TOWARD A THEORY OF CULTURE LEARNING:
A STUDY BASED ON JOURNALS WRITTEN BY
JAPANESE AND CANADIAN YOUNG ADULTS
IN EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

By

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Toward a Theory of Culture Learning: A Study Based on Journals

Written by Japanese and Canadian Young Adults in Exchange Programs

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to develop a theory of culture learning, that is, a theory of how novices learn the sociocultural knowledge and cultural practices that allow them to operate appropriately within their place in another culture. The study is grounded in the experience of Japanese and Canadian youths living abroad in Canada and Japan for three months. The primary source of data was the journals students kept to record daily events of interest. Students interpreted these events in terms of their current sociocultural knowledge. They returned to the entries periodically, modifying their interpretations as they felt necessary.

Jack Mezirow’s (1991) transformative learning theory provided theoretical categories that guided data analysis. This theory addresses the process by which new experience is interpreted and meaning is constructed, validated and reformulated. Meaning structures act to shape, focus and delimit learning. Meaning structures have two dimensions: meaning perspectives and meaning schemes. Meaning perspectives are broad dispositions that create our expectations and habits of interpretation. Meaning schemes are more specific manifestations involving values, beliefs, and concepts.

Mezirow’s theory identifies four forms of learning: (1) learning through meaning schemes, (2) learning new meaning schemes, (3) learning through transforming meaning schemes, and (4) learning through perspective transformation. Three forms of reflection: (1) content (2) process, and (3) premise are also identified. These forms of learning and reflection provided categories to guide data analysis.
The study develops a theory of culture learning based on an analysis of students' journals using grounded theory procedures. This analysis reveals typologies within the forms of learning and reflection. In addition to elaborating on the central role of learning through the transformation of meaning schemes and perspectives in culture learning, the study clarifies the role of resistance to the transformation of these same structures in the process. The study looks outside Mezirow's work to Ochs and Schieffelin (1986) to clarify the relationship between learning language and learning culture. Moreover, Stephen Kemmis' (1985) work helps recast Mezirow's conception of reflection, recognizing reflection as a more socially situated activity in culture learning. Finally, the study reveals the great potential in exchange programs for emancipatory learning.
Writing the acknowledgements page is a happy occasion. People who deserve thanks always stretch back through time. I will begin my page by thanking my dissertation committee. To Jan Walls - my thanks for your encouragement to begin this project and your help and enthusiasm through to the end. My thanks also to Kelleen Toohey, especially for her insistence that I think harder about the nature of culture. To Steve Kline, the third member of my committee, my thanks for helping me think harder about methodology.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Let's start with Shigeru. Shigeru Suzuki, a young Japanese male, is an international student enrolled in a Canadian community college. As a well off member of an affluent society, Shigeru is a privileged youth. However, despite the good fortune not to be a refugee, or a socially and economically marginalized young immigrant, Shigeru faces many of the challenges his less privileged counterparts do. Foremost among these is the need to understand his new culture. Shigeru's emotional comfort and academic success in Canada depend crucially on how well he meets this need. Shigeru's feelings after three months in Canada provide a good starting point for this dissertation:

Basically not many things have changed, but the word three months makes me recognize that I have got used to a different culture. At the same time, this word makes me anxious as well because I feel that I have understood only a little about Canadians' lives. If this anxiety is the dark side of my days, the bright part for me is that I could experience a deep friendship among friends and host-families in these three months. Fortunately, the people around me are all wonderful. Being away from my friends in Japan, I recognize the importance of friendship.

(Shigeru, 11/30/92)

These contradictions and tensions between feeling comfortable and feeling anxious are familiar to all newcomers to other cultures. While it should please us that Shigeru’s days are brightened by the friendships formed in Canada, it should concern us that his days are darkened by the anxiety of understanding so little about Canadians’ lives. But how can we increase Shigeru’s understanding of Canadians’ lives and reduce his anxiety?

Understanding how Shigeru has become used to the new culture and further, how he has
learned even a little of Canadians' lives, is a good start. Such knowledge can direct our efforts to help reduce Shigeru’s anxiety and accelerate his learning about Canadians' lives, or in other words, his culture learning.

This dissertation reports on a study of culture learning in which Shigeru participated. He and the other participants were international students, but the full significance of the need for culture learning must be understood more generally. Writing of globalization trends in the introductions to dissertations is a cliche, but these trends are real. Global economic, social and political developments increasingly bring us into close contact with new neighbours who are culturally different, and these trends may also compel us to live abroad in culturally different communities. Both the need to learn culture and occasions for learning culture are ubiquitous. Moreover, understanding culture is not merely the need or activity of the educated and privileged who invented the academic construct of culture. Millions of people learn culture daily in such common acts as speaking with neighbours of different cultural backgrounds and discovering differing expectations for their children’s schooling in Canada, or tuning in to a Japanese soap opera on T.V. in a remote Chinese town, or studying in a foreign school or university. The happiness of intercultural marriages, the business success of immigrants and effective cultural, economic, and institutional alliances large and small are all evidence of culture learning.

The examples above are benign. Unfortunately, the oppression and exploitation of other people is often mediated through knowledge of their culture. The success of such activities is also evidence of successful culture learning. Culture learning may also occur in
contentious and unhappy circumstances where power is abused and human rights denied. Culture learning alone is no guarantee of social and economic justice. Nor is it a guarantee that relations with fellow students, teachers, neighbours or business partners will be conflict free. But an understanding of each others' cultures can provide an important foundation for the resolution of conflict and for harmonious relations. Culture learning may also help those who are oppressed defend their own interests. In fact, many who are oppressed already understand the culture of those whom they must resist. This knowledge has ensured their survival.

It is another cliche that global trends influence local contexts. But this too is true. A local context frames my relationship with Shigeru. Moreover, it is within such local contexts that the culture learning of Shigeru and other youths, and for me as their teacher, is most urgent. But to keep the focus on Shigeru is to understand how he and many thousands of young people must function effectively, now as students and later as adults, in culturally different environments. In the specific context of schooling, students like Shigeru need educational programs which focus on culture learning and provide a basis for them to understand the lives of the people they study among. They also need to understand people with different cultural backgrounds in their own multi-cultural communities.

My work as a teacher of English as a second language and Japanese in a community college in British Columbia is the context in which I became aware of the importance of culture learning. In last 10 years, many thousands of young immigrants and international students like Shigeru have entered my institution and other secondary and
post-secondary educational institutions in British Columbia. Most of these students come from Asia. They bring with them cultural backgrounds and languages significantly different from those of most of their teachers and many of their fellow students. During this same time, many hundreds of young British Columbians have been studying Japanese and Chinese in secondary schools alone. These enrolments have risen dramatically to a current estimate of nearly 10,000 students. Moreover, through school twinning and government sponsored exchange programs, hundreds of local students have the opportunity to live in another culture when still quite young. In fact, the most ambitious provincial government program sends 25 - 30 high school students to Japan each spring to study in immersion programs for three months. Other B.C. high school students are sent to other Asian countries to live with local families and study in local schools for periods up to a year. In each of these cases, the young participants, like Shigeru, must understand a different culture in order to live and learn effectively in new circumstances.

Developments in the post-secondary system also reflect this trend to internationalization. Just a decade ago, no international students could enrol in the public schools or the community colleges in British Columbia. Major universities severely restricted undergraduate enrolment of international students. In the years since, financial necessity, and to a lesser degree, an appreciation of international students’ contributions to internationalizing campuses, has resulted in large numbers of overseas students (and landed immigrants) enrolling in our post-secondary institutions. Institutional interest in developing “study abroad” programs is also growing. As a result, very few post-secondary students in B.C. are isolated from contact with people who are culturally different from
them. Of course, Canadian immigrants continue to enroll in significant numbers too, making all educational institutions multi-cultural. At my own college, among the three or four hundred other international students, a group of 12 students from our sister university in Japan enroll annually in a year abroad program. Shigeru is one such student. All of these programs at the post-secondary level are contexts in which culture learning is important.

An overview of the study

The study was designed to investigate the culture learning experience of a group of Japanese and Canadian youths. Each group participated in an educational program in the other's country. The group of twenty-four Canadian students studied in high schools in Kyoto and Tokyo, Japan for three months in the spring of 1992. They lived with local families. The twenty-four Japanese students, in two groups of 12, were students at a community college in New Westminster, B.C., Canada in the Fall of 1992 and 1993. They lived with Canadian families. Both groups of students had already studied English or Japanese before going overseas. They continued their language studies while abroad and were generally integrated into the student body of the educational institutions to which they were sent. The Canadian students returned to Canada after the three-month program. The Japanese students stayed in Canada for eight months in 1992 and twelve months in 1993.

Their involvement in this study required that they keep a "culture learning" journal for three months. In this journal, they recorded, at least twice weekly, events they experienced. They were asked to select events that were significant because they were
interesting, puzzling, irritating or otherwise noteworthy. After describing an event, the students interpreted it in terms of their understanding of the host-culture. They returned to these entries every two weeks, reinterpreting them if their understanding of the events had changed. Their journals provided the researcher with descriptions and interpretations of several hundred separate experiences in Japan or Canada.

These journal accounts became the data for this study of culture learning. In the section below, I will outline the work that has been done previously on culture learning and then go on to introduce the main features of transformative learning, the adult learning theory of Jack Mezirow (1991). This theory forms the theoretical framework for my study. I follow this by setting the professional and personal context of the research problem addressed in this dissertation and then discuss the purpose of the research. This chapter ends with a short presentation of the significance of the study, a definition of terms used herein, and an outline of the dissertation.

Culture Learning

Shigeru's need to understand Canadians' lives provides a simple definition of culture learning - learning about the lives of people from different cultures. This definition is no less sophisticated than many in the professional literature. The lack of sophistication reflects the fact that scholars don't know very much about this kind of learning. I have argued in the pages above that we need to know more. An examination of existing definitions is a good place to begin a review of what we know of culture learning. In the past 25 years, definitions of culture learning, also called intercultural or cross-cultural
learning, have appeared in a number of fields. Since these definitions have been more concerned with learning than with culture, they have not made explicit their underlying conceptions of culture. (The definition of culture used in this study appears among the terms defined at the end of this chapter.) Culture learning is defined in the field of anthropology as part of two concepts: enculturation and acculturation. The former focuses on first culture learning: "the conscious or unconscious conditioning occurring within the process [of learning one's own culture] whereby the individual, as child and adult, achieves competence in a particular culture" (Hoebel & Frost, 1976, cited in Samovar & Porter, 1991 p. 58). The latter term, acculturation, refers to this same process for adults becoming competent in another culture (Damen, 1986). In cross-cultural psychology, Adler (1972) defined culture learning as a personal transformation making people both more aware of culture generally and more self-aware. In multicultural education, Pusch (1981) defined culture learning as "either (1) learning the principal characteristics of another culture, or (2) the way in which a learner progresses from ethnocentrism to an acceptance and appreciation of another culture" (Pusch, 1981, p. 7). This focus on personal growth in both Adler and Pusch's work is apparent in other definitions of culture learning in cross-cultural communications. William Gudykunst (1983), for example, defined culture learning as a cognitive, affective and behavioral process where an individual grows beyond the parameters of any one culture. This view will be critiqued in the next chapter.

The anthropological literature seems a likely place to begin a search for a theory of culture learning, since this activity is an important part of anthropologists' professional
lives. However, introspective accounts of how anthropologists themselves learn culture, not in an academic sense, but in a more functional day-to-day sense, are rare. Those few that exist focus on methodology rather than learning theory. The other disciplines mentioned above, cross-cultural psychology, multicultural education and cross-cultural communications also fail to offer a theory of culture learning. They merely speculate on the nature of culture learning. In no case is this speculation the result of an empirical study of culture learning.

This paucity of empirical studies of culture learning and of a theory of culture learning created a challenge at the outset of this study. Given these circumstances my choices were limited. First, I could abandon plans to study culture learning. Second, I could conceive a “classic” grounded theory study where the data alone, without reference to any other existing theories, generates the theory. A third choice is finding a more general but related theory and adapting and transforming it through applying it in the specific context of culture learning. This too is a variety of grounded theory. Having started the study with the second choice in mind, the third emerged as the better option as I became familiar with the data in preliminary analysis and as I continued to read literature relevant to culture learning. I began my search for a foundation for developing a theory of culture learning with what I felt were the two most relevant fields: language education and linguistics, and intercultural communications. In the end, I found the theory I needed in studies relevant to both intercultural communications and adult education. What follows is a brief overview of the state of work on culture learning in the fields mentioned above. This work will be reviewed more completely in Chapter two. This overview is followed by
an introduction to Jack Mezirow's theory of transformative learning (1991) which I have
used as the conceptual framework of this study.

*Language education and linguistics:*

In the field of language education and linguistics, scholars have tried both to define
culture learning and to investigate it. Early efforts in the field of linguistics focused on
defining the relationship between language and culture (Hymes, 1974) and in language
education on identifying goals and methods for cultural instruction (Seeyle, 1974).
However, studies of how culture might be learned were neglected, even in the 1970s or
early 1980s, when studies of language acquisition were burgeoning. Language educators
and linguists were curious about the process of learning culture, but not active in research.
Jacobovits (1970), for example, speculated on culture learning, concluding that as an
outcome, we must "consider the probability of an 'interculture' that" might be "a
conceptual supra-structure peculiar to the bilingual which enables him to draw on
experiences from two cultures" (p. 89). Jacobovits, however, devoted less than two pages
concluded that culture learning was unresearchable. They had intended to evaluate culture
learning as part of a study of bilingual exchange programs between the provinces of
Quebec and Ontario. However, the team found no previous research into culture learning
and, moreover, failed to agree on a methodology for that part of the study; they finally
concluded that the "cultural" effects of the bilingual exchange were "not researchable in
this study" (p.26). The study proceeded without an investigation of students' culture
learning.
The dearth of studies of culture learning continues. Recently, Christina Bratt Paulston (1992) concluded that there is "virtually nothing written on biculturalism" and when bilingual/bicultural education is talked about in recent dissertations they "typically ignore the bicultural element and rather examine either language proficiency or self-concept" (p. 116). Outside of the field of bilingual/bicultural education, work related to foreign language education does examine the culture learning side of language learning. Michael Byram (1989), in the context of an ethnographic study of culture learning, defined it as the "way we structure our knowledge of the world and in particular of other cultures" (p. 5). No investigation of culture learning that I am aware of predates his 1989 study.

More recently, studies reported in Michael Byram, Veronica Estarte-Sarries and Susan Taylor (1991) describe the perceptions of other cultures of British learners of French, their attitudes to foreign people, sources of influence on these and the effect of teaching of French on these same factors. A three year study of learners of French in Germany by Hagen Kordes (1991) investigated the stages of intercultural learning that students in language programs might reach. The Byram et al. and Kordes studies are descriptive studies. By focusing on learners' experience using ethnographic methods, they made a significant advance in research into culture learning. These studies were not intended to develop a theory of culture learning or to describe in-depth the dynamic by which this learning occurs. However, the Byram et al. study did propose that culture learning might be a process mediated through changes in the structure of the schemata of the learner. I will return to the model of culture learning proposed by Byram et al. (1991) shortly.
Byram’s recent work is more directly concerned with theory building in culture learning. In his most recent work, Byram (1994), surveys language learning theories and theories of developmental psychology in search of support for a theory of "language-and-culture learning" (p. 5). He concludes this review with the observation that theories in both areas are insufficient as a foundation to understand the culture learning dimension of language learning and teaching. In summary, literature on culture learning in language education provides no practical direction for a theory of culture learning.

Intercultural communications:

The field of intercultural communications includes three areas in which to find a possible basis for developing a theory of culture learning: (1) intercultural communication theory, (2) intercultural competency and, (3) intercultural communication training. Literature in each area will be previewed below and reviewed in more detail in Chapter two.

The emergence of theoretical work in intercultural communications is a recent development, dating from William B. Gudykunst’s Intercultural Communication Theory (1983). With one exception, the prominent theories ignore the role of learning altogether. Positivist theories of intercultural communication (those which try to isolate and detach separate elements of communication in search of explanatory relationships) such as Larry Sarbaugh’s (1988) theory of interculturalness or W. B. Gudykunst’s (1988) theory of uncertainty/anxiety reduction, ignore learning as a variable in their theories. Humanist theories of intercultural communication (those which try to apprehend the nature of intercultural communications as it arises) such as Mary Jane Collier’s and Milt Thomas’s
work on interpretative perspectives in theorizing cultural identity (1988, 1990) and James L. Applegate’s and Howard Sypher’s (1983, 1988) constructivist theory of communication, also fail to address the role of learning in their theoretical work.

One limited exception to the rule is Young Yun Kim’s (1988) systems theory of cross-cultural adaptation. In her theory, initially developed with Brent Ruben, Kim attempts to articulate the “theoretical relationship between intercultural encounters, culture shock experiences and adaptive transformation” (Ruben & Kim cited in Gudykunst & Kim eds., 1988 p. 299). For Kim, a cycle of stress-disequilibrium-adaptation explains both the how and why of the process of cross-cultural adaptation. She argues generally that “the tension between stress and adaptation and the resultant internal transformation essentially characterises the life processes of humans” (Kim, 1988 p. 44). More specifically, she argues that this process creates an intercultural identity for people in regular close contact with another culture. Such people cope with challenges of the unfamiliar by incorporating new experiences and developing an intercultural identity; they have “re-drawn the lines of their original cultural identity to accommodate the new life patterns, combined with the original patterns” (Kim, 1992, p.3).

In assessing Kim’s work in explaining the learning dynamic in adaptive transformation, Taylor (1993) concludes that although her theory strongly implies there is a learning dynamic, it does not make this explicit. In the end, Kim’s work too falls short of clarifying any aspect of culture learning. Intercultural communication theory provides no direction for developing a theory of culture learning.
The concept of intercultural competency also makes no contribution to a theory of culture learning. In the last 25 years this concept has been discussed under many different terms including “cross-cultural adjustment, cross-cultural awareness, cross-cultural effectiveness, multiculturalism, intercultural effectiveness, cultural competence and intercultural competence” (Taylor, 1993 p.2). This plethora of terms and perspectives makes definition difficult. Brent Ruben (1989), in his review of intercultural competence, concludes that the best that can be done to synthesize these definitions is to conclude that “competence” has various facets. Taylor (1993) reviewed this same literature to determine if it might contribute to an understanding of the learning process involved in becoming interculturally competent. He concluded that it does not, noting “despite the evolution of research in the area of intercultural competency, little progress has been made in understanding in-depth the learning process that takes place in becoming interculturally competent” (p. 6). My own review of the literature also failed to find any work that addressed the issue of learning and competency. Conceptual work in intercultural competency too provides no basis on which to build a theory of culture learning.

The applied side of intercultural communication, the area of training, is primarily concerned with providing orientation and other kinds of services to facilitate successful adaptation for people planning to live abroad. Trainers in the field thus have a professional interest in understanding culture learning. Three publications (Bennett 1986; Hughes-Weiner 1986; Sikkema & Niyekawa, 1987) in this area point to David Kolb’s theory of experiential learning as a basis on which to build a theory of culture learning. Kolb’s theory relates processes of concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract
conceptualization and active experimentation in a circular relationship that results in learning. Kolb’s work led Gail Hughes-Weiner (1986) to argue that preparation programs for sojourners, short-term residents in overseas settings, need “to go beyond learning specific cultural information” and “to learn how to learn” about other cultures (p. 485). Hughes-Weiner recommends Kolb’s experiential learning theory as a natural basis for the “learning how to learn” component of training programs. In a review of three types of training programs, Janet Bennett (1986) argues that good training programs should also “assist the learners in understanding the theoretical foundations of learning” (p. 118). She describes the challenge of learning in overseas settings as a case of Kolb’s experiential learning. However, Bennett regards culture learning as a special case, “a qualitatively different case of experiential learning” (p. 120).

Sikkema and Niyekawa (1987) provide a descriptive account of the culture learning of adults during field experiences related to training courses in intercultural communications they teach in Hawaii. This study describes the outcomes of these programs in-depth, but makes little of the process of culture learning. They too identify experiential learning as the “core element in culture learning” (p. 41). Like Bennett, they see culture learning as a special case of Kolb’s (1976) theory of experiential learning. However, they do not provide support for this assertion in their study, they simply offer a few speculative generalizations about the process of culture learning that are implied by the content of their students’ culture learning.

The three studies above suggest that Kolb’s theory of experiential learning may provide a basis for a theory of culture learning. However, no empirical study of cross-
cultural training programs or culture learning in general has used this theory. Despite the promise of Kolb's theory, this area too did not seem to provide an obvious basis for the development of a theory of culture learning.

In the field of adult education another theory of learning has been used in two empirical studies of the culture learning. Both studies investigated adult learning in the intercultural context. Taylor (1993) and Lynette Harper (1994) both used Jack Mezirow's (1991) transformative learning theory in their studies. In Taylor's study of 12 sojourners, he explores Mezirow's theory as an explanation of the learning process involved in becoming interculturally competent. He concludes that Mezirow's model of perspective transformation, part of his theory, with modification, does explain the learning process of intercultural competence. Harper's (1994) life history study of Mira, a young immigrant woman from Lebanon (a refugee at the time of the study), also drew on Mezirow's theory to understand aspects of Mira's experience of learning culture. Harper concludes that Mezirow's work on meaning scheme and perspective transformation helps explain Mira's experience of learning about Canadian life. These two empirical studies provide a strong case for looking to Mezirow's (1991) work to build a theory of culture learning upon.

Along with the two studies described above, the Byram et al. (1991) study also points to Mezirow's (1991) theory of transformative learning as a basis for a theory of culture learning. The explanation that Byram et al. (1991) proposed for culture learning has similarities to Mezirow's theory of learning. In observing several French language classrooms, they concluded that the relationship between how language and culture are presented has significant implications for understanding the process of culture learning.
Changes in that relationship create a different dynamic for how the qualitatively new experience represented by the foreign culture may be assimilated. The study concludes that this process can be understood in terms of possibilities for changes in schemata, data structures for representing generic concepts in memory (Rumelhart, 1980, cited in Byram et al. p. 374). The possibilities the study identified are: (1) to assimilate the new thinking to schemata already possessed, (2) to adapt existing schemata or ways of thinking in response to new experience, or (3) adopt new schemata to cope with the new experience. Byram et. al. refer to this process of adapting and adopting new schemata as “tertiary socialisation”. Byram’s efforts to differentiate types of culture learning in relation to schema change is very similar to Mezirow’s (1991) model of transformative learning, particularly to Mezirow’s identification of four forms of learning.

All three of these studies encouraged me to look closely at Mezirow’s (1991) work as a basis for a theory of culture learning. I concluded that investigating culture learning as a case of transformational learning, rather than as a special case of experiential learning, is a more promising direction for developing a theory of culture learning. Unlike Kolb, Mezirow elaborates on the dynamics of learning, providing a more detailed theory to investigate culture learning. He critiques Kolb’s work, especially his failure to elaborate on the role of reflection in experiential learning. A close review of Mezirow’s theory, especially in its attention to reflection as a central dynamic for learning and its identification of different forms of learning, reveals its strength as the conceptual framework for this study.
Transformative learning

Mezirow’s (1991) theory of transformative learning provides the conceptual framework for this study. Mezirow’s definition of learning is a good point to begin an overview of his theory. Mezirow defines learning as making meaning:

Making meaning is central to what learning is all about. The learning process may be understood as the extension of our ability to make explicit, schematize (make an association within a frame of reference), appropriate (accept an interpretation as our own) remember (call upon an earlier interpretation), validate (establish the truth, justification, appropriateness, or authenticity of what is asserted), and act upon (decide, change an attitude toward, modify a perspective on, or perform) some aspect of our engagement with the environment, other persons, ourselves. (Mezirow, 1991, p. 11)

Transformative learning stands in contrast to other learning which relies on an old set of secure meanings to interpret and give coherence to new experience. In transformative learning a new experience is reinterpreted through a new set of meanings and expectations. Old experience can be similarly reinterpreted. Transformative learning thus matches very well the most salient feature of culture learning - learning in which expectations and familiar ways of interpreting the world do not necessarily work well to interpret experience in a new culture. Because this type of learning transforms basic expectations and interpretations developed in the course of early socialization and learning, Mezirow identifies it as a form of adult learning. His dismissal of this form of learning for children seems off-hand. The youths in this study can all be said to be adult in the sense that they are beyond early socialization and learning.
Meaning schemes and meaning perspectives:

The concepts of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives are central to Mezirow's theory. These are "boundary structures" through which new data are perceived and comprehended. Meaning perspectives are broad structures of "assumptions within which one's past experience assimilates and transforms new experience" (p. 42). These perspectives are webs of habitual expectations and orienting frames of reference. Meaning schemes are smaller scale structures "made up of specific knowledge, beliefs, value judgments, and feelings that constitute interpretations of experience...." (p. 6). The way these two structures are applied, modified or transformed in the interpretation of experience distinguish different forms of learning.

Forms of learning:

Understanding how these forms of learning function in the process of culture learning is one focus of this study. Mezirow's theory identifies four of these forms of learning: (1) learning through meaning schemes, (2) learning new meaning schemes, (3) learning through the transformation of meaning schemes and (4) learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives. In learning through existing meaning schemes, we simply interpret new experience in ways consistent with our existing meaning schemes acquired in the past. In the second form, learning new meaning schemes, we expand the scope of an older meaning scheme, slightly modifying it in the interpretation of new experience. There is more continuity than change in existing meaning schemes when we learn like this. The third form, learning through the transformation of meaning schemes, results when new experiences cannot be interpreted through our existing meaning
schemes. These schemes must then be transformed. The fourth form, learning through perspective transformation, is a profound form of learning with far reaching consequences. Mezirow defines this form:

The process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand and feel about the world; changing these structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrative perspective; and finally, making choices or otherwise acting upon this new understanding. (Mezirow, 1991, p. 167)

**Forms of reflection:**

As well as identifying forms of learning, Mezirow (1991) also identifies forms of reflection. Understanding the role of reflection in culture learning is another important focus of this study. The forms of learning and forms of reflection are interdependent.

Reflection is the process that changes meaning schemes and meaning perspectives. Mezirow (1991) criticized learning theory generally for “egregious disregard for the function of reflection” (pp.100-101). Transformative learning theory identifies the process of reflection as the central dynamic of learning. Reflection in Mezirow terms is an active process in which:

...we check back on our problem solving process: were our generalizations based upon a representative sample, our inferences warranted, our logic sound, our control of variables appropriate, our anticipated consequences of alternative actions inclusive, and our analysis fully discriminating, our evidence convincing, and our actions consistent with our values?


Within the general process of reflection, Mezirow identified three distinct forms: content, process and premise. We use content reflection to review our past experience when we need to match it to current experience when interpreting the meaning of the new
experience. Process reflection is used when we review the process by which we make
interpretations. Premise reflection is the most radical form of reflection and involves
"becoming aware of why we perceive, think and feel or act as we do..." (p.108). This form
of reflection is associated with learning through perspective transformation.

Mezirow's theory of transformative learning shows promise as a foundation for a
theory of culture learning because it provides a detailed framework through which to look
at both the content and process of culture learning. The theory provides categories of
learning and reflection for the analysis of journal entries that are the data for this study.
Mezirow's (1991) theory, however, fails to address some areas of culture learning
adequately. This shortcoming will be discussed later.

Problem Statement

This dissertation has its origins in the dual context of my personal and professional
life. Both these contexts are important to a full treatment of this problem statement.
Qualitative methodologists agree that researchers draw on their own experiences to
understand social situations and that this experience inevitably influences their
interpretations (Guba, 1990). This implies a need for certain kinds of disclosure on the
researcher's part, including disclosure of why he or she chose a certain problem. Sandra
Harding (1987) calls this procedure, by which researchers choose to identify problems and
raise the related research questions, the logic of discovery. Recent expectations for
clarifying the logic of discovery challenge the traditional criteria on which the discovery or
definition of an issue or problem is judged.
Traditional philosophy of science argues that the origin of the scientific problem or hypothesis is irrelevant to the "goodness" of the results of research. Harding (1987), among others, criticizes this traditional position as short-sighted. She argues that the criteria for choice of problem to study or questions to be asked is "at least as determinative of the adequacy of our total picture as are any answers that we can discover" (p. 7). Her argument recognizes the influence that the researchers' personal experience has on interpretations of data, particularly qualitative data. As a result of this challenge to the traditional position, many qualitative researchers provide a comprehensive account of why they choose a problem, including personal factors involved. In this same spirit, qualitative researchers are open about ways in which the interpretation of their data might be influenced by their experience.

In the spirit of revealing the full context of discovery here, I will first outline the professional experience that led me to identify my research problem and then outline the personal experience that merged with the professional in my choice to study culture learning. I will follow this up with a discussion of how this may have influenced my interpretation of my data.

*The professional context*

This dissertation originates partly from reflections on my practice as a teacher of Japanese as a foreign language (JFL) and English as a Second Language (ESL). Like many other language teachers, my view of language teaching and learning goes beyond a narrow focus on the development of linguistic competence. The emergence of the concept of communicative competence (Campbell & Wales, 1970; Hymes, 1972) focused language
teachers’ attention on language in its socio-cultural context. More recently, the concept of intercultural communication competence (Benson, 1978; Dinges, 1983) focused teachers’ attention on language in its intercultural context (Krasnic, 1983). Damen (1986), among others, related these twin strands in her argument that teachers and learners need to attend to language learning both in its social context and in its intercultural context. This call to attend to learning culture in the language classroom is not new. Since the 1970s, language teachers and researchers have argued for the importance of teaching and learning culture in the language classroom. Ned Seelye’s (1976) *Teaching culture: Strategies for foreign language educators*, Louise Damen’s (1986) *Culture learning: The fifth dimension in the language classroom*, and most recently Michael Byram, Carol Morgan and colleagues (1994) *Teaching-and-learning language-and-Culture* are just three prominent works that argue the importance of teaching language and culture.

While these publications, among others, point out the importance of language teachers’ mission to help students learn language and culture, Omaggio (1986) argues that teachers have not successfully integrated the teaching of language and culture. Nearly a decade after Omaggio’s observation, I believe this situation remains unchanged. In reflecting on my own practice, I realize that I too, do not deal very effectively with this integration in my teaching or curriculum design work to ESL and JFL programs. Perhaps some colleagues have been more successful, but most confess to having problems.

Byram (1994) acknowledges that language teachers have intuitive theories of culture learning, but points out that we lack an explicit and elaborated theory of culture learning. Inadequate provision for culture learning in our language programs, then, stems
in part from the absence of a theory of culture learning. In earlier work, Byram et al. (1991), Byram identifies more broadly the problems involved in teaching and learning language and culture. He points out that before we classroom teachers can confidently make changes to our treatment of culture learning in language programs, we need to develop an “adequate didactic” for cultural studies. He identifies several important preconditions for this development: first, an adequate understanding of what form of cultural analysis might be appropriate to the language classroom; second, a clear notion of the relationship between a curriculum of language and culture and general curriculum theory and development; and third, an adequate theory of culture learning in the circumstances of foreign language teaching (Byram, Estates-Sarries & Taylor, 1991). To this latter point, I would add the circumstances of second language teaching. The problem this dissertation addresses is the lack of an adequate theory of culture learning to support classroom practice. This study then, addresses Byram’s third precondition for an adequate didactic of culture learning above in the hope of providing support for more informed and effective classroom practice in the teaching of language and culture.

The personal context

My interest in the understanding culture learning is not only a professional concern, but also a personal one. Culture learning has been an central part of my life over the last 25 years. I will share a little of biography to set this interest in context. Let’s begin with May of 1970 when I left Canada for five years of travel and work in Australia and Asia. After a four week crossing of the Pacific, I arrived in the Philippines: a dramatically different cultural environment. I had very limited experience of the world. This was the
first time I had ever been more than 300 kilometres from home. Having just turned 21, my entire world view and identity were defined by West coast Canadian working class culture and one year of university.

This world view began to change almost immediately. Three days after arriving in the Philippines, I found myself sleeping in a small family home in a poor barrio in the mountains north of Manila with new Filipino friends. This quick inclusion into the life of another culture opened a world nearly unimaginable to me in my working class Burnaby neighbourhood in Canada a month earlier. I had expected to find more walls than doors in the world, so I found this Filipino openness and embrace overwhelming. I can still recall the feeling of astonishment that everyone is potential family. Amidst difference, I found similarity and an unexpected solidarity.

It wasn't an entirely pleasant discovery of the world, however. Filipinos, especially those in the barrios, were living through a period of particularly brutal repression. Student leaders whom I had met in Manila were shot dead during demonstrations a week later. And I frequently saw soldiers on missions against guerillas in the mountains. A family, I quickly understood, provides little protection against injustice and political brutality. In looking back on this experience, I realize my own privilege. With mobility, wealth and a white skin and male privilege, my experience of other cultures is dramatically different than that of most others. I am grateful that my culture learning and experience in the world has never been a demoralizing and humiliating necessity, as it can be for many immigrants and refugees.
The story of my culture learning continues in Japan. Following six months’ travel in South East Asia and a year spent working in Australia, I moved in November 1971 to Kyoto to teach ESL and learn Japanese. I remember standing, shortly after arrival, in front of an 1100 year old temple complex, and suddenly feeling an enormous sense of anxiety as my sense of identity and history was instantly recontextualized. Despite earlier feelings of solidarity with people from other cultures, until then I was still largely secure in my own ethnocentricity. In a moment, however, I realized how limited the civilization I had come from was in comparison to the extent of the Japanese civilization at that time. My sense of identity that had been centred in pride in my Anglo Saxon background was severely shaken. In the Philippines, I had felt strongly the similarities that are shared across cultures, but in Japan, I became aware of history, feeling the differences arising from the influence of powerful cultural and historical forces. I suddenly felt marginal. I began to appreciate dimly what it might mean to be part of a powerless cultural and racial minority, beset by anxieties of cultural inferiority. Difference was painful.

The following three years in Japan, despite times of painful self-examination, were extraordinarily exciting. The self-discovery and awareness of Japanese culture begun in front of the Higashi HonGangji temple triggered an intense period of culture learning. Other changes stimulated this learning. In the second year in Japan, I lived with the Matsunagas, a Japanese family. I remain close to this family, returning “home” as often as I can. The process of learning Japanese, living with the Matsunagas and associating with Japan for twenty years since, has allowed me to see my own background in perspective and recognize that what my own culture presents as the “natural” order of social and
cultural life is only a “naturalized” alternative. The early experience in Japan in particular is a resource that I return to often in continuing my own culture learning. Though my life now conspires against this memory, I have not entirely forgotten what it is like to feel your identity slip away and to be marginalized. How has this experience influenced me as a researcher? I have used my own experience of culture learning, both consciously and unconsciously, in my interpretation of the data in this study. I can identify some of these influences. First, I experienced culture learning as an emotionally charged activity; it had moments of extraordinary exhilaration as well as moments of deep pain and anger. I also recognize that I cannot articulate all of the practices that I learned in order to live successfully in Japanese culture. Much of my “knowledge” emerges only in interaction as part of a “Japanese” persona. I have access to it only when interacting with Japanese, either in Japanese or, paradoxically, in English. Many people who speak more than one language will recognize this phenomenon. However, I think that too much can be made of the link between language and culture. Clearly, learning language and learning culture are profoundly interrelated. But this is not the whole story; in my experience, the two often pull apart.

I also learned that not everyone gets equal access to the experience of another culture. Despite some marginalization in Japan, I was very fortunate in being a young white male. If I had been significantly older, or ethnically different, or female, I would not have moved as freely in Japanese society as I did. Culture learning is a social as well as emotional process. My culture learning is the product of hours of conversation with Japanese nationals and expatriates from many countries. I doubt that I have a single insight
into Japanese culture which is uniquely mine. Access to talk is vitally important to culture learning. Closely related to this position is my recognition of the potential of culture learning for political transformation. In both the Philippines and Japan, my political consciousness underwent significant transformation. A commitment to social justice arose from my experience living and travelling in Asia. My interest in culture learning as emancipatory learning arises from having seen others experience a similar political transformation from the experience of living overseas.

A final influence of my life experience arises from the fact that my second language and second culture (Japanese) are dramatically different in many ways from my own. Because of this, I may over-emphasise the discovery of difference in culture learning. Feeling that people are profoundly and舒适ably similar while having at the same time substantial differences has conditioned the way I approach culture learning. The weighing of similarity and difference and the testing for closeness and distance from inside the "inter" in intercultural space is the axis of culture learning. The question is never where am I, but rather who I am? Is the other like me or not? We need to find some basis of contact, some shared humanity, or we live in a wilderness. And this brings us back to Shigeru, and to a poem by Margaret Atwood.

"First Arrivals", a poem from Atwood's (1970) Poems from the Journals of Susanna Moody, describes with striking images the disorientation that all of us, like Shigeru, feel while first in a strange place, and how imperative it is for all of us to make contact with our fellow beings. Atwood has Susanna Moody, an early immigrant to
Canada speak to this need in us. After describing how coming to Canada was entering “a large darkness”, she continues:

It was our own ignorance we entered.

I have not come out yet.

My brain gropes nervous tentacles in the night, sends out fears hairy as bears, demands lamps; or waiting for my shadowy husband, hears malice in trees’ whispers.

I need wolf’s eyes to see the truth.

I refuse to look in a mirror.

Whether the wilderness is real or not depends on who lives there.

Despite cultural differences, people do reach out as Canadians did for Shigeru. In most intercultural contact, people of good will do move across barriers towards each other. However, we need to remember that this is the bright side of the story, the result of privileged circumstances. The dark side of the story as we can witness in civil war and inter-ethnic conflict is much darker than most of us can imagine.

Research Purpose

The purpose of this research is to contribute to the development of a theory of culture learning. It does so by investigating the culture learning experience of two groups
of young people, Japanese and Canadians, studying in each other’s countries. It seeks to
develop theory through an analysis of journals that record the students’ daily experience
overseas. It explores Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning as a basis for doing so.
This exploration is twofold. First, the study addresses questions such as: How do the four
forms of learning that Mezirow (1991) identified function in culture learning? What
meaning schemes and meaning perspectives are associated with the interpretations each
group made of their experiences in the other culture. Second, the study addresses
questions such as: How do the three forms of reflection Mezirow (1991) identified
function in culture learning? How does reflection lead to the change and transformation of
meaning schemes and meaning perspectives. What strategies and forms of logic are
associated with the forms of reflection? A secondary, related, purpose is to evaluate the
potential of overseas exchange programs, especially those where students live with local
families, as environments for culture learning.

**Significance of the study**

This study offers both theoretical and practical contributions. *Theoretically,* it
makes three distinct contributions. First, it demonstrates how Mezirow’s theory may be
applied in a new context: intercultural learning. My study outlines a theory of culture
learning that emerges in the analysis of the students’ journal entries using Mezirow’s
theory as the conceptual framework. This analysis recasts Mezirow’s theory to explain the
dynamics of culture learning by developing typologies within Mezirow’s forms of learning
and reflection that open up the process of culture learning for examination. In particular, it
elaborates on the role of learning through the transformation of meaning schemes in culture learning. In so doing, the study clarifies the concept of resistance to transformation as well as the concept of confirmation of meaning schemes in culture learning. The study concludes, however, that transformative learning theory alone, important as it is, provides an insufficient basis for a fully developed theory of culture learning. Its principal weakness is its inadequacy in accounting for the links between learning language and learning culture.

Second, this dissertation contributes to the refinement of Mezirow's theory, elaborating some of its undeveloped but important aspects. Specifically, it elaborates the three least developed of his four forms of learning: learning through meaning schemes, learning new meaning schemes, and learning through the transformation of meaning schemes. It also clarifies the two most opaque of the three forms of reflection: content and process reflection. This study, through identifying actual cases and applications, makes a significant contribution to clarifying these forms of learning and reflection.

The study's third area of theoretical contribution is to bring work from anthropology and cultural studies to the efforts to develop a theory of culture learning. The study explores the implications of the critiques of the concept of culture and contemporary ethnography in the work of anthropologists like Renato Resaldo (1988) and James Clifford (1986) for a theory of culture learning. Critical theory, in particular, the concept of emancipatory learning, is also brought to bear in developing a theory of culture learning.
Finally, the study provides a basis to critique mainstream work in intercultural communications. It critically examines the assumptions supporting the conceptual and theoretical work of Hanvey (1976), Adler (1976), Kim (1988) and others. This study has practical significance as well. By providing an empirical basis for teachers to understand the educational potential of culture learning, particularly in the exchange context, this study introduces new criteria for a philosophy of intercultural pedagogy. It asks teachers to recognize the potential for critical awareness and emancipatory learning as the ultimate goals of culture learning. It also offers these criteria as the measure for evaluating the effectiveness of methodologies to assist culture learning. More specifically, the study points out the importance of reflection in culture learners. It presents the culture learning journal itself as a technique to assist culture learning.

Definition of terms

The following terms are defined for purposes of clarity in this study:

*Culture*:

For the purpose of this study I use the term culture as Bambi Schieffelin (1990) conceptualizes it in her studies of language socialization. She summarizes it in five points:

1. Language and culture comprise bodies of knowledge, structures of understanding, conceptions of the world and collective representations that are extrinsic to any individual.

2. These contain more information than any individual could know or learn.
3. There is variation among individual members in terms of their knowledge. This variation is crucial to the social dynamic between individuals, but it is also socially structured, and as such is extrinsic to individuals.

4. It is important to distinguish between the symbolically constructed contexts in which individuals live and the knowledge, attitudes, interpretations and understandings they must have to operate appropriately in their place within their culture. These are not the same thing. Thus,

5. One does not "acquire culture"; one acquires a set of practices that enable one to live in a culture.

(Schieffelin, 1990, p.15)

**Culture learning:**

Several different definitions exist but the most useful and relevant one for this study is: “the way we structure our knowledge of the world and in particular of other cultures” (Byram, 1989, p. 5). I have used culture learning throughout this dissertation instead of cross-cultural or inter-cultural learning since culture learning has become the standard term for this phenomenon.

**Host culture:**

The culture into which the students went to study. I sometimes refer to this as the target culture.

**Host family:**

The family that students were billeted with during their stay.

**Intercultural:**

Interaction between people of two or more cultures. Sometimes cross-cultural is used to identify situations where only two cultures are represented. Since this
rarely happens and since difference within cultures can be as great as that between cultures, I prefer to use intercultural communication to describe most situations of contact across cultures.

**Intercultural transformation:**

The: “gradual change that takes place in the internal conditions of individuals as they participate in extensive intercultural communications activities” (Kim, 1988, p. 299)

**Meaning structures:**

These are made of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives. Personal and social ideologies, they select, interpret and give coherence to our experience.

**Meaning perspectives:**

Meaning perspectives refer to “the structure of assumptions within which one’s past experience assimilates and transforms new experience” (Mezirow, 1991, p. 42). These are large scale habitual expectations and orienting frames of reference.

**Meaning schemes:**

Meaning schemes, smaller scale structures, are “made up of specific knowledge, beliefs, value judgments, and feelings that constitute interpretations of experience...” (p. 6).

**Perspective Transformation:**

The process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand and feel about the world; changing these structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more
inclusive, discriminating, and integrative perspective; and finally, making choices
or otherwise acting upon this new understanding.

(Mezirow, 1991, p. 167)

*Sojourner:*

People, usually students and business people rather than tourists, who are
temporarily resident in a different culture.

*Source culture:*

The culture into which one is born and which provides the framework within
which he or she views another culture. This is also referred to as the home culture.

*Transformative learning theory:*

Jack Mezirow's (1991) adult learning theory that offers an explanation of how
people make meaning from experience, through changes in meaning schemes and
perspectives.

Outline of the dissertation

Chapter two of the dissertation presents the literature relevant to this study. It has
two parts. The first critiques work in three fields: (1) intercultural communication theory,
(2) intercultural communication competence and (3) intercultural transformation. The
second reviews a small number of empirical studies of culture learning. The literature in
the first part forms the background to this study. The studies in the second are the
foreground. This study is then positioned in relation to the other empirical studies of
culture learning that have been reviewed.
Chapter three presents the conceptual framework for the study. Jack Mezirow's (1991) work on a theory of transformational learning and its critics are also discussed. In addition, the work of Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schieffelin (1984, 1990) on language socialization is presented as part of the study's conceptual framework. Finally, the work of Stephen Kemmis (1985) on critical reflection is also introduced as part of the framework.

Chapter four outlines the methodology used in the study. It details the design of the study and describes the data collection and data analysis protocols. It provides an overview of the study and also establishes the unique characteristics of journals as a means to gather data. It concludes with a discussion of the degree of collaboration between the researcher and the participants in general and describes the collaboration that was part of this study in particular.

Chapter five presents the findings. This is divided into two sections: the first analyzes the journal entries in terms of Mezirow's forms of learning and the second analyzes the journal entries in terms of the forms of reflection.

Chapter six summarizes the study and the conclusions. It then discusses specific issues that arise from the findings related to the function of forms of learning and forms of reflection in culture learning. It also discusses a number of issues related to culture learning in general. It concludes with an outline of a theory of culture learning.

Chapter seven presents the implications of the study for practice and goes beyond this to relate my own philosophy of intercultural pedagogy. It does so in the context of examining how the study contributes to our understanding of the pedagogical significance of culture learning. It proposes the development of a critical cultural awareness as the
goal of culture learning in all programs generally, and in exchange programs specifically. Finally, the chapter clarifies the potential for emancipatory learning in placing students with host-families during exchanges.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This review focuses on literature in four areas:

1. intercultural communication theory,
2. intercultural communication competence,
3. intercultural transformation,
4. empirical studies related to culture learning.

The purpose of this review is twofold: first, to survey and critique work in intercultural communication related to the first three areas above and second, to survey the small number of empirical studies of culture learning and to position my study in relation to these. These other empirical studies provide the foreground to my study. The literature from the three areas of intercultural communications above forms the background. Scholarship from inside both intercultural communication itself and from outside in the disciplines of adult education, anthropology, cultural studies, educational sociology and language education provide a perspective from which to critique mainstream research in intercultural communication.

Intercultural communication theory

Intercultural Communication as a distinct field of study has a short history. William B. Gudykunst’s (1983) volume on theory was the first significant effort to develop theory in this new field (Ellingsworth, 1983 p. 261). In the decade since, several theories have emerged to explain the nature of intercultural communications. Among these theories, three traditions exist: positivist, (Gudykunst 1988; Gudykunst & Kim, 1988; Sarbaugh 1988), humanist (the terms qualitative, constructivist or interpretivist are

My intention here is twofold. First, I will review the critique of the positivist theories of William B. Gudykunst (1988) and Larry Sarbaugh (1988) offered by humanist theorists James Applegate and Howard Sypher (1983, 1988), and Milt Thomas and Mary Jane Collier (1983, 1988, 1989). Second, I will critique the concept of culture and how it is operationalized in positivist theories. My argument builds on Collier’s (1988, 1989), critique of the conceptualization of culture in positivist theory. This critique is implicit in her theory of emergent identity in intercultural contact (1988) and is raised explicitly in her taking issue with the “lack of clarity and sometimes inappropriateness with which culture and cultural/intercultural communication are defined” (1989, p. 287). Current conceptualizations of culture offered by scholars in anthropology, language teaching and cultural studies provide a perspective from which to develop this critique.

Sarbaugh’s (1988) theory of interculturalness offers a taxonomy of interculturalness. By arguing that intercultural communication is a subset of interpersonal communication, he links it with other forms of communication. In doing so, he identifies a core set of variables that all forms of communication share: “the characteristics of the participants, the relationships among them, their encoding and decoding behaviours, the channels by which they relay symbols to each other, the social and physical contexts within which they operate, and their intentions in the communicative act” (Sarbaugh, 1988 p.5).
Sarbaugh theorizes how the interplay of these variables determines the levels of interculturalness in a given communication situation.

The prime “discriminator” for the level of interculturalness is the degree of heterogeneity in any encounter, inter-cultural or intra-cultural. Sarbaugh asserts that “the homogeneity-heterogeneity distinction may lead to classifying communications across generations within the same village or town as highly intercultural communication” (p.7). Sarbaugh combines seven key variables (number of people, channel type, perceived relationship, perceived intent, verbal or non-verbal code, normative beliefs, and world view) that create homogeneity-heterogeneity into four sets of variables: (1) perceived relationship and intent of participants, (2) code system, (3) level of knowing and accepting normative constraints and, (4) world view. Assuming dyads using direct channels, these four sets of variables are theorized to predict 36 types of situations. These situations may be rank-ordered to establish seven levels of interculturalness. In the most homogenous relationship, the lowest level of interculturalness, participants perceive themselves as equals engaged in a cooperative activity, have a common code system, know and accept the others’ normative patterns of belief and share a world view. As each of these variables shifts towards more heterogeneity, five intermediate levels of homogeneity/heterogeneity and finally a level of extreme heterogeneity are established.

A second positivist theory, Gudykunst’s (1988) uncertainty/anxiety reduction theory of intergroup communication, grows out of Charles Berger’s (1975) uncertainty theory. Berger developed a “theory of relationships based on a single covering law: that the goal of reducing uncertainty about one another governs the process by which persons
form relationships" (cited in Gudykunst, 1983, p. 94). This goal involves “the creation of proactive predictions and retroactive explanations about our own and others’ behaviour, beliefs and attitudes” (Gudykunst et al., 1988, p. 22). Gudykunst identifies understanding as the goal of reducing uncertainty. By understanding he means “the ability to make accurate descriptions, predictions and or explanations” (p. 23). Gudykunst applies uncertainty reduction theory to intercultural communication. Relating intergroup to intercultural communication, he identifies six shared assumptions. Three are - at least one person in an intergroup encounter is a stranger, the initial encounters with a new in-group will be experienced as a series of crises, and uncertainty and anxiety are independent dimensions of intergroup communication (Gudykunst & Kim, 1988). His theory predicts communication conditions ranging from low uncertainty/anxiety to high uncertainty/anxiety based on the interplay of these variables: “ethnolinguistic identity, second language ability, expectations, group similarity, shared networks, interpersonal salience, self-monitoring, cognitive complexity, and tolerance for ambiguity” and culture (Gudykunst & Kim, 1988 p. 128). The interactions of these primary variables create or reduce uncertainty/anxiety and thus explain and predict two outcomes of intergroup communication: intergroup adaptation and intergroup communication effectiveness. In low uncertainty/anxiety situations, the parties in contact have a weak sense of identity with their own ethnolinguistic group, have positive expectations of the other group, share similarities, share networks, have an intimate relationship with each other, are fluent in the relevant second language, are good self-monitors, have a high degree of cognitive complexity, and tolerate ambiguity. These conditions promote intergroup adaptation and
effectiveness. As conditions deteriorate, for example, if the people interacting have a strong sense of group identity, intergroup adaptation and effectiveness are retarded.

Humanist theories of intercultural communication challenge the central philosophical/methodological tenets of Gudykunst’s (1988) and Sarbaugh’s (1988) theory building. James Applegate and Howard Sypher (1983) and Mary Jane Collier and Milt Thomas (1988, 1990), all humanist theorists, propose less rigid theoretical models which focus on apprehending the nature of the communication phenomenon as it emerges. Applegate and Sypher (1983) argue for a constructivist approach to theory, which they describe as interpretative in nature. Such theory, they assert, “should embody a philosophical anthropology that treats people as active interpreters of their social environment: one that rejects determinism and recognizes the falsity of the nature/nurture dichotomy” (in Gudykunst & Kim eds., 1988 p.42). They eschew the practice of establishing conceptual categories to guide observation first, proposing instead interpretive theories which provide dense and detailed accounts of everyday interactions. Assuming that people are active interpreters of experience, the goal of such research is to focus on the participants’ interpretations of situations. These theories do not offer a set of axioms to explain the communication dynamic; rather, they seek explanations of how mental constructs and strategies generate communication, and how goal-related beliefs influence communication.

Mary Jane Collier’s and Milt Thomas’s (1988, 1990) work in theorizing cultural identity is based on an interpretive model of emergent forms of communication rather than explaining communication events from fixed variables. They regard intercultural
communication as a distinct form of interpersonal communication; intercultural and interpersonal occupy the opposite ends of a communication continuum. However, they argue that this continuum lies within individuals themselves, and communication between individuals who are culturally different may move along this continuum. They assert that there is no one fixed point where contact rests; communication can, at different points in the contact, become more or less intercultural or more or less interpersonal.

The nature of cultural identity accounts for this change. Indeed, Thomas and Collier believe the phenomenon of culture, intercultural communication and communication competence all revolve around the nucleus of cultural identity, defined as "identification with and perceived acceptance into a group that has shared systems of symbols and meanings as well as norms/rules for conduct" (in Gudykunst & Kim eds., 1988, p. 113). Cultural identity is fluid; it varies in scope - how many people share it - salience - relative importance of that identity vis-a-vis others in the situation, and intensity - the strength with which it is asserted. Such fluidity plays an essential role in determining the nature of intercultural communication. Collier and Thomas postulate that people can choose to assert cultural identities of varying "strength." For them, an understanding of cultural identity is central to describing and explaining intercultural communication. Predicting behaviour solely on the basis of someone's culture at birth as a variable misses the point - identity is flexible. Collier and Thomas summarize their theoretical position: "when intercultural communication is conceptualized according to operative cultural identities, then we can begin to distinguish intercultural from non-intercultural communication, either by explicit references to differing cultural identities or by
Collier (1989) takes issue with positivist theories. She is critical of the way they operationalize culture in their research. According to Collier, Gudykunst (1988) distinguishes cultures “from one another on the basis of assumptions and world view as well as goals and objectives and norms and rules” (p. 292). Collier is not explicitly critical of this definition of culture; rather she objects to culture being operationalized as “national culture.” Instead, Collier argues for a conceptualization based “upon identities, intersubjectively defined by similarities in symbols and norms, which are posited to change during the course of a conversation” (p. 295). Collier proposes a notion of culture that is embedded in individual identity and “adopted, managed and negotiated” during intercultural encounters. Culture may be seen as shared background, but it must also be seen as emergent “patterned conduct around a particular thematic identity” (p. 295).

European scholars of intercultural communications also take issue with the definitions of culture used in the field. In a recent literature review, Bolten (1993) found differing and “factually incompatible” definitions: “a browse through a random sample of publications from 1990 illustrates this: culture is linked in one case to “nation” (Mead, 1990) in another to “society” (Knapp & Knapp-Potthoof, 1990), and in a third to “social unit” (Keichel, 1990). Bolten points out that the more differentiated definitions of culture become, the more they blur the dividing line between inter-cultural and intra-cultural communication, a matter of importance to German scholars in a newly united Germany. Bolten sees the linking of the concept of culture with the notion of way of life of an explicitly defined group as problematic, since as group size grows, the degree of
homogeneity falls. He observes that “the degree of homogeneity of the nation state is relatively low” (p. 341). Bolten cautions that “real communication does not take place between groups, but is always interpersonal contact between individuals, where the ways of life and social contexts of the communicating individuals can clearly (to a greater or lesser extent) be different (p. 341). For this reason, he argues for rejection of the contrastive approach to intercultural communication training in favour of an interactive approach that takes account of individual differences, while also recognizing degrees of heterogeneity within cultures.

The difficulty scholars in intercultural communications face in “deproblematising” their concept of culture is compounded by trends in anthropology, their historical source for understanding culture. For some time now, anthropologists have been problematising the concept of culture, worrying about, among other things, “the neo-colonial, racist and nationalist overtones” of the term (Street, 1993). Much influential contemporary thinking in anthropology involves “rejection of the notion of a fixed inheritance of shared meaning” and poses the question of “what culture is” instead of “what culture does” (p. 23). Street (1993) prefers to conceive of culture as a verb. He argues that the nominalization of culture as a thing, as in definitions of culture that use metaphors of a grammar to link behaviour and the concept of culture to national cultures, obscures culture’s “essentially changing character and process nature” (p. 27). Street does not argue for the rejection of the idea of patterns in social life; he does, however, point out how confining this idea is as the sole focus in the investigation of culture. He praises the work of Cowan (1990) who views culture as a process, noting that “applying these ideas to gender practices in
contemporary Greece, she believes, enables her to maintain the anthropological advantage of seeing the patterns and constraints of social life at the same time as recognizing - in a post-modern sense - their multi-vocal and contradictory character and giving voice to local perceptions and differences” (p. 37).

Renato Rosaldo (1988) too views culture as a process that is characterized as much by multi-vocality and contradiction as by consistency. He contrasts contemporary views of culture with more “classical” views of culture as national culture. This latter view is most often used in the field of intercultural communication (Kramsch, 1993b). Rosaldo identifies this classic conception as deriving from Durkheim’s views that culture is like a grammar. In this view, cultural patterns are structures that stand on their own, independent from individuals. The patterns of a culture are related to the “grammar” of the culture, just as our speech is related to grammatical rules. Against this background, Rosaldo argues for a different view:

In contrast with the classic view, which posits culture as a self-contained whole made up of coherent patterns, culture can arguably be conceived as a more porous array of intersections where distinct processes criss-cross from within and beyond boundaries. Such heterogenous processes often derive from differences of age, gender, class, race and sexual orientation. (Rosaldo, p. 20)

Rosaldo, like Street, does not reject the idea of unique cultural patterns. However, he asserts that to emphasize such patterns is to deemphasize the powerful forces of change, inconsistency, conflict and contradiction at work in cultures, a serious oversight. These important forces arise at the borderlands or “the boundaries of officially recognized
cultural units, but also at less formal intersections, such as those of gender, age, status and distinctive life experiences’ (p. 29).

Central to Rosaldo’s view of culture, then, is the notion of ambiguity. He argues that social life is not based on clear-cut, “uniformly shared programs for behaviour,” where “human beings simply follow the rules, rather than waiting to see what time will tell” (p. 91). We all live our lives with a certain degree of doubt. Expectations and the meanings of some experiences are always ambiguous, uncertain or unknown. People improvise, learn from doing, and make things up as they go along. There is no clear, unambiguous cultural grammar. Collier’s idea that cultural identity is fluid and emergent in situations is consistent with Rosaldo’s ideas here.

In the field of language teaching, the work of Claire Kramsch (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) carries forward the critique of the conception and operationalization of culture within intercultural communication research. Kramsch (1993c) presents some interesting empirical evidence of the high degree of heterogeneity that exists within national cultures. Recent work (1992) in Europe brought together 12 teachers: two teachers of German and two teachers of French from the US, two teachers of German and two teachers of English from France, two teachers of French and two teachers of English from Germany in a cross-cultural teacher training seminar; Kramsch (1993c) had these teachers critique the choices made by their foreign counterparts of material to teach “American” or “French” or “German” culture abroad. She reports that “not one national group was able to achieve a consensus on what “American” or “French” or “German” culture should be taught abroad (p. 355). Teachers subsequently realized the real problems with notions of
"representativeness, prototypicality and individual voice," particularly in shaping lexical equivalents (p. 356).

Kramsch (1993b) carries her critique of the notion of "national culture" or "national identity" further. She argues that, both in Europe and the United States, the term culture as used in intercultural and cross-cultural communication "generally refers to the mainstream cultural characteristics of nation states" (p. 6). Kramsch asserts that this approach locks people into binary categories, such as us and them. She supports the view of advocates of critical language pedagogy Fairclough et al. (1990) who argues that the binarism of Us vs. Them, Insider vs. Outsider that essentializes people in one or the other of their many cultural dimensions (e.g. the "American" or the "woman" or the "Black") must be resisted. (This is a matter of gross stereotype and as such much different than that found in the distinction between insider and outsider that structures human relations in Japanese society, for example.) Kramsch proposes an alternative to binarism in focusing on what Homi Bhaba calls the "social process of enunciation" (1992, p. 57, cited in Kramsch 1993b p. 10). In breaking out of binarism, Kramsch draws on Bhaba's idea that the process in cross-cultural encounters can both reveal existing codes and construct something different - a hybrid of these codes. Bhaba uses the term "third space" to describe the intercultural space; this space is one "that does not simply revise or invert the dualities but revalues the ideological bases of division or difference (1992, p. 57 cited in Kramsch, 1993b, p. 10). Bhaba's third space must be understood as a shift in perspective of viewing culture from the "end" to seeing it from the "edge," what Rosaldo calls the "boundaries." Culture is a plurality of practices that are different, but that exist in the same
space and time. The cross-cultural encounter offers a space for people to question the grounds of cross-cultural conflict and "incommensurability of values", and it raises the prospects of a "possible reinscription and relocation of values emerging out of cultural difference" (Bhaba, 1992, p. 57, cited in Kramsch 1993b. p. 10). This concept of a third space being negotiated in cross-cultural encounters is a very different conceptualization of the outcome of intergroup contact than that of increased intergroup adaptation and effectiveness. It also suggests that the idea of levels of interculturalness as highly predictable rather than negotiable is seriously flawed.

**Intercultural communication competence**

Intercultural communication competence is a complex concept. By way of introduction, I will define it as an individual's ability to communicate effectively in an intercultural setting. The related literature is extensive. In a recent review of this literature, Taylor (1993) points out that over the last twenty years, intercultural competence has been discussed under many different labels: cross-cultural adjustment, cross-cultural awareness, cross-cultural effectiveness, multiculturalism, intercultural effectiveness, cultural competence, and most recently intercultural communication competence (Benson, 1978; Dinges, 1983; Hannigan, 1990; Ruben & Kealey, 1979; Hammer, 1987; Kim, 1991; Ruben, 1989; Spitzberg, 1989). The majority of this research has responded to the practical difficulties that business, military and non-government organization personnel faced in overseas assignments. Indeed, failure rates in these assignments are very high with "more than one-third of all Americans who take up residence in foreign countries
return[ing] prematurely because they are unable to adapt to day-to-day life” (Storti, 1990, p. xiii). Research efforts into the overseas experience sought “to prevent failure overseas, to predict success, to develop personnel selection strategies and to design sojourner training and preparation methodologies” (Ruben, 1989, p. 230). No doubt trainers of espionage agents have also had a deep interest in this matter.

Intercultural communications scholars have tried to synthesize this literature in various ways. I will summarize briefly three recent efforts: Ruben (1989), Spitzberg (1989), and Kim (1991). I conclude this discussion with Jerzy Neustupny’s (1990) definition of interactive competence as a model of special interest to language teachers.

Ruben (1989) concluded that initial studies of cross-cultural competence seeking to identify variables in the “competent” encounter were psychological, “focusing on characteristics of the prospective sojourner which were thought might predispose the individual to success or failure” (p. 230). Literature reviews from Benson (1978) to Taylor (1993) share this conclusion that the research has primarily yielded lists of personal skills, abilities or attitudes. Interestingly, these research efforts have had parallels in second language studies identifying the traits of the “good” language learner (Rubin, 1975, Stern, 1975). Such qualities as tolerance and empathy, lack of inhibition, capacity for self-monitoring and willingness to practice associated with the “good language learner” had parallels in the effective cross-cultural communicator. Pusch (1981) identified personality traits, associated with interculturally competent individuals:

An effective cross-cultural communicator is often described as a person who has rather vague boundaries of self, who tolerates ambiguity well, and who is adaptable to new stimuli, social conventions and behavioral demands. The
person is skilful at observing and interpreting the cultural features of
behaviour and displaying respect for other cultures and their people. Finally,
this person is able to accept his or her failures, understand his or her cultural
roots and their effect on personal behaviour. (Pusch, 1989, p. 11)

Ruben’s (1989) synthesis of this research in intercultural communication
competence identifies three distinct facets; there is competence to build and maintain
relationships; competence to transfer information across cultural boundaries without
distortion and competence to get people to cooperate with you. He argues that a
complete definition of competence should incorporate all three facets.

Brian Spitzberg’s (1989) review and synthesis distinguishes two foci of research.
First, approaches that identify abilities which make people competent are distinguished
from those that speculate on how interactants judge each other’s competence. Second,
studies focusing on generalizable “structures and dimensions of relational life” are
distinguished from those that account for “moment to moment interactive behaviour in
specific episodes of communication” (p. 241). Spitzberg finally concludes that the
literature is fragmented and “suffer[s] from a lack of theoretical integration and serious
problems in the measurement development and validation” (p. 241).

Spitzberg also observes that much of the literature can be reduced to lists of skills,
abilities and attitudes. Spitzberg (1991) lists over 50 “empirically derived factors of
intercultural competence,” ranging from ability to adjust to different cultures to verbal
behaviours (Spitzberg, 1991 p. 355) In response to this fragmentation, Spitzberg proposes
“an integrative model of intercultural competence” (1991, p. 354). In his own attempt to
theorize intercultural competence, he organizes these skills, abilities and attitudes into
hierarchies as they might emerge in dynamic relationships. His model proposes three levels of analysis: the individual system, the episodic system and the relational system.

Young Yun Kim (1991) also observes that the common goal of research in intercultural competence has been the identification of variables that might predict effective intercultural interaction. However, she points out that this research has problems of conceptual validity. She is particularly critical of research into competence done in specific cultural contexts; she believes these studies confuse culture specific competence with a more general intercultural competence. She argues that these concepts are separate and distinct; one is context specific and the other more general. The general competency “must be anchored within a person as his or her capacity to manage the varied contexts of the intercultural encounter regardless of the specific cultures involved” (Kim, 1991, p. 265, cited in Taylor, 1993, p. 31). Kim concludes her review by proposing a model of competence that takes into account someone’s capacity to manage three challenges in the intercultural encounter: lack of familiar messages, intergroup identities and stress. This capacity is called “adaptability”, a process where the person changes “some of the old cultural ways, to learn and accommodate some of the new cultural ways” (Kim, 1991, p. 268 in Taylor, 1993, p. 31).

Neustupny’s (1990) conceptualization of interactive competence includes two components: communicative competence and socioeconomic competence. The former includes sociolinguistic competence and linguistic competence. Socioeconomic competence is built around Fishman’s (1972) identification of domains: daily life, family, friendship, education, work, public life, services, and entertainment and culture domains.
Competence is primarily based on the knowledge “of socioeconomic components of behaviour within a situation” (p. 8) that will identify the rules for behaviour and the attitudes common in those situations.

I will begin this critique by reviewing the problems with the concept of intercultural competence that Ruben (1989) has identified. He raises a series of important questions that focus on the weaknesses of research related to the concept. Like Kim, he sees problems with conceptual clarity and validity. Is the concept of competence different from style, adjustment, and adaptation? Is competence essentially a matter of attitude, knowledge or behaviour? Equally important are questions of where competence is located; is it in the eye of the receiver or in the skill of the sender of messages? Or is there a third alternative: “a didactic, systematic or culture-based conceptualization, where competence is defined by a set of relational, social or cultural rules” (p. 235)? He raises problems with the measurement of competence, asking: if you are competent in one relationship or culture are you equally so in another? Finally, Ruben asserts that establishing the relationship between interpersonal communication competence and cross-cultural competence is an unresolved problem.

The criticism raised in relation to intercultural communication theory’s operationalization of the concept of culture as “national culture” is one equally applicable here, particularly since in some definitions, notably those of Y. Y. Kim’s (1991) and J.V. Neustupny (1990), the culture-specific component of competence is central. Other conceptions of intercultural competence (Dinges and Lieberman, 1989; Imahori and Lanigan 1990; Martin and Hammer, 1989) also include culture specific knowledge as part
of competence. Indeed, Collier (1989), in taking issue with the conception of culture and its operationalization in research, was concerned with both work in intercultural communication and in intercultural communication competence. This criticism is equally valid in relation to the latter literature.

I will carry the critique of intercultural communication competence further by linking it to the concept of communicative competence, as linguists understand it. In doing so, I can use elements of the critique of communicative competence to clarify the weaknesses inherent in the mainstream conception of intercultural competence.

Communicative competence (Canale & Swain, 1970; Hymes, 1972) is parallel to intercultural communicative competence in an essential feature. The latter concept also reflects the dominant hegemony, presenting intercultural competence in ways consistent with western, liberal democratic views of human nature and capacity. Mainstream conceptions of intercultural competence and communicative competence share these assumptions:

1. Competence is an autonomous personal power, a product of individual skill, limited only by the quality of that skill;

2. All participants in conversation or intercultural encounters are equal socially and politically, and all linguistic and cultural exchange occurs cooperatively;

3. Sociocultural and sociosemantic rules and cultural rules exist on their own terms; they have no political or ideological constitution;

4. The notions of discourse and culture are largely apolitical; they reflect nothing more substantial than rhetorical rules or historical traditions;
5. Grammatical and sociocultural rules are parallel phenomenon, suggesting that language and society are too;

6. In terms of language acquisition and culture learning, this dualism also exists: an independent subject acquires language or intercultural competence with its own resources.

Challenges to these assumptions regarding communicative competence are a useful source of critique for the conception of intercultural communication competence. The works of Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Norman Fairclough (1990), and Elinor Ochs (1990) challenge the assumptions above. Each will be examined in turn.

Bourdieu’s (1977) analysis of the relationship between language and society has important implications for revising the notion of cultural competence. His argument necessitates a replacement of traditional concepts of linguistics: first, in the place of grammaticalness, acceptability; second, in the place of relations of communications, relations of symbolic power. It further necessitates replacing the notion of the meaning of speech with the question of the value and power of speech. Finally, his analysis replaces the concept of linguistic competence with the notion of symbolic capital, an expression of the individual’s position in the social structure. These changes form the basis of a very different view of communicative competence, one with implications for the parallel conception of intercultural competence.

Replacing the concept of grammaticalness with acceptability, Bourdieu presents competence as situational competence. Restricting competence to situational frames is an important change in viewpoint. Concepts of intercultural competence are rarely situationally based, perhaps with the exception of Neustupny’s (1990). Ruben’s (1989)
questions of transferability of competence from one situation to another recognize this problem. Bourdieu’s replacement of the notion of communications relations with the notion of relations of symbolic power is also important. Linguistic relations are seen as constrained since they “depend on the structure of the linguistic field which is in itself a particular expression of the power relations between groups” (p. 647). So too are intercultural relations constrained in any given context by the relations of production, or power, involved. If it were otherwise, we would have to separate language and culture in discourse. Bourdieu’s arguments give us cause to question the almost complete absence of discussion of power relations on either the acquisition or exercise of intercultural competence in the related literature.

Bourdieu’s work also challenges the assumption that cultural knowledge is necessarily the determining factor in the quality of intercultural exchanges. Bourdieu argues that in linguistic exchanges the structure of the symbolic power relation is not determined by the specific linguistic competencies involved. By drawing a parallel between cultural knowledge and grammar knowledge, we might also conclude that the cultural competencies of participants don’t necessarily determine effectiveness in intercultural exchanges. Bourdieu critiques the privileging of grammaticality in the notion of communicative competence: “the belief that one has to be a “master of language” in order to dominate linguistically is the illusion of a grammarian still dominated by the dominant definition of language” (p. 652). Just as power in linguistic exchanges is not the outcome of contests between degrees of mastery of language, we may also recognize that degrees of mastery of culturally specific knowledge do not necessarily determine relative
power. Consider that a maintenance worker acting as a chief executive officer has a very
different reception than the reverse situation - where the CEO would be complimented on
having the common touch. In truth, the utterance or behaviour does not speak - the whole
social person speaks. As Bourdieu himself summarizes:

The whole truth of communicative relation is never fully present in the
discourse nor even in the communicative relation itself; .....but also outside it, in the social conditions of the production and reproductions of the
producers and receivers and of their relationship. (p.653)

Norman Fairclough’s (1989) work on language and power offers an analysis of
language and society that complements Bourdieu. He sees language as a discourse that
embodies in itself the social conditions of its own production. And, like Bourdieu, he
identifies language as praxis, ascribing to it significance in the production, maintenance
and change of the social relations of power. Fairclough, while not suggesting that power is
simply a matter of language, asserts that language does, nonetheless, figure largely. Power
as ideology is mediated through language, and this ideology is hidden in what he calls
“common sense.”

This notion of common sense provides the link to relate this discussion to
intercultural competence. Common sense is embedded in culture and being culturally
competent is partly a matter of understanding another concept of common sense. For
example, the type of traditional conventions in discourse that exist between doctors and
patients, which assume authority and hierarchy as natural or as common sense, illustrate
this interface with culture. Such assumptions, Fairclough claims, are ideological.

Ideologies in this way are linked to power, language and to culture. The failure to link
power and culture in the conceptions of intercultural competence is a serious oversight.

Fairclough’s and Bourdieu’s arguments undermine the mainstream view that the development of both communicative and intercultural competence is primarily dependent on individual skill. Their arguments suggest that competence is predominantly a social phenomenon, not an individual one. However, there are significant differences in the way they see power operating. Bourdieu ties power relations, or relations of symbolic capital, closely to positions in the social structure: social class. In contrast, Fairclough allows for more diversity in power struggles inside the relations of production; he does not reduce power relations to class relations. He admits there is also power in “relations between social groupings in institutions and between ethnic groupings, between young and old, which are not specific to institutions” (p.34). It is not necessary to adopt rigid or classic views of power in the social structure to move this criticism forward.

Elinor Ochs’ (1990) work on language socialization raises the question: are conceptions of competence that minimize second language knowledge problematic? Her theory of language socialization articulates a close relationship between language acquisition and culture. This view has significant implications for a theory of what it means to know both a language and a culture. Like Bourdieu’s and Fairclough’s work, it challenges the individual-social dualism that sees society and the individual as separable entities. Moreover, Och’s research challenges the dominant theories of language acquisition that insist that the development of grammar and cognitive schemata are essentially lodged in neurological and biological systems, (Urwin 1984, p.264). She identifies how these grammar and cognitive schemata are shaped and ordered significantly
through “two key mechanisms -the role of affect, and the interdependence of social perception and language learning” (p.xi).

Och’s research on these two “key” mechanisms explores the links between linguistic forms and given social situations. She is interested in discovering how meaning is embedded in cultural conceptions of context, or how “the process of acquiring language is embedded in the process of socialization of language” (p.xv). Och’s research demonstrates how sociocultural knowledge, linguistic knowledge and the process of socialization and language acquisition are interdependent. Linguistic knowledge is embedded in sociocultural knowledge and “understandings of the social organization of everyday life, cultural ideologies, moral values, beliefs and structures of knowledge and interpretation are to a large extent acquired through the medium of language” (p. 14). This has implications for understanding the development of intercultural competence. If language and culture are so intertwined, can a strong knowledge base be built without a high degree of linguistic fluency? That few conceptualizations of intercultural competence emphasize language acquisition, either first or second, is clearly problematic.

In summary, the work of scholars reviewed above challenges several of the central tenets of intercultural competence. First, this scholarship suggests that we need to question the operationalization of culture as national culture in models of competence. Second, it suggests care must be taken with the common assumption that competence can be autonomized, that is, developed equally by all persons simply on the basis of individual skills and abilities. Third, it suggests we must ask serious questions about the role of power in the acquisition and exercise of intercultural competence. In particular, we need
to clarify the military, government, and corporate origin of much research in competence: is the absence of serious discussion of issues of power in competence theoretical, political, accidental or something else? Fourth, the work of scholars reviewed here suggests that it is a false argument that superior cultural knowledge results in superior competence, particularly in regards to what Ruben calls the competence to transfer information. Finally, the critical work I introduced here suggests that concepts of cultural competence that minimize the role of both first and foreign language acquisition and knowledge are seriously flawed.

**Intercultural Transformation**

Intercultural transformation is the process that the stranger undergoes “mentally, physically, and behaviorally when he or she partakes in a significant intercultural experience” (Taylor, p. 32). Kim (1991) and Taylor (1993) identify two traditions in research on this process: the problem approach associated with the concept of culture shock (Oberg, 1960; Church, 1982; Furnham & Bochner, 1986) and the learning/growth approach (Adler, 1975, 1982; Kim, 1988, 1991, 1992; Kim & Ruben 1988; Mansel, 1981; Yoshizawa, 1987). The first characterizes the transition experience to another culture as problematic. The second approach characterizes it as an opportunity for learning and growth.

In this review I will look at literature in the second tradition since the assumptions found therein often provide the pedagogical and ideological basis for training programs in intercultural communication and are thus more relevant to this study. In concluding this
section, I will present ideas from current writing about intercultural pedagogy. This literature offers a different pedagogical and ideological bases for education and training than the literature of intercultural transformation. I will draw on the work of scholars in several areas: in language education, Mike Byram (1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1993), Claire Kramsch (1993a, b and c), and Hagen Kordes (1991); in educational sociology, Henry Giroux (1983, 1993); in intercultural communications (Bolten, 1993); and in adult education, Ed Taylor (1993) and Lynette Harper (1994).

The learning/growth tradition in the literature of intercultural transformation begins with Adler (1972). Adler (1972) turned the concept of culture shock (Oberg, 1960) on its head, viewing it not as an “illness” but as a “powerful learning tool in which the gains, in both experiential and cognitive learning, facilitate a high degree of self-understanding and personal growth” (Adler 1972, reprinted in Luce & Smith, 1987, p. 29). He went on to argue that culture shock and the notion of cross-cultural experience are “essentially the same phenomenon.” Adler argued that the result of this experience was a particular kind of learning that he called cross-cultural learning. Unsupported by any empirical research, Adler offered a broad definition of the cross-cultural learning experience as a “set of situations or circumstances involving intercultural communication in which the individual becomes aware of his own growth, change and learning” (p. 30).

Adler (1972) identified two distinct types of learning that combine in cross-cultural learning: cultural awareness and self-awareness. He saw momentous implications for this type of learning: the emergence of a new kind of personality. As result of cross-cultural learning, the learner constructs a personality that knows “how to interpret situations, how
to deal with problems and conflicts, how to trust other people, and how to simply enjoy
the diversity of people" (Adler, 1972 reprinted in Luce & Smith, 1987 p. 33). In his widely
quoted essay, Beyond Cultural Identity: Reflections upon Cultural and Multicultural Man
[sic] (1977), Adler elaborated on this personality, arguing that a new kind of identity emerges from cross-cultural learning. This is the first of many such speculations in the
literature. Adler called this new identity “a radical departure from the kinds of identities found in both traditional and mass societies”, allowing a person to be “neither totally a part of or apart from his culture; he lives, instead, on the boundary” (p.26). He described this personality as psychoculturally adaptive, living in a constant state of becoming something different and having “indefinite boundaries of self” (p. 30). Adler’s work was very influential. Metaphorically and poetically attractive (though the continuous use of the pronoun “he” and use of “man” is jarring today), his conception of a new kind of person emerging from intercultural contact soon appeared in the work of others.

Mansell (1981) and Yoshikawa (1987) too conceive of the intercultural experience as a learning/growth experience. They describe this experience as dramatically self-
transforming, “bringing perceptive visions of the world beyond its own boundaries”(passim). Yoshikawa (1987) argues that extensive intercultural communication and contact is analogous to religious enlightenment or scientific discovery, creating a “cognitive structure that enables a broadened and deepened understanding of human conditions and cultural differences and a view of things that is larger than any one cultural perspective” (Yoshikawa, 1987, passim, in Gudykunst and Kim, 1988, p. 314).
The most recent and most elaborated model of intercultural transformation is that of Young Yun Kim (1983, 1988, 1991, 1992). Kim has developed this model in the context of her integrative theory of intercultural adaptation (1988), the leading example of a systems theory of intercultural communication. This theory, initially developed with Brent Ruben, articulates the "theoretical relationship between intercultural encounters, culture shock experiences and adaptive transformation" (Ruben & Kim, 1988 p. 299). The transformative/adaptive process is the core of this adaptation (Taylor, 1993).

Like Adler (1975), Kim asserts that the stress of intercultural contact, or culture shock, is best understood as learning/growth experience capable of significantly transforming individuals. She refers to this transformation as the "process of change in an individual’s cognitive, affective and behavioral limits beyond the original culture" (1988, p. 306). Stress is the central force at work in the process of transformation in the intercultural encounter. Kim asserts that the "tension between stress and adaptation and the resultant internal transformation essentially characterises the life processes of humans" (Kim, 1988, p. 44). In the intercultural experience, stress has an even more significant presence. She quotes Holmes and Rahe’s (1967) observation that in the first year in a new culture “an individual may experience nearly one-third of the 43 most significant life changes” (p. 306). The cyclical process of stress-disequilibrium-adaptation is on-going throughout our life.

In her early work Kim (1988) theorized that cross-cultural adaptation experiences have three consequences: increased functional fitness, increased psychological health and increased intercultural identity. She later (1992) expands on the concept of an increased
intercultural identity. She argues that this identity is the outcome of the stress-disequilibrium-adaptation cycle, or "stress-adaptation-growth" dynamic as she renamed it. She argues that this intercultural identity is not a replacement for a previous identity, but an extension of it. People with such a new identity have "re-drawn the lines of their original cultural identity boundary to accommodate the new life patterns, combined with the original patterns" (Kim, 1992, p.3).

Kim (1992) identifies five distinguishing characteristics of such people: they do not noticeably or deliberately reject their first cultural identity; they are "less categorical, superficial, and ethnocentric in their perception of events;" they have an expanded self knowledge; they are resilient and can persist in the difficult work of intercultural growth; and finally, even when "not aware of the cultural customs of the other person", they are likely to "have the affective and behavioral flexibility to adapt to the situation and to creatively manage or avoid conflicts that could result from the inappropriate switching between cultures" (p. 19-20). She admits this list is tentative and needs further investigation.

In the literature of intercultural transformation, models of intercultural identity are not the sole focus. Models of cultural awareness are also found in this literature. These two foci arise from the distinction between cultural awareness and self-awareness (Adler, 1972). Adler defined cultural awareness as "attitudinally internalized insights" (p. 31) about the common values, attitudes, and beliefs of others. He identified two distinct attitudes: first, an attitude of cultural relativism recognizing the logical and coherent system each culture has for managing daily life and; second, an attitude that recognizes all
people as products of the cultures they live in. In contrast, self-awareness was defined as "behaviourly internalized insights" (Adler, 1972, p.32). This second kind of learning had an important consequence: it significantly transformed the learner. Models of intercultural identity arise from this second kind of learning. Hanvey (1976) and Milton J. Bennett (1986) have created developmental models that elaborate the concept of cultural awareness. They use cultural awareness in what Rick Berwick (1994) calls "the least contentious and most public sense," that is, to refer to an "amicable understanding of cultures other than one's own" (p.333, original emphasis).

Hanvey (1976) provided the first full treatment of the concept of cultural awareness, defining it as the ability to "comprehend and accept the consequences of the basic human capacity for creating unique cultures - with resultant profound differences in outlook and practice manifested among societies" (p.13).

Moreover, he conceptualizes cultural awareness as hierarchical, advancing through four levels. Level I, associated with tourists, is "awareness of superficial or very visible cultural traits and stereotypes"; level II, associated with sojourners is "awareness of significant and subtle cultural traits that contrast markedly with one's own" (p. 20); level III is a level of intellectual acceptance that precedes either a move up to level IV or down to level II. Level IV is associated with "awareness of how another culture feels from the standpoint of the insider" (p. 21).

Hanvey noted that reaching level IV was extremely difficult. He speculates that a learning process closely related to, but going beyond empathy, called "transpection," may be the process that can move people up the scale of cultural awareness. Magoroh
Maruyama defines transpection as “the effort to put oneself in the head ... of another person... [it] is a trans-epistemological process which tries to learn a foreign belief, a foreign assumption, a foreign perspective, feelings in a foreign context, and consequences in a foreign context” (cited in Hanvey, 1976, p. 21). This last level of awareness mirrors the models of intercultural identity or multicultural personhood found in related literature.

Bennett’s (1986) developmental approach to training for intercultural sensitivity is implicitly a developmental model of culture-awareness, though he doesn’t use that term. Bennett identifies six stages of development; each “represents a way of experiencing difference” (p. 181). The first three are associated with ethnocentrism and the latter three with ethnorelativism, a term Bennett coins as the antonym of ethnocentrism.

The three ethnocentric stages display little or no cultural awareness. The advance towards ethnorelativism begins when cultural differences are acknowledged and respected. Significant cultural awareness begins with stage four which has two levels: the first is to accept behavioral difference; and the second is to accept “the underlying cultural value differences which may represent profoundly different organizations of reality” (p. 185). The fifth stage, adaptation, is characterized by empathy, the ability to construe events “as if” one were the other person. This quality promotes cultural pluralism, the ability to shift into two or more cultural world views. Integration, the final stage, is the application of ethnorelativism to one’s own identity. In the language of Bennett’s model, “a person who has integrated difference is one who can construe differences as processes, who can adapt to those differences, and who can additionally construe himself in various cultural ways”
(p. 186). As with Hanvey, this last stage of awareness echoes the models of intercultural identity or multicultural personhood found in other literature.

Adler (1977), Mansell (1981), Yoshizawa (1987) and Kim (1991) each offer a model of transformation describing stages or patterns which people move through from lower to higher levels of intercultural development (Taylor, 1993). Hanvey (1976) and Bennett (1986) also describe stages or levels of culture awareness. However, in Taylor’s (1993) recent review of Adler (1977), Mansell (1981), Yoshikawa (1987) and Kim (1991), he is critical of the lack of an empirical basis for their conceptualization of intercultural transformation. I concur, and I can add that neither Hanvey (1976) nor Bennett (1986) undertook empirical studies to support their models of the development of cultural awareness. These two works can be included in those Taylor (1993) describes as “rich metaphorical descriptions,” and then concludes that, because of their lack of empirical basis, they stand as “a house of cards” (p. 37). The assumptions that these conceptions are based on cannot be operationalized or measured. In the end, these conceptions both of the development of cultural awareness and intercultural transformation are mere speculation.

These models of self-development or the development of cultural awareness all imply learning. Yet none offers an account of the dynamics of that learning. Taylor (1993) identifies this absence as a serious weakness of this literature. He concludes his review of Adler (1977), Mansell (1981), Yoshikawa (1987) and Kim (1991) by noting that “the most significant concern about the research in the learning/growth approach is twofold: first, it does not address specifically the learning that is taking place among adults during
intercultural transformation using the theory and research of adult learning; and secondly when the learning concept is used, it is not explored in-depth in recognition of the intricacies of the learning process” (p. 39).

Bennett’s (1986) and Hanvey’s (1976) accounts of cultural awareness also fail to address the learning process involved in the movement along their continuums. Bennett admits that a major shift is required to move people from the ethnocentric to the ethnorelative approach. Subjectively the ability to construe difference not as a thing, but as a process is important. He fails, however, to discuss this shift, leaving us asking: does it occur because of an individual’s personal characteristics, and/or her experience, or is it a natural process occurring with time and with quality of experience? Other than offering the ill-defined concept of transpection as partial explanation, Hanvey too fails to account for the implied learning that moves someone from one level to another. The lack of attention to the dynamic of learning in both these models of cultural awareness and intercultural identity is especially important in the context of this dissertation, since it confirms the conclusion that this literature cannot provide direction for a theory of culture learning.

There are several other points that one may raise in criticism of this literature, besides its lack of empirical basis and failure to account for the learning implied in the cross-cultural experience. First, some scholars find this literature deeply offensive because it fails to recognize its own position of privilege, and fails to acknowledge that intercultural transformation may be a very different process for a black servant and a well-off graduate student. Second, the conceptualization of culture such as that which Kim
(1991) reveals in her emphasis on "cultural patterns" (p. 268), often operationalized as "national" or "group" culture and masking variation, is as inadequate here as it is in regards to intercultural communication theory and intercultural competence. Third, as with the conceptions of competence, the learning/growth literature is overly psychological, suggesting that growth is entirely determined by internal mental processes. The learning/growth literature does not account for the social context or other factors that may constrain an individual's potential for transformation or even smother their desire to be transformed.

This body of literature has been very influential in shaping mainstream intercultural pedagogy. Creating a culturally aware, world citizen has deep appeal to educators. Kim (1991) describes people with an intercultural identity as those able to "self-reorganize by being open, flexible, resilient, and creative - not being closed, rigid, intolerant, and habitual" (p. 269), and "to manage the varied contexts of the intercultural encounter regardless of the specific cultures involved" (p. 265). Adler (1972), Mansell (1981), Yoshizawa (1987), Hanvey (1976) and Bennett (1986) all offer attractive new models of the human personality to inspire teachers and students engaged in the study of intercultural communication in language classes, or adults in training programs for overseas assignments. Viewed uncritically, these images of new types of people are wonderful ideals sure to lead to the greater good, and difficult for many to criticize.

Encouraged by this literature of intercultural transformation, educators often design programs to encourage individuals to become culturally competent, however these can involve some very questionable assumptions. First, the people of the target culture are
frequently portrayed as rigid and unlikely to forgive cultural faux pas. There is a great emphasis on the dualism - us and them. Second, some programs rarely question their political assumptions. They may strive to be politically neutral while in fact frequently supporting the status quo, through aiming to fit students into the new social structure. In addition, by encouraging a suspension of judgement regarding cultural differences and encouraging an extreme cultural relativism, they position students to avoid their ethical and political responsibilities. Third, the focus in these programs on national culture in an international context often fails to provide students with tools to deal with issues in their own culture involving multiculturalism. Fourth, by avoiding hard historical questions, culture is presented as a natural, not a naturalized phenomenon. In sum, the approach of training or educating for a new intercultural identity that flows out of the largely uncritical literature reviewed above, can be almost analogous to a finishing school, where newly and differently mannered students are individually empowered and graduate to assume comfortable positions in society.

There is a tradition of more critical intercultural pedagogy that can provide a resource for critiquing these programs. The idea of a third place, a hybrid culture, being produced in the intercultural encounter is an important part of this other tradition. Thinking about this third place is more evolved outside the field of intercultural communications than inside. However, the thinking is still exploratory. In language education, Claire Kramsch (1993a) writes of the third place “that grows in the interstices between the cultures the learner grew up with and the new cultures he or she is being introduced to” (p. 236) in terms of three frames: a sociological, an educational and a
political frame. A popular culture frame sees this place as a place where the learner creates meaning. The clash of meanings allows learners to make new meanings on the boundary between the two worlds. In an educational frame, learners can be seen to recognize the power of context and develop a critical distance. The third place can offer a space "to think through and to question existing practices" (p. 240). In the political frame, a third place is that which may preserve the "diversity of styles, purposes and interests" of learners against "hegemonic tendencies of larger political and educational structures" (p. 247).

Other scholars add depth to the diversity of ways of thinking of intercultural transformation and of intercultural pedagogy. Some provide an explicit ideological point of reference. Michele Borelli (1990) argues that intercultural pedagogy should be a critical practice. It should not merely promote an affirmation and acceptance of culture, but also critique the "subjective and objective condition of being constrained within the institutionalised power involving individuals and groups, and peoples" (p. 280). Mike Byram (1993) too offers a political orientation for intercultural pedagogy, arguing that in foreign language classes the treatment of multicultural issues is a "natural extension of learning about other cultures" and provides topics that make "evident the political and ethical responsibilities" that students have (p. 183). Henry Giroux (1992) calls for a liberatory theory of Border Pedagogy to help students understand "difference and voice and politics" in their own community as well as in the international community (p. 209). This pedagogy would link difference in relational terms to broader politics; would provide conditions in which students, as a form of resistance, culturally remap their lives through
“systematically analyzing the ways in which the dominant culture creates borders”; would emphasize how fragile identity is in “borderlands crisscrossed with a variety of languages, experiences, and voices”; would highlight the issue of power in a “dual sense” including how teachers use it; would make students media literate and sceptical of all discourses of power; and finally, would redefine “the everyday as an important resource for linking schools to the traditions, communities, and histories that provide students with a sense of voice and relationship to others” (p. 210).

In summary, the work of Borelli (1990), Byram (1993), Giroux (1992) and Kransch (1992, 1993) presents a more politically conscious context for the notion of learning/growth than does the earlier literature. One may also charge that these recent works are themselves “rich in metaphors” of growth, and that they too lack an empirical basis. However, I think they offer a more mature view of transformation. Certainly it is a less naive one. These thinkers have a clear sense that intercultural transformation is a significant political process, unfolded in the face of opposition and involving ethical and political responsibilities. They recognize people as positioned subjects. They treat intercultural transformation as a feature of national life as well as international life. Finally, these scholars treat transformation as a source of social emancipation as well as a source of personal satisfaction and empowerment.

**Empirical studies**

The purpose of the review above has been to develop a critical understanding of the literature of intercultural communications that forms the backdrop to this study. In
addition to the work reviewed above, there are a handful of empirical studies of culture learning of interest. These form the foreground to this study. The purpose of this review is to locate my study in relation to these others. Some studies reviewed below are dissertations, others are monographs, and one is a book. Qualitative methodologies predominate. I will review each of these works in order of their publication dates.

Don Northey’s (1985) study of a group of 25 B.C. secondary school students and their Quebecois counterparts engaged in a two-week exchange program was designed to “understand the inside, subjectively lived world of the participant” (p. i). The essential question was “what is the nature of the exchange experience”? In interviews, observation, interaction with the group and an in-depth focus on two students, Northey uncovered and developed a number of themes.

One theme in particular, coming to the other in his/her difference, addresses the exchange experience as learning. Northey found that students were more likely to notice cultural similarities than differences. Students were “hesitant” to voice “subtle cultural differences” (p. 176). Moreover, Northey found that students were more focused on the intersubjective experience than on a more objective view of the new culture. He noted that students were reluctant to generalize from their situational experiences to form cultural statements. He feels this is because the intimacy of the exchange relationship meant “the other was viewed not as a representative of a culture but a specific being with a holistic identity symbolized in their name” (p. 312). This finding is particularly interesting since it suggests that, contrary to expectations, interpreting experience through stereotypes may
be suspended in intimate personal contact, even in the early stages of intercultural experience.

Sikkema and Niyekawa's (1987) study reports the results of several years of field experience undertaken as part of a college level intercultural communications course. The study consists mostly of anecdotal reporting of the authors' observations, supported by students' accounts of several weeks of field experience in Guam. The theoretical framework for the study is an eclectic one, applying work on convergent and divergent thinking, affective learning, and selective perception to understand culture learning. Although they had journal data available they did not make extensive use of it in their study.

Sikkema and Niyekawa summarize student gains related to five areas: first, increased cultural awareness since "the learning experience of students substantiates the notion that one's culture shapes and structures one's life and behaviour in subtle and consistent ways" (p.55); second, expanded cross-cultural learning skills and cross-cultural competencies; third, increased interpersonal skills complementing cross-cultural learning skills; fourth, increased knowledge of the ways that learning the language and learning the culture are linked and; finally, increases in self-confidence, a stronger sense of identity and increased self-esteem (p. 54).

Byram, Estarte-Sarries and Taylor's (1991) study is an extensive description of the culture learning of secondary students. The purpose of their research was "to study the relationships between learning a language as a school subject, perception of the associated culture (or cultures) and attitudes towards people of that culture" (p. xiv). Their research
design was qualitative, designed to compose a picture with a deep focus. The focus was the impact of language teaching on attitudes and perceptions. Relationships between pupils, teachers, parents and siblings were also explored.

The conclusions from the first level of analysis of the Byram et al. study are limited: (1) "pupils who have been taught French in secondary school have more, and more differentiated, images of the French way of life than do those in primary school" (p. 379); and (2) in regards to attitudes, "explanatory statistical evidence did not indicate any significant association between learning French and attitude change (p. 379). The evidence suggests that out of school factors influence attitudes more than the French classroom. The researchers recognized also that "the power of the experience of visiting the other country seems to be significant, yet cannot be considered a fundamental aspect of teaching" (p. 380).

A second level of analysis, an ethnographic study of classrooms, is more significant. Four "descriptive models of the relationships and effects among the various factors in the study" (p. 15) are reported. These models relate three components of French lessons: style, perceptions, and attitudes in "interpretive models of teaching and learning" (p. 370). These models are differentiated more by how culture is presented or taught than how it is learned. The relationship established between language and culture is a significant discriminator in model type. For example, both Models A and B separate language and culture for teaching purposes. Model C strongly emphasises the provision of cultural knowledge.
This relationship between how language and culture are presented, in turn, creates a different dynamic in how the qualitatively new experience represented by the foreign culture may be assimilated. This process is understood in terms of changes in schemata, data structures for representing generic concepts in memory (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34 cited in Byram et al., 1991, p. 374). For example, both models A and B “extend competences and knowledge on an existing basis, rather than create a new basis on which to build new experience and competences” (p. 376). In Model C, learners have new experience presented from a native viewpoint. They are encouraged not to assimilate this, but to develop new schemata in addition to their existing ones. The possibilities for involvement of schemata in the different Models are: no change (use of existing schema), adaptation of existing schemata or adoption of new schemata. The implications of these findings for my study have been discussed in Chapter one.

Hagen Kordes’ (1991) study of 112 learners of French in Germany focused on the process of intercultural learning within the medium of school learning. The short outline of this study does not describe the methodology. Three findings are reported. First, the development of intercultural competence lags behind other dimensions in the general development of foreign language communication competence. In this study, one third of the students stayed at a monocultural level. The next stage was reached “with great difficulty” by the majority of students who showed “the willingness and capability to see their own cultural norms in relative terms” (p. 288). The last stage, the transcultural stage in “which the character of one’s own culture is recognised by being exposed to a foreign culture” (p. 288) was reached by only six students. Second, critical experiences of cultural
and intercultural identity arise only late and sporadically in foreign language learning at school. Third, intercultural learning is mainly defined as a cognitive strategy of knowledge in the language classroom. Teachers and pupil merely carry out text analysis on various literary or political texts. The teacher is the only model of interlingual and intercultural competence.

Kordes' study also yielded insight into a “succession of tasks of development” (Kordes, 1991, p. 290). The first of these developmental tasks is to cope with the disruption of interlingual interaction. The second is to cope with disrupted international co-operation. The third is to cope with disrupted international communication. This task involves the “voluntary extension of the personality” (p. 294). For this extension, students need to have experience with the foreign culture. This experience challenges the individual and social identity and opens it up for transformation.

The Kordes study does not offer any substantial explanation of how students “advance” from one task to the other. However, it does recognize that these processes are “generative” in nature; they cannot be taught. They are mobilised by new experiences. The shock of the new experiences are somehow catalytic. This insight, suggests that Kordes shares with Adler (1972) the view that culture shock stimulates culture learning. His speculations also support Byram et al. (1991) in their tentative conclusions that culture learning is a generative process involving new experience acting on old, culturally specific internal schemata.

Ed Taylor's (1993) study aimed to describe the learning process involved in becoming interculturally competent. It explored the extent to which transformative
learning theory (Mezirow, 1991) can serve as a model for the learning process involved in becoming interculturally competent. Taylor interviewed 12 Americans of varied background, considered to be interculturally competent, who had lived overseas for a minimum of two years, and who regarded the experience as positive. These structured interviews helped Taylor explore whether Jack Mezirow’s (1991) theory of perspective transformation could explain the learning process involved in intercultural transformation.

Taylor found Mezirow’s model very helpful in understanding the intercultural learning experience. However, he qualified aspects of Mezirow’s theory from important variations in his participants experiences. He found that the learning model of intercultural competency that emerged in his study was recursive, contrary to Mezirow’s expectations of perspective transformation being a strictly linear progress. He also found the state of readiness for change and learning in all participants to be significant, thus uncovering an aspect of transformation that Mezirow neglects. Again, contrary to the expectations of Mezirow, he found that only a few of his participants showed a reflective orientation, displaying rather a non-reflective orientation seeming “to rely on direct apprehension and thoughtful action” (p.204). Taylor’s study identifies three important behavioral learning strategies as central to perspective transformation: observing, participating and developing friendships. Finally, he concluded that transformative learning theory helps explain the learning process of intercultural competence, since “both processes share similar properties, such as catalysts for learning (disorienting dilemma and cultural disequilibrium); similar cognitive processes (premise reflection and reflective orientation);
similar learning strategies (action and dialogue with others and observing and participation); and similar learning outcomes, a perspective transformation” (p. 209).

Lynette Harper’s (1994) study used an anthropological life history of Mira, a young Lebanese refugee in Canada, to investigate migrant transition. She worked collaboratively with Mira to construct a descriptive and interpretative account of her life in terms of Mira’s culture learning and adaptation. She attributes much of Mira’s process of culture learning and adaptation to transformative learning. In particular, Mira became aware of both the Lebanese and Canadian meaning perspectives, and this allowed her to move “from ethnocentrism and a dualistic epistemology towards cultural pluralism and relativism” (p. ii). Critical reflection also played a role in Mira’s ability to create her own choices and commitments.

Harper describes Mira’s active resistance to aspects of both Canadian and Lebanese society, allowing her to appear to conform to mainstream Canadian and Lebanese society, but actually be maintaining a peripheral position to both as she chose. Moreover, Mira’s experience of culture shock stimulated questions about existing assumptions, and led to her revising meaning schemes in ways helpful to her adaptation. This experience of Mira’s has implications for educational intervention. Harper argues that intervention in the process of culture learning and adaptation might best be deferred until “minor incidents of culture shock have accumulated or there is a major phase of disruption” (p. 126).

My study adds important dimensions to this small body of studies of culture learning. My study has a specific focus: it investigates culture learning in the context of
daily experience of international students. It is also unique in its focus on developing a
theory of culture learning. While other studies have used structured interviews, life
histories, surveys and ethnographic observation, the extensive use of journals as a source
of data is unique to my study.

This study complements three other studies in particular. First it builds on Taylor’s
(1993) and Harper’s (1994) studies of culture learning, which were wholly or partly based
focus on long-term (2 years plus) sojourners and refugees respectively, this study focuses
on short-term exchange students thus contributing another important population to the
understanding of the culture learning experience. While Taylor and Harper focus on
experience in periods of months and even years, this study focuses on day-to-day
experience. Because of this time span, Taylor and, to some extent, Harper were concerned
only with the learning through perspective transformation, and premise or critical
reflection aspect of Mezirow’s theory. My study focuses on the less dramatic forms of
learning and reflection. Moreover, whereas Taylor’s and Harper’s research each looked at
only one national group (Americans and Lebanese) my study involves both Japanese and
Canadians. This study also complements the Byram, Estarte-Sarries and Taylor (1991)
study. By using Jack Mezirow’s theory of transformative learning, this study explores
further the tentative conclusions of the Byram et al. (1991) that culture learning is
mediated through changes to schemata.
CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the conceptual framework used for this study. The work of Jack Mezirow (1978a, 1978b, 1981, 1990, 1991, 1994) on transformative adult learning theory provides the major focus. Mezirow (1994) intended his theory to be a "comprehensive, idealized, and universal model consisting of generic structures, elements, and processes of adult learning" (p. 222). His theory is a constructivist theory, "an orientation which holds that the way learners interpret and reinterpret their sense experience is central to making meaning and hence learning" (p. 222). This study uses his theory to understand the culture learning experience of young adults, ages 17 - 20, in overseas settings. Two theoretical constructs are central to the analysis of that experience: Mezirow's (1991) conceptions of four forms of learning and three forms of reflection.

Mezirow’s (1991) transformative learning theory

Mezirow views learning as a developmental process: “making a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of an experience, which guides subsequent understanding, appreciation, and action” (Mezirow, 1990, p. 1). He is particularly concerned with the question of how meaning is “constructed, validated and reformulated” (1991, p. xii). He identifies four forms of learning and three forms of reflection to explain the dynamic for this “construction, validation and reformulation.”

Mezirow 1978

Mezirow’s theory has its beginnings in the early 1970’s in a study of the personal changes in a group of adult women who had returned to school or work after a period of absence from both. Based on this study, Mezirow (1978) introduced the notion of a perspective transformation, “a structural change in the way we see ourselves and our relationships” (p. 100). He was especially interested in the results of consciousness raising in the woman’s movement, observing that “by becoming aware of hitherto unquestioned cultural myths which they have internalized, women come to find a new sense of identity within a new meaning perspective which can lead to greater autonomy, control and responsibility for their own lives” (p. 102). Mezirow concluded that this process of transformation was widespread and cited other examples of perspective transformations in “daily life.” He observed that:

There are certain challenges or dilemmas of adult life that cannot be resolved by the usual way we handle problems - that is, by simply learning more about them or learning how to cope with them more effectively. Life becomes untenable, and we undergo significant phases of reassessment and growth in
which familiar assumptions are challenged and new directions and commitments are charted. (Mezirow, 1978, p. 101)

Mezirow turned early to the work of Paulo Freire (1972) and Jerome Bruner (1973) in an attempt to understand the process of transformation. He found Freire’s educational collaboration with illiterate peasants an important source of insight into this process. Mezirow sees the new level of awareness of social and political circumstances the peasants achieved through “conscientization” as evidence of “the possibilities of using education to transform one’s frame of reference - what is here called a meaning perspective - in fostering personal and social change” (p. 103). Seeking the dynamic for this transformation, he tentatively concludes that Jerome Bruner’s idea of “decentration” might be a possibility. Thus, Mezirow (1978), after identifying a learning experience with profound personal consequences, locating it in a social context, begins a search for the learning dynamic in the process of perspective transformation.

Mezirow 1981

Mezirow (1981) represents a significant advance in his thinking. In the 1981 article, Mezirow locates his work within the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas, elaborates on the notion of reflection, and expands his conception of perspective transformation. Mezirow frames his work within Habermas’ (1970, 1971) conceptualization of three domains of learning: instrumental, communicative, and emancipatory. By locating perspective transformation within the domain of emancipatory learning he provides it with theoretical support. Mezirow interprets Habermas’ concept of emancipatory learning as “an interest in self-knowledge, that is, the knowledge of self-reflection, including interest
in the way one’s history and biography has expressed itself in the way one sees oneself, one’s role and social expectations” (p. 5). Mezirow uses his understanding of Habermas’ philosophy to link emancipatory learning and perspective transformation. He defines perspective transformation “as the emancipatory process of becoming critically aware of how and why the structure of psycho-cultural assumptions has come to constrain the way we see ourselves and our relationships, reconstituting this structure to permit a more inclusive and discriminating integration of experience and acting upon these new understandings” (p.6). His failure to adopt all of the connotations of emancipatory learning, particularly its commitment to collective political action, will be a chief source of criticism of his work in the future.

Mezirow also elaborates a model of perspective transformation in 1981, identifying a series of 10 steps linked to completed transformation: “(1) a disorienting dilemma; 2) self-examination; (3) a critical assessment of personally internalized role assumptions and a sense of alienation from traditional social expectations; (4) relating one’s discontent to similar experiences of others or to public issues - recognizing that one’s problem is shared and not exclusively a private matter; (5) exploring options for new ways of acting; (6) building competence and self-confidence in new roles; (7) planning a course of action; (8) acquiring knowledge and skills for implementing one’s plans; (9) provisional efforts to try to implement plans and to assess feedback; (10) a reintegration into society on the basis of conditions dictated by the new perspective” (Mezirow, 1981, p. 7). Mezirow identifies Step One, a disorienting dilemma, as a catalyst for the perspective transformation; the more severe this trauma is the more likely the probability of
transformation. Mezirow (1978, 1981, 1994) describes perspective transformation as the result either of sudden insight perhaps from a major crisis in one’s life, or of an accumulation of transformations of closely related meaning schemes.

By 1981, Mezirow has also advanced his thinking on reflection, recognizing the important role of critical reflectivity in learning: “perspective transformation fills an important gap in adult learning theory by acknowledging the central role played by the function of critical reflectivity” (p. 11). Critical reflectivity is identified as one of three forms of reflectivity: (1) conceptual reflectivity, that is, questioning the adequacies of our concepts for understanding; (2) psychic reflectivity, recognizing our habits of hasty judgment; and (3) theoretical reflectivity, becoming aware of previously taken-for-granted assumptions. This third form, also called critical reflectivity, is “the process central to perspective transformation” (p. 13). The names of these forms are changed in subsequent work.

Mezirow 1990, 1991

Mezirow (1990) is a collection of the work of 18 authors each describing applications of critical reflection. He contributes the opening and concluding chapter. The opening chapter “How Critical Reflection Triggers Transformative Learning” debuts three important developments in his theory. First, he introduces the concept of meaning structures and defines two dimensions: meaning schemes and meaning perspectives. Second, he clarifies his ideas on reflection, renaming the forms of reflection. Third, he acknowledges changes in Habermas’ thinking by collapsing communicative learning and emancipatory learning into a broadened category of communicative learning. Each of these
three aspects of his theory are presented in more depth in his 1991 book. A journal article in 1994 summarizes his theory succinctly without changes. I will discuss the three aspects noted above as they appear in his work in the '90s.

**Meaning schemes and Meaning Perspectives**

Mezirow (1994) sums up the concepts of meaning scheme and meaning perspective, calling them two dimensions of meaning structures that “shape, focus, delimit” (p. 223) the process of learning. Meaning perspectives are broad “sets of predispositions” that create our expectations and “serve as one of three sets of codes significantly shaping sensation and delimiting perception, feelings and cognition: sociolinguistic codes (e.g., social norms, ideologies, language games, theories), psychological codes (e.g., personality traits, repressed parental prohibitions which continue to block ways of feeling and acting), and epistemic codes (e.g., learning styles, sensory learning preferences, focus on wholes or parts, or on the concrete vs the abstract)” (p. 223). A meaning scheme is a more specific dimension of our frame of reference. It is a “specific manifestations (sic) of our meaning perspectives” as “the constellation of concept, belief, judgment, and feeling which shape particular interpretations (e.g. when we think of abortion, black people, the Muslim religion, free market capitalism, or liberalism)” (p. 223).

Mezirow conceives of meaning perspectives and meaning schemes as mutable structures. He cautions that to see them as “habits of expectation that construe and hence structure meaning is not to suggest that they exist as structures of the brain or storage bins for memory” (Mezirow, 1990, p. 4). There is a dynamic interaction between the events
that we experience and our habits of interpretation. This process is mediated by reflection. Nonetheless, our meaning schemes and perspectives profoundly influence our interpretations. Mezirow asserts that we trade off perception and cognition for relief from the anxiety generated when our experience does not comfortably fit these meaning structures. If what we experience is too threatening “we tend to block it out or resort to psychological defense mechanisms to provide a more compatible interpretation” (Mezirow, 1990, p. 4). We may also transform meaning schemes and perspectives to accommodate new interpretations of experience.

*Content, Process and Premise Reflection*

Mezirow (1991) assigns reflection a prominent role in his theory. Charging other learning theories with “an egregious disregard for the function of reflection,” he calls it the “central dynamic” of transformative learning (p. 100). Reflection is more than a simple awareness or awareness of awareness; it involves “critique of how we are perceiving, thinking, judging, feeling and acting,” and is employed only in circumstances “when we require guidance in negotiating a step in a series of actions or run into difficulty in understanding a new experience” (1991, pp. 106-7). Reflection takes more than one form.

Mezirow (1990) renames the three forms of reflection in the transformative learning theory as content, process and premise reflection. Each has a distinct character. In interpreting experience, as well as problem solving, “we may reflect on the content of the problem, the process of problem-solving, or the premise of the problem” (Mezirow, 1994, p. 224). Content and process reflection are common forms and account for how we change our minds and transform our meaning schemes in daily life. Premise reflection, less
common, however, can cause us to examine the very bases of interpretation or judgments, and may result in transforming our meaning perspectives, a significant learning experience.

Although he refers to reflection, calling it reflectivity, in 1981, Mezirow (1990) first differentiates an “assessment of how or why we have perceived, thought, felt or acted” from “an assessment of how best to perform these functions when each phase of an action is guided by what we have learned before” (p. 6). The concepts of thoughtful action and reflective action identify these two types of reflection: how and why. This distinction draws on Edward Cell’s (1984) division of action and reflective interpretation; Mezirow identifies the latter as “the process of correcting distortions in our reasoning and attitudes” (p. 7). The former he associates with thoughtful action which involves questions of how best to perform an action such as making a move in chess.

Mezirow (1990) also expanded his understanding of critical reflection, suggesting that this term be reserved for the reflection that challenges the presuppositions of previous learning. Calling critical reflection “premise reflection” is more exact, he concludes, since it “addresses the question of the justification for the very premises on which problems are posed or defined in the first place” (p. 12). An important distinction between reflection and critical reflection is that the former is associated with problem solving while the latter is associated with problem posing, “making a taken-for-granted situation problematic, raising questions regarding its validity” (1991, p.105). Mezirow writes later that “critique and reassessment of the adequacy of prior learning, leading potentially to its negation, are the hallmarks of [premise] reflection” (p.110).
In 1991, Mezirow links the notion of the three forms of reflection and the distinction between instrumental learning and communicative learning to different types of logic. This line of thought is evident in 1990 when Mezirow adopts Habermas’ revised position, and collapses two of the three previous categories of learning, communicative and emancipatory, into one broader category of communicative learning. The distinction between communicative learning and instrumental learning is discussed at some length by Mezirow. He sees this distinction as being of theoretical importance, but states that in practice: “it is important to emphasize that both the instrumental and communicative dimensions are involved in most acts of learning about the world, other persons, and ourselves” (Mezirow, 1991, p. 89). He is particularly concerned with the theoretical implications for transformative learning of different types of logic associated with each of the two types of learning. These types are discussed below.

Communicative learning is “understanding the meaning of what others communicate concerning values, ideals, feelings, moral decisions, and such concepts as love, labor, autonomy, commitment and democracy” (1991, p. 8). This kind of learning focuses on creating coherence out of our experience. Mezirow describes this kind of learning as of “greater significance” (p. 8) to adult learners than instrumental learning. Differences in the form of logic between these two kinds of learning are significant. The logic of communicative learning is different: rather than testing hypotheses, we “often intuitively, search for themes or metaphors by which to fit the unfamiliar into a meaning
perspective, so that an interpretation in context becomes possible” (p. 9). Reflection critically assesses this distinctive process.

Instrumental learning is distinguished from communicative learning by its focus, its form of reflection, and its logic. The former is essentially task-oriented problem solving - how to do something; how to perform. This kind of learning “involves the process of learning to control and manipulate the environment and other people” (p. 8). In reflection, we look back on content or procedural rules. We may also check to see that we are acting in a way consistent with our values and goals.

Mezirow (1991) considers more carefully the idea of forms of logic and reflection involved in instrumental and communicative learning. This idea too flows from Habermas, who makes a fundamental distinction between learning to control and manipulate the environment (instrumental learning), and learning to understand others (communicative learning), believing that “a fundamentally different methodology of objective enquiry for each type of learning” is needed (p. 73). Mezirow identifies cause-effect relationships as most important in instrumental learning and suggests that in terms of “transformation theory, meaning is acquired deductively in task-oriented problem solving by testing a hypothetical meaning scheme that we believe will more effectively influence a cause-effect relationship so as to permit greater control over a problem situation” (p. 74). The hypothetico-deductive approach is thus the main form of logic in problem solving in instrumental learning.

The process of problem solving in communicative learning is markedly different. Here the learner “actively and purposefully negotiates his or her way through a series of
specific encounters by using language and gesture and anticipating the actions of others” (p.79). Mezirow calls this learning “designative” in contrast to prescriptive, since “we learn to understand what is designated rather than to dictate what we should do” (p. 79). The logic here is learning through metaphor. We start with a metaphoric association with what is known, then we must begin to modify this initial interpretation of the whole by seeing its parts. Mezirow calls this logic metaphorical-abductive.

Mezirow (1991) associates content and process reflection with both instrumental and communicative learning. However, premise reflection, or critical reflection, is associated with a particular kind of communicative learning that Habermas calls emancipatory learning. Knowledge resulting from critical self-reflection is emancipatory. After Habermas, Mezirow (1991) writes that this knowledge includes the “way our history and biography have expressed themselves in the way we see ourselves, our assumptions about learning and the nature and use of knowledge, and our roles and social expectations and the repressed feelings that influence them” (p. 87). Moreover, Mezirow identifies critical reflection as “appraisive rather than prescriptive or designative” (p. 88). Appraisive means that alternative choices are identified and these choices can be emancipatory and transformative. Mezirow also asserts that premise reflection has its own logic: “an inferential logic which I have characterized as ‘dialectical-presuppositional’, a developmental movement through cognitive structures” (p. 110).
Forms of learning

In his 1991 book, Mezirow is chiefly concerned with understanding the dynamics of making meaning, the central activity in learning. Mezirow is concerned with a specific form of learning: transformative learning. Unlike learning which relies on old and secure meanings to explain new experience, transformative learning interprets a new experience or reinterprets an old experience from a new set of ideas and expectations, or meaning schemes and perspectives, thus giving a new meaning and perspective to both old experiences and new. In this 1991 work, he introduces a new concept to explain how this process works: a typology of four forms of learning. These four forms of learning play a major role in the analysis of the data for this study. These are elaborated below.

In arriving at this conception of four forms of learning, Mezirow draws on the work of Gregory Bateson (1972) and Edward Cell (1984). Their influence is visible in Mezirow’s description of the role of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives in his four stage model of transformative learning. Bateson (1972) hypothesized four categories of learning. He was more concerned with the impact of the change in context rather than the acquisition of new data, and this shapes his four levels of learning. The first, “zero learning,” extends a habitual response to additional facts in a known context. The second, Learning II, is “a change in the process of Learning I, e.g., a corrective change in the set of alternatives from which choice is made, or it is a change in how the sequence of experience is punctuated” (1972, p. 293, cited in Mezirow, 1991, p. 90). Here the context changes and known facts assume new meanings. Bateson saw level three, Learning III, as a change in the process of Learning II. He identifies six possible changes including “if
Learning II is a learning of the contexts of Learning I, then Learning III should be learning the contexts of those contexts” (1972, pp. 303-304 cited in Mezirow, 1991, p. 91).

Mezirow describes Learning III as a perspective transformation since this “implies learning that involves a change in the whole assumptive frame of reference within which our habits of expectation have been formed” (p. 91). Edward Cell’s (1984) learning theory has also influenced Mezirow’s development of four forms of learning. Cell saw learning as involving four different levels of change taking place separately or in combination. These are: (1) response learning; (2) situation learning; (3) trans-situation learning; and (4) transcendent learning” (p. 91). The first form proceeds by trial and error and includes “conditioned responses and rote learning”; the second involves a change in the way we interpret a situation”; the third involves changing our interpretations of a situation, “interpreting our acts of interpretation and reflecting on our powers of reflection,” and the fourth form is the “ability to modify concepts or to create new ones for interpreting individual situations” (p. 92). Bateson (1972) and Cell (1984) contributed to Mezirow’s theorizing of “four distinct forms in which adult learning may occur” (p. 93). A discussion of these four forms follows.

The first two of Mezirow’s four forms are closely related. The first form of learning is learning through meaning schemes. Here we differentiate or elaborate previously acquired meaning schemes. This form involves habitual or stereotypic responses to information, often referred to as recipe learning. The second form is learning new meaning schemes, “that is, creating new meanings that are sufficiently consistent and compatible with existing meaning perspectives to complement them by extending their
This form of learning does not change the related meaning perspectives since there is neither fundamental change nor negation of the scheme. The larger and related meaning perspective can in fact be strengthened, since the new meaning scheme can often resolve inconsistencies in new experiences.

The third form of learning, learning through transformation of meaning schemes, is a significant departure from the two previous forms, and accounts for significant changes in meaning. In this form, we reflect on our assumptions, usually when “we find that our specific points or beliefs have become dysfunctional, and we experience a growing sense of the inadequacy of our old ways of seeing and understanding meaning” (1991, p. 94). Here we find that our old meaning schemes are inadequate and transform them to allow us to interpret new experience more adequately. If several related meaning schemes undergo simultaneous transformation, this can lead to transformation of the related meaning perspectives.

The fourth and final form of learning is learning through perspective transformation. This involves “becoming aware through reflection and critique, of specific presuppositions upon which a distorted or incomplete meaning perspective is based and then transforming the perspective through a reorganization of meaning” (1991, p. 94). This is a very significant form of learning. It often begins in emotionally charged environments when we encounter experience that fails to meet our expectations, or we find inconsistencies or anomalies which cannot be “given coherence either by learning within existing schemes or by learning new schemes” (1990, p.94). Understanding of the incoherent experience may only be achieved by redefinition of the situation, which in turn,
"is achieved by critically reassessing the assumptions that support the current meaning scheme(s) in question" (1991, p.94).

Mezirow defines perspective transformation at this point as:

> The process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand, and feel about our world; changing these structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrative perspective; and, finally, making choices or otherwise acting on these new understandings. (Mezirow, 1990a, p. 167)

These four forms of learning are tied into the three forms of reflection. Different forms of reflection pertain to each of form of learning. Content and process reflection pertain to all four forms of learning, while “reflection of premises transforms meaning perspectives only” (Mezirow, 1994, p. 224).

**Criticisms of Mezirow**

Mezirow’s work has been critiqued by several scholars. Taylor (1993) identifies four areas of criticism. Since Taylor’s work appeared, new critiques of Mezirow have been published. I will begin this discussion by summarizing the four earlier areas, go on to discuss Taylor’s critique of Mezirow and finally, summarize recent critiques. I will outline Mezirow’s response to his critics in the context of discussing his views of emancipatory learning, the subject of major criticism.

The first area of criticism of Mezirow is found in Collard and Law’s (1989) charge that Mezirow has fused his work with that of Habermas improperly. In particular, they are concerned that Mezirow detaches the notion of emancipatory education from political and social action, and locates it within the liberal democratic tradition. Collard and Law charge
that "his failure to address adequately questions of context, ideology, and the radical needs embodied in popular struggles denies perspective transformation the power of emancipatory theory (pp. 105-106, cited in Taylor, 1993, p. 54). A related critique is Hart’s (1990) criticism of Mezirow’s failure to deal adequately with the issue of power. Hart criticizes Mezirow for adopting a conception of emancipatory education which views communication as power free. Because he derives part of his theory from Habermas, she feels that he is obliged to deal with the issue of power more directly.

Other criticisms of Mezirow aim at the theory itself. In opening up a third area of criticism, Clark and Wilson (1991) claim that Mezirow fails to understand how context impacts learning and that his work is decontextualized. They critique his early study of women returning to learning for its failure to see changes in the women in “their historical and sociocultural context, thereby limiting our understanding of the full meaning of those experiences” (p. 78. cited in Taylor, 1993, p.56). This, they claim, overemphasises the individual dimension of learning at the expense of the social.

Riesman’s (1986) and Taylor’s (1993) critique of Mezirow’s goal of developing a universal adult learning theory is a fourth area of criticism. Riesman (1986) is alarmed that Mezirow seems to want to impose “western” ways of knowing upon other cultures pointing out that the ideas of Kohlberg, who Mezirow cites as an influence in his theory, have been found to be ill-suited to studies in non-western settings. In particular, there are "psychological studies in Africa which seriously call his ideas into question" (1986, p. 79, cited in Taylor, p.59). Taylor points out that Mezirow tries to “have it both ways” (p. 58); Mezirow looks for universal conditions and rules for learning while using Clifford Geertz
(1973) to demonstrate that certain social and psychological processes are shaped culturally. Mezirow himself, Taylor suggests, is torn between the view that a universal learning theory is possible and a belief that culture can play a dramatic role in shaping learning, noting that "culture can encourage or discourage transformative thought" (Mezirow, 1991, p. 3). I take issue with other aspects of this statement in Chapter six.

Taylor also takes issue with Mezirow for privileging critical reflection in transformative learning "implying it as a 'higher' form of learning not found in all individuals and cultures" (p. 59). This opens up a fifth area of criticism. Taylor asks if critical reflection might arise in one culture but not another. He also raises the related question of who decides what is the best way of knowing. He cites Mezirow's use of Bruner's (1973) work suggesting that lower-class individuals are less able to reflect critically, as an indication that Mezirow has an "elitist and somewhat class-oriented approach" to the matter of critical reflection (p. 60).

Mezirow's work continues to attract critics, notably Mark Tennant (1994) and Michael Newman (1994). Tennant argues that Mezirow does not distinguish between normative and fundamentally transformative development. Tennant differentiates these two on the basis of the location of the development. In the former it occurs within the taken-for-granted world-view, and in the latter this world-view is replaced by a new world-view. A more fundamental disagreement with Mezirow is that psychological and social codes cannot be separated as he implies they can in treating perspective transformation as an individual activity. Tennant believes that the boundaries between the social and the psychological are blurry; in his view "development needs to be understood
as an essentially dialectical process, with constant interaction between the person and the social environment” (p. 235). He asserts that Mezirow fails to accept this.

Newman (1994) takes issue with Mezirow’s view of reflection. He praises Mezirow for contextualizing it in perspective transformation, thus rescuing reflection from the trend to diminish it by decontextualizing it. However, Newman is critical of what he claims is a separation of reflection and action. He contrasts Mezirow’s conception of reflection in perspective transformation with Paulo Freire’s conception of reflection in conscientization. He claims that perspective transformation does not “impel the learner actively into the flow of social history in the way Freire argues that conscientization will” (p. 240). He is critical of Mezirow giving the learner the option of reintegration with the society as it is. Moreover, he is critical of Mezirow’s broadening of the concept of social action to include change in “more personalized contexts of the family or personal relations” (p. 240), or in large contexts like organizations, communities and nations. In doing so Newman claims “we rob it [social action] of the smell of the streets and the clash and clatter of radical protest” (p. 240). I agree with Newman that Mezirow’s conception of reflection is not socially contextualized enough, and it is for just this reason that I introduced the work of Stephen Kemmis (1985) into my conceptual framework.

In summing up Mezirow’s work, Taylor (1993) acknowledges that: “it is quite apparent that he has stimulated discussion and excitement in the field” (p. 53). In tempering his praise of Mezirow, Taylor writes:

However his theory is only a beginning. It still has gaps that need to be addressed, such as: (a) the separation between personal transformation and social action; (b) the issue of reaffirmation and resistance during a
transformative learning experience; (c) the contradictions that exist between constraining institutions and their supposed practice of emancipatory education; (d) the contradictory nature between its proposed universal application and its emphasis on cultural determinism. Most important, is the paucity of empirical research in the testing of transformative learning theory. (p. 53)

Taylor (1995) has now found 26 studies that have used Mezirow's work; he may now find that his last sentence needs revision. However, the other "gaps" remain. The most recent criticisms of Tennant (1994) and Newman (1994) address point "a" above. This study addresses at least two of these gaps, making a contribution to understanding the "relationship between reaffirmation and resistance in the transformative learning experience" and critiquing how the question of cultural influences on transformative learning is put.

Mezirow and emancipatory learning

The most consistent criticism of Mezirow, (Collard & Law, 1989; Hart, 1990; Newman, 1994; and Tennant, 1994), is directed at the political dimension of transformative learning theory, particularly the alleged misuse of Habermas. Mezirow has answered these critics, explaining his understanding of emancipatory learning, and justifying the use of that concept in a more broadly defined context of social action. Mezirow's (1989) response to Collard & Law's criticism outlines his position. For Mezirow, perspective transformation is the result of critical reflection of both an individual and sociocultural nature. These two levels may be separated: "Transformative learning is profoundly intersubjective but it is not exclusively group" (Mezirow, 1989, p. 173). In
reply to his critics, Mezirow also argues that definitions of social action are often unclear and fail to recognize the multiplicity of situations in which transformative learning occurs:

There can be no linear relationship between transformative learning and social action; there are many kinds of transformative learning and many kinds of social action. Transformative learning experiences which result in changes that are epistemic and psychic may not logically lead to collective action at all and may only very indirectly be a product of a specific social practice or institutionalized ideology. (Mezirow, 1989, p. 174)

Mezirow (1991, 1994) defines more clearly how he understands emancipatory learning and emancipatory education. He acknowledges his differences with Habermas by recognizing that: “When Habermas points to critical social theory as the process of systematic inquiry most appropriate to study material related to our emancipatory interest, my impression is that he is referring to critical reflection upon cultural, or more specifically, ideological assumptions in the domain of communicative learning” (p. 89). Mezirow widens the scope of emancipatory learning:

The emancipation in emancipatory learning is emancipation from libidinal, linguistic, epistemic, institutional or environmental forces that limit our options and our rational control over our lives, but have been taken for granted or seen as beyond human control. These forces include the misconceptions, ideologies, and psychological distortions in prior learning that produce or perpetuate unexamined relations of dependence. Although for Habermas emancipatory interest focuses upon critical self-reflection, critical reflection clearly constitutes an integral element in the process involved in validating learning about the environment and other people as well as ourselves; that is, both instrumental and communicative learning. (Mezirow, 1991, p. 87)

Mezirow carries this view of emancipatory learning over into his view of emancipatory education. The goal of such education is to “help learners move from a simple awareness of their experiencing to an awareness of the conditions of their
experiencing (how they are perceiving, thinking, judging, feeling, acting - a reflection on process) and beyond this to an awareness of the reasons why they experience as they do and to action based upon those insights” (emphasis in original, 1991, p. 197). Mezirow (1994) clarifies his understanding of action, noting that reflective action “often involves overcoming situational, knowledge and emotional constraints” (p. 226). Action in transformation theory also means making a decision, though this does not necessarily result in behaviour change. Some transformative learning, especially that related to sociolinguistic perspectives, “will result in learners motivated to take collective social action to change social practices, institutions or systems” (Mezirow, 1994, p. 226).

Mezirow (1994) returns to his argument offering a broader, more “liberal” definition of this social action than his critics:

But social action may also pertain to working in concert with like-minded individuals as well as collectively to effect cultural as well as political change in interpersonal relations, families, organizations, communities or nations. Transformative action may also address change in oneself and the way one learns. Education for communicative competence involves cultivating the learner’s ability to negotiate meanings and purposes instead of passively accepting the social realities of others. (Mezirow, 1994, p. 226)

It is important to remember that Mezirow is primarily interested in developing a learning theory rather than a philosophy of education. In responding to Michael Newman’s criticism that his work is inadequate compared to Freire’s, Mezirow points out that Freire offers an educational philosophy: “his sole focus is on using education to effect social action” (p. 231). Mezirow claims his efforts to develop a learning theory must address different aspects of learning to “describe an abstract, idealized model, the elements and dynamics of which may or may not be applied in a variety of social and educational
settings” (p. 231). Still, Mezirow makes clear his links with Freire’s work: “I view conscientization as a description of the same learning process as perspective transformation but limited to critical reflection on the premises of beliefs pertaining to sociolinguistic codes” (1994, p. 232).

Stating that his work involves developing a learning theory does not mean that Mezirow works without a concern for the political context. He writes: “I have indicated my conviction that an adult educator cannot be neutral in his or her conviction that social change is necessary to create a society in which all adult learners may participate fully and freely in critically reflective discourse” (Mezirow, 1994, p. 226). He calls on educators to be “partisan activists” in creating such a society. However, he defines this ethical commitment as one to help learners think for themselves, not to convert them to views not their own. While calling it “a serious distortion to characterize perspective transformation as an approach limited to ‘personal growth’” (p. 232), he does see transformative learning as deeply personal. Transformative learning aims to foster adult development which ultimately means “the progressive realization of an adult’s capacity to achieve a broader, more discriminating, permeable, integrative understanding of his/her experience as a guide to action” (p. 226).

**Other Views of Reflection**

Reflection is a central feature of Mezirow’s theory. While he has devoted considerable attention to this, his view is only one of many. Others have written on reflection: Boud, Keogh and Walker, (1985); Boud and Walker (1992); Boyd and Fales
(1983); Dewey (1933); Habermas (1971, 1972); Kemmis (1985); and Schon (1987) included. Newman (1994) has both praised and criticized Mezirow's work on reflection. He has praised Mezirow for contextualizing reflection, but criticized him for divorcing it from action. In his criticism of this aspect of Mezirow's work, Newman points to Freire's (1970) conception of conscientization as a praxis: the fusing of action and reflection, as better model of reflection. To carry this critique forward, I will use the related work of Stephen Kemmis (1985) rather than Freire (1970). Kemmis (1985) offers a recent and very complete treatment of reflection as praxis. Coming from a more "political" perspective than Mezirow offers, Kemmis' (1985) conception attends to reflection's role in collective life:

My central thesis is that reflection is a political act, which either hastens or defers the realization of a more rational, just and fulfilling society. (p.140)

Reacting against definitions of reflection as something quiet and personal, he argues that it is active, social and political. As a result, it can often lead to praxis (practical action) which Kemmis sees as the "the most eloquent and socially significant form of human action" (1995, p. 141). He makes these points regarding reflection:

1. Reflection is not a purely "internal" psychological process: it is action-oriented and historically embedded.

2. Reflection is not a purely individual process: like language it is a social process.

3. Reflection serves human interest; it is political process.

4. Reflection is shaped by ideology; in turn it shapes ideology.
5. Reflection is a practice which expresses our power to reconstitute social life by the way we participate in communication, decision making and social action. (Kemmis, 1985, p.140)

I will elaborate on these five points. First, Kemmis sees reflection as a dialectical process, looking both inward at thoughts and feelings and outward at the situations people find themselves in. He describes it as a kind of “meta-thinking” in “which we consider the relationship between our thoughts and action in a particular context” (p. 141). The second contention that reflection is, like language, a social process, rests on three observations. First, reflection is a conversation in our minds. Second, the ideas and understanding we use are socially constructed. Third, action, the fruit of reflection, has meaning and significance in the world. Reflection is thus dialectical in a second sense: “the thinking of the individual is shaped by a social and cultural context, and the social and cultural context is itself shaped by the thought and actions of individuals” (p.144).

His third contention, that reflection is political, is guided by Habermas’ (1972) notion that each of three forms of knowledge, the technical, the practical and the emancipatory, is accompanied by interests which “guide and shape the constitution of knowledge” (p. 144). The first two of these are related to instrumental learning, the last to communicative. In each of these three forms, reflection is political since the self-interests of different groups will not be uniformly served. Kemmis argues a fourth point: since “reflection is an action-oriented, historically embedded, social and political process, it should be clear that reflection is ideological” (p. 147). Kemmis defines ideology as “the cultural and cognitive ‘residue’ of values, attitudes and beliefs which sustain a society
economically, socially and politically by reproducing the social relations of production in society" (p. 147). As meta-thinking, reflection challenges taken-for-granted ideas, problematising them and calling into question prior expectations and orientations to the social world and social order.

Kemmis’ final and most important assertion is that reflection is the process by which our experience can be transformed and radical breaks can be made in “our practices of communication, decision making and action” (p. 148). By pausing to reflect, we raise the possibility of changing, through our thoughts and actions, the social world. Viewing reflection, then, as practice, sets it apart from being a mere mechanism of information-processing, or simply a way that we construct an interpretation or meaning. We can see it instead as a power in the “analysis and transformation” of the situations we find ourselves in. It allows us to express “our agency as the makers of history as well as our awareness that we have been made by it” (p. 149).

This position of Kemmis is a particularly challenging one. In the process of culture learning, the degree to which people choose to assimilate new patterns reflects their capacity for agency over passivity. The emergence of “agency” is the fruit often associated with emancipatory learning (Habermas, 1972, 1974). Kemmis assigns a more important role than Mezirow does to reflection as the process that fuses the social and the individual, and gives us a stronger concept with which to understand culture learning as a form of learning in which the social and individual dimensions are deeply bonded.
Mezirow and Learning and Language

Mezirow only touches upon the relationship between language and learning in his work. However, since the relationship of learning language and learning culture is an important aspect of this study, this lack of attention to the relationship between language and learning in Mezirow is problematic. In order to support analysis of this aspect of culture learning in my study, I have turned to the work of Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schiefflin (1986) on language socialization. Before outlining their work, I will briefly precis what Mezirow has to say about language.

Mezirow (1991) identifies two stages in learning, a prereflective or perception stage “prior to the use of language to form categories” (p. 15). The second stage, comprehension, is defined as learning through language: “cognitively” construed meaning involves the interaction of speech with the following elements: (1) the habituated symbol system embodying the ideal types, (2) the image in the mind, and (3) the external stimuli. He continues that “the idealized symbol system is projected onto the external stimuli to form the image in the mind” (p. 19). Language reflects the “qualities, connections and relationships” of our symbolic models. These symbolic models provide “classifactory schema pertaining to such properties as direction, dimension, and sequence...” , they “enable us to make value judgements” and make possible “basic-level categories (George Lakoff, 1988) of the “most common concepts with which we are familiar: objects such as ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘table’, ‘chair’; events such as ‘party’, ‘fight’, ‘race’; and states such as ‘dreaming’, ‘joking’, ‘acting’ (p. 21). Mezirow goes on to describe these categories as
being between superordinate categories such as animals and specific categories such as breeds of dogs.

Mezirow makes an important distinction between schema that depend on language and those that do not: “transformation theory differentiates the functions of classificatory schema that pertain to time, space, direction, dimension, sequence, and entity from those that depend on the mastery of language” (p. 49). Language based schema differ since “language does not merely describe things and events that we experience but constructs them” (p. 58). This idea is expanded in Mezirow’s one direct reference to language learning:

Transformation of linguistic meaning perspectives is inherent in language learning. New expectations (meaning schemes) can bring forth changes in concepts because they contradict beliefs embedded in the meaning of old words. We learn by understanding a problem for which we prepare a “theory” or meaning scheme. This provides us with new words that we can use to state a new problem. The new problem is solved by a new meaning scheme that provides some specialized language, and so on. (Mezirow, 1991, p. 61)

The text immediately following makes clear that Mezirow is referring to first language learning here. In the analysis of the data from this study, I will argue that second language learning may transform existing expectations and meaning schemes, leading to new expectations and beliefs consistent with the culture embedded in the new words. (Mezirow makes only indirect mention of non-verbal communication, coupling the phrase “language and gesture” in descriptions of how we understand each other in communicative learning.) Ochs’ and Schiefflin’s model of how first language learners acquire language and culture provides a basis for tentative conclusions regarding how this same phenomenon might happen in second language acquisition.
Language Socialization

Language socialization embraces two major areas of socialization. Ochs and Schiefflin define socialization as “an interactional display (covert or overt) to a novice of expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting” and assert that “social interactions themselves are sociocultural environments” (1986, p.2) The two major areas of socialization they are concerned with are: first, socialization through the use of language; and second, socialization to use language. In their view, language and culture are interrelated and thus the process of acquiring language is embedded in the process of the socialization of knowledge. As Ochs puts it:

In making sense out of what people are saying and in speaking in a sensible fashion themselves, children relate linguistic forms to social situations. Part of their acquired knowledge of a linguistic form is the set of social relations that it forms in social situations, just as part of their acquired knowledge of a social situation includes the linguistic forms that define or characterize it. (Ochs, 1986, p.2).

In the analysis of the data in this study, I will draw links between the above assertion for children and how adults also acquire knowledge of a set of social relations in the social situations in which they acquire their second language.

In understanding this theory of language socialization, the distinction between language acquisition and language socialization is important. The former refers to an understanding of the nature of linguistic competence at different developmental points. In contrast, language socialization “has as its goal the understanding of how persons become competent members of social groups and the role of language in this process” (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986, p. 167). This means investigating how language is the medium or tool in
the socialization process, or how acquiring the appropriate use of language is part of acquiring social competence. The theory that language socialization advances is shaped within a sociocultural framework for language acquisition. This is a complex project since it involves developing an “understanding of how sociocultural knowledge, linguistic knowledge and the process of socialization and language acquisition impact on one another” (Ochs, 1986, p.4). The discussion that follows will look at the way children (and adults): 1) acquire language and culture through interactional routines, 2) acquire knowledge of status and role through language use, and 3) acquire the capacity to express affect. This third category does not have as obvious a counterpart for adult second language and culture learners, although they may find that they adopt different ways of expressing certain affect in the context of their second language and culture.

In understanding how language and cultural knowledge are acquired through interactional routines, “indexing” is a key concept. Languages at all levels of grammar and discourse have constructions that signal information on how the interactants see their own and the other’s positions. Indexing is not a simple matter. Aside from mapping a given contextual feature onto a linguistic form and/or linguistic forms and contextual dimensions, it also organizes past and present knowledge: “an index or set of indexes may recontextualize the past and precontextualize the future, as well as contextualize the communicative context of the moment” (Ochs, 1986, p. 212). It is also important to understand the role of activity in this process. An activity is a behavioral unit, but it is also a process. This characteristic brings together the linguistic and sociocultural phenomenon. Ochs writes: “Children’s language practices are partially engendered by grammatical
discourse, sociocultural and general cognitive structures. However, these structures of knowledge are created in part through children’s participation in temporally and spatially situated practices and activities” (Ochs, 1986, p.17). This reinforces the point that language socialization scholars make that “ordinary conversational discourse is a powerful socializing medium” (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986, p.172)

Understanding how children acquire knowledge of status and role through language socialization involves understanding how the organization of communication carries cultural concepts of social status as well. This is an important aspect of socialization: Clancy (1986) restates Scollon’s (1982) observation that “children’s acquisition of culture specific patterns of communication is an extremely important part of their socialization, since such patterns serve as one of the primary sources of information on cultural values concerning social relationships and interaction” (p. 213). One way in which this acquisition happens is that children come to understand their social identities through interactions with others.

Understanding how children are socialized to express affect through language is another important finding of research in language socialization: “Every society has ways of viewing moods, dispositions and emotions, including how they are displayed verbally and nonverbally and the social conditions in which it is preferable or appropriate to display them” (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986(b), p.8). One of the ways in which affect is linguistically coded by adults, children and siblings is teasing; one study in Baltimore found “teasing reveals the high value placed on interpersonal and verbal skills of self-assertion and self-defence, especially in situations of threat and conflict” (Schieffelin and Ochs,
1986(a), p. 180). Other studies have shown how “affect-laden grammatical forms [are found] in teasing, shaming, challenging and assertions of love and sympathy in interactions with Western Samoan children” (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986(a), p. 180).

The process of language socialization plays a very important role in the acquisition of a culturally appropriate communicative style. Katriel (1986) refers to this as expressing the affective patterning, the moral and aesthetic “tone” of a culture (p. 1). Acquiring these culture-specific patterns of communication is an essential feature of children’s socialization. These patterns are a primary source of information on cultural values, especially those related to social relationships and patterns of interaction (Clancy, 1986).

In a study of language socialization of Japanese children, Clancy (1986) noted the acquisition of aspects of communicative style in Japanese in the interaction of mothers and young children. She observed how the norms of verbal agreement and empathy in interaction between mothers and children prefigured in “amae” or the presumption of benevolence in human relations. In this way children are being socialized to the Japanese communicative style which “places speaker and hearer in the prototypical social relationship, namely one that is based on ‘amae’; the values reflected and reinforced in this mode of communication” (Clancy, 1986, p. 217).

One important issue to explore before we leave the concept of language socialization is whether socialization is seen as a one way process or not. Even though most socialization takes place through recurrent participation in interactions with more knowledgeable members of the community, this does not mean that such interaction is passive. In fact, “a critical part of this interaction dynamic is the active learner. When we
examine children’s productions and participation in interaction, we see abundant evidence that they too are agents in many respects” (Schieffelin, 1990, p. 18). Moreover, we know from studies in the ethnography of speaking that the addressee’s identity affects the form and content of all utterances (Schieffelin, 1990). The process may be only minimally two-way, but socialization in the concept of language socialization is nonetheless an active, interactive, two-way process. Language socialization is not limited to understanding the socialization of children, but involves language socialization across the life span, and, moreover, it is not limited to speech; it also investigates the relationship between literacy and society (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986). For the purposes of this study, it is important to understand that adult culture learners too are not passive in the learning process; they are continually making choices about what they will accept or reject in the “socializing” environment. They too, like children, have effects on this environment and thus modify the process of “socialization.”

This chapter has presented the work of Mezirow as it has evolved over nearly 20 years. It has outlined the major criticisms of Mezirow’s (1991) theory of transformative learning, and discussed his response to those criticisms, particularly those related to his understanding of emancipatory learning and emancipatory education. (It should be pointed out that no major criticism has been directed to Mezirow’s (1991) conceptions of four forms of learning and Newman’s (1994) criticism is the first directed at the three forms of reflection, the aspects of his theory that provide the foundation for my study.) Further, this chapter has presented Stephen Kemmis’ (1985) work on reflection and Ochs and Schieffelin’s (1986a, 1986b), Ochs’ (1986), and Schieffelin’s (1990) work on language
socialization. The work of these three scholars will be used to investigate issues that emerge in data analysis where Mezirow’s theory fails to provide an adequate basis to do so.
CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

This chapter begins by discussing the design of the study, and outlining the methodology. The following section on data collection presents the advantages of using journals to gather data. An overview of the study, providing details on the participants, their circumstances and their tasks follows. The subsequent section on data analysis includes a description of the techniques and procedures of grounded theory research used in the data analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of issues related to collaboration with the students who participated in this study.

Background to the study

This study has its origins in an earlier study (Barbour, Berwick & Whalley, 1992). The earlier study evaluated an immersion program in Japan designed for twenty-four high school students from British Columbia. Contracted by the Ministry of Education of the Province of British Columbia, this study evaluated both the language learning and culture learning component of the three-month immersion program and served as a pilot study for my dissertation. The collaboration with my colleagues Ross Barbour and Dr. Rick Berwick, the principal investigator, in the earlier study added immeasurably to the quality of thinking that went into this one.

My study here, however, goes far beyond the 1992 study. This study was conceived to develop a theory of culture learning rather than evaluate a program. It also uses a much wider range of data than the initial study. Another significant difference
between the two studies is the inclusion of Japanese youths in this one. The Japanese students were included for two reasons. First, I wished to expand the dissertation population. Second, I wanted to explore the issue of whether differences in the process of culture learning might emerge as a result of the cultural differences between the Japanese and Canadian students. In preliminary data analysis, however, the similarities in the process of their culture learning emerged so strongly that I have treated them as a single population in investigating culture learning.

I will turn now to a discussion of the choices in methodology and method that were made in the design of this study. These decisions were made in regards to the pilot study and then carried over into the expanded study reported on here. I use the term methodology to refer to a theory and analysis of how research should proceed. A methodology is associated with an epistemology or theory of knowledge. I use the term method to refer to a technique for gathering evidence.

**Design of the study**

Few studies of culture learning have been done. Finding an appropriate methodology has been a major problem. Hanna et al. (1980), while designing an evaluation of bilingual programs, discovered that a methodology for studying the culture learning aspect was especially difficult to identify. Finding that “there appeared to be little literature available on culture learning,” the researchers concluded that “a methodology for evaluating the cultural impact of the exchange was not obvious” (p. 25). Rather than design one, they abandoned that part of the study.
A decade later, there was still little literature available. However, the expanding interest in qualitative methodology during the 1980s suggested new possibilities for a study of culture learning. Qualitative design is often described as non-experimental, meaning that it is an alternative to traditional models with control groups and other measures designed to manipulate variables (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). With the promise of more naturalistic features, such an approach seemed ideal to study students' experience over several months in an environment some distance away from the researcher. There are, of course, several approaches within the qualitative tradition. Among these, constructivist inquiry (also called naturalistic or interpretivist inquiry), seemed to match most closely the questions I wanted to ask and the kind of data I thought I could gather.

Constructivist inquiry

Constructivist inquiry is characterized by a set of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. These are discussed in turn below.

Ontological assumptions include the idea that (a) reality is multiple and constructed in context; (b) mutual shaping influences provide a better explanation of causality than cause and effect; (c) research should aim to create idiographic knowledge, that is, knowledge “in the form of pattern theories, or webs of mutual and plausible causes expressed as working hypotheses or temporary time and place bound knowledge” (Lincoln, 1990, p.77).

Epistemological assumptions include the ideas that: (a) the relationship between the researcher and the subject is a subjective one - the influence of one on the other cannot be separated; and (b) the human being as researcher is ideally suited to naturalistic inquiry
because of a capacity for "responsiveness, adaptability and insight" (Guba & Lincoln, 1986, p. 148).

Methodological assumptions include the ideas that: (a) studies should use hermeneutic, dialectic methods aiming to reconstruct the world as it is in the minds of the people constructing it (Guba, 1990); (b) studies should use methods appropriate "to capture realities holistically, to discern meaning implicit in human activity, and to be congenial to the human-as-research-instrument" (Lincoln, 1990 p.71); (c) the research design should arise out of continuous analysis of data "performed on a daily basis, so that insights, elements of theory, hypothesis, questions, and gaps can be identified and pursued" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.209); and (d) since these methods are hermeneutic and dialectical, they should be concerned with conflict as well as consensus. Several features of constructivist enquiry made it especially attractive to me. First, the assumption that reality is multiple and constructed in context was attractive since the study of culture learning is essentially a study of how learners construct reality in context. Moreover, the use of the journal in my study rather than a survey instrument or statistical package, arises from its congeniality to the human beings as the chief instrument of research and interpretation. Third, the commitment to having the research design arise out of continuous data analysis was compatible with my interest in using the procedures and techniques of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in data analysis. Finally, since I expected to find that culture learning was not always a benign process, a methodology that recognized the importance of conflict as well as consensus was particularly attractive.
Data Collection

Having made a decision to pursue a qualitative research design of a constructivist type, I next had to choose a method to gather data. In general terms, such a method needed to meet at least two general criteria: first, it needed to record both the content of intercultural experience and second, it needed to reveal the process of interpreting that experience. Specifically, I needed to gather detailed accounts of students’ daily experiences in another culture. Moreover, these accounts were required to reveal the learning process involved in selecting, describing and interpreting that experience.

Four possibilities for such a method occurred to me. First, assuming I could have regular access to people during an intercultural experience, I might conduct a series of interviews. Second, I might ask participants to take photographs and then explore those images with them to gain insight into how they were constructing a model of another culture. Third, I might have learners keep written records in journals or letters. Fourth, I could use these methods in combination.

I chose the third option primarily because no studies of culture learning had used this method before and because I believe it has a number of strengths for gathering data for this kind of study. These strengths will be discussed below. Other advantages of this third option include the ability to manage a larger number of students than an intensive interview based study might. It is also fiscally possible. The fact the Canadian students were in Japan meant that telephone interviews would be my only option and this would be prohibitively expensive. I had neither the time, money nor permission to go to the sites in Japan where the students were studying. The Japanese students were nearer at hand and I
was able to interview them at regular intervals. This was done in place of having them write a letter to me, an artificial task since they saw me weekly.

Journals as a source of data

A journal-based study appealed to me in part because they have been useful in research in other areas. In particular, in the early 1980s diaries (I use the term journal for reasons discussed later) were used successfully in studies of second language acquisition (Bailey & Ochsner, 1983). Diaries provided introspective reports on affective factors, strategies, and perceptions arising in the language learning experience. They revealed “facets of experience which are normally hidden or largely inaccessible to an external observer” (Bailey & Ochsner, 1983, p. 190). Typically the diarist supplemented her observations of events with introspection and self-observation. The capacity to reveal “hidden” or “inaccessible” facets of experience was especially important in my choice of a diary format for obtaining the data I needed.

The journal format used in this study was piloted in the 1992 study evaluating the three month immersion program in Japan (Barbour, Berwick & Whalley, 1992). My colleague, Dr. Rick Berwick, and I designed a format we called a “culture learning journal”. We used this term rather than “diary” to avoid students associating it with a diary as a mere descriptive record of the minutiae of daily life. This journal featured a split-page format. This format is familiar to some as the dialectical notebook used by writing teachers. This format has also been used by B.C. teachers on study tours to Asia as reflective journals in projects directed by Dr Ted Aoki. (personal conversation, Summer, 1991). The split page encourages a reflective stance to experience by inviting writers to
return to entries recorded on one side of the page and revise them on the opposite side of
the page.

Since a split page journal encourages students to reflect on their experience and
interpret it, the journal entries include both a description and interpretation of experience.
Each account describes an event in Japan or Canada but also reveals, under the surface of
this description, the process that shaped the interpretation of the experience. The journal
entries can be seen as short narratives of experience, each with a story line. This
characteristic allies them to anecdote, which Webster defines as “a usually short narrative
of an interesting, amusing or biographical incident.” D’Israeli described anecdotes as
“minute notices of human nature and human learning” (cited in Van Manen, 1990, p.120).
The journal entries thus share with anecdote its power as a methodological device which is
used widely in phenomenological research (Van Manen, 1990).

Van Manen argues that methodologically, the story or anecdote allows us to create
“a hybrid textual form ...combining the power of philosophic or systematic discourse with
the power of literary or poetic language” (1990 p. 120). This textual form avoids some of
the shortcomings of abstract theoretical discourse:

Anecdote particularizes the abstracting tendency of theoretical discourse: it
makes it possible to involve us pre-reflectively in the lived quality of concrete
experience while paradoxically inviting us into a reflective stance vis-a-vis the
meanings embedded in the experience. The important feature of anecdotal as
well as phenomenological discourse is that it simultaneously pulls us in but
then prompts us to reflect. (Van Manen, 1992, p. 121)

Like anecdote, the journal entries, while telling us about something particular, also
address more general themes of learning. The stories or anecdotes are not literary
embellishments: they are examples and topics for practical theorizing. Van Manen draws on the work of Rosen (1986) to elaborate on the power of anecdotal narrative:

1. to compel: a story recruits our willing attention;
2. to lead us to reflect: a story tends to invite us to a reflective search for significance;
3. to involve us personally: one tends to search actively for the story teller's meaning via one's own;
4. to transform: we may be touched, shaken or moved by story; it teaches us;
5. to measure one's interpretive sense: one's response to a story is a measure of one's deepened ability to make interpretive sense. (Van Manen, 1990, p. 121)

These parallels between journal entries and anecdotes allow us to appreciate the potential journals have as a source of research data.

Overview of the study

Following the decision to use journals as the primary means of data collection, the students were asked to keep “culture learning” journals in a special format. In the belief that it would provide an adequate amount of data and would be manageable for the students, the students were asked to make entries in their journals twice a week.

Guidelines for the contents of the letters were identified and a frequency for the letters determined. The conditions for interviewing the Japanese students were established.

Consistent with accepted standards for ethical research, students were given full documentation on the purpose of the study, asked to sign informed consent forms, and assured that they could withdraw from the study at anytime. They were also assured that
their real names would not be used in connection with any journal entry that was subsequently made public. Throughout this dissertation, all the names used are pseudonyms and the names of host-families members that might lead to the identification of students have been changed. All the documentation above was given to the Japanese students in Japanese.

Major features of the study are detailed below:

1. *The participants*

23 Canadian and 24 Japanese young adults participated in the study. There were 12 young women and 11 young men in the Canadian group and 13 young women and 11 young men in the Japanese group. The Canadians were high school students in grade 11 with an average age of seventeen while the Japanese students were second year University students with an average age of nineteen. The Canadian students had completed at least one year of Japanese language study. The Japanese students had studied English for several years in high school and university.

2. *The receiving Institutions*

The Canadian youths were enrolled as students in Japanese high schools: the young women in a Tokyo high school and the young men in a Kyoto high school. The Tokyo high school enrolled only females while the Kyoto high school was coeducational. For a period of three months, the students attended both Japanese language classes and content classes along with their Japanese counterparts. They also participated in extra-curricular activities such as sports clubs. Numerous field trips to points of interest both
locally and throughout Japan were programmed for them. They returned home at the end of their three-month stay.

The Japanese students all studied in a community college in British Columbia. For the first term, the students were enrolled only in English as a Second Language classes. They had contact with Canadian peers in other settings, however. For example, they participated in extracurricular activities such as ski trips with Canadian youths. They also participated in the Language Partners Program at the college. This activity paired them with Canadian students willing to help them learn English, in exchange for receiving help learning Japanese. In 1992 the Japanese students stayed in Canada for eight months and in 1993 they stayed for one year. They participated in the study during their first three months in Canada only.

3. *The host-families*

Both the Canadian and Japanese students were billeted individually with host-families. Families accepted students as quasi-family members for differing periods: three months for the Canadians and up to one year for the Japanese students. The students shared most aspects of family life including recreational activities. In some cases, they shared bedrooms with host-brothers and sisters. The economic circumstances of these families, in both Japan and Canada, varied widely. Some families had modest incomes; others were quite wealthy. Other circumstances varied as well. Some families had no children living with them so that the students were “only children” in effect. Other families had children ranging in age from infants to teens. In both Japan and Canada, some of the families lived together with grandparents.
4. Pre-program orientation

All the students had a brief orientation program (three days for the Canadians, two for the Japanese students) before they left. These programs provided them with logistical information, such as information on the schools they were going to attend, and on homestay and transportation arrangements. These programs also included information typical of orientation programs for exchange students. There were short sessions presenting cultural “do’s and don’ts” and presentations on cultural values, as well as general brief introductions to concepts in intercultural communications.

These orientation programs formed only a very small part of the students’ background knowledge of the countries they were going to. Students already had much greater stocks of socio-cultural knowledge about each other’s countries than a short orientation program could provide. Both groups of students had studied the target language for at least a year. Almost all the Canadian students had some contact with Japanese students in their schools. The Japanese students had taken an introductory course in intercultural communications. Both groups of students had been exposed to a great number of images of the other culture through the media. Japanese youth culture draws heavily on images from popular American culture through movies and television, fashion and music. Canadian youth have contact with Japanese culture through martial arts clubs, popular movies, such as the Karate Kid, and increasingly Japanese animation.

5. The journal keeping task

The main requirement for all participants in the study was to keep a “culture learning” journal for a period of three months. (Appendix A for the format). The Canadian
students were asked to keep their journals in English while the Japanese students were asked them to keep them in Japanese. Both groups were given a set of guidelines for this task (Appendix B) and provided with specially prepared journal pages. The instructions printed directly on the pages of the journal itself asked them to “record an interesting, puzzling, irritating or otherwise significant experience which has occurred during the week.” The same instructions appeared in Japanese for the Japanese students. These directions were followed by another set directing students to interpret their experience: “Next, try to interpret or explain the experience.” Again, instructions for the Japanese students were in Japanese. It was suggested that students try to make an entry twice a week.

The journal pages incorporated a split page format; there was space to make an initial entry on the left hand side and an equal space to add comments later on the right hand side. Students were asked to return to their entries every two weeks and reexamine their initial interpretation of events. The right hand side of the journal page, bore these instructions: “Reexamine the experience two weeks later. Has your interpretation changed? Record the changes.”

In addition to the journal task, the Canadian students were asked to write a letter to me every third week during their stay. A set of guidelines for the letter (See Appendix C) suggested that they summarize their experience, and write about how well they felt they were adjusting to life in Japan. I regarded the letters as personal correspondence and responded to each. After the journals and letters were mailed to me, they were photocopied and returned. The photocopied material was put onto disk for later analysis.
A need to limit the data, together with a decision to make the main focus of this study the process of making meaning from identifiable events in daily life, meant that these letters have been used only occasionally in this study, primarily to clarify the content of the journals.

The Japanese students were asked to undertake an additional task. They were asked to write a monthly summary of their experience. Their guidelines for this summary were similar to those given to the Canadian students for their letter: they were asked to summarize their experience and write about how they were adjusting to life in Canada. Their journals and summaries were delivered to me at regular intervals, photocopied and returned. The photocopied material was translated into English by an experienced native Japanese translator, and put onto disk for later analysis.

Since the Japanese students were in close proximity to me, I was able to interview them once a month. This interview was casual and took the form of a conversation about the student’s experience over the last month. I used the interview as the format to discuss their monthly summaries. I conducted these interviews in Japanese. Although they were taped, they were not translated and transcribed and they were not used in the study for the same reason that I did not use the Canadian students’ letters.

6. The data

The journals of the 47 participants in the study provided close to 500 separate entries describing, interpreting and reinterpreting daily events. In addition, the study generated about 100 letters and monthly summaries; in these, students summarize their experience in Japan and Canada and comment on the process of adjusting to life in either
country. Some of the journal entries are a sentence or two long while others are one or two paragraphs long. One of these accounts, Shigeru’s, appears in the Introduction. As a summary of three months’ experience, that particular account is typical neither of Shigeru’s journal nor of other journals. The two entries below, the first by a Japanese, the second by a Canadian, are typical of journal accounts.

Account #1:

Yesterday and the day before yesterday and three days ago people visited my host family. However, they came to the house before I knew it and they were gone before I knew it, even though I was at home. In Japan, when people visit us, there is some kind of tension at home. And, we receive our guests at the door and give them a send off at the door. We also provide some kind of warm reception to our guests. It was surprising for me to see guests making a cup of coffee by themselves in my host-family’s house. Is it because they often have guests? Don’t they need to give any hospitality to their guest because they are so close to each other? But I still feel strange when the guests are gone before we knew it. (Rie, 05/10/93)

Account #2:

My host mother’s friends come over quite often and my host parents always offer them something to eat and drink. The friends always say “sumimasen” over and over again and bow and sometimes refuse the offer. This shows (I think) that the people want to be sorry for taking the offer and opposing in my host family’s life.

(Kyla, 06/29/92)

On reflection the next day she adds:

I think that the friends were just showing their thanks for the offer and that the Japanese are more thankful to other people than Canadians are.

(Kyla, 06/30/92)

These two entries are typical of journal accounts. They consist of two parts. Like most entries, they first record an event or sometimes a series of events in daily life that caught the student’s attention. This is followed by an attempt, not always completed, to
explain that event in terms of the host-culture as students currently understand it. In some cases the event and interpretation are written on the same day; at other times students have thought about it for a while and written it later. Sometimes they used the left hand side of the page to reinterpret the experience; at other times they simply continued the entry on the right hand side, ignoring the journal instructions.

The students kept their journals in English or Japanese. Except for two Canadian students, these languages are the first languages of the students. Account #1 above was originally written in Japanese. It was later translated into English by a trained Japanese translator, formerly employed by the Foreign Press Club in Tokyo. A selection of her translations were rechecked by others and no inaccuracies were apparent. In a few cases, I have edited her translations for grammatical matters. The Canadian students’ journal entries have not been edited at all. I have left them as they were written; they were not edited for grammatical errors or other writing problems.

Data analysis

Data analysis drew on the procedures and techniques associated with grounded theory research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded theory research is a variety of constructivist enquiry that is designed to derive theory inductively from the phenomenon under study itself, or theory that is “discovered, developed and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 23). In the course of data analysis, the study incorporated an existing theory to form a conceptual framework. Such a development is not uncommon in
grounded theory research. The principal procedures and techniques associated with grounded theory continued to guide data analysis within the framework provided by Mezirow’s (1991) theory of transformative learning.

**Procedures and techniques of grounded theory:**
*Questioning and Constant comparison*

Grounded theory research proceeds through three stages of coding: open, axial and selective. Although each stage has distinct features, the line between each is sometimes difficult to strictly demarcate. Two analytical procedures are central to this coding process: making comparisons and asking questions. The former is particularly important and is the reason why grounded theory is often referred to as “the constant comparative method of analysis” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 101 - 116). The role of these two procedures is “to help to give the concepts in grounded theory their precision and specificity” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 62).

Questioning is a technique designed to open up the data and stimulate the researcher to think of potential categories, properties and dimensions. General questions begin with the standard: Who? When? Where? What? How? How Much? and Why? Temporal questions of frequency, duration, rate and timing are also important. Sometimes these questions are asked of extended chunks of data, but at other times the analysis of a single sentence, phrase or word may raise a question. Constant questioning opens up the data since one question leads to another and brings into focus categories that are initially hidden within the texts.
Constant comparison is the second procedure used to open up the data. Strauss & Corbin (1990) identify a number of types of comparison that can be useful. Comparison is not only a technique that is used between units of data but also inside units. The “flip-flop technique” (1990, p. 84) involves comparing the extremes of a dimension, that is, it compares the picture that emerges when one aspect of the phenomenon under study is identified as important with the picture that might emerge if it were treated as unimportant. Exercises such as this are designed to have researchers think analytically rather than merely describe the data. Moving from description to analysis means seeking out relationships not readily apparent within the data. The use of systematic comparison of two or more phenomena also helps researchers to break out of initial patterns of thinking. Another technique is the “far-out comparison” (1990, p. 90). Here the researcher stretches her imagination to think of analogous situations that may not be readily apparent. As analytical techniques, these are intended to prevent the researcher from taking anything for granted, and pushing on from descriptive levels of analysis to theoretical levels, and finding the hidden links between parts of the data. Constant comparison and questioning are carried out at every stage of coding.

Coding procedures in the study

The first stage of data analysis is open coding: “The process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 61). At this point, categories for both content and process related to culture learning were generated through constantly comparing journal entries for similarities in content and for similarities in the process of culture learning. I began this procedure by using The
Ethnograph, a software program designed to aid qualitative analysis; however, like many other researchers, (QUALRS.internet discussion Oct - Nov, 1994), I found the use of this kind of software unsatisfactory for two related reasons. First, it tends to atomize the data, drawing the researcher into coding smaller and smaller parts of the data merely because it is possible, and not necessarily because it is useful. This excess of coding happens at great cost in time. Second, the narrow focus on small bits of data often blunts sensitivity to larger contexts.

After experiencing frustrations with The Ethnograph, I decided to sort my data by simply using the cut and copy functions available with WordPerfect 5.1. This still offered a more sophisticated technology than the traditional “scissors and paste” techniques that qualitative researchers used to sort their data into categories. Using WordPerfect, I grouped journal entries into progressively narrower files. This process concluded when the journal entries were grouped into categories embracing entries that could not meaningfully be grouped in smaller units. Dozens of these categories, both content and process, were created in this way.

Theoretical sensitivity

Throughout the entire grounded theory process, but particularly in the early stages, theoretical sensitivity plays an essential role in shaping the direction of research. This sensitivity is defined as “the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and the capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn’t” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 42). Theoretical sensitivity may arise from a number of sources: the literature, professional experience or personal experience. After finishing the
open coding, a mostly descriptive phase which took approximately two months, and
before proceeding to axial coding, I began to review my personal and professional
experience and my reading in an exercise in theoretical sensitivity. As detailed in the
Introduction, I brought over twenty years of professional and personal experience with
culture learning to data analysis. Throughout the process of data analysis, I had continued
to read the literature related to culture learning. The exercise in theoretical sensitivity was
an opportunity to look for links between what I had read, what I knew from experience
and the data in order to identify the outlines of a theory which might be emerging from the
data.

A few weeks into the open coding process, I discovered Jack Mezirow's (1991)
theory of transformative learning. Two months later, I concluded that the categories
generated by open coding, intuitions grounded in my professional and personal experience
and additional reading pointed to Mezirow's (1991) theory of transformative learning as a
useful conceptual framework with which to continue this study.

The introduction of Mezirow's work meant that theory was no longer being
developed primarily by induction; elements of testing theory now emerged. This is not
anathema in grounded theory, indeed for certain purposes it is recommended:

If, after completing your study, you find that your emergent theory has some
relationship to already recognized and developed theory, then you may want
to use yours to extend the other. However, it is important to understand (as
we note below) that as your theory evolves, you can incorporate seemingly
relevant elements of previous theories, but only as they prove themselves to
be pertinent to the data gathered in your study. Given what we have just
explained, it makes no sense to start with received variables (categories)
because these are likely to inhibit or impede the development of new
theoretical formulations, unless of course your purpose is to open these up
and to find new meanings in them. (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 49-50, emphasis mine)

The direction of my study shifted sharply toward evaluating aspects of Mezirow’s theory as relevant to developing a theory of culture learning. The project of “opening up” aspects of Mezirow’s theory and finding “new meanings in them” became central. This had a strong influence on what I did at the axial coding stage.

Axial coding

The second step in grounded theory procedure is axial coding: “A set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 96). In my axial coding, I searched for connections between the categories that had emerged during open coding and Mezirow’s forms of learning and reflection. Through using the cut and copy function of WordPerfect 5.1, based on the technique of constant comparison, I grouped related journal entries within new categories corresponding to the four forms of learning and three forms of reflection. This process built on relationships between journal entries and categories, mostly related to content at this point (e.g. accounts of learning non-verbal behaviour in the family), established at the open coding stage.

It is customary in research of this nature to have others verify certain of the steps in the data analysis procedure. Once I had completed the exercise of axial coding, I had graduate students familiar with my work and my senior supervisor repeat the exercise of matching individual journal entries with forms of learning and forms of reflection. Their feedback suggested that no major revisions needed to be made in this analysis.
Selective coding

The final step in the grounded theory procedure is selective coding, a process of "selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 116). This stage is sometimes called integration and is similar to axial coding, but undertaken at a higher level of abstraction. At the selective coding stage the findings of the study begin to emerge, since selective coding is designed to "systematically develop it [earlier work] into a picture of reality that is conceptual, comprehensible and grounded" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117). Strauss and Corbin identify several steps in the process of selective coding: explicating a story line; relating subsidiary categories around the core category through a paradigm relating categories at the dimensional level, validating relationships against the data, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development (pp. 117-118).

The story line, identifying the core categories, or the most striking feature of a study, emerged out of Mezirow's theory. The four forms of learning and three forms of reflection formed the core categories. The second step, relating subsidiary categories to these core categories, meant creating sub-categories within them. Taking the journal entries related to each form of learning and each form of reflection, I identified, by constant comparison, types within each form of learning or reflection. These types included smaller, dimensionally related categories. The criteria for these typologies follows the grounded theory practice of relating sub-categories to the core category by identifying, through a paradigm, similar "conditions, context, strategies, consequences" (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990, p. 124). This step identified important properties and dimensions within each of the forms/categories themselves, making them richer and denser. It also clarified relationships between the categories and sharpened the distinctions between each of Mezirow’s forms of learning and forms of reflection.

The stage of validating the theory against the data involved “testing” Mezirow against the sub-categories that had emerged. In the process of developing subcategories, or typologies, within the core categories, it was obvious that parts of Mezirow’s theory were inconsistent with findings emerging from data. Problems with validating aspects of his theory in the context of culture learning thus emerged. This allowed me to pursue the task of opening up Mezirow’s theory and looking for ways to re-cast his theoretical categories to fit the data better. This process led me to “rewrite” parts of Mezirow’s theory. It also allowed me to identify other theory that might add density and specificity to categories where Mezirow’s work could not. In particular, the work of Ochs and Schieffelin (1986) opened up the sub-categories that related language learning and culture learning, and the work of Stephen Kemmis (1985) later opened a up a discussion of how the sub-categories related to forms of reflection link the individual and the social.

Record keeping

Along with the practice of coding, certain kinds of record keeping and “theorizing” activities are important in grounded theory research. Keeping memos, in particular, is an integral part of doing grounded theory research. Throughout my data analysis, I kept memos. In the parlance of grounded theory, “memos” are records of analysis related to theory formulation. There are several types of memos: code notes, theoretical notes,
operational notes, diagrams and logic diagrams (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Most of my memos were code notes containing summaries of my coding, including concepts and themes and indications of progress. Others were theoretical notes that recorded intuitions and deductions about the possible connections between dimensions, categories, relationships and processes emerging in data analysis. I also kept operational notes recording possible leads to follow in chasing the theoretical implications of these connections. I made few memos of the logic note or logic diagram types; these diagram relationships and trace out analytical relationships. Mezirow’s work provided a framework that addressed the aspects of theory building that logic notes and logic diagrams usually help with.

Thus far, this chapter has focused on what might be called the “technical” aspects of this study. Before concluding, I will discuss an issue related to what might be called the “political” dimension of this study: the issue of collaboration with students.

Collaboration in research

In recent years many qualitative researchers have become committed to the idea that “subjects” in research ought to benefit from the research and be regarded as partners in the process (Lincoln, 1990). Thus the involvement of the “subjects” in qualitative research is often an ongoing process beginning in the data gathering phase, continuing through the data analysis phase and even, in some cases, continuing during the writing and presentation of the research. Action research (Kemmis & McTagg, 1988; Carr & Kemmis, 1986) is perhaps the best known example of research which is designed in this way.
This change from viewing research participants as "subjects" to viewing them as "collaborators" arises from differences between the quantitative and qualitative research traditions. The older, quantitative tradition, embracing subject-object dualism, demands a sharp distinction between the researcher and the researched. Further, it is concerned with "protecting" the research subjects who are treated "as something between priceless Ming vases sent out for cleaning and children" (Lincoln, in Eisner & Peshkin, 1990, p.289). Moreover, quantitative research and its tradition of logical positivism includes a set of attitudes towards the research subject that fosters the belief on both sides that the researcher knows best. Qualitative research, particularly where the purpose of inquiry is to understand a socially or personally constructed meaning, brings the researcher and researched into a very intense and intimate relationship. In this relationship each shapes the other to some degree. As Lincoln (1990) puts it, "the transformation of the researched from an "object needing protection" to a person empowered to determine the direction and focus of participation requires a new axiology" (in Eisner and Peshkin, p. 290). This includes the notion of the "researched" as collaborator.

This study included a role for the participants as more than passive "subjects," but the collaboration was limited. The students did not participate in the data analysis phase at all. However, during the initial, data gathering phase, I was in very close touch with the participants. This was mutually beneficial. It allowed me to establish a relationship with the students and this contributed to the quality and consistency of the data that I gathered. Regular contact with the students allowed me to influence the quality of the journals since I could comment on what I found useful and listen and learn from the students about what
they thought was important in the journal writing task. In this way, the journal format, focus and contents were partly a matter of negotiation.

I think the students also benefited from this limited collaboration. The advantage for the Canadian participants was having a friendly presence back home who was a source of encouragement and help with the journal when writing was difficult. I'd like to think that for some students keeping the journal became a more positive experience since they knew I was keenly interested. The Japanese students were studying at my own college so our relationship was closer. For the Japanese students, I was a sympathetic ear available on a regular basis if needed. From time to time, I discussed their experience in Canada generally, and their culture learning specifically. I could not do this with the Canadian students. In the end, however, I think collaboration was much more beneficial to me than to any of the students. I feel very indebted to both the Canadian and Japanese students for making this dissertation possible. I never missed an opportunity to let them know how much I appreciated their participation in the project.

Once the period of keeping the journals ended, further contact with the participants was almost non-existent. There are practical reasons for this. I put their journals aside for almost two years. Moreover, the Canadian students returned to homes all over B.C. and then went on to other pursuits: some went to university, others to work and a few went travelling. One Canadian student was a student of mine in a Japanese course the following summer, but I lost touch with the others. The Japanese students returned to Japan. While I have met a few of the students who have returned to Canada on short visits, I have not maintained regular contact with them.
Despite these logistical difficulties with keeping in touch, a question still remains of why I have not attempted to involve the students in the data analysis phase. This is both a political and methodological question. The answer to the political question is that I don’t feel that researchers are obliged to involve participants in all phases of research unless negotiating entry is contingent on such a premise, or unless the topic of research is politically sensitive and participants have a material interest at stake. I did not negotiate entry into this project with students on the basis that they would be involved beyond the data gathering stage. I am not even sure they would have found that an attractive prospect. Moreover, the focus of this research is not such that it would harm any of their material interests. However, given the interest I have developed in action research in the years since I first designed this study, if I were to do this study again, I would try to involve the students in all phases of the study. I would also try to build opportunities for the Japanese and Canadian students to meet with and work with each other. There was no contact between the Japanese and Canadian students involved in this study; they have a lot to teach each other.

A reply to the methodological question is not so easily made. In retrospect, collaboration with the students during the data analysis phase would have been very beneficial. Many problems of interpretation that emerged while matching the journal entries to theoretical categories may have been more easily resolved through discussing the different options with the author of the entry. Moreover, I would like to have tested Mezirow’s ideas of transformative learning and my intuition of its soundness against the students’ understanding of their own experience.
Another area where continued collaboration with students would have been especially helpful is in understanding the experience of perspective transformation. By talking to those students who I think may have experienced such a transformation, I might confirm whether that experience was as significant as I thought. Conversely, checking with students whose journals I felt did not suggest any particularly significant learning experiences could confirm or challenge this conclusion. I would also like to find out how they would define a significant learning experience. Collaboration with the students during the phase of data analysis and writing might have opened up avenues for students to gain additional benefits from keeping the journals. I recognize it was a difficult, time consuming task, requiring considerable self-discipline. Through changes in my teaching practices, presenting workshops to other teachers, and talking to current students about this research, I think I have already made this research useful to other students. Making this research useful to the students directly involved would have been mutually satisfying. Collaborating on the analysis and writing up of this research might have revealed ways to achieve this goal. I also have a lingering curiosity: I have always regretted that I did not keep a journal as a youth in similar circumstances. I wonder if these students will find their journals a source of value and pleasure two or three years later. Will they in the future? Collaboration may have provided an answer to these questions, or even determined a positive answer.

This chapter has addressed a number of “technical” issues relevant to the choice of methodology and method for this study. In particular, it has discussed the nature of constructivist inquiry, provided an overview of the study and evaluated the use of journals
in research generally. It has also detailed the procedures and techniques associated with
grounded theory research which was used in data analysis. It has concluded with a
discussion of a “political” issue: the advantages and obligations for collaboration with the
participants in research projects generally, and in this one specifically. The next chapter
discusses the findings of the study.
CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS

The purpose of this qualitative study is to develop a theory of culture learning. By culture learning I mean the process by which people make meaning from everyday experience in another culture and construct a general framework for understanding that culture. The data for the study was journal accounts kept by Canadian high school students resident in Japan for three months and Japanese college students resident in Canada for four months. These journals record and interpret daily events in terms of the students’ current stock of sociocultural knowledge related to their new culture of residence.

The four forms of learning and three forms of reflection identified in Jack Mezirow’s (1991) theory of transformative learning provide categories for data analysis. Forms of learning and forms of reflection are interrelated in each act of making meaning. The practice of reflection “drives” learning and the form of reflection and the form of learning are interdependent, although in order to provide a clear focus for analysis, each is treated separately here. This chapter is divided into two sections:

- **Section I** presents an analysis of how the forms of learning function in the context of culture learning.
- **Section II** presents an analysis of how the forms of reflection function in the context of culture learning.

Journal accounts were selected for analysis in one section or another on the basis of different criteria. In both sections, accounts selected record experience in school,
among peers and in public spaces including subways, shops, buses and recreational facilities. Different accounts were used in each section. Selection was determined by whether the account was more revealing of a form of learning or a form of reflection. This division is artificial: accounts include both. Separate treatment of these two aspects is an editorial decision made in the interests of a clear presentation of findings.

APPLYING MEZIROW IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE LEARNING:

SECTION I: FORMS OF LEARNING

This section presents an analysis of culture learning using, as analytical categories, Mezirow’s (1991) four distinct forms of learning: (1) learning through meaning schemes; (2) learning new meaning schemes; (3) learning through the transformation of meaning schemes; and, (4) learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives. The distinction between these forms arises from the manner in which meaning schemes and meaning perspectives are applied habitually, modified, or transformed in the process of making meaning. Each is also associated with a form of reflection.

Mezirow (1991) describes meaning schemes and meaning perspectives as “boundary structures” through which experience is perceived and comprehended. Meaning perspectives are broader, made up of: “uncritically assimilated habits of expectation” (1991, p. 4). Meaning schemes, narrower manifestations of meaning perspectives, are “made of up specific knowledge, beliefs, value judgements, and feelings that constitute interpretations of experience” (1991, p. 6). Together these meaning schemes and perspectives form the two dimensions of a meaning structure that acts to “shape, focus
and delimit the process of learning.

In the analysis following, each form of learning is elaborated upon in a new context. In the analysis of the journal accounts a typology emerges. This typology opens up and gives new definition to each of the four forms of learning within the context of culture learning. A fifth form of learning emerged in the data analysis as important in the context of culture learning, learning through resisting the transformation of meaning schemes and perspectives. The table below identifies the major categories of the typology that emerged in this section.

**Table 1: A Typology of Forms of Learning in Culture Learning**

1. LEARNING THROUGH MEANING SCHEMES

2. LEARNING NEW MEANING SCHEMES
   2.1 Learning through new meaning schemes by extending stereotypes
   2.2 Learning through new meaning schemes by modifying stereotypes

3. LEARNING THROUGH TRANSFORMATION OF MEANING SCHEMES
   3.1 Transforming meaning schemes through rejecting stereotypes
   3.2 Transforming meaning schemes through recasting basic categories
   3.3 Transforming meaning schemes through learning elements of non-verbal communication
   3.4 Transforming meaning schemes through learning language
      3.4.1 learning culture through indexing
      3.4.2 learning culture through communicative style
LEARNING THROUGH PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMATION.

4.1 Transforming perspectives through a single incident

4.2 Transforming perspectives through cumulative incidents

5. LEARNING THROUGH RESISTING TRANSFORMATION

5.1 Resisting the transformation of meaning schemes

5.2 Resisting the transformation of meaning perspectives

1. Learning through existing meaning schemes.

This form of learning is "learning to further differentiate and elaborate the previously acquired meaning schemes that we take for granted, or learning within the structure of our acquired frames of reference" (Mezirow, 1991, p. 93). This form is characterized by habitual and stereotypic responses to information received through pre-existing, known categories of meaning. This may be described as "recipe learning" or rote learning. In the context of culture learning, this form of learning involves minimal change in our interpretation of new experience. When existing meaning schemes are used to interpret experience in another culture, the result may be a failure to understand new experience in a situationally appropriate way, and misunderstanding may result in a breakdown in communication (Barna, 1991).

I now turn to a discussion of three accounts of learning through meaning schemes that emerged from the data. Perhaps because the number of accounts of this type is limited, no sub-types emerged. However, each of the three examples that follow have some noteworthy variations. The first account appears to have resulted in bruised feelings
arising from what I interpret as a failure to understand the experience in a situationally appropriate way. The second account of learning through meaning schemes reveals what could be interpreted as a feeling of solidarity through the discovery of cultural similarities. The third account seems to involve the articulation of a meaning perspective as well as meaning schemes.

The first account, written by a young Japanese man, Shigeru, reveals some misunderstanding that arises through applying an existing meaning scheme in another culture. Shigeru relates a confusing experience with the family of a Canadian friend:

I went to Victoria Saturday morning and stayed overnight. My friend there is a student at U. Vic. and was in Japan for a few months. She returned to Canada a month prior to my arrival. So I met her after an interval of two months. Because she was staying with a busy host-family in Japan, I always took care of her. (I was not a member of her host-family.) So she received my assistance during her stay in Japan. However, I didn't hear any expression of appreciation from her parents (in Victoria). If they knew that I took care of her when she was in Japan, I think they should have expressed some appreciation. I do not intend to put them under any obligation, but it is not unusual to express appreciation in Japan.

(Shigeru, 09/12/92)

Shigeru expects his help to be acknowledged. As he himself points out, this expectation is common in Japan. His expectation is conditioned by a culture where little distinction is made between a family and its individual members and where recognition of mutual assistance is important (Doi, 1973). In contrast, the family of the female friend may consider thanking someone for looking after their adult daughter as infringing on her independent status.

In the second example below, Alice, a young Canadian woman, recognizes similarities between herself and her Japanese counterparts through using existing meaning
schemes to make meaning of the new experience:

Today was sports day. It took me two hours to get there, and it was raining. But today I really noticed that Japanese girls are no different from Canadian girls. There was lot of emphasis put on sports day. There was a practice session put on, opening and closing ceremonies etc. But when the events actually started, everyone was just in there to have fun.

(Alice, 05/16/92)

Alice’s account is short on detail, but I am particularly struck by one line in her observation: “today I really noticed that Japanese girls are no different from Canadian girls.” Regrettably, she doesn’t indicate what she noticed that led to this conclusion. In contrast to her fellow students accounts of this same event, her account is especially interesting. Her fellow students describe the sports day as a very traditionally Japanese event and mostly commented on the cultural differences they observed. (These accounts appear later.) Alice, however, does not record differences she might have noticed, focusing instead on similarities between herself and the Japanese girls. This difference points to the very subjective nature of culture learning.

This third entry by Roberta, a young Canadian woman, differs from the two above.

The excerpt below is taken from a letter Roberta wrote to me near the end of her stay in Japan:

Japan is a different place for each person. They all experience different things and see things in different ways. Just try to remember that the people here are just like you and me. They live according to the way they know - and nothing’s really strange about the way they are. They happen to be very trustworthy people and some are kind, some are nasty - they have the same different attitudes but just see life from a different angle. Everybody does what’s best for them - it seems here - reaching the top is important. Happiness with me is good enough - but even in Canada people strive for success.

(Roberta, 06/01/92)
Roberta’s account involves a broad focus that might be described as learning through meaning perspectives, in contrast to Alice, who seems to be learning through meaning schemes. Roberta’s meaning perspective is her personal philosophy expressed above as: “people here are just like you and me”. This quote illustrates a position that many sojourners take: no significant differences exist between people generally, and the sojourner and their foreign hosts specifically. People with this perspective believe their existing meaning schemes are adequate, with some elaboration, to interpret new experience with people from another culture. Apparent differences are seen as superficial expressions of underlying similarities: “they just see life from different angles”. Roberta’s strong feeling of sharing a common humanity with her hosts is obvious. For her, culture and cultural differences do not appear to be meaningful in understanding individual members of another culture.

It was not possible to develop a typology from the very limited number of journal entries which illustrate learning through meaning schemes. There are several possible reasons why there were so few examples of this form. First, because of its habitual nature, this kind of learning may simply not often come to the attention of the learner. Second, the fact that learning through existing meaning schemes confirms similarities, rather than identifies differences has some implications. Similarities may be intrinsically less interesting than differences and therefore get mentioned less. Finally, the students may have concluded that they were supposed to record differences. This wasn’t my intention. However, my instructions did ask students to “record an interesting, puzzling, irritating or otherwise significant experience which has occurred during the week”. Unfortunately, in
the case of some participants, including Roberta, this may have been interpreted as
instructions to look for and only write about differences. For a variety of reasons then,
journal accounts of learning through meaning schemes may appear to be under-
represented in the journals. This did constrain the possibility for a typology within learning
through existing meaning schemes to emerge.

2. Learning new meaning schemes

This form of learning creates “new meanings that are sufficiently consistent and
compatible with existing meaning perspectives to complement them by extending their
scope” (Mezirow, 1991, p. 92). Learning new meaning schemes extends the existing
meaning perspective but does not fundamentally change it. In fact, the meaning
perspective may be strengthened since the new meaning scheme makes possible new areas
of understanding and “resolves inconsistencies or anomalies within the older belief
system” (p. 94). Journal accounts where students appear to be extending existing meaning
perspectives through the addition of new meaning schemes are plentiful. In the context of
culture learning, this form of learning can be most easily understood in relation to the
concept of stereotype. A stereotype is “any categorization of individual elements
concerned with people which mask differences among those elements” (Brislin, 1981, p.
44). Stereotypes may also be understood as meaning perspectives which are derived from
a limited base of personal experience, which categorize people by lumping them into
homogeneous groups, and which are held uncritically. The individual elements or traits
associated with the stereotype may be understood as meaning schemes.
In many accounts, stereotypes appear to be the means by which students are interpreting new experience. However, this is not the whole story. Students are also modifying stereotypes, and in some cases rejecting them. Two distinct types of learning new meaning schemes emerge: first, learning new meaning schemes through applying stereotypes unreflectively; second, learning new meaning schemes through modifying stereotypes.

2.1 Learning through new meaning schemes by applying stereotypes

In many journal entries students appear to use stereotypes of the host-culture to interpret new experience. Three closely related stereotypes emerge from the data: (1) Japanese society is more conformist than Canadian society; (2) Japanese society is organised around collectivism while Canadian society is organized around individualism; (3) Japanese are restrained in their expression of emotion, while Canadians are not. Both Canadian and Japanese youths used these stereotypes to interpret new experience. These stereotypes can be considered meaning perspectives, and the specific elements of the stereotypes can be thought of as meaning schemes. For example, a stereotype that all Canadians are very individualistic might have an associated meaning scheme that teenagers have no loyalty to their family.

2.1.1 Learning new meaning schemes that extend stereotypes related to conformity:

By making meaning from the differences in fashions, Alice and Satsuki, a young Japanese woman, extend their stereotype of Japan as a conformist society and Canada as less conformist:
Conformity is big in Japan. On the trains all of the businessmen wear suits. There is little variety. All of the school children wear uniforms. Everyone dresses the same. Even the uniforms the boys wear seem to be preparing them for when they are adults. Most of the uniforms are similar to suits. People don’t like to stand out and be individuals here.”

I think in Japan maintaining your status is very important. If you say the same as everyone else then you don’t make mistakes. Someone who stands out and does things differently is more likely to be treated differently.”

(Alice, 04/06/92)

Echoing Alice’s observation, Satsuki writes:

The cold days have lasted for a while. But Canadians wear whatever they like. Some of them wear short sleeved shirts. In Japan everyone wears the same kind of clothes because if we do something different from other people, we feel left out. The difference between the national character of Canada and Japan can be seen very clearly.

(Satsuki, 05/23/93)

2.1.2 Learning new meaning schemes that extend stereotypes related to individualism and collectivism:

Paula, a young Canadian woman, provides a good example of learning through a new meaning scheme associated with individualism and collectivism:

I knew Japan was based on groupness rather than on individuality but I didn’t expect such strong ties as I’ve seen among groups. In groups of friends they decide together what to do. If someone disagrees they look for something that pleases all. Also in family life the members are very close. My host sister once didn’t feel like going to play tennis with the family and when the father found out he got out of the car, ran into the house, and made her come to play tennis. I wonder what he said to make her change her mind?

(Paula, 05/15/92)

Paula has extended her stereotype that Japan is a group society through learning a new meaning scheme in making meaning from an event in her host-family.

Below, Kenji, a Japanese male, extends his stereotype of Canadian society as placing little importance on the group:
In the cafeteria I found a big difference in attitude between Canadians and Japanese. In Japanese groups, when a person is speaking, every other member of the group listens to the speaker. In Canadian groups in contrast, not all members pay attention to the speaker, and some members talk off the topic. I understand if they talk only to the person next to them in keeping with the topic of the whole group, but what I saw is that Canadians did not care much about being a group. I don’t think what I saw would happen among Japanese groups.

(Kenji, 11/24/92)

2.1.3 Learning new meaning schemes that extend stereotypes related to constraining or openly displaying feelings:

The third stereotype commonly observed in the journals was related to a contrast in the manner in which Canadians and Japanese express feelings. The following account is an example of such a stereotype. Setsuko, a young Japanese woman through learning a new meaning scheme, extends a stereotype that Canadians display feelings of pride openly.

I thought about this matter when I stayed at my friend’s house. In Canada, they display large portraits of their children. The house where I stayed for a month last year and the house where I am now staying also display family photos (especially of children) everywhere in the house. Japanese don’t have a custom to enlarge their kid’s picture and display them where everyone may see. I guess Westerners have strong feelings that they like to show off their children to other people. In the Japanese case, they tend to hide their feelings of wanting to show off their children to other people while Westerners like to show off their children openly.

(Setsuko, 05/29/93)

In the entry below Oscar as part of his attempt to understand the meaning of touching in Japan, extends the stereotype that Japanese do not express feelings openly. He writes:

I recently had an embarrassing experience. I started getting into a lull, and I started treating my Japanese friends like my Canadian friends. Big mistake. Several times I touched people to get their attention; for example, touching somebody’s wrist and asking what time it was. She told me that she didn’t like me touching her and that in Japan they don’t touch each other.
This is quite different. In Canada we use touching to help communicate to a friend deeper meanings. Here they don’t touch as much, especially between opposite sexes. It may be that they don’t touch because touching would be a show of emotion and that is an important Japanese difference. They don’t show their emotion as freely as we do in Canada.

(Oscar, 06/26/92)

Besides being an example of the extension of a stereotype, Oscar’s account also serves as a reminder of how new meaning schemes are often developed in painful or embarrassing circumstances. Extending the stereotype that Japanese express emotion in different ways helps Oscar understand why this, to him, innocent act was problematic. Aversion to touching becomes another example of the expression of feeling restrained by custom in Japan. The examples above show how the new meaning scheme extends the scope of the related meaning perspective. The new meaning schemes learned to make meaning of clothing choices, or the role of the group in conversation, or a family decision making process, or children’s pictures on a wall, or a touch, extend the scope of the meaning perspective related to conformity, or individualism and collectivism, or the open or constrained display of emotion. No meaning perspective is changed; each is strengthened.

2.2 Learning through new meaning schemes by modifying stereotypes

Learning through new meaning schemes isn’t just a matter of the unreflective extension of stereotypes. Stereotypes may be modified in the process of making meaning of a new experience. The following two accounts illustrate how thoughtfully new meaning schemes may be learned and stereotypes modified.

Hiroo, a young Japanese writes:
Reviewing my journals, I found that I wrote repeatedly on the same topic: individuality. This may not be a very new discovery, but this is what I was most impressed with. In Canada individuality is more highly valued than in Japan. This is a big difference between the two countries, but it doesn’t mean that I suffered from so called culture shock. The general opinion that Japanese are not self-assertive is not always true. Even though we live in the same culture, everyone has their own culture. I found that I attempted to tie every difference to individualism. Having such preconception - difference is derived from individualism - is not good, I thought. Still it is true that I felt strong individualism in this society.

(Hiroo, 07/08/93)

The second of these accounts is by Ursula, a young Canadian woman:

Mejiro high school has a university attached to it. The girls do not have to wear uniforms. I’ve noticed that among them, and also the other young (females especially) on trains etc., there is a definite “style” of clothing, much distinguished and uniform than in Canada.

Maybe the explanation is as simple as the idea that the particular brand has been successful in its advertising, making that style the “in” way to dress. Young people are often very concerned about the way they look, and how they fit in, so it seems likely that it is the same here, only more extreme than in Canada. It seems strange though: in Canada, young people dress the same way within their social group (headbanger, skater, prep etc.) Here except for the obvious minority of alternative people, everyone is in the same style.

(Ursula, 04/20/92)

Neither student jumps to conclusions or engages in blunt stereotypic thinking.

Both exercise caution in interpretation, and Hiroo in particular shows an awareness of the problem of making judgements on the basis of stereotypes. Both students are aware of their stereotypes, and Ursula in particular thinks over alternative explanations for what she has observed. Neither Hiroo nor Ursula reject their stereotypes, but they have modified them by thinking them through and identifying exceptions that make their stereotypes less general.

Other students also rejected stereotypes after thinking about them as Ursula and
Hiroo did. These cases provide an example of learning through transforming meaning schemes.

3. Learning through transformation of meaning schemes

This form of learning involves reflection on assumptions and occurs when “we find that our specific points of view or beliefs have become dysfunctional, and we experience a growing sense of the inadequacy of our old ways of seeing and understanding meaning” (Mezirow, 1991, p. 94). When our existing meaning schemes are not adequate to explain or make sense of either our new or old experiences, they must be transformed if we are to make meaning of experiences. In Mezirow’s (1991) theory, the transformation of a meaning scheme results in the previous meaning scheme being abandoned since it is no longer useful for understanding new experience. This has important implications for the applicability of this form of learning in the context of culture learning. This point will be taken up more fully later. The transformation of meaning schemes does not necessarily lead to the transformation of meaning perspectives, but an accumulation of related transformed meaning schemes can lead to such a broader transformation.

Learning through the transformation of meaning schemes is common in culture learning. Many sojourners and travellers can recall experiences overseas of sudden realization that, like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, they were “not in Kansas anymore.” At these moments we realize that our existing meaning schemes are not adequate to make meaning from our new experience. These are anxious moments when things just don’t make sense. Records of such impasses in the journals are sometimes accompanied by expressions of initial confusion and discomfort. These disconcerting moments may be
trivial, but they may also account for reports that up to 30% of personnel sent overseas fail to do well in assignments (Storti, 1990).

Examples of learning through transformed meaning schemes are the most common type in the journals. In analysis of the journals four sub-categories emerged: (1) rejecting stereotypes; (2) recasting basic categories; (3) interpreting unfamiliar elements of non-verbal communication; and, (4) learning language and communicative style.

3.1 Transforming meaning schemes through rejecting stereotypes

Perhaps the clearest examples of learning through transforming meaning schemes are accounts wherein students’ interpretation of new experience subvert their own stereotypes. This subversion occurs when the stereotypes simply cannot make situationally appropriate meaning of the new experience. The rejection of a stereotype is not always accompanied by evidence of new interpretation for the experience, but the conditions in which a new meaning scheme can arise have been created.

In the account below, Fiona, a young Canadian woman, becomes aware that her existing stereotype is not consistent with her interpretation of a new experience in her host-family:

Right now, my host-dad is vacuuming and cleaning! I’m so surprised! I was under the assumption that the women were in charge of the home and the men went out of the home to work. It’s true that my host-mom cooks all of the family meals, but it seems they share the cleaning duties. I’m very impressed. I plan to ask my Canadian friends if their host-dads clean because I would like to know if this is the exception to the rule.

I find it very interesting that so many of the assumptions I was under have turned out to be false. It makes me feel a little bad, too, and I hope that because of it, I’ll become more open to learning about their traditions and culture.

(Fiona, 04/11/92)
3.2 Transforming meaning schemes through recasting basic categories

Another type of learning through transforming meaning schemes that emerged from the data is related to shifting everyday experiences from one category of meaning to another. We can think of the meaning scheme as the category. For example, students may redefine a certain food, perhaps in terms of the categories “dinner” or “snack” food, or redefine the acceptable place to wash socks, or the appropriate status of the family pet. Each account below illustrates the transformation of a meaning scheme related to a basic category.

In this account, Yukihiro, a young Japanese man, transforms a meaning scheme that interprets pizza as a “snack” food to recategorize it as a “dinner” food:

Dinner tonight was Pizza. Pizza is served at least once every two weeks. I cannot believe it. I get bored eating pizza after trying a couple of pieces. But I have to eat a lot so I won’t be hungry later. I asked my friend whether he had pizza for dinner or not. He said he sometimes had. Pizza is never served as dinner in Japan. Rather it is a kind of snack. I think that there is a big difference in food culture between Japan and Canada.”

(Yukihiro, 07/20/93)

The second example of this form shows Mitsuo, a young Japanese man, learning through transforming a meaning scheme to understand the bathroom and kitchen in categories differently than he is accustomed to:

I heard this from one of my friends. He was going to wash his “little laundry” (socks and underwear) in the bathroom. Then the host came and told him. “This is a place to wash your body. Take the laundry to the kitchen and wash it there.” I didn’t feel good about washing my socks and other things in the kitchen.

Perhaps people here think bathrooms are for people, and kitchen is for objects. I think that is why he was scolded.

(Mitsuo, 12/02/92)
A third example of learning through transforming meaning schemes records Mitsuo's efforts to understand the status of the cat (and standards of hygiene) in his family:

The other day, I put the dishes in the dish washer to help my host-mother. She came and asked me to put the cat's plate in together with the dishes. In Japan, we usually don't wash people's and cats' dishes together. (There are exceptional cases though.) I wonder if people here think that cats and humans are the same being?

(Mitsuo, 10/10/92)

Mitsuo's question at the end of the account reveals the process of recategorizing; the categories cats and humans are the choices within Mitsuo's meaning schemes. The answer to the question will determine if the scheme is transformed or not.

The accounts above may appear trivial and we may wonder whether they really are examples of variations between cultures. At first glance they appear just as likely to be variations between families. However, I consider these accounts examples of culture learning since it is clear that the students regard the discoveries as representing variations across cultures, not between families. In each account, there is obvious overgeneralization in the process of trying to transform a scheme and shift common objects and events into a new category. This overgeneralization is probably unavoidable in the early stages of culture learning.
3.3. **Transforming meaning schemes through learning elements of non-verbal communication**

Non-verbal communication is an important aspect of intercultural communication. Some studies have placed the contribution of non-verbal message content to meaning as high as 65% (Birdwhistle, 1970, p. 148). While in the past there has been no consensus on what the full range of non-verbal behaviour might be (Knapp, 1972), current definitions, for example, Samovar and Porter’s (1991), include physically based features such as eye contact, gesture, and touch, and more abstract features such as conceptions of time and space. The former conception may determine, among other things, attitudes to punctuality; the latter may determine such things as the comfortable distances between people in conversation. Japanese and Canadian journals contain accounts of students making meaning of non-verbal communication. Three topics emerge from the data: eye contact, personal space, and touch.

**3.3.1 Use of eye contact**

Students learned to understand different conventions of eye contact through transforming meaning schemes. When meaning schemes that had adequately interpreted the meaning of eye contact or its absence proved to be dysfunctional in the new culture, they transformed these to make meaning from their new experience.

The entry below by Teresa, a young Canadian woman, is typical of interpretations Canadian students made of eye contact in Japan:

I have noticed that people here don’t usually make eye contact or smile to one another on the street. In Canada even strangers may nod on the street and they usually make eye contact (at least from my experiences) but here - nothing.  

(Teresa, 05/21/92)
Two weeks later she is still refining her observation:

I have been watching people closely since I made the eye contact observation. Some people do make eye contact and smile but the business men usually don't. Many of the people who aren't constantly on the run and worn down are happy to make eye contact and maybe even say a few words. I do remember hearing somewhere though that the Japanese consider it rude to make eye contact.

(Teresa, 06/06/92)

It is significant that Teresa continues to reflect on the significance of the differences in eye contact and refine her conclusions in reference to variations she observes. In doing so, she continues to transform meaning schemes at different levels of detail, making meaning of eye contact in different circumstances. Another interesting feature of Teresa's account is how information she has regarding Japanese attitudes to eye contact becomes newly relevant to her in the course of transforming the meaning scheme.

There is some evidence in this study, to be discussed later, that the application of dormant sociocultural knowledge to new experience is a common feature of culture learning.

Japanese students too made many observations of eye contact among Canadians. One young Japanese man, Hiroo, noticed differences in a situation that must have been quite unnerving! He writes:

Canadians stare at a person's eyes when talking to them. Japanese look at others' eyes once in a while when talking to them. Even when driving the car, my host-mother tries to look at my eyes. This was surprising to me.

(Hiroo, 05/20/93)
3.3.2. **Use of personal space**

Some students wrote about differences they observed in the use of personal space. Below, Fiona links interpretations of eye contact with making meaning from different interpersonal distances.

I have noticed that, on the whole, most Japanese people avoid looking you straight in the eye when talking to you. I’ve also noticed that if I lean in closer to try to hear what they’re saying, they looked startled and back off. I think that both of these situations might somehow be related to personal privacy. I think it is kind of like an exercise I used to do in ballet. You have a box around you, and that is your space and no one is supposed to come into that space. Maybe because there is a lack of personal “alone” time in Japan, that space somehow becomes very important. Also, the expression, “the eyes are the window to your soul” may also apply. The Japanese may feel that if you look another person in the eyes, you are invading their space.

(Fiona, 04/26/92)

Fiona needs to transform a meaning scheme to interpret, to her own satisfaction, the reaction of her Japanese conversational partners to her own choice of conversational distance. What is particularly interesting here is how she searches her old experience to find an analogy to help interpret the new experience.

I will discuss later the importance of this kind of logic - building an analogy to existing experience to interpret new experience.

3.3.3 **The use of touch**

Donald’s account below records the process of transforming a meaning scheme related to a familiar way of touching, prodding a friend with a foot, to make a different meaning from this event.

One interesting difference that I noticed is dealing with feet. My host-brother was lying on the ground and I wanted to get his attention so I touched him with my foot. I didn’t think anything about it at the time, but it must have
upset him because when we talked to the coordinating teacher the subject came up.

The teacher explained to me that in Japan feet are thought of as dirty because they always touch the ground. Therefore, when I touched my host brother with my feet, he became really upset. It was like I meant to deeply insult him, as if he was not worth better treatment. I can see how this custom could come about. Logically the feet are the lowest part of your body and frequently touch the ground and the ground is dirty; therefore the feet are dirty. Also it could be that because they are the lowest part of the body, they don't deserve as much respect. On a side-point, I noticed that there is no name for foot in the Japanese language, as if maybe it didn't deserve a name.

(Donald, 04/27/92)

Two aspects of this account are particularly interesting. First, Donald doesn't realize the inappropriateness of touching his host-brother with his foot at the time; a third party had to point it out. Second, Donald draws on linguistic knowledge, the absence of a word for foot in Japanese, in the process of transformation. On many occasions, we, like Donald, learn culture retroactively: transforming meaning schemes to reinterpret previous experience when someone points out meaning we were unaware of in past experiences. Many sojourners can recall experiences when people commented on past actions, pointing out behaviour that was situationally inappropriate. Drawing on linguistic resources in the transformation of meaning schemes too is a common strategy.

In the accounts of Teresa, Hiroo, Fiona and Donald above, the familiar meaning scheme was inadequate to make a culturally appropriate interpretation of the meaning of eye contact or its absence, or the meaning of a given interpersonal distance, or the meaning of touching someone with your foot. In order for students to understand new experiences of non-verbal communication which is appropriate situationally, they needed to transform their habitual meaning schemes. The old meaning schemes that interpreted
each of these experiences in familiar contexts could not adequately make meaning in the new context.

3.4 Transforming meaning schemes through learning language

Mezirow (1991) makes a distinction between meaning schemes that are based on language and those that are not. However, he does not elaborate on this distinction. Many of the journal accounts reveal students transforming meaning schemes as a result of second language learning. This study provides an opportunity to explore the form of learning through the transformation of meaning schemes in relation to language learning. The discussion here draws on the work of Ochs and Schieffelin (1986). Their work demonstrates how children are socialized through language, and how children are socialized to use language. The first point is particularly germane here. Children are socialized through language because language and culture are linked through constructions, at the level of grammar and discourse, that index or “map” linguistic forms onto social context, revealing, for example, how the interlocutors are related socially. Second, the acquisition of culture-specific forms of communication style also provide information on social values and relationships.

In the analysis of the data, two types of transforming meaning schemes through learning language emerged: (1) those that point to the importance of the indexing function of language in learning culture through the transformation of meaning schemes and; (2) those that point to the importance of culture-specific forms of communication in learning culture through the transformation of meaning schemes.
3.4.1 Transforming meaning schemes through indexing

Among accounts where students are learning culture as they are learning language through the transformation of meaning schemes, three types of account are found. These include accounts where students are: (1) learning culture through learning new forms of address; (2) learning culture through learning new meanings and contexts for common phrases like “thank you” and “excuse me”; (3) learning culture through learning culturally significant connotations of certain lexical items.

3.4.1.1. Learning culture through learning new forms of address:

Forms of address provide good examples of how language can index social structure. Canadian and Japanese students needed to transform meaning schemes in order to make sense of the new forms of address they were learning.

Hideo, a young Japanese man, records the personal significance of adopting people’s first names as a form of address in Canada:

What I am going to write here is not a special event that happened today, but one that has happened everyday since I arrived in Canada. It seems very simple, but it is hard to understand for me. Not only people in Canada, but foreigners too call each other by their first names. I can understand this custom because we sometimes do so to. However, I was surprised, that Canadians use first names for teachers as well. I know only a few instructors here at Douglas College and they allow students (including Japanese) to call them by their first name. I myself use such expressions like “Hi, Tom” (to my instructor Mr Whalley or Tom Sensei). “Good morning Melany” etc. Thinking it over, the expression “Teacher Tom” sounds childish and strange. Yet, using the first names of teachers is impolite and never happens in Japan. I noticed this cultural difference. It was hard for me in the beginning of my school life here to greet Mr. Hosoi, “Hi Tad”. The reason that I have become used to calling foreigners by their first names may be that I know they have a different cultural background from mine.

(Hideo, 08/25/92)
Through transforming a meaning scheme Hideo learns that people, even teachers, are commonly addressed by their first names in Canada. The transformation is difficult for Hideo and it's not clear if he is even now entirely comfortable with the practice of using first names.

Another student, Satsuki, feels liberated by the opportunity to set aside anxieties about choices of polite language dependent on who she talks to.

I have been thinking about this for a long time, I think English does not have polite forms or phrases. In Japanese, we use polite language for older people, or we are considered very rude, but the same style of English is used with everyone. Moreover, in Japan, a younger sister never calls her older sister by her first name. I think the Japanese language is too formal and troublesome.

(Satsuki, 10/18/92)

By discussing forms of address in the context of how politeness, a social value, is expressed in language, and how the form of address she uses with her sister is a manifestation of a larger cultural phenomenon Satsuki shows that she is aware of how Japanese forms of address index her own sociocultural context. The shift to understanding how parallel phenomena in English also index her new sociocultural context is not hard to make.

The entry below by Alice also shows how Japanese forms of address index social relations:

Today my host family really made me feel part of the family. I was talking about my host-sister to my host mom. I said “Motoe” (her name). I'd never really called her anything before, but my host mom said “no, no, no” you should call her “onesan” because she is older, not by her name. That really made me feel part of the family.

(Alice, 06/2/92)
Alice has learned through transforming a meaning scheme related to expectations to address siblings by first names to a different scheme, one that interprets “onesan”, older sister, as the proper form of address for her older host-sister. In using this form, she recognizes that she has become a member of the family - the “imooto” or “younger sister” to the elder onesan. Because these terms index the relationships within the family she is able to draw the conclusion that she is part of the family.

In each case above, a meaning scheme that shaped expectations of how teachers, elders, friends and family members should be addressed was inadequate to make sense of experience in the new culture. These meaning schemes in turn, are related to meaning perspectives related to expectations of social relations in a hierarchical society, like Japan, on the one hand, or a less hierarchical society, like Canada, on the other. When these meaning schemes fail to make appropriate meaning of social relations, those meaning schemes may be transformed. Thus learners may come to understand that calling your teacher by a first name or calling your sister “older sister” reflects a different social order.

3.4.1.2. Learning culture through learning new meanings and contexts for common phrases:

Two accounts reveal students transforming meaning schemes to reinterpret the meaning of familiar terms like “thank you” and “excuse me” in the host-culture. The account below records Naomi’s transformation of her understanding of the meaning of “thank you”:  

I found that the bus driver often says “thank you” and this makes me feel comfortable. Customers sometimes reply “thank you” too. This scene could not be seen in Japan. I have never heard a bus driver say “thank you” to the customers.”
Someone once said that Japan is a country of “sumimasen”, [trans: excuse me or I am sorry], and English speaking countries are countries of thank you. Japanese try to keep good relations among people by saying “sumimasen” and English speaking people do so by saying “thank you”.

(Naomi, 04/23/93)

The next entry is closely related. In an echo of Naomi’s account, Paul records how the different circumstances under which “sumimasen” or excuse me are used in Japan initially puzzled him. Later a fellow Canadian helps him transform his meaning scheme to make meaning of those phrases in Japanese.

A B.C. student helped me learn more about my experience. In class he commented on how everyone is so, nice, polite and friendly in Japan. He also commented that if you make a mistake and inflict pain on someone, they would say sorry to you and not the other way.

(Paul, 04/15/92)

In the two accounts above, these common everyday phrases also index social relations, and the students need to transform their habitual way of understanding the meaning of “thank you” and “excuse me” to make situationally appropriate meaning in the new cultural context. Naomi and Paul learn culture through transforming the meaning schemes they formerly used. Through their understanding of how such familiar phrases as “thank you” and “excuse me” need to be interpreted in new circumstances, they are able to describe differences between their two cultures.

3.4.1.3 Learning culture through connotations of “key” vocabulary

The following account illustrates how students learn culture through transforming meaning schemes in understanding the connotations of “key” words and phrases. I use the expression “key” to identify a group of words and phrases which may index important social values. Roberta’s entry shows how she learned culture through understanding how one such
“key” word, a common adverb, indexes an important social value.

This weekend I learned the meaning of “ishokenmei”. It translates to “with effort” or “harder effort” and it relates this time to study. All the school girls are studying for exams this week. The way that they study amazes me. They read the same thing over and over again to memorize it - for hours each night - when they could be sleeping- and during the weekends - all day long - then relax or play until late at night and then start studying again.....

(Roberta, 05/31/92)

In the accounts above, students became aware that the language they were learning points beyond itself to the social and cultural context they are in. The daily activities that they engage in bring together both linguistic and sociocultural phenomena. The language they learn through these activities (greetings, forms of address, etc.) provides them with information about the web of social relations and information on where they fit. For them, as for children, everyday talk is powerful and exposes them to the essential sociocultural information they need to interpret experience in their place in the culture.

3.4.2 Transforming meaning schemes through understanding communicative style

Students also learn culture while learning culturally- specific styles of communication. Students most commonly made reference to directness as a characteristic of English communicative style and indirectness as a characteristic of Japanese communicative style.

Below, Donald finds a visit to Hiroshima an occasion to articulate what he has learned of indirectness as a part of Japanese communicative style:

Home from Hiroshima today. One would never know that this city was gone 47 years ago except for the A-bomb dome. One definitely gets an eerie feeling when one stands in front of it or speaks to a person who actually saw the Enola Gay fly over head. I found it difficult to understand if people were still disturbed by it because so much goes unsaid here.

(Donald, 05/28/92)
Two weeks later he reflects on this:

On the comment “so much goes unsaid here”, I would stress it now. To know what the Japanese people think is very difficult to a foreigner because we cannot read the facial expressions etc. and if one asks the opinion of a Japanese person, you will not get a yes or no.

(Donald, 06/15/92)

In Akiko’s account below, a culturally-specific pattern of communication that is characterized by directness is identified as a feature of English:

I was surprised that people on skytrain or buses talk to other passengers like friends even though they don’t know each other. In Japan, talking to unknown people takes a lot of courage, so most Japanese would not do so. I envy this characteristic of Canadians. They even talked to me, a Japanese!

(Akiko, 12/12/92)

In the account below, Hiroo combines an insight into the different use of eye contact, which I made reference to earlier, with an insight into communicative style. He writes:

In Canada it is more important to tell your feelings to others than in Japan. They express their opinion precisely and then to confirm that you understand what they said, Canadians stare at your eyes.

(Hiroo, 05/20/93)

Acquiring culture-specific patterns of communications or communicative styles is culture learning because: “such patterns serve as sources of information on cultural values concerning social relationships and interaction” (Clancy, p. 213). Clearly, in the accounts above, students are linking differences in communicative style to different social values. Through transforming meaning schemes related to the communicative style of their own language, they learn to interpret the meaning of a different communicative style.
4. Learning through perspective transformation

Mezirow’s (1991) fourth category of learning involves “becoming aware, through reflection and critique, of specific presuppositions upon which a distorted and incomplete meaning perspective is based and then transforming that perspective through a reorganization of meaning” (p. 94). Perspective transformation often occurs when we encounter an anomaly that cannot be given coherence “either by learning within existing meaning schemes or by learning new schemes” (p. 94). Only by critically reassessing our assumptions and redefining the problem can we resolve the dilemma. Mezirow calls these transformations “epochal” and associates them with life crises and changes. Moreover, he calls this form of learning “the most significant kind of emancipatory learning” (1991, p.94).

Distinguishing a meaning scheme transformation from a meaning perspective transformation rests on a number of criteria. First, there is a difference of scope. Meaning scheme transformations are related to making meaning in more concrete contexts. Meaning perspective transformations involve becoming aware of broader presuppositions which distort our interpretations of a wide range of experience. Moreover, perspective transformations often occur in emotionally charged contexts where we encounter anomalies that challenge our most strongly taken-for-granted presuppositions. The practice of critically reassessing presuppositions is also an important characteristic that distinguishes meaning perspective transformations from meaning scheme transformations. Perspective transformations involve changes in our value systems.
In the context of culture learning, perspective transformation may take several forms. Taylor (1993) found that perspective transformation in sojourners resulted in a "more inclusive and integrative world view" (p. 195). Harper (1994) found that perspective transformation for Mira, the subject of her study, meant a change in "which Mira’s ethnocentrism and dualism shifted towards cultural pluralism and a relativist epistemology" (p. ii). In this study also, some students experienced a perspective transformation. Two sub-types of perspective transformation emerged in the data: (1) perspective transformation that arises from a single unique event; and (2) perspective transformation that arises from an accumulation of related events or repeated occurrences of a single event.

4.1 Transforming perspectives through a single incident

Being in another culture provides occasions to reexamine presuppositions that have resulted in prejudicial views of other people. Sometimes even a single event can trigger a reflection on values and result in the transformation of a meaning perspective. While in Canada, two Japanese students became critically aware of prejudices they held. One student became aware of and critiqued his homophobia and another became aware of and critiqued her failure to recognize the full humanity of the physically and mentally challenged. The self-criticalness and new attitudes apparent in their accounts suggests that both students have experienced a perspective transformation.

The entry below recounts Kakuei’s change in perspective towards gay people specifically, but also towards diversity in society generally:
I went to a nudist beach for the first time in my life. It was Wreck Beach at U.B.C. This is a mysterious spot which cannot be experienced in Japan. Many kinds of people are walking around nude. The smell of marijuana is everywhere. There are people selling pizza and beer. You can’t see the same type of people in Japan. Speaking of that, I once hesitated to go see a parade of gays and lesbians but people on the road had great respect for them. They (gays and lesbians) have claimed their rights and are living in this society together with others. I felt ashamed that I more or less had a prejudice against those people.

(Kakuei, 07/31/93)

The next entry, Mitsuko’s, is an account of a similar experience. She critically reflects on the treatment of mentally handicapped people in society and transforms her meaning perspective, defining standards for just treatment for them and their place in society:

I often see people with physical and mental handicaps with guardians to assist them. Those helpers sometimes counsel them about their manners. In Japan, handicapped people can not go out often, perhaps because not many helpers are available. We (in Japan) should follow the social welfare system here. It is very nice to treat everyone as an independent human being. It was a long time ago, but I once saw a mentally handicapped person next to me on the bus in Tokyo. He sometimes mimicked the bus driver’s attitude in a loud voice, but the helper did not say anything. I now recognize that the helper should have said something to him if the helper was treating him as an independent human being. I also feel ashamed at myself for not saying anything.”

(Mitsuko, 05/06/93)

4.2 Transforming perspectives through cumulative incidents

Other students appear to have experienced a perspective transformation that is the result of a slow accumulation of changes in meaning schemes, rather than a single experience. Two journal entries in particular, suggest a perspective transformation based on a gradual awareness of the significance of an accretion of interpretations of new experience and also of reinterpretations of old experience.
In Satsuki’s account below, she seems to transform her meaning perspective related to expectations for the status of women as a result of a number of smaller meaning scheme transformations over the last months:

Today, a sister of my host-father visited us, so everyone in the family was doing household chores, such as cleaning the rooms and cooking. Surprisingly this work was mainly done by the host-father. I couldn’t believe it. This kind of thing never happens in Japan: the father cleaning the rooms and cooking!

In Japan we are taught that any housekeeping job is a woman’s role. I think women’s lives in Japan are harder than those in Canada because Japanese women have more things that they have to do. Can we find a Japanese man who does housekeeping jobs frequently? Canada has been holding the principle of equality between men and women for a long time. I think the Japanese sense of values is out of date.

(Satsuki, 08/28/92)

A month later she summarizes her thoughts:

When I recall the last month, I am impressed that Canadian men work hard on chores. Even boys help with the housework. I could not believe that when I first saw it. I guessed this was because of the high number of working women in the society. However, in Japan, the custom has not changed yet, even though many women are participating in the work force. When I lived in Japan I thought this is normal. After I noticed that, it seemed the Japanese custom was wrong so that now I feel that housework by men is normal.

(Satsuki, 09/28/92)

Her account begins with a critical assessment of a meaning scheme: the roles of men and women in marriage. The meaning scheme is specifically related to who does the chores. Satsuki is clearly critical of one of the traditional expectations for marriage. But her critique goes beyond this: she begins to reassess the status of the “principle of equality between men and women” within a Japanese value system. This reassessment is characteristic of transforming meaning perspectives. Another indication that she is transforming a meaning perspective is her reassessment of the presupposition that cultural
practices in Japan are "normal". By recognizing that what is "normal" in Japan is not necessarily "normal" in Canada, she significantly challenges the presupposition that culture is a natural order.

In this second account, Irene reveals a perspective transformation when she writes of her reassessment of her values and expectations:

Just recently I find myself adjusting to certain cultural aspects I would previously thought impossible. I have joined the volleyball club (last week) and I already I have become aware of the many advantages of units as opposed to individuals. All of my life, I have been a proclaimed individualist and completely against any aspect of conformity, but now I am aware of the incredible amount of support and encouragement within the group and I am beginning to really respect it.

Other aspects include the amount of physical contact between the girls at school. At home any such acts would have been outrageously scorned upon and up until now there were definite looks of disapproval between us, but as of yesterday (sports day) I find myself looking at things from a different point of view. In Canada, my personal space bubble was tremendous and any physical contact at all would have been followed by a very high degree of uneasiness, but here I find little things like that comforting and reassuring. I am aware that I am no longer looking upon this culture through a foreigner's eyes. I even hope to become part of it.

(Irene, 05/22/92)

Irene's account above reveals in some detail a transformation in her perspective. This perspective transformation seems to have developed slowly out of several transformations of meaning schemes. She records how she has come to appreciate the experience of the group-oriented life in Japan. And she writes of how she has made changes in her attitudes towards physical contact. Her own assessment that she is no "longer looking at this culture through a foreigner's eyes" is the best evidence we have for her perspective transformation.
Two issues arise in relation to the presentation above. The first is the question of whether these students really have experienced a perspective transformation. The second question is whether these experiences can be considered emancipatory learning. Both of these issues will be taken up in the next chapter in the discussion of these findings.

5. Learning through resisting transformation

This fifth form of learning, learning through resisting transformation is not a form identified in Mezirow's (1991) theory of transformative learning. Mezirow would regard each of my examples as a case of learning through meaning schemes or learning new meaning schemes. I have added this type here because it emerged as a distinct category in the course of data analysis. The accounts in this category all express criticism of aspects of the host-culture and reject transforming meaning schemes and perspectives associated with that culture. Simultaneously, students affirm their commitment to existing values and state their preference for meaning schemes and perspectives associated with their own cultures.

In the context of culture learning, this form of learning is characterized by learners' resistance to embracing other cultural practices and interpretations of experience. Harper (1994) showed how Mira deliberately chose to locate herself on the margins of Canadian society and that "she quietly resisted both social and cultural domination by minimizing her participation in Canadian society" (p. 120). Mira's capacity for autonomous action allows her to position herself on the margins of both Canadian and Lebanese society. Harper points out that Mira "found it a source of power, when she used her position on the margins of both Lebanese and Canadian societies to give her voice the authority to
represent alternative perspectives in order to criticize and to educate (p. 123). In her coming to “to see things from different corners” (p. 123), Mira is involved in the creation of a third place on the borders of Canadian and Lebanese culture where she constructs a life, drawing as she chooses from cultures.

Like Mira, students in this study lived on the borders of two cultures and chose to distance themselves from some aspects of those cultures and embrace others. The records of students’ confirmation of their attachment to their cultural practices and interpretations of experience are valuable records of this process. Two types of accounts in this category emerged from the data: accounts where meaning schemes are confirmed; and accounts where meaning perspectives are confirmed.

5.1 Resisting meaning schemes transformation

The experience of being in Japanese schools was particulary difficult for some Canadian students and accounts that critique the culture of the school are common. The following two accounts in particular are good examples. This first is an excerpt from a letter written by Gayle:

"... But I must say that this trivial problem is absolutely nothing compared to school. I am going to be straight out and blunt and say that I just really hate school with a passion. I find the whole system so rigid and cold; its almost pathetic sometimes how incredibly far apart the students are from their teachers. I don’t see how anyone can learn sitting in a drab, colourless class having a teacher just drone at you for hours on end, no wonder they always sleep during class. We (all the Canadian students) are finding it quite hard to adjust I think. I know I am. All these stupid rules! I have been trying to be rational about it but I still honestly can’t see why even half of them are necessary except possibly all the male teachers in the school area on one huge power trip. Possibly this week will reveal some of the answers to me, but until then I will just remain frustrated.

(Gayle, 04/18/92)
This second account gives a more detailed criticism, but also details the student’s confirmation of the value she assigns to the cultural practices in her own schooling:

Today I sat in on my first Japanese class - not a language class, but a chemistry class. It was an hour long, and not once did a single student say a word or ask a question. The teacher just spoke for the whole time. If all Japanese classes are conducted in this way, I don’t see how they actually learn anything. Their school system seems designed to pump them full of information for two months, have them spit it out during exam time, and then forget it all. There is no interaction between teachers and students, no friendship. This is very different to our school system, where a great move is toward accommodating a variety of learning styles, and changing the teacher’s role to that of a facilitator, not a lecturer. Japanese students who are more holistic learners, as opposed to being linear must have an extremely hard time succeeding.

(Ursula, 04/08/92)

Some of the young men too found life in Japanese schools difficult. At one time during their stay in Japan, some young Canadian males were suspected of illegal activities: shoplifting and abuse of commuter passes. In the wake of this development, all the students were made aware of the Japanese practice of holding a group responsible for the actions of a few. Not surprisingly, this practice was criticized by students, as Donald’s account below attests:

Some Canadian students have gotten into trouble and it seems as though they [the Japanese] look upon the group with a frown. Although the actions are illegal and there is no reasonable answer, I don’t believe the entire group should be massed into one and treated as one. In Japan, the group is very important and the group is very strong. However, when something like this happens, how can you punish the group for the actions of a few?

(Donald, 06/11/92)
5.2 **Resisting meaning perspective transformation**

Some of the accounts that are critical of the host-culture appear to critique the culture on a very much broader basis. In contrast to the accounts above, where criticism is quite narrowly directed, the accounts below appear to be more broadly critical.

The first account, written by Shigeru, is a very general critique of the values of the host-culture. He writes:

> Time goes fast because school has become very busy. Because of such busy school days, I feel like I am losing my awareness of what I am doing. Also I sometimes feel that I am living without my real consciousness. In this situation, I think I am becoming rude or uncultivated. It is good to say that I am getting North American generosity or becoming big hearted. But, it is bad that I am becoming rude. For example, in Japan you must handle books in the library very carefully, but here, people cast books on the counter or drop them off into the returning box. I now know that this manner is the Western style, and for Japanese young people, it is considered a neat manner. I think that I am forgetting Japanese manners such as the Japanese ideals of respect and etiquette. There is no excuse to be such a person.

(Shigeru, 10/30/92)

Although Shigeru refers to specific practices, he expresses a more general rejection of the values he associates with Canada and he affirms the superiority of those he associates with Japan. The level of abstraction of this critique with reference to larger concepts like Japanese ideals suggest that transformation of a meaning perspective is being resisted.

Young Canadian women were often critical of the status of Japanese women as they observed it. Most of this criticism, since it is directed to specific practices such as who does the housework or is listened to at the dinner table, relates to meaning schemes. However, several entries, including Ursula’s, are different:
I’ve been watching the Japanese TV programs on and off since arriving (as much as I can, though I am not able to understand a lot of it) and I’ve noticed a distinct difference between the roles of males and females. The males on news programs, game shows, and commercials are given strong roles, and the females are always present in supporting roles, like a laugh track. The men may be old and balding, with a beer belly, but the woman is always young, slim, if not totally skinny, - and pretty.

It seems quite evident that in Japan women are not taken as seriously. Their role seems to be that of follower. It may be that young, pretty females boost the ratings of the TV station but that still indicates that within the general Japanese population, that is what people want to see. I don’t think women here really want to change that. In my host family as well as other girl’s, the females find no problem with the way the programs turn them into objects.

(Ursula, 04/25/92)

In this account, Ursula is transforming meaning schemes, but she is also building a critique of the broader context of the practices she finds insulting and unacceptable. In doing so, she engages in a critical analysis of broader issues such as the status of women in Japan. She is not just resisting the specific practices she identifies, rather she is resisting the transformation of a meaning perspective that supports these and other practices that she sees as profoundly objectionable.

What are we to make of the five accounts presented in the preceding pages? Are they just instances of students complaining about Japan and Canada? Should we just dismiss them as rudeness or even racism and conclude that students are ungrateful for an opportunity to study abroad? Or is there another way to view them?

In fact there is. Harper’s (1994) account of Mira’s life and resistance theory such as Giroux (1983), point to another way to regard these accounts. Resistance theorists argue that “the mechanisms of social and cultural reproduction are never complete and always meet with partially realized elements of opposition” (Giroux, 1983, p. 258). These
accounts are evidence of elements of opposition in the context of culture learning.

Borrowing the vocabulary of resistance theorists to analyze the accounts above is perhaps to take it out of its context of political struggle and schooling, but it does offer a way to understand this handful of accounts. The notion of “agency” is particularly important. In resistance theory, agency refers to “the role that students play in challenging the most oppressive aspects of schools” (Giroux, 1983, p. 260). Through agency, students are able to “refuse, reject and dismiss the central messages of the school” (p. 260). Harper’s account of Mira demonstrates that agency and resistance need not be restricted to a context of schooling.

Although three of the accounts I have used above are set in school, they are as much about resistance to and rejection of practices and pressures to accept transformed meaning schemes and perspectives outside of school as within it. Ursula’s account reveals her resistance to accepting uncritically the status of women in Japan. Shigeru’s account does not make it very clear what he is resisting besides treating books rudely, but he certainly implies that there are values he must oppose and transformations of meaning schemes and perspectives that he would feel profoundly uncomfortable with.

There is no evidence that the students above publicly opposed the practices they resisted; they didn’t leave Canada, or refuse to go to school or write letters to the T.V. stations. Nonetheless we can see in these accounts that their culture learning was not passive; these students resisted accepting some practices and values, picking and choosing what they wished from the host culture and from their own, affirming the values of their own. We can see in this exercise of agency the active creation of a third place that “grows
in the interstices between the cultures the learners grew up with and the new cultures he or she is being introduced to” (Kramsch, 1993, p. 236).

**Summary of findings of Section I**

This section has applied Mezirow’s (1991) four forms of learning in the analysis of the experience of culture learning. In making this analysis, sub-categories in three of the four forms of learning emerged. A fifth form of learning, not distinguished by Mezirow, also emerged.

Applying the first form, learning through meaning schemes, to culture learning, was unproblematic. In intercultural encounters, new experience is commonly interpreted in terms of our existing meaning schemes. Because of the paucity of examples of this type of learning, no typology emerged from data analysis. However, some important variation was found in the contrast of three particular accounts.

Applying the second form of learning, learning through new meaning schemes, to culture learning was also unproblematic. Two sub-types emerged within this form. The first involves creating new meaning schemes by extending stereotypes to new areas, for example, interpreting experience in the family through a stereotype perhaps first used to explain behaviour at school recently. The second involves modifying a stereotype to recognize some variation in its application, perhaps exempting one sub-group from its influence.

The third form of learning, learning through the transformation of meaning schemes, had the most extensive application. Four sub-types emerged in the study. These were transforming meaning schemes through: (1) rejecting stereotypes; (2) recasting basic
categories; (3) learning elements of non-verbal communication; and (4) learning language. There is, however, a problem with this third form when applied in the context of culture learning. Mezirow (1991) sees the transformation of a meaning scheme resulting in the learner discarding a dysfunctional or inadequate interpretation of experience to adopt a new one recognized as superior. In culture learning, learners do not abandon the old meaning scheme; they develop a bifurcated structure or reject the new through resistance. The original meaning scheme remains in place to interpret experience in the original culture and the new meaning scheme is used to interpret experience in the host-culture.

Applying the fourth form of learning, learning through perspective transformation, requires some caution since this study is of short duration and perspective transformations can take time. However, two sub-types of learning exhibiting some characteristics of perspective transformation emerged in the study: first, perspective transformation based on a single incident; and second, perspective transformation based on cumulative meaning scheme transformation. From a single written account it is difficult to judge the significance of an experience. It is impossible to tell if it will be of lasting effect in the writer’s life. These cautions aside, I think some students did experience a transformation of meaning perspective. This will be discussed at length in chapter six.

A fifth form of learning emerged in the data analysis: learning through resistance to the transformation. Two sub-types of this form emerged: first, learning through resisting meaning scheme transformation and; second, learning through resisting meaning perspective transformation. These two forms of learning establish learners as agents in the process of culture learning, embracing new practices as they wish and resisting those
practices which are not in their best interests or offend their sense of values. In Mezirow’s (1991) theory this type of learning would be considered as part of learning through meaning schemes or learning new meaning schemes. However, I have argued that in the accounts that are critical of the host-culture, we should recognize another category of learning; the links to resistance theory and agency suggest a special importance to these accounts in the context of culture learning.

At the conclusion of this analysis, three questions remain to be discussed further. First, what is the significance of the variation in learning through the transformation of meaning schemes in the context of culture learning? What are the implications of the fact that a bifurcated structure may develop? Is it possible perhaps to understand degrees of acculturation and assimilation in terms of this form of learning? A second question is: are there stages to culture learning? Do individual learners move through stages in a linear fashion as Hanvey (1979) and Bennett’s (1986) models of cultural awareness suggest or not? A third question is: what is the potential for emancipatory learning in culture learning? Are the accounts related to learning through resistance to meaning scheme and meaning perspective transformation, and those related to learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives, emancipatory or not? These questions will be taken up in chapter six.
SECTION II: FORMS OF REFLECTION

This section presents an analysis of culture learning using the three forms of reflection: content, process and premise, conceptualized in Mezirow’s (1991) theory as analytical categories. Mezirow identifies reflection as the “central dynamic in intentional learning” (p. 99). His main theoretical interest is not with reflection in the popular sense which “limits it to the interpretation of data, application of facts and principles, and logical reasoning” (p. 103), but rather with reflection in a more technical sense as “the process of critically assessing the content, process, or premise(s) of our efforts to interpret and give meaning to an experience” (p. 104). Reflection provides the dynamic for confirmation, modification, transformation or resistance of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives, processes which in turn, characterize different forms of learning.

Mezirow (1991) defines content, process and premise reflection in the passage below:

An example may clarify the differences among these processes. Becoming aware of, say, negative feelings towards an acquaintance named John is introspection, simply being aware of ourselves feeling, perceiving, thinking or acting. Deciding that “John is bad” is a thoughtful action, making a judgement based upon evidence or prior learning. This involves content reflection - reflection on what we perceive, think, feel or act upon. Process reflection is an examination of how we perform these functions of perceiving, thinking, feeling, or acting and an assessment of our efficacy in performing them. We might, for example, ask ourselves whether we could have misinterpreted some incident that we used as evidence in concluding that “John is bad”. The act of premise reflection leads us to question whether “good” or “bad” is an adequate concept for understanding or judging John. Premise reflection involves our becoming aware of why we perceive, think, feel or act as we do and of the reasons for and consequences of our possible habits of hasty judgement, conceptual inadequacy, or error in the process of judging John. Premise reflection involves the process of “theoretical reflectivity” (Broughton, 1977). Theoretical reflectivity may cause us to become critical
of epistemic, social or psychological presuppositions .... (Mezirow, 1991 pp. 107-108)

Thoughtful action, though it may involve some content reflection, is not a form of reflection in the sense that Mezirow wishes to use the term - it lacks a critical dimension. Thoughtful action involves “higher-order cognitive processes to guide us as we analyze, perform, discuss, and judge” (p. 106). It draws upon prior learning, but does not move beyond preexisting meaning schemes or perspectives. In thoughtful action “we are not attending to the grounds or justification for our beliefs, but are simply using our beliefs to make an interpretation, like deciding on the next action move when involved in an intense physical sport” (p. 107). One form of thoughtful action that Mezirow (1991) identifies is introspection, the action of thinking about ourselves and our feelings. Since introspection “does involve validity testing of prior learning” (p. 107), it is not considered reflection. For Mezirow this type of activity is cognition, not reflection.

In Mezirow’s terms, reflection, in its fullest sense, only begins when we encounter difficulty in understanding a new experience because prior learning is inadequate to the task. To be reflective in this sense, we must “check back on our problem solving process”, asking ourselves questions like: “were our generalizations based upon a representative sample, our inferences warranted, our logic sound, our control of variables appropriate, our anticipated consequences of alternative actions inclusive, our analysis fully discriminating, our evidence convincing and our actions consistent with our values?” (p. 106). In short, to be considered reflection, mental activity must involve a critique of existing assumptions about the process or premises employed to interpret experience. This
critique is as much about problem posing as about problem solving. The former makes "a taken-for-granted situation problematic, raising questions about its validity" (p. 105).

I will turn to a wider discussion of reflection in culture learning. In the analysis of journal accounts here, sub-types emerged within two forms: process reflection and premise reflection. The table below summarizes this typology.

**Table 2: A Typology of Forms of Reflection in Culture Learning**

0. Introspection

1. Content reflection

2. Process reflection
   2.1 Process reflection confirming existing meaning schemes/resisting the transformation of meaning schemes
   2.2 Process reflection creating new meaning schemes
   2.3 Process reflection transforming meaning schemes

3. Premise reflection
   3.1 Premise reflection creating resistance to perspective transformation
   3.2 Premise reflection creating the desire for perspective transformation, but not the means
   3.3 Premise reflection transforming perspectives
0. **Thoughtful action: introspection**

I begin this discussion with examples of introspection, one form of thoughtful action. Beginning this way will clarify, by contrast, the character of reflection as Mezirow defines it. This section helps set the parameters of the discussion to follow.

Many journal accounts are contemplative records of students “mulling over” their experience in the host-culture. Consider this account of Michael’s:

> I am sitting here this evening in my room reflecting on my family members. Though I have been very busy since the day that I arrived here, I still have a fair amount of free time. Unfortunately my host-brother Tomomitsu does not, and that is what this journal entry is based upon. In the almost 2 1/2 months that I have been here, I have only done two things with my brother. ............... Nonetheless he is a great guy and we have had a few wonderful talks late at night together. It is just unfortunate that when I return to Canada, I’ll honestly have to say that I won’t miss him because I never really got to know him.

(Michael, 06/10/92)

Reading Michael’s account, we may conclude that he is reflecting in one popular sense of reflection: thinking quietly or meditatively about something. However, since he is not undertaking any validity testing of prior knowledge, or critiquing the process he uses to arrive at his conclusions, or critiquing the premises of his interpretation of experience, we cannot call this reflection in Mezirow’s terms. Rather than call this activity reflection, he would call Michael’s action introspection: “thinking about ourselves, our thoughts, or our feelings” (p. 107). To the extent that Michael does not critically assess his efforts to interpret his experience, he is not being reflective.
1. **Content reflection**

Content reflection is “reflection on what we perceive, think, feel and act upon” (Mezirow, 1991, p. 107). It is the dynamic associated with learning through meaning schemes, that is, making interpretations based on prior learning. Just as there were too few of the appropriate accounts to develop a typology of learning through meaning schemes, there were too few appropriate accounts for a typology of content reflection to emerge. The two entries below illustrate students using content reflection to review prior learning in the application of existing meaning schemes to new experience.

In the first account, content reflection is in evidence as Gayle confirms that her new experience is easily understood in terms of an existing meaning scheme:

> My opinion on this subject hasn’t altered much since I arrived though I have discovered more about it. The typical Japanese woman has quite a meek personality. I think this stems from having had to serve all their lives. It seems that all females are very much below men here.  

*(Gayle, 04/15/92)*

In Gayle’s account the phrase “my opinion....hasn’t altered much” indicates that she is simply reviewing past experience to find a meaning scheme applicable to current experience. This uncritical review of prior learning is the essence of content reflection.

The second account by Atsuko is similar:

> The days are long in Canada so that children can play outside for a long time. When I see those children, their parents are always watching them. I think that even though Canada looks very safe, it is as dangerous as I had expected.  

*(Atsuko, 05/10/93)*
In the entry above, Atsuko uses content reflection to guide the interpretation of new experience. Her conclusion that Canada "is dangerous as I had expected" indicates the use of this form of reflection.

In these accounts, the limitations of content reflection are clear. The previous meaning scheme is not challenged. Neither student allows for the possibility that her interpretation may be culturally conditioned or that her existing meaning scheme might cause her to select certain features of the situation for attention and ignore others. Gayle does not consider, for example, that the women's behaviour she observes may be misunderstood if seen only as an expression of meekness. Similarly, Atsuko does not consider that the parents' watchfulness may imply something other than a dangerous situation. Neither young woman reviews the process she uses to make meaning, or the underlying assumptions in her interpretations of this new experience.

I am not proposing that these two young women have necessarily interpreted their experience incorrectly. My observation is that, in the context of their culture learning, content reflection does not allow them the possibility to conclude that they might have it wrong. This is not to fault Gayle or Atsuko. In fairness, perhaps most of our interpretations of experience, in our own culture or in another, do not allow for the prospect that we may be wrong. In cases where we are using content reflection we are "not attending to the grounds or justifications for our beliefs, but are simply using our beliefs to make an interpretation" (p. 107). This characteristic, of course, is the essence of learning through existing meaning schemes.
In contrast to content reflection, process reflection, as the examples in the next section will show, allows us to confirm, elaborate, and transform meaning schemes and meaning perspectives, as well as resist their transformation.

2. **Process reflection**

Process reflection is “an examination of how we perform these functions of perceiving, thinking, feeling or acting and an assessment of our efficacy in performing them” (Mezirow, 1991, p. 108). This form of reflection reviews the evidence for our interpretations, allowing for errors in judgement and alternative interpretations. We turn to this form when we experience difficulty understanding a new situation, or when we have to negotiate our way through a new series of actions.

In the analysis of journal accounts which revealed evidence of process reflection, significant variations emerged. Three sub-types emerged: (1) process reflection confirming existing meaning schemes, (2) process reflection creating new meaning scheme, and (3) process reflection transforming meaning schemes.

2.1 **Process reflection confirming existing meaning schemes/resisting the transformation of meaning schemes**

Many accounts show evidence of students reviewing, through process reflection, the basis for their initial interpretations, and then confirming their initial interpretation. These accounts differ from content reflection to the extent that students entertain an alternative interpretation.

This first entry from Shigeru, a record of a ski-trip with Canadian students, is a good example of at least considering another point of view:
The biggest problem on this trip was using the bathroom. We ran out of hot water very quickly because our lodging was for 10 people and 20 of us were there. In Japan, we would consider others (or make mutual concessions). However it is apparent that people here try to be first. I could not stand that. The Japanese Canadians told us that we Japanese lacked self assertiveness. However, I guess, there is a very fine line between self assertiveness and selfishness. It was we Japanese who waited for a long time until more hot water was supplied.

(Shigeru, 12/24/92)

This account reveals Shigeru initially concluding that Canadians put themselves first, reviewing this conclusion with reference to his Japanese experience, then confirming his initial interpretation. Shigeru has tried to be charitable and see self-assertiveness as a positive value, but then after reassessing his values, confirms his attachment to the view that, in fact, self-assertiveness is just selfishness. This reflection on, and then confirmation of his values makes this an example of learning through resistance to the transformation of meaning schemes. What makes this different than a retreat into ethnocentrism is the act of considering another interpretation possible.

It is especially interesting here that a Japanese Canadian has tried to mediate between the two cultures - perhaps this is evidence that people of pluralistic heritage with their unique viewpoint stand in especially important places in intercultural networks.

A further example of this sub-type, is provided by Lawrence’s account below:

Something very special happened tonight. My host brother just got his first job and his pay was about 6-7 dollars per hour. I was very happy for him, and congratulated him right away. However, he surprised me by asking me to keep a secret about his part-time job. I asked him why, and he explained to me that it is not common in Japan that high school students have part-time jobs. Also, he felt that it was a “shame” to have a part-time job because it meant his family was not that rich.

(Lawrence, 05/06/92)
This account reveals Lawrence making a negative judgement on his Japanese host-brother's attitude to having a part-time job. Using process reflection, he reviews the basis for his own interpretation, takes into account his host-brothers, and thinks about the difference, while engaging his brother in discussion. Even with a perfectly coherent explanation, Lawrence is not prepared to transform his meaning scheme and accept his host-brother’s viewpoint.

Almost three weeks later, he still has negative feelings regarding his host-brother’s feelings about the part-time job:

By looking at my host brother’s idea about his part-time job, I don’t feel very positive about it. Actually I have talked to my host brother several times about the part-time job during these two weeks. I tried to explain to him that having a part-time job is good for him and it is very common for Canadian students to have a part-time job because it shows individual ability and independence.

However, my host brother still didn’t change his attitude about his part-time job. I think it is due to the Japanese cultural background and Japanese emphasis on study.

(Lawrence, 05/29/92)

Lawrence’s account is a good example of how values are contested in intercultural encounters. Lawrence argues that his host-brother should change his values and adopt the view that the demonstration of his ability and independence are more important than family loyalty. In fact, Lawrence argues, although he surely doesn’t realize this, that his host-brother should see himself as an individual first, rather than as a member of a family first. (For Lawrence himself to realize this would be an example of premise reflection.) The process reflection that Lawrence uses to review his own position merely results in the reassertion of his criticism of his brother’s attitude toward a part-time job. What makes
this different than a retreat into ethnocentrism is the act of considering another interpretation possible. Lawrence’s account is not a fully settled account. At its conclusion, continued process reflection has Lawrence engaged in a reinterpretation of his experience. He continues to reflect on the problem of understanding this difference between himself and his host-brother, speculating that the requirements of study in Japanese culture might partly determine the attitude towards holding a part-time job expressed by his host-brother. This may be the beginning of a broader perspective for Lawrence, and the start of an epistemological change where he can look for meaning in terms of a framework outside his own.

2.2 **Process reflection creating new meaning schemes**

Betty’s entry below shows process reflection at work in the context of making meaning of her experience with her Japanese host-mother and of negotiating the degree of supervision she needs:

I can handle things on my own, but she [host-mom] was worried that I might miss the bus. I can handle things on my own, but they are trying to protect me.

This is just another difference between the amount of independence that kids get in Canada and Japan. But even in Canada, the emphasis on independence varies with the individual’s family. Some kids are totally free, while others are more protected. But on the whole Canadians tend to do things more on their own.

(Betty, 05/13/92)

In this account, Betty begins by interpreting her experience as an example of the lack of independence that kids have in Japan. However, she also weighs the evidence and admits that the evidence may not be as conclusive as a first glance suggests. Using her
own experience in Canada as a means of checking for a possible misinterpretation of her Japanese experience, she engages in process reflection. She concludes that while there are different expectations for the degree of independence that teens have, this difference may not be as great as she first thought. Here she learns through creating a new meaning scheme.

Alice's entry below is similar to Betty's. Alice writes:

My host-mom is always telling me that I can bring my friends home, and if they live far away, they can spend the night etc. etc. I always thought that the Japanese didn't have people over to their house a lot. My family usually doesn't, but if it will help make the situation better, they are quite willing to have guests. But even so, compared to in Canada that is different. In Canada, people frequently visit other people's houses.

(Alice, 05/04/92)

Alice reviews her interpretation of experience both in reference to experience in Canada and to a stereotype she holds. She checks to see if she has misinterpreted her experience because she previously thought that: "Japanese didn't have people over to their house a lot". This checking for misinterpretation is an act of process reflection. In this case, it results in a modification to her stereotypical expectations of Japanese customs regarding visitors and her expectations for her family's behaviour. Through a new meaning scheme she learns that visitors may stay over in some circumstances.

One entry already seen, Hiroo's remarking on individualism in Japan and Canada, is worth another look as an example of a process reflection:

Reviewing my journals, I found that I wrote on the same topic repeatedly: individuality. This may not be a very new discovery, but this is what I was most impressed with. In Canada, individuality is more highly valued than in Japan. This is a big difference between the two countries, but this doesn't mean that I suffered from so-called culture shock. The general opinion that
Japanese aren’t self-assertive is not always true. Even though they are living in the same culture, every person has his own culture. I found that I attempted to tie every difference to individualism. Having such a preconception - that difference is derived from individualism - is not good, I thought. Still it is true that I felt strong individualism in this society.

(Hiroo, 07/08/93)

What is most significant here is Hiroo’s deliberate review of how he is thinking: “I found that I attempted to tie every difference to individualism. Having such a preconception - that difference is derived from individualism - is not good, I thought”. In Hiroo’s evaluation of how he has reached his interpretations, process reflection, he transforms a meaning scheme related to an epistemology. By this same process, he also learns through a new meaning scheme, modifying his binary view of Japan and Canada representing opposite poles of the individualism/collectivism continuum coming to a view that is less black and white.

2.3 Process reflection transforming meaning schemes

Another sub-type of process reflection results in the transformation of meaning schemes. Each of the accounts below results in transformation, rather than modification or confirmation, of the initial interpretation of an experience. In doing so, the students reject previous stereotypes.

The account below by a young Canadian woman, Virginia, is an example of this sub-type: She writes:

Yesterday, I was watching T.V. with my sister and brother [host-siblings] and we had rented a video to watch, so I said “can we watch it now?” and they said “Wo, wait until your Mom and Dad have finished washing the dishes.” I was stunned! The father was washing the dishes? The other day he made dinner too. I was so impressed. The attitude that had been conveyed to me before was one of extreme chauvinism and I had a few problems putting up
with it, but the father must be really liberated. My interpretation is that all Japanese should not be stereotyped.

(Virginia, 04/10/92)

In this account, Virginia uses process reflection, a review of how she comes to her interpretations, to transform a stereotype. Finding her father doing housework results in her checking whether her stereotypic knowledge of Japan (The attitude that had been conveyed to me before was one of extreme chauvinism....) is adequate to interpret this new experience in her family. She concludes that it is not, and transforms a meaning scheme that all Japanese men are chauvinistic. At the same time she is transforming a meaning scheme related to an epistemology - she decides that she can’t make meaning appropriately by stereotyping all Japanese. This latter action is almost a premise reflection, but we don’t have quite enough information to confirm this.

In another example of transforming a meaning scheme, Shigeru too rejects a stereotype in the account below:

My host family includes a mother, father, two sons (18 and 15 years old) and 9 year old twin daughters. We are going on a picnic to the Sunshine Coast tomorrow, but the two sons are not going. The eldest son has a job, but the other son has no particular plan for tomorrow. Although the mother has been trying to get him to go for the last two days, it seems that he doesn’t want to join us. The mother said to me, “Boys of such an age are often not willing to go out with their mother. How is it in Japan?” I told her that I felt the same way when I was a teenager. However, my idea regarding North American people was that they think that the family is always important in their lives. And that adolescent boys and girls here spend more time with their family than those in Japan. Also I frequently notice the phrase in movies: “Mom I love you”. So I didn’t expect that North American teenagers (boys and girls) would have the same feeling that I had as a teenager. Eventually I realized that everyone at that age is the same even though they come from different countries.

(Shigeru, 09/03/92)
Assessing how he has arrived at his interpretations helps Shigeru realize that his stereotypic expectations do not allow him to satisfactorily make meaning of this event in his host-family. By transforming the meaning scheme that shapes unrealistic expectations of his family, he rejects the stereotype built from movies. In addition, reflecting on his own personal experience in Japan helps him interpret this new experience. By building an analogy to his experience in Japan, he finds similarities that lead to feelings of solidarity. Process reflection, checking for misinterpretation, provides the dynamic for this transformation of meaning schemes.

3. **Premise reflection**

Premise reflection is the most profound form of reflection. It is also the least common since, as Mezirow points out, it “becomes necessary for us to reexamine and challenge our presuppositions less frequently than to critique content or our process strategies and tactics” (p. 110). This form of reflection leads to the understanding of why we perceive, act, think or feel as we do. It bares the unexamined assumptions behind our habitual actions. Moreover, just as we can confirm these assumptions, we can also negate them as well. It is this latter result of premise reflection that facilitates perspective transformation.

Distinguishing between process and premise reflection is not easy. Before presenting accounts of the latter, I will clarify how premise reflection differs from process reflection. Contrasting the account of Hiroo, previously used as an example of process reflection, with Ursula’s account, an example of premise reflection, illustrates the difference. Hiroo wrote:
Reviewing my journals, I found that I wrote on the same topic repeatedly: individuality. This may not be a very new discovery, but this is what I was most impressed with. In Canada, individuality is more highly valued than in Japan. This is a big difference between the two countries, but this doesn’t mean that I suffered from so called culture shock. The general opinion that Japanese aren’t self-assertive is not always true. Even though they are living in the same culture, every person has his own culture. I found that I attempted to tie every difference to individualism. Having such a preconception - that difference is derived from individualism - is not good, I thought. Still it is true that I felt strong individualism in this society.

(Hiroo, 07/08/93)

If we contrast the above account of process reflection with an account of premise reflection below, we can clarify the distinction between these two forms. In the following account, Ursula reflects on the lessons of being in Japan.

All I learn about Japanese culture (which I think is very different to the culture of Tokyo alone) is really just another form of learning about myself, because as I recognize motives and emotions behind the actions that I observe everyday and analyze why I react to each event in a certain manner, I begin to see where my own morals, ethics, values lie, and how they influence my own actions. It’s very frustrating to see myself adapting to the negative aspects of the culture which surrounds me. I’ve watched myself lose respect and tolerance for the people around me; I feel myself losing touch with the creativity inside me; if I allowed it, I’m sure I would lose my faith in God too

(Ursula, 05/09/92)

The difference between these two accounts may seem, at first glance, to be merely a matter of degree, both students seem to be equally engaged in process reflection and reflecting on their own values. A closer look, however, reveals a contrast between Ursula’s and Hiroo’s accounts. Hiroo is reflecting on the assumptions he uses to arrive at his interpretations; he is assessing the how of his thinking. On the other hand, Ursula is reflecting on the underlying assumptions shaping how she sees the world. She is assessing the why of her thinking. Hers is a critical assessment of her morals, ethics and values.
Hiroo's is a critical assessment of the correct or incorrect application of a concept - in this case individualism and collectivism. Not only matters of degree, but also matters of intention allows us to distinguish between process and premise reflection.

In the analysis of the data, three sub-types of premise reflection emerged: (1) premise reflection creating resistance to perspective transformation, (2) premise reflection creating the desire for perspective transformation, but not the means, (3) premise reflection leading to perspective transformation.

3.1 Premise reflection creating resistance to perspective transformation

Premise reflection did not always lead to perspective transformation in the journal accounts. Two other responses emerged. The first is resistance to transformation. In Ursula's account on the previous page, resistance to transformation is evident: “It's very frustrating to see myself adapting to the negative aspects of the culture which surrounds me” (05/09/92). This resistance to perspective transformation is not rare. A moment’s thought can identify a number of reasons why it may arise. People may, like Ursula, resist transforming meaning perspectives because they recognize their perspectives as deeply held matters of principle. Another reason people may not want to transform perspectives is that meaning perspectives may maintain privilege. For example, racism is a meaning perspective and its embodiment in apartheid in South Africa maintained many people in positions of privilege. Moreover, perspective transformation assumes rationality, a quality in short supply in many stressful human environments. In some circumstances, it takes great courage to change, and people may resist their own best interests out of fear or intimidation. However, in this study only the outcome of premise reflection creating
resistance to perspective transformation because it threatened deeply held values (as in Ursula’s case), emerged.

3.2 Premise reflection creating the desire for perspective transformation, but not the means

A second possible outcome of premise reflection which emerged in this study is that people may become aware of presuppositions, desire to transform them, but not have the resources to do so.

The account below by Kimi, a young Japanese woman, is an example of this possibility:

More than three months have already passed in Canada. I’m adapting better to the environment than I thought I would. There is nothing that amazes me. Three years ago, when I went to the USA, I was amazed by everything. Now I am not amazed by the culture, but rather by myself as a Japanese. Tom’s Japanese classes especially have given me a lot of thoughts that confirm that I am a Japanese. There are a lot of peculiar Japanese habits that Japanese take for granted. I can understand this when I leave Japan. It is sad to confirm that I am a Japanese after explaining Japanese culture to Canadian people, but I cannot help it. There is no need to be aware of myself as a Japanese when I am in Japan. It is obvious.......

(Kimi, 07/30/93)

Although Kimi does not identify specific assumptions she has recognized, it is clear that she has become aware of some of the taken-for-granted assumptions she holds as a Japanese. Yet, she sees herself as unable to transform her perspectives: “It is sad to confirm that I am a Japanese after explaining Japanese culture to Canadian people, but I cannot help it”. Like Ursula, she too has became aware, through the experience of living in another culture, of some of the assumptions she holds. However, in contrast to Ursula who resists transforming the meaning perspectives incorporating those assumptions, Kimi
demonstrates a commitment to transforming them when she writes later in the same account:

In Vancouver multi-culturalism is the mainstream. I think I need to recognize every single culture and develop my own self-identity.

(Kimi, 07/30/93)

3.3 Premise reflection transforming perspectives

Perspective transformation was the third possible outcome of premise reflection that emerged from the data analysis. Two accounts previously introduced exhibit characteristics of perspective transformation will now be re-examined to clarify the role of premise reflection in culture learning.

In the first account below, Satsuki becomes aware of her presuppositions shaping her expectations of the roles of men and women.

When I recall the last month, I was impressed that Canadian men work hard on chores. Even boys help with the housework. I could not believe that when I first saw it. I guessed this was because of the high number of working women in the society. However, in Japan, the custom has not changed yet even though many women are participating in the work force. When I lived in Japan I thought this was normal. After I noticed that lots of women in Japan work too, it seemed the Japanese custom was wrong. Now I feel that men helping with housework is normal.

(Satsuki, 09/28/92)

Here a series of meaning scheme transformations, together with the emergence of premise reflection, lead to a perspective transformation. First, Satsuki learns that in Canada there are different expectations for the division of household labour between married men and women and boys and girls and that the arrangements may be considered "normal". Second, Satsuki transforms the assumption that this cultural difference could have economic roots: she learns that nearly identical economic conditions: a high
percentage of women in the labour force, have different results in Japan and Canada. As these meaning scheme transformations accumulate, and premise reflection emerges, a meaning perspective that Japanese culture is normal becomes transformed. Satsuki begins to see Japanese norms and expectations for marital relationships and, more broadly, for the status of women as constructed in Japan. She has seen that normal is defined by people not by a “natural” culture. “Now”, she writes: “I feel that men helping with housework is normal.” (Satsuki, 09/28/92). She has begun to see culture as a naturalized order.

Irene, a young Canadian provides the final example of the workings of premise reflection below:

I find myself looking at things from a different point of view. In Canada, my personal space bubble was tremendous and any physical contact at all would have been followed by a very high degree of uneasiness, but here I find little things like that comforting and reassuring. I am aware that I am no longer looking upon this culture through a foreigners eyes. I even hope to become part of it.

(Irene, 05/22/92)

Irene’s account above, documents the changes to her meaning perspectives. Her assertion that she is “looking at things from a different point of view” and is “no longer looking upon this culture through a foreigner’s eyes” is evidence of a transformed meaning perspective. A measure of the extent of this perspective transformation is her ambition to act on this new perspective and take a part in Japanese society. The previously presented accounts of Kakuei’s awareness and critique of his homophobia (p. 171), and Mitsuko’s awareness and critique of her prejudicial attitudes to mentally and physically challenged adults (p.171) also show evidence of premise reflection since both are critiquing presuppositions that support their former meaning perspective. These two accounts, like
those of Satsuki and Irene presented above, reveal premise reflection. The assertion that these are cases of perspective transformation rather than something less will be revisited in chapter six.

**Summary of findings of Section II:**

Both accounts of content reflection: Gayle’s account of her observation that Japanese women are meek, and Atsuko’s observation that Canada is a dangerous country are examples of learning through meaning schemes. Content reflection, reflecting back on prior experience, provides the dynamic for using existing meaning schemes to interpret new experience. The analysis of the data here does not indicate that the context of culture learning alters the role that content reflection plays in learning through meaning schemes.

The accounts of process reflection include examples of three sub-types. First, those like Shigeru’s account confirming his interpretation of Canadians as selfish reveal process reflection creating resistance to the transformation of meaning schemes. Accounts like Lawrence’s wrestling with his host-brother’s attitude to his part-time job reveal process reflection confirming existing meaning schemes. Second, accounts like Betty’s modification of a stereotype that Japanese kids have less freedom than Canadian kids reveal process reflection resulting in learning through new meaning schemes. Finally, Virginia’s account where she rejects her stereotype that all Japanese men are chauvinistic and Shigeru’s account of rejecting his Hollywood-movie-based stereotype that North American teenagers are deeply attached to their families are both examples of process reflection providing the dynamic for learning through the transformation of meaning schemes. The final discussion of forms of reflection focused on premise reflection. Three
outcomes of premise reflection emerged from the data. First, premise reflection can lead, as it did in Ursula's case, to resisting transformation. Second, it can result in the desire to transform perspectives, but not the resources. Finally, it can result in more fully developed meaning perspectives. Mezirow (1991) writes that "premise reflection leads to more fully developed meaning perspectives, that is, meaning perspectives that are more inclusive, discriminating, permeable (open), and integrative of experience" (p. 111).

The analysis here has confirmed Mezirow's (1991) proposition that content and process reflection are the dynamics by which meaning schemes are elaborated, created, transformed or confirmed. And, I would add, resisted. The role of premise reflection has also been confirmed as the dynamic that transforms meaning perspectives. However, at the conclusion of this analysis three important questions remain to be examined.

First, to what degree is perspective transformation really in evidence in the accounts related to premise reflection? Some would argue that a perspective transformation needs action to be completed and that in the absence of social action such accounts are merely evidence of meaning scheme transformation (Taylor, 1993). Mezirow (1991, 1994) himself, however, has a very broad definition of social action. Later I will discuss which view is most helpful in understanding the implications of students' experience.

Second, is there a special significance to the practice of reflecting on experience in one's own culture as a strategy in culture learning? Making reference to your own culture in both process and premise reflection is a very prominent feature of culture learning. In many accounts there is a dialectic, a moving back and forth from reflecting on one culture
to reflecting on the other. There are related questions regarding the type of logic associated with process reflection in particular: is building an analogy between experience in both cultures to make meaning a form of logic essential to culture learning? Are other forms of logic in evidence in relation to one or more forms of learning?

Third, does focusing exclusively on the role of reflection as the central dynamic in culture learning, as I have done herein, provide a distorted account of culture learning? Is it presented as an overly psychologically centered and passive process? Is the approach limited? Is it blind to the reality of the student’s situation in society, and does it thus fail to recognize the way in which cultural knowledge may be socially constructed? Do we ignore power relationships in focusing exclusively on the reflective activity revealed in the journal accounts? This and other questions above will be taken up in chapter six.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This chapter summarizes the study and reviews the conclusions that emerged from the findings. Following this, questions related to these findings are discussed. Those arising from the findings regarding forms of learning and forms of reflection are discussed first, followed by those related to wider issues of culture learning. This discussion forms the background for an outline of a theory of culture learning. Finally, the limitations of this study are identified and recommendations for future research are made.

Summary of the study

This study was conceived in order to contribute to the development of a theory of culture learning. It systematically examines the experience of Japanese and Canadian youths in immersion language and culture learning programs in Canada and Japan respectively. Journals that the students kept provided the primary source of data for the study. In these journals the students recorded events in their daily lives and interpreted those events in terms of their understanding of the host-culture. Every two weeks they returned to each entry and revised the interpretation if they had new insight.

The study provided several hundred accounts describing and interpreting daily experience in the host-culture as data. The analysis of these accounts followed the analytical techniques and procedures associated with grounded theory. Using standard electronic "cut and paste" capabilities of word processors, the accounts were grouped in categories which arose from common content. The initial implications of these categories,
relating to the process and content of the student’s culture learning, suggested Jack Mezirow’s (1991) theory of transformative learning as a potential conceptual framework to clarify the nature of culture learning.

The next stage of data analysis was shaped by Mezirow’s (1991) theory. His conceptualization of four forms of learning (learning through meaning schemes, learning new meaning schemes, learning though the transformation of meaning schemes, and learning through perspective transformation), and three forms of reflection (content, process and premise) provided categories for further analysis of the data. Journal accounts that fell into each of these categories were identified. Using the grounded theory techniques of questioning and constant comparison, these accounts were further analyzed revealing sub-categories within all but one form of learning and one form of reflection. The limited number of accounts of learning through meaning schemes or content reflection made identifying meaningful sub-categories impossible. This exercise of establishing a typology within each form of learning clarified the application of forms of learning and forms of reflection in culture learning.

The following list summarizes the most general conclusions that emerged from the findings:

1. Learning through meaning schemes has straightforward application in the context of culture learning. This form is in evidence in accounts where students interpret new experience in the host-culture in terms of their existing frames of reference.

2. Learning new meaning schemes also has straightforward application in the context of culture learning. This form is in evidence in accounts where students are extending or modifying existing stereotypes.
3. Learning through the transformation of meaning schemes as Mezirow (1991) understands it has limited application in the context of culture learning. Accounts which suggest the development of a bifurcated structure where the existing meaning scheme is transformed to interpret experience in the host-culture, but retained for use in the home culture problematises the applicability of Mezirow's version of this form in culture learning.

4. Learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives has straightforward application in the context of culture learning as Taylor (1993) and Harper (1994) have shown. However, assessing the evidence for such a transformation is complicated by the short duration of this study and the limitations of journal accounts as evidence.

5. Learning through resistance to the transformation of meaning schemes and the transformation of meaning perspectives emerged as a category in showing the importance of resistance and agency in culture learning.

6. All three forms of reflection have application in the context of culture learning, but content reflection plays a lesser role, supporting the interpretation of experience in the host-culture in terms of the learners' existing frame of reference.

7. Process reflection plays an important role in culture learning. In accounts where new meaning schemes are being learned and where meaning schemes are being transformed or confirmed, premise reflection provides the dynamic.

8. Premise reflection plays an important role in culture learning. In accounts recording the transforming of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives as well as resistance to transformation of both meaning schemes and meaning perspectives, premise reflection appears to be essential.

Discussion

I will now discuss the conclusions above, identifying their implications for a theory of culture learning and drawing connections to related literature. In this discussion, I will also address the specific questions raised in relation to each section of the findings chapter. This discussion will proceed in three stages, each addressing one set of the questions identified below.
Three questions arise from the analysis of forms of learning:

(1) What is the significance of the divergence from Mezirow’s (1991) conception of learning through the transformation of meaning schemes which emerged here?

(2) Did students in this study really experience a perspective transformation or something less? A closely related question is:

(3) What is the potential of culture learning for emancipatory learning?

Two other questions arise from the analysis of the forms of reflection.

(1) Does Mezirow’s conception of reflection lead to an overly passive view of culture learning? In other words, is reflection largely an intra-personal phenomenon or is it more socially situated?

(2) Are different forms of logic related to reflection in culture learning? What is the significance of the students’ frequent use of contrast with their own culture?

Other questions relate to issues of culture learning in general. These include:

(1) What do we mean by the “culture” in culture learning?

(2) Is there a sequence to culture learning?

(3) Is culture learning influenced by biographical factors?

In the course of this discussion, I will occasionally introduce new journal entries. When referring back to accounts already presented, I will note their page number in this text. Whenever possible I will use accounts from the journals of Shigeru and Alice. Their journals appear in full in the appendices D (journals), E (letters), F (journals), and G (letters) in order to provide the reader with two examples typical of the complete journals which were subject to analysis in this study. I have chosen Shigeru and Alice to use here because examples from their journals appear frequently in the findings chapter.
A review of the role of the five forms of learning in culture learning provides the structure for the discussion of the first three questions above.

*Learning through meaning schemes*

The journals provided several accounts of students interpreting new experience in terms of their existing meaning schemes. This practice can have a number of consequences. Shigeru’s account (p. 145) when his expectations of his friend’s family thanking him for his concern for their daughter failed to materialize, illustrates how learning through existing meaning schemes can result in people feeling bruised in intercultural encounters, as he did. Gayle’s critical comment that Japanese women are meek (p. 187) is an example of how learning through this form may both confirm the learner’s negative judgement about the host-culture and confirm a sense of the superiority of one’s culture since the other culture is seen to lack some essential desirable quality. Alice’s account (p. 146) of her discovery at the sports day that she and her Japanese counterparts are really not different from one another exemplifies cases where similarities are noted through this form of learning, leading perhaps to feelings of solidarity and closeness.

In most cases, we must question how accurately the host-culture is being interpreted through learning this way. Learning through meaning schemes is a habitual and largely unreflective activity. Learners lack an awareness of the framing paradigm they use to interpret experience. In models that conceptualize cultural awareness as developing in stages, this form of learning is often associated with the first stage. In Bennett’s (1986) model, for example, this form is associated with the first of the three stages of ethnocentric consciousness. Kordes (1991) would likely consider this form as part of the
monocultural stage of intercultural learning, the first stage of his model. In Hanvey’s (1979) levels of cultural awareness, level one is identified with some of the outcomes of this form of learning. At this first level, learners’ information consists of stereotypes and isolated facts. The culture is seen as “bizarre” or “odd,” and ideas are often expressed in terms of what the culture “lacks”. Culture bearers, he writes, “may be considered rude, ignorant or unrefined at this stage of understanding” (Hanvey, 1979, cited in Omaggio, 1986, p. 372).

Hanvey’s (1979) model, like Bennett’s (1986) establishes a stage of little or no awareness. Typically such a stage is described in terms of negative outcomes such as intolerance and ineffectiveness. This study, however, suggests another possible characteristic: despite a lack of awareness, learning through existing meaning schemes can also result in feelings of solidarity with and respect for the new culture. This occurs when the learner perceives sufficient similarities to conclude that people from the other culture are just like them. In Alice’s account (p. 146) of her experience at the sports meet, this is exactly what occurs. Shigeru also, in one account of family life (p. 195), experiences feelings of solidarity when he uses existing meaning schemes to interpret a teen’s response to his host-mom, and concludes that Canadian young people are just like he was at their age. These feelings of solidarity are very fragile because they arise from very narrow knowledge.

Learning through new meaning schemes

This form of learning emerged from the data in a very specific manifestation: the use of popular stereotypes of the other culture to interpret new experience. These
stereotypes were often extended to interpret new experience not originally associated with the stereotype. For example, in one of Alice’s accounts (p. 150) she gives her stereotype of Japan as a group oriented society a new application in her observation that school uniforms and suits confirm that “conformity is big in Japan”. In Shigeru’s journal account (p. 190) we see him using the ski trip with Canadian students to gather evidence to extend his stereotypes of Canadians as individualists to cover a new experience. As Alice’s entry (p. 193) shows, she uses her experience in her host-family, to modify her stereotypic view that Japanese do not entertain at home. Her experience shows how stereotypes are modified in this form of learning.

The difference between this form and learning through meaning schemes may be minimal, but the potential, through process reflection, to modify an existing meaning scheme has great importance in culture learning. There is a “circularity” to learning through this form. Meaning schemes are modified and may later be transformed. This transformed meaning scheme itself becomes a meaning scheme which may again be modified. This steady incremental modification of stereotypes brings to the learner’s attention subtle traits of the new culture. These traits may eventually be organized in such a way that a separation of the learner’s frame of reference and that of the host-culture emerges.

*Learning through the transformation of meaning schemes*

In the analysis of this form of learning, the limitations of Mezirow’s (1991) version of this form become clear. In his version, the transformation of a meaning scheme is expected to result in the abandonment of the original meaning scheme. By definition, a
meaning scheme is transformed in order to interpret experience more adequately, so the old scheme no longer has a function. In an important variation to this, in culture learning the original meaning scheme continues to exist despite the transformation of the meaning scheme. In this study, cases emerged where a bifurcated meaning structure seems to include two different sets of meaning schemes, each in reference to a distinct culture.

The clearest examples of this phenomenon are found in cases where students are learning language and learning elements of non-verbal communication. Take for example, Alice’s account (p. 164) where she learns to use a new Japanese form of address for her older sister. In doing so, she does not abandon the form of address that she would use in Canada. For Hiroo (p. 159), reinterpreting the meaning of eye contact in Canada does not mean abandoning the meaning scheme that allows him to make meaning of eye contact in Japan. Similarly, Donald (p. 160) may now interpret touching someone with his foot as rude, a “made-in-Japan” meaning scheme, but it is unlikely he would now interpret a Canadian touching him with his foot as rude, either in Japan or Canada. Finally, in shifting experience from one basic category to another in interpreting new experience, the existing meaning scheme is left in place for use in the home culture. For example, when Yukihiro (p. 156) transforms a meaning scheme to interpret pizza as a dinner food, he does not then also consider it food in Japan. Sojourners sometimes do forget a meaning scheme that is associated with their own culture. People returning home after being abroad often report continuing to interpret experience consistent with the frame of reference of the former host-culture. (For months I felt slightly offended when no one bowed when they greeted me after coming home from Japan.) This habit of interpretation is usually temporary.
What is the significance of the fact that a bifurcated structure emerges in culture learning? Very little research has been done into the structure of biculturalism (Paulson, 1993); however, Jacobovits (1970) speculated that bilingual people had two distinct and separated sets of concepts which were used as needed. This is one of two models found in the literature on bilingualism. The other is that two variations of the same concept are stored together. These two models of bilingualism are called compound and coordinate (Agar, 1991) respectively. The compound model suggests that one conceptual storage place has two languages mapped onto it. The coordinate model suggests that each language store/conceptual store is separate. The accounts in this study of the student’s developing biculturalism suggest that the two models of bilingualism may work for biculturalism.

At first glance, the evidence here suggests a model of coordinate biculturalism; the existence of two distinct meaning schemes each mapped onto a different culture. However, the current state of the coordinate/compound bilingual debate suggests good reason for caution. Hakuta (1986) has looked at the question of two models of bilingualism and concluded: “I believe that the question of whether the two languages of the bilingual are independent or interdependent misses the mark. The real question is the identification of the conditions under which the two languages are maintained separately and under which they are merged” (cited in Agar, 1991, p. 171). Agar (1991) concludes from this that arguing for an either/or determination in regards to the separation or merger of two cultures is also off the mark.
Agar makes the sensible case that in some places the two cultures of the bicultural might be independent and in others interdependent. He identifies the conditions for this as resting in how different the point of contact between the two cultures might be. The example he uses is the Austrian German concept of “Schmah”. He points out that even native speakers have difficulty translating it, but describes it as a view of the world, “a life feeling” that things are much worse than they seem, and all you can do is laugh it off. This concept is a core view of things with very specific meanings so “putted” into Viennese life that it is a badge of self-identification. He calls points of contact like this, where it is difficult for outsiders to make meaning: a “whorfian cliff.” Agar (1991) describes these places as “rich” with, “the connotations of tasty, thick, and wealthy all intended” (p. 176). Such “rich” points in a culture and language where interpretation is enormously difficult are places where concepts associated with the two cultures might remain independent, a coordinate biculturalism. Other less “rich” points may be interdependent, a compound biculturalism.

Before we leave the question of the links between transforming meaning schemes and the development of biculturalism, one other experience needs to be considered: the case where entirely new meaning schemes are needed to interpret experience in another culture. Learners’ discovery of expressions in a second language that are simply not translatable into their first language (and vice versa) are not rare. The same is true for cultural practices: sometimes there is simply no related meaning scheme that can be transformed to aid the interpretation of new experience. Although this study presents evidence that the transformation of meaning schemes creates a new and separate structure
for making meaning in the host-culture, there appear to be exceptions. In cases where there are cultural similarities, for example, it may be that the existing meaning scheme is simply modified to interpret this new situation. These exceptions suggest we reserve judgement on whether these transformed meaning schemes are always maintained separately. We can conclude, however, that Mezirow’s failure to recognize that an existing meaning scheme and the meaning scheme resulting from its transformation can co-exist limits the usefulness of his version of this form in understanding the process of culture learning.

Learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives

The important question that emerged from the findings in relation to this form of learning is: did some students actually experience a perspective transformation or something less? The accounts identified here include Kakuei’s critique of his homophobia (p. 171), Mitsuko’s critique of her attitudes to the physically and mentally challenged (p. 171), Satsuki’s rejection of the traditional divisions of labour within marriage specifically and traditional status of women generally (p. 172), and Irene’s embrace of more collectively organized social life (p. 173).

The difficulty in deciding whether or not to call the instances above examples of perspective transformations or not is twofold: first, the duration of this study is very short; and second, a single account is used as the basis for this judgement. In the absence of more information, it is difficult to know the consequences of the perspective transformations suggested above. A review of Mezirow’s (1991) work can help clarify whether or not, even in a short time abroad, these students experienced a perspective transformation as defined below:
The process of becoming critically aware of how and why our assumptions have come to constrain the way we perceive, understand and feel about the world; changing these structures of habitual expectation to make possible a more inclusive, discriminating, and integrative perspective; and finally acting upon this new understanding. (Mezirow, 1991, p.167)

Perspective transformation is both a process and a product. Although perspective transformations can occur suddenly, or happen more gradually as the result of an accumulation of transformations of meaning schemes, Mezirow (1991) identifies a 10 step sequence in both cases. When examined, each account identified as an example of such a transformation reveals at least the first three of 10 steps associated with a completed transformation. First, a disorienting dilemma is in evidence to some degree in each account: a particular experience acts as a “trigger” for critical reflection on former meaning perspectives. For Kakuei, for example, the trigger is confronting his feelings as he watches the gay pride parade. Second, feelings of guilt regarding past beliefs are expressed. These feelings are characteristic of the second step of a perspective transformation. Both Kakuei and Mitsuko write of feeling ashamed of former beliefs and the other three students give some indication of uneasiness with, or criticism of, their old position. Finally, all accounts show evidence of a critical assessment of underlying assumptions behind the old meaning perspective. This critical reflection is the third of the 10 steps identified. Thus, each account shows evidence of at least the firm beginning of a perspective transformation.

The remaining seven of ten steps in the developmental process are not so clearly evident, but some inferences can be made. The fourth step in the process of perspective transformation is recognizing that your discontent is shared. This is particularly interesting
in the context of culture learning. Even if their peers did not show similar tendencies to transform a meaning perspective, the students were surrounded by people in the host-culture who, while they may not have negotiated a similar change, certainly model the new perspective.

Opportunities for steps five through nine, stages where one “tries on” a new role and relationships, are plentiful in a new culture. These new roles and relationships are relatively easy to try on if one has an institutional context such as school and/or family life within which to assume new roles. Indeed, it is tempting to argue that living in another culture can accelerate perspective transformations for just this reason. The final step in the process of perspective transformation is integration of the new perspective into one's life. This is a critical step and hard to assess in the case of these students. Would we have to wait until they were home in their own countries, or is adapting to the new culture evidence of integrating the new perspective? Mezirow is silent on this. My position is that integration of the new perspective in the context of life in the new culture is a legitimate measure of a perspective transformation.

The four accounts under discussion here certainly reveal evidence of the first three steps in the process of perspective transformation. Moreover, I have argued that there is a high likelihood of steps four through nine being taken. Step Ten is problematic: what constitutes integration in the student's lives of a new perspective? Is it enough that they wrote about it? The most critical objection to calling their experience a perspective transformation is the lack of evidence of action based on the changed perspective (Taylor, 1995, personal correspondence).
Certainly, in the case of three of the four students, there is no evidence that they acted on their new perspective in the public and political sense of the word “action.” I don’t have a record of Kakuei making a gay friend, or being publicly critical of Japanese or Canadian homophobia, nor do I have evidence of Mitsuo responding differently to mentally or physically challenged people or of advocating social change in this regard. Evidence that Satsuki will seek a different kind of partner in marriage or become active in Japan or Canada as a feminist is also absent. However, Irene can be said to have acted on her perspective transformation since she is a willing participant in a more collectivist society and, by her own account, relates physically very differently from before to the people around her in Japan. She has integrated her new perspective into her life. But I think the other students have also integrated the experience of the perspective transformation into their lives by writing about it. Surely writing about something, especially when you know that it is going to be read by others, is a very concrete social action - it is an expression of commitment. That act of writing is evidence that a profound personal change has occurred. I think all these accounts stand as examples of perspective transformation.

*Culture learning and emancipatory learning*

Another important aspect of the question of whether or not the students experienced a perspective transformation involves evaluating the potential of culture learning in general for emancipatory learning. Again a review of Mezirow’s (1991) work will help clarify this. His definition of emancipatory learning follows:
The emancipation in emancipatory learning is emancipation from libidinal, linguistic, epistemic or environmental forces that limit our options and our rational control over our lives, but have been taken for granted or seen as beyond human control. These forces include the misconceptions, ideologies, and psychological distortions in prior learning that produce or perpetuate unexamined relations of dependence.

(Mezirow, 191, p. 87)

Jurgen Habermas, the originator of the term emancipatory learning, intended that involvement in social action, usually thought of as some variety of collective political action, should be a necessary attribute of emancipatory learning. For my own part, I am willing to accept, with Mezirow, a broader definition of social action to include less public and overtly "political" acts.

Consistent with my position, I would argue that Irene's experience in coming to both appreciate and function within a different culture is emancipatory. This may be less publicly emancipatory than, for example, activism aimed at transforming a competitive sports program in a neighbourhood school into a cooperative one, but the former case is empowering for Irene. In Satsuki's case, I think that reaching an understanding that Japanese culture is naturalized rather than natural is emancipatory. Her critique of the status of women in Japan need not lead to social activism to make a profound difference in her life. She may find that she makes a very different choice of partner. Moreover, her understanding that culture is not "natural" may help her see that she has options. It is important, however, to recognize that her commitment to a more equal status for women will still be emancipatory when she returns to Japan, but more difficult when she finds herself struggling to assert this view. We need to recognize that emancipatory learning carries with it a heavy price, and that is one more reason why we should regard actions
that fall short of overt political action as significant. In many instances, it takes great
courage to express a thought that is not socially or politically acceptable. These small acts,
too, change society.

To avoid the very great danger of weakening the power of a concept like
emancipatory learning, however, I think evidence of such learning must include a critique
of society and power relationships in particular. The journal accounts of the four students
above show that they are engaged in critical reflection on their own socially created values
which they identified as important in their own culture. To recognize and critique your
own (and your culture’s) homophobia, or your denial of the full humanity of the physically
and mentally challenged, as Kakuei and Mitsuo do, is no small achievement. Nor is
recognizing the social construction of the limited options available to you, as Irene and
Satsuki do, a small thing. Each of these revelations are part of a process of political
education and position students for social action, if only as voters or critics.

Emancipatory learning in culture learning is about developing a critique, through
critical reflection, not only of your own society, but also of the host-culture. The overtly
political content, especially critiques of power and its distribution, of journal accounts
reveals the potential of culture learning as emancipatory learning. Not surprisingly,
questions of race and power were raised by Japanese students in Canada as Shigeru’s
journal entry below attests:

I wonder why janitors are working at fast-food restaurants. I thought that
these restaurants used a “self-serve” system where every customer takes the
responsibility to clean up their tables and return the trays to the proper place.
I went to Burger King today, and saw an oriental man who was cleaning up
all the tables in the restaurant. I cleaned up my own table, but most of the
customers left their trash on the table. Speaking of another topic, I wonder why all the orientals work as janitors and white people work inside the counter.

(Shigeru, 10/20/92)

Shigeru was not alone in raising the issue of racism.

Akiko too raised this issue in commenting on some Canadians’ attitudes towards immigrants:

Recently, I often hear that Canadians’ living standards, especially of the middle class, are going down. High taxes will be one reason, but also people who are not hard workers will be a possible cause. Immigrants are accepted to improve the situation. I think that they support the Canadian economy; however, Canadians are not friendly to the Chinese. Canadians often describe the Chinese as very noisy. Originally Canada was a country of immigrants, so I think that Canadians should not say “we don’t like immigrants”.

(Akiko, 11/24/92)

In addition to students raising issues of race and power, they also raised issues of gender and power. Both young Japanese and Canadians discussed the status of women in their host-cultures. We have seen several of these accounts in the previous chapter. One of the most important features of these accounts is the questioning of what is “normal”. From this question, it is only a short distance to questions of who gets to decide what is “normal”. In the case of one student, links were also made between the position of women and positions of minorities in Japan. The entry by Ursula below raises not only the issue of women’s position in the social hierarchy, but also the position of foreigners (gaijin) in that same hierarchy:
The other main thing that I noticed was that in the very crowded trains, the older men will push you around without saying a word of sorry or excuse me.

That, combined with the stress people give me, gives me the impression that gaijins rate lower on the social scale than Japanese and that the older men seem more aware of this than the younger people.

(Ursula, 04/05/94)

Two weeks later she writes some more on this observation:

As for the social scale, age has more to do with it than ethnic origin, because I continuously see the older people push to get off the train first, etc. A bigger factor than both these seems to be gender. Young men will stay in a seat leaving elderly women to stand - an elderly couple will have the man sit and the woman stand. ....

(Ursula, 04/20/94)

One young Canadian, Donald, raised the issue of the causes of war and moved beyond a position of assigning blame to any one nation to argue that the responsibility for peace belongs to everyone. This is a change in political consciousness. He writes:

We visited Hiroshima’s atomic dome and peace museum today. Looking at the atomic dome and reading tons of pictures and information in the museum made me realize the very cruel part of war. At the same time, I felt very sorry for those Japanese people who got killed and seriously hurt by those two atomic bombs.

However, the historical fact was that Japan started the war in the first place and caused hundreds of thousands of Chinese people to die in China. Therefore, by knowing the historical fact and hearing Japanese people say “stop the war”, I felt very complicated.

(Donald, 05/25/92)

One week later, he writes:

One week has passed since I came back from Hiroshima, and I can clearly remember how emotional I was in the peace museum. I have been trying to understand what advantage could a war ever bring to human beings in the world, but all I can see so far are disaster and damage. But it seems that people have not learned enough lessons from the war in the past.
Unless people in the world really realize the true meaning of “peace”, “stop the war” is only a slogan.

Donald, 06/04/92)

The accounts that have been presented earlier as examples of learning through resistance to the transformation of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives are also examples of developing a critique of the host-culture. Although the three accounts above and those related to resistance do not result in social action, they are examples of actively questioning social reality. Mezirow argues that this ability “to negotiate meanings and purposes instead of passively accepting the social realities of others” is one aspect of emancipatory learning (1994, p. 26). This activity in the host-culture also provides a model for critical reflection and resistance in the home culture.

My conclusion to this discussion is that culture learning has very high potential for emancipatory learning. We should not dismiss action which is not overtly political as emancipatory if it involves developing a critique of society and sharing it. Emancipatory learning may also involve such non-political actions as dramatically changing a self-image or even developing a new epistemology, as we learn more about how we learn. In the next chapter, I will explore further the implications of linking culture learning to a broad conception of emancipatory learning.

Reflection and culture learning

Understanding the potential of culture learning as emancipatory learning or political education rests in large part on understanding the nature of reflection. This study has explored the role of reflection in culture learning, confirming it as the central dynamic that changes meaning schemes. Mezirow’s (1994) conception of reflection tends to
present it as an intra-personal phenomenon more than a socially situated one. However, in this study a number of “learning strategies” linked to reflection emerged that remind us that reflection is not a solitary and passive practice, but essentially an enlivened and social activity. It is also clear from this study that certain forms of logic were more in evidence than others.

**Reflection as socially situated**

The two questions raised in relation to the findings on reflection will be discussed below in the context of a general review of the understanding of reflection that emerged in this study. This study shows reflection as a dynamic process, actively changing meaning schemes and meaning perspectives. It is also a socially significant process. Kemmis (1985) argues that the action that arises from reflection is the “the most eloquent and socially significant form of human action” (p. 141). Unlike Mezirow (1991), Kemmis (1985) does not distinguish forms of reflection. He is more concerned with defining reflection in its social context. He does so by making five points about reflection. I will deal with Kemmis’s first two points below in reference to all three forms of reflection in general, but process reflection in particular. I will deal with the remaining three points in relation to premise reflection. Kemmis makes these two points (three to follow) regarding reflection:

1. Reflection is not a purely “internal” psychological process: it is action oriented and historically embedded.

2. Reflection is not a purely individual process: like language it is a social process. (Kemmis, 1985, p. 140)

The first point above reminds us that reflection is a dialectical process, looking both inward at thoughts and feelings and outward at the situation people find themselves
in. His second point, that reflection is, like language, a social process, rests on three observations. First, reflection is a conversation in our minds. Second, the ideas and understanding we use are socially constructed. Third, action, the fruit of reflection, has meaning and significance in the world. Reflection is thus dialectical in a second sense that, "the thinking of the individual is shaped by a social and cultural context, and that the social and cultural context is itself shaped by the thought and actions of individuals" (Kemmis, 1985, p.144).

Reflection emerges as more of a social or inter-personal rather than individual or intra-personal process for the learner in this study. Students’ interpretation of their experience was not a solitary activity: dialogue was critical to this process. Dialogue grew out of reflection and fed further reflection. Students were constantly talking to each other, to their host-families, to their teachers, to me and to their host-culture peers about Japanese and Canadian culture.

The social context of reflection is particularly evident in relation to process reflection where students seek input from others as they transform their meaning schemes. Accounts of process reflection often record conversations with host-family members. Shigeru’s account (p.195) of his conversation with his host-mother regarding the relationship of teens to parents in Japan and Canada is one example. Lawrence’s conversations with his host-brother about having a part-time job (p.191) is another. Accounts of learning through the transformation of meaning schemes add records of talk with peers, host-culture friends and teachers. Fiona’s account (p.155) revealing her habit of asking other Canadian students about their experience in their host-families is one
example. Mitsuo’s account (p. 157) of his conversation with his Japanese friend concerning where he could wash his socks and underwear is another example of how students talked with friends from the same culture and incorporated this into their practice of reflection. Students also talked to the friends they made in the host-culture. Yukihiro’s conversation (p. 156) with a Canadian friend about whether he had pizza for supper or not is another example of dialogue feeding the process of reflection. Students also talked to their teachers as attested to in Donald’s account of talking to his Japanese teacher about why his brother was offended by being touched with his foot. The findings of this study extend Taylor’s (1993) finding that developing friendships was a very important learning strategy in perspective transformation. This study suggests friendships with members of your own culture as well as members of the host-culture are important. All the above examples confirm that dialogue is an important part of the process of reflection, particularly process reflection.

The next three points that Kemmis makes about reflection are particularly important to an understanding of premise reflection. These points are:

1. Reflection serves human interest; it is a political process.

2. Reflection is shaped by ideology; in turn it shapes ideology.

3. Reflection is a practice which expresses our power to reconstitute social life by the way we participate in communication, decision making and social action. (Kemmis, 1985, p.140)

The striking thing about premise reflection, particularly in accounts of resistance to the transformation of meaning schemes, but also in accounts of perspective
transformation, is the political context of this reflection. It seems to arise in response to observation of, or participation in, social activities, rather than from dialogue. The examples I have in mind: Kakuei’s critique (p. 171) of his own homophobia arising from watching the gay pride parade, Mitsuo’s critique (p. 171) of her attitudes towards the handicapped arising from her observation on the bus, Irene’s record (p. 173) of her preference for collective forms of social life and Satsuki’s critique of marriage and the status of women. All of these accounts include premise reflection. Each is “political”, that is, it makes reference to the way in which social life is constituted. So too do the accounts of resisting the transformation of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives. These accounts include critiques of practices involved in schooling and of the status of women in Japan.

Kemmis’s (1985) final point that reflection expresses our power to reconstitute social life seems particularly important in understanding the importance of each of the accounts above. In each case, premise reflection has implications for the reshaping of social life. Clearly Kakuei, Mitsuo and Satsuki’s critiques of Japan are not simply personal matters. If their critiques move them to make decisions and undertake social action, this could result in activism to end homophobia, discrimination against the mentally and physically challenged and the unequal status for women in Japan. Similarly, Irene’s critique of Canadian society could result in activism to create a society here with a more collectivist character.

The discussion here has tried first, to broaden Mezirow’s (1991) perspective on reflection to present reflection as a social and political process and second, to underscore
the active nature of culture learning. Learners are always participants and observers of the
social and political life of the host-culture. Reflection is the process that brings the learner
into relationship with the society both as observer and as participant. Both these roles are
active.

Reflection and forms of logic

An important question that arose in the analysis of forms of reflection was whether
the frequently observed practise of students referring back to their own culture in the
process of interpreting new experience is an essential strategy in culture learning. This
activity is an important clue to an underlying form of logic. Mezirow’s (1991) observation
that different types of logic are applied in problem solving in transformative learning offers
a starting point for answering this question. He identifies three types of logic:
hypothetical-deductive, metaphorical-abductive, and dialectical-presuppositional, a form
linked to induction. Mezirow offers this short definition of abduction, deduction and
induction: abduction explains what may be, deduction what must be, and induction what is
operative (1991, p. 85). In this study, the use of hypothetical-deductive and metaphorical-
abductive logic emerged as the two most frequent forms of logic. No clear evidence of the
third form, which is associated exclusively with perspective transformation, emerged from
the few accounts of such transformation in this study. Of the two forms that did emerge,
metaphorical-abductive logic, associated with comparing and contrasting the home and
host-culture, seems to be a particularly important form in culture learning. This latter form
will be examined following a discussion of hypothetical-deductive logic in culture learning.
Hypothetical-deductive logic involves students looking for evidence to confirm hypotheses they have about the host-culture. This activity is linked to process reflection.

One of the most interesting examples of this is the account below where Betty sets up an ingenious test of the hypothesis that hospitality shown her visiting sister in Japan is sincere rather than a matter of obligation:

Yesterday my sister came to visit me from Monza. Of course, it is extremely exciting to have someone else in Japan with you from your family. My host family was so hospitable. They completely treated her (as well as me) like royalty. They gave my sister presents and bought her ticket home. This was so fascinating for both of us. Especially if I compare them to my old host family. It was puzzling also though I couldn’t understand if they felt obligated or if it was a cultural thing or if it was because they wanted to. I’ll check and find out how much they talk about her after she’s gone. This is a way I personally think you can tell if they actually like her!

(Betty, 05/30/92)

A week later the results of her test are summarized:

I have the same interpretation of the experience. My host family I think really took a liking to my sister though because they talk about her quite often. So this is really nice of them. Maybe it’s not just because it’s culturally appropriate to be polite but because of the fact that they liked her! Whenever they introduce me to someone they automatically afterwards express to the individuals that I have a sister and everything about her! I’m so happy they took a liking to her!

(Betty, 06/05/92)

Another example of this kind of logic is seen below when Shigeru observes the behaviour of other Asian students in order to confirm a hypothesis he has about Canadian culture:

I have been thinking for a long time that there is no concept of “ue” and “shita” (trans: upper and lower) here. Especially in the bathroom, people leave their bags on the floor without any awareness. Or some throw their belongings on the floor as soon as they come into the bathroom. Those who put their bags on the countertop are better I think. I’ve never seen Orientals
(perhaps ESL students) do the same thing in the bathroom. I have heard the situation is the same in the girls’ bathroom as well.

(Shigeru, 10/23/92)

Fiona’s account below is also an example of hypothetical-deductive logic:

Right now, my host dad is vacuuming and cleaning! I’m so surprised! I was under the assumption that the women were in charge of the home and the men went out of the house to work. It is true that my host-mom cooks all of the family meals, but it seems they share the cleaning duties....

(Fiona, 04/11/92)

In this case, Fiona has a hypothesis falsified. Her plan to explore this matter further also includes a strategy linked to hypothetical-deductive logic. She continues: “I plan to ask my Canadian friends if their host-dads clean because I would like to know if this is the exception to the rule.”

Many accounts seem to reveal a different type of logic. The two accounts below are good examples of another type of logic:

Young people are often very concerned about the way they look, and how they fit in, so it seems likely that it is the same here, only more extreme than in Canada. It seems strange though: in Canada, young people dress the same way within their social group (headbanger, skater, prep etc.). Here except for the obvious minority of alternative people, everyone is in the same style.

(Ursula, 04/20/92)

Someone once said that Japan is a country of “sumimasen” [trans: excuse me or I am sorry] and English speaking countries are countries of “thank you.” Japanese try to keep good relations among people by saying “sumimasen” and English people do so by saying “thank you.”

(Naomi, 04/23/93)

Both accounts above are examples of metaphorical-abductive logic. Mezirow (1991) argues that this form of logic is central to communicative learning. In abduction, learners draw on their own experience to explain others’ experience. Through abduction,
parts of the whole are understood in terms of a first impression of the whole. These first impressions are then shaped by a process of recognizing the parallels to other experiences - the metaphorical part of the metaphorical-abductive form of logic. Finally, the interpretation of the whole is modified in light of an analysis of the parts.

Metaphorical-abductive logic appears to be used in many accounts as in the two above. The major characteristic of these accounts is that students use their knowledge of their own culture in interpreting the other culture. By comparing and contrasting the two cultures, students build an analogy to their own experience and thus open up their understanding of the other culture. Such activity also results in an increased awareness of the learner’s own culture. This study also leads me to conclude that metaphorical-abductive logic, relying as it does on contrasting or comparing one’s own culture to another, plays a central role in culture learning.

This concludes the discussion of questions that arose out of the findings related to the function of forms of learning and forms of reflection in culture learning. The next part of the discussion will address questions related to broader issues of culture learning: (1) What do we mean by “culture” in culture learning? (2) Is culture learning a linear process? (3) Is culture learning influenced by age, gender or cultural background?
What is the “culture” in culture learning?

I would like to begin to answer the question: what do we mean by the culture in culture learning, by discussing both the experience of the students as ethnographers and the journals as ethnographic field notes.

Students as Ethnographers

In asking the students to observe and interpret the culture that they were living in, I asked them to become ethnographers. Although there are differences between the students and trained ethnographers, most obviously the students comparative lack of intellectual preparation and a much broader focus of study, the similarities between the two groups are more significant. The most important similarity is the methods both used for learning culture.

The students, like ethnographers, used participant observation: “living as much as possible with, and in the same manner as the individuals being investigated”, as the main method of culture learning (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984, p. 109, cited in Harper, 1994). Ethnographers do, however, try to maintain some degree of marginality and strive to avoid “feeling at home” for fear of losing “one’s critical, analytical perspective” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 102). The degree of marginality that the students and ethnographers maintain is quite different. The students made no concerted effort to stand aside from events. In fact, they were interested in “feeling at home” and strove to fit in. This study shows that the degree of marginality the students maintained was set differently. Their marginality was established by others, or, most importantly, by their need to maintain personal integrity through resisting pressures to accept values and conform to
certain behaviour expected in the host-cultures. Making a conscious effort to maintain a critical, analytical perspective was not an important goal for the students.

Although the students were obviously not trained in ethnographic techniques, nor deliberately marginalizing themselves, they moved through stages similar to those of professionals in the field. Agar (1982) describes these stages of ethnographic field work as: “breakdown, resolution, coherence”, (cited in Harper, 1993, p. 131). He sees each as a cognitive process culminating in a new level of internal integration. Spradley (1980) looks at the field experience as a two phase process. The first phase for an ethnographer is to engage in “descriptive observation”, (Spradley, 1980, pp. 32-33). This stage involves “the general question “What is going on here?” (Spradley, 1980, p. 73). Ethnographers follow this phase with a more structured activity of “domain analysis” (Spradley, pp. 85-99) to identify categories and sketch out problems. From this phase questions and hypotheses emerge.

The students, like ethnographers, began with a phase of descriptive observation, writing down what happened to them and considering the question “What is going on here?” They then moved to a more structured activity where they attempted to ask questions and develop hypotheses to explain what they had observed. The interpretations of the events they experienced reveal their hypotheses about Japanese culture. These two phases were usually but not always separated in time. Like ethnographers, the students too were active in collecting new data, reflecting on previous questions and hypotheses, and modifying these over time. Many journal entries show how students rejected earlier
hypotheses, asked new questions, and established new hypotheses. This process is well illustrated by accounts in Chapter Five.

**Journal as ethnographic field notes**

The parallels in learning “strategies” between students and professionally trained ethnographers are clear, but are there parallels between their products? The students’ journals are not ethnographies. Ethnographies are more focused and developed from a narrow selection of field notes which are subject to systematic reflection. However, as carefully constructed accounts of experience, the product of participant-observation, which link particular events to larger patterns in culture, the journals share much with ethnographies. As a result, the journals too invite the question: are they accurate descriptions of the culture? But this question of accuracy and seeing the students as ethnographers is a very problematic way to understand both what the students were doing and the nature of the product they created. James Clifford (1986a, b) writes that participant-observation, data collection, and cultural description are all “predominant metaphors in anthropological research” and all presuppose a standpoint outside - looking at, objectifying, or, somewhat closer, “reading a given reality” (1986a, p. 11).

But just how “scientific and objective” ethnographers and ethnographies are is an important debate in contemporary anthropology (Clifford, 1986a, b). Entering this debate can help us place student journals in a better context to understand what they are. Clifford cites Wagner (1975), in asserting that it is more accurate to conclude that these journals, as ethnographies, are more caught up in the “invention” of culture than they are with the “representation” of culture (1986a, p. 2). Clifford (1986a) asserts that ethnographic
"representation" of culture (1986a, p. 2). Clifford (1986a) asserts that ethnographic writing is determined in at least these six ways: contextually, rhetorically, institutionally, generically, politically and historically (p. 6). Perhaps too simply put, he suggests that these forces shape ethnographies in such a way that they are most accurately described as fictions "in the sense of something made or fashioned" (p. 6). Clifford concludes:

Ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial - committed and incomplete. This point is now widely asserted - and resisted at strategic points by those who fear the collapse of clear standards of verification. (Clifford, 1986a, p. 7)

This position of Clifford's reflects a view of culture that was discussed earlier: one that critiques the notion that cultures in the classic sense of a "national culture" exist. Clifford (1986a) makes it clear that for the students in study, or any of us, there is "no ground from which persons and groups can securely represent others" (p. 22). Everything is in flux:

There is no longer any place of overview (mountaintop) from which to map human ways of life, no Archimedean point from which to represent the world. Mountains are in constant motion. So are the Islands: for one cannot occupy, unambiguously, a bounded cultural world from which to journey out and analyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly influence, dominate, parody, translate, and subvert one another. (Clifford, 1986a, p. 22)

Having pointed out the difficulty of "mapping" human ways of life, Clifford, like Renaldo (1988) and Street (1993), does not claim that ethnography should be abandoned and culture as a concept set aside. Clifford argues that since truth is a construction, made in relation to our identity, and sometimes made together with informants who don't reveal all their own constructed truth, all ethnographers may know are partial truths.
In relation to student’s accounts, then, the question of the “accuracy,” in the absolute sense, the sense of having made a “correct” interpretation of the culture must be set aside. The students’ journals too are also “partial truths” - as a selection of journal accounts below can show us.

*Culture in the journals: is this a multiple choice question?*

For culture learners, the argument of Rosaldo (1988), Street (1993) and Clifford (1986a, b) above that the “classic” understanding of culture as national culture, consisting of predictable patterns, is misleading and incomplete is not merely an academic debate. The students in this study, like others, were prepared for their overseas programs with information on the host-culture as national culture. They set off confident that they would both confirm known cultural patterns and discover more patterns and that these would be the keys to understanding their new culture. Such preparation sets up in learners powerful expectations of what they think they are to learn. As much as the scholar then, the culture learner must confront the question of whether “there is a ‘there’ there.” The contradictions and inconsistencies within culture often make culture learning a multiple choice question. Yet, students are usually led to expect one right answer. What happens when they don’t will be shown in accounts presented in the discussion below. First, I will present two accounts which reflect what we might consider “traditional” characteristics of Japan and Canada.

The two entries presented side-by-side below are accounts of events in Japanese and Canadian culture which reflect differences that might be expected between these two cultures.
CANADIAN ACCOUNT

My host mother's friends come over quite often and my host parents always offer them something to eat and drink. The friend always says “sumimasen” over and over again and bows and sometimes refuse the offer. This shows I think that the people want to be sorry for taking the offer and imposing in my host family's life.

(Kyla, 06/29/92)

The next day Kyla comments again, writing:

I think that the friends were just showing their thanks for the offer and that the Japanese are more thankful to other people than Canadians are.

(Kyla, 06/30/92)

JAPANESE ACCOUNT

Yesterday, and the day before yesterday, and three days ago people visited my host family, However, they came to the house before I knew it and they were gone before I knew it, even though I was at home. In Japan, when people visit there is some kind of tension at home. Moreover, we receive guests at the door, and send them off at the door later. We also provide a warm reception to them. So, it was surprising for me to see guests making a cup of coffee by themselves in my host-family’s house. Is it because they often have guests? Don’t they provide any hospitality to their guests because they are so close to each other? But still I feel when the guests are gone before we know.

(Rie, 05/10/93)

These accounts reflect traditional views of Japan as a more formal society and one where social ritual is important. In contrast, Canada appears as a more casual society where people, especially friends, don’t stand on ceremony. These images are no less real for being traditional: on the contrary, each account confirms the other’s interpretation of the host-culture. However, the expectation that these differences are predictable on all occasions is very problematic. Such a conclusion is typical of the belief that national cultures with high degrees of internal consistency exist, and that reliable predictions can be made on the basis of similarities and differences between cultures. This position, in turn, raises expectations that there are Japanese and Canadian cultural patterns which function like a “grammar” of the culture, and that this grammar shapes all behaviour and requires
that all "accurate" interpretation of behaviour in the culture be related back to its structures.

The position above is what Rosaldo (1993) refers to as the "classic" view of culture. However, these expectations for predictability may be soon frustrated. The accounts below, presenting as they do descriptions of the culture that contradict those above, illustrate how much variation there is within a culture. Michael's account that contradicts Kyla's and Rie's description of Japanese culture above is an interesting example of such variation. His account below describes the protocol for the visits of friends to the family he lives with:

Though any day could have been chosen to relate this experience, I decided to finally write it down today. I have been puzzled by how visitors enter a friend's house in Japan. Whereas in Canada we simply ring the doorbell and wait for an answer, the Japanese take a much different approach. On more than one occasion a friend or neighbour of my host-family has simply walked into my house as if he was a regular member of the family. What baffled me even further was that my host family treated him like he was a member of the family! As of now I have absolutely no ideas nor answers to this original Japanese custom.

(Michael, 03/30/92)

Those familiar with Japanese culture might be tempted to explain this contradiction through reference to the distinction between uchi no mono and soto no mono, literally people of the house and people of the outside. They might even quote Takie Sugiyama-Lebra (1976) who points out that "the Japanese are known to differentiate their behaviour by whether the situations is defined by uchi or soto." (p. 112). While this interpretation is possible, it is very difficult to decide who is an insider and who is an outsider. As Sugiyama-Lebra herself admits, "where the line of demarcation is drawn varies widely; it
may be inside versus outside an individual person, a family, a group of playmates, a school, a company, a village, or a nation” (p. 112). The distinction between insider and outsider would be forced in the case Michael describes. The differences in the protocols we have seen described by Rie, Kyla and Michael make the point about the non-universality of any given trait in terms of a national culture.

There are also contradictions within accounts that point to variation in some cultural practices. Another of Michael’s accounts provides a record of confusion about gift-giving, a source of much anxiety among visitors to Japan.

Yesterday, I was given a present for every member of my Canadian family by my host brothers. Accepting them gratefully, I set them aside, remembering that it is bad manners to open gifts in front of the giver. Therefore, after my brothers left, I proceeded to open my present while putting my family’s present away.

Later that day my mother came into my room, and when she realized that I had opened my gift she became incredibly angry. My host brother Tomo would later tell me that it was wrong of me to open my present. He said that it showed very bad manners to do what I did.

(Michael, 06/24/92)

Contradictions like the ones that Michael encounters above are extremely puzzling for sojourners. Learners may adopt different strategies to resolve these. The most obvious one is to ask someone else from the host-culture to help you to interpret the situation.

This is exactly what Michael does. He asks his Japanese teacher:

Therefore today when I went to school I told Kurahashi sensei [his teacher] about this incident. She told me that there was nothing wrong with what I did. So now I am uncertain and confused once again about the sensitive subject of receiving gifts in Japan.

(Michael, 06/24/92)
Asking about this practice only reveals contradictions in Japanese society regarding the proper protocol for gift-giving. The result, as we can see, is for Michael to be “uncertain and confused once again”. The desire for consistency is understandable among culture learners since the inability to predict behaviour, whether in our culture or another, is stressful.

Ursula’s account below about gift-giving, a topic which is part of most orientation sessions for the Japan-bound, reveals other levels of contradiction: some within her experience and some between what she was taught to expect and actually discovered about the etiquette of gift-giving. For Ursula, gift-giving becomes a very emotional and complex issue:

Before coming to Japan, I learned a bit about gift-giving. I was all prepared for my host family to not immediately open the gifts which I brought for them, but they did. I decided that, being a very western family and, (from the fact that they don’t have the household, ancestral shrine that other families have) not religious, they didn’t follow the old tradition. O.K. I can deal with that. However, we were never told anything about never using the gifts. It’s been 1 1/2 months, and I’ve never seen them wear the shirts, jewellery, buttons, etc. Maybe, being a well-off family, they consider the gifts to be cheap-looking, and don’t want to embarrass me, or shame themselves, by wearing them. If that is the case, it is very different from our culture, where even if you hate a gift, you wear it (assuming it is wearable) so as not to hurt the giver’s feelings. Maybe they just have not had the opportunity to wear the gifts. Maybe, it is a culture thing stemming from the fact that if one immediately uses a gift, it implies that one was in need of it/didn’t have it. This leaves the receiver in a negative light, and could make the giver feel awkward for having exposed this lacking. Or maybe my family does it backwards - they open the gift immediately, and then leave it to offer up thanks. Is this a multiple-choice question?

(Ursula, 05/14/92)

Ursula’s last phrase is a wonderful metaphor for learning culture: to a large extent it is a multiple-choice question. She is momentarily stumped by the large number of
interpretations possible for the seemingly simple act of gift-giving. A big part of the problem here is her search for the “right” answer. She will remain stumped, in part, until she accepts that perhaps there isn’t a “right” answer.

Learning culture must mean expecting variation as well as the consistency and probability that allows for prediction. Moreover, culture learners are positioned subjects able to understand some things but not others. The accounts they construct of the culture on paper and in their minds are partial truths. When their positions change, they must learn that their accounts of the culture will too. Failure to alter accounts means cultural fossilization. Thus, to help learners we need to encourage them to conceive of the “culture” in culture learning differently than the “classic” view of culture. To cling to a traditional view of culture as composed of reliable and consistent patterns, as does mainstream literature in intercultural communications and related fields, is to set learners up for frustration in dealing with the complex phenomenon of culture. We need not adopt an extreme version of the fragmentation of cultures to prepare culture learners to deal with variation and contradiction. They are very able to do so in their own cultures; learning to do so in another is not a task of another order.

Is culture learning linear?

A question that soon arises in an investigation of culture learning is this: is it a linear process culminating in a perspective transformation? The evidence in this study suggests that it is not a linear process. The forms of learning that are identified here are not stages in the sense that Hanvey (1979) or Bennett (1986) conceive of stages in their models of cultural awareness. Thinking of this process as a linear process means thinking
of culture learning as something more than a partial truth. It also means failing to see it as the highly subjective phenomenon that it is.

Four particular accounts in this study illustrate how subjective culture learning is. These accounts, all of the same sports day, provide evidence of the variation in interpretation from one individual to another. They also show how different forms of learning and reflection are used to interpret the same situation, even by learners who have spent the same length of time in the new culture. The four entries below, by different students, each describe a Japanese sports day:

Account #1

I was actually quite bored to be there. We sat under the tent watching people run or hop or whatever for hours on end and then my competition came and went. The Japanese students were chatting, eating and taking pictures between their events - but they probably rather would have stayed in bed!

I wonder if it was supposed to be fun - everything had to be done a certain way and everyone had their own special place - you sat with your class and your teacher - I wish I had a friend near me to speak English to - maybe then it would be more enjoyable!

(Roberta, 05/17/92)

Account #2:

Today was Sports Day. It took me 2 hours to get there and it was raining. But today I really noticed that Japanese girls are no different from Canadian girls. There was a lot of emphasis put on Sports Day. There was a practice session on opening and closing ceremonies etc. But when the events actually started, everyone was just in there to have fun. It was competitive, but it didn’t matter if you won or lost. The main thing was to work as a team with your teammates. There were very few “individual” events. The focus was on the group.

(Alice, 05/16/92)
Account #3:

I want to go into the group attitude a bit more. We had the school “undokai” (sports day) last weekend and many things pointed out the stress on cooperation and group effort. First of all, everyone wore their uniforms to the sports ground, and then changed into their uniform track suits, so that no one was different, no one stood out, no one attracted attention (except for the 16 B.C. students, in our bright shorts, t-shirts, runners, etc.) Each team was distinguished by a different coloured ribbon. In Canada, students would be putting the ribbons all over - around necks, arms, ankles, hair. Every single girl here wore her ribbon in the exact same fashion - as a hair band (right down to the same type of bow at the back). What stood out the most were the events. The only individual event in the whole day was a sprint. Everything else required group participation: relays, tug-of-wars, many different types of three, four and five legged races, and a traditional game “the fighting pony”, which involves four girls in each group. Obviously, even when playing the emphasis of Japanese culture is on group unity.

(Ursula, 05/27/92)

Account #4

This account only mentions sports day obliquely, but it is an important mention:

Other aspects include the amount of physical contact between the girls at school. At home any such acts would have been outrageously scorned upon and up until now there were definite looks of disapproval between us, but as of yesterday (sports day) I find myself looking at things from a different point of view. In Canada, my personal space bubble was tremendous and any physical contact at all would have been followed by a very high degree of uneasiness, but here I find little things like that comforting and reassuring. I am aware that I am no longer looking upon this culture through a foreigner’s eyes. I even hope to become part of it.

(Irene, 05/22/92, emphasis mine)

These four accounts share similarities in the interpretation of the event, but there is significant variation in each. First, it is clear that each account has highlighted differently the centrality of the group to the organization of the sports day. While Alice’s account (#2) and Ursula’s account (#3) are explicit in mentioning the group or group unity, Roberta’s account (#1) mentions this obliquely through mention of the teachers and
students being together and the organization being uniform. Irene’s account (#4) does not mention it directly at all, but rather uses it as the context in which she briefly mentions sports day.

What is especially interesting in these accounts is that different attitudes are expressed towards what each observed. Roberta’s account (#1) is a superficial description of the experience of the sports day. Moreover, it is not a very sympathetic account of a Japanese sports day. Indeed, it is critical to the extent that she even insists that the Japanese students shared her sense of boredom and displeasure with the organization of the day.

Alice’s account (#2), in contrast to Roberta’s, is distinguished by the degree of solidarity that she experiences with the Japanese students, writing that “Japanese girls are no different from Canadian girls”. Her account is a largely sympathetic one. In fact, she interprets the efforts to organize things around the group as positive and describes it in terms of team work designed to ensure everyone enjoys the day.

Ursula’s account (#3) is very critical of the high degree of conformity and commitment to group unity that she observes. She contrasts this quite unsympathetically with the values of the B.C. girls whom she praises as free spirits. However, she spends little time trying to interpret the experience, concluding that “even when playing the emphasis of Japanese culture is on group unity”.

Irene’s account (#4) mentions the sports day indirectly, but it is an important reference, embedded as it is in a highly sympathetic account of Japanese culture. The sports day provided the context for an important insight into both herself and Japanese
culture. In fact, her experience that day, a change of attitude towards physical contact in the form of a dramatic collapsing of her personal space bubble, is a very important part of a substantial shift in perspective.

The four accounts above not only refer to the same event, but they were also written after each young woman had spent the same amount of time in Japan. Yet each is different - there is a Rashomon effect, each views the same event, but interprets it differently. Taken together, these accounts suggest that culture learning is a highly individualized phenomenon. This conclusion is evidence to counter overly deterministic descriptions of culture shock and overly simple notions of stages of cultural awareness. These accounts suggest that culture learning is determined by neither the content of the experience or factors such as the length of time someone has spent in the country.

Another aspect of Clifford's (1986a, b) argument that all ethnographies are partial truths can help clarify what is happening in the accounts above. In furthering his argument, Clifford also points out how intertwined the observer and the observed are: "Hermeneutic philosophy in its varying styles, from Wilhelm Dilthey and Paul Ricoeur to Heidegger, reminds us that interpreters constantly construct themselves through the others they study" (1986a, p.10). These accounts above illustrate this very well. Each account is different because the observer is different. The truths are partial truths because the observer is a “positioned subject,” positioned in her biography and in the social order in Japan. A Canadian teacher would have a different interpretation.

We can also see how Alice, Ursula and Irene use images of their culture in constructing the account of Japan. In building her account of Japan, Alice makes reference
to Japanese and Canadian girls being alike. Ursula draws on contrasting images of Canadian and Japanese girls in constructing her account of Japanese culture as group oriented with no room for individuality. Irene draws on contrasting images of Canada where people are physically distant from each and individualistic to “invent” her Japan. To conclude that in this way they are learning about themselves is too simplistic.

There is nothing new about the notion that in doing field work “you find out the culture you are studying, your own culture and yourself” (Jackson, 1986, p. 264). However, the view that the three can be separated so neatly has become increasingly difficult to maintain. Clifford (1986a) writes: “Now ethnography encounters others in relation to itself, while seeing itself as other” (p. 22). The students in this study too create accounts that draw on their awareness of themselves as the other. I have just argued that in the accounts above the students use images of themselves to construct or invent or interpret the other. But these self-images too are partial truths - and can be as much an invention of their own culture as their representations of the other culture are. How else can we explain how differently Alice and Ursula see Canadian girls in contrast to Japanese girls - in the one case seeing no difference while in the other seeing them as very different? What the students record of the other culture, as we see above, is the intersection of the partial truths of their own culture with the partial truth allowed by their circumstances in the host-culture. Representation under these circumstances is an extremely complex process. Students see only a piece of the puzzle, through a glass partially. To say that the students only discover partial truths is not to criticize them or to deny that they are
learning culture. In our own cultures too, we only learn partial truths - there is no other kind.

Age, gender and culture influence culture learning

The final question arises in relation to the three most prominent biographical differences of participants in this study: age, cultural background and gender. Did these variables have any noticeable influence on the process of culture learning examined here? In the analysis of the data no clear indication emerged that culture learning was influenced by any of these three differences. The question of the age range can be dealt with simply: the two year difference seems to have made little difference. The second question regarding the influence of culture on learning raises the same issue of the understanding of the nature of culture I have addressed throughout this dissertation. The question regarding gender and culture learning raises the matter of the effect of being a “positioned subject” on such learning. I’ll explore each of these differences briefly.

Mezirow (1991) argues that “culture can encourage or discourage transformative thought” (p. 3). He argues that cultural background influences transformational learning to the extent that the transformation of meaning schemes and perspectives may be more easily achieved in one culture than another. Taylor (1993) criticizes this position for the cultural bias it displays in terms of raising transformative learning to an ideal that all cultures should aspire to. However, the suggestion that cultural background may influence the process of culture learning is a question that my study can address. It led me to question the question.
We may ask whether or not transformative learning was more difficult for the
Japanese students than the Canadians. We might even ask if these cultural differences
influence the degree to which learners transform meaning schemes and perspectives. Does
the group orientation of Japanese culture make it less likely that Japanese will transform
certain meaning schemes and perspectives? However, putting this question like this
reflects the same “classic” conception of culture that I have critiqued throughout this
dissertation. In order to answer this question, we must conceive of the Japanese students
in this study as all socialized to look to their primary group (uchi) for the social definition
of meaning (Doi, 1975). This is a rather sweeping claim and ignores the complexities that
Sugiyama-Lebra (1976) identifies when she writes of the difficulty in determining where
the line between an insider (uchi) and outsider (soto) is. It varies widely.

Falling back on a broader concept of collectivists to describe these Japanese
students is just as problematic. This concept too is contested. It is a western construct and
now quite rightfully criticized by, among others, the Korean scholars of intercultural
communications Soo-Hyang Choi and Sang Chin Choi (1990) who write: “the concept of
collectivism, as understood in the current literature, does not seem to be indigenous to the
alleged collectivist societies; rather it appears to be formulated to conveniently provide
accentuating comparability to the western individualistic framework” (p. 1). Describing
Canadian culture as individualistic and thus one where people are more likely to transform
meaning schemes and perspectives without reference to other people is equally
problematic. Neither of these contrasting descriptions of Japanese and Canadians are valid
on the level of groups of people.
The difficulty then with answering the question raised by Mezirow is not one of finding evidence that culture influences the likelihood of transformative learning one way or another. The problem is operationalising culture as national culture; in doing so, he fails to understand the nature of culture. The question of the influence of culture learning is simply not answerable in the form that Mezirow (1991) would ask it.

A third factor that we may expect to influence culture learning is gender. However, the differences that are noticeable between the journals of young women and young men are more in content than process of learning. In general, the young women were more consistent at keeping detailed, reflective journals; however, though in smaller numbers, young men kept equally detailed and reflective journals. The most noticeable variation between the young men and young women reflects the differences in their positions in the social order. The young women shared an interest in a critique of both their own culture and the host-culture since, as young women planning their futures, they needed to confront the limitations and barriers imposed by the unequal status of women in both Canada and Japan. In contrast, the young men were far less critical of their experience in the host-culture and only occasionally commented on gender issues in Japan. They saw few constraints on their future ambitions.

An outline of a theory of culture learning

The findings of this study and the discussion above have clarified a number of issues in culture learning. The purpose of the section that follows is to outline a theory of culture learning.
This study set out to explore Mezirow's (1991) theory of transformational learning as the basis for an understanding of culture learning. The work of Taylor (1993) and Harper (1994) showed that one form of transformational learning, perspective transformation, explains the learning process of intercultural competency and intercultural adaptation. The question remained whether other forms of learning identified by transformative learning theory might also illuminate the process of culture learning. Byram et al.'s (1990) suggestion that culture learning might be mediated through changes in schemata, a process similar to transformative learning, influenced my choice of Mezirow (1991) as a conceptual tool to explore culture learning. My findings show that culture learning is indeed mediated by the transformation of meaning schemes and perspectives, as theorized in Mezirow's (1991) model of transformative learning. Each form of learning and reflection plays a distinct role in the process of culture learning.

Learning through meaning schemes is the most limited form of learning about another culture. In learning like this, we are largely unconscious of our own system of making sense of the world. Learning only through this form would make another culture virtually indistinguishable from one's own, and such learners would remain monocultural. Content reflection is associated with this form of learning and limits the change in meaning schemes.

Learning through new meaning schemes opens up the prospect of learning to differentiate the features of the other culture. However, this is not a profound form of learning. No meaning schemes are being transformed at this point. In learning about another culture through this form of learning, the interpretation of the other culture is still
heavily influenced both by meaning schemes and by meaning perspectives used in the culture of origin. In terms of reflection, this is a form dominated by content reflection. There is little or no questioning of the processes or premises of interpretation.

Stereotypic knowledge plays an important role in learning through new meaning schemes. Such learning is often the result of the modification of previously acquired stereotypes. Learners using this form fail to realize that modification may not be enough. Their existing meaning schemes may not yield accurate interpretations of new situations without considerable alteration. Learners thus continue to base their interpretations of the other culture on meaning schemes and perspectives used to interpret their own, conceding only that existing meaning schemes need to be broadened a bit. In this study, learning new meaning schemes emerged as a prelude to learning through the transformation of meaning schemes in circumstances when attempts to interpret experience in the new culture revealed that previously acquired stereotypic knowledge could not interpret new experience adequately.

Intercultural learning of significance may only begin with transforming meaning schemes. In this study, we have seen learners’ understanding of the host-culture develop through recognizing that their existing meaning schemes, and their stereotypic notions brought with them to the new experience, are no longer able to interpret their new experience adequately. This form of learning provides us with rich new insights, both into the host-culture and into our own. It also has implications for changes in our personal epistemologies, since it alerts us to how our stereotypes limit our understanding. Moreover, in employing this form to learn about the other culture, significant learning
about oneself and one’s own culture emerges. It is thus a complex activity in which two parallel processes are occurring - an expanding awareness of one’s own culture and an expanding awareness of the other culture.

A very important feature of this form of learning is the dilemma or sharp challenge created when our existing meaning schemes simply fail us in the interpretation of experience. With this failure, we realize that we must revise our interpretations. Reviewing, through process reflection, the basis on which we make our interpretations accelerates the rejection of the previous interpretation. This is often a painful experience. Adler’s (1975) conception of culture shock as a process initiating both cultural-awareness and self-awareness seems confirmed by the dynamics of this form of learning. In addition, Kim’s (1991) theory of the development of intercultural identity as an identity built up through a cycle of disequilibrium and restoration of balance to disequilibrium, seems to correspond to the dynamics of the transformation of meaning schemes. The stress that arises when we cannot interpret new experience sets up the cycle that Kim (1991) describes. The transformation of meaning schemes in situations of frustration and of conflict implies that affect plays a strong role in culture learning.

Learning through the transformation of meaning perspectives is the most profound form of cultural learning. In this short study, few examples of this form of learning were found. But those few have important implications. They show that even the earliest experiences in another culture can stimulate premise reflection and thus lay the foundation for a perspective transformation. In this form of learning, as in learning through the transformation of meaning schemes, a disorienting dilemma acts as a trigger. The accounts
of perspective transformation are emotional: typically, they record feelings of shame, 
embarrassment or anger. Perspective transformation is close to the heart. Here premise 
reflection helps clarify values and learners realize that the interpretation of new experience 
is going to require a radical shift from old frames of reference to new.

To call learning through perspective transformation the most profound form of 
culture learning is not to suggest that it is the ultimate stage of learning in a linear 
progression. Taylor (1993) found that many long-term sojourners underwent a perspective 
transformation, but he also found this process of learning to be recursive rather than linear. 
Viewing this form of learning as a final stage is also wrong in that not all learners either 
aspire to it or achieve it. In fact, Harper (1994) suggests that refugees and immigrants may 
consciously resist perspective transformations.

Harper’s (1994) study provides evidence that a theory of culture learning needs to 
take into account the phenomenon of resistance. Resistance is an especially important 
process since it is here that affect seems to play the most significant role in culture 
learning. The accounts of resistance in this study were all quite emotional. Students 
expressed their strongest feelings of anger and frustration in these accounts. Process 
reflection and premise reflection help learners clarify their values and decide on a course of 
action. It is the clarification of values that underlies a decision either to transform a 
meaning scheme or perspective or to resist transformation. In terms of developing 
awareness of our own culture, this may be the most potent form of learning since it brings 
into such sharp relief differences between our own culture and the host-culture.
A theory of culture learning also needs to recognize the potential of culture learning as emancipatory learning. Learning through perspective transformation or resistance to transformation is the nexus for emancipatory learning and culture learning. The opportunities for emancipatory learning in culture learning are created because the latter brings to our attention the fact that cultures are naturalized orders rather than natural ones. To understand that your culture, and through it your identity, is socially constructed is to be liberated from the tyranny that things need to be accepted as they are because they are “natural”. Another emancipatory feature of culture learning is that it presents people with concrete alternatives to possibly aspire to. These alternatives in another culture also provide a basis on which to develop a critique of their own culture.

In assessing the potential for culture learning as emancipatory, we need to recognize the importance of reflection, particularly process and premise, in culture learning. These activities are strongly linked to emancipatory learning. It is particularly important to recognize the social nature of these forms of reflection. This quality provides the perspective from which culture learning and emancipatory learning can be seen not as individual achievements, but rather as social achievements. It would be a mistake to develop a theory of culture learning, or emancipatory learning within it, that saw such learning as an autonomous process, the success of which rested on the strength of the individual. We need to recognize that not all learners have equal access to the resources needed for culture learning. A theory of culture learning thus needs to take into account power and its effects on learning.
Finally, the theory of culture learning that emerges from this study confirms Taylor’s (1993) idea that a recursive, not linear, process as in Hanvey’s (1979) and Bennett’s (1986) concepts of the growth of cultural awareness, is at work here. The evidence from the experience of Japanese and Canadian youths in three months of study abroad shows that even in a short time-span all forms of learning and reflection are employed in making meaning from new experiences. In students’ journals, accounts revealing one form of learning and reflection occur in random sequence.

The nature of the phenomenon of culture also conspires against a linear model of culture learning. Culture cannot be learned in its entirety; there is no end point to this learning. The learner needs to cope with dramatic change and inconsistencies in the foreign culture, as well as in his or her own. We have seen the examples of Michael (p.239) and Ursula (p. 240) trying to cope with variation within even simple culture practises. Moreover, learners may simultaneously learn about different aspects of culture through different forms of learning and reflection. And they may remain ignorant of others.

Limitations to the study

Before continuing on to identify areas for further research, it will be useful to point out some of the limitations of this study. First, like all research, its methodology poses some limitations. This study was not designed to be generalizable in the statistical sense. Nor was the data quantified in any way. Accounts within categories were not counted. The question of whether there was more of one form of learning or reflection and another
was not a feature of this design. Rather, the focus of the study was to contribute to the development of a theory of culture learning by opening up and giving new meaning to Mezirow’s (1991) theory of transformative learning and by undertaking an in-depth examination of the experience of culture learning from the perspective of Japanese and Canadian youths in overseas immersion programs.

Second, there is a related question of how far these findings have application for the teacher. Despite the fact that the students studied were participants in an overseas immersion program, a situation that most foreign language classrooms cannot replicate, the study does have application in these situations too. The implications for intercultural pedagogy both in the foreign language classroom in the students’ home culture and in an overseas exchange program are outlined in the next chapter.

Third, this study was based on several assumptions. One assumption was that the journals were truthful records, reflecting an honest representation of the student’s intercultural experience. It is true that the journals were written to be seen by me and they are probably self-censored to some degree. Still, the reader will recognize that the accounts are very self-revealing and that students did not hesitate to be critical in their journals. Another assumption was that the act of keeping the journal did not essentially change the experience of culture learning. It is undeniable that the journal keeping was a strategy of culture learning. Moreover, by requiring that learners return to entries and review earlier interpretations, journal keeping encourages process reflection. Reviewing previous entries often entails questioning the basis or “how” one arrived at the earlier the
interpretation. It may also stimulate premise reflection if students begin to unearth hidden assumptions supporting the framework they have been using for their interpretations.

A final assumption is that I analyzed the accounts thoroughly and presented them honestly and that the translations are accurate. I have outlined the process through which the translations and the assignment to categories of journal accounts was checked. I have also appended two of the 48 journals I had to work with for the reader to reference. In the end, however, we need to recognize that this has been an interpretive exercise and absolute standards for judging decisions arising in analysis or presentation are difficult to establish. Checking veracity lies as much in how accurate the interpretation feels to the reader with a similar experience as an examination of my criteria for interpretation.

**Recommendations for future research**

The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of a theory of culture learning grounded in the experience of Canadian and Japanese youths living overseas. The study was limited in duration and also limited by the relative homogeneity of its participants, all privileged youths. Based on the findings and the limitations of this study, the following recommendations are made for future research.

1. Future studies should be of longer duration. The first three months in a new culture may be a period of culture learning with some untypical qualities. Repeating this study with a longer time-line would allow for greater insight into how forms of learning and forms of reflection may play different roles in different lengths of residence in another culture. A longer study could also trace perspective transformations as they emerge out of
situations like this study identified. For many people, myself included, the continuation of this process over many years is an essential part of life. Thus, understanding how, over a longer span, culture learning changes has important applications for self understanding.

2. Future studies should include the period after students have returned home. Reports of the difficulties many sojourners report on returning home suggest that the return to one’s culture of origin may be an especially productive period for culture learning. In fact, many returned sojourners note that re-entry is more difficult in some respects than the initial period of living in the host-culture. These difficulties suggest that many of the previously taken-for-granted interpretations of one’s own culture are being highlighted anew particularly clearly. This may very well stimulate the kind of premise reflection that leads to perspective transformation. Conversely, it may also be the case that perspective transformations begun in the fertile and supportive environment of another culture are severely challenged and perhaps stopped on the return home. Important insight into the social and political nature of reflection could be gained from a longitudinal study of culture learning, including the first weeks after re-entry into the culture of origin. For many people, especially for international students, this period can be very traumatic (it certainly was for me) and understanding the special character of culture learning during this time could help returnees manage the experience better.

3. Future studies should also address issues of power. Important issues concerned with culture learning and power could not be addressed easily here because of the high degree of homogeneity of the participants. Repeating this study with a group more varied in terms of age, race, ethnic background and social class could provide insight into the
variety of experience of culture learning. Also, including short-term exchange students, immigrants and refugees in the study could yield more insight into the role of power in culture learning.

4. Future studies should focus more deliberately on questions related to gender and culture learning. A study designed within a theoretical framework with a clear hypothesis regarding the role that gender may play in culture learning could yield insight in the possible influences of gender in culture learning.

5. Future studies should also include students in the phase of data analysis. As I suggested in Chapter Four in the discussion of methodology, this study would have been better if the students had been included in all phases.
CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY:
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERCULTURAL PEDAGOGY

This final chapter considers the broad implications of this study for educational practice in language and culture learning. This dissertation was an occasion for me to reflect on learners’ experience of culture learning. This allowed me, among other things, to refine both my understanding of the rationale for culture learning and my understanding of the potential of immersion programs that include homestays. In this chapter, I will explore some of the implications for goals and designs for language and culture programs generally and overseas immersion programs specifically. Although adult educators engaged in cross-cultural communications training and related activities are also concerned with culture learning, my remarks here are directed specifically to my colleagues who are educators of teens and young adults in schools, colleges and universities.

The capacity for perspective transformation and emancipatory learning within culture learning obliges us to recognize it as an activity with great power to foster personal and social transformation. Educators need a philosophy of intercultural pedagogy that firmly enables us to maximize this potential. The work of Michele Borrelli (1991) promotes an approach to intercultural pedagogy that clearly identifies the potential of culture learning to foster profound personal and social transformation. Borrelli (1991) argues that intercultural pedagogy should be a critical practice, not simply “a set of statements, designed simply to supplement the traditional educational opportunities, or to enrich the field with a new variant, discipline or perspective” (p. 277). Intercultural
pedagogy should not merely promote the affirmation and acceptance of culture, but rather as a critical practice it should function to critique and intervene in societal practice. A critical intercultural pedagogy should stand to critique ideology, to question political, social and economic realities, and to examine the legitimacy of power and the structures that stabilize power. A central task of intercultural pedagogy then is to encourage learners to question, within their individual and social being, “the subjective and objective condition of being constrained within institutionalised power involving individuals, groups, and peoples” (Borrelli, 1991, p. 280). To make these constraints transparent so that learners can question them and perhaps change them, a critical pedagogy has to go beyond traditional pedagogy.

Immersion programs such as those studied here are ideal environments to go beyond traditional pedagogy and realize the goals of a critical intercultural pedagogy. In overseas immersion programs, learners become aware of the ways in which their perception is subjectively constrained by the meaning structures of their own culture. This awareness is reinforced by insights into how the perceptions of their foreign counterparts are also constrained by their culture. Objective constraint is revealed when students observe the ways in which human thinking and action in the host-culture are shaped by fixed roles, and the ways in which norms and values are shaped by institutional power. Stepping outside their own culture removes students from an environment which they believe to be natural; seeing that others too think their own culture is natural makes it possible for them to understand the construction of the meaning schemes of their own culture and their position within it.
Accepting that the task of intercultural pedagogy is to make the constraints on the individual and society visible and open to question means educators need to go beyond traditional goals in exchange programs, both short and long-term. Traditionally, exchange programs establish goals solely in terms of language learning and an increase in a vaguely defined “cultural awareness”. Rarely if ever is the goal to develop a critical consciousness of culture or to support learners in any form of social critique. In fact, exchange programs are frequently viewed as a finishing school might be. These types of programs are expected to create a certain level of sophistication in students so that they become “mannered” in a way fitting a smoothly functioning international or multicultural society. Of course, students also expect economic advantage from increased language skills and intercultural communication competence. The alternative to this goal is to design programs that promote a critical consciousness in students. In doing so, we need to establish the goal of critical cultural awareness, rather than just cultural awareness. To understand this concept of critical cultural awareness, I turn to the work of language teachers and theorists such as Romy Clark, Norman Fairclough, Roz Ivanic, Marilyn Martin-Jones (1990, 1991). Their work in defining critical language awareness is especially helpful in developing a parallel concept of critical cultural awareness. Working from the premise that the “development of a critical awareness of the world ought to be the main objective of all education, even language education” (Clark et al, 1990, p.249) they argue for developing a critical language awareness in students in contrast to a simple language awareness. Language awareness (LA) and critical language awareness (CLA) are contrasted in the table below.
Table 3: A comparison between language awareness (LA) and critical language awareness (CLA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Motivations</th>
<th>Schooling</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Learning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>Legitimation of social &amp; socializing order</td>
<td>Fitting children into the social order</td>
<td>Natural order</td>
<td>Knowledge isolated from practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Social emancipation</td>
<td>Critique &amp; change of social &amp; socializing order</td>
<td>Fitting children to work in and change social order</td>
<td>Naturalized order</td>
<td>Knowledge integrated with practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Clark et al., 1990, p.249)

Corresponding to the language awareness/critical language awareness distinction is a cultural awareness/critical cultural awareness parallel that educators concerned with establishing a critical intercultural pedagogy must draw.

As a pedagogical environment for achieving goals of critical cultural awareness, immersion/exchange programs are ideal. Here the balance of possibility can be turned strongly in favour of the development of critical cultural awareness, especially in regards to seeing culture as a naturalized order and developing awareness in the context of practice. Immersion students have the opportunity to see culture as a naturalized order rather than a natural order. Moreover, knowledge is automatically integrated with practice in the course of daily immersion life. Setting objectives, establishing a motivation and defining the role of the exchange program with the intention of fostering a critical cultural
awareness are all achievable within the context of an overseas program. In fact, immersion and exchange programs that are designed to develop a critical cultural awareness will benefit from the spontaneously occurring characteristics of culture learning we saw emerge in this study.

Conceiving of these programs as opportunities for social emancipation recognizes the processes that inevitably develop in immersion settings. The transformation of meaning schemes and meaning perspectives through process and premise reflection are contexts in which a critical cultural awareness can arise. The findings of this study have shown how far-reaching the consequences of such reflection may be. Stephen Kemmis (1985) argues that reflection is the means by which we critique the social order and prepare for social action: “Reflection is a practice which expresses our power to reconstitute social life by the way we participate in communication, decision making and social action” (1985, p. 140). In Chapter Six I argued that Kemmis’ conclusion is supported by evidence of how reflection operates in culture learning.

Living amidst another culture also permits us the opportunity to pause to reflect on our own culture and alternatives to it, and this raises the possibility of changing, through our thoughts and actions, our social world. Because reflection sets the stage for practice, it is a process quite apart from a mere mechanism of information-processing; nor is it merely a way of interpreting experience or making meaning. Through it we analyze and transform the situations we find ourselves in. It allows us to express “our agency as the makers of history as well as our awareness that we have been made by it” (Kemmis, 1985, p. 149). In this sense reflection is emancipatory.
Can the potential for critical-cultural awareness and emancipatory learning for students in immersion settings be increased? The findings of this study suggest that placing students with host-families increases the potential for culture learning as emancipatory learning. Understanding that culture is a naturalized, that is, a socially constructed order, rather than a natural order, is perhaps the most liberating realization students can come to. It sets the stage for far reaching self-analysis. This difference is dramatically demonstrated when students gain insight into how others are socialized to be different from them. This study provides evidence of students seeing that what they thought was natural for them was not necessarily natural at all for someone from another culture. Because the family is the site of primary socialization (Berger and Luckman, 1966), students who live with host-families are able to observe this process at first hand. Several journal accounts revealed how students came to link childhood experience to an understanding of the culture of adults. One account in particular exemplifies this. Satsuki, in recording how children are raised in Canada, makes a connection to socialization for Canadian adult culture:

"Compared with children in Japan, those in Canada are more grown up. They must be trained from childhood to look after themselves and therefore, males and females can share housework equally" (09/06/92). A young Canadian woman, Kyla, noting that her Japanese family never hires a babysitter, makes a similar connection: "The Japanese are raised to be very dependent on others so this is a good way for kids to be dependent on people they know" (04/20/92). Such observations set the stage for students to see themselves also as products of a deliberate socialization.
Not only is the family the site of socialization, it is also the site where the relative status of men and women is made visible to students, shedding light on issues of gender and power in the broader society. This study reveals that for both young Japanese and Canadian women the sharpest critical insights that they developed into their own culture and their host-cultures were around the issues of gender and power. The commitment of young Japanese females to change the nature of traditional social roles within marriage was very evident in the accounts of at least three young women. Perhaps the best example is Satsuki's account where she writes of her changed perspective on who should do the housework: “When I lived in Japan I thought this [women doing all the housework] was normal. After I noticed the [high numbers of working women in both Japan and Canada] it seemed that the Japanese custom was wrong ...” (09/22/92). Young Canadian women developed a critique of sexism in Japanese culture too. Gayle, for example, wrote: “Being quite a liberal person who believes in equality for women I have found it quite challenging yet intriguing to be living in the house that I am. There is quite an evident component of sexism in the structure of this family” (04/14/92). Critiques of the host-culture like this one must surely have the potential to sharpen students’ critique of sexism in their own culture.

The family is also an environment which provides the visitor’s only opportunity for critical insights into the world of work. Because students in immersion programs rarely if ever have the opportunity to work, very important parts of the social order remain hidden from them. To the extent that adult men and women bring their work home and that this experience forms part of the talk of family members, the family is an environment in which
the student is exposed to otherwise hidden parts of the social order. Journal accounts reveal critical insights into students' own culture and into their host culture through their understanding of the way work is organized. We have seen one account where Lawrence's host-brother's attitude towards having a part-time job provided in some small way insight into the wider issues of the workplace.

Taken together, these opportunities in family life do seem to provide students with rich experience to reflect upon critically. The family presents in microcosm many of the predominant characteristics of the society, characteristics which might otherwise be hidden. Placing students with host-families enhances their potential for developing critical cultural awareness and for emancipatory learning.

As I have argued throughout this dissertation, immersion programs have great potential for emancipatory learning. The results of this study indicate that even in short-term programs students gain insight into the nature of their own cultural construction, and begin to unveil the premises that support their view of the world. Whether the full potential for this kind of learning is realized in a systematic way depends a great deal upon choices educators make to support or impede the development of critical cultural awareness in students. We can set up programs that have as their objectives social emancipation and that are motivated by a genuine desire to help students critique and work for change in the social order. We can choose to fit students into work in the real world and to change the social order.

These decisions are not without ethical dilemmas and risks. They raise important questions. How far dare we intervene in the student's experiences to create critical
consciousness? To what extent do we help students organize collective action for change that may arise out of a critical cultural-awareness? One of the issues that is likely to make many educators feel uncomfortable is the development of students’ critical awareness of the host-culture. For example, it may be easy for teachers to applaud young Japanese women when their experience in Canada stimulates a critique of the sexist nature of Japanese culture. However, they may feel less than comfortable when young Canadian women develop that same critique of Japan, becoming angry and articulate critics of that aspect of Japanese culture. Educators in programs with cultural awareness as a goal and those with critical cultural awareness as a goal will respond differently. The former might be tempted to encourage students to suspend judgement and accept sexism as a natural consequence of Japanese history and traditions - this is a position of cultural relativism that promotes social integration into another culture. With social emancipation and critical cultural awareness as a goal, educators might encourage students to find a group of young Japanese feminists, work with them and develop their critique of Japanese culture in the context of cooperative social action.

Finally, there is the issue of support for learners in this process. Perspective transformations and critical insights into one’s own culture while abroad can result in some very painful transitions on the return home. Educators who are committed to helping students develop critical cultural awareness have a responsibility to students who embark on such painful processes of change. Therefore, it is essential that programs designed to develop critical cultural awareness be very comprehensive. Support for students must be available in all stages of the experience, particularly the phase when they return home.
Support at this stage is very critical if the perspective transformations that have taken place overseas are to be integrated into the students’ lives back in their own culture.

Culture learning offers the potential for education in the fullest sense of the word. Borrelli (1991) writes that education moves us towards humanity in two ways: “one being an individual act of liberation towards oneself, the other a collective act of liberation towards the societal whole, towards the human as a species.” (p. 282). This is the great promise of culture learning.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A:

CULTURE LEARNING JOURNAL FORMAT

CULTURE LEARNING JOURNAL

Name

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Record an interesting, puzzling, irritating or otherwise significant event which has occurred during the week. (2) Next, try to interpret or explain the experience.</th>
<th>Re-examine the experience weeks later. How has your opinion changed? Record the change.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Date ]</td>
<td>[Date ]</td>
</tr>
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</table>

[Continue on the back if you need more space to record your experiences and interpretations] [Continue on the back if you need more space to continue your re-examination.]
JOURNAL KEEPING: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. WHY DOES THE RESEARCH REQUIRE US TO KEEP A JOURNAL?

I am interested in knowing about the **PROCESS** and **PRODUCT** of your culture learning. In other words I want to know what you learn about Canadian culture and how you learn it. I can't interview you everyday so by keeping a journal I can have a look at, I can discover some of the "whats" and "hows" of your learning.

2. IS A JOURNAL LIKE A DAILY DIARY?

Yes and no. In a diary you may record your feelings and the significant things that happen to you. You may also just record what you did that day, who you did it with, where you went, what you ate for dinner etc. You may be in the habit of keeping a daily diary like this anyway and you can continue this in Canada. Some of you may wish to start one in Canada. However, what I want you to do for me is to keep a more specialized record, a journal. In this journal I want you to record events of a more significant rather than trivial nature on the topic of Canadian culture: what and how you are learning about it.

3. WHAT KINDS OF THINGS DO YOU WANT ME TO RECORD IN MY JOURNAL?

Events, thoughts, opinions, feelings related to the "how and what" of learning about culture. In Canada, you will have many experiences that are joyful, interesting, puzzling, inspiring and sometimes perhaps a little painful and confusing. I want you to record these experiences and express an opinion about what they teach about Canadian culture. Don't be afraid to also record how you may feel about these events.

Sometimes you will learn important things about Canadian culture from sources other than your experience. You may want to record these too. As often as you can, note down anything that or anyone who helped you learn about the culture behind your experiences: a helpful Japanese friend or teacher, other B.C. students, a good book, host parents or perhaps T.V. etc.
4. **HOW OFTEN DO I HAVE TO WRITE IN MY JOURNAL?**

Make a journal entry twice a week, each entry separated by a few days. Fill the page each time you sit down with your journal. This shouldn’t take long. Please spend some extra time once every two weeks reexamining journal entries over two weeks old and reflecting on these old entries to see if your opinion has changed.

5. **WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY “REFLECTING”?**

In this case it means rethinking your feelings and revising your opinions about past events in the light of new experiences. This practice can be really useful in getting an accurate idea of Canadian culture since it can prevent you from building up stereotypes and making quick judgements. It also helps you see patterns, the underlying connections between isolated events.

6. **DO I RECORD MY “REFLECTIONS” IN THE JOURNAL TOO?**

Yes. You have a split page journal to allow you space to write your original record and a space to come back and record any changes in your views: on the right hand half of the page you have space to record your fresh observations, opinions, helpful learning aids; on the left hand half you have space to come back again and change your original opinion or interpretation or note down new feelings and make some comments on why you have a different understanding now. Don’t forget to record how you learned more too.

7. **WILL ANYONE ELSE BESIDES THE RESEARCH TEAM SEE MY JOURNAL?**

Other researchers in similar projects may see them. But you have my pledge of privacy and promise not to have or use your name in connection with your journal entries. Of course, the person who translates your journal entries from Japanese to English will see them.

8. **WILL I GET HELP IF I AM HAVING DIFFICULTY KEEPING THE JOURNAL?**

Yes. I will ask you to give me your new journal pages every three weeks and I will comment on how you are doing and return them. If you are having difficulty, I’ll help then.
APPENDIX C:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR LETTER WRITING

YOUR LETTER: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO WRITE IN THE LETTER?

I am most interested in hearing from you about how your behaviour is changing as you learn new things about Japanese culture. Do you do things differently? Do you notice changes in your view of the world and values? Do you feel you are changing in any way? Are you fitting more in Japanese society? How? What have you learned about your own culture?

I am interested in reading about other things too: You can also review your journals and comment more on some of those experiences. You can comment on how much or little you feel you are learning about Japanese culture; you can comment on helpful things you are doing to learn about it or on things that have not helped at all.

You can write about the most pleasant things about your time in Japan or the least. You can write about your language learning and how that is helping learn about Japanese society. And of course you can comment on how you feel about your participation in this research project. Consider these like letters to a friend where you have a chance to talk about important changes in your life.

2. WILL YOU ANSWER MY LETTERS?

Yes. I will reply to your letter. I may also suggest topics to write about or think about in your next letter. You can regard me as your personal consultant on your Japanese culture learning, someone who you can direct questions to and share your experience with.

3. HOW LONG DOES THE LETTER HAVE TO BE?

About a page or so should be ample. A half-hour should be enough time to write a thoughtful letter.

4. HOW OFTEN DO I HAVE TO WRITE?

Just three times. You will be divided into three groups of 6 or so students each. One group will write each week on a three week cycle.
5. **WILL ANYONE ELSE SEE MY LETTER BESIDES YOU?**

Other researchers may. But you have my pledge of privacy and promise not to use your name in connection with the contents of your letter. Your letters will be returned to you.

6. **WHY DOES THE RESEARCH DESIGN REQUIRE JOURNALS AND LETTERS TOO?**

There are a number of reasons. First, although I want all of you to keep journals, some of you will find it easier to express your thoughts in the letter format rather than the journal format. Second, it allows us to have a more personal relationship with you through the exchange of letters. Third, it allows you to talk about different things than the journal. In particular, it provides a place for you to talk about the changes you are going through in relation to what you are learning about Japanese culture. Finally, it is another reason for you to review your journal and see your experiences in a different perspective.
Entry: April 2, 1992

I haven’t been here for very long but already I’ve noticed 1 thing. They (my host family) feeds me a lot. They seem to think I eat a lot, and they always want me to eat. Whenever I say I want a little bit, they’re kind of surprised.

I think it’s because I’m a foreigner. Maybe from their experience they think Canadians eat a lot. I’m the tallest one in my family. They probably think that because I’m big I must eat a lot. (I usually don’t eat a lot.)

Reflection: April 12, 1992

This is happening to other people not just me. They don’t know us or our eating habits so by giving us a lot of food there’s less chance of us going hungry. (Also the more food, the better chance there’s something you like.)

Entry: April 6, 1992

Conformity is big in Japan. On the trains all of the businessmen wear suits. There is little variety. All of the school children wear uniforms. Everyone dresses the same. Even the uniforms the boys wear seem to be preparing them for when they are adults. Most of their uniforms are similar to suits. People don’t like to stand out and be individuals here.

I think in Japan maintaining your status is very important. If you say the same as everyone else then you won’t make mistakes. Someone who stands out and does things differently is more likely to be treated differently.

Reflection: April 12, 1992

Basically because we’re foreigners, we are treated differently. No matter how much of the culture we learn or how much Japanese we speak, we (I) will never be the same as them.

Entry: April 8, 1992

I’ve never really noticed before how much people sleep. On the trains everyone has their eyes closed, heads down. (either that or they’re reading) I still haven’t figured out how they know when to get off at their stop. They always seem to wake up at just the right time.
This is probably because most Japanese wake up early in the morning to catch the train and return home late at night. Some people spend much time on the trains. Perhaps this is their rest time! Or if the train ride is long it can be boring and sleeping may be a way to help pass the time away. I suppose after riding the same train day after day your body knows just how much time it takes.

Reflection: [no date recorded]

I think it is due to the fact that sitting on 1 train for long periods of time can be boring is one reason why everyone sleeps but another reason is people get tired. This I know from experience.

Entry: April 10, 1992

I’ve noticed how willing people are to help you and talk to you when you’re a foreigner. Today I was standing and waiting for my friend when these 2 girls wearing school uniforms came up to me. They get all excited and tried to talk to me in English. They were happy that they could speak English to me. Then my friend and I were at the place where you buy tickets and we couldn’t figure out how much it cost. This lady comes up and asks if she can help us. She showed us which ticket to buy, then when we were on the wrong side of the train tracks, she motioned to us and showed us where we wanted to be.

I think people like talking English because they learn it in school etc. but never really have a chance to practice it with a native speaker. It makes them feel good to be able to communicate in a foreign language. And to help someone you don’t know depends on the individual.

Reflection: April 12, 1992

I still think people just like to practice their English, and when they can carry on a conversation in a different language they feel proud. Any little thing I can manage to say in Japanese, and someone understands it makes me feel good.

Entry: April 13, 1992

Today I had English (everyone is in different Japanese classes). They were reading a story about Canada. It was so untrue. It was talking about how Canada is always cold, in the winter you look outside and there is snow everywhere, nowhere in Canada is it warm etc. (That may be true for the Northern parts of Canada but not where I live). It occurred to me that if that is where they get their interpretations of places from then... I’ve noticed how even the Japanese who can’t speak English, seem to know key words in English. But they’re really obscure words. Its funny because they learn things that aren’t really all that
common, words that we don’t normally use everyday. I think this is because they are learning the grammer rather than the everyday language and slang that we use.

Reflection: April 19, 1992

I think that the Japanese are still interested in learning the grammer behind things and the ‘obscure’ or less commonly used words are what appear in the textbooks.

Entry: April 15, 1992

Today I noticed how the students in the school hold respect for their teachers for some things but not others. Here homeroom is supposed to take place from 3:25 - 3:30 then officially school has ended. In my school 5 or 10 minutes before the bell everyone is packed up and ready to go, and when the bell rings everyone leaves. But here the teachers dismiss. Today the teacher didn’t even start homeroom until 3:30, and the people in the class accepted it. But for other things they don’t patiently abide by the rules. They bring in candy and sweets during lunchtime etc.

I guess it’s just that certain ‘rules’ are followed differently. I was shocked that they all sat patiently waiting for the teacher to dismiss them, but that was just compared to my school, it is probably different in other schools in Canada too.

Reflection: April 26, 1992

I think this may be just 1 school and 1 rule that everyone follows. There are probably similar rules carried out by students in Canada as well.

Entry: April 19, 1992

Today is Easter Sunday. In Japan it is celebrated, but it is different. They acknowledge it rather than celebrate it. (for example no Easter Bunny or chocolates and it’s not a holiday like in Canada). Its kind of strange how they take certain holidays that we have and celebrate them too, only differently.

I went to church with my family, and we had an Easter luncheon, and talked about the Easter flower etc, but it wasn’t the same thing. In Canada it’s a holiday and most people “celebrate it”.

This I know is because different cultures celebrate different holidays and occasions. For example, many countries all over the world celebrate Christmas, but they all celebrate it in a different way. I’ve never really experienced a special holiday that we have [she notes to continue on back, but there is no back page copy here]
Reflection: April 26, 1992

I still think that not all countries will celebrate holidays the same way. Even if it does seem weird to have a holiday that we are used to treating one way, be treated differently. This probably holds true for various countries all over the world.

Entry: April 23, 1992

I've been noticing how much wrapping there is on everything. All of the food is packaged, and sometimes you'll open up a box of something and inside each individual item will be separately wrapped. Today I went with my host sister to a sports club, and we got towels, all done up nicely in plastic bags. Then in the changerooms they had a supply of bags to put your shoes in. It seems like a waste. When it's raining all of the stores etc have bags to put your umbrellas in, then as soon as you're back outside, it's thrown away. This brings about another point. Compared to the number of people in Tokyo there is very little litter.

I think that the reason things are packaged is for health and sanitary reasons but it must create a lot of garbage.

Reflection: May 3, 1992

Wrapping is a way of making sure things are sanitary, and also it keeps items in stores etc from being tampered with. This is probably just a safety measure.

Entry: April 28, 1992

Today we had cooking. One of the things we were preparing was tempura. I was standing by the stove waiting because we had only 2 more things to fry when the oil "popped" and splashed on me. A bit of it landed on my hand. It hurt so I ran it under water. There was a few tiny red marks, and it kinda hurt, but it wasn't a big deal. Then at lunchtime I showed it to one of the girls in my homeroom and she freaked out and pushed me into the medical room. They put a bunch of medicine on it, wrapped my hand all up etc. and treated it as if it were a major injury. I couldn't believe it. If I had been at home I would have put some ice on it, and that would have been it.

From previous experiences I've learned that's just the way they are. Most Japanese people tend to worry about people getting hurt or being sick.

But yet some aspects of being healthy are overlooked. It seems like just about everyone smokes, (I don't consider that healthy) and no one worries, but 1 little cut (in my case a burn) and everyone gets concerned. Different emphasis is put on different aspects of health.
Reflection: May 3, 1992

I think they were just concerned. Especially the school in a sense they are responsible for looking after us while we are in Japan and they don’t want anything to happen to us.

Entry: May 1, 1992

Today was one of our excursions through the school. Lately I have been noticing the prices of things and how expensive they are, but also how much they vary. A few weeks ago we were on an excursion and were treated to a piece of cake each. The price was 600 y. Then a few days ago we went to the little restaurant/cafe in the museum and 1 scoop of ice cream in a bowl was 300 y. 3 crackers and 3 pieces of cheese was either 120 or 210 y. Then today we looked in at 2 different restaurants. One was double the price of the other for the same food. Generally speaking the price of sweets (chocolate and ice cream) varies a lot here. I’ve had a huge chocolate sundae for 500 y and a tiny tiny piece of cake for 600 y. At the train station they sell chocolate bars. In a normal store they’re usually around 100 y (95 y) but at the station I bought 1 for 110 y. The next day I bought exactly the same thing, it was 120 y.

I guess this isn’t really a cultural experience, but it is something that I’ve noticed. Different people own all of the various restaurants etc. It seems like they don’t have set prices for anything. To a certain extent its the same in Canada.

Reflection: May 3, 1992

In different places (Canada included) different items are priced differently in different locations. For certain items such as food prices are not set, therefore the individual owners charge whatever they feel is appropriate.

Entry: May 4, 1992

Today I noticed how hospitable the Japanese are, amongst themselves as well as to foreigners. My host sister had a friend over for the day, she was invited to stay for dinner. Then after dinner she was getting ready to leave, but it was quite late. So right away my host mom invited her to spend the night because she was worried about her going home by herself so late at night. My host mom is always telling me I can bring my friends home, and if they live far they can spend the night etc. etc. I always thought that the Japanese didn’t have people over to their houses a lot. My family usually doesn’t, but if it will help make the situation better, they’re quite willing to have guests. But even so compared to in Canada that’s different. In Canada people frequently visit other peoples houses.
Reflection: May 7, 1992

All in all the Japanese are a caring society towards themselves. Their friends and foreigners. They are always willing to do whatever they feel will help you. The hospitality of having people stay over at their homes is just one example.

Entry: May 7, 1992

Today was an all day excursion to Hakone. We left early in the morning, (around 9:00), spent the whole morning on the trains, and arrived around noon. Then we had lunch. From Hakone you are supposed to be able to see Mt. Fuji. The day we picked was cold, wet and very foggy. We couldn’t see anything. We were allowed to look in a few of the shops, but our supervisors kept rushing us, trying to keep us all together. Then they hurried us off to catch some boat to take us down the mountain. We’re rushed along, only to get there and have to stand outside in the cold for 10 min while they counted us numerous times to make sure we were all there. We are always being rushed and pushed along to catch trains, only to have to stand and wait because the trains aren’t even there yet. Basically we’re treated like little kids who can’t look after themselves.

I can understand their point of view, up to a point. They are responsible for us, but we can handle things ourselves. And if we miss the train it’s our fault, and we can handle it. But I think the Japanese culture puts a big emphasis on the group not on independence. So they are probably just treating us like that.

Reflection: May 13, 1992

Basically I think its because they are responsible for us and they want to make sure we’re okay. They also probably feel that we are in a new country, we don’t speak the language and if we did get lost we wouldn’t know what to do. I’ve noticed that most of the Japanese our age don’t have as much freedom as we do in Canada, so they are also treating us like the Japanese.

Entry: May 10, 1992

Today is Mothers Day. Again I noticed how the stores etc. advertise Mothers Day, but I don’t think they actually celebrate it. I was shopping with my friends, and on the way home I bought a flower for my host mother. She was happy but surprised. It’s just kind of funny how everyone knows its Mothers Day, but when the day comes its just another normal day.

This is just the way that different cultures celebrate different holidays. Perhaps Mothers Day is just one of the many holidays adapted from a different country, but just because its the same holiday doesn’t mean it has to be celebrated in the same way.
Reflection: May 13, 1992

This is just another example of how different cultures celebrate events and holidays differently even if on the surface they appear to be the same holiday. Some cultures just place more emphasis on them than others.

Entry: May 13, 1992

The whole school is preparing for Sports Day on Monday. All of the students gathered outside and for the first 2 classes in the morning, we practiced just the opening ceremonies. One of the teachers is really worried about me getting to Sports Day. It’s on Saturday. It’s not far it is just long (2 hours or so away) I told her I wasn’t worried about it, but she went and arranged for a girl (from my school) who goes to the same station as me to take me there. Today at lunch I went to meet here. I even tried telling my host mom that it was okay. I could get there on my own, but she was worried that I might miss the bus. I can handle things on my own, but they’re trying to protect me.

This is just another difference between the amount of independence that kids get in Canada and Japan. But even in Canada, the emphasis on independence varies with the individual’s family. Some kids are totally free, while others are more protected. But on the whole, Canadians in Canada tend to do things more on their own. My teacher and my host mom are probably just worried because they are responsible for me, but I’m also not as familiar with Tokyo, I’ve only been here 2 months, and I’m not fluent in Japanese, so they’re probably worried about what I would do if something did happen (i.e. I got lost) and they’re just trying to prevent anything from happening.

Reflection: May 24, 1992

Again this is the independence difference between Canada and Japan. And also the responsibility that our families and teachers here hold over us, making sure we’re safe and nothing happens to us.

Entry: May 16, 1992

Today was Sports Day. it took me 2 hours to get there, and it was raining. But today I really noticed that Japanese girls are no different from Canadian girls. There was a lot of emphasis put on Sports Day. There was a practice session on opening and closing ceremonies etc. But when the events actually started, everyone was just in there to have fun. It was competitive, but it didn’t matter if you won or lost. The main thing was to work as a team with your teammates. There were very few “individual” events. The focus was on the group.
I think they put a lot of emphasis on it to ensure that everything went smoothly and that the students would have fun. Everything was well organized. But they also made sure that the emphasis was on the group not on the individual. In this way winning or losing was not as important as helping each other as a team.

Reflection: May 24, 1992

I feel they wanted everyone to have fun and if each race was an ‘individual’ race, it would discourage the less athletic people, and there would always be 1 distinct winner. In this way working together as a team ensured everyone of a good time. And all of the organizing and planning was just to ensure that everything worked out.

Entry: May 22, 1992

Today we had another excursion. We had mentioned before that we like seeing traditional Japanese things. One of the teachers managed to get tickets to see a sumo game. We were very lucky to be able to go. The season is only 15 days long and tickets are very hard to get. Some of us were looking forward to going, while others didn’t really want to go. It was the best excursion so far. I think everyone enjoyed it. Sometimes you have to do things you don’t want to, and it ends up being fun. It was something you could never see in Canada. I enjoyed it, because it is Japan’s National Sport. It is something uniquely Japanese. Sumo wrestling is definitly a cultural event. I’m glad we got to experience it. I never really knew that much about it before, but being there, watching it made me more interested in it. Now I’m curious as to the details of the sport. (Ie, why they throw salt before they start etc)

Reflection: May 28, 1992

I really enjoyed watching sumo. I’m glad we got to see something typically Japanese, that we can’t see in Canada. It’s just one more part of the culture that I’ve managed to experience.

Entry: May 24, 1992

Every (most) Sunday I got to church with my host family. Today there were 2 other foreigners there. A man and his wife. They’re from Betoo. After Church I was talking to them. They’ve been here for 3 months and are teaching English. But they know practically no Japanese. They said it’s hard because they are always around English speaking people and don’t use Japanese. It made me realize that just being in a country doesn’t mean you’ll learn the language. Especially in Japan. I was surprised at how many people speak English. Just about everyone knows at least a bit of English. (I guess its kind of like in Canada, a lot of people know a bit of French). But I realized that if you don’t make an effort to learn the language, you won’t learn it.
Reflection: May 28, 1992

It takes (?)word to do things; no one can force you to learn if you don’t want to. And it wouldn’t be too hard to survive in Tokyo not knowing a word of Japanese. People here are always wanting to practice their English with a Native English speaker. My family all speak English fairly well, and my host dad is fluent. But I consider myself lucky that they speak to me in Japanese not English, otherwise I wouldn’t be using my Japanese and I wouldn’t learn Japanese.

Entry: May 28, 1992

Today we went on an all day trip to Kamakura. We got to see the big Buddha lately on our excursions lately because our ‘supervisors’ have become less protective of us. When it was time to leave we were supposed to meet at 10 min to 3. Well some of us were a bit late. All of a sudden we found out or train was at 3:00 (we didn’t know that). So we started running and got on just in time, except for 2 of us. (They missed the train) so at the next stop one of the teachers got off and went back to them. We continued on because our next train we had reserved seats. They never made it. I found out later they had asked some people and were capable of finding their own way home. But now I understand their point of view. Because they were responsible for us they couldn’t just leave them there. They had to go back to them. Then another teachers had to wait for them, because he had the tickets, and we all (I) felt bad that they (rest missing)

Reflection:

We shouldn’t expect them to change and treat us differently. We came to Japan to learn about their culture and if they keep changing the rules and treating us differently, we won’t learn. Even if we don’t like the way some situations are handled, we should try to accept it, or at least understand it. But for some things they should understand that we aren’t Japanese and we’ve grown up with different values, etc.

Entry: June 2, 1992

Today my host family really made me feel like part of the family. I was talking about my host sister to my host mom. I said “Motoe”… (her name). I’d never really called her anything before, but my host mom said no no no you should call her “O nesan” cause she’s older not by her name. That really made me feel like part of the family.

After being with a family for 3 months you are no longer treated like a guest.
Reflection:

After 3 months I really came to like my family. After 3 months I (you) are no longer considered a guest.

Entry: June 5, 1992

My host family is still surprised when I don’t eat a lot. My host mom knows I only want a little bit of everything but she always tells me how little it is and I’m tall so I should eat a lot. But she never forces me to eat or do anything. She says its my choice.

Reflection:

Because I was not brought up as part of the family so they have to respect my rights and they can’t force me to do anything cause I’m not their real daughter.

Entry: June 9, 1992

I wanted to go to Kyoto the weekend after next. But another girls is already going and Saturday is the choir competition. I understand that they don’t want two people to miss the choir competition but ... they never came out and said no I couldn’t go then. It was frustrating because I didn’t know for sure. Well I finally figured out I can’t got and I have to go this weekend but they don’t want me to miss any school. At the beginning they said they would give us time off to go on trips (eg to Kyoto) now (reluctantly) they’re allowing me Friday off. They never actually say no and we get different stories all the time.

It is part of their culture not to be rude and coming out and plainly saying no is considered rude.

They also consider school to be very important and because the Japanese don’t just take time off for trips. They didn’t feel I should especially because we are here for only a short time and need all of the time to study Japanese we can.

Reflection:

I guess they just feel bad about saying no outright.

Entry: June 13, 1992

Today I went to Kyoto. I bought my ticket myself and went all by myself then my host family from last summer met me at the other end. My other host mother expected me to speak a lot more Japanese. I understand a lot but I find it hard to speak in Japanese. In 3
months no matter how hard you tried, you can’t learn everything. Especially since the 12
of us speak English to each other.

Three months is a good introduction to all of the basics of not only the language but the
culture as well it provides a good background.

Reflection:

It’s hard because it is so much easier to speak English, you really have to make the effort
to learn Japanese.

Entry: June 20, 1992

Today is the choir festival. We (the Canadian exchange student and I) sang some Japanese
songs and a Canadian song (land of the silver Birch). It was so touching. 3 of the girls
who have been here for 1 year sang “That’s What Friends are For” and all of us on stage
started crying, the Japanese girls in the audience were crying too. We were really treated
as “The group of Canadians” today but somehow it felt good. I was proud to be part of
the group (and proud to be from Canada).

Sometimes when we are treated differently because we’re Canadians it’s hard, especially
when we’re trying to fit in, but today I didn’t mind.

Reflection:

We are a group and we are representing Canada so its nice we can feel proud of that.

Entry: June 25, 1992

Today was our last day of school. All of the girls at the school were really nice.
Everyone’s homeroom got together and bought gifts for them. I got a small gift and they
made lunch for me. I was really surprised at all of the gifts we received.

Giving gifts is a major part of their culture.

Reflection: June 30, 1992

Gift giving is part of their culture and even in Canada it is common to give people gifts
before they go away.
Entry: June 29, 1992

Today I actually realized that my family is not all that traditional Japanese. They stress Japanese. Yesterday I bought a walkman and when I got home I realized the battery charger that came with it wouldn't work in Canada. So I had to go back to the store today. Because I bought it by myself (without my host family) they assumed I could go back by myself. My host mom explained what to say etc. It kind of surprised me because I always thought the Japanese stressed people doing things in a group.

I think this is just my family. I guess they have confidence in me and want me to learn how to handle things on my own.

Reflection:

I think one of the main reasons my host family has different outlooks on certain things is because they lived in Brazil for 4 years. So they know what it is like living in a foreign country.
APPENDIX E

ALICE’S LETTERS

Letter #1 April 17, 1992

My journals last week were done in a bit of a rush, I haven’t had much time lately. The first week I was just getting accustomed to a new exciting and interesting country. I haven’t personally been involved in many things that are culturally different. Mostly I just observe things that are strange or new to me. Is it okay to write about things where I am not directly involved?

I feel like I’m fitting in better now. Things don’t seem strange anymore. I am still observing and watching before I act. For example when a new type of food is placed before me I watch to see how may family members eat it first. (so I won’t pick something up with my hands when it’s supposed to be eaten with chopsticks). I’m learning a lot about the culture, and the language too.

By watching other people I’m beginning to understand why and how people react to different situations and how it is different from the Canadian culture. On the surface the two cultures seem different but when you look deeper into it, the people are the same here as in Canada.

Hopefully I will spend more time on my journals next time I send them in. I am finding a lot of little things that are different, but I’m not so surprised any more. I feel comfortable here. I’m glad I came. Even though writing the journals takes a lot of time, hopefully in the long run it will be worth it.

Sincerely yours, Alice

Letter #2: May 12, 1992

The time is going by quickly. I’m really enjoying my stay here in Japan. My host family is great, but I miss my family and friends in Canada.

I was wondering if we’re going to find out our marks from the best we wrote before coming to Japan. One of the main “problems” was that most of us didn’t know any kanji. Well, we are learning quite a lot of it now. It helps because everything here is written in kanji, but it will take a lot longer than 3 months to master even 1/4 of the kanji in daily use.

I had a hard time finding things cultural to write about for my journals. I’ve stopped being surprised at anything different and just accept it. So sometimes it takes a while to distinguish whether it’s cultural or not, but I’m trying.
We still don’t have a lot of time. I’m spending more time at school here than I would be in Canada. But I’m used to it. I think I’m used to pretty much everything here. I still really like it in Japan and I am glad I came. Just being here is an experience worth remembering. (I guess that’s where writing journals comes in).
Yours truly, Alice

Letter #3: June 8, 1992

Thank you for answering my letters. I appreciate it. (I haven’t been getting much mail lately)

This trip is not what I expected it would be. I thought of it more as a holiday. Everyone thought I was lucky, no 3 months of school. I’m spending more time at school here then I would be at home! At home school finishes in about a week or so because of exams. Here we’re going to school right up until the 26th. But 3 months is not a holiday. It’s just enough time to settle into the Japanese lifestyle. My family is great. They’re treating me just like of of the family.

A lot of my past journals focused on the independence differences in Japan and Canada. That is something I’ve noticed a lot of. I was actually quite surprised that my host family is letting me make a lot of decisions for myself. Sometimes they suggest things but the decision is always left up to me. I’m planning on going to Kyoto to visit a previous host family. I was deciding whether to go Thursday night or Friday morning. I asked my host mom and she told me to decide. So I kind of decided on Thursday night. Then she was talking to my other host family (from last summer) on the phone and I found out she was worried so I asked her about it and she said she was worried about me going by myself at night but since I’d decided on Thurs. night she didn’t say anything. (By the way I’m now going early Friday morning).

When I first came here I didn’t really experience culture shock. I was expecting things to be different but it is going to be hard going home and being expected to fit in with everything again. I think I’ve changed since I’ve been here. It’s funny because Japan is not the country that stressed independence but I think I’ve become more independent. I’ve learned to handle things on my own (I’ve had to) and problems that would have been big in Canada are less important here. I think everything I’ve experienced is for the better. I’m not homesick and I don’t wish I was home, but it will be nice to be home, to catch up on all I’ve missed and to see my family and friends. No matter how much we tried it would be impossible to learn everything in 3 months. 3 months is a good starting point. It made me understand a lot more about Japan, the people, the culture. If I ever come back for a year or so I’d already have the basics and could focus on the language. Hopefully sometime I’ll master it.
Yours truly, Alice
APPENDIX F

SHIGERU'S JOURNAL

Entry: 09/03/92:

My host family members are: father, mother, two sons (18 yrs old, 15 yrs old), daughters (twins, 9 yrs old). We will go on a picnic to Sunshine Coast tomorrow (Sept. 4), but two sons are not going. The eldest son has a job but the other son has any particular plan for tomorrow. Although the mother has been trying to have him go for these two days, he seems that he doesn't want to join us. The mother said, "Boys of such age are often not willing to go out with their mother. How about is Japan?" I told her that I did the same situation when I was a teen ager. My idea regarding to North American people is that they think the family is always important for their life. And the adolescent boys and girls spend more time with family compare to those in Japan. Also, I frequently notice the phrase in the movies, like "Mam, I love you." So, I didn't expect that the North American teenagers (boys and girls) have a same feeling that I had before. Eventually, I realized that everyone at that age is same even though the country is different. However I do not know how to translate the meanings.

Entry: 09/12/92:

I went to Victoria in the morning on Saturday and stayed overnight. My friend there is a student at UVC and was in Japan for a few months. She returned to Canada a month prior to my arrival. So I met her after an interval of two months. Because she was staying with a busy host family in Japan I always took care of her. (I was not a member of her host family) So she was appreciated for my assistance during her stay in Japan, however, I didn't any words of appreciation from her parents. If they know that she was taken care of me, they usually express some appreciation, I think. I am not intend to give then an obligation but it is not usual in Japan.

Entry: 09/27/92:

My host brother was having a cold, and he didn't feel good. When I asked him, "Are you OK?", his answer was "I am sick". I was surprised that he made himself really a sick person. Still more surprised is that he is sleeping with stripped to the waist, not covering his shoulders and arms with comforter, and nobody even his mother cares about it. Japanese think we should always cover our shoulders with comforter even when we don't feel cold. So I was totally amazed to see it. I don't think it is a matter of the difference of climate. In Japan, people answer "I am O.K. when they are asked.
Entry: 09/29/92:

I have been thinking about the rough driving of buses. Today, the bus was pretty vacant so I put my bag beside my seat. When the bus made turn, my bag fell off the seat by the force. The drive looked at it and laughed without any words. Why driving bus is so rough while individual cars drive so safely? Also buses always made squeaking noises. I thought Japanese buses would be better...

Entry: 10/04/92:

At home: My host mother asked to go out for a walk together after dinner, so I did. I thought that this is a walk for dog, but children asked her if they could take a dog. I realized that taking a walk for the dog is not the purpose but simply for enjoying a walk. Outside was already dar, so I didn’t thought that it was a good idea to have a walk in the dark. Anyway, we went out, and came back after an hour and a half. It was not a short time walk for about 15-20 minutes that I thought. Is this a common habit for Canadians? I thought Japanese usually don’t have “a walk in order to walk.”

Entry: 10/16/92:

People here don’t use umbrellas for a little rain. I’ve heard that it is a rainy season, but I wonder why there is not enough choice of umbrellas. I thought having more rains develop more fashionable raincoats. It seems not like it. Japan is one of the countries that have much rain, and have special stores for umbrellas with varieties of colours and types. Canadians umbrellas, in contrast, look same, and the quality is not good. Though I didn’t bring any rainwears from Japan, I still can’t make up my mind to buy a Canadian umbrella.

Entry: 10/19/92:

Since I came here, it seems like I go to bathroom quite often. I drink a lot of coffee here. I have something to drink in class all the time, and during the break time, I would drink again. It seems like I am drinking something all the time. I drink at least five cups of coffee daily, so I have to go the bathroom. I don’t think we need a break for only two hours class, but this recess may be for those who need to go to the bathroom like me.

Entry: 10/20/92:

I wonder why janitor people are working at fast-food restaurants. I think that these restaurants take “self-service” system that every customer have responsibility to clean on their tables, return trays to the proper position, etc. I went to Burger-King today, and I saw an oriental man who were cleaning up all table in the restaurants. I did by myself, but most of customers left their trash on the table. Talking about another topic, I wonder why oriental work as janitors and white people work inside the counter.
Entry: 10/21/92:

I went to a dentist due to serious toothache, and I skipped a class. I was really surprised that I found a TV installed in the ceiling when I lay down on the bed. I could not figure out wearing headphones and watching TV is a western idea, or it’s for kids who scare treatment. Anyway, I was surely amazed by this western idea.

Entry: 10/23/92:

I have been thinking for a long time that there is no concept of ‘ue’ and ‘shita’ (upper and lower). Especially in the bathroom, people leave their bags on the floor without any conscious. Or some throw their belongings on the floor as soon as they come into the bathroom. Those who put their bags on the countertop are better, I think. I’ve never seen that Orientals (perhaps, ESL students) did the same action in the bathroom. I heard that the same situation in the girls’ bathroom as well.

Entry: 10/26/92:

Students who take Japanese class tend to enjoy coffee and talking in the cafeteria during a 10-minutes break. They spend there more than 15 minutes. If I was a student, I just buy a coffee and return to the class as soon as possible. From the point of Japanese view, students have to back their seats at least two minutes before the end of the break session. I feel western people, in general, are lazy of time consciousness.

Entry: 10/31/92:

I will be taken to the barber by Masa’s Language partner tomorrow, so that I planed to visit downtown after having cut my hair. She asked me whether I could go downtown right after the barber without taking shower. I thought it was not necessary for me take shower, so I replied I didn’t care. However, today, I found I was wrong. Everything was rough! Lots of cut hair were put around my neck, and I felt itchy very much. What is worse, their technique was terrible. North Europeans wavy hair can cover their low technique, but Asian have quite straight hair which need well-balanced cutting. I was disappointed myself because I could not explain these matters in English. I decided to go to a Japanese barber shop next time!
Entry: 10/31/92:

I was in Downtown till late at night, and a friend drove me back. (Canadian friend) I felt that young people are the same all over the world. When they drive on highway at night, they drive in a quite high speed. Difference from Japanese young drivers is that Japanese keep basic rules such as using winkers ahead, but Canadians tend to forget everything. Apart from today, I feel my host’s driving is not good either though he does not drive too fast. Japanese are more sensible about driving.

Entry: 11/08/93:

I am teaching Japanese to some Canadian friends. They teach me English in exchange, but I cannot read their English because of their bad writing. I tried to write Japanese letters as clear as possible for them, but I don’t think they make the same effort. They may not have a sense of beautiful penmanship.

Entry: 12/10/92:

Christmas decorations have started to be seen recently. It is very beautiful to see these decorations from the bus at night. I am surprised the amount of bulbs that are used for decorations. I heard that hydro expense is expensive in Canada, but nobody care the cost this season. I feel the everybody compete their decoration each other.

Entry: 12/12/92:

We are going to have Christmas soon. In department stores, there is a kind of fuss as if it’s Christmas day already. I went to shopping to buy Christmas presents for my host family. Look at those many people! I think Metrotown Mall is too large for shopping. There are many similar stores everywhere, and it’s very difficult to decide what to buy. Also, it’s so hard to pick up good presents for everyone in my family. Considering Canadian people are doing this for every single year, I just couldn’t help but feel terrible. It is fine to buy just one or two present, but I just can’t stand this kind of Christmas shopping that I have to carry enormous number of shopping bags in my both hands.

Entry: 12/14/92:

It’s about people’s sense of sanitation again. Today, even though the floor of the bus was wet because of those snow and rain, a young girl put her canvas bag on the floor when she sat down. How come doesn’t she think it’s dirty? In Japan, that kind of girls can hardly make boyfriends.
Entry: 12/14/92:

I went to a shopping mall near here. The mall is also a starting point of bus. After my shopping, I waited a bus to go home. However, the bus didn’t come. It was more than 5 minutes late. If the bus starts late at the beginning, it also means the bus is going to be late for other stops as well. Furthermore, I was surprised that nobody complained about that. The bus driver also explained nothing and didn’t even apologize. I’m fed up with such negligent manner of those people about the time.

Entry: 12/18/92:

Regarding ski trip with Canadian friends from Dec. 18 to 26. We, five Japanese are going to stay at my Canadian friend’s house because we have to leave early morning tomorrow. The Canadian family was so kind that they came over to our place to pick up each of us and offered beds for each of us even though we have met just one time before. I guess Japanese can not take care of other people they do not know well. In that respect, Canadians are generous.

Entry: 12/19/92:

In the morning on our departure, Canadians, as usual, are not punctual. We supposed to leave at 7:00 a.m., but all of the member gathered at 7:45. However, I did not feel to blame them because I was used to such their manner, and they will drive for us. It was about 10 hours driving including times for a rest. 5 cars were used for the trip. I was surprised that they did not drive by turns. In Japan, we tend to change drivers every 2 or 3 hours in turns for the safety. The reason why they (Canadians) did not change the driver may be for the insurance reason. Anyway, I thought the idea does not look like one of the western people. Or, it is a kind of their self-assertion that “I don’t want to drive.” We arrived at our accommodation around 6 p.m. finally. Although I knew that the number of the bedrooms were not enough for all people, to my surprise, Canadians took rooms as they wanted as soon as we arrived there. We, Japanese were left in the dining room. We were at lost because we did not have sleeping bags and blankets. Canadian seemed to be not to concern about us, and they enjoyed themselves. We Japanese asked one Japanese-Canadian friend who was a bilingual to talk about this matter with them. Then they gathered. For Canadians, this kind of matter is not a big problem, and will be solved naturally later. However, Japanese think that how to sharing rooms should be decided at the beginning. Needless to say, it is a problem. We were disappointed in such Canadians attitude.
Entry: 12/20/92:

No Canadians asked us to ski together because of, I guess, yesterday's argument between us. Anyway we did ski. I expected to have chance to ski together in 7 days, but eventually, we spent by ourselves for all 7 days. Canadians never ask us to ski together, and we did not do so neither. I wondered why they came here in a group of 20 people, but it may come from their individuality.

They don’t ski hasty. We Japanese wanted to start skiing on the arrival day because we want to enjoy as long as possible. In contrast, they are not this type. They start to ski late in the morning, and never ski at night. They took one day off from skiing, and spent all that day inside. I understand that we are called “ski crazy. We skied from early in the morning to late at night for all 7 days. In Japan we all enjoy party at night whenever we go to skiing. The party after skiing is a kind of big fun for us. So, we expected what kind of party we can have with Canadians during this trip. However, they stop skiing around 4:30 p.m. and had dinner at 8 p.m. and some of them already went to bed at 9 p.m. There were 2 couples among Canadians, but they just enjoyed quiet atmosphere. We were disappointed in such a Christmas because we expected to have an interesting Christmas in North America.

Entry: 12/24/92:

The biggest problem in this trip was using the bathroom. We ran out of the hot water very quickly because our lodging was for 10 people and 20 of us were there. In Japan, we would consider others (or make mutual concessions). However it is apparent that people here try to be the first. I could not stand for that. The Japanese Canadian told us that we Japanese were lack of self-assertion. However, I guess, there is a very fine line between self insistence and selfishness. It was we Japanese who waited for a long time until another hot water was supplied.

Entry: 12/29/92:

I think, in Japan, we showed special consideration and kindness to many international students. However, here in Canada, there are too many international students, and of course, we are not treated as special. For example, one Canadian told me that he would call me, but there was no phone call from him. I asked his phone number in good reason, but he said “There’s no need. I will call you anyway”. After all, he called me in 2 days later, and said “I’m sorry. I was too busy, and I forgot to call you”. In Japan, I did many things for my international student friend. But in here, they don’t treat me like that. Is it because they don’t like me?
Entry: 12/29/92:

I met my host parents’ children (twin sisters of 9 years old). They said that they don’t have any homework for winter vacation. I thought it was because it is Christmas, but they also said they don’t have any homework on summer vacation, either. I was surprised, but if I was a child, I would prefer that. Also I realized one more thing. It might be that because they are twins, but they don’t play with other children after school or during the vacations. I haven’t seen them bringing their friends to their home, either. My host parents are always complaining about the school, some students, and their parents. Maybe that’s why. Is that why I sometimes see a child playing by themselves in the park?

Entry: 01/03/93:

I went to SFU for the meeting about 1 week ski trip. 20 people are going together, and 4 or 5 of them would be Japanese. We were supposed to meet at 1:00, but only Japanese people were in time. It was almost 2:00 when all the people finally showed up. Canadians say “You Japanese are punctual”. It is not a special effort for us to be on time. Anyway, Canadians never come to the place in time. I would say, they have no conscience to be on time.

Entry: 01/12/93:

I’ve sometimes noticed the kitchen at my host family’s house is always dirty, especially in the morning after everybody has left. There are dirty dishes everywhere. Ham, milk, cheese, still on the table. I cannot stand that. Sometimes when I clean up the kitchen, I am thanked by them very much. However, my Japanese mother would never satisfy with what I did here. I thought Canadian people just concentrate on “eating”, and don’t care much about how to handle foods, whereas, we Japanese are much more neat and tidy.

Entry: 01/16/93:

I went to the hockey game with my friend and his friends (10-15 of them). We spent the whole day together. They were very kind to me (I was the only Japanese). This is a big difference between those people I went to ski together on the other day. It was only a day, but we became a very good friends and I had a really good time. One thing is, they drink a lot! We came back home at 4 am. They started drinking beer at 2 pm. I don’t remember how much we drank, but I knew it was too much. I didn’t despise them. Rather, I understand their feeling of having fun. I felt that there’s no difference between us, and we could really share the friendship. The interesting thing was, though they drank so much, yet nobody smoked. It was what I expected from North American young people, and I liked that very much. Anyway, I had a great time. Their kindness, hospitality, and cheerfulness made me feel so wonderful.
Entry: 01/14/93:

I met an Canadian friend who I haven’t seen for a long time. He asked me about my ski trip, because he loves skiing, too. I told him there was no party at all, and he said they were not ordinary young Canadians. Perhaps, they were just happened to be the group who don’t like partying. According to him, his group binged all the time even while and after they were skiing.

Entry: 01/16/93:

We went to Grouse Mountain for skiing. We took bus, and surprisingly, there were many people on the bus with their ski boots on! I was so surprised because there is an instruction of ski boots that it basically applies on snow, not on rigid ground. Apparently, they are damaging their boots. North American often say, “In Japan, everything is expensive,” but we use goods with a good care. If somebody wearing ski boots on the bus in Japan, he/she may be considered as a crazy guy. Boots will be damaged, and what is more, are not suitable to walk. Even though ski goods are rather cheap here compared with the price in Japan, those will get worse very quickly. Therefore, people have to buy another one in a short period, and consequently, they spend a lot. I think that it is humanistic and morally acceptable way to treat things with a great care.
APPENDIX G

SHIGERU'S MONTHLY REPORTS

Report #1: 09/18/92:

I have spent a month here now. Everything I saw and felt were new to me. Still, there are lots of things I don’t understand for Canadians. I am quite got used to the school life and its environment. But I am still in pretty nervous when I speak English in front of several native speakers. The reason I don’t hesitate to give a speech in Japan (in front of Japanese, of course) is perhaps I know what they are thinking and their characteristics to some extent. I order to understand the thought and psychology of Canadians, the best way is to stay at a hostfamily and to contact many native friends. It will take time to understand everything.

Report #2: 10/30/92:

Time goes fast because school works became very busy. Because of such busy school days, I feel like losing my recognition about what I am doing. Also, I sometimes feel that I am living without my real consciousness. In this situation, I think I am becoming rude or wild partly. It is well said I am getting North American generosity (or big heart). It is badly said I am becoming rude. For example, in Japan you should handle books in the library very carefully, but here, people cast books on the counter or drop off into returning box. I now know, that this manner is western style, and for Japanese young people, it is considered as a neat manner. I think I am forgetting Japanese manners such as Japanese ideal of respect and etiquette. There is no excuse to be such a person. My English skill has not improved these two months. Sometimes, I act as if I can understand everything. I still can not believe that my listening comprehension will be improved as I get used to. I have a pile of homework that I never reach to the end even if I tried hard. Recently, when I wake up in the morning, I feel “Uh... it’s school again.” Once a day begins, time goes so fast and I get tired which makes me feel like I studied hard. Sometimes, I wonder whether my English skill will be improved after eight months living such days.

Report #3: 11/30/92:

Three months have passed. I am spending quite busy days recently, and every day seems to have the same routine. English is still hard for me, especially, listening skill has not been improved yet. I really got used to living here, so nothing is unusual for me now. I think I partly took the different culture in myself, but my basic way of idea has never been changed. My apparent change is external activities. I spent my daily life furiously in these 3 months. I did not pay attention what happened on me very much because I was just busy with studying English. I expect myself to have time to think about myself and what I could
not think before from the coming 4th month. For example, I would like to think about the
difference of culture. Moreover, I want to try to ask or talk about it with somebody. To
do so, I need to improve English and find time to think about many things. Basically, not
many things changed, but the word “three months” makes me recognise that I got used to
(the different culture?). At the same time, this word makes me anxious as well because I
feel that I understood only a little about (Canadian’s life). If this anxiety is the dark part of
my days, the bright part for me is that I could have a deep friendship among friends and
hostfamilies in these three months. Fortunately, people around me are all wonderful. Being
away from my friends in Japan, I recognized the importance of friendship.