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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE RCMP:
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY

by

Gary Edward Reed
B.A., Carleton University, 1978

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Political Science

Gary Edward Reed 1984
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
August 1984

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This research examines organizational change within the administrative headquarters of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police during the period 1968 to 1980 utilizing an environmental and institutional theoretical framework. A longitudinal approach has been taken in order to develop an institutional and structural model of the Force between 1873 and 1960. The focus is on organizational change: the impact of environmental pressures and institutional factors.

Initially, the research focused on the formation of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The environment in the Canadian West prior to 1873 was linked to the emergence of national goals and ultimately the para-military structure of the Northwest Mounted Police. Once formed, the Northwest Mounted Police began a process of core formation which assumed the proportions of an ideology by 1968. The success of the Force in achieving national goals, coupled with its wide public support, also led to the development of an institutional legitimacy.

These institutional characteristics of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police contrasted, and later conflicted with powerful environmental pressures emerging during the period 1968 to 1980. The Force attempted to preserve the status quo and evade critical evaluation by relying on its closed nature and institutional legitimacy. Environmental pressures related to the pursuit of accountability in the public sector and internal dissatisfaction demanding changes in the management style of the Force. Two specific periods of organizational crises resulted, and senior management perceived an urgent need for change.

Specific organizational changes have been examined within the context of environmental pressures confronting the Force and its institutional char-
acter. The research shows that when the pressures focused on the tasks or functions of the Force, change occurred. But when pressures focused on the institutional character or the established social structure, the Force endeavoured to rely on its institutional legitimacy to influence or control the environment. Where it was not possible to control the pressures, they were co-opted into the policy-making and decision-making structure.

The outcome was organizational change that introduced new tasks into the Force but did not significantly alter its institutional character. Much of the change was found to have achieved less than the anticipated level of effectiveness which is attributed to its social structure.

The research demonstrated the impact of the environment on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and, paradoxically, how open to change the Royal Canadian Mounted Police actually proved to be in spite of its institutional legitimacy. In the final analysis, much of the change was squeezed into the existing institutional structure.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Without the formal approval of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police this research would not have been possible, so that my first thanks goes to Inspector W.R. Spring for his initial support of my request to undertake the project. Likewise, without the assistance of the staff of the Archives and Records Sections, and the staff of the Headquarters Library in finding the appropriate records and other research material the research could not have been done. A particular thanks goes to those members of the Force and people outside of the Force who gave freely of their time and perspectives on organizational change in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about organizational change within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), change from a para-military organization characterized by strong traditions and its own ideology to an organization typified by contemporary bureaucratic processes such as planning, program evaluation and accountability. It will deal with the causes, the issues and the problems of this transition to a contemporary bureaucracy which primarily occurred during the period 1968 to 1980.

Organization change is a process through which an organization attempts to adapt itself better to its external environment. The necessity for change is related to the organization's inability to completely control its environment and a desire to ensure its autonomy, security or prestige. As a result, the organization restructures or changes its behaviour in an effort to deal more effectively or maintain its relationship with the environment.¹

A second source of change may be through a process of growth and development as the organization ages or matures. However, but most change is acknowledged to originate in the environment whether it is changing technology, new government demands or changing social values.² But in either case, organization change is caused or facilitated by the relationship between the organization and its environment.

Change, however, is not always the only possible outcome in response to environmental pressure. In some organizations there is a marked reluctance or bureaucratic inertia within to resist or even deny the need for change. In other cases, organizations may attempt to influence or control their
environment to preserve the status quo, particularly if they are powerful and institutionalized, like the RCMP.

Unlike much of the literature about the RCMP, this research is an attempt to provide an academically objective and neutral evaluation of the factors of change and the internal dynamics of the RCMP from information that is not readily available to other researchers.

The Nature of the Organization and the Issues of Change

The RCMP was established in 1873, initially as a small mounted police unit to patrol the largely unsettled Western territories during the first years of the newly created Dominion. Over the RCMP's 110 year history it has, however, been transformed from a small unit into a large complex organization within the public sector. During this extended period of development, it has built a tradition as an effective law enforcement agency which is recognized world wide.

This recognition coupled with its para-military structure, and the resulting para-military character and ideology have played a significant role in the process of change. The most profound period of change has been during the late 1960s and the 1970s when the RCMP grew approximately 67 percent. Based on this data, an observer might conclude that growth and development were the fundamental change processes at work, but that is not the case, as the research will demonstrate. The period was also characterized by considerable internal and external pressures about its role and operation. The impact of these pressures was to accelerate the rate and direction of change. An article in Saturday Night by Charlotte Gray summed
up the pressures on the RCMP,

"Never had the RCMP been under attack from so many quarters; never had its values instilled in its members been so obviously at odds with those of the society it was supposed to serve." 

The RCMP was and largely still is a tightly controlled para-military organization which puts great emphasis on the importance of tradition, career, discipline and rank. The acceptance and perpetuation of these values has been contingent on the closed nature of the recruiting and training system which is illustrated in the following statement from an article in the Star Weekly in 1965,

"At Rockcliffe and Regina recruits are given some technical instruction but the core of their training is a make-or-break regimen of drills, spurred boots, salutes for everything that moves, spit-and-polish discipline and an emphasis on grooming and riding horses that borders on the mystic. (The present Commissioner, like those before him, quotes Winston Churchill. The outside of a horse is good for the inside of a man.) Like priests, the recruit must be celibate; marriage is forbidden for two years after enlistment. All this combines to produce a man whose heart and soul are devoted to the Force, whose very raison d'etre is the uniform of the RCMP."

The aim of the intense training and indoctrination has been to develop a strong sense of commitment and purpose within the RCMP's membership. Part of this "commitment and purpose" is the rejection of the notion of being civil servants and the rejection of the political role playing of bureaucracy in favour of what the RCMP considers a more worthy set of ideals: service to the public and non-political interference. To achieve the necessary commitment to the organization, the Force typically selected single
rural males with the minimum educational requirements -- those who it was felt could be most easily indoctrinated. Frequent transfers have been used to reinforce this commitment by reducing identification to specific tasks or geographical regions. However, the process has tended to create an isolation and elitism within the organization.

Internally, the consequence of this closed system and frequent transfers has been to retard the development of expertise, and restrict the entry of new ideas and values into the RCMP. As a result, the organization is highly structured, rigid and lacking in innovation. The fundamental point, however, is that this value system or ideology which has been indoctrinated into young recruits and reinforced throughout their service by the transfer and promotion system, affects to a significant degree the decision-making process. To arrive at the top, authors Edward Man and John Lee state, one must survive "in a ruthless competition for promotion; the best survival technique is to become a yes-man." In general, these practices have made the RCMP ill-equipped in terms of organizational expertise and political acumen to undertake the changes being thrust upon it.

The dramatic changes in social values especially in the area of civil rights and cultural nationalism which took place in the 1960s contrasted sharply with the para-military values of the RCMP. The sixties was also a period in which a number of incidents regarding RCMP practices in respect to national security became known and received considerable publicity. After a number of exposés during the decade, the Government appointed the Royal Commission on Security which reported in October 1968. The report dealt with the complexities and contradictions of a security role for a police force. The major recommendation was that the Directorate of Security and
Intelligence of the RCMP should be a separate agency. As a result, Prime Minister Trudeau indicated that changes would be forthcoming in the direction and control of the Directorate of Security and Intelligence. He stated in the House of Commons:

"It is therefore the government's intention with the full understanding of the RCMP, to ensure that the Directorate of Security and Intelligence will grow and develop as a distinct and identifiable element within the basic structure of the Force. The Security Service will be increasingly separate in structure and civilian in nature."\(^{11}\)

The RCMP never did embrace the idea of civilianization of the Security Service despite pressures for change. The extent of civilianization was really the appointment of a civilian Director General.\(^{12}\)

Two other sources of pressure requiring an organizational response from the RCMP came from the Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission, 1962) and the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (Lambert Commission, 1979). These Commissions were not focused specifically on the RCMP; but through the Force's immediate environment, which constitutes mainly the central agencies of government and the Solicitor General's Department, they had a significant impact on the development of planning, the delegation of responsibility and departmental administrative accountability within the RCMP.

The Glassco Commission's recommendations resulted in amendments to the Government Organization Act in 1968, which altered the relationships between the departments and the central agencies by making departments, including the RCMP, accountable for the "organization and its programs" within certain limits. The delegation of increased responsibility, however, required in-
increased accountability, and this was a major shortcoming of the entire de-
centralization process. The Lambert Commission recommended a restructuring
of the Central Agencies and a consolidation of their control and coordina-
tion roles over the departments.

The Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons for
the fiscal year ended March 31, 1981 emphasized and illustrated just what
impact the central agencies and government policy has had on the RCMP.

"The RCMP has been responsive to government initia-
tives to improve the quality of planning in depart-
ments and agencies. In the late 1960s, these initia-
tives focused on development of P.P.& B. Systems. In
the early 1970s, the RCMP improved its planning pro-
cess by establishing a planning branch and providing
full time planning staff for senior divisional man-
egement."13

The forces of change were not, however, exclusively external to the
RCMP. In 1972 Jack Ramsey, in an article in Maclean's, compared the RCMP's
rules as more appropriate to a penal colony than a police force and said of-
fficers maintained discipline through fear.14 Ramsey's article touched off a
wave of internal discontentment within the Force that resulted in mass meet-
ings in several major cities two years later. This issue escalated to such
an extent that the government appointed the Commission of Inquiry Relating
to Public Complaints, Internal Discipline and Grievance Procedure within the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Marin Commission) on June 6, 1974. As yet
the major recommendations of the Commission which reported in January 1976,
have not been implemented. However, a quasi-elected representative system
has been established to provide input into the decision-making process on
issues important to the general membership.
A critical distinction that emerges in determining the impact of the environment on the RCMP is whether the demands or pressures focused on the Force's task structure or on the social structure. It will be evident that this distinction is important in analyzing the Force's response to changes or demands in the environment.

The Central Hypothesis

Organizational change is viewed as a process in which the organization endeavours to maintain a viable relationship with its environment. This viable relationship relates to the organization's autonomy, security and prestige. The primary assumption is that change in the environment alters the relationship between it and the organization requiring a response from the organization. In the RCMP this changing relationship is filtered through the Force's institutional or value system which ultimately affects the kind of response.

The two hypotheses are developed against these two assumptions as follows:

Organizational change within the RCMP has primarily taken place as a result of pressures in its immediate and internal environment, and

Institutional characteristics within the RCMP have played a significant role in how the RCMP perceives and responds to environmental changes or pressures.

The contention is that the institutional characteristics or social structure have reduced the effect of any organization change or co-opted that change so that it fits within the existing social structure of the RCMP.
What these two statements suggest is that the RCMP has resisted change and that even when change has been undertaken, it has not fundamentally changed the character of the organization. The aim of the research then, is to prove the validity of the two hypotheses.

The Scope and Methodology of the Research

The scope of this thesis is limited to examining organizational change in the administrative centers of the Headquarters of the RCMP. Changes in the operational police structure have not been examined for two reasons; operational police matters are confidential and access to that information is restricted, and the operational sphere is so extensive and geographically dispersed that the task would be beyond the scope of a single researcher.

The second limitation is that the research of the environment and organization change in the RCMP is confined to the period between 1968 and 1980. This period was selected because it represents a period when a great deal of pressure for change emerged in the environment. The upper limit of 1980 was arbitrary so that the research did not encroach on contemporary issues which the Force might not want made public. An historical review is included, because of its relevance to the structural and the institutional characteristics of the RCMP.

Organization theory is very broad with a number of competing and overlapping theoretical concepts or models, each one allowing the researcher to focus on a specific aspect of the organization. However, there is no one comprehensive or general theory of organizations. Therefore, selecting a theoretical concept is largely dictated by what aspects of the organization one wishes to examine. In this case, the focus of the research is organ-
izational change within the RCMP.

Chapter II discusses the theoretical concepts and develops a theoretical framework within which the research is then structured. The primary theoretical framework that is developed, is from environmental and institutional theory. A secondary focus of the research, is an analysis of the structural dimensions of the RCMP which is used to describe and define the structure and processes. These dimensions are treated as given and used as measures of organization change in a comparative context between the various chapters in the text. They are not developed or examined in a theoretical way.

Environmental theory deals with the forces or pressures, generally outside the boundaries of the organization to which it reacts or adapts, usually with some change in structure or procedure. Important in the framework is whether the organization is "closed" or "open," which largely affects the kind of relationship the organization has with its environment. Leadership is crucial because it plays an important role in the power and autonomy of the organization. The leadership's role is to act as a sensing or mediating or liaison mechanism, particularly in the case of closed organizations, in regard to intrusions into the organization's activities.

Institutional theory is used to demonstrate the importance of organizational ideology and myths which organizations attempt to develop in order to rationalize their legitimacy and ensure their survival. These institutional characteristics have a profound effect on the direction and degree of change within organizations by influencing decision making.

Primary sources of information include interviews of people in key positions who are able to provide rationales for certain kinds of decisions and
organizational change, and an examination of RCMP documents and records. Secondary sources of information include an examination of existing literature, newspaper articles and Royal Commission reports that deal with the RCMP directly or with aspects that have a direct relationship to this research. All tables and figures referred to in the text are contained in Appendix II.

The objective of the research is to validate the central hypotheses of the thesis and where possible to provide generalizations or predictions about organizations that may be of some value to organization theory. The research will be primarily a qualitative examination of organizational change in the RCMP; however, some quantitative data which assists in describing or explaining phenomenon will be utilized.

The Organization of This Paper

Chapter II develops a theoretical framework utilizing environmental and institutional theory, and explains how this theoretical framework is operationalized. Environmental theory provides a framework in which changes occurring in the RCMP's environment can be examined and analyzed in respect to their potential impact on the Force. Three dimensions of environmental theory are developed: (1) the role of the environment in determining the goals and ultimately the structure of the organization, (2) changes in the environment which require a response from the organization if it is to achieve its objectives of autonomy, security or prestige, and (3) the open or closed nature of the organization, which determines in part the organization's ability to sense changes in the environment. The environment is
sub-divided into the larger environment, the immediate environment and the internal environment. A detailed definition of each is provided in Chapter II.

The institutional theory portion of the chapter relies on three institutional processes: cooptation, core formation, and rationalized legitimacy. Each one of these institutional processes or characteristics plays a role in how the Force perceives or responds to changes in the environment.

Chapter III is organized into an historical overview of the RCMP's development. Within this historical overview, specific theoretical aspects developed in Chapter II are examined: the goal structure relationship, the core formation process, and the emergence of a rationalized legitimacy. A structural analysis also takes place which is used later to compare and define specific organizational changes examined in Chapter V.

Chapter IV is an examination of the RCMP's environment. The primary focus is on changes in the Force's immediate and internal environment because of the direct impact on the organization; however, broader issues and debates taking place in the larger environment are also discussed. The objective of the chapter is specifically to describe and define changes in the RCMP's environment to which it has had to respond or adapt.

Chapter V examines specific organizational changes that have occurred as a result of the issues and pressures developed in Chapter IV. The chapter is organized around whether the issues and pressures focus on the task structure or the social structure of the Force. The role of institutional processes in the Force's response to its changing environment become evident. Several major issues which focus on the social structure of the Force are co-opted into the policy and decision-making structure and their impact
partly neutralized. A rationalized legitimacy of the Force's role and status emerges and is shown as being used to resist change and evade critical evaluation. Formalization of administrative functions is shown to be extensive and the impact of this formalization is analyzed.

Chapter VI provides a summary of the research presented in the previous chapters and compares the structural model developed in Chapter III and Chapter V. Conclusions are then developed and presented within the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II. A number of significant issues emerge out of the research and these are the subject of comment in the concluding chapter.

**FOOTNOTES**


2Greiner and Barnes, p. 2.


7Gray, p. 24.

The authors provide a detailed, but somewhat biased examination of these events. Lorne and Caroline Brown, *An Unauthorized History of the RCMP* (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1973), p. 102.


Ramsey, "My Case Against the RCMP," p. 19 & 68

Professor Wilson stated that the problem of a theoretical focus is one that haunts anyone delving into organization theory, "Authors, whether of textbook, or of more specialized areas of study, therefore, must unavoidably make numerous decisions as to what should be emphasized and what to leave out entirely." V. Seymour Wilson, *Canadian Public Policy and Administration: Theory and Environment* (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1981), p. 129.
CHAPTER II

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework from organization theory which can be used to examine and analyze organizational change within the RCMP. A theoretical framework should integrate the research and theoretical concepts in such a way that the results of the research are directed toward establishing valid generalizations about organizations. The importance then, of developing a theoretical framework is that it structures the analysis and defines what factors must be taken into consideration.

Chapter I stated that there was no general theory of organizations and that organization theory consisted of a number of competing and overlapping theoretical concepts. However, selecting a theoretical perspective is less problematic than the above statement suggests. Developing a theoretical perspective is largely dictated by the assumptions one makes about the organizational relationships to be examined.

In the introduction of Chapter I, organizational change was described as a process through which an organization attempts to adapt itself to its external environment. There are two assumptions present in that statement; first, that the environment is an important variable, and secondly, that the organization will attempt to adapt itself in order to maintain its relationship or relevance to the environment. The second assumption raises the question of what the adaptation process might entail. Larry Greiner says,
"My position...is that the future of an organization may be less determined by outside forces than it is by the organization's history." 3

Accepting that proposition suggests that in addition to the environment, the organization's history is relevant to the issue of organizational change. Institutional theory focuses on that very issue; that organizations have a "natural history" which is fundamental to understanding them. But accepting the validity of institutional theory as a relevant focus is not based solely on its historical inclinations. It also examines the dynamics of the organization's process of adapting to its environment,

"Natural forces work their ways quietly, and it is often not until too late that the organization discovers, for example, that its social bases in the community - the groups that supply its personnel, receive its services, provide legitimacy - is eroded." 4

This is a situation not unlike the RCMP's during the 1970s.

Going back to the first assumption about the relationship between organization change and the environment, one is inclined to ask whether organizations change in other ways. William Starbuck examines organizational change from a growth and development perspective, related to growth in size and age. He emphasizes that the organization's relationship with its environment is fundamental because the organization's goals develop around societal needs. Therefore, in order to grow, it must maintain a positive relationship with the environment. 5

Another approach to organizational change is the evolutionary/revolutionary concept developed by Greiner. This concept has some merit but it does not approach the issue from a significantly different perspective than Starbuck,
"The speed at which an organization experiences phases of evolution and revolution is closely related to the market environment of its industry."

Greiner clearly relates speed of response to periods of change to success or failure in a market environment.  

Neither Starbuck or Greiner can totally explain away the environment. In fact, both are directly related to or contingent on the environment. While it is evident that a process of growth and development did occur in the RCMP, it did not alter the basic structure significantly.

Given the above assumptions and arguments, there is a strong case for an environmental and institutional approach to the research. But what other theoretical concepts are there, and how relevant are they to this research? For example, James L. Gibson says systems theory "presents the opportunity to view the organization as a totality." Systems theory, he says, "treats organizations as complex sets of mutually dependent and interacting variables."  

In spite of the apparent relevance, that perspective tends to treat the interaction between different organizations as mutually dependent and complex. Indeed networks of interaction do exist but in the case of the RCMP there is very little that could be described as mutual dependence as the research will demonstrate. Charles Perrow notes that studies have found that "the web is neither as dense nor as complex as we generally think; there is surprisingly little interaction, conflict, or need for accommodation."

Weberian theory or "the theory of bureaucracy," defines the structural characteristics of bureaucracy which are of some relevance to the research and analysis. But it does not address the impact of the environment on the organization or the processes occurring within it, as the organization
adapts or endeavours to control or influence its environment.9

Likewise, the human relations model pays little attention to the organization/environment relations, focusing rather on individual motivation and informal groups within organizations.10 Phillip Selznick says the model ignores the real relationships in the organization that relate to legitimate self-assertion and accommodation—largely a political process of how leadership issues and conflict, etc. are resolved, aspects of considerable importance in the RCMP which led to the membership challenging the legitimacy of the leadership in 1974.11

In developing an environmental and institutional theoretical framework, no attempt has been made to be all-encompassing in respect to environmental or institutional theory. Specific aspects of each theory are developed selectively as they relate to the focus of the research. In developing the general theoretical framework, considerable reliance is placed on Charles Perrow's Complex Organizations, and Marshal W. Meyer's Change in Public Bureaucracies, interpretations of organization theory. Other sources are referred to where they elaborate on specific issues relevant to the framework and the analysis.12

The importance of environmental theory to this research is that it provides a framework in which the relationship of the organization to its environment can be examined. This relationship between the organization and the environment is seen as critical, since the organization's survival often depends on its ability to maintain a positive relationship with its environment. A positive relationship whether from an environmental or institutional theory, or grow and development perspective, etc., is one in which the conditions between the organization and the environment do not threaten its
security autonomy or prestige, or jeopardize its opportunities for growth.

Three dimensions of environmental theory are important here: the role of the environment in determining the goals and structure of the RCMP, the relationship of environmental change or uncertainty to structural and process changes in the RCMP, and the open or closed nature of the RCMP in responding to environmental change or uncertainty.

Organization boundaries which are usually an important part of environmental theory are treated here as given. This approach is taken as the RCMP is an organization with distinct boundaries which are statutorily and institutionally maintained. The validity of this approach will be evident throughout the research. The relevance of boundaries to the analysis here, relates specifically to sensing or mediating mechanisms within the RCMP which 'sense its environment.13

Institutional theory focuses on the natural process of tradition building and rationalization that goes on in organizations. It is found that this process determines to a substantial degree management's response to pressures or changes in the environment. Consequently, change or the lack of change within the RCMP is determined both by institutional factors which are internal to the organization and by external environmental factors.

The actual analysis of organizational change is the secondary focus of the research. However, it is not treated in any theoretical way. Three organizational configurations, Appendix I, are adapted from Henry Mintzberg's article "Organization design: fashion or fit?" and are used to describe the structural components of the RCMP.
Environmental Theory

One of the fundamental assumptions of environmental theory and the one around which the environmental perspective of this thesis is organized is that goals arising out of some need in the environment essentially determine the structure of the organization and its future relationship to the environment. That is, in setting goals, society determines what the organization is to achieve. In 1873 goals of stability and order were formulated and the NWMP was organized to achieve those goals.

This environment-goal-structure relationship is shown in Appendix II, Figure I. It illustrates the link between the environment, the goals and the structure in both a closed systems model and an open systems feedback model. This relationship becomes the first focus of the research.

The second element of environmental theory of importance here is that change occurring in the environment alters the relationship between the organization and its environment. This altered relationship, ultimately, requires some response from or change in the organization. Environmental change may be in the form either of new goals, a change in government or societal attitudes and values.

Whatever the conditions, the organization's objective is to maintain a positive relationship with its environment. Therefore, the achievement of environmental goals is important to the organization's stability and survival, emphasizing the importance of the link between the organization and its goals in the open systems feedback model, Figure I. The degree to which the organization is able to achieve this is often used as a measure of its effectiveness, particularly in bureaucracy where there are few effective measures of performance.
Change, however, is not the only response to changing or uncertain environmental conditions. The fact is, according to Perrow, that large organizations wield considerable influence in the environment and they may attempt to control or manipulate the issues confronting the organization. In some cases, the organization may simply disregard or deny the pressures, rationalizing them as unrelated to the organization or of a short term duration requiring no response. If the problem appears urgent, the organization may also contract its lines of authority in order to achieve more control and quicker decisions by having fewer people involved in the decision process.17

How the organization responds, however, is most often directly related to the focus of the pressures or changes in the environment, and this is evident in the RCMP. William Starbuck says there are three kinds of change: change to the organization's goals, change to its task structure or change to its social structure. According to Starbuck, it is change to the social structure that evokes the most resistance, particularly if the organization is large and old. The social structure constitutes the organization's systems of thought and values which form part of its ideology and institutional character. The task structure is the tasks or activities carried out by the organization.18

The environment for the purpose of this study is subdivided into the larger environment, the immediate environment and the internal environment, although other environmental definitions and distinctions are possible. The larger environment is society at large including the organization's clientele, and the political and economic systems in which the organization functions or serves. Generally, the pressures in the larger environment are too
dispersed or diffused to have an immediate or direct impact on the organization. 19

These demands are generally filtered through the immediate environment into the organization's boundary spanning or mediating mechanisms. This immediate environment consists of other departments of the same level of government or "superordinate agencies," such as the central agencies of the Canadian Government which have some impact on the organization and with which the organization interacts on a regular basis. It is the immediate environment which is most influential. However, the organization is ultimately responsible to the larger environment, and "its effects are rarely avoided." 20

Environment is usually considered to be external to the organization. But in this analysis, dissatisfaction among members is described as the internal environment because the only practical method of expressing such dissatisfaction was outside the formal structure to such an extent that it could not even be considered an informal network or group. 21

To what degree the organization responds to environmental pressures is largely determined by how open or closed the organization is to its external environment. One of the fundamental issues in environmental theory is whether organizations should be treated theoretically as closed systems or open systems. Meyer concludes that the issue is related more to whether or not the organization has effective feedback mechanisms which buffer or mediate environmental issues, although Haas and Drabek link closed organizations to the institutional characteristics of restricted entry into and identification with the organization. These latter characteristics are typical of the RCMP. 22
Closed organizations are viewed as systems which are insulated from the environment and attempt to block external forces from intruding into the organization's affairs. Activities are generally programmed in advance through such activities as planning, formalization and standardization of procedures. They are characterized by the lack of feedback mechanisms with which to continually sense their environment. Therefore, there is a tendency for a state of tension or disequilibrium to develop between the closed system and its environment, potentially threatening the stability or survival of the organization. The closed organization is depicted in Figure I without the feedback link between the environment and goals.

Open systems are viewed as continually adapting to changes in their environments. The concept is generally applied to firms operating in uncertain market environments. The open system functions with continual feedback through its inventory, production and accounting mechanisms, and adjusts to changes in its environment, as in the "Open System Feedback Model" in Figure I which contains a feedback loop.

In both models, there is a link between the environment, goals and structure of the organizations. Environmental issues give rise to goals and the organization is structured to achieve those goals. The rational closed system model, however, has no feedback mechanism between its structure and goals, so instability in the organization is likely to result. This paradoxically makes "closed systems" more open or vulnerable to change or intrusion from the immediate environment than organizations with effective feedback mechanisms. This occurs because there is a weak link between the structure and the goals, as is typical of bureaucracies. The organization's response is to "elaborate administrative structures and rules, to compensate
for the lack of feedback," a process undertaken on an extensive scale in the
RCMP during the 1970's.25

Meyer's view is that feedback mechanisms which assist the organization
in self-correcting become the crucial element in the "open" or "closed" sys-
tems debate. Leadership, in the bureaucratic model or closed system,
emerges as the primary feedback mechanism. In order for the organization to
function effectively, management must act as the sensing and mediating mech-
anism between the organization and the environment. In this capacity, man-
agement seeks to define clearly and to maintain the boundaries of the organ-
izations's activities.

Institutional Theory

Institutional theory is derived substantially from the work of Philip
Selznick. Important to the theory is the distinction it makes between or-
ganizations and institutions. Organizations are viewed as rational and
functional, striving for efficiency in a "no-nonsense system of consciously
coordinated activities." While institutions are also organizations, they
are described as responding or adapting to environmental circumstances as
they arise in an unplanned way. Organizational change in the institution is
thus responsive and unplanned. One of the important aspects of the institu-
tional school is the importance that it gives to the organization's relation-
ship with the environment, although Perrow suggests that the theory ig-
nores the possibility that organizations influence the environment.26

The second characteristic of institutions is that their original goals
are displaced over time by the organization's concern for its survival. In
doing this the institution seeks to impose its values and traditions on its
members and to build a strong sense of identification and commitment to the
organization. Out of this process, the institution builds an identity of its own and an ideology which becomes part of its social structure.27

Three distinct institutional processes emerge out of the theory: co-optation, core formation and institutional legitimacy. They are examined in detail because of their direct relevance to the research and the RCMP.

Co-optation was first identified by Selznick as a process through which organizations absorb into their leadership and policy structure external forces that threaten its stability or survival. However, through the process, the organization gains an understanding of the problems it faces and reduces the potential for conflict by giving the external forces a position within the structure. Co-optation, therefore, may be less dramatic than confrontation. Ultimately, co-optation affects the goals of the organization because the co-opted forces and the organization must be in agreement over goals. But in the process the organization loses its ability to act arbitrarily or unilaterally. Once legitimized, these forces are difficult to dismantle.28

Core formation is the process through which the organization attempts to promote and protect the basic values of the organization. It is also the process which makes organizations into institutions. Perrow says,

"one of the major tasks of the institutional leader is to wield the member of the organization into a 'committed polity', with a high sense of identity, purpose and commitment."29

Selective recruiting, indoctrination, the sharing of common experiences and values are fundamental. In the RCMP, the March West, tough training and discipline fill such a role, eventually becoming part of the institution's ideology and social structure.
This "commitment" is used to achieve goal consensus and to encourage members to accept uncritically the legitimacy and rationality of the system. Frequent geographical transfers and duty changes focus the individual's commitment on the organization by reducing his identification with specific goals or functions. Conformity and loyalty become the basis of security and promotion. However, conformity to the organization's value system or social structure tends to isolate management from criticism and jeopardizes the organization's claim to professional status because power, loyalty and status rather than skills are the source of influence. Morris Janowitz found such issues existed when he studied the U.S. military. The consequence was that commitment to rank and status and the authority structure complicated the introduction of new skills into the military, conditions not unlike those in the RCMP.

Meyer extends the idea of institutionalization further than mere goal displacement or consensus building. He suggests that institutions attempt to cultivate highly rationalized societal belief in the legitimacy of the organization and its goals. This institutional legitimacy occurs mainly in public bureaucracies where output is typically difficult to measure.

The success of the institution is thus measured in terms of its legitimacy rather than its efficiency. The extent to which the institution "mirrors societal beliefs" regarding its purpose, the easier it is to evade assessment of its outputs, and to justify its claim for a share of society's resources.

Institutionalization, however, has the effect of creating rigidities and resistance to change because the organization ignores realities by sub-
stituting or displacing goals. For instance, the core-formation process, while creating a strong sense of purpose and commitment, etc., has the effect of distorting the organization's perspectives about reality and discouraging critical evaluation.33

Commitment may build consensus and reduce conflict, but as Perrow notes, it "often means little recognition of the rights of participants in organizations."34 Both a lack of critical evaluation and a lack of concern for individual rights were evident in the RCMP prior to the mid-1970s.

The organization has a number of possible responses to change in the environment, so change in the organization does not automatically follow change in the environment. First, the internal conditions and dynamics of the organization will affect how it perceives its environment. Secondly, the organization may deal with changes or uncertainty with a variety of methods ranging from denial, delaying tactics, rationalization or simple dismissal of the issue, so that ultimately the organization is highly selective in how it changes.35 The importance of formalization and resistance to change should however, not be overemphasized as James C. March notes, "organizations are remarkably adaptive, and enduring institutions."36 Anthony Down's also views bureaucratic inertia as creating a measure of stability in society.37

Operationalizing the Theory

A theoretical framework has been developed within which the environmental issues and institutional factors that have played a role in organizational change within the RCMP can be analyzed. The first objective is to demonstrate the validity of the first hypothesis:
Organizational change within the RCMP has primarily taken place as a result of pressures in its immediate and internal environment.

The assumption is that the RCMP is a closed organization with few feedback or mediating mechanisms, so that only strong pressure from the environment affects the organization. This pressure, highlighted in Chapter I, is viewed as having altered the relationship between the RCMP and the environment. Since the pressure was of a political and bureaucratic nature, the Force had no option but to respond. How the Force responded, however, was affected by its institutional character. In operationalizing environmental theory, changes or pressures in the larger environment that have been filtered into the immediate environment and affect the RCMP are defined or described, such as the changing roles of the Central Agencies and the requirement for increased accountability resulting in the development of planning and auditing processes. One of the major methodological problems in environmental theory is that of measuring environmental change quantitatively. The approach taken here has not been to measure it quantitatively but to describe or define the changes qualitatively, such as the changing roles of the Central Agencies or the demands for an association within the Force.

A second aspect important to the analysis is whether the pressures or demands for change focus on the task structure or on the social structure, because it determines to a substantial degree the Force's response. Chapter V is consequently organized around the focus of environmental pressure. The task structure is defined as the activities and functions of the organization while the social structure is defined as the systems of thought, values and traditions of the organization.

Before examining organizational change in the RCMP from an environmental perspective, however, it is first necessary to examine and define the
Institutional characteristics of the Force, because of their role in organizational change, as set out in the second hypothesis;

the institutional characteristics within the RCMP have played a significant role in how the RCMP perceives and responds to environmental changes or pressures.

Institutional theory is used to examine and analyze the core formation, the co-optation and the institutional legitimacy processes in relation to open or closed nature of the Force, and to resistance to change and organizational change generally.

The core formation process of indoctrination and tradition building are focused on in respect to their effect on the membership and the leadership. This examination shows there is a reluctance toward critical evaluation, and an acceptance of the existing control systems and ideology as still valid and functional. Ultimately, a number of philosophical conflicts emerge such as the conflict between rank and qualifications, and the "generalist" theory of transfers and the organizational structure generally.

The concept of co-optation is used to examine the Force's response to internal pressure and demands for change that affect the social structure. Here the Force shows a propensity to attempt to control or influence these environmental pressures.

The popularity of the RCMP has played a substantial part in legitimizing the RCMP's role, increasing its autonomy and prestige. The effect has been to increase the RCMP's ability to fend off pressure from the immediate environment and to ensure its claim on public resources.
The importance of institutional theory is that certain institutional characteristics have become part of the RCMP's social structure, consequent-ly affecting how it perceives and undertakes change. The aim is to use the theory to explain why certain kinds of changes have occurred and why the apparent need for other kinds of change has not occurred or has not met expectations.

In dealing with specific aspects of organizational structure and processes, references and explanations of structural elements and dimensions of organizations are taken from Henry Mintzberg's "Organization design: fashion or fit?" and are attached as Appendix I.

FOOTNOTES

1Professor Seymour Wilson views organization theory as being continually "open to validation, rejection or refinement." Wilson, p. 127, and Haas and Drabek, p. 2.

2March, "Footnotes to Organizational Change," p. 564, and Greiner and Barnes, p. 2.


8Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations (Glenview: Ill. Scott, Foreman and Co., 1973), p. 237. Eugene Haas and Thomas Drabek comment that many of the concepts associated with systems theory are impractical to make


The Human Relation School focuses on harmony, the individual's hierarchy of needs, conflict resolution and the desire for participation. In fact, organizations are less concerned with the individual than the model thinks they ought to be. There is conflict, quite often little participation, and a political power structure. The model is discussed in detail by Perrow, pp. 90-138, and Haas and Drabek, pp. 42-48.

Perrow, P. 133

The classification and organization of the various theoretical models differs considerably with individual authors. Perrow's classifications are used here. For a completely different organization of the various organization theories see: Rolfe. Rogers, Organizational Theory (Toronto: Allyn Beacon, Inc. 1976) or Haas and Drabek.

Boundaries, like organizational theory generally, have a lot to do with the focus of the research. They may distinguish organizations from one another or groups within organizations. The RCMP's external boundaries are clear. Internal boundaries are also clear, being maintained by the rank structure. Meyer treats boundaries only in the context of boundary spanning activities and mechanisms. Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies, pp. 30 & 99. Haas and Drabek view boundaries as more relevant to open rather than closed organizations. Haas and Drabek, pp. 15, 17, 20 & 21.


Concepts such as disequilibrium, dysfunctions, tension and stress/strain are used by various authors. All result from the activities of the organization becoming increasingly irrelevant to the needs of or the values of the environment. Peter M. Blau and Marshall W. Meyer, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956, 2nd ed., 1971) p. 22 & 23, Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), p. 175, and Haas & Drabek, p. 239.
16Meyer, Public Bureaucracies, p. 32.


18Starbuck, p. 474-475.

19The authors contend there is a "multitude" of environments that must be differentiated. They refer to markets, societal attitudes and values, etc., but generally treat the notion rather vaguely. Haas and Drabek, p. 17.

20This definition of immediate environment is utilized by Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies, p. 33.

21Meyer also uses the concept of an internal environment. He also refers to social, political and economic environments, but acknowledges that there are many intermediate levels in the environment. He divides the larger social and political environment, a split that is useful in this research since most of the pressures originate or are translated through the immediate environment. Ibid., pp. 33 & 34, and Downs, p. 41.


24Ibid., p. 25.


26Ibid., p. 31; Haas and Drabek, p. 50; and Perrow, pp. 186 & 198.

27Haas and Drabek, p. 49.


29Perrow, p. 187.


32Ibid.

33Blau & Meyer, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, p. 53.

34Perrow, p. 188.
35 Haas and Drabek, p. 284-291.


37 Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 197.

38 Meyer says that the problem of measuring environmental change relates to the complexity of and the multiple environments to which the organization must respond. Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies, pp. 75 & 76.
CHAPTER III

THE RCMP: 1873 TO 1960

Introduction

The origins of the RCMP, its growth and development as part of the national character go back to the very first years of the Dominion. During those early years of development: environmental, social and political forces had a profound and permanent effect on the nature and the structure of the RCMP.

This chapter presents the highlights of the Force's history from its formation in 1873 to 1960. Emphasis is placed on developing in some detail the structural and institutional characteristics of the RCMP which provide a background for examining the environmental factors and organizational change during the period 1968 to 1980. The research is organized into five sections which develop specific theoretical aspects discussed in Chapter II.

Within the framework of this historical background, the first section includes an examination of the environment-goal-structure relationship. Here the conditions in the early West are linked to the development of goals which led to the formation of the para-military Northwest Mounted Police (NWMP). As the environment evolved and the national goals expanded an enlargement of the structure of the NWMP also occurred.

The second section examines the formation and growth of the NWMP and the RCMP from 1873 to 1960. It details some of the political issues relating to the expansion of the Force into a national organization.
The third section is a detailed examination of the structure of the NWMP and the change in the structure as it evolved into the contemporary RCMP. Structural and situational elements are analyzed within the context of Mintzberg's three organizational configurations in Appendix I. These structural elements include such factors as specialization of jobs, formalization, liaison devices, decentralization, planning and control systems. Situational elements considered are age and size, environment and power. The section is not organized around these structural or situational elements, rather they are used only to define and describe the structural aspects of the RCMP.

Section four examines the dimensions of power and autonomy. It shows that the government, through the appointment of the Commissioner, in the early years exercised control over the Force. Later, the appointment of the Comptroller of the Force added a new dimension to administrative control.

Section five of the chapter focuses on the core formation and rationalized legitimacy processes characteristic of institutions. The early roots of the para-military structure, the enforcement of rigid discipline and the emergence of an elitist Officer Corps within the Force are examined. The impact of these processes can be measured in the dedication of the membership and the popularity of the Force in Canada today. Out of this tradition of dedication and public popularity emerges a rationalized legitimacy for the Force's continued existence.

A definition of the Force as an open or closed organization is left to the conclusion of the chapter because, in addition to liaison devices, institutional factors are crucial to the definition.

Research for this chapter has relied extensively on the Annual Reports
of the Northwest Mounted Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from 1873 to 1960. However, considerable reference to previous research on the early Force and some literature by ex-members is also utilized. Aspects relating to the organizational structure of the Force has been derived from primary research of RCMP records held by the Archives Section, dating back to 1920.

The Canadian West and The Emergence of National Goals

The history of the RCMP began on May 23rd, 1873 when The Mounted Police Act was assented, enabling the Government by Order-in-Council to form a mounted police force. The Act brought into being an organization that marched across 2000 miles of the newly acquired Northwest Territories and into the national fabric of the country.

Before 1873 the Canadian West, or in those days the Northwest Territories, was a vast and virtually unsettled region in which Indian tribes roamed in search of their main sustenance, vast herds of buffalo. However, with the decline of the buffalo herds in the late 1860s the Indians' way of life was being threatened and the region was becoming generally unstable.

Already there had been one rebellion in the region, the Red River Rebellion, by the Métis under Louis Riel in 1869/70 which resulted in the formation of the Province of Manitoba in 1870. The cause of the rebellion was the transfer of the Northwest Territories, formerly Rupert's Land, from the Hudson's Bay Company to the Dominion in exchange for £300,000 and certain land grants in June 1869. Government apprehension was also heightened by rumours being circulated in Eastern Canada of Indian violence and wild whiskey traders from the United States.

Two government surveys, one in 1871 by Captain W.F. Butler, an Officer
in the British Army and a second by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Robertson-Ross of the Canadian Militia in 1873 noted the complete absence of law and recommended the establishment of a semi-military force in the West. Captain Butler described in his report the coming plight of the Indians because of the diminishing buffalo herds, and the increasing lawlessness in the region:

"the region is without law, order or security for life or property; robbery and murder for years have gone unpunished; Indian massacres are unchecked even in the close vicinity of the Hudson's Bay Company posts, and all civil and legal institutions are entirely unknown."

By 1873 conditions in the West seemed to indicate that an Indian uprising was imminent. Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris of Manitoba began warning the Government rather persistently of unrest and of the activities of American traders at Fort Whoop-up, in what is now southern Alberta. The Government responded with inactivity until news of a massacre of Assiniboine Indians by a party of American freebooters in the Cypress Hills in the Summer of 1873. The incident became known as the Cypress Hills Massacre.

The commitment to establish law and order was not, however, linked exclusively to conditions in the Territories. Fear of an influx of American settlers and annexation similar to that of the Oregon Territory in 1846 also existed. The American election of 1844 had been fought by James K. Polk on the slogan "Fifty-four forty or Fight" and the geographical North/South pull added to the threat of annexation.
The Rebellion of 1869/70 also underscored the need for a police presence in the West. Indian warfare in the United States had cost $20,000,000 a year between 1862 and 1868; a sum that totalled the entire revenue of the new dominion. Considering the cost of America's Western adventures, the only possible Canadian West was a peaceful one. According to Historian R.C. Macleod, the NWMP became the cornerstone of the Government's western policy of stability, settlement and economic development. In addition, the issue of stability was important to the Government's commitment to British Columbia in 1871 to begin construction of a railway within two years of that province joining Confederation.

The major conflict was between Sir John A. MacDonald's desire to police the West; ensuring stability, settlement and the construction of the railway, and the financial costs of the undertaking. However, Lieutenant Governor Morris' persistence and the Cypress Hills Massacre seem to emerge as deciding factors that led to the Order-in-Council of August 30, 1873, ordering the formation of the Northwest Mounted Police.

Environmental conditions in the Territories prior to 1873 can be described as turbulent with a complete lack of law and order, and fear of an Indian uprising or annexation by the U.S. as the prevailing conditions. From the perspective of the few residences in the Red River area there was an urgent need for intervention by the government to secure and stabilize the region. The Rebellion of 1869/70 and the American experience were concrete evidence that some action by the Government was required. Thus, the commitment to British Columbia to build a railroad, national sovereignty and MacDonald's vision of a settled territory emerged as national goals. The NWMP became the instrument to effect those goals.
Intervention by the Government in the Northwest Territories was never seriously in doubt. The issue had been how long could the Government delay having to make the associated expenditure and in what form the intervention should take. In 1869, MacDonald was aware of the need for some presence, although the form of that presence was still open to debate,

"I have no doubt, come what will, there must be a military body, or at all events a body with military discipline at Fort Garry. It seems to me that the best Force would be Mounted Riflemen, trained partly as Cavalry, but also instructed in rifle exercise. They should also be instructed as certain of the line are, in the use of artillery. This body should not be expressly military but should be styled Police, and have the military bearing of the Irish Constabulary."  

Colonel Robertson-Ross, in his report in 1873, raised the question of a police force unsupported by a military force being able to maintain order in the event of serious disturbances, but also emphasized that a military force without a civil force was not desirable.

Financial considerations largely resolved the issue of what form a presence in the Territories should take; the choice was a mounted para-military police force modelled on the Royal Irish Constabulary. The hope was that such a force would be able to fulfill both a police and military role.

The Formation and Growth of the NWMP

On September 25th, 1873, the Mounted Police began recruiting men and assembling supplies in Toronto for the journey west, but it was not until the fall of 1874 that it could be said the Force was on duty in the West. The journey west was fraught with hardship; it was summed up in the first Report of the Commissioner G.A. French in 1874, 

"I feel, Sir, that in the foregoing Report I have but very inadequately represented the doings of this Force; the broad fact, however, is apparent --a
Canadian force, hastily raised, armed, and equipped, and not under martial law, in a few months marched 2,000 miles, through a country for the most part unknown as it proved bare of pasture and scanty in the supply of water. Of such a march, under such adverse circumstances, all true Canadians may well feel proud."

The presence of the Force in the West by no means eliminated the uncertainty that surrounded its formation and continued existence. MacDonald had always considered the Mounted Police as a temporary measure until the Territories became sufficiently settled and assumed the law and order responsibilities of provinces, as illustrated by Historian Macleod's statement,

"They (the Government) persisted in the curious belief that as soon as enough settlers arrived in the Northwest Territory the police would no longer be required."

The duties seemed clear enough; suppress the whiskey trade, pacify the Indians, and bring law and order to the Territories. Yet the Force was equipped for much more, it was equipped to begin the settlement of the West.

"To a stranger it would have appeared an astonishing cavalcade: armed men and guns looked as if fighting was to be done; what could ploughs, harrows, mowing machines, cows, calves and c. be for? But that little force had a double duty to perform: to fight, if necessary, but in any case to establish posts in the far west."

During the first year in the field, the police spent their time establishing themselves or probably a more accurate statement would be surviving, judging by the Commissioner's Report of 1874. Initially, duties such as farming and the care of their horses took up considerable time, but as the Force established itself, it began patrol operations to exert its presence. Duties included the enforcement of liquor prohibition, customs duties, quarantine regulations and "mail runs," as well as collecting data respect-
ing crops, weather and making map corrections. The majority of these non-
police duties were done on behalf of other departments of the Government.\textsuperscript{16}

The period 1874 to 1885, found the NWMP acting as the transitional in-
stitution for an economy that was changing from a fur trade base to an agri-
cultural base and as the executive arm of the Government in the Territor-
ies. Records of the Mounted Police travel from Fort Walsh, HQs of the
Force, illustrate the administrative nature of the Force's duties in 1881.
Crime prevention accounted for 830 miles, Indian Affairs 1,283 miles and In-
ternal Affairs, 12,865.\textsuperscript{17}

Initially, the Territories provided a rather uncertain and hostile en-
vironment for the Force, not only in respect to law and order but in its own
survival. Few of the basic necessities existed, but as time progressed and
as settlement expanded, so did the availability of feed and other essential
supplies. While the increased settlement may have improved the living stan-
dard of the Mounted Police, it also increased the tensions between the
Indians and settlers, increasing the scope of their police functions.\textsuperscript{18}

During the late 1880s and early 1890s, technological changes such as
the railway, telegraph and telephones were beginning to affect the opera-
tions of the police and the location of their posts, such as Calgary and
Regina along the main railway line. Systematic patrols were introduced and
became routine to prevent cattle rustling and to police the border.\textsuperscript{19}

By 1905, the Royal Northwest Mounted Police (RNWMP) had seen the West
through the Rebellion of 1885, the building of the railway, the beginning of
settlement on the prairies, and the gold rush in the Yukon. But with the
formation of the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, the Force seemed on
the brink of being exiled to the North. However, Alberta and Saskatchewan
both entered into what was to be the forerunner of the provincial contracts, whereby they agreed to pay for the services of the RNWMP. An agreement that probably meant the very survival of the Force as an organization.

Later in 1917, Alberta and Saskatchewan both formed Provincial Police Forces as a result of the dwindling manpower of the RNWMP associated with their wartime duties. The strength of the Force at this time was 303 men. Approximately 800 had volunteered for service during the First World War.

The future of the RNWMP was again in doubt at this particular stage in the Force's history, as it had been when the Liberals, under Alexander McKenzie took power in 1873 and in 1905 when Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces.

However, labour unrest during 1918/19 and the Winnipeg Strike, June 21, 1919, resolved the issue of the Force's existence. In a memorandum dated December 10th, 1918, the Comptroller of the RNWMP, Angus A. McLean agreed with the Minister of Militia and Defence's suggestion that a strong Federal police force should be organized in order to ensure "good order and peace" during the period of reconstruction following World War I. The Minister recommended the RNWMP establishment be increased from 1,000 to 2,000 men.

In a letter dated December 12, 1918, to the Comptroller, the Committee of the Privy Council indicated that it concurred with the Minister of Militia and Defense, that the Government had "no intention to terminate the life of the Force - but to make it either a Permanent Federal Police Force or a Unit of the Permanent Forces of Canada." On November 10th, 1919, An Act To Amend The RNWMP Act was assented.

As of February 1st, 1920, the RNWMP ceased to exist and the RCMP came into being. The Act also provided for the absorption of the Dominion Police
and the RCMP now had jurisdiction federally across the entire country. Headquarters for the Force was also moved from Regina to Ottawa.23

The Annual Report ending September 30th, 1920 reported that the Force was responsible for enforcement of 41 Federal Statutes. In spite of the expanded scope of duties, S.W. Horrall, RCMP Historian commented,

"The enlargement of the federal responsibilities of the Force in 1920 was more apparent than real."24

By June 1st, 1928, the RCMP was back into the Provincial contract policing business when it again assumed policing duties in Saskatchewan. The 1930s represented the return to provincial policing on a large scale. Under new Federal-Provincial Agreements, the RCMP took over policing in Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island in 1932. By 1950 only British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec remained outside the RCMP’s umbrella of Provincial contracts. The first municipal contract was entered into with the City of Flin Flon, Manitoba April 1st, 1935.25 By 1945, 56 municipal contracts had been undertaken by the Force.26

Specialized services also began to develop during the thirties to meet new problems and responsibilities: Modus Operandi Section, the Preventative Service (1932), Dog Section (1932), Marine Division (1934) and Air Services (1937).27 Historian Horrall contends that by 1939 the modern character of the RCMP had taken shape. Essentially that it had been transformed during the 1920s and 1930s "into the principle institution for law enforcement in Canada."28 By the early fifties, the Force had reached its contemporary status as a geographically dispersed and highly diversified organization.

The environment in 1873 had been found to be less hostile than had initially been anticipated but it was demanding; a test of individual endurance and initiative to meet unknown circumstances of survival in an unset-
tled region. As the region began to be settled with the coming of the railroad, the environment stabilized, and the operations of the Force became more routinized with systematic patrols and major posts along the railroad. The evolution of the environment led to changes not so much in the goals but in the tasks of the Force. The national goals of stability and settlement had been achieved and were replaced with goals of "good order and peace." These in essence were a re-affirmation of the earlier goals and led to the expansion of the scope of the Force's task structure: first in 1905 with the entry into contract policing and later in 1920 with the extension of jurisdiction nationally. The environment and the goals of the Force had thus made a transition from securing stability and order in a limited region, to more complex and expanded goals encompassing national responsibilities and jurisdictions. These changing environmental conditions and goals resulted in structural changes in the Force which will now be examined.

Organization of the Force 1873 to 1960

On July 8th, 1874, when the NWMP marched out of Fort Dufferin into the Northwest Territories it consisted of 308 men - all ranks. They were organized into six Divisions, "A" to "F", with "D" Division including Headquarters and the Staff Officers as illustrated in Figure 2. As the Force took up its positions in the Territories, the Divisions dispersed into specific geographical regions.

In 1885, Commissioner A.G. Irvine reorganized the Force into ten Divisions, "A" to "K", and "Depot" Division because of the increasing strength of the Force and its wider dispersion. Depot Division incorporated Headquarters (HQs) which had been moved from Fort Walsh to Regina in 1883 to be on the main CPR line. Total strength of the Force now reached 1,039 men
dispersed through 28 posts. Divisions continued to be organized along geographical lines with each Division responsible for patrolling and the maintenance of order in its particular area.

When the Force assumed national jurisdiction in 1920 its divisional organization assumed the structure that essentially exists today, with each province becoming a Division. The organization of Headquarters which had been moved from Regina to Ottawa was published in General Orders issued by the Commissioner February 14th, 1920. Several new duties including the Special Branch and Finger Print Section had been inherited from the Dominion Police, although these duties were not organizationally developed into specialized units, as illustrated in Figure 3.

The growing diversity of tasks, however, was reflected in a reorganization of the Adjutant's Branch in 1937, Figure 4, which dealt with the administrative functions of the Force. Control was highly centralized with the Division Officers Commanding reporting to and seeking authority from the Adjutants Branch on virtually all administrative matters.

In 1938, the Adjutant's Branch was reorganized again, Figure 5, as a result of instructions from the Commissioner, and seemed to have been in response to a requirement to break down the duties of the Adjutants Branch into three functionally related or specialized units.

The Director of Training was in effect, in charge of the Adjutant's Branch. The reporting channels or lines of authority as illustrated in Figure 4, were rather complex with the Director of Training reporting to both the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner. There was also a failure to organize related functions in the same sections, for example the staffing functions of recruiting, promotions and transfers were in two different areas,
as were discipline and discharge boards.

Organizationally, the RCMP had been absorbing or incorporating functions by adjusting the existing structure without fundamental rationalization of authority and responsibility. Change at HQs in 1938, however, did introduce much clearer lines of authority and responsibility. The major groupings were now called departments as illustrated in Figure 5.

During the 1940s, the only major change was the establishment of a personnel branch which resulted in the formalization of recruiting and personnel processes within the RCMP. On September 20th, 1944, Commissioner S.T. Wood reported to the Minister of Justice that the force had borrowed Captain R.L. Haig-Brown from the Department of National Defence to undertake a survey of the RCMP and make recommendations respecting the formation of a personnel branch.

Capt. Haig-Brown travelled across the country, visiting a large number of Force establishments prior to reporting to the Commissioner. The reports were comprehensive in that they represented the first external survey of the Force with the objective of making changes. In a series of letters from May 16th to August 16th, 1944, Capt. Haig-Brown dealt with a variety of issues ranging from selection procedures, orderly room proceedings, discipline, northern service and personnel practices.

The result of the survey was the establishment of a Personnel Department. In a memorandum to all members of the Force November 1st, 1944, the Commissioner commented:

"For somewhat I have felt that the increased scope and size of the Force, together with its heavy responsibilities as a Dominion-wide organization, required a more thorough screening of recruits. I have been aware also that, with the growth of the Force, problems affecting the morale and efficiency of members have arisen."
The Annual Report for 1952 reported the organization of more autonomous Directorates in order to cope with the increased volume of work. Directorates as a title replaced the "departments," but were essentially organized into the same functions. The organizational chart, Figure 6, illustrates that no fundamental organizational changes had taken place in the intervening thirty years.

A second major survey of the RCMP was initiated by Commissioner L.H. Nicholson in 1953. Mr. J.R. Cameron of the Organization and Methods Division, Civil Service Commission, was given the mandate of examining the operations of "S" (Supply) Directorate, at the HQs Division, Sub/Division and Detachment levels. Recommendations as a result of the examination were presented in August 1954. They resulted in the decentralization of the major financial and control procedures within the Force, but did not affect the organizational structure significantly.36

The only organizational change was the formation of Estimates and Financial Branch in 'S' Directorate, February 14, 1956. The formation of the Branch consolidated the " Estimates" process and a number of other financial and control functions which had previously been carried out by the Interior Economy Branch, the Departmental Secretary and the Chief Treasury Officer in the Treasury Board.37

In 1960, the Force consisted of 12 Operational Divisions and four Service Divisions, Figure 7. HQs was organized into six Directorates, Figure 8. The strength of the Force at this juncture in its history stood at 7,558.38

Dimensions of Power and Autonomy

Control of the RCMP, and indeed all government departments, has always
been difficult for Ministers and inevitably focuses on two mechanisms: financial control and the appointment of the department head. The appointment of the Commissioner has always been a Government prerogative defined in Statute. Section 10 of the *North West Mounted Police Act* of 1873 stipulated,

"The Governor in Council may constitute a Police Force in and for the Northwest Territories, and the Governor may from time to time, as may be found necessary, appoint by commission, a Commissioner of Police, . . . whom shall hold office during pleasure." That prerogative stands today. The appointment of a department head, however, does not necessarily reveal the degree of power or autonomy which an organization or its leadership possesses. Historian R.C. Macleod concluded from his research of the Force that the Mounted Police occupied a position of power up to 1885. The Force's power within its own environment, given the number of Statutes it enforced and its role as the executive arm of government supports Macleod's views.

Yet the first four Commissioners all resigned or left the Force under some form of duress. Commissioner G.A. French resigned in 1876 over a continuing dispute about the location of the HQs of the Force, and as one writer noted,

"The Commissioner was completely dissatisfied concerning his relationship with the government. Rarely did they see eye to eye." French was also held suspect by the Liberals of Alexander McKenzie, who took power after his appointment. French in turn suspected a conspiracy against him that involved other officers in the Force and certain Liberal MPs.

Commissioner French was replaced by Assistant Commissioner James F. MacLeod, who was also forced to resign in 1880 over his inability to manage the financial affairs of the Force. MacLeod had also demonstrated an "over-
ly independent" attitude in refusing to accept political appointments of officers in the Force.44

Commissioner A.G. Irvine, who replaced MacLeod, was forced to resign over his handling of the Mounted Police during the Rebellion of 1885. Irvine's replacement was L.W. Herchmer, who became involved in something of a personal vendetta of Nicholas Flood Davin, a Conservative MP, and his connections to Macdonald did not cast him in a favourable light with the Liberal Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Herchmer was pensioned off after a tour of duty with a contingent of Mounted Police in the South African Boer War. Historian Macleod wrote,

"Like his predecessor, he retired in an atmosphere of bitterness, believing that his service had not been recognized."45

The next resignation of a Commissioner did not occur until 1959 when Commissioner L.H. Nicholson resigned over a dispute to send reinforcements to Newfoundland during a period of labour strife. The Diefenbaker Government refused to authorize the reinforcements because of political reasons involving the Federal Government and the Smallwood Government of Newfoundland.46

The resignation of the first four Commissioners suggests rather direct political control over the Force, yet during the period 1873 to 1891, six different departments were in charge of the Force.47 The most effective control thus seems to have been through the Comptroller of the Force, Fredrick White. White was appointed in 1880 and remained Comptroller until 1912 when he was replaced by Mr. Lawrence Fortescue. He held the rank of Deputy Minister and had a "voice in matters of broad policy" and was responsible for the financial affairs of the Force.48 Undoubtedly, MacLeod's
extravagant spending played a role in the appointment of White as the quote by historian MacLeod suggests,

"Macdonald professed to be shocked at the extravagant manner in which Macleod in his concern for the efficiency of the police was depleting the public treasury."

The position of Comptroller of the NWMP was first defined in amendments to the North West Mounted Police Act in 1894. The Comptroller according to the order of precedence outranked the Commissioner and had "under the Minister,...the control and management of the Force, and of all matters connected therewith." It is evident from the statute that the Comptroller had more than a voice in matters of broad policy; he in fact, was in charge of the Force.

It was not until 1919, when the RNWMP became the RCMP, that the Commissioner, by statute, became the head of the Force. The Comptroller became known as the Financial Comptroller but the order of precedence was reversed putting the Commissioner in charge of the Force. The Commissioner, also now became responsible for "the control and management of the Force...."

In the financial area there is ample evidence to demonstrate direct and stringent control of the Force's resources via the Treasury Board, which at that time was part of the Department of Finance. Financial control in the early years consisted primarily of a pre-audit of virtually all Force expenditures. The main estimates were also prepared by the Chief Treasury Officer with little assistance from the Force. This procedure was in effect until 1954 when changes were introduced as a result of the Cameron Report. The Chief Treasury Officer is shown in Figure 5 detailing the organization of HQs in 1938 and in Figure 6 as Treasury Branch in 1952.
Control of expenditures during the Thirties became even stricter with the passage of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act of 1931 by the R.B. Bennett Government. The Act centralized the control of all government expenditures and created the Office of the Comptroller of the Treasury.\textsuperscript{53} The extent of the control by the Comptroller was set out in a Privy Council memorandum, which essentially pushed financial transactions to the very senior levels of the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{54} Expenditures in excess of $500 required the approval of the Treasury Board authority, expenditures under $500 required the approval of the Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner. Division Officers Commanding (OC) could only authorize expenditures that did not exceed $25. The procedures required multiple forms outlining the details of the expenditure which amounted to the duplication of financial records at HQs, at the Divisions and at the Treasury Office.\textsuperscript{55}

Pre-audit control of expenditures remained in place until the recommendations of the Cameron Report were put into effect in 1954, which decentralized much of the accounting and raised the expenditures authorizations of the Division Officers Commanding to $2,000 without reference to HQs. Estimates and Financial Branch was also formed, Figure 7, and became the central point of financial control. It was also responsible for the preparation of the Force's estimates.\textsuperscript{56}

During the period 1873 to 1960 the structure of the RCMP evolved in response to changing environmental conditions and expanding goals. As the jurisdiction expanded the number of divisions increased but control remained highly centralized with virtually all major decisions being taken at HQs.

The development of the Personnel Branch in 1944 represented the first major step toward formalization of procedures with introduction of regular
personnel reports, interviews and personnel records. The Cameron Survey resulted in the delegation of increased authority to the Division Officers Commanding which predated the Glassco Commission and delegation in other Government Departments.

Increasing specialization was also evident with the emergence of specialized service divisions and branches as illustrated in Figure 7. There was no specific period when the need for specialization was recognized. Specific functions were inherited or developed as the need became apparent as in the case of the Personnel Branch. The Haig-Brown and Cameron Surveys were significant in that they represented a move away from purely incremental change toward a more rational approach to change.

The Commissioner and senior Officers represented the strategic apex of the Force and major changes or plans during this period originated from that level. Planning and liaison devices were conspicuously absent with planning being of a highly personalized nature emanating from the Commissioner. The recognition of the need for outside surveys apparently originated with the Commissioner as there was no correspondence to indicate issues had been previously identified.

In respect to power and autonomy, the RCMP had always enjoyed a reasonable degree of latitude in respect to operational matters. In the early days the remoteness of the Territories from Ottawa and the need for flexibility, in a rather uncertain environment, virtually eliminated any direct interference by government. In fact, the NWMP were the executive arm of the Government, enforcing and administering virtually all government activities in the West. This gave the Force unprecedented power until the arrival of the railroad in 1883 when the structure of the West began to alter.
By the time the Force moved to Ottawa the environment had stabilized and the concept of political non-interference was beginning to emerge; a fact recognized much later by the MacDonald Commission,

"the dependence of the Government upon the R.C.M.P. to enforce federal laws effectively, has generated an unwarranted disinclination on the part of government to interfere in R.C.M.P. affairs..."57

The resignation of Commissioner Nicholson in 1959 stands out as the only time since the 1900s that a Commissioner has apparently felt obliged to resign because of differences with the Government.

In respect to administrative matters, the Government exercised control over the Force through the appointment of the Comptroller and the Commissioners, as well as, by strict financial control. The resignation of the first four Commissioners suggests Government control was effective, however, the succession of departments that were responsible for the Force raises doubts about the absoluteness of that control. Clifford Sifton was the first minister that did take a serious interest in the Force. His attitude prior to 1902 had been one of ambivalence, being interested primarily in political appointments and the political mileage gained from the Force. After 1902, he seems to have developed a sense of the deep roots that the Force had in the West.58

Financial control was stringent, particularly after the appointment of the Comptroller who enjoyed Deputy Minister status, although there is no evidence that the Force was ever generously funded prior to the appointment of the Comptroller. According to Assistant Commissioner Kemp, the Comptroller exercised considerable power in the affairs of the Force and this was the case until 1919 when the Commissioner became responsible for the control and management of the Force.59
Kenneth J. Meier, in research on organizational power and autonomy, say that in order for any organization to exercise power, it must have "resources and discretion in the use of those resources." According to that criteria, given the stringent financial control between 1880 when White was appointed Comptroller and the delegation of financial authority to the Division Officers Commanding following the Cameron Survey in 1954, the Force would appear to have enjoyed little power or autonomy financially.

The Institutional Characteristics of the RCMP

The RCMP's para-military social structure and traditions have roots which go back to the moment the organization was formed, even though it was intended to be a civil force. The first Commissioner, George A. French had been an Officer in the Royal Artillery, and the majority of other officers and men had some military background. Out of a total of 217 men that assembled at Toronto in 1873, 174 had some previous military service as shown in Table I.

Although the original rank structure as seen in Figure I had little military character, by 1889 a military rank structure including Corporals, Sergeants, Staff Sergeants and Sergeants Major was in place. What evolved was an extensive, militarily, oriented hierarchy of rank.

In 1873 Officers had been drawn from the Eastern Canadian "establishment" and they played an important and explicit role in the training and organization of the Force. In addition to whatever rank or previous status Officers held, they had considerable authority conferred on them under Section 22 of the Mounted Police Act of 1873 and the amendments of 1874. Section 22 in the Act of 1873 gave the Commissioner the authority to fine, suspend or discharge members for unstated reasons. Under the amendment of
1874, Section 22 became very explicit in respect to what constituted an offence. The Section incorporated numerous offences: disobedience of the lawful commands of a superior, oppressive or tyrannical conduct, intoxication however slight, mutinous words, and infamous behaviour to name just a few.\textsuperscript{66}

Officers came from three sources during the period 1873 to 1905: Royal Military College Kingston, the Active Militia and NCOs of the Force. In 1903 graduates from RMC represented almost a quarter of the Officers. However, by the 1900s the importance of the militia had declined as a source of Officers as the emphasis shifted toward commissioning NCOs from within.\textsuperscript{67}

The perception of the elite nature of the Officer Corps is illustrated by the suggestion of a board of Officers in 1907 concerning servants,

"We consider that it is neither desirable, reputable nor even possible for an Officer to perform his duty to the public unless he is provided with some sort of domestic assistance."\textsuperscript{68}

Historian MacLeod described Officers as a group "sure of their positions in society and ... secure in their strongly held opinions and attitudes."\textsuperscript{69} As a result the Officers were somewhat isolated from the remainder of the organization, an isolation Haig-Brown commented on in 1944,

"And the men feel, generally, that their Officers are not sufficiently approachable and do not work hard enough in their interests."\textsuperscript{70}

The continued emphasis and importance of the status of Officers was evident in the Officers Indoctrination Course during the 1950s,

"Officers should be given instruction in regards to conduct and the necessities of the career they embark upon when promoted to Commissioned rank."\textsuperscript{71}

A second memorandum clearly illustrated what was expected and how it was to be achieved,

"It is far more important to us that he be an Officer
in every sense of the word. What is necessary is to reorient their thinking so they now acquire an appreciation of his duty from the point of view of an Inspecting Officer."72

Training emphasized the enforcement of discipline, morale, messing practices, social obligations and protocol. The importance of management and administrative functions, however, had crept into the indoctrination process by the sixties but it did not totally replace the emphasis on status.

The most fundamental change that did occur in the Officer Corps was the commissioning of all officers from within the ranks. That essentially made the Mounted Police a closed organization since the 1900s. Even today, entry continues to be via the bottom and through the system to the commissioned ranks.

Status of the Officer Corps was reinforced by the disciplinary power Officers held and related directly to internal control. Annual Reports continually remarked on the high state of discipline.73 The Rules and Regulations published in the Canada Gazette, April 14th, 1945 reminded the Officers of their role and the importance of discipline,

"Sec. 110 - It is imperative that a high standard of discipline be maintained throughout the Force, and officers are reminded that,...

Sec. 111 - Strict observance of the law and rules of discipline are essential to a well established discipline."74

Control of the membership reached far beyond one's duty hours. Members were rarely permitted to be out of uniform until the 1920s and it was a privilege as illustrated by General Orders for June 12, 1920,

"During the warm weather commencing from the 15th June until the 1st of September, the privilege is granted to Other Ranks to wear plain clothes when off duty after "Evening Stables" and on Saturday and holidays after 1 P.M., and when going on furlough. It is confidently expected by the Commissioner that no
one will take undue advantage of this privilege which might result in its cancellation. At all times, members of the Force must be respectably dressed when in plain clothes.\footnote{75}

Relaxation of off duty dress regulations when they did come, were not greeted with enthusiasm from every quarter of the Force. An unidentified Officer from Vancouver wrote directly to the Commissioner expressing his views on the subject,

"It has for some time impressed me that this privilege and latitude allowed the men in the matter of dress,...has ultimately had a retrogressive effect as regards morale and esprit-de-corps, which is not what it used to be in the old days. One direct consequence of this privilege is that the men do not take the same pride in having their uniform perfectly fitting and well cut boots properly altered to fit the leg,...as they did formally. There is hardly a man in the Division who habitually wears the uniform in the city in the evenings. The consequence is that the uniform is rarely seen on the streets and people are more or less unaware of our existence."\footnote{76}

The quote illustrates the emphasis placed on esprit-de-corps and the projection of the Force's image in the community as early as the 1920s.

Dress regulations and the development of canteens on posts tended to isolate the Mounted Police from community life generally. The Annual Report of 1889 reported on the construction of a recreation room and the beneficial effects such a recreation room would have on the membership.

"This will greatly obviate the necessity for the men leaving barracks to seek amusement, as they will be in a position to spend their evenings both pleasantly and profitably in barracks...."\footnote{77}

Barracks were usually located on the outskirts of town which virtually eliminated fraternization between the police and local citizens. The low pay, frequent transfers and canteens effectively controlled the social activities of off duty policemen, but did encourage a "family spirit" or strong sense of identity with the Force.\footnote{78}
Strict discipline was often resented within the Force yet projected externally as part of the organization's traditions. Haig-Brown viewed members of the Force as competent and intelligent, and suggested that the discipline procedures were demeaning to such a body of men.

The only evidence of any reflection on the philosophical underpinning of discipline was in a paper prepared by Supt. W.H. Kelly in 1956. Kelly wrote rather objectively, "Discipline for the sake of discipline itself has no place in any organization" and "discipline which creates a rigidity of mind is a considerable liability."

In addition to discipline, direct supervision of work was effected through the rank structure with Officers and NCOs exercising authority over lower ranks through the "lawful command" of a superior and sanctions authorized by statute. In the 1880s, members on patrol were required to have settlers sign the "patrol sheets" which were forwarded to HQs on a weekly basis and checked against population registers. This kind of control was typical as the Force continually strove to achieve uniformity through supervision. Inquiries or directions from HQs were replied to promptly, if not somewhat defensively, as illustrated in several responses during the 1930's,

"The daily routine of the office entails a lot of work which cannot be mentioned. It seems that all the members of this staff are always busy."

"The cause of delay in not replying to your memorandum of the 20th ultimo is due to the pressure of work."

Direct accountability to HQs for most matters relating to duties, establishment and organization was apparent. The establishment of the Inspection Team in 1954 added another dimension of accountability to HQs which had previously been the responsibility of the Division Officer Commanding.
The Inspection Team inspected the Divisions, Sub-Divisions and selected Detachments and reported to the Deputy Commissioner. 84

Recruit training was used to instill discipline and develop the paramilitary character of the Force. Drill and military training constituted the daily routine of members of the NWMP, as early Annual Reports illustrate,

"In addition to the ordinary duties and routine; foot, riding and gun drill was carried on during the entire winter and spring.... There was Commanding Officer's parade every week, when arms, clothing and ammunition were inspected."85

Reports from different posts, included in the early Annual Reports, always made some reference to the state of discipline and training.

The importance of training as a method of instilling discipline has always been one of the major philosophical underpinnings of the NWMP and the RCMP,

"It has from the beginning been characteristic of this Force that recruits are given the full training of a cavalry soldier, the system has the advantage of inculcating discipline and embuing the men who pass through the course successfully with the pride in and devotion to their service."86

As late as the mid-sixties, equitation continued to be a major component of training although the training functions outside the Depot were becoming increasingly functionally related with the advent of advanced courses and the Canadian Police College in 1932.

A more contemporary explanation of the objectives of training was quoted in the introduction. The statement suggests that the basic training philosophy has not evolved significantly in the last 100 years. Its role continues to be that of forming a disciplined, loyal and cohesive body of men.
After training, the policeman's career was marked with frequent transfers and different types of duties, aimed at broadening their experience and knowledge of the Force's duties. The concept of the "well-rounded man" or the generalist is another philosophical cornerstone of the Force. The origins of the "well-rounded man" appears to go back to Haig-Brown and the importance he placed on people with varied backgrounds and broad interests, although it may have actually existed before then considering the very general nature of organizational structure.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Force and related in part to its very survival has been the fostering of its popularity and traditions within and outside Canada. The Force caught the imagination of the Canadian public early in its existence, particularly in the West. Newspapers had kept track of the Force's progress to the West and its many exploits. The Commissioner in his Annual Report for 1888 commented,

"I am deluged with applications from all parts, even the old country and the United States, for admission to our ranks." 89

This popularity prevented Government from either abolishing the NWMP or reducing its numbers at several crucial points in its history. An editorial in the Regina Standard in 1899 reflected the public's sentiments when it was suggested the NWMP be replaced by some form of military presence,

"We would mildly hint to the government the necessity there is for all policemen being policemen first, and not soldiers doing useless things." 90

By the turn of the century, the police were much in demand for performances at fairs and exhibitions across the country. International recognition was enhanced when the NWMP were granted the privilege of using the prefix Royal for participating in the South African War of 1899 and the attendance of
contingents of Mounted Police at the coronation of King George II in 1911 and King George VI in 1937.91

How had the Force achieved such public support? Historian MacLeod suggested they had created a strong tradition of order, impartial treatment of the Indians in the 1800s and later a reputation for toughness and discipline.92 Much of this tradition is related to the many books and stories about the Force, many fictional, but nevertheless contributing to the myth. Keith Walden in an examination of the symbols and myths of the Force concluded, like MacLeod, that the achievement of order in the West was the fundamental achievement of the NWMP. Discipline was an integral part of Walden's perspective in *Visions of Order*; it "taught a higher purpose than self-preservation," and this was characteristic of all Mounted Police.93

A military structure was essentially predetermined even before the NWMP was formed. Early reports on conditions in the Territories all recommended a para-military police organization similar to the Royal Irish Constabulary. The reliance on military officers and personnel in forming the original contingent ensured an acceptance of a military model. The imposition of rigid discipline and authority with the amendments to the *North-West Mounted Police Act* in 1874 and the cavalry training which continued into the sixties created within the Force a military atmosphere. However, the rigid discipline and military atmosphere were becoming increasingly questioned.

Officers nurtured and perpetuated the military traditions of the Force and the elite status of the Officer Corps. Emphasis was put on conveying to a new officer the importance of his position, role in the enforcement of discipline, social obligations and protocol. The attitudes of the Officers toward their status is suggested by the importance they placed on the need
for domestic servants and as Historian MacLeod comments on "their strongly held opinions and attitudes." Officers were expected to "be an Officer in every sense of the word."

Capt. Haig-Brown noted an isolation between the Officers and the men, and felt that the men were not given the recognition they deserved. He considered the police to be competent and intelligent men and that the rigid discipline was demeaning.

The selection and training of recruits in the traditions of the Force imbued an acceptance and devotion to the Force. The rigorous training, discipline, frequent transfers, the isolated posts with their canteens reinforced the ties to the Force and the military atmosphere. However, the conditions created an isolation and elitism within the Force generally.

Discipline, devotion to duty, and impartial but strict enforcement of the law became characteristic of the Force. Ultimately, these values and beliefs assumed the proportions of an ideology, reflected in the Force's motto "Maintain the Right."

In the public eye, the Force had fostered the development of the West and through impartial enforcement of law and order had made the Force an integral, if not irreplaceable, part of the West.

**CONCLUSION**

Conditions in the West prior to 1873 were deteriorating, the disappearance of the buffalo herds was creating uncertainty amongst the Indians and the transition of the Territories to the Dominion had already resulted in one rebellion. In addition, the commitment to British Columbia to build a railway and the fear of annexation of the Territories by the U.S. were added dimensions to be considered in the formation of the national goals of order
and settlement.

The isolation of the region seemed to dictate that an organized body would be necessary to achieve those goals. Earlier reports by Capt. Butler and Col. Robertson-Ross on conditions in the Territories made that specific recommendation, thereby, linking conditions in the environment, national goals and the para-military structure of the NWMP. Consistent with the fundamental assumption of environmental theory and Meyer's "environment-goal-structure" Models in Chapter II.

Environmental conditions evolved rapidly after the arrival of the railway in 1883 and by 1905 the Territories were made Provinces, largely as a result of the success of the NWMP in achieving order in the West, facilitating settlement and economic development. One of the major transitions in the Force occurred when it assumed the role of provincial police in Alberta and Saskatchewan. This transition resulted not so much from a change in any goals but from a reaffirmation of earlier goals and the success of the Force in achieving those goals. A similar process occurred in 1920 when the Force became the only Federal Police Force and assumed national jurisdiction.

Structurally, the organization of the Force corresponded to its expanding duties and jurisdiction. In fact, few structural components changed during the period between 1873 and 1960, the Force simply incrementally added to or enlarged the structure to encompass the expanding scope of the Force's duties.

Initially, the Force was broken into Divisions which patrolled specific geographical regions. Control was direct with no extensive hierarchy or large numbers of Officers. Consequently decisions were centralized, being made in the strategic apex of the organization in spite of the divisional-
ized structure. This centralized structure reflected the need for operational flexibility in a dynamic environment and the external control by Government. Government control was exercised through the appointment of the Commissioner and the Comptroller of the NWMP who acted as the main liaison device between the Government and the Force.

One of the few changes in the organizational structure was the gradual emergence of specialized duties beginning formally with the absorption of the duties of the Dominion Police in 1920. The formalization of administrative functions in the more modern context could be said to have begun with the organization of the Personnel Department in 1944.

More characteristic of the Force as an organization, in Mintzberg's context, was what it lacked. There was no evidence of any significant planning being undertaken. The advent of studies or surveys began with Haig-Brown's Survey in 1944 and the Cameron Study in 1954, both outside resources.

Planning was of a highly personalized nature, originating in the strategic apex (Commissioner and/or Staff Officers) and not from a technocratic core. The reorganization of the Adjutant Branch in 1937 is an example of directions originating from the Commissioner and the Adjutant making suggestions about specific changes. The decision to undertake the Haig-Brown Survey appears also to have been a personal decision of the Commissioner.

The typical approach to the process of change involved the Commissioner outlining a particular problem and seeking the comments of the Division COs. In one particular case, the problem was what title should be used for "file readers." Responses from the Divisions and Directorates generated 14 possible titles from file analyzer to expeditor. Several months later, the
Commissioner advised he was not satisfied a solution had been found and he intended to examine the problem further. No solution was evident on the file.

The actual decision-making process in the strategic apex is rather obscure. Officers' Conferences were held as far back as 1932 but records reflect little of the internal dynamics and contained one gap of 15 years. Minutes of the Conferences were in the form of directions. Decision making would thus appear to have been rather authoritarian given the nature of the control system and the lack of a collegial decision making process inside the strategic apex of the Force.

Institutionally, core formation has been one of the major internal activities of the Force. Recruiting has been highly selective followed by intensive training and indoctrination with the traditions and values of the Force, particularly the need for discipline and obedience to lawful commands. This indoctrination process was extended to newly Commissioned Officers in the form of reorientation. Training initially emphasized military skills but has gradually become more police oriented.

Out of this core formation process came an elitism and isolation within the Officer Corps on which Haig-Brown commented. Supt. Kelly's "Discipline for the sake of discipline itself has no place in any organization" and "discipline which creates a rigidity of mind is a considerable liability," may have been implying that discipline was being carried to the extreme for no specific purpose except discipline and the status of the Officer Corps.

The leadership of the Force clearly had a strong belief in its own morality and values, and functioned as a tight knit group which had considerable authority conferred on them. Control of the membership has been
through close supervision and an extensive hierarchy of ranks. Formal inspections from HQs which began in 1954 were a move toward the standardization of performance across the Force.

In defining the Force as a type of organization against Mintzberg's three configurations, the NWMP could be described primarily as a "Simple Structure." Structurally, it was centralized with little need for specialization or formalized performance measurement because it was a small organization, functioning in a relatively simple environment. What had been required was flexibility and initiative in the early years, traits of which members of the NWMP seemed to possess in abundance judging from their record of performance in the early years.

No formal planning or liaison devices existed beyond that carried out in the strategic apex, giving the leadership of the Force complete and absolute control internally. This control was characterized by direct supervision. Few actual structural changes occurred between 1873 and 1960. Specialization and formation of activities began to appear but essentially it retained its original structural components.

The success of the NWMP in achieving its original goals resulted in the expansion of its jurisdiction and the absorption of the Dominion Police. This success gave a legitimacy to the Force's core formation process within, while externally it improved the Force's claim on public resources and continued survival.

Discipline, tough training, devotion to duty, and impartial enforcement of law and order became characteristic of the Force, characteristics out of which emerged an ideology built up on fact and myth. In fact, the Mounted Police were principled men—idealists—devoted to the Force and to their
duty. In myth they always got their man.

Out of the tradition of loyalty to the Force, and the Government's record of disinterest and stringent financial control, came a latent rejection or animosity toward Government. The membership held themselves to be above the political vagaries of government, never officially recognized or commented on, yet pervasive. Kemp's writings are one of the rare instances of acknowledgement of such views.

The consequence of a lack of lateral entry after the 1900s, a lack of liaison devices other than the role filled by the Officers Corps, the elitism and ideology of the Force tended to make the Force a relatively closed organization within the context of Meyer's Closed Systems Model.

FOOTNOTES

1Some of the most comprehensive historical research on the NWMP and the RCMP has been done by R.C. MacLeod, The NWMP and Law Enforcement - 1873–1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), and S.W. Horrall, The Pictorial History of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1973).


3R.C. MacLeod, "The Problem of Law and Order in the Canadian West 1870–1905," The Prairie West to 1905, ed. Lewis G. Thomas, p. 142-150.


8MacLeod, *NWMP and Law Enforcement*, p. 3

9Chambers, *RNWMP*, p. 16

10The first actual report was made by Thomas Blakeston, an Officer of the Royal Artillery in 1859. He suggested a military police similar to the Irish Constabulary. Horrall, p. 14.


12Those concerns were justified, the Rebellion of 1885 required a military force. The police had been too few in number and too widely dispersed to be effective. Chambers, p. 11.


16MacLeod, *The NWMP and Law Enforcement*, p. 34

17Ibid, p. 22

18Ibid, pp. 44 & 45.

19This report contained the first reference to telephones. *NWMP, Report of the Commissioner, 1886*, p. 31. Chambers, *RNWMP*, p. 103


22Ibid.


24Horrall, p. 191
The Province of Saskatchewan entered into a contract with the RCMP in 1928. Canada. RCMP. Duties and Status of the Force in Canada, 1958, correspondence dated 29th January, 1932 and 10th February, 1932 and Horrall, p. 194.

Kelly, p. 202

Ibid, pp. 172-177.

Horrall, p. 204

Initially each lettered Division represented a geographical region of the Territories. Today they essentially indicate each province as shown in Figure 10 of Appendix II. NWMP, Report of the Commissioner, 1885, p. 13.

The Divisions are not completely organized along provincial lines, Ontario and Quebec are organized into three Divisions. In 1920 the Maritimes constituted one Division, today they make up three Divisions. Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended September 30, 1920, p. 8.

RCMP. Conferences of Officers at Headquarters-General File, Vol. 1, Correspondence dated September 29, 1932.

Organization of Headquarters - RCMP, 1949, Memorandum dated December 19th, 1938.

Organization - Personnel Dept. - General File, 1948.

Captain Haig-Brown's Report is a series of letters addressed to the Commissioner of the RCMP.

Ibid, Memorandum dated November 1, 1944.


Ibid., Memorandum dated 12-5-1959 from OIC Estimates and Financial Branch to DSS.


MacLeod, "The Problem of Law and Order," The Prairie West to 1905, ed. Thomas, p. 153

MacLeod, NWMP and Law Enforcement, p. 36

Kemp, Scarlet and Stetson, p. 24
Historian MacLeod discusses the tenure of the first four Commissioners in some detail. MacLeod, NWMP and Law Enforcement, pp 39-42.

MacLeod, p. 41.

Ibid., p. 56. Also see Atkin, pp. 92-95

John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada - The Years of Achievement 1956 to 1962 (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1976), p. 317

Kemp, Scarlet and Stetson, p. 27

MacLeod, NWMP and Law Enforcement, p. 41

Ibid.

Canada, The North-west Mounted Police Act, 1894, s.4.

An Act to Amend the Royal North-west Mounted Police Act, 1919, s.6(1) and 10(1).


RCMP. Control System of Expenditure of Commitment - Dept. of Finance, Privy Council Memorandum dated March 17th, 1934.

Ibid., Correspondence dated March 20th, 1933 and April 9th, 1935, p. 3.


MacLeod, NWMP and Law Enforcement, p. 68.

A/C Kemp described the financial conditions of the "shanty" Force, referring to a description of their dwellings by a Public Works Official. He also described kit sales and fines, the revenue of which went to the Government. Kemp, Scarlet and Stetson, pp. 10, 20 & 26. Without fear, favour or affection, pp. 18-21.

Some writers might disagree with this assessment and it will come under some discussion later in the text.

Report of the Commissioner, 1874, p. 28


Regulations and Orders for the North-West Mounted Police, 1889 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1889), p. 36

MacLeod, NWMP and Law Enforcement, p. 73.

MacLeod, "The Problem of Law and Order," p. 157

MacLeod, NWMP and Law Enforcement, p. 77

Ibid., p. 80.

Ibid, p. 81


RCMP. Training-Sub/Inspectors on Appointment to Commissioned Ranks, Memorandum dated September 4, 1959.

Ibid, January 26th, 1960

The early Annual Reports provided fairly comprehensive reports on the nature of discipline, breaches and desertions. NWMP, Report of the Commissioner, 1886, p. 57; 1888, p. 15 & 16 and 1889, p. 9.


Regulations: Re Wearing Civilian Clothes - NCOs and Men, 1964, General Orders for June 12, 1920

Ibid., August 24th, 1923

NWMP. Report of the Commissioner, 1889, p. 55
78Kemp, Scarlet and Stetson, pp. 130 & 131.

79Kemp, pp. 25 & 115.


81W.H. Kelly, "Doctrine of Leadership, Discipline and Inter-rank Relations," (Unpublished paper, 1956), pp. 6 & 63

82Horrell, p. 98.

83RCMP, Organization of the RCMP - General File, 1951, Correspondence from O.C. Montreal to the Commissioner dated March 25th, 1937 and correspondence from O.C. P.E.I. to the Commissioner dated April 9, 1937.

84RCMP, Organization, Procedures and Functions - Inspection Teams 1964, Memorandum dated May 11th, 1953.

85NWMP, Report of the Commissioner, 1880, p. 31


90Ibid, p. 58

91Horrell, Pictorial History, p. 117 and 207.


93The bibliography in Walden's book includes an extensive and detailed list of books and novels about the RCMP. Keith Walden, Visions of Order (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982), p. 46.

94RCMP. Organization, Procedures and Functions - General File, 1965, Correspondence to Division C.O. dated October 15th, 1952 and April 4th, 1953
CHAPTER IV

CHANGING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE RCMP

Introduction

The major environmental trends that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s which the RCMP had to respond to managerially and organizationally are examined in this chapter. A qualitative approach is used to define and describe these trends in a context that will provide a background for examining specific environmental issues and the Force's response to them in Chapter V. The thrust of this chapter demonstrates the importance of environmental theory, depicting an increasingly turbulent and changing environment within which the RCMP was functioning.

Two variables of importance are the source and the focus of environmental pressures or demands for change. As defined in Chapter II, environmental pressures may originate in the larger environment, the immediate environment or the internal environment with their focus on either goals to be achieved by the organization, its task structure or its social structure.

Since the latter part of the 1950s environmental pressures began to emerge that resulted in several Royal Commissions and criticism by the Auditor General which dealt with bureaucratic management and accountability in Government. As a result of this criticism new goals respecting management and accountability began to emerge from the Central Agencies, and were gradually being applied to all Government Departments including the RCMP. The primary focus of these pressures was on the task structure of the Force.
A second source of environmental pressure originated internally, also during the latter part of the 1960s, demanding changes in the management style and the militaristic traditions of the Force. These pressures ultimately found their way into the immediate environment and resulted in the Marin Commission of Inquiry. The focus of these pressures was on the social structure.

Two other Royal Commissions which dealt specifically with the RCMP's national security role were the MacKenzie and Macdonald Royal Commissions. These two Commissions are not discussed in detail in this research but references to them are made where they deal with administrative and management practices which support or complement the focus of this research.

The chapter is organized into three sections: the first section is a very general presentation of research and comments that have taken place in the larger environment since 1970. The second section deals with environmental pressures originating in or being translated through the RCMP's immediate environment. Section three examines the internal environment and identifies major sources of internal dissatisfaction within the RCMP.

The Larger Environment

Criticism of the RCMP's security activities during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in two Royal Commissions, the Mackenzie Commission and the McDonald Commission. While the specific focus of these Commissions is not relevant here, they do provide a contemporary description and view of the RCMP.

In 1966 the Government appointed the Royal Commission on Security (the MacKenzie Commission) to examine and report on "the operations of Canadian security methods and procedures." The appointment of the Commission followed a period in which the activities of the RCMP Security and Intelligence
Directorate came to the attention of the public and the government.2

Organizationally the RCMP was described as a unique para-military police force, whose members are carefully selected, highly motivated and of great integrity with indoctrination and training "oriented toward its police function."3 Characteristic of this indoctrination and training process was the instilling of discipline and the traditions of the RCMP. One of the major shortcomings the Commission noted was the lack of importance given to university training. The Commission felt the RCMP had essentially cut itself off from those recruits "who are likely to possess the most intelligence, initiative and imagination." They went on,

"We find it difficult to believe that officers with the background and training of those in the RCMP will be able to meet the increasingly complex challenges in the field of security that are to be expected in the future."4

After examining the security environment, the Commission recommended that a civilian non-police security agency separate from the RCMP be established.

A second Royal Commission (the McDonald Commission) was appointed July 6, 1977 "to inquire into and report upon certain activities of the RCMP." The majority of the activities under scrutiny related to the Security Service and, in fact, were a continuation or extension of the issues which led to the appointment of the MacKenzie Commission in 1966.

The McDonald Commission was a much more extensive report on the activities and structure of the RCMP. Its major recommendation, like the MacKenzie Commission, was for the establishment of a separate civilian security agency for Canada. Environmentally, the Commission recognized that a number of changes had occurred in respect to technology and this had created "an immensely complex problem of evolution for a Force with personnel mostly
trained to enforce the law in traditional ways." During a survey by the Commission several respondences argued,

"that the management and personnel system of the Force are as inappropriate to the rest of the Force as they are to the Security Service. Thus they concluded significant and dramatic change is needed in all areas within the RCMP."

This view consequently became part of the Commission's proposal on management change in a separate security agency, "We believe strongly that changes in the internal management practices are a critical element in the package of reforms...." Generally, the McDonald Commission indicated it was not impressed with the level of analysis or creative thinking among Senior Management of the Force.\(^5\)

Political control of the RCMP was described by the Commission as limited and at arms length because of a "loosely defined legal doctrine of police accountability to the law."\(^6\) This doctrine affected the amount of influence the government had been able to exercise over police activities through the Minister.

Less formal debate and examination was also taking place in research circles and the media. Richard French and André Béliveau in an examination of the Force described it as highly hierarchial with authority residing in rank rather than expertise. They said promotions in rank and commissions often give the appearance of an initiation "into a self-selecting fraternity of visceral conservatives." This pursuit of the perpetuation of the status quo, has ultimately led to, what the author's describe as, a lack of "managerial sophistication, realism and vision" which has resulted in a form of crises management. The inference of crises management is thus related by
French and Béliveau to inherent managerial shortcomings which have stifled internal policy development in what they describe as an "atmosphere of tradition-bound hostility to innovation." 7

In part, the resistance to innovation is attributed to the closed entry, the total career concept, seniority and the self-preservation orientation of the promotional system. They also allege that Senior Management had badly mishandled the internal unrest in 1974 and that the underlying factors have not been addressed. They viewed the conflict within the RCMP as not between individuals, but between rank levels which originate in the formal rank structure, and therefore, more difficult to handle. 8

Michael Whittington in an analysis of RCMP's expenditure trends observed a number of similar organizational aspects about the RCMP as had French and Béliveau which suggested that senior officers were ill-equipped to compete effectively in the bureaucratic arena. He found that the "pattern of RCMP budgetry growth in the last decade was essentially incremental." In 1970/71, the RCMP's percentage of total government expenditures was 1.02% and a decade later in 1980/81, it was still 1.02% of government expenditures. 9

More significant is the fact that the RCMP received a declining share of the financial and manpower resources of the Solicitor General's Department as illustrated in Table II.

While French and Béliveau had been more critical of management of the Force, Whittington felt the system was much more complex than simply a failure on management's part. In addition to a general failure to recognize the importance of the budgetry process, he suggested the Force lacked an identifiable clientele or interest group which could press the Force's claim to
resources. Another problem in developing an effective claim on resources has been the failure to develop meaningful measures of performance, beyond the vague agreement that law and order is a worthwhile social good. Whittington contends, however, that the RCMP still enjoys wide public support and that the Federal Government is trying to strengthen its federal image, particularly in the West, through the RCMP. 10

More journalist analysis of the RCMP has tended to describe or portray the Force as out of control or as a "sovereign state." During the 1970's the issue of political control of the RCMP simmered between the Force and the Deputy Minister of the Solicitor General's Department. According to an article in MacLean's, the then Solicitor General, Jean Pierre Goyer, attempted to rein in what the article described as an "independent-minded RCMP." by downgrading the Deputy Minister status of the Commissioner. The intent was to have the Commissioner answer to the Deputy Minister of the Solicitor General's Department. The dispute went on until late 1972 when the RCMP apparently won out. 11

Other issues continued to surface and the dispute resembled something of a war of attrition with public support the prize. On the one hand, the RCMP was subjected to two Royal Commissions. On the other hand, the RCMP conducted a number of politically sensitive investigations which had tenuous links to Members of Cabinet and the Liberal Party. In one incident, the RCMP was accused of leaking information in order to gain power. 12

The McDonald Commission clarified the dispute over the Deputy Minister status of the Commissioner by noting that the initial organization of the Department of the Solicitor General was that of a "ministry" with a limited research and policy role, and in fact, the Department heads of the main
agencies including the RCMP, had been designated as deputy heads by Order-In-Council.\textsuperscript{13}

Whittington's view that Government was using the RCMP's role as a national institution to enhance its federal image would seem to be incongruent with the events of the 1970s. However, a MacLean's article posed a crucial question about the leadership of the RCMP and its future relations with Government,

"The next big test could come with the appointment of a new Commissioner to replace Nadon, due to step down in 1977."\textsuperscript{14}

A more recent article in Saturday Night about the current Commissioner noted that "by the time Simmonds took over the leadership of the RCMP, relations between the Force and the Government were at an all time low."\textsuperscript{15} The Deputy Solicitor General between 1972 and 1977, Roger Tassé, was quoted as saying,

"The only person in the driver's seat was the Commissioner. So the politicians had to exert some influence on the appointment of the Commissioner."\textsuperscript{16}

The Saturday Night article posed a question that in some respects answered the question raised in the earlier MacLean's article,

"Had the government appointed him (Simmonds) in the hope that his political naiveté would allow the Minister to tighten the leash?"\textsuperscript{17}

Examination of the Force that was taking place in the larger environment suggested that the RCMP continued to retain its para-military character and that the RCMP's environment was becoming increasingly complex, raising doubts about the adequacy of its management system. It was described as lacking in creative thinking and being hostile to innovation. Whittington's examination of the Force's financial claim on public resources suggested a
lack of understanding of the political nature of the budgetary process. Yet media reports indicated that when it came to the question of bureaucratic control the Force fended off political attempts to gain increased control.

Surprisingly, amidst all the criticism and debate that took place in the larger environment, the RCMP managed to retain the confidence of the majority of Canadian public, as several Gallup Polls in 1978 indicated. On a question of mail opening, 67% felt the RCMP should be allowed to open mail if there were strong suspicions the material was dangerous to Canadian Security, while in another poll 68% felt the RCMP had either the right amount of power or not enough. In contrast, only 35% of the public polled approved of the Federal Government's record in 1976 and 1977.18

The Immediate Environment: In Pursuit of Accountability

During the 1960s, government underwent considerable reorganization and reform which was largely a result of the Glassco Royal Commission on the Organization of Government. The Commission was appointed on the 16th September, 1960 to:

"enquire into and report upon the organization and methods of operation of the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada and to recommend the changes therein which they consider would best promote efficiency, economy and improved service in the dispatch of public business."19

The problems which resulted in the Commission had several sources: tight fiscal control which had been instituted by the Bennett Government under the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act of 1931, dramatic growth in the size and complexity of the public service, and a critical Conservative Government that felt parliamentary control was diminishing and that the quality of internal management was unsatisfactory.20
Since the 1950s, government had grown in size by nine times to a point where it employed 480,000 people, while the population of the country had grown only two and a half times. The trend toward consistent growth was recognized by the Commission as beginning in the 1950s; thus the public service was described as "largely the product of the last two decades."\(^{21}\)

Much of the growth emerged from the theoretical underpinnings of Keynesian economics, that Government could actively promote the social development of the country.\(^{22}\) This emerging economic and social environment contrasted sharply with the extensive centralized control and strict pre-audit of departmental expenditures carried out by the Comptroller of the Treasury.\(^{23}\)

The Commission focused on three broad aspects of government: administrative management, financial management and personnel management. They noted that the need for effective management fell into two categories: the central direction and administration of government generally and the administration of departmental operations. "Let the managers manage" or the delegation of authority to the departments became one of the major thrusts of the report, however, certain limits were envisioned,

"Above all, departments should, within clearly defined terms of reference, be fully accountable for the organization and execution of their programmes and enjoy powers commensurate with their accountability. They must be subject to control designed to protect those general interests of government which transcend departmental interests."\(^{24}\)

A strengthened Treasury Board headed by its own minister was recommended to undertake the central direction and co-ordination of departmental activities. Treasury Board would shift from pre-audit control of expenditures to review and approval of departmental program requirements, and the estab-
lishment of administrative principles and guidelines. It was also recommended that the departments should be left to develop their own financial units and systems. This was viewed as a counter-balance to the enhanced position of Treasury Board. As a result of the Glassco Commission recommendations, the Cabinet portfolio of President of the Treasury Board was created in 1967 and the Treasury Board Secretariat became a separate agency apart from the Department of Finance.

The prime recommendations of interest here as discussed above were,

- the delegation of increased authority to the departments
- a restructuring of Treasury Board's role, emphasizing control and co-ordination of general administrative policy and guidelines
- the transfer of expenditures and accounting responsibility to the departments
- the introduction of planning and estimating financial requirements by activity over a five year projection
- the requirement for a system of internal audit
- that finance should be directly accountable to the Chief Executive

In 1963, after the publication of the Glassco Report, the Treasury Board Secretariat made a number of proposals to the Public Accounts Committee which resulted in a reduction in the number of votes and a reorganization of the votes into capital and operating costs with a more descriptive explanation of programs. These initiatives by Treasury Board laid the groundwork for the introduction of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the departments. PPBS incorporated a ritual of identifying objectives, analyzing the objectives, budgetary proposals tied to those ob-
jectives, a five year expenditure forecast, a formulation of plans of action for each projected year and a monitoring process.\textsuperscript{30}

Since then other techniques have been introduced with varying degrees of success and failure, to assist government in making resource allocation decisions: Operational Performance Measurement System (OPMS), Management by Objectives (MBO), Cost/Benefit Analysis and Cost/Effectiveness Analysis.\textsuperscript{31}

The actual delegation of increased managerial and financial responsibility did not occur until 1969 when amendments to the Financial Administration Act were passed. The Comptroller of the Treasury Office was abolished and his pre-audit functions were transferred to the departments. This represented a major decentralization of financial responsibility away from the central agencies, in the spirit of the Glassco Commission.\textsuperscript{32}

While the issue of responsibility seemed to have been addressed with the decentralization of financial responsibilities, a dispute over accountability emerged between Treasury Board and the Auditor General. The Auditor General accused Treasury Board of denying him adequate resources to carry out his duties, while Treasury Board accused the Auditor General of exceeding his authority by reporting "unproductive expenditures." The dispute remained unresolved until 1973 when the Wilson Committee was appointed to examine the responsibilities and the scope of the Auditor General's activities and the relationship of the Auditor General with the other central agencies.\textsuperscript{33} The Committee reported in 1975, recommending the Auditor General should remain independent, and his responsibilities and scope of activities should be defined by legislation. The report added to economy and efficiency, by noting the importance of effectiveness.\textsuperscript{34}
In 1974, the Auditor General also undertook a major study, The Financial Management and Control Study of the financial management and control practices of government departments which he believed were in a critical state,

"I am deeply concerned that Parliament and indeed the government – has lost, or is close to losing effective control of the public purse."\(^{35}\)

The major recommendation of the study was that government should establish a position of Chief Financial Officer, the Comptroller General, whose responsibility would be the development of procedures relating to financial management and control.

Government responded by appointing the Royal Commission on Financial Organization and Accountability (Lambert Commission) in November 1976, and by expanding the responsibilities of the Auditor General in 1977 to include audits of effectiveness, in addition to audits of economy and efficiency. These audits became known as comprehensive audits.\(^{36}\)

The Lambert Commission followed a period of innovation and change in respect to the introduction of a variety of planning and budgetary processes. Many of the fundamental concepts had originated out of the Glassco Commission recommendations. However, the degree and direction of the changes created some instability in the control and accountability system which the Commission viewed as serious:

"We have reached the deeply held conviction that the serious malaise pervading the management of government stems fundamentally from a grave weakening, and in some cases, an almost total breakdown in the chain of accountability."\(^{37}\)

The cause of the breakdown in accountability was attributed to the immense growth in the size and scope of government activities since the 1960s
and a number of defects that had developed over a period of several years in "the structure, organization and processes" of government as illustrated,

"Virtually no effort has been made to establish clearly defined objectives against which the performance of a department...can be measured either in total or in respect of particular programs or activities.... The Treasury Board Secretariat has been pre-occupied with the allocation of new resources, rather than with the efficiency with which existing resources are employed."38

The Commission noted the appointment of the Comptroller General (O.C.G.) in April, 1978 as a partial recognition of the problem by government. The thrust of the report was that management was fundamental. Proposals for the improvement of management included the reshaping of the "roles, responsibilities, and structure" of the central agencies.39

Sound management was seen as beginning with the establishment of goals and the assignment of priorities via the allocation of resources. This process required the delegation of substantial authority to the departments but also included a comparable degree of accountability. As part of the increased delegation, it was recommended that departments should be required to develop strong accounting systems, internal audit and program evaluation systems.40 The control and accountability in respect to the departments was to rest with the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Office of the Comptroller General. Treasury Board would be responsible for the organization of the government service, the administration of policy, personnel management and for program effectiveness review policies. The O.C.G.'s role would be to support Treasury Board with financial standards, internal audit and program evaluation methodology.

In September 1978, the Office of the Comptroller General launched its first initiative, IMPAC (Improvement in Management Practices and Controls),
an examination of departments' planning, control activities and programs. It proposed to link a department's operational activities to its stated plans by improving the planning process and program evaluation. One of the departments surveyed was the RCMP.41

Generally, the period between 1966 and 1980 was characterized by the decentralization and delegation of increased financial and managerial responsibility to the departments along with increased accountability. Much of the change was inspired by the Glassco Commission and resulted in the restructuring of the Treasury Board Secretariat in 1966 and the amendments to the Financial Administration Act in 1969. While delegation of financial responsibility occurred, the Auditor General was critical of the level of accountability. Pushed by Mr. J.J. Mcdonell, Auditor General from 1973 to 1980, major changes occurred in the accountability process, including the expansion of the Auditor General's role following the Wilson Review, and the appointment of a Comptroller General in 1978.

The Internal Environment: Unrest and Dissatisfaction Within the RCMP

Internal dissatisfaction within the RCMP has been primarily limited to the initial formation period and the contemporary period of the Force's history. In the early years it most often resulted in desertions or purchasing one's discharge. By 1875 more than half the members that had made the March West had left due, almost entirely, to conditions of service.42 However, as the organization matured, dissatisfaction began to focus on the strict discipline and the lack of input by members into issues that directly affected them. The first mention of an association or some representative mechanism was found in Capt. Haig-Brown's reports in 1944 when he essen-
tially reported the absence of any sentiment for an association.43

Serious concern about an association first emerged in Montreal in 1966 when the Commanding Officer (C.O.) of the Division reported to HQs about a meeting between the Criminal Investigations Branch (C.I.B.) Officer and Division Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (N.C.O.) which had resulted in the airing of complaints about extra duties and long overtime. The problem was that RCMP members were working along side other police forces which were receiving overtime. The loss of experienced members was attributed to working conditions and criticism of the emphasis placed on the military characteristics of the Force was also expressed. The contentious issues were summarized as overtime pay, a 40 hour work week and the lack of a grievance committee or association through which members could draw attention to matters.44

Later in 1966, the Officer in Charge of "N" Division (Rockcliffe Training Centre in Ottawa) reported information he received about RCMP members in "C" Division contacting the recently formed Quebec Provincial Police Force Association. The Officer's in Charge opening remark indicates he considered any association talk by members as disloyalty to the Force,

"As much as it is not without grieved feeling that I must comment on a subject as distasteful as the question of doubtful loyalty to the Force by some of our C.I.B. members."45

That specific issue was later to polarize members into two camps.

Suggestions by the Director of Personnel in 1967, that the Force was unprepared to deal with a threat of strike by members and should undertake some preparations were met with an attitude of denial concerning member dissatisfaction as the following illustrates,
"After reviewing the material on this matter, it is my opinion that it would be a grave mistake to consider training any of our members in trade unionism simply because one or two malcontents in one Division may have raised a question concerning this type of organization."  

The Commissioner took a less dogmatic stance pointing out that the Public Service had just received the right to collective bargaining and as a result the occasional rumblings could be expected.

Discontentment and the issue of an association faded away until 1970 when the Montreal Gazette printed an article "Mounties on their high horse." Overtime continued to be the major grievance. Interestingly though, the tone of the discontentment had become somewhat militant, as the following quote from the Gazette article indicates,

"The men don't want to be paid off in glory for their work any longer. And if the improvements we're looking for aren't made soon, don't be surprised if the whole thing blows up in the government's face."  

The issue of discontentment subsided again until 1972 when Maclean's magazine dropped a bombshell on the RCMP by publishing Jack Ramsey's "My Case Against the RCMP." The article characterized the Force as an organization with stringent military regulations "more appropriate to a penal colony than a police force." Discipline and obedience were described as first and foremost in training, and when the recruit was "conditioned into mindless obedience" he was posted to a detachment where the exercise of discretion and flexibility were of the utmost importance. The Force's objective, Ramsey asserted, was to increase its power by polishing its image. In his view, it had forsaken its ideal of maintaining the right.
The rank structure was described as a caste system which was a major obstacle to communications and teamwork, and consequently, effective policing. Officers were accused of being preoccupied with the status quo and the power it conferred on them and were increasingly isolated as they rose through the system. The individual member was also cast against the system, as having little input or means of grieving injustices. Ramsey said,

"Every member knows that if he complains, he'll be labelled a trouble-maker.... Policemen in other forces have their associations. The Mounted Police-man has no one. He's alone." 50

The article crystallized the discontentment and the lack of an adequate grievance procedure in the RCMP.

In early 1974 a series of newspaper articles began appearing across the country indicating that the discontentment had deep roots and was spreading. 51 The problems and the sentiments of the members were captured in a letter to the editor of the Ottawa Journal by a member identified only as A.L.,

"I am of the opinion that the vast majority of the members do not really want a union or an association. However, many have reluctantly embraced the idea as the only hope and means of bringing about meaningful and significant change in the method, style and attitude of management in the RCMP. The men have lost confidence in management and they doubt its sincerity in promising reform.

Without exception the rank and file believe in the Force and its role and purpose as an organization. Unfortunately, their loyalty to the Force has, until recently, been interpreted by management as a vote of confidence in themselves. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The management system of the Force was, and still is, autocratic and militaristic in the purest sense." 52
Internal tension mounted and climaxed in a series of meetings which attracted in excess of 3,000 members in Vancouver, Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto. The mood of the meetings varied from one of concern by 2,000 members at the Ottawa Civic Centre to one of considerable tension and militance attended by 600 members at the Toronto Police Brotherhood Hall.53

On June 6, 1974 the Solicitor General reacted to the mass meetings and appointed the Commission of Inquiry Relating to Public Complaints, Internal Discipline and Grievance Procedures within the RCMP.54

The Commission, in its report, concluded that the disciplinary system was virtually "unchallenged and unchanged" since the first 20 years of the RCMP. However, the importance the Force put on discipline seems to have been accepted by the Commission as they stated that the effectiveness of the police was in part related to how they were viewed by the public. It also noted the lack of confidence in the disciplinary system and that this lack of confidence had resulted in "some deterioration of morale."55 The extent of control over the individual was also recognized,

"The inseparability of the requirements of policing and the standards of conduct is better understood when one realizes that a member is under the supervision of a supervisor whose interests extend beyond assessments of his technical competence to include his attitude, dress, deportment and loyalty to the Force."56

But more significantly, the Commission recognized that the discipline system may have become abusive,

"The attention of the Commission was called to a disturbing number of instances in the recent history of the Force where the full weight of a highly formalized system of investigation was invoked in response to seemingly minor, and sometimes petty, breaches of standing orders and regulations..."57
The Commission's major recommendation called for the establishment of a Federal Police Ombudsman who would play a role in public complaints against the Force and act as a review of last resort for members of the Force. A total of 76 recommendations were made in respect to discipline and grievance procedures by the Commission.

Mass dissatisfaction emerged as a new phenomena within the RCMP, one that could not be controlled through the normal disciplinary process. For the first time the Force was faced with dissatisfaction that couldn't be attributed or labelled as "one or two malcontents in one Division." Initially the dissatisfaction focused on overtime but later it shifted to management style.

Dissatisfaction within the Force became a public issue and finally the Government responded with the Marin Commission on grievances and discipline. Somewhere in the debate, the question of management style got lost as the Commission's findings made only vague references to excessive discipline. Jack Ramsey's article was clearly the catalyst that inflamed the issue as well as providing an insight into the management of the Force from the membership's perspective.

CONCLUSION

Generally, the RCMP was confronted with pressures or demands from two primary sources: its immediate and internal environments, which it had to interact with during the late 1960s and 1970s. Pressure did exist in the larger environment but much of it was in the form of media comment and some academic analysis which had little direct impact on the Force.
Pressure in the immediate environment was in the form of new rather broadly defined goals aimed at all government departments which were being translated or implemented through the Central Agencies in respect to management and accountability in public service. These new goals emerged from a number of sources: the Glassco and Lambert Royal Commissions, the Auditor General and Treasury Board Secretariat. The major recommendation of the two Royal Commissions and the Auditor General were that the departments should implement internal auditing, increased planning and increased financial control through the introduction of a variety of evolving control systems and a departmental chief financial officer.  

The amount of change and the introduction of new financial control systems, some of which has been relatively ineffective and time consuming, resulted in fragmentation in the management and control processes in the Central Agencies and confusion in the departments. Faced with what H.L. Laframboise described as "inconsistent and contradictory demands" two reactions from the departments were possible, "the...immobilization of managers..." and "an outright hostility to change...." This view is also supported by a number of other researchers.

The period was characterized by decentralization following the Glassco Commission, and a recentralization or consolidation of the control and accountability functions in the Central Agencies during Mr. Macdonell's tenure as Auditor General and following the Lambert Commission. The Treasury Board Secretariat clearly comes out as the most influential agency with the priority setting and policy administration responsibilities of the Government. The Auditor General's role was expanded to include audits of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, termed comprehensive audits. The Office of the
Comptroller General was created in 1978 and he immediately launched a survey of management and financial practices called IMPAC.

The second major source of pressure on the Force came from the internal environment which gradually became increasingly militant. It attracted the attention of the media and resulted in the Marin Commission into discipline and grievance procedures. The focus of these pressures was on the social structure. Management style, rigid discipline and the lack of autonomous grievance procedures were the main criticisms. Senior management was in the position of having, to some extent, its legitimacy and credibility challenged.

One of the major omissions of the Marin Commission was its failure to address the management structure and processes of the Force. Their statement that "there was some deterioration in morale" would appear to be something of an understatement. The McDonald Commission was also only mildly critical of the management system, however, the inference drawn from their recommendation for a separate Security Service suggests the Commission felt the Force was incapable of the necessary changes.

French and Béliveau in their analysis of the RCMP's security role were more specific in their criticism describing management as lacking in sophistication and being hostile to innovation. They attributed the internal dissatisfaction to conflict between rank levels and thus a far more serious and difficult problem than personnel conflict.

It was evident that the Force was able to exercise considerable political autonomy as the dispute between the newly formed Solicitor General's Department and the Force demonstrates. It ultimately led to charges in the media that the Force was out of control. The crucial question that was
raised was who would replace Commissioner Nadon in 1977, inferring that leadership was a crucial element in the issue of political control.

**FOOTNOTES**


2 The authors provide something of a slanted view of the events but they do include a summary of specific incidents which ultimately led to the appointment of the Mackenzie Commission. Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, pp. 99-126.

3 Royal Commission on Security, pp. 18 & 19.

4 Ibid., p. 19.


6 Ibid., p. 81.


8 Ibid., pp. 48 & 49.


10 Ibid., pp. 140 and 143.


12 Ibid.

13 McDonald Commission, p. 81.


16Ibid., p. 24.
17Ibid., p. 25.
20G.C.E. Steele, "Needed - a sense of proportion! Notes on the history of expenditure control!" Canadian Public Administration (Fall 1977): 438.
21Glassco Commission, pp. 35 & 36.
23Strict pre-audit of departmental expenditures came into being with the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act of 1931. Glassco Commission, p. 43.
24Ibid., p. 51.
25Ibid., pp. 56 & 92.
28Ibid., p. 111.
30Strick, p. 42.
31A description of the different programs is contained in D.G. Hartle, "Techniques and processes of administration," Canadian Public Administration (Winter 1975): 24-29.
34Balls, pp. 607 & 608.


36Balls, pp. 607, 609, 111 & 112.


39Ibid., pp 27 & 33.

40The Strategic Plan was to define social and economic trends, their effect on the department and put forward a departmental plan. The RCMP is now in the process of implementing yet a new technique, Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS), Ibid., p. 259.


42Marin Commission., p. 18.


44RCMP, Dissatisfaction & Criticism Amongst Members of RCMP, Memorandum from the CIB Officer to the CO "C" Division, June 15, 1966.


46Ibid., Memorandum from DOP to D/C (Admin), February 28, 1967.

47Ibid., Memorandum from D/C (Admin) to DOP, March 8, 1967.


49Ramsey, pp. 68 & 74.

50Ibid., p. 68.

51Many of the articles were syndicated in other cities and reported in the Journal. "RCMP shedding rosemarie image," Ottawa Journal, date unknown.


54Marin Commission, p. 3.
55Marin Commission, p. 119.
56Ibid., p. 114.
57Ibid., p. 133.


CHAPTER V

ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE RCMP

Introduction

Chapter III developed a model of the RCMP as an institution with an intensive core formation process of indoctrination and tradition building; aimed at eliciting from its members, a strong sense of loyalty and identification with the Force and a concern for maintaining its public image. These objectives became goals of the Force, in addition to those formulated in the larger or immediate environment. The tradition building included the Force's "vision of order" which became part of its rationalized or institutional legitimacy. The extent of the success of this institutional legitimacy is demonstrated by the popularity and national image of the Force today. Once legitimized this tradition has aided the Force in its survival and growth as an organization. A relative level of autonomy also existed as a result of this legitimacy and because of what the Macdonald Commission described as a "loosely defined doctrine of accountability to the law." This was most evident during the early 1970s, when the Force attempted to polish its image and fend off increased bureaucratic control.

Organizationally, in 1873 the Force was a "simple structure," characterized as functioning in a simple but hostile environment, with the Staff Officers or the strategic apex exercising direct control through a centralized command structure. This strategic apex also functioned as the only liaison or sensing mechanism. Close supervision through the rank structure could be said to be the only formalized control system until the organization of the Inspection Team in 1954.
Operationally, specialization emerged as the Force matured and was becoming a formal part of the structure by the 1950s. However, a technostructure had not yet emerged in the administrative areas, nor were procedures highly formalized, although the organization was regulation oriented as early as the 1880s. Some delegation of authority had occurred following the Cameron Report in 1954, but generally the Force remained highly centralized. In 1960, Planning Branch was formed and could be said to be the beginning of a technostructure, but it did not undertake any real strategic planning until taking over PPBS in 1968.

The main departure from Mintzberg's simple structure was the organization of divisions which expanded from a regional structure to a national structure in 1920, and the indoctrination of personnel.

Since 1960 an important indicator of organizational change in the RCMP has been the change in establishment. In 1968, the strength of the Force stood at 10,397, which represented an increase of 38% over the 1960 figure of 7,558. By 1980 the strength of the Force stood at 16,148 which represented a further increase of 55%. So that in the space of 20 years, a 114% increase in strength had occurred.

The divisional or geographic organization of the Force has not changed significantly since 1960; however, the HQs or administrative organizational structure has changed significantly with successive reviews and subsequent re-organizations. The trend generally, has been to organize or create new branches around related or emerging functions which this chapter demonstrates is directly related to environmental pressures. Comparing the organizational structure in 1960, Figure 8, and the structure in 1967, Figure
9, and the structure in 1980, Figure 10, the greatest period of change has occurred during the latter period.

The Directorates were primarily in place in 1960, but the reorganization and creation of new branches within the Directorates has been extensive since 1968. 'A' (Administration) Directorate, for example, in 1967 consisted of three Branches while in 1980 it consisted of eleven Branches, Figure 11. Looking at the Commissioner's Secretariat, Figure 10, two completely new branches were formed: the Internal Communications Officer (I.C.O.) and Public Relations Branch, while Planning Branch and the Inspection Team have undergone major role changes to become Planning and Evaluation Branch, and Audit Branch. Consequently, in the administrative and policy areas of the Force, significant changes have occurred.

In spite of the organizational changes that have taken place during the latter 1960s and the 1970s, the social structure of the Force remains relatively intact. Training still emphasizes and attempts to develop a strong sense of identification with the Force as the following statement by a training officer suggests,

"What we are trying to achieve here is beyond mere training. It's a lifestyle. There are many intangibles that go into developing attitudes, but we find the results are tangible. We create bonds as the troop eats together, sleeps together and trains together. There is a recognition that you don't let the team down. It's an experience which lasts a lifetime. The edge we have on other police forces is that we move them out of their homes and they live in barracks here for six months. City police forces hire men from within the community. Our men are continually adapting to new communities. Coming away from home is a condition that prepares them for their transient lives. Loyalty or ethos is an attachment to the Force, rather than to a physical place."
Considerable importance also continues to be attached to protocol and the unique role of Officers in the Force.

"The 'book' reminds us that Junior Officers should stand when the Senior Officer enters the Mess. This kind of thing needs to be emphasized by having its purpose explained and in making a case for the desirability of continuing this practice....The foregoing, and indeed much more, gains added importance at this time because of the more liberal (slack is perhaps more appropriate) attitudes emerging from the NCOs Messes.... I become a bit weary of the slick cliché terms so current in describing management principles. MASLOVE, HERZBERG, KUNTZ, O'DONNELL, et al.... The traditional role of the Officer requires these principles while incorporating the first imperative which is and always will be leadership.... I can accept the idea of a superior Officer calling me by my first name, in fact, I appreciate it. However, I do not approve of the two-way exchange."³

Mann and Lee in The RCMP VS The People, criticize recruit training because the intensive indoctrination creates what they call a "reality gap" between the ideal developed in training and the realities of police work. They contend it "leads to a cynical distrust of higher officers" or "over conformity in upholding the RCMP image."⁴ The dissatisfaction among members that developed in 1974 lends strong credence to their point of view.

Leadership as a concept has a special significance in the Force distinct from the concept of management, as the above quote states, "the first imperative is and always will be leadership." The Force's view of leadership, more often than not, is associated with discipline and control, which the above quote also infers is lacking.

The Macdonald Commission rejected the notion of leadership based on giving orders as appropriate to any organization,
"advocates of this approach to leadership ignore an increasingly important aspect of modern organizations: they are complex and their parts are highly interdependent... a leadership style based on giving orders must give way to a team approach where the emphasis is on shared decision-making, and where control by superiors is largely replaced by self-control and self-direction, based on a common understanding of shared goals."

Examination of the RCMP's environment during the late 1960s and 1970s found it becoming increasingly turbulent and less supportive. The larger environment, in the context of this research, was largely a reflection of internal pressures demanding changes in the social structure of the Force. Theoretically, these pressures should have been picked up by the Force's sensing or liaison mechanisms. The immediate environment responded with the Marin Commission, however, the sensitivity of senior management of the Force was limited. Senior management's attitudes and responses are developed in this chapter.

Pressures from the immediate environment were in the form of increased financial control and accountability aimed at all Government departments. New goals which directly affected the Force emerged from the Central Agencies. As a result, the need for increased planning, auditing, improved financial control systems and new organizational structures to accommodate these new functions emerged. These pressures represented highly formalized bureaucratic and political obligations which the Force could not legally or legitimately ignore.

Internal pressures or demands for change focused on the Force's social structure. While these pressures were directed at specific issues, such as overtime or discipline, they reflected a conflict between rank levels as
French and Béliveau suggest, and a low level of confidence in management. How the Force handled these demands can only be described as a classic case of co-optation, although the initial response had been one of denial.

Important to the organization of this chapter is the focus of environmental pressures or demands for change, that is, whether they focused on the task structure or the social structure. Meyer's environment-goal-structure relationship is evident as the structure responded to pressures from the immediate environment. Also apparent, is the validity of his hypothesis, in the form of a paradox that "closed organizations" are in fact more open to change than "open organizations;" along with his contention that the distinction is really a question of the existence or lack of effective sensing or mediating mechanisms.

The extent of the institutionalization of the RCMP is also evident in this chapter and is developed in the context of its role in the organizational change process. But what is most evident and crucial is that there was initially a lack of commitment from senior management on major issues, until they reached a situation approaching an "organizational crises" forcing the management to take immediate action.

The first section of the chapter deals with environmental pressures that focus on the task structure of the RCMP and is organized around the two major studies that occurred: the P.S. Ross Study in 1968 and the Organization Review which began in 1977. These studies were a direct result of pressures from the immediate environment and out of them flowed specific organizational changes which are examined as case studies of particular branches.
Planning and Audit were affected by both studies while the formalization process examined in the Staffing and Personnel Branch case came directly out of the Ross Study. Formation of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (C.F.O.) in 1979 came out of the Organization Review, although the original recommendation went as far back as the Glassco Commission.

The introduction of classification is examined last as it is unrelated to either study. Other changes such as the restructuring of the Senior Executive Committee (S.E.C.) are included in the examination of Planning Branch because of the relationship between the two structures initially.

The second section of the chapter: the social structure, focuses on internal dissatisfaction as the main environmental issue. The direct result of these pressures were the formation of the Divisional Staff Relations Representative (DSRR) system and the appointment of the Internal Communications Officer. Externally, the major impact was the appointment of the Marin Commission of Inquiry. Also included in this section is an examination of the overtime issue because it was one of the major issues in 1974 and demonstrated the impact of the Force's ideology on how the issue was perceived.

The Task Structure

Environmental Factors

Environmental factors that emerged during the period 1966 to 1980, that had a direct impact on the RCMP's task structure in the administrative and management areas of the Force, originated primarily out of the Glassco Commission and were translated through the immediate environment during the above period. These environmental issues related to management practices
and accountability, and they were examined generally in Chapter IV, in the section "In Pursuit of Accountability." The specific recommendations of the Glassco Commission that are important here, related to the development of long range planning, internal auditing and the accountability of departmental finance to the departmental head. These of course were in addition to the main thrust of the report "let the managers manage."

In 1966, Treasury Board issued its Financial Management Guide which essentially introduced PPBS into the Public Service. This came out of the recommendation from the Commission in respect to planning that,

"All departments and agencies be required to prepare and submit... long term plans of expenditure requirements by programmes... for a period of five years ahead."

In response to the Treasury Board's initiative the Force felt that some action was required if PPBS was to be introduced into the Force. The Commissioner wrote to the Solicitor General on August 8, 1966, suggesting a management consulting survey,

"I am convinced that a management consulting survey of the "HQ" of the Force, its organization and structure should now be carried out and that a survey will do much to make for a more efficient operation."

A senior Civilian Member who was in charge of Estimates and Financial Branch at the time said during an interview,

"It is safe to say PPBS was the catalyst for the Study (P.S. Ross). There was a recognition that in order to implement PPBS there was a need to have the activity structure and priorities established by a senior executive committee. At the time, there was no executive committee."

The P.S. Ross Study, however, did not get off the ground until February 1968 because of a jurisdictional dispute between the Force and the Solicitor Gen-
eral's Department.

To a large extent the Ross Study, when it did take place, established the conceptual framework for many of the organizational changes that followed between 1968 and 1980, much as the Glassco Commission had done for government generally.

The RCMP was actually one of the first departments to introduce PPBS and became a model for other departments. In 1966, Estimates and Financial Branch of 'S' Directorate began developing an "activity structure" for the 1966/67 Estimates. A program based on nine activities was initially rejected by Treasury Board, however, a second activity structure of eleven activities was later approved.

While Estimates and Financial Branch had been successful in developing an activity structure in 1966, the Adjutant's Branch had serious difficulties with the management aspect of PPBS from late 1966 into 1968. The difficulties were set out in a memorandum from the Director of Personnel to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) September 18, 1967,

"the Government has publicly accepted the Glassco Commission concepts of Government management. This represents a dramatic change in a Department such as ours where we have gone along for years on the basis that the operational side was the really important aspect and that the administrative side, while serving some useful purposes, was really an unnecessary appendage that we have had to put up with. What we must now realize is that Glassco changed all of this.

In keeping with the Glassco concept of placing more and more management in the hands of Departments, the traditional Treasury Board Establishment Reviews are being dropped provided the Departments can satisfy Treasury Board as to the competence of their own internal Establishment Reviews. In this respect we have failed badly. We do not have an adequate in-
ternal Establishment Review...we have neither the resources nor the capability...to handle it.

To be acceptable to Treasury Board, the internal establishment review must be a continuing year-round...study in depth, monitoring, and control of manpower resources as they are used to carry out the Force's approved objectives. This is a major undertaking which has never been attempted in the Force in the past.

My concern at the moment is that if we do not take the initiative now to set up adequate machinery to handle this important phase of our management control, it may be inferred that we are not accepting this responsibility seriously and in good faith.

Treasury Board suggested last year that we should have an Officer in charge of Establishment and Classification.... I cannot help but wonder what their reaction will be when they learn that the position was deleted."

In 1966, Establishment and Classification Section of the Adjutant's Branch considered PPBS as "one tremendous insurmountable task," for which they had neither the manpower nor the expertise. The above quote was a summation of the DOP's frustration and concern which had been building over the past year in respect to his efforts to upgrade Establishment and Classification Section to Branch status with an Officer in Charge and to introduce PPBS. Four months later, the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) requested the Bureau of Management Consultants Services to conduct a study of the Force's planning needs.

The next major examination of the Force's organizational structure, the Organization Review, began in 1977 and lasted until the latter part of 1978. It was broken into three phases. Unlike previous studies or reviews, it was conducted by the Force and not by outside consultants.
The study came about as a result of a statement by the President of the Treasury Board in September 1975 regarding the regionalization of Federal Government services. Following the statement, the Force suggested a pilot project in the Maritimes; but in spite of its own initiative, Treasury Board rejected the suggestion. The Force, however, decided to examine regionalization along with the overall organization structure of the Force with a view to some reorganization. The Commissioner subsequently wrote to the Divisions requesting views on regionalization and the identification of organizational problems for future study.

The P.S. Ross Study and the Organization Review

The Ross Study had initially been proposed in 1966 but it was not until late October 1967 that the final decision to go ahead with the study actually occurred. The delay was over the establishment of terms of reference between the RCMP, and the Solicitor General who was insisting that an examination of the departmental relationship between the RCMP and the Solicitor General's Department should be included,

"The chief purpose of the amendment was to bring into the survey the relationship, in the administrative sense, between the R.C.M. Police and the Headquarters of the new Department."16

The Solicitor General's objective was essentially aimed at obtaining the Force's recognition that the Deputy Minister of the Department should "perform the functions ordinarily performed by a Deputy Minister in any department of the Government." Such a relationship would have seen the Commissioner reporting to the Deputy Minister and not to the Minister, that is with Assistant Deputy Minister status. The Minister indicated that direct
communication between himself and the Commissioner would still take place on
important matters at their weekly meetings. He continued that he would like
to see the survey move ahead as quickly as possible and indicated the
Force's timetable of late 1967 or 1968 was inadequate. Treasury Board al-
so indicated to the Deputy Solicitor General that it was in favour of having
the review go ahead focusing on the relationship.

The Force reacted by having its Legal Branch examine the question of
legal accountability to the Deputy Minister. Legal Branch's opinion was
that the Commissioner of the RCMP held specific powers given to him by Par-
liament under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act which neither the Min-
ister nor the Deputy Minister could exercise. However, the Commissioner was
responsible to the Minister. The Deputy Minister, while having the same
power to direct as the Minister, was also responsible to the Minister.

The survey was undertaken by P.S. Ross Management Consultants and began
in February 1968, with final consultation with Senior Management taking
place in late February 1969. Terms of reference for the survey centered on
the organization and functions of HQs, the Directorates, and Personnel Ad-
ministration. The scope of the survey was to include delegation, organiza-
tion of activities, communications and personnel systems. In respect to the
relationship between the RCMP and the Solicitor General's Department, the
Consultants recommended that the role of the Deputy Minister should be de-

defined as one "primarily concerned with policy advice to the Minister and
long range planning for the Department," which in effect left the issue of
Departmental accountability clouded.

The Consultants, in presenting their final report August 26, 1968, con-
sidered the need for reorganization to be pressing since the projected
The growth rate of the Force was 50% over the next five years. Two sets of short term and long term alternatives were presented to the Force. The short term alternatives were:

1. No substantial change in the organization
2. The Commissioner's role should change by delegating more administrative decisions to the field areas, leaving more time to deal with long range policy issues, planning and external relations.

They suggested the specific areas of focus should be the Commissioner's Office, a broad reorganization of the administrative functions, a reorganization and development of personnel functions, and the implementation of a committee structure. Figure 12 depicts the various alternatives.

The first long range alternative related to the organization of the operational responsibilities of the Force. The importance of this alternative was that it would see the Commissioner's relationship to the Division Commanding Officers (CO) changed. Rather than reporting directly to the Commissioner, the COs would report to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) effectively reducing the Commissioner's span of control which the consultants felt was excessive. This alternative would have four primary elements reporting directly to the Commissioner: planning, public relations, management audit and a secretariat.

The second alternative would see the Force organized along functional lines, which would have required the development or identification of separate programs. This alternative was viewed as meshing with program budgeting better than the current single program which was in place. Three program structures were suggested: National Police Services, Security and Intelligence, and Law Enforcement. The Consultants note that these three areas
were already "managed, staffed and budgeted" separately. The Operational heads of the three programs would report to the Commissioner giving him a more manageable span of control and freeing him for the strategic planning and external relations role identified as lacking.23

The functional structure was strongly recommended and felt to be superior to the first long term alternative which left the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) with a large span of control similar to the Commissioner's current span of control. The Consultants also urged the Force to undertake the changes immediately as delay often reduced the chances of success.24

Administrative problems were identified as restricted upward communications, the lack of defined responsibilities for Planning Branch, fragmented programs in the personnel areas, and too much stress on the control process. Delegation of increased administrative decisions was envisioned as leaving the HQs role as one of basically the management in the broad sense of planning, coordination, control and innovation.25

The Personnel Administration Report dealt with a more micro analysis of the 'A' Directorate Organization and Personnel functions. The thrust of the recommendations in the report was that a number of fragmented functions should be organized into related areas in either four or five Branches.26 Five Branches are shown in Figure 13, and actually became the structure after changes were made.

It was evident from the Consultants letter to the Commissioner that there was not total agreement over the recommendations, "We did have some misunderstanding concerning the present organization of the Force and as a result of this, we had some difficulty in communicating our
proposals."27

Specific objections related to the recommendation regarding the line of command, which had the Division COs reporting to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) rather than the Commissioner. The Force's position was that such an arrangement was unacceptable and tended to imply that the Division COs would not have direct access to the Commissioner. At issue was that most problems coming to HQs were of an administrative rather than an operational nature which would result in the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) becoming involved in administrative issues. A general statement by the Commissioner set the tenor of the Force's view on the entire project,

"Although the Management Consultants have concluded an extensive survey of the administration of the Force, it now seems clear that they have no definite appreciation of the manner in which it has to function under the control of the Minister and the Commissioner. Very little mention has been made of the discipline, the requirement for rapid reaction to the requests of the Minister, or the extent of the responsibility of certain senior officers."28

In subsequent meetings, the Commissioner stated that "he insists on line command permitting direct access to the Commissioner's Office by COs," citing the quick reaction time that existed in the present structure. Several other recommendations were treated in a similar manner. The Consultants emphasized the need for more strategic planning at the senior level and the shifting of some decision making into the respective responsibility areas.29

A survey team made up of members of the Force examined the Consultants report and made a number of recommendations which were approved by the Commissioner in July 1969. Implementation began in September, 1969. The primary results were a reorganization of 'A' Directorate as set out in Figure
13. The organization structure and duties of 'A' Directorate prior to the change were depicted in Figure 9, which was essentially the same structure as the Adjutant's Branch in 1937, Figure 4.30.

The creation of the Solicitor General's Department in 1966 had in effect made the RCMP a branch of the new department. The primary issue that arose was control of the Force through Deputy Minister of the Department. Since 1920, the Commissioner had been responsible directly to the Minister of Justice, but the new structure implied the Commissioner was responsible to the Deputy Minister, relegating him to the status of Assistant Deputy Minister.

Legal Branch's opinion was that the Commissioner's responsibility to the Minister could not be removed even though the Deputy Minister of the Department could act with the same authority as the Minister. As a creation of Parliament, the Commissioner had been given "certain duties, powers and functions" which could not be removed by other general statutory provisions. The Commissioner, under the RCMP Act, was responsible to the Minister as was the Deputy Minister. In the RCMP's opinion, the Commissioner held Deputy Minister status and the issue was no longer a bar to undertaking the study.

The Solicitor General's Department was pushing for the study with the intent that it would recommend the Deputy Minister's control over the Force, but the recommendation was that the Deputy Minister should be responsible for policy advice to the Minister and long range planning for the Department. The Solicitor General's Annual Report for 1972/73 indicated that the above relationship had been formally accepted by 1973,
"The three agencies that form the Ministry...the Royal Canadian Mounted Police - will retain full operational control over their administrative functions and programs with the Heads of Agencies continuing to report directly to the Solicitor General."31

The Deputy Solicitor General was left with the responsibility for the Ministry's four policy branches.

The P.S. Ross Study represented a broad approach to altering the basic structure of the RCMP by recommending that the Force move toward a functional structure based on three programs which would fit in with the estimates structure. Problems identified by the study were the Commissioner's excess span of control, the lack of delegation and a need for more strategic planning. Other less important problems were the fragmentation in the organization of personnel functions, too much stress on the control process and restricted upward communications.

The Consultants recommended that the second short term alternative entailing a restructuring of the administrative and personnel areas should be undertaken immediately. The second long range alternative, organizing the Force along functional lines with three programs was recommended because it would reduce the Commissioner's span of control and give Headquarters primarily a planning, coordination and control role.

Strong disagreement emerged from the Force over the long term recommendations that would remove the direct access of the COs to the Commissioner,

"The Commissioner stated that the organization described in Chart III would destroy his line command with field Divisions."32
Treasury Board officials and the Consultants both disagreed with the Commissioner and emphasized the need to reduce his span of control. The Commissioner indicated that he did not see the span of control as a problem.33

Other shortcomings of the report were cited as the lack of attention to the need for discipline, the requirement for rapid response to inquiries by the Minister and the importance of the responsibility of certain senior officers. What emerged was an acceptance of the second short term recommendation, illustrated in Figure 12, and a set of principles aimed at increased decentralization and delegation and increased emphasis on personnel functions.34

It was apparent from the Force's view (the Commissioner) that a functional organizational structure was not acceptable, as it seemed to challenge too many of traditional organizational characteristics of the Force, such as, the line command to the Divisions, the role of some senior officers and the Force's approach to control through discipline. While discipline was not specifically referred to, the Consultants noted that the Force was too control oriented and upward communications were restricted.

Recommendations that focused on the task structure, the realignment of branches or the formation of new branches were accepted, while those that focused on the institutional aspects, such as command and discipline, were rejected. The net impact of the study was the reorganization of administrative and personnel functions into more specialized units and a commitment to undertake increased delegation and decentralization.

There was a general failure to recognize problems related to communications and discipline which manifested themselves in 1974, and a rejection of the long term recommendations related to the organization's traditional
structures as illustrated by the Commissioner's remark,

"It now seems clear that they have no definite appreciation of the manner in which it has to function under the control of the Minister and the Commissioner...or the extent of the responsibility of certain senior officers."35

In spite of management's reluctance to alter elements that would affect the command structure, important changes took place. A process of delegation actually began which will be evident in the Staffing and Personnel Branch case study. The reorganization of 'A' Directorate brought together related functions which had previously been fragmented and resulted in the formation of new specialized administrative units, such as Organization and Establishment Branch, and Classification and Compensation Branch. Basically, a structure had been established which recognized and to a large extent, was able to deal with the major environmental issues that continued to emerge and focus on the Force's task structure.

The second major study, the Organization Review, began in 1977 and was broken into three phases. Phase I included responses from the Divisions respecting regionalization and suggestions as to what directions the review should take.

Responses from the Divisions were largely opposed to the idea of regionalization on the grounds it would create another level of bureaucracy and jurisdictional issues for the contract Divisions. Few organizational problems were identified, but those identified, generally related to increased delegation and decentralization of responsibilities to the Divisions as important issues.

General agreement on the need to reorganize HQs before any broader reorganization of the Force occurred, emerged from the replies. The Commis-
sioner's span of control, 27 subordinates, was also considered to be the major problem. Recommendations from Phase I included the following:

- regionalization should not be implemented
- future analysis should address the Commissioner's span of control
- increased authority should be delegated to lower levels of the organization with the attendant accountability and monitoring

Phase II of the Organization Review dealt primarily with the role of HQs and defined a number of specific areas which should be examined in Phase III. The report recommended that HQ's role should be,

- the development and coordination of policies and programs
- the monitoring and evaluation of programs
- Divisions should operate autonomously with the COs accountable to the Commissioner or "his delegate"
- Headquarters should exercise line (Operational) control over the Divisions only when specifically authorized by the Commissioner
- SEC should replace the Planning Board and the Budget Committee, although a revised Budget Committee chaired by the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) should deal with most financial matters. Matters where there were significant differences of opinion would be referred to the Commissioner.

It was recommended that the Senior Executive Committee should be composed of the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner (Criminal Operations), the Deputy Commissioner (Admin), the Deputy Commissioner (Canadian Police Services), the Chief Financial Officer, and the Director General Security Service.
Several recommendations in respect to planning and auditing were made and the details were to be explored in Phase III. 38

No recommendations in respect to the Commissioner's span of control were made other than to examine the matter in Phase III; however, a number of aspects which affected the Commissioner's role did emerge in Phase II. The Divisions were to be increasingly autonomous and were to be responsible to the Commissioner, through the functional Deputy Commissioner. 39

The focus of Phase III was an examination of specific processes in HQs,

- the Commissioner's span of control
- the role of the Deputy Commissioners
- the role of the COs and their accountability to HQs and the Commissioner
- the role of Senior Executive Committee
- an examination of the Audit and Planning functions 40

The Commissioner's span of control which had been one of the main concerns in Phase II was examined in detail in Phase III. Reporting to the Commissioner were 27 subordinates, which was considered excessive for effective management. Two alternative structures were proposed; one was to create two additional Deputy Commissioners and have the Division COs report to them, reducing the Commissioner's span of control to 12. The second alternative was to have a number of non-operational functions report to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) reducing the span of control to 21. 41

There were different views on the need to reduce the Commissioner's span of control. The previous Commissioner had felt that he was not well informed of what was going on in the Division, while the current Commissioner, did "not feel the large span of control presents a particular management problem." 42
It was also recommended that a position of Chief Financial Officer separate from 'S' Directorate be created, because it was felt that the Deputy Commissioner (Admin), who was considered the Chief Financial Officer, could not exercise the financial accountability necessary along with his other administrative functions. It was also recommended that the Senior Executive Committee should be responsible for the Force's strategic plans, development of alternatives, statements of policy and the activity structure of the Force.43

Phase III was presented to Planning Board in September 1978. The following procedural and organizational changes were approved by the Commissioner on October 25, 1978 which made the Senior Executive Committee responsible for:

- planning
- policy
- budget
- audit and program evaluation reviews

A Director's Policy Co-ordinating Committee was also approved to support the Senior Executive Committee.44

The major impact of the Organization Review was the formation of the Senior Executive Committee to replace the Planning Board which had become too cumbersome and the delegation of increased responsibilities to the Deputy Commissioner (Operations) and the Deputy Commissioner (Admin). The only other significant result was the recommendation that the Force should have a Chief Financial Officer; in line with recommendations by the Auditor General and the original recommendation of the Glassco Commission. Other changes that occurred related to the planning and auditing functions. They amounted
new terms of reference, formalizing their responsibilities which are discussed in the following sections.

In fact, no significant changes to the task structure of the Force occurred as a result of the Organization Review. The net impact was increased formalization of the roles and functions of the Branches that had been examined. Recommendations in respect to the Commissioner's span of control resulted in the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) and Deputy Commissioner (Operations) being the normal line of communications between the Divisions and the Commissioner; however, the Division COs could still go directly to the Commissioner on important issues. That, incidently, had been one of the recommendations of the P.S. Ross Study in 1968, along with the recommendation that the Chief Financial Officer should report to the departmental head.

Planning Branch

Planning Branch was initially formed in 1960 as a special projects unit to undertake specific research projects authorized by the Commissioner. The first actual involvement in a formal planning process came in 1968 when the Branch took over the responsibility of developing the program activity structure as part of PPBS.45 An official in the Auditor General's Department, who was familiar with the introduction of PPBS in the RCMP described the events,

"A lot of departments had trouble reacting to Glassco's recommendations in respect to planning; what did it mean in practical terms? At the same time, PPBS emerged out of the U.S. Defence Department and there was a feeling in Government that they might bring these two initiatives together. So there was a need for planning and budgeting units and there was a cry for people who could
drive these programs into place. It was really the OIC Planning Branch who realized that there had to be an initiative if the RCMP was going to implement PPBS, so the Force went to the BMCS. The role was to help Planning Branch make the transition from a study oriented unit to a strategic planning unit."

On February 24, 1969, the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) requested the Bureau of Management Consultants Service (BMCS) to conduct a study of the Force's planning needs. This was in direct response to the Director of Personnel's correspondence of September 18, 1967, to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) outlining the problems being encountered in the Adjutant's Branch in respect to the introduction of PPBS. The primary recommendation of the BMCS study was the need for a central planning organization and new terms of reference. A centralized planning approach was to include a Planning Board composed of Senior Management and a Planning Secretariat consisting of two sections: Planning and Management Services.46 The recommendations were formally approved by the Commissioner in August, 1969.47

The P.S. Ross Study in August 1968, had also made a similar recommendation regarding a centralized planning unit reporting directly to the Commissioner, although the BMCS Study dealt more with the actual planning process than did the Ross Study.48

The role of Planning Board as the ultimate decision making body was to:

- state and ratify the objectives of the Force
- suggest alternative strategic objectives for research
- ratify strategic plans
- ratify the program activity structure of the Force
Within the Secretariat, Planning Section was responsible for: reviewing and clarifying the Force's objectives, reviewing and developing the activity structure, conducting analysis of alternative strategies, performance measurement and monitoring of goal achievement. Management Service Section was to be responsible for providing a comprehensive range of management services. Included in the new mandate for Planning Branch was the responsibility for coordinating and developing the "Objectives and Goals" as part of the Program Forecast for the 1971/72 Program Forecasts.49

One of the recommendations of the BMCS Study was that Planning Branch should be made up of qualified personnel. As a result, more emphasis was placed on formal education with background in management fields, economics, commerce, statistics and engineering.50

The early 1970s represented a period of research and development in "Policies, Objectives and Goals" and the program activity structure. In spite of the reorganization and the recognition of the importance of strategic planning, major problems in the planning process were identified. These were a lack of coordination between the planning and the budgeting cycle, a lack of an effective monitoring system, unrealistic operational goals, program activity structure organizationally determined rather than functionally determined, and a lack of policy direction from Headquarters.51

In an attempt to improve the situation, Planning Branch was reorganized again in late 1974 and became Planning and Research Branch with an enhanced coordinating role. That structure, however, was short lived when it was reported that the only improvement was in the coordinating role. A number of minor statistical and operational research functions which had been trans-
ferred to Planning Branch in 1969 were also returned to their original areas in 'C' Directorate. In 1976, the Management Service function was also moved out of Planning Branch because its duties were to conduct specific research projects which were not part of the planning process.52

When Phase III of the Organization Review was carried out in 1978 by the Force, it concluded that the "essential ingredients for effective policy and planning development" existed but that there was a lack of cohesiveness. What it concluded was that greater leadership from Headquarters was required.

One of the major considerations in the report on planning was the placement of program evaluation. The recommendation was that it was related to planning and not an audit function; on the basis that program evaluation results should feedback into the planning process and play a determining role as to the value of specific programs. This organizational structure and approach to planning was approved by the Commissioner on October 25, 1978.53

Program evaluation emerged as a concern when Treasury Board issued guidelines on September 30, 1977, that departments "will periodically review their programs to evaluate their effectiveness in respect to meeting departmental objectives and the efficiency with which they are being administered." The terms of reference for the Performance Evaluation Section were to review all programs every three to five years.54

The OCG's IMPAC survey of the Force in late 1978 and early 1979 judged the RCMP's management practices and controls to be good. It noted that, where there were deficiencies, plans were already in the process of being developed to correct them. Specific problems identified were: a need to
review and revise the Force's "Policies, Objectives and Goals" to reflect current issues, slow progress in implementing program evaluation and the need to improve the qualifications of audit personnel. As a result, the Force entered in an IMPAC-Action Plan with the OCG in July 1979 to improve the planning process and to speed up the implementation of program evaluation.55

During 1971 the Solicitor General's Department began requesting the RCMP's Program Forecast prior to submission to Treasury Board. The aim was to increase research and analysis of law enforcement programs within the department. The extent of contact and coordination is not evident. Some correspondence suggested that there may have been some tension between Planning Branch and the Solicitor General's planning group, which may in part have been a carry over from the dispute over the legal status of the Commissioner in relation to the Deputy Minister.56

A S/Sgt. familiar with the role of Planning Branch commented on its liaison activities with the Solicitor General's Department,

"Our dealings with the Solicitor General's Department is limited to the development of the 'strategic overview' on an annual basis, although there are a number of specific working groups in other areas. The tendency is toward liaising with the Department on specific issues or projects but there is no established relationship. In respect to the 'strategic overview' the OIC of the section and an NCO represent the Force. The question of liaison is of concern to the Commissioner and he has made an effort to control the amount of external contact when it relates to policy."

The transition of Planning Branch from an ad hoc special projects unit to a formal planning unit responsible for planning, research and program
evaluation was a result of issues initially generated by the Glassco Commission in 1963 and the implementation of PPBS by Treasury Board in 1966. As a result, Planning Branch became involved in PPBS and the more strategic issues of the Force. Early problems in implementing PPBS resulted in the study by the Bureau of Management Consultants Services. Recommendations from the BMCS and the P.S. Ross Studies resulted in the formation of Planning Board to direct the planning effort.

Much of the effort was directed at developing "Policies, Objectives and Goals," program monitoring systems and the program activity structures which were part of PPBS. However, PPBS did not live up to all its expectations and was gradually replaced by the "Strategic Plan" and program evaluation techniques. Planning Branch accordingly became Planning and Evaluation Branch.

A Sgt. who had been in Planning Branch summed up the issues,

"Planning has never been particularly effective, the problem has been tying planning to the activity structure in a meaningful way. Our planning is resource planning aimed at getting more resources, although we've tried to develop manhour systems to account for the activities. Progress is being made but it's slow."

The development of Planning Branch into a specialized branch responsible to the Commissioner was in response to the demand for better financial and management control from the Glassco Commission. There was little indication that Senior Management had much commitment to the concept of strategic planning as the following comment by the Commissioner suggests,

"We've got to watch that we don't suddenly become an organization that's great on research and short on results."57
The Official from the Auditor General's Department commented further on management's commitment,

"Their reaction was more, Treasury Board wants this; therefore, as a department we've got to react to it. I don't think there was as strong a commitment as one would have liked; however, that wasn't unique to the RCMP, that's probably how most departments approached it."

The continuous reorganization and redefining of the terms of reference for Planning Branch, suggests there was a fairly serious search for an organizational solution to the problem of planning; however, it also suggests there was some confusion in exactly how to implement the planning process. The reorganization of the Branch in 1974, is an example of a structural approach to problems which was acknowledged a short time later as resulting in no improvements. The problems, rather than being structural, were continually shifting methodology and a lack of expertise, although there was recognition that qualified people were required.

Audit Branch

The first formal audit process, controlled directly by Headquarters, began in 1954 with the formation of the Inspection Team, whose responsibility was primarily a compliance audit which focused on,

- financial accuracy
- interpretation of HQ policy by the Division
- uniformity of policy application

Initially the Inspection Team was headed by a Deputy Commissioner until April 1961 when a Chief Superintendent was put in charge. Later in September 1965, the position was elevated to an Assistant Commissioner giving some indication of importance attached to the inspections.
In October 1968, the OIC of Estimates and Financial Branch of 'S' Directorate recommended that an Operational Audit be incorporated into the Inspection Team. The concept of an Operational Audit had been defined by the Glassco Commission as an independent internal appraisal of the department's activities in relation to accounting, financial and other operations as part of a management control system. In subsequent correspondence emphasizing the need for an operation audit, the OIC noted the role of Treasury Board,

"Treasury Board have been very active in establishing or having established in each Department ... an Operational or Management Review Unit."60

The Force accepted the concept in principle; however, it was not operationalized until November 1970 when the Inspection Team was renamed the Management Analysis Unit with the responsibility for,

"reviewing, analysing and evaluating the administrative and operational allocation and control of resources in order to advise the Commissioner and Division COs where these resources are being used effectively and efficiently in relation to the achievement of the stated objectives of the Force."61

While the need to restructure the Inspection Team had been discussed for some time, the deciding factors were articulated as: the need to assure government that the Force's resources were being used effectively and efficiently, the growth of the Force and "the development of management analysis techniques." This was also linked to the process of delegating financial control to the departments which would require increased departmental accountability.62 The Commissioner rationalized the need for an audit function as related to the Force's international image as an effective organization,
"The level of effectiveness of the Force is amongst the highest in the World, and this must not be allowed to deteriorate."63

By 1973, there was still some confusion as to where the operational audit function should be located and its exact role; even though the Ross Study had recommended that Management Audit should report directly to the Commissioner and should be responsible for the evaluation of the organization's "structure, its basic policies, its administrative controls and its system of internal communications."64 On September 18, 1973, the OIC of Management Audit Unit discussed the matter at an executive meeting with the intention of getting some of Senior Management's views, and a consensus as to what role the Management Audit Unit should be assuming. There was general approval for the principles outlined in the "Treasury Board Concept Paper On Operational Auditing," in which operational audits were defined as "a systematic independent appraisal activity within an organization for a review of the entire departmental operations as a service to management."65

Senior management was clearly not satisfied with the role and approach of the Management Analysis Unit had been taking. The OIC Management Analysis Unit countered by making the distinction between effectiveness auditing and compliance inspections, a distinction he said, was not well understood by management. Senior Management agreed to consider the question of functional independence and a broader approach to auditing. On October 4, 1973, Management Audit Unit was renamed the Operational Audit Unit with the terms of reference defined as being,
"responsible to the Commissioner for conducting systematic, independent reviews and appraisals (Operational Audit) of each Division and Headquarters Directorates and independent branches." 66

In 1974, financial audits were combined with the managerial control audits. The consolidation of the two audit functions was a result of the Financial Management and Control Study, carried out by the Auditor General in 1974, which recommended that audit functions should be expanded and responsible to a senior management audit committee. 67 A Planning Board meeting on the February 26, 1976, approved the transfer of 'S' Directorate Financial Audit Unit to Organizational Analysis Unit effective April 1, 1976. It was to be called Financial Audit Section. The formation of an Audit Committee composed of the three Deputy Commissioners and the Director General was also approved. A collegial decision making process seemed to exist in Planning Board, as all participants noted their views and agreement or disagreement on matters discussed. 68

Phase III of the Organization Review carried out in 1978 examined the audit function and found that there were 15 different types of audits being carried out, ranging from financial audits to operational and administrative audits of the Divisions. A second observation was the fragmentation of audit results because reports were structured under the five elements of management: planning, organizing, resource allocation, directing, and controlling. Previous reports had been by function and tended to give a more comprehensive review of the area being audited. The major recommendations from the review were that:

1. The Audit Committee should continue
2. Only two levels of audit should exist:
   (a) HQ audits of Divisions,
   (b) Division audits of Sub/Divisions

3. Other audits should be termed "managerial reviews" and may be carried out by COs and Directorate Heads.

The above recommendations were approved by the Commissioner on October 25, 1978.

The development of internal auditing is clearly related to the Glassco Commission and pressures from the Central Agencies to expand the scope of audits from compliance audits to audits of efficiency and effectiveness. As a result, the Inspection Team was transformed during the 1970s into a comprehensive audit unit consolidating the various types of audits that existed prior to 1978.

One of the major problems in audit is still linked to the role of the Inspection Team. An Officer familiar with the operations of Audit Branch said,

"I think it's still the idea of breaking away from the concept of the Inspection Team; the Commissioner and senior management expecting audit will be able to look at everything and every place...a year and a half ago he reluctantly agreed to a three year cycle."

Generally, Senior Management did not seem to grasp the concept of auditing and the role it should play in the organization even though it was stated in the terms of reference. Structurally, the consolidation of the audit functions complemented the divisionalized structure of the Force by standardizing and formalizing the centralized control process, theoretically reducing the need for direct supervision as a control mechanism.
Staffing and Personnel Branch

Staffing Branch was reorganized in 1969, as a direct result of the P.S. Ross Study, bringing together a number of fragmented staffing responsibilities which had previously been divided among the Adjutants Branch, Training Branch and Staffing Branch as illustrated in Figure 9. The Ross Study had described Staffing Branch as "highly centralized" and virtually unchanged since it was first organized in 1944.71

Prior to the Ross Study, however, a review of the staffing function had been done by Dr. W.R.N. Blair from the University of Alberta in 1967, his conclusion, like the Ross Study, was that the Branch required a thorough reorganization. He cited a fragmentation of programs, a lack of any special criteria for the selection of Personnel Officers, a lack of job analysis of positions which made career planning impossible and a lack of research into future personnel requirements. The Force took no action as a result of Blair's report, pending the completion of the Ross Study primarily because it disagreed with some of the criticisms.72

The Ross Study essentially agreed that significant changes should take place. In addition to a reorganization, it recommended that increased delegation of staffing responsibilities to the Divisions should take place and that the following programs needed to be developed,

- manpower planning
- performance appraisals
- job analysis
- personnel research73

In response to the criticism by the two studies, a number of internal studies and policy reviews were undertaken during the 1970s. The major
changes that followed focused on the delegation of increased responsibilities to the Divisions, and the development and formalization of staffing policies. The first formal decentralization of responsibilities took place April 1, 1972, when the authority to approve the suitability of applicants was delegated to the Division COs.74

In 1972, Staffing Branch undertook to develop a system of transfer planning that would attempt to plan for the eventual replacement of personnel through a program called succession planning. The objectives and advantages of the program were described as follows,

"Perhaps the most significant benefit of succession planning, is that by taking cognizance of planned job changes in career development of the individual and/or structural changes in the organization, it provides for early identification of manpower imbalances in terms of numbers, and/or skills and consequently, lead time to train members where possible, recruit where necessary and provide for planned placement in event of surpluses."75

Initially the system involved divisions sending "succession lists" of planned transfers to HQs for review, but it resulted in an immense amount of paperwork. An officer who had been in Staffing and Personnel Branch described the system thus,

"Succession planning tried to preplan every transfer but it failed because each division had a different system and when the lists arrived in HQs there wasn't enough staff to process them. What finished the system though, was when members started to have a choice on transfers because it depended on arbitrary decisions. Once that wasn't possible, succession planning became virtually impossible."

Development and revision of Succession Planning as a system continued into the 1980s, and has resulted in transfer policy, in the Administration
Manual, going from eight pages in 1970 which set out the activities and responsibilities of Staffing Branch operations to a comprehensive manual two inches thick in 1980. The new manual sets out transfer policy, procedures, position requirements, duty and location codes in a comprehensive manner as part of the succession planning process.

A study of bidding systems was also done in 1974, but the study concluded that such a system of transfers would be chaotic, citing a "lack of efficiency and time loss in actually filling" positions as the main drawbacks. In addition, the study concluded that management would be deprived "of its prerogative to manage by transferring those who, in its considered opinion, were the best people for a particular job." The Force's view was an affirmation of the existing system,

"The study...showed that the Force is as progressive as most other organizations in the area of staffing."

Promotion policy underwent a similar process of formalization and delegation as did transfer policy. The first suggestion of delegating promotion authority to the Divisions came in 1966, but no action was taken until January, 1976, when the Director of Personnel wrote to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) advising that the promotion process was beginning to entail an extremely heavy workload, sometimes involving the review of up to 400 individual personnel files. In the majority of cases the recommendations of the Division COs were followed anyway. The Director of Personnel consequently recommended the decentralization of the promotions and the formation of Division Transfer/Promotion Boards. The proposal was approved by the Commissioner as of January 20, 1976, but was limited to the promotion of
Constables and Corporals. Later, in July 1976, all promotions within the NCO ranks were delegated to the COs and the Division Transfer/Promotion Boards. The Commissioner remained the authorizing authority until July 1976 when he delegated that authority to the COs so he could act as the final level in the grievance process.78

The major formalization of transfer/promotion policy occurred in 1975 when it was recommended by the OIC Staffing Branch that policy should include a clear statement of the objectives of the system. Suggested objectives, to be included in the statement, were that transfers should meet the needs of the Force and be progressive, while taking into consideration the expectations of the individual, and prior consultation, before transfers were ordered. Merit, demonstrated ability and leadership qualities were suggested as the criteria for promotions. The recommendations were incorporated into policy in February 1975. They represented a bold initiative considering how arbitrary the system had been previously.79.

Policies that related to service guidelines for promotions to the various ranks, consideration of previous police experience and university training in respect to meeting the service guidelines for promotion, and the development of dual staffing designed to provide Civilian Members with increased career opportunities, were also under constant review and amendment.80

Recruiting policy also underwent major changes during the 1970s, which included the recruitment of women and married men for the first time in the history of the RCMP. The changes came about as a result of a severe shor-
tage of applicants during 1974, and pressure from the government to hire women in keeping with the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 1970. With the recruitment of women, recruiting standards for men were being increasingly questioned. In December 1974, the Bureau of Management Consultants reviewed the recruiting procedures of the Force and suggested a system of weighted selection standards. After being studied by the Force, approval was given to implement the "Weighted Selection Standards" or the WSS, in 1976. The system resulted in the elimination of arbitrary maximum age and minimum height standards. Under the system, a list of qualities were given points and the highest scoring applicants were recruited.

Performance evaluation systems underwent a similar transition. The first project began in April 1971, and on January 1, 1975, the standard Performance Rating and Review Report (A-26) was replaced by a Performance Evaluation and Review Report (PERR) for Senior NCOs. The objectives of the review were described in an Administration Bulletin as necessary to develop a system that would provide accurate information about members performance in a manner that standardized the information "so that realistic personnel administrative decisions...can be carried out."

A new Performance and Evaluation Profile (PEP) for Constables and Corporals was introduced in July 1978. The development of this new report began in 1973, using a rating technique called "forced choice." The forced choice technique consists of four descriptions which describe the member's performance against a number of job related questions. In it, the rater does not know which description results in the highest rating and is, therefore, forced to rate the member solely on the basis of which description.
most accurately describes the level of performance. The ratee is ultimately provided with a statement comparing his level of performance in a particular occupational group with all others in the same group.84

The old Performance Rating and Review Report was largely a behavioural assessment with four of eight qualities relating to the Force's value system. The characteristics were:

- appearance, bearing and personal grooming
- discipline
- conduct and deportment
- loyalty

In 1968, the Administration Manual instructions defined the following points to consider in assessing loyalty,

- "Does the member oppose anything which might damage the Force or its reputation?"
- Does the member refuse to bring discredit upon the Force by his action and words?
- How far does the member place the welfare of the Force ahead of other considerations?"85

The above gives some idea of how members of the Force were evaluated and what was expected of them if they expected to get ahead in the organization. The later appraisal forms were more serious about identifying work related performance characteristics.

A High Potential Development Program was also incorporated into performance appraisals in August 1975. It was designed to identify and provide members with above average performance, exposure to an increasing variety of duties and responsibilities. The program, virtually from the start, met with resistance from the Division Staffing Officers. Most of the problems centered around the vagueness of the program and the inability of the Divi-
sions to provide the kinds of opportunities necessary to make the program function. 86

No significant organizational changes have occurred in the staffing function since 1968 when the reorganization brought together previously fragmented staffing related activities in one specialized Branch. Although, in 1975, the Branch was renamed Staffing and Personnel Branch and some re-alignment of activities internally did take place. 87

Since 1968, the staffing function has undergone extensive review and delegation of some of its responsibilities to the Divisions. The net impact has been the massive formalization of staffing related functions; a process that has occurred generally throughout the Force during the 1970s. The Administration Manual was a single volume in 1968, today it is a set of ten volumes. The Officer who had been in Staffing and Personnel Branch commented on the impact of formalization on the staffing process,

"Formalization has benefited the individual by defining the rules but at the same time it has emasculated the power of staffing because decisions about human resources are made by boards, and board decisions are not consistent. The power of the OIC Staffing is thus limited by an elaborate system of policies and procedures."

Transfer policy underwent the most significant change with the introduction of Succession Planning. Elaborate and formalized procedures were developed which required the Divisions to develop succession lists for all positions and forward them to Headquarters for review. Succession Planning, as the OIC Manpower Planning Section noted, was intended to solve most of the Force's staffing problems by addressing the majority of the criticisms
in the Blair and Ross reports in respect to career planning. By late 1979, it was evident that Succession Planning was not living up to expectations, a view the Director of Personnel expressed in 1972,

"succession lists are visualized as the answer to many, if not most, of our manpower planning problems. I do not share this view."

In 1980, a major review of the program began.

The performance appraisal systems were also under continuous examination and review between April 1971 and July 1978. The changes resulted in a highly formalized system which has attempted to standardize ratings and eliminate potential bias. Ratings have become much more job related, moving away from the behavioural orientation of the A-26 which emphasized conduct and loyalty, and paid little attention to actual job performance. Promotion policy which is closely linked to the appraisal system is gradually replacing seniority with merit as the basis of promotion; however, service guidelines still continue to be part of the system. The standardization of promotion criteria and the definition of merit between Divisions also remains something of an enigma, even today.

Recruiting policy has become more liberal with the recruitment of women and married men. These changes represented a major departure from the Force's previous tradition of recruiting only single young men. The change occurred as a result of a recruiting squeeze in 1974 and pressure from the Government to have a high profile organization respond to the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.
Office of the Chief Financial Officer

Prior to the Glassco Commission Report in 1962, the Force had already undertaken a reorganization of its financial management system as a result of the Cameron Survey in 1954. The essential changes at that time had been the delegation of increased financial authority to the Division COs and the organization of the Estimates and Financial Branch in 'S' Directorate as a central point of financial control.

After the Glassco Commission reported, the Force became one of the first departments to begin a process of delegation and to examine systems related to financial planning, internal auditing, and financial control systems. According to one Senior Financial Officer who was interviewed, the Glassco Commission began a process of evolution marked by the increased delegation of responsibility to the departments in the spirit of "let the managers manage." He said,

"We did that, we embarked on a pattern of delegation but there was a failure to manage properly, as a result we had problems in the operational areas. We didn't have systems in place to review and monitor policy. On the corporate (financial) side there has been continued delegation to the COs and Senior Financial people in the Division. I would say though, we have entered a period where increased delegation has ended."

In 1966, the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) recommended that Estimates and Financial Branch be separated from 'S' Directorate and that a Budget Committee be formed. He felt that the Force was badly out of step with the basic concept of independent financial operations and accountability to the Department Head, as recommended by the Glassco Commission. In fact, the Chief Financial Officer of the Force, the OIC Estimates and Financial Section, was two levels below the Commissioner.
No action was taken on the recommendation as it was felt that Treasury Board would not allow the separation of the finance and supply functions. It was suggested that the OIC Estimates and Financial Branch report directly to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) or the Commissioner on financial matters, and to the Director of Service and Supply on services and supply matters. The Commissioner approved the suggested chain of command and the formation of the Budget Committee on April 1, 1966. The prime function of the Budget Committee was to do a program review of establishment requirements and financial allocations. That structure remained in place until the Office of the Chief Financial Officer was organized in 1979.91

In spite of the changes that had occurred following the Cameron Study and in 1966, the Chief Treasury Officer, an Officer of the Comptroller of the Treasury, continued to carry out functions relating to,

- accounting control systems, and departmental appropriations
- audit of departmental contracts and service accounts
- auditing revenues collected by the Force
- RCMP pay and pension92

In March 1969, the Government Organization Act transferred the government accounts to the Department of Services and Supply and amendments to the Financial Administration Act transferred the pre-audit and commitment control functions of the Comptroller of the Treasury Office to the departments. The premise of the transfer was that pre-audit was an integral part of the departmental management responsibility which also came out of the Glassco Commission.93 The key difference according to the Senior Financial
Officer was that "the Force was now responsible for Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Financial Administration Act," which had previously been the responsibility of the Chief Treasury Officer.

No structural changes to 'S' Directorate were considered until Phase III of the Organization Review which recommended that the Chief Departmental Financial Officer should be responsible directly to the Head of the Department. The Deputy Commissioner (Admin) was in theory the Chief Financial Officer for the Force, but in practice he was too far removed from the day-to-day financial activities and burdened with other administrative duties to meet the criteria set out by the Auditor General for an independent departmental financial officer.94

In early 1979, Treasury Board's approval was sought to reorganize 'S' Directorate in order to "strengthen the financial management and control, and accountability" mechanisms within the Force.95 According to the Senior Financial Officer, it resulted in more financial autonomy,

"We have more autonomy and financial authority but also a lot more accountability to Government."

The rationale for the reorganization was stated as being based on the need for improved financial management and control throughout government which had been stressed by the Force's immediate environment. Successive re-organizations during the preceding years which had increased the duties of the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) in the area of personnel, finance, official languages, management services and information services were also cited as rationale for a restructuring of the financial and supply areas. Approval for the reorganization of 'S' Directorate and the creation of the Financial Management Directorate was given by Treasury Board on May 1,
Structurally, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer was organized into two Directorates: Budgeting and Accounting Systems, and Financial Control and Authorities. Accountability for financial matters was now directly to the Commissioner through the Chief Financial Officer who also became part of the Senior Executive Committee. The duties related to the overall financial management and control of the RCMP and liaison with the Central Agencies. As a result of the organization of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, 'S' Directorate was restructured but remained under the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) and not as had been initially suggested under the Chief Financial Officer.97

As with many of the preceding changes they had their origins initially in the Glassco Commission and changes that came out of the Auditor General's dispute with the Government. The impact of these pressures were confirmed by the Senior Financial Officer as the primary impetus for change, but he also commented,

"the overwhelming pressure of two responsibilities created a necessity for organizational change in order to get the job done. In fact, we had been reporting directly to the Commissioner in an ad hoc way before the change."

Classification

Classification originated in the Public Service and had been carried out to facilitate the introduction of collective bargaining. Prior to 1966, well over 2,000 job titles or grades existed in the Public Service, so it was necessary to reduce the number of categories to something that would be
manageable in the collective bargaining process. 98

Following the relative success of classification in the Public Service, Treasury Board directed the Force in October 1967, to undertake the immediate development and implementation of a classification system. The essence of Treasury Board's letter, according to the OIC Classification Section, was that if the Force doesn't do it, "the Bureau of Classification Revision will do it for us." 99 The Force was thus in the position of having to undertake classification if it wanted to have any input into the process. It responded by creating an Officer's position in August 1968, and began researching classification methodology. 100

The intent of classification was to establish a basis for compensation of similar work within and between organizations. In addition, classification was intended to assist in the staffing and training processes by defining the tasks of positions and the requirements necessary to carry out those tasks. 101 The essence of classification then, became the development of standards against which jobs would be compared and ultimately classified.

Prior to 1966, establishment ratios were controlled by the number of person years in each rank and were related primarily to a span of control of four to one. 102 Many of the problems that emerged later, in respect to classification, related to the question of rank and establishment control.

By early 1970, the development of classification standards began in earnest in three areas with Treasury Board providing the expertise: Administration, Law Enforcement and Special Services. Discussions with Treasury Board on the first Administrative Standards took place early in 1971. Al-
though acceptable to Treasury Board, implementation was not authorized pending the completion of standards for the Law Enforcement and Security Service areas. In June 1972, the Law Enforcement Standard was rejected by Treasury Board and restructuring took until January 1973. At that time, the Force suggested partially implementing the Administration and Law Enforcement standards but Treasury Board again rejected that suggestion and insisted that comprehensive standards covering all positions should be approved before implementation. 103

During an interview, one Treasury Board official who had been involved in the RCMP's classification since 1972, said the Force had built the standard around comparisons of only large police forces in Canada and Treasury Board had wanted to take a more of a "middle of the road approach and use some smaller police forces in the match."

Both Treasury Board and the Solicitor General's Department had been applying pressure on the Force to complete the classification process. Pay negotiations became linked to the introduction of classification when the Solicitor General indicated he wanted it in place before the next pay review in 1973. 104 A Chief Superintendent who had been in charge of Classification Branch confirmed this during an interview,

"Treasury Board was applying considerable pressure and in at least two successive occasions linked pay negotiations to the implementation of classification. This occurred in the early 1970s. Whether linking our pay negotiations to classification slowed the negotiations is difficult to say, however, they certainly used it to get us moving on classification."

Responding to pressure from Treasury Board, the Commissioner, in an executive meeting in January 1973, emphasized that he wanted the classification
program completed as quickly as possible. Part of the problem appears to have stemmed from a shortage of qualified personnel. The OIC Classification and Compensation Branch reported on several occasions about a backlog of work. In response to the mounting complexity of the task and increasing workload, Classification and Compensation Branch was split, as illustrated in Figure 11. The reorganization was approved on April 1, 1975, and became effective in September 1975.

The implementation of classification in the RCMP was fraught with considerable problems from the beginning, first, in attempting to develop adequate standards which were rejected by Treasury Board at several different stages of the process, and secondly, as explained by the Chief Superintendent,

"The major issues in classification are the relative worth of positions and the development of benchmarks, but our major problem was we had two incompatible systems. Classification in the form of our existing rank system with fixed establishment ratios and position classification as in the Public Service system. Determining worth between some administrative areas and police functions was difficult and this is where our system was incompatible. There is a solution; that is, eliminating the requirements for police experience in administrative areas, but we're not prepared to do it because it would impact on the careers of members."

The development of standards was also complicated by the Force because of its conception of its role. Treasury Board felt that job classification should follow the Public Service model, as much as possible, in the development of standards for the Force; that is, the standards should be based on the requirements of the position and present duties. The Force insisted that its "total career" concept and the "appointment as peace officers" en-
tailed a wider range of duties that could not be captured in total, in position job descriptions. As a result, the Force felt a system of establishment controls must be part of the system.

In arguing its position, the Force said that the terms and conditions of employment for members was considerably different to that of the Public Service. The Force described itself as a police force with a well defined rank and organizational structure which had been in existence for 100 years, and that it had been highly successful as a law enforcement agency with an international reputation for efficiency and effectiveness. This success it believed was based on dedication and "unity of purpose of its members--esprit de corps." The attitude in some quarters was that job evaluation was discriminating and potentially divisive, creating a drift toward Public Service norms and values which threatened the organizational integrity of the Force.

According to the Treasury Board official, the Force put a great deal of emphasis on its traditions,

"Treasury Board used to say a policeman's job was the same no matter where you were. We actually went out and measured the weight of comparisons to other police departments to determine where the Force was different. Some of the arguments the Force was putting forward were valid, but they had to prove them.... Prior to classification, Treasury Board definitely had a low level of understanding of the Force. Treasury Board, ultimately, came around to accepting the Force's view on a number of issues and specifically that there were considerable differences in many of the duties."

During the period April 1, 1975 to December 31, 1976, 3,221 Regular Member positions were re-evaluated of which 26.9% were upgraded and 4.7% downgraded. In virtually every category upgradings exceeded downgradings.
Similar upgradings occurred in the other categories: Civilian Members and Special Constables.110

During a meeting with Treasury Board staff April 7, 1977, it was suggested that the force "hold the line" on additional rank increases until an audit could be done to determine what the major problems were. One Treasury Board official remarked he was "appalled by what he had heard." The Force conceded that the rate of re-evaluation was extremely high and the resultant increases in ranks was alarming "but hardly appalling." The meeting generally concluded that "the Public Service system of classification was ill-suited for a para-military organization."111

Several explanations were offered to account for what appeared to be uncontrolled increases in rank: increased establishments, more complex investigations, specialization, and new and expanded mandates.112 Treasury Board later recognized, that indeed, there were more factors involved in the substantial upgradings than re-evaluation and that some system of establishment control was necessary. As a result of Treasury Board's suggestion to hold the line, the Commissioner ordered that all reorganization proposals were to be forwarded to HQs for approval and that the rewriting of job descriptions would be restricted to situations where there were substantial changes in the duties of the position.113 During the interview on classification, the Chief Superintendent said,

"Our initial design was intended to maintain the status quo, but in one year there were 1098 upgradings out of 4171 re-evaluations. So it was a little out of hand for a system that was supposed to maintain the status quo. Re-evaluations were occurring mainly because Branches were reorganizing in an attempt to capitalize on the system rather than any non-acceptance."
Classification resulted in the development of a highly formalized system of job descriptions describing the functions, qualifications and experience of every individual position in the Force. The workload resulted in the organization of a separate Classification Branch in 1975. The emphasis on police experience as a component of all job descriptions was aimed at preserving the institutional characteristics of the Force and was the major stumbling block in the development of the General Field Administration Standard in 1972.

A second major contradiction between classification and the existing social structure was the recognition that classification gave to the complexity and diversity of roles and duties in the Force. Today one of the major antagonisms is between the reality of the diversity of responsibilities classification recognized, and the view of Senior Management in respect to the generalist career model. The Commissioner made his view quite clear in an interview with the media,

"Simmonds made it plain he subscribes to what his men call the 'generalist theory'.... A good investigator's a good investigator. There's nothing magic about the workings in the Security Service, and there's nothing magic about being in a murder squad."115

The Auditor General's comprehensive review of the RCMP in 1980 was critical of the Force on that very issue,

"The movement of personnel from one career stream to another may broaden their overall experience base, but it has also resulted in a loss of expertise from work areas that require an increasing amount of specialized knowledge, training, education and background experience."116

And, Morris Janowitz in *Sociology and the Military Establishment* gives an enlightening view of the "generalist" and the consequences,
"The classical military solution to the dilemmas of career development has been to emphasize as much as possible the belief that the officer must be a generalist.... Like all organization 'myths', these assumptions are essentially correct in indicating the paths of advancement, but in many cases they can be inadequate in preparing personnel for emerging tasks."117

The introduction of classification was in response to Treasury Board's instruction in late 1967 and came about as a result of the introduction of collective bargaining in the Public Service.

After a period of research and development the Force presented its first standard to Treasury Board in 1971. Disagreement emerged over the standards themselves and the timing of introduction. Treasury Board insisted on complete implementation rather than a phasing in of the standards in different areas. This delayed implementation of classification because problems were encountered in the development of Law Enforcement and General Administrative Field Standards.

The Force sought to legitimize its position by emphasizing its traditions, the total career concept and its reputation as a highly effective police agency. Classification was also perceived as threatening the organizational integrity of the Force by imposing public service norms and values.

Considerable pressure had been applied on the Force by Treasury Board. Pay negotiations during the early 1970s were tied to progress on classification. Slow negotiations and a lack of knowledge about pay negotiations became one of the major issues leading to unrest within the Force. Treasury Board's position on classification and pay negotiations, thus can to some extent be linked to the militance that developed in 1974.
Ultimately, Treasury Board yielded to the Force's view on classification and acknowledged that Public Service standards were ill suited for the RCMP. Classification was thus manoeuvred into the para-military structure through the Force's rationalized legitimacy of the total career concept and the need for establishment controls linked to the rank structure. Classification was consequently, co-opted into the Force's existing social structure with few actual changes to the organization other than a considerable number of rank upgradings.

The Social Structure

Environmental Factors

Environmental pressures that focused on the RCMP's social structure and challenged the management system, originated primarily out of internal dissatisfaction within the ranks, ultimately being translated into the immediate environment, through the larger environment, via the media. This internal dissatisfaction was examined in Chapter IV and was first evident in 1966, but was dismissed by the Force until the publication of Jack Ramsey's article in MacLean's in 1972.

A retired Commissioner recalled the circumstances of how the DSRR system was first suggested,

"By late 1972, there was a certain amount of unrest in the ranks of the Force.... Around the same time the Minister responsible for the RCMP, the Solicitor General, was in the habit of calling annual workshops for senior executives of his department and the Force. It was while heading out to a Laurentian hideout for such a workshop, that D/Commr. Bazowski first suggested the creation of a Staff Relations Representative Group."
The Official from the Auditor General's Department said he recalled attending one meeting in which the problem of internal unrest came up and "management figured they had a rebellion on their hands, there was a great deal of concern."

Out of the internal dissatisfaction came the DSRR system, the appointment of the Internal Communications Officer and the Marin Commission of Inquiry, and an overtime compensation system.

The Division Staff Relations Representatives System and the Internal Communications Officer

The DSRR System

While the organization of the DSRR System emerged directly out of Jack Ramsey's attack on the RCMP in July 1972, there is little recognition of the fact in RCMP files. Correspondence from the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) to the Director of Personnel attributed the necessity of a representative system to the reorganization or decentralization of Division Staffing which found Staffing reporting to the COs rather than directly to HQs. The DSRR Handbook noted, however, that "by late 1972, there was a certain amount of unrest in the ranks of the RCMP" without any specific reference.

In the same memorandum, the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) indicated the Commissioner had directed that serious consideration be given to establishing a system of representatives in the Force and a meeting in November (1972) was proposed to facilitate the opportunity for members to express their concerns and views to senior management. Specific instructions as to how the representatives were to be selected were not spelled out. It was suggested, that in view of the short time before the proposed meeting,
"The representatives to the first meeting could perhaps be picked on a more ad hoc basis with a view to developing procedures, etc. by which representatives for further meetings could be appointed...."121

Initially there had been accusations that the Force was attempting to control the representative system through the appointment of representatives, however, they would appear to be largely unfounded. The Commissioner, in later correspondence to the Division COs, indicated his views on the matter of selection of representatives,

"What I have in mind is a selection by the members themselves of a representative for each Division."122

Although, an Officer familiar with the DSRR System and the role of the Internal Communications Officer was of the opinion that appointed representatives continued to be part of the system until as late as 1974.

There was little reaction from the Division COs concerning the meeting with the exception of the COs of "E" and "K" Divisions, who wanted to postpone the meeting until after the COs Conference which was scheduled for December 1972. The reply from the CO "E" contained a hint that the existing status quo was being disregarded,

"The proposal advanced in this correspondence (Commissioner's) is a departure from anything we have done in the sphere of our activities previously and while departures from established and well entrenched methods are sometimes good, the time frame in this particular case is very short."123

The representative meeting was held from the 15th to 17th November, 1972. The purpose of the meeting was to establish guidelines for future representative meetings. Communications was emphasized by management as the fundamental issue and the representatives were advised the meeting was not a forum for individual complaints or grievances, or a process of confrontation
or negotiations. Issues that were on the agenda related to dress regulations, performance evaluation, pay, overtime, haircuts, promotions and transfers.124

Guidelines for the representative system were set out later in the Commissioner's Bulletin dated November 28, 1972 as follows:

- each Division was to have one representative
- representatives must be elected
- representatives would have access to senior management
- representatives would be free to communicate with the members they represent
- meetings were to be held annually, with the next meeting scheduled for October, 1973.125

The Solicitor General's interest in the meeting was conveyed to the Commissioner by the Deputy Solicitor General who raised a number of questions regarding whether the representatives had been appointed or elected. The Commissioner replied indicating the majority had been selected by committees of Sub/Representatives from Sub/Divisions, and advised that the selection of future representatives would be guided by the principles which had been established at the first meeting.126

The second CO/DSRR meeting November 26, 1973, dealt with a variety of administrative matters, but seemed to have generated no major issues or any confidence in the system, as events in early 1974 were to prove.127 The pivotal year for the program became 1974 when member dissatisfaction took on decidedly militant overtones. The Commissioner hastily called a CO/DSRR meeting for May 8, 1974. Planning Board had met the previous day and agreed there was a need for "a truly representative system, no appointments, to
serve as an effective channel of communication and to make management more responsive." General agreement was reached that a change in the style of management was required with more flexibility and increased delegation of power to the Division COs.128

Minutes from the May 1974 meeting indicate the Commissioner recognized that autocratic management style was a problem. DSRRs from the Divisions had inferred that much of the blame for the loss of credibility of the DSRR system in 1972 and 1973 resulted from the lack of co-operation and support they received from the line officers and the COs, although exceptions were cited. Frequent references were made during the meeting about the fear of reprisals if members raised grievances, the lack of trust in senior management and the feeling that management was ineffective in its dealings with Treasury Board.129

A S/Sgt. who had been a DSRR for eight years confirmed that relations with Treasury Board had been a source of problems,

"Slow pay" negotiations and a lack of information about negotiations were a major issue in 1972 and 1973. The DSRR wanted to take over pay negotiations after 1974, but Treasury Board rejected the idea and wasn't even prepared to allow a DSRR representative to sit in on the pay committee.

The Force was putting pressure on Treasury Board threatening to tell the membership the DSRR system wasn't working. Treasury Board was totally uncompromising, their attitude was if you want collective bargaining form a bargaining unit."

The HQ's DSRR in his address to the 1974 meeting, said that he had warned that if action was taken to cap the strong feelings "the situation would explode. He was told to cap it. It exploded." The CO "E" Division
said he had spoken to 60 junior members and had been told that if the Vancouver City Police went on strike on May 10, 1974, "there was no way this Force was going to use them as strike breakers." What emerged from the meeting was a strong commitment by the COs to make the program work if it was given another opportunity. It was, however, apparent that one of the overriding concerns was to avoid a union at all costs.130

The Solicitor General, Mr. Warran Allmand, in his opening address to the meeting, said he had been surprised by the meetings in Toronto and Vancouver because "he was not aware that any serious problems existed." He indicated his support for the DSRR system and said government wanted good morale and suggested the government was not too interested in seeing a union in the Force.131

One of the questions that emerges is how could a management system be oblivious to morale problems over such an extended period of time. The following remark by the CO of "J" Division indicated part of the problem,

"The A-26s, Inspection Reports, and Personnel Interview Reports going across his desk had simply surfaced no general complaints."132

The S/Sgt who was interviewed elaborated further on the issue,

"there was very little recognition by the Force of what the problems really were, to them it was just discontentment. I would say management's style was the real problem which created a communications problem."

The Officer familiar with the DSRR System and the Internal Communications Officer's role agreed,

"One of the issues was a red tape road block, senior management wasn't getting a true picture of what was happening out there. A morale problem in a Division would not reach the C.O., if the C.O. was the problem."
Following the sharp criticism of Senior Management in the May 1974 meeting, new terms of reference for the DSRRs were contained in a memorandum signed by the Commissioner October 9, 1974. The number of representatives was to be based on representation by population, representatives were to be elected freely for a maximum term of two years and any member could run as a representative. The representatives were to be responsible to the membership and the CO of the Divisions, and he was to have direct access to the CO and the Internal Communications Officer at HQs. In addition, they were to have:

- access to all normal channels of communication
- meetings were to be held twice a year
- one DSRR was to be directly involved in pay negotiations
- one DSRR would sit on NCO Promotion Boards at HQs
- the chain of command was to be adhered to unless valid reasons existed for more direct methods

No further changes were made to the system until the November 21, 1977 CO/DSRR meeting when the current Commissioner in his opening address to the meeting raised the issue of DSRR accountability in terms of the cost of the program which was approaching $750,000. The Commissioner indicated that he supported a staff relations program in the Force but because of the cost, he felt the regulations governing the program needed to be better defined.

A Committee was formed to examine the Commissioner's concerns and to make recommendations. It consisted of four COs and four DSRRs under the chairmanship of the CO "E" Division, a Deputy Commissioner. In a memorandum to the CO of "E" Division on December 21, 1977, the Commissioner defined his
main concerns as:

- a need for clear terms of reference and accountability
- the issue of tenure, i.e. how long can a member remain a DSRR
- some controls on the DSRR other than being responsible to the membership
- the judicious use of channels of communications

The issues raised by the Commissioner gave the appearance of restricting the activities of the DSRRs, however, the committee came to the conclusion that trying to define the role would "stifle rather than help the program." Changes that ultimately resulted from the work of the committee were primarily administrative procedures regarding monthly reporting of statistics, performance rating of the DSRRs themselves, election procedures and some cosmetic changes to the role of the DSRR. The latter changes related to accountability and communicating with the media. The net effect was the increased formalization and definition of the procedures in which the DSRR system functioned and how it was organized.

The guidelines and terms of reference are essentially unchanged today. The DSRR System continues to function and few major issues of a jurisdiction nature have arisen. DSRR newsletters and the contents have surfaced as issues on several occasions but no changes have been made to the policy on the contents of their newsletters. The DSRR newsletters represent the only informal communications mechanism that is not directly responsible to management; and as such it fills a limited role of debate and consensus building within the organization.
The Internal Communications Officer

A parallel development to the restructured DSRR Program in 1974 was the appointment of the Communications Officer on April 29, whose role was to,

"meet with groups of members across the Force on a continuing basis to explain management decisions and to advise management of matters that personnel wished looked into."138

The appointment of the Communications Officer was intended to demonstrate Senior Management's willingness and commitment to improved communications, and was described as,

"a further dimension in our efforts to improve lines of communications which becomes more and more necessary as the Force grows in size and complexity."139

No sooner had the appointment been made than attempts were made to limit and clarify the role. The Director of Personnel in correspondence to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) emphasized that the Internal Communications Officer should only act as a link to the Commissioner's Office in unusual circumstances,

"Essentially he is a direct communications link functioning from the Commissioner's Office after normal means have been attempted and found wanting. I have no objection to this item provided the Commissioner's Office does not become a direct formal channel."140

The Deputy Commissioner (Criminal Operations) also had reservations, he felt the terms of reference were ill defined and conflicted with some of the Force's basic management principles. The Deputy Commissioner (Admin), while agreeing to the general thrust of guidelines, felt that the normal lines of communications should not be bypassed. His view was that the role of the Commissioner's Office should be one of co-ordinating the Division Representatives' activities "with the emphasis on communication rather than
having any sort of line responsibility which properly belongs to the responsibility centres concerned."141 Apparently the Commissioner did not agree entirely with the dissenting views as a Bulletin published later did not substantially change the terms of reference. The Internal Communications Officer was to continue to report directly to the Commissioner on matters relating to the DSRR program.142

The Officer, familiar with the role and responsibilities of the Internal Communications Officer, agreed that it was possible that some people in Senior Management would have liked to see the Internal Communications Officer access to the Commissioner limited,

"I have no doubt in my mind that there are COs that object that the ICO has direct access to the Commissioner. The fact that the DSRRs can get access to the Commissioner does not sit well with them either."

He indicated the current Internal Communications Officer does not have the same contact with the Commissioner as the original Internal Communications Officer but deals with the Deputy Commissioner (Admin) on most issues. He described the Internal Communications Officer's role as facilitating upward communications and co-ordinating issues among the DSRRs. The crucial issue in his opinion was the relationship between the Division CO and the DSRR. At one point the Internal Communications Officer actually was moved to 'A' Directorate for a short period in 1976, as related by the S/Sgt who had been a DSRR,

"I was in the program about two years and suddenly the ICO couldn't get to the Commissioner. I raised the issue and got a lot of support from the other DSRRs. The ICO was moved back to the Commissioner's Office."
Both the DSRR System and the Internal Communications Officer came about as a result of internal dissatisfaction amongst members of the Force. Jack Ramsey's article in *Maclean's* in 1972 was the main catalyst in the formation of the DSRR System. Initially, the attitude in management would appear to be one of indifference as there were no major decisions apparent in Planning Board, and the matter of organizing the system was left to the Deputy Commissioner (Admin). His inclination was that representatives should be appointed, however, later correspondence from the Commissioner indicated that representatives should be selected by the membership of each Division.

The DSRR program emerged from the first Conference in 1972 clearly within the confines of the existing command structure, with DSRR communications to the general membership controlled by the Division CO and with only one annual meeting. The fundamental advance that emerged out of the program was the election of representatives and their right to communicate directly with senior management.

The Force attempted to focus the issues on communications and professionalism, away from charges of autocratic management style which tended to threaten or challenge the existing rank structure, the chain of command and the absolute prerogatives of management; all an integral part of the Force's social structure. It was evident from the remarks of the DSRRs that members generally, mistrusted management and feared reprisals if they lodged complaints.

Only under strong pressures from an increasingly militant membership in 1974 was there any acknowledgement that some changes in management style were required. Senior Management took a new interest in the DSRR Program when an unscheduled CO/DSRR's meeting was called in May 1974. More flexible
and broader guidelines resulted along with full-time elected representatives who had travel and communication rights. DSRRs were also brought into the policy and decision making process through representation on promotion boards and a variety of other committees.

What appears to have been an attempt by the Commissioner to restrict the DSRRs' role in 1977 was rejected by a Committee of COs and DSRRs. They suggested increased control would stifle the program. However, the intent of the Commissioner's address may in fact have been a legitimate concern regarding accountability, but limiting the program could have reduced the effectiveness of the program. The continued existence of the DSRR system, in part, no doubt rests on the lingering fear of a full fledged association within the RCMP.

One of the fundamental problems was the failure of management to recognize that serious issues were emerging. The evidence would indicate that negative information was not being passed upwards into the system. The explanation would appear to be that it would reflect on the people who were in charge of the particular area.

The Internal Communications Officer came about as a result of the internal pressures in 1974 and his role was to act as a linking mechanism between the DSRR System and the Commissioner's Office. Here again, there were attempts to limit the role of Internal Communications Officer by limiting his direct access to the Commissioner's Office to exceptional circumstances.

The development of the DSRR system and the appointment of the Internal Communications Officer were resisted by different sectors of the Officer Corps, on the grounds that it conflicted with the Force's basic management
principles or that it was a departure from past practices. The principles or practices were never clearly defined, however, the appeal was clearly aimed at maintaining the status quo. The majority were overruled by the various Commissioners of the day until 1977, when the Commissioner attempted to clarify and define the DSRR's role.

The major impact of the DSRR system and the Internal Communications Officer is that they represented a sensing mechanism for management. However, they are clearly structured to function within the parameters of the Force's existing policy and decision making process, thereby, reducing the threat to the social structure of the Force. The acceptance of the role of the DSRR system within the existing structure demonstrates the success of the Force in co-opting internal dissent into the policy and decision making structure of the Force, without significantly altering the existing social structure.

The Marin Commission

The internal dissatisfaction that resulted in a restructuring of the DSRR System in 1974, also led to the appointment of the Marin Commission of Inquiry by the Government. However, before the Commission even reported in 1976, the RCMP was already revamping its grievance and disciplinary procedures, which the Commission had described as virtually unchanged in the 100 year history of the RCMP.143

Prior to the Commission of Inquiry, the RCMP Regulations specified how complaints were to be handled,

"93(1) Every member who feels he has been injured or aggrieved or that he has suffered any personal oppression, injustice or other ill-treatment may make a complaint in the manner prescribed in these regulations,..."
Complaints were to be sent through the "normal chain of command" in writing, respectful in tone and "neither frivolous nor vexatious in nature," to such a level that if the complaint was found to be true, the Officer had the authority to order redress. If the complaint was not forwarded within a reasonable period of time the complainant could "forward it directly to the person to whom it is addressed." 144

In the case of discipline procedures, a member who was under investigation for a disciplinary offence was accorded due process, in that he was allowed to be represented by another member of the Force of his choosing, to ensure that his interests were safeguarded. The Service Court was also held before an independent tribunal officer. 145 An offender, however, was obliged to give a statement when being investigated; if he refused, he could be ordered to do so. Although this ordered statement could not be used as evidence, it was used to further the investigation. 146

Discipline, as Chapter III emphasized, has always been an important part of the Force's traditions. In 1968, the Administration Manual cited,

"Obedience to lawful authority is an outstanding quality required of a member of the Force, and a member shall receive the lawful command of his superior with deference and respect, executing it promptly to the best of his ability without question or comment." 147

Today the philosophy of the present disciplinary system appeals to the need for self-discipline as a requirement for effective policing,

"No group of people can work together without some form of organized control and discipline. The nature of our profession, as peace officers, demands that we set for ourselves a much higher standard of conduct than is expected of a member of the general public,
and that we be willing to live by a much stricter code of self-discipline. We are mindful that our everyday actions, both on-the-job and in private lives are judged by the public in our role as peace officers, not as private citizens.”148

In correspondence prepared for the Solicitor General, in the event he was questioned in the House on the matter of discipline, following the publication of Jack Ramsey's article in July, 1972, the Force wrote, "today the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have developed a body of regulations...which have contributed in no small measure to the development of a police force whose competence is of the highest and whose reputation is second to none in the world.”149

The Force's view was that any dilution of the enforcement of discipline would undermine the stability, the integrity, and reduce effectiveness and efficiency of the RCMP. The concluding remark, was that the Government did not intend to conduct an inquiry into the code of discipline or the enforcement of discipline within the Force. Events in early 1974 overtook that position and the Commission was actually established October 31, 1974.150

By the time the Commission reported, changes to the grievance and discipline procedures were underway within the Force. Serious disciplinary breaches, where a charge is laid are still dealt with through Service Court under Section 25 "Major Service Offence" and Section 26 "Minor Service Offence" of the RCMP Act. Lesser infractions are dealt with through a hierarchy of sanctions beginning with a "cautioning," an oral admonishment and a "warning," a written reprimand.151

Punishments, which are prescribed in Section 36 of the Act, vary depending on whether the offence was a "minor" or "major" service offence from
confinement to barracks, loss of seniority, reduction in rank, fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Compulsory discharge is the sole prerogative of the Commissioner.152

One of the major complaints of the Commission was the strong link between performance on the job and discipline which they felt was inappropriate.153 Today unsatisfactory performance, rather than a disciplinary matter, is dealt with in a corrective manner, with the member either being advised or served with a "notice of shortcomings." The member is provided with supervision and counselling, if required, before any disciplinary action or discharge is considered.154

Appeals to the Commissioner continue to be an element of the disciplinary process, although, under Section 43 of the Act, the Minister may convene a Review Board composed of a Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner and two other Officers above the rank of Superintendent. They review the evidence and make recommendations to the Commissioner. The Commissioner, however, is not bound by the recommendations.155

Changes to the grievance process were made in late 1975, and are now part of the Staff Relations program which is administered by Staff Relations Branch which was formed June 1, 1975.156 A member is now allowed to seek the assistance of the DSRR or any other member in preparing a grievance and there are four executive levels to which a grievance can be taken:

1. Officer Commanding of the Sub/Division
2. Commanding Officer of the Division
3. Deputy Commissioner (Admin)
4. The Commissioner (whose ruling is final)
Grievances are loosely defined as "problems or grievances concerning his (a member's) well being at work," so that virtually any matter can be grieved including discipline, performance matters, transfers and promotions. The grievance process is highly formalized with specific procedures and time frames detailed in policy.157

The DSRRs also sit on Grievance Advisory Boards which are convened at the CO's level. The inclusion of the DSRRs on the Grievance Advisory Board incorporates an individual who is outside the formal chain of command and who is an elected representative. In extreme cases, he has the right to go directly to the Commissioner or raise the issue at CO/DSRR Conferences, which might be considered a quasi-political level.

When the Marin Commission Report was submitted to Government on January 16, 1976, Senior Management's initial response was that it would have far-reaching effects if implemented in its entirety. Although considered fair and unbiased, it was termed a "sugar coated indictment of RCMP management."158

A Committee was established to examine the review and comment on the Commission's Report. Comments were also solicited from Officers and members across the Force. Serious reservations were expressed about the need for a Federal Ombudsman which was the major recommendation, and his role in the discipline and grievance process. The Committee's position was that many of the recommendations would require serious analysis before any action could be taken.159 Government, while flexible on most issues, felt that "third party review" was mandatory; whether through a Federal Ombudsman as recommended by the Commission, or an RCMP suggestion that the Federal Court could act as the third party.160
A second committee, made up of officials from the Solicitor General's Department, Privy Council, Treasury Board Secretariat and Senior Management of the Force, was also formed to review the Commission's findings in October, 1976. The Committee reviewed the report and emphasized "the need for the Force to become more visibly responsive to the concerns of the general public," and the need to extend comparable rights to members involved in disciplinary proceedings as enjoyed by citizens in criminal courts.161

To date, three Bills to amend the RCMP Act in line with the Marin Commission recommendations have been presented to Parliament but have died on the order paper. The latest Bill C-13 would see a major overhaul of the RCMP Act in respect to how discipline and misconduct would be treated.162

The major changes with respect to this study would be the introduction of "Discipline Standards" and a "Code of Conduct" which would replace the current list of "Offences" in Section 25 of the RCMP Act. The new Act would create an External Review Committee consisting of three members appointed by Governor-in-Council which would deal with internal matters. The Commissioner would not, however, be bound by the recommendation of the Committee. Included in the Act is the establishment of a Public Complaints Commission to deal with public complaints against the Force or members of the Force.163

When internal dissatisfaction originally surfaced to challenge the existing social structure, the Force initially emphasized to the Minister the importance of discipline to the reputation of the Force and its role in law enforcement. This view of discipline as an obligation, had been supported by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1955 in a ruling between "Archer vs White", 

"the member, by joining the Force, has agreed to enter into a body of special relations, to accept certain duties and responsibilities, to submit to certain restrictions upon his freedom of action and conduct and to certain coercive and punitive measures prescribed for enforcing fulfillment of what he has undertaken. These terms are essential elements of a status voluntarily entered into which affects what, by the general law, are civil rights, that is, action and behaviour which is not forbidden him as a citizen."164

As late as 1976, the Commissioner wrote to all Division COs stressing the importance of discipline and protocol, and requested that all Officers in the Divisions be advised to take steps to improve the lapse of both:

"During recent months it has been noted there has been a deterioration, not only with respect to the standard of dress and personal grooming of members, but also a certain erosion in protocol has been noted in that proper respect is not always being shown to Officers, i.e. members not saluting at all required times.... This deterioration can only lead to a loss of public respect."165

The appointment of the Marin Commission in 1974, as a result of internal dissatisfaction, to some extent removed the issue of discipline from the Force's hands. Particularly, since the Committee involved other departments and agencies in the Force's immediate environment.

The Force has responded by implementing new grievance and discipline procedures linked to the DSRR System and allowed grievances at four levels. The procedures, however, remained completely within the Force's administrative structure, and mainly represent a liberalization and formalization of the existing procedures. Inclusion of the DSRRs was the major departure. Performance matters were separated from the discipline procedures with a formal procedure of notification of shortcomings established. The major change was really one of attitude, and this combined with a new grievance
procedure incorporating the DSRRs, has resulted in more grievances.

Discipline continues to be an integral part of the control system and philosophy of the Force as illustrated above, however, the tone has shifted more toward an ethic of self-discipline. Many of the actual control systems remain intact in spite of the shift in emphasis.

The Marin Commission, itself, tended to be an understatement of the issues. In commenting on the discipline system, it said, "this has resulted in some deterioration of morale" and in referring to the events leading to the formation of the DSRR program, "a number of factors led to the formation of the Division Staff Relations Representative Program." 166 Senior management even commented on the report as a "sugar coated indictment of RCMP management." 167

One of the major changes in the disciplinary procedures that originated entirely separate from the Marin Commission is the permissibility of members seeking outside legal counsel. This occurred when the Federal Court, Trail Division ruled on a case before it, that Section 33 of the RCMP Regulations which restricted representation to members of the Force was "ultra vires" and "held that a member is entitled to be represented by counsel of his choice." 168 The RCMP did not appeal the ruling and in fact extended the use of legal counsel into other areas including "discharge and demotion" proceedings. 169

The Overtime Issue

Overtime as an issue went as far back as 1966, but the Force did not undertake any action to address it until 1970. At that time a study, conducted by Treasury Board and the RCMP, concluded that overtime was the
single largest disutility in respect to working conditions. Several trials which incorporated "lieu time off" were run and then a survey listing seven alternatives was conducted to determine what method was preferred by the membership.

The results of the survey indicated there was strong support for hourly compensation for overtime worked, with 48% in favour of that alternative. A second alternative combining overtime payment and equivalent lieu time off received 16.5% support, while five other alternatives with different arrangements of lump sum premium payments received even less support. In spite of a near 50% support for hourly overtime out of seven alternatives, the study concluded that a lack of support for hourly overtime was apparent, "The results of the Questionnaire revealed that none of the alternatives presented was favoured by more than 50% of the respondents." The results of the study revealed that none of the alternatives presented was favoured by more than 50% of the respondents.

Combined, the two hourly pay systems accounted for 65% of the membership.

As a result of the study, the Force negotiated a lump sum premium of $900 for overtime for the 1972/73 fiscal year. However, overtime returns for that period indicated a drastic reduction in overtime reported so that for the 1973/74 fiscal year, the premium fell to $600. By May 1974, when the DSRRs met with the Commissioner, it was apparent that the premium system was not widely supported, a point the DSRRs emphasized. Under considerable pressure from the DSRRs, the Force implemented overtime compensation on October 1, 1974.

The overtime issue did not surface again until the CO/DSRR Conference in May/June, 1977. At that time in response to a submission by the CO "L" Division, another study of possible alternatives was undertaken by the OIC.
Policy, Planning and Evaluation Section of Staffing and Personnel Branch.

The CO "L" Division suggested that the current overtime system of compensation for overtime worked "does not fit well with the particular nature of duties carried out by the Force." A decrease in voluntary overtime being worked by members, complicated administration, subordinates earning more than their superiors, erosion of efficiency and understand standardized application of policy were cited as some of the problems. At the onset, the DSRRs were opposed to any other system of overtime being implemented.174

The study took what could be described as the "traditional" RCMP approach to problem solving or studies generally. Opinions and suggestions were sought from all the Division COs. A total of 62 identifiable responses were received of which 42 were in favour of retaining the hourly overtime system and 20 were in favour of returning to the premium system.175

Several of the responses graphically illustrate the views held by some of the Officers in respect to overtime. An Insp. from one of the northern Divisions wrote,

"In my opinion our present overtime program is a most terrible thing.... It has done more to harm the Force than anything else which has occurred during my service. It has almost destroyed our professionalism, lowered our standards of performance and acceptance, hurt our overall morale, frustrated our rank system, ruined initiative, caused a need for outside employment.... One would have to write a book to cover completely the problems.... We must have the Premium Payment System."176

A rather emotional response, yet another Insp. replied in the same vein,

"It's about time we got back to square one and started putting men back on the street where they are most needed.... Members would also stop keeping track of time or stop "clock watching" and be more concerned about doing a professional job as and when required."177
Evidently the command structure and the Force's traditions were perceived as being threatened by overtime.

Responses in favour, varied from reasoned replies, to simply positive replies, but most focused on the fact that overtime was fair and equitable to those who actually worked the overtime. One DSRR wrote,

"I am unaware of any widespread dissatisfaction with it (overtime) among the members at large whom I represent. Any premium system would always pay someone who didn't earn it and fall short of properly compensating others."178

The entire issue and the factors involved are probably summarized best by the following reply from a Supt.,

"I detect a strong desire in the minds of many in our senior management that they would like to go back to the 1950's when everything was straight forward, tranquil and not bothersome. There is also an element of resentment and jealousy that members today have it too good and they may make more money than Officers. We are living in the late 1970's and management must move along with the times. If they think they can go back one minute in time, they are dreaming idle dreams.... I do not agree with the majority of observations of the C.O. "L" Division. Many of the situations he mentions could be a reflection of poor management."179

In the final analysis, the DSRR in "L" Division reported the results of a poll taken in his Division, 19 members were in favour of some form of premium system and 63 favoured the hourly overtime compensation system.180

A report was submitted by the OIC Policy, Planning & Evaluation Section proposing several variations of a premium system, but the issue simply died. There was very little support in the first instance for a premium system, although the report stated,

"Throughout the Force there is no clear consensus with respect to the type of overtime compensation which is desired or supported."181
Yet several replies had noted that the Force had tried the premium system and it had not worked, and the responses were approximately 75% in favour of hourly overtime.

Problems with hourly overtime were identified as a lack of strict control, a change in attitudes which has not enhanced the Force's professional status and an assumption that members have put the dollar above "career and pride in service to the community." The report implied that a premium system would,

- retain the unique character of the Force
- avoid creating supervisor/subordinate conflict
- maintain relativity of supervisors/subordinate pay
- would encourage cooperation and professionalism

Interestingly, most of the dogmatic debate on the issue of overtime came from regions which represented only a few hundred members of the Force's entire population, Prince Edward Island and the northern regions. British Columbia and Alberta which represent almost 40% of the Force's population, and where overtime would likely be a valid issue, generated no such emotional responses.

Hourly overtime represented a major problem for the command structure by linking the utilization of manpower to resource allocation and rational economic decision making. That represented a challenge to the command structure which was based on rigid discipline and obedience to lawful command, not rational economic or operational decision making. Management, attempted to introduce a system that essentially maintained the status quo,
which was evident in the first study in 1970. Even though 65% favoured an hourly overtime system in some form, the conclusions of the report inferred that there was a lack of support. It is difficult to support a statement that there was a lack of consensus on the issue. The analysis of the questionnaire can be described as suspect.

The attempt to return to a premium system in 1977 originated with middle management and had little support within the organization and management generally. Overtime represented a challenge to the social structure of the Force, and the statement by the CIB Officer in "G" Division emphatically made that point. The final report by the OIC Policy, Planning & Evaluation Section, also demonstrated a clear bias toward maintaining the command structure by appealing to the need for a return to the old traditional values and recommending a return to some form of premium system. The report contained a number of comfortable rationalizations or tautologies, the validity of which were never tested, such as,

"The present hourly system, while generally considered equitable, discourages 'voluntary overtime', reduces professionalism to some degree...."183

"there can be little doubt that our efficiency is reduced when extra effort is discouraged."184

Implicit in these statements is the assumption that overtime reduces professionalism and encourages inefficiency.

The Commissioner's attitude in 1974 is evident from a statement he made in an address to the Ottawa Area Officers meeting November 27, 1974,

"Before opening the forum let me touch briefly on some of the highlights of my remarks to the men in the field....I ended by a few quotations hoping to remind the members of our purpose in life; and also, to stop asking and start contributing.185
Yet in summary of the Force's structure and activities prepared for P.S. Ross Consultants in 1968, the Force reported that for the fiscal year 1966/67 members "worked an average of two hours, 34 minutes of uncompensated overtime daily." No overtime was paid and in order to achieve a 40 hour work week, an additional 1,919 members would have to be added to the Force's establishment. The amount of overtime reported above suggests that members had been contributing.

CONCLUSION

It is evident throughout that the majority of organizational changes that occurred in the RCMP between 1968 and 1980 had their origins in either the immediate environment or the internal environment. With few exceptions the changes that focused on the task structure resulted from the emergence of new goals in the immediate environment. Pressures that focused on the social structure originated primarily in the internal environment and were translated through the large environment into the immediate environment before resulting in any organizational change. The major environmental changes were the introduction of PPBS in 1966 which came out of the Glassco Commission and internal dissatisfaction in 1974, both resulting in a state of organizational crises within the RCMP.

Organizational crises has been defined by Jeffory D. Ford in an article "The Management of Organizational Crises" as,

"a situation exhibiting two characteristics: threat and time pressure. The threat is that participants in a crises feel they will be unable to achieve, obtain, or maintain the values, resources, or objectives they view as important... The second characteristic, time pressure, is the perception by the participants in the crises of the amount of time they have
to search, deliberate, and take action before losses begin to occur or escalate."187

In both the major environmental changes these conditions were evident. In the case of PPBS the threat was that of being unable to achieve the introduction of PPBS without a major initiative and the threat of being perceived as not acting in good faith, while in the case of internal dissatisfaction, the threat was to the value system or the social structure.

Time was viewed as a critical element following the introduction of PPBS,

"My concern at the moment is that if we do not take the initiative now to set up adequate machinery to handle this important phase of our management control, it may be inferred that we are not accepting this responsibility seriously and in good faith."188

And in the case of internal dissatisfaction, Senior Management felt that they had to act or face the threat of unionization.

The Glassco Commission on the Organization of Government clearly emerges as the main catalyst for change in the immediate environment and the formulation of new goals in relation to departmental management and accountability. These new goals were translated through the immediate environment and had a direct impact on the structural changes that occurred in the RCMP following the Ross Study.

The immediate environment also had a direct role in determining the partial direction of the Ross Study, the introduction of classification, the Organization Review and the Marin Commission of Inquiry. The latter case represented one of the few instances in which the larger environment also played a direct role.
The Ross Study was a broad examination of the Force's structure which was in response to the introduction of PPBS and the general thrust of the Glassco Commission. To a large extent, the study was not well received by the Force; but it did establish the structural framework of the organization in the administrative areas, out of which other organizational changes flowed, such as the transition of Planning Branch and Audit Branch.

Later pressures from the immediate environment resulted in the organization of the Financial Directorate under the Chief Financial Officer. It was less directly related to the Glassco Commission, although appointment of a senior financial officer in the departments had been recommended, it was not translated through the immediate environment until much later. In 1966 the Force actually considered such a move but felt Treasury Board would not approve such a re-organization. Treasury Board was also the main catalyst for the Force undertaking its own organization review in 1977.

The impact of the internal environment is evident in the organization of the DSRR System and the appointment of the Internal Communications Officer. Pressures in the internal environment initially found their way into the larger environment and finally into the immediate environment, resulting in the Marin Commission. Of significance was the complete failure of the two sensing mechanisms—the Officer Corps and Staffing Branch—to sense the gravity of the situation and to comprehend the nature of the issues; even though they were aware of some problems as early as 1966.

On the whole, significant changes had taken place in the RCMP's environment during the 1960s and 1970s. Much of the pressure was of a formal bureaucratic nature in the form of new Government guidelines and directives from the Central Agencies and could not legitimately be ignored by the
RCMP. In the classification case and the P.S. Ross Study, Treasury Board and the Solicitor General's Department actually applied direct pressure on the Force.

Considerable organizational change followed between 1968 and 1980 as a result of the environmental pressures as Figures 9 and 10 illustrate. But as important as the structural change, was the formalization of the administrative processes within the Force, illustrated by the Staffing and Personnel Branch case study, but evident in other areas as well.

In analyzing the structure, specialization or at least the organization of related activities into separate branches is most evident. Many of the functions, such as compensation, establishment and internal affairs had been responsibilities of the Adjutant's Branch but were not organized in any functional way until after the P.S. Ross Study. The Ross Study emerges as the single most important study since the changes that resulted were not incremental. Later organizational changes, such as the formation of the Financial Directorate and the appointment of the Internal Communications Officer occurred as a result of specific needs.

Formalization of activities occurred on an extensive scale as illustrated in the detailed examination of the staffing function. Recruiting policy, performance appraisals, transfer and promotion policy were all examined and new policies and guidelines, etc., were developed during the 1970s. In Planning Branch and Internal Audit, terms of reference were reviewed and redefined as new guidelines emerged from the immediate environment giving rise to an incremental process of development in both functions. The incremental approach to change, particularly in planning and audit suggests there was a lack of comprehension of the changing roles in senior management.
Classification represented a massive process of formalization. Classification standards and benchmarks were developed, and detailed job descriptions outlining the duties and requirements for each position in the Force were written. In the Internal Affairs and the Staff Relations areas new discipline and grievance procedures were developed and implemented.

In general, the system can be described as highly bureaucratic because of the extensive degree of formalization of procedures, job descriptions, terms of reference, rules and the like. While formalization reduces the number of decisions that must be made by the leadership, by establishing and defining the parameters of decision-making within the lower levels of the organization, it also reduces the authority of the line officers and reserves discretionary power for the strategic apex.

Quasi-planning and audit functions existed before the Glassco Commission; however, they took on a new importance as planning and controlling systems after 1968. Planning Branch became involved in PPBS and the development of Policies, Objectives and Goals for the Force, and later performance measurement and program evaluation. Audit Branch became responsible for operational and administrative audits of the Divisions. Both roles focused on the standardization of outputs; but in the absence of realistic performance measures, close supervision remains a fundamental part of the control system as the Auditor General noted in his 1981 Comprehensive Audit.

"In the absence of comprehensive, quantifiable measures of workload and performance, the RCMP relies on the uniform training and development of police officers, close supervision of work, and frequent reviews, inspections and audits of operations to ensure an acceptable level of efficiency and quality in the delivery of police services. We found that the
RCMP's development and use of performance measures was generally consistent with other police forces.189

The establishment of the DSRR System represented the development of an internal sensing and mediating mechanism which essentially replaced the Officer Corps and Staffing Branch as the main internal sensing mechanisms. The emergence of militant dissatisfaction in 1974 demonstrated the lack of effective feedback mechanisms so that the organization was clearly out of touch with its internal environment. Even when issues surfaced, as in Haig-Brown's report in 1944 and during the period 1966 to 1974, senior management ignored or discounted them. The consequence was that once the issues found their way into the larger environment the Force proved to be rather open to change in spite of its relative independence and autonomy.

Even though the RCMP has improved its ability to sense the internal environment, the Officer Corps remains the only liaison device between the Force and the external environment which the Solicitor General's Department found during the early 1970s when they attempted to gain influence within the Force,

"the Solicitor General's Department secretariat found the lower levels of the Force impenetrable."190

The Deputy Solicitor General conceded,

"The only person in the driver's seat was the Commissioner. So the politician had to exert some influence on the appointment of the Commissioner."191

The NCO from Planning Branch commented on the Commissioner's concern about liaison outside the Force, and a second NCO familiar with the role of the Ministerial Information Unit explained its role,
"MIU's role is to control the flow of correspondence between the Solicitor General's Department and the Force for the Deputy Commissioners who have that responsibility. Occasionally, you find a junior officer liaising outside the Force but its usually a relationship that has been established by a Minister. It would be unusual for an OIC of a Branch to have any direct liaison functions. Contact with the Privy Council Office is carried out by the Commissioner, even though he may delegate it, he would maintain control through briefings.

I would say the senior officers are concerned with the political environment and who represents the Force on policy matters."

In defining the structure of the RCMP within the context of Mintzberg's three configurations (Appendix I), the RCMP is clearly a divisionalized form with a machine bureaucracy configuration in the Divisions. The divisionalized form is really a collection of organizations with a HQs superimposed over the divisions, the divisions themselves being driven toward machine bureaucracy because of the external control over them. This control is exercised through the formalized procedures, performance measurement and the standardization of work outputs. Divisionalization, however, does not mean the organization is decentralized. Decentralization is the dispersal of decision making power in the organization. According to Mintzberg that is not characteristic of the divisionalized form.192

Machine bureaucracy is described as an organization which emphasizes standardization of work, consequently it "requires many analysts to design and maintain its systems of standardization...." Standardization focuses on processes that formalize behaviour and plan actions. Normally these analysts by virtue of their roles gain a "degree of informal power, which results in a certain amount of horizontal decentralization." Horizontal decentralization is described as the extent to which non-managers or the
technostructure control the decision process. Line management is structured on a functional basis, so that the coordination role, and consequently, the formal power lies at the top.193

Structurally, there is the appearance of horizontal decentralization within the administrative areas of the Force because of the organization of functional or specialized branches and divisions. However, the Force remains highly centralized because of the command structure which remains relatively intact, in spite of organizational change, and because of the external control by Government which makes the Commissioner responsible for the organization's actions. In effect, according to Mintzberg, that drives the organization toward clearly defined standards and centralization in order to maintain accountability.194 Both situations are clearly characteristic of the Force.

The delegation of increasing responsibilities to the Divisions since 1968 has resulted in the duplication to varying degrees, of the major administrative functions in the Divisions. The result is that Division HQs have become replicas of HQs, as illustrated in Figure 14, which is consistent with a machine bureaucracy configuration. In spite of the delegation of increased authority to the Divisions, there is only limited vertical decentralization; that is, authority delegated to line managers, and virtually no horizontal decentralization. This limited vertical decentralization is bureaucratic as most decision making is within the parameters established by the Division CO or HQs, and thus, confers little real authority beyond the strategic apex.195

In the introduction to the Chapter, it was shown that the core-formation process, which was identified as an institutional characteristic of the
RCMP in Chapter III, continued to be emphasized well into the 1970s. The development of strong identification with the Force rather than to one specific duty or location, the importance of protocol and the belief in leadership as a unique characteristic of the Officer Corps continued part of this core-formation process.

It was suggested by the Macdonald Commission, however, that the Force's concept of leadership ignored the complexities of the organization, and inferred that it had more to do with control and the command structure. That was evident in the P.S. Ross Study, "Very little mention has been made of the discipline" and in the Marin Commission, "Obedience to lawful authority is an outstanding quality."196

This need for control was based on the presumption by the Officer Corps that members needed to be controlled or that they were not completely responsible. A statement by the OIC Operational Audit illustrates this lack of faith,

"Members who have served with the Operational Audit Unit have been surprised at the openness and frankness of the members interviewed. These members welcomed an opportunity to discuss their work situations and matters related to themselves and family.... They used the interview opportunities constructively and objectively and not to voice minor or petty concerns."197

The overtime issue revealed similar attitudes; that overtime would result in the loss of efficiency or members would exploit the overtime system. No evidence was presented to support such views.

The impact of the institutional characteristics of the RCMP is most evident in the case studies that focused primarily on the social structure, although it was evident they were at work in some of the cases that focused on the task structure.
In the case of the DSRR system, the idea of elected representatives with a direct line of communication to the Commissioner represented a major challenge to the command structure and the prerogatives of management, particularly at the Division CO level, "The proposal advanced... is a departure from anything we have done... previously." Initially, the DSRRs were received with at best indifference from the command structure and in some cases management actually appointed the representatives.

The DSRR system under those circumstances was viewed by the membership with considerable skepticism. Militance in 1974, which in the larger centres received considerable empathy, if not outright support, resulted in a serious commitment by the Commissioner and the Division COs to make the system work. As a result of this commitment, the DSRRs were given a role in a number of committees, including the pay committee and promotion boards. This brought the DSRRs into the policy and decision making process; however, the Force essentially set the guidelines for the program which gave management considerable control, because they structured the parameters within which it functioned. Thus the program was essentially co-opted by the Force.

The major impact of the DSRRs is that they act as a sensing and mediating mechanism within the Force, in spite of being drawn into the policy and decision making process. They also represent a democratization of the Force, and have resulted to some extent, in the politicization of the membership. What power the DSRRs do have is derived from the electoral process and the lingering fear of an association. That power is, incidentally, quite considerable and represents a major constraint on management.

Appointment of the Internal Communications Officer also initially met with a negative response from senior management because it conflicted with
some of the basic management principles such as line command. They attempted to restrict his access to the Commissioner to exceptional issues and ultimately, the Internal Communications Officer was moved to 'A' Directorate eliminating any practical access to the Commissioner. That move was reversed under pressure from the DSRRs. The major importance of the Internal Communications Officer is his direct link between DSRR system and the Commissioner's Office.

Discipline within the RCMP has always been considered to be fundamental to its effectiveness as a police force. In correspondence prepared for the Solicitor General following Jack Ramsey's article in 1972, the Force wrote emphasizing the role of discipline in developing a high level of competence and a reputation "second to none in the world." Even following the Marin Commission Report in 1976, the Commissioner wrote to the Division COs noting that there was a noticeable deterioration in the level of discipline and protocol which could only lead to a decline in public respect. The Force's view was that any dilution of discipline would undermine its integrity and effectiveness.

Overtime was another issue that was perceived as a direct threat to the command structure because it meant decisions relating to when personnel worked had to have some rational basis that would support financial expenditures. That also reduced the prerogatives of management.

In the debate concerning paid hourly overtime and a premium system, elements of management attempted to project the unique character of the Force, conflict between rank levels, the idea of professionalism and the belief that overtime would reduce effectiveness as arguments against over-
The depth of the issue is evident in several quotes, but the quote from the CIB Officer went to the heart and soul of the issue - the social structure.

While most of the emotional and ideological responses came from the less senior officers, a limited number of similar criticisms emerged from the lower ranks, demonstrating the depth and commitment of the membership to the Force's social structure.

In both the P.S. Ross Study and the Organizational Review, senior management discounted negative information about the organization of the Force and its command structure,

"it now seems clear that they (the consultants) have no definite appreciation of the manner in which it (the Force) has to function under the control of the Minister and the Commissioner." 200

Delegation was clearly unacceptable to the various Commissioners. Classification was also perceived as threatening the total career concept of the Force and potentially creating a drift toward public service norms and values.

In a number of cases, the Force sought to rationalize its position on issues by relying on its institutional legitimacy. When approving new terms of reference for Internal Audit Branch, the Commissioner commented,

"The level of effectiveness of the Force is amongst the highest in the world, and this must not be allowed to deteriorate." 201

A similar statement was included in correspondence being prepared for the Solicitor General following Jack Ramsey's article and much the same argument was used when classification was under development. The Force described it-
self as a highly successful law enforcement agency with an international reputation for efficiency and effectiveness, which it attributed to the "unity of purpose of its members."\textsuperscript{202}

Treasury Board ultimately accepted many of the Force's rationalization in respect to classification, such as, total careers, the diversity of duties and the need for control of position descriptions tied to an establishment structure. Classification was thus manoeuvred or co-opted into the existing social structure. The command structure and the rank structure are still intact, and the antagonism between rank and expertise continues to exist.

\textbf{Footnotes}

\textsuperscript{1}Establishment data may vary with different sources, usually explained as either authorized positions or the actual establishment. The data utilized here is from the following: Canada, RCMP, \textit{Monthly Establishment Records} (Microfiche maintained by Establishment Branch, 'A' Directorate) March 31, 1960, 1968 and 1980.


\textsuperscript{3}RCMP, \textit{Officers Familiarization Course}, 1978, Memorandum from the Training Officers to the C.O. "Depot" Division dated January 5, 1976, pp. 2 & 3.

\textsuperscript{4}Mann and Lee, pp. 127 & 137.


\textsuperscript{6}Glassco Commission, p. 96.


\textsuperscript{8}A number of interviews have been conducted in order to supplement the research material. Since the majority are serving members of the Force they have been treated anonymously. In the text, each individual is identified either by rank or by particulars which are intended to clearly separate information supplied by different speakers and to qualify their statements.


12. Some of the correspondence was designated confidential and is, therefore, referred to only in general terms. The Annual Report of the RCMP for 1968 showed Establishment and Classification as a Branch but does not mention any organizational change. A later note on file dated 22-2-68 signed by the Commissioner indicated that no action was to be taken in respect to reorganization of the Section pending the advice of the consultants (P.S. Ross), although an officer was put in charge of Establishment and Classification Section. Ibid.


14. Organization Review, Vol. 1 (Phase I) Memorandum OIC OA&D to the D/DOP(O) dated February 27, 1976, p.4. (Some correspondence refers to the Organization Study - RCMP, but they form part of the same file.)

15. Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to the Division COs dated January 5, 1977.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., Memorandum Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Board to the Deputy Solicitor General dated February 1, 1968.

19. Ibid., Memorandums D/C(A) to DCl dated March 6, 1968 and the OIC Legal Branch to the D/C(A) dated 19 March 1968.


22. Ibid., p. 8.

23. Ibid., pp. 10 & 11.


28Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to the D/C(Ops) dated October 22, 1968.

29Ibid., Minutes of the Liaison Committee Meeting, February 27, 1969, p. 2.

30 Re-organization - Division Personnel Units of the Force, Memorandum Director of Personnel to Deputy Commissioner (Admin) dated 23 April 1970.


33Ibid.

34Ibid., Memorandum from the Coordinating Officer to the Commissioner dated December 18, 1968.


37Ibid., p. 2.

38The recommendations cited are the major recommendations of the report. Ibid., (Phase II), Reports dated September 1, 1977, paragraphs 2.2.4., 2.4.3., 2.5.2., 2.3.1., and 2.6.3.

39Ibid., Vol. 3, Memorandum D/DOP(O) to D/C(A) dated October 11, 1977, p. 2.

40Ibid., p. 8.

41Ibid., (Phase III) "Commissioner's Span of Control," p. 11. (Phase III consists of a series of reports on the various focuses of analysis, i.e. "Span of Control").

42Ibid., (Phase II), "Management by Commissioner," paragraph 2.8. and Memorandum Deputy/Director of Personnel (Organization) to Deputy Commissioner (Admin) dated April 4, 1978.
43Ibid., (Phase III), "'S' Directorate," p. 4 and "Senior Executive Committee - Planning Board", p. 7.

44Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioners dated October 25, 1978.

45Very little information is available on the formation of Planning Branch or its activities until 1968. Several sets of lecture notes on PPBS state Planning Branch was formed in 1960 but acted as an ad hoc research group until 1968. Planning Branch, Planning, Programming and Budgeting, Lecture notes dated October 21, 1970, p. 30 and Strategic Planning in the context of P.P.B., Lecture notes undated, p. 16.


47C.G. Young, Strategic Planning in the Context of P.P.B., (Lecture notes held by Planning Branch) 1969, p. 22.


52Ibid., Minutes of Planning Board Meeting February 13, 1975, p. 2.


58 Management Audit Unit - Organization, 1972, Correspondence dated May 24, 1966 and a memorandum from the DOP to the CO "HQ" dated September 22, 1965.

59 The specific recommendation in the Glassco Commission Report was that: "Departmental management be responsible for establishing and maintaining a proper system of internal audit ..." page 105. Ibid., Memorandum I/C Estimates and Financial Branch to DSS dated October 8, 1968.

60 Planning Branch - Organization, 1970, Memorandum OIC "HQ" Inspection Team to the D/C(A) dated November 25, 1969.

61 Audit Branch Organization, 1972, Memorandum Commissioner to the D/C(A) dated November 17, 1970.

62 Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to the D/C(A) dated October 29, 1968.

63 Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to Directorate Heads dated October 2, 1970.


70 Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner (Admin) dated October 25, 1978.


72 The actual Blair Report has been destroyed and there are only references to it available. Staffing Branch - Organization, 1968, Memorandum SPO to the DOP dated January 5, 1968, pp. 1 & 2.


74 Regular Members, Spl. Csts. & Civilian Members Recruiting of Policy, 1971, (Microfiche No. 3), Memorandum D/C(A) to the DOP dated December 2, 1977.
75 Succession Planning, 1975, Memorandum OIC Manpower Planning Section to the OIC Staffing Branch dated October 25, 1972.


77Ibid, p. 3.

78The actual approval is written in hand and dated by the Commissioner. Promotion to and Within NCO Rank - Policy, 1970 (Microfiche #1) Memorandum. OIC Planning Branch to the D/C(A) dated July 27, 1966; and 1976. (Microfiche #1) Memorandum DOP to the D/C(A) dated January 13, 1976.

79Ibid., 1975 (Microfiche #1) Memorandum DOP to the D/C(A) dated February 17, 1975.

80Policy regarding preferential treatment for University graduates and people with previous police experience has been retracted. Ibid., 1976 (Microfiche No. 1) Memorandum dated January 13, 1975 and 1976 (Microfiche #3), Memorandum OIC Classification & Compensation Branch to the DOP dated May 8, 1975.


82Promotion To and Within NCO Rank, Vol. 2, 1976, Memorandum D/C(A) to the DOP dated August 5, 1976.

83Amendments to the PERR form have been made subsequent to 1975. Currently a major initiative is underway to revise the system again. A detailed explanation of the objectives of the 1973 review were cited as follows. "Performance Rating and Review," Administration Bulletin - 17, dated March 6, 1973, p. 1.


87 Staffing Branch Organization, 1975, Memorandum OIC Staffing Branch to the DOP dated 3 July 1975.

Each one of these aspects were subject of specific recommendations of the Glassco Commission, pp. 96, 102, 99 & 105.

RCMP, Financial Services and Supply Branch - Organization, 1969, Memorandum D/C (A) to the Commissioner dated March 11, 1966, p. 3.

Ibid., Memorandum D/C(A) to the Commissioner dated March 30, 1966, p. 3.


That specific recommendation can be found in the Glassco Commission Report, p. 99. Strick, Canadian Public Finance, p. 35.


Ibid., Commissioner to the COs, April 25, 1979.


RCMP, Classification Section - Organization, 1975, Memorandum OIC Classification Section to the Adjutant dated August 22, 1968.


Ibid., Memorandum, pp. 1 & 2.

"New RCMP Classification - Appendix F", Ibid., p. 3.

Classification Program - Background, Memorandum OIC Classification Section to the DQP dated 25 June 1974, Background Report Appendix "A", p. 2.

Ibid., Letter from the Deputy Solicitor General to the Commissioner dated September 13, 1972.


Several pieces of correspondence refer to the backlog of work and the need to delegate some of the responsibility to relieve the work pressures.
107 Ibid., 1980, Memorandum OIC Classification Section to the OIC Classification and Compensation Branch dated September 1, 1975.


109 ______, Classification Program—Background, Memorandum OIC Classification to Compensation Branch to the DOP dated April 18, 1973.


111 Ibid., Memorandum file dated April 7, 1977, p. 3.


113 ______, Classification—General, Memorandum Commissioner to the COs dated April 29, 1977, p. 3.


117 Janowitz and Little, Sociology and the Military, p. 83.


119 ______, Meetings of Division Member Representatives, 1972 (Microfiche No. 1) Memorandum D/C(A) to the DOP dated September 11, 1972.


121 ______, Meeting of Division Member Representatives, 1972, Memorandum D/C(A) to the DOP dated September 11, 1972.

122 Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to the Division COs dated September 14, 1972.

123 Ibid., Memorandum CO "E" to the Commissioner dated September 19, 1972.

124 Ibid., (Microfiche No. 2) "K" Division Bulletin (K-275-39), dated October 18, 1972.


127 Details of the DSRR meeting were published in the Commissioner's Bulletin (ADM-122) issued December 6, 1973.

128 RCMP, Divisional Members Representative System, Minutes of Planning Board Committee meeting dated May 23, 1974.

129 Frequent reference is made throughout the text regarding the issues raised in this paragraph. Minutes of the Meeting of Division Representatives and Commanding Officers Held at Headquarters, Ottawa May 8th and 9th, 1974, (Unpublished- HQs Library). pp. 10, 22-29 & 46.

130 Ibid., pp. 30, 35 & 48.

131 Ibid., pp. 1 & 2.

132 Ibid., p. 46.

133 Meetings of Divisional Member Representatives, 1978, Memorandum on file dated October 9, 1974.


137 Division Staff Relations Representatives System, 1980, Memorandums CO "N" Division and the CO "O" Division to the CO "HQ" dated January 16, 1978.


139 Ibid.

140 Ibid., Memorandum DOP to the D/C(A) dated July 22, 1974.

141 Ibid., Memorandum D/C(Ops) to the Commissioner dated July 30, 1974. Memorandum D/C(A) to the Commissioner dated July 23, 1974.


143 Marin Commission, p. 30.
Discipline and Offence," and "Service Court Procedure," Administration Manual (March 9, 1968) Section 1144 to 1153 and Sections 1210 to 1216.

Marin Commission, p. 32.

RCMP, Administration Manual, (March 9, 1968) Section 1147


Ibid., p. 3.


RCMP Regulations, 1959, C.54, Sections 173 and 177.

Marin Commission, p. 123.


Marin Commission, p. 128.


Examples of how detailed and formalized procedures have become can be found in the Marin Commission Report. All references to policy are made from policy that was in effect prior to 1980. A.M. II.16.E.2.c. (November 28, 1975), Marin Commission, pp. 186 & 187.


The actual recommendation is contained in the Marin Commission, p. 102. Ibid., Memorandum Commissioner to the Solicitor General dated March 19, 1976.

Ibid., Memorandum Secretary of Treasury Board to the Commissioner dated July 23, 1976, p. 2.


An Act to Amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, (Bill C-69), First reading June 22, 1981, Sections 25, 31, 32(1), 45.32 and 45.38.


Conduct and Discipline Policy - General, 1976, Memorandum Commissioner to the Division COs dated December 22, 1976.

Marin Commission, pp. 38 & 119.

RCMP, Study of Marin Commission, Memorandum DOp to the D/C (A) dated March 15, 1976.


RCMP, "Report on Overtime in the RCMP", pp. 3 & 7.


Data derived from replies on file. Ibid., Vol. 1 & 2.

Memorandum S&P Officer to the CO "G" Division dated August 2, 1977.

Memorandum OC Yellowknife S/D to CO "G" Division dated August 5, 1977.

Memorandum "O" Division DSRR to OIC A&P "O" Division dated August 8, 1977.

Memorandum OIC CIB "G" Division to the CO "G" Division July 28, 1977.

Memorandum "L" Division DSRR to the CO "L" Division dated March 8, 1978.

Memorandum OIC PP&E to the OIC S&P Branch dated November 9, 1977, p. 4.

Ibid., p. 6.


188 RCMP, Establishment Section Organization, Memorandum DOP to the D/C (A) dated September 18, 1967, p. 2.


191 Ibid.

192 Mintzberg, p. 110-11.


194 Ibid., p. 110.

195 Ibid., p. 116.


198 Meeting of Division Member Representatives, 1972, Memorandum CO "E" Division to the Commissioner dated September 19, 1972.


201 Audit Branch Organization, 1972, Memorandum Commissioner to the Directors dated October 2, 1970.

202 Classification Program - Background, Memorandum OIC Classification and Compensation Branch to the DOP dated April 18, 1973.
Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

Introduction

Organizational change within the RCMP has been demonstrated to be a complex process involving changing environmental conditions and institutional characteristics that have shaped the Force's perception and response to the environmental issues it was confronting. Both the environmental and institutional dimensions developed in Chapter II have proven to be an appropriate theoretical perspective from which to examine organizational change within the RCMP.

The research is summarized in relation to these dimensions in the first section of this chapter. One dimension that could have been emphasized in the theoretical model, is the relevance of growth and its implications in the organizational change process. This absence is examined in the analysis of the impact of environmental pressures on organizational change in the RCMP.

The general conclusion from the research is that the RCMP made the transition, as defined by Mintzberg, from a "simple structure" to a "divisionalized form" primarily during the period 1968 to 1980.

Summary of the Research

Chapter III presented an historical examination of the RCMP which analyzed its development between 1873 to 1960 in the context of: the environment-goal-structure relationship, the core formation process, the emergence of an institutional legitimacy and whether the Force was an open or closed organization.
Environmental conditions clearly played a fundamental role in the formation of a para-military structure. Once established this para-military structure began a process of indoctrination and tradition building, or core formation, which ultimately resulted in the development of a distinct ideology and social structure.

This social structure was characterized by bottom level entry which formed the basis of a total career, a high degree of loyalty amongst the membership, internal promotions through a hierarchical rank structure, rigid discipline and adherence to orders, and an elitist Officer Corps. The social structure combined with a tradition of order and impartial enforcement of the law formed the basis of a distinct RCMP ideology. The success of the Force in achieving the national goals of stability and order, wide public interest and later support, developed into an institutional legitimacy which played a role in the survival of the Force during the period 1873 to 1920.

Organizationally between 1873 and 1960, there was an elaboration or enlargement of the structure but few fundamental structural changes. As late as 1960 the Force still essentially resembled a simple structure; control was exercised by the strategic apex through the rank structure and close supervision, planning was of a personalized nature emanating from the strategic apex, and few tasks or procedures were highly formalized. Centralized control made the Force flexible while it was small and it achieved notable success in stabilizing a turbulent environment. The Officer Corps represented the only liaison device, but by the 1960's they were totally a product of the system; highly indoctrinated and biased toward the system, which essentially eliminated any internal critical evaluation of the organiza-
tion. Combined with the absence of lateral entry after the 1900s, the Force was essentially a closed organization. The major exception to the simple structure was the organization of divisions which, initially, were geographical, and later geographical and contractual.

In Chapter IV, changes in environmental conditions between 1960 to 1980 were examined. During this period the RCMP found itself confronted by new goals in respect to management and accountability emerging from a reorganized and turbulent immediate environment in addition to demands for change to the social structure from an increasingly militant internal environment. The research indicated that goal displacement was occurring with increasing emphasis being placed on the traditions and image of the Force during the 1970s; in effect, an attempt to strengthen the institutional legitimacy of the Force from mounting environmental pressure.

The significance of these environmental pressures was that they were altering the Force's established relationships with the government and its own membership. In the case of new goals from the central agencies, the Force was obligated to respond politically and legally, and in the case of internal environmental pressure, management felt that it had little choice but to undertake change.

Chapter V examined the organizational change that resulted in the administrative areas of the Force during the period 1968 to 1980 within the context of the structural and institutional characteristics developed in the preceding chapters. The chapter concluded that there were two sources of organizational crises: the introduction of PPBS and internal dissatisfaction.
Pressures from the immediate environment had a significant impact on organizational changes that effected the task structure, although it was evident that the recommendations spilled over into the social structure in several areas. Where they did spill over, they were dismissed out of hand as illustrated by the recommendations respecting the span of control and line command in the Ross Study. Specific environmental issues were linked to specific organizational changes such as the formation of new branches or tasks.

Internal pressures focused on the social structure, and it was evident that the Force used its institutional legitimacy to rationalize its position and to evade critical evaluation. Where the Force failed to persuade the environment as to the legitimacy of its position, it resorted to co-optation. Co-optation within the context of this research, however, tended to be an unplanned response.

Structurally, in spite of the transition to a divisionalized organization, there is little decentralization of authority either within the divisions or the directorates. The major change has been the organization of tasks into related functions and the formation of new branches. Direct supervision is increasingly being replaced by the standardization of work and outputs, reflected in the formalization process, and the planning and audit systems. However, in the absence of effective performance measurement, close supervision still remains part of the system, as the Auditor General's comprehensive audit in 1981 noted.

Of considerable significance to the Force has been the development of the DSRR system which acts as a sensing and mediating mechanism. The DSRR system also provides management with increased feedback and an opportunity
to influence the internal environment in an informal way. The Officer Corps continues to be the primary external liaison device in the administrative areas, sanctioning external contact and dictating Force policy.

The Hypothesis and Issues Emerging From the Research

The first hypothesis stated, "Organizational Change within the RCMP has primarily taken place as a result of pressures in its immediate and internal environment." The research demonstrated that the immediate and the internal environments did play a significant role in the organizational change process following 1968. While the degree or extent of the pressures is difficult to quantify, they fall into two categories: bureaucratic and political or in the Weberian sense legal-rational, and perceptual.

Pressures from the immediate environment were of a bureaucratic and political nature implying a legal obligation on the Force to act. Demands for change from the internal environment were perceptual in that Senior Management of the Force perceived themselves as having no option but to undertake change.

While the larger environment is not directly linked to any specific organizational change in the RCMP it did act as a conduit for channelling information into the immediate environment in relation to internal dissatisfaction. An example of the impact of the larger environment was media pressure in 1977 which suggested the Force was a "sovereign state" and questioned the amount of control the government exercised. The media viewed the appointment of the next Commissioner as crucial to the issue of government control. Subsequent comment by the media suggested the government got a
Commissioner who was considerably more responsive and cooperative than previous Commissioners had been to bureaucratic accountability,

"Official Ottawa looked on with interest and liked what it saw. Here at last was a Commissioner who appeared responsive to pressures on the force."¹

And,

"Robert Kaplan (Solicitor General) describes (Commissioner) Simmonds as 'the perfect man for the job at this particular time - Canada is lucky to have had a Commissioner so in tune with what the Force means, but so sensitive to the issue of accountability'."²

So while the larger environment had no direct impact on the RCMP itself, it did act as an effective conduit for channelling issues into the immediate environment.

Of direct concern to the RCMP were the new goals emerging from the immediate environment in respect to management and accountability. These goals were an attempt to deal with the fundamental issue pervading government; the search for economy, efficiency and effectiveness. They resulted in a reorganization of the task structure within the RCMP. Planning, audit and financial branches developed with the objective of linking inputs to outputs through a variety of systems; initially and most notably PPBS, which had organizations defining goals, analyzing alternatives and attempting to measure performance. The objectives appear to remain as elusive as ever; given the continuous introduction of new systems, the complaints of the Auditor General, and criticism by the Lambert Commission.

These pressures were specific in nature and resulted in specific organizational changes. New branches were formed around specific tasks or functions, so that the link between pressures in the immediate environment and organizational change in the RCMP is very direct and specific. There was no
evidence to suggest that growth in size was linked to, specific organizational changes. Chapter III indicated that growth in size resulted in an elaboration or enlargement of the existing structure rather than any fundamental structural change. It must be recognized, however, that the necessity for a functional organizational structure simply did not exist prior to the 1960s when the Force was a relatively small organization. The implication is that increased size is likely to result in an elaboration of the existing structure while environmental pressures are likely to result in specific structural changes.

Internal dissatisfaction represented a major challenge to the social structure and resulted in the development of sensing and mediating mechanisms within the Force. The significance of those mechanisms, is that they provide management with feedback in respect to the internal environment. This has resulted in a more open system and facilitated change. External liaison devices still are not particularly well developed. Relations between the external environment are carried out through the strategic apex as several quotes in Chapter V illustrated.

The research revealed only limited contact with the Solicitor General's Department in respect to policy matters and nothing of a mutual or co-operative relationship between the Central Agencies. In respect to the relationship between the Force and the Solicitor General's Department, it can be described as more with the Solicitor General and less with the Department. In respect to the Central Agencies, it is a case of them exercising bureaucratic authority over the Force. This supports the assumption that boundaries and networks are not a significant factor in organizational change in the RCMP but that leadership is important.
The conclusion emerging from the second hypothesis which stated, "Institutional characteristics within the RCMP have played a significant role in how the RCMP perceives and responds to environmental change or pressures," is that institutional factors did play a significant role in the organizational change process. Pressures that focused on the social structure were met with rigid attitudes linked to the Force's ideology. The impact of the core formation process was evident in the perception of classification as undermining the values of the Force by introducing public service values and norms. Implicit in this attitude regarding classification is that an ideology gap exists between the RCMP and the bureaucracy which the following quote suggests:

"The Mounties, however, never regarded themselves as players in the Ottawa power game. They remained, aloof from policy-makers."3

Changes to the Commissioner's span of control recommended by the P.S. Ross Study, were also viewed as threatening the social structure,

"it now seems clear that they have no definite appreciation of the manner in which it (the Force) has to function.... Very little mention has been made of the discipline...or the extent of the responsibilities of certain senior officers."4

Internal dissatisfaction was also perceived as disloyalty, and ignored as being one or two malcontents in one division. Senior management clearly failed to comprehend the seriousness and depth of these issues, allowing them to become organization crises before taking action.

Pre-dating the internal dissatisfaction, there was within the Force and particularly in the Officer Corps, a strong belief in the validity and legitimacy of the system which was used to resist change or rationalize the
Force's position on issues. Strong public support for the Force gave these views added legitimacy. This institutional legitimacy was most evident when issues focused on the social structure.

An example was the case made for rigid discipline in response to Jack Ramsey's article in 1972, a position largely accepted as valid by the courts and by the Marin Commission. However, the fundamental assumptions regarding discipline are questionable given the nature of police work. Morris Janowitz cites the role of discipline in the military as diminishing because of modern weapons which mean men can no longer be deployed in large groups. The emphasis, he says, has shifted to the development of initiative.5

Rarely if ever do police work in groups, yet the role of discipline in a military context continues to exist simply as a control mechanism perceived as necessary by the Officer Corps. Its rationale is questionable, Jack Ramsey suggested recruits were conditioned into "mindless obedience" and yet what was required was discretion and flexibility.6 Only Supt. Kelly's paper challenged the accepted notions regarding discipline and they appear to have fallen on deaf ears in 1956. Later, the Macdonald Commission questioned the validity of rigid discipline and the reliance on obedience as inappropriate to managing modern organizations.

In the case study of overtime, it was argued that overtime would undermine the efficiency of the Force or that members would exploit the system, however, there was no empirical evidence to support that view. There was data that indicated members had contributed long hours of voluntary overtime. A loss of professionalism was also referred to in the study, but applying a criteria of professionalism: self-regulating, extensive training in a field of expertise and identification with one's field of expertise rather
than the organization, suggests that professionalism is the antithesis of how the Force actually functions.

Reliance on the Force's institutional legitimacy was also evident in the Marin Commission and Classification case studies. There was an attempt to evade evaluation by emphasizing the perceived value of discipline to the reputation of the Force, whose effectiveness was described as "amongst the highest in the world." The rationalizations were presented as sufficient justification in themselves for no further consideration of the issues.

Environmental pressures the Force could not ignore, such as internal dissatisfaction, it co-opted by forming the DSRR System and bringing them into the policy and decision making structure. The DSRRs now play a role in promotion boards and a major role in the grievance system. Classification was also co-opted into the social structure. In spite of the development of job descriptions detailing the experience and qualifications of every position, the entire system continues to be structured around rank which is controlled by establishment ratios. In the final analysis, classification became part of the system without affecting it. If there was any impact, it was in the number of upgradings and subsequent promotions that resulted from the introduction of classification.

Co-optation, however, was not a planned attempt to neutralize environmental pressures but rather an attempt by the Force to strike the best bargain possible with the environment from a position of weakness. While the environmental pressures may have in fact been neutralized, the Force was not left totally unaffected. As in the case of the DSRRs, fundamental changes did occur and are continuing to occur to the management, leadership and discipline philosophies of the Force.
Since the primary focus of the research was organizational change in the RCMP and was largely self evident, it was not formulated as a hypothesis. The conclusion that significant organizational change did occur was less relevant than what is the direction of change, and the impact and implications of those changes. The fundamental change has been from a paramilitary structure which was characterized by the dimensions and elements of a simple structure to a bureaucratic organization characterized by the dimensions and elements of a divisionalized form.

Four dimensions that emerge as significant in the transition to a divisionalized form are the emergence of specialization or the functional organization of tasks, the formalization of procedures as examined in the Staffing and Personnel Branch case study, the development of planning and control systems and the development of liaison devices.

The Organization of the Adjutant's Branch in 1937, Figure 4, compared to The Organization of 'A' Directorate, Figure 11, illustrates the functional organization of tasks. Planning and Audit Branch focused on the development of goals, performance measures and audits in an attempt to rationalize efficiency, etc. in the absence of profit indicators, while the DSRR system and the Internal Communications Officer were intended to sense and mediate with the internal environment. The Officer Corps still retains the external liaison activities which is related to the centralization of authority within the Force, and the status and role of officers.

In each one of the major areas of change some issues emerge. Structurally, a functional organization of tasks gives rise to the appearance of highly specialized branches or a technostructure. Mintzberg describes the
technostructure as "the analysts who design systems concerned with the formal planning and control of work." John Kenneth Galbraith elaborates on the criteria and what a technostructure is,

"It embraces all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making. This, not management, is the guiding intelligence - the brain - of the enterprise.... I propose to call this organization the Technostructure." 

While the structure appears specialized, few of the tasks are actually carried out by specialists. First, few people bring to the task specialized knowledge, talent or experience. Secondly, they do not participate in group decision making because directions still flow from the top down via the command structure. Thirdly, because of the "generalist theory" of transferring personnel so members identify with the Force and not a specific function, profession or location. And finally, there is an innate lack of faith in the general membership by management. So there, in fact, is less horizontal decentralization than would normally be found in a typical machine bureaucracy.

A manifestation of these issues is the conflict between rank and expertise. This is part of the fundamental antagonism between the para-military character of the Force and the emerging bureaucratic character, associated with planning, audit and formalized processes.

Formalization of procedures has impacted on the command structure by defining, and thereby reducing the prerogatives of line managers by limiting or confining the range of decision-making. This, of course, has occurred at the Branch head levels and downward. Real discretionary power resides in the strategic apex where there are few rules. This is also typical of a functional structure where coordination takes place at the top. The pro-
cess, however, tends to isolate senior management from the day-to-day activities and the bureaucratic decisions being churned out by the system. In other words, management is not always guided by the realities of the organization but often by their perceptions and opinions.

Formalization is in effect, the standardization of work and the substitution of authority by rules, guidelines and the like, which have the effect of undermining the rank structure and the doctrine of "obedience to lawful command." With the increase in formalization and differentiation of tasks, one would expect increased delegation to lower levels. This failure to delegate stems from the external control imposed on the RCMP by Government, which holds the Commissioner accountable for the organization. The ultimate impact of formalization may, however, be to increase the resistance to change in the administrative structure because of the complexity associated with policy development.

Examination of the planning and audit functions suggests that the Force has had difficulty in developing completely effective programs in those areas. This is supported by the continuous reorganization and development of terms of reference from the Ross Study onward. The OCG's IMPAC Survey in 1978 indicated there was difficulty in linking the Objectives and Goals of the Force to resource allocations, in introducing program evaluation and in developing sufficiently qualified personnel for the audit function. Essentially, the same issues were identified in the Auditor General's Comprehensive Audit in 1981.

There was, however, the suggestion that the Central Agencies' initiatives have been "inconsistent and contradictory." According to Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, other departments have also experienced person-
nel problems and indifferent senior management and some departments created planning units solely because of pressure from the Central Agencies. The official from the Auditor General's Department commented on those issues,

"I don't think it has caused that much confusion but it caused a proliferation of planning and auditing, etc. What has occurred in the departments rather than action, is a 'we've got to study it' response. As auditors we see it time and time again, they pass that off as reacting to policy or frequently they give policy lip service but never implement it."

The RCMP was in fact, one of the first departments to organize a planning branch. Consequently, attributing a failure to develop effective programs solely to the RCMP's shortcoming would be to ignore the fact that the problems are not unique to the RCMP.

Generally, however, there does appear to have been a failure of a number of programs to achieve their anticipated level of effectiveness and a failure to address issues originally identified in the Ross Study, relating to a functional program structure and the command structure. These same issues were examined in the Organization Review following 1977. In addition, some of the issues identified by Haig-Brown in 1944 continued to emerge well into the 1970s such as discipline and control.

Successive commissions and audits by the government and the Central Agencies have largely been structural examinations of the Force and have failed to address the fundamental management issues. Internal promotions, total careers, the generalist theory, and leadership still predominate as the management ethos. Rather than focusing on organizational and management issues, "accountability to government" has become to goal displacement what the maintenance of the traditions and the image of the Force were during the early 1970s.
The MacDonald Commission is the only study which directly hints at the question of the appropriateness of the existing management structure. Macdonald concluded that management built on a cult of leadership and obedience was inappropriate for an intelligence organization, others suggested to the Commission, it was also inappropriate to the police side.

Conclusions

Based on the research into organizational change in the RCMP, the following conclusions have emerged:

1. The RCMP made the transition from a "simple structure" to a "divisionalized form" primarily during the period 1968 to 1980.

Comment: As a result of the transition to a divisionalized form the RCMP has assumed a more typical bureaucratic character, however, its para-military ethos remain very much a part of the organization. Fundamental conflicts emerge, as a result, such as the conflict between rank and expertise, and the conflict between the command structure and formalization. However, where the two have a common purpose there is a lack of flexibility and rigid adherence to policy.

The search for solutions have been primarily structural solutions from a completely institutional or ideological perceptive as the overtime case illustrated. The quote by the Staffing Officer suggested that policy was often formed around the opinions of senior management with little emphasis on the results of research. The typical approach to research was illus-
trated in several cases where the views of the Division COs was sought. The lack of an influential technostructure which participates in the decision process is one of the exceptions in the RCMP to the divisionalized form but it is an institutional shortcoming not a structural one.

2. Environmental factors clearly played a significant role in the formation of the NWMP and in later organizational change by altering established relationships.

3. Environmental pressures tended to be specific in their focus and consequently resulted in specific organizational changes.

4. The larger environment was more influential in the change process than the research anticipated by acting as a conduit for the immediate environment.

Comment: If the larger environment is any measure, internal management of the Force will be the next major issue and could manifest itself in the appointment of the next Commissioner.

5. A distinct RCMP ideology and social structure deeply rooted in the traditions of the Force has developed since its formation in 1873.

Comment: This ideology has made the Force a closed organization and in spite of the organizational change, it continues to remain relatively closed to its external environment, with accountability exclusively through the Commissioner.
Internal dissatisfaction demonstrated the dysfunctional consequences of its application in the extreme and the failure of feedback mechanisms.

A unique feature of this ideology is that the RCMP is virtually apolitical. The trend toward a more bureaucratic structure and the DSRR system may see the emergence of an increased political awareness and consequently, increased political leverage.

6. The RCMP's institutional character has played a significant role in determining how the RCMP perceived and responded to environmental pressures.

Comment: Institutional legitimacy is in part a recognition of an organization's achievements. The critical issue, is that in the extreme they may be self-serving and dysfunctional.

The degree to which the pressures focus on the social structure determines the degree to which the RCMP will attempt to resist change, usually by relying on its institutional legitimacy, or by attempting to neutralize its impact through co-optation.

7. Environmental pressures that could not be blocked or evaded through the use of the Force's institutional legitimacy were co-opted.

Comment: Even though the DSRR system was co-opted, it has made the Force more responsive to internal issues and has created a more democratic intern-
al environment replacing a purely automatic management structure. A democratic atmosphere is considered to be crucial to the organizational change process.

8. Institutions appear to be especially prone to goal displacement as a means of reinforcing their legitimacy and avoiding critical evaluation.

Comment: During the early 1970s, the Force was pre-occupied with preserving its traditions and image at the expense of internal and external issues. Today, it has become pre-occupied with accountability to government at the expense of critical structural and managerial issues.

9. Failure to implement effective programs in the planning and audit areas is attributed primarily to the Force's ideology.

Comment: The generalist theory has retarded the development of expertise in the planning and auditing functions, and the total career concept and the absence of lateral entry has prevented the acquisition of qualified personnel. What makes the generalist theory work is that it is easier to tolerate low levels of effectiveness and to retrain personnel than it is to deal with the disincentives inherent in a highly structured system, the lack of influence by participants in the organization and the resulting frustration.

Currently, the Force has virtually eliminated "rotational transfers" in the administrative areas but has failed to address the fundamental issue of management style. As a result, internal issues are likely to emerge, which
rather than leading to change are likely to lead to the resumption of "rotational transfers." It should be emphasized, however, that the question of rotational transfers goes very deep into the psyche of the typical member of the Force, and that there are valid reasons for some movement of personnel.

There is an indication that contradictory and inconsistent policies from the immediate environment have also contributed to the problem. This is supported by the fact that these problems have not been unique to the RCMP.

10. The Government has shown a reluctance to thoroughly examine the management structure of the RCMP in spite of a decade of environmental pressures directed at the Force.

Comment: What evaluation has been done has been specific or structural in nature, generally understating or evading the critical management issues.

11. The research suggests there is a fundamental ideological gap between the RCMP and the public service.

Comment: This gap stems from the deep historical roots of the RCMP, the Force's perception of accountability to the law and the Minister, and not to the bureaucracy. The following quote illustrates the difficulty the bureaucracy encountered in attempting to develop contacts within the RCMP.

"The Mounties resisted every overture. The Commissioner made it plain he had no intention of reporting through the solicitor general's deputy minister, and the solicitor general's secretariat found the lower
levels of the Force inpenetrable. The RCMP's position was that it was answerable in court for its tactics: it didn't need to answer to government policy review committees as well."

The consequences of such a gap could be critical to the appointment of a civilian Commissioner. A bureaucrat might meet with considerable resistance throughout the organization. A lawyer or judge might seem appropriate, however, the issues confronting the RCMP are not legal issues, they are structural and managerial. Lawyers or judges would not likely possess the necessary organizational skills. A civilian Commissioner, in order to affect the system in a meaningful way, should come from the private sector.

The importance of this research in respect to organizational theory generally is that it represents a longitudinal study of an organization and according to Marshall W. Meyer there are few such studies.11 Secondly, the research has demonstrated the validity of environmental and institutional theory as a theoretical framework from which to analyze organizations.

Although the research does not extend the theoretical concepts, several aspects are worthy of note. Co-optation was found to be, rather than a subtle or overt process of bringing in opposing views or groups into the decision process, a process of attempting to strike the best possible bargain in a bad situation. Environmental pressures were also found to result in specific organizational changes rather than an elaboration or enlargement of the structure, which while not a focus of this research appeared to be related more to growth in size.
The open and closed systems issue also warrants some consideration. Marshall Meyer argues that the question is essentially one of effective feedback mechanisms and says,

"the issue of open versus closed systems is closed, on the side of openness."\(^{12}\)

Clearly the RCMP is a closed organization with restricted entry, institutionally maintained boundaries and structured feedback mechanisms. Meyer is correct in concluding the issue is one of feedback mechanisms, but given the characteristics of the RCMP, the notion of a closed organization requires redefinition rather than exclusion from organization theory. Using the RCMP as an example, a closed organization can be described as an organization that, rather than lacking feedback mechanisms, structures its feedback or liaison mechanisms, etc.

Also considering the nature of the institutionalization process in the RCMP, it can be concluded that closed organizations strive to control their internal environment in order to minimize the influence of the external environment on the organization. This particular argument is central to James D. Thompson's theoretical work *Organizations in Action* (1967). In it, organizations were treated as open but striving for closedness in order to control uncertainty in the environment.\(^{13}\)

Focusing on the RCMP, the research represents the first examination of the RCMP's administrative structure over an extended period of its history and pulls together past studies that dealt with specific issues at particular points in time. It is from this perspective that one is able to comprehend the role of the environment and the institutional character of the RCMP, and to predict how and where organizational change begins and proceeds.
Structurally, the RCMP appears to have been very adaptive during the 1970s to environmental pressure within the context of institutional theory. That is, much of the change was simply responsive and unplanned. The research suggests the Force has muddled through the process as in the case of planning, auditing and succession planning which have never gotten solidly off the ground. The cause of this failure to achieve effective programs varies from changing environmental conditions, a lack of expertise, a lack of commitment by senior management, to decisions based on the opinions and perceptions of senior management who have an institutional disregard for research.

There is little to suggest that an innovative spirit exists within the RCMP which can be attributed to the highly structured and formalized nature of the organization. Such a structure would appear to have inherent disincentives in how the organization functions, and that is supported by the emergence of fundamental antagonisms within the structure. Mann and Lee's "reality gap" is not between the ideal developed in training and the realities of police work, as they purport, but between the kind of organization depicted in training and the realities of the para-military organization.14

The RCMP has proven to be a remarkably enduring organization and one can only conclude, as Duane S. Elgin and Robert A. Bushnell do in an examination of the limits of complexity in bureaucratic organizations, that systems in crises are surrounded by other healthy systems in the organization which support the disfunctional structure.15 Considering the continued public support for the Force, it must be assumed that the larger environment is relatively satisfied with the operational performance of the RCMP and that they accept its institutional legitimacy. This supports the notion
that other areas of the Force are relatively healthy. The assumption underscores one of the fundamental antagonisms, that of a closed organization which places personnel whose primary experience is that of policeman, into bureaucratic and political roles.

Having drawn conclusions from the research about how the RCMP responded to environmental pressures and change during the 1970s, it is appropriate to ask what is the current state of the RCMP from an environmental perspective. Initially it has been acknowledged that there has been a contraction of authority rather than increased delegation,

"In this capacity he (the Commissioner) initiated major changes that he felt were necessary to counteract the somewhat tarnished image the Mounties had acquired. He did a lot of house cleaning, rerouted a great deal of decision making to his office, gave substance to the RCMP grievance procedures, and worked long and hard to improve relations with the government, an involvement his predecessors had avoided to the detriment of the RCMP."16

The consequence of this contraction of authority has been something of a descent into chaos, judging from a recent statement by one DSRR,

"The Commissioner must have more to do than to decide who should get acting pay, fill a lateral position, deal with plainclothes allowance, etc. We have gone behind, not ahead, in this area....

Then again, the Commissioner has to be prepared to allow the others to make decisions. From the comments throughout Headquarters Divisions this is one of the most talked about faults of our upper management, not making or being allowed to make administrative or operational decisions.... In the same vein, many NCOs are frustrated with being asked to prepare projects, submit plans, formulate policy, etc. by
their Senior NCOs and once completed, the plan is completely reversed or modified by the next level of command. The complaints surround the fact that why isn't there more input in the form of inter-office meetings with all levels when projects are being delegated...

As the new CO "HQ" said during a recent meeting with us, 'I haven't heard that complaint.' 'Well Sir', was the answer, 'How many times as a Corporal or Sergeant did you walk into the CO's office to complain?'.17

These contemporary issues have a familiar ring to them, but one fundamental change has occurred, the DSRR system: a change that brings the issues forward, a point of optimism in an otherwise distressing emergence of past internal issues. The quote lends some credence to Michel Crozier's definition of bureaucracy as "an organization that cannot correct its behaviour by learning from its errors."18

Given the focus of the research and the identification of contemporary issues, there is considerable validity in what Crozier says. And as in the case of internal dissatisfaction, it is the larger environment that has anticipated and articulated the issue of management change,

"Mountie watchers agree that the RCMP needs a major managerial shake up to meet the evolving demands on it."19

The question that emerges is how responsive will the Officer Corps be to environmental pressures focusing on the last preserve of the para-military RCMP itself?
FOOTNOTES

2Ibid., p. 28.
3Ibid., p. 24.
4RCMP, Organization Study, Memorandum the Commissioner to the D/C (Ops) dated October 22, 1968, p. 2.
5Janowitz, p. 57.
6Ramsey, "My Case Against the RCMP," p. 20.
11Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies, p. 38, and Haas and Drabek, p. 17.
13Ibid., Cited in Environments and Organizations, p. 9.
14Man and Lee, p. 127.
19Gray, p. 28.
APPENDIX I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Simple structure</th>
<th>Machine bureaucracy</th>
<th>Divisionalized form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key means of coordination</strong></td>
<td>Direct supervision</td>
<td>Standardization of work</td>
<td>Standardization of outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key part of organization</strong></td>
<td>Strategic apex</td>
<td>Technostructure</td>
<td>Middle line</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Structural elements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Specialization of jobs</strong></th>
<th>Little specialization</th>
<th>Much horizontal and vertical specialization</th>
<th>Some horizontal and vertical specialization (between divisions and headquarters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training and indoctrination</strong></td>
<td>Little training and indoctrination</td>
<td>Little training and indoctrination</td>
<td>Some training and indoctrination (of division managers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalization of behavior – bureaucratic/organic</strong></td>
<td>Little formalization – organic</td>
<td>Much formalization – bureaucratic</td>
<td>Much formalization (within divisions) – bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Grouping</strong></th>
<th>Usually functional</th>
<th>Usually functional</th>
<th>Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit size</strong></td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Wide at bottom, narrow elsewhere</td>
<td>Wide at top</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning and control systems</strong></td>
<td>Little planning and control</td>
<td>Action planning</td>
<td>Much performance control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liaison devices</strong></td>
<td>Few liaison devices</td>
<td>Few liaison devices</td>
<td>Few liaison devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decentralization</strong></td>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>Limited horizontal decentralization</td>
<td>Limited vertical decentralization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situational elements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Age and size</strong></th>
<th>Typically young and small</th>
<th>Typically old and large</th>
<th>Typically old and very large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical system</strong></td>
<td>Simple, not regulating</td>
<td>Regulating but not automated, not very complex</td>
<td>Divisible, otherwise like machine bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Simple and dynamic; sometimes hostile</td>
<td>Simple and stable</td>
<td>Relatively simple and stable; diversified markets (esp. products and services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>Chief executive control; often owner managed; not fashionable</td>
<td>Technocratic and external control; not fashionable</td>
<td>Middle-line control; fashionable (esp. in industry)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Note:**
Bold type indicates key design parameters.

TABLE I

SCHEDULE OF MEN OF PREVIOUS SERVICE TO ENROLMENT IN THE NORTHWEST MOUNTED POLICE FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Police</th>
<th>Cdn Artillery</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIC &amp; Civil</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>87</td>
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TABLE II

THE RCMP SHARE OF FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER RESOURCES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>1970/71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>1980/81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX II

FIGURE I

ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, GOALS AND STRUCTURE

a. A Closed System Model

b. An Open System Feedback Model

APPENDIX II

FIGURE 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE NWMP - 1874

\[ \text{Staff Officers} - 4 \\
\text{Inspectors} - 4 \\
\text{Sub Inspectors} - 4 \\
\text{Constables} - 30 \\
\text{Acting Cst.} - 20 \\
\text{Sub Cst.} - 204 \\
\text{Total} - 308 \]

APPENDIX II

FIGURE 3

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS - 1920.

APPENDIX II

FIGURE 4

REORGANIZATION - ADJUTANTS BRANCH - 1937

1. Administration of HQ
2. Discipline
3. Transfers
4. Promotions
5. Establishment
6. General Orders

1. General Supervision of the entire Branch
2. Direct access to the Commr on matters of Training and Organization
3. Training
4. Recruiting
5. Inspection Reports
6. Discharge Boards
7. Routing HQ Authorities

FIGURE 6

HEADQUARTERS -1952

COMMISSIONER

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

DEPARTMENTAL SECRETARY
CENTRAL REGISTRY
LIAISON OFFICER

"A" DIRECTORATE
ADMINISTRATION

"S" DIRECTORATE
SUPPLY

EMERGENCY
PLANNING

SPECIAL
BRANCH

"C" DIRECTORATE
CRIME

ADJUTANTS
BRANCH

TRAINING
BRANCH

PERSONNEL
BRANCH

COMMUNICATIONS
BRANCH

ACCTS &
FINANCE BR.

CRIME DETEC-
TION LABS.

IDENTIFICATION
BRANCH

PREVENTIVE
SERVICE

CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION

MARINE
LIAISON BRANCH

PURCHASING
BRANCH

FIGURE 7
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
ORGANIZATION - 1960

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION

OPERATIONAL

DIVISIONS

"E" "K" "F" "D" "O" "A"

"C" "J" "H" "L" "B" "G"
Que. N.B. N.S. P.E.I. Nfld. & N.W.T. Labrador & Y.T.

SERVICE

DIVISIONS

"N" Division
(Training)

"DEPOT" Division
(Training)

"MARINE"

"AIR"

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION – 1967

COMMISSIONER

Departmental Secretary
- Historian
- Planning Branch
- "HQ" Liaison Branch

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
(Operations)

"C" DIRECTORATE
Criminal Investigation
- Crime Detection Laboratories
- Criminal Investigation Branch
- Criminal Intelligence Liaison Officer – East
- Criminal Intelligence Liaison Officer – West
- Emergency Planning Branch
- Identification Branch
- Legal Branch
- Municipal Police Coordinator
- Preventive Service Branch
- Traffic Branch

"I" DIRECTORATE
Security & Intelligence
- Inter-Directorate Liaison Section
- Visa Control
- "A" Branch
- "B" Branch
- "C" Branch
- "D" Branch
- Central Registry

"M" DIRECTORATE
Marine Services
- Adjudant's Branch
- Personnel Branch
- Training Branch

"S" DIRECTORATE
Services & Supply
- Administration and Research Branch
- Estimates and Financial Branch
- Property Management Branch
- Purchasing Branch
- Supply Branch

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
(Administration)

Officer i/c Equitation
- Central Registry

Department of Finance
- Treasury

ORGANIZATION OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE – 1980

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS ADMINISTRATION

FIGURE 12

RECOMMENDED SHORT TERM ORGANIZATION

SOURCE: The first long term alternative would have seen the Division COs reporting through the D/C (Ops), while the second long term alternative would have seen the three functional programs replace the D/C (Ops) with the Division COs reporting to the Law Enforcement Program. P.S. Ross, Draft Report on Organization for the Commissioner's Office and Administrative Functions, August 1968, Short Term Organization Chart I.
APPENDIX II

FIGURE 13

'A' DIRECTORATE - ORGANIZATION AT CONCLUSION OF CHANGE

SOURCE: RCMP, Reorganization Division Personnel Units of the Force, April 1970. Plate II
Figure 14

TYPICAL DIVISION STRUCTURE

SOURCE: This is a fairly representative of most Divisional structures, although there is some minor variances between Divisions. Organization Charts, (Microfiche prepared by OA & D).
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher and Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year Ended</td>
<td>Ottawa: The King's Printer, 1924</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ended March 31, 1966</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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