ALIENATION: A SOCIAL PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

Marx's early writings on alienation are examined; and his definition of alienation interpreted as the separation of "whole man" from his "species characteristic" of "free, conscious activity" through "forced labor", in which man treats himself as a "mere particular function". This definition is accepted as an hypothesis. Parts of Weber's social theory are examined for their relevance to Marx's thesis, and some limitations of Weber's value-free or normative approach are discussed. The critique of this approach is extended to include the work that has been done by contemporary, and especially American, sociologists. It is concluded that the concept of alienation has been so transformed by contemporary sociologists that it has little if any value for sociological analysis. With this conclusion in mind, Mead's social theory is considered with reference to Marx's alienation hypothesis in an attempt to link the two theorists, and through doing so, to make meaningful Marx's notion of "free, conscious activity". The purpose of this thesis is to reinstate alienation as a powerful concept for understanding human social behavior. In conclusion, some hypotheses relating to self-determined social behavior, as suggested by the uniting of these two theorists, are outlined.
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INTRODUCTION

...Society and politics only have the responsibility of arranging everyone's affairs so that each will have the leisure and the freedom to pursue (the absolute)...

Camus, The Rebel

An issue has climbed down from the philosophers' tower to the streets of everyday life. Wearing various guises in different situations the issue is that of ourselves as spiritual beings and as physical creatures. We are being forced through a number of means, and especially in connection with the development of new communication techniques, to look at ourselves in new ways that contradict our traditional expectations, and the result is a most widespread dissonance.

For thousands of years Western civilization has grown on a conceptual foundation which contains a basic schism—that separating mind and body. While in the past this seems not to have interfered with "normal" living, it is becoming increasingly obvious that today we pay a high price for its maintenance, a price which has been stated as alienation.

The word serves both as a descriptive and as a critical device; it describes a human condition and at the same time suggests a radical criticism of the factors contributing to this condition. As a critical device alienation questions the validity of our assumption of a split between mind and body, and consequently questions the foundations of our self knowledge. Questioning these foundations requires two things:
a critical examination of our "way of life", our behavior; and an examination of our cultural heritage of values, the humanist perspective and its accompanying assumptions about the nature of man.

We find, through our experience and investigation, that our behavior and our cultural values are contradictory, the contradiction experienced as one between humanist values and "practical" ones, between the assumed equality of all men and the apparent social inequality between men, between the vision of men as self determining beings with freedom and responsibility and the experience of men as confined by ignorance and poverty, enslaved rather than free and apathetic rather than responsible.

The framework within which alienation (as it is here being used) arose suggested the possible solutions to the "problem" as well as defining this human condition as a problem. The solutions are essentially of two sorts: the first is destruction of the basic social organization within which alienation has grown, destruction in the form of eliminating classes; and the second is the creation of a new social organization, symbolically represented by a classless society. The first can be accomplished within the limits of the framework in which alienation is used as a critical description of human experiences, but the second necessitates going beyond this framework. The second solution neither necessarily follows from the first nor does it presuppose the first. A
mistake made by interpreters of Marx's theory, in supposing that there is some necessary connection between the two solutions, rests upon a myth that Society exists. It was with reference to this myth that alienation was considered to be a problem, and going beyond it is an essential step toward the solution of the problem.

Alienation presupposes a lack of unity where unity "should" be. Whether this dissociation is regarded as one between the individual and society or the individual and himself, one must necessarily, within the context of a mind-body duality, conclude that Society is the source of both unity and disunity. The development from assumption to conclusion occurs roughly in the following manner. The mind-body duality, as elucidated by Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum", is handled not only as a schism between mind and body, but, as the arrangement of the words (I think, therefore I am) implies, is portrayed as mind preceding and justifying bodily existence. In his philosophical inquiry, Descartes verbalized and clarified a cultural assumption, which can be stated along the following line: The capacity of the mind to reason distinguishes man as a human animal. Loss of this ability is loss of humanity. When we probe the origin of mind and find it to be Society, we conclude: I am a member in (or part of) Society, therefore I think, therefore I am. This is the line of argument developed in the work of e.g. Comte & Durkheim. Where cultural standards of "right reason" are transformed into the source and justifica-
tion of existence for the "isolated" individual, the existence of the "social" individual is explained by his membership in Society, expressed as his "position" in the Whole (Society). These two abstractions, Individual and Society, derived by logical deduction on the basis of questionable assumptions, are considered to be distinct entities, "interacting" with one another. Both the organismic and mechanical analogies tend to lead one into this trap. Alienation, within this framework, is the experience of a disunity between the Individual and Society (as part and whole), or between the Individual and Himself (as mind and body) through the medium of Society.

Marx criticised the use that men make of their human capacities. It was this use (or misuse) of their abilities in the form of "capitalist society" that he saw creating the disunity expressed as alienation. He thought that men, in misunderstanding their human capacities, worked against themselves, against their human interests. "Communism" represented for him, at least in his early work, a new organization of social relations by means of which men would work for their human interests, and he carefully warned against reifying the abstractions "individual" and "society". A perusal of alienation theory in American sociology indicates that this warning is as relevant today as it was when Marx wrote it.

The common fear of questioning our way of life beyond speculative notions is, at first glance, a puzzle. It becomes
understandable if we assume that people are acting within the context of the myth of Society. Within this context, tampering with Society threatens one's mind and consequently one's body. To be genuinely critical of Society (i.e., in practice) invites the possibility of one's destruction as a human being.

This fear is reinforced by another myth which is the complement to the former. Represented by Prometheus and Christ, this myth suggests that even those few who can successfully deny the accepted order of things cannot escape destruction. Prometheus and Christ symbolize the man who can reject "legitimate" authority when it conflicts with the authority of his own experience, who can impose new meaning on the world through accepting, to the limits of his capabilities, responsibility for his own acts, and who is sacrificed to the gods (Society) for this transgression.

A paradox appears when these two myths are compared. This paradox was only briefly referred to by Marx but is of central significance to the study of alienation. Marx stated the paradox with reference to the alienation of both ruler and ruled in capitalist society. Alienation is expressed in the former through his being and in the latter through his activity. The person who does not act with responsibility to his human capacities gives up his responsibility in name but not in deed. He is passively sacrificed through losing the "inner world" of his humanity to the "outer world" and external authority.
When people externalize and make absolute their standards, the relation of the individual to these standards is of no consequence except insofar as he is able to "measure up to" and embody them. People treat one another and themselves as "mere" individual reflections of the standards they create and maintain. Against this background, the myth represented by Prometheus and Christ serves as a reminder of our human capabilities, illuminating the experiences of all people, both as a positive ideal and as a source of terror at having to face the fate of being human.

When these two myths are transferred from the privacy of assumption to the publicity of evaluation and the connection between them is recognized, the spell of Individual versus Society is broken. The public exposure of these myths illuminates the fact that both represent aspects of our common life as perspectives that we have invented to enable us to comprehend this life. I may face Society as Prometheus in one situation but for another person in another situation I may represent the Society with which he, as Prometheus, must contend. If we are able to see the relation of these myths to our common practice we have at least the rudiments of a new view of man with which we can review the relation between mind and body.

Marx provided a rudimentary new view of man through stressing practical activity as the source of human experience. He wrote comparatively little on human relations as such,
choosing to concentrate his attention on a critique of capitalism. In doing so he rather took for granted that men would realize their ideal human nature while ridding themselves of the "biasing" social perspectives associated with class relations. What remained rudimentary in Marx's theory was explored more thoroughly by Weber and became a well developed account of human relations in the work of George Herbert Mead.

According to Mead's theory of mind (mind being a process of self-consciousness), men are self-conscious while taking perspectives of the world in which they themselves appear as one of the objects within the perspectives. This taking of perspectives is a social process, dependent upon our being related to one another through a common language. We learn perspectives through one another and create new ones relative to old ones. What we know of the old (what has passed) is always bound by the new (what is coming) within which the old appears not as it "really was" but as it appears to have been within the context of the new. The new is equally as bound by the old out of which it arises, and in relation to which it finds expression. We see ourselves in the present through being able to take perspectives based on interpolating between past and future. There is an overlap between the old and new, where the one passes into the other, and it is in this overlap that the continuity between past and future is maintained. This continuity is based upon our
on-going experiences in our common life.

Mead's theory can be used to look at the mind-body problem in a new light. It is through our capacity to take perspectives of our common life by means of a common language that one person can "stand on the inside" of his experience while others can "stand on the outside" of it. Because of this capacity we are able to abstract out of common experience the notions of mind and body (subject and object, individual and society). Both "sides", when a conflict occurs, may be equally as certain of the reality of their experience. If, when this occurs, we are acting on the assumption of the existence of Society, assuming that the world must be One, we are able to consider only one perspective to be valid within any given situation. The two must be prevented from coming into direct conflict. Our means of protecting the one from the other, the creation of two worlds, one for the spirit and the other for the body, is embedded in our customs regulating contact with one another. We refer to these customs in the rights of privacy and in public obligations. Those aspects of experience which are acknowledged publicly are considered to be profane because they are subject to external definitions. The more private aspects of experience, while considered to be sacred, are not allowed to interfere with the "necessity" of public obligation.

Within this polarization, one approaches a "stranger" initially through "public" modes of behavior and may, through
a complicated process of sharing more and more "private" spheres, become intimate. The ability to do this depends upon one's first having developed, to some extent, within "private" spheres. The cultural assumption accompanying this behavior is that men, while remaining isolated from one another, are directly connected to "God" and to "necessity". "God" and "necessity" are the two bridges spanning the space between individuals.

To say that men are essentially isolated individuals related to one another by necessity is analogous to saying that magnetic poles are isolated individuals related by the necessary currents passing between them. In fact, it is only with respect to their relation that we can separate them, calling one North and the other South. Similarly, it is the acknowledgement by people of the currents passing between them, their awareness of "God", that lies at the source of human life. Deeper than particular cultural traditions, histories, technologies, this shared experience is the fountain-head of self-consciousness, responsibility and identity.

Shared experience or self-other-consciousness precedes and acts as an anchor for self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is a necessary condition for the exercise of responsibility. We have a tendency in our common use of "responsibility" to stress its meaning as obligation to respond in particular ways in particular situations, passing lightly over the fact that "responsibility" includes the ability or
capacity to respond. This tendency, as will be discussed shortly, reflects the myth of Society. Identity emerges in responsible co-operations where ability to respond is channeled by mutually determined obligations between people. I am using co-operation here in the literal sense to mean the joint action of individuals effecting an event.

Unlike magnetic poles, we have the capability, through being aware of ourselves in this relation, to direct and control the "currents" passing between us. The possibilities arising from this are enormous and we have learned to protect ourselves from them with "insulators" manifested most clearly in taboos against touch, and reflected in the structure of our language. We move through our assumed spaces, our "social" spaces, guided by untested assumptions about the world in which we move, "out of touch" humanly even though we surround one another as strangers. Our experience of the drastic effects that can result from this blind acceptance of assumptions is enough to jar us into questioning them, and yet these same assumptions prevent us from doing so for fear of loss of what existence we do have.

Self-consciousness, rather than being used to explore new possibilities, is experienced as shame at being exposed to be other than what is expected and guilt for failing to adhere to prescribed rules of behavior -- rules of behavior which were created for movement in another time and space.

Responsibility is interpreted as obligation, the
ability to respond being taken for granted. That we may be demanding modes of behavior that we are not able to perform does not arise for consideration. Ability and obligation to respond emerge as two distinct "realities" opposing one another. The former is referred to as freedom (from responsibility) and the latter as restriction on that freedom if we stress the ability to respond. When we stress the obligation to respond the former is called lack of responsibility and the latter duty, obligation, or simply responsibility. In this confusion the urge toward unity is perverted into an attempt to escape the social process through increasingly rigid formal control of response; and the urge to explore, rather than being directed toward maintaining the social process, is transformed into rebellion against the effect of the perverted urge for unity. Those who strive for unity react in turn to the effect of the perverted urge to explore, and the process is one of an increasing spiral of violent confrontation between the representatives of both "sides".

It is the breakdown of informal communal control of behavior that lies behind this development. Formal control emerges in situations that cannot be handled informally, but it remains dependent upon forms of informal control. When communal control breaks down and formal control is used as an attempt to compensate for it, our myth of Society and the isolated individual finds its full flowering, unhampered by communal reality. The ability to respond, which could be
assumed before the breakdown of communal life, becomes problematic. The "problem" is indicated in high rates of divorce, crime, and "mental" illness, and in conformity (confused as "co-operation") with rules external and incomprehensible to the individual.

This conformity did not arise as a problem in former modes of communal life. In communal life an individual was not considered to be co-operative or rebellious -- he acted "properly" or was a heretic, traitor, or witch, depending on the quality of his deviation from the "correct" way.

The confusion between co-operation and conformity is made with reference to the myth of Society. If we detach "co-operation" from this myth and use it as I have indicated to refer to the joint action of individuals to effect an event, the word becomes a key stabilizer for a new understanding of our life. Rather than referring to the deliberate conformity of individuals to some predetermined and/or external set of rules for behavior, the word now emphasizes the mutual activity of people with reference to which consciously determined rules are but one factor effecting the event. The shift in emphasis is an important one because it indicates that the interaction of various individuals is the central factor in determining the shape of an event. It indicates that both the ability and the obligation to respond refer to this interaction.

By this definition, if a particular individual is
involved in an event (affected by it) he is involved in the
co-operation effecting that event. The paradox involved in
the confrontation between the myths of Society and the Res-
ponsible Individual, that we cannot escape being sacrificed
whether we choose the one "way" or the other, is dissolved.
We can choose to be passively or actively involved in the
shaping of an event, but we cannot escape being involved.
That we cannot escape is shown in the effect of the event on
us.

Events occur in "presents" 14 and it is with reference
to this fact that responsibility, as both ability and obliga-
tion, gains its significance. Both the ability and the obli-
gation depend upon the individual's understanding of the event
within which he responds. It is in terms of this understanding
that we can speak of a person choosing a course of action, the
opportunity to make choices between genuinely possible alter-
natives deciding the conditions in which responsibility can be
exercised. Obviously, where no alternatives exist (both
imaginatively and empirically) there is no possibility for
responsible action.

While a person may attempt to avoid responsibility by
refusing to respond (within the myth, either to conform or
rebel), this attempt cannot, with respect to my definition of
co-operation, be a genuine escape. Refusal to respond becomes
equivalent to a decision, on the part of the person attempting
the escape, to allow someone else's response to answer for his
own. It is necessary, in our complexity of relations, to delegate responsibility (i.e., to make someone else's response answer for one's own), and we organize elaborate "structures" to do this, but it is pure fantasy to suppose that these structures in any sense replace our personal responsibility, (i.e. our responses to one another as persons). The person who allows another's response to answer for his own is passively rather than actively involved in the co-operation. His active involvement remains a possibility and it is this fact that creates the instability of events within which a majority of people are passively involved. The instability is due to the fact that while a person remains passive, his active involvement (i.e., the choices he can make) cannot be determined. He is an unknown factor. In any situation where responsible co-operation (as the ability and obligation with reference to some specified event, to make choices from among two or more alternative actions such that the joint action of the individuals effecting the event is consciously controlled) is possible, both active and passive involvement have to be taken account of.

Identity, the resolution of the alienation dilemma, emerges in responsible co-operations. To the extent that we try to create an identity within the framework of Society so that identity is interpreted as a "thing" which one "has" due to his"position" in Society, we will experience the strain of contradiction between this assumption and the sociality.
actually experienced by us, the strain of alienation. If we regard identity not as some "thing" but as a word referring to a method developed and used by human beings for locating themselves within the context of an event called a "lifetime", a word referring both to the continuity of the individual's experience of himself throughout his lifetime and to the changeability of circumstances relating to this event, our focus of attention moves to the sociality of our existence. Rather than being passively separated from some "thing" with which we have a need to be actively united, victims struggling to maintain an identity in a world we did not create and do not comprehend, we find ourselves standing on a new threshold, uncertain of what we are going to discover but confident of our human ability to discover.

The transformation is one of attitude which comes as we uncover our activities from the myths shrouding them. The method by which we have created new inventions was not to destroy the sailboat before inventing the steamer. Our method has always been to explore new possibilities against an accepted cultural background, transforming the world through incorporating the new and the old. The most firm obstacle in the way of this transformation is the assumption that society is a thing, with the properties of thingness such that it can be destroyed and replaced with a new one, and a thing, consequently, that has to be protected from destruction.
CHAPTER I
ALIENATION IN THE THEORY OF KARL MARX

In this chapter I discuss briefly the major uses of "alienation" leading up to Marx's definition, with major reference to those aspects of Hegel's and Feuerbach's work which seem to have particular relevance to Marx's theory. I then go into a detailed discussion of Marx's theory of alienation as "estranged labor", and finally, relate it within the larger context of community as Marx seems to have understood it. I have taken the major portion of this latter discussion from the German Ideology which, together with the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, seems to form a basic theoretical coherence which is missing from either work taken separately.

1. THE BACKGROUND
Origin and Early Uses of Alienation

The English term "alienation" has its root in the Latin "alienatio", and can be traced back to Greek and Hebrew sources. In the Hebrew usage it referred to separation of a person from God for various reasons such as a "wicked nature", the worship of false idols, and "darkened understanding" caused by "blindness of heart".¹ This meaning was incorporated into the Latin use of "alienation" to indicate what we would now refer to as psychosis. The Greek "ecstasis", as it refers to
the transcendence by the individual of his usual mentality into "pure contemplation", also flows into this use. While in the Hebrew alienation was given negative connotation and in the Greek, positive connotation, the Latin use is more neutral, indicating separation of a person from some other person, group, being, or thing; a separation which may have positive or negative connotations, depending on the situation. This neutrality of affective connotation is indicated in the legal context within which alienation was used. In this legal sense alienation referred to the transference of property from one person to another.

The Latin meanings of alienation were incorporated into European thought in two distinct definitions; the one indicating a mental condition and the other referring to possession of property. The first retained the Hebrew connotation of negativity while the second retained the neutral connotation of legality, until Marx merged them in his critique of capitalism.

Hegel's Two Uses of Alienation

Hegel retained the distinction between "mental" alienation and alienation of property, concentrating his attention on the former. He referred to "mental" alienation in two ways: as a condition or state of being, and as a process of becoming. In the first case one is alienated from himself and in the second, from others. In both cases Hegel
used the dialectic to forge a unity between finite and infinite.

a. The Unhappy Consciousness

Hegel united the concept of alienation with the Cartesian dilemma of the self as both subject and object, a dilemma which had become, at his time, a recognized "fact".

As Daniel Bell summarized:

Alienation, in its original connotation, (by original he means Hegelian -- DE) was the radical dissociation of the 'self' into both actor and thing, into a subject that strives to control its own fate, and an object which is manipulated by others.... Alienation was an ontological fact, in the structure of grammar as well as of life; for the self was not just an 'I' seeking to shape the world according to its intentions, but also a 'me', an object whose identity is built up by the pictures that others have of 'me'.

Hegel considered the Unhappy Consciousness to be one of many stages in the development of the World Spirit from one level of consciousness to another. Recognizing itself as both particular and universal (unchanging), the Unhappy Consciousness is unable to reconcile its "alienation". Hegel, using his dialectic to show that mind is "particularity in general", resolved the Cartesian dilemma as a "problem" of the alienated soul. As a "problem" of the mind, alienation is not a necessary condition, but is due to a misunderstanding of a necessary condition, i.e., that of the duality of self. The duality of self is a necessary condition for the full development of the World Spirit, whose ultimate goal is self-contemplation. In order for It (as subject) to contemplate Itself (as object) the duality of self is essential.
b. Alienation of self from others

In an attempt to validate his notion that the goal of the World Spirit is self-contemplation (and consequently the necessary existence of the self as both subject and object), Hegel tried to prove that consciousness of self is the basic condition for consciousness of anything whatsoever. In so doing, he developed his second use of alienation.

He argued that the object of consciousness is knowledge of the immediate, of what is. Consciousness is "I". Knowledge of what is is attained through the senses, and the essential nature of sense-certainty lies in neither the object nor in the "I", but in the fact that both are. When one makes the statement -- I know --, the "I" knowing immediately becomes an object. Consciousness knows itself through reflection, i.e., it only "comes upon the grave of its life". Consciousness coming upon the grave of its life is the alienated consciousness. The self passes beyond this state of mind.

But since consciousness has found out by experience that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has no concrete actuality, that the vanished particularity qua particularity, it will give up looking for the unchangeable particular existence as something actual or will cease trying to hold on to what has thus vanished. Only so is it capable of finding particularity in a true form, a form that is universal.

The self as object is formed through medium of culture. Culture, which includes all means of self-development, both ideas and material factors, is the means by which an individual gets objective validity and concrete actuality. It is through
estrangement from one another that individuals define one another, this opposition and separation being essential for the development of self-consciousness. The negation of this negation is the recognition of their essential unity. Spirit is this negation. Men, who are separated from one another through the medium of culture in order to develop self-consciousness, are united together in the World Spirit. "Spirit is alone Reality ... it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once", the unity of the unchangeable and the particular. ¹⁴

The first use of alienation describes a period in the historical development of Spirit and the second describes the history of individual development, i.e., the process by which individuals grow into self-consciousness. Both senses in which the term is used dismiss the possibility of genuine contradictions between feeling, thought and behavior. Hegel assumed that a logical solution of objectivity and subjectivity as such constituted a complete solution of alienation.

Feuerbach's Anthropology

Feuerbach attacked Hegel's basic assumption that consciousness of self is basic to consciousness of anything.

... Before I understand myself, I am grounded in the existence of others by nature. My thinking only makes me conscious of what I am already: a being, not ungrounded, but grounded upon another existence. Not 'I', but 'I and Thou' is the true principle of life and thought. ¹⁵
The Essence of Christianity is devoted to describing how essence is grounded in existence, and how theology is the anthropomorphism of man's own qualities.

In Hegel's theory, man's consciousness of God is the self-consciousness of God. Feuerbach took issue with this, asking -- Why dost thou alienate man's consciousness from him, and make it the self-consciousness of a being distinct from man, of that which is an object to him? --.

... if it is only in human feelings and wants that the divine 'nothing' becomes something, obtains qualities, then the being of man is alone the real being of God, -- man is the real God. And if in the consciousness which man has of God first arises the self-consciousness of God, then the human consciousness is, per se, the divine consciousness. 16

Ignoring the flaws in this argument, Feuerbach opened up for consideration the possibility that what is felt as divine is consciousness of consciousness (as distinguished from particular contents of this consciousness). It is the attributes of human consciousness that are attributed to God.

As we can conceive nothing else as a Divine Being than the Rational which we think, the Good which we love, the Beautiful which we perceive, so we know no higher spiritually operative power and expression of power than the power of the Word. 18

The Word (language as language) is sacred, the instrument of human consciousness. The particular things referred to through use of language are not sacred; the particular rational thoughts, the particular good and beautiful; it is rather these forms of consciousness that are sacred.

Feuerbach placed man within the framework of the
natural world, as a species of animal. As he saw it, consciousness of consciousness makes a qualitative difference between man and the other animals, this quality being anthropomorphised as God. But this consciousness does not have direct accurate reference to the natural world within which it emerges.

A thing which has a special significance for me, is another thing in my imagination than in reality. The thing signifying is not itself that which is signified. What it is, is evident to the senses; what it signifies, is only in my feelings, conceptions, imagination, -- is only for me, not for others, is not objectively present. 19

Feuerbach's distinction between subjective and objective is not the same as that made by Hegel, but is rather closer to the use that Marx made of these terms. For Hegel, a thing may be both subject and object for the Mind. Feuerbach saw an objective world independent of men's minds, which can be known by its effects -- "only that which produces effects, is". 20

Feuerbach argued that the morality of a relation is derived from the sacredness of the relation as such to the persons honoring it.

Property did not become sacred because it was regarded as a divine institution, but it was regarded as a divine institution because it was felt to be in itself sacred. 21

The feeling of sacredness comes from the living relation in the community of men, and moral sanctions are applied as a result of this relation. The implication here, which is followed up by Marx, is that all morality and religion is dependent upon
actual concrete relations. If these actual relations change, what was formerly felt to be sacred no longer being present in reality and new relations having been formed, then morality and religion must change correspondingly.

Feuerbach believed that religion alienates man from himself by leading him to attribute his own nature, which is inter-subjective, to a separate being, God, and by leading him to (at least within the Christian religion) ignore his senses as being base and profane. But, he insisted, it is through the senses that we come to know reality, and to deny the senses is to deny reality. ²²

He used Hegel's method of synthesizing the infinite and finite to ground man's spiritual essence in his sensuous existence, and to analyse, within this context, the role of religion in alienating man from himself. He simply turned over the relationship between the Spirit of Hegel, or God, and man so that man now creates God in his image and is not merely the tool whereby God comes into self-awareness. Where Hegel saw men related in the common Mind of World-Spirit while remaining isolated from one another in their particular existence, Feuerbach united men in their sensuous inter-subjective existence, and saw their minds as being isolated. ("What (a thing) signifies ... is only for me, not for others, is not objectively present.") ²³
2. ESTRANGED LABOR

MARX'S Alienation Through Material Existence

Marx's organized theory of alienation is found in a short chapter entitled "Estranged Labor" in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Here he elaborated upon four aspects of estranged labor: alienation from the products of labor, in the process of work, from species life, and from others. Where Hegel discussed alienation within the context of theology (i.e., with reference to the development of the World-Spirit) and Feuerbach used the concept within an anthropological framework, Marx employed it in a radical criticism of political economy. Political economists, he argued, accept the fact of private property as being natural or inevitable, and assume the relations e.g. between labor and capital, capital and land, to be laws. They do not try to explain the fact of private property, but merely describe it. The import of this criticism is made clear in the light of Steven Toulmin's convincing argument distinguishing science from natural history. Toulmin differentiated between science as physics, and natural history; but the argument holds for all fields in which the scientific method can be applied. The method of the natural historian is to look for empirical regularities and to classify objects in terms of these regularities. The scientist, on the other hand, looks for explanations of empirical regularities. As an example of the difference
between these two methods, with reference to life forms, it is the job of the natural historian to classify life forms into species, types, etc., and the job of the scientist to account for the occurrence of life forms by inventing models such as the gene, and by being able to recreate the conditions under which life occurs.

It is at this point that we can see how Marx distinguished himself as a scientist. The particular way in which he related theory to practical reality constitutes the revolutionary nature of his approach, in comparison with Hegel and Feuerbach, to the study of man. Hegel knew that the laws of logic must arise from the nature of logic, but did not question the nature of logic. He can be seen as a natural historian of "the mind". Marx wanted to explain the nature of private property and was, to the extent that he accomplished this intention, a scientist of human society.

Marx neither ignored history as did Feuerbach, nor did he attempt to explain present relations only in terms of historical development as did Hegel. "We proceed from an economic fact of the present." \(^\text{29}\) i.e., private property.

Characteristics such as competition, greed, classes, which were taken for granted, at the time that he wrote, as human nature, independent of particular social organizations, Marx hypothesized to be characteristics of human society induced by an economic organization based upon private property. The source of these "traits of human nature" is the
practical economic relations engaged in by men, rather than being "found" in man as such. Marx analysed estranged labor to show how private property induces these characteristics.

Alienation of man from his "species characteristic" (i.e., his human nature) is both the least discussed and most basic aspect of estranged labor. Alienation of the process of labor and the consequent alienation from the products of labor constitute the means by which men are alienated from their species characteristic, and alienation from self and others is the result of alienation from the species characteristic.

a. Alienation from species character.

Marx saw the relationship between man and nature as an essential, living relationship.

Man lives on nature -- means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.

The universality of man consists of the "universality which makes all nature his inorganic body". Labor is the means by which man is related to his inorganic body, and it is this particular relation that distinguishes man from other forms of life. All life is sustained in a process of exchange between the life form and its environment. Only man has the capacity to produce his means of life. The species characteristic making this capacity possible is "free, conscious activity".

Labor is the means by which man is able to realize his human nature. While the animal "is its life activity", 
meaning that the animal hunts for food, procreates, etc., to keep physically alive, man does these things in order to "live" in a different sense.  

(the animal) ... produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.  

The purpose of labor is to make objective or to actualize in the material world, man's species life. In creating his world of objects, man does not create for himself alone or for his children, but universally, for all men.

Estranged labor alienates man first from his relation with nature and consequently from himself.

It changes for him the life of the species into a means of individual life. First it estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly, it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form.

b. Alienation from others

The estrangement between men is implied in their estrangement from their species nature, and it is in their relations with each other that their alienation is "first realized and expressed". Men are always objectively related to themselves in the same way that they are objectively related to each other.

Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.

It is interesting to note here that, although alienation from each other is logically the result of the alienation of the
individual from his species nature through estranged labor, it is alienation from each other that is first recognized. It is through this recognition that we are able to trace its origin. At this point we get a clear insight into Marx's reasons for analyzing so thoroughly the "material" organization of society while passing lightly over the "ideology" shared by us in our relations with one another. He was obviously assuming that since our relations with one another stem from our labor, if we alter the latter the former will be taken care of. It remained for Weber to show that the relation between material organization and ideology is much more of a two-way flow than Marx seems to have believed.

c. Alienation from the process of labor

Active alienation occurs in the process of labor, where work is not a source of fulfillment to the person, but a source of self-denial and degradation. This is forced labor rather than chosen. The individual is coerced to work in order to survive so that the labor has no value in itself for the worker, but has value only with reference to an external need.

This notion of forced labor has to be set within an historical context to be properly understood. Marx recognized that however man relate to their species nature, they have first to survive as a species. But he also recognized that what was once a necessity may later be arbitrary for survival, due to man's creation and development of new means for
producing the things that he needs to survive. Forced labor refers to forms of labor that are arbitrary. It occurs through the control by some men to the exclusion of others of the means for labor, and their consequent control over the ability of those excluded to do labor. It is through this control over the ability to work that the work done, the activity, "belongs" to the person controlling the means rather than to the worker. In forced labor, the person is compelled, not by his relation to his environment as a member of the human species, not by his own relation to himself as a member of the species, but by another member of the species. As such, forced labor is the activity alienating the person both from his relation to nature and from his human capabilities. It follows that labor that is not alienated requires two conditions: that the person recognizes what is necessary for him in his relation to nature, and that he has the ability to make choices from genuine alternatives.

d. Alienation from the products of labor

Marx began his analysis of estranged labor with an empirical proposition: that the greater the increase in commodities, the greater the decrease in human values, i.e., the value that men place on themselves as human beings. It is important to note, with Mills, that this increasing poverty does not necessarily include material poverty.37

The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an even cheaper
commodity (emphasis mine -- DE) the more commodities he creates. With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of men. Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity -- and this in the same general proportion in which it produces commodities.38

The product of labor, the commodity, is the "objectification" of labor. When people are alienated in their activity, their labor, it follows that they will be alienated from the products of alienated activity. In alienated labor the work is not only objectified as the product, but the product, the object, appears to the person as a thing external to him. It is seen as something for which he is not responsible and which exists independently of him. The product of labor is reified.

The more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself -- his inner world -- becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. . . . The worker puts his life into the object: but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. . . . The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.39

Only when labor is done for the benefit of someone other than the laborer, when the labor is forced, does this objectification appear as "a loss of the object and bondage to it."40

To summarize the relations between the four aspects of estranged labor: Men are species beings, with a species nature just as are horses and dogs. It is in their universal
species nature that they gain their human characteristics. The universal character of the human species is "free, conscious activity", and the purpose of labor, the means by which man is related to his inorganic body, nature, is to actualize or "objectify" his species nature. In doing labor man objectifies himself, i.e., he can "see" himself in relation to the products of his labor. Estranged labor turns the "life" of the species (free, conscious activity) into a means for individual life. People, rather than laboring to develop their human capacities, use their human capacities to labor for "mere" individual survival. They (as abstract individuals isolated from their species nature) view themselves and others objectively as isolated individuals, recognizing not their common species nature but only their common need to survive. This common need to survive is viewed within the context of scarcity of opportunity which results in the necessity of each isolated individual to compete with each other isolated individual for individual survival.

e. The Cause of Alienated Labor

Marx asked,

If the product of labor is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it belong? If my own activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced activity, to whom, then, does it belong? 41

He outlawed both the gods and nature as the "lords of labor".

The alien being, to whom labor and the product of labor belongs, in whose service labor is done and for whose benefit the product of labor is provided, can only be man himself. 42
The alien being is, of course, the person(s) who benefits from the labor of others without himself doing labor. He is the person who owns the means of production.

Private property Marx understood, "as the material, summary expression of alienated labor, (emphasis mine -- DE) embracing both relations -- the relation of the worker to work and to the product of his labor and to the non-worker, and the relation of the non-worker to the worker and to the product of his labor." 43

In this passage, we see that Marx recognized the common alienation of all men in an alienating social organization. He outlined three ways in which alienation is expressed by workers and non-workers:

First it has to be noted that everything which appears in the worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of estrangement.

Secondly, that the worker's real, practical attitude in production and to the product (as a state of mind) appears in the non-worker confronting him as a theoretical attitude.

Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against the worker which the worker does against himself; but he does not do against himself what he does against the worker. 44

At this point the manuscript ends, which is most unfortunate considering that this is the only place where Marx considered alienation as a universal social problem shared by all people, all other references being ones of implication.

This is an important passage, both for an understanding of other aspects of Marx's thought and for interpreting Marx's theory in the contemporary world. Throughout this chapter on
estranged labor, Marx referred to the laborer as being estranged, i.e., as having a passive involvement; and to the non-worker as the alien power, i.e., as the agent. That he not only saw the interests of the worker and non-worker to be in opposition but also assumed the interests of the worker to be the "legitimate" ones (legitimate with reference to species nature) is reflected in his other works, notably in the Communist Manifesto. His notion of the worker as passive victim and non-worker as active villain was probably instigated by his outraged sense of justice and related to the third mentioned expression of alienation in worker and non-worker, i.e., that while the worker acts against his own human interests, the non-worker acts against the interests of the worker but not against his own. His championship of the worker was related more to his personal values than to his analysis of alienation, i.e., it does not logically follow from his analysis. What does logically follow from his analysis is that all men are alienated from their species nature, and that all alienate themselves. There is a co-operation (as defined in my Introduction) underlying class relations which Weber, perhaps unwittingly, uncovered.

The Transition from Contemplation to Action

Feuerbach's view of man was formulated in opposition to Hegel's, such that while Hegel began with the premise of historical consciousness in the form of the World-Spirit, Feuerbach began with the premise of non-historical inter-
subjective "natural" man. Marx premised historical consciousness in terms of man as a social being, not only in the sense of "I and Thou", but in the sense which involves all men in community. "Man" became the universal historical development by the species of its species nature, i.e., Marx saw man creating his human world through a long development of his senses. Where Feuerbach, contrary to Hegel, devoted his attention to "that part of man which does not philosophize, which is against philosophy and opposed to abstract thought", Marx went beyond "simple" negation of Hegel's theory and carried the dialectic into a new realm of material socio-historical existence.

There are many ways of viewing the change in meaning of alienation from Hegel to Marx. To my mind, the most obvious and profound, found in a comparison of their different world views, involves the transition from contemplation to action. Hegel's central criterion for validity of thought was reason, while for Marx it was science. Between the one and the other Feuerbach acted as a bridge, with his attempt to anchor the spirit in material existence.

Hegel, as was previously mentioned, was familiar with the distinction between alienation of property and mental alienation, and chose to maintain the separation between these two uses.

I may abandon a thing provided that the thing in question is a thing external by nature. Therefore those goods, or rather substantive characteristics which constitute my own private personality and
the universal essence of my self-consciousness
and my right to them is imprescriptible. 47
(emphasis mine -- DE)

With reference to spiritual alienation, he dis-
tinguished two forms. He described alienation of the indivi-
dual from himself as the experience of the individual (mind)
by himself as both infinite subject and finite object, and
the experience of this "double" life as a contradiction. He
solved the "problem" through relating this experience to the
development of the World-Spirit through human history. The
infinite subject became the World-Spirit and the finite object,
the individual person. Each individual is, essentially, an
"eye" through which the Spirit can contemplate itself. The
alienation, then, does not lie in the subject-object duality,
but in the notion of this duality being contradictory with the
Oneness of the World. When people fully recognize
their instrumentality in the World-Spirit's development, they
pass beyond the notion that there is a contradiction. They
see that, for the World to be One, It needs to comprehend
Itself as an object.

The second sense in which he used alienation was to
describe the process by which all individuals become self-
conscious (i.e. objects to themselves) and are thus able to
serve as "eyes". This is the development, through the medium
of culture, of a sense of identity distinguishing each person
from all others.

Comparing these two uses of alienation, the former
refers to a mental state of being while the latter refers to a process necessary for people to attain a state of being. The state of being toward which this process is directed is that of self-consciousness. As such it is a process gone through by all people at all times in all societies. The state of being referred to by the former definition is experienced only by some people, i.e., those who happen to live within the temporal span in which the Spirit is passing through Unhappy Consciousness.

Feuerbach took alienation out of the historical context and placed it within the sensuous present. He interpreted God (equivalent to Hegel's World-Spirit) as man's anthropomorphization of his own human qualities. It is not God that expresses Himself in man, but man who expresses himself and then reifies, as God, the capacity that he has to notice himself.

Feuerbach recognized no state of alienation, but viewed it as a process carried on by man in the present natural world. He took, as his focal point, Hegel's notion of the alienation of people from one another through the medium of culture. He agreed with Hegel that it is in our relations with one another that we come to identify ourselves as persons, but this is not a process of alienation. These relations are intersubjective. It is in these inter-subjective relations that we gain our identity, and it is these same relations that we externalize as a sacred "world". We then place this sacred
"world" over and above ourselves, mystifying and denying our real (inter-subjective) sensuous contact with each other.

Marx, in his analysis of estranged labor, unified the two definitions of spiritual alienation and alienation from property. He not only rejected Hegel's distinction between "things external by nature" and "private personality", but denied that there are any "things external by nature". In Marx's theory there is an exchange between man and his environment such that the "external", the "objective", is man's relation to the environment. Purposive activity (labor: free, conscious activity) defines both subject and object, and the relation between them.

For Marx, man's "right to" his "private personality" and the "universal essence of (his) self-consciousness" is determined by his relation to "things external by nature". As well as alienation of property being related to spiritual alienation, property itself, as private property, is "the summary expression of" alienated labor. Thus it is in the work of Marx that alienation was, for the first time, solidly grounded in the material conditions of life.

The solution to alienation, as given by Hegel, is "correct thought". Marx's solution is "correct practice", a synthesis of thought and action.

3. THE CONTEXT
Community and Society

Throughout his early work Marx made a consistent
distinction between community and society. The exact nature of this distinction varies in different parts of his work, but there remains a general coherence of meaning. Society man shares with other animals, as the means by which the individuals in the particular species are united with their environments, for the common survival of the species. The difference between human society and that of other animals is that men create their society through their ability to produce their means of subsistence. Society, for men, is not only their means for survival, but is also used by them as a basis for another "order of life", i.e., the development of their human capacities. Specifically human capacities are developed within communities, or community is the development and maintenance of human capacities. Community, therefore, is necessary for personal freedom.

Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions. Only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible.

The development of the division of labor has marked the development of man's potential for human life. But in this division of labor "social relationships take on an independent existence,"

... there appears a division within the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch of labor and the conditions pertaining to it.

It is to that part of the person's life which is determined by labor that the terms "class individual", "citizen", "partial
man", refer. It is this part that is "accidental" to the whole man.

The division of labor has developed in "natural" rather than "voluntary" association. Man has been governed by rather than governor of society.

The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined within the division of labor, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but natural, not as their own united power but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and end of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay, even being the prime governor of these. 51

Natural society is further characterized by a dissociation of particular and common interests, associated with the division within the life of each individual.

As long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long therefore as activity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. 52

The common interest of men is the development and maintenance of society, the particular interests referring to each man's development of his human capacities: complementary interests.

In natural society, the State is a substitute for community, an "illusory" community, in which people are bound rather than freed. It is independent of and "divorced from the real interests of individual and community." 53 Men are within it, but it is not within them. If men are to get
society "in" them, i.e., so that they use the tools they have developed for their own purposes, they have to develop the ability to do so, and this requires communism.

The transformation, through the division of labor, of personal powers (relationships) into material powers, cannot be dispelled by dismissing the general idea of it from one's mind, but only by the action of individuals in again subjecting these material powers to themselves and abolishing the division of labor. This is not possible without the community. 54

Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals ...., only when controlled by all. 55

To control society, to develop the ability to control it, they have to transcend the limitations of nationality (State), classes, tribe and family, all of which form the basis of the "illusory" community. In transcending these limitations, each individual is freed to associate voluntarily with all others, and in doing so, to develop the capacity to control society.

... the communal relationship into which the individuals of a class entered, and which was determined by their common interests over against a third party, was always a community to which these individuals belonged only as average individuals, only in so far as they lived within the conditions of existence of their class -- a relationship in which they participated not as individuals but as members of a class. With the community of revolutionary proletarians on the other hand, who take their conditions of existence and those of all members of society under their control, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it. 56

Objectification and reification; science and ideology

Objectification is the method, according to Marx, by which men become self-conscious and acquire control over their world. Tools are such objectifications.
An instrument of labor is a thing, or a complex of things, which the laborer interposes between himself and the object of his labor, and which serves as the conductor of his activity.

Leaving out of consideration ... ready-made means of subsistence ... the first thing of which the laborer possesses himself is not the object of labor but its instrument. Thus Nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own bodily organs ... (Machines, etc.) are instruments of the human brain created by the human hand; they are materialized power of knowledge.

Self-consciousness is not equivalent to thought in Marx's theory, but is an activity including all of the senses.

Man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of thinking, but with all his senses.

Each of his human relations to the world -- seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving -- in short, all the organs of his individual being ... are in their objective orientation or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of that object.

To make objective, then, is to make material. Language, writing, music, painting, machines, films, etc., are all objectifications of man's human capacities.

Reification is the transference of human powers from their human context to an "outside" source. Objects are an aspect of human self-consciousness, but, in reifying them, men treat objects as alien powers. Things "become the measure of man through the reification of human self-consciousness".

Marx particularly warns against establishing 'society' as an abstraction over against the individual. The individual is a social being as the subjective, experienced existence of society.

Man reifies things when he does not relate to them as a
"positive, depersonalized objectification of himself." Reification is false consciousness.

Ideology, equivalent in Marx's theory to illusion, is a form of reification. Ideologies are symbolic representations of actual social organizations and have their major purpose in justifying actual power relations associated with the organizations. Not all ideas are ideological. Those associated with the scientific method, especially, are not ideological.

Marx's belief in the possibility (actually, the inevitability, in the long run) of community control over society was based on his understanding of the scientific method and his belief that it could be used to understand society. Arguing against "the Hegelians' " solutions to false consciousness, Marx gave a parable about the man who believed that people drown only because they have the idea of gravity.

If they were to knock this idea out of their heads by stating it to be a superstition, a religious idea, they would be sublimely proof against any danger from water. His whole life long he fought against the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful results all statistics brought him new and manifold evidence.

This passage not only illustrates Marx's argument with the philosophers of his time, but it indicates as well his awareness that ideas do not exist on their own, and that if an idea is only a reflection of experience (i.e., superstition) it is not enough simply to deny the validity of it. Simple denial does not eliminate the experience associated with the idea.
His answer was to replace the 'superstitious idea with an "objective" one.

Marx's Whole Man

Marx said that his primary interest was in "man as such and as a whole" rather than in man as a "particular function and not as a complete human being." The whole man is not subsumed under any particular classification such as economic man, political man, alienated man, moral man, existential man. These particular classifications are perspectives that men take of themselves with reference to particular functions that they can distinguish. Man making these classifications is man exercising his human (species) characteristic of free, conscious activity.

That free, conscious activity is a species characteristic means that it is common to all cultures. In fact, the presence of different cultures with distinct languages, mores, etc., can be construed as evidence of such a species characteristic. If we accept, for purposes of the development of his argument, his assumption of free, conscious activity as a species characteristic, we are still left with the question of the relation between man's species characteristic and his alienation from it. It is quite clear in Marx's theory that man is 'alienated from this characteristic through forced labor. He denied that the agent of forced labor was God or Nature. This point is also clear. He thought that men enslaved men and that this forced labor has never been necessary for the
survival of the species. He did not deny that alienation was necessary for the development of civilization to the time at which he lived, nor did he deny the continuing necessity of forced labor if we choose to maintain civilization as we now know it.

Marx suggested that man could overcome alienation by abolishing division of labor. He also said that division of labor as social organization for the survival of the species could never be discarded; that society is the basis of human life, and as long as humans survive they will do so in society. He further stated that if man is to control his human destiny he must control his society.

When he spoke of abolishing division of labor, and labor as such, he did so with reference to his notion of classes. He was not, in this context, referring to specialization of tasks based upon communal agreement and communal control where all people involved in society are also members of the community controlling social organization. The division of labor to which he referred was the division into workers and non-workers. It was in these terms that he distinguished between the "illusory" community represented by the State, and the larger "human" community of "whole men".

In the "illusory" community, large numbers of people act as if and are treated as if, in their labor, they are not whole men. Since their labor takes up the majority of their time, they act and are treated as if they are not whole men the
majority of the time. They do not, as members of the "human" community, control their own activities, but are controlled by the social organization which appears external to them. The freedom of those who do treat themselves as whole men, i.e., those who control the social organization, is a false freedom because it depends, not upon their membership in the "human" community, but upon the "enslavement" of the majority of men to the social organization.

Marx did not consider the problem of alienation to be one of making men whole, but saw it rather as a practical problem of bringing society into the control of men who are whole. He saw men not as one-dimensional or fragmented, but as treating themselves and one another, in society, as if they were one-dimensional and fragmented. If men are not assumed to be whole, there is no basis upon which they can transcend their alienation. In fact, it is the contradiction, in Marx's theory, between this assumed fragmentation and the actuality of wholeness that makes alienation problematic.

In alienated society men realize (actualize, objectify) their human capacities only to the extent that it is necessary in the "service" of society. The more routinized labor becomes, the more particularized, the less necessity there is for the whole man to exercise his full capacities in his work, and the more he becomes aware of labor as a partial function. The man becomes a "particle" in the social organization, but at the same time, social organization becomes a "particle" in his
Now a distinction can be drawn between two uses that Marx made of the term "society". On the one hand, the term refers to the organization of those activities required to maintain the life of the species. On the other hand, in a broader sense, the term refers to the association of people with one another for whatever purpose. When Marx discussed man controlling society in community, he meant that man could control "society" (in the former sense) in "society" (in the latter sense) where the former is treated as a "thing" and the latter is a process, an activity.

This activity was what he meant by practical activity. Men, in their practical relations with their environment, create their means of production (including both forces and relations of production). These means can then be treated as "things", to be used and manipulated, i.e., they have been objectified. If men want to control a "thing", the nature of which includes relationships between people (relations of production), all people involved in the relationships have to agree to the use of the "thing". When people can do this, they are not only "in" society (i.e., fulfilling particular functions), but society is "in" them (i.e., within their subjective control).

In order for people to agree to use society in one way or another, they must be able to communicate their wishes and plans to one another. Marx held that the decisive barrier
to such communication is the fact that some members (in his case, most) of the "human" community are treated as if they are only parts in the "thing" and, as such, need only be manipulated in the "illusory" community associated with the State.

Marx's political activity, his suggestions to workers of modes of action that can be taken, was not a logical step from his theory of society. It was based much more upon his recognition of the power of "whole man" to control himself as "particular function", in combination with his outraged sense of justice. He did not recognize that, while in many senses "workers" can be seen as victims, they victimize themselves. I do not mean to imply, in the simple minded sense, that particular men prevent themselves from getting an education, a good job, etc., but that in community (or lack of) men perpetuate alienating activity.

If there is any validity to Marx's theory of alienation, if men are whole and only act as if and are treated as if they are "particular functions" in Society, it follows that they are active agents in alienating themselves. The question is no longer one of who is to blame but of how do they do this to themselves.
CHAPTER II
WEBER'S CONTRIBUTION TO MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

1. THE RELEVANCE OF WEBER'S WORK

I have discussed among other things Marx's alienation theory as a hypothesis that man (as whole man) alienates himself from his species characteristic of "free, conscious activity" by treating himself as a "mere particular function", and that his alienation of himself is practised in forced labor. If the hypothesis that man alienates himself in this way is accepted for serious consideration, we need to find out whether the hypothesis is a valid one. This can be done by trying to discover how man alienates himself from himself.

I would like, now, to interpret some aspects of Weber's social theory with reference to Marx's alienation theory; and to show how Weber's work both clarified and solidified Marx's hypothesis. Weber also contributed independently to the study of alienation by drawing attention to the fact that our participation in societal organization is directly related to our irrational fears and hopes. By drawing attention to this fact, he not only supported Marx's contention that capitalism is, with reference to man's species characteristic, an irrational mode of organizing, but described the basis upon which any mode of organizing can be evaluated as to its rationality for man's goals.

If man's particular involvements in societal
organization are related directly to his hopes and fears; when his hopes and fears motivate him to behave in particular ways (societal organization), and when these particular ways of behaving do not resolve the fears and realize the hopes motivating them, then man's behavior is irrational.

Weber did not question the origin of motivation and, consequently, did not consider the possibility that particular hopes and fears are created in relation to particular ways of behaving. Marx, with his theory of alienation, did consider this possibility, and suggested a standard external to particular hopes and fears, and particular modes of behavior. With modes of behavior reduced to fear and hope, human goals, of course, are similarly reduced, both being re-oriented toward "practical" human life. This latter theme will be taken up in depth in Chapter IV.

Class and Status

Marx did not clearly differentiate between "class" and "status" in his work, and indicated in The Communist Manifesto that he thought the two to be equivalent.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guildmasters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; and in almost all of these particular classes, again, other subordinate gradations. [Emphasis mine -- DE]

Without distinguishing between "social rank" and "classes", he went on to say that in modern industrial society "society as a
whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other ...". The fact that this has not occurred, that if anything we have a more "manifold gradation of social rank" than was evident in "earlier epochs of history", has served as one central point for criticism of Marx's social theory. Both Dahrendorf and C. W. Mills, for example, have discussed this problem in Marx's theory. As I argued previously, Marx's political theory does not logically follow from his analysis of society, but rather reflects the man and the time at which he lived. Criticism of his political theory cannot serve as a basis for criticism of his analysis of society.

Weber, interested in showing how ideas act as an independent variable in determining the form of society rather than being mere reflections of economic relations, made a careful and precise analysis of status relations and distinguished status from class. Leaving aside the differences in Marx's and Weber's definitions of class which are irrelevant to my argument, Weber agreed with Marx that 'Property' and 'lack of property' are ... the basic-categories of all class situations. He agreed that class could be the basis for social ranking in society, but disagreed that social rank is necessarily based on class relations. Status is the necessary basis of social rank.

In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle.
Weber differentiated class from status by defining class in terms of "property and lack of property", and status in terms of "style of life". When he discussed the relation between the two, he considered "property" as one of many factors determining status.

Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. 7

But status honor need not necessarily be linked with a 'class situation'. On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property. 8

In considering "property" (as ownership of the means of economic production) as one possible and usual status qualification, Weber treated it as one form of "property" in a broader sense. If status is expressed in life styles, particular statuses can be determined by studying the behavior required for them. Some indications of status are mannerisms, taste in cultural products, speech. All of these can be considered to be "property" of the individuals expressing them, in the sense that people can be said to "have" mannerisms, tastes, speech habits. By treating class in this way as one variable related to status, and failing to reverse the relation, considering status as a variable related to class, Weber ran into a difficulty indicated throughout his work. The difficulty, of course, is his failure to consider the factors determining style of life.

To illustrate his point that status honor "normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer
property", Weber used the example of the reception given the entrepreneur by the aristocracy in the early stages of capitalism. This example is representative of vertical mobility in general as related to status, and vertical mobility is probably the most obvious single indicator of the necessity for differentiating between class and status. The treatment of a new-comer by a status group indicates the presence of a relationship between class and status, but does not indicate the nature of the relationship.

Weber himself, although he did not seem to realize it, gave some explanation of the nature of the relationship between class and status, and at the same time solidified his argument for the independent effect on society of ideas, in his discussion of the relation between class and status, and communal action.

In our terminology, 'classes' are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent bases for communal action. 9

Weber listed specific conditions under which communal action may occur as a result of class situation. I stress "may" here because Weber stressed the fact that even given the necessary information for communal action, it still remains for the individuals in the community to choose to act.

For however different life chances may be, this fact in itself, according to all experience, by no means gives birth to 'class action' (communal action by the members of a class). The fact of being conditioned and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For only then the contrast of life chances can be felt
not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from either (1) the given distribution of property, or (2) the structure of the concrete economic order. It is only then that people may react against the class structure not only through acts of intermittent and irrational protest, but in the form of rational association.¹⁰

In this passage Weber pointed out the importance of the attitudes of people, as well as their class situation, in determining their actions. Marx was aware of the importance of attitudes as reification in the illusory community and objectification in the human community. These specific conditions outlined by Weber, necessary for communal action based on class situation, were conditions that Marx assumed in his political theory. The importance of Weber's work here is that by specifying these conditions he, by implication, directed attention to the conditions under which communal action will not arise in relation to class situation.

Weber went on to say that "in contrast to classes, status groups are normally communities".¹¹

Communal action refers to the action which is oriented to the feeling of the actors that they belong together.¹²

This definition of community as we-feeling includes both of Marx's "communities". Weber did not make value-judgments about the bases on which communities are formed. His definition is a normative one. Marx, on the other hand, hypothesized the existence of a species characteristic common to men, and used the relation between men and their assumed species characteristic as an independent standard against which normative
relations could be evaluated.

Status groups, by their nature as communities, "hinder the strict carrying through of the sheer market principle". With these associations between class and status, and community, in mind, the treatment given a newcomer to a status group, and the opposition of status groups to "mere property" are easily understood. An individual who is vertically mobile can thoroughly learn a style of life only by associating with members of the status group in which he wants to belong. (In the case of downward mobility, it may be a matter of the individual being forced to associate with members of a status group through lack of availability of other groups.) He may have the means to live as the others do, but cannot know how to use these means in terms prescribed by the status group. Complete acceptance by the newcomer and his family can, and usually does, take generations.

To consider the questions and problems that arise from Weber's definition of status would serve to detract from my argument. I would just like to reiterate my point, accepting his definition, that while the results of individual movement from one status group to another indicates that a distinction between class and status is a valuable one, these results do not indicate the nature of the relationship between class and status.

It is clear that class situation is, for any given individual, only one of the determinants of the status groups
to which he may belong. Other "possessions" which can influence the individual's chances are, to name a few, beauty, intelligence, race, religion, and nationality. The questions that have to be answered are: what are the factors determining the "possession" of these characteristics, and what explains their being used as determinants of status; questions which lead to a confrontation with Marx's theory of classes.

Power and Authority

Marx did not explicitly define power. He indicated his understanding of this term through his use of it. His usage indicates that with reference to people he understood power, in relation to the possession of the means of production, as the ability to control the factors determining modes of human life. He was concerned more with particular uses of power, i.e., to direct society, rather than with power as such. Weber was interested in defining power independently of the various purposes for which it might be used.

In general, we understand by 'power' the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.15

According to Weber then, men may exercise power individually or in concert with others and the action is taken within a communal context. This definition is confusing because it does not specify whether all people who are "participating in the action" are also involved in "communal action". Weber also defined another form of action which he called "societal
action" which is "oriented to a rationally motivated adjustment of interests". 

Both communal and societal action depend on the intention of the individuals involved in the actions, since, in the former action is oriented to the feeling of belonging together, and in the latter action is oriented to rationally motivated adjustment of interests.

For my argument, the important point here is that societal action can be taken independently of community and communal action can be taken independently of rationally motivated adjustment of interests. It also follows from his definitions of communal and societal action that, with reference to the exercise of power, while power must be exercised in communal action, those resisting the action may not be doing so communally. Communal and societal interests can also conflict for members of a group or for individuals. The possible relations between communal and societal action and the relevance of considering them for understanding aspects of alienation are clarified by Weber's discussion of authority.

Weber saw that the basis for power is the ability to use force. Authority is the means by which the use of force is legitimized. Weber distinguished between three types of "legitimate power" or "authority": charisma, traditional and legal-rational, of which the third he felt to be the most prevalent in modern industrial society. Legal-rational authority refers to the "belief in the validity of legal statutes and functional competence based on rationally created rules."
Weber pointed out that methods of legitimizing power do not answer to some external control. They are "inner justifications" for use of power.

It is understood that, in reality, obedience is determined by highly robust motives of fear and hope -- fear of the vengeance of magical powers or of the power-holder, hope for reward in this world or in the beyond -- ... However, in asking for the 'legitimations' of this obedience, one meets with these three 'pure' types ....

Weber defined power "in reality" as the chances of an individual or a number of them to realize their will even against the opposition of others. Types of authority, as modes of justifying some uses of power (and, of course, rejecting others), are "in reality" modes of expressing fears and hopes. Weber considered legitimacy to be normative. If authority is normative we can question to what conditions "in reality" do the norms refer, which leads directly back to Marx's theory of alienation.

Weber's "authority" answers to Marx's "ideology" as the reification of self-consciousness. In the case of legal-rational authority, man reifies rules he created into "legal statutes" and "functional competence" which become standards over man to which he must answer as if to an external force. His relation to them is as to "things" that he did not create; for which he is not responsible but to which he is responsible.

Marx distinguished between community as human and as illusory, the former being based on man's capacities as a species and the latter based on the State. In human community
all action not only flows from man's species characteristic, but is controlled by his knowledge of this characteristic and directed toward the development of human capacities suggested by this characteristic. In civil society (illusory community) man's actions flow from his species characteristic but are not controlled by knowledge of it and are not directed toward development of human capacities. The development of human capacities in civil society is accidental and limited by the conditions (including ideology) which are required to maintain civil society.

The major distinction that I wish to draw here between Marx and Weber is that while Weber described what he saw normatively, Marx denied the validity of normative behavior as such. He set up man's species characteristic as an absolute standard, i.e., an objective standard external to particular norms, against which normative behavior can be evaluated as to its benefits or harmfulness to man as man.

**Bureaucracy**

Weber considered bureaucracy, as a stable mode of organizing for the realization of goals, to be technically superior to other forms of organization because it ensures "that the official business of the administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible". 19

The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. 20
Administration in bureaucracy is carried out with reference to "objective considerations", which means "a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'."\(^{21}\) Administration in bureaucracy, ideally, is societal action. Weber's description of bureaucracy as a "machine" and administration as societal action parallels Marx's description of self-consciousness objectified into society as a "thing", and the reification of this object through disregarding the relations between it and the persons who create and maintain it.

Bureaucracy is perfected through the "dehumanizing" of official relations.

Its specific nature, which is welcomed by capitalism, develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is 'dehumanized', the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.\(^{22}\)

He equated "dehumanization" with the elimination of "personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation". Within the framework of Marx's theory of alienation, "dehumanization" of official relations does not, in itself, necessarily imply the dehumanization of man. Alienation does not follow from the depersonalization of relations in society (as a thing) but from the use that man makes of this object, society, that he has created. In his communistic society, man "possess objective reality".

...through the fact that all objects are for him a positive, depersonalized objectification of himself. He is the man to whom the world indeed belongs, because its manner of production does not alienate him, but establishes him.\(^{23}\)
He also said, in his discussion of human requirements, and the "emancipation" of the human senses, that men in human community... relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently lost their egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use.  

Weber too recognized a distinction between social organization as a tool and the human use of it. His recognition of it is indicated in his association of power with communal action, and in his further discussion of communal and societal action with reference to bureaucracy. 

Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of carrying 'community action' over into rationally ordered 'societal action'. Therefore, as an instrument for 'societalizing' relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is a power instrument of the first order -- for the one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus. 

It follows that control of bureaucratic apparatus heavily weights the chances of an individual or a group of individuals to realize their will in communal action. 

Under otherwise equal conditions, a 'societal action', which is methodically ordered and led, is superior to every resistance of 'mass' or even of 'communal action'. And where the bureaucratization of administration has been completely carried through, a form of power relation is established that is practically unshatterable. 

Weber's belief in the invulnerability of power relations based on control of bureaucratic apparatus is dependent upon his assumption that a change in power relations would
require the breakdown of the bureaucratic machine. This assumption is questionable since communal action can be carried on independently of particular societal organizations, and it is possible that power relations expressed in bureaucratic organization can be changed on other grounds. This might entail a change in the uses made of bureaucracies but would not necessarily entail the breakdown of bureaucracies. Weber thought that such re-organization would be at least highly unlikely because of the nature of bureaucratic organization.

The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed. In contrast to the honorific or avocational 'notable', the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march. The official is entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top. The individual bureaucrat is thus forged to the community of all the functionaries who are integrated into the mechanism. They have a common interest in seeing that the mechanism continues its functions and that the societally exercised authority carries on. 27

The continuing functioning of bureaucracy is in the interests of the vast majority of people.

The ruled, for their part, cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus of authority once it exists. For this bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso-like mastery of a single yet methodically integrated function. If the official stops working, or if his work is forcefully interrupted, chaos results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements from among the governed who are fit to master such chaos. This holds for public administration as well as for private economic management. 28
Weber has shown that destruction of bureaucratic organization would lead to chaos and would thus be in no one's interests, neither those of the rulers nor of the ruled. He has not shown how he can justify his assumption that this fact entails the necessity of maintaining power relations as they exist. He has not shown the necessary connection between the use of bureaucracy and the existence of bureaucracy.

Weber was, in fact, unable to show any such necessary connection. He unwittingly equated bureaucratic organization with capitalism, i.e., he equated the object and one particular use of it. He recognized that modern forms of bureaucracy were first developed in relation to capitalism.

The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master. This concentration occurs, for instance, in a well-known and typical fashion, in the development of big capitalist enterprises, which find their essential characteristics in this process.

Alongside this development of bureaucracy in capitalist enterprises is a corresponding development of bureaucracy in public organizations. Because bureaucracy arose parallel with capitalism, Weber assumed that, once fully developed, it could not be separated from capitalism.

More and more the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organizations of private capitalism. The idea of eliminating these organizations becomes more and more utopian.

The equation of a social object with the use to which it was originally put is a false equation. The beauty of Marx's
theory of alienation is its questioning of this equation, but one need not resort to Marx's theory to show the inadequacy of it. The development of social objects is a process of creating social objects, separating them from their original use, and using them in new ways. One example of this process is the development of travel by water. Sailboats, which were once a primary means of travel, were replaced by steamers as a primary means. But the sailboats were not destroyed. Sailing has become a means of recreation.31

2. WEBER AND THE MYTH OF SOCIETY

In my discussion of Weber's work I have been laying the foundation for my argument that his analysis of authority is an analysis of one of the methods by which people alienate themselves from their species characteristic. His analysis of communal and societal action, power and authority, and bureaucracy is invaluable to the study of alienation. He clearly showed how ideas must be treated as an independent variable in man's understanding of society. He also clarified and, perhaps unintentionally, added weight to Marx's contention that if man wants to overcome alienation he has to understand and control his relation to social objects.

But Weber, with his phenomenal range and depth of interest, went far beyond a simple clarification and affirmation of Marx's theory. It was with reference to his discussion of rationality as a general cultural development underlying all aspects of modern life that Weber reached beyond Marx's rather
simple classification of the alienated as worker and the alienator as owner, and contributed independently to an understanding of alienation in the contemporary world.

Rationality

Weber used the term "rational" in a variety of ways of which I am going to consider three: rational action, rational systems, and rationalization as an attitude toward the world. Of Weber's definition of rational action Talcot Parsons noted,

Weber unfortunately does not give us an explicit statement of (the) criteria, but they can be inferred from his discussion. An act is rational in so far as (a) it is oriented to a clearly formulated unambiguous goal, or to a set of values which are clearly formulated and logically consistent; (b) the means chosen are, according to the best available knowledge, adapted to the realization of the goal. Rational action, then, includes orientation toward a goal, the means used to achieve the goal, and some judgment of the adequacy of the means for the realization of the goal.

Of the second usage that I wish to consider, Weber stated simply, "'Rational' may also mean a 'systematic arrangement'." A systematic arrangement is a method which is "unambiguously oriented to fixed goals", which formally includes it in the specification of the above definition of rational action listed after (b). My reason for considering the two uses separately is that, while rational action focuses attention on the actors, rational system focuses attention on the method.
Rationalization as an attitude toward the world, refers not to any increased rationality on the part of the individual but to the assumption by individuals that the world is rational (as systematically arranged). In "Science as a Vocation" Weber discussed "intellectualist rationalization" as the belief that, although one has no increased knowledge of the conditions under which one lives, one could, if one wished, discover what they are. It is the belief that all things can be mastered by calculation, and that there are no mysterious and incalculable forces in the world, a belief related to the development of the scientific method.

Weber saw the development of the scientific method historically from Socrates to the Renaissance within the context of the search for "true art". He pointed out that for the early experimentors science was the path to true art and thus to true nature. But this faith in science is no longer tenable.

After Nietzsche's devastating criticism of those 'last men' who 'invented happiness', 'I may leave aside altogether the naive optimism in which science -- that is, the technique of mastering life which rests upon science -- has been celebrated as the way to happiness ...

He asked what meaning we can make of science,

... now after all these former illusions, the 'way to true being', the 'way to true art', the 'way to true nature', the 'way to true God', the 'way to true happiness', have been dispelled? Tolstoy has given the simplest answer with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: "What shall we do and how shall we live?"'. That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable.
Weber concluded that the value of science is that it can give us clear means for reaching our goals, but we ourselves must specify those goals for ourselves.

Intellectualist rationalization is an attitude toward the world based on a misconception which is that, because science gives explanation but no meaning, there is no meaning in the world aside from the mundane calculability of it. It was toward this attitude that Weber directed his observation that the world is "disenchanted".

We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. Fate, and certainly not 'science', holds sway over these gods and their struggles.... Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years -- blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclusive orientation towards the grandiose moral fervor of Christian ethics. 39

Weber was not deluded by a longing for some romantic past. He believed that these "gods and their struggles" would have to be dealt with in practical life, in "meeting the 'demands of the day' " 40 His notion was that we are coming into a time characterized by the necessity of facing the "gods" of the ancients without the protection either of their myths or of our own - our heritage of Judeo-Christianity. In a sense, he "prophesied", as did Marx, a "new world"; but where Marx stressed the positive aspects of man gaining his freedom from
societal organization, Weber stressed the fantastic amount of effort and discipline required to deal with our "civilization". As we well know now, Weber's point of view cannot be passed off as "mere" pessimism.

Weber showed how our societal organization is becoming increasingly rationalized in bureaucratic systems. He also described the subjective attitudes which have developed parallel with this increasing empirical rationalization. What he failed to do was to distinguish clearly between the one and the other, and to indicate the nature of the relationship between them, an important distinction for the study of alienation.

For example, Weber presented his three forms of "legitimate power" as "ideal types", emphasizing that none is ever found in a pure form in reality. As ideal types they are constructs that we can employ to get a clearer understanding of human behavior in any society. Historically, in Western civilization, he believed that our society is characterized by a general development of the legal-rational type with a decrease in both charismatic and traditional. He related the decline in traditional authority to the development of science in European culture; and the decline in charisma to the diminishing importance of the individual and of the effectiveness of individual action in societal organization. Applied to a concrete example, such as the development of European civilization, the ideal type of legal-rational authority now refers both to a
factual empirical development of rational systems based on the use of scientific method, and to the orientation (of attitudes) of people to these rational systems. As Marx showed, the two can be separated, the one being the objective development of man's capacities and the other the reification of these "objects".

Weber saw the increasing appeal to rationally created rules as a method of justifying the distribution and use of power, to be an aspect of the general trend of rationalization. The general trend of rationalization, as an attitude toward the world, is based upon certain assumptions, as I have discussed, about science. These assumptions reify science, and consequently are not necessarily implied in the empirical rational systems. They indicate, not the character of the systems man has created, but the use of these systems by man.

**Individual and Society**

It is by confronting Weber's ideas about the relation between the individual and society with Marx's understanding of man that I wish to complete my argument. The validity of Marx's theory of alienation rests finally on his assumption that man is "whole man" and not "merely a particular function", that he may treat himself as a mere particular function, and to do so is to alienate himself from his "species characteristic" of "free, conscious activity", i.e., to deny his wholeness, acting out of it without recognition of doing so. If man has no "nature, if he
is determined only by environmental situations, a "mere reflection" of his culture; or if men are isolated individuals related together only through shared myths and shared necessity, then there is no need to consider alienation as a problem. The experience to which the term "alienation" refers can indicate, in the first case, at most, contradictions between different aspects of a given culture, contradictions reflected in man; and in the second case can indicate, at most, the natural isolation of individuals and their natural conflicts of interest. These are the two senses in which Hegel considered alienation, and in both cases there can be no genuine "solution" to alienation. There can be only the recognition of a necessary human condition and acceptance of it.

I would like to continue my "defense" of alienation theory with an appeal to the fact that, while this theory encompasses the relations described by Weber, he offered no alternate theory explaining the experiences to which "alienation" refers. Weber never explicitly formulated his ideas about the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, but they are implied in his work. Without attempting to define his "real" thoughts, his writing indicates a theoretical assumption that men are naturally isolated individuals, related together in society through shared bonds of myth and necessity.

Weber took the individual and society "as given", recognized the "distance" between private and public life, and
saw that private life as given has very little, if any, effect on public life.

The fact of our time is characterized by rationalization, intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. 42

Believing that power in the hands of a few to control the lives of the many goes hand in hand with large-scale bureaucratic organization, that a radical change in the distribution of power implies disruption of bureaucracy and consequently "chaos", and believing in the increasing indestructibility of bureaucratic organization, Weber thought that the only thing for men to do is face up to the realities of life as they are with individual integrity.

... We want to draw the lesson that nothing is gained by yearning and tarrying alone, and we shall act differently. We shall set to work and meet the 'demands of the day', in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibres of his very life. 43

What he left unquestioned was the content of the 'demands of the day'.

Rejecting the idea that the 'demands of the day' fall on the shoulders of individuals (as isolated individuals), what these demands consist of depends on the ways in which people are prepared to organize themselves in relation to societal organization. Weber saw the individual as helpless in the face of increasing rationalization of society, the only
channel for effective power being bureaucratic organization. In his discussion of power, he defined it in terms of an individual or individuals in concert being able to "realize their own will in a communal action even against others who are participating in the action". Since communal and societal action can be distinguished, any particular societal organization, such as bureaucracy, is only one of the means by which "wills" can be "realized". Since power is the realization of individual wills in communal action, and societal organization is one means by which power is exercised, at least some individuals are far from helpless in our society.

Rejecting Weber's assumption that one particular use of bureaucracy is a necessary use of it, it follows that the power distribution now related to bureaucracy is not a necessary one. Weber saw legal-rational authority as a justification for existing power relations. In Marx's theory this parallels the reification of law in the interests of the "ruling" class. Weber saw that such justification was equally in the interests of the ruled, referring to both their hopes and their fears. However, as long as such justification stems from hopes and fears without actually resolving fears and realizing hopes, it is based on irrational feelings (love; hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation) and is not rational action, as he defined the term. As an irrational means of dealing with "real" hopes and fears, it is a failure of man to use his societal organization
in his human interest; a reification rather than an objectification of his powers. Legal-rational authority, as a reification, attributes power belonging to individuals in relation to one another (regardless of the complexity of these relations) to rules which are believed to have an existence independent of the men using them. Justification of power relations is a communal activity, and to the extent that men in community reify their objective power relations, they define themselves individually as helpless in the face of mass society. Each individual is helpless because all individuals in community define themselves as such and act on their communal agreement.

Rationalization of societal organization, as the objectification of man's powers, does not necessarily imply individual helplessness. Weber realized that societal organization can be used as a tool for communal goals. The question that has to be answered here is which "community" (or communities) is using existing societal organization to its own advantage. By Weber's definition, individual men can organize in many different kinds of community, depending on to what they are referring for their "we-feeling". By Marx's definition, men can refer to one of two communities for their "we-feeling", to an illusory one or to that based on their species nature, including all members of the species.

The distinction between Weber's normative and "value-free" approach and Marx's suggestion of a standard external to cultural norms by which normative behavior can be evaluated
is important to the study of alienation. Both approaches are "value-free" in the sense of being amoral. Marx and Weber used their analyses of society to make moral evaluations of it, but their morality is not implied in their analysis. Marx interpreted "free, conscious activity" within a 19C framework. Weber's penetrating analysis of normative authority took us beyond Marx's rather simple optimism, but did not answer Marx's basic hypothesis that man is whole and only treats himself as a partial function in forced labor. Nor have we who are fully within the 20C done so.

We have studied fairly extensively, in functional analyses of society and in role and games theory, ways in which man treats himself as a particular function. Weber anticipated the problems inherent in this kind of study when it is unchecked by being placed within a more encompassing understanding of man. With reference to the use of functional analysis, he had this to say:

For purposes of sociological analysis two things can be said. First this functional frame of reference is convenient for purposes of practical illustration and for provisional orientation. In these respects it is not only useful but indispensable. But at the same time if its cognitive value is overestimated and its concepts illegitimately 'reified', it can be highly dangerous. 44

Functional analysis of "society", as the objectified power of man, is one way of describing societal organization. It is, to use Toulmin's terminology, a method of natural history and not a scientific explanation. It neither explains human
behavior, nor does it illuminate our understanding of man's relation to societal organization. If the results of functional analyses of "society" are not referred to "whole man", the method contributes to the perpetuation, in our culture, of the myth of Society.

What has yet to be accomplished in the social sciences is an explanation of how man is related to himself as a particular function, and consequently, how he alienates himself. Weber contributed to the beginning of such an explanation by hypothesizing that our justifications for power relations, and consequently our use of societal organization, are based on our fears and hopes.
CHAPTER III

1. THE MYTH OF SOCIETY IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

In this chapter my main intention is to show how contemporary definitions of alienation do not touch on Marx's basic hypothesis: that alienation is a relation between man and his species characteristic (i.e., that which distinguishes him as a species from other species of life), such that man uses his species characteristic without consciously realizing what he is doing. Contemporary thinkers in America have concentrated on what Marx considered to be the activity of alienation (i.e., forced labor, reification), but have approached this activity as a "thing" without referring the "thing" to the people to whom it relates. They consider alienated man (man treating himself as a particular function; civil man) to be the whole man and, in doing so, fail to get beyond normative models of man in society. I argue that contemporary thinkers have retained alienation as an evaluative concept, referring to inhumane treatment of man as inhuman treatment, and reducing Marx's notion of species characteristic to ethical values peculiar to one culture and one period of time. In contemporary theory, alienation refers mainly to a comparison between cultural values and societal organization, and to contradictions between the two. This usage is more closely affiliated with Durkheim's notion of anomie, and especially as the term has
been developed by Robert Merton, than to Marx's alienation. One would have to agree with Kaufman that alienation, as used in this manner, is not a fruitful concept for scientific analysis of society.

My argument is that the contemporary usage of the term is a distortion of Marx's definition, which can be stated in the form of a hypothesis, if extricated from its narrow 19C humanist value orientation. Marx's theory was stated, as he himself pointed out, in the form of a rough and incomplete outline, and he himself derided idealistic humanism. I raise these points as an attempt to justify my separation of certain aspects of his general theory from the traditional "Marxian" framework, with the conviction that his theory of alienation can be used as a hypothesis with reference to which empirical data can be meaningfully interpreted.

I. CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS

Eric and Mary Josephson, in Man Alone, devoted a rather extensive introductory chapter to a survey of the various ways in which "alienation" has come to be used. Their survey illustrates the wide range of interest in the concept, an interest spanning the distance between poets and politicians. Walter Gerson constructed a less extensive and less detailed list of uses to which the concept has been put by psychologists and sociologists. He suggested that, even though incomplete, his list shows "a sizeable majority of persons living in our advanced industrial society" to be alienated.
Melvin Seeman\(^4\) attempted a logical historical classification of kinds of alienation which he hoped to be of use as a basis for empirical research.\(^5\)

On the critical side, and relevant to my thesis, Horton\(^6\) has questioned whether contemporary definitions of alienation are value-free, "or are we witnessing a transformation from radical to conformist definitions and values under the guise of value-free sociology?" In an unpublished paper entitled "Alienation and Anomie", Stephen Lukes\(^7\) argued that alienation has been debased in favor of the divergent "contemporary pre-occupations" of researchers, resulting in "the common core of Marx's concept" having been lost. Kaufman\(^8\), finally, has suggested that since alienation is a concept primarily used in moral contexts it should be recognized as such and eliminated from the scientific vocabulary of sociology.

If the contentions of Lukes, Horton and Kaufman are well founded, and a perusal of the literature pertaining to alienation suggests that they are\(^9\), a question arises as to what value there is in the contemporary work being done. While agreeing with Lukes that the common core of Marx's concept has been lost (or perhaps not yet found), I would further argue that, with respect to the approaches of social scientists to alienation, the contemporary definitions indicate the presence of the Myth of Society.

This myth, stemming from the philosophical mind-body problem, takes different forms in different contexts, e.g.,
society as a whole versus isolated individual, and individual
(as passive clay) determined by society as a whole; but the
essential referent of the myth remains the assumption of a
separation between "mental constructs" and "sensuous exis-
tence", without any attempt to consider the origin of this
separation. The general form in which the myth is expressed
and implied via Durkheim and Weber is: with reference to
Durkheim, that "society" is normative and places moral res-
trictions on otherwise anarchistic individual men; and with
reference to Weber, that "society" is normative and indivi-
duals relate to "it" motivated by fear and hope.

John Clark has remarked that in spite of the proli-
feration of definitions of alienation,

an isolable feature of all of them is man's feeling
of lack of means (power) to eliminate the discrepancy
between his definition of the role he is playing and
the one he feels he should be playing in most situa-
tions. Two others who explicitly agree with Clark are Arnold Kaufman,
for whom "alienation" might be defined as such and such a
feeling which results from certain beliefs together with
certain objective social conditions", the alienated persons
having a relationship to something else such that avoidable
discontent or loss of satisfaction results; and Fritz
Pappenheim who placed alienation, as so defined, within an
historical perspective.

This "common core" definition of alienation as a
discrepancy between what one expects and what one finds to be true - a discrepancy which is unnecessary or avoidable, and at the same time a threat - highlights the fact that alienation cannot be separated from values (as expectations). It makes no reference to 1) the source of the expectation, 2) the source of the objective social conditions, or 3) the relation between expectation and actual conditions in terms of their respective sources. The definition is a normative one, taking values as given and social conditions as given, without attempting to explain both relative to some external standard.

This orientation toward alienation is radically different from that of Marx, who stressed alienation as a practical activity (in forced labor), and the objective external factor of species characteristic. He distrusted considerations of "actual roles" versus ideas of what "should" be, except within this practical context. Outside of practical contexts the study of alienation can, as he well knew, degenerate into a form of romantic idealism.

Pappenheim's historical approach is of value today in that it checks the tendency of American social scientists to ignore the cultural past and view alienation only in our social present, and specifically with reference to modern technology.

In the course of history alienation has undergone significant qualitative changes (so) that its meaning today is quite different from what it was in previous eras. In the present stage of history man has means of self-realization at his command which were unknown to him in former periods ....
Once this concept of the individual's sovereignty has been awakened in the minds of men, a new climate is prepared. The consciousness that man's yearning for self-realization is thwarted becomes a crushing experience which could not have existed in previous stages. In such a situation the alienation of man is not any longer accepted as an inevitable fate; more than ever before in history it is felt as a threat and at the same time a challenge.  

Alienation is not, he reminds us, a peculiarly modern problem, but is an age-old problem which takes different guises at different times: it becomes a problem, perhaps, for consideration in a new context, more of a "crushing experience", and obviously, with the power of self-destruction available to modern man, a much greater threat.  

The major question which comes out of an examination of contemporary uses of "alienation" is that of the criteria for evaluating both values and conditions of life. Kaufman raised the point that the discontent experienced by the "alienated person" is avoidable, but since both expectations and objective social conditions are to some extent arbitrary, the question remains one of how alienation can be avoided. This question, which I have been posing throughout this thesis, is usually handled today as a question of "adjustment". To what extent can people be expected to "adjust" to present "conditions of life" and to what extent can they change these conditions to suit their expectations? Which of our values are left-overs from environments that no longer exist and can exist no longer, and which aspects of our new environment are
undesirable and avoidable? The question raised by Marx of an objective method of evaluating man's expectations in relation to his experience remains the basic problem in alienation theory and remains unanswered.

2. THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ALIENATION

Keeping in mind Marx's definition of alienation as a relationship expressed in his practical activity, in which he treats himself as a mere particular function, between whole man and his species character, I will move into a more specific consideration of the problems raised by Horton, Lukes and Kaufman.

**Value-free Sociology as Realism**

Contemporary alienation theory is being approached in two ways. On the one hand there are those who are trying to extend and/or improve upon the work done by Marx; and on the other there are those who, to use Horton's phrase, are attempting to study alienation within the framework of "value-free sociology". Those who can be placed in the latter category are characterized as "realists". They have attracted criticism, more so recently, from many directions. Helen Lynd, for example, characterized this approach as "less than full realism".

In finding conscious identifications with and beyond our own time and society, much turns upon the way we conceive realism, what meaning we give to 'facing reality'. Continually we are urged by therapists,
by realists in foreign policy, by practical persons of various kinds to abandon sentimental dreams, idealistic utopias, and romanticism, and to face reality. Reality when so used almost always means limitation. The reality we should face is the limitations in ourselves, in other people, in the possibilities of human society. Rarely are we urged to face the reality of the slanting light of early morning and late afternoon, of Berlioz' 'Luceat!', or of Braque's colors, of human courage and integrity under stress, of delight in wit and laughter, of a child's expectancy, of the revelation of new human experience in unimagined openness and communication with another person, of the ranges of the possible ....

Statements of realism, or of the reality principle, as acknowledgment of limitation, of adjusting to the is rather than dreaming of the possible, are well known. All of them are some version of Machiavelli's central tenet: ...

how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done sooner effects his ruin than his preservation ...

Realism that excludes the longer, enduring purposes of men and men's unrealized dreams is less than full realism. 20

Lynd's criticism suggests that when men refer to "reality", the "reality" may be one thing in one context and another in a different context. This is a theme that will become central in my discussion of Mead's theory, but for the present it is sufficient to note that the "reality" to which advocates of "value-free sociology" refer indicates as much value as reality i.e., the value of facing an implied unpleasant necessity.

Marx's Theory Debased

Lukes, discussing the differences between Marx's outlook on society and that of Durkheim, saw the basic distinction between them in their radically different visions of the
relation between the individual and society.

Compare Marx's statements that 'it is above all necessary to avoid postulating "society" once again as an abstraction confronting the individual' and that communism creates the basis for 'rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals' with Durkheim's that society is 'a reality from which everything that matters to us flows', that it 'transcends the individual's consciousness' and that it 'has all the characteristics of a moral authority that imposes respect'. Marx begins from the position that the independent or 'reified' and determining character of social relationships and norms is precisely what characterises human 'pre-history' and will be abolished by the revolutionary transition to a "truly-human" society, whereas Durkheim assumes the "normality" of social regulation, the lack of which leads to the morbid, self-destructive state of "non-social" or Hobbesian anarchy evident in unregulated capitalism. Social constraint is for Marx a denial and for Durkheim a condition of human freedom and self-realisation.

It is true, as Lukes argued, that where Marx stressed the "rights of the individual", Durkheim stressed the moral authority of society. But this does not get at the essential difference between their world views with reference to alienation: a difference as relevant today as at the times they wrote. If one is to grasp firmly the contradiction between Marx and Durkheim, one must consider that where Marx saw men in social intercourse creating themselves and their world, Durkheim saw men in social intercourse being created and controlled by the "collective conscience".

Without going into a discussion of which view is the more generally adequate for sociological analysis, I would like to stress the point that with respect to alienation, the
Marxian orientation is a necessary one. Alienation is not a meaningful concept when used within a theoretical framework that assumes man to be passive and powerless (either as an explicitly stated assumption or as an implied one, by taking man's expressions of passivity and powerlessness at face value without attempting to explain this expression). In Marx's theory passivity and powerlessness indicate alienation. If one now assumes passivity and powerlessness to be "natural" to man or accepts them as "given", one has presented no alternate theory of alienation (i.e., is giving no alternate explanation for the phenomena referred to by the concept "alienation"), and has relegated alienation to a feeling state, independent of practical activity.

Value-free Debasement, Illustrated

I have chosen Blauner's *Alienation and Freedom* as the sacrificial lamb in a not altogether arbitrary manner, since to date he has done the most thorough, empirical study of "alienating conditions", and has explicitly stated his intention to "fuse an empirical, realistic approach with the valuable humanistic tradition of alienation theory that views all human beings as potentially capable of exercising freedom and control ..." My criticism of Blauner's approach to alienation is meant not as an attack on his work specifically, but on his work as an example of a general tendency among American sociologists interested in studying alienation.
Blauner limited his discussion of alienation in modern society to the blue collar worker, with the intention of explaining the "uneven distribution" of alienation among factory workers in American industry. He studied four kinds of industry: printing, textiles, automobiles and chemicals; each industry being typified by a technology particular to it.  

Blauner defined alienation as "a quality of personal experience resulting from specific kinds of social arrangements" and used a modified version of Seeman's dimensions of alienation as a working definition of the conceptual one. The four dimensions or modes of alienation, as modified by Blauner, are powerlessness, meaninglessness, social isolation and self-estrangement; his concentration of interest being upon the mode of powerlessness.  

In his usage, powerlessness results when a person is treated as an object and is unable to act as a subject to change or control the conditions in which he finds himself. The polar opposite of powerlessness is freedom, as the ability to control these conditions. Lack of freedom exists when the person has no "real choices", while lack of control refers to the person being unwillingly dominated by others. Blauner distinguished four modes of powerlessness: the separation from ownership of the means of production and the finished product, the inability to influence general managerial policies, the lack of control over the conditions of employment, and the lack of control over the immediate work process. He
suggested that the third and fourth modes are most important for the blue collar worker, and devoted the major part of his study to a consideration of the variations in control over the immediate activity of work within the different kinds of industry. The form of control he thought to be of central importance is the control over pace of work, which relates to other important factors such as freedom of physical movement, freedom to control the quantity of production, and control over the quality of work.

Meaninglessness, according to Blauner, exists when the employee lacks an understanding of the purpose of his work and its co-ordination with the other aspects of the industry. Under such conditions the worker's ability to act "intelligently" in given situations declines. He has little insight into the interrelations of events, and consequently, little idea of what his work is "for".

Social isolation refers to the feeling of the worker that he does not belong. He is unable or uninterested in identifying with the organization and its goals.

Self-estrangement, alienation from the "inner self", is absent under two conditions: when the work is satisfying in itself, or when the work is integrated with the total life of the individual. Self-estrangement is experienced as a heightened awareness of time with a split between present activity and future considerations. Non-alienated activity
consists in immersion in the present -- total involvement. Blauner stressed that there is no necessary connection between social isolation and self-estrangement, so that an individual might be both satisfied and self-estranged.

Blauner, following Seeman, treated the four modes of alienation as independent from one another. Marx considered these four concepts as aspects of alienation, aspects of one process, inseparable practically and separable only conceptually, for the purpose of analysis. It is questionable, in simple common sense terms, whether these four concepts can be usefully treated in the way that Blauner and Seeman choose. With reference to the dimension of meaninglessness, one might question how a person can be expected to have a sense of purpose in his work if he is subject to all four of the modes of powerlessness, or even to some of them. If the products he makes do not belong to him, if he has no influence over managerial policies, if he cannot control or influence the conditions of his employment, if he has no say in the pace of work, how can he possibly have a sense of purpose in his work? The same holds more clearly with reference to social isolation. What possible reason could a person have for being interested in "identifying with the organization and its goals" when the organization and its goals are irrelevant to him personally, and he is personally irrelevant to them (i.e., powerless)? As Blauner defined self-estrangement, the only way in which work under conditions of powerlessness could be non-alienating,
be integrated with the total life of the individual, would be if this powerlessness were to be extended into the whole life situation of the worker.

One can understand Blauner's failure to see the connection between his modes of alienation as an indication of his failure to grasp, as Nisbet would say, the "perspective of alienation". That he did use the concept without comprehending the implications of it is evident through casual remarks he made throughout the book, of the following sort -- "... few people in pre-industrial societies seem to be alienated (the powerlessness of the masses might be the exception)." He could as sensibly have said that few people in industrial society seem to be alienated (the powerlessness of the masses might be the exception), in which case one would question the purpose for his study on alienation and freedom among blue collar workers in industrial society, i.e., the masses.

Blauner related the four modes of alienation to an underlying fragmentation, with each mode representing a different kind of fragmentation. Powerlessness is a split between the person as subject and object, meaninglessness between the part and the whole, isolation between the individual and social components of human behavior and motivation, and self-estrangement between the temporal continuity of experience with activity as a means to an end rather than being an end in itself.

The relationship between the concepts used by Blauner can be interpreted in the following manner:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODES OF ALIENATION</th>
<th>FRAGMENTATION</th>
<th>SYMPTOM OF MODE</th>
<th>POLAR OPPOSITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>powerlessness</td>
<td>subject-object</td>
<td>man as mere object, impotent to control conditions</td>
<td>potency to act, control of conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meaninglessness</td>
<td>part-whole</td>
<td>cannot see connection of activity to whole</td>
<td>connectedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isolation</td>
<td>individual-society</td>
<td>cannot relate self to activity</td>
<td>organic relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-estrangement</td>
<td>present-future</td>
<td>activity is means to end</td>
<td>activity is end in itself</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I question the relevance of such a classification. In relation to Marx's theory, this classification is a reification of alienation, the supreme irony. There is no reference to the man who treats himself in this fragmentary fashion, nor to the relatedness of these modes of alienation "in reality". Is there not, for example, some connection "in reality" between self-estrangement and subject-object fragmentation, between isolation and being unable to see a connection between one's activity and the "whole"?

The major points made by Blauner are: that each of the dimensions of alienation varies in form and intensity according to the industrial setting; that alienation is distributed unevenly in industrial society; and that the kinds of blue-collar occupations, e.g., assembly-line work (usually
associated with alienation by commentators), include a small proportion of the total work force, something under one fifth. He also points out that, in terms of history, the industrial world is shifting from craft technology to continuous-process technology. What we experience in assembly-lines and in machine-tending jobs is a passing phase in technology. With the development of continuous-process technology many of the problems raised by technology which tend to alienate persons will be solved, but the development is going to take a long while and we must face the problems of the more severely alienating technologies now. His assumption is that workers in continuous-process technology are less alienated than in the other kinds of technology, giving as evidence the fact that they are becoming more like white collar organization men.

That white collar workers are less alienated than blue collar workers is a question that quite a few people would be willing to argue with him, notably Riessman, Fromm, Ericson, and Whyte, as well as some students of political alienation.

Blauner's assertion that technological organization as such is the cause and solution to alienation ignores the contribution of Weber to alienation theory. At best, it is a vulgar interpretation of Marx's notion of economic determinism.
Blauner's attempt to "fuse empirical realism" with the humanist tradition failed because he did not succeed, in his theoretical orientation to his empirical data, at freeing the "whole man" from his "particular function", his role as employee/employer. By ignoring the first and second modes of powerlessness (separation from ownership of the means of production and the finished product, and the inability to influence general managerial policies) and concentrating on the third and fourth modes (lack of control over the conditions of employment, and lack of control over the immediate work process), Blauner refrained from questioning the essential power relations, i.e., ownership and control of the means of production. By his own definition, workers remain passive objects. His point that employers are coming more and more to see the worker as a human rather than as a part of the machinery is irrelevant. Firstly, he has not demonstrated that employers ever did "see" the worker as part of a machine. Marx's contention was that workers are treated as and treat themselves as objects. It is quite possible that employees have always "seen" employees as humans, but the question is, what do they "see" as "human". He also failed to consider to what extent employers treat themselves as "part of the machinery". Weber's study of bureaucracy showed that, with reference to "human" considerations, the bureaucrat is equally as helpless (and perhaps more so) as the worker to make radical changes in the structure of
societal organization.

The limitations of the "realistic" approach exemplified in Blauner's become obvious through contrasting this approach with another kind of "realism". Compare Blauner's comments:

A characteristic of machine industry that usually contributes to social integration if the large number of female employees. Male workers feel that their status is higher and that they are recognized as more important than the women. They have somewhat increased chances for promotion into the minority of jobs with skill or responsibility. Women, who tend to be more satisfied than men with the prevailing unskilled routine jobs, 'cushion' the occupational floor in machine industries, raising the ceiling slightly for the men who might otherwise be frustrated in low positions. 32

People with limited education are most concerned with being free from restrictive and oppressive conditions. The absence of opportunities to develop inner potential, to express idiosyncratic abilities, and to assume responsibility and decision making functions may not be a source of serious discontent to most workers today. For this reason, empirical studies show that the majority of industrial workers are satisfied with their work and with their jobs. 33

with those of Virginia Woolf and Arthur Quiller-Couch:

The news of my legacy reached me one night about the same time that the act was passed that gave votes to women.... Of the two -- the vote and the money -- the money, I own, seemed infinitely the more important. Before that I had made my living by cadging odd jobs from newspapers, by reporting a donkey show here or a wedding there; I had earned a few pounds by addressing envelopes, reading to old ladies, making artificial flowers, teaching the alphabet to small children in a kindergarten. Such were the chief occupations open to women before 1928. I need not, I am afraid, describe in any detail the hardness of the work, for you know perhaps women who have done it; nor the difficulty of living on the
money when it was earned, for you may have tried. But what still remains with me a worse infliction than either was the poison of fear and bitterness which those days bred in me. To begin with, always to be doing work that one did not wish to do, and to do it like a slave, flattering and fawning, not always necessarily perhaps, but it seemed necessary and the stakes were too great to run risks; and then the thought of that one gift which was death to hide -- a small one but dear to the possessor -- perishing and with it myself, my soul -- all this became like a rust eating away the bloom of the spring, destroying the tree at its heart. However, as I say, my aunt died; and whenever I change a tenshillng note a little of that rust and corrosion is rubbed off; fear and bitterness go. Indeed, I thought, slipping the silver into my purse; it is remarkable, remembering the bitterness of those days, what a change of temper a fixed income will bring about. No force in the world can take from me my five hundred pounds. Food, house and clothing are mine forever. Therefore not merely do effort and labour cease, but also hatred and bitterness. I need not hate any man; he cannot hurt me. I need not flatter any man; he has nothing to give me.... In a year or two ... the greatest release of all came, which is the freedom to think of things in themselves.... Indeed, my aunt's legacy unveiled the sky to me....

Virginia Woolf

What are the great poetical names of the last hundred years or so? Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Zandor, Keats, Tennyson, Browning, Arnold, Morris, Rossetti, Swinburne -- we may stop there. Of these, all but Keats, Browning, Rossetti were University men; and of these three, Keats, who died young, cut off in his prime, was the only one who was not fairly well to do. It may seem a brutal thing to say, and it is a sad thing to say; but, as a matter of hard fact, the theory that poetical genius bloweth where it listeth, and equally in poor and rich, holds little truth. As a matter of hard fact, nine out of those twelve men were University men: which means that somehow or other they procured the means to get the best education England can give.... The Poor Poet has not in these days, nor has he had for two hundred years, a dog's chance. Believe me -- and I have spent a great part of ten
years in watching some three hundred and twenty elementary schools -- we may prate of democracy, but actually, a poor child in England has little more hope than had the son of an Athenian slave to be emancipated into the intellectual freedom of which great writings are born.

Arthur Quiller-Couch

The two statements made by Blauner are "realistic" -- His ideas about women and about the uneducated are backed up by empirical studies which have been done. But so are the quotations from Woolf and Quiller-Couch "realistic" -- one the description of a personal experience of a woman in the economic sphere, and the other an evaluation, based on experience and observation, of the chances of working class boys.

What distinguishes the two kinds of "realism" is the way in which the observer is prepared to interpret his "facts", his "empirical evidence". The kind of "realism" which asks us to "face up to necessity" has to be examined for the assumed content of "necessity". If the assumption is that what is, necessarily is, the approach cannot be considered a scientific one and is, instead, the approach of the natural historian who accepts "what is" as given and attempts to classify objects within this framework. Marx hypothesized that alienation is related to class relations, and Weber's work served to strengthen the hypothesis. Contemporary students of alienation in America have not considered alienation in relation to Marx's "classes" nor in relation to Weber's "social stratification". They have, in the main, assumed that some form of stratification is a
necessary aspect of human social life, and have failed to
distinguish this possibility from the notion that the particular kind of social stratification that we now have is a
necessary aspect of human social life.

In his discussion of man's relation to his work, the central theme of Blauner's book, he rejected Marx's contention
that "as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague". He rejected it on the grounds
that both observation and research have disproven it. The research cited by him to support his position consists of the
fact that 80% of a national sample said they would keep working if they inherited enough money to live comfortably. In order
to be meaningful, this kind of data would have to be balanced by a study of those who are independently wealthy; of how they
spend their time and, if they work, what kind of work they do and for what reasons. Otherwise the data is not amenable to
meaningful interpretation, because a person living in one social environment cannot say with reliability what he would
or would not do given different conditions with which he is not at present familiar. Blauner's observation that "even in the
most unalienated conditions, work is never totally pleasurable; in fact, the freest work, that of the writer or artist, usually
involves long periods of virtual self-torture" indicates his neglect of Marx's distinction between voluntary and forced
labor, one of the essential distinctions in alienation theory.

Blauner also supported his position by referring to
the fact that in America there is little class consciousness in the Marxian sense, and that class consciousness is replaced by job consciousness. As Landecker has argued, class consciousness is a concept referring to a complex phenomenon, and the fact that class consciousness is virtually non-existent does not, as Blauner seems to have assumed, imply that there no objective problems of class in America. The "satisfaction" indicated by workers with their position may be an indication of their ignorance of any real alternatives, such awareness of alternatives being one of the basic requisites for class consciousness.

Blauner assumed that alienation is a modern problem brought about by the large-scale organizations and impersonal bureaucracies in industrial societies. To limit alienation to this modern setting and interpret it within the framework of industrial society is misleading. It ignored the larger question posed by Marx of the relation between man and his species characteristic, and results in a loss of awareness of the basic issue inherent in the concept of alienation. In Marx's theory, it is whole men who happen to fulfill the functional role of manager (particular function) and other whole men who happen to fulfill the functional role of worker (particular function) who alienate themselves as whole men from their common species characteristic of "free, conscious activity", through their relations as particular functions.
All empirical information gained about men and their relations with one another has implications relative to the values that men have; and all social scientists who gather this information bring into their study values and assumptions about men, which influence the kind of data they organize and the way in which it is organized. Many social scientists are willing to pay lip service to this fact, and yet are able to see "society" as a thing independent of men, their values and their methods of organizing. In the American school, at least, and especially in the area of social stratification and bureaucratic organization, the tendency of social scientists is to present information in such a way that the structure they are describing appears to be not only fact, but fact independent of particular historical material conditions, particular modes of thought, particular values held by men who perpetuate the organization. As Alvin Gouldner has summarized:

For the iron law of wages, which maintained that workers could never improve their material standards of life, some sociologists have substituted the iron law of oligarchy, which declares that men cannot improve their political standards of life. Woven to a great extent out of theoretical whole cloth, much of the discussion of bureaucracy and of organizational needs seems to have provided a screen onto which some intellectuals have projected their own despair and pessimism, reinforcing the despair of others. Perhaps the situation can be illuminated with an analogy. For many years now infantile paralysis has killed and maimed scores of people. For many years also doctors, biologists, and chemists have been searching for the causes and cure of this disease. Consider the public reaction if, instead of reporting on their newest vaccines, these scientists had issued the following announcement: 'We have not reached any
conclusions concerning the causes of the disease, nor has our research investigated defenses against it. The public seems to have perfectionist aspirations of flawless health, they have "utopian" illusions concerning the possibilities of immortality and it is this -- not the disease -- that is the danger against which the public needs to be armed. We must remember that the human animal is not immortal and that for definite reasons his lifespan is finite.'

Gouldner concluded that these men would be castigated for "having usurped the prerogatives and functions of clergymen".

Of central relevance to contemporary work on alienation is Marx's insight into the relations between men's notions of what should be and the actual lives they lead. For Marx, ideas about what should be are as open to question as are the societal institutions to which they refer. His alienation theory assumes that men create themselves (both their values and organizations) in their daily activity, and poses the questions: created by whom, of what, for what, and for whom. If men create themselves and their world, they do so by their nature as a species of animal. Since they create out of this "nature", they "should" make decisions with reference to this "nature". This is the only "should" necessarily implied in Marx's theory of alienation. His specific suggestions for political action do not logically follow from and are not necessary to his analysis. If we relegate this "should" to the status of just one more value-judgment, none of us can answer for our sanity because to do so is to relegate the affirmation of life to the status of just one more value-judgment.
Kaufman's definition of alienation as being dependent upon both beliefs and objective social conditions leads to a distinction that has been made only recently, between alienation as it is felt or experienced and the conditions which produce this feeling. A large section of the literature on alienation has been devoted to attempts to describe the experience and to measure it, with very little attention paid to conditions producing the feeling. According to Kaufman, the feeling of alienation is a product of the interaction between beliefs and objective social conditions, both of which are to some extent arbitrary, and therefore open to question. Beliefs can be examined independently of objective conditions and objective conditions can be examined independently of beliefs, and the interaction between them can be studied.

Some of the work that has been done on political alienation examines the reasonableness of political beliefs and expectations. Reissman & Maccoby and Levin & Eden consider the possibility that political alienation is realistic and not due to some anti-social characteristic or psychological defect of the voter. With reference to the American ethic of realism, Reissman & Maccoby suggest that "often, 'realism' becomes no more than the opposite of idealism, reasonableness, or morality". They suggest that feelings of helplessness are realistic in face of questions about real
social problems such as "what can you do about nuclear war?"

Levin and Eden, in a discussion of "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter" suggested,

In some political situations, the views of alienated voters are correct. Their alienation is testimony to their powers of rational perception. Aside from the fact that their use of "alienation" is more representative of Durkheim's "anomie" than of Marx's use, they raise a point that is relevant to this study.

According to Levin and Eden, the political expectations of the "alienated" which are not being realized are: the right to be politically effective, the ability to cast a vote based on adequate information, and government by due process of law without recourse to bribery. The question of the reasonableness of these expectations is dependent upon, aside from the possibility of them being able to be realized, whether the expectations are more highly valued by people than are the existing institutions. Most of the articles in periodicals imply that their authors see alienation as a "fault" of the individual, a problem that he has with facing the reality of existing institutions. They assume that it is easier to change the beliefs and expectations of people so that these beliefs are in line with existing institutions than it is to change institutions so that they are in line with beliefs and expectations. Both Riessman and Maccoby, and Levin and Eden question this assumption, suggesting a more critical attitude toward existing institutions.
Many studies have been done on objective social conditions conducive to alienation, with major focus on working conditions. The central factor relating to alienation that has emerged out of these studies is that of organization, both physical and interpersonal. Weber's work on bureaucracy pioneered the way for a good deal of critical evaluation of large-scale, highly stratified, impersonal organizations, with emphasis on how these organizations are conducive to alienation. A few writers, however, have been interested in studying the positive effects of organization. Neal and Seeman, for example, have pointed out that organization mediates between the isolated potentially powerless individual and the massive state. One might question their idea of "isolated potentially powerless individual" versus "massive state", but their work does remind us that it is not organization as such which is alienating, but certain kinds of organization. The only extensive attempt to delineate different kinds of organizations and their relation to alienation has been done by Robert Blauner in his study of Alienation and Freedom, discussed earlier. Regardless of his questionable interpretations of his data, Blauner's attempt to distinguish and make comparisons between different kinds of organization is an important step in the study of alienating conditions. Goffman has studied some aspects of interpersonal organization which are conducive to alienation. He related
alienation to lack of spontaneity in conversation, and asserted that, in our present society, alienation is the rule and spontaneous conversation the exception. Goffman listed four modes of alienation, or barriers to spontaneous conversation: self-consciousness, external preoccupation, interaction consciousness, and other-consciousness. The effect of these barriers is to prevent people from paying attention to the content of conversation or the activity going on. Goffman did not probe into the reasons for these barriers, beyond describing the superficial connections between them and individual motivation. For example, interaction-consciousness is grounded in feelings of responsibility on the part of persons for things to go well.  

Helen Lynd, in On Shame and the Search for Identity, did probe more deeply into these forms of awareness, and concluded that they may be illuminating rather than alienating experiences, depending on how the person experiencing them is able to cope with his awareness. The forms of consciousness considered by Goffman are forms of exposure of social life, and these exposures are generally accompanied by feelings of shame and guilt. It is the experience of shame and guilt that Lynd found interesting and, contradicting Goffman's conclusion, saw them as potential clues to identity.

Of those who have studied alienating conditions, sociologists have been more concerned with studying physical organization and especially with reference to work situations.
Studies of interpersonal organization have been done mainly by social psychiatrists and psychologists, often with no reference to alienation as a concept describing the phenomena with which they deal. A consideration of these people's work and the relevance of it to the study of alienation would constitute a thesis in itself. Within the limitations of my work, I can only make short reference to theirs.

The success of Ericson's therapeutic approach suggests that men are in fact whole men, and that they treat themselves as particular functions with reference to their symbolic systems. The power of the individual to create himself and the fact that he does so in terms of his personal emotional relations with others is illustrated in Bettleheim's study of "Joey, the Mechanical Boy". The conformity studies of Asch show the vulnerability of the individual to "group consensus", and his dependence upon information about the situation in which he finds himself. Group therapy techniques illustrate how very much more successful is personality change when it is carried on "communally" rather than by techniques oriented toward "isolated" individuals. Studies of sensory deprivation and of feral men indicate that, except in a very crude sense (i.e., as objectively distinct biological organism), there is no such thing as an "isolated" individual in reality. That "individual" is an abstraction from reality, as is "society", cannot be denied in the light of the results of
these studies. They indicate that "man" is a concept including very complex relations among the human organism, physical environment, and social organization. All of these studies, as well as many others on perception, when related together, upset radically our traditional assumptions about man, and raise the question of whether we "know" (knowledge here being used as formalized systematic explanation) anything about him, as man.

4. MAN AS PROBABLE AND MAN AS POSSIBLE

In attempting to understand alienation, one is continually thrown back to the question of man as man, independently of particular cultures and particular times. The myths of Society and Prometheus outlined in my Introduction can be looked at within another framework: that of man as probable (relating to the myth of Society) and man as possible (relating to the myth of Prometheus). An interesting relation between the two "views" of man is uncovered in this framework.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "possible" as "that can exist, be done or happen", and "probable" as "that may be expected to happen or prove true, likely". Statistically, these two concepts are usually applied to events within a static frame of reference, such that the most probable event is that event which is most likely to occur, measured by the ratio of the favourable cases to the whole number of possible cases. The relationship between the two concepts is such
that an event must be possible in order for it to be considered to have some probability: the major interest being focused on "probability" rather than on "possibility". If these two concepts are considered within the framework of change over time, the relationship between them is transformed, not statistically, but in reality. With this transformation, the fact that the probability of the occurrence of events is constantly conditioned by the emergence of new possibilities becomes the major focus of interest. It is the emergence of new possibilities that transforms the world of man. An example of such an event is the invention of the phonetic alphabet, a tremendous improvement on syllable-writing and picture writing. As Hogben noticed,

Writing by alphabet-signs for the separate consonant and vowel sounds in a syllable has turned up once and once only in history. The possibility is not by any means obvious; and it is doubtful if it could have happened in more than one way. 61

Not only man's inventions, but man himself can be seen in these terms. Man, as a species of life, was one of many possible species of life, but having occurred, became a probable event in the world, and a necessary condition for new possibilities. His particular life as a human animal is also one of many possibilities. Social psychologists and psychiatrists have come to recognize that men, as biological organisms, are active non-directed creatures. Direction and peculiarly human life are gained in organized social life. Direction and, consequently, probable behavior, are conditioned by the
particular possibilities which are historically created or which emerge over time in society. What is a mere possibility at one "stage" in time becomes a necessary condition for possibilities at another "stage", and the probability of events is conditional upon the emergence of new possibilities.

This temporal relationship between possibilities and probabilities is an important one when the possibilities and probabilities that we are considering relate directly to man. One can easily make a mistake, when viewing society as a static organization, of seeing the events occurring in it as necessary, not only with reference to the static situation being considered, but over time as well. When one considers events to be necessary and inevitable one dismisses from consideration events which are improbable given "things as they are" in an abstract (static) representation of the actual world. But dismissal from consideration does not dismiss them from the actual world, and in the actual world change occurs in terms of a relationship between probable events and possible events, between the "old" and the "new".

Relating this back to alienation theory, Petrovic, following the line of Marx's thought suggested that "man really is man when there is no split between his essence and his factual existence", and defined man's essence as "historically created human possibility", such that "man is at one with himself if he stands on the level of his possibilities". He distinguished between human and inhuman possibilities, an
example of the latter being a war criminal. With reference to
the fact that, biologically, the human animal is non-directed,
Petrovic's notion of human and inhuman possibilities is
revealed as a humanist oriented value-judgment. While agree-
ing with him that man's "essence" is "historically created
human possibility", and that there can be no expression of
human "nature" apart from historically created human values,
it seems important that we recognize both humane and inhumane
expressions of human "nature" as human possibilities. If we
want to maintain the value of alienation theory we must extri-
cate it from 19C humanism, and recognize that, as a biologi-
cally non-directed creature, man is ethically neutral. It is
only with reference to ethical neutrality that we can meaning-
fully speak of man as having a natural capacity to make
choices, and it is with reference to man's capacity to choose
his "essence" that alienation theory is applicable in the
contemporary world.

De Jouvenel 64, while recognizing the difficulties
involved in Utopian ideals, did not abandon the belief in
people being able to work toward them. He suggested that
Utopian ideas which are simple fantasy be separated from
ideas which can be realized and which are labelled Utopian
on the grounds that they are not now being realized. His
major point is that to bring Utopias into existence we have
to think of daily life in all its aspects instead of pro-
ceeding analytically from a few accepted premises. Here again-
we hear the echo of Marx's voice, with his insistence on examining practical daily life for clues to the factors conditioning the behavior of men. But where Marx stressed economic organization as the essential factor, de Jouvenel cautions us to look at all daily activity.

The development from Marx to people like Petrovic and de Jouvenel is a subtle but a profound one. The realization and self-control of our species characteristic within the humanist orientation has come gradually to be seen less as something which is inevitable or even highly probable, and more as one possibility. But we can carry this development much farther. I would like to suggest that alienation theory, as formulated by Marx, does not have as its central concern man's realization of his humane capacities, but is centrally oriented toward, and has its lasting value with reference to, man's relation to the species characteristic which distinguishes him as human apart from other forms of life. I would further suggest that Marx's 19C humanist orientation has been maintained by contemporary thinkers while his sociological analysis has been ignored. I suggest, as well, that his notion of alienation is dependent upon his awareness of scientific methodology, i.e., on the notion that we can discover lawful relations in the world and can use our knowledge of these relations to create new possibilities. The misunderstanding of Marx's theory is related to a general misunderstanding of scientific methodology, a misunderstanding
outlined by Weber in his discussion of increasing rationalization in our culture.

We do not, through "discovering" laws of the universe, come to control the universe. What we do, through the use of these laws, is to control our human environment by creating new "objects" out of our knowledge of these laws. We control ourselves in doing this. Certainly, we influence small areas of the universe -- our own planet -- and possibly will influence larger areas in the future, but the major referent of our scientific methodology is ourselves. The development of uses of atomic energy and our recent growing understanding of how life lives are the proof of this. Our major concern with reference to this knowledge is how we are going to affect ourselves through using it.

With our scientific methodology we relate our common experience of the physical world to models that we construct of relations between objects in the physical universe, and we transform our common experience with reference to this relation. If we are going to apply this method to human society, we have to relate our common experience of the social (physical) world to models of the social, and expect our common experience to be transformed.

In the physical sciences common experience acts as a standard against which our models can be tested, and our models act as a standard against which our common experience can be tested. Marx's alienation theory, insofar as it
hypothesizes a relationship between man's common experience of himself and models of his species characteristic, is a testable hypothesis which can be referred back to common experience. This theory of alienation is a small first step in getting beyond our "cultural screen", our assumption that we "know" ourselves. The theory specifies the factors that we can study in order to begin to "know" ourselves.

George Herbert Mead also assumed a "species characteristic" and, in his discussion of it, suggested a method by which we can study the factors specified by Marx, comparable to the scientific method used in physical sciences, i.e., a method based upon the scientific attitude of doubt and systematic exploration, which takes us outside of the attitude with which we perpetuate the myth of Society.
CHAPTER IV

THE RESOLUTION OF ALIENATION IN THE THEORY OF
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

Before entering into a discussion of Mead's theory, I would like to summarize the development that I have intended to this point. In Chapter I, discussing the change in usage of the concept "alienation" from Hegel to Marx, I suggested that Hegel's work could be characterized as a "natural history" of the mind while Marx was attempting a scientific explanation of human society. I separated Marx's alienation theory from a political context for analytical purposes, arguing that the analysis of alienation is logically connected neither with Marx's discussion of worker as alienated and non-worker as alienator nor with his political theory following from this discussion. I interpreted his definition of alienation as the separation between "whole man" and his "species characteristic of "free, conscious activity" through the medium of "forced labor". I argued that it is consistent with his general theory of the relations among man, community and society to understand alienation as the activity of man as a whole, both "workers" and "non-workers" contributing to this alienation; and concluded that with this interpretation the question of blame becomes irrelevant for sociological analysis and how man alienates himself becomes the moot question.

With the question of how man alienates himself in mind, I went on to discuss some of Weber's ideas as
contributions to alienation theory. I interpreted Weber's description of increasing rationalization in Western civilization, with reference to Marx's theory of alienation, as a description of the development in Western society of "forced labor", i.e., the means, both "objective" as rationalization of institutions and "subjective" as intellectual rationalization, by which man treats himself as a "particular function" in contemporary society. Weber's description of kinds of authority as justifications of power relations based on fear and hope strengthened Marx's argument that "natural society", "illusory community", is an irrational form of organization with respect to man's relation to his species characteristic. I criticised Weber's normative approach to the analysis of society as failing to consider Marx's thesis that these normative societies are the means by which man alienates himself.

In my discussion of contemporary alienation theory in America, I applied the same criticism as to Weber's approach, and suggested that contemporary definitions of alienation more closely approximate Durkheim's concept of "anomie" as developed by Robert Merton.

Relating George Herbert Mead's thought to Marx's theory of alienation, I refer again to Chapter One and my discussion of Marx. Mead did not use "alienation" in his analysis of human society, but his theory can be applied to the study of alienation as defined by Marx.
Marx drew our attention to practice as the expression by man of his species characteristic. Mannheim, considering the possibility of a science of politics, noted:

If we seek a science of that which is in the process of becoming, of practice and for practice, we can realize it only by discovering a new framework in which this kind of knowledge can find adequate expression. 1

His observation holds true with reference not only to politics, but to all forms of human activity.

In this chapter I would like to discuss Mead's work as the "discovery" or creation of a new framework of the sort Mannheim envisaged. His three major works, Philosophy of the Act, Philosophy of the Present, and Mind, Self and Society, centre around the common theme of what characterizes man as a species of animal distinct from other life forms. Mead did not use the phrase "species characteristic", but it is a phrase adequate to describe the subject of his work, and serves as a conceptual link between his theory and that of Marx.

Of the two works to which I will refer in this chapter, Mind, Self and Society is devoted to a description of the process of human socialization, i.e., humanization, and of the relation of man to society. In The Philosophy of the Present Mead outlined his theory of the relationship between mind and sensory experience.

1. MEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT

In the development of his philosophy Mead referred to Einstein's Relativity Theory, and created his theory in
terms of the four dimensional time-space perspective suggested by Einstein's work rather than within the traditional three-dimensional Newtonian "timeless" spatial perspective. Marx, in his theory of society, anticipated this four-dimensional perspective, but he had no formal philosophical theory of the universe; and his discussion of man's relation to the physical universe suggests that he assumed, "in the back of his mind", a three-dimensional Newtonian universe. The most basic difference, with relation to my discussion of alienation, between the two universes rests in the fact that, while in the Newtonian universe everything can be reduced to concrete entities and their interrelations, in the Einsteinian one, everything is reduced to transformations of energy so that concrete entities are "concrete" and "entities" only in a relative sense. A "thing" may be concrete with reference to one system (one set of relations between elements) and lose its "thing-ness" with reference to another. For example, an "organism" in one system is a "constellation" of atoms in another and an organization of energy transformations in a third. The reality of these different systems in which "things" are located is demonstrated by, for example, the effects of atomic reactions upon organic life and, in turn, the effects of organic life (man) on physical systems, as in the splitting of the atom. Philosophers have in the past questioned matter, but with Einstein's theory we have for the first time a science which
questions it, and which explains a way in which matter and energy are equivalent.

Mead's understanding of Einstein's theory is basic to his social philosophy. In attempting to explain the fact of the occurrence of different systems and their interrelations, and the common experience of them by men, Mead developed three fundamental concepts, most clearly stated in a set of four lectures delivered to the American Philosophical Association in 1930 at Berkeley. These lectures have been included in a book published posthumously, The Philosophy of the Present. These concepts, "the present", "sociality" and "emergent", are important keys to understanding his theory about human society.

The Present

The present, according to Mead, is the "locus of reality". It is in the present that we experience, our experience occurs via our senses, and it is to this sensuous experiencing in the present that thought refers. Mead suggested that thought (abstraction) which "leads to a metaphysical separation of what is abstracted from the concrete reality from which the abstraction is made", is "improper use" of "a tool", the proper use of which is "intellectual control of that reality". One must be careful here, as with Marx's relating of thought to "practice", not to mistake this idea as scientism gone mad. The poet, the painter, the composer of music, all use abstraction for the control of the particular
"perspective" of reality with which they deal. The perspective of the philosopher is intellectual, and it was toward philosophical thought that Mead directed this argument.

Pasts and futures, in reality, arise out of present experience, and

the different pasts of experience are (not) subjective reinterpretations (of) a past which is independent of that or any present".7

Mead was arguing here with the interpretation of our changing human history which assumes one real world of which we have partial knowledge, which we "subjectively" reinterpret as we develop new tools (e.g., techniques of studying geological evidence of former human societies). This interpretation of human history assumes a "metaphysical separation" between subjective interpretation and the "concrete reality" to which it refers. To this position, he replied that

... a reality that transcends the present must exhibit itself in the present. This alternative is that found in the attitude of the research scientist, whether he confesses it in his doctrine or not.8

How clearly we can hear the voice of Marx over the span of one hundred years --

Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition.... Such a primordial condition explains nothing; it merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous distance. It assumes in the form of a fact, of an event, what the economist (sic scientist) is supposed to deduce -- namely, the necessary relationship between two things -- between, for example, division of labor and exchange. Theology in the same way explains the origin of evil by the fall of man; that is, it
assumes as a fact, in historical form, what has to be explained. We proceed from an economic fact of the present.

The similarity between Mead's differentiation of "abstractions leading to the metaphysical separation of what is abstracted from the concrete reality from which the abstraction is made" and knowledge used as a tool for intellectual control of reality; and Marx's concepts of reification and objectification, is striking. Rather than speaking of "true" and "false" knowledge, Mead distinguished between proper and improper use of a tool. The differences between their respective ideas about uses of knowledge are equally as striking. Marx left the relation between subject and object pretty much as an assumption in his work. That he assumed, as did Mead, the boundaries between subject and object to be conventional, is indicated in his discussion of the difference between "civil man" and "whole man". His idea was that civil man is conventional (i.e., arbitrary), but whole man is not. Mead did not make this kind of bifurcation, and treated the conventional in a conservative manner.

To give an example illustrating his argument: the scientific method is used to discover relations that hold regardless of particular occurrences in particular presents, e.g., the laws of gravity and of optics; yet these discoveries are made under definite conditions within particular presents. A biologist studying the DNA molecule is at the same time sitting in a laboratory looking through a microscope, or perhaps staring at a wall across the room, thinking. His
activity is also related to other presents in which he will relate his discoveries to other scientists, in which tests will be carried out on animals relative to his discoveries, and in which new life forms may appear as a "result" of these particular activities in particular presents. The biologist's theory (if he creates one) transcends particular presents, but is created, proved valid, and used, in particular presents.

The ultimate implication of Mead's argument, in contrast with the notion of "subjective reinterpretation" of an external (objective) reality, is that both the "subjective" and the "objective" aspects of human life emerge in presents, together and in relation to one another, as a means of locating the organism in the present. Mead argued that our ability to classify experience into subject-object dichotomies is learned through our involvement in human society, via the "significant symbol".

Mead observed that the past is "as hypothetical as the future". He did not mean by this that we can wilfully recreate the past, changing what has happened and causing something else to occur.

...The irrevocability of the past event remains even if we are uncertain what the past event was.... It may be thinkable that viewed from some vast distance the order of some of what we call the same events might differ in different perspectives, but within any perspective what has passed cannot recur.... There is an unalterable temporal direction in what is taking place.... In general, since passage is itself given in experience, the direction of changes that are going on partly conditions what will take place.
The hypothetical nature of both past and future is a condition of our knowledge.

The event that has taken place and the direction of the process going on form the basis for the rational determination of the future. The irrevocable past and the occurring change are the two factors to which we tie up all our speculations in regard to the future. 13

Both past and future are only for us in our experience in the present.

Knowledge has here been related to "reality" in a peculiar way. Mead saw it as an aspect of the individual (self's) relations in the world, as a process occurring within the more inclusive process of living. As such it is both part of the individual's equipment for survival, and is an aspect of "reality", the natural universe. Because it is both an aspect of the natural universe and a tool "belonging" to individuals, people can use it deliberately to influence themselves in the natural universe. The difficulty that we have in recognizing knowledge as an ongoing process in present activity arises from the fact that

... the emergent has no sooner appeared than we set about rationalizing it, that is, we undertake to show that it, or at least the conditions that determine its appearance, can be found in the past that lay behind it. Thus the earlier pasts out of which it emerged as something which did not involve it are taken up into a more comprehensive past that does lead up to it. 14

Mead argued that conditions necessary for the occurrence of an event are necessary after the fact.
... In our use of the term irrevocability we are pointing toward what must have been, and it is a structure and process in the present which is the source of this necessity.... The force of irrevocability then is found in the extension of the necessity with which what has just happened conditions what is emerging in the future. 15

We only begin to trace necessary conditions for the occurrence of a phenomenon when there is something about that phenomenon which is new to us. The necessary conditions which we "discover" arise out of the perspective that we take relative to the phenomenon, and this perspective arises out of a (believed, perceived, conceived, experienced) contradiction between what we were prepared to experience on the basis of our knowledge of the world in the past and what we experience in the present. If we experienced no new things, things for which we are not prepared, we would have no notion of past, present or future. All would simply be; nothing would be becoming.

... where being is existence but not becoming there is no past, and ... the determination involved in passage is a condition of a past but not its realization. 16

Mead's treatment of the concept "knowledge" is not a unique one, but follows the line of argument posited by C. H. Peirce, who did not accept the conventional separation of "belief" and "knowledge". Peirce reduced all knowledge to opinion (belief), commenting that "It now begins to look strongly as if perhaps all belief might involve expectation as its essence"17, and suggesting that the purpose of an explanation is "the establishment of a habit of positive expectations that shall not
We generally tend to regard opinion and belief with suspicion, and to trust knowledge, as e.g., scientific knowledge. But, contended Peirce, the sole object of inquiry (reasoning) is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false.

If we reject, for example, theological explanations and accept scientific ones, we are not exchanging "mere opinion" for "true opinion", but are changing the criteria for acceptable opinion, on the grounds that opinion (knowledge) based on the scientific method has proved, by experience over time, to be less "disappointing" than theological explanations. Mead accepted Pierce's "pragmatic" theory of knowledge, and used it as a basis for his theory of society.

The Emergent

In the discussion of Mead's notion of "present" as the center of reality, with reference to which pasts and futures are created, we saw that the present is characterized by novelty, and that the occurrence of novelty is necessary for our recognition of past-present-future. Very crudely, he has simply argued that we can recognize change only because change occurs. Change occurs in the present, and is the occurrence of emergent events.

The chief reference of a present is to the emergent event, i.e., to the occurrence of something which
is more than the processes that have led up to it and which by its change, continuance, or disappearance, adds to later passages a content they would not otherwise have possessed.  

We recognize emergents against the background of our knowledge of the world. They appear as unique events which can neither be predicted from the knowledge we have before their appearance nor be reduced to the elements out of which they emerged. To understand the appearance of a unique event we create a past by which we can explain its emergence, and in doing this, in "discovering" the necessary conditions of its emergence, we create a future as well.

Given an emergent event, its relations to antecedent processes become conditions or causes. Such a situation is a present. It marks out and in a sense selects what has made its peculiarity possible. It creates with its uniqueness a past and a future. As soon as we view it, it becomes a history and a prophecy. Its own temporal diameter varies with the extent of the event.

An emergent, then, can have a greater or lesser effect on the world, depending on its relation to other events. Its "temporal diameter" emerges with the event. This notion is extremely interesting when applied to cultural change. An individual (e.g. Aristotle) lives in a particular time and place and the reach of his influence as a living organism is limited by that time and space, but through his ability to use language (as significant symbols) he can have an influence on other individuals in different times and places, thousands of years after he no longer lives.

Mead held that pasts and futures are located in mind
which belongs to organisms, "to emergent events whose nature involves the tendency to maintain themselves" through "adjustment looking toward a past, and selective sensitivity looking toward a future". Mind is an aspect of this maintenance, and is itself an emergent. It resides neither within nor outside of the organism, but emerges in the social process of life which includes both the organism and its environment. The existence of an organism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of mind. Feral men exemplify living organisms with no "mind".

With mind, the organism is able to transcend the sensuous present of its existence.

The field of mind ... is the larger environment which the activity of the organism calls for but which transcends the present. 23

... The field of mind is a temporal extension of the environment of the organism... 24

Mead treated mind as a phenomenon of the natural world, denying that inanimate bodies are more "natural" than animate ones, and suggesting that mind is a natural property of some animate bodies.

He contrasted the study of animate and inanimate bodies, not in terms of the one being more "real" or "natural" than the other, but in terms of the different perspectives required for their understanding. The perspective required for the understanding of inanimate bodies rejects "form" and environment as explanatory devices.
No transformation affects the reality of the
descriptive system.... The essential feature of
the doctrine (relativity theory) has been that
reality does not lie in the form -- for there
may be endless transformations -- but in the
matter, mass or energy.... The particular form
of an inanimate body is irrelevant to 'what it
is'. For such bodies the environment is as
unessential as the object. 25

The process of life cannot be understood with this perspective,
but requires one which recognizes as necessary for the explana-
tion of life, the relation between form and environment.

We find in the living form an individual thing
that maintains itself through the mutual deter-
mination of the form and its environment. 26

The process of life involves the interaction of the living
thing with the things around it so that the "process of life
as really confers character upon the environment as it does
upon the plant or the animal". 27

Mead argued that life emerged out of non-life, and
human life emerged out of animal life, all natural processes;
and that once the "event" emerged it could not be explained
by the same perspective with which the former state of affairs
could be explained. Emergent events such as life and mind
implies the emergence of new "social" systems, which interact
with the old, changing the whole character of "reality".

Mead defined mind in such a way that it is peculiar
to man. Communication via significant symbols distinguishes
mind as the capacity of the human organism deliberately to
affect itself and its environment. Mind is not a constant in
human life, and is not identical with the occurrence of selves.
The unity of the mind is not identical with the unity of the self. The unity of the self is constituted by the unity of the entire relational pattern of social behavior and experience in which the individual is implicated, and which is reflected in the structure of the self; but many aspects or features of this entire pattern do not enter into the consciousness, so that the unity of the mind is in a sense an abstraction from the more inclusive unity of the self. 28

The person is self-conscious when he takes a perspective which includes himself as one of the objects in his awareness. Only when the person is self-conscious can he deliberately affect himself. He can affect himself without deliberation through deliberately affecting his environment without consciously including himself as part of that environment. Mead's treatment of "mind" suggests that it can be controlled by individuals for different purposes. The way in which it is controlled would depend upon the perspective taken by minding individuals in their "present existence", and the perspective taken would depend upon the goals of the minding individuals. Their "procedure answers to their goals". 29

This theory of mind is precisely in line with Marx's ideas about man as a productive animal (i.e., deliberately affecting himself and his environment), and man's "species characteristic" of "free, conscious activity". Mead has defined mind as free (i.e., can be controlled for different purposes, and may not be controlled) conscious (via significant symbols) activity (as an aspect of the larger activity of the organism in environment).
There is a further similarity between the two thinkers. Where Marx, in his discussion of political economy, insisted that if one wants to explain this phenomenon he must "proceed from facts of the present", and must pay attention to concrete empirical relations, Mead extended this argument beyond the particular perspective of political economy, and into all aspects of human life. "If we are to escape illusion and hallucination", he held, we must refer to "the physical thing of contact experience".

We find here the fundamental relation between the future and the past in the present.... In the immediate perceptual world what we can handle is the reality to which what is seen and heard must be brought to the test....

The human organism will influence itself and its environment, regardless of whether it is "minding" or not, and regardless of whether it is controlling its "minding", because of its character as a form of life. But where it minds without taking its present self-in-environment into account, it is subject to delusion. Its mental activity is irrelevant to its existence in the present, as a self-determining being.

The mind, in Mead's theory, is an activity of the organism by which it passes from one perspective to another, and this passage may be deliberately controlled by the organism to effect its self and environment. The mind exists in the present, is an emergent in the present, and is
characterized by "sociality". "Sociality is the capacity of being several things at once." 32

In contrast to the conventional usage of the term "social", Mead proposed:

Now that we are accustomed to call social is only a so-called consciousness of such a process, but the process is not identical with the consciousness of it, for that is awareness of the situation. The social situation must be there if there is to be consciousness of it. 33

It is the passage from one perspective to another that characterizes sociality, and this passage occurs in the natural world.

The scientist proceeds by transformations, but they are transformations which are possible only as the observer grasps that in his own situation which involves his placing himself in the situation of that which he observes. Although this is more complicated, it comes back in its findings to perceptual occasions. Now this is only possible if that sociality of thought in which we occupy the attitude is also a characteristic of nature. 34

Mead has grounded mind irrevocably in the natural world. He has, by constantly maintaining a vision of man as an animal organism, skirted around a number of metaphysical mind-body problems. He saw the relation between mind and body within the larger context of life, which includes both so that mind can be seen as an aspect of body and body can be seen as an aspect of mind. Mind is an emergent out of organic life which can carry on without it; but having emerged, mind changes the character of the natural world. It changes the character of the world through its interaction with non-mind (the organic) in a social process. This interaction occurs in the ongoing activity of
individuals in society (i.e., individuals being several things at once relative to one another, through their common use of significant symbols).

The interaction between "mind" and "body", then, is a social process in the natural world. We are aware of its occurrence in our conventional use of the word society, but "the process is not identical with the consciousness of it". In the conventional use of the term, we tend to think of society as a "thing" external to us as individual persons, rather than recognizing it as a process in which we are involved, and which is necessary for our ability to abstract out the notions "individual" and "society". We feel our involvement as pleasure and pain, but cannot explain the source of the pleasure and pain.

2. MIND AS A SOCIAL PROCESS OF TAKING PERSPECTIVES

"Present", "emergent", and "sociality" are three concepts basic to Mead's theory of human society. He discussed some of the problems involved in our understanding the origin of consciousness, commenting that

The primary difficulty in dealing with these matters lies in our tendency to cut off life and consciousness at the boundaries of the organism. Selection undoubtedly lies in the living form, but such a form can only live in a physical environment of a definite sort. Living processes include active relationships with objects in an environment, and conscious living processes also include such objects. The response of the organism to its own response to food undoubtedly lies within the organism, but only as a part of a whole process of eating that includes also the food. 35
The terms "organism" and "environment" are abstractions from the social process organism-environment, and are useful abstractions for certain purposes. Mead was not suggesting that we begin to ignore the fact that we can distinguish between, e.g., a tiger and a tree, especially if we have a choice of being confronted with the one or the other. He was suggesting that if we want to understand and explain life and consciousness we have to understand the principles underlying our specious world, seeing the organism as an emergent in the natural world, and with its emergence, the transformation of aspects of the natural world to its "environment". We have to be able to see consciousness as an emergent, and the transformation of aspects of the natural world to its "environment", i.e., part of the environment of the organism relative to which consciousness emerges.

Mead argued that the "environment" or "field" of consciousness includes aspects of the organism being conscious.

... Life becomes conscious at those points at which the organism's own responses enter as a part of the objective field to which it reacts. 36

Consciousness occurs when the "individual" experiences his "self" as part of the "objective" field within which he is acting. Consciousness includes processes not only within the organism, but between organisms, and between organism and the natural world within which it exists.

Mead posited feeling as the most basic form of consciousness.
... When we say that the lowest form of consciousness is feeling, what is implied is that when living forms enter such a systematic process that they react purposively and as wholes to their own conditions, consciousness as feeling arises within life. 37

Feeling is dependent upon the organism's ability to distinguish pleasure and pain. Feeling-consciousness is the basis out of which mind emerges -- mind referring to ideas, images, sensations. Mind emerges at the point where one individual is able to take the attitude of another into consideration so that he is able to pass from one mutually exclusive system (perspective) into another.

From this discussion we can see that Mead considered mind to be a special case of consciousness which arises when one organism "sees" itself in relation to another, i.e., when it includes both its own attitude and that of another in its consciousness. He explained:

... Let us ... accept passage as the character of reality, and recognize that in passage there is change in the structure of things, and that because of passage objects can occupy different systems. If we then recognize that there is a form of sociality within which we can go from the one to the other by means of a system of transformations, and so occupy both systems, identifying the same objects in each, it becomes possible for passage to take place between alternative systems that are simultaneously mutually exclusive. The set of transformations and the mathematical structure built upon it are as much parts of nature as anything else. They are attitudes answering to meanings of things brought under our control by symbols. Passage from a system in motion to the same system at rest, while the rest of the world passes from rest to motion, means passage from the one to the other in what we call a mind. These two aspects exist in nature, and the mind is also in nature. The mind passes from one to the other in its co-called consciousness, and the
world is a different world from the standpoint of one attitude from what it is from another. We say the world cannot occupy both meanings, if they are mutually exclusive; but passage in a mind enables it to do so by means of transformations. All that we need to recognize is that the world had the one aspect from one point of view, and that there has been the same passage in nature from the one to the other as has taken place in the mind, just as there is a passage from one price to another in stocks on the market because of the changing attitude in men's minds. 38

What I want to discuss here, with reference to the tradition in Western civilization of an either-or philosophy, is an implication of his observation that "We say the world cannot occupy both meanings, if they are mutually exclusive; but passage in a mind enables it to do so by means of transformations". According to Mead, when we say that the world is either one way or another, e.g., that it is either basically good or basically evil, we are not making statements about necessary conditions of reality, but about two alternate choices, and that the one entails one world, the other, another. Just as the prices in the stock market fluctuate because of "changing attitudes in men's minds", the natural world changes when men take one attitude or another. Here we can see the full implication of his argument that "the different pasts of experience are not subjective reinterpretations of a past which is independent of that or any present." The natural world is a potential chaos, "brought under our control by symbols". We have to be careful at this point to keep from assuming that Mead has taken a solipsistic stand, remembering that he places
mind within the framework of the organism in the natural world, and that mind is subject to the "laws" of this world, that it is a natural process in interaction with other natural processes. But at the same time we can recognize the power at which he is hinting at the disposal of minding organisms, a power which they can use to control atomic energy for destruction and creation; and there is no reason to suppose that the control of atomic energy is representative of any more than a small fraction of their full capacities, i.e., future emergents.

Mead described the world as consisting of a finite number of objects occupying simultaneously many systems. One gets the impression that he imagined a temporal-spatial stratification of the world, of systems within systems, so that, for example, we can distinguish between atoms as objects, organisms as objects and persons as objects. The passage of persons from one system to another is an experience common to everyone: both in the sense that everyone experiences passage from one to another, and in the sense that the passage occurs only by communal agreement. For example, a "father at home" passes into a "motorist on the road" into a "professor at university". The person, in this passage, moves physically from one location to another, acting in ways specific to the different "temporal-spaces", and his physical movement means father-motorist-professor by communal agreement. The meaning, and the performance, of the physical activity depends on the
"mental" attitudes of the members of a community.

Mead's orientation toward this common experience illuminates some of the problems involved in deliberate social change, and reflects on Marx's idea that radical social change most probably (i.e., in most cases) requires violent revolution. His theory suggests that the smaller a group, the easier radical change will be, the smallest group being defined as a "self" (consisting of "I" and "me", which enables the individual to address itself as self and other); and the larger a group ("group" presupposing some sort of organization, excluding aggregates and mobs) the more difficult it will be to effect radical change. It also suggests that the kind of change will be peculiar to the size of the group. For example, the individual can "change his mind" much more readily than his inter-personal habits, which include at least some other people in the "group" to which they refer.

It suggests that, if we want deliberately to make radical changes, regardless of the size of the group moving from one perspective (system) to another, we need to have a clear understanding of the perspective that we now occupy, and a clear understanding of the methods that we can employ to move from one system to another, i.e., direct our own emergence.

With reference to Marx's theory of violent revolution, Mead's theory suggests that it is unlikely to be a method adequate to the goal of moving from one system to another.
It may be that violence (physical interpersonal or otherwise) is an aspect or indication of radical change, but it is not a method. Both our historical experience with violent revolution and Mead's theory imply that it is only a tool of destruction, and not a method of deliberate creation. Violent revolution alone, as Marx recognized, results not in a radical (basic) change, but in a "mere" revolution (turning over). What Marx did not recognize, in the light of Mead's theory, is the extent to which we control (or are capable of controlling) ourselves, and the "intermingling" of mind with our culturally created society. Mead's theory indicates that the streets, cars, buildings, clothes, etc., all are "entangled" with mind so that choosing to make radical changes involves much more than simply making a conscious decision (i.e., have an intention) and then acting on it. It involves continuous deliberate attention focused on the present.

Of the self, the minding organism, Mead said,

The self by its reflexive form announces itself as a conscious organism which is what it is only so far as it can pass from its own system into those of others, and can thus, in passing, occupy both its own system and that into which it is passing. That this should take place is evidently not the affair of a single organism. Shut up within his own world -- that which answers to his stimulations and responses -- he would have no entrance into possibilities other than those which his own organized act involved. It is only as his activity is a part of a larger organized process that such a possibility can open. Nor is this the only prerequisite. The social organization of a multicellular form is one in which each cell in living its own life lives the life of the whole; but its differentiation restricts its expressions to the
single function to which it has become adapted. Only in a process in which one organism can in some sense substitute for another could an individual find itself taking the attitude of another while still occupying its own. Its own differentiation must never be so complete as to restrict it to fulfilling a single function only.\textsuperscript{39}

Mead has named two prerequisites necessary for the occurrence of a self: the activity of the organism is part of a larger organized process, and the organisms are "in some sense" capable of substituting for one another such that they are able to "take the attitude of the other" while still occupying their own.

The mechanism "by which the individual living his own life in that of the group is placed in the attitude of taking the role of another" is "that of communication".\textsuperscript{40} He disagreed with the use of "communication" to describe all intra and inter-organic interaction, and argued,

There may be a type of communication in which the conditions of one organ stimulates others to their appropriate responses. There is in the physiological system such a system of communication carried out by the hormones. But this is only an elaboration of the interrelation of highly differentiated organs functioning in a common life-process. Communication as I shall use it always implies the conveyance of meaning; and this involves the arousal in one individual of the attitude of the other, and his response to these responses.\textsuperscript{41}

Mead distinguished between communication common to several species of animal and communication which appears to be unique to man as "conversation of gestures" and "conversation of significant symbols". Conversation of gestures is a mode of conveying feeling consciousness, while conversation of
significant symbols is the method of "mental" communication, dependent upon the faculty for language (as organization of vocal sounds).

Feeling consciousness is bound by the present in which feeling occurs, and it is only with mind that the present is transcended, and a past and future created, i.e., that consciousness becomes reflexive.

... The animal could never reach the goal of becoming an object to itself as a whole until it could enter into a larger system within which it could play various roles, so that in taking one role it could stimulate itself to play the other role which this first role called for. It is this development that a society whose life process is mediated by communication has made possible. It is here that mental life arises -- with this continual passing from one system to another, with the occupation of both in passage and with the systematic structures that each involves. It is the realm of continual emergence. 42

Mind is a social process, a "temporal extension of the environment of the organism", the "larger system within which it", the animal, can "play various roles".

In the above passage Mead referred to "mental life" as the process in which the animal is an object to itself as a whole. Relating this to Marx's alienation hypothesis, interpreted as: "Man as a whole" alienates himself from his "species characteristic" of "free, conscious activity" through practising "forced labor"; Mead made no use of the term alienation but defined mind in a way consistent with Marx's "free, conscious activity", and said that the organism is an object to itself as a whole when it practises "mental life". Marx related
forced labor to the division in human society between mental and physical activity. He argued that this is a false distinction, and that, in order for alienation to be overcome, forced labor needed to be abolished, implying that the division between mental and physical activity has to be abolished. Mead did abolish this division in theory. The methods by which alienation (in Mead's terminology, illusion, hallucination) can be overcome in practice are implied in his theory and only cautiously hinted at by him overtly.

Mead understood mind to be located in nature, as a continual emergent; an interaction between selves-in-environment in systematic interrelations. These relations are characterized by sociality, selves having the capacity to slip from one system into another, in the present, marked by passage. If we try to look at an individual, or a group of individuals, outside of passage, we will see him (them) in only one system. This way of looking at individuals and groups is characteristic of the orientation typified by the Newtonian three-dimensional universe, in which the system appears to be of infinite extent; and is characteristic of the structural/functionalist approach to society. It is in this approach that man is regarded as a particular function, i.e., each man is a particular function. Seen within the larger framework of Mead's theory, the structural/functionalist approach can have great value, as a method of studying systems in isolation. As is well known in the social sciences, this approach cannot
explain change in society, and Mead's theory is an explanation of why it cannot. Change is a process involving the movement from one system to another.

Mead suggested the direction in which social scientists can look (the perspective they can take) in order to determine social change.

Our problem is to determine just what it is that has preceded what is taking place so that the direction of temporal progress may determine what the world is going to be. There is a certain temporal process going on in experience. What has taken place issues in what is taking place, and in this passage what has occurred determines spatio-temporally what is passing into the future. So far then as we can determine the constants of motion we can follow that determination, and our analysis seeks to resolve the happening in so far as may be into motion. In general, since passage is itself given in experience, the direction of changes that are going on partly conditions what will take place. The event that has taken place and the direction of the process going on form the basis for the rational determination of the future. If we could "determine the constants of motion" in human society, we could "follow that determination", i.e., predict change in society. Change in human society can be effected by controlling "mental life" in the process of "mental life".

One of Mead's cautious hints for effecting social change is indicated in the following passage:

I wish to make as emphatic as possible the reference of pasts and futures to the activity that is central to the present. Ideation extends spatially and temporally the field within which activity takes place. The presents, then, within which we live are provided with margins, and fitting them into a larger independent chronicle is again a matter of some more extended present which calls for a wider horizon.
But the widest horizon belongs to some undertaking, whose past and future refer back to it. For instance, the present history of the sun is relevant to the undertakings of unravelling the atom and, given another analysis of the atom, the sun will have another history and the universe will be launched into a new future. The pasts and the futures are implications of what is being undertaken and carried out in our laboratories. 44

In the physical sciences we study the relation between such "objects" as the atom and the sun, relating microscopic systems to macroscopic ones. We understand the "history of the sun" in terms of our "analysis of the atom". Mead suggested that we apply the same attitude to human society, relating the "universal" process of ideation to persons existing in finite presents. By analysing ourselves in our present activities and relating our activity to ideation, we can control ourselves.

He suggested, as an implication of his theory, that

This view then frees us from bondage either to past or future. We are neither creatures of the necessity of an irrevocable past, nor of any vision given in the Mount. Our history and our prognostications will be sympathetic with the undertakings within which we live and move and have our being. Our values lie in the present, and past and future give us only the schedule of the means, and the plans of campaign, for their realization. 45

This means that regardless of whether we choose to be aware of it, regardless of whether we choose to control our social existence, by the fact that we practise human living in the present, we condition human life in the future and create our human history. "Our history and prognostications will be sympathetic with the undertakings within which we live and move and have our being." Mead's tone in this passage was triumphant and
optimistic, but one is reminded of Weber's cautioning words: "The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'".\(^46\) and his recognition that "academic prophecy, finally, will create only fanatical sects but never a genuine community".\(^47\) Being freed from the bondage to past and future carries with it the implication of an awesome responsibility in the present. We can orient toward this responsibility in various ways, just as easily falling into despair over the enormity of the situation and the ignorance with which we face it as rising up to the challenge with eagerness to learn. The attitude that we take toward our situation conditions "what will be", because these attitudes have objective existence.

.. the principle (that the individual enters into the perspectives of others, in so far as he is able to take their attitudes, or occupy their points of view) ... has serious implications ... if one accepts the objectivity of perspectives, and recognizes that these perspectives are made up of other selves with minds; that here is no nature that can be closed to mind. The social perspective exists in the experience of the individual in so far as it is intelligible, and it is its intelligibility that is the condition of the individual entering into the perspectives of others, especially of the group.\(^48\)

"There is no nature that can be closed to mind", a logical implication of his theory of human society, resting on the acceptance of the "objectivity of perspectives". This is, of course, a hypothesis, open to empirical verification.

As a principal evidence that perspectives are objective, Mead cited the influence that our use of the experimental
method has had on us.

It is instructive to note that never has the character of that common perspective changed more rapidly than since we have gained further control over the technique by which the individual perspective becomes the perspective of the most universal community, \ldots that is, the technique of the experimental method. We are deluded, by the ease with which we can, by what may be fairly called transformation formulae, translate the experience of other communities into that of our own, into giving finality to the perspective of our own thought.\ldots We have never been so uncertain as to what are the values which economics undertakes to define, what are the political rights and obligations of citizens, what are the community values of friendship, of passion, of parenthood, of amusement, of beauty, of social solidarity in its unnumbered forms, or of those values which have been gathered under the relations of man to the highest community or to God. On the other hand there has never been a time at which men could determine so readily the conditions under which values, whatever they are, can be secured. In terms of common conditions, by transformation formulae, we can pass from one value field to another, and thus come nearer finding out which is more valuable, or rather how to conserve each. The common perspective is comprehensibility, and comprehensibility is the statement in terms of common social conditions.\textsuperscript{49}

Men are now in a position to determine the conditions under which values ... can be secured", and the perspective through which they can do this is the common one of comprehensibility, "the statement in terms of common social conditions". Common social conditions are those that have an effect on all people in society. The effects may not be uniform because different people occupy different attitudes with reference to common conditions. Through studying the various attitudes with reference to the common situation, we can begin to "comprehend" our situation.

More specifically, Mead said of the common
In the process of communication the individual is an other before he is a self. It is in addressing himself in the role of an other than his self arises in experience. The growth of the organized game out of simple play in the experience of the child and of organized group activities in human society, placed the individual then in a variety of roles, in so far as these were parts of the social act, and the very organization of these in the whole act gave them a common character in indicating what he had to do. He is able then to become a generalized other in addressing himself in the attitude of the group or the community. In this situation he has become a definite self over against the social whole to which he belongs. 50

The most comprehensive "generalized other" refers to the relation between the individual and all others, or, in Marx's terminology, to the individual who "treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being". The broadest relation (individual to all), the macroscopic, is related to the narrowest (individual to self), or microscopic. But in relating these two systems we have to remember the source of self is in communication between organisms. Neither Marx nor Mead were interested in "isolated" individualism. Social change implies the involvement of more than one individual. The social individual can effect change "in" himself through his social character as a self, as well as being able to act in conjunction with others to effect change. As a fully isolated organism, it has no self and can effect no human social change.

3. MARX AND MEAD ON HUMAN SOCIETY

Hegel used the dialectic method to describe the pro-
cess of ideation as a relationship between finite objects and infinite subject (World Spirit). Marx took this method out of the Hegelian context and applied it to the material world to show how activity and not "mere" thought changes the world. For Marx the great mover of society was the dialectic between the forces and relations of production. In making this transition Marx bridged a gap between thought and action such that anyone who reads and comprehends his theory (i.e., looks at the material world around him and at himself in this world with reference to the theoretical framework provided by Marx) transcends the separation of thought and action, regardless of whether or not he agrees with Marx's specific diagnosis. Marx created a crude scientific method for analysing human society.

In his discussion of practice, he stressed activity more than thoughtful activity. Immersed in the assumption of a three-dimensional universe, he assumed that the physical environment is a constant in which there are causal connections between things independent of man's relation to them. He seems to have assumed that we have only to understand the laws associated with these causal connections and we will be able to use them to control our own lives. The question of what we would do with them was not a problem for him.

Mead, with the advantage of a four-dimensional picture of the universe in which relations between "physical objects" are just as questionable as are relations between "mental constructs", was able to go a step further than Marx and
analyse the phenomenon of practice. Marx assumed that in practice, without reification, the real interests of people would become apparent to them, their real interests being objectively related to the real world of practice. Mead analysed practice as a social emergent occurring in a present, including both thought and action, i.e., as "mental life".

Marx used the dialectic to analyse movement or passage in the material world, but was unable to see the logical extension inherent in this method if applied in a four-dimensional universe -- a universe in which many mutually exclusive systems can co-exist. In this interpretation of the universe, an object may be a thesis $T_1$ relative to an antithesis $A_1$ in one system, and a thesis $T_2$ relative to an antithesis $A_2$ in another, the object having the capacity to exist in several systems at once. The resolution of the contradiction between $T_1$, $A_1$ and between $T_2$, $A_2$ may not take the form of a synthesis of each within the different systems, but may be in the form of an emergent which incorporates both systems and many others. Marx assumed that there can be only one human social system, and suggested that communism is the best one. Mead, on the other hand, assumed a limited number of objects occupying many systems at once, so that we can have a variety of systems in our human life, none being necessarily the best, each answering to specific goals.

Reification as a form of mental blindness, a way of disguising real connections between real conditions in the
objective world, which exist independently of the "phantoms in men's minds" \(^{52}\), became in Mead's theory, illusion and hallucination. Reification means thought which is not of practice, and it results in irrational action. Irrationality and reification are directly connected with each other. Marx concentrated his attention on economic activity, and referred to capitalism, for example, as an irrational mode of organizing for human purposes. Through Mead's critique of the whole of human life as we now know it, Marx's theory of alienation through forced labor is united with psychological and psychiatric theory of "mental illness", i.e., the study of methods by which people hallucinate and delude themselves.\(^{53}\)

Marx suggested that what is particular to human beings is the relation of the whole man to his species characteristic, man acting as a human being when he treats himself as a "universal and therefore free being". Mead said that to understand human behavior, "It is the relation of the individual perspective to the common perspective that is of importance".\(^{54}\) Perspectives constitute the natural world, i.e., are not "reflections of" or "approximations of" more "real" objects "out there". Both the perception of the individual and the object being perceived "belong" to perspectives. Thus the importance of touch, physical contact, for the "sanity" (prevention of hallucination) of individuals.

Both the individual perspective and the common perspective arise together in relation to the organisms-in-
environment. In ongoing particular human societies the individual gains his perspective relative to the common perspective by learning "where he stands" in relation to others in a particular society. He learns to be both self and other. By learning both the individual and common perspectives he is able to act out of the individual perspective with reference to all others (including himself as one among many). This holds for all "occupations" of perspectives, illustrated by e.g., the occupations of father, doctor, artist, etc. Once the individual has learned how to be a self, he can create new "occupations" for himself and for others, and can redefine the boundaries of already existing perspectives. Artists and scientists have as their specific "occupation" the purpose of doing this.

Within this framework, Marx's work on alienation can be seen, with reference to forced labor, as his insight into the fact that in "natural society", and especially within the past few hundred years, labor (in the economic system) is at the same time arbitrary to the identity of the whole man, and overshadows all other "occupations" (of perspectives) to the extent that it is a major determinant of the form that other occupations will take. Man treats himself as essentially one dimensional, rather than realizing himself to be by his human "nature" multi-dimensional, a social being, capable of being several things at once.

The word alienation calls attention to the ways in
which human animals find themselves to be strangers to themselves, one another and their common environment. The word refers both to the individual and common perspectives, such that the individual experiences himself as a stranger in the world (as individual, distinct from the common), and the experience is a common one, all individuals having the experience. "Alienation" refers to this experience as a "problem" which is solvable. The solution is in man as a whole treating himself as man as a whole, and not as a "mere" particular function. The experience of being a stranger in the world is an objective one. People actually are strangers to themselves, to others and to the world. The beginning of the practical solution to alienation is the recognition of it, insofar as it is a problem, as a common problem, i.e., we are strangers to ourselves, one another, and the universe, rather than I am a stranger to myself among "those others" in "that world out there".

It is not the new and unfamiliar, i.e., strange, in itself that constitutes alienation, but the ways in which man approaches himself, others and the environment with reference to the strange. The fact of new and unfamiliar experiences is basic to human life by its characteristic of emergence. The experience of strangeness is a potentially meaningful one, and the scientific attitude, the experimental method, is an example of one way in which strangeness is part of a meaningful experience. The particular kind of estrangement constituting
alienation is that between body and mind as expressed within the individual; between bodies and minds as expressed between individuals; and, with reference to the universe, between mind to "all", the oneness of the universe, and body to "particularity", the physical discreteness of all objects, i.e., the separation of "religious" experience and science.

"Alienation" draws attention to the arbitrary nature of our individual perspectives relative to the common perspective (e.g., particular occupations in the economic system), pointing to the fact that our individual perspectives are not due to inherent differences in our biological make-up but are the result of a combination of accident and choice in the social world. (This is a statement of general conditions, and is not meant to apply to e.g., the effect of possible innate differences which contribute to Van Gogh painting differently from Paul Klee.) The realization of the extent to which particular perspectives are accidental leads to the recognition of the extent to which we are capable potentially of controlling them, and the recognition, through experience in the world as it now is, of the very complex set of conditions preventing us from actually controlling them.

We can study the relation between potential and actual control of society through analysing existing power relations, i.e., particular uses of energy, as they now exist. Marx discussed power relations as a problem within the context of
socio-economic organization where a few people use the organization to "exploit" the majority. He studied this "exploitation" as "forced labor", and considered the exploited, in their passivity, to be acting out of "false consciousness". He treated "false consciousness" as a rather simple (as opposed to complex) problem in his social theory, the solution to it being the realization by the exploited of their class position, i.e., of "class consciousness".

Weber defined power in a more general way, allowing for a clearer understanding of the problem Marx raised, power being

... the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action. 55

His definition presupposes, as conditions for the execution of power: 1) the existence of a "will", which must necessarily include (a) intention on the part of those acting and (b) a plan of action of some sort, and 2) interpersonal action, i.e., communal action. His definition does not imply that where power is exercised, there must necessarily be resistance to it. Realization of power against the resistance of others is only one possibility; another possibility being the realization of power by individuals in communal action such that there are no members who resist, or even would resist if they had the will to.

Weber's description of the combination of large scale
bureaucratic organization and capitalist ownership of the means of production (property) suggests that this combination is not only a use of societal organization which prevents a large number of people from realizing their "will", but suggests as well that it is a use of societal organization which prevents people, through the kind of involvement required by their participation in it, from forming "wills" that they might then try to realize. Weber defined power in such a way that power is the interpersonal use of energy. The enormous size of bureaucratic machinery gives the individuals involved in it the impression that they are dealing with an impersonal (consequently, inhuman) force, and directs their attention away from the fact that they are dealing with one another.

Marx's theory of forced labor, exploitation, etc., is an hypothesis that can be tested. To test it one would first have to analyse in detail the specific factors in contemporary socio-economic organization that "prevent" people from forming "wills" (i.e., discover whether there are such factors). Since power is an interpersonal use of energy, and since interpersonal activity is mediated through communication, the beginning of such an analysis could be undertaken by a study of communication channels. Familial, recreational, political, and economic organizations all can be seen as channels of communication. The questions to be answered by a study of these organizations (systems) would be communication of what, by whom, for what, and for whom. That is, who does what, where, when, why, to whom and
how is it done.

The task, however, is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are imbedded. Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there. The whole history of warfare between societies and within societies shows how much more readily and with how much greater emotional thrill we realize ourselves in opposition to common enemies than in collaboration with them.
CONCLUSION

The 19C humanist perspective was one with which men criticised their social organization with reference to their traditional values. It seems that in order to get beyond alienation in the 20C men need to be critical of both their traditional values and their social organization. Men have a method by which they are now able to do this, the scientific method, and the attitude with which it is associated. In the broadest sense, the method consists of ways of checking our expectations about some specific event with the actual occurrence of that event. If we are going to adopt this method with reference to human behavior, we have also to take the attitude accompanying it, the attitude being characterized by "healthy scepticism", i.e., by delaying habitual responses, suspending habitual expectations about how people behave.

Marx's work, among other things, showed how men are, in general, unable to distinguish their values from their sensory experience, and consequently, in the process of reification, fail to control either. He also developed the notion that social organization can more or less allow for human expression, depending on the kind of organization and the goals associated with it. He suggested that all organization is directed to some end, and in fact, that people only organize for ends.

Marx assumed that social perspectives are, in general,
biasing, and that objective knowledge is independent of such bias. Social perspectives as biasing he termed reification, in contrast with objective knowledge. Marx assumed that if the biasing perspectives were exposed for what they really are, men would be free to act humanly, seemingly that human behavior is inevitable in the absence of reification and forced labor.

Mead approached knowledge from another direction, believing that social perspectives are basic to knowledge, i.e., are knowledge. Mead suggested that there is one attitude common to all of humanity, the attitude of comprehensibility which is most basic to human life. He suggested that with the scientific method we are learning to test the past against the present.

Applying this notion to alienation, we are learning to cope with the authority of our ancestors. We are at present witnessing a confrontation between authority as such and individual perspectives which deny the use of authority which is external to them.

Mead suggested that his analysis of human society frees us from the past, taking us beyond the necessity of adhering to old moralities and authority, and providing us with the freedom to choose. The old moralities and authority assume that people are incapable of taking individual responsibility, and that they must be cared for as children by e.g., the Church and the State. Mead did not, as Marx did, assume that man will take individual responsibility in a "new world"; he assumed
that he can do so, through adopting the common attitude of comprehensibility. With the adoption of such an attitude, there can be no absolute social perspective in the sense of one best way, one total ideology. Nothing which is open to the conscious scrutiny of people can totally capture them. The ability to imagine and analyse the situations in which we find ourselves makes these situations arbitrary rather than total.

With this attitude our myths are exploded, and we are unable to justify our actions with reference to total ideologies. Instead, we are led to question, to test the validity of our assumptions -- to discover under what conditions people will act in one way or another, and the laws associated with their behavior.

One consequence or symptom of alienation in our contemporary world is the lack of significance in the lives of many, the majority of, people. Most people most of the time move "blindly" or habitually through the events comprising their lives, and are referred to by some contemptuously, as "the masses". Only when we become aware, within a larger framework of our movement, does our activity take on significance for us. Men make their actions human (i.e., give them significance) by referring them to larger frameworks, by seeing themselves through their actions in the world. The suggestion here is that removal of forced labor may be a necessary condition for going beyond alienation, but it is not a sufficient one. It is
also necessary for men to make their lives meaningful, i.e., in Marx's sense, to work freely to create themselves.

From the combination of Marx's theory of alienation and Mead's theory of human society, I have deduced some basic hypotheses about the ways in which men do and can make their lives significant, through controlling themselves and their interrelations.

1. Individuals can control events only if
   a. they are involved in effecting the events
   b. they are able to understand some possible alternate lines of action that can be taken to effect the event.

2. The less understanding there is of the possible alternatives, the less controllable is the event.

3. Any individual's understanding of an event (in terms of the possible alternate lines of action) derives from an understanding common to all individuals involved in the event and refers back to that common understanding for its validation.

4. It is equally as necessary, for each person's understanding of an event, to know the locations (perspectives, associated with identity) of all persons involved, since all involved contribute to the results and experience the effects of the co-operation.

5. Only to the extent that one knows the location (identity) of all persons involved in an event does he know his own location.
6. The fewer number of people, relative to the total number, deliberately effecting an event, the fewer number of locations that can be identified.

7. The fewer number of locations that can be identified, the less complete will be the common understanding of the event. (leading back to 2)

8. The limits of self-conscious co-operation (self-determination) are defined by the maximum size of a group in which all affected by the event can deliberately effect the event.

9. The maximum size of a group in which all affected also deliberately effect the action would depend, in turn, upon the nature of the activity. (Two factors involved in the limitations imposed by the nature of the activity would be technical skill at organizing and available communication channels)

By common understanding, I am referring to Mead's common attitude of comprehensibility.

All of these hypotheses refer to one event, and I have apparently ignored Mead's basic contention that significance emerges in the confrontation between one system and another. It seems to me that it would be in relation to the confrontation between different systems that men would see the alternatives for action with reference to one system, i.e., that they can understand one event only in relation to other events in which they are involved. This is Mead's basic notion of
sociality. It can be illustrated quite simply: one can ask what attitude a person has toward e.g., a specific sort of criminal activity, as a "father", as a "judge", as a "criminal", as a "political scientist", as an "artist", etc., getting different perspectives on the same "object", or event. It is not the specific content of any "role" that is human behavior, but rather the capacity to move from one "role" to another, to choose roles, invent new ones, etc., that is characteristic of all humans. We can see this as a fact from cross cultural comparisons. It is toward this capacity that scientists (as opposed to natural historians) must direct their attention if they choose to understand human behavior.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See Leon Festinger's *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Stanford University Press, 1957, esp. Ch.1. Festinger refers to cognition as mapping "reality", and to cognitive dissonance as an experience due to "the reality impinging on a person" and exerting "pressures in the direction of bringing the appropriate cognitive elements into correspondence with that reality".

2. I am referring to Marx's theory of alienation, and consider theories previous to his, e.g. those of Hegel and Feuerbach, to be partial theories. Hegel uses alienation to describe a state of mind, and Feuerbach uses it with reference to sensual experience. Marx was the first to ground both mind and sensual experience in practice.

3. "Classless society" is a symbolic representation of this second solution because we cannot assume that elimination of classes will result in the elimination of alienation. Simple destruction of one way of life does not automatically imply the creation or construction of another to take its place. "Classless" tells us what will not exist, but does not adequately describe what will exist. Only in the development of a new form of social organization can the symbolic be actualized.

4. This myth has been expressed in different ways--e.g. as the Hebrew's "Jehova", Plato's "Forms", Durkheim's "Collective Conscience."


7. Responsibility implies the capability of an individual to consciously make choices from among alternate lines of action, and to recognize himself as making these choices. It presupposes self-consciousness.

8. Identity as the recognition by the person of "where he stands"--both as the possibility that, given different
conditions, he would stand somewhere else, and of the continuity of being the same individual making different choices in different circumstances. Only in responsible activity can an individual "discover" and create his identity. I would like to note that no temporal sequence is intended here.

9. This use of co-operation applies for other forms of life as well as for men. Bees, ants, wolves, co-operate to effect events. The distinction I am making is one between all animals co-operating to effect events and man's capability for responsible (consciously determined) co-operation.


11. Property can be seen as an extension of the self, marking boundaries between individuals, and identification of ourselves through property relations is indicated in our uses of "me" and "mine", "you" and "yours".

12. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1951; and Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, Henry Regnery Co., Gateway Ed., Chicago, 1962, for two excellent discussions on this problem. The clearest and most awful description that I have found of the helplessness that can be felt by people when faced with situations in which their old assumptions have no effect is given by Rudolf Vrba in I Cannot Forgive, Bantum, Toronto, 1964, in which he describes with cool intelligence his experiences as a prisoner in Auschwitz.


14. This special use of the word present was developed in Mead's Philosophy of the Present, and will be discussed more fully in Ch. 4. It was through developing some of the philosophical implications in Einstein's General Theory of Relativity that Mead arrived at this usage of the word. At present it is sufficient to note that he referred to the present as the "locus of reality", in which the self finds its expression and to which mind refers.
15. Gerth & Mills, in the introduction to From Max Weber, Oxford University Press, New York, 1958, p.p. 71-73, discuss Weber's idea of freedom in our complex societal organization. Weber "...conceived of individual man as a composite of general characteristics derived from social institutions; the individual as an actor of social roles... (only in so far as he does not)... transcend the routines of everyday institutions." (p. 73) The point is that men can define themselves as cogs in a machine, and can act on this definition, and can understand, predict and control their behavior on the basis of their self-definition and their acting out of it. They do not have to, but choose to do this. Marx's argument, with reference to this issue, was that if men choose to do this, they are not acting in the interest of their human nature. Mead went farther and showed how human nature is the transcendence of "the routines of everyday institutions".

16. Sociality is another word that gains a particular definition in Mead's work. It refers to that universal process which allows for the occurrence of new phenomena. Mind is a social process which allows the individual "minding" to take different perspectives with reference to the same object. The object being regarded is a social process as well, by his definition of sociality as "the capacity of being several things at once."
CHAPTER I


5. Both J. B. Bury (The Idea of Progress, Dover, New York, 1932, esp. Ch. XIII, "German Speculations on Progress", pp. 238-59) and Arthur O. Lovejoy (The Great Chain of Being, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960, esp. Ch. IX-XI) discussed the great concern of philosophers in Hegel's time with the idea of the historical development of man. Hegel, along with his friend Goethe, accepted the idea of eternal change, while still maintaining the notion that man is perfectable, (Bury, p. 259) Self-conscious Spirit being the final stage of man's development.

Hegel developed the dialectic method to describe this development as the continual merging of finite and infinite in the process of becoming. His notion was that while the subject as infinite and the object as finite are not contained within the same being, there is continual change, i.e., becoming. When the subject and object are united in the same being, Self, which is both finite and infinite, the negation of the one by the other is a self-negation. The negation of this self-negation, the synthesis of the finite and the infinite, is being-for-self, or self-contemplation, i.e., Self-conscious Spirit.


8. In Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, (Tr. J. B. Baillie, New York, 1931) he traced the development of the World Spirit through three stages: Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Alienated Consciousness. Each stage, he
believed, represents a new "level of consciousness", or the Spirit coming more completely to be conscious of itself. The basic principle of Stoicism is that consciousness is essentially "that which things". Stoicism is the negation of otherness, i.e., of anything which is not thought. Because it ignores existence Stoicism does not negate existence in an absolute sense. Scepticism does absolutely negate existence by doubting existence. It is the "realization of that of which Stoicism is merely the notion, and is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is; it is in itself and essentially the negative, and so must exhibit itself". (p.246) Stoicism answers to the notion of independent consciousness; Scepticism corresponds to its realization. Stoicism recognizes only pure thought; Scepticism recognizes existence and denies it.

The Unhappy Consciousness has gone beyond both Stoicism and Scepticism through recognizing both pure thought and particular existence. The Unhappy Consciousness has transcended pure thought, "so far as this is the abstract thought of Stoicism, which turns away from particulars altogether, and again the merely restless thought of Scepticism--so far, in fact, as this is merely particularity in the sense of aimless contradiction and the restless process of contradictory thought. It has gone beyond both of these; it brings and keeps together pure thought and particular existence, but has not yet risen to that level of thinking where the particularity of consciousness is harmoniously reconciled with pure thought itself. It rather stands midway, at the point where abstract thought comes in contact with the particularity of consciousness qua particularity. Itself is this act of contact; it is the union of pure thought and individuality; and this thinking individuality or pure thought also exists as object for it, and the unchangeable is essentially itself an individual existence. But that this its object, the unchangeable, which assumes essentially the form of particularity, is its own self, the self which is particularity of consciousness--this is not established for it". (pp.256-57)

10. Ibid., Ch.14, pp.217-267.
11. Ibid., pp.149-55.
12. Ibid., p.258.
13. Ibid., p.259.
14. Ibid., Ch.VI, B.

15. Lowith, op.cit., p.80.


17. A major flaw in Feuerbach's argument is the assumption that if an event, A, arises out of conditions X,Y,Z; then the conditions X,Y,Z are equivalent to event A. George Herbert Mead argued against this assumption with his notion of "emergence", which will be discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis. An authoritative argument on this subject, with reference to the emergence of life out of non-life, can be found in the biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy's book, Problems of Life, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1960.

18. Feuerbach, op.cit., p.79.

19. Ibid., p.244.

20. Ibid., p.245. For a discussion of the philosophical relation between Hegel and Feuerbach, see Lowith, op.cit., pp.71-82.


22. See Lowith's discussion, op.cit., p.76.

23. See note 19 above.

24. Lowith, op.cit., p.76.

25. See Marx's The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Tr. M. Milligan, International Publishers, New York, 1964, esp. p.111, para.4, and p.112, para.2. That Marx consistently referred to aspects of alienation becomes relevant in my discussion in Chapter III of contemporary thinkers' handling of the concept. Seeman, for example, ("On the Meaning of Alienation", American Sociological Review, 24, Dec., 1959, pp.783-91) distinguished four kinds, rather than aspects, of alienation, arguing that they are logically distinguishable. Marx's reference was to the empirical world; and the way in which Seeman has handled this concept, without reference to empirical conditions of alienation, misses the point of Marx's argument, and results in an empty classification system.


29. For some fascinating new information on the possible source of private property in the territoriality of animals; and for a discussion on the different uses of social space in different cultures, see respectively, Robert Ardrey's African Genesis, Collins, London, 1961; and Edward T. Hall's The Hidden Dimension, Doubleday, New York, 1966.


31. Ibid., p.112.

32. Ibid., p.112.

33. See Marx's chapter on "Human Requirements", op.cit., pp.147-164.

34. Ibid., p.113.

35. Ibid., p.112 ff.

36. Ibid., p.115.


38. The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p.107. Some contemporary theorists who are concerned with man's treatment as a commodity are, to name only a few, William H. Whyte, Marcuse, Fromm, Gabriel Marcel, Helen Lynd, Pappenheim, Bettelheim, and Arendt, whose works are referred to in my Bibliography.

39. Ibid., p.108.

40. Ibid., p.108.

41. Ibid., p.115.

42. Ibid., p.115.

43. Ibid., p.119.

44. Ibid., p.119.
45. Lowith, op. cit., p. 76.


47. Rotenstreich, op. cit., p. 553.

48. See Flamenatz, Man and Society, op. cit., Ch. 6, pp. 351-408, for a discussion of Marx's understanding of "society" and "community".


50. Ibid., p. 76.

51. Ibid., p. 24.

52. Ibid., p. 22.

53. Ibid., p. 23.

54. Ibid., p. 74.

55. Ibid., p. 67.

56. Ibid., p. 75.


58. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 140.

59. Ibid., p. 138.

60. From Hegel to Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 155.


62. From Hegel to Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 281.

63. For a more detailed discussion of the various ways in which Marx defined "ideology", see Flamenatz, op. cit., pp. 323-50.
64. The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 2.


66. See Marcuse's use of "one-dimensional" in One-Dimensional Man, Beacon, Boston, 1964.

CHAPTER II


4. Ernst Fischer, in The Necessity of Art (Tr. A. Bostock, Penguin, 1963) noted that "Marx and Engels both warned against dogmatic and mechanistic over-simplifications of their fundamental thesis" (i.e., interpreted as economic determinism, against which Weber argued in favor of the influence of ideas independently of economics upon social change) (p.128). He quoted passages from letters written by Engels to Joseph Bloch and Starkenburg, explaining the approach Marx took to his subject matter. To Bloch he wrote, "According to the materialist view of history, production and reproduction of real life are, in the last instance, the determining factor in history. Neither Marx nor I have asserted more than that. If anybody twists this into a claim that the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms our statement into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but all the factors of the superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its results, constitutions adopted by the victorious class after winning a battle, forms of law, and more than that, the reflections of all these real struggles in the minds of the people involved, political, legal, and philosophical theories, religious views both in their early and their more developed, dogmatic form—all these factors also influence the course of historical struggles and in many cases play the dominant role in determining their form". (p.128) Engels repeated the same theme in his letter to Starkenburg: "Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, and artistic developments, etc. are based on economic development. But, in addition, they all react upon one another and also on the economic basis. The economic situation is not an original cause which alone is active while all else is merely passive effect. There is, rather, mutual action on the basis of economic necessity, which always proves the determining factor in the last instance."(p.128)

6. Ibid., p.186.
8. Ibid., p.187.
10. Ibid., p.184.
11. Ibid., p.186.
12. Ibid., p.183.
13. Ibid., p.185

14. Studies on the "marginal man" have shown that this is true for movement from one society to another as well as for movement within a society. See Everett V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man, a Study in Personality and Culture Conflict, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937, pp.139-58.

16. Ibid., p.183.
17. Ibid., p.79.
18. Ibid., p.79.
20. Ibid., p.214.
22. Ibid., p.216.
23. From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p.281. See his note as well.
24. The Economic & Philosphic Manuscripts, op.cit., p.139.
26. Ibid., p.228.
27. Ibid., p.228-29.
28. Ibid., p.229.
29. Ibid., p.221.
30. Ibid., p.229.
31. Arnold Hauser, in The Social History of Art (Tr. S. Godman, New York, Knopf, 1952), discussed the relation of cultural products to the society in which they arise, and their carry-over into different conditions.
34. From Max Weber, op.cit., p.293.
35. Ibid., p.294.
37. Ibid., p.143.
38. Ibid., p.143.
39. Ibid., pp.148-49.
40. Ibid., p.156.
43. Ibid., p.158.
44. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op.cit., p.103.
CHAPTER III

3. Ibid., p.144.
7. "Alienation and Anomie", seen by the author through the courtesy of T. B. Bottemore, then Head of the Department of Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology at Simon Fraser University, now at Sussex in England, shortly to be published.
and Dean in trying to measure alienation. Clark's criticism was that their measuring scales failed to be situationally specific. He argued, "It is necessary for man to consider himself deserving a role in the social situation before he can experience feelings of alienation within it..." (p.849). Scales which are not specific to situations imply some normative behavior in the society as a whole, an assumption which is unwarranted and which needs testing. With reference to Nettler's scale, which is an attempt to measure estrangement from popular culture, a person may be disinterested in 'items' of popular culture without being alienated.

Alienation scales which are based upon the assumption of normative behavior in society are meaningless within the Marxian definition of the word. This approach puts the onus on the individual who is seen as a deviate, rather than critically assessing the relation between individuals and their social relations.

Neal and Rettig (op.cit., ref.5) discussed the many meanings assigned to "alienation" by different sociologists in their attempts to operationalize the term, and concluded that "in the absence of agreement on the meanings of the major variables involved, alienation research, taken collectively, manifests a series of discrete and unrelated studies, rather than cumulative additions to a coherent body of empirically verified propositions". (p.63) They suggested that "careful empirical studies of alienation should eventually provide a basis for synthesizing numerous sociological and psychological concerns with man and society". (p. 63ff) It seems to me, as I argue in this paper, that the problem with alienation studies is not one of a lack of "empirical orientation", but one of the assumptions the researchers bring into their study of alienation.

10. The Division of Labor in Society, Tr. G. Simpson, The Free Press, New York, 1966, p.3, "Human passions stop only before a moral power they respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting, the law of the strongest prevails, and latent or active, the state of war is necessarily chronic."

11. I do not mean to disparage the positive contributions of these theorists, but merely to underline the limitations inherent in their analyses due to the assumptions that they carried into their analyses of society.


14. See Robert Blauner's Alienation and Freedom, op.cit., ref. 5, as an example of this tendency.


16. Nearly all of the books listed in my Bibliography are concerned in some way with the threat of alienation. Special attention might be given to Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Matson, The Broken Image; Laing, The Divided Self; and Bettleheim, The Informed Heart; to name only a few.

17. For a classic study of some of the effects of "adjustment" to conditions in suburban districts, see Whyte's The Organization Man, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1957. See, also, Alan Harrington's "Life in the Crystal Palace", in Man Alone (op.cit.) pp. 133-43.

18. See the books by Lewis Mumford and by Ashley Montagu in my Bibliography with reference to this problem of man's adjustment to his environment and it to him.


23. The printing industry is characterized by craft technology; the chemicals industry by continuous-process; the textiles by machine-tending; and automobile industry by the assembly-line technique. Craft technology is distinguished by lack of standardization, relatively low level of mechanization, a high proportion of workers with traditional skills, and it is the prototype of
pre-industrial society. Machine-tending is the prototype technique of early industrialism. The products in this industry are highly standardized and the hand work which existed in pre-industrial manufacture of textiles has been eliminated. The job of the worker is to tend a large number of machines, a job which requires very little skill but demands attention of the worker. The social and economic structure of the automobile industry (assembly-line) is bureaucratic rather than traditional in contrast to the printing and textiles industries. The typical automobile factory is large and has an impersonal atmosphere, with even greater standardization of the product than in machine-tending technology; large centralized factories, compressed wage and skill distribution, infrequent advancement opportunities and relatively few close-knit, functional work groups. The continuous-process technology common to chemical plants is characterized by large plants with relatively few workers, decentralization, a balance of skill distribution, highly elaborate system of job classification, variety of work and responsibility, and a relaxed work pace. Blauner noted that the loyalty of the chemical operator to the firm for which he works approaches that of the white collar organization man.

24. Ibid., p.15.

25. See Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation".

26. Seeman argued that his five uses of "alienation" are "logically distinguishable", but one can question the value of such a distinction since the five modes of alienation as defined by him are interrelated and not separable in reality. For example, with reference to his definition of powerlessness and meaninglessness: powerlessness is "the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks" (p.784); and meaninglessness occurs when "the individual is unclear as to what he ought to believe--when the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision making are not met". (p.785) By definition, if a person experiences meaninglessness he must also experience powerlessness, indicating that the two are not independent of one another. It might also be debated whether a person can feel powerless in situations which are meaningful for him.

27. See my discussion of alienation, Ch. One.


31. See note 3, Ch. Two.


33. Ibid., p. 183.


38. For a discussion of the "unreal alternatives" considered by factory workers, see Ely Chinoy, Automobile Workers and the American Dream, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1955.


19, l, 1955, pp.21-27, which pictured the alienated man as being egocentric, distrustful, pessimistic, anxiety ridden and filled with resentment.


45. Ibid., p. 49ff.


50. Refer to note 23, this Chapter.


52. Ibid., p.50.

53. On Shame and the Search for Identity, op.cit.
54. Childhood and Society, op. cit.


CHAPTER IV


2. None of which he wrote with the intention of publication. These three volumes are comprised of notes gathered from lectures, and from Mead's own notes. See Morris's introductions for details. The Philosophy of the Act, ed. C. Morris, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964; The Philosophy of the Present, ed. A. Murphy, Open Court Publishing Co., La Salle, Ill., 1959; Mind, Self and Society, ed. C. Morris, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963.


4. See The Philosophy of the Present, p.1, and The Philosophy of the Act, pp.31-33, 56, 627-29, 119, 274-75, and 364-65, for Mead's definition of "reality". He wrote, for example, "Appearance is the adjustment of the environment to the organism—that is, the effect which the environment has upon the organism because of the characteristics of the organism. Reality is the effect which the environment has upon the organism when the organism has responded to the primary influence of the environment upon the organism", (p.627) and "This world, which is the test of all observation and all scientific hypothetical reconstruction has in itself no system that can be isolated as a structure of laws, or uniformities, though all laws and formulations of uniformities must be brought to its court for its imprimatur." (p.31) This is the world of "things and events, which are what they are". For a view of the world sympathetic with that of Mead, see Wallace Stevens' poetry, and his book The Necessary Angel, where he discusses reality as things which are what they are, and the "pressures of reality" on the imagination. (Essays on Reality and the Imagination, London, Faber, 1960)

5. The Philosophy of the Present, pp.20-21.

6. Mead said of perspectives, e.g., (arguing against Whitehead's interpretation of relativity) "In his objective statement of relativity the existence of motion in the passage of events depends not upon what is taking place in an absolute space and time, but upon the relation of a consentient set to a percipient event. Such a relation stratifies nature. These stratifications are not only there in nature but they are the only forms of
nature that are there. This dependence of nature upon the percipient event is not a reflection of nature into consciousness. Permanent spaces and times, which are successions of these strata, rest and motion, are there, but they are there only in their relationship to percipient events or organisms. We can then go further and say that the sensuous qualities of nature are there in nature, but there in their relationship to animal organisms. We can advance to the other values which have been regarded as dependent upon appetite, appreciation, and affection, and thus restore to nature all that a dualistic doctrine has relegated to consciousness, since the spatio-temporal structure of the world and the motion with which exact physical science is occupied is found to exist in nature only in its relationship to percipient events or organisms". (p.171) A perspective, then, is a relation between the "percipient event" and nature.

7. Ibid., p.10.
8. Ibid., p.11.
10. "A (significant) symbol does tend to call out in the individual a group of reactions such as it calls out in the other, but there is something further that is involved in its being a significant symbol: this response within one's self to such a word as 'chair' or 'dog', is one which is a stimulus to the individual as well as a response. This is what, of course, is involved in what we term the meaning of a thing, or its significance. When we speak of the meaning of what we are doing we are making the response itself that we are on the point of carrying out a stimulus to our action." (Mind, Self, and Society, p.72)

12. Ibid., p.13.
15. Ibid., p.16.
18. Ibid., p.ix.
19. Ibid., p.x.
20. Ibid., p.23.
21. Ibid., p.23.
22. Ibid., p.24.
24. Ibid., p.25.
25. Ibid., p.34.
26. Ibid., p.33.
27. Ibid., p.34.
28. Mind, Self and Society, p.44.
29. The Philosophy of the Present, p.35.
30. Ibid., pp.36-37.
31. Ibid., pp.36-37.
32. Ibid., p.49.
33. Ibid., p.48.
34. Ibid., p.62.
35. Ibid., p.72.
36. Ibid., p.73.
37. Ibid., p.69.
38. Ibid., p.80
39. Ibid., p.83.
40. Ibid., p.83.
41. Ibid., p.83.
42. Ibid., p.85.
43. Ibid., pp.13-14.
44. Ibid., pp.88-89.
45. Ibid., p.90.
47. Ibid., p.155.
49. Ibid., pp.166-67.
50. Ibid., p.168.
51. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p.112.
52. The German Ideology, pp.3-5.
54. The Philosophy of the Present, p.167.
56. The Philosophy of the Present, p.194.
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