1967-1969]. During the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, he deserted the radical Third World camp at the UN and supported conservative Britain’s claim of sovereignty over the Falklands). Otunnu now became the UNLA regime’s minister of Foreign Affairs. Observers believed that, bewildered with the intricacies of state administration, the Okellos were
grooming Otunnu for the role of the next civilian President. Okello’s actions displayed his insensitivity to people’s wishes and a complete lack of political acumen. For example, he invited Muwanga and other members of the discredited Obote regime to participate in his administration, he recruited mercenaries, his troop recruitment policy accentuated the ethnic imbalance in the security forces, and promoted terror, as he failed to discipline UNLA soldiers. He relied on the show of force to stay in power. Tito Okello’s political fortunes depended on the Acholi faction in the army. This faction was under the tutelage of his fellow Acholi, Basilio Okello (former Commander of the 15th Battalion, the one Obote had stationed in Kampala to terrorize the Baganda. His ruthless treatment of the Baganda had earned him the unsavory title of ‘the butcher of Kampala.’ Okello’s approach to ruling the country alienated Ugandans from all regions. His policies suggested to observers that UNLA military government leaders had not learnt any lessons from the failures of the previous regimes (Mutibwa 1992, 164, 172).

Okello’s Approach to Internal Security

President Okello responded to the widespread complaints from the people about the deteriorating security situation in the country, caused by the undisciplined UNLA troops, by recruiting more troops from Northern Uganda. Ugandans elsewhere in the country had to face the grim reality that the two Okellos, Tito and Basilio, believed improving state security implied massive troop recruitment from their homeland of Acholi and other parts of that region. Having lost the Oboteist faction within the UNLA, the two Okellos were unsure of the Acholi soldiers’ ability to maintain the Nilotic peoples’ grip on state power. They were particularly worried by the increasing strength of Southern Uganda backed guerrilla groups. Basilio Okello mounted a vigorous recruitment campaign of mercenaries of the former Uganda Army (Amin’s soldiers). Acholi and Southern Sudanese recruited by Wilson Toko to fight the NRA were “hurriedly brought to Kampala in Uganda Airlines Fokker Friendships.” These mercenaries were coaxed into joining the UNLA with the promise of acquiring a generous war booty that would include land, Baganda women, and of repossessing the properties of the expelled Asians. (Amin’s troops had been forced to abandon the private and commercial properties they had grabbed from the expelled Asians as they

**Relationship of Okello’s Government with Obote’s Political Foes, and Military Groupings.**

Soon after taking power the Okello led government made some conciliatory gestures when it invited guerrilla groups that had been fighting the Obote regime to stop fighting and join the UNLA government. The soldiers also invited Semwogerere, the DP leader, who accepted to participate in the new military government. Weary of fighting and unsure of ultimate success most of the small guerrilla groups jumped at the offer. The various fighting groups that joined the military junta included; the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU), Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) (Mutibwa 1992, 168). The NRM ignored this offer and continued to engage UNLA soldiers in battle. President Moi of Kenya brokered peace talks that took place from August 1985 in Nairobi, between the Okello regime and the NRM leaders. Olara Otunnu, one of the more able supporters of the military government, led the government delegation while Dr. Samson Kisekka and later Museveni led the NRM side (Ingham 1994, 209). During the peace talks UNLA soldiers continued to commit atrocities at home. On one occasion Basilio Okello invited leaders of the guerrilla groups that had joined the military government to attend a meeting on state security in his Kampala office. Ugandans were shocked when instead of holding a briefing he shot and killed two of the former guerrilla leaders, in cold blood, on a Kampala street. Evidently Tito Okello dishonestly claimed a willingness to share military power with ‘Southerners.’ (The term Southerner[s] is used loosely by political commentators when referring to people in Buganda, Eastern and Western Uganda who speak Bantu languages).

**Okello’s relationship with Southern Ugandans.** For removing Obote, Okello’s soldiers had anticipated applause from the people of Kampala. However, the cold shoulder with which the soldiers were received elicited their true feelings about the residents of the Capital, “the alleged DP capital:” “.... [It] soon became apparent that the same
old soldiers of the ‘liberators’ had returned. They promptly wrecked shops, stole private vehicles and emptied petrol stations. The ghastly evidence of their handiwork was everywhere to be seen in the streets of Kampala... (Mutibwa 1992, 167)" With the fall of the Obote regime the NRA made swift progress in the battlefield. Nearly all of Buganda, Western Uganda, and parts of Eastern Uganda were now under NRA control. By December the NRA soldiers were poised to take Kampala (Farley 1989, 291). Most Ugandans refused to cooperate with the Okello government, for they regarded it as equally fraudulent as the Obote mark II regime that came before it. National Resistance Movement government Prime Minister, Eliya Kategaya, believed that during this time the country faced a real possibility of breaking up. During this period the civil war reached its climax (Watson, 1991, 16).

From the start the Okello regime was too preoccupied with devising strategies to hold on to power to provide effective leadership. It faced such strong opposition from guerrilla forces and hostile ordinary Ugandans, that it did not even bother to claim or pretend to have an economic development plan.

Okello’s relationship with the NRA and NRM. After several starts and spurts, in negotiations to end the guerrilla war the UNLA government and NRM representatives reached some sort of agreement for a power sharing formula. Some of the Acholi and Nubian soldiers are said to have interpreted the peace agreement signed by the government and NRM/NRA leaders in December 1985, in the Kenyan capital, as a signal for their dismissal, since the NRM was to be given 3,580 out of 8,480 of the army recruitment. They therefore resumed looting, robbing and murdering the people of Buganda (Mutibwa 1992, 176). Appeals from a wide cross-section of the civilian population to the NRM not to join the Okello government, the cold blooded assassination of leaders of small guerrilla factions, and the persistent abuse of human rights by Okello’s troops, all contributed to discouraging NRM leaders from participating in the UNLA led military regime (Mudoola 1991, 232).

A Theory of Action Interpretation of the Behavior of the Okello Regime

The theory of action informs us about what motivates individuals and groups to act
the way they do as they interact politically in different political jurisdictions. The assumptions we make about the beliefs and desires of political actors form our view about what motivates political actors to select those specific options from the array of available options (Dowding 1991, 23). Okello had four broad political options from which to choose: He could have remained subservient to his long time boss Obote; he could have replaced the Langi dominated inner UPC party caucus, without upsetting the UPC dominated national political status quo; he could have invited all rival political groups to form a broad-based government (similar in arrangement to the umbrella government Binaisa had tried to create between 1979 and 1980) in which, if at all, the military was to be nominally represented; or he could have formed a military government with or without civilian participation. By imposing a military government with nominal civilian participation, on 27 July 1985, again a soldier, Okello, plunged Uganda into a military dictatorship six years after Amin’s removal from power (Mutibwa 1992, 163).

Our investigation of Okello’s political behavior is premised on the assumption that political actors choose those options which they think will help them maximize their personal, and constituencies’, marginal utility/benefit (Davidson 1980, 14). Since actions are informed by desire and belief, the assumptions we make about Okello’s desires and beliefs help us to better appreciate the motives of his actions. We shall review the process Okello followed in his endeavor to maximize his own, and his ethnic group’s, marginal benefits. Desire and beliefs influence actions. While desire motivates action, belief channels action, therefore action involves a triumvirate of desire, action, and belief (Davidson 1985, 25). The manner in which a political actor manipulates the two emotions, belief and desire, in the practical political environment, reality, often determines that particular actor’s or groups’ political success or failure. Before initiating any action a political actor or actors must make some probability calculations regarding the consequences of their anticipated actions (Davidson 1980, 14). The actions of an actor are the proximate cause of those particular actions.

Assumptions about Okello’s political beliefs. Our assumptions about the steps Okello took in his attempt to maximize his marginal benefits and those of his ethnic
group are informed by Okello’s relationship with the following political and social groupings: Obote’s friends and foes; Southern Ugandan civilians; guerrilla forces; and Northern Ugandans. We shall also comment upon the consequences of Okello’s political beliefs on national economic development. Okello’s lengthy association with UPC party leaders stretched back to the days of the Obote mark I rule. Okello’s relationship with Obote had blossomed while the two lived in exile in Tanzania. The relationship between the two grew even firmer as Okello assisted Obote in planning the military strategy that helped to dislodge Amin from power. In 1972, from Tanzania, Tito Okello had led Obote’s guerrillas in the abortive attempt to topple Amin (Ingham 1994, 142). Okello’s friendship with Obote and UPC party leaders and functionaries reached its peak when the Okello led UNLA backed Obote and his UPC party, when the latter grabbed power after the disputed 1980 elections. Okello trusted, and knew, more UPC party personnel than he did politicians from all the other political parties combined; consequently, he invited Muwanga, Obote’s former Vice President, to become the new military regime’s Prime Minister (Mutibwa 1992, 168). Otema Allimadi (an Acholi like Okello), Obote’s former Prime Minister, was one of the many prominent UPC politicians Okello gave a leading role in his government. Okello’s affiliation to the Roman Catholic church brought him into contact with DP leaders, whom he used to meet at Sunday Mass, at Kampala’s Rubaga Cathedral. His contacts with DP leaders were however too open, formal, and brief to develop into anything more than that of casual acquaintances.

After the fall of Amin, as the military commander of the UNLA from its inception in 1979, Okello had witnessed the jubilation of Ugandans as they welcomed the UNLF government that was led by Lule; he had seen the disappointment and anger of Ugandans, manifested in a month-long economic paralysis Ugandans orchestrated in Kampala and other major cities, after radical politicians had connived with UPC leaders in the NCC to remove Lule from office in 1979 (Ingham 1994, 157; Furley 1989, 280). Besides DP leaders, Okello had expected to ingratiate himself with all of Obote’s political foes. This is why he invited leaders of all political groupings and parties to join his government (Mutibwa 1992, 173). Believing that having the two warring sides in his government (he was also aware of deep internal differences within each side) would weaken each side’s political strength, he
pitted the alleged left (UPM, UPC etc.) against the so-called right (DP and CP). Commenting on the political intrigue among Ugandan leaders of the time Ingham believes: “...Okello was not happy to take [a] subordinate [place] and the DP leaders, together with the renegade UPC members, felt their grip on the situation loosened by the military...” (Ingham 1994, 208). He believed that once the two sides neutralized each other’s political base, through negative campaigning, the resulting political vacuum would pave the way for him to establish himself and the Acholis as the supreme national political leaders.

As commander of the Army, Okello was part of the top national military triumvirate whose other members were: Oyite Ojok, as Chief of Staff, and Basilio Okello, as commander of the 15th Brigade (Lule 1982, 6). The trio’s national security policy had translated into terrorizing the people of Kampala and other parts of Southern Uganda, during the UNLF, MC, and Obote mark II rule (Anon. 1984, 6). This trio planned and executed Obote’s ‘scorched earth’ anti guerrilla military strategy. One writer observes that by 1983 the rest of the world was only beginning to learn about this brutal military strategy: “... when Malcolm Rifkind, the new [British] Minister of State for African Affairs, visited Uganda in July 1983, the world was becoming aware of the army’s ‘scorched earth’ policy in the ... Luwero Triangle. ... Rifkind joined Canadian and Australian High Commissioners in voicing concern about the violations of human rights in the Area (The Times 15 July 1983). This strategy involved destroying all living things in the war zone that could aid the guerrilla fighting machinery. The behavior of Okello’s troops in the war zone revealed that they, and their leader Tito Okello, had no compunction for the social, economic and political consequences of the UNLA actions, for the people in the Triangle.

The anti guerrilla military strategy planned and executed by soldiers under Tito Okello caused enormous suffering: it resulted in the death and maiming of hundreds of thousands of people, and turned hundreds of thousands of children into orphans and refugees. One writer remarks that much of the Triangle was turned into “a desolate wasteland” and its remaining inhabitants into “zombies” (Crisp Jeff October 1983). It also involved the destruction of property and the livelihood of yet millions of people, in Southern Uganda from 1981 to 1985 (Lwanga-Luyiingo in Mutibwa 1992, 159; Anon. 1984, 13). To placate their alleged enemies in Southern Uganda, Okello distanced himself from the actions of his
former boss Obote. To win public support for the Acholi coup he directed Acholi troops to march into Kampala waving the clenched fist, the DP mobilization symbol (Mutibwa 1992, 167). We learn from Mutibwa that by using the DP symbol: "... the Acholis ... meant to proclaim to the people that the coup had been staged on behalf of the Baganda, who had all along defied and rejected Obote. This was the first mistake the Acholi coup-makers made; [however] the people refused to be fooled" (Mutibwa 1992, 167). We assume that Okello and his team's political behavior was premised on the assumption that Southern Ugandans were either very forgiving or were endowed with such a short collective memory, and would therefore welcome their former tormentors under the UPC regime (the Acholi UNLA soldiers) with open arms.

Okello's decision and timing of his military coup exhibited his disrespect or ignorance of the imperative of political stability, an essential prerequisite for any regime hoping to launch a successful national economic development program. Fighting which took place in the hub of the country's economic engine, Buganda, had worsened the already bad political and economic conditions in the country. This combined with the erratic anti-guerrilla policies of the Obote mark II regime had left Uganda in a political and economic muddle. Moreover, the new Obote regime had accumulated an international debt exceeding 1.2 billion US dollars. To ensure that the regime had enough coffee to fill the country's international coffee quota, at one stage, Obote had ordered Okello's soldiers to forcefully collect coffee from farmers in the war zone (Anon. 1984, 13). Economic observers proposed that Okello's action of ousting the civilian regime in the middle of a civil war, in which the guerrillas were increasingly taking an upper hand, was likely to accentuate the country's political and hence economic instability. Okello's action demonstrated that he believed that achieving his political ambitions, political power, was worth plunging the country into an economic abyss.

**Okello's military and political actions.** Okello believed he could buy time to consolidate his hold upon national political power. His strategy involved half heartedly engaging the NRM/NRA guerrillas into peace negotiations in Nairobi, while his close associates were engaged in eliminating leaders of guerrilla groups that had already joined
his government. Okello acquiesced in the killing of guerrilla army leaders, and in the massive recruitment of delinquent youths and mercenaries from Northern Uganda, to prop up his regime in Kampala. Mutibwa believes Okello’s action of inviting the West Nilers who were also yearning to rule Uganda, was a desperate action he took in the attempt to entrench himself in power: “... with the dissolution of the Acholi-Langi alliance, the Acholi embraced the West Nilers...[the West Nilers had hopes of toppling Okello]... since they believed themselves to be more experienced in fighting and to have better leaders [such as Amin]” (Mutibwa 1992, 172). Acquiescing in the killing of guerrilla leaders, and incorporating pro Amin fighters in his army, were two of his actions that provided political observers with the necessary evidence that Okello was determined to base his claim to national political power upon the traditional Nilotic domination of the military instrument. Observers were now sure that the new regime was emulating the ethnic polarization of the Ugandan society, the tactic upon which the Obote and Amin regimes had relied to remain in power.

**Assumptions about Okello’s military and political desires.** Desire motivates action (Davidson 1985, 25). In June 1984, Obote bypassed Basilio Okello and instead appointed a recently promoted Langi officer, Brigadier Smith Opon-Achak (his fellow Langi), to replace the late Oyite Ojok as Chief of Staff (Ingham 1994, 198). As Mutibwa put it, Obote’s action did not only vex the Acholis, it helped crystalize their desire to remove Obote from power:

The appointment of Smith Opon-Achak removed the element of doubt. Hitherto [Acholi] opposition to Obote had been unfocused, but with the decision to throw in his lot with his own tribesmen, the Langi, a clear decision appeared to have been made against them. To the wavering Acholi army officers it brought relief, especially in the lower ranks. Their spirits were no longer troubled, their souls and bodies no longer divided. They now knew that they had to remove the man who humiliated them” (Mutibwa 1992, 163).

Acholis, who were led by Brigadier Basilio Okello, and those in the government who were led by Otema Allimadi, felt used, cheated, and insulted by Obote and the Langi military-political echelon. The Acholis reasoned that they deserved a better reward for having helped
Obote and the Langis acquire political power after the disputed 1980 elections: they had propped up the Obote regime in power during the subsequent four years in which Ugandan guerrillas in different parts of the country fought the new regime. Basilio Okello had expected to be rewarded with the most influential Chief of Staff, military position (after the death of Oyite Ojok) for his contribution to the UPC-Obote mark II rule (Mudoola 1989, 136). The two Okellos claimed that it was their desire to rectify Obote’s biased (Obote’s partiality to the Langis) army personnel promotion procedure, rather than a hunger for political power, that had motivated the Basilo Okello engineered coup d’état, which brought Tito Okello to power. The Acholis also accused Obote and Langi military officers of having conspired to send Acholi soldiers to the front lines while holding back or placing Langi soldiers in safe areas far from harm’s way. Mutibwa observed that the desire for self preservation encouraged the Acholis to take drastic action against the Obote regime:

For the Acholi soldiers, who formed the bulk of the army, the war which Museveni’s guerrillas were fighting against Obote was quickly becoming a war against the Acholis only. The soldiers who were being sent to the war front were virtually all Acholi, and Langi officers and men were manning safe areas of Kampala and being deliberately kept away from the war zone (Mutibwa 1992, 161)

This had resulted in the Acholis incurring much higher war casualties in proportion to the ethnic group’s total population than did their erstwhile Langi cousins, when fighting the guerrillas (Farley 1989, 291). That the coup makers wanted to mitigate and indemnify the Acholi losses incurred in the war against the guerrillas, was another reason the Okellos offered to justify overthrowing the Obote regime (Mutibwa 1992, 167).

Although Tito Okello’s political desires were initially latent, his behavior and that of top Acholi military personnel toward various political constituencies soon brought to the fore his desire and that of the Acholis to rule Uganda. Okello’s political desires were revealed in the populist demeanor he adopted soon after taking power: his well-publicized attendance of the main Mass at Rubaga Cathedral became a routine Monday news item. Pro Roman Catholic Church newspapers started carrying pictures of Tito and Basilio mingling, before and after Sunday Mass, with the congregation. (We should recall that while the two were serving as senior military officers during the Obote mark II regime, the army had
labeled the same congregation as the ‘cradle of the guerrilla army’ The UNLA soldiers used every opportunity to express their sinister sentiments toward Christians from Southern Uganda. On one occasion in 1984, after desecrating and burning a seminary and a Catholic Center, UNLA soldiers had left this inscription: ‘You Christians are trying to shelter the guerrillas--- you are all going to die’ (Guardian Weekly 15 July 1984). The Okellos also organized mass rallies in parts of Buganda that were still under government control, at which they dissociated themselves from the horrific actions of the Obote regime against the Baganda. Tito even promised to work toward returning Uganda to genuine multi party politics (Mutibwa 1992, 171). To win support with the DP leadership and laity, Tito implied that as a member of the Roman Catholic church he and the predominantly Roman Catholic Acholi troops under his command were a natural DP constituency. He lamented that he and the Acholi soldiers in the UNLA had been misled by guileful UPC politicians into backing the deceitful Obote instead of their natural DP brethren.

**Probability calculations made by Okello.** Obote had received the news of his pending downfall late one night when a Dr. Opiate informed him that the army in Gulu was marching on Kampala under the leadership of Basilio Okello (Ingham 1994, 204). (Most evidence shows that it was Basilio the younger, unquestionably ruthless warrior, and more ambitious of the two Okellos who actually masterminded the coup that toppled Obote. He invited the semi retired Tito to join the Acholi coup plot, to avoid portraying an image of division within the Acholi military hierarchy). According to an Obote biographer, Ingham, Tito Okello’s loyalty to Obote was undermined by an offer from the coup plotters, of full overall control of the army and the purchase of military supplies (Ingham 1994, 206). Although a person’s actions are determined by what they desire and what they believe to be possible, maximizing marginal benefit necessitates making a probability calculation (Davidson 1980, 14). Tito wanted to derive all the political benefit he could muster from Obote’s removal. He, however, had to make several probability calculations, regarding how he would handle the different constituencies we identified, since he had no other way of knowing the likely reaction of both Obote’s friends and foes to the then pending Acholi coup.
The Muwanga-Mugwisa faction in the UPC regime, which was loosely associated with Tito Okello and hence with the Acholi component of the UNLA, had expressed a desire to negotiate with the guerrillas to end the war (Mutibwa 1992, 161, 163, 170). Diehard Oboteists, led by Obote himself and including the Langi political and military elite, were resolute in demanding a military resolution of the conflict (Mutibwa 1992, 169). The deep chasm induced by a difference in opinion between the two UPC factions led to unsubstantiated allegations of treachery; the Obote faction had suspected that the Muwanga-Mugwisa faction was negotiating a secret deal to end the war, share political power with the NRA/NRM and marginalize the Obote faction (Mutibwa 1992, 161). In contrast, the Muwanga-Mugwisa faction was living in constant fear that the Obote faction would discover and subvert the political contacts the former faction had established with the NRA/NRM guerrillas. On taking power Okello saw an opportunity to exploit the divisions within the UPC to his advantage. By coopting the Muwanga faction within his government, while distancing himself from the Oboteists, he hoped to form a political base in Buganda founded around the UPC leaders from Buganda.

Obote’s political foes were hardly cohesive; they held wide ranging political views that stretched from the radical Marxist-Leninist ideologies of Nabudere, Rugumayo Owony Ojok and Yaspal Tandon (‘the gang of four’) to CP federalists who were led by Mayanja Nkanji, former Katikiro, prime minister, of Buganda. Okello was also prepared to exploit to his advantage the diverse and often conflicting political positions of Obote’s political enemies. Leaders of the DP, UPM, and CP accepted cabinet positions in Okello’s government (Mutibwa 1992, 173). By inviting rival political groups to join his government, he saw an opportunity of exhibiting himself to Ugandans as a conciliatory figure, who was above petty party politics. Like his predecessor Obote, Okello marketed himself to Ugandans as the only person who could hold the country together. Okello’s promise to allow Ugandans to resume party politics in the near future was a calculated move. With this promise he was portraying himself to Ugandans not only as a defender of their cherished but elusive democratic sentiments; with the same move he intended to mollify, if not neutralize, the political pressure created by the demands upon him, from the left and right, for an immediate return to multi party politics.
Okello’s initial conciliatory actions toward the Baganda included presenting a revised version of Uganda’s post Amin politics in which he absolved Acholi soldiers of any wrongdoing. He blamed politicians, particularly his former UPC bosses, for using fraudulent tactics to acquire political power after the 1980 elections. He blamed the same group of politicians for the repressive rule which had resulted in untold human misery in Buganda. What started as a guerrilla war had, by 1985, escalated into a civil war. The military arsenal taken from UNLA armories around the country at Obote’s downfall had rejuvenated the NRA. The guerrilla army was now a formidable war machine that could successfully challenge the UNLA in direct military combat. The NRA had captured the barracks of Mubende, Mbarara and Masaka. It was now holding fixed positions. In August 1985 it overran the city of Fort Portal in the West and set up an interim government there in October. The country became divided into two separately governed territories when the NRA seized a major bridge on the Kampala Mbarara road (Mutibwa 1992, 172). Okello was aware that he would be facing an impossible political and military proposition if he had to fight the NRA guerrillas while contending with a hostile civilian population in the capital. He had hoped that the Baganda would reciprocate his initial conciliatory gestures, which would give him time to consolidate his power and reorganizing his troops to better confront the NRA. His conciliatory moves toward the Baganda were nevertheless accompanied by increased recruitment of troops from Northern Uganda. This alerted political observers that like his predecessors, Obote and Amin, Okello too was prepared to use force to impose his rule upon Ugandans if his persuasive abilities proved ineffective.

Conclusion

Okello’s behavior before and after taking power from Obote exhibits the work of the triumvirate of desire, belief and action in Okello’s mind, in his effort to maximize his personal, and his group’s (the Acholis), marginal benefits. We learned that the desire to mitigate Acholi losses in the war against guerrilla fighters, and a wish to correct what the Acholis regarded as an unfair promotion procedure, had motivated the Okellos to oust Obote. After acquiring power his desire to retain it prompted him to act swiftly, first to justify the Acholi coup in the eyes of Ugandans, and to try to hold the country together,
which, due to the civil war, was on the verge of disintegration. His actions were guided by the belief that like Amin, Okello could manipulate Ugandans while consolidating his own political and military base. Similar to Amin, Okello demonstrated conciliatory actions while he was building his military force; he promised to restore multi party politics while he himself started cultivating a political base, through concluding political arrangements with politicians from diverse political persuasion, and by promoting his contribution to the revival of the rule of law, at church services and at political rallies; like Amin he promised to uphold human rights, yet was either too weak, or deliberately ignored punishing his roguish soldiers, who continued to harass, intimidate, maim and kill civilians just like they had done during the Obote mark II era. Okello’s relationship with Obote’s friends and foes, his relationship with Southern Ugandans, his troop recruitment policy, all suggest that most of his probability calculations were erroneous. Apart from successfully using the religious card to woo DP leaders, he failed to coax the local people into supporting his regime. Including Muwanga (in response to a public outcry he later dropped Muwanga from his government) and other UPC stalwarts in his government earned Okello the wrath of those who believed they were victims of the hated Obote mark II regime. His reliance on discredited UPC political advisors, and the deleterious actions of his troops against civilians, alienated many Ugandans. Many people became convinced that Uganda’s political salvation lay in a total break with the old political-military establishment; these people increasingly looked toward the NRM to champion a new political order (Mutibwa 1992, 176).
CHAPTER SEVEN

UGANDA UNDER THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT GOVERNMENT: A RECIPROCAL OR BARGAINING POWER THEORETICAL REVIEW

Uganda Under the NRM Government

On 26 January 1986 the National Resistance Army (NRA), the armed wing of the NRM, entered Kampala. Yoweri Museveni assumed the Presidency with a broad-based government including extensive representation of former political parties, and the NRM, of which he was the Chair (Kasfir 1991, 254; Nsibambi 1991, 279). The accession to office of the NRM Government led to a general reestablishment of security throughout the country, and by 1994 there were only limited areas in certain northern districts which suffered from some degree of unrest (Ngabo 7 June 1994). The last seven years witnessed determined efforts by the NRM Government to establish new forms of democracy in Uganda and maintain a high regard for human rights.

Economic conditions at the advent of NRM rule. The following picture gives us some idea of the adverse economic conditions under which the NRM government had to formulate a feasible economic development policy. Kiyonga reminds us that the economic changes made since 1986 were inevitably shaped by the course of events under previous administrations. Pervasive insecurity of life, property and employment had led to corruption, mismanagement and careless neglect in many spheres of social and economic life. These trends were associated with economic structural change. There was a decline of 11 per cent in real GDP between 1970 and 1985. Production from all sectors fell 14 per cent during that period; in particular, manufacturing declined by 58 per cent (Statistical Dept., MPED. 1989, 2). The pattern of agricultural output also changed, switching away from an emphasis on export and cash to a focus on production for food, subsistence, and survival. The cause of this switch was a decline in the real price being offered to producers by monopoly marketing boards and the heightened insecurity. As a result, export volumes and reve-
nues fell substantially. The Ten Point Program for Rehabilitation, which the NRM leaders designed during the civil war, and have attempted to implement since coming to power, was conditioned and is constrained by these trends (Kiyonga 1989, 10; Brett 1991, 305).

**Economic development objectives of the NRM government.** The Ten Point Rehabilitation and Development Program document contained the comprehensive economic development objectives of the NRM government. This document was worked out by the National Resistance Council (NRC), the legislative branch of the NRM, with the High Command and Senior Officers of the NRA, with Museveni as the Chair. The main objectives of the program were: Restore democracy (Museveni 1986, 50). Guarantee security (a conservative estimate placed the number of people killed by the Obote mark II and previous ruling regimes before 1985 at 800,000) (52). Consolidate national unity and eliminate all forms of sectarianism (53). Defend and consolidate national independence (54). Build an independent, integrated and self sustaining national economy (58). Restore and improve social services and rehabilitate the war-ravaged areas (65). Eliminate corruption and misuse of power. Redress errors that had resulted into the dislocation of sections of the population and improvements of others (68). Cooperate with other African countries in defending human and democratic rights of our “brothers” in other parts of Africa (70). And follow an economic strategy of mixed economy (73). The program proposals formed the basis for a nationwide coalition of political and social forces that ushered in a new and better future for Ugandans. The program highlighted the need to resolve political problems in order to restore peace, stability and democracy; these were the prerequisites for recreating an environment that was conducive to planning and setting up a viable, rational economic development policy (Museveni 1986, 44).

**NRM’s view on the Colonial and Post Colonial Power Systems**

The analysis of the colonial and post-colonial power system that follows offers us a glimpse of the theoretical prescriptions that inspired and guided NRM economic policy makers. The NRM leaders combine both the radical and mainstream interpretations of the functioning of the colonial and post colonial systems of power in Uganda. For example,
like the radical analysts, Museveni blamed the colonial education system for having produced individuals who did not appreciate the value of involving themselves in running their own national political affairs:

Uganda unfortunately, seems to have had more than its fair share of backward men in positions of leadership. The main reason seems to be that at independence our elite, one of the best-trained in sub-Saharan Africa at the time, despised "politics" largely because of the nature of their colonial training. They left mostly men of low political understanding, most of whom had a low level of modern education. That is how school-drop-outs like Obote found themselves at the helm of state affairs by independence (Museveni 1986, 18).

Museveni concurs with analysts like Mazrui, who identify a negative impact of the colonial pattern of administration on the psychology of colonial Ugandans. However, unlike the latter, he believes the major psychological damage is not to do with the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer; rather, the experience eroded the self-esteem of the colonized. He believes that the colonial administration gave rise to leaders who despise the people and people who despise and underestimate themselves (Museveni 1985). Like the mainstream analysts, he recognizes the important role industrialization must play in elevating Uganda from its backward position in economic development.

**Bases of the NRM Government’s Economic Development Policy**

The NRM government leaders were aware that the success of their economic development policy would depend upon, first, restoring peace, security and a respect for human rights among Ugandans. They also had to rehabilitate the public service, the economic infrastructure, the market economy, and restore social services. They also encouraged Ugandans to revive traditional cultural institutions, long feared by central government rulers, to ensure that all segments of the society participated in the rehabilitation process. Our review of government policies that follows should help us determine whether or not the NRM administration was fulfilling its promise to rehabilitate and improve the national economy (Museveni April 11, 1989, 8).

**Restoring impersonal political institutions.** The NRM leaders were keenly
aware that the personal nature of rule that characterized many of the previous regimes substantially contributed to the country’s political and economic problems. Government leaders traced the causes of personal rule to the country’s backwardness epitomized by a weak political culture (Museveni 1986, 18). They therefore worked toward rebuilding and strengthening the impersonal institutions of the state, to strengthen the national political culture.

**Constraints to carrying out the Program.** Soon the NRM government realized that it needed other resources, besides the mutual goodwill it shared with most of the population, to execute its economic recovery program. Major constraints which hampered the program from the onset included a shortage of money, internal weaknesses which were manifested in the run-down tax base and a weak civil service and tax administration. For example, the number of tax officers had never been expanded since the breakup of the EAC in 1977. The fall in commodity prices had shrivelled the export list, leaving only coffee as the country’s foreign currency earner. Since inputs for the production sector were scarce (for these had to be imported), the government had to look abroad for resources for the program while it strengthened the internal system. Reckless economic policies coupled with the unprecedented high human toll that came to characterize the Obote mark II regime left the economy nearly mortally wounded. Obote had pursued an absurd economic policy, which included placing soldiers in the key foreign currency generating coffee industry. For example, he placed a fellow Langi, Major Gen. Oyite Ojok (widely regarded as the Eichmann of Luwero [Mutibwa 1992, 163]), who lacked any knowledge of the domestic and international coffee industry, in the top position as the Chair of the Coffee Marketing Board. Each year the Chair and his friends diverted part of each annual coffee harvest from the CMB to meet personal needs. Through exporting personal coffee consignments the Chair and his friends made a small fortune in convertible currency which they kept in banks abroad, thus worsening the country’s shortage of convertible currency. The country’s desperate economic condition, exacerbated by the civil war, forced the government to seek financial help from the WB and the IMF (Ochieng 1991, 50).

Kiyonga, the former NRM Finance Minister, corroborates our initial findings that Obote’s reckless political policies of 1966 were responsible for the “onset of the economic
tragedy that befell the country” as they led to a “total disruption of the ... economy and social life.” He depicts the grim national economy the NRM government inherited: agricultural implements such as hoes, tractors, and ploughs were in short supply; chemicals and seeds were unavailable to the population; industry was constrained by a lack of raw materials and spare parts; industrial capacity utilization was below 20 per cent; both trunk and feeder roads were in a very poor state of disrepair; transport equipment in the form of trucks and other vehicles was in very short supply; the electricity supply was undependable; the government ran the administration on large deficits financed by borrowing from the Central Bank (it printed money). Uganda’s foreign debt stood at 1.2 billion U S dollars by 1986 (Kiyonga 1989, 9). Overall GDP had fallen between 1969-1985 by a factor of about 16 per cent, yet during the same period the population had grown from 9.7 to 16 million. Thus income per capita had fallen by a factor of nearly 50 per cent in real terms. Kiyonga criticizes the Obote regime for having incurred such a heavy debt, most of which comprised expensive early maturing loans (which actually matured at the time the NRM took power), yet with nothing to show for the money. Thousands of people had fled into exile, while murders, and lack of training, equipment, appropriate promotions and appointments had eroded the public and the civil service. The depleted and demoralized civil service had given rise to weak state institutions (10).

NRM personnel in key economic planning positions, like economic policy makers in most Third World countries, offered sound reasons why they regarded economic recovery programs designed by international organizations as harmful to the national economy. They are said to be harmful as they “[militate] against effective real resource planning agency. Neither the Ministry of Planning nor the Ministry of Finance, nor the Presidential Economic Council can act as an effective national economic planning mechanism” (Banugire 1989, 221). Consequently, Museveni and his team were at first reluctant to continue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) economic recovery and development policy programs (Mugyenyi 1991, 62). These programs were initially introduced during the Obote mark II regime, purportedly to rectify the economic mess of the Amin years (Lateef 1991, 37).
Implementing the Rehabilitation Program

**Backwardness and a weak political culture: implications for economic development.** The NRM government leaders recognized the serious constraints to democracy, and hence to economic development, that derive from a weak political culture. Having identified the linkage between backwardness and the weak political culture, NRM leaders were determined to break the cycle. Government leaders constantly appealed to Ugandans to discard those traits of backwardness that fed and perpetuated this weak political culture:

The phenomena of tribalism, nepotism, rampant corruption, barbarism exhibited by the so-called armies, and disrespect for human dignity are products of this very backwardness. Amin and Obote... and other monster politicians do not drop from heaven but arise out of this very problem of backwardness. Backwardness tends to propel backward elements into positions of leadership (Museveni 1986, 18).

On the social-political, economic and psychological fronts, Museveni and his team were determined to fight the phenomena which had perpetuated Uganda's backwardness. This backwardness, according to NRM leaders, stood in the way of restoring or creating new strong impersonal political institutions (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 19). Based on its belief that strong democratic state political institutions must form the foundation upon which economic development can occur, the NRM government has diligently pursued a policy of strengthening national political institutions. In the early 1990s the NRM government expressed a wish to decentralize power. However, not having clarified whether it intended to merely deconcentrate power or actually devolve power to the regions, it opened itself to attacks from proponents and opponents of the two forms of decentralization (Nsibambi 1991, 295)

**Rehabilitating the infrastructure.** Repairs to roads linking Kampala and the major regional towns, the construction of new industries and rehabilitation of old ones, the rehabilitation of a number of important institutions: Makerere University, Mulago Hospital, and tourist hotels are among the many tangible results of the government's rehabilitation of the infrastructure. To sustain growth and ensure that income per capita would begin to rise.
it set GDP a goal of growth of 5 per cent per annum with an estimated population growth of 3-3.5 per cent per annum. After one year in office the NRM government recorded an 8.2 per cent growth rate (1987) and 6.2 the following year. As promised in the Ten Point Recovery Program, the main growth areas were reconstruction, industrial rehabilitation and agriculture. The government made a serious effort to identify local resources that could provide suitable linkages within the economic production system to enable Ugandans to build an independent, integrated, and self sustaining economy (point 5). For example, with government encouragement locally available clay building materials, such as bricks and tiles, have since replaced concrete structures and galvanized iron sheets, as the choice building materials. Large quantities of cement, iron and steel, had to be imported for the latter type of building. To achieve a self sustaining economy each component has to be supportive of others (Museveni in Mutibwa 1992, 190).

Restoring the market economy and the social services. The NRM government made some questionable decisions which included dismissing advocates of the free market economy such as the liberal economist and former Minister of Finance, Professor Mulema, from the cabinet. Later the NRM government realized that it stood a better chance for attracting private investment capital that would help it achieve its declared rehabilitation and development objectives by following liberal economic policies (Ochieng 1991, 50). A fall in coffee revenues and tax collection had worsened the government’s financial position. The deteriorating economy necessitated a change of view. This example demonstrates how reality dictated the course of ‘action’ for economic development the government had to take in order to survive. Government officials toned down the radical rhetoric, toured the country explaining the virtues of free enterprise to the people, and promised prospective investors from abroad attractive IMF and WB guaranteed investment terms. To improve the management of public corporations the government privatized unproductive parastatal organizations and sold off the unclaimed Custodian Board Properties (this Board was responsible for supervising the properties of the Asians Amin had expelled from Uganda in 1971). Key elements in Museveni’s recovery plan, which supports the free market policy, included: abolishing price controls, establishing a market-determined exchange rate, ending cur-
rency restrictions, and downsizing the army and the civil service (Forbes Magazine July 18, 1994).

Aware of the important potential contribution of a strong, healthy, well educated population to economic development, but limited by lack of sufficient resources, the government promised to devote more attention to education, health, environmental protection and other aspects of the social sector as the economy recovered (Museveni 11 April 1989, 13). By 1988 over one fifth of the money allocated to development and rehabilitation was spent in the social sector; this data confirms the Government’s commitment to improve this sector (Kiyonga 1989, 10).

Evaluating the Economic Rehabilitation Performance of the NRM Government.

The economic rehabilitation program outlined in the NRM policy proposals provides us with a base from which to compare and evaluate the government’s performance regarding achieving its stated goals since coming to power. The rehabilitation plan reflects IMF and WB desires (Ochieng 1991, 50). Many of its elements, particularly the reforms of government institutions which included downsizing of the civil service, seem to confirm the worst fears of the doom sayers, having caused great hardships to retrenched civil servants and their families (Obbo 1991, 98). However, on the macro economic level, this same policy has been responsible for the rehabilitation and expansion of the economy, which the NRM government found in tatters on taking power in 1986 (Lateef 1991, 26). The NRM has achieved impressive results in rehabilitating, reorganizing, and restructuring the economy of Uganda. This prompted Forbes Magazine (which depicted a gloomy economic future for most of Africa, and accused African leaders of being responsible for the economic chaos in their countries), to place its reputation on the line by advising its readers of the attractive investment climate in Uganda. Forbes singled out Museveni’s economic policy as the only one which has been successful within the African region in addressing the economic needs of the country:

...While most of the world has embraced free markets, many African countries still stagnate under corrupt governments that have stifled private enterprise and crippled economies.

But amid the gloom and doom is the unlikely exception of Uganda. Once synon-
ymous with despotic chaos and economic devastation, Uganda in recent years has become a showcase for economic reform in Africa. The results: since 1987, when Museveni began the reforms, economic growth has averaged 5% and inflation has fallen from 200% to less than 5%. Foreign investors are beginning to return. (Forbes July 18, 1994).

In practice, the success of the economic recovery program can be attributed to the commitment of the NRM government to fulfilling its ‘ten point program’ for economic rehabilitation and development, and the support the government received from Ugandans since taking power from the UNLA soldiers.

The promise of democracy and the guarantee of security (points 1 and 2) encouraged citizens to make long term economic investment plans, which were unheard of during the periods of despotic rule. By trying to ensure equitable ethnic and sectarian representation in government services and by discouraging petty ethnic rivalry, the government made some headway toward eliminating sectarianism (point 3) and was on the way to consolidating national unity (Mugyenyi 1991, 62). It also found a means to help people in areas suffering from ethnic strife to release pent up energy, by advising them to engage in healthy competition, through diverting their energy and resources to developing their home regions rather than wasting it in ethnic squabbles. Devolution rather than deconcentration would more likely give the government crusade to eradicate ethnic rivalry a positive impetus.

Devolution is the process of separating or loosening regions from the nation as a whole by peaceful means, for example by legislation (Webster 3rd Edition, 1989). In Uganda this would translate into giving meaningful financial, legislative and administrative power to elected local governments. Such an arrangement would not only help many people realize the many opportunities for the individual and for the community economic advancement, locally available, at the regional level it would also reduced the pressure or competition for benefits only available at the center (Nsibambi 1991, 295). Deconcentration merely entails delegating functions to a local level but retaining control of the these by the central government officials (Nsibambi 1991, 295). However, after eight years in office, power was still concentrated in the centre, the few gestures of decentralization which included establishing a five tier resistance council local administrative system, suggested that the NRM leaders favored deconcentration, over power devolution to the regions (Monitor 19 May 1995).
By following a strategy of mixed economy (point 10), the government attracted substantial local and international private and bilateral investment capital (Mugyenyi 1991, 71). The government achieved encouraging results in diversifying the export base. Several non-traditional export commodities including sim sim (this is a staple grain with a high vegetable protein content that thrives well in the tropics) are now significant exchange earners (Zake 1993, 16). Private foreign and domestic capital the government attracted into the industrial sector since 1987 has mainly been invested in the import substitution industry (Basu P. K. 1993, 31). To fight corruption and the misuse of power, (point 7), the government appointed an Inspector of Government Services (IGS) (Kiddhu-Makubuya 1991, 220). By 1990 feedback received by the office of the IGS indicated that ordinary citizens were slowly regaining confidence in the central government’s ability to deliver on its promises. This indicated that the government was making some headway in the war against corruption and the misuse of government power (Watson 1991, 7).

**Set back to the Recovery Program.** In 1989 prices of export commodities, including coffee, collapsed. National Resistance Movement leaders used the radical philosophy to explain the setback in the recovery program attributed to the drop in the export commodity prices. They argued that the dependent and underdeveloped economy of Uganda was not sustainable since the country could not guarantee the price of its exports and therefore the import level and supplies to the population from the industrial sector. With the loss of the capacity to earn foreign currency, the industrial sector could no longer take for granted the supply of machines, spare parts and raw materials (Kiyonga 1989, 8). The restoration and improvement of social services and rehabilitation of the war ravaged areas (point 6), have been a major challenge for the NRM government. Work in these areas has not always progressed at the pace at which both government leaders and the people had expected. Funds allocated for this program have often been misused or stolen. Rows among senior government officials about who should take the blame for the lost funds have not been of much help since the money has not been recovered. People living in many parts of the Luwero triangle are getting increasingly skeptical that the government will, as it had promised, ever rehabilitate the social and welfare amenities in the region (Uganda Confi-
Reciprocal or Bargaining Power used by the NRM Government

The NRM government employed many bargaining techniques to get reluctant and often recalcitrant constituencies to follow government policy. Power is distributed in inverse proportion to costs and offers available among political players; every offer a player makes involves a cost (Harsanyi in Bell et al. eds. 1969a, 247). Using the political interaction framework Chazan posits that the congruence between regime and constituency economic development objectives mirrors the relative success or failure of government attempts to penetrate the social matrix. We used Harsanyi's depiction of power and the political interaction review of the congruence between regime and constituency objectives (Chazan 1992, 220) in our appraisal of the bargaining process between the NRM and local constituencies since 1986. We evaluated the effectiveness of NRM economic development designs in the light of local interests, needs, values, and concerns. We shall demonstrate that the success of the NRM in expressing political power as defined by Barry (1980, 185) and Chazan (1988, 21) has depended on the resources, capacities, objectives, techniques and political conduct of the country's ruling elite, and the vulnerability, organization, and priorities of specific communities. Changes in financial management, cutbacks in the public sector, relaxation in repression, decentralization, and competitive elections will be explored, with a focus on the implications of the changes so identified for the country's present and future economic development.

**Congruence of interests, needs, and concerns.** The job of ruling the country was much easier for the NRM government than was the case with previous regimes so long as its interests, needs, and concerns rhymed with those of most Ugandans. (Njuba 1991, 216). We saw how Amin's policy toward the Asians ultimately alienated increasing numbers of Ugandans. The acrimonious relationship that developed between the Amin regime and local constituencies forced it to impose a police state (cf. Chapter 5). We also explored how the fraudulent manner by which Obote returned to power caused armed opposition to the UPC regime (cf. Chapter 4). The warring relationship between the Obote
mark II regime and the local constituencies culminated in a civil war. These two examples illustrate the wide gap or chasm that existed between the interests, values and objectives of these two regimes and those of most of the population. While fighting the five-year long guerrilla war, Museveni and other leaders of the Movement had enough time to hear first hand the needs, fears, and hopes of the people on whom they depended for food, intelligence etc. NRM leaders were also able to study the vulnerabilities, organization, and priorities of the various communities in the territories they wrestled away from the Obote mark II regime (Museveni 1986, 40).

Predecessor regimes began their rule from the center or top with headquarters in Kampala and Entebbe. In contrast, the NRM started its campaign to rule from the periphery or bottom (rural villages) and worked its way to the center or top. It was therefore able, using the responses it received from the people, to tailor its economic policy objectives to rhyme with those of the people. Policy guidelines NRM leaders developed while fighting the PW reflected many interests and values of the rural folks. Its populist policies helped it to garner mass support, which was crucial to the NRM war effort (Museveni 1986, 42).

The Use of Influence Techniques by the NRM Government

Supplying information or misinformation, gaining legitimacy, providing unconditional positive or negative incentives, and supplying conditional incentives to constituencies are the four influence techniques Harsanyi identified (in Bell et al. eds. 1969a, 247). There are many examples illustrating how the NRM government, having recognized the importance of these influence techniques, used them in political bargaining with local constituencies.

**NRM position on use of information.** Since taking power, the government has encouraged the dissemination of public domain information, particularly that in the economic field (Tumubweine 1989, 165). For example, information on international markets expressing an interest in buying products from Uganda is now usually readily available from most government departments for a nominal fee. In the past such information was only accessible to a privileged few who were favored by the incumbent rulers, or could
only be obtained by ordinary citizens at a high cost. Easy access to information on external commodity markets enabled many Ugandans to participate in the often lucrative export industry. Exports to the Middle East translated into foreign exchange earnings for Uganda from non traditional exports. Exports of agricultural commodities to Asia, Middle East and other parts of the world grew steadily after 1986. The share of receipts from non coffee exports catapulted from an average of 5 per cent of exports during the 1980s to 31 per cent in 1991/1992 (Zake 1993, 16).

Since government leaders recognized the potency of misinformation in destabilising the state, they adopted a policy of unprecedented openness in policy formulations. Extensive consultations covering all important facets of a proposed policy, have usually disarmed naysayers. For example, the national constitution ratified in 1995 took nearly six years to be drafted; during this period representatives of all political persuasions and ethnic communities were encouraged to take part in the extensive and sometimes intensive debates between constituencies with opposed political ideologies (Njuba 1989, 216).

The example below illustrates some dangerous consequences of withholding information from the public. Sometimes the government has found it difficult to preempt ‘Radio Katwe’ through openness, particularly when dealing with matters of a state security. (Radio ‘Katwe’ was the grapevine of information and misinformation that came into existence when Amin banned foreign news publications, censored local media and forbade Ugandans from listening to foreign news broadcasts. The grapevine was named after ‘Katwe’, the southwestern slum suburb of Kampala, which was the hub of political opposition to both colonial and post colonial regimes). For example, in the late 1980s an armed pseudo religious cult left Gulu in the Acholi homeland, and marched toward Kampala through the Eastern province. Its declared aim was to overthrow the NRM government and restore Acholi supremacy (Behrend 1991, 162). The faction leader, Alice, somehow convinced her followers or disciples that she was the reincarnation of a powerful ancient Acholi spirit, ‘the Lakwena’ (1991, 164). Converts believed that being a ‘spirit’, she was invincible to weapons made by mere mortals, and therefore could not be harmed by bullets. She claimed powers that enabled her to bestow similar powers upon her followers, most of whom were renegades from the disbanded Okello faction in the former UNLA, who numbered in the

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The supernatural powers Alice claimed to possess earned her army the name 'spirit army'. Stories describing the horror and destruction the 'holy spirit army' left in its path through Lango, Busoga and other districts on its way to Kampala, soon reached residents of Jinja and Kampala (Behrend 1991, 164). The mayhem credited to the 'spirit army' rivalled that caused by Obote's army in the Luwero triangle. According to the grapevine, the government was about to fall. News of the progress of Lakwena's army from foreign radio news services monitored locally caused a commotion in Jinja and Kampala, as people scattered in confusion to escape the approaching marauding invaders. Government troops, which had largely ignored the 'holy spirit army', finally confronted and routed it around Jinja. Only after the Lakwena threat was no more, did government representatives tell Ugandans that although pretending to ignore Lakwena's invaders, military intelligence had all along been closely monitoring the cult's southward movement (166). By avoiding premature confrontation, NRM soldiers had ensnared the invading army into the narrow strip of land near Jinja, with water on either side, where the NRM troops had all along planned to pin it down. The cult disintegrated, Alice fled to Kenya, and since then government soldiers had little trouble from the remnants of the 'holy spirit army'.

This example shows that despite its eagerness to conduct open government, there were occasions when the government, for security reasons, withheld tactical information from the public. In this instance the grapevine constantly fed residents of the two cities with frightening stories of the swift southward progress of the 'holy spirit army'; panic ensued in these two cities since the government did not alert them of its counter insurgency strategy. In these circumstances Kampala and Jinja city dwellers had no choice but to depend on the grapevine for news. Withholding information in a sense fanned the exaggeration of the strength and accomplishments of Lakwena and her army that came out of Radio Katwe. Misinformation emanating from the grapevine caused undue apprehension and suffering, as people fled from their homes worried that the 'holy spirit army' would prevail.

**Approach to gaining legitimacy.** The legitimacy of a ruler and government derives from the 'provisions of the law' and the 'accepted rules and procedures.' (Webster).
Since 1967, when Obote abrogated the independence constitution which was formulated by all Ugandans and was recognized by all regions of the country, subsequent Presidents ruled under the controversial, custom tailored constitution Obote had imposed upon Ugandans in 1969 (Mudoola, 1989, 117). Following Obote’s precedent of suspending the constitution to satisfy extra-constitutional desires, rulers such as Amin and Muwanga assumed extra-constitutional powers when it suited their needs. For example, Amin suspended Obote’s constitution while consolidating his power after staging a successful coup d’état in 1971 (Ibingira 1973, 290). As the Military Commissioner, Muwanga also suspended the constitution, as he and his UPC team were manipulating the 1980 election results to ensure a UPC victory (cf. Chapter 6). Many Ugandans had resigned themselves to the reality that the national constitution, rather than being the basic law from which rules and procedures governing rulers flowed, was a cheap document which those holding the top political office could revise or discard at will if it did not suit their political taste.

For a long time national rulers never received the people’s mandate through a universally accepted constitution and free elections. As a result most Ugandans morally did not recognize the legitimacy of the post 1967 rulers and their regimes. Previous ruling regimes, therefore, found it difficult to achieve their policy objectives given the glaring hostility of the people, who questioned the legitimacy of successive rulers (Pinychwa 1978, 248). To reverse this trend, the NRM appointed a constitutional committee which was given the responsibility of researching, gathering opinions from the diverse Uganda community, drafting and preparing the new national constitution for debate. The committee travelled throughout the country consulting with Ugandans representing all interest groups and concluded its work toward the end of 1993. A constituent assembly was elected in 1994; representatives of all shades of political thought debated the new constitution; the ratified version of the constitution was to become effective in 1995. By involving all Ugandans in the constitution making process, not only did this improve the legitimacy of the NRM in the eyes of those who rejected the Obote constitution; this exercise also laid the foundation, or the basis, for instituting impersonal law, the constitution, from which the legitimacy for future rulers would flow (Museveni 24 October 1989, 21).
Use of unconditional positive and negative incentives. Unconditional negative or positive incentives are used by actors in bargaining to affect the target actor/s’h calculation of the opportunity cost of a group or an individual’s actions (Harsanyi 1969a, 229). The incentives are unconditional since the actor(s) must bear the costs, or receive the advantages, of the incentives whether or not s/he conforms to the wishes of the provider of the incentive. Armed with both unconditional positive and negative incentives, the government embarked upon the job of trying to alter the incentive structure of individuals and communities, and hence win support for its policies from reluctant constituencies (Njuba 1991, 212-216).

Given the limited financial resources at its command, the NRM government realized it could not achieve the objectives listed in its rehabilitation program all at once. It therefore reassessed the economic needs of the country and came up with what it termed ‘The Economic Recovery Program Priority Areas since 1986’. The areas the government identified as needing priority attention, in the revised economic recovery program, were: defense; agriculture; roads; railways and water transport; purchasing commercial trucks; repairing light goods industries to save foreign exchange; repairing of utilities, especially electricity and water for industrial use; restoration of construction capacity, and restoration of storage capacity (Museveni 1990, 8).

By implementing substantial portions of the 1986 recovery program, the government provided Ugandans with unconditional positive incentives; incentives relating directly to economic development included an improved physical and economic infrastructure, both of which must function efficiently for economic development to occur (Museveni April 1989, 9). Providing security to people in all parts of the country was another unconditional positive incentive the government offered to all Ugandans (13).

The success with which the NRM government carried out the revised recovery program earned the government acclaim from the international community, but above all it received praise from the local people. These incentives were unconditional since all Ugandans bore the costs, or received the advantages of the incentive (improved security and a rehabilitated infrastructure), whether they supported or opposed the NRM government. The success of the government’s use of unconditional incentives can be measured by the many
former opponents of the NRM who changed allegiance, having discovered that they stood to benefit more from cooperating than fighting the government. Increasing numbers of former UPC supporters realized they were free to enjoy the benefits of the improved social economic environment, as much as supporters of the NRM and other parties. As a result, support for the UPC, which was never abundant, waned even further in all parts of Uganda but the bastion of UPC, Obote’s home area. Tito Okello, former President under the UNLA government, and Otema Alimadi, former Prime Minister in the Obote mark II regime, are two of the many prominent former opponents of the NRM who responded to the amnesty the government extended to all its former enemies. Skeptics, particularly pro UPC elements led by Ongwal, and Pinychwa (author of a generous political biography of Obote in the 1960s), who dutifully criticized the government’s every political and economic rehabilitation move, began to sound ridiculous when challenging the NRM’s economic rehabilitation record. When comparing the NRM government with the Obote mark II regime, Ugandans are quick to recall the insecurity, the dilapidated infrastructure, shortages of all types of consumer goods and other shortcomings of the Obote mark II regime. In contrast, despite the financial hardships to which IMF policies subjected most Ugandans, the people were grateful that the NRM economic rehabilitation policies were reviving the economy.

The NRM government did not shy away from using negative unconditional incentives when bargaining with stubborn constituencies. After Obote’s downfall in 1985, the UNLA suffered a partial break up, as defeated soldiers of the Obote faction deserted the force and sought sanctuary in their homeland. Much of Northern, and parts of Eastern, Uganda became destabilized when the now jobless former UNLA armed men returned to their homeland. The ultimate fragmentation of the remaining Okello faction of the UNLA occurred five months later, following Okello’s downfall when the NRA captured Kampala. Okello’s downfall exacerbated the destabilization of the same regions as more defeated armed former soldiers returned to their homelands in Acholi, other districts in Northern Uganda, and Southern Sudan. During the late 1980s and early 1990s renegade remnants of the UNLA turned into bandits who terrorized people in Northern and Eastern Uganda, particularly in Acholi, Lango and Teso districts (Behrend 1991, 164). Mutibwa offers a graphic description of the unimaginable acts of cruelty similar to those committed in Buganda
by the UNLA soldiers, which the renegade troops now committed in Acholi: "...[O]n 9
July 1991, ...fifty rebels...raided the Sacred Heart Girls School and abducted forty-four
students, in addition to raping and maiming many others, and looting and destroying prop-
erty. ...they cut off their victims' ears, noses and lips...[M]any civilians were hacked to
death using axes and machetes (1992, 165 fn.10)." They also used to ambush government
troops sent to these regions to restore order. Since some local people in these districts sym-
pathized with the renegade soldiers, NRA soldiers found it difficult to capture these men.

In the process the government incurred some major losses (165), key NRM casual-
ties included Captain Ndayondi, one the original 27 NRA members with whom Museveni
began the military challenge to the new Obote regime; he was the son of the late Gasyonga,
Omugabe (king of Ankole). (Ndayondi’s brother, Fred Nkuranga, another NRA officer,
was killed soon after the guerrilla war started). After Ndayondi’s death, NRM troops
encouraged local people to move to camps that were usually located in Church compounds,
tightened security around these camps and embarked upon an intensive campaign to capture
UNLA renegade troops who were terrorizing the Acholi district. Forcing people to leave
their homes was an unconditional negative incentive, as this NRM policy disrupted the nor-
mal routine of all residents of Acholiland irrespective of whether or not they did sympathize
with UNLA troops. Schools were closed, farms abandoned and the economic welfare
development projects for Acholi district came to a virtual halt. People living in the refugee
camps experienced severe hardships, and many of them had to depend on international aid
agencies for food and clothing. After isolating the terrorists from the civilian population
government soldiers scored higher successes in combat against the terrorists without pla-
cing civilian lives at risk. Eventually the defeated renegade troops disbanded and those who
surrendered were rehabilitated, and many rejoined the national army. The NRA military
strategy in Acholiland, and other parts of Northern Uganda, contrasted sharply with that of
the UNLA military activities in the Luwero Triangle in the early 1980s (cf. Chapter Six).
For example, aid agencies confirmed that there was no evidence of NRM government spon-
sored atrocities against civilians (similar to the state sponsored terrorism personnel of the
same aid agencies witnessed in the Luwero triangle during the Obote mark II regime), and
that the few incidents of NRA excesses against civilians reported by aid agencies seemed
random and isolated. Government soldiers who committed crimes against civilians, when apprehended, were usually punished in the presence of the aggrieved party/s or their relatives. Government officials reasoned that prompt punishment of offenders was a necessary mean to let Ugandans know that the government did not sanction unruly behavior, and to re-assure the public that unlike previous regimes, NRM government policy did not place NRA soldiers above the law.

Positive and negative conditional incentives used by the government.

The main components of the NRM’s broad economic rehabilitation and development program were enunciated in the Ten Point Rehabilitation Program, and the Revised Recovery Program of 1989. The government has also supplied positive and negative conditional incentives to different constituencies to encourage them to follow its economic rehabilitation and development policy. Using this method of bargaining involves making threats and offers calculated to enlist the cooperation of reluctant actors (Dowding 1991, 173).

Supporting the import substitution industry. The government’s extension of support to the import substitution industry program illustrates that it used conditional incentives to encourage people to invest in domestic industries. The positive incentives included tax breaks, easy access to import licenses, foreign currency, and government departments responsible for approving industrial development plans, to entrepreneurs who conformed to the government import substitution program. Industrialists like Mayur Madhvani, Mulwana, and Mukwano enterprises who heeded the government’s warning and invested in local industries came out winners for they could now expand their investment portfolios using the attractive investment terms offered by the government. Through the Preferential Treaty Agreement (PTA) these entrepreneurs could further extend their markets beyond Uganda, to include many East, Central, and Southern African countries (Museveni 6 September 1989, 42-44). We review the government’s use of conditional negative incentives by looking at the approach it adopted when fighting the operation of unproductive import-heavy businesses, and corruption and the misuse of power by public officials.
Fighting the ‘magendo’ economy. On taking power NRM leaders had vowed to destroy the ‘magendo’ economy. (‘Magendo’ was the Kiswahili word that generally referred to the retailing and wholesaling of often poorly documented locally produced and imported merchandise, mainly of a luxury nature with a high profit margin). Although the ‘magendo’ economy was not beneficial to economic development, it was very popular with all classes of Ugandans, and had created a multitude of ‘shilling’ millionaires (Obbo 1991, 99). This kind of business provided an opportunity for making large profits to those possessing minimal entrepreneurial skills. For many, ‘magendo’ business had become a respectable career. ‘Magendo’ business lured professionals including doctors, teachers and engineers away from the poor paying government jobs to the ‘big-buck’ world of ‘business’. Structural change, a necessary consequence of rehabilitation, implied a drastic change from the ‘magendo’ economy. This type of business had sprung up to fill the vacuum in the supply of consumer goods after Amin expelled the Asians in 1972. The Obote mark II regime had pumped fresh blood into the ‘magendo’ economy by extending commercial, trading, import, and other licenses (avenues to wealth), only to genuine UPC card holders (Kasfir 1991, 251; Bond and Vincent 1991, 116). The NRM government had warned that for Ugandans to begin building an independent, integrated, self sustaining economy, people, including those with a career in ‘magendo’ business, had to redirect their resources into more productive forms of business. While discouraging people from importing such things as perishable consumer and luxury goods with questionable utility value, it encouraged Ugandans to invest in small, medium scale and even large scale domestic import substitution manufacturing industries, or the distribution and retailing of locally produced goods (Museveni 1991, 40).

Since many local sponsors of the PW had made their fortunes in the original ‘magendo’ economic environment of the Amin era, opposing ‘magendo’ placed the NRM government in an awkward situation. Many wealthy ‘magendo’ entrepreneurs, among whom were members of the National Resistance Council (the legislature), felt betrayed by the government. Stringent anti smuggling, custom and excise regulations, and the high import duties imposed on luxury merchandise by the government hurt the ‘magendo’ economy. The new goods and services tax, coupled with the 1987 100 per cent currency deva-
luation, besides creating a new source of government revenue, further hurt the 'magendo' economy. This example shows how the NRM government used conditional negative incentives to achieve its goal, destroying the 'magendo' economy. The incentives were negative since those who failed to conform to its investment and trade requirements were denied soft loans, tax concessions, assistance with project development, and hence access to the expanding regional market. These measures destroyed most of the financial fortunes of 'magendo' tycoons and virtually dealt the 'magendo' economy a mortal blow (Obbo 1991, 104).

**Fighting corruption and misuse of power in the civil and public services.** The government also devised various strategies to fight corruption and the misuse of power. The NRM government's efforts to eliminate corruption from government departments and public corporations, and efforts to contain the powers of public officials met intense resistance from the strong 'magendo'-entrepreneur/bureaucratic coalition (Brett 1991, 307). Reforming the civil and public service translated into structuring the vertical and horizontal lines of authority in government departments and public corporations that were not privatized. Structured authority had disappeared during the previous administrations; parochialism was prevalent, rendering rank and seniority meaningless. A janitor cousin of a minister, or UA, or UNLA soldier, could for example wield as much or more power within a government department than a professional parliamentary secretary (permanent secretary) with no such ties. Denuded lines of authority had led to connections of very complicated permutations developing between the business community, and government workers. For a fee, a lowly ranked employee with easy access to a Minister could, for example, get an import licence, or an application for foreign currency approved faster than a Deputy Minister, who may need to consult the same minister before approving the same licence or currency request. These connections led to the growth of what we called the 'magendo'-entrepreneur/bureaucratic coalition (Obbo 1991, 105-107).

Over the years partisan favors, corruption, nepotism, and other nefarious considerations had led to the uncontrolled expansion of the civil service. By 1986 the government was finding it difficult to meet the salary commitments to its workers. Moreover, the bloa-
ted, corrupt, inefficient, ill-trained, underpaid, broadly uncommitted and largely demoralized civil service was a major liability to the NRM rehabilitation policy (Lateef 1991, 29). International financial advisors helped the government reach a decision when they recommended the downsizing of the civil service. When reducing the civil service labour force, the NRM government tended to review the target employees' service record. Those recruited under suspicious circumstances, such as relatives and friends of former leaders, who lacked the educational documentary proof to support their competence, and those with a dubious performance history, were released. The NRM administration tried to retain only those who showed the potential to help it carry out its institutional reforms and national economic rehabilitation program. The fate of public servants who ignored government warnings to refrain from misusing official power and employed corrupt practices when dealing with the public was similar to that of 'mugendo' entrepreneurs (Brett 1991, 30). They soon lost their jobs and, for some, their only source of income, as they were among the first victims of the retrenchment policy.

The stated noble objectives of many state companies were: providing vital services such as purchasing export commodities from farmers (Coffee, and Lint, Marketing Boards, and the Uganda Tea Authority); fast, efficient road haulage of imports and exports to and from the port at Mombasa (Trans Ocean Uganda Limited). Many state-owned companies started in the colonial days were expanded in the Obote mark I period. More corporations came under state ownership when the Departed Asian Custodian Board was created during the Amin era, to handle the properties of the expelled Asians. Other state companies, such as the Uganda Railways Corporation, Uganda Posts and Telecommunication Corporation; and Uganda Airways (UA) were formed to handle the services that were formerly provided by the defunct EAC. Initially many of these corporations had seemed to make a useful contribution to economic development by providing quality services, while also providing employment to many people. This good reputation helped many corporations earn praises from local and international analysts. The ensuing economic and political turmoil of post 1966 Uganda, however, had its toll on state corporations. Many corporations had degenerated into inefficiently run fiefdoms in which corruption and nepotism were rampant, which perpetually depended on government deficit financing for their existence (Brett 1991,
The NRM government set cost effectiveness or efficiency as the condition which state-owned corporations had to meet to survive. Corporation employees, particularly those in senior management positions, often enjoyed a lifestyle that was at odds with the strapped position of the State companies they ran. Many managers of State corporations repeatedly ignored government warnings to abandon their extravagant lifestyles. They also ignored government advice to reorganize their companies into lean, efficiently operating entities. Corporations that failed the efficiency test were off loaded (Watson 1991, 15). This example is a further illustration of how the government used conditional negative incentives when bargaining with entrenched uncooperative constituencies. Following WB and IMF advice, the government sold off many of these corporations to foreign and local private investors.

**Market-determined exchange rate, and abolishing price controls.** The controlled currency exchange system, in place since the Obote mark I period, had, by the early 1980s, corrupted the entire country’s banking system. In May 1987, without first appealing to bank employees to reform, as it had done with public employees, and ‘magendo’ entrepreneurs, the NRM government, acting on the advice of the IMF, introduced a market-determined exchange rate (Mugyenyi 1991, 71). Given the crucial role of the banking system in the economic life of a country, the prompt action the NRM government took to reform the banking system was essential. Before the NRM adopted the IMF currency reforms, it was typical for Central Bank and commercial bank employees to demand a bribe before processing a bank customer’s foreign exchange application. Some bank employees were involved in the illegal parallel currency exchange market, locally called ‘kibanda’. The ‘kibanda’ currency exchange rate was always pegged several points above the controlled Central Bank rate, enabling those operating the illegal market to make large profits. The Central Bank-determined exchange-rate, though giving the Uganda shilling a seemingly decent rate of currency exchange, was unrealistic, since it did not reflect the country’s purchasing power in the international money marketplace. By adopting a free market-determined exchange rate, the government drastically reduced (if it did not entirely
destroy) the attraction and the opportunity for corruption of Central and commercial bank employees that derived from the Central Bank controlled exchange rate. The new currency exchange system also made Uganda more attractive to foreign investors since it guaranteed them the freedom to move their money in and out of the country, without undue restrictions. Above all, the market determined exchange system destroyed the ‘kibanda’ currency exchange market, on which much of the ‘mugendo’ economy depended (Obbo 1991, 106).

Part of the rehabilitation program involved abolishing price controls. Price controls introduced by earlier regimes were intended to keep the prices of essential goods within the reach of the ordinary citizen. With the collapse of the economy essential goods disappeared from the market. There was a pervasive shortage of nearly every essential commodity during the Amin and Obote mark II eras. Since government favored retailers and wholesalers enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the marketplace, they frequently inflated the prices of the few imports and locally produced commodities that found their way into the local market. In these circumstances price controls, although remaining on the books, became almost meaningless as they were impossible to enforce. Price control laws encouraged corruption, for often poorly paid price inspectors and corrupt security personnel falsely accused innocent shopkeepers of overpricing goods with controlled prices. They would threaten to cancel the trading license of any shopkeeper so accused, if they did not come up with a ‘fine’ specified by the inspector. Since the judicial system had also broken down, the desperate shopkeepers usually had no other recourse but to pay a tribute to the corrupt municipal officials to remain in business. Money collected in this manner was usually kept by the corrupt price inspectors. Extortions or ‘fines’, in extortion jargon, of the type we described above were, however, still in existence albeit at a reduced level after five years of NRM rule (Obbo 1991, 107).

**Condition for releasing rehabilitation funds to the Northern and North Eastern region.** The government was determined to mitigate further unnecessary loss of valuable military personnel, without letting up on its promise to restore peace, law, and order to the region. To convey its message it withheld rehabilitation and development funds, while the region remained unstable. It also launched a major public education cam-
campaign through which people were told that the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and other services in the region depended on their cooperation with the authorities in restoring peace to each disturbed district. They were given examples of the rehabilitation programs that were taking place in peaceful parts of the country. Government officials convinced the cowed civilians that they could help the government restore peace and prosperity to their areas by leading the authorities to the bandits. The promise of a safe, prosperous environment was too attractive to resist, and many Itesots, Acholis and Langis therefore began leading government troops to the hiding places of the bandits. As peace gradually returned to Northern and Eastern Uganda, the government released more resources for rehabilitation and development into the two regions. Recent commodity export figures show that with the drop in the international coffee market prices, sim sim, which thrives well in these two regions, was increasingly becoming a major earner of foreign exchange for Uganda, bringing in 10.56 US million dollars in 1990/1991, thereby becoming the second highest convertible currency earner after coffee (Zake 1993, 16).

Costs Incurred by the NRM Government.

The government incurred several of the costs of bargaining Harsanyi (1969a, 227) identified, when bargaining with different constituencies. There were the costs associated with communicating its commitment to rehabilitate all sectors of the state, particularly the economic sector; the cost of making the commitment credible; the cost of monitoring opponents of its policy, including the renegade UNLA deserters, and the cost of carrying out the commitment. When asked to state his political philosophy, Museveni had expressed partiality to a minimalist stance. Following the minimalist philosophy, the NRM government incurred financial and other costs striving to ensure that all Ugandans received at least the minimum basic requirements of decent living (Museveni 1987, Interview, Vancouver British Columbia).

Cost of communicating the commitment. To rehabilitate the economy the NRM government needed a team that was committed to working selflessly for the public good. To communicate to the public the government’s determination to eradicate corruption
from public institutions, NRM leaders made numerous personnel changes in the civil and public service. Many NRM personnel came from the ranks of the new generation of ‘returnees’, those who were in the NRA guerrilla army, or NRM sympathisers who went into exile after the disputed 1980 elections. By replacing ‘stayees’ in public institutions with NRM ‘returnees’, the government alienated many people. The term ‘stayee/s’ was coined in 1979 to distinguish returning exiles, who were called ‘returnee/s’ or ‘exile/s’ or ‘liberators’ from those who had remained in the country during Amin’s rule. The NRM personnel administration policy cost the government substantial support among Ugandans, particularly ‘stayees’ who identified with the victims of the NRM retrenchment policy. Many Ugandans, for different reasons, had weathered the political and economic storms of the Obote mark I, and II, and those of the interceding Amin, Muwanga, and Okello eras, by staying in the country. These became known as ‘stayees’. After the euphoria of welcoming compatriots home had faded, strains developed within the relationship of ‘stayees’ and ‘returnees’. By invoking a heroic, often false, contribution to the war effort that removed Amin, many ‘returnees’ demanded a disproportionately large share of government and other national economic resources. Strains between the two groups were exacerbated when ‘returnees’, who now occupied all the key political offices, used their newly acquired political power to remove qualified, often blameless, ‘stayees’ from top public and civil service jobs and replace them with fellow ‘returnees’. One observer eloquently summarized the avaricious behavior of ‘returnees’ or ‘liberators:’

...this group of the liberators was headed by those who came from the north, although some of the Bantu leaders were allowed to pick up what they could from the dispensers of the largesse. Thus the ‘O’ (The names of the people who came from the north—and to a certain extent from the east—start with ‘O’. Hence the term ‘O’ signifies northerners or easterners—the Obotes, Otaiis, Okellos, Ojoks, Omaras, Odongs, Obongos, Ottis, Odyeks, Olaras, and so on) filled the ranks of management in parastatals and government-owned financial institutions…and the civil service itself. [They] also took their fill of businesses left by the Nubian-Amin elite…in sharing the spoils the most favored were those from the ‘royal’ clan of the Langi, something which did not please the other members of the northern alliance and was therefore a factor in the later rift within the uneasy Acholi-Langi alliance (Mutibwa 1992, 153).

The economic mess caused by the successive ruling regimes since the mid 1960s had turned many Ugandans, particularly ‘stayees’, into consummate skeptics who never
believed that any national government could ever deliver on its economic reform and development promises. Top government officials in most of the previous regimes set the pace of corruption and mismanaging government resources. It was therefore not surprising that in the early days of NRM rule, ‘stayees’ dismissed as mere rhetoric NRM promises to fight corruption and reform the economy.

Corruption in public offices had become institutionalized “The ‘right to survive by eating’ [was] recognized as a basic right by most Ugandans. Incomes earned by exacting extra fees for services that the public [was] ostensibly entitled to for free or at officially fixed prices supplemented the wages of most civil servants” (Obbo 1991, 99). To ‘survive’ (‘survive’ was the term ‘stayees’ used when referring to eking a living out of difficult times) many Ugandans had learnt to successfully deal with corrupt civil and public servants. For example, they knew how to interpret all the signs insinuating the nature and size of the bribe a public official expected to receive before rendering the desired service.

Lengthy exposure to brutal regimes of the past had had its toll on the once highly altruistic Uganda society. Many people had turned into intractably selfish individuals, who scorned the NRM government’s altruistic policies aimed at restoring and expanding those institutions and services that catered for all, particularly the needy. Survival of the fittest had become the only sure form of eking out a living in the days of violent regimes. Few people were prepared to give up their survival techniques, which had served them well during the cataclysmic times, and wholeheartedly embrace what they considered as morally and economically idealistic NRM reforms. Negative social habits like cheating the government by hiding income and not paying income tax, dishonest business practices, stealing from the employer, could all be found in the survival kit of many Ugandans, particularly the ‘stayees’. The NRM government, therefore, had to spend substantial time, money and human resources conveying its message or commitment to arrest and reverse this trend, to its morally tainted employees, and the skeptical public. Through public education the NRM officials advised the public to forget the corrupt practices when dealing with public officials; they also had to devote resources to educating public officials on the merits of an honorable bureaucracy. They also had to teach Ugandans to relearn appreciating, and respecting, social welfare amenities and services, as they had done before the political turmoil that
began in the mid 1960s unhinged the moral ethical codes of the society.

**Cost of making the commitment credible.** To set a good example NRM officials in the government, the public corporations and the security forces had to follow a strict code of conduct and face a high ethical standard. They hoped that this strategy would convince Ugandans that the NRM intended to instil into all the people a healthy respect for a high standard of performance of duties in the public and private domain. For example, the code of conduct did not permit NRM officials to hold more than one job or run a private business on top of their regular job, a familiar case with officials in previous regimes. Those who disregarded the stringent code of conduct risked losing their jobs. Enterprising NRM officials were not allowed the opportunity to contribute, through private investment, in the economic recovery process. This was a necessary cost if its commitment to eradicate corruption was to remain credible. Unlike their predecessors, NRM government officials were therefore denied the opportunity of using their offices to amass wealth. (The stringent and restrictive regulations prohibiting NRM and NRA officials from participating in the private economic investment field have since been relaxed). The government also lost much talent when it had to release talented professionals who did not meet its political criteria of commitment to NRM economic reform requirements. To stamp out smuggling and other illegal business practices, the government had at times to call upon the army to mount anti-smuggling operations, in which lives on both sides were often lost. To add more credibility to its anti-smuggling campaign, it deployed NRA soldiers to assist the police manning the national border crossings. Custom and excise officials often needed military assistance when handling the many hardened smugglers, some of whom carried deadly weapons and had long lost a fear of the police and a respect for the law. This policy cost the government popularity among those who thrived on smuggling. It incurred substantial financial and human resource costs while attempting to reform a very corrupt judicial system. Through education, the strengthening of the legal system, and the enforcement of criminal and civil law, the government showed that it was prepared to use judicial force to make sure that those criminally sabotaging the rehabilitation programs would have to face the law when answering for their actions.
Cost of monitoring the target actors. While most Ugandans welcomed the NRM government’s promises to rehabilitate the economy, few were prepared for the harsh commercial and fiscal regulations it introduced. Many Ugandans were not ready to change their old tested ways that in the past had enabled them to survive under adverse conditions. We saw that much of the gear in the ‘survival’ of many Ugandans contradicted the government’s economic rehabilitation and development objectives. The government had to devote high human and financial resources to monitoring those using the ‘survival’ techniques that were harmful to the rehabilitation effort, who were dispersed across the country. It had to devote ample resources to finding honest people who could be trusted to monitor the activities of public officials and not succumb to the many temptations of wealth, crooked officials placed in the NRM officials’ way; but would do their duty of flushing these corrupt, inefficient elements or ‘deadwood’ (‘deadwood’ is the term some NRM firebrands used when referring to crooked officials) out of the administrative system. This strategy was costly since the government had only few officials with such fortitude to deploy to the regions; it also meant that the NRM government had to spread thin its best talented human resource. By promising to restore security to the entire country, including the core of the former UNLA in Northern and North Eastern Uganda, the government had to deploy large troop contingents and expensive military hardware to these regions. The security and defense branches incurred substantial human losses and the government incurred major financial expenses, which necessitated delaying progress on many rehabilitation and economic development programs in peaceful parts of the country.

Cost of carrying out the commitment. The cost alone of rehabilitating the economy required resources beyond the country’s modest technological, human, financial, and other related resources. (Museveni believes the extreme shortage of the necessary resources for economic rehabilitation and development reflects Uganda’s backwardness). Despite this backwardness the government carried out many commitments in its Ten Point Rehabilitation and Development Program and The Priority Areas Economic Recovery Program since 1986 (Museveni 1990, 8). To augment the meager local resources for economic rehabilitation and development, the government had to accept the loathed IMF and WB pre-
sence in the Central Bank; a decision that cost the NRM government its once cherished independence in economic policy development and implementation.

**Conclusion**

We used the reciprocal or bargaining power theory to review the NRM government’s performance in power since 1985. Our sources showed that although it entered into dialogue with many constituencies, it did not hesitate to use force if its authority was challenged. For example, the government used force to quell armed resistance to NRM rule emanating from Northern Uganda. Our investigation revealed that the government had an easier job implementing its policies in those parts of the country where the interests, needs, and concerns of the people rhymed with those of the NRM policy makers. For example, the NRM government found it easier to reestablish peace and security and carrying out its rehabilitation program in Buganda and Western Uganda, than it did in parts of Northern and Eastern regions of the country where Okello’s and Obote’s renegade soldiers still smarted for a fight.

We looked at many influence techniques the government used to achieve its policy objectives. Through the wise use of information and other influence techniques, it re-instilled into the Ugandan community’s social fabric, moral and ethical qualities which had been severely damaged by prolonged exposure to misrule. The NRM also used both positive and negative unconditional incentives to make Ugandans work toward rehabilitating the economic system, and the infrastructure. For example, roads, railways, postal services, telecommunication services, were among the many social services that received priority attention in the rehabilitation program, as part of the government’s unconditional positive incentives. To fulfill its commitment to rehabilitate the country’s social, political, and economic environments the NRM government needed many committed personnel and vast quantities of financial resources. Both these requirements were not always readily available. Shortage of able personnel often made it difficult for NRM leaders to monitor the administration of the rehabilitation projects, sometimes resulting in the loss of rehabilitation funds. We saw how the government’s failure to monitor or supervise the disbursement of funds for the rehabilitation of the Luwero triangle led to the loss of funds and cost the gov-
ernment the trust and confidence of the people in the area.

We saw how the rehabilitation and expansion of the industrial and agricultural sector was greatly facilitated by the government’s utilization of positive and negative conditional incentive programs. Industrialists and other entrepreneurs who could adjust their business operations to reflect the NRM government’s macro economic objectives benefited from the soft credit and expanded market for their products. Winners included major industrialists such as the Madhavani, and the Metha family, Mukwano, Mulwana, and many others. Those who were reluctant to change, or failed to abandon the ‘magendo’ approach to doing business were the losers, and many went bankrupt. The government also used both positive and negative conditional incentives in its fight against corruption and the misuse of power in the civil service. We found evidence showing that forcing some government employees to take early retirement and dismissing corrupt officials was part of the NRM government leaders’ demonstration of its determination to fight and win the war against corruption in government services.

We reviewed the costs the government incurred when carrying out its ‘Ten Point Rehabilitation and Development Program’ (devised while the NRM was fighting against the Obote mark II regime), and its revised ‘Priority Areas Economic Recovery Program Since 1986.’ Our investigations revealed that meager local resources cost the regime its cherished independence, when it had to seek financial help from the WB and IMF, two stern international money lending institutions. The NRM government also incurred many costs associated with bargaining. When communicating its resolve to streamline government administration, it adopted stern policies, which alienated many government employees and Ugandans who had become accustomed to living in a malfunctioning social-economic and political system, of the Amin, and Obote mark I and II eras. To prevent situations of conflict of interests from arising, we saw that NRM personnel were prevented from trying out their entrepreneurial skills by participating in the private economy. Although this regulation endowed government officials with more credibility than that ever enjoyed by officials of the previous regimes, it hurt the economic rehabilitation program, in that NRM personnel were not able to contribute their share to private enterprise economic development.

In conclusion to this chapter we predict that the success or failure, or the litmus test,
of the NRM government performance in power, will be determined by how it handles the legitimacy question. Since 1967, when Obote abrogated the independence, federal national constitution, legitimacy of national leaders has been a contentious issue. We looked at the NRM government's efforts to draft a constitution that was acceptable to all Ugandans. A two hundred and one member constituent assembly elected to debate and ratify the constitution was still in session when we concluded writing this chapter. There were, however, strong indications that advocates of the unitary republican system in key government positions were determined to steer the new constitution into that direction. Former political enemies in DP, CP and UPC, postponed their traditional rivalry to present a common front in the constituent assembly, favoring a federated state. When we recall that it was the UPC party leaders who destroyed the original pro federation independence constitution, we have to receive with caution the party's sudden change of heart. By January 1995, the federal versus unitary republican constitution debate which revived old ethnic prejudices was threatening to tear the country apart once again.
General Conclusions

Most world communities exist as a nation state chiefly because the constituent parts such as states, counties, ethnic groups etc., believe the advantages of being part of a particular political entity outweigh the costs. According to Raphael, a "Nation-state is a nation organized as an association", and is different from a 'nation' which is "a community, a group with all the conditions for a common life and giving rise to natural sentiments of loyalty and identification, but not limited to a specific set of purposes" (Raphael 1970, 40). Communication through dialogue between rulers and the citizens, at the various levels of government, is crucial to the existence of a state, particularly a multi cultural one. Through communication the government becomes aware of the needs, fears, and aspirations of the people, and the people also get to learn about the policies the government devises for meeting people's demands. Disharmony ensues once significant components of a Nation State begin to question the logic of remaining part of the larger entity. In this atmosphere, demands for redefining regional boundaries to remove apparent or substantive political or economic inequities, or demands for revising the constitution are often made; when these demands fail to rectify the problem, the continued existence of the nation state may be jeopardized if the aggrieved party or parties threaten to secede. In successful multi cultural societies social, political, and economic goals elaborated in national constitutions are sacred and the severe sanctions for breaking the rules are usually clearly stated. Actions of those holding public offices are constrained by the knowledge that they risked being impeached, incarcerated, or hit with heavy fines if they violated the rules defining the offices they occupied. To achieve harmony diverse communities had to agree upon the terms of association or incorporation into the larger political entity - which we know as the nation state. Citizens appreciate this association with pride and are so committed to protecting their nation that they usually set aside parochial differences and defend the country with arms if necessary, from external enemies. A fear of sanctions for violating state laws, and the pride that derive from allegiance to one's country translates in self regulation, thus reducing incidences of criminal abuse of national laws by politicians, bureaucrats and the public (Tilly 1985, 185).

Our review of Uganda’s pre colonial ethnology, in Chapter One, revealed the wide
variety of political organization of the people who lived in the region that roughly constituted the contemporary state of Uganda. While centralized kingdoms existed in the south and western parts of the region, societies organized along segmentary lines, or on an acephalous basis - according to Middleton and Tait - occupied the northern and most of the eastern part of the area of contemporary Uganda. Post colonial rulers found it difficult to unite communities with such diverse and often parallel political philosophies in the post colonial era.

It is possible for disparate ethnic groups to coexist in harmony; most contemporary world societies are found in multi cultural political entities. Besides periodic ethnic pogroms that seem to characterize life in the vertically stratified caste communities such as that of Rwanda, India and Burundi, and the periodic uprisings in countries blighted with internal colonialism, most horizontally organized plural communities seem to exist with a substantial measure of harmony. The most nefarious, prolonged and frequent conflicts in the post World War II, and post Cold War, eras were of a political, religious or ideological rather than an ethnic origin, this is ample testimony of the viability of the multi cultural nation state.

We could not fault the colonial regime for the amorphous political environment in the region that constituted today’s Uganda that pre dated British rule. However, we found it difficult to absolve the colonial regime for introducing an inappropriate administrative, social, economic and education structure. The feeling of ethnic insularity fostered by the colonial administrative system which we reviewed in Chapter One, turned Africans within the same territorial jurisdiction into strangers to one another. Colonial political jurisdictions and trading arrangements smothered cross cultural links that had developed through trading networks in the pre colonial era. They thwarted the opportunities for Africans to forge new and broaden old, intra regional trading ties, such as those that had developed over centuries, between the Baganda and the traders from Karagwe and Mombasa. The colonial regime’s petty social policy meant that education, health, and community development were largely dependent upon self help. Social welfare programs were therefore adopted by those living in the politically better organized and economically stronger parts of the country, which were mostly located in the southern and western parts of the country earlier than they
were to the northern and eastern regions; this accounts for the head-start, in education and the alleged inordinately higher provision of welfare amenities found in southern Uganda to which critics of the colonial system such as Nelson Kasfir (1976, 106), and Gingyera Pinychwa (1978, 19) referred. The gap between the north and south that arose from the regime’s recruitment policy for personnel to serve in its coercive organizations laid an ominous foundation for the post colonial state: southerners were apprehensive when associating with the heavily armed northerners, with whom they shared no social linkages besides the tenuous links through the colonial state - as subjects of the same colonial power. Conversely, northerners feared that the better educated southerners who had also served as apprentices in the colonial administrative system would dominate the post colonial political system. They were worried that such an eventuality would further delay the prospect of fulfilling their aspiration to use massive state resources, to bridge the gap between the north and south in the provision of welfare and social services. Mutual suspicion provided a weak predicate for building strong cross cultural bonds between people in the two groups, bonds that would have led to a rapid development of a spirit of nationalism among Ugandans.

Only the British had a sense of Uganda as a territorial unit since it is they who contracted protection agreements between the British government and different African peoples living in the territory around present day Uganda. After the territory came under British rule the absence of a common language entailed that dialogue between the disparate cultural groups was usually difficult to establish. At independence, people who had lived in the insular cultural homelands created by the colonial administrative system, were suddenly required to promptly transfer their allegiances from the homeland, to the new Uganda state. In Chapter Four, we reviewed the political maladies that afflicted Uganda on the eve and in the first decade of independence. We traced the afflictions partly to the nature in which the colonial regime incorporated the diverse (more than forty) ethnic groups into a single political entity that became known as Uganda. We looked at how the cost-benefit equation influenced the manner in which different groups of people interpreted the territory’s economic needs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For example, members of cultural or religious groups, which either had little or nothing to lose or who believed they had more to gain
from the political arrangements that were to come with independence jumped upon the nationalist bandwagon. They hastily declared their unqualified support for independence. Leaders of the wealthier, politically more organized parts of the country, whose political systems had weathered the forces of colonial rule and came out almost intact, were reluctant to jump blindly upon the same bandwagon; they feared that the cost of mortgaging their homeland to the fledgling independent state of Uganda outweighed the benefits.

There were those who wished to opt out of the colonial arrangement since the protectorate contracts had been concluded on a bilateral basis, between the British government and specific pre-colonial political entities. They argued that such pacts would expire at independence, once the protectorate arrangements were extinguished. Since no bilateral or multilateral political covenants had ever been concluded among discrete parts of the colonial state, vulnerable cultural groups did not want to be bound into a political relationship, with peoples who had expressed overt hostility against the former groups’ political institutions. In the introduction we mentioned how the most economically significant region of the country - Buganda - resisted participating in the pre-independence colonial territorial elections of 1958, because the Buganda Lukiiko parliament suspected that the colonial regime was conniving with politicians from outside Buganda to use the Legislative Assembly to compromise Buganda’s interests (Mutesa II 1967, 158). Politicians from some of the regions that were traditionally organized along segmentary lines, had clearly expressed their distaste for the hierarchical political organization of the kingdoms in western Uganda and Buganda, during their campaigns in the political build-up to the independence elections. For example Obote had said that he would “crush the Baganda” (Mutesa II 1967, 160). Soon it was evident to politicians from most parts of the country that the protectorate government was about to abandon the colonial subjects to the whims of fate.

As colonial rule approached its end, in desperation, representatives of parts of the colonial state, which were apprehensive about their fate in independent Uganda, such as Buganda, appealed to the colonial government for permission to decide their own political future. To put some pressure upon the departing British to act urgently, regions like Buganda threatened to secede from the protectorate if the colonial regime did not meet its demands. Ugandans attained independence only after the politicians who participated in the
constituent assembly agreed to adopt a federal national constitution as the sure way for allaying the suspicions and fears about the post colonial political system, that were expressed mainly by the Kingdoms of Buganda, Ankole, Toro, Busoga and Bunyoro, West Nile province and Bugishu district.

In Chapter Four we saw how the gravity with which most legislators upheld the independence constitution almost led to the impeachment of the first Prime Minister of independent Uganda. Strict adherence to rules by politicians and bureaucrats occupying public offices was responsible for the honeymoon of the early years of independence when Ugandans enjoyed peace and prosperity; since sanctions such as impeachment and incarceration were in place, office bearers could be expected to constrain themselves from committing political crimes.

We also saw how accountability of public servants to the electorate came to an abrupt end after the first executive prime minister abrogated the independence constitution in 1966. His actions eroded the sanctions contained within the same document that regulated the behavior of national, regional and municipal office bearers. The Prime Minister’s arbitrary political actions forced Ugandans who did not freely participate in the development of the successive constitutional documents, devised by the ruling regime, in 1967 and revised in 1969, to defy the government by refusing to extend the same amount of respect to the new documents as they had done to the original constitution. Therefore since 1966, politicians have found it difficult to invoke allegiance to the constitution as a tool for inspiring nationalism among Ugandans, particularly in those parts of the country which rejected the new constitutional arrangements. Weak rulers who relied on the military rather than the electorate to stay in power adopted increasingly dictatorial policies. Leaders who banned opposition parties, jailed political opponents, placed politically hostile areas under martial law, and established spy agencies for harassing and spying upon political enemies, soon turned the once peaceful country into a police state. By concentrating state powers in the executive, rulers such as Obote denigrated the sanctity of the separate branches of government powers - the legislature, judiciary and executive as stated in the independence constitution which had regulated the relationships of Uganda’s disparate cultures. These changes led to the breakdown of law and order and eroded the gravity with which legislators had
insisted upon accountability of politicians to the electorate, on whose support the former group’s ascendancy to power had originally depended.

As the rule of law faded, corruption and abuse of public office became rampant. By adopting radical and unpopular social, political and economic policies, the regime which inherited the colonial state adopted measures that were increasingly repressive. These included using the army to contain mounting public opposition to the loathed government policies which we reviewed in Chapter Four. Soon soldiers realized the potential personal financial and political benefits they could reap by deposing the unpopular dictatorial regime. In January 1971 soldiers ousted the civilian regime. Soldiers who overthrew the discredited civilian regime were warmly welcomed by the civilians since they promised to rectify the political, social and economic conflicts they inherited from the fallen regime.

At first the public appreciated moves soldiers made to placate enemies of the fallen regime which included: releasing political detainees, lifting of the five-year old state-of-emergency regulation over Buganda, and the liberalization of national economic policies. Policies of the new government fell short of the peoples’ expectations, when they became aware that soldiers had broken their promise: to restore unqualified plural democracy in Uganda after a brief interlude of military rule. Civilian support for the government waned when the soldiers created new forms of antagonism among Ugandans and reneged on their promise to resolve those conflicts they had inherited from the civilian administration. In Chapter Five, we reviewed the drastic measures used by the regime to hold power in the face of extensive local and international opposition. Lacking the political prowess with which to respond to criticism, the regime adopted repressive policies that matched or exceeded those of its predecessor. The regime hoped to withstand criticisms, from internal and external sources, of its political and economic policies by turning Uganda into a fortress state. The vicious methods the regime adopted to cling to power despite widespread opposition, resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans, and also gravely damaged the country’s economy. To divert people’s attention away from the deteriorating economy that arose from the regime’s mismanagement of national resources, and the perennial struggles for power within the army, military leaders embarked upon an unsuccessful invasion of Tanzania. After eight years in power, this action precipitated the downfall of the
military dictatorship. Nyerere invited Ugandan exiles who had assisted his forces in dislodging the military from power to form an interim government, which would prepare the country for the return to plural democracy.

In Chapter Six we looked at the struggle to control the state which ensued among Ugandan politicians after the downfall of the military dictatorship. We saw how some power-hungry politicians holding intractable political positions, who also had an aversion to the plural democratic system of government - similar to that which had existed in the early 1960s, manipulated the interim political arrangements, while preparing to usurp national political power once the interim two-year, broad based administration period elapsed. Peoples’ worst fears were realized when despite all indications the politically avaricious UPC leaders declared themselves winners of the 1980 elections and proceeded to form the government. Disputes over electoral results culminated in a military challenge to the new military backed civilian regime the following year. A protracted guerrilla war resulted in heavy civilian and partisan army casualties. Since the new regime was preoccupied with fighting numerous guerrilla armies, it could hardly devise any meaningful economic development plans during the next five years. In 1985, not only did the war weary soldiers who had propped up the unpopular regime rebel, they deposed it, allegedly to bring the civil war to a quick end. The military government led by Tito Okello, which replaced the second Obote regime, lacked the political ability to unite Ugandans, the civil war escalated as the leading guerrilla groups acquired arms left in armories around the country by fleeing pro Obote troops. Failure of Okello’s team to meet the terms of the peace pact concluded between representatives of the two warring sides, in Nairobi, forced the NRA to reject the peace pact; it continued fighting until January 1986, when it took control of the country’s political affairs after defeating the new military regime in the battlefield.

We investigated NRM government policies and some features which distinguished this government from its predecessors in Chapter Seven. Important differences which influenced NRM policies which we discussed included: it was backed by an armed wing, the NRA, which had very weak if any links with the traditional national army Ugandans inherited from the colonial state; the bulk of the officer and infantry personnel were from Western Uganda rather than Northern and Eastern Uganda; for the first time in the country’s post
colonial history Baganda were allowed to handle guns, and were, in the early days of NRM rule, represented in substantial numbers in the infantry; the high level of discipline of NRA soldiers was in sharp contrast to the disgraceful behavior of Obote’s, Amin’s and Okello’s armies; western Ugandans with some assistance from southern Ugandans, controlled the administrative and coercive organizations of the state which since independence in 1962, had been controlled by northern Ugandans; NRM recruitment policy stressed certain minimum levels of education for its soldiers; this helped to improve the quality of the personnel in the coercive organizations of the state; this was a sharp departure from the traditional recruitment policy of both the colonial and post colonial regimes, which had based recruitment into these organizations, mainly upon ethnic origin.

Political mismanagement of the country in the 1960s and the internecine wars of the 1970s and early 1980s had stifled peace and security in the country. Since 1966, large segments of the population refused to cooperate with ruling regimes, which they regarded as illegitimate, since they ruled under the constitution imposed unilaterally upon the people in 1967, by Obote. Social, political and economic interests of the NRM government were usually congruent to those of people in most parts of the country; this made the work of restoring peace, social and political conditions that were conducive to economic development, easier for the new rulers than was the case with the previous regimes. The constitutional development process initiated by the NRM government in 1987 was inspired by the regime’s desire to resolve the legitimacy issue which stigmatized all post 1966 ruling regimes. The manner in which the NRM government handles the constitution making process will not only determine the level of respect Ugandans would extend to the regime for the balance of its term in office; it will also determine the legitimacy of future regimes, which will rely on the same new constitutional arrangements.

Implications of the Study

To strengthen African states, national leaders must work toward convincing disparate ethnic groups that the benefits of belonging to the post colonial national political entity outweigh the costs. Leaders will achieve this through fair distribution of national resources: they must strive toward impartiality when distributing the meager resources without unduly
penalizing the wealthier more economically productive parts of the country. This will mitigate the potential of alienating segments which are vital to the economic welfare of the state. Bureaucrats and politicians must keep the channels of communication between the government and the public always open to understand and respond to the needs, fears and aspirations of the citizens. To gain people’s confidence ruling regimes must respond constructively and promptly to people’s social, political and economic demands; by doing so, such regimes will prevent antipathy against the government from developing among people, which could result in political instability as frustrated people make drastic demands upon the government. To institutionalize democratic power distribution within the separate organs of the state, within each African country, the electorate must be prepared to instantly withdraw support from leaders who threaten to derail democratic rule. To diligently guard democratic institutions, premised on constitutional arrangements that were voluntarily agreed upon by representatives of all political groups, which bind the disparate ethnic cultures, legislators must diligently enforce the prescribed penalties against incumbent rulers violating rules governing the offices they occupy. By avoiding to succumb to corruption and other forms of abuse of public offices, national leaders will provide the public with the right example of behavior commensurate with holding important public office. Citizens will be proud to extend their allegiance to the state led by morally upright leaders.

Critics of colonial rule, particularly radical African scholars, were quick to trace the development of underdevelopment within the colonial state to the colonial era, but their prescriptions for eradicating this malady were flawed. The haphazard manner for redistribution of wealth, recommended by such scholars, accentuated instead of resolving the economic problems of many countries which adopted radical economic policies in the post colonial era. In the 1960s and 1970s, a witch hunt against societies living at the center of the former colonial state was initiated by radical regimes. It was often inspired by the works of radical scholars from the peripheral parts of the former colonial state. This exercise did more harm than good to the efforts of the genuine nationalist politicians who wished to unite all people who lived within the same national political jurisdiction. By stressing the differences rather than the common interests of the people, these scholars deliberately or unwittingly sensitized the people to divisions within the peripheral society further, compli-
cating the complex center-periphery relationships of nationals in newly independent states. People at the center had to constantly defend themselves from unsubstantiated accusations that they owed their wealth to having ‘collaborated’ with the enemy - the former colonial master. This left them little, if any, time and opportunity to direct their energies to actively participating in post colonial economic development activities. Conversely, people in the peripheral regions were constantly pressing the new radical regime to redress inequities originating in the colonial era. Unimaginative post colonial regimes penalized societies at the center of the new state, in the mistaken belief that by transferring resources from the center to the periphery, the latter societies would quickly achieve social, and economic development without injuring social and economic development levels of societies at the center.

Above all else, to instill a spirit of nationalism among the disparate ethnic groups, which since independence were severely polarized by self seeking politicians, national leaders must encourage insular ethnic communities to establish benign unofficial channels of communication with one another so that people from different parts of the country acquaint themselves with the way of living of people from other cultural groups. This will reduce and eventually eliminate animosity toward ‘strangers’, which is often bred from ignorance, and the deception of unscrupulous bureaucrats and politicians. These channels will initiate peaceful and mutually beneficial working relationships among people from diverse cultural groups, living within the same national territorial jurisdiction, which have been elusive in most countries during the post colonial era.

Questions inviting further investigations

From the mid 1960s many first-generation post colonial African rulers were dislodged by the military from power. Irresponsible social, political and economic policies of deposed regimes were frequently cited among the key reasons that provoked soldiers to remove corrupt politicians from power. Although many deposed rulers never had a second chance, many of those who got another chance, committed similar if not identical mistakes as they had done before, during their second term in office. Questions which demand answers include: Why did politicians and soldiers fail to learn from their previous mistakes to avoid committing the same mistakes the second time around? Why, like their predeces-
sors. did the new generation of civilian rulers fail to learn from the mistakes of their prede-
cessors and committed blunders which constrained social, political, and economic develop-
ment of their countries; blunders which often provoked soldiers to periodically intervene in
national politics? Despite having better educational and political preparation for running the
nation’s affairs, than their military counterparts, why did civilians fail to devise viable eco-
nomic policies which would discourage soldiers from vying with politicians over the con-
trol of the post colonial state? Overwhelming evidence confirmed that the monolithic,
one-
party system, in vogue during the first decade of independence, not only accentuated politi-
cal differences among the people but failed to initiate the anticipated speedy economic deve-
lopment or to inspire a spirit of nationalism among the disparate cultural groups; yet,why
did many African rulers stubbornly refuse, despite domestic and international demands, to
genuinely embrace plural democracy? These are questions which we believe ought to be
investigated at the national, regional and global level.

In Chapter Three, we introduced the reciprocal or bargaining theory of power, when reviewing the inverse proportion of costs and benefits available to political players in
the Third World. Models of rational choice espoused by Allison (1971) and Elster (1985)
together, provide valuable tools for investigating the behavior - desires, actions and beliefs
of political actors, which influence the selection, pace and direction of economic develop-
ment of many Third World societies. The Reciprocal or bargaining power theory, advanced
by Harsanyi (1969a) is a powerful tool for reviewing influence techniques, and costs actors
incur in political bargaining, which influence economic development. We encourage scho-
olars of Third World politics to utilize these potent explanatory approaches within the politi-
cal interaction framework to uncover the underlying social and political currents embedded
within the African and other Third World social-political systems which constrain economic
development in post colonial societies.
## Table 4.1 Gross Domestic Product by Sector
### Actual Performance: 1966-70 and Plan Targets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Ginning, Coffee Curing and Sugar manuf...</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry, Fishing and Hunting</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacture of Foods</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manufacturing</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Services</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rents</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MONETARY ECONOMY</strong></td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>4333</td>
<td>4403</td>
<td>4933</td>
<td>5075</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY</strong></td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2158</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL GDP</strong></td>
<td>6071</td>
<td>6275</td>
<td>6408</td>
<td>7091</td>
<td>7224</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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</table>

Table 4.2 Uganda Direction of Flow of Private Capital, 1966-1970 (in millions Uganda shillings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inflow</th>
<th>Outflow</th>
<th>Balance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>115.7</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>158.0</td>
<td>159.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>174.0</td>
<td>193.7</td>
<td>-17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>313.6</td>
<td>-294.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 Production of Manufactured Goods, 1966-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Waragi ('000 liters)</td>
<td>238.4</td>
<td>253.3</td>
<td>364.8</td>
<td>395.5</td>
<td>563.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer (million liters)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes (millions)</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>1332</td>
<td>1536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipe tobacco (tonnes)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton and rayon fabrics (million sq.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meters)</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets ('000 pieces)</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>1164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soap ('000 tonnes)</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<td>Matches ('000 cartons*)</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
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<td>Super phosphates ('000 tonnes)</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
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<td>Sawn timber** ('000 tons†)</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steel ingots ('000 tonnes)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plywood ('000 sq. feet.)</td>
<td>8622</td>
<td>8637</td>
<td>9987</td>
<td>12766</td>
<td>12266</td>
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<td>Corrugated iron sheets (tonnes)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9473</td>
<td>9910</td>
<td>11632</td>
<td>13262</td>
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<td>Cement ('000 tonnes)</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>139.5</td>
<td>154.9</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>191.1</td>
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<td>Paints ('000 liters)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>1672</td>
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</table>

* Cartons of 10 gross match boxes.
** Estimate based on a 68 per cent sample.
† 1 ton equals 600 board feet

Source: Uganda Plan 1 1 1 Third Five-Year Development, Plan Ibid. p. 204.
Table 4.4 Manufactured Exports, 1966-70

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<tr>
<td>Cotton fabrics</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
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<td>Other manufactured exports</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>89.1</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL—MANUFACTURED EXPORTS</strong></td>
<td><strong>138.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>136.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>121.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>126.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
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Table 4.5 Actual and Estimated Sales and Generation of Electricity of U. E. B. Selected Years.

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<tr>
<td>Sales to Kenya</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>247.2</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>Standard tariffs</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>250.6</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>533</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special industrial tariffs</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>164.2</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>467</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total sales</td>
<td>578.7</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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<td>Losses</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total generated</td>
<td>634.4</td>
<td>734.6</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>1,338</td>
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<td>Max. demand (M. W.)</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>222</td>
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Source: Uganda's Plan 111 Five-Year Development Plan, p. 290.
Table 4.6 Uganda's Merchandise Exports, 1966-70.

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<td><strong>ARABICA COFFEE:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
<td>17,545</td>
<td>14,006</td>
<td>23,449</td>
<td>17,556</td>
<td>11,399</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
<td>6.020</td>
<td>5.550</td>
<td>5.920</td>
<td>5.550</td>
<td>7.750</td>
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<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>138.8</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>88.3</td>
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<td><strong>ROBUSTA COFFEE:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
<td>149,631</td>
<td>145,461</td>
<td>128,214</td>
<td>162,997</td>
<td>179,845</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
<td>3.940</td>
<td>4.210</td>
<td>4.800</td>
<td>4.740</td>
<td>4.940</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
<td>589.8</td>
<td>614.3</td>
<td>575.3</td>
<td>682.5</td>
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<td><strong>RAW COTTON:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
<td>69,803</td>
<td>71,958</td>
<td>61,652</td>
<td>52,902</td>
<td>78,117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
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<td>4.210</td>
<td>4.800</td>
<td>4.740</td>
<td>4.940</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
<td>306.9</td>
<td>303.2</td>
<td>295.7</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>351</td>
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<td><strong>TEA:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
<td>8,967</td>
<td>9,616</td>
<td>11,390</td>
<td>15,925</td>
<td>15,052</td>
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<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>7,370</td>
<td>6,620</td>
<td>5,870</td>
<td>6,310</td>
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<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
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<td>70.9</td>
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<td><strong>SUGAR:</strong></td>
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<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
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<td>33,167</td>
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<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
<td>82,953</td>
<td>97,227</td>
<td>82,463</td>
<td>87,048</td>
<td>94,899</td>
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<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>480</td>
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<td>530</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
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<td>44.3</td>
<td>49.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
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<td>2,891</td>
<td>2,077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
<td>5,650</td>
<td>8,410</td>
<td>7,460</td>
<td>8,400</td>
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<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
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<td>24.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<td><strong>HIDES AND SKINS:</strong></td>
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<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
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<td>3,380</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>4,221</td>
<td>4,159</td>
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<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
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<td>7,720</td>
<td>5,860</td>
<td>6,520</td>
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<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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<td>27.4</td>
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<td><strong>COPPER:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
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<td>14,973</td>
<td>15,631</td>
<td>16,638</td>
<td>16,466</td>
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<td>Price (Shs. per metric ton)</td>
<td>7,290</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>7,130</td>
<td>10,762</td>
<td>10,060</td>
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<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
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<td>109.3</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>179.1</td>
<td>165.5</td>
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<td><strong>COTTON FABRICS:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantity (metric tons)</td>
<td>19,441</td>
<td>20,226</td>
<td>12,960</td>
<td>13,661</td>
<td>16,318</td>
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<td>Price (Shs. per sq. meter)</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value (Shs. million)</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>55.9</td>
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<td><strong>OTHER AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS:</strong></td>
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<td>105.3</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>114.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER MANUFACTURED EXPORTS:</strong></td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>89.1</td>
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<td><strong>RE-EXPORTS (Shs. million):</strong></td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td><strong>MERCHANDISE EXPORT</strong></td>
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<td>ADJUSTMENTS*** (Shs. million).</td>
<td>-80.9</td>
<td>-67.5</td>
<td>-50.8</td>
<td>-92.1</td>
<td>-148.1</td>
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TOTAL MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (Shs. million) 1470.2 1495.2 1489.7 1569.1 1864.7

* Comprising the balance of SITC sectors 0, 1, 2 and 4.
** Comprising the balance of SITC sectors 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
*** For valuation and timing.

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<th>Towns</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Ratio of Africans: Asians - Cols II: III</th>
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<td>Kampala</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>113</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jinja</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12:1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masaka</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>N. K.*</td>
<td>6:1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mbale</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21:1</td>
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<td>Mbarara</td>
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<td>3:1</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>N. K.</td>
<td>12:1</td>
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<td>Masindi</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>N. K.</td>
<td>3:1</td>
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Source: Official Records of the City and Town Councils.
* Not Known.
Table 6.1 Grants Paid to District Administrations by Government (in E. A. Sh)

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<th>1969</th>
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<td>4812450</td>
<td>1363281</td>
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<td>2. Ankole</td>
<td>6142910</td>
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<td>488100</td>
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<td>3. Bugishu</td>
<td>4149485</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>4. Bukedi</td>
<td>5902260</td>
<td>1052200</td>
<td>1247660</td>
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<td>5. Bunyoro</td>
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<td>2076108</td>
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<td>6. Busoga</td>
<td>6701825</td>
<td>1345825</td>
<td>1125000</td>
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<td>7. Karamoja</td>
<td>4296330</td>
<td>4572875</td>
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<td>8. Kigezi</td>
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<td>11. Sebei</td>
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<td>707045</td>
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<td>13. Toro</td>
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<td>15. Mubende</td>
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<td>16. Masaka</td>
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<td>17. East Mengo</td>
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<td>18. West Mengo</td>
<td>-</td>
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