THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSPECTIVE
IN KARL MANNHEIM'S
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

by

Peter C. Morley

B. A. (Hons,) Simon Fraser University, 1967

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Political Science, Sociology & Anthropology

© PETER C. MORLEY, 1969
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

March, 1969
(ii)

EXAMINING COMMITTEE

Dr. D. G. Bettison
Department of Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology
Simon Fraser University
Senior Supervisor

Dr. F. B. Collinge
Department of Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology
Simon Fraser University
Examining Committee

Dr. Werner Cohn,
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
University of British Columbia
Examining Committee
Abstract

Karl Mannheim's name is firmly linked with the sociology of knowledge which is chiefly known for its preoccupation with the problematic connections between sociocultural factors and thought in its various manifestations. The inherent relativism of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is evident not only from his considerations on the historicity of human thought, that is, its dependence on and limitation by the historically created conditions prevailing in a specific culture at a specific time, but on the contrary, his emphasis was on the relativity of human thought with regard to position in social space. In a stratified society, he reasoned, thought products and knowledge are expressions of group or class situations. It is not only the content of ideologies that varies from group to group within the same society; also members of different groups see and comprehend even the same things with different eyes. Their "thought styles" are as different as their thought systems.

Group and class ideologies, in their dual function as thought styles have been called Aspektstrukturen, roughly translated as universe of discourse. They represent the common frames of reference of the group members. Within these frames, meaningful discussions are possible; errors of thought may be eliminated as accidental deviations from the common outlook, and truth may be established by reference to universally recognized group values. Usually, universes of discourse are conceived of as the unquestioned sources and preconditions of valid knowledge. The "detached observer", however, is aware that a number of universes of discourse exist, and he may recognize their partial correctness as well as
their particular social slant. This particular nature of universe of discourse, which opens up a view upon the social "world" as seen from a specific social angle, has been described as "perspectivism".

If a sociologist of knowledge decides to adhere to a non-evaluative treatment of his subject matter, he must establish the partiality, the perspectivism, of all socially encountered group ideologies, without attempting to construct postulates that would be valid for all of them. A recognition of perspectivism leads to the acceptance of a universal relativism, and thereby excludes the establishment of a generally valid knowledge.

Mannheim's concept of "perspectivism" is critically examined; and it is argued that his early preoccupation with the structural analysis of knowledge, as formulated in his dissertation (published in 1922 under the title Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie) and expanded in his seminal work Ideology and Utopia (1929), sets the stage for his later analysis of social crises and his subsequent "prescriptive" sociology. It is demonstrated that Mannheim moves away from Weltanschaungen historicistic philosophy to his conceptualization of "perspectivistic relationism", which he argues will provide "a new level of objectivity" in the analysis of the social.

It is shown that in investigating successive ideologies Mannheim asserted a "necessary regularity" in their sequence, a regularity leading to an understanding of the "inner meaning of history" itself. Mannheim demonstrated this most clearly in his representation of the development of the "utopian mentality" from the Anabaptists to the Marxian socialists:
here it is shown that he moves through a series of dialectical spirals of genuinely Hegelian design.

Methodologically, Mannheim was faced with the task of showing how his sociology of knowledge, as a system of social inquiry, could serve as an instrument for the systematic liquidation of the ontologically postulated relativism and how it could establish generally valid knowledge within the framework of his epistemological assumptions. In other words, he had to answer the question how a sociology of knowledge is possible in the face of his historicistic presuppositions.

It is argued, in the main body of the thesis, that the possibility of a non-perspectivistic and thus universal knowledge would have been demonstrated if Mannheim had shown that there is a particular and unique position within the social structure, the occupants of which are situationally equipped to overlook and comprehend the totality of the social process. He believed that he established such a stratum in his "socially unattached intelligentsia", but this proves to be a historicistic construction without empirical counterpart. Mannheim, it is argued, failed to link his theoretical system to the existence of a specific social group.

A comprehensive or overall social insight may be gained through various means of perspectival synthesis. Insofar as such syntheses are accomplished by conscious intellectual effort they may be subjected to what Maquet has called the "criterion of objectivity". But since this turns out to be only another term for Mannheim's "criterion of unanimity", i.e., "sharing the same point of view" is possible; within limits, nothing new
is added by applying it to a unification of several perspectives. For selecting the "best perspective" among several, Mannheim suggested "empirical fruitfulness" as a measure: the best perspective is that which reveals the "decisive features of the object". This suggestion begs the question, however: what is regarded as most fruitful depends on the purpose in hand and the frame of reference used. In this case the frame of reference has to exist outside the perspective under consideration. Thus, we argue, the selection of a "best perspective" for purposes of synthesis, or of the "best elements" out of several perspectives, must rest on acceptance of a pre-established theory. The suggested procedure seems to be subject to, or dependent on, an acceptance of Mannheim's sociological system. In sum, then, the notion of a "best perspective" begs the question which is: "Best with reference to what objectives?" In the final chapters of the thesis we demonstrate that Mannheim has unlocked a pandora's box. He has thrown open the whole axiological question. Does he thrust us back into a box of metaphysical presuppositions? This, and other questions of an axiological nature, are examined. Mannheim's own sociological perspective is examined to discover what really are his presuppositions with regard to value, and the connections, if any, between these axiological presuppositions and his sociological perspective.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examining Committee</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>(iii) to (vi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acknowledgment</td>
<td>(viii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>(ix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Existential Basis of the Perspective</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mannheim's Thesis: Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Concept of Ideology: An Overview of a Myth</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Weltanschauung: A Structural and Historical Approach to Knowledge and the Perspective</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Problem of Imputation</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Perspectivism: Specificity or Generalization?</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Detached Perspective: Knowledge and Alienation</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Unattached Intelligentsia</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Search for Objectivity: The Revised Epistemology</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mannheim's Perspective: From &quot;Soul&quot; to Social Reconstruction</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concluding Comments</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

My thanks are due in the first instance to Professor David G. Bettison for the extremely valuable guidance and encouragement he gave me during the writing of this thesis. His contribution consisted of invaluable criticism, comment, suggestion and personal generosity. I have always found him a challenging and critical thinker, and our frequent discussions helped greatly to clarify my thoughts.

I am also indebted to Professor T. B. Bottomore of the University of Sussex, who as a teacher and friend, imparted in my student years a love for sociology and philosophy and left me with whatever sensitivity and appreciation I have for the social sciences.

Special thanks are due to Professor A. H. Somjee whose scholarly approach toward the "stuff" of politics has left a lasting impression.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge a general and considerable debt to a stimulating group of teachers and friends at Simon Fraser University, including, Tom Brose, Frank B. Collinge, Louis Feldhammer, Nathan S. Popkin, Gary B. Rush, Michael J. Mulkay, and Robert W. Wyllie. Let none of those mentioned be held responsible for my errors.
... I never judge a writer before I have studied him thoroughly. But to take as a norm the warning to be cautious, out of fear for a possible error or because of the eventual judgement of later epochs, - this I will not accept... If I have erred frequently, the historian of the future will be right...

Georg Lukacs to Anna Seghers,
28 July, 1938
Chapter 1

The Existential Basis of the Perspective

Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life.

Karl Marx

If I had been asked what existence was, I would have answered in good faith that it was nothing - merely an empty form which added itself to things from the outside, without changing anything of their nature. And then, suddenly, there it was, clear as day: existence was all of a sudden unveiled. It had lost its innocuous appearance of an abstract category: it was the very stuff of things.

Jean-Paul Sartre, La Nausée

Marx, more than any other thinker, influenced Mannheim's sociological thought. Marx and Engels asserted that "relations of production" establish the "real" foundations of the superstructure of ideas:

The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social political and intellectual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but on the contrary their social existence determines their consciousness.¹

In another context Marx argues:

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process...
Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain their semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this, their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. ²

Marx and Engels assert here that man's consciousness should lose its semblance of independence as if it were a self-generating phenomenon in its own right. Consciousness is determined by the totality of social existence as part of an on-going process of actual living. Human thought is not intelligible solely in terms of itself; explanation is possible only within the social context in which it occurs (relativism). As C. Williamson has observed, Marx is "announcing the programme of sociology"³ in that he is defining his position on one of the basic dichotomes of philosophy of science and is opting for a fundamental existential position. Marx and Engels provide us with a "minimal" conception of ideology in which human thought becomes ideological when placed "in a framework of a definite set of social relations". ⁴ However, Marx and Engels do not assert the position that ideology is the effect of which 'economics' is the cause, but that ideology is "directly interwoven with . . . the language of real life". ⁵ Marx, then, consistently maintained that the social relations of production constituted the real basis for the superstructure of ideas. What Marx attempted to do in essence was to "functionalize" ideas, i.e., relate ideas to their sociological base. ⁶ Yet thought is not an automatic "reflection" of objective social class position.
Although Marx's emphasis on the "definite set of social relations" is congruous with his concept of class as a basis for the imputation of ideas, but does not altogether eliminate other influential factors, he asserts the class basis as a primary factor. In the first preface to Capital he states this implicitly:

... here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests. 7

Marx hypothesizes that "class roles" are the primary determinants of thought and behavior. However, he does not do more than leave, as an open question, the problem of the extent or degree of determination involved in the economic factor of production as an influence on thought systems and knowledge. 8 Indeed, if we examine one line of development in Marx's thought from The German Ideology, to the later works of Engels we find that there is a progressive delimitation and re-definition of the degree of economic influence exerted on the conditions of knowledge and the forms of thought. The German Ideology is in fact, "largely taken up with a critical examination of different versions of the Hegelian philosophy of history". 9

Yet, both Marx and Engels placed considerable emphasis on the argument that "the ideologies of a social stratum need not stem only from persons who are objectively located in that stratum". 10 In the Communist Manifesto, for example, Marx and Engels indicate that as the ruling class moves towards dissolution:
... just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeois, so now a portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

For Marx and Engels, thought, ideas and knowledge are determined in a non-mechanistic way by locating the class position (by a process of imputation - to be examined in a later chapter) which is appropriate to the class perspectives under examination. Marx explicitly states that we must not embrace the narrow minded idea that the petty bourgeoisie wants to enforce an "egoistic class interest". Rather, this stratum holds on to the conviction that the special conditions of its emancipation are the general conditions through which alone modern (sic) society can be saved "and the class struggle avoided". Marx writes:

Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven from earth. What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is, in general, the literary representatives of a class and the class they represent.

Marx, then, was concerned with the argument that the external verities of dominant ideas and thought, appeared as class vested
expressions. Indeed, he regarded "pure thought" as irrelevant to existential reality and viewed it as a way to preserve the status quo and provide a rationalization (i.e. false consciousness) for the prevailing socioeconomic arrangement of power.

Marx, then, develops a theory of knowledge which was explicitly that of the natural sciences. To recapitulate briefly, Marx found social and political ideas determined by the sociocultural milieu to reflect the economic interests of specific classes involved in class conflict. In this instance Marx clearly distinguished between the natural sciences and his proposed science of man. He argues that in the social sciences objective knowledge is not possible because ideological thought and not objective ideas emanate from the class basis of thought. Marx argues that an objective value free science of man will emerge only when the distorting influence of ideologies is removed, i.e., when the class struggle is ended. Thus, with Marx, as with Bacon, the ideologues, and Comte, the perspectives of groups, classes, etc., are regarded as derogation from the "autonomy of reason".

Marx, then, argues that ideological thought is not a "permanent and inescapable feature of the human situation". Ideologies are obstacles to the construction of a science of society and will be transcended at the same point in history when such a science is created. The creation of a science of man and society, is however, dependent upon specific structural changes in society itself. This aspect of Marx's argument was grasped enthusiastically by Mannheim and culminated in the formulation of specific
criteria of what he termed the "best perspective".

Mannheim also assumed that a science of man was to be developed with a definite function in a world of transition. It was to this end that he employed the Marxian model and extended the existential basis. We now turn our attention to a preliminary examination of Mannheim's thesis and its derivation from Marx's thought. Further comment on Marx's influence becomes necessary as the concept of perspectivism is developed. We will demonstrate that Mannheim, during the development of a "perspectival synthesis" transforms Marx's sociological debunking of all social modes of thinking into a sociology of knowledge in which all positions are relative to their specific situation and perspectives. Applying theoretical insight, he reexamined the conditions of his own relativistic thinking and analyzed the perspectives of his own conceptions.
Footnotes - Chapter 1

4. Ibid., p. 127.
6. A more recent attempt to utilize the Marxian model in an analysis of philosophers and their interrelatedness to social structures in Erich Fromm's *The Dogma of Christ*, N. Y. Rinehold Winston (1955), see especially pp. 3-94.
Mannheim's Thesis: Introduction

Mannheim seeks to obtain a kind of 'documentary' perspective on the subject of motives, on a 'second level' of generalization. That is: he accepts not only the Marxist debunking of bourgeois motives, but also the bourgeois counter-debunking of proletarian motives; and he next proceeds to attenuate the notion of 'debunking' ('unmasking') into a more neutral concept that we might in English call 'discounting' or 'making allowance for'.

Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, (1941)

In the preceding chapter we briefly reviewed Marx's observations on the existential basis of thought and knowledge. It was this aspect of Marx's thought above all else, that influenced Mannheim. Mannheim's early involvement with the Marxian analytic framework, fused with the influence of Weber, Scheler, Husserl, Lederer, Lukacs and others, culminated in his "radical" sociology of knowledge. The word "radical" is appropriate because in contrast with Scheler's moderate view, which claims that social conditions do not determine the actual form or content of knowledge,¹ Mannheim's radical branch emphasizes that all aspects of culture are influenced by social conditions.

In the preceding chapter we also established the contention that central to Marx's thesis is the argument that ideologies, and knowledge in its broadest sense, are located socially through the analysis of their
"perspectives" and presuppositions. Mannheim's "perspectivism" although greatly influenced by Marx's presuppositions, also follows a path derived from German historicism "pushed to its extreme conclusion". Moreover, the "internal dialectic" of Mannheim's theoretical presuppositions "derives precisely from this antinomy between the perspectivistic character of all historical knowledge and the meaningful reality of the whole (i.e. the absolute)". Mannheim, then, derives from Marx primarily by a process of extension; he extends the Marxian existential basis. Once the fact of multiple group affiliation has been established the problem consists of establishing which of these affiliations "are decisive in fixing perspectives, models of thought, definitions of the given, etc." Mannheim, objecting to the assumption of what he termed a "dogmatic Marxism" which asserts that all social thought is traceable to a class basis, postulates a series of other social groups which are bearers of social ideologies or perspectives. Contrary to the charges of some of his critics, Mannheim does not merely impute thought to a class basis, but rather, he holds the opinion held by many contemporary social psychologists, that "reference groups" are also bases of perspectives. Mannheim elaborates his thesis on social groups and perspectives thus: 

... of course we do not intend to deny that of all the above mentioned social groupings and units class stratification is the most significant, since in the final analysis all the other social groups arise from and are transformed as parts of the more basic conditions ...
of production and domination. None the less, the investigator who, in the face of the variety of types of thought attempts to place them correctly can no longer be content with the undifferentiated class concept but must reckon with the existing social units and factors that condition social position outside those of class. 6

Mannheim's primary objection to what he terms an "undifferentiated class concept", is that it is too narrow. Again, he broadens the Marxian base to include such groups as "generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups, etc." 7

Mannheim, however, did not assert a direct liasion between economic position and ideology through the language of "real life", as did Marx. Rather, he concerns himself with such concepts as "social setting", "social position", etc., thereby denoting the relativity of a social class position. Although he extends the Marxian model beyond the limitations of economic position he does provide evidence which suggests that he was aware of the significance of economic substructure and accordingly ascribed some import to the Marxian concept of homo econimus. He writes:

All actions which arise from the purely economic sphere or are captured by it, have the tendency to become free of ideologies and to be 'value-naked'. All actions independent of, or opposed to this power, are of a spiritual ideological character. 8

The economic sphere thus becomes recognized as having a potential for
purely rational action disposing of both ideologies and values. Thus, it appears that Mannheim was familiar with the concept of economic Zweckrationalität, i.e., the rationality of economic means for what is termed "naked gains". Mannheim utilizes two distinct types of rationality derived from Max Weber. First, there is the concept of Wertrationalität, which implies that "the choice of means is oriented to the realization of a single absolute value without reference to consideration of cost". Secondly, there is the concept of Zweckrationalität which is more complex than Mannheim's use of the term as simply, expedient rationality. This type of rational economic activity in Weber is oriented to a plurality of values in such a way "that devotion to any one is limited by the possibility of its entailing excessive cost in the form of sacrifice of the others". Mannheim's theory of perspectivism expresses an implicit Zweckrational cognisance of a plurality of values, which means that the relations of production include social habits, value attitudes, and their legal and political realities as independent of, although interdependent with, economic processes.

Mannheim does not confine the concept of perspectivism to the various Weltanschauungen of a group held at various places and at various times. A specific social point, occupied and experienced by a group or an individual, does affect the social perspective of the members themselves. The members of a group, in fact, experience more than they observe! Indeed individuals, at their respective positions in the social structure tend to adopt different values, see different things,
exclude certain facts, stress the significance of their ideas vis-a-vis their social orientation, and see problems in terms of their vested interests. To use Mannheim's terminology, people operationalize different "categorical apparatus" when devising their particular personal Weltanschauung.

What then does this diversity of perspectives mean? One aspect is the extreme difficulty encountered in the movement of individuals from one social position to another. Given that the perspectives of an individual are formed through his relationship with reference groups the difficulties involved in perspectival cogito formation during any process of vertical or downward mobility are recognizable. Of course, we must recognize that certain members of society are just "passing through" any given social stratum, and that some have an all-encompassing world view, and others are determined to transcend the limitations of class position. The latter are best exemplified by the "unattached intelligentsia" and are accordingly given considerable attention by Mannheim.

It is central to Mannheim's thesis that thought systems are emanations of social groups whose perspectival "bias" is the end result of systematic interpretations of various social situations presented to them, and generated by them. Also, their perspectives are dependent upon the particular social vantage point of the class or groups to which they belong. Thought styles, argues Mannheim, become thought systems. Thought systems, comprising the in toto spiritual, (Volkgeist), and intellectual ideational systems of social groups, are subsumed under
his conception of ideology. The spiritual basis of the group's ideological expression is its Weltanschauung. The collective Weltanschauung appears as a product of a common historical fate, and unites the group spiritually; common people "absorb" it, but even "the profound insight of the genius" stems from the same grounds. 11

In sum, perspectivism (Aspektstruktur) "signifies the way in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking". Furthermore, perspectivism is something more than a formal determination of thinking, it refers to qualitative elements in the structure of thought. It is these factors "which are responsible for the fact that two persons, even if they apply the same formal-logical rules, e.g., the law of contradiction or the formula of the syllogism, in an identical manner, may judge the same object very differently". 12

The problem raised by such a position is that the formal, logical criteria used to differentiate between different perspectival viewpoints tend to be inadequate and it becomes necessary to discover new criteria which will accommodate Mannheim's "qualitative elements in the structure of thought". The perception and cognition of all social matters is governed by socially/culturally, derived perspectives. Perspectivism is a crucial factor of social structure, indeed of social existence.

Two types of perspectivism may be distinguished. First, there is that type which is concerned with such remarks as: "From my point
of view I think that...", or "From where I stand..." etc. Mannheim was not concerned with the different ways in which objects present themselves to the subject. Rather, he was primarily concerned with the way the subject looks at the sociohistorical process and how he construes an in toto situation from "given facts". He was concerned with "whole modes of conceiving things".

Mannheim's concept of ideology will now be considered principally through its historical and theoretical significance. By juxtaposing Mannheim's theory of ideology with other conceptions of the same term greater clarity is obtained and certain significant factors of his thesis emerge.
Footnotes - Chapter 2


2. R. Aron, German Sociology, p. 56.

3. Ibid., p. 57.


5. See for example, T. Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives" in the American Journal of Sociology, (1955) reprinted in A. Rose (ed.) Human Behavior and Social Process, (1962). It is interesting to observe here, with Peter Berger, that Merton, in his Social Theory and Social Structure, while developing an introduction to reference group theory, makes no attempt to relate this to the sociology of knowledge although this area is also covered in the same volume. C.f. P. Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality, p. 10.


7. Ibid.


9. The concept of Zweckrationalitaet was under discussion during the 1927-1930 period but was not incorporated in Ideology and Utopia. See also
Mannheim's Essay "Conservative Thought" in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology.


12. Ibid., p. 244.
Chapter 3

The Concept of Ideology: An Overview of a Myth

What is rational is real and what
is real is rational.

Hegel, Philosophy of Right

... 'a commonsense reality' becomes
irrelevant in a changed perspective.
An ideology is essentially a perspective
in which 'realities' are defined. As
long as the perspective remains intact,
so do the realities, and the problems
arising in the context of the realities
remain relevant. An ideological
struggle is essentially an attempt to
change a perspective and the resistance
to such an attempt. Thus, an ideological
struggle is not an attempt to 'solve a
problem', but an attempt to bring one
or another class of problems into focus.

Anatol Rapoport,
Our Generation, Vol. 1

Much of the literature devoted to the study of ideology traces
its paternity to the cumulative study of thought patterns dating back to
Thucydides and Aristotle. In a more specific sense, studies of
ideologies are closely associated with a growing conviction (rightly or
wrongly) that human behavior is either "non-rational" or "irrational".

This dichotomous view of man was given social impetus by the work of
Charles Darwin in 1859:¹ "since there is no break in the chain of descent
between man and other animal species, we need not assume that the
behavior of man is determined by forces radically different from those
operating in the behavior of animals. Since the behavior of animals is
largely impulsive and instinctive, men began to assert, at the turn of
the present century, that human beings too have instincts, that human
actions are in considerable part 'non-rational' or 'non-logical'. "2
This Darwinian influence may be traced through the work of such men
as Spencer, Kidd, Drummond, Durkheim, Sumner, Keller, Ward,
Eiddings, Baldwin, Cooley, and Ross. The list by no means ends here. 3
The notion of man as "non-rational", determined by culture, combined
with Freudian psychoanalytic thought to subvert (by a process which
also revealed the relativity of thought and morals) the eighteenth and
nineteenth century belief in "rational" man. 4

Given an intellectual recognition of man's "irrationality" as a
phenomenon we find a revised use and analysis of the concept of
ideology. In a historical sense, the concept of ideology emerged
during a time of religious, economic, and political controversy. This
"world" of intellectual conflict increased man's awareness of his opponent's
intellect. Earlier, distinctions were made between "objective reality"
and "social conceptions". This is particularly apparent in the writings
of such men as Marsilio de Padua (Defensor Pacis, 1324), and
Machiavelli (The Prince 1513, Discourses 1521). 5 Bacon presents us
with an analysis of the "idols" and preconceptions, the illusions of the
populace (praenotiones vulgares) which, in his mind, blocked the path
of scientific knowledge. 6 Indeed, in the seventeenth century ideologies
assumed the "shape" of what Carl Becker terms "climates of opinion".
He states: "What renders Dante's argument or St. Thomas' definition
meaningless to us is not bad logic or want of intelligence, but the medieval climate of opinion - those instinctively held preconceptions in the broad sense, that Weltanschauung or world pattern - which imposed upon Dante and St. Thomas a peculiar use of the intelligence and a special type of logic". This was a similar obstruction to scientific discourse as that observed in Bacon's time. In the eighteenth century there was a realization that ideas had a social setting. The Philosophes of the Enlightenment "demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials". The Enlightenment "produced a completely original form of philosophic thought. Even when it reworks prevailing ideas, when it merely continues to build on a foundation laid by the seventeenth century - as in the case with its cosmology - everything takes on a new meaning and appears in a new perspective. For nothing less than the universal process of philosophizing is now seen in a new light".

The word "ideology" is encountered, indeed coined, for the first time in 1801 when Destutt de Tracy, a French savant in charge of the Institut de France, used the term "ideologie". The "ideologues" of the "Institut" were liberals who asserted the primacy of freedom of thought and discourse and looked upon these as the major conquest of the French Revolution. Their attitude was "ideological" in the twofold sense of "being concerned with ideas, and of placing the satisfaction of 'ideal' aims (their own) ahead of the 'material interests on which the post-revolutionary society rested".
The dichotomous nature of the liberal "ideology" as formulated by Destutt de Tracy reveals itself as (a) a system of normative ideas, and (b) an incipient critique of absolute norms. His treatise Elements d'Ideologie, (1801-1815) puts forward a "Science des Idees" conceptually derived from Locke and Condillac the originators of what he termed "the natural history of ideas". The natural history of ideas will "describe the natural history of the mind", i.e., the way in which thought is shaped. Hence we see that:

Il est seulement à remarquer qu'il n'existe réellement que des individus et que nos idées ne sont point des êtres réels existant hors de nous, mais de pures créations de notre esprit, des manières de classer nos idées des individus.  

The "science of ideas" is to reveal true knowledge of human nature leading ultimately to the redefining of the "laws" of sociability; what is "natural" is therefore "social".  

Helvétius, (drawn upon by both Marx and Nietzsche), extends Holbach's thesis which asserts that man must:

free himself from all idols, from all illusions concerning the original cause of things, for only by so doing can he succeed in ordering and establishing the world according to his own ideas. 

The idols are "prejudices" contrary to "reason". An "unprejudiced" understanding of nature is only obtainable through the relentless application of critical reasoning. In his Systeme de la Nature (1770),
Holbach maintains that:

L'homme n'est malheureux que parce qu'il méconnait la Nature ... La raison guidée par l'expérience doit enfin attaquer dans leur source des préjugés dont le genre humain fut si longtemps la victime ... La vérité est une; elle est nécessaire à l'homme ... C'est à l'erreur que sont dues les chaînes accablantes que les Tyrans et les Prêtres forgent partout aux nations. 17

Helvetius maintains that "our ideas are the necessary consequences of the societies in which we live". 18 Helvetius, then, as stated, extends Holbach's thesis and forms a preliminary sociology of knowledge. The "idols" are the "necessary fruit of social constraint and selfish interest", but he is convinced that "unprejudiced" observations could be made by the application of reason and education. For Helvetius, scepticism is counterbalanced by the "rationalist faith" from Descartes: "reason has the power of correcting its own errors". 19

Marx, for the first time in history, placed the concept of ideology within the context of a systematic doctrine, analytically stated the relationship between environment and ideology, (it is possible that we have here the first notion of ideology as a culture system), and emphasized the socioeconomic foundation of ideology. Ideas, argued Marx were to be withdrawn from Hegelian "spiritualism" and secularized in the world of their origin.

In the world of "real active men", 20 the very origin of ideation - emerges his sociological perspective, that man develops specialized
techniques or "productive forces", and is thereby differentiated from other animals. The subject matter of historical materialism is the study of society and the laws of its development. Historical materialism studies the general laws of social development and provides a scientific dialectical-materialist interpretation of the phenomena of social life. It deals with such problems of human social development as the relationship between social being and social consciousness, the significance of material production for peoples' lives, the origins and role of social ideas and their corresponding institutions. The structure of society, the substructure (Unterbau) and the superstructure (Überbau) combined, give rise to ideologies, including art, religion, science, philosophy and morals.

Marx and Engels made a distinction between the illusory ideas of the masses (the common-sense perspective) and knowledge derived from scientific investigation. They describe ideology as "the deduction of a reality, not from reality itself but from imagination". Indeed Engels adds:

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives... he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of... thought...
of the life processes. Also, Marx's conception of ideology asserts that: "in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in 'camera obscura'." 25 Ideology is such that to say ideas are ideological is to say also that in one way or another, they distort the reality they reflect. That Marx considered his method in direct opposition to the French Ideologues is well known. However, the irony in the history of the concept of ideology is that whereas ideology probably began as a label for the scientific alternative to metaphysical speculation it ended as a cynical label for the metaphysical label for science. 26

The idea of life appearing as in "camera obscura" leads Marx to an oscillation between two senses of ideology: "the sense which includes all ideas used in mental intercourse, the widest sense of all; and the sense which includes only normative concepts and theories and doctrines which are not scientific". 27 Plamenatz, commenting on this "oscillation", observes that:

This second sense is suggested by the singling out of the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, and metaphysics, for these languages do not include all ideas but only those involved in the activities relegated to the superstructure; and perhaps also by the assertion that in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down, for presumably they do not appear so in science or in the mental intercourse actually involved in production. 28
In another passage, referring to the ideas of the ruling class, the ideas referred to "do not include all normative concepts; they include only concepts and doctrines which favor the interests of a class". Marx terms ideology false consciousness, and he also calls it illusion. Ideology has been described as a passional and delusional system by several contemporary social psychologists the most notable being Jules Monnerot. Monnerot elaborates upon Marx's thesis, he views, as did Marx, ideology as a collective "passional" or delusional system, as false consciousness. Monnerot adds to Marx's conception of ideology and consciousness in a two dimensional analysis. First, the individual is conscious of his desires, volitions, and impressions, "but not of their cause". In other words, he is not conscious of "what moves him". Ideology is "deflected by passion, and all its rational elements experience a sort of inner compulsion which does violence to their rational nature ... " Marx too, it should be remembered, speaks of ideology as illusion in terms of an individual not being conscious of the fact that ideology is a reflection of economic conditions.

One of the central problems, then, with Marx's concept of ideology is that he sometimes viewed ideology as beliefs and sentiments which are deeply set by conditioning forces impinging on the individual from birth. "Actual life processes," he writes, shape the individual from birth, even force upon him "a particular exclusive sphere of activity... from which he cannot escape: He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd,
or a critical critic and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood..." Each individual is directly interwoven with the "material activity" and the "material intercourse" of his fellow men; and from this material praxis and its social reflections men learn "a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life..." As "individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce it". Thus, not only does Marx see man attached to his "exclusive sphere of activity", but more specifically, they are also attached to a "mode of life" because, literally, that is what they are. And, included in what man is, encompassed in man's particular form of expression or mode of life, are various "forms of consciousness". Ideology is a part of "what men are" and the very form of their consciousness. 34

We turn our attention now to George Sorel. Sorel, like Durkheim, did not use the term "ideology", but referred to the "myth" and described this as a body of images capable of evoking sentiment instinctively. 35 Sorel argued from a position close to that of Whitehead; a position which asserts that science and human life both depend upon "the qualitative distinction between fact and value." The myth "could best release man from the bondage of either a mechanical or probabilistic world view". Moreover, "scientific statements could not effectively be used to challenge such a position," since Sorel had it on authority of the leading scientists of the age, that science was itself bound to arbitrary
models, to myths".  

Lasswell and Kaplan describe political myth as "the pattern of the basic political symbols current in a society". These "basic symbols" are "those having a bearing on the social structure, not merely on some, on particular power relationships or practice. These basic symbols formulate the most general perspectives concerning interpersonal relations in the society; specific power facts are responded to in these perspectives". Thus, the political myth "consists of the political perspectives most firmly accepted". The political myth comprises these "fundamental assumptions" about political life and consists of the symbols invoked "not only to explain but also to justify specific power practices". Sorel's usage of the term "myth" is not to be interpreted as necessarily imputing a fictional, false, or irrational character to the symbols. Symbols here are characterized in terms of their functioning, not directly by their properties. In this sense Sorel's "myth" is close to a number of other concepts: Marx's "ideology", Mosca's "political formula", Pareto's "derivations", Mannheim's "ideology" and "Utopia".

Contrary to the Marxian perspective, Sorel rejects the argument that false consciousness, the ideological standpoint, is injurious to the promotion of social action. He takes the view that "ideology is the essential element in human consciousness that makes possible any sort of revolutionary practice". For Sorel, the individual either acts on myths or not at all. Indeed, asserts Sorel, "we assume the value of fictions by acting as if they were the brute facts of experience".
It was Durkheim who made what may be considered the first systematic attempt to eliminate ideological influence from the social sciences. Durkheim claims that the social sciences must be "positive", "inductive", indeed "scientific". Inhibiting metaphysical presuppositions, and praenotiones, must be eliminated:

These idola, which are illusions that distort the real aspect of things, are never the less mistaken for the things themselves. Therefore the mind, encountering no resistance in this imaginary world... comes to believe in the possibility of constructing or rather reconstructing, the world by virtue of its own resources exclusively and at the whim of its desires... In sociology especially, these prejudices or 'idols' to use Bacon's expression... are likely to be substituted for the study of facts.

Durkheim, then, argues that when an "idea" or "ideal" enters social life it becomes an extremely important part of a total social reality. Durkheim "shares with Freud a large part of the responsibility for turning contemporary social thought from the classic rationalist categories of volition, will, and individual consciousness to aspects which are, in a strict sense, non-volitional and non-rational". However, as Nisbet observes, there is every reason to regard Durkheim's reaction to individualistic rationalism "as more fundamental and encompassing than Freud's". Freud never doubted the primacy of the individual and intra-individual forces in his studies of human behavior. For Freud, non-rational influences proceed from an unconscious
mind within the individual. Hence, Freud sees the individual as the "solid reality". Durkheim, however, "sees community that has prior reality, and it is from community that the essential elements of reason flow". 47 For Durkheim "everything human above the level of the manifestly physical or biological begins and ends in society". We see that:

A society is the most powerful combination of physical and moral forces of which nature offers us an example. Nowhere else is an equal richness of different materials, carried to such a degree of concentration, to be found. Then, it is not surprising that a higher life disengages itself which, by reacting upon the elements of which it is the product, raises them to a higher plane of existence and transforms them. 48

Furthermore, in a comment which may well be directed toward the "psychologism" of such theorists as Tarde and Spencer, Durkheim asserts that:

Society is a reality sui generis; it has its own peculiar characteristics, which are not met with again in the same form in all the rest of the universe. The representations which express it have a wholly different content from purely individual ones. 49

Durkheim's "sociologism", is in opposition to the basic individualism "which underlies all of existential thought, for it takes as basic assumptions the solidarity of individuals and the objective reality of society". 50
Durkheim did not use the term "ideology", but employed the
term "doctrine". He develops a theory of "collective consciousness"
which may be defined as simply, "the body of beliefs and sentiments
common to the average of the members of a society". As Aron has
observed, the "collective consciousness", "whose existence depends
on the sentiments and beliefs present in individual consciousness, is
nevertheless separable, at least analytically, from individual consciousness;
it evolves according to its own laws, it is not merely the expression or
effect of individual consciousness". 51 The "collective consciousness"
becomes a collective representation. That is to say, a break occurs in
the collective consciousness, between consciousness and the things
perceived. Representations "are images (communicable) in a mind or
else categories (linguistic, and in that sense communicable) into which
a mind classifies data". 52 Thus, representations are in one sense
culture.

Durkheim's political theory distinguishes between the
political society and the state. By political society "he means a society
comprising a number of secondary social groups which submit to a
sovereign authority, not itself subject to any regularly constituted
higher authority". 53 On the other hand, the state is "the special group
of officials who represent the sovereign authority; it is the organ pre-
eminent among that collection of groups which is the political society". 54
Within the context of a somewhat obscure organic metaphor, Durkheim
"finds the distinctive characteristic of the state in its capacity to 'think'"
The state, however, does not incarnate the collective consciousness of its intrinsic psychic life. In all societies there exists a widely diffuse psychic life which may affect the state, but for Durkheim the state thinks for the society in "a rational and self-conscious way" and is the "ideological" expression of its psychic components. In sum, Durkheim shows that "doctrine" emerges as a logical support for preconceived ideas rather than as a result of some study of reality.

Pareto takes Marx's conception of ideology and widens its meaning into what Finer terms, "a system of thought which masks and rationalises human predispositions and urges - and not simply the ones that are due to their economic interest or class position". His conception of ideology may be viewed as a sustained onslaught upon the liberal-democratic, socialistic, and Marxian theories, respectively. As in the case of Max Weber, Pareto also develops his sociology in what Zeitlin terms "an intense debate with Marx's ghost". Pareto did, however, exhibit considerable insight into the problem of "ideas" and "ideals" as seen in his works; especially The Mind and Society.

Pareto delineates a dichotomous category of human action, the "logical" and "non-logical" forms of action. This classification "turns upon the distinction between means and ends which he assumes without further inquiry to be applicable to all human behavior". Logical action is directed at the end-in-view, both subjectively and objectively. All other actions are "non-logical" in that they have only a subjectively
"logical" end which does not correspond with what Pareto terms, the
"real purpose of man". In contrast, acts are logical when the
consequences anticipated by the subject are identical with the
consequences that might reasonably be anticipated in the light of
knowledge.

Pareto becomes entangled in the problems of psychology and
sociology which regard as logical those social phenomena which are in
part automatic or instinctive, but mostly non-logical and even irrational.
Thus, "ideologies" are associated with non-logical, non-scientific
action. "Ideological" actions are "affected in varying degrees by
complex influences - ignorance, guess work, uncontrolled theorizing
and emotion, passion, superstition, mythology, mass or individual
hysteria and beliefs and other elements". Thus, drawing on the
analysis of Parsons, we may summarize Pareto's "ideological"
categories in the following way.

First, in his analysis of non-scientific theories Pareto
illustrates that there are certain uniformities in the non-logical actions
of man. Then, having satisfied himself that the self interpretations of
human actors are mostly "rationalizations", or to use Pareto's
terminology "derivations", he proceeds to demonstrate what it is that
is being "rationalized". His theory of derivations (ideology) emerges
from that which is "rationalized".

Pareto terms as "residues" those expressions of sentiments
out of which actions arise. "Derivations", however, are essentially
speech reactions - 'ideologies' - deductions that aim to explain, justify and demonstrate the residues. Pareto views social structures as "enveloped by a web of essentially distortive ideation". Language is the basic fibre of this distortive ideational aspect of social structure and is the vehicle for the rationalization of human actions. There are also religion, mythology, morality, political theories "and all other interpretations of social life capable of giving reasons for human actions". However, as Berger observes, this situation is not a transitory phenomenon of a particular moment in history "as is, by comparison, Marx's localization of 'false consciousness' in the capitalist phase of historical development". It is endemic to society and in history it is repetitive.

Pareto shares with Durkheim, Marx, and Weber a broad conception of sociology and its relationship to the humanities, "a rejection of idealistic interpretations of society and history, an interest in the methodological foundations of sociology and a rejection of psychologistic approaches to social phenomena". Of the three thinkers mentioned, it is Durkheim who most closely approximates the ideas of Pareto. Durkheim, like Pareto, has been labelled as "positivistic", and "sociologistic". But, the most significant parallel is that both theorists emphasized consciousness. Durkheim asserts that society is a product of mind. Collective "representations" and "their congealment in the collective consciousness are the vital cement that holds the society together". Indeed, society is that assemblage of collective representations.

Durkheim, with emphasis, considers society, once established, as reality
sui generis. This reality cannot be reduced to the reality of its individual members, but rather, it has a reality which transcends their existence. In contrast, Pareto sees society as "staged" by individual actors. Society has only that being imputed to it by its individual members. In this phenomenologically structured rejection of any hypostatization of social reality Pareto is drawn more closely to Max Weber. Weber shares with Pareto a strong concern with the role of thought in history and society. Furthermore, Weber understands society in terms of what Schutz refers to as "inter subjective meanings", and he rejects any notion of a hypostatized social reality - Weber's sociological "nominalism" as opposed to Durkheim's "realism".

Weber's most lucid and systematic statement on ideology is found in his work Politics as a Vocation. In this essay Weber argues that regardless of what end the politician is serving he must put his faith in that end. His personal motives plus those of his adherents determine the outcome and success of his endeavors. The politicians' actions, asserts Weber, are not ruled by conviction but by responsibility. His perspective is derived from the foibles and ideologies of mankind. In this respect Weber is in accord with Marx and Mannheim and their conceptualization of the perspective.

The preceding discussion has set the stage for conceptual identification of Mannheim's theory of ideology. There is, as Lichtheim observes, justification in treating Mannheim's Wissenssoziologie as "an epilogue to that of Weber". Indeed, Mannheim makes the step from
Weber's Wissenschaftlehre to Wissensssoziologie. Lichtheim also observes that an important link between Weber and Mannheim is provided by Georg Lukacs, notably in the latter's History and Class-Consciousness (1932): "a work which for many years led an underground existence before being recognized as the influence it was". It is here that Lukacs intuitively fixed upon the alienation and restitution of man as the pivotal point in the Marxian world view. Mannheim's work appears as the dialectical counterpart to Lukacs' romantic subjectivism.

Mannheim develops a dichotomous conception of ideology. The term "ideology" is employed by Mannheim in two different ways - the particular, and the total. The particular conception of ideology, we are told, "denotes that we are skeptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent". They are looked upon as more or less "conscious disguises of the real nature of the situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests". Moreover, these distortions range "all the way from conscious lies to half conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self deception". In short, this type refers to thought which is existentially determined. This conception of ideology is particular in several ways. Its particularity, Mannheim argues, becomes evident when contrasted with the more inclusive total conception of ideology. The total type refers to a more specific kind of existentially bound thought. Here Mannheim refers to the ideology of an age "or of a concrete historicosocial group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and
composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group. The common thread in these two conceptions consists in the fact that neither relies solely on an awareness of what is said by an opponent in order to arrive at an understanding of his "real meaning and intention". Both concepts "fall back on the subject", whether individual or group, proceeding to an understanding of what is said "by the indirect method of analysing the social conditions of the individual or his group*. Mannheim adds that:

The ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as functions of his existence. This means that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies further that the specific character and life-situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions and interpretations.

Both the total and the particular conceptions of ideology make these "ideas" a "function of him who holds them, and of his position in his social milieu". However, there are significant differences between these two concepts. Mannheim mentions three distinguishing characteristics. First, whereas the particular conception of ideology "designates only a part of the opponents assertions as ideologies - and this only with reference to their content", the total conception questions the opponent's total Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus), and "attempts to understand these concepts as an outgrowth of the collective life of which he partakes*. Secondly, Mannheim asserts that the particular
conception of "ideology" makes its analysis of ideas solely on a psychological level. For example, if a claim is made that an opponent is lying, or that he is concealing or distorting "a given factual situation", it is assumed that both parties hold common criteria of validity - "It is still assumed that it is possible to refute lies and eradicate sources of error by referring to accepted criteria of objective validity common to both parties". It is to this latter point that Mannheim addresses himself in considerable detail: the construction of criteria of objective validity through a perspectival synthesis of opposing perspectives. In the case of the total conception of ideology, Mannheim observes that when we attribute to one historical epoch "one intellectual world and to ourselves another one, or if a certain historically determined social stratum thinks in categories other than our own, we refer not to the isolated cases of thought content, but to fundamentally divergent thought-systems and to widely differing modes of experience and interpretation". The theoretical or noological level is touched upon whenever both content and form are considered. Also, the conceptual framework of "a mode of thought as a function of the life-situation of a thinker is to be included in this noological level of abstraction".

Corresponding to this difference, the particular conception of ideology operates primarily with what Mannheim terms "a psychology of interests", while the total conception uses a more formal functional analysis and does not refer to individual motivations. The total conception confines itself to an objective description of "the structural
differences in minds operating in different social settings". The former, we are told, "assumes that this or that interest is the cause of a given lie or deception". On the other hand, the latter "presupposes simply that there is a correspondence between a given social situation and a given perspective, point of view, or apperception mass".

As the particular conception never leaves the psychological level, the point of reference is always the individual. As soon as the total conception is used as an analytic framework we aim to reconstruct the systematic theoretical basis which underlies the single judgments of the individuals. Analyses of ideologies of the particular variety (making the content of individual thought largely dependent on the interests of the subject), can never arrive at this basic reconstruction of the whole perspective of a social group. At best they can "reveal the collective psychological aspects of ideology, or lead to some development of mass psychology, dealing either with the different behavior of the individual in the crowd, or with the results of the mass integration of the psychic experiences of many individuals". 89

In historical perspective, Mannheim informs us that the first significant step in the development of the total conception was the development of a philosophy of consciousness. The philosophy of consciousness "has put in place of an infinitely variegated and confused world an organization of experience the unity of which is guaranteed by the unity of the perceiving subject". Following the demolishing of the objective ontological unity of the world an attempt was made to
substitute for it a unity "imposed by the perceiving subject". In short, in the place of the medieval-Christian objective and ontological unity of the world, there emerged the subjective unity of the absolute subject of the Enlightenment - consciousness in itself. From this point on the world as "world" exists only with reference to the "knowing mind", and the mental activity of the subject "determines the form in which the world appears". Hence, we have what Berger and Luckmann term man's "social construction of reality". At this stage the world is seen as a "structural unity" and is related in its entirety to a subject, a "consciousness in itself". In this perspective, particularly pronounced in Kant, the noological level is "sharply differentiated from the psychological one". This, asserts Mannheim, is "the first stage in the dissolution of an ontological dogmatism which regarded the 'world' as existing independently of us, in a fixed and definitive form".

The second stage in the development of the total conception of ideology is attained when "the total but super-temporal notion of ideology is seen in historical perspective". This is largely the accomplishment of Hegel and the Historical school. Both Hegel and the Historical school begin with the assumption that the world is a unity and conceivable only with reference to a knowing subject. During the Enlightenment the subject as bearer of the unity of consciousness was seen as a wholly abstract super-temporal and super-social entity - "consciousness in itself". The Volksgeist (folk spirit) emerges to represent "the historically differentiated elements of consciousness",
which are integrated by Hegel into the "world spirit". Mannheim emphasizes that the historically changing nature of mind was discovered "not so much by philosophy as by the penetration of political insight into the everyday life of the time". In the final analysis, the transition from the general abstract, "world-unifying" subject (i.e. "consciousness in itself"), to the more concrete subject (i.e. the "nationally differentiated Volksgeist"), was the expression of a transformation in the manner of "reacting to the world in all realms of experience".

The final, and most important, step in the creation of the total conception of ideology, argues Mannheim, "arose out of the historical-social process". When "class" replaced "folk" or "nation" as the bearer of the historically evolving consciousness there was an increased awareness that the structure of society "and its corresponding intellectual forms vary with the relations between social classes". The concept of Volksgeist is replaced by the concept of "class consciousness", or more correctly "class ideology".

Mannheim develops a conception of consciousness which "varies in accordance with historic periods, nations, and social classes". This conception of consciousness, he argues, provides a more adequate perspective for the comprehension of historical reality.

There are two consequences flowing from this conception of consciousness. First, it is clearly perceived that human action cannot be understood by an isolation of their elements. All facts and events in an historical period are explicable only in terms of meaning, and meaning
in its turn always refers to another meaning. "Thus the re-interpretation of that continuous and coherent change in meaning becomes the main concern of our modern historical sciences."

Thus, the second point is made: this interdependent system of meanings varies both in all its parts and in its totality from one historical period to another. 96

It is significant that although the two conceptions of ideology are initially separated in Mannheim's analysis, they begin to converge. The particular conception merges with the total. This, maintains Mannheim, becomes apparent in the following manner. Earlier one's opponent, as representative of a certain political-social position, was accused of conscious or unconscious falsification. Now, after discrediting the total structure of his consciousness, our opponent is no longer considered capable of thinking correctly. In the light of a structural analysis of thought this means that during the early phase of seeking out the sources of error, distortion was revealed only on the psychological plane "by pointing out the personal roots of intellectual bias". In Mannheim's words, "the annihilation is now more thoroughgoing since the attack is made on the noological level and the validity of the adversary's theories is undermined by showing that they are merely a function of the generally prevailing social situation". 97

As part of his macroscopic interest Mannheim makes an effort to show by concrete examples that political-historical thinking assumes various forms. He cites five examples 98 of politico-historical ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These may be
summarized in the following manner. First, he analyzes what he terms bureaucratic conservatism, which attempts to find remedies "by means of arbitrary decrees". This ideological perspective further attempts to construct a framework which regards "a revolutionary outbreak as nothing but a serious interference with its own neatly planned strategy". 99

Secondly, Mannheim discusses the historical conservatism type of ideology which seeks to legitimate or justify government by an aristocratic elite class. This type of ideological substructure emerged from an essentially aristocratic-feudal mentality. In this context leadership by the aristocratic elite is "instinctual" and based on an experimental basis. It cannot be taught to "outsiders".

Thirdly, there is the liberal-bourgeoisie conception of ideology: the liberal-democratic ideology. This perspective "demands scientific politics", and attempts to develop such a discipline. Inherent in this ideology is the belief that the best political goals are attained through the processes of thinking, discussing and carefully planned procedures and organization. 100

The fourth type is the socialist-communist (dialectical) type of ideological perspective. The dialectical theory of this type emerges from impulses which are aroused by certain social situations. The related theory results in a type of action; if this action is not successful it is subsequently replaced by a "new" theory. Mannheim also asserts that although dialectical thought is rationalistic "it culminates in irrationalism". 101 The socialist-communist ideology depends, for its
fruition, on the revolutionary potential of the proletariat.

Fifth, fascist ideology is described as ideology based primarily on action and on unconditional subordination to the leader who is acting. Social change does not occur through action on the part of the masses, or by ideas, or by unconsciously working forces, but rather, by a few leaders such as those outlined by Pareto as elites.\textsuperscript{102}

Mannheim's aim is to describe, not to criticize these five types of ideologies. He does argue, however, that intellectual activity does not come from a ruling class whose members have closed ideological minds. Rather, intellectual activity comes from an unattached social group, the intelligentsia. This aspect of Mannheim's work will be discussed later.

In summary, then, the particular conception of ideology "operates primarily with a psychology of interests", whereas the total conception operates or utilizes a more "formal functional analysis" devoid of reference to motivation. Indeed, asserts Mannheim, the total conception confines itself to "an objective description of the structural differences in minds operating in different social settings".

Earlier, we mentioned the historicistic element in Mannheim's thesis. He observes that the human intelligence is unable to grasp the total "historically given" situation. Ideas can not only be dated but they can also be set in the context of a given society. The situation is "always viewed from a particular social position in the course of history". All positions permit of socially perspectivistic knowledge. In accordance
with these theoretical formulations, ideology, as a specific type of thought pattern, designates inadequacy or "situational incongruity" with varying degrees of pronouncement. Ideologies, in this sense are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents.

Thus, Mannheim's conception of knowledge qua ideology is tied up with the Weltanschauung of a social group. He observes that such concepts as "movement", "process", and "flux", conceived organically, and applied to sociocultural phenomena and institutions, first appeared in a definite historical period. Mannheim states: "we have historicism only when history is written from the historicistic Weltanschauung".

103
Footnotes - Chapter 3


2. Ibid., C. f. Theories of Instincts developed by W. McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology, (1908); W. G. Sumner, Folkways, (1906); G. Wallas' emphasis on the non-rational in human behavior as developed in his Human Nature and Politics, (1908).


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 31.


15. The antecedents of Tracy's "Science des Idees" have been shown to be Baconian and Cartesian. Condillac, (Essai sur l'origines des connaissance humaines - Oeuvres, 1 p. 507) asserted that Bacon's "idols" were the starting point of the reformation of consciousness, the central aim of the period of the Enlightenment. Bacon's "idolum" became Condillac's prejuge a term given to much usage by Holbach and Helvetius. The removal of these barriers leads to "unprejudiced" understanding of nature. Thus, we see the "debunking" effect of critical reason. (C.f. Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 9.).


17. Quoted in Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 9.


21. See B. Croce, Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx, especially pp. 2-12, 66-77. See also M. M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (Harvard: 1962).
22. See, P. Gardiner, *The Nature of Historical Explanation* (Oxford: 1961); especially pp. 65-112. Gardiner presents a clear examination of other aspects of historical explanation which focus attention on such theorists as Plekhanov, Popper, James, MacIver, Hampshire, Kaufman, Waismann, Mandelbaum, etc. In sum, he presents a series of alternate explanations of causal historical relationships. The entire book constructs a logical thesis which attempts "to avoid a priori theorizing about the method and subject-matter of history, and to concentrate instead upon determining the nature and role of explanation as it actually occurs in the work of historians. Also of interest here is J. W. Meiland's *Scepticism and Historical Knowledge*, (Random House: 1965).


31. "Passional" refers to emotionality, i.e. that which pertains to the passions.

33. Ibid.


Some writers disagree with the distortion effect thesis offered by Marx. Roucek, for example, argues that the ideologist is not interested in a "scientific truth", but in a synthesis of facts and assumptions "arranged to demonstrate an ideal which differs radically from what might be likened to a photograph of social realities". Furthermore, "ideology takes its illusions for granted; it declines to question them, not seeking even possible contradictions between one factual assumption and another, and refuses to correct the distorting influences of its selected facts. Hence, it sees often what does not exist". For Roucek, distortion, or illusory effect, is not necessarily the only defining characteristic of ideology. Rather, distortion somehow results from effective ideologies being "heart-felt" ideals indispensable to man in facing the reality around him. See Roucek, "Ideology as a Means of Control", in R. C. Snyder, and H. Wilson (eds.), *Roots of Political Behavior: An Introduction to Government and Politics*, (American Book Co., 1949), pp. 522-26. See also Roucek and associates *Social Control*, (N. Y.: 1947), pp. 185-87.


38. Ibid.


41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.


45. R. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition*, p. 82.

46. Ibid., p. 83. It is noteworthy that Jung and Durkheim shared essentially the same notion of the "collective unconscious".

47. Ibid., p. 83.


49. Ibid.


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. S. E. Finer (ed.), in 'Introduction' to Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, p. 84.

57. I. Zeitlin, op. cit., p. 159.


60. Ibid., p. 90.

61. Ibid.


63. Ibid.

64. T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, p. 273.

66. The concept of "residues" is closely related to what Allport terms "prepotent reflexes" and to what psychologists generally refer to as "complexes", or "drives"; C.f. Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 48-50.


68. Pareto's theory of ideology has been utilized by Hans O. Ziegler in his studies on the Sociology of language; C.f. Ziegler, "Ideologienlehre" in Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Heidleberg, 1927, Vol. 57.

69. B. Berger, op. cit., p. 271

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p. 275.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.


79. C.f. G. Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 34.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.


83. Ibid., p. 50

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. 51

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., p. 52

90. Ibid., p. 58.


94. C.f. Marcuse, op.cit., p. 32.

95. Mannheim, op. cit., p. 60.

96. Ibid., p. 61.

97. Ibid., p. 62.

98. In the five examples of ideologies his analytic framework is that of the "ideal - type" concept of Max Weber.


100. Ibid., pp. 107-8.

101. Ibid., p. 118.


103. Mannheim, op. cit., p. 81.
Chapter 4

Weltanschauung: A Structural and Historical Approach to Knowledge

and the Perspective

For, try as we may, we cannot get behind the appearance of things to reality. And the terrible reason may be that there is no reality in things apart from their experiences ... The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.

Oscar Wilde

The concept of Weltanschauung is central to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Indeed, we see that he regarded this concept as (a) a given factum or as an assumption, and (b) as an inextricable part of his subject matter. In addition, he conceived of it as "the way of certain insights" which would otherwise be "out of sight" hence out of the mind of any observer of the substance of ideologies. However, as a particular source of particular kinds of knowledge, Weltanschauung was a constant hindrance to Mannheim's thesis. In fact, he became far more concerned with the apparent function ascribable to specific ideologies within the development, and the social existence, of a given group, or class. Thus, he often refers to the idea he terms "a series of collective experiences", and concurrently developed Weltanschauung.¹ That is to say, Weltanschauung is regarded as a product of a common historical fate. This, asserts Mannheim, if properly verbalized, is said to have "a unifying power over great distances", linking social
groups together even if they are dispersed in a spatial sense. Moreover, Mannheim argues, Weltanschauung ensures the continuity of generations arising under similar sociocultural conditions, plays a significant part in the formation of classes; and appears to unite a social group in a spiritual sense for purposes of concerted social action. It follows that the individual in the group, if he is not what Mannheim terms the intellectual, merely tends to assimilate the particular Weltanschauung of the group. In contrast to the universal quality of Weltanschauung, Mannheim advances his concept of the collective unconscious motives, which he asserts, may reach a level of consciousness only in a quite specific situation.

Knowledge emerges from the on-going social process which exists in the group struggle for "self-assertion" and political survival. Thus, in this sense, Mannheim considers active existence and cognitive development to be within the dynamics of the social structure and is consequently the genesis of "socially relevant cognition". Being part of a social group, and immersed in group sentiments, the individual is socialized into these sentiments. Mannheim terms these processes the "collective unconscious".

Mannheim further emphasizes that we must not think we are in error when we designate this "collective unconsciousness" as the "irrational" breeding ground of values and group (i.e. collective) sentiments which facilitate the acceptance of an articulated Weltanschauung.
Mannheim extends this argument by asserting that "even the profound insights of the genius are the collective historical experiences of a group which the individual takes for granted, but which should under no conditions be hypostatized as 'group mind'."

Moreover, the presence of thought in conflict within any given society, renders the hypothesis of a Volksgeist untenable. Mannheim's argument does not, however, completely eliminate the underlying presence of a hypothesis which, if not an explicit demonstration of the so-called "group mind" hypothesis, does indeed contain a similar foundation. It can be argued that Mannheim held ideas, or opinions, which are consistent with the assumptions of a multiplicity of group, or class spirits, each capable of perpetuating, or giving "birth" to a particular Weltanschauung or ideology.

Mannheim, does not make clear what he means by social class. Indeed, as Maquet has observed, he wonders if Mannheim meant "class" as "some sort of metaphysical being which is endowed with its own conscience, and which appears in the individuals who share it".

Furthermore, it appears that the concept "conscience", in Maquet's sense of the term, refers to the English term "consciousness".

Weltanschauungen thus emanate from the collective fate of a social group embodied in a common historical process which may determine the destiny of the group, or its specific "historical mission". This is an unsystematic concept, but in its basic orientation, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge attempts to construct the relationship between the existential-developmental conditions of social groups, and the
spiritual manifestations of these same conditions. It is doubtful if such definitions, or relationships, could be methodologically ascertained. Indeed, it would appear that Mannheim's statement of such relationships is beyond empirical validation. In order to link his social substructures together with their ideological superstructures, Mannheim speaks most often of "correspondence". Merton has observed that Mannheim "made a variety of unintegrated assumptions in his derivation of certain forms of thought from certain types of social situations".¹

To Mannheim the historicist, the problem of empirical verification was relatively unimportant, but to Mannheim the sociologist, there was a concrete problem of a distinctly precarious nature since he did not merely wish to propound philosophically relevant theories, but also wished to find them sociologically valid. One possible way out of this dilemma would be to eliminate the entire interpretation of the historicistic genesis and function of Weltanschauungen and treat them as given data. Mannheim concludes that to eliminate the hypothesis of the historico-existential genesis of Weltanschauungen, ideologies, and thought systems the question must be raised: Can the bearers of these concepts be identified according to lucid sociocultural criteria? Weltanschauungen, as historicistic emanations, have been difficult to grasp, if not completely intangible. However, as rationally formulated theories, or even as ideologies, they could quite conceivably become as accessible as other types of sociological subject-matter, and could be examined as such.
In Mannheim's discussion of "perspectivism", i.e., how to recognize group ideologies or Weltanschauung and attempt to ascertain their meanings, range, and social adequacy, Mannheim is explicit in his conception of ideology when he asserts that the particular conception of ideology operates primarily with a psychology of interests while the total conception uses a more functional analysis. The latter conception of ideology confines itself to an objective description of the structural differences in minds operating in different sociocultural settings. The total conception, it should be remembered, presupposes that there is a "correspondence" between "a given social situation and a given perspective, point of view, or apperception mass". This emphasis on "structural differences in minds" does not use the individual as a point of reference. Mannheim specifically rejects confining observations to individual mental processes:

If we confine our observations to the mental processes which take place in the individual and regard him as the only possible bearer of ideologies, we shall never grasp the structure of the intellectual world belonging to a social group in a given historical situation.

Consequently, thought systems are not represented by the thoughts of any one individual. In short, the ideology of the group is not expressed by its intellectual leader, or leaders. The "mental world" of a group "could never come into existence without the experiences and production responses of the different individuals", and from this it could be concluded that within his theoretical framework, Mannheim views
group ideology as the in toto of all experience and productive response of the members of a group. On the other hand, the intrinsic structure of the group ideology is not to be found in a mere integration of these individual experiences. We see, for example, that Mannheim offers his explanation in terms of the sociological and intellectual limitations of the individual participants, thus:

Every individual participates only in certain fragments of this thought-system, the totality of which is not in the least a mere sum of these fragmentary individual experiences. As a totality the thought-system is integrated systematically, and is no mere casual bundle of fragmentary experiences of discrete members of the group. Thus, it follows that the individual can only be considered as the bearer of an ideology as long as we deal with that conception of ideology, which by definition, is directed more to the whole structure of thought.  

The individuals who comprise the social group, although sharing segments of the total thought-system do not represent its totality. This means that although the concept of thought-system is central to his thesis, and to the subject matter of his sociology of knowledge as group ideology, we are not, as Mannheim insists, viewing either an empirical entity; nor, for that matter, as group-ideology what the intellectual leaders of the group express, nor what their followers display as mental attitudes, etc. Rather, the intellectual formulations and belief systems found within the group:
reveal the collective psychological aspects of ideology, or lead to some development of mass psychology, dealing either with the different behavior of the individual in the crowd, or with the results of the mass integration of the psychic experiences of many individuals.  

At this point it is necessary to examine two aspects of Mannheim's treatment of the relationship between the thinking of an individual and the collective ideology of a particular group. First, it seems that he disregards a problem intrinsic to his thesis: that individuals participate in only parts ("fragments") of the thought-system of a given group. His thesis is concerned with a "sociological fact" which is of paramount importance in a society built upon (a) a stratification of function, and (b) a division of labor of an economic and intellectual kind. In such a society, or social group, there exists a distribution of knowledge, both practical and theoretical, which gives rise to two central issues, one concerning integration, the other concerning communication.

Knowledge in the foregoing sense does not mean ideology. Knowledge as used here is consistent with Mannheim's typology. Mannheim's conception of knowledge, as has been illustrated, is tied up with the Weltanschauung of a social group, and with its "collective unconscious" anchored directly in the steam of an unfolding social process, and consequently represents cognition" only as an indirect
manifestation of historicistic group existence - as a rationalization of that existence for the social-technical purposes of an essentially political activity". 15

This "functionality of knowledge" observes Wagner, "eludes positivistic interpretation not only with regard to its historicistic genesis". Also, the rationality of the means applied is not "matched" by rational ends. Rather, "it is governed by a historical teleology": a social group, or class, tends to conceive of its role in society in terms of a "mission" as defined by its Weltanschauung and manifest in its "Utopia", or more specifically in its ideological anticipation of a state of society (brought about by social reconstruction?) to be brought about, and which thus "transcends given realities as well as given knowledge". 16

Given our understanding of this conception of knowledge, we are better equipped to understand Mannheim's rejection of the conventional conception of science. Also revealed is his type of reasoning's incompatibility with that type of reason expressed in the rules of the practical fields of social research. Also this "radical" conception of knowledge clarifies his long time goal to see a "science of politics" at the pinnacle of all types of knowledge.

Knowledge is diffused in all spheres of intellectual and practical (i.e. the commonsense world) activity. Here again we see Mannheim presupposing, in part, the Berger/Luckmann thesis which conceives of knowledge as a socially distributed phenomenon, and as the theoretical interpretation of the world. 17 Mannheim was aware of what
Berger and Luckmann term the "commonsense perspective", but he did not develop this aspect of his sociology to such a degree as did the former. Schutz expresses his views on the proper concern of the sociology of knowledge in the following way:

All typifications of common sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete historical socio-cultural Lebenswelt within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially approved. Their structure determines among other things the social distribution of knowledge and its relativity and relevance to the concrete social environment of a concrete group in a concrete historical situation. Here are the legitimate problems of relativism, historicism, and the so-called sociology of knowledge. 18

Mannheim differs from Schutz, Berger and Luckmann in at least one important sense. Mannheim's conception of knowledge is entrenched in his historicistic ontology. Also, he was concerned with "theoretical" knowledge and thought, "ideas", and Weltanschauungen and not Schutz's "commonsense" interpretations of reality. However, Mannheim was aware of the weakness and inadequacies of the Weltanschauungen concept. This "awareness" is what leads Mannheim to the development of his concept of "perspectivism".

Mannheim does, however, share with Schutz a concern for the distribution of knowledge and its relativity and relevance to the concrete social environment. For Mannheim the knowledge of the intellectual, or expert, formalized, and generalized; philosophical
assumptions which ascribe general meaning to certain areas of a wider theoretical framework - are ascending steps in the direction of the transformation of specific knowledge into general (dispersed) knowledge, and which channel, or direct, the distribution of information from the initiated few to the general many regardless of class or group position. Distribution patterns are, admittedly, highly selective and are subject to censorship (in its broadest sense) and valuative predispositions which, depending on the particular level or stratum we are concerned with, will vary both in form and content. Adaptation and popularization make for a constant re-interpretation of these bodies of information hence they eventually lead to a transformation of meaning as well. Thus, we see a gradual change wherein the expert's activity has been diffused, and integrated, by a selective process. Also, this information has been re-interpreted and integrated into prevailing ideologies and filtered down to what we may term the commonsense conception of reality. Indeed, the actual process of the distribution of knowledge is, at the same time, a process of transformation. The knowledge of the intellectuals, i.e., the "truth" as seen by their perspective, becomes "truth" vis-a-vis the perspective of the commonsense man's world. Here Mannheim grasps at the various levels of knowledge, or the distinctions made at various levels of the social strata between "knowledge", and "belief" taken to be knowledge. Berger and Luckmann missed Mannheim's preliminary remarks in this regard when they state their case for a "new perspective" based on the "commonsense" perspective:
The theoretical formulations of reality whether they be scientific or philosophical or even mythological, do not exhaust what is 'real' for the members of a society. Since this is so, the sociology of knowledge must first of all concern itself with what people 'know' as 'reality' in their everyday non- or pre-theoretical lives. In other words, commonsense 'knowledge' rather than 'ideas' must be the central focus of the sociology of knowledge. It is precisely this 'knowledge' that contributes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist.20

Mannheim, although never explicitly formulating as clear a distinction between "ideas" and "commonsense", does appear to be aware of the transformation of knowledge as it filters down from "ivory towers" to the "commonsense world" of the masses.

But, even under the conditions just outlined, the continuous influx of "factual" information flowing into areas of the "commonsense perspective" or orientations must effect the perspective of the latter. Change in ideas, etc., is bound to occur under the impact of educational information services and the media of mass communication.

The distribution of knowledge within any given modern society is an on-going process. Within the matrix of this process, individuals unite their personal knowledge and experiences, with a multiplicity of fragments of information, popularized theories (e.g. the "pop" sociology of Vance Packard, etc.), and their own general inferences of all these. Selection occurs, and re-interpretation follows in the critical attempt to propitiate a confusion of new "knowledge" with existing value systems, group perspectives, and long held beliefs and assumptions.
At this point we may raise several questions of sociological importance. First, what are the distributive mechanisms of these processes? Secondly, to what degree are they socially organized? How is the process regulated? And, at what point is knowledge converted into ideology?

Mannheim largely ignored this type of empirical question for he assumed that the fragmentary personal experiences, and knowledge, of the "group", or members of a society excludes integration and communication on the levels of actual social intercourse. Ideal-typical construction was the method Mannheim preferred, but it predisposed him to positing answers which seem dictated by his philosophical position.

There is a problem concerning the coherence and consistency of the relationship between Weltanschauung as a historicistic conception, and as a fact in his sociology of knowledge.

The socio-existential basis of thought systems (the elements of a Weltanschauung) appear as emanations in Mannheim's philosophical framework. Emanations, that is, of the processes of group existence and development. A Weltanschauung "belongs" to the group; but the thought system (i.e. its rational expression) is separated from the existence, and the actual thinking of its members. Mannheim was content merely with stating the issue, without attempting a thoroughgoing analysis of the difficult methodological problems. Can the transition from Weltanschauung to thought system be interpreted as one of the
dialectical steps in which a Hegelian-like "objective mind" switches from the state of unconscious existence to a state of conscious self-recognition - the first aspect presented by some such medium as "group spirit"; the second, by the reasoning power of the philosopher himself?

In his later essays Mannheim attempts to provide a methodological analysis of Weltanschauung and to "determine its logical place within the conceptual framework of the cultural and historical sciences". First, he asks whether Weltanschauung is a possible object at all. Every cultural product will exhibit three distinct strata of meaning: (a) its objective meaning, (b) its expressive meaning, and (c) its documentary or evidential meaning. He illustrates this trichotomous distinction thus: He is out for a walk with a friend when a beggar beckons them, they pause for a moment, and then the friend gives the beggar a "hand-out". This relatively simplistic incident - a "meaningful situation" - can, at first, be interpreted existentially. "Beggar", "assistance", "giver" and "charity" are considered correctly by Mannheim to be sufficient to reveal the meaning of the social interaction taking place; the "objective social configuration without a knowledge either of the beggar's or the friend's consciousness gives us what Mannheim terms the objective meaning of the situation the most superficial level of understanding." If we are to transcend this level of understanding we must attempt to grasp the "individual intent" of the "almsgiver". When he gave the beggar the "hand-out", the
objective meaning and the result of which was "assistance", the "giver" may as an intended consequence have meant to convey that he was altruistic and representative of the apotheosis of human compassion.

If, however, we are to determine whether or not this was the case we must know the almsgiver "intimately", only then can we grasp his act in any valid meaningful sense. The phenomenological influence of Husserl becomes apparent at this point. We must attach a subjective meaning to the Other's act in order to comprehend the meaningful "intersubjectivity" of any social act. This Mannheim terms the expressive meaning of the "giver's" act. If, on the other hand, we discover through our Verstehende sociology that the "giver's" act was an act of hypocrisy, i.e., not in keeping with his general character, we see the third part of Mannheim's conception of meaning, the authentic act, this is the documentary or evidential meaning of the act. These analytic levels of abstraction are, of course, difficult to differentiate at the level of social reality and social interaction.

Mannheim's conception of Weltanschauung is, at this stage of his writing, amenable to scientific investigation. Mannheim does not equivocate on this point. Of course, he means scientific in the strict sense of the Geisteswissenschaften (i.e. science of the intellect). In support of his contention he points to various composers and argues that any experienced listener is able to perceive significant differences in the music of Mozart, Tchaikowsky, and Debussy. Moreover, art connoisseurs, students of philosophy and experts in musical stylistics
recognize that their areas of interest, in a given historic period, share common themes or "spirit"—in short, they express a common Weltanschauung.

Mannheim's study of Weltanschauung philosophy had, as Zeitlin puts it, a twofold purpose: (1) he wanted to emphasize the necessity, in the study of certain cultural aspects, to free himself from the methodology of the natural sciences, i.e. naturalism. And, (2) he wanted to illustrate that "in the realm of the mental" we are not able to distinguish the whole from the parts.  

With the "centrality" of his conception of Weltanschauung as global perspective we encounter a focal, indeed formidable, problem: the problem of imputation, a way of tracing back, indeed a reconstruction of thought-systems and perspectives to a particular Weltanschauung. Imputation links the global perspective to particular thought-systems and ideologies.

The Problem of Imputation

During the course of his thesis Mannheim develops two levels of imputation, which is the main clue to the methodological aspects of the sociology of knowledge. The level (Simmgemasse Zurechnung) deals with general problems of interpretation. This level reconstructs integral styles of thought and perspectives, tracing single expressions and records of thought which appear to be related back to a central Weltanschauung which they express. However, this does not completely
solve the problem of imputation, because, as Mannheim states, there is the question as to whether an explicit reference to a central outlook or perspective (such as "liberal" or "conservative" thought) "which proceeds purely on an intellectual level actually corresponds to the facts". 28 It is quite possible, argues Mannheim, that "the investigator will succeed in building up out of fragments of expression the two antithetical, closed systems of conservative thought on the one hand and liberal thought on the other, although the liberals and conservatives of the period might not, in actuality, have thought that way at all". 29

The second level of imputation, i.e., Faktizitätszurechnung operates with the ideal-type constructs, such as those found on the first level, and "attempts to ascertain the extent to which the given groups have in fact thought as they are alleged to have thought..." The ideal-type construct, argues Mannheim, offers maximum reliability "in the reconstruction of intellectual history" because the ideal-typology "analyzes into its elements what at first was merely a summary impression of the course of intellectual history" and furthermore reduces this impression "to explicit criteria" thereby making possible a "reconstruction of reality".

Once the structure and the tendencies of a particular style of thought have been formulated the problem of their sociological imputation confronts us. We must take it one step further and attempt to explain the forms and variations of a given thought system. This is done by seeking:
... to derive them firstly from the composition of the groups and strata which express themselves in that mode of thought. And secondly, we seek to explain the impulse and the direction of development (of a given thought-system) through the structural situation and the changes it undergoes within a larger, historically conditioned whole ... and through the constantly varying problems raised by the changing structure. 30

Thus, Mannheim's in toto conception of ideology qua knowledge transcends the empirical connotation of his "particular" conception of ideology. It is necessary to integrate the thought system of a given group outside of, and independent of its members. Thus:

As soon as the total conception of ideology is used, we attempt to reconstruct the whole outlook of a social group, and neither the concrete individual nor the abstract sum of them can legitimately be considered as bearers of this ideological thought-system as a whole. 31

A perspectivistic thought system, then, is a thought system which has been constructed out of discrete ideological elements put forward by the various members of the group, or class, in question, by a sociologist. In short, it is a theoretical creation, or an ideal type. 32

Mannheim's "reconstruction" of integral styles of thought and perspectives consists of this: As a historicistic philosopher, Mannheim asserts the emanation of a Weltanschauung out of the historical and social
processes of group existence. On the other hand, as a sociologist of knowledge, he attempts to demonstrate how it is possible to "uncover" the "central" Weltanschauung of a certain social group which is purportedly hidden behind the so-called "discrete segments of a system of thought" which is said to be representative of his sociological data.

Mannheim's term "uncover" is somewhat ambiguous, if not out of place. Methodologically, imputation is almost antithetical to the process of "uncovering". One can surely only uncover that which has a tangible but hidden existence. Mannheim's thought systems, however, are the theoretical synthesis of discrete elements of ideologies. Thus, it would seem that for all methodological purposes, these Weltanschauungen and thought systems do not exist within the theoretical framework of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.

There are many other problems involved in the imputation of meaning. One of the most comprehensive statements made on the problem of imputation is to be found in the writing of Arthur Child. Child has discussed the problem in three works. 33

Child asserts that it is possible to impute a given ideology to a definite class by "discriminating the attitudes that have produced it and by then assigning the ideology to the class to which the attitudes belong". That is, he adds, "the foundation of social behaviorist imputation". 34 However, as Child observes, in order that we may impute or relate attitudes to classes (to determine perspective), the
concept of attitudinal structure, simple, and ideal are required.

This problem is clarified by Child in this way:

A simple attitudinal structure... is
an implicit behavior pattern
determined by the position of a
class with relation to the total
social process by the interests
resulting therefrom and by the
natural drives as modified through
social interaction.

Also, in Child's context we see the ideal attitudinal structure assumes a position which is rationally suited to a definitive, typical position in what he terms "the process of production". Indeed, it is described as "a situationally adequate behavior pattern". Moreover, it is the structure that would prevail if the actual implicit behavior pattern of the class or group in question did in fact correspond to the objective position of the class in reference to the in toto social structure. Thus, we see that when Child speaks of an "ideological representative" of a class other than his "own", he is able to speak as a person whose actual attitudinal structure is identical with the ideal attitudinal structure of the class.

Mannheim's position on imputation raises a number of questions: First, as observed here, he "asserts the existence of an integrated thought-system which, as a totality, is carried neither by concrete individuals nor by the group of which these individuals are members". We must now ask such questions as: "How could, and where does such a thought system exist?" Secondly, we may ask what
Mannheim means by partial participation (i.e. his assertion that "every" individual participates only in "certain fragments of this thought system"). We may also ask how the ideology is related to "the single judgments of the individual", especially in light of the fact that it has no existence beyond the confines of the mind of the investigator. Surely, it cannot be conceived as underlying the single judgments of all individuals if it does not exist in the individual's mind, nor the consciousness of the group.

Mannheim, perhaps, had some reservations concerning the "strength" or "soundness" of his concept of imputation of meaning because he introduces the concept of imputation on the factual level as a second mode of "reconstruction". Here, the imputed thought systems are utilized as ideal-typical hypotheses.

It may be stated with some certainty that Mannheim "up-ended" factual imputation, turning it back into historicistic imputation. Combined with imputation of meaning, it developed into an analytical representation of the "summary impression" gained from a Weltanschauung in general. By reducing this impression to certain explicit criteria, a "reconstruction of reality", within Mannheim's conceptual framework, has resulted.

If we accept Mannheim's claim that imputation (as method) allows us to single out the "anonymous unarticulated forces which are operative in the history of thought", and, (in the form of the controllable determination of facts), obtain systematic understanding (Verstehen) of the relationships between thought and social existence; then, we must
recognize that he has not bridged the gap between his historicistic-existential assumptions and his methodological intent. This means that if we conceive of a Weltanschauung as an "unarticulated force" in the context of a social group, its existence cannot be empirically demonstrated by Mannheim's modes of imputation. Indeed, his mode of imputation is fundamentally a theoretical construction, if not philosophical conjecture. Perhaps, Mannheim's problem is further complicated by his use of imputation as a concept denoting fact. Rather than accept this specific referent perhaps it would be better used as a concept which refers to a heuristic-hypothetical relation between an element of thought, emotion, or volition on the one hand, and in a group, institution, "time", or Weltanschauung, "attitudinal structure" 40 etc., on the other. Finally, it may be stated with some certainty that the methodological device of imputation has no connection with the asserted immediateness of concrete social experience, and leads to no spontaneous revelation of intrinsic meanings. Indeed, the imputation of social thought to social reality is practically the opposite of emanation and discovery.
Footnotes - Chapter 4


4. Ibid., p. 177. There are (apart from purely psychological studies) many other studies of the unconscious and social relations. Examples of this may be cited thus: Gustave LeBon discusses the unconscious emotional and intellectual processes of individuals in the structure of a crowd. He states that the individual, a member of a psychological crowd is not conscious of his acts, C.f. LeBon, The Crowd (1947), Macmillan, N.Y. Tarde described, in considerable detail a process he termed unconscious imitation; Durkheim, Hollingshead and Redlich refer to unconscious judgements, all of which are related to Mannheim's "unconscious" standpoints. Znaniecki also discusses unconscious standpoints as seen in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Thomas and Znaniecki also discuss the unconscious modification of culture in the same work. Cooley was adamant about the "unawareness" of certain values and their influence on behavior. He argued that values may be generated by unconscious processes. His ideas are best expressed in his Social
Processes N. Y., (1924). E. Faris described unconscious attitudes in his work The Nature of Human Nature, N. Y. (1924). Burgess and Cottrell recognized the role of unconscious influences in marriage as outlined in their Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage, N. Y., Prentice Hall, (1939); especially pp. 175, 335, 534. Burgess and Locke argued that parental control and influence on mate selection is largely unconscious and includes family expectations in terms of culture, class, and conceptions of qualities of the desirable person. See for example, their work, The Family (1960). Greenwood discusses "unconscious use of the method of agreement". His ideas are set forward in his Experimental Sociology, N. Y. (1945). Jean Piaget discusses the unconscious assimilation of thoughts and feelings about the "rules of the game"; see his work The Moral Judgment of the Child, N. Y., (1948). Also, his works and ideas on the unconscious, seen from the sociological perspective, are to be found throughout his writings. Simmel discusses unconscious interests, Max Weber unawareness of motives, and Sorokin unconscious activities. The works, in order, in which their ideas are expressed are: K. Wolff (ed.), The Sociology of George Simmel (1950); M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1957); and P. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937-41), Vol. 1. The most comprehensive bibliography, available at the moment, dealing with the unconscious and the social may be found in O. Machotka, The Unconscious in Social Relations, N. Y. Philosophical Library (1964); and an earlier work, J. G. Miller, Unconsciousness, N. Y., Wiley and Sons (1942).
5. Mannheim's concept of "collective unconsciousness" may be attributed, with some degree of certainty, to Georg Lukacs' theory of class unconsciousness. See for example Lukacs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923); (only part of this work has been translated into English), C.f. excerpts from his essay on "Functional Change in Historical Materialism", in R. Daniels (ed.) A Documentary History of Communism, N.Y., Random House, 1960. See also "What is Orthodox Marxism?" - the first essay of his History and Class Consciousness - transl. by M. Harrington in The New International, Summer, (1957). Other translation consists of what may be termed "random" selections. For example Child's translations in Ethics, 52, 2 (1942), pp. 153-185. Here Lukacs states:

"Class consciousness... viewed abstractly and formally, is at the same time a class determined unconsciousness of the social-historical economic position of a class. This position is given as a definite formal connection, which seems to rule, all the objects of life. And the 'false' the 'semblance' contained in this state of affairs is nothing arbitrary but is precisely the mental expression of the objective-economic structure." (Ethics, op. cit., p. 160).

Lukacs' argument and general presuppositions and their relationship with Mannheim's theoretical formulations will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. See also D. Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Problems in Mannheim's Thought", in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLLXX, No. 3, Sept., (1967), pp. 416-420.


8. In French it is well known that "conscience" stands for both concepts.
   Considerable confusion revolves around this word and is specifically a problem in Durkheim's works.


11. Ibid., p. 52.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


16. Ibid.


19. In the Platonic sense of the terms.


22. Ibid., p. 44.


25. For elaboration on the concept of "intersubjectivity" see A. Schutz, op. cit.


27. There is an interesting, but complex affinity here between Mannheim and later-day functionalists. But, more specifically, and in keeping with the contemporary trends in psychology, he is perhaps closer to the Gestalt frame of reference. C.f. Mannheim, *Essays* . . . p. 82.


29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 277.

31. Ibid., p. 52.

32. It should be emphasized here that, in this context, "ideal-type" is used by Mannheim in a different sense than that used by Max Weber. In Weber's sense this concept serves as a theoretical measure constructed to guage the degree to which actual social phenomena conform to a purely rational model. For Mannheim, the theoretical concept of thought system is an instrument of the imputation of an ideology, or more specifically an ideological construct upon the existential reality of given social groups.


"The Problem of Imputation in the Sociology of Knowledge",


35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid. It should be emphasized here that by social structure Mannheim means:

"the web of interacting social forces from which have arisen the various modes of observing and thinking..." (Ideology and Utopia, pp. 45-6) For a comprehensive review of the concept of social structure see S. F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure, London, Cohen and West, 3rd ed. (1965).


Chapter 5

Perspectivism: Specificity or Generalization?

We have seen, in the preceding chapter, that Mannheim's concept of Weltanschauung is a highly intangible construct. The group, or class, to which it is imputed cannot be accurately established as a social entity. Indeed, as Child observes, "the process of imputation would consist merely in the formation and verification of a hypothesis as to the implicit systematic relationship between simple judgements". The asserted relationship, or correspondence, between Weltanschauungen and group is both vague and indeterminate.

Maquet,² has questioned the relevance of Mannheim's assumptions regarding the relationships and correspondences between Weltanschauungen and group. For example, he directs our attention to cases where, as he puts it, these assumptions do not obtain: the Indian caste system, or the American status structure.³

Mannheim's postulation of a relationship or correspondence between ideological manifestations and social existence, even if reductionists convert it to a formal pattern, cannot be said to be pointing to a feature which is common to all class societies, and not to all modern industrial class societies. Indeed, extreme arguments have been posited which assert that if Mannheim's thesis is, at the least correct in a minute way, it is still restricted to one particular country. One of these critics, Max Ascoli, reviewing Ideology and Utopia from
the "perspective" of a political theorist assumes that Mannheim's reasoning is essentially a product of a particular pattern he imputes to the political system of the German Republic. To this, which, given the historicistic orientation, makes sense, we should add the overall impact of more than a century of ideological and political antecedents upon the political reasoning process of this republic. Ascoli's conclusion is that "the connection between political party and world outlook is a typical German phenomenon which cannot be generalized". 4

If we accept unquestioningly Ascoli's argument then it would seem that one of Mannheim's theses is based on views which are mere manifestations of a specific historical period in a specific country, and which are emanations of a somewhat unique philosophical and political tradition. We could extend Ascoli's thesis to its extreme and assert that Mannheim's "perspective" is but a common feature of German intellectualism viewed through the eyes of the German intelligentsia.

However, it appears that Ascoli, and for that matter Hartung, 5 dismiss Mannheim too readily with their suggestion that Mannheim's position is itself merely an expression of the times in which he lived. As Natanson has succinctly pointed out: "The decision to become, to be, and to remain an existential thinker is at issue...", 6 and it is important that this be kept in mind.

Mannheim's insecure construction of the correspondence between thought systems and group existence poses a polarity of problems.

At one pole we see his
his concept of thought systems is derived by virtue of his definition of
the total concept of ideology, transcend the "social reality" of group
existence, as accessible to empirical investigation. At the other pole
we see that the social groups assume the position of indefinite structures
in that neither the group, nor the intellectual spokesman, as a totality,
can be regarded as the specific bearers of its ideology.

Thus, there is considerable difficulty involved in the task of
ascertaining a specific universe of discourse for a specific thought
system. George Herbert Mead, like Mannheim, was confronted with the
problem of integrating the "perspective" into a universe of discourse.
Mead's concept of the generalized Other complements and extends
Mannheim's concept of "perspective". We recall that the perspective
in Mannheim's thesis is "the model that is implicitly on the mind of a
person when he proceeds to reflect about an object". In a more complex
sense the perspective is the implicit interpretive scheme which an
individual brings into inquiry; it is the culturally based lens through
which an individual observes and interprets "social reality". For Mead,
a universe of discourse is simply "a system of common or social
meanings". Indeed, as Mead asserts, "the very universality and
impersonality of thought and reason is, from the behavioristic standpoint,
the result of the given individual taking the attitude of others toward
himself and of his finally crystallizing all these particular attitudes into
a single attitude or standpoint which may be called that of the 'generalized
Other'". Mead's, and Mannheim's, type of speculation on this point is
similar to Hegel's dialectic which assumes a synthesis may be in error thereby keeping the concept of reality alive. 10

Mannheim suggests that "if one were to trace in detail, in each individual case, the origin and the radius of diffusion of a certain thought-model one would discover the peculiar affinity it has to the social position of given groups and their manner of interpreting the world". 11

As may be clearly seen, Mannheim's formulation is an "if" proposition. At this point it hardly seems necessary to point out, with emphasis, that the assertion of an "affinity" is not equivalent to its demonstration. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that in a modern social context it is easier to reveal, systematize, and construct relatively closed thought-systems, than it is to discover a group to which it could be imputed in (a) a sociologically unambiguous, and (b) empirically conclusive manner. Thus, it would appear that Mannheim's suggestion is only plausible if the condition of the group in question is socially and historically well established; indeed, if it is relatively static. That the group's thought-model remains static (if such a state be possible) would seem to be a necessary state because it is only under such conditions that the establishment of common feelings, modes of thinking and general ideological disposition could be envisioned. Thus, the existence of "correspondences", if found to be acceptable, would become plausible for a sociologist who does not readily ignore empirically substantive, albeit conclusive evidence, in favor of historicistic conjectures.
Mannheim does not deal adequately with the mechanisms that connect thought to its social matrix. Mead, however, does develop a theoretical bridge between thought processes and existential reality: he identifies language and role-taking as the principal connecting mechanisms.

Language is the basic nexus. Language "communities" emerge in a particular sociocultural context; subsequently, each "community" of language develops and assumes a specialized form as behavior is synchronized in particular structural settings. The developed vocabulary acts as a system of social control which directs perceptions or perspectives and channels interpretations. Mead does not argue that language expresses ideas which exist antecedently in all minds, nor does it reflect "data" from the objective environment. More correctly, language is a socially constituted product that focuses attention on specific aspects of the environment in specialized ways; the prevailing universe of discourse establishes a framework for our perspectives of social reality.

A person learns a new language and, as we say, gets a new soul. He puts himself into the attitude of those that make use of that language. He cannot read its literature, cannot converse with those that belong to that community, without taking on its peculiar attitudes. He becomes in that sense, a different individual. You cannot convey a language as a pure abstraction; you inevitably in some degree convey also the life that lies behind it ... 12
The individual's thinking assumes the form of what Mead terms, "internalized conversation", i.e., with self. The "conversation" is shaped by sets of values, beliefs and implicit assumptions which are selectively internalized by the individual through the language process. Language, therefore, provides the medium for thought, and is a part of the nexus between "mind" and "existential reality".

Mead develops his concept of the "generalized Other" as a representation of those segments of society that provide the conceptual frameworks and evaluative systems selectively internalized by the "actor". Individuals build a "generalized Other" from the social environment. The internalized model then directs his thought processes:

It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for it is this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor in the individual's thinking.

Mead sees the "generalized other" as a synthesis of the various "roles" or patterns of conduct an individual enacts in his life history. Thus, the "generalized other" is developed against a background of social patterns of existence.

Mead develops a theory of society and mind in a similar way to that of Mannheim. Both view mind functionally rather than substantively, i.e., mind operates as "symbolic activity" functioning to promote man's "adjustment" to culture. For Mead, as for Mannheim, society is the
organization of the perspectives of all. It is moreover, the organization of perspectives of individuals each having his own phenomenological perspective which he is capable of holding and interpreting. Mead was unaware of Mannheim's work, but Mannheim, late in his life, became, aware of the structural similarities between his theories and those of Mead. For example, Mannheim remarks that:

> It is G. M. Mead's great merit to have pointed, like Karl Marx and before him Hegel, that society with its network of relationships in logic and in fact precedes the individual and ego formation... and he was among those psychologists who regard the Self as deriving from the social process in which it is implicated... the hypothesis that the social Self emerges from the patterns of social interaction and the concept of role taking are great advances in our language.\(^\text{16}\)

We will not engage further in Mead's analysis. Suffice it to say that he did, in effect, go beyond Mannheim's analysis. Mead's extraction of mind, self, thinking, and meaning, as McKinney remarks, "from the context of the social act via the delineation of such mechanisms as role-taking, the generalized other, symbolization, and attitude systems, constitutes an expansion of the frame of reference of the sociology of knowledge".\(^\text{17}\) Mead also delineates mechanisms which are empirically researchable, and he moves away from the general imputation problems still associated with Mannheim's thesis. Mead is clearly engaged in a sociology of knowledge moving in the direction of testable empirical inquiry.


10. For a comprehensive overview of G. H. Mead's contribution to the sociology of knowledge see, J. C. McKinney, "The Contribution of

11. Ideology and Utopia, p. 247. (emphasis added)


15. Mead, in Strauss, op. cit., p. 232. The term "generalized other" refers explicitly to this type of situation: "My parents are angry when I hit them." "My parents, teachers and friends dissaprove when I am mean." "Nice people don't approve of aggressive behavior." "One should not be aggressive." The last step represents the "generalized other" - in this case an internalized norm derived from the composite evaluations by significant others in the individual's experience. The individual's "reality level" can be viewed as developing in roughly the same way.


17. J. McKinney, op. cit., p. 149.
Chapter 6

The Detached Perspective: Knowledge and Alienation

There can be no doubt about the depth of Mannheim's aversion to authoritarianism. But, in the end, his philosophy of history, for all its liberal sympathies...is a version of the oldest kind of philosophy of history. It is the kind which assigns to a Chosen People the task of doing the great work of history...It lacks the Utopian overtones...which have usually gone with Platonism. But at bottom, it is a return to the ancient Platonic dream that cities of man will not cease from ill until philosophers are kings.

C. Frankel,
(The Case For Modern Man)

In answer to the charge of relativism Mannheim develops several arguments. We have clearly seen that within the context of his thesis there is a decisive conclusion that the position of the observer influences the results of thought. This fact leads to one of the basic difficulties of his thesis and results in his postulate of "relationism". Relationism refers to the fact that thought manifests itself as an instrument of action; as such it is socially conditioned\(^1\) and its validity is linked to this social perspective. Relationism, asserts Mannheim, "does not signify that there are no criteria of rightness and wrongness in a discussion". He adds, that it does insist, however, that it lies in the nature of certain assertions "that they cannot be formulated absolutely, but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation".\(^2\) It becomes relativism only when it is linked with the older static ideal of eternal,
unperspectivistic truths independent of the subjective experience of the observer, and when it is judged by this alien ideal of absolute truth.

But, as T. B. Bottomore has observed, "relationism" is indistinguishable from "relativism". 3

The notion of "relationism" leads to "particularization". Here, Mannheim, having described the "relational" aspects of knowing asks: "What can it tell us about the validity of an assertion that we would not know if we had not been able to relate it to the standpoint of the assertor?" In short, we must ask if we have verified or falsified a particular assertion when we have imputed it to such ideologies as liberalism or Marxism, or to other particular perspectives.

"Particularization" is a preparatory measure for ascertaining the eventual validity of the assertions contained in an ideology. Mannheim poses three answers to the question of verification of imputed statements. First, it may be stated that "the absolute validity of an assertion is denied when its structural relationship to a given social situation has been shown". In this sense, states Mannheim, there is a current in both the sociology of knowledge and the theory of ideology which accepts this type of relationship as a refutation of opposing assertions and which "would use this device for annihilating the validity of all assertions". 4

Secondly, and in opposition to the first postulate, there is perhaps another answer: the imputations made by the sociology of knowledge between a statement and its assertor, tell us nothing about the truth-value of the assertor "since the manner in which a statement
originates does not affect its validity).

There is a third possible way of judging the value of the assertions made by the sociologist of knowledge, which Mannheim, argues, represent "our own point of view". This, he adds, differs from the first view in that it demonstrates that the mere factual demonstration and identification of the social position of the assertor "as yet tells us nothing about the truth-value of his assertion". Indeed, it implies only the suspicion that this assertion might represent merely "a partial view". As over against the second view, it maintains that "it would be incorrect to regard the sociology of knowledge as giving no more than a description of the actual conditions under which an assertion arises (factual-genesis)". 5

Mannheim asserts that a fully developed sociology of knowledge will contain within itself an elaborated analysis of the perspective. This means that "particularization" will acquire a set of criteria for treating problems of imputation. The range and degree of comprehension of each of these several points of view "becomes measurable and delimitable through their categorical apparatus and the variety of meanings which each presents". 6 Thus:

The orientation towards certain meanings and values which inheres in a given social position (the outlook and attitude conditioned by the collective purposes of a group), and the concrete reasons for the different perspectives which the same situation presents to the different positions in it thus become even more determinable, intelligible, and subject to methodological study through the perfection of the sociology of knowledge. 7
Maquet terms Mannheim's concept of "particularization", "very fruitful", although he adds "not very original". Merton accepts it as what he terms a "widely recognized precept, namely that whatever is found true under certain conditions should not be assumed to be true universally or without limits and conditions".

Mannheim attempts to describe how possibilities for the particularization of ideologies arise spontaneously within the social process. He puts forward three factors which are to be considered vehicles for the recognition of the perspectivistic character of thought systems. The most important of the three factors is the conflict which occurs between two ideologies: Conflict would render transparent thereby establishing a perspective with regard to each other. Following this a "detached perspective" would arise, providing insight into the limitations of both, and thus transcending them on a higher level.

A "detached perspective" which evolves from the pitting of two ideologies (e.g. the old and the new), may not, however, be such a matter of course as Mannheim would have us believe. Each opposing group may well "debunk" the other's ideology, and each may strengthen their beliefs in the exclusiveness and absolute validity of their own convictions. Thus, although briefly viewed here, we can recognize the underlying notion of the dialectical mechanism of history, a notion which permeates Mannheim's sociology.
In order to demonstrate that there is a possibility of a socially total knowledge, Mannheim develops a dualistic framework. First, he attempts to demonstrate that the society in toto, had advanced far enough historically to permit the evolution of a holistic view out of the dialectical interplay, the existential conditions of the social classes, and their contradictory ideological perspectives.

In a later publication translated, edited, and posthumously published under the title *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (1956), Mannheim explicitly asserts that the behavior of the individual "cannot be adequately understood apart from his social relations". In this work he discusses (among other things) three concepts: Class consciousness, class, and class position. Indeed, he emphasizes positional perspectival behavior. The position, in terms of social stratification, which an individual occupies, explains, to a considerable extent, his behavior and motivations. In effect, his "positional" behavior "is behavior that reveals his reaction to his location". One of the most important forms of "positional" behavior is that which is solely guided by the economic interests of an individual as they are seen in the market.10

A class, in the economic sense, states Mannheim, is comprised of persons who "act uniformly in accordance with their like interests and like position in the productive process".11 A conscious class is one in which
the members act collectively in accordance with a conscious evaluation of their class position in relation to all other strata of society. Class position, then, suggests a certain affinity of interests within a diversified society "that delegates power, differential prerogatives, and economic opportunities selectively". 12

Also in this work, Mannheim gives considerable attention to a particular group, the intelligentsia. Here, he makes a transitional nexus between class qua social location, and an elite detached from mundane class interests; the "detached perspective" of the "free-floating" intelligentsia. Here, Mannheim is aspiring toward theory of objectivity through "detachment". The existential thinker is thus alienated.

Mannheim considers the intelligentsia from a number of approaches: (1) their social background which gives us some insight into why they have certain predispositions to "meet and experience given situations". 13 Moreover, it provides us with "patterns of ideation (which) under historically known circumstances we need not only analyses of individual life histories, but statistical data concerning the social (class or vocational) background and position of representative intellectuals". 14 (2) Their associations and participation in various professions and vocations also reveals some of the bases for their special thought modes:

In sum, the special moulds of intellectual amalgamation furnish a significant basis for the understanding of the roles which the educated strata of a society play, and from case to...
case, they even throw light on the prevalent style of expression and the mentality which the more articulate elements of a society evolve.¹⁵

The third approach considers an ascending intelligentsia that move into "an open and generally accessible stratum" which tends to "evolve an individualist and heroic philosophy", and to be both activistic and optimistic.¹⁶ Then, we see the type of intellectual who rejects the idea of social change. These may be, (in Mannheim's "generational" terms) the older generation of scholars whose social position does not allow a readjustment to change. They may also be members of what Mannheim terms, "declining vocations", or recipients of an independent income whose particular situation inhibits an understanding of change. Finally, a phase is reached by persons sharing a similar sociocultural background but of a subsequent generation who are able to reconcile themselves to an altered state of affairs.¹⁷

The detachment of this group of intellectuals, from their own stratum, is usually accompanied by the typical symptoms of dissociation or alienation: an inner-directed critique and scepticism towards the older exponents of their group.¹⁸ These individuals pass through two stages of doubt and scepticism. First, they discount the creed and promises of the revolutionaries,"but eventually they also lose faith in their own pre-revolutionary ideals". This, argues Mannheim, is known as "the sceptical state of a reactionary ideology". Furthermore, he adds, this marks the "social genesis of scepticism".¹⁹ A sceptical
attitude of mind emerges "from the eclipse of a group-centered world-view".

The intelligentsia are located in three areas, each area involving a specific intellectual type. These areas Mannheim terms "habitats". One type of intellectual is found in that area known as the local habitat. The local habitat possesses a persuasive and durable culture and is concerned with the understanding of neighborhood people.\(^{20}\) A second type of intellectual is represented by the "literate of institutions". They may be expressions of such institutions as church organizations, or of business interests, and possibly stable and well-entrenched political parties which create their own intelligentsia.\(^{21}\) The third type, and possibly the most important in Mannheim's quest for "objectivity", is termed the "detached intellectual". The "detached" perspective is usually detached from any political party, religious domination or other indoctrinating organization. He is able to make up his mind in a variety of ways and capable of "vicarious participation in a great variety of social movements".\(^{22}\)

The unattached intellectual then, is an existential thinker. This is fundamentally the paradox of the relativization of thought: the alienation of the existential thinker. He has given up the dream of absolute truth, he is aligned with the sceptic tradition. The unattached intellectual, as unmasker of lies and debunker of ideologies, as relativizer of and devaluator of immanent thought, as destroyer of Weltanschauungen, he is "the agent of a theory that seeks metaphysical justification and epistemological adequation but which, in principle, is committed to the
impossibility of both". 23

Thus, we see that as all thinking is existentially determined, Mannheim has to answer the question as to who is the social bearer of syntheses. We have also seen that his answer to this problem is a sociological category first introduced by Alfred Weber: the socially unattached intelligentsia. However, Mannheim does not claim that intellectuals have direct access to truth; the existential determination of truth is not suspended for them, but merely complicated. The detached intellectual is not "free" in general but rather, he is free to select perspectives and to synthesize them. His most notable, peculiar, characteristic is his membership in a group which, different from all social classes, is identified by its cultural possessions. Through education (Bildung), he gains access to the perspectivistic views of all classes. Thus, we see that the intellectual, as described by Mannheim, is capable of conversion, heresy, and opportunism, but he is also more burdened with responsibility than anyone else. The major fault in Mannheim's reasoning here is his assumption that the medium of Bildung is altogether imputable to the impulses of social classes and that members of the intelligentsia are not merely confronted with problems but with the perspectivistic views concerning these problems. The process of becoming aware, or conscious, of the inferior "truth-value" of the various perspectives as well as an awareness, and selection, of the most valuable elements for purposes of attaining a perspectival synthesis presupposes criteria which cannot be derived
from these views. In other words, any perspectival synthesis postulates "non-ideological" knowledge rather than multiple social determination.

Mannheim has transplanted Marx's idea of the "historical mission" from the proletarian class upon the intelligentsia. Indeed, we can see a similarity between Kautsky's concept of "bourgeois intellectuals" and Lenin's "ideologists" as representative of a socially unattached intelligentsia. All these groups are capable of arriving at Mannheim's concept of the "best perspective".

The inherent relativism of Mannheim's thesis is evident not only in the sense of the historicicity of thought, that is to say its dependence on, and limitation by historically created sociocultural conditions existent at a specific time. But also, it is evident that his emphasis was on the relativity of thought with reference to position in social space. In any stratified society, he argues, thought and knowledge are expressions of group or class situations. The content of ideologies varies from group to group within the same society; also members of groups exhibit different thought styles.

Class and group ideologies, we have seen have a dual function: as thought systems and thought styles called Aspektstrukturen. This latter term we have translated as universe of discourse. Universe of discourse represents the common frame of reference for group members. Usually, universes of discourse are considered the unquestioning sources and preconditions of valid knowledge. The detached intellectual (in his alienated "objectivity") is, states Mannheim, conscious of the
existence of many universes of discourse, and he may be conscious of their accuracy or bias.

Mannheim's detached intellectuals represent a key factor in his search for objective perspectives on the social order. Mannheim, was of course, aware that most intellectuals are socially attached and provide services to the ruling classes. But, he also believed that they did develop a special form of consciousness. The intellectual, asserts Mannheim, is able to achieve things "which are of indispensible significance for the whole social process", the most significant being, "the discovery of the position from which a total perspective would be possible". By this he means the position from which the totality of social processes could be comprehended. Even those intellectuals attached to a political party are able to reach an objective understanding of the society which they try to influence from their position. This is the "mission" of the intellectual.

It is important to observe here that Mannheim spoke of potentialities rather than actualities. But we may make several critical remarks especially in regard to the "objectivity" of intellectuals per se.

First, we may assert that a socially detached perspective may occur at the common-sense level of social reality. A member of a closed community who moves into another area or environment is in a position to make a comparative study of such things as values and beliefs, etc. In effect, formerly absolute values and beliefs become relativated.
This "commonsense" process may be systematized into a more sophisticated sociological procedure. According to Mannheim, a sociologist qua intellectual may consciously detach himself from the "social" and categorize specific perspectivistic world views that are relevant to and are valid in certain social situations. Thus, we see that the existential thinker, seeking objectivity and a synthesis of perspectives, becomes alienated from his social group.26

The social responsibility of the intellectual is to synthesize and interpret socio-political problems and perspectives.27 This responsibility, on the theoretical level of abstraction, is an epistemological problem.

In the final analysis it is the dilemma of the sociologist of knowledge that his alienation is defined by his commitment to the principles of relativization: that all determinations are historical, ideologized, and if not ultimately destroyed, at least partialized and devalued. These principles, themselves rational, define the existence of the existential thinker. Mannheim has not solved the problem of relativization by introducing a new term "relationism" and, as we shall see in the following chapter, his "situational relativism" leads to what may be termed a highly refined subjectivity. In this sense, he offers a new meaning of objectivity.
Footnotes - Chapter 6

1. It should be remembered that the German phrase "Seinsverbundenes Wissen" leaves open the exact nature of the determinism. Such a determination is to be regarded as a demonstrated fact in those realms of thought in which it can be shown (a) that the process of knowing is influenced by extra-theoretical factors, i.e., by existential factors rather than by an autonomous "inner dialectic", and (b) if these factors can be shown to penetrate into the concrete content of knowledge. C.f. *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 239-240.


5. Ibid., p. 255.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 255-56.

8. J. Maquet, loc. cit., p. 81

9. R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, p. 261, N. B. - In this form "particularization amounts to almost a truism. However, Merton does not completely cover the meaning and implications of Mannheim's concept.


11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 123
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 142.
16. Ibid., p. 143
17. Ibid., p. 149.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 155.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 159.
27. For a comprehensive analysis of Mannheim's intellectuals as elites see S. Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society, N.Y. Random House, 1963. See especially pp. 6, 142, 219, 246, 270, 302, 13-16, 176, 190; two types of elites, 19, 23, 290. For an opposing view of
the intellectual which argues cogently that, whatever their potential, the intelligentsia has historically shown more capacity for disseminating fashionable nostrums than scholarly truth, see F. A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Routledge-Kegan & Paul, (1967). See also, T. Molner, The Decline of the Intellectual, N. Y. Meridian, (1961).
Chapter 7

The Search for Objectivity: The Revised Epistemology

Once we realize that although epistemology is the basis of all the empirical sciences, it can only derive its principles from the data supplied by them, and once we realize, further, the extent to which epistemology has hitherto been profoundly influenced by the ideal of the exact sciences, then it is clearly our duty to inquire how the problem will be affected when other sciences are taken into consideration.

Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia

The truth or falsity of a proposition or of the entire theoretical sphere can be neither supported nor attacked by means of a sociological or any other genetic explanation. How something came to be, what functions it performs in other contexts is altogether irrelevant for its immanent character of validity. *

Karl Mannheim,
"Uber die Eigenart Kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis" (Unpublished M. S., dated 1921)

Mannheim's attempt to escape from relativism (by syntheses of many perspectives by socially unattached intellectuals) is, though controversial, insightful. In effect, a perspectival synthesis, in Mannheim's sense, leads to what may be termed a "redefined objectivity". What Mannheim proposes here is a highly refined subjectivity, freed as much as possible from the illusion of "absolute objectivity", as sensitized as
possible to the subjective and human elements which are inherent in it. In sum, objectivity is newly defined by a humanized epistemology.\(^1\)

Mannheim is emphatic that this solution does not imply renunciation of the postulate of objectivity and the possibility of arriving at decisions in factual disputes. It does not involve an acceptance of illusionism according to which everything is an appearance and nothing can be decided. It does not assert that objects do not exist. He adds:

> It is not intended to assert that objects do not exist or that reliance upon observation is useless and futile but rather that the answers we get to the questions we put to the subject-matter are, in certain cases, in the nature of things, possible only within the limits of the observer’s perspective. The result even here is not relativism in the sense of one assertion being as good as another. Relationism, as we use it, states that every assertion can only be relationally formulated. It becomes relativism only when it is linked with the older static ideal of eternal, unperspectivistic truths independent of the subjective experience of the observer, and when it is judged by this alien ideal of absolute truth.\(^2\)

Although during an earlier cursory examination of the "relativism"/"relationism" controversy we concluded with T. B. Bottomore that there is little, if any difference, between the two concepts further examination of the problem is necessary at this point.

> It may be recalled that in the preceding chapter Mannheim was termed a "situational relativist". Situational relativism designates the premise of a social scientist who rejects the assumption that he can establish
definitive conceptions of truth and justice, but who assumes, nevertheless, that he can make cumulative progress toward the realization of these ideal aims through the construction of hypotheses which are sufficiently objective to be reasonably acceptable. The situational relativist acknowledges the influence of the scientist's subjective preferences and sociocultural environment upon his conception of what kind of knowledge is meaningful. It is also a premise of situational relativism that all ways of knowing exhibit a similar epistemological perspective which for each investigator is relative to his own specific psychological and sociocultural situation.

It is recognizable that Max Weber's aim to preserve some objectivity despite relativity qualifies him as a "founding father" of what we term situational relativism. Parsons observes that "Weber's principle of value relevance, while it does introduce an element of relativity into scientific methodology... does not involve the skepticism that is the inevitable consequence of any really radical relativity". 3 Weber's statement should also be noted: "We cannot discover however, what is meaningful to us by means of a 'presuppositionless' investigation of empirical data. Rather perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation". Moreover, he states that meaningfulness naturally "does not coincide with laws as such, and the more general the law the less the coincidence. For the specific meaning which a phenomenon has for us is naturally not to be found in those relationships which it shares with many other phenomena". 4
What differentiates "radical relativism" from "situational relativism"? The difference is slight. "Radical relativism" maintains that the knowledge-situation is determined by motivational and socio-cultural conditions, whereas "situational relativism" maintains that it is the meaning-situation which is so determined.

However, as both the method and criterion are determined by the conception of what kind of knowledge is meaningful, it would appear that there is little, if any, modification. Two important aspects of this modification should be noted. First, according to situational relativism, the environmental-motivational determination does not preclude the investigator's relatively self-determined capacity for making a choice from among culturally-begotten alternatives. In other words, it is presupposed that a reflective person has some freedom of selection under the conditions and within the limitations which his total existential environment imposes upon him. Secondly, the situational relativist assumes that within the specifiable limits and in accordance with the specific requirements of a given epistemological perspective testable claims can be constructed and verified as reasonably acceptable to a community of reflective minds. If there is to be such a "community of reflective minds" (such as the "detached intelligentsia"), the social scientists who share the same general epistemological perspective must be motivated by the same intellectual preferences and must share the same conception of what kind of knowledge is meaningful.
Mannheim advocates situational relativism, when he analyzes the "existential basis of mental production". Moreover, it is demonstrable that Mannheim is actually dealing with the psychological and sociocultural conditions to which the meaning-situation rather than the knowledge-situation is relative. Although Wissenssoziologie is translated as sociology of knowledge, Mannheim insists that the solution to the problem of knowledge is to be found through "the structural analysis of epistemology". He purposively attempts to balance the extreme of a one-sided psychological analysis of behavioral determinants, with the other extreme of a one-sided sociological analysis of institutions.\(^5\) Mannheim declares that he is also anxious to avoid the "vague ill-considered and sterile form of relativism with regard to scientific knowledge which is so prevalent today", as he is to refute the absolutistic theories of knowledge which assumes that the genesis of a proposition is under all circumstances irrelevant to its truth. This, he believes is a radical challenge to the abrupt and absolute dualism between "validity" and "existence", and between "fact" and "value" which is characteristic respectively of most idealistic and positivistic epistemologies.

Mannheim's concept of "relationism" conveys nearly the same meaning as "situational relativism" which is used here. The "perspective" of the investigator is what distinguishes Mannheim's "relationism" from "radical relativism". As it is the observer's "perspective" rather than his answer to a particular question, that is the product of the psychological and sociocultural background, this principle of Mannheim's "relationism"
requires special attention.

We may recall that by "perspective" Mannheim means "the orienting concept which determines how one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking". In other words, "perspective" entails the meaning of the concepts used; the phenomena of the counter-concept; the absence of certain concepts; the structure of the categorical apparatus; dominant models of thought; level of abstraction; and the ontology that is presupposed. Although "perspective" precludes absolute knowledge, it does not preclude "criteria of rightness and wrongness in a discussion", as radical relativists will maintain. Thus, a "relational type of objectivity" may be realized by thinkers who have a common conception of the "perspective" to which their assertions are relative.

Mannheim's position, it was noted, is a mediating position with respect to the problem of interpreting the "validity" of a given "perspective". The next step is to examine how Mannheim, given his conception of knowledge, identifies a "valid" perspective from an "invalid" one. What criteria does he utilize to arrive at his new conception of truth? There are three criteria used by Mannheim to reach perspectival validity.

First, there is the criterion of unanimity. As different observers are identified with the same perspective, and utilize the same conceptual and categorial apparatus they will be able to arrive at similar results and be in a position to eradicate everything which deviates
from this consensus. Mannheim supposes that what is seen by all observers sharing the same point of view exists in the thing under observation, and is thus a means of suppressing the personal equation and establishing "authentic socially conditioned" knowledge. Thus, we see that Mannheim believes that "sharing the same point of view" is possible within limits. Furthermore, he states emphatically that this is a methodological problem which is not beyond solution.

The next criterion is the criterion of perspectival synthesis. At this point we have several views of the same thing emanating from different perspectives. Here Mannheim attempts to demonstrate how it is possible to attain a certain objectivity by comparing different perspectives. In this case, that which has been correctly but differently perceived by the different perspectives must be understood in the light of the differences in structure of these various modes of perception. He insists that a formula must be discovered for translating the results of one into those of the other and to discover a common denominator for these varying perspectives. He states that once such a common denominator is discovered it will be possible to "separate the necessary differences of the varying views from the arbitrarily conceived and mistaken elements, which here too should be considered as errors".

Does the process of perspectival synthesis and the attempt to find a common denominator leave a residue (i.e., that which can be seen from any point of view) or, does it suggest a new perspective which will
synthesize the old ones? In answer to this question Mannheim seems to conceive of an integration of points of view into what he terms a "dynamic synthesis", an emerging, more comprehensive, progressive synthesis. However, he is not clear as to how this "dynamic synthesis" will come about. Presumably, he relegates this problem to his dialectical historicism thereby proposing implicitly, a resolution of the problem.

The problem of "objectivity" remains as long as we are confronted with many different perspectives. Mannheim must ask which of the various perspectives is "best". This calls for a criterion of the "best perspective": "As in the case of the visual perspective, where certain positions have the advantages of revealing the decisive features of the object, so here pre-eminence is given to that perspective which gives evidence of the greatest comprehensiveness and greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical materials". 9

The "best perspective" will be that which is the broadest and most fruitful. He has defined the broadest perspective as that which transcends opposition and permits a synthesis. On the other hand, the perspective which is termed most fruitful is that which permits the most adequate adjustment of the action to the objective we wish to obtain. Given Mannheim's position on this point, it appears that an idea may be said to be fruitful, or efficient, when it allows either conduct adapted to the situation in which it develops or, on the other hand, when it allows the effective preparation of a future social order. Mannheim claims that a theory is wrong if, in a given practical situation, it uses concepts and
categories which, if taken seriously, would prevent man from adjusting himself at that historical stage.

Thus, we see that, lacking unanimity in perspective, that perspective is the "best" one which, at a given moment of history, gives the possibility for the broadest synthesis, and permits the best adaptation to the situation. The statement "best adaptation to the situation", however, begs the question at hand which is: "Best with reference to what objectives?" Mannheim, is also faced with the problem of establishing a scientific method, or failing that, a metaphysic that will permit of an escape from relativism and allow for valid historical and social knowledge. This was also the problem of such thinkers as Dilthey, Croce, Simmel, Rickert, Scheler, Troeltsch, and Max Weber. Each of the preceding thinkers came to the realization that knowledge is relative to a given stylistic structure, or place in the socio-historical complex. It is evident that the relativism of all historical and socio-cultural accounts is due to the presence of conditioning valuational factors that give rise to the "mentalities" which Marx, Mannheim, Weber and others have attempted to characterize in various ways.

Summary

Marx accepted a view of objectivity as applied in the natural sciences. However, he declared that in the sociocultural realm an inevitable distortion is introduced by the presence of unequal economic classes in conflict. For Marx, objectivity is possible at the level of
social thought when class conflict is ended. This is Marx's concept of ideological superstructures. His theory of ideology is however, derived from individualism. It is premised upon the conception of reason as an absolute, and upon the corollary of this conception that reasoning in the particularistic terms of class and institutional interests is of necessity a derogation from the autonomy of reason.

Mannheim, like Marx, tends to retain the notion of objectivity. Mannheim adds to the limitation and partiality imposed upon thought by class and institutional perspectives. He adds what we may term a "positive" element: Facets of reality previously unobserved are brought into the focus of consciousness in the process of conceptualization. Thus, we see that the ideology contains new elements of knowledge but these elements are bound up in the prejudices, interests, wishes, etc. However, it was these interest-bound aspects of the situation that directed attention to the neglected segments of that situation. Thus, the referral of a perspective back to the social conditions under which it was formulated and expressed, is done "with the purpose of synthesizing these new elements of knowledge, with other perspectives, and not merely with the negative purpose of unveiling the character of the distortion". This, it may be argued, is the worth of Mannheim's thesis - the discovery of the value of perspectival knowledge.

Mannheim equates perspectival knowledge with qualitative knowledge. But, it is clear that the concepts that go to make up a given perspective "need not be valuational concepts". Hence, the entire
range of knowledge, and not only social knowledge, in principle can be subsumed under the category of perspective.

The objectivity which Mannheim articulates is a synthesis that gives agreement at the level of values as much as it does at the level of existential facts. In sum, then, according to Mannheim's "situational relativism", the objectivity of any claim to knowledge is relative to three situations which, together, constitute his epistemological perspective: (1) his value situation, i.e., the primary preference which motivates him; (2) his meaning-situation, i.e., the kind of knowledge he considers acquirable; (3) his knowledge-situation, i.e., the method by which he constructs his knowledge and the criterion by which he attempts to validate it. Within Mannheim's epistemological perspective the knowledge-situation (methodological) is derived from the meaning-situation (epistemological). It is the meaning-situation, rather than the knowledge-situation which is relative to his own value-situation (motivational) and to the symbolic frame of reference which is an integral part of the culture pattern that he shares with others as a universe of discourse. Mannheim's value-situation, in terms of his "Best Perspective", it was shown, begs the question: "Best with regard to what objectives, what values?" The answer to this question may now be sought through an examination of Mannheim's own sociological perspective to discover what really are his presuppositions with regard to value, and the connections, if any, between these axiological presuppositions and his sociological presuppositions. In light of this contention we now examine the value components of Mannheim's reconstructionist sociology.
Footnotes - Chapter 7


1. Ideology and Utopia, p. 270.

2. Ibid. - For a critique of this argument see C. Becker, "Social Relativity", in The New Republic, Jan. 27, (1937), p. 388. He states, in rather dogmatic terms: "I feel that, having relentlessly pressed all our heads down below the surface of the flowing social process, he (Mannheim) first assures us that we can never get out, and then tells us that we can after all escape drowning by frankly recognizing that we are under water. I must confess that I do not share his confidence, but if we are all under water for good no doubt something is gained by recognizing the fact". C.f. R.B. Perry, Realms of Value: A Critique of Human Civilization, N.Y. Greenwood Press, (1954), p. 362.


6. Ideology and Utopia, p. 270

7. Ibid., p. 271.

8. Ibid., p. 270.

9. Ibid.

10. Taylor, op. cit., p. 84.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.
Chapter 8

Mannheim’s Perspective: From "Soul" to Social Reconstruction

A perspective is a pattern of identifications, demands, and expectations. Certain identifications, demands, and expectations tend to be clustered, as in the case of the person who is strongly identified with humanity as a whole; he is likely to support a world order, and to cherish some optimism about at least the long-range prospects of mankind. A perspective need not be a logically unified whole, and indeed seldom is. It may include 'stray' identifications, demands, and expectations, so to speak, as well as integrated interests, faiths, and loyalties. It may even include in varying degrees, conflicting commitments of the ego and the self.

H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan
(Power and Society)

In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim felt that he had successfully destroyed, once and for all, the claims of absolute validity for all types of thinking. Indeed, as Albert Salomon observes:

He was proud of having established scientifically the limitations of value judgments that resulted from the social perspectives of human thinking. Applying the method he reexamined the conditions of his own relativistic thinking and analyzed the perspectives of his own conceptions.¹

In this chapter, we will examine Mannheim's own sociological perspective as revealed in his reconstructionist sociology. Through an
examination of the "valuational" content of his applied sociology we will arrive at a point of greater clarity and understanding of his own verificatory model. In effect, we employ Mannheim's own conception of "perspective", which demonstrates his recognition of the two facets of knowledge, the cognitive and the valuational, to examine his manner of perception and the qualitative way in which he construes the object of his knowledge within his model.

G.W. Remmling, distinguishes between four phases, or stages of intellectual development, through which Mannheim's thinking has changed course. We may delineate them thus:

First phase: Sociology of Knowledge
Second phase: Social Planning
Third phase: Values and religion
Fourth phase: The Control of Power

As we have seen, Mannheim's early work was rooted in a historicistic framework, and proclaimed that every Weltanschauung is historically determined and therefore both limited and relative. This was to culminate in his "total" historicism which states that every part of the mental-psychic world is in a state of flux, of becoming. His early preoccupation with the sociology of knowledge reflects his attempts to clarify the problem of the historical nature and unity of mind and life. The just period of Mannheim's work ends with his article Wissenssoziologie, published in 1931. Here Mannheim still attempts to clarify epistemological and ontological issues of the sociology of knowledge. He follows the main
stream of Kultursoziologie and moves towards the problems of a sociology of mind. 5

Remmling and Wirth both argue that Mannheim's early theorizing must be understood against the background of the Weimar Republic. 6 In Remmling's words:

Political and social life of this period resembled a kaleidoscopic display, with the observer witnessing constant changes of the most varied philosophical, political, social, and cultural tenets. 7

Remmling observes further that:

Because of these and other experiences and influences, including Marxist economic determinism and the various methods of unmasking ideologies that were advanced by Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, Mannheim in time came to a basic doubt regarding man's intellectual behavior. The impact on him of Lebensphilosophie and historicism increased and accentuated his doubts and distrust until he eventually arrived at the question of the basic meaning of mind and culture. 8

In 1933 Mannheim gave up the chair of sociology in Frankfurt 9 and, following his "dismissal" by the Nazi government, accepted a post as lecturer at the London School of Economics. This, states Salomon, was "a decision of great importance for the development of his work after 1933, in particular his books Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction
Following 1933 Mannheim's thinking began to change. Remmling delineates four factors, over and above the obvious influence of his new English environment, which explain these changes. First, the impact of Lebensphilosophie, existentialism, and extreme historicism, touched off considerable intellectual conflict on the continent. This "upheaval" was "the ultimate climax of a great disillusionment that started with Nietzsche and spread after the Auto-da-Fe of World War I". By the time that he arrived in Britain "he left behind him this 'lightening', as the England of the early thirties had hardly been touched by this crisis".

The second aspect is that following 1930 Mannheim lost interest in historical materialism. This development was strengthened by the third aspect which is described by Remmling as a turning away from "the Hegel-Marx-Dilthey sequence". Here, Mannheim, like Pareto, and Ortega y Gasset, approaches the concept of the elite. He left his earlier construction of a "socially unattached intelligentsia". In place of this ideal-typical construct he posits a positivistic sociology to determine how an elite will emerge from the masses:

Mannheim assimilated social psychology, instrumentalism, behaviorism, and pragmatism. He began to think more and more in terms of ecological approaches and established contact with similar schools in American pragmatism.
Fourthly, Mannheim's observation of political life in England, "led to a slow but steady recovery of faith in democracy". He had lost faith in the value and vitality of the democratic process while in Germany during the first phase of his intellectual development. It was during this period that he wrote *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* and develops his argument that without a reconstruction of man, there can be no reconstruction of society.

The third phase, i.e., that dealing with values and Christianity is reflected in his work *Diagnosis of Our Time*. This is a series of lectures and essays, written mostly in 1941 and 1942, and was designed primarily to complete the ideas put forward during the second phase:

This was his response to the crisis of continental society. The outbreak of war against Nazism now stimulated Mannheim in an attempt to support and amplify his original intention - to alleviate the crisis by means of a rational planning of society - through the postulate of moral and religious rearmament.¹⁵

*Diagnosis of Our Time* serves two functions. First, it popularizes the ideas set forward in *Man and Society*... Secondly, it moves toward the construction of a new value system "and a revaluation of Christianity". He analyzes the question of "whether or not Christianity might help to create values meaningful to a planned social order". And, as Remmling correctly observes, Mannheim asserts that:

Such a well-integrated and functional value system is essential to generate enthusiasm and activity that would be instrumental in realizing the objective of planning for freedom.¹⁶
The fourth phase deals with the problem of power. Mannheim's work, *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning*, (published posthumously in 1950) raises many questions surrounding the controversy between power and freedom which a planned democracy must try to solve:

... Mannheim is no longer a detached critical observer, but has grown into a political and social strategist who tries to understand so that others may be able to act.\(^\text{17}\)

Here, in the fourth phase, emerges his Christian perspective and he "recognizes the need to enhance his rational theory of planning through the introduction of volitional and emotional elements". \(^\text{18}\)

The preceding examination of Mannheim's changing preoccupations, although cursory, serves to introduce our focal point which involves an examination of specific axiological presuppositions inherent in Mannheim's social reconstructionist paradigm.

Mannheim uses several terms to designate the value aspects of experience. Among them are: aim, goal, goal-direction, qualities, value, valuation, objective virtues, cultural aspects, morals, attitude, interest, sentiments, proper ends, social codes, conduct patterns, way of life, ideology, and Utopia. \(^\text{19}\) These terms, although at first glance they may appear spurious, are used by Mannheim specifically when "referring to the valuational side of experience, and he often uses the above terms interchangeably with the word *value". \(^\text{20}\)
Mannheim asserts that values are "part and parcel of the social process". Indeed, he adds, they are "functions of the social process". To the sociologist values are:

... Not abstract entities nor are they intrinsic qualities of an object. In the light of concrete analysis it is meaningless to speak of values as if they existed independent of the valuating subject or the group for which they are valid. Further, we are reluctant to change this attitude because we are afraid of the relativism which may follow the realization that values are created by society and vary in different societies, and that our own values are also dependent on our social system. 21

Mannheim, then, argues that we must accept the fact that values are "socially generated". He asks what will happen when we realize that values are not dictated by some transcendental force but by "our rational insight into the needs of our social order". He concludes that:

What will really happen will be that the theological, and to a large extent the philosophical justification of values appeals to the thought habits of men accustomed to act under authority, whilst the sociological approach appeals to the democratically educated man because the social obligation can be reasonably tested. Another advantage of the sociological concept is that it both explains the obligation and opens the door to reforms, whereas the old absolute conception rendered reform slower. 22
Values, then, are not abstract entities, nor are they intrinsic qualities of an object. Moreover, it is meaningless to speak of values as if they were independent of the valuating subject, or for that matter, the group for which they are valid.

Mannheim delineates what he terms the "value-generating situation". There are three factors here: organism, situation, and object. The organism is necessary "to give meaning to the idea of value". It is not necessary to be conscious of the values that motivate us. The situation, we are told, serves as the context for action, within which the organism carries out a particular act of judgment and selection. He elaborates on this goal-oriented activity by observing that we can begin by considering an object of interest from the point of view (perspective) of its subjective element. Moreover, once interest has been focused on the object, it becomes more and more important. In this broad sense we are able to discuss and develop interests in cultural objects such as a philosophy or ideology. In this sense "interest" means objects which enlist our attention.

Mannheim distinguishes between interest in the sense of being "interested in" an object, etc., and interest which has the "special implication of personal advantage" sometimes termed self-interest or in its more extreme form egocentric. As an example of this "self-interest", he posits the striving for great power, prestige, or economic gain. The wish for "self-gain" is the motivation which urges the individual to purposive activities. This means that individual interests compel the
individual to organize his behavior in order to attain "this given end". It is in this sense that Mannheim's second sense of interest is considered; that is, rational interest, which implies calculation and striving for a given end. This is a complex form of "adjustment", because calculation is involved and this "implies choosing the means which lead most effectively to that end and in the shortest way with the greatest economy of effort". Furthermore, it implies a positive control over the resources which are necessary to "carry purposes into effect", and also, "possession of the necessary means with which to satisfy desires and the trained powers of mind and particularly of initiative and reflection required for free preference and for circumspect and far seeing desires".

We see here that Mannheim has posed the problem in terms of a means-end situation. Also, he has suggested a distinction of the means-value and the end-value. This raises two questions, that of determining the ends sought, and that of determining the proper means of achieving those ends.

The value of the means is established by the nature of the ends; ends that is, that require organization to achieve the sought-after goal. These instrumental values vary in that they may lead us to the end in the shortest, most economical way possible; or, they may be useless and wasteful of both "effort" and "energy".

Mannheim also speaks of a positive control over "the source necessary to carry purpose into effect", and of the "means to satisfy desires". To this he adds the calculating and striving for a given end.
There is a differentiation between the two dimensions of value which may be termed instrumental and intrinsic. The latter, may be defined as those values that are prized for their own sake, whereas the former are those which cause or lead to intrinsic values.²⁶

It would seem at first that intrinsic values are out of place in Mannheim's framework for he had stated emphatically that "values are not abstract entities nor are they intrinsic qualities of an object". However, when we examine his terminology we discover that intrinsic, in this instance, is equated with independent; that is independent of a valuating subject. In effect, he uses the term intrinsic to identify specific value categories, without implying any independence of intrinsic values from valuing objects. In Mannheim's usage, intrinsic values appear to refer generally to actual qualities of experience, in contrast to normative values. He refers to certain cultural patterns which he designates as "intrinsically good". Indeed, at one point he speaks of "doctrinal disputes and fights for intrinsic values".²⁷

Also of interest to Mannheim are what he terms inclusive and exclusive characteristics of values. Inclusive values are those which encompass other values as a whole encompasses its parts and as shared experience of values encompasses the experiences of more than one individual. Hence inclusive values do not refer to any absolute set of values, but rather, to varying levels of comprehensiveness as varying wholes may be parts of much larger wholes.
Exclusive values refer to the particularistic character of value. These types of values are restricted to particular individuals, or may serve partial or particular ends. Also, they may be embodied in, and experienced by, a specific group.

In his discussion of the values of democracy, Mannheim singles out the fact that the vertical relationships involved in a stratified society may produce an inclusiveness on certain restricted levels. For example, the social values of a specific professional group, such as physicians, provide a cohesive element and sustain the life of that particular group, i.e. they are inclusive of that group. However, it is important to keep in mind that they are also exclusive and particularistic, in that they do not encompass other social groups. Democratization involves the "value" of face-to-face relationships - a horizontal rather than a vertical relationship. Thus, they involve value experiences which transcend the vertical relationship and the restrictive inclusiveness that was involved in stratification.²⁸ He adds:

The real opportunity that democratization gives us consists in being able to transcend all social categories and experience love as a purely personal and existential matter... It follows that a democratic social order, with its tendency to minimize vertical social distance, provides the most favorable conditions for the development of 'internalized' personality.
In effect, Mannheim urges a greater emphasis upon those fundamental values which ultimately integrate groups, and on those fundamental values which are the products of the historical life of the community, and on new ideals which aim at the "just" reconstruction of society. 29

Mannheim recognizes a unity between factors of change and permanence, as these factors reveal themselves in the goals and values of human activity, and in the social, political, economic, and cultural processes. History, states Mannheim, is more than a series of events; it is "the narrating of events in the particular context of continuing functions", thus making the account of change continuous. 30 He also points out that the positive values of a given tradition can be fully realized when it is being lived, and is at the same time, distant enough from it to see those elements of the past which are relevant to the present:

It may be well worth heeding a tradition, not for the sake of its venerable character, but because it stems from past situations which may arise again. 31

In a positive sense, he points out that in stable social groups the actions and behavior of the members are shaped by definite group traditions and values as prerequisite for "tolerable" human life.

When dealing with the dynamics of change, Mannheim observes that the dynamics of change may assume, in some instances, an "antithetic course and invert a given trend". However, he does not believe that change occurs universally through opposites, and he claims that the Marxist view of the inevitable process of structural inversion is not at all adequate:
The thesis that capitalism is the dialectical opposite of feudalism is as questionable as the corresponding prognosis that the trend of capitalism points toward its antithesis. What the student of social change may learn from Marx is not his political and propagandistic casuistry, but the structural approach to change and to the dynamics of history. 32

Mannheim’s basic approach to the problem of social change and valuational changes is to be found in his study of generations. 33 His approach to the historical character of thought processes and valuation is explicit in his statement that it is evidenced not only by the individual consciousness, as it appears from within, in a phenomenological sense, but also by the fact that "men cogitate as members of groups and not as solitary beings". 34

The thought of individuals is historically relevant in so far as the groups to which they belong continue through time. The transmission of group understandings from generation to generation is an interpretative as well as a selective process. 35

Change thus appears to be characteristic primarily of successive emerging generations, observed as trends or currents of "goal actualization" within the social process.

Mannheim posits (tentatively), eight hypotheses, which in his opinion "suggest themselves" when we are trying to solve the riddle of changing human valuation.

The first, refers to valuations of attitudes and activities
(among them are included the professions). These valuations, he states, are originally set by groups. The "real carrier of standards is not the individual, but the group of which he happens to be the exponent". Next, the standards of different groups reflect, in part, "their respective social structure, the nature of their organization, and of their fundamental needs and functions". The third hypothesis asserts that valuation is "originally not an isolated psychological act of an individual", and for the most part cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of subjective intention. Fourthly, a conflict in valuations usually arises "when two or more different groups are co-ordinated or superimposed on each other". In these cases, he adds, the values are primarily counter-values, "set up against the standards of competing or subjugated groups". Fifth, with social stratification the forms of co-existence of "class standards" tend to reflect "the nature of co-existence of these social strata". Sixth, he argues that the ruling elite sets the value standards for all classes in a "static society", which has reached a certain balance. The seventh hypothesis is a corollary to this in that it asserts that when a society is becoming dynamic, i.e., "when quick changes in the stratification takes place, when a sudden rise and fall of individuals in the social scale is a matter of course", then, the values of the ruling groups will be challenged. Finally, he points out that it would be wrong to relate social values exclusively to social classes. All groups (reference-groups), set value standards and "determine" perspectives. 36

Change is seen by Mannheim to be of a more microscopic nature,
rather than a cataclysmic series of valuational, or isolated disturbances.

Even during a revolutionary period the old and the new merge in a synthesis. 37

Mannheim believes in the principle of rational control and argues for the "reeducation of the whole man" toward a "conscious appreciation of values that appeal to reason":

In a society where the value controls were traffic lights directly appealing either to conditioned responses or to the emotions and the unconscious mind, one could bring about social action without strengthening the intellectual powers of the ego. But in a society in which the main changes are to be brought about through collective deliberation, and in which re-valuations should be based upon intellectual insight and consent, a completely new system of education would be necessary, one which would focus its main energies on the development of our intellectual powers and bring about a frame of mind which can bear the burden of scepticism and which does not panic when many of the thought habits are doomed to vanish. 38

Here, Mannheim argues that techniques of control based on rational values and sober judgments are the key to social planning of a democratic nature.
Footnotes - Chapter 8


3. Ibid.


5. Remmling, op. cit., p.27.


7. Remmling, op. cit., p. 27.

8. Ibid.

9. Mannheim was the only full professor of sociology in Germany at this time.


11. Remmling, op. cit., p. 27.

12. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


22. Ibid., p. 132.

23. Ibid., p. 133.

24. Ibid., p. 37.

25. Ibid.


31. Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 82.

32. Ibid., p. 58.


35. Ibid.


37. *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, p. 171

38. *Diagnosis of Our Time*, p. 23.
Concluding Comments

We have seen how Mannheim has attempted to develop a theory of "perspectival validity", an objective analytic perspective with which to diagnose the crises of his age. He has presented us with a "blueprint" for action and, as a result, has made his own axiological presuppositions apparent.

Mannheim is confident that he has reached a stage in the development of his sociological "perspective" where he is able "objectively" to diagnose what he terms the "crisis of culture in the era of mass-democracies and autarchies".\(^1\) He asserts that man has progressed so far as to be able to plan society, and even to plan himself.

Mannheim favors indirect ways of influencing behavior and he deals with five aspects of the problem. We may delineate them thus: (1) influencing behavior in unorganized masses, (2) influencing behavior in concrete groups, (3) influencing behavior by means of field structures, (4) influencing behavior by varying situations, and (5) influencing behavior by means of social mechanism, such as the distribution of power.\(^2\)

Mannheim is convinced that democratic planning is possible, and that planning and a planned society is consistent with freedom. His concept of freedom means, "not so much freedom of action but the possibility of self-expression".\(^3\) Indeed, he argues that freedom means more than the deciding of the individual's destiny, for it also encompasses
the "influence one is able to exert in determining the aims which are
to be realized by collective action". In *Diagnosis of Our Time*, he
states that:

> Freedom can only be achieved if its conditions are organized
> according to the democratically agreed wishes of the community. But the latter can prevail only if the community has a vision of aims to be achieved and a knowledge of the means by which they can be achieved.

Freedom, a value sought by Mannheim during his own lifetime, means to participate in the community or communities where goals, values, and the "visions of aims to be achieved" are decided. In sum, he sees the problem of freedom as a "functional prerequisite" to maintaining a balance between the possibilities of individual choice in a given situation and the necessities of group control which maintains and preserves the conditions for the exercise of free choice. In Parsonian terminology, Mannheim is here concerned with "pattern maintenance" as a functional prerequisite to social equilibrium.

Mannheim's category of social planning is directed toward the realization of human freedom. His phrase "planning for freedom" is perhaps, the best clue to understanding his social strategy. Indeed, as Rempel observes, this frequently used phrase "does in fact, sum up his whole social theory". He would ultimately wish to re-shape values according to the new vision of democratic society. Salomon states that Mannheim's planning is "directed toward the goal of liberating man and
society, a goal that presupposes a concept of human dignity as revealed by the individual's potential spontaneity of thought and action".  

Mannheim has raised questions which ask specifically:

"What can the sociology of knowledge, the perspective, contribute to an understanding of the problem of freedom and planning?" He admits that there is one question which sociologists can never answer scientifically, namely: "What are the unique and individual paths which a given person must follow to attain a rational and moral way of life?" He proposes, however, to solve the riddle by putting forward an outline of the role which the sociology of knowledge can and must play in shaping man's future freedom:

The fact that the sociology of knowledge gives us a certain foundation does not free us from the responsibility of arriving at decisions. It does however, enlarge the field of vision within the limits of which, decisions must be made. Those who fear that an increased knowledge of the determining factors which enter into the formation of their decisions will threaten their 'freedom' may rest in peace. Actually it is the one who is ignorant of the significant determining factors and who acts under the immediate pressure of determinants unknown to him who is least free and most thoroughly predetermined in his conduct. Whenever we become aware of a determinant which has dominated us, we remove it from the realm of unconscious motivation into that of the controllable, calculable, and objectified. Choice and decision are thereby not eliminated; on the contrary, motives which previously dominated us become subject to our domination; we are more and more thrown back upon our true self and, whereas...
formerly we were the servants of necessity, we now find it possible to unite consciously with forces with which we are in thorough agreement. 9

The concept of the perspective, as developed in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, would contribute to the realization of democratic freedom in that its non-ideological "objective" utilization is capable of great analytic depth. Analysis, once achieved, through "perspectival synthesis" on the "order of things", provides Mannheim with a basis from which to re-shape the values according to his vision of democratic society.

Mannheim seeks a progressively more rationalized world; a world where individuals exercise freedom through an increased awareness of the irrational social factors which had historically stood in the way of freedom. To act responsibly, in accordance with the increased awareness of man's irrationality, and to subject human action to the guidance of rational goals and values, is to be free. This was the goal Mannheim attempted to work toward: freedom both for himself, and his fellow man.

In summary, Mannheim's perspective on social planning indicates a decidedly functionalist approach to social problems. His verificatory model emphasizes the need for social equilibrium, and his goal-orientation is reflected in his model. His intellectual paternity, it was noted, came from many areas. His dialectical approach to knowledge, largely derived from Marx and Lukacs, led him toward
a synthesis of the many sociological and philosophical perspectives from which he draws his own categories and perspectives. His values are explicit; his own perspective, during the last stages of his productive years, reflects clearly the impact that Christianity had on his life. This was a force which came to dominate the valuational side of his life. Indeed it became his "paradigmatic experience". He elucidates:

'Paradigmatic experience' in our context will mean those decisive basic experiences which are felt to reveal the meaning of life as a whole. Their pattern is so deeply impressed upon our mind that they provide a mould into which further experiences flow. Thus, once formed they lend shape to later experiences.¹⁰

The Christian, he observes, seeks not just any adjustment, but an adjustment which is "in harmony with his basic experience of life". Christianity, shapes Mannheim's "most recent perspective", and, given the argument that the "best perspective" is the "most recent" it would appear that there is a relationship between Mannheim's verificatory model and the Christian values he eschews. Indeed, as Kettler correctly observes, Mannheim argued that "a basis for an adequate perspective is clear awareness of what one is about". Finally, it may be said, with some certainty, that important links connect the perspective of Mannheim "with a 'conservatism' like that of Michael Oakeshott".¹¹ Mannheim, then, has gravitated away from the Marxian model toward a type of structural functionalism of a decidedly "conservative nature".¹²
Footnotes - Concluding Comments


3. Ibid., p. 371.

4. Ibid., p. 373.

5. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 105.


12. Kettler adds that Mannheim's conservatism is far more "rationalist" and daring than the "normal" conservative imagines. C.f. p. 426.
Bibliography of Mannheim's Works

Not all of the following works were directly quoted or necessarily referred to. However, the bibliography may be found useful as a source of primary material.

I. Books


II. Mannheim's Articles

Mannheim, Karl, "Beitrage zur Theorie der Weltanschauungsinterpretation", in Jahrbuch fur Kunstgeschichte, XV (1921-1922).


Mannheim, Karl, "Ideologische und Soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde", in Jahrbuch fur Soziologie, Karlsruhe G. Braun, (1926).


Mannheim, Karl, "Zur Problematik der Soziologie in Deutschland", Neue Schweizer Rundschau, II (1929).


General Articles on the Sociology of Knowledge


Barber, B., "Sociology of Knowledge and Science 1945-1955", in,
Sociology in the United States: A Trend Report, (ed.) H. Zetterberg,

Bogardus, E., "Mannheim and Social Reconstruction", in Sociology and

_______, "Mental Processes and Democracy", Sociology and Social

_______, "Mannheim and Systematic Sociology" in Sociology and Social

Berger, Brigitte, "Vilfredo Pareto and the Sociology of Knowledge", in
Social Research, June, (1967), pp. 265-281

Bottomore, T. B., "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge", in

Child, A., The Problems of the Sociology of Knowledge: A Critical and
Philosophical Study, (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Berkeley, U. of
California, 1938).

Five chapters have been published in revised form:

_______, "The Theoretical Possibility of the Sociology of Knowledge",
Ethics, LI (July: 1941), pp. 392-418.

_______, "The Existential Determination of Thought", Ethics, LI,


Hartung, F. E., "Problems of the Sociology of Knowledge", in Philosophy of Science, 19, (1952), pp. 17-32.


Tonsor, S., "Gnostics, Romantics, and Conservatives", in Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 616-34.


Additional References - Books


_______, *Selected Works*, Vols. 1 and Moscow.


