THE ANGLO-ASANTE WAR OF 1873-1874

A NARRATIVE AND ANALYSIS

by

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The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, it is intended to be the narrative of a war which resulted in a radical change in British policy on the West Coast of Africa. Second, it is an attempt to assess, in military terms, the manner in which the British conducted their campaign against the Asante in 1873-1874.

The information upon which the study is based was secured primarily from the Colonial Office Confidential Print, the Sessional Papers of the British Parliament, and several edited collections of documents—notably those compiled by J.J. Crooks, G.E. Metcalfe, and C.W. Newbury. In addition, however, works published by many of the participants themselves proved to be invaluable. Although studies published by W.W. Claridge, U. Kimble, and W.E.F. Ward were used somewhat extensively, secondary materials provided little more than background information.

As an introduction, the growth of British involvement on the Gold Coast and the development of the Anglo-Asante dispute is traced from the time of the first British contact with the region up to the very eve of war. The study then proceeds to examine in detail the conduct of the campaign against the Asante. Finally, because the official documents and much of the primary source material present a distorted view of the roles played by the various participants, an attempt is made to re-evaluate the
performance of those participants.

This approach has revealed that much of what was written of this war was either biased or incomplete. For example, Colonel R.W. Harley, the Administrator of the Gold Coast until October 1873, was a man who received little recognition for his role in the war yet he is revealed as a man who accomplished much in the face of almost overwhelming odds. Similarly, the Fanti tribesmen, who were consistently reviled for their laziness and cowardice at this time, emerge in a considerably better light. In addition, the role which Captain John Glover, R.N., played in the war is proven to have been much more significant than hitherto acknowledged. Above all, Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, who is often referred to as one of Britain's greatest generals, is proven in this instance to have been a soldier of far less merit than previously supposed.
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CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-ASANTE RELATIONS TO 1873

The story of the circumstances and events which led to the Anglo-Asante war of 1873-1874 is complex and often confusing. Had the Asante been a coastal people, outlining the causes of their dispute with the British would no doubt be a much simpler task. However, Asante was an inland state and because of this, the tracing of the development of the Anglo-Asante dispute involves the telling of a parallel story. That is, the story of the growing involvement of the British in the affairs of the coastal states on the Gold Coast. For had the British not become involved in the settlement of disputes between the coastal states themselves and between those states and the Asante, there would have been no cause for the Anglo-Asante confrontations which eventually occurred.

Although English traders had operated on the Gold Coast as early as 1553,¹ the first 175 years of their presence there was devoted almost exclusively to the establishment and maintenance of their small trading stations.² Events during these early years gave no indication of the role that the chartered companies which initially administered the settlements and then the British Government itself were eventually to play in Gold Coast politics for throughout that period not only the British, but all European traders, were "merely tolerated by the Africans because they were useful, but they were neither liked nor feared."³
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, a subtle change had begun to take place in the role of the Europeans on the Gold Coast. This change began to occur when the growing coastal trade led to the rise of new urban settlements near the walls of the various forts. In describing the effects of these new African settlements, J.D. Fage wrote,

The limits of these (new urban settlements) took no account of the boundaries of the traditional native authorities. Their inhabitants included both permanent and transient emigrants from a number of states, some of them probably in the remote interior. The economically less successful of them were apt to make their living by performing services of various kinds for the occupants of the forts or even by finding regular employment as artisans, servants, or soldiers within them. ... The European language, customs, and religion the community as a whole had in common.

There were indigenous ways in which the Africans could solve the divisions and conflicts of authority arising in such cosmopolitan communities, but in the last resort, particularly when it came to the defence of the community against outsiders, authority naturally tended to reside with the commander of the forts and its soldiers and guns, and the inhabitants would also naturally tend to side with their own particular group of Europeans in conflicts between the various European nationalities.

There existed almost from the very first, therefore, a moral obligation for the Europeans to protect these Africans who had lost their traditional means of protection against the depredations of outsiders. This initial and highly nebulous oblig-
ation slowly but surely drew the British merchants and subsequently the Government into the mainstream of Gold Coast politics. Eventually the growth in economic and political importance of these settlements and the subsequent claims to sovereignty over them eventually proved to be one of the major problems in Anglo-Asante relations.

In the meantime, however, there was yet another result of the European impact on the African situation which created the actual basis of the problem. This was the revolutionizing of the traditional economic and political pattern throughout the entire region of West Africa. In a comment on this revolution, J.D. Page wrote:

In the broadest sense, what was happening to the Gold Coast, and to West Africa in general, (in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) was that it was being turned about-face. With the development of European maritime trade on the coast, new foci of economic and political change were evolving in the south, in the coastlands and in the adjacent forest country, instead of, as hitherto, in the northern savanna country bordering the Sahara with its camel-borne trade with North Africa.

As a result of this changing trade pattern, two states arose on the Gold Coast where hitherto there had existed no indigenous states of comparable stature. These were the Fanti in the coastlands and the Asante in the adjacent forest country. The Fanti enjoyed the lucrative position of middlemen in the pre-
vailing system of trade and they united in order to control the trade routes and thus establish their own conditions of trade. Conversely, the Asante had, by the end of the eighteenth century, secured control over the supply of slaves and gold to the coastal markets and of the distribution of the European imports received in exchange, over a wide area of the regions north of the upper reaches of the Pra River.\textsuperscript{7}

The situation was one which could eventually lead only to conflict for as the Asante Empire continued to grow in both power and influence, it could not accept its lack of direct access to the sea.\textsuperscript{8} It is true that the Asante had, by virtue of their capture from the Denkyera of the Dutch Note\textsuperscript{9} for Elmina Castle, been brought into direct contact with the coast as early as 1700.\textsuperscript{10} However, ownership of the Note did not in any way guarantee unimpeded access to the coast at Elmina because the Fanti tribes occupied the territory which lay between the southern portion of the 'ring of states' which comprised provincial Asante\textsuperscript{11} and the coast. It was only natural, therefore, for the Asante to eventually undertake a drive to the sea in an effort to eliminate the coastal middlemen. Conversely, however, this was a move which those middlemen could not and would not permit without a struggle.

The Asante were clearly aware of the Fanti attitude and the strength of the Fanti states combined with the latent hostility of their own restive provinces which bordered on Fanti ter-
ritory made the Asante very cautious in their handling of the situation. Even so, by 1765, tensions had increased to such an extent that a clash between the two peoples appeared unavoidable. In fact, early in 1765 the Asantehene, Osei Kojo, actually began to gather his army for an invasion of Fanti territory in retribution for what he viewed as a Fanti act of treachery. 12 This punitive expedition was abandoned at the last minute because Osei Kojo died before he could complete his preparations. A subsequent twenty-year period of successional disputes then made it impossible for the Asante to organize sufficient forces to carry out the operation. Nevertheless, this was only a postponement.

Osei Bonsu became Asantehene in 1800 and by 1806 he had completed a series of punitive wars within the Empire which secured his position as Asantehene and re-established his suzerainty over the 'provinces' of the Empire. 13 He was thus ready to pick up Osei Kojo's quarrel and when the Fanti refused to surrender a fugitive from the Asantehene's justice, he had a legitimate excuse for waging war. Even at this stage he was reluctant to engage the Fanti in open warfare. Nevertheless after several futile attempts at negotiation, the Asante army was finally launched into Fanti territory early in 1806. 14
The resultant campaign was short and decisive. The Asante won several small victories in the border country and then advanced swiftly toward the sea. By May 1806, the main Fanti army had been met and utterly defeated within four miles of Cape Coast, near the town of Abora. The military reputation of the Fanti as the strongest power in coast politics was utterly destroyed and the Asante army swept virtually unimpeded from one end of the coast to the other.  

Brief flare-ups of Fanti resistance required follow-up campaigns in 1811 and 1814, but the 1806 invasion had clearly decided the issue and the balance of power on the coast had been completely altered. Not only had the military power of the Fanti been broken but so also had that of Akin and Akwapim.  

In addition, the Asantehene had gained, by right of conquest, the Notes for certain of the coastal forts thus forcing the Dutch and the British to recognize Asante supremacy by virtue of paying the stipulated rent to Kumasi. Moreover, the Fanti country was formally incorporated into the Asante Empire by being placed under the rule of Asante governors.  

The result of all this was political chaos; but worse was yet to come.

At the very height of the political upheaval, the economic balance of the Gold Coast received a staggering blow. In 1807 the British Government abolished the slave trade. At one stroke some nine-tenths of the trade of the Company of Merchants Trad-
ing to Africa had become illegal. At first, the Company made an unsuccessful attempt to have the application of the Abolition Act postponed.18 This was followed by an application to the Government for an increased grant while "making a general tender of their (the Company's) services in the execution of whatever policy the Government should decide to pursue in that part of Africa in the future."19

In the circumstances, it is rather surprising that the British Government did not decide that it had no further use for the Gold Coast forts.20 The Abolitionists, however, were strongly opposed to reducing the British interests in Africa. Zachary Macaulay,21 and those who thought like him, rather wished to see British influence extended to promote the civilization of Africa, particularly by fostering new branches of 'legitimate' and less harmful trade.22 It was in response to this prompting that the Government decided to send a Commission of Inquiry to the Gold Coast in order to collect information about the potentialities of West Africa. The Commissioners reported in July 1811, and although they recommended that certain of the forts be given up, they were in agreement that the British presence should be maintained on the coast in order to ensure that positive steps were taken to stop the slave trade.23

With their continued existence on the Gold Coast thus assured, the Company's officials were faced with the task of adjusting themselves to "a new state of affairs in which their
chief trade had ceased to exist, and what may be called the Ashanti Question came more and more to occupy their attention." Certainly some form of agreement had now to be reached between the British and the Asante if the Company was to achieve its prime objective: the assurance of steady 'legitimate' trade and open trade routes. That is, a means had to be found whereby the perpetual threat of new Asante invasions caused by disputes with the coastal states over large yet vague and unsettled claims to authority, tribute or compensation, could be removed.

The first move toward finding some form of settlement came sometime about 1810. At that time the Asantehene asked the Governor of Cape Coast Castle to send an officer to reside in Kumasi. For reasons which have never been made clear, this initiative was never acted upon. There then followed a period of some twenty years of confusion before the situation was even partially clarified. Unsuccessful attempts were made in 1817 and 1820 to negotiate an Anglo-Asante treaty which would settle the problem. The failure of the British to honour those treaties so angered the Asantehene that in mid-1820 he ordered the Asante traders to cease visiting Cape Coast Castle and other British forts, and to trade only with the Danes and the Dutch. This action then prompted the British to become more and more concerned with the protection of their own traders and the coastal tribes—in particular the Fanti—from what might possibly have been an irresistible Asante drive to the sea.
Despite the passage of time, the situation remained unimproved. The despatches written by Mr. John Hope-Smith, the Governor-in-Chief from 1616 until 1622, clearly illustrate how completely at variance were the fundamental assumptions of the two parties. On the one hand, the Governor firmly denied that the Asante had any jurisdiction over Cape Coast. On the other hand, the Asantehene insisted that the inhabitants of Cape Coast were as much his subjects as the rest of the Fanti. Neither side would concede anything and trade, which the Asantehene's blockade had already caused to dwindle to almost nothing, ceased altogether during the first months of 1621. In the view of Mr. Joseph Dupuis, only positive negotiation at this stage could have averted open warfare with the Asante. Unfortunately, these negotiations did not take place because a new element was injected into the situation.

In their reports, the 1616 and 1617 Select Committees had recommended that the Company should continue to administer the Gold Coast, but that the Governor should be appointed by the Crown. These recommendations, combined with the advice of several knowledgeable and influential persons, convinced the Government that something had to be done. It was therefore decided to abolish the Company and institute Government control of the Gold Coast forts. In July 1621 the transfer was effected, and the Gold Coast settlements were placed under the Governor of Sierra
Leone, Sir Charles MacCarthy. This move coincided with the final tightening of the Asante blockade of Cape Coast.

On his arrival at Cape Coast in April 1822, MacCarthy therefore inherited the strong probability of a war with Asante. Even so, he made no overtures to Kumasi because he felt the Asante blockade to be merely a local quarrel not affecting the British generally. In the face of this lack of diplomatic initiative, it required only one spark to detonate the explosive situation. This spark was provided by the Asante at Anomabu when they arrested a Fanti sergeant in the British service there.

Commenting on the significance of this incident, Metcalfe writes:

This unfortunate (sergeant) summed up the conflict in his own person. As a soldier he was a subject of King George. As an Anomabu he was claimed as a subject of the Asantehene. The prestige of either power was so involved that neither could admit the other's claim. For the British a climb-down would have condemned them to continue in the forts merely on sufferance: for the Asantehene it would have been the signal for the defection amongst the recently conquered and still restless tribes.

Although initially in favour of a passive approach to the problem, MacCarthy was forced to take strong measures when the sergeant was put to death. A punitive expedition was despatched in response to this 'outrage' and, badly bungled though it was, this military effort attracted offers of assistance from many neighbouring chiefs who were always alert for any opportunity to secure their independence from Asante. Thus the complexion of
the dispute was completely changed, for such an offer actually constituted a revolt against the Asante suzerainty established in 1807. Unfortunately, the new Governor does not appear to have understood this and the offer was accepted with the result that the alliance soon included all of the coastal states except Elmina. Subsequently, the alliance assumed even greater significance when the inland states of Wasaw and Derkyera also went into rebellion by joining the allies after the allied repulse of a rather tentative Asante invasion of the coastal region in August 1823.36

In the face of this popular support, MacCarthy felt that the Asante would come to terms and that an early peace would be arrived at. Thus he clearly misunderstood the implications of his policy for the Asante could never accept the loss of their newly acquired southern provinces so casually. Indeed, they reacted immediately to the latest defection. Asante armies moved south early in 1824 and on the 21st of January, they met and defeated a small force under Sir Charles himself at Adamanso. Sir Charles was killed in action and the Asante, who numbered more than 10,000, went on to crush any and all resistance.37 They then remained in the south until July 1824, when the combined effects of the rains, smallpox, dysentery, and the news that the Danish Governor of Christiansborg was organizing an expedition into Akim to attack them on the flank, decided them to abandon their campaign and return to Kumasi.38
After this experience, both MacCarthy's successor, Major-General Charles Turner, and the British Government entertained second thoughts about the advisability of remaining on the Gold Coast. The Government in England now wished only to patch up the peace with Asante and reduce their coast establishments to Cape Coast Castle and Accra. General Turner questioned if even these were worth keeping and he suggested that the only effective alternative to complete withdrawal was to secure control of the whole coastline and detach the Gold Coast from Sierra Leone. However, the Colonial Office was not prepared to consider either total abandonment or new annexations and the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Bathurst, was in the process of preparing a new Commission of Inquiry under Mr. C. Rowan, when matters were taken out of his hands by events on the coast.

In January 1826, a new Asante army invaded the Fanti country. After foraging unchecked up and down the land for seven months this army attacked the Accra to punish them for having abandoned their ancient alliance with Asante. General Turner had died and his replacement, Sir Neil Campbell, was told to make peace if possible, and if not, to defend the forts and leave the tribes to their own devices. Before he arrived on the coast, however, the British had already won a decisive victory over the Asante army. Lieutenant-Colonel Purdon, the Acting Governor, had ignored his orders, taken the field and, with some of the eastern chiefs, won a decisive victory against the Asante at Katanansu on
August 7th, 1825. 44 In Ward’s words, this complete defeat of the main Asante army "decided the fate of the Gold Coast". 45

After the battle of Katamansu, the Asante returned to Kumasi and a long series of abortive negotiations began late in 1827. At first it appeared that peace would be easily established. However, the allied chiefs did not think this a fitting time to offer terms to Asante and refused to enter into negotiations.

The intransigence of the African allies, the negligible and declining trade, and the findings of Commissioner Rowan, 46 who had managed to conduct his inquiry despite the war, all combined to prompt Governor Campbell to urge a drastic reduction of the scale of the local British establishment to the Dutch or Danish level. Lord Bathurst was prepared to go further and he issued orders for the forts to be abandoned at the end of 1827: 47 but for this to be done without endangering the British merchants, it was necessary that further efforts be made to establish peace on the coast. Governor Campbell’s death in August 1827, placed his deputy, Major H.J. Ricketts, in the position of mediator and by December 1827, terms of settlement had been agreed upon. But two events caused the negotiations to collapse. First, the Fanti insisted on blockading Elmina to revenge themselves for the help the Elmina people had always given Asante. Second, the people of Osu refused to give up their Asante prisoners, including Pusua, a wife of the Asantehene. The Asante, who had released their
prisoners, protested vehemently against what they viewed as the treacherous actions of the Fanti and Osu and negotiations were broken off. Ricketts tried his best to resolve the dispute but he left the Gold Coast in September 1629 without having succeeded.

This failure caused the British Government, which had thus far resisted pressure from various British commercial interests opposed to abandonment,⁴⁸ to drop its plans for disengagement and agree to devise some permanent arrangements whereby the local merchants might be aided to protect themselves. These arrangements were worked out in the course of 1629 and under the terms of the agreement, the future management of Cape Coast and James Fort at Accra, was vested in the resident merchants. After some subsequent negotiation it was agreed that an annual grant of £4,000 was to be administered by a committee of three London merchants approved by the Government while affairs on the coast were to be conducted by a full-time, non-mercantile President who would preside over a council of five coast merchants elected from among their numbers by the merchants resident on the coast.⁴⁹

There were two immediate results from the reinstitution of Company control on the Gold Coast. First, the search for a 'detente' with the Asante appeared to come to a successful conclusion. Second, there began a period during which British influence among the coastal states increased greatly. These changes were largely due to the work of Captain George Maclean,⁵⁰ the first-and-only President of the Council.
Maclean's first task on arriving at Cape Coast in February 1830 was to conclude peace negotiations with the Asante; a task which was finally accomplished in April, 1831. Aside from a provision calling for a 'bond to keep the peace' and hostages, this treaty contained several articles that were of vital importance to future Anglo-Asante relations. These provided that (a) trade should be unrestricted, and 'panyarring', 51 denouncing and "swearing on or by any person or thing whatever" were forbidden: (b) Denkyera, Assin, "and others formerly his subjects"52 were free from any allegiance to the Asantehene, but were prohibited from insulting him: (c) all quarrels were to be decided as already agreed by the parties.53 The significance of this last provision was that it mutually bound "the three parties, British, Ashanti and Fante allies, by precise rules, and the superior authority of the former is definitely acknowledged by the implied agreement of the other two to accept the Governor as referee in any case of dispute. There was also a tacit understanding that the allies would be afforded British protection in the event of any further aggression on the part of Ashanti."54

With the signing of this treaty, relations between the Asante on the one hand, and British and the coastal states on the other, were ostensibly settled and peace was restored. In fact, with the exception of several quarrels which almost led to open warfare, the peace remained unbroken for more than thirty years. However, the lack of direct armed conflict notwithstanding,
future events would prove that the seeds of discord had been sown by the very treaty which made this peace possible.

This was mainly due to the face that the 1831 treaty treaty formally recreated a semblance of the political organization which had existed prior to the war of 1807. That is, there once more existed the three political groupings of Asante, Fanti and the British forts. There were, however, several vital changes in the situation. Asante had been deprived of the fruits of the 1807 campaign and had even lost several territories which she had considered her own even before that conflict. In addition, the Fanti no longer enjoyed the military and political power which they had previously possessed for their pre-1807 military and political unity no longer existed. Finally, and of equal importance, the British situation had changed considerably. The most important of these changes was the official assumption of the role of arbiter in any future disputes between the African signatories to the treaty. Also of major importance, however, was the recognition of the fact that as a result of the victory of Katamansu, the British had become the owners of the land on which their forts and castles stood. Thus the payments of ground rent on the "stes, which had been such a source of trouble in the past, ceased.56

These changes are most important because they indicate the three basic elements which would decide the course events on the Gold Coast were destined to follow. First, the British, who
were now operating from a position of some strength, were better able to exert some influence over the chaotic conditions in the immediate coastal hinterland. Second, the strife-torn and faction ridden coastal region was turning in its weakness more and more to the British in their search for a solution to both their internal problems and the constant threat from the Asante. Third, the Asante themselves harboured a deep-seated resentment over the loss of their 'southern provinces' and the access which these provinces gave to the coast.

It was to be the slow and tortuous expansion of British influence in response to the growing dependence of the coastal states which would cast the British in the role of 'Protecting Power' when the Asante finally decided to redress this basic grievance. The development of the British 'Protectorate' on the Gold Coast is therefore a basic factor in the growth of the Anglo-Asante dispute and for that reason it should be reviewed in some detail.

Having established peace, Maclean proceeded to attempt the improvement of the economic situation on the Gold Coast. To accomplish this, he had to work to encourage the establishment of peace and security in the coastal states where the social and political organization had been severely damaged by the slave trade and the Asante invasions. He therefore began to attempt the extension of his judicial authority far beyond the official limitations imposed by London.
He was outstandingly successful in this venture. However, even though this extension of British influence beyond the forts is of immense historical significance, it must be remembered that what ultimately proved to be a quasi-political authority was based solely on Maclean's reputation as a wise and honest man. The British Government had expressly forbidden any extension of British territory and to ensure compliance had restricted Maclean's power to the forts alone. Consequently, although his influence was great--his extra-legal jurisdiction over African litigants of every rank and station expanded rapidly--he possessed no legal authority beyond the forts. Even so, Ward refers to the region within which Maclean's 'de facto' power and influence developed as the 'Protectorate' and for the sake of simplicity that will also be the term used in this study.

The area of the 'Protectorate' was bounded on the east by the Volta and on the west by the Pra, and reached inland as far as the Asante Border. Not every tribe in this area accepted Maclean's influence, however.

Most of the Accra plains were under Danish influence, and Elmina, Axim and other towns were under Dutch influence. On the other hand, certain areas to the west of the Pra including Wassaw, Apollonia and Dixcove, were in the British sphere. Roughly speaking, however, we may regard the British sphere as reaching from the Pra to the Volta, a distance of about 100 miles, and from the sea-shore inland to an average depth of about forty miles.
The limitations on Maclean's authority and his need to rely heavily on personal influence required that he be most circumspect in his application of any power which the Africans consented to give him. For this reason he refused to interfere in the customs of tribesmen who were not British subjects unless he thought that such customs were dangerous social evils.61

The subtleties of Maclean's position were lost on many people in England,62 in particular the anti-slavers. As a result of complaints inspired by this lack of understanding and also because of several other complaints lodged against Maclean personally63 and against his administration, Lord John Russell,64 the Colonial Secretary at that time, decided that the only way to ensure the prompt application of the laws against the slave trade was for the Government to resume control of the forts. At the urging of the Treasury, however, he agreed to postpone taking any action until a special commissioner had visited West Africa and reported on the situation there.65

The Commissioner selected was Dr. R.R. Madden, "one of the most exalted of the anti-slavery zealots, who, in the temper of 1840, was hardly likely to do justice to Maclean's achievements".66 Indeed, Madden's report was so obviously biased that the Colonial Office, by that time under the direction of Lord Stanley,67 refused to act on its recommendations before a Select Committee of the House of Commons had gone into the whole question of West African affairs.68
As a result, the Madden Report became virtually a dead letter and the Government was guided instead by a number of the recommendations made by the Select Committee which was formed in 1842. Acting on the Committee's advice, the Government instituted two important measures. First, the Committee had recommended that the Crown should resume control of the Gold Coast and thus separate the judicial function, which had been such an outstanding feature of Maclean's work, from the political authority of the Queen's representative. Accordingly, in 1843 the Government resumed direct control of the British forts on the Gold Coast, placing them under a Lieutenant-Governor responsible to a Governor-in-Chief in Sierra Leone.69 Under this new arrangement, Maclean was appointed Judicial Assessor (i.e. Chief Justice with a special responsibility for the administration of justice among the coastal tribes).

Maclean's new post stemmed directly from the second Committee recommendation accepted by the Government. Having been most favourably impressed with Maclean's work in the extension of British influence through the operation of his court, the Committee had recommended that the unofficial jurisdiction which had resulted from Maclean's efforts be regularized in some manner.70 To implement this recommendation, the Government utilized the terms of the Foreign Jurisdictions Act of 1843 which empowered the British Government to exercise jurisdiction in non-British territories provided that such jurisdiction was authorized by
treaty between Britain and the foreign state concerned. The new Governor, Commander W.H. Hill, R.N., negotiated such authorizing treaties—generally known as the 'Bonds'—with a number of coastal states in 1844.

First signed by eight chiefs, including those of Denkyera, Anomabu, Cape Coast and Assin, the Bond clearly and simply legalized and defined Maclean's hitherto informal jurisdiction. The agreement bound the African rulers to protect the rights of individuals and of property; to abolish such barbarous customs as human sacrifices and pahyarrying; and to authorize British judges to help them try crimes such as murder and robbery, so that the customs of the country would become moulded to the general principles of British law. By 1849 the Akiin Abunkwa, many divisions of the Akin Kotoku, the Wassaw, the Agona and others of the nations between the sea and the upper Pra had also signed the Bond. The number of coastal states adhering to the Bond was increased even more in 1850. In that year the Danish forts were purchased and although the British only inherited what had been a vague Danish influence over Akwapim and Akiin which was not unlike that which had been enjoyed by themselves before the Bonds, the chiefs of these newly acquired areas of influence became adherents to the Bond soon after the transfer.
Although this creation and extension of the Bond was an important step in the establishment of British influence on the Gold Coast, it must not be forgotten that it in no way gave the British the right to intervene in the government of the signatory states. The language of the preamble clearly implied that the power and jurisdiction were to be exercised in the future as they had been in the past, and in no other way. There was no intention of granting to the Crown any territorial sovereignty or suzerainty, nor was there granted any authority beyond that of enforcing compliance with the orders of the court. It is clear that the Gold Coast states which entered into Bonds had granted the British the right to intervene in their administration of justice only. Nevertheless they continued to become more and more involved—albeit informally—in the affairs of the coastal states and it was this growing informal commitment which was to eventually draw them into conflict with the Asante.

After the signing of the Bond, the search for a solution to the financial problems of the British authorities on the coast led to the next degree of involvement. The basic problem with respect to funds was that succeeding British governments were unwilling to have their taxpayers provide more money for the Gold Coast administration than the minimum needed for the salaries of its officials, even though the increased funds were desired solely because, as a result of the growth of British influence,
the peoples of the coastal states were beginning to look to the
British administration to provide services for which there were
no funds available in the annual operating grant.76

Finally, in an attempt to solve this dilemma, the British
authorities attempted to persuade the rulers of the coastal states
themselves to raise the desired funds.79 In April 1852, a large
assembly of chiefs and elders met at Cape Coast in the presence
of the Governor, apparently at his invitation and with the ap-
proval of Earl Grey,80 the new Colonial Secretary.81 They met
to consult with the Governor and his council on means of rais-
ing revenue. The meeting was attended by a large number of Parti
chiefs and others from the 'Protectorate'. The delegates con-
stituted themselves a 'Legislative Assembly' and voted a poll tax
of one shilling a head for every man, woman and child in the
'Protectorate'. This meeting was supplemented by a similar one
at Christiansborg which was attended by chiefs from Accra, Akim,
Akwapim and even beyond the Volta who associated themselves with
the decisions of the Cape Coast assembly. The resolutions were
subsequently approved by the Governor and were confirmed in law
as the Poll Tax Ordinance.82 Even so, the measure proved to be
unsuccessful.83

The importance of both the Legislative Assembly and the
poll tax lay in what they implied not in what they were. It is
worth quoting from Yard at some length to illustrate this point.
He states,

Though no legal protectorate had been proclaimed, the Government and the assembly had acquiesced in the phrase "population being under the protection of the British Government." The chiefs of the 'Protectorate,' if not the majority of their people, had admitted that it was reasonable to pay taxes to support the Government in return for the performance by the Government of certain duties. The frontiers of the 'Protectorate' might not be fixed, but there was now in existence a British Government, responsible for providing schools, law courts, roads, and hospitals, as well as other unspecified 'measures of improvement and utility,' and entitled to collect a revenue to maintain the services it provided. No mention had been made of military matters; but it was certain that no future Governor could plead to the Asante'ene that he had no control over any of the tribes in the 'Protectorate,' or could permit the Ashanti to attack Assin or Denkyera without coming to their aid. In this respect the Ordinance of 1852 supplements the Treaty of 1831; the independent states referred to in the treaty as being free from their old allegiance to Ashanti had now transferred a good part of their allegiance to the British Government. 34

By 1852, therefore, Asante was once again, by virtue of the Bond and the implications evident in the Legislative Assembly and the Poll Tax Ordinance, almost completely isolated from the sea by hostile territory. The only difference this time was that the territory concerned was under British 'protection.' With the exception of Assin in the far west and Keta in the far east no European settlement on the Gold Coast could be reached
from Asante without passing through protected territory. On the other hand, Asante did have some outposts in the 'Protectorate' in the form of allies; the most important of these being Elmina, which still maintained, under the protection of the Dutch guns, its proud connection with Asante and its implacable enmity to the Fanti states. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the conclusion that the Asante were in an even worse position, with respect to the coast, than they had been in 1807.

This situation thus intensified the fundamental causes of Asante hostility which had never been redressed. The most serious of these continuing grievances was the fact that the Asante could not reconcile themselves to the loss of Assin, Akin, Akwapim, and Denkyera. Those states had for so long been regarded as provinces of the empire that their loss by virtue of the provisions of the 1831 treaty was unacceptable. It could therefore only be a matter of time before moves would be taken to set the matter right. There was also the need to avenge the dishonour of the defeat at Katamansu and regain the lost rent for the British and Danish forts. Moreover, there was a deep resentment toward the British for their having stopped the slave trade, which the Asante, like many others still regarded as the most fruitful and profitable trade of the country. Under these circumstances, it was almost inevitable that any misunderstandings with the British authorities would lead to trouble.
Such misunderstandings were not long in occurring. Relations between Asante and the British and coastal states began to deteriorate and full-scale armed clashes were only barely avoided in 1844 and 1854.\textsuperscript{85} These narrow escapes notwithstanding, the circumstances were such that the British and their coastal 'allies' could only postpone—not permanently avoid—open warfare with the Asante.

The breach finally occurred in 1863 when the Asante invaded the 'Protectorate'. The ostensible cause of the invasion was the refusal of the British governor, Richard Pine,\textsuperscript{86} to send back to Kumasi refugees from the Asantehene's justice who, in his opinion, would be unjustly condemned to death.\textsuperscript{87} The Asante army met with no serious opposition. Indeed, the defence was so mismanaged that the Asante were able to ravage the coast and ultimately withdraw with complete impunity. The bad effect of this failure to effectively protect the 'Protectorate' could, in Pine's view, only be repaired by a counterinvasion of Asante. Initially, the Duke of Newcastle,\textsuperscript{88} the then Colonial Secretary, was not prepared to sanction so hazardous a step but he could not deny that the situation might arise in which an offensive would prove the best defence.

Eventually, Pine was given reinforcements to defend the frontier on the Pra. He was also given conditional permission for an advance into Asante.\textsuperscript{89} The available forces moved to the.
Pra and established defences there but the Asantehene did not renew the attack and the invasion never took place. Instead, the diseases endemic to the forest caused unacceptable casualties and the entire force of reinforcements was withdrawn not only from the Pra but also from the country.

This war left the Gold Coast in a lamentable state. Trade was at an absolute standstill. The British and Asante were still at war and there seemed no prospect of reaching any compromise on the basic underlying questions over which the war had started. And, possibly worst of all, British prestige among the peoples of the 'Protectorate' had slumped so badly due to the dismal handling of the war effort that both the coastal peoples and the British Government itself were beginning to give up hope that the 'Protectorate' could ever provide the coast with proper protection against the Asante. Insofar as the Africans of the coastal states were concerned, this feeling was heightened when the undefeated Asante armies began to freely raid the 'Protectorate' after the British forces had withdrawn from the Pra.

General dissatisfaction with the inconsistency of British policy and attitudes, combined with the sharp disappointment over the failure of the British to honour what the Africans felt were the obligations of a protecting power in the 1863-1864 conflict, caused the coastal people to entertain second thoughts about the entire question of the advisability and usefulness of
the British connection. This trend in African thinking was given even further encouragement when Edward Cardwell\textsuperscript{92} insisted that the chiefs should do more for their own defence than they had attempted in 1863 and 1864, and accordingly laid down a strict defensive role for British troops in any future operations on the Gold Coast.\textsuperscript{93} This policy caused considerable unease among the majority of the coastal chiefs who had no desire to see the 'Protectorate' abolished.\textsuperscript{94} Nevertheless, it was to be the extension of that policy which would eventually provide the impetus for various African projects for self-government based on the British model.

In England, the reaction to the war was both swift and negative. Both the campaign and the incompetence with which it appeared to have been conducted caused an immediate response in Parliament. In July 1864, the Conservative Opposition, led by Mr. C.B. Adderley\textsuperscript{95} and Lord Stanley, carried a motion for a Select Committee of Inquiry into the West African Settlements, calling for special attention to the Gold Coast.\textsuperscript{96} This Committee did not begin hearings until February 1865 and, in the interval, the Colonial Office despatched Colonel Henry Cord, an engineer officer with West African experience, on a tour of the settlements.\textsuperscript{97} On his return, the Committee considered his report and interviewed a large number of witnesses. Although the subsequent findings of the Committee reflected the views of Adderley and Stanley rather than those of the majority of the
witnesses, the recommendations for future policy, thanks partly to the efforts of Cardwell, were not as damaging to the British presence on the Gold Coast as they might have been had their views held sway.

The major recommendations embodied a compromise between the policy which appealed to many people in England, --Adderley and Stanley included--which urged extreme caution and favoured a complete withdrawal, and the policy favoured by the officials on the coast who urged the maintenance and expansion of the British position against the Asante pressure.98 The compromise recommendation stated that it was "not possible to withdraw the British Government, wholly or immediately, from any settlements or engagements on the West African Coast"; but that "all further extension of territory or assumption of Government or new treaties offering any protection to native tribes, would be inexpedient"; and that the Government should aim at gradually withdrawing from all four areas of British settlement except probably Sierra Leone.99

This compromise was accepted by the British Government but whether or not it would have worked is a moot point for it was never given a chance to operate. Nevertheless, it did lead to several events of general concern on the Gold Coast--not the least of which was the persuasion of the chiefs and people of the Fanti tribes by some of their European-educated members to con-
sider organizing a government which would be able to take over from the British when they left, as it was assumed they eventually would do. Even so, its importance with respect to Anglo-Asante relations stems more from the fact that it led to certain Anglo-Dutch agreements which, in turn, only served to inflame an already delicate situation.

The Committee's recommendations had clearly emphasized the desirability of reducing commitments wherever possible. As a result, the Colonial Office apparently actually discussed plans for confining occupation to Cape Coast while Major S.W. Blackall, the new Governor-in-Chief at Sierra Leone, was so worried about the Asante that he would have preferred to abandon that post as well. Although neither of these steps were taken, the investigations of the Committee at least ensured that it was at last understood that if they stayed, the British would be bound to interfere to some extent in local affairs. The question was, within what limits were they to interfere?

Colonel E. Conran, who became Acting-Governor on August 1865, seems to have advocated firmer rule within a more confined area. Accordingly, on 16th September, he issued a proclamation defining the limits of British territory. Similarly, he recommended a division of the coast with the Dutch, hoping thereby to ease the task of managing and defending the 'Protectorate'. Cardwell immediately disallowed the Proclamation as an extension
of obligations but the suggestion with regard to the Dutch possessions received favourable attention.103 Ironically, it was the British action taken on the basis of this recommendation, which was itself inspired by the spirit of the recommendations of the 1865 Committee, that sealed the fate of the very policy advocated by the 1865 Committee. It also proved to be a factor which contributed in large measure to the Anglo-Asante War of 1873-1874 for it was eventually to lead to circumstances which left the British as the sole European power on the coast; thus ensuring that it would be the British who had to face any Asante moves in the future.

Acting on Conran's advice, the Government lost no time in concluding an agreement with the Dutch whereby they agreed to eliminate the inconvenience of having the forts of the two powers intermingled by dividing the coastline into Dutch and English spheres and effecting an exchange of forts. They further agreed to impose a common customs system. The agreement was signed in March 1867, and by its provisions the frontier was fixed at the Sweet River just to the east of Elmina. Each ceded to the other a total of four forts. The British ceded to the Dutch also their 'rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction' over Wassaw, Denkyera and Appollonia.104

Apparently the African peoples were not consulted until some months after the whole matter had been settled between the two European powers. Had the agreement involved only the forts,
this oversight would not have been too serious. As things stood, however, the cession of the vague rights which were claimed over the African states without even having consulted the states involved is incomprehensible and indefensible. Certainly the problems which this error of omission caused proved that it was an oversight of the first magnitude for the political ramifications were most serious. For example, Denkyera and Wassaw had been allies of the British against the Asante, whereas the Dutch had been consistently neutral; and it was to be expected that these states would be left defenceless by the Dutch against any Asante vengeance. Also, at various points along the coast there had grown up feuds between the townsfolk living under rival British and Dutch forts, and these feuds would not lapse simply because the Europeans chose to come to an agreement between themselves. Moreover, an even clearer example of the European lack of forethought was the fact that convenient though the Sweet River was as a frontier, it cut right through Cape Coast territory and severed Cape Coast itself from its food supply. 105

Thus the British officials were once again faced with the continuing anomaly of their position on the Gold Coast; they had gradually assumed, and continually exercised, so many rights of jurisdiction that they had come to believe that they also held rights of sovereignty. 106 The consequence of their arbitrary action was disastrous and during the succeeding years the 'Protectorate' was almost torn apart. Sublimely ignorant of the
whirlwind that was about to descend upon them, the Europeans set the transfer date for 1st January 1668, and in the early days of January the four eastern Dutch forts were duly handed over to the British without any trouble. But when the joint Anglo-Dutch Commission moved beyond Elmina and tried to transfer the four British forts, trouble began at once.107

The crux of the problem was the refusal of the Kommenda people to accept the Dutch flag. This dispute began a long war between the Dutch and the Kommenda which the Dutch were unable to bring to an end. The Kommenda plundered the Elmina villages; the Dutch made unsuccessful attempts to recapture the town of Kommenda itself, both by land and naval expeditions; and eventually the Kommenda men became so bold that they carried guerrilla warfare right up to the outskirts of Elmina itself.108

Meanwhile, a widespread African movement was started to help the Kommenda in their resistance, and to help also any other tribe that should be forced to accept Dutch authority against its will. An assembly was held at Mankessim, at which the Fanti chiefs and people agreed to help Kommenda against Elmina, and in a short time a Fanti Army appeared before Elmina and blockaded the town. The states represented at Mankessim included some of the principal Fanti states, as well as Assin, Wassaw and Denkyera.109 At first Cape Coast did not join but Anomabu did. However, in April 1668 the people of Cape Coast became infuriated by an
Elmina attack on one of their villages, and a Cape Coast contingent at once marched out to join the blockading army. In this way the Fanti Confederation was born.

Finally, after a heavy but indecisive battle outside Elmina in the summer of 1863, the coastal allies agreed to lift the blockade and leave the settlement of their quarrel with the Elmina to the British Administrator of the Gold Coast, Mr. H.T. Ussher. The conference which followed became deadlocked almost immediately. The Fanti Confederation refused to consider peace unless the Elmina gave up their Asante alliance. Of course this the Elmina would not consent to do because it was the Asante alliance, together with the guns of the Dutch fort, which comprised the basis of Elmina strength. Despite continued pressure, the Elmina held firm in their resolve because they were almost continually in contact with the Asante and had every reason to expect their help. For the time being, however, the Asante could not help.

The Asantehene, Kwaku Dua, died in April 1867, and a dispute evolving out of the performance of his funeral rites delayed the accession of his successor, Kofi Karikari, until July 1868. Thus when the blockade of Elmina began the Asante government, although determined to reopen its trade route, did not yet feel secure enough to attempt an invasion in force. Toward the end of 1868, however, conditions in Asante were so much improved
that the Asantehene and his council decided to act in force in an effort to relieve Elmina, settle with Krepi and its allies, and conclude the 1863 war with the British which had never been formally terminated. A three pronged attack was planned. An army which was already in the Krepi country, was reinforced and put under the command of a new general, Adu Bofo, and given the task of attacking the enemy's right flank. A second general, Atjiempon, was sent with a small force of a few hundred men to organize and take command of the Elmina army and thus provide a 'fifth column' on the coast. The Asantehene himself was to cross the Pra with the main force when the other two armies had accomplished their missions.

Late in 1868, the two flanking forces began to move. Atjiempon moved southwest through Sefwi to the region of Assini. He then moved along the shore to Elmina where he remained to create problems for both the Dutch and the British until he was finally arrested and confined in the fort by the Dutch in April 1871. It was not until December 1872 that the British released him and sent him back to Asante.

Adu Bofo had even less success. He moved down the east side of the Volta and invaded Krepi with high hopes of a rapid sweep to the sea. He was frustrated in this hope by the Krepi chief, Dumpré, who was able to secure assistance from Akwapim, Accra and Akim and mount a highly successful guerrilla campaign.
against him. He had only one particular success. This was the capture of the German missionaries, Ramseyer and Kühne, the holding of whom gave the Asantehene a strong lever in subsequent negotiations with the British. Nevertheless, Adu Bofo had found the campaign to be too expensive in both manpower and materiel and once he had managed to kill Dompre, he withdrew to Kumasi late in 1869. In all, his efforts had cost the Asante 136 chiefs and nearly half of the men in his army and he had so greatly depleted the Asante reserve of ammunition that another campaign could not be planned until new troops had been recruited and the ammunition stocks replenished. Thus four years were to pass between the time of Kofi Karikari's decision to invade the Gold Coast and the time that he finally launched his main army across the Pra into the 'Protectorate'. In that time the situation on the coast had changed considerably.

The event which precipitated this changed situation was the Dutch decision to leave the Gold Coast for good and sell their forts to the British. This decision had been prompted by a number of considerations. The wars and general unrest had throttled their trade. They were utterly unable to put a stop to the guerrilla warfare of the Komenda men. Atjiampon, whose march from Axim along the coast to Elmina had been accompanied by "killings and other barbarities under the very eyes of the Dutch authorities", was in Elmina with an Asante force. In fact,
it was his presence prior to his arrest, more than any other factor, which created the situation whereby the Dutch authorities had no control whatsoever over the Elmina people and the knowledge that a strong contingent was on its way from Kumasi to reinforce him made any hope of restoring Dutch authority a very remote possibility.\textsuperscript{120}

Negotiations began in November 1869, but an agreement of cession was not ratified until February 1872.\textsuperscript{121} The main reason for the protracted nature of these negotiations, and the most significant one with respect to Anglo-Asante relations, was the status of Elmina. Somewhat surprisingly, the officials at Cape Coast did not view the question of the status of Elmina as a potential source of serious trouble with the Asante.\textsuperscript{122} In general, they viewed the question in its more positive terms. They felt that if the British controlled the whole coastline from Beyin to Keta it would be fairly easy to stop the continual fighting between Elmina and the Fanti towns, to impose a uniform customs tariff, and to stop smuggling. They felt that the old alliance between the British and the western states could be resumed and that under all of these circumstances, Asante intrigue on the coast would be much easier to control. Moreover, with the castle in British hands, the Asante control of Elmina town would be greatly weakened.
In London, however, the approach was much more cautious. Although this attitude was no doubt prompted in part by the continued strong adherence in that quarter to the spirit of the recommendations of the 1865 Committee, there was also a clear understanding that the Asantehene regarded Elmina to all intents and purposes as part of his own kingdom. The dangers inherent in the situation seemed so great that the Government was determined not to take over Elmina unless the Dutch authorities could satisfy them that they had a good title, and that the Asante claims to anything more than friendship and alliance were unfounded.123

The Dutch gave their assurances that such was the case despite solid evidence to the contrary. They completely ignored the fact that the Asantehene held the Note for Elmina and that the Dutch had always honoured it with an annual payment. They also chose to discount or forget the fact that the Elmina people themselves paid a regular tribute to Asante, and had always received in return, not only the customary courtesies accorded a subject state, but also considerable military assistance against the Fanti.

The British were unconvinced by the Dutch assurances for even had they no knowledge of the circumstances outlined above, they possessed evidence of their own which made the Dutch claim suspect. In the first place, by the terms of Boudich's treaty,
the British themselves had recognized the right of the Asantehene to control the Elmina people, and had secured a guarantee from him that Elmina should not make war on Cape Coast. In addition, after the Battle of Katamansu, the Asantehene had made it clear to Ricketts that he regarded it as treachery on the part of the British and Fanti to continue blockading Elmina during an armistice which he had understood to include all his subjects, among whom he counted the Elmina people. Moreover, there were letters on file in which the Asantehene referred to the Elmina as his "friends and relations" and in which he stated that "the Dutch had delivered Elmina to him as his own". And, finally, when the Asantehene heard of the proposed sale, he wrote to Mr. Ussher, the Administrator of the Gold Coast, to remind him that Elmina was his 'by right' and to express the hope that Elmina was not included in the proposed cession.

In the face of this, it is not surprising that the British required the Dutch to secure from Kumasi confirmation of the fact that Elmina was not subject to the Asantehene before they would ratify the treaty of cession. Accordingly, a Mr. Kwasu Plange went to Kumasi and brought back the renunciation asked for, and though the validity of this document was not above suspicion, the forts were duly handed over to the British in April 1872. Dutch rule on the Gold Coast had thus ceased after having lasted for 27½ years.
At first it appeared that the transfer would cause no difficulty. Both Mr. John Pope-Hennessy, the new Governor-in-Chief\textsuperscript{131} and the outgoing Dutch Governor wrote to Kumasi to inform the Asantehene of the transfer of Elmina, and Mr. Pope-Hennessy promised to double the annual payment that the Dutch had been making for so long.\textsuperscript{132} Pope-Hennessy also reopened the roads to Asante which had been closed for several years and thus obligingly made it possible for the Asante to replenish their stocks of ammunition which had been exhausted by Adu Bofo's 1868-1869 campaign against the Krepi. A message came back from Kofi Karikari to the effect that the only question still outstanding was the ransom to be paid for the captive missionaries.\textsuperscript{133} Even in Elmina itself, the situation looked promising. Kobina Edjan\textsuperscript{134} had been deposed by the Dutch before the transfer had taken place and the African leaders themselves had publicly stated that they approved of the transfer to the British.\textsuperscript{135}

All was not as it seemed, however. The first sign of trouble appeared in Elmina where the deposition of the chief who had most violently opposed the British, Kobina Edjan, caused considerable unrest. A serious riot moved Mr. Pope-Hennessy to reinstate Kobina Edjan as chief of Elmina.\textsuperscript{136} This was an understandable but unwise move, for Kobina was just as strongly opposed as ever to accepting British rule and by returning him to power Pope-Hennessy had in effect re-established the Asante enclave in Fanti country.
Mr. Pope-Hennessy misjudged the Asante situation as badly as he had that in Elmina for the Asante were not nearly so quiescent as he believed. All possibility of war had not been disposed of by the promises made to the Asantehene on the occasion of the transfer and there were other matters besides that of the captive missionaries which rankled in the hearts of the Asante. Most of the grievances which led to the 1863-1864 conflict had not been redressed because the war was still technically in progress. These grievances were only further inflamed by the threatened loss of Elmina and the closing of the roads to Asante trade and the blockading of Elmina by the Fanti. Even in the face of these deep grievances, however, for a time it appeared that Mr. Pope-Hennessy’s re-opening of the roads and generally conciliatory approach might make a negotiated settlement possible. Unfortunately, this hope was dashed when the Asante made the absolutely unacceptable demand for the return to the Asantehene’s allegiance of all the tribes in the ’Protectorate’.

The Asante were thus determined on war and had already begun active campaigning as early as 1863 when Adu Bofo and Atjiampon began their operations. The question is, how did the British, who in 1865 had proclaimed that they would not in future fight an invading Asante force unless the forts were directly attacked, and who, as late as 1869 were saying that, ”they (the Africans of the coastal states) must rely on themselves for success in (their) wars, and that the British Government is unable
to make itself responsible for their defence in case they should prove unable to defend themselves',\textsuperscript{141} become so completely committed in the war which was about to break out? The answer is that they were finding the Gold Coast to be less of a burden and consequently they developed more interest in maintaining their influence there.

The British had been surprised and gratified by the manner in which the Gold Coast situation had been developing ever since the signing of the Anglo-Dutch exchange agreement of 1867. Disastrous as the exchange project had proved politically, even as early as 1866 it had been justified financially. By that time there had been a substantial increase in revenue,\textsuperscript{142} due to the imposition of the new customs duties authorized under the terms of the agreement. As their resources increased so did the confidence of the British authorities. At last they could hope to raise sufficient revenue locally to provide adequately for the defence and development of the 'Protectorate'. The situation was so improved that by 1871 the authorities were thinking seriously of attempting to re-establish their influence in the 'Protectorate' at its pre-1863 level.\textsuperscript{143} This new attitude of optimism and the growing readiness on the part of the British to resume a more active role in the affairs of the coastal states was exemplified by the manner in which the British officials in Africa and London treated the Fanti Confederation. Although the Fanti Confederation did not become a factor in Anglo-Asante relations, it is worth
briefly tracing its development and demise for what it reveals of the important change in British attitude which, in itself, was a major factor in the background to the 1873-1874 war.

In October 1871, an assembly at Nankessin, similar to the one of 1868, agreed to a constitution for the Fanti Confederation which had been effectively in existence ever since the war between Komenda and Elmina. Prompted by the repeated British pronouncements of their policy of non-involvement and non-extension, this assembly stated that the purpose of the Confederation was to provide an administration which would serve to unite the coastal states to fight Asante, and which would improve the country by providing roads and schools etc., and by developing its agricultural and mineral resources. Each of the thirty-three member states was to send two members—one chief and one educated African—to a central Assembly, a King-President was to be elected from among the chiefs, and, under a permanent central executive, there was to be a system of salaried magistrates and government agents in the provinces of the confederation.144

This attempt to combine traditional African ideas of government with those of the Europeans was largely the work of a group of educated Africans. And, although it was motivated by the apparent reluctance of the British authorities to provide the amenities which the people of the coastal states desired and to defend them against Asante, it was not anti-British in spirit.
Indeed, the authors of the constitution sought the recognition, advice and support of the British Government in order to make it work successfully. The British reaction to this request for help proved a rude shock to the Africans. At first the officials at Cape Coast actively opposed the scheme but as time passed, and other concerns occupied their time (i.e. the Elmina affair and the mounting tension with Asante), the British simply neglected to lend any support to the movement and it slowly but surely withered on the vine. The only evidence which appears to explain the British reason for this attitude is to be found in the Colonial Office despatch of 16th January 1872. This despatch criticizes the haste which led the promoters of the scheme to act upon it as a settled institution before submitting it to Mr. Salmon, the Acting Administrator. But its main criticism is that "some of the Articles in the Constitution of the Confederation were practically inconsistent with the jurisdiction of the British Government in the protected territory". Herein lies the official expression of the changed British attitude. In 1865, jurisdiction was clearly defined as being firmly restricted to the forts and the terms of the Bonds but less than seven years later the British were claiming the right to interfere in the political affairs of the coastal states.

Clearly, the only jurisdiction enjoyed by the British in territory outside of the forts was the restricted judicial authority of the British courts, which was exercised in accordance with
the Bonds of 1844 and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843. There were simply no grounds to support any claim to political authority. Despite this, however, and in the face of the recommendations of the 1865 Committee and of the despatch of 1865 from Cardwell to Conran and the despatch of 1869 from Granville to Kennedy, all of which stressed the avoidance of any real or apparent extension of British jurisdiction, there was a continuing drift on the part of the British officials serving on the coast to extend what amounted to a very tenuous British influence into an illegitimate jurisdiction over political affairs in the 'Protectorate'.

The failure to support the Fanti Confederation was only the most outstanding and most recent manifestation of this development. It is important because although the British were not yet aware of it, the renunciation of the Confederation effectively destroyed the only possible hope of the coastal tribes forming an effective protective alliance. Indeed, the British had ruled out the last opportunity for effective African co-operation against the Asante and they were soon to find that they had assumed the full responsibilities of a protecting power. Claridge comments on the resultant situation as follows:

This war was merely a continuation of that of 1863, which was now resumed because of the occupation of Elmina; but had the Dutch never left the Coast, or had the English declined to take Elmina, the invasion would have taken place just the same, if not at this particular time, then at
some future date. One of the principal objects of the English in acquiring Elmina and the other Dutch Settlements had been to put an end to the warfare on the Coast, but now the common fate of would-be peacemakers was theirs and they found themselves seriously involved.

No matter what its actual exciting causes were, this war was inevitable from the Ashanti's point of view, and it was equally inevitable from the point of view of the British Government... the mutual feelings of distrust that had grown up had put it outside the range of practical politics; while the conditions of life in Ashanti, the barbarous and despotic nature of its government, the enmity between its people and the British protected tribes, and the losses involved by the frequent quarrels and disputes consequent thereon, made some decisive measures necessary. The longer such measures were delayed and a weak and temporizing policy adopted, or any stronger policy was unbacked by the power to enforce compliance with legitimate demands, the greater the difficulties became and the more did the Ashants learn to despise the power of the English and have increased faith in their own supposed invincibility. So far had this process already gone, and so peculiar and difficult would have been the situation, even if a treaty could now have been made between two nations so widely separated in the scale of civilization, the more barbarous of which was locally the more powerful, that the definite conquest of Ashanti could no longer be deferred.
This comment is made with the benefit of hindsight, however, and the situation was not so clear-cut when the Asante army crossed the Pra in January 1873. In fact, the British were not overly concerned when they were first informed that the Asante army had invaded the 'Protectorate' for they felt that the coastal tribes would be able to handle the situation. Some months were to pass before the true situation was recognized and only then did they commit themselves to a full-scale war with the Asante.
CHAPTER II

STALEMATE

A number of authorities on the subject feel that the Asantehene was not in favour of an invasion at the end of 1872.\(^1\) They generally agree that Kofi Karikari, despite the clamouring for war on the part of a number of his chiefs, wished to make good most of the losses suffered by Adu Bofo during the Krepi campaign before making any move against the south. However, the transfer of Elmina brought matters to a head much more quickly than Kofi Karikari had anticipated. Fuller maintains that largely as a result of the Elmina affair, the invasion was decided upon at a meeting held by the Asantehene on the 22nd of October, 1873.\(^2\) At that meeting the majority of the major chiefs voted in favour of an invasion and, in accordance with the terms of the Asante 'Constitution', the whole of the Council and the Asantehene then vowed unanimously to fully support the march to the coast.\(^3\)

The plan of attack was based on the classic three-pronged pattern established on previous occasions. Adu Bofo was given command of a force of some four to five thousand men whose mission it was to secure the right flank by overrunning Denkyera and Wassaw. Kofi Bentuo, the Chief of Narawere, was assigned to the left flank where he and his small force of two or three thousand men were to hold the Akins in check. With the flanks thus
secured, the main body—a division of some fifteen to twenty thousand warriors directly under the command of the Supreme Commander, Amankwa Tia, Chief of Bantame—was to advance due south along the Prasu-Cape Coast road. His mission was two-fold. He was not only to re-establish Asante suzerainty over the coastal states which had been lost by virtue of the Treaty of 1831, but he was also to either bring the English to terms or expel them from the coast.4

Adu Bofo's division marched first. Following the Mansu-Inkwanta road, this force crossed the Ofin into Sefwi and marched on Wiosu. From Wiosu it bore south and after several brief and successful encounters, concentrated in the region of Apollonia.5 The army's right flank had therefore been rather easily secured. Such was not the case on the left flank. Due to the slow concentration of some levies, Kofi Bentuo's division did not move until some seven weeks after Adu Bofo's departure and Fuller reports that he was recalled even before he had entered Akim Territory. The Asantehene had heard "that the Denkeras had hidden their heirlooms in a forest called Yinabafora, close to Imbraim, and sent Bentuo to recover them."6 As a result, Kofi Bentuo's mission was never accomplished because before he could be diverted from his 'treasure hunt', disaster had struck the main army under Amankwa Tia.
At the time of Kofi Bentuo's recall, however, there were no indications that the eastward thrust could not be carried out once the Kenkyera treasure had been recovered. Indeed, during the initial stages of Amankwa Tia's campaign, there was some justification for believing that the eastern operation might be quite safely cancelled entirely. When this powerful center division left Kumasi just one week after Adu Bofo's departure, it gave every impression of being invincible. And its early operations lived up to the promise of that early impression.

Amankwa Tia's division began crossing the Pra at Atasi on the 22nd of January 1873 and five days of continuous ferrying were required before the army was finally concentrated on the south bank of the Pra. The southward drive thus began on the 28th of January when the Asantes first plundered and burned several Assin villages and engaged in a minor skirmish against a body of some one thousand Assins. In this action one Asante prisoner was taken and two more were killed. The prisoner was killed and all three heads were sent to King Anfoo Otoo at Abrakrampa as proof of the actuality of the invasion. It was from King Anfoo's letter reporting his information and a message from Chibu the King of Assin, both of which reached Cape Coast on the 31st of January, that the Government first learned of the invasion.
Colonel Harley, the Gold Coast Administrator, was actually conducting negotiations for the release of the European Missionaries when he received word of the invasion and he was caught completely off guard. In reporting the invasion to the Administrator-in-Chief at Sierra Leone, Mr. Pope-Hennessy, he clearly expressed his shock and bewilderment when he said:

"I need scarcely convey to your Excellency the profound astonishment with which I have received these tidings, as nothing but the most amicable relations have existed between this Government and Ashantee for some time, and assurances of lasting peace and goodwill have been sent down by the king ever since my assumption of the Government."

Harley also expressed annoyance at what he viewed as Asante treachery in attacking without provocation while envoys were actually at Cape Coast conducting negotiations for the removal of the "last cause for conflict between (the British) and the Ashantees." Despite his surprise and chagrin, however, Harley was destined to move quickly and positively to confirm the fact of the invasion and take measures to counter it.

Mr. Hennessy, who had been Administrator-in-Chief for barely eight months, received Colonel Harley's despatch on the 8th of February and his reaction verged on the hysterical. No doubt this was due in large part to the fact that should the invasion be serious, Hennessy's diplomacy on the Gold Coast would be entirely discredited. As a consequence, he maintained until
the day he left West Africa that the conflict was a localized "border skirmish." His despatches to the Colonel Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley, and his directives to Colonel Harley, consistently repeated this theme while advising and ordering that the Ashanti had to be dealt with carefully to avoid expanding the conflict. He continually blamed Colonel Harley for the difficulties and the senior naval officer on the coast, Commodore Commerell, R.N., as well as some functionaries at Cape Coast supported him both in his view of the invasion and his condemnation of the Administrator. His despatch to Lord Kimberley on the 13th of February contains three paragraphs which clearly illustrate his position. He wrote:

4. At the same time, the Commodore (Commerell) appeared to think the affair was much exaggerated.

5. From what he saw at Sekondi, he believed the disturbances there were the result of the Administrator's speech at Elmina about the native customs.

7. All the private correspondence I have seen from the Coast confirms this view; and it is in entire accord with my own opinion. 17

Mr. Hennessy's opinion notwithstanding, Colonel Harley immediately began to take measures to counter what he viewed as a serious threat to the 'Protectorate' and thus the Anglo-Asante War of 1873-1874 was well and truly under way. The subsequent campaign falls into three distinct phases. The first phase covers the period from 1 February, 1873 until the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley in September 1873. Phase two begins with
Wolseley's arrival on the Gold Coast and ends with the completion of the Asante withdrawal across the Pra River late in November 1873. The third phase involves the preparation for and execution of the successful British invasion of Asante territory, the subsequent withdrawal from Kumasi and the evacuation of the European troops from the Gold Coast in February 1874.

Phase one was dominated by Colonel Harley's attempts to cope with four basic problems. In the first place, he had to clearly and firmly define British policy for the benefit of the chiefs in the 'Protectorate'. He then had to ensure the security of the forts scattered along the coastline. Thirdly, he had to encourage and support the tribesmen of the 'Protectorate' in their efforts to halt the Asante invasion. Finally, some means had to be found to deal with the difficulties presented by Elmina and all of the other settlements which had previously been under Dutch control, many of which sympathized with the Asantes.

The first statement on British policy was given on the 30th of January when Colonel Harley responded to King Anfoo Otoo's notification of the Asante invasion. The Administrator first expressed his strong doubts over the possibility of a massive invasion but then went on to clearly intimate what the British attitude would be should an invasion prove to have taken place. He wrote:
You and the other kings of the Protectorate may rely upon the Government giving you assistance in arms and ammunition, in the event of your being attacked; but you must bear in mind that it is alike your interest and duty to defend your own frontiers, and that nothing but an united and decided system of defence, which the kings should all agree upon, is likely to render your efforts successful in resisting and overcoming your enemy. 18

One day later, the Administrator received sufficient evidence to shatter his somewhat complacent attitude. He responded by immediately convening his Legislative Council. 19 After due deliberation, the Council agreed unanimously that all future actions of the Administrator and the Council would be guided and controlled by the instructions issued on 23 June, 1864, by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Cardwell. 20 The most important portion of those instructions stated that:

... the proper course, therefore, is to take every possible means for bringing the chiefs to a united and decided system of defence, and for this purpose to give them advice, to supply them judiciously with military stores, and, in concert with the officer commanding the forces, to furnish them with assistance as he may be able to afford, without exposing his officers and men to any protracted residence in the interior, especially at the unhealthy season, and without weakening his force upon the Coast, so as to endanger the safety of the Settlements themselves. 21

The essence of these instructions was included in a Proclamation issued by the Legislative Council on the 31st of January and was immediately distributed throughout the 'Protectorate'.

Colonel Harley was firmly supported in this action by both Mr. Hennessy and the Colonial Secretary himself, Lord Kimberley. Indeed, Mr. Hennessy was most anxious that this policy should be pursued because of his firm conviction that this was only a border dispute of minor import. In passing Harley's reports on to Kimberley, he stated most forcefully that any direct British involvement would serve only to inflame the Asantehene and precipitate a full-scale invasion of the 'Protectorate' and that the continuation of the policy of non-involvement was the only course to be adopted.

British policy was thus clearly stated from the very outset. Should any doubts have remained, however, Mr. R. W. Keate, Hennessy's replacement, removed them in a concise statement of policy which he communicated to Colonel Harley on the 18th of February. In this despatch he said:

I desire, however, especially to draw to your attention to a despatch from Sir Arthur Kennedy of the 8th June 1869, in which he transmitted to the other acting Administrator for his guidance a Despatch from the Secretary of State, dated the 17th May 1869, in which the principle is expressly laid down with respect to the Protectorate chiefs, that 'the wars in which they engage themselves are their wars, and not the wars of this country (Great Britain); that they must rely on themselves for success in their wars, and that the British Government is unable to make itself responsible for their defence in case they should prove unable to defend themselves.'
This approach was eventually to prove completely unworkable but some months were to pass before the British realized this. In the interim, Colonel Harley struggled—with what was, under the circumstances, a considerable degree of success—to deal with the three serious problems which still remained to face him. Indeed, upon investigating these problems one begins to realize how doubtful it is, under the circumstances prevailing in early 1873, that the situation during this early phase of the war would have developed any differently even had the British adopted a policy of direct intervention. No matter what policy they might have chosen, the British were simply not capable of doing much more than they actually did during the early months of the war.

In keeping with an informal but time-honoured tradition, the "Ashantis had caught the Government in its habitual state of unpreparedness."26 In the entire territory there were only 178 officers and men available for field duty and even this small force was spread out in 'penny packets' as garrisons at Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Secondee, Axim and Elmina. There were some serviceable field-artillery pieces available but they were virtually useless due to the absence of trained gun crews and a lack of ammunition. Even rockets, the most portable and easily utilized form of artillery, were in exceedingly short supply. There were only 48 on the entire coast. Even more serious, however, was the shortage of personal weapons. The stores at Cape Coast
Castle contained only 380 flint-lock muskets and 190 muzzle-loading (M.L.) Enfield rifles. Fortunately, there was a reasonably large quantity of gunpowder, M.L. cartridges and lead with which to supply those tribesmen in the 'Protectorate' who already possessed their own firearms.²⁷

These appalling shortages and the lack of support from Hennessy and Commerell notwithstanding, Colonel Harley was faced with the monumental task of having to devise some method whereby he could defend the forts and still give aid to the 'Protectorate' chiefs. Undaunted, the Administrator threw himself into the task and had soon devised a simple three-phase plan which utilized the meagre supplies available to their best advantage while adhering to the limitations placed on his freedom of action by the announced British policy.

The first step was to carry out a reconnaissance in order to define the scope and intent of the invasion and in order to assess the spirit of the tribes in the 'Protectorate'. On the basis of the information collected, the decision would be made as to what supplies of arms and ammunition could be spared for issue to the tribes. Accordingly, the proclamation issued by the Legislative Council at its meeting on the 31st of January, 1873 was delivered to the chiefs by Dr. Rowe, the colonial surgeon,²⁸ who was sent to them as a special commissioner. The proclamation exhorted the tribes to unite and face the invader and Rowe was
directed to encourage the chiefs as strongly as possible while attempting to assess their spirit of determination. 29

Dr. Rowe reported rather favourably on the attitude prevailing among the chiefs 30 and Colonel Harley was impressed with what he viewed as a spirit of enthusiasm pervading all classes of the Africans. The spirit of Cape Coast was exemplified by the prompt offer of their services by the 250 members of the Cape Coast Volunteers 31 and in the interior, the Kings of Abrah, Anambo, Mankessim and Assin all declared their intention to fight and requested assistance in the form of arms and ammunition. In fact, the response was so good that the Administrator estimated that there would be "upwards of 60,000 men in the Protectorate... more or less actively engaged in the coming struggle, and who (were) all prepared to demand Government aid." 32 Certainly this estimate appeared to be well justified when just one of the Chiefs, Chief Bentill of Mumford offered to turn out 20,000 men. 33 This highly encouraging picture led Colonel Harley to issue his small stock of arms and ammunition to the existing tribal forces in limited but—by European standards 34--adequate quantities so that he would be able to supply the expected new levies as they came into service.
The second phase of the Administrator's plan was to provide some concrete yet qualified proof of the British intention to support the tribal allies. To achieve this, the Legislative Council agreed that the available detachment of 50 Hausa Police be sent to Dunkwa. However, while taking this action, the Council made it clear that the aim of the move was not to provide a force to stand and fight the Asante invaders. In his letter to Dr. Rowe, Colonel Harley asked him to make it clear to the chiefs that his "object in sending fifty armed police (Hausas) to Dunquah is not in any way to be regarded as more than a demonstration in favour of the Protectorate, and my desire to have the law enforced against marauders and plunderers if they can be taken, but they will, as a matter of course, defend themselves in case of attack. Should, however, there be any chance of their being outnumbered and attacked by such a force as they are not strong enough to repel, they will at once fall back on Cape Coast Castle".

The plan's third phase called for a general strengthening of the British position on the coast. Consequently, the Administrator requested aid from Sierra Leone in an attempt to build up his garrison and replenish his general stores and magazine. He recommended to Mr. Hennessy that 300 of the new breech-loading (B.L.) Snider rifles be sent to the Gold Coast for the purpose of re-arming the Hausas. He would then be enabled to arm the
Cape Coast Volunteers with the M.L. Enfields thus released. Reinforcements of at least company strength were also requested so that the forts could be completely garrisoned with regular troops of the Second West India Regiment (2 WIR). This move was intended to both strengthen the garrison and release the entire Hausa force for duty as a form of reserve. Finally, he asked for officers to command the various outposts. He specifically requested the services of a Lieutenant Hopkins, 2 WIR, to take charge of the Hausas. Thus realistic and positive steps were planned by Colonel Harley. Unfortunately, however, his plan was somewhat frustrated from the very outset.

Although immediate arrangements were made to provide for the granting of these requests, Mr. Hennessy was loath to authorize the shipment of the men and supplies concerned. He stubbornly clung to the idea that the whole affair was being greatly exaggerated. He continually and vehemently denounced Colonel Harley and used every scrap of evidence he could gather to discredit the Gold Coast Administrator. His vendetta had gone so far by the middle of February that he was actually prepared to relieve Colonel Harley of his duties. He was frustrated in this attempt, however, by the timely and fortunate arrival of his own replacement, Mr. R. Keate.
On his arrival at Sierra Leone, Governor Keate found the situation so confused that he sent only the arms and ammunition to the Gold Coast while retaining the troop reinforcements in Sierra Leone. He decided to hold the reinforcements and proceed to the Gold Coast with Mr. Loggie, the Inspector-General of Police, in an attempt to clarify the situation and ascertain whether or not the troops were really needed.

The Governor and the consignment of arms and ammunition arrived at Cape Coast Castle on the 7th of March and although he died within ten days of his arrival, Governor Keate was able to write two despatches which were to be of considerable importance.

The first of these despatches was of great importance in London as it clearly stated the extent of the Asante menace and the policy which was to be pursued by the Gold Coast officials in the face of that menace. The Governor stated that since he had become better acquainted with the facts, he could not but concur in the opinion expressed by all people of consequence on the Gold Coast that the invasion was the most serious of any that had ever been made into the 'Protectorate'. He further commented that the policy being pursued was completely in line with past instructions which required that the British Government should in no case become a principal in repelling attacks upon the natives of the 'Protectorate'. The second despatch, which reported an Asante victory at Yankumasi Fanti, was of vital importance to Colonel Harley's plans because it authorized the movement of the 100-man
reinforcement company of 2 WIR troops, who had been on standby at Sierra Leone, to the Gold Coast.\(^4^4\) These additional troops arrived at Cape Coast Castle on the 20th of March, and proved to be but the first instalment in a steadily growing flood of supplies.

The series of despatches received in London up to the 10th of March had been causing increasing concern on the part of the Gladstone Government. Indeed, by the 20th of March the Colonial Office was so convinced of the seriousness of the situation that it issued a memorandum to the War Office which made reference to the fact that "the invasion of the protected territory by the Ashantee may be prolonged and there may be some difficulty in holding the forts in British occupation."\(^4^5\) Nevertheless, the Government was firmly opposed to the idea of sending an expeditionary force to the Gold Coast.\(^4^6\) Under such circumstances, the only alternative action was to adhere to the existing policy and attempt to ensure the continued operation of the allied armies by providing sufficient quantities of arms and ammunition to keep them in the field.

This the Government resolved to do and the War Office decided on the 20th of March to ship certain munitions to the Gold Coast. The Government's understanding of the urgency of the matter is exemplified by the fact that a special train was made up to carry the consignment to the docks so as to ensure that the
shipment was delivered with the least possible delay. As a result, 700 M.L. Enfield rifles and 210,000 rounds of ball ammunition arrived at Cape Coast Castle on the 7th of April. From this point onward, the provision of supplies for the Gold Coast never posed a serious problem even though the officials on the Gold Coast did not become aware of these developments until the arms and supplies actually began arriving.

As only the supplies and reinforcements requested from Sierra Leone had been vital to Colonel Harley's plan, their arrival, combined with the apparently successful call for a united effort on the part of the tribes of the 'Protectorate' should have signalled the beginning of success for the British plan. Unfortunately, such was not to be the case for the very premise upon which the British had based their policy—the ability of the Fanti to unite effectively in the face of the Asante threat—proved to be fallacious. Thus, with but one exception, the pattern of the earlier invasions was once more to be repeated. In the coming campaign the enemy would be able to engage and defeat the several tribes one after the other, driving before them the fugitives from the first battles to demoralize those whom they had next to encounter.

There were three basic reasons for the lack of Fanti unity. First, the Fanti were traditionally a divided people who continually quarreled amongst themselves and whose quarrels had
become especially divisive as a result of the Anglo-Dutch agreement on the cession of the Dutch forts. Second, the tactics traditionally used by the Fanti were not designed for offensive action and they were not conducive to the formation of a large army fighting for broad strategic goals. Third, the British, by virtue of their Gold Coast policy, had not only undermined the one recent attempt made by the Fanti to unify themselves, but had also placed Colonel Harley in the position where not even he could supply the degree of support and leadership necessary to effectively unite the tribesmen. This third factor has already been discussed at some length but the others have not. It is therefore necessary to briefly review the first and second factors at this point.

It is known that the Fanti settled in the region of Mankessim near the end of the fifteenth century and that between about 1660 and 1690, partly because of population pressure, partly with a view to establishing a tighter control over the increasingly lucrative trade between the Europeans and the interior peoples, and partly because of political rivalry, the different clans began to move out to carve out kingdoms for themselves in regions formerly occupied by the Etsii. Each of the states thus formed considered itself independent, though it did in theory recognize the Braffo of Mankessim as its supreme head. Thus even though, by the end of the third decade of the eighteenth century, the Fanti had expanded from the interior and occupied or estab-
lished their control over the whole coast stretching from the mouth of the Pra in the west to the borders of the Ga kingdom in the east, there was no unified Fanti state. Each small Oman jealously guarded its independence and conflicts between the various Fanti kingdoms were relatively common. There was therefore a strong climate of mutual suspicion among the Fanti and it required an exceptionally serious external threat to bring them into alliance.\(^5\)

This situation was exacerbated by the Anglo-Dutch rivalry on the Coast. This rivalry had transmitted itself to the coastal tribesmen with the result being that their natural antagonism became intensified. In fact, during the spring of 1873, most of the quarrels that led the people to fight amongst themselves rather than marching to oppose the advancing Asante, were the result of disputes between those who had always been under British protection and those who had until very recently been associated with the Dutch. These disputes, two examples of which were the riots at Sekondi and Butri during the middle of January, comprised Colonel Harley's fourth problem. However, although these quarrels and others like them were to be a constant source of worry to the British, they never achieved the degree of seriousness reached by the threat posed by King Kobina Edjan and his adherents at Elmina.
While investigating various disturbances at Sekondi and Butri, the British officials found that Kobina Edjan was exercising a powerful influence over the chiefs of many of the towns that had formerly been under Dutch influence, and was, in fact, encouraging a spirit of disaffection with British rule. His object was apparently to carry out the original scheme for which Atjiempon had been sent to Elmina—a general rising of the western tribes led by the Elminas as soon as the Asante army reached the neighbourhood of the coast towns. By the first week of March, his conduct had become so suspicious that Colonel Harley decided to test his loyalty. To accomplish this, a meeting was held in Elmina Castle on the 11th of March. All of the Chiefs attended, the oath of allegiance was read and interpreted, and Kobina Edjan was then called upon to set an example to his Chiefs by being first to sign it. This he flatly refused to do as did two other Chiefs, Kwamin Ekum and Tando Mensa. All three men were therefore arrested and sent to Cape Coast where they were imprisoned in the Castle and from whence they were subsequently deported to Sierra Leone. The British had no time to celebrate their apparent defusing of the Elmina affair, however, for even before the three Chiefs had been arrested, news was received of yet another Asante victory.
The second factor which mitigated against the effective unification of the Fanti warriors—their traditional military organization and tactics—was never fully understood by the British and it was for this reason more than any other that the Fanti reputation for cowardice gained credence. The British did understand that every Fanti village and town had its own warrior organization, the Asafo. They also knew that in times of emergency, the Asafo of each state came together under a commander-in-chief known as the Sahin, and formed a well-organized field army within which each Asafo had a specific function. What the British did not realize, however, was that the Asafo were organized for the purpose of defending their homes; not for aggressive purposes. Neither did they realize that even though the various Asafo might be involved in operations as part of a Fanti-wide army under the command of a Sahin, their primary responsibility was to their home-village or town. It was not appreciated, therefore, that the Asafo would leave the field if their homes were threatened regardless of the consequences to the Fanti as a whole. Thus it was possible for a sizeable Fanti army to disintegrate in the face of a determined enemy attack more as a result of this circumstance rather than as a result of a complete lack of courage.
This is not to say that fear played no part in the Fanti reluctance to attack Amankwa Tia and in the subsequent disintegration of the Fanti army. Indeed, the Fanti had every reason to be afraid of the Asante who had successfully invaded and laid waste large portions of the 'Protectorate' on previous occasions. The Asante reputation for invincibility which had arisen as a result of these previous invasions no doubt had a strong effect on Fanti morale and was, in part, responsible for the slowness of the Fanti response to Colonel Harley's call to arms and for their poor showing subsequent to the battle of Dunkwa. The intention of this brief review of the traditional Fanti military organization is not to discount completely the British claims of Fanti cowardice. Rather it is intended to show that there was an inherent weakness in the Fanti military organization which contributed equally to the difficulties encountered in attempting to organize a united Fanti resistance to the invasion.

Traditional Fanti divisions, the inherent weakness in the Fanti military organization, and the debilitating effects of British policy on the Gold Coast were all eventually to interact in various subtle ways to bring about the collapse of Fanti resistance. Initially, however, the overall effect was simply to retard the assembly of the Fanti army. Therefore, although the Assins had collected at Yankumasi Assin by the 7th of February, they were not strong enough to check the Asante advance unaided.
However, as the Fanti Sahin, Chief Bentil of Mumford, had settled on Yankumasi Fanti as the place to make a stand, that aid was not forthcoming. As a result, the Assins were left alone to face the enemy and when Amankwa Tia attacked on the 9th of February, the Assins were defeated and driven back while the Asante army occupied Yankumasi Assin.56

After their defeat at Yankumasi Assin, the Assins had retired to Mansu, a distance of some twenty miles, where they were joined by a small force under the King of Abrah. The bulk of the tribes were slowly concentrating around Dunkwa, however, and under gradually increasing Asante pressure, the tribesmen at Mansu moved back to Yankumasi Fanti.57 Colonel Harley was by this time becoming thoroughly alarmed over the discord among the tribes and over the fact that the Fantis were not advancing to meet the enemy. As a result, he adopted two measures in a desperate attempt to stiffen the Fanti resistance. He despatched Lieutenant Hopkins with 100 Hausas who had recently arrived from Lagos,58 to join the 50 man detachment already at Dunkwa. Lieutenant Hopkins was ordered to act in the way he might deem best, with the view of giving every moral aid to the Assins and Fantis in resisting the progress of the enemy. He was also directed, should he find himself in a position to do so, to aid the Assins in driving the Asantes beyond Mansu and holding that place. However, he was ordered not to employ the Hausas in any way so as to endanger their safe and direct concentration at Cape Coast in
case the Asantes should make a further advance beyond Dunkwa. Clearly, the important object of his command was to cover Cape Coast from any sudden attack. In addition to this first measure, Colonel Harley sent Mr. Thompson, a Government interpreter, to rouse the Fantis to action. After completing his tour, Mr. Thompson reported that, in his opinion, they were determined to unite and drive the Asantes away, but that "delay was the evil: they would not go to fight and drive the king away; they said, let him come and we will fight him." Of course this was the normal tactic adopted by the Fantis but the British failed to appreciate the fact and the view that the tribesmen of the coast were cowards began to gain credence from this point on.

Lieutenant Hopkins moved his Hausas from Dunkwa to Yankumasi Fanti on the 1st of March. On his arrival there, he assembled the kings and chiefs and managed to get them working with a will to form an extensive camp on the right and left of the road, in advance of the village. Even so, he was unable to inspire them to take the initiative and go out in search of the enemy. Eventually, however, very early on the 10th of March, a small part of the Fanti army did finally advance in search of the Asante force but it soon gave up the effort and returned to the allied lines just as the camp was beginning to stir. At that very moment the main body of the Asante army fell upon them. Caught completely by surprise, all of the tribes except the
Assins and Derkyeras cut and ran and, after a short fight, these also retired. As a consequence, Lieutenant Hopkins, considering that his special duty was to cover and protect Cape Coast from any sudden attack, fell back on Cape Coast.62

Fortunately, Amanwho Tia did not exploit this success and the retreating allies were able to regroup at Dunkwa. Within a very few days, approximately 25,000 tribesmen were concentrated around this small village and they immediately began to call on the Government for a resupply of ammunition and to complain bitterly over the withdrawal of the Hausas in the previous battle. Their uncontrolled expenditure of ammunition made it almost impossible for Colonel Harley to keep them sufficiently supplied and as the first supply of arms and ammunition had not yet arrived from Great Britain he finally had to buy from private merchants to meet the huge demand, for the Imperial magazine was almost empty. He also sent the Hausas and Cape Coast Volunteers back to Dunkwa under the command of Lieutenant Hopkins but, as he rightly believed that his first objective was to ensure the safety of the forts, he made no change in the previous orders he had given to Hopkins with regard to the priority of tasks to be assigned to his command.63

By the 1st of April, therefore, the situation appeared to be stabilizing. The British position had been clearly defined and the security of the forts was reasonably assured. The arrival
of the reinforcing 2 WIR troops from Sierra Leone and the 100 additional Hausas from Lagos had made it possible to put a respectably sized contingent of Hausas in the field in support of the African allies. The allies themselves were beginning to gather in considerable numbers around Dunkwa. And four ships of war were anchored in the road of Cape Coast Castle. It should therefore not be surprising that the arrival on the 7th of April of the large special consignment of arms and ammunition which had been shipped from London on the 21st of March, should lead Colonel Harley to comment on what he viewed as a "feeling of complete security (at Cape Coast) and along the Coast".

Despite the fact that he professed a "complete feeling of security," one should not feel that Colonel Harley was blind to the problem he faced with respect to the African allies in the 'Protectorate'. As early as the 15th of March he was beginning to realize that the continued adherence to pursuit of the policies laid down in 1864 and 1869 was not necessarily practicable. In a despatch written on that day he wrote,

7. The tribes of the Protectorate are now assembling at Dunquah, and I have issued a fresh supply of ammunition. . . . It is difficult to resist the demands which are made as a right, not as a favour, on the part of the native kings and chiefs for munitions of war, men, and money, as they state that they are and have been loyal subjects of the Queen, and as such should receive protection. I confess that the position is one of some embarrassment; for, while on the one hand the instructions of the Secretary of State ('vide' Despatch of
the 23rd June 1864) are definite and specific as to the extent of the assistance to be given to the tribes of the Protectorate upon such an emergency rising as the present, it is difficult to find that these instructions have been impressed or even communicated to the people after the close of the war of 1864; so that ten years of an indolent ease has been allowed to pass without the tribes taking any active measures, so far as I can ascertain, for their defence. Indeed, the fact declares itself openly, as they are as helpless now as they were found to be in 1863, when the Ashantees invaded the Protectorate.

There can be no doubt that they require leaders capable of directing them, and, above all, staying for the present the angry and bitter jealousies which exist among them, so as to present an united and decided course of action.66

Colonel Harley's dissatisfaction was echoed by Lieutenant Hopkins. Upon his return to Dunkwa, Hopkins once more tried to imbue the tribesmen with some aggressive spirit. However, he again encountered the old difficulty of stirring the native chiefs to take the initiative. In fact, he was hardly able to get them to complete the minimum works required for defensive operations let alone achieving any progress towards the adoption of any offensive measures. The bush was cleared in the area selected for the battle line67 but despite promises made on the 4th and 5th of April, no advance was made against the Asantes. In attempting to overcome this reluctance to take the initiative, Hopkins even went so far as to take his Hausas and Cape Coast Volunteers to the front as if to attack the enemy without waiting for the allies.68 Even this strategem failed and by the 8th of April,
Colonel Harley wrote that the allies simply could not be induced to attack and that their whole conduct might be summed up in the Spanish phrase 'Manana'. Even so, the Administrator was not overly discouraged for he believed that though they could not be induced to attack, the Fantis were in good spirits and he had every confidence that they would fight vigorously in defence of their country if they were themselves attacked. 69

The Administrator's confidence was only partially vindicated. At the very time he was writing, the Asantes were taking the initiative and were themselves attacking the Fantis. About seven o'clock on the morning of the 8th of April they attacked the Fanti camp along its whole front. On this first day of the battle, however, the Fantis held their position at every point and fought the Asantes to a standstill, thus following their normal procedure and proving their ability to fight a defensive battle.

Immediately on receiving word of the battle, Colonel Harley sent forward a large supply of ammunition, and, even more important, he despatched a supply of Hale's rockets and an experienced artillery officer, Mr. Loggie, 70 to the battlefield. The ammunition was delivered and Mr. Loggie was in position before dawn on the 9th of April and as soon as it was light enough, Lieutenant Hopkins urged the people to follow up their success of the previous day. His exhortations were to no avail for they would
not advance but rather were resolved to await another attack.\textsuperscript{71} As a result, aside from some considerable excitement within the Fanti camp itself on the 13th of April,\textsuperscript{72} nothing happened until the 14th of April.

At eight o’clock on the morning of the 14th the Asantes renewed their attack on the Fanti camp along its entire length and although the battle raged for some eleven hours no decisive result was achieved. The Fanti troops fought a good defensive battle even though numbers of tribesmen, particularly the Cape Coast people, had proven most unreliable. The rockets had also proven particularly effective in halting the Asante attack. In fact, the determined stand of the allies throughout the two battles, combined with the destruction wrought by the rockets, had caused Amankwa Tia to give up the attempt to force the Cape Coast road and he began to withdraw from the field during the early hours of the 15th. The Fantis were not aware of this, however, and at the very moment when the Asantes were beginning their withdrawal, the Fantis began to retreat ‘en masse’ toward Cape Coast. Lieutenant Hopkins and the ubiquitous Dr. Rowe tried their best to turn them around but their efforts were in vain and before long the whole of the tribes were in full retreat to the coast. Lieutenant Hopkins then had no choice but to withdraw his command to Cape Coast Castle. Amankwa Tia received news of what was happening just after he had begun to move northward. He promptly turned his army about and occupied Dunkwa.\textsuperscript{73} As a result
of this reverse, Colonel Harley was forced to report to Lord Kimberley in the following vein:

2. I regret to have to inform your Lordship that for the present, defensive operations on a large and combined scale are at an end, as the Fantees have dispersed to their homes, and, I fear, are sadly demoralized; . . . .

This break-up of the whole of the Fanti army caused considerable apprehension and confusion at Cape Coast. The Administrator requested the senior naval officer, Commander Stubbs, R.N., to send a gunboat immediately to Elmina as he realized that both Elmina and Cape Coast Castle were now uncovered and in danger of suffering an Asante attack. These were the only extra precautions taken though, for the Administrator felt that the forts were adequately garrisoned and that the navy could provide sufficient supporting gunfire in the event of an attack. His main concern was over the condition of the African allies. He seriously considered the formation of yet another war camp but Dr. Rowe advised him that it would be impossible to unite the whole of the Fanti tribes in one camp until after the close of the rainy season. As an alternative, he suggested that something might well be done to unite those who were near to each other, or whose interests were especially common, in larger bands than they would otherwise form. Such smaller units could possibly prevent the ravages of small bands of Asante plunderers even though they could not prevent the approach of the Asante army.
In the face of the difficulties which existed, the Administrator once more took steps to prepare some form of defensive system with the materials at hand. Measures were taken to implement Dr. Rowe’s suggestion for the formation of small camps. Mr. Loggie, with sixty Hausas, was sent to Annamaboe to form the nucleus around which the Annamaboes, Cormantines, Saltponds, and Winnebahs could be induced to rally. The Assins, Abrahs, and Akims collected in small numbers at Assayboo, and the Cape Coast people promised to join them. Around Elmina was drawn a cordon of lesser chiefs, who promised to oppose any advance on the part of the Asantes and the King of Commandah promised to resist the enemy should he advance in his direction. 77 With this, Colonel Harley had to be content.

These new efforts say much for the flexibility and ingenuity of the Administrator and the other officials on the Gold Coast but as matters developed, neither the fruit of their labours among the allies nor the forts were put to the test. Amankwa Tia had suffered heavily at Dunkwa, as his initial withdrawal from the field indicates, and, if he was to achieve his aim, he would require both resupply and reinforcement. 78 As a result, he failed to drive for the coast in an effort to exploit his somewhat marginal victory. Instead, he concentrated his army at Dunkwa and within days of their settling in the camp built by the allies, his troops were in wretched physical and psychological condition. Relying on the evidence given by several Asante prisoners cap-
tured on the 23rd of April, Captain L.L. Brett, 2WIR, the Officer Commanding the Troops, Gold Coast, commented on the state of the Asante encampment as follows:

... in those two engagements (the 8th and 14th of April) they suffered most severely, and especially from the Hale's rockets served by the Hausas.

They are now in possession of the late Fantee camp, but, not finding an enemy, they imagine the Fantees have gone around them; they are now afraid either to advance or retire, not knowing in the bush when they may meet the Fantees.

The Ashantee camp is in a most wretched condition, a large quantity of them suffering from wounds and fractures.

Small-pox has broken out dreadfully amongst them. They are starving; a plantain, the price of which is usually about 2d. a dozen, now selling for the same sum each plantain; and besides there is an abominable stench from dead bodies scattered through the bush in all stages of decomposition.79

In spite of this report, one must not jump to the conclusion that the position of the Asante army was hopeless. So fertile was the country,80 and so scattered their Fanti opponents, that they were able to remain in the Fanti country for another six months. As one camp became denuded of provisions, they simply moved to another and extended the range of their foragers. Amankwa Tia was clearly following this age-old tactic when he broke camp at Dunkwa near the end of May and, as he hoped to carry out his orders to punish the King of Denkyera and to effect a juncture with Adu Bofo's force, began slowly moving his army
eastward toward the Denkyera town of Jukwa. 81

In the face of this new threat, the Denkyeras immediately asked the British for assistance in arms and ammunition. 82 These were supplied and Dr. Rowe tried once again to induce the allies to reassemble and make yet another stand. However, the Fantis clung to their traditional military organization and plan. On every side he encountered a firm resolve on the part of each chief to defend only his own home 83 for the complete lack of any reliable intelligence as to the enemy movements had resulted in a veritable orgy of rumours which had the Asante army threatening every conceivable point at once. Under these conditions there was very little hope of organizing any united effort on the part of the tribes of the 'Protectorate'.

Eventually, however, a considerable force mustered at Abakrampa 84 and moved the eight miles to Jukwa at the end of the month of May. On the 3rd and 4th of June the Asantes attacked, but only some desultory fighting took place on the outskirts of the town. On the 5th, however, the Asantes attacked the place in force. They met with only the most feeble resistance. Indeed, the King of Denkyera himself fled from the field at the very beginning of the battle and thus set the example for the other tribesmen. The result was even worse than at Dunkwa. This time the Fanti army was finally crushed as an effective force and the tribesmen withdrew precipitately over the twelve
miles of bush trail to Cape Coast. These terror-stricken fugitives soon infected the entire countryside with panic and between 15,000 and 20,000 people were estimated to have sought the protection of the Castle guns within hours of the battle. Captain Reade described the resultant scene in the following terms:

It was a most piteous sight. Many were emaciated by famine or disease: some were carrying their aged parents on their backs, or leading the blind; the wayside was littered with corpses, with the dying, with women bringing forth children.\(^{85}\)

The panic became even worse when Amankwa Tia followed up his success at Jukwa by moving further south to Mampon and Efutu several days after the action of the 5th of June. He was now approximately ten miles from both Cape Coast Castle and Elmina and the only effective troops left to oppose him in the field were the two or three hundred Hausas and several hundred Cape Coast Volunteers.\(^{86}\)

At this critical moment news was received of trouble in the Western districts. Atjiempon had finally appeared in the neighbourhood of Elmina and the Asante sympathizers there had revolted. They openly joined the enemy and were soon busy supplying both Atjiempon and Amankwa Tia with food and water. British access to Elmina by road was cut off almost immediately and rumours were soon circulating to the effect that the Shamas and Elminas were preparing to attack Komenda.\(^{87}\)
The situation was extremely serious and on the 6th of June, Colonel Harley made a desperate effort to reverse the trend. He called a meeting of all the Kings and chiefs, from which the King of Anamabo was the only absentee, and proceeded to point out to them that their failure had been due to a lack of unity and that the reason for the Asante success had been their ability to act under one head. He suggested that the Fantis should follow the Asante example, elect one of their number as commander-in-chief, and form a new war-camp in a place of their choice in preparation for yet another confrontation with the Asante army.

In their reply to this suggestion, the Kings and chiefs firmly tossed the problem back to the Administrator. Their letter, which was published in the *West African Herald* on the 26th of June, stated that:

> They (the Kings and chiefs) do not feel able to take the management of affairs. It would be impossible for them to do so; nor could they elect one to be their Chief King; that power must come from the Governor... 

It therefore becomes clear that an impasse had been reached. Colonel Harley had obviously done all that could be done with the available resources if he was to adhere to the limits of British policy as expressed in his instructions from The Colonial Office. Conversely, the Fantis had also reached the limit of their resistance. No doubt the disputes between the "Dutch" and "English" factions along the coast-line did much to weaken the Fanti resistance but there were other factors which combined to
make it virtually impossible for the Fantis to unite and once more take the field as they had done at Dunkwa where they had been able to assemble a force of over 56,000 men.\textsuperscript{90}

One major factor was the effect of the high casualty rate during the battle of Dunkwa.\textsuperscript{91} Yet another was the demoralizing behaviour of the King of Denkyera during the battle of Jukwa. Of even greater importance than these two, was the withdrawal of the Asafo, after the battle of Dunkwa, so that they might assume their prime role as the defenders of their home-villages from the depredations of the invading Asantes. It was, however, quite possibly the increasing incidence of famine and sickness due to a combination of the growing pressure being exerted on the countryside within a fifteen-mile radius of Jukwa by Asante foraging parties and the unusually severe rains, which proved to be the major factor in preventing any further co-ordinated effort on the part of the Fantis.

In the end analysis, however, neither Colonel Harley's attempts to rally the tribesmen nor their inability to rally were to prove of any great significance. Decisions taken in England as soon as the disaster at Dunkwa became known, were destined to change the entire character of the conflict. In early May, Lord Kimberley decided that the forts were no doubt liable to be invested by the Asante army and although he felt that the existing forces were sufficient for a short siege, he believed that the
contingency of a prolonged attack against Elmina or the other forts had to be provided against.92

The Colonial Office and the War Office agreed that the situation warranted the immediate despatch of an additional warship; 110 officers and men of the Royal Marine Light Infantry (R.M.L.I.) and the Royal Marine Artillery (R.M.A.) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Festing, R.M.A.; as well as large additional quantities of ammunition and rockets and a portable field gun. At the same time it was decided that a reinforcement of four companies and a full regimental staff from the 2WIR would be transferred from the West Indies to the Gold Coast as quickly as possible.93

Providentially, the Royal Marine reinforcements and the munitions arrived just when they could be of the most practical and psychological value. H.M.S. Barracoota, with Captain Fremantle, R.N., in command, reached Cape Coast with the troops and supplies on the 8th of June. Twenty-four hours later the troops and supplies were ashore and were immediately being utilized in attempts to stabilize a situation which had been growing steadily worse in the wake of the debacle at Jukwa.94

Colonel Festing assumed responsibility for the defence of the forts and the coordination of any further military moves involving British troops and he began to plan operations almost immediately. On the 11th of June, he, Dr. Rowe and Captain
Fremantle carried out a reconnaissance of Elmina and confirmed that the inhabitants of the quarter formerly controlled by Kobina Edjan were supplying the Asante with stores of various description by way of Saltpond. This intelligence was transmitted to the Legislative Council on the 12th of June and the members of the Council decided both to proclaim martial law in the town of Elmina and those surrounding districts occupied by the Asante and to require the residents in those places to give up their arms.95

In order to ensure surprise, Colonel Festing took a 500 man force of Hausas, Marines, and 2WIR troops and marched for Elmina that same night. Supported by boats from five of the warships on the coast, he planned to enforce the proclamation in that center of disaffection. In the resultant action, the town of Elmina was bombarded by the ships and a body of some 2,000 Asantes was engaged immediately to the west of the town and defeated by the British troops. The British thought that they had successfully driven the enemy from the immediate vicinity and had begun to prepare their mid-day meal when a body of Asantes estimated at a strength of between 2,000 and 3,000 men suddenly began to advance on the loyal quarter from the north. Naval gunfire was used to support the British force and after a short engagement on an open plain to the north-west of the fort, the Asante were driven away at a cost of some 200 enemy killed as opposed to British losses of one killed and four wounded.96 The
expedition had been most successful because it not only neutralized the threat posed by Asante sympathizers in Elmina, but because it also effectively prevented any renewed attack on the forts by the Asantes.

Unfortunately, this success did little to brighten an otherwise gloomy picture. Thousands of refugees from all parts of the country, cowed and despondent after their defeat at the hands of the Asantes, had continued to descend on Cape Coast. They jammed into the already over-crowded town and many were forced to sleep in the streets. Food became increasingly scarce as supplies from the bush were cut off by the Asante forging parties operating in the triangle formed by Jukwa, Cape Coast and Elmina, and the terrified people refused to venture out of the town even to cut firewood. At this point the already heavy rains set in with unusual severity and there followed an almost continuous heavy downpour for several weeks. The resultant famine, sickness, exposure and regular outbreaks of panic at every rumour of an Asante advance, turned Cape Coast into an unbelievable center of filth, death and turmoil which the Administrator and his staff could do little to change.97

As one would expect, this depressing state of affairs was not restricted to the civil sphere. Largely because of the weather, the military situation was also rapidly deteriorating. Initially, the health of the troops had continued to be good de-
spite the weather but towards the end of June, sickness—particularly dysentery—began to break out among the marines and sailors. In fact, by the end of June, the troops available to the Administrator were in poor condition. Of the more than one hundred Marines at Elmina, just under one-half were on the sick-list. Of the 273 2WIR men stationed at the four major forts, only slightly over 200 were fit for service. The Hausas numbered 210 all ranks, of which 32 men were in hospital. The Cape Coast Volunteers could muster only 70 or 80 men at any given time. Admittedly there were approximately 400 marines and seamen of the fleet who could possibly be sent ashore in an emergency but by the 1st of July, the Officer Commanding the Troops on the Gold Coast would be hard pressed to raise a total of 1,000 men even with the aid of the men from the fleet.

Without doubt the British and their allies were in very poor condition but there was some consolation to be found in the knowledge that the enemy was no better off. The Asantes had remained encamped within approximately ten miles of Elmina at Mampon, Efutu and the surrounding villages, and though better off than the Fantis, they were in a bad enough plight themselves. As the British had no control over the Elmina hinterland, the Asantes had free access to all the farms located there and also drew supplies of food regularly from their sympathizers in Elmina; but even with those advantages, food was none too plentiful. In addition, the heavy rains, the swampy ground, the un-
sanitary conditions of their camps, the ravages of small-pox and dysentery, and the destructive effects of the idleness of camp life on men who valued their family life but were far from home, all combined to dishearten them and make them thoroughly miserable. The state of their morale was indicated by the increasing numbers of deserters who were giving themselves up at the different forts. Finally the chiefs forced Amankwa Tia to petition the Asantehene to recall the army. The request was sent to Kumasi but Kofi Karikari had felt from the very beginning that he had been forced into the war by the ambition of these very chiefs and he showed his resentment of this by refusing to sanction any withdrawal.

By late June, therefore, both sides had sunk to their lowest ebb. It is hard to imagine what the coming dry season would have brought had neither side made a move during the rains but as things transpired, the British did not allow matters to stand as they were. The arrival on the 6th of July of the first contingent of the 2WIR reinforcements promised by Lord Kimberley in his despatch of the 12th of May, allowed the British to begin taking the initiative. Commodore Commerell, R.N., arrived on the 5th aboard H.M.S. Rattlesnake to find H.M.S.'s Barracouta, Druid and Merlin already in the roads at Cape Coast and H.M.S. Argus at Elmina. On the 6th of July, the Himalaya arrived with the headquarters, 13 officers and 360 men of the 2WIR and a Lieutenant A.H. Gordon of the 98th Foot who was to replace Lieutenant
Hopkins, who was at this time suffering from fever, as Commandant of Hausas. This reinforcement relieved those of Colonel Festing's Marines who were at Cape Coast Castle and thus permitted the concentrating of all of the Marines at Elmina. 103

The arrival of these fresh troops caused some resurgence of confidence on the part of the British on the Gold Coast and because of this, it was finally decided that something could now be done to rectify the hitherto appalling lack of accurate intelligence about the Asante dispositions and movements. It was a hard fact that while every movement the British made was at once known in the Asante camp, 104 the only information gained by the British which was of any value at all was the scanty fare derived from prisoners. This was mainly because the scouting parties hired by the British from among the allies did no actual scouting and upon their return to camp after a supposed mission, lied freely in order to ensure that they were paid. For example, Chief Attah of Cape Coast was employed to send out scouting parties and it was proven that his scouts seldom went further than a mile from the town. And it was further proven that once they were out of sight, they remained safely hidden until they had finished their provisions at which time they would return to spin whatever tale they thought would satisfy the British. 105
In order to correct this serious military deficiency, Lieutenant Gordon and his Hausas conducted a series of reconnaissance patrols along the coast between Cape Coast and Elmina and from Cape Coast into the immediate hinterland. The aim of these patrols was to accurately ascertain the strength and position of the Asante force but the consistently bad weather prevented the completion of this mission. However, the importance of the patrols lay in the fact that they signalled the beginning of a more aggressive spirit on the part of the British for from this point onward, they began to assume more and more responsibility for the direction and prosecution of the campaign.

This growing spirit of aggressiveness was also exemplified by the British response to events which occurred in the Western districts late in July. At that time Adu Bofo's division had effected a rendezvous with the force of 3,000 men which had been sent south from Kumasi under the command of the redoubtable Atjiempon. The Asantehene had ordered that this joint force was to assist the Amahi against Blay and then raise a large army from amongst the former Dutch subjects in Takoradi, Sekondi and Shama with a view to crossing the Pra and joining the Elminas and Amankwa Tia. Of course the scheme stood an excellent chance of success because of the great animosity which still existed between the residents in the formerly Dutch territories and those who had always been under British protection.
Up until the 20th of July 1873, however, the British had not even received any reliable intelligence as to the existence of this particular Asante force let alone its intentions. But on that day despatches were received which revealed this new Asante threat for the first time. It was reported that two towns belonging to the loyal King of Blay had been destroyed and that both Dixcove and Sekondi were threatened. Obviously Adu Bofo and Atjiempon had begun their campaign but, in contrast to their earlier approach, the British did not respond to the emergency by attempting to rouse and arm the tribes under attack. Their experience with the Fantis and their knowledge of the strong Dutch sentiment in the region convinced the men at Cape Coast that such efforts would be futile. Accordingly, they decided to concentrate their efforts on defending and holding the forts.

On the 21st of July, Hausa detachments were sent to reinforce all three of the threatened forts and at the same time 100 men of 2ndIR were sent to the threatened area as a shock force. About 50 of the West Indians were subsequently left at Sekondi while the remainder returned to Cape Coast Castle on the 24th. These moves effectively countered the Asante threat and, with one exception, the enemy forces in the region played no significant role in the operations which were to follow. From this point onward, the major events of the war were destined to occur along the axis of the Prasu-Cape Coast road.
This successful reinforcement of the forts in the Western districts was immediately followed by further British initiatives. On the 4th of August, Colonel Harley called a staff conference at which it was decided to take steps to dislodge the Asantes from their position at Mampon. It was also agreed that a necessary preliminary to this operation would be the establishment of several secure forward bases between the coast and Mampon. Lieutenant Gordon and his Hausas were selected for the task of establishing these outposts and on the 6th of August Gordon departed for the village of Napoleon with 100 Hausas, 20 members of the Gold Coast Rifle Corps, and 100 labourers. He was to throw up a redoubt and form an encampment in order to obtain better information of the enemy's position and strength and to restore the confidence of the Fantis. The post was also intended to serve as an assembly area once a general move against the enemy could be mounted. Within a week of leaving Cape Coast, Gordon had completed the redoubt, instituted a regular and reliable system of patrolling over a radius of some seven miles and had made it possible for the villages between Cape Coast and Napoleon to be reoccupied by their former inhabitants.

The patrolling was of especial importance. No map of the country was available from any source and the patrols made it possible for Lieutenant Gordon to complete a rough but adequate tracing of the country which was subsequently used extensively. The patrols also gathered information of great immediate mili-
tary value. From their reports it was definitely ascertained that no Asantes crossed the Sweet River; that the left of the Asante standing camp was at Efutu, where their numbers were few; that great numbers were at Mampon, whence they extended westward towards Agoonah and Aquafoo; that a large body of them—perhaps several thousand—was at Simeo; and that they foraged for provisions in the gardens of deserted villages between Simeo and the Sweet River. It was also established that the Asantes communicated regularly with Elmina by way of Simeo.116

The effort at Napoleon succeeded so well that Colonel Festing ordered Lieutenant Gordon to investigate the possibility of repeating the process somewhere between Elmina and Mampon. Gordon therefore began a detailed reconnaissance of the area west of Napoleon on the 11th of August. While carrying out this reconnaissance he learned that the north-south trails were heavily used, but that there was no large body of Asante troops in the region between Elmina and Mampon. He also learned that the centrally located village of Simeo had recently been evacuated by a large Asante force117 and as it was strategically located and tactically sound for the type of outpost desired by Colonel Festing, Gordon determined to site his second redoubt there.118

Napoleon was then garrisoned by a new detachment of mixed Hausa and 2WIR troops and Gordon began his move on the 16th of August. He was forced to abandon Simeo, however, because his
Gold Coast Riflemen flatly refused to go that close to the Asante main camp. As a result, he moved three miles closer to Elmina and began construction at Abbaye. The new redoubt was begun on the 18th of August and within ten days the successful pattern established at Napoleon had been repeated. Brackenbury commented,

Gordon carried on a system of patrols and spies and he daily captured Ashanti prisoners who were forwarded to headquarters. Besides stopping the direct communication between Mampon and Elmina, the occupation of Abbaye restored large portions of fruitful land to the Fantis, and covered the lower Sweet River and Sirowee from the enemy.

The establishment of these two forward posts were solid achievements and were of inestimable value for detachments under British control and leadership were at last proving that they could go into the bush and function effectively.

These modest but important accomplishments in the field were paralleled by a tremendous increase in the quantity and quality of resupply from England. The supplies which had come with Colonel Festing's Marines had been but a sample of what was in store. A brief review of the four month period ending on the 30th of August will illustrate the increased rate at which the logistic support was growing. The mail-packet which left England on the 18th of May brought additional hospital supplies in quantities previously only dreamed of. It also brought sufficient supplies to replace all the stores issued from the Imperial magazines at Cape Coast Castle and Sierra Leone for the use of the
Colonial Government as well as large quantities of such general stores as entrenching tools, blankets, tents, Norton's tube-wells and kitchen equipment. Meanwhile, it was decided at a conference to send out H.M.S. Simoom with 200 R.M.L.I. and R.M.A. to increase the existing establishment and fill any vacancies due to death or injuries. The Simoom sailed on the 17th of July. The next day, 240,000 rounds of Snider ammunition, 150,000 rounds of Enfield ammunition and a quantity of powder and lead were shipped out together with two 7-pounder mountain-guns and 300 rounds per gun. On the 30th of July two Gatling guns with 10,000 rounds per gun were shipped out by mail-packet. At the same time, a large demand for such stores as entrenching tools, accouterments, etc., which had been made by Commissary Marsden immediately on his arrival at Cape Coast in the beginning of June, was complied with. Finally, further quantities of hospital stores were despatched on the 30th of August.

This flood of supplies began to arrive when H.M.S. Simoom dropped anchor at Cape Coast on the 9th of August. The Simoom was retained on the coast as a hospital ship and was given the additional task of distilling water. Because of the prevalence of fever, the Marines were not landed until several weeks had passed. However, the poor health of Colonel Festing's original contingent of Marines caused the staff to institute measures for the immediate evacuation of the bulk of the command. Eighty
men had already sailed for England on the 4th of August and, with the arrival of the reinforcements, the remainder were sent to sea for a short recuperative cruise before being once more committed to action.\textsuperscript{129} Aside from the military stores and reinforcements, however, the Simoom carried a large supply of rice which had been sent out to help meet the enormous demands which were then being made on the Administrator by the starving populace.\textsuperscript{130} From this time onward, supply ships arrived at regular intervals and the various magazines and commissaries were soon beginning to fill with all manner of arms, ammunition and equipment.

This steadily brightening picture was marred by only one serious reverse. On the 7th of August, a report had arrived from Dixcove that Amankwa Tia was trying to move his army across the Pra into the Wassaw country in order to join forces with Adu Bofo and Atjiempon.\textsuperscript{131} This move was thought to be in preparation for an attack on Dixcove and Sekondi and within a week Commodore Commerell was at Sekondi in command of relatively small force of armed and manned boats from the Argus and the Rattlesnake. On the 14th he led this small flotilla to Shama where he anchored, went ashore, and held a palaver with the kings and chiefs, hoping to obtain their assistance to drive the Asantes from their crossing place. The Shama protested that their only desire was to maintain an absolute neutrality. They refused to participate in the expedition and they even refused to provide pilots for the boats that were to ascend the river.
Undaunted, the Commodore proceeded across the bar and up the river without Shama assistance but before the boats had gone two miles upstream, it became obvious why the Shama had not wanted to accompany them. Without any warning, shots rang out from the Shama side of the river and a hail of slugs came pouring into the boats at about ten yards range. The fire was such that the force had to withdraw down the river to the town where it was found that the townspeople had attacked a small reinforcement of Fanti Police being landed for service in the fort. The Commodore promptly had the town shelled and reduced to a heap of burning rubble. The British loss in this unfortunate affair was four men killed and six officers and fourteen men wounded.

This British repulse at the hands of the Asantes caused those former Dutch subjects who had hitherto been hesitating in their allegiance and maintaining an outward semblance of loyalty to break out into open rebellion. The inhabitants of Takoradi, Dutch Sekondi and many other places took up arms and declared against the Government. The only way that these insurrection could be dealt with was through the old medium of gun-boat persuasion. Consequently, during the succeeding weeks, naval vessels cruised up and down the coast, shelling and burning a village here and there as outbreaks of defiance were reported. Of course this was limited in effectiveness because only the villages were destroyed while the inhabitants usually escaped unscathed into the bush and continued to carry on a campaign of
harrassment against the various forts. Throughout the month of August, the entire coastline from Axim to Shama was disturbed by sporadic clashes between the 'Dutch' people and the loyal tribemen and the shelling of disloyal towns was a regular occurrence.\textsuperscript{136}

Commodore Commerell's defeat strongly influenced Colonel Harley's thinking with regard to the strategic conduct of the war. He had finally become convinced that it was no longer profitable to continue rushing back and forth along the coast in frantic efforts to counter every threat posed by the enemy. As a result, he proposed to Lord Kimberley that the British should really take the initiative by attacking and taking Kumasi. He suggested that a force composed of 300 Marines, 600 West Indians, a battalion of rifles (European) not less than 800 strong, 200 Gold Coast Riflemen and 10,000 native auxiliaries could accomplish the mission quite easily after a "leisurely march of ten days from Cape Coast" on the Prasu road.\textsuperscript{137} Colonel Festing recognized the dangers inherent in the Administrator's scheme and firmly stated his disapproval of it. He closed his memorandum on the matter by saying, "As an officer writing with responsibility, I cannot permit myself to think lightly of an undertaking involving unknown hazards. That it is possible to assert the sovereignty of our country on this coast I fully believe; but not, in my humble opinion, with the insufficient means proposed in your Excellency's despatch."\textsuperscript{138}
In the end, nothing was done to implement this particular plan. On the 11th of September, the mail-packet arrived from England bringing Captain Glover, R.N.,¹³⁹ and instructions from the Government. These instructions stated that Sir Garnet Wolseley was about to proceed to the Coast, in order to assume the duties of civil administrator and military commander, and they directed that no extended operations should be undertaken pending his arrival.¹⁴⁰ Colonel Harley was thus summarily replaced, and the second phase of the war was about to begin.
CHAPTER III

THE 'PROTECTORATE' CLEARED

The Gladstone Government had clung desperately to the hope that Colonel Harley would be able to cope with the situation on the Gold Coast for they knew that any increased involvement would quite possibly necessitate the raising of an expensive expeditionary force. In the past, such forces had proved unpopular and Gladstone, whose administration was already in serious trouble over such issues as the Irish question and Cardwell's army reforms, had no desire to gamble on the possibility of increasing the degree of public disfavor. Indeed, the cabinet was well aware of the fact that should an expedition be despatched and subsequently prove a failure as in the case of Macarthy and the debacle of 1863, the Liberal party could very well be turned out of office.

In spite of these political dangers, Lord Kimberley, who was by now under no illusions as to conditions on the Gold Coast, was convinced that the Government would have to adopt firm and powerful measures in order to re-establish the ante bellum 'status quo' in the 'Protectorate'. Commenting in his memoirs on the Colonial Secretary's attitude at this time, Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote:

In this condition of affairs it became very evident to Lord Kimberley that all hope of making any definite and lasting peace with the Ashante king until his army had been utterly defeated was merely the dream of timid men...
Sir Garnet was serving in the War Office as Assistant Adjutant-General: Discipline Branch, at this time and he received his first intimation as to what was afoot from the War Secretary, Mr. Cardwell, in July of 1873. Cardwell confided to Sir Garnet that there was a possibility of an expedition being sent to the Gold Coast and that he would work for Wolseley's appointment to head such a force. He advised the young colonel to prepare for such an eventuality by submitting to him an applicable military plan. This Sir Garnet proceeded to do, and he emerged with a detailed plan at the very moment when Lord Kimberley, who was working closely with Cardwell, decided to appoint a soldier as military and civil head of the Gold Coast territory. The War Secretary immediately sent the plan to Lord Kimberley with a note saying, "Sir Garnet Wolseley, who so successfully went to the Red River, is now ready to capture Kumasi."

This original scheme was disapproved by the Duke of Cambridge, who was not in favor of using European troops, and it also came under fire from several officials in the Government for various other reasons. Undeterred, Sir Garnet immediately set about producing yet another plan which took into consideration the various objections which had been raised. His revised scheme called for his immediate departure with a group of specially selected officers to survey local conditions and to organize a force of friendly natives to drive the Asante back over the Pra. Should the native levies prove inadequate for a final thrust
across the river to Kumasi, two first-rate white battalions and necessary support elements, held in a state of readiness at home, would be sent out upon request to complete the work. Because of the deadly climate, Sir Garnet promised to use these men with all possible speed during the best season between December and February. A good road would be constructed to the Pra beforehand, with suitable shelters erected at each halting place. Once the Asantehene had been forced to terms, or his capital at Kumasi destroyed should he resist to the end, the white troops would be hurried back to the transports. Wolseley promised to carry out the entire operation for less than £150,000.

The final decision as to the adoption of this plan and the appointment of Sir Garnet to its command was reached at a lengthy and somewhat acrimonious meeting in the War Office on the 13th of August, 1873. Senior representatives of various Governmental departments, and high-ranking naval and military officers were in attendance and the naval contingent, supported by at least one unnamed minister of the Government, actively opposed the idea of an expedition and argued strongly for a continuation of gunboat diplomacy. Lord Kimberley, irritated by the obviously inadequate proposals by the Admiralty and exasperated by the cross-examination of another Minister, finally lost his temper. Thumping a table, he declared that either the Wolseley plan would be adopted or he would resign. Sir Garnet was then asked if he was prepared to take over civil as well as military author-
ity provided he was not expected to remain in Africa after settling the Asante affair. He replied that he was prepared to accept the post on those terms and it was then agreed that he would be appointed to execute his own plan with the clear understanding that "nothing but a conviction of necessity would induce Her Majesty's Government to engage in any operations involving the possibility of its requiring the service of Europeans at the Gold Coast."\(^{10}\)

Two days after this crucial meeting, it was announced in the London newspapers that Sir Garnet was to leave for West Africa as soon as possible to undertake the direction of the civil and military affairs there with the local rank of major-general.\(^{11}\) The move was decried not only by those who did not approve of Wolseley's role in the Cardwell reforms, and by those officers senior to Wolseley who felt that they should have had the command, but also by the 'Old Africa Hands' who had begun to condemn the very thought of using European troops on the Gold Coast when the formation of a Gold Coast expedition was first rumoured. However, the vast majority of younger officers in the army and much of the general public approved of the appointment.\(^{12}\) Wolseley himself cared little for what anyone thought, however, and once he had received his instructions,\(^{13}\) he immediately began making preparations for the execution of his plan.
The implementation of his revised plan required that Sir Garnet gather around himself an able staff for only dedicated, energetic and competent staff-officers could hope to carry out the difficult duties which lay ahead. He was limited to selecting thirty-six staff and special service officers from the more than two hundred volunteers who answered his call. Nevertheless, when his selection was complete, he had assembled what Alan Lloyd describes as a "remarkable clique of young enthusiasts" comprising an "odd mixture of untried staff theorists and proven derring-doers, united to a man in their devotion to Wolseley and the 'modern' military school". This group was scornfully dubbed the 'Wolseley Ring' or the 'Ashanti Ring' by the skeptics and, to some degree this skepticism was to prove justified but the members of "Ring" still were able, and in some few cases, brilliant men.

With his staff selected and rapidly assembling, Wolseley turned to the task of completing the detailed planning for the coming operations. Within three weeks the planning job had been completed and on the 12th of September, 1873, Sir Garnet and his staff boarded the steamer "Ambriz" and departed for the Gold Coast in what one observer described as a "holiday mood". The trip was no holiday, however, for the General had made plans to use the sea voyage to good effect by conducting an in-transit training school for his staff.
He brought dozens of books on the history and geography of West Africa for the use of the staff and Captain Maurice helped in the search for knowledge by making a compendium of the various works. These were distributed among the members of the staff, along with a table of advice on health written by the chief medical officer and each day Captains Huyshe and Brackenbury put their notes in shape and lectured the officers on tribes and terrain. 18

Sir Garnet utilized his own time at sea to finalize his general plan for the campaign. He viewed the operation as breaking down into two phases: (1) what was to be accomplished before the European troops arrived; (2) what was to be done once the European troops had been concentrated at Prahu. Commenting on the first of these phases, he wrote:

Number one divided itself into two objectives which must be accomplished before number two could be begun; they were as follows:-

(a) To clear out the Ashantees from the protectorate with whatever native troops I could raise;

(b) The construction of a road from Cape Coast to Prahu—a distance said to be seventy-five miles—and the preparation of good shelter for the white troops at the selected halting-places. 19

Obviously one of the major tasks facing the General and his staff would be the recruitment of African troops. After studying recent despatches from the Gold Coast, it was felt that
it would be best to avoid relying too heavily on the Fantis and the other Coastal tribes as a source of manpower. Accordingly, a comprehensive plan was devised for the acquisition of recruits from other points in West Africa; recruits who would be farther from their homes and whom Sir Garnet therefore believed would be less likely to desert their posts.  

Although this plan was of questionable merit, it was begun immediately upon the arrival of the "Ambriz" at Sierra Leone on the 27th of September. Captain Furse and Lieutenant Saunders were sent by boat north to the Gambia to enlist fighting men from among the Moslem tribes there. Lieutenant Gordon of the 93rd Highlanders remained behind in Freetown in an effort to recruit volunteers, especially pensioners from the West India regiments. It was also hoped to enlist men from the warlike Kossoo (Mende) tribe at Sherboro where Mr. Loggie, who was by this time stationed at Sherboro as the collector of customs, was pressed into service as the recruiting agent. It was intended that these native levies from the Gambia, Sierra Leone and the Sherboro would ultimately form two regiments which were to be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, V.C., and Major Baker Russell.

Aside from these recruiting efforts, several other steps were taken to build up the force. Arrangements were made with Captain Strachan, R.N., the Administrator of Lagos, who was then in Sierra Leone, for the transfer of 150 Hausas to the Gold Coast
in exchange for half that number of men from the 2nd IR. In addition, Major Home, the Commanding Royal Engineer (CRE), succeeded in obtaining a body of 33 carpenters and masons and 20 labourers in Sierra Leone. At the same time he had ascertained that more artificers could be obtained at Accra so it was decided that Lieutenant Bolton, 1st IR, would proceed to Accra immediately upon the arrival of the Ambriz at Cape Coast with a view to hiring more of the badly needed carpenters and masons there. It was also decided that he would continue on to Winneba and there attempt to enlist more fighting men for use in either Russell's or Wood's regiments. The final recruiting mission was carried out after the Ambriz sailed from Sierra Leone when Commissary O'Conner was landed at Cape Palmas with instructions to enlist Krumen, whose reputation as willing workers caused Wolseley to believe that they would be a valuable acquisition as carriers.

Once O'Conner had been set ashore, the Ambriz sailed directly to Cape Coast and early on the morning of the 2nd of October, she dropped anchor in the Cape Coast Roads. Sir Garnet and the members of his staff had lost none of their enthusiasm during their uncomfortable voyage and Brackenbury comments that far from being depressed by the dismal aspect presented by the town, all and sundry viewed it as "the Land of Promise". In keeping with the traditions of the Gold Coast, this enthusiasm was put to the test almost immediately. Within hours of their arrival, the General and his staff were quickly made aware of the
fact that neatly designed plans conceived in London by men ignorant of the conditions of life on the Gold Coast were often knocked awry when their execution was attempted.

For example, Sir Garnet had counted heavily on finding at his command some 300 trained and disciplined Hausas, armed with Snider rifles. To his chagrin, he found that Colonel Harley had allowed Captain Glover to take all of them away to Accra for employment in his expedition.\textsuperscript{26} The result of this was that the only reliable troops remaining in the neighbourhood of the main camp of the Asante army, were several small detachments of the 2WIR. What was worse, even the small complement of 2WIR troops still available was further reduced by the need to post fifty men to Lagos in keeping with the agreement with Captain Strachan. When one deducted the Lagos contingent and the garrisons of Sierra Leone, Axim, Dixcove, and Secondee, the numerous sick, and the men absolutely required for garrison duties and not available for the field, the entire force which could be deployed at Elmina, Cape Coast Castle, Beulah and Napoleon was under 400 strong.\textsuperscript{27} This shortage of other-ranks was exceeded only by that of officers. Sir Garnet had already sent back to England for an additional twelve special-service officers when he was in Freetown but he had also counted on using some of the officers already at the Coast for special duty. Upon his arrival at Cape Coast, however, he found only thirteen officers available for service with the 2WIR and as that number was not even sufficient for normal
requirements, he dashed off yet another urgent demand supporting his Freetown request and asking that it be granted with all speed.28

This was all a serious blow to Sir Garnet's plans as he had been counting heavily on the Hausas, the West Indians and the local British officers to act as a nucleus around which to form his African levies. Under these circumstances, it was fortunate that the General had the support of Captain Fremantle and the naval squadron even though the captain's freedom of action was severely limited by the instructions left behind by Commodore Commerell. The Commodore had had little love for Colonel Harley and he had left specific instructions that unless Captain Fremantle should receive special orders from the Admiralty, no officers or men were to be landed for service on the coast, nor were they to proceed up any rivers unless absolutely necessary for the protection of British life and property.29 Nevertheless, Captain Fremantle promised his fullest support to Sir Garnet within the scope of his powers. As a result, the General's despatch of the 10th of October contained the comment that he believed that not only might Cape Coast Castle be protected, but that any enemy attack could be "repulsed with much material loss to the enemy and considerable moral benefit to the British and their African allies".30 Of course in making this statement he was reasonably safe as Colonel Harley had already proven that the ex-
isting force was capable of meeting and repulsing a reasonably strong enemy attack on Elmina.

The lack of that vital 'stiffening' which Sir Garnet knew the Hausas, the 2WIR troops and their officers would have provided for the projected African levies proved to be only one of the problems which he found awaiting him. Somewhat to their surprise, the staff discovered a great shortage of the supplies and arms necessary for the equipping of the levies—should the Africans enlist in any numbers. Although quantities of camp supplies and relatively sophisticated weapons had begun arriving as early as August, and although Sir Garnet's own stores were enroute, the quantities of rifles, ammunition and basic accouterments normally issued to the Africans were still not in stores. In his report of the 4th of October, the Deputy-Controller stated that there were only nineteen Snider rifles in the imperial stores and 400 Enfield rifles in the colonial stores, together with a few Dutch rifles for which there was no ammunition. Possibly even more important, however, he estimated that his reserve of rations was only equal to four days' issue for the force of regular troops on the coast.31

Fortunately for Sir Garnet, he was not destined to operate under the heavy restrictions which had bedevilled Colonel Harley, and he was thus able to move quickly to counter many of these problems; something the former Administrator could not do.
The General had virtually unrestricted access to the full resources of a now thoroughly aroused British Government and as a first step toward solving the immediate problems, application was immediately made by way of Madeira for 500,000 pounds of salt beef in small packages in addition to the quantity originally indented for while the staff was still in England. Pending the arrival of the supplies already at sea, salt meat and biscuits were obtained from the ships-of-war in port. With the food problem thus apparently coming under control, the General turned to the question of weapons. In a bit of high-handed chicanery, he simply detained the store-ship "Gertrude", which arrived at Cape Coast on the 6th of October carrying supplies for Captain Glover, and removed 300 Snider rifles to replace those which had been taken away with the Hausas previously panyared by Glover.32

While attempting to deal with these shortages in supplies, equipment and disciplined troops, Sir Garnet also proceeded to make the preparations necessary for the execution of the plans on operations, which he had formulated in London and on board the "Ambiriz". On the 3rd of October, the General ordered work to begin immediately on the construction of adequate beach-head facilities at Cape Coast and for a start to be made on the survey and improvement of the Cape Coast/Prasu road.33 This action was taken even before any attempts were made to raise an African army in the 'Protectorate' because unlike the task of raising African levies, this problem was a relatively simple and straightforward
matter of military logistics and because Sir Garnet already had sufficient staff-officers and skilled tradesmen to start work on the project without involving an appeal to the African leaders for assistance.

The major problem of off-loading and storage facilities was the first task to engage the attention of the staff because considerable work was required before Cape Coast would be capable of supporting the projected invasion. One difficulty lay in the landing and storage of supplies and stores. The ships arriving from England had to lie nearly a mile from the shore and everything had to be landed in surf-boats which were supplied at inflated prices by local contractors. It was therefore decided to establish a boat-service which was independent of contract and within two weeks such a service was in operation. There was also a great shortage of storage space and considerable confusion in the organization of the existing stores due to the constant changing of control officers. To overcome this, the engineers immediately began the construction of proper storage sheds and by the 7th of October, three large double huts were already completed and in use. This additional accommodation and the establishment of a full-fledged control department quickly solved both problems.

Off-loading and storage facilities were only part of the picture, however. Adequate transport and communications were
also vital to the operation. Initially, transport was not a serious problem as a corps of some 600 native carriers had already been established. Even so, steps were taken to improve the organization of this body and plans were made for its augmentation by assigning to it those Krumen recruited at Cape Palmas. The situation with regard to communications was not so encouraging. A swift and reliable means of communication simply did not exist within the 'Protectorate'. The staff attempted to correct this deficiency by establishing a system of postal communication with the various outposts. A line of police-runners was formed and a headquarter military post-office established at Cape Coast. Runners were posted at the different stations, and at about six mile intervals on the secure portion of the Cape Coast/Frasu road. Assistant postmasters were appointed at the major outposts with orders to report daily to headquarters. 'Time-slips' were given to each runner, on which the hours of departure and arrival at each place were noted by the postmaster; and fines were instituted to insure regularity in the transit of letters. Unfortunately, although this system was reasonably effective, it was never expanded to provide adequate communications as the area of operations south of the Pra slowly increased in size.

Finally, in the face of the persistent rumours of a forthcoming Asante attack, steps had to be taken to insure the security of Cape Coast and its environs. Lieutenant-Colonel Festing
was placed in command of the troops at Cape Coast and was charged with responsibility for the defence of Cape Coast and its immediate environs. By the 5th of October, he had prepared a comprehensive and detailed plan of defence which made the best possible use not only of the weapons and troops immediately at hand but also of the sailors, marines, guns and rockets of the fleet anchored in the Cape Coast Roads. The plan was never put to the test but its cunning use of shelter-trenches and the firepower of the guns, rockets and Sniders give one every indication that any Asante attack would have resulted in a bloody repulse.

With the administrative support area thus growing and secure, the staff devoted more of its attention to the vital question of the proposed main supply route (MSR) for the invasion, the Cape Coast/Prasu road. The road had long been an established trade route from the interior and even before Sir Garnet’s arrival, Lieutenant Gordon and his Hausas had done much to improve it as far as Yankumasi Fanti, a distance of some twenty miles. Indeed, Lieutenant Gordon submitted a most optimistic appraisal of his achievements in this respect but Captain Huy-she, the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General on the staff, carried out his own inspection of the road on the 8th and 9th of October.

His road-report indicated that the road-making carried out so far had consisted only of clearing the path to a consid-
erable width. He commented that as Sir Garnet considered it very important that the troops should march dry-shod and with the least possible fatigue to the Pra, much work remained to be done.\textsuperscript{41}

The task of building such a road fell to Major Home, the CRE, and the small detachment of Royal Engineers under his command. Their job was not to be an easy one for it was intended to make the road as nearly dry as possible, twelve feet wide, and clear of stumps and roots. This meant that in addition to normal clearing, swamps had to be either drained or avoided, or causeways had to be built through them, while culverts had to be made where necessary and all streams had to be bridged.

The orders received by Major Home on the 4th of October directed him to improve the existing road and extend it as far as possible to the Pra. However, it was not until the arrival of a small detachment of three officers, one sergeant and five sappers of the Royal Engineers on the 10th of October that work could actually begin. The CRE broke his small group of experts into four specialized parties and allotted to them all of the African labourers he was able to get.\textsuperscript{42} However, the lack of skilled labour and the constant threat of an Asante ambush slowed the work down considerably. In fact, it was due solely to the initial work done by Lieutenant Gordon that the CRE could report on the 15th of October that he had reached Yankumasi Fanti and that the road to that place, with the exception of a four mile segment immediately south of Assayboo, was cleared to a width of
some fifteen feet, and was passable for troops marching in formation.\textsuperscript{43} Even so, it was becoming obvious by the end of October that the road work was not proceeding as rapidly as it should. However, Sir Garnet was by that time fully immersed in his operations and the logistics problems were left largely in abeyance. This was soon proved to have been a major error on the General's part.

As these preparatory measures were being taken by the Administrative and Quartermaster branches of the staff, the General and his operations personnel were busy on other matters. Immediately upon having assured himself that adequate steps had been taken for the start of the development and protection of the beachhead and the MSR, Sir Garnet turned to the collection and organization of a force of Africans which were to be drawn from the Fantis and the other coastal tribes. On the 4th of October, a full-dress 'palaver' was held on the grounds of Government House and Wolseley addressed the assembled kings and chiefs in an attempt to stir them into providing men for the coming struggle. Claridge comments that:

Sir Garnet, being bound by his instructions, had once more to repeat the old ridiculous assertion that the war was a purely native war and not Her Majesty's, but promised that, if the people would only exert themselves, they could be given every possible assistance against the enemy. . . . (Concrete offers of assistance were made and) the Chiefs retired to consult together, promising to re-
turn with their answer on the 6th
... when they returned on the
6th, . . . one and all expressed
their willingness to collect their
men if they were given English of-
ficers to accompany and assist them.
They were in no great hurry to start,
however, even after their request had
been granted. Letters were also sent
to those Kings who had not attended
the meeting summoning them to collect
t heir men and march to Dunkwa, where
the other contingents had been order-
ed to assemble.44

The reasons for this far from enthusiastic response to
yet another British call to arms are not hard to find. In the
first place, these Africans had seen similar appeals and prom-
ises come to nothing and they had no proof that things would be
different on this occasion. In fact, in this particular war,
which they felt had been caused by the British acquisition of
Elmina and not by them,45 and in which they had so far borne the
brunt of the fighting, British support had been even more feeble
than it had at any previous time. In addition, their utter de-
feat at Jukwa and the terrible privations which they suffered in
the wake of that defeat were still fresh in their minds. There-
fore the Fanti were understandably reluctant to once more engage
an enemy whom they had every reason to believe was still capable
of devastating retaliation should they have the temerity to attack
him. Finally, they felt that no such confrontation was necessary
because the war was actually over. They knew that Amankwa Tia
had ceased all major offensive operations and was only awaiting
the Asantehene's permission to withdraw to Kumasi.46 They there-
fore had no desire to force a battle when all they had to do was leave the enemy alone and he would eventually leave. The British determination to engage the enemy with a view to teaching him such a lesson that he would never again be tempted to invade the 'Protectorate' simply had no validity in their minds.

Sir Garnet, who was aware of this attitude and who had really done nothing new to change it, stated in his despatch of the 9th of October that in view of past British performance it was scarcely to be expected that without something more than mere verbal assurances "the whole of a much-dispersed and dispirited people will suddenly come to believe in our serious intention vigorously to aid them". The General believed it necessary for the British to take some form of energetic, offensive action if there was to be any hope of encouraging the Africans to act with the speed that was necessary if they were to be of any use in the forthcoming operations. However, in the light of his comments about the Africans at this time and considering his slowness to adopt any new or more effective means to encourage greater Fanti participation in the war, one wonders if this was the true motive behind the General's subsequent actions. The fact that he sent for the European troops after taking only nine days to assess the African potential, leads one to the conclusion that he was really more interested in justifying his request for the regular troops rather than stirring the Africans into action.
Nevertheless, despite his true motives, steps were immediately taken to advertise a more aggressive British spirit.

As a necessary preliminary step to any offensive move on his part, Sir Garnet set about strengthening his intelligence service. He created a small intelligence office within his staff, reinforced the existing outposts at Abbaye and Napoleon and established new outposts along the Cape Coast/Prasu road. Unfortunately, however, he did nothing to establish a proper patrol system. Nevertheless, by the 8th of October, the total number of outposts thusfar established were as follows: Abbaye with a detachment of two officers, 100 other-ranks of the 21IR, and 125 Gold Coast Riflemen; Napoleon, with one officer and 48 other-ranks of the 21IR; Accroful, with one officer and 49 other-ranks of the 21IR; Dunkwa, with one officer and 20 Hausas and Yankumasi Fanti, with one officer, 15 Hausas and 35 Gold Coast Riflemen. In this way a semicircle of what could be described as patrol bases lay between the Asantes and the Coast and the southern portion of the Cape Coast/Prasu road, but effective patrolling was never conducted from them.

When combined with the various steps taken to defend Elmina and Cape Coast, this cordon of outposts completed the preparation of a reasonably adequate defensive system. Certainly there was little doubt in anyone's mind that any fortified post held by disciplined troops armed with breech-loading rifles
could withstand an Asante attack for an indefinite time. However, no steps had been taken with regard to offensive operations other than the attempts to collect men and the advance of parties along the main road as far as Yankumasi Fanti in order to threaten indirectly the line of communications between Amankwa Tia's army at Jukwa and Prasu.

Sir Garnet realized that the establishment of outposts and attempts to once more rouse the Africans should not be the limit of British aggressive action. For two very good reasons, he made up his mind to force an encounter with the enemy. In the first case, he had come to Africa already convinced that only British troops could effectively finish the war. He was therefore most anxious to conduct an early test of the negative opinion he had already formed as to the combat capabilities of the troops which were to be raised by the kings and chiefs of the 'Protectorate' so that British troops could be asked for at the earliest possible moment. Secondly, he realized that African morale was at a dangerously low level and that some success was needed to reawaken their confidence in the British and thus encourage them to answer his call for assistance.49

The Elmina area was selected as the site most suitable for an encounter of the type envisaged by Sir Garnet. The Asantes encamped at Mampon and Efutu were still drawing their supplies from the villages around Elmina and the villagers, especially the
people of Ampeni, defied the British at every turn. In fact, British control in the region was so tenuous that parties of Asantes were able to approach within a few miles of Elmina itself and fire on the survey parties engaged in mapping the area. It was essential that something be done if any semblance of British authority and prestige was to be maintained. Therefore, by striking at these villages, the General felt that he would be able to achieve the three-fold aim of inspiring the tribesmen of the 'Protectorate', pacifying the Elmina district and causing the Asantes "generally to feel that a new state of things had arisen". 50

Even before the operation could be mounted, however, Sir Garnet had already eliminated one of the reasons for carrying it out. On the 11th of October he revealed the fact that his attempts to raise Fanti levies were really more sham than reality, for he decided that he did not need to test the warlike capabilities of the tribesmen of the 'Protectorate'. His previously held conviction as to the value of African troops and what he had seen and heard since his arrival had convinced him that they were of little or no use to him. Accordingly, he resolved not to give them a chance to prove him wrong. As a result, he wrote to the Colonial and War Offices on the 13th of October requesting that the previously allotted European troops be despatched to the Gold Coast. In these despatches he claimed that there was little or no hope of securing peace except by inflicting a signal defeat
on the Asantes; that this certainly could not be done without the assistance of European troops; that they would not be required to serve on the Coast during the unhealthy season; that everything would be prepared for their reception before they arrived, and that the risk to their health would be far less than commonly supposed, losses in previous undertakings having been due mainly to causes that would be effectively guarded against on this occasion.51

There was, of course, no guarantee that his request would be granted and even if it were, the other motives given above still made the Elmina attack necessary. Sir Garnet was still resolved to clear the Ashantees from the Protectorate with the aid of whatever African troops he could raise. To raise the necessary levies he still had to do something to bolster African morale and, of course, there were still the questions of the Asante presence near Elmina and the recalcitrance of the tribesmen in the Elmina area which had to be dealt with. He therefore continued to make his battle plans and by the morning of the 14th of October all was ready. Secrecy had been maintained until the very last moment52 and the column of some 500 men which began to move out of Elmina at 5:30 that morning, achieved complete surprise when it descended upon the Asante detachment quartered in the village of Esaman ninety minutes later. The ensuing battle was violent but brief and resulted in a complete victory for the British. The troops rested briefly and then began a twenty-one mile trek
Sketch to illustrate the
ACTION AT ESSAMAN
14th October, 1873.
From the H.G. Staff Survey.

MAP 5.
through the bush which resulted in the destruction of the three additional villages of Ankwanda, Brenu Ankinim and Ampeni. The return of the troops to Elmina at 8:00 P.M., that same day signalled the end of an action which was far more important than its size would lead one to believe.53

Of prime importance was the effective disruption of a major Asante source of supply. Not only had the attack deprived Amankwa Tia of his main source of supplies on the coast54 but it had also effectively dissuaded otherwise sympathetic villagers from offering any help. Of somewhat less importance in the light of his prior request for European troops, was the fact that the action confirmed Sir Garnet in many of his previously held opinions as to the quality of the tribal soldiers and supposedly proved many of his theories on the nature of bush fighting. Not surprisingly and somewhat conveniently, as he had only Hausas and 2WIR under command, everything he observed convinced him of his wisdom in requesting the European troops. For example, he found that "little reliance can be placed on even the best native troops in this bush-fighting, where it is impossible to keep them under the immediate control of European officers". He was also convinced that "a small body of very highly disciplined troops, well supplied with selected officers, would be of far greater service for warfare in this country, than a much larger number detailed for service in the ordinary tour of duty".55 But possibly
of even greater importance was the realization that European troops had carried out a relatively demanding mission during the height of the lesser of the two annual rainy seasons\textsuperscript{56} with but few cases of illness or exhaustion.\textsuperscript{57}

Of somewhat less importance than either of the preceding points, partly because of subsequent events, and partly because Sir Garnet never exploited the situation was the fact that the victory resulted in some limited restoration of public confidence in the Government. Upon seeing the British finally seeking out and destroying the enemy in what had hitherto been his sanctuary, the tribesmen of the 'Protectorate' were at last beginning to trickle into the camp which had been established for them at Dunkwa. Their numbers were still small, however, because nothing significant had been done to overcome African reluctance or apathy.\textsuperscript{58} Not surprisingly, Sir Garnet did not see the problem in this light. In his view, even though he had really fought but one small action against somewhat less than 1,000 enemy troops, he believed that the Esaman action had given dramatic proof that he not only intended to attack the Asantes in the bush but also that he was capable of beating them, and the lack of African response was therefore inexcusable. Consequently, the Fanti reputation for cowardice and laziness became more firmly rooted than ever.
Unfortunately, the recruiting in the neighbouring settlements had been equally unsuccessful. The only men obtained were 66 from Sierra Leone, 120 Mende from the Sherbo, 100 men from the Gambia, 53 Opobos, 104 Bonnys and 100 Krumen who were to serve as carriers only. Sir Garnet formed these men, the Cape Coast Volunteers and some of those tribesmen who had gathered at Dunkwa, into two units and designated them as Wood's and Russell's Regiments respectively. The formation of these units left an irregular and undisciplined force of not more than 1,500 allied tribesmen available for service. Realizing that this would be probably the best he could hope for, and being himself either unable or unwilling to devise more effective methods of recruitment, the General increased his request for European troops to three battalions. In his letter of request, dated the 24th of October, he wrote:

I have seen the days pass by since I held a reception of the native Kings and Chiefs, and no native levies of any importance have taken the field. Apathy, if not cowardice, seems to have enveloped the people of these tribes. I had hoped to raise large native levies from every portion of the Coast; but a few scores of men from each tribe amounting altogether to a few hundred, seem all that I am likely to obtain. I have seen the danger of depending on ill-disciplined levies in bush-warfare. I have learned that the 2nd West India Regiment, on which I had relied as an effective battalion, is unable to furnish more than about 100 bayonets for the field.
The bitter disappointment which he said he now felt over the reluctance of the tribesmen to rally to the cause was somewhat softened by good news from the Western Districts. Immediately before and after Sir Garnet's arrival, the navy had been doggedly pursuing its tactic of patrolling the coast and occasionally bombarding the rebel villages but within one week of his arrival, the General had been impressed with what he termed the "singular lack of success enjoyed by (the gunboat tactic)." By the middle of October, he was reluctantly coming to the conclusion that he might conceivably be forced to attempt the removal of the threat posed to his left flank by the recalcitrant Western tribesmen and the Asante army which was operating in their support before he could do anything further about Amankwa Tia's force. He had even assigned several members of his staff to study the problem when news was received which made such an operation unnecessary. On the 20th of October a despatch was received from Axim reporting that Atjiempon had died of consumption, accelerated by a wound in the side, and that the remnants of the Asante army under his command were beginning to withdraw to the north. It was reported that various Asante prisoners claimed that the army was actually returning to Kumasi on orders from the Asantehene. The problem of moving a land force into the Western Districts was therefore dropped and the problem of pacifying the troublesome tribesmen of the region was allowed to remain in the hands of the Royal Navy and the garrisons of the
various forts along the coastline. 66

While these events were in progress, Sir Garnet was also complying with that portion of his instructions which required him to communicate with the Asantehene. Immediately after the Esaman battle, he wrote a letter to Kofi Karikari and had three copies forwarded by separate messengers on the 14th, 17th and 18th of October. In this letter he asserted that the invasion was without justification but that he was willing to discuss terms of peace provided the Asantehene would, within twenty days, comply with three conditions. First, all Asante forces were to withdraw from the 'Protectorate'. Second, all prisoners were to be surrendered immediately. Third, guarantees were to be given for the payment of compensation. The letter closed with a firm statement to the effect that non-acceptance of the British terms would result in "the full punishment which your (the Asantehene's) deeds have merited." 67

Two copies of this letter fell into the hands of Amankwa Tia and the third went astray somewhere between Cape Coast Castle and Kumasi and was never recovered. There is no record of what Kofi Karikari's response would have been to Sir Garnet's demands because Amankwa Tia, instead of forwarding the letters which he had intercepted on the 20th of October, took upon himself a right which was Kofi Karikari's alone, and replied in the Asantehene's name. This response 68 made it clear that even though he had ask-
ed the Asantehene's permission to withdraw from the 'Protectorate', he had no intention of complying with the British conditions.

This was no doubt due to the fact that the Asante general had written his letter before receiving any intelligence as to the British occupation and fortification of Dunkwa and Mansu. Although he had been aware of British patrols along the Cape Coast/Prasu road for some time, it was not until sometime after the 20th of October that he had confirmation of the British intention to interdict the road south of Mansu to his army.69 However, with his line of retreat thus threatened, Sir Garnet's letter, the defeat at Esaman and the weakened condition of his army due to its long stay in Mampon assumed much greater importance than was previously the case. Recognizing the dangers, the Asantes became thoroughly alarmed and even though the Asantehene's permission to withdraw had not yet been received, Amankwa Tia decided to break camp and pull back to the Pra before he could be trapped by the suddenly aggressive British.70

Had this decision been made a month earlier, it is most probable that the Asante army could have left the 'Protectorate' without encountering any British forces. By the last week of October, however, Amankwa Tia had lost this opportunity. By that time the newly established but somewhat rudimentary intelligence department under Captain Buller was beginning to build up a reasonably accurate picture of the enemy situation in spite of the
large number of unreliable reports that were received. Consequently, after much conflicting and dubious information had been carefully sifted and evaluated, the intelligence staff had been able to prepare a report on the 16th of October which tentatively forecast the imminent withdrawal of the Asante army from Mampon northwest to the Cape Coast/Prasu road and then north to the Pra. 71

Undeterred by the possibility that Captain Buller's assessment of the situation might be wrong, Sir Garnet decided that immediate steps would have to be taken to protect the road so that the job of improving it could be carried out without interruption. As a result, on the 16th of October it was decided to establish another outpost between Napoleon and Dunkwa. The village of Abrakramp was selected for this purpose and by the 19th the town was believed sufficiently garrisoned and fortified so as to act as an effective roadblock to any Asante move in that direction. 72 The survey parties which had moved as far north as Mansu were also reinforced on the 19th, and by the 21st that town was fully fortified and had been redesignated as Fort Cambridge. In addition, Colonel Festing was ordered to Dunkwa to take command of the camp set aside for the African forces assembling there and to assume responsibility for all of the advanced posts along the road. 73
By the 22nd of October, therefore, the British had somewhat fortuitously adopted measures to cope with the Asante withdrawal even before that withdrawal was fully underway. Certainly the defensive situation looked better than it ever had before. All was quiet at Elmina and Cape Coast. The bush outposts at Abbaye, Napoleon and Abrakrampa were in good condition and were engaged in attempting to gather intelligence. And the main road outposts at Akrofu, Dunkwa and Mansu were sufficiently fortified and garrisoned to be capable of resisting attack and protecting the road crews supposedly engaged in the vital task of preparing the main road for the coming invasion.74

While the British had been continuing to strengthen their outposts, etc., information continued to trickle in which indicated more and more strongly that a general Asante movement was being made toward Dunkwa. It was not until the 23rd of October, however, that any completely reliable word was received as to this movement. On that day, a reconnaissance by Lieutenant Gordon and his Hausas confirmed that large bodies of Asantes were moving through Ainsa along the "Haunted Road" to Dunkwa.75 The following day this intelligence was confirmed and added to when a young Fanti woman, the slave-wife of one of the Asante chiefs, escaped from the retreating army and came to the British headquarters. She gave a complete and detailed and valuable account of Amankwa Tia's plans and of the condition of his army. Brackenbury states that,
Her manner, the circumstantial nature of her evidence, and the absence of any contradiction when carefully examined a second and third time, placed it practically beyond all doubt that the Ashanti camp at Mampon was broken up; that the army had the intention of retreating; that it intended to move in the direction of Dunquah (Dunkwa), and then strike the main Prah road.

The General held a staff conference immediately and before the day was out a plan of operations had been devised, which indicated that Sir Garnet was finally becoming aware of the realities of his position and adopting his tactics accordingly. It was generally agreed that because of the numerical weakness of the reliable British forces, a head-on clash with the Asante main body had to be avoided at all costs. At the same time, however, it was also agreed that the enemy had to be prevented from gaining the use of the Cape Coast/Prasu road and that every effort should be made to ensure the "greatest possible display of the European force in various directions". In his despatch of the 31st of October, Sir Garnet explained his thinking to the authorities in London. He wrote,

I desire not only to hasten the enemy's retreat, which is necessary before I can advance beyond Mansu, but to appear to be driving them out of the country, in hopes that I may thus instill some spirit into the Fantis, and induce them to rise and harass the retiring enemy, as, would they do so, they might inflict very heavy losses upon him. At the same time, I have done all in my power to spare the European troops undue fatigue.
The basic idea was therefore not only to protect the road but also to press in on and harass the Asante army as it attempted to carry out its withdrawal. In accordance with this plan, orders were sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, at that time the Officer Commanding at Elmina, on the 25th of October directing him to begin pushing his regiment toward Abbaye as soon as the Captain of H.M.S. Druid had taken over the responsibility for garrisoning the complex of forts at Elmina. Once he had established a firm base at Abbaye, Colonel Wood was then to move to a point approximately half-way to Mampon, survey the situation, and devise his own plan for the harassment of any rear-guard which might have been left at Mampon. He was to be supported by a reconnaissance party which had simultaneously been ordered out of Napoleon in the direction of Mampon.79

On the 26th of October, Sir Garnet himself began marching to Dunkwa with reinforcements of 100 men from Russell's Regiment and 250 men from the Naval Brigade.80 This party camped at Assayboo on the night of the 26th. While there the General learned that Lieutenant Gordon had once more detected strong Asante forces moving eastward on the Haunted Road between Jukwa and Dunkwa. Sir Garnet realized that, should he advance with his force through Abrakrampa and on to Assanchi, he could hit the Asante column in the flank; and should Colonel Festing march simultaneously with the whole of his available force westward along the Haunted Road, he could take advantage of the confusion which
would result from the flank attack. There was no doubt in the General's mind that the psychological and material effect on the Asantes would be considerable should such an action prove successful. Consequently, despite the dangers inherent in the exhaustion of his troops, the lack of reliable intelligence, and the slowness of communications between the various detachments scattered along the road, the necessary orders for a move on the Haunted Road were issued well before sunset. 81

Both of the British columns moved out on the 27th but, not surprisingly, the operation did not work out in quite the way it had been planned. Sir Garnet found that the weather and the fatigued condition of his sailors and marines made it impossible for him to reach Assanchi in one day. He therefore abandoned his attack and remained in Abrakrampa rather than pushing on to Assanchi. Colonel Festing's column did not have this problem and it moved out of Dunkwa in search of the enemy. Contact was made with a Asante camp of some 4,000 men about one mile east of Iscabo and Festing's force promptly attacked. The ensuing action was confused and for some time the outcome was in doubt but with the aid of Rait's artillery, the British force finally dispersed the Asantes and completely destroyed their camp. Colonel Festing suffered very few casualties and his troops were back in Dunkwa before nightfall. 82
Unaware of Colonel Festing's success, Sir Garnet made plans for yet another similar combined drive on the retreating Asantes. Late on the 27th, he issued orders which required both he and Colonel Festing to move on Iscabio on the 28th. The Wolseley column was to move to Assanchi and there await the sound of firing from the direction of Iscabio which would indicate that the Festing column had engaged the enemy there. Once the firing was heard, the Wolseley column was to move east along the Haunted Road and thus catch the enemy between two forces and destroy him. The plan miscarried. The General arrived at Assanchi but the sound of firing was never heard because Colonel Festing had been unable to induce his African allies to leave Dunkwa and he quite wisely decided to cancel the operation rather than risk the destruction of his small force of disciplined troops in the bush. After waiting several hours, Sir Garnet turned his column about and marched back to Abrakrampa.83

An excellent opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat on an element of the retreating Asante army was thus missed and Sir Garnet's conduct of operations reflects little credit on his professional ability. It is possible, however, that the failure of this operation was actually a blessing in disguise. Had Sir Garnet succeeded in engaging the enemy forces in the Assanchi-Iscabio area without having firm intelligence as to the enemy dispositions, he might well have invited an attack by the Asante
main body which unbeknownst to him, was rapidly approaching his rear. Certainly such an attack would more-than-likely have resulted in a repetition of the Macarthy debacle of 1822. It is indicative of the inadequacy of Sir Garnet's arrangements for scouting and rapid communication that it was not until his return to Abrakrampa that he was informed of the presence of the main body of the Asante army at Essecroom and of Amankwa Tia's intention to move against Abrakrampa and thus eliminate a serious threat to his flank. This placed the General in a difficult position. His detachment of fatigued sailors and marines constituted his only disciplined reserve but the fear of sickness meant that he could not retain them at Abrakrampa for an indefinite period of time or until it pleased Amankwa Tia to attack. Accordingly, he decided to withdraw the bulk of the Europeans from Abrakrampa and by the 30th of October they had been re-embarked on board the warships in the roads.

A garrison of twenty-five sailors and marines was, however, left at Abrakrampa, under the command of Lieutenant Wells, R.N. This force was left there to form a nucleus of reliable men in case the place should be attacked. Major Russell was left in overall command, and his regiment was increased to a strength of nearly 200. He had also about 80 Hausas under Lieutenant Gordon and more than 300 Abrahms in the garrison. As the post was well provisioned and strongly entrenched, with the bush well cleared
around it, it was considered that it was quite capable of resisting an attack by any number of the enemy. 86

Although disappointed over his inability to close with the enemy along the Haunted Road, and considerably sobered by the fact that his failure had probably saved himself and his force from destruction, Sir Garnet had no intention of abandoning offensive operations. Indeed, immediately prior to his return to Cape Coast, he had made further plans for engaging the enemy. After nearly a month of futile attempts to raise African forces of sufficient strength to allow an encounter with Amankwa Tia's army, the General was finally coming to the realization that his numerical inferiority made it impossible for him to engage the main Asante army without the risk of losing the few disciplined troops he possessed as well as much of the prestige he had worked so hard to gain. He therefore announced his decision to adopt the hit-and-run tactics of bush warfare. 87 Brackenbury explains that the movements of the enemy determined the nature of the operations which were subsequently undertaken.

To harass him (the enemy) by means of constant raids from Dunquah and Abrakrampa, both of which places must be strengthened by an increased garrison, and to press, so far as possible upon his rear, with native allies from Napoleon and Abbaye, was the course presenting itself as the most suitable under the unfortunate condition of our inability to attack boldly his main body, caused by the paucity of troops at our disposal. 88
From this time onward, the British began to increase both the diplomatic and the military pressure on the Asantes. On the first of November, Sir Garnet once more took the initiative in the diplomatic sphere by sending to Kumasi yet another copy of his original letter to the Asantehene. This time the letter arrived at its destination but it was greatly delayed enroute. The Asantehene did not receive it until the 20th of November by which time the twenty days allowed for a reply had already expired. Even so, it arrived at an opportune moment.

The failure of Ádu Bofo and Atjiempon in the Western districts and the disconcertingly fragmentary and distorted news of Amankwa Tia's reverses in the south had already caused great concern in Kumasi. As early as the 27th of October a great meeting of the Council had been held at Amankia, a suburb of Kumasi, at which the Chiefs now urged Kofi Karikari to recall the army. Unimpressed by the Chiefs' arguments, he again pointed out that it had been they and not he who had clamoured for war. He therefore refused to do as they asked unless they guaranteed to refund the large sums of money that he had already expended on the campaign. This they eventually agreed to do and the message of recall had then been sent to Amankwa Tia who was already withdrawing.
The copy of Sir Garnet's threatening letter was thus bound to have much more impact arriving when it did than the original would have had. For certainly the letter written in mid-October would have arrived while the Asantehene and his Council still felt that the initiative lay with their forces. Immediately upon the receipt of this copy of the British demands, Mr. Dawson was called to read and interpret them to the Asantehene and his assembled councilmen who listened in profound silence. The captive missionaries were attending this assembly and Ramseyer and Kuhne report that the subsequent speeches reflected considerable concern over the manner in which the war was progressing. The letters which the Asantehene wrote in response to the British demands reflected this concern and clearly illustrated that although the Asante feared an invasion, they did not really believe that one would take place. However, these letters were not received by Sir Garnet until late in December and in the interim, the situation south of the Pra was changing radically.

The General had not waited for a reply to this second letter before increasing the tempo of his military moves in the 'Protectorate'. On the 1st and 2nd of November, both Abrakrampa and Dunkwa were reinforced to the extent that the former had a garrison of some 900 men and the latter had one in excess of 1,500. At the same time the garrison at Napoleon was relieved by a smaller force and Colonel Wood was pushed on to the village
of Beulah. The aim of this move apparently being to give a more forward base from which to use Wood's force and some levies to scout further to the north-east in the direction of Essecroorn and Abrakrampa. Also on the 1st of November, Colonel Festing was informed that the bulk of the enemy's force was definitely between the Sweet River and Dunkwa. He was ordered to make a reconnaissance in force each day, attacking the enemy whenever he had an opportunity, hanging on to him and harassing him as much as possible. Similar orders were issued to Major Russell at Abrakrampa.93 Finally, on the 3rd of November, the newly arrived Lieutenant-Colonel Webber assumed command of the 2IR and marched with a reinforcement of 100 2IR troops to Mansu where he was to take command of the garrison.94

Despite these plans, Sir Garnet fully realized that even the possibility of effectively following and harassing the enemy was doubtful. The allocation of the European troops had not yet been confirmed and even if their use was authorized, they could not be expected until the first week in December at the earliest. The few regulars then on the Coast were insufficient for the work to be done, and the African allies, who might have provided an adequate force and inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy, were still not responding to Sir Garnet's impassioned call to arms in the necessary numbers.
Any attempt to follow and attack the Asantes with the small force at his disposal would have involved a terrible risk and Sir Garnet, who still failed to understand the Fanti attitude, made one last despairing effort to increase Fanti recruiting. On his return from Abrakrampa, he published a proclamation which he felt was a plain statement of the condition of affairs expressed in terms which would have a positive effect on the tribesmen. However, there was still no reason for the Fantis to respond any more vigorously than they already had, and the call achieved nothing.

The General's comments in many subsequent despatches clearly illustrate that this appeal failed and that he had little understanding as to why it had failed. For example, on the 5th of November, he wrote:

> It is impossible to exaggerate the cowardice and feebleness of the conduct of our native allies. They remain absolutely in the rear, abandoning our officers and firing wildly into the air at nothing; then a sudden panic seizes them, and they rush panic-stricken home when no Ashantee is near them. Near Beulah a panic of this kind occurred because they came across some dead Ashantees. From Abrakrampa similar scenes are reported.

To the very end of the campaign the British retained this view of the Fanti. They made no attempt either to ascertain the underlying reasons for the Fanti actions or to utilize the tribesmen in a manner better suited to their methods of warfare and temperament.
On the 3rd of November strong patrols were sent out from Beulah, Abrakrampa and Dunkwa. The two latter alone came upon the enemy, and only Colonel Festing’s patrol from Dunkwa found them in any great numbers. The Dunkwa patrol became engaged in a fierce encounter with a body of some 3,000 Asantes just on the outskirts of Iscablo but the bulk of the untrained African levies, who composed more than ninety percent of the column immediately fled to Dunkwa and even beyond it. The steadiness of the small detachment of West Indians alone saved the situation, and after the action had lasted two hours the enemy’s fire slackened enough to allow the troops to fall back upon Dunkwa. This action combined with the relative quiet around Abrakrampa to convince Sir Garnet that the main body of the Asante army was going to go around Abrakrampa and attempt to debouch on the main road somewhere near Dunkwa. Indeed, despite the fact that there was virtually no scouting being carried out in the immediate vicinity of Abrakrampa, he was so convinced that there was to be no attack on Abrakrampa that he ordered the return of the marines and sailors from there to Cape Coast on the 4th of November.

Fortunately, Major Russell misread these orders and did not prepare the troops for their return to Cape Coast until the afternoon of the 5th. Thus it happened that at the very moment when the marines and sailors were forming up to begin their trek to the coast, the long-predicted Asante attack was made. The
battle began at 3:30 P.M., and it raged on until late in the evening when the Asantes finally retired after having been unable to breach the defences. Sir Garnet received word of the fighting during the night and a relief column composed of the General, his staff, and 22 officers and 303 men of the Naval Brigade began marching for the besieged town early on the morning of the 6th. The troops were thoroughly exhausted by the march and less than half of the original contingent was present when the column arrived at its destination around sunset of the same day. Upon his arrival, Sir Garnet found that the enemy had only just broken off the attack and withdrawn from the field. In anticipation of yet another engagement, he ordered the relieving troops to man the entrenchments so that the exhausted defenders might receive some rest before they would be once more required for combat. 100

The night passed quietly and on the next morning, the 7th, the garrison waited for the attack to be renewed. When nothing had happened by 2:00 P.M., it began to appear that the enemy must be retreating and in order to clarify the situation, Sir Garnet ordered the 1,000 men of the Cape Coast levy which had arrived just that morning, to advance into the bush. It is not surprising, when one considers their lack of training and professional leadership, that the tribesmen refused to carry out this order despite the vigorous attempts on the part of some British officers to force them to do so. Late that same afternoon, however, sever-
al wounded Asante were taken prisoner and they revealed that Amankwa Tia and his chiefs had decided to break-off the battle and that the Asante army had begun to withdraw toward Ainsa early on the morning of the 7th.101

Had he but realized it, Sir Garnet was now presented with an excellent opportunity to severely hurt the retreating Asante army. With the defending force from Abrakrampa worn out from the long battle and with the untrained, undisciplined, and inadequately led African levies obviously incapable of closing, and/or unwilling to close with the enemy's rear-guard, the time had come for the application of those harassment tactics which the General had supposedly adopted on the 31st of October. Small scouting parties composed of the special service officers, men from 2NDR, Hausas, Kossoos, and some of the Assins, could have been formed and despatched along the trail being used by the Asante. These patrols could have maintained contact with the enemy with a view to keeping the General informed as to their location and actions so that he could then slip an ambushing party around to the north through Dunkwa and attack the flank of the Asante columns at a time and place of his own choosing. Fortunately for the Asante, the General failed to grasp this opportunity. Instead, he decided to adhere to the very policy which had already failed so miserably.
At daybreak on the morning of the 8th, columns composed almost exclusively of African levies\textsuperscript{102} were sent out on both the Anasmadie and Ainsa roads with orders to harass the enemy's rear. However, although these unbelievably inadequate patrols closed with the retreating enemy near the village of Ainsa, they accomplished absolutely nothing. Indeed, when it was decided to disengage from the fire-fight which had broken out as soon as contact had been made with the Asante rear-guard, the African levies cut and ran for Abrakrampa as they feared that the Asante were following and surrounding them.

It was obvious from these events that the continued use of the levies in this manner would accomplish virtually nothing. Sir Garnet refused to see this, however. Ignoring the obvious deficiencies in training, discipline, and leadership in the African levies, he contented himself with continuing to follow what was by this time the standard British approach: blame the cowardly blacks but bash on regardless.\textsuperscript{103} Accordingly, neither he nor any member of his staff made any attempt to adapt their tactics to the realities of the situation.

The post at Abbaye was closed down and the troops from there were used to reinforce the now redundant "advanced" posts at Beulah, Napoleon, and Abrakrampa. In addition, these three posts as well as Akrofu, Dunkwa, and Mansu, were all fortified and prepared to meet any Asante attack. In this way, Hausas and
troops from 2WIR were committed to garrison duty in posts which a study of the map reveals were in all likelihood completely safe from enemy attack. Thus the troops most suitable for use in scouting and harassment operations were removed from the field at just the moment when they could have been most effectively employed. Not content with this, however, the General then ordered that parties composed almost exclusively of the African levies press upon the Asante rear from Beulah and Abrakrampa and harry the Asante flanks from the direction of Dunkwa and Mansu. No attempt was made to head the Asante withdrawal. The main objective had become simply to deny the enemy the use of the Cape Coast/Prasu road and to speed his movement across the Pra.104

The very composition of these harassment forces made it very unlikely that they would be able in any way to operate effectively. As matters developed, however, they never had the opportunity to prove or disprove this point for Sir Garnet's failure to create an effective scouting force immediately after Abrakrampa resulted in all contact with the enemy being lost.

Scattered and unverified reports received from Asante stragglers and deserters after the 8th of November indicated that the enemy was moving so as to strike the road north of Mansu and it had been on the basis of those reports that Sir Garnet had issued the orders detailed above. By the 10th of November, however, all touch had been lost with the Asante army although there were
constant reports and rumours of enemy activity between Dunkwa and Mansu. Somewhat surprisingly, the main body of the Asante army remained in the bush rather than break out onto the Cape Coast/Prasu road. Finally, on the 20th of November, it was ascertained that Amankwa Tia had bypassed both Dunkwa and Mansu and was already to the northwest of Mansu. On the basis of this information, construction was begun on a new post at Acrofumu on the 21st, and on the 23rd, Colonel Wood took command of both the new post and the advanced guard in the operations south of the Pra.105

On the 26th, Colonel Wood moved south to yet another outpost which had been established just south of Suta. There he learned that the Asante army had finally debouched onto the road at Suta and Fesu on the night of the 25th/26th and that it was moving slowly toward Prasu.106 On the morning of the 27th, letters were received from headquarters instructing him to harass the enemy in his retreat, and authorizing him to proceed beyond Suta if he should think it desirable. He accordingly decided to march to either Ahtoh Insu or Fesu depending on the circumstances.107 This decision led to the battle of Fesu which proved to be the last engagement with the Asantes south of the Pra.

The battle began well for the British forces but a minor tactical withdrawal caused the Hausas and Mende in the force to panic and the vast majority of the African troops ran for their lives. Fortunately, the enemy did not press them very closely
during this retreat, or the result might well have been disastrous. Even so, a great deal was made of the affair though it was not nearly the disaster that the British press subsequently tried to make of it. Indeed, the staff eventually learned through a prisoner that far from being a total failure, the action had finally produced the desired effect. This prisoner reported that as soon as the Asantes had given up their pursuit of the retreating British force, they broke up their camp, and fled through the night by the light of torches, scarcely stopping until they reached the banks of the Pra. Colonel Wood was not aware of this, however. His untrained scouts were unable to patrol effectively and even though the miserable condition of the Asantes was clearly illustrated by the fact that the Prasu road and the bush to each side was found strewn with their dead and dying, the scouts simply refused to push on past Fesu. Consequently, he was unable to form an accurate picture of the enemy's location. As a result, it was not until the 4th of December that Colonel Wood had sufficient information to permit his advancing beyond Suta. By that time, all of the Asantes were across the river and not a man was to be seen upon the north bank.

The retreating army did not reach Kumasi until the 22nd of December, and its return was far different from the triumphal processions so often seen before. Instead of the usual long lines of prisoners and slaves loaded with valuable loot and the
numerous jawbones of the enemy's slain, only eighty persons now returned with the army and the jawbones that were displayed were nearly all very old. In addition, battle, famine, and disease had felled fully half of the some 40,000 men who had gone forth to the war. More than 280 chiefs had fallen and others who had gone out with twenty men now returned alone carrying their bundles on their heads. Under these circumstances, there can be little wonder that a city which had but twelve short months before echoed with the joyous send off given to a seemingly invincible army, should now be filled with the sounds of "mourning and lamentations." Even so, one must not draw the conclusion from this that the miserable condition of Amankwa Tia's army was solely the result of Sir Garnet's operations. In fact, although the General and his chroniclers would intimate that the operations conducted after the end of October were largely responsible for the depletion of the Asante force; most of the damage was inflicted by Colonel Harley, the Fantis, the rains, disease and famine. Indeed, although the actions of Sir Garnet's forces were undoubtedly one of the motives prompting Amankwa Tia's decision to withdraw, they inflicted heavy casualties on only one occasion--Abrakrampa. The General actually missed his one opportunity to severely maul Amankwa Tia's army at little cost to himself when he neglected to properly carry out his proposed harassing operations after the battle at Abrakrampa.
Nevertheless, the second phase of the war drew to a close with the bedraggled Asante army once more back in Kumasi and the British force closed up onto the south bank of the Pra and it was at this time that Sir Garnet received the Asantehene's reply to his letter of the 1st of November. Had he entertained any doubts as to whether or not an invasion would really be necessary, the tone of Kofi Karikari's response settled the issue. The answer to Sir Garnet's letter and a subsequent one written immediately after the battle at Fesu, were received on the 24th of December and once he had studied them both, the General was convinced that an invasion was absolutely necessary if the Asante people were to be taught a "proper lesson". However, time was of the essence as the necessary European troops had to be used during the period of time between December and February. With the month of December already past there remained barely enough time to reach Kumasi and then effect a withdrawal to Cape Coast before the end of February. Every effort had therefore to be made to accomplish this mission within the stipulated time limit. Thus it transpired that the third phase of the war, some preparations for which had already been underway since the arrival of Sir Garnet and his staff, began immediately after the 'Protectorate' was declared free of the enemy.
CHAPTER IV

THE DRIVE TO KUMASI

The third phase of this war was first and foremost a race against time. Even before Amankwa Tia had completed his withdrawal from the 'Protectorate', Sir Garnet had been becoming increasingly alarmed over the rapidly dwindling 'dry' season. For this reason, although he had received no assurances that European troops were to be sent to the Gold Coast, he had been driving the members of his staff ever since their arrival in October in order to have all the necessary logistic arrangements completed before the expected reinforcements arrived. On the 9th of December the already serious time element became even more vital. On that day, Sir Garnet, who was still up-country, received word that the first contingent of European troops had arrived at Cape Coast.

The General was thankful that the Gladstone Administration had granted his request but he was unjustifiably critical of the timing of the arrival of the troops. He believed that they arrived too late to attack and defeat the Asantes while they were still near the coast and thereby destroy their army before it could regain the relative safety of Asante territory. Even worse, was the fact that preparations for the invasion of Asante were still incomplete so that no immediate advantage could be taken of the Asante confusion resulting from their withdrawal. Sir Garnet felt, quite unjustifiably, that had he been given
prior warning, the invasion preparations could have been pushed more vigorously and he would have been ready to take up the pursuit while the enemy was still off balance.\(^4\) However, such was not the case and as it was of prime importance that the white troops not be exposed to the West African climate any longer than absolutely necessary, he was forced to order the ships to sea until the end of the year, by which time it was estimated that everything would be ready for the march to the Pra.

Thus the arrival of the European Brigade, complicated as it was by the rapidly approaching rainy season, and the absence of any indication that the Asantehene was prepared to accept the British terms, suddenly revealed a major shortcoming in the General's conduct of operations to this point. It was all at once clearly apparent that even though vigorous initial steps had been taken, the staff had not kept up the tempo of the preparations for the expected invasion of Asante territory. Consequently, although the troops had arrived within twenty-four hours of when he had forecast they would arrive Sir Garnet was not yet ready for them. He therefore exerted great pressure on all concerned in an attempt to make up for lost time; a step which was made even more vital by the fact that he had already set the 15th of January, 1874, as the date for the invasion to begin.
On that date he planned to launch several columns simultaneously across the Pra and have them converge on Kumasi with a view to weakening the army which would oppose his Main Body by forcing the detachment from the Asantehene's army of the contingents of those Chiefs who would find their own districts threatened by the auxiliary columns. The Main Body, consisting of the European brigade, the Naval Brigade, Wood's and Russell's Regiments and Rait's Artillery, under Sir Garnet himself, was to advance along the Prasu-Kumasi road; Captain Glover was to lead his force towards Jabin from the east; while a third column composed of Akims under Captain Butler, was to operate between Glover's force and the main body. A fourth column was to operate on the General's left flank under Captain Dalrymple who was to advance with a force of Wassaws, Denkyeras, and Komendas, and cross the Pra lower down than the Main Body. 5

In the light of the previous difficulties with the African 'allies' and the virtually insurmountable problems of communication, this was a highly ambitious plan. Nevertheless, it was based on a sound theory and preparations for its execution were underway. Now that the European troops had arrived, not only the organization of the auxiliary columns, but also the completion of the road to the Pra, the preparation of the staging camps, and the organization of transport, all of which were far behind schedule, had to be rapidly pushed forward, in order to
achieve a maximum period of time for "dry" operations. Thus the short dry period was to be further reduced by virtue of the fact that Sir Garnet's failure to properly expedite these invasion preparations would ultimately result in the loss of precious time spent in completing tasks which should, and could, have been completed earlier.

The building of the Main Supply Route from Cape Coast was of basic importance to the forthcoming operation. Fortunately, clearing and general surface improvement had been pushed on as rapidly as the retreating Asantes had permitted and by Christmas Day, Major Home was able to report from Prasu that the road was completed to the specifications set earlier by Sir Garnet.6

The track itself was, of course, only part of the problem in so far as the Cape Coast/Prasu route was concerned. The question of selecting and preparing sites for the staging camps was also of great importance and Captain Huyshe had eventually been ordered to effect liaison with the CRE with a view to selecting the necessary sites along the route.7 In addition, Surgeon-Major Gore was appointed sanitary officer with instructions to report upon the measures necessary to ensure the health of the troops to be quartered in each of the camps.8

Eight sites were eventually approved and despite the late start and several construction problems, the three officers directly responsible for the preparation of the camps had completed
their task by the 26th of December. While the preparation of the road had ensured that the men should march to the Pra with dry feet, the camps were designed to provide for any other contingency. For example, shelter from the sun and rain was ensured by the building of huts; by means of guard-beds, the troops were raised two to three feet above the damp ground; a supply of pure drinking-water was ensured by the careful selection of the camps and the abundance of filters; and lastly, an ample supply of good food was ensured by the ration which had been fixed on the recommendation of Dr. Home, the Principal Medical Officer. Good opportunities for ablution were provided at all the stations; supplies of dried wood were collected for the purpose of fires for cooking, and also to enable fires to be lighted at night in the huts or in the doors as smudges and for warmth. A good arrangement for surface drainage was established at each camp; and a small body of sanitary police and scavengers was formed for the sole purpose of camp conservancy.10

Despite all of these measures, however, it was appreciated that sickness would be relatively high among the Europeans throughout the campaign and that there would be battle-casualties once the invasion began. Immediate attention had therefore to be given to the creation of a system of treatment and evacuation for the sick and wounded. It had already been decided before he left England that Sir Garnet would be responsible for medical matters only up until the time that casualties were marked for evacuation
back to England and that once it had been decided to send a man home, he became the responsibility of the Royal Navy and the Home Government.11

Dr. Home was therefore concerned only with local or first echelon medical planning and he had actually devised an applicable medical plan within two weeks of his arrival on board the Ambritz.12 The pressure of time, however, entailed some modification of this plan and in the end proper hospitals were constructed only at Cape Coast, Mansu, Akrofu and Prasu. At all of the other staging-camps the procedure followed was simply to improve the best of the barracks and set them apart for the sick and wounded after the troops had marched through. In anticipation of a heavy demand, the plan also provided for further accommodation of casualties aboard certain ships. H.M.S. Victor Emmanuel was sent out from England fitted to service 240 patients. H.M.S. Himalaya and H.M.S. Tamar, lying in the roads, could accommodate 100 each; besides which, the other transports could—in case of need—take convalescents, and provide properly for men not requiring active medical treatment.13

The hospital accommodation was excellent when one considers the times and the circumstances and Dr. Home continued to set a high standard of sound and efficient planning when he evolved the system for evacuation of the sick and wounded from the front. Based entirely on African porters, this system, when work-
ed at high pressure, was considered capable of moving 1,425 casualties a month and his memorandum on this matter is a concise and realistic directive which provided for the most efficient use of porters and litters. Of his work in this field, Brackenbury writes:

Only a brain specially gifted with organizing power, and of remark-
ably clear judgment, could have arrang-
ed with such singular effectiveness for
the probable contingencies of a campaign
in this climate. All Dr. Home's calcula-
tions were subsequently found to be
most wonderfully correct; and his suc-
cessors found organized and ready to
their hand a complete system.14

The road, in-transit troop accommodation and the medical arrangements were therefore rather rapidly prepared. Unfortunately such was not the case with transport15 which proved to be not only a major problem prior to the invasion but which also became a chronic difficulty throughout the campaign. This was partly be-
cause Sir Garnet did nothing to relieve the problem until it had become virtually insoluble. It was also partly due to the fact that, when he did finally recognize the seriousness of the situa-
tion, he spent most of his time trying to find some alternative16 to human porterage rather than attempting to remove the causes of the complaints of the Africans so that the only effective system of transport for the region could operate properly.
Eventually, however, the British were forced to acknowledge that human porterage was the only answer to the transport problem. This meant that the corps of some 650 carriers found on the Coast when Sir Garnet arrived, would have to be increased to more than ten times that number before the drive on Kumasi could be launched. However, by the 18th of November, the total transport corps was reported to be at a strength of only 1,323. In an attempt to swell these numbers, several missions were sent to various kings and chiefs in the hope that the number of carriers immediately required might be provided without touching the armed Africans, the idea being that these could therefore be left for the present, remaining available to be taken and employed as carriers at some subsequent date. Unfortunately, these missions were only partially successful, and Sir Garnet's failure to effectively deal with the problem when it first appeared made it necessary not only to disarm some of the African allies in order to ease the situation, but it also became necessary to recruit women for the job.

The lack of a properly organized transport department was one of the root causes of much of the difficulty. Transport had been placed under the Control officers and thus a service which required all the energy of a large number of experienced officers was being superintended by officers who were so heavily involved in their immediate responsibilities for supplies that they had
little time for organizing, paying, counting, and caring for carrier gangs. Sir Garnet realized that organization was one of the problems but the situation was so out of hand that he was almost despairing of finding a solution when a senior officer ideally suited to handling the situation arrived aboard the Samaritan on the 18th of December. Lieutenant Colonel George Colley was well known to the General who said of him,

He was— all round— one of the very ablest men I ever knew. Perfect as a man of business, I never served with any one who could so absolutely evolve order from confusion or straighten out the most tangled web of difficulties so effectually as he could.22

No time was lost in appointing this new arrival as Director of Transport and assigning him to the command and organization of the transport service. The move was a good one for not only had Colonel Colley for some considerable time devoted his attention to questions of army organization, including the vital questions of transport and supply,23 but he also brought to the job an abundance of energy and a great capacity for hard work.

The new Director of Transport left for Mansu on the 19th of December and within a week he had submitted to the Deputy-Controller a memorandum which provided for the systematization of the transport. This memorandum, an adaption of normal army transport organization, was accepted and its recommendations immediately implemented.24 The fact remained, however, that the system
would work only if sufficient manpower was available and manpower was still in short supply. The total number of carriers required by the force for the march northwards from the Pra, without provisions, but carrying regimental reserve of fifty rounds of ammunition per man, amounted to more than 3,500 men. In addition to these 3,500 men, there would also be a requirement for 5,000 station carriers who were needed to carry up supplies of food and ammunition, and to carry back the sick and wounded. It was appreciated that if any portion of this transport should fail there would be but one way to meet the difficulty; to reduce the manoeuvring force.

In an attempt to avoid this step, Sir Garnet ordered Colonel Colley to take over the management of the tribes from Colonel Festing. Colonel Colley then held a meeting of the kings and chiefs on the 27th of December at which time he inquired into the cause behind the continuing problem of desertion, and urged them to bring forward any complaints which they might have. However, although the immediate results of this meeting were heartening and the assignment of regimental transport progressed quite well, events would soon prove that the problem was far from being solved.

While the logistic preparations for the invasion were in progress, the attempts to form the auxiliary columns were also going forward. Captain Glover had gone to Accra immediately
after his arrival at Cape Coast and had been virtually single-handedly organizing his Volta expedition ever since late September. It had been his intention to use the Hausa Armed Police which he had taken from Cape Coast Castle as the nucleus of a force of armed Africans drawn from the various tribes found in the southern trans-Volta region. Unfortunately, he found it much more difficult to execute his plans than to evolve them for he encountered one difficulty after another.28 As a result, although he had promised Sir Garnet on the 14th of December that he would be established on the banks of the Pra by the 15th of January with a force of at least 16,000 men and possibly as many as 30,000,29 he was forced to write the General on the 22nd of December to the effect that he saw no possibility of reaching the Pra in less than forty days.30

This message caused considerable consternation at Cape Coast for it had been Glover's optimistic forecast of the 6th which had been largely responsible for Sir Garnet having chosen the 15th of January as the invasion date. The General realized that because of his slowness in completing his preparations for invasion, any further delay on his part would necessitate the abandonment of the projected invasion altogether for the rains would set in before it could possibly be carried out. Additional orders were therefore sent to Captain Glover requiring him to advance immediately to the Pra with his Hausas and any other dis-
ciplined troops he had, and to be on the banks of the river by the 15th of January whether the allies could be induced to follow him or not. In addition, he was not to allow any of his men to cross the Oda River to the west of Jabin or advance towards Kumasi.  

To the chagrin of all concerned, the two remaining officers gazetted to raise auxiliary columns were even less successful than Captain Glover. Captain Butler, who had left Cape Coast for Akim country on the 3rd of November, had been charged with a double mission. He was to raise African levies as quickly as possible for the purpose of both hastening the Asante withdrawal from the 'Protectorate' and for participating in the invasion of Asante territory.  

He failed in his first mission partly because of Captain Glover's reckless giving of presents which made the Akims reluctant to join Butler and forego the more lucrative remuneration in Glover's camp, and partly because of what appears to have been a general lack of fighting spirit on the part of the Akims, who had been untouched by the invasion and had, therefore, no reason to participate in the British venture. In the end analysis, only Captain Butler himself, with about fifteen men, reached Prasu by way of Yankumasi Assin on the 10th of December and found that the enemy had already crossed the river. Undeterred by the fact that what he viewed as the apathy and greed of the Akim chiefs
had thus brought about the utter failure of his first objective, Captain Butler returned to the Akim territory and turned his attention to his second task, the collection of men for the invasion of Asante.

The situation in the west, where Captain Dalrymple had gone at about the same time that Captain Butler had departed for Accra, was even more discouraging. Captain Dalrymple had exerted every effort to raise his force of Wassawas, Denkyeras, Eguafos and Komendas but he suffered much the same problems as Captain Butler. When he had first set out for his recruiting area, he had expected to find fully 1,000 allies already gathered under Sergeant Hughes of the Cape Coast Volunteers, but found none at all. Even so, he kept at his task in the hope that at least some men could be persuaded to serve.

Despite the apparent failure of at least two of the auxiliary columns, Sir Garnet was determined to move the main body across the Pra on the 15th of January. By Christmas of 1873 most of the logistic preparations for the movement of the main body had been completed and on the 27th of December the troops began to concentrate at Prasu. The General and his staff departed from Cape Coast on the morning of the 27th and joined the garrison already at Prasu on the 2nd of January. The Naval Brigade and 1WIR disembarked on the 27th. The former moved off to Prasu and the latter, in a serious instance of misuse, was despatched to
various garrison duties along the main road. The European brigade began to disembark on the 1st of January. Both the Rifle Brigade and the Black Watch landed and began moving up-country without incident but on the 3rd, before the full complement of Fusiliers could be landed, the transport system began to falter.

Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Alison, who was in direct command of the European brigade, immediately suspended the disembarkation of the second half-battalion of the Fusiliers and the Royal Artillery and telegraphed to Colonel Colley that he would hold up any further unloading until the matter was resolved. On receipt of these reports at Frasu, Sir Garnet confirmed the Brigadier's orders to halt the disembarkation and he further ordered that the troops in transit be halted in their staging-camps. He then made arrangements for the temporary employment of the men of 1WIR and 2WIR as well as Wood's Regiment as carriers, but the problem was acute and some more permanent solution had to be found.

Even before Brigadier Alison's report, Colonel Colley had informed Sir Garnet that carrier desertions had become general at all stations along the road and that unless the trend could be stopped, the march to Kumasi could never be undertaken. He also stated that under any circumstances, so large a force of Europeans as originally contemplated would have to be abandoned because sufficient transport was simply not available. Brackenbury comments:
Every mouth to be fed must now be considered; and not one single European with whom it was possible to dispense, could under these circumstances be brought up to the front. Already at this date it was perfectly evident that the amount of supplies which the Deputy-Controller had undertaken to have at Prasu by the 15th of January, could not be there; and it became a matter for serious consideration, wither, if the force originally proposed were to be brought up to the Prah, the stock of supplies there would not diminish day by day rather than increase. It was a difficult situation but Sir Garnet made the only decision possible under the circumstances. He at once ordered the first half-battalion of Fusiliers to re-embark on board the ships. The General was most unhappy at the resultant loss of the detachment of Royal Artillery and of the infantry battalion but at least the presence of Rait's highly proficient Hausa artillery offset the loss of the British gunners. With the troops already ashore still stopped in their staging camps, the immediate demand for carriers was made less acute and Sir Garnet then conferred with Colonel Colley as to a more permanent solution to the overall problem.

The long overdue solution which they arrived at called for an improvement in the food being provided for the carriers, an increase in their pay, and more stringent application of the punishments provided for desertion. The third item was especially effective and with the arrival, during the second week of January,
of a large reinforcement of officers specifically gazetted by Sir Garnet for employment with the locally organized transport service, the situation began to improve considerably. By the 6th of January, the troops were once more on the move and the flow of supplies was rapidly building up to the proper volume.\textsuperscript{46}

In the meantime, however, Sir Garnet had received an embassy from the Asantehene bearing Kofi Karikari's answer to his ultimatum of the 21st of November. He had barely finished reviewing the garrison upon his arrival at Prasu when he was informed that nine Asante messengers were on their way to the camp with two letters. The contents of both letters led the British to believe that Kofi Karikari had no idea of the true state of affairs. Claridge summarizes the general opinion at the time when he writes:

It was well known that no one dared to tell the King any bad news, and the tone of these two letters fully bore out the supposition that Kofi Karikari had no idea of the real extent of the reverses that his army had met with, and this belief was afterwards confirmed by the missionaries. As a matter of fact, the King knew nothing of the defeat of his troops before Elmina and at Abrakrampa and Dunkwa, but had only heard of a brilliant victory that had been gained over the British at Fesu, . . .\textsuperscript{47}

Convinced that this was the case, Sir Garnet decided to communicate once more with the Asantehene in a final attempt to clarify the situation and, if possible, to avoid an invasion.
His review of the Asante reverses south of the Pra was brutally frank and his promise of ultimate destruction should the war be continued was equally straightforward. Then, despite the obvious dangers involved, he informed the Asantehene of his plan of operations in the hope that Kofi Karikari would be under no misapprehension as to the threat posed by the British. He did not, however, close the door to a negotiated peace. He offered peace on the prviso that all of the European and African prisoners be immediately released; that an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold be paid; and that a new treaty of peace be concluded, in Kumasi, after the delivery of certain later to be specified hostages for the safety of the General and his escort.

Not content with the expected shock value of this letter, Sir Garnet also proposed to show unmistakably to the messengers entrusted with the delivery of his letter that he was determined to compel compliance with his terms. Accordingly the messengers were detained until more white troops should reach the Pra and be pushed across it in a show of strength and until the bridge across the river could be completed.

The arrival of Naval Brigade at Prasu on the morning of the 3rd of January provided the General with the 'cast' for his show. As a first step, the sailors and marines were formed up and the Asante envoys were marched past them so that there might be no doubt in their minds as to the fact of the European build-
up. Then, on the following day, the Gatling gun was demonstrated for them as an indication of the overwhelming force of the British firepower. Finally, on the morning of the 6th, troops were marched across the newly completed bridge as yet another example of British strength and determination. The envoys were then passed through these apparently invading forces and sent on their way to Kumasi with Sir Garnet's latest letter. Although there was some slim hope that this latest communication might result in a negotiated settlement, the General entertained little hope for such a result and as the transport problem had already seriously disrupted his timetable, he continued to push forward with his invasion plan, of vital importance to which was the establishment of a secure bridgehead on the north bank of the Pra. The staff anticipated enemy resistance, if not to the passage of the Pra itself, then at least to the advance immediately beyond it. In fact, it was felt that the roads would have to be cut and the various camping grounds cleared every day under cover of the whole European force and that the rate of advance would average only four or five miles a day. A bridgehead was therefore needed in order to have a secure base from which to launch the assault and from which to supply support sufficient to sustain the advance under the most gruelling of conditions.

The original plan was to complete the bridge and form the bridgehead under the protection of Rait's guns and the infantry of the Naval Brigade and Wood's and Russell's Regiments. There-
fore as the transport problem had made time even more crucial than had previously been the case and as the Asante were expected to contest the crossing, the bridgehead began even while the Asante envoys were at Prasu.

Immediately upon his arrival at Prasu, Sir Garnet decided to increase reconnaissance north of the Pra. Accordingly, the existing body of scouts was increased in numbers, put under command of Lieutenant Lord Gifford and sent across the river on the morning of the 4th of January. The scouts encountered no resistance and, on the morning of the 5th, Russell's Regiment was ferried across, the bridge not yet being ready, and marched about eight miles north of the river to the village of Atobiasi, while Gifford's scouts advanced to Esaman. Russell's Regiment had orders to send on a company provided with entrenching tools to form a defensive post at Esaman, while the remainder of the regiment was to use the time remaining on the 5th to clear the ground and erect huts at Atobiasi. On the 6th it was to commence opening the road. The regimental carriers returned to Prasu on the 6th in order to begin carrying supplies from Prasu to Atobiasi.

This move was also carried out without encountering any enemy resistance and from the 7th of January onward, preparations moved ahead smoothly and the pattern established south of the Pra was soon being successfully repeated. By the 12th of January, the Prasu encampment was completed; the engineers were working on
the improvement of the road north of the river; Gifford and his scouts were about 12 miles up the trail at Accrofumu; adequate defensive posts had been established at Atobiasi, Esaman, Ansah, and the ford on the Fumusu River; the movement of reserves of supplies to these posts was well under way and the construction of a large control store had been started at Esaman. It was at this point that a second embassy arrived from the Asantehene.

The envoys who had carried Sir Garnett's letter of the 2nd to Kumasi had been greatly alarmed by the growing European force at Prasu as well as by the sight of the Naval Brigade on the road just north of the Pra, Russell's men at Atobiasi, and Gifford's scouts at Esaman. They were therefore convinced that a crisis was at hand such as had never threatened Asante before and their comments as well as the contents of Sir Garnet's letter had a profound effect on the Asantehene and his council. Indeed, virtually all of the Chiefs who had been engaged in the war favoured peace while only those who had never left Kumasi during the conflict now dared to counsel further resistance. In fact, it is proposed that the only thing preventing the Asantehene from surrendering was one of Sir Garnet's demands.

As the matter of the hostages had not yet become an issue, it is suggested that Kofi Karikari would probably have consented to surrender all of the prisoners, and might even have agreed to pay the indemnity. However, the proposed presence of a British
force in Kumasi when the treaty was signed was "too much for Ashanti pride".\textsuperscript{59} It would have signified total surrender and would certainly have threatened the empire with total extinction as it would have proved to the tributary states and the surrounding tribes that the power of Kumasi was indeed on the wane. Such an admission was obviously an impossibility and some means had therefore to be found to gain time so that the defeated and disbanded Asante army, which had been allowed to disperse immediately after its arrival in Kumasi,\textsuperscript{60} could be once more brought together. It would appear likely, therefore, that the Asantehene, rather than absolutely refuse the British terms, attempted to prolong the negotiations with a view to not only gaining some delay for the purpose of rallying his forces, but also in the hope that some better terms might be obtained whereby he might gain peace without having to sacrifice his dignity and imperil the integrity of his empire.

For these reasons, the letter carried by his envoys expressed his desire for peace and asked that a British officer might be allowed to return with the Asante party in order to hear all that the Asantehene and his Council had to say on the subject. In addition, Plange and Amankwa Tia were blamed for all of the misunderstandings and the General was asked to halt his army and thus avoid any possibility of fighting.\textsuperscript{61} As a sign of his good faith and in an astute diplomatic move Kofi Karikari also released the missionary, Kuhne, and begging him to intercede for him
with Sir Garnet, sent him with the envoys assuring him that every-
thing would be arranged satisfactorily if only the European ambas-
sador was sent. However, the information supplied by Mr. Kuhne
was interpreted by Sir Garnet as a further indication that the
Asantehene was only trying to gain time. 62

Therefore, in acknowledging the receipt of this letter, Sir Garnet explained that he could not consent to send any officer
to Kumasi so long as the Asantehene detained two of the previous
Governor's messengers. He also stated that he would not halt his
army until the preliminary terms that he had imposed had been
complied with. 63

As a result, Accrofumu was occupied on the 13th of January
and the construction of a large control store was begun there.
On the 14th, Gifford's scouts advanced to Anwiausso, and it was
from there that the Asante envoys were despatched with Sir Garnet's
answer to the Asantehene's second letter. On the 15th, the scouts
pushed on to Brofoyedru. On the same day, new orders were issued
to Major Russell, who had been commanding the Advance Guard and
supervising the garrisoning of the various new posts, directing
him to obtain and hold, if possible, possession of the crest of
the Adansi hills. Gifford's scouts conducted a reconnaissance of
the new position on the 16th and reported both the town of Monsi
and the crest of the hills deserted. Russell therefore occupied
and fortified the crest of the Monsi hill on the 17th of January.
Major Horns, with 36 sappers, arrived at Monsi on the same day and commenced forming an entrenched post there. 64

The next day, Gifford's scouts made the first move into Asante proper 65 by advancing to Quisah which they found occupied by a small party of Asante scouts. No fighting took place, however, and Russell moved down and occupied the town on the 19th of January. Sir Garnet had ordered that no advance was to take place beyond the crest of the Monsi hill as he did not wish to show any force beyond that point until he should march over with his white troops. However, the orders did not reach Major Russell in time for him to act on them and once he was in possession of the town he did not abandon it. 66

The entire British operation was settling down and gaining momentum with the passage of each day. By the 19th a good road had been cut to the very crest of the Monsi hill and the establishment of staging-camps was proceeding extremely well. Not only was the Monsi Hill position well fortified but clearings sufficient for the encampment of two battalions together with fortified posts for sixty men and large control stores had been completed at both Esaman and Accrofumu and were well on the way to completion at Monsi. In addition, it was decided that the Advanced-Guard, which now consisted of Rait's Artillery, Wood's and Russell's Regiments and the headquarters of 2 NIR, 67 could be more profitably used if it were organized as a separate command.
under Colonel McLeod of the Black Watch. Even more important, however, was Colonel Colley's report of the 19th to the effect that the transport difficulty had, from the British point of view, been satisfactorily overcome. In fact, matters had progressed so well that the European troops began to cross the Pra on the morning of the 20th of January.

The departure of the European Brigade on this date was a great relief to Sir Garnet who had been seriously disturbed by the fact that the carrier problem had forced him to abandon his plans to concentrate his troops at Prasu by the 13th and to cross the river on the 15th. As matters had developed, however, the slower rate of concentration and the delayed departure date were of little consequence. The lack of any Asante resistance to the movements of the Advanced-Guard had changed the entire picture and the expected fighting advance at the rate of four or five miles per day never materialized. Indeed, rather than having to fight for every foot of ground, the European Brigade was now faced with a simple four-day approach march to Quisah. Brackenbury put a good face on the situation by ignoring the fact that Sir Garnet's negligence with regard to certain of the preparations for the invasion had been largely to blame for the delay. He wrote:
... so far from our movements having been delayed, and time having been lost, time was actually gained over what had originally been anticipated; and in addition, the European troops would be able to march to the other side of the Adansi hills with comfort, and under most favourable sanitary conditions instead of the discomforts and under the unfavourable conditions, which, it had been feared, they would have to meet.

Sir Garnet, the staff and the Naval Brigade were the first to leave Prasu while the remaining units followed at set intervals. The General was most impressed with what he saw along the road and his arrival at Monsi on the 23rd, accompanied as it was by the arrival of the Rifle Brigade at Monsi, the movement of the Naval Brigade and Rait's Artillery to Quisah, and the advance of Russell's Regiment and a detachment of Royal Engineers to Fomana, filled him with a strong feeling of optimism. Sensing that this was the time to press home his advantage, he then issued orders for a continuation of the advance. However, it was precisely at this moment that yet another embassy arrived from the Asantehene.

In the early afternoon of the 23rd, two envoys arrived in Fomana accompanied by the rest of the white captives and carrying yet another letter from the Asantehene. The envoys were held at Fomana while the captives, Monsieur Bonnat and Mr. and Mrs. Ramseyer and their two children, brought Kofi Karikari's letter down to Monsi. The Asantehene had little to add to his previous
communications. Repeating his plea that the General halt his advance, he declared that he would make Amankwa Tia pay the indemnity if he was only given time and that he would liberate all of the Fanti prisoners directly upon the completion of negotiations. 72

The General refused to see any attempt at conciliation in this response to his demands and once again the comments of the released captives confirmed him in his belief that the Asantehene was only attempting to buy time so that he could gather his army. 73 Consequently, in his reply, Sir Garnet refused to make any compromise. Instead he hardened his demands by insisting on the immediate liberation of the Fanti prisoners and by demanding the payment of half the indemnity—something which Kofi Karikari had already said required time—and the delivery of certain important hostages as preliminaries to the conclusion of peace. He promised to advance but slowly for the next few days in order that the Asantehene might have time to comply with these conditions and to halt his army directly Kofi Karikari had done so. He would then advance with an escort of only 500 men to sign the treaty in Kumasi. 74 On the surface, it appeared that Sir Garnet was granting a considerable concession to the Asantehene by calling a halt to the advance. The truth of the matter was, however, that no real delay was entailed by the General's promise for it was actually necessary to call a halt at that point in the march in order
to form a supply depot at Fomana and close up the column before continuing the advance.\textsuperscript{75}

In fact, even had the four-day halt at Fomana been a serious concession to the Asantehene, this last letter from Sir Garnet had, through his lack of knowledge, firmly closed the door on any possibility of a negotiated peace. Not only had he continued to insist on Kumasi as the site for the signing of a peace treaty but he had also demanded, and continued to demand, hostages whom it was impossible for Kofi Karikari to surrender. The hostages specified by Sir Garnet were Prince Mensa, the Heir-Apparent, the Queen-Mother, Efua Kobri, and the heirs to the stools of Jabin, Mampon, Kokofu and Bekwai. These were the most important persons in the empire and had apparently been chosen with the idea of impressing the Asantehene with the irresistible strength of the British. The fact of the matter was, however, that it was absolutely out of the question that they could ever be given up as hostages. United they were far more powerful than Kofi Karikari himself,\textsuperscript{76} and even should the Asantehene be able to convince them that they should voluntarily become hostages, neither the Queen-Mother nor the Heir-Apparent could ever have been surrendered so long as Asante remained a kingdom. It is therefore clear that the halt at Fomana could accomplish nothing toward the achievement of a diplomatic solution to the problem and that ultimately Kumasi would have to be taken by force.
Fortunately for the British, it appeared that the Main Body had successfully overcome its initial problems and that with matters now finally going largely according to plan, a fight for Kumasi, should it be necessary, would not be too trying a task. Things were not going nearly so well with the auxiliary columns. In the end, Captain Dalrymple failed completely in his attempts to raise a force in the West and he was finally forced to abandon his mission and rejoin the Main Body at Fomana as it returned from Kumasi. Similarly, Captain Butler, who did at least manage to raise a small force of Akims and lead them as far as Akina, lost all of his men when they suddenly melted into the bush and dispersed to their homes. He rejoined the returning Main Body at Ajimama. Indeed, of the three auxiliary column commanders, only Captain Glover enjoyed any real measure of success.

Captain Glover crossed the Pra on the 15th of January with 750 Hausas, Yorubas and Donkos and advanced to Abogu, which was reached on the 16th. A brief action was fought there on that day but the usual over expenditure of ammunition forced him to remain there until the 26th so that further supplies could be brought up. However, this delay allowed the Chief of Asum to join him with 120 men and Kofi Ahinkora of Eastern Akim with 350 more. The reinforced column resumed its northward march on the 27th of January. Subsequently it made a substantial contribution to the campaign in an indirect manner for its very presence
forced the King of Jabin to prepare to oppose its advance by refusing to send his contingent to the slowly reassembling Asante army. This meant a loss of some 12,000 men to the Asantehene and thus considerably lightened Sir Garnet's task of forcing his way up the main road to Kumasi.  

At first glance, this evidence would thus cause one to place little value on the efforts put forth by Captains Dalrymple and Butler, but such is not the case. Sir Garnet had informed Kofi Karikari of his plan to utilize the three auxiliary columns and even though Captain Glover was the only one of the three commanders to field an effective force, the very presence of the other two men actively trying to raise forces in their allotted areas of operations gave credence to the General's words and lent some legitimacy to the threat. Thus the Asantehene lost men from his tributary provinces whom he could ill afford to lose when contingents were denied to his army in order to counter the phantom threats from the Akim and Wassaw/Denkyera country. Commenting on the situation, Brackenbury writes:

... although we were scarcely aware of it, the movements of these forces had begun to have their effect upon the movements of the enemy, and there is every reason to believe that by this time the news of Captain Butlers movements, as well as of Captain Glover's, had reached Coomassie and the other great towns, and that the chief of Jabin was mustering his forces to oppose Captain Glover on the roads leading to his capital while the chief of Kokofoo was assembling his men.
to oppose the advance of Captain Butler. Nor had Captain Dalrymple's movements, unimportant as they yet were, been without effect... (for) the King of Becqua assembled his men to oppose the invasion by that route.81

In the meantime, while Captain Glover was mounting a reasonable offensive and while Captains Butler and Dalrymple were still struggling through the bush in a vain attempt to raise their columns, Sir Garnet himself had been completing his preparations for the resumption of the advance on Kumasi. During the four-day halt, the necessary reserve supply depot had been established, the troops had closed up from the rear, and further reconnaissance had been carried out. On the 26th of January, a strong reconnaissance party had moved on Atobiasi where a brief action was fought and where, as a result of this skirmish, it was ascertained that the Asante army would most probably make its stand at Amoafu.82 Sir Garnet then wrote to the Asantehene on the 27th, informing him of the Atobiasi encounter and giving him a last warning, pointing out once more that it would be useless for him to attempt to oppose the advance of the European troops.83 However, the General allowed hardly enough time for an answer to come back from Kumasi.

As no answer had been received by the morning of the 29th the main body began to move on to Dechiasu. The move was unopposed and on his arrival in that town, Sir Garnet found further letters from the Asantehene which contained renewed assurances of
his peaceful intentions and repeating his requests for delay. He omitted, however, to comply with any of the demands that had been made upon him as preliminaries to further negotiations. He did this on the basis that the near approach of the British force had drawn all his chiefs into the field and thus had made it impossible for him to convene his council.\(^6\) Mr. Dawson, the interpreter,\(^5\) managed to warn the General through the use of a note, not to put too much faith in the Asantehene's protestations.\(^6\) In fact, this warning seems to have been superfluous for the General had consistently refused to entertain any suggestion that Kofi Karikari might be attempting to negotiate in good faith. He appears to have interpreted every Asante overture as a simple device to buy time while, in turn, he steadily increased the pressure on the Asantehene so that any hope of a compromise was destroyed. With this pattern already firmly established, it is not surprising that he responded harshly to this most recent peace initiative and resumed his advance the following day, the 30th of January.\(^7\)

By the 30th, the whole of the European force, together with Rait's artillery and the African regiments, had been concentrated at Insafu and Akankuasi.\(^8\) Gifford's scouts had confirmed the presence of a strong Asante force near Amoafu, and it was virtually certain that a battle would have to be fought there if the advance was to be resumed.
Sir Garnet appreciated the virtual certainty that the enemy, who were present in immensely superior numbers, would try to carry out their usual plan of making flank attacks and surrounding the army opposed to them. As the British force was far too small to prevent this, it was decided to meet the tactic head-on by dividing the British troops into four columns to form a large open square.89

The leading column was to advance along the axis of the road. The right and left columns were to advance at some distance from, but parallel to the main road, keeping in touch with the center column and cutting their own paths through the bush. The rear of the square was closed by the Rifle Brigade. The total force, including Engineer labourers, amounted to 1,509 Europeans and 708 Africans.90

The advance began soon after daybreak on the 31st of January and the scouts first came in touch with the enemy just outside Ejinasi at a little before eight o'clock. The small party of Asantes who occupied this village fell back after offering only a token resistance but when two companies of the Black Watch began to advance along the path beyond, they collided with the main body of the enemy and the battle began in earnest.

The Asante commander, Asamoa Kwanta, had chosen his position skillfully. Rogers, who was present and serving on the General's staff, commented that:
MAP 6.

References:

A = clearing of bush cut by Sir G. Fezely's attacking force.
B = road cut by left attack against Amantie right flank.
C.C. = hill stormed by Russell's Regt.
D.D. = advance of two columns, Rifle Brigade entering Amantie Hill.
E.E. = position taken up by Naval Brigade, pointing south, east, north.
Soon after leaving Ejinasi the road descended into a swampy hollow filled with deep mud, through which flowed a sluggish stream, and then ascended a ridge on the opposite side. Beyond the stream, this ridge fell back on the right side of the track; but on the southern side it swept round in a semi-circle and covered the path descending into the ravine on the left, so that the Ashantees, who had chosen this ridge as their main position and occupied it in thousands, flanked and completely commanded, not only the path descending into the swamp, but also its continuation up the slope beyond. They could hardly have found a stronger place.91

Despite the obvious strength of the enemy position, the frontal attack was pressed home. The Black Watch descended into the ravine and came under heavy fire at approximately eight o'clock and the subsequent battle for the main road raged on until midday when a final charge by the Highlanders, supported by Rait's guns, drove the Asantes out of the town of Amoafu.92 At the same time that the Black Watch was thus engaged in the battle for the town, both of the flanking columns had been engaged in brisk fire-fights of their own.

Colonel McLeod's men had cut their way into the bush on the left where they were met with a heavy fire from a body of men who occupied the summit and slopes of a small hill. It was soon found impossible to keep pace with the Black Watch so a path was cut to the summit of the hill where a clearing was made, and the enemy were then driven back by Russell's Regiment under cover of
rocket fire. Just after the village was taken, this column cut its way to the main road behind the Black Watch. In the same way, Colonel Wood's force was unable to advance against the terrific fire that was poured into it as it cut its path to the north-east, and he, too, ordered his men to make a clearing in which they could lie down and return the enemy's fire.93

In addition to these vicious actions, however, there were other smaller engagements taking place. While the main body of the Asante army was opposing the advance of the three British columns, other detachments had been making frequent, determined attacks on the British flanks and had even cut their way into the road between the Rifle Brigade and the forward elements of the square.94 Even the fall of Amoafu failed to stop these harassing attacks. For example, at about one o'clock heavy firing came from the bush on the eastern side of Ejinasi and from the bush along the road as far as Amoafu, and though this road was lined by troops, who returned the fire, the enemy stood their ground until the Rifle Brigade finally advanced and occupied Ejinasi Hill. Because of this, it was not until almost two o'clock that the firing in the immediate vicinity of Amoafu finally sputtered out.95

The British had fought doggedly and their firepower and discipline decided the issue but the Asantes had performed magnificently. Without even the aid of artillery, they had managed
to subject a well-armed and disciplined British line-regiment to four hours of heavy fighting before giving ground. It is true that they were greatly shaken by having their centre finally broken and it is also true that they could not withstand the steady advance of the Highlanders who kept them almost continuously on the move and prevented their taking cover; but in spite of this, they not only disputed every inch of ground in front, but also delivered a succession of disruptive attacks on the flanks of the square and along the line of communication.

One need not look far for the reasons behind this desperate resistance. Henty comments that:

They were truly at bay; never before had they so much at stake. Even at Dodowa they had had a clear line of retreat and their own country had not been threatened; but here was an army of white soldiers not only in their own country, but boldly pushing forward in spite of their utmost efforts to stay them, and already almost within striking distance of the capital itself.96

In the light of this, it is not surprising that Asante efforts to halt the British advance did not cease with the fall of Amoafu. Once they realize that Amoafu was firmly in British hands, the enemy troops immediately passed around the main body of the British force and once more attacked the line of communications. At about one o'clock heavy firing was again heard in the direction of Kwaman where an Asante attack was being made from the south-west. The enemy pressed hard on the garrison but
a company of the Rifle Brigade was sent to the rescue and the Asantes were driven back and their fire was silenced by four o'clock. About an hour later, however, the attack was renewed. The Asantes struck just when the baggage, reserve ammunition column and field hospitals which had been left in Akankuasi and Insafu during the advance against Amoafu, were being moved up the road in a five-miles long convoy under escort of troops from 2WIR. This convoy had arrived some 1,000 yards short of Kwaman when this second attack on the village began and the southern division of the enemy suddenly turned upon the highly vulnerable carriers. Many of the carriers bolted down the road, and matters had begun to look most serious when reinforcements from the Rifle Brigade and 2WIR arrived from Kwaman. These additional troops soon drove the enemy into the bush and enabled Colonel Colley's men to recover a great deal of the baggage. Nevertheless, a great many of the loads fell into the hands of the enemy and the fighting on the road continued without any intermission until night set in. Another small convoy was attacked on the same day near Dompoasi, and £80 of Government money and a few loads were lost. However, by early the next morning the road from Insafu to Amoafu was lined by the troops, the baggage and ammunition was safely passed up, and the immediate Asante threat to the Main Supply Route had been at least temporarily countered.
In the meantime, however, many of the Asantes had retreated to Bekwai which was situated off the main road about one mile west of Amoafu. Sir Garnet felt that this posed too serious a threat to the advancing army and he ordered its destruction before the advance was resumed. Accordingly, on the morning of the 1st of February, a force of some 250 men advanced on Bekwai where a short fight ensued. The enemy was driven away, the town was destroyed and the force returned to Amoafu on the same day with a loss of but one man killed and two wounded.98

In general, the two days of fighting had proven relatively expensive to both sides. The British had lost five killed and 196 wounded while it was estimated that the Asantes had lost between 900 and 1,300 killed and at least as many more wounded.99 Neither side could continue to sustain such losses for long. The British were already steadily losing men to sickness and their manpower resources were definitely limited. Similarly, the withdrawal of various contingents to counter the threat posed by Captain Glover's force and the losses suffered in the prior campaign, seriously restricted the number of men available to the Asantehene.

His dwindling strength, the rapidly approaching rainy season, his absolute refusal to consider that the Asantehene wanted to negotiate in good faith, and the possibility that the Asante chiefs would discover the spurious nature of the threat
posed by Captains Dalrymple and Butler and hasten to reinforce the Asantehene's army, all combined to convince Sir Garnet that he must continue to push forward with utmost vigour. Therefore, with the threat posed by Bekwai removed, the advance was resumed on the 2nd of February. At daybreak the entire force marched out of Amoafu, and although the Advanced Guard was fired on as each village was reached, it met with no really serious opposition and reached Ajimamu soon after midday. The Main Body arrived a little later, but it was decided to move the troops no further that day. In the afternoon, however, the Advanced Guard was sent on to Ajabin, which was occupied without a fight. The baggage was then ordered up from Amoafu and the Naval Brigade escorted the rear of the force into camp shortly after dark.100

Despite this uncontested advance of the Main Body, the Asantes had not left the field. They continued to harass the supply lines and on the afternoon of the 1st of February, another convoy had been attacked at Dompoasi. Once more the carriers bolted but this time, however, there was no loss of life and all of the abandoned loads were recovered. Then, on the 2nd, the enemy encamped at Boborasi, under Asomoa Kwanta and Kobina Obina, made a determined attack on the important supply and medical transport center at Fomana. This battle raged back and forth for several hours but, once more, the enemy was driven back and no serious damage or loss was suffered.101
The importance of these raids on the lines of communication lay not in the extent of material damage or loss inflicted. Their significance lay in the psychological effect they had on the carriers. In this respect they had a serious bearing on subsequent events for the continuing threat which they posed to the supply line demoralized the carriers to the extent that they could not be persuaded to leave for the front with stores. Neither could the regimental carriers be prevailed upon to carry the regimental baggage unless the route was lined with troops while the convoy was being passed up. This led to a full stoppage in the movement of supplies. In fact, the situation had become so serious that the best Colonel Colley could promise was to move up a further supply of rations, etc., in five days time. This was a serious situation for the troops in Ajimamu had only four days rations with them.

Under normal circumstances, there would have been no question as to the most advisable action to be taken at this time. The lines of communication were in disarray and the troops were operating on their immediate reserves of supplies. Therefore, as the main concern of a commander is the safety of his command, the General should have put his men on a slightly reduced ration and halted for the necessary five day period.

Circumstances were not normal, however, for Sir Garnet was now paying the price for having neglected to expedite the in-
vasion preparations at the same time as he was carrying out his operations against Amankwa Tia. This neglect had delayed his invasion sufficiently to seriously reduce his available period of "dry" weather manoeuvring time. Thus with time a crucial factor, Sir Garnet was really faced with two possible courses. First, at the risk of having the arrival of rains force his withdrawal to the south before he accomplished his mission, he could remain in Ajimamu until his administrative services were once more functioning effectively. The five-day period needed for this could then be used in an attempt to negotiate a compromise with Kofi Karikari. Alternatively, he could abandon his lines of communication and make a dash for Kumasi, which was barely fifteen miles away, in the hope that such a stroke would bring the Asantehene to terms.

Three factors made the first of these courses the most prudent. In the first place, because all of the Asantehene's offers to negotiate had shown a conciliatory attitude, there was sufficient justification for the belief that negotiations would be successful. In addition, the British success at Amoafu had clearly demonstrated both the serious intent and the strength of the British operation, thus giving Sir Garnet a strong position in any negotiations. Finally, this course would avoid any unnecessary risk to the invading forces.
The second course had little to recommend it. To adopt it would result in having the small British force operating unsupported in a hostile land surrounded by vastly superior numbers of the enemy. Coincidentally, with the passage of each mile after Ajimamu, the invasion force would encounter ever increasing Asante resistance and would no doubt be required to fight at least one major action. Finally, there was no reason to believe that the taking of the town, despite its importance, would result in an Asante capitulation. Therefore, this approach would conceivably accomplished no more than the first but it was infinitely more hazardous to the troops involved.

Nevertheless, Sir Garnet decided to allow his men to brave the risks inherent in this second course of action. Apparently convinced of the Asantehene's perfidy, clearly apprehensive of the possibility of an unusually early beginning to the rainy season, and firm in his belief that he had proven at Amoafu that the Asante were incapable of withstanding a continuous and determined advance on the part of his artillery supported force, he decided to make the dash for Kumasi. He resolved that once Kumasi had been taken he would then either make peace or destroy the place and return as quickly as possible to the now strongly entrenched position at Ajimamu where further supplies would by then have been accumulated.
In accordance with this decision, he left the less fit men of his command at Ajimamu as a garrison and began the final advance on Kumasi early on the morning of the 3rd of February. Within forty-five minutes of starting, the Advanced-Guard made contact with the enemy. After an initial skirmish, there ensued a hit-and-run battle in the course of which the enemy fired from ambush, thereby forcing the advancing British to deploy, and then withdraw to a new position only to repeat the same manoeuvre time after time. The Asante use of this tactic inflicted some casualties at every encounter and although the advance was steady, it was slow and relatively costly in casualties. Sir Garnet was in the process of formulating a plan to increase his rate of advance when the arrival of yet another party of Asante messengers bringing letters from the Asantehene and Mr. Dawson, caused a temporary halt in the advance. 104

Kofi Karikari once more called upon the General to halt his advance and reconsider the matter of the indemnity and the hostages. Mr. Dawson also begged Sir Garnet to halt and treat with the Asantehene. It was obvious from the tone and content of his letter that Kofi Karikari was seriously alarmed and it appears reasonably certain that he would have been more than eager to make peace at this juncture had such a move not entailed the surrender of the hostages earlier specified by Sir Garnet.
Unfortunately, Sir Garnet, who claims that he was convinced that the granting of any concession at that time would be construed as a sign of weakness on his part and who still clung to his belief that the Asantehene was simply attempting to gain time in which to collect more troops, apparently did not appreciate the significance of his demand for hostages of such importance and he refused to alter his original request. Consequently, he responded to this eleventh hour appeal by informing the Asantehene that he would not halt until the hostages were in his possession; but that, as time pressed, he was willing to accept the Queen-Mother and Prince Mensa only. He said that he would halt for the night on the south bank of the Oda River in order to give the Asantehene time to send them; otherwise he would march straight to Kumasi. Whatever may have been Kofi Karikari's real intentions before, the receipt of this ultimatum decided the issue. He could not comply with Sir Garnet's demands and, as the River Oda formed his last line of defence before Kumasi, he had no alternative but to fight again in a last effort to defend his capital.

The Asante envoys were sent back through the lines shortly after noon and the advance was immediately resumed. This time, however, although there was some resistance, it was not so heavy as it had been and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the Oda River had been reached. As a bridge was necessary for the passage of
the force across the river at this point, Russell's Regiment was ordered across to act as a covering force for the Engineers who immediately began their bridge building task while the troops went into bivouac. Everyone spent a thoroughly miserable night under the lashing downpour of a heavy tornado but, undeterred by the weather, the sappers worked at the bridge throughout nearly the whole night and by seven o'clock the next morning it was finished. The rain had ceased just before dawn and after the men had time to dry their clothes a little and get some hot breakfast, the advance was resumed.108

The crossing was immediately contested with the resistance being centered around the village of Odasu which lay atop a piece of rising, difficult ground approximately one mile from the river. It was only after almost two hours of heavy fighting, during which time four companies of the Rifle Brigade and a detachment of guns were finally committed, that the town was taken. However, driving the enemy from the town did not signal the end of the battle as he still held the bush to the front and on both flanks. Nevertheless, the road from the river to the village was lined with troops and at half-past twelve the Naval Brigade, which formed the Rear-Guard, was passed over with the baggage and moved along this covered way into the village.
The enemy then closed in on the rear of the column and overran the deserted British camp. Sir Garnet had expected this but he admits in his memoirs that the situation became much more serious than he had anticipated for rather than falling back on Kumasi as he had expected they would, the Asantes surrounded the British force and maintained a continuous and fierce attack. Fortunately, the men of the Rifle Brigade, who lined the bush all around the village, were able to drive back the successive Asante attacks and inflict considerable casualties in the process.

Even so, the situation was becoming more dangerous with the passage of each minute when, at eleven o'clock, Brigadier Alison reported to Sir Garnet that,

...(the) enemy seems to be collected in force on our front. I purpose to attack them at once with the Rifle Brigade, guns, and 23rd; but I must be supported by the 42nd closely, as I want to break them this time without fail. It is no use in sending Wood's and Russell's regiments to the front—the men won't go; but they can garrison this village, and keep up the communication with me.110

Sir Garnet weighed the Brigadier's report carefully and finally decided that the best solution to the problem was to make a dash for Kumasi. The resultant plan called for the Black Watch to lead the attack under the cover of Rait's Artillery. Colonel McLeod, who resumed command of his regiment for the attack, was to form a 'flying column', break right through the centre of the enemy's front, and push straight on to Kumasi, disregarding all
flank attacks. The Headquarters and the Rifle Brigade were to follow as soon as the cessation of the Asante attacks on the village would permit them to do so. The remaining elements of the force were to remain in Odasu as a rear-guard until called for.

Colonel McLeod and his Highlanders began the attack shortly after midday. The Hausa artillery fired several rounds straight down the road and the lead companies then erupted from the village and charged down the road toward the astonished Asantes. Writing later of the ensuing action, Brigadier Alison commented,

Placing himself at their head, he (McLeod) gave the word to advance. . . . On first debouching from the village, a tremendous fire was opened on the head of the column from a well-planned and strong ambuscade, six men being knocked over in an instant. But the flank companies worked steadily through the bush; the leading company in the path sprang forward with a cheer; the pipes struck up, and the ambuscade was at once carried. Then followed one of the finest spectacles I have ever seen in war. Without stop or stay the 42nd rushed on cheering, their pipes playing, their officers to the front; ambuscade after ambuscade was successfully carried, village after village won in succession, till the whole Ashantis broke and fled in the wildest disorder down the pathway to their front to Coomassie. . . .

While the Highlanders where pushing on as a flying column, however, the Asante attack on Odasu had continued unabated. Although Sir Garnet was keen to push on to Kumasi with the remainder of his force, he refused to move out of Odasu until these attacks
had abated and until he was sure of the situation with respect to
the Black Watch. At 1:45 P.M. a message was received from Brig-
adier Alison, who was with Colonel McLeod, which said,

We have won every village except
Karsi, which I hope to take soon.
Their army is flying in panic,
chiefs' chairs and umbrellas are
strewing the ground; if you will
support me vigorously I will be
in Coomassie to-night.\textsuperscript{112}

This message was received just as the Asantes were once
more renewing their attack on the village and, commenting on its
effect upon the troops, Brackenbury wrote:

\textit{... when it (the message) was com-
municated to our troops and trans-
lated to the natives, they raised such
a ringing cheer that, almost, as by
magic, the enemy's fire ceased, and
not another shot was fired by him.
He knew that that cheer could have
but one meaning, lost heart, and gave
up the game.}\textsuperscript{113}

As soon as it had been confirmed that the enemy had in
fact withdrawn from Odasu, Sir Garnet issued orders for an imme-
diate general advance. A small but sufficient garrison\textsuperscript{114} was
left to hold Odasu and the General marched out with the Rifle
Brigade, followed by Colonel Wood with his own and Russell's Reg-
iments and the Naval Brigade, forming a Rear-Guard in charge of
the hospital, wounded and other impedimenta. While enroute Sir
Garnet received two letters from Mr. Dawson frantically calling
on him to stop the advance. Paying no attention to these re-
quests, the General simply ordered the troops to press on.\textsuperscript{115}
The troops advanced quickly and Colonel McLeod's men crossed the Subon swamp and entered Kumasi at 5:30 P.M. Sir Garnet, who arrived barely forty-five minutes later, found the troops already drawn up in the market place to receive him with a general salute. Thus the gamble worked and the General records in his memoirs that he felt a "flush of pleasure" when he received the report that the headlong and exceedingly hazardous dash from Odasu to Kumasi had been accomplished at a cost of only 6 killed and 60 wounded out of a total force of 1,611 men.\textsuperscript{116}

There was little time for self-congratulation, however, for Kumasi was still an armed camp and the British had to proceed with extreme caution. Brackenbury reports that the town was full of armed men and that they deliberately walked through the marketplace, past the front of the troops, carrying their arms and ammunition away into the bush. Members of the staff and some regimental officers pressed Sir Garnet to take some action to stop what they viewed as the escape of the enemy army. However, the General wanted to avoid the possibility of street fighting and as he felt that the rapid approach of darkness made it impossible to find and guard all of the exits from the strange town, he contented himself with making arrangements for the safety of his troops and issuing an order which simply forbade the removal of munitions of war. In his opinion, there was no reason to stop the movement out of the town of those Asantes who wished to leave but he was anxious to find and detain the Asantehene.
An armed party was thus sent out to find the palace and arrest Kofi Karikari. The palace was eventually found but the Asantehene, the Queen-Mother, the Crown-Prince, and all of the other notables had fled. At this point, Mr. Dawson, who had previously refused to guide the arresting party to the palace, produced messengers who were ready to go to the Asantehene with any communication which the General might wish to send. As Sir Garnet was now anxious to conclude a peace with Kofi Karikari, and, if possible, obtain a treaty from him, he dashed off a letter for immediate delivery to him. In this letter he agreed to accept hostages of lesser rank than the Queen-Mother and the Crown-Prince and he called upon the Asantehene himself, or if he was unwilling, the Queen-Mother or the Crown Prince, to come to Kumasi on the following day in order to conclude a treaty of peace.

The night which followed all of this activity was one of broken sleep for the already exhausted British. A number of fires broke out one after another in different parts of the town. Many of the troops, tired out with the day's march and fighting after their sleepless night at the Oda River, were again kept out for hours trying to extinguish these fires and prevent their spread. The situation was made even more confused and tiring by the need to use even more troops to stop the heavy looting being carried out by some of the African troops and the now released Fanti prisoners. For this reason, when dawn finally broke on
the morning of the 5th, it was a weary British soldiery which found that the situation in the town had changed considerably during the night.

Instead of the thousands of armed men that had filled the streets the night before, there were not more than thirty or forty Asantes in the town. All night long the people had continued to stream from the place, taking their arms, ammunition and valuables with them. Even the palace, which had been left unguarded, had been stripped of much of the royal treasure during the hours of darkness.121

As the morning wore on, however, there was no sign of either the Asantehene or any agent he might wish to appoint. As time passed and no negotiators appeared, Sir Garnet began to suspect treachery. His feeling of unease was increased when a series of violent rain squalls turned the British camp into a sea of mud. Being disinclined to rely too heavily either on the trustworthiness of the Asantehene or the reliability of the weather, the General therefore began to prepare for the possibility of a speedy withdrawal by evacuating the wounded from Kumasi.

By midmorning of the 5th, all wounded who were unable to march were sent off under escort of Wood's and Russell's Regiments and a company of the Rifle Brigade. At eleven o'clock, Major Russell reported from the Ordah River that the bridge was about 18 inches under water in places and that there had been
some difficulty in passing the convoy across the river. 122

This report caused some considerable consternation in Kumasi. A succession of heavy rain squalls had seemingly set in and the Africans assured Sir Garnet that these were the prelude to the rainy season, which—as he had been forwarned—was evidently to begin somewhat earlier than usual. As there had been no further word from Kofi Karikari, the General was faced with the problem of deciding whether to take the risk of remaining in Kumasi one more day or to destroy Kumasi at once and return to Ajimamu. 123

The decision was really not too difficult to make. Russell's report on the condition of the river and the rapidly deteriorating weather made it clear that every hour of delay would make the return from Kumasi just that much more difficult. Placing the health and welfare of the troops, for whose lives and health he was responsible, above all other considerations, Sir Garnet decided to destroy the town and the palace and return south at daybreak the next morning. 124

During the afternoon of the 5th, therefore, a report was circulated to the effect that the troops would advance in pursuit of the Asantehene at daybreak and that any Asantes who were then found in the town would be shot. This was done to insure the departure of all the inhabitants before the place was set on fire. Prize agents were appointed to visit the palace that night and
collect as many valuables as could be carried by thirty men, and arrangements were made for the Engineers to spend the night in making preparations for the blowing up of the palace and the burning of the town.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 6th, the troops were formed up and by seven o'clock all except the rear-guard had marched off. By eight o'clock all of the charges were laid. The fuses were then lit and the town set on fire and by nine o'clock, when the rear-guard finally lost sight of the town, all that remained of Kumasi was a heap of smouldering ruins.

Lacking the same sense of immediate danger which accompanied the march to Kumasi, the return march was somewhat of an anti-climax for the troops. It was not, however, a helter-skelter dash for the coast. The troops moved in planned stages from one protected post to the next in much the same manner as they had done during the advance. Generally, the move went smoothly and the various supply centers, etc., were dismantled and the stores removed to the south as the Rear-Guard passed through. It was a well executed move which, somewhat surprisingly in the light of Sir Garnet's previous disregard for such matters, resulted in the preservation of lives and the recovery of considerable quantities of material.
The overriding consideration was the General's concern that the European troops be evacuated as quickly as possible. Consequently, when a transportation difficulty arose at Ahkan-kuassie on the 10th of February, the order of march was abandoned and the European brigade was passed down the line to Cape Coast without further delay. The West Indian Regiments were utilized in conjunction with Wood's and Russell's Regiments to garrison the remaining outposts\textsuperscript{127} and by the end of February, all of the European troops had embarked for England.\textsuperscript{128}

Sir Garnet and several members of his staff remained at Fomana rather than accompany the main body to the Coast. This they did for two reasons. In the first place, the General wished to remain in the rear of the column until the last convoy of sick and wounded could be sent across the Adansi Hills. Possibly even more important, however, was the fact that he had finally received reliable word from the Asantehene.

While camped in Detchiasu on the 9th, Sir Garnet had received a message from Kofi Karikari. In this message, the Asantehene expressed his desire to make peace, and, after begging Sir Garnet to halt Captain Glover, who was by this time encamped at Jabin, offered to accede to all of the General's terms. Sir Garnet immediately wrote back to the Asantehene informing him that he would halt at Fomana until the 13th, and that if by the night of the 12th the Asantehene sent to him 5,000 ounces of gold
as a sign of good faith, he would make peace, and order Captain Glover's forces back across the Pra. He then contacted Captain Glover informing him of what had happened and asking Glover to remain where he was until the 14th, if he could safely do so.

The General then proceeded to Fomana where, on the night of the 12th, word was received that the Asantehene's envoys were at Dompoasi and that they wished to meet with Sir Garnet in order to treat for peace. Permission was given for them to enter the British camp provided they had brought the gold, and early on the morning of the 13th, two envoys and a long train of carriers entered Fomana. They brought only 1,000 ounces of gold with them but by this time the main object was to secure peace, and as the indemnity was of importance only as a sign of Kofi Karikari's submission, the amount involved was of little importance. The General therefore accepted the smaller amount and presented the envoys with a draft treaty to take back for the Asantehene's signature.

The treaty was read over and each article carefully explained to the envoys, who raised objections to only two of its provisions. First, they questioned the size of the indemnity. However, when Sir Garnet pointed out that the Asantehene had already agreed to the sum of 50,000 ounces of gold in his letter of the 23rd of January, they withdrew their objection. The second
point involved the required acknowledgement of the independence of Adansi. Sir Garnet explained that this stipulation had been included in the treaty at the request of Kobina Obin of Adansi, who had arrived in Fomana on the 11th, and that as it involved a private arrangement between the Adansis and the Wassaws, he could not interfere. The envoys had therefore to be content with the treaty as it stood and they left on the afternoon of the 13th promising to get the treaty signed by the Asantehene and to produce it in Cape Coast within the prescribed time limit of fourteen days.

On that same afternoon, orders were sent to Captain Glover informing him of the situation and requiring him to retire south of the Pra with his troops. These orders reached Glover at Kwaman on the 14th and he began his withdrawal the next day. Reaching Prasu on the 17th, he dismissed his African levies, who moved eastward to their own homes, while he marched down the main road to Anamabo with the Hausas.

With Captain Glover's return, the British withdrawal was all but complete. Sir Garnet had left Fomana for Cape Coast on the 14th and by the 20th, the last outpost north of the Pra, Esaman, had been cleared of its stores and dismantled. The last British troops, three companies of 1st IR, crossed the Pra and assumed garrison duties at Prasu on the 21st, and, on the 23rd, the invasion was officially terminated when the bridge across the
river was destroyed.

With the Asantes defeated, and the European troops removed from the Gold Coast, the only tasks remaining were concerned with the security of the 'Protectorate'. Garrisons were retained at Prasu and Mansu only and all intermediate outposts along the Cape Coast/Prasu Road were cleared of their supplies and razed to the ground. In addition, martial law was finally lifted from Elmina and Sir Garnet prepared a memorandum on the subject of garrisoning the Gold Coast with African troops. As a first step toward the implementation of the recommendations contained in that memorandum, the General immediately requested Captain Glover to retain 350 of his Hausas at Anamabo until Mr. Berkeley, the Governor-in-Chief, should decide whether he would keep them or not.135

Finally, steps were taken to re-establish peace in the western and eastern regions of the 'Protectorate'. The two men directly involved in these efforts were a Mr. Goldsworthy and a Mr. Gouldsbury. Mr. Goldsworthy was charged with affairs in the east but he failed in his efforts to make peace with either the Awunas or the Akwanus. However, Mr. Gouldsbury was more fortunate. He toured all of the tribes in the Western Region and although many months were to pass before he had finished his work, he eventually extracted promises of peaceful and obedient behaviour from all of the kings and chiefs concerned.136
As his terms of service had specifically exempted him from remaining in West Africa once the campaign was over, Sir Garnet did not remain to supervise the completion of the military and political preparations which he had set in motion. In his opinion, his mission had been accomplished and even though his job was far from finished, he sailed for England on the 4th of March. Before leaving, however, he wrote one final letter to the Asantehene. Eighteen days had passed since the treaty had been sent to Kofi Karikari and as it had not yet been returned, the General wrote to remind him that his messengers had promised to deliver the treaty to Cape Coast within fourteen days. In closing, he pointed out that hostilities would not be terminated until the treaty had been ratified and thereby implied that further fighting was not an impossibility.  

This letter actually proved to have been unnecessary for on the 12th of March, an embassy from the Asantehene arrived in Cape Coast. Composed of one of Kofi Karikari's sons, Kofi Intin, and representatives of every tribe and province in the empire, the embassy was received by Colonel Maxwell, the Acting Administrator of the Gold Coast, on the day of its arrival. The treaty drafted at Fomana was produced with the two crosses which indicated Kofi Karikari's assent to the terms contained therein affixed to it and although there continued to be some dispute as to the size of the indemnity, the treaty was finally ratified on the 15th of March, 1674.
The Anglo-Asante War of 1873-1874 thus officially came to a close and at a superficial glance, it would appear that this little war had been a complete and somewhat brilliant success for the British. However, such was not entirely the case and it is now necessary to critically analyse the campaign with a view to assessing its conduct and establishing the degree of effectiveness of Sir Garnet's leadership.
To criticise the conduct of a campaign which has achieved its stated aims is dangerous. From the outset the critic is faced with several major difficulties. First, the sweet glow of success often causes contemporary reporters to ignore or rationalize the errors made by the victors. It is therefore often difficult to clearly establish who perpetrated the mistakes, what caused those mistakes, and what effect they really had on the conduct of the campaign. Second, the critic is writing with the benefit of hindsight and is often in possession of information which was not available to the participants. For this reason, his criticisms are often in danger of being excessively harsh. Nevertheless, it is the function of the critic to look beyond the clearly obvious results of the campaign in an effort to assess its conduct so that a balance may be provided for the often biased and uncritical narratives produced immediately after the event.

A criticism of the Anglo-Asante War of 1873-1874 labours under all of these difficulties. Indeed, this campaign has the additional complication that it has never been subjected to a particularly searching analysis. Virtually all of the published works dealing with the subject rely heavily on the "official" histories and they therefore tend to uncritically repeat the official version of events. For this reason, there are certain general conclusions as to the conduct of the war which have come
to be largely accepted as fact. The most important of these contend that:

1. Colonel Harley accomplished little during the first phase of the war;

2. the coastal tribesmen were cowardly, lazy people who first refused to defend themselves and then refused to help the British finish the war;

3. Captain Glover contributed virtually nothing to the campaign, and, to a degree endangered its chances of success;

4. Sir Garnet Wolseley was "the very model of a modern Major-General" without whose guidance and leadership the war would have been lost; and

5. the Asantehene never seriously attempted to negotiate a settlement with the British but rather attempted to use the pretext of negotiations as a screen from behind which he could prepare for the destruction of the British force.

A careful study of the various primary source materials reveals that these conclusions are, to varying degrees, inaccurate. Therefore, without detracting in any way from the fact that the British campaign did succeed in achieving its stated aims, the comments and criticism below are intended to expose these inaccuracies.
Of all the British officials involved in this war, Colonel Harley is possibly the one who has received the least recognition for his efforts. Certainly the great bulk of material on the war leads one to conclude that nothing of any importance was achieved prior to Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival at Cape Coast. Yet even though he was completely hamstrung by the requirements of the British policy then being pursued on the Gold Coast; obstructed by the active opposition of his immediate superior, Mr. Pope-Hennesey, and his senior official at Cape Coast, Colonel Foster Foster; operating with a sadly reduced garrison and a shockingly depleted magazine; and suffering from a lack of experience among the Fanti; nevertheless, it was Colonel Harley who managed to preserve the British presence on the Gold Coast and thus set the stage for Sir Garnet's subsequent operations.

Indeed, when one considers the circumstances under which he had to function, it is amazing just how much the Administrator accomplished. For example, the initial support which he provided to the Fanti had enabled them to fight the Asante army to a draw at Dunkwa. He was therefore instrumental in checking what could easily have become a rapid Asante sweep to the coast. However, he received little recognition for his role in this affair because Amanuel Tia's continued presence in the 'Protectcrate' obscured the true significance of the battle. In addition, although his instructions and his slender resources made it impos-
sible for him to effectively rally the Fanti forces after their defeat at Jukwa, Colonel Harley managed to take several other vital steps which countered the Asante moves. The forts were secured against the possibility of seizure by the Asante armies. Effective steps were taken to relieve the suffering of the hosts of Fanti refugees in and around Cape Coast. The situation at Elmina was rendered far less dangerous than had previously been the case. The uprisings in the territories west of the Pra were dealt with as effectively as conditions would permit. And, possibly most important, steps were taken to clearly define the location and condition of the Asante army and to reopen tracts of Fanti territory to their former inhabitants with a view to preparing for some future move against Amankwa Tia.

Nevertheless, despite these accomplishments, Colonel Harley received no recognition in any of the works which claim to describe the war fully and neither did he receive any official Government recognition for a job well done. Instead, he was relieved of his duties and recalled to England immediately upon Sir Garnet's acceptance of the dual post of Civil Administrator and Military Commander of the Gold Coast. Despite the Earl of Kimberley's private protestations of satisfaction with the Administrator's performance under admittedly difficult circumstances, it was quite possibly this failure on the part of the Government to acknowledge the Administrator's efforts which was most responsible for the general lack of recognition.
The standard assessment of the actions of the tribesmen of the 'Protectorate', who are universally execrated for their cowardice and laziness, is even more unfair than that accorded Colonel Harley. The truth is that the tribesmen began the war by fighting well and although one cannot deny that they subsequently did not respond in the way which the British wished them to, cowardice and laziness do not appear to have been the reasons. In fact, their good showing at the commencement of the battle of Dunkwa leads one to believe that had they been properly supported and handled by the British they might have acquitted themselves well throughout the campaign.

The Fanti performance at the battle of Dunkwa on the 8th and 14th of April, 1873, clearly indicated that they would and could fight to good effect despite their abhorrence of offensive tactics. It is obvious, therefore, that the problem was not that they lacked the will to fight. Instead, the problem lay in the fact that the Fanti, whose attempts to achieve some degree of effective unity through the medium of the Fanti Confederation had been frustrated by the British, looked to the British to provide the necessary leadership around which they could unite. Colonel Harley apparently realized this and he tried, within the strict limits imposed on him by his instructions and his resources, to give adequate support and leadership. Unfortunately, he could not provide evidence of British leadership and support sufficient to imbue the Fanti with the confidence necessary to
keep them united in an army large enough to defeat Amankwa Tia.

Consequently, when they began to suspect that they were being left unaided to fight a war which they saw as being largely the result of British actions, each Fanti contingent placed its traditional responsibility to defend its home-village ahead of the requirements of the 'Protectorate' as a whole. It was the combination of this attitude, the arrival of the rains, and the heavy defeat at Jukwa which was largely responsible for the disintegration of the Fanti army in early June, 1873. Universal Fanti cowardice does not therefore appear to have been a major factor behind the Fanti collapse during the first phase of the war. Neither does it appear to have been a major reason for the failure of the Fanti to respond to Sir Garnet's call to arms during the second and third phases of the war.

Instead, the Fanti failed to re-form their army for the simple reason that they saw no reason to do so. This was partly due to the fact that Sir Garnet, in a massive but possibly conscious miscalculation, told them nothing of the probable involvement of European troops; thus losing his one chance of showing that a new approach had been adopted by the British. Instead, he repeated the same tired promises that the Fanti had heard before and, unimpressed by mere promises as proof of the seriousness of the British intentions, they were reluctant to once more take to the field. In addition to this, however, they could
no valid reason for once more engaging the Asante army. In their view, shortsighted though it might have been, the war was now following the traditional pattern of all such Asante invasions and was therefore virtually over. They knew that Amankwa Tia had exhausted himself and was only awaiting the Asantehene's permission to return to Kumasi. They therefore had no desire to excite the enemy into renewed activity by threatening to attack him. Instead, they were quite content to await his withdrawal so that they might quietly return to their homes. This last consideration was of great importance as the Fanti had suffered terribly throughout the invasion and they were eager to resume their normal lives. They consequently had little interest in participating in what they viewed as an unnecessary military exercise which would do nothing more than delay their efforts to return to normalcy.

Aside from these major considerations, there were two additional factors which caused the Fanti to resist service in the projected levies. One of these involved pay. A soldier received 1½ pence per day and all found while a carrier received 6 shillings per month and all found. Thus the British themselves made armed service less attractive than civil employment. The other was the fact that the levies were generally badly handled by the British. They were given little or no training and yet they were often thrown into situations with which they could not be expect-
ed to cope with the result that desertions were heavy and panics commonplace whenever they were in contact with the enemy.\(^7\)

It thus becomes clear that the often repeated charges of Fanti cowardice were, if not untrue, at least grossly unfair. The same may be said of the charge of laziness—an accusation based on the general Fanti reluctance to serve in the Transport Corps. In this instance all of the mitigating circumstances reviewed above remain equally valid. There are two of those circumstances which are possibly more important than the others, however.

The first concerns the Fanti desire to return home as soon as possible in order to resume a normal way of life. This desire had already caused numbers of tribesmen to refuse to join in the fight to drive an already departing enemy from the 'Protectorate'. It would therefore no doubt have been an even more potent reason for refusing to serve as a carrier during an operation which would entail service even further away from the homes which they were so eager to re-establish.

The second major circumstance which caused the Fanti to avoid service in the Transport Corps was the poor treatment the carriers received. For example, drafts from various villages were broken up and distributed through various mixed gangs so that men were often faced with the distasteful prospect of working with strangers under strange headmen. There were also many
occasions when the food and accommodation were poor and inadequate. In addition, pay was erratic and there were frequent instances of graft and extortion. Finally, the supervision was inefficient and the carriers often received brutal treatment from European supervisors and African headmen alike. It is little wonder, therefore, that service as a carrier rapidly became unpopular, despite the relatively high pay, and that desertions increased at the same time as recruiting declined.

Unfortunately, the responsible British officials on the Gold Coast were either unable or unwilling to recognize that the Fanti failure to respond to the situation in a manner which the Europeans thought proper was attributable to valid reasons. In the eyes of Sir Garnet Wolseley, the members of his staff, and virtually every European observer on the Coast at this time, the reasons behind the Fanti reluctance to "come to grips with their traditional enemy and drive him from their sacred homeland" were purely and simply their "natural cowardice and laziness". It is regrettable that this largely unjustified generalization gained credence and became the standard explanation for Fanti conduct throughout the war, but such was the case.

The contributions of both Colonel Harley and the Fanti were thus ignored or badly misrepresented in most of the contemporary accounts of the war. They were not alone in this, however, for Captain Glover suffered a similar fate. This was so mainly
because Sir Garnet, whose opinions and attitudes tend to dominate most of the material written at the time, disapproved of the Volta expedition.\textsuperscript{10} It is also due, in part, to the fact that Captain Glover was not accompanied by newspaper correspondents to the extent that Sir Garnet was. As a result, the tendency throughout was to view events from the General's point-of-view and to downgrade the importance of Captain Glover's actions accordingly. Even so, there is no doubt that Captain Glover, like Colonel Harl-ey, accomplished much under difficult conditions.\textsuperscript{11} Because this is the case, it is well to briefly review the two major contributions made by Captain Glover and to assess their impact on the campaign.

The first of these two major contributions was his successful diversion of the King of Jabin's large contingent from Kofi Karikari's army at a time when it was vitally needed. Even though he was seriously under strength as a result of the combined effects of Sir Garnet's insistence on adhering to the 15th of January invasion date and the conflicts among the Africans in the trans-Volta region, Captain Glover managed to create a diversion of sufficient proportions to deny the Asantehene some 12,000 men. The importance of this can be appreciated when one considers that the battles of Amoafu and Odasu were both hard fought engagements which the British came very close to losing and which they would quite probably have lost had Kofi Karikari had those additional 12,000 men.\textsuperscript{12}
Captain Glover's accomplishments with respect to the Jabins did manage to elicit some grudging recognition from Henry Brackenbury and others. However, his second major contribution is mentioned only once: in a modern study of the Asante wars written by Mr. Alan Lloyd. Mr. Lloyd suggests that it was the added threat posed by Captain Glover, when he suddenly appeared immediately to the east of Kumasi just after Sir Garnet's withdrawal, which was the actual reason for the Asantehene's acceptance of the General's terms even after the British had already begun to move south. The facts would appear to support this contention for Sir Garnet had done his worst, had accomplished nothing toward getting a treaty with the Asantehene, and was virtually fleeing to the Coast when the Asante envoys overtook him at Ketchiasu with Kofi Karikari's offer to treat.

In the light of this, it is thus doubtful that the General's actions were solely responsible for the sudden Asante desire to reach an accord. Instead, the real reason behind the sudden peace move was revealed in the Asantehene's request which accompanied his offer to sign the treaty, that Captain Glover's force be halted and withdrawn. This made it clear that Sir Garnet had not dealt the Asante a mortal blow but rather that it was the shock of what they took to be another strong British force coming from the east to continue the war, that provoked the belated Asante appeal for a treaty. As this is an interpretation which would have been anathema to Sir Garnet as well as
the majority of the men who wrote of the war, this vital contribution was never revealed in its true light by any of the contemporary writers.\textsuperscript{15}

Unlike Colonel Harley, the coastal tribesmen, and Captain Glover, Sir Garnet Wolseley emerged from this war with his record untarnished and his reputation enhanced. This was not because he waged a brilliant campaign. Rather it was a result of the fortuitous combination of two other elements. First and foremost, he simply succeeded, in spite of his many mistakes, in doing what he set out to do. Second, the men who wrote of the war, be they soldiers, who were invariably members of the "ring", or newspaper correspondents, were generally sympathetic toward him and recorded his actions in a favourable light.\textsuperscript{16} Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that Sir Garnet performed poorly throughout the campaign and it was more by good luck than good management that the British cause was saved from disaster.

Initially, this did not appear to be the case for the General's work on the Gold Coast began well. His plan appeared both simple and viable, even though it had been conceived in England without informed assistance, and he moved with speed and energy to put it into immediate operation. Even so, within days of his arrival the basic weaknesses in his approach were beginning to mitigate against its chances of success.
A major shortcoming was his failure to find a way to induce the Fantis to voluntarily participate more fully in the conduct of the war. This failure can be ascribed to several basic factors. In the first place, although he never admitted it, it was against his interests to effectively rally the Fantis. He had become convinced of the absolute worthlessness of the coastal tribesmen even before he left England and he arrived at Cape Coast already determined to call for the European troops. It was therefore convenient for him to demean the fighting spirit and ability of the tribesmen on every possible occasion so that he might further justify his request for regular army units. Second, as he did little to make his call to arms and his promises of support any more convincing than Colonel Harley's had been, the Fantis had no cause to respond any more vigorously than they had for the Administrator. Third, he refused to utilize men experienced in the handling of Africans in his attempts to rally and organize the tribesmen. He refused the services of several 'Old Africa Hands' who offered to come out from England for him specifically for that purpose. And, even worse, he neglected to utilize such relatively experienced men as Colonel Harley, who offered to stay on in an advisory capacity, and Colonel Festing, who was denied a post on the staff and was relegated to a relatively minor command in the field. Instead, he surrounded himself with men who were generally gifted in the art of conventional warfare but who were as ignorant of conditions on the
Gold Coast as he was. He thus denied himself the services of the very men who might best have been able to induce the tribesmen to fight.

An additional factor which mitigated against his chances of successfully executing that portion of his plan which called for engaging the Asante army in damaging field operations, was the General's slowness in adapting his plans to suit the existing circumstances. The Fanti levies were vital to the success of his tactical plan, which envisaged the driving of Amankwa Tia from the 'Protectorate' while inflicting the greatest loss possible on his army. However, even though he had decided within days of his arrival at Cape Coast that any Fanti force would be useless and despite the fact that he knew within two weeks of his arrival that the Asante army was already planning to withdraw, he made no move to change his plan accordingly. Instead, he tried for the better part of a month to execute his original plan and it was not until the 1st of November that he finally admitted the futility of his efforts and decided to change his approach. This was late in the game, however, and as a result, he was rapidly losing his one opportunity to inflict significant losses on the Asante force.

Even so, largely as a result of the ludicrous manoeuvrings around the Haunted Road in late October, he announced his decision to adopt the bush-warfare tactic of harassment in lieu
of seeking a traditional confrontation in the field. Thus on the surface of things, it appeared that Sir Garnet was at last coming to terms with the situation. Certainly had he pursued his new tactic as vigorously as he denounced the Fantis, he might still have exacted a heavy toll on the retreating Asante army. As matters developed, however, the General soon proved that he had little understanding of the requirements of bush-warfare and his actions after the battle of Abrakrampa even cast some doubt on his basic leadership ability.

The situation after the battle of Abrakrampa presented Sir Garnet with a golden opportunity for the prosecution of harassment tactics. Although the enemy was still capable of defeating him in a head-on confrontation, it was Sir Garnet who possessed all the necessary advantages. The enemy was suffering from an apparent collapse of leadership; his morale was low; sickness and hunger were rife throughout the army; supplies were low; and he was already committed to a withdrawal. On the other hand, the tactical advantage lay with the British who now possessed the initiative, who finally enjoyed a relatively plentiful supply of arms and munitions, and who possessed sufficient disciplined troops to effectively harass the enemy columns. However, the General failed to seize this opportunity to exact an additional toll from the sick and weary Asante army.21
What information the British had confirmed that Amankwa Tia was definitely heading for the Pra and that his force was on the verge of a rout. He should immediately have sent reliable patrols after the retreating enemy in order to maintain contact with him and in order to hurry him on his way. He should then have formed several small but well armed and competently led raiding parties which he could initially have stationed at Dunkwa and Mansu but which he eventually would have moved north along the road parallel to Amankwa Tia's line of march. He would therefore have been in a position to act on the reports of his patrols by carrying out numerically small but physically and psychologically destructive hit-and-run raids on the flanks of the enemy columns.

Instead of this, however, the troops most suitable for these operations—the West Indians—were committed to the reinforcement of the already redundant posts at Beulah, Napoleon, Abrakrampa, Assayboo, and Akrofu; contact with the enemy was lost; and the difficult job of locating and harassing the enemy was given over to the same Fanti levies which had already demonstrated their inability to carry out such a task immediately after the battle of Abrakrampa. As a result, there was no effective pursuit. Instead, once he realized that there was no pressure on his Rear-Guard, Amankwa Tia slowed down his rate of march. In fact, the Asante general was allowed to take twenty
days to cover the forty miles from Dunkwa to Prasu virtually unhindered, thus saving many men who would have been unable to stand the rigours of a forced march. Consequently, although the Asante army returned to Kumasi in a sad state, it returned in much better condition than it would have had Sir Garnet acted more vigorously and intelligently than he did.

Nevertheless, had Sir Garnet's errors during this second phase of the war been restricted to the field of tactical operations, one would be inclined to overlook his various errors and simply attribute them to a lack of experience in a very specialized form of warfare. Unfortunately, the General was found equally wanting in the field of logistical operations and for this there could be no excuse. It is a military axiom that a commander at any level must delegate responsibility to trusted subordinates but that he must at all times supervise the actions of those subordinates as he alone bears responsibility for the success or failure of the operation in hand. A general's reputation is therefore based not only on his ability to choose able and reliable subordinates but also on his capacity for assuming overall direction and control of every major aspect of the campaign without unduly emphasizing one particular aspect to the detriment of the others. This Sir Garnet failed to do. Throughout the campaign he concentrated on tactical operations and allowed his logistic support to fall into disarray.
His actions during phase two of the campaign clearly illustrate this situation. Admittedly he took positive steps to begin the organization of the center of supply at Cape Coast, the Main Supply Route from Cape Coast to Prasu, and the Transport Corps immediately after his arrival. But from that time until just before the arrival of the European troops in early December, he virtually ignored the preparations for the invasion. Instead, he dashed about the countryside leading attacks and directing relief columns which could have been commanded at least as effectively by such subordinates as Colonel Festing, Colonel Wood, and Major Russell.

As a result of this situation, the only projects which moved ahead at a reasonable rate while tactical operations were at their height, were the construction of storage facilities and the improvement of the road--both of which were of importance to the immediate tactical aims. However, nothing was done about the vital need to prepare the staging camps along the road and nothing was done to solve the steadily worsening carrier problem.

Sir Garnet's failure to push ahead with the construction of the campsites while the Asantes were still in the 'Protectorate' is virtually inexplicable. He knew that the enemy had definitely begun to withdraw by the end of October and he also knew that the European troops would be arriving, if they were to be sent at all, early in December. Nevertheless, no attempt was made
to select, plan, or begin construction of the campsites until the first week in December. This was negligence of the highest order because Inkwabim, Akrofu, Yankumasi Panti and Mansu, the first four of the eight campsites eventually selected, were sufficiently protected for work to have been started a month earlier than it was and because sufficient labour was available to begin the construction just as soon as the campsites were secure.²⁵

Similarly, the transport problem was recognized as early as mid-November but no active steps were taken to rectify the situation until one month later by which time the situation had degenerated into almost hopeless chaos. Sir Garnet himself admitted in a despatch dated the 13th of November, that the difficulties being encountered in the raising of transport companies lay in the lack of organization and in "native discontent"²⁶ with the terms of service. Nevertheless, instead of attempting to rectify the problem by removing the causes, the General and his staff spent their time unsuccessfully trying to devise alternate means of transport.

It was not until Colonel Colley arrived that any positive steps were taken to rectify the situation and it says little for the General and his "ring" that the Colonel simply adopted procedures and took steps that would have occurred to any soldier who possessed a modicum of common sense and a rudimentary knowledge and understanding of the principles of field supply and person-
nel management. He simply adapted the existing organization of transport then current in the British Army to suit West African conditions and then proceeded to meet with the African leaders in order to define the areas of "native discontent" so that steps could be taken to remove the causes of that discontent.

Sir Garnet's only comment on the situation was to the effect that it had hitherto been impossible to form a proper Transport Department because there were not sufficient officers available to staff it and that the arrival of the draft of officers on the 23rd of December was all that made Colonel Colley's recommendations viable. Not only does this fail to excuse his failure to provide the leadership and direction necessary at least to deal with the problem of African grievances but it is also patently untrue. There were Special Service officers whom Sir Garnet himself had attached as liason and training officers to the various kings and chiefs of the 'Protectorate' who could easily have been withdrawn to assume transport duties for it was clear by mid-November that their continued employment in that capacity was useless. In fact, they were quite possibly the best men available for employment in the Transport Department for by this time although the large armed levies which they were supposed to organize and train were apparently not going to materialize, they were in an excellent position, through their intimate association with the various tribes and their leaders, to be high-
ly effective in the raising and supervision of transport companies based on tribal groupings— if the Fanti would come forward.

Unfortunately this type of solution was never attempted and the damage caused by Sir Garnet's neglect of the transport problem was never fully overcome. Service with the Transport Corps had fallen into such disrepute with the Africans that even Colonel Colley's last minute attempts to rectify the problem could accomplish little and the British had eventually to resort to force and the use of women and children in order to raise the bare minimum number of carriers needed.

In the end analysis, Sir Garnet's failure to properly plan and supervise the campsite work on the Main Supply Route and his inability to deal effectively with the transport question when it first arose were to have far-reaching consequences. For example, his failure to push forward with the work of preparing the campsites and his failure to have an adequate transport system ready to begin moving supplies northward as soon as Amankwa Tia was clear of the 'Protectorate' delayed the invasion by more than three weeks. Consequently, he exposed the European troops to at least three completely unnecessary risks. In the first place, the delay seriously reduced the period of time available for "dry" weather operations and thus increased the risk of exposing the troops to the deleterious effects of the rainy season. Second, the loss of time preyed on the minds of the General and
the members of his staff and led them to adopt questionable, if not dangerous, tactical plans once the invasion was begun. Finally, any delay on the part of an attacking force normally works to the advantage of the defender and, as Sir Garnet had informed the Asantehene of his invasion plans, this occasion proved to be no exception to the rule. In addition to all of this, the General's neglect of the transport problem which was partially responsible for the unnecessary loss of a significant portion of his European brigade, a loss which limited the effectiveness of his force and greatly increased the risk of failure. This last point is of considerable importance because, possibly more than any other single incident in the campaign, it clearly illustrates a major and consistent flaw in Sir Garnet's generalship.

A general's first responsibility is to preserve his force as an effective military instrument. He must therefore take every precaution to plan the conduct of the operation for which he is responsible in such a way as to eliminate every unnecessary risk to that force. The most appalling aspect of Sir Garnet's conduct of the Asante campaign is the way in which he consistently proceeded to undermine its chances of success by ignoring this prime responsibility. His actions, or lack thereof, during the period from early October through to late December 1873, partially illustrate this fact. However, his actions after the troops began to land in late December, expose this serious shortcoming even more clearly. In fact, he so greatly increased the
risk of failure that it is actually difficult to believe that he was successful in extricating his invasion force for he committed several major errors which put the entire operation in jeopardy. Indeed, as one studies the campaign it becomes increasingly clear that had the General failed, his actions would have been subjected to a much more critical appraisal than they were and that his campaign would have gone down in history with such classic military blunders as the charge of the Light Brigade, Gallipoli, and Dieppe and his reputation would have suffered the same fate as did those of the leaders involved in those infamous debacles.

One of the General's actions which seriously and unnecessarily endangered the success of the invasion was his misuse of the troops at his disposal. When making the plans for his drive to the north, Sir Garnet was faced with three basic requirements for troops. He had to garrison the forts on the coast, guard his lines of communication, and field an invasion force which could make up for its lack of numbers by its superior discipline and fire-power. The obvious priority for troop allocation was therefore to use the least reliable forces in the forts where the Navy could lend assistance in an emergency, the next best units could then be used to secure the lines of communication, and the regular troops could form the invasion force. Taking into consideration the General's prejudice against the West Indians, this would have entailed the assignment of Wood's and Russell's Regiments, the Gold Coast Rifles, and the remnants of the Fanti
levies\textsuperscript{32} to garrison duties in the forts and along the Main Supply Route. It would then have required the employment of some of the West Indians as garrisons for the most forward stations on the Main Supply Route and as a first-line reserve. However, the majority of the West Indians would move with the European troops who would form the bulk of the Main Body of the invading army.

Originally, the General's troop allocations adhered roughly to this order of priority. The forts were to be garrisoned by the Gold Coast Rifles, some Fanti levies, and the Hausas. The Main Supply Route was to be guarded by the under-strength 2WIR.\textsuperscript{33} The Main Body was to consist of 1WIR, the Naval Brigade, two European battalions and Rait's Artillery. The only major deviation was the employment of Wood's and Russell's regiments with the Main Body; a decision which can only be ascribed to Sir Garnet's desire to push forward two members of the "ring" for the troops themselves were hardly suitable material for the invasion force.

With the exception of the use of Wood's and Russell's units in lieu of 2WIR, the roles of the two components should have been reversed for maximum effectiveness, this assignment of the available troops was reasonably sound. With the arrival of the third European battalion, however, the situation changed radically. On the basis of his unjustified belief that this additional British regiment, which had just completed at least six
years of garrison duty in Great Britain, provided "the better fighting material", Sir Garnet took a step that severely increased the margin of danger in the coming operation. Apparently without giving a thought to moving Wood's and Russell's regiments, he assigned the 575 officers and men of 1WIR to garrison duty at Cape Coast Castle and Elmina. Thus at one blow, he replaced men most likely to withstand the climate with Europeans and denied the Main Body the services of badly needed regular troops while retaining in their stead the highly dubious fighting material contained in the aggregations commanded by Colonel Wood and Major Russell.

This was in itself, a colossal blunder but Sir Garnet went on to compound his folly. When he lost the use of some two-thirds of the third European battalion due to the breakdown in the transport system during the unloading of the troops, he took no action to bring his invasion force up to strength by moving 1WIR up to Prasu. Instead, he simply re-embarked some 400 regular troops and left 1WIR on garrison duty. In this way he unjustifiably denied his Main Body of a considerable weight of disciplined fire-power and exposed it to yet another unnecessary risk.

Had Sir Garnet been the gifted field-commander we have been led to believe him to be, he surely would have possessed the knowledge necessary to recognize the dangers inherent in this
approach and he would have possessed the flexibility and imagination necessary to correct the deficiency. The fact of the matter is, however, that he took no steps to replace the lost men and his failure to rectify the problem seems doubly damning when a solution was so close at hand.

The problem lay in the fact that a European battalion required almost three times the amount of transport to move and supply itself as an African unit did. Colonel Colley clearly stated that it would be impossible for him to raise sufficient carriers to keep a third European battalion in the field but his strength returns for the 12th of January 1874, show that he did have sufficient transport to move and support a "native" battalion. By that date, therefore, Sir Garnet had the means to fill the large gap in his Main Body. He could have brought the more experienced 2:WIR up to strength with reinforcements from 1WIR and immediately move it up to Prasu. He could then have utilized the remaining men from 1WIR as an immediate reserve while they performed garrison duty in the most forward staging camps. The immobilized Fusiliers could then have been used to garrison the forts and, as the carrier problem eased, they could have been moved up the road on line of communications duties and as a second-line reserve. Unfortunately, this solution, or some modification of it, does not appear to have occurred to either the General or the members of his staff. The seriousness of this
oversight soon became apparent when illness and battle casualties began to reduce his already inadequate force to a dangerously low level. 36

In the light of these comments, it appears reasonable to say that Sir Garnet, by virtue of his own mistakes, began his invasion too late and with an unnecessarily weak force of men. Therefore, in the interests of conserving his manpower and avoiding any unnecessary risk, he should have made every effort to negotiate a settlement before engaging the Asante army in combat. Certainly this was the course of action suggested to him by the Earl of Kimberley. In his instructions to the General, the Colonial Secretary had cautioned him to bear in mind "the capacity (of the Asante) for carrying on illusory negotiations," but he advised him to consider the possibility that the Asantehene, "on learning of the retreat of his army and the further preparations against him, (would) be ready to make reparations, and to conclude at once a peace on conditions acceptable to Her Majesty's Government". He also reminded the General that "a satisfactory state of things would be obtained if (he) could procure an honourable peace, or could inflict, in default of such peace, an effectual chastisement on the Ashanti force". 37 However, he especially cautioned Sir Garnet as to the probable inadvisability of occupying Kumasi. 38 That is, Sir Garnet was advised to fight if necessary but to avoid a fight if possible.
These instructions did not have any great degree of influence on Sir Garnet's dealings with the Asantehene, however. Instead, he apparently chose to be guided by Lord Kimberley's comment that there was no desire on the part of the Government to "fetter the discretion which must always be placed in the hands of an officer commanding a force in the field". Thus despite repeated attempts on the part of Kofi Karikari to initiate some form of negotiations, Sir Garnet clung stubbornly to the view that the Asantehene's overtures were being made in bad faith. He subsequently refused to attempt any form of compromise and, ignoring his professional responsibility and personal undertaking to husband his European soldiers, he committed his troops to a campaign that quite possibly need not have been fought.

There is no doubt that Sir Garnet was correct in treating the initial Asante overtures with suspicion, but it is almost impossible to see how he could continue to discount the sincerity of the succeeding initiatives. In the light of the evidence available, there were at least two reasons why Kofi Karikari's offers to negotiate should have been taken seriously.

In the first place, he made no attempt to stop the British advance by force until all attempts at negotiation had failed. This is of considerable importance because had the Asantehene been simply negotiating for the purpose of "buying time", he would have made his first stand at the Adansi Hills. This posi-
tion would have been chosen for three reasons. First, it was symbolically significant in that it was the frontier between metropolitan and provincial Asante. For this reason, had it been the Asantehene's intention to fight, it would have been politically important to halt the British before they actually entered the Asante heart-land. Second, the hills formed a magnificent defensive feature and it is likely that the British would have been enticed into exhausting themselves in their attempts to take it. Third, the Asantehene had adequate resources at hand to delay the British Advanced Guard sufficiently long enough to permit the reconcentration of his army in time to confront the British Main Body when it reached Monsi. As matters developed, however, no attempt was made to halt or harass the British until twenty-six days after Gifford's scouts had crossed the Pra.

The second reason for taking the Asante offers to negotiate seriously lay in the fact that Kofi Karikari gave concrete indications of his willingness to compromise. Upon receiving Sir Garnet's blunt and uncompromising letter of the 2nd of January 1874, the Asantehene adopted the logical procedure of trying to show his good faith; thereby opening the door to serious negotiations. He released Mr. Kuhne and requested Sir Garnet to appoint an official envoy to Kumasi with a view to opening direct negotiations. It is not particularly surprising, in the light of the Colonial Office comments and all that he had read of previous
British negotiations with the Asante, that Sir Garnet responded to this offer by adhering rigidly to his initial demands and continuing his advance.

By the 23rd of January, however, the General had far less reason for doubting the Asantehene's motives. On that day he received an embassy from Kumasi which should have given any man who was himself honestly interested in negotiating a peaceful settlement, sufficient cause to make some concession in the interests of facilitating negotiations. On this occasion, Kofi Karikari released the remaining European prisoners, agreed to pay the indemnity, and agreed to release all of the African prisoners once negotiations were completed. In return he asked only that Sir Garnet halt his advance and "go on with peaceful negotiation(s)".42

Certainly a man sincerely bent on following the spirit of Lord Kimberley's instructions would have taken every opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement at this time as the British were in an exceptionally strong position. They occupied an excellent defensive position from which they could easily withdraw if the need arose; they held a strong, well supplied support-base south of the Pra at Prasu; and their lines of communication were secure and operating efficiently. In addition, their extraordinary response to the Asante invasion43 had thrown the Asantehene off balance and it would be reasonable to assume that he was
eager to reach a compromise. It was at this point that Sir Garnet could have sent his emissary to Kumasi and tested the sincerity of the Asantehene's intentions but this he refused to do.

There are several possible explanations for the General's refusal to take this opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement. The first, and the only one to which he admits, is that he was convinced of the duplicity of Kofi Karikari. The second is that he realized that the delay caused by his neglect of the logistical preparations prior to the invasion had so seriously reduced his time for operations that, should he pause long enough to conduct proper negotiations, and should those negotiations fail, he would have no time left to move on Kumasi and still withdraw his European troops before the end of "the healthy season". Third, he was so consumed with his personal desire to occupy the Asante capital and gain the attendant glory, that he would allow nothing to stand in his way. No doubt all three of these considerations influenced his actions but, of the three, the second appears the most valid.

His motives aside, the fact remains that Sir Garnet did not follow the spirit of his instructions by taking advantage of the excellent bargaining position in which he found himself. Indeed, he not only failed to make any concession to the Asantehene, but he also increased his demands to such an extent that
he made it absolutely impossible for Kofi Karikari to comply even though the Asantehere tried twice more, on the 26th of January, and 3rd of February to avoid further fighting and negotiate a settlement. Thus the man who had already compromised the safety of his troops by neglecting several vital aspects of his responsibilities as commanding general, was now, as the British diplomat responsible for negotiating a settlement of the dispute, quite possibly needlessly exposing them to combat by virtue of his inability, or lack of desire, to conduct meaningful negotiations toward an acceptable compromise.

The General's conduct of affairs during the battles of Amoafu and Odasu and his actions in Kumasi need not be subjected to any searching analysis here. By virtue of the facts already discussed above, Sir Garnet had placed himself in a desperate position. Whatever his motives, he was determined to take Kumasi with an inadequate force within an extremely limited period of time. His advance therefore degenerated into a blind charge through the bush which, had the Asante had the benefit of the Snider rifle, would probably never have succeeded.

After the battle of Amoafu, the General acted like a hound on the scent for he pressed on toward Kumasi with no thought for anything other than reaching that place. All of the elaborate supply and medical arrangements, which had worked exceptionally well up to the time of Amoafu, were allowed to decline
in efficiency as Sir Garnet once more concentrated on tactical operations to the exclusion of all else. Rather than getting his lines of communication back into proper working order before continuing the advance, a step which the time element made most difficult, he simply cut himself off from all administrative support and dashed off into the bush.

Administrative detail was not the only thing ignored by Sir Garnet, however. He also made several major tactical errors. In his haste, he failed to use his scouts and Advanced-Guard to full advantage. Thus his men were once more exposed to further unnecessary risk as they found themselves being worn down by the succession of Asante ambushes set between Ajimamu and the Oda river; ambushes which could have been cleared at less expense in manpower by proper scouting and utilization of the Advanced-Guard. The General also endangered the entire force by purposely allowing himself to be completely surrounded in the village of Odasu by the numerically superior Asante force. It seems probable at this point that had Kofi Karikari deployed his forces in such a way as to simply hold the British in Odasu for as little as thirty-six to forty-eight hours rather than attempting to force an immediate decision, Sir Garnet would have been destroyed at that point and gone down in history with such colossal military blunderers as the American Indian-fighter, General George Custer. Fortunately for Sir Garnet, however, his superior fire-power and
the shock value of his desperate break-out for Kumasi so unnerved the Asantehene that he fled from the field and thereby released the British from the trap.

His initial actions on reaching Kumasi also fail to reflect much credit on Sir Garnet's military capability for he made no attempt to disarm the enemy troops in and around the town. One of the main objectives of warfare is to destroy the military potential of the enemy. In this instance, however, the "victor" held his own troops in check and allowed a large portion of the enemy force to pass unmolested into the bush where they rejoined the Asantehene. Sir Garnet himself never bothers to explain this action but his most sympathetic chronicler, Henry Brackenbury, intimates that the General acted as he did for two reasons. First, he felt himself too weak to force the issue. Second, he believed that such an action would illustrate to the Asantehene his good intentions and thus pave the way for immediate negotiations toward a peace treaty. There are arguments for and against the validity of both of these reasons and it is probable that the General was actually motivated by them. In retrospect, however, it appears that Sir Garnet did have the capability to seal off the town and disarm those Asante who were then in it and those who subsequently attempted to pass through it. The fact that he failed to do this does not redound to his credit as a field-commander.
Certainly the General's gesture had no effect on Kofi Karikari for the Asantehene made no effort to seek a peace settlement even though the British had reached and occupied his capital. Instead, he stayed in the bush with his army where he appeared quite content to remain until Sir Garnet had withdrawn from Asante territory. Thus when the General withdrew from Kumasi, fearing the advent of the rains, he had not succeeded in achieving the basic aim of his mission, for he had neither concluded a peace treaty with the Asante nor had he inflicted an effectual chastisement on the Asante force. Instead, he had simply forced the Asantehene and his army to abandon Kumasi which he then destroyed after having plundered the royal palace; acts which one could hardly characterize as an effectual chastisement of the Asante force. In fact, it was not until Sir Garnet was well on his way back to Cape Coast that Kofi Karikari agreed to come to terms and, as has been pointed out, there is good reason to believe that his sudden capitulation was far from being entirely motivated by Sir Garnet's operations.

The official view of the Anglo-Asante war of 1873-1874 notwithstanding, it should now be clear that the success which attended British operations on the Gold Coast did not result solely from the efforts of Sir Garnet Wolseley and "the troops which her Majesty's Government confided" to him. Instead, it should be obvious that the British were able to bring the war to an end on terms favourable to themselves through a combination of four contributing factors.
Of prime importance were the contributions of Colonel Harley and the Fanti. Indeed, had the Administrator and his allies not challenged and severely checked Amankwa Tia's army at Dunkwa, and had Colonel Harley himself not acted quickly and effectively throughout the first phase of the war, it is possible that the war would have ended in the early summer of 1673 with the British being forced from the Gold Coast entirely. Similarly, Sir Garnet's efforts throughout the campaign, despite his many errors and shortcomings, were vital to the end result. Certainly without his operations there would have been no treaty and relations between the Asante, the Fanti, and the British would have continued in the same state of suspended hostilities as had existed ever since 1863. It is equally apparent that without the third contributing factor—Captain Glover's expedition—all that had been done by the British in the 'Protectorate' and along the Prasu/Kumasi road would have been for naught. Sir Garnet had withdrawn from Kumasi without the treaty for which he had supposedly fought and it was solely due to Captain Glover's sudden appearance to the east of the Asante capital that the Treaty of Fomana was signed. Finally, the Asantehene himself made an indirect yet substantial contribution to the British success. It was his failure to make this stand at the Adansi Hills which made it possible for Sir Garnet to reach Kumasi at all. By neglecting to take this step, Kofi Karikari allowed the British to pass unmolested beyond the only defensive position along the invasion
route from which the Asante army could possibly have offset the overwhelming superiority of British fire-power and thus halted the invasion.

Aside from this debit and credit accounting, the war had been a costly venture. Although the drain on the British coffers had been relatively high, the cost in human lives had been higher. The toll among the Africans will never be known but of the approximately 4,000 Europeans, West Indians, and Africans involved as members of the various military units, 68 were dead, 394 were wounded (135 from the Black Watch), and a total of 1,018 were invalided for one reason or another. Seven members of the original Wolseley "Ring" were dead and 31 invalided. Proportionately, no less than 43 per cent of the combined strength of the European regiments was invalided home, and there was 71 per cent sickness in two months. The Welsh Fusiliers, not all of whose companies were used in action, had the greatest proportionate amount of sickness, the Rifle Brigade next and the Black Watch least, while the list of wounded and killed in these units showed proportions of the reverse order. In addition, many hospital cases died on the boats during evacuation.

Accepting the hypothesis that this war was actually necessary, its cost in gold and lives could be largely justified had it resulted in the British actually being able to "insure a lasting peace with the Ashanti kingdom." Such was not the case,
however. With the war over and with the treaty of Fomana supposedly forming a firm and lasting basis for relations between the British and the Asante, the British Government reverted to the very policy which had been largely responsible for the war in the first place. Thus the door was left open for an Asante resurgence and a recurrence of Asante attempts to reassert their influence in the 'Protectorate'. This opportunity was not allowed to slip past.

When the war had ended, the Asante Empire had fallen to pieces. Most of the important states, including Mampon, Nsuta, Bekwai, Kokofu, Jabin and even Okomfo Anokye's town of Agona, refused to obey the central government; and all the outlying provinces such as Kwahu, Gyaman, Sefwi, Banda, and the northern tribes openly declared their independence. Kofi Karikari was unable to reassert his authority and in August or September of 1874, he was deposed. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Mensa Bonsu, who set himself to rebuild Kumasi and to reassert the authority of the Golden Stool over the rebellious provinces.

Mensa Bonsu began his campaign to regain his empire by exerting pressure on Jabin. But Asafo Agyei, the King of Jabin would not consider resuming his role as a tributary of Kumasi and he even went so far as to kill all the Kumasi traders in the kingdom as a sign of his defiance. In the face of this, Mensa Bonsu questioned the British Government as to its views on the
subject. However, the British declined to interfere in any way. The Asantehene therefore decided to make the Jabin question into a test case for the rest of the Asante states. All of those states, faced with the alternatives of rallying around Kumasi or around Jabin, supported Kumasi. Accordingly, in October of 1875, Mensa Bonsu attacked Jabin and by the 3rd of November he had driven the Jabin army from the field.

This victory greatly strengthened the Asantehene's position. No other state had supported Jabin in its revolt, the British, who no doubt wished to see as much dissension as possible among the Asante, clearly would do nothing to interfere with him, and the flight of the Jabin had allowed the direct rule of Kumasi to be extended considerably. It was therefore natural that Mensa Bonsu should decide that he had nothing to fear from the British. As a result, when the British envoy arrived in Kumasi in December of 1875 to receive another instalment of the war indemnity, he was hooted and pelted in the streets of the town. This so alarmed the British Government that it never again attempted to collect the indemnity and only 4,000 of the 50,000 ounces of gold demanded by the treaty of Fomana were ever paid.49

Commenting on this condition, Ellis writes:

Thus within less than two years after the burning of Kumasi the Ashanti had, thanks to the Government policy of non-intervention, recovered the whole of their lost territory except Kwahu and Adansi, and escaped the payment of the greater part of the indemnity.50
The policy of the British Government towards Asante from 1874 to 1890 was therefore weak and inconsistent, and the fruits of the war of 1873-1874 were lost in an unbelievably short time. A small band of civil officials, soldiers, and adventurers had won the war--largely by good luck--but the policy makers and their officials lost the peace with the result that the whole process would have to be repeated in 1895-1896.
CHAPTER I - FOOTNOTES


3 Ward, Gold Coast, p. 140. Despite the use of the term "British", it is important to realize that the British Government had no direct dealings with the Gold Coast. From early Stuart times the British system had been to charter a company which enjoyed a monopoly of the British trade on the coast. In return, the company maintained the forts which were considered essential for the security of trade. The succession of monopolist companies which resulted from this policy were constantly criticised but the policy was retained for some time. In 1750, however, pressure from the rising port of Liverpool caused the replacement of the Royal African Company—the last and most long-lived of all the companies—by a loose association of all the British merchants trading to Africa. Known as The Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, this organization was not in itself a trading concern. Rather it was simply a device for maintaining the forts and factories by means of a Parliamentary grant instead of a trading monopoly.

4 The European powers had established themselves on the Gold coast at the following times: Portugal (1482), Holland (1595), Denmark (1642), Sweden (1647) and Brandenberg (1682). Both the French and English had been on the coast from the middle of the sixteenth century but they did not build their first forts until 1650 and 1631 respectively. Although Gold had been the commodity which had originally drawn the Europeans to the Gold coast, it was the advent of the trans-Atlantic slave trade which caused the sudden increase in activity after 1630. However, before the end of the eighteenth century most of the competition had been eliminated and only the Dutch, Danes and English still possessed forts on the Gold Coast. Of these, the Dutch and English installations were by far the most important and by the end of the eighteenth century the English had secured an easy dominance over the slave trade in general and the Gold Coast trade in particular. See E.C. Martin, The British West African Settlements: 1750-1821, London, Longman's, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927, pp. 52-54; and W.E.F. Ward, A History of the Gold Coast, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948, passim.

6 Ibid., pp. 51-52.


8 The Ghanian historian, Dr. A. Adu Boahen develops this theme of economic determinism rather fully. See Boahen, *Topics*, pp. 69-76.

9 From the time of the first Portuguese settlement on the Gold Coast, there had arisen the custom of paying regular land-rental to the local African rulers for the land on which the forts stood. This custom was eventually formalized into written contracts called 'Notes'. In the eyes of Africans and Europeans alike, these Notes stood for the rental fees and the honouring of them by the Europeans acknowledged the sovereignty of the African ruler in control of the state wherein the fort lay.


11 The Asante Empire may be said to have consisted of two distinct segments roughly in the form of concentric circles centering on Kumasi. The inner circle was comprised mainly of Akan states; founded in large part by the Oyoko clan. These states came under close scrutiny of the Asantehene himself. This is often referred to as Metropolitan Asante. The outer circle was comprised of conquered states which were often of non-Akan origin. These were considerably more free of control and supervision by the Asantehene. These states are often referred to as being part of Provincial Asante. See R.S. Rattray, *Ashanti Law and Constitution*, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, for details.
12 At this time, the Asantehene, Osei Kojo, planned a punitive expedition against the Akim. The Akim widened the area of conflict by allying themselves with their western neighbours, the Assin. This was a serious development for the Assin were closely allied with the Fanti. The question of Fanti neutrality therefore became most important and Osei Kojo payed the Fanti chiefs a bribe in order to ensure their neutrality. The Fanti accepted the bribe but broke their promise and thus created the first of several grievances which would eventually lead to massive Asante retaliation. See Claridge, History, Vol. 1, pp. 149-151.

13 Ward, Gold Coast, pp. 132-133.
15 Ibid., p. 234.
16 Map No. 2: The Gold Coast - Chief Tribal Divisions
17 Ibid., p. 279.


19 Metcalfe, Documents, p. 3.

20 At this time, there were British settlements on the Gambia, at Sierra Leone, and on the Gold Coast. With the exception of an experiment in Crown colony government in the captured 'Province' of Senegambia from 1764 to 1783, the British Government had relied on regulated companies of merchants and philanthropists to administer the various settlements along the coast with the aid of parliamentary grants. Thus British participation in West African trade by the last decades of the eighteenth century was largely the business of Liverpool, Bristol, and London trading houses. In fact, with the exception of the brief period of Crown colony rule in the Gambia region, official withdrawal from responsibility for African plantations or posts was almost complete for twenty-five years. It is important to note that the 1811 decision taken with regard to the Gold Coast was reflected both in Sierra Leone—which was declared a Crown colony in 1807—and on the Gambia.

It is also important to note that although the desire to halt the slave trade and the expectation of a lucrative 'legitimate' trade were potent factors in the motivation of the pressure groups which exerted influence on the British Government at this time; there was a third factor. This was African exploration which by the end of the eighteenth century had become a field for scientific and commercial investment and part of the strategy of the war with France. The organization most active in this field was the Association for promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa. Founded in 1788, this Association was intended to open to Britain a commercial passage to rich and populous nations by investigating the course of the Niger River. It must be remembered, however, that the only Government supported expedition prior to 1815 was Mungo Park's second—and fatal—Niger expedition of 1805. The period of relatively heavy Governmental involvement began in 1815 with the Luckey and Peddie expeditions and ended with the Lander brother's expedition of 1831. (Maps 4 and 5 refer.)

At this time, therefore, what Colin Newbury describes as a few dedicated enthusiasts helped to create commitments in trade, anti-slavery activities, and exploration, for government departments which had been glad to renounce the West African coast as

21 Zachary Macaulay: Governor of Sierra Leone, 1793-95; Secretary of the Sierra Leone Company, 1799-1808; and of the African Institute, 1807-12; member of the Anti-Slavery Society from 1823.


24 Ward, Gold Coast, p. 155.


26 Mr. T.E. Bowdich negotiated a treaty in 1817 and Mr. J. Dupuis negotiated a second treaty in 1820. In both cases, the Governor at Cape Coast, Mr. John Hope-Smith, failed to honour the terms of the treaty. See Bowdich, Mission, and Dupuis, Journal, for the views of the British negotiators. See also C.O. 879/6; Gold Coast No. 46, The Gold Coast Settlements from their first establishment to the death of Mr. Maclean in 1847; March, 1874, for the Colonial Office interpretation. Collins', "The Panic Element" is especially interesting for the light it sheds on some of Dupuis' prejudices with regard to the Company.


28 T.70/1604/1; Governor and Council to the African Committee, 22 January, 1819; T.70/1601/1; J. Hope-Smith to J. Dupuis; 26 January, 1820; and T.70/1606/1; Governor and Council to the African Committee; 19 May 1820, cited in Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 54, 57, and 61.

29 In the Asantehene's opinion, the one difference between Cape Coast and the rest of Fantiland was that it had not been overrun by his armies, and this, only out of his consideration for the English. See T.70/1603/2; Hutchison to Hope-Smith; 17 November, 1817, cited in Metcalfe, Documents, p. 70.


32 Sir Charles MacCarthy. After service in the West Indies he was given a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the Royal African Corps and next year (1812) became Governor of Sierra Leone. He was knighted in 1820.

33 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 46; March, 1874, pp. 26-27.

34 This incident is dealt with in considerable detail in Ward, Gold Coast, pp. 168-170.

35 Metcalfe, Documents, p. 71.

36 C.O. 267/58; MacCarthy to Bathurst, 7 April, 1823; C.O. 267/58; Chisholm to MacCarthy, 8 August, 1823; and C.O. 267/59; MacCarthy to Bathurst, 12 December, 1823; all cited in Crooks, Records, pp. 169-172. Of special note in this formation of an alliance was the astute political sense exhibited by the African chiefs who took care to secure themselves against being abandoned to the tender mercy of the Asantehene by having a formal agreement and holding a ritual oath-taking. See H.R. Ricketts, A Narrative of the Ashantee War, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1831, pp. 40-41.

37 A clear and concise account of the entire action is contained in Ward, Gold Coast, pp. 168-174. The Asante were much impressed with Sir Charles' courage. They consequently ate portions of his body and preserved his head which became a powerful 'fetish' in Kumasi. See Claridge, History, Vol. 1, p. 352, for details.


39 Major-General Charles Turner entered the army in 1795; served in the West Indies and the Peninsula; Major-General, 1821; Governor of Sierra Leone, 5 February, 1825, to 7 March, 1826.

40 Henry Bathurst, 3rd Earl Bathurst; M.P. 1793; President of the Board of Trade, 1807-12; Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 11 June, 1812, to 30 April, 1827.

41 A series of despatches were exchanged between Major-General Turner and Earl Bathurst on this matter but the most important appear to be: C.O. 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, 24 March, 1825; C.O. 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, 9 April, 1925; and C.O. 268/20, Bathurst to Turner, 5 July, 1825. Also of considerable importance are: C.O. 267/65, Memorandum on the Gold Coast, 2 July, 1825; and C.O. 258/23, Instructions to the West African Commissioners, 11 November, 1825.
42 This they were able to do with impunity for neither the tribesmen nor the Danes were able to effectively challenge their invasion. See Nørregard, *Danish Settlements*, pp. 196-198.

43 Major-General Sir Neil Campbell, entered the army in 1797; served in the West Indies and the Peninsula, and with the Allied armies in Germany and France, 1813-14; knighted in 1814; Major-General in 1825; appointed Governor of Sierra Leone, 13 May, 1825.


45 Ward, *Gold Coast*, p. 177


47 C.O. 268/26, Bathurst to Campbell, 21 March, 1827.


49 C.O. 267/97, Hay to Barnes, Brown and Forster, 30 October, 1828; and C.O. 268/27, Rules for conducting the affairs of Cape Coast Castle and Accra and securing the appointment of fit and proper persons for the charge and management of these forts, 10 January, 1829.

50 Captain George Maclean, served as an officer in Royal African Colonial Corps and came to official notice when he went to the Gold Coast in 1826 in a military capacity. Appointed President of the Committee of Merchants and Governor of the Gold Coast, 1830-1843; Judicial Assessor on the Gold Coast, 1843-1847. Died of dysentery at Cape Coast Castle in May, 1847.

51 Panyarring was the well-established custom whereby a creditor might seize any fellow-townsmen of the debtor and hold him as security. The family of the man thus panyarred would naturally put pressure on the debtor to pay. During the slave trade, however, there was a strong temptation to panyar a man for a small debt and sell him into slavery without giving his family a chance to secure payment of the debt; thus making a handsome profit.
52 This is a direct reference to those southern states which became Asante provinces as a result of the 1807-1814 wars. See above, pp. 6-10; and C.O. 879/6, G.G. 46, pp. 13-15.

53 This seems to refer to the terms which had been reached under Rickett's auspices in December 1827, but which were never carried into effect.

54 C.O. 879/6, G.G. 46, Appendix (c).

55 Although both the Dutch and the Danes were still active on the coast at this time, neither became as involved as the British in the affairs of the Africans. Therefore, even though both powers refused to co-operate in such matters as common customs duties, etc., and even though the Dutch exacerbated Asante/Fanti relations by their activities through Elmina, the "power groupings" were actually the Asante, Fanti, and British.

56 Claridge, History, Vol. 1, p. 391 - These notes, having once been claimed from the Fanti chiefs by the Asantehene as a right of conquest, had simply reverted by the same right to the British, and the sites to which they referred became their absolute property.

57 The official stipulation was that his authority was restricted to the "forts, roadstead or harbours thereunto adjoining, as well as the persons residing therein." Even so, a precedent existed for this in that under both the old Company (H.C. 507, 1816, Vol. VII Report of Committee on the state of the Settlements and Forts of Africa - Part II - Evidence of Mr. S. Cock) and under the Crown (H.C. 551, 1842, Vol. XI-XII, Report of Committee on the state of British Possessions on the West Coast of Africa and their present relations with the neighbouring tribes; Evidence of Mr. W.B. Sewell.), the British authorities had intervened in political and judicial disputes amongst the African population, usually at their request.

58 By the 1830's both African trade and African exploration had ceased to attract the support of the British Government. The Committee of Privy Council for Trade and Plantations made no objections to a Colonial Office suggestion to abandon the Gold Coast at the end of the 1820's; and in 1841 the Niger Delta palm oil trade was contrasted favourably with the small amounts exported from ports under British rule. The lesson was obvious enough: African possessions offered little commercial advantage in return for their upkeep, in relation to coastal trade as a whole. The merchants' case for the retention of African posts which was still based on the eighteenth century premise that a fort offered protection of the principal national interest in the African market was, by the 1830's, and extremely weak one.
Similarly, the 1831 journey of the Lander brothers down the Niger to the Delta rounded off the period of West African exploration begun in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Immediately the interest of the government departments lapsed and it was laid down that no missions were to be sent from Sierra Leone or the Gambia at the administration's expense.

This attitude was also reflected in the field of administration. MacCarthy's plan for unified settlements did bring about the abolition of the African Company in 1821, when the forts on the Gold Coast were placed under Sierra Leone. However, very few of the implications of establishing a united government were thought out. MacCarthy's recommendations for a supreme court with power to appoint magistrates were ignored, and the executive powers of the governor outside of Sierra Leone were not mentioned at all. In the Gambia settlement, which was tied to the Sierra Leone Council, a lieutenant-governor was appointed for the first time in 1829--unable to pass his own legislation and subjected to the multiple delays of a system of administration which was in need of abolition or reform.

In fact, by the early 1830's, official interest in West Africa had sunk to the lowest point in the nineteenth century. For a general discussion of the plans for withdrawal which were suggested at this time, see *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. II, "The Growth of the new Empire 1783-1870", Cambridge, The University Press, 1940, pp. 650-2.


60 Ward, *Gold Coast*, p. 185. This is indeed "roughly speaking" for although the Danes were of considerably less importance, the Dutch constituted serious breaches in the British sphere. Indeed, the Dutch often created problems for the British through their relationship with Asante via the Elmina for it was from the Dutch that the Asante received most of their arms and ammunition.

61 C.O. 98/1A, Council Minute, 12 November, 1839; C.O. 267/162, Maclean to Russell, 27 January, 1840; and H.C. 551, 1842, Vol. XII, Conclusions. Human sacrifices and panyarring came into this category but the mild form of domestic slavery practised on the Gold Coast did not. Few people were more hostile to the slave trade than Maclean, but he did not see that he had any authority to arrest slave-traders who were not British subjects.

62 C.O. 267/162, Minutes by Russell and Stephen, 3 April, 1840.
63 See G.E. Metcalfe, Maclean of the Gold Coast: The Life and Times of George Maclean, 1801-1847, London, Oxford University Press, 1962. This work gives an excellent account of the difficulties encountered by Maclean and illustrates most clearly the devastating campaign of character assassination which was carried out against him after the sudden death of his wife at Cape Coast Castle. See also, Cruikshank, Eighteen Years, Vol. 1, pp. 224, et seq., which deals with the question of Mrs. Maclean's death very fully.

64 Lord John Russell; Secretary of State for War and the colonies, August 1839 to September 1841; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1855; Foreign Secretary, 1852-3 and 1859-65; Prime Minister, 1846-52 and 1865-6.

65 H.C. 551, Treasury to Colonial Office, 10 June, 1840; and H.C. 551, Colonial Office to Treasury, 17 June, 1840.

66 Metcalfe, Maclean, p. 268. Madden's report is included in H.C. 551 and a summary of his recommendations can be found in C.O. 267/170 - cited in Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 170-171.

67 Edward George Stanley (later 14th Earl of Derby), Entered Parliament as a Whig in 1822. Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 1827-30; Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, March 1833 to May 1834 and from September 1841 to December 1845. Joined the Conservatives in 1835; later three time Prime Minister.

68 C.O. 267/170, Minute by Stanley, 12 January, 1842. See H.C. 551, Vol. XI, pp. iii-xxi, for the Select Committee's findings and recommendations with respect to the Gold Coast.

69 Claridge, History, Vol. 1, pp. 448-450. This period of time was vital for the entire West Coast of Africa. Colin Newbury comments that:

The years from 1839 to 1844 were a watershed for British policy towards West Africa as a whole. Decisions taken then ended the indifference of the previous decade to the inheritance of the eighteenth century on the coast; and from these decisions about the conduct of the anti-slavery campaign and the organization of the forts and settlements derived most of the consequences which involved Government, officials, and traders more closely in African affairs during the rest of the century. See Newbury, Policy, p. 43.
It was in 1840 that evidence of an increase in the slave trade and the suspicion that the Gold Coast forts were being used to supply slavers shook the Colonial and Foreign Office out of the attitude of makeshift and compromise that had prevailed in all of the West African settlements since about 1828. The consequences on the Gold Coast have been dealt with but there were also important consequences elsewhere. One major consequence was the attempt to negotiate anti-slavery treaties with African rulers at Sierra Leone and on the Gambia. Even more important, however, was the development of the use of consuls in the Bights of Benin and Biafra and on the Sherbro from the end of the 1840's.

The consequence of consular appointments to the Bights was increased reliance on the Navy to secure the aims of British policy. One consul, Mr. Beecroft, made overtures at Abomey and Abeokuta in 1850 but failed to win over King Ghezo to the anti-slavery cause and thus brought the British into temporary alliance with the Yoruba. The naval bombardment of Lagos in 1851 which followed this, and the installation of King Akitoye at Lagos as signatory to an anti-slavery treaty produced a crop of agreements along the coast. Thus the kind of commitment which the Colonial Office had tried to avoid in the Gambia and in Sierra Leone had now been entered into by the Foreign Office and the Admiralty in the Lagos interior.

70 Loc. cit.

71 Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 191-192.

72 Commander Hill had served as commander of the West African Squadron, R.N., prior to this appointment.

73 C.O. 96/4, Declaration of the Fanti Chiefs, 6 March, 1844.


75 They did, however, open the way to further encroachments. Indeed, the Bonds were unique to the Gold Coast. In Sierra Leone, the need for asserting the authority of the administration outside the colonial boundaries was neither so pressing as on the Gold Coast, nor was it tolerated by the Colonial Office. In Gambia the situation was different again. There, by the 1850's the old treaty policy was breaking down because of external factors and the whole British policy towards the Gambia Wolof and Mandinka chiefdoms which had reposed on occasional agreements and stipends was destroyed between 1852 and the mid-1860's by a series of political and religious revolts. (For information on these wars, see J.S. Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa,
London, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 155-184). At Lagos, too, the administration after 1861 was vulnerable to disruption of interior trade and local market supplies. However, the reaction of officials there was to intervene by force of arms, as exemplified by Administrator Glover's defeat at the Egba in 1865.


77 C.O. 96/7, Minute by Stephen, 28 January, 1846; and C.O. 96/11, Gray to Winniett, 20 January, 1849.

78 This growing demand was in large part a result of the increasing influence of the missionaries. A good general review of this development can be found in Ward, Gold Coast, pp. 193-199. For a more detailed and adequately documented account, see David Kimble, A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism: 1850-1928, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, Chap. II and Chap. III, - pp. 125-135.

79 With the coffers in London locked to them the local administrators were faced with a serious problem because there were great difficulties in the way of raising adequate revenue locally. The major problem was that the Africans could not be taxed as they were not British subjects. It had been hoped that customs duties might provide the needed funds but even that source of income held little promise because any attempt to increase the small duties levied on trade passing through the British forts would merely have meant that the British trade would revert to the Dutch and the Danes. Even the purchase of the Danish forts did not produce the hoped for additional revenue from raised duties on trade because the Dutch still refused to co-operate.


80 Henry George Grey, Viscount Howick, later 3rd Earl Grey: Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 1830-3; Secretary at War, 1835-9; Secretary for War and the Colonies, 1846-52.

81 C.O. 96/19, Minute by Grey, 16 November, 1850.

82 C.O. 96/25, The Poll Tax 'Ordinance', 19 April, 1852.
83 C.O. 96/40, Ord to Labouchere, 16 May, 1856, and Ward, Gold Coast, p. 191. See Kimble, Political History, Chap. IV, for a concise and well document account of this period in Gold Coast history. Not only did the measure fail to raise the desired funds, but it also caused unrest and dissatisfaction among the tribesmen in the 'Protectorate'. The people objected to the methods used to collect the tax and they also asserted, no doubt correctly, that their chiefs had no right to tax them in this way. Resistance was so great that instead of an expected £20,000, only £7,500 was collected in the first year. In succeeding years so little was collected that the tax was eventually quietly discontinued.

This measure was not unique to the West African settlements. The principal aim of Crown administration was to keep the traders' peace and make colonial government pay for itself. Economy had been one motive behind the return of the forts to the merchants in 1826; it was no less a consideration from the 1840's on, when Customs duties were looked to increasingly as a means of paying for local expenditure. Experiments with direct taxes on persons, property and produce were tried at various times, since the days of the Sierra Leone Company's quit rents. However, they had failed for much the same reasons as had the Gold Coast poll tax.

Need for revenue was also a factor which combined with humanitarian motives to persuade the Colonial Office to approve between 1850 and 1863 a number of territorial acquisitions. The period of restraint from about 1827 till 1848 ended when Earl Grey agreed to the purchase of the Danish forts as Customs posts in 1850 and to the annexation of land at Kombo to support Bathurst settlers. In the Bight of Benin, as a result of the growth of consular authority and the promise of a new field for trade, the Foreign Office persuaded the Colonial Office to agree to the annexation of Lagos in 1861. Annexations of Bendu and of Sherbro Island in the name of the anti-slavery campaign and the timber trade followed soon after. Bulama Island which had been formally annexed in 1849 and Koya were declared part of the colony of Sierra Leone and occupied in 1861. On the Gold Coast the administration of the eastern districts was expanded towards the Volta mouth as far as Kata; and Madagri, Palma and Lekki were added to Lagos to ensure control of the lagoon markets for customs in 1863.

84 Ward, Gold Coast, p. 191.
The incident in 1844 involved British refusal to return an Assini fugitive from the Asantehene's justice to Kumasi and war was only just averted by a timely giving way on the part of the Governor, Commander Hill, R.N. The problem in 1854 was the result of Asante intrigues with Kwadwa Otihu of Assin to bring his state out of the 'Protectorate' and place it once more under Asante suzerainty. The plans went awry and the Asantehene resolved on the use of force. However, the British assembled a force large enough to cause the Asantehene to reconsider his plans for invading the coastal region.

Richard Pine, younger brother of Sir Benjamin Pine (Governor of the Gold Coast, March 1854-May 1858), served on the Gambia, 1855-62; Governor of Gold Coast, 1862-1865.

C.O. 96/58, Pine to Newcastle, 10 December, 1862, cited in H.C. 385, 1864, Vol. XLI, Despatches from the Governor of the Gold Coast explaining the cause of the war with the King of Ashantee: despatches to the Governor directing him to prosecute the war: returns of the expenses incurred, etc., p. 133.

Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham Clinton, 5th Duke of Newcastle; M.P. 1832-51, first as a Tory and later as a Peelite; Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, December, 1852 to June, 1854; Secretary for War until February, 1855; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1859-64.

H.C. 385, 1864, Vol. XLI, provides considerable documentary evidence on this campaign. In the light of the vague and non-committal wording of the despatch granting permission to cross the Pra (C.O. 96/63, Rogers to Pine, 21 December, 1863), it is not surprising that the invasion was not undertaken.

Claridge, History, pp. 529-530.

The disturbances over the poll tax had been a major factor in the development of this feeling but there was a more fundamental clause. When Maclean had had the direction of Gold Coast affairs, he was to a great extent able to make his own policy and to act consistently on it. But the British officials who followed him were required to follow the constantly changing policies of successive governments in Britain. This situation was further complicated by the fact that the British governors and their aides were rarely on the coast for periods longer than a year to two. In general they lacked the time and the incentive to get to know the country and its people properly, and were thus unable to act as an effective counter-weight to vacillating policy.
92 Edward Cardwell (later 1st Viscount Cardwell); M.P. 1842-74; President of the Board of Trade, 1852-5; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1859-61; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1861-4; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1864-6; Secretary of State for War, 1868-74.

93 C.O. 96/64, Cardwell to Hackett, 23 May, 1864; and C.O. 96/64, Cardwell to Pine, 23 June, 1864.

94 C.O. 96/64, Grievances of the Gold Coast Chiefs, 9 August, 1864.

95 Sir Charles Bowyer Adderley, later 1st Baron Norton. Conservative M.P. for North Staffordshire, 1841-1878; interested in colonial questions; co-operated with E.G. Wakefield in founding Canterbury, N.Z., and the Colonial Reform Society; under-Secretary for the Colonies, June 1866 to December, 1868.


99 Cmd. 412, 1865, Vol. 1, abstract of resolutions cited in Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 311-312. Commenting generally on the situation at this time, Colin Newbury writes:

Increasingly, there was a tendency (from the late 1840's) to look to the British Government to cut the Gordian knots that bound small communities of European traders and ofﬁcials to the leaders of local African society and impose a solution to the problems of contact on European terms. The Government, however, was limited in its choice of methods, inhibited by the need for economy and by a general desire to avoid acquiring an empire in Africa. The forts and settlements had been retained and administered largely for humanitarian reasons in the case of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, for the gum trade in the case of the
Gambia, and as a base for legitimate trade on the Slave coast in the case of Lagos. After 1865, the humanitarian argument for the posts weakened. But by then they had developed into Crown colonies and the pressure of the apostles of Buxton was redirect-
ed against domestic slavery and for the reform of native law and custom. The role to be played by Government, therefore, was still not uninfluenced by what was loosely termed "public opinion". In the case of West Africa this meant the small parliamentary group from the Aborigines Protection Society, traders from Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, and London, and occasionally missionary societies. Consequently, abandonment of all posts was never really considered seriously in the 1860's. Newbury, Policy, pp. 38-9.

100 Major Samuel Wensley Blackall; M.P. 1847-61; Governor of Dominica; Governor of Sierra Leone, 1863; Governor-in-Chief, West African Settlements, February 1866-February 1868.

101 C.O. 96/68, Cardwell to Conran, 23 November, 1865; and C.O. 96/71, Cardwell to Blackall, 23 June, 1866. See also, C.O. 879/2, Gold Coast No. 6 - 20 January, 1866, Memorandum by Mr. Elliot and Major Blackall on remodelling of West African Governments.

102 Lieutenant-Colonel E. Conran of the West Indian Regi-
ment who came to Cape Coast with reinforcements in August, 1863. Remained to serve as Governor from August 1865 to July 1867.

103 C.O. 879/2, G.C. 6, 20 January, 1866, pp. 7-8; and C.O. 96/72, Conran to Blackall, 6 September, 1866:


105 Ibid., pp. 50-55.

106 For a detailed account of this situation, see Kimble, Political History, Chap. V, "King Agger's Challenge to British Jurisdiction: 1865-7", and Chap. VI, "The Fanti Confederation: 1868-73".

107 Loc. cit.
This is a very concise dissertation on the problem and is particularly enlightening as to the position of the Africans.


This action is of considerable interest for the proof it provides of Fanti fighting qualities and it brings the subsequent British charges of cowardice, etc., into question. See comments by Wolseley, Brackenbury, etc., in subsequent chapters.

See Claridge, History, Vol. 1, pp. 579-583, and pp. 645-647; Ward, Gold Coast, p. 238 and p. 262; C.O. 879/3, Gold Coast No. 25 - 19 January, 1870 - 6 February, 1872; Cession of Dutch settlements - Correspondence; and C.O. 879/4, Gold Coast No. 29 - 15 January, 1872 - 17 May, 1873; Cession of Dutch Settlements and Ashanti Invasion - Correspondence; passim, for a discussion of the capture of the missionaries and the subsequent negotiations for their release.

Fuller, Vanished Dynasty, p. 109.


Coombs, The Gold Coast, Britain and the Netherlands, pp. 54-56.

C.O. 879/3, G.C. 25, Appendix A.


C.O. 879/3, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 3 February, 1871, p. 106.

C.O. 879/3, Maclrelas to Ussher, 20 December, 1870, p. 132.
125 C.O. 879/6, G.C. 46, Appendix A.

126 Ellis, History, pp. 191-192.

127 Crooks, Records, pp. 386-387.

128 Ibid., pp. 391-3.

129 D. Coombs sheds some new light on this question in his The Gold Coast, Britain and the Netherlands. He suggests that the document was not a forgery, as charged by Ellis and others, but was genuine and part of the Asantehene's very clever diplomatic campaign against the British.

130 See C.O. 879/3, G.C. 25, and C.O. 879/4 Gold Coast No. 29-13 January, 1872 - 17 May, 1873, Cession of Dutch settlements and Ashanti invasion; Correspondence, for details.

131 John Pope-Hennessy (later Sir John); Governor of Labuan, 1867; Acting Governor-in-Chief of West African Settlements, February 1872 - February 1873; Governor of Bahamas, 1873; Windward Islands, 1875; Hong Kong, 1876; and Mauritius, 1882-9.


133 See p. 36 above.

134 Kobina Edjan and his party had been the strongest supporters of the Asante link and although they had been unable to actively oppose the transfer of Elmina to the British, their sympathies were well known and Kobina Edjan was therefore deposed, in part as a preventative measure.


136 Kimble, Political History, pp. 256-257.

137 Ward contends that, "the haggling that ensued (over the missionaries) was probably not meant seriously by the Asantehene; at all events nothing came of it." Ward, Gold Coast, p. 262.

138 See pp. 24-26 above.

139 Cmd. 890, 1874, Vol. LXVI, King Kofi Kalkaree to Governor Harley, 20 March, 1873, cited in Metcalfe, Documents, p. 349. There is every indication, however, that the Asantehene was not in favour of the war and was actually forced into it by his Council of Chiefs. See Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty, pp. 100-115. It would also appear that hopes of a settlement were seriously hampered by the actions and threats of the ubiquitous Mr. Plange.
who acted as Hennessy's messenger to Kumasi during the negotiations over the missionaries. See Claridge, History, Vol. II, pp. 6-8. Although it remained relatively steady at approximately £9,000 per year from 1853 to 1865, revenue from imports and exports was steadily increasing by 1866. Metcalfe's figures are: 1866, £11,053; 1867, £20,839; 1868, £15,404; 1869, £24,127; 1870, £30,851; 1871, £28,609; 1872, £40,195. See Metcalfe, Documents, Appendix D, pp. 750-751.

140 Crooks, Records, p. 374.
141 Ibid., pp. 385-388.
142 Kimble, Political History, p. 260
143 C.O. 96/87, Ussher to Kennedy, 6 March, 1871; C.O. 96/89, Kennedy to Kimberley, 8 November, 1871.
144 Kimble, Political History, pp. 246-249.
145 C.O. 879/4, Gold Coast No. 29-A, 3 January, 1872 - 10 March, 1873, Fanti Confederation Correspondence, pp. 98-99.
146 Kimble, Political History, pp. 249-256. Contains an excellent description of Mr. Salmon's violent reactions, the reasons for such reactions and the response to them.
147 C.O. 96/89, Kimberley to Kennedy, 16 January, 1872.
150 The reasons behind this drift are to a large extent explained in note 97 above. In addition, however, the men directly involved realized that the aims of British policy could not be achieved without a greater involvement than had hitherto been the case.
151 Claridge, History, Vol. II, pp. 8-9. This entire passage is also noteworthy for the light it sheds on the 19th Century British attitude toward the Africans. Such terms as "higher civilization of the English," "... being weaned from their (the Africans) more objectionable customs," and "the barbarous and despotic nature of (their) government;" all clearly indicate the European sentiments at this time. In the succeeding chapters, this bias will be illustrated over and over again in the quotes taken from Sir Garnet Wolseley, Henry Brackenbury, and their contemporaries.
CHAPTER II - FOOTNOTES


2 Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty, p. 114.


4 C.O. 879/4; Gold Coast 29 - Cession of Dutch Settlements and Ashanti Invasion; Serial 183; Sub-Enclosure 10, Rowe to Harley, 6 February, 1873, and Serial 200, Sub-Enclosure to Enclosure 2, Minutes of the meeting of the Legislative Council, 11 February, 1873.

5 Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, p. 138; and C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 297, Enclosure, Gouldsbury to Harley, 6 January 1873 and Ibid, 9 January, 1873.

6 Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty, p. 115.


8 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 183, Sub-Enclosure 10, Rowe to Harley, 6 February, 1873.

9 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 183, Sub-Enclosure 1, Anfoo Otoo to Harley, 29 January, 1873 and Sub-Enclosure 2, Chibu to Harley.

10 Colonel (later Sir) Robert William Harley, entered the army in 1847; served in the Gold Coast (1863) and Gambia (1864) expeditions; Administrator of British Honduras, 1871-2; Administrator of the Gold Coast, 1872-3; Acting Governor-in-Chief West Africa, March - August 1873; later Lieutenant Governor of Tobago (1875), Grenada (1877) and British Honduras (1883-4).

11 See above, Chapter I, note 131.

12 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 187, Enclosure 1, Harley to Hennessy, 31 January, 1873.

13 Loc. cit.
14 Mr. Pope-Hennessy had completely misread the situation and, having a highly inflated opinion of his own influence with the Asantehene, proceeded to follow a policy which did nothing to solve the disputes extant between the British and the Asante. For a sympathetic recounting of the situation, see, James Pope-Hennessy, *Verandah*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964, pp. 131-171.

15 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 187, Hennessy to Kimberley, 8 February, 1873.

16 The most outstanding of these functionaries was Colonel Foster Foster whose main appointment was Collector of Customs but who held several other appointments and acting appointments.

17 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183, Hennessy to Kimberley, 10 February, 1873.


19 The Council membership included Colonel Harley, Administrator; D.P. Chalmers, Chief Magistrate; and Col., The Hon. Foster Foster, Acting Collector of Customs. Captain Turton (ZMIR), OIC troops was also present at this meeting. C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183.

20 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183, Sub-Enclosure 2, Minutes of a meeting of the Legislative Council, 31 January, 1873.


22 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 189, Kimberley to Keate, 28 February, 1873.

23 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183, Hennessy to Kimberley, 10 February, 1873 and Serial 193, Hennessy to Kimberley, 13 February, 1873.

24 Mr. R.W. Keate, Educated at Eton and Christchurch, Oxford; called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn, 1844; was appointed civil commissioner of the Seychelles Islands, 1849; Lieutenant Governor of Granada, 1853; and Governor of Trinidad, 1854-1864; Governor of Natal, 1866-78.


27 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183; Enclosure 1, Harley to Hennessy, 4 February, 1873.

28 Dr. (later Sir) Samuel Rowe, Surgeon-Major, Engaged on the West Coast of Africa from 1862. Medical Officer and Chief of Staff to Captain Glover during the Asante War of 1873-4; on special service to the Gold Coast, November, 1874; lieutenant-governor, West African Settlements, 1875; Administrator of the Gambia, 1875; conducted two expeditions into the Sherbo country in 1876, Governor of the West African Settlements, 1876; knighted, 1880; Governor of Gold Coast Colony, January, 1881 - December, 1883.

29 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183; Sub-Enclosure 7, Harley to Rowe, 2 February, 1873.

30 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183; Sub-Enclosure 10, Rowe to Harley, 6 February, 1873 and Serial 195, Sub-Enclosures in Enclosure 2, Dr. Rowe's Report to the Administrator Harley, 11 February, 1873.

31 The Cape Coast Volunteers were a European-officered, African militia which had been attached to the regular military forces as the Governor's Body Guard in 1845, 1852 and 1863. See C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183, sub-enclosure 9, Captain Degraft to Colonel Harley, 3 February, 1873.

32 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183; Enclosure 1, Harley to Hennessy, 2 February, 1873, and Serial 183; Sub-Enclosure 8, Rough Estimate of the Fantee Forces.


34 During a battle there was a considerable difference between the amount of ammunition consumed by Africans and that consumed by Europeans. For example, a first line supply and reserve of ammunition judged sufficient for three days heavy fighting by European troops would often be expended in one brief engagement by the African levies.

35 Although there were Hausa people in the northern territories above Asante, the Hausa Police were recruited from Lagos and were hence of Northern Nigerian origin. However, although these men were not all Hausa, they were all Muslim.

36 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183, Sub-Enclosure 7, Harley to Rowe, 2 February, 1873.
Apart from the West Africa squadron which was primarily for use against the slave trade, West African forces were drawn from British African and West India units and from locally raised volunteers. The West India Regiments were partly recruited from liberated Africans from 1811 till the 1830's. The first units of the West India Regiments were sent to the Gold Coast forts in the 1840's although there were West Indian troops at the Gambia and Sierra Leone long before then. The strength was very low and it was not until the ineffectual campaign against the Asante in 1863-4, that two complete West India Regiments were brought to West Africa. In 1869, the West Indian establishment in West Africa was reduced to only four companies. At the beginning of 1873 there were no more than 375 men of the West India Regiment on the coast, supplemented by 1,250 police and volunteers. See Newbury, British Policy, pp. 584-585.

38 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 183, Enclosure, Harley to Hennessy, 4 February, 1873.

39 See C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 193, Hennessy to Kimberley, 13 February, 1873; and Serial 194, Hennessy to Kimberley, 12 February, 1873, for the most outstanding examples of Hennessy's attitude. In this Hennessy was following the pattern he had already established in Labuan where he had become involved in petty disputes. Indeed, he repeated the pattern in the West Indies, Hong Kong, and Mauritius. See Pope-Hennessy, Verandah, passim.

40 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 187, Hennessy to Kimberley, 8 February, 1873.

41 Mr. R. Keate had been delayed in taking up his duties because of a prolonged illness. Even though his arrival stopped Hennessy's blundering, he was too late to reverse the trend of affairs and as matters developed, his health proved unequal to the climate and he had little effect on the situation.


43 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 236, Harley (for Keate) to Kimberley, 14 March, 1873.

44 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 237, Harley (for Keate) to Kimberley, 15 March, 1873.

The Gladstone Government was in sufficient domestic difficulty—especially over the Irish question—that its members were more than eager to accept Hennessy's reassuring reports and fall back on the outdated principles established in 1865 by the Select Committee.


49 That is, the Fanti Confederation. See Ward, *Gold Coast*, pp. 275-255.

50 See above Chapter I, pp. 41-44.


52 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 195, Sub-Enclosure to Enclosure 3, Staff-Assistant Surgeon to Mathews, 23 January, 1873.


58 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 195, Enclosure 3, Harley to Keate, 14 February, 1873 - These extra Hausas had been specifically requested from Administrator Berkely at Lagos by Colonel Harley.

59 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 236, Harley (for Keate) to Kimberley, 14 March, 1873, and Serial 236, Enclosure 3, Chalmers to Keate, 6 March, 1873.
60 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 236, Sub-Enclosure to Enclosure 2, Foster to Thompson, 16 February, 1873, and Ibid., Thompson to Foster, 26 February, 1873. This proved to be the very beginning of a long and acrimonious debate over the military capabilities of the Fanti.


62 Loc. cit.

63 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 266, Harley to Kimberley, 31 March, 1873.

64 These ships, H.M.S.'s Seagull, Rattlesnake, Druid, and Barrocouta, were invaluable not only for their mobility and heavy firepower but also as a source of extra manpower for both marines and sailors could be landed to assist the garrisons of the various forts should the need arise. The total force available to the Administrator now consisted of: 2/WIR (273); Hausa (210); Volunteers (98); R.N. (approx. 100). Of these figures, only 2/WIR returns are verifiable. The Hausa total includes the Lagos contingent, and the R.N. personnel are based on an informal estimate made by commander Stubbs. The 2/WIR and Hausa figures include personnel listed as sick.

65 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 275, Harley to Kimberley, 8 April, 1873.


67 The site was chosen for the battle by the Sakin and Lieutenant Hopkins. As the entire area was covered in bush and as there was no tactical feature of benefit to the Fanti, it would appear to be significant only for its proximity to the centers of Fanti population. A matter of some consequence when one recalls that the prime duty of each Asafo was to protect its own village or town.

68 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 61.

69 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 275, Harley to Kimberley, 8 April, 1873.

70 Mr. Loggie had experience in the Royal Artillery where he had served as a captain. He had remained at Cape Coast ever since his arrival with Mr. Keate on the 7th of March, 1873.
71 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29, Serial 297, Harley to Kimberley, 10 April, 1873.

72 This excitement was caused by the alleged treachery of a Cape Coast merchant, Mr. George Blankson. He was accused of supplying arms and ammunition to the Asante and even though the evidence was far from conclusive, he would have been summarily executed by the Fanti chiefs had Colonel Harley not had him brought to Cape Coast where he remained in jail until the end of hostilities. He was eventually acquitted.

73 C.O. 879/4; Gold Coast 30 - Further Papers Relating to the Ashante Invasion; Serial 8, Harley to Kimberley, 12 April, 1873.

74 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30, Serial 37, Harley to Kimberley, 21 April, 1873. Harley was expressing what was becoming the general British attitude toward the Fanti. Seeing only the immediate situation and, one suspects, subsequently confirming his assessment on the basis of the reported initial withdrawal of Amankwa Tia, he accused the Fanti of becoming demoralized. In fact, however, it would probably be more accurate to soften this judgement by considering that the heavy losses suffered by the Fanti, combined with their justified fear of the Asante, caused the Asafo to drop their commitment to the overall Fanti cause in favour of their basic responsibility to protect their individual villages and towns. It is possible, therefore, that their withdrawal was a conscious desire on their part to break off the formal battle in favour of a form of guerrilla war in an attempt to wear out Amankwa Tia in numerous small but tiring engagements.

75 By this time the garrisons consisted of between 50 and 75 2WR at each of the four forts with the detachments at Cape Coast Castle and Elmina being reinforced by the Hausas and Volunteers as they came down from Dunkwa. In addition, the R.N. personnel were on stand-by.

76 Loc. cit.

77 Loc. cit.

78 Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, p. 189. See p. 2 above for Amankwa Tia's objective.

79 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30, Serial 52, Sub-Enclosure 2, Continuation of the Report on the Ashantee Invasion of the Gold Coast, 23 April, 1873.

C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30, Serial 132, Harley to Kimberley, 15 May, 1873; Serial 135, Harley to Kimberley, 16 May, 1873; and Serial 159, Harley to Kimberley, 24 May, 1873. It should be noted here that the spelling of Jukwa used in this paper is the modern spelling. The 19th Century spelling was Jooquah.

C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30, Serial 185, Harley to Kimberley, 2 June, 1873.

Loc. cit.

It is estimated that some 15,000-20,000 Fanti troops gathered at Jukwa. Claridge, History, Vol. 2, pp. 26-27.


The Cape Coast Volunteers had not proven too effective in that their terms of service were of such a nature as to allow them to serve on an "if I wish" basis. Consequently, they were disbanded on the 20th of June. In their place, a Gold Coast Rifle Corps was enrolled—with a number of the same men but under terms of service similar to those for regular troops. None but British subjects or those who had been born under British Protection before the 31st of December, 1867, were enlisted, and the officers were all Africans. See Claridge, History, Vol. 2, p. 66.

C.G. 879/4; G.G. 30, Serial 228, Harley to Kimberley, 21 June, 1873. Colonel Harley had received some prior warning of this move, and he had already asked Commander Stubbs, R.N., the senior naval officer on the Gold Coast, to transport small garrisons to Dixcove, Sekondi and Axim. See C.O. 879/4; G.G. 30, Serial 35, Enclosure 6, Harley to Stubbs, 21 April, 1873, and Ibid., Serial 43, Harley to Kimberley, 24 April, 1873.

C.O. 879/5; Gold Coast 35 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion; 9 May, 1873 to 30 September, 1873, Serial 44, Harley to Kimberley, 30 June, 1873.

The West African Herald of the 28th of June, 1873.
90 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 297, Harley to Kimberley, 10 April, 1873.

91 On the 8th of April alone the African casualties were 221 men killed and 643 wounded. See C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Serial 37, Harley to Kimberley, 21 April, 1873.

92 On the 12th of May, a Colonial Office memorandum observed that "... it is not probable that the war will be soon or easily terminated, and the local government may have to meet a strong and sustained attack upon the forts and towns. The rainy season now commenced may compel the Ashantees to suspend active operations but Lord Kimberley is of the opinion that no time should be lost in increasing the strength of Her Majesty's forces on the Gold Coast." - C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Serial 21, C.O. to W.O., 12 May, 1873.

93 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Kimberley to Harley, 12 May, 1873. The establishment for one company of the WIR was 1 captain, 1 subaltern, and 85 other ranks.

94 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 72-73. The bulk of the reinforcements were assigned to Elmina and the remainder were kept at Cape Coast.

95 There appears to have been no legal basis for this action other than the fact that the British held the belief that the Dutch had an arrangement similar to the "Bonds" which the British had with the Fanti. This was not the case, however, and the Treaty of Cession gave the British no such authority.

96 This was the first time that the Asantes faced a competently led, disciplined force of men who were armed with the Snider rifle and supported by artillery fire. Aside from its tactical importance, the battle was therefore significant because it proved the need for both more reliance on a trained soldier and more emphasis on professional leadership. The action was an unavoidable failure in one respect, however. The prudent British decided not to pursue the retreating Asante troops into the bush and thus helped to reinforce the opinion held since 1863 that European troops dared not venture into the bush. The victory was therefore of little value propaganda value in-so-far as the Africans were concerned. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 73-77; Claridge, History, Vol. 2, pp. 29-32; and C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Serial 234, Enclosure 1, Fremantle to Commerell, 17 June, 1873, for a full description and discussion of the battle and its consequences.
Unlike official reports of today, the reports which issued from the Gold Coast during this period, included comments which were penetrating and exhibited an emotional response and compassion which the modern bureaucrat must blush to read. The following despatches therefore give colourful and complete pictures of the plight of the African refugees. See C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Serial 37, Harley to Kimberley, 21 April, 1873; Ibid., Serial 135, Harley to Kimberley, 16 May, 1873; Ibid., Serial 184, Harley to Kimberley, 1 June, 1873; and especially Ibid., Serial 228, Harley to Kimberley, 21 June, 1873.

C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Serial 184, Enclosure 4, Commander Stubbs to Harley, 30 May, 1873.


Ibid., p. 86. See also Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, for an interesting commentary on the situation as it was viewed from the reports received in Kunasi where the nature of Amankwa Tia's plight was not fully appreciated.

Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, p. 239.

The cycle on the Gold Coast is comprised of a major rainy season from March to July, an August drought, a minor rainy season from September to November, and a dry season from December to February. See The Gold Coast Handbook - 1928, p. 56, for more detailed information on the weather in that region.

C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 81, Harley to Kimberley, 7 July, 1873.

The Asante system of scouting and use of sympathetic coastal tribesmen gave them an exceptionally effective intelligence network.

Both Claridge, Ashanti, Vol. 2, pp. 34-35 and Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 97-99, comment on this situation in some detail.

Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 87.

See above pp. 80-81.

C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 193, Harley to Kimberley, 24 July, 1873, and Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, pp. 243-244.
109 Axim, Sekondi and Shama had been notbeds of disaf-
fection ever since the Dutch withdrawal from the Gold Coast.

110 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 193, Enclosure 11, Goulds-
bury to Harley, 19 July, 1873, and Ibid., Enclosure 13, Stevens
to Harley, 19 July, 1873. It is of interest to note that although
the main Asante thrust was through "British" territory, both of
the flanking attacks described at the beginning of this chapter
were aimed at "non-British" territories. Adu Bofo and Atjienpon
were operating in areas which had earlier been under Dutch in-
fluence and Kofi Bentuo's abortive campaign was intended to move
into an area where Danish influence had been dominant. There is
no evidence to support the view that this was a conscious effort
on the part of the Asante to capitalize on any anti-British
sentiment in those areas. However, the diplomatic and military
sophistication of the Asante would lead one to believe that such
was probably the case. Certainly the results in the Western
Territories, where the Asante armies received considerable sup-
port, would seem to justify this supposition.

111 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 193, Harley to Kimberley,
24 July, 1873.

112 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 257, Harley to Kimberley,
4 August, 1873.

113 Loc. cit.

114 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 110-112 and C.O.
879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 381, Harley to Kimberley, 19 August, 1873.

115 This was replaced when the Wolseley expedition brought
a slightly more useful but still very inaccurate map prepared by
the new, formed in mid-1872, and small (5 man) Topographical
Department of the War Office from information taken from many of

116 Ibid., pp. 118-120.

117 Although the British were not yet aware of it, Amankwa
Tia was already planning his withdrawal (See Chap. III) and al-
though convoys plied the trails between Jukwa and Elmina, several
of the formerly garrisoned towns were abandoned and the troops re-
concentrated at Jukwa, Mampon, and Efutu.

118 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 297, Harley to Kimberley,
10 August, 1873; and Ibid., Serial 381, Harley to Kimberley, 19
August, 1873, and Ibid., Serial 379, Enclosure 12, Gordon to
Harley, 13 August, 1873.
119 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 381, Harley to Kimberley, 19 August, 1873.

120 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 98. It should be noted, however, that this assessment is not entirely accurate in that supplies were still able to flow north from Elmina albeit with less ease.

121 Norton's tube-wells were a patented prefabricated metal tube approximately thirty-six inches in diameter. They were lowered into a well once it had been dug to the required level and thus prevented cave-ins.

122 C.O. 879/4; G.C. 30; Serial 18, Kimberley to Harley, 12 May, 1873, and C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 6, Harley to Kimberley, 10 June, 1873.

123 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 9, W.O. to C.O., 16 July, 1873.

124 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 18, Admiralty to C.O., 18 July, 1873. The seven-pounder guns were of especial value because they were quick firing, accurate, simple in mechanism, and portable. Designed as a mountain gun, they were ideal for a bush campaign as they could be broken down for human portage.


126 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 261, W.O. to C.O., 26 August, 1873.

127 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 300, Admiralty to C.O., 1 September, 1873.

128 This did not prove to be a particularly happy arrangement for the Simoom was an old merchant ship which lacked the headroom and ventilation necessary for a hospital ship. Nevertheless, she remained on the Coast as a hospital ship until very near the end of the war.

129 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 357, Harley to Kimberley, 4 August, 1873 and Ibid., Serial 381, Harley to Kimberley, 19 August, 1873.
130 The extent of those demands can be gauged by the fact that, in the months of July and August, relief was issued to an average number of 980 persons daily by the Relief Committee. This Committee was created by Colonel Harley after it was found that the local chiefs were profiteering on the distribution of relief supplies. It was an organization of officials and merchants at Cape Coast who received and distributed the food supplies dispatched from England at the expense of the Home Government. See Claridge, *History*, Vol. 2, pp. 33-34 for a brief review of the situation.

131 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 379, Enclosure 2, Helden to Harley, 4 August, 1873, and *Ibid.*, Enclosure 6, Gouldsbury to Harley, 4 August, 1873.

132 The Fanti Police were local Africans recruited in and around Cape Coast in 1863. It was intended that they would eventually replace the Hausa Police attached from Lagos and assume the police duties for the 'Protectorate'. When hostilities broke out, some of them were armed and used for garrison duty in some of the lesser forts.

133 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 380, Harley to Kimberley, 16 August, 1873.

134 Long dissatisfied with the Dutch withdrawal from the coast, the "Dutch" Africans appear to have been simply waiting for some sign that a British land-force could be driven away. Commerell's repulse was that sign, and the unhappy tribesmen immediately tried to drive the British out of the forts in order to re-establish their position as coastal middlemen for the Asante.

135 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 382, Harley to Kimberley, 20 August, 1873.


137 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 381, Harley to Kimberley, 19 August, 1873.

138 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 410, Enclosure 1, Festing to Harley, 20 August, 1873.
139 Captain J.H. Glover, R.N. (later Sir John); accompanied Baikie's 2nd Niger expedition; Administrator 1863 and Colonial Secretary (1864) of Lagos, of which he was again Administrator from 1866-1872; later Governor of the Leeward Isles and then of Newfoundland. It was Glover who first formed the Hausa Police when he was Administrator of Lagos in 1863 and was often referred to as "the father of the Hausas".

140 G.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 170, Kimberley to Harley, 18 August, 1873.
CHAPTER III - FOOTNOTES


2 On the 6th of September, 1873, Kimberley made the following entry in his journal: "I must confess that knowing nothing of the affairs of the Gold Coast (upon coming into office) I did not take sufficient precautions against a quarrel with Ashantee arising out of the Treaty (ceding the Dutch forts). Then I was unfortunate in removing Sir. A. Kennedy to Hong-Kong and appointing Mr. Keate to succeed him. . . . Had I possessed any insight into the state of things at the Gold Coast, I should never have removed Sir. A. Kennedy at such a crisis. I was still more unfortunate in appointing Pope-Hennessy as an interim Governor till Mr. Keate's arrival. I never expected that he would hold the appointment more than a few months. . . . A man of quick intelligence and considerable abilities, he is vain, unscrupulous, wanting in sound judgement and common sense, and prone to quarrel with his subordinates. Colonel Harley whom I appointed administrator of the Gold Coast is a painstaking, well meaning man: and did his best in great difficulties. Had he been properly supported by Hennessy, things might have gone better, but Hennessy wholly mistook the situation, and was angry with Harley for refusing to agree in his view that no danger was to be apprehended from the Ashantees. The consequence was that the Government at home was misled by Hennessy's reassuring reports and no timely measures were taken to meet the emergency.

"The latest accounts which have reached us are that Commodore Commerell and Colonel Harley are quarrelling, and that the senior military officer, Colonel Wise, is drunken. Cardwell and I have therefore determined to cut the knot by sending out Sir Garnet Wolseley". The Earl of Kimberley, A Journal of Events During the Gladstone Ministry: 1868-1874, London, The Royal Historical Society, 1958. (E. Drus, ed., Camden Miscellany, Vol. 21.) p. 42.
3 Sir Garnet Joseph (later 1st Viscount) Wolseley; Commissioned, 1852; served in Burma, the Crimea, India, China and Canada, and after a period at the War Office under Cardwell, subsequently served in Zululand and Egypt. Knighted in November, 1870. Retired with the rank of Field Marshal and as Commander-in-Chief in 1900.


5 Lehmann, All Sir Garnet, p. 164.


7 The major stumbling block proved to be the objections raised by Prince George, Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief of the army. No doubt the Duke did have sincere reservations as to the advisability of employing Europeans on the Gold Coast. It is more probable, however, that he was seeking revenge against the young "upstart" who had been one of the staunchest advocates of army reform: a measure which the Duke had fought with every fibre of his aristocratic being.


9 See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 268-269 for his recollection of the scene. This appears to be the only surviving comment on the meeting for it is the only one quoted in four other scholarly studies of the period. See also, C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 152, W.O. to C.O., 16 August, 1873.

10 The navy was unable to block the decision to send Wolseley out to the Gold Coast but that did not mean that there was to be no role for the navy to play in the coming campaign. Aside from its vital squadron duties along the coast itself, it still managed to become somewhat vicariously involved in the land effort. On the 30th of July, 1873, Captain J.H. Glover, R.N., had offered to organize the eastern tribes and "cause a diversion in the rear of the Ashanti and threaten Kumasi." The Colonial Office accepted his offer on the 7th of August and on the 20th of August, he left for the Gold Coast. Upon his appointment to the overall command of the effort against the Asante, Wolseley stated that he had no objection to Glover's roving commission so long as he adhered to his instructions to harass and alarm the Asante so as to force their retreat from the Protectorate, or at least to improve prospects for the success of a frontal attack; but he suspected that the explorer-captain's chief aspiration was to open out a new, easy route for trade into the interior of Africa by the Volta River.
Valley. Whether this was really Captain Glover's aim or not we will quite possibly never know for Glover himself never published a memoir and the available material on him says nothing specifically of this aspect of the matter. Motive aside, however, the Glover expedition often proved an annoyance and a hinderance to Sir Garnet and it was really a side issue in the 1873-1874 war. For this reason, little will be said of it in Chapters three and four of this thesis but it will be discussed in somewhat more detail in the concluding chapter. C.O. 879/4; African No. 31; Correspondence respecting Captain Glover's Mission to Eastern Districts of the Gold Coast Protectorate; and subsequent folios from the Colonial Office confidential Print to 1916 give details of Glover's expedition.


12 Lehmann, All Sir Garnet, pp. 165-166. A variety of letters appeared in a number of London newspapers which exemplified all of these views. The public in general appeared to have been apathetic toward the whole enterprise, however, and not even the dire warnings of those ubiquitous letter-writers to the Times, "One Who Knows," (17 August, 1873) "The Man Who Has Been There" (19 August, 1873) and their kinsman of the African Times, "The Man on The Spot" (24 August, 1873), could arouse much genuine public interest.

13 See Annexes A, B and C for the text of these instructions.

14 Lloyd, The Drums of Kumasi, p. 75.

15 The high level of ability possessed by these men is illustrated by the fact that despite the fatalities and permanent disabilities which were suffered, a staff which had comprised one Colonel, one Lieutenant-Colonel, five Majors, twelve Captains, fourteen Lieutenants and eight attached specialist ranks; was destined to produce one field-Marshal, six Generals, one Lieutenant-General and two Major-Generals. In addition, four of these men were actual or prospective holders of the Victoria Cross and the rest were to be mentioned in despatches so frequently that a catalogue of their honours would fill a book in itself.

16 This was an unheard of procedure and Wolseley had some difficulty in persuading the necessary people to participate. However, once its usefulness had been fully illustrated, it became a more or less established procedure. Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 270-271.

18 Ibid., pp. 144-145 and J.F. Maurice, The Ashantee War, London, S. King and Co., 1874, pp. 18-20. This was a valiant attempt to overcome almost total lack of knowledge and experience on the part of the members of the "ring". It was, however, impossible to provide these men with the background of such experienced men as Glover and Harley—whom Wolseley refused to utilize to best effect. See chapter Five below for further comment on this point.


21 A number of the men who were pensioned from the West India Regiments had stronger ties with Sierra Leone and Freetown than they did anywhere else. Consequently, many of them went to pension there.

22 Ibid., pp. 146-147.

23 C.O. 879/5; Gold Coast No. 36; Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion; Serial 265, Wolseley to Kimberley, 2 October, 1873. All of these recruiting ventures were of questionable value. There was no guarantee that the imported men would be any better than the Fanti and it was certainly true that Wood's and Russell's Regiments could have been just as easily manned by Fanti levies. In fact, had the levies been organized with the N.C.O. and officer structure contained in those two units, they might have performed much better than they did.

24 Loc. cit.

25 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 149

26 There was considerable hard feeling over this incident for the instructions issued to Harley (C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 173, Kimberley to Harley, 18 August, 1873.) clearly stated that the Haussas were not to be placed at Captain Glover's disposal if their removal would at the time be attended with actual danger to the 'Protectorate'. Harley had chosen to interpret these instructions very liberally and Sir Garnet actually suspected him of acting with malice over what he felt had been his unjust removal from office (Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 1, pp. 294-295). There is no evidence to support Wolseley's contention but Harley's action was nevertheless a severe blow to the General's plans. See C.O. 879/5; G.U. 36; Serial 209, Harley to Kimberley, 15 September, 1873.

28 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 36; Serial 266, Wolseley to Kimberley, 2 October, 1873. Sir Garnet's comments on this matter are typical of his reporting of events. He creates the impression that someone, probably Harley, was to blame for this shortage of officers. However, he should have already been aware of the situation as he knew that the establishment on the coast would allow for an absolute maximum of twenty officers—provided there was no illness. Had Wolseley been the man of genius we are led to believe him to be, he would have equated this factor with the effects of disease and brought extra officers with him. He was given this opportunity (Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 152) but he turned it down.

29 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 372, Admiralty to C.O., 14 September 1873 and C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 363, Wolseley to Kimberley, 7 October, 1873.

30 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 326, Wolseley to Kimberley, 10 October, 1873.

31 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 267, Wolseley to Kimberley, 5 October, 1873. All of this was, of course, not entirely surprising. Colonel Harley had been working what few troops he had very hard and their demands on the stores, when combined with the demands of the chiefs for supplies of arms and ammunition, depleted the basic stores items. There were, however, growing quantities of hospital and camp stores.

32 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 322, Wolseley to Kimberley, 10 October, 1873. Fortunately for Glover this loss had no long term effect on his expedition. His stores had been ordered some weeks prior to Sir Garnet's and much had already arrived before the General landed at Cape Coast. In addition, Glover was enough of an "old hand" to order equipment and supplies in sufficient quantities to counter such a loss.


34 This shifting of officers was largely due to the high rate of sickness. However, Captain Glover, who was authorized to recruit from the Gold Coast staff, was also partly responsible in that he had enticed several control officers into accompanying him to the Volta. He also managed to gain the services of an experienced and energetic man when Dr. Rowe agreed to accompany him.

36 Loc. cit.

37 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Enclosure 1 in Serial No. 399, Wolseley to W.O., 7 October, 1873.

38 Loc. cit.

39 Loc. cit. and C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 326, Wolseley to Kimberley, 10 October, 1873.

40 Gordon had actually reported that the road was fit for artillery as far as Dunkwa. It is not clear from the report, however, as to whether or not he meant artillery carried by porters for the seven-pounder field guns were often dismantled and carried in that manner. His report is cited in C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 399, Enclosure 1, Wolseley to W.O., 7 October, 1873.

41 Loc. cit.

42 Initially, these were very small parties consisting of approximately 5 British soldiers and 45 African labourers each. Within three weeks the number of labourers had begun to increase steadily. More engineers did not become available until after the arrival of the Himalaya, however. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 159.

43 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 434, Wolseley to Kimberley, 21 October, 1873. Much has been made in the various histories of the fact that railway equipment had been brought out with the Wolseley expedition with a view to constructing a line at least as far as the Pra. Wolseley himself comes in for considerable censure on this score but, in fact, the scheme was forced upon him and immediately upon his arrival he had recognized the impossi-bility of carrying out such a scheme and had immediately stopped the shipment of further stores. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 309, for circumstances, etc.

44 Claridge, Ashanti, Vol. 2, p. 49. This request for Fanti participation was doomed almost from the very first as Wolseley offered nothing new in the form of aid and as he refused to admit what the Fanti already knew—that this was an Anglo-Asante dispute just as much as an Asante-Fanti quarrel. Sir Garnet did attach liaison officers to some of the Kings and chiefs, however. The Kings of Denkyera, Annamaboe, Nankessim, East Assin, Domonassie, Goomooh, and Cape Coast—all of whom attended the meeting—had British officers attached to them. The leaders of Western Akim, Western Assin, Insabah, Essecooma and Adumacoe, all of whom failed to attend, received no such aid. Those who failed to attend were virtually all living outside of the danger zone while those
who did attend were mostly residents of the area most directly threatened by the enemy. None of the previously "Dutch" Africans attended.

45 It must be remembered, however, that Kofi Karikari maintained that the expedition was intended to punish the King of Denkyera and to regain the territories lost by virtue of the Treaty of 1831.

46 Ibid., p. 51.

47 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 369, Wolseley to Kimberley, 9 October, 1873.


50 Ibid., p. 297.


52 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 427, Wolseley to Kimberley, 15 October, 1873; and Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 172. See the comments of Winwood Reade, Ashantee Campaign, pp. 137-140, and Sir Henry Morton Stanley, Coomassie and Mangala: The Story of Two British Campaigns in Africa, London, Chapman and Hall, 1874, Chap. III, for the reaction of the "gentlemen of the press" to Sir Garnet's highly effective maintenance of secrecy on this occasion. The force consisted of 126 Hausas, 210 men of 2/7IR, 129 RMLI, 20 RMA, 16 seamen, 300 labourers and carriers, 2 x 7 guns and 1 rocket tube.

53 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 427, Wolseley to Kimberley, 15 October, 1873 and Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 173.

54 See above, Chapter II, note 120 for background.

55 Loc. cit. In this instance, he appears to have been motivated by his concern over stamina and the psychology of volunteers versus draftees. He completely ignores, however, the matter of experience--of vital concern in this form of warfare and in the terrain involved.

56 See above, Chapter II, note 102.
C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 427, Enclosure 1, Report of Deputy Surgeon-General Home, 14 October, 1873. This assessment was to have serious repercussions. Wolseley had neither understanding of nor sympathy for the Fanti and this incident only hardened his prejudice. He therefore did little of a constructive nature to encourage African recruiting from this point on and his operations suffered because of it.

Less than four hundred had arrived at Dunkwa by the 15th of October. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 182. Viewed realistically, the British efforts were still far short of what was required if Fanti confidence was to be fully restored.

Wolseley's Regiments were used a great deal throughout the campaign but one tends to believe that this was so more because of their commanders than because of the fighting qualities of the men. One of the main drawbacks to these units was the mixing of the various contingents; a fact which caused considerable difficulty in communication. The actual composition of the units was as follows: Wood's Regiment—No. 1 Company, Cape Coast Volunteers; No. 2 Company, Elimans; No. 3 Company, Kossus; No. 4 Company, Bonnys. Russell's Regiment—No. 1 Company, Hausas; No. 2 Company, Sierra Leonians; No. 3 Company, Mumfords; No. 4 Company, Winnebas; No. 5 Company, Opobos; No. 6 Company, Anambos.

This is a biased and misleading despatch the only aim of which appears to be the justification of the increased demand. Wolseley had no personal experience with Fanti cowardice in the field. He had done nothing new to inspire Fanti participation. He refers to levies which he had hoped to raise but gives no indication as to how he would have officered and trained them had they materialized. He refers to experience with ill-disciplined levies in the bush when he had had no such experience. He uses the depleted 2WIR as an excuse when it was he who had caused that depletion. In general, this letter reveals Sir Garnet's penchant for colouring all events to his advantage—a short-coming which makes all of his despatches suspect.

62 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 363, Wolseley to Kimberley, 7 October, 1873.

63 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 185.

64 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 433, Enclosure No. 1, Blake to Wolseley, 18 October, 1873.

65 Loc. cit., and such authorities as Brackenbury and Maurice. It is virtually impossible, however, to ascertain whether or not the Asantehene had issued orders for a withdrawal at this time. Certainly Ramseyer and Kuhne make no comment in this regard although they do mention the return of the forces from Apollonia and they make much of the concern caused in Kumasi by the reverses suffered by those forces.

66 This was, of course, limited in effectiveness as the degree of British control was dictated by the range of the guns on the ships and in the forts. A range which one would expect to be no more than three miles and quite possibly much less. Even that shelling which did take place was of questionable value as the Africans simply took to the bush when the ships were sighted. Consequently, damage was usually restricted to a few huts destroyed.

67 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 431, Wolseley to Kimberley, 18 October, 1873.

68 See Annex C for the text of this letter.

69 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 210. This information was gained from several prisoners who impressed on the General for the possibly first time, the fact that access to the road was vitally important to Amankwa Tia and that even the relatively small British outposts posed a serious threat to the orderly withdrawal of the Asante army.

70 This decision to withdraw did not yet encompass a move back across the Fra for the Asantehene's permission to return to Kumasi had not yet been given and it is most doubtful the Amankwa Tia would have crossed the river without that permission.

71 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 434, Enclosure No. 2, Buller to Wolseley, 16 October, 1873.

72 The church in the village had been loopholed and fortified as had the houses on the north, west, and south. In addition, connecting shelter-trenches had been constructed and an intrenched magazine and storehouse had been constructed. The garrison at this time consisted of 100 Hausas, 25 men of 2MIR, and approximately 100 men of the Abrah levy.
73 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 436, Wolseley to Kimberley, 26 October, 1873.

74 At this point there is constant reference to road building in the despatches to London and in Brackenbury. However, later events proved that this aspect of the General's plan was not going well due to the fact that it was not receiving sufficient attention from either Sir Garnet or the members of his staff.

75 The 'Haunted Road' was the track which ran north-east from Jukwa to Dunkwa. It was so named by the Fantis because the Asantes were reported to have 'done fetish' on the road and thereby have closed it to their enemies.

76 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 234.

77 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 477, Wolseley to Kimberley, 31 October, 1873.

78 Loc. cit. This was most true. What European troops he possessed had been either returned to England (RMLI and RMA) or re-embarked (Naval Brigade) after the Elmina operation and had thus not been employed since mid-October.

79 Loc. cit.

80 The Naval Brigade was formed of sailors and marines from the fleet then on the Gold Coast. Its first detachment was formed on the 28th of November, 1873 and it consisted of fifty-three all-ranks and numbered in excess of 250 by the 1st of January, 1873. See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 318-319, for his comments on this unit.

81 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 477, Wolseley to Kimberley, 31 October, 1873 and, Ibid., Serial 487, Kimberley to Wolseley, 24 November, 1873. The Festing column consisted of 12 officers and 701 men, of whom 73 were from 2WIR, and 615 were Fanti allies. Rait's Artillery was attached. The guns and the Sniders of the 2WIR troops were decisive and this firepower was largely responsible for keeping the losses in the action to five officers, five NCO's and men of 2WIR, and 42 Africans wounded, and one Fanti killed. Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 239-240.

82 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 477, Enclosure No. 1, Festing to Wolseley, 28 October, 1873.
This particular operation reminds one of the nursery jingle, "The Grand Old Duke of York. He had ten thousand men. He marched them up the hill and marched them down again." Indeed, this little rhyme is indicative of many of the British moves during this phase of the operation. Certainly the lack of reliable intelligence, the faulty nature of communications and the small numbers of troops at Sir Garnet's disposal all combined to make the General's efforts just about as productive as the Duke's.

C.0., 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 477, Wolseley to Kimberley, 31 October, 1873.

Loc. cit.

See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 235-245; Wolseley, A Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 308-310 for a detailed account of this operation which eventually took place here. See also Reade, Ashantee Campaign, pp. 224-228 and G.A. Henty, The March to Coomassie, 2nd ed., London, John Murray and Co., 1874, pp. 108-112 for comments on the action as viewed through the eyes of civilian reporters. As is normal, these reports exhibit considerable pique that the soldiers saw fit to do their job without the benefit of the expert assistance of the correspondents concerned. In general, the arrangements were good. A small cannon had been added to the Abrakrampa weapons and all of the troops except the Fanti levies were armed with the Snider rifle. The fact that the garrison eventually withstood two days of heavy Asante attacks speaks well for the defensive arrangements.

This was an admission that the plan, conceived in ignorance of Gold Coast conditions, was unworkable. It is unfortunate that so much time had to pass before this decision was made for much valuable time was lost during which the General and his troops could have been mastering the rudiments of this unorthodox mode of warfare. As matters developed, the change had been left until too late and subsequent military operations were not particularly effective.


This is inferred from the date of the Asantehere's reply, 25 November, 1873, which is quoted in Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 40-41.

Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, p. 245.

Ibid., p. 247
92 **Loc. cit.** Special emphasis was laid on the speech made by the Queen-Mother whose harangue advising the release of the missionaries in the hope of placating the British, is cited in all of the major works on this topic.

93 Unfortunately, this move did not fully achieve its tactical purpose. This was partly because the untrained African allies once more refused to move in any direction where it was possible that the enemy might be found and partly because Wood's men were equally unqualified for scouting operations.

94 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 524, Wolseley to Kimberley, 4 November, 1873. His garrison then consisted of 150 men from 2/IR, 2 x 7 pdr. guns, and 1,400 African allies.

95 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 477, Enclosure 4, Proclamation by Wolseley to Kings, Headmen, etc., of the Gold Coast, 30 October, 1873.

96 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 525, Wolseley to Kimberley, 5 November, 1873.

97 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 526, Wolseley to Kimberley, 8 November, 1873. The force of Asante encountered at this time was estimated at about 3,000 men. Festing's force consisted of some 1,100 men of whom almost 1,000 were African allies. The remainder of the force was composed of a detachment of Rait's Artillery, 80 men from 2/IR, and a few Hausas.

98 **Loc. cit.** See also Reade, *Ashantee Campaign*, pp. 187-190 for a most acid commentary on this incident. It is surprising that Sir Garnet would contemplate recalling the troops at this critical moment but his concern for maintaining the good health of the European troops no doubt was the decisive factor. He himself offers no explanation either in his despatches or his memoirs. Maurice, *The Ashantee War*, p. 151, refutes Reade's arguments on this point.

99 There is some controversy over this point but Russell himself admits to misreading the order. See C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 526, Enclosure 3, Russell to Wolseley, 7 November, 1873.

100 **Loc. cit.** See Maurice, *The Ashantee War*, pp. 152-154, for an interesting and highly colourful description of the march of the relief column and its actions upon arriving at Abrakrampa. Maurice makes no comment, however, on the questionable value of replacing exhausted men with other exhausted men who were ignorant of local conditions.
All of the contemporary authors make much of the cowardice of the African allies on this occasion and there are many indignant comments respecting the British officers and the Mende beating the Africans into the bush with the aid of their umbrellas and swords respectively.

Sir Garnet's comments on this action are contained in C.O. 879/5; Gold Coast 38 - Further Correspondence respecting the Asante Invasion; Serial 30, W.O. to C.O., 8 December, 1874. He stated, in part, that, . . . even the enemy's retreat cannot instil courage into these faint-hearted natives, and that they can neither be counted on to insure a victory nor to complete a defeat. They were ordered to pursue the enemy, remain in the field, and harass him in his retreat. The road was strewn with the debris of the retreating army; bodies of murdered slaves lay along the route; many prisoners were captured; the enemy's fire was silenced; and yet, such is the cowardice of these people that they had to be driven into action and after a success they became a panic-stricken and disorderly rabble.

Special correspondents Stanley, Reade and Henty were largely to blame for this as their despatches were highly coloured. However, Sir Garnet's despatch was also partly to blame due to the fact that he did use several terms which could have been misinterpreted. See Claridge, Ashanti, Vol. 2, p. 73.
110 This was a prisoner taken in the action around the Adansi Hills after the British had crossed the Pra. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 296-297.

111 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 38; Serial 142, W.O. to C.O., 29 December, 1873.

112 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 38; Serial 168, Wolseley to Kimberley, 3 December, 1873.

113 Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, pp. 251-253.

CHAPTER IV - FOOTNOTES

1 In fact, almost one-third of the time available for operations involving European troops had passed before all preparations had been completed. See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 298-299; Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 310; and C.O. 879/5; Gold Coast 38, Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion; Serial 98, Wolseley to Kimberley, 27 November, 1873.

2 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 38; Serial 169, Wolseley to Kimberley, 15 December, 1873. H.I.S. Himalaya reached Cape Coast with the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade and some detachments of Royal Engineers and other special corps on the 9th of December. The Tamar arrived on the 12th with the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, a detachment of Royal Artillery, thirteen medical officers, and several other small details. These were followed on the 17th by the hired transport, Sarmatian, having on board the 42nd Highlanders (Black Watch), a number of Special Service Officers (Transport Department) and a few more men from other Departmental Corps. Finally, on the 27th of December, the 1st West India Regiment arrived from Jamaica. The breakdown of strengths is as shown in the table below.

TABLE I - British Troop Arrivals.

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<th>Regiment</th>
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</table>

1W1R 14 Officers and 554 N.C.O.'s and men.
3 The General had no justification for his annoyance over the timing of the arrival of the troops and he had no reason to believe that they would have accomplished much even had they arrived earlier. In the first instance, Sir Garnet himself had estimated that the troops could not possibly arrive before the 10th of December. (Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 125.) In addition, there was not sufficient time for the Government to inform him of the despatch of the troops. His request was received in London on the 17th of November and the Himalaya and the Tamar sailed from Plymouth on the 19th of November. Short of dispatching a ship with a warning on the 18th, there was little to be done. In any event, such a warning would have given only a few days notice and preparations on the Gold Coast were so delayed that by this time such a short warning period would have accomplished little. Second, his belief that an earlier arrival would have allowed the defeat of Amankwa Tia south of the Pra is based on the false premise that the European troops were experienced in bush-warfare. In fact, the three battalions were stale from years of garrison duty in the United Kingdom. (The Rifle Brigade was the unit with the most recent overseas duty and it had been in England for approximately six years.)


5 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 373-374.

6 C.O. 879/6; Gold Coast 39, Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion; Serial 76, Enclosure 2, Home to Wolseley, 25 December, 1873. The worry over the completion of the road would have been lessened had all of the Royal Engineers been disembarked from the Himalaya on the 12th of December. However, this matter will be dealt with in Chapter Five. A point of interest in this respect was the arrival of R.E. communications personnel. Sir Garnet had made a request in October for 200 miles of telegraph wire and a signals detachment of one officer and 25 operators and linemen to be sent out with the European troops. Unfortunately, only 12 operators and linesmen and 72 miles of wire arrived with the troops while the remaining 128 miles of wire were sent out aboard one of the slowest transports then in use. Nevertheless, the wire which arrived with the Himalaya was immediately off-loaded and construction of a line was begun immediately. Its construction and operation was plagued by all manner of human and natural problems but before the campaign had come to a close, the line was operating with reasonable effectiveness between Cape Coast and Prasu.
7 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 316-317. The date is difficult to confirm but would appear to have been sometime in the last week of November.

8 Loc. cit.

9 The camps selected were:

a. Inkwabim ........... 6½ miles from Cape Coast  
b. Akrofu .............. 13½ " " " "  
c. Yankumasi Fanti .... 24½ " " " "  
d. Mansu .............. 35½ " " " "  
e. Suta ................. 46 " " " "  
f. Yankumasi Assin ... 58½ " " " "  
g. Beraku .............. 67½ " " " "  
h. Prasu ............... 73½ " " " "

One should note that the first two marches were purposely made as short as possible, on account of the absence of any shade on that portion of the road, and also because the men, coming straight from on-board ship, could not be expected to be in training for a long march in the heat, and would have to be broken-in gradually.

10 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 39; Serial 76, Wolseley to Kimberley, 26 December, 1873.


12 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; Serial 525, Enclosure 3, Home to Wolseley, 28 October, 1873. This was included in a despatch to Kimberley dated 5 November, 1873, and appears to be in support of his request for the European troops.

13 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 323.

14 Ibid., p. 329. This system was an improved and specialized variation of the process of casualty evacuation which had begun to appear in the American Civil War of 1860-1865, and which evolved through the intervening years into the system of echeloned casualty evacuation and treatment now in use in most modern armies. This plan is deserving of the credit it receives from Brackenbury. However, there were major shortcomings. For example, although the manning of the system involved no reduction in the strength of the Main Body and although all members of the fighting force were handled by the system, no arrangements were included for the care and treatment of the African carriers, etc. In addition, no medical plans were evolved for Glover, Butler, and Dalrymple.
15 See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, p. 312. This problem had already been clearly illustrated in the Abyssinian campaign led by Sir Robert Napier in 1867 against the fortress of Magdala. (See Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, for a newspaper correspondent's view of this punitive expedition. See R. Oliver and J.D. Fate, A Short History of Africa, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1966, pp. 177-178, for a brief review of the circumstances.) In military terms, the problem was simply that transport came under the control department; a civilian supply department which had no idea of the military transport requirements. It was not until the Boer War that a proper military transport organization, the Royal Army Service Corps, came into being. See note 18 below.

16 Although this matter was possibly the most thoroughly mismanaged aspect of the entire campaign (see Chapter Five below), it must be admitted that a number of alternatives to human porterage had at least been given serious consideration. The possibility of the use of mechanical transport, mules, elephants, and several other substitutes were all investigated. In the end, however, the passage of time forced the abandonment of all schemes except the traditional method of employing carriers.

17 See Chapter Three, p. 112 above.

18 From a report submitted by Captain Huyshe, D.A. Q.M.G., to Sir Garnet. Cited in Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 338-339. The reluctance of the Fanti and other tribesmen to serve in the transport corps was due largely to several easily remedied complaints. The food was poor and inadequate, the pay was sporadic, living conditions poor, treatment was often brutal, and gangs were not organized on a tribal basis, hence men were forced to work with strangers—a fact which seriously affected morale. See below, Chapter V, note 26.

19 Captain Huyshe was sent on a mission to the different kings and chiefs at Asebu, Abrakampa, Dunkwa, and Mansu. He was to attempt to collect, in excess of the men already under arms, some 5,000 carriers. He managed to collect less than one-tenth that number.

20 The process of disarming the African levies had actually begun, although on a very small scale, after the battle at Ainsa where they had proved themselves so unreliable. Nevertheless, this failed to rectify the situation for these men deserted the carrier corps just as readily as did those men recruited specifically for carrier service. For details of disarming, see Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, pp. 340-341.
21 Brackenbury comments that both women and children were obtained for carrier service between Cape Coast and Dunkwa and that the women proved to be both willing and strong and that they made infinitely better carriers than the men. See Brackenbury, *Ashanti War*, Vol. 1, pp. 336-338.


23 Brackenbury, *Ashanti War*, Vol. 1, p. 368. Whether or not the eventual solution to the problem was really a result of Colley's work—as claimed by both Wolseley and Brackenbury—is debatable. Colley's ability is brought sharply into question by subsequent events in his career. See especially Ian Hamilton, *The Happy Warrior: A Life of General Sir Ian Hamilton*, London, Cassell, 1965, pp. 42-45, for Colley's role in the debacle at Majuba in 1881.

24 In brief, Colonel Colley organized the transport as follows:

a. The Transport Corps was organized into two branches; the first was termed Regimental Transport, the second Local Transport. There were, however, no transport companies or platoons.

b. Regimental Transport included all carriers attached permanently to regiments, corps, departments; and moved with the troops for the purpose of carrying baggage and immediate reserves of rations, ammunition, and supplies.

c. Local Transport included all carriers employed in maintaining supplies and communications between Cape Coast and the front. It worked permanently between fixed stations along the road which was divided into districts for ease of control and administration.

d. The carriers were organized into gangs based on regional and/or tribal association and each man was registered and given a number so that identification was simplified.

e. Pay, feeding, rest, accommodation, medical treatment, and other sources of friction were standardized and their implications clearly outlined to the officers concerned. For full details, see Brackenbury, *Ashanti War*, Vol. 1, pp. 369-372.

25 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 39; Serial 76, Enclosure 5, Colley to Wolseley, 26 December, 1873.
The major difficulty was the lack of support staff for Glover had but ten British officers to assist him. Another serious problem lay in the fact that his allies, mostly Akims and Accras, had been promised a crack at their traditional enemies from the East bank of the Volta, the Awunas and Akwamus, before moving on the Asante.


C.0. 879/6; G.C. 39; Serial 76, Enclosure 1, Glover to Wolseley, 22 December, 1873.

C.0. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 477, Wolseley to Kimberley, 31 October, 1873; and Ibid., Serial 521, Wolseley to Kimberley, 4 November, 1873.

Various despatches, and most of the primary sources make constant reference to the 'reckless way' in which Glover had been giving presents to the African kings and chiefs in his efforts to gain recruits. He is accused of having distributed gin, rum, tobacco and other articles with an excessively lavish hand in that every chief of any importance had received goods and money to the value of £200 or £300 in addition to the ordinary gratuity and pay and allowances for his men. However, these comments do not appear particularly justified for it was Glover more than his detractors who knew what was needed in the way of gifts if there was to be any African participation. Quite naturally, Captain Butler presents the most vitriolic and one-sided account of this problem but his comments have some validity.

See Major W.F. Butler, *Akim-Foo: The History of a Failure*, London, Sampson Low, Marston, Low & Searle, 1875, for Butler's account of his mission among the Akims. It is unfortunate that Glover's despatches provide no refutation to these charges and it is doubly unfortunate that neither Glover himself nor anyone else has written of his Volta expedition and thereby presented his side of the story. There is, however, a report by Glover on the "Conduct of the Deputy Commissioners, Officers and Men Composing the Expedition Under his Command", See British Parliamentary Papers, 1874, XLVI, (Cmd. 892), p. 1089.

35 Claridge, History, Vol. 2, p. 116. The failure of Dalrymple and Butler to accomplish their missions was largely due to their inexperience. They were well supported by Wolseley, who ensured that they received supplies on the same scale as Glover, but they were unable to operate effectively in the recruitment of Africans. On the other hand, the highly experienced Glover had little difficulty in collecting a large African force. It is revealing of Wolseley's attitude that Glover is given little credit for this.

36 The garrison then at Prasu consisted of Wood's regiment of approximately 450 men; Russell's regiment with some 500 men; Rait's Artillery with a strength of 50 men, 3 7-pounder field guns, 2 4 2/5-inch howitzers, a Gatling gun, and 6 rocket-troughs; together with a detachment of 70 men from 2WIR.

37 See Chapter Five for further discussion of this point. Sir Garnet's employment of the WIR troops and the men in Wood's and Russell's regiments raise serious questions as to his competence as a field-commander.

38 The disembarkation began at 1:45 A.M. on the 1st when the personnel on the Himalaya were transferred ashore and by 6:35 A.M. the whole of the Rifle Brigade and the detachment of Royal Engineers were in Inkwabin. The unloading of the Sarmatian began at approximately the same time on the 2nd and the transfer to shore of the Black Watch proceeded with the same quiet order and regularity as had the disembarkation of the Rifle Brigade. The removal of the Fusiliers from the Tamar was scheduled to take place on the 3rd.

39 The problem lay with the regimental transport. The transport requirement for the headquarters and the Naval Brigade was small and had been easily satisfied. The Rifle Brigade drew its transport from Cape Coast, chiefly Ahanta and Elmina men while the transport for the Black Watch, chiefly Goomoahs, was brought down from Mansu; and these two regiments started without difficulty. But conditions in the service were little better than they had been and between the 31st of December and the 3rd of January, reports were received by Colonel Colley of the desertion of the bulk of the Adjumacoes; that the Accoumies had dispersed even before they reached the road; and that the Agoonahs, 500 in number, had deserted after one trip. Thus, for the very reasons that had made recruiting of carriers difficult to begin with, the transport designated for the Fusiliers simply evaporated. There remained only the transport absolutely necessary to maintain the flow of supplies to the front. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 18-20; and C.O. 879/6; G.C. 32; Serial 153, Wolseley to Kimberley, 8 January, 1874.

41 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 39; Serial 153, Wolseley to Kimberley, 8 January, 1874.


43 Wolseley glosses over this point in his memoirs but his despatch to Kimberley on the 8th of January refers to the loss of the Fusiliers and comments on the fact that he would have to devise some way to ensure that the Fusiliers would be represented in the campaign. This he eventually did by sending one hundred members of that unit to replace one hundred of the Black Watch who were specially chosen as being the least likely to bear the fatigues of the campaign.

44 Formed on the 16th of October, 1873, by Captain Rait, R.A., one sergeant, one bombardier, and 10 Hausa gunners; this unit had grown to include Captain Rait, one lieutenant, two sergeants, four bombardiers and 50 Hausa gunners by the 2nd of January, 1874. Armed with 3 x 7-pounder guns, 2 x 4 2/5-inch howitzers, a Gatling gun, and 6 rocket troughs, this unit had, by all accounts, become a well-drilled and competent fire-unit. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 206, and Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 10-11.

45 Prior to this time, Sir Garnet had been loath to use his powers in order to coerce the Africans to serve. However, he now recognized the seriousness of the situation and applied all the pressure of which he was capable. See Reade, Ashantee Campaign, p. 234 et. seq.; and Maurice, Ashantee War, pp. 251-252, for further commentary.

46 The numbers steadily increased and by the 15th, there were 4,200 men and 1,250 women employed with the Local transport sections. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 34.


48 One can understand this motive but it is difficult to see how any military commander could so blithely compromise his opportunity to achieve surprise and thus greatly increase the risk to his troops.

49 Sir Garnet had estimated the cost of the expedition at £150,000. It actually cost approximately, £300,000. The indemnity would have had a market value considerably in excess of that amount.

50 For the text of Kofi Karikari's letters, see C.O. 879/6; G.C. 39; Serial 148, Wolseley to Kimberley, 2 January, 1874; and for Sir Garnet's reply, see Ibid., Serial 151, Wolseley to Kimberley, 6 January, 1874.
Although more will be said of this in Chapter Five below, it is of interest to note here that despite this use of the Gatling gun to demonstrate British superiority in weapons, the gun was not used effectively in the subsequent campaign. No reason is given for this and the weapon is never mentioned after Prasu.

Some of the troops seen by the envoys on their return to Kumasi were part of a ruse devised by Sir Garnet and those men returned to Prasu once the Asantes had passed by. However, there were already considerable British forces operating north of the river by this time. See below pp. 168-170.

The original body of scouts had only been formed in early December. It consisted of some twenty Africans of mixed origin under a Lieutenant Grant. Their only training had been "on the job". However, some thirty Assins were added although they lacked in formal military training, they knew the country south of the Adanski Hills and were thus of great value. In general, the scouts acquitted themselves well throughout the invasion. However, after the Battle of Amoafu, Sir Garnet failed to use them effectively.

This lack of Asante resistance is most significant. Wolseley chose to interpret it as an indication that Kofi Karikari was simply unable to confront the British at this point. He also chose to view the subsequent Asante embassies as time-buying devices through the use of which the Asantehene expected to be able to raise sufficient forces to repel the British force. It is more likely, however, that Kofi Karikari refrained from challenging the invaders at this point in the hope that a negotiated settlement could be reached. See Chapter Five below.

Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, p. 263.
When questioned, Mr. Kuhne, who was with the envoys, stated that when Amankwa Tia had reached Kumasi on the 22nd of December, his army had been disbanded and the men sent to their homes. He claimed that the only people on the road between the Adansi Hills and the Pra, as of the 2nd of January, were a few hunters inhabiting the all but deserted villages there. Beyond the Adansi Hills, however, would be found the Adansi contingent of the main army. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 56.

It is possible that at this point the Asante were still expecting the British to follow the pattern established in 1863—the pattern common to tribal warfare wherein the hostilities ceased once the enemy was clear of the defender's territory. This was the attitude taken by the Fanti, who were certainly unable to appreciate the British determination to carry on the fight. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the Asante viewed things in the same light.

See C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Serial 5, Wolseley to Kimberley, 13 January, 1874; for the text of this letter and Sir Garnet's response as well as the circumstances surrounding the arrival of Mr. Kuhne, etc.

Mr. Kuhne never admits that he said anything like this to Sir Garnet. He does say, however, that he told Sir Garnet that he believed it probable that Kofi Karikari was preparing to defend Kumasi at all costs. It would thus appear that Sir Garnet put his own interpretation on the missionary's comments. See Chapter Five below for further comment.

The territory south of the Adansi Hills was considered part of the Asante Empire but it was territory which had been subjugated. The territory north of the hills was part of central or metropolitan Asante and as such had much closer political and ethnic ties with Kumasi and the Asantehene. See Captain R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, for a full description of the organization of the Asante Empire. See also, Kwame Arkin, "The Structure of Greater Ashanti", Journal of African History, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1967), pp. 65-86, and above Chapter I, note 11.

67 This H.Q. was used as its troops were employed on line of communications duties and it therefore had no command function to perform.

68 Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, p. 321. This was accomplished by a combination of slightly better food, etc., and by increased penalties for desertion and refusal to work.

69 One of the General's major concerns was the rising incidence of sickness. By the 25th of January, 3 officers and 215 other-ranks had been sent down to the Coast. In fact, the situation was so serious that an additional 200 men from the Fusiliers were landed and marched to Prasu as reinforcements even before the main body crossed the Pra. SeeClaridge, History, Vol. 2, pp. 109-110. This concern was well warranted as Wolseley himself was largely responsible for the factors which caused the delay and should he be unable to achieve his aim, no doubt his negligence would be revealed. His position on this occasion tends to make his orders to Glover appear unwarranted. But, in all fairness to Wolseley, it must be noted that had he allowed Glover to become involved in tribal wars east of the Volta, it is possible that Glover would contributed nothing to the success of the campaign. As matters developed, however, he made several vital contributions to the British success.

70 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 73.


72 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Serial 9, Wolseley to Kimberley, 26 January, 1874.

73 The comments in notes 60 and 62 above appear to also apply in this instance. Indeed, the fact that Kofi Karikari had by this time had three weeks within which to raise his army gives sufficient cause to question Sir Garnet's motives for not seeing some other reason for the unusual lack of Asante resistance.

74 Loc. cit.

75 See C.O. 879/6; Gold Coast 43, Chronological Table of events at the Gold Coast; p. 8.
It is often mistakenly believed that the Asante was an absolute monarch capable of ordering his subjects to obey his every command. This was not the case, however, for every aspect of Asante life relied heavily on the reaching of a consensus regardless of level of society involved. See note 65 above for sources on this matter. Ramseyer and Kuhne comment that: "the reins of the Ashante government are not exclusively in the hands of the king, nor does he possess unlimited power, but shares it with a council which includes, besides his majesty, his mother the three first chiefs of the kingdom (Juaben, Bekwai and Mampong), and a few nobles of Kumasi..." See Ramseyer and Kuhne, Four Years, appx. III, "The Government of Ashantee".

See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, Chap. III.

A contributing factor was a battle which took place between Butler's force and an element of Clover's column when each took the other for the enemy near the town of Enunsu on the 26th of January. To date, however, there is no explanation, other than Butler's charge of cowardice, for the sudden panic of the Akims on the 30th of January just before they were to carry out a flank attack against the Asantes then being engaged by Sir Garnet at Amoafu. See Butler, Akim-Poo, Chap. XIII, for his comments. See also Cmd. 892, Gold Coast, Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashante Invasion, No. 8; Serial 15, Wolseley to Kimberley, 7 February, 1874.

C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Serial 9, Wolseley to Kimberley, 26 January, 1874; and Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 98-105.


Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 133.

C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Serial 9, Wolseley to Kimberley, 26 January, 1874; and Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, p. 336.

C.O. 879/6; G.C. 43; p. 9.

Loc. cit.

Mr. Joseph Dawson, an educated African, had been Secretary of the Fanti Confederation and had been sent to Kumasi during the negotiations preceding the war as an interpreter. Upon the outbreak of war, he had been obliged to remain in Kumasi. See Claridge, History, Vol. 2, p. 248.
Virtually every primary source makes mention of the fact that Dawson included in his note a reference to the Bible, i.e., "See 2 Cor. ii. II." That verse is: "Lest Satan should get an advantage of us: for we are not ignorant of his devices."


Wood's and Russell's regiments, however, had been much reduced in strength, for they had been providing detachments to garrison the posts scattered along the road.

Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 158. See diagram below.


Colonel Wolseley, C.B.

Ibid., p. 159-160.

Aside from its tactical significance, this battle is important for what it reveals of the Wolseley/Kofi Karikari correspondence. Even Brackenbury admits that evidence was found after the battle which indicated that much of the Asante force had been at Amoafu for at least five or six days. In addition, the scouts had confirmed the presence of a large Asante force at Amoafu on the 26th of January: five days before the battle. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that Kofi Karikari had for some time possessed forces sufficient to challenge the British advance. The fact that he waited until Amoafu to do so is significant in that it would appear to substantiate his protestations that he did not wish to fight but
that he much preferred to reach a negotiated settlement. See Henty's comment on p. 38 of this Chapter.


93 Loc. cit.

94 One of these parties actually came close to either killing or capturing Sir Garnet himself when it attacked the village of Kwaman, from which he was directing the battle.

95 See C.O. 879/6; G.C. 43, pp. 10-11 for a brief resume.

96 Henty, Coomassie, p. 197.

97 Both Brackenbury and Wolseley attempt to make this incident appear much less important than it really was by stressing the apparently effective British counter-measures. However, both Reade, Ashantee Campaign, pp. 247-250; and Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, pp. 173-175, comment, possibly with the wisdom of hindsight, on the seriousness of the situation. Lloyd, Drums, Chap. 8, gives a balanced critical account of the entire Amoafu action.


99 See Claridge, History, Vol. 2, p. 124, for the most complete description of casualties. The situation with the British was clearly indicated by Brackenbury who wrote, "Our loses in this action (Amoafu) sadly diminished the little force already so much thinned by sickness. Of the 1,550 European N.C. officers and men who had originally landed... only 1,375 were present at Amoafu, nearly 200 having thus succumbed to sickness, or about 12 per cent, in the space of one month." See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 184.


101 See Cmd. 892, G.C. 8, for comments on this aspect of the campaign.


103 As would be expected, this was not the only concern facing Wolseley to decide on such a desperate move. Although he fails to mention it in his memoirs, sickness was a major factor in helping him to decide to press on. Attrition due to fever, etc., had by no means slackened and if he did not move quickly, his European force might easily have melted away even before reaching Kumasi. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, Table VI,
p. 344. See also Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 338-342, for Sir Garnet's comments.


105 The term "apparently" is used here because there is no evidence to show that Sir Garnet appreciated the enormity of his demand. Indeed, no Englishman really understood this matter until Captain Rattray made his study of the Asante in the early 20th century.

106 Loc. cit.

107 Indeed, the British already knew, through the information gained from spies and prisoners, that a large force was being collected to the north of the Oda River, where the Asantehene intended to make a final stand if his negotiations failed. See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, pp. 345-347. As matters developed, Kofi Karikari actually took to the field and was present with his troops during the battle which followed this exchange.


109 Wolseley even goes so far as to admit that had the enemy been armed with the Snider rifle, matters might have gone differently for the British. See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, p. 343. Having already cut himself off from his main supply column, the General now completely isolated his force. It is hard to believe that he took such a monumental risk and managed to emerge from it relatively unscathed. However, his success in this matter does not negate the fact that his actions are more those which one would expect of an ignorant, glory-hunting subaltern rather than an experienced field-commander of general rank.

110 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 212. Mention has been made previously of the mis-employment of Wood's and Russell's regiments in this operation, but this is the first admission on the part of any contemporary that they were less than satisfactory. It would seem that this alone would have justified the retention of these two "Ringer"-led units south of the Pra and the employment of the much more suitable troops of the WIR in their stead.

111 Ibid., p. 215. This highly dramatic description of the breakout reveals that the Asante force between Odasu and Kumasi was not very large for the Black Watch had less than 400 men fit for action. Indeed, subsequent evidence proved that Kofi Karikari, who had been present in the field, had himself fled the scene at about the time of the charge by the Highlanders. There is therefore reason to suspect that the Asantehene had already decided to give up Kumasi and move to the northwest even before the British breakout.
This success was no doubt largely due to the fact that the British move came as a complete surprise. The Asante had Wolseley's tiny force surrounded and outnumbered. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the last thing they would expect would be an attack by the surrounded force. The combination of Hatt's artillery fire and the highly aggressive infantry appears to have thrown the Asante troops between Odasu and Kumasi into confusion.

This was actually a baggage detail composed of 50 sick and wounded Europeans and the bulk of Russell's regiment.

See C.O. 879/6; G.C. 43; pp. 12-14 for a general resume.

See C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Serial 11, Wolseley to Kimberley, 5 February, 1874. See also Lloyd, Drums, Chap. 10 for an excellent critical account of this battle.

One of the unexplained mysteries of this war is the role played by Dawson. There is no explanation for the fact that he warned Sir Garnet of the Asantehene's supposed perfidy on the one hand and then refused to co-operate once Kumasi was taken and he was no longer under threat of death.

Wolseley himself never explains this sudden change of mind with regard to the hostages. Alan Lloyd suggests that he realized, after his arrival in Kumasi, that his whole operation was in jeopardy and the requirement for hostages was thus reduced. See Lloyd, Drums, pp. 170-171.

Brackenbury contends that the robbing and burning of the houses were due to the Fanti prisoners whom the British had released that same afternoon. He estimates that approximately one-fourth of the dwellings in the town were destroyed. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, p. 231.

This shortcoming was rectified in the morning when a guard of 100 men from the Rifle Brigade was detailed to guard the palace and stop the flow of treasure into the bush.
123 At this time, there was some pressure put upon Wolseley to march on Bantama, the site of the Asante royal burial ground, and destroy it for the psychological effect such a move would have. There was also a strong temptation to stay one day longer in the hope that the Asantehene would appear and sign a treaty before the troops withdrew. See Brackenbury, *Ashanti War*, Vol. 2, pp. 238-239.

124 On this matter, Brackenbury comments that it was out of the question to undertake any operation which might involve another battle. He states that any increase in the number of sick and wounded would have placed it beyond the power of the force to remove them from Kumasi as there were simply not enough hammocks or bearers to carry them.

125 This loot was sold at auction when it arrived at Cape Coast and the £5,000 realized was apportioned to the troops as prize money. See Claridge, *History*, Vol. 2, p. 144.

126 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Wolseley to Kimberley, 8 February, 1874. Further details may be found in Cmd. 892, G.C. 8; Serial 14, Wolseley to Kimberley, 7 February, 1874.

127 These units were retained for a short time only. Before the end of March, Wood's Regiment had been disbanded at Elmina, Russell's Regiment and Raitt's Artillery had been disbanded at Cape Coast and 2/WR had returned to the West Indies. Only 1/WR remained in the 'Protectorate'.

128 The steadily increasing incidence of sickness also prompted this acceleration in the withdrawal of the European troops. The Naval Brigade and the Fusiliers were embarked on the 20th, the Rifle Brigade and the Royal Engineers on the 23rd, the seriously ill on the 26th, and the Black Watch on the 27th.

129 British Parliamentary Papers; 1874; Vol. XLVI; Serial 17, Wolseley to Kimberley, 9 February, 1874. It has been suggested by several observers that the Asantehene had held back from negotiating with Sir Garnet in Kumasi because he feared for his life and because his followers were once more gathering around him. See Claridge, *History*, Vol. 2, p. 134, for one example. It is also suggested that it was the threat posed by Glover which prompted him to act when he did. See, Lloyd, *Drums*, pp. 178-179. Certainly the request Glover be halted supports this view.

130 Glover had left Abogu on the 26th of January and occupied Konoma where he remained encamped awaiting the arrival of further supplies of ammunition and sending out frequent reconnaissances in every direction. On the 1st of February, he confirmed his suspicion that the Jabins were encamped along the Enum River and that they intended to oppose any further advance on his
However, by the 8th, he had received fresh supplies of ammunition. In addition, the end of the Africans' trans-Volta expedition which had cost him most of his African levies, combined with the effect his success to date resulted in the arrival of a reinforcement of about 4,000 Akins, Akwapims and Krobos. He then advanced to attack the Jabin position, which he found abandoned. This was, of course, due to the fall of Kumasi, of which Glover as yet knew nothing. Glover continued his advance and, on the 10th, believing he was then within about seven miles of Kumasi and under the impression that Wolseley was still in the Ashante capital, he sent his assistant, Captain Sartorius to open communication with the General. In fact, however, the distance was closer to eighteen miles and the enemy was still about in considerable strength and Sartorius was unable to contact Wolseley until the 12th when he finally caught up with the General in his camp in Fomana. Captain Glover followed Sartorius, entering Kumasi with 4,700 men soon after midday of the 12th, and then marching by easy stages to Kwaman, which he reached on the 14th.

See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 262-265; and Cmd. 892, G.C. 8; Serial 46, Enclosure 1, Glover to Wolseley, 20 February, 1874.


132 Ibid., pp. 274-275. See also, Cmd. 892, G.C. 8; Serial 25, Wolseley to Kimberley, 16 February, 1874.

133 See Claridge, History, Vol. 2, pp. 154-156, for a brief review of this matter; and Cmd. 892, G.C. 8; Serial 35, Wolseley to Kimberley, 13 February, 1874.


135 This memorandum is reprinted in its entirety in Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 275-280.


137 Cmd. 892 (1873-1874) The Ashantee War, Part ix, pp. 7-9.

138 Ibid., p. 11.
1 This applies to all of the secondary sources listed in the bibliography for this study, with the single exception of Alan Lloyd's Drums of Kumasi. In the case of the contemporary works, only Winwood Reade, Story of the Ashantee Campaign; and H.M. Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala, offer any serious criticism.

2 Ellis contends that although the shortage of food, the incidence of disease, and the unusually heavy rains were all major reasons behind Amankwa Tia's failure to follow up the disintegrating allied army, the stubborn resistance of the allies at Dunkwa was an equally important reason for his decision.

3 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 440, Kimberley to Harley, 17 November, 1873.

4 A letter addressed to Colonel Harley from Quassi Adoo, the King of Mankessim, on the very eve of the invasion clearly indicated that the Africans were looking to the British for firm leadership as well as logistic support. In his letter, King Quassi, who had been elected head of the abortive Fanti Confederation, said:

"I now address your Excellency as the head of the Fanti Confederation, for the purpose of learning from you what amount and the nature of the assistance your Government will render to the country in the present state of affairs.

Since the Fanti Confederation has not yet received the support of H.M. Government, but has been left to shift for itself as best it can; and the powers inherent in all Governments have been, in the case of the Confederation, deprived of their legitimate exercise and functions by the action of H.M. officials here, and by the neglect and discouragement of H.M. Government; I am thus constrained to appeal to you, as we infer from these facts that H.M. Government is prepared to accept, and has accepted, and will accept in the present emergency, the responsibilities that attach to it as 'the protecting power!... (I am therefore writing) for the purpose of enquiring into the steps that are to be taken, and will be taken, to rid our soil of the invader."

See C.O. 879/4; G.C. 29; Serial 183, Sub-Enclosure 3, Quassi Adoo to Harley, 1 February, 1873.
5 Claridge suggests that the General, wishing to make the people do their utmost, had carefully avoided making any allusion to the possible employment of European troops. See Claridge, *History*, Vol. 2, p. 52. Neither Brackenbury nor Wolseley openly make this claim but they hint at it.

6 The European argument that the Fanti failure to soundly defeat the Asante on this occasion would just result in another invasion at some future date had no effect on the Fanti who viewed Asante invasions as an inevitable fact of life and who were simply glad to be finally quit of them this time.

7 The most outstanding example of this was Sir Garnet's attempt to send the newly raised Fanti levies into the bush after the retreating Asante immediately after the battle of Abrakrampa. On that occasion, the British observers made no comment on the lack of training and experience on the part of the Fanti. Instead, they wrote paragraphs on their attempts to force the Africans after the Asante by beating them with their umbrellas.

8 All of these grievances came out when Colonel Colley had his meeting with the chiefs in November, 1873, and they were fully reported in his memorandum on the subject. However, Brackenbury printed only that part of the memorandum which dealt with the method of re-organization. The entire report is available in C.O. 8791.

9 These phrases have been taken from Stanley, *Coomassie*, p. 132. It was he who suggested the more extensive use of the whip and leg-iron to solve the carrier problem.

10 Wolseley very carefully avoided making any openly hostile comments about Glover's expedition but he managed to convey his opinion by comments to the effect that he suspected the explorer-captain's "chief aspiration was to open out a new, an easy route for trade into the interior of Africa by the hitherto unexplored Volta Valley". See Wolseley, *Soldier's Life*, Vol. 2, p. 268. With the exception of Stanley's comments, all of the other contemporary reporters reflected this bias.

11 Although Glover had large quantities of cash and equipment with which to raise and outfit his expedition, he had only ten British officers and the best sort of African army he could scratch together to achieve his mission.

12 Even had they still been forced to quit Amoafu, these extra men would have made it possible for the Asante to more effectively disrupt the British lines of communication and might possibly have halted Sir Garnet's advance at that time.


15 In virtually every source, Glover is made to appear to have arrived on the scene after it was all over and his operation is thereby severely reduced in importance. This entire process of relegating Glover to a position of unimportance is taken to such an extent by a number of the contemporary writers that even his success in diverting the Jabin contingent from the Asantehene’s army is made to look of somewhat less importance than the futile efforts of Captain Butler.

16 The only exceptions to this rule were Winwood Reade and H.M. Stanley but even their criticism were superficial and at times were tinged with malice.


18 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 35; passim. Offers of service came from Prince Ansah, the Asante prince who had lived on the Coast for a number of years but who was at this time in London; Major Levenson, an experienced officer with the Hausas, Mr. E. Wilson, a volunteer from the Cape of Good Hope who had years of African experience; the African Barter Co., which had a number of experienced men available for employment with the force; Lt. Col. De Ruvignes, who had once been civil commandant on the Gold Coast; and many others. They were all politely turned down or had their suggestions and offers funnelled into the War Office machinery where they slowly sank out of sight.

19 C.O. 879/5; G.C. 36; Serial 440, Enclosure 1, Harley to Kimberley, (undated).

20 See chapter III, p. 136 above.

21 In all fairness to the General, it must here be noted that he was suffering from a severe bout of fever just at this time. However, this does not excuse him from not having made some preliminary plans for just such an eventuality as he now faced. Neither does it excuse his staff, the members of which should have been able to carry on during his illness.

22 At this time he had some 200 members of the naval Brigade, approximately 600 men of 2WMR, as well as the men of Rait's artillery, and Gordon's Hausas from whom he could have chosen several strike-forces of between 100 and 150 men each. He could then have increased the size of these forces by an intelligent and effective assignment of men from the Fanti levies and Wood's and Russell's regiments. This would still have left sufficient troops for the necessary garrison detachments.
23 See Chapter III, pp. 130-131 above.

24 Brackenbury himself admits this when he writes that even before leaving England, Sir Garnet had estimated that, should he request the troops by the 16th of October, "the 10th of December would be the earliest date at which the troops could be expected at the Gold Coast". See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 1, p. 125. As matters developed, the request for the European troops left the Gold Coast on the 14th of October and the first troops arrived on the 9th of December.

25 This observation was made by Major Home in a report dated the 3rd of November, 1873. Cited in Books, Documents, p. 168.

26 See above, Chapter IV, note 18.

27 This mixing of the various groups of carriers into different parties had been one of the major complaints made by the chiefs to Colley.

28 See Clariidge, History, Vol. 2, pp. 103-113, for a description of the various methods used to raise carriers.

29 Sir Garnet maintained that he took this step in an effort to convince Kofi Karikari of the serious nature of the British preparations. It is, however, difficult to see how any intelligent commander would so completely forego the benefits to be gained by surprise.

30 Such a need had been anticipated and arrangements for the landing of sailors and marines to help garrison the forts had been made with Captain Fremantle. See C.O. 679/5; G.C. 38; Serial 102. Hewitt to Admiralty, December 22, 1873.

31 Sir Garnet held a strong prejudice against any "colonial" troops but he was particularly outspoken in his negative comments about the West Indians. He appeared to look upon the West Indian units as nothing more than a haven for incompetent English officers and he gave them little chance to prove otherwise. See Wolseley, Soldier's Life, Vol. 2, passim.

32 There were still some 1,500 Fanti tribesmen under arms even after the mass disarmings were carried out to help solve the carrier problem.

33 By this time, 2WIR was operating at just slightly more than half-strength (approximately 300 all-ranks).

35 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 39; Serial 159, Enclosure 2, Colley to Wolseley, January 12, 1874.

36 By the 25th of January, even before they entered their first battle, 218 of the 1,800 European troops on shore, had become ineffective from sickness. See Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 139-140.

37 See Annex "C" attached.

38 Kimberley's comments in this respect are most interesting in the light of what actually happened. See Annex "C" attached.

39 Loc. cit.

40 Any initial offer to negotiate should be treated with a healthy suspicion, regardless of the circumstances and the Asante record in this respect certainly did not make them exceptions to the rule.

41 See Chapter IV, note. 56.

42 Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 81-82.

43 This was the first time that the British had refused to confine their military activities to the 'Protectorate', and it is probable that Kofi Karikari was having difficulty understanding that Wolseley was actually determined to move on Kumasi unless his terms were met.

44 The General felt that his force was so small that he could not afford to leave any detachments behind to guard the camp south of the Oda River and keep open his line of retreat over the river.

45 C.O. 879/6; G.C. 41; Serial 18, Wolseley to Kimberley, 16 February, 1874.

46 Estimates vary but the most common figure is £150,000. See, Cmd. 892, p. 946.

47 See tables II and III below and Brackenbury, Ashanti War, Vol. 2, pp. 340-344 for a full medical report.
TABLE II.—PERCENTAGE OF MORTALITY TO STRENGTH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per cent from Fevers</th>
<th>Per cent from Dyseentery and Diarrhœa</th>
<th>Per cent from other Diseases</th>
<th>Per cent from Gunshot Wounds</th>
<th>Per cent of Total Mortality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23d Regt.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Regt.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Brigade</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st W. I. R.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Black only)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d W. I. R.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Black only)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Brigade</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood's Regt.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell's Regt.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratt's Artillery</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. E. (65)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. A.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III.—TOTAL SICK, INVALIDED, WOUNDED, DIED, AND KILLED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>Invalided</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Died</th>
<th>Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Service</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Regt.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd Regt.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Brigade</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st W. I. R. (b)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(w)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d W. I. R. (b)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(w)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. M. D.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratt's Artillery</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood's Regt.</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell's Regt.</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Brigade</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In addition—4 Scots were killed and 22 wounded; and 7 Engineer Labourers were killed and 28 wounded.*

*The Black Indiads proceeded to their homes for discharge.*
48  C.C. 879/6; G.C. 41; Ibid.

49 For a brief resume of this period see Ward, Gold Coast, pp. 279-283. For a more detailed account, See Claridge, History, Vol. 2, Chaps. X to XX.

1. Parliamentary Papers


1852-53 - Vol. LXV - Despatches from Major Hill, the Governor of Gold Coast, relating to the Warfare between the Fantees and the Ashantees, and the part taken by the British officers in the trials and executions of some of the native chiefs. - No. 703.


1864 - Vol. XLI - Despatches from the Governor of the Gold Coast explaining the cause of the war with the King of Ashantee: despatches to the Governor directing him to prosecute the war: returns of the expenses incurred, etc. - No. 385.

1864 - Vol. XLI - Number of Officers and men in the Cape Coast command; number dead and invalided, etc. - No. 393.

1864 - Vol. XLI - Further papers relating to military operations on the Gold Coast. - Cmd. 3364.
1. Parliamentary Papers cont'd

1864 - Vol. XLI - Plan of Military Operations on the Gold Coast. - Cmd. 3364-II.

1865 - Vol. XXXVII - Dates of Correspondence with respect to the Ashanti War. - No. 70.

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C.O. 879/1 - No. xxiv - April-October, 1857
Sir B. Pine's views in regard to the future government of Her Majesty's settlements on the west coast of Africa.

C.O. 879/2 - Gold Coast No. 6 - 20 January, 1866.
Memorandum by Mr. Elliott and Major Blackall on remodelling of West African governments.

C.O. 879/2 - Gold Coast No. 7 - 16 July, 1864 - 10 February, 1865.
Finances of Settlements; Despatches and reports.

C.O. 879/2 - Gold Coast No. 8 - June, 1864
Use of Settlements; Memorandum by T.F. Elliott.

C.O. 879/2 - Gold Coast No. 18 - October, 1867
Protectorate; Abstract of correspondence.
2. Colonial Office Confidential Print cont'd

C.O. 879/2 - Gold Coast No. 19 - 6 May, 1867 - 3 August, 1869.
  Protectorate; Correspondence.

C.O. 879/3 - Gold Coast No. 25 - 19 January, 1870 - 6 February, 1872
  Cession of Dutch settlements; Correspondence.

C.O. 879/4 - Gold Coast No. 29 - 15 January, 1872 - 17 May, 1873
  Cession of Dutch settlements and Ashanti invasion; Correspondence.

C.O. 879/4 - Gold Coast No. 29A - 3 January, 1872 - 10 March, 1873.
  Fanti Confederation; Correspondence.

C.O. 879/4 - Gold Coast No. 30 - Further Papers Relating to the Ashantee Invasion, 14 March, 1873 to 18 July, 1873.

C.O. 879/4 - Gold Coast No. 31 - Correspondence Respecting Captain Glover's Mission to the Eastern Districts of the Gold Coast Protectorate, September, 1873.

C.O. 879/4 - Gold Coast No. 32 - Further Papers Relating to the Ashantee Invasion, 13 June, 1873 - 6 September, 1873.

C.O. 879/4 - Gold Coast No. 33 - List of Military Equipment ordered for the Gold Coast, 15 September, 1873.

C.O. 879/5 - Gold Coast No. 35 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 9 May, 1873 to 30 September, 1873.

C.O. 879/5 - Gold Coast No. 36 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 29 August, 1873 to 3 December, 1873.

C.O. 879/5 - Gold Coast No. 38 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 1 December, 1873 to 3 January, 1874.

C.O. 879/6 - Gold Coast No. 39 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 5 January, 1874 to 3 February, 1874.
2. Colonial Office Confidential Print cont'd

C.O. 879/6 - Gold Coast No. 41 - Ashantee Invasion: Latest Despatches from Sir Garnet Wolseley, 26 December, 1873 to 5 February, 1874.

C.O. 879/6 - Gold Coast No. 42 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 4 February, 1874 to 3 March, 1874.

C.O. 879/6 - Gold Coast No. 45 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 1 March, 1874 to 31 March, 1874.

C.O. 879/6 - Gold Coast No. 46 - March, 1874 Gold Coast Settlements from their first establishment to the death of Mr. Maclean in 1847.

C.O. 879/6 - Gold Coast No. 55 - Further Correspondence Respecting the Ashantee Invasion, 4 April, 1874 to 14 May, 1874.

C.O. 879/7 - Gold Coast No. 69 - Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of the Gold Coast, 15 July, 1873 to 22 January, 1875.

3. The Colonial Office List


4. Semi-Official Documentary Collections


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1. Works by Contemporaries Containing Primary Material cont'd


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2. Secondary Sources


2. Secondary Sources cont'd


Secondary Sources cont'd


2. Secondary Sources cont'd


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Barrow, Capt. R.K. The Ashanti War of 1863. 1874. Gold Coast Pamphlets: No. 5.


Clarkson, T. Record of Rev. T.B. Freeman's Journals of Visits to Ashanti. 1845. Gold Coast Pamphlets: No. 1.


"From Cape Coast to Coomassie: A Narrative of the Ashantean War", Illustrated London News, 1874.

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1. African

The Gold Coast Times, March, 1874 - July, 1874.
The Freetown Independent, December, 1874
The West African Herald, May, 1873 - September, 1873

2. European

The African Times, January, 1873 - April, 1874
The Daily News, August, 1873 - March, 1874
The Illustrated London News, January, 1873 - April, 1874
The New York Herald, October, 1873 - February, 1874
The Times, October, 1873 - February, 1874
The Standard, October, 1873 - February, 1874
UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL


No. 1

"9. I need scarcely say that her Majesty's Government cannot for a moment listen to such preposterous demands, nor can they allow the territories of the tribes in alliance with her Majesty to be devastated, the inhabitants butchered or driven away into slavery, and all progress and commerce stopped on the Coast by hordes of barbarians.

"10. At the same time, her Majesty's Government have never had any desire to prevent the Ashantis from peaceful intercourse with the Coast; on the contrary, they have always been anxious in every way to foster and encourage such intercourse; and one of the advantages which they anticipated from the possession of the forts at Elmina was, that through the friendly connection between the Elminas and the Ashantis, increased facilities would have been afforded for trade with the latter.

"11. On your assuming the government, or as soon after as you may think advisable, you will address a communication to the King of Ashanti, summoning him to withdraw his forces from the territories of our allies within such a period as you may fix, and to make adequate reparation for the injuries and losses which he has inflicted upon our allies, and give securities for the maintenance of peace in future. I have in another despatch indicated to you generally the nature of the conditions which her Majesty's Government would consider equitable.

"12. You will intimate to him that active measures are in preparation against him, and that if he refuses to comply with our demands, or delays to withdraw his forces within the time named, he may rest assured that means will not be wanting to compel him to do so, and to inflict such a defeat upon him as will effectually deter him from repeating his aggressions.

"13. Colonel Harley has been instructed to invite the principal kings and chiefs of the friendly tribes to meet you on your arrival at Cape Coast, and you will of course lose no time in endeavouring to collect and organize any native force which you may judge to be necessary for conducting any operations which may appear to you certain, or in a high degree likely, to be undertaken.
"14. You should state to the native kings that the Queen, on learning the calamitous position in which her allies are placed by the invasion of their country by the Ashantis, and their inability, without further assistance, to repel the invaders, has sent out specially an officer of high authority and experience, uniting the chief civil and military command, for the purpose of rendering them that assistance.

"15. You should explain to them that while her Majesty's Government are prepared to take such measures as may be found expedient on your advice to aid them in carrying on the war against the Ashantis, they expect the native tribes to use their utmost efforts to defend themselves, and to place their resources unreservedly at your disposal.

"16. The native tribes undoubtedly made considerable efforts at the beginning of the war; but since their last defeat, they appear to have been unable to rouse themselves to even the most necessary exertions for their own protection. The reports received by her Majesty's Government show that at Cape Coast the natives have not even taken steps to clear away the bush which endangers the safety of the town, and that nothing has been done by them to obtain trustworthy information of the movements of the Ashantis. You will intimate plainly to the native kings that it is impossible to help those who are unwilling to help themselves; and that unless they unite together cordially in their own defence, and show themselves prepared to make every sacrifice in their power to maintain themselves against the invader, they must not look for aid to her Majesty's Government.

"17. Her Majesty's Government are unable to give you more precise instructions as to the measures which should be taken in order to bring the war to a speedy and successful termination, without further information than they at present possess. Much will depend upon the amount of co-operation which you may be able to obtain from the friendly tribes, the position and force of the Ashantis, concerning which but imperfect intelligence has hitherto been received, and upon the opinion which you may form after examination of the state of affairs on the spot as to the practicability of an expedition into the interior, and the number and composition of the force with which you might recommend that such an expedition should be undertaken. It may be that you will find the forces at your disposal upon the Coast sufficient for the accomplishment of any object which you may think it proper to undertake. But if you should find it necessary to ask for any considerable reinforcement of European troops, I have to request that you will enter into full explanations as to the circumstances in which you propose to employ them, and the reasons which may lead you to believe that they can be employed without an unjustifiable exposure, and with a well-grounded anticipation of success. - I have, &c.,

"KIMBERLEY."
"SIR, - Her Majesty's Government wish to leave you a large discretion as to the terms which you may think it advisable to require from the King of Ashanti, but I may point out to you that the treaty which was concluded with Ashanti in 1831, and of which I enclose a copy for your information, seems to afford a reasonable basis for any fresh convention.

"2. It would certainly be desirable to include in such a convention an explicit renewal by the King of Ashanti of the renunciation contained in the treaty of 1831, of all claim to tribute or homage from the native kings who are in alliance with her Majesty, - and further, a renunciation on his part to supremacy over Elmina, or over any of the tribes formerly connected with the Dutch, and to any tribute or homage from such tribes, as well as to any payment or acknowledgment in any shape by the British Government, in respect of Elmina or any other of the British forts or possessions on the Coast.

"3. The king should also, for his own interest no less than with a view to the general benefit of the country, engage to keep the paths open through his dominions, to promote lawful commerce to and through the Ashanti country, and to protect all peaceful traders passing through his dominions to the coast; and it might be expedient that a stipulation should be made that a resident British consul or agent should be received at the Ashanti capital if her Majesty should think fit at any time to appoint one.

"4. You will of course be careful to avoid as far as possible anything which may endanger the lives of the European missionaries and their families who have so long been held in captivity at Coomassie, without any fault of their own so far as her Majesty's Government are aware, and you will use every effort to secure their safe release.

"5. You will also endeavour to procure the surrender of all the prisoners taken by the Ashantis from the tribes in alliance with her Majesty.

"6. It is a usual practice with the native tribes to demand hostages for the faithful performance of treaties of peace. This was done in 1831, when two hostages of high rank were delivered over to the British Government by the King of Ashanti. If you should find it advisable to make a similar demand on the present occasion, you will bear in mind that the hostages should be men of high rank and position in Ashanti.

"7. It would be reasonable to exact from the King the payment of such an indemnity as may be within his means, which are said to be considerable, for the expenses of the war, and the injuries inflicted on her Majesty's allies."
"8. Lastly, the opportunity should not be lost for putting an end if possible to the human sacrifices and the slave-hunting which, with other barbarities, prevail in the Ashanti kingdom. - I have, &c.,

KIMBERLEY."
"SIR, - I have the honour to inform you that the command of her Majesty's land forces on the Gold Coast has been conferred upon you during the present troubles with the Ashantis, in combination with the civil administration of the settlement.

The objects with which this arrangement has been made have been communicated to you by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. My duty is to give you such general instructions in respect to your military command, as may be necessary to convey to you the views of her Majesty's Government in that respect.

The difficulties with which you will have to contend are not such as are to be encountered from an enemy formidable in the field. They are the far more serious difficulties of contending with a climate peculiarly fatal, especially at particular seasons of the year, to the constitutions of European soldiers, and, in a less degree, of all soldiers recruited anywhere else than upon the Coast itself.

In determining what reinforcements it may be necessary to send you from time to time, her Majesty's Government will be greatly influenced by the reports they will receive from you after your arrival on the Coast, when you will have had time to communicate with those whose experience on the Coast, and knowledge of the immediate circumstances of the case, will best enable you to judge what measures you ought to adopt in order to give effect to the views of her Majesty's Government, as conveyed to you by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and what means it is necessary to employ for that purpose.

The force at present upon the Coast appears, by the latest reports, to be fully adequate for the defence of the British settlements themselves against the attacks of the Ashantis. It will be for you to consider what military measures will be necessary to free those settlements from the continued menace of such attacks, and to accomplish the further objects of your mission. In arriving at a judgment on this subject, you will not fail to bear in mind the following considerations - viz.:

1. That European troops ought never to be exposed to the influence of that climate, when the service required can be performed by Houssas, or by native auxiliaries, or by any other force indigenous to the country.
"2. Nor, unless the service is one of paramount importance to the main object of your mission.

"3. Nor, unless it can be accomplished with a rapidity of execution which may render the exposure to the climate very short.

"For this reason, if the employment of Europeans shall become a necessity, every preparation should be made in advance; and no European force should be landed on the Coast until the time for decisive action has arrived. The period when the risk of loss from climate is at a minimum, appears to be that comprised within the months of December, January, February, and March, and it is consequently of much importance that your decision should be arrived at as soon after your arrival on the Coast as you may be enabled to frame it with sufficient knowledge of the circumstances, and with satisfaction to yourself.

"You will be able to judge what prospect Captain Glover has of raising a local force, so as to make a decided impression upon the invaders by his movement upon the Volta, and how far it is possible to organize that not inconsiderable body of natives, of whom Colonel Harley speaks as available, when supplies of food shall have been placed at your disposal for their use. You will also be able to judge what assistance native attendants will be able to render to the European troops, if you shall eventually find that you are compelled to employ Europeans in order to effect the purposes which her Majesty's Government have in view.

"The reports just received by the Himalaya give an account of the sickness of the marines employed upon the defence of the settlement before the arrival of the West Indian troops, and of the West Indian troops themselves, which her Majesty's Government have received with great concern. It is true that the season in which your operations will be carried on will be much less exposed to the hazards of the African climate than that which has just passed; and there seems good reason to believe that those hazards are greater upon the seaboard than in some favoured parts of the interior; but it is to be remembered, on the other hand, that service on a march is exposed to trials of its own, which do not affect men living on board ship or in quarters.

"I have thought it right to state for your guidance these general considerations, because nothing but a conviction of necessity would induce her Majesty's Government to engage in any operation involving the possibility of its requiring the service of Europeans at the Gold Coast. But it is far from my intention to fetter your judgment in the responsible and arduous duties which have been intrusted to you; and no one, I am sure, will be more sensible than yourself of the cardinal importance of the considerations to which I have invited your attention, or more desirous to spare to the utmost of your power the exposure of European soldiers or marines to the climate of the Gold Coast. — I am, &c.,

EDWARD CARDWELL."
"SIR, - I informed you, in my despatch of the 11th of
November, that I should address you further when the statement
which you proposed to send to the Secretary of State for War
respecting the employment of a European force had been received.
"2. You will have learnt from the Secretary of State
for War by the last mail that, after consideration of that state-
ment, it had been determined to despatch at once the troops which
had been held in readiness, and that the further battalion which
you had asked for would follow.
"3. I have now to acquaint you with the views of her
Majesty's Government respecting the employment of this force, and
the general limits within which, as far as circumstances may ad-
mit, your action should be confined.
"4. You are aware, from previous despatches, both from
the Secretary of State for War and from myself, that her Majesty's
Government were most reluctant to send European troops to the
Gold Coast. In the instructions conveyed to you in my letter of
September 10, before your departure from this country, you were
informed that, if you should find it necessary to ask for any
considerable reinforcement of European troops, you were to enter
into full explanations as to the circumstances in which you pro-
posed to employ them, and the reasons which led you to believe
that they could be employed without an unjustifiable exposure and
with a well-grounded anticipation of success.
"5. You have now given it as your opinion that a certain
force of European soldiers is indispensable, not only for the
purpose of an advance into the enemy's territory, but also for
the preliminary operations which you describe in your despatch to
me of October 9, and you state that you have satisfied yourself
that they can be employed during the more healthy season in the
manner you propose, without serious risk from sickness.
"6. After carefully considering the arguments by which
your proposals are supported, her Majesty's Government had no
hesitation in determining to comply with your request, and orders
were at once given accordingly for the despatch of the troops.
"7. Before the troops reach the coast you will, no doubt,
as far as lies in your power, have made every preparation in ad-
ance, so that no European soldier may be landed until the time
for decisive action has arrived; and her Majesty's Government
rely with confidence that you will not employ this force, especially in the interior, a day longer than the paramount objects of your mission may require. The limit of their employment is fixed by the continuance of the more healthy season, and her Majesty's Government trust you may be able to re-embark the troops for return to England during the month of February, or at the very latest in March, before the end of which month, at all events, it will be absolutely necessary to withdraw them. This limit of time, which is imposed by the conditions of the climate, will, of course, of itself place a corresponding limit upon the operations which it will be prudent or possible for you to attempt. The nature and extent of the operations which it may, within this limit of time, be necessary to undertake in order to bring the war to a conclusion, must be left to your own judgment to determine; nor do her Majesty's Government wish to fetter the discretion which must always be placed in the hands of an officer commanding a force in the field; but they desire that, in forming your decision, you will bear in mind the following considerations:

"8. You were informed in my despatch of October 6 that a satisfactory state of things would be obtained if you could procure an honourable peace, or could inflict, in default of such peace, an effectual chastisement on the Ashanti force.

"9. It is obvious that it will be the interest of the Ashantis to gain time by negotiations, so as to delay the progress of the operations against them until the unhealthy season returns. They have abundantly proved their capacity for carrying on such illusory negotiations, and I have no fear that you will suffer yourself to be deceived by them. But it may be that the King of Ashanti, on learning the retreat of his army and the further preparations against him, will be ready to make reparation, and to conclude at once a peace on conditions acceptable to her Majesty's Government, in order to avert the impending blow. Her Majesty's Government would view with much satisfaction such a termination of the existing difficulties.

"10. But if it should be necessary to advance far into the interior of the country, and even beyond the Prah, it appears to her Majesty's Government by no means to follow that it would be advisable to occupy Coomassie.

"11. If you should inflict a severe defeat on the Ashanti army near or beyond the frontier, the occupation of the capital might, perhaps, be effected without much difficulty; but it is probable that the result might be a complete break up of the king's government and power. In such an event, you might find yourself in possession of Coomassie without any government or ruler to treat with; and as it would be wholly out of the question to keep European troops in a state of inactivity in the interior; you might be compelled to return without having obtained a full security for the establishment of a lasting peace.
It seems probable that one of the main grounds of quarrel between the Ashantis and the coast tribes arises, as in other parts of Africa, from the impediments interposed by the latter to the free access and trade of the Ashantis with the coast. If the King of Ashanti were persuaded that our object would be to facilitate and protect the trade of the Ashantis, and that they might regard Elmina as in every respect as much open to them, now it is under our influence, as it was when under Dutch protection, or as it could be in any other circumstances, it is reasonable to suppose that it would effect a great change in his relations with the British settlements.

In any communication which you may have with the king, you should lose no opportunity to impress upon him that our object is to promote, in every way, the intercourse of the Ashantis with the coast, and to protect the trade coming from the interior from interruption and annoyance. You cannot too strongly assure him that we desire to be on terms of friendship with the Ashanti nation, and that he has been completely deceived if he has been led to believe that our object in obtaining possession of the Dutch forts was to cut off his people from communication with the coast; that, on the contrary, if they come as peaceful traders, it is as much our interest as his that they should meet with no hindrance which it is in our power to remove.

I have further to observe that, whilst the violent aggression of the King of Ashanti upon the Protectorate, at a time when he was professing to be in friendly negotiations with the British authorities, cannot be overlooked, much less the ravages and barbarities by which the progress of the invaders has been marked, it must not be forgotten that there is a reason to believe that the Ashantis received some provocation from the tribes of the Protectorate, and in negotiating the terms of peace, you will be careful to give fair consideration to any complaints which the king may urge against these tribes; and if you should be of opinion that they are to any extent well founded, you will give due weight to them in determining the amount of reparation which you may require.

I may sum up by saying, that it is the wish of Her Majesty's Government that you should conclude a satisfactory peace as soon as it can be obtained; that you should advance no further into the interior than may be indispensable for the attainment of such a peace; and that, after concluding, if possible, a Treaty with the King of Ashanti, you should return with the least practicable delay to the sea-coast, and send home the European troops, keeping on foot only such other forces as you may consider necessary for the service of the settlements, and for holding the road to the Prah, so as to keep the communication with the interior open to trade.
"16. With respect to our relations after the war with the tribes of the Protectorate, considering that with some few exceptions the native tribes since their first defeats have made very little effort to defend themselves against the Ashantis, and that, practically, the whole burden of the war has fallen upon this country, it must be understood that when the present operations have been concluded, Her Majesty's Government will hold that they have discharged their obligations to the protected tribes, and that they are entirely free to review their relations with those tribes, and to place them on such footing as the interests of this country may seem to them to require.

"17. In desiring you, therefore, to leave the road to the Prah under the protection of such a force as you may deem necessary, they must not be understood as pledging this country to permanently maintain a force to keep the road open; and you will be careful not to enter into any stipulation with the Ashantis which may fetter the discretion of Her Majesty's Government in dealing hereafter with the relations between this country and the Gold Coast generally.

"18. You will, of course, give such instructions to Captain Glover as will insure his conforming strictly to the views of Her Majesty's Government as indicated in this despatch. - I have, &c.

(Signed) "KIMBERLEY."
"SIR, - Your honour's letters by the man captured at Assanchi, bearing the dates October 13th and 1st instant, I have safely received, and have the contents read and interpreted correctly to me. It is true that there exists such treaty as your honour refer between my predecessor and late Governor McClean. Being aware of it, and having no palaver with white men, my good friends, I only directed my General Amanquatia against the black men, who are my own slaves, and now refuse to serve me. I was incited to take this step by the message Attah, alias Mr. Henry Plange, brought to me, 'that in four months' time the Administrator-in-Chief was to take my power away for Kwarkefram,' the King of Denkera. Of course I could not bear to hear this, and I therefore sent to fetch him, Kwarkefram. But since I heard his death, which has pacified me, and heard that my armies were proceeding to attack the forts, I immediately sent, about twenty days ago, ere your honour's letters reached me, one of my captains, 'Busummuru Intekura' by name, to call back Amanquatia, forbidding his attacks upon the forts, as that would incur the displeasure of you, my good friend. Respecting the detention of your honour's messenger, Mr. Dawson, and the Europeans, it is because my captain who brought them disapproved my sending them to the coast ere the money is sent. If, therefore, your honour would send it as early as you can by the return of the bearers of this, Mr. Dawson will be allowed to start directly with them.

(Signed) "KOFI KAREKARBE, his X mark.
by the Linguists,
KOFI BUAKI, his X mark.
AKOSSI APPIA, his X mark.
YAW NAMKUI, his X mark.

Witnesses to the signatures:
(Signed) Fr. Ramseyer.
M. G. Bornat.

His Honour Colonel Harley, C.B.,
Administrator of her Majesty's Forts and
Settlements on the Gold Coast."
"Kumassi, December 26, 1873.

"MY GOOD FRIEND, - Your honour by this will find that my letter dated 24th ultimo had been returned back again to Coomassie. The cause of this is the attack made upon my army on their way back, when I ordered, by your Honour's desire, their return home, and thereby killed all their sick men, and took away all their property. Especially finding in that at Posoo one of your honour's officers among them, whose hammock and provisions my men took after defeating them. This, of course, pains me very much, as I did not foresee a trick in it; and also having written your honour to acquaint you with my having no war with white men, but the black people. However, considering your honour as my good friend still, I send one of my court criers, Essen Kuaku, and another man, Kudjo Fodwin, to accompany one of Mr. Dawson's men, Assradu, to ask your honour's answer to my first letter, respecting the giving me back Assins and Denkeras, and at the same time for some explanation for these last attacks upon my people. I beg to say that I have given them only fourteen days to perform their journey in and out. - We are, &c.,

(For King Kofi Kalkaree),
Linguists,

(Signed)
"YAW MANTWI, his X mark.
KOFI BUAKI, his X mark.
VINESE APPEA, his X mark.
KWABINA AMTRUENSA, his X mark.

"His Honour Colonel R. W. Harley, C.B., Administrator,
&c. &c. &c.
APPENDIX E

MAPS

Map 4. Post-War Explorations, 1816-21

Map 5. Clapperton, Lander, and the Lower Niger

- Clapperton And R. L. Lander 1825-1827
- R. L. Lander Alone 1827-1828
- R. L. And John Lander 1830