NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCUE

Canada
NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: George Roger Taft

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: Socialism in North America: The Case of British Columbia and Washington State, 1900-1960

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THIS THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE WAS CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRÂDE: 1983

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE LA THÈSE: Dr. Karl Peter, Professor of Sociology

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film. The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author’s written permission.

DATED/DATÉ: April 12, 1983

SIGNÉE/SIGNÉ:

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXÉE: 1334 Johnson Street, Victoria, B.C., V8S 3P1
SOCIALISM IN NORTH AMERICA:
THE CASE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON STATE,
1900-1960

by

George Roger Taft

B.A. Western Illinois University, 1972
M.A. University of British Columbia, 1975

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Sociology and Anthropology

George Roger Taft 1983

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

© April 1983

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
NAME: George Roger Taft

DEGREE: Doctor of Philosophy

TITLE OF THESIS: Socialism in North America: The Case of British Columbia and Washington State, 1900-1960

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Chairman Dr. Noel Dyck

Dr. Karl Peter
Senior Supervisor

Dr. Heribert Adam
Examining Committee

Dr. Jorgen Dåhlie
Examining Committee

Dr. David Elkins
Acting Chairman
Department of Political Science
University of British Columbia

External Examiner

DATE APPROVED: April 11, 1983
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Socialism in North America: The Case of British Columbia and Washington State, 1900-1960

Author

George Roger Taft

May 13, 1983
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines why a labour, or socialist, party took root in Canada but not in the United States. It investigates this question through a comparative case study of British Columbia and Washington State for the time period 1900-1960.

A review of previous studies and theories established the hypothesis that more developed economic structures and modern political institutions facilitate independent union politics and separate parties for the political left.

To verify this hypothesis, the present study analysed data from three areas. The examination of the economic structure of British Columbia and Washington State identified trends in 1) occupations, 2) leading industries, 3) size of industrial plant, 4) urbanization, and 5) occupational communities. The examination of political institutions revealed developments in 1) constitutional forms of executive and legislature, 2) electoral institutions, parties and pressure groups, 3) judicial and legal institutions, 4) federalism, 5) the political institutions of the economy, and 6) the degree of centralization or fragmentation of institutions. Finally, labour union growth, its structure, and the experimentation with different forms of political participation, as well as the political left's experiments with organization, ideology, and voter appeals were examined.

The time span during which this comparative sociological and political analysis of the British Columbia-Washington region was conducted was crucial to the institutionalization of a labour, or socialist, party in North America.

The similarity in the province's and the state's economic structure...
and the differences in the political institutions led to the rejection of the original hypothesis which saw the economic structure as causal in the emergence of a socialist party and supported the conclusion that the nature of political institutions played a primary role in this process. For the respective unions, the political institutions (especially the labour relations systems) created separate paths for political participation. The political institutions legitimated and made viable a reformist socialist party in British Columbia, while in Washington State the institutions undercut radical political efforts, and depoliticized economic conflict.

It is concluded that political institutions are more important than economic structure in shaping political affairs; it is also suggested that both Canadian and American democracy have characteristic problems and a characteristic scope for political power that bear on the emergence of socialist parties. Finally, it implies that the political institutions are the major influence on whether the adopted society will be influenced by the ideological heritage of an immigrant group.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all those who have over the years encouraged or facilitated this research. In particular, I want to thank the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Department of Business Administration for the teaching assistantships without which my graduate studies and this dissertation would not have been possible. This research was also made possible by the President's Research Grant and the SFU Open Scholarship awarded through the Dean of Graduate Studies and the SFU Senate.

I owe a special debt to several people. I am especially grateful to Professor Karl Peter for all the support, criticism, and enthusiasm he gave this project. Professor Heribert Adam was also influential in shaping my research. Through many discussions and through his comments on earlier drafts, Micheal Meade has helped advance my work. Jackie Powell cheerfully performed the tedious job of typing the final draft. Finally, I want to thank my wife for proofreading the preliminary and final drafts, but especially for her support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................. v

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................ viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ......................................................................... ix

Chapter

I.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1

   Modernity and American Exceptionalism
   The Problem of "No Socialism in the United States"

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF SOCIALISM ...... 19

   Definition of Key Terms
   Overview of the Theories of Socialism's Origins
   Conclusions and Hypotheses

III. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND
     WASHINGTON STATE .......................................................... 106

   Occupational Structure of the North Pacific Region, 1900-1961
   Industrial Structure of the North Pacific Region
   Conclusion

IV. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND
    WASHINGTON STATE ......................................................... 191

   Constitutional Form of Executive and Legislature
   Electoral Institutions, Political Parties and Pressure Groups
   Judicial and Legal Institutions
   Federalism
   Political Institutions of the Economy
   External Influence on Political Institutions
   Conclusion

V. UNION STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL POLICIES IN BRITISH
    COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON STATE, 1900-1960 ............... 293

   The Structure of Unionism

vi
### VI. SOCIALISM AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON STATE, 1900-1960

Socialism and Political Parties in British Columbia
Socialism and Political Parties in Washington State
Conclusion

### VII. CONCLUSION

The Findings and the Hypotheses
Regional Perspective on a National Issue?
The North Pacific and Previous "No Socialism" Studies
The Import for Canadian and American Society Perspectives and Problems in the Social Sciences
Future Research

### BIBLIOGRAPHY
### LIST OF TABLES

2. Occupations of the Washington State Work Force, 1900-1960 .......................................................... 115
3. British Columbia--Leading Manufacturing Industries .......................................................... 147
5. Size of Establishment by Number of Employees--Washington State and British Columbia .............. 162
6. Percentage of State and Provincial Population in Major Urban Areas ........................................... 170
7. Percentage of Population in Urban Areas ............. 170
8. Percentage of Gainfully Employed in Various Occupations for Major Urban Areas, 1900-1961 .... 175
ILLUSTRATIONS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agricultural Occupations</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Fishing and Forestry Occupations</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mining Occupations</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Manufacturing and Construction Occupations</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Professional and Trade Occupations</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Public Service Occupations</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Clerical and Service Occupations</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Blue-collar and Middle-class Occupations</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Left-voting Occupations</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Modern societies are distinguished by several characteristics which are absent or undeveloped in traditional societies. One of the most significant features of modern societies is the participation of its working classes in the social and political institutions. In all modern societies (except one, the United States) the formation of working-class oriented political parties has accompanied this heightened participation. The American exception to the formation of a labour party is often attributed to its being a "new society."\(^1\) Significantly though, its North American "twin", Canada, has developed a socialist party and tradition, despite the great socio-political similarities. These national trends are mirrored in the political paths that labour has taken on the North Pacific coast. The northern and southern halves of the original Columbia region had a high degree of socio-political similarity in the early twentieth century, but have subsequently incorporated their working classes by different political means.

This thesis is a comparative political sociology of British Columbia and Washington State from 1900-1960 as a case study of the fate of socialism in North America. As such, it is a contribution to the long standing question of
"why is there no socialism in the United States?" Though this study is organized to investigate the lack of an American socialist party and tradition, it also contributes to the study of socialism in Canada. This dissertation has implications for the study of society and politics in Canada and the United States and for many social science theories that can benefit from the "crucial comparison" provided by the North American social landscape. Finally, this thesis also contributes to the literature on political and social modernization, by examining different patterns of the institutionalization of participation.

Modernity and American Exceptionalism

The heightened role that rationality plays in their social organization is said to be distinctive of modern societies. The rule of law, the rise of bureaucratic organizations based on the principles of merit, hierarchy, specialized knowledge, and specialized tasks, the institutions of parliamentary democracy, constitutionalism, economic efficiency, social integration, rational calculation of means, utilitarian social relationships, an advanced division of labour, increasing differentiation of tasks and roles, and a rational money economy are said to "homogenize" modern industrial societies so that at least in rough outline and in rough equivalence of institutional structure industrial societies are increasingly similar.

Within the industrial West, however, it must be noted that the timing and specific form of modernization has varied
greatly from nation to nation. One of the areas of largest
difference among the Western industrial societies is in the
political sphere. Perhaps the most significant difference
in Western political development is to be found between Europe
and the United States. Indeed, the differences between
American and European politics often seem to render each
other's politics inexplicable, if not incomprehensible.

Though Europe and America share significant political
practices and institutions, the differences are not just a
matter of degree, they are a matter of kind. The society that
has been called the first new nation and of which it is
claimed that it was "born modern" combines the ethos of
modernity with less-rationalized institutional forms,
especially in its political institutions. The differences
between the European and American socio-political system are
central to the polity, and none more so than the political
party system. Because of the visibility and importance of
these differences, European and American development have
been contrasted in stark terms: American exceptionalism.

The American type of political modernity, is not just an
accident or an interesting, but insignificant anomaly; it is
more properly seen as a paradox or major significance for
theories of modernity, social structure and social change.

This thesis is concerned with one of the paradoxes of
American society and politics. Specifically, the major goal
of this research is to contribute to an understanding of why
a labour-type party did not develop in the United States.

The modern political party, it has been claimed, is the most
distinctive modern political institution. Given this central place for the political party, one can use the paradox of the American party system to contribute to the broader comparisons and issues. In addition, many of the points of comparison and paradox of American politics are either directly tied to or have been used to explain the absence of a labour-oriented party.

The paradoxes are numerous: economically "advanced" yet politically "backward"; modern values and "Tudor" institutions; early mass democracy and conservative political policies; a creed of human goodness and equality with a xenophobic "paranoid" style of politics; the first secular society but deeply religious, moralistic social movements; equality giving birth to conformity and anti-intellectualism; hierarchy and inequality despite the value of equality; pride in democracy yet a hatred of politics; lawlessness in a highly legalistic society; militant labour unions that are politically conservative; and a highly "open" democratic system but the failure of new parties.

In many ways this absence of a socialist tradition is the most distinctive of the differences among the Western socio-political systems. Because of the central role of modern political parties, and the importance of political "images", rhetoric, and ideology, the American pattern of incorporating its working class can be seen as a centre-pin of America's "exceptionalism". It seems more distinctive than a presidential versus a parliamentary system (though the "no socialism" question cannot be divorced from considering
these factors.) Both Germany and France have had experience with effective separation of executive from parliamentary power. Likewise the two-party distinction is not unique to the United States. The direction that the American "new society" has taken is also not distinctive, for other "new societies" with predominately liberal values have not replicated the United States' political pattern. The closest parallel to America's development, Canada, has maintained a different course; and though Canada's labour politics are not as virulent as Europe's (or even other Commonwealth countries), the development of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation/New Democratic Party is important given the North American context. In fact because of the similarities with the American case, Canadian developments are that much more significant for an understanding of the paradoxes of American political life and its institutions.

If the absence of a working-class oriented party is so distinctive how is it connected to the other features of American society and politics? Interpreters have seen the robustness of American capitalism as causing a working-class embourgeoisement. The non-cohesive, non-rationalized American party that lacks a specific doctrine has also been seen as militating against socialist success. The liberal values of equality and liberty are claimed as a form of surrogate socialism and prophylactics against socialist collectivism. The early franchise has also been seen as a hindrance. The "paranoid style" of politics, the extreme moralism, the American conformity are claimed as suppressants of socialist
contagion. The general democratic ethos as a civil religion has established further blocks to independent labour politics. American lawlessness has been testimony to the corruption of politics and the co-optation of labour leaders, thus undercutting working class cohesion. The excessive legalism and especially the devotion to the Constitution have, it is claimed, thwarted socialist and labour organization and agitation. The job-consciousness and militant tactics of most labour groups has reinforced a non-political course for labour. The trait of anti-intellectualism has been related to a distrust of "system builders", theoreticians, and labour's unwillingness to be subservient to intellectuals. Anti-intellectualism has tended to reinforce job-consciousness. Finally the failure of a socialist party has been seen as a particular instance of third party failure: the American party system has not only precluded the establishment of a significant labour party but any significant third party for the last 125 years.

The Problem of "No Socialism in the United States"

The investigation of this aspect of American "exceptionalism" is not new. The formulation of the pertinent questions and many of the arguments began 130 years ago. The majority of the writings on this topic, however, have engaged the politically committed and the academically interested mainly in the past eighty years. In a sense the problem is a "classic" of political sociology. One of the first systematic attempts to address this problem was produced by Sombart in his Why is There No Socialism in the United States?, written in 1906. Since Sombart's time labour historians, sociolo-
gists, economists, political scientists, philosophers, historians, and ideologues of many stripes have proffered a variety of answers.

Despite this voluminous literature "the issue of why "no socialism in America" remains with us . . ." Given this history, it may appear redundant to present yet another contribution to the "no socialism" literature. How can one justify treading down such a well-worn path? To put the answer simply, the research of the past eighty years has not completely explored several avenues that may provide insights on this problem. There are three major shortcomings of many of the previous studies on the fate of socialism: ideological pre-judgement, lack of comparison and reliance on narrow single factors for an explanation.

I. Ideological Prejudgement

The lack of a socialist party has been seen as progressive or reactionary, usually depending on the writer's ideological predisposition.

Many leftists have taken the situation as an indication of American "backwardness." These critics of American practices generally think in quasi-evolutionary terms and their interpretations often reduce complex events to a simplistic understanding of "social forces". This type of analysis assumes that since the major socio-economic groups are the ultimate basis of political cleavages and political parties that the American political system has either skipped a stage (which it must "go back" and "pick up") or else its
political development is retarded (in which case the emergence of a labour political party is "just around the corner"). As G.D.H. Cole wrote in 1948, "... when one looks beneath the surface it seems not unreasonable to conjecture that Labour in America is, on the whole, moving on a road which Labour in Western Europe has trodden already." Similarly, the American New Left interpreters point to the radicalization of the young rank and file union members as a budding of "class consciousness."

On the other hand, those who view the lack of a socialist party as a positive attribute view it as due to the strength and superiority of the "American way of life." These celebrators of the American main drift often see the American Revolution as a national rejection of the European class-based system that bred national rivalry, war, servile behavior, and invidious social distinctions. From this perspective, the avoidance of a working class party indicates the consensual nature of American politics, its moral superiority, and indeed its classlessness by allowing high rates of mobility.

Both of these points of view often serve as intellectual cloaks to hide judgements of political preference. The causes of American exceptionalism are much more complicated and much less self-flattering than these ideological interpretations would lead one to believe. Many of the European and radical views of American political trends seem hopelessly out of touch with the American scene. In addition the quasi-evolutionary bias is anachronistic, while the sociological reductionism is simplistic. On the other hand, many American
interpretations suffer from self-serving statements, a willingness to moralize history, and a simplistic analysis of American developments.

The correctness of these ideological interpretations is not the task of this thesis. This research views the absence of a working-class oriented political party in the United States as a scientific problem that calls for an explanation. Though it may appear that the very asking of this question presupposes a value commitment, the following analysis is not undertaken with such a commitment in mind. Rather as the earlier discussion of the paradoxes of American development sought to make clear, the problem is raised for its wider intellectual interest in the social sciences. Whether one views the peculiar American development as "good" or "bad" is irrelevant to the purpose of this investigation; the major concern here is with an adequate and objective explanation of why the American socio-political system accommodated its "working-class" without the institutionalization of a working-class oriented political party.

The Need for Comparative Studies

The uniqueness of the United States was by and large an unexamined assumption so that researchers were often led to inconclusive results. One would think that this issue would automatically call for a detailed comparative method of analysis; surprisingly many studies focus almost exclusively on the details of the United States. Although many previous studies are none the less valuable, any conclusions drawn
from them must be tentative pending the results of similar investigations in other countries. The validity of these previous investigations is directly related to the comparability of the findings of similar studies. To more adequately answer the "no socialism" question it is not sufficient to detail the assumed exceptional American conditions; one must also seek the similarities to other industrial societies as a way to isolate the causal factors. 17

The need for a comparative analysis leads to a more specific weakness of some previous studies of the "no socialism" issue. Comparative analysis is in many ways a motherhood issue: everyone will agree that when comparisons can be made they should be made. Some comparisons, however, are more important than others. It can be argued that the differences between Europe and United States are too great for realistic comparisons to yield significant results. Europe is an old society, it never really had a frontier, its feudal legacy and the established church all make it so different from American society that comparative analysis has too many variables to work with manageably.

The Canada - United States Comparison

Fortunately there is a comparison that minimizes these drawbacks. Because Canada and the United States share some of the factors often cited as causal in the "no socialism" argument, an intra-North American comparison could offer valuable insight. Admittedly this type of approach would be contrary to many analyses of comparative politics and society which have tended to treat Canadian development as American
"writ small." But despite this "and also" status for Canada, the developments north of the 49th parallel were sufficiently different so as to be a useful counterpoint to American trends. The common status as a "new society", a frontier experience, large immigration, federalism, and a common Anglo-tradition of political and legal institutions, are the common points that serve to underline the divergences: Canada's evolutionary development, her "feudal" past, cohesive parties and most importantly a significant (though nationally weak) socialist party. 18

A direct national comparison between the North American neighbors, however, also presents some major problems. The great size of the two nations, the social diversity, the bi-cultural and bi-national conditions of Canada could offer serious difficulties to comparative research.

A way out of these problems of national comparison is to examine similar regions in Canada and the United States as a case study of the larger issues. The western border regions of North America provide material for such a case study because of the comparable periods of settlement, their contiguity, and the prima facie socio-economic and political similarities.

The North Pacific region

More specifically, western Canada and the bordering regions of the western United States developed roughly comparable movements and parties in comparable socio-economic environments. The Canadian west's political developments, however, led to the institutionalization of a labour-oriented
party, while similar parties failed to sink lasting roots in
the American west. In both countries the socialist movements
and parties contained agrarian and industrial elements. But,
since the relation of industrial labour to politics is a

- crucial question, a comparison of British Columbia and
Washington State (both relatively industrial economies) could
most usefully serve as a case study for a Canada and United
States comparison.19

An overview of the history of British Columbia and
Washington State indicates the serviceability of this compari-
son.20 From rather similar socio-economic and political back-
grounds at the turn of the century the Province and the State
dIVERGEd in their political accommodation of the working class.
The North Pacific region (for the purposes of this dissertation
defined as British Columbia and Washington State) at the turn
of the century constituted a distinct region; the economic
conditions were not only quite similar, but were integrated
through corporate ties, labour union ties, communication
patterns, and high inter-migration. In the early part of this
century, similar, and often the same, social movements affected
both British Columbia and Washington State. The rate of
development was roughly the same for long periods of time.
Transcontinental railroads first opened up each area in the
1880's. Population growth was roughly similar.21 And, the
early political direction of labour, though not congruous,
was analogous. In the mid 1930's British Columbia, however,
developed a significant socialist party; by the mid-1950's
it was so strong, it forced its opponents into a coalition
under a new party, the Social Credit Party. In Washington, the earlier election of socialists to public office had by the 1930's given way to the pattern more typical of the United States as labour formed a block within the Democratic coalition.

British Columbia and Washington State from 1900 to 1960, thus, offer a "crucial" comparison. 22 By using a regional comparative framework one can operationalize a Canada and United States comparison in such a way that the unit of analysis is preserved and in such a way that displays the larger national trends and developments.

An Abundance of Narrow, Single Factors

Much of the literature on the "no socialism" problem has tended to focus on one or only a few narrow factors. This has unfortunately led to reductionist answers to the problem. Those interested in movement and party ideology have focussed on issues of rigidity, purity, and strategy. The more traditional sociologists have relied on mobility, ethnicity, demography, and values as explanatory items. The political scientists have likewise claimed that a political factor, whether of party, electoral arrangements, or constitution has been most important. The labour historians have focussed on union history. The marxists and many economists have traced the major economic trends. In general most studies have relied on narrow discipline boundaries and have paid less attention to the interaction of how these factors create specific institutional outcomes which then shape subsequent development. What is needed is a broader course of investigation that seeks...
to detail the interactive relationship of social forces with the changing pattern of economic and political institutions. While not underestimating the significance of social forces (be they ideas, values, class, ethnicity, industrialization, modernization, etc.) the mediating role and sometimes independent role of political and other institutions should be recognized. Institutions and organizations are significant patterns of power distribution and when they persist for long periods of time they tend to channel and shape human behavior to a large degree. There is another reason why this case study requires an emphasis on social forces and institutions. British Columbia and Washington State constituted "new societies" in which institutions and patterns of expected behavior emerged only slowly (which is not to say that they were ever entirely absent). In the 1900-1960 period, the social forces of class, industrialism, ethnicity, etc., probably bulked large early in the period, but over time were mediated more and more by institutionalized and regularized action.

From these comments it is clear that a multi-factored comparison of British Columbia and Washington State from 1900-1960 could usefully extend the understanding of the problem of "why no socialism in the United States." The next chapter turns to a detailed review of the literature on the origins of socialist politics. The evaluation of the theories put forward in this literature will lead to the identification of several factors worth researching and the forwarding of a few hypotheses to account for the fate of socialism in British Columbia and Washington State.
FOOTNOTES


3. The term "American exceptionalism" has both a broad and a narrow meaning; in some treatments it also has ideological overtones. The broad meaning refers to the unique pattern of American society and culture that seem to make it obey idiosyncratic rules that do not hold in other societies, especially Europe. In its most extreme form, the doctrine of American Exceptionalism would deny the possibility of using any European based explanations or expectations on American data. In the ideological form it becomes a celebration of all that is distinctive of American society as a measure of its greatness, moral superiority, and its rejection of decadent European ways. The narrow meaning refers to the non-political course for labour and also the non-class oriented behavior of American workers. The lack of class-consciousness, class organizations, militant unions and socialist parties, and even the non-revolutionary nature of American society can be part of what is meant by "American Exceptionalism." The narrow definition has a double-sided ideological content: kommunist and socialists have written of "American Exceptionalism" as a deviation from normal capitalist development, while non-marxist labour economists have explained it as the normal trend for North America. see J. DeBrizzi, "The Concept of American Exceptionalism as Ideology" Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 1978-79, 23, pp. 83-97. As used here the term "American Exceptionalism" comes close to the non-ideological broad meaning.

4. In this thesis the following terms will be used interchangably: labour-type party, labour party, working-class party, working-class oriented party, socialist party, and socialism. The various terms are used for variety and to avoid rigid prose; it is not meant to imply subtle distinctions. See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of these terms.


8 W. Sombart, Why is There No Socialism in The United States? (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976). This interpretation and the ones that follow are covered more fully in chapter two.


12 For a good overview of the "no socialism" literature see S.M. Lipset "Why no socialism in the United States" in S. Bialer and S. Sluzar (els.) Sources of Contemporary Radicalism (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1977); Laslett and Lipset.

13 Sombart.

14 Lipset, "No Socialism", p. 149.


16 The issue of social mobility is still an unsettled one. For discussion of mobility as it relates to "no socialism" see the exchange between the Thernstrom and Lipset in J. Laslett and S.M. Lipset, Op. Cit.

17 The better contributions to this field have adopted a comparative perspective. This discussion does not mean to imply that no comparative work on this topic has been
undertaken, only that from a comparative perspective many of the analyses are incomplete.


Though a few writers have argued that neither the CCF nor the NDP should be considered socialist parties, such judgements are usually based on ideologically biased definitions of socialism. Though the CCF and to a lesser extent the NDP had Marxian elements in their ideology and movement, the CCF/NDP was a much more broadly based form of socialism, drawing on Marxian socialism, Fabian socialism, Christian socialism, and re-cycled syndicalists. More importantly, the CCF/NDP saw itself as a socialist party, viewed its roots in the socialist movement of the 19th and early 20th century, presented policies usually associated with socialist parties, and was treated by its opponents and the electorate as a socialist party.

Socialism as a doctrine held that a capitalist, free enterprise economy naturally tended to monopoly and economic and political injustice; as a remedy, socialism held that it was necessary to "socialize" the economy. Within this broad definition there were disagreements among socialists as to the speed of change (evolution and reform versus revolution), the agent of the new administration (state socialism versus local co-operatives, communes, or syndicates), and the extent of economic intervention (state ownership of all economic enterprises versus the selective ownership of "important" enterprises and the creation of a welfare state to redistribute wealth). Clearly the CCF/NDP followed a policy of evolutionary, democratic socialism that emphasized the virtues of the positive state in reforming the economy through selective ownership of important industries, the adoption of reformist measures to ameliorate unequal wealth, and the adoption of economic planning. In these policies (and in the general drift toward reformism) the CCF/NDP closely resembled the reform socialists and social democrats of northern Europe.

Although it is possible to make a distinction between socialism as an ideology and as a movement and party, this thesis assumes that the continuing viability of socialism as an ideology is dependent on the successful institutionalization of the carrier of the ideology, i.e., a socialist party. The presence or absence of a socialist ideology is due to the success or failure of a socialist movement or party to strike lasting roots.

Finally, though many parties advocate "socialistic" policies, one must also examine a party's image, its appeal for votes, its basic policy direction, and its rationale for policies before labelling a party socialist. For example, the purchase of B.C. Electric by the Socreds was undertaken to provide necessary "infrastructure" when private companies would not. Such a policy has been used by many capitalist governments and differs significantly from the socialist's belief in the virtues of "collective of social ownership", "rational planning", or an omnipotent state. In addition, Social Credit's primary appeal was to business groups (especially small business), to the "little man", and to the
province's outback regions; the CCF/NDP directed its appeal to the "working people" and especially to building and maintaining a tie to the labour unions. The Socred's policies were primarily aimed at creating a good economic climate for business and investment, emphasized the virtues of a free enterprise economy, and as much as possible avoided direct government intervention in economic enterprises and economic affairs.

19 A trans-border comparison of the wheatgrowing areas (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Minnesota, North and South Dakota) would also be interesting, though less crucial.


23 For a general discussion of the relation of political studies to the other social sciences see S.M. Lipset, Politics and the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) and especially the chapter by G. Sartori, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology," pp. 65-100.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

The question of "why no socialism in the United States", as chapter one noted, is not new. Accordingly, before examining the case of the North Pacific coast, a review of previous attempts to answer the "no socialism" question may help to avoid the blind alleys and the shortcomings of previous research. Because the scarcity of comparative studies is one of the limitations of previous research, the following overview will not be solely concerned with the theories and circumstances of the failure of socialism to develop in the United States and its successful development in Canada. Theories and examples based on other industrialized countries will be discussed to shed light on North America. After surveying and evaluating the previous literature, the final portion of this chapter offers a few hypotheses and a research strategy to guide examination of the British Columbia and Washington State case study.

Two topics, it should be noted, are not discussed in this chapter: third world socialism and the reform versus revolution dimension of socialism. While both of these topics would be included in a full-scale discussion of socialism, the scope of this thesis does not allow their treatment here. Most importantly, these two topics are separate from the
central question of this thesis, which concerns the failure of all varieties of socialism in an industrial society.

Finally, this theoretical overview is not intended as a complete, comprehensive listing and analysis of the theories on socialism's rise or decline; rather it is representative of the major answers given to this problem.

Definition of Key Terms

Before reviewing the previous literature, the terms "socialism" and "political party" must be clarified to prevent misunderstanding of the scope and intent of this thesis. Clarification of these terms is doubly necessary given the emotion that often accompanies inquiries on socialism.

Socialism, Socialist Party

As the perceptive reader may have already surmised, the following terms are being used synonymously: socialism, socialist party, labour party, working-class party, working-class oriented party. For the purposes of this thesis these terms are defined as a political party that seeks to be the political representative of the working-class, constructs its appeals and policies towards advancing the claims of this class, seeks political office under a common banner, has its intellectual roots in the nineteenth-century socialist tradition, and is commonly recognized as socialistic.

By defining these terms in the above manner it is not meant to suggest that other studies may not find useful distinctions between these terms; nor is it to suggest that
alternative definitions are not possible or useful in other studies. It is recognized that the terms being treated as synonymous can have useful and subtle distinctions. Socialism can be treated as a movement, an ideology, a party, or a government policy. Labour parties are sometimes distinguished from socialist parties because the former are usually less dogmatic and ideological, although in practical terms, almost all labour parties have been socialist by the above definition. This variety and subtlety of meaning has been thoroughly analysed in other literature. It is not pertinent to this thesis, however, to elaborate these subtle differences.

While recognizing that the subtle distinctions may have useful validity for other studies, the use of the terms as set out above has several justifications and advantages for this research.

By using these terms and defining socialism in the above manner, the discussion will move off of the controversies that are concerned with whether a socialist organization was "true to the faith". The goals and tactics of a socialist party may or may not be true to a Marxist heritage, nor need socialist parties be necessarily revolutionary. Clearly, some brands of socialism changed the doctrine's meaning from the formulation given in the nineteenth century. Socialism was a broad social, political, and intellectual movement that ranged from mild state action to communist anarchism, from evolution to revolution. But no matter which group or party in the socialist tradition one is dealing with the question of the "purity" of socialism is not of central concern to our
discussion. First, such concerns are often questions of political faith better left to the ideologues and political philosophers. Second, how a doctrine changes through time may be an interesting problem; none the less, it is a separate issue from the "no socialism" question, which is concerned with the failure of any viable socialist tradition and party to take root in the United States. For the purposes of the following discussion groups are considered socialist if they presented themselves as such and were treated as such.

Second, within the North American context the subtlety of the various terms listed as synonymous have proven to be historically irrelevant. The ideological and policy differences between a labour and a socialist party are not relevant, because in the United States none of the wide variety of socialist parties were successful and in Canada labourism increasingly gave way to the socialism of the CCF and the NDP. While recognizing that in North America there were differences between socialists, communists, syndicalists, etc., to focus on the differences and the failure of each would be to miss the major point that all of them failed to become significant parties. Similarly, the viable socialist tradition in Canada has been rather narrow, being confined mainly to the CCF-NDP.

Third, the use of the term "labour party" as synonymous with socialism is justified because it is reasonable to assume that had a socialist party taken root in the United States it most likely would have been a labour-type party similar to the British Labour Party, the Canadian CCF-NDP, and others in Anglo-democracies. Several factors have tended to make the
Anglo-democracies similar to each other and these factors would be operating in this matter also: English common law, parliamentary institutions, English liberties, an Anglo penchant for the politics of compromise and pragmatism, and even the Anglo dislike for system building, abstraction, and theory. A more important reason for equating "labour party" with "socialism" derives from a comparative perspective. One rarely has a radical leftist party or movement without more moderate political types appearing. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to assume that a mild-mannered, ameliorative, evolutionary socialism is the most that could have been expected in North America.

Fourth and finally, the substitution of "working-class oriented party" for "socialism" plays up the importance of a party's self-image and public image. A party's image is crucial because the appeal for votes and loyalty is built on it. The image also helps shape doctrine, policy and program. Finally, the image of a party is important in electoral contests because it affects the coalition or blackmail potential that are crucial elements in deciding a party's significance. (See discussion of political party significance below.)

By calling a working-class oriented party socialist, it is not meant to imply that all parties that draw working-class support are socialist; nor is it meant to imply that if a party appeals to working-class support is it necessarily to be considered socialist. Many parties have drawn support from the working-class or from labour groups. Though labour may
form a block of support for these parties, one must not confuse this fact with a party's priorities, or with its orientation, or with its image. Thus, the Nazis had a block of support from the working-class, but its primary appeal was to the whole nation with an image of a *folksgemeinschaft* and a "community of the trenches." Similarly, the British Conservatives regularly receive a sizable portion of the trade union vote, but this has not changed their political orientation. The democratic party in the United States draws heavily on the working-class and does fashion policies to appeal to the working-class and to trade unions. But the Democrat's primary appeal and orientation is "something for everyone". The working-class and labour unions form one power block among many, which means that generally business and national priorities take precedence. To repeat, it is the primary orientation, the image of a party, and its connection to an intellectual tradition that leads to labelling a party as socialist. Most working-class oriented or labour parties viewed themselves, were seen by others, and deliberately cultivated the image of being socialistically oriented. Though the labour-type parties may have changed their policies over the years, the conscious recognition of their roots in nineteenth-century socialism also justifies the term "socialist".

**Political Party, Significant Political Party**

A political party is a group with a common label that seeks to elect political office-holders. Several points
should be noted about this definition. First, included in this definition are parties that vary in organization from highly rigid to extremely loose. Second, common policy or doctrine beyond office seeking is not necessary, though it is a common attribute. Third, seeking office as a criterion discriminates between parties and groups seeking office through favors, bribes, purchase or force.

With such a broad definition of political party, all Western democracies have a multi-party system, probably of at least 10 to 12 parties in each nation. By this broad definition even the United States has had socialist parties. Thus, this thesis is concerned with parties of significant size and not the ephemeral edges of politics. By what criteria can one discriminate the minor parties from the major parties? Sartori has suggested that a political party is significant or relevant when it has the potential for assuming government power itself or as a coalition partner, or when "its existence or appearance affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition," of the government or coalition parties. In other words a party is relevant when it has coalition or blackmail potential. Using these rules the CCF-NDP has been a significant socialist party. On the other hand, the socialist parties in the United States were significant in certain regions of the country in the early twentieth-century, but their present day heirs are not significant parties.
Overview of the Theories of Socialism's Origins

The factors claimed to have helped or hindered socialism can be gathered for simplicity into seven categories: internal factors, mobility, ethnicity and immigration, cultural factors, social structure, political institutions, and reactions to change.\(^6\)

Internal Party and Movement Factors

Probably the most frequent strategy adopted to explain the socialist's success or failure examined the parties and movements themselves in order to isolate significant internal factors. These theories fall into two general types. First, some analyses stressed the realistic or unrealistic nature of socialism. Second, others emphasized the type of leadership as crucial to socialist success.

Realistic Versus Unrealistic Socialism

An example of the first strategy is Bell's argument that the failure of socialism in America was due to socialism's rigid world-view.\(^7\) Socialism was unrealistic because it did not recognize the necessity for compromise. Socialism's quasi-religious belief system created inflexible policies and fostered sectarian schisms. A second variant of this theme is that American socialists in particular, were unrealistic.\(^8\) To account for such unrealistic beliefs one could cite the strong moralistic, religious tone of American reformist movements that influenced the socialists to stress purity of purpose and party over compromise on a
workable program. One could also cite the rejection of active collaboration with American trade unions by certain American socialist groups as being indicative of an uncompromising spirit.

The theories emphasizing unrealistic socialism, however, do not promise to help resolve the problem at hand. First, Bell's argument about socialism's rigid belief system is true enough. A rigid, uncompromising belief system can lead a party into political oblivion. But, when examined at the philosophical level, all belief systems are rigid, including liberalism and conservatism. The central weakness of Bell's line of reasoning, however, is that if it is true it applies to all socialist parties and movements. Consequently, while it is a telling point about socialism, it does not account for the success of European and Commonwealth socialists and the failure of American socialists.

In regard to the schismatic nature of American socialism, this point is also true enough. On a comparative basis, however, American socialism was probably no more schismatic than many European and Canadian left-wing groups. In addition, excessive schisms are as much a symptom of weak popular support as it is a cause of weak popular support.

The second charge of unrealistic socialism in America is also weak. While some American socialists were doctrinaire and unrealistic many others sought to work with unions and endeavored to build a broad coalition of workers, farmers, and artisans. Far from holding aloof from politics, many social-
ists sought and won state and municipal office and worked for basic social reforms. The charge of unrealistic socialism in the United States also seems a little misplaced when American socialism is compared to some of the European varieties. The inward-turning European communist movement that rejected parliamentary compromise and denied the value of "bourgeois legislation" hardly deserves to be considered realistic when compared to the American socialists. Realism and compromise in politics are not necessarily prerequisites to longevity or the building of a strong popular base. After all, irresponsible policies and statements are often a function of minority party status.

Leadership

The importance of good leadership for labour and political groups has been a cardinal principle among socialists ever since Lenin argued for the necessity of a vanguard party to lead the workers beyond trade-union consciousness. The Leninist emphasis on organization has meant an increased concern for ideologically "correct" leadership to lead the working masses who cannot move beyond their immediate, narrow concerns for wages, jobs, and security. It was necessary for the party to provide the leadership that workers could not provide. Without this ideologically informed leadership, Lenin felt that unions and parties would be co-opted and manipulated into supporting the capitalists.

Oddly enough, Perlman and the Wisconsin school of
labour historians agreed with Lenin on the natural conservatism of the rank and file workers and the radical-ism of outside leaders, i.e., intellectuals. But Perlman's interpretation approved of the American labour movement's "natural conservatism" and the rejection of intellectual leadership and socialism. Thus both liberals and Leninists agreed that American unions were more conservative and would not support socialist political groups because union leaders rose from within the ranks of the union and not from intellectuals or politicians.

Whether one uses the above theory to argue for liberal or Leninist conclusions, the theory must first meet several objections about its assumptions and from comparative studies. Starting from either Perlman or Lenin, what is one to make of the non-revolutionary socialist parties and unions? European unions and parties relied on intellectuals and non-working class elements for leadership and theoretical direction much more than North American unions. From a Leninist interpretation how is one to account for the reformist socialism of much of European labour groups? From Perlman's point of view, the long standing political direction of labour groups is contrary to his theory of labour's basic interests.

One of the basic problems underlying both Perlman's and Lenin's theory is that it postulates a fundamental split between a conservative, subservient, sheep-like rank and file and a manipulating, aloof leadership that pursues its own interests above the worker's interests. Most likely
this type of dichotomy is unrealistic. The relationship of a leader to the rank and file is a complicated affair of mutual adjustment and conflict. To explain the political direction of unions by their using outside leadership elements ignores the considerable control that rank and file members exercise over the leaders. Likewise, to see the conservative direction of unions as a function of leadership ignores this point. Any leader has a degree of independence, but it must also please the members on basic issues. A leader's ability to push members into unwanted political activity is limited. Of course these objections do not mean that unions and parties are completely democratic. Michel's conclusions that even formally democratic organizations tend toward oligarchical control is valid. This power difference, however, does not give the leaders a completely free hand. Usually leaders are eventually held accountable for basic policies.

The most significant problem, however, with studies that try to account for a trade union's or political party's direction by examining the leadership is that it emphasizes a factor that has little to do with the success of following a socialist direction. It is probably true, as Lenin and Perlman argue, that different social strata tend to act and think in distinctive ways. Nonetheless, the theories of leadership tend to ignore the importance of the social and political circumstances of the trade unions and political parties that form a vital link in explaining why a
political direction for labour groups succeeds or fails. By paying attention to internal factors these theories
ignore the social circumstances which can foster or hinder socialism.

This ambiguous and contingent role for a leadership's policies is exemplified in an extreme form by the Russian case. Without the Russian defeat in the First World War and the Kerensky government's resolve to continue the war, Lenin would probably have been remembered only as the organizer of small, unsuccessful revolutionary groups.

Finally, co-optation of leaders is also not an adequate explanation. If co-option is so continuous and wide-spread, then the issue is not leadership but rather a social structure that is open to change and advancement so as to pull the teeth of class-based grievances.

In summation, the major problem with the argument about realistic or unrealistic strategies and leadership is that it places too much importance on the question of tactical or partisan line. Yes, a political party's program must have relevance for the society it wishes to rule. Beyond this general provision, however, internalist arguments come down to hoping to find the right tactical or ideological key. Questions of doctrine and belief, however, cannot be separated from the institutional context. The continued failure to find the right tactical key should indicate that factors outside of the socialist movement were more important and that the cause for the irrelevance of socialist
politics in the United States does not lie in better leadership, propaganda, or party line. Further research that is primarily directed to internal party or movement factors will not likely extend the understanding of the absence of socialism in America.

Studies of Mobility

The second group of hypotheses on the emergence of socialist politics claim mobility acted as a safety valve. The mobility argument contends that high rates of mobility (either social or geographic mobility) militated against socialist politics because upward social mobility pulled the teeth of discontent and geographic mobility removed the possibility of continuous organization.

Early mobility studies presumed that European societies were static and that North American societies were dynamic; specifically, the frontier was a safety valve. The view that the North American frontier acted as a political safety valve has been criticized for 1) over-estimating the actual amount of upward mobility, 2) assuming that all immigrants participated in the movement to the frontier, 3) and assuming that all frontier settlement was of the farm entrepreneur type. Comparative studies of various frontiers indicate that it is the degree of openness and individualism versus the closedness and corporate nature of the frontier that may affect socialist movements and parties. Finally, the frontierists often confused upward mobility with geographic mobility.
Later assessments of social mobility consciously sought to separate social from geographic mobility. Lipset and Bendix's study of social mobility found relatively uniform rates of social mobility in most industrial countries. Their study cast doubt on the assumed social rigidity of Europe. High rates of social mobility appear unrelated to socialist politics on either side of the Atlantic.

Thernstrom, after acknowledging the relative accuracy of the modern mobility studies, doubted their applicability to previous historical periods. Based on finding high rates of geographic and social mobility in the Boston area for the 1870-1960 period, he argued that either type of mobility could have prevented socialist parties from emerging. Corroborating European studies do not appear to be very far advanced, but the few studies that do exist have yielded contradictory conclusions.

The debates on geographic and social mobility have fostered an amazing quantity of research and data over the decades. Unfortunately, there are serious reservations about the applicability of this data to the no socialism question and also the value of pursuing this line of investigation. First, the frontier thesis has developed a double standard: when applied to North America it explains the lack of class consciousness but if applied to European societies it should also argue for low levels of class politics. Secondly, mobility studies assume a universal human motivation for upward achievement. While low mobility rates in achievement-oriented societies may lead to frustration, anger, and
radical political activity, quiescence would be more congruous with the value system. Consequently, research on high or low social mobility rates may not prove anything in and of themselves unless viewed through the society's value system.

Third, the relationship of mobility to radical political activity is not clear-cut or unequivocal. If Bendix and Lipset are right about the relatively uniform rates in all industrial societies (which is not completely settled) then-social mobility had little relationship to the no socialism question. In addition, Thenstrom's claim that high rates of geographic mobility undercut radical union and/or political activity must account for some counter-evidence. In the metal-mining regions of the western United States, the lumber regions of the American Northwest and in British Columbia high rates of geographic mobility were coupled with radical unions and radical politics. The Industrial Workers of the World, the Western Federation of Miners, the One Big Union, and the B.C. Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and various American and Canadian socialist groups drew their support specifically from occupational groups with high labour turnover, or in which the work itself was seasonal or migratory. Thus, while one may grant Thenstrom's general point that geographic mobility does present significant organizational problems, it is not axiomatic that geographic mobility precluded socialist politics when other factors supported radical politics.
The future of the impact of mobility studies on the question of socialist political action seems to be limited to a few areas of further investigation. First, the future of frontier-type explanations that stress the uniqueness of frontier conditions and the loose connections to the more settled regions is clouded. The frontier thesis can probably be best subsumed under the broader social and geographic mobility studies. In addition, the frontier's dynamic growth aspects are probably more meaningful as a sub-species of Olson's rapid growth argument. Further social mobility studies may help to settle the still inconclusive assumptions about blocked mobility. European longitudinal studies, similar to Thernstrom's Boston study would be helpful, for it is on the basis of European studies that the case for social mobility as a factor in socialism either stands or falls. How certain areas with migratory populations have developed radical unions (and especially the organizational response of labour unions to this type of social environment) may be useful in assessing the relationship of geographic mobility to political behavior.

Ethnicity and Immigrant Politics

A third set of variables has the common theme that ethnically heterogenous societies are resistant to socialism because the ethnic cleavages manage to take precedence over class cleavages. Many scholars have claimed that one's ethnicity (and not one's economic situation) is a stronger force for generating a common social outlook and a community
of interests. To Marxists ethnic consciousness ultimately is a form of "false consciousness" and is used to divide and manipulate the under-privileged class. From either perspective ethnic consciousness is a block to class consciousness. These theories conversely also hold that ethnically homogenous societies are more prone to socialist politics because the only major social divisions are those of power and privilege related to one's economic standing. As ethnic consciousness declines so class-based issues become more pronounced.

More specifically, several arguments have been put forward to explain how ethnicity prevents class-based political organizations: 1) ethnic cleavages (and especially a race question) provide objects of hatred and caste-like divisions within the working class which are easily exploited by the business group to prevent labour and political organization; 2) recent immigrants have little commitment to their adopted societies; and 3) recent immigrants cannot participate fully in the politics of the new society due to their "foreignness."

**Ethnic Heterogeneity**

The ethnic heterogeneity of North America has often been cited as a cause for the lower levels of class consciousness. The use of a variety of ethnic groups in factories was supposed to prevent a common consciousness from arising. Also, the use of various ethnic groups to break strikes has been widely remarked on and listed as a
contributing cause to socialist failure. The strength of ethnic cleavages reaches its zenith when certain ethnic groups are treated as pariahs, as for example blacks and orientals in North America. The existence of an ethnic pariah group has often been seen as the source of ethnic cleavages which prevented the formation of working-class solidarity and labour politics. Whether the working class' actions to maintain ethnic ties or to remain separate from the pariah groups are seen as racism or as "false consciousness", the reality of ethnic antagonism and especially of anti-black and anti-oriental sentiments and actions cannot be denied.

The interpretation that ethnic cleavages precluded class awareness and organization, however, is open to question. Comparative material casts an interesting light on the question of ethnicity and class politics. For example, Canada had comparable immigration of various ethnic groups that were often in direct competition with each other. These ethnic cleavages, nevertheless, have not acted to preclude the rise of socialist parties and the creation of a class-based politics in some provinces. In British Columbia and Washington the ethnic composition was remarkably similar over the 1900-1960 period. The percentage of the population in each that was either native-born or from Anglo-democracies varied from the middle 80% range early in the century to the low 90% range in mid-century. The development of socialist politics, admittedly, was slow and primarily spearheaded by British immigrants. But the ethnic heterogeneity did not
preclude a labour party. Similar to the Canadian case, in the German Ruhr district industries were manned by several ethnic and religious groups, but this situation did not prevent the emergence of a militant labour movement. Moore concluded that the type of industry and the specific "social contract" of the industry were the important factors.23

Turning to the pariah factor, several reasons lead to doubting its role in weakening working class movements in America. Many North American labour unions on the west coast were first organized as the European workers attempted to influence wages and workplace conditions including the limitation of competition from lower-priced oriental labourers. Though oriental workers were used to break strikes in British Columbia, the presence of oriental labourers did not present an insurmountable obstacle to the formation of a labour party. On the contrary, the issues of oriental exclusion, head tax, and other anti-oriental issues pushed labour groups into politics.24 In the American case, the major migrations of blacks to industrialized areas occurred after the union movement was firmly established. "In 1900, 90 percent of the Negro population resided in former slave states excluding Missouri; in 1920, 85 percent, in 1940, 77 percent, in 1960, 60 percent."25 Thus although some black versus white job competition existed during the consolidation of the union movement the competition was a rather limited affair and for the most part did not occur until after the Second World War.
Also dubious are the interpretations that claim a false consciousness and manipulation for the deeper anti-oriental and anti-black sentiments. The existence of pariah like groups should rather be seen as part of a three-way split between low-priced labour, high-priced labour and the business group. In such a situation high-priced labour organizes to restrict or exclude low-priced labour from job competition. These deep ethnic conflicts can be seen as economically based and also as mobilizers of labour groups. 26

The argument being put forward here should be clearly understood. It is acknowledged that ethnic and race divisions may divide a working class often to its detriment. Similarly, racial and ethnic cleavages often work against the full participation in unions and political organizations. It should be recognized, however, that since the emergence of a labour party in many societies was not necessarily connected to all workers participating in unions, then the lack of socialism in a society cannot be pinned necessarily to ethnic and racial fragmentation. In other words the existence of labour politics, socialist movements and ethnic heterogeneity are not necessarily negatively correlated.

**Sojourner Ethnics**

Other analyses of ethnic relations emphasized the position of the European immigrants to North America as being decisive in blocking socialist politics. Rosenblum cited the "uncommittedness" of European workers as the key to understanding the position of the immigrant. 27
Most immigrants to America wanted short term economic success at relatively high paying jobs, with the longer term prospect of returning home to live a better life than they originally could have come to expect. This lack of commitment had several effects on labour organization in America. First, it promoted high geographic mobility that undercut union organizational drives. Second, it facilitated the use of immigrant workers to break strikes. Third, when the immigrant workers did belong to unions, the immigrants helped to promote business unionism and to discourage independent labour politics.

Although Rosenblum cites some startling figures on immigrant repatriation (which mesh nicely with Thernstrom's geographic mobility studies), there are a few reservations about the strength of immigrant mobility as a factor in explaining the conservative nature of American immigrants. First, though many immigrants were primarily interested in monetary gain, the lack of commitment to American society surely could only be a factor for the first generation of immigrants and even then not for all first generation immigrants. Second, though large immigration slowed after 1920 the subsequent decades of union activity did not witness a successful break away from business unionism.

Objections to Rosenblum's thesis are reinforced by comparison with Canadian immigration and labour. High rates of immigration, internal mobility, and outmigration from Canada meant a lack of committedness by a large section of the working population. But this situation did not prevent
the rise of a radical labour movement and a socialist party. In short, Rosenblum has undoubtedly provided a valuable insight into the psychology of the immigrant. Comparative cases, however, cast doubt on the strength of his explanation of American labour conservatism.

Xenophobia

Rosenblum's idea of the immigrant's sojourner status could also be a product of the receiving society. That is, immigrants long after their arrival and even generations later were still called and treated as if they were not full, equal citizens. In America this treatment was fed by nativist sentiments of hostility to foreigners and led to two conditions. First, immigrant groups had to conform to nativist expectations of proper American political behavior. Second, it led to a withdrawal from equal participation and an integration into the local politics which was dominated by the older parties. (This factor is not quite the same as Rosenblum's argument for where he emphasizes the immigrants definition of himself as an outsider, this other factor plays up the power of the nativist elements to define even the immigrants committed to staying as "foreign" and second class.) Interestingly, the Canadian CCF was primarily composed (especially at the leadership level) of British immigrants who were treated as full citizens, while other immigrants without this treatment, e.g. Ukrainians, were not significant supporters of the CCF. This Canadian acceptance of British radicals is in interesting contrast to the
social rejection of Jewish and German socialists in the United States.

Nevertheless, even this explanation has a few shortcomings. Although granting that treatment as a foreigner or as a second class citizen could easily lead to political quiescence by the second and third generation immigrant political participation should rise as they became more assimilated and accepted. In the American case a more important qualification lies in the oft noted fact that recent immigrants participated in politics and used the political machines as vehicles to mobilize their group, in which case the conditions in which the machines operated would be more pertinent than the ethnicity of the participants.

To sum up, the theories that see ethnic cleavages tending to prevent the emergence of socialist politics appear overstated. While American society has been ethnically divided, Canada's ethnic divisions have not prevented a labour-type party from emerging. And while ethnic cleavages undoubtedly could be exploited by businessmen and politicians, unionization was still achieved in ethnically heterogeneous industries. Ethnic cleavages may be a factor in slowing the development of labour unions and labour politics but it does not seem to explain American labour's peculiar political course.

Cultural Factors

A fourth group of theories claim that a society's
culture (in the general sense of value-system, idea system, world-view, or ideology) is of major importance in explaining the fate of socialist politics. Within this group one finds two general points of view: on the one hand, it is argued that a value-system may be so close to socialism that it prevents the latter's acceptance; on the other hand, socialism may be too foreign for a society's value-system to adopt socialism.

A Substitute for Socialism

Arguing for the first point of view, Samson and Lipset reasoned that socialism never took hold of Americans because the values of "Americanism" acted as a surrogate for socialism. The American values of equality, democracy, and opportunity were so close to socialist values that socialism (as commonly understood by the populace) appeared to be achieved. Lipset traced this American acceptance of "socialistic" values to the fact that America was "born modern."

The importance of the early achievement of democracy and equality before the law as distinctive of American society vis a vis Europe should not be underestimated. The widespread acceptance of egalitarian values, however, should also not necessarily preclude the acceptance of socialism. Using the logic of Weber's analysis of protestantism and the spirit of capitalism, one can argue that the similarity of socialism to "Americanism" should exhibit a tendency for elective affinities to develop such that the similarities of
socialism and Americanism are emphasized and the difference glossed over. The weakness of the surrogate socialism argument is that the opposite tendency appears to be just as likely if not more likely.

**World-views in Collision**

Taking the second point of view, Rossitier suggested that socialist failure in America could be attributed to the inappropriateness of socialist values and the clash with American values. Using similar logic, Karson pointed to the significant Catholic membership in American unions as an important conservatizing force.

But important counter-examples weaken Karson's argument. Why were the French, Italian, and Spanish socialist parties so strong? From a cross-national perspective, one can also argue for the positive correlation of Catholicism and Socialism. Of course one could argue that the struggle against the Church in these countries decisively helped the socialist cause. But this would be an argument more about the social structure and less about values.

The relationship of Catholicism to radicalism is similar to the theory that socialism is the outcome of a dialogue between liberal and conservative world-views. The idea that socialism was born of a conservative (or feudal) world-view has most forcefully been argued by Hartz in his "fragment thesis." According to this theory, the emergence of socialism and its ability to become an institutionalized aspect of a society depends on the society having had a
feudal heritage. The memory of the organic-collectivist ideals is what socialism feeds on in its ideological dialogue with liberalism, and is what distinguishes it from liberalism. The lack of feudalism means the inability to develop socialism. Hartz and followers McRae and Horowitz have attempted to show that socialism in new societies sprang from feudal cultural elements and that in the "new societies" that lacked feudal cultural elements socialism failed to develop.  

Limitations of Cultural Causes

The basic problem of using cultural factors to explain the weakness or strength of socialist parties is that it abstracts a society's idea-system or culture from the institutions and social structure. In some writer's hands it has become a form of cultural determinism, in which the ideas of equality and democracy seem to cause institutional and social change. The concern for cultural elements led the structural-functionalists to write of a society's normative order as the "centre" or core of the society around which institutions and social organizations are built. Ultimately, a cultural explanation is a form of idealistic causation theory. And though it may often include the study of "material" factors as political power, economics, and institutions these are seen as dependent variables created and used by the cultural elements to maintain the normatively based social system. The point in contention here is not whether cultural factors and values are important and need
investigation. Rather, the cultural determinism model is too simplistic. Cultural factors should be examined in the context of the operation of political and social institutions.

The relationship of values to social structure is a complex affair in which a one-sided idealism and an equally one-sided materialism are misstatements. Values and idea-systems are important social elements, but by themselves they can be socially unimportant. It is when cultural factors are institutionalized (which itself is subject to great variety) that values and ideas become important. In addition, during the process of institutionalization values and material interests subtly alter each other as an elective affinity develops between the ideal and material factors. 34

The institutionalized nature of values is especially important because a society's institutional order faces new members as a given and tends to select social roles and values in line with its needs. Consequently, the acceptance and maintenance of values and ideas is dependent on their rough correspondence to the institutional patterns of power and authority. Social institutions are not completely frozen value-systems, but select and reinforce values congruent with the institution. As the institutions change (perhaps under the force of a group's adherence to a new value-system, but also and primarily under internal and external institutional tensions) so the cultural factors tend to be modified, for the old accounts of the society seem not to make sense of the society.
Several of the writers that have emphasized cultural factors have intimated that a subtle interaction occurs between values and social structure. Lipset seems to suggest such a reciprocal relationship, but his analysis is not clear as he oscillates between the two sides and does not firmly address or resolve the problem. Hartz's "fragment thesis" is suggestive but places more emphasis on the value-system as causal. The major drawback of the Hartzian feudalism to socialism theory is that it assumes a cultural unity that must be shown and it introduces the assumption that once set an ideological system (at least liberalism) cannot evolve further. Hartz directs attention to a relationship on the ideological level that should be examined in more detail, but especially from the point of view of specific social practises and institutional development. More specifically, two studies are needed: one in a setting with a "feudal heritage" and the other without such a history. The analysis should examine fairly specific social settings to see if prior conservative ideas, practices, and institutions can be seen as influencing the emergence of socialist parties. In certain respects, a Canada and United States comparison would be ideal for such a study. As Horowitz and Lipset observed, Canada has a "tory touch" and a counter-revolutionary heritage, while the United States lacks a "tory touch" and has a revolutionary heritage. 

Social Structure

The influence of the social structure is the fifth
major grouping of factors affecting the formation of a socialist party. Several of the arguments mentioned above come close to or lean on arguments about the social structure. The point of separating these theories from the rest is the prominence of the arguments that a social structure has influenced labour parties. The range within this group of theories is also very wide in ideological persuasion, ranging from pluralists to radical political economy.

"Social structure" can be a rather vague term, and has been used in ambiguous and often contradictory ways. The element common to most uses of the term is that it refers to the relatively permanent aspects of the society that are of central importance (e.g., values, norms, roles, institutions) and sometimes but not always considered socially necessary. The social structure, though acknowledged to be a human creation, presents itself as an object to new social members, tends to shape the social members to fit its contours, and also tends to resist rapid change, though it is not impervious to change. The concept of a social structure has an implicit idea of power and authority built into it. It also implies the notion of the primacy of certain activities and very often a stratification based on the primary activities. Social structure, finally, also implies a degree of determinism: the social structure causes or at least conditions social phenomena in a fundamental way.
Three Views of Social Structure

Beyond these general characteristics the use of the term "social structure" breaks down into several approaches. The structural-functionalists contend that the basic social structure of every society can be defined by certain necessary functions and that social phenomena should be examined to locate how the phenomena function in the society to maintain the society's structure. For many of the structural-functionalists the basic social activity involves what Parson's called the problem of order. That is, the basic social functions and structures are concerned with conflict regulation, normative control and values. Consequently, to the structural-functionalists, structural analysis examines basic social values and norms. The structural-functionalists have been criticised because their perspective tends to sever the connection of social background, values, and norms; in addition, they down-play the question of power by assuming equality and consensus on norms. In this assumption of equality of power functionalists have contributed to a pluralist interpretation of society. Pluralists emphasize the diversity of group and multiplicity of social ties; they also posit a basic equality among men and institutions and the adherence to a common set of values that regulate conflict.

Marxist investigations of social structure take a different tack, emphasizing the unequal power in non-socialist societies. The unequal power springs from a society's economic structure. Consequently, Marxist analysis
views the economic structure (and especially the mode of production) as the heart of the social structure from which all other social elements derive and by which they are in the long run determined. In these types of analyses the basic social group --classes-- are accounted for by their relation to the means of production: class structure is social structure. The other major social components, eg., beliefs, values, politics, are epiphenomena that are analyzed through their connections to the economy. Criticisms of Marxist investigations of social structure have disputed the economic reductionism of the argument and have indicated that while the Marxian attention to the question of power is good, it does not include other relevant dimensions of power and authority.

Some critics of the structural-functionalists and the Marxists broadened the notion of power to include authority relations in general as the basis of a society's structure. Drawing on the work of Weber, Veblen, Michels, Mills and Dahrendorf, this third approach holds that the institutionalized authority relations constitute a society's structure. This type of analysis locates the central social sphere in the major institutions of economy, polity, religion, media, etc. By emphasizing institutional imperatives and influences, these social power theorists have hoped to avoid the weaknesses of the functionalists, pluralists and Marxists; also the reductionism and determinism gives way to a concern for historical specificity and limited generalization. The one way causal sequence is supplanted by the possibility of
different causal sequences in different circumstances. The primacy of values or economy is replaced with the idea of an interactive relationship but with the major institutions being of primary but not exclusive influence. This last group of analyses of social structure do not assume consensus or the equality of power in the various institutional spheres as the structural-functionalists tend to; similarly this last group also rejects positing social power exclusively in economic terms but seek it in the diverse institutions. Having outlined the basic social structure arguments we can now turn to how the pluralists (and functionalists), Marxists, and the power theorists accounted for the advance or demise of socialism.

Pluralist Social Structure

Pluralist analyses of modern industrial societies often resemble Durkheim's idea of organic solidarity. To the pluralists, industrial society meant the growth of highly differentiated social parts. Humans became highly interdependent by the specialized nature of the various occupations and institutions. Whereas in pre-modern societies social groups were few in number, modern society has fragmented the population into potentially conflicting occupations, skill-levels, institutions and interests, none of which is large enough to dominate other groups. While the pluralists may agree with the structural-functionalists emphasis on consensus and integration around a common value system (see supra on cultural factors) the point to emphasize here is
that the modern social order fragments the population and creates a plurality of institutions, groups, associations, parties and pressure groups with roughly equivalent power. Thus for the pluralist the lack of a labour party in the United States is a reflection of the pluralistic social structure that avoids conflict and builds consensus and democracy by including all groups in a highly interdependent system. Though the strength of European labour-type parties may lead to doubts about the pluralist explanation, the pluralists interpret the conservatism of socialist parties since the Second World War as confirmation of the further modernization of European society. If the United States did not develop a socialist party it was because of its more modern social structure. To re-state this factor in more abstract terms, modern societies are structurally diverse with equal power in the various social parts which prevents one group from being large enough to achieve its will in opposition to other groups. This situation necessitates that modern parties become broad coalitions that seek compromise and shun class and ideological politics.

In many ways the pluralist social structure analysis is complementary of other approaches. The pluralist model of the multiplicity of interest groups and voluntary associations comes close to the coalitional style of political parties often held as the norm for modern political parties. But here the emphasis on social structure places the cause for coalition politics on the social basis of politics, whereas the discussion below of political party types views
the continued coalitional politics as due to the political institutions themselves, i.e., the tradition and weight of the party structure. In the pluralist social structural model, the society itself is viewed as fragmented and individuals in modern society are viewed as actors with multiple interests that can only be realized through membership in a multitude of single-interest groups. Religion, income, education, family, and profession tend to divide and unify groups in a series of "cross-cutting cleavages."

Except for the acceptance of certain ground rules by which all can compete equally there are no all-embracing, overriding allegiances or permanent social groups. If the classical liberal's view that the individual could realize his personal and political ends through individual activity is out of date, the modern liberal pluralist's acceptance of associations and interest groups as the primary social and political actors has not led pluralists to give up the classical liberal's view of the state as an "umpire" or policy as the result of vector-sum analysis. For the pluralists the political party aggregates these diverse interests and should not pursue its own ideological path, for its constituent's may shift allegiance.

A weakness of the pluralist argument about social structure (and this directly affects the pluralist political implications) is that it assumes an equality of power from the diverse and sometimes organized nature of various social interest groups. This consensus and egalitarian assumption has been pointed out often enough that elaboration here should
not be necessary. The use of an unwarranted assumption, however, does not mean that all of the pluralist scheme is for nothing. Some parts of the argument are valid, useful insights. Modern societies and class structures are so complex that they often create social divisions where an observer may assume there should be a unity of interests. The working class is not necessarily a unified block and is often divided by large differences in wages, prestige, and power. These observations, however, are not sufficient grounds to claim that classes do not exist, are not important, or that power is fairly evenly distributed as the pluralists often assume. In other words, the pluralist's point that modern societies are diverse and that this diversity necessitates that parties draw on more than traditional working-class or business groups is valid. Although the pluralist's analyses of social structure after World War Two may in part account for the less ideological tone of European politics in the 1950's it came up short with a return of ideology in the sixties and seventies. Most importantly for our purposes the pluralists have a harder time addressing the longevity of socialist politics and the origins of labour politics which pre-dates World War Two.

The denial of the equal distribution of power and "integration" marks the crucial distinction between the pluralist and other social structure arguments about the social basis of politics. These other approaches range from radical political economy to other power and conflict theories which claim a few institutions and groups as pre-eminent in the social structure.
The hypotheses that the radical political economists put forward are the oldest attempt at an understanding of the rise of socialism. These theories are both an attempt at self-explanation and an attempt to motivate and direct socialist political activity. Although radical political economy is a diverse grouping of theorists, they all take their lead from Marx and Engels by claiming that economics (and specifically the mode of production) is the most important aspect in studying society. The economic structure forms the basic contours of a society, influences the social and political institutions, and shapes the political movements and political parties. To this economic model of society, they tie a philosophy of history that considers organized class struggle to be the catalyst of social progress. For present purposes one only need note that the radical political economists postulated how, when, and where socialist parties should emerge. A brief overview of Marx and Engels' ideas will be followed by a look at the latter-day radical political economists who attempted to refine this perspective's views on socialist parties.

The Basic Ideas

In broad terms it can be stated that Marx and Engels believed that the objective conditions of class stratification led in a fairly direct manner to class self-awareness. Objective class position would lead to class conscious organizations of a political character. Marx and Engels'
postulation of the rise of class conscious organizations attended to macro-economic trends as the most relevant for understanding the sources of political action. Capitalist development would swell the proletariat's ranks, as the increasing concentration of the ownership of the means of production would thin the capitalist's ranks, yielding a capitalist society increasingly divided into two classes. Proletarian class consciousness and political organization would follow in the wake of these changes. Marx and Engels allowed for minor variations in their theory of political action. For instance, the specific form of proletarian politics (e.g. revolution versus peaceful change) might be affected by each society's special conditions or historical peculiarities. Nonetheless, they assumed a strong positive correlation between capitalism's advance and the development of socialism.

Marx and Engels offered two contradictory theories on American (and presumably Canadian) economic and political development. The first theory viewed American society as typical of colonial economies and thus was essentially in a less-developed stage than was Europe. Not until individual property holding had been accumulated into large-scale capitalist ownership would the pre-conditions for a socialist movement exist. The second theory (although it was even less fully elaborated than the first theory) claimed that because the United States had been able to skip the "feudal stage" it was an almost purely bourgeois culture. Thus, "workers, like everyone and everything else in America, had been bitten by
the capitalist bug and had become infected with bourgeois ideology."\(^{43}\)

Although both theories noted the lack of class consciousness in the United States, Marx and Engels appeared to believe that American workers would follow the general path of European socialism, and noted on several occasions the positive aspects of American labour struggles. But because America was not central to their thinking "Marx and Engels were never able to fit this country into the great puzzle they claimed to have unravelled."\(^{44}\)

Though Marx and Engels' social theory has served to highlight the role of economic relationships, a major problem for it is the origin of class consciousness. The transition of a class in itself to a class for itself has not proven to be as simple nor as straightforward as it was assumed. The heterogeneity of the working class, technological advance, and other factors have tended to prevent the emergence of class consciousness and political organization. Second, the contention that economically advanced countries would lead the way to socialism also appears questionable. The most highly developed capitalist societies (Britain and the United States) produced neither socialist revolution nor the most militant socialist parties.

Consequently, the Marxist causal sequence that macro-economic changes lead to political consciousness and organization could only be retained by adding "intervening factors" that have blocked the expected outcome. Marx and Engels hinted at such intervening variables when they allowed for
special circumstances and especially when they noted that relatively high wealth or other factors may retard class consciousness. These qualifications, however, were not explored in detail. The full elaboration of these "intervening factors" was conducted by later generations of radical political economists.

Later Refinements

The latter-day Marxists claimed two types of intervening variables prevented the outcome postulated by political economy. First, special economic circumstances led to a temporary abatement of class conflict and working-class organization. Second, various elements of the "superstructure", especially false consciousness, prevented the working class from realizing its true opposition to capitalism.

The special economic circumstances theory contended that capitalism's wealth could buy social peace. Following Lenin's lead, radical political economists claimed that class struggle (from revolution to socialist party support) failed because advanced capitalism entered an imperialist phase. Imperialism exported class contradictions and allowed workers to share in the internationally generated profits. Imperialism prevented class struggle by creating high wages, the welfare state, and a high standard of living. The crisis of falling rates of surplus value was solved by the international generation of surplus value. Other writers in this group did not comment on the origin of the wealth, but also
claimed the relatively high wealth of the working class in America led to a contentedness with the social arrangements. As Sombart wrote, "all socialist utopia came to nothing on roast beef and apple pie." The corollary of these arguments is that a decrease in wealth should lead to militant class politics.

The second major intervening factor was the restraining influence of the society's "superstructure." The use of the coercive power of the state is one such element. But the most important factor in this second group is "false consciousness" in which members of the working class do not perceive their common bonds with each other and where the working class views their interests as the same as the capitalist class. This reversal of "natural" class bonds is reputed to occur by several mechanisms ranging from childhood socialization to media ownership and manipulation. Those that stress childhood socialization often stand Freud "on his head." They argue that Freud was correct in how humans learn to conform to society and how to defer to authority, but he was wrong in his Hobbesian view of human nature. These writers substitute a view of human nature that is close to the optimistic view of human nature in liberal theory, but without the component of egoistic acquisitiveness. To this naturally social, but malleable man, capitalist society adds egoism, acquisitiveness, submission, and respect for authority. Raised in a capitalist society, it is "second nature" to believe these acquired traits are naturally given and that one's interests are contrary to the "real interests" of
working-class unity and socialist political activity. The Marxist theory of religion as a special case of this "false consciousness" is too well known to need any elaboration. Other writers in this tradition emphasize the role of the media in creating "false consciousness." Here the point is that media ownership and manipulation give unfair advantage to capitalist ideas and sentiments because of advertising and the superior position of big money in delivering its message. Thus a "false consciousness" exists because alternative social arrangements are rarely presented and the universe of social debate is artificially limited. Yet other writers see all the above areas (education, media, socialization, etc.) as part of the "ideological state apparatus" which seeks to create legitimacy for the social order. 50

An Evaluation

The radical political economists' understanding of the rise of socialist parties has several limitations. They are often better on criticism than they are on formulating a workable substitute. A major problem of this analysis stems from its basic model of society. In addition, evidence casts doubts on the validity of the postulated factors.

An economic model of society simplifies and distorts the role of politics. That industrial societies create new classes and that these classes, given modern rhetoric, attempt to make their weight felt politically is not in question. But the variety of forms available for political activity is subject to cultural, ideological, historical, and institu-
tional forces. It is not possible to reduce these other factors to economic interest group action. Consequently, socialism and socialist parties (not to mention revolution) are not axiomatic upon industrialization. The radical political economy model of society has applied a historically time-bound social theory to all societies. As Gellner has suggested, the primacy of political factors over economic forces is probably a more justified model of the major institutions.

Radical political economy's view of human nature also raises problems. Both liberal and radical political economy postulate that man is primarily an economic creature. But this assumption does not lead to an adequate explanation of political behavior. Although humans have to eat and work to produce the necessities of life, this fact cannot be stretched to mean that the necessity of economic activity can be a sufficient explanation of other social activities and of all human nature. Beyond a minimum subsistence level, economic activity is only one of a number of concerns of human society.

Turning to the intervening factors of special economic circumstances, there are several reservations about their validity. In regard to imperialism, several European states (e.g., France and England) had extensive empires but also developed strong socialist parties of either the reformist or revolutionary type. Commenting on the economic theory of imperialism, Schumpeter argued that the Leninist view of the necessity for export of capital is unfounded. As further
counter-evidence one can also cite the Scandinavian combination of highly profitable and mainly capitalist economies, strong social democratic parties, and a distinct lack of imperialism.

Because of these reservations about the explanatory power of imperialism as an inhibiting factor, the arguments about relatively high wealth may seem more plausible. The conservatizing effect of wealth, however, is also subject to major reservations. Evidence contrary to the relatively high wealth argument is found in one of the earliest statements of this theory when Sombart cites the average worker's income in various sections in the United States in 1900. The highest paid workers were those in the Pacific and mountain states, and these states were also among the most militant politically, successively supporting populist, syndicalist and socialist movements and parties. The political economy assumption about relatively high wealth is missing the cultural, ideological, and institutional context within which relative affluence takes on meaning.

At the heart of the relative wealth argument is the contention that the American standard of living was notably superior to the European. So widely accepted was this contention that little research was conducted to establish its basis in fact. A recent work imposes serious limitations on the arguments about the relative well-being of American workers. Comparing Pittsburgh and Birmingham, England between 1899 and 1913, Shergold found that the superior American standard of living extended only to the skilled,
highly paid workers and not to unskilled workers. American workers faced a wider distribution of incomes and harsher working conditions than did the English workers. It was the divisions between American workers that was their prime characteristic and not their relative affluence when compared to their European brothers.  

By emphasizing the cultural, ideological, and institutional factors the theorists who emphasize "superstructural" factors have an edge over the other radical political economists. But once again there are several doubts about the adequacy of "superstructural" effects. The repression of socialist parties of government or even employer violence has of course been a fact of life. Nonetheless, it is most likely that repression cannot be a prime intervening factor, especially since the illegal status of the German and other socialist parties did not prevent the formation and survival of socialist parties. Likewise, the theories of "false consciousness" are problematic. While granting that the "false consciousness" theories are more sophisticated than the economic assumptions about human nature inherent in political economy, one must still question whether their assumptions about human nature are any more well-founded than the assumptions they argue against. To claim a suborning in which workers do not express their own thoughts and interests assumes that the writer knows better than the workers what the "true interests" are, but only on the basis of certain assumptions about the nature of humans and society,
Given this bias of "false consciousness" theories, one cannot claim that a "false consciousness" exists in its own right. However useful the studies of ideological bias in education and the media have been, these studies have too often been interpreted to mean that dominance by the economically powerful entails complete manipulation and control. Few doubt the advantages the wealthy and powerful have in using the media, but an advantage is not control. The theories of "false consciousness" ask one to believe in a grand confidence game.

Because of the above criticisms, further research on the radical political economy approach to social structure and socialist politics would probably not further the understanding of the rise of socialist parties. Of course this conclusion does not mean that economic factors can be ignored. Rather, the radical political economy approach to economic and political questions seems unfruitful. Economic factors are an important element in any social analysis, but they must be investigated within the overall social structure, without biased assumptions of their importance or role.

Modern Power Theory

The structural approach that emphasizes unequal power of the major institutions and basic social cleavages has also been applied to the origins of socialist parties. Lipset and Rokkan have analyzed the origins of various European political parties as being due to the previous economic and political institutions in a particular nation. The basic social
cleavages that resulted from the conflict of church and
state, landed and industrial economies, and capital and
labour have led to the formation of different parties built
on the diverse social basis. In reference to socialist
parties, their origin, strength, and ideological direction
was deeply marked by the previous social and institutional
struggles. Lipset and Rokkan's work is an attempt to place
political parties into an overall context of a society's
distribution of power and authority.55

The structural approach that emphasizes unequal power
has also been used to examine how simple, dichotomous social
structure tends to produce conflict, while diversity tends to
diffuse political action of one class or interest group.
Robin and MacPherson have documented how regional movements
can turn into regional political parties on the basis of
simplified social and economic structures.56 In the case of
British Columbia, the occupations of fishing, mining, and
forestry tended to produce sharp class conflict and social-
isim. Other Canadian regions tended to not produce such
social bases for conflict politics because the diverse social
structure introduced conflicting claims and diluted the
power of working-class forces. The weak side of Robin's and
MacPherson's analyses is the underdevelopment of the influence
of political institutions on the social forces, although this
side is suggested but not elaborated.

While the power theory type of structural argument is
similar to the pluralist and radical political economy
approaches, it differs in several key respects. First, it examines economic interest groups without the radical political economy assumptions of working class unity or the economy as being the determining factor. Groups and associations other than economic ones, may influence the political outcome by acting as "cross-cutting" cleavages. But contrary to the pluralists the social structure does contain a hierarchy built on unequal economic and political power. Second, power theory examines the relations and institutions of authority, whether religious, political, economic, or social, as of major significance in a social structure. Third, this approach has tended to investigate specific historical cases instead of elaborating a sweeping theory of all societies. Fourth, the regional focus of some of these studies highlights the specific local factors that form the basis for socialist parties instead of the national focus that many social structure analyses have taken. This regional approach is preferable for national aggregation tends to produce pluralistic results just because of the national statistics and analysis.

The explanation of socialist politics from the social structure point of view could use further research, but the pluralist, functionalist, and radical political economy perspectives appear problematic in their assumptions and not likely to yield adequate results. Given this situation an investigation of social structure should proceed from the analysis of power theory that investigates the social institutions structuring of power and authority as an
influence on socialist politics.

Political Factors and Institutions

Several political factors and institutions have been considered influential on the emergence of socialist politics: electoral arrangements, the franchise, machine politics, feudal politics, and the response of political elites.

Electoral Arrangements

Despite the relative similarity of political arrangements in Western democracies, there are a variety of electoral institutions that may have affected the emergence of socialist parties.

The parliamentary system, with a union of the legislative power to the executive power has, according to some, fostered national unified parties. Because the government may fail if it lacks unity in the legislature, there is a tendency for the legislative members to form a cohesive unified block to retain power. This cohesion in turn lends itself to adopting a principled program. In such a parliament of principled parties, a socialist party is more easily and readily successful. On the other hand, in a presidential system that separates the legislative power from the executive there is less impetus for legislative and party unity, for the executive's term of office is separate and fixed. Consequently, legislative parties tend to be loose and shifting coalitions based on patronage and expediency. The parties are also more attuned to local needs.
and demands. A legislature composed of these parties should be hostile to organized, principled parties, as a socialist party is by nature. 57

The second electoral factor is the type of political party. Broad coalition parties tend to eschew ideological politics and instead concentrate on building up a number of blocks of voters unified on a broad, often contradictory platform. These type of parties attempt to foster an image of "something for everybody." On the other hand, ideological parties tend to seek the exclusive support of one major social group and to forego the support of other blocks of voters. The latter type of party is more conducive to the emergence of a socialist party than is a loose coalition party system which conditions a party to steal the thunder of an ideological party with the addition of a seductive plank to its platform. 58 The difference between this point about the type of party and the previous point is that here the origins of the coalition party lies not in the constitutional-electoral arrangements of legislature and executive but in the types of party and the social basis of politics.

A third factor of electoral politics seen as important to the formation of political parties is the opposing tendencies of unitary and federal states. Unitary states are said to reflect national political cleavages among various groups, e.g., business, labour, church, landed aristocracy. On the other hand, federal states tend to reflect regional cleavages and discontents. Federal political
systems, consequently, tend to reinforce coalition parties and tend to undermine the support for ideological parties. Both Perlman and Taft noted that the American federal system of strong states' rights shifted the locus of much of labour's political program to the state level instead of the federal level. In addition, the recognition of this separation of political jurisdictions in the American Senate acted to carry over the regional disputes into national politics, further undermining a national ideological party.

A fourth influence of electoral practices is whether the election system is a multiple member district, with some form of proportional representation, or a single member, simple plurality district. Multiple member, proportional representation schemes were designed to insure that a minority had representation in the legislature. That it works to this effect has been taken to mean that it encourages polarized politics, ideological parties, and in particular, socialist parties. On the other hand, single member, simple plurality electoral districts tend to discourage minority representation and thus are supposed to encourage a two-party system of broad coalition parties.

A fifth electoral practice claimed as influential on the rise of parties is the sheer number of elections. Most parliamentary systems have few elections, usually only once every few years. In addition, they usually require that the voter make only one decision. In each district the party has to field only one candidate. In the United States, however, the number of elections is extremely high, with several
each year. In addition, the party and voter must fill numerous offices in separate votes. The effect of a simplified system would be to allow new, relatively amateur political parties to emerge quickly and live longer; the relatively complex American system has tended to build a larger group of professional politicians. The latter has also acted to prevent new political parties from forming due to the tremendous work involved in fielding a credible slate of candidates. 62

The last electoral arrangement seen to affect the rise of socialist parties is the legal status of political parties. In many political systems the political party is solely a private association with little or no legal standing or recognition. The party's internal affairs are not regulated, their existence has no constitutional status and they are generally not even recognized on the ballot. But in the United States, parties are recognized and regulated through law. Though the parties have no constitutional status, the attempts to control corrupt practices at the end of the last century led to state and federal regulations of primary elections, finances, the overseeing of elections, and official recognition on the ballot. This legal regulation could have the unintended effect of making the two major American parties official. Thus in addition to the other problems they face, third parties, minor parties, and socialist parties have had to overcome the legitimacy bestowed by the legal system on the two major parties.
Electoral Arrangements Evaluated

The exact impact of the above constitutional and electoral arrangements on the rise of socialist parties is open to question. The purported tendencies of the various factors must be examined carefully lest one jump to a premature endorsement of the causal capacity of the political institutions.

The first point, on the influence of parliamentary versus presidential systems, seems overstated. Comparative data on the workings of the two types of executive/legislative systems does not always support the conclusions outlined above. Germany had a long period of effective separation of executive and legislature (though one could hardly call Bismarckian Germany a presidential system.) The German arrangements did not prevent the rise of unified parties or of socialist parties. Sombart claims that the very impotence and separation from effective power strengthened the German Social Democrats.63 The French Fifth Republic's presidential system has not undermined cohesive, ideological parties. These examples tend to support the conclusion that although executive and legislative arrangements may introduce a certain tendency to unified parties, equally important factors are to be found in the social bases of the parties, in the party's organizational structure, and in the other institutional arrangements. In addition, the introduction of a cohesive party into any legislature would increase that group's effectiveness and consequently would
tend to perpetuate it and most likely lead to emulation of their tactics. Once again the social basis and the organizational aspects of the parties seem equally pertinent to the rise of socialist parties. The influence of executive and legislature unity on the rise of socialist parties may, when tied to other factors, inhibit these parties because of the difficulty of simultaneous success and the inability to enact a program with success in only one sphere.

The second factor of party type (coalition versus ideological) rests on a pluralist viewpoint on the social structure discussed and evaluated above.

The influence of federal versus unitary states also does not seem as strong as its advocates make it appear. The Canadian federal system did not deter the formation of the CCF-NDP; one could even argue that it helped to entrench these socialist parties. Nonetheless, the question of fragmented political jurisdictions does seem to raise some possibilities for further work. For example, why did not the American federal system operate as the Canadian system did in relation to the formation of regionally-based socialist parties?

The explanation that argues that single-member, simple plurality districts inhibit, while multiple-member or proportional representation systems lead to the entrenchment of minority parties, polarized politics, or socialist parties likewise is questionable. As Cairns has demonstrated a single member, simple plurality system works against geo-
graphically dispersed minorities, but does not prevent the emergence of third parties when their adherents are geographically concentrated. Proportional type elections may entrench minority representation but it is unlikely "that in the absence of a social basis for multi-party politics proportional representation could create them." When one turns to historical example, the strength of the plurality versus proportional model appears of dubious strength for it has not deterred the British or Canadian labour parties from forming. In addition, "... it is to be noted that (the plurality system) clearly favored the development of socialist parties at the beginning of the twentieth-century, and that the first countries in which they were able to assume office were in fact countries with a simple-majority, single-ballot system, Australia and New Zealand." Further research on the question of proportional versus plurality electoral methods is unlikely to shed much light on the rise of socialist politics.

The influence of the number of elections and the number of separate offices to be filled on its own does not seem to be of overriding significance. Many of the offices that American's vote for are unimportant and do not have significant amounts of power as compared to the legislators and executives. But as the separation of the executive and legislature requires more organization and possibly fewer rewards, the number of elections and offices are an indication of the same pattern. Consequently this factor, if
investigated in conjunction with similar factors, may warrant further research.

Finally, the legal status of American political parties may be a factor in creating a sense of legitimacy for the major parties. The major parties' recognition in the law, however, has never prevented third parties from arising or even from having some minor success. While granting the importance of legitimacy that legal recognition may bring, it does not appear to be sufficient to preclude other parties from arising. The failure of socialism in America must be sought in other areas than the lack of a mild form of legal recognition.

The Franchise

The timing of the franchise has been tied to the emergence of socialist parties. Epstein views the early extension of manhood suffrage in a predominately agrarian and un-proletarian America as a source for the emergence of non-ideological coalition parties. Contrariwise, the extension of the franchise in Europe was coincidental with the rise of an urban working class which then formed the basis of ideological parties. The nucleus of European working-class parties was often instrumental in pushing for the extension of the franchise. When the vote was finally given to the working class, these political groups were the recipients and organizers of working class support. The expansion of the British labour party's vote after the First World War, it has been concluded, was a direct outcome of
the 1918 franchise changes.\textsuperscript{69}

Nevertheless there are several weaknesses to applying this line of reasoning to North America. In the case of the United States, it assumes that a party system once molded in a particular way is basically unchanging. Although it is true enough that political parties tend to perpetuate themselves and the party system, over time the parties and the general social circumstances change so that continuity and rigidity of organization cannot be assumed. On a comparative basis, many political party systems have not been as rigid and as unchanging as the above theory would lead one to believe. For example, western Canada's early political history was dominated by the two national parties. But in the period 1920-50 they lost their hold over several of the western provinces. In many of the European cases, the large support of labour parties may have more to do with the deeply entrenched status groups and the social separation and segregation of the classes than with the timing of the franchise. The late extension of the franchise, of course, is an indication of the retaining of traditional status groups.

\textbf{Machine Politics}

Another institution specific to the American case that has been implicated in the "blocking" of socialism is the American practice of organizing politics with the use of corrupt big-city machines. By incorporating recent immigrants and the lower classes into the machine and spoils system, the
machine bosses were reputed to have undercut second and third party movements. The machines were often in collusion with corporations and it is claimed that the machines thrived best in this atmosphere. The spoils system was a continuation by recent immigrants of the tradition of particularistic relations with political authorities. Spoils also provided a primitive welfare system that offset the rough edges of economic hardship. All these aspects of machine politics worked to prevent the rise of class-based, ideological local parties.

The reality of the corruption and inner-workings of American machine politics is really beyond dispute. Several facts, however, must be kept in mind when attributing a "blocking" mechanism to machine bossism. First, the political machine was not an America-wide phenomena. Although the urban machine was wide-spread, it tended to affect the larger cities primarily in the East. Also, it was not continuous and some cities were affected for relatively short periods of time. Second, the use of metaphor "machine" is deceptive; they were not as all-pervasive or omnipotent in the cities they controlled as is often assumed. Many cities had several machines which sometimes worked together but at other times fought each other. There were even "reform" machines to combat the more corrupt machines. These facts indicate that though machines had an advantage, they did not preclude other types of political organizations. Nor did the machines necessarily prevent the emergence of militant,
ideological labour groups. Chicago and New York were dominated by corrupt machines, but both were the home of strong labour groups. Finally, the city machines were often vehicles of immigrant and lower class social mobility. As such, the machines were not simply the manipulators of immigrant groups or the lower classes. The machines were often the immigrants own construction and were vehicles of mobilization. American city politics was often left to the lower social groups as the "better element" was too pre-occupied with business affairs and did not want to become involved in sordid political affairs. Consequently, machines reflected ethnic and class cleavages. Insofar as the machines were ethnic mobilizers, they were a symptom of the lack of class consciousness rather than its cause. But insofar as they were dominated by lower class elements machines were vehicles of social mobility, though hardly of a class-conscious variety.

"Feudal" Politics

The development of socialist parties has also been linked to the inheritance of class or status-based politics from the feudal stratification system. The establishment of modern mass democracy in formerly feudal societies was marked by the carrying over of the feudal status groups into modern party government. The major social cleavage inherited by most European societies was the self-conscious estate groups of landed aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and later the urban workers and peasants. Because the upper reaches
of European society dominated the old politics, the extension of the franchise to all adult males also witnessed the emergence of the self-conscious peasant and worker's parties because these societies lacked the institutions and heritage of cross-class support. (This argument about the importance of feudalism is similar to Hartz's "fragment thesis" except that where Hartz stressed the ideological factors this explanation emphasizes institutions and stratification.) An example of this welding of feudal and modern politics can be seen in the German case. Bismarck attempted, on the one hand, to accommodate the working class with formal democracy and a parliament based on estate membership; on the other hand, he endeavored to retain power for the upper classes by keeping most of the effective power in the hands of the upper-class administration. In consequence, the retaining of feudal politics within modern institutions boosted support for the working class party; this system also increased the radicalness of the German socialists before the First World War by sharing neither power nor responsibility, yet bestowing a platform from which to launch broadsides. 73

As noted above in reference to Hartz's "fragment thesis" studies which examine the influence of feudalism on socialist politics may be able to extend the understanding of these political forms. By emphasizing the prior institutions and stratification system, the analyses of feudal politics are a useful corrective to Hartz's primarily cultural argu-
ment. Studies of feudal politics give a specific social context to the Hartzian thesis and give credence to both explanations. In terms of understanding the fate of socialism in North America, a useful contrast between Canada and the United States could be pursued. Such a study would be similar to Horowitz's analysis of Canada's "tory touch" but would focus more on the institutions and stratification system.

The Response of Political Elites

A fifth type of political factor does not refer to an institution but rather to the political response by a society's ruling group. The focus on political leaders to explain historical events is a long established tradition. Modern sociological investigations have advanced on previous historical and political work by emphasizing the leadership group instead of the individual leaders. These sociological elite theories have some unfortunate conclusions that one does not necessarily need to agree with in order to see the value of the elite theories. One need not attempt to assess Paretian "foxes" and "lions" to recognize that the resistance, accommodation, suppression, or collapse by a ruling group will have an effect on the political alternatives available to a population. From this point of view, the political response of the elites may be crucial to the emergence of a socialist party. Moore argues that the institutionalization of socialism in both China and Russia was in part due to the collapse of the previous group's ability to rule. He also
sees a similar "state crisis" as a main factor in the unsuccessful German revolution after the First World War. 74

To account for the American lack of socialism, two slightly different (though not contradictory) views are put forward. On the one hand, the vigor and vision of American political elites allowed them to see the necessity of accommodating the working classes. The American elites of the 1920's and 1930's generation aimed to create a subordinate coalition status for labour. This type of analysis has often pointed to the special influence of specific leaders. In this vein Norman Thomas attributed the socialist party's failure in the 1930's to one man -- Roosevelt. 75 On the other hand, it could be argued that the political elite's suppression of radicalism during and after the First World War and then the anti-red propaganda for the next five decades had the effect of nullifying radical political alternatives.

That political elites influenced socialist parties and popular support is not really in question. The decisions made by elites establish a sequence of events that affect all political movements and parties. It is even possible that movements, parties, and ideologies can be completely suppressed, though this is probably very rare. The influence of elites, nonetheless, is a more limited affair than these theories would have. Elites may be able to sway specific decisions, but they are probably not powerful enough to suppress or co-opt a movement or party with a large firm
social base. Elites may be able to affect individual political decisions and political groups, but their influence probably does not extend to the very existence of a political group. Thus political elites have more influence on the formation of a socialist government and less on the formation of socialist party in the first place. Second, the influence of elites must be placed in the institutional context in which they operate. Once the context of institutions is played up, the question becomes one not of elite response but of institutional flexibility to accommodate new groups. Without the institutional context, the argument about socialism's success or failure as being due to an elite's response is ultimately an argument comparing different elite's intelligence and vision, which would be an extremely difficult and probably unrewarding task. Because of the above criticisms, the study of political sociology would be better off to view elite response as a minor and dependent variable subject to the larger forces of institutions, social structure, economics, and ideology.

**Political Factors: Summary and Conclusions**

The above overview of political factors has cast some doubts on the strength of many of the political factors touted as significant for the rise of socialism. Several of the factors do not seem to be worth further investigation: multiple member, proportional representation versus single member, simple plurality electoral arrangements, the legal status of parties, and machine politics. Many of the
political factors were judged to be overstated and that with modification may lead to useful research on this problem. The separation of executive and legislature as exhibited in the presidential system and the opposite in a parliamentary system probably influences the rise of strong parties to a degree, but insufficiently to be the only factor. The "separation of powers" may be of importance if incorporated with other factors that blunt the formation and effectiveness of ideological parties. The federal versus unitary systems also seems overstated, as does the number of political offices and elections. Turning to the timing of the franchise, this factor may be of importance but it has to be freed of the assumptions about the static nature of political parties and must not be divorced from the prior social and political institutions. The influence of prior institutions is evident in the feudal politics factor which also holds some promise. Finally, the political response of the elites is a minor and dependent variable.

As these promising political factors are a polyglot group, the investigation of the rise of socialism would be helped if a common denominator could be found. An underlying theme of the political factors is the importance of institutional factors in molding circumstances so as to help or hinder socialist politics. A theme that runs through the above factors is the fragmentation (or separation) and unity of institutionalized power and authority. The division of significant political power into separate, independent
spheres is a factor that unites the federal versus unitary state idea, the number of elections and elected officials, the separation of executive and legislature, and the influence of feudal estate groups on the franchise and modern politics. In general, the dimension of centralized, unified versus decentralized, fragmented politics seems to run through all of these factors. This indicates that the type and degree of the institutionalization of authority is the political factor that needs further work. The above discussion indicates that modernized political systems with more or less centralized institutions seems conducive to socialist politics; a decentralized type of political system works against socialist success because the dispersed authority makes organized opposition more costly and less effective. Of course the type of research just outlined is not complete by itself as it could be applied to any opposition political movements, thus leaving out the specific socialist content. Nonetheless, if the investigation outlined above can be coupled with other factors (e.g., economic, cultural, etc.) it promises to be a useful avenue of investigation.

Reaction to Change

The last group of theories view the rise of socialist parties as a reaction to recent change. The formation of socialist movements and parties are seen as caused by the alteration of some previous social equilibrium. Within this group are theories of relative deprivation, theories of how traditional groups react to modernism, and theories of
political action as based on perceptions of justice and an implicit social contract.

Relative deprivation theories all stress that increased discrepancies between what people expect and what is actually possible can lead to feelings of resentment, formation of ideological parties, and rebellion or revolution. 76 Runciman and Gurr refine this theory further by outlining several variations of relative deprivation based on constant, rising, or falling expectations and capabilities. Also they add that relative deprivation may exist over the three separate scales of economics, status, and power.

Davies' "J" curve theory of revolution is really a subspecies of Runciman's ideas (specifically proportional relative deprivation.) Although the relative deprivation theories have made a significant contribution to theories of rebellion and analyses of how psychological factors are related to social structure, the theories have one major drawback in relation to the present study of socialist parties. Relative deprivation theories are timeless and seek to explain all rebellions and revolutions regardless of ideological content of the movement or party. In regards to relative deprivation, studies are needed that give a specific context to the feelings of resentment. If one takes relative deprivation theory as is, there is little connection between the conditions of relative deprivation and a specific political action. For relative deprivation theories to be more meaningful and predictive a closer connection must be made between
political action and prior expectations or traditions. Relative deprivation must be put back into historical context to make it applicable to political party mobilization.

Hobsbawm's work views the rebellion exhibited in the southern European socialistic movements as attempts by peasants to re-establish some social justice in the period following the intrusion of capitalist relations into their traditional economies. The withdrawal of the Catholic Church from the concerns of social justice, the sale of private property, and the influence of the market economy upset the previous social standards and led to peasant reactions from the anarchism of the Andulusians to the Mafioso of Sicily. Although Hobsbawm has shown how peasants can be "progressive" be acting to restore, rejuvenate, or build a new sense of justice, his writings can be no more than suggestive when analysing industrial societies.

An attempt to give a close historical account of the expectations of workers and the socially derived sense of justice is found in Moore's Injustice. In attempting to account for the source of moral outrage, he traces how the expectations and sense of justice conditioned the timing and ideological direction of revolt. Though Moore does not acknowledge the affinity to Hobsbawm or the theories of relative deprivation, the structure of his thought is quite similar to these theories.

Analyzing the workers in the German Ruhr district between 1848 and 1919, Moore argues that an implicit social
contract became institutionalized through the acceptance of specific work practices. The implicit social contract gained legitimacy through longevity and the continual acceptance of it by all the parties concerned. When the traditional expectations regarding work relations were upset by the removal of state controls over mining practices, by the bureaucratization of mining, and by the introduction of new practices with new mining machinery, the miners organized to re-institute a semblance of the previous social contract. Though Moore's work is similar to Runciman's with the concern for the socially derived sense of justice, Moore improves on relative deprivation theory by giving it a specific historical context, a specific ideological direction, and a connection to the process of institutionalization. To generalize on Moore's approach and to apply it to socialist parties would mean examining the work relations, political arrangements, and the implicit social sense of justice.

Though Moore's research does not lead to any single factor as causative of socialism, it oddly enough seems to confirm or give added weight to several factors outlined above. In a sense, his work gives more credence to the theory that socialism is dependent on a prior feudalism. By analyzing the details of the working class movement in the Ruhr, Moore has shown not only the affinity of conservative-tory and socialist political and social ideas, but he has also shown the mechanism by which these ideas become transmuted: the implicit social contract.
Further investigations of reactions to recent change can most likely further the understanding of socialist political parties if they follow the lead of Hobsbawn and Moore and not the more abstract approaches of the relative deprivation theories. Possible future areas of research include applications to the United States where the lack of feudal institutions of work and politics created a social contract that may be an important factor in the absence of socialism.

Conclusions and Hypotheses

The task of this section is several-fold: to review the conclusions about the seven types of factors seen as related to socialism; to make some general observations about the literature on the rise of socialism, especially as it pertains to the United States; and drawing on the previous two points, to fashion some hypotheses for the investigation of socialism in British Columbia and Washington State.

Several of the major factors discussed above are not likely to add significantly to the understanding of the rise of socialism, especially in North America. Whether because of unwarranted assumptions or contrary data from other studies, the following approaches seem to be of secondary importance and are not likely to be major clues to the fate of socialism: the internal party factors in either the leadership or the ideology and strategy guise; the mobility studies of either the social or geographic type; ethnic and race relations research; and the social structure analyses
derived from the pluralists and radical political economy, whether in the original Marxist formula or in later revisions with the blocking factors of imperialism, high wealth, "false consciousness", or superstructural effects. The evaluation of these factors does not mean that they have no importance, but that they play subordinate and non-crucial roles.

On the other hand, a few areas appear to be more fruitful avenues of investigation. Some of the political institutions offer promise if they are subsumed under a general heading of the fragmentation or centralization of political power and authority. Several of the political factors can be seen as indices of political modernization with greater institutionalization of participation on rationalized, hierarchical lines. On the other hand, a number of political variables (e.g., certain electoral arrangements, machine politics, legal recognition) are less interesting. While several of the cultural factors offer limited research possibilities, the Hartzian "fragment thesis" if tied to an analysis of the social structure and institutions is worth pursuing. Likewise, the general economic factors when put in the context of the social structure's institutions of power and authority might yield significant results. As with the political factors, the economic structure may be amenable to treatment from the point of view of the institutionalization of modern economic structures. Finally, Moore's and Hobsbawm's attempt to
explain reactions to social change and the social sense of justice also appear to be worth investigation as they draw on several of the above variables.

From the above review of the literature, two general observations about the rise of socialism can be made. First, the comparison of American and Canadian material for implications on the origin of socialism is relatively underdeveloped. The only work on this comparison is by Hartz, Horowitz, Schwantes, and Lipset. This lack of studies on the North American "twins" is especially significant for the preceding discussion noted that such a comparison could fruitfully extend the analysis of several of the factors seen as contributing to the rise of socialism. Specifically, the discussion has reinforced the earlier observation that the North Pacific region would be an especially apt comparison. The similarity of the political institutions, of the general economic circumstances, of the social and cultural factors and of the reactions to social change provide interesting possibilities for comparison.

Second, despite the fact that many of the factors have been treated and analyzed in isolation and as monocausal, several of them are open to being pulled together into a few larger factors. At the risk of over-simplifying, one of the underlying themes of the preceding discussion has been the importance of the institutional arrangements of power and authority. Many of the criticisms pointed to the inadequacy of a certain factor's account of institutions. For example, the cultural factors were postulated for the most part in a
void that allowed little connection to the institutions that are each generations "social given." The leadership and ideology issues tended to downplay the institutional arrangements which shaped the leaders and the ideology. On the other hand, many of the factors that appeared to be worth further investigation were concerned with the institutional orders of society (e.g., politics, economics) and how they have changed. This concern for the institutional distribution of power and authority was also present in the cultural and social sense of justice factors; for the most hopeful areas of research for these factors were related to changed institutions or the institutionalization of new power and authority relations. Consequently, the recurrent theme gleaned from this review of the literature is how the social institutions have shaped the political response of labour's increased participation in the modern state and economy so as to either help or hinder socialism.

The two key terms of this conclusion are "modern" and "institutions". The term "modern" refers to a complex of social values, and economic and political institutions. The complex of social values includes equality, entrepreneurialism (though not necessarily private), democracy rational calculation, and achievement. Modern societies have a high division of labour and a high degree of differentiation and specialization of tasks and roles. Economically modern societies are primarily engaged in production for markets (whether free or controlled) and are dominated by machine
industry. Rationalized economic activity tends to increase predictability, control of economic factors (capital, labour, and machinery), planning and the expansion of economic power. Politically modern societies have increased political participation with high-institutionalization of government activity and participation; they also adhere to formal political equality. Rationalized political activity tends to increase predictability, bureaucracy on a merit basis, centralized control of political factors, government planning, and the effectiveness and expansion of political power. As economic modernization tends to rationalize, concentrate control, and expand productive forces, so political modernization tends to rationalize, concentrate, and expand political power. 

The increased institutionalization of modern societies is a key characteristic and goes hand in hand with differentiation and specialization. An institution, as a series of roles organized into a particular pattern of power and authority, constitutes a set of expectations and tasks that recur over a period of time and develops a "life of its own" by shaping, molding, and selecting its personnel and social environment. Some institutions have a relatively low level of specialization and differentiation, like marriage, while other institutions are highly specialized and differentiated, as in modern bureaucracies. Modern societies have institutions of increased size, power, and specialization. Institutions tend to expand into most spheres of life. As rational calculation tends to concentrate and expand economic
and political power, it also means concentrated and expanded power for institutions. Institutionalization is carried forward primarily by the economic and political spheres. Thus, where a few traditional institutions may regulate aspects of life, modern societies have a higher degree and greater elaboration of institutional specialization. Where traditional institutions often rely on customary observance and enforcement of rules and norms, modern institutions often define behavior, rules, and norms rather strictly and in a highly rationalized, articulated fashion.

Modern societies have witnessed a growth in institutional specialization, institutional power, and institutional centralization. Each society, however, has a unique institutional cast in part due to the prior institutional pattern. That is to say, one can view the political, economic, social structural, and cultural factors outlined above as particular manifestations of a more basic pattern of institutionalization that accompanies and is indicative of the modernization of society. In general then one can hypothesize that the fate of socialism is determined by the pattern of institutionalization a society adopts as it becomes modern and that this pattern is a result of social forces acting to change a prior institutional order. Thus the prior institutional order in part determines the pattern of later institutions and determines whether a socialist party will become institutionalized.

The central issue that has surfaced repeatedly in the
political, economic, and social structural factors has been the relative centralization or de-centralization and independence of the various institutions, and the centralism versus de-centralism within these institutional orders. The issue that seems to need investigation for the problem of socialism is the degree of modernization (involving by definition a higher degree of centralization of the institutions) of the prior institutions and the degree of modernization attained in the historic shift from an agrarian to an industrial social order.

By thus uniting several of the factors, one can formulate the hypotheses of this thesis as follows: 1) in industrializing societies a modernized state (rationalized, unified, articulated authority structures) facilitates the institutionalization of a working class party; 2) in industrializing societies, unified social and economic institutions facilitate the establishment of a socialist party; 3) a socialist ideology is accepted and grows in an industrializing society only if an "elective affinity" is established with a pattern of institutional power and practice and selected elements of the "social myth" used to explain the society's structure and operation; 4) in immigrant or "new societies" or frontier societies, the immigrating social fragment's political culture may become significant if an affinity is established with the institutionalized power and ideology. These hypotheses can be
stated in a way that is specific to the case of the North Pacific coast: the failure of a working class party in Washington State was due to the fragmented nature of political and social power and authority which made independent political action inefficient for the realization of the ideal and material interests of labour groups. The opposite was the case in British Columbia.

By posing the hypotheses in the above manner the factors of political institutions, economic structure, social structure, and political culture are brought into a single framework which suggests that centralized, rationalized institutions prior to large scale working class participation allows or facilitates the working class to form broad political and economic organizations to have their grievances met. The greater modernization of the state with its rationalized, extensive power also provides a firm, reliable instrument by which a working class can realize its economic, political and social goals of greater equality. Contrariwise, a dispersed de-centralized pattern of institutions provides no firm, calculable instrument to realize labour's goals because the very weakness and chaos of the institutional structure makes independent political parties inefficient. Consequently, a less modernized society and polity has so many competing authority systems that efficient, rational action demands localized, circumscribed activity. In essence, in a highly institutionalized setting of a modern state and economy, political activity on the part of labour
makes sense because political success means real results, while in a de-centralized system the organizational activity of a working-class party becomes wasted effort due to the fragmentation of economic and political authority. In a de-centralized system, labour action is directed toward the workplace, toward job action, "syndicalism", and bread and butter issues because the authority structure is so haphazard and diffuse that centrally mandated changes are almost impossible. A situation as one just described should lead to militant job-oriented unions. When central institutions are strong, it is a more reasonable and likely course of action to attempt to capture the institutions. But in weakly institutionalized societies, capture of the main centres of authority is impossible or pointless. To be effective in such a situation the main centres of power would require large-scale centralization of authority which is beyond the capability of unions and a working class party.

The formulation of the hypotheses on ideology and cultural factors connects these factors to the changing institutional order and hopefully avoids the static character or the other formulations of the "ideal" factors influence on socialism. By emphasizing the reciprocal, dynamic nature of the ideal and material factors, the hypotheses point to how a social tradition and sense of justice is used to change the society by a selective retention of old elements that work and are still relevant and the addition of new elements that fit into the old ones and work. In essence, a socialist
ideology will take root only if the institutional arrangements correspond to some of the ideology's key elements. In regard to socialism, the key ideological element that appears to correspond to the element of modern society is the collective, organized, and relatively unified institutions. A de-centralized authority structure "resists" socialist ideas because the latter's collectivism does not "make sense" of the atomised institutions and thus does not help the believers in socialism to advance their cause.

**Research Strategy**

As the discussion of modernization sought to point out modern societies have increased specialization of task and institution coupled with a higher participation. The modernization process tends to increase the power and impact of the institutions such that a process of centralization occurs within each institutional order. In economic terms this means the consolidation, strengthening, and rationalization of corporations, unions, money systems, negotiations processes, etc. In political terms it means increased political participation, the consolidation, rationalization, and expansion of political power and institutions so that a more rationalized, hierarchical and powerful central polity takes shape. This also means that the government becomes more active, more wide-reaching in its attempt to regulate the other institutions in accordance with its role as "supreme authority" institution. In addition to these changed institutional patterns come a
change in the social forces as part of a response to social change. This investigation must also look at how these social forces created by institutional change reacted with the institutional distribution of power to either become part of the new institutional order or die.

In brief, the data to operationalize the hypotheses consist of information on the economic and political institutions and the changes over the period 1900-1960; also, information on the movements, parties, and groups that attempted to mobilize support to influence or gain power and authority in the various institutions.

The data on changes in economic and social factors is divided as follows: occupational distribution, major economic sectors and size, size of economic institutions, urbanization, and occupational communities. These data were drawn from a number of sources including census reports, government documents, economic histories, and sundry economic and sociological analyses.

The data on changes in political institutions can be divided into the following areas: constitutional distribution of authority, electoral institutions, parties and interest groups, judicial power, dynamics of federalism, political institutions of the economy, and the influence of external institutions. This information comes from political studies of parties, parliamentary and presidential systems, and Canadian and American government.

The last major area of research is devoted to an
examination of the social movements, parties and unions as they tried to realize socialist goals. This part of the research will necessitate an overview of the various social movements, their lifecycle, their tactics, their strategies, and their aims as they changed over time. This section will examine union strength, the structure of the union movement, and political parties strength. More importantly, this area of research will examine the socialist parties, groups, and unions' actions to redress their felt grievances to note how they were influenced by the institutional environment and how they were able to influence it. Thus this section calls for relying on previous analyses of these movements, unions and parties.
FOOTNOTES


4 The qualification of election does not presuppose Western democracy for the definition does not distinguish between free and unfree elections.

5 Sartori, Political Parties, p. 121.

6 These categories are by no means the only ones possible and they are only intended as aids to ordering material that would otherwise be unmanageable. In addition the categories are by no means mutually exclusive. As will become evident later, several of the theories are fairly close to one another, although they may place an emphasis on different factors.


9 . . . permanent minority parties tend towards opposition. Expressing an opinion which is, they feel, not that of the nation and which has little support, they are led into an attitude of protestation and intransigence by the same psychological mechanism which leads an inferiority complex to show itself in aggressiveness. The absence of
responsibilities for government and of a reasonable chance of ever assuming them removes furthermore any check of their opposition tendency. They are demagogic by nature, the most demagogic of all parties. When they are supported by a homogeneous and solid fraction of the population -- a geographical or religious minority -- the tendency is even more emphasized, for outbidding and violence are ways of separating from the national community, of keeping their individuality and their heterodoxy unsullied." M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963) p. 294.

10 Lenin, What is to be Done? (London: Lawerence Wishart, 1906).


12 Sombart, interestingly enough, realized that equal participation in frontier settlement was a false assumption, but nonetheless claimed that "the mere knowledge that (the immigrant) could become a free farmer at any time could not but make the American worker feel secure and content." W. Sombart, Why is There no Socialism in the United States? (London: MacMillan Press, Inc., 1976) p. 64.


14 Ibid.

15 R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, Social Mobility in Industrial Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964)


17 See the exchange between Lipset and Thernstrom in op. cit. Laslett and Lipset, Failure of a Dream? pp. 509-553.


20. For a recent statement of this general position see Davis, "Why the US Working Class is Different" New Left Review, 1981, pp. 3-45.


22. In 1900/01 B.C. 83.3%, Wash. 84.9%; 1910/11, B.C. 80.8%, Wash. 84.4%; 1920/21, 86.8%, 86.0%; 1930/31, 85.8%, 89.4%; 1940/41 88.9%, 92.0%; 1950/51, 91.0%, 94.7%; 1960/61, 88.6%, 96.1% R.L. Rosenberg, "Origins of the People of Washington and British Columbia: Comparative Study of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Groups, 1870-1961" Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Washington, 1964.


31 M. Karson, "Catholic Anti-Socialism," in Ibid., pp. 164-84.


38 N.W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) especially chapters 5, 6, 7.


40 The political economy tradition can be divided into a liberal wing and a radical wing. Both wings centre their analysis on the economic structure of society as being of the most importance in understanding a society and history. The difference lies in the radical political economy tradition adopting Marx's philosophy of history that sees class struggle as the motor of history and his critical assessment of capitalism. The liberal political economy tradition derives more directly from Adam Smith and does not share the critical perspective on capitalism.


Ibid. p. 323.

Ibid. p. 329.


Sombart, Section Two.


Sombart, Table 2, p.64.


57 Epstein, p. 35.


59 Ibid.


63 Sombart, p. 38.

64 Duverger, passim.


66 Epstein, p. 39.

67 Duverger, p. 323.


70 Sombart, p. 70.

71 J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Nation and State Building in America: Comparative and Historical Perspectives (Boston: 1971).

72 Epstein, pp. 27-28.

73 Sombart, p. 38.

74 Moore, Injustice Chapter 8; for other analyses of revolutionary situations as being connected to "state crises" see B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).


79 For a discussion of the various modern uses of the term democracy see C.B. MacPherson The Real World of Democracy (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1955).


CHAPTER THREE

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON STATE

The impact of economic variables is one of the oldest explanations for the absence of socialism in the United States. As noted in the last chapter, many of the economic factors used to explain the "no socialism" problem are less than adequate to the task. Investigations of the role of imperialism, "class conflict," and relative wealth are most likely dead-ends for research of this problem. Other economic variables, however, hold more promise. As part of the understanding of how power and authority are distributed, research on economic structure may facilitate the pursuit of an answer to the "no socialism" problem.

In particular, several aspects of economic structure have been considered relevant to "left-voting" and labour conflict. Jamieson, following the logic of Kerr and Siegel, noted that British Columbia has historically had a high percentage of conflict-prone occupations. Lipset has also offered several occupational and economic correlates of "left-voting:" large plant size, greater urbanization, high levels of blue-collar occupations, high levels of lower-skilled workers, and occupations with insecure incomes (including single-crop commercial farmers and fishermen). Robin has attributed British Columbia's polarized politics to...
the lack of middle-classes, stemming from the resource-orientation and corporate domination of the province's industrial structure. 3

Did the long-term trends of the economic structure in British Columbia and Washington State as indicated by the just cited variables differ sufficiently to account for the entrenchment of a socialist party in the province but not in the state? As the data presented in this chapter make clear, the economic structure of British Columbia and Washington State for most of the 1900 to 1961 period was remarkably similar. The similarity was so striking that the hypothesis connecting a modernized economic structure and institutions with socialist success should be rejected. The economic variables, either individually or collectively, cannot be viewed as the cause of the political differences in the North Pacific region, however much the economic variables may have contributed to the initial rise of the socialist movements. By implication, the fate of socialism in North America was not ultimately determined by the economic structure.

This chapter is organized into two major sections. By examining the secular trends in occupations in British Columbia and Washington State, the first section permits an examination of the connection of occupational groups with the establishment of a labour party. The second half of this chapter discusses the industrial structure: leading manufacturing industries and their relative sizes, number of employees per establishment, urbanization, and the location of occupations. These data address the influence of urban
life, size and type of industry, and skill level of workers, and the incidence of "occupational communities."

**Occupational Structure of the North Pacific Region, 1900-61**

The purpose of an analysis of occupational structure is to chart the trends in the various occupational categories to see if the occupational distributions are related to political movements and party support. If the hypothesis on economic structure is correct, there should be a correlation of "left" occupations with the institutionalization of a labour party.

To this end the census data for British Columbia and Washington State were secured and re-worked to provide a rough continuity between the Canadian and United States data and between each country's decennial census periods. Before presenting the data a short discussion on the rationale and methods employed in this reconstitution of census data is in order.

**Note on Census Statistics and Method**

Comparison of the census material on occupations for Canada and the United States presents a number of problems. First, the definitions of key concepts, such as "gainfully employed" and "labour force", are not necessarily the same in the two countries or even between census periods. The later concept, which is slightly more specific in that it asks for actual work performed, was adopted by both countries in the middle of the period under study here. Similarly, the month of the census has not been uniform for either the Canadian or
United States census. Because of this variation in the timing of the census, the number of seasonally employed, such as farm labourers, may be under-represented. Since there is not a method of correcting for these two types of factors, a margin of error is built into any comparisons made either between Canadian and United States data or even between census years in the same country. Nonetheless, the amount of variation that these type of differences introduces is probably not sufficient to preclude a rough comparison.

A third problem of comparison concerns the occupational categories themselves. For example, is a Canadian "professional" the same as an American "professional"?; and are they the same in every census period? The major occupational categories have varied widely between Canada and the United States and from census year to census year. Both the changes in record keeping and the rise of new occupations have made comparisons of these broad categories difficult. Additionally, the broad occupational categories such as, "mining", or "manufacturing" have often included within the same group people of much different objective and subjective circumstances. Often owners, managers, and foremen were included in occupational groups with wage earners who did not share the former's social position based on ownership, control, and supervision.

Fortunately, the censuses of both countries contain detailed occupational listings for the major occupational groups, which provides a way to mitigate this set of problems. A system of major occupational categories more appropriate to this study was constructed by de-composing the original major
occupational groups and re-assigning the detailed occupations to the new major categories. For example, the occupation of "shipping clerk" was originally categorized by the various census data as either "trade", "transportation," or "clerical." The system adopted here categorizes "shipping clerks" consistently as "transportation-clerks." This system increased the consistency and the comparability of the census data over both time and between the British Columbia and Washington State data.

Several principles were used in constructing the new major occupational categories. Since studies have indicated that owners, proprietors, managers, supervisors, and foremen often share roughly similar objective and subjective circumstances vis-a-vis manual and white collar workers, an effort was made to differentiate where possible these authority groups from the manual and white collar groups. In some cases it was not possible to separate workers from those in positions of authority. For example, in the category "trade" the detailed group "salesmen" or salesclerk" could be lowly store clerks or fairly independent sales people more likely to share the circumstances and outlook of managers. Because this group could not be broken down further they were grouped together. In this particular case the problem of following the method of categorization did not seriously compromise the outcome of this research because during the period of this study store clerks tended to identify less with labour unions than with management.

In addition to building categories based on authority,
certain occupational groups reputed to be prone to militant unions and left-voting were isolated where possible. Thus, in the "transportation" category sub-groups were established to separate the clerical, managerial, and manual positions from the longshoremen and sailors.

Of course this re-constitution of the detailed occupational groups does not eliminate all the problems of comparisons. Remaining is the problem of the exact definition of the detailed occupation. Nonetheless, the procedure followed here provides a rough continuity that is probably only affected by such definitional discrepancies in a minor way. Other remaining problems stem from incomplete information being provided to the census takers and from the short-term economic trends which may affect one occupation more than others.

Considering all these sources of errors, it is best to treat the occupational data introduced below with a measure of caution. To interpret even a full percentage point as real would probably be an injustice. Two observations should be kept in mind: first, the data not built on an exact comparability but only a rough comparability of categories; second, the overall trends are probably more important than minor, short term differences.

Agricultural Occupations

Much of the impetus of settlement in the North Pacific Region came from the desire to exploit the resources of fur, timber, fish, and minerals. The North Pacific region, like
much of the American west, developed primarily as an industrial frontier and not as an agricultural frontier.\(^5\)

As the data in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 indicate, the relative under-development in British Columbia and Washington State of agriculture was characteristic from the early period of the turn of the century to the 1960's. The proportion of the work force classified as either farmers or farm labourers never exceeded 25%. For the whole United States agricultural employment in 1900 stood at over 41%, dipped 24.8% in 1930, and 8.4% in 1960; the Canadian figures were similar.\(^6\) A comparison of the Washington State and British Columbia trends indicates only one period of large difference in agricultural occupations.

The period prior to World War One saw a relatively greater development of the agricultural sector in Washington State with the 1900/01 figures indicating nearly twice as large an agricultural sector in the state as in the province (23.2% compared to 12.6%). After the opening of the century Washington State's agricultural sector slowly declined in size.

The British Columbia farming sector reached its zenith after World War One. This later peaking of the agricultural sector was probably due to the generally later opening up and integration of the province (vis a vis Washington State) through the completion of railroads, continued high levels of immigration and the later extension of farming to the interior areas. The agricultural boom of the World War One period was soon slowed by the agricultural limitations of the province.
and by the general economic forces that have affected modern agriculture.

Thus, after the expansion of British Columbia's agricultural sector during the World War One period, the trends in farming for the region as a whole are highly similar. The data indicate a marginally larger farming sector in Washington State, though the differences never exceeded 2.5% and are probably of little consequence.

The trends for the sub-categories of farmers and farm labourer do not seem to significantly countermand this generalization.

One important difference between the agricultural sectors of British Columbia and Washington State was the type of farming. Western Washington's farming was of a diversified type as was most of British Columbia's farming. Depending on the climatic conditions, these farm regions were engaged in dairy farming, vegetable and berry farming, and orchard farming. In contrast to these areas, eastern Washington State tended to be single-crop farms growing wheat. Wheat has been a major crop of Washington State for the whole of the period under consideration here. For the period 1910 to 1939, wheat acreage averaged above 2 million acres on not less than 12,000 farms.

Other Primary Occupations

Turning to the other primary sector occupations of fishing, forestry, and mining, one finds a similarity of trends in British Columbia and Washington State, but with
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td>10,186</td>
<td>26,908</td>
<td>28,821</td>
<td>34,762</td>
<td>21,448</td>
<td>15,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Labourers</td>
<td>6,734</td>
<td>3,663</td>
<td>8,213</td>
<td>17,817</td>
<td>16,791</td>
<td>6,922</td>
<td>8,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>3,992</td>
<td>4,412</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>7,306</td>
<td>5,047</td>
<td>4,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Workers</td>
<td>2,613</td>
<td>11,280</td>
<td>11,970</td>
<td>13,292</td>
<td>16,049</td>
<td>11,038</td>
<td>11,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Officials</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td>3,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners</td>
<td>14,003</td>
<td>17,383</td>
<td>10,490</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>10,413</td>
<td>8,396</td>
<td>4,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Officials</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing &amp; Construction Officials</td>
<td>3,267</td>
<td>7,369</td>
<td>3,251</td>
<td>4,452</td>
<td>12,426</td>
<td>17,876</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing &amp; Construction Workers</td>
<td>17,324</td>
<td>58,307</td>
<td>43,730</td>
<td>39,440</td>
<td>74,844</td>
<td>108,671</td>
<td>136,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longshore, seamen</td>
<td>(3,700)</td>
<td>(1,993)</td>
<td>(3,768)</td>
<td>(2,704)</td>
<td>(3,174)</td>
<td>(4,260)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Clerks</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>4,944</td>
<td>4,944</td>
<td>10,214</td>
<td>9,439</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans. Foremen</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>4,698</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>7,572</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Trans. but clerks and foremen</td>
<td>5,407</td>
<td>27,976</td>
<td>45,882</td>
<td>23,908</td>
<td>20,089</td>
<td>34,228</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade—clerks</td>
<td>3,868</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade—labourers</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade—other</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade—all but above</td>
<td>8,098</td>
<td>17,911</td>
<td>23,443</td>
<td>32,046</td>
<td>32,854</td>
<td>56,036</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>6,329</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>4,323</td>
<td>9,513</td>
<td>11,806</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>7,016</td>
<td>14,036</td>
<td>18,833</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>64,994</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and Service</td>
<td>10,323</td>
<td>13,787</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>31,700</td>
<td>37,485</td>
<td>64,432</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>2,634</td>
<td>7,077</td>
<td>19,281</td>
<td>22,820</td>
<td>71,501</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.O.S.</td>
<td>8,003</td>
<td>7,578</td>
<td>9,028</td>
<td>22,062</td>
<td>26,062</td>
<td>32,055</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on recomputations of Census of Canada 1911, Table v: 1921, Table 6: 1931, Table 44: 1941, Table 13: 1951, Table 4: 1961, Table 4: 1961, Table 2

1See definition for specifics of each occupation in appendix A.

21901 data based on Table 2 in 1951 Canada Census; detailed information is not available. Figures for transportation, trade, and professions are estimates.

3Apparently includes unpaid family members and other farm labourers.

4Includes enumeration of Indians on reserves.

5Includes an estimate of labourers in manufacturing. The estimate is probably conservative considering the high level of unallocated labourers. Most of these labourers are probably connected with either construction or manufacturing.

6labourers.

7N.O.S. is a residual category though for most years it is predominately constituted by unallocated labourers. The 1951 and 1961 figures also include military personnel for 28.

8Not otherwise specified.
Table 2  Occupations of the Washington State Work Force 1900-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manufacturing and Construction Official</th>
<th>Manufacturing and Construction Official</th>
<th>Longshore, seamen</th>
<th>Transportation Clerks</th>
<th>Trans. Foremen</th>
<th>All Trans. except clerks and foremen</th>
<th>Trade-clerks</th>
<th>Trade-labourers</th>
<th>Trade-all except above</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Domestic and Service</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>N.O.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>255,387 20.5</td>
<td>251,701 20.3</td>
<td>81,541 27.3</td>
<td>81,294 24.3</td>
<td>189,901 29.0</td>
<td>172,909 26.0</td>
<td>139,756 23.5</td>
<td>211,145 25.1</td>
<td>230,407 26.0</td>
<td>11.466 6.1</td>
<td>20,500 8.8</td>
<td>18,429 9.8</td>
<td>6,823 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>40,856 18.1</td>
<td>87,344 12.9</td>
<td>71,345 12.3</td>
<td>69,803 10.5</td>
<td>56,817 9.6</td>
<td>53,138 6.3</td>
<td>33,283 3.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,939 0.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>11,516 15.1</td>
<td>30,654 5.9</td>
<td>27,750 4.8</td>
<td>24,474 5.2</td>
<td>24,118 4.1</td>
<td>22,028 2.6</td>
<td>23,884 2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>3,325 1.4</td>
<td>3,711 0.7</td>
<td>6,911 0.8</td>
<td>5,559 0.6</td>
<td>3,570 0.6</td>
<td>4,188 0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>11,890 3.7</td>
<td>21,368 4.1</td>
<td>23,201 4.1</td>
<td>24,232 3.6</td>
<td>17,392 2.9</td>
<td>14,084 1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>11,855 5.3</td>
<td>10,705 2.1</td>
<td>8,423 1.6</td>
<td>5,199 0.7</td>
<td>5,401 0.7</td>
<td>2,132 0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>740 0.3</td>
<td>688 0.1</td>
<td>598 0.1</td>
<td>522 0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,118 0.9</td>
<td>12,353 2.4</td>
<td>17,636 3.1</td>
<td>13,742 2.1</td>
<td>13,869 2.3</td>
<td>22,901 2.7</td>
<td>26,999 2.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>21,903 8.1</td>
<td>50,949 18.8</td>
<td>41,285 7.1</td>
<td>40,831 6.9</td>
<td>57,537 6.8</td>
<td>65,386 6.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>10,831 10.3</td>
<td>1,018 0.9</td>
<td>1,173 0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,145 0.4</td>
<td>2,582 0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1See definitions for specifics of each occupational category in appendix

Source: Based on re-computations of U.S. Census of Population, 1900, Table 91; 1910, Table II; 1920, Table 1; 1930, Table 4; 1950, Table 74; 1970, Table 170

N.O.S. -- not otherwise specified
Figure 1
Agricultural Occupations

- Washington
- British Columbia

-- All agricultural
--- Farmers

% of work force

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
small differences that gave British Columbia a larger proportion of these primary occupations over the whole period 1900-1961.

Fishing occupations follow the same general trend (Fig. 2) of slow decline on both sides of the 49th parallel. The proportion of Washington State's fishermen was generally though marginally lower than the province's throughout the period. Fishing occupations just managed to keep pace with the overall growth in the economy (with slightly under 1% of the work force) until World War Two. Fishermen in British Columbia started out the century as a slightly larger proportion and end up the period as a larger proportion, but they were usually within one and a half percentage points of their Washington State counterparts. 8

The North Pacific region experienced a major expansion of forestry in the first decade of this century with Washington State leading slightly in 1900/01 (3.7% to 3.2%) and British Columbia slightly in 1910/11 (5.5% to 4.1%). For the next thirty years the distribution of forestry occupations was fairly constant and roughly even between the province and the state. World War Two appeared to be a turning point in each area with the relative decline of these jobs. Washington State's forestry sector declined more rapidly than did the British Columbia sector.

Though the data indicate differences between the state and the province, it must be borne in mind that the contrast is very subtle. For the turn of the century period the
differences were 1% out of 4% while the 1960 figures were 1% out of 2%. The middle period was as close or closer. Thus the differences in forestry occupations were marginal and probably of little importance.

In mining occupations the differences between British Columbia and Washington State were more pronounced. At the turn of the century the North Pacific region was in many areas a mining frontier. Vancouver Island and the Cascade mountains in Washington State were coal-mining districts. Another major mining district included eastern Washington State, northern Idaho, western Montana, and the southern interior of British Columbia; it was dubbed the Inland Empire.

On the American side, mining developed and peaked earlier than in British Columbia, which seemed to follow by 5 to 10 years the American mining developments. Washington State (and for that matter the whole American portion of the Inland Empire) experienced an occupational contraction of mining in the first two decades of this century. The proportion in mining occupations was halved in Washington State by 1910 and further decreases came later. British Columbia also exhibited this general pattern with sharp contractions in the mining sector in the first two decades of this century. The mining sector plummeted to around one-third of the 1901 level by 1921, with a 4.8% of the workforce in mining occupations at the latter date. After World War One both Washington State and British Columbia experienced a further decline in the mining sector, but the decline was more gradual.
The relatively larger proportion of British Columbia's work force engaged in mining over the whole of the 1900-61 period is partly an artifact of the comparative framework adopted in this thesis. A more appropriate, but methodologically very difficult, comparison would supplement the Washington State data with data from the rest of the American portion of the Inland Empire. The British Columbia data necessarily include the interior mining districts, while the corresponding American mining districts are primarily located in northern Idaho and western Montana. State-wide data for Idaho and Montana indicate that the American Northwest and British Columbia were comparable in the proportion of mining occupations.

At the turn of the century Idaho had proportionally 2 to 3 times the number of miners as Washington State, while Montana had 4 to 5 times the Washington proportion. When Washington State, Idaho and Montana were treated as one the proportion employed in mining were as follows: 1900, 9.3%; 1910, 4.5%; 1920, 3.2%; 1930, 2.5%; 1940, 2.5%; 1950, 1.3%.

In conclusion, mining was a slightly larger proportion of British Columbia's work force over the whole period 1900 to 1961. Nonetheless, because of the small percentage of the work force for most of the period (1% to 4%) and the slightly artificial nature of the Washington State data, one should not make too much of the real though small difference. In terms of the mining sector's overall place in the economy the province and the state are similar though British Columbia
Figure 3

Mining Occupations

- Washington
- British Columbia
had a stronger accent on mining.

Manufacturing Occupations

The occupational trends for manufacturing and construction are a little more complicated than the trends in the primary sector. In general British Columbia's and Washington State's manufacturing and construction sector during the period of this study hovered in the middle of the twenty percentage range. (See figure 4)

The Washington State data indicate the quick blossoming of manufacturing industry with fully 27.3% of the work force in this sector in 1900. After a pre-World War One decline, the 1920 figures indicate a return to the 1900 level, probably due to war-time spending. Subsequent years saw a slow decline in manufacturing and construction occupations, except for a temporary small reversal in the 1950 census which was probably due again to war-related spending.

The data for British Columbia are a little more complicated. On first glance the figures in Table 1 and Figure 4 seem to indicate a highly volatile manufacturing and construction sector; in addition the data suggest a lower level in this secondary sector especially in the 1901 period and in the 1920-1940 period. However, both the major fluctuations and the low percentage recorded for these occupations are primarily a consequence of the method of census information collection and recording. The United States census allocated labourers to the general occupational category in which they worked. On the other hand, the Canadian
Figure 4

Manufacturing and Construction Occupations

- Washington Manufacturing and Construction
- British Columbia Manufacturing and Construction
- Washington Manufacturing and Construction Labourers
- British Columbia Manufacturing and Construction Labourers
census placed all labourers, other than those connected to the primary sector, in a residual category. Most of these unallocated labourers were probably in the manufacturing and construction sector. In several of the census years some compensation was attempted for this missing labourer group, but the procedure was probably inadequate. Consequently, most of the unallocated labourer group should probably be attached to the manufacturing and construction sector. The consequence of attaching the unallocated labourers to the manufacturing and construction sector is to reduce the gap separating the British Columbia and Washington State levels by 4% to 7%.

If the line of reasoning outlined in the above paragraph is correct then the manufacturing and construction sector of British Columbia has been fairly similar to Washington State over almost the whole period under consideration. Washington State had a slight edge on the province in these type of occupations, especially during the 1920 through 1940 period, but the occupational data that is available does not indicate a significantly lower level of secondary sector development for British Columbia.

Unlike mining and forestry, manufacturing and construction can be conducted under highly different circumstances and conditions. The second half of this chapter will discuss in more detail the industrial structure of the region by presenting data on the leading manufacturing industries and plant size.
Transportation Occupations

One of the most analogous occupational sectors was the transportation sector. With the exception of the aberrant year 1911, the largest difference between Washington State and British Columbia's manual transportation workers was 1.1%. The 1911 census data for British Columbia appears temporarily inflated due to major railway construction. Overall, the transportation sector appeared to be highly stable with 7-8% of the workforce engaged in these occupations once the transportation network was established.

Trade Occupations

The sixty year trends in the trade occupations (i.e., commercial and financial occupations) indicate a slightly upward trend. (See Figure 5) The figures indicate a rough comparability of this sector's growth for Washington State and British Columbia up to the 1920's. Then in the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's Washington State's trade sector continued its growth to the 14% mark, while British Columbia's comparable sector levelled off until after World War Two. The closing of the small gap that developed in trade occupations occurred in the 1950's.

The overall upward trends in trade occupations were congruent with the growing national importance of the commerce and finance sectors. Much of the growth was probably due to the increasing number of white-collar workers especially store and bank clerks. The slight upward trend is also evidence of the continued role of the small businessman and
Figure 5
Professional and Trade Occupations

- Washington
- British Columbia

% of work force

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
of the middleman occupations of wholesale and retail trade.

The differential growth of the trade sector may in part indicate that two different economic processes were slightly more advanced in Washington State than in British Columbia. First, the slightly higher level of trade occupations for most of the period under consideration may be a reflection of the often commented upon middle-class nature of the United States. The small degree of difference for these trade occupations for the 1900-1921 period and later in the 1950's, however, tends to indicate that the small differences are not due to a greater development of this part of the middle-class in the United States. The second and more likely possibility is that the differences indicate an earlier and more sustained economic modernization in this sector in Washington State than in British Columbia.

Whatever the reasons for the differences in trade occupations, one should be cautious in interpreting this data. At most the differences between the state and the province were less than 4% of the overall work force and it averaged 2.2% for the 1910-1951 period. As with the data presented above on the primary sector occupations, the differences on the two sides of the 49th parallel seem to be of "hue" or "touch" as opposed to large and meaningful differences that much can be attributed to.

Professional Occupations

The slightly higher level of trade occupations noted for Washington State for certain decades is repeated when one
examines the professional occupations. Up to 1931, the British Columbia and Washington State trends for these occupations are often similar, though Washington State exhibits a greater expansion of the professions. (See Figure 5) After 1930, Washington State's professions continued to grow, while British Columbia's did not rise appreciably until the 1950's. Even by the end of the period under consideration, there is still a gap between the state and the province in these occupations.

Like the observations expressed above on the trade occupations, the higher level of professions in the work force in Washington State may be evidence of the more middle-class nature of the United States and/or of the more "modernized economy" that required a more highly skilled and trained work force. Of the two occupational sectors, trade and the professions, the latter's advantage in Washington State appeared more permanent and prominent than the former's short term advantage over the comparable occupations in British Columbia. If one were to attempt to pin an occupational group to the "more middle-class" thesis one would have to say that from the Washington State data the professional groups were largely responsible for this observation.

Public Service Occupations

The data on public service occupations indicate that little if any difference existed between British Columbia and Washington State. This data does not necessarily indicate the small role of the government in the institutionalization of a
labour party. First, the data on public sector occupations do not indicate the actual size of government for many employees, such as clerks, are included under other categories. Second, and most importantly, these figures on government occupations say nothing of the policies adopted by government. The next chapter discusses the role of government policy.

Clerical and Service Occupations

The overall development of the clerical and service occupations in the North Pacific region in the 1900-1961 period exhibit a strong similarity for the province and the state (see figure 7).

The domestic and service sector of occupations in turn-of-the century British Columbia was relatively large, employing nearly one out of eight workers. The high volatility noted for some other occupational groups in pre-World War One British Columbia was also characteristic of the service sector. Washington State's service occupations did not experience the volatility of its northern neighbor (or perhaps it experienced it before 1900). British Columbia from 1911 and Washington State from 1900 experienced a slow and slight expansion of service occupations through the 1950's. The only alteration of this pattern was a small contraction after World War Two that was more than made up in the 1950's expansion of these occupations.

For the whole period under consideration, the sizes of the service occupations in the region were for all intents and purposes of this thesis identical. Even the small difference of 3.8% at the turn of the century is negligible for many of the service occupations were filled by politically-disenfran-
Figure 7
Clerical and Service Occupations

Washington Clerical
British Columbia Clerical
Washington Service
British Columbia Service

% of work force

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
chised and socially-ostracized Chinese.

The trends in clerical occupations also indicate a general similarity in growth. The trend lines are not as close as the service occupations, but the differences do not strike one as very important or as indicative of major dissimilarities. Washington State and British Columbia started the century with comparable levels of clerical occupations, 3.8% and 3.4% respectively. Both the province and the state experienced a slow expansion of clerical occupations up until World War Two. Washington State's economy, perhaps due to earlier modernization and rationalization of economic enterprises, had a slightly earlier growth than did British Columbia. The difference, however, is of slight consequence for the largest gap was 2.1% and during the crucial decades of the thirties, forties and fifties it was narrowing or non-existent. By World War Two the level of clerical occupations was virtually identical; after the war both economies saw a sharp expansion of the clerical sector. Once again the World War Two period seemed to be a major turning point for the economies of the region.

The virtual identity of trends in these two sectors is reinforced when the clerical and service occupations are combined and compared between Washington State and British Columbia. The largest difference for these combined figures existed at the turn of the century with 16.1% for British Columbia and 12.7% for Washington State. By 1910/11 the difference narrowed with 15.5% for the state and 12.6% for the province. Thereafter the differences were less than 1.2% sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other side.
The Major Occupations: A Summary

The above outline of the major occupational sectors needs little by way of summary. For many occupational groups the differences between Washington State and British Columbia were not sustained differences and where there were differences they were small differences. On the whole the differences in occupations between Washington State and British Columbia were largest in the pre-World War One period. After that date, the state and the province became remarkably similar in almost every occupation. The most noticeable (though small difference) was in British Columbia having a slightly larger percentage in the non-farm primary occupations while Washington had a touch more in the white-collar occupations.

The similar occupational structure of Washington and British Columbia should have established similar social forces. There appears to be no great dissimilarity of the various occupations that might have contributed to the establishment of a labour party in British Columbia and the lack of one in Washington State. If an observer had only the occupational data presented above, he would be hard pressed to indicate a reason for British Columbia's socialist party tradition and Washington State's different method of politically incorporating its working class.

Blue-collar and Middle-class Occupations

A long tradition of political and sociological analysis has connected socio-economic groups with specific tendencies. The less-privileged, the poorer, and the less powerful have
been associated with liberalizing political trends while larger property owners, management, commerce and other "middle-classes" are usually associated with status-quo or even reactionary political programs. This dichotomy is often seen as a split between the blue-collar group and the middle-class group.

It was noted in the discussion above that several of the blue-collar occupations in British Columbia had a slightly higher percentage of the work force than their counterparts in Washington State. It was suggested that the differences with Washington State were negligible. The implication of this similarity of occupational groups was that the difference was not large enough to provide for different political outcomes. The obvious question is that though the occupations individually do not appear appreciably different perhaps by aggregating the occupations into blue-collar versus middle-class occupations some vital differences can be seen.

Figure 8 indicates the trends for an aggregation of the blue-collar groups -- fishing, mining, forestry, manufacturing, and transportation -- and the middle-class groups -- farmers, management, trade, and professional. The trends for Washington indicate a wide gap between the blue-collar and the middle-class occupations at 1900 slowly narrowed so that by 1940 the two groups were of approximately equal strength. This rough balance in Washington State continued until the end of the period of this study despite a gradual decline in importance for both groups. It should
Figure 8
Blue-collar and Middle-class Occupations

% of work force

- Washington Middle-class
- British Columbia Middle-class
- Washington Blue-collar
- British Columbia Blue-collar

Year:
- 1900
- 1910
- 1920
- 1930
- 1940
- 1950
- 1960
be kept in mind that part of the farm group in Washington State was engaged in wheat-farming, an occupation known for its economic insecurity and left-voting. Consequently, the level of the middle-class group must be reduced by several percentage points. This special proviso is especially necessary since the Populist and Progressive parties achieved limited followings in Washington State.

The trends for British Columbia indicate a longer continuance of a wide gap between the blue-collar and the middle-class occupations. After a significant narrowing of the gap after World War One, the blue-collar versus middle-class difference grew to the 10%-12% range until the gap began to narrow after World War Two. At the time of Washington State's narrowing of the blue-collar/middle-class gap in British Columbia the gap was growing.

The trend lines further indicate that the blue-collar group in the region experienced roughly similar trends in Washington State and British Columbia moving from the 45% and above range in 1900, to the 30-35% range in 1960. Through the 30's, 40's and 50's British Columbia's blue-collar occupations retained a higher level of the work force than in Washington State. The difference in this period is less than 5.5% of the work force.

The middle-class occupations in British Columbia showed more volatility than in Washington State and a generally lower and later date of expansion. The differences in the middle-class group was greatest in the 1930-51 period with 5%, 8.5%
and 4.8% differences between British Columbia and Washington State.

What conclusions can be drawn from these aggregated occupational trends? First, the tendency to seize on Washington State's relatively equal post-1940 period while British Columbia continued with a 10%-12% gap between blue collar and middle-class groups should be resisted. Such an interpretation relies on the homogeneity of the occupational groups which in fact is not realistic. The lack of homogeneity for the farming group was noted above; and others have noted the political differences within professional groups.12

Figure 8 indicates a slightly stronger blue-collar sector in British Columbia. However, the moderate percentage difference with this group in Washington State seems hardly strong enough to warrant the rise of a labour party. The weakness of British Columbia's middle-class occupations is a rather interesting finding of this study. If the blue-collar and middle-class gap in British Columbia is taken very seriously it should indicate much more support for a labour party than for middle-class parties. Though the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation was first elected to the provincial legislature in the 1930's, the surprising fact in light of these statistics is the dominance and strength of the old-line parties in British Columbia in the 1930's and 1940's.

The occupational differences between the state and the province do indicate a larger blue-collar sector in British Columbia and a lower level of middle-class occupations; Washington State's occupations were more evenly split. The
crucial question of these undoubted differences between the province and the state is are they of sufficient magnitude to be a major factor in the institutionalization of a labour party? It is the conclusion of this researcher that the differences indicate a condition facilitating the easier emergence of a socialist party in British Columbia; but the size of the blue-collar group does not appear to be of a sufficiently greater magnitude than Washington State's to warrant a judgment of more than a weak contributing or facilitating factor.

This conclusion is necessary for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned earlier the occupational data are not completely accurate or comparable. The aggregating of occupational groups tends to magnify the errors inherent in the data. Second, the connection of occupation to politics is not direct nor necessarily very strong. Third, the use of the aggregations "blue-collar" and "middle-class" tends to over-emphasize the reliability and homogeneity of these categories. The census data could not be reconstructed in such a way as to highlight special sub-groups as highly skilled blue-collar workers, sales clerks, or less-skilled and semi-professionals, all of which may or may not share the circumstances, outlook, and political behavior of the group to which they have been aggregated. Fourth, the data for Washington State are slightly artificial since they do not reflect the occupational distribution of the Idaho and Montana portions of the Inland Empire. As was mentioned above, these areas correspond to the southern interior of British
Columbia. Both sides of the border in this interior mountain region had high levels of blue-collar occupations, especially mining at an early date and smelting and forestry at later dates.

Figure 8 helps one understand the social basis of the "class-conflict" pre-World War One British Columbia. The size of the blue-collar group in this period is an unmistakable sign of the highly polarized society that much of the literature speaks of. The data does not indicate, however, why when the blue-collar group became more stable and smaller in the 1920-1961 period at around the high thirty percentage range, (when Washington State's blue-collar occupations were in the mid-thirty percent range) -- why such a small difference should lead to such a large political difference.

Left-voting Occupations

The conclusion of the preceding section indicated that the marginal difference between the blue-collar occupations of Washington State and British Columbia did not appear to be of sufficient magnitude to be anything more than a weak facilitator of labour politics. Jamieson has attributed British Columbia's history of labour conflict as in part due to a high percentage of the work force in strike and conflict-prone occupations. Lipset has also written of the left-voting patterns associated with specific occupations. Both of these writers agree on the more leftist tendencies of miners, fishermen, sailors, longshoremen, and forestry workers. Lipset also adds commercial farmers and especially
notes the left-voting tendencies of wheat farmers. Could it be that the aggregation of all blue-collar occupations has tended to submerge the importance of these "radical" occupations?

A comparison of the occupations of fishermen, forestry workers, miners, longshoring and sailors is presented in Figure 9. The graph once more indicates a similar direction and pattern for these occupations in Washington State and British Columbia. The pre-World War One period saw a major decline for these occupations from the 1900/01 period. After World War One these occupations experienced a slower decline. The inter-war period saw a difference between the state and the province of around 5% favoring British Columbia, while for the post-World War Two period the differences shrank even further.

For the whole period under consideration, British Columbia held the edge on these occupations. In fact for the period 1940-1961, the difference between the state and the province appears to be the major source of the difference in the blue-collar occupations.

Though there is a perceptible and persistent difference within the North Pacific region on these "left-voting" occupations, a few words of caution are necessary. Once again the major source of this statistical difference is the mining occupations which as noted before is partly an artifact of the method of comparison of this thesis. In addition, to be more directly comparative the Washington State data should have included the wheat farmers of eastern Washington State.
If both of these provisos were added into the evaluation of Figure 9 the sizes of "left-voting" occupations would be more similar.

Even after these qualifications are made British Columbia probably still had a slightly higher level of these "radical" occupations. Nonetheless, the slight difference with Washington State hardly seems to be of the magnitude upon which a political party is built or upon which one falters.

Conclusions on Occupational Data

The data presented so far lead to some general conclusions and observations: First, the state and the province had a roughly similar occupational base for most of the 1900-1961 period. The period of greatest divergence was actually before World War One. In this period, however, there are striking resemblances: an industrially-based work force with a very strong fishing, mining and forestry sector; a relatively low agricultural work force; and, considering the late date of settlement for the region, a relatively advanced manufacturing sector. As the century matured, the occupational differences slowly disappeared, with Washington State's occupations often pointing the direction that British Columbia occupations would move in a few years. Second, though similarities were present, occupational differences of weighting or emphasis were apparent: more emphasis on the non-farm primary occupations in British Columbia and an earlier development of professional, trade, and clerical occupations in
Washington.

The overall conclusion that is derived from these statistics is that no one occupational group nor a combination of a number of occupational groups seems to be so developed in British Columbia and Washington State as to provide anything more than a weak facilitator to a labour party or to act as a weak detractor from organizing a labour party. The data presented above appear not to support a purely socio-economic explanation of the failure or success of socialism in the North Pacific region. Neither the size of the labouring class, nor specific occupations seem to be strongly related to the political differences between the state and the province.

This general conclusion, however, does not necessarily contradict other studies of labour militance or of social democratic politics. The conclusions on occupations only indicate an insufficiency in the region to translate occupational dynamics into a political institutional form. The journey from occupational tendency to political party is a long and complicated one. Lipset, Jamieson, and Kerr it must be borne in mind have not necessarily included political party origins in their claims on the tendencies of occupations. Rather, they have spoken of voting trends and labour conflict. Likewise, the data above indicate a moderate difference in the incidence of middle-classes for British Columbia and Washington State. This however does not necessarily contradict Robin's thesis that British Columbia had a relative
absence of middle-classes. The most crucial area for his point is not the provincially aggregated data but the single-industry communities. The second half of this chapter will deal briefly with the question of single-industry communities.

Industrial Structure of the North Pacific Region

Occupation is not the only socio-economic dimension that has been seen as related to the problem of the origin of socialism. In addition to occupation, other economic factors have been linked to left-voting: concentration on a few economically insecure industries, high levels of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, large plant size, a largely urban work force and a large segment of single-industry communities. The second half of this chapter will take a closer look at these variables in the North Pacific Region.

An economy that is dominated by a few economic sectors is especially open to major fluctuations and dislocations. As studies of single-crop farming areas have indicated, the reliance on one product (or group or related products) creates particular social forces and a social structure than can lead to political activism outside of traditional party lines. Consequently, a topic for investigation is the size of the leading economic sectors in British Columbia and Washington State. The first half of this chapter has given some indication of the importance of various economic sectors. Below the discussion will focus on the leading manufacturing industries to see if secondary economic activity has led to
economic diversification.

Another socio-economic factor of importance is the size of establishment. The role of a few large firms can be paramount, for size of establishment may indicate the amount of economic insecurity, in a region. Also, size of establishment can be used as an index of intra-group communication and as a factor helping group mobilization. For the purposes of this thesis the most useful indication of size of establishment is the number employed in each plant or establishment.

A third factor has to do with the geographic location of the population and of economic activity. The degree of urbanization can be seen as a measure of the influence of "modern" or city values in a society. In addition the geographic location of economic activity as indicated by the location of occupations can be a measure of the role of single-industry towns.

Leading Manufacturing Sectors

Sociological analysis has often connected blue-collar manufacturing work to militant unionism and political radicalism, though there is some disagreement over the relative importance of the various factors. Nonetheless, heavily manual industries, industries requiring less-skilled workers, large plant size, and industries that are highly cyclical have usually been associated with a propensity to militant unionism, left-voting, and political radicalism. This section will examine the leading manufacturing industries to see if the state or province can be associated with these factors.
Prior to World War One the North Pacific region's manufacturing industry was primarily oriented toward the processing of a few raw materials. As the statistics on occupation in the first half of this chapter indicated, the 1900-14 period saw the relative decline of mineral production, the rise of the timber industry, and the beginning of the slow decline of the importance of the fishing industry. Thus it is not surprising to see that the major manufacturing industries were engaged in the processing of these raw materials. The trends in the manufacturing end of the mineral, forest, and fish resources also follow the general trends of the occupations in these primary sectors. (See Tables 3 and 4)

In British Columbia prior to World War One smelting and lumber products were approximately of equal size when measured by the value of products at around 23% of value of all products in 1901. The two sectors respectively employed 6.7% and 32% of all employees in manufacturing. Fish canning in 1900 contributed 15% of the value of products while employing a little over 32% of manufacturing employees. These three industries continued to dominate the British Columbia manufacturing sector before World War One. In 1911 these three industries controlled over 61% of the value of products while employing over 73% of manufacturing employees. The next three most important industries as measured by value of product shifted over the period to reflect the increasing role of transportation and machinery as seen in the rising importance of the
Table 3 British Columbia -- Leading Manufacturing Industries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of total value of Product</th>
<th>% of total employees</th>
<th>% of total establishment</th>
<th>Average employees/establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1) Smelting</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Log and Lumber Products</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Fish Canning</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Liquors, Tobacco</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Printing and publishing</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Women's clothing</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1) Smelting</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Log and Lumber products</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Fish Canning</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Slaughter and Meat Packing</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Bread, biscuits, etc.</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Liquors, Tobacco</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1) Sawmills and lumber products</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Pulp and Paper</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Canned Fish</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Smelting (?)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.0 (? ?)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Slaughter and Meatpacking</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Petroleum Refining</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1) Sawmills and lumber products</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Pulp and Paper</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Fish Canning</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Smelting (?)</td>
<td>6.0 (? ?)</td>
<td>6.0 (? ?)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Slaughter and Meatpacking</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Printing and publishing</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1) Sawmills and lumber products</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Shipyards</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Fish Canning</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Smelting (?)</td>
<td>5.0 (? ?)</td>
<td>3.2 (? ?)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Slaughter and Meatpacking</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Petroleum products</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1) Sawmills and lumber products</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Pulp and Paper Mills</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Fish Canning</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Smelting (?)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.5 (? ?)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Slaughter and Meatpacking</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Petroleum products</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1) Sawmills and lumber products</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Pulp and Paper Mills</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Primary metals</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Metal Fabrication</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Printing and publishing</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Chemicals</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1901 Census of Canada; Census of Manufactures of Provinces Table XVI; 1911 Census of Manufactures of Provinces and Canada, Table VI; 1916 Census of Manufactures, Tables XVII and XII: Leading Industries of the Western Provinces, 1923, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Table 1: Manufacturing Statistics of the Province of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory, 1931 Table 4, 1941 Table 7, 1951, Table 14, 1961, Tables 4 and 5.

*All industries under the headings log products, lumber products, wooden boxes, cooperage, sawmills, planing mills and saw and door factories were aggregated when possible under the headings "log and Lumber Products" and "Sawmills and Lumber Products."

1For all years starting in 1922 the category of "central electric stations" was deleted from the statistics.

For the years 1923, 1931, 1941 and 1951 the size of the smelting industry is based on estimates from the statistics on "other leading industries" and information in DBS publications on the primary metals industries. During this period the Cominco smelter was the major smelter in the province and probably employed in excess of 2000 employees. The statistics are not given by the DBS due to rules on disclosure. In the mid-fifties Alcan opened an aluminium smelter in Kitimat. The figures on this smelter and the Cominco operation are included in the 1961 data on "primary metals industries."

For 1961 only these figures are based on value added by manufacture and not on value of products.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1939 % of total value added by manufacture</th>
<th>1939 % of all employees</th>
<th>1929 % of all establishments</th>
<th>1929 % of all establishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundry and Machine Shop</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flour and Grist Mill</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liquors, Malt</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundry and Machine Shop</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Railway Shops</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flour and Grist Mills</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipbuilding (Steel)</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>338.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipbuilding (Wood)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundry and Machine Shop</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Railway Shops</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flour and Grist Mills</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>206.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundry and Machine Shops</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bread and Biscuit Products</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>186.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundry and Machine Shops</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Railway Car Shops</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>147.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Products</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pulp and Paper Mills</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>145.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation Equipment</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Metal Products</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pulp and Paper Mills</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>204.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation Equipment</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>169.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Metal Products</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>160.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Printing and Publishing</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation Equipment</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>352.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pulp and Paper</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>200.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food and Kindred Products</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Metal Products</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>153.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemicals and Products</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Transportation Equipment</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>353.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sawmills and Lumber Products</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pulp and Paper Mills</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>222.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemicals and Products</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Metal Products</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>126.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canning and Preserving</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: U.S. Census. Washington, 1919 Washington, Table 1; 1919 Washington, Table 3; 1923 Washington Table I; 1923 Washington Table III; 1926 Washington, Table 17; 1947 Washington, Table 3; 1954 Washington, Table 4; 1963 Washington, Table 5.

1Railway Car Shops were also an important employer with 2.8% of all manufacturing employees.

2All industries under the headings "log products" and "lumber products", "wooden boxes", "cooperage", "sawmills", "planking mills", and "sash and door factories" were aggregated where possible under this heading.

3Railway car shops employed 3.9% of all employees.

4Shipbuilding contributed 1.7% of value added and employed 2% of all employees. Pulp and paper accounted for 1.5% of value added, 1.6% of employees and averaged 24.8 employees per establishment.

5A more detailed breakdown is not available. Canning probably accounted for approximately 4% of value added and of employment.

6Machinery and fabricated metal products employed 3.7% and 3.3% respectively.
foundry and machine shop and the railway repair shops. Together these two employed 6% of the manufacturing employees.

Washington State had similar manufacturing industries before World War One. The lumber and log products sector in Washington State dominated the whole period with 55% and 51% of the value added by manufacture and 63.7% and 60.1% of all employees for 1899 and 1909 respectively. As was noted above, the metal-mining region of the American Northwest lay in northern Idaho and western Montana; these areas were also the primary sites of the smelting industry in the American Northwest. If these areas were included with Washington State, the state would have had a larger smelting industry. Washington State's manufacturing sector also had a strong canning and preserving industry. As with British Columbia, this industry declined in the pre-World War One period, but it never represented as large an economic sector as in British Columbia. In addition Washington State's canning industry at the turn of the century was mainly in fish packing (with 6.4% of employees in manufacturing) and this leading role of fish packing declined rapidly.

The other leading industries of Washington merely shifted positions over the period: printing and publishing, flour and grist mills, and malt liquors. Washington State's foundry and machine shop and the railway car shops sectors were also important, employing 6.3% and 7.6% of the work force in 1899 and 1909 respectively. These two sectors also controlled about 6% of the value added by manufacture.
In the period before World War One, industries that used a high percentage of manual workers of the unskilled and semi-skilled variety dominated the North Pacific region manufacturing sector. These industries were also subject to outside economic forces that created boom and bust conditions. At the turn of the century both British Columbia and Washington State had about 70% of the manufacturing work force in the heavily manual industries of smelting, timber products, and canning. Ten years later the predominance of the same industries continued with 73% and 63% respectively for the British Columbia and Washington State manufacturing work force.

Though the size of firm will be discussed in more detail below, some indication of the number of employees per establishment can be found in the last column in Tables 3 and 4 which record the average number of employees per establishment. Here again there appears to be a rough similarity. However, the figures on average number of employees per establishment may be deceptive for they tend to underestimate the number of employees the medium and large firms controlled. Some indication of how this column under-represents the employment figures is available from 1909 Census of Manufacture figures for Washington State. In the lumber industry over 69% of all employees were in plants employing more than fifty; 51% were in plants having more than 100 employees. Likewise canning had 36% of its workers in plants using more than 250 employees. Foundries and machine shops had 46% in establishments larger than 50 and almost 40% in shops greater than 100. Finally, the
railway car repair shops indicate even larger establishments, with 86.2% of all employees in shops having more than 100 employees, and almost 40% of all railway shop employees were in establishments of 1000 or more.

These figures on plant size indicate that Washington State had a large number of firms in the leading manufacturing sector but that most firms had relatively few employees. A few firms tended to dominate the employment in an economic sector.

The conclusion from the above data on the leading manufacturing sectors is that British Columbia and Washington State between 1900 and 1914 exhibited a strong similarity and had roughly the same socio-economic groups in similar proportions. The state and the province seemed to be equal in providing the social basis for labour and political radicalism.

From World War One to World War Two

In the period from World War One to World War Two the North Pacific region's manufacturing industries were still dominated by the lumber and timber products sector. The declining importance of smelting and fish canning continued, while the 1920's witnessed the rise of the pulp and paper industry to a major role.

World War One had an immediate though temporary effect on Washington State's economy. The war created a major ship-building boom. From a work force of only 1,444, the ship-building sector of Washington State's manufacturing jobs jumped to 29,391 in nine plants, equal to 22% of the manufacturing
The shipbuilding boom was short-lived and after the war the wood and timber products industry returned to dominate Washington State's economy. By 1923, the employment in the timber and lumber-related industries again approached 60% of all manufacturing employees. The other leading industries continued the pre-war pattern. Shipbuilding had dropped to 2% of all manufacturing employment.

In the 1920's pulp and paper emerged as a major industry. The growth of this industry was slower and later in Washington State than in British Columbia. In 1923, Washington State's pulp and paper industry only contributed 1.7% of the value added by manufacture while employing 1.8% of all manufacturing employees. Simultaneously, the pulp and paper industry in British Columbia was the second most important sector with 9.4% of the value of product and it employed 8% of manufacturing employees.

The rest of British Columbia's manufacturing sector in this middle period was dominated by the lumber and timber-related industries (with 33.5% of the value of products and 38.2% of manufacturing employees) and the fish-packing industry (with almost 18% of manufacturing employees). Though exact figures are not available specifically for the smelting industry (due to disclosure rules that prevent releasing information on one or two firms) smelting probably placed a distant fourth with perhaps 4 or 5% of the value of product and of the manufacturing employees. The remainder of British
Columbia's leading industries had small percentages of the value of product and of employment: other canning, meat packing, shipbuilding, printing and publishing, and sheet metals products.

The relative position of the leading industries in British Columbia remained stable until World War Two. The major changes were not in which sectors were leading but in the number of manufacturing employees each industry controlled. Lumber and log products fell in 1931 to less than 28% of the manufacturing employees. Employment in that year was adversely affected by the depression, but even war prosperity ten years later only increased employment in this sector to slightly under 30% of all employees. Similarly, fish canning registered a decline in employment, falling drastically to near 4% of all manufacturing employment. Pulp and paper employment had a milder contraction.

The only variation from the resource-processing pattern in British Columbia during this middle period was connected with World War Two when shipbuilding grew at an explosive rate. By 1941 (i.e., an early phase of the war) shipbuilding employed 10% of the manufacturing employees and accounted for almost 8% of the value of products for the province. As with the shipbuilding boom in Washington State during World War One, British Columbia's World War Two shipbuilding boom ended as the war wound down.

Washington State's manufacturing sector during this middle period was also primarily one of processing resources.
Taken together the lumber and lumber-related products, pulp and paper products, and canning and preserving accounted for about 60% of manufacturing employment and over 50% of all value added by manufacture. Washington State's second line of leading industries was fairly constant in this middle period with printing and publishing, foundry and machine shops, railway car shops, primary metal working shops, and other food processing.

As with the early period of this century, the North Pacific region in the period from World War One to World War Two exhibited a strong degree of homogeneity. The state's and the province's industries were primarily geared to the processing of raw materials and secondarily to products for local consumption. The major industries of the period, also required unskilled and semi-skilled operatives. The work was primarily of a heavy manual variety.

The major industries of the state and province had a medium (and in some cases a high) number of employees per establishment. Size of plant can be categorized as follows: less than 100, small; 100-500, medium; over 500, large. These categories are not absolute for size is relative. The smelting and the primary metal products firms tended to be very large employers; pulp and paper mills also tended to employ significant numbers in each plant, with averages continually in excess of 100 employees. Often the pulp and paper mills averaged between 200 and 400 per mill. Lumber products and canning had lower averages usually in the range of 30 to 50 employees per establishment, but varying more widely for the
lumber products industry sometimes up to the range of 80 employees per plant range. It should be kept in mind that the figures on average employees per establishment underestimate the size of plants for very small plants were common. The incidence of marginal operations was high in canning and even more so in lumber products where the cost barrier of entry into the industry was markedly lower than pulp and paper, smelting, shipbuilding, and railway car repair.19

The pulp and paper industries seem to have operated with more employees per plant in British Columbia than in Washington State; the lumber and wood-processing factories in the latter, however, seem to have operated with about twice as many employees as in the province. These figures can be no more than suggestive for data on the size of establishment by number of employees for the specific industries is unavailable for this period.

Interestingly, during this middle period the relative size of industries employing "left-voting" workers tended to favor Washington State. Employment in the unskilled and semi-skilled manual industries of smelting, primary metals products, lumber products, canning and pulp and paper was 62.4% and 68% for 1923 for Washington State and British Columbia respectively; for 1929/31 the figures were 62.7% and 43.8% and for 1939/41, 63% and 43.2% of all manufacturing employees.

World War Two to 1960

The World War Two period saw massive shifts in the allocation of the economic resources in the North Pacific region.
In both British Columbia and Washington State the war-related industries of transportation equipment (especially ships and airplanes) created new industries and employed major portions of the work force. As noted above by 1941 10% of British Columbia's manufacturing work force was building ships. In Washington State the shipbuilding, airplane, and atomic research facilities mushroomed overnight. Between 1940 and 1944 employment in the aircraft industry in Washington State increased from 6,000 to 44,000 while shipbuilding went from 2,000 to 95,000: the metal industries grew from 5,600 to 17,000 workers. In the middle of the war construction of the Hanford Atomic Works employed some 60,000.

World War Two planted the seeds for a later industrial divergence between the province and state. The industrial legacy of the war in British Columbia was negligible as the post-war economy returned almost unchanged to the pre-war pattern of lumber products, pulp and paper, canning, and primary metal production. Washington State's war-period legacy was the firm establishment of the transportation equipment sector, primarily around Boeing aircraft. However, this manufacturing sector did not create an appreciable difference vis-a-vis British Columbia until the middle of the fifties.

In British Columbia the lumber industry increased in size in the post-war period, engaging 35% to 40% of the manufacturing work force. These figures represent an expansion of this sector and appear to occur with a drop in average size of firm. Smaller plant size in the post-war period probably
represented an expansion of the lumber industry in the interior of the province. The pulp and paper industry returned after the war to the second spot with 6% to 10% of the labour force and 10% to 12% of the value of products. Primary metals production grew slightly in this period with the addition of aluminum smelting facilities in the mid-1950's. Fish packing continued its slow decline to end the period with about 3% of both the manufacturing workforce and the value added by manufacture.

Post-war Washington State also returned to the pre-war pattern of resource-based manufacturing. The war-related industries quickly shrank; shipbuilding employment in 1948 fell to 4,000, while in the same year aircraft employment stood at 15,000.21 Lumber and related products once again assumed its place as the most important manufacturing industry. By the middle of the fifties the manufacturing seeds planted in World War Two, and nurtured by the permanent war-footing of the Cold War and the growth of commercial aviation, pushed the transportation equipment industry into first place. By the end of the period under consideration in this thesis, the transportation equipment industry accounted for 35% of value added by manufacture and employed 32% of all manufacturing employees. Lumber products, on the other hand, experienced a rapid decline in the post-war period. From 1947 to 1954 to 1963 the percentage of the manufacturing workforce engaged in lumber-related products fell from 30% to 25% to 19%. Like British Columbia, Washington State's lumber industry in the post-war period
had a noticeable drop in average firm size by number of employed. As in the province this trend was probably due to the expansion of the interior lumber products industry which tended to have smaller plants. 22

The pulp and paper industry in Washington State remained fairly stable in the post-war period as did the canning industry. The primary metals industry experienced an expansion due to the cheap hydro-electric power used in aluminum smelting.

In both Washington State and British Columbia the post-World War Two period had the usual second-line major industries of printing and publishing, food processing and the additions of a small chemical products industry and a metal fabrication sector.

In general, the post-war period for the North Pacific Region appeared to be an extension of the two earlier periods. The major industries of the period are also resource-processing and tend to use unskilled and semi-skilled labour. The only variation from this pattern was the growing importance of transportation equipment to Washington State's economy; but it is only towards the end of the period under consideration that Washington State's economy breaks out of the resource-processing pattern. British Columbia's dependence on resource-related industries remains fairly constant to the end of the period.

These trends of the post-war period can be illustrated by noting the changes of proportion of manufacturing employ-
ment that was in the resource-related industries of primary metal products, pulp and paper products, lumber-related products, and canning. For Washington State, the 1947, 1954 and 1963 figures are approximately 52%, 47% and 35%, while the British Columbia figures for 1951 and 1961 are approximately 53% and 56%. The relative size of industries employing "left-voting" manual occupations tended to be roughly equal in the state and the province up to the mid-fifties when the advantage in these groups went over to British Columbia.

Size of Establishment by Number of Employees

The number of employees working in a plant or on one location has long been considered an important factor in union militance and left-tending politics. Marx saw the modern factory with its large number of workers as a creator of alienation, of economic struggles over wages and working conditions, and eventually of political struggles. Larger factories usually meant greater mechanization and alienation; but they also provided the social basis of economic struggles and hopefully made political struggles against capitalism more likely.

Others have also seen the size of establishments as an important element in industrial relations and political affairs. Increasing size and complexity of an establishment has been connected to higher levels of bureaucratic organization. The decline of traditional work attitudes and the rise of an internalized work ethic is influenced by the consolidation within the factory of formerly scattered work processes.
The increased size of plant and organization are also seen as being related to the type of control used in an establishment. In a more directly political vein, a correlation of size of establishment and left-voting has been noted. The rationale for this connection is that workers in large plants have greater insecurity of income, unsatisfying work, and low prestige; at the same time they have good communication with those of a similar economic group, tend to lack traditionalism, and have low expectations of mobility.

In addition to these observations, the history of trade union movements indicates that size of establishment appears related to a left-tending lower class. From the turn of the twentieth-century to mid-century the more militant, and politically left-leaning wing of organized labour has been the industrial unions. Whether the unions were in the primary industries of mining or forestry, or in the manufacturing industries of autos and steel, industrial unions have tended to be more militant and politically progressive.

The topics of size of establishment by the number of employees was briefly discussed in the preceding overview of the manufacturing industries. For some of the pre-World War One years data was presented for some of the industries in Washington State. That information indicated a small to medium size (20-100 employees) for many sectors and a large size for a few of the industries as the railway car repair shops. The information also indicated a wide variability in size for some of the industries, as fish canning and lumber
products. In addition to these pre-World War One figures, the average was presented as a means of suggesting the size of establishment. It is subject to much distortion because it tends to under-estimate the size of establishment.

In an effort to more adequately gauge the size of establishments, Table 5 presents the percentage of employees working in establishments of various sizes. Unfortunately the information for a complete assessment of the size of establishment is not available. As Table 5 indicates data for some periods are quite sparse. For Washington State there is almost a twenty-year gap from 1929-1947 and the Census of Manufactures after 1954 discontinues giving the necessary information. Similarly, the data on British Columbia are spotty with a gap between 1930 and 1951 and apparently no information before 1924.

Despite these shortcomings of the data, the information in Table 5 does give a general idea of the overall trends in the size of establishments for British Columbia and Washington State.

The size of manufacturing establishments in Washington State underwent massive change in the first two decades of this century. In 1900 less than 8% of all manufacturing employees were in establishments of more than 50 and none in plants having more than 100 employees. Within ten years over 45% of all manufacturing employees were in plants employing more than 100. By the end of the second decade two-thirds of all this sector's employees were in firms larger than 100 and
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Establishments by Number of Employees - Washington</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of employees working in establishments employing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Establishments by Number of Employees - British Columbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of employees working in establishments employing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Less than 15 employees per establishment

\(^2\) Less than 25 employees per establishment

SOURCE: Canada Yearbook, 1926, 1933; Size of Establishments, DBS, 1951, Table 3, 1961, Table 10. A List of Industrial Firms in British Columbia Reporting to the Department of Labour for the Year 1955 (and 1958) Segregated According to the Employment Shown in Each Plant Location; U.S. Census Abstract, 1900 Table 166, U.S. Census of Manufactures, 1929, Table 8, 1947, Table 2; 1954, Table 2.
World War One had a massive impact on Washington State's shipbuilding capacity and the figures for 1920 reflect this influence. Though shipbuilding experienced a major contraction in the 1920's the growth of middle size firms and large firms was a permanent trend in Washington State. From after World War One until the mid-fifties around two-thirds of all manufacturing employees in Washington State were in plants larger than 100. After 1919, never less than 40% of all manufacturing employees were in establishments with more than 250 workers. In the inter-war period, the data suggests that one out of five worked in plants with an excess of 500; in the middle of the Cold War this largest category employed 41% of the manufacturing employees.

The information for British Columbia does not indicate as dramatic a shift in plant size as was evident for Washington State. Though British Columbia may have experienced a comparable early shift in plant size, the information available suggests that for the inter-war period slightly more than 50% of the manufacturing work force was in middle-sized plants with more than 100 employees. After the Second World War the percentage of employees in this same category rose to the upper 50% range. The growth of larger plants apparently did not really take off until after World War Two when about one out of four employees were in establishments larger than 500.

For the periods in which information is available it appears that Washington State's manufacturing sector generally
had 12% to 15% more of its manufacturing work force in medium-sized and large plants. The secular trend in both the province and the state was for larger plant size. However, the expansion of plant size (which is connected to a higher degree of economic rationalization, a more advanced economy, and political radicalism) occurred more extensively and apparently at an earlier date in Washington State than in British Columbia.

This moderate difference between the province and the state on plant size points to one conclusion: in so far as plant size tends to create the social basis for left-wing unions and politics, Washington State's overall size of plant should have lent itself to a more militant working force. This conclusion holds for the politically quiescent 1920's (for which information is available) and, extrapolating from the overall trends, for the 1930's and 1940's. Since Washington State's firms went much further in this direction, the failure of a socialist movement to revive itself and institutionalize a labour party is all that more poignant. It should be borne in mind that Washington State also held an advantage in regard to industries that used unskilled and semi-skilled labour. The favorable pre-disposition of Washington State in regard to these two indices makes the political outcomes in the North Pacific region as puzzling as it is remarkable.

Urbanization and Occupational Communities

The last topic of this chapter is the effect of urban life. At first glance the relationship of urban life to
politics and social trends may seem tenuous. However, many theories of political action have made cogent arguments about the relationship of politics, social trends, and the character of urban life.

The effects of cities on the wider society and on individuals has been held to be great. Whether the examples were Weber's medieval cities, Engel's Manchester or Tonnies gesellschaft, city life is often seen as a "modernizing" force. The city is the place where tradition breaks down and innovation of social relationships abounds. In a specific connection to politics, urban centers and especially larger cities have been connected with politically liberalizing movements and left-voting practices. Rural areas and small town life are viewed as bastions of conservatism and political traditionalism. The major exception to the portrayal of the countryside as conservative is when farm areas have been so heavily commercialized (usually with a one-crop economy) that they are markedly subject to outside economic fluctuations, that is, when the economic forces of the city have penetrated and transformed the countryside.

The theory of the city's influence on politics connects the size of the city, the transience of the population, and the "cross-cutting" pressures of social diversity to the decreased influence of kin and ethnic ties, religious ties, and community bonds. The urban areas create a more "cosmopolitan" atmosphere by their social and cultural diversity. The staid parochialism of the rural area and the
small town gives way in the city to an atmosphere of change, progress and worldliness. Politically, the city-dweller tends to support "progressive" policies and political figures.

Cities facilitate communication and organization among people of common circumstances, outlook, and interest, but it pits them against a number of similarly organized groups. Thus the city creates the basis for "progressive" politics but it also creates a diversity and specialization that prevents a completely polarized polity.

An exception to this anti-polarization effect of the city is the creation of occupational communities which build enclaves of low cross-class or cross-group communication. At the beginning of this chapter the discussion paused briefly on some occupations that tend to be performed in occupational communities -- fishermen, forest workers, miners, sailors and longshoremen. These occupations are usually performed outside cities or in special districts separate from the main city. It is possible, however, that urban areas as a whole may become occupational communities when one industry or firm dominates a community's economic life. These one-industry towns reach an extreme form in the company town. One-industry urban areas it has been argued create a polarized political situation that pits workers against owners and managers. When the industry is one that employs high levels of manual workers, the town usually has a lower portion of the middle strata occupations of professionals, trade, clerical and service. It is contended that single-industry towns increase
the visibility of the management versus worker split. The nature of these towns also means the absence of other social groups to mediate conflict and with which cross-alliances might be built. 29

The importance of single-industry towns in British Columbia's development is viewed as one of the reasons for the province's politics of class conflict. 30 An economy oriented to the "industrial" primary sector (fishing, mining, and logging) and on resource-processing (lumber mills, pulp and paper mills, fish packing and smelting) has fostered occupational communities, labour conflict, and political polarization.

Here then are two factors that may help account for the different political outcomes in British Columbia and Washington State: degree of urbanization and the relative importance of isolated occupational communities.

Urbanization

The North Pacific coast it has been noted developed as an "industrial" frontier with an early development of the forestry, mining, and manufacturing sector and a comparatively lower proportion of agricultural occupations. This "born modern" aspect of the region is also evident in the importance of urban communities at the turn of the century. British Columbia and Washington State at an early date had major cities that specialized as national and regional transportation centers and also as centers for the servicing of an economic hinterland. The early development of these major
metropolises meant that the region outpaced the national trend toward urban predominance. But as the century approached the mid-point, the regional levels of urbanization conformed more closely to the national levels.

In British Columbia, the earlier importance of Victoria as a trading center and governmental seat gave way to Vancouver's robust growth in the years near the turn of the century. After its founding in 1886, Vancouver grew quickly as a water and rail terminal for the region and nation, as a manufacturing centre, and as the regional centre for trade and exploitation of the north and interior.

In Washington State, Seattle's ascendance over its Puget Sound rivals, Tacoma, Port Townsend, Port Gamble, among others, was sealed by the central role it played in the Alaska gold rush in the late 1890's. Seattle's growth outpaced the other western Washington State cities and grew into the regional centre of transportation, trade, service, and manufacturing. Other major urban centres in Washington State were Tacoma (the original western rail terminus, but also a manufacturing centre with a smelter, and a strong wood products and food-processing industry) and Spokane. The latter city's central location in the Inland Empire made it a transportation centre for many railroads; it was also a major service and distribution centre for eastern Washington State, the southern interior of British Columbia and northern Idaho.

The proportion of population in Vancouver and Victoria, and in the Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma urban areas are given
in Table 6. The two British Columbia cities and the three Washington State cities contained roughly the same proportion of their respective populations for the period 1900-61. The differences are slight and indicate a marginally larger proportion for the Washington State cities up to 1920, while between 1930 and 1950 Vancouver and Victoria represent a larger proportion of the provincial population. Both British Columbia's and Washington State's cities follow similar growth patterns, reaching peak proportions in the 1930's. A more detailed study of Vancouver and Seattle has indicated a similarity in growth curves for these cities up to the Second World War.

The major cities of the province and the state accounted for roughly similar proportions of their respective populations so that no significant difference existed that might have created a more traditional or modern outlook.

Vancouver and Victoria, and Seattle, Spokane, and Tacoma, however, accounted for only a portion of the urban population of the North Pacific Region. The figures on the overall level of urban population are more useful in determining the role of urbanization in creating social forces favorable to left-voting and left-wing politics. Table 7 presents the percentage of the British Columbia and Washington State population residing in urban places for the years 1900-1961. The definitions of "urban place" are quite different for British Columbia and Washington. Prior to 1951 the Canadian census counted as urban any place incorporated as a city,
Table 6
Percentage of State and Provincial Population in Major Urban Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of State Population in Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma</th>
<th>Percentage of Provincial Population in Vancouver and Victoria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900/01</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920/21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930/31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7
Percentage of Population in Urban Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Washington</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900/01</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920/21</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930/31</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940/41</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of the United State, 1950 Population, Table 3 p. 47-7; U.S. Census, 1960 Washington, Table 70; Canada Census, 1961, Population Table 1, p. 2-25.

1The figures for Washington are for places with over 1000 people so as to more closely resemble the Canadian definition.
town or village under the provincial municipal laws. The British Columbia definition did not have a minimum number of persons; indeed, the Municipal Affairs ministry listed several urban areas with populations as low as 400 people. Before 1950 the United States' definition of urban places included incorporated places with more than 2500 people. The American data prior to 1950 like the Canadian data prior to 1951 tended to underestimate the urban population by not including unincorporated places and "fringe settlements." Both the Canadian and American census rectified these errors in the 1950/51 enumeration and also established minimum numbers of 1000 and 2500 respectively for the Canadian and American census. Thus the data for the years before 1950 is not directly comparable but merely suggestive. The years after 1950 are more directly comparable, because the Washington State data was supplemented with the population figures for places with populations between 1000-2500.

Despite the imperfections of the data the general trend suggests that except for the beginning and the end of the period 1900-1961 Washington State was slightly more urbanized by roughly 5% to 8% over British Columbia. The only major exception to this margin of difference occurs when the agricultural boom, reflected in the 1921 census, pulled British Columbia's proportion of urban residents down to the 1900 level. The slight difference of 5-8% between the province and the state may actually be greater than Table 7 indicates for prior to 1951 the Canadian data included all provincially incorporated places regardless of size.
The implications of the data on urban population are several-fold. The proportion of the population in large cities in which "modern", "cosmopolitan" values and outlooks thrive was roughly the same in British Columbia and Washington State. As major centres of trade, clerical, service, and professional groups these cities should have had similar effects on the political outlooks and coalitions. Second, the figures on urbanized places indicate that Washington State's moderate edge in urban population should have created social forces more favorable to left-voting and support than in British Columbia. Third, the first two conclusions must remain tentative for while the data give a rough outline, the available information on urban places allows for little more than a few suggestive generalizations. What is needed is a breakdown for British Columbia on the various sizes of the urban places. Fourth, though the data on urbanization suggest a left-voting tendency in Washington State, the indicators of urbanization do not take the character of different urban areas into account. A farm service town made up of relatively high levels of commerce, service, and professionals would have a very different character from a town of the same size that was a company-town or one built around a single industry. This last comment indicates the need to assess the role of occupational communities and single-industry towns and regions.

**Occupational Communities and Single-Industry Towns**

It is a common observation that the type of economic activity of an urban area often has a marked effect on the
social character of a community and on its politics. The occupational and industrial compositions of the various towns may help to account for the social and political differences, in that the different occupations and industries can have different ideal and material interests. The occupational and industrial composition of urban places also creates different coalition potentials.

The large role of single-industry towns in British Columbia has led Robin to view these as one of the social bases of British Columbia’s politics of class conflict. This observation leads to two questions: was the location of occupations meaningfully different in the province and the state? and, was the role of the single-industry town also different?

The data to evaluate these questions is not easy to come by. Apparently few studies of occupational communities and single-industry communities in the North Pacific region have been conducted. Two reports in the late 1970’s indicate that the incidence of single-industry (or single-sector) communities is still relatively high in British Columbia with 37.5% of the non-metropolitan population in single-sector communities. Other than these reports, data necessary to examine these questions directly is not publicly available.

Thus a few means to indirectly assess these two questions were devised. First, an occupational breakdown was constructed for the combined major metropolitan areas in Washington State and British Columbia. This allowed the
comparison of major urban centres to see if occupational
groups were over or under-represented. The occupational
breakdown also facilitated the calculation of the proportion
of the occupational categories resident in the major urban
areas. The implication of this last calculation is that metro-
politan over-representation of a specific occupation should
mean rural and small town under-representation.

The second means to assess the importance of occupa-
tional communities applies only to Washington State. For some
census years Washington State data were available to indicate
which counties were dominated by single-industries. Unfortun-
ately, similar data were not available for all census years in
Washington State, nor were they available for British Columbia.

Table 8 presents the percentage distribution in the
metropolitan regions of selected urban occupations for
Washington and British Columbia. Several points about the
table should be noted. The data for Washington State for 1940,
1950, and 1960 are based on the major census category provided
in each of the census and not on the reconstituted categories
used in the earlier years. The information available after
1940 was too sketchy to use the more precise categories. For
the census years 1940 and 1950 the manufacturing and transpor-
tation sector could not be separated. Finally, the Canadian
data on manufacturing for 1921-1941 are understated due to the
separate listing of labourers. If the labourers were included
in the manufacturing and construction figures the percentages
would be 4% to 7% higher.
Table 8
Percentage of Gainfully Employed in Various Occupations for Major Urban Areas, 1900-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vancouver and Victoria</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Construction</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Construction</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from Canada Census, 1911 Table VI; 1921, Table 3; 1931, Tables 41 and 43; 1941, Tables 7 and 9; 1951, Table 6; 1961, Tables 7 and 8; U.S. Census, 1900, Table 94, p. 590-96; 1910, Tables IV and III; 1920, Tables 19 and 20; 1930, Table 4; 1940, Tables A-42, B-42, C-42; 1950, Table 35; 1960, Table 74.

1Percentage is understated due to separate allocation of labourers which in 1921 were 4.3%, 1931, 14.0%, 1941, 7.5% and 1951, 6.0%.

2The figures for these years are not directly comparable to previous years for they are based on major occupational categories supplied by the Census of the various years and not on the reconstituted major categories.

3The percentages for this year combines manufacturing, construction and transportation workers.

na -- not available
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vancouver and Victoria</th>
<th>Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Construction</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from data in Tables 8, 1 and 2.

1 These years are understated due to separate listing of unallocated labourers. See footnote 1 to table 8.

2 See footnote 2 to Table 8.

3 See footnote 3 to Table 8.

na -- not available
Table 8 indicates several trends. First, several province-wide and state-wide trends are also reflected in the metropolitan data. A slightly earlier development for the professional and clerical occupations is evident for Washington though by 1920 this slight gap is all but closed. The trade sector in Vancouver and Victoria is more fully developed which may indicate a smaller trade sector in the rest of the province; Washington State's trade sector may have been more robust in the small towns. However, the difference is slight with a 3% difference between the province and the state. Vancouver and Victoria's service sector is also marginally higher for the period under consideration. The final trend, in manufacturing, displays a marked degree of change up to 1920 with first the British Columbia metropolitan areas and then Washington State metropolitan areas having about one out of three of all so gainfully employed. After 1920 the manufacturing and construction sector occupies slightly under 30% of the metropolitan areas.

Table 9 indicates the percentage of the state-wide or province-wide occupations found in the metropolitan areas. This table indicates that the professional, clerical, services, and trade occupations were more concentrated in Washington State's metropolitan areas than was the case in British Columbia. This finding suggests that the middle-strata groups in British Columbia were more dispersed throughout the province than were their counterparts in Washington. The implication is that the non-metropolitan urban area of
Washington State had fewer of the middle-class groups that have been seen as mediators of political and economic conflict. Further, the evidence suggests that Washington State's non-metropolitan urban areas were more prone than the similar areas in British Columbia to be occupational communities.

Extra caution, however, must be exercised in interpreting the data in Tables 8 and 9 for they are highly indirect measures of the occupational and industrial composition of the non-metropolitan urban areas.

Turning to more direct evidence of single-industry communities, a cautionary proviso is even more important for little historical data are available. What information is available, however, suggests that single-industry communities were widespread throughout the North Pacific region. It is a common assumption of much of the writing on British Columbia history that this type of community has long been important. In reference to Washington State, census data on occupations and industry on a county basis are only available for 1930 and 1940. After subtracting the agriculturally employed from the county-wide gainfully employed, computations were made to determine the prominence of lumber and paper-related occupations in the non-metropolitan counties. Using 20% of the non-agricultural work force as the mark of a single-industry county, it was found that in 1930 almost 57% of the non-metropolitan gainfully employed lived in counties that were lumber and paper-related single-industry counties; in 1940 the comparable figure was over 69%. What this limited information suggests
is that Washington State has long had a high incidence of
single-industry towns. They have been primarily related to
lumber and paper products while British Columbia's single
industry towns have had a stronger representation of mining
and metal-working industries.

The influence of occupational communities and single-
industry communities on the political directions of the region
is difficult to assess. Little work has been done on this
aspect of the region; there is a lack of publicly available
information; and what is available is sketchy and sometimes
contradictory. The conclusion from the above discussion casts
doubt on the special contribution of occupational communities
or single-industry towns in accounting for British Columbia's
socialist tradition and Washington State's lack of a viable
socialist tradition. In both the state and the province, the
occupational communities and single-industry towns were
important. The role of these type of communities is not well-
documented nor well-understood; more research is needed on
this topic before anything more than tentative conclusions can
be put forward.

Conclusion

In the broad sweep from 1900 to 1961, the socio-
economic trends indicate that Washington State and British
Columbia were remarkably similar. Of course differences
between the state and the province did exist; but the
differences were ones of emphasis, "accent" or "tone".

The major period of contrast appears to have been the
pre-World War One period; but the differences between the
province and the state in the pre-World War One period should
not be overstated. Other periods indicate small contrasts
between Washington State and British Columbia: the province's
middle classes in the 1920's and 1930's appear slightly smaller
and Washington State's manufacturing sector in the mid-fifties
moved away from extreme dependence on resource-processing.
These contrasts are relatively small and on the other economic
indicators of occupational structure, manufacturing industries,
and urbanization the province and the state were close.

The predominant character of the North Pacific region's
economy was the high profile that natural resources have
maintained over this whole period. As the occupational
trends indicate the region has had a sizeable portion of its
work force employed in extractive primary occupations. British
Columbia's non-agricultural primary occupations have been more
diversified than Washington State's, what with a slightly higher
role for fishermen and miners. Washington State's non-
agricultural primary occupations have been primarily in
forestry though inclusion of the other Inland Empire areas of
northern Idaho and western Montana in this study would make
the comparison of the primary sector more evenly balanced.

Resource-processing has been the dominant form of manufacturing
with log and lumber products, pulp and paper, primary metals
production and canning being the major source of manufacturing
employment and profits. For the period 1900 to 1961 it was
only the impetus provided by the warfare economies of the two
probably an earlier extension of bureaucratic management and
than British Columbia's. These trends indicate that there was
and the other primary occupations contracted slightly earlier
been noted. Similarly, Washington's agricultural work force
expansion of clerical, trade, and professional occupations has
Washington State than in British Columbia. The earlier
rationalization of the economy occurred slightly earlier in
as part of the economic process of modernization and
Colombia and Washington State. Trends that have been recognized
exist in the twentieth-century economic development of British
Despite the overall similarities slight differences did

The rationalization process of the region's
and development of the continental market in the local economy
early growth of medium and large-sized firms, and the importance
a dominant agricultural sector, the early urbanization, the
and mining, and an industrial form of organization. The lack of
rural pursuits, the agricultural pursuits of forestry
economic structure from an early date was oriented to
This region was also "born modern" in the sense that its
modern. The data presented in this chapter indicate that
It has been said of American society that it was "born

It is surprising that the mark of the war-induced changes was so
All but the Cold War were fleeting affairs. It is not
region's occupational and industrial structure, and since
World Wars and the Cold War that significantly altered the
control, mechanization of work, and rationalization by economies of scale (e.g. size of firms by number of employees). On balance, however, the earlier pace of Washington State's economic modernization was not of such magnitude as to create grave discrepancies between the province and the state.

The consequence of the similar economic structure and the similar economic trends was to create socio-economic groups with a similarity of circumstance and outlook. The economy of the North Pacific region was centred on industries that used high levels of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. The resource-based nature of the economy also necessitated the creation of large numbers of occupational communities. The seasonal and migratory nature of much of the work and workforce created insecurity. This type of work also created conflicts over poor working conditions and at the same time undercut the ability of unions to organize and parties to gather votes. There was also insecurity borne of the region's dependence on products particularly susceptible to a boom and bust cycle. The reliance on external markets meant added insecurity by "importing" other areas' economic troubles. The industrial structure of the region from the beginning created conditions favoring good communication among the labour force and slighted the development of paternalistic industrial authority relations.

In essence, in so far as the economic structure tends to create social forces that have political propensities, the similarity of British Columbia and Washington State tended to
create like social forces.

This chapter has several implications for the economically based theories of political sociology. There appears to be little evidence of meaningful differences within the North Pacific region's occupational and industrial structure that could account for or contribute in a major way to the institutionalization of a socialist party in British Columbia but not in Washington State. The occupational structure of the province and state over time was remarkably close. At most the observed differences between British Columbia and Washington State are weak facilitators of (or discouragement to) a labour party.

Some of the data presented even tend to support the view that Washington State was more prone to labour radicalism and left-voting. The state's employment in resource-processing manufactures that required unskilled and semi-skilled labour and built occupational communities was equal to or higher than the similar work force in British Columbia. In the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's this manufacturing sector outpaced the province by as much as 15 to 20%. Similarly Washington State developed medium and large-sized manufacturing plants earlier than in British Columbia. As far as the data on urbanization can be relied on, they indicate that the state had a higher degree of urbanization. Finally, the information on occupational communities is mostly indirect and sometimes contradictory. It suggests, however, that both British Columbia and Washington State had a high incidence of these type of
The major conclusion of this chapter is that as a whole the North Pacific Region had an economic structure that favored left-wing unions, left-voting, and leftist politics. The economic data presented does not, however, appear to account for the political differences under investigation in this thesis. It appears that an answer to the fate of socialism in the North Pacific region is not to be found in the economic structure. This is not to deny that the economic structure of the region played an important and necessary role. If anything this chapter has indicated that the socio-economic structure helped to create similar social forces; this factor, however, is insufficient to account for the different paths by which these similar social forces were politically institution- alized.

The next chapter will examine the political institutions of the province and state to note their influence on the similar social forces of the region.
Definitions of Major Occupational Categories

Farmers: various farmers, fruit, grain, dairy, and general farmers; gardeners, florists, nurserymen, apiarists, stockraisers, farmer's sons, in-farm labourers, "other" and office employees

Farm labourers: hired farm labourers, not including related son or daughter or family labourer

Fishermen: fisherman, oystermen

Forest Officials, etc.: logging operations and forest operations owners, superintendents, foremen, managers, foresters, rangers, timber cruisers

Forest Workers: river drivers, shantymen, inspectors, scalers, surveyors, woodsmen, labourers, "logging n.o.s."

Mine Officials, etc.: owners, operators, officials, superintendents, foremen

Miners: drillers and borers, operatives, labourers, workers in quarries, salt mines and petroleum wells

Manufacturing and Constructions Officials: owners, foremen, operators, managers, superintendents, including construction builders and contractors

Manufacturing and Construction Workers: building trades, construction workers, repair and servicing of machines, animal and food products makers, packing workers, workers in leather, fur, clothing, chemicals, iron and steel, lumber, furniture, pulp, paper, printing, non-metallic mineral products, metal products, liquor, beverage, stationary engineers, textiles and manufacturing and construction labourers.

Longshoremen and sailors: stevedores, longshoremen, deckhands, sailors

Transportation Clerks: express agents, messengers and office clerks in transportation, communication and utilities, station agents, baggagemen, telephone and telegraph operators, agents and collectors in transportation and communications, shipping clerks

Transportation Foremen: owners, operators, superintendents, officials, foremen, and inspectors of transportation, communication and utilities
All Transportation except Clerks and Foremen: all transportation, communication and utilities employees not so classified

Trade Clerks: office employees and messengers in trade, commerce and finance.

Trade Labourers: labourers in commerce, trade or finance.

Trade Other: newsboys, hucksters, pedlars, and deliverymen.

Trade - all but above: all trade, commerce, and finance not elsewhere classified; includes salesmen and saleswomen, merchants, dealers; bankers, realtors, insurance agents, retail and wholesale trade salespersons, independent businessmen and business women.

Public Service: government employees at all levels of government but not including labourers or armed forces.

Professional: educators, law, medicine, literary, engineers, art, entertainers, sportsmen, religious, technicians.

Domestic and Service: personal service, domestic service, hotel and restaurant keepers and workers, etc.

Clerical: clerks in manufacturing, professional, mining, forestry, fishing, typists, messengers, accountants, actuaries and miscellaneous clerks but not those classified as transportation or trade clerks.

N.O.S. (Not Otherwise Specified): all occupations not otherwise included in any of the above classifications.
Footnotes


4. See pages 185-6 for a listing of which detailed occupations were used to constitute the new major occupational groups.


8. The slight growth in British Columbia's fishing occupations in 1931 and 1941 seems to be an artifact of the census method for in these two census years Indian's on reserves were included in the "gainfully employed". In 1911 and in Census years after 1941 this group was tabulated separately. "Introduction" to "Occupation and Industry Trends in Canada" Canada Census, 1961, p. XI.


11 The clerical figures are based on adding together the major clerical group with any clerical subgroups in the other sectors that could be located.


13 Jamieson.

14 Lipset, Political Man, pp. 242-244.


16 For a good discussion of these factors and political radicalism see Lipset, Political Man, Chapter 7.


18 U.S. Census of Manufactures, 1919, Table 3, Washington, p. 1554.


21 Ibid.

22 Guthrie and Armstrong.


25 Lipset, Political Man, pp. 242-244.

26 Ibid., pp. 276-77.

27 Veblen has been particularly caustic about the conservative nature of American small town life. "The capacities that make the outcome and that characterize this gild of self-made business men (of the small towns) and cupidity, prudence, and chicane -- the greatest of these, and the one that chiefly gives its tone to this business life is prudence. And indispensable among the qualities that command that confidence of his associates without which no man can make himself a business man, is a conservative temper." Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966) p. 336. Veblen also contended that the small town businessman was pivotal for his ways have become the expected ways of the whole business community. p. 339.

28 MacPherson; Lipset, Agrarian Socialism.

29 Robin, "British Columbia; however, not all analyses of single-industry towns agree with the above interpretation. For a work that sees single-industry towns creating conservative social bonds see R.A. Lucas, Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of Single Industry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971) esp. Chapter 14.

30 Robin, "British Columbia".


32 Single-Sector Communities (Ottawa: Dept. of Regional and Economic Expansion, 1979) p. 12.

33 The criteria used in ibid. was 30% of a community's employment. Since the Washington data was based on county-wide figures and not just communities, towns or villages, a lower criteria of a single industry county was used.
CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA
AND WASHINGTON STATE

Though the occupational and economic structure of the
North Pacific Region molded similar tendencies toward labour
and political radicalism, the political institutions these
movements worked through (and which in part molded the move-
ments) plainly varied. Chapter two examined many political
factors' influence on the rise or demise of socialism. Con-
cluding that many of these factors (if taken separately) were
inadequate explanations, the discussion argued that if several
of the political factors could be shown to hang together so as
to indicate a distinctive pattern of political institutions,
then this pattern may offer clues to the fate of socialism.
Further, that chapter suggested that the traits of a modernized
polity -- specialization and differentiation of political
institutions, integration and hierarchy of the institutions,
expanded public participation, and expanded public power --
offered a pattern of politics that might be associated with the
entrenchment of a socialist tradition.

This chapter examines the political institutions in
British Columbia and Washington State (and to the extent that
they resemble their respective national governments, Canada and
the United States) between 1900 and 1960. A difference that
is at once apparent, though perhaps not fully appreciated, is the fragmentation and dispersal of Washington State's and America's political institutions and the relatively more centralized, concentrated political power in the Canadian provinces and in the federal government. The themes of fragmented versus unified institutions and of the degree of government power will be developed by examining the constitutional arrangements of executive and legislature, the party system and pressure groups, the electoral system, judicial and legal matters, and federalism.

The relative concentration of authority and degree of power apparent in these political institutions may have influenced the establishment of a labour party in a number of ways. If political authority is fragmented into competing, relatively autonomous arenas, popular influence and coherent, comprehensive policy may be thwarted. In addition, such a pattern of power may place premiums on a less-structured method of organizing political influence at a lower level of government, and on limiting the scope of public power; it may also influence the use and content of ideology. Of course, a more unitary set of institutions will have different effects.

This chapter also examines two other topics: the political institutions of the economy (private property, industrial relations, and economic regulation and government ownership); and the influence of external factors on British Columbia and Washington State. The first topic indicates both a policy-style and the degree of government power on issues
that were important to unions and the socialist movements.
The role of external forces is included for it shows the degree
of government power, while it also provides some of the needs
and rationale for expanded government power.

Constitutional Form of Executive and Legislature

The most conspicuous political contrasts between
Washington State and British Columbia are the "constitutional"
provisions. The constitutional arrangements for separation
of powers, checks and balances, and multiple executive is one
source of Washington State’s fragmented political structure.
On the other hand, British Columbia’s constitutional provisions
for a responsible parliamentary government centralize power
into the cabinet and to a lesser extent into the legislature.

Earlier political conflicts fashioned these constitutional provisions. The constitution of Washington State,
adopted in 1889, crystallized three major waves of American
constitution-making. In reaction to British colonial rule,
American constitution-makers in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth-century erected barriers to strong executive rule,
by giving the legislatures many powers so that they would be
the primary instruments of government. At the same time, this
generation of constitution-makers distrusted a purely popular
government, so they created institutions and procedures to
buffer the government from the excesses of popular rule.

This pattern of checks and balances and of separation of powers
came the basic model for almost every American state govern-
ment.
In the second quarter of the nineteenth-century, the Jacksonians re-fashioned political matters by removing most barriers to adult white male sufferage, and added the popular election of many offices including multiple executives and judges. As grass-roots democrats, the Jacksonians believed that political officeholders should be responsible to the citizenry: political responsibility could be insured by patronage and the election of important officeholders.

In the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, a third wave of constitution-making reacted to the corruption and domination of political machines by adding anti-legislature and anti-party provisions. Constitutions formed in this third period curbed legislative power even more than the separation of powers by pre-empting or limiting authority with highly detailed constitutions and by limiting or undermining party activities through non-partisan elections, primary elections, and "direct democracy" provisions.

Because Washington State's constitution was adopted in the late nineteenth century, it inherited all three waves of constitution-making. Consequently, the governmental institutions were highly fragmented and the government's powers were often severely limited.

British Columbia's "constitution" formed under very different circumstances. As a retrenchment of the British presence in the face of American expansion, British Columbia clung to British political practice and adopted a responsible parliamentary system. British Columbia retained the British
practice of effective unification of legislature and executive. In addition, within the subject areas of its jurisdiction the provincial government ruled with few limitations on its authority. Finally, British Columbia did not adopt the anti-party devices and the direct democracy provisions so popular south of the border.

Executive and Legislature

Most North American socialist groups wanted to control the making and the execution of laws. In the quest for political power the socialists enmeshed themselves in a series of interconnected institutions: legislature, executive, the franchise, party system, and party organization. But these institutions influenced the political outcome long before any elected officials took office. The institutional order shaped political behavior, ideas, and methods.

The separation of executive and legislative powers in Washington State and the union of these powers in British Columbia is a most fundamental difference between the two political systems. From this contrast flow many of the other political distinctions: cabinet government, party discipline, and programmatic parties. This difference also affected the labour and socialist groups.

British Columbia

British Columbia followed the Canadian and British tradition of representative and responsible government. The unwritten portions of Canada's constitution draw the executive
(the cabinet) from the elected legislature. The executive or government remains in power only so long as it retains the support of the legislature; and legislative members that support the government head the executive departments. The union of executive and legislative powers in the cabinet centralizes government authority. Cabinet government tends to create disciplined parties because the cabinet controls the rewards and punishments for the parliamentarians.5

The written and unwritten portions of the Canadian constitution also recognized the competence of a government to legislate in its own fields of jurisdiction. Except for jurisdictional boundaries of the two levels of government, there are few limitations on the scope and topics of provincial or federal legislation. The political effect of this wide scope of legislation is to centralize political conflicts into the legislature and into the cabinet.

The overall effect of this constitutional distribution of power is to centralize and de-localize disputes: it gives the upper hand to the cabinet and reduces the importance of the grass roots; it tends to create disciplined parties and it increases the possibility of legislating change and thus politicizes many issues.

The British parliamentary system as adapted to British Columbia meant a simplified governmental structure and authority hierarchy. The provincial electoral system provided for one legislative chamber and less than fifty-five legislators. There were few boards and commissions that were
independent of government control. After an early period of
unstable governments, disciplined parties emerged in the British
Columbia legislature in 1903. British Columbia's simplified
and unified political structure focused political pressure and
issues on the cabinet and onto party policy. It reduced the
number of arenas of political conflict and thus attenuated the
influence of the grass-roots and of other institutions.
Further, as a streamlined and authoritative system, British
Columbia's cabinet system increased the importance of its
actions and gathered in political influence.

Washington State

Seeking to limit executive and legislative power, the
American political system separated legislative from executive
offices and dispersed power among government institutions.
Separate executive posts and two legislative bodies multiplied
political contests. The separation and overlapping of
constituencies, however, created independent power bases. The
constitution further dispersed power by requirements that
limited policy or required the consent of another political
body. The limitations on political power allowed influence
from those affected by a decision: it insured a measure of
democracy. But the limitations placed on government institu-
tions strengthen the dispersal of power; because the sites of
political conflict were numerous, it strengthened the tie of
local constituents to an office-holder by increasing the
latter's importance in making policy.

Washington State, in the period of this study, elected
nine state-wide executive offices and 147 legislators divided between two chambers; the upper house and the executive faced election every four years, while the lower house, every two years. The limitation on the governor's power is seen in the independent election of important executive offices. The constitutionally mandated sharing of power with the legislature formed another barrier to the governor. The legislature's power is limited by specific constitutional provisions, especially those that limit indebtedness and ties with private corporations. Finally, both the executive and legislature were limited by the judiciary (which in Washington State was elected) and by the numerous semi-independent boards and commissions. In effect, Washington State's constitutional provisions fragmented power, shifted power to the grass roots, frustrated change, and strengthened conservative interests by providing many sites for influence and delay.

Electoral Institutions, Parties and Pressure Groups

The electoral institutions also fragmented Washington State's politics; British Columbia's electoral institutions, contrariwise, simplified the political system.

The Populist movement crested in the first years of Washington's statehood. Though a spent electoral force after 1900, populism influenced Washington State politics until World War One through a general diffusion of populist attitudes and sentiments. Electoral reform was the most enduring political legacy of this movement. The populist farmers and middle class reformers united in their opposition
to political corruption. Their distrust focused on legislative power, and especially on political parties. These reformers sought direct election of United States senators, the recall, the referendum, the initiative, women's suffrage, non-partisan civic elections, and party primaries. Washington State adopted a form of all of these "direct democracy" measures in the years before World War One. In 1935 Washington State adopted an even stronger anti-party primary law: this "blanket primary" allowed one to vote for a Democrat for governor, a Republican for senator, a socialist for state representative, and a communist for state senate. In effect, the blanket primary rendered party affiliation meaningless.

All of the populist measures tried to eliminate "political" decisions by letting "the people" speak directly. "Direct democracy" reforms further fragmented and decentralized political power in Washington State. The reforms undercut the mediating secondary institutions of party and legislature, exacerbating Washington State's anti-party sentiments. 

Contrary to Washington State's drive for "direct democracy," British Columbia refrained from adopting the initiative, recall, referendum, or non-partisan elections. British Columbia directly elected its federal representatives and adopted women's suffrage in World War One. The populist reforms of Washington State were of a cloth foreign to British Columbia. "Direct democracy" reforms updated (and were the last gasp of) Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy, the very type of democracy that some Canadian leaders abhorred.
and labelled "mobocracy." Canadian democracy preferred to think of itself in Old Whig or even 'tory' terms: the sanctity of parliamentarism and responsible government. The political effect, as noted above, coalesced power into the cabinet and legislature. The ambit of party remained unhedged and plebiscitarianism, avoided.

The above contrast of British Columbia's and Washington State's electoral institutions it should be remembered was built on several similarities. Suffrage in both polities effectively had dropped the property qualification for adult white males by the turn of the century. Washington State extended the sufferage to women in 1909 and British Columbia adopted it in 1917. The electoral districts in both jurisdictions were primarily single-member districts although a limited number of multi-member districts still exist in British Columbia at both the provincial and municipal level. The balloting, with one exception, conformed to the Anglo-American pattern of simple plurality for victory. The only exception came in 1952 when the Liberals and Conservatives in British Columbia embraced a ranking ballot they hoped would insure their victory; the electoral reform backfired, and the victorious Social Credit party later changed back to the old rules.11 In consequence, neither the franchise nor the voting institutions were remarkably different nor were they such as to facilitate a socialist party as these factors may have in other countries.12

These similarities reinforced the importance of fragmented versus unitary electoral arrangements. In Washington
State voters were called on to vote almost every year, and they had to fill out long complicated ballots. The contrast with British Columbia was striking; the voter had one MLA and one MP office to fill, and a handful of city offices.

Party Systems

Political parties are as much political institutions as are legislatures and constitutions. Indeed, as enduring features of the political landscape, parties also play quasi-constitutional roles by selecting office-holders, and creating governments. Like many states, Washington regulated through law the organization of the major political parties. This gave the parties legitimacy by imparting a quasi-constitutional status. Parties tried to influence government by seeking public office in elections. The role of parties in British Columbia and Washington State was noticeably different and was a source of the more unified politics of British Columbia and the dispersed politics of Washington State.

British Columbia's Party System

British Columbia's parties were more centralized than Washington State's parties. The dominant element in the province's parties (and of the Canadian national parties) was not the grass-roots but the party hierarchy and organization. The system of rewards and punishments of Canadian politics favored the national-organization and the provincial level. Localism of political parties has not plagued the Canadian parties as it has their American counterparts. The constitu-
tional centralization of power in responsible government pushed the focus of political rewards up to either the national or provincial level depending on the jurisdiction. Instead of the American delegate theory of representation, the Canadian system reinforced the role of the party as the vehicle of society-wide concerns.

The centralizing tendency of Canadian parties may seem to run counter to the third party tradition evident in Canadian politics in the twentieth-century. But the centralized party structure and organization was fostered by the constitutional arrangements. And, these constitutional provisions when coupled with a socially and economically diverse society led to third parties -- but third parties mainly at the provincial level. This occurred for a variety of reasons. First, the simple plurality, single member district tended to undervalue opposition parties unless they were geographically concentrated.13 The dominance of Ontario and Quebec, economically and politically, relegated the western provinces to a lower status because their parliamentary representatives were not essential to forming a federal government. In addition, after the turn of the century provincial powers expanded and the areas of their jurisdiction became the more decisive areas. This trend lent an importance and invigorating drive to provincial governments. The final trend that tended to validate third parties at the provincial level was the tendency for the most important opposition to federal power (and the most important decisions) to occur in conflicts of the federal and provincial levels of
Contrary to the American pattern, the changes in Canadian politics in the twentieth-century did not undercut the importance of political parties. Rather, the strengthening of provincial governments afforded provincial parties with more resources to firm up their grip. The changes also meant that the capture of the provincial government was more desirable because it seemed to have more effective jurisdiction and power. The provinces thus became more desirable targets because their political capital had increased.

At the national level, Canadian parties did not have to overcome direct democracy proposals. Rather their dilemma was to override ethnic and regional conflicts and disparities. This aggregation of interests was expedited by the considerable resources still in the hands of the federal government. The weakness of national parties in Canada that has affected the Conservatives since the First World War, the CCF-NDP since the 1930's, and more recently the Liberals has come because the most important conflicts in Canadian politics have increasingly by-passed parliament and have pitted provincial governments against the federal government. The social, economic, and ethnic diversity of the country was not adequately represented in the federal parliament and in the federal parties because of the federal political institutions. But since national parties were centralized in decision-making and policy-making (and were not direct expressions of local interest) third parties tended to arise in the provinces to express grievances
and to exercise power that could not be had by alliance with federal parties.

American reformers, especially advocates of "direct democracy" proposals, wanted structural and procedural changes to bring public policies into line with popular aspirations. The result was a withering of political parties. Canadian reformers inherited a more collectivist, less atomistic version of democracy, shunned "direct" measures, and channelled their efforts through organizations to alter government policies and not procedures. The one tradition sapped party strength as the other re-invigorated and experimented with party forms. 15

Though parties in British Columbia reflected the special quality of the province's political culture, the overall trends that affected much of Canadian politics are clearly evident. In the province, party regularity did not really exist before 1903. From then until 1933 the Liberals and Conservatives were the major provincial parties, although their legislative representation was sometimes reduced to the same level as the socialist parties. A variety of third parties were active in this period including labor, socialist, and progressive-farmer parties. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation altered this Liberal and Conservative monopoly of significant political organization in the 1930's. In the forties and early fifties the two older parties formed post-election coalitions as support for the CCF rose and fell. The other major party re-alignment in the pre-1960 period occurred with
the Social Credit's rise to power in 1952 and 1953 when it displaced the two older parties as the major "free enterprise" party.

Since 1903 British Columbia's political parties have shared significant features. First, though the personality of leaders has been a factor in success or defeat, the parties are predominately cohesive center-dominated organizations. Political resources for compliance were located mainly at the province-wide organizational level. Provincial organizations dominated local constituencies, though of course this did not mean that local organizations or constituents were unimportant: they had mainly suggestive powers and little power of initiative and enforcement. Consequently, the site of political conflict and support lay in the provincial party organization. The strength of the provincial level of the party was reflected in the strength of the political machines the Conservatives, Liberals, and Socreds were able to establish. Thus British Columbia too had machine politics that was often marked by corruption and patronage. The difference with the United States was the governmental level at which the machine operated and the unhindered scope for action of the machines in the province.16

The party system in British Columbia further centralized political power into the hands of those who controlled the legislature. Political parties were able to use the resources available to create an organization to influence and capture the government. What emerged in British Columbia from the
simplified electoral arrangements, from the availability of
inducements for loyalty, and from the parliamentary inducements
for party regularity were parties that had to stress organization
and cohesion. The institutional arrangements made the
emergence of opposition groups and parties difficult but it
also focused their attention on manageable electoral goals and
it forced them to build strong organizations.

Washington State's Party System

The American party system like much of American govern-
ment and politics focuses on grass roots. Above we pointed to
some of the institutional reasons why this is so. The rewards
and punishments that are available do not favor national control
of political leaders or political policy. Instead political
parties were strongest at the state level and especially at the
local level. Patronage was always more lucrative and unhinder-
ed by other considerations at the local and state level than it
was at the federal level. The constitutional fragmentation of
authority that entrenched a state's prerogatives helped to build
a theory of representation in which a legislator was a delegate
of his local constituents. This theory of representation was
more pronounced with the state legislature's power to appoint
the United States senator.

Given the local centre of gravity for American parties
it may seem surprising that disciplined parties did not become
firmly established in state and local politics. But because
state governments replicated the federal scheme of separation
and division of powers, cohesive state parties also tended to
be short-lived anomalies. The states with the strongest party systems tended to be the older states; the newer western states, in reaction to the older party politics, often possessed highly independent electorates, weaker parties, and often explicit non-partisan elections. Of course state and city machines were not uncommon even in the west. The machines strength lay in its ability to "deliver", which was directly related to the availability of rewards and sanctions. Machines succeeded where there was a ready source of "pork" and where they could exploit patronage and "loyalty" to deliver in spite of the dispersion of political power. The best location for machines was the relatively unencumbered city government. The reformers of the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth century struck at the roots of machine politics by advocating a merit system, non-partisan elections, and direct democracy.

These reforms and the establishment of party primaries undercut the effectiveness of political parties on the state and local level. Since the early decades of the twentieth-century political parties in the United States have slowly withered. Parties became in most states nothing more than a common label sought and used by individuals and their followers to achieve office. State organizations often ceased to exist between elections. The personal following of a candidate began to substitute for party organization. The oft-noted opportunism of American parties sprang from this lack of coherent, sustained organization. The modern American politician's cultivation of personality, style, and image is but the application of a his-
torical trend to an electronic age. The much heralded "death" of political parties in the United States since 1960 was the culmination of a long anti-party trend that was well advanced in the western states in the early decades of this century. 17

In many ways Washington State's parties presaged the general American trends. A measure of early anti-party attitudes is the constitutional provision for non-partisan civic and judicial elections. As noted above Washington also adopted a direct primary system in 1907 and then adopted the even more liberal blanket primary in 1935. The effect of the latter primary system has been stated succinctly: "there does not seem to be any doubt that the blanket primary tends to break down party discipline". 18

Up until the great depression, Washington State's party system consisted of a dominant Republican party, a weak Democratic party, and a host of smaller, though intermittently important, third parties. After the 1932 tidal wave of support for Roosevelt subsided, the state's Republicans and Democrats became more evenly balanced. In both periods, party regularity of the leaders and the followers was low. Though the Republicans were regnant prior to the depression, the party was composed of several streams. A progressive wing backed T.R. Roosevelt in 1912 and often joined forces with the Democrats, old populists, and labor groups on specific issues. This type of splintering also plagued the Democrats. The permutations of popular support and party factions led to a bewildering series of shifting political alliances. It was not uncommon
for candidates to change parties. One leader in the course of his political life stood as a socialist, a progressive, a Democrat, and a Republican. 19

This volatility coupled with the dominance of one party appears paradoxical. But the volatility is less an indication of a firm organization attempting to fashion a workable policy than it is an indication of the profoundly weak organizational strength of the parties in the face of stronger grass-roots organizations and of strong leaders' personal followings. The parties were not solid entities, but rather provided the organization of competition and the mantle of legitimacy. The parties "tend to become 'arenas' where various interests come to hash out compromises;" but the interest groups are "autonomous, free to move or withdraw from support of a party or its candidates as they please." 20

The fragmentation of party organization in Washington State is demonstrated by the selection of party leaders and office holders. There has never been a firm centralized or even organizational method of selection of office holders let alone leaders. The nominal leaders of the parties (the governor and the leaders of the legislature) acquire their positions, in the main, through their own devices and have few obligations to other officeholders of the same party.

Candidates do not receive much financial assistance from the party; each "must depend on assistance from personal friends, upon the efforts of his organization to acquire private donations, or else deplete his own resources to conduct the
campaign. But, without obligations party leaders also lack influence. A party's leadership possessed few resources to stop someone from seeking and winning office (and possibly acquiring leadership) in their party. The localism and "cult of personality" of Washington's parties reduced the powers of a centralized party. The localism of party also increased the loyalty of local areas to "their man" by increasing the sway and importance of the local representative.

Washington State's party system exacerbated the disorder fostered by the electoral system. The anti-party tradition of Washington State withdrew the political resources necessary for the creation of viable political machines that could field the tremendous number of candidates for office. What remained of parties, consequently, tended to be pushed down to the grass roots level. The fragmented electoral system and party system meant havoc for opposition parties that sought to rise above the opportunism of the Republicans and Democrats. The electoral and party systems rewarded the personal side of politics and not the organizational side of politics. It held out the promise of an easy change of government policy by the easy entry of new politicians; but it militated against the necessary organization to carry through the reforms. Thus the oft-noted collapse of third parties after a quick period of growth was due not so much to the opportunism of the major parties stealing issues, but to the underlying structure of political authority that rewarded personal politics and strong grass roots.
Pressure Groups

Pressure group activity also contrasted in British Columbia and Washington State. Like political parties, pressure groups responded to the institutionalized power that was partly embedded in the constitutional arrangements and partly in the less formalized political practices of institutions. The different political landscapes of Washington State and British Columbia presented different obstacles, different sites for conflict and influence, and induced different motivations and strategies for those seeking to influence government office holders.

Pressure Groups in a Parliamentary System

The centralization of power and decision-making into the party, cabinet, and bureaucracy make these the object of pressure and power struggle in a parliamentary system. The concentration of power had direct effects on the organizational structure and the motivations of pressure groups.22

The simplified political structure of British Columbia and Canada reduced the opportunities and sites for pressure groups. The union of legislature to the executive robbed pressure groups of many chances to influence decision making. The practice of party cohesion and of cabinet dominance of backbenchers eroded the chances of pressure on legislative members. Party centralization and control of resources also slighted the influence of grass-roots organizations on individual members and on the party hierarchy. The unified executive in the parliamentary system blocked pressure groups from using...
one administrative office against another. Likewise, the less-activist tradition of the Canadian courts meant fewer opportunities to influence decision-making.

Compared to Washington State (and the United States), British Columbia (and Canada) had fewer arenas in which political conflict was resolved and in which pressure was applied. Legislative committees in British Columbia and Canada were fewer in number and were less powerful than their American counterparts. Throughout the period 1900-1960 British Columbia operated its legislature without committees. Party control of members and policy restricted the sites of influence to party conventions, party leadership, and the cabinet; it also reduced the individual legislative member's dependence on and vulnerability to special interests. Finally, because the Canadian system was less open to influence and because decision-making was carried on in a structured manner, it relieved groups of the need and reason to exert pressure at many points.

Such a unified political structure directly affected interest and pressure groups. This political structure did not remove the influence of interest groups, but it structured their influence in ways that were highly significant, especially for labour organizations. By contracting the places, opportunities, and reasons for influence, parliamentary systems diminished the potential for conservatives to dominate the process by discounting their currency: money and influence at many sites. Instead the parliamentary system placed a thumb
on the political scales by facilitating the left's currency: numbers and organization.

The tradition of strong government had important effects on those who sought to influence the decisions of the state. A centralized political structure shifted the locus of pressure upwards in the system. Since the grass roots and the periphery was less influential, the primary locus of influence was the party's leadership, the cabinet, and the heads of the bureaucracy. In such a system, efficient action for a group required the expansion of organization to the whole province or nation and the use of this organization to influence the central sites of power. Pressure groups tended to attach themselves in a relatively permanent way to political parties.

The effect on motivation was equally marked. The structure of the political institutions fostered a wider perspective on a group's members; it encouraged the welding together of heterogeneous elements; it emphasized large and long term goals; it rewarded ideology. The centralization and institutionalization of authority nurtured organization; it prompted individuals and groups to sink their differences for a greater goal; it facilitated and rewarded the organization man's regularity; and it encouraged identification with the group or party.

The consequence of this centralization of political authority on democracy was different from the American pattern. The Canadian system had the potential for effectively "freez-
ing out" local and peripheral groups from the sites of decision making. This was often the case since the population, economic goods, and political power were unevenly distributed in the polity. By erecting a small initial barrier to democratic participation, the centralized political institutions made individual and local influence on politics more difficult. The political system raised the stakes of participation by demanding time, money, organization and submission to group efforts. Influence was more difficult and thus the political system presented a more solid resistance to direct democratic influence; but the system presented fewer barriers to effective policy changes if a group could achieve office. Thus, the unified political structure in the short run often diminished accountability and responsiveness; but in the long run and for larger groups it facilitated and insured the realization of influence and goals.

Pressure Groups in a Fragmented System

The American fragmentation of political power created numerous opportunities, sites and reasons for pressure group activity. The separation of powers in both national and state government opened opportunities for influence by creating several arenas at which influence could be directed. Influence on an executive officer could be countered with pressure on the legislature; pressure on one house, balanced by pressure in the other house; influence on one committee, opposed by influence on a sub-committee. The weakness of political parties and the strength of the grass roots opened large numbers of sites for
influence. The equality and independence of the social bases of the legislators meant that influence must be exerted on as many legislators as possible. Outside the executive and legislative branches further pressure could be brought to bear through the independent court system. In addition, the other level of government could be used to influence decisions for jurisdiction is concurrent in many areas.

In such a system the opportunities for influence varied in direct proportion to the number of sites for pressure. The opportunity to influence political decisions was also magnified for decisions could be influenced or countermanded at almost any time. Finally, in such a fragmented polity and without cohesive parties to aggregate and articulate long-term interests, the reasons for political pressure increased. The inability of the political system to translate public pronouncements directly into policy increased the necessity for pressure groups. Since the political party in Washington State had

a decentralized power structure at all levels it has not been able to deliver on party policy and program. It is thus left to the voters and diverse special interest groups to settle major political problems by direct legislation. Otherwise policy matters fall by default to the so-called "independent" commissions, boards, leagues, and numerous other sub-divisions of government. 24

The fragmentation and dispersal of political power has several consequences for pressure groups. The increased number of sites for influence tended to favor conservative social elements. The division of formal political authority between executive, legislature, and judiciary, and between state and
federal levels exacerbated this tendency. Better able to command money and political resources, the conservative social forces could more easily meet the challenge of influencing many sites simultaneously.

These political arrangements also gave a natural advantage of those seeking the delay or denial of policy changes. One of the original reasons for the American system of checks and balances (argued most eloquently by Madison) was to prevent government tyranny by pitting faction against faction. The original American political institutions were well designed to do this. The subsequent trend in American institutions as discussed above multiplied this checking and balancing effect. The result has often been an institutionalized immobility. Except in extreme crisis situations (and even then not without problems) the American government system moved slowly towards goals and afforded well-organized and well-financed groups with numerous platforms to counsel delay. It provided veto arenas in which to deny or reverse stated social policy.

Decentralized power profoundly affected the organization of pressure and opposition groups. The variety and independence of political figures and of their power bases channelled pressure groups to those sites with effective influence. As the grass roots were the key level of political organization, pressure groups shifted the locus of their activities down to that level. Lobbyists sought out individual legislators and sought to use the member's constituents to pressure the legislator to adopt the lobbyist's point of view. Efficient
action demanded the expansion of political pressure to the numerous sites which influence decision-making. Pressure groups thus sought to influence where and how their actions would make a difference: they provided information, money, and perhaps manpower to individual candidates. Since these contests were local affairs and often charged with specific issues, the use of an explicit ideology was shunned, for ideology is often used to motivate and coordinate large and often disparate social groups.

Paradoxically, the fragmentation and dispersal of political power meant that local groups, special interest groups and even less powerful groups did have means of influencing political decisions. The fragmentation of the policy process increases the democratic nature of politics, even though as noted above the overall outcome of such fragmentation favored the conservative forces seeking delay. The "localisation" of politics increased an opposition group's stake in politics; but it also meant that to be effective these groups must be willing to compromise, log-roll and otherwise hedge and trim their original goals.

Finally, decentralization and fragmentation of politics forced pressure groups outside political parties. It encouraged pressure groups to focus their activities at the most vulnerable site, be it the courts, the primary, the referendum, the legislative committee, or the constituency. This structure of politics discouraged pressure groups from becoming tied to an overall cohesive and co-ordinated party organization. Of
course, pressure groups did work within parties; but their need to influence went beyond the confines of party support to other vehicles of influence.

In Washington state, the political sites for pressure groups to influence were very numerous and were effectively used by business, labour, education, and civic groups. Like many other states, lobbying was a significant part of Washington's politics and tended to focus on the individual decision makers -- especially in the state legislature. Lobbyist's and pressure group's support was most enthusiastically given to specific candidates at election time and less enthusiastically given to the party organization, for the parties were open to mavericks rising to control the name of the party. This personalization and localization of pressure group support was influenced by the early adoption of a direct primary.

The Canadian and American systems thus structured the political participation of parties and pressure groups differently. Like crystals that replicate and grow from an original crystal, the organization of a government's authority reproduces similar institutions of participation. The American parties and pressure groups resembled the fragmented American political system they sought to influence and control. Canadian parties and interest groups imitated the more unified pattern of authority that was their goal. The Canadian system placed a premium on organization and especially on cohesive, co-ordinated parties and organizations. Participation was structured through hierarchically-ordered institutions to influence
Judicial and Legal Institutions

The role of the judiciary and the legal institutions has been mentioned briefly above. A further elaboration, however, is in order because the judicial system historically played a major role in labour relations, especially in the United States. There are three areas of concern: the relation of the judiciary and legal institutions to the other political institutions; the use and limits of judicial review; and the importance accorded to a constitution and law.

As in the discussions on constitutions, parties, and pressure groups, the central variable here is the degree to which judicial authority is dispersed and separate from other political authority or the degree of "integration" with other political authority.

Relation To Other Political Institutions

The relationship of the judicial and legal institutions to the other political institutions in Canada and the United States is broadly similar except for a few differences that resemble the trends outlined above.

In the United States the judicial system is much more variegated than in Canada. The federal system and the state systems of courts and law are, by and large, separate, although appeal of state judicial decisions to the federal level is allowed on constitutional grounds. The Canadian system on the other hand is much more unified with federal appointment of
judges and control over much of the judicial system. The American system established concurrent jurisdiction in many areas and decentralized control by establishing numerous independent appointment authorities.

The appointment of United States federal judges is a prerogative (with the consent of the Senate) of the executive. This prerogative is not exercised in a completely independent fashion for it is one of the tools by which a president hopes to influence the Congress. By consulting with congressional representatives whose districts may be affected by the appointment, a president is, in part, attempting to overcome the limitations of his authority. The cost of overcoming the fragmentation of the political institutions is to increase the importance of the grass roots' representatives at the expense of the central authority's independence of action.

The state judiciaries are often subject to similar tendencies where the judges are appointed. In states where judges are elected the removal of the judiciary from centralized political authorities is more complete. Washington State's judicial system is of the latter type. Judges run in non-partisan elections that are supposed to "de-politicize" the judicial process. One of the political effects of an independent judicial branch is to reduce the tools and powers available to politicians to create and enforce policy and party loyalty. The state judiciaries, whether elected or appointed, also inherited the independence of the American federal judiciary in relation to the other branches of government on matters of legal interpretation. The independence of
the judiciary created another arena of political conflict—but an arena most vulnerable to the delaying and veto tactics of powerful interest groups.

The doctrine of the judiciary as a separate and equal branch of American government is different from the Canadian system which stresses parliamentary supremacy through a separate but subordinate judiciary. Partly due to its purely appointed status, partly due to the presumption of legislative pre-eminence, and partly due to the English tradition of a subordinate judiciary, the Canadian judicial system has not become the object of as much political influence as in the United States. The appointment of judges in Canada did not become as deeply enmeshed in overcoming a fragmented political system, it was another tool in building strong political parties at the national level. Although the judicial system in Canada was occasionally used to delay or thwart the will of the legislature, its more subordinate role made it less effective as a power unto itself, than was the American judiciary.

Judicial Review

The power to review the policies of the other political institutions is a central element of an independent and politically powerful judiciary. Although both legal systems have a form of judicial review and interpretation of the law, most authorities acknowledge that the scope and importance of judicial review in the United States is much larger than in Canada. In both countries judges declare laws unconstitutional or ultra vires and make law through interpretations; the Canadian
judiciary (and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council), however, are less willing to use these remedies than are their American counterparts. More specifically, Canadian judicial review is almost solely concerned with the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments.

The Canadian judicial system's limited use of judicial review originated in several features that were distinctive of the Canadian polity. As an heir to the British style of government, the parliament is supreme and its will, as expressed in law, is considered a most important factor in judicial rulings. Because of the long period of semi-sovereignty (for the judiciary this lasted until the Supreme Court became the final appeals court in 1949), and with a statute of the imperial parliament as the major piece of its constitution, limitations were placed on both judicial and parliamentary authority. Finally, the attempt to build exclusive jurisdictions for either federal or provincial governments led to disputes over which jurisdiction had authority and not if government per se had authority. All of these factors curbed the range of judicial review to questions of narrow law and proper jurisdiction.

The American judiciary applied judicial review more widely and freely. In Chief Justice Marshall's hands, judicial review was a powerful force favoring conservatives and the federal government. Marshall's achievement further divided federal authority and established judicial review in the state judiciaries. The American distrust of centralized
government and the notion of popular sovereignty found a powerful tool in judicial review. Judicial review made the judiciary an equal branch of government; and as the final arbiter of law, the judiciary in a sense became "more equal than others." With such an elevated role the judiciary became more political for it could be used in opposition to the other branches of government.

Constitution and Effects of Judicial Institutions

The sacredness of a constitution is the final comparative note between the United States and Canadian judicial systems. The mundane character of the BNA Act and other documents of the Canadian constitution stemmed in part from its being another country's statute and from the non-revolutionary history of Canadian political development. In the United State the constitution was treated as an expression of the will of the people that must not be thwarted. It was treated with almost religious reverence. The Canadian and the British polities treated the constitution as a guide to government and as a codification of procedural necessities. The American view of the constitution was that it is a procedural guide but that it is also an embodiment of highly charged ultimate values.

This different treatment of the constitution led to different roles for the law and for the legal system. In the United States, the constitution raised law above the control of government. The American constitution was raised to this level by interpretation and the necessity of extraordinary concurrent majorities.
The effect of the foregoing differences in Canadian and American judicial institutions was to politicize the judicial process in the United States, to insulate the judiciary's decision-making, and to augment legalistic tendencies. On the other hand, the Canadian judiciary was more subordinated to the other political institutions. By making the judiciary a tool of party politics and by giving the federal government quasi-judicial powers (disallowance of provincial legislation) the Canadian political system directed political opposition to focus more directly on the parliament, cabinet, and administration.

With the increased role of judicial review in the American system, the judicial institutions increased the sites, opportunities, and rewards of political influence. Judicial delay became as sure a policy as denial. The pattern of judicial powers also put a premium on legal battles while it discounted executive and legislative power. The American judicial system thus helped to frustrate innovative social policy, especially labour policy, while it channelled political opposition into legal suits.

The device of judicial review in the United States was used repeatedly before 1938 to thwart the intent of legislators. From the use of anti-trust legislation against unions to the revoking of the New Deal NRA, the United States Supreme Court led the American judiciary on a series of dilatory steps away from the intention of lawmakers. The effect on those seeking reform of labour laws was to frustrate government policy and to re-locate pressure and conflict to where change could be
effected: the grass roots of politics, the state governments, the establishment of minimal rights or opportunities, and the local plant and employer.

Although the Canadian judicial system's effect did bear some resemblance to the American, it was not so extreme. In general, Canadian judges and the Privy Council remained subordinate to parliamentary intent and gave government legislation wide latitude. Judicial review often came late and would usually reserve power to another level of government. In the case of the Industrial Disputes Investigations Act, this basic labour legislation operated for almost twenty years before it was declared to be an infringement of provincial rights. This long period of federal control allowed the IDI Act to take root and established the legitimacy of its basic approach. Even after the Privy Council's decision on the IDI Act most provinces adopted the federal act as their own.

It was not that anti-reform or anti-labour groups did not try to use the judicial system to their advantage; rather, the judicial system in Canada diminished the ability to use the judiciary for delay and denial. Opposition to government policies was directed to the legislature and cabinet, and ultimately to the parties that controlled the government.

**Federalism**

The question of federalism and centralization of power has been one of the main animators of political conflict in the United States and Canada. This question is not unrelated to the fate of socialism, for federal political institutions, it
can be argued, segmented and frustrated efforts at reform. In large, diverse, and federally structured polities, these political institutions may act as a brake on the rise to power of reform movements by diluting a movement's strength and establishing hurdles and counter-weights to reform.

The period of 1900-1960 for Washington State and British Columbia was relatively static for many of the institutions outlined above, with the exception of political parties. Federalism, however, changed appreciably, in both Canada and the United States. The most significant areas of concern for this study are the jurisdictional boundaries or field of effective administration of the two levels of government. Judicial interpretations, war, and national economic and social trends, affected federalism in both countries.

American Federalism: The Proliferation of Competing Arenas

In the United States, the Civil War precipitated a "revolution" in federalism that decreased the states' rights and asserted the supremacy of national power. In the decades up to the 1930's, this national power was extended in a slow and tentative manner. The federal level of government asserted or had powers conferred on it that were exercised infrequently or only symbolically. The Fourteenth Amendment extended the Bill of Rights to all states, although it was well into the twentieth century before this judicial interpretation was effectively administrated. The commerce clause of the constitution established the right of federal regulation of interstate commerce. In the late nineteenth century, the
commerce clause justified the initial and nominal regulation of national economic actors; expanded use of this clause, however, awaited a latter day. National government power fostered transcontinental railway construction, settlement of western lands, and most significantly, extension of a national industrial economy by protective tariffs and easy immigration. The rights of national government preeminence were exercised briefly during World War One, the most outstanding example being the virtual nationalization of the railways. The return to "normalcy" indicated not only a return to American isolation but also a return to a domestic status quo ante: federal rights of supremacy, but effective decentralization of power to the states and to private property interests.

Thus the period up to the 1930's combined federal regulation with a wide latitude for state regulation. The federal government claimed the right to regulate all interstate commerce (within the bounds set by the Supreme Court), and the lack of regulation still prevented state governments from taking action. In this period states retained much room for innovation and their decisions were often insulated from national consequences. However as the economy grew more national in scope and as national corporations came to dominate whole industrial sectors, thus reducing the scope of "free markets", individual state social conditions and policies spilled over into the national arena. By 1930 the modernizing economic forces had created an effective national market in many important commodities and had consolidated economic control.
into an oligopolistic pattern that is now familiar.

The New Deal of the 1930's sought to implement the federal rights and to apply these powers in an unprecedented scope and detail. At first the New Deal was not successful in these efforts, as the Supreme Court invalidated much of the important New Deal legislation. After 1937, the court acquiesced, upholding revisions of earlier programs.32

Though the twentieth-century revolution in state-federal relations is usually dated from the New Deal, it is more properly seen as a product of the response to a war economy. The heightened role of the federal government, first because of World War Two and then because of the Cold War, did not mean a diminution of state government: it was not a zero-sum game. Rather, the activities of both levels of government expanded -- often in the same fields -- primarily through a complex system of grants-in-aid, cost sharing programs, and deficit financing.

Thus the changed dynamic of federal-state relations after the New Deal increased government programs at all levels, although the most noticeable change was an increase in federal government power as compared to previous decades. After the 1930's the specialization of government policies increased and government power proliferated, often duplicating programs at the two levels. In effect, the New Deal and the warfare economy added significant new sites to be politically contested and to control policy.

These changes in federal and state government, nonethe-
less, did not really rationalize government relations. By adding another layer of government it created more "differentiation" but it did not bring order to federal-state relations. Consequently, numerous institutional barriers continued to exist to block and delay national policies. The expansion of government after 1940 did not have an accompanying "integration" of government powers into a clearly organized structure.

The effect of these federal and state trends was to continue and extend the fragmentation of American political institutions. In Washington State, the importance of federal power had been a long standing concern. Like many western states, Washington State's economy and politics were deeply influenced by federal politics. The control of railroads, federal ownership of a large proportion of Washington State's land, federal control of interstate waters, federal timber policy, and federal defense-related spending were longstanding external impacts on Washington State. After the New Deal ascendance of the federal government, the importance of federal policy increased for Washington State, as it did for most states. But the rise of federal importance did not mean a simplifying of government policy or influence. Instead, it reinforced the old pattern of grass-roots politics and the fragmentation of authority. With increased federal spending local representatives became more valuable; federal initiatives on public power did not supplant local or private power companies; control of timber resources were still divided between federal, state and private owners.
Washington State became subject to national issues and social forces, but the institutions remained remarkably the same and, if anything, reinforced the older pattern. Constitutionally, the federal-state relations shifted to co-jurisdiction and did not move control to a different level of government. Thus civil rights, labor relations, political rights, commerce, and transportation were all controlled by both the federal and state level of government.

Canada: The Emergence of "Co-operative Federalism"

The Canadian trends in federalism, on the other hand, were a re-assignment of power to the province and a system for simplifying concurrent jurisdiction. The early pattern of centralized federalism and later decentralization of government power and jurisdiction was not always in this direction. In addition the early centralization created a relative uniformity of policy and government structure that persisted after the onset of decentralization.

The pattern of federal-provincial powers had a decided federal presumption from confederation to between the world wars, when a number of factors began to erode federal supremacy. First, beginning around World War One the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council issued a number of decisions that interpreted constitutional powers more in favor of the provinces. The decisions had the effect of reducing federal areas of jurisdiction and federal power by de-emphasizing the "peace, order and good government" clause in favor of the specific powers granted to each level of government. Second, the jurisdictions given
to the provinces that were originally thought to be of a mainly local nature became more important; these jurisdictions even acted as a "residuary" power for the province's controlled property, civil rights, resources, and labour relations. Third, the settlement and development of the western provinces created political and economic demands on the federal system that were not easily accommodated within the previous political structures. This alienation of the west took many forms including third parties and demands for a "better deal". As a response to the special status of the west, Saskatchewan and Alberta were ceded control of their resources which had been withheld from them.

By the 1930's federal domination of the provinces began to erode. The outcome of this shift in power and jurisdiction was the beginning of a patchwork federalism in which some provinces allowed the federal government to control certain programs, other provinces "rented" services from the federal government, others adopted federal policies as their own, and others fashioned their own policies. This tendency to decentralize government power was arrested (actually delayed) by World War Two and the consequent centralization of policies needed for the war and immediate post-war period. After World War Two's emergency was well past the pre-war ascendence of the provinces resumed under "co-operative federalism" fueled by resource-based development and the rise of Quebec.

The political effect of this power shift was to increase the jurisdictional scope of provincial authority. A pertinent example is found in the labour relations field. For twenty
years after its adoption in 1907, the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act was liberally applied to many labour disputes not strictly within the federal sphere of competence. In 1925 the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council limited the applicability of the IDI Act to strictly federal areas of jurisdiction. The provinces had to adopt their own policies. British Columbia for the decade after this decision did little other than apply the federal code in their own areas of jurisdiction. In the late 1930's the province started on a path of separate labour policy that continued after the war and has resulted in one of the most experimental and distinctive labour codes in the country.

The decentralization of jurisdictional authority made provincial governments more efficacious, more desirable objects to control, and more easily influenced and controlled. The smaller scale of provincial government reduced the dilution of political influence many groups experienced on the national level.

Another important consequence of the changed federal and provincial relations was the manner in which the decentralization was accomplished. Though decentralization involved a certain amount of overlapping programs, there was a relative clarity of control in the various policy fields. Gray areas of concurrent powers and areas of contested powers remained; but on the whole (and in comparison to the United States) many jurisdictional fields were clearly demarcated. Control of hydro-electric power, water resources, and underground resources
provide good examples. Whereas in Washington State, the control of these areas is divided between federal, state, local and private hands, in British Columbia the right to control these areas are clearly with the competence of the provincial government.\textsuperscript{36} In short, the decentralization of governmental responsibility in Canada has not created as massive a jungle of conflicting jurisdictions, as has the relative centralization of American federalism.

The effects of the different trends of federalism in Canada and the United States on reform and labour groups was to frustrate comprehensive change in the United States while facilitating local or small scale reforms; on the other hand, Canada's decentralization retained a simplicity of government structure and by giving vigor to provincial governments made them more appropriate, and also easier targets for influence. American federalism in the twentieth-century increased the sites of political influence and created numerous overlapping and concurrent jurisdictions. Though national economic and political forces increasingly intruded on states, the political institutions of federalism were not reorganized in an integrated, rational manner. Canadian federalism, while holding the possibility of fragmentation born of decentralization, retained the tradition of unified government and policy, but with the provinces as the increasingly important level of government. Within their wide ambit the provinces were able to integrate policies and institutions under the control of the provincial cabinet in a manner not available to American
Many discussions of political institutions only include the topics analyzed so far in this chapter. The "formal" institutions of executive, judiciary, legislature, and federalism are usually only supplemented by party and pressure groups, for the latter are held to be vital "aggregating links" in the political system.

In this and the following sections of this chapter, we will examine two institutional areas that are usually treated as policy, but, because of the longevity of the policy and the importance of these areas in structuring further policy and political influence, are more properly treated as political institutions. The first topic -- the political institutions that directly affect the private economy and its authority relations -- is especially important for it was the expansion of government control that most socialist groups sought. Indeed, it will be argued that the pattern of the institutions that affected the economy affected the fate of socialism by establishing precedents and obligations to adopt socialist-like policies. The second topic (the influence of the external forces of war, empire and competition) is included for this factor has been different for Canada and the United States; also, it has created different institutions and policies in the two nations. In addition, some of the greatest stimuli to political modernization and centralization have come through armed conflict (both internal and external) and
international competition. External forces created a broader range of state activity in Canada at an earlier date, thus accelerating its political modernization when compared to the United States.

The major political institutions of the economy are private property, the industrial relations system, and regulation of the economy and public enterprise. Undoubtedly there may be other topics that conceivably could be listed, but for the purposes of this chapter these three will illustrate the major pattern of these types of institutions.

Private Property

Though Canada and the United States inherited a similar private property tradition this does not mean that private property is viewed identically in the two countries. To a degree the two traditions of private property stemmed from different sources: on the Canadian side, it comes from the old theory that all property ultimately belonged to the crown; on the American side, Locke has been laid over the older theory, thus retaining the idea of government control, but taking rather literally the notion of property arising from a man mixing his work with a piece of property and the virtual equation of property with liberty.37

The one tradition surrenders immediate control to the present occupant, while the ultimate control and the strong right to regulate present use is vested in the parliament. The American tradition apparently gives a stronger claim to the immediate occupant, by surrounding private property with
constitutional guarantees. The British may have created the notion of a "man's home is his castle", but the American's have placed a "constitutional moat" around the castle. Though the legal treatment of private property is much the same in the two countries, the American constitutional guarantees imbue private property with qualitative and mainly psychological differences.

In British Columbia the theory of private property came directly from England when the province was established as a colony; it was later reinforced by English Canadian legal traditions when British Columbia joined the Dominion. As part of the terms under which the Hudson's Bay Company surrendered control of the coast province and later ratified in constitutional provisions, the British Columbia government had the right to control directly all lands not alienated. 38

The importance of the crown's control of property is nowhere more evident than in the control that the province exercises over the underground resources and in the regulation and leasing of crown lands, especially timber lands. The British Columbia government originally controlled nearly all of the land in the province and through a series of sales, trades and grants it ceded ownership to individuals and corporations. 39 Land grants were a favorite way of inducing railway construction. The government also leased out timberland to induce cutting of the forests. The latter policy of course retained ultimate control for the crown. But even the alienated land was still subject to many government controls and regulations, especially as regards sub-soil rights. In consequence,
British Columbia, following the general Canadian pattern, retained a strong influence in regard to the use of private property.

Washington State, following the American pattern was subject to two different, important conditions. First, like many other western states, much of Washington's land was owned by the federal government. Federal land included a sizeable proportion of the state's timberland in national parks and forests. The federal government, also controlled considerable amounts of land through Indian and military reserves. Second, the Lockean tradition hedged the rights of either level of government to regulate the use of private property. Significantly, sub-surface rights attached wholly to the owner. Finally, the virtual equation of liberty with property gave a strong presumption to individual rights when in conflict with community rights. In consequence, the Washington State pattern fragmented control of private property. Land ownership and control was dispersed by having a large "absentee landlord" that was not subject to regulation by the state government.

The difference between Canadian and American legal attitudes toward property should not be overstated. Indeed, the disposal and regulation of property was often very similar. But beyond this similarity the Canadian notion of private property and especially the large public ownership of land had a stronger residue of public regardingness; the American conception of private property had to balance public regardingness with the constitutional concern for individual freedom.
The difference in the Canadian and American attitudes to private property had several implications. First, the attitude that property could be used in almost any manner and for almost any ends was more fully developed in the United States. When the major form of property changed from land to industrial property and commodity goods the rights inherent in property attached to the newer forms of property. In consequence, state regulation of private property in its newer industrial form faced more difficulties in the United States.

Second, the different institutions of private property reinforced different attitudes and created different motivations. The perception of high walls erected around property in the United States reinforced the individualism of the entrepreneur; it drove him to greater competition with other businessmen and made him a more intractable foe of unions and reformers. By entrenching the notion of private possession, the American constitution motivated businessmen to ignore demands for social responsibility. The "canonization" of a right to property and the connection of property to freedom inculcated a drive for property on the part of all segments of society. This special place for property in American society reinforced monetary evaluations of the quality of life and helped to channel reforms away from large scale social change to small tasks and to bread and butter issues. For unions the sacredness of property changed their goals and their methods of organization. Since attempts to regulate "private property" were often futile, unions devoted their attention to local, shop-floor organization; this goal and type of organization, of course, reinforced the
bread and butter type of unionism.

This brings the discussion to the third consequence of American notions of property: it tended to privatize most social conflict, especially between employer and employee. With the apparent underwriting of property rights, conflicts were often removed from the public realm. Thus if regulation of property occurred, it was to ensure the right of opportunity. The centre stage of American regulation was occupied by policies meant to enforce the right to compete, the right to opportunities, and the rights of expression and private organization. The key was passive regulation, not intervention, planning, or direct aid.

The Canadian notions of property, on the other hand, allowed more easily for state regulation. Because property was not protected by explicit constitution rules, property owners had to defend their exercise of authority in terms of the public's good: they could not wrap themselves with a constitutional guarantee. This concept of property also changed the motivations of unions and reformers by widening the scope of activities and the schemes of amelioration. By opening the door to a stronger public regardingness and public ownership, property in Canada opened the possibility of a wider consciousness, broadened pressure groups concerns, and increased the necessity to organize. Finally, though the Canadian concept of property also tended to privatize disputes, it also created the possibility of direct, active state intervention. The pattern of Canadian reforms thus was more interventionist and
directly regulatory. Canadian economic policy fostered oligopoly and direct government involvement. One of the most important areas of these government reforms was in the labour relations field to which the discussion will now turn.

Industrial Relations

By providing support or through forming a direct alliance, labour unions can play a key role in building a socialist or labour party. Since the industrial relations system has a major impact on unions, it is appropriate to ask did the industrial relations systems push British Columbia's and Washington State's unions toward different political strategies?

The evolution of the labour relations system in Canada and the United States is a rather complicated affair in all its details. The general provisions and trends, nonetheless, are fairly clear, and will be outlined before turning to a more detailed examination.

First, the Canadian industrial relations system as regulated by law changed from a centralized system in the early part of this century to a more decentralized system beginning in the inter-war period; it progressed further in this direction after World War Two. After the period of decentralization had set in, British Columbia experimented widely with its labour laws, which have come to constitute perhaps the most unique labour relations system in Canada. South of the forty-ninth parallel labour laws first emerged at the state level. Labour legislation gained a foothold at the federal level in the aftermath of the First World War and became
entrenched at that level in the thirties. The labour relations system established in the New Deal became the major American system.

A second trend involves the role of the government in dispute settlement. The Canadian industrial relations system, and especially British Columbia's labour relations system since the late 1930's, projected the government into labour-management disputes more than have Washington State's and the United States' industrial relations systems. Since the adoption of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act in 1907, industrial conflicts within British Columbia's jurisdiction and in the federal labour domain have required specific actions of the two parties to the dispute, have compelled negotiation, investigation, and mediation by a board, a report and recommendations on settlement, and control of the timing of work stoppages. In Washington State and the United States, labour law has refrained from becoming directly involved in the disputes. Starting with the Norris-LaGuardia Act (1926) through the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act (with the exception of the emergency provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act) American labour laws established procedures guaranteeing rights, opportunities, fairness, and internal democracy. These laws refrained from mandating bargaining procedures, mediation, investigation and strike and lockout timing. Canada and British Columbia adopted many of the provisions of American labour laws within a few years of American adoption, but Canadian law kept the previously estab-
lished role of government supervision of bargaining through compulsory conciliation and delay.

**British Columbia's Labour Relations System**

The core of the Canadian industrial relations law (the IDI Act) came in response to coal strikes in British Columbia and Alberta coal fields in 1907, although the idea of conciliation boards and compulsory provisions date to 1900 and 1903 respectively. The IDI Act applied to mining, transportation, communication, and public utilities; it could also be extended to disputes in other industries if the two parties to the dispute agreed. The act provided for the delay of work stoppages while a tripartite board conciliated and investigated the dispute. The board was also charged with making recommendations as to a fair settlement. The act did not establish collective bargaining rights nor did it construct the mechanism for determining bargaining rights and agents.

During and after World War One the federal government expanded the scope of the IDI Act to cover war-related industries and to cope with labour unrest. In 1925 the IDI Act was successfully challenged in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and was retracted to cover only disputes in the federal domain. Since a provision in the amended IDI Act allowed provinces to continue coverage of this act by passing enabling legislation, the act retained its national significance as all provinces except Prince Edward Island passed the necessary legislation. By the end of the thirties, however, Alberta and British Columbia adopted their own codes.
which except for a few provisions were the same as the federal code. 43

Under the crisis conditions of World War Two, the federal government again expanded the powers of the IDI Act to cover war-related industries. P.C. 1003 (1943) combined the provisions of the IDI Act and most of the Wagner Act's provisions for the right to organize, certification of unions, compulsory collective bargaining, and the regulation of unfair labour practices. This second major labour law became the model for most of the provinces after the cessation of the wartime emergency in 1948. 44

After the war, British Columbia legislated major innovations in its labour laws. In 1947, 1954, 1959 and 1961 the provincial government introduced changes aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labour relations system. Although the changes increased the options available, the British Columbia labour code retained the basic ideas of compulsory conciliation, mandatory delay of work stoppages, government supervised strike votes, and conciliation recommendations. 45 The changes in the forties and fifties actually increased government control and discretion in labour relations by requiring government supervised strike votes before a strike and after a new offer was made. Unions were also made liable for illegal strikes. In 1959 legislation permitted court injunctions against illegal strikes, picketing, and boycotting and exposed unions to damage suits. Finally, the legislation after 1954 gave the provincial labour minister several sub-
stantial discretionary powers. 46

Washington's Labour Relations System

The labour relations system of Washington State in contrast to British Columbia's system moved from one of virtual free competition to federal regulation of the competition.

Labour unions in Washington State date to the first years after statehood and have long been prominent aspects of the industrial system in the state. Legislation on industrial matters also dates from the early decades of this century: Workmen's Compensation Law (1911), eight hour day for women (1911), minimum wage laws (1913), and child labour laws (1903 and 1907). 47

Although state laws and initiatives were passed to control the excesses of industrialism, Washington State legislators refrained from creating a legal system of labour conflict regulation. A state labour commissioner was created at the turn of the century; his powers were limited to investigation, and his office was under-funded. Following the laissez-faire pattern of labour relations prevalent throughout the nation, employers and unions were left to their own devices to settle disputes. State and local authorities were sometimes induced to use police or troops to quell the sharper labour conflicts; but up until the mid-thirties, with one exception, no legislation was passed to regulate labour disputes. 48 When labour legislation was finally passed it was not comparable to the IDI Act in Canada.

Two pieces of national legislation passed in the 1930's
formed the core of American industrial relations. The Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) reduced the use of injunctions against unions and (once again) affirmed that the anti-trust laws were not meant to include unions. The Wagner Act (1936) followed in the mold of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by establishing rights and opportunities, and by providing the machinery for their enforcement. The National Labour Relations Act (Wagner Act) was built on the three principles of freedom to organize unions, freedom from employer interference or domination, and compulsory bargaining. It also established unfair labour practices by management and established machinery to determine bargaining units and to investigate complaints. Finally, the Wagner Act created a voluntary mediation and conciliation service.

These national labour laws were in a sense minimal legislation. These laws affirmed rights, privileges, and opportunities. Insofar as the acts regulated and intervened, it was to uphold rights but not to closely regulate the process of dispute settlement. The limited nature of American labour laws continued with subsequent labour laws. The Taft-Hartley Act (1947) established unfair union practices, asserted individual union members' rights, and provided for government interference in disputes in an emergency. The Landrum-Griffin Act (1959) continued this legislative direction with protections for union democracy.

All of these national labour laws were applied in Washington State through the federal government's regulation of interstate commerce and through its role as a major
employer and buyer of goods and services. Of course many of the state's workers could not avail themselves of the federal legislation, including farm workers and those in small businesses.

**Effects of the Labour Relations Systems**

The two preceding sections emphasized the differences in the labour relations systems of Canada and the United States. This highlighting of differences was not meant to overlook the extensive similarities, for in many ways there is a single pattern of North American labour relations. Strong local unions, decentralized bargaining, high levels of strikes and lockouts, fragmented union federations, and weak employer organizations characterize these labour-management relations. Because of these similarities, the differences of labour law can be seen as an important factor in the differences between Canadian and American industrial relations. Several effects can be in part traced to the different labour laws.

First, it has been argued that the Canadian tradition of compulsory delay and conciliation exacerbated labour conflict more than the American regulation of rights system. By postponing and structuring the labour conflict, Canadian law (and especially British Columbia law) delayed the point of genuine negotiation, placed a premium on union and employer "solidarity" in the hopes of winning at the conciliation and report stage, and made strikes harder to stop once started. The American laissez-faire and voluntary mediation tradition offered no such premiums to union or employer.
Second, the encouragement of employee cohesiveness mentioned above was the very heart of the IDI Act. Although this act did not guarantee union rights as later legislation did, it implicitly encouraged employee organizations. Despite the fact that employee organizations did not have safeguards against employer domination (and in some cases the unions were tantamount to company unions), the Canadian labour relations system from 1907 provided legitimation for union activity and provided a subtle form of encouragement. A comparable encouragement and legitimation was absent in Washington State and the United States until the 1930's.

In addition to exacerbating conflict and organization, the Canadian labour system introduced politics into the regular process of dispute settlement. The routine administration of the IDI Act (and later British Columbia's own code) was entrusted to a labour minister or board that was politically appointed. Because of their influence on the disputes settlement machinery, these political figures and positions became important targets for influence. If captured through election, the powers of these offices would be a prized trophy for a pro-labour government. When the politicization of the labour system was coupled with the parliamentary union of executive and legislature, a natural tendency existed for unions to direct their pressure through parties and parliament to the executive. The American system, on the other hand, privatized industrial conflict as much as possible by giving government a lower profile with voluntary mediation services and by
channelling disputes into judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.

Finally, because the administration of labour disputes machinery in the United States was largely a federal matter, labour's influence on this machinery became diffused. In other words, what political direction the American labour laws imparted was subject to the dilution of national concerns and the diluting effect of the national political institutions. On the other hand, the devolution of labour relations to the British Columbia government concentrated labour's political influence for provincial political divisions were simpler than the national political scene.

**Economic Regulation and Public Ownership**

A third aspect of the political institutions of the economy is government ownership and the type and extent of government regulation of economic activity. The issue of government ownership and regulation of economic activity is important for the "no socialism" problem for a number of reasons. First, the scope of government ownership and regulation indicates the degree to which the public sphere controls the private sphere. Government regulation indicates the amount of government's power and thus is an index of its modernization. Second, the scope of government regulation may play a direct role in the establishment of a socialist party by partially validating socialist ideology and policy. An active, interventionist (though non-socialist) government means that the "distance" between socialist and non-socialist parties is smaller.
The major differences between Canada and the United States was a more interventionist Canadian policy and a greater willingness to rely more on "market forces" in the United States. In addition the United States regulatory process widely employed appointed boards to de-politicize regulation and it elaborated a system of special districts that were highly decentralized, "non-political", or independent of centralized state direction; government ownership was limited and fragmented. Canadian economic regulation (though using bodies similar to American regulatory agencies) has not gone as far in the "non-political", decentralized direction by maintaining a more or less explicit government control and centralization; government ownership was more widespread and a more accepted practice.

**Economic Regulation in British Columbia and Canada**

The discussion above on private property and government policy made reference to one of the important aspects of the regulatory process in British Columbia and Canada. Because the BNA Act clearly stated that control of property and resources were provincial matters and because much of British Columbia's land was retained by the provincial crown, the British Columbia government had a strong weapon with which to regulate resource development and land use. The governments of the early twentieth century were so interested in opening the province up that very often little regard was given to regulation. Though the provincial governments after World War One were more careful about timberland sales and grants of
large blocks of land (as had been given to stimulate railway construction), the governments up to 1960 did not exercise their regulatory powers to the fullest.

As was common throughout North America, the British Columbia and Canadian governments stimulated railway construction through land grants, monetary grants, and the underwriting of debts. In British Columbia the period up to World War One was one of a frantic railway boom, not unlike that experienced throughout the continent: grandiose promises from railway promoters, government subsidies, profiteering, and corruption on a large scale. Government stimulation of railways was not unique to British Columbia; but what was perhaps unique was that the agent of these subsidies was a provincial government that had a major influence on the railways because of its control of crown land.

Another type of government regulation came through the policies aimed at the agricultural sector. Provincial government policy, from as early as the turn of the century, had been to foster the co-operation of agriculturists, first in the establishment of co-operatives and then later in the founding of compulsory marketing boards that regulated intra-provincial trade. British Columbia pioneered the concept of marketing boards with legislation in 1927 and 1936. The marketing boards as established by law gave monopoly power to the producers and were beyond the immediate control of the government.

The creation of marketing boards, is indicative of another trait of Canadian economic regulation: where direct
government regulation was not desired, the policy was often to encourage oligopoly or even monopoly. The history of such practices in British Columbia stretches back to the origins of the province as a Hudson Bay Company trading region. The Company's exclusive trading rights were viewed as the cause of high prices in Victoria and caused much resentment among the colonists. Later in the nineteenth-century the virtual monopoly granted to the Canadian Pacific Railway and its huge land holdings granted as part of the terms of union gave the CPR tremendous economic and political power in British Columbia. In the early part of this century the CPR moved to consolidate its control over the southeast interior of the province by purchasing small railroads and by consolidating most of the mines in the area.

A central element in Canadian attitudes to large or exclusive economic enterprises is the governmental attitude to economic competition. The endorsement of the virtues of the "free market", notwithstanding, Canadian government policy against corporate concentration has been notable primarily for its toothlessness. Anti-trust legislation has been weak and enforcement weaker. In consequence, few limitations were placed on corporate takeovers. When the "free market" tends to oligopoly and monopoly with so little government opposition, then the dedication to competition must have been weak to begin with.

Government regulation of industrial relations as mentioned above shifted from being primarily a federal concern
to a provincial concern during the period under consideration. British Columbia also passed legislation regulating working conditions: a workman's compensation act (1902), a trades union bill (1902), minimum wage laws (1917, 1924), and the establishment of a ministry of labour (1917). Unemployment insurance was delegated to the federal government through constitutional amendment in 1940. Old-age pensions came under concurrent jurisdiction in 1951.57

Government regulation of the important transportation, communications, utilities, and banking sectors are also consistent with the pattern outlined above. Railway regulation was a federal matter and British Columbia had little say in what many felt was an onerous CPR. One of British Columbia's few methods of counteracting the massive influence of the CPR was to offer crown lands and to underwrite debts for other proposed transcontinental railways. Though much was given away, little was built; and what was built, much fell into the hands of the CPR and later the Canadian National Railway.

The regulation of communications, especially telecommunications, was a federal jurisdiction in Canada, as much of it is in the United States. But again the Canadian method of regulating and providing for this essential industry is different. Owing to a number of considerations, Canadian broadcast regulation entailed public ownership and strong regulation of private broadcasters. The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Corporation (1932) was designed as a crown corporation to provide Canadian broadcasting and programming in the face of
the imminent American buy-out of Canadian stations. 58

Control of utilities and utility rates also follows similar trends to the transportation and telecommunications sectors. Controls of fuels has long played a significant role in Canadian public policy. Disruption of coal supplies due to a prolonged strike precipitated the IDI Act in 1907. Control and regulation of fuels in British Columbia was initiated in 1937. In the early war years the Fuel Board, with much controversy, was given the power to determine the retail price of gasoline. 59

The role of British Columbia government in electric utilities underwent profound changes after World War Two. Prior to the war two large private firms dominated electric power, the British Columbia Electric Railway Company and Cominco’s subsidiary, West Kootenay Power and Light. In 1945 the provincial government consolidated twenty-three small electric utilities under the British Columbia Power Corporation, a crown corporation. It was not subject to the control of the Public Utilities Commission and its "sole channel of accountability and direction (was) through the provincial cabinet." 60 In 1949, Alcan was given control over a major river system in the province’s northwest to power their aluminum plant. In the 1950’s the Social Credit Government adopted plans to develop both the Peace and Columbia rivers for their hydro-electric potential; and when British Columbia Electric would not adopt these goals of northern development, the provincial government nationalized the private utility in 1961. 61 Thus the history
of electric utilities in British Columbia is a good example of the Canadian pattern of fostering private monopoly and of strong government policy.

**Economic Regulation in Washington and the United States**

Government regulation in Washington State and the United States often took a similar tack as the Canadian form, but it also differed in some important respects. The control of land and the regulation of economic activity through the control of land was less extensive in Washington State than in British Columbia. In part this difference in land policy was due to the federal control of land policies in the territorial period and the federal governments retaining of large amounts of land since statehood. The state of Washington had less clout than the British Columbia government because the former did not have as extensive proprietary rights to the state's territory. Instead, the American federal government, through a bewildering set of agencies controlled a large proportion of Washington's land. In addition, sub-surface resource rights accrued to the owner of the surface and not to the government.

Government aid to stimulate railway construction came from the national and local level, though the major support came from the federal government, before Washington's statehood. The public largesse to railroads was substantial (900,000 acres in Washington State to the Northern Pacific alone) and the public's ire against railways and their connections to trusts worked its way into the debate on Washington State's constitution. The regulation of railways in Washington
State after the 1905 establishment of a state railway commission was split between the federal government (the Interstate Commerce Commission) and the state. 63

Washington's policy toward agricultural development conformed to the predominant American pattern of allowing the market and private associations to set the path. Government policy stimulated opportunities and developments by special legislation aimed at settling arid lands, improving irrigation and transportation, stimulating agricultural research and electrification. 64 When further government action was demanded to cope with the agricultural disasters of the thirties the answer was found in a welfare system for farmers: a price support system. This system preserved competition, allowed the market to set prices in normal times, and underwrote the price a farmer would receive by setting as a minimum a percentage of normal prices, i.e., a parity system. The contrast with British Columbia is instructive: a mandatory market board versus controlled competition.

American regulatory policy codified popular attitudes against monopoly and cartels. Anti-trust measures, first adopted at the turn of century, were very popular in the American west, including Washington State. The tremendous power, manipulation, and corruption of the big companies, such as the Northern Pacific and Weyerhauser, fueled these sentiments in Washington State. But like many previous attempts to regulate the large American firms, Washington State's jurisdiction over these national firms was severely limited. Because
of the nationalization of the control of commerce, the federal government became the primary focus of anti-trust agitation and legislation. The model of government regulation was one of preserving "competition," rights, and opportunities. That the anti-trust laws did not effectively guarantee competition, rights, or opportunities is not our concern here; rather, the point is that the model of economic regulation adopted and proclaimed (and to an extent effected a mild) competition and saw a positive virtue in diverse competing institutions. In a sense the governmental system of checks and balances and the separation of powers was the model for the regulation of trusts.

Two anti-trust cases were important in Washington State during the early period of this century. In the Northern Securities case, federal trust busters dissolved the merger of the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific Railways. The case also involved the Union Pacific Railway; or in other words three of Washington State's four transcontinental railroads. The other case did not involve a court settlement but effected the same end. This second case involved the lumber price lists established by the Westcoast Lumbermen's Association in its attempt to control cutthroat competition. In 1906 after accusations of "trust" and "cartel", the association stopped strict enforcement and reported "prevailing prices."65

Government regulation of transportation, communication, and utilities in Washington and the United States displays the familiar fragmentation of authority and the attempt to insure a degree of competition. As mentioned above the regula-
laction of railways was divided between weak state regulation and stronger federal regulation. Broadcast communications in the United States, like Canada, was almost wholly a federal power; but unlike Canada the American's have relied on an independent regulatory agency to enforce minimum broadcast standards but not to engage in actual broadcast operations.

The fragmentation of the regulatory process for Washington State's electric utilities provide a good comparison to British Columbia's experience. The control of navigable waters lay with the federal government and control of other waters lay with the state and private owners. Washington's electric utilities near the turn of the century were divided between municipal power systems and private power companies. In the 1930's two new actors entered the electric utility field. In 1930 after years of agitation by farmers and rural residents, a public utility district (PUD) law permitted unincorporated districts to organize utility districts. Since the capital expenditures and the organizational requirements of the PUDs were high, the setting up of the electric power districts proceeded slowly. The other actor, the federal government, was actually an array of competing bureaucracies. The Rural Electrification Agency, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior, and the Federal Power Commission all had their hands in electric power development in Washington State. The Bonneville Power Administration established to construct hydro-electric projects on the Columbia River and to market this power incor-
porated this perplexing maze of jurisdictions. After World War Two (and as British Columbia moved in the direction of increasing provincial control of electric power) Washington's electric power system changed little. New dams were built, PUDs established, and a regional grid constructed; but several attempts to integrate the power systems failed due to opposition from almost every organized group in the region.

Public Enterprise

The Canadian tradition of fostering private monopolies to ensure state policy shifted in the twentieth century to the founding of government-owned and-operated businesses. At the federal level the first and most prominent examples of public enterprise were the Canadian National Railway (1920) and the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Corporation. The use of public enterprises for government economic policy, however, was not limited to the federal government. Some of the most conservative provincial governments of the day "nationalized" economic enterprises that were deemed vital to provincial interests. In the first decade of this century Ontario established a publicly-owned railroad and public electric power. Saskatchewan and Manitoba took over their telephone systems. Alberta entered into competition with the provincial phone companies.

In British Columbia public enterprise dates from World War One. In the face of foregoing further northern development with a bankrupt Pacific Great Eastern railway, the British Columbia government took over the railway in 1918. The control of the railway was always political as the premier
usually retained it in his portfolio. The second instance of public enterprise in British Columbia came after World War Two with the creation of the British Columbia Power Corporation to furnish electricity. The period after 1952 was one of expanded use of the crown corporation.

Of course the initial reasons for public enterprise were not a desire to expand state power out of a highly ideological perception of the virtues of state control. Rather the two cases of public enterprise in British Columbia before 1950 were pragmatic decisions. Although born of pragmatic needs, both public enterprises became conscious tools of province-building. In other words, public enterprise in British Columbia provided the political means by which provincial policy overcame the shortcomings of private development.

Turning to Washington State, the role of public enterprise is quite different. It is not the case that public enterprise or government "corporations" are not to be found. Municipalities and other districts have long operated utilities and power systems; and the federal government acted as timber merchant and electricity salesman. Rather, the scope and freedom of action of public enterprise has been severely curtailed in Washington State and the United States. Constitutional provisions placed limitations on government enterprise and the politics of decision-making made establishment of public corporations difficult and usually hamstrung their operations once the enterprises were founded.

The limitations placed on public enterprise originated
in the anti-political, anti-legislature sentiments that were widespread in Washington State at the time of statehood. Some of the limitations were incorporated into the state's constitution, which placed a $400,000 ceiling on public debt and prohibited municipalities from incurring financial obligations larger than 5% of taxable property. Municipal debt could be increased by 5% if the money went for public utilities. Furthermore, the state constitution forbids lending state monies to individuals or corporations and forbids stock ownership in corporations. The federal government was not constrained by such detailed constitutional language on debts, property values, and stock. Nevertheless its ambit for public enterprise was restricted by the federal limitations of power and the constitutional interpretations that defined very narrowly the governmental powers for the general welfare. The powers available to the federal government to control navigable waters, interstate commerce, and defense carried with them strong jurisdictional boundaries such that public enterprises were circumscribed.

Public ownership of electric utilities provide a good example of the problems confronted by public enterprise. The constitutional hurdles and the massive funds needed for hydro-electric projects delayed the implementation of PUDs in Washington. A decade after the enabling act, only four were operating in Washington. After the Bonneville Power Administration established an intertie system with a preference clause for publicly owned utilities (thus obviating the necessity for PUDs to build their own hydro-electric systems) public utility
districts sprang up almost overnight. By 1965 Washington State had 24 PUDs and 21 municipal systems. At the state and the federal level proponents of public power encountered massive opposition from private utilities and faced strong constitutional limits. The municipal systems in Seattle and Tacoma and Puget Sound Power and Light squared off for battles over public power. The private utilities fought the legislative attempts to expand or establish public power. When public power came to Washington in 1930 it did not come as a statewide system but as a bevy of local systems. The federal government massively expanded public power in the decades after the New Deal. But even federal public enterprise was fought by private utilities and the former eventually subsumed an adjunct role as a provider of power to the latter and to the local public utilities. The BPA did not have the latitude of action given to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The United States Supreme Court in reviewing the enabling legislation for the TVA looked askance at federal "power business unless electricity was merely a by-product of projects sanctioned by traditional interpretations of the general welfare clause of the constitution—navigation, flood control, and defense of the nation." In other economic sectors that have seen public enterprises in western countries, Washington State followed the general American trend of leaving most commercial ventures to private companies. Railways, telephone, communications, transportation, resource development, and most energy systems have
been left to the market place. Government involvement in these areas has been minimal with regulations aimed at safety, fairness, and opportunities to compete.

The Effects of Political-Economic Relations

Throughout the discussion of the political institutions of the economy it has been noted that several themes recur when examining the Canadian and American policies. First, Canadian policy, whether at the federal or provincial level, has been more activist and more willing to intervene in economic matters. Second, Canadian institutions of crown and cabinet have more unfettered power to intervene in economic matters. This ability for Canadian government to intervene is especially strong at the provincial level with its control of property, resources, and civil rights. Third, Canadian political institutions of the economy are less subject to the problems of truncated or concurrent jurisdiction than are American institutions. Canadian political institutions on the economy was thus more unified, comprehensive, and possessed a clarity that was absent from American policy, for the latter had to fight a highly fragmented system of jurisdictions.

The political effects of these different political institutions of the economy were significant for reformers and labour groups. First, the more activist Canadian policy would tend to set precedents for further political intervention in the economy. Second, because some of the government policy directly and indirectly affected labour groups, the government became more of a target for political influence. Third, the greater
power and scope of Canadian government made the major reform proposals of labour, socialists, and other reformers realistic alternatives, if one could either influence or control the government. In Washington State and the United States, the opposite characteristics undercut government policies to regulate the economy, made the government less of an efficacious agent for social change, set precedents for private settlement of conflicts, and made the government less of a target for influence and capture.

**External Influence on Political Institutions**

The last topic of this chapter, like the previous topic is often omitted in discussions of political institutions. External influences, however, have had significant impacts on the internal policies and institutions of Canada and the United States. These influences whether in the form of war, empire, regional conflicts, or national competition have also had effects on British Columbia and Washington State.

The external influences are important for the "no socialism" problem for many of the same reasons that the political institutions of the economy were important. War, empire, regional conflicts and national competition had impacts on the scope of government, by necessitating a broad policy response. In this manner external influences provided some of the needs and rationale for government policy. In essence, the strong pull of external influences can be seen as one of the sources that modernizes political institutions. By responding, strong government policy legitimizes a policy-style similar to social-
ism, as it also creates the mutual obligations for loyalty, sacrifice, benefits, and support between citizens and government.

British Columbia and Canada

Foreign Rivalry

Confederation, the subsequent expansion of Canada to allow for the addition of the eastern and western areas in North America that were under British control, and the national policy of MacDonald have been described as "defensive expansionism". Under the competitive threat of the United States the British Northern American colonies and lands had to be consolidated or, it was thought, they faced the prospect of piecemeal absorption by the United States. "Defensive expansionism" was not only a rationale to deal with the external competition of the United States; it also had internal consequences that affected federalism, provincial governments, and government policy long after concern about political absorption had passed.

MacDonald's National Policy attempted to unify the British area of North America by adopting several policies. The act of political unification would not effectively prevent American encroachments if it was not accompanied by effective governmental control, settlement, and economic development of the western lands. Thus behind the policy of defensive expansionism lay the policy of strong state-led and state-induced social and economic development. In this strategy a trans-
continental railway formed a keystone. As a way of nation-building the CPR staked the Canadian claim to the west in opposition to the avaricious American railways. To a large extent the Canadian sponsorship of monopoly in areas of high national interest was part and parcel of "defensive expansionism." Similarly, anti-monopoly legislation in the pre-World War One period would have rebounded to favor American interests, especially the aggressive Great Northern Railway and the American mining interests in British Columbia.

Strong state regulation, intervention, and public enterprise became institutionalized due to the continual presence of a strong foreign competitor. The policy of "defensive expansionism" in the twentieth century was transmuted from the consolidation of far flung provinces and territories to the internal consolidation through social and economic development. Because of the tremendous geographical size, because of the magnitude of the economic and social issues, because of the inadequacy of the Canadian "marketplace" to meet these challenges, and because of the need for prompt action, extensions of state regulation, intervention, and public enterprise were justified by the phrase "the state or the United States."74

Empire and War

Another external factor of importance in fostering a more centralized, efficient role for government was the imperial connections to Britain. The British influence on Canada and on British Columbia in particular has long been
noted in political affairs. But the British influence was not limited to British liberties, a parliamentary government, immigrants, and identification with Britain. The imperial link placed two types of obligations on the Canadian governments. First, the welcoming of British capital investments and the necessity for stable government to insure these investments placed a strong impetus for speedy, straightforward, and undisputed competence of government policy.

The second imperial obligation was support for the empire, especially in times of war. And it is war that is the third major external force that helped to institutionalize a stronger state in Canada. As part of the British Empire and the Commonwealth, the Canadian government had to organize for the Boer War and the First and Second World Wars. In the later two conflicts especially, war created the necessity for comprehensive state powers to handle the emergency. This centralization of and expansion of authority subordinated the provinces, employers, and labour to national goals. In the war periods major lasting reforms were introduced, including labour legislation, railway reform and social welfare measures.

Regional Conflict

A final external factor is not an external national element but rather an extra-provincial factor: western alienation from central Canada. British Columbia's relation to central Canada and the federal government has often been marked by animosity and suspicion. "The spoilt child of Confederation" resented slow railway construction, the CPR's
domination of its politics and economy, the general "eastern" domination of the province politically and economically, and in general shared many of the "anti-eastern" grievances of the prairie provinces. The British Columbia government through the twentieth century often felt that eastern capital and politicians were only too willing to line their pockets at the province's expense and to prevent (perhaps through inaction) the province from reaching its full development. Thus, part of the animus for a strong, competent provincial government came from this antagonism. The anti-eastern sentiments led to provincial attempts to circumvent the CPR's monopoly of rail transportation by subsidizing other railway construction. Later when the Pacific Great Eastern faced bankruptcy the provincial government took it over as a buyer could not be found for it. Other transportation links and utilities development became part of W.A.C. Bennett's Ottawa-bashing rhetoric after his ascension to power in the early fifties. Thus in the first sixty years of the twentieth century the trend to decentralization of constitutional powers, the growth of provincial jurisdictions, and the anti-eastern sentiments led to a province-building strategy on the part of the British Columbia government. Much as Canada faced the option of "the State or the United States", British Columbia faced the option "the province or 'eastern' domination".

Washington and the United States

When set against the Canadian trends of external forces and institutions, the influences of these factors on Washington
State and the United States appear limited, infrequent, and subject to many internal impediments.

**Foreign Rivalries**

After the War of 1812, international rivalries did not pose a serious threat to the United States. Neither Canada, Great Britain, nor Mexico offered significant competition for continental expansion. From 1815 to 1941 the United States enjoyed a luxury offered to few nations: it was virtually free from military conflict with a sophisticated enemy, had no threats on its borders, and possessed an economy strong enough to resist foreign domination. Thus the United States' external rivals were sufficiently distant that it did not have to develop internal policies and mechanisms to mobilize its resources to meet external threats. Although the federal government erected a protective tariff, American national policy did not require the internal correlates of "defensive expansionism" noted in the Canadian case. Railroad building was a centre-piece of nation-building and expressed the power of the regnant northeast's industrialism. But the abundant resources, the size of the domestic market, and the lack of a foreign threat allowed government policies to foster competition. The construction of the Union Pacific expressed economic strength and abundance; the Canadian Pacific, national will and necessity.

The early twentieth-century, like the late nineteenth century, brought little impetus for state regulation that could not be handled by existing government machinery. The press of
foreign events did not lend a special quality to government affairs and policy. Without serious foreign rivalries, the United States government could afford the luxury of a competitive model of social affairs and only extended its powers in order to create competitive rights and opportunities. Through the first forty years of this century Americans and their government took little notice of foreign affairs. No imperial ties brought European conflicts to their soil, nor did they need to develop government machinery to respond to imperial obligations.

War

In the fifty years prior to 1941 the impact of war on the United States was minimal when compared to Canada. Entering the two world wars late, the United States experienced less of a strain from the wars. In World War One the governmental effects in the United States were significant with the virtual nationalization of railroads and the important federal intervention in the Northwest's forestry industry through the Spruce division and the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen; but at wars end the status-quo ante returned swiftly. In the Northwest one of the notable effects was the improved working conditions in the timber industry that the governments Spruce division affected. Nationally, the railroads returned to private hands and politics moved to the right.76

The impact of World War Two on the United States was entirely different as the war's length and the subsequent emergence of a permanent war readiness centralized and expanded
government activity. The government expansion of Roosevelt's New Deal paled before the expansion of government during the war and Cold War years. The impact of the war expenditures shifted the federal balance of power decisively in favor of the national government. The creation of a large, permanent army (a new phenomenon in American politics) had many civilian spin-offs: coupled with expenditures on welfare programs, war spending acted as the engine to create "aggregate demand" for the Keynesian view of the economy; and justified as defense related, the federal government expanded into programs previously at the borders of its proper sphere -- road building on a massive scale, support for higher education, and scientific and technological research. World War Two and the Cold War often provided the need and the constitutional justification for an expanded state.

The expanded federal power in Washington State mush-roomed overnight in the war crises. Shipbuilding, airplane construction, naval bases, and nuclear projects were all stimulated by the war and the latter three continued to be important during the Cold War.

As much as war expanded and centralized political power, however, it did so within constricted bounds and on limited subjects. The national government's new initiative was fully justified as a traditional constitutional power (defense); this virtue, however, created natural barriers to further government expansion and rationalization. Defense expenditures could only be spent on visibly defense-related projects. The thinness of the defense justification is seen from the expend-
itures on higher education and national highway projects.

In addition, the defense-related expansion did not allow the wholesale absorption of other government functions, nor their re-structuring. War-related expansion of the federal government was just that. It proliferated government programs but it left other governments and other branches of the federal government intact. The overall effect was to compound the fragmentation of authority especially at the state level by introducing new bureaucracies and an expanded federal government to compete with state and local government and private interests.

Finally, the constitutional limitations of the defense argument for expanded government were severe even at the national level. In the Korean War, President Truman seized the steel mills (which were involved in a labour dispute) using the rationale of a war necessity. Though the Supreme Court did not explicitly rule so, there was much unease over the use of foreign affairs to expand domestic powers in such a manner. Thus the external factor of war had a more limited effect in the United States than in Canada in part because of the previously institutionalized arrangements for both war and peace.

Regional Rivalries

Though anti-eastern and anti-federal sentiments were widespread in Washington State the result was different from the British Columbia case. From the 1880s to the early decades of the twentieth century, Washington State spawned a number of large movements that railed against the big eastern interests
that dominated the state and region: the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, the Weyerhauser Company, the eastern controllers of utilities, and the owners of mines and smelters. 78

Nonetheless, these movements and the sentiments did not become translated into as strong an anti-federal bias and anti-eastern bias as in British Columbia; further, these attitudes did not form the basis for a "state-building" program for a number of reasons. First, the federal government was not as closely aligned with the economic interests that dominated Washington State as was the case in Canada, although the American economic interests used the government to their advantage when ever possible. Second, though the Washington State government attempted to regulate railways, utilities, and mines, it was not as much the master of its own house as were the Canadian provinces. Above the differences were noted in the control of public land, interstate commerce, labour relations, and resource ownership all of which undercut an effective state policy to redress grievances in these areas. The populist's and progressive's criticisms of eastern domination had to be handled at the national level where they were subject to dilution, delay, and compromise. Third, the fractured condition of state authority in Washington made state policy in opposition to federal power extremely difficult to execute.

In summation, the external forces and institutions of foreign competition and rivalry, empire, war, and federal versus local competition worked in opposite directions in Canada and the United States. In the former the external
factors reinforced a trend to strong government and to government policies aimed at stimulation of growth, monopoly, government intervention, government regulation, and, finally, government ownership and control. In the United States and Washington State, the later development of external factors created less of a justification for and created fewer institutions and policies of a positive state. When the push of external factors did come, the influence was mediated by the institutions of a "negative state" that sought to limit government and to preserve the spheres of authority of local authorities and the private sector. Thus the changes wrought by the external forces after 1941 tended to preserve and extend the fragmentation and limitations of public authority.

Conclusion

This chapter has described at length the political institutions operative in Washington State and British Columbia between 1900 and 1960. What effect, if any, did these institutions have on the fate of socialism in the northwest of this continent?

First, this chapter underscores the reservations expressed in chapter two in regard to many political factors when considered singly. The influence of the franchise and extensions of it to the non-propertied and to women was roughly co-terminous so that, unlike Europe, the extension of the franchise may not have been a potent force. Federalism, per se, also appears to be a feeble explanation. Likewise, the electoral rules of proportional representation, single
member, simple plurality districts and the use of political machines and corruption seem not to be crucial in the North Pacific region.

On the other hand, many political institutions are either slightly different or different enough so as to be potential facilitators of the different paths that labour has taken in British Columbia and Washington State. Rather than attempting to assess each individual factor (a rather difficult and probably futile exercise) it is more rewarding to group these factors together with some common threads. The common threads of Washington State's political institutions present a noticeable and significant contrast with those of British Columbia. Moreover, the political differences are significant in areas that would directly affect the ability, need, and desire of labour groups, socialist groups, and the working class to use the political institutions to their advantage.

The major political contrast between Washington State and British Columbia is the fragmentation and limitations placed on public authority in the former and the greater centralization and larger scope of political policy of Canadian governments whether federal or provincial. Fragmentation and limitations (or the opposite) on public authority had important effects on the type and level of organizations that could affect public policy and decision-makers. It created different sites and different numbers of sites for political and economic conflict. The fragmentation of political institutions reinforced a private conflict model and created an institutional "image" in the minds of the populace that helped to define further political behavior.
The two sets of political institutions created an environment that shaped the motivation of individuals and organizations.

The American pattern of government divided and shared governmental authority between a number of relatively independent bodies. The original design, expressed in Federalist 10, to pit faction against faction by pitting institution against institution (and born of a general anti-government attitude) was admirably suited to this purpose. As an institutionalized check on excessive government intervention and power, the separation of powers and checks and balances not only pitted faction against faction it used government against itself; but this government structure did not result in an even balancing of rich and poor. Rather, the immobilizing of government reinforced the strengths of propertied interests, and, somewhat ironically, increased the conflict with individual property owners, by reinforcing the propertied interests' sense of independence and by neutralizing the systematic use of the state by the non-propertied as a counter-vailing force.

Washington State carried the fragmentation of government even further than at the federal level. Washington's constitution and subsequent elaboration of political institutions divided jurisdictions, overlapped power, and created independent bases of political power. The divisions of government structure may have been open to being overcome through the informal mechanism of party. However, in Washington State what little the political institutions allowed for in the way of cohesive party organizations was undermined by a non-party and anti-party tradition and the institutions of referendum,
recall, initiative, blanket primary, and non-partisan elections. In British Columbia, on the other hand, the British parliamentary tradition effectively centralized political authority into the parliament and into the cabinet. Judicial power and judicial review was of a more limited nature than in Washington State, while British Columbia's executive did not have to overcome rigid jurisdictional and power restrictions.

**Number of Political Arenas**

The fragmentation or centralization of political authority in the North Pacific coast had four major consequences. First, fragmentation increased the arenas of political conflict while centralization decreased the number of arenas. By increasing the sites of political conflict one apparently also increases the democratic or open character of government. In the short run this is so because the openness allows more people and groups to participate in decisionmaking. But the long term effect is to open the system to influence at so many points that delay and reversal of decisions are highly likely outcomes. A political system with a large number of effective political arenas in the long term frustrates democracy and favors those with wealth and those who seek delay.

Furthermore, the increased number of sites necessitates a massive organization for those who seek a comprehensive change in government policy, as did the socialists. The British Columbia government system also placed a premium on organization. In Washington State the task of organizing was complicated by an extra legislative house, a bevy of executive offices,
elected judges, numerous local electoral districts, and federal offices. Compounding this, the primary election system removed much of the continuity of party leadership in favor of popularity seekers. The blanket primary withdrew the necessity for party regularity to vote in primary contests. Consequently, the adoption of the blanket primary in the mid-thirties removed the rewards and incentives by which party loyalty and regularity was built. With organizational incentives depleted, politics became increasingly dominated by notables assembling their followings, seeking a label, and further decentralizing the struggle for power.

British Columbia's organizational incentives presented a more manageable scheme for those wishing to influence political affairs. Provincial political contests were limited to one legislative assembly with less than fifty-five seats and federal contests of less than thirty. The number of sites thus did not place an onerous strain on organizations wishing to re-direct political policy. In addition, British Columbia law placed a few impediments to party organization. With no legal status, except as a society, the political parties were free to develop as they wished. In Washington State, the quasi-legal status of political parties left the parties as shells to be filled by opportunistic notables.

The Level of Political Organization

The second major effect of the fragmented public authority in Washington State was the level at which political organization and influence was directed. The fragmentation of
political authority in Washington State created political "fiefdoms" out of the various independent political jurisdictions. The divided authority in Washington State reduced the resources available for central party figures to control their members. This being the case, legislators accentuated the view of themselves as beholden only to their local constituents. This also enhanced the log-rolling and compromise orientation of legislators and the governor. The political structure of Washington State tended to push the organizational level of politics down to the local level. The site of leverage on politicians was at the constituency level. By localizing political sites of conflict and influence, Washington's political structure created further roadblocks for organizations to overcome with so many sites. By lowering the level at which political organization was aimed and most effective, the system in the short-term increased democracy and the efficacy of the system; but in the long run the reliance on log-rolling and continual compromise undercut effective implementation of policies by favoring the conservative, wealthy interests and those wishing to use the numerous political arenas for veto.

The British Columbia political system, on the other hand, gave large resources to the top level of government. The union of legislative and executive authority in the cabinet created the need for party organization and also provided relatively large political resources with which to gain compliance of the backbenchers. Of course, local constituencies and riding associations were not powerless; rather their influence was overshadowed by the cabinet and the party's leadership. By
depreciating the value of the local level, the political system in British Columbia and Canada tended to shift the level of crucial organization and the level of significant conflict to the top. The centralized political structure thus centralized the organizations that sought to influence it. Winning a province-wide or national election required a strong measure of organization and discipline; but it is a manageable form of organization, especially at the provincial level. Further, this type of organization required the subordination of local interests for a wider interest. As this type of organization appears less open to influence at many sites, it appears less democratic. Change appears harder, also. But by placing a premium on cohesive organization, long term change and democracy is enhanced because the centralized political institutions once influenced or controlled are relatively unopposed in policy matters. Because of the larger stakes involved in the control of the legislative assembly, the parliamentary system generates a more political direction for social groups to either defend or expand their position in society. The American pattern, especially in its late phase as indicated in Washington State, frustrates a cohesive, concerted drive for policy changes such that, "in Washington State the potential for veto has been stronger than the potential for change afforded by the state's populistic system." 79

The Limits of Political Policy

The third impact of fragmented political authority has been to impose limitations on political policy.
State political structure, by offering a high potential for veto, (which is likewise present at the federal level) has had the cumulative effect of limiting the scope of government policy. Many groups in Washington State and the United States tried to limit the government. The ideal of small government or of government as a necessary evil, had adherents in the twentieth century as it did when the constitution was written. Nevertheless, attitudes by themselves would have done little to keep the size of government down, especially in times of crisis. Perhaps an equal number, over the years, have sought some form of strong government action. The advocates of limited government, however, had a significant institutional advantage over those wishing to expand either state or federal powers. The fragmentation of authority, the constitutional limitations on government, and a fortuitous period when few external forces could induce a need for strong government reinforced the liberal laissez-faire attitudes.

Limitations on the scope of political policy reinforced the privileged position on the private sphere in American society. The chaotic condition of American government, the overlapping lines of jurisdiction, the decentralized character of politics, and the greater number of political arenas tended to privatize and localize conflicts. Because the potential for veto was so great and could only be truly circumvented by constitutional amendment, a more efficient method of handling conflicts was through private, direct means. It was better to handle conflicts between the immediate parties than by public law because public law created too many unknown variables.
that might even backfire. The relative effectiveness of private contractual settlements then reinforced the anti-political attitudes of many Americans.

In British Columbia, on the other hand, the relative centralization of political authority in parliament and cabinet did not institutionally reinforce limited government. In fact the lack of a rigid codification of the political system (while retaining a few important principles as the crown, parliamentary supremacy, rule of law, and basic civil rights) allowed a greater degree of governmental flexibility. Government policy more readily expanded when needs arose, and in Canada's case external factors played a strong role in inducing the internal expansion of public policy into non-traditional areas. Thus, though British Columbia had its advocates of limited government and laissez-faire, the unified and relatively unchallenged position of the crown and parliament created a propensity to expand government power. It is significant in this regard that many of the early twentieth-century platforms of the British Columbia Conservatives and Liberals advocated policies considered socialist in the United States, such as public ownership of utilities and railways. 80

The expansion of government power, of course, is not an easy horse to rein in once the horse has its head. The use of government power in Canada created the demand for more state intervention, while at the same time it legitimiz ed the socialist's call for expanded government. The encouragement of large corporations and monopoly created a stronger sense of alienation by providing a greater sense of "us versus them" among the non-
propertied groups as it simultaneously provided the example of
government policy to set large-scale social policy. Similarly,
the interventionist role of government in labour relations gave
a tacit form of recognition to unions (i.e., before 1943) al-
though it withheld the rights to collective bargaining later
attached to unions; government labour policy also made influence
on this policy a political goal that could best be realized
through the major vehicle of influence in parliamentary systems
--a political party. The American labour relations system
relying as it did on a non-compulsory mediation service and on
private negotiations created fewer demands for a political
direction. As long as the bargaining rights were assured,
private settlement of economic disputes was preferred.

"Images" of Authority
The fourth impact of the political institutions deals
with the perception of structures of authority, of workable
political strategies, and the political motivations of
individuals and groups. The pattern of institutions in a
society creates an "image" or a perceived arrangement of the
institutions. The image is usually a simplified version of
the institutional arrangements. This perception of the social
and political structure is usually fairly similar among the
strata that are similarly situated vis a vis the society's
structure of public and private authority. This image of the
social structure operates to channel political motivations
toward certain ends and also acts to filter political programs
and demands. By conveying to the population a sense of "correct"
understanding, analyses, and criticisms of political matters and by helping to identify "workable" political policies and reforms, the institutional image screens and reinforces political goals and motivations. The image of the social structure as a widely shared perception mediates the acceptance of doctrines and ideas.

Washington State's pattern of political institutions created an image of political authority that was fragmented, oriented to the grass roots, and open at several levels to popular influence. In addition, the limitations placed on government intervention created the perception of a strong private sector that was capable of handling problems without public intervention. The limitations placed on government and the divided authority on the public sector reinforced the idea that desirable and possible public policy should be kept to a minimum. The image created by American institutions thus motivated individuals and groups to direct conflict into private associations and to limit the role of government to the underwriting of rights and opportunities to compete. The image created was one that stressed the system's "openness" and the ability to compete, no matter who the competitor.

The image and political structure motivated individuals and groups to focus their attention and pressure on the grass-roots, to use personal influence on notables, and to seek small-scale decisions that affected the individual or group. The image of a fragmented polity thus reinforced the atomism of nineteenth-century liberalism and, by stressing the accessibility of the grass roots, undermined the motivation and willingness
to subordinate individual or sectional claims to larger goals. Motivation for party loyalty in such a system weakened even further and treated independence from party as a virtue and an asset in maximizing political influence.

The pattern of government in British Columbia created an image of a more centralized, cohesive social and political structure. The image of a relatively omni-competent government that could meet external threats and internal needs created an image of proper and acceptable government policies that was wider than the comparable image in the United States. In addition, the precedent of an active, interventionist government working on behalf of many social groups (especially the wealthy and powerful) created the image of a working arrangement between government and big economic interests to the exclusion of wage earners and other less privileged groups; it also provided an image of how government could act on behalf of all society. The identification of big business with government created an alienation that sought to use the precedent of expanded government powers to end government by special interests. While the Washington State pattern of authority created an image of limited government and a strong private sphere, in British Columbia the private and public sphere overlapped in the public's image of the social order such that the less privileged felt excluded from important public affairs despite formal democracy. British Columbia created an image of the social structure that was similar to (though not as extreme as) the image in many European countries of a society dominated by political and religious elites. As in Europe, this image of the
social structure heightened the group consciousness of the excluded working classes. 

Importantly, such an image of the social structure motivated the individuals and groups to direct their influence at the parliament and cabinet and to politicize social conflicts. This image of centralized authority created the motivation for associations aiming at influence and power to seek government intervention and regulation. In British Columbia the image of authority stressed the closed nature of the political structure and consequently the need to organize large, cohesive groups to maximize political influence. With the motivation for large organizations came the need to sink individual and sectional differences for the common good. Doctrine and cohesive policies were stressed over personal influence. The image of a unified polity, recreated the motive for collectivism by stressing the relative inaccessibility of influence; it thus placed a premium on psychological and ideological sub-ordination to group efforts at political influence. By strengthening collectivism, the image of the British Columbia social structure increased the motivation for party membership by treating it as a virtue and a necessity for maximizing influence.

The effect of Washington State and British Columbia's political systems on socialist and labour parties should have been distinctly different. Washington State's political structure should have channelled labour reform, and socialist influence to the grass roots level, away from large-scale social policy, toward enforcement of rights, and toward conflict in the private sector. The state's politics should have discouraged a strong,
independent political direction for labour, and it should have posed significant organization hurdles in the way of socialist politics. The limited, fragmented style of government should have encouraged a "syndicalist" (i.e., militant plant-level) pattern of industrial conflict and weak support for labour political parties.

On the other hand, the structure of British Columbia's government should have encouraged strong, disciplined parties, and the advocating of an interventionist state to resolve social problems. The political structure should have directed socialist and labour groups to focus their activity on the legislature and cabinet government; it should also have emphasized party organization and cohesion as the method of increasing the effectiveness of the working classes.

The political institutions in Washington State and British Columbia point to different behavior and attitudes by the socialist and labour groups in the state and the province, which are the subjects of the next two chapters.
Footnotes

1. "Among students of law and politics the term "constitution" is used in two different ways. In the first sense we refer to a legal code which within a geographically delineated area overrides all other enactments or acts of government and is usually amendable by procedure less flexible than that related to other legislation. The second way we use the term constitution involves subject-matter, the laws and settled usages within a state which determine the respective powers and privileges of the various institutions of government and the essential aspects of the relations between citizens and the political community." D.V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies 2nd. ed., (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976) p. 1.


4. The major exception to the explicitly political direction of socialist groups was the Industrial Workers of the World. While their official ideology and rhetoric counselled direct action and not political activity, as syndicalists they were a variant of the socialist tradition. In some instances the wobblies seem to have abandoned their anti-political stance, see, A.R. McCormack, Reformers, Rebels, and Revolutionaries: The Western Canadian Radical Movement, 1899-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) pp.99-101.


See the discussion below on the industrial relations system.


Ibid. p. 91

Ibid., p. 104.

Smiley, pp. 18-21.

Ibid. pp. 120-123, and passim.


Control of these subjects was given under the heading of property rights which was interpreted broadly by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.


Ormsby, p. 325.


Federal control of western lands was based on the purchase and conquest of these lands on behalf of the whole nation. When the western states achieved statehood, the land was not necessarily ceded to them. The federal government controls 48% of the land in the eleven western states and Alaska. Redford, et al., p. 659.

Jamieson; Woods.

Ibid., Jamieson, p. 118.

Ibid., p. 120

Ibid., p. 123

Ibid., passim.

Jamieson, pp. 128-129.

Johansen, pp. 470-71.

48 The one exception was the Railway Labour Act of 1926 which applied only to the nation's railways. This law presaged many of the provisions incorporated in the Wagner Act, Redford, et al., p. 637.


Jamieson, passim.

Ibid., p. 128.

Cail, pp. 427-439.
Robin, Chapters II, III, IV.


Ormsby, pp. 115-16.

Robin, passim.

Smiley, p. 6.


Ormsby, p. 466, p. 473.


Ibid., p. 11.

For example, the establishment of national forest reserves put 20% of Washington's standing timber under control of the federal Forest Service, Johansen, p. 543.

Ibid., p. 465.

Ibid. passim.

Ibid. p. 404.


Ibid. p. 532.


Ibid.

Johansen, p. 340.

Ibid. p. 528.
72 Ibid. p. 526.


74 Hardin, p. 257.


76 Johansen, pp. 482-83.

77 Krislov, p. 100.

78 Cf. Schwantes, passim and Johansen, passim.

79 Mullen, et. al. p. 199.

80 Robin, Rush, pp. 89, 123.
CHAPTER FIVE

UNION STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL POLICIES IN
BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON STATE, 1900-1960

If the findings of the two preceding chapters are correct (the strong economic parallels argue for similar social forces in British Columbia and Washington State, while the political institutions tended to create separate political paths) then several questions require answers. What movements, organizations, and parties arose in the province and the state to express and tap the economic and political discontent? What form did the movements and parties take? What policies did they adopt? What course of action did they follow? Perhaps most important of all, how and why did the movements and parties change?

This chapter traces the development of organized labour in British Columbia and Washington State from 1900 to 1960, while the next chapter examines the political parties, with special attention on the socialist parties. In reference to organized labour, several topics need airing. Since small size and disunity within a union movement may create conservative goals, policies and outlook, the first section of this chapter examines the strength and cohesion of the unions in the North Pacific region. The other question related to trade unions concerns their policies toward government programs.
and political participation.

In brief, this chapter argues that union strength and cohesion were comparable in British Columbia and Washington State during the most important period, 1900-1940. Second, both union movements experimented with a number of political policies and styles of participation. The British Columbia unionists worked with the following constellation of forces: the early success of independent labour and socialist representatives, the centralization of political authority in the legislature and the cabinet, brittle parliamentary parties, and especially important, an interventionist industrial relations system. These factors progressively validated the legitimacy, viability, and necessity of independent, partisan, and ideological politics. Organized labour in Washington State had to contend with other factors: the difficulty of controlling political decision-makers, the weakness of political parties, the dispersal of government authority (with the consequent ability to veto political decisions at numerous points), and a laissez-faire collective bargaining system. This constellation of factors, over time, galvanized participation through non-ideological, non-partisan pressure groups. Washington's unions also came to advocate a minimal political program, and relied primarily on economic action to achieve their goals.

The Structure of Unionism

Union structure consists of two elements, the size of the unionized work force and the degree of organizational,
political, and ideological unity. Prior to 1940 the size of the unionized work force in British Columbia and Washington State varied drastically from year to year, with only a small proportion of unions able to maintain membership levels for extended periods. Probably the most consistent characteristic of labour unions on the North Pacific coast was the tremendous factionalism that racked the movement until a semblance of peace was achieved with the mergers of the AFL and the CIO unions in 1955 and 1956. For convenience the 1900-60 period can be divided into four major sub-periods.

North Pacific Turbulence: 1900-1923

The extent of union membership in this first period is difficult to gauge. For many years statistics are not available, while for other years the statistics are not complete. The records for British Columbia start in 1911, when 162 out of 231 locals reported 22,599 members. These numbers have been estimated to represent 12.4% of the non-agricultural work force. Fluctuating yearly, membership fell to a low of 19,757 in 1915, or 5.9% of the non-farm labour force. World War One boomed the union rolls to 263 locals of which 165 reportedly had 40,070 members in 1919. (21.8% of the non-farm labour force). But three years later slightly over 17,000 unionists, representing 8.9% of non-agricultural labour, were recorded.

After taking the larger work force into consideration, organized labour in Washington State appeared to have been of roughly similar size. In 1904 Washington State's Labour Commissioner estimated, on the basis of 88 out of 208 question-
naires sent to union locals, that unionists numbered 22,562. Ten years later 178 locals (out of a possible 445) reported membership of 25,573. As in British Columbia, Washington’s peak year came in 1919 with 81,795 unionists. As an indication of the density of unionism (that is, the percentage of the possible work force that is unionized) Friedheim reports that in 1919 fifty percent of the Seattle work force carried union cards. By 1923 Washington’s unions reached their post-war nadir with the Washington State Federation of Labor reporting only 20,263 paid members in 240 locals; the Seattle Central Labor Council numbered 11,703, slightly more than half their 1919 peak. (The WSFL and SCLC figures are not strictly comparable to the British Columbia figures for many unions, notably the railway brotherhoods, did not belong to either the WSFL or the SCLC.)

Turning to the issue of labour movement unity, trade unions in the first two decades of this century split along three axes in both British Columbia and Washington State: (1) craft versus industrial union organization; (2) rival central labour bodies; and (3) "pure and simple" unionism versus "political" unionism. These union rivalries often overlay one another and thus exacerbated the conflict.

The tension between craft and industrial unionism was a natural occurrence given the economic structure of British Columbia and Washington State. As chapter three indicated the major industries of the region were mining, fishing, lumbering, woodworking, and metal working, all of which presented difficulties to craft organization principles. The western Canadian and
American unionists often criticized their eastern brothers because of the lack of appreciation and support for organization on industrial lines. Thus the craft versus industrial rivalry often manifested itself as a western versus eastern type of unionism, which exacerbated other rivalries. Craft and industrial rivalries, nonetheless, divided labour unions in the west as jurisdictional fights grew in timber and woodworking, metal trades, and other areas.

The region's AFL and TLC affiliated central labour councils attempted to downplay the clash of the principles of craft and industrial unionism. The Seattle Central Labor Council, and Washington State Federation of Labor, and the British Columbia Federation of Labour expressed strong sympathy for industrial unionism, despite the predominately craft orientation of the AFL and the TLC. Between 1914 and 1925 the SCLC repeatedly urged the national AFL convention to re-organize on industrial lines. Seattle also went a long distance to accommodate industrial unionism within its organization. In the years before 1920, the central labor council pursued a unique form of organization, labelled "Duncanism" after the leader, James A. Duncan, who was its architect. This form of organization created stronger loyalties to the SCLC than to the individual unions, emphasized the co-operation of allied trades through councils that approximated industrial organization, and timed related union contracts so as to expire almost simultaneously. The Seattle AFL by 1920 had carried industrial organization about as far as it could go within the structure laid out by the national AFL. Such accommodation of the spirit of
industrial unionism within a craft union form did not eliminate tensions or rivalries but merely described the arenas in which the conflicts occurred.

The craft and industrial competition also led to the creation of rival central labour bodies. The Western Federation of Miners, which was strong in the American Northwest and British Columbia at the turn of this century, fostered a succession of rivals to the AFL and T&CB. The Western Labor Union, formed in 1898 to organize industrial unions west of the Missouri River, changed its name to the American Labor Union in 1902 when it started nation-wide competition with the AFL. The ALU had strong backing in the Inland Empire prior to 1905. This rival central body had a firm grip in the hard-rock mining centres and in Spokane, which formed the cross-roads for the miners and smeltermen of the region.10

The American Labor Union, nonetheless, failed to generate widespread support; so the Western Federation of Miners along with some other groups formed the Industrial Workers of the World in 1905. Although the WFM turned its back on the IWW and then rejoined the AFL in 1911, the wobblies remained a rival magnet for labour support. Their strength was highly sporadic though at times significant in British Columbia and Washington State before 1920. After that date, IWW supporters drifted into other far left political groups or out of the picture completely. At different times the IWW had a following in the metal miners, lumber workers, railway construction crews, and even agricultural workers. A number of wobblies held memberships in both the IWW and in Seattle area AFL unions.11
In 1919 an indigenous syndicalist labour central formed in western Canada. The One Big Union's effective lifespan was even shorter than the IWW's and by 1921 had shrunk to a feeble size. 12

The final schism within the labour movement in this first period occurred over politics. The second half of this chapter discusses the political questions and divisions in detail.

Both the British Columbia and the Washington State labour movements fragmented along the axes outlined above. Considering the incomplete nature of the available statistics and considering the volatility of union membership, it is almost impossible to gauge if the province's or the state's movement was more affected by these problems. What is clear, nevertheless, is that achieving stability and unity presented major problems for both union movements.

Rearguard Action, 1923-1933

Decline and then stagnation characterized the second period of the union movement. The post-war depression, the drop in government spending that had stimulated the North Pacific's economy, the "open shop" campaign of employers, and the "Red Scare" combined to force unions onto the defensive. Many unions collapsed, others shrank, and only the conservative unions maintained their strength.

After the sharp declines recorded in the early twenties, the remainder of the twenties and the early thirties were lack-lustre years for union organizations and membership. During the
1920's small membership gains often disappeared in subsequent years. When the great depression hit the North Pacific coast, unions in British Columbia could barely hold their ground. From a 1930 high of 27,204 (10.7% of the non-farm labour force), union membership slid to 19,017 (7.2% non-farm labour) in 1934. Meanwhile, in Washington State the statistics indicate that unionists may have been having an even worse time of it. The state federations of labor's membership plummeted to half its 1929-30 level when it reached 13,504 in 1933-34. The SCLC fared better with 15,109 in 1929 and 9749 in 1933. While the figures for Washington State and British Columbia are not strictly comparable, the slightly better position of the British Columbia unions at this time, may have been caused by the greater legitimacy and protection accorded during difficult times to weak unions by Canada's industrial relations system.

The internal conflicts that rocked the labour movements in the first two decades subsided slowly in the 1920's. The dualism that pitted the IWW against the AFL all but disappeared by the mid-twenties. In Canada the One Big Union clung to a precarious existence, after being decimated by secessions and raids in the early twenties. Another form of dual unionism blossomed with the formation of communist unions, but their numbers were small during this period. By the mid-twenties the conservatives in Washington's labour movement were in firm control with only a few of the Seattle based radicals and moderates in power.

The relative calm of the twenties and early thirties was not born of mature strength, but rather of weakness and frag-
mentation. The craft versus industrial conflict all but ceased because of the weakness of the industrial unions. The "pure and simple" unions won out over the more politically oriented unions. The British Columbia unions retained a stronger political tone than the Washington State unions for the Canadian Labour Party was the recognized arm of the Trades and Labour Council; many of the TLC unions, however, never put much muscle into their political arm.

In British Columbia the union movement fragmented into concentrations of unions in a few urban centres. The British Columbia Federation of Labour dissolved after joining the OBU, while rival publications spoke for the unions. By 1925, eighty percent of union members lived in or around Vancouver.\textsuperscript{15}

Renewed Growth and Fissure, 1933-1956

The great depression of the 1930's lit the fuse for the explosive union growth of this period; bitter factionalism, however, rent the union movement more deeply than ever before.

Unions in British Columbia started a slow, steady growth in the mid-thirties. During the war years unions once again flourished. From 34,297 (12.7%) in 1939, membership vaulted to a war-time high of 90,702 (28.8%). After the Second World War, the percentage of the non-farm workforce that was unionized moved ahead to the low 30% range and by 1955 reached 35.3% or 166,550 members.\textsuperscript{16}

In Washington State the growth of unions appears to have been even more spectacular. In the six years from 1934 to 1940 membership in the Washington State Federation of Labor
increased almost four-fold, to 51,734. When all unions are counted the total of union members in the state in 1939 was 175,300 accounting for 41.3% of the non-farm labour force. By 1953 union membership had doubled again to 393,600 representing 53.3% of the non-farm labour force. Density of union membership in Washington State drifted lower after 1953 until by 1964 the figure stood at 44.0%. From 1939 to 1960 Washington State had either the highest or second highest rate of unionization in the nation, and was second only to West Virginia.

Serious rifts re-emerged simultaneously with the renewed growth of the unions. The craft versus industrial fight returned, often with a vengeance. Craft-oriented AFL lumber unions had long tried to organize the wood products industry. The woodworker's union made a toehold in the industry in the thirties, but soon left the AFL for the CIO where it was more welcomed. The Woodworkers were at the center of an internecine war in the American Northwest in the thirties, pitting Teamster and AFL leader Dave Beck against Longshoremen and CIO leader Harry Bridges. The AFL and CIO split was not as severe in British Columbia for the International Woodworkers and other CIO unions remained in the TLC until 1939, when the TLC under pressure from the AFL expelled the CIO affiliates.

The third major axis of union fragmentation in the 1933-1956 period was once again the partisan versus non-partisan political dimension; a full discussion of this subject follows in the second half of this chapter.

On top of the divisions of craft and industrial unions, of rival labour centrals, and of partisan versus non-partisan
politics there emerged in this period the divisive issue of communism. On the North Pacific coast this fourth axis was especially important for communists influenced the Longshoremen's Union, the International Woodworkers of America and the Mine, Mill and Smelter workers union. The AFL and CIO first made moves against communist influence in 1940. In Canada the TLC made similar moves against the communist elements at this date, but the Canadian Congress of Labour (formed in 1940 from the CIO affiliated unions and the nationalist unions of the All Canadian Congress of Labour) could not check the influence of the communists as all the industrial unions had strong communist factions.

The American districts of the IWA purged the communists in 1941 when the anti-communist bloc replaced the communist leadership of Harold Pritchett of British Columbia. The communist influence in British Columbia's IWA remained strong until 1948. Communist influence in other unions proved more resistant. Harry Bridges remained as head of the Longshoremen's union; communist influence in the Boilermakers and Shipyard Workers declined only with the post-war decline in shipbuilding; and the Mine, Mill union remained under communist influence even after being expelled from the CCL in 1948.

The controversy over national versus international unionism (a fifth axis) further complicated the structure of British Columbia's union movement in this period. The first nationalist unions arose in the mid-twenties, but the major period of their growth and influence came in the 1930's and 1940's. The nationalist unions formed the All-Canadian Congress
of Labour in 1927. The only major union in the ACCL was the
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees. After a spate of
bitter factionalism in the mid-thirties, the remaining ACCL
unions merged with the Canadian CIO unions in 1940 to form the
CCL. The nationalist unions criticized the TLC and the
international unions for American domination of funds, of union
policies and of political activity. The rivalry between the
nationalist and international unions was not directly related
to the differences on political activism. Although the
nationalist unions were more outspoken in their political
independence than were the TLC craft unions, the CIO affiliated
unions were consistently the strongest supporters of the CCF.19
Especially strong in their political work for the CCF were the
Steelworkers and the Auto-workers unions -- unions that south
of the border rejected the path of third party support and
socialism.

In summation, the period of 1933-1956 witnessed
unprecedented growth and unprecedented fragmentation of the
labour movement in both British Columbia and Washington State.
That the disunity of the labour movement did not lead to a
general decline in unionism is remarkable and can probably be
attributed to the expansion of union membership into newly
unionized industries. That the bickering and rivalry within
the union movement occurred simultaneously with the rise and
solidification of the CCF in British Columbia indicates that
factors other than union size and cohesion were more important
for the establishment of a socialist alternative.
Entente Cordiale, 1956-60

By the mid-fifties labour unions throughout North American had, by and large, overcome their internal fragmentation. The issue of communism had been solved by expelling individual communists, demanding pledges of non-communist affiliation, and expelling communist dominated unions from central labour bodies. In 1955 the AFL and the CIO unions patched up their twenty year quarrel; the following year the TLC and the CCL also formed a united labour organization in the Canadian Labour Congress. Likewise, the issue of political participation ceased to cause as much trouble as in the past, for Washington's unions had confirmed their dedication to non-partisanship, while the British Columbia movement moved into a stronger and direct alliance with the CCF. For the Canadian unions the question of nationalist unions was in this period a dead issue, although it would re-emerge as a centre of controversy in the late sixties and seventies. In the United States the major union controversy of this period was "labor racketeering" and centred on the Teamsters union. In British Columbia the Teamsters were expelled from the CLC for raiding in 1960.20

But the true measure of the institutionalization of the labour movement is seen in the stability of the membership figures. Unlike the 1920's (also a period of prosperity and/or stability within the labour movement) the gains in union membership in the fifties remained solid. In British Columbia the percentage of the non-farm labour force that was unionized ranged in the 35 - 40% area, while in Washington State the
figure hovered in the mid-40% range.21

The rhythm of union growth and decline in British Columbia and Washington State from 1900 to 1960 appears very comparable. Both had high rates of union membership when compared to their national averages. Prior to 1937 the membership figures, though sketchy, indicate similar levels of unionization. During the lowest period of the depression the British Columbia unions appear to have been able to resist decline better. Interestingly, the period of greatest difference in membership and union density occurred when the political differences of the two movements was greatest, after 1937. The fragmentation of the state's and the province's union movement also followed similar patterns. Both movements were riven with factionalism and bitter rivalries.

Considering these generalizations, it is difficult to connect the structure of the trade union movement in the province or the state with a particular pattern of political support or affiliation. Union structure does not appear causally related to support for a labour party or the affiliation of the union movement to a labour party.

Union Policy on Politics

The second portion of this chapter discusses union attitudes about proper political policy. Before turning to the specific union movements of the region, two preliminary points should be noted.
Economic Action and Political Action

Labour unions, like business organizations, are fundamentally economic organizations. A union's first goal must be the economic advancement or protection of its members, however that advancement or protection may be defined. Unions may (and almost always do) adopt other goals, especially political goals. These other goals may eventually become extremely important for a union. The continued viability of the union, nonetheless, rests upon meeting successfully the basic economic goals.

Given this basic goal structure, the limited resources of unions, and the weakness of unions in North America, a distinction is often made between economic action (e.g., organizing drives, collective bargaining, strikes, etc.) and political action (e.g., pressure politics, partisan politics, etc.). Some have taken these distinctive activities and goals as mutually exclusive. The Industrial Workers of the World and Samuel Gompers, in his anti-political phases, advocated abandoning all political activity and urged relying on purely economic tools to achieve their goals. This is not to say that the final goals of Gompers and the wobblies were identical, however similar their strategies.

More commonly, unions experimented with their mix of economic and political goals. A major defeat on the economic field often led to increased political activity. Defeat in politics often meant a renewed economic confrontation. Less often, economic success led to political action and political success led back to economic activity.
In the discussion of the British Columbia and Washington State unions that occupies the remainder of this chapter, the alternation of economic and political action is one of the major factors to be accounted for. In Washington State, the alternation of strategies taught the unions to emphasize primarily economic goals and action, while maintaining sporadic, limited and non-partisan political activity. British-Columbia's unions also alternated their strategies. Slowly, however, they developed a strong political activity to complement their economic activities.

It will be argued that the factors responsible for this difference in activity and attitude was the structure of politics and the nature of industrial relations policy. In Washington State the fragmented political structure made a high level of political activism and partisanship inefficient, while holding out the possibility of exercising a veto on interventions in the collective bargaining system through pressure group politics; in British Columbia the interventionist policies of a stronger provincial government necessitated a political wing for labour to protect and rectify the collective bargaining process from political manipulation by the government.

Voluntarism and Political Participation

In discussing union political action and attitudes, two issues must be kept distinct. Where a union stands on both issues measures the degree of conservatism or radicalism of a union.
The union's attitude toward government regulation of the conditions related to work is the first issue. Samuel Gompers and the national executive of the American Federation of Labor in his day advocated a "voluntarist" policy: governments should not concern themselves with work related legislation, except in the cases of child and women's labour. The voluntarists condemned minimum wage laws, hours of work legislation, workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance, and mandatory conciliation and arbitration. The philosophers of voluntarism believed the goals of these laws to be admirable; they wanted these benefits and provisions, however, to be won and incorporated in union contracts through collective bargaining. Gompers, representing the sentiments of many unionists, stressed the importance of independent, strong unions and rejected a dependence on government intervention to achieve goals. The suspicion and fear of government, for Gompers and other voluntarists, grew from the experience of having had legislation backfire. They felt government regulations to be at their best, toothless, and at their worst, a wrecking ball to an already weak movement.

The policy of voluntarism along with political non-partisanship, the doctrine of free collective bargaining, anti-cooperativism, and the sanctity of labour contracts formed the philosophy of "pure and simple" unionism. For the national AFL these policies remained relatively intact from the middle of the 1890's to the middle of the 1930's. Violated in a major way only once (during World War One) the policy of voluntarism finally succumbed when the depression
pushed the AFL leadership and convention into supporting
government unemployment insurance, pension plans, regulation
of hours of employment, and minimum wage laws. The other
aspects of "pure and simple" unionism remained intact as almost
all third party political efforts by American unions came to
an end in the thirties.

Although the national AFL (and to a lesser extent the
Canadian Trades and Labour Congress) subscribed to voluntarism,
state, provincial, and local labour bodies often adopted differ-
et policies and practices. The Washington State and the
British Columbia Federations of Labour and several city central
labour councils did not subscribe whole-heartedly to "pure and
simple" unionism, especially not to voluntarism. This
independence from the national AFL was not unusual for the
local central unions were the most politically
oriented organizations in the American labor
movement. In reality, they were not labor
organizations at all, but rather political
institutions ancillary to the trade union
movement. Local central bodies rejected
the anti-statism of the national leadership
and vigorously advocated positive government
intervention in all areas of working class life.

The independent course of British Columbia's and Washington
State's unions (especially before 1925) often caused conster-
nation and sometimes rage in the national AFL and TLC.

The second issue of union policy on political affairs
concerns the type of political participation, partisan or non-
partisan. Several modes of participation can be identified:
direct affiliation to a party, formation of a party, endorse-
ment of a party, pressure group politics, or the non-partisan
"reward friends and punish enemies." In addition, one can
distinguish between affiliation or support for left-wing, centre, or right-wing parties. In practice trade unionists adopted three approaches to political participation, which combined the above categories in a variety of ways. 26

Labour conservatives viewed the union's economic struggles as foremost and the political endeavors as a frill in ordinary times though a reluctant necessity in bad times. The conservatives believed in non-partisanship (reward friends and punish enemies) and in pressure group politics. When applied this policy meant supporting which ever major non-socialist candidates or party adopted a reform platform. The non-partisan, pressure group policy entailed working with sympathetic elements in the government for short-term and usually narrow goals. Though the conservatives in British Columbia and Washington State were not voluntarists, their emphasis on economic goals led them to support a narrower range of government programs than did the labour moderates and radicals.

The labour radicals opted for a full commitment to and an affiliation with a highly ideological socialist or communist party. These elements emphasized class struggle, ideological commitment, and independent political parties. The labour radicals often emphasized political action more than economic action, although these elements sometimes had a strong syndicalist streak that transmuted purely economic actions into "political struggle."

The labour moderates (sometimes known as progressives) were deeply committed to political action as a means of helping
the union movement. They were often very critical of the political parties of the centre and of non-partisan participation. Though less ideological than the radicals, the moderates would sometimes use the radical's ideas. Reform-minded socialists and the labour moderates had much in common and the latter often supported third party movements of a reformist or labour cast. The moderates believed in industrial unionism but also in labour unity. They thus worked to unite the local labour factions within the AFL and the TLC. Though the moderates were committed to political action to compliment the economic struggles, it was more a pragmatic, than an ideological commitment.

The national TLC and many eastern and central Canadian TLC bodies were sympathetic to the non-partisan policy. Legislative pressure group politics in its classic American form, however, never fully blossomed due to the stronger party discipline. The non-partisan policy became the diplomatic way of avoiding political entanglements for the whole union movement, while allowing previously established individual party loyalties to continue. As a local labour body within the AFL structure, the TLC had a strong political role for a major purpose of the organization was to act as a "legislative mouthpiece." The national TLC on many occasions equivocated on the question of a third party. As early as 1906 the national convention called for the formation of a Canadian Labour Party. The effort put in to this party was never very substantial and in subsequent years amounted more to lip service than active commitment.
Western Canadian unionists, especially in British Columbia, had fewer ties to the conservative unions and to the established political parties. With a larger moderate and radical group (the latter concentrated in the mining areas) British Columbia's unionists often opted for third party politics of either a socialist or labour type.

In the United States, the national AFL and many eastern AFL local bodies generally followed a non-partisan policy as enunciated by the conservatives. On a few extreme occasions, the national AFL charted a different course. In 1906, it urged that independent political action might be necessary, and in 1924 the AFL endorsed the personal candidacy of LaFollette when he ran under the Progressive party label. As many state and local AFL bodies did not adopt a voluntarist policy, so many also did not accept non-partisanship or pressure group politics as the only proper political vehicle. The Washington State labour movement had a stronger representation of radicals and moderates and thus adopted all forms of political participation at different times. The conservative unionists after 1905 were more firmly entrenched in Eastern Washington and on the executive of the State Federation of Labor. The radicals and moderates usually hailed from western part of the state and especially from the Puget Sound region.

From Miner's Radicalism to Partisan Conflict
Organized Labour's Political Participation in B.C.

West Coast Ferment, 1900-1917

Though independent labour politics started in British
Columbia in the 1890's, at the turn of the century it remained in a state of confusion and flux. The absence of party discipline before 1903 contributed to the political commotion. Typical of this period (and of the undisciplined nature of political representation) was Ralph Smith. Elected by the Nanaimo area miners as a labour representative to the provincial legislature and later to the federal parliament, Smith worked closely with the Liberals. He was eventually repudiated by the Nanaimo area unions and joined the Liberal party. 28

The Vancouver Trades and Labour Council put up labour candidates in the 1900 election. But during this first period labour and socialist candidates polled very badly in Vancouver and Victoria, usually coming in at the bottom. The popular support for independent labour and later for socialist candidates came from the coal mining areas of mid-Vancouver Island and the metal and coal mining regions of the southern interior.

In the unsettled political conditions, several groups attempted to form a broad-based reform coalition. Meeting in Kamloops in 1902, unionists, socialists, farmers, and reformers put together a Provincial Progressive Party. The effort proved stillborn as the socialists advocated abolition of the wage system, and the labour representatives only wanted reform of the political system. 29 Such differences were to keep the socialists and major sections of the trade union movement apart for many years to come.

A more important break from the previous decade's political alignments came when Hawthornwaite, the legislative
representative of the Nanaimo Labour Party, joined the
Socialist Party of Canada in 1902. In the following year's
provincial election Parker Williams joined Hawthornwaite as the
second socialist MLA. Both represented Vancouver Island mining
districts. Hawthornwaite served as MLA until 1911, while Williams
won re-election also in 1912 and 1916.

This radical upsurge also manifested itself in the
labour organizations. In 1902 the Nanaimo miners broke with the
TLC and joined the Western Federation of Minsters; the following
year the Vancouver TLC withdrew from the national TLC and de-
clared for industrial unionism. But the union radicals held
sway for only a short period, as the Vancouver Trades and Labour
Council rejoined the TLC in 1906 and the WFM lost its hold on
the Vancouver Island fields.

This attempted rapprochement of radicals and the main-
stream of organized labour soon developed problems. The
socialists became more doctrinaire and took their electoral
success as proof of their correct policy, while the labour
unions continued to want reforms and strong economic organiza-
tion. The radicals in the labour movement were isolated in the
mining fields, as the urban unions continued to cast about for
a vehicle to meet their reform demands. After the TLC in 1906
endorsed the concept of a Canadian Labour Party, the Vancouver
and the Victoria unions attempted to organize a provincial
labour party. Again the effort failed, for the radicals
attending the founding convention came to control it and
quickly dissolved the labour party as unnecessary, arguing that
the Socialist Party already represented labour. Unable to
work with the doctrinaire socialists, the conservative and moderate elements of organized labour had to ally themselves with reformist elements in the two major parties.

These setbacks established a pattern in which organized labour in British Columbia oscillated between economic and political action to achieve its goals. The failure of economic struggle, or the intervention of the government to adversely affect the struggle, led to adopting for a period of time a more aggressive pursuit of the political path. The failure of politics to help the unions or, as in this early period, the inability to fashion a political vehicle with wide labour support, pushed the pendulum back toward economic action.

Though the radicals, moderates, and conservatives remained divided over the appropriate political vehicle, the radicals support for the SPC taught the unions that an organized political effort could achieve electoral success and could produce important results for unionists. When the McBride government in 1903 found itself needing the support of the two socialist MLAs to maintain a majority, the socialists traded their support for legislation dear to their constituents: mining regulations and protection for unions from damage suits. The institution of party discipline thus worked to reinforce the socialist MLA's power. Though trade unions continued to oscillate between economic and political action, the radicals early, limited success had an important demonstration effect for later political efforts.

The apparent political strength of the radicals, however, was built on a basic weakness of the miner's unions and
had self-limiting properties. In addition to the atmosphere of class conflict and frontier confrontation, the province's mining areas had a marked weakness in union organization. Both the Vancouver Island and the Interior mining unions had difficulty staying organized, at the turn of the century. The WFM efforts on Vancouver Island in 1903 collapsed and rivalries between the WFM and the United Mine Workers in the interior fields continued for several years. After the jurisdiction was divided between metal and coal miners, the Interior unions achieved a measure of stability especially after the WFM rejoined the AFL in 1911. The Island coal unions continued weak despite efforts of the UMW to organize the area in 1912. A two-year strike started in that year, replete with militia and violent confrontation, failed to win a contract. 33

Political action and representation thus became a substitute for unionism when economic action proved less effective.

Though the doctrinaire policy of the Socialist Party of Canada prevented a direct alliance with the moderate and conservative unionists, reformist socialists continued to work within the province's trade unions. When the British Columbia Federation of Labour was formed in 1910 several socialists were among its leaders. The reform socialists and the moderate unionists of the BCFL had many points in common as both were disposed toward industrial unionism and criticism of the conservative craft orientation of the TLC and AFL. In addition, the sentiment within the British Columbia Federation of Labour for independent political action was sizable; what was lacking was agreement on forming a party or endorsing one of the avail-
The inability of the province's unions to agree on a common political vehicle grew after 1911 as the SPC became more doctrinaire and isolated; in 1912 a Social Democratic Party rose to split the vote even further. The beneficiaries of this chaos were the provincial Liberals who managed to bring the socialist MLA Parker Williams into the party in 1916. By 1917 the SPC "was no longer a factor in BC politics." 35

The increase in strikes in 1911 and 1912 had pushed the unions into strong economic actions. The ferocity of the 1912-14 coal strike pushed organized labour and the political left together. The BCFL, IWW, UMW, SPC and SDP formed a temporary coalition to aid the miners. Without a common political vehicle, the unions concentrated on economic activity. When World War One came the economic direction was also accentuated because of an increasing labour shortage, economic stimulation, and a steady inflation.

A Budding Alliance, 1918-1926

As the war dragged on union sentiment favoring some form of novel action mounted. Many elements of organized labour in the Canadian west disliked conscription, particularly when suspicions grew that conscription was being used to undermine collective bargaining and unionism. 36 Furthermore, economic gains proved difficult for organized labour despite the virtual explosion in membership in the final years of the war. Inflation ate at wages, while the war placed limitations on strikes and other economic weapons.
By 1918 organized labour's search for new tools to advance its goals settled on two alternatives. On the one hand, the labour moderates renewed their attempt at forging a viable labour party. This path made some progress when the British Columbia Federation of Labour, along with sympathetic socialist elements, started the Federated Labour Party in 1918.\(^{37}\) The FLP's success in building a wider coalition than the previous socialist and labour parties did not become apparent until the other alternative, syndicalism, had spent itself.

Syndicalist ideas of direct economic action, class struggle, and the general strike had been current in British Columbia since the wobblies introduced them in 1906. In the heady aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the severe stress caused by the war, syndicalism took on a new appeal for it promised quick results for economic and political problems. Syndicalism, though rejecting parliamentary politics, contained a strong political tone in its condemnation of capitalist society. It thus combined, in inchoate form, industrial unionism, revolution, economic action, class consciousness, and the tinges of frontier confrontation -- elements that had long appealed to the migrant and unskilled labourers of mine and forest. By 1919 syndicalist influence in the BCFL had reached a peak as many leaders helped to start the short-lived One Big Union.

The glitter of the syndicalist's foolsgold soon tarnished. By late 1919 the failure of general strike tactics, direct economic action, and the One Big Union's organization became manifest. The failure of the direct actionists had two effects:
it disillusioned many leftists and it "swung the pendulum once again toward political action."\(^{38}\)

The return of organized labour to politics proved a most significant development. "For the first time (in B.C.) labour and socialists were able to co-operate sufficiently to form a common party."\(^{39}\) The platform of the FLP combined immediate reforms and demands with a class perspective. It marked a significant shift from the older socialist and labour parties. Ideologically, the FLP was more centrist, combining labourism with reformist socialism. Electorally, it was an attempt to build a broad political base of organized labour and other progressive voters.

The results of the 1920 provincial election sustained the moderates' faith in political action. Fifteen labour candidates received an average of 25\% of the popular vote in their ridings, while the new party elected 2 MLAs. An independent labour candidate from Vancouver Island was also returned.\(^{40}\)

Even before the election of 1920, the British Columbia labour movement had begun to fracture. The TLC convention would not accept the credentials of the BCFL in 1919, so the latter withdrew from the TLC; next March, the BCFL disbanded owing to strong OBU sentiments. The local and regional councils became the main labour organization in the province, with little co-ordination between them. In addition many unions did not belong to even the local labour councils. By 1925 less than one-third of Vancouver's unionists were allied to the VTLC.\(^{41}\)
Labour's political vehicle, the FLP, had checkered support. It received a boost when the TLC in 1921 again urged the formation of a Canadian Labour Party. Later in 1923 the provincial executive of the TLC helped to form (along with the FLP and the Workers party) a British Columbia branch of the CLP. In the 1924 provincial election three candidates won election under the CLP label. \(^{42}\)

Conservative unionists did not fully back the labour party idea and throughout the twenties many preferred to work with a non-partisan policy. In addition, many labour voters continued to support the Liberals. After the 1924 elections, a number of unionists became disillusioned with political action. The Liberal's eight-hour day law had so many loopholes that unionists felt that instead of government enactment only economic action by the unions could bring about the eight-hour day. By the mid-twenties economic action was regaining momentum.

Moderate and radical labour leaders persisted in independent political action, despite its meagre results. The Vancouver TLC continued to work with the FLP and its successor the Independent Labour Party after the latter was formed in 1926. Many radicals, who had joined the (communist) Worker's party, tried to gain control of the CLP. By 1928 their influence had become so great that they virtually dominated the ILP and the CLP. As a consequence, the Vancouver TLC by referendum vote left the CLP in 1928 over the issues of oriental enfranchisement and communist control. The British Columbia ILP still ran candidates in the 1928 provincial election but the results were discouraging as only one labour candidate won. \(^{43}\)
Political action had once again stymied while factions fought for control of a weak party.

In British Columbia up through 1925 the oscillations between economic and political action by organized labour had progressed in a direction that emphasized the need, efficacy, and legitimacy of both types of activity. It had also indicated the possibility of success on the political field. The necessity for an independent political party was most apparent to the province's miners for this occupation concentrated workers in occupational communities while it exposed them to government intervention with the Industrial Disputes Investigation mechanism and the militia as in the 1912-14 coal strike. Faced by a fierce employer and an apparently compliant provincial government, the Island miners turned to independent politics, particularly as the unions lacked staying power.

Independent politics also acquired legitimacy early in this century. For, "... it was the fact of (the SPC) having representatives in Victoria which earned the party legitimacy and awarded it a more significant role in British Columbia politics than might otherwise have been the case."\(^{44}\) The legitimacy of having independent political representatives speak for and work on behalf of organized labour could be drawn on by the FLP, the ILP, and the CLP in the 1920's, when they attempted to broaden the political base of a left-of-centre party.

The electoral and organizational successes of these later parties indicated the viability of the political path. Starting with the FLP, these parties manifested the ability to build a broader political base and to maintain organizational
links to important labour bodies. Further, they indicated the need and efficacy of adopting a reformist platform while retaining elements of a class analysis. The first element acted to ensure the relevance of the parties, as the second preserved organizational boundaries in a political system rewarding party lines. Thus though the union conservatives re-emerged after the radical upsurge of the war years and though union central bodies fractured and shrank in the 1920's, the moderate unionists managed to sustain their political action policy.

A House Divided, 1933-1948

When the great depression shook voters out of their usual political allegiances, the prior decades of experimentation reinforced the third party option as a viable alternative. The old socialists and FLP voters did not give up on independent politics, but drew on their experience to organize a better (and hopefully more successful) version of the political vehicles that had garnered mild success in previous decades.

At its formation in 1932, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation met with enthusiastic support from British Columbia unions. The international unions, especially in Vancouver and Victoria, were well disposed toward the new moderate socialist party. In the first elections it contested in British Columbia, the CCF drew much of its support from the urban working-class districts. Such grass-roots labour voter support became a constant of CCF strength. Despite favorable reviews that organized labour gave the new party, no local unions affiliated to the CCF and neither the Vancouver nor the Victoria TLC
endorsed the party.\textsuperscript{45}

Hardly had this union-CCF courtship begun than it broke up on the rocks of internal union factionalism and the Liberal's reformist policies. The nationalist ACCL and the CCF moved closer after 1932 although the ACCL's strength declined in the 1930's as a split rocked the latter's organization in 1936. The apparent ACCL tie tended to drive away the TLC unions from supporting the CCF. In addition the labour conservatives, through the provincial executive of the TLC, preferred to work with the provincial Liberals who had promised "work and wages." Though the CCF remained willing to work with most unions, organized labour kept its distance. By the middle of the decade the CCF "could no longer be considered the official arm of organized labour in British Columbia. Probably for the first time in the province's history there was a complete separation between the dominant union and political organizations of the labour movement."\textsuperscript{46}

This separation of organized labour from the CCF continued through the thirties as the labour conservatives hoped to influence social and labour legislation by working with the Liberals. Patullo's attempt to unite a broad spectrum of groups with a "socialized capitalism" platform, however, ended by pleasing few. After indefinitely postponing a popular health welfare plan, the Liberals in 1937 once again sided with their conservative wing by pushing a new Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act that encouraged company unions over independent unions. The postponement of health reforms raised doubts about the government's policy; the new ICA act was viewed more
seriously by unions for it undermined the labour conservative's primary tool, collective bargaining. In consequence the provincial TLC leaders threatened to become political. 47

This incident reveals the type of problem that recurred continually after the province became the major regulator of labour conflict. British Columbia's interventionist labour policies continually reminded the unionists that independent political action was necessary if the unions were to defend themselves on the economic field.

In the years of World War Two most of British Columbia's unions concentrated on economic activity, generally steering clear of ambitious political action. This was not so much due to a unanimity of thought as it was to an unlikely circumstance. The labour conservatives happily followed their non-partisan policy as a seemingly pliable federal government assumed more direction of labour affairs during the war. The craft unions, however, no longer dominated the union movement. Membership in industrial unions affiliated to the Canadian Congress of Labour exploded during the war. In British Columbia almost all new union strength accrued to the communists as they provided the organizers and leaders for the unions. The communists' policy, dictated by international considerations, called for a union of the CCF with the communist's Labour-Progressive Party and for a Liberal-labour coalition. Consequently, when the CCF refused such a united front policy, the communists worked on a non-partisan basis to "win the war against fascism."

On the national level the CCL pursued a stronger independent political course during the war years. In 1942 the
CCL convention encouraged members to study the CCF platform; a year later the CCL convention endorsed the CCF and urged locals to affiliate.

Dissatisfaction with the overt ties to the CCF by the communist affiliated unions forced the CCF supporters to lower the profile of the CCL's political support. The 1944 convention did not re-endorse the CCF. To avoid a costly division on politics the CCF unionists adopted the strategy of channeling support for the CCF through union political action committees. The device of political action committees provided another advantage. As a political vehicle similar to the American CIO's political action committee, the CCL PAC's provided a non-partisan cover for essentially partisan purposes. The CCF-oriented PACs supplied a low-profile, but meaningful, bridge between organized labour and the third party at a time when elements of both were suspicious of each other. 48

In British Columbia, only two locals (the Nanaimo miners and the Kamloops railway employees) affiliated with the CCF. A few other CCL unions preferred to use political action committees. But organized labour during the forties displayed little harmony on the issue of political participation. Though the national TLC urged the formation of political action committees, most of the TLC affiliated unions preferred a non-partisan policy. 49 The communist-dominated British Columbia Federation of Labour (resurrected in 1944) agreed with the provincial Liberal-Conservative government in 1945 to set-up a joint committee on labour problems. 50
The general direction of political policy as outlined above did not appreciably change until after the unions resolved the issue of communist influence. The CCF supporters in the CCL unions played a key role in forcing the communist issue to a crisis state. Especially important were the CCF supporters on the national level of the Steelworkers and the Autoworkers. Through the use of provincial union organizers and sympathetic local elements, these moderate labour leaders helped to purge the B.C. Federation of Labour, the IWA, the boilermakers, and other unions of communist elements. Another communist stronghold the Mine-Mill union was forced out of the CCL in 1949. By the end of 1948, moderates controlled the Vancouver CCL council, the BCFL, and the IWA.51

The Necessity of Politics, 1948-1960

The post-war years were ones of strong economic action for organized labour as they attempted to extend organization to new locals and to win wage increases postponed by the war. The dismantling of the Federal government's war-time powers also necessitated a shift of labour's concern to the provincial government.

The post-war changes in provincial labour relations legislation increasingly cast a political shadow over the conduct of collective bargaining. Legislation in 1948 supplemented the mandatory conciliation and delay procedures with a government supervised strike vote. "The legislative regulation of strikes also opened the door to the increased use of injunctions, which greatly compromised the right to strike."52
The government regulation of labour relations tended to undermine the collective bargaining guarantees that had been so dearly fought for; these changes also came at a time of high union growth. In the decade and a half after the Second World War all segments of British Columbia's labour unions found themselves forced to become political in order to defend the collective bargaining process. Interventionist labour relations policy convinced unions that economic action and political action were inseparable.

The unity of outlook developed slowly. The craft unions gained in membership after the war and generally persisted in a non-partisan policy, hoping to push the Liberal-Conservative coalition government into reforms. The 1948 labour code changes presaged the death of coalition's reform impulse in the early fifties. The elimination of communist influence in the CCL unions freed the Political Action Committees to work with the CCF. When the Social Crédit Party arose as the new coalition party in the early fifties "a segment of the labour vote went to them, especially the older craft unionists and the unorganized workers." 53

The Socreds flirtation with organized labour proved short lived. In 1954 the Socreds moved to revise and tighten the labour code. The CCL, the TLC, and the railway unions found themselves on common ground in opposition to the new labour act. Feelings ran so high about this latest government interference in collective bargaining that talk of a general strike re-emerged briefly. 54

The growing rapprochement of the TLC and the CCL at the
national and the provincial levels served to confirm the trend to overt political participation with the CCF. In 1956 a new British Columbia Federation of Labour incorporated both the TLC and the CCL unions. The founding convention of the BCFL struck a committee "to consult with farm organizations, co-operatives, and the CCF with a view to forging a common program." The next year the BCFL voted by 75% in favor to endorse the CCF. With the next provincial election in mind, there followed in 1958 a joint CCF-labour union committee to establish a "working partnership" for the election campaign. The BCFL again endorsed the CCF in 1959 and worked closely with the latter in the following year's provincial election. Finally, in 1960 the national CLC voted overwhelmingly to join with the CCF in establishing a new party. Except for a few old TLC locals, the direct affiliation with, participation in, and establishment of a moderate socialist party found widespread support in the province's unions.

By the second half of the fifties, organized labour had reached a consensus on their political efforts. The radicals had been either purged from the unions or weaned from their revolutionary ideologies; the distance between the moderates and the conservatives also narrowed as the non-partisan policy kept failing on such vital matters as labour legislation. At the same time the flexible yet distinctive policy of the CCF had earned for the party over the previous twenty years a legitimacy as a realistic political alternative. The CCF's strength and stability of organization also gave it a viability as a political tool. Given these circumstances even the con-
servative unions, by and large, became convinced that the economic goals of the unions could only be secured in British Columbia with a strong political affiliation to the moderate socialist party.

From Regional Autonomy to Non-Partisan Concord: Union Political Participation in Washington State

The political path of organized labour in Washington State started from ground similar to British Columbia's; by World War Two, however, Washington State's unionists had retraced the steps that had led previous American unionists into a non-partisan policy.

Like their brothers in British Columbia, unionists in the state prior to 1925 often adopted a political course that contrasted sharply with eastern AFL unions and the national executive of the AFL. "Pure and simple" unionism had noticeably fewer supporters in the northwest corner of America. Part of this independence grew from the late arrival of the AFL and the lower level of integration into the AFL structure; part can also be attributed to Washington State's economy; and another factor was the strong role that local labour councils played, particularly in the Puget Sound region.

A Regional Movement, 1900-1917

Washington State labour councils displayed an independent political streak in the years before 1900. The Washington Central Labour Union in 1894 and in 1896 endorsed the Populist Party. In the latter year the Populists swept to power by controlling both state legislative chambers. By 1900, however,
the collapse of Populism through fusion with the Democrats and
the return of Republican strength forced many unionists to
seek other political instruments. Many unions came to maintain
working alliances with Democrats and former Populists, while
the more conservative unionists drifted into a policy of back-
ing progressive candidates in either the Democratic or
Republican Party. 57

Socialist's and some unionists also found a modus
vivendi at the turn of the century. The growth of Populist-
Democratic fusion disturbed many Populist supporters who then
preferred to join the Social Democratic party. This party grew
rapidly in 1900. 58 In Seattle union sentiment for socialism
increased. The Seattle Ironworkers adopted the Socialist
Party of Washington's platform in 1901. The presidents of the
Seattle typographical union and the Buildings Trades Council
were also socialist party members. In the Inland Empire,
union-socialist ties intensified, too. Unionists and socialists
in the smelter town of Northport collaborated in the city
council elections for a strong showing in 1901. The following
year the American Labour Union, which was strong in Spokane
until 1905, endorsed the Socialist Party of America. 59

The rise of the doctrine of "impossibilism" (a doctri-
naire, anti-reform, anti-middle class ideology) within the
Socialist Party of Washington after 1902 quickly ended the
budding friendship. "Reformist" and "fusionist" socialists
were either kicked out or hounded out of the party. Many union
socialists turned away from the SPW, though not from their
political beliefs. Typical of this pattern was H.L. Hughes who
worked within the Washington State Federation of Labor, becoming in 1914 the WSFL's lobbyist in the state capital.  

As a result of these divided sentiments "... the pendulum of sentiment (for political action within Washington unions) swung back and forth between partisan politics and pressure politics" in the first decade of this century. The conservatives felt that their non-partisan policies worked well enough, for they could back individuals of progressive leanings to get reform legislation passed.

Union sentiments for political action outside the two parties remained strong, nonetheless, in the Puget Sound region. The radicals in the SPW prevented co-operation with unions in the early part of the first decade, but towards the end of the decade the doctrinaire socialists began to lose control. In 1908 the Seattle Central Labor Council endorsed the Socialist Party of Washington. The United Mineworkers District 10 in 1910 resolved for "... the necessity of public ownership and democratic management of all the means of production and exchange that are collectively used ..." That year also marked a turning point in the SPW. The reformist socialists expelled their highly doctrinaire, anti-union wing.

"After 1909 the socialists became trusted allies of the Seattle AFL. Many AFL leaders ranging from conservatives like George P. Listman, publisher of the (Seattle) Union Record, to progressives like James A. Duncan of the Seattle CLC, accepted much of the socialist right-wing viewpoint. In return leading socialists such as Hulet Wells and Harry Ault became influential in the Seattle labor movement. This paved the way for the Seattle AFL to become in latter years one of the most energetic centers of left-wing..."
In 1910, many labour leaders hoped to create a state labour party. Forty union locals elected delegates to a united labour party convention; the Seattle CLC endorsed the party's platform; and the State Federation of Labor approved a resolution to consider a state labour party. The labour party effort, nonetheless, proved stillborn. Little rank and file support could be mustered and only the Seattle area indicated strong interest.

Simultaneous with these moves to the left, the labour conservatives regrouped their political efforts. The end of prosperity in 1908 brought the "first phase of the Progressive era . . . to a bitter conclusion." The rising strength of the radicals in the IWW and the metal trades council appeared as ominous portents of things to come. In response the labour conservatives sought to make their pressure group tactics more effective. After the 1908 elections the State Federation of Labor and the state Grange formed a joint lobbying committee. This farmer-labour political coalition became the first of a series of joint efforts that culminated in the founding of the Farmer-Labor Party in 1920. After the 1910 elections the farm-labour coalition formalized the political alliance by establishing a Joint Legislative Committee as a permanent lobbying body in Olympia.

The labour movement's lobbyists supported a wide variety of political and welfare reforms. The direct legislation panaceas of the day, the initiative and referendum, obtained
labour's backing. It was hoped that anti-labour legislation could be over-ridden or that pro-labour measures could be enacted by these plebescitarian means. The great expectations of these devices turned out to be greatly exaggerated. When the Joint Legislative Committee's lobbying efforts turned up empty handed after 1914, the direct legislation route proved to be equally ineffective. Little positive legislation could be passed by direct means, though the initiative and referendum did provide another arena for veto.

The welfare measures that labour supported included an eight-hour day for women, minors, and workers on government projects. The labour lobbyists advocated inspection of mines and workshops and government work projects in hard times. Passage of the Workmen's Compensation act of 1911 was a major triumph for the legislative lobbying efforts. This legislation also demonstrated the alternation of economic and political action. Advocates of the compensation law hoped to relieve the conditions of the unskilled, mainly, immigrant, workers in the wood products industry; these workers were largely beyond the reach of union organizers and, if nothing were done about their conditions, they would have threatened "the craft structure of the WSFL and the SCLC." "Unable to organize in the woods directly, labor sought to achieve its ends politically."66

The revival of progressive sentiments in the Republican and Democratic party after 1908 allowed the lobbyists to have a major influence in elections and on a positive legislative program. This influence began to wither in 1912. As the socialists and moderate labour unionists continued to move closer
in Seattle, the lobbying effort of the WSFL saw the first signs of the withering of Progressivism in the major parties. The 1912 election, often viewed as a revival of Progressivism, proved less than fulsome in its legislative results. "The legislature's failure to enact more progressive legislation greatly frustrated the labour movement. It revived the appeal of industrial unionism, the IWW, and socialism and paved the way for intensified labor-management conflict." 67

While the conservatives held strong positions in the WSFL, the Seattle labour unions moved further in the direction of uniting all elements under a strong central labour council. This form of organization, "Duncanism," lent a special flavor to Seattle's labour unions, as it moved them leftward in politics and on union organization questions. From 1912 to 1917 labour radicals rose to positions of power in the Seattle locals and in the central council. Though the Seattle area provided many votes for the Socialist Party of Washington, the SCLC did not endorse the SPW. As in British Columbia at this time, labour unions desired reform, while elements in the SPW continued to opt for a "revolutionary" platform. The Seattle unions were not averse to the socialists' ideas (even the radicals' ideas) provided the ideas or tactics had positive results.

As World War One approached, Washington State's economy turned down and progressive legislation met defeat. The political rebuffs and the economic hard times strengthened the ties between the unions and the left. Getting nowhere in the 1914 legislature, the Joint Legislative Committee tried to
enact the labour reforms by the initiative. When this last resort tactic failed, the State Federation of Labor convention of that year became militant. The WSFL endorsed a resolution calling for "the collective ownership and democratic management of all means of production." The SCLC that year endorsed the SPW plan to re-organize the AFL on industrial lines and then introduced this resolution in the AFL convention; the SCLC introduced a similar plan yearly until 1925. Stymied by the demise of progressive legislation and the inability to form a viable alternative to the two major parties, Washington's unions returned to militant unionism.

The political policies of the conservatives before 1917 continued to meet defeat. In 1915 the state legislature turned strongly in an anti-labour direction with a bevy of acts repealing prior labour victories and restricting labour's picketing rights. The labor lobbyists appeared helpless in stemming the tide of conservative legislation. Only the governor's veto prevented the enactment of the more repressive measures. Again the farmer-labor lobbyists tried to use direct legislation, but again the effort failed. From 1916 to 1919 the ball returned to the court of economic action and organizational drives.

The political efforts of organized labour from 1900 to 1917 ended with a stalemate between the farm-labour coalition and the state's more conservative social groups. Many of the early gains by the lobbyists had either been lost by 1917 or had been nullified through inaction. The stalemate evident in the state legislature of 1916-17 typified the whole progressive
era: "it had not lived up to labour's darkest fears. Neither had it accomplished most of labour's goals." The political stalemate forced labour unions to concentrate on the economic struggle.

There were five political lessons for organized labour in this first period: first, independent partisan politics needed a wider base of support than either the Socialist Party of Washington or the attempted labour party could provide. Second, non-partisanship worked only so long as Progressivism animated a large portion of the electorate. Pressure politics also had some potential for positive results given a largely receptive electorate. Fourth, at its worst, pressure politics at least offered the possibility of organizing "veto power" in any one of the state's political arenas. Finally, only direct economic action, i.e., militant, local unionism, offered substantial and relatively secure means of advancing toward organized labour's goals.

Thus by 1917 organized labour's experimentation with political policies had explored a number of alternatives. Doctrinaire socialism briefly held the allegiance of some unions, but most had rejected the "impossibilists." The option of independent political action was kept open, though neither the reform socialists nor a labour party seemed an adequate vehicle. Non-partisanship and pressure politics worked when the middle classes wanted reform, but otherwise could only provide a means to block ill-conceived legislation. By the time the United States entered World War One, Washington State's unionists had not established a unified policy on political participation.
In the chaotic post-war years, organized labour reached for new instruments to further their economic and political goals.

"Duncanism" Unravels, 1917-1925

During the years of American participation in World War One the labour unions concentrated on economic activity. The turn away from political action came for several reasons. The political stalemate of the state government seemed a waste of effort for small gains when a burgeoning work force and war inflation required immediate and direct action. The war (and its aftermath) completed the burial of the progressive movement in the two major parties, as reform took a back seat to nationalism.

In the years 1917 to 1919 radical and, particularly, syndicalist influence reached a crescendo. The war economy stimulated those industries employing the backbone of the socialists' and the radical unions. Specifically, the shipbuilding and lumber industries expanded the influence of the radical metal trades council and the lumber workers. The resurgence of the IWW accentuated the talk of one big union and militant, direct economic action. The establishment of soldiers and workers councils near the war's end (apparently in imitation of the Bolsheviks) was also cut from this cloth.

The attitudes of the unionists toward the Russian revolution indicate why the radicals and moderates could cooperate in many endeavors. The conservative unionists, of course, condemned the Russian revolution, although they agreed with the moderates and radicals on government ownership of the
means of transportation, communication, and distribution. At the other end of the spectrum the radicals endorsed the Bolsheviks. The moderate unionists also endorsed the October revolution for they were strong idealists; and their attitudes had overtones of the American form of class consciousness. 70

Though the Seattle general strike of 1919 was hardly a revolution, it was cut from the cloth of labour unity, syndicalist influence, the need for united economic action, and the strength of industrial union sentiment within the AFL-affiliated unions. The SCLC, with its quasi-industrial organization ("Duncanism"), made the strike possible and took a leading part in organizing the strike itself. 71

The general strike proved to be a disaster. With no firm objectives and little appreciation of the consequences of a general strike, the Seattle labour movement overplayed its hand and lost its economic battle on behalf of the metal trades council. The failure of the strike sent the Seattle unions back into independent politics.

Defeated economically, suspected by most of Seattle's non-labour public because of the general strike the Seattle AFL tried to recover its position by entering into politics. To hostile Seattleites, the general strike had been a revolution and they felt that its failure had rendered labor powerless. Political activity was the last method of retaliating against this impression available to organized labor. 72

After the general strike, the SCLC's unity broke down. The general strike proved to be the beginning of the unraveling of "Duncanism." As the syndicalist faction of the SCLC saw the strike as a success, they moved further in that direction.
The politically-minded radicals and the conservative and moderate unionists, led by Duncan, pushed for a political response to the post-war open shop movement.

In this return to political action in 1919, the question of partisanship initially divided the unionists. The union conservatives (along with their erstwhile coalition partners, the farmer conservatives) had found themselves politically homeless after 1917, as the Progressivism of the major parties declined. Additionally worrisome to the conservatives, their favorite tactics of non-partisanship and pressure group action needed a major overhaul, if not replacement. With this in mind, the State Federation of Labor hoped to effectuate a renewed and yet broader coalition in a non-partisan triple alliance of the WSFL, farm groups, and the politically awakened railway brotherhoods. The labour moderates and the non-syndicalist radicals, however, wanted the triple alliance to become an independent political party; the new party was to be the broadly-based reformist vehicle that the SPW and the labour parties had not been. In one of the last instances of a united labour movement in the immediate post-war period, the political party advocates carried the day. The labour conservatives on the State Federation of Labor grudgingly went along, although the railway brotherhoods refused to support the triple alliance or the new party. 73

The Farmer-Labor Party, as the new party was christened, combined moderate labour with moderate socialism; it wanted the farmer's support but its main backing came from western Washington-
ington labour groups. The state's farmers split on support for the FLP with easterners giving less support than westerners. In leadership, the FLP was comprised mainly of ex-socialists and moderate labour leaders and labour spokesmen. Hulet Wells, J.C. Kennedy, and James Duncan figured prominently. The Farmer-Labor Party represented a continuation of the pre-World War One radicalism, tempered with the knowledge that a broader appeal must be made. The party's policy stressed immediate reforms, non-doctrinaire policies, and long-term economic change.

The 1920 elections heartened, but also disappointed the third party advocates. The FLP replaced the Democrats as the second largest vote-getters in the state. Though the party's candidates ran solid races for many offices, only three FLP legislators won office; no state-wide elections went to the FLP.

Almost immediately, the labour conservatives withdrew their support for the new party. The following year the State Federation of Labor convention returned a majority of conservatives to the leadership, thereby isolating the third party advocates in the Puget Sound region. Thereafter, the conservative leadership of the WSFL, "assiduously avoided any entanglements with third party candidates on the state and local level."

In the Puget Sound area, support for third party politics lingered on for a few more years. The Seattle CLC and the Tacoma CLC in 1922 endorsed Duncan in his bid for the U.S. Senate on the FLP ticket. The Tacoma CLC also endorsed the (communist) Worker's Party. The Seattle CLC and the Carpenters Union sent delegates to the 1922 FLP convention and the FLP elected two more legislators, for a total of five in that year's state elec-
Despite these modest gains, the FLP was actually in decline. In July of 1922 only six county units of the party remained. In the November election the Democrats started a comeback. Significantly, the FLP victories of 1922 were in part due to a FLP-Democratic party fusion that was beginning to take place in some county organizations. But of most importance, the coalition of moderates and radicals that formed the strongest block for the FLP began fighting each other for control of the labour movement. The moderates and the conservatives were thus driven together in order to maintain labour unity. 77

By 1924 labour support for the Washington FLP had all but vanished. The immediate post-war years witnessed a heightening of labour-management conflict. The open shop movement, the economic decline of the war industries, and the recession of the early twenties forced unions onto the defensive in their economic struggles. The unions in the war industries experienced a sharp contraction of membership. The politically-minded unionists were hardest hit by the economic circumstances. A general strike to maintain union strength was out of the question. Instead unions engaged in a series of strikes in the early twenties that carried on too long and badly hurt the unions. "Lacking external support, internally divided, facing strong and unified opposition, the state labor movement seemed on the verge of disintegration." 78 The poor showing economically, coupled with the use of the anti-union injunction propelled the labour conservatives of the WSFL back into politics -- but back to non-
partisanship and not again into third party ventures.

At the national level of the Farmer-Labor Party, the communists had gained control in 1924 thus forcing many FLP supporters out of the party. Most of these former FLP elements ended up supporting LaFollette's presidential bid on the Progressive ticket.

The Washington FLP was buried in the 1924 elections. The SCLC withdrew from politics that year. The state FLP endorsed LaFollette; this precipitated a split in the Washington FLP. The only labour union support that the FLP garnered came from the railway brotherhoods who endorsed Robert Oman of the Tacoma railway shopcrafts federation for governor. After the election the FLP retained no state legislators. With the FLP's demise went the hopes for a coalition of moderate socialists, labour, and farmer groups. The organization was in a shambles though the progressive social base seemed intact as LaFollette's candidacy indicated. He received in Washington State twice the national average with 36% of the votes to the Democrats 10%. LaFollette had a strong showing among Washington's unionists with estimates of 82% of them backing him, while the whole unionist vote may have contributed 30% of his total. 79

By the mid-twenties almost all of Washington State's unions had reverted to the policy of non-partisanship. The radicals, strong in the war industries, were decimated by the return of "normalcy". Politically, the radicals moved into the communist party. The moderate unionists were caught between the conservatives and the radicals, unwilling to forsake the AFL and labour unity, yet tarred with the brush of radical
policies that had caused the disaster of 1919 and the organizational failure of the FLP. The moderates' vehicle to recoup the economic losses, the FLP, had proved ineffectual in both the legislature and the polls. Burned by the radicals and third party elements, the conservatives worked to regain the losses and to protect the unions by withdrawing to the safer ground of non-partisanship and economic action.

By 1925 the conservatives were dominant in the state's unions, but the victory was hollow for the state's labour unions faced difficult times throughout the decade. The return to non-partisanship had few positive results in the twenties. The organizational drives also failed to increase membership.

The Triumph of the Conservatives, 1932-1940

The political activities of Washington State's unions stayed in the conservative track, while their organizations languished until the depression of the thirties. The first change of political policy came on the question of voluntarism. The 1931 AFL convention meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia, split along craft vs. industrial lines on government unemployment insurance. Spurred by the depression, in 1932 the AFL executive board did a volte-face, approving compulsory unemployment insurance. These changes brought the Washington State unions that had long abandoned "voluntarism" more into line with the national body.

In the early thirties the Seattle CLC again stirred to political life. It was drawn to the technocracy movement which advocated national planning and massive public works to
end the depression. Technocracy was considered by some socialists to be an applied form of socialism. Many of the SCLC's unions (particularly the industrial ones) also affiliated to the Washington Commonwealth Federation. Founded by socialists, technocrats, and an assortment of other reformers, the WCF considered itself part of the national "co-operative commonwealth" movement and had similarities to the Canadian Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The WCF's main plank was "production for use and not for profit", which had associations with long-standing socialist demands. Learning from the past mistakes of the third party advocates, the WCF hoped to bore from within the Democratic party to achieve power. (The WCF will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.) In addition to the ties to the WCF the Seattle CLC's political welfare committee worked to elect a majority of the Seattle city council and increased its clout with the county council.

Washington State's politics underwent a major transformation in 1932, with the Democrats sweeping to power and becoming the vehicle of the progressive sentiment re-kindled by the depression. The WSFL could claim little responsibility for the change for it had come through the most effective level of political participation in America's fragmented political structure, the local level of the two major parties.

The results of the 1933 legislative sessions demonstrated that nothing less than a revolutionary change in labor's political position had occurred. Ironically, these changes, which so benefitted labor, had not been foreseen by labor. Neither had labor actively worked to encourage them on a statewide level. Rather they were the results of local actions.
While labor had been paralysed on a statewide level, local labor leaders had effectively worked to elect pro-labor legislators. And while the WSFL had been unable to decide on a national candidate, local leaders had succeeded in electing numerous mayors and city councilmen. 82

After the Democrats sweeping victories of 1932 proved that political action might once again yield results, Washington's unions became more politically active; their political participation, unlike the political upsurges prior to 1924, was confined to working within the Democratic party. All major union groups in Washington State during the thirties, including the radicals, had come to realise the futility of a third party venture. In this the unionists resembled the non-labour socialists, radicals, and progressives who had modified the prior decade's strident rhetoric and doctrinaire goals in the hopes of capturing the Democratic party.

One of the major vehicles of labour union participation in the Democratic party was the Washington Commonwealth Federation. The State Federation of Labor endorsed the WCF in 1935 and at the founding convention of that year 116 out of 483 delegates represented labour unions. As in its prior excursions into partisan political activity, the WSFL soon became disenchanted with the recipient of its political endorsement. Many local trades councils, such as Seattle, Bremerton, Centralia, and Everett, maintained more active support. In 1936, two vice-presidents of the WCF represented unions or labour councils. 83 The labour unions associated with the WCF were mostly industrial unions (often communist influenced unions), although a few AFL affiliated unions belonged
to the WCF.

Labour unions' dissatisfaction with the WCF surfaced in 1936 when some elements in the WCF wanted to form a third party. The labour unions in the WCF opposed this and the WCF stayed in the Democratic party. The WCF captured the Democrat's state convention in 1936 and passed a platform advocating "production for use." Labour disenchantment with the WCF returned later that year when the WSFL and the SCLC endorsed the Democrats for the general election but rejected the "production for use" initiative. 84

The 1937 AFL and CIO schism caught the WCF in the middle. After the SCLC withdrew from the WCF in April 1937, "the WCF by choice and circumstance (became) tied to the growing CIO, although some AFL unions remained affiliated with it." 85 International Woodworkers of America locals became affiliated to the WCF and the IWA pledged its support to the WCF, to the Oregon Commonwealth Federation and to Labor's Non-Partisan League. 86

The strong alliance the WCF built with a segment of organized labour only exacerbated the conflict with other sections of organized labour. Late in 1937 the Seattle Metal Trades Council, two AFL affiliated Lumber and Sawmill Workers locals, the Longview-Kelso and the Bremerton central labour councils left the WCF. In the fall of 1937 the Seattle CLC branded the WCF a dual organization.

The strained relations between the AFL and the WCF spread to the latter's relationship with the CIO in the second
half of 1938. Since late 1936 the WCF had been more and more influenced at the leadership level by communists. Over the years this became a contentious issue. The WCF could not duplicate the ties to the CIO that the Oregon Commonwealth Federation managed to build. With the WCF's impotence to effect political change and to control the Democrats, and with the WCF's communist affiliations becoming more unacceptable, the CIO in 1940 formally rejected working with the WCF. The next year the IWA's American locals moved to purge their union of communist influence and leadership. 87

As the unions grew more distant from the WCF, the legislation of the Washington State government drew organized labour's attention. Governor Martin introduced a bill giving an industrial tribunal powers to order a thirty-day cooling off period in strikes, and the power to investigate disputes and recommend a settlement. Organized labor vehemently opposed this, threatening to join in common cause with the radicals. Through pressure group action the bill was successfully opposed; labour then countered with their own legislative program for a state-level Wagner act. Labour's legislation met defeat. The final act of this anti-labour versus labour union tussle came when the unions defeated an anti-union initiative in 1938. Thus as in previous years the unions could not get their legislation passed but at least the pressure group activity provided a veto over interference with the collective bargaining process.

By the late 1930's, the politically-minded segments of Washington State's unions had beat a retreat to pressure
politics, non-partisanship, and to the economic front. The political field had proven to be an unreliable arena for pursuing organized labour's goals, except as it provided the possibility of veto. The major parties showed themselves to be too ephemeral and too unreliable in the candidates they allowed to rise in their ranks. The state government was a political maze that could produce few positive results. The unionists drawn to politics in the thirties had by the forties come to similar attitudes and behavior that the older AFL unions had come to decades previously. The CIO unions came to adopt a more political bent, but even they concentrated their efforts on economic action, pressure politics, and participation through formally non-partisan political action committees.

In 1940 the Democratic Party in Washington State lost its huge gains of the 1930's. After 1940 state politics became for the first time a real contest between the Democrats and Republicans. With the decline of the state's Democrats and with the disaffection of organized labour from important Democrats, the unions in Washington reverted to the individualized politics advocated by Gompers and the labour conservatives.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of union structure and political participation in British Columbia and Washington State leads to several conclusions.

First, the growth and extent of unionism in British Columbia and Washington State between 1900-1961 ran on parallel
lines. Though the data for Washington State is more sketchy before 1939, what is available suggests that the rhythm of union growth and decline indicates a broad comparability. But starting in the late 1930's Washington State's unions made a remarkable recovery from their weakened condition in the depths of the depression. This recovery led them to far outdistance their northern brothers for the whole 1939-61 period.

This situation of early similarity of size and later divergence raises some interesting points. Washington State's labour groups, after a radical early period and after many attempts to construct a broad reform coalition, scaled down their political ambitions and set their sights on a rather minimal program from the government: the right to bargain collectively and organize. The turn away from independent political participation coupled with the minimal rights of the laissez faire labour relations system made the unions' economic struggles pay handsome dividends in membership growth.

On the other hand, British Columbia's union growth rate may indicate a harder time organizing even after the right to organize and bargain collectively was granted in World War Two. But the post-1930's divergence with Washington's unions may also indicate the tendency to use political action as a means to redress grievances that in Washington State would have been resolved through economic action.

The second major question raised by this chapter's discussion of union structure concerns the relationship of union movement unity to political action. In short, the answer appears to be that the two are not related. The periods of greatest
union fragmentation have been ones of great expansion and political fermentation. The heterogeneity of the union movements do not give ready clues as to their members' political affiliation or the union's policy. That the CCF took hold during a period of great labour movement conflict argues that the conflict influenced the form of political participation (political action committees and individual memberships) more than the fact of participation.

The discussion of union political participation reinforces several points made previously. That organized labour in British Columbia and Washington State was not internally unified on the issue of political participation, and that the willingness to engage in political activity by unions was not constant or even growing over time indicates the experimental nature of labour's political efforts. The history of union politics on the North Pacific coast indicates that experience and not a relatively invariant "essence" of the labour movement led to the different styles of participation and rank ordering of goals.

Two factors seem to have been of prime consideration in shaping the willingness of unions to participate in independent politics: the relative efficacy of economic or political action, and the necessity of entering politics because of political intervention in collective bargaining. The experimentation with different forms of political participation taught and retaught the unions the value of the different strategies. It taught the unions to emphasize economic and/or political action by the
results it produced; the experimentation taught which form of participation worked best and was most compatible with the economic goals.

Specifically, Washington State's unions grew to understand the futility of third party movements in the fragmented American party system. They also learned that the weakness of American parties provided few guarantees that those elected would stick by party policy. In addition, the parcelling out of authority to many institutions frustrated the unions' attempt to control or influence public policy especially as it related to labour relations.

The American unions' limited success came when they operated on a non-partisan basis using pressure group tactics. Though this policy sometimes yielded positive benefits (as with the Workmen's Compensation Law) its major success came as a method of blocking or vetoing anti-labour policies. The weakness of American parties and the fragmentation of political authority made this policy workable. Political action for Washington's unions repeatedly became a way of deflecting interference with collective bargaining. Political action in Washington State's unions came to have little connection to positive policy and little need for a strong alliance with a political party or political ideology. As a result unions emphasized economic struggles more than politics, as the former yielded tangible results.

Organized labour's political experimentation in Washington State up to the late 1930's represented a regional replaying of the national quest for a policy on political
eventually arrived at similar political policies, indicating the strength with which the political institutions shaped labour's policies. The American union's experimentation led away from partisanship and overt affiliation; it taught organized labour to mute demands for state intervention and socialism, however mild.

On the other hand, British Columbia's unions returned to independent political activity because it had earlier acquired legitimacy, it produced tangible results, and because government intervention in labour relations made political action necessary to preserve the integrity of collective bargaining. British Columbia's unions received an early demonstration of the usefulness of socialist or independent labour representation when the socialist MLA's in 1903 used their balance of power position to deliver reform legislation. The early success and the results the MLA's achieved legitimized political action and the legislative amelioration of the industrial struggle. This legitimacy kept alive the partisan and direct affiliation option. At the same time the state intervention in collective bargaining slowly taught even the labour conservatives that economic results depended on independent political participation. The government intervention in the industrial disputes in the province's mining industry early in the century was later supplanted by the provincial
government's labour legislation as the mechanism that reinforced the "political" nature of industrial disputes.

Independent political activity required a broad political base; the moderate socialists provided the organizational and ideological tools for building such a political base. Although direct trade union ties to the CCF developed very slowly, moderate socialism struck firm roots in the province's union membership. Socialism justified and explained the unionists' place in society, provided them with hope for future success, and worked to materially benefit the unionists' struggle with employers and political opponents who seemed to work hand in hand. In Washington State the choice for unions was largely one of economic or political action; in British Columbia economic and political action were increasingly seen as hanging together.

Having explored organized labour's structure and political policies, the discussion now turns to the second line of development (the political parties) that created a moderate socialist party in British Columbia but not in Washington State.
Footnotes

1 Reliable statistics on union membership in British Columbia do not exist before 1911 when the federal government started the yearly collection of information on labour organizations. Professor Phillips has gathered these statistics together for British Columbia and has also attempted to measure the relative size of the unionized in relation to the non-farm agricultural work force by straight-line extrapolation with the decennial census figures. P. Phillips, No Power Greater: A Century of Labour in B.C. (Vancouver: Boag Foundation, 1967) Appendix A pp. 169-70; Statistics for Washington State prior to 1939 are sketchier. For the pre-1939 period two sources have been used: 1) the Washington State Labor Commissioner's Reports issued every two years from 1897. These reports give incomplete statistics before 1921 and no statistics after that date; 2) J. Dembo, "A History of the Washington State Labor Movement, 1885-1935," Unpublished PhD. Thesis, University of Washington, 1978, provides data on the membership of the Washington State Federation of Labor and the Seattle Central Labor Council. For the post-1938 period more complete statistics are to be found in G.S. Bain and R. Price, Profiles of Union Growth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) Table 3.2 p. 92.

2 Phillips.


5 Dembo, Tables Two and Three, pp. 686-89. Pages 361-2 at the end of this chapter give the abbreviations of the organizations discussed in this chapter.


8 Dembo, p. 122.

9 Friedheim, pp. 48-50.

10 Schwantes, pp. 137-140.

11 Friedheim, passim.

12 Robin, pp. 178-98.

13 Phillips; Dembo.

14 Dembo, pp. 407-16.

15 Phillips, p. 96.

16 Bain and Price; Phillips, p. 96.

17 Bain and Price.

18 Bain and Price.


21 Ibid., Appendix A; Bain and Price.


23 Higgins, pp. 34-35.

24 Ibid., pp. 56-108.

25 Fink, p. 806

26 Friedheim, passim; Dembo, passim.

27 Robin, pp. 80-83.
28 Ibid., pp. 48-53, 62.


30 McCormack, p. 49.

31 Ibid., p. 51.


34 Robin, pp. 104-06.

35 Johnson, p. 311; quoting British Columbia Federation of Labour President Midgeley.


37 Johnson, pp. 340-42.

38 Ibid. p. 362.

39 Ibid., p. 360.

40 Phillips, p. 89.

41 Ibid., p. 90.

42 Robin, p. 253.

43 Phillips, p. 100.

44 Johnson, p. 373.


46 Ibid.

48 Horowitz, pp. 70-84.

49 Phillips, pp. 135-36.


52 Phillips, p. 146.

53 Robin, Pillars, p. 187.

54 Ibid., p. 197.

55 Ibid., p. 215.

56 Horowitz, p. 228.

57 Schwantes, pp. 64-66, 121.

58 Dembo, p. 31.


60 Schwantes, pp. 132-33.

61 Ibid., p. 159.

62 Dembo, p. 77.

64 Dembo, p. 78.
65 Ibid., p. 73.
66 Ibid., p. 102.
67 Ibid., p. 113.
68 Ibid., pp. 118-19.
69 Ibid., p. 139.
70 Friedheim, p. 29; Cravens, pp. 69-71.
71 Friedheim, p. 29.
72 Ibid., p. 165.
73 Cravens, pp. 95-100.
74 Ibid., p. 116.
75 Ibid.
77 Cravens, pp. 150-53.
78 Dembo, 332.
80 Higgins, pp. 62-70.
82 Dembo, p. 616.
83 Acena, pp. 141-42.
84 Ibid., p. 129.
85 Ibid., p. 188.
86 Ibid., p. 185.
87 Ibid., p. 357.
ABBREVIATIONS OF ORGANIZATION NAMES

ACCL  All-Canadian Congress of Labour
AFL   American Federation of Labor
BCFL  British Columbia Federation of Labour
CBI   Commonwealth Builders, Inc.
CCF   Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
CCL   Canadian Congress of Labour
CIO   Congress of Industrial Organizations
CLC   Canadian Labour Congress
EPIC  End Poverty in California
FLP   Federated Labour Party (British Columbia)
FLP   Farmer-Labor Party (Washington State)
IWA   International Woodworkers of America
IWW   Industrial Workers of the World
LPP   Labour-Progressive Party
NDP   New Democratic Party
OBU   One Big Union
SCLC  Seattle Central Labour Council
SDP   Social Democratic Party
SLP   Socialist Labor Party
SPA   Socialist Party of America
SPBC  Socialist Party of British Columbia
SPC   Socialist Party of Canada
SPW   Socialist Party of Washington
TLC   Trades and Labour Congress
UMW   United Mine Workers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VTLC</td>
<td>Vancouver Trades and Labour Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCF</td>
<td>Washington Commonwealth Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFM</td>
<td>Western Federation of Miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSFL</td>
<td>Washington State Federation of Labor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX

SOCIALISM AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON STATE, 1900-1960

In democratic countries the formation of new political movements and parties recurs on a regular basis (which is not to say continuously). The rise of new political groups has been connected to periods of significant alteration of the socio-economic or political structure. The rapid change from a frontier area to a more settled political jurisdiction is one such cause of new political groups seeking to participate in politics. Large-scale and fast-paced economic change is another political motivator for movements and parties. Finally, government policies can be as much of a propellant of movements and parties as it is the latter's political objective. On the north Pacific coast rapid frontier settlement, major economic changes, and government policies created new political movements and parties; the specific form of these movements and the success in the transition from a movement to a party, however, was mediated and shaped by the political institutions and by the lessons of prior attempts at participation.

The differences in political party developments in British Columbia and Washington State between 1900 and 1960 are the progressive weakening of the ability of Washington's socialist movement to maintain its existence outside of the two
major parties. On the other hand, British Columbia's socialist movement, though initially weak, found political participation outside of the major national parties was both necessary and viable. The different fates of the movements are not due so much to different levels of factionalism, opportunism, or ideology as they are to the institutional premiums placed on the need for and the form of political participation.

**Socialism and Political Parties in British Columbia**

Within the 1900-1960 period, British Columbia's socialist movement and parties can be broadly grouped into two distinct, though related, waves of activity and organization. Before examining these movements and parties in detail, a brief overview will help put the discussion in perspective.

The first period from 1900-1926, begins with a doctrinaire ideology and early success in winning seats in the provincial legislature. By 1911, the reformist socialists had a falling out with their doctrinaire partners, as the movement experienced the contradiction of working for long-term revolution, while maintaining the voter's loyalty, present momentum, and organizational stability. The doctrinaire wing retained control of the Socialist Party of Canada's machinery after 1911, but its membership and influence seriously declined through the early war years; the socialist's legislative presence remained intact until 1916.

After a brief syndicalist phase, at the end of World War One, socialists and the politically-minded unions returned to politics with a new vehicle to win power. Formed out of...
rightward moving socialists and leftward moving unionists, the Federated Labour Party was constructed with hopes of being a broader coalition than its left-wing predecessors. The FLP however could not elect any more MLAs than the SPC did, though it broke out of the pattern of support mainly from the mining areas. The FLP proved to be less than its original billing and slowly lost influence. By the mid-twenties, the open shop movement, a general prosperity, and the reformism of the Liberals had undercut the support and hopes of the third party backers. The future political prospects of the socialists by the mid-twenties were bleak as their organization withered and they fought amongst themselves. This decline brought the socialist movement in British Columbia to the end of its first phase.

The importance of the first phase cannot be judged by the results of the 1920's. Rather, the underlying impact of the first phase could not be grasped until the great depression once again renewed the enthusiasm and need for political change. The second phase, 1932-1960, began with an explosion of participation in the third party movement. The apparent suddenness of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation's growth hid the contribution of the first phase and especially the contribution of the relatively centralized political institutions. The primary contribution of the first phase was not "keeping the socialist ideal alive" or even contributing important leaders to the second phase; rather the first phase tested strategies of political participation. Those strategies found wanting ("a highly doctrinaire party," an "impossibilist" ideology
antagonistic to organized labour, the "middle class" and "reformism" were discarded; strategies, however mildly successful were retained (a mildly socialist ideology to appeal to a wide range of groups and interests, appeals to unions, middle-class and the reformers, the emphasis on electoral organization and education, and the necessity of a strong third party.)

Crucial to the lessons of the first period were the influences of the government institutions on participation; in the second period, these influences continued, as they again and again validated the CCF's third party efforts. The institutional premiums on organization led to the routinization of support and participation that could weather the adverse political influences of prosperity and a rival political party. In particular, the "brittle" nature of British Columbia's parties placed a strain on them that forced reformist elements and labour unions out of the two old parties and into the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. The second period ended as the CCF re-grouped itself after a long period in the doldrums by forming a new party with the direct affiliation of organized labour.

"Impossibilist" Parliamentarians, 1900-1911

Prior to 1903, political alliances in the British Columbia legislature consisted of ad hoc arrangements of notables, who acted more like loose fish than reliable party members. As a consequence, the government resembled a revolving door, for the political support in the legislature changed on most issues. Premier McBride altered this situation by
successfully introducing national party lines in 1903. 4

Party discipline was only part of McBride's achievements; he also fashioned a political machine to enforce party loyalty, to dispense patronage, and to harvest votes. Pursuing a policy of resource exploitation, McBride oiled his political machine with the proceeds of railway schemes, timber sales, and mining rights. He initiated a policy that later governments would also adopt: "open up" the province by providing incentives and facilities for resource exploitation. His vision looked to the southern interior and north along the coast; later politicians gazed further north to the Cariboo, the Peace, and beyond to the Arctic. McBride also appealed to the province's working classes by orchestrating the boom and at the same time by allowing the passage of bills regulating mine work practices and limiting the liability of unions. 5

At the same time that McBride solidified the Conservative party in British Columbia, a Liberal party emerged. The latter's fortunes declined precipitously after 1903, being reduced to two MLAs in 1909 and none in 1912. 6

With the introduction of national party lines, left-wing politics in British Columbia also changed. In the previous decade, the mining areas of central Vancouver Island had supported independent labour candidates for both provincial and federal election. Many had been successful and usually worked in alliance with other MLAs or parties that seemed to offer the greatest benefits for their constituents. Federally, this policy meant an alliance with the Liberals. Shortly after the turn of the century, this independent labour stance came to
an end, when Nanaimo MLA, Hawthornwaite, joined the Socialist Party of B.C. in 1902. That same year a miner, Parker Williams, polled 40% on the socialist ticket in a by-election in the Vancouver Island coal mining district. The turn away from independent labourism to the Socialist Party grew in the mining districts in the succeeding years, until bitter factionalism emerged in 1911 after the Socialist’s growth had arrested.

The socialist movement in British Columbia grew from a number of left-wing, labour, and reformist sources. Prior to 1902 several groups that were often short lived competed for allegiance. In that year a Socialist Party of British Columbia grew out of a unity convention called by the major socialist groups. The SPBC soon adopted an "impossibilist" ideology, trumpeting the inevitable class struggle, forsaking reformism, stressing agitation and education, and bashing trade unions.

When the SPBC attempted to lead a national movement, it changed its name in 1904 to the Socialist Party of Canada, but retained its doctrinaire ideology.

The British Columbia socialist movement quickly developed a strong momentum. In addition to the new allegiance of an MLA, the strong polling of Parker Williams, and a unity convention, the socialists, in 1902, also attended a convention in Kamloops that was intended to found a Provincial Progressive Party out of reformist, labour, and socialist elements. Suspicious of the unions and reformers, the socialists worked to scuttle the project. In the provincial election of 1903 the Socialists ran ten candidates and elected two from the Vancouver Island coal mining districts; they garnered 8% of the
total provincial vote. The following year the SPBC contested five federal seats, receiving 8% of the province's votes.\textsuperscript{10}

The general pattern of support for the socialists (strong support in the mining districts and little support elsewhere) continued until World War One. In Vancouver, the SPBC and later the SPC candidates continually resided at the bottom of the poll. By 1904 the SPBC membership stood at 240 with 15 active locals; at the peak of its strength the SPC had no more than 1,000 members in B.C. and 2,000 in other provinces.\textsuperscript{11} Electorally, the "impossibilists" in British Columbia rode a rising wave of support that crested in 1909. In the 1907 provincial election the SPC ran in 17 ridings, reaping 8% of the votes. The federal election in the following year had the SPC doubling their provincial vote with 15% of the ballots cast. Two years later the SPC's support peaked, when they received 25% of the votes in the provincial election. This popular support, however, came mainly from the province's mining areas.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the growing support for the Socialists, the SPC had some major internal problems. The doctrinaire ideology caused more and more problems as time went on. In 1907, reformist socialists left the SPC to form a Social Democratic Party with a platform emphasizing immediate demands and less doctrinaire policy. This secession did not quell internal factionalism. After the sharp increase in support in the 1908 and 1909 elections, some SPC members advocated building a stronger political machine; the ideologues won out and retained education as the primary goal.
As indicated by the membership figures, interest in the SPC started to decline in 1910 and continued downward through to the middle of World War One. The SPC also experienced difficulties in appeals to the working class as labour unions often chose to run independent labour candidates. The SPC's original base of support in the British and American miners also shifted at the end of the first decade. In 1910 a party member from Vancouver Island complained of the lack of British interest in the party and the growing non-Anglo-Saxon membership. This shift to a large foreign-language membership occurred because mining and the growing lumber industry became filled with the new immigrants. They were attracted to the SPC because of their exposure to socialism in their homelands. The east Europeans resented the SPC policy on foreign language federations, and after 1910 left the SPC for the Social Democratic Party.

The problem of reform versus revolution was most poignant for the SPC's legislators. How could they reconcile an "impossibilist" doctrine with electoral activity and legislative participation? The SPC's parliamentarians came to lead a schizophrenic existence. On the one hand, the party emphasized its role as an agitator and educator for the inevitable revolutionary struggle; it castigated reforms and legislation to ameliorate class conflict; and the party forswore building a strong electoral organization and was ideologically opposed to manipulating their vote-getting appeal. On the other hand, the MLAs instigated and supported a stream of reformist measures aimed at helping their constituents. In
these endeavors the socialists received a boost from the establishment of party discipline, for though their numbers were small between 1903 and 1907 their support was often necessary for McBride to continue in office. For their successes the MLAs were returned to Victoria again and again.

The internal problems of the SPC finally boiled over in 1911. The immediate spark involved MLA Hawthornwaite who staked a coal claim. The underlying cause, however, concerned the party's stagnation and the generally doctrinaire course the party followed. At that year's convention, the SPC came apart on the Hawthornwaite affair, with 30% of the convention delegates walking out. With the foreign language groups leaving for the Social Democratic Party, the SPC became more of a doctrinaire band of English-speaking socialists. In the 1911 federal election, the SPC's popular support eroded further, falling to 3% of the provincial votes from 7% in the 1908 election.15

In summary, the socialists in the province quickly translated their popular support into a political presence in the years 1900-1911. In this endeavor they were helped by the simplified, yet centralized, governmental institutions. The SPC ignored the municipal elections by and large and after a time came to concentrate on the provincial government. The concentration of miners in occupational communities, of course helped the SPC maintain its support and political visibility by regularly electing MLAs. The parliamentary system also boosted the early socialists by having their reforms enacted and thus conferring legitimacy and viability on the third party tradition.
The identification of the mine owners with the government of the day also led the miners to seek a political spokesman for their interests. After this first decade, these political effects were continually reinforced and magnified. In addition, the leaders and members of the socialist movement drew the lesson that a socialist third party was a viable and necessary policy. The challenge became how to build a strong, large coalition and a strong party organization.

Reform Versus Revolution, 1911-1918

The dominance of the McBride Conservatives continued until World War One. The Liberals were reduced to two seats in the 1909 election, while the two Socialists returned to the legislature. So sweeping was the Conservative's victory in 1912 that only two socialists remained as the opposition. The socialists however, were in disarray after the schisms and debacle of 1911. After the 1912 election the SPC became more irrelevant and doctrinaire. It refused to broaden its voter appeal and became locked into the province's mining districts.

The socialist movement in British Columbia from 1912 through the war faced serious difficulties. Internally, the SPC suffered from declining membership and an increasingly rigid leadership. The SDP was isolated from the social mainstream because of its largely foreign language membership and its electoral weakness. In the pre-war years the Socialist Party had a maximum of 1,000 members in the province; membership turnover, even in Vancouver, was great. The question of changing the party's "impossibilist" policy re-emerged in 1913, when
some members again urged more effort on political organization and not just on agitation. As in previous attempts to change the party's course, this too failed. Members drifted off, from 1912 on; trade union socialists left the party; even the doctrinaire stalwart, E.T. Kingsley, ceased active participation in the party. 17

The socialists' internal difficulties were matched by their external difficulties. The rivalry between the SPC and the SDP continued as the Social Democrats entered provincial contests in the 1912 election. After the cooling of relations with the trade unionists years previously, the SPC and the unions could not find a new rapprochement, even in the years of industrial turbulence before the World War.

Politically, the Socialist Party lost influence. Though they were the only opposition party in the legislature from 1912-16, the SPC's two legislators could do little to oppose the overwhelming Tory majority. The Liberals, though not even having a seat in the legislature, constituted the real opposition. By the early war years the SPC's influence approached nil. In 1916, Vancouver unionists tried and failed to organize an independent labour party. In that year's provincial election the two Socialist MLAs endorsed the Liberals, while one of them (Parker Williams) joined the Liberal party. Later in 1917, Williams became the first head of the Workman's Compensation Board. All the Socialist candidates lost in 1916. 18

The demise of the Socialist Party of Canada turned out to be permanent. Though the SPC maintained a nominal existence
until after the war, its effect was very marginal. There were many shortcomings of the Socialist Party. Its concern with education and doctrine proved too academic for most unionists and labouring men in British Columbia. The ideological rigor also prevented amicable relations with the union movement despite the latter's willingness to endorse independent political action and to condemn conservative craft unionism. The tension of reformism versus revolution proved too great as schisms, expulsions, and defections weakened the socialist movement. The SPC's inability to fashion a workable political party caused endless problems for the MLAs. Eventually the party either kicked out or drove out its best members. In its political victories and through its MLAs, the Socialist Party, nonetheless, made a major contribution in the quest for adequate political participation. The success of electing MLAs and the success of some of these legislator's measures indicated that participation by independent representatives was viable. The parliamentary system offered subtle premiums in this direction through party discipline and the centralization and simplification of political institutions. Far more important than the legislation that the SPC MLAs supported, and more important than the educational work of the Socialist Party itself, was the legitimacy that political election conferred on the socialists. For "... it was the fact of having representatives in Victoria which earned the party legitimacy and awarded it a more significant and enduring role in British Columbia politics than might otherwise have been the case."19
Convergence and Decline, 1918-1926

During World War One the political alignments in British Columbia shifted dramatically. The reform elements finally united behind the Liberals to dump the Conservatives in 1916. The Liberals brought together those closed out of Conservative Party targets in a political campaign for "purity" in government. The Liberal's drive to sweep the Augean stables so fouled by the Conservatives soon petered out as the Liberals sought to claim the spoils of victory. Though the Liberals delivered on women's suffrage, the establishment of a Labour Department, and other reforms, they were soon in the uncomfortable position of dispensing the very patronage and spoils they had condemned.

For the politically conscious unionists and the socialists, the Liberals appeared to offer little help in the tight war economy. Many of the province's unionists realized that the Socialist Party had pursued too dogmatic a policy and too narrow a political base. The economic problems created by the war propelled these unionists to seek a broader based instrument of political participation. These feelings were also shared by many socialists and ex-socialists. The British Columbia Federation of Labour joined with many ex-socialists to form the Federated Labour Party in 1918. It is interesting to note that even the dogmatic E.T. Kingsley felt the need for a new party; he joined the FLP in 1918 and became president of the Vancouver Branch. The Federated Labour Party had a strong element of immediate reformism mixed with its socialist ideas. The FLP represented a wedding of independent labour and the reform, or moderate, socialist wing. 20
At the same time that some unions and socialists began to find ways of political collaboration, syndicalist ideas were growing rapidly in British Columbia. Syndicalism reached a peak in 1919, when many in the British Columbia Federation of Labour backed the formation of the One Big Union and a sympathy strike to support the Winnipeg strikers.

After the manifest failure of the syndicalist tactics and organization, the moderate and radical forces in British Columbia swung back to the proven methods of political action. In the provincial election of 1920 the Socialist Party and the Federated Labour Party contested many ridings, although the SPC was in an extremely weak condition. The FLP won three seats. Marking an important change, a Vancouver area riding went to the party of the left; the other two seats came from mining districts.

The broadened voter appeal and support that the FLP managed to build in 1920, began to slip away in the years that followed. Part of the problem was the further fragmentation of the other left-wing parties and of the labour movement. The Socialist Party in 1921 split apart over the affiliation with the Comintern. A communist Worker's Party was formed and at the national level a re-vitalized Canadian Labour Party re-emerged. The open shop campaign, and then the return of prosperity in the 1920's also undermined left-wing political activity.

A basic problem facing the FLP lay in the Liberal's program of mild reform and a booming economy. The Liberals in the twenties had become the heirs to the patronage power of
the Conservatives. As the Conservatives were before them, the Liberals became the new party of interior expansion. Through the provincial railroad, the PGE, and through the government's important influence on the resource based economy, the provincial government was a major ally of the business classes and companies. Through the twenties they also attempted to placate the conservative unionists and the reformist electorate with mildly progressive legislation. Such a diverse coalition, however, was fragile and could only be held together because of the prosperous times and the low level of political demands placed on the provincial government.

The only other challenge to the province's party system in the twenties came when a group of small businessmen attempted to form a provincial party. Popular support for this new party did not prove fulsome, as the Liberals had become the new prosperity party with a strong machine in the north and interior.

In an effort at left-wing unity, the Federated Labour Party, the Workers' party, and the Vancouver Labour Council agreed in 1924 to run candidates for that year's provincial election under the common banner of the Canadian Labour Party; the constituent organizations, however, refused to submerge their individual identities in a common organization. The 1924 elections sent three MLAs to Victoria from the left-wing parties. Two of the victories were in the lower mainland.21

Despite this modest success at the polls, the organizations of the political left remained weak and divided through the twenties. The Federated Labour Party, the Canadian Labour Party locals in Vancouver, and some remaining Socialist Party
locals united in 1926 to form the Independent Labour Party as a non-communist group within the national CLP. The communists remained within the CLP and two years later forced a dispute with the non-communist elements over oriental enfranchisement. The ILP left the CLP to the communists and ran their own candidates in the 1928 provincial election. The political fortunes of the left-wing parties declined further in that year's election as only Thomas Uphill from Fernie returned to Victoria. 22

In conclusion the Federated Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party represented a modest success and further refined the strategy of British Columbia's socialist movement. The success in maintaining a parliamentary presence attested to the efficacy of their tactics. The broader coalition they had managed to pull together, though not a raving success, ensured the election of a few MLAs and also ensured that this path of political participation would remain open. The FLP was also notable for its ability to win election in the Vancouver area ridings, something the Socialist Party had never managed.

British Columbia's parliamentary institutions helped the FLP in its modest success, by placing premiums on solid organizational work without overloading the party with too many political conflicts or political arenas. The parliamentary victories also vindicated once again the usefulness and legitimacy of third party politics.

The FLP made a significant political breakthrough by establishing for a short period a tenuous link between the
socialist politicians and the labour unions. This bond grew weaker as the twenties matured; that it had been made at all indicated that such a link was not futile speculation or wasted effort. The major stumbling block for the FLNP and the ILP lay in the Liberals' reformism and the loyalty of labour voters to the Liberals. These two elements of the Liberal's coalition began to unravel after 1927; the dissatisfaction reached major proportions when the great depression led voters to increase their demands for government action to end the depression.

Enthusiasm and Routinization, 1933-1941

The second major change in British Columbia's party alignments came as the result of the depression. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives suffered major losses of support. In power since 1928, the Conservatives fell out among themselves as the populace levelled blame for the depression on the incumbent government. The Liberals were not unscathed, either.

Emerging out of a series of yearly conferences of western political groups, the newly created Co-operative Commonwealth Federation tried to combine old socialist elements with appeals for labour votes and the reform-minded urban middle classes. With a strong reformist plank, and retaining the socialist rhetoric, the CCF became the protest vehicle for the social elements dissatisfied with the Liberals and Conservatives. The depth of protest against ineffectual government programs to deal with the disastrous economy swelled the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation's popular
support to a third of the popular vote, giving them seven seats in the legislature. Significantly, the previous pattern of major support from the mining regions and marginal support in the urban areas was broken as the CCF drew widespread urban backing. 24

Three elements combined to favor the CCF's upsurge in the thirties: the dire economic straits; the lessons that socialists had learned in previous decades -- an independent political organization could work if it avoided ideological isolation and appealed to a broad electoral base; and the inability of the two mainstream political parties to accommodate the dissatisfied groups and their demands.

It was not for lack of trying to fashion new party images that the Liberals and Conservatives lost political support. The provincial Liberals under Patullo promised a "socialized capitalism" with health insurance and conjured a Rooseveltian little New Deal. At the national level, R.B. Bennett offered a Canadian New Deal that seemed oddly out of touch with the Conservative's business approach to government; leading Conservatives quickly repudiated Bennett's proposals shortly before the electors had their chance in 1935. MacKenzie King, flanked by a Conservative Party trapped in a pro-business image and a resurgent farmer and labour coalition, won on a promise of measured change.

The crucial test of the realignment of parties in British Columbia was less a one time vote built largely on protest and the enthusiasm of a new movement; rather, the ability to hold the organization together, to make the voters
loyal with some tangible results and hopes for the future, and to bring into the party potential allies were the stormy seas that the CCF had to master. The ability to institutionalize and routinize the new found support for radical politics is a key factor in understanding why the socialist tradition took root in British Columbia and not in Washington State. In this task the structure of government institutions, the nature of parties in Canada, and the power of government authority (especially, in relation to economic affairs) were of central importance.

The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in British Columbia first formed as a federation of the Socialist Party and the CCF Clubs in the province. The former was the main bearer and preserver of the socialist ideology and the political lessons of the past; the latter represented the new urban political base. The Socialist Party tended to be more rigid in its ideology. The leaders of the CCF Clubs also had good socialist credentials but tended to be more flexible in ideology.

The 1933 provincial election came close on the heels of the CCF's formation. After the euphoria of the election the provincial CCF turned to the question of amalgamating the CCF Clubs and the Socialist Party. The unification of the two groups within a single organization was completed in 1935.

The CCF also systematically rejected overtures from the communists, who advocated amalgamation or united front tactics. Membership in the CCF was through individual membership in a CCF Club. These clubs proliferated in the province, with
300 claiming existence in 1940. Membership by 1938 reached 3523. But between 1937 and 1940 the mass-based club organization actually withered. For many of the 300 clubs were "paper organizations" active only during elections. 27

In the thirties no labour unions belonged directly to the CCF and the method of affiliation remained a controversy within the CCF for many decades. CCF members resented the possibility of being swamped by the direct affiliation of unions. Luckily for the CCF, this controversy did not pose a major problem in the thirties. As noted in the previous chapter, the ACCL unions and the CCF grew friendlier from 1933 to 1935, but this budding alliance alienated the international unions from the CCF. Shortly after the estrangement from the international unions, the ACCL suffered a decline in membership and an internal split. Thus the CCF in its tender years was forced to build its own organization. If the absence of direct union ties meant that the CCF had to forego a great potential gain, it also meant that the CCF avoided the equal potential for schism.

Not all schisms, however, could be avoided. The first internal split came when in 1936 the CCF legislative leader, Connell, publicly criticized the provincial executive of the party. The controversy blossoming from this incident caused a rupture in the party with 3 MLAs joining Connell to sit as Social Constructives. The split was partly a left versus right controversy. It was also one of personalities and old feuds. Though Connell's viewpoint was not without some grassroots support, and despite the support of some important figures, including the old socialists Midgeley and Pritchard, the
provincial executive retained the loyalty of most CCF members. In the split, the movement also lost its main publication "The Commonwealth" when its editor swung the publication behind the rebellious Connell. The party organization, nonetheless, remained intact. 28

The internal splits and public feuding contributed to a decline of 3% of the popular vote in the 1937 provincial election. The number of CCF MLAs climbed back to seven; all the Social Constructivists met defeat. In 1937 the CCF still remained a Vancouver based party, with five of seven seats in the lower mainland. 29

The Liberals also contributed to the solidification of the CCF. In 1933, the provincial Liberals promised reforms and welfare measures. The coalition the Liberals attempted to build consisted of business groups, the urban and small-town middle classes, and conservative unionists and labour voters. After winning control of the government, the Liberals passed legislation setting a new minimum wage, establishing maximum work hours for all industries, and creating a board of industrial relations. 30

The Liberal's attempt to "socialize capitalism", nonetheless, broke down under competing and conflicting demands for government action. After investigating and then passing a health insurance scheme, the Liberals postponed its implementation indefinitely, because the reformist wing of the Liberals was out-gunned by the doctors and business interests. The Liberal coalition experienced a further strain when the government had to reconcile their union supporters to a "new Industrial
Conciliation and Arbitration Act that ostensibly favored employers. Later in 1939 Patullo was again caught in the cross-fire of competing interests within his own party when he adopted a Fuel Control Act strenuously opposed by the oil companies. Faced by major economic problems that the provincial government could do little about and faced with strenuous demands for conflicting policy, the Liberals in the thirties found it increasingly hard to placate their coalition members.

As tensions within the Liberals drove dissident wings into the Conservatives and the CCF, another factor helping the CCF was the legitimacy accorded the CCF because of its MLAs and also because of the CCF MLAs' work on behalf of reforms. When the Liberals passed a Special Powers Act in 1933 giving the provincial cabinet sweeping powers, the CCF became the champion of the democratic process against "cabinet dictatorship." Though the CCF MLAs were unable to pass their program, they forced the Liberal government to amend certain measures, adopt CCF proposals (as with the Fuel Bill of 1939), and even split the Liberals on a few issues. The sense of legitimacy accorded the CCF MLAs, coupled with the legislature as a highly visible platform, and the CCF's modest legislative reforms helped to build loyalty, a sense of purpose, and a commitment to the CCF. At the same time the socialist ideology worked as a gate-keeper to prevent complete opportunism; it also cemented loyalty and unified dissident elements.

By the beginning of the forties, the Liberal's reformism under Patullo had been almost exhausted; they had also alienated a section of their business support, which preferred to work
with the resurgent Conservatives. Patullo blamed the lack of substantial provincial powers for his inability to carry through his "little new deal" of "socialized capitalism." When he tried to switch political themes to an "anti-Ottawa" theme (even though the Liberals controlled the Federal government) by leaving the Dominion-Provincial Conference in 1940, Patullo discredited himself in the eyes of the electorate. 32

This internal fighting of the Liberals played into the hands of the Conservatives and the CCF who polled the highest popular vote in the 1941 provincial election. Additionally, the expansion of the industrial unions, especially the IWA on the coast, helped the CCF. The industrial unions though unaffiliated to the CCF, helped the party's organization win in the ridings of Rossland-Trail, Comox, Mackenzie, and Cowichan-Newcastle. 33 The CCF's gains in the 1941 election, represented the CCF's regaining of the non-urban ridings that were strongholds of the older socialist parties. Despite the expansion of popular support beyond the Lower mainland, the CCF in 1941 remained a Vancouver based party. Most notably, the CCF won in the dual ridings of Vancouver-Burrard and Vancouver-Centre while retaining its strongholds in Vancouver-East, Burnaby, North Vancouver, and Delta. The dissatisfaction of the urban middle classes with the Liberals was so complete that in the Lower Mainland only New Westminster returned a Liberal; only the north and interior remained Liberal supporters.

By 1941 Patullo's attempt to build a broad coalition party had clearly met failure. Acting as a strong undercurrent against his success were the institutional factors. First, the
widely-held demands for strong government action to re-
dress the economic grievances of the depression could not
easily be resisted on ideological or practical grounds because
of the Canadian and British Columbia traditions of government
intervention. The wide authority granted and exercised by
government raised the expectations of reformers while it also
raised the fears of the conservative and business groups.

Second, because the important arenas of political conflict were
the party, cabinet, and parliament, both the conservative
business wing and the reformist wing of the Liberals dug their
heels in deeper, becoming more intransigent the longer the
coalition lasted. Under the increased pressure of conflicting
demands (and during an era of economic retrenchment that pre-
cluded dividing an expanding economy and pork barrel) the
Liberal party grew "brittle" and cracked.

The resurgence of the Conservatives and the upsurge in
CCF support in 1941 created the possibility of a precarious
minority Liberal government. To avoid a quick return to the
polls and to stanch the CCF's growth, the Liberals and Conserv-
vatives formed a post-election coalition. With a new leader,
John Hart, the Liberals ignored the warnings of Patullo that
coaition spelled political suicide. The Liberals once again
resurrected the dream of a broad coalition arrangement. In the
new coalition Hart's right flank would be protected by the
mechanism of a formal coalition with the Conservatives. This
allowed Hart to extend political benefits to the Conservatives,
while he also renewed the Liberal's reformist image.
Expansion and Malaise, 1941-1955

During the Second World War the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation seemed to ride on the crest of a wave that appeared sure to carry the party to government power within a short period of time. On both the national and provincial level the CCF's fortunes looked good. An increase of only 5% of the popular vote in the provincial election of 1941 doubled the socialist MLA's numbers to fourteen. The surge of support for the CCF in Ontario in 1943, the election to power in Saskatchewan in 1944, the high standing in the war-time opinion polls, and the 1943 Canadian Congress of Labour endorsement augured well for the future of the CCF.

In British Columbia, the CCF reaped the benefits of ten years organizing work. In the early forties the CCF dropped its club membership form of organization in favor of an at-large membership. Membership peaked in 1945 at 7609. The CCF's popular vote turned up another notch in 1945 to 37.6%, but the legislative representation fell to 10 because of the Liberal-Conservative coalition. More important than the small gains in the popular vote, the CCF in 1945 started to expand beyond its primarily urban social base. It solidified its hold on the Vancouver Island working class ridings and made important gains in the northern and southern interior.

The CCF's war-time gains, however, were due to temporary and self-limiting circumstances. The explosion in war-related employment in lumber, shipbuilding and metal production coincided with major union membership gains. IWA membership increased ten-fold between 1940 and 1943; the Mine, Mill union
won certification for 8,000 at Cominco in 1944; the Vancouver Labour Council mushroomed from 2700 to 28,000 in the four years before 1945; and in 1944, CCL unions re-founded the British Columbia Federation of Labour. The growth of these unions did not directly aid the CCF for only two union locals directly affiliated to the CCF in 1944. Rather than the organizational ties, it was the popular support that the CCF enjoyed in unionized areas that was important. The surge in popular support was limited by the duration of the war and the inevitable decline in war stimulated industries. The fear of a post-war depression also stoked the fire of CCF support, hope and success. Finally, the unresolved issue of communist influence, particularly in the unions, limited the CCF's expansion. The communist issue split the CCF in 1945 as communist support for Herridge in the Kootenay federal riding and communist competition in Comox and Cranbrook rent the CCF.

The 1945 provincial election marked a turning point in British Columbia politics and established a pattern lasting until 1953. The formal coalition of Liberals and Conservatives held together, recaptured the urban reformist wing, maintained ties to business groups, and had turned the tide of socialist advance. The coalition's success was not unmitigated, for the loss of northern and interior seats was a barometer of the alienation of the hinterland with Vancouver and Victoria politicians. Rather than a temporary aberration, the CCF's northern and interior victories reflected the booming economies of these regions and indicated the potential for a protest party to sink deep roots.
The post-war boom in the north and interior continued to feed the social elements that the coalition by its structure and policies were excluding from influence. The war and post-war boom stimulated the expansion of the small lumber companies, the small town merchants, and the single industry towns. The small businessmen, the other middle classes and the labouring classes were the growing socio-economic groups in the interior and north. The constricted political opportunities, a direct consequence of the Liberal-Conservative coalition, came to frustrate outback politicians. The provincial government's policies after the war benefitted the large corporations (the re-organization of forest licences, the government favors extended to Alcan and the mining companies) and made the outback middle-classes fertile ground for populist, anti-big corporation appeals. Simultaneous with the growth of interior and northern labouring classes was the resumption of provincial control then the revamping of provincial labour relations; this alienated the outback working classes and reinforced the need for independent political representation.

The enervating effects of political coalition slowly ate the heart out of the Liberal and Conservative political organizations. The underlying weakness of the coalition was hidden by the war boom, the heady feelings of success, and the return of the reformist middle class support. After the war the decline of industrial unions, the internal fighting over the communist issue, and the beginning of a long wave of economic growth in North America rebounded to the favor of the Liberal-Conservative coalition.
The loss of political momentum after 1945 for the CCF had markedly negative effects. Riding the war-time wave of support, the factions in the CCF could mute their differences and work for mutual gain in a world of expanding political opportunities. But the receding tide of CCF support after the war brought out old animosities of the left-wing versus the right-wing. In a universe of shrinking political opportunities in-fighting and factionalism heightened in the struggle for political place and prestige. In 1949, provincial legislative representation fell to the 1930's level with seven MLAs, even though popular support had slipped only 2.5%. Left and right wrangled, as membership declined in the late forties and early fifties, reaching 3500 in 1952.36

In this period of low ebb that may have destroyed other political parties (particularly in the United States) the CCF continued to have the support of several institutional "props". First, the CCF constituted the official opposition. Second, its criticisms and reform proposals created the image of a viable alternative. Third, the nature of the coalition government and its policies alienated labour unions, interior middle classes, and reformist sentiment. The CCF prior to the overnight rise of Social Credit received most of these protest votes.

By the early 1950's the cancer of coalition had destroyed the Liberals and Conservatives from within. Holding formal political power had deceived the coalition partners into overestimating their organizational strength and popular support. The clash of federal and provincial wings of both parties weakened party organization, exacerbated personal rivalries,
and limited the claims on party patronage. The Liberals' reform impulse once again died in the early fifties, while the northern and interior ridings grew restive under the coalition government. The Liberals and Conservatives, though divorced, planned to cement their alternating custody of the provincial government by using a preferential ballot system to reduce the CCF's influence.

The new electoral arrangements would have worked as planned except for the emergence of the Social Credit party, which had the pleasing attributes of a "protest" image coupled with little-man free enterprise sentiments. The Socreds' narrow victory in the 1952 provincial election was constructed out of being the second preference of CCF voters and, to a lesser extent, of Conservative voters. The broken coalition of Liberals and Conservatives had to share the "free enterprise" support with the Socreds. This split buoyed the CCF's legislative victories to eighteen MLAs although the CCF's final popular vote fell marginally to 34.3%.

The political lines that emerged from the 1952 election cast the parties along an axis of old parties versus protest parties; the Liberals and Conservatives traded votes for first and second preference, while the CCF and the Socreds tended to favor each other. Odd as such an alliance might seem, as a measure of protest a CCF-Social Credit link made sense. The CCF garnered the support of middle class reformers and the working classes who felt either threatened or betrayed by the Liberals and Conservatives; the Socreds appealed to the outback elements for the former coalition partners had neglected
to woo the north and interior with sufficient economic and political opportunities.

Despite the nearness of victory in 1952, the CCF in the fifties continued to languish in the post-war doldrums. The remarkable increase in legislative victories was due more to the fractured state of their opposition than it was due to the CCF's strength; once the Socreds consolidated their support the CCF's fortunes receded once again. Up to 1953 the leadership of the CCF remained in the hands of the first generation of CCF leaders. The CCF had always presented itself as the political representative of labour; it garnered large support from ridings with industrial unions; and in the early fifties the CCF improved its ties to the local unions after the communist issue had been settled. But despite these seemingly favorable changes the electoral results were not forthcoming and the sense of momentum that drove the movement in the early years seemed to have dissipated permanently. With the decline in momentum came internal wrangling and falling membership. The party's future was severely tested by the rise of Social Credit, for this upstart party was catapulted to power by some popular sentiments closely akin to those of CCF voters. The four-way election fight of 1952 under other circumstances, should have brought the CCF to power.

Shortly before the 1953 election, CCF leader Winch resigned to run in a federal election. A christianly school-teacher took his place, but the change in leadership did not help the CCF. The Socreds altered their image from the "protest party" of 1952 to the new "boom party" of 1953, uniting the
rural and urban middle classes, the big and small businessmen, and a good chunk of the working classes. In the 1953 election the CCF's popularity slipped a further 5% to 29.5% of the vote, as they lost four seats, leaving them a total of fourteen.\(^{40}\)

Toward the New Party, 1954-60

In 1956 the leadership of the CCF again changed and the left-wing versus the right-wing tensions continued to weaken the party's organization. The lack of political momentum plagued the CCF as twenty years of party organizing seemed to have led to few political advances. In the 1956 election the CCF's popular support further eroded as only 28% of the voters backed them; legislative representation plummeted to nine.\(^{41}\) More significantly, the CCF lost in areas that had either long been safe or were part of the party's expansion in the forties. The CCF lost a seat in Vancouver East, Comox, Revelstoke, Atlin, and Skeena.\(^{42}\)

The only bright spot for the CCF in the second half of the fifties was the growth of stronger ties with the labour unions. After 1956, the stronger union ties, a move to renew the party's organization, and the emergence of a new generation of leaders pulled the CCF out of the doldrums.

Social Credit formed an extremely strong coalition in the fifties that effectively supplanted the Liberals and Conservatives. W.A.C. Bennett beat the old coalition partners at their own game as he used the considerable powers of the provincial government to unite the urban and small-town elements. The cement was provided by the government underwriting economic
development. Bennett's success was fortuitous for he came to power in a long wave of economic development. The demographic trends were in Bennett's favor, too. As the tables in chapter three indicated, in the fifties the occupations associated with left-voting either remained stagnant or declined in size; the occupations connected to trade, business, and white-collar work expanded. Thus at a time when his opponent's political base was stagnant, Bennett's was expanding. Social Credit's "white-collar vision" was also fortuitous for the middle-classes and clerks were at a point of unorganized development. By the late sixties (and in part due to Bennett's policies) these groups sought to unionize. Many middle-class professions had become institutionalized appendages of the government, while the white-collar workers wanted protection for their jobs and wages.

In summary the socialist tradition had become immovably entrenched in British Columbia's politics by the end of the fifties. Though the CCF had only come close to power once in thirty years, it had come to form an enduring aspect of the political landscape of the province. The CCF's successes and endurance in the thirties can be explained as a function of the depression, the rigidity of parliamentary parties, the enthusiasm of militants, and the routinization of participation due to the party organization. The party's gains in the 1940's are attributable to the wartime fears of a new depression and the expansion of industries and occupations closely aligned with support for the CCF.
What then explains the continued support for the CCF during its decline in the late forties and the fifties? The continuity of CCF support during the hard times of the forties and fifties, was primarily due to the institutional incentives of British Columbia's political system. That the parliamentary system has given a sense of legitimacy to the CCF has been noted several times in the preceding pages. In addition the internal dynamics of the parties has regularly forced reformist elements out of coalitions with the Liberals, then the Liberal-Conservative government, and finally the Socreds.

The CCF's reformism acted to draw off the reformist impulse from the other parties. The CCF's efforts on behalf of social and economic reform had positive benefits for the reform proposals (as distinct from the large-scale socialist proposals) were often incorporated in the government of the day's program. The British Columbia government's attempts to stimulate development and provide leadership in province-building (particularly under the Socreds) tended to validate the socialist's larger programs of economic reform. Though the socialists did not agree on the specific policies their opponents adopted, the spirit of an active government legitimized a similar aspect in the socialist's political faith. Like the reformist groups, dissident groups have been forced out of the old line parties. The Socreds, it has been noted, capitalised on the northern and interior dissent in the early 1950's.

The unions that aligned themselves with the Liberals, also found it difficult to maintain these ties. This problem
of labour support presented an intermittent problem for the Liberals in the thirties and forties and did not reach major proportions because of the internal weakness of the unions. The ties to the Liberals became more problematic in the late forties and fifties because of the increased size of the unions and the unity of the union movement, and because of the greater intervention of the provincial government in collective bargaining. The Socreds inherited these problems of labour union support but also had to contend with the anti-union sentiments of their small business supporters. Ultimately, such internal party dynamics reinforced the polarized image of society that the CCF propagated. Business and government appeared as one in terms of political party support and in terms of policies that rewarded business groups large and small, yet put the brakes on labour unions and reformist measures.

By 1960 the institutional premiums reinforcing the CCF had lasted through to a new political generation and had socialized them to give support to the CCF as the left-reformist party. Also by 1960 the institutional forces had compelled the unions and the CCF to form a new party. The new party's policies were more reformist than the CCF's policies due to the passing of the older generation, the prosperity of the times, and the influence of the relatively well-off labour unions. Though the new party's policy continued the trend toward reformism begun decades earlier, the founding of the New Democratic Party in 1961 indicated how deeply the socialist tradition had become institutionalized in British Columbia.
The socialists of British Columbia had been able mainly with the help of the political institutions, to build a lasting organization that routinized its early enthusiasm and renewed its political commitment with a broader coalition after a prolonged period of decline.

Socialism and Political Parties in Washington State

Socialism's critical phases in British Columbia were not completed until the late fifties; Washington's movement, on the other hand, died in the late 1930's. The death was a failure of organization induced and conditioned by the political system that rewarded personal politics, fragmented the structures of authority, enervated participation through organized parties, and de-politicized economic conflicts. Washington's less modern political structure slowly made the socialist alternative organizationally, programatically, and ideologically unworkable. Once again a brief overview will help put these changes in perspective.

Up to 1925 the rhythm and direction (though not the electoral success) of the socialist parties in Washington State closely paralleled the development of their sister parties in British Columbia. In the early part of the twentieth century, the movements in the state and the province experimented with different ideas and types of organization. In the first decade of the century, the highly doctrinaire left-wing of the socialists was dominant. In the second decade the reformers and revolutionaries were more evenly balanced. The syndicalist "holiday" affected both movements in 1918-1919. Syndicalism
fostered the return to politics between 1920 and 1925. Similar to the movement in British Columbia, the Washington State socialists tried to build a larger base of political support after World War One by appealing to the conservative unionists and the state's farmers. For both movements these efforts were failures. By the middle of the 1920's the future of socialism in the North Pacific region had to be in serious doubt, despite the mildly greater success in British Columbia in electing provincial legislators.

In the second major phase of socialist growth, triggered by the great depression of the thirties, the underlying influences of the political structure became more apparent than in the earlier period. Amid the economic crisis and heightened political demands, the institutional premiums and experience of prior attempts to build radical parties affected the Washington State and British Columbia socialist movements in profoundly different ways.

As the British Columbia system continued to validate independent political action, the effects of Washington's dispersal of authority led Washington's socialists and allies into a policy of capturing the Democratic party. The easy success in this effort by the Washington Commonwealth Federation, however, was its very weakness. The progressive emasculation of all political parties by the direct primary, the blanket primary, and the fragmented government authority as set out in the national and state constitutions rendered the WCF's Democratic party victories in 1936-37 hollow. The Democrats were easy enough to capture for the "production for
use, not for profit" advocates, but since the party was an empty shell little could be gained by its capture. Compounding the WCF's failure of strategy was its inability to either pass its program or make itself useful to its constituents. The Washington Commonwealth Federation became what it had set out not to become: a mildly reformist pressure group within the Democratic party. The other parties' programs did not validate the WCF's reformist socialist perspective and the limitations on state power encouraged its supporters to seek other means to their goals.

Party as Agitator and Educator, 1800-1909

Though the Democrats and Republicans established themselves in Washington State during the territorial period, the predominance of Republican national administrations prior to statehood translated into a strong Republican party in Washington State. Nonetheless, a disaffection from the Republican and Democratic parties so prevalent in the American West between 1885 and 1900, also affected Washington, sweeping the state with populist reformers of many hues. The strength of the Populist Party's forces markedly affected the Republicans and Democrats so that the two major parties hoped to capture the populist voters by putting forward popular candidates and reformist platforms. Thus by the turn of the century, Washington's voters displayed little party regularity or loyalty to orthodox Republican or Democratic politics. Populists and "insurgents" abounded. When the populist wave receded in the late 1890's, its former adherents along with other reformist
elements moved into the Republican party, which became the bearer of the progressive spirit in Washington State politics.

This fluid political climate provided a warm, fertile sea for the socialists. The socialists could feed on residual populist sentiment against "the interests." The regional economy, largely using unskilled and semi-skilled labour in strongly cyclical industries, also supplied ready working class sentiment. Finally, regional resentment of "Eastern domination" and the frontier sentiments of "rough and tumble independence" augured well for third party movements.

Like their British Columbia cousins in the first decade of this century, Washington State's socialists were relatively small in numbers; what they lacked in numbers, they made up for in drive and ideological rigor. The Socialist Party of Washington rooted itself in the left-wing of the nation-wide socialist movement. Until 1909 Dr. Herman Titus dominated the Socialist Party in Washington State. Under his guidance the SPW took up an "impossibilist" stance, and gave the party a proletarian, anti-middle-class, anti-reform character. A former reverend, Dr. Titus used his editorial position on the local socialist paper to rid socialism in the North Pacific region of its middle-class and reformist "heretics." Similar to the Socialist Party of Canada, the Washingtonians stressed long-range goals as opposed to immediate demands. Like Daniel DeLeon (whose Socialist Labor Party had only a small following in Washington State) Titus viewed the party's primary goals as education and agitation, not election. Thus like their
northern brothers, the SPW downplayed electoral organization and wide voter appeal.

Through his paper, *The Socialist*, Titus became the leading theoretician of the left-wing in the Socialist Party of America. He and the Washington socialists exerted considerable influence in the SPA. *The Socialist* by 1903 had a circulation of 7,000, which was the second largest circulation of socialist papers in the nation. The per capita vote for socialist candidates in the 1902 Washington State election came in second only to Massachusetts. Two years later the SPW claimed the highest per capita membership of all the states.46

Popular support for the SPW in the first decade gave these frontier socialists reasons to be optimistic. In two years, the SPW's membership had increased five-fold, reaching 1000 in 1902. By 1908 the SPW claimed almost 1500 members in 58 locals. Unionists and socialists in the smelter town of Northport united in the 1901 city council election to come within one vote of majority control of the city council. In addition the leaders of the Typographical union and the Building Trades Council in Seattle in 1901-02 were socialists. Popular support at the polls was also forthcoming. The combined SPW and SLP votes in the 1902 election climbed to 7% of the total Seattle and state-wide vote.47 In 1905 two councilmen were elected in Edmonds. Factionalism and an off-year election yielded a poor vote in 1907 with the socialists garnering less than 3% of the vote. In the following year's general election the SPW claimed 7.7% of the state-wide vote, although due to a controversy over the new primary law the
Afficials gave the total as only 2.5%. Debs, running for president on the SPA ticket, was unaffected by the primary law change and received about 8% of the vote. 48

Despite the rapid early growth and the ability to maintain a roughly stable organization and voting support, the Socialist Party of Washington suffered from grave problems. The honeymoon between the SPW and the unions ended quickly as the radical left-wing saw middle-class elements and fusionists behind every attempt to broaden the party's appeal and support. Starting in 1902 many sympathetic unionists kept their distance from the SPW. By 1907 the SPW's growth had leveled off and turnover of membership and local organizations remained high. Moderate socialists began to feel that the doctrinaire Titus group held the party back by refusing to allow sympathetic middle-class elements into the party. Using the acceptance of the "class struggle" as the touchstone of socialist loyalty Titus kept the party unnecessarily small. After 1906, the reform versus revolution controversy resurfaced again and again. A major rupture of the party came in 1908 with the formation of a Social Democratic party led by the moderate socialist and former SPW member W. T. Mills. The SDP quickly enrolled 600 members state-wide. Meanwhile, the moderate elements in the SPW were gaining influence, so that the Seattle Central Labour Council and several unions endorsed the SPW. The factionalism within the SPW finally came to a measure of resolution in 1909 when Titus and the left-wing were forced out of the party. 49

Before turning to the second decade of the SPW's
history, the differences and similarities with the British Columbia socialists should be noted. Both movements in this period were left-wing socialists, i.e., "impossibilists". Both faced internal schisms over the questions of reformism and revolution, though British Columbia's major internal crisis came in 1911 and the left-wing retained control of the SPC. The major differences between the movements in the state and the province in this early period lay not in political attitudes but in the arena for political activity and in the relative success of the political efforts. First, the Washingtonians, facing a highly fragmented and decentralized political structure, sought office and influence on every level from city, school district, and county offices to state and federal offices. In some localities the socialists met success and in many placed a respectable second. Importantly, the dispersal of political authority and the sheer numbers of elections and offices placed a heavy burden on the party's organization and coffers. In British Columbia on the other hand the SPC concentrated their efforts on the provincial and federal elections where effective government power resided. The only municipal elections they contested were in Vancouver.

Second, the Washingtonians success on the state and local level (they only once elected a state legislator in 1912) had a smaller impact than the few legislators the British Columbia socialists elected. Though political power was decentralized in Washington State the municipalities had a shortened ambit of authority. Thus the Washington State socialists gained little of the legitimacy accorded to the
British Columbia socialists. Also, the Washington socialists had fewer perquisites; the SPC MLAs became full-time party organizers on government pay. Finally, the British Columbia socialists used the just emerging party discipline to their advantage, which the Washingtonians could not do if they had won state office because of the lack of party discipline.

The third major difference between the province and the state in this early period was that the SPC drew major support from the miners who were densely concentrated in the Kootenays and in mid-Vancouver Island. The Socialist Party of Washington could not count on a similar group as the mining regions in the American Northwest were mainly in Idaho and western Montana.

Reformism and the Return of Factionalism, 1909-1919

The second decade of this century marked the high tide of the Socialist Party as the vehicle of leftist radicalism in Washington State. After forcing the Titus group out of the state party in 1909, the party moderates retained control for a few years. This new political direction had beneficial results on the relationship with the labour unions, on party membership, and on electoral support. "After 1909, the Socialists became trusted allies of the Seattle AFL." The Seattle union leaders accepted the moderate socialists viewpoint on many issues, while socialist leaders joined the unions and helped to give the Seattle AFL a strong pink hue.

Membership totals also reflected the new sense of growth. "By 1912 the Socialist Party of Washington claimed a dues-paying
Significant electoral gains also resulted from the new party policy. In 1911 two Washington State cities elected socialist public officials. The following year the SPW and the SLP polled 13% of the state-wide vote with Debs receiving over 40,000 votes. In addition, one state legislator received the necessary votes to assume office. 1913 brought other victories as two other towns elected socialist officials.53

After 1912 internal factionalism in the Socialist Party flared again. At the national level W.D. Haywood, a major spokesman for the syndicalist left with a strong following among western miners and the migrant lumber and agricultural workers in Washington State, was expelled from the party for advocating sabotage. In Washington State the question of reform versus revolution once again heated party debate. The moderates set up a rival Socialist party with most of the state's membership in 1913. The existence of two parties in Washington State caused the National Executive of the Socialist Party to investigate the Washington State party; the rift was eventually healed.54 On top of the left versus right tension came the issues related to World War One. The divided party attitudes on participation in the war and the nomination of a relatively unknown candidate for president depressed the socialists' vote in 1916 to 6% of the statewide totals.55

The controversies over the Russian Revolution and communism delivered the final blow to unity in the Socialist Party. The Washington State party split into two factions, one supporting a communist party and the other the Bolshevik.
Revolution but not a communist party. In 1919 part of the left-wing of the Socialist party went into the newly formed communist parties and the resurgent IWW, while the moderate socialists and some of the radicals tried to form a larger coalition in the Farmer-Labor Party.

Though the socialist's second decade quickly promised to be a boon, several factors in addition to the internal factionalism (that the British Columbia movement also experienced) undercut the SPW's organizational and electoral efforts. First, the introduction of direct party primaries in 1907 undermined the importance of all party organizations. By taking the nomination out of the party's hands, the primary devalued party regularity and participation in party organizations; the primary decreased the hold of party officials on the party and made the parties appear as flexible as the range of candidates that presented themselves for election. The withering effect hit the minor parties the hardest. By decentralizing the nomination process, the raison d'etre of the third parties suffered for they were premised on having a "hard" mainline party to push against. The direct primaries, contrary to the fears of the Republicans, acted to perpetuate the Republican dominance in Washington State, for the Republican primaries became the major contest to win.

Second, the other institutions of direct democracy exacerbated the centrifugal tendencies of the political system to disperse authority. The initiative and referendum opened new arenas for political conflict. Allies, (such as labour unions) that in other circumstances may have turned to third
parties to express their viewpoints, were encouraged to enter a risky political arena that could not be overridden but that had high organizational and financial costs.

Third, though the reforms passed by the Progressive Republicans were not inconsiderable, the reforms were not as important for potential socialist supporters. World War One also acted as a brake on Progressive reforms. The eclipse of Progressivism had a dual effect on reformers, labour unions, and socialists: on the one hand it drove the reformers to political action often through the vehicle of direct democracy; but the limited nature of reforms in this era and the reversal of reform measures by legislatures and courts discredited political action.

The death of progressivism at the end of the war, the anti-radical fervor, and the need to re-coup from war-time factionalism led the socialists in Washington State (as in the nation) to seek an accommodation with labour and reformist groups. The Farmer-Labor Party was the result of this accommodation, and was a shift to the right once more in the hopes of building a stronger political base.

In summation, the second decade of Washington's socialist movement closely paralleled British Columbia's movement. The electoral support in Washington State was mildly higher than the first decade but the political institutions took a further turn against the SPW's success. Meanwhile, British Columbia's movement maintained its visibility, legitimacy, and usefulness to its supporters by the political premiums placed on strong parties, despite the movements fissure into SPC and
SDP. Significantly, the socialists in both the province and the state turned to a larger political coalition and wider voter appeal in the hostile post-war environment.

**Radical Resurgence and Decay, 1919-1924**

At the end of World War One and in the post-war period, almost all political alignments and alliances came apart. The war precipitated a crisis for pre-war party platforms. For these few short years new, unexpected alliances seemed possible. The signs of political change in 1919-1921 died quickly, however, as the FLP fell under the wheel of adverse political institutions. The new born Farmer-Labor Party failed the major test of a political party: it could not build a viable organization that would routinize support and reduce membership turnover.

Progressivism, the reformism of the older upper and middle classes, ended in 1917. The middle-class reformers and the union and farmer groups that had hoped to use Progressivism for their own benefit drifted apart over the war issues. The end of Progressivism also meant that the conservative unionist's and farmer's policy of non-partisan pressure politics had become untenable. The distance between Washington State's middle classes and the labour unions increased even more after the general strike of 1919. The open shop campaign, the Centralia massacre in 1919, and the suppression of Seattle's union daily newspaper, the Union Record also contributed to this rift. The conservative labour leaders fell into disfavor as western Washington's unions swung heavily behind the advocates of independent political action.
Farmer and labour leaders of many stripes hoped to form some sort of political alliance in 1919. The Seattle CLC and the WSFL strongly supported the idea of a Tripple Alliance of the WSFL, the Railway Brotherhoods, and the state's farmers. The railway unions and the eastern farmers, fearing domination by the Seattle labour "reds", bowed out of the Triple Alliance in early 1920. All of these groups, however, reassembled in July of 1920 in hopes of deciding on a common course of action for that year's election. The conservatives and easterners wanted to work in the Republican primaries, while the main WSFL group and the socialists hoped to push for a third party effort. The third party advocates stressed that if they formed a third party they would be the recipients of 50,000 socialist votes. In addition, defeat with a pure party was better than winning "... a hollow shell, filthy with past corruption."58 In the final vote the Triple Alliance (WSFL) and the socialists prevailed. The eastern groups, however, opted to work through the Republican primary, though they all adopted a common platform.59

Thus in July 1920 the Triple Alliance gave birth to the Farmer-Labor Party. The FLP was supported by the state Grange and the Washington State Federation of Labor (President W. Short, a Gomper's man, reluctantly went along with the members' decision. Indicating the close ties of the Washington and the national FLP with the political left, socialists played a prominent role in the FLP. The socialist, J.C. Kennedy, active in the FLP's formation later became its president. Former socialist, Max Hayes, ran on the national FLP ticket in 1920.
The Socialist Party of Washington openly backed the FLP with all factions united in this support. As the foregoing has indicated and as the 1920 elections were to bear out, the FLP was farmer only in its hopes; it was really a creature of the western Washington labour movement and the socialists.

The movement of labour unions and socialists into the FLP in Washington State had its counterpart in a similar, though smaller, movement on the national level. At both levels the motivations centred on creating a stronger vehicle for their common beliefs. Part of the reason for the move towards a national labour party, and then the Farmer-Labor Party was cosmetic. After World War One many politically-minded labour leaders came to believe "... that for one reason or another, the term "socialist" had become an unnecessary handicap for working class politicians." The factionalism after 1919 in the Socialist Party also contributed to the rise of the FLP. The Washington State scene differed from the national scene only in the amicable relations between the radicals and the moderates in Seattle. This friendliness boosted the left-wing elements in the Washington FLP. "Convinced that the socialist parties were too divided (i.e., after the 1919 splintering of the party) to be capable of further effective activity, most militant socialists simply melted away and regrouped in the dynamic new Farmer-Labor Party." The election results of 1920 appear phenomenal for a party less than six months old. In the Washington State elections the Farmer-Labor Party displaced the Democrats as the major opposition party. The FLP won three legislative seats,
but these victories were almost meaningless as all the other seats were won by Republicans. In most state-wide contests (except for president) the FLP outpolled the Democrats, receiving 30% of the vote for governor and 26% for United States Senator. The pattern of support reinforced the sectional nature of left-wing politics in the state; most support came from west of the Cascades and from the small farm areas. The regions of larger farms in eastern Washington did not vote for the FLP in large numbers.63

Almost immediately after the election, the inherent weaknesses of the FLP began to surface. As a hastily put together coalition, the FLP consisted of highly volatile elements. The post-election period offered little opportunity or incentive for solidifying the FLP organization.

The labour and farmer conservatives, never enthusiastic about the third party vehicle, quickly renounced their allegiance to the FLP. The conservatives had long pursued a non-partisan policy. When the FLP did not prove an immediate success they must have remembered WSFL president Short's argument against the third party option: "I'm tired of dreaming and hoping... I want to win and so does labor."64 As noted in chapter five, the labour conservatives moved back to non-partisanship and to fighting on the economic front after the 1920 election. The state Grange broke apart on the issue of backing the third party. The easterners sided with the national Grange on the non-partisan policy, while the western Washington farmers re-grouped in the Western Progressive Farmers which claimed 20,000 members.65

The mainstay of the FLP had been the western Washington
labour movement, in particular the coalition of radical and moderate unionists that agreed on independent political action. In 1921 these erstwhile allies fell out as the radicals denounced the "labour capitalism" of the Seattle AFL. The consequence of this controversy, as noted in chapter five, was to drive the moderates into coalition with the conservative unionists, thus undermining labour support for the FLP.

These internal fissures severely weakened the flimsy FLP organization. On the whole the FLP was "an effort by amateurs to defeat professionals at their own game." In the year after its formation, the only supporters left from the original coalition was a rump of western farmers, the labour moderates, and the socialists. In 1921, the FLP elected J.C. Kennedy, a former socialist party member, as leader. But the county organizations of the FLP atrophied as interest in the party plummeted after the 1921 legislative session.

In 1922 the FLP grew even weaker. The radical and moderate unionists had lost members in the depression and in the post-war return to "normalcy". Though the Everett and Seattle CLCs endorsed the Farmer-Labor Party (and the Tacoma CLC endorsed the (communist) Worker's Party), the conservative unionists in the Puget Sound area resented these political moves.

Of greater significance for the future of left-wing politics, several FLP county organizations in 1922 either fused with local Democratic organizations or reached agreements to avoid running opposing candidates. This process of fusion with the mainstream parties was not new. Individuals associated
with the Socialist Party had gravitated in the past to the Democrats and the Republicans. For example, E.J. Brown, a SPW reformist leader, became a Democrat in 1912 and ten years later succeeded in his election bid for mayor of Seattle. Prior to the 1920's the problem of fusion with the major parties affected only individuals; in 1922, however, the process of fusion occurred on a larger scale with whole FLP organizations working with the Democrats. Tired of the political wilderness and tired of gaining few benefits from meagre political representation many in Washington's socialist movements hoped to use the Democrats as the vehicle to their own ends.

This process of fusion with the Democrats was a consequence of the American fragmentation and decentralization of political authority. The relatively low level of institutional development in Washington State encouraged the FLP to de-emphasize its ideology of an exclusive third party of "all producers"; it enticed the FLP to merge into the Democrats in order to pursue the goals of the FLP. The primary agents responsible for this fusion process were the primary system and the lack of a firm structure in American political parties.

The lessons that the FLP experience taught Washington's radicals were contradictory. The FLP indicated that a broadened political coalition of all "producers" had significant support from the electorate; it received much more support than the more ideological SPW could ever muster, even though many of the programs and personnel were the same. Nonetheless, the experience of the FLP indicated that a "producer" organization could not sink firm organizational roots because of the primary
system and the fluidity of the mainline parties. The legitimacy for the FLP was also not forthcoming because the effectiveness of the FLP legislators in providing tangible benefits was hampered by the limitations on legislative authority and state government authority in general. The experiment with the FLP as a radical vehicle did not give renewed legitimacy to the third party option despite the success in pushing aside the Democrats. Rather, legitimacy was attached to fusing with Democrats to use this old party for new purposes. The FLP fusionists had re-learned the lessons of previous attempts to build third parties in America. Their policy of fusion also shaped the strategy later used by the Washington Commonwealth Federation in the thirties: "bore from within" the Democrats.

The success of fusion with the Democrats carried the FLP to a higher level of representation in the state legislature. Five FLP legislators went to Olympia in 1922. But this was a hollow victory, for in the ensuing years the FLP declined rapidly. The other FLP candidates in 1922 did poorly. James Duncan received only 12% of the vote in his United States Senate contest. The following year the moderate unionists lost power in the Seattle CLC. In November of 1923 the Socialist Party left the FLP hoping to re-establish itself. After the departure of the moderate unionists and socialists, the FLP in Washington came increasingly under communist control. By 1924 the FLP in Washington State was for all intents and purposes dead. The communists bolted from the state party that year and all FLP candidates lost in the fall elections. With no organized left-wing party to turn to, many reformist groups (includ-
ing the Grange, the WSFL, and the socialists) endorsed the personal presidential candidacy of LaFollette.69

The years between the collapse of the FLP and the great depression were like a desert for Washington's radicals and reformers. The collapse of radical political organizations was almost complete; only a few groups managed to cling to a sporadically active life. Electoral support for radical groups also evaporated. In the 1928 presidential election, the combined socialist votes totalled only 1.3%. No socialist public officials were elected in Washington State.70 Radical and moderate unionists lost control of the union movement to the conservatives. The FLP-Democratic party fusionism of 1922 marked the political direction for the rest of the twenties as "... most of the former supporters of the Farmer-Labor Party joined the Democratic party gradually between 1922 and 1932."71

To conclude the discussion of the FLP, its failure can be attributed to many of the factors that worked against the SPW's success. The factors outlined in chapter four -- the primary system, the "hollow shell" nature of American parties, the de-emphasis on and discontinuity of party organization, the limitations on public authority and the fragmentation of state government authority -- all once again worked against the ability for a political party to routinize its organization, its constituent groups, and its voter support.

The FLP's failure to routinize its support of the broad coalition that started it and voted for it was less an internal failure than the outcome of the lack of structure of the major parties. Without a party policy or specific coalition to
maintain, the Democrats and Republicans generated fewer centripetal forces than their British Columbia counterparts. As the Republicans and Democrats became more or less regions of conflict (one more or less liberal, the other conservative) with low entry costs, the easiest course to follow was to enter the major parties. In addition, the depoliticizing of issues in Washington State had a cumulative effect. Reformers and radicals might be frustrated at the absence of reform or at the limited nature of reform; but the low level of intervention by the government also implied less need for political action by potential party supporters.

In the end, the FLP's failure proved to Washington's political left and reformers that an independent third party was not workable. This conclusion did not necessarily imply a caving into the non-partisan policy of the labour and farmer conservatives. Rather when the depression re-awoke Washington's political left, the experience of the FLP led to a concerted effort to capture the Democratic party for radical political ends.

The Washington Commonwealth Federation and the Stalking Horse Strategy, 1932-1940

The great depression slammed hard against Washington's economic life. "In 1933 the number of production workers in Washington was 59.1% of the number in 1929." Export of lumber fell to 50% of 1929 figures; wholesale trade was off by 47%. In these circumstances political alignments (never very firm in Washington State anyway) shifted rapidly.
Republicans bolted to the Democrats and the radicalism of earlier days re-emerged with a new twist. The new strategy of boring from within the Democrats had been shown to be successful by the former Socialist Party members Bone and Brown and by the FLP members who had fused with the Democrats in 1922.

The disparity in popular support between third parties and the two major party candidates in the early 1930's indicates why Washington's radicals pursued this strategy. Only two locals of the Socialist Party survived in 1931. The following year the socialist candidate for state governor received less than 10,000 votes. On the other hand, W. Pemberton, running on a "frankly socialistic platform" in the Democratic primary won King and Pierce counties and placed second overall with over 57,000 votes. And, running third in the contest (on a platform similar to Upton Sinclair's EPIC Program and that foreshadowed the Washington Commonwealth Federation's "production for use, not for profit" proposals) Schwellenbach reaped over 55,000 votes.73

The "openness" of the Democrats had enticed many in the previous decade, as the Republican Party had in its progressive days. In the early thirties a flood of new "60-day" Democrats swamped the party. Except for seven primary races, the Democratic primary of 1932 produced a gaggle of candidates who "had either tenuous ties to the party or no former connection at all."74 Many were either radicals, or former Farmer-Labor supporters, or progressives of a variety of stripes.
Perhaps the most noteworthy of this group was H.T. Bone. A SPW member in 1912, Bone moved to the Republican Party, the Farmer-Labor Party, and then the Democratic Party. Through all these party affiliations he remained a staunch advocate of public ownership of electric power. In the thirties, Bone retained a strong socialistic streak, advocating in 1934 the nationalization of the banks, public ownership of utilities and munitions plants, and further nationalizations if necessary. When he was attacked by Norman Thomas, the national leader of the Socialist Party, as a deserting socialist, the Socialist Party of Washington defended Bone as a practical politician.

By his example and advocacy Bone was a leading proponent of the strategy of capturing the nomination of one of the old parties and then using this platform for radical ends. The 1932 election indicated the cogency of at least the first part of Bone's strategy. For "after the dust (of the primary) settled one thing became abundantly clear. The Democratic Party had proved to be a hollow shell, capable of being filled by a popular candidate who chose to run on the ticket."75

The leftward shift of the Democratic Party in Washington State continued in 1933 and 1934. In King County (Seattle) left-wing forces took control of the Democratic county organization in September of 1933. The Democratic sweep of 1932 had also brought to the governor's office a conservative Democrat, Martin, who retained Republicans in his administration and in other ways antagonized the liberal Democrats. The falling out became public at the 1934 Democratic state convention. The party delegates rejected a resolution expressing personal approval
of Governor Martin; instead they voted for the nationalization of the banks, a state-run gasoline business, and the Bone public utilities power bill.  

The depression also spawned several movements that offered solutions to the social crisis. Several of these groups went on to form the WCF that came to play such an important role in the Democratic party. Formed in 1931, an Unemployed Citizens League at first emphasized self-help schemes to aid the poor; the league turned political in 1932, endorsing Bone, Pemberton, and Zioncheck. Later the Unemployed Citizens League was captured by the socialists and communists. The Technocratic movement, in addition had a strong following in Washington State. The Socialist Party also enjoyed a resurgence with its new reformist, ethical image that downplayed the class struggle.

Several individuals who had floated between all these groups came together in August of 1931 to form the Commonwealth Builders, Incorporated. The CBI consciously modelled their program after the End Poverty in California program of Upton Sinclair. The CBI advocated "production for use, not for profit," an old radical slogan from before the turn of the century.

Simply put "production for use" meant that goods being produced would be utilized to take care of the producer's own needs. Under this plan, the idea of producing goods for profit would be curtailed or completely eliminated and the possibility of going off the money system would loom. The dawning of the Co-operative Commonwealth would come about. . . . the state then should be enabled to buy the land or factories which (were idle)
and utilize them for the employment of the able unemployed. 78

To be sure the Commonwealth Builders were not class-conscious Marxian socialists. Theirs was a reformism defined by a combination of the Protestant ethic and christian socialism. Many of the CBI leaders were ministers of the social gospel. The CBI in its socialistic reformism represented the last of a lineage and demonstrated the slow weaning of American socialism away from doctrinaire ideology. The experiences since the turn of the century had depreciated the value of strong ideological commitments as American politics moved to the rhythm of personality and not programmatic politics.

The goals of a broad coalition of "producers" in the Farmer-Labor Party suggested the dropping of the able socialist. The decentralization of the political structure had slowly enervated the need and practicality of using heavily ideological appeals. With power residing in locally based officials and fragmented institutions of participation, the political system encouraged short-run perspectives, narrow group interests at the expense of society-wide cleavages or concerns.

The Commonwealth Builders staked a position in the left-wing of the Democratic party. Shunning any alignment with the communists, the CBI often criticized Roosevelt's New Deal for being too conservative. The CBI also acted as an internal pressure group by endorsing candidates for the 1934 election. To receive the CBI's endorsement candidates had to sign a pledge to support the CBI Economic Security Act and to co-oper-
ate with any party supporting a national production-for-use plan. Thirty-five of the candidates so endorsed won in 1934. Endorsement, however, is a long way from control, especially in American politics; when the legislature met, the CBI could only count on 20 state representatives. An alliance of conservative Democrats and Republicans limited the CBI's influence, just as this coalition later defeated the WCF's measures. The 1935 legislature narrowly defeated a production-for-use proposal.

Although the Washington State legislature enacted state versions of New Deal programs, left-wing and reform groups became dissatisfied with the conservatism of the governor and the legislature. In 1935 the CBI, farm and labour organizations, socialists, technocrats, and Democratic clubs came together to form the Washington Commonwealth Federation. The CBI seemed to want to form a new political party. Most of the groups, however, were opposed to a third party because of the failures of previous third parties. CBI leader (and later WCF spokesman) Howard Costigan explained his opposition to a third party saying that he was opposed "to taking the third party horse to the political well and not get a drink." The WCF opted to work within the Democratic party, by continuing the CBI's policy of endorsing candidates.

The Washington Commonwealth Federation was an enlarged version of the CBI and retained the latter's "production-for-use" platform along with a host of more reformist measures and an emphasis on vote-getting appeal. Perhaps more important to understanding the WCF's political lineage were the words "commonwealth federation." These words in the name of the
organization recalled long-standing socialist imagery in North America, going back to Gronlund's adaption of Marxism to American conditions in his book *The Co-operative Commonwealth*. The WCF's sister organizations in other regions also indicate its political roots, character, and image. "...the proposed name for the organization (the WCF) evoked the newly formed Commonwealth Party in New York and the CCF in Canada. The Seattle effort seemed to be part of a continent-spanning upsurge." Though the WCF saw itself as part of such a political movement (and even sent a delegation to British Columbia to study the CCF) it was a completely independent organization; its platform and its tactics largely represented indigenous responses to the local situation. The WCF's vestigal socialism was contained in its "production-for-use" proposals, while the reformist lessons of previous decades pushed the WCF closer to the centre of American politics. The 1935 WCF platform urged a "production-for-use" initiative for the 1936 elections, government responsibility for health care and hospitalization, pensions, and collective bargaining.  

As in previous radical movements in Washington State, the areas west of the Cascades and especially Seattle were the biggest supporters of the WCF. Most of the constituent groups came from the Puget Sound area. The Washington State Federation of Labor also endorsed the WCF in 1935 but quickly grew disillusioned with the WCF. The labour councils in Seattle, Bremerton, Centralia, and Everett, nonetheless, remained in the WCF. Labour unions sent 116 out of 483 delegates to the WCF's founding convention. The editor of the WCF's *Washington Commonwealth Builder* was formerly associated with Seattle's
labour daily, the Union Record.

Having set aside thoughts of a third party, the WCF in 1936 set about infiltrating the Democratic Party organization on the county level. Their success was most noticeable in King County where liberals and WCF members virtually took over the organization and adopted the "production-for-use" and public ownership planks of the WCF. The WCF also carried Pierce, Thurston, Gray's Harbor, and Cowlitz counties. The success of the WCF in controlling much of Washington State's Democratic Party allegedly prompted Postmaster General, Jim Farley, to offer a toast to "the forty-seven states and the Soviet of Washington." Though the story may be apocryphal it aptly conveys what regular democrats must have thought had happened to their party.82

The next major target was the Democratic State convention. Since the Democratic party contained groups ranging from the WCF radicals to fairly conservative labour leaders and eastern Washington farmers, it is not surprising that the 1936 party convention turned into a bit of a circus. The two major wings of the party were sharply divided on a number of issues. After almost 24 hours of continuous debate, the WCF was victorious. The left-wing of the party wrote the "production-for-use" proposals into the state's Democratic party platform; they also won the inclusion of a public ownership plank on natural resources. The WCF, however, could not get the party convention to support the "production-for-use" initiative set for the fall of 1936.83

The state convention further split the badly divided
Democrats. Democratic Governor Martin blamed the WCF for preventing investment in Washington State. Meanwhile, the WCF continued its boring from within policy, as they pushed their own candidates against Governor Martin in the primary.

The WCF's victory at the Democratic state convention proved to be pyrrhic. The convention exercised little real power and the platform hardly mattered to voters, except for its potential to discredit the party or candidates. The atrophy of the institutions of political party in Washington State had proceeded very far by the mid-thirties, such that between elections the party "virtually becomes a 'paper' organization." The party did not reside in the convention. By attempting to control the "centre" of the Democratic party, the WCF grasped at the party's most inconsequential part. Furthermore, the direct primary, and especially the blanket primary adopted in 1935, removed the gate-keeping function from the party organization and placed it in the "people's"hands. The new blanket primary influenced the 1936 Democratic primaries as Republicans crossed over to back Democratic Governor Martin in his fight with the WCF's Stevenson.

The WCF's failure against Martin in the primary revived discussion of running a third party candidacy against the governor; nothing came of the third party talk, although it heightened the rifts inside the WCF.

The fall 1936 general election proved to be the major turning point for the WCF. Many of the candidates the WCF endorsed won in the election. In the 1937 legislature the WCF could count on 24 legislators: More crucially, however, the
WCF's "production-for-use" initiative lost by an overwhelming margin: about 21% of the votes cast favored the initiative. The public power initiative also failed. In a convention following the 1936 election, the Washington Commonwealth Federation abandoned their "production-for-use" plank. Shortly afterwards those WCF members interested in "production-for-use" and co-operatives left the WCF; included in this group were the technocrats and many of the original leaders of the Commonwealth Builders. 85

Behind the scenes, the WCF, also changed rapidly. After the November 1936 election, the most prominent leader of the WCF, Howard Costigan, secretly became a member of the Communist Party. For the next several years communists grew stronger and stronger within the WCF's leadership. The policies the WCF adopted in 1937, and after, generally coincided with the communist party's popular front program. The program also emphasized moderate reform and the unity of "progressives" against war and fascism. Ironically, the WCF, because of its secret communist leadership, became the protector of Roosevelt's New Deal. Their preoccupation with defending this reformism in an atmosphere of growing hostility to the New Deal marked the WCF's conversion from a radical force into a mildly reformist pressure group. "With the new orientation (of the WCF) the indigenous radical movement (in Washington State) with its roots in the nineteenth century became a historical footnote." 86

In 1937 the WCF grew weaker as even the reformist elements started leaving. Labour unions cut their ties and the AFL and CIO schism affected the unions connected to the WCF.
The Seattle CLC left the WCF in the spring of 1937 and the WCF became more closely tied to the CIO unions especially those with communist leadership.

After 1936 the WCF sought and won local and city offices and became a large mass-based organization; its radicalism muted, the WCF sought to broaden its popular base further by creating a pensioner's union and a progressive movement in its own image throughout the western states. By 1938 the WCF had peaked in its new efforts at mainline reform politics. In that year regular Democrats turned against the WCF and urged the election of Republicans to the state legislature and the "purging" of the progressive Democratic faction. Increasingly in this period, charges of communist influence were levelled against the WCF. Through all this the WCF mustered support by holding rallies and conventions and other tactics aimed at showing broad public support for the WCF. But the WCF's real influence slipped noticeably. In the legislature the WCF's state legislators were ineffective as the conservative Democrats teamed up with Republicans to defeat the left's measures.

The years of decline after 1937, escalated into mass disaffection in 1940. The question of Roosevelt's third term, the Russo-Finnish conflict, and the loss of power in the Democratic party's precinct elections and state convention precipitated the final decline of the WCF's influence. Costigan's radio show was cancelled; the WCF suspended him as executive-secretary when he left the Communist Party that year. After 1940 the Washington Commonwealth Federation became more and more an organization that existed only on paper. Like other
Communist-dominated organizations flip-flopped on support for World War Two in time with Russia's foreign policy changes. The Washington Commonwealth Federation's major policies in the late thirties and through the war coincided with the Democrats.

The WCF limped on through the war with little influence or support, although one of its leaders managed to win a congressional election in 1944. As an organization separate from the Democrats the WCF was dissolved in 1945.

In summary, the WCF's failure to carry through on its radicalism and in its attempt to "bore from within" the Democratic party were caused by several factors. First, the party structure as outlined in Chapter Four was so flexible as to allow almost any influence to be felt, but it was also so weak that few gains were derived from control of the party. Acena's judgment on the WCF in this regard is pertinent.

The WCF exerted most of its energies in a vain effort to control the Democratic Party in Washington State. But the Democratic Party, by its very nature, proved immune to capture by a single pressure group. However well led or disciplined, the Democratic Party was composed of whomever it assembled for the biennial or quadrennial exercises called election campaigns. Its composition was fluid and ever-changing, dependent upon momentary alliances and issues. When no election was impending or when no great issue confronted it the party then simply became the few party faithful able to devote their time to keep the party alive until the next election.

Second, the lack of party discipline in the state legislature prevented the WCF's reliable legislators from acting in a balance of power situation to provide crucial votes. The lack of party discipline also meant that a party in Washington...
State could house a broader range of seemingly contradictory policies and groups than could British Columbia's parties.

Third, the direct democracy devices robbed the American parties of the crucial gate-keeping function, while they also created new arenas of political conflict that were extremely difficult for a minority political group to exploit.

Fourth, the ineffectiveness of the WCF legislators drove its erstwhile supporters to seek other ways to achieve their goals. Most notably (and as pointed out in chapter five), the labour unions went back to their non-partisan policy and pressure group tactics.

Fifth, the limitations on government authority that had evolved over the years offered little hope for public amelioration from the economic crisis. The government's power to initiate reform was noticeably restricted as was its taxing power. This limitation on power reinforced the earlier presumptions in favor of a strong private sector and thus de-politicized social conflict. Without adequate authority to enact sweeping new programs, Washington's politicians of all stripes did not raise the electorate's expectations and fears of government action as much as in the case of British Columbia; the relative absence of such expectations and fears in Washington State made political coalitions possible, whereas in British Columbia similar coalitions became untenable as when the Liberals attempted to retain business, middle class, labour, and reformist support by "socializing capitalism."
Conclusion

In tracing the development of the socialist movements and political parties in the North Pacific region, several long-term trends must be kept in mind when drawing implications and conclusions.

First, the socialist movements and parties before World War One were of roughly equal strength. In terms of per capita membership, Washington State's Socialist Party was stronger than British Columbia's; the former had a high-tide mark of over 6,000, while British Columbia's never exceeded 1,000. If votes received can be a measure of strength, then the socialists in British Columbia had a slight edge in this period. The province's leftists peaked at 20% of the popular vote, while their sister-party in the state could only muster a maximum of 13% statewide.

Between the World Wars, the vehicles of radicalism in the province and state changed, but their relative strengths remained roughly equal. The quest for broader popular support and a broader coalition of groups led to new organizations and larger support in the inter-war period. The Farmer-Labor Party displaced the Democrats as the state's second party; in the mid-thirties the Washington Commonwealth Federation captured the Democrats and received 21% of the vote for an immediate implementation of their "production-for-use" proposal. In British Columbia, the Federated Labour Party gained the first significant support from urban voters and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in the thirties went further in this direction, receiving one-third of the popular vote and official...
opposition status.

Second, the schismatic nature of left-wing political parties was equally evident in both the province and the state prior to 1930. In both movements the revolutionary "impossibilists" dominated in the first decade of this century; the left and right wings of the movement fought for control through to the middle of World War One. The political implications of the war and the Bolshevik Revolution shattered the socialist left-wing even further, while the moderates led in creating a modus vivendi with moderate labour unions and other reformist elements. After a brief period of unity, the socialist and labour forces became highly schismatic once again. By the mid and late twenties Washington's and British Columbia's movements were in disarray and decline.

In the thirties and forties, British Columbia's movement formed a united coalition of left-wing groups, sought independent political power, and overcame internal schisms and breakaway movements. The Washingtonian's after a brief united effort within the Democratic party, fell out among themselves; communist control eventually pushed the WCF into political isolation and dissolution. Thus the British Columbia and Washington State movements were equally fractious and isolated before 1930. After that date only the Washington State movement remained weak and divided.

Third, the relationship of the socialist movements with the trade unions in both British Columbia and Washington State was checkered up until the rapprochement of the middle fifties in British Columbia. The World War One period to 1922 marked
the high point of socialist and trade union unity in both the state and the province. Nonetheless, the rapprochement remained tenuous and incomplete as the labour conservatives remained skeptical of independent political action.

A section of the labour unions sought to work with the CCF and the WCF in the thirties. The Washington State unions, with the exception of the communist dominated unions, stayed with the WCF for a very short time and would not endorse the "production-for-use" proposal. The CCF claimed to speak for labour but had no significant labour union affiliations until the 1950's. Conservative unions preferred to work with the Liberals; communist unions, with the LPP. Only the non-communist industrial unions lent the CCF support, and that was sporadic and for the most part indirect. Only after the communist influence in the unions had decreased and government interference with collective bargaining had increased did the unions (as separate from union members) back the CCF.

In summary, neither the strength of the socialist movements in British Columbia and Washington State (as measured by party membership or popular vote), nor the degree of sectarianism, nor the relations with the labour unions can explain the failure of Washington's socialists to create a viable alternative to "old-line" political parties. What factors then can account for the British Columbia's socialist movement's continued third party thrusts in the 1930's, their expansion in the forties, the ability to sustain their organization through post-war doldrums and the formalizing of direct ties to organized labour by 1960?
The political institutions played an important role in almost every decade of the socialist movement's history. The institutions operated in such a manner as to force political participation into specific forms (e.g., political party versus pressure group); the form of political participation when combined with other political variables associated with the degree of centralized or fragmented authority gradually altered the content, style, and goals of the socialist movements.

In British Columbia, the socialist movement kept returning to the vehicle of a political party with an explicit, though reformist, socialist ideology. By fighting for representation in the provincial arena, the British Columbia socialists achieved a maximum return on their efforts. The municipalities were too inconsequential, while the federal seats, at first, were too large. The disciplined nature of parliamentary parties reinforced the ability of the socialists to routinize their support, while their ideology acted to unite larger groups. The ideology also acted as a gatekeeper to minimize fusionist influence.

The participation through a party tended to validate the strategy of the reformist socialists over that of the movement's left-wing. This shift rightward was not just one wing of the movement defeating another wing; it affected many individuals and leaders of the movement. Starting with a fervid revolutionism or syndicalism, Kingsley, Winch, and Pritchard slowly moved to the right in their thinking and political associations. The "impossibilist" Kingsley joined the Federated Labour Party; the one-time syndicalist Pritchard, the CCF and
the Social Constructives; and the radical Winch became the "minister of institutions" for the CCF. These men could still serve their socialist rhetoric "boiling hot"; their practices and strategies as they grew older were much milder. Though the ideology softened with time, the commitment to a third party remained strong. Finally, the "brittleness" of disciplined parties and their electoral coalitions, and the demand for and elaboration of an interventionist government reinforced the party as a vehicle of reformist socialism.

The Washington socialists met a different end. As the preceding pages have indicated the political structure of Washington State sapped parties of strength and boosted the potency of pressure groups. The leftist Washingtonians had to fight in political arenas ranging from municipal, to county, to state, to federal levels. Even then their political struggles did not end for the American judiciary was difficult to control. The Washington socialists and reformers hoped to build a viable third party movement in the Farmer-Labor Party; the weak party tradition in Washington State, however, had never taught these reformers and socialists how to organize a large cohesive party. The weak party tradition also gave the reformers and socialists many reasons to downplay the importance of a party. As a result, those previously supporting the third party option adopted fusionism (in the twenties and thirties) as the preferred form of political participation. This path seemed to offer quicker, almost painless, success, if only the primary could be won. Thus in the thirties similar elements that joined the CCF in British Columbia joined the Democratic Party
in Washington State to form an internal pressure group for socialist ends.

The political form of participation by fusion with the "old-line" parties affected the ideology of the Washington State socialists by necessitating the dropping of the socialist label and many socialist shibboleths. Fusionism emphasized the man over the creed. In this manner ideology ceased to be a gate-keeper for the party.

Fusionism also depreciated the organizational side of the socialists' political efforts. When participating in the major parties one did not need a strong broad based organization; one just needed a minimal organization to win the primary, get the major party's label and then, maybe, win the general election. In this regard, the primary, not the organization or ideology, was gatekeeper of the party. Even this minimal gatekeeping function of the direct primary (allowing voters to vote in only one party's primary) vanished with the free-for-all of the 1935 blanket primary.

Tracing Washington State's socialists over time indicates the fusionist form modified many peoples' ideas and goals. Homer Bone and "Doc" Brown joined the major parties as reformers and slowly their reform schemes became less sweeping, less radical, and more localized. The electoral success of these fusionists legitimated this form of participation; but once fused to the major parties, they (like the WCF) found they could not alter the major parties' directions for the parties were nine-tenths paper, one-tenth primary.
Finally, the expansion of government power in Washington State during and after World War Two followed a policy of permitting government actions in policy areas, like labour relations, but it did not prescribe and require policy as was the case in British Columbia. Consequently, the unions and reformers in Washington State could safely rely on pressure group tactics to achieve their limited ends.
Footnotes

1S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967) Chapter One; for the definition of a political party and when a party is significant see chapter two. A movement can be defined as a group (or a series of groups) with the goal of re-defining and/or re-distributing power and authority in some social sphere. Movements are usually marked by a relatively low level of organization, high levels of commitment and enthusiasm and common attitudes. Though movements may restrict their activities to one sphere e.g., politics, economics, religion, they may encompass, or oscillate between several spheres, as chapter five indicated. A party may retain many of the elements of a movement in the party's early enthusiastic period; after routinization sets in the movement characteristics recede.

2A third major phase started with the formation of the New Democratic Party from the CCF and labour unions. Its key characteristics are a further move in the reformist direction, an almost complete muting of the rhetoric of "class struggle," and the inclusion of more middle-class elements, particularly the institutionalized professionals.

3Johnson argues that the SPC's legacy for the socialist tradition in British Columbia was its contribution of leaders and that it was a "keeper of the faith." While his general point about contributions from the SPC may be valid, he tends to underplay the shift in strategy and ideas of the socialist organizations and leaders. R. Johnson, "No Compromise-No Political Trading: The Marxian Socialist Tradition in British Columbia," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1975, passim.


5Johnson, pp. 215-16.

6Robin, pp. 90, 104, 123.


9 Johnson, pp. 150 - 156; See pages 361-62 in chapter five for a list of abbreviations of unions and organizations.

10 Ibid., p. 249.

11 Ibid., pp. 196 -213.

12 Ibid., p. 239, 249.

13 Ibid. p. 231.

14 Ibid. p. 249.


16 Johnson, pp. 261-63.

17 Ibid. p. 287.

18 Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 107-08.

19 Johnson, p. 373.

20 Ibid., p. 320.; Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 149-50. The convergence of support for the FLP is indicated by Hawthornwaite's hope that the new party would appeal to all classes and be flexible in policy; on the other hand, Kingsley (who would have nothing to do with the unions years before) saw the Russian revolution as inspiration for the FLP and in subsequent years advocated working with unions and through political action to achieve socialism. Ibid. pp. 149-50, 177.

21 Ibid. p. 253.

23 Robin, Radical Politics, pp. 258-65.

24 Ibid.

25 For the details of the emergence of the CCF in British Columbia and the brief role of the Reconstruction Party that later became the Associated CCF Clubs see D.G. Steeves, The Compassionate Rebel: Ernest Winch and the Growth of Socialism in Western Canada (Vancouver: J.J. Douglas, Ltd., 1960) pp. 77-82.


28 Steeves, pp. 110-111.

29 Ibid. pp. 112-113


31 Ormsby, p. 473.

32 Ibid. pp. 478-79.

33 Robin, Pillars, p. 51.

34 Ibid. p. 87.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid. p. 142.


Socialist Labor Party support in Washington State was always small compared to the SPW's membership and voter support. The SLP in Washington, like its parent organization, was highly doctrinaire and for the most part unrepresentative of mainstream socialist thinking. Because of this intellectual isolation and relatively small support the following discussion will not discuss the SLP in any detail.

It is interesting to note that the socialists of western Montana, the major mining area of the America Northwest, had a better record of electing public officials than did Washington State. See J. Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912 to 1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) pp. 116-118.

54 Schwantes, pp. 210-211.


56 Cravens, p. 44.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p. 116.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Weinstein, pp. 223-24.

62 Ibid., p. 227.

63 Cravens, p. 137.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

65 Ibid., p. 153.

66 Ibid., p. 247.

67 Ibid., p. 159.

68 Ibid., p. 163.

69 Ibid., p. 245.

70 Johansen, p. 474.

71 Cravens, p. 251.

72 Johansen, p. 507.

74 Krause, p. 56.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., p. 91.

77 Weinstein, p. 338.

78 Acena, pp. 34-35.

79 Ibid., p. 92.

80 Ibid., p. 90.

81 Ibid., p. 88.

82 Ibid., p. 117; Schwantes, p. 223.

83 Krause, p. 145.

84 Acena, p. 454.

85 Ibid., p. 142.

86 Krause, p. 160.

87 Acena, pp. 151-160.

88 Ibid., pp. 454-55.

89 E.T. Kingsley, on the leading members of the doctrinaire SPC, castigated unions and reformism; but in later days he softened his anti-union stance, joined the FLP, urged working through unions and parties, opposed secession from the international unions, and was also critical of the syndicalism of the OBU.

E. Winch, who advocated syndicalism in 1919, was an instrumental figure in the socialist party wing of the CCF; he later made the conditions of the province's jails, hospitals, and asylums his special interest. Defending this reformism he said "I fail to see that a socialist representative is illogical when he takes up individual problems or proposed reform measures in parliament as long as he keeps ever in mind the necessity of attacking the underlying social factor..." D.G. Steeves The Compassionate Rebel: Ernest Winch and the Growth of Socialism in Western Canada (Vancouver: J.J. Douglas Ltd. 1960) pp. 122-23.
W. Pritchard also advocated syndicalism in the OBU; in 1936 he sided with Connell in the later's criticism of the CCF's left-wing; Victor Midgley, also formerly of the OBU, likewise sided with Connell. Ibid. p. 107.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The general nature of the answer to the "why no socialism" question should, by now, be evident. After a brief recapitulation of this study's findings, this final chapter aims at noting the implications and at achieving some perspective on this study. Several questions need addressing: from the evidence of this case study, can the hypotheses on the fate of socialism in British Columbia and Washington State be confirmed? Can the findings of this study be extended to the outcomes experienced by the nation-wide socialist parties? Does this thesis have a bearing on other studies of the "no socialism" question? Are these findings suggestive for issues in Canadian and American society? How does this thesis contribute to research perspectives and problems in the social sciences? And finally, can other research be suggested that may contribute to the understanding of the "no socialism" problem?

The Findings and the Hypotheses

The long-standing question of why socialism failed to take root in the United States (and the larger question of working class political participation) has not usually proceeded from a direct comparison of the Canadian and American experience; additionally, most studies have used a national
focus to address these problems. But because of the unique
caracter of the North Pacific coast, the regional outcomes and
trends were enlisted in hopes of indicating the national trends.

Analysis of prior research on the origins of labour
politics led to the conclusion that the most fruitful avenue of
investigation should concentrate on the economic and political
structure as the primary factors that the union movements, and
parties had to work with in order to build a socialist alter-
native.

It was hypothesized that more developed economic and
political institutions (i.e., a more modern institutional
structure in each sphere) would tend to create the conditions
necessary for sustaining and entrenching a left-wing party.
Further it was hypothesized that movements and "social frag-
ments" would adopt ideas and political vehicles congruent with
the institutional order.

Economic Structure

Contrary to expectations (specifically, the hypothesis
on economic structure) little compelling evidence could be
found for an economic explanation of socialist success in
British Columbia and the failure in Washington State. Only
mild and temporary differences between the province and the
state were found in some occupational categories. The percen-
tage of the workforce in the various occupations was not
associated with significant differences in the development of
economic institutions. Examination of other economic variables
augmented the findings on trends in occupations. Analysis of
the secular trends in the leading industries in the province and the state provided little evidence to support economic structure as a major explanation of the political differences: by and large the types of industries and occupations tended to create similar economic and social forces of roughly similar size in both the state and province. Interestingly, size of plant (which is often used as an index of modernization and union militance) was generally larger at an earlier date in Washington State. Finally, available evidence on urbanization and the incidence of occupational communities did not point to major socio-economic differences.

Clearly, the economic structure of the North Pacific region cannot have been the primary causal link. The economic data suggest that comparable economic and social forces were present such that non-economic factors played the more decisive role in establishing a labour party in British Columbia and not in Washington State. Of course, this conclusion does not mean the economic questions were irrelevant. Rather, the economic structure of the province and state gives some reasons for the origins of political discontent; but it is an insufficient explanation for the translation of discontent into a significant political party.

Political Structure

The examination of political institutions indicated important long-term differences between the state and the province. Within the general framework of a democratic, parliamentary, and capitalist polity, the political institutions
in Washington State fragmented political authority into numerous competing sites; in British Columbia an opposing tendency toward centralization and rationalization of political authority amplified the scope and power of political policy and of organized "group" politics. The political institutions in British Columbia in this regard were more congruent with socialist policies and images of the political realm. Furthermore, the different political structures placed premiums on different forms of participation that over time resulted in different ideologies and forms of success.

The differences in political structure and the kinds of political action are strong evidence for the hypothesis on political institutions. Specifically, it argues for a causal link between modern political structures and socialist success.

Trade Unions

Examination of the growth and history of trade unions in British Columbia and Washington State tended to support the findings on the economic and political structure. The growth of trade unions and the degree of unity was comparable for many years up to the early 1930's, after which date the Washington State unions had greater success. The political policies that unions of the North Pacific region adopted seemed only remotely connected to questions of trade union size, density, or unity. The difference in political direction for the union movements in British Columbia and Washington State appeared more closely related to the form of political participation that the institutions encouraged. Thus through a process of experimenta-
tion both union movements found distinct forms of participation and distinct policies appropriate to their institutional order. The more centralized political structure in British Columbia encouraged and in part forced the unions into an independent political path to defend their economic goals. A prime political mobilizer for the labour unions was identified as the interventionism of the labour relations system.

Movements and Political Parties

Like the trade unions, the fate of the socialistic movements and parties in the region seemed less connected to questions of size, popular voting support, and unity. Rather, the forms of participation and political authority rewarded organization and ideology more in British Columbia than in Washington State. A solid party organization in British Columbia was made viable and necessary by the centralized political authority. In Washington State the institutional premiums made cohesive parties inefficient and ineffectual. As with the trade unions, the political movements and parties experimented with similar strategies and tactics in the province and the state. The different political premiums, however, acted to select forms of participation (undercutting third party politics in Washington State) that came to affect ideology and public attitudes. The major factor affecting the forms of participation used by the movements and parties in Washington State was the fragmented and dispersed authority of political institutions, especially the political primaries, party organization, and the system of checks and balances.
The examination of the trade unions and political movements and parties addresses the final hypotheses on the adoption of ideologies and the interaction of "social fragments" with the economic and political institutions. As noted in chapter two the North Pacific region appeared to be rather similar in ethnic composition. The economic and political movements (and many individuals, too) went through a process of maturation and experimentation that confirmed or disproved tactics and strategies. The early similarity of the union and socialist movements in the province and the state indicate that the social fragments from northern Europe and North America acted in similar ways. The differences in the political fate of socialism thus seems related to the ability of the social fragments to use the political institutions for their own purposes. The American social fragments could not freely use their political heritage for the political institutions acted as the validator or invalidator of the heritage. When the political structure worked against making the ideological heritage operational then the ideological heritage slowly became muted and eventually abandoned. On the other hand, the British immigrants in British Columbia found institutions similar to their heritage such that they could more easily express the political culture of their homeland. In British Columbia this transfer of ideology was slow but once it was accomplished, by about 1935-1940, it was very powerful and easily sustained.

In short, the evidence presented in this study 1) leads to a rejection of the hypothesis connecting modern economic
structure with the establishment of a viable socialist party.
2) a confirmation of the hypothesis on modern political
institutions (i.e. greater adaptability, unity, differentiation,
coherence and autonomy) and socialist politics
3) and based
on the above and after a reformulation of the hypothesis on
ideology and "social fragments" a corroboration that political
structure was the major factor influencing the acceptance of
socialist ideology and a "social fragment's" idea system.

**Regional Perspective on a National Issue?**

The argument presented in this thesis concerns
specifically the case of British Columbia and Washington State,
1900-1960. For many reasons the conclusions advanced above
can also be extended to include the outcome of the socialist
tradition at the national level.

Though British Columbia and Washington State differed
from their respective national averages on many socio-economic
variables, other aspects mirrored the national differences more
faithfully. In economic structure it was noted that the North
Pacific region differed from the national trends, foreshadowing
the secular trends on agricultural occupations, urbanization,
and unionization. The political institutions of the province
and the state, although in some ways unique to the west coast,
reflected in many respects the national differences: a laissez
faire versus interventionist labour relations system, the frag-
mentation versus centralization of political authority, and the
development of strong party lines versus the progressive
weakening of party organization.
Most importantly, since the major differences found between British Columbia and Washington State were political and not economic, the argument advanced in this thesis is directly suitable to the national movements because the political factors also operated in the rest of the nation. Thus, while acknowledging that British Columbia and Washington State had perhaps extreme manifestations of political radicalism, the political outcomes for the left-wing indicate why it is fair to extrapolate to the national level with basically the same line of reasoning used in this thesis.

The North Pacific and Previous "No Socialism" Studies

This thesis has several implications for other studies on the issue of the rise of socialism in industrial societies.

The non-confirmation of the economic hypothesis that this study began with raises important questions for research that has sought to establish economic variables as the most important in understanding labour politics. This study specifically raises doubts about economic explanations of the "no socialism" problem. Since marxian analyses use economics so heavily, such investigations of this problem are open to strong questioning. Likewise, studies that have used America's rural character vis-a-vis Europe will find that this thesis runs contrary to their explanations. The weakness of the economic variables in this study strengthens the doubts about economics as the prime explanation for this problem; it also corroborates the doubts expressed in recent studies, particularly Shergold's conclusion that the working classes of Pittsburgh and
Birmingham, England shared a comparable standard of living.²

The previous studies that place a heavy emphasis on social and geographic mobility seem questionable in light of this thesis. Although no direct evidence was presented on social, or geographic mobility, the similarity of the economic and occupational structure in the province and the state means that major differences probably did not exist in social or geographical mobility.

Related to the geographic mobility explanations of the "no socialism" problem, is Rosenblum's contention that "sojourner" immigrants with little commitment to their adopted society reinforced the business orientation of American unions. Although this study did not directly investigate the committed-ness of immigrants in the North Pacific region it nonetheless implies that the sojourner character of the work force was less important than the political institutions. The general ethnic similarity and economic similarity of British Columbia and Washington State argue against a different level or role for "sojourner" immigrants.

Finally, this study supports and qualifies other analyses that suggest that the political institutions played a significant role in the "no socialism" question. However, where the other studies of political factors tended to divide the political institutions into individual discreet forces, this thesis provides evidence that the over-all pattern of institutional authority played the decisive role. As was seen in chapters 4, 5, and 6 the Washington State pattern of numerous sites of political influence and conflict, the sharing of authority,
the numerous veto arenas, the limitations on political authority, the overlapping of jurisdictions and constituencies, the weakness of political parties in general, and the relative lack of unity, coherence, adaptability, and autonomy of the political institutions (as contrasted with British Columbia) undermined the socialist's ability to establish firm roots; in British Columbia the opposite pattern rebounded to the socialist's favor. It was not a specific political institution but the overall organization of politics that led to the differences on the North Pacific coast and in Canada and the United States.

The Import for Canadian and American Society

The socio-political evolution of the North Pacific region offers insights on topics broader than those dealing with the fate of socialism in North America. This study also has implications for studies of Canadian society and American society.

The Scope of the Political

Part of the explanation offered in the preceding pages used the notion of the scope of what was included as within the political realm. The scope of the political in the United States was narrowed in that the institutions tended to push issues out of the political realm or keep them in the private sphere. On the other hand, in Canada political solutions to social and economic problems were reinforced by the structure of the institutions.

Such differences between the United States and Canada have often been downplayed in comparative studies. But if
the argument about the scope of the "political" influencing movements, parties, and political policy is correct, it has several implications for studies of Canadian and American society.

First, since the political institutions create propensities for "political" versus "private" solutions, the differences between Canada and the United States in solving similar social and economic problems will probably grow greater over time. Thus the United States will probably become more isolated from European and Canadian trends in solving common problems. In Canada, the impetus toward "political" solutions will have the added consequence of pushing all political groups toward a more interventionist policy. Of course, such state interventionism is well advanced even within the most outspoken advocates of "free enterprise," the Social Crediters and the Progressive Conservatives. Given the magnitude of the present economic problems and also given the institutions and tradition of interventionism the Canadian direction most likely does not lie in an American-style anti-government crusade; rather it lies in a further "statist" direction. Although the ideological justification for this "statism" can come in many guises, the most publically appealing one is "nationalism."

The politicizing of conflict in Canada, secondly, had in the past and will continue to create federal versus regional tensions. These kinds of tensions and conflicts are natural in a federal system and are common to societies that are as economically and socially diverse as Canada. Nonetheless, the institutions that have politicized conflict (and increased
political participation and political demands) do not include a method of making regional conflicts regular and manageable. The growth of separatism in both Quebec and the West should be viewed as in part a manifestation of how the national political institutions have exacerbated and entrenched regional conflict. The only institution that has in the past acted to ensure regional representation and the resolution of regional conflict -- the Liberal party -- is in serious decline in many regions. Without such a unifying force in either a party or other institution, the Canadian polity is open to serious problems as the press of events and tradition demand a political solution to pressing problems but the institutional framework makes such a solution harder to reach.

Democracy

The second national implication of this study concerns the quality of democracy in Canada and the United States. If this study has a major implication about democracy it is that the specific institutions or form of democracy has a major impact on the goals that the participants come to seek. The way that people participate is just as important as the fact of participation; in fact one can make a strong argument that it is more important, for the mode of participation influences immediate policy and long-range options by investing participation arenas with power over decisions.

American institutions, by emphasizing the grass roots level of power and by dispersing political authority, reinforce a style of democracy built on immediate response to issues. This
type of democracy leads to several conditions.

First, by placing the balance of power on the immediacy of response the tie between voter and politician is kept short and the government is kept close to the populace's attitudes; this in turn creates a greater sense of identification with the institutions of government as opposed to the specifics of government policy or specific office-holder.

Second, the emphasis on the grass roots, when coupled with major impediments to the fulfillment of popular attitudes and ideas contributes to the passionate and moralistic tone of American politics. The structure of politics unites people on a moral, individualistic basis. The depreciation of political organization requires an almost fevered excitement to pull the dispersed political arenas in one direction to effect change.

Third, American democracy, while reinforcing immediate response, also thwarts democracy by undercutting the adoption of controversial or long-term policies. The dispersal of authority and the grass-roots institutions have been used repeatedly to thwart widely held attitudes, opinions, and social movements. Thus, although this study has used many concepts and methods traditional to political science's analysis of American democracy, this study indicates the limitations of American democracy.

Fourth, the American political system has a tendency to undermine democracy by frustrating the execution of policy. The existence of large numbers of veto arenas has produced a tendency to build programs acceptable to all and a proliferation
of pet projects as the price of political trade-offs. Consequently, the government institutions have a limited dynamic toward the elaboration of a specialized, differentiated government structure; but with the emphasis on the immediacy of political response, little impetus is given to counterbalancing the differentiation with an integration of government institutions. Thus American democracy produces the specialized tasks of modern government on a limited scale but it does not provide a rationalizing mechanism to produce efficiency or effectiveness.

Fifth, the cumulative effect of the American political system has been to weaken the amount of participation. In recent presidential elections less than 60% of those eligible have voted. A variety of impediments from residency requirements to registration procedures, have been seen as responsible. In addition, the general structure of American politics is also responsible. Weak parties build fewer loyalties and weaken participation; and the thwarting of policies undermines the perceived usefulness of political participation.

Canadian democracy has de-valued the short-run democratic approach in favor of valuing persistence and organizational effectiveness. The direct consequence of this mode of participation is to create a distance between the voters and the politicians at almost every level of government. The centralized power of government (whether provincial or federal) makes it possible and expedient to ignore the immediate opposition to policy and to diminish the importance of the socially marginal and the peripheral regions. This distancing
of the voters from the politicians has not led to a distrust of government per se, but has forced opposition to organize better and to delay political gratification. The delay of gratification has increased the importance of government policy, particularly since the implementation of party policy is strongly connected to electoral success. Canadian democracy thus encourages hard political lines to develop as American democracy encourages flexibility.

The modes of participation in Canada and the United States also create characteristic national problems. For Canadian democracy the problem is how to overcome the rigidity of the political institutions and how to ensure that the grassroots and the regions are adequately represented in the political process. For Canada this is an especially acute problem. Britain's geography and relative linguistic and economic unity can with some effort be accommodated within its unitary form of government. But for Canada to use an essentially unitary form within the provinces and in the national parliament when significant linguistic, cultural and economic cleavages are deeply embedded tempts political failure. The political system entrenches cleavages and leaves bridging of these cleavages to political parties. The political parties, however, have a tendency to grow "brittle" and crack under the press of adverse fissiparious events. What is needed is a more permanent way for the Canadian regions and the politically excluded to be included in decision-making at the provincial level, but especially at the federal level.
The weakness of American democracy lies in its proliferation of authority, the tendency to ignore longer run policies, and the large number of veto arenas. The proliferation of public authority with little concern for an overall integrated strategy is a luxury that cannot long be afforded in a highly interdependent, volatile world political and economic environment.

**Perspectives and Problems in the Social Sciences**

This dissertation contains several implications for the study of specific sociological and political problems. In addition, it suggests some conclusions on general perspectives in the social sciences.

**Reductionism**

Durkheim began the formal study of sociology with an attack on the "reductionism" of many previous social studies. His argument that society could not be reduced to psychology or biology argued for the irreducibility of social phenomena. Unfortunately, the study of political sociology has long used as a given another form of reductionism: political issues have often been boiled-down to pre-existing sociological categories into which the participants fit. Political affairs are seen in this view as the public working out of socio-economic, attitudinal, ethnic, regional, or religious characteristics. Institutions in this view are, by and large, passive vessels open to be filled and used by any interest, ideology, etc. Aptly this approach has been called a "sociology of politics" instead of "political sociology." It is no coincidence that the major techniques
used by this approach are the analysis of voter preferences, the correlation of socio-economic variables, and survey research; these are techniques admirably suited to accounting for short-term events. The underplaying of organizational and institutional factors inherent in these techniques suggests the techniques are not geared to more long-term problems.

This study, by forwarding arguments against answering "no socialism" question from the "sociology of politics" approach, suggests that this form of reductionism may be less than adequate to the task of understanding complex political questions. These comments should not be read as suggesting that who participates and who benefits from political decisions are not important questions. Rather the point is that these factors must be viewed in the context of the institutions and organizations which give these sociological variables meaning. This thesis points to the sociology of institutions and organizations as of major importance to political sociology.

Furthermore, this thesis suggests that a historical, comparative approach offers an important method for assessing the relationship of institutions and "social forces"; through such an analysis one can avoid a rigid "institutional determinism" and sociological reductionism.

Academic marxism is but a specific version of sociological reductionism that stresses economic variables. In the theoretical overview of the "no socialism" problem (chapter two), several criticisms of the radical political economy tradition's answer to American exceptionalism were discussed. Because of the prominence of the economic data used in this thesis
(mainly chapters 3 and 5), this study implies that the political economy perspective may be less than adequate, not only for the "no socialism" problem, but also for an understanding of political affairs in general. This study then strengthens the reservations expressed in chapter two about the limitations of a political economy approach to political studies.

This dissertation also suggests other conclusions about the relationship of political and economic affairs. A few of the more sophisticated political economists have suggested that economic factors are "determinant" in the "long run," while politics is more influential in the "short run." When the case of the North Pacific region is taken as a whole it suggests the opposite: economic affairs and fluctuations are most influential in the "short run" while political factors, especially political institutions, are decisive in the "long run."

Fragment Theory and Ethnic Politics

The findings of this thesis in reference to the contribution of social fragments to politics contains an implication for Hartz's "social fragment" theory and for Horowitz's elaboration of it. Central to Hartz's analysis of "new societies" is the concept of "congealment": "new societies" experience a period of cultural and ideological flux that is followed by a hardening of the culture and ideology so that subsequent immigrants cannot contribute their heritage to the "new society", as the society has already congealed around a core value system. In his work on Canada, Horowitz retains
the "congealment" concept, but with the substitution of "degree of congealment" for "point of congealment." This amendment removes the controversy over when a society becomes congealed, while still retaining the basic concept.

This thesis suggests two points in regard to "fragment theory." First, the political institutions are important carriers and important mediators of the cultural heritage of immigrant groups. The institutions, not just the ideological perspective or social class, of "social fragments" needs investigation.

Second, instead of speaking of "congealment" of a "new society", this study indicates that a better concept would be "correspondence": where an immigrant group's culture is similar to the "new society's" institutions as to actively help the immigrants, the culture will be retained by the immigrants and will be absorbed to some extent into the "new society." Such a correspondence of culture, ideology and institution is highly unpredictable as to when it will occur or what shape it will take. The idea of "correspondence", nonetheless, is preferable to "congealment" for the latter contains a strong presumption of social inertia. "Correspondence" on the other hand allows for the influence of a "social fragment" over longer periods of time and any time so long as they "fit" the institutional environment.

While on the topic of "social fragments" and immigrants, it should be noted that this dissertation suggests a source for the differences between America's higher profile for ethnic politics and greater ethnic assimilation and Canada's less
developed ethnic politics and ethnic mosaic. By restricting the sites of influence, Canada's more centralized polity undercut the ability of non-charter ethnics to organize and to influence political policy. The institutional premiums on organization and ideology paid by party and cabinet government would have forced non-charter ethnics into larger coalitions, while it is suggested it also de-emphasized the ethnic dimension of voter appeal and voter loyalty. When these tendencies were coupled with party centralization a further tendency existed for ethnic groups to become sub-ordinate partners and to provide few candidates for leadership. Such a freezing out of non-charter ethnics, of course, is open to manipulation from the top (as most recently with the Liberal's multiculturalism programs), for the top levels tended to control rewards and resources.

Such a sub-ordinate status for Canadian ethnic groups, this study suggests, would have reinforced the retention by ethnic groups of their ethnic loyalties, culture and identification in a more "pristine," un-hyphenated condition. In other words, because ethnic participation and the use of ethnic appeals was downplayed an accompanying identification with the Canadian polity tended to be lacking. Cramping the rights of participation attenuated a psychic obligation to the nation.

On the other hand, the American pattern of stronger grass roots and relatively open political parties would have allowed ethnic groups to have freer access to political influence, office, rewards, and resources. This study suggests that the relatively greater independence of American politicians also tended to increase the value of the ethnic
appeal both for politicians and constituent. The long-term effect of such ethnic participation in America would have been to increase the assimilation of immigrants into American life, while heightening the identification with the American polity.

The Nature of Trade Unions and Union Politics

This thesis indicates that the long standing controversy over the "true" character of trade unions (especially their political direction) may have been miscast. The political left has traditionally held unionists to be progressive and inherently politically-minded. Pointing mainly to European unions, these analysts have considered this attitude to be the norm while American "bread and butter" unionism was aberrant. On the other hand, more conservative analysts (most notably Perlman) argued for the essential conservatism of unionists.

This thesis, by emphasizing the "experimental" side of unions, has played up the role of the social and political environment as the primary cause of "political" or "bread and butter" unionism. Unionists and their unions experiment with a number of policies; the successful policy is related more to which one is compatible with the institutions than with the inherent nature of the labour movement. The evidence and line of reasoning put forward in chapter 5 suggests that the controversies over the "soul" of the labour movement are mainly ideological exercises that contribute little to the understanding of trade unions. Without having to resort to ideas of "false consciousness" or a conspiracy of the union leadership, this study has accounted for the changes in union
policies and political directions by examining the external political environment.

Future studies of the "no socialism" issue (and of labour politics in general) would do well to drop concern for the vital essence of the labour movement. More important to the understanding of union activity is the specific legal-political environment the unions operate in. For as noted in chapter 5, it was the necessity of entering the political field in order to protect economic goals that reinforced, decade after decade, the political side of British Columbia's unions. And it was the relative dissociation of politics and labour relations that channelled Washington State's unions into their lower political profile.

Social Movements

This study also suggests several points in relation to social movements and especially about the cycles they go through.

First, the goals of political movements are deeply influenced over time by the methods available in a political system. The methods of participation, the arenas of participation, and the relationship of the political arenas to each other convey a sense of legitimacy to the methods and arenas which are used successfully. Success then builds persistence along a particular avenue of participation. In addition, in so far as the arenas and methods of participation reinforce an ideological direction, the goals, values, and idea system of a movement are also selected for by success.
Second, paralleling the observations above concerning labour unions, social movements are experimental in form and content. Movements should not be treated as having a special essence or true character inherent in their nature.

Third, because a political movement becomes incorporated into a power structure or institution it should not be taken as an indication of its death or its failure. Social movements should be defined by their aims and fluidity, not by their undying opposition to established power. Successful movements become part of the institutional order and their character, if successful, can be attributed to the environment provided by the political institutions.

Fourth, this study indicates that movements stagnate or diminish in size because they do not serve the needs or promote the goals of members or potential members. Although humans are not purely, rational, calculating creatures, persistence for a long period of time in completely futile endeavors is not a widespread characteristic. Political movements must successfully provide for the political needs and goals of their members.

Change and Institutions

The final implication of this thesis concerns the influence of institutions on change. It is a common assumption that institutions and organizations act to retard change. The image of ossified institutions steeped in tradition, riddled with favoritism, and reinforcing the status quo is so widespread it is almost natural. It is not often acknowledged,
however, that institutions also can promote change. In following the institutional development in British Columbia and Washington State, this thesis has suggested that change can not only be resisted by institutions but that institutions have a propensity to change along specific lines and to promote this change.

Parallel to the institutional argument for change is the suggestion that at the psychological level the institutional order creates an "image" of how the social structure operates. This "image" is tested and made workable by experience with the institutions. By creating and validating such an "image" of the social order, the institutions create psychological tendencies for change and also create the directions for change. The institutions thus "select" the psychological responses that are in accord with their own workings, by reinforcing these tendencies as being "pragmatic."

Future Research

Several areas for further investigation of the "no socialism" question are raised by this thesis.

First, a mainly biographical study of the leaders and militants of the unions and socialist parties in British Columbia and Washington State may prove useful. In chapters 5 and 6 it was noted that several important leaders in the socialist and union movements underwent significant alterations in their politics, tactics, and strategies in the course of their active lives. Such changes appear to have been common. Yet little scholarly research beyond the level of highly prom-
inent leaders (e.g. Samuel Gompers) has been conducted. It would be interesting to analyze the leaders and militants of the North Pacific region to examine the trends of the political "maturation" cycle.

Second, a method used here (historical regional comparison) can usefully be extended to other North American regions. An obvious choice would be the Canadian prairie provinces with the American states just south of them. Several parallels argue for such a study: ethnic composition was similar, as cross-border migration was high; the economies were largely built on a single cash crop; and the political movements were similar.

Another interesting comparison would examine a couple of Canadian provinces, for example, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Why has Saskatchewan provided strong support for the CCF and NDP when Alberta (also with a strong wheat economy and parliamentary institutions) has not? While it is not within the scope of this conclusion to answer this question, several contingency factors may have contributed to the political differences: the greater American influence in Alberta, the oil industry, the ranching sector, the Mormon factor, and the legacy of unique provincial political institutions in creating different political traditions.

A third set of further studies of labour politics should examine European political institutions, in particular the role of the labour relations system as political mobilizer. Did the structure of bargaining or union representation influence the political direction of European unions? How did the government
regulation of industrial relations influence the union movement and political parties?

* * * * * * *

Seventy-five years ago, Sombart, in the first systematic treatment of the "no socialism" problem, concluded that American socialism floundered because of the robust economy. In examining the North Pacific region, this study indicates that the reefs the socialists were wrecked on were not made of roast beef, as Sombart would have it, but of the political institutions.
Footnotes

1. S.P. Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 12-24. Huntington sees "political modernization involving the rationalization of authority; the differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participation" p. 93. Modern institutions thus involve high adaptability (which is roughly a function of age and the challenge of the environment), relative complexity (the multiplication and differentiation of sub-units) autonomy (i.e. independence from being overwhelmed or sub-ordinated to "social forces") and greater unity and coherence (thus giving a greater capacity for co-ordination and discipline.) pp. 12-24. Political parties are central to modern politics for they are the institutions of participation. pp. 89-92.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BOOKS


Lenin, V.I. *What is to be Done?* London: Lawrence, Wishart, 1906.


________. *The Real World of Democracy.* Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. 1965.


II. ARTICLES


III. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS


Canada, Canada Yearbook, 1926, 1933.

Department of Labour (British Columbia). A List of Industrial Firms in BC Reporting to the Department of Labour for the year 1955 (and 1958) Segregated According to the Employment Shown for each Plant Location.


IV. THESES


