NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.
NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: Cheryl L. Cline

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: Art Criticism and the University Education of Artists

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRÂDE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE: M.A. (Education)

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRÂDE: 1984

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE: Dr. D. Nadaner

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

DATED: Oct. 15/84    SIGNED: 


Burling B.C.

USA 55b
ART CRITICISM AND THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF ARTISTS

by

Cheryl Cline

B.Ed., Queen's University, 1982

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS (EDUCATION)
in the Faculty
of
Education

© Cheryl Cline 1984
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
October 1984

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL

Name: Cheryl L. Cline
Degree: Master of Arts (Education)
Title of Thesis: Art Criticism and the University Education of Artists
Examinining Committee
Chairperson: T. O'Shea

D. Nadaner
Senior Supervisor

R. Walker
Associate Professor

R. Staley
Associate Professor
Department of Visual and Performing Arts in Education
University of British Columbia
External Examiner

Date approved October 15, 1984
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Art Criticism and the University Education of Artists

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Author: ____________________________

(signature)

Cheryl L. Cline

(name)

Oct 15, 1984

(date)
ABSTRACT

There is a classic assumption that intuition is a necessary and even virtuous quality of visual artists. A manifestation of this assumption is evidenced in university visual art studio programs that emphasize skills in technique and the manipulation of form. Little attention is given to art criticism and other conceptual considerations. It is argued in this thesis that intuition and related subjective qualities of the psyche are paramount but not the exclusive concerns of contemporary art and thus should not dictate the approach by which university studio art programs function.

Contemporary art has diverged significantly from an affiliation with technique, craft, and commonly defined values to a plurality of styles and theories, many of which have conceptual and social concerns. Such basic contradictions between visual art studio education and the nature of art are identified in this thesis in a discussion about conceptual versus intuitive perspectives in visual art education.

Because an understanding of the nature of contemporary art is fundamental to consideration of valid, informed artistic activity and, contingently, the education of artists, and
because it is crucial that we examine in theory the critical component that is lacking in university art education, major theories in art and art criticism are analysed. To represent most comprehensively the plurality of art and art criticism, theories are selected for review according to three distinct paradigms: formalism--the most objective and most dominant paradigm in art education; the social paradigm, including both Marxist and non-reductionist theories; and the more subjective theories of expressionism and phenomenology.

The recommendation for a more critical and conceptually informed university visual art studio education is simply an extension of two main conclusions of this investigation. First, the critical, conceptual approach is indeed vital to all three paradigms and co-exists, although in varying proportions, with the intuitive and subjective. Hence, art criticism--the synthesis of critical skills and knowledge about art--is recommended as an essential and integrated component of studio courses. Second, the exclusive adherence to any one theory or paradigm promotes a biased and inadequate conception of art. A knowledge of all three paradigms, then, may help prevent the uncritical hegemony of dominant formalist ideologies and allow for a more complete understanding of both the intuitive and the conceptual qualities of art.
I especially thank Dr. Dan Nadaner for his continual assistance and encouragement throughout all stages of this thesis. One couldn’t ask for a more supportive mentor.

Thanks also to Wendy Doberéiner and Dr. Robert Walker for their assistance as supervisory committee members. Wendy Doberéiner offered some valuable insight during the formulative stages of this thesis, especially in regards to the problems surrounding the university education of artists. Dr. Walker very kindly assisted with the later drafts.

Jeff Wall and Dr. Suzanne DeCastell offered some useful insight and perspectives for which I am grateful.

And Mark Abrahams, thank you as always for your assistance of all sorts, including the introduction to the age of word processing.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of the Visual Arts in Higher Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Preliminary Historical Considerations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem to be Examined</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of the Thesis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. TWO PERSPECTIVES TOWARD THE EDUCATION OF ARTISTS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educating for Intuition</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educating for Rationality</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. ART CRITICISM AS AN EXTENSION OF THE ISSUE OF THE TWO PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions in Contemporary Art Criticism</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scepticism</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential and Integral Dialectics</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. THEORIES IN ART: AN INTRODUCTION TO A REVIEW OF PARADIGMS</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism in Contemporary Art</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of Paradigms</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vi
CHAPTER 5. THE OBJECTIVE PARADIGM ................................. 73

The Nature of Formalism ............................................. 73
Formalism as a Reflection of the Objective Paradigm.. 76
Other Examples of Objectivity in Art......................... 80
Implications for the Education of Artists..................... 82
Critique of formalism................................................. 86

CHAPTER 6. THE SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGM .......................... 93

Categories of Affiliation Between Art and Sociology.. 93
Marxist Reductionist Theory and Its Implications
for the Education of Artists ................................. 97
Implications of a Non-Reductionist Sociology of
Art for the Education of Artists ................. 103

CHAPTER 7. THE SUBJECTIVE PARADIGM: EXPRESSIONISM AND
PHENOMENOLOGY .................................................... 112

Expressionism in Art .................................................. 113
The Subjective Paradigm and the Question of
Knowledge .............................................................. 117
Phenomenology ............................................................ 121
Implications of Phenomenology for the Education
of Artists ................................................................. 125

CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 133

Summary ................................................................. 133
Recommendations for Implementing Art Criticism in
University Art Programs ................................. 138
Recommendation for Representing Diverse Perspectives 146

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................ 153
Status of the Visual Arts in Higher Education

The basic assumptions that dictate visual art studio education are explored in this thesis. These assumptions, although inadequate in themselves, continue to be uncritically adopted by many artists and studio instructors. The general lack of attention given to studio art education is substantiated by the task force report by the National Endowment of the Arts and the National Council on the Arts (1978, p. 20):

With respect to the education, training, and development of professional artists, current research and information is minimal.

Although this is an observation from an American report, it applies also to the Canadian situation.

There is a common complaint generally among art educators (elementary and secondary school levels) that education has assigned the arts to a peripheral role, that the acquisition of verbal and mathematical skills are emphasized and maintained to be essential in our technological society. This complaint applies equally to the status of studio art education within institutes of higher education. Dr. S.M. Gould, chancellor of
the State University of New York, and a prognosticator of the future of art programs within universities, recognizes that there are still educators who "earnestly and sincerely" doubt that art production has any place in higher education (cited in Rosenberg, 1973, p.94). Dr. Meyerson, president of the University of New York at Buffalo, says that:

... in common rooms and faculty clubs it <studio art> is often referred to as 'hobby lobby' or other terms of approbrium... comparable questions are not raised about mediocre art historians. (cited in Rosenberg, 1973, p.95)

Of central concern to this thesis is this view expressed by the university community towards the artist as intellectual:

...that the artist does not know what he is doing, that he does not understand his art, nor how he produced it, nor its place in the culture and in history. (Brandstater, 1969, p.45)

The tendency to assume that a laissez-faire, naive quality is an integral characteristic, or worse, a virtue of the artist is first, arguable, and second, not a justifiable explanation for either the lack of research or the peripheral role of the visual arts within higher education.

One major reason (and there are many) why educators remain uncertain about the role of art education within the universities, according to Dr. Gould, is that so much of what is dealt with in the arts touches upon "technique" as opposed to "philosophy" (cited in Rosenberg, 1973, p.95). The observations of two American studies correspond with this: In a 1967 American Survey of College Arts it was reported that the
curious combination of rudimentary courses and highly specialized work indicates a lack of fundamental philosophy of education to guide development of both curricular and extra-curricular programs (Mahoney, 1970, p.128); and in a study sponsored by the College Art Association of America (Ritchie, 1966, p.xii) it was reported that:

...the teaching objectives of many undergraduate studio programs are still not sufficiently well defined to permit any definite conclusions as to their precise contribution to a liberal arts curriculum or the quality they offer for the education of professional artists."

It should be noticed that most of the information and attitudes cited above were published roughly fifteen years ago. Because there is little recent published research one can only assume that some of these attitudes remain.

Neither the peripheral role of the visual arts in higher education nor the lack of research about higher art education can be attributed to a belief that the majority of artists are self-trained or self-educated independent of institutions of higher education. The Empire State College Visual Arts Survey (Villenes, 1982), designed to obtain evaluations from a selection of 600 artists of international, national, and regional reputation, contained reports that at least 90% of the artists had had a formal education in institutions of higher education in either or both studio and art history courses; those who did not receive a formal training were born before 1920. Furthermore, the vast majority of these professional
artists had some continuing association either through teaching or attending classes in higher education institutions. (National Endowment of the Arts and the National Council on the Arts, 1978, p.86). In another study, Michaels (1970) found that only 3.5 percent of "outstanding professional artists" consider themselves self taught, that is, had not attended art schools or universities. From his survey of over 200 artists working in various visual art media, only two painters, three printmakers, and two weavers were self taught.

Some Preliminary Historical Considerations

The issue of the artist as intellectual is an issue only since the recent changed role of the artist. Perhaps an historical cause for some university educators' doubts about the credibility of studio art departments is the earlier conception of the artist's role. Artists were once considered to be strictly artisans or craftsmen because they worked with their hands. Little consideration was given to the artist as an intellectual or that artists be educated within universities. Rather, the concern was with skill training, apprenticeships, and guilds. At times the artist was viewed merely as the passive medium through which, to use the example of the Middle Ages, representation of the divine could be served (Hausman, 1970).

The changes in the role of artist as craftsman to that of a humanist, not unlike the poet or scholar, were most critical
during the late nineteenth century—an era that marks also the beginnings of the problems of critical standards and the identification of valid artistic activity, so fundamental to this thesis. The growth of individualism and the many other dramatic forces that were to develop during the Industrial Revolution significantly effected the artist's role. Artisans were gradually being replaced by machines. The development of the camera had profound effects, especially in terms of art as the representation of the external world (Benjamin, 1979). Artists had gradually been shedding their role in "lower" levels of mechanical activity where art was considered as technique. As the ideas of freedom and the mythical free individual became popular, painters and sculptors abandoned the strictures and limitations of the guilds and the security of patronage, and turned to more personal and individualized directions.

As artists were turning from the commonly defined values of "crafts" to their own inner subjective feelings for the basis of their art, art historians were tending towards a greater belief in objectivity and analytic systems for dealing with art. Art history was solidly entrenched in the university curriculum long before the consideration of introducing studio art courses. The universities' acceptance of the responsibility for studio visual art programs for both future artists and for students in eclectic liberal arts programs came about very gradually and as a result of complex
forces.

Art history, and for that matter, the history of music, drama, and poetry, were permissible because they followed the academic German heritage. The early "teutonic" methods of the German schools constructed rigid and unnecessary limitations still evident in the discipline today (Hausman, 1970). Art history became a separate established discipline in Germany and to some extent in France and Italy following an influx of recruits to this new field from classical archaeology, theology, literature, and architecture (Panofsky, 1965). Its most exquisite North American counterpart was instigated at Harvard at the end of the last century (Mahoney, 1970). At this time, the ideal of university art education was connoisseurship in the English "belles-lettres" tradition of Ruskin and Pater:

...an educative process intended to produce if not new Berensons then at least a steady stream of employable curators to staff the increasingly numerous and extensive American collections. (Larabee, 1970, p.41)

Such a refined atmosphere would make any contemporary practicing sculptor or painter feel uncomfortable.

Art history, as we know it today as scholarly historical analysis and interpretation of artifacts only surfaced from its entanglement with art connoisseurship in 1923 when the Art Bulletin (founded in 1913 and now recognized as a leading art historical periodical) carried ten art historical articles and only one art appreciation, and with the formation
of a competing periodical, the short-lived *Art Studies* (Panofsky, 1965).

The eventual impulse for the artist's inception within the university did not follow from any social belief in the artist as a valued citizen, or from any belief in art's potential educational contribution to the campus; but from a need for public school teacher preparation courses in art (Ritchie, 1966). Secondary influences came from existing, more utilitarian programs such as architecture, home economics, and engineering, which required drawing and colour theory as descriptive and communicative tools (Ritchie, 1966). Gradually, painters and sculptors were accepted on faculty lists to provide expertise in these matters. Although kept at a mere "cultural enlightening" level, studio art courses were increasingly offered within a liberal arts framework to supplement art history courses, with a Bachelors of Arts degree as terminus. In the early 1930's, the University of Wisconsin and Dartmouth University located a few important artists within their setting, entitling them "artist-in-residence" and calling attention to both the artists' merits and the universities' courage in supporting them (Chipp, 1968; Larabee, 1970). With some financial incentive from the Carnegie Foundation, this example was soon widely imitated across the U.S.A. (Larabee, 1970) and eventually in Canada. Art schools in the New York vicinity, because of their location, had for some time engaged artists
to teach on a part-time basis, but with the post World War II shift in art capitals from Europe to New York, many artists were increasingly accepted as permanent faculty members regardless of the fact that many of them had never attended universities themselves (Chipp, 1968).

Within the role of professor, there was more of a consciousness for artists to make statements with deliberation and clarity about their work and the theories behind it (Chipp, 1968). Galleries also encouraged artists to make statements of their intentions for the increasingly elaborate exhibition catalogues. Under the guise of scholarship, theories and intellectualization on art received a certain legitimacy. Although theorizing may have sometimes resulted in ideas that were forced or dilettante, the result was a body of theory convenient for purposes of academic scholarship. Robert Motherwell exemplifies the artist with a close link to the intellectual aspects of the university (Chipp, 1968).

Having studied philosophy at Stanford University and in France, his career was not only that of an influential painter, but as a theoretician, writer, and editor concerned especially with artists' statements (Chipp, 1968). Ad Reinhardt and Clifford Still, other artists of this post-war period, taught art history at colleges and universities (Chipp, 1968).

Larabee (1970), in his article that attempts to justify the role of the arts within the university, writes that the method of defending and protecting the arts by placing them
within university scholarship and "intellectualizing" and professionalizing them is more pronounced in times of scarcity. "Cultural" questions and concern with how to make life more meaningful, pleasurable, and peaceful are rare, he says. In education, the relevance of the arts is justified in terms of educational value. Expenditures can be more readily justified by illustrating to educational administrators and the public that students are learning something concrete and "useful", rather than merely playful experimenting. In contrast, under conditions of affluence, Larabee suggests that popular dissatisfaction focuses on the quality of life and the arts assume a more prominent role.

The emergence of art into a vital role in higher education is prevented by two types of people, according to Ackerman (1970). First, he describes those who measure educational value quantitatively. They see artistic activity not so much as a means of acquiring knowledge but as a means of self-expression—nothing "palpable" is learned. When the creative impulse of art is emphasized, as opposed to art as a discipline of knowledge, art is construed to be a "mere libidinal release" or an opportunity to exercise faculties not central to learning, somewhat like athletics (Ackerman, 1970).

In our information-seeking society this role of the arts segregates art into a peripheral role as effectively as explicit opposition.

Secondly, there are those whom Ackerman terms "the
intellectual elite". They recognize the seriousness and potential for acquiring knowledge but believe that...

... a gentleman and scholar might dabble in the mechanical arts or theorize about them, but he would not practice them. (Ackerman, 1970, p.67)

According to the intellectualist, the student artist should study and practice within a professional art school, whereas the university liberal arts student may be entitled to a few studio courses primarily on grounds that they "broaden experience" (Ackerman, 1970, p.67).

There is a crucial distinction to be identified in Ackerman's account: the distinction between those who recognize art as primarily the exercise of self-expression and "the creative impulse", and those who recognize art as another discipline for the acquisition of cognitive knowledge. As Ackerman suggested, neither category is particularly beneficial for justifying and promoting visual arts studio education, especially if considered in this simplistic manner.

However, this distinction provides useful concepts for addressing the problem and eventually suggesting improvements. It is a distinction that forms the foundations of the argument in this thesis between, as I have termed these approaches, educating for intuition and educating for rationality.

That such a separation can be made between the intuitive and the cognitive conceptions of art and art education relates back to the early distinction made between the "mechanical"
artist and the aristocratic notion of the liberal arts student. Arnheim (1969) outlines the distinction between the Liberal Arts and the Mechanical Arts: The Liberal Arts were so named because they were considered to be the only disciplines worthy of being practiced by a "free man" (p.2). They were, specifically, Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music because each of these dealt with either language or mathematics. Because painting and sculpture required labour and craftsmanship, they were assigned to the Mechanical Arts. Arnheim briefly mentions some examples that illustrate how this disdain for the visual arts originated and how it persisted through time. He traces it back to Moses' destruction of a sculpture of a golden calf and the long hostility against graven images that followed. Arnheim then traces the disdain for the visual arts through the period of the Pythagoreans, the Chinese thinkers of the taoistic and the yin-yang schools, and the Greek philosophers. Of particular significance was Plato's claim that the arts, especially painting, strengthened man's dependence on illusory images rather than, as with music, the mathematical order and harmony of the cosmos.

The reluctance to accept the visual arts into the university and its continued subordinacy in the eyes of university administrators also has much to do with popular theories of psychology. Arnheim describes the popular theory of psychology as one in which the mind, in order to cope with
the world, must fulfill two functions. First, the mind gathers information and second, it must process it. Creating concepts, accumulating knowledge, connecting, separating, and inferring were believed to be a function of the "higher" cognitive function of the mind. Messages of the senses were thought to be confused and indistinct and that it takes reasoning to clarify them. The suggestion that there are two modes of human consciousness exists in the more recent "split-brain" research.

According to this development, the rational-verbal mode is located in the left hemisphere of the brain and the emotive-intuitive in the right (Jones, 1979).

In philosophy also, the idea of distinct functions of the mind has prevailed. The rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries derived the distinction from the medieval philosophers. The tradition was continued even by Baumgarten, the philosopher who gave the new discipline of aesthetics its name by asserting that both perception and reasoning could attain a state of perfection. However, he demoted perception as inferior to reasoning because he thought it lacked the distinctness that supposedly comes only from reasoning (Arnheim, 1969). These two functions of the mind have been neatly separated in theory, however for Arnheim they are not separate in practice.

A further application and support of the dichotomy is found in our education system. In elementary and secondary schools, the stress is upon words and numbers (Arnheim, 1969),
and their relation with the arts is obscured so that, consequently, the arts are considered as optional frills.
 Schools are frequently accused with the downgrading of visual thinking. Pictures, if they are used in schools are there primarily to illustrate concepts.

Art educators such as Efland (1971), Giffhorn (1978), and Sherman (1983) write that the two usual bases of educational theory—the cognitive emphasis and the affective—alternate also within the theory of art education in elementary and secondary schools:

The pendulum of art education seems to perpetually swing from the cognitive to the affective and back again. Rather than exploring the relationships between the two, we rally to one camp or to the other. (Sherman, 1983, p.39)

Giffhorn attributes one alternative in elementary and secondary school art education as deriving from the "Progressive Era" in the 1920's and from educational theories in which art was believed to be the medium through which children could become happier and more creative. The stress was on the individual, "primitivity" (p.52) or originality, and emotions, in opposition to rational inquiry and art criticism. In general, the tendency was toward anti-intellectualism (Giffhorn, 1978).

In the other extreme is "discipline-centered" school art education. Giffhorn attributes American stimulus-response and cognitive theories of learning and curriculum as strong but indirect influences upon this conception. The implications of discipline-centered art education are an emphasis on conceptual
teaching, rational inquiry, and systematic control.

The Problem To Be Examined

In this thesis the distinction between the intuitive and the rational—a distinction that is rooted in such disciplines as philosophy, psychology, and education—is examined with particular reference to the university education of artists. There is a classic assumption among many artists (as illustrated later in Chapter 2) that intuition and related qualities of the psyche are necessary and even virtuous qualities of an artist. In this thesis it is recognized that the intuitive qualities are paramount concerns of art and should be so in any art education. However, this assumption needs to be examined and should not be accepted uncritically as a justification for either the lack of research or the peripheral role of the arts within higher education.

Art instruction in many universities appears to be primarily a matter of self-expression assumed to be attainable with little more than the acquisition of skills in technique and the manipulation of form. Such instruction is a manifestation of the assumption that uncritically espouses intuition. In many art programs less attention is given to critical inquiry about conceptual and contextual concerns such as, say, the importance of intuition and emotion in art and society. This thesis explores both the intuitive and the rational, conceptual elements as they exist in higher art
education, art criticism, and contemporary art. It is argued in this thesis that a more critical, conceptual element is essential to most approaches in contemporary art. The intuitive element does not exist exclusively and with little connection to the conceptual. It follows that there is reason to question the validity of a university visual art program that functions primarily by the dictates of the intuitive perspective. Perhaps there is reason to contemplate a curriculum that encompasses both the intuitive and conceptual elements and recognizes their inter-dependence.

It is most important to stress that, by attending to the intuitive and the rational as distinct elements, I do not intend to promote or reinforce such an artificial dichotomy. I acknowledge Dewey's opinion that many of the contradictions between theories do not really exist but are carry-overs from our tradition of dichotomy-embodied thought. In reality there are not usually rigid dichotomies but rather, a spectrum exists between poles and many theories lie in a middle ground. The distinction is useful for providing concepts by which the thesis problem can be explored and discussed. That a separation is regarded as artificial does not mean that it cannot be discussed. I would like to think that, as Arnheim (1969, p.3) suggested, "once we understand in theory, we might try to heal in practice the unwholesome split."

One further preliminary clarification must be made as to whom the concerns of this thesis are directed. One function of
university studio art programs is to promote and cultivate the artistic potential of students with career aspirations as professional artists. Secondly, university students enroll in visual arts studio courses to supplement a broader eclectic arts and science education, or a more specialized art history program. Most of the concerns in this thesis are directed to student artists although both functions of university art programs are inseparable in that they have the potential to educate students to be informed and appreciative of the arts, which in turn helps to provide long-term audiences and support of the arts (The Arts, Education, and American Panel, 1977).

Outline of the Thesis

The two perspectives that can be found to exist regarding the education of artists are examined in Chapter 2. Educating for intuition and educating for rationality, as I entitle these perspectives, are each discussed here as distinct and as extensions of the historically-rooted dichotomy.

In Chapter 3, the inter-dependence between studio production and art criticism is introduced. Art criticism receives emphasis for two reasons. First, it is worth considering as an important component of university art education because it embodies knowledge about art and critical skills. Second, it reflects, in its several forms, various fundamental assumptions about art which may be of direct use to student artists, but also, these differences in assumptions can
be linked to the intuitive and rational perspectives toward educating artists. The latter section of this chapter is devoted to a brief discussion of the dialectics of the dichotomy to illustrate the inadequacies and even the dogmatism of both the intuitive and rational perspectives, especially if each is regarded exclusively of the other. Some sort of conciliation seems to be in order.

Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to consider further the education of artists without some general conception about what constitutes valid artistic activity, it is necessary to attain some understanding of the nature of contemporary art. Such an understanding would illuminate some basic contradictions between the present nature of art and the nature of many studio art programs. The essentially pluralistic nature of contemporary art and its theories makes this a difficult task, however, so in Chapter 4 three paradigms are selected which to me most comprehensively represent this pluralistic nature. These paradigms—the objective, social, and subjective—are respectively reviewed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In each of these paradigms, the roles of both the conceptual, rational approach and the intuitive are outlined to illustrate that a primarily intuitionist approach to art and, contingently, to higher art education is not justifiable.

Attention is given to any implications for the education of artists, which, in Chapter 8, are extended into recommendations for application in university visual art studio programs.
CHAPTER 2
TWO PERSPECTIVES TOWARD THE EDUCATION OF ARTISTS

Educating for Intuition

There is a classic attitude in the Art school by which one regards with a great deal of suspicion any verbal form of intellectual or analytical activity practiced by an artist.

David Naylor, in a statement delivered to the University Art Association of Canada Conference, 1981, continues to explain that the argument for this popular attitude, "when there is one", is based on an opposition to the rational in favour of the intuitive. According to this attitude, he says, art is considered to be primarily concerned with the intuitive and as such cannot be considered objectively or "in syntax".

Intuition, the general tenet behind this perspective is an elusive concept.

"Intuition" in its broadest sense is defined as "immediate apprehension" (Rorty, 1967). Yet little can be said about intuition in general because "apprehension" is a term used to cover anything from mystical rapport to sensation to knowledge. Likewise, "immediate" is used to signify the absence of any of the following: inference, causes, the ability to define a term, justification, symbols, or even the absence of thought (Rorty, 1967). That intuition does not refer to these and other concepts associated with reasoning is an appropriate definition
For purposes here.

Associated with the educating for intuition perspective is a fear that art can be adversely conditioned by the influences of university scholarship and the fear that students themselves may become "art scholars" rather than "creative" artists. A study prepared for the College Art Association of America (Ritchie, 1966) includes a precaution against the possibility of the values of art somehow becoming confused with the "values of learning as a discrete activity" (p.39). It is feared that there will be a quick transfer from "idea to dogma." A related fear is that art can be made to appear more real through verbal description than in the fact of its own existence. Proponents of the intuition perspective see the adoption of art by the academic establishment as a serious threat especially when the increasing number of artists thoroughly conditioned to life in academe themselves teach in the university.

If art departments must take on a 'protective coloration of scholarship' if they are to be accepted by the scholarly enterprises, not only may the humanistic learning atmosphere of a university confine more than nurture, but if actual studio time is forfeited for these causes of existing, then the universities may be producing artists who are 'respectable' but uninspired. (Ritchie, 1966, p.88)

A question that proponents of the intuition perspective pose is: Who can construct a valid and objective definition of the stucture of the discipline of art without imposing that individual's perspective upon students? They warn that the urge towards academic conformity, both in individuals and in
art programs, may defeat the aims and the individualistic nature of art. There may indeed be an emphasis placed on theory, rhetoric, and historical principles in order to avoid the risk of appearing too vocational. Would they suggest as a remedy, then, the deletion of studio art from universities? And yet many other present university programs are more "vocational" than "philosophical". The Arts, Education and American Panel (1977) reported that many university administrators have not yet been persuaded that studio art activity is equally as valid for the aspiring artist as lab work is for the scientist, and thus can and should be awarded post-secondary credit.

Dan Flavin (1968) known for his sculpture with fluorescent light tubes, blasphemes higher art education as:

...righteous formats of technical vocational training couched in the pieties of occasional art talk, .... lessons of pretentious past aesthetics, all of which is encompassed by the ultimate censorship of art history .... <and> whatever else it takes to fill out an ostensibly presentable oriented curriculum. (p.28)

...The romance of days of belaboured feelings, of precious, pious, compulsively grimy studio-based labour by haphazardly informed neurotic 'loners' often verging on mental illness is gone. (p.32)

Flavin condemns the universities' typical curriculum categories of media such as painting and sculpture for the reason that they are convenient, official categories of "falsified arts". All works of art, from the most "decadent humanist drawings" to the "latest fun things", are taught in isolation from one another he claims. These are disciplines
that have been...

...constructed and appropriated from the history of art—frequently from its especially useless and tasteful trove, ancient history... No matter how up to the minute a program of discrete mediumistic indoctrination may seem, if the artist feels that he cannot use it, he should not be pressed to do so. (Flavin, 1968, p.32)

According to Flavin, the college and university art department and professional art school versions of an artists' education still exist for the most part as "formal indoctrination of students in art historical media" (p.28).

A line of reasoning like that of Flavin's could be construed without too much difficulty as one in which art, like most anything else in today's reality, is characterized by continuous and accelerating change. The only fixed ideas for dealing with our world have become change itself and the anticipation of change. Indeed, contemporary art continually transgresses the limits imposed by categorization and conventional disciplines. Studio art curriculums that are rigidly constructed around separate categories continually destroy the relation to the change and innovations that characterize contemporary art. A position like that of Flavin's is disparaging to the popular desire for basics and rigid conceptual and operational structures that are often unintentionally constructed to cope with the difficulty in adjusting to continuous change and to perhaps provide some stability and confidence in the future.

A precondition for lessening the lag between the art of
the present time and the fixed categories of media instruction would be increased budgets and facilities for art departments. But this would only service—to use Flavin’s example—the student sculptor’s plans which were not at all radical by "technological implications already apparent in contemporary art." A typical solution to the problems of coping with continual change might be, as Flavin recommended, to relegate art departments, as we know them now, to "advisory study status" under the direction of circumspect artists and scholars with administrational aid. The artist is to be of "independent prospect" since "discipline" in art is bred of "self-regard for self development" (Flavin, 1968, p.32). Flavin presents few specific or constructive solutions beyond the recommendation for indulgence in self-expression and the rejection of art historical knowledge, yet what little he does offer clearly represents an attitude that can be evidenced in much university art instruction—an attitude that favours educating for intuition.

Unlike that of discipline-centred educators, the concern of those of the intuition perspective is not with knowledge and a structured curriculum. Hence, selecting specific content for a studio art curriculum becomes awkward. Peter Fuller, in his book entitled Beyond the Crisis in Art (1980), refers to a recent sociologist’s study which reported that half the tutors and approaching two-thirds of the students of certain art colleges agreed with the proposition that art cannot be taught. Nearly all tutors rejected former academic criteria and
modalities in art but none had any other convention to put in their place (Madge and Weinberger, 1973, cited in Fuller, 1980). Fuller writes that although the apparatus of a profession persists, no professionals, no aesthetics and no identifiable skills survive to be taught because of the advanced stage of the "kenosis" or emptying of commonly defined values, traditional materials and methods that has occurred within the "professional Fine Arts". However, because it has been allowed relative autonomy, the "Fine Arts" have persisted long after their social function was minimalized and marginalized. But due to mechanical means of producing and reproducing images, according to Fuller this "Art" may be disintegrating. He labels it an historically specific concept", one which only came into being with the rise of the bourgeoisie.

Regardless of the direction in which this formalist art may be going, there are adherents to form and media technique who continue to be "real" artists (of the "Fine Arts" tradition) by confining form and content to the pure and simple elements of, say, colour and line, and their relationships--"all that was left over after the kenosis, that is, art itself" (Fuller, 1980, p.58). Fuller calls this an artist's art, a critical examination of painting for experienced viewers. Since there is no referent or allusion outside the work, recognizable or of interest to the viewer, the true audience becomes very small and specialized. It seems safe to assume
that techniques of form and media can be valid components of even the most intuition oriented curriculum. They are necessary vehicles for expression in any art. An institute that exemplifies a continuing practice with technique and form is the New York Studio School. As its dean, Bruce Gagnier (1982, p.29) states, from the outset the Studio School has conducted a "form-based program of art training." Drawing classes, for example, are an important requisite and students learn to work from nature and to derive from it a 2-D pictorial reality.

Reference to the New York School is included here for the important reason of illustrating that art programs conceived primarily as skills training in the manipulation of form and media do actually exist and are recognized in the art circles.

When the ideal in art is viewed as the expression of intuition, emotion, and sensations with little conscious critical reasoning about such conceptual matters as, say, social or historical context, then it is reasonable to assume that this ideal of art could be extrapolated into an ideal view of the education of artists that also centres around promoting intuition and self-expression. According to this education, instruction is kept to a minimum with the intention that students may be better able to discover for themselves the unique possibilities for self-expression. The only likely case in which the value of instruction would be recognized is if it helps provide students with sufficient skills in media technique and the manipulation of form so that they are able to achieve these objectives. There are some obvious contentions
to this extrapolation of intuitionism to the education of artists. In response to the suggestion that emotions and intuitions should be expressed as genuinely as possible, it is impossible to avoid contextual associations and complications. The meanings conveyed in a work are rarely only those which the artist intended. Because this issue is discussed later in a sociological critique, it is sufficient to note here that the very choice of materials or the manner in which form is used reflects prevailing ideologies (Fuller, 1980). Furthermore, instruction in technique cannot be devoid of the instructor’s biases and values. They inhere in the choice of techniques to be demonstrated, the methodology used, or the context in which the instruction occurs. Without some conceptual awareness, the values associated with conventions are unknowingly internalized and later reproduced.

Another contention lies with the concern that academic institutions pose a threat of robbing art of its intuitive qualities in favour of a more rational, conceptual and critical approach. This concern contradicts the conception of art as generally more conceptual. Flavin (1968, p.32) even stated that the artist is becoming a "public man, trusting his own intelligence, confirming his own ideas." Although his ideas about the contemporary artist are not particularly new (both the Bauhaus and the Constructivist schools believed that the artist should, like the lawyer or engineer, be a sophisticated, intelligent, self-confident professional), it does raise a question about where this ideal of such a conceptual or
A well-informed artist is to acquire all this "intelligence" and knowledge. To contend Flavin's general reproach of university art education, it is worth considering the university as an appropriate institution for the preparation of professional artists because of the variety of intellectual and cultural resources it can offer. Ed Colker, editor of an issue of the *Art Journal* (1982, p.27) about higher art education, contemplates about the benefits of attaining a broader education, in spite of the rebuttal that a student's energy should not be drained into other areas or distractions:

In recommending humanities and science courses which do take time, the argument is made that bright young artists won't survive well as artists or as people without more 'education' than perhaps we needed when we were going into the profession which represented a relatively small universe at that time.

The intuition approach to studio education offers little for the contemporary artist who is less of an artisan and instead has a greater concern for the conceptual and methodological--an artist who might benefit from the "intellectualizing" influences of the university. The traditional art academy with its emphasis on charcoal still-life studies and hammer and chisel sculpture has lost some ground to, for example, the contemporary sculptor who inscribes instructions and a loose sketch on blueprint paper for a foundry to construct.

The intuition perspective is problematic not only in relation to the nature of contemporary art, but also in its relation to the nature of education. A popular conception among philosophers of education is that the aim of education is
the acquisition of knowledge and the development of rationality (Hirst, 1969). A question raised in the following section is that if intuition involves the perception of truths and ideas without cognitive reasoning and knowledge acquisition, how, then, can a conception of studio art activity and the development of artists according to the intuition perspective seriously be considered as "education"?

Educating for Rationality

Art is not solely knowledge and the problems proposed by knowledge; art is also ignorance and the eager consciousness of the unknown that impels creation. (Rosenberg, 1973, p.100)

Rosenberg's statement is not so different from Flavin's (1968) suggestion that all artists, no matter how "sophisticated" or "conceptual", rely on their own particular and mysterious gifts of "intuitive good sense": it is these undeveloped qualities that should be fostered through "individual thought" and "self-prospect", not stifled by "formal art historical media indoctrination." However, Rosenberg (1973) points out the ridiculousness of educating for ignorance. The right combination of self-discipline, intuition, and inventiveness cannot be provided for each student. The idea that the studio art teacher needs only to provide students with the technical training required to express inspiration is absurd:

Ignorance in particular is not a quality a university is equipped to supply, or even to honor. (Rosenberg, 1973, p.101)
It is generally assumed that the function of a university is to impart knowledge. However, if art concerns more than the positivists' conception of knowledge—if it concerns intuition—then the issue becomes first, what is teachable or what, if anything, are some relatively concrete fundamentals; and second, which of these are of most significance to the student artist. This is an extremely controversial issue both in educational circles and in the art world. For example, art historical knowledge seems like a relatively tenable candidate for including in an artist's education. But on the other hand, and in brief reference to a point made near the end of this chapter, it is often argued, especially by intuitionists, that even this may be unnecessary or even inhibiting.

That there can be systematic instruction in, or at least about art, and that art education can and should be more than mere vocational training in art media and production is the argument presented by Broudy (1964), a philosopher of education. In his opinion there are plenty of definitions of periods and styles, techniques, and procedures in art that can be identified and stated. Although the characteristics and generalizations on which these definitions are based present difficulties, according to Broudy they are not essentially different in kind from those facing classificatory definitions in other disciplines. A position by which art is seen simply as not the only complex human activity that is difficult but not impossible to discuss and teach in terms of precise
concepts is different from that which views art, even media technique, as changing so rapidly that attempts at teaching art are useless and must depend on self-discovery.

Since that which is teachable in studio art is an issue of present concern, the nature of the artistic process, especially in terms of its related concept, creativity, deserves some investigation. Creativity is related to the artistic process because it is popularly considered to be a necessary condition for greatness in an artist. Philosophers, through careful definition and analyses, have informed us that it cannot be taught. But although a student cannot directly be taught to be creative, acquisition of knowledge is considered necessary for its cultivation and can be acquired through teaching.

With a post second world war concern for developing new "creative" solutions to theoretical and technical research in business and in industry (particularly in reaction to the Russian launching of Sputnik), numerous theories have developed in efforts to analyze and then hopefully systematically nurture creativity to produce individuals superior in inventiveness and intelligence. However, the term "creativity", despite its continuing positive connotations, has become almost meaningless through overly broad definitions and excessive verbalization. Whereas philosophers make scientifically objective attempts at clarification, others maintain that creativity develops best when "protected by the cloak of mystery", as witnessed by
Eisner (1972, p.237), who advocates research in art education, especially the type aimed at studying human behaviour.

...to throw a spotlight on, to illuminate each crack and cranny is to rob creativity of its power... creativity is believed by some to be incapable of being understood. (Eisner, 1972, p.237)

A review of the philosopher's analysis of the concept of creativity— an investigation which they claim provides a better understanding of the conceptual relationships between creativity and art— may illuminate some important implications for the education of artists. There is another important objective of this review: The philosophical method of conceptualization and systematic analysis of such a seemingly complex concept characterizes that process of conscious reasoning that is promoted in the perspective toward educating for rationality. It also distinguishes it from the educating or intuition approach. I use the term "rationalist" throughout this thesis simply to denote proponents of rational inquiry and a more intellectual, critical studio art education. This term is derived from the Latin term, ratio, meaning "reason". "Rational" is appropriate to this discussion because it infers having or evidently exercising the faculty of "reason" (Williams, 1983). Another definition of "rational", although not essential to this discussion, refers to a philosophical program or outlook of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, particularly that of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. These philosophers stressed the power of reason for attaining substantial truths about the world. They tended to
maintain an optimistic view of the power of scientific inquiry.

The definition of "creativity" of immediate concern here is that which R. K. Elliott terms "the traditional concept". It is rooted in an outmoded theory of art in which its foundations were based on a divine or spiritual being controlling the artists' activity. Langer (1957), in a much less mystical manner, defines "creativity" as, to use her example, the application of pigment to canvas resulting in a painting that is more than a mere "pigment-and-canvas structure"

The picture that emerges from the process is a structure of space, and the space itself is an emergent whole of shapes, visible colored volumes. (p.27)

Langer makes the important distinction between "creating" and "making" or "fabricating" automobiles, bricks, toothpaste and shoes from pre-existing material and objects.

The educational philosophers Cochrane (1975), Degenhardt (1976), Elliott (1971), and White (1968) have carefully defined the necessary and sufficient criteria of creativity. The criteria of value and originality are of most concern here but there are also two others. First, the philosophers claim there must be causal agency. Things produced by non-human agencies (nature, God, or machines) do not satisfy this criterion. Their second criterion is intentionality, although they find complications when considering the art of Dadaists who used random elements and chance as intentional violations of our normally accepted notions of art and creativity.
Novelty is a third and obvious criterion. One who copies works of others or their own previous work contradicts our notions of both art and creativity. As is inherent in its definition, novelty cannot be taught. The student alone can create something novel. An idea or method may indeed have been novel, but once learned from an instructor or from any other source and repeated by a student, that student cannot make a claim to novelty. Although this may seem straightforward enough, confusion surrounds the sort of novelty and the context. Is an indefinitely prolongable comparison of what the artist has just created with what has already been done necessary? For the art critic, Lucy Lippard (1971) there is a distinction between "novelty" and "originality":

Originality is novelty that endures through influence and provides "intellectual satisfaction in itself" (p.28).

Originality should be a basic criterion for aesthetic judgement, says Lippard, and while there is no infallible test for originality, one of the best indications is a work’s influence on the art that succeeds it. Immediate acceptance of the new for the sole reason of novelty is condoned only by journalists whose interest lies in the sensational, claims Lippard. "Change of course is not necessarily progress" (p.28). Regardless of these questions, there does seem to be consensus as to the value of the new in art: Art that does not innovate becomes insignificant. The conversion of conventions into new forms is not carried out for purposes of perpetuating traditional values but to demonstrate that new aesthetic forms
If all we can appreciate and feel in a work is its novelty then any qualities of enduring interest and value may be neglected. Berenson (1948) reminds us that the lust for novelty which seems so natural in our society is neither ancient nor universal:

...prehistoric races are credited with having so little of it <novelty> that a change in artifacts is assumed to be a change in populations, one following another... the West, on the other hand, was entirely won over to the spirit of change... from the beginning of the present millenium change has been continuous and even quicker.

It is the nature of art to intentionally reject the conventions to produce something new. But what of the iconoclast who, knowing the conventions, can easily produce something novel? Is this novel something necessarily creative? Too much of an emphasis on novelty and change complicates the problem of values and exposes art to sensationalism and the influences of fads and publicity. As Lippard (1971, p.30) stated, that by advocating only change and that which is new...

... I am setting myself up for all those time-less shots at contemporary critics as opportunists, faddists, public relations men, and historical illiterates.

Creativity is an honorific term. When we speak of creativity, we assume that what is produced is of some value. Originality and value together, then, are the demands of creativity. But determining value in art is controversial and the crux of this thesis and of the discipline generally. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to list any absolute, objective values, yet confusion results if we say that judgements of value are entirely personal matters of whim and fancy, as it were.

From this brief discussion of creativity it is important to establish that although creativity, according to its philosophical definitions and criteria, is not directly "teachable", there is a predominant belief among philosophers of education that a knowledge of the immense variety of styles and forms in tradition, which Broudy claims are "teachable", allows the student artist the freedom to defy tradition and produce highly distinguishable and valuable innovations. Knowledge about tradition and modes in art can be taught in order to provide a foundation upon which students can critically reflect upon their own work. Critical reflection is an activity essential to the creative process. It is in this manner that a knowledge about art fosters creativity. As John Dewey (1958) wrote:

Even the work of an original temperament may be relatively thin, as well as tending to the bizarre, when it is not informed with wide and varied experience of the tradition of the art in which the artist operates.

It is the tradition which gives even the greatest and most innovative artists a beginning point from which to make a unique and valuable advancement. As seen clearly in the history of the visual arts, even the most radical innovators have been highly indebted to their tradition. If this were not so, there would be few recognizable styles or trends.
characteristic of a culture or an era. Some innovations are so radical that any relation to their tradition cannot be comprehended by their contemporaries (Degenhardt, 1976), and it is only with the passing of time and sometimes many years after the artist’s death that the relation to what has gone before can be detected.

That an essential task of university studio art education is the transmission of a knowledge of the tradition of art is a valid argument. As rationalists would argue, the acquisition of a knowledge of art would help to provide students with the critical skills necessary to resist unchecked assumptions and the values defined by instructors or others, and to recognize art that is uncritically based on biases, conventions, and values deemed appropriate by institutions. Stated another way, it is the lack of knowledge and of critical skills that allows students to uncritically internalize conventions and values of their instructors rather than adopting a critical consciousness of them. However, and to this the intuitionists would agree, there is the danger that too much scholarship may inhibit students' abilities to produce creative works if presented in an unnecessarily restricting manner where, for example, historical facts regarding a resuscitated painting become monotonous and meaningless. An art critic for London’s Evening Standard, Richard Cork (1972), observed that such paralysis caused by art institutions is most obvious when the college graduating student exhibitions are surveyed.
Cork noticed that within each department of each institution, particularly painting departments, one overriding direction prevailed. Most students...

...operated within a tired convention... abstract paintings looked like arid exercises, performed by timid conservatives who prefer to reiterate rather than push on towards statements which could renew the language they used... (p.68-69)

Cork observed that students at London’s Royal Academy of Art, on the whole, were unable to reveal their reasons for retreating towards the "woolly stylistic cliches" (p.67) of realism: they did not add new possibilities or suggest any relevancies to their own situations.

In itself, working within a tradition is not a sign of weakness, but it does become derogatory when the premises of such an acceptance have not been rigorously considered and understood. Although a student artist may not consciously set out to produce work which faithfully conforms to standards from a past generation, students are impressionable. Cork writes that almost every student unconsciously has ended up conforming to an image of the student’s role which the college and university environments cherish.

One art student, recognizing this, and subsequently disillusioned at the end of four years of formal art education, disowned all his college art and displayed in its place an essay expounding what he believes to be an artist’s "institutionally defined status":

Most of the work I have done I now believe to be based upon biased conventions and unchecked assumptions, accepted by me temporarily in an
attempt to embrace the role of artist. (Bailey, cited in Cork, 1972, p.70)

In this chapter two perspectives were introduced that, in varying degrees, do actually exist in higher visual art education. In summary, proponents of educating for intuition defend against any endeavor to render the arts in a "scientific" or a rational method. Any subject matter within an art curriculum is questioned for positivism and false conception. The rationalist, on the other hand, advises that art curriculums should consist of tangible subjects such as philosophy of, history of, or sociology of art. Observation, reasoning and knowledge acquisition are necessary for the creative process and the production of valuable innovations: Art students should develop an ability to think critically.

There are disadvantages to both approaches and either one, if considered without regard to the other is problematic for art students. For instance, the confusion surrounding the mystery and relativism of intuitionism, causes difficulties for challenging the peripheral role of the arts in education and in society. It is difficult to find concrete evidence of educational value if very little that is "palpable" is learned. The rational perspective, at the other extreme, favours intellectual content and the nature of artistic intelligence. Yet it avoids those principally important intuitive and expressionist aspects which conventionally characterize the arts, and which offer an important alternative to positivism. In its attempt to promote art to the same level of recognition
that the sciences maintain in education and in society, a rationalist approach to studio art education merely confirms the peripherality of the arts by merging artistic activity into just another form of intellectual activity.
CHAPTER 3

ART CRITICISM AS AN EXTENSION OF THE ISSUE OF THE TWO PERSPECTIVES

Researchers in art education have long been concerned with the development of the highly complex and controversial process called "creativity" and have built curriculums around the productive aspects of art. Undoubtedly, the productive aspects of art are the most important components of an artist's education, but it is also the intention in this thesis to explore the interdependence of studio production and critical competences. Researchers on creativity claim that by increasing the number of conceptual tools students may use in the artistic process, the more they may be increasing the ability to work creatively in the area of art production.

Both the process of critical inquiry and knowledge about art are embodied in art criticism. It is difficult to conceive of a valid art program that ignores the critical component, yet, as illustrated, there are many programs that do just that. For this reason, it is crucial that we examine in theory the potential of different forms of criticism for higher art education: we need to survey what is missing.

Art criticism as a contemporary phenomenon with several forms sustains differing assumptions about art. Many of the differences among these assumptions, particularly the
differences among theories about evaluation, definition, interpretation, and even perception, can be affiliated with the intuitive and rational perspectives toward the education of artists. In this chapter, the nature of criticism in general and its differing fundamental assumptions are discussed. Succeeding chapters focus more particularly on each of the objective, sociological, subjective critical methods and the implications of each for higher art education.

Assumptions in Contemporary Art Criticism

"Criticism is judgement ideally as well as etymologically." This assertion by Dewey, in *Art and Experience* (1934, p.298), has frequently been contested by art critics, educators, and artists. Weitz (1952) for one, considers the primary function of art criticism to be the explication of the work of art. To have communicated this explication or interpretation is to have "completed the whole of the critical transaction" (p.284). The addition of an evaluation of the work's "greatness" or "badness" adds nothing to our appreciation of it. Weitz advocates non-evaluative criticism following a belligerent analysis in which he presents two related fundamental points upon which the logical positivists insist: first, aesthetic judgements like, for example, "this painting is bad", are not factual reports about the properties of works of art; and second, these judgements cannot consequently be true or false in any objective sense. It follows from this that there are no
objective standards or criteria upon which to predicate evaluative criticism. To say that "good" in art is "integrated" is to wrongly assume that integration, or for that matter, any other criteria of value such as universality, profundness, social significance, truth, or beauty, corresponds to "good" in art. (Incidently, and discordently, Weitz's writings disclose a conception of "good" art based upon the extent of organic unity—the integration of the formal constituents of the work to the work as whole.) Defining precise criteria so that consequences can be drawn from them, as practiced in philosophy as a logical method for objectively evaluating, becomes problematic in the criticism of art. Whereas philosophy is a discipline involving intellectual processes of construction of definitions, meanings, and criteria according to an established ideal, the experiencing of art, it can be assumed, involves both intellect and complex emotion and is thus more subjective (Leepa, 1973).

Standards, rules, classifications, and value theories are general while works of art are particular and if they apply too broadly these abstractions tend to apply to nothing specifically. In attempts to become concrete these abstractions must be referred for exemplification to individual works, but the traits and tendencies that characterize works of art do not have fixed boundaries enabling one to conveniently place a work in a particular distinct category. Nor do categories have fixed boundaries. Through avant-garde experimentation, categories like sculpture and painting have
been stretched, twisted, and defied. Although these categories may seem infinitely maleable, we still seem to know what sculpture and painting are. They have their own internal logic as does any other convention. Painting and sculpture are historically bound categories, not universally bound (Krauss, 1983, p.33). Definitions and classifications can be educative if they are used only to direct attention to significant tendencies, but some art theorists and critics, wrote Dewey (1934), assume that a definition discloses some inward reality about the object just by its being a member of some fixed category.

Weitz cautions us that error commonly occurs in our prevalent thinking about evaluation because if art cannot be objectively defined and categorized, and aesthetic evaluations are not factual reports then, in the opposite extreme, we presume evaluations to be entirely subjective. Supposing one took the extreme high "Crocean" view and maintained that if each work of art is a unique individual then comparisons, theorizing and value judgements of any sort and in any case are necessarily convoluted. This relativistic attitude may also result in the false notion that art criticism is affiliated almost exclusively with "taste" and subjective opinion rather than with the more established and surveyed conditions of science which claim to bear, as does art history, the existence of objective "knowledge". This in turn may help to explain why, in the curriculum of most university art departments, art criticism is not recognized as a department or subject of
knowledge. This essential tension between subjectivity and objectivity underlies that of criticism as non-evaluative versus criticism as evaluative, and, relatedly, art education that is intuitive or rational.

Feldman (1972, 1973) supports the non-evaluative concept of criticism by reason of its embodying the greatest educative worth. At the simplest level he defines criticism as "talk about art" and outlines a four step process: description, analysis, interpretation, and, but yes, evaluation. For Feldman, a judgement about a work of art is the least educationally significant aspect of criticism even to the extent of being anti-educative. Jumping to a premature judgement with only fragmentary evidence is "perilous": we must learn to "resist the tendency to reach a premature closure to our aesthetic experience" (1973, p.51). The first three steps of Feldman's methodology of art criticism—description, analysis, and interpretation—are vital to ensuring a thorough experience of the work. The viewer is encouraged to perceive and describe the elements of the work in "unloaded" words and expressions which, says Feldman, only "other people would agree are there." This type of statement contains the "objective" presupposition that, because a work of art is a concrete physical object, there exist within it objective elements perceived identically by all. This is a positivist supposition that can be contested.

Thomas Kuhn (1962) has argued that paradigms are prerequisite to perception itself. What we perceive depends
upon the accepted theory of our time (and in times of crises and confusion as paradigms are shifting our perception is also shifting). Psychology and the study of perception has shown that sensory experience is not fixed and neutral. Through experimentation two persons with the same retinal impressions have each been found to see two different objects, and two persons with different retinal impressions each see the same object (Kuhn, 1962). In accordance with these experimental outcomes, Hobbs (1980) stated that our environment and past experiences, for example familiarity with conventions, traditions, and even iconography in art, affects the way we perceive and this in turn affects what we see. The process of perception, states Langer (1957), is a process of formulation which begins with the eye and its peculiar abstractions of sense-data. Our perception of forms rather than of a mere flux of light impressions, according to Langer, "rests on the fact that we promptly and unconsciously abstract a form from each sensory experience." We use this form to conceive the experience as a whole, as a "thing". If there is no such thing as a universally perceived form of the "real" world, then perception will not only differ from one culture to another culture but from individual to individual.

There is a different but prevalent view by which our abilities to perceive--our perceptual apparatus--are regarded as universally alike, and what does explain perceptual differences is our differing interpretations of our observations. Kuhn attributes this second viewpoint to a
philosophical paradigm typical of nineteenth century science whereby the use of fixed categories in concepts of time, space, and causality enabled man to project and establish knowledge about the world. This is now an antiquated notion since dramatic changes in science and technology have long since destroyed man's ability to synthesize an internalize all of knowledge.

An awareness of perceptual differences exposes an even more elementary basis for differences within the concept of criticism, and its significance to any discussion of art criticism and art education cannot be overlooked. Perceptions supply material to description, analyses, interpretations, and, importantly, judgements. Differences in visual perception among individuals, compounded through these processes, will unavoidably lead to a lack of consensus about evaluations. But in terms of educative worth, these potential differences are not of foremost concern to educators like Feldman. What is important is that the work of art is observed sensitively and completely. The importance of the completeness of first-hand perception is supported by Dewey (1934, p.298):

...obtuseness in perception can never be made good by any amount of learning, however extensive, nor any command of abstract theory, however correct.

Ralph Smith (1973), has distinguished two types of criticism: "exploratory aesthetic criticism", and "argumentative aesthetic criticism". Exploratory criticism involves three stages approximating the first three of
Feldman's model. Similarly, these are intended to function educationally by way of "intelligent interpretive perspective". Exploratory criticism does not purport to meet the level of professional critical performance, unlike argumentative criticism which assumes a critical judgement of work has already been made. With argumentative criticism, the critic must then, following an exploratory critique, attempt to persuade others that the work mirrors the interpretation and judgement "by carefully weighing merits and demerits as measured by a number of standards" (p. 44). Smith's distinction between evaluative and non-evaluative, quite similar to that of Feldman's, infers that criticism as evaluative belongs to the professional art critic and has little or no function for educational purposes. However, Smith notes that once an object has been carefully described, analysed, and interpreted, an evaluation has inevitably been made or is at least strongly implicit in the detailed account.

In relation to Smith's last point, there is a theory that description and evaluation, instead of being distinct, run together in the same concept—like a spectrum. Righter (1963) claims that evaluation is merely an extension of description. At the evaluative extreme, words are used such as "good", "bad", "mundane" and at the other end of the spectrum are less evaluative words like "texture", "hue", and "atmosphere" for example. In between these poles are terms which can be either or both. Words such as "tension", "ambiguity", "austere" are descriptive but also carry evaluative overtones, especially if
they receive much recent popular usage. These words, which in ordinary communication are vague, when used by art critics in the context of a work of art, may convey sharp evaluative perceptions. The value of these words lies in their contribution to the illumination of the experience. For Righter, the exactness of argument in science, logic, or common sense has no serious role in criticism. Righter's theory of words and their connotations prompts some consideration of the essential difference in modes of communication between visual art forms and verbal criticism. Visual and verbal differences are represented in Langer's (1957) discussion of "presentational" and "discursive" forms.

"Discursive" refers to all language, all verbal symbolism, in which words have a linear discrete, successive order--"strung one after another like beads" (Langer, 1957, p.76). In fact Langer claims that thoughts which cannot be arranged in this order cannot be spoken at all. Some logicians who rely upon a logical positivist paradigm, have perverted this so far as to say that anything that cannot be arranged in discursive form is "not accessible to the human mind" (p.30). Here Langer refers with objection to Wittgenstein and Carnap. Their implication is that they have defined knowledge and from it have excluded presentational forms—that realm of feeling, immediate experience, and intuition which are more difficult to articulate verbally, and of which visual art involves.

The derivation of meaning from presentational forms, involves a simultaneous, integral, and spatial presentation,
unlike the linear presentation of discursive forms. The realm of sensation, emotion, intuition, all of which constitute the arts, is described by Langer as extremely "complex, fluid, full". Discursive forms, including art criticism, are less capable of articulating these complexities. Here lies the problem of studio art education. If the production of art involves the simultaneous, integral, and spatial, how can such a non-discursive process be taught? How can discursive forms be used for instructing about the creative process? Intuitionists would contend that discursive forms are severely inadequate. They would likely glorify Langer's following statement:

... language is a very poor medium for expressing our emotional nature. It merely names certain vaguely and crudely conceived states, but fails miserably in any attempt to convey the ever-moving patterns, the ambivalences and intricacies of inner experience, the interplay of feelings with thoughts and impressions, memories and echoes of memories, transient fantasy, on its mere runic traces, all turned into nameless, unemotional stuff. (1957, p. 92)

The converse assumption that a work of art can be objectively translated into words attests to our over-reliance on rational discursive thought as the primary means of thinking and understanding. The belief that a work of art can be translated into words also attests to the unreasonable belief that verbal statements are the most efficient and most reliable means of communication. Consider, for example, a description of a person's facial expression. Some qualities are better conveyed through a visual portrait (painting, photograph, sculpture), whereas others may be better described through language (poetry, descriptive prose).
That visual forms are not fastidiously and objectively translatable into verbal language does not nullify the worth of art criticism. Language, like art, is both a social instrument for communication that functions to extend understanding, and a means for self-expression. Neither visual perception nor verbal translation of a work of art are objective processes. No attempt to refrain from evaluating, say, by observing, describing, analyzing and interpreting with as objective, non-evaluative terms as is possible and without reference to a priori standards is exempt from unnoticed personal and cultural interpretations and evaluations. As Najder (1975) wrote in a philosophical account of evaluation, every choice of action is psychologically grounded in evaluation, whether the agent is aware or not of such dependence. Our consciousness acts selectively and abstracts upon the great mass of sense-data and this selection is carried out at many levels, from sensation and perception to the level of opinions regarding what is worth noticing, and what is important and valuable.

This introduction to some fundamental concerns of art criticism, specifically theories of perception, interpretation of meaning, and the nature of language and communication are essential to bear in mind when considering the dialectics of the intuitionist and rationalist perspectives to the education of artists. For instance, the intuitionist’s defence against rational methods tends to be based on a recognition of the apparent infinite variation and intangibility of individual differences in perception, verbal description, and social
influences in art. The rationalist, on the other hand, views
the inexactness of the arts as not presenting any peculiar
pedagogical difficulties because sense can be made by
recognizing generalities for classification and evaluative
systems; curriculums can still be constructed that exhibit a
knowledge structure like that of the history or the philosophy
of anything else. These general tendencies can be further
extended into an account of the role of certainty in concepts
of scepticism and idealism and, ultimately, into the dialectics
of differentiation and integration.

Scepticism

Stephen Pepper (1945) claims that appeals to certainty and
to the authority of tradition and conventions as displayed in
the works of "masters" are dogmatic. That descriptions of
works of art are frequently presented as "facts" attests to our
dominant contemporary positivist paradigm of thought. "Facts"
in the arts involve emotions, sensations, and intuited forms
that are not "objectively" agreed upon. But equally dogmatic
as certainty, wrote Pepper, is scepticism in critical inquiry.
Would he say, then, that radical anti-art, with its refusal to
condemn any activity as non-art, is just as dogmatic as any
earlier claims to truth and the authority of tradition?

Pepper addresses the issue of scepticism in his advocacy
that the problem of criticism is ultimately the problem of
evidence for the justification of the criteria used in
criticism. The anti-intellectualist's de-emphasis of critical inquiry can be viewed as a means to relieve oneself of all demands for evidence: it is to say that "nothing at all is known", and is non-committal to any "cognitive responsibility." If one is to accept this form of anti-intellectualism, Pepper insists that the sceptic must provide evidence that denies the untrustworthiness of evidence. But here Pepper appears to be imposing the positivist's scientific logic of provision of evidence for all criteria, which is the very rational process to which the anti-intellectualists protest.

A problem we seem to face, then, if we deny the existence of certainty in criteria of value of art and, in turn, repudiate evaluative criticism, is that art becomes a matter of personal taste. In other words, art that is solely a matter of preference is a denial of the existence of value in art. To say, as the philosophers might, that liking X above Y without reason or reflection does not seem to be sufficient cause for evaluating X as embodying more value than Y. "Liking" is a personal statement, a confession, weighted heavily with psychological reports, rather than a conscious analysis of the work of art. Value judgements, in contrast, are considered to be supported by evidence often observed in the work (Sharer, 1980). Opponents of the sceptical approach would question that if aesthetic evaluations are not consistently held by all, surely this does not warrant reducing them to personal likes or dislikes. Can valid evaluation exist without demanding,
universal consensus? Or can evaluative criteria be legitimate if it is specific to a culture or to an artist? If art is considered to be a matter of personal taste, if there are no standards and criteria of value or standards, and "anything goes", then this is also a rejection of the critical process—a rejection linked to the anti-intellectual forces of the Sixties which de-emphasized among other skills, critical inquiry (Nichols, 1981; Smith, 1973).

Without attempting to impose rigid and complete connections it is not difficult to see a similarity of attitudes between those who are sceptical of certainty and evaluation in criticism and those intuitionists who maintain a scepticism about the value of an intellectual, critical approach to visual art studio education. Similarly, there seems to be a connection between idealists, that is, those who discern some logic and evaluation in art criticism, and those who regard the development of critical abilities and acquisition of knowledge as important for art students.

Idealism

Criticism in art is, for the idealist, a sufficiently logical procedure. However, this, "logic" never pretends to have the rigour and necessity which strict logical deductive connections demand. This use of the term "idealism" is not so different than the way in which Plato used its root. "Idea", according to Plato, is apprehended by the intellect, and does
not exist in time. It refers to a universal in contrast to a particular (Acton, 1967).

Hegel, who is described as an Absolute idealist (Acton, 1967), wrote the following about philosophical idealism:

...the ideality of the finite <is>...the main principle of philosophy.
...every genuine philosophy is on that account idealism. (Hegel, cited in Acton, 1967, p.114)

Idealists are concerned with the difficulties and controversies of evaluation and see critical assessment as unavoidable. In art education, for example, decisions must be made as to what is worthy of attention as there is obviously not time enough to attend to all art (and this is presuming of course, that art has been distinguished from non-art).

Similarly, in the professional art world, as it were, evaluation occurs by implication in journals, magazines, and galleries. According to what criteria (if any) do art councils distribute funds? (There are other criteria such as didactic potential and marketability that function in favour of various institutional and economic reasons. It is important to be aware of the employment of these criteria, yet for purposes here they are peripheral.)

Broudy’s (1964) writing tends toward idealism. In the previous chapter, he was referred to as an advocate of an intellectual, factual type of art education, since he sees no lack of definitions of periods, styles and techniques in art. Although characterizations and generalizations present problems, these difficulties, to repeat his claim, are not
unlike those faced by other complex disciplines and human activities. Thus, for Broudy, critical evaluation would only be impossible if we could not point to certain identifiable features in a work of art.

Given the ideal case, the logic of rules and principles of art present no peculiar difficulties. (Broudy, 1964, p.99)

Knowledge, experience, and a set of standards are grounded, in a theory about, writes Broudy in idealistic overtones, "the good, about reality, and about knowledge itself, that is, by a complete philosophical system" (p.101). If this philosophical idealism was pursued, systematic instruction would occur in the arts as it occurs in any other discipline, for procedures, definitions, and ideals that can be identified and stated qualify as knowledge in the conventional cognitive sense.

The idealist's conception of criticism as evaluative presupposes the necessity of cognitive reasoning and knowledge. For the idealist, an object can only be judged to be good or bad, valid or invalid according to a set of standards and value criteria. It is the establishment of such rules which is so problematic. However, evaluating subjective art experiences is not necessarily impossible and is, according to the idealist perspective, unavoidable, whereas for the sceptic it is nearly impossible. For an idealist, a studio art curriculum would be constructed to include evaluative criteria, critical inquiry, and intellectual content: the methodology and intellectual content of art criticism would be tantamount.
Differential and Integral Dialectics

When confronted with so many conflicting claims about value judgements or even controversy about the essence of forms of art such as the "nature" of sculpture or performance art, one might recoil and conclude that there is little solution and that all discussion of them is vain. Olsen (1976), a representative of the 1950's school of "New Criticism", draws a better inference: There is no such thing as an absolute critical theory. Rather, there are as many possible systems of art as there are of philosophy generally. Olsen invites a comparison between Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Hegel, for example, to illustrate that all philosophers who comprehend the arts in their systems develop their own distinctive philosophies of art. The solution of any problem, according to Olsen, is always relative to its formulation. No problem can be completely formulated and, he adds, any solution is a function of the particular dialectic upon it. The important consequence is that what seems like dissent may merely be methodological difference or concern with different aspects of a subject. Olsen reminds us that when discussing value in art we are immediately confronted with two difficulties: the peculiar character of art; and the terms that we use in criticism, which, far from promoting understanding by their clarity or uniformity have often, by their ambiguity and
irregularity, supplanted the problems of art as a subject of
dissention.

It is hardly strange that those who start at
different points and move by different means
in different directions should end up in diff-
erent places. In any case, this affords no
real ground for scepticism. (Olsen, 1976, p.308)

The variety of existing philosophies about art has been
advanced as a chief argument for scepticism in art - the latest
manifestation of which is the so-called "Critical Relativism"
(Olsen, 1976, p.333). The sceptics assume that this variety is
equivalent to contradiction, every philosophic "sic" being
cancelled by a philosophic "non" (p.334). This sceptical
assumption in effect implies the impossibility of any
constructive formulations, hence an examination of its
dialectics.

Philosophies, according to Olsen, vary according to the
dialectics upon which they are based. Olsen defines
"dialectics" as the logic of the system as a whole. At the
most primitive level, dialectics may deal merely with
likenesses (integral) or with differences (differential). To
these dialectics the idealist and sceptic attitudes of art
correspond respectively. Linked to these are the rationalist
and intuitionist perspectives toward the education of artists.

If one takes the extreme view that all things are unique
then differential terms are employed to discriminate A from B;
and since things are viewed to be in constant change, then
object A must also be discriminated from itself, for A at one time is different from A at another. If this position is pushed to its utmost extreme, says Olsen, signification becomes impossible since words are finite while things, attributes, and moments are infinite. In fact things cannot be perceived, contemplated or acted upon, for what we would act upon has changed or is gone before we can act; thus Heracleitus' remark that we cannot step into the same river twice (Olsen, 1976). Indeed, the view that only motion or change is real is an extreme position of scepticism. For those of a more moderate differential position, absolute precision is of course still impossible but relative degrees of accuracy may be achieved by specification despite the ambiguities of language. Olsen states that this dialectic frequently provokes a form of analytical discipline intended to improve the accuracy of language, or to avoid the psychological confusions which language may induce.

In the other extreme, if the dialectic concerns absolute similars by a denial of individual differences, precisely the opposite state of affairs occurs. Universals are sought but if taken to this extreme the dialectic now turns to a reduction of the many to the one; motion and individual forms are only appearances (Olsen, 1976).

One method by which the new is made more comfortable, more familiar, is by sweeping differences aside and seeing the evolution of new forms from the forms of the past. Krauss
defines "postmodernist" practice in art as being in relation to critical operations based on a set of cultural terms rather than, like Olsen's perspective, in relation to the more conventional operations based on a given medium. Despite both the intentional and non-intentional stretching and defying of traditional terms (such as sculpture), Krauss claims that the covert message of the ideology of the new is that of historicism.

Historicism works on the new and different to diminish newness and mitigate difference. It makes a place for change in our experience by evoking the model of evolution, so that the man who now is can be accepted as being different from the child he once was, by simultaneously being seen—through the unseeable action of the telos—as the same. And we are comforted by this perception of sameness, this strategy for reducing anything foreign in either time or space, to what we already know and are (1983, p.32).

Rather than abdicating before each manifestation of the unfamiliar, art criticism typically constructs paternities for new work (Krauss); it is continuity that makes discourse comprehensible. Krauss presents as an example the paternity constructed for minimalist sculpture: A set of constructivist fathers—Gabo, Tatlin, Lissitsky—could legitimize and thereby authenticate the strangeness of these objects so that new ideas such as inert geometries, factory production, and plastic appeared less foreign. In the 1970's the rage to historicize often became suspect as critics, not without difficulty, were making tenuous connections, for example between earthwork
sculpture and Stonehenge, Indian burial mounds—"anything that could be hauled into the court to bear witness to this work's connection to history" (Krauss, 1983, p.33).

The earlier accounts of scepticism and idealism and especially Olsen's dialectics may appear inappropriate since they concern such polar extremes and reduce the two perspectives presented in this thesis to such rudimentary and perhaps hypothetical views. It is important to re-emphasize that extremes of opinion are used here (and elsewhere in this thesis) to provide concepts to most clearly differentiate major characteristics among perspectives and to illustrate the inadequacies that occur if only dichotomies are represented devoid of any interdependences that may exist between poles. The intention in this thesis is to carefully consider art criticism and the possibilities of the "critical" in connection with university visual art education. "Critical", if defined in the Kantian sense, is an indomitable systematically questioning approach towards subjects, opposed to both dogmatic certainty and the merely sceptical viewpoints (Murray, 1975). Such extremes of certainty in the form of philosophical idealism and scepticism are primary deterents of any constructive critical enterprise. On grounds of dogmatism, either pole is an inadequate and unacceptable approach to any type of art education. For the education of artists, a ramification of this is that either pole of the related intuitionist/
rationalist dichotomy, in itself, is suspect. The sort of critical inquiry or art criticism that becomes the focus of recommendations for the education of artists assumes an interdependence between intuitive qualities and the intellect.
Pluralism in Contemporary Art

The education of artists must occur in light of some conception of valid artistic activity and excellence in art. This conception is incorporated into the objectives and practice of studio art curriculums. Furthermore, art criticism of the didactic sort that is opposed to dogmatic certainty and mere scepticism was previously shown to be grounded in evaluation. This chapter therefore begins with a discussion of value criteria and the manner in which theories enable us to grasp values that are typically multiple and related in complex ways. A method is then proposed for a review of critical theories in contemporary art (to follow in Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Because criticism necessarily rests upon certain theories about the nature of and values in art, an understanding of these theories increases our understanding of art criticism and its potential contribution to higher art education. And importantly, an understanding of the nature and critical methods of contemporary art allows for a more complete recognition of the role of critical thought and of intuition in art which in turn may suggest what role these two aspects
should assume in the education of artists. To offer any suggestions for the improvement of the education of artists without an adequate understanding of the nature of art and the issue of value criteria would be premature.

Criteria of evaluation are necessarily dependent on a theory of the nature of art and the aesthetic. In other words, prior to the question of evaluation is the question of what factors qualify a particular work as "art". However, there exist concurrently a multitude of diverse theories about the nature of art. There is not an absolute and all-comprehending theory, and it is likely that not even the most extreme philosophical idealist would seriously attempt to advance a singular theory for evaluating all works of art. The simultaneous existence of a multitude of aesthetic theories has not always typified the arts, however.

At various times throughout much of the history of western art there was a "universal" theory of art. The theory of imitation is one such theory that persisted from Plato to the Romantic period. Of course, imitation was not always defended in its literal sense. Plato condemned imitators of superficial appearances (Rader, 1979). Aristotle advocated that art should express the real, rid of irrelevancies and the disturbances of chance. Characters were to be "imitated" not as they were, but as they ought to be, so that their tragic flaws were veiled behind their lofty nobility. The imitation of the Platonic universals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty was accepted as the
goal of the fine arts right through to the eighteenth century when Neoclassicism waned (Rader, 1979). Throughout this time, though, the word "imitation" was frequently substituted: for example during the Romantic period the term "representation" was used instead. Presently, the theory of imitation is now generally rejected along with art that is imitative in any literal sense.

In earlier art movements, value criteria were a "healthy" part of the "conceptual equipment with which one approached the problem of artistic creation," stated Daley (1980), a philosopher at a symposium in Britain entitled Excellence and Standards in the Arts. Value criteria were...

... inherent in the processes themselves and not the source of identity crises. They defined the limits of the problem rather than constituting the essence of it. (Daley, 1980, p.58)

Daley's concern about the present lack of attention given to the very concept of standards in the arts reflects the general attitudes among members of this symposium. The situation in the arts is currently in a state of crises, they agreed. Daley condemns art critics of a non-evaluative bend for their apprehension about making judgements which involve rejecting certain styles, forms, and theories from the realm of "good" art for fear of repeating the error of reactionary rejection made by art critics at the turn of this century. Although aesthetics, like politics, morals, and religion has never had absolute answers, in Daley's opinion standards do
exist and should be established.

If standards could be identified and defined, as suggested by Daley and other members of the symposium, not only would art criticism with its enigma of evaluation be radically simplified, but valid artistic activity could thus likely be defined and the problem of the education of artists would no longer be problematic in this sense. Curricula could be designed to satisfy criteria based upon an agreed definition of art and valid artistic activity.

However, it is precisely the lack of consensus regarding standards and theories as clearly evidenced throughout the discipline of the arts which is the chief justification for scepticism. It is only a small step from disregarding the issue of value in the arts on grounds of too much diversity and disorder among basic theoretical principles, to rejecting any sort of structured "intelligent" art curriculum.

Given the lack of consensus in the discipline of the arts generally, there is one respect in which consensus is apparent, namely, that contemporary art is in its essence pluralistic. There is not one dominant art movement in today's Post-modernist era but many art styles, and these in themselves are pluralistic.

Members of the American Section of the International Association of Art Critics (1980) held a roundtable discussion about pluralism in art and art criticism. Responses ranged from tones of idealism through to scepticism. Like the overall idealist attitude among members of the British symposium, the
responses by some American art critics appear to pertain to Olsen's integral dialectics (discussed in Chapter 3). In fact one critic sees sufficient similarities between styles that the very use of the term "pluralism" indicates merely an inability to recognize the similarities:

Pluralism is only an impression and it would not be difficult to show that pattern, narrative, new image, and so on belong to the same sensibility. They are all involved with language and narrative. ...If we look beyond surface, beyond style, we may find far less disparity than we suppose. (Michelé Cone, cited in American Association of Art Critics, 1980, p379)

Also in line with the attitudes expressed by many members of the British symposium, a second popular view expressed at the American conference of art critics was one of crises:

Pluralism represents a lack of commitment and a fear of making judgements about quality... Pluralism represents to me a kind of pseudopopulism. I don’t think pluralism is a notion addressed to the professional as much as to the new gallery-going public, which is turning out in unprecedented numbers to be entertained as well as to find cachet. We're adapting ourselves to these people, rather than having them come to us. (Phyllis Tuchman, cited in American Association of Art Critics, 1980, p377)

There is a crisis. It is manifested by this impression that everything is possible. The meaning or the value of the work of art no longer has very much to do with the opinion of an informed person who looks at it and analyses it at length. The meaning of a work of art today is inscribed by a number. (Michele Cone, cited in American Association of Art Critics, 1980 p.378)

Nobody is arguing with anybody else. The jockeying for position is on a very small scale, so it all becomes rather trivial. (Corinne Robins, cited American Association of Art Critics, 1980, p.378)
Pluralism is a cop-out word, there is a lot of mediocre work around. (David Bourbon, cited in American Association of Art Critics, 1980, p.378).

There is a third and very different attitude towards pluralism in art. The diversity allowed by pluralism provides a great liberation for artists and critics:

It is of course everyone’s perogative to specialize... It may be confusing for the art dealers, the art collectors, the art speculators, the art curators, and even for many artists and some art critics. But it reflects our society and the possibility of egalitarian pluralism.... The tension we feel when examining the varieties of contemporary art—art that is serious, ambitious, well thought out, and thought provoking—is a positive force. Received opinions are of little help. We cannot rely on authoritarian dictates concerning taste and quality. What is good taste? What is quality? Dogma does not suffice. In terms of art criticism, power is not in the hands of two or three star critics, as it has been in the past. I welcome the multitude of critical responses to art works and to the art situation, as do many other art critics. It is enriching... it would be sad if we were to fall back into looking for an authoritarian situation, which, I am afraid, may reflect something in the larger society... I would rather have this chaos. (John Perreault, cited in American Association of Art Critics, 1980, p.377-379)

In this thesis it was suggested that if artists are to avoid the dogmatic or superficial reliance upon unsupported opinions or the convictions of authorities with flashy credentials and reputations, a knowledge of art and its theories may be useful. But a second reason for considering theories in art when investigating the education of artists is that art emerges from theory. It was mentioned earlier that art is now farther removed from the earlier realm of habit, manual dexterity, commonly defined values and assumptions into
that of ideas. Rosenberg (1971) stresses that the automatism involved in the application of craft skills and traditions has been replaced by conceptual acts...

...occurring at the very beginning of the making of a work. (his emphasis)
...styles now originate in abstract ideas and idea-based art movements.... The roots of contemporary creation lie not in observation of nature nor in earlier works of art but in theoretical interpretations of these. The new relation of art and ideas has imposed upon art the necessity for a self-consciousness that has rendered skillful copying obsolete. (p.137,138)

A knowledge of theories and theoretical content in art may provide guidelines and categories by which distinctions can be made that might have otherwise gone unnoticed (Eisner, 1982) and it may provide a means by which many styles in art can be understood. However, a precaution must accompany this suggestion. Theories are not prescriptive rules or formulas. By themselves they are inadequate to deal with the problems of art production. The simple suggestion that possession of a knowledge of theories would reconcile the issue of the education of artists would be just another dogmatic and idealistic blunder that glosses over the complexities, particularities, and intuitiveness of imagination and invention of the artistic process. Because many styles of art were initiated in reaction to the tenets of theories of art, many new theories are subtle and philosophical—philosophical in the sense that an argument is presented followed by a systematic defense of the ground for the claim and alternate views presented.
That contemporary art is pluralistic has prevalently been established but to consider each of the manifold art styles, critical responses, and their respective fundamental theories is a "Herculean task" unattainable within this thesis. So in order to make the task manageable, three major paradigms or tendencies will be selected for review. Paradigms enable us, as Kuhn (1962, p.109) stated, not only to "know nature" which is too complex and varied to be explored at random but also to provide us with "some of the directions essential for map-making."

By reviewing major theories of art in the following three chapters, it is my intention to demonstrate the role and significance, if any, of the critical element in contemporary art, and discuss any educational implications. If a critical element can be evidenced as an important component of art and its fundamental theories within all major paradigms then it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that a more critical and conceptual approach has a valid role in university studio art education. Contingent to this hypothesis is the recommendation that art criticism can inform and enrich studio art activity providing that it is not isolated as a separate classroom activity.
Selection of Paradigms

The three major paradigms through which the pluralism of contemporary art styles and theories can be dealt with should be as distinctive as possible yet also representative of all major theories and trends. My selection of paradigms ensues, in part, from the three distinct world views or categories of "processes of inquiry" of which Habermas (1968, p.308) wrote, namely: the "technical cognitive interest" of the empirical analytic sciences, the "practical interest" of the "historical-heurmeneutic sciences", and the "emancipatory-cognitive" interest of the "critically oriented sciences". In this thesis, these paradigms are referred to as "objective", "social", and "subjective". Not only are they general paradigms or world views, but in this thesis they demarcate trends that can be recognized within the discipline of art itself.

Habermas systematically explored the relationship between different types of knowledge and their motivating interests. Knowledge should be considered from all three perspectives, he argues, because each perspective lacks that which the other two offer. When bodies of knowledge are organized according to this trichotomous relationship and when all three "worlds" are simultaneous, the stress of every theory can be made explicit. For example, the possession of multiple perspectives enables us to recognize, first, that those who stress only the objective, physical/material world cannot advance beyond objectivism. The
demonstration of all three categories "is the task of a critical philosophy of science that escapes the snares of positivism" (p.308). Second, those who stress only the social construction of knowledge cannot progress beyond relativism. And third, subjectivists who rely extensively on "self-reflection" (p.310) get bound up in self-actualization and the phenomenological. Neither is the discipline of art itself exempt from these biases and distortions. These will become evident as each category or paradigm is reviewed.

If difficulties and biases result when extremes are approached in any direction, it seems that the ideal situation for approaching perspectives and theories of art and of art criticism, then, both in terms of aesthetic experience and the attainment of cognitive knowledge requires a familiarity and adeptness with all three perspectives. If equally important aspects are neglected due to a partiality or familiarity with one view, then this one view may become the sole criterion of value and all deviations from it could conceivably be condemned as deviations from art itself.

Feldman (1967, 1972), in his methodology of art criticism by stages of description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation, has outlined three "philosophies" or critical approaches to art upon which evaluations in art criticism are founded. With a concern for pluralistic views, Feldman suggests that...

It is better to use these philosophies interchange-
ably, according to the character of the art object, than to stick rigidly to one philosophy alone and thus lose discovering some excellence the work may have. The goal of art criticism is not necessarily to demonstrate how consistent you are in your final judgements. The real goal is to increase the sum of values and satisfactions you can get from art. (Feldman, 1972, p.377)

It may be unjust to consider all works of art in the same manner because not all works convey nor involve all three emphases equally. The elements taken into account in evaluation, their stress, and the way they are balanced are bound to vary from artist to artist and from critic to critic—what the individual regards as significant in the particular instance will vary. However, all categories are relevant and neglect of any one category due to unfamiliarity is not a legitimate option of a comprehensive and carefully informed evaluation.

The philosophies according to which Feldman suggests evaluations can be justified are "formalism", "instrumentalism", and "expressionism". In many ways Feldman's critical theories in art criticism parallel Habermas' world views. Formalism, as the word implies, stresses the importance of the formal or visual elements in art and, as will be illustrated in Chapter 5, relates to the objective paradigm. Instrumentalism is Feldman's second category that primarily involves the purposes of art that have been "determined by persistent human needs working through powerful social institutions" (1972, p.374). Hence it relates to the social
paradigm of Chapter 6. Finally, expressionism concerns the depth and intensity of the art experience and the "power to arouse the viewer's emotions" (1972, p.374), and can be linked to the subjective paradigm of Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 5
THE OBJECTIVE PARADIGM

The Nature of Formalism

Of the entire range of art theories, formalism has most thoroughly dominated twentieth century art, art criticism, and art education. Formalism is a variant of the "physical object hypothesis" (a term used by Wolff, 1983, p.70) which, in the case of the arts, focuses on the particular properties of works of art, even though with music or drama, the works of art are not necessarily physical objects. The communication of feelings and ideas are thought to be dependent solely on the perceivable formal structure—the elements of form and materials within the work, their interrelationships and relationships to the work as a whole. Form is emphasized rather than content (Feldman, 1972; Mayer, 1969).

Because of this confinement formalism gravitates toward objectivity. Social, perceptual, symbolic, and other factors extrinsic to the "physical object", the work of art, are neglected in formalist analysis. Formalist theorists seem to make an effort to appear philosophically sound, even quasi-scientific. My use of the term "objective" has been used in the most general sense as that which exists outside the mind
as an actual object as opposed to ideas, thoughts, and feelings in the mind. (This is very different from the positivist sense in which scientists must be objective in their experiments, that is, without bias. It is also different from the sense that a work of art can be described as either "abstract" or "objective" in its representation of or resemblance to natural objects.)

That formalism can be described as a renunciation of social and contextual concerns is not to say that it has had little social significance. The widespread inception of an art that intentionally rejects comprehensible imagery and its associated meanings was indeed revolutionary. Traditions and public taste were defied. Formalism, evidenced most predominately in the stream of abstract and non-figurative painting typical of the New York School, is seen in art history texts as having derived from Cubism. The means by which images could be formalized in painting was so revolutionary that painting changed in appearance more during the Cubist epoch, from 1907 to 1914, than it had since the Renaissance (Chipp, 1968). This engrossment with formal devices had immediate influence upon poetry, literature, music, and especially architecture and the applied arts. Formalist writers and critics, in their proclamation of the autonomy of the formal elements, attacked the academic dictum that the subject of a painting must deal with a comprehensible and narrative event of
an important, a noble, or a literary event (Chipp, 1968).

Metzinger and Gleizes, two well-known Cubist painters according to the public and press at the time, were intimately involved in the Cubist manifestations in the Salon des Independants and published a book about the ideology and aims of Cubism, *Du Cubisme* (1912). Their bias for form is clearly evidenced in an article for *Pan* (Paris):

> ...form, used for too many centuries as the inanimate support of color finally recovered its rights to life and to instability. (Metzinger, cited in Chipp, 1968, p.196)

The literature of the Cubist movement is abundant and expansive in scope. Probable reasons are that it readily lends itself to theorization, and because Cubist innovations were so revolutionary and, in retrospect, is pertinent to later art.

The longevity of formalism and the general shifting of the force of art from Europe to New York has been accredited, in part, to the influences of Hans Hoffman. Hoffman brought from Munich and Paris the formalist concerns in the tradition of Cezanne and Cubism. He opened a school in New York and for nearly fifty years his theories remained essentially unaffected by trends of social-consciousness (Chipp, 1968). Hoffman taught about colour, space, light, technique, and imagination. Many of the artists who were to become leaders of the post second world war generation of formalists were either Hoffman's students or were influenced by his painting or his reputation.
The following is an excerpt from his teaching:

We recognize visual form only by means of light, and light only by means of form, and we further recognize that color is an effect of light in relation to form and its inherent texture. When color is richest, form is fullest! This declaration of Cezanne's is a guide for painters. Swing and pulsating form and its counterpart, resonating space, originate in color intervals. (Hoffman, 1948, p.77-78)

Formalism as a Reflection of the Objective Paradigm

An antecedent of the idea of form itself is found in Plato's written explanation of form's profound affinity to spirit: form provides a necessary basis for the expression and cultivation of the human soul. For Plato, formal characteristics were a constituent of and inseparable from aesthetic experience (Rader, 1979). The collaboration of harmony, rhythm, design, theme, emphasis and subordination, and Plato's other principles of form constitute the whole, a conception commonly called organic unity.

Depending upon the scientific paradigm of perception of the particular era, the emphasis has shifted between the "part" and the "whole". Whereas Plato emphasized representative qualities of the whole, Hume, for instance, suggested an interpretation in terms of acuity and precision:

Where the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition, this we call delicacy of taste. (Hume, cited in Osborne, 1979, p.308)
It was Baumgarten, attributed to be the father of aesthetics, who first noted the importance of subsidizing the accepted rationalistic classification of philosophical studies with what was then believed to be an "inferior cognition"; that is, the senses (Osborne, 1979, p.308).

Within the paradigm fundamental to Hume's thinking, experience is broken down into its elements. These elements are analysed, generalized, laws and physical causes sought, all in attempts to gain much useful and objective knowledge and categories.

In the middle of this century, a paradigm that became dominant in the occidental world emphasized the affinities of thought and language (Murray, 1975). According to this paradigm, the critic facing a work of art, like the scientist analyzing nature, must describe the visual object of inquiry in discursive terms. Even the visual artist who may think in visual terms is, according to this paradigm, couching those thoughts in language-like terms. Nelson Goodman (1968) notes that this analytic philosophy that focuses on the problems of language, meaning, logical structures, and on scientific knowledge with its objective attitude of physical cause for everything neglects important aspects of the arts. Thoughts and feelings are not always articulated most effectively with discursive forms.

Incursions from the analytic territory upon the arts are
clearly represented in *The Meaning of Meaning*, a book with presuppositions that have pervaded, often unintentionally, much of contemporary criticism (Murray, 1975). The authors are I.A. Richards, a prolific writer on the theory and practice of literary judgement, and psychologist C.K. Ogden. Richards represents a school of formalist critics within what was termed "New Criticism", but of these critics, he maintains the most aggressively open positivist manner. In fact Richards is attributed with helping to oust impressionist prose in the 1920's and to initiate the austere, self-denying era of objective criticism (Marmer, 1979, p.70). Critical writing that emphasized the critic's subject-ive reactions was mocked by positivists as the "great soul wandering among masterpieces" approach (Marmer, 1979, p.70).

The positivistic design of *The Meaning of Meaning* is apparent in its overthrow of the "magical theory" (p.243) by a "scientific theory". Magical theory refers to a conviction that words are a part of the thing and have special power over reality. Richards and Ogden attempt to eradicate this "habit" and "the phantom problems resulting from such superstitions" (p.244) by a scientific study of signs in which the bond between language and reality is severed enabling one to realign language with reality through the reference capacity of scientific symbols.

Richards believed that an "objective" determination of
experience resulted from our deeper grasp of science; no worthy answers are attainable without the most thorough and far-ranging investigation. What matters for Richards is what a poem is formally, not what it says. A position like that of Richards' is an ideology rather than knowledge and informed choice. Richards' formulations represent a reactionary and intellectually unsound response to the prevailing influences of positivism. He represents a paradigm that makes theorizing about the arts easier yet falsely systematic and exact.

After all, positivism, according to one definition by Beittel (1979), is a false interpretation of science. Positivism is the dogmatic belief in scientism which amounts to science's irrational belief in itself and only itself (Beittel, 1979).

The word "positivism" was introduced by Comte about 1830 (William, 1983). Comte argued that the human mind passed through primary stages of theological interpretation, and metaphysical and abstract interpretation, to a mature stage of "positive" or scientific understanding based only on observable facts. Positivism was soon to become not only a scientific movement, but also a scheme of history and social reform. Raymond Williams (1983) points out that our contemporary critique of positivism argues that the position of the observer is neglected when "observable facts" are limited to only those that are subject to physical or repeatable and verifiable measurement.
Although Richards' concern was with literature, his formalist influence upon the visual arts has been considerable. One such espousal of formalism exclusive to the visual arts is found in the aesthetics of Clive Bell. "Significant form" is the key term in Bell's theory of concentrated and uncompromising emphasis on sheer abstract design, and also in Roger Fry's related but more subtle and complex theory of art. (The concept of form has been emphasized by many authors in a variety of terminology.) Significant form in Bell's theory refers to a unique quality resulting from certain combinations of lines, colors, or compositional elements. Bell holds that aesthetic emotion, the only emotion he considers legitimate in art and different from the emotions of everyday life, is aroused by the vision of significant form. Representation, except for that of space necessary to achieve certain kinds of visual form, is aesthetically irrelevant, claims Bell:

The emotion that the artist felt in his moment of inspiration he did not feel for objects seen as means, but for objects seen as pure forms—that is, as ends in themselves.... It is form, or at any rate through pure form that he feels his inspired emotion. (Bell, 1979, p.295)

Other Examples of Objectivity in Art

Before considering the implications of a formalist approach for the education of artists, it is worthwhile to realize that the attempt to attain "objectivity" in the
discipline of the arts was so pronounced that a type of mathematical research was designed to find concrete evidence by empirically measuring aesthetic value in works of art by method of statistical analysis. Mention of these pursuits may rightly seem inappropriate since they are reductive and may no longer be seen to be of any serious relevancy, yet it is important to realize the extent of positivist hegemony.

Eysenck, a British psychologist, attempted to prove that aesthetic values are objective because consensus among evaluation can be found and hence should be measurable (Child, 1966). Eysenck asked a sample of people to rank a set of paintings in order of personal preference. Any congruity of preference for one painting over another was detected by statistical analysis. Understandably, there was the objection to Eysenck's proposition that the standard of aesthetic value is determined by the average taste of the majority. His study neglected the possibility that a small segment of society with a specialized interest in art may have a stronger influence in determining aesthetic value (Child, 1966). Additionally problematic was the likelihood of a variation in taste among various strata of society. These lacunae were pursued by the psychologist, Kate Gordon, in the early 1920's with a similar method that measured consistencies among experts with hopes of finding more consensus and thus more objective results. Instead she found that experts agree among themselves less
often than do the general public (Child, 1966).

Yet another analogy between evaluation in art and mathematics, but of a different sort, was proposed by George Birkhoff in his writing suitably entitled Aesthetic Measure, 1933, and a few years later by Rashivsky (Berlyne, 1971; Osborne, 1979). Berlyne (1971) reviewed these theories of objective measurement to see to what extent they can be reconciled with the present state of knowledge in psychology and in other scientific fields of study such as neurophysiology. Basic to these theories was the notion of arousal and the idea that too much or too little arousal diminishes the value of aesthetic experience and therefore the meaning. Birkhoff, Rashivsky, and Eysenck each constructed mathematical equations in which aesthetic value in works of art were measured by a formula relating order to mathematical complexity (Berlyne, 1971).

Implications for the Education of Artists

Theories in art are developed with implications about what kinds of criticism are acceptable and what factors denote value in art, yet any critical theory starts from an assumption about what is artistically valuable. In other words, when art theorists and critics delineate and establish theories in art, they are inevitably suggesting values—they must maintain some
conception about what is artistically valuable. These values can then be appropriated by artists who attempt to create art that will be acknowledged by critics and gallery administrators. Despite the problems that surround this circularity between artists and critics (a "chicken and egg" interrelationship that is more relevant to sociology of art and especially institutional theory than to this present discussion), ardent formalists can, in principle, identify and delineate value criteria in art according to the relatively objective conditions of formalism. Richards (1948) held that a logical system of evaluation must precede any application of literary judgement. Formalism, because of its affirmation of the existence of evidence obtainable within the object's form upon which classifications and value systems are constructed, allows for ease in ascribing value more than any other theory of art. In turn, and in principle, the construction of a studio art curriculum within a formalist paradigm should be relatively unproblematic—yet this is a proposition that is customarily deemed problematic by many educators and artists.

Since valid artistic activity can be logically defined according to the tenets of formalist theory, formalism tends to present few difficulties for systematic instruction in education. Curriculums consisting of units of knowledge and demonstrations in technique and formal design elements can be readily constructed in compliance with formalist notions of
value. Such a curriculum lends itself conveniently to control during instructional hours, and to student evaluation by empirical methods.

The formalist premise that value somehow inheres in works of art and that it can be measured can result in a formalist conception of art education intended to cultivate in students an ability to evaluate art. When works of art, including student works, are compared or interpreted in a highly judgemental way, the aims of art education appear to be the cultivation and refinement of students' "taste" and the ability to evaluate and appreciate "valuable art" (Giffhorn, 1978). Art criticism of an evaluative sort could be construed to be of utmost significance to an artist's education. An implication for art production in studio courses would be an emphasis on the creation of "valuable" objects. ("Valuable" is often paralleled in much of the literature of aesthetics with some conception of "beauty").

Just as a formalist approach is influenced by positivism and the notion that objects can be broken down into component parts to be defined, interpreted, and analyzed, so too is the approach of many existing university art programs. Many programs are constructed according to principles of form: figure/ground, light/dark relationships, balance, harmony, rhythm. Much of the art created by students in secondary school art classes is both inspired and evaluated by these
formalist principles. And Michaels' (1970) study indicated that in many American university studio programs art is treated primarily in a formalist manner. Explanations for this may be that formalist principles are convenient tools by which both mature artists and students can experiment with media and the manipulation of form, and secondly, these principles have been the prime concern of many twentieth century artists. The problem occurs, however, when there is an inadequate understanding of the premises. To recognize that the emphasis in much of modern art has been upon formalism or, more particularly, that the emphasis of the Bauhaus School has been upon design elements, is not in itself sufficient reason for promoting a strictly formalist art education. It was Pepper's (1945) opinion that dependence upon authority without knowing that authority's evidence is blind concession. Although formalism is conducive to rational inquiry and may even tend more closely toward reductionism than other theories, it should be realized that any theory can be reduced to dogma if developed without critical understanding and innovation.

Richards defined art criticism in The Principles of Literary Criticism, 1948, as the endeavour to "discriminate between experiences and to evaluate them". We cannot do this without, he claims, some understanding of the nature of experience or without theories of valuation and communication (cited in Murray, 1975, p.37). Richards continues to explain
that a worthy definition of "experience" can only be attained with a "deeper grasp of science" and the most thorough and encompassing investigation. In educational terms, this would be a didactic exercise in the sense that observation, interpretation, and analysis of materials, forms, and interrelations within the work can undoubtedly increase perception by enabling the viewer to see previously unnoticed elements and relationships, perhaps thereby leading to increased understanding and appreciation for the complexity of embodied meanings. Whether such a systematic cognitive experience detracts from or overthrows the true potential function of art by lessening or even eliminating "aesthetic experience" (an amorphous concept associated with emotional response) is a controversy dependent upon the particular conception of the nature and function of art. It is also an issue that reflects back to the argument of Chapter 2 between the role of intuition and rationality in higher art education.

Critique of Formalism

One side of the argument—the intuitionist side—toward the relation between the aesthetic experience of art and conceptual knowledge is that a more sensitive and increased aesthetic experience does not necessarily result from the cognitive assimilation of formal elements and meanings.
associated with formalism. Without the vitality and brisk rhythm of "aesthetic experience", art criticism may prompt the viewer to habituate into a process of merely-searching for recognizable images and meanings (Stolnitz, 1966). The intuitionists would say that art involves itself with more than just form—that art is linked essentially with intuition and emotion. Art criticism, which they would likely parallel with formalist analysis, involves the intellect. Therefore criticism can overthrow the true potential function of art by lessening or even eliminating the immediacy with which art affects the viewer.

The argument just presented between formalist analysis and aesthetic experience resembles Adorno's (1982) discussion of the broader issue of cultural criticism. Adorno distinguishes between "immanent" criticism and "transcendental" criticism. Immanent criticism of artistic and intellectual phenomena seeks to transform, through analysis of form and its resultant meaning, a general recognition of the "servitude of the objective mind" (p.32) into a heightened perception of the thing itself. Because immanent criticism involves analysis of form and the "objective" mind, Adorno's criticisms can be applied to formalism.

Immanent criticism cannot take comfort in its own idea. It can neither be vain enough to believe that it can liberate the mind directly by immersing itself in it, nor naive enough to believe that unflinching immersion in the object will inevitably lead to truth by virtue of the logic of things
if only the subjective knowledge or the false whole
is kept from intruding from the outside, as it were,
in the determination of the object. (p. 33)

Adorno criticizes immanent criticism as being "fetishism of an
object blind to its genesis" and, resultingly, the prerogative
of the expert. Yet equally faulty, he says, is the
transcendental contemplation and abstract theorization that
forgets the constitutive "objects" necessary about which to
theorize. Adorno then precautions that "topological thinking
which knows the place of every phenomenon and the essence of
none" is related to the mechanically functioning categories
into which experience is severed from the object and according
to which knowledge is compartmentalized to make knowledge more
readily graspable. As Adorno reminds us, the world is
compartmentalized. However such compartmentalization is
vulnerable to domination ("divide and conquer")--the very
domination against which construction of the categories
was intended to resist.

Compartmentalization of knowledge may lead to more
objective (or "factual") knowledge by reason that it evade
much subjective prejudice or personal preference and the
confusions associated with a differential dialectic.
Similarities are sought for the more scientific purposes of
classification and compartmentalization, definition,
interpretation, and analysis. Supposing these methods of
science are considered for their possible provision of
objective knowledge—to return to a central (although positivist) point of Richard's formalist thesis—then perhaps a reason to believe in the methods of science is that scientific theories are open to rejection and modification. According to Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), anomalies can lead to the rejection of a critical theory resulting in paradigm change, or as he terms it, a "scientific revolution". It is the pseudosciences like astrology that are problematic because they are not as open to modification and change in this way. David Carrier (1979), an art critic who explored the link between science and the arts, questions that if such change in theories in science should be a reason to call scientific theories objective, then why should not the same be true of certain critical theories of art? As in science, Carrier says, we can reject formalism because it fails to account for much contemporary art, or because it denotes a certain concept of modernism as incoherent, or because other accounts better describe the relation between "old master" and contemporary art.

Yet formalism still exists. Certainly there are no lack of alternate theories and anomalies but these do not lead to objective knowledge in the sense that Carrier intends since few theories are rejected. Rather, formalism, especially its Minimalist inheritors, co-exists alongside the variety of theories and approaches in a state of pluralism. The
permissiveness of the pluralistic situation should mean that artists and critics no longer need be constrained by the putative objectivity of formalist rhetoric, yet formalism because of its objective authority of formal elements has been argued by Fuller (1980) to hinder the emergence of contemporary art from a condition of elitism and irrelevance to its public. And formalism is perpetuated by art education generally. Fuller reacts to a comment made by Clement Greenberg, an influential art critic of the 1960's and a proponent of American Formalism, that painting should confine itself to the...

...disposition pure and simple of color and line and not intrigue us by association with things we can experience more authentically elsewhere. (Greenberg, quoted in Fuller, 1980, p.59)

It is this very confinement to such pure and simple that Fuller claims is the explanation, in part, of such a small, specialized audience.

The formalist insistence that a work of art is a closed and complete system in itself in which its elements are explained and evaluated in terms of their interdependence, independent of subjects and social factors, is to categorize art as a commodity and to situate it in an elitist position wherein appreciation of it requires a select social position, money, and "Culture". This exclusion represents, though quite simply, the essence of a sociological critique of art. Sociologists of art would argue that meaning and value in art
cannot be derived solely from its formal context, that it is impossible to separate it from its social milieu. Philosophy, formalism, and all aesthetic theories are themselves social constructs. Regardless of whether artists portray or reject, intentionally or not, or hurl defiance at a culture's aesthetic standards and conventions, they are nevertheless delegates of that culture and the social stratum upon which they depend. Furthermore, the distinction of "great" works of art which eventually form the established aesthetic tradition and later incorporated into a static, linear form in art curriculums, are evaluated by academics, critics, intellectuals, and the like, themselves institutionally and strategically located within a social history. This is an evaluative process that many opponents of formalism consider to be ideological and partial.

Fuller denounces critical theories that make claims to empirical objectivity. He calls their apparent objectivism "rampant idealism in fancy dress" (1980, p.219). These "bourgeois idealist critics" (p.225) cling to the concept of reified ideals and universals. Fuller demonstrates this by citing Kenneth Clark's description of the classical Greek sculpture, Venus de Milo, as "one of the most splendid physical ideals of all humanity" (cited in Fuller, 1980, p.225). Purporting eternal universal ideals is, in Fuller's words, "sexist", "racist", and "imperialist" because it elevates not only a race as "ideal" but also elevates a
condition of sculpture under Western capitalism into a category allegedly valid "for all times and all places" (p. 228).

Sociologists of art would immediately purport that aesthetic theory, and especially the objective pseudo-scientific attempts by formalists, have failed because of its unmitigated reduction of the nature of art. The discipline of the arts continues to exist on the whole, with little reference to sociological intervention (Wolff, 1983, p. 27). In the following two chapters the approaches which formalist theory overlooks are discussed—the social, and the subjective. Despite its obvious lacunae, the formalist paradigm merits attention here because of its significant and extensive effect upon the discipline of art, upon education generally, and of course, upon the education of artists.
Many of the difficulties and complexities of the arts have been reduced by concentrating on the formal elements irrespective of any social context, as evidenced in the previous account of formalism. Certain transcendental or universal qualities that persist through time and across cultures have often been explained by the partial or supra-historical status of formalist analysis and the philosophy of art. However, the formalist's claim to objectivity has been rendered problematic by exposing the complexities and situating art in a social context that may suggest ways in which the arts can better be understood. A sociological approach attempts to demystify art and its related issues that are generally used uncritically.

Categories of Affiliation Between Art and Sociology

Art is integrated into the structure of society when it is created, perceived, and evaluated. The relationships between art and sociology are diverse.

First, there is the theory in which political and ideological doctrine do not necessarily have to be the intention, either explicitly or allegorically, of the artist, but that all art is political nevertheless. This first category
is a perspective by which the context, the intentions, and sociological implications can be considered for all art regardless of whether it is a purist painting in which the sole intention is to explore certain formal qualities.

Wolff (1983) insists on the relevance between art and sociology because art is unavoidably political. She stresses that this does not necessarily mean that art is only political, or that aesthetic evaluation can be reduced to ideology, like sociological reductionists (discussed later in this chapter) would purport. Any painting with apparently "innocent" subject matter can be decoded to identify its ideological position. Wolff recognizes that the implicit meanings of the work will most often be found to be complex and even contradictory, reflecting both the "contradictory nature of consciousness" and the variability within the "artistic system of representation" (p. 64). This may explain why works generally interpreted as conformist or supportive of the status quo have suddenly been found to offer new subjective meaning.

A second category is art that is explicitly and intentionally political. Whereas the first category represents a theoretical position, the second is a category of art that can be produced and used for the service of political reaction and revolutions, or in times of stability, its political role may be the result of an artist’s exploration of the means by which innovation in art may produce a transformation of political consciousness (Feldman, 1967; Wolff, 1983). To
understand sufficiently a work of this nature the viewer must realize its social and historical circumstances. Although the political role of art is paramount, Wolff suggests that this type of art becomes merely "agitprop" only when all consideration of form is totally subordinated to considerations of propaganda. One of the monuments of revolutionary art is Liberty Leading the People by Delacroix. The intention of this enormous political spectacle that depicts an allegorical figure was to inspire and guide the French revolutionaries.

A third category is art which is political to the extent that it is concerned with political themes. Again, works of this sort cannot adequately be understood without a knowledge of the political inspiration and reference involved (Berger, 1980; Feldman, 1967; Wolff, 1983). These works differ from those of the second category in that the intention behind these works may not be to mobilize audiences or to intervene in political events, but to present a social description by selecting or "framing" existence as a way of life, say, or focusing on the quality of life. The Ash Can School of eight American painters exemplifies the tradition of social description. These artists organized themselves in revolt of the sentimental and picturesque ideals of the salon art of Europe. Instead they portrayed working class themes.

Satire is another form of art with social intentions, and can belong to either this second category or the third. Satire often serves to ridicule institutions and people or to
dramatize the gap between official promises and actual performance.

The perception and definition of art in terms of its social roles and institutions is termed "institutional theory". According to this fourth category, art is accredited the status of art by reference to traditions that inevitably derived their characteristics from social and institutional forces. Proponents of institutional theory would carefully consider the effects of what art critics, editors, scholars, gallery administrators, and members of boards of arts councils that determine the distribution of funding to artists and projects would bring to bear upon their practices. Wollheim is linked to this theory by Carrier (1979) and Wolff (1983) because of his argument in Art and Its Objects (1980) of how new arts are established as art. Institutional theorists, he writes, ask questions that...

...will benefit from the comparatively rich context in which it is asked. It is for instance, in this way that the question, Is the film an art? is currently discussed. (Wollheim, 1980, p.152)

The following section reviews a fifth and extreme relationship between sociology and art. It is one in which art and aesthetics are radically reduced to ideological concerns. Although insistent upon the relevance of sociology for art, it is a position contended by Wolff (1983), Fuller (1980) and other non-reductionist sociologists of art.
Marxist Reductionist Theory and Its Implications for the Education of Artists

A belief common to all sects within sociological reductionist theory of art is that the problems of aesthetics and aesthetic evaluation are solved. The production, perception, and evaluation of art are seen as mere socio-historical events: aesthetics itself is simply a historically specific discipline and as such is reducible to ideological explication. Nicos Hadjinicolaou, a social historian of art deemed representative of reductionism by Fuller (1980) and Wolff (1983), illustrates in his book, *Art History and Class Struggle* (1978), the principle by which aesthetic evaluation can be conceived as, curiously, unproblematic. Hadjinicolaou does not deny that the perception of the object of art provokes reactions varying from pleasure to displeasure (to name only two polar reactions) but that these reactions are always closely linked to the extent to which the viewer recognizes her or himself in the "visual" ideology of each work. Hadjinicolaou takes this a step further with his statement that the pleasure felt by the spectator on viewing a picture, and the correspondence between the viewer's aesthetic ideology and the painting's visual ideology are "one and the same thing" (p.180). Given that the aesthetic effect of a work is nothing but its visual ideology, the very notion of aesthetic value can only be rejected.
I deny the existence of an aesthetic effect which can be dissociated from the visual ideology of a work. And I refuse to use even the idea of aesthetic value in art history. (Hadjinicolaou, 1978, p.179)

Such a resolute assertion appears to be a suggestion that art is disintegrating, and in fact, he does state:

The recognition that there is no aesthetic effect to be isolated results in certain consequences for aesthetics as a discipline.... aesthetics will follow philosophy of history into oblivion, because it also is a 'discipline' without subject matter. (Hadjinicolaou, 1978, p.182,183)

Aesthetic judgement, according to Hadjinicolaou, is not totally subjective as frequently alleged but always derives from the aesthetic ideologies of social groups (p.183). Any reflection or speculation on aesthetic value must be incorporated into a concrete historical and "immanent" analysis of the work or style in question. The art historian's task is to establish his analysis of a painting's visual ideology on the history of its appreciation.

If art programs in universities conformed to such a reductionist theory by which aesthetic effect is nothing more than the pleasure felt by observers as they recognized themselves fitting within a picture's visual ideology, the problematic issue of evaluation in terms of evaluation of student's work, decisions as to what art is worthy of study, and so on, would be reduced to sociological concerns. Although undoubtedly complex, evaluation would become a more tangible and almost logical procedure employing criteria
of visual ideology. The discipline of art criticism would function primarily to describe and interpret visual ideology, a function very similar to that of art history. Given the similarity between methodologies, perhaps it is possible that criticism would merge or even yield to art history. And, if an extreme sociological reductionist theory of art was completely accepted, all categories of the aesthetic would be officially rejected, as Hadjinicolau suggested. In this case art education as we know it as involving the senses and the emotions could also become defunct. Studio art courses such as painting and drawing would likely maintain a role as purveyor of the skills required to master symbolic form through which ideological and political statements could be rendered. There would be little concern for intrinsic abstract qualities of form itself.

Undeniably, formalists and sociological reductionists consider themselves at opposite poles. The essence of formalism is form confined within the work itself, irrespective of social or extrinsic elements, whereas for the reductionist form is only of worth as a vehicle through which ideology is represented. Their similarity, however, lies with the reductionist incorporation of the aesthetic into a concrete, scientifically rational analysis of specifics. In this manner reductionism echoes, in some ways, formalist analysis. Both theories assume that many concrete and definable "facts" about art do exist although these "facts" differ between the two
This similarity is apparent in Edward Thompson's critique of Althusserian reductionist theory. (Althusserianism is one grouping within Marxism which is frequently criticized for its stringent regard of the aesthetic product as the result of the application of a means of labour to transform a raw material. Althusserians do not distinguish between art and other material products.) The aesthetic "product" is described as:

...a sealed system within which concepts endlessly circulate, recognize and interrogate each other and the intensity of its repetitious introversial life is mistaken for 'science'. (Thompson, cited in Fuller, 1980, p.246)

It seems reasonable to infer that the reductionist methodology of cognitive analysis for determining classification, interpretations, and evaluations, if extended into art education, would similarly necessitate an intellectual, logically concrete approach to art education, somewhat like that of a formalist emphasis. However, Hadjinicolau denounces the positivist approach to conventional (formalist) art history as autonomous and essentially independent—"a part of bourgeois ideology" (p.62). Such a "particularly conservative school of thought" (p.68), in his opinion, results in art history as a chain of isolated events, ideas, and creations, "with the weakest of links and lacking any relation to the 'outside' world" (p.68). Its suppositions reincarnate "the old notion of art for art's sake" (p.68). He
attributes formalism’s popularity to its conduciveness to
-analysis. Ironically, while cautioning us about the danger
that formalism presents because it allows for very rigorous
analysis, Hadjinicolauou simultaneously writes that to strengthen
the links to the "outside" world a scientific approach to art
history is needed to uncover "facts" about ideology in art.

With the aid of concrete socio-historical analysis,
reductionists claim to solve even the following problem raised
by Marx in his Grundisse, 1857:

| But the difficulty lies not in understanding that the Greek arts and epic are bound up with certain forms of social development. The difficulty is that they still afford us artistic pleasure and that in a certain respect they count as a norm and as an unattainable model. (Marx, 1857, p.111, cited in Hadjinicolauou, 1978, p.182) |

The phenomenon of reducing a work of art to ideology undoubtedly undermines any transhistorical or universal aesthetic value that may exist and impoverishes the emotional and intuitive essence of art. So it seems that by foreshadowing an objection "by all who rightly fear a dogmatic or mechanical approach", Hadjinicolauou concedes that Greek art or any art that is seen as an ideal is "not the same ideal on each occasion". The history of the reception and experience of the work and the complexity of class divisions must also be considered carefully before any parallel can be made with content and style in art.
One has to look at the complexity of each era and take into consideration the fact that several aesthetic ideologies coexist during any one period and that one dominates the others. (Hadjinicolaou, 1978, p.182)

Despite Hadjinicolaou's conciliation of the existence of ideals, complexities, and inconsistencies, this sort of Marxist reductionist theory is rejected by many sociologists of art. Wolff (1983) argues that Hadjinicolaou's explanation about why Greek art appeals to nineteenth century artists avoids any implication of the existence of purely aesthetic qualities and values in art; any transhistorical aesthetic value is explained away, or reduced within the theory of visual ideology.

Fuller (1980) acknowledges his Marxist persuasion:

Despite certain questions and reservations, I consider that Marx's assignment of primary determinative power to the economy, and his account of the division of society into conflicting classes whose contradictions will demand resolution in history are basically right. (Fuller, 1980,p.242)

However, Fuller is apprehensive of any Marxist theory or any derivation thereof that advocates absolute "scientific" truth. It is certain Marxist critiques of "bourgeois", "ideologically-blind" aesthetics that Fuller rejects. He sees Marxist reductionists as themselves ideologically-blind for they too are caught up in commoditization ideologies--those of "late monopoly capitalism", long since the antecedent of entrepreneurial or bourgeois capitalism.

They talk about paintings as if these were advertisements... 'artist's style' has indeed been eliminated, since the image is corporately conceived and mechanically re-
produced. The advertisement lacks any stamp of individuality... aesthetic effect is reduced to a redundant contingency. The advertisement is constituted wholly within ideology. (Fuller, 1980, p.37)

The elaboration of a theory of ideology has been one of Marxism's greatest contributions. It offers a scientific analysis of society and, importantly, revises the twentieth century formalist attitude that art is somehow "above" social considerations. Although sociology of the arts as a scholarly tradition and body of knowledge dates only from the mid sixties (Wolff, 1981)--the time of Arnold Hauser's study of the sociology of art history--a great amount of the inquiry into the nature of art as social occurs within a Marxist conceptual framework and uses Marxist terminology.

The Implications of a Non-Reductionist Sociology of Art for the Education of Artists

Ideology is so pervasive that it manifests itself "persistently" within the artist, the critic, and within works of art, stresses Fuller (1980, p.224). Art does not simply reflect ideology but reproduces it through forms of representation. Consequently, the first prerequisite for both artist and critic, says Fuller, is the adoption of a conscious position of opposition to the prevailing ideology. But such an act of intention is not sufficient since the artist's constraint by an internalized ideology, however great that struggle against it, is compounded by the techniques and media
used in art production. Much of the materials and methods used in art are linked to the "production of luxury commodities", and their use results in additional inferences. With their control of mass media, power complexes have significant effect upon the conditioning of our norms and values.

As I see it the task of criticism is not to advocate that the artist should abandon the struggle altogether (as many do) but, recognizing the inevitability of contradictions, to battle against the adulteration of perception, both within the critic himself, and also within the artist himself. (Fuller, 1980, p. 224-225)

Hendricks, Johnson, and Toche (1973) of the Guerilla Art Action Group have a spirited bias for socially informed art, and condemn art that is excessively perverted by the ideology of materialism. An art that glories in detached aesthetics rather than confronting the concerns of direct relevance to society "negates human values and freedom".

Art has become a meaningless game for the sole benefit of those engaged in the suppression of human life and values, the toy for a white elite, which in this country destroys the culture of Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Indians, an elite that forces onto them a foreign and irrelevant culture. (Hendricks et al, 1973, p. 80)

Art that falls into the category of the politically aware, if its experience is activated by art criticism and art education, becomes in itself an educational process of awareness. Possession of critical skills and knowledge about art and society are essential for acquiring an awareness of governing ideologies. As one example, energies do not need to
be wasted in "status symbol competition" (Giffhorn, 1978, p.52) if the symbols, forms, and techniques used by mass media and advertising art for the manipulation and distortion of the public's judgement are recognized and neutralized.

When questioning all motives, assumptions, and values of both the "Great Tradition" and media images, it becomes apparent that not only are the values that dominate our ideas and form our conceptions of art predominantly Anglo-saxon, but that they are also predominantly male oriented. It is both the fine arts tradition and media images which construct and reproduce social problems such as sexism, racism, materialism, and militarism.

As evidenced by the growing body of feminist art criticism and feminist art, particularly video and performance, feminists are reacting to the tradition of art, and for more than one reason. First, they react to the manner and social roles in which women are portrayed in art. Secondly, there is objection in terms of the actual production of art and the way in which women have been "handicapped" or even excluded as practitioners. During certain periods when the Art Academy was dominant, for example, women were banned from life drawing classes (Broude and Garrard, 1982). Such an exclusion was a crucial factor in determining what sorts of work they could pursue and explains why, in many cases, they turned to the decorative arts, flower painting, and the painting of animals—modes that were discredited in the male-dominated tradition of
art. A third reaction is directed to the fact that those few women artists who were relatively successful in their own time were, for the most part, not adequately represented in the history of art.

An approach to art and art education that neglects the sociological considerations of art's context, ideologies, and influences, or one that restricts itself only to the "Fine Arts" tradition has a tendency to stabilize existing conditions or to leave the reform of social structures to those who already maintain power and privilege (Giffhorn, 1978). When sociological considerations are neglected, art remains accessible only to those with enough leisure time and money to enjoy it. Art education retains its peripheral role as a frill. Artists who lack this fundamental sociological realization can do little to challenge the status quo or the social stratification of unequal economic and social classes, or even challenge the peripheral role of the arts.

Indeed, a sociological approach may partially explain aesthetic value in terms of political values. This seems reasonable if we consider aesthetic value as also being historically specific, and that value judgements about works of art are determined to a large extent by professionals situated in universities, publishing, and galleries (the thesis of institutional theory). Although it is worth noting what elements are brought to bear in the evaluation of art, sociological analysis can locate and analyse ideological
elements in certain value judgments in art without necessarily reducing the question of aesthetic value to entirely sociological questions, as is the tendency of Marxist reductionist theorists.

Wolff (1981, 1983) defends aesthetics from ideological reduction partly because of the difficulty incumbent in identifying the political ideology of a work of art. For Wolff, works, apart from the most banal, will not be reducible to "a single, unified set of values" (1983, p. 64). Art is always ideological in the sense that art and ideology are inseparable, yet values, even ideological values, are always changing—the social history and sociology of art demonstrate both the political nature of art and the fluctuations in aesthetic criteria of value.

In support of a non-reductionist sociology of art, Wolff (1983, p. 59) argues quite simply:

All evaluations involve a certain factual defense and facts are always value laden. Aesthetic values then, necessarily involve extra-aesthetic values.

Within this statement are three notions that summarize her position. The last sentence of Wolff's argument reinforces the previous discussion of ideological awareness and critical skills so it will be discussed first. Sociology encroaches upon aesthetic values in two ways: one, by either supporting or attacking vested interests in the persistence and dominance of particular art forms; and second, by bringing political values to bear in the actual evaluation of particular works of art.
In both respects, a critical sociological awareness is required for the process of aesthetic evaluation. It seems to me very unlikely that Wolff, if she had directly addressed the issue of the education of artists, would recommend the intuitive approach (as outlined in Chapter 2) but instead would insist upon a broadly based education through which art students could acquire critical skills and a knowledge of dominant ideologies, conventional values and traditions in art, and the context in which art is situated.

Secondly, Wolff's use of the term "factual defense" implies that informed evaluation is distinguishable from personal preference. We generally attempt to defend the former rationally in terms of empirical knowledge and statements.

Thirdly, the phrase "facts are always value laden" infers that the very choice of empirical criteria, the language used, biographical, ideological, and other factors involved in the investigation of objective "facts" are subjective. Wolff relays the objection posed by Habermas and Marcuse to claims made by the natural sciences that present themselves as the epitome of "objective" knowledge and rationality (Wolff, 1983). Habermas claims that any knowledge can never be "objective" in the sense of being exempt from "interest-determination". Even practitioners of the natural sciences operate in the interests of the status quo and the dominant groups in society. According to Habermas, it is their naive assumptions about value-free knowledge that allows them to be
manipulated to the most irrational and most drastic ends. Wolff uses the example of the production of nuclear weapons to illustrate this point: "Self-reflexivity" or critical awareness of the institutional and interest-bound features of science would render practitioners of the natural sciences less vulnerable to such manipulation.

If Habermas recognizes subjectivity within scientific knowledge and consequently recommends self-reflexivity as a means to avoid manipulation, then surely the arts could also benefit from such reflection, even if only in the form of a sociological demonstration of art's ideological nature. That the discipline of art can be subjected to analytic investigation by sociological techniques does not invalidate art's emotional and intuitive character. Because art involves more than cognitive ideas and scientific methods, the sociology of art purported by Wolff, unlike sociologies of other disciplines entirely suspends the question of truth and the portrayal of correct ideas:

...we simply need to observe the problematic nature of all claims to objectivity. (Wolff, 1983, p.58)

From the point of view of a sociology of art (of the non-reductionist sort) that recognizes the subjectivity of art due to extrinsic social influences, individual and cultural differences in perception, verbal description and interpretation, art, then, cannot be reduced and confined to objective classification and evaluative systems. The
discussion of the sociological approaches to art in this chapter has returned to an earlier critique of formalism. It is sufficient to repeat here that the formalist insistence that a work of art is an independent entity, a closed and complete system, allows for tidy systems for ease of evaluation and art curriculum development. In opposition, the non-reductionist sociologists of art would go as far as to say that these contrived and distorted systems are anti-educative in that they set limits to perception and experience. The following passage by Rosenberg (1971, p.136) is directed toward the discipline of art criticism, yet is important for art educators to consider:

Modern art is saturated with issues and ideologies that reflect the technological, political, social and cultural revolutions of the past one hundred years. Regardless of the degree to which the individual artist is conscious of these issues, he in fact responds to them in choosing among aesthetic and technical alternatives. By choosing a certain mode of handling line, form, and colour he will have affiliated himself with an aesthetic grounded on the obligation of art to communicate judgements of the artist's environment... art in our time cannot escape having a political content and moral implication. Criticism that is unaware of this is fatally poverty stricken.

Criticism, and for that matter, art education, if it intends to be of any educational value can only employ concrete, individual examples investigated in depth; it cannot flourish in general underlying principles or closed, independent systems of formal elements. Sociology and social history has relativized the philosophical, the ideal, and the universal. Art programs must acknowledge the resulting
complexities and the conception that all aesthetic problems and all instruction are necessarily social (Giffhorn, 1978). In an attempt to avoid the complexities that surround a recognition of art's subjectivity and relativism, art education must not discard a critical and informed approach in favour of an intuitive laissez-faire approach, because, as Habermas cautioned, this would allow artists to operate blindly in the interest of the status quo and the dominant groups in society.
CHAPTER 7

THE SUBJECTIVE PARADIGM: EXPRESSIONISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

The terms "expression", "emotion", "imagination", "sensation", "spiritual", and "intuitive" are associated with a definition of "subjective" in the sense of relating to or arising within one's self or mind, in contrast to what is outside the self. "Expression" can be described as...

...something both **physical** and affective: facial expression provides a good analogy...

Expression is intimately involved with the emotional and bodily basis of human being: expressions of suffering, rage, and ecstasy are, for example, similar in every society. But historically variable social conventions powerfully influence expression too. Expressionism in art, too, has much to do with the culture within it is realized; and yet when it is successful it does not seem to be culture-bound. (Fuller, 1980, p.30)

Expression in art arises from within the individual, yet it inevitably has much to do with the culture in which it is realized. Its link with sociology can be explained in rather Marxist terms: the society in which we now live is determined by the underlying structure of the economy—an economy which is determinative over wide areas of social, institutional, political, intellectual and cultural life (Fuller, 1980). In this sense, our emotions and much of our thinking are ideological. However, Fuller (1980) and Wolff (1983) claim it is the "authentic" expression of past art that transcends
Beyond ideology and historicity. That is, past art (especially that which we commonly refer to as "the masterpiece") does not always appear foreign, opaque, and incomprehensible to us because its expressive qualities transcend the ideological phenomena specific to its particular culture and era.

Although expressionism in art can be explicated according to a sociological paradigm, it is more typically affiliated with the subjective paradigm for a reason that, as Kathy Acker (1984, p62) puts it:

"Since whatever I cry out is stupid and meaningless, ... my cry is asocial."

Expressionism in Art

Direct visual statements that communicate an artist's individual subjective reality—emotions, thoughts, sensations—are loosely assigned to the Expressionist style in visual art.

Our new arrangement was, quite simply, no arrangement.... We faced the canvas with the Self, whatever that was, and we painted. We faced it unarmed, so to speak. The only control was that of truth, intuitively felt. (Ferren, 1958, p.25)

Within an art movement so individualized and subjective, diverse directions have been taken. However these directions can almost all be traced back to an avant-garde revolt against academic naturalism and the visual description of objective reality. A group of Symbolist poets developed theories of art which were to provide an ideological background for the
thinking of many artists during the next several decades. The theories and attitudes of the new subjective movement were first acknowledged in a Symbolist Manifesto, 1886 (Chipp, 1968). These theories, inspired by Romanticism and, in particular, the poet Baudelaire, reflected the life of the middle-class people—a life found tolerable in the cultivation of their own feelings and imagination (Chipp, 1968). For the visual artist who followed the lead of the Symbolist poets, the realm of imagination, fantasy, and new stimuli gained from an exploration of the subjective world allowed them the freedom to choose colors and forms unlike those of objective reality. In turn, through use of these non-objective forms and colors, emotional subjective qualities could be expressed. Popularly associated with an early version of this style are the paintings by Gauguin. It was not until after the turn of this century in Germany that there was a complete rejection of the depiction of the external world in favour of direct immediate communication of the inward world of thoughts and feelings. Traditional religious and literary subjects had still been employed as the form through which emotional qualities could be expressed.

The complete subordination of conventional formulas and depiction of objective reality to "expressionism" is first attributed to two famous groups of expressionist painters: the Brücke (Bridge) painters, originating in Dresden, 1905; and the Blaue Reiter (Blue Rider), who, in the mainstream of European
culture, formed a group in Munich, 1912, (Chipp, 1968). The Brucke painters were considered "figurative expressionists" because they concentrated expressive qualities into protests against social injustice by retaining some reference to the "real world". The Blaue Reiter painters, on the other hand, stripped their work of all reference to objective reality in order to strengthen the imaginative content; thus their appellation "abstract expressionists". Kandinsky, a prominent Blaue Reiter painter in a search for spiritual meaning, wrote Concerning the Spiritual in Art in 1910. This was to become a pivotal document of abstract art, despite the fact that many abstract expressionists, like the Blaue Reiter, did not formally subscribe to any real codification or theory: No specific formal language or style could be postulated because art was considered the embodiment of the spirit regardless of what form it might assume.

Concerning the Spiritual in Art was often misinterpreted as a "program", wrote Kandinsky in a later book entitled Reminiscences, 1913. But worse, critics branded him as theorizing artist who had failed at "brain-work". Kandinsky's promotion of the expressive as opposed to the intellect was not rightly recognized. This oversight is, once again, another disclosure of the classic conception of artists, particularly expressionists, as being either incapable or unauthorized to mix intellect with intuition. That Kandinsky himself found little connection between analytic, cognitive "brain-work" and
his expressionistic ideal of art is apparent in his writing:

Nothing was farther from my mind than an appeal to the intellect, to the brain.... Nothing can and will be dangerous any longer to the spirit once it is established and deeply rooted, not even therefore to the much-to-be-feared brain-work in art (p. 42)

.... Art is like religion in many respects. Its development does not consist of new discoveries which strike out the old truths and label them errors (as is apparent in science). Its development consists of sudden illuminations, like lightning, of explosions, which burst like a firework in the heavens, strewing a whole "bouquet" of different shining stars about itself. This illumination shows new perspectives.... As time went on I very gradually recognized that 'truth' in general and in art specifically is not an X, but that this quantity is constantly moving in slow motion. (Kandinsky, 1964, p. 37)

Kandinsky condemned the use of form which developed out of the application of logic. Form itself is meaningless unless it develops purely from feelings within, that is, unless it is the expression of an "inner necessity". The inner wish, he wrote, imperatively dominates the form and thus is capable of "overthrowing all known rules and limitations at any moment" (1964, p. 35). The inner element is the emotion in the soul of the artist and has the capacity to evoke a similar emotion in the viewer of the work of art in which the emotion was expressed. Kandinsky describes the soul as being connected with the body, and affected through the senses. This may explain his deduction that emotions are aroused by what is sensed, and in turn, embodied in an external element—the form.

Expressionism in art did not retain popularity throughout
this century. A trend in the 1960's, for example, focused upon
the art object in isolation and alienated from humans. The
traditional expressive potential of the artist as "creative"
human subject was devalued. This late modernist trend became
exaggerated in the art of the 1970's until, in the framework of
performance and conceptual art, tradition and the art object
were devalued (Jagodzinski, 1981; Fuller, 1980). Art revealed
itself in the conceptualization of the 1970's as naked
ideology. "Expression had been destroyed" (Fuller, 1980). In
today's eclectic and pluralistic period of Post-modernism,
however, the subjective paradigm of art has re-emerged in a
style known as Neo-expressionism.

The Subjective Paradigm and the Question of Knowledge

Much Post-modernist art reflects the sociological
reductionist thinking typical of Hadjinicolau, claims Fuller
(1980). The notion that even emotions are ideological has been
extrapolated to imply that ideology is everything; that we are
acted upon by an extrinsic structure whose effects we become.
Hadjinicoloau was cited in Chapter 6 as stating: "the essence
of every picture lies in its visual ideology." He refuses the
idea of aesthetic value to the point that he sees no such thing
as an "artist's style." Like the extreme sociological theories
that reduce art to objective environmental, economical factors
and influences, objective theories of formalism in which value
lies in the tight formal organization of a work of art, also
assault subjective psychological factors and regard the expression of the inner element as less consequential.

The lack of attention given to the very concept of the "human subject" in the visual arts (despite Neo-expressionism and the popular characterization of the arts as representing the subjective), reflects, not surprisingly, the larger situation. At the most general level, terms and ideas associated with the subjective are not seriously realized in Western society. As we have already seen, our tradition of philosophy clearly illustrates this.

Abbs (1981) outlined certain historical features of Western philosophy that have helped to promote a general misunderstanding of the inner subjective element or, to use his terms, "metaphor" and "image". Abbs uses the term "image" in reference to that which is personal in nature and which reveals a personal truth, not a scientific truth: image inheres in art.

.... art is the formal elaboration and refinement of all the elusive, dramatic, ever-changing feeling, and phantasmagoria thrown up by the conscious, semiconscious, and unconscious psyche. (Abbs, 1981, p.486)

One very influential case to which Abbs refers in his historical exposition is Hegel’s realization of an inevitable contradiction between the sensuous base and the conceptual base of art. In itself the recognition of the existence of a sensuous base is a progressive step for the stature of the personal or sensual in art. Unfortunately, however, Hegel implicitly judged the sensuous as less important: "the Rational
is Real: the Real is the Rational". Prior to Hegel, Hume would have liked to have burned all books devoid of deductive or experimental reasoning, for they could only embody "sophistry and "illusion" (cited in Abbs, 1981). Locke attacked metaphor in his desire for a simple language of signifier-object equivalence. Bentham held that words were "perverted from their proper office when they were employed in uttering anything but precise logical truth!" (as told by John Stuart Mill, cited in Abbs, 1981, p.477). James Mill, whom Abbs claims was responsible for devising one of the most inhuman educational programs ever, regarded all intense emotion as pathological phenomena, a form of madness.

Although Abbs commends this tradition of philosophy as undoubtedly contributing much to the advance of science and technology, his intent was to stress that such a tradition unfortunately excludes the immense and rich complexity of actual experience, it thins out and reduces our understanding of the psyche, and it neglects aesthetics. With a tradition of philosophy in which one of its main purposes has been to objectify and purify language so that it can be used clinically and accurately...

...it is not surprising that in our own century logical positivism made the word 'emotive' a term of abuse and has culminated in a fascination with 'language games' with no interest in what lies beneath the game in the deep preconceptual sources of our being". (Abbs, 1981, p.477)

Reality and science are dogmatically sanctioned as synonymous concepts when science is conceived of as the belief
in itself and only itself. In the midst of rigorous analytic science, the question of knowledge and the role of philosophy as a process of radical self-reflection tends to be overlooked. If one ignores the question of what constitutes knowledge, then one also dogmatically liberates oneself of all correction, criticism, and concerns with cultural tradition. Because scientific methods and categories of pure reason cannot verify through analytic means the sort of truth communicated by the expressive experiences of art, positivists accuse the subjective paradigm of conveying little knowledge and truth to such an extent that art is not considered a form of knowledge. A most important argument that can be made, however, is that positivism in no way constitutes all knowledge (Abbs, 1981; Beittel, 1979; Langer, 1957b). The entire range of possible experience constitutes knowledge. Abbs (1979, 1981) stressed that we have more than one mode of thought.

We are not pure minds nor are we bundles of sense perceptions. To insist that we are is to distort the nature of what is. (Abbs, 1981, p. 477)

The existence of more than one mode of thought was also recognized by Habermas. As cited in Chapter 4, Habermas wrote that to escape the "snares of positivism" (1968, p. 308) one must have a knowledge of the pluralism of world views. The acknowledgement of all modes of thought and all forms of knowledge is elaborated later in this thesis as a valid method in art criticism and the education of artists.
Positivist theories typically convey subjective concepts like intuition, emotion and their expression in art as mystical, intangible, unreal, magical, or primitive. This may explain why these inner qualities often get consigned to limbo. Emotion is inevitably seen by positivists as unfit for the mainstream of civilized, rational life; the occurrence of extreme emotion is a signal of some disorder or defect. However, there is a mode of thought counter to positivism, by which images and emotions in all their variety are conceived as tangible. This philosophy, termed "phenomenology", proposes that emotions and other concepts associated with the inner self produce a truth which is as valid as any scientific truth. Hence, phenomenology as a critical method is of particular relevance to the arts and to education.

Phenomenology

In its broadest meaning the term phenomenology signifies a descriptive philosophical method of experience by which the "is-ness" of phenomena is revealed. Phenomenology was founded by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl in 1900 (Schutz, 1970). Phenomenologists share with expressionist artists like Kandinsky and Klee an obvious common foundation, namely, the prominence given to the inward form of truth as embodied in emotions, sensations, and the image.

Phenomenologists recognize two equally valid forms of reality: the phenomenological mode or the inward form of truth;
and the empirical mode of thought characterized by the natural sciences (Flannery, 1980).

The phenomenological mode and the empirical mode of thought each has its own truth and its own method of arriving at that truth. The empirical mind proceeds linearly and unidirectionally toward a goal (Flannery, 1980). This process is conducive for constructing a logical, discursive body of knowledge. In terms of the discipline of art, this linear mode of thought characterizes our knowledge of art products, art history, criticism, and education. It enables us to accumulate important knowledge which is not available to us by any other means (Flannery, 1980). It is this discursive mode of thought which leads to the systemization and categorization of art products upon which evaluation depends.

In contrast, the phenomenological mode of thought concerns "random thought". To illustrate this mode, Flannery (1980, p.33) describes the artist's creative experience:

The artist is the genius of the phenomenal world. He is able to jump into it.... Artists have told us that we are living in a perpetual, fluxing aesthetic bath which is present with us every instant we live.

Flannery, to illustrate the phenomenological aspects in the writing of artists, then quotes Kandinsky, Klee, Mondrian, and Van Gogh as they describe the aliveness and complexity of things around them and their attempts to resist habituation in perception. The artist, like the phenomenologist, cultivates access to the "primordial world" (Flannery). For both, truth
is embodied in sensory images and emotions, and is revealed by the phenomenological method.

The following is a brief outline of Husserl's phenomenology as described by Schutz (1970). Husserl intended phenomenology to be applicable to all disciplines of knowledge, yet its affinities to the expressionist conception of the artistic process are most obvious. First, Husserl insisted that all preconceived notions and beliefs about the "outer world", about everyday life be, suspended. It is this outer world in which we function practically and out of habit. It is a world that we take for granted and within which we find security and stability. In order to create a presuppositionless philosophy this outer world must be "bracketed" in an act of "phenomenological reduction". All suppositions must be "suspended". However, this is not to either deny or confirm our presumed "reality" of the outer world (Schutz, 1970). Only when the "naive attitude" in which we normally function is delimited can any "acts of subjective experience" be revealed and considered, claims Husserl. Only after all common-sense, taken-for-granted assumptions are eliminated by a process of turning ourselves toward our inner experiences, are we left with a stream of inner experiences. The entire "world" with its constituent objects, actions, feelings, behaviours and so on becomes a world of apperceptive appearances. (Schutz, 1970)

Husserl's methodology for studying phenomenal reality begins with the subjective and the particular, but by means of
this "eidetic reduction", essences of phenomena can be extracted that he believed are universal and intersubjective. Husserl uses the terms "universal" and "intersubjective" to imply objectivity, and in this sense he has constructed a bridge from the subjective qualities of the expressive to the objective (Beittel, 1973, Zurmühlen, 1980)—he has proposed a mediation between the expressive and the rational modes.

According to Husserl, we validate judgements of subjective states by evidential experiences. One type of evidential experience is sense-perception (Zurmühlen, 1980). Husserl's aim was to make reflection as "radical" or primordial as possible by proceeding directly to and "questioning" the sources of evidence. By questioning everything for its evidence, all scientific knowledge with its axioms and "facts" is suspended. This helps to explain the phenomenologists' ardent anti-positivist stance. Schutz (1970) explains Husserl's position:

It was his conviction that none of the so-called rigorous sciences, which use mathematical language with such efficiency, can lead toward an understanding of our experiences of the world—a world the existence of which they uncritically presuppose, and which they pretend to measure by yardsticks and pointers on the scale of their instruments. All empirical sciences refer to the world as pre-given; but they and their instruments are themselves elements of this world. (Schutz, 1970, p.54)

As one would expect, positivism has given little attention to such a method that claims there are thought processes which precede and transcend science's claim to objective
knowledge. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, see little reason for the widespread misunderstanding that phenomenology is anti-scientific. Although phenomenology is committed to the subjective and does question the objective, phenomenologists refuse to classify the study to a metaphysics that originates in mysticism, uncontrollable intuition and revelation. Phenomenology is based on analysis and description— as Schutz states: "for a method, it is as 'scientific' as any" (1970, p.55).

Implications of Phenomenology for the Education of Artists

But how, specifically, can the tenets of phenomenology be useful for the field of art education? As a way of demonstrating that phenomenology can offer a tangible method worthy of consideration for university art programs, a few varied examples of specific applications are included here. It is worth noting that, because of the extensive espousal of empirical methods in North America, use of the phenomenological method is much less popular on this continent than in Europe (Flannery, 1980). When it exists, the phenomenological influence is most apparent in humanistic movements in psychology and education. In art education, Viktor Lowenfeld’s theories for promoting self-expression and creativity may have been a result of such influences (Beittel, 1973; Flannery, 1980).

Flannery (1980) pursued phenomenological methods in a
course he taught at the University of Florida. In this course entitled "Aesthetic Experience", university students are required to recognize the phenomenological in their experience by writing phenomenological descriptions of their observations in attempts to become conscious of their non-linear thoughts as they are naturally manifested in day to day life. In class they explore phenomenological experience through, for example, exercises in which changes in the phenomenological shape of the body are observed as emotions change. Other exercises involve the study of synaesthesia, that is, how all the senses correspond to stimuli such as, to use one of Flannery's examples, biting into a bitter pickle at the same instant there is sharp stinging sound of metal being struck in a work of music.

Phenomenological methods have also been applied in art education research. An example is Johnson's dissertation (1977, cited in Zurmuehlen, 1980, p.8-9) in which social interactions between docents and children during school tours through an art gallery were studied. Tape-recorded conversations were described, edited, reflected upon, and reflexively analyzed to ascertain the kinds of art knowledge being constructed during the tour and the method by which this knowledge was conveyed to the children. The knowledge purveyed in these tours was then analyzed to reveal taken-for-granted assumptions.

In reference to the study of film, Nadaner (1983)
discusses some educational implications of Schutz's synthesis of phenomenological and social theory. Nadaner explains that phenomenology allows us to develop our own subjective understandings of the world as well as "intersubjective" understanding, that is, how others see the world. However, it is not possible to know everything about everyone.

This is why individuals in a culture are inclined to share in the relevances and typifications of other individuals within the culture. Once sufficient overlaps have been created between the individual perceptions within a group then a cultural way of seeing, or world view, is established. This world view is taken for granted by the group. For this in-group, their world view is assumed to be the objective state of affairs. To Schutz, however, this world view is entirely subjective, and can be seen objectively only by an outsider to the group. (Nadaner, 1983, p.5)

Nadaner suggests how film art, by virtue of its potential for authenticity and expressive depth, opposes such pre-formed stereotypes. Film has the potential to provide a knowledge of others and thus has an important role in social education.

The visual arts, then, have the capacity to take us far beyond the simple awareness of another person's existence, or appearance, or behaviour. The visual arts communicate the inner images that define our subjective experience. (Nadaner, 1983, p.8)

Beittel (1979) recommends that art educators, both teachers and researchers, be receptive to truth as it is communicated through the language of art, not merely the "world view" version of truth and understanding established by the overlap of individual perceptions. Beittel claims that the
"scientific method" encourages this inadequate positivist view of truth since it is concerned with control and thus necessarily pre-forms truth: The scientific method is not conducive for attaining genuine truth and understanding because the individual's participation in the interpretation and structuring of truth is denied. Beittel prefers a truth that is structured in a person's experience as it appears by method of meditative thinking—a conception derived from Gadamer. Like Gadamer's theory, Beittel's theory attributes the arts as best able to mediate truth because the arts are characterized, above all else, by self-expression, uniqueness, values, beliefs, and emotions. Gadamer, termed a hermeneutic phenomenologist, wrote in his book *Truth and Method* (1975) that the "science of art can neither replace nor surpass the "experience of art". Truth is experienced through a work of art that cannot be attained in any other way. Because it asserts itself against all scientific reasoning...

The experience of art...issues the most pressing challenge to the scientific consciousness to acknowledge its own limits.... Experience of truth comes to us through the work of art against the aesthetic theory that lets itself be restricted to a scientific concept of truth." (Gadamer, 1975, p.xiii)

The value of the phenomenological method from an art educational point of view is evident. Such a program of reflection, thorough analysis, and radical change in thinking habits, could very likely have an emancipating effect upon the art student. If the educational implications of the
phenomenological approach were reviewed, first, from an art educational perspective with a bias for the intuitive, and, second, from a perspective that valued an intellectual, critical approach, both factions would find in phenomenology much potential value for studio art education, although for very different reasons.

In the first case, proponents of educating for intuition would, like the phenomenologist, accept and encourage the infinite variation, intuition, random thought processes, and emotional expression considered characteristic of art. They would defend art against any endeavor to render the arts in a "scientific", rational method. Everything should be questioned ("suspended") including any knowledge in the arts basic to categorization, systemization, and evaluation.

In the case of a more conceptual attitude to higher art education, phenomenology would be promoted for obviously different reasons. From a perspective that accepts the inexactness of artistic study but sees this as not highly problematic because curriculums can be constructed upon the more "factual" subjects such as the history of art, phenomenology can result in a valid body of knowledge, and even a valid truth upon which curriculums that include description, interpretation, and evaluation of art can be legitimated. In fact, rationalists might even consider phenomenology to be a most viable alternative to the intellectual approach because its method comprises a critical, analytic, and self-reflective
process which leads to truth but appears less positivistic than the scientific methods of observation, logic, and proof. That phenomenology can grapple with problems stemming from subjectivity and randomness of art and claim to offer a more objective solution, does not, however, completely solve the problem of evaluation for the rationalist. "Objectivity", in the phenomenological sense, implies an individual, personal type. If phenomenologists like Beittel advocate a truth and understanding by method of individual self-reflective interpretation of the work, then, consequently, the personal history that each individual brings to bear upon the analysis reveals a truth unique to each individual. It becomes difficult to project how, for example, any consensus in evaluation can occur. This reiterates an issue raised in Chapter 3: Is evaluation in the phenomenological sense any more "objective" than personal preference? A related question is: If knowledge is determined by each individual through a personally designed inquiry, then how could one teach or research?

For the most part, art educators rely upon a positivist method designed to find similarities among phenomena so that they are able to gain knowledge about their discipline. Because regularities and systems in art are likely to be the result of human construction, and are not pre-determined by nature, it seems questionable that a method of the natural sciences should be the ideal method in the arts. Phenomenology, although it provides an alternative for dealing with
subjectiveness and expression in the arts is frequently criticized as being as limiting as the positivist version of knowledge. Johnson (1980) admits that there is value in recognizing a personal aspect to knowledge, but that this aspect in itself is incomplete and biased. A phenomenology that concentrates on personal or private interpretations ignores social knowledge, that is, what others have known. Social knowledge has a profound impact on our formation of truth, the self, and as Johnson continues, what the self considers about knowledge. Furthermore, art education is a social structure maintained by the activities of art educators, just as art is an institutional event with cultural meanings (Johnson, 1980). Indeed, Johnson's criticisms may rightfully apply to Beittel's proposal in which little credit is given to the intersubjective or social character of knowledge. However, a theory like that of Schutz's which focuses upon the intersubjective by synthesizing social understanding and phenomenology is less subject to Johnson's sociological criticism.

In summary, not only is phenomenology ignored by what I have loosely categorized as the objective or positivist tendency (in terms of art, this tendency is most closely represented by formalism), but from a sociological perspective pure Husserlian phenomenology can be found to be partial and biased. This would seem to suggest that in its purest or extreme form, phenomenology has inadequacies as do the extremes of any other approach. Importantly, though, any approach that
pursues the inner subjective element of emotions, intuition, and imagination has profound implications. Phenomenology is an approach by which issues about art and knowledge that have traditionally been concealed or ignored by the objective paradigm can be revealed and neutralized. It offers an alternative to the objective paradigm that so thoroughly dominates our thinking and which necessarily places the arts in a peripheral role. For artists, students, educators, and anyone who finds themselves in a position where they must defend, justify, or promote the arts, the phenomenological model can begin to offer a valid approach to truth and knowledge. As a critical method in the education of artists, ideally phenomenology encourages critical reasoning beyond positivism, while still promoting the subjective inner elements of intuition and emotion. And when combined with social knowledge it provides some insight for opposing inhibiting, unquestioned assumptions and stereotypical world views.
CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Critical reasoning is essential to art production and to understanding contemporary art. The previous review of theoretical paradigms demonstrated the overall importance of this critical approach. However, the extent and the sort of critical activity differs from theory to theory. Within stringent formalist theories, the critical method requires cognitive methods of logic and a knowledge of the elements of form and their interrelationships. Within theories with a sociological emphasis, relevant social knowledge and critical understanding of ideologies is necessary. Within the subjective paradigm, phenomenologists suggest combining intellectual modes with experiences of the inner self. Intuition, emotion, and expression of the inner self do exist as all-important qualities in most art and should not be neglected. But as qualities in themselves and unaccompanied by critical inquiry and information they are inadequate and distorted approaches for understanding contemporary art and creative processes. Art criticism can inform the creative process without hindering the necessary intuitive aspects of
Artistic production.

Art criticism, when implemented into an art program in the manner suggested later in this chapter embraces both the intuitive and the critical perspectives. As the long tradition of philosophy, psychology, and education illustrates, these two qualities have been viewed as separate. But the credibility of this separation can be contended, and has, in fact been a more recent point of contention for such scholars as Arnheim (1969), Abbs (1981), Ryle (1979), and Jung (1968). In this thesis, the intuitive and the rational functioned as useful categories for exploring the issue of the education of artists, yet when recommending art criticism for the education of artists, I am assuming an interdependence and compatibility between these categories. The discussion that follows illustrates, in the most fundamental way, this essential relationship.

In Chapter 2, Naylor was cited as stating at the University Art Association of Canada Conference that the classic attitude of suspicion toward any verbal form of intellectual or analytic activity practiced by an artist is based on an opposition to the rational in favour of the intuitive. In this framework, intellectual activity and intuition are conceived as distinct and perhaps even at odds. Intuition is seen as something very different from conscious reasoning. But we can illustrate that even within what is
thought to be an extreme application of intuition in art there
must necessarily be some degree of intellectual activity.

There is a theory in art, termed Intuitionism, in which
the ideal of art is identified with a creative, spiritual
activity of expression of the inner life of the psyche. The
concern of Croce (1979), a proponent of Intuitionism, is
perfection of the imaginative vision in itself and its
interpretation in expression. Intuition is thought to be at a
different level than that of conceptualization. However, in
order that the images, intuitions, and individuality of things
can be expressed in art, it is necessary to maintain some sort
of basic awareness of these images and some degree of conscious
selection and reasoning.

The necessity for a dependence between cognitive reasoning
and any type of experience was addressed by Dewey (1916). He
wrote that some element of "thinking" is necessary for any
"experience" to have meaning. If we insert any type of
artistic activity into this principle—for indeed art
activity qualifies as "experience"—the implication for art
education is that thinking must accompany or inform the art
process. Thinking, wrote Dewey, is the discernment of the
relation between our intentions ("what we try to do") and "what
happens in consequence". Thinking...

...extends our practical control. For if some of
the conditions are missing, we may, if we know
what the needed antecedents for an effect are,
set to work to supply them; or, if they are such as to produce undesirable effects as well, we may eliminate some of the superfluous causes and economize effort. (Dewey, 1916, p. 168)

The opposite of thinking is "routine and capricious behaviour" and "action which rests simply upon the trial and error method". Dewey defines routine as the complete acceptance of what has been customarily mindless of the connection between our actions and their consequences. The problem with the trial and error method is that it is at the mercy of circumstances.

Dewey next addressed the connection between thinking and knowledge. Thinking results in knowledge, yet knowledge is necessary for thinking. "Knowledge controls thinking and makes it fruitful" (p. 176). Of course, Dewey did specify that thought must be "tried in the world" (p. 177) and hence even the most thorough and consistent thought can never take into account all connections nor predict all consequences.

Dewey's account is useful for clarifying what is meant by thought or the cognitive function of the mind. The cognitive element seems to involve two interrelated aspects, then: one, thought or reflection as a process contrary to routine and trial and error; and two, that which may result from, or which informs thinking, namely knowledge.

Although Dewey's account is very general, if considered in light of the more specific issue of higher art education then, the implication is that the experience of art production (and for that matter, the experience of perceiving art), no matter
how intuitive the intention, qualifies as experience and thus
necessitates thinking and knowledge if students are to avoid
the pitfalls of empty routine and trial and error. This
parallels an essential conclusion of this thesis which together
elicits the major recommendation put forth in this thesis: Art
criticism, because it involves critical thinking and knowledge
of art should be a significant adjunct to studio art production
and should not be left as a separate or peripheral classroom
activity. If the interdependence between the intuitive aspects
of art production and the critical aspects associated with art
criticism is not recognized and practiced, the potentially
worthwhile functions of both for art education would also not
be fully realized. For example it would seem almost acceptable
to reject any art education that maintains the tenets of
Intuitionism on grounds that it is a sceptical, dogmatic
approach and, like the argument presented in Chapter 2, it is
contrary to our notions of education and artistic
creativity—the function of any education is not to foster
ignorance. But neither is it to foster false knowledge.
Because intuition and expression of the inner self and related
methodologies such as phenomenology, lead to an equally valid
knowledge or truth, their absence from a curriculum would
result in a biased, unbalanced, and less than comprehensive
knowledge of art. The omission of intuitive qualities would be
mere positivism.
But on the other hand, neither can we accept "rational" only in the narrower positivistic sense of objective, analytic activity because "rational" in any narrower sense is no longer rational. Rationality requires a complete and unbiased understanding, unobtainable within an ideology of positivism or, in the case of art, within strict formalism. Positivism, the dominant dogmatic reliance upon objective scientism does not constitute the entirety of knowledge and truth. The following recommendations for practice in the education of artist are offered with this in mind; that is, that art criticism, like the larger impartial sense of rationality, should comprehensively encompass many diverse perspectives.

Recommendations for Implementing Art Criticism in University Visual Art Programs

The recommendations for practice in university studio art programs--to which the remainder of this thesis is devoted--are a synthesis and extension of the ideas presented throughout this thesis. The major recommendation is that art criticism should become a significant component of university studio art programs. Because it involves both critical thought processes and a knowledge of art, criticism is conducive for developing in art students both critical and creative qualities.

Art instructors inevitably function as art critics when they select and present professional works of art for didactic
purposes, and when they discuss and evaluate student art (whether or not in conjunction with their students). However, evaluation should not be restricted to the criteria based on standards embodied in the instructor’s own work as often does occur between influential artists and their protege. Rather than determining value criteria for others to comply with, the instructor should, through critical discourse, provide the most complete and unbiased description, interpretation, and evaluation as is possible in the interest that students may eventually be able to recognize values, their sources, and how they are reproduced or challenged in their own work. This sort of art criticism, didactic in nature, parallels in many respects the objectives of the scholarly criticism that occurs within the supposed security of a university’s academic tenure. The objective of the type of art criticism recommended for student artists is not so much to render evaluations as to advance the critical capabilities and sensibilities of students. As was argued earlier, a judicious withholding of evaluation may allow for more complete sensations, impressions, associations, and reasoning.

Biases and preferences can never be entirely avoided, yet there are some types of criticism in which the vulnerability to special interests and alliances is more obvious. Mention of these contrasting types of criticism serves to elucidate the nature of the didactic type recommended here. Journalistic
criticism, for example, is written as a category of news with essential obligations of informing readers about events in the art world and retaining the readers' interest in a particular journal or newspaper (Feldman, 1967). In a discipline in which there are ongoing struggles toward innovation and recognition, judgement can often be, intentionally or not, the by-product of the cliques and schemes of the art world. That we maintain a concept of the avant-garde artist working in advance of or in reaction to conventional taste is dependent upon the existence of a popular majority with a rather consistent consensus of opinion. The trend in this opinion, through Western history has generally been a preference for naturalism and realism (Feldman, 1967, Fuller, 1980). Another type of art criticism --one which has a great effect upon the total art situation--is the product of the majority. With popular criticism, the amount of art knowledge and skills varies considerably among its critics, and personal preference is a predominant criteria for evaluation.

A didactic type of art criticism has educational benefit for artists for two reasons based upon Dewey's two suggested aspects of thinking: one, it can help students construct a body of knowledge and ideas for artistic activity, and, two, art critical methods can develop and refine critical skills and discriminative sensibilities. The construction of a body of knowledge and ideas brings to mind the assortment of knowledge
about art and artists typically conveyed through art history courses. The study of art history traces the form and imagery in a work to its influences and sources, reinforcing the popular (although formalist) truism: "All art derives from art." Art historical knowledge illuminates patterns of artist's creative processes and thus may provide motivation and stimulation for students' own art production. Familiarity with works of art and the alternatives available in contemporary art provide ideas which students can either develop, modify, or defy. It provides students with concepts and artistic concerns which they can question and become involved with. In studio courses there is little attention given to aims or inspiration (Michael, 1970). Because students have illustrated an interest by electing to study art it is assumed that they require no further inspiration and motivation. Conceptual knowledge about art, then, can be valuable for students if it inspires, raises questions about artistic concerns, or stimulates artistic creation.

Academic courses in art history and theory are a valuable component of an artist's education, yet studio art experience should retain absolute priority in an artist's education. In other words, studio experience should not be forfeited for isolated classroom courses. Rather, images produced in the studio can be the stimuli and motive for critical discourse. Conceptual knowledge and critical methods that embrace studio
experience are likely to be more meaningful than if restricted to the classroom. Providing of course that the student is highly involved in art production, the teaching of conceptual aspects through studio art experience is supported. The U.S. National Assessment of the National Center for Education Statistics (cited in Michael, 1980) found a strong correlation between adolescent student's level of involvement in art activity and their knowledge about art history, major art concepts and judgemental criteria.

Art history, theory, and criticism if restricted to the classroom may be anti-educative to the extent that a distancing may occur between the student and the art or curriculum content in question. Criticism as mere cognitive exercise may not sharpen discriminative sensibilities and provide motivational interest. If "facts" and meanings are spelled out in piecemeal fashion it may be more difficult to see their relevance to studio work. Criticism may become a process of merely recognizing meanings: the immediacy of aesthetic experience will be lost. Additionally, if generalities are stressed rather than differences it is easy to overlook what is distinctive about the individual work. Instead perceive it as a stereotype. Furthermore, values drawn from the great works of the past and simply applied to contemporary innovations in art may inhibit rather than instigate more general debates about, say, cultural effects of post-modernist art or, more
particularly, the interrelationship between art and the visual mass media. A lack of understanding of contemporary meanings and values obstructs the recognition and subsequent challenge of the use of art for the objectives of the market and its alienation to a position of elitism.

The direction of the above argument evokes a further specification for the recommendation of art criticism. Because contemporary art is saturated with ideologies and issues of our time and because art students should be able to distinguish between art that is trivial and a blind support of dominant ideologies and art that questions dominant ideologies, a broad knowledge in many disciplines is an important acquisition. One major advantage of securing an art education within a university is the convenience of opportunity to attend courses and events in other disciplines. Although a student's concern at a particular time may be with thoroughly exploring in a convergent manner the characteristics of one medium or form, this is not reason for neglecting to expand one's knowledge in many disciplines.

Students should also recognize the relationship between the visual arts and the other arts. Traditional barriers between the arts are disintegrating. Not only are many artists working in more than one medium simultaneously (Michael, 1970), but more areas of the crafts and of technology are continually being accepted as legitimate media for art production. Yet
most university studio art curricula are structured around courses in painting, drawing, sculpture, photography, and sometimes options in video and film. In the final year of a studio program students frequently specialize in one medium. In light of the more interdisciplinary nature of much of contemporary art, serious reconsideration about the current structure of art programs according to traditional categories is required.

The recommendation for a more informed and conceptual art program appears to leave little time and interest for matters of technique. Training in media and technical skills are a necessity for art students and cannot possibly be eliminated from a curriculum in which art activity is the foremost concern. Despite the apparent affiliation with non-intellectual skills training, technical matters need not be forfeited for the sake of art criticism. Instead, the two realms are interrelated. Experimentation with techniques of form and media does not necessitate a method of trial and error "at the mercy of circumstances" (in Dewey's words). Critical reasoning can be effective for assessing and focusing experimental attempts. For example, traditional media is steeped in ideologies, aesthetic meanings and values (Fuller, 1980) and understanding these can be useful for understanding the position and nature of the student's own work in a larger historical and sociological context. Demonstrations and
excercises in technique, like the acquisition of conceptual knowledge, would likely be more accurately assimilated and remembered longer if linked to the art experience that provoked it in the first place.

Experimental techniques, forms, styles, and motives in contemporary art are accompanied by a specialized vocabulary—a vocabulary that appears frequently in art publications. For artists, possession of a specialized art vocabulary is necessary in so far as it enables the explication and defence of their own work. An additional advantage of a curriculum that promotes critical methods and knowledge is the likelihood that verbal skills will be acquired. Critical discourse may even help students identify and remember qualities that may have gone unnoticed if not for the reinforcing process of verbalization. The regular scheduling of class critique sessions and visiting artists provides an opportunity for critical discussion of others' work.

Much writing on art, however, consists of confusing jargon and residues of old systems of universals and "essences". Because art is individualistic by nature, it is unlikely that that the criticism that describes art will be completely coherent. But some attempt should be made to replace abstract terms such as "quality" or "expressive form" that are often applied to all art of all times with more specific and concrete terminology. Students should acquire a critical awareness of
the current state and historical development of the critical
rhetoric that is so vividly described by Rosenberg (1971, p.140):

"...art criticism today is looked down upon by other forms of critical thinking as unintelligible jargon immersed in insignificant aestheticism. Of course, specialization has overtaken all learned pursuits in our society... art criticism consists for the most part of an indescribable compost of promotional copy, theoretical air bubbles, history without perspective, readings of symbols based on gossip and farfetched associations of ideas, visual analyses which the eye refuses to confirm, exhibitionistic metaphor mongering, set phrases manipulated to supply copy for indifferent editors, human-interest coddling of Sunday art-page audiences, in-group name dropping, ritually repeated nonsense (Rosenberg, 1971, p.140).

Recommendation for Representing Diverse Perspectives

Much of the rhetoric in art literature, in its attempt to apply universally, is devoid of contextual considerations. Similarly, much of the rhetoric typical of studio activity describes art as if it consisted of designs that are free of social and emotional content. "Balance", "unity", "contrast", "texture", "rhythm", and "line" are popular terms describing concepts for students to learn and practice in art production. These principles of design provide an "objective" set of "facts" around which a curriculum can be neatly organized for beginning art students to learn to manipulate forms and media,
and according to which meanings in other works can be extracted. However, these popular principles of design—as made popular by the Bauhaus school of design—represent the dominant objective formalist paradigm. As concluded in this thesis, contemporary art is pluralistic and any one theory or paradigm, if adhered to exclusively and in its extreme, results in a conception of art that is distorted and inadequate. This thesis conclusion is stressed in this final section in the form of an important specification to the recommendation for implementing art criticism in university studio art education: Art educators should question the overwhelmingly dominant and distorted influences of formalism upon art education. If this distortion is to be neutralized, it is important that students have a knowledge of, or at the very least, an awareness of all major paradigms in art.

To begin to facilitate this necessity for representing diverse perspectives, art curriculums can be constructed to include a selection of art and critical methods for study that best represent the plurality of theories. (Of course there are reasonable limits worth respecting in order to avoid confusion.) Members of art faculties and visiting artists can be selected with a similar concern of representing, collectively, many perspectives. Furthermore, students in their senior years of art education who wish to specialize within their desired tendency should not make this selection
prematurely without consideration of the diverse alternatives.

Theories in art, like those reviewed within the objective, social, and subjective paradigms, are entwined with art movements and styles. It was said that the diverse body of knowledge and ideas that can be assimilated through an awareness of these theories can be of use for motivating and informing art production. Theories also provide frames of reference according to which properties and evaluative criteria are determined as appropriate in the particular instance; they help determine what to look for and how to look at it. However, as prescriptive formulae for art practice, theories are inadequate and restrictive. Novel and unforeseeable conditions are continually being created in art, and even with careful predictions, accurate definitions and rules cannot be constructed without imposing arbitrary restrictions and stipulations. Complete definitions can occur only in logic or mathematics where concepts are logically constructed and thus precisely definable. Furthermore, each theory purports to be the most complete statement and most just evaluative criteria, yet each omits what another regards as central or inhering the most value. Therefore, to recognize the inadequacies of each theory and to acquire an unbiased understanding of art, again it should be stressed that familiarity with a diversity of theories is necessary.

Formalism is only just one approach to art or to art
education and it may also be an invalid approach for understanding and appreciating art with, say, politically reactive intentions. To contemplate only the balance and composition of colour, texture and other formal elements within a photograph with images of violence or of propaganda may be misleading and may even render the motives and meaning of the work and others like it totally meaningless. The same inadequacies may occur, on the other hand, if a highly emotional expressionist work like a painting by Kokoschka or Soutine is interpreted according to the formalist objectives and principles typical of purist paintings like those of Mondrian, Albers, or Malevich. The phenomenologists' methodology of questioning all assumptions, all knowledge, all theories, including the "objective" principles of formalism, may be a useful method for avoiding such mistakes.

The following inquiry into the concept of emotion is one means of summarizing and more concretely illustrating that the conceptual processes of art criticism are more than just tools for deciphering more analytical and formalist art, and can in fact embrace the two seemingly disparate elements of the subjective intuitive-emotional self and the conceptual rationalism associated with formalist art and with criticism. The traditional view of emotions maintains that emotions and intuitions are intangible, purely private experiences, distinguishable from each other only by hazy, undefinable
degrees of feeling quality. According to this view, emotions are not educable and we can only be passive under them. In contrast is the view that emotions are educable: critical thinking can lead to discrimination among sensory and emotional qualities. The methods of critical discernment can be more than some elusive method of control, suppression, or passive description.

The philosopher R.W. Hepburn (1981) rejects the view of emotion as wholly inner unanalyzable quasi-sensations and states that, if made the object of sensitive, critical study, emotion need not be simply lived through unreflectively—emotions need not be classified in the "rough and distorting way our normal, practical, utilitarian interests encourage" (p. 112). Our emotional experience can be enlarged and we can become aware of and reject the "emotion-clitches" determined or conditioned by our popular culture. Hepburn claims that in day-to-day life it is continually suggested to us how we should feel in which situation. The authority of these blunted, generalized and crude cliches restricts our emotions to the lowest common denominator of human response to generalized human situations. Emotion in art is often misused to arouse all sorts of emotions in the viewer. Erotic literature is sometimes confused with pornography. Renaissance revenge tragedies can be taken simply as sadism (Hepburn, 1981). The extent to which a work excites strong emotions in a viewer
is only haphazardly correlated with aesthetic value. To gain insight into and to evaluate works of art that vary in their emphasis from the subjective to analytical formalism, the skills and knowledge of art criticism are a necessary means by which all perspectives can be effectively introduced into an artist’s education.

Education of the emotions also has moral and social implications. Hepburn writes that sentimentality, particularly sentimental patriotism, is an example of a blind, irrational, undiscriminating emotional response: it is a trap that blurs all differences of value between the various aspects of one’s country’s way of life. A realization of the alternative possibilities for feeling as expressed in art allows for greater personal freedom and alleviates the sense of inevitability caused by stereotypes, claims Hepburn. He stresses the difference between emotional freedom and freedom from emotion. The first is highly desirable and the second is detrimental. "The person who lacks emotional energy is like a ship that cannot maneuvre because it is becalmed or because its engines have failed." (p.116). Conditions of contemporary life are often blamed as a cause of at least a partial withdrawal of emotional vitality. The adoption of an objective scientific attitude to objects of study and manipulation, for example, tends to require a deliberate withholding of emotional projection. Hepburn’s account suggests that emotion and
intellect need not be separate. Activities of reason are essential features of emotion-experience itself, and likewise, intellectual activities can carry their own, often powerful, emotional charge, even if the emotions involved are not typically considered primary, instructive ones.

This interdependence between emotion and the intellect reflects the message of this thesis: If the emotional and intuitive elements of the inner self are to be more than a matter of naive prejudice and esoteric personal preference, and instead be realized as a valid form of truth and knowledge, then they must be reflected upon critically and be informed with social knowledge. Similarly, if critical inquiry is to advance beyond sterility and positivism, it must recognize all perspectives, especially creative and intuitive insights. A healthy representation and interdependence of perspectives can result from a university studio art education that is closely informed with art criticism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Flavin, Dan. "...on an American Artist's Education...". Artforum. 6 (March 1968) pp.28-32.


