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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION
AND TRADE IN THE RESERVE
AREAS OF KENYA, 1895-1929

by

Ian Robert Grant Spencer
B.Sc.(Econ.), University of London, 1965
M.A., McMaster University, 1966

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
History

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
August 1974

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Title of Thesis/Dissertation:

The Development of Production and Trade in the Reserve Areas of Kenya, 1895-1929.

Author:

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Mr. Ian Spencer

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August 20, 1974

(date)
Abstract.

The thesis begins with an examination of the attitudes and policy of the governments in Nairobi and London to the growth of agricultural production in the reserve areas of Kenya between the declaration of the Protectorate in 1895 and the onset of the great depression in 1929. During the period up to the First World War the Protectorate Government was preoccupied with the tasks of establishing an administration and assisting the foundation of European farming which, it believed, would be far more likely to provide a firm and self-supporting economic base for the country than peasant cultivation. African agriculture was ignored, except for the unsuccessful schemes to encourage cotton cultivation and the efforts of individual administrators to stimulate economic growth within the reserves. Although government efforts were concentrated in European areas, it was the reserves that before the outbreak of war provided the bulk of the Protectorate's exports.

The war and its immediate aftermath strengthened the position of the non-official European population, but settler attempts to achieve absolute dominance over Kenya's economy were rebuffed by the intervention of London. The representations of humanitarian and commercial interests, allied to the pressure of elements within the administration of Kenya, stimulated the Colonial Office to reassert its authority in the Colony. As part of the attempt to justify its claim to exercise trusteeship on behalf of Kenya's African population against the competing claims of the settlers and the Indians,
the Colonial Office insisted on the redirection of economic resources towards the encouragement of African production. The development and implementation of the Dual Policy under Coryndon and Grigg revealed that the Government of Kenya, faced by settler concern over the security of their labour-supply, did not comply with the intentions of London's declarations of 1922.

The study of agricultural policy illuminates sharp differences of opinion within Kenya's administration over the possibilities and likely path of development of the reserve areas and the effect which the growth of peasant production might have on the future of European agriculture. A similar difference of view is apparent from the examination of veterinary policy.

The important role of Indian traders in the development of peasant production and trade has, in past studies, received scant attention. Government policy towards them was generally unsympathetic; even those elements of the administration that favoured reserve development believed that the Indians, because of their trading methods and the barrier they presented to African aspiration, were a deleterious influence. By 1929 there were clear indications that government action was beginning to undermine the Indians' almost monopolistic control of reserve trade.

The aim of the four district studies which follow is to examine the local application of government policy and attitudes in areas with differing human, economic, and geographical characteristics. Government policy was ineffective in influencing
economic development, largely due to the unwillingness to invest resources of adequate size or quality. Nonetheless, African response to economic stimulus was rapid and profound.

The conclusion attempts a tentative revision of the prevailing view that the economic function of the reserves was substantially that of providing labour for European owned estates. The reserves experienced far-reaching changes, including the sustained growth of surplus agricultural production for both the external and the internal markets, despite the allocation of government economic aid to the European sector and the harmful effects of land alienation and the extraction of revenue and labour from African areas.

The study is based on extensive research into archival material located in London and Nairobi, principally consisting of the correspondence between the Imperial and Colonial Governments and district and provincial records. These were supplemented by such secretariat and departmental records that survived the Nairobi fire of 1939, the archives of the East African Indian National Congress, oral interviews with Indian traders, published Government material and secondary sources.
TO

RASHIDA

(vi)
Preface.

The welfare and prosperity of Kenya depends, as it has always done, on the success or failure of agriculture. Political and social changes derive their character and their timing from largely rural sources, from the changing relationship between the African population and the land. Writing on Kenyan economic history of the colonial period has tended to deal with this relationship in the context of studies of the history of European farming enterprise. This emphasis was, perhaps, understandable among historians writing before Independence, when it was European farming which provided the largest part, by value, of the country's exports and was the main hope for future prosperity. The departure of most of the white farmers has shifted the onus for development to African cultivators, but historians have not, in the decade since Independence, responded by delving back into the past to gain some understanding of how African production has developed. The early pattern of growth of African agriculture in Kenya has had a powerful impact upon subsequent social and political developments, as well as upon the shape of Kenya's developing economy.

The thesis is based on extensive research into archival material located in Britain and Kenya. At the Public Records Office in London the most fruitful sources by far were the collections of original correspondence contained in F.0.2 and C.0.533. Limited use was made of private papers. The private collections of the most influential official advocates of peasant production, Coryndon and
Ainsworth, were both consulted at Rhodes House. The papers of McGregor Ross at Rhodes House and E.D. Morel at the London School of Economics both proved disappointing. In Nairobi, the Kenya National Archives recent efforts to centralise and classify colonial records considerably assisted research there. The provincial and district records were massive, but invaluable. Regrettably, the Secretariat and most departmental records were destroyed in the fire of 1939, and little unpublished material relating to the period under consideration has survived. The East African Indian National Congress archives in Nairobi yielded little of value and, not surprisingly perhaps, Indian businessmen were found to have kept few records of their business activities in the reserves. An attempt was made to overcome the deficiencies of the written record of Indian economic activity in the reserves by arranging interviews with traders who had been active in African areas over a substantial part of the early colonial period. Sixteen interviews were conducted with traders whose average age was seventy-nine years.

One handicap that proved more difficult to overcome was the lack of statistical data, still more of reliable statistical data. Population figures for the period, for example, were estimates usually made by district commissioners on the basis of Hut and Poll Tax collection figures. The level of surplus African agricultural production could only be measured crudely by local administrators from figures for railway bookings or from estimates of purchases made by local traders. Livestock numbers appear to be little more than
Less serious are the difficulties caused by changes in nomenclature. The British East Africa Protectorate was renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya in 1920. In 1907 the Commissioner became the Governor and his deputy, who was also the head of the Secretariat in Nairobi, was known variously as the Deputy Commissioner (1902-1907), the Lieutenant-Governor (1907-1911), the Chief Secretary (1911-1921) and the Colonial Secretary (1921-1929). To avoid any possibility of confusion with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, sometimes referred to as the Colonial Secretary, the Kenyan official will be referred to in the text as the Chief Secretary. The terms District Commissioner and Provincial Commissioner will be used throughout the thesis to denote officers in charge of districts and provinces respectively. Changes in the names and the boundaries of districts and provinces are potentially more confusing. Four maps which trace the adjustments are included.

The word 'reserve' is used in this thesis to refer to those areas of the Colony which contained few or no settlers, whether those areas were gazetted as reserves or not. Up to 1915 reserves were created either by agreement with the tribes or by the use of the Outlying Districts Ordinance of 1902, under which orders could be issued restricting entry into a defined 'closed district.' The administration did gazette other reserves, but these were no more than administrative dispositions without legal authority. The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 empowered the Governor to reserve any Crown Land which, in his opinion, was required for the use or
support of the African tribes of the Colony. Finally, following the recommendations of the East Africa Commission of 1924 on the need of Africans for assurances against further land alienations, an amendment to the Crown Lands Ordinance was passed which empowered the Governor to declare any area of Crown Land to be a reserve. By the end of 1926, twenty-four reserves had been gazetted, and the process of boundary demarcation essentially completed.

My thanks are due to Philip Stigger, Peter Kup, Kenji Okada, Oliver Furley, John Lonsdale, Roger van Zwanenberg and Zulfikar Mawani for their advice and assistance. In Kenya, Suleman Premji was as unstinting in his efforts to identify and locate ex-reserve traders as he was generous with his hospitality. Simon Fraser University President's Research Fund and the Canada Council provided the financial assistance which made the research possible. I owe a debt of gratitude to the library staffs at Simon Fraser University, the Royal Commonwealth Society Library, Rhodes House, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, the MacMillan Library, Nairobi, the Public Records Office and the Kenya National Archives. Finally, I acknowledge the invaluable encouragement and support of my wife.
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Chapter 1. Introduction.

When the British East Africa Protectorate was declared in 1895, it held little apparent promise as an area for profitable economic development. It was regarded by the Foreign Office as an appendage to Britain's historical interests in Zanzibar and Uganda. Though Zanzibar was the centre of East African trade, and Uganda appeared to be a sound prospect as a potential market, Britain's decision to place the entire area within her sphere of influence, under the Anglo-German agreements of 1886 and 1890, was by no means conditioned by their value, immediate or potential, as fields for the investment of British capital, as areas which would yield raw materials for British industry, or as markets for the products of Lancashire. Their economic value, judged by any standard, was small enough; Germany, Britain's major rival in the area, evidently felt it worthwhile to surrender her claims to both Uganda and Zanzibar, in exchange for Britain's cession of the tiny island of Heligoland in the North Sea.

Britain's interest in the region derived initially from her desire to terminate the East Coast slave trade centred upon Zanzibar, and to protect the interests of her Indian subjects, who controlled much of the trade of the area. Following her invasion of Egypt in 1882, these relatively minor concerns were eclipsed by a far more pressing interest in the control of access to the Upper Nile. In order to protect her position in Egypt, Britain needed to prevent any other major European power from gaining access to the headwaters of the Nile. To achieve this, she had to win control of the lake region of east central Africa. Her position
on the lakes could only be secured if she could command access to it from the Indian Ocean coast. By the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, Britain's sphere of influence in eastern Africa was finally defined to include Uganda and the area between Uganda and the coast, later to become known as the British East Africa Protectorate.

In view of her essentially strategic motives, it is hardly surprising that Britain did not immediately set about the administration and exploitation of the area. The Foreign Office was only too willing to hand over both responsibilities and costs to an eager group of financier-philanthropists, led by Sir William MacKinnon, who formed, for the purpose, the East Africa Company.\(^2\) Chief among the Company's aims was the final eradication of the slave trade by the spread of licit commerce and industry. None of its founders expected the venture to yield any considerable profit, and indeed subscribers to the Company were restricted to men of considerable means, in order that the purely financial motive would not dominate its activities.

The Company failed entirely to investigate, let alone exploit, the productive capacity of the interior lands to the east of Lake Victoria.\(^3\) Its efforts were concentrated upon opening a regular route to Uganda, where they believed the most rapid development would occur, and, to a lesser extent, upon exploiting the potential of the area to which they had easy access, the coastlands. P.L. McDermott, the Assistant Secretary of the Company, wrote in 1893 that: "The districts intervening between the coast and the lake regions, owing to the present economic condition of
the country, are comparatively valueless, and must so continue until
the process of development has realized their latent resources." Buganda, on the other hand, was "populous, productive and highly cultivated," and its inhabitants were "a race superior in physical and mental qualities to all the surrounding tribes".

The Company failed to establish a regular transportation system linking Uganda with the coast; the rough bullock cart track, known as the Mackinnon Road, reached only as far as Kibwezi, and the railway did not manage to progress much further than the outskirts of Mombasa. The solution to the problem of establishing communications with the interior was far beyond the reach of the meagre financial resources available to the Company. When its rule gave way to direct Foreign Office control in 1895, almost the only signs in the interior of seven years of effort in British East Africa were the isolated stations established at Ndi, Machakos, Kikuyu, and Eldama Ravine.

On the coast their development plans were similarly still-born. An agricultural expert, William Fitzgerald, was sent out from London to assess the character and capabilities of the coastlands, a telegraph line was constructed to link Mombasa with Lamu, an experimental farm was established at Magarini near Malindi, and experiments with cotton, rubber, and fibres were conducted. The Company administrators were encouraged to develop and work their own plantations, but in the face of what they described as "the apathy and ingrained habits of idleness characteristic of negro races in a state of barbarism," they could claim little success. Colonization of the coast by Indians was thought to
be the solution to the labour problem, but the Government of India failed to extend the provisions of the Indian Emigration Act to cover British East Africa. Another scheme was frustrated.

When the burden of this very small corner of the Empire shifted from the shoulders of the philanthropists to the broader, but far less willing, shoulders of the Treasury, the imperatives for economic development were thrust firmly into the foreground. During the period of Company rule, the costs of administration had far exceeded both the revenue accruing to the Company and the commercial gains derived by Britons from the area. None of these costs, however, had been born by the taxpayers and the Treasury. In financial terms, the new Protectorate had to be self-supporting; it could not expect to depend indefinitely on grants from Her Majesty's Treasury. Development though had to wait on the construction of an efficient means of communication with the interior. A railway route to Lake Victoria had already been surveyed and, in early 1895, the decision was finally taken to commence construction. The decision to build the railway, and the huge cost that this involved, provided an added incentive to look seriously at the prospects of deriving some financial return from East Africa. Though all of the early hopes of economic gain were pinned on what was seen as a potentially rich market in Uganda, that market alone could hardly be expected to yield revenue sufficient to compensate the Treasury for its investment in the railway line and its substantial contributions to administrative costs. It does appear, however, that the aim of MacDonald's railway survey team had been to find the quickest and cheapest way to reach Uganda. The route chosen
passed through few of those areas of the Protectorate which were to become economically prosperous. The very name of the railway, the "Uganda Railway," gave a strong clue to the intention of its constructors. Mungeam, in his detailed study of the establishment of British rule in Kenya, concludes: "In the last analysis, it was Uganda that counted. To the Foreign Office the strategic link with the headwaters of the Nile came first. The East Africa Protectorate was important chiefly as it served this purpose." 7

Revenue could be derived from two major sources; from taxation imposed upon the indigenous population, and from customs duties raised on the external trade of the Protectorate. Taxation could not be raised without the extension of administration, both in terms of the area it covered and the number of officers which it employed. This necessarily slow process could itself only begin in earnest after the completion of the railway. The other possibility, customs revenue, depended directly on the volume of East African external trade. This trade had been seriously disrupted by the activities of the colonial power in attempting to terminate the slave trade. The trade of the interior had rested upon the twin pillars of ivory and slaves. By the beginning of the colonial period, the slave trade had been almost entirely wiped out, and ivory was a rapidly wasting asset. Nor could the import trade develop substantially until East Africa's inhabitants could win, through sales of produce, the money with which to purchase the imports. Sales of produce could not develop until the railway was completed and an internal marketing mechanism developed 8.
The year 1901 saw the railway reach Lake Victoria. The introduction of the Hut Tax in the administered areas followed in 1902. In the same year, the Protectorate received a grant-in-aid of £313,600 from the Treasury. As the administration grew in size and scope, so did the cost of that administration, and the gap between revenue and expenditure widened.

Table 1: Protectorate revenue, expenditure and grants, 1900-01 to 1913-4.
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It was soon evident to both the Foreign Office and the local administrators that the local African population would be unlikely to provide the basis for economic development without the stimulation which an immigrant population would provide. Jewish and Indian immigration were both considered, but neither, for a variety of reasons, were encouraged to settle in large numbers.

Whilst these plans were being considered, a spontaneous and apparently unco-ordinated movement of Europeans into the Highlands had taken place. By 1902 over thirty white settlers had already established themselves. Charles Eliot, the Commissioner who replaced Harding.
in 1901, saw these men as the nucleus of a new white dominion, and was firmly supported in his view by Clement Hill, the head of the African Protectorates Department of the Foreign Office. Their views prevailed, and in 1903, the Protectorate Government began a policy of deliberately attracting white settlers from both England and South Africa.

Despite the fact that, in the period before the First World War, African payments made up most of the Protectorate's revenue, and African agriculture produced the largest part of its exports, peasant production was not regarded as being likely to provide the basis for the economic development of the territory. The following chapter considers why this was so, and examines the policy of the Protectorate towards reserve development in the early colonial period.
Footnotes. Chapter 1.


2 The East Africa Company was officially incorporated by royal charter in April 1888 and was known subsequently as the Imperial British East Africa Company.


5 Ibid., p.105.

6 Ibid., pp. 218-19.


8 The lack of an economical means of transport was the greatest single hindrance to Company activity. Human porterage cost about £250 per ton from the coast to Buganda. The development of other methods requiring capital investment were beyond the means of the Company. See Hemphill, pp. 410-11.


2.1. The Decision to Support European Agriculture.

Throughout this period, African agriculture and industry not only provided the bulk of the export trade of Kenya, it also exhibited a considerable potential for growth. There is ample evidence to suggest that Africans in the richer agricultural areas of the Protectorate, stimulated by demands for tax payments and by the activities of Indian traders, were willing and able to adapt their agricultural practices quickly to the demands of the market. In Nyanza Province, the annual report of 1905-6 refers to Africans in both Ugaya and Kisumu Districts already beginning to plant substantial quantities of beans and 'sim-sim for sale to Indians, despite considerable transportation difficulties. A rise in the price of sim-sim in 1905 brought a singularly rational response. Africans, "quick to grasp the advantage, have extended the area of cultivation very considerably." ¹ By the end of the decade, the Provincial Commissioner was optimistic enough to suggest that the trade of Nyanza Province "should within the next few years become of predominating importance in the protectorate." ²

Exports of African produce (excluding ivory) and livestock were already bringing them over one million rupees a year, with sim-sim accounting in the first half of 1910 for over one-third of this sum. ³ Two years later income from produce had doubled to about two million rupees. ⁴ By comparison, one hundred and twenty-four farms, covering about one half million acres, had been leased or sold to Europeans in the same province. By 1913 these produced nothing but a few tons of butter. ⁵ Nor was Nyanza
an isolated example of the rapidly improving value of African production; in Machakos District, the Wakamba quickly began to produce large quantities of ghee, worth over half of the Rs4,000,000 of African products exported in 1915 from the district. 6

European and African production both faced a similar set of difficulties in the early years. Crops and animals were being introduced to areas where they had not been grown or raised before. The plants often yielded poorly or succumbed to unknown diseases, the livestock often died from mysterious ailments. 7 European agriculture failed to provide the East Africa Protectorate with staple export products before the First World War. By 1912-3, the three major European produced exports, coffee, fibre, and wool were worth just one third of a million rupees, whereas African exports of sim-sim, maize, and cotton alone were valued at over two million rupees. When hides and skins worth over a million, and other agricultural products of the reserves worth another million are added, it is clear that exports of African produce, coming largely from Nyanza Province, were worth ten to fifteen times more than European products in the period immediately preceding the First World War.

Table 2: Exports of agricultural products from the East African Protectorate. 000 Rupees. Items over 50,000 Rupees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>1907-8</th>
<th>1908-9</th>
<th>1909-10</th>
<th>1910-11</th>
<th>1911-12</th>
<th>1912-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fibres</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total - Largely European</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes - African &amp; European</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beme
Maize
Cotton.
Ghee
Ground-Nuts
Hides.
Ox
Sheep & Goat
Copra
Alse
Rubber
Sim-Sim
bee-wax
Total - Largely
African

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1907-8</th>
<th>1908-9</th>
<th>1909-10</th>
<th>1910-11</th>
<th>1911-12</th>
<th>1912-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghee</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-Nuts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides. Ox</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skins. Sheep &amp; Goat</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sim-Sim</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bees-wax</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It certainly cannot be argued in defence of the poor showing of the settlers that they were heavily burdened with taxation, or that the government was in any way unsympathetic towards their ambitions. Europeans paid no direct taxation and contributed little to indirect taxation. Customs duties were adjusted and freight rates altered to accommodate their interests. In 1904 export duties were removed from, and railway rates reduced on, maize, beans and potatoes, products on which many of the early settlers unsuccessfully pinned their first hopes. Export duties on African products such as ivory, rubber, and hides were heavy, whereas import duties were not charged at all on plants, seeds, agricultural implements, and breeding livestock. Africans began in some areas to pay direct taxation in the form of Hut Tax at the rate of two rupees in 1901. By 1904-5 this tax yielded over £37,000, out of a total of £51,989 raised locally from taxes and licences. Customs revenues, largely paid by Africans, and grants-in-aid from the Imperial Government produced the rest of Kenya's revenue.
Though revenue and trade derived largely from African sources, little capital and assistance was directed towards aiding the growth of peasant cultivation. The Protectorate Government was starved of funds for development purposes. Because Kenya was dependent for its solvency on an annual grant-in-aid from the Treasury until 1912-3, it had to suffer the tight control of its finances which this entailed. Grants received between 1895-6 and 1904-5 totalled £1,657,408, and those between 1905-6 and 1912-3 £1,185,475. It was necessary to justify to the Treasury every new item of expenditure. The criterion for acceptance or rejection was generally one of whether or not the new item would result in a rapid increase in external trade or revenue. A minute by Butler, an official at the Colonial Office, on a dispatch from Jackson advocating expenditure on survey works on the Tana River, well illustrates the frustration caused by financial dependence on the Treasury:

This would no doubt be a glorious scheme if we had at our disposal large funds which were itching to be employed in far-sighted projects of development. But, for the present, we seem to be condemned to run the country on the principle that no scheme of development will be looked at that does not bring in an immediate return of something like its own cost.

Severe financial restrictions, combined with the prevailing general attitude towards Africans, dictated the pattern of government expenditure.

The obvious and rapid increase in the export of African agricultural produce between 1907-8 and 1912-3 convinced very few officials that it would be worthwhile spending money and energy on a deliberate programme to encourage reserve production.
Contemporary prejudices about the "backwardness" of Africans were too strong. Africans were seen as being at a very early stage of evolution and, though it was widely believed that it was the duty of Europeans to help them along the road to "civilization," it was felt that this process would take many centuries. \(^{13}\) The Africans of the East Africa Protectorate were regarded as being particularly backward. Early colonial administrators failed to find indigenous systems of political, social, or economic organization which could be seen as likely to respond to contact with European civilization. Unlike the centralized societies of, for example, the Baganda and the Banyoro in Uganda, which had, it seemed, already progressed to a stage equivalent to that of feudal Europe, the small-scale and apparently amorphous and leaderless societies of the East Africa Protectorate appeared to be very primitive. The Baganda, unlike the societies of East Africa, had already shown a ready response to trade expansion and to Christianity. Charles Eliot, Commissioner of East Africa Protectorate 1901-1904, wrote:

> To cross the lake is like entering another continent.... Any estimate of the potentialities of East Africa must recognise in the native of Uganda a semi-civilized race far superior to the best of the Somalis and Masai.\(^{14}\)

The system of shifting cultivation used by the agricultural tribes of the Protectorate was thought to be incapable of producing substantial agricultural surpluses. A popular textbook on tropical agriculture written in 1908 by Dr. Willis, the distinguished Director of the Ceylon Botanical Gardens, expressed the orthodox opinion of the time when it described the practice of shifting cultivation as being "utterly destructive of the natural capital
of the country." 15 A further explanation for the unwillingness to consider the possibilities of peasant production undoubtedly lay in the sparseness of the population over large areas of potentially fertile highlands close to the railway. The two largest tribes of the area had both suffered substantial population losses as a result of severe famines and epidemics in the last years of the nineteenth century. 16 References to the wide open spaces and large unoccupied areas of the Protectorate available for settlement for immigrants were very common in the writings of administrators in the early years of the century. 17

Britain's past experience with colonial development in other tropical colonies also predisposed her to favour the encouragement of white rather than peasant agriculture. Prior to 1900, commercial agriculture in Britain's tropical colonies was organized almost exclusively by planters and settlers. In the West Indies, in Ceylon, and in Malaya, colonial administrators had been dealing with territories in which Europeans were both willing and able to settle, and where rainfall was sufficient and reliable enough for crops to be grown with every chance of an adequate return on invested capital. Kenya certainly appeared to satisfy all of these conditions; there were apparently huge unpopulated areas of land, and a climate ideal for European settlement and cultivation. In Britain's older tropical colonies, knowledge and experience was strongest in the area of settler cultivation of tree crops, such as coffee, cacao, tea and rubber, and of sugar. On the other hand, colonial authorities had very little experience dealing with the commercial exploitation of annuals, upon which African cultivators relied.
The cultivation of annual crops would have presented new problems of rotation, manuring, and disease control, and of coping with an unskilled peasantry, who could apparently provide little assistance towards the solution of these problems. The weight of colonial experience inclined both the Foreign and Colonial Office to concentrate initially on what they knew, rather than the unknown. 18

In September 1904 Commissioner Sir Donald Stewart wrote:

For some years it has been very evident to the officials entrusted with the administration of East Africa that if the country remained dependent on the development of native trade, there could be no prospect of the Protectorate paying its way for many years to come. The only chance was that white settlers would come in. 19

The backwardness of the local tribes, the availability of large areas of apparently vacant land, and Britain's previous experience with the development of tropical territories, all contributed to the decision to encourage white settlement. It was made in the context of a shortage of local funds and stringent Treasury control of the disbursement of the grants-in-aid. Because no rapid response could be expected to attempts to improve African methods and techniques of cultivation, no rapid increase could be expected in the level of African production. Consequently, it would be difficult to justify expenditure aimed at the development of African agriculture. Europeans were a different matter. They might be expected to be acquainted with the skills of modern agriculture, and they would bring capital with them. By establishing a viable economy, they would free the Protectorate of financial dependence on, and control from, London. The prospect appealed to Nairobi and London alike.
2.2. The Allocation of Resources.

By favouring European agriculture, the administration reduced the possibility of African surplus production developing. As farmers, as well as some local officials, quickly came to realize, the two modes of agricultural development were in competition for the two basic factors of agricultural production, land and labour. European farms required large numbers of labourers; if African agriculture were allowed to develop, Africans would be able to satisfy their cash requirements without accepting employment on European farms, which would, in turn, stultify their growth. From the time of the first labour crisis in 1908 through to the early 1920's, the government adopted a wide range of measures of varying effectiveness to ensure that Africans left the reserves in adequate numbers. As to land, substantial areas of the East African Protectorate were alienated, and constant demands were made by settlers for further alienations. It has recently been calculated that about 20 percent of the fertile land of Kenya was sold or leased for European use. The Carter Land Commission of the early thirties estimated, probably conservatively, that almost 1,500 square miles, out of the total of 12,000 square miles alienated, had been occupied.

It was clear to Commissioner Charles Eliot that the European farmers, if they were to succeed, would need specialist advice and encouragement. On his recommendation the Treasury sanctioned in 1903 the formation, "as a temporary experiment," of the Department of Agriculture. The direction government assistance to agriculture
was to take was first outlined in the instructions given to Sir Donald Stewart on his appointment as Commissioner in 1904:

The Agricultural Department... should be able to afford considerable assistance by advising settlers as to the best lands for different classes of products, by the supply of seeds and the loan or hire, as may be found most expedient, of the sires of the English breeds of horses, cattle and sheep which have been sent out to the Government farms from this country.  

Clearly, and hardly surprisingly, the efforts of the new department were to be oriented almost exclusively towards serving the needs of the settlers. Indeed, the first Director of Agriculture, Andrew Linton, considered the settler to be "a public benefactor" who was entitled to some assistance in his work.  

The pro-settler bias of the department's work can be clearly seen in a report on its re-organization, submitted by the second Director of Agriculture, A.C. MacDonald, to the Colonial Office in 1907. His view of the role of the experimental farms is the most obvious illustration. Of the three farms actually operated by the Department, the Nairobi farm, he argued, should be moved to Kiambu, where soil and conditions were more typical of the settlers' farms, the Naivasha Stock Farm should continue to be used as a source of pure and half-bred livestock for the settlers, and the Mazeras farm, opened in 1905 "for the purpose of demonstrating the suitability of certain tropical economic plants for growth in and around the district and for raising plants for disposal to settlers," should be moved to another site as it was difficult for settlers to reach it, and it was, therefore, "not fulfilling its primary purpose". An early annual report of the department described its activities as consisting of meeting settlers and visiting their farms to give
advice, attending settler association meetings, working with the Land Board on surveys of land due to be alienated to settlers, and distributing quantities of plants and seeds. None but the briefest reference was made to African agriculture. 26 Governor Girouard, noting in 1909 that the expenditure of the Department of Agriculture had crept up to £10,000, observed that it worked "almost exclusively" for the white population of the highlands.

His criticism of this situation was not that more should be spent on African areas, or that such a sizeable annual outlay was not yet yielding an increased revenue for the Protectorate, but that the opinions of the farmers were not being considered when the question of the allocation of the expenditure was being decided.27

Thus, the Protectorate Government indicated its preference for European farming but, at the same time, it did not accept that this implied the exclusion of future efforts to develop African agriculture.28 Indeed, Secretary of State Harcourt's instructions, to Stewart on his appointment drew the Commissioner's attention to London's enthusiasm for the expansion of cotton cultivation.29 Linton was ordered by Stewart to conduct a survey of the prospects for the cultivation of cotton in the Protectorate. It is worth looking at the report in some detail as an illustration of the difficulties which were thought likely to attend the encouragement of African cultivation.

Linton, the Director of Agriculture, and Brand, his assistant, saw the major problem as one of lack of desire on the part of the African to grow more than he needed to satisfy his immediate requirements for food. The imposition of Hut Tax, and the African's
desire to acquire livestock, increased these minimal demands, but they were not apparently significant enough incentives to alter the general picture. Experimentation with cotton in Malindi District had started in 1894 when Weaver, the District Officer serving the Imperial British East Africa Company, had, following the recommendations of FitzGerald, supervised the planting of 200 acres of cotton. Ten years later the district still did not produce enough for export. Some blame for this was attached to the Indian shopkeepers who purchased the crop. They were accused of swindling the growers and of providing them with toddy. More basically the problem was seen as one of lack of incentive, which could only be overcome by increased "supervision". Africans, the Report stated, must be shown how and when to plant, how to cultivate, and how to pick and clean the crop. In 1904, for the first time, a concerted effort had been made to assist African planters, and in those areas where the crop had been successful, the planters were asking for more seed. Prospects were, in the short run, not very bright. Supervision on the scale required was not available, the areas which each African could cultivate would be small unless oxen drawn ploughs could be introduced, and even with supervision the cultivators would only be able to produce a medium staple. Though the African might be expected in time to become an important factor in the agricultural development of the country, Linton and Brand were clearly in favour of bringing over Indians to cultivate the richest areas of the Protectorate, which Europeans, for reasons of climate, could not settle. In the opinion of the senior members of the Department of Agriculture, Lansdowne's
instructions to Stewart to press for the extension of cotton cultivation could only be pursued successfully if large numbers of staff were available, and even then results could be expected only slowly. The cost of the necessary supervision was viewed as prohibitive; the solution to the country's need for rapid economic development clearly did not lie in this direction. 30

Brand, in a private letter to Ellis at the Colonial Office, supplemented the views he had expressed in the cotton report. For him, the encouragement of European planters and farmers, and the development of the forested areas constituted the only economic future the country possessed. "The native population numbers scarcely a single tribe possessing the industry or desire for wealth...." Settlers suffered from lack of roads and bridges, transport facilities, markets, and particularly labour. Government energies should be directed at removing these obstacles. Measures, which he considered the government should give urgent consideration to, included the prohibition of squatting, the charging of rent to Africans living on Crown Lands, the enforcing of laws against vagrancy, the abolition of taxes and charges on passports for travelling Africans, and the exempting of farm servants and employees from taxation. 31

The idea of encouraging African cultivation of cash crops was not, however, given up entirely. Stewart's successor, Sir James Hayes Sadler, proclaimed himself in favour of encouraging African production. In 1906, shortly after his arrival, he wrote to the Colonial Secretary:
Particularly in Kenya and Kavirondo (Provinces) there is an immense agricultural population which will alone represent a large export trade as soon as they have been taught to grow the right kind of produce. It has been too much the habit to look upon East Africa - the White Settlement Area - as a white man's country without attaching full significance to the possibilities that lie in native production in the areas outside it....

Even so, he gave the strong impression that such development would be supplementary to the main effort.

The development, and consequently the revenue, of the Protectorate will advance on two distinct lines, one by the capital and enterprise of the white man in the area opened up to white settlement, the other by native production in the areas unfit for white settlement, partly directed by official and unofficial agencies, and partly assisted by white capital....

Hayes Sadler also seriously considered the idea of introducing Indian agriculturalists who, with government assistance, would develop the tropical areas of the country around Kibos, Voi and Malindi. Hayes Sadler thought the Indians would be of assistance to Africans in raising cash crops, and be particularly helpful in encouraging cotton cultivation. The only result of Hayes Sadler's initiative was that an official was sent to India to recruit fifteen Indians for the Kibos area.

The idea of developing cotton cultivation in Kavirondo caught Hayes Sadler's interest. Twice he visited the Province to hold barazas at which he took the opportunity to eulogise on the benefits of replacing grain crops with cotton. These efforts were encouraged by approaches made to the Colonial Office in early 1906 by the British Cotton Growing Association, which offered to send an expert to British East Africa to demonstrate correct methods of cotton cultivation, as well as to take over the commercial
side of the operation and offer a minimum price for all cotton grown. 36 Antrobus at the Colonial Office responded to the proposals of the B.C.G.A. rather unenthusiastically, preferring that they concentrate their efforts in the Uganda Protectorate, where the natives were "more intelligent," and noting that there was a labour shortage in East Africa. 37 The matter was referred to Hayes Sadler, who approved the B.C.G.A. proposals. 38 The Association agreed to take over the operations of the experimental farms at Kibos and Malindi and receive a grant of £1,000 over a period of three years on condition that it spent at least an equivalent sum. 39 The operations of the British East Africa Corporation, which acted for the Association, met with little sustained success and the agreement was not renewed at the end of its three year duration. 40 The Corporation had concentrated its efforts on the coast. When the Corporation withdrew, the Treasury grant-in-aid to encourage cotton cultivation continued, and Girouard, Hayes-Sadler's successor, re-directed attention towards Nyanza Province where, in 1909-10, the bulk of the money was spent on the free distribution of seed to Africans and the establishment of a cotton experimental station under the Department of Agriculture at Kibos. Under Ainsworth's general supervision, the programme continued through to the beginning of the First World War. 41

A small proportion of Department of Agriculture funds were used to assist peasant cultivation. Through the agency of district
commissioners quantities of seeds were distributed. The main problem with this method was that the local administrators had little time and very limited knowledge for the task. Very few of the distributions had any marked effect. In Machakos District in 1908 there were large issues of maize, wheat, potatoes, beans and wattle. They had no significant effect on the level of production. In 1907-8 fifteen loads, i.e. 900 lbs., of beans were handed out in Kikuyu District for planting. The local D.C. commented:

This is a move in the right direction. If some of the expenditure which has been incurred by the Agriculture Department on behalf of the European settlers had been spent in the interests of the Kikuyu and Kavirondo, it is likely that a speedy return would have resulted.

But it appears that in the Kikuyu areas the small quantities of seed which were distributed to Africans before 1910 were either paid for in cash or were taken on the understanding that, for every load issued, two would be returned. C.S. Hemsted, an experienced administrative officer, believed that the reason for this was that the settlers claimed that the issue of free seed would "pauperize" the Africans.

Other than the distribution of small quantities of seed, the only assistance the Africans received from the Department came through the appointment in 1907 of two West Indians to supervise the experimental farms at Kibos and Mazeras. Dopwell at Mazeras spent most of his time on experiments with sisal, rubber, and cotton, only occasionally venturing out into the reserves. In contrast, Holder at Kibos toured extensively in Kavirondo, under the instructions of the Provincial Commissioner, John Ainsworth, initially
concentrating on improving and extending the cultivation of sim-sim, maize, and beans by issuing better varieties of seeds, and encouraging the use of ploughs and other modern implements. With a view to securing the continuity necessary to the success of this work, Holder trained a number of Africans as "Overlookers of Native Shambas". They were engaged to follow him around the districts he visited to ensure that the practical instructions being given were carried out. At the farm, Holder cultivated experimental plots of maize, beans, cotton, sim-sim, sugar cane, tobacco, sisal hemp, and ceara rubber, and local chiefs were encouraged to visit. Small numbers of oxen belonging to local chiefs and headmen were trained at Kibos for use with small wooden ploughs, and then returned to their owners. In 1911, when Ainsworth began his drive to introduce cotton as a cash crop in Kavirondo, Holder began to reside permanently in the reserves, only visiting Kibos occasionally. Holder also proved useful to H.H. Horne, the District Commissioner at Mumias, on whose instructions he supervised the draining and planting by Africans of five previously uncultivated swamp areas.

Horne was also instrumental in framing proposals which, had they been carried through, might have partially compensated for the lack of Agriculture Department effort. He suggested, in December 1913, that the facilities abandoned by the administration at Mumias be utilized, with a staff drawn from West Africa and the West Indies, as an industrial and agricultural school for Africans. Mumias was an important trading centre at the core of an extensive
area of African cash crop production. The scheme, using existing buildings and low cost staff, had the important virtue of cheapness, and so received Belfield's approval. Several months later, when war broke out, all projected expenditures unrelated to the war effort were reviewed, and this scheme perished. The country had to wait for another ten years before its first school devoted to African agricultural training was opened.

In default of Agriculture Department efforts, the administrative officers were the most important agency for effecting change in the reserves. The growth of exports of African produce before World War One was largely the result of the work of individual administrative officers. They were charged under their standing instructions with the task of fostering the cultivation of cash crops by the African populations of their districts. This they were in most cases unable to do effectively because of the time consuming burden of Hut Tax collection. Ainsworth complained that two of his three district commissioners stationed at Ugaya and Kisumu spent six months of the year collecting tax, and that neither of his officers at Mumias or Kisii had any time for anything else. Also, prior to the reorganization of district boundaries, which took place at the end of the First World War, administrators were frequently in charge of areas which contained both European farms and reserve areas. They invariably found themselves spending the majority of their time on matters of direct concern to the European population. The District Commissioner Kikuyu District, for example, spent half of his time settling labour questions. He became a firm
advocate of dividing up such districts along lines of racial settlement, in order that the African areas could receive the attention that their potential merited. 52

Ainsworth in Nyanza felt that efforts to encourage African production of cash crops were severely handicapped by the painfully slow development of communications within the reserves.

The country so far is only partially opened up and future progress is retarded for want of reasonable communication in the way of cart roads, etc. There still remain many parts of the Province that can be made rich and productive and responsive to civilized economic pressures if we can but introduce some reasonable and easy access to the areas.

As with the rest of the country, local transport in Nyanza Province depended upon carts, donkeys and porters. Cart transport required serviceable roads, and Ainsworth complained that, not only did the province lack roads, but also that those which had been built up were only of use in fine weather. Donkey transport had very limited possibilities, and the cost of porters ruled out their use, except for carrying the most valuable of products. The British East Africa Corporation's attempt to improve communications by bringing up from Nairobi a tractor and trolley, for use on the Kisumu-Mumias road, was thwarted by the poor state of this central artery of African trade. Neither was the railway adequate to cope with the local trade, in addition to the goods it carried to and from Uganda and German East Africa. 53

In view of the rapid increase of African produce flowing into Kisumu, it was decided to investigate the prospects of constructing a branch railway from Mumias to connect with the main line at Kisumu. When Beldfield arrived in East Africa in
1913, the reconnaissance survey was under way. The new Governor decided that, "from the point of view of development," it would be "more beneficial" to build the railway westwards across the Uasin Gishu Plateau, with the intention of opening up large new tracts of land for European settlement. Ainsworth agreed, believing that the new line would pass through Mumias and thus relieve the congestion in North Kavirondo. Ainsworth was also promised a tarred road for the Kisumu-Mumias route. The road was never built, and the projected railway, constructed after the war, was routed from Nakuru to Eldoret and on through Kitale to Uganda, avoiding North Kavirondo. The original route advocated by Ainsworth approximated the line opened in 1928 between Kisumu and Butere.

With the exception of parts of the Kisumu to Mumias road, all the roads and tracks in Nyanza had been built by Africans with very little government assistance. So small were government grants towards the construction of roads and bridges in the reserves that in October 1913 the Acting Provincial Commissioner for Nyanza Province proposed that, if the government agreed to construct certain bridges in the province, the local inhabitants would agree to meet the costs of construction, provide the labour for the building work, and pay for the upkeep and maintenance of the bridges. Belfield thought the suggestion an admirable one, and recommended that the Public Works Department should survey the proposed sites and estimate the costs. The local administration would arrange for the necessary sum to be deposited before the construction began. He even agreed that no charge should be made for the advice and services of regular members of the P.W.D.
though, if additional staff had to be hired, these costs would have to be met by the local population. London's response to the proposal was mixed. Read felt that the Government should bear a percentage of the costs, and suggested twenty-five percent, on the grounds that, if government made no contribution, critics may claim that settlers received their public works for nothing, whereas Africans had to pay the total cost. He was overruled by Fiddes, who minuted, "It would not be fair even to the natives to make approval dependent on a contribution which the Government might not see its way to provide in view of heavy calls on the revenue." 58 The Colonial Office, in approving Belfield's proposals, recognised not just the heavy demands made on the Protectorate's revenue, but also the inclination of the Protectorate Government to spend the money available to them on works beneficial to the settlers. Even though a very high proportion of the revenue collected in East Africa derived from the African population, the Colonial Office acquiesced in the collection of further revenue from them to meet the cost of services which, for the settlers, were provided free of charge. This provided a foretaste of the system adopted in 1925 of collecting Local Native Council rates to support local educational, medical, and agricultural services. 59

These heavy expenditures for the benefit of the settlers, and the prevailing attitudes which encouraged them, did not go unchallenged either in London or in East Africa. R.B. Lobb, a second class clerk in the East Africa Section of the Colonial Office, minuted in 1909:
It would interesting to know what amount of Hut Tax revenue is derived from the outlying districts of the East African Protectorate away from the Railway, and how much of the total is expended in ways which are of direct benefit to their inhabitants. 60

A posting to Bermuda prevented him from pressing further for expenditures on school buildings and model plantations for Africans. Early in the following year, a similar sentiment was expressed by Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, in a dispatch to Hayes Sadler.

I am struck by the very small sum directly contributed by the European element in the community on whose behalf so much is done.... In the Draft Estimates of 1909-10, which are before me, rents of all kinds are estimated to produce only £13,534, while the natives of the Protectorate will pay in Hut Tax £94,314.... 61

Another occasional advocate of African agricultural development was Winston Churchill who, as Under Secretary of State for Colonies (1905-8), paid a visit to East Africa. With the advice of the recently appointed Secretary for Native Affairs, A.C. Hollis, he helped to lay the foundations on which the Native Affairs Department was to develop. 61 Churchill saw the great need for supervision of native affairs from the centre, and pressed for the appointment of a number of officers to the reserves specifically charged with the responsibility of protecting native interests. They would receive orders from the Senior Native Commissioner stationed at Nairobi. Though they would act primarily as a means of regulating the supply of labour, their duties were also to include the stimulation of native agriculture and stock raising. 63 The importance of these proposals was to lie very much in the future; Churchill had made the point that there was a
specific native interest, which could conflict with other interests in the Protectorate and which, therefore, should have a spokesman. His advocacy of reserve development had another and more immediate consequence. It resulted in the Director of Agriculture agreeing to the appointment of two European instructors, whose duties would be to travel from district to district giving instructions to African farmers. The appointments were duly placed in the 1908-9 estimates, but only one was actually made. They were struck out of the estimates the following year. The instructor who was appointed spent only the briefest of periods working on African agriculture, before being placed in charge of a wheat hybridization programme designed to produce a high-yielding and disease resistant strain for European farmers. When Hollis asked in the Legislative Council why the instructors had been deleted from the estimates, MacDonald replied that he felt that the country needed the services of a tobacco expert rather more, and that he had reallocated the funds accordingly. So Churchill's initiatives produced no immediate results of significant benefit to African farmers, but they did lend temporary support to the endeavours of Ainsworth and other administrative officials who were striving to effect developments in the reserves.
2.3. Native Policy and African Agricultural Development.

Ainsworth stands out as the most consistently firm advocate in the East Africa Protectorate before the war of a policy of assistance to African agriculture. Though he was to earn the hatred of many of the settlers, Ainsworth was by no means opposed to their presence in Kenya; on the contrary, he saw them as a vital ingredient in the development of the country, and had, particularly during his years as Sub-Commissioner of Ukamba, done a great deal to aid the growth of settlement. More fundamental was his belief that if East Africa was to be a successful colony in both financial and moral terms, a general policy "for the uplifting and betterment of natives" must be applied.

From whatever point of view we look upon this question, i.e., whether from a business or sentimental point of view, it is but common sense to accept that a policy of native development is the only sound moral and business like way of dealing with these millions of blacks over whom we have asserted our control. Ainsworth wished to discourage idleness in any form; native policy must be directed at making every African a useful member of society and a factor in the economic development of the country. This could be done not by methods advocated by many of the settlers, such as cutting down the area of their reserves and forcing them out to work, but by teaching them industrious habits within their own reserves. Native efforts alone and unaided would produce results only slowly, as African methods of cultivation were wasteful of both labour and land. "It would seem reasonable and politic to have them instructed in civilized methods of agriculture so as to allow development with as little waste as possible." Greater results would be achieved with less effort, and progress would continue whilst, at the same time, large numbers of the male population
would be freed for works of development elsewhere. African reserves were not to be inviolable sanctuaries. Although African populated and reserve lands should not be alienated, except for small areas for administrative and trading purposes, they should be open to as much trading intercourse as possible, and Africans should be "encouraged" to leave their reserves to look for work. "Commerce must be the medium of increasing the wants of the people. This will teach increased industry which is a necessity to civilized life; and the greater the industry the more the possibility of the tribes reaching a higher form of civilization."  

It is clear that Ainsworth believed that encouragement of African production would not lead to a decrease in the supply of labour available to the settlers. "I am firmly convinced that only from the native populations that are among themselves industrious will any appreciable amount of the future voluntary labour force come. The industrious native is always wanting something more." He argued his case before a hostile Native Labour Commission in 1912, and supported it by pointing out that those areas of Nyanza which produced the most export crops also provided the most labour. He insisted against objections that reserve development must come first, and this, in turn, would lead to an increased labour supply, once Africans began to associate regular work with their normal existence. There was also a positive benefit to work outside the reserve, as those who left it developed wants which, on their return to the reserve, were copied by others who, now needing more money, either left the reserve, or put greater effort into growing crops for sale. The development of African agriculture and the growth of the supply of labour, he argued, go hand in hand. Privately he insisted to the Colonial Office that, if
he had believed that encouragement of African agriculture would have meant a decrease in the supply of labour, he would not have hesitated to say so, and added, "I cannot accept the argument that a native has no right to develop his own country, and I sincerely believe that in the tropical areas increased success in native agriculture means a prosperous Protectorate."

Ainsworth could and did point to his success in Nyanza, where he energetically pursued his ideas with little encouragement from others. Prior to 1908-9, when his policy began in earnest, there had been virtually no exports from Nyanza, except ivory and hides. Bookings of export produce from provincial railway stations rose in steady annual increments to 17,799 tons in 1912-3.

Table 3: Bookings of export produce from Nyanza Province Stations, 1908-9-1912-13. Tons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>3,583 tons</td>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>16,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909-10</td>
<td>6,829</td>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>17,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>9,893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ainsworth to Read, 8th August, 1913, C.0.533/130

Ainsworth's approach to development was energetic and resourceful. He attacked the underlying problems of poor communications and of disease, particularly malaria and trypanosomiasis. Cotton seed and ground nuts were introduced to cultivators. More immediately productive were his efforts to improve the quality and quantity of maize production. Meetings were organized in all the lake districts at which it was explained to Africans that, if they replaced their maize seeds with an improved variety, higher cash returns would result. Arrangements were made to buy up the native crop, and at the beginning of the next planting season large
quantities of Hickory King seed were made available for purchase at each district station. 76

Ainsworth’s policies, and the local success he achieved, provoked heated opposition, primarily from settlers concerned about the harmful effect of these policies on their labour supply. Witness after witness before the Native Labour Commission of 1912 spoke in this vein. With the exception of two other officials (Horne and Watts), a coast planter, and a stock farmer, the large majority of officials, European farmers, Indian traders, and Africans saw a direct conflict between the encouragement of African cultivation and the needs of the farmer, officials, and merchants for labour. The Africans in Central and Nyanza Province had, in theory, a choice as to how they could acquire their tax money, satisfy their demand for livestock and wives and their growing need for cloth and other European products. It is clear from the evidence given before the Labour Commission that frequently the choice was not a free one. On the orders of the District Commissioner, the Chief or the Headman would instruct men, either directly or through the elders, to go out to work.

Before the Commission, Ainsworth was three times singled out for personal attack by European farmers, one of whom, Lord Delamere, spoke as the most widely respected member of the settler community. Delamere attacked Ainsworth again in a letter to the Chief Secretary, Charles Bowring, in October 1912.

He (Ainsworth) has always denied the rights and benefits of the civilization to which he should be a prop and tried to introduce a system which must result in the ultimate demoralization and degeneration of the natives to a drinking loafer.... 77
The Report of the Native Labour Commission, of which Delamere was a member, expressed the view that economic development of the reserves hindered the recruitment of labour and, though it recommended a reduction in the size of the reserves, it did not request the government to suppress development measures. This conflict between the demands of the farmers and the administration for labour, and the desire of some members of the administration to aid the development of African farming, came up again, in a more acute form, in the early 1920's.

Ainsworth felt strongly that reserve development could and should be financed from the taxes paid by Africans. In a report he wrote for Governor Belfield in 1915, Ainsworth expressed his belief that a fixed percentage of the £34,000 in direct taxation levied on Africans should be used to provide agricultural instruction, medical and educational facilities, and improved communications. He added that "practically all" of the administrative officers agreed with him in this matter. However, the most senior executive officer, Belfield, disagreed. He felt it would be "indiscreet to fetter the discretion of Government by giving any such undertaking," but thought, "it would certainly be politic to inform the tribes concerned that such revenue... as can from time to time be spared for expenditure upon such improvements will be so utilized." Ainsworth pressed this point again, and with somewhat more success, in 1920.

As Ainsworth claimed, his views on African development gained consistent support from district administrators, who were in the very best position to assess the realism of his ideas. The District Commissioner, North Kavirondo, felt it to be both economically sound and the duty of the government to encourage African agriculture. Instead of conserving
this 'valuable asset,' government policy was serving to dissipate it by
levying large amounts of taxation and failing to plough any of the
money back. He found it "difficult to see" why the claims of Africans
for assistance had been overlooked, particularly as the relative fail-
ure of the cotton growing scheme was, in his view, "entirely due" to the
fact that the shambas were not adequately supervised. "The cow," he
wrote, "cannot be milked indefinitely without an attempt to restore her."
His suggestion that £2,000 of the tax raised locally should be set aside
annually to assist agricultural development fell on deaf ears. 82
H.R. McClure, the District Commissioner, Nyeri, commented rather acidly
on government policy in his annual report of 1915-6:

The advantages already conferred on the native by the Government
are, no doubt, of considerable value, comprising as they do
valuable education in the matter of labour and commerce. In the
former by persuading them that temporary discomfort breeds
eventual dignity and in the latter by purchasing their oxen at a
lower price than they would obtain elsewhere. Admirable as
these concessions are it is possible that some more tangible
signs of the interest which the Central Government, no doubt,
takes in the natives under its rule, would be still further
appreciated by the native population. This might even take the
form of the expenditure of some of the public funds on the
public.83

McClure's predecessor at Nyeri, Charles Dundas, used a handing-over re-
port to deliver a broadside at government policy, which he believed was
not in the best interests of either the Africans, the settlers, or the
Colony as a whole. The government owed a duty to the African population
to improve its standard of living by assisting the development of African
agriculture, a policy which it had failed to pursue in the Kikuyu areas,
due to the government's belief that, if it did so, it would reduce the
labour supply available to farmers. But Africans were reluctant to
work only because they were unfamiliar with the notion of work, and it was "positively preposterous" to suppose that the most efficient way to encourage African labour was to pressure them into working for Europeans. This they would eventually do in much larger numbers, if they were encouraged first to work for themselves. If they were taught improved methods, the land would be farmed more extensively, the shambas would increase in value, and land would become scarce. Africans would then have to labour in order to buy a shamba. Dundas also argued that the non-development of large areas of reserve land was to the detriment of the prosperity of the Colony as a whole, particularly when the Africans were so willing to put in the effort. 84

If Ainsworth's views were widely shared, or if his actions were widely copied by other members of the Native Affairs Department, it was not the result of government guidance. Indeed, the primary characteristics of native policy as a whole in the East African Protectorate were its inconsistency and its lack of clarity. Despite the promptings of Churchill, the Secretary for Native Affairs and his small staff were largely concerned with matters arising out of the relationship between European master and African servant. Little time remained for anything else. 85 Native policy, without an effective centralised administration, was left very much in the hands of the local administrative officials, who were themselves a very mixed group from diverse background. Just after his arrival in 1909 as Governor, Percy Girouard wrote:

After a close perusal at any documents which could be placed before me, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that there was an utter absence of defined policy whereby I could take up the work of my predecessor and ensure continuity of effort and direction. 87
Girouard's memorandum on native policy of 1910 was his attempt to promote "continuity of policy and similarity of administrative action." However, the memorandum contained a fundamental contradiction, which it left unresolved. It began by setting down the basic tenets of native policy:

The fundamental principle and the only humane policy to be followed in dealing with people who have not yet reached a high stage of civilization is to develop them on their own lines and in accordance with their own ideas and customs, purified in so far as is necessary.

Only those ideas and customs repugnant to higher ideals of morality and justice should be rejected, and the introduction of "so-called civilization," when it has "a denationalizing and demoralizing tendency" should be avoided. For administrative officers, "...it must certainly be their endeavour to lift the natives to a higher plane of civilization; but this can only be achieved by gradual methods and by observing existing conditions."

There were great dangers in allowing tribal authority to be ignored or broken.

...It will mean that we, who numerically form a small minority in the country, shall be obliged to deal with a rabble, with thousands of persons in a savage or semi-savage state, all acting on their own and making themselves a danger to society generally. There could only be one end to such a policy and that would be the eventual destruction of the rabble.

With the opening up of the country Girouard continued, the railway, the traders, farmers and missionaries all required labour. All were contributing to "breaking down the tribal system;" all were "adding their quota to denationalizing the Africans." Even so, a class of African workmen was "a most important factor in the development of East Africa."
If economic development was to be pursued through the settlement of European farmers, and Girouard felt "morally bound" to give the settlers "all reasonable assistance," then increasingly large numbers of Africans were to be faced with "denationalization," a process which he had, in the same document, condemned as unjust and dangerous. The memorandum stated the contradiction clearly, yet made no attempt to resolve it.

Through the issue of circulars from the Secretariat in Nairobi, which occasionally included instructions and advice on native questions, an attempt was made to secure some unity of policy and purpose. However, the extent to which the government of the Protectorate was itself prepared to permit regional variation in policy can be seen by looking at one of these circulars, issued in 1915. Number 58 contained a provincial circular on native policy, which had been sent out to all district commissioners in Nyanza Province by John Ainsworth. The covering letter instructed provincial commissioners to draw up and issue a similar document to their district commissioners. The differences between Ainsworth's original version and Hobley's revised version on the question of economic development illustrate the scale of the variation in attitude and belief which the colonial government was prepared to tolerate. Both circulars were approved for issue by the Colonial Secretary.

Ainsworth's circular contained a summary of his views on native policy, laying great stress upon the need to direct energy towards making the African an economic asset to the country."The planting of economic products still requires constant encouragement and actual pushing. It is still necessary to instruct all young men who are not employed in the development of their own districts to go out and earn wages." Hobley's
view was rather different. He scorned the "materialist school of administrators - the type of man, for instance, who quotes with great pride the number of bicycles and gramophones his pet tribe purchases per annum and considers that this is a gauge for measuring advancement...." This rather obvious reference to Ainsworth could hardly have been missed, either by the Chief Secretary, or by Hobley's district commissioners.

He further insisted that:

The only true standard of progress is an ethical one. Improvement in the public sense of justice is a great test, the growth of a public spirit, the feeling that anti-social acts are tabu, that the bribing of elders and the receipt of bribes by elders is not an accepted convention....

Apart from the radical difference in emphasis, Hobley, when he finally came round to discussing economic questions, adopted a position quite distinct from Ainsworth's.

It is the duty of the elders to see that their land is utilized as fully as circumstances admit if they wish to indefinitely retain their claim to it. No-one in this world, be he black or white, can look upon large areas of land without utilizing them unless he is prepared to pay heavily for the privilege.

Improvements in agricultural methods and the utilization of better implements were matters for "close attention" but:

The growth of economic products in the reserves should not however be allowed to militate in any way against the supply of labour furnished by each tribe for work outside the reserves.... D.O.'s should therefore in all cases insist on the elders ordering out the young men to work, and should support the efforts of the elders in this direction. 91
It appears then that, in the absence of clear central government directions, sections of the local administration followed quite divergent policies on the basic question of whether the productive efforts of the African populations of the reserves should be directed principally towards developing their own reserves or providing labour for European estates. It is clear though that the bulk of government resources and effort were devoted to estate development, which was expected to yield substantial results more quickly. Peasant production had its vocal and effective advocates, who could, and did, argue that in 1914 the reserves still produced the largest part of the territory's exports.

* * *
2.4. The War.

Owing to the lengthy and costly military campaign fought in German East Africa, the war set in train major changes in the Protectorate. During the war years, African production and trade made no progress at all. On the contrary, compulsory recruitment for the war effort caused a mass movement of able bodied young men from the reserves. To avoid being conscripted, large numbers of Africans obtained work on European farms where, until April 1917, they were protected from recruiting agents. Others fled from their home areas into the bush. By the end of the war the equivalent of half the total of the male population of the reserves had been conscripted for military operations. Though the figures given for conscription by the administration are, on their own admission, unreliable, it appears that over 200,000 out of a total male population (aged 16-40 years) of about 400,000 enlisted.

Table 4: Recruitment for military operations, 1914-1919.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early period of the war, as carriers</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the formation of the Carrier Corps</td>
<td>162,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxim Gun Porters</td>
<td>9,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stretcher Bearers</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier Police</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casuals</td>
<td>13,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>201,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these 26,193 were known to have died, but the actual figure is certainly much higher than this. Of the huge numbers of deserters Bowring reckoned that about 14,000 died. The total number of deaths was probably in excess of 50,000 or about one-eighth of the total of adult males in the country.

The war disrupted the development of African production and trade. In Nyanza Province, for example, where there had been considerable growth in the years immediately prior to the war, the export of foodstuffs was prohibited, and transport facilities were taken over by the military. The government commandeered lake vessels and large numbers of ox-carts. Road repairs and construction ceased, except where military demands had to be met, and on the railways military traffic took precedence over other loads. As a consequence of these difficulties, the price of both sim-sim and cotton fell dramatically, and Africans were left with large stocks of unsaleable crops. By 1915-6 steamer tonnage entering and leaving the lake port of Kisumu had fallen to about 40% of its pre-war level, the Africans had ceased to cultivate cotton, which could no longer be exported, and traders were experiencing considerable difficulties in obtaining regular supplies of imported goods, the prices of which were rising steeply.

The total effect of such a holocaust on the economic development of the reserves is exceedingly difficult to assess, as we know very little, for instance, about the regional distribution of the casualties. Presumably the death rate was far higher among the tribes that inhabited the higher altitudes in Kenya, as the overwhelming majority of the deaths were the result of disease rather than enemy action. Suprisingly,
perhaps, the production of grains remained close to the pre-war level in the first two years of the war, only dropping in 1917 and 1918, when climatic irregularities intervened to expose the growing absence of males. Heavy and unseasonal downpours of rain in mid-1917 were followed by the failure of the short rains in 1917. It is likely that with such large numbers of men away from the reserves new areas for cultivation could only be cleared with difficulty, and that the yield of the areas under cultivation was falling. Large scale military purchases meant that there were no reserves to fall back upon. Two years of fine rains, in 1915 and 1916, delayed the appearance of a food shortage in the reserves, but in 1918 over 8,000 tons of maize had to be imported from South Africa. The rain failures were quickly followed by the influenza epidemic, particularly devastating in coastal districts, together with widespread outbreaks of dysentery and small-pox in Kavirondo and Kikuyu Provinces, and further extensive rain failures in 1918. Large numbers of stock deaths accompanied the drought in Masailand. One estimate of deaths caused by the combination of the war, the famine, and the epidemics among the Kikuyu alone placed the figure at 120,000, out of a total population of about one million.

From this series of disasters some benefits flowed. The famine was met with a programme of relief works, particularly irrigation and road building projects, which had some lasting benefits for the reserves, as well as providing the money for many Africans to purchase their food. The war had the effect of further monetizing the economy, and of bringing many Africans into the territorial food and cattle market for the first time. Military purchases of livestock were very extensive and, though in many cases they were compulsory sales, there was a certain amount of
willing selling. In Nyanza Province alone it was estimated that Africans parted with over 50,000 cattle in the first four years of the war. Money earned in the Carrier Corps supplemented the returns from these sales, and it is probable that, as a direct consequence of the war, more money circulated to more people in reserves than had been the case in the pre-war period. For the first time, too, the government of the country was forced to an appreciation, through the systematic medical examination of draftees for the Carrier Corps, of the huge extent of the medical problem that existed within the reserves. Ainsworth, as Military Commissioner for Labour, recognised that, if extensive production was to be expected from the African areas after the war, a serious medical programme would have to be undertaken. At least a third of the men examined for military service were found to be medically unfit.

Table 5: Health in the reserves, 1914-17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>109,739</td>
<td>53,344</td>
<td>20,082</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukamba</td>
<td>48,816</td>
<td>31,310</td>
<td>12,062</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>136,956</td>
<td>143,288</td>
<td>52,883</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>295,511</td>
<td>227,942</td>
<td>85,027</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ainsworth to Acting Chief Secretary, 1st June, 1917 and 2nd October, 1917, enclosed in Monson to Long, 15th October, 1917, C.0.533/185. The figures refer to the period up to the end of July, 1917.

These figures do not include the "very considerable number" who were so apparently unfit that they were not even sent to the district commissioner for examination. A large percentage of those returning to the reserves in 1917 and 1918 were either sick or in a convalescent state.
They brought with them a range of diseases, such as dysentery and syphilis, which spread rapidly through the reserves.\textsuperscript{101}

Before the end of the war, the East Africa Protectorate Government proposed a programme of expenditure on medical, educational, and agricultural services in the reserves. This was an early indication of the recognition of the need to restore the reserves. It was also an attempt to fulfill a promise, made to native interests after the Hut and Poll Tax had been raised from three to five rupees in 1916, that a proportion of the additional revenue so raised should be devoted to the reserves. The 1918-9 estimates made provision for the appointment of eight new medical officers, five new sub-assistant surgeons, two agricultural instructors and sixteen native assistants for the reserves. In all, an extra £23,506 was to be spent on additional services. This plan, though well intentioned, was still-born. The Colonial Office agreed to the expenditure, but pointed out, correctly as it transpired, that it was highly improbable that the required additional staff would be available until well after the end of the war. About a third of the money was spent on communications and relief works during the famine, and the balance left unspent.\textsuperscript{103}

Out of the disasters of the war-time also came a recognition of the need to encourage the increased production by Africans of food and oil-bearing crops. The fall in production during the war years of both European farms and reserve areas, added to the temporary difficulty of obtaining freightage for imported supplies, created severe shortages. The population was facing famine conditions. The coast area, which experienced an extended period of poor rains during the war, was the particular target of much of the effort. To ensure success, additional staff
and money, and a substantial supply of seed were necessary, but none were forthcoming in sufficient quantity.\textsuperscript{104} As the situation worsened, Ainsworth, now sitting on the War Council as the Advisor on Native Affairs, took a hand by urging that some form of compulsion be adopted.\textsuperscript{105} With the approval of Acting Governor Bowring and the Executive Council, he introduced, in April 1918, to the Legislative Council a bill to "compel the natives by legislation to make better use of the lands set aside for their operation." Africans were liable to neglect their cultivation, and "we require authority to compel reasonable development generally." On the second reading the bill was opposed by the unofficials and, on Bowring's advice, Ainsworth withdrew it for discussion at a later date.\textsuperscript{106} Two weeks later the proposal was attacked by an unofficial member in the Legislative Council: "We cannot help but think that it is wrong in principle to encourage compulsion within the reserves, without equally encouraging the production of labour for the more important industries of the country."\textsuperscript{107} The bill's final withdrawal was greeted with pleasure by settler members Delamere and Hunter, who feared that it would have adversely affected the supply of labour to their farms.\textsuperscript{108}

Ainsworth's bill, though acceptable to the Governor as an emergency wartime measure, ran into firm opposition from the settlers. By mid 1918 stronger pressures in the Protectorate were pressing, not for compulsory cultivation by Africans of their reserves, but for compulsory cultivation by Africans of European farms. In August 1918 Ainsworth was instructed by the Executive Council to draft a circular on labour, which was to become the first of the infamous Northey Circulars.\textsuperscript{109}
Footnotes. Chapter 2.

1 Nyanza Province Annual Report 1905-6, PC/NZA 1/1.

2 Nyanza Province Annual Report 1909-10, PC/NZA 1/5.

3 Ibid.

4 Nyanza Province Annual Report 1911-12, PC/NZA 1/7.

5 Nyanza Province Annual Report 1912-13, PC/NZA 1/6.

6 Ulu District Annual Report 1914-15, DC/NKS 1/1/2.

7 See, for example, the difficulties experienced with sheep and castor oil seeds in Nyanza Province, and ground nuts and cotton in Nandi District. Nyanza Province Annual Reports 1905-06 and 1911-12, PC/NZA 1/1 and 1/7, and for Nandi District, Nyanza Province Annual Reports 1906-07, PC/NZA 1/2.

8 A. Marsden, "Report on Trade, 1904-05," enclosed in Stewart to Lansdowne, 14 March 1905, C.O.533/1 and F.J. Jackson, "Minute on the Address of the Colonialists' Association, 23 August 1905," enclosed in Jackson to Lyttleton, 11 November 1905, C.O.533/5. On this latter occasion Jackson resisted settler demands for further reductions of freight rates on maize, beans and potatoes. He argued that if Africans, who were shipping their produce from the lake region, were able to pay the existing rates, settlers farming in the Highlands ought to be able to pay them.

9 Cotton goods, which were almost exclusively bought by Africans from Indian traders, constituted between one quarter and one third of the total imports by value in every year between 1903-04 and 1912-13. See "Annual Report of the Protectorate, 1912-13," enclosed in Bowring to Harcourt, 13 December 1913, C.O.533/125.


Minute by Butler on Jackson to Crewe, 8 May 1909, C.O.533/59.

See R. Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908 (London: Macmillan 1968), pp.369-70. Hyam argues that discussion on native policy in Africa was based on three general assumptions. Firstly, nothing should be done that involved the regular commitment of revenue to Africa, secondly, that any change must be introduced slowly and thirdly, that Africans were much further down the evolutionary scale of civilization than Asiatics.


Masefield, pp.62-66. It may be argued that Britain had the experience of India to call upon, but India did not present all the problems of the African colonies. There, plough and cash crop cultivation were already known and systems of agriculture designed to maintain soil fertility had been worked out before the imposition of British administration. The Indian and the Colonial Civil Service recruited separately and transfer between them was rare.
19 Quoted by M.F. Hill, p.280. It was only dimly realized in these early years that the white settlers would be unable to achieve the rapid success widely expected of them. Many of the crops which they relied upon, particularly coffee, sisal, and rubber, needed a period of years before plants matured and yielded any return. Other investments, notably in wheat and sheep, had to go through a lengthy period of experimentation before satisfactory strains and breeds were found. See also Hyam, p.405.


22 Sorrenson, pp.686-687.

23 Lansdowne to Stewart, 8 July 1904, F.0.2/833.

24 Linton to Stewart, 18 January 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lansdowne, 23 January 1905, F.0.2/914.

25 A.C. MacDonald, "Report on the Re-organization of the Agriculture Department," 14 December 1906, enclosed in Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 12 February 1907, C.0.533/27. The following year the Department of Agriculture reported the failure of Mzera's Government Farm, which had received only twelve visits from settlers in its final year of operation. The site for the new Nairobi farm was chosen by settlers in co-operation with the Department of Agriculture. The Department had also surveyed a site for a new experimental farm on the Uasin Gishu Plateau. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1907-08 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1909).


27 "Interim Report on British East Africa," enclosed in Girouard to Elgin, 13 November 1909, C.0.533/63.
In the period before the First World War it was by no means certain that Europeans could live permanently and breed successfully in the highlands of East Africa. For example see, W.S. Churchill My African Journey (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1908), pp.58-60.

During the cotton crisis of 1901-3 Lancashire had experienced very costly cotton shortages. As three quarters of Britain's cotton came from outside the Empire, it was decided to stimulate cotton growing in selected colonies. The British Cotton Growing Association was formed in 1902 with this purpose in view. R.D. Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism : Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp.80-81.


E. Brand, "Memorandum of suggestions for the removal of the present deterrents to Agricultural Progress in British East Africa," enclosed in Brand to W. Ellis (First Class Clerk, Colonial Office), 14 May 1906, C.0.533/24.

Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 19 September 1906, C.0.533/17.

Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 21 May 1906, C.0.533/14. The idea was not a new one. Eliot had approved a small settlement of Indians at Kibos in Kavirondo in 1902, see Sorrenson, pp.36-37.


Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 28 July 1906, C.0.533/15 and 12 January 1908, C.0.533/41.

B.C.G.A. to Elgin, 14 March 1906, C.0.533/24. The minimum price they offered was 1d. per lb. For the origins of the B.C.G.A. see above, note 29.

R.L. Antrobus (Assistant Undersecretary for Colonies, East Africa) to B.C.G.A., 6 April 1906, C.0.533/24.
Hayes Sadler to Elgin, Telegram, 15 September 1906, C.0.533/17.

Antrobus to Treasury, 22 September 1906, C.0.533/17.

Hayes Sadler to Crewe, 8 February 1909, C.0.533/57. The reasons for the Corporation’s failure are dealt with below, see pp. 309-310.

See H. Fearn, An African Economy: A Study of the Economic Development of the Nyanza Province of Kenya, 1903-1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). By 1914-1915 African cotton production had reached close to 600,000 lbs. of seed cotton, but in that year prices offered by traders fell by one half. Convinced that they had been swindled by the traders, the Africans would, according to the provincial commissioner, require "a good deal of persuasion" if they were to grow cotton again. The following year no cotton was grown. Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1914-15 and 1915-16, PC/NZA 1/10 and 1/11.

Machakos District Agricultural Gazetteer, 1955 (?), pp.2-4, DC/MKS 14/3/2.

Kikuyu District Annual Report, 1907-08, DC/KMU 1/1.

Kikuyu District Quarterly Report, 30 September 1910, DC/MKS 1/6/1.

Minutes of the Legislative Council, 18 December 1908, C.0.544/2.

John Ainsworth C.M.G., D.S.O., C.B.E.; 1889-1895 employed by Imperial British East Africa Company; 1895-1906 Sub-Commissioner, British East Africa Protectorate, Ukamba Province; 1904-1905 Acting Deputy Commissioner; 1906-1907 Commissioner in charge, Naivasha Province; 1907-1916 Senior Commissioner, Kavirondo Province; 1917-1918 Military Commissioner for Labour, East African Expeditionary Force; 1918-1920 Chief Native Commissioner, Member Legislative Council, Member Executive Council.


48 District Commissioner, North Kavirondo to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 20 December 1913, enclosed in Belfield to Harcourt, 7 May 1914, C.0.533/136.

49 Belfield to Harcourt, 26 October 1914, C.0.533/142.

50 "Memorandum for Provincial and District Commissioners: Issued for the guidance of administrators with the object of promoting continuity of policy and similarity of administrative action, 18 May 1910." DC/NDI 1/8/1. See section 7 on trade.

51 Hayes Sadler to Crâwe, 25 February 1909, C.0.533/58.

52 Kikuyu District Annual Reports, 1907-08 and 1910-11, DC/KEU 1/1 and 1/2.

53 J. Ainsworth, "Proposals by the Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, for the better development of Nyanza Province," enclosed in Ainsworth to H.J. Read, 8 August 1913, C.0.533/130.


55 Belfield to Harcourt, 16 March 1914, C.0.533/134.


57 Belfield to Harcourt, 13 August 1914, C.0.533/134. This dispatch shows how the government in East Africa intended to spend a £100,000 loan for road building. With the exception of the Mumias to
Kisumu road, all the projects would have been of far greater benefit to European settled areas than to African populated areas. The war intervened to disrupt the programme.

58 Belfield to Harcourt, 14 October 1913, and minutes by H.J. Read (Principal Clerk) and G.W. Fiddes (Assistant Undersecretary for the Colonies, Eastern Africa), C.O.533/123 and Harcourt to Belfield, 14 November 1913, C.O.533/123.

59 See below, p. 87.

60 Minute by Lobb, 6 March 1909, on Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 1 April 1908, C.O.533/43. R. Popham Lobb was a temporary member of the East Africa section. He had seen active service in Northern Nigeria where he had worked under Lord Lugard. He had previously attacked Hayes Sadler for his approval of punitive expeditions undertaken in 1907-08. In his minute of March he described Hayes Sadler as "utterly unfit to be entrusted with the task of administering an African Protectorate." See Mungeam, pp.175-178.


62 Mungeam, pp.191-192.

63 Churchill to Hayes Sadler, 11 November 1907, Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 26 November 1907 and enclosed Governor's circular to Provincial Commissioners, 18 November 1907, C.O.533/33.

64 A.C. Hollis, "Memorandum on the Rt. Hon. Mr. Churchill's suggestions regarding the Native Affairs Department," 12 November 1907, enclosed in Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 26 November 1907, C.O.533/33.

65 Jackson (Acting Governor) to Elgin, 30 December 1907, C.O. 533/33.

Minutes of the Legislative Council, 18 December 1908, C.O. 544/2. Tobacco was a crop grown by Europeans and Africans. The following July the tobacco expert was axed. Minutes of the Legislative Council, 5 July, 1909, C.O. 544/2.

Both Watkins and Leggett were to use the precedent of Churchill's activities in East Africa at this time to support the arguments they advanced to the Colonial Office in the early 1920's in favour of a dual agricultural policy. See below, Chapter 3.

His contribution was recognised publicly by both the Colonists' Association and the East African Agricultural and Horticultural Society in 1906, immediately prior to his departure for Naivasha. See Goldsmith, pp.57-58 and 63. See also Unpublished Memoranda, John Ainsworth on Land, DC/MK 26/3/1.

John Ainsworth, "Proposals by the Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, for the better development of Nyanza Province," enclosed in Ainsworth to H.J. Read, 8 August 1913, C.O. 533/130.

Ibid.


Ainsworth, "Proposals..."


Ainsworth, "Proposals..."


Quoted in Goldsmith, p.85.
78 Native Labour Commission, 1913, pp.324-333. Two missionaries, two settlers and three officials sat on the Commission.


81 See below, pp. 66, 79 note 22.

82 North Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1911-12, PC/NZA 1/7.

83 Nyeri District Annual Report, 1915-16, DC/NYI 1/2.

84 Nyeri District Handing Over Report, Dundas to McClure, 19 January 1914, DC/NYI 1/2.

85 Mungeam, pp.90-95.

86 Girouard thought very poorly of the majority of his senior administrative officers. For his comments see Girouard to Crewe, 26 May 1910, C.O.533/74.


88 "Memorandum for Provincial and District Commissioners issued for the guidance of administrators with the object of providing continuity of policy and similarity of administrative actions, 18 May 1910." DC/NDI 1/8/1.

89 Ibid.

90 Girouard to Crewe, 26 May 1910, C.O.533/74. Sent to London only six days after his memorandum was issued. Girouard's "Report on the British East Africa Protectorate" indicated a strong preference for development by settler activity.
Both circulars can be found in Coast Province File, CP 20/103. Where conditions were suitable, Hobley, as Ukamba Province Commissioner, pressed vigorously for the development of African agriculture. See Provincial Commissioner’s Inspection Book, 1910-18, entries for November and December 1910, DC/KTI 8/1. For further expression of his view on the development of the reserves see C.W. Hobley, Bantu Beliefs and Magic: With particular reference to the Kikuyu and Kamba Tribes of Kenya (London: Witherby, 1938), pp. 297-300.


Monson to Milner, 31 December 1919, C.0.533/216. These figures are based upon the recorded deaths among Maxim Gun porters; no close check was kept on the other sections. McGregor Ross refers to "much sardonic comment, some of it angry, at the Government's conservative and precise estimate of 23,869 as the African death roll in our war." Ross, pp.152-153.


Bowring to Long, 1 May 1918, C.0.533/195.

Savage and Forbes Munro, p.337.

Ainsworth to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 24 February 1919, enclosed in Northey to Milner, 11 March 1919, C.0.533/207.


Northey to Milner, 11 March 1919, C.0.533/207, and Minutes of the Legislative Council, 8 November 1918, C.0.544/6. Maize worth £1,800 was distributed to coast Africans for work performed on road-building famine relief projects. The seventy mile road from Rabai to Kakoneni, a road from the Nyika reserve towards Kilifi, and small roads in the area north of the Sabaki leading to Malindi were constructed.

101 Savage and Forbes Munro, p.326.

102 Bowring to Long, 20 March 1918, C.0.533/194.

103 Ainsworth to Acting Chief Secretary, 10 June 1920, enclosed in Bowring to Milner, 30 June 1920, C.0.533/233. See also, Bowring to Milner, 19 June 1919, C.0.533/211 which refers to three vacant posts of agricultural instructor. The low salary scales offered, £250 x 10 = £300 for two of them, and £350 x 15 = £400 for the other, could not have helped to fill them.

104 Director of Agriculture to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 19 April 1917, Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 20 August 1917, Director of Agriculture to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 19 September 1917, and Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 7 January 1918, in Coast Province 39/625.

105 Ainsworth to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, enclosed in Ainsworth to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 1 February 1918, in Coast Province 39/625.

106 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 11-12 April 1918, C.0.544/6, and Minutes of the Executive Council, 30 January 1918, C.0.544/14.

107 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 25 April 1918, address on the adjournment by P.H. Clarke, C.0.544/6.

108 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 5 November 1918, C.0.544/6.

109 Minutes of the Executive Council, 8 August 1918, C.0.544/14.
Chapter 3. The Adoption of Dual Policy, 1919-1921.

The whole tenor of the Belfield-Bowring wartime administration was strongly pro-settler. Belfield's address to the Legislative Council in February 1917 illustrates this:

If any impression still exists that the legitimate requirements of the farmers are to be subordinated to the policy of confining the native to his reserve, I trust that these words may be sufficient to dispel that impression once and for all....I am prepared to state definitely that we desire to make of the native a useful citizen, and that we consider the best means of doing so is to induce him to work for a period of his life for the European....

The wartime administration introduced the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 and the Native Registration and Resident Natives Ordinances, granted elected representation to the settlers, and set up the Soldier Settler Scheme designed to attract a fresh flood of settlers to the Protectorate as soon as the war ended. The Native Registration Ordinance, passed in 1915, but not put into effect until 1919, and the Resident Natives Ordinance, introduced in 1916 and finally approved in 1918, were both settler supported measures aimed at securing and controlling the supply of labour. Under the Crown Lands Ordinance, the settlers obtained, in effect, a legal consolidation of their exclusive right to alienated areas in the highlands, and satisfactory terms covering the purchase and transfer of land. 2

These measures were bound to push the country further towards domination by the European settlers, whose attitudes towards the African population were strongly influenced by their post-war need for a large and growing supply of cheap labour. The non-official European population was, for example, increasingly concerned with the provision of adequate medical and educational
services in the reserves, as they came to realize that the supply and efficiency of their farm labour was partly dependent upon them. They did not, however, have any sympathy with the notion of developing African production in the reserves, as this would provide the African with an alternative method of earning his tax money and might, therefore, tend to reduce the supply of labour. They were determined that the economic development of the Protectorate would proceed as a result of increased estate production. The views expressed by the Economic Commission, which met at the end of the war, exemplify these attitudes.  

Middle Africa's part in the development of the British Empire should be judged, according to the Report, not by its past performance, but by its future potential. The European part in this was to act as the yeast upon the inert leaven of African dough. One white immigrant into East Africa might galvanize one thousand economically speaking 'dead' Africans into active participation in Imperial trade. Without this white stimulus the African produces and consumes in intensely local self-sufficiency and has no surplus product for external exchange. The appropriate native policy was, therefore, one which favoured interpenetration rather than segregation. The reserves should not be sacrosanct; enough land should be reserved for the Africans for their immediate needs, but no more, and the land thereby freed should be offered to Europeans for settlement. The policy of encouraging Africans to leave their reserves to work for the Europeans should be fully developed, because contact between Africans and Europeans would break down the barriers to civilizing the African.
The Commission was totally opposed to the policies of the then Chief Native Commissioner, John Ainsworth, who, it claimed, wanted to keep the reserves as "strongholds of backward savage ignorance."
The Report argued that if the reserves were to be developed, then the natives must first learn modern methods, and the only way they could do that was by working for Europeans. Therefore, it concluded, those who wished to see the reserves most productive should advise Africans to go out to work for Europeans.6

The extent of the labour problem anticipated by the Economic Commission at the end of the war may be gauged by a comparison of estimates made by the Government in 1920 of the daily labour requirements of employers with estimates of the potential labour supply.

Table 6: Labour demand and supply, 1920.7

Demand: Average daily requirements:

- European farms: 38,300
- Other private employment: 20,081
- Government departments: 18,500
- Total demand: 76,961

Supply: By province:

- Nyanza: 130,755
- Kenya: 101,011
- Ukamba: 32,286
- Others: 24,062
- Total potential supply: 288,114

Source: Acting Governor Bowring to Milner, 8 June 1920, CO.0.533/233.

Apparently, if each adult male worked for three months out of each year, the labour requirements of the Colony could be met. In fact, by no means all of the adult males were medically fit. As we have seen, war-time examinations had clearly shown that about 37% of
adults examined in the three major labour producing provinces were unfit for service as carriers, and this figure certainly increased as a result of the war. Applying the conservative 37% unfitness figure, to the potential labour supply, the total can be reduced to 181,512, and the average labour requirement for each able bodied male rises to over five months per year. With these estimates in mind, it is not surprising that the problem of an adequate labour supply preoccupied the Government of Kenya and the settlers in the years immediately following the war.

When Northey arrived in the East African Protectorate in February 1919, he accepted the view that settler interests should be paramount. Within a month of his arrival, he indicated this clearly to the Legislative Council:

I believe that our duty is to encourage the energies of all communities to produce from these rich lands the raw products and the foodstuffs that the world at large, and the British Empire in particular, require. This can only be done by encouragement of the thousands of able bodied natives to work with the European settler for the cultivation of the land and improvement of stock. The native must be taught to realize that cooperation between the European and himself will be beneficial to both.

Northey accepted two settlers as members of the Executive Council, he arranged for the alienation of a large area of land inhabited by the Nandi for the Soldier Settler Scheme, and he began the practice of consistently consulting with settlers before the introduction of bills into the Legislative Council. Through the post-war boom immediately following the end of hostilities, Northey spared no efforts on behalf of the settler cause but, as the world wide depres-
sion began to bite in Kenya, and as opposition to his policies mounted, the Colonial Office began to review its tacit acceptance of Northey's policies. During his last months in office, and under pressure from London, the Government of Kenya designed the first major plan to assist the agricultural development of the African reserve areas.

The best known of Northey's measures to aid the rapid re-establishment of European settlement are the infamous Northey Circulars, which encouraged district commissioners to use all measures short of actual force to bring labour out from the reserves and on to European run farms. In fact, these circulars encouraged practices no different from those described in ample detail before the Labour Commission of 1912-3. Both Ainsworth and Owen were able to support them, for both believed that there was ample labour available for both European farms and the agricultural development of the reserves.\(^10\) The amendment to the Native Authority Ordinance, introduced by the Government in January 1920, received a far less favourable response from native interests. Under its provisions, Africans were liable to compulsory labour on government works for up to sixty days per year if they could not prove, either that they were fully employed, or that they had been continuously employed for three months out of the previous twelve.\(^11\) Whereas the Northey Circulars could be seen as being aimed at encouraging previously idle Africans to work on European farms, the Native Authority Ordinance amendment appeared to be aimed more directly at African cultivators. Those
who worked on European farms could produce a chit from their employer proving that they had been employed. The cultivator, on the other hand, had no way of proving that he had been gainfully employed, and indeed the Chief Native Commissioner wrote to Owen that: "It would not be possible to accept the native's own statement that he had done three months work and the difficulty of finding a sufficiently reliable witness to prove that he had done it would be almost insuperable." Northey added in a despatch to Churchill that something beyond the native's own statement that he had worked continuously for more than three months was necessary, because of the African's "desultory" style of work, and his "different idea of truthfulness." Africans were, therefore, liable to six days per quarter unpaid labour and sixty days per year paid compulsory labour if they stayed on the reserve, whereas if they left to work for the European they were subject to neither of these impositions.

The labour policy of the Northey administration aroused a storm of protest from those who feared that it laid British policy in Kenya open to the accusation that it encouraged the use of forced labour. Questions about labour policy in Kenya were asked in the House of Commons on 23rd and 25th February, 17th March, 21st and 28th April, 1st and 16th June, and 1st July 1920. Several of the critics were specifically concerned about the effect of the labour policy on the prospects for African development in the
Colony. During the debate on the Colonial Office vote in the Commons in April 1920, Josiah Wedgwood compared policy in Kenya unfavourably with policy in the West African colonies, where Africans were encouraged to develop their own land and become producers and exporters.\textsuperscript{15} The following October, Oswald Mosley asked whether an African, who had worked for three months out of the preceding twelve months on his own shamba, could claim exemption from the requirements of the Native Authority Amendment Ordinance of 1920.\textsuperscript{16} He was assured that exemption could be claimed. Yet another question in November, asking how many Africans had claimed and been granted exemption on the grounds that they were fully occupied cultivating their own land, caused the Colonial Office to seek an assurance from Kenya that African cultivation was not being adversely affected by the compulsory recruitment of adult males.\textsuperscript{17} Northey's denial that it was so affected was accepted, "in the absence of further proof."\textsuperscript{18} Colonial Office concern about the issue was kept alive the following year by continued questioning in the Commons, and by representations made by J.H. Oldham, the Chairman of the Conference of Missionary Societies, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.\textsuperscript{19} Oldham pointed out that only labourers, with chits from employers would be excused from compulsory paid labour, and that the amendment to the Ordinance would, therefore, have the effect of forcing Africans onto the private labour market. The legislation, he observed, had been defended in these terms by an editorial in the East African Standard:
The farmers feel, and rightly, that justifiable compulsion for public work must react favourably on the private labour market, and they will not witness with patience the jeopardy of that quite rightful demand by government neglect or by wilful excess of functions. The government owe it to the settler to make the Ordinance secure against all attack.

Oldham called for the adoption of "a policy directed to the improvement of native agriculture and the development of native industry." The Colonial Office promised to discuss the issue with Northey.

Concern that the Government of Kenya was favouring European development at the expense of the reserves was raised again through a different, though not distinct, issue. In proposing the estimates for 1920-1, the Kenya Government argued that Africans could well afford to pay eight rupees, rather than the five they had paid since the last increase in 1916. The Kenya Government made two conditions for itself. Firstly, taxation paid by Europeans would increase similarly by the imposition of an income tax and, secondly, a proportion of the additional revenue raised from the Africans should be spent on reserve development. The Kenya Government felt that it was:

"...no longer possible to ignore the fact that in the past very little that the native sees and really appreciates has been done for his immediate welfare. Certain small sums have been set aside from time to time in the annual estimates for educational, technical and agricultural training, medical treatment and so on, but these sums are in no way commensurate to the aggregate contributed by him to the state in the form of direct taxation and in many instances have lapsed because of shortages of staff."
Of the new taxation, which would raise a total of Rs. 6,560,689, Rs. 500,000 were to be devoted to reserve services, going in roughly equal proportions to medical and educational work. 24

J.W. Arthur, the Chairman of the Alliance of Missionary Societies in British East Africa, immediately objected that the last tax increase had been accompanied by promises that it would benefit the African, and nothing had been done. He felt that the new tax level was unreasonably high and that the revenues collected from the reserves should be spent on medical, educational, and agricultural services. 25 A deputation led by the Archbishop of Canterbury before the Colonial Secretary, Milner, raised a similar point. Both representations were referred to the Governor, who met them with frank statements that not enough had been done in the past, and that a definite programme was now underway. 26 The outcry in England induced the Convention of Associations to set up a sub-committee, composed of both settlers and missionaries, to reply to the critics of Kenya's native policy. Its report, published in abridged form in the East African Standard in March 1921, found that the position was quite satisfactory in the areas of medical and educational work, but that the Colony was not doing enough to assist the agriculture development of the reserves. Holm, the Director of Agriculture recently hired from South Africa, informed the sub-committee that £3,400 was devoted to agriculture work and £2,100 to veterinary work in the reserves, and that much more would be spent the following
year. Oldham of the Conference of Missionary Societies latched on to those figures. In a letter to the Colonial Office he described them as "altogether inadequate." He felt that a policy directed to the improvement of native agriculture would result in an all round economic gain for the Colony and a fairer return to the African for the taxes he paid. The missionaries, in objecting to the increase in African taxation, raised the vital question of the adequacy of white settler farming as the basis of economic development in Kenya.

The missionaries raised moral objections to a policy which seemed to them to exploit the African. A section of influential Kenyan commercial opinion offered, in the context of the gathering economic depression, practical objections to what seemed to them to be the enormously costly and inevitably unsuccessful policy of stimulating the development of white settler agriculture. Humphrey Leggett and Lord Hindlip both had substantial commercial interests in Kenya. Leggett was the Chairman of the East Africa Section of the London Chamber of Commerce and Managing Director of both the British East Africa Corporation and of the East Africa Lands and Development Corporation Limited. Lord Hindlip, once a Kenya settler, was also on the board of the British Africa Corporation. In the early months of 1922, Leggett wrote to Sir James Kesterton-Smith, the Permanent Undersecretary for Colonies, J.C. Bottomley, Assistant Secretary at the Colonial Office and effective head of the East Africa section, and to Josiah Wedgwood M.P., who passed his letter along to the Colonial Office.
Leggett attacked the whole economic policy of the Kenya Government as being excessively costly. Kenya's budget was £2,000,000 against Uganda's £600,000, and yet their African populations were roughly similar in size. European settlement, he deduced, cost Kenya £1,400,000 per year. Even so, their settlers earned for the Colony only £600,000 in exports, less the sum that Africans employed by Europeans would have produced in their own reserves. Settlement incurred very high overhead costs, which the African met through high taxation. The result of this high taxation was that the purchasing power of the African, with static wages, was falling. As a consequence, the country's trade was in decline. The settlers, he argued, had an undue influence on the policy of the Kenya Government, and encouraged it to bear the costs of their settlement. The settlers were opposed to the development of African production, and influenced the government to adopt a policy which regarded the African purely as a wage earner. Leggett was not totally opposed to European settlement. He felt that it should be concentrated in a smaller geographical area in order to reduce overhead costs. It should concentrate on high value capital intensive products, and leave the production of low value bulk agricultural products to the Africans. Above all, the Kenya Government needed to stimulate African production by spending a larger proportion of its revenue on reserve area programmes, while at the same time reducing the level of taxation, and so allowing the revival of the purchasing power of the Africans.

The reaction of the Colonial Office officials was, at first, somewhat sceptical. They noted that Leggett had admitted that the British East Africa Corporation had been forced to drastically cut
back its operations in East Africa. They thought that this was perhaps due to poor business practices, and that Leggett was trying to blame the colonial authorities for his own failures.31 Watkins, who had recently been the Acting Chief Native Commissioner, was asked for his reactions to Leggett's views. He responded by largely supporting them. Watkins regretted the fact that, in the past, European agriculture had been subsidized and African agriculture virtually ignored, at great cost to the Colony.32 His Native Affairs Department Annual Report for 1920-1 reached London in March 1922, and added further weight to his points.33 If further confirmation was required, the following month saw the arrival of the Labour Bureau Commission Report, which also recommended the rapid development of African agriculture.34 The response of the Colonial Office was to review the history of government policy towards expenditure on reserve development services and allocation of revenue for African uses.

In May 1922, Lord Hindlip initiated a debate in the House of Lords. This occasion finally brought from the government a public statement of its intentions with regard to the economic development of Kenya. By the time Hindlip's motion came up in the House of Lords for debate, the Colonial Office was convinced that taxation levied on Africans should be reduced, expenditure on services for the reserves should be increased, and a definite programme of stimulating African production in the reserves should be undertaken. The speech of the Duke of Sutherland, the government spokesman on colonial affairs, in the House of Lords on May 19th 1922, marked a distinct change in Colonial Office attitudes towards Kenya.35 African production was assigned a definite place in Kenya's future economic development. A
month later Governor Northey was recalled.

It would, however, be quite incorrect to assume that this revision of policy came purely as a result of representations by missionaries and commercial interests. Their pressure had stimulated Colonial Office officials to consider again the methods it had chosen by which to encourage economic development in Kenya. Batterbee, for example, minuted in April that the Government was "morally bound" to spend more on African services, and that, "from a moral point of view," there was no doubt that policy should try to turn the African into a producer. Rhetorically he asked himself, "Is the native in Kenya to be condemned forever to be a hewer of wood and a drawer of water for the European?" He answered himself with a reference to Uganda and West Africa, and concluded that it was "very doubtful" if European development would pay better than African development.

The effect of broader issues of policy on the decisions of May were referred to in a draft dispatch from the Colonial Secretary to Northey in the first part of June. In March 1922 Harry Thuku, the leader of the African protest against increased taxes, falling wages, and the kipande, was arrested. A serious riot followed in which twenty-five African protestors were shot and killed. Though it had already been decided that taxes would be reduced, the Colonial Secretary insisted that more had to be done to remedy African grievances and avoid any repetition of the disturbances. Probably even more important than this concern for peace and order was the desire of the Colonial Office to establish a secure position for itself in the debate which was then raging over the Indian Question.
Office was faced with challenges to its authority from two quarters; from Kenya Indians who, supported by the India Office, demanded elected franchise and free immigration; and from the settlers, who called for responsible self-government. Both these claims made the Colonial Office sensitive to charges that it was not fulfilling its trusteeship adequately, and induced it to adopt a policy which gave it grounds from which it could resist them. A minute on a draft dispatch to Northey written in June 1922 reads:

The Government cannot justify its position as trustee unless it has a programme for native welfare. Try to gain a point without saying so in so many words that we cannot justify an argument of trusteeship against the Indian unless we do more. 40

Denham, the Chief Secretary of the Colony, looking back on the Indian Question in September 1923, wrote in a private letter to Northey's replacement, Coryndon:

The result of the struggle over the Indian Question has been to make all parties realize how essential it is to the general progress of the Colony (and to secure its independence of the Indian Element) that every effort should be made to stimulate the agricultural, economic and industrial development of the native. 41

Even as the Colonial Office was deciding to launch itself in the new direction, the Kenya Government was already reacting to early indications that a change of Colonial Office thinking might be imminent. As late as March 1922, Northey's attitude to the findings of the Labour Bureau Commission, that a programme should be adopted to increase the efficiency of reserve production, was less than enthusiastic. He noted that money may be required to put the recommendations into practice, and that none would be available until it became possible to earmark a portion of native taxation for expenditure in the reserves. 42 Only two months later, at the end of May,
Northey, now under pressure from Churchill, was talking about "taking all possible steps to encourage the production of economic crops in the reserves." Bowring's powerful Economic and Finance Committee played an important part in this change of attitude. This standing committee, set up in March in an attempt to affect a solution to Kenya's desperate economic plight, had concluded that Kenya's salvation lay in the development of maize production both on European farms and in the reserves. It advocated the encouragement of the production of exportable commodities in the reserves as one part of the cure for Kenya's economic ills. Action was not long in coming. By the end of June, Northey told Churchill that Harrison, the Acting Director of Agriculture, had already re-organised the Agriculture Department along "less ambitious and more economical lines," and that he had "witnessed and assisted in the adoption of the first real effort to stimulate, by means of special departmental activities, production in the native reserves." It appears that Northey at this point tried to make Holm, the Director of Agriculture and then on leave, the scapegoat for the government's previous lack of attention to native agriculture. Northey asked for Holm's transfer from Kenya ostensibly on the grounds of economy, though Northey strongly implied that Holm would feel himself unable to accept the changes initiated by Harrison during his absence. There is ample evidence of Holm's unsympathetic attitude towards the development of African agriculture. Only a year earlier, when he had to face criticism from provincial commissioners about the lack of a definite policy towards the agricultural development of the African areas, Holm had rejected the idea that European agricultural instructors would be useful. West
Indians, who could be hired at lower rates of pay than Europeans, he also dismissed as being too expensive. One concession he was prepared to make was the introduction of a system of training for African agricultural instructors. Holm was committed publicly to strong support for the Europeans settler; he believed that Kenya should concentrate its slim resources upon the method of development which, in his view, was most likely to bring the most rapid return. At Northey's suggestion the Colonial Office looked for, but could not find, alternative employment for Holm. They did find alternative employment for Northey.

Before Northey left Kenya the outline of the scheme, which was intended to set the pattern and the priorities of government activities in the area of assistance to African agriculture, was drawn up. It was proposed that two senior and four junior European agricultural officers be hired to supervise and train a body of fifteen native instructors. Their task was to carry the gospel of improved agriculture to the reserves. The officers were to be responsible for carrying out tests to determine which crops were best suited to which areas, and to ensure the distribution of the best available seeds throughout the reserves. The programme was to be controlled by the Agriculture Department and costed in the estimates for 1923.

Northey's apparent change of attitude towards the direction of agriculture development in Kenya, though largely brought about by the insistence of the Colonial Office, can also be attributed, in part at least, to a change in attitude in Kenya resulting from the Colony's deepening financial crisis. Kenya's solvency depended o
income from three major sources, customs tariffs, the Hut and Poll Tax, and railway revenues. By mid-1921, Kenya had incurred a deficit of £300,000 for the 1920-1 financial year, and expected a further £350,000 deficit for the nine months of the 1921 financial year. It was imperative that steps be taken to stimulate trade and production, and in particular exports, in order to restore revenues. Yet, while revenues were depressed, Kenya was in no financial state to aid the flagging settlers. Schemes for reviving heavily capitalized European farming were too expensive; Northey in May 1921, for example, had suggested the establishment of a land bank, which would have cost £1,000,000. On the other hand, advice to peasants came cheaply if Africans were used extensively in the programme. For the expenditure of relatively small sums of money it was felt that it might be possible to generate a substantial volume of exports. Africans were using the vast potential of their reserves largely to fulfil their own personal requirements, when they could be producing, with a little encouragement, large quantities of surplus for sale and export. Now that the Europeans were employing so few labourers, not only would their opposition to reserve development melt away, but there would also be more Africans available for the task of production in the reserves. The production of bulk commodities would be especially helpful in restoring railway revenues. The sale of reserve products would enhance the purchasing power of the Africans and through this ensure the payment in full of the Hut and Poll Tax, plus a large additional contribution to customs revenue. Financial imperatives, appreciated in both London and Nairobi, strongly supplemented London's moral concerns and its desire to resist the dual challenge to its trusteeship.
It would be incorrect to interpret the decisions of 1922 as heralding a radically new policy; more accurately they involved a shift of emphasis and attention. The minutes of Colonial Office officials on the important dispatches of the period show a continuing concern with the future of European agriculture. Sutherland in the House of Lords gave the necessary assurances when he said that the policy of encouraging African agriculture would not reduce the supply of labour available to the farmers because, after the end of the depression, the farmers would offer higher salaries and this would attract Africans back to the farms. The higher salaries the farmers would have to pay would encourage them to utilize labour more efficiently by the introduction of piece-work systems and labour saving machinery. "At first sight the interests of the Europeans and the natives in this matter appear divergent, but in my opinion the divergence is apparent rather than real and I am far from being without hope that a way will be found of effecting a harmony between the two."
Footnotes. Chapter 3.

1 Minutes of the Legislative Council, 12 February 1917, C.O. 544/6.


3 So too do the views contained in E.S. Grogan's two hour speech at a dinner held by the Convention of Association to welcome General Northey to East Africa in February 1919. John Ainsworth's 'zoo theory' of native policy was roundly condemned by the President of the Convention. Dilley, p. 38.


5 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

6 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

7 The figures for potential labour supply are very rough estimates based on a hut count. It was assumed that the total population equalled three times the number of huts, that 47% of the population were male, and that 30% of these were aged between 16 and 30 years. Under 'Others,' Kamasia, Elgeyo, Nyika and Swahili groups are included, but Jubaland, Tanaland, Masai, Suk, Turkana and N.F.D. are excluded as the latter were considered "not available for the labour field".


9 Bennett, Kenya, pp. 48-49.

10 According to Ainsworth the circular was "...intended to stimulate labour supplies for purposes of general development. The actual wording was in accordance with instructions given by the Governor to whom a draft was sent for any comment before it was circulated. His Excellency (Northey) had the draft sent direct to the Government press for printing so it came back to me in completed
form. The Circular being over my name I naturally took full responsibility for it.... Possibly the wording of the Circular was too pointed and its intention misconstrued in England." Quoted in Goldsmith, p.102. W.E. Owen, the Archdeacon of Kavirondo, and a vociferous champion of African rights, went even further than Ainsworth in accepting the necessity for a form of safeguarded conscription of labour for European farms. Article by Owen in the East African Standard, 7 September 1920, enclosed in Northey to Churchill, 21 May 1921, C.O.533/272.

11Ordinance No.3 of 1920, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 19 January 1920, C.O.544/6. Under the original Ordinance of 1912, Africans could be required to work without pay for six days per quarter on public works within the reserves.


13Northey to Churchill, 10 June 1921, C.O.533/260.


18Minute on Northey to Milner, 11 December 1920, C.O.533/238.

19For example, Hosley again in the House of Commons on 2 March 1921. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, 1921, Vol.138, cols.1843-44.

The Masai were to pay Rs.10, the Coast Province tribes Rs.5 (except the Teita), Tanaland Rs.7, N.F.D. and Jubaland Rs.6 (nominal), and the Suk Rs.6.

Ainsworth as Chief Native Commissioner pressed the government to make this commitment. He wrote to the Chief Secretary in May 1920: "I feel that I must make very strong reference to what is apparently the universal opinion of all Provincial Commissioners and that is the absolute necessity for showing the natives concerned that the Government is really in earnest as to providing for medical and educational schemes out of the increased revenue. My personal opinion is that we must undertake these services and that they have already been too long delayed." 26 May 1920, enclosed in Bowring to Milner, 30 June 1920, C.O.533/233.

Noticeably no additional money was budgeted for expenditure on reserve agriculture. Income tax was never successfully levied and of the £42,843 eventually set aside for additional services only £6,083 was spent. The overall education estimates for 1920-21 totaled £64,328, and that portion directly allocated to African education was £21,994. Only £2,627 of this latter sum was spent, whereas the remaining votes, totalling £42,334, were overspent to the extent of £2,571. W.A. Kempe, "Financial Report and Statement for 1920-21," enclosed in Northey to Churchill, 7 January 1922, C.O.533/295.


Leggett, as General Manager of the British East African Corporation, had accompanied Hayes Medler on his tour through Nyanza Province in 1908 with the intention of encouraging Africans to plant cotton, ground nuts and sim-sim. Between 1907 and 1910 the


31 Minutes by Bottomley and Batterbee (Principal, East Africa section), on Leggett to Wedgwood, 28 March 1922, C.O. 533/291.

32 Watkins was in England at the time. Watkins to Batterbee, 7 April 1922, C.O. 533/291.


35 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th Series, 1922, Vol. 50, cols. 363-369. Edward Wood, the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, spoke of the change of policy in the House of Commons on 4 July 1922. "...No great progress has hitherto been made in exploring the possibilities of the native as a producer. These circumstances have now changed, and my right hon. friend (Churchill) is in communication with the Governor in order to explore more fully the possibilities of the development of native production in Kenya." Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, 1922, Vol. 156, cols. 230.

36 Minute by Batterbee on Leggett to Wedgwood, 28 March 1922, C.O. 533/291.


38 Churchill to Northey, June 1922, draft, C.O. 533/287.
The literature on the Indian Question is very large. See, for example, Kangat, pp.97-131, Bennett, pp.41-52, Dilley, pp.141-178.

Churchill to Northey, June 1922, draft, C.O.533/287.

Denham to Coryndon, 23 September 1923, Box 4, Coryndon Papers, Rhodes House.


Northey to Churchill, 29 June 1922, C.O.533/278.

Ibid.

Minutes of the Senior Commissioners Meeting at Nairobi, 1-4 March 1921, PC/JUB/1/7/1.


Northey to Churchill, 10 July 1922, C.O.533/279.


See these attitudes expressed in Northey to Churchill, 10 May 1922, 150, C.O.533/279. Northey sent two dispatches on this date, Numbers 150 and 151.

Ibid., 150 and 151.

Though it is impossible to assess how significant its pressure was, the Native Affairs Department, from the Chief Native Commissioner downwards, campaigned in 1921 and 1922 for a positive approach to African economic development. See below pp.113-114.
Minutes by Bottomley and Batterbee on 1922 House of Lords: Native Tax and Products, C.O.533/287.

Chapter 4. The Development of the Dual Policy, 1922-1929.

During the two and a half years of Coryndon's governorship, the cause of African agriculture advanced farther and faster than it had done in the entire prior period of British colonial rule. Coryndon, who arrived from the Governorship of Uganda, where he had administered an economy successfully based upon African production, was personally convinced of the wisdom of sustaining and developing the policy initiated rather tardily by Northey. ¹ At the same time, he saw the settlers as a responsible body, with legitimate interests, which the Government should not deliberately impede. His was the dual policy of even handed treatment to both settlers and Africans, a policy founded upon the belief that the two groups were not, and would not be, in conflict for the resources of the country. He detected a "new spirit" among the settlers, and pointed for his proof to the many "enlightened" resolutions passed by the Convention of Associations in the early 1920's. "I believe," he wrote, "that the settlers can be led in the right direction. Everything is in train now for native development to go ahead, I hope and believe largely with the willing support of the settler himself."² But the one resolution passed by the Convention in support of assistance to African agriculture had been passed before the changes of 1922, and at a time when there was no labour shortage. Further, it had included a qualifying clause implying clearly that its authors foresaw a conflict of interests, the existence of which the Governor denied.
This Convention wishes to place on record its appreciation of the encouragement the Government is giving to the natives to increase the production of native products and trusts the necessary safeguards will be introduced to ensure that existing industries will be safeguarded.

It was to become apparent fairly quickly that others, including settler representatives on the Legislative Council, Maxwell, the Chief Native Commissioner, and many of the critics of Kenya policy in England, for example Leys, Hamilton, and Morel, did not share Coryndon's optimistic view that the two methods of production could be supported simultaneously and without conflict.

One of Coryndon's first dispatches to the Colonial Office, after his arrival in September 1922, included a request for the approval of money needed to execute the first stage of the policy to increase reserve production. On a budget of £5,825, there was provision for six European agricultural supervisors (two senior and four junior), fifteen native instructors, and the equipment and seed thought necessary to service them. The year before, in 1922, the Agriculture Department's assistance to African agriculture had involved only one officer, six native instructors, and the distribution of twenty-eight tons of seed. Very substantially increased provision was made for the enlargement of the veterinary services operating in the reserves. These increased sums were made available, despite an overall cut in the Agriculture Department's budget of nearly £40,000, from £123,552 to £83,697.

The cutback in expenditure meant the closing of Mazeras and Kabete Experimental Farms and of the Naivasha Stock Farm as luxuries the Colony could no longer afford. Agricultural experimentation would, in future, be carried out by individual
farmers with the assistance of the Department of Agriculture.

As Bowring put it:

Circumstances no longer warrant such extensive assistance to the non-native agricultural and stock raising industries as has hitherto been provided while at the same time they demand that increased facilities be afforded native production in these directions. 5

In the next two years advances were made. The estimates for 1924 saw the vote for the Division of Native Agriculture rise to £10,320, which allowed for the provision of three additional European agricultural supervisors and a further twenty five native instructors. 6 More important was the provision made for the establishment of two schools, where Africans could be taught the rudiments of modern agriculture, before being sent to the reserves as native instructors. At Bukura in North Kavirondo District, the Agricultural Training School was placed in the charge of a senior agricultural supervisor, whose goal was to reach an enrolment of thirty pupils by the end of 1924, and double that number by the end of 1925.

The Africans, while being trained, were paid by the Government under an indenture, which gave the Agriculture Department first call upon their services as soon as their training was completed. Annual intakes were kept deliberately high, as it was expected that the rate of wastage would be very high. 7 The Native Training School at Kabete had been opened in late 1922 on the Government Experimental Farm. When the farm was closed, the school was moved to the Scott Agricultural Laboratories where, in August 1924, it had an enrolment of 38 pupils. These two institutions were to provide a flow on native instructors to the agricultural
tribes of Kenya. The instructors were to work with the people of their own tribe under the nearest European senior supervisor. A very small start was also made with agricultural training in village schools. The Agriculture Department supplied seed to the central schools in 1924 and, in co-operation with the Education Department, issues were made to mission and smaller schools the following year.

Much of the effort of the first years of the new policy was concentrated in Nyanza Province, where in the light of pre-war experience, the prospects of early success were thought to be the brightest. Four of the European supervisors were stationed there, against one for the entire Kikuyu area, and one for Ukamba. The coast, despite the report of Ainsworth Dickson's committee, was almost completely ignored. Seed in unprecedented quantities was distributed in an effort to improve the quality of maize, sim-sim, ground-nuts, cotton, and beans grown by the Africans. In the first half of 1924 Nyanza Province received 371 tons, the Kikuyu districts 59½ tons, Ukamba 3½ tons, and the Coast Province 7 tons. Native agricultural shows were organized for the first time, and were thought to be a great success. The first one, held at Kahuia in Kiambu in late 1923, was attended by ten thousand people, and was followed by further shows at Maseno in North Kavirondo in January 1924, and at Fort Hall in the following month.

The new programme was soon under attack. Maxwell, the Chief Native Commissioner, felt that the allocation of funds to schemes which would assist African development was still grossly
inadequate. The proportion of Kenya's revenue derived from the reserve areas was still far higher than the proportion of revenue spent in the reserves. The example of Nigeria should be followed where, he pointed out, fifty percent of direct taxation was returned to the native administrations. With the advice of local native authorities, the money could be spent in the reserves to develop essential services. He proposed the appointment of a Director of Native Development to act as a co-ordinator and inspector of native services. The government accepted Maxwell's suggestion that local native councils be established but, not surprisingly, rejected his proposal to allocate close to a quarter of a million pounds to native development. As it transpired, the local native councils were established in 1925, and had to raise their own revenue by imposing a local rate additional to the Hut Tax and Poll Tax.

Maxwell's criticism of the inadequacy of the scale of the programme was repeated in the published works of Norman Leys, an ex-Protectorate Medical Officer, who had been transferred as a result of his opposition to the second Masai move, and W. McGregor Ross, who had served in the Colony as Director of Public Works for eighteen years up to 1923. According to these critics, the Kenya Government, acting in defence of settler interests, placed deliberate checks on the speed and direction of growth of the African arm of the dual policy. The first of these was a bar to the extension of the programme into the area of coffee cultivation, and the second was a restriction on the actual or potential growth of the African agricultural sector,
due to the Government's concern that the labour supply of the European farmers would prove inadequate if expansion moved too fast. 13

The coffee issue was an old one. It was first raised by Governor Belfield who, in 1916, issued orders to his administrative officers to the effect that they were not to encourage the growing of coffee by Africans. The justifications he advanced for his actions to the Colonial Office were three. First, he felt that coffee required careful and intelligent handling, of which the Africans were not yet capable. The coffee plant was liable to infection by twenty-six insect pests and eight fungoid diseases all of which, if harboured on African shambas, were liable to spread to European farms and endanger their crop. Secondly, he believed that coffee required proper preparation by machinery. The necessary application of capital was beyond the means of Africans. Careless preparation of Kenya produced coffee by Africans would lower the excellent reputation built up by European produced coffee, and thereby reduce the price and saleability of a valuable export. Belfield's third objection rested upon a prediction that, if Africans were allowed to grow coffee, they would then be more likely to steal the product of European plantations and represent it as their own. If they were not permitted to grow coffee, they would not be able to do this, as coffee found in their possession would be known to be stolen. As Africans had no prospect of success with coffee growing, and as Europeans were just beginning to be successful in producing it, he saw no reason to risk a certain gain. The Colonial Office
referred to their experience in Uganda, where the question had been raised recently. They noted that the Director of Agriculture in Uganda had brought forward no objections to African cultivation, but nevertheless they decided not to press the matter on the curious grounds that, as the Governor had not asked for approval for his policy, there was no need to respond. Clearly, they thought that the question was best settled by the local administration and left well alone.  

The question was raised again by Harry Thuku's protest movement as one of the sources of Kikuyu grievance, and subsequently by E.D. Morel, whose questions in the House of Commons in 1923 caused the Colonial Office to request the Kenya Government to define its policy.  

Coryndon in his official reply did not merely repeat the unqualified opposition that Belfield had earlier displayed. He thought it "inadvisable" to encourage Africans to grow a crop, which required such expert cultivation and preparation, at a time when African production was booming in products he felt were better suited to their capacities.  

In a private letter to Sir James Masterton-Smith, he took a rather different line, arguing that African coffee cultivation should not be permitted, on the grounds that it would spread disease and endanger a European investment of over £2,000,000. The Governor also expressed a wish to avoid public controversy with the Governors of Uganda and Tanganyika Territory, Archer and Byatt, both of whom favoured African coffee cultivation.

Though the tone of Coryndon's official dispatch on the subject was very moderate, the Colonial Office were well aware how
strongly he was opposed to the suggestion. A minute on his official dispatch stated that Coryndon "will hear no more, and will resist with his utmost power" any suggestion of changing the existing policy. 18 Holm, the Director of Agriculture, and currently in London on leave, also made strong representations against any revision of previous policy. He argued that Uganda and Tanganyika would soon discover their mistake and reverse their policies. 19 This presented the Colonial Office with a way out of their dilemma; they decided to defer to Governor Coryndon's preference, and wait on the results of the Uganda and Tanganyika experiments. A year later, the East African Commission examined the question and lent its support to the view that Africans should not be allowed to grow coffee. The commissioners were not convinced that the risk of disease, and the danger to the European market of permitting African produced coffee of a lower standard to be sold, could not be averted by the provision of regular inspection of African grown crops. They felt, however, that in view of the small number of Africans who wished to grow coffee, and the high cost of maintaining an inspectorate, the question was one of merely "academic and sentimental importance." 20

Because of its effect on the labour supply, any attempt to revise the prohibition of African coffee cultivation would have been politically difficult for the Kenya Government. The settlers saw the reserves as little more than sources from which they drew their labour:
The more prosperous and contented is the population of a reserve, the less the need or inclination of the young men of the tribe to go out into the field. From the farmers' point of view, the ideal reserve is a recruiting ground for labour, a place from which the able bodied go out to work, returning occasionally to rest and to beget the next generation of labourers.21

In the mid twenties, as European farming in Kenya revived, another labour crisis loomed ahead.22

Table 7: Average number of units of labour employed monthly, 1919-20 to 1929-30.

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<th>1919-20</th>
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<td>114,320</td>
<td>110,697</td>
<td>125,885</td>
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Source: Agriculture Commission Report, 1929.

Increasing government demands for labour for railway construction exacerbated the situation. Coryndon was well aware of the problem, and in April 1924 wrote to his friend Coghlan, the Premier of Southern Rhodesia. "People are beginning to worry about it, (the labour supply) partly because I am pushing a policy to develop bulk production of native grown crops in the native reserves..." He requested from Coghlan details of the Southern Rhodesia Labour Bureau system, which he felt might provide the model for a similar set of practices in Kenya.23 Coryndon and his Chief Secretary Denham acted to appease the settler fears.

Coryndon announced, in an address to the Legislative Council in May 1924, that he was alive to the importance of the question of the supply of African labour to European farms, and that he had instituted several courses of action. The Economic and Finance Committee were now investigating the problem of the voluntary
supply of native labour, he was endeavouring to find out from
Southern Rhodesia details of their Labour Bureau system, and
he was also in correspondence with the Colonial Office regarding
the possibility of labour movement between the three East
African territories. Coryndon denied that a shortage of labour
on European farms would necessarily result from the government's
policy of encouraging African agriculture:

Government quite realizes the importance of supporting the
main industries of the country, but it believes that with
the sympathetic assistance of district officers, and with a
close organization by the settlers themselves, perhaps on
the lines adopted in Southern Rhodesia, there is little
real fear that the problem will assume grave proportions.
I do not believe for a moment that the Government's policy
of encouraging the production of native grown crops in the
reserves will have any adverse effect on the supply of
voluntary labour outside the reserves, if the measures
and safeguards I have already indicated are taken and
observed.24

The "sympathetic assistance of district officers" to which
Coryndon referred was secured by the issue in December of a
Native Affairs Department circular which, though it repeated
the government's desire to stimulate African production, did point
out the urgent need for labour on the farms. It stressed that it
was the duty of the administrative officers to facilitate the
flow of voluntary labour, particularly of young unmarried men,
for employment outside the reserves.25 Denham, as Acting
Governor, explained the thinking behind government policy to the
Convention of Associations at the opening of its annual conference
in March 1925:

...It is unthinkable that Government can contemplate the
efforts of settlers who have - after vicissitudes each of
which was in itself sufficient to cripple a less energetic
community - converted waste into arable and uncultivated
lands into fields of maize, coffee or sisal—being rendered useless from the want of labour when and where such is available, and where it may and should be possible to secure the active assistance of the native and without prejudice to their interests.26

Settler attacks on government policy, despite these assurances, intensified. They had grown so intense that one of the elected settler representatives on the Legislative Council, T.J.O'Shea, was moved to commiserate with the Chief Native Commissioner:

I must confess I have considerable sympathy with the Honourable Chief Native Commissioner, because so many attacks during the past few days have been directed against his poor unfortunate head. It is inevitable that it should be so because we on this side of the House are definitely of the opinion that efforts are being made to pursue a native policy in this country that is not in the best interests of this country as a whole, and the Honourable Chief Native Commissioner is unfortunately mainly responsible for the direction of that policy.27

In 1926 O'Shea and his elected colleagues on the Legislative Council were urged, by a motion of the Convention of Associations, "to take every lawful step to secure the removal of the Chief Native Commissioner from his post."28

Whereas Coryndon assiduously refused in public to recognise that a conflict of demand for labour could occur between European and African agriculture, his replacement as Governor, Edward Grigg, at first adopted the opposite point of view. In a memorandum of August 1925, he explained to the Colonial Office his belief in "separate development." In the existing system of government, white and native interests were, he believed, dissimilar, and their ultimate aims "not merely different but irreconcilable." The Europeans wanted self-government, and the Africans wished to progress in their own reserves. But the danger
of stimulating native education and production was that it would lead to a serious shortage of African labour in the white settlement areas. He did not believe that the immediate needs of the European for labour could or should be brushed aside, any more than the ultimate interests of the Africans should be ignored:

White opinion is entitled to a very powerful voice, which must ultimately become a decisive voice, in the government of the areas of white colonization; and its interests must be duly considered in the policy pursued for the native reserves. But in the second place, the policy of government in the native reserves cannot be made wholly subservient to the needs and opinions of the white settlers. They are deeply interested parties and there is no community, however well-meaning and however high-minded, which can rule a subject race disinterestedly when it holds power as an autocratic oligarchy outnumbered by its subjects in the ratio of 250 to 1.

He concluded that the Colony should be divided. The African area should be ruled directly by the Governor, and the European area should be granted responsible self-government. Grigg advocated that, before the separation could be made, the European area should be given a promise that its labour demands would continue to be met.  

During the six years of his Governorship, Grigg's ideas changed radically. Shortly after the end of his period of office, Grigg expounded his views before the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union. The interests of black and white, he now believed, were complimentary, and could be developed without injury to one another. The key to understanding this reversal of opinion lies in Grigg's acceptance of the view that, without the settler, the
African would barely have progressed at all. Compared with settlers, administrative and agricultural officers were of little use; it was the settler who showed Africans how things should be done on the land. Further, without the wages the African earned on the European farm, he would be unable to improve his own agriculture, and without the settlers, the state, financed by native industry alone, would not be able to afford the services and credits which native development required. Grigg had moved to a position where he clearly favoured European over African development. He told the Joint Select Committee in 1931 that:

There is not the native population to produce any sufficient increase of commercial prosperity on native production alone. Natives will do a great deal, but by themselves, with their small numbers in that vast territory, they cannot form the basis of any great commercial development; it is impossible.

He felt that there was "ample room" for 100,000 white settlers in Kenya. 30

Grigg's actions as Governor indicate that it was these later ideas that were influential in determining his attitude towards questions involving labour and the development of the African reserves. In his second year in Kenya, the Colonial Office requested all three East African governors to issue a circular clarifying to administrative officers their exact duties with regard to labour and native production. Grigg's proposed circular, though insisting on the need to encourage African production, contained one paragraph to which the Colonial Office objected strongly. This contained a threat to use, as compulsory labour on government works, all Africans who could not provide
registration card evidence of employment. At London's insistence, Grigg reluctantly agreed to include a statement drawn up by the three East African governors at their first joint conference. This statement denied the use to government officers of any form of persuasion aimed at directing Africans towards the alienated areas. "The natural play of human preference and economic impulse should be allowed to take its course, so that the native may chose to work in which ever way pleases him and pays him best". Nonetheless, the circular, when finally issued in January 1927, made copious reference to the benefits of working for Europeans, and particularly to its educative value. It gave the distinct impression that its author believed that the future of Kenya rested very much with the future success of the European farms.

The correspondence over the labour circular between Grigg and the Colonial Office, in which Donald Cameron, the distinguished and experienced Governor of Tanganyika Territory, also became involved, shows clearly that Grigg had chosen, in the first eighteen months of his governorship, to perch himself securely on one of the horns of the Kenyan dilemma. In defence of his circular, and of the ways in which it differed from the one issued by Cameron in the neighbouring territory, Grigg expounded his beliefs about African development. The reserves, to him, existed to protect African tribal life, and he felt that his government was doing everything in its power to encourage the African to develop his inheritance. This, however, was not enough. The African tribal system tended to resist progressive change, and it was a
major problem to overcome this resistance. The efforts of government compared unfavourably, as a liberating influence, with the presence in the reserves of natives who had experience on European farms.

It is manifest that the combined efforts of administrative, educational and agricultural officers in the Reserves often produce less effect on the native mind than the example of a few natives who have learned by practical experience on European estates. It is the definite experience of this Colony that those native communities whose men offer for work most readily outside the reserve are also the most energetic and progressive in putting their own lands under cultivation.

This was a return to the arguments of the Economic Commission of 1919. He continued:

The Government does not consider that administrative officers, who come and go over wide areas, are necessarily or in fact more effective civilizing influences than settlers of the same race and type, who make their homes in a single district and set there the high example of industry and conduct which their civilization demands.\(^{34}\)

Cameron's view, supported by the officials of the Colonial Office, directly contradicted Grigg's. Cameron declared himself:

....Unable to make any statement to the natives, with regard to their form of occupation, founded on the proposition that the best school for an African is a European estate. If the longest view is taken, the best place for the native, judged mainly by his own interests, is on his own land producing economic crops, guided and taught by administrative, educational and agricultural officers.\(^{35}\)

In considering the two sets of views, the Colonial Office recognised that Grigg's were based on twelve months experience of administration in Africa against Cameron's nineteen years. Grigg's argument was found to be "unconvincing". It was felt that he had failed to take into account the progress made by Africans elsewhere in the continent who had not experienced the benevolent influence of European settlement. The Under-Secretary for State, W.Ormsby-Gore,
minuted, "Sir E. Grigg clearly has no conception of the native side of the dual policy or how to set about changing and adapting the tribal system to progressive and economic ends." But, as they had already approved the circulars for issue, they thought it best to say no more. 36

As might be expected from a government whose chief executive officer expressed so little faith in the effectiveness of the European officer in the reserves, the agricultural assistance programme progressed only slowly. Expenditure on the Division of Native Agriculture actually fell in Grigg's first full year of office. By the end of the decade it had risen to only 20% above the level at which it had stood when Grigg arrived in Kenya. Over the same period, 1925 to 1929, the expenditure of the Agriculture Department as a whole rose by 120%. Thus, the proportion of the expenditure of the Department allocated to the Division of Native Agriculture declined from 10.9% in 1925, to only 6.1% in 1929.

Table 8: Estimates and expenditure of the Department of Agriculture, 1910-11 to 1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910-1</td>
<td>£24,548</td>
<td>£32,238</td>
<td>1920-1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-2</td>
<td>21,823</td>
<td>27,554</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-3</td>
<td>24,214</td>
<td>28,771</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-4</td>
<td>31,940</td>
<td>32,146</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>84,522</td>
<td>76,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-5</td>
<td>43,923</td>
<td>33,615</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>87,159</td>
<td>83,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-6</td>
<td>36,766</td>
<td>31,788</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>92,459</td>
<td>101,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-7</td>
<td>37,606</td>
<td>30,320</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>116,574</td>
<td>109,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-8</td>
<td>39,056</td>
<td>38,309</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>121,532</td>
<td>115,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-9</td>
<td>52,539</td>
<td>48,805</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>128,021</td>
<td>150,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>61,552</td>
<td>63,922</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>148,536</td>
<td>221,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Estimates and expenditure of the Division of Native Agriculture, 1923-1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Percent of total Agriculture Department estimate</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Percentage of total Agriculture Department expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>£ 6,756</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>£ 4,153</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>10,320</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8,091</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>11,953</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11,041</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>11,804</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9,216</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>11,591</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9,819</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>12,704</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>11,548</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>16,067</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13,431</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Grigg's administration, though it clearly favoured the allocation of ample government resources and energy to assist European agriculture, was unwilling to share the views and follow the course of action advocated by the strong faction in Kenya which felt that assistance to African agriculture was a waste of effort and finances. This view is best illustrated by the conclusions of the Labour Commission of Enquiry, set up by the Governor in January 1927 to investigate the present and future labour needs of the Colony, and to look into measures which could be adopted for the more efficient use of labour. The Commission was made up of the Director of Agriculture, as Chairman, and four settlers, Colonel G.C. Griffiths, S.L.K. Lawford, W. Tyson and E.A. Evans. In a section of its report, the Commission attempted to show that it was disadvantageous for the African (and by extension for the Colony) for him to work as a producer of cash crops within the reserves. Comparing production by the African within and outside, it concluded that inside the reserve the African family produced every year an agricultural
surplus worth, on the average, about Shs. 30; outside the reserve a family in European employment could earn around Shs. 215, and thereby generate a far more valuable saleable surplus. 37 Sensibly, Denham rejected this section of the Commission's findings, pointing out that the calculations were based upon false assumptions and inaccurate and unreliable data. These conclusions, he wrote, were "fallacious and demonstrably false". 38

Grigg's administration, whilst in a position to reject the advice of the more extreme sections of unofficial European opinion, was not inclined to govern without the consent of a substantial body, if not of the majority, of the settlers. Through their elected representatives on the Legislative Council, the settlers were able to exert a considerable influence on the way in which public funds were spent. In 1920 the Secretary of State for the Colonies had accepted the principle that no expenditure of funds, which derived from Kenya, could be made without the approval of the majority of the Legislative Council. 39 Though the settlers were in a minority on the Council, they were able, through the Finance Committee (established in 1923), to exercise more influence than their position under the constitution might otherwise have allowed. After the budget was introduced to the Legislative Council, it was referred to the Finance Committee, known later as the Select Committee on the Estimates, which usually consisted of three officials, the Chief Secretary, the Treasurer, and the Chief Native Commissioner, and all of the eleven non-official members. 40 The officials on the Committee were directed by the Governor not to defend every budgetary item,
though when they did, the non-official view was presented to the whole house as a minority view. After modification and approval by the Finance Committee, the budget went to the committee of the whole house for further consideration.

Indeed, Grigg, like Coryndon and Northey before him, believed in the closest possible association of unofficial elected Europeans with government policy. Political conventions were, in any case, so developed in Kenya by the time he arrived that he felt he was "obliged" to govern by consent. Not until Passfield came to the Colonial Office in 1929 was an effective challenge offered to the system of government by agreement, which characterized Kenyan politics in the 1920's. In 1930 the Secretary of State for the Colonies used his power to make important amendments to the estimates for the first time in the decade. Several months earlier, Grigg had been pressured by Passfield to use the official majority on the Legislative Council to push through the unpopular Native Lands Trust Bill. The constitutional conventions, which had enabled the settler population of Kenya to effectively oppose suggested legislation with which they disagreed, were thrust aside. Grigg himself, in 1931, was replaced by the more pliable Byrne.

After its promising start in 1922, the growth of the programme of assistance to African agriculture development was effectively checked by Grigg. The explanation for the quantitative inadequacy of the resources devoted to the programme lay in the opposition of the settlers, who were concerned primarily for the labour supply to their farms, the unwillingness of Coryndon to
press forward too fast against their opposition, and the reluctance of Grigg to assign priority to reserve development. The Colonial Office, in the absence of disaster or public scandal, was unwilling throughout to assert its authority in the Colony against the will of the Kenya Government. It had done so in 1922, when faced by the combination of the prospect of economic disaster and a challenge to its authority from both the settlers and the India Office. Over the questions of African coffee growing and Grigg's labour circular, it evidently did not feel strongly enough to disrupt the tranquility of its relationship with Nairobi. The initial enthusiasm for African agricultural development of 1922 and 1923 quickly faded. Nairobi ceased to inform London about its progress, and only House of Commons questions provoked London to enquire. At its maximum extent the programme was too small in scale to have any radical effect on the reserves. It was also ill-conceived, inexpertly managed, and inadequately staffed.
Footnotes, Chapter 4.

1See particularly Box 5, File 1, Coryndon Papers, Rhodes House.

2Coryndon to Bottomley, Personal and Confidential, 28 September 1923, C.0.533/297.

3List of Resolutions of the Convention of Associations, Box 2, File 3, Coryndon Papers, Rhodes House. The resolutions to which Coryndon referred had all requested, as had the Report of the Economic Commission of 1919, that more attention be paid to the provision of medical and educational services for Africans. This concern was compatible with the interest of the settlers in the efficiency of the labour force and its recovery from wartime disruptions.

4Coryndon to Churchill, 6 September 1922, and enclosed, Bowring to Northey, 22 June 1922, C.0.533/281. Figures for 1922 can be found in Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Annual Report, 1922 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1923), pp.3-4, enclosed in Coryndon to Devonshire, 8 November 1923, C.0.533/298.

5Bowring, Chief Secretary, to Devonshire (draft approved by Coryndon), 23 November 1922, C.0.533/284. European farm based production was now rising rapidly; to a substantial extent they had found the crops they had been looking for. See below, table 24, p. 368.

6Coryndon to Thomas, 14 February 1924, C.0.533/308, and Thomas to Coryndon, 15 May 1924, C.0.533/309.

7E. Harrison, "Memorandum on the Development of Agriculture in Nyanza," enclosed in Coryndon to Thomas, 28 August 1924, C.0.533/312. As expected, it proved difficult to retain trainees in government employment, due to the low wages paid to qualified instructors. See below, p.123.

8Ibid.

9See Chapter 8, section 2.

11. Coryndon to Thomas, 11 March 1924, C.0.533/309.

12. Memo. by G.V. Maxwell, Chief Native Commissioner, enclosed in Denham to Thomas, 4 July, C.0.533/311.

13. See Leys (1924), pp.203-209, and McGregor Ross (1927), pp.100-103. They were both members of the Labour Party's Imperial Affairs Committee whose major spokesmen in the House of Commons appear to have been Josiah Wedgwood and E.D. Morel. See E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1973), p.60.

14. Belfield to Bonar Law, with notes by Bottomly and Read, 1 June 1916, C.0.533/168. Curiously, when the issue first came up for discussion by the Executive Council in May 1916, it decided that coffee cultivation by Africans should not be discouraged. The Agriculture Department should supervise African-run plantations. Two and a half weeks later the council reversed its position, presumably after representations by the Director of Agriculture, and agreed to issue a circular to all administrative officers advising them that African coffee cultivation should not be encouraged. They were permitted to pay compensation to Africans who had already planted coffee bushes. Minutes of the Executive Council, 9 May 1916, and 26 May 1916, C.0.544/14.


16. Coryndon to Thomas, 27 March 1924, C.0.533/309.

17. See note by Bottomley, in Coryndon to Thomas, 27 March 1924, C.0.533/309. Africans in Uganda and Tanganyika were, by now, growing both Robusta and Arabica varieties.

18. Ibid. Notes by Calder (Principal, East Africa section) and Bottomley.

19. Ibid.
Hall's Agriculture Commission at the end of the decade recommended that the government regulate the growing of coffee by imposing a large licence fee. Before permission to grow coffee could be granted to African or European, the Department of Agriculture had to satisfy itself as to the bona fides and competence of the applicant. Agriculture Commission, Report (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1929), p. 35. Something close to this solution was eventually adopted in Kenya.


For increases in European output, see Table 22, below p. 365.

Coryndon to Coghlan, 29 April 1924, Box 5, File 1, Coryndon Papers, Rhodes House.


Native Affairs Department circular No. 48, enclosed in Coryndon to Amery, 8 January 1925, C.O. 533/528.

Quoted in Denham to Amery, 27 March 1925, C.O. 533/330.


For the settler attacks on Maxwell and his Native Affairs Department see, McGreggor Ross, pp. 174-75.

E. Grigg, "The System of Government in Kenya Colony," enclosed in Grigg to Amery, 3 August 1925, C.O. 533/343. The idea of the separate development of divided European and African areas came originally from Lord Lugard. See Lord Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa* (London: Blackwood and Sons, 1922) and Dilley, pp. 65-66. By 1927 Grigg had changed his mind, and the new Secretary of State for the Colonies was less sympathetic to the idea than his predecessor Amery. Dilley, pp. 67-68.

31 Chief Native Commissioner to all Senior Commissioners, Draft Circular No.47, 9 November 1926, enclosed in Grigg to Amery, 16 November 1926, C.O.533/348.

32 Grigg to Amery, 30 December 1926, C.O.533/348.


34 Grigg to Amery, 22 January 1927, enclosed in Northcote (Acting Governor) to Amery, 8 February 1927, C.O.533/367.

35 Ibid. Cameron's views quoted by Grigg. A summary of Cameron's views on labour policy while he was Governor of Tanganyika may be found in K. Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron, 1919-1931," in History of East Africa vol. II, pp.585-85.

36 Ibid. Notes by H.T. Allen (Principal, East Africa section) and W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore (Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies) on Grigg to Amery, 22 January 1927.


38 Denham to Amery, 8 July 1927, C.O.533/378. The Commission collected no information from Africans and rejected statistical evidence provided by the administrative officers. The Native Research Officer said of the section on African production that it"...admirably illustrates the difficulties experienced by all who endeavour to base a reasoned argument on statistical data in this Colony. Reliable data are not available covering a sufficiently wide base to serve as a foundation of any sound argument."

Grigg had, by 1927, become an advocate for an unofficial majority on the Legislative Council. In an address to the Legislative Council in August 1927, he dismissed the counter argument that settlers could not be trusted with political power over general policy because their training and numbers were inadequate, by saying: "No one verily believe, has more to gain than the African from a policy which draws out of the settled population its natural bent of honour towards the weak, its sturdy political sense and its instinct for fair play."


This was Grigg's own word. See Bennett, Kenya, p.59.

Ibid., pp.69-70.
Chapter 5. The Implementation of the Dual Policy.

5.1. Native Administration and Agriculture.

The inadequacy of the government programme can be most easily illustrated by reference to the area of its greatest concentration of effort, North Kavirondo District, where an attempt was made to stimulate the production of cotton. Ginnery sites and the rights to purchase African grown cotton were allocated in 1923 under the Kenya Cotton Ordinance and the Kenya Cotton Rules. Six ginneries were opened that year, but by 1926 three of them had already closed. Cotton production failed to reach a figure adequate to keep them open as viable economic propositions.

Table 10: Cotton production in North Kavirondo District, 1924-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yield (000 lbs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2,256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: North Kavirondo District Annual Reports, 1924-1929.

The failure was due in part, no doubt, to the Cotton Rules which imposed a tax of six cents per pound on ginned cotton produced in Nyanza Province. The cost of the tax was passed back to the African producer in the form of lower prices, and represented the equivalent of a reduction of two cents on a pound of unginned cotton. This was at least sufficient to encourage large numbers of growers to take their cotton over the
border, where no such tax was levied.  

W.H. Himbury, the Managing Director of the British Cotton Growing Association, visited the district in 1926 to assess the progress that had been made there. He noted that the area was "terribly understaffed," that yields were "very small" at only 120 pounds per acre. Because of the low yields, the government was, in Himbury's opinion, encouraging Africans to grow a crop which, at its present price, did not yield them a fair or adequate return. A return of about twenty shillings per acre for cotton compared very unfavourably with a minimum of thirty-two shillings from sim-sim. R.W. Hemsted, the Nyanza Provincial Commissioner, confirmed Himbury's findings. The low yields were the result of the inadequate and inappropriate techniques of the African farmers. "The native scratches the surface, sows the seed broadcast, neglects to thin out the plants or weed and often fails to pick the crop at the right time." Dobbs, who was Hemsted's successor, believed that the staff available were not being used properly. Instead of spending their time on safari, the agricultural supervisors at Bukura merely supervised the model farm. Two ginning concerns, Folkes and Hilton and Small and Company, also complained of inadequate assistance to African cultivators. Folkes and Hilton attributed the poor condition of African shambas to:

a) no encouragement on the part of the administration of planting beyond the occasional baraza and b) no instructions as to the methods of cultivation which is presumably the work of the Agriculture Department. It would not pay Africans to grow cotton at 12 cents a lb. with their present methods of cultivation.
Commenting more broadly about the work of the Agriculture Department in
the district as a whole, and across the range of agricultural products, the
letter continues:

Neither does anything appear to be done in this case regarding
the better cultivation of foodstuffs while any attempt to
promote ploughing or other modern methods seem about as far
off as the millenium.... Whatever may be on paper in the
Secretariat files, I can assure you that...there is no appa-
rent attempt being made at development in North Kavirondo,
and thus carrying out the policy laid down by the Secretary
of State.8

Yet North Kavirondo was a most favoured district. It included the Bukura
experimental and training station where two agricultural supervisors were
stationed. Up to May 1925, it had enjoyed the full time services of a third
Agricultural supervisor.9

With a maximum of twelve European supervisors working in the
reserves (two of these were used in institutional teaching roles), much
of the burden of the new programme fell upon the administrative officers.
They had little enough time for such activities, particularly after
November 1922 when, on the recommendation of the Economic and Finance
Committee, the number of those administering the African areas (excluding
Jubaland, the Northern Frontier Province, and the European settled
areas) was reduced from an establishment of eighty-four to one of sixty-
three as a depression economy measure.10 This must have had a very marked
effect on the amount of time district commissioners were able to devote
to agriculture, as this was one of the additional duties to be performed
only after Hut Tax had been collected, disputes settled, and the necessary
but burdensome paper-work dispatched. Harrison, the Deputy Director of
Agriculture, pointed out that, though many officers were very useful to
the agricultural programme, because the Native Affairs Department was so understaffed, they could not meet all the demands made upon their time. Maxwell, who saw the success of any development scheme as resting primarily on the shoulders of his officers, did not believe that they were able to carry out adequately all of their tasks.

In his Native Affairs Department Annual Report of 1924, the Chief Native Commissioner observed that his staff had not been increased since the cuts of 1922, and that much tax had to be left uncollected because of the shortages. Illness to officers had brought administration in some districts to a standstill, and this often entailed transfers to fill the gaps. The frequent movement of officers between districts prevented continuity of administration, so necessary to the success of agricultural programmes.

Not only were the demands made on the administrative officers too numerous, the staff themselves were not of the calibre that Maxwell would have wished. Several of the officers in the first class grade he described as, "unsuited to the duties and responsibilities of Senior Commissioners," and urged that in future promotion be made on the basis of merit alone, and not on length of service.

As in the pre-war period, some officers were more enthusiastic than others about initiating programmes of economic development. A minority were totally opposed to the encouragement of African cash crop production. F.W. Isaac, the Senior Commissioner of Tanaland Province, stated his beliefs before the Economic Commission in 1919. "The business of a Government was to govern - not to direct cultivation. The process of
development would be best carried out by the ordinary economic method of inviting capital and enterprise to the country."¹⁴ F.T. Bamber, the District Commissioner at Rabai, responding to a secretariat circular on land alienation, wrote:

The ultimate economic development of this country is a matter of such importance that I do not think it should be hindered because the native wishes to go on living in the same apathetic way as he has always done.... I feel sure that this country is destined to become a country where European interests absolutely predominate.¹⁵

Northcote in Kiambu was not in favour of the stimulation of large scale African production. The objects of such an exercise would be to teach Africans the value and advantages of work, to increase his material welfare, and to encourage trade. These three aims, he believed, could be attained far more readily by encouraging labour onto the farms without the danger of "a very sudden influx of wealth...liable to upset native standards with too much violence; as it is...the Gikuyu are suffering from monetary indigestion."¹⁶

Other serving officers had a financial stake in the successful development of European farming. Northey, who was responsible for relaxing the regulations by which officials were prohibited from holding a financial interest in the country, had a £6,000 stake in an estate at Thika. A significant number of government servants had, by the early 1920's, invested money in farms and plantations in Kenya. Other prominent officials with investments were the Assistant Director of Agriculture, with a half share in a farm near Ngong, and the Personal Assistant to the Director of Agriculture, with two mortgages on farms to the value of over £4,000. Two district commissioners, two assistant district
commissioners, the Assistant Chief Veterinary Research Officer, the Chief Quarantine Officer, the Commissioner of Police, and the Senior Labour Inspector were also among those who owned, or part owned, farms in Kenya in 1922.17

The large majority of the administrative officers had neither investments in Kenyan farms, nor indeed any doubts at all about the need to stimulate economic development in the reserves. They acted as an influential and persistent pressure group, favouring the allocation of a fixed portion of the Hut and Poll Tax revenue to the reserves for expenditure on educational, medical, and agricultural services. The senior commissioners had played a part in bringing about the 1922 shift in policy towards African agriculture. At both of their meetings in 1921, they criticised the Agriculture Department for its policy towards African agriculture. In December 1921 they passed the following resolutions:

Resolved that this meeting strongly urges the adoption of a definite programme of agricultural development in the reserves, and considers that the best method of attaining this is to form a native section of the Agricultural Department consisting of officers whose special duty it will be to supervise this development in cooperation with Administrative Officers.18

The district commissioners expressed similar views, often unanimously, through motions passed at regular meetings held by them within each of the provinces, as well as through their administrative reports.19 Typical of these attitudes were those set down by R.G. Stone, an administrative officer in charge of Machakos District, in a letter to his superior, the Senior Commissioner, Nairobi, of September 1921. Machakos was a large district in central Kenya, with a population of about 184,000, only 200 of whom constituted a small European farming community. Stone was in charge of three European officials, but such were the demands of the
immigrant communities that he calculated that the quartet of officers were able to spend only one third of their time on African affairs. Revenue collected from Africans amounted to Rs.460,679, whilst Indians and Europeans contributed Rs.26,479. The District Commissioner wondered how, in view of the allocation of resources and expenditure within the district, the large tax burden on the Africans could be thought of as fair. He went on to express the hope that the administrative officers in Machakos District, "may still be permitted to indulge in tentative hopes of being able to improve the conditions of native life." Annual reports, submitted at the end of each year to the provincial commissioner and condensed by him for submission to the Chief Native Commissioner, frequently contained extensive references to the inadequacies of the services provided for Africans. But without specialized agricultural training, burdened down with a multitude of routine tasks, and handicapped by the shortness of their stay in any one district, they were normally unable to effect any significant changes in the state of the reserves.

Sharing the responsibility for the success of the programme was a body of agricultural supervisors, who were described by their own immediate superior, the Deputy Director of Agriculture, in a very uncomplimentary terms. The issue of the suitability and qualifications of the officers hired by the Kenya Government was raised in the House of Commons by E.D. Morel, who had asked whether or not it would be possible to recruit experienced men from West Africa or India for service in Kenya. The Colonial Secretary wrote to Coryndon in April 1924 to express his dissatisfaction with the current appointees, all but one of whom had been hired locally.
The qualifications of these officers appear to be inferior and not such as will likely fit them for promotion. In other tropical dependencies where the encouragement of native agriculture forms the principal duty of Agricultural Officers it has been proved repeatedly that whilst personality, practical knowledge and the power of adaptation are all important, yet a thoroughly sound academic training is equally essential if the efficiency of the Department is to improve from year to year.23

Though it had been hoped to attract officers with good agriculture degrees or diplomas and, though it was desirable that the appointees have some previous experience of the type of work they would be carrying out in Kenya, in fact the salaries offered would only attract "second rate specimens of the Agricultural College type, who failed to get jobs elsewhere or who have failed to make good in Kenya".24 The salary scales offered by Kenya, in comparison with those offered for equivalent jobs in Tanganyika, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank in Kenya</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Equivalent Rank in Tanganyika</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Supervisor</td>
<td>£400 x 20</td>
<td>District Agricultural Officer</td>
<td>£600 x 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- £500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>£300 x 15</td>
<td>Assistant District Agricultural Officer</td>
<td>£400 x 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- £400</td>
<td></td>
<td>- 500 x 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- £500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any good men attracted to Kenya would soon feel dissatisfaction when they discovered that men in the adjoining territories at an equivalent rank were earning far more. The crux of the problem was pointed to by Harrison, who observed that, had the salaries been higher, they would never have been accepted into the estimates at all, and that the present salaries were all the existing appointees were worth. The agricultural
programme was burdened with "a terribly weak lot of men," who were not removable as they had been hired on three year contracts. In view of the adverse financial circumstances of the Colony, it was not felt possible to recommend an increase in the salaries.

The progress made by Kenya agriculture in the ten years since the end of the First World War, and particularly the role of the government agencies in its past and present development, were the subject matter of the Report of the Agriculture Commission of 1929, chaired by Sir Douglas Hall. Though the Commission expended most of its energies on the problems faced by European agriculture, its report suggested many improvements which it felt could be made in the organization of assistance to African agriculture. It recommended that agricultural officers, instead of being under the authority of the Director of Agriculture, should serve under the provincial commissioners, who could integrate their activities with those of the other services working towards the development of the reserve areas. The Report expressed the view that agricultural officers were too often inadequately acquainted with local languages, customs, and practices. To remedy this, they should be required to serve for as long as possible in one area. Co-ordination and co-operation between agricultural officers should be secured by the holding of an annual conference. If possible, agricultural officers should be relieved of clerical work to allow them longer periods on safari. Native instructors, whose work was criticised before the Commission, should come under the immediate supervision of the district commissioners, rather than the previously loose control of the agricultural officers, who were responsible
for more than one district. The important role assigned to the district commissioners would be carried out more effectively, according to the Commission, if all administrative officers during their first tour were to spend three months on a course at the Scott Agricultural Laboratories, acquainting themselves with the problems of African agriculture. 28

The defects which the Agriculture Commission pointed out in the organisation of aid to African agriculture were a relatively minor aspect of the failure of the programme to significantly affect production in the reserves. The agriculture staff was inadequate in numbers, finance, and training, and too often simply gave the wrong advice. The commonly held European assumption that the African was hundreds, if not thousands, of years behind him was born out in the European attitude to African cultivation, shared by officials and non-officials alike. African agricultural methods and practices did not follow those of the Europeans and were, therefore, thought to be wrong. Few apparently realized that African methods and practices had been developed to suit the particular needs and environment of the Kenya African. H. L. Shantz, of the Bureau of Plant Industry of the United States Department of Agriculture, who visited Kenya in 1925, was one of the first to grasp the importance of studying local methods, and students of agricultural development have appreciated it retrospectively in criticising the wholesale application of European methods to African conditions. 29 An example of the errors which flowed from the failure to recognise the difference between local and English conditions was the extensive sheet and gully erosion resulting, in part at least, from the advice given to Africans to plough in straight
lines. A study of the methods and techniques of local farmers would have provided valuable clues to the difficulties presented by local conditions. For example, many African groups in Kenya had developed a method of assessing the suitability of particular areas of land for particular crops by using indicator trees and plants. Africans were not thought capable of this type of sophistication.

The particular need that African methods were designed to serve was the avoidance of crop failure. Whereas to the European crop failure meant financial embarrassment, to the subsistence cultivator crop failure meant starvation and the destruction or dispersal of the community. European farming methods aimed at the maximization of output, African methods at the minimization of the risks of failure. The particular environment of Kenya differed markedly in major respects from English or European farming conditions. Both rainfall and soil conditions were far more variable, and leaching and natural erosion occurred far more rapidly in Kenyan conditions. In order to advise African cultivators in an effective way of the measures they might take to increase production, the Europeans needed to understand these conditions. Accustomed to commercial agriculture based upon farm land of a uniform type and upon a regularity of climate, they failed to do so.

Not until the late 1920's, for example, was any work done on the investigation of soil types in Kenya, and not until 1936 was a provisional and very general soil map produced. Very little use was made of men who had served in India or West Africa and whose experience
might well have been relevant to Kenya's problems. It was only at the very end of the period that agencies were established in London by the Colonial Office which could organise and co-ordinate research on tropical agriculture.
5.2. Education, Public Works and Medicine.

Of all its recommendations on the organisation and development of services to assist African agriculture, the Hall Commission considered none more important than its suggestion that more attention be paid to the vital question of agricultural education in schools. It went so far as to recommend that no government grants be given to schools unless they had land available for agricultural training. Holm and Harrison, the Director and Deputy Director of Agriculture, agreed that the most important factor on which African agricultural development depended was the supply of Africans with the appropriate education and training.

The question of education and its relationship to agricultural development had been the subject of a memorandum from John Ainsworth to the Colonial Office as far back as 1913. He had recommended that a system of government directed primary education in agriculture and simple technical matters, combined with elementary scholastic subjects, be instituted in African districts to be financed from Hut Tax receipts. There was no positive response to this suggestion before the outbreak of the war. Education in Kenya continued, with very few exceptions, in the hands of the missionaries after the war, but it had to face a rising tide of criticism from both Africans and official Europeans. Whereas African criticism focused on the question of the independence of schools from missionary control, the administrators voiced their growing dissatisfaction with the nature of the curriculum of the mission
schools, which they felt was largely irrelevant to the needs of the reserves. In Nyeri District, for example, in the mid-1920's the missionary schools were producing annually about 1,250 pupils, "with a smattering of literary education and a distaste for the soil." Most of these would seek a clerical vocation, but there were not that many clerical posts available in the whole of Kenya. "To them (the missionaries)," wrote the District Commissioner A.M. Champion, "reading and writing is the beginning and end of education. Let us see that we educate them so that they can take part in the economic development of the country." A resolution passed unanimously by a meeting of Central Province district commissioners expressed the administrators' viewpoint clearly:

This meeting wishes to draw the attention of the Government to the social danger arising from the uncontrolled spread of literary education among the Kikuyu which not only creates a distaste for cultivation of the soil but a desire for clerical vocations for which not only are they unfit by the standard of education obtained, but which the country is quite unable to offer in the numbers which even now are being demanded....

In 1927 the Legislative Council set up a special committee to examine, in the light of the policy of dual development, the needs of the Colony in the area of agricultural education. Its report noted that, with the exception of the agricultural training of native instructors at Bukura and the Scott Agricultural Laboratories, no specialized training in agriculture was given at any government or government assisted school. The educational system of Kenya appeared to satisfy the demands of the non-native areas for masons, carpenters and artisans generally, as well as the demand for clerks and teachers. The only government school
in Machakos and Kitui Districts, the Machakos Central School, was a typical example of this emphasis. It was a boarding school for boys, with an enrolment of 176 in 1927, and it selected its pupils from among the most promising boys at the village schools. The first two years were spent entirely on literary education, and the last three mainly in the workshop. Of the one hundred boys in the senior year in 1927, 41 were training to be carpenters, 35 to be bricklayers, 3 to be tailors, and 21 to be teachers. African education in Kenya tended to separate its students from the one activity by which most of them would later earn their living.

The Committee reported:

It is essential that this practical teaching should commence at the earliest age and ... therefore recommends unanimously that agricultural instruction should form an integral and compulsory part of the curriculum in all elementary schools for Africans in rural areas.

All those being trained as school teachers in village schools should be qualified to give instruction in simple agriculture and to run a demonstration plot. In central schools simple agriculture formed part of the general instruction given in the first two years, after which vocational training commenced in carpentry, masonry and commercial subjects. The Committee recommended that the government retain agricultural education in the early years of the central schools, supplemented by specialized training for selected pupils in the senior years under European instructors. These European instructors should also, the Report urged, be responsible for instructing trainee teachers in agricultural education and for inspecting the agricultural work of the local elementary schools.
This last recommendation touched on one of the central problems of developing African agricultural education in Kenya—the lack of teachers for all levels of education who had been trained in agriculture. At the end of the decade the Education Department had only two trained European agriculturalists on its staff, one at the Jeannes School at Kabete (for training teachers for village schools) and one stationed at a large central school. D.L. Blunt, a senior agricultural officer, believed that the best way to overcome this difficulty was to extend the range and scope of education at the two agricultural schools to include a one year course in agriculture for teacher trained Africans. In addition, there should be a course designed to turn out African teachers who were more highly qualified than the three year trained native instructors.42

A lack of emphasis on agriculture at all levels of education and a shortage of trained teachers were by no means the only problems facing those who wished to adapt African education to serve the needs of the reserve. The Report of the Special Committee on the Organization of Agricultural Education for Africans also noted the need to counter the popular belief among young educated Africans that crop production and livestock rearing were fit activities only for the uneducated.43 They felt that this could be partially achieved by raising the salaries paid to native instructors, who received twenty five shillings per month, in contrast to learner clerks, who started with twenty shillings per month at fourteen years old and rose to sixty five shillings at sixteen.
First grade clerks in government service received a salary of one hundred and fifty shillings per month. Indeed, wastage on "a considerable scale" did occur after the completion of the three year course. Tractor driving, trading and other employments claimed an appreciable number of students at wages well above those paid to native instructors. By 1929 only fifty of some several hundred trained men were actually employed as native instructors. The government had no difficulty recruiting a sufficient number of Africans to fill the places available in the agricultural schools. It did not find it easy to enrol a large enough body of students with educational backgrounds adequate to enable them to take full advantage of the teaching offered. The Agriculture Department, as a consequence, had to extend the original two year course by one year and adapt the first year of education to the teaching of reading, writing and Swahili. Apparently, very few of those who had acquired a sound secondary level education would consider employment as a native instructor.

Agricultural education also faced politically motivated African opposition in Central Province. The few attempts that were made in the twenties by missionaries to implement or expand programmes of agricultural education were resisted by the Kikuyu. Crops were destroyed, attempts to acquire expanded sites for school gardens were effectively opposed, and schools that developed such programmes were frequently boycotted. In Kikuyu minds attempts to cultivate at mission stations were associated with past land alienations, and were viewed with extreme suspicion as a preliminary to possible
future thefts of land by Europeans. It seems unlikely that, even had more than a few missionaries attempted to expand the scale of agricultural education in the reserves, it would have proved possible to overcome African resistance.

Many of the criticisms and recommendations for reform made in the reports of the Legislative Council Committee and the Hall Commission were supported by the writings of government employees with first hand experience of the problems of establishing and operating an effective programme of agricultural education. R.S. Dentall, an agricultural officer stationed at the Native Agriculture School at Bukura, occupied a perfect vantage point from which to observe agricultural education in Kenya. He served in the areas where most of the effort towards agricultural improvement was concentrated and he was attached to the institution which produced most of the native instructors. In a report to the Director of Agriculture in 1931, Dentall vigorously attacked the type of agricultural education being offered at his school.

The popular idea that rapid improvement would follow if Africans were given merely a technical education, which would teach them to use more efficient implements, ploughs and improved seed was, he argued, totally false. The type of instruction given by agricultural officers using barazas and demonstration plots was "entirely useless," if the methods taught were unrelated to, and unaccompanied by, other types of education. Despite considerable efforts in all three Nyanza districts, he felt that there had been no lasting improvements, except where Africans lived near schools and received constant supervision, or where attention had been solely directed to one crop.
Even then, the changes were very seldom permanent and depended upon the sustained vigilance of the European officers. The African farmer needed "a sound general education teaching him how to exercise his initiative, discipline his mind and use his brain to adapt his knowledge to the particular circumstances in which he finds himself." In general, missionary schools hindered rather than assisted the work of the agricultural officers; religious education was their first priority, and general education was secondary. As a rather extreme example of the effects of missionary education, Bentall cited the example of an effort he had made in one area of South Kavirondo to encourage the population to plant a free issue of improved maize, provided by local native council funds. The farmers had responded very poorly and, on enquiring as to the reasons, his native instructor had told him that the farmers did not think it worthwhile to produce more than they could eat, as the mission had taught them that worldly aspirations were damnable, and that the Almighty would provide for the Faithful.

Bentall felt strongly that the government should play a large part in educating the people. Between five to thirteen were the crucial years, when education in government schools should insist upon the possibilities for economic advancement which existed on the Africans' own doorstep. The dignity, as well as the profitability, of peasant agriculture should be stressed through the use of the school shambas. At a higher level of education, Bukura and Kabete
Agricultural Schools were, he argued, a failure because of the attitudes instilled into African children at an earlier age. Trainees arrived too late, with their personalities already formed. They were "incipient karanies", trained by other makarani, before they reached the agricultural school. As returnees, they had an exaggerated idea of themselves as the intelligensia of their districts. As native instructors, they were ineffective and could be used more profitably if they worked the soil themselves as model peasant farmers.\(^47\)

The efforts in South Kavirondo had only managed to affect a small proportion of the population and a very small area of land. At Bukura itself, for example, where Africans could observe and learn to use improved methods, there was no single instance of farmers, even those with shambas adjacent to Bukura, adopting any of the modern methods permanently.\(^48\) Hennie Smith, an educationalist who visited Kenya in 1931, suggested that the school had isolated itself from the surrounding community, and that the pupils consequently grew dull for lack of contact with other people. The success of the school's application of European methods was also seriously hindered by the fact that the soil was very poor. The Native Council had apparently "fobbed off third-rate land on the government."\(^49\)

Bentall's condemnation of the system of African education in Kenya coincided broadly with the criticisms of another working official, J.W.C. Dougall, the Principal of the Jeannes School,
Nairobi. He wrote in 1930:

It is a common criticism of our educational policy in Africa that education, from the African point of view, has come to mean unrelated information, the acquiring of literary skill and languages, but that it has had singularly little influence on the life of the masses of the people. Schools have been isolated centres of 'learning' rather than centres of training for a life of action.

He recognised the difficulties of instituting a more practical type of education. Not only did African parents demand a European literary education for their children, but the teachers, mainly missionaries, were only equipped and concerned to offer a literary education.

If adequate and appropriate educational services were an essential ingredient of any scheme to develop African agriculture, so too was the provision of adequate medical facilities in the reserve areas. No effort to increase production could possibly succeed if its participants were incapable of the greater physical efforts required of them. Prior to the end of the First World War, medical work in the reserves had been left almost entirely in the hands of missionaries, unaided by government funds, while the government Medical Department concentrated upon the care of Europeans, and health and sanitation in the towns. Ainsworth told the 1919 Economic Commission that, only fifty percent of adult males in the reserves were capable of hard work, and recruitment experience during the war years had provided ample evidence to support this view. The government, according the H.R.A. Philip, a doctor working with the Church of Scotland Mission at Tumu Tumu, had in twenty five years
only "played with the question of health in the reserves." A lone government medical officer covered the reserves of Meru, Embu, Fort Hall and Kitui, and he was inadequately supplied with drugs and equipment. Philp's testimony, backed as it was by further evidence advanced by settlers, missionaries and officials alike, found expression in the Commission's recommendation that additional resources should be devoted to medical services in the reserves.

The Convention of Associations added its powerful voice to the demand for improved services. Government efforts in this direction were delayed by the post war financial crisis and by the difficulty in the immediate post war years of obtaining suitably qualified medical staff for colonial service.

For an interim period, government discharged its responsibilities by subsidising mission work until, in the early 1920's, a new policy of establishing medical centres in the reserves was embarked upon. Due to inadequate finances and staff shortages, the new programme progressed very slowly. In comparison with the two other British East African territories, medical services for Africans in Kenya, though more extensive at the beginning of the 1920's, had by 1930 fallen some way behind both Uganda and Tanganyika.
Table II: Patients in native hospitals in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Thousands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kenya In</th>
<th>Kenya Out</th>
<th>Kenya All</th>
<th>Uganda In</th>
<th>Uganda Out</th>
<th>Uganda All</th>
<th>Tanganyika In</th>
<th>Tanganyika Out</th>
<th>Tanganyika All</th>
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<td>1920</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>1921</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>1930</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>430</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Asians.


At the end of the twenties, the Chief Medical Officer of Kenya described the state of physical health in the reserves, and the efforts of the Medical Department to influence the situation, to a conference of provincial commissioners in the following terms:

It is hardly possible to overemphasise the fact that the average native is born, lives and dies amongst the most insanitary conditions... Almost every African native is infested with some type of intestinal worm. A large proportion suffer at one time or another from malaria. Over large areas plague and yaws are endemic. Syphilis appears to be becoming increasingly prevalent in certain districts. Pneumonia, bronco-pneumonia and tuberculosis take a large toll of life.... The circumstances of people are such that they live under conditions which are admirably suitable for the existence and spread of the causal agents of disease or of their animal hosts.

Inadequate and insanitary housing, polluted water supplies, a poor diet, and primitive grain storage facilities were all aspects of the totally unsatisfactory conditions in which most Africans in the reserve areas lived.
The only preventive measures which can be taken with any hope of real success is confined to the treatment of individuals. The position is then governed by the amount of medical and sanitary staff available... in Kavirondo and Kikuyu districts for instance the proportion of medical officers to population varies from 1 to 100,000 to 1 to 250,000. With the present strength of medical staff, even including the few medical men engaged in mission work, and the number of sub-dispensaries which can properly be supervised, it is not possible to supply even that portion of the population which suffers from communicable disease. To what extent can any one medical officer come into effective contact with a quarter of a million people? 57

The full extent of the problem facing the Medical Department in 1930 can be appreciated by looking at the results of a detailed medical survey carried out in Digo District in 1930. The level of nourishment among 58% of the population was found to be only fair and among 17% it was described as poor. Ankylostomum, a hook worm infection, was diagnosed in 76% of the Duruma examined; 90% showed cardiac dilation and bruits. Spleen rate, an indication of malaria, was found among 70% of the population. 58 The Medical Department had not, by the end of the twenties, brought about any significant improvement of medical health in the reserves.

Unless the area being developed was close to the railway or to existing major routes, a sine qua non of the success of any scheme was the construction or improvement of communications facilities. In the post-war as in the pre-war period, the development of many of the reserve areas was hindered or prevented by the slow growth of communications and the unwillingness of the Kenya government to contribute from general revenue to their extension. Maxwell, the Chief Native Commissioner, objected in 1925 when the
government proposed to use £3,500 of Native Trust Fund money to construct a road between Kisumu and Kisii. He argued that public funds should be used to finance public works, and was supported by Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who laid down that:

The money derived from native lands should not be used merely to relieve taxation by carrying out public works or paying for services normally charged to Colonial or Municipal funds. If a service is desired on public grounds, the fact that it is urgent for native purposes is an argument for carrying it out, but not necessarily for charging native funds with a portion of the costs involved.

But, who was to bear the costs of roads and bridges which were primarily for the use and benefit of Africans? Minor roads and tracks within the reserves were normally built by compulsory unpaid labour under the 1912 Native Authority Ordinance, whereas all roads in settled areas outside the municipalities were built by the Public Works Department from general revenue. In 1920 the Director of Public Works and the Chief Native Commissioner agreed that roads used primarily for European benefit should be a charge on the Public Works Department, whether in reserve areas or not. Roads purely for the benefit and convenience of the Africans should be the responsibility of the Native Affairs Department. Thus, for the first time, the Public Works Department accepted responsibility for major routes which, though they ran through African areas, were primarily of benefit to the settlers. But the Chief Native Commissioner and the provincial commissioners were dissatisfied with the situation this agreement created. A year later they resolved that:
The estimates for maintenance and construction of roads in native and non-native areas respectively be framed with due regard to the proportion which the revenue accruing from direct native taxation bears to the total revenue collected in the province.\(^6^2\)

In plainer language, this meant that the senior officials of the Native Affairs Department felt that, as the Africans contributed by far the largest proportion of taxation revenue, they should benefit accordingly; that African subsidisation of roads constructed for the benefit of the settler population should cease.\(^6^3\)

That this redistribution of expenditure did not occur is abundantly clear from complaints by district commissioners in official reports and correspondence. One example will suffice to illustrate the point. Kachakos District included both settled and reserve areas, but the allocation of money through the Public Works Department favoured the settled area. In 1925 £1,568 was set aside for the European part of the district, and £300 for the African area, which included well over 95% of the district population of over 200,000. The following year the first figure more than doubled to £3,500, while the second remained the same. The District Commissioner, evidently a master of understatement, remarked that he was "not sure that the allocation of funds from General Revenue is defensible from all points of view".\(^6^4\) To assist the development of communication in the reserves, the local native councils from 1925 began to contribute sizeable sums to road building programmes. Again in 1926, in Kachakos District, the Local Native Council voted £640 to augment the £300 from general revenue.\(^6^5\)
The Public Works Department not only failed to allocate a significant proportion of its budget to works which would primarily benefit the African population, it was also reluctant to permit the spending of large sums of money on essential works within the reserves. In the annual reports of the district and provincial commissioners in the post First World War period, there are frequent and often highly critical references to the parsimony of the Public Works Department in relation to construction within the reserves. This was undoubtedly an important factor in retarding the development of many reserves. The case of the Athi River bridge on the road between Kitui and Kibwezi provides an example. The natural outlet for the extensive trade of Kitui District lay south from the town of Kitui to the railway at Kibwezi, from where the exports of hides, skins, beeswax and ghee could be railed to Mombasa. By 1913 a cart road had been completed from Kitui to Kibwezi, with a cable way across the seasonal Athi River. This proved useless because the punt, without which the cable way could not operate, was diverted for use at another crossing at Donyo Sabuk. The road proved unuseable by oxcarts due to the incidence of tse-tse fly on the section between Ikutha and Kibwezi. In November of the following year the assistant to the provincial commissioner, H.R. Tate, commented bitterly: "The sooner the Administration have no longer to depend on the Public Works Department for the execution of imperative and highly remunerative public works so much the earlier will the Native Reserves come into their just due." A year later, the Indian traders of Kitui
township took the initiative by offering to organise a syndicate to run motor transport to Kibwezi, if the administration would agree to provide a bridge across the Athi. The trade of the district was, according to District Commissioner Montgomery, capable of "immense expansion," but without expenditure on communications the "vast potential" of the area would not be realized, and efforts to encourage agricultural development would fail. At the suggestion of the district and provincial commissioners, a sum of £2,500 was voted for the bridge in 1917. This was diverted by the Director of Public Works to a project in the Usain Gishu area; two years later the same thing happened again. Though the revenue of the district always far exceeded its expenditure, no action was taken. In 1926 the district commissioner complained yet again that the bridge had not been built. He pointed out that the revenue for that year alone exceeded the estimated revenue by over £6,000, a sum almost sufficient to pay for the bridge. Three years later the bridge was finally completed, just in time to help avert a famine disaster.
Footnotes. Chapter 5.


2 See above, p. 59, note 21.

3 Himbury to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 April 1926, C.0.533/363.

4 Such calculations are difficult to make because of the shortage of statistics relating to prices and yields. For this calculation the yield for sim-sim was taken as 266 pounds per acre, the estimate of the average for the whole Colony in 1930. This is almost certainly a low estimate for North Kavirondo, where sim-sim grew readily. No price for sim-sim is given in the Annual Report of the district for 1926. The average price in 1923 and the low average price in 1928 of four shillings per frasilah of 36 pounds was taken. There do not appear to have been any drastic price changes over these years. See Nyanza Province Annual Report 1925, PC/NZA 1/20, North Kavirondo Annual Reports 1923 and 1928, DC/NN 1/4 and 1/9, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, A Decade of Agricultural Progress in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1931 and R.W. Hemstead to Chief Secretary, (?) February 1926, in PC/NZA 3/3/10.

5 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1925, PC/NZA 1/20.


7 Cotton Ginneries, Nyanza Province, Small and Company Limited, Sio, Agriculture Department file 1/366.

8 Alex S. Folkes of Folkes and Hilton to Chief Secretary, 1 October 1926, Agriculture Department file 1/366.

9 See D.C. North Nyanza to S.C. Nyanza, 1 September 1926 and P. Booth, Agricultural Supervisor, North Nyanza to Director of Agriculture, 9 November 1926. Agriculture Department file 1/366.
The administration was only just recovering from the run down of staff that had occurred during the war. In May 1918, for example, only sixteen officers serving in the colony were not overdue for leave. There were 36 vacancies, and twenty two officers were on secondment fighting in East Africa or Europe. Bowring to Long, 1 May 1918, C.O.533/195. The economies of 1922 were to be made by leaving vacancies unfilled.

E.Harrison, "Memorandum on the Development of Agriculture in Nyanza," enclosed in Coryndon to Thomas, 26 August 1924, C.0.533/312.

Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1924 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1925), pp.1-2. Teita District, usually manned by one officer, provides an example of the frequency with which personnel were changed. Between July 1902 and July 1913 fifteen changes of officer occurred. Teita District Political Record Book, 1910-1912, DC/TTA 3/1.

Memorandum by G.V.Maxwell, enclosed in Denham to Thomas, 4 July 1924, C.O.533/311.


F.T. Bamber to Acting S.C., Mombasa, 26 October 1920, enclosed in Administration of Native Reserves, CP 20/102. Bamber had served for only six years in Kenya.


Minutes of the Senior Commissioners Meeting held at Nairobi, 19-22 December 1921. Senior Commissioners Meetings, PC/JUB 1/7/1.

For an example of the resolutions passed at D.C.'s meetings, see CP 56/1550.


24. Ibid. Minute by Captain Irby, Assistant Private Secretary (Appointments) to the Secretary of State for Colonies.

25. Ibid. Minutes by Irby, C.J. Jeffries (Principal, East Africa section) and W.C. Bottomley.

26. Sir Douglas Hall was the Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture, the head of the most important agricultural research station in the Empire at Rothamsted, and head of the John Innes Horticultural Institution. For more detail on his views on Kenyan agriculture, see A.D. Hall, "Settler Problems in Kenya," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts 78, 1930, pp.406-423.

27. Following Colonial Office criticisms of the Agriculture Department's original policy of hiring local men, they had begun to make appointments from England. The Commission felt that this change should be re-examined. It valued the superior knowledge of the local candidates of African languages and practices above the higher level of technical expertise which the appointees from England possessed. The Colonial Office was surely correct in insisting that there was more future in degree men from England, who could acquire local expertise rather more readily perhaps than local appointees, could acquire technical knowledge. Suitably trained local men were probably not attracted by the low salaries offered by the Agriculture Department - European farmers offered them a far more lucrative career.


32. The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture was not founded until 1924. It took its first Colonial Office trainees the following year. The Agriculture Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies was first appointed in 1929, when the Colonial Advisory Council for Agriculture and Animal Health was also set up. Though the Imperial Bureau of Entomology was founded in 1913 and the Imperial Bureau of Mycology in 1920, it was not until 1929 that eight further bureaux, ranging from soil science to animal nutrition, were established. Masefield, pp.69-70.


34. Proceedings of the Agricultural Research Conference held at the Amani Research Station, 2-6 February 1931, Nairobi, 1931, p.156.


37. Minutes of the District Commissioners Meeting held at Nyeri, 8-9 March 1926, PC/CP 8/4B/5.
This was not strictly true. Agriculture could be taken up to School Certificate examination level, but in fact was only offered to this level by the Church of Scotland schools at Kikuyu and Tumu Tumu. According to Orr, the Director of Education, a great change in agricultural methods was noticeable in the vicinity of these two schools, mulching, banking up of potatoes, planting of one crop on an increased scale, planting of each crop separately, and planting in straight lines. J. Orr, "Memorandum on Agricultural Education," enclosed in Legislative Council of Kenya, Report of the Special Committee on the Organisation of Agricultural Education for Africans, Nairobi, 1927.


John Anderson, writing of the twenties, has observed that "... impression increasingly developed in young African minds that such (a morally oriented education) was only 'second class' education, that it led back to hard manual labour and limited long term rewards, rather than the wealth and technical advantage of Western life that European were demonstrating."
before them every day. . . . Reading and writing were seen as the keys to success, not gardening, or to use its later euphemistic name, 'rural science,' and still less 'educating the African along his own lines.'" Anderson, p.21. This idea is amusingly illustrated in a modern African novel by Cameron Duodo, The Gab Boys (London: Fontana, 1967), pp.26-28

44Blunt, p.3.


48Ibid.

49Smith, p.262.


51See above p.45.

52Economic Commission Report, pp.140-142, Philp and his colleague Dr. J.E.Henderson noted that Africans were generally willing to pay large sums of money for medical treatment.

53Ibid., p.19.

54See above p.46.

55See Ann Beck, A History of British Medical Administration in East Africa, 1900-1950 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). For an admission by Kenya's Chief Secretary of the inadequacy of the Colony's medical services see Denham to Anery, 27 March 1925, C.O.533/330 and note by W.C.Bottomley. Denham's despatch was written in response to a Colonial Office request for material which could be used to reply to Ley's criticisms of
colonial policy contained in *Kenya* (London: Hogarth, 1924). Denham admitted that, up to the current year, no actual medical work directed towards raising the living standards in the reserves had been undertaken. Bottomley noted that native health had been neglected in favour of European services.

56 The population of the three territories were approximately similar in size, with Uganda's probably slightly lower, and Tanganyika's probably slightly higher than Kenya's.


Ancylostoma duodenale is a blood consuming worm that attaches itself to the intestines.

59 Denham to Amery, 5 March 1925, C.O.533/330 and Maxwell to Denham, 19 January 1925, in Denham to Amery, 16 June 1925, C.O.533/331. The Native Trust Fund had been set up in the early years of the century to receive money from the sale of cattle captured during punitive expeditions.

60 Amery to Denham, 15 August 1925, C.O.533/331.

61 Minutes of the Senior Commissioners Meeting held at Nairobi, 28–30 September 1920, PC/JUB 1/7/1.

62 Minutes of the Senior Commissioners Meeting held at Nairobi, 19–22 December 1921, PC/JUB 1/7/1.

63 The provincial commissioners followed up their resolution by stating that they should have the power to approve or disapprove Public Works Department expenditure in their provinces. Naturally enough, the Director of Public Works did not agree to this suggestion, as it would have impinged on the autonomy of his department. In this view he was supported by the Governor. The Director also opposed the idea that there should be any relationship between the derivation of revenue and the direction of expenditure. He argued that European areas needed cart roads far more urgently than African areas. Interestingly enough the Director was W. McGregor Ross, Director of Public Works to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 10 April 1922, in PC/JUB 1/7/1.
64. Machakos District Annual Report, 1926, DC/KKS 1/1/15.

65. Ibid.


68. Kitui District Provincial Commissioners Inspection Book, 1910-1918, entry for November 1914, DC/KTI 8/1.

69. Kitui District Annual Reports for 1914-15, DC/KTI 1/3/6 and 1915-16, DC/KTI 1/3/6. Almost every D.C. between 1914 and 1929 made similar comments. Between 1911-12 and 1919-20 the value of Kitui trade (excluding livestock) fluctuated between Rs.300,000 and Rs.500,000 annually. See, for example, Hobley’s comment in Provincial Commissioners Inspection Book, entry for June 1912, DC/KTI 8/1.


71. Kitui District Annual Report, 1926, DC/KTI 1/1/2. The Hut Tax alone in that year raised £32,842.

72. Kitui District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KTI 1/1/2.
Chapter 6. Veterinary Policy.

When scholars first began to look carefully at the economies of "primitive" people in the nineteenth century, they accepted the idea that man throughout the world had developed through a number of economic stages. As a hunter and gatherer he had learned to domesticate a number of his game animals and had become a pastoralist. The pastoralist, in turn, began to cultivate seed, and eventually evolved into an agriculturalist. At the beginning of the century this three-stage theory of human evolution was widely accepted, and formed the basis of the attitude of British administrators in East Africa towards the pastoral peoples of the Protectorate. Pastoralism, in the words of John Ainsworth, represented a "barrier to civilization" which, if imperial rule in East Africa was to be able to justify itself on moral grounds, had to be breached. There were other far more positive and immediate determinants of government policy towards the pastoralists. Because of their nomadic way of life, the pastoral tribes presented far greater administrative problems than the agriculturalists. Taxes were more difficult to collect from, and laws were more difficult to enforce among groups who were spread very thinly over thousands of square miles and who were frequently on the move in search of water supplies and more favourable pasture. As British experience with the Somali and the Nandi soon showed, pastoral tribes were difficult and costly to bring under political control. For a protectorate dependent upon grants-in-aid, the administration of the pastoral tribes of
the north and the north-west was a luxury it could not afford. Hayes Sadler, on his appointment as Commissioner of Uganda in 1901, was told that "it is not desirable to push too quickly among tribes in outlying districts who have little to offer at present in the way of commerce and who have not yet become accustomed to the sojourn of the white man in their midst." The risks and the expense of the extension of administrative control into the out-lying areas were not commensurate with the small amounts of revenue that might be yielded by the imposition of taxation and the stimulation of trade.

The pastoral tribes living alongside the railway and on the highlands felt the full effect of the European presence. The Nandi, who posed a threat to the security of British communications between the coast and the lake, were dealt with by a series of punitive expeditions, the last of which was launched in 1905. It was the Masai, who occupied vast stretches of land at the strategic centre of the Protectorate, that presented the administration with its most serious pre-war problem. Once it was decided that European settlement was necessary in order to promote economic development, the Masai had to be moved from their rich pastures in the Rift Valley. Fortunately for the British, the Masai, in the period immediately prior to the establishment of colonial rule, had suffered severely from a series of droughts and epidemics, as well as from a bloody intra-tribal conflict, the combined results of which had probably halved the population. In this weakened state they were
only too willing to attempt to recoup some of their recent losses by joining the British in raids against some of their former enemies. When the British, in turn, decided to confine them to a fraction of their traditional grazing lands, to an area between the railway and the Tanganyika border, they were unable to resist effectively.?

One of the most important elements in the calculations which fixed the final size of the pastoralists' reserves was the observation that, for the immense extent of the land they occupied, they contributed very little to the economic development of the country. Not only did they fail to produce exportable commodities in any quantity, they also refused to contribute labour to help the developing European economy. Their herds buffered them against the need to work by providing them with adequate food supplies, and hides and skins as well as livestock to sell to realize the necessary money for Hut and Poll Tax. Pastoralists as a whole were seen as a brake on the development of the country, an uncivilized body whose nomadic habits should be curbed for the benefit of the entire country. Commissioner Eliot wrote on the Masai in the following terms:

The customs of the masai may be interesting to anthropologists, but morally and economically they seem to me to be all bad, and it is our duty, as it will also be our advantage, to change them as soon as it is practicable. Tribes closely akin to the masai on Kilimanjaro and elsewhere are said to cultivate and those in the neighbourhood of Nairobi seem to be settling down. It is much to be desired that the Naivasha masai should follow the same example, instead of straying about with large herds of inferior cattle and sheep....
Men as far apart in the views they held on the future direction East Africa should take as Governor Belfield and Ainsworth both subscribed to these ideas. When the question of fixing the borders of the Lumbwa, Buret and Sotik reserves arose, Belfield opposed allowing them very extensive grazing areas because he did not wish to encourage their "pernicious pastoral proclivities." These he would positively deter by

... every legitimate means, not only because they are productive of nomadic tendencies but because they inculcate in the minds of the people a distaste for any settled industry, materially increase the difficulty of controlling them and, as is the case at present with the Mandi, reduce them to a state of comparative impoverishment when periodic attacks of rinderpest decimate their herds.¹⁹

Ainsworth felt that it would be in their own best interests if they were "restricted in such pastoral inclinations and are practically compelled to take to mixed agriculture."¹⁰

As well as being unproductive and administratively inconvenient, the pastoralists were also a direct threat to the successful establishment of a European cattle industry in Kenya. Between 1904 and 1908 the number of major European cattle owners in Kenya had grown from three or four to twenty, all of whom possessed larger herds than their predecessors.¹¹ The herds had been built up from two sources. Pedigree bulls were imported from England and crossed with African cattle. Pedigree European cattle were susceptible to a wide range of diseases, unknown or virtually unknown in Europe, the most lethal and common of which appeared to have been rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia.¹²
The crossing of European and African cattle resulted in a breed that was hardier and more resistant to disease, but by no means immune. In fact, European cattle owners suffered and continued to suffer enormous losses as a result of the contact between their herds and those of surrounding pastoralists. Further, though far smaller, losses occurred as a consequence of the belief of most of the pastoral people of East Africa that any cattle herds, whether owned by Europeans or other Africans, were a fit target for raiding. The developing European herds needed protection from contact with African herds and, in the period before the First World War, the government veterinary service was primarily occupied with this task. Powers to restrict the movement of cattle between districts were acquired with the approval by Commissioner Eliot of the Cattle Diseases Ordinance of 1902. The veterinary staff was, however, never adequate in these early years to enforce the Ordinance as it was applied to various districts of the Protectorate.

When the Ordinance was promulgated, there was only one specialist veterinary officer in the employment of the government. The Veterinary Department had been established in 1898 with the appointment of R.J. Stordy, a veterinary surgeon who worked single handed, primarily on the Uganda transport service, until 1900. As the number of European cattle owners in the Protectorate grew, so the size and range of the veterinary services was extended. In the first years of the century Stordy worked on an unsuccessful experi-
ment to domesticate the zebra for use as a draught animal, an
endeavour which, had it proved successful, would have provided
incoming settlers with a useful bonus. Following an outbreak of
rinderpest in 1904, he was joined by a second officer, and three
more followed in the next two years. Even so, because of absence
through leave and illness, there were at the end of 1906 only
three officers on active duty.

Efficient operation of veterinary services in these early
years could hardly have been assisted by the frequent departmental
reorganisations. The Veterinary Department enjoyed a separate
existence from its formation until 1904, when it was placed under the
Agriculture Department, only to be separated again later in the same
year. Another change came in 1906, when veterinary services were
grouped with agriculture and forestry under the Commissioner of
Lands. A similar period passed before agricultural and veterin-
ary services emerged under a newly formed Department of Agriculture,
controlled by the new Director of Agriculture, A.C. MacDonald, and now
wholly independent of the Commissioner of Lands. Under this
arrangement veterinary services enjoyed a period of sustained
growth until, at the outbreak of war, the staff consisted of the Chief
Veterinary Officer and deputy, the Veterinary Pathologist and
assistant, ten veterinary officers, the Chief Stock Inspector and
five stock inspectors, four Indian assistants, the Permit Officer,
and the Chief Clerk.
The veterinary service defined as its principal task the suppression, prevention, and investigation of contagious cattle diseases, of which rinderpest, pleuro-pneumonia and east coast fever were the most important. A contemporary definition of the duties of the veterinary officers reflected this concern. Infected animals owned by Europeans were treated free of charge and, when outbreaks of disease occurred, officers issued permits to allow the movement of animals within settled areas. Another officer was stationed at Mombasa where his main task was the inspection of imported animals. The energies of the service were directed primarily at establishing an effective quarantine for the European settled areas, designed to prevent the movement of infected cattle from the reserves. Periodically, as the prevalence of cattle disease dictated, quarantine rules were issued under the Cattle Diseases Ordinance of 1902 prohibiting the movement of cattle into the European owned stocklands of the Rift Valley and the Kau. The rationale for this policy was put forward in the Annual Report of the Agriculture Department of 1908-9 to explain the issuance of rules prohibiting the transfer of cattle from Kenya and Ukamba Provinces to the Rift Valley and the Kau. "Into these districts (the Rift Valley and the Kau) considerable capital had been invested in founding the livestock industry on which the future success of East Africa must greatly depend." To prevent the illicit movement of cattle, the service embarked in 1907 on an ambitious programme of fencing, designed to create a barrier between European farms and the reserves. This was supplemented by
hiring extra stock inspectors and police guards. Over the two years, 1908-9 and 1909-10, 340 miles of fencing were built and 273 tons of wire were distributed to settlers. A sum of £16,000 was advanced on easy repayment terms to enable settlers to build their own protection against African herds. Extensive efforts were also made to remove African stock, largely owned by squatters, from European farms, though it is clear that, with the exception of Nairobi and Kiambu Districts, these attempts were unsuccessful. To advise the service a Quarantine Board was established in 1909, composed of settlers and members of the administrative staff.

It appears that only once in the pre-war period was a determined effort made to eradicate cattle disease in the reserves. In 1910 cattle in North Kavirondo District were hit severely by an outbreak of rinderpest, and during the following year veterinary staff inoculated 20,000 cattle in an attempt to counter its further spread. The reasons for the failure of the experiment indicate clearly why the effort was not repeated. To counter the disease effectively, the Provincial Commissioner estimated that 250,000 doses of serum were needed, but in the year 1910-1911 only 23,700 doses were produced in the whole of the Protectorate. Further, it was found impossible, with the staff available, to prevent the movement of cattle within the reserve as the inoculation programme was being carried out. Consequently, it would have proved impossible to cover systematically all of the infected areas of the district. After eight months the disease was still spreading and, as the veterinary officer in charge was required
elsewhere, it was decided to allow the disease to take its natural course. Movement of cattle out of the district to the neighbouring settled areas was prohibited.\(^{29}\) The staff and the funds of the veterinary section of the Agriculture Department were clearly inadequate for the task they had set themselves. The only practical method of achieving its first priority, that of developing a European cattle industry, was the defensive method of quarantine.\(^{30}\) Attempts to encourage the exploitation of African-owned cattle would clearly have to await a change in government attitudes toward development priorities.

At no time was movement between settled and African areas brought to a complete standstill. European farmers needed African cattle for breeding purposes, and for draught and transportation work. To secure clean animals, quarantine stations were established at most of the main points of entry into the settled highlands.\(^{31}\) Though farmers occasionally complained that they were unable to secure cattle in large enough numbers, by 1912 a substantial supply was available to them, principally from Jubaland and Borana, through the quarantine station at Rumuruti.\(^{32}\) The veterinary service tried by another means to assist settlers faced with the difficulty of arranging transportation through infected reserve areas. For settlers who would not otherwise be able to afford them, it provided mules to replace cattle used for transportation.\(^{33}\)

The veterinary service helped the European stock owner to build up his herds by more direct means. At Naivasha, the service
established a Government Stock Farm in 1903 for which, during the next year, fifteen pedigree cattle and one hundred pedigree sheep and goats were imported, for use as studs for settler owned livestock.  

Churchill, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, on a visit to the Protectorate in 1907, recommended and secured Colonial Office and Treasury approval for the expenditure of an additional £2,000 on stock for breeding purposes. The fees charged for the use of the animals were very low, far too low to cover the expenses involved in transporting and feeding them. Where, because of distance, it was not possible to hire out an animal, it was instead sold to the settler at a price less than that which it had originally cost the government. Linton, then the Director of Agriculture, excused this apparently generous policy in a letter to Commissioner Stewart by explaining that he thought the pioneer settler "...may be considered a public benefactor and is therefore entitled to some assistance in his work." The stock farm was also used to pasture the large numbers of livestock captured on the punitive raids into Nandi, Kipsigis and Embu areas. Between 1905 and 1908, at least 4,750 captured cattle were sold at Naivasha, and at one of these sales, that of Sotik cattle in 1905, only Europeans were permitted to make purchases. According to the auctioneer, European buyers dominated the sales of captured Nandi stock the following year.  

Pioneer settlers built up their herds with the assistance of the administration, which helped them to acquire both European
and African cattle, and provided them with advice. The African pastoralist, on the other hand, paid the costs where the European reaped the benefits. It was his land and his cattle that provided the basis of European ranching in Kenya. The very presence of European herds in the country had serious repercussions on the life of the pastoral people. The delimitation of reserves prevented them from following patterns of migration designed to maximise the use of available pasture. Often herds were confined to areas from which some of their richest grazing lands had been excluded. The problems of overcrowding thereby created were further exacerbated by the wholesale imposition of quarantines on the reserves. This affected the pastoral reserves in two ways. Firstly, by cutting down the movement of cattle, quarantine tended initially to lower the incidence of disease, and secondly, under quarantine regulations the export of cattle from the reserves was prohibited or severely restricted. In these circumstances, numbers tended to increase rapidly until the maximum grazing capacity of the reserve was reached. Overgrazing was the inevitable result of this overcrowding, which in turn caused soil erosion and the reduction of the cattle carrying capacity of the land. In such overcrowded conditions, a lighter than average annual rainfall had catastrophic effects, and disease spread very rapidly. Herds, lost their natural increase to drought and sickness. Quarantine prevented the pastoral people from selling their cattle in order to pay their taxes, or to meet other financial obligations. And, once a quarantine was imposed, it often stayed in operation for a
lengthy period. Stock inspectors were seldom available in sufficient numbers to check on the continued necessity for the quarantine regulations. This latter situation was most common in districts where there was no European settler population to pressure the Agriculture Department into frequent reviews. In Kitui District, for example, the District Commissioner, C.H. Osborne, convinced that his district was entirely healthy, bemoaned in 1910 the absence of a stock inspector. "It would almost appear," he wrote, "that the absence of European Settlement in the District is considered sufficient cause for this neglect. The District cannot at any rate go on indefinitely paying its Hut Tax out of Goats and Wax."38

The classic example of this pattern of restriction and loss of land, the imposition of quarantine regulations, the rapid rise in cattle numbers leading to overstocking, soil erosion, and a fall in cattle numbers, occurred in Kachakos District. Just before the first European settlers arrived in central Kenya, the Kambahad experienced a severe epidemic of rinderpest, which had greatly reduced the size of their herds.39 An early settler reported that in 1906, even without the valuable grazing lands alienated to the west and south east of their zone, the Kambahad plenty of room for their livestock.40 Confined within the boundaries of a reserve, and facing almost continuous quarantine restrictions from 1901, the cattle multiplied quickly.41 In 1928 a careful estimate by a veterinary officer placed the number in the reserve at 230,000.42
As early as 1919 the Provincial Commissioner of Ukamba had reckoned that the district was overstocked, and in the 1920's administrators frequently referred to overgrazing as a serious problem. The Ulu Settlers' Association told the East Africa Commission in 1925 that conditions in the reserves were "impossible," due to overstocking. With a carrying capacity for the reserve estimated at 60,000 beasts, it is not surprising that, by 1930, over 3,000 Kamba with 16,000 cattle had left to graze their animals and squat on European farms in Thika District alone. Witness after witness gave evidence to the Kenya Land Commission of 1932 that both the quality and the quantity of Kamba cattle had fallen as a result of the deterioration of the grazing in the reserve due to overstocking.

The decision to concentrate available resources on the development of European rather than African owned cattle was based, in part, upon observations that African cattle owners were unwilling to adopt commercial attitudes towards their livestock. Africans, it was frequently stated, were reluctant to improve their cattle by selective breeding, and continued to favour a thin, bony, and commercially relatively valueless type of animal. They were reluctant to permit the inoculation of their cattle. Above all, Africans were thought to be unwilling to sell their cattle for cash. Undoubtedly these would prove powerful barriers to the success of any policy directed at the commercial exploitation of cattle in the reserves. To all African cattle keepers in Kenya their livestock represented much more to them than a means of livelihood, a source of milk, blood and meat. To a group such as the Kamba, the
possessing larger numbers of cattle than was necessary for subsistence was essential, because of the periodic droughts which affected their districts regularly, at least once every ten years, between 1860 and 1930. The additional cattle, in drought years, provided a reserve food supply when crops failed and when, owing to deteriorated grazing conditions, milk yields dropped and cattle died. Reluctance to sell what Europeans regarded as "surplus" cattle related closely to the unwillingness of the pastoralists to expose themselves to famine in years of abnormally low rainfall. Cattle were also regarded as a store of value, and as such continued to hold distinct advantages over cash. Faced with a choice of the two, an Kamba was likely to ask, "Does a shilling give me a calf every year?". Price fluctuations, and the bewildering changes in the type of currency used in the Colony, tended to cement the African preference for livestock over cash.

The possession of cattle was sanctioned and encouraged by tribal practice and tradition. In a wide range of social activities cattle were used as a method of payment and as a means of cementing social bonds. Marriage was accompanied by the presentation of an accepted number of cattle, sheep and goats by the bridegroom's family to the bride's family. Litigation frequently involved the gift of cattle to the chief in return for his support, or to the aggrieved party in a dispute as compensation. Rituals, social, religious, and magical, were often accompanied by the slaughter of cattle. The possession of cattle was the one indisputable mark of wealth and
prestige. Thus, an integral relationship existed between cattle and social organization, ritual, custom, and tradition. Cattle were not, and could not be regarded solely as creatures from whom an income could be derived. The stock cult, or cattle complex, whilst it undoubtedly provided a barrier to the commercial exploitation of African owned cattle, did not by any means exclude entirely all prospects for commercial development. Indeed, there is ample evidence that increasingly Africans were willing to overcome these "conservative prejudices," to have their cattle inoculated, and to take steps to improve the breed of the cattle they owned.

In the 1920's, when inoculation programmes were started in earnest, Africans in many parts of the Colony responded enthusiastically. At the end of 1924 an inoculation depot was established at Bungoma, in North Kavirondo District. Even though a charge of Shs. 2/50 was levied for each inoculation, the cattle were brought in, often at a rate of 1,000 per day. By the middle of the year Africans were demanding the establishment of additional centres. The Masai, too, proved willing to pay inoculation fees; in the mid-1920's they expressed a desire to have their cattle double-inoculated against rinderpest, and were prepared to sell some of their animals to pay for the treatment. It must be noted that this positive attitude of the pastoral people towards inoculation was related to their desire to break out from quarantine barriers. In the northern districts, the Samburu and the Turkana shared the view of the Masai. The Chief Secretary observed in 1927: "This attitude is typical of that adopted by most of the tribes in the Northern
Frontier Province, who quite realize that the removal of quarantine restrictions will enable them to find a market for their cattle.\(^{54}\) Both the Samburu and the Masai showed early signs that they were alive to the advantages of improving their stock by breeding them with imported animals.\(^{55}\)

It is difficult to assess the truth of the view that Africans were unwilling to sell their cattle. In most areas of Kenya they were simply unable to do so, or where they were able to sell they were forced to do so under most unfavourable conditions. The Masai of Narok District, who were under permanent quarantine in the twenties, had only one outlet for their cattle.

Any cattle destined for the markets must be trecked to Nbagathi – an East Coast Fever area which is some eighty miles from Narok – through large tracts of waterless country infested with lions and hyenas. It is unreasonable to expect any people, who are by no means in financial straits, to trek oxen from Narok to Nbagathi for sale. Having survived the journey, the cattle arrive in poor condition, yet the owners and the prospective buyers know, that unless the beasts are sold within a fortnight of their arrival, they will probably contract East Coast Fever.\(^{56}\)

Even under these conditions, the Masai supplied as many beasts as the market could absorb. Over the border in Tanganyika, where a successful effort had been made to reduce disease in the Masai reserve, a far more extensive trade in stock had developed.\(^{57}\)

The Kitui Kamba also displayed a willingness to sell their stock. Whereas the Lachakos Kamba were under almost permanent quarantine, their neighbours in Kitui District, whose reserve did not share a border with a European settlement area, were able under permit
to export their cattle. They sold male beasts in substantial numbers, and by the end of the period were probably exporting close to ten percent of their herd every year.

Table 12: The export of cattle from Kitui District, 1913-1930.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913-4</td>
<td>7,298</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>4,680</td>
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<td>1914-5</td>
<td>7,475</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>5,095</td>
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<tr>
<td>1915-6</td>
<td>5,709*</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>4,949</td>
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<td>1916-7</td>
<td>11,285*</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917-8</td>
<td>802+</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-9</td>
<td>1,046</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>12,126</td>
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<td>1919-20</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>9,479</td>
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<td>1920-1</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td>4,543</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>10,552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes sales to the military.
+ Sales affected by quarantine regulations.

Source: Kitui District Annual Reports, DC/NKS 1/3/1-15 and DC/KTI 1/1/1-2.

The first major proposal aimed at helping pastoralists develop their livestock resources and realize an economic return from their herds derived from a government circular of March 1912 to administrative officers asking for views on a proposed increase in tax paid by Africans. McLellan, Ainsworth, Tate, Hobley and Hollis all expressed the opinion that the pastoralists would be well able to pay the additional taxation, as their herds had increased greatly in the period since 1895. Resentment of the huge areas they occupied and a desire to curb their pastoral habits were also clearly instrumental in determining these responses. Three types of tax were suggested, a tax per head of cattle owned, an annual levy of a percentage of the stock held by a particular tribe, and a
tax on the unimproved value of the land the tribe occupied. Belfield accepted the first of these ideas, and late in 1913 presented to London his view that a cattle tax should be imposed on the Masai. He argued that an effort should be made to lead the Masai gradually to agricultural enterprise:

No such change can of course be effected in the case of the Masai for years to come, but it is possible to damp their ambition to increase their herds and to bring some pressure to bear on them to put a portion of their stock on the market by exacting from them a contribution in respect of their cattle.

The Colonial Office felt that the proposal came too soon after the end of the second Masai move, and desired that the measure be delayed until they had been given a chance to settle down. In July of the following year Belfield set up a committee to study the question of the advisability of levying the tax but, due to the outbreak of the war, the committee was not able to meet. The Colonial Office received another proposal for a cattle tax from Belfield in 1915 and again responded by urging caution. The matter, Bonar Law argued, should be considered again at the end of the war. Meanwhile, in 1916, when the Hut Tax was raised to Rs. 5, the Kasai rate was held back at Rs. 3, pending a final decision on the cattle tax.

A full set of proposals drafted by the Officer in Command Kasai Reserve, R.W. Hemstead, were put forward to, and accepted by, the Executive Council in December 1917. These proposals included provisions for assisting the development of African herds. Hemstead
estimated that the basai, as owners of not less than 600,000 cattle, two million sheep and 10,000 donkeys, valued at approximately Rs. 150 million, were among the richest people in the world. Each adult male, he calculated, was worth about Rs. 7,700 in livestock. They enjoyed a minimum natural increase of fifteen percent per annum, but as the reserve was fully stocked, they were unable to benefit from this. Though during the war years large numbers of livestock had been sold to the army, in normal times the only cattle sold outside the reserve went to supply the Nairobi meat market. In order to avoid wastage, therefore, the administration should take steps to compel the basai to part with their surplus stock. As their own wants were so few, and as they had little use for cash, the tribe should be taxed, with a proportion of the tax being ploughed back into the reserve in the form of improvements. The amount of tax, therefore, should be large enough to prevent a rapid natural increase, but not so large that it prevented increase altogether. The small increase could be accommodated in the reserve as a result of the improvement undertaken with part of the tax receipts. Hemstead argued that, of the natural increase of 90,000 per annum, 50,000 should be taken off in tax and, as these would be males or barren or worn out cows, they would fetch about forty rupees each. If the administration asked for Rs. 2 million in tax, or Rs. 3 per beast, they would force the sale of these cattle.
The justifications Hemstead used for suggesting this type and level of taxation, which were also those passed on to the Colonial Office by Bowring, are interesting and revealing. The aims of the tax were to secure a large revenue of over £100,000, to compel the Masai to place their surplus stock on the market, and to provide funds for the development and improvement of the reserve. Hemstead was trying to balance the government's desire for additional revenue and the Masai's ability to pay with his own desire that the Masai should benefit from European rule.

In the past, he felt, the administration had done very little for them:

Beyond safeguarding the lives and property of the Natives, it cannot be said that the State does much to bestow the ordinary blessings of civilization and responsible Government. Although the Reserve comprises 14,000 square miles of territory, no Doctor, Veterinary Officer, or educational facilities exist, and beyond some spasmodic and not very successful efforts to conserve water in earth work dams, we do nothing to change the country for the better, to improve the stock or to prevent disease. It has in fact been said that disease is welcome as it serves to impede the increase of stock, but surely our policy should be to make use of the surplus stock instead of allowing it to die.

It was planned to spend about half of the new taxation on additional administrative officers and police, buildings, water works, irrigation, dips, pure-bred cattle, and medical, technical and educational services. As if to excuse his enthusiasm, Hemstead added:
The only drawback, if it can be called one, would be that the Kasai would become even richer than they are now, but as long as they contributed their fair share of taxation and disposed of their surplus stock, no objection could reasonably be taken to this.

Plans for the introduction of the tax moved forward slowly. Hemstead's scheme required long term planning; the consequences were far reaching. It involved the annual sale of up to 50,000 cattle, many of them sub-standard. The meat market and the demands of the European settlers could only take a fraction of this number, and no meat canning or freezing facilities existed in the Protectorate to absorb the remainder. In any case, because of the presence of cattle disease, the reserve was quarantined, and cattle were only allowed out of the reserve through one route, direct to Nairobi for slaughter. No staffs were available to set up quarantine stations, collect the tax or carry out the suggested improvements. Belfield felt that the scheme could not be considered until after the war, and the Colonial Office agreed.

Nine months after the end of hostilities Northev, the new Governor, decided to take up Hemstead's plan. His motives for doing so were indicated in a dispatch of August 1919 to the Colonial Office. The Kasai had been raiding into Tanganyika to replenish herds cut down by disease, drought, and sales to the military. Northev clearly regarded the Kasai as a danger to security, and a danger to the cattle of the settlers located close to their borders. A cattle tax, with half of the revenue devoted
to improvements, would mean that the tribe could be concentrated into smaller improved areas, which would allow easier control and the alienation of lands from their over-large reserve. Parkinson at the Colonial Office was sympathetic but, fearing "another Buganda agreement," he did not wish to be committed to spending a precise percentage of the revenue from the cattle tax on improvements. He felt that the proposed measures would be useful from a security point of view, though he had little hope that the Masai would every become economically productive:

It has been long agreed that the Masai are a useless race, however picturesque they may be. Sir G. Elliot (sic) compared them to the lion and the leopard: strong and beautiful beasts of prey, but no use and often dangerous. 67

The vital ingredient of the Hemstead scheme was the provision of a canning factory, which could absorb the Masai cattle increases and indirectly provide the revenue for both the government purse and the reserve improvements. The government had already received applications for land from three firms in the meat canning and freezing business. In March 1919 Northey called for tenders. He offered an area of 34,000 acres between Ulu and Sultan Hamud (and thereby in a position to take cattle from both Masai and kamba areas without the risk of infecting European owned cattle), at a rent of ten cents per acre per annum. The factory was to be constructed within two years of the finalization of the agreement, and had to be capable of producing five million pounds of canned or frozen meat every year (i.e. 20,000 beasts). Minimum
prices for native cattle were to be fixed by the government to avoid the danger of Africans, faced by high tax demands, being forced to sell their stock at artificially low prices. Under this offer no tenders were submitted. Direct approaches to reputable firms were also tried, but these too proved unsuccessful. The world economic depression and the shortage of investment capital deterred potential investors.

There was another more specific objection to the scheme raised by the firms which the government approached. The government was unwilling to guarantee a minimum annual supply of beasts to the factory. Leaving aside the question of the general willingness of the pastoralists to sell their cattle, the government were unable to rely upon a regular annual increase in African cattle holdings because of the heavy incidence of cattle diseases, particularly rinderpest, pleuro-pneumonia, and east coast fever, in the reserves. Especially during the last years of the war, deaths of African cattle from disease had increased markedly. Many officers of the Kenya Government began to realize that the availability of a secure marketable surplus of cattle depended upon effectively combating these diseases.

William Kennedy, the Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, believed that seventy-five percent of the stock losses in the reserves were due to preventable disease. This represented a loss of twelve and one half percent of all native cattle per year, worth over £1 million.
Kennedy blamed the smallness of the veterinary services for the ineffectiveness of its policy in the past. 70

The staff of the Veterinary Department in the past has barely sufficed to deal with the stock diseases which have come under notice in the settled areas of the Protectorate and no staff has been available to adequately cope with the disease in the Native Reserves. 71

As a result of this lack of staff, the service had to prohibit the movement of stock from reserve to settled area in order to check the spread of disease. Very few quarantine stations were provided to allow a flow of clean cattle into the settled areas. Again, because of the lack of staff the quarantine could not be adequately policed, and the movement of diseased cattle in smaller numbers continued. By restricting the passage of cattle from the reserves to the settled areas, the quarantine caused a build up in demand for breeding stock and transport oxen. As the demand rose so did the price, and these "high and fictitious values" themselves encouraged movement. The quarantine policy, in order to be effective, needed to be accompanied both by policing measures and the provision of inspection bomas to allow cattle, after a period of quarantine, to move out of the reserve. The imposition of quarantine regulations in Kenya prior to 1920 generally meant a total ban on the legal movement of cattle. 72

As a policy designed to restrict the spread of disease, the quarantine policy generally failed, though it is fair to add that the relaxation of regulations during the war years, due to military demands for meat supplies, probably caused an accelerated worsening of the situation. Rinderpest had, by 1920, infected the entire Masai reserve and was widespread in the Suk and Turkana areas. Previously isolated outbreaks on European farms gradually gathered momentum until, by the end of the war,
the disease affected farms in Laikipia, Gilgil, Nakuru, Ravine, Londiani, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Fort Ternan, Muhoroni, Kibigori, Nairobi and Kiambu areas. After a gradual increase in the number of areas affected with rinderpest through the first decade of this century, it was prevalent by 1911 in Nyanza Province, the northern Masai reserve, parts of the southern Masai reserve, and isolated areas in the Rift Valley and Ukambani. In 1913 it invaded Nandi, Suk, Turkana, Ravine and Baringo, and in the following year it was considered to be enzootic through most of the native reserves. During the war years, it appeared in epizootic form in Samburu, Tanalond, Fort Hall, Embu, Meru, Nachakos and Kitui Districts, and by 1919 European farms were facing more frequent outbreaks. Quite possibly the actual spread of both these diseases was a great deal less dramatic than the known spread. What was certainly true was that, by the end of the war, veterinary officers recognised that urgent steps needed to be taken to avoid the further infection of European herds and the apparently multiplying losses among native cattle. The two problems were, of course, inseparable; the African herds were the source of infection for European farms and, as it was impossible to fully control movement out of the reserves, it was necessary to combat the diseases within them. With its grossly inadequate staff, the veterinary service was unable to tackle the problem, and the end of the war saw a quarantine blanket thrown over all the reserve areas touching upon occupied alienated land. Indeed, an approach from the Uganda Government in 1919 requesting consideration of joint action against cattle disease on a regional basis was rejected by the Kenya Government on the grounds of excessive cost. A dire shortage of stock in settled areas was, however, instrumental
in bringing about a change in the quarantine policy. Wartime military requisitions of settler cattle and heavy losses by stock diseases on many European farms, accompanied by a general rundown of the level of stock holding during the absence of many of the settlers at the front, meant that many settlers in the immediate post-war period required large numbers of cattle for breeding and slaughter and for transport and plough work. The arrival of over 1,200 new farmers under the Soldier Settler Scheme and a further 300 or so, who bought land in the normal way, added to these demands. Yet, while the quarantine was in operation, settlers could not legally obtain clean cattle from the reserves in sufficient numbers. The Chief Quarantine Officer estimated in late 1919 that about 500,000 cattle would be required in the near future, whereas only 30,000 per year were moving through the quarantine stations. The two largest stations at Kibigori and Rumuruti were, by early 1920, allowing about 20,000 cattle per year through into the settled areas. To satisfy settler needs and to prevent the flow of illicit diseased cattle, the Chief Veterinary Officer proposed that quarantine stations be opened at Mbagathi, Ngong, Kedong and Trans Mara on the borders of the Masai reserves, two stations on the Kenya border with Tanganyika Territory, and one each to allow cattle to flow more quickly from the Turkana, Suk and Elgeyo areas. The capital cost he reckoned at Rs.56,000 and recurrent costs at Rs.140,000. Bowring endorsed the scheme, adding in his dispatch to Kilner that the measures would make possible the introduction of a cattle tax. The aim was not to reduce the level of disease in the reserves, but to achieve the controlled flow of cattle from the reserves to the settled areas.
The problem of cattle disease in both the reserves and the settled areas, however, worsened through 1920 and 1921. As a consequence, the Legislative Council, on a motion introduced by Holm, agreed to call the veterinary officers of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika Territory together to discuss methods of eradicating rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia. They met in September 1920. Their conclusions were an extension of the ideas that Kennedy had put forward to the Economic Commission. The report of the conference calculated that losses from rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia were running at a rate of over 500,000 per year in Kenya alone and, as a result, the cattle population, instead of doubling itself every five years as it would if the reserves were free of disease, was gradually declining. Other than the sheer waste of resources this represented, which at Rs. 40 per animal worked out at Rs. 122 million a year; the conference detected other disadvantageous economic effects flowing from the presence of the diseases in the reserves. Because of the risk that cattle bought may be infected, the cattle traders offered lower prices for them, and yet they had to charge more when they sold them to cover the losses they had sustained when cattle died in their possession. This pushed up the cost of ploughing and transport. Further, the shortage of healthy cattle for plough and transport work meant that many farmers were having to use human labour instead, thus creating a higher demand and a higher price for labour. Transport involving the use of oxen became impossible, or at least very difficult, along many routes which crossed quarantine boarders. Finally, the report of the conference noted
the adverse effect of large scale cattle deaths on the African 
pastoral tribes, who were finding it increasingly difficult to 
support themselves.

The officers strongly urged an all-out attack on both 
diseases by a massive programme of inoculation carried out by 
veterinary units, each consisting of one European veterinary officer, 
five stock inspectors, and thirty five native scouts. They estimated 
that Kenya alone would need thirty two such units operating for 
three years, after which they could be slowly run down. The 
African stock scouts could observe between one thousand and five 
thousand cattle each, visiting them as often as possible to check 
for disease. They would require only a simple two month training 
programme. Within two years of starting the operation, the 
veterinary officers predicted that deaths could be cut drastically, 
and within ten years all but eliminated, thus saving the Colony 
about £2 million per annum in cattle losses. By contrast to the 
savings, the initial outlay would be £1,088 per unit, plus recurrent 
annual costs of £7,089. The total cost of all the units over three 
years they calculated at £238,458 per year. Much of this would 
be recoverable from cattle owners by charging an inoculation fee.

By the time the report of the conference reached London, 
the financial position of the Colony was desperate. Even if, in 
more prosperous times, there had been a chance that their plan 
would have been adopted, in the financial circumstances of 1921 
there was no question at all of spending such large sums of 
money primarily for the benefit of African cattle. Otherwise the 
report received sympathetic consideration. This was in clear
contrast to its reception by certain parts of the Kenya administration. Northey felt that the report greatly exaggerated the value of native stock for, while there was no market, stock in such large numbers had little or no value. Neither was there any immediate prospect of establishing a beef industry to create such a market. Holm, the Director of Agriculture, was a great deal less sympathetic than Northey and, for the next few years, carried on a running fight with one of the report’s co-authors and firmest advocates, R.E. Montgomery, the Veterinary Adviser to the East African governments.

The accusation that the Veterinary Department had favoured the European settler at the expense of African live-stock was a constant feature of the debate. The Native Affairs Department was drawn in on the side of Montgomery. Watkins, the Acting Chief Native Commissioner, stated in the Legislative Council in January 1921 that it was very difficult to persuade Veterinary Department officers to go into the reserve, and that the Veterinary Department tended to look at the entire veterinary problem from the point of view of the European settler and ignore the Africans’ interests. He pointed the finger directly at Holm who, as Director of Agriculture, had overall control of Veterinary Department. He called for independence for the Veterinary Department from the Agriculture Department, in order that more attention could be given to the problems of African owned stock. Maxwell’s Native Affairs Department Annual Report of 1921 made a similar accusation.

Through 1921 the calls by administrative officers for the release of the reserves from quarantine became more insistent as
taxes in many areas became more difficult to collect. The position was particularly acute because of the increased level of taxation, the short financial year of 1921, and a widespread crop failure.84

For many Africans the only method of raising taxes was to sell their cattle. Further, many of the administrative officers insisted that either the quarantines be raised or, as the Veterinary Conference advised, an all out attack on the diseases should be launched. Holm stated that he was unwilling to act simply on the professional advice of Montgomery, believing the issue to be one which should be decided as a matter of general policy. He proposed, and the Legislative Council accepted, the establishment of a committee to investigate the entire question of the pleuro-pneumonia infection and the proper government response to it.85

Other parties in the Colony were deeply concerned in the issue; the Governor and the Treasurer were worried about falling revenues; and the settlers could observe that the twenty-one European farms currently infected with pleuro-pneumonia were threatened with ruin. In January 1921 the Colony, as one of a range of economies, ceased the payment of compensation to European cattle owners whose infected cattle were slaughtered. The call to raise the quarantine represented to them the prospect of further infection and further financial loss.

A committee of eight members, chaired by Holm and including five settlers,86 could hardly conclude otherwise than that the quarantine, which affected 1,500,000 cattle, should remain in force.

They argued that any relaxation of the regulations would be
followed by a spread of disease both inside and outside the reserves. The establishment of quarantine bomas would create additional movement inside the reserves and would thereby prove damaging to African stock owners. Further, quarantine bomas were an unnecessary expense which the Colony could ill-afford, particularly as European demand for African cattle had largely been met. With no market for cattle outside the reserves, the amount of tax collected would not be altered by lifting the quarantine. The committee thought it most important that a veterinary survey be conducted in the Kamasia and the Uasin Gishu Masai reserves at the earliest possible time to see if the disease existed there. If it did not, they recommended that the quarantine be immediately lifted. More significantly, the committee made some concession to the increasingly powerful groups, who felt that more of the country's resources should be directed towards the development of the native reserves. Though they rejected the Veterinary Conference report, they did advocate that an effort be made to combat cattle diseases in the reserves. Their grounds were rather self-interested:

In view of the fact that the infected native areas are the source of all out-breaks which occur in the European area and that the disease is spreading rapidly in the reserves, the Committee strongly recommends that three Veterinary Officers be withdrawn from the European area and detailed for duty in native reserves. They should be supported by nine stock inspectors, the latter to be paid from Native Trust Funds.

The new Governor, Coryndon, welcomed the recommendations. They meshed in well with his programme of aid to African agriculture, and with the recommendations of the Economic and
Finance Committee of June 1922. Though the overall veterinary budget was cut, Bowring's Committee agreed that a start should be made in combatting the diseases at their source. They recommended the establishment of two veterinary units of one veterinary officer and three stock inspectors each to work in Nyanza Province. To defray some of the expenses Africans were to pay for rinderpest injections, though not for pleuro-pneumonia. Three other officers would work in Masai and Kikuyu areas inoculating African cattle, and would be self-supporting. The estimates of the veterinary service were framed, according to Bowring, "with the object of fostering and protecting native stock." The Naivasha stock farm was now considered a luxury and was closed down. Passed while Holm was on leave, the estimates included a new head of expenditure, "Native Reserves", under which provision was made for one senior veterinary officer, four veterinary officers and eight stock inspectors, costing a total of £10,374. The authors of the Veterinary Conference report no doubt regarded the sum, and the effort it paid for, as nominal. It was, however, the first time since the foundation of the Veterinary Department that money had been specifically set aside in the estimates for an effort to assist the development of African livestock.

Much the same set of pressures which had resulted in the decision to spend money on the assistance of African agriculture also prompted this initiative. The expenditure had the backing of European settlers who, far from being threatened by the programme, stood to benefit from it. It might be argued...
that healthier African cattle meant less reliance on farm wages as a source of money for tax payments, and thereby the programme might adversely affect the supply of labour from pastoral and non-pastoral cattle owning peoples. In fact, the reverse was true. The major source of income from cattle was hides, and the higher the disease rate, the higher this income rose. While the quarantine barriers remained, the European cattle industry was in no danger of being swamped by the much greater potential of African livestock. At the same time European farms were protected from diseases and assured of the small supplies of clean African cattle they normally required. Unless the proposals of the Veterinary Conference were accepted wholesale, there was no danger that the quarantine would be lifted.

Nevertheless Montgomery, with some support from the Colonial Office, continued to argue that a serious attempt should be made to eradicate disease in the reserve and lift the quarantine. He continued, too, to press for the erection of a meat canning factory to consume the huge numbers of cattle saved by his schemes. He believed that East African cattle, paid for at the rate of 10/- per 100 lbs. live weight, could well compete with Australian, South American or South African meat products, whose current prices were between twice and four times higher. The revenue gained from cattle sales could be used for conservation programmes and for the purchase of imported breeding bulls to improve the supply of better grade meat and reduce the price still further. Coryndon, in the early months of his governorship,
supported him. In his view, African prosperity, and with it the prosperity of the whole Colony, would be stimulated more certainly and more rapidly if an outlet could be found for their cattle than by developing African agriculture. His other concern was the difficulty in collecting taxes from pastoral areas now that the European buying boom had subsided. Coryndon supported Montgomery's view that government should guarantee the supply of cattle to any reputable firm willing to invest money. The Colonial Office was unwilling to face the possibility of forced cattle sales in Kenya, and asked the Governor to reconsider the proposals. Revised terms were drawn up in April 1923 omitting the guarantee, and this time they met with approval in London. But still the Colony was unable to interest any of the large meat packing firms in their proposition. As a last, but unavailing, effort Montgomery, whilst on leave in England later in 1923, tried to persuade the Colonial Office to accept the idea that, if private investment could not be attracted, then the Government, in the interests of developing the Colony, should finance the project. The Colonial Office, guessing that the Kenya Government would oppose such a move, showed no enthusiasm for the idea.

Montgomery's failure to find money for his factory plans from either private enterprise or government was of crucial importance to the failure of his larger scheme for eradicating cattle disease and building up East African native herds. Holm's opposition to Montgomery's ideas effectively carried the day through the important debates of 1923 and 1924 on the future of
the African cattle herds in Kenya. Holm argued that no foreseeable return from cattle sales, or from sales of their products, could possibly justify such a huge expenditure as £715,360 over three years proposed by Montgomery. Heavy losses by Africans were "most regrettable," but without a market the losses were "in no sense real." In any case, the African was accustomed to them, and unlike the European he was not, according to Holm, dependent upon his cattle. Any policy of cattle conservation would also quickly result in greater pressure on the land, overstocking, and the movement of cattle onto land which could more profitably be used for agriculture. Holm probably had the Yatta Plateau specifically in mind. Conservation of cattle must wait upon the opening of a canning or freezing plant. Holm's policy favoured an increase in the numbers of veterinary officers operating in the reserves as soon as the financial position of the Colony improved. They should be used to check the further spread of disease, supervise quarantine stations for the regulation of stock movement between African and European areas when Europeans demanded it, as well as between native areas, and to instruct Africans in the preparation of hides and skins and the manufacture of ghee. Holm saw the future of the cattle owning tribes in terms of increased sales of ghee and hides, an increased inter-tribal livestock trade (as African agricultural production increased to allow Africans in the reserve a higher level of meat consumption), and a higher level of sales of draught and beef animals to European farms, as the latter developed to their full economic potential.
Montgomery and the Chief Veterinary Officers of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika were not impressed by Holm's arguments, and continued to press for the expenditure of large sums of money on a cattle conservation. Crucial to the success of Montgomery's plans was the support of the Governors of Uganda and Tanganyika, for Montgomery had always argued that the success of his schemes could only be assured if a regional approach was adopted. Byatt of Tanganyika and Archer of Uganda did not support him. Neither felt justified in committing large sums of money to the scheme, Byatt because of the absence of a market and the more urgent calls on government money made by what he believed were more deserving development programmes, and Archer because he felt that Africans would be very reluctant to part with large numbers of cattle. Coryndon remained the most enthusiastic of the East African Governors, but even his enthusiasm was so qualified it could not prevent Montgomery's plans from subsiding into oblivion. As funds permitted, he was prepared to increase the veterinary staff, to establish a training depot for African stock inspectors and scouts, and to take preventive measures for dealing with outbreaks of disease amongst native cattle. The future of African livestock rested with the provision of meat canning facilities. Until this was available, he was only prepared to approve the financing of a policy of containing disease and developing the hide and ghee trades.

Opinion in the Colonial Office was deeply divided. Calder agreed wholeheartedly with Holm that Montgomery was far too optimistic about the value of East African cattle, and was
convinced that the whole scheme was economically unsound. He went further than Holm in arguing for a retrenchment in the veterinary service in favour of other branches of agriculture development which, he felt, offered more promising openings for government expenditure. His seniors, Bottomley and Read, took a diametrically opposed view. Read expressed "great confidence" in Montgomery and felt that he should be encouraged, while Bottomley thought it "deplorable that Mr. Montgomery's careful schemes for regenerating and using them (African cattle) should find so little sympathy." Calder's suggestion for retrenchment was over-ruled, but response was confined to repeated calls for an end to the policy of quarantining African reserves. The Colonial Office officials were unwilling to recommend the adoption of Montgomery's plans in the face of resistance from East Africa.

In the years 1922 to 1925 veterinary policy in Kenya followed the pattern advocated by Holm in his debates with Montgomery. There was no large-scale attack on disease in the reserves, quarantines continued to be used extensively, and a little positive assistance was provided for African cattle owners to develop a trade in ghee and hides. The campaign against cattle disease had, in fact, begun in a small way in the Kipsigis Reserve in July 1922. By December the veterinary authorities stated that they were experiencing difficulty extracting payments for inoculations. Holm argued that, until the Colony's financial position improved, veterinary policy should mark time and content itself with improving African...
cattle by giving advice on breeding selection to cattle holders. The Executive Council agreed that, as there was no outlet for cattle, there was no point in continuing with the inoculation programme. Consequently, the programme of systematic inoculation was suspended, and energies were diverted into instructing Africans in the manufacture of ghee and the preparation of hides. The veterinary units began to make systematic veterinary surveys, but continued to deal with fresh outbreaks of disease in the reserves, whenever it was possible for them to do so.  

Efforts to encourage the more efficient production of ghee were directed at reducing the very high level of imports of the product from India. Stock inspectors were ordered to give demonstrations at native markets of clean and efficient methods of ghee production, and all government officers in the reserves were instructed to aid the construction and operation of African run dairies. The programme was handicapped by the lack of specialist knowledge and by the shortage of funds. As the Director of Agriculture admitted, the agricultural officers were not trained for this work, and the scheme needed the appointment of a specialist officer, who could examine the conditions in each reserve and determine which improvements would fit the particular circumstances he found. The Government of the Colony was unwilling to assign a high priority to this work. Holm explained:
Having regard to the demands upon this Department for services to different branches of the agriculture industry which are not yet met and which relatively are of greater importance than the Ghee Industry, I cannot urge the appointment of an Officer to deal only with ghee production at present. 105

From 1925 local native council money was used to develop dairies in Masai, Meru, Kavirondo, Kipsigis, Kamba and Kamasia areas. 106

The export of hides had always provided a substantial part of the total value of Kenya's exports. The price per unit had, because of a lack of preparation, remained low, and it was the government's intention to instruct Africans in methods of cleaning and drying, which would result in higher prices being offered for prepared hides. These strictly advisory methods had little or no effect. They lacked the backing of either legal sanction or financial incentive. 107

As far back as 1905 an ordinance had been passed in German East Africa which forbade the branding of cattle in any manner which would adversely affect the value of the hide. In Kenya, agriculture and veterinary officers gave advice to barazas and issued a booklet containing instructions in Swahili. Traders continued to buy hides, not individually by quality, but by weight irrespective of quality. While no legislation existed to curb this practice, there was little prospect of the African, who carefully prepared his hides for sale, being rewarded financially for his extra effort.

The policy of using quarantine restrictions on the
movement of African cattle underwent no appreciable change as a result of the debate about the role of the veterinary services. Increasingly though, the application of quarantine rules to large areas of the African reserves for long periods of time came under challenge both from London and from Kenya. Thomas, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, his successor Amery, and their staff indicated their disapproval. The issue arose as a result of Maxwell's critical Native Annual Report of 1922. The Colonial Office requested an explanation. Before this arrived, Goryndon informed them of the reimposition of quarantine over the entire Masai reserve area. Calder attached a strong minute to the despatch:

It seems to me quite wrong that a huge area like the Masai reserve should be under quarantine. It is larger than the whole area occupied by Europeans, and no-one would contemplate placing the whole European area under quarantine because disease existed on some farms.

Bottomley agreed that there was a need to keep the situation under constant review, but added that, because of lack of staff and the large size of the quarantined areas, inspection and treatment were bound to be slow. Thomas replied in strong terms:

The placing of the whole Masai reserve under quarantine restrictions is a most drastic measure which clearly inflicts considerable hardship on the Masai. I trust that inspections will be made as often as possible and the quarantine areas reduced....

The question came up yet again, later in 1924, when the Native Affairs Department Annual Report arrived. This again contained strong criticism of the policy of quarantining large areas of African land for long periods. It drew a critical response from Thomas' successor, Amery. "While quarantine is no doubt
the only means of checking the spread of endemic disease," he wrote, "the areas to which quarantine orders are applied seem unduly large." Again, budgetary difficulties were recognised by London, and Amery contented himself by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to rectify the situation. The Colonial Office, while clearly in disagreement with the policy being pursued in Kenya, was not prepared to overrule and impose its will on the government of the Colony.

The criticism of the use of quarantine measures contained in the Native Affairs Department Annual Reports reflected the concern expressed by administrative officers that quarantines, once imposed on African areas, were retained without an inspection of the reserve to determine whether the reasons for its original imposition were still valid. In 1922, for example, a quarantine was imposed on Mayale District after an outbreak of pleuro-pneumonia. It killed a flourishing cattle trade southwards through Rumuruti. Four years after the quarantine was instituted the District Commissioner, Moyale, wrote:

The District now appears to be entirely free of pleuro. It still however remains in quarantine, and will presumably remain so until visited by a representative of the Veterinary Department. As this District is entirely given over to the breeding of stock, has been in quarantine since 1922, and has not been visited by a representative of the Veterinary Department in four years, it is hoped that such a visit may prove practicable during the ensuing year.

In response to this plea, an officer did visit the district in 1927, and declared it free from disease. This was the only visit to this cattle dependent district in the entire decade.
Areas adjacent to European herds were visited more frequently.

As the District Commissioner, Kiambu, commented in 1929:

"No Veterinary Officer visits the Reserve or does any work in the reserve, except when an epidemic occurs which creates a threat to European owned stock."  

This comment was entirely typical of the reaction of administrative officers to the operations of the official veterinary services of the Colony.

While the veterinary staff remained small, inspection was inadequate to prevent the movement of diseased stock to European areas. The quarantines remained on most of the reserves for most of the rest of the decade. In the last half of the 1920's government concern shifted from plans to develop the cattle resources of the Africans to a desire to conserve the land they grazed, in order to prevent the overcrowding, degeneration, and consequent demands for the extension of the area they could use. The movement of the Kamba on to the Yatta Plateau provided a clear example in mid-decade of the dangers of allowing cattle herds to grow too quickly. Two approaches were possible. The government could either cope with cattle increases by devoting resources to the improvement of grazing areas, or they could act to restrict the numbers of cattle in the reserves by legislation. It was Coryndon's intention, as early as January 1925, to introduce legislation to enforce the restriction of growth of herds above the level which the land could bear. At the same time, he expressed an interest in preserving the condition of the grazing lands, and in facilitating the sales of surplus cattle.
Kenya Government policy towards pastoralists was totally opposed to any extension of the land used by them. The idea that pastoralism was a "backward" form of existence survived. It was still felt that government should use its influence to check the nomadic ways of the cattle owners, to attempt to restrict their movements so that school and medical facilities could be developed, which would exercise a "civilizing" influence upon them. By providing improved water supplies in the pastoral areas, therefore, two goals would be achieved simultaneously; firstly, the land would be better able to support larger herds without deterioration; and secondly, with assured water supplies, relatively settled communities could develop, replete with the institutions of western civilization.

A.D. Lewis, the Director of Irrigation for South Africa, was hired by the Kenya Government in late 1925 to write a report on irrigation prospects in Kenya, with particular reference to the question of water supplies for Kamba and Masai stock. His conclusions were clearly influenced by settler opinions and by his own South African background. He concluded:

I would hesitate to recommend the expenditure of large sums of money on irrigation works for the natives, especially in view of the fact that there are considerable and growing demands for the labour of the natives in various other directions in the country.

Lewis did point out the crucial relationship between the grazing density an area would support and the need to develop water supplies. Previous schemes in Masailand had failed because water supplies had been provided in areas where there was already
sufficient water for the number of cattle the grazing could support. One scheme that was submitted to Lewis for his consideration allowed for the grazing of 10,000 head at one water source. But if, as he calculated, each beast would require, on the average, ten acres of grazing, the cattle would be spread over 100,000 acres. This would constitute a circle of seven miles radius around the water supply. Some cattle would, therefore, be walking fourteen miles at least once every two days for water, which would render them useless for either beef or milk. In fact, the cattle would not be spread evenly over the entire area, and the land closest to the water would quickly become overgrazed and useless. As a solution, Lewis recommended a large number of small centres about four miles apart, with a restricted amount of water available at each. At the most, each centre could support five hundred cattle. His scheme, therefore, would not allow the concentrations of population that would be able to support schools, hospitals, and dairies. No rapid development followed this cheerless report. Water boring equipment was moved into the Colony in 1927, and first put to use in the Sultan Hamud area.

Increased water supplies would offer no short term solution to the problem of conserving grazing lands in the unalienated areas. Reacting to widespread reports of overgrazing and the deterioration of cattle lands, the executive designed a bill based on Coyndon's proposals of January 1925, under which
they would acquire powers to limit the number and type of cattle kept by Africans in any area the government wished to specify.

In October 1927 Grigg asked the Colonial Office to give its assent to the introduction of a set of rules under the Crop Production and Livestock Ordinance of 1926, which had been approved by the majority of the Executive Council. Applied to Machakos and Kitui Districts, the rules forbade Africans to keep bulls over fifteen months old, unless approved by inspectors and branded as breeding bulls, or cows over five years old, unless used as draught animals, cows which had either not given birth for two years or which were considered by an inspector to be unfit for breeding purposes, and any cattle judged to be suffering from an incurable disease. This was the first attempt by the Kenya Government to restrict the size of African herds by culling, and it came at a time when the Kamba were demanding increased grazing areas for their rapidly growing herds. The rules were not approved by the Colonial office. It felt that such a measure should operate more gradually. The proposals did not include, as the Colonial Office pointed out, any provision for marketing the culled cattle. The forced sales of stock would have resulted in a fall in the market price of cattle and inadequate compensation for the Kamba. The Government of Kenya was attempting to meet the problem of overstocking by the negative response of enforcing a reduction in the number of cattle owned, rather than by the more positive means of starting schemes to recondition the reserve.
Hall's Agriculture Commission saw erosion as the major problem of African agriculture. Compulsory culling, for example, in Kamba areas to one third of the present cattle population, was seen as the only possible solution to the problem. The Commissions recommended that a meat factory with a capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 beasts per annum be set up before the culling began. They felt that, as most of the cattle culled at first would be of very poor quality, their commercial value would be low, and the Kamba would be unwilling to part with them at the prices which could be offered for them. The government must, therefore, be prepared to offer a subsidy to the factory of around £3,000 per annum. Ultimately the Kamba must be induced to eat more meat to take up more of the surplus cattle. Unlike the 1927 government proposals, the Commissions saw beyond the simple need to reduce the numbers of stock. In recommending the establishment of a subsidised meat factory, they recognised that the pastoralist would have to be guaranteed a financial reward for the loss of cattle. They also recognised that the collection of livestock was "an aspect of social competition", and recommended the unlikely idea of the provision of coins, with cattle and goats embossed on them, to serve as legal tender in the reserve. The coins would have holes in them, so that they could be displayed, strung across the chest. They advocated, too, a programme of education in the commercial exploitation of cattle and cattle products, and the conservation of grazing based on a stock farm, using methods which related closely to existing African practices. For success, any scheme would have to
contain a strong educative element, designed to inculcate commercial attitudes towards cattle at the expense of the traditional cattle complex, and to teach the practices of commercial cattle keeping by example. 123

Only a few minor efforts and little expenditure had been directed towards this end. In 1925 the Kenya Government successfully proposed that quarantine stations in the reserves be used as educational centres; the extension of services they offered being paid for by the increased revenue from inoculation fees. 124 Another scheme, the Central Native Training Depot, located at Ngong, aimed at educating Africans to handle dairy cattle. Both its aims and its methods came under heavy criticism from the Agriculture Commission. 125

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that government preoccupation with the health and profitability of the quarter of a million European owned cattle led it directly to ignore the commercial potential of the four million African owned cattle. 126 There were considerable problems involved in implementing a programme of aid in the reserves. The cost of eradicating disease was vast, private companies failed to provide the capital for a canning or freezing plant, and strong doubts remained as to whether Africans would be willing to sell their cattle. Government thinking about African cattle remained defensive to the end. The measures they proposed in the late twenties were not designed to develop African herds, but to protect the land on which they grazed from further erosion. As with spending on
agricultural assistance, spending by the veterinary services on African owned cattle increased in the early 1920's with the adoption of the dual policy, and stagnated thereafter.

Table 13: Expenditure and Estimates of the "E" Native Reserves Division of the Veterinary Department, 1923-27.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>£ 9,374</td>
<td>£ 9,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>9,904</td>
<td>8,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>9,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>11,052</td>
<td>10,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>11,690</td>
<td>11,893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Government of Kenya was not prepared to support the ambitious plans of Montgomery for the development of the commercial potential of African cattle, despite the backing they had received from the Colonial Office. London, in turn, was unwilling to permit Nairobi to adopt measures designed to conserve land and reduce the number of African owned cattle, without any provision for development.

Two conflicting schools of thought about the future of the pastoral peoples of Kenya developed in the first thirty five years of colonial rule. On the one hand, it was argued that pastoralism was a backward way of life. The duty of the administration was to assist its demise. The opposing view, which emerged strongly after the First World War, insisted that the government's duty towards the pastoralists lay, not in discouraging their aspirations to acquire more cattle, but in assisting them to adopt modern methods of cattle keeping. One sought to change their way of life in a fundamental sense, to induce them to
adopt agriculture or industry, while the other view held that the pastoralists' path to progress lay through the adaption and modernization of their existing way of life. Broadly, these two sets of attitudes paralleled, and were perhaps derived from, two schools of thought about native administration in general - direct rule and indirect rule. Proponents of direct rule believed that "primitive" African civilization should be confronted with the full weight of European ideas and culture. European administrative and legal systems must be introduced, and European commercial penetration and investment encouraged. By contrast, indirect rule advocates held that African advancement would occur more easily, and with a much reduced danger of open conflict between coloniser and colonised, if the indigenous culture was used as the basis from which to encourage change. Few colonial administrators in London or the colonies disagreed about the need, or the duty, to bring colonial people into the modern world of European culture and ideas, and into the orbit of the imperial economy, which was itself a primary agent of change. What they disagreed about was the means to be used to accomplish this end.

The conflict of views can be illustrated by the debate at the highest levels of government in Kenya, between Holm and Montgomery. The Director of Agriculture was opposed to any measure capable of being interpreted as an encouragement to the pastoral way of life. He was antipathetic towards schemes for the systematic inoculation of African cattle; he argued for the restriction of herds to limited geographical areas. In contrast,
Montgomery advanced and supported a wide range of policies
designed to allow African herdsmen to exploit the commercial
value of their possessions. The debate echoed through the
Kenya administration, involving district and provincial
administrators as well as high officials. Between the two sides
the crucial issue was undoubtedly that of how much land the
pastoralists would be permitted to occupy. Upon this depended
the survival of the pastoral way of life in Kenya. Under the
Protectorate, land alienation bore more harshly upon cattle
keeping than upon the agricultural societies. The Masai, the
Kipsigis, and the Nandi suffered the loss of large areas of
their best grazing land, and certainly in the case of the
Kipsigis this was a factor encouraging them to turn to
agriculture. The Kamba suffered less than most from direct
alienation of land for European occupation, though they did lose
a large area of occasional grazing land known as the Yatta
Plateau. This was declared Crown Land, but it was not occupied
by Europeans.

Rapid growth of both human and cattle populations on the
Machakos Reserve from the beginning of the colonial period, added
to the confinement of herds within rigidly defined boundaries,
led quickly to overcrowding and overgrazing within the reserve.
From 1913 onwards the Kamba, principally from Machakos District,
were permitted from time to time, on payment of a fee, to graze
their cattle on the Yatta Plateau for a restricted period. From
1916 until the end of the period the use of the Yatta was an
issue of conflict dividing the administration at all levels.
Those who saw pastoralism as a way of life capable of improvement and modernization, and potentially able to provide Kenya Colony with an export income, advocated that the Kamba be granted permanent rights on the Yatta, whereas those who saw pastoralism as a regressive, backward way of life, argued for the permanent alienation of part or all of the land to Europeans. D. Storrs Fox, District Officer, Machakos, was clearly a member of the latter group. He was opposed to the idea of allowing the Kamba a large area of land in proportion to their population, and believed that "a certain degree of congestion would appear beneficial," since it compelled the society to make the most effective use of the land they already occupied. More land would simply encourage pastoralism, and this, in turn, encouraged idleness, because pastoralists were able to obtain their food supply with less effort than agriculturalists. Pastoralism:

...gives rise to an intense conservatism and contempt for all manner of work, and hence lack of progress. The able bodied men spend an undue proportion of their energies indulging in free love with the women. The incidence of gonorrhea is therefore abnormally high, thus causing a very high proportion of barren women and so reducing the birth-rate....

On the other hand, F.S. Traill, a Provincial Commissioner of Ukamba Province, reflected the views of Montgomery. Kamba cattle would become a valuable asset if quarantine restrictions were removed, free inoculations started, and a canning factory opened. If increased native production was being sought, it should be the policy of the government, argued Traill, to develop
Kamba stock holdings by allowing them permanent occupation of the Yatta Plateau. But there was a second argument:

We have now been administering the Kamba for more than a quarter of a century. During that time I feel constrained to say (with all due deference) we have given them remarkably little in return for the services received so lavishly from them.131

Before the onset of the depression at the end of the twenties, neither of these two approaches could be said to accurately characterise policy in Kenya toward cattle keeping societies. Ambitious schemes of development, though they received much support in London, were opposed successfully in Kenya, and further land alienation, which would have spelled the end of pastoralism in Kenya, did not occur in the twenties. The Yatta issue was left unsettled, mass inoculation schemes for African owned cattle were not implemented, cattle culling without market outlets was firmly prevented by London, little was done to find water within the reserves in order to increase grazing capacity, and quarantine regulations remained in force over almost the entire country. The primary result of government policy was the growth in cattle numbers within the reserves and the steady erosion, in many areas, of the carrying capacity of pasture land. The commercial potential of African owned cattle remained unexploited.
Footnotes. Chapter 6.

1 For criticism of this theory, see C. Daryll Forde, *Habitat, Economy and Society* (London: Methuen, 1934). It first came under serious attack from academics at the beginning of the twentieth century.

2 Memorandum by J. Ainsworth, enclosed in Belfield to Harcourt, 3 April 1914, C.0.533/135.


4 For further detail on British policy towards northern pastoral tribes, see Mungeam and Barber.


6 Stewart to Lansdowne, 9 February 1905, F.0.2/915. Stewart argues here that, without the use of the Rift Valley, neither the Railway nor the Colony could be made to pay.


9 Belfield to Harcourt, 3 April 1914, C.0.533/135. See also Belfield to Harcourt, 30 October 1913, C.0.533/123. He argues for restrictions to be placed on the growth of Masai herds: "I hold the view that it is desirable to discourage by all legitimate methods the pastoral proclivities of native tribes and to lead them gradually to agricultural and industrial enterprises."
Rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia proved to be the major lasting threats to Kenya cattle. Pleuro-pneumonia took the form of a microbe, which attacked the lungs and the lung passage of the infected animal. Infection occurred by direct contact with a carrier and the symptoms took anything from ten days to four months to become apparent, though usually the disease was obvious after a period of between three to six weeks. Once exposed, the animal, though it may not die, would continue to carry the disease and infect others. In enzootic areas, for example much of the Masai reserve where cattle were exposed to the disease at birth, losses ran at ten percent per annum. Outbreaks of the disease in epizootic areas caused the death of about 45 percent of the herd.

Rinderpest was an infectious and contagious disease which affected all ruminants, including game animals. It was a minute organism, which attacked the animal's digestive tracts. Symptoms appeared between three and nine days after infection, and death often followed a week later. Mouth lesions, diarrhoea, and a peculiar and distinctive odour made it easy to detect. Unlike pleuro-pneumonia, the disease died out after the attack, and animals which recovered were no longer a source of infection. The virus could remain alive about a week outside the animal, and could be carried by game animals, birds, humans and hides. A herd attacked in an epizootic area lost, on the average, three-quarters of its number; in enzootic areas losses ran at ten percent.

Other diseases, notably east coast fever, anthrax and black-water also affected Kenya's cattle, though losses from these were far less significant.

See "Report of a Conference of Representatives of the Veterinary Departments of Kenya Colony, the Uganda Protectorate and Tanganyika Territory held at Nairobi, 11th September 1920," enclosed in Northey to Churchill, 29 April 1921, C.0.533/258.

Newland, p.266.

See Matson, pp.22-25 and Wrigley, pp.380-381.
15 A.C. MacDonald, "Report on the Re-organisation of the Agriculture Department," 14 December 1906, enclosed in Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 12 February 1907, C.0.533/27.

16 R.J. Stordy to Hayes Sadler, 18 May 1906, enclosed in Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 13 June 1906, C.0.533/16.

17 A.C. MacDonald, "Report on the Re-organisation of the Agriculture Department," 14 December 1906, enclosed in Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 12 February 1907, C.0.533/27.

18 Ibid.

19 Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 22 November 1907, C.0.533/33.


22 F. Brandt to Colonial Office, 8 May 1914, C.0.533/149.

23 Annual Report, 1908-09, p.34.


The District Commissioner, North Kavirondo, estimated that in the six months between April and September 1910 rinderpest claimed fifty percent of the cattle in the district. Political Record Book, North Kavirondo, Volume 1, DC/NN 3/1.


These were often ineffective. In 1919, for example, when a quarantine was imposed on North Kavirondo District, the District Commissioner reported that it was impossible to prevent movement between the reserves and the Trans-Nzoia farms. North Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1919-1920, DC/NN 1/3.


A.C. MacDonald to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 18 June 1910, enclosed in Monson to Crewe, 14 July 1910, C.0.533/75. The scheme apparently lapsed shortly after the despatch was sent.

A. Linton, Director of Agriculture to Stewart, 18 January 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lansdowne, 23 January 1905, F.0.2/914.

Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 12 December 1907, C.0.533/33.

Linton to Stewart, 18 January 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lansdowne, 23 January 1905, F.0.2/914.

Newland, p.265.

Kitui District Annual Report, 1909-10, DC/KTI.1/1/1.

A record of the terrible losses of men and cattle can be found in Ukamba Correspondence, Inward, 1899, CP 75/47 and Ukamba Correspondence, Inward and Outward, 1896-1900, CP 75/48 and CP 75/49. See for example, Ainsworth to Hardinge, 7 March 1898.

41. These appear to have been eased between 1905 and 1907, 1911 and 1917, and modified to allow export on permit from 1924. See District Annual Reports, DC/MKS 1/1/1-23.


43. Ukamba Province Annual Report, 1919-20, PC/CP 4/2/2 and Machakos District Annual Reports, 1925 and 1926, DC/MKS 1/1/15.

44. Kenya Land Commission, p.1356.

45. Ibid., p.1362, evidence of Captain Scott Little.


47. Ibid. For example, the evidence of C.F. Johnston, p.1348, H. Clay, p.1374, Major F. de V. Joyce, p.1355, and James Mutua, p.1336.

48. See, for example, the evidence of S.F. Deck, District Commissioner, Ngong, Economic Commission Report, pp.185-189. Alex Holm used these arguments frequently when opposing Montgomery's schemes. See below, pp. 177-178.

49. Kitui District Political Record Book, DC/KTI 7/1. An entry by District Commissioner Montgomery describes how, with great regularity, Kitui experienced drought conditions in 1868, 1878, 1888, 1898, 1908 and 1918.

51 Ibid., pp.94-106.

52 Denham to Amery, 6 June 1925, C.O.533/331.


54 Denham to Amery, 23 August 1927, C.O.533/371.

55 A.C. MacDonald reported that the Masai had willingly exchanged an unspecified number of bullocks for a grade-bred bull. Economic Commission Report, p.24. H.B. Partington, the District Commissioner, Rumuruti, commented in 1908 that the Samburu prized highly the half bred English cattle they had acquired through trading with the Europeans. Partington to Provincial Commissioner, Naivasha, 11 September 1908, enclosed in Hayes Sadler to Crewe, 29 September 1908.

56 Narok District Annual Report, 1928, DC/NRK 1/1/2.

57 Narok District Annual Report, 1929, DC/NRK 1/1/2.

58 These figures are for cattle exported under permit and represent probably less than one half of the total number of cattle exported from the district. Permits were only available at Kitui township in the southern part of the district, yet large numbers of cattle were exported from the northern part of the district to Kikuyu areas. For this trade Africans seldom bothered to obtain permits for which they would have had to travel up to 150 miles. See Kitui District Annual Report, 1924, DC/KTI 1/1/2.


60 Seldfield to Harcourt, 30 October 1913, C.O.533/123.
Harcourt to Belfield, 3 December 1913, C.O.533/123.

Bowring to Long, 13 March 1918, C.O.533/194.

Belfield to Harcourt, 26 May 1915 and Bonar Law to Belfield, 10 August 1915, C.O.533/14. Belfield proposed the new tax, payable from the end of the war, on the grounds that the Masai "now pay little or nothing in return for what is being done for them."


Bowring to Long, 13 March 1918, C.O.533/194.

Hemsted told the Economic Commission that the Masai had parted with around 100,000 cattle during the war years. Economic Commission Report, p.151.

Northey to Milnor, 14 August 1919, and minute by Parkinson, C.O.533/212.


Northey to Milner, 22 September 1920, C.O.533/236.

In the recent past the veterinary service had lost some of its officers to occupied German East Africa.

Drawn from Kennedy’s evidence to the Economic Commission, p.147.

Ibid., pp.146-150.

Report of the Conference of Representative of the Veterinary Departments of Kenya Colony, the Uganda Protectorate and Tanganyika Territory, held at Nairobi, 11 September 1920, enclosed in Northey to Churchill, 29 April 1921, C.O.533/255.
According to the Colonial Office Lists, the veterinary staff in 1919 totalled sixteen men – the Chief Veterinary Officer, the Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, a veterinary pathologist and thirteen veterinary officers.

Bowring to Milner, 16 September 1919, C.0.533/213.

R.J. Stordy, Chief Veterinary Officer to A.C. MacDonald, Director of Agriculture, 30 December 1919, enclosed in Bowring to Milner, 11 February 1920, C.0.533/230.

Bowring to Milner, 11 February 1920, C.0.533/230.

Debates of the Legislative Council, 8 June 1920, C.0.544/6.

Report of the Veterinary Conference, 1920. The programme involved the slaughter of all cattle already infected by pleuro-pneumonia and the inoculation of the unaffected with a newly developed virus. To deal with rinderpest there were two alternatives. Rinderpest areas were to be thoroughly isolated, and all cattle within them immunised with serum. As the immunity lasted only two weeks, it was necessary to re-inoculate every fortnight, until the disease died out. There was no conclusive evidence that this method would prove effective, and certainly re-infection was possible via game animals. The alternative was to double inoculate all cattle with serum and rinderpest virus. The disadvantages of this method, the death of about five percent of the animals double inoculated, losses from abortions, the deterioration of the condition of the animals following the inoculation, and the difficulty in arranging the supply of fresh blood, which contained the germ of rinderpest but no other infection, were probably outweighed by the advantages, the permanent immunity given by double inoculation, and the slightly lower cost of the operation compared with repeated inoculations.

Ibid.

Northey to Churchill, 29 April 1921, C.0.533/258.
82 Debates of the Legislative Council, 31 January 1921, C.0.544/6. The same point was made by Maxwell's deputy on 18th October 1921 in the Legislative Council.

83 Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1921 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1922) p.4. The report noted that there was less disease than usual among African cattle. "The quarantine for pleuro-pneumonia imposed on almost all of the Reserves for the protection of European owned stock has been disastrous for the native, who is thus prevented from bringing his surplus stock out for sale."

84 In 1921 the government changed over from a financial year which ran from 1st April to 31st March, to one which ran from 1st January to 31st December. Thus, in 1921 the financial year ran from 1st April to 31st December.

85 Debates of the Legislative Council, 18 October 1921, C.0.544/6.

86 The five settlers were Lord Delamere, R.B. Cole, Conway Harvey, J.E. Coney and T.A. Wood.

87 By the end of 1922 the price of African breeding stock had fallen from a peak of Shs. 90-100 in Shs. 50-40. See Coryndon to Devonshire, 14 February 1923, C.0.533/293.

88 Report of the Special Committee of the Legislative Council appointed to examine and report upon the position in respect of Bovine Pleuro-Pneumonia and to make recommendations regarding the steps which should be taken to deal with it, 1922. Enclosed in Bowring to Devonshire, 23 November 1922, C.0.533/254.

89 Bowring to Northey, 22 June 1922 enclosed A Coryndon to Churchill, 6 September 1922, C.0.533/281.

90 Bowring to Devonshire, 23 November 1922, C.0.533/284.

91 Coryndon to Churchill, 6 September 1922, C.0.533/281.
In the last full financial year, 1920–21, the Department of Agriculture had spent £2,100 on veterinary services for Africans. Holm to Conway Harvey, Chairman, Sub-Committee of the Convention of Associations, 18 January 1921, enclosed in Northey to Churchill, 10 June 1921, C.0.533/260.

Memorandum by R.E. Montgomery, 6 January 1923, enclosed in Coryndon to Devonshire, 14 February 1923, C.0.533/293.

Coryndon to Devonshire, 14 February 1923, C.0.533/293.

Northcote to Devonshire, 27 May 1923, C.0.533/294.

Minute by Parkinson on Northcote to Devonshire, 27 May 1923, C.0.533/294.

It was in 1923 and 1924 that the debate about the future use of the Yatta Plateau raged. This was an area of unalienated Crown Land, which had been used intermittently since 1907 by the Kamba for grazing their surplus cattle. In 1923 the Kamba were ordered to vacate it and did so, in the process incurring large stock losses. There followed a debate on how the area should be used, many officials, including Holm, arguing that Europeans should be settled on parts of it. See below, pp. 193–195.

Holm to Chief Secretary, 12 January 1923, and Holm to Acting Chief Secretary, 1 June 1923, enclosed in Coryndon to Thomas, 28 August 1924, C.0.533/312.

Memo by the Chief Veterinary Officers of Kenya Colony, Tanganyika Territory, the Uganda Protectorate and Nyasaland, and the Veterinary Advisor to the Colonial Secretary, Nairobi, 19 April 1923, enclosed in Coryndon to Thomas, 28 August 1924, C.0.533/312.

Byatt to Thomas, 20 February 1924, and Archer to Thomas, 24 June 1924, C.0.533/316.

Coryndon to Thomas, 28 August 1924, C.0.533/312.
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[70x636]Thomas,

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[179x600]e by Calder, on Coryndon to

[340x600]~hoks,

[390x600]14 February

[462x600]1924,

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[82x588]Thomas

[148x588]to Coryndon, 25 July 1924, C.0.533/308.

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[209x576]on Coryndon to Thomas, 10 April 1924, C.0.533/309.

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"Report

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[143x481]1926,

enclosed in

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[293x481]to Amery, 22 January 1926, C.0.533/

356. See also, Coryndon to Thomas, 14 February 1924, C.0.533/308 and

Coryndon to Thomas, 13 March 1924, C.0.533/309.

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1926,

for example,

the Masai Local Native Council voted

Shs.3,100 and the Heru Local Native Council Shs.1,400 to assist the

development of the ghee industry. Bailward (for Chief Native Commis-

sioner) to Chief Secretary, enclosed in Northcote to Amery, 14 July 1926,

C.0.533/348.

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[83x241]Bottomley, on Coryndon to Thomas,

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C.0.533/309.

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London in late 1923. Coryndon's com-

ments followed in Coryndon to Thomas, 12 February 1924, C.0.533/308.

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Notes by Calder and Bottomley, on Coryndon to Thomas,

10 April 1924, and reply, Thomas to Coryndon, 3. June 1924, C.0.533/309.

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Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1923, enclosed in

Coryndon to Thomas, 28 October 1924, and reply, Amery to Coryndon,

24 December 1924, C.0.533/314.


[112]Moyale District Annual Reports, 1927, 1928, 1929 and 1930,

PC/NFD 1/6/2.

114. See, for example, District Commissioners Meetings, PC/CP 8/4B/4. The District Commissioners of Coast Province passed a resolution in 1924 deploiring the failure of the veterinary service to appoint an officer for their province.

115. Coryndon to Amery, 8 January 1925, C.0.533/325.

116. See the minutes of the discussion on native land tenure involving members of the East Africa Commission, the Governor, the Chief Native Commissioner, the Commissioner for Lands, and the Chief Secretary. Coryndon and Maxwell both expressed this view. Minutes enclosed in Coryndon to Amery, 8 January 1925, C.0.533/325.


118. Ibid., Chapter 7.

119. Denham to Amery, 23 August 1927, C.0.533/371.

120. Grigg to Amery, 14 October 1927, C.0.533/372. The Chief Native Commissioner registered his dissent when the rules were considered by the Executive Council.

121. Minutes by Bottomley and Ormsby-Gore (Parliamentary Under-secretary for the Colonies), on Grigg to Amery, 14 October 1927, C.0.533/372.


123. James Mutua, a sub-headman from Machakos District, observed that the educated no longer shared traditional attitudes to cattle. He told the Kenya Land Commission: "Now in these days they learn to keep the money instead of keeping cattle. If a man gets a hundred cattle and is an educated man he doesn't want to keep all that, he will sell half and keep half. Now is not like old times." *Kenya Land Commission*, p.1338.
Northcote to Amery, 10 July 1925, C.0.533/332. Bungoma quarantine station in North Kavirondo District was already producing a profit.

Agriculture Commission Report, pp.31-32.

Agricultural Census, 1930. The estimates were 218,000 European owned cattle against 4,742,379 African owned cattle in 1930.

In 1927 it was decided to discontinue the practice, started in 1923, of placing the estimates of expenditure on cattle in the reserves under a separate heading.

See below, pp. 271-272, 298.

For a summary of the recent history of the Yatta Plateau see, the Secretary's precis of evidence submitted to the Kenya Land Commission, pp.1269-1276.

Ibid., pp.1297-99.

Ibid., 1324-26.
Chapter 7. The Role of the Indian Trader.

The work of Indian traders in East African territories forms a bright chapter in its history, worthy of our pride in it, and deserves encouragement because of their usefulness, and their contribution to their (sic) development since the early days of known history. Theirs is a record of service of which anyone may well be proud.

With these words J.B. Pandya opened his presidential address to the newly formed Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry of East Africa in 1932. He looked back with pride, but forward with extreme uncertainty to what he predicted would be the intensification of a programme designed to remove the Indian traders from the position they had built up in the reserves. Pandya had no doubt about the importance of the Indian contribution to the development of production and trade in the reserves. Others, outside the Indian communities, assessed their contribution rather differently, and argued that the Indian domination of trade in the reserves should be ended.

In general, Indian traders followed rather than preceded the administration into the interior of the Protectorate. During the last half of the nineteenth century Indians dominated the retail trade of the East African coast and the off-shore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Expeditions, trading and exploratory, into the interior were usually financed by Indian entrepreneurs. Customs collections at coast and island ports was farmed out by the Sultans of Zanzibar to Indians and, towards the end of the century, many Arab owned estates on the Protectorate coast were mortgaged to Indians. With rare exceptions, such as Musa Mzuri, Indian traders preferred not to operate in the interior.
depending instead upon Arab and Swahili agents to act for them. Until the completion of the Uganda Railway in 1902, the major trade routes of east Africa ran from the coast through Tanganyika to the lake regions. Along these routes Indian traders established a chain of stores or dukas stretching into Uganda. Allidina Visram’s dukas on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria were the only Indian retail establishments in the interior of the Protectorate before the construction of the railway. The vast area bounded on the west by the coastline, on the east by the lake, and on the south by the international boundary, remained virtually untapped by traders of all nationalities. Besides the Imperial British East Africa Company, two European companies, Bousted, Ridley and Smith, Mackenzie and Company, were actively trading through the Protectorate to Uganda in the last decade of the nineteenth century. They established depots at Kikuyu, Muani, Msongoleni, Voi and Mikungani but, preoccupied with the Uganda trade, their only concern in British East Africa was to secure sufficient food for their caravans. They were either unable or unwilling to supply the administrative stations with the trade goods they needed. These stations needed large supplies to pay labour and to purchase food both for themselves and for official parties passing through their territory. To indicate the extent of their demands, Ainsworth at Machakos needed 420 pounds of thick brass wire and fifty pieces of nineteen yard lengths of Bombay gumpty per month to pay a hundred porters in the railway survey party, as well as three loads of pink pound beads and three loads of Bombay gumpty to pay for food for them. A month later, in September 1896, Ainsworth was requested to supply another one thousand labourers with food.
A constant pre-occupation of the early administrators in the interior was the supply of trade goods. Only certain types of cloth, wire and beads were acceptable to Africans, and payment of these in return for labour and food supplied had to be met from the stores held at the boma. The administrators were, therefore, engaged extensively in entrepreneurial functions, maintaining an adequate supply of goods, ensuring that they stocked the type of goods for which there was a demand, and fixing rates of exchange for food and labour against various types of trade goods. It is not surprising, in view of the multitude of other duties they were expected to perform, that administrators tried to rid themselves of these tasks. The most obvious way to achieve this end was to attract to the stations resident traders, who would keep a store of goods and purchase food from the surrounding population. The station could then begin to pay labour in cash, and the recipients could then purchase the food or the trade goods they required from the local trader. In addition, the trader could meet the many requirements of the boma for food and supplies. It was with these developments in mind that Ainsworth obtained permission in 1896 to spend £60 of government money on the construction of a retail store and dwelling house at Machakos.

He failed to attract Indians from Mombasa to take up the business; a European, Mr. John Scott, agreed in 1897 to accept Ainsworth's offer. Indian traders in sizeable numbers entered the interior in the wake of the railway, attracted primarily by the opportunity of supplying a variety of goods to the coolies brought over from India to construct the line. A temporary bazaar sprang up at Kibwezi in 1898, and the
following year, when the railway reached Nairobi, another bazaar was rapidly erected.\textsuperscript{8} As the railway moved inland, so administrative control was extended. The railway reached the eastern edge of the high-lands in 1899. In 1900 a boma was founded at Fort Hall, in 1901 at Nyeri, and in 1908 at Meru.\textsuperscript{9} In each case Indian traders established themselves at the station, either at the time of construction or shortly afterwards. In Fort Hall District there were eleven Indian traders by 1902,\textsuperscript{10} and in Nyeri four shops had been started by 1903.\textsuperscript{11} When Horne set up the administrative station at Meru in 1908, two Indian traders, Habib Ahamed and Adam Isaak, went with him.\textsuperscript{12} At Chuka, a sub-district station in Embu District, an Indian had already opened a shop before the construction of the station had been completed.\textsuperscript{13} This process of moving with the administration continued in all areas of Kenya whenever new stations were established. For example, in 1929, when the administrative boma of West Pokot (West Suk) District was moved from Kacheliba to Kapenguria, Indian traders in Kitale and Kacheliba were asked if they wished to take up shops at the new site. A number did so.\textsuperscript{14}

The spread of Indian traders through Kenya was controlled by various government ordinances and rules. In the earliest years of the Protectorate, the unrestricted spread of itinerant traders, mainly Swahilis and Somalis, had caused concern to the administration. Over areas far away from administrative centres, it was impossible to supervise these traders, to discourage swindling and illicit trade in guns and ivory, and to protect traders from attack.\textsuperscript{15} The Outlying Districts Ordinance of 1902 closed all African districts, excluding townships and
administrative bomas, to non-native traders unless they obtained a permit from the appropriate provincial or district official. The Ordinance appears to have hindered the growth of trade, and in April 1909 its terms were considerably modified to exclude roadways and trading centres. Administrative officers were encouraged to establish trading centres in locations where they believed substantial trade might develop. When the trading centre had become an established focus for trade, it could be gazetted as a township. In both townships and trading centres, applicants for plots were to be granted temporary occupation licences, renewable annually and subject, after the first year, to three months notice to terminate on either side. When the township or trading centre was surveyed, plots would be demarcated for Asians (50 feet by 100 feet) and Europeans (50 feet by 100 feet to one acre) in separate areas, and offered to the temporary occupation licence holder on a 99 year lease. In Kenya, outside the large towns and the highlands, very little survey work was conducted. The vast majority of Indian traders in the reserves held their land not on leasehold terms, but on temporary occupation licences.

The administration was as anxious to attract Indian traders to the new administrative centres as the Indians were anxious to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the extension of imperial control. The traders performed a wide range of functions for the boma. They provided food for prisoners, warders, police drivers, hospital patients and staff, survey staff, mail runners and carriers, administrative officers and their staff and safari parties, arranged transport for the district commissioner, medical staff and judges, managed the upkeep of
hospitals, dispensaries and prisons, and supplied a wide range of goods required by the boma. In addition, in the early days of Hut Tax collection, they bought the food and livestock payments in kind from the station. The relationship was obviously one of mutual benefit. The administration was relieved of a host of burdensome and time-consuming tasks, and the boma, in turn, was a source of considerable patronage for the traders. An examination of the cash registers of one station, Eldama Rayine, for the years 1911 to 1915 reveals that, on the average, the station spent well over Rs. 3,000 each year with the local traders.18

Of more lasting concern were the broader economic functions performed by the Indian traders in the reserves, the purchase of agricultural products, and the sale of a widening range of imported goods to Africans. The activities of the Indian traders were immediately responsible for the introduction of currency to large areas of Kenya. They were paralleled by administrative action which encouraged the production of surplus crops for sale.

Beginning in 1902, the Hut Tax was levied on an increasing number of African reserve residents, the tax being payable in cash.19 To meet this demand, Africans were faced with the choice, often not a free one, of working for European farmers or the administration, or selling the products of their own labour. If they chose the second course, it was invariably to an Indian trader that the produce was taken in order to realise the cash return needed to meet government tax demands. Africans were undoubtedly attracted by the prospect of acquiring goods displayed at the local dukas, and this, in turn, often stimulated the production of
an agricultural surplus that was larger than was necessary to meet the basic tax demands.

Almost all administrative officers appreciated the connection between the extension of trading centres and the level of agricultural production and labour supply. Bagge, the Provincial Commissioner of Kavirondo Province, noted in 1906 that trading encouraged the growing of cash crops and the adoption of new crops.\textsuperscript{20} His successor wrote in 1912 that: "The opening of Trading Centres is also appreciated by them (Africans) and these are resulting in increased efforts to make the land productive."\textsuperscript{21} Another provincial commissioner believed that the way to stimulate economic development was through the creation of wants, by teaching Africans to "... buy a multitude of perishable commodities which will eventually become so necessary to them that they will be forced year by year to work more and more to satisfy their needs."\textsuperscript{22} In the early years administrative officers were quick to designate and gazette trading centres where Indians could take up plots. Many adopted the more aggressive approach of taking traders with them on safari through the district, and directly encouraging Africans to purchase the trade goods.

The trading safari, and to some extent the baraza, were used to encourage Africans to spend their money in ways best suited to the administration's goal of encouraging economic development. Many annual reports testify to the fact that Africans over large areas of Kenya tended to hoard sums of money in order to buy livestock. This question was tied up with the acceptance of currency, which seems to have occurred in two stages. First, and fairly rapidly, currency was recognised as a
much more slowly, money was accepted as a store of wealth. It appeared to Africans that currency as a store of wealth had a number of serious disadvantages compared with livestock. Fluctuations in the price of both imports and agricultural produce indicated that money changed its value frequently and rapidly. Unlike livestock, cash did not produce either a dividend or edible product, nor could it be used to meet social obligations, to acquire a wife, or to display as a mark of wealth or prestige. Consequently, Africans in most districts preferred for many years to invest in livestock rather than to store cash. Administrative officers were concerned to induce Africans to develop tastes, which would require them to enter the exchange economy permanently as producers or labourers. The possession of livestock, on the contrary, provided them with a means of paying their tax that released them from the need either to produce cash crops or work for Europeans. Agricultural implements were a commodity officers were particularly keen to have sold in large quantities. Two reasons explain this. First, the use of improved agricultural implements, such as machetes and iron hoes, would tend to improve the productivity of African reserve cultivation, and second, they were items with a limited life span needing replacement. They would, therefore, tend to draw the African permanently into the cash sector of the economy.

Indians in the reserves also carried out certain subsidiary economic functions. Before the mid 1920's they monopolised ghee making and grain milling. They played an important role in the provision of
transport, acting as carters, not only for each other, but also for the administration. On Lake Victoria they dominated the fishing industry.

Indian traders were successful in stimulating demand for imported goods among Africans in the reserves. Without doubt, the habits of the ruling European class, observed in the towns and on the farms, and missionary education and attitudes were primary stimulants to the development of African demand for a greater volume and variety of imported goods. The more extensive these influences, the greater the volume and range of goods bought in particular areas. In the early years of the century, the Indians supplied beads, wire, cloth and blankets to all areas. By the late 1920's, beads and wire were only sold in quantity in the looser administered areas away from the major population centres and lines of communication. Areas of extensive agricultural production and areas which produced large numbers of labourers rapidly developed sophisticated tastes. In North Kivirondo District, for example, about half of the adult population wore some form of European clothing by the end of the twenties, whereas in neighbouring Nandi District, in the same period, ninety percent still clothed themselves in cloth and blankets. The number of bicycles in Nandi District did not exceed half a dozen; in North Kivirondo hundreds were in use. In every single reserve area of Kenya, the sale of imported goods and the purchase of African cash crops were dominated by Indian traders. With the exception of the Masai districts, where Sikhs from the Punjab were present in force, the large majority of dukas were run by Gujarati speakers, from the area north of Bombay on the west coast of India. The group could be sub-divided into two main sections, Hindus
of the Lohana and Vania castes, and Moslems of the Ismaili (Khoja) and Bohra communities. Of these, the Ismailis were the largest single group. Smaller numbers of traders derived from Goa and the Punjab. Though some of the largest traders in the interior, like Allidina Visram, came from the coast or Zanzibar, where they had been established for a number of decades, the large majority of dukawallahs had migrated from India in the period subsequent to the establishment of the Protectorate in 1895. News of the opportunities that were created by the railway came from family or trading contacts with families settled in the East African coast, and the migration was perhaps accelerated by plague and famine, which hit the west central coast of India in the mid-1890's. The majority of immigrants who later established dukas came as single men in their teens or twenties, the sons of retail merchants and small scale farmers. They brought very little money with them, expecting to raise the small sums of money necessary to start a business by loans from relatives in East Africa, or by working as agents or managers for large concerns. Many started in business in the reserves as managers for larger firms, such as those owned by Allidina Visram, Walli Hasham or Walji Hirji. A fairly typical example of a successful trader was that of Habib Ahamed, who traded in Meru from 1908 until the Second World War. In 1908 he was hired by Hassam Janmohammed, Allidina Visram's manager in Nairobi, on a three year contract paying Rs. 275 in the first year, rising to Rs. 375 in the third. He founded and managed for a year and a half Visram's store at Meru, until it was sold to Janmohammed Jivan. The experience he gained of conditions and practices in the reserves was, no doubt,
important in determining the success of his own business, which he
opened in Meru in 1909 on Rs. 1,000 borrowed from his former employer
and Walli' Hasham.27

To start a business in the reserve, the Indians required only a
small sum of money. The buildings in most cases were very rudimentary,
being constructed with wood and sheets of corrugated iron. A descrip-
tion from the late 1930's gives a clear picture of the appearance of
a duk̲a:

Daylight did not improve its appearance. It was a square
building of corrugated iron, raised a foot or so from the
ground on wooden piles. The front was entirely open, floor
to ceiling, long folding wooden shutters serving to close
it up at night... Inside, round the three sides of the
shop was rough shelving stacked with clothes, blankets,
cigarettes of brands unknown in England, rolls of cotton
cloth... and an incredible variety of other things. Most
of the floor space was occupied by open boxes, containing
foodstuffs and spices of all colours and with diverse smells....
Strings of beads were everywhere, slung from lines across
the shop and hung on nails on the walls. A pair of
scales stood on an empty kerosine-box.28

Seven wood and iron shops in Machakos District trading centres sold be-
tween 1905 and 1921 fetched an average price of only Rs. 440. The stock
was generally worth considerably more.30

Because traders ran their businesses on a credit system, little
capital was required to stock the duk̲a. It was customary for merchants
to buy their goods from wholesalers in Nairobi and Mombasa on five
months credit, and to sell the produce they acquired in the reserves on
three months credit. In this way receipts from sales in the reserves
could be used to meet the cost of purchases from Africans, and receipts
from the sale of that produce were to hand before the bill for the goods
supplied by the wholesaler fell due. In periods of stability or prosperity this system worked well, but its effect in times of depression was often drastic. When, for example, during the early years of the war, imported goods were in short supply due to a shortage of shipping, wholesalers, who themselves had to pay cash, demanded cash on delivery for goods supplied. Many of the smaller traders were unable to meet the new terms and closed down.

Again in 1926, when cotton prices fell dramatically, a large Indian merchant and wholesaler in Kisumu, Hasham Jamal, was declared bankrupt. His major Indian competitors were also in financial difficulties. The effects were felt over the length and breadth of the Colony. When the Kisumu merchants called in the debts owing to them for the supply of goods, many of the smaller traders were unable to meet their commitments and were bankrupted. The Annual Report of the Dagoretti Sub-District of Kiambu recorded: "The cotton slump in Uganda has reacted with amazing rapidity on the Indian members of this community and money is very tight." A similar reference was made in the Mombasa District Annual Report of the same year. Thus, the bankruptcy of a major trader in Kisumu and the financial difficulties of his competitors had effects that were substantial enough to merit reference in annual reports from three provinces.

While it may have been fairly simple for ambitious Indians to establish a business in the reserves, it appears that his prospects of surviving for more than a few years were remote. In part, the credit
system was to blame; crises and extensive closures occurred in 1914, 1920-1, 1926 and 1929. Too, the survival of the small Indian traders depended, in the grain producing areas, on the weather. If the rains failed and the grain crop was small, his purchases of African produce would be limited. Because of the reduced amounts of money realized by grain sales, Africans would have less to spend on imported goods at the "duka. The reduced supply of agricultural produce being bought by the

Table 14: Number of Indian plot-holders in Southern Province townships and trading centres, 1916-7-1930.

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Source: Southern Province Annual Reports, 1916-7-1930

traders would tend to push up prices and, conversely, the reduced demand for trade goods would tend to push down the prices charged by the traders. Thus, both the volume of trade and the level of profits fell in years of rain failure.\(^ {34}\) In these conditions, merchants without capital were often forced to declare themselves bankrupt.\(^ {35}\) Loopholes in the bankruptcy laws of Kenya permitted a fairly rapid recovery. The trader often handed over his store to his son or started a new company trading under his son's name. Alternatively, the trader might attempt to raise a short
Table 15: Traders in Voi Township, 1909-1932.

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**Source:** Teita District Annual Reports, 1909-1932.
term cash loan from a larger trader in the local township or in one of the three major trading centres, Nairobi, Mombasa or Kisumu. The rate of interest on such loans was usually very high; official records of registered short-term loans indicate that the rates averaged 22½% per annum.57

In pastoral areas the situation was little better, though for different reasons. Traders depended upon income from two sources, the purchase of hides and skins, and the sale of maize. Drought years affected the volume and profitability of trade favourably because, at such times, larger numbers of livestock died, the supply of hides and skins rose, the price fell, and the profit margins tended to widen. The demand for maize also rose and, unless controlled by famine regulations, its price also tended to rise. Instability was also caused by rapid fluctuations in the price the trader could realize in Nairobi or Mombasa for the hides and skins he bought from the Africans. The trade in hides and skins was a highly speculative business, for there appears to have been more sudden and more drastic shifts in the price of these goods than in any other type of produce, agricultural, pastoral or sylvan. Between 1920 and the beginning of 1922, hides bought in the Masai reserves were virtually unsaleable. At the end of the 1920's the price dropped very sharply.58
Year | Hides | Ghee
--- | --- | ---
1927 | 45 | 52
1928 | 32 | 60
1929 | 16 | 60
1930 | 9 | 35

Source: PC/SP 1/2/1 Annual Reports, Southern Province, 1914-1939.

The trade of many of the reserves was dominated by several long established and wealthy traders. In Keru, for example, the four largest traders in 1914-5 held over ninety percent of the trade of the district. Before the end of the war at least ten other Indians opened businesses in Keru township. By 1928, of these ten only one survived, yet of the four larger merchants in the town in 1914, three were still active in 1928 and still virtually monopolised trade. They had been joined in the meantime by a further ten new small scale entrepreneurs. Similarly in Voi, as Table 15 clearly shows, of the seven businesses founded before the First World War, three survived until at least 1932, yet ten of the sixteen that started after 1914 had a life-span of less than five years.

Many of the smaller reserve traders were never independent. Some of those trading in their own names were, in fact, managers of shops owned by larger merchants. In other cases the larger township
merchants in a district acquired a near monopoly of the leases of sites in trading centres, which they let to smaller merchants, who sold goods bought from the landlord for a commission. With a few exceptions in each reserve, those who were independent tended to possess little capital to buffer them against the vagaries of an unsteady market.

Unstable though their trading system was, Indians from the beginning dominated trade in the reserves. Neither Europeans nor Africans were able to present any real danger to their position. European trading ventures in the reserves were never successful, despite frequent encouragement from the administration. District and provincial records contain countless paragraphs calling for the establishment of European trading concerns in the reserves. In a number of cases where they did attempt to establish themselves, usually in the smaller townships, administrative officers proffered some direct assistance. Wiggins, a medical officer stationed at Kisumu in the first years of the century, recalled in his memoirs that the European population consisted of five officials and H.B. Clarke, a European trader. Clarke's major problem, his lack of capital, was solved by the five officials clubbing together to give him a start. The provincial commissioner helped him further by giving him work in the new township. Gethin, a trader who established himself in South Kavirondo District at the time of the First World War, had cause to be grateful to the local district commissioner. "I don't know what I would have done without his help. Labour was produced to build huts for me, the Kisii were
advised to bring their products to me for sale, and I was given guides to explore a track to the Masai Reserve.\textsuperscript{45} Manley, who was the only European trader in Machakos township, benefitted from the patronage of the boma. A district cash book reveals that the bulk of the purchases of the administration were made at his store; in 1917, for example, Rs. 17,012 of the Rs. 17,569 spent locally.\textsuperscript{44}

European traders were not successful because they could not maintain their businesses on the low profits acceptable to the Indian traders. European overheads were far too high to be covered from the profits that could be reaped from small scale, localized native trade; they required housing, transport facilities and food of a standard which approximated to that to which they had been accustomed in England or South Africa. Indians, on the other hand, could, according to a contemporary expression, "live off the smell of an oil rag."\textsuperscript{45} Certainly they were willing to accept rudimentary accommodation, virtual isolation and a simple diet.\textsuperscript{46}

There were also more incentives for the Indians to succeed in the reserves. Europeans had been granted the exclusive right to farm large areas of Kenya's most fertile land, and could trade freely in that rich and prosperous area. Indians, by contrast, were virtually excluded from trade in the highlands, except in designated townships, where they were permitted to hold land on lease. Before the First World War some Europeans farmers, especially in the Kiambu area, encouraged Indian traders onto their farms in order to stimulate African squatters
to work for them, but the Indian crisis of the early 1920's hardened the attitudes of the farmers to the Indians. Associations of European farmers agreed to a general ban on traders on their farms. Further, until the early twenties, Indian traders faced commercial and residential segregation in townships, where they invariably were granted rights in less advantaged areas than Europeans. Restricted in their opportunities elsewhere, Indian traders were the more determined to succeed in the reserves.

European traders could not survive unless they could achieve higher levels of sales and purchases than the average size Indian trader. This they tried to do by offering higher prices to African agriculturalists and selling their imported goods at lower prices than their competitors. The history of the first thirty five years of trade in the reserve areas is dotted with optimistic attempts by Europeans to drive their Indian opposition out of business. One such case was that of the Nyanza Trading and Transport Company, which started operations in 1923 at Luanda, Asembo and elsewhere in Nyanza Province. As with many of the other examples, the local administrator remarked, shortly after the establishment of the Company, that it had caused prices offered to Africans for produce to rise. In this particular case, maize prices went up one hundred percent. If the Nyanza Trading Company stopped buying for a short period, the price immediately fell. The following year the company closed down. It seems unlikely, in view of the large number of failures in similar circumstances, that the
causes of this particular failure was the boycott of the firm suggested by Indian traders to the local Africans. A far more likely explanation was that offered by an administrator of an earlier period and of another province:

Under present conditions few (European) traders would care to embark upon such an enterprise on the ground that having gone through all the initial expense incidental to working up a connection as soon as the business began to be remunerative they would be surrounded by a host of Indians who would cut rates until they had succeeded in driving out their competitor.

The author, C.S. Hemsted, suggested that reliable European traders should be granted passes to allow them absolutely free travel within the reserves. They should be engaged on a small salary by the Agriculture Department in the capacity of seed issuers. Though many administrators, judging by their actions and their writings, may have favoured the extension of European trading enterprise in the reserves, the Kenya Government at no time gave them encouragement by legislative discrimination, such as that suggested by Hemsted.

African competition presented little more of a threat to Indian domination than European competition. An explanation of the problems of African business enterprises offered by an African economist in the sixties applies with even greater force to the period before 1930. Africans lacked the capital to start a business and, because of their low income and low propensity to save, were unlikely to acquire even the small sum required to open a trading concern in the reserves. They lacked the commercial skills of simple accounting and the ability and knowledge to assess the market possibilities of both imported goods
and agricultural produce. If these two barriers could be overcome, traditional family obligations hindered the further development of the enterprise. Entrepreneurs were expected to employ their relatives regardless of their efficiency, share their income with other members of the extended family, and come to their aid if they were suffering financial hardship. The crucial obstacle to African success in business was the lack of appropriate education and skills. Indian traders were numerate and literate and, in the large majority of cases, were children of families in business. Among Africans the general lack of education made the extended family obligations a burden, whereas in the case of an Indian family these ties tended to work to the benefit of an Indian in business. The Indian family represented, in effect, a pool of talent which could be and was called upon to assist in the family enterprise. It was not unusual for heads of Indian families to ensure that sons and nephews received the type of education or training most needed by the family business. The sons and sons-in-law of dukawallahs often opened branches of the family business in neighbouring trading centres.

The evidence clearly supports this explanation. "The Kavirondo native," wrote one provincial commissioner in 1927, when there were over four hundred African run shops in the province, "has no business instinct and whether he runs a shop or a motor lorry he never knows whether he is making a profit or a loss and simply carries on from hand to mouth." And two years later: "Small native shops exist in considerable numbers but it is very unlikely that they will be successful
until the owners learn a little more about finance. Account keeping ought to be made an important part of native education." In fact, schools made little or no effort to teach commercial skills to Africans. In thirty or forty schools another provincial commissioner visited in the twenties, he wrote a simple sum on the board in columns - posho 20 cents, chai 20 cents, sukari 15 cents - and asked any pupil to tell him what change the Indian shopkeeper would give out of a shilling. Not once did he receive the correct answer. When substantial numbers of Africans did begin to trade in the twenties, the large majority of them, because of their lack of capital, were agents of large Indian concerns rather than independent traders.

Despite these difficulties, well over one thousand Africans held trading licences in the reserves by 1929. Before the war, the only Africans trading in the reserves were Swahilis, Nubians and Nyamwezi, the residue of the pre-colonial trading system and the remnants of various bodies of porters, askaris and soldiers. Few of these remained independent long after the advent of the administration. Most did not have the means to buy a trading licence. At least as early as 1910, the large majority of those in trade held hawkers licences, which permitted them to carry goods into the reserves and purchase African produce. In this way they performed a service for the Indian, who was only permitted to establish dukas at gazetted trading centres and townships. Swahilis were loaned goods by Indian merchants and these were bartered for produce. The debt was relieved by selling the produce, in turn, to the Indian trader. It was in this capacity as a hawker on behalf of
an Indian trader that most Africans started in business. There were isolated attempts by the administration to encourage African traders before the First World War. Not until the middle and late twenties did this become a concerted effort.

As with the encouragement given to European traders, the efforts to stimulate the growth of African entrepreneurship sprang, in significant part, from a general European distrust of, and distaste for, the Indian traders and their methods. In reviewing contemporary Kenyan literature it is impossible to remain unimpressed by the strength of the antipathy. Visitors to the Protectorate reported and reflected these attitudes. W.S. Rainsford, an American visitor to British East Africa in 1907-8, wrote:

The Hindi who comes here...is not, so I am told by those who know India, the best sort of Indian. Certainly the natives do not respect him. He degrades them and cheats them. Economically he may be a convenience, but morally he is a curse....

The Indian debauches the native wherever he gains influence over him and leaves his dreadful mark wherever he remains. He is a past master in all departments of deceit and fraud. He is the worst element in the labour market. He cheats the native workman and knows enough of Indian law to avoid, when avoidance is possible, the just punishment of his rascality. He has no permanent interest in the country. It is to him merely an orange to suck as dry as may be....

Of course, in speaking thus harshly of Indian influences in East Africa, I do not forget that there are some honest and upright men of that race. I speak of the Indian influence as it is generally felt in that country, and I have met no single man, civil officer, or resident missionary, who does not assent to the truth of what I have tried temperately to state.

Another visitor confirmed that: "The plain fact is that both settlers and officials look upon the Indian in the light of an unmitigated
Lord Cranworth noted that the settlers objected to the Indians on two grounds. First, they objected to being undersold in nearly every branch of trade. The Indian was not a better trader, but he could live on food which a European would not touch, in conditions "fit for pigs," and he could do without soap and fresh clothes. He often sold his goods below cost price and made his profit "by some illicit trade."

Second, the Indian caused both moral and spiritual harm to the African. They kept brothels, ran illicit stills and gambling dens, and received stolen property. "It is hardly too much to say that in Nairobi, there is hardly a crime among natives which is not directly traceable to the Indian." The objections, he claimed, were not founded upon colour or race prejudice, but on the observation that the Indian was "a foul liver, a drunkard and a thief."

Administrators in their official reports and correspondence tended to offer specific criticisms of Indian trading methods and practices rather than general condemnations of the entire community. Criticisms tended to fit broadly into two related categories; those that implied that the traders were dishonest, and those that regarded the Indians as being an ineffective and inefficient agency of development. Indians were accused of arranging price rings, cornering markets, and making excessive profits, and of cheating Africans by manipulating currency and using false weights and measures. As traders, they were said to be too conservative in their attitudes to the introduction of currency, too slow to improve the range of goods they stocked, and...
ineffective in improving the standards of African produce because they bought indiscriminately. They loaned money to Africans at usurious rates of interest and thereby reduced the incentive to increase production. An examination of the evidence related to these accusations will clarify the nature of Indian trading practices and methods in the reserve, and afford the reader an understanding of the motives behind the policy of the administration towards the Indian trader in the reserves.

There is probably less truth to the first set of criticisms than to the second. Certainly the accusations of price fixing, profiteering, and cheating are more difficult to substantiate, and seldom, in official documents, is concrete evidence brought forward to support the assertions. In many cases statements of Africans are simply repeated, without any attempt at corroboration. Many of these can perhaps be explained by the inexperience of Africans in the market economy. A currency without intrinsic value, which could act as a medium of exchange and a store of value, was new to the vast majority of reserve Africans. The bewildering changes that occurred in the system used in Kenya up to 1921— from rupees and pice, to rupees and cents, to florins and cents, and finally to shillings and cents—certainly caused confusion, as did the introduction of paper currency in 1921.67 The weights and measures used by Indians were also strange, and differed from the less standardized measures already in use.68 Further grounds for confusion were created by the constant and often drastic movement in prices through the period, the causes of which were not comprehensible to most Africans buying
and selling in the trading centres. The rapid rise in prices of imported goods during World War One, the rise and then the sudden fall of prices for African produce in the two years immediately following the war, the fall in prices at the end of the twenties and the annual variations in grain prices, depending on the nature of the weather across the grain producing areas of the whole country, could not be easily understood by Africans who had little or no conception of the operation of the laws of supply and demand in a national or an international market. 69

These qualifications do not exonerate Indians from all blame. Indeed, it would be surprising if the Indians did not take advantage of their situation. They were dealing with commercially inexperienced Africans in conditions in which there was little regulation or inspection of their activities. It would be harsh to expect of Indian traders in the reserves the same level of conduct attained by merchants in an industrialized western society dealing with literate and educated consumers, safeguarded by extensive legislation enforced and supervised by bodies of officials and inspectors.

It is unlikely that Indians made excessive profit out of their trade. The large number of failures and bankruptcies, the free choice open to Africans of trading with any one of the merchants in a township or trading centre, and the frequent comment that Indians could and did live off the smell of oil, all indicate that the reverse was the case. The traders themselves stated that their profit margins were low, in the region of five to fifteen percent. A quite typical comment was
that the profits reaped by merchants today were then only a dream. 70

The competitiveness of many trading centres was indicated by the traders' practice of inducing Africans to trade with them by offering gifts of magadi, salt or sugar to those who entered their shops. 71

A number of references in official records to price-fixing agreements in trading centres 72 were, not unexpectedly, strongly denied by the interviewed traders. Only one admitted that he knew of the existence of a price fixing ring elsewhere in the Colony. 73 Most of the references apply to districts or parts of districts well away from the main communication routes and the large population centres. In order for the ring to be effective, it was obviously essential that the producers be unable to reach alternative markets. There do not appear to have been any organised sanctions to prevent merchants from breaking the ring. The situation in Narok District was described in the following terms:

The traders in any one trading centre agree to the prices at which they will buy hides and sell goods. One of the traders, finding he is not doing as much trade as his fellows, endeavour to attract trade to himself by breaking the agreement; all the other traders then break the agreement and a cutthroat competition ensues. When the traders are on the verge of bankruptcy they meet again and agree to combine and so continue round the circle.

Stability and prosperous conditions were necessary if individual traders were not to break the ring. These conditions did not exist over any extended period in the trading centres. Unless the traders held the leases on all of the plots in the trading centre, there was little they could do to prevent any Indian with a small amount of capital, attracted
by the high profits, from applying for a temporary occupation licence and opening a duka. For the ring to survive, it either had to offer the new merchant membership, or it had to lower prices and drive out the competitor. The latter did happen:

Resort is made to trading at a loss in order to oust competitors from any particular trading centre. Having attained this object the remaining traders enter upon a period of profiteering to recover the losses they have incurred.

It is unlikely that price fixing arrangements affected more than a small proportion of the trade in the reserves, even though they may have been attempted from time to time in the less productive areas well away from the main centres and arteries of trade.

On the whole, administrators were more concerned that Indian traders, as agents of development, left a great deal to be desired. On numerous occasions traders were criticised for encouraging Africans to barter, rather than to trade for money. The common view was that barter was encouraged by traders because it allowed them to make profits on two transactions instead of one. Administrators were concerned that the continuance of a barter system would delay the spread of money and hinder the economic advancement of Africans, which would only occur when they came into close contact with a money economy. It appears from the records to have been a fairly widespread practice in the less economically advanced reserves, even at the end of the period. In Nyanza Province it had largely died out by 1910, whereas in Kitui at the same time three-eighths of the imported goods were bartered and a quarter of the produce received by traders was acquired by barter.
The traders claim that very little barter took place at all at any period. They insist that Africans who brought in produce to sell did so, except at tax collection time, because they wanted to purchase cloth or wire or salt. The buyer and the seller bargained until they agreed on a price in rupees for the produce, and then bargained again to arrive at a price for the goods the Africans wished to purchase. If there was a balance in favour of the African, he either took the cash or entrusted the balance to the trader, who kept it until tax collection time. In this way, though cash often did not change hands, it could not be said that there was a system of barter in operation.

Administrators were concerned, too, about the effects of Africans becoming indebted to traders. This occurred far more frequently on the coast than upcountry where, it seems, debts were on a far smaller scale. In coastal areas it was not uncommon for Africans to mortgage their crops to Indians well before the harvest. The permanent state of indebtedness, which this system could and did create, was regarded by the administrators as dangerous, in that it was likely to kill off any desire on the part of cultivators to increase production or to take care of crops. After a lengthy debate involving the Chief Native Commissioner, the Coast Province Senior Commissioner, the district commissioners and the district committees, it was decided that legislation, though desirable, would be impossible to draft in such a form that it would just control the terms of advances, rather than prohibit them altogether. There was general agreement that advances of seed,
food and cash in times of drought or hardship were of positive benefit to Africans, particularly as the administration was usually too slow to act to alleviate hardship. The harmful could not be separated out from the beneficial, and it was thought better to have both rather than neither.  

Far more serious than the tendency to barter or to loan money to cultivators were the effects on the development of production and trade of the linked problems of the instability and undercapitalisation of the dukas. Traders were unable, because of the very limited funds available to the large majority of them, to stock an ever-widening range of imported goods to meet the growing sophistication of the cultivators. The dukawallahs appeared to be conservative, unwilling to stock new lines which might give fresh impetus to Africans to produce more. One district commissioner wrote:

Not one of them show, or appear capable of, the smallest enterprise or initiative, not one of them are capable of striking out a line of their own or getting out of the groove in which they are all confined like a flock of sheep in a pen.  

They often possessed inadequate financial resources to purchase, at fair prices, all the produce cultivators were willing to sell after a good harvest. With only a limited amount of money to spend on produce, increased production drove down prices in the local market, even though the price at which the trader sold remained unchanged. This tended to destroy the incentive to raise the level of production. Obviously, this situation only applied in circumstances where the African grower was unable to carry his produce to a large market with substantial
traders. Both of these criticisms were of fundamental importance—they indicated limitations in the effectiveness of the manner in which the Indian trader carried out his primary economic functions in the reserves.

The most frequent, and to the Kenya Government the most grave, of all the criticisms of the activities of the Indian trader was that, as a buyer of African produce, he was undiscriminating. He paid the same price for poor quality ungraded goods as for carefully prepared, dry, clean and regular produce. Serious consequences flowed from this. The export of poor quality produce gained a poor name for Kenya produce in international markets, and tended to depress the price which it could command. Payment by weight alone, rather than by weight and quality, offered no incentive to Africans to produce high quality goods, which could more easily penetrate overseas markets and establish a sound reputation. The ignorance of the Indian trader, it was often argued, thereby stunted the possibilities of economic growth in the reserves. Dukawallahs had little or no knowledge of the produce in which they dealt. Nor was there any commercial incentive for them to find out, because wholesalers and exporters generally paid the same price, irrespective of quality. The price the dukawallah received was based upon the past experience of the purchaser of the quality of goods from the area. A case in point was the marketing of goat skins. European and American tanners fixed the price they paid on the past reputation of skins from Mombasa. Poor fleshing and sun drying could not be detected until the skins were actually tanned. After tanning the
percentage of skins fitting into the four categories was calculated, and the price was fixed accordingly. The prices paid for skins from Kombasa fell in the twenties because the quality of the skins declined.

Table 17: Quality and prices of skins exported from Kombasa, 1924-1926.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Grade of skins (percentage)</th>
<th>Prime</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Reject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Price of grades (sh. per score)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Reject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7/50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hides and Skins, 1925-28, PC/NZA 2/481

The price paid in 1927 was 22/- per score; in 1924 an average score was worth 27/35 cents, but by 1926 this had fallen to 24/-. Government reacted to this situation by an attempt to improve the quality of hides and skins sold by Africans. Shade drying bandas were erected, district officers held barazas to instruct Africans on the best method of preparing and drying skins, and traders were urged to offer better prices for the better prepared items. When, because of the lack of financial incentive for the Indian to offer higher prices for the better prepared hides and skins, the campaign had little effect, the administrative officers tended to blame the Indians. The situation was similar for ground nuts and sim-sim, both of which were exported ungraded.

Grading of maize for export was introduced in 1923. It did not affect the prices paid by traders to Africans. Most of the maize sold to dukawallahs was not exported, it was sold to the farms and to African areas which did not produce enough to satisfy their own demand, such as Narok, Kajiado, Machakos and Kitui Districts and the Northern Frontier Province. These markets did not differentiate between graded and mixed
quality maize. The quality that was exported was graded at Mombasa and the appropriate amount paid to the wholesaler, the large merchant of Nairobi or Kisumu who had bought from the dukawallah. Under the grading scheme, most of the African produce that was exported was sold as native grade at the lowest prices. Towards the end of the decade, as the work of the Agriculture Department began to have some effect, increasing quantities of maize from the reserves were graded into the higher priced categories. There is no evidence that the Africans who produced the higher grades received a higher return than those still producing the native grade maize. This was largely because it did not pay the dukawallah to differentiate between grades. The maize (as with other crops) was received in small quantities from large numbers of producers. The quality was usually variable and uneven, and it was simply not economical for the buyer to sort and grade each small quantity.

Administrative officers in general levelled two sets of charges against Indian traders: that they were dishonest, and that they were inefficient as stimulants to the expansion and improvement of production in the reserves. It is possible to discern two distinct trends in administrative policy towards the traders, which broadly reflected these two sets of criticisms. The first was the increasing encouragement given to African merchants, and the second was the effort to draw up plans to control or replace the Indian as a purchaser of African produce.

These trends in policy were not solely attributable to the widespread view that the Indian merchant was a dishonest and inefficient trader. They related, too, to the commonly held opinion that it was the
duty of the administration to stimulate the economic advancement of Africans. The concept of trusteeship lay behind this idea, a trusteeship that was held and exercised by the British. Indians represented a challenge to that trusteeship, most clearly expressed during the political crisis of the early twenties. Having rejected Indian demands for a substantial share in the trusteeship, the administration set about justifying the terms of the Devonshire Declaration by attempting to ensure that Africans achieved a higher rate of economic advancement in the reserves. One aspect of the policy was the effort to advance African agriculture, another was the encouragement of African entrepreneurs in the reserves. Perhaps a critical difference between the two was that, whereas the first aroused the opposition of the politically powerful settler community, the second received its support.

As the Indian crisis developed in the early twenties, the Acting Chief Native Commissioner issued a circular to provincial commissioners, which urged them to take steps to encourage Africans to open shops. Watkins asked his subordinates to determine the number of Africans who wished to start shops, the sums of money available to them, and the class of goods they wished to sell. The Native Affairs Department was anxious to help remove the handicap that existing African traders were suffering of having to buy goods at retail prices from Indians. On receipt of the relevant information, the Department would contact a "reliable firm," which would supply goods at reasonable wholesale prices. Discussions were subsequently held between the department and the head of Bird and Company. This operation, which appears to have been quite
unsuccessful, probably because the European company was unable to offer more attractive facilities than the local Indian firms, was carried out with some secrecy. The Chief Native Commissioner warned his commissioners that: "It is advisable, as far as possible, to make enquiries and take other steps without due parade to avoid provoking opposition before we get into working orders." Two months before this circular was issued, the Convention of Associations had passed the following resolution:

That every effort should be made to bring natives into direct commercial communication with European distributors, merchants and markets and that the support of the whole European community is desired to foster the legitimate economic position of the natives in the trade and production of the Colony.

Further illustrations of official policy may be found in circulars of 1922 and 1924. Circular 89 of 1922 offered advice on how Africans could be helped to start their own grain mills, an activity dominated by Indians, and Circular 9 of 1924 drew attention to methods which could be used by African traders to order and obtain goods without recourse to the local Indian trader. In October 1924 official sanction and encouragement was given to a group known as the European and African Traders Organisation. All district commissioners were circularised with the information that the Organisation was willing to advance goods to African traders recommended by the local district commissioners. The amount advanced was to be treated as a loan, returnable without interest within three months with half the profits made on the sale. The profits would be credited to the trader in part liquidation of the loan, and additional goods advanced until the full amount of
credit was paid off from profits. The aim of the organisation, founded in early 1923 at the height of the Indian crisis, was to work towards the elimination of the economic influence of Indian traders and artisans; its motto was, "Every European and Every African is an Asset to Africa, Everyone else is a Liability." Though there was considerable discussion between officials of the Organisation and Coryndon, his Private Secretary Dutton, and Chief Secretary Denham, only one district commissioner responded to the circular of August 1924. For the rest of the decade unco-ordinated efforts were made in every province by district commissioners to cut out the Indian middleman. For example, in Fort Hall District local farmers were contacted and successfully encouraged to buy maize direct from African growers, in Central Kavirondo Africans were encouraged to sell fish direct to wholesalers in Kisumu, in Machakos District Indians complained that Africans were being forced to take their produce to African rather than Indian traders, and in Karicho District Kipsigis shop-keepers were encouraged to combine together and purchase wholesale in Nairobi.

Other measures came to the fore later in the decade. The trading centres, where the Indian traders were concentrated, had, in the main, been gazetted before the reserves in which they were situated had been defined. In the 1920's the government embarked upon a policy of defining the boundaries of the reserves and establishing guarantees against further alienation. As a temporary safeguard, the Secretary of State laid down, in August 1921, conditions under which small areas of reserve land could be alienated. The prior consent of the
native authorities and the Secretary of State had to be obtained, land
could not be alienated permanently without full compensation except
in "very special circumstances," and the whole of the rent and the
proceeds of the alienated land had to be expended for the benefit of
the reserve from which it had been taken. Yet, until the passage
of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance in 1930, the position with regard
to the establishment of trading centres in the reserves was extremely
confused. The terms of the Secretary of State's despatch were certain-
ly not enforced. By 1925 it was thought necessary to regularize the
establishment of trading centres by amending the Crown Lands Ordinance
of 1915, but no rules were issued under the amended Ordinance to
enable the centres to be set up. Debate about the Native Lands
Trust Bill, which was bound to affect the granting of new trading cen-
tres, began in 1927, and further delayed clarification of the situa-
tion. The effect of the prolonged discussion on the question of the
terms on which land could be alienated from the reserves delayed the
creation of additional centres and stemmed the geographical advance of
the Indian trader. There is no evidence at all to suggest that this
pause was engineered with the deliberate intention of frustrating the
expansion of Indian interests, though the results of the discussions
certainly had this effect.

The Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1930 enshrined the principle
that the approval of the local native council was to be sought before
any alienation of land could take place. In fact, from the establish-
ment of the local native councils in 1925 it had been the practice of
the administrators, under the terms of the Secretary of State's des-
patch of August 1921, to seek such approval. The local native
councils controlled the rents paid by Indians on temporary occupation
licences, and had the power to limit or refuse the issue of licences.
Indian traders were discriminated against by the councils, sometimes
restrained, but often encouraged by their chairman, the district com-
mmissioner. For example, in Nyeri and Fort Hall Districts in 1925 the
councils resolved that no more mill plots should be granted to Indians
in the reserves,104 while in Machakos District the council raised the
fee for a temporary occupation licence and agreed that trading centres
should be set aside for Kamba traders where no rent should be
charged.105 Two years later the council in Machakos unanimously re-
solved that Indian traders should be removed from Matungulu trading
centre, but they were prevented from doing so by the provincial com-
missioner.106 Nearby, in Kitui District, a resolution prohibiting
Indians from holding plots in a new trading centre was agreed to by the
district commissioner. Another, which sought to prohibit non-Kamba
from holding plots in all trading centres was lost.107 A further re-
solution, which passed unanimously, stated that "...owing to the fact
that the famine is never a very unlikely occurrence in Kitui, it should
be forbidden to sell to traders the following crops: Mbazi, Maweke,
Kunde, Matama, Bean and Maize."108

There is no doubt that the expansion of Indian commercial act-
ivities in the reserves was held back as a result of the devolution of
control over trading centres to the local native councils. Indian fears
were further aroused by the terms of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of
1930. This established a Central Native Lands Trust Board, consisting of six officials including the Governor, and four non-officials nominated by the Governor. In practice these were Europeans. The central board was advised by district advisory boards of two officials, a European non-official, and an African nominated by the local native council. Indians were thus excluded from membership of the bodies which could now fix the terms of leases in the reserves, within the limit of the 33 year maximum period set down in the ordinance. Most of the traders in the reserves still held their plots without security on temporary occupation licenses, awaiting the grant of a lease.

The second of these policies, whose beginnings can be seen in the twenties, was that of introducing buying licences for African produce and thus eliminating the Indian duka from this area of trade. The first introduction of a buying licence came with the passing of the Cotton Ordinance of 1923. This prohibited the purchase of raw cotton except by licence holders, who were permitted to buy only at specified locations agreed between themselves and the government. The experiment was unsuccessful. Six applicants were granted licences but, within three years, three of the original licencees had ceased trading, due to the fall in both price and yields. The Cotton Ordinance did not cause objections from the trading community. Cotton growing was confined to parts of Nyanza Province and the issue of licences coincided with the launching of a new programme to stimulate African cultivators to grow cotton. That the dukas had not had, they would not miss.
The twenties and early thirties was a period in Kenya when
ideas about the introduction of buying licences affecting a wide
range of African products were discussed. Under Coryndon there is
evidence to suggest that there was general sympathy at the highest
levels of government for the idea of introducing buying licences for
maize. This, unlike the introduction of licences for cotton, would
certainly have seriously affected the position of the Indian duka-
wallah. Indeed, it was one of the aims of the scheme to limit what
were thought to be the extensive malpractices of the Indian trader and
to ensure that the African received a fair price for his maize. The
discussion arose as a result of complaints made by directors of the
unsuccesful Nyanza Trading and Transport Company to the Governors' Office about the unfair competition offered by Indian traders in the reserves. ¹¹² The Company officers asked for a local buying monopoly, and suggested that a licencing board be established to grant buying licences to similar reputable companies. ¹¹³ These suggestions met with the approval of the Governor, his Private Secretary, the Director of Agriculture and his deputy, and the Chief Native Commissioner. ¹¹⁴ But, at a meeting between the representatives of European trading interests and the provincial commissioners and their chief, it proved impossible to agree on the details of a concrete scheme, and this particular proposal lapsed. ¹¹⁵

Pressure to introduce a form of licencing came from at least
three sources, the maize conferences, the agricultural officers, and the
European chambers of commerce. At the first Maize Conference, held in
Nairobi in 1923 and attended by representatives of European maize growers, interested commercial organizations and government officials agreed that central markets for specific crops supervised by government officers were essential if the abuses of the existing system were to be checked. The proposal was transmitted through the Chief Native Commissioner to the provincial and district commissioners for comment. Coast Province administrators thought that present market facilities were adequate and, though they would like the means to check local price rings, believed that a buying licence system was unnecessary. Records of the reactions of administrators in other provinces have not survived, but it may be fairly safely assumed that their response was not particularly enthusiastic, as the suggestion was taken no further.

Further proposals for licencing traders to purchase maize, simsim, potatoes, and wattle bark came from meetings of Agriculture Department staff concerned with the development of African agriculture. The officers received reports on marketing systems used on the west coast of Africa and in Ranganyika, and they discussed at some length the strengths and weaknesses of the auction, the commission agent, and the permanent market centre systems. They resolved that:

In view of the fact that the market price for produce and the higher rate for higher quality produce is rarely if ever transmitted to the producer, some action should be taken which would provide adequate reward to the grower. Whenever provincial effort is made to improve quality and output of any type of produce, arrangements should be made whereby the produce in question is bought only by licenced traders. Further, in order to restrict the number of licences issued, only firms of repute employing good buyers should be licenced.
It is very likely that the authors of this resolution were also the authors of an unsigned Government of Kenya paper submitted to the Conference of Governors of British East African Territories held in 1932. It proposed the general introduction of a buying licence system.119

Also received by the conference was a memorandum from the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Eastern Africa on the same subject. Unlike the official paper, this presentation of the views of the European commercial bodies contained a strong attack on the activities of the Indian traders in the Colony. The author believed that there was "an enormous wastage" of agricultural products grown in the native reserves due to the methods used by the Indians. There were far too many dukas in the reserves, a large proportion of them run by "a type of individual who would far better be out of the native reserves...
The present system leads to a desperate cut throat competition from people whose standards of business morality are usually nil." The memorandum recommended the granting of purchasing monopolies to applicants who were capable of keeping proper books, who had never been bankrupt, and who were in a position to deposit a substantial bond as a guarantee of their financial standing.120 Though the conference discussed at length the question of marketing, it did not decide on any positive action. Marketing of Native Produce Ordinances were passed in Uganda and Tanganyika in 1932 and, against fierce Indian opposition, in Kenya in 1935.121

By the early thirties it was clear to the Indian community in Kenya that the decades of unrivalled domination of trade in the reserves
were drawing to a close. The two threats, the competition of African traders encouraged by government action, and legislation which regulated and restricted their activities, were already apparent and growing in strength. For "protection against external attack by other interests," Indian traders in 1932 formed the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce. \(^{122}\) Neither the Federation nor its successors were able to meet and match the challenges which eventually destroyed the Indian dukawallah.

Indian traders were an indispensable element in the early development of production and trade in the reserves. By establishing shops in even the most remote areas of the Colony, they stimulated the African to become economically more productive and assisted his entry into the cash economy as a labourer and a producer. They developed transport systems and provided services which assisted the spread of the administration. No other group was both willing and able to perform the tasks they undertook in such difficult conditions. Like middlemen the world over, the Indian traders were accused of dishonest and unscrupulous trading. In Kenya, the accusations were made with particular vehemence - the traders were members of a large community which challenged European primacy both politically and economically. They represented the claims of peasant agriculture against the plantation system. By asserting the paramountcy of African interests the Imperial Government defused the immediate crisis aroused by the political claims of the Indians. It also provided grounds for an attack on the position of the traders in the reserves.
The official measures of the twenties that began to undermine the dukawallah's position were inspired by a mixture of motives. Most of the administrators believed the traders to be guilty of unfair practices, others held that they provided an inefficient and unstable trading system. Almost all wished to advance what they regarded as the legitimate interests of the Africans. It is impossible to determine objectively whether the Indians were guilty of the errors of which they were accused, or whether they were the victims of prejudice and self-interest. It is necessary to distinguish between the anger and passion of the attacks of European settlers and traders, who saw Indians as a barrier to the achievement of self-government and as a threat to their commercial and economic interests, and the more limited and reasonable criticisms of the administrators. Whether or not, objectively, the accusations of dishonesty and malpractice were true, matters less than the fact that they were generally believed to be true. Certainly as small-scale traders with limited financial resources, most dukawallahs were poorly equipped to cope with the purchase of large quantities of graded produce destined for export. As the productiveness of the reserves increased, the inadequacies of the Indian trading system became more pronounced and obvious, and the suitability of a system of government controlled buying posts more apparent.
Footnotes. Chapter 7.

1 Agriculture file 1/245, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce.

2 For detail on the economic role of the Indians in the nineteenth century, see Mangat, pp. 9-62.

3 Sub-Commissioner, Machakos to Acting Commissioner, Mombasa, 30 September 1896, enclosed in Ukamba Correspondence, Outward, 1896-1900, CP 75/48.

4 Ibid., Ainsworth to Commissioner, Mombasa, 10 August 1896.

5 Ibid., Ainsworth to Acting Commissioner, Mombasa, 2 September 1896.

6 Demand for particular types of trade goods fluctuated widely in these early years. In August 1896 Ainsworth requested large quantities of pink pound beads from Mombasa. Four months later he reported that pink pound beads were "absolutely unsaleable". Ibid., Ainsworth to Commissioner, Mombasa, 10 August 1896 and 18 December 1896. Ainsworth and Hall complained frequently that the supply of trade goods from the coast was inadequate for their needs.

7 Ibid., Ainsworth to Acting Commissioner, Mombasa, 17 January 1897. Scott does not appear to have been successful. In 1898 Ainsworth reported the presence of five Indian traders at Machakos.

8 Machakos District Political Record Book, DC/MKS 4/11.

9 This progress may be traced in detail in Mung-aam.

10 History of Fort Hall District, 1888 to 1944, DC/FH 6/1.

11 Kenya Province Political Record Book, PC/CP 1/1/1.

12 Interview with Habib Ahmad, Nairobi, 1970.

13 Chuka Sub-District Political Record Book, PC/CP 1/6/1.
14 District Commissioner, West Suk to Provincial Commissioner, Turkana Province, 14 October 1929, Land and Boundaries 1929 to 1954, DC/WP 7/2.

15 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1905-1906, PC/NZA 1/1.

16 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1909-1910, PC/NZA 1/5.


18 Cash Registers, Eldama Ravine, 1902-1916, DC/ER 4/1-3.

19 In some districts for a few years the tax was accepted in kind.

20 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1905-06, PC/NZA 1/1.

21 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1911-12, PC/NZA 1/7.


23 See above, pp. 156-158.

24 There are many examples of trading safaris recorded in district and provincial reports. One example of a safari through Kisii District in 1913 resulted in the sale of 15,000 imported hoes, thousands of pangas and thousands of rupees worth of clothing. See South Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1913-14, DC/KSI 1/2. During a series of trading safaris carried out by a European firm in Machakos District, £1,800 of imported goods were sold - the equivalent of about seven percent of the annual sale of imports in the entire district. See Ukamba Province Annual Report, 1916-17, PC/CP 4/2/2.


26 According to Sidi Babul (interviewed Nairobi, 1969), there were approximately 150 Ismailis in Nairobi in 1905. All of these had come direct from India, most of them from Kathiawar. The Ismailis of Zanzibar he described as "a quite separate group," who were not represented in Nairobi. All of the traders interviewed were themselves immigrants from India rather than
descendants of settled coast and island Indian families. They confirmed that the large majority of their fellow traders in the reserves were from similar backgrounds.

27 Interview with Habib Ahamed, Nairobi, 1970.


29 Register of Documents, Machakos District, DC/MKS 30/1.

30 For examples, see Machakos District Political Record Book, 1914-1921, PC/CP 1/3/4 and Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1926, PC/NZA 1/21.

31 Dagoretti Sub-District Annual Report, 1926, DC/KBU 1/19.

32 Mombasa District Annual Report, 1926, DC/MSA 1/3.

33 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1926 and 1927, PC/NZA 1/21 and 1/22.

34 Dagoretti Sub-District Annual Report, 1926, DC/KBU 1/19.

35 One Indian trader recalled that he was declared bankrupt three or four times between 1916 and 1933 largely because of the rapid fluctuations in the price of hides and skins. Interview with Rehemtulla Daya, Nairobi, 1970.


37 Rates of interest varied from twelve to thirty percent per annum. Bills of Sale Ordinance, General, PC/NZA 3/5/1.

38 A trade report for Baringo District for 1929 observed that Indians frequently lost large sums of money on hide purchases because the price fluctuated so rapidly and because the Indians could not find out the ruling market price until after they had dispatched their purchases to the wholesaler. Changes of between Shs. 20 and Shs. 40 per frasilah in a week were not uncommon. Trade Report, 1 October 1929, Baringo District Political Record Book, Volume 5, DC/BAR 3/5.
In the last years of the First World War two-thirds of the total trade of Kitui District was managed by two of the fifteen traders. At the end of the twenties trade was monopolised by three merchants who owned most of the trading centre stores. According to the District Commissioner, the small man had no chance against them and usually survived only a few months. See Machakos District Cash Book, 1916-18, DC/MKS 27/1/1 and Kitui District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KTI 1/1/2. In Nyeri at the beginning of the twenties the turnover of one trader, Osman Allu, was far larger than that of all the other traders combined. Kikuyu Province Annual Reports, 1920-21 and 1922, PC/CP 4/1/2.

For examples, See Kitui District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KTI 1/1/2 and Trading Centres and Townships, Sub-letting, PC/NZA 3/51/2/2.

For an example, see Ukamba Province Annual Report, 1911-12, PC/CP 4/2/1.


Machakos District Cash Book, 1916-18, DC/MKS 27/1/1.


Provincial Commissioner H. R. Tate attempted, in an annual report, to explain why only one European was trading in the African areas of his province. "In trade the Indian shopkeeper as I have known him in Kenya is a shrewd and enterprising businessman, earning at first a far smaller return on his capital than would suffice an European merchant for his living and out of pocket expenses. Subsequently his waiting policy is invariably justified and the returns of a successful shopkeeper or miller are undoubtedly high but business risks which a European would not run are frequently taken by them." Kenya Province Annual Report, 1918-19, PC/CP 4/1/1.
47 For an example, see Ukamba Province Annual Report, 1911-12, PC/CP 4/2/1.

48 Minutes of the Machakos District Committee meeting, 9 March 1929, Machakos District Committee Minutes, 1927-1944, DC/MKS 12/4/1. Indian Settlement in Nyanza Province, 1928, PC/NZA 3/22/3. Also Machakos Station Diary, 1925-26, DC/MKS 6/4/1. The entry for 17 April 1926 notes that Indian traders were unable to acquire sites on land set aside for European settlement. There was one exception in the district on the farm of Mr. T.L. who allegedly received £80 per month from the Indian trading on his land. The farmer claimed that the Indian was his employee.

49 The situation in Nairobi is dealt with in Leys, pp. 271-72.

50 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1923, PC/NZA 1/18 and Central Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1923, DC/CN 1/5/2.

51 Central Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1924, DC/CN 1/6/1.

52 Central Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1923, DC/CN 1/5/2.

53 Kikuyu District Quarterly Report, 30 September 1910, DC/MKS 1/6/1.


55 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1927, PC/NZA 1/22.

56 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1929, PC/NZA 1/24. An almost identical comment can be found in South Nyeri District Annual Report, 1926, DC/NYI 1/2.


58 South Nyeri District Annual Report, 1929, DC/NYI 1/2 and Fort Hall District Annual Report, 1925, DC/FH 1/5.
59 The figures of the number of dukas whose licences were held by Africans at the end of the twenties were: North Kavirondo 69 (1927), Machakos over 100 (1929), Fort Hall 154 (1929), South Nyeri 100 (1929). There were also sizable numbers in Kiambu, Embu, Meru, Kericho and South Kavirondo. Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1927, PC/NZA 1/22, South Nyeri District Annual Report, 1929, DC/NYI 1/2, Fort Hall District Annual Report, 1929, DC/FH 1/8, and Machakos District Annual Report, 1929, DC/MKS 1/1/22.

60 Kitui District Quarterly Report, 30 September 1910, DC/MKS 1/3/3.


62 Kitui District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KTI 1/1/2, and Machakos District Political Record Book, PC/CP 1/3/2.

63 For example, J.W. Isaac in Ukamba Province encouraged chiefs to invest their money in building and stocking new shops in the reserves. Ukamba Province Annual Report, 1906-07, PC/CP 4/2/1.


65 R.S. and M.E. Meikle, After Big Game: The Story of an African Holiday (London: Werner Laurie, n.d. 1914 ), p. 278. The Meikles visited East Africa at the invitation of Governor Belfield and, when not shooting animals, they stayed at Government House. See also, Captain H.A. Wilson, A British Borderland: Service and Sport in Equatoria (London: Murray, 1913). p.338. "Local opinion strongly condemns their presence. Their effect upon the native is bad in the extreme from a moral and from other points of view."

66 Cranworth, pp.63-64.

67 Almost every annual report for 1919-20, 1920-21, 1921 and 1922 provides evidence for this view. For examples, see Ukamba Province Annual Reports, 1919-20, 1920-21 and 1922, PC/CP 4/2/2.

68 See Machakos District Political Record Book, 1895-1910, PC/CP 1/3/1. Chiefs and headmen at the government baraza complained that Indians were cheating in the purchase of ghee because they were using "different measures to those used by the people." Also, entry for September 1925 in Nyanza Province Monthly Diaries
of District and Provincial Commissioners, PC/NZA 3/26/2 and Machakos District Political Record Book, Volume 6, 1925-30, DC/MKS 4/8. Africans were also liable to deceive Indians, for example by mixing sand and stones in beeswax or filling the lower part of a kibuyu of ghee with flour. Kitui District Quarterly Report, 30 September 1910, DC/MKS 1/3/3, and interview with Morar Natha, Machakos, 1970.

69 Prices of selected imported goods, 1915 and 1920. Americani, per piece, Rs. 6 and Fls. 15; Porters blankets, per korja, Rs. 16 and Fls. 45; Best blankets, per korja, Rs. 35 and Fls. 90; Imported flour, per bag, Rs. 21 and Fls. 45. At the end of the war prices of African produce fell rapidly. Maize in Nyanza was bought for between 2 and 6 florins per load in 1919-20 and for between 75 cents and one florin in 1920-21. Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1920-21, PC/NZA 1/15.

70 See above, for fluctuations in the prices of hides and skins.

71 Interview with Habib Ahamed, Nairobi, 1970.


73 Mohamedali Daya knew of an arrangement at Asembo Bay in South Kavirondo where all the merchants agreed to pay the same price for produce. Periodically they would auction it off among themselves. Interview, Nairobi, 1970.

74 Narok District Annual Report, 1929, DC/NRK 1/1/2.

75 Narok District Annual Report, 1927, DC/NRK 1/1/2.


78 Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza to Chief Native Commissioner, 11 February 1930, in Correspondence, Provincial Commissioners Meetings, PC/NZA 3/35/1/2. Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1929, PC/NZA 1/24, entries for June 1926 and September 1927 in Nyanza Province Travelling Diaries, 1925-27, PC/NZA 3/26/4/2-3, and Kitui District Annual Report, 1921-13, DC/KTI 1/1/1. One Indian who died was owed Rs.97 by 24 Africans; another in Kisii in 1929 filed 83 cases against Africans, all for sums under Shs.200. For the coast, see Credit Trade with Natives, CP 6/466 and 27/332 and Advancing Money to Natives against Coming Crops, CP 52/1277.

79 District Commissioner, Digo District to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 2 October 1924, and Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa to Chief Native Commissioner, 5 September 1924, in Credit Trade with Natives, CP 27/332.

80 The whole debate can be followed in Advancing Money to Natives against Coming Crops, CP 52/1277. The East African Indian National Congress strongly discouraged its members from engaging in credit transactions with Africans on three grounds. First, in a credit transaction where one party is illiterate there is a strong presumption that, where disputes occur, the literate party is guilty; second, the practice of giving credit was likely to lead Africans into habits of obtaining goods they did not need; and third, it involved too great a risk of the trader losing his money to be worthwhile. See Indian Association, Nairobi to Indian Association, Kericho, 23 May 1921, in E.A.I.N.C. Correspondence with the Kericho Indian Association, 1921-22, E.A.I.N.C. Archives, Nairobi.

81 R.R. Dundas, District Commissioner Machakos, in Machakos District Political Record Book, 1900-10, PC/CP 1/3/2.

82 For examples, see Kisumu District Annual Report, 1913-14, DC/CN 1/5/1, Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1911-12, PC/NZA 1/7, Machakos District Annual Reports, 1918-19 and 1928, DC/MKS 1/1/10 and 1/1/22.

83 See below, pp. 333-334.

84 R.S. Bentall, "Agriculture in South Kavirondo," Agriculture file 1/180. For earlier criticisms, see Machakos District Political Record Book, 1900-10, PC/CP 1/3/2, and Kitui District Quarterly Report, 30 September 1910, DC/MKS 1/6/1.


87. Indians were criticised for exporting damp, immature, and damaged ground nuts, Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1928, PC/NZA 1/23. Rules were gazetted in 1929 under the Crop Production and Livestock Ordinance which made it illegal for Africans to sell ground nuts before 1 September each year to prevent them being sold in an immature state. Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1929, PC/NZA 1/24.


89. The relevant section of the 1923 White Paper read: "Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail. Obviously, the interests of the other communities, European, Indian or Arab, must severally be safeguarded.... In the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races." Indians in Kenya: A Memorandum, Cmd.1922, 1923, pp. 1-2. See above, pp. 71-72.

90. See particularly, Watkins to Provincial Commissioners, Circular No.62, 9 August 1921, and Circular No.80, 22 August 1922, in Native Shops in Native Reserves, CP 54/1457.

91. Convention of Association resolutions in Box 2, File 3, Coryndon Papers, Rhodes House.

92. Chief Native Commissioner to Provincial Commissioners, Circular No.89, 9 November 1922, and Circular No.9, 14 March 1924, in Chief Native Commissioner's Circulars, 1921-25, DC/MKS 25/3/1.
93 Ibid., Chief Native Commissioner to Provincial Commissioners, Circular No. 40, 5 November 1924.

94 For copies of the circulars issued by the E.A.T.O. see, Imperial Indian Citizens Association, Indians Abroad, Bulletin No. 5, Bombay, May 1923, pp. 36-52.

95 Correspondence and notes of meetings can be found in Box 5, File 2, Trading in Native Reserves by Europeans. This is an official file from the Governor's Office. Judging by notes and letters in the file it had been seen and used by R.B. Turner, the Organising Secretary of the E.A.T.O. Deposit in Rhodes House.

96 Fort Hall District Annual Report, 1927, DC/FH 1/6.

97 Entries for September and December 1927 by the District Commissioner, Central Kavirondo in Nyanza Province Travelling Diaries, 1926-27, PC/NZA 3/26/4/3.

98 Machakos Station Diary, 1925-26, DC/MKS 6/4/1.

99 Entry for May 1927 by District Commissioner, Kericho and entry for October 1927 by the Provincial Commissioner, in Nyanza Province Monthly Diaries, PC/NZA 3/26/2.

100 Churchill to Northey, 25 August 1921, a copy of which was issued as a circular by the Chief Native Commissioner to all provincial commissioners, 27 October 1921. General Matters, Native Reserves, PC/NZA 2/23/2/1.

101 Chief Native Commissioner to Provincial Commissioners, Circular No. 24, 11 August 1924, and Provincial Commissioner, Kisumu, to Chief Native Commissioner, 23 September 1927, in General Matters, Native Reserves, PC/NZA 3/23/2/2.


103 All of the annual reports for Nyanza Province between 1926 and 1929 contain comments that the expansion of trade suffered because of the delay in establishing new trading centres. Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1926-29, PC/NZA 1/21-24 and General Correspondence, Trading Centres and Townships, PC/NZA 3/51/2/1.
South Nyeri District Annual Report, 1925, DC/NYI 1/2 and Fort Hall District Annual Report, 1925, DC/FH 1/5.
For similar examples in Kericho District, see below, pp. 284-285.

Entry for July 1925, Machakos District Local Native Council Minutes, DC/MKS 5/1/1.

Entry for November 1927, Machakos District Local Native Council Minutes, DC/MKS 5/1/2.

Minutes of the meetings of 27 August 1928 and 23 February 1929, Kitui District Local Native Council Minutes, DC/KTI 9/1.

Ibid., Minutes of the meeting of 18 December 1930.


See above pp. 227-228.

Nyanza Trading Company to Coryndon, 5 January 1924, in Box 5, File 2, Coryndon Papers, Rhodes House.

Ibid., Memorandum by Private Secretary to the Governor, E.A.T. Dutton to Coryndon, 13 March 1924.

Ibid., Report of the meeting of 8 January 1925.


Maize Crops, Maize Conference, CP 44/937.

Minutes of the meetings of Native Agriculture Staff, 25-27 August 1930 and 13-16 September 1930, Agricultural Officers Meetings, CP 2/370.

Ibid., "Trade Development in Native Reserves," Paper GC (32) 52 Native Policy.

Yoshida and Belshaw.

Agriculture file 1/245, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce.
Chapter 8. The District Studies.

The aim of these four district studies is to highlight the particular circumstances and conditions which were responsible for the nature and the extent of economic development and change among selected groups in Kenya in the early colonial period. The Colony was very diverse in the geographic and climatic sense, as well as in the range of types of polities and economies that existed prior to the colonial period. The nature of the initial impact of British rule varied widely from area to area and British administration was not applied evenly to the entire Colony. The selected groups provide a variety of contrasts of conditions and experience. The pre-colonial economies of the Nandi and the Kipsigis were both based upon cattle keeping, the Giriama and the Pokomo were both agricultural; the Nandi and the Kipsigis were both located close to substantial and important European settlements, the coastal people were sited well away from the concentrations of prosperous European farms; the Kipsigis and the Giriama supplied substantial quantities of surplus grain to the market, the Nandi and the Pokomo did not; both the Kalenjin groups reacted positively to demands for labour, the Giriama and the Pokomo tended to stay on their reserves. The generalisations of earlier chapters conceal important local differences and peculiarities. Even two groups as closely related as the Nandi and the Kipsigis displayed quite different reactions to the new economic conditions.
2.1. Nandi and Lumbwa Districts.

In the pre-colonial and early colonial periods strong similarities existed between the population and history of the areas which became known as Nandi and Lumbwa Districts. The most basic similarity was that which existed between the tribes which made up the overwhelming majority of the population of each district. The Nandi and the Kipsigis are both classified by Huntingford as belonging to the Nandi division of the Nandi group of Southern Nilo-Hamites. They speak a slightly different dialect of the same language and regard each other as being of one people. It is probable that, perhaps as late as the latter half of the eighteenth century, the tribes lived together.

After the geographical separation, the Nandi and the Kipsigis maintained a close relationship, often joining with one another on raids against their common enemies. Whilst no compensation was payable to members of any other tribe killed by the Nandi or the Kipsigis, any death caused by fighting between the two tribes was recompensed by payment of cattle. The two tribes intermarried freely and Nandi settled permanently in Kipsigis country without the formality of adoption or the stigma which attaches to those who forsake their own tribe and tribal custom. It was also customary for Kipsigis children to attend initiation ceremonies in Nandi, and vice versa, if the time of initiation within their own tribes was inconvenient.

Their traditional economies and their initial reactions to colonial intrusion were also similar. Both tribes were cattle
keeping people who engaged in raids upon other groups with
the intention of augmenting their herds. Both attached
enormous importance to the size and state of their herds, and
to both people cattle were of primary economic, social, and
ritual importance. According to Huntingford:

Cattle provide not only the chief occupation and
interest in the life of the Nandi, but also food
and a number of necessaries like hides for clothing
and sleeping on, and dung for building and medicinal
use; not to mention the fact that they are wealth in-
a visible, automatically increasing and essentially
attractive form. They are also the chief medium for
the payment of bride price, and are therefore
indispensable accessories in the formation of family
life, the production of children and the continued
existence of the tribe.

The same author wrote that: "The attitude of the
Kipsigis to cattle is the same as that of the Nandi: cattle
are their main interest in life." Both tribes also supplemented
their basic diet of milk, blood, and meat with grain. The two
tribes grew small patches of finger millet or wimbi (eleusine
corocana) and both have exactly the same story to explain the
origins of their cultivation.

In pre-colonial times the Nandi and the Kipsigis
inhabited contiguous and similar geographical areas, and both
suffered excisions from their homelands to make way for European
settlement. The Nandi, after the punitive expedition of 1905-6,
signed a treaty at Kipture, under which they agreed to give up
the south-east corner of their lands populated by the Kamelilo
and Kapchepkendi divisions. Failing to understand the terms of
the agreement, they were forcibly removed from the area by
Meinertzhagen in January 1906. Their reserve was gazetted to exclude them from access to grazing land on the Uasin Gishu, which they had used since the mid-nineteenth century, but it included the areas of Kaimosi and Kipkaren, which were sliced off in 1919 to make way for further European settlement under the post war Soldier Settler Scheme. As they were finally defined, Kaimosi and Kipkaren represented a loss of 61 square miles out of a total reserve area of 601 square miles (excluding forest reserve). The Kipsigis suffered a similar fate when, in 1906, a block of land centering on Chemagel in the south-west section of their lands was alienated, and again in 1920 when the British East African Disabled Officers Colony was established in an area centering on Kericho. Much of the southern alienation of 200 square miles had been inhabited by the Kipsigis, as had 130,000 acres of the alienated land around Kericho.

Prior to the taking of their lands by the Europeans, the two tribes had reacted in like fashion to the coming of the white men. Neither were pacific tribes, as both depended on raids to sustain their herds and obtain meat. Neither had suffered the crippling epidemics experienced in the late nineteenth century by the Masai; they were at the peak of their power. The Europeans, in their attempt to establish dominance, clashed violently with them. Nandi attacks on traders and railway parties and the continued raiding by the Kipsigis of the Gusii, were the causes of a series of punitive expeditions, which finally
Nandi put up the stoutest resistance, and it took a total of five expeditions and the killing of the Nandi okoiyot before the Europeans could feel that they had achieved their objectives. The Nandi also suffered the greatest losses at the hands of the invaders. Hollis wrote in 1909 that: "Formerly the Nandi owned enormous herds, but during the late punitive expedition they lost large numbers." Kipsigis losses were also heavy; 2,000 head of cattle were confiscated from the Sotik area alone after the expedition of 1905, and in 1913 a collective fine of Rs. 16,000 was imposed on the Peelkut and Puret divisions. Not surprisingly, neither tribe was liberal in its affection for Europeans. In 1939 Peristiany wrote of the Kipsigis that, "Their attitude towards all Europeans is one of aloofness, of reticence, and of extreme suspicion."  

Yet, despite the close similarities between the tribes in the pre-colonial period and the early twentieth century, the pace of development of production and trade in the two districts was markedly different. The initial response to European economic pressure was in both cases very slight but, whereas Kipsigis production and trade developed steadily after about 1910 and rapidly in the 1920's, that of the Nandi barely increased at all until the very close of the period. In part this may be explained by the deeper resentment felt by the Nandi, due to the harsher treatment they received from the Europeans. Other stronger circumstantial explanations will emerge from the following
accounts of the development of production and trade in the two
districts.

Lumbwa District.

Shortly after the Eastern Province of Uganda was handed
over to the East African Protectorate in 1902, the administrative
station at Kericho was founded. In the period immediately prior
to its establishment, the Kipsigis were trading with
Swahilis. In 1892 an engineer on the railway survey party
observed that at Sotik Swahili traders had established a
strong headquarters camp from which they sent out parties of
men into the surrounding countryside to barter trade goods
for ivory. Initial trading contacts with Indians took place
on the railway; in 1901 Johnston recorded that numbers of Indians
and Swahilis were purchasing sheep from the Kipsigis for sale
to the railway. In the same year chiefs from the Fort Ternan
area were selling large quantities of grain, almost certainly
wimbi, to the troops stationed on the line. Over the following
three or four years itinerant traders moved into the area in
considerable numbers. In 1905 the District Commissioner wrote
that he had to temporarily apply the Outlying Districts
Ordinance to control the activities of Somali livestock traders,
who were "over-running the country and giving anxiety by their
methods of trade." The Somalis were purchasing large numbers of
sheep and goats which they herded to the Kikuyu areas. The
almost insatiable Kikuyu demand for small livestock was to
prove a continuing feature of Kipsigis trade throughout the early
colonial period. A more temporary feature of early colonial
Trade was the supplying of the Protectorate military forces stationed first at Kericho and then at Lumbwa Railway Station until 1907 when, after successful expeditions against both the Nandi and the Sotik Kipsigis, the force was withdrawn.

The presence of the military in the district indicates one of the two major concerns of the administration in its early years. It was particularly concerned to maintain a state of peace between the Kipsigis and the Gusii where they clashed on the southern border of Kericho District; the Gusii were a customary target for Kipsigis livestock raiding activities. To help prevent further clashes between the two tribes, the Government decided to alienate a large portion of land along the line of potential conflict to European settlers. In doing so the administration provided itself with a great deal of work in the short term, and in the long term a great deal more trouble than it had forstalled.

The alienations of Kipsigis land also represented a major part of an attempt by the government to depastoralize the Kipsigis. Ainsworth, the Provincial Commissioner of Kavirondo Province (of which Kericho was then a part), played a leading role in ensuring that the borders of the district were gazetted in such a manner as to exclude large areas of Kipsigis grazing land, whilst leaving intact very large areas which were suitable for arable farming. In 1914 Ainsworth told the Governor, Belfield, that the boundaries of the Kipsigis reserve contained some of the best areas for mixed farming in the country and ample land for every Kipsigis. He believed that
the government should act to restrain the primary ambition
of the tribe which was, of course, to acquire more livestock.

On the first acquaintance with such questions as these it
might possibly appear to some people as a gross piece of
interference when we say that the native must necessarily
be restricted in his pastoral tendencies. To such I
distinctly state that the best interests of the natives
are studied when they are restricted in such inclinations,
and are practically compelled to take to mixed
agriculture. Amongst all native tribes, excessive pastoral
propilities more or less influence nomadic or unsettled
conditions in their life. Such conditions can never make
for advancement amongst Africans; indeed, in the long run,
they are generally their undoing.... Their very best
interests will be served by holding to the policy of
mixed agriculture.... 16

The result of the Governor's agreement with Ainsworth's thoughts
was that the Kipsigis lost about 130,000 acres, including

"practically all of their best grazing land." The alienation

of salt licks caused particular problems for the Kipsigis. In

1920 the District Commissioner, C.M. Dobbs, summed up the tribe's

land holding position:

The Lumbwa have far more cultivable land per head of
population than any other tribe in the country, and
far more that they can possibly make use of for
generations. On the other hand practically all the
grazing land has been taken away from the Butret and
Sotik sections and given to the farmers... 18

If the Kipsigis were to adopt agriculture successfully,
the first requisite was to discover a suitable crop for the tribe
to grow. Finger millet or wimbi was unsatisfactory as it gave
very low yields per acre and as there was only a very limited
export market for it. From at least as early as 1907, the district
administration decided that maize had all the qualities necessary
to become the staple Kipsigis crop. Not only was there a large
demand for it both within and outside the Protectorate, but as
a food crop it would offer an alternative source of
nourishment to the tribe in years of partial crop failure. 19
An energetic and successful programme of seed distribution was
embarked upon. In 1908 3,000 lbs., in 1909 12,000 lbs., and in
1910 4,400 lbs. were distributed; in the war years the effort
was stepped up due to increased demand from the military, and
over 20 tons of selected seed reached Kipsigis farmers. 20

Immediate response was disappointing; the District
Commissioner in 1909 labelled the Kipsigis as "a poor prospect." 21
In the following decade this judgement was reversed as the
tribe slowly built up a substantial trade in maize. From the
40 tons of maize sold by African farmers of Kericho District
in 1909-10, the surplus built up to 150 tons in 1910-11, and by
1919-20 Kipsigis reserve farmers sold 1,400 tons of maize worth
about 80,000 Rs. 22 Almost all of the crop was sold; the
Kipsigis continued to eat wimbi to supplement their diet of
milk, meat and blood. Resistance to maize as a food crop
stemmed from the knowledge that maize, unlike wimbi, could
not be easily ground by hand between the flat stones used by
the tribe, that maize did not produce such potent beer, and that
maize in store was liable to attack by weevils and was,
therefore, difficult to keep in good condition for more than
six months. Wimbi would keep in edible condition for anything
up to five years, and any surplus could, therefore, be stored
to stretch over dry years when the harvests were small and the
pasturage poor. 23 In 1915-6 it was estimated that the Kipsigis
together with the Nandi grew approximately ten times more wimbi than maize, using in the order of thirty times more land for their traditional grain. Maize was a crop grown strictly for cash to meet the increasing tax demands and to purchase additional livestock.

Government efforts were not confined to maize alone. They recognised that returns per acre for maize were low compared to other crops and that, because of its bulk, it posed considerable transportation problems. Beans, peas, English potatoes, caster oil seeds, lentils, sorghum or mtama (sorghum vulgare), sim-sim, ground nuts, rice and black wattle were all experimented with as alternative cash crops. Seeds were distributed, often in sizeable quantities, and usually without success. Beans were a distinct success and castor oil seeds grew well, but no one would purchase them at a price that would offer a reasonable return. Most of the other crops were either quite unsuited to the soil and climatic conditions of the district or failed because there were no trained officers to give specialist advice on the cultivation of crops whose needs differed from those of the established grain crops.

The Indian merchants, who bought the bulk of the Kipsigis maize crop, had established themselves in Kericho shortly after the administration moved in. By 1906, when the townships of Lumbwa and Kericho were surveyed and gazetted, there were fourteen shops established in Kericho township and a small
bazaar at Lumbwa station. Hayes Sadler, during a visit to the district, noticed that trading was chiefly in hides and skins for blankets and cloths. Unlike their Kavirondo neighbours to the west, the Kipsigis were already beginning to purchase cotton goods in considerable quantities, and the Governor anticipated that, after the recent completion of the Kericho to Lumbwa road, trade would be considerably augmented by the sale of grain. The use of money had spread quickly through the reserve; by 1906 all taxes, except those collected in Sotik and in the area west of Buret where goats were used, were paid in money. Hut Tax collection rose slowly to Rs. 18,870 in 1908-9, and then rapidly to Rs. 47,874 in 1910-11.

Despite the growing yields of maize, the major source of income for both Africans and traders almost certainly derived from the trade in hides and skins. In 1909-10 traders bought almost 3,500 score of sheep and goat skins and thirteen and a half tons of hides. Ten years later the figures were 1,600 score of skins and 30 tons of hides. It is not clear from the records whether, over the period up to the end of the First World War, the Kipsigis were net sellers or net purchasers of livestock. It seems likely that there was a substantial flow of cattle, sheep, and goats both into and out of the reserve area. Small livestock came into the district across the border with the Masai and left in the direction of Kikuyu country, though the extent of the trade is never quantified. "The principal trade," the Provincial Commissioner wrote in 1911, "was in sheep and
goats which the Somali bought and took down to Kikuyu. What
the native this year has been offering for sale is grain, and
he had become a buyer rather than a seller of livestock. This
statement seems to reflect a hope and a future trend
rather than an actual observation; that year the value of
Kipsigis grain sales probably did not exceed Rs. 8,000. In these
early years, before the extensive production of grain for sale,
the Kipsigis were probably forced to sell off small stock to
meet their tax obligations. There is no evidence to suggest
that in the same period cattle were also sold off to pay taxes
and, bearing in mind the vital importance of cattle to the
tribe, it is unlikely that they would part with them in any
numbers. Later, however, in the early years of the war the
District Commissioner did record that the Kipsigis were slowly
becoming less reluctant to part with their cattle, and the
following year the annual report reveals that 1,815 bullocks
were bought in the district by the military and 2,524 by Indian
and Somali traders. Though some of these sales may have been
made under compulsion, it should be recorded that three years
later, when the practice of compulsory purchase had lapsed, the
Kipsigis sold over 4,700 cattle in a single year. In that year,
too, the grain crop was successful, so it is unlikely that, added to
the figure of well over Rs. 40,000 gained from the sale of hides
and skins, the Kipsigis were short of money for tax. But it
certainly was the case that during this period there was an
exceptionally high demand for cattle from newly arrived settlers,
a demand which forced cattle prices up to unprecedented levels, to which the Kipsigis responded.

Trade, at first confined to the townships of Lumbwa, Kericho, and Sotik and supported by the activities of itinerant traders, expanded around 1910-11 co-incidental with the surge in grain production, and probably coupled with it. By this year permanent trading centres had been established at Litein (Kapsita Hill), and Kapcherero (Kipsonoi) with temporary sites also at Tugenon River, Petchu Letatch, Kampetu (Kapsaus), Mara Mara River, Longisa, Kapkilmolwet (Amala), Simoti and Marraboi. The trading centres were connected by a series of newly constructed roads, one of which went from Sotik to the border of Kericho District with the Masai Reserve to service the growing trade with the Masai in grain, honey, and hides. Cart roads, which provided the major arteries of trade, connected Kericho with the railway at Lumbwa in 1906 and with Sotik in 1913. Though occasional complaints were registered in the annual reports about the slow development of transport, it appears that African producers and Indian traders were better served by the roads in Kericho District than in almost any other part of Kenya. To this extent the district was fortunate to have European settlers who could clamour successfully for adequate communications from which the Africans and Indians could also draw some benefit. The growth of the Asian population, whose sole livelihood was African trade, provides a useful, if not entirely accurate, index of the growth of production and trade
in the district. From 88 in 1910-11 they grew in number to 264 in 1919-20. The number of shops in the district trading centres also grew rapidly from 18 in 1909-10 to 56 in 1916-17.

By comparison with its growth in the period up to the end of the First World War, trade and production in Kericho District raced rapidly forward in the succeeding decade. The most likely explanation for this acceleration was that the European farms, which had developed very slowly in the period up to the end of the First World War, now with augmented numbers and a larger alienated area, began to prosper. Whereas in the early years of settlement they had concentrated none too successfully on maize, in the 1920's they found in tea a crop ideally suited to the soil and climatic conditions and for which there was a profitable and ready international market. In 1919-20 European farmers had 1,737 acres under flax, 673 acres under coffee and 510 acres under wheat; in 1929, by which time the farmers had entirely recovered from the effects of the post war depression and the simultaneous failure of the flax market and the Disabled Officers Colony, the acreage under coffee had grown to 5,064 and under tea to 4,392 acres. Farmers within and on the boarders of the district came to rely heavily upon Kipsigis grown maize to feed their labour force. At the end of the decade the reserve produced about 85,000 bags or around 8,000 tons of maize, roughly half of which was bought by the farmers. Of the remainder, a fraction was bought by the government to feed its labour, the balance going for export. Much of this balance went not, as
might be expected, to the railway, but southwards to the Masai reserve to satisfy the rapidly growing Masai appetite for maize meal. Indeed, the Kipsigis had been from as early as 1914 one of the major sources of supply for their pastoral neighbours. Some of the busiest trading centres in the district were engaged in the Masai trade, Kipsomoi (Kapcherero) which had thirteen occupied plots at the end of the decade and Kapkelmolwet (Amala) in particular.

The rapid increase in the production of maize was accomplished through the introduction and widespread use of the plough. In the era before 1920, all cultivation had been undertaken with the hoe. The first plough seems to have come into use in 1921; by 1927 65 were being used, and by 1930 this figure had risen to 400. In 1928 the District Commissioner reported that one location was using a tractor hired from a local European farmer to break new ground for maize planting. The Kipsigis, without any assistance from the Agriculture Department, except by the supply of seeds, became in the 1920's one of the most productive tribes in the entire country measured in terms of surplus sales of grain per capita.

The Kipsigis, unlike most other Kenya tribes, were fortunate in having two very large maize markets, the European tea and coffee estates and the Masai, close by. At the beginning of the period of its most rapid growth the district already had over 170 miles of roads capable of carrying wheeled traffic, and there was easy access to the railway at Lumbwa from Kericho.
There was also an ample supply of arable land well suited to maize growing. But the existence of favourable marketing conditions, good communications, and plentiful agricultural land do not fully explain the apparent readiness of the tribe to adopt the practices of cash cropping when, by tradition, the Kipsigis were devoted to the pastoral way of life. Explanations for this change must take into account the fact that, even in pre-colonial times, the Kipsigis grew considerable quantities of grain to supplement their largely animal derived diet. Of perhaps primary importance here was the nature of the land alienated by the Europeans—it had been pastoral rather than arable land. The Kenya Land Commission found in 1932 that, while the reserve could not be described as overstocked, it could certainly not provide grazing for many more animals than it then contained. The suitability of the land available in the reserve for arable rather than pastoral activities no doubt had some influence on the nature of Kipsigis economic behaviour. Perhaps also of considerable importance was the imposition, in 1921, of a quarantine on cattle, which lasted through to 1925 and which was applied periodically thereafter. Cattle, which had been a source of money income to the tribe, were rendered useless for this purpose, and the cultivation of maize provided a lucrative alternative. Sales of sheep and goats in very large numbers, as well as the long standing trade in hides and skins, provided other sources of money income. But the Kipsigis way of life had changed only by degree;
at the end of the period they owned about 200,000 cattle and a similar number of sheep and goats. About a fifth of the cattle were kept by squatters on local European farms where, in return for the right to graze their animals, the Kipsigis supplied labour to the farmers. There were over 3,800 resident labourers from Kipsigis on neighbouring farms in 1932. It is by no means clear how many of these had left the reserve in order to find better grazing or how many had merely continued in residence after the land on which they had been living had been alienated. Certainly the farmers regarded them favourably as a stable source of inexpensive labour.

By no means all of the Kipsigis chose to rely upon maize as a major source of income, even though there was apparently a surplus of arable land within the reserve; during the 1920's a large number of adult male Kipsigis chose to leave the reserve and sell their labour. Classified at the beginning of the decade as a tribe which was in the process of coming on to the labour market, by the end of the decade nearly 7,000 out of a population of able bodied males between 15 and 40 years of close to 13,000 were in employment. Only Nairobi-Kiambu and Nandi Districts supplied a higher proportion of their young adult males to the labour market.

These two revolutionary changes in the nature of Kipsigis economic activity, the huge increases in the production of maize and in the supply of labour, were accompanied by, and undoubtedly connected with, the very rapid growth in the range
as well as the total sales of imported goods by traders operating in townships and trading centres in Kericho District. In the mid-twenties such items as European clothing and caps, furniture, cooking utensils and tea began for the first time to be sold in large quantities. 47 Eight of the largest Indian traders who supplied figures to the District Commissioner reported sales worth 361,188/- in 1925, 674,591/- in 1928, and 825,000/- in 1930. By 1928 the largest Indian trader in the district, Sherkhan Panukhan, alone employed six lorries to move his goods. 48 So optimistic were the traders about the future prospects of the district that, when twenty 2nd class business plots in the township of Kericho were auctioned in July 1929, prices up to 3,650/- were paid for stand premia. This was at a time when prices were falling and the economic depression was already underway. The return from trading licences, another index of prosperity, rose from 1,590/- in 1924 to 5265/- in 1929.49

As in every other district of Kenya, Indians, in this case largely Hindus, dominated the retail trade of the district. Africana brought in maize, hides and skins to the dukas and bought from them a range of imported products, ranging from unbleached cotton cloth to luxury items like European clothing, adopted by about five percent of the Kipsigis by 1930, and bicycles.50 At the end of the 1920's the most important centres of trade, measured by the number of occupied plots, were Kericho, where all the major traders were based, Kapsamonget, Litein (Kapsita), Kipsonoi (Kapcherero), Kapsaos (Kampetu), Marraboii,
As well as dominating retail trade the Indians also controlled the important subsidiary activities of milling and transport. In or about 1908, in response to the first programme of seed distribution, the first Indian owned water powered flour mill was set up at Lumbwa station on the banks of the River Nyando. Within ten years most of the major traders had set up their own mills.

In none of these areas did Indian dominance go unchallenged by either Africans or Europeans. The livestock trade was never subject to Indian control. Somalis, who in the early years of colonial rule had run sheep between the Kipsigis and the Kikuyu, were forced out by 1920 by the buyers and sellers, who thereafter themselves controlled the trade. European farmers, though they bought some of their maize supply directly from Kipsigis squatters, purchased most of it through the Indians, who acted as collection agents and middle men for the reserve growers. Not until 1929 do the district records note "several instances" of European farmers buying directly from African producers, a move which the District Commissioner regarded as "a step in the right direction." Only four years before the first Kipsigis owned shop had been opened in the reserve. The Local Native Council in its first year of operation made a loan of Shs.1,000 to a Kipsigis to open a shop at Jamji. Evidently there was sufficient enthusiasm to warrant the Provincial Commissioner, on a visit to Litein two years later, calling together the African
traders there to discuss the possibility of purchasing their goods directly from Nairobi at wholesale prices, instead of continuing to purchase at retail prices from the local Asian traders. In 1929 African traders were already objecting to the granting of any further temporary occupation licences to Indians at Kipsterre trading centre where the Kipsigis had already opened up several shops. The early African attempts to break into retail trade were on too small a scale to worry Indians seriously, but two European attempts to open large stores in Kericho in the 1920's had caused them some concern. By the end of the decade both of these challenges had been brushed aside successfully.

A field in which the African offered an earlier and more substantial threat to the Indians was that of milling. The first African mill in the district appears to have been built in 1917 with funds subscribed by Africans living in one location of the district. Within two years two other locations had also built their own mills, also water powered. Though none of these earliest attempts worked satisfactorily, by 1923 eight African owned mills were in operation and the number rose steadily to 73 in 1930.

Again the Local Native Council contributed to this development; in the two years of 1925 and 1926, for example, it advanced loans of Shs. 10,000 for the purchase of mill stones and ploughs. In August 1926 the Provincial Administration decided that permission to set up water mills would not be granted in the case of fresh applications by Indians. Official policy was to encourage Africans to set up their own. Indian traders reacted by bringing in a more
efficient type of mill driven by an oil engine. This was capable of handling much heavier loads as it did not depend on water pressure, which was low or non-existent for about half of the year, and it was cheaper to operate. A decision taken by the Chief Native Commissioner gave the Provincial Commissioner the right to refuse Indians permission to erect oil-engined mills on trading centre plots if there were objections from local Africans. Several applications made by Indians in 1929 were refused on the grounds that they would prejudice the success of local African enterprise. 62
Nandi District

Unlike the Kipsigis, who grew increasingly large quantities of maize to satisfy a vigorous local market, the Nandi failed to find a staple crop or commodity on which to base their local economy. This contrast between the tribes related most closely not to any small differences in tribal structure, the nature of pre-colonial economic activity, or soil and climatic conditions, but essentially to the differences in the geographical location and the economic opportunities these afforded to the two tribes.

The earliest years of contact between the Nandi and the colonial government were characterized, of course, by the considerable challenge offered by the tribe to the extension of governmental authority. From 1902 taxes had been collected in rather small amounts from the Nandi, and there had been a very limited trade in hides and skins amounting to no more than Rs. 1,000 per year. It was not until after the expedition of 1905 that the administration began to take an interest in the economic development of the area.63 As with the Kipsigis, government sought to introduce a crop which the Nandi could grow and export with profit. C.S. Hemsted, the District Commissioner in 1908, argued that, if the Nandi could be induced to cultivate valuable crops, they would be far less likely to cause trouble.64 Native crops, with the possible exception of tobacco, were considered to be of little or no value. For the major Nandi grain crop, finger millet or wimbi, there was very little demand outside the
district, and it was considered that Nandi tobacco, although amongst
the best in Kenya, could not be exported until the Nandi had
learned to cure it properly. Over the next four years the
administration brought in maize, wheat, bean, linseed oil, ground
nut, soya bean, gram and cotton seed for a series of experimental
plantings, followed up with the distribution of seeds to selected
areas. For a variety of reasons none of these crops provided the
solution the administration was seeking to the problem of
providing the Nandi with a dependable revenue-yielding crop.
Ground nuts succeeded at first around Kapier but, after widespread
distribution, it was found that in most areas they took ten months
to mature and yielded a very low return. The district was found
to be unsuited to the cultivation of cotton. Linseed grew well
and in 1908-9 the small crop was sold for high prices. It briefly,
became the main hope of the administration until dire shortage of
seed prevented its further spread. Wheat was a crop which
received much attention. First introduced in 1908, 650 lbs. of
seed were distributed after initial experiments to discover the most
suitable planting period. The following year 500 acres were planted,
but yields were low at only four bushels an acre, and much of the
crop remained unsold. The varieties of seed which had been
distributed tended to develop rust and, without the constant
introduction of large quantities of fresh seed, both the quality and
the yield continued to fall. As with linseed, insufficient
quantities of seed were available. Maize and beans, introduced
in 1906, grew successfully in the district. Neither could provide the tribe with an income because neither could be sold at a profit, except in a very restricted local market. Even this shrank further following the withdrawal of the King's African Rifles in 1907.

In these early years Nandi District lacked both roads and organized trading centres. Though Kapsabet, the administrative centre of the reserve from 1907, was only fifteen miles away from the railway line at Kibigori, the Nyando Escarpment, rising two thousand feet from the level of the valley through which the railway ran, proved an insurmountable barrier to wheeled transport without the construction of a proper road. Access to the west was provided in 1909 by a track which ran through Kaimosi to Kisumu, but its length, nearly fifty miles, prohibited its use for the transport of bulky low value goods. In 1907 Kapsabet was also linked by track with Kaptumo, Kapiyét and Yala River. None of these connections were apparently adequate for wheeled transport. Trade might also have flowed north-eastwards onto the Uasin Gishu Plateau, where European farmers were beginning to establish themselves, but again no road existed which was capable of carrying wagons. To make matters worse, the native pass system discouraged the Nandi from carrying produce from one district to another for sale, as they had often to travel long distances to obtain passes which would allow them to move outside their own district. One administrator commented that, in any case, the Nandi were not prepared to carry
their crops five or six miles in order to market them. Certainly
the Nandi were unwilling to act as porters for traders, who were
forced to obtain their labour from the neighbouring Kavirondo
districts.\textsuperscript{72} Neither wheat, beans or maize were able to bear the
cost of portage, which worked out at around one rupee for one-
load carried from Kapsabet to the railway.\textsuperscript{73} Almost every administra-
tive report in these early years referred to the lack of commun-
ications severely impeding the progress of the district.

Many of them also mentioned the small numbers and the
unsatisfactory type of trader who moved into Nandi at this time.
Hemsted blamed the very limited scope of Nandi trade on the Indian
merchants, "whose dishonest and rapacious methods have stifled every
industry which attempts have been made to develop." He felt that,
until a better class of trader could be attracted, it would be
difficult to place the trade of the reserve on a sound footing.\textsuperscript{74}
But traders were handicapped by poor communications and by legal
restrictions which prevented them erecting buildings outside the
limits of the three townships of Kapsabet, Kapiyet and Kaptuvo.\textsuperscript{75}
It is probable that traders were deterred from entering the area
by the fearsome reputation enjoyed by the Nandi.

In order to pay their taxes, the Nandi relied upon small
scale sales of grain to the administration, the sale of skins,
which rose to a peak of Rs.4,680 in 1906-7 and thereafter declined,
the sale of livestock, and the hire of their labour. Whilst the
military were in the district, taxes were raised easily as the troops spent their pay locally, but after they left the District Commissioner reported that the Nandi were having to sell their cattle or, if they had none, hire out their labour. In 1908-9 the tribe derived Rs.19,400 from the sale of livestock through the agency of Somalis at prices which were very low compared to those paid in other parts of the Protectorate. The District Commissioner, C.S. Hemsted, regarded these sales as undesirable as they acted as a drain on the wealth of the Nandi and "fostered a spirit of disaffection." He called for a more liberal policy towards the issue of seeds of marketable products and the allocation of funds for the construction of roads towards the railway line. By the end of 1908 the Nandi were in dire straits; the district had attracted very few traders, there were no organised trading centres or roads to service them, and there was no obvious way the Nandi could survive economically, save by selling off their resources or leaving the reserve to find work.

The brief rubber boom of 1909 and 1910 altered the picture. In late December 1908 permission was granted to the Nandi to tap the wild rubber vines found in abundance in the forests of the Nandi District. The Forestry Department had misgivings about allowing the tribe unregulated access to the vines, fearing that they would over-tap and hence destroy their future productive capacity. The district administration did not share these doubts, believing that the price of wild rubber in 1909-10 was as high as
it was ever likely to be, and was bound to fall in the near future with the impending expansion of production from commercial rubber plantations. Such regulations as were imposed only managed to restrict the output to about 80,000 pounds over two years, after which period the forests were closed to tappers for two years. The most immediate consequence of the rubber boom was a large influx of traders, including many Europeans, and a considerable broadening of Nandi contacts with them. By June 1910 ten traders were either established, or had made application to establish themselves, at Kapiyet, ten at Kaptumo and eight at Kapsabet. In December 1909 the District Commissioner recommended the establishment of five new trading centres, and the following year the first wagons, with difficulty, reached administrative headquarters from both the railway and the Uasin Gishu Plateau. By the end of 1909 about 1,200 loads of trade goods were being carried into the district from the railway every month. Through the tapping season about one hundred bulls were being slaughtered every month for meat. But as quickly as the boom developed, so it collapsed.

After the closure of the forests to tappers, Nandi District fell back into a trough of economic depression from which it did not emerge for ten years. Three new trading centres were opened at Mussuriot Spring, Chepsonei and Maraba, but by 1920 they were all practically deserted. In March 1913 Kapsabet housed only three or four traders, Kapiyet one occupied shop and Kaptumo was described as "a place of little importance." The Nandi were very
slow to develop a taste for the luxuries introduced by western civilization; even in 1917, the major items of demand were still blankets, beads, brass-wire and salt. Less enthusiasm was displayed in the 1910's by local administrators for the programme of pressing for increased agricultural production, which had proved so attractive in the area before the rubber boom. Linseed, beans, and European potatoes were pushed at various times with little success. Linseed continued briefly as the great hope of the administration. Seven hundred loads were bought from the Nandi in 1911-12 for redistribution to African planters but, by the time the crop was harvested the following year, the market price had collapsed and the Nandi were left with most of it on their hands. Of the other European crops, only maize achieved any success. The traditional grain crop, finger millet, remained overwhelmingly the most popular of all. In 1916-17, for example, admittedly a year of poor rains, merchants in trading centres and townships were able to buy 38 tons of wimbi, against 12 tons of maize and three tons of beans. Whereas the vast bulk of the wimbi crop was eaten by the Nandi, maize continued to be very unpopular as a food. Agriculture certainly received a setback as a result of the rubber boom; Nandi, who could raise money by tapping vines, were certainly not likely to grow crops for sale. District commissioners agreed that the rubber boom had "demoralized the Nandi hopelessly." Few improvements were made in communications;
there were, in 1915, only three wheeled vehicles serving the district when the District Commissioner complained that only Rs. 200 was allowed per year for the construction and upkeep of roads. As late as 1921 almost all of the goods coming into the district were being carried by head load up the escarpment from Kibigori station to Kapsabet by Kavirondo porters. A series of partial crop failures due to climatic irregularities further hindered progress. 1912-13, 1916-17, 1917-18 and 1918-19 were reported as being particularly poor years. Crop failure in 1916-17 was also accompanied by a severe smallpox outbreak. In 1918-19 nothing was offered for sale, and by 1921 the District Commissioner noted that there was "practically no agriculture" in the area. He referred rather caustically to the Fls. 45 allowance which he had been allowed by the Agriculture Department to enable him to stimulate the growth of cash cropping.

Yet, over this same decade when agriculture was stagnant, Nandi Hut and Poll Tax payments rose almost sixfold from just under Rs. 29,000 in 1910-11 to over Fls. 104,000 in 1920-21. This money was secured primarily by labouring, and to a lesser extent by the continuing sale of livestock. It was during this period, and particularly after the increases in Hut Tax rates after the war, that the Nandi became perhaps the most prolific labour supplying tribe in the entire country. Rough estimates only are available of the numbers working outside the district; the District Commissioner thought that over 6,000 persons worked outside the reserve in 1919-20, but he was unable to say how many of those had left as squatters. Large
numbers had joined the King's African Rifles and the police, and remittances of wages from these sources were reckoned to bring Rs. 2,000 per month into the reserve in 1916-17. As the Uasin Gishu Plateau was opened up, and after the alienation in 1919 of the two blocks of land within the reserve at Kipkarren and Kaimosi, the number of Nandi leaving the reserve proper with their cattle to become squatters undoubtedly rose sharply.

What money they failed to raise by labour and by small scale sales of produce and hides and skins, the Nandi obtained, when quarantine regulations permitted, through the sale of livestock. They seem to have regarded this as the last method to which they would resort in order to raise money. The quantity sold varied considerably from year to year, depending apparently on the state of the labour market and the climatic conditions. Their willingness to sell was probably reduced following the losses they experienced after the severe rinderpest epidemic of 1912. Additional losses were incurred in 1920 when pleuro-pneumonia reached epidemic proportions. The administration reacted by placing the district in a lengthy period of quarantine. The dependence of the Nandi on cattle sales was revealed most clearly in 1921 when, by the end of the year, 40% of the Hut Tax remained unpaid because the Nandi were unable, due to the quarantine, to export any of their beasts.

Over the decade the major purchasers of Nandi cattle were the small resident Somali population and the Uasin Gishu settlers.
The collapse of the cattle market and, to a lesser extent, of the labour market in the early twenties brought trade to its lowest ebb since the earliest days of the colonial administration. Hides and skins were virtually unsaleable, yet the prices of imported goods had, at the same time, risen dramatically. When the depression was at its lowest point in 1922 only five of the trading plots in the three Nandi townships remained occupied. Trade was reckoned to be at a level of only fifteen percent of the pre-quarantine period. Rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia continued to strike at Nandi cattle. They were unable to reduce the effect of the diseases by taking advantage of inoculation because they could not meet the charge of Shs.2.50 per injection. Their only means of raising the money to pay for inoculations was through the sale of cattle, and this was impossible because of the quarantine. Without inoculations they could not reduce the incidence of rinderpest and thereby have the quarantine removed; the Nandi were caught in a vicious circle.94

Slowly the Nandi emerged from the depression in response to the establishment of a quarantine station on their northern border, increased demand for cattle from the Uasin Gishu settlers, and the opening of the Uasin Gishu Railway. With the rapid development of European maize farms on the Uasin Gishu, a brisk trade sprang up in plough and slaughter oxen. By 1926 the District Commissioner reported that the tribe had plenty of money with which to pay for the large quantities of grain they were importing. Though accurate figures for this trade are not
available, it seems likely that from 1924 through to about 1929 between 1,000 and 2,000 head of cattle, almost entirely male stock, were exported from the district annually. The revival of Nandi agriculture was a slower process, perhaps owing partly to the series of natural disasters which struck the district. An influenza epidemic in 1923 was followed by a season of poor rains in 1925, and a far more serious malaria and influenza epidemic in 1926. Administrative efforts in the early years of the decade were clearly ineffective. In 1921, for example, the District Commissioner observed that the Nandi refused to plant crops in any quantity, and that the 400 pounds of maize seed and the small quantity of onion seed he had distributed for planting had probably been eaten. This continued Nandi resistance to the practices of cultivation might well be connected with the overt resistance to colonial rule which came to a head in 1923, when the administration deported a number of Nandi leaders. There may also be a connection with the inconsistency of administrative effort and the failure of many of the early projects. Only in the last three years of the decade did the agricultural revival become obvious. In 1927, with credits from the Agriculture Department and the Local Native Council, 95 bags of maize seed were distributed, and in the same year Local Native Council funds were applied to the construction of the first African owned water mill in the district. By 1929 ten ploughs were in use by African farmers and four African owned water mills were in operation. Over the same period the Nandi began to produce fresh vegetables for the European market on the Uasin Gishu
As in Kericho District, the crop upon which African farmers concentrated was maize, for which there was a growing demand within the district. A marked shift in Nandi tastes away from wimbi and towards maize had occurred in the 1920's, perhaps as a result of the exposure of many of the Nandi to the new grain during the war and during their residence on European farms. Despite growing herds, the Nandi diet became increasingly more dependent upon maize meal. An indication of this was that, during the first half of 1927 following two seasons of poor crops, around 3,000 tons of maize was imported into the district, much of it by four lorries running twice daily trips between Eldoret and Kapsabet. The Nandi could not afford to pay for these large quantities of posho simply from the sales of cattle. Increasing numbers worked for Europeans, the majority of whom chose to take their cattle and squat on nearby European farms. Those who stayed in the reserve raised additional cash through the sale of small quantities of hides and skins and honey. Other than to meet their tax requirements, the Nandi had little use for money. The sales of Indian merchants in the reserve were confined largely to blankets and cloth, agricultural tools and some oil. There was little demand for luxuries; in 1927, for example, there were only six bicycles in the entire reserve.

The agencies, which did much in the neighbouring district of North Kavirondo to assist the development of the native economy, were almost entirely absent in Nandi. Throughout the entire period
no officer of the Agriculture Department visited the district, and not until 1930 was the Veterinary Training Centre at Kapsabet opened. Missionaries proved to be a dismal failure and, as a consequence, there were very few schools in the district. The government school established at Nandi in 1925 did little to help the tribe economically. Huntingford, its first Principal, commented,

I always felt that this school should have concentrated on the improvement of methods of animal husbandry and agriculture, with a limited amount of literary teaching. But though it was allowed to have a plough and two oxen, the dairy herd which I had hoped for never came into being, and organized agricultural work in the reserve in which several headmen... were willing to help was not allowed to be started.... The three R's were to be taught and the boys were to learn carpentry, brickmaking and building, subjects in which they were not interested and for which the Nandi have never seemed to me to be suited.  

So, like the Kipsigis, whatever progress the Nandi made came largely as a result of their own initiatives in response to the forces of the market.

Conclusion.

The pattern of economic development among the Kipsigis was clearly affected by the land alienations which they suffered. The Nandi similarly suffered land alienations, the extent and effect of which are difficult to establish. Occasional pastures on the Uasin Gishu Plateau and land to the south and south-east of the reserve were certainly excluded from their orbit after 1906, and in 1919 the important Kipkaren area and the Kaimosi farms were excised. Like the Kipsigis, the Nandi proceeded to squat in large numbers with sizeable herds of cattle on the areas they had lost.
Relative to the size of the populations of the two tribes, the areas left in the reserves were of similar size and fertility; the Kipsigis were perhaps marginally better off, as their lands enjoyed a somewhat more regular rainfall. Neither reserve was overcrowded or overstocked in 1930, though in both cases the reserves were nearing their stock holding capacity, and would not apparently have been able to accommodate large numbers of returning squatter cattle.

This does not imply necessarily that substantial numbers of either tribe left their reserve because it was overstocked. Initially many people of both groups merely remained on land which had been alienated while they had been resident upon it, and they were probably reluctant to move away because of historical or sentimental attachments to that particular area. Others may have been forced to move from the reserve because they had lost their access to salt licks, which the Nandi continued to believe were essential to the continuing health of their cattle. Again, many Nandi and Kipsigis must have welcomed the opportunity to accord to the traditional practice of distributing cattle for care to various members of their families, a practice which probably derived largely from a desire to distribute their animals geographically in such a manner as to avoid the danger of them being killed off by a single epidemic. Encouragement to do this, particularly for the Nandi, sprang from their observation that the mortality rate among cattle kept on farms was lower than among those which remained in the reserve.
Further, squatting was a very attractive arrangement to Nandi and Kipsigis who wished to avoid having to sell their cattle in order to pay their taxes. Squatting at once provided them with healthy and abundant pasturage for their cattle and ample opportunity to earn sufficient money with which to meet their tax obligations.

In 1929 the major interest of both tribes was still undoubtedly their cattle. Both tribes were clearly willing to sell large numbers of male cattle; Nandi herds of around fifteen in number at the end of the period contained on average, only two males. Of the two tribes, the Kipsigis had clearly moved further towards the adoption of agriculture. Neither had been subject to much exposure to government agencies that might have encouraged such a trend, and it is unlikely that their impact on either tribe was very marked. Of the two, the Kipsigis enjoyed the greater opportunity to grow and market agricultural produce. Though both groups had European estates on the border and within their reserves, the estates had differing requirements. Kipsigis tea estates were far more labour intensive than the estates to the north of the Nandi which produced maize, and they were therefore a richer market for both grain and labour. The Kipsigis had early and easy access to the railway for their produce; the Nandi, for the purposes of the export of bulky low value products, were virtually cut off from it. The type of land alienated from the tribes differed and may well have affected their economic behaviour. After the alienations, the Kipsigis were left with a higher proportion
of arable to pastoral land than the Nandi. More intangible is the question of the severity of early colonial contacts and their effects on subsequent economic development. Nandi resistance to agricultural practices may well have been one aspect of the continuing resentment of the tribe of colonial rule. The Kipsigis, at the turn of the century, were probably less powerful than the Nandi, and certainly suffered less at the hands of the early colonial rulers. Nandi administrative reports are peppered with observations about impending trouble and local discontents; by comparison, those of Kericho District present a picture of peace and urbanity.
8.2. Malindi and Tana River Districts.

Malindi District

The area between the railway in the south and the Sabaki River to the north contained one of the richest grain producing areas in British East Africa, a region which provided grain for the towns of the Benadir coast and the Persian Gulf as well as for the population of the coast of Kenya. The northern half of this region was "essentially an agricultural district" and the condition of trade "depended entirely upon the prosperity or otherwise of the crops."106

The area on the coast immediately to the north and south of Malindi had, from the revival of the town in the early 1860's, been a major producer of grain, primarily millet and maize. The Arabs of Malindi, over a period of about forty years, utilized slave labour to develop substantial grain producing plantations. With the abolition of the slave trade and the legal termination of the status of slave, the plantations gradually collapsed. Serious decline began in the early 1890's; by 1910 they had ceased to be major producers of grain. As the slave plantations of the coast declined, production of grain by Africans in the interior rose. The Giriama entered the Sabaki River area from the south in substantial numbers in the 1880's and, by 1890, they had settled on the productive banks of the Sabaki River where they were joined by smaller numbers of ex-slaves from the Malindi plantations.107 It was from this inland area, rather than from the coastal strip, that the large majority of the grain exported in the early colonial period derived.

Maize comprised the bulk of these exports. Figures for the export
of maize from Malindi port, the major centre for the trade, give an
approximate guide to the productiveness of the area:

Table 18: Exports of maize from Malindi port, 1907-1928
Hundreds, sterling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>To other Kenya ports</th>
<th>To foreign ports</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Quantity Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
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<td>76,206$</td>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
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<td>1913</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,061</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>4,492</td>
</tr>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
<td>N.i.l.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>N.a.</td>
<td>N.a.</td>
<td>14,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>16,004</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>17,768</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>6,056</td>
<td>3,537</td>
<td>9,593</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>11,123</td>
<td>24,195</td>
<td>35,318</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>25,383</td>
<td>4,866</td>
<td>30,249</td>
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<td>1923</td>
<td>10,116</td>
<td>7,744</td>
<td>17,860</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>38,038</td>
<td>6,550</td>
<td>44,638</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>35,225</td>
<td>21,562</td>
<td>56,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>32,022</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>33,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>11,614</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>14,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - Foreign ports only.

Source: Malindi and Kilifi District Annual Reports.

Over the entire period an average of 1,300 tons were shipped annually
to other East African and foreign ports. The annual figures fluctuated
widely, depending primarily upon the vagaries of the weather. Between
1915 and 1917 little if any maize was exported when a year of
excessive rains which drowned the crop was followed by two years of
serious rain shortage. In 1917 maize was imported and distributed to
the local population in order to avert a likely famine. The depressed
production figures of 1915-17 can also be attributed to the disruption
caused by the Giriama rising. On the other hand, in the two best five year periods, between 1910 and 1914 and between 1921 and 1925, an average of 1,940 and 1,850 tons respectively were exported with high annual totals of 3,810 tons in 1911 and 2,840 tons in 1925.

As can be seen from these figures, maize exports were, on average, probably no higher in the twenties than they were in the preceding two decades. This was, no doubt, due in part at least to an ambivalent attitude towards African production on the part of the administration. Hobley, the Coast Provincial Commissioner, expressed in 1917 the negative aspect of this attitude. After stating his opposition to the inclusion of the north bank of the Sabaki River in the African reserve, on the grounds that the Giriama would use the land inefficiently compared with European farmers, he went on to add:

As the rich coastal lands develop I am convinced that their (the Giriama's) prosperity depends upon them becoming (to use a biological term) commensal with the coast planters; that is, to say the prosperity of the Wanyika will increase pari passu with that of the planters if the Wanyika can only be induced to take their part, their part being to work and earn money which they will take back to their reserve, and to grow maize which will be purchased by planters to ration their workers and thus many Wanyika will eat the grain produced by their fellows but it will be paid for by the planters and issued to them free. In this way the Wanyika cannot fail to become prosperous, and I venture to submit that the Government policy should be directed towards this end and no efforts omitted to achieve it.

His successor as provincial commissioner, J.W.T. McClellan, expressed a diametrically opposed point of view four years later.
Had the Agricultural Department attempted to assist these natives in anything like the proportion it has assisted the white, or in anything like the manner the Germans assisted their natives, this coastal area would be exporting large quantities of grain etc. and sugar...

Today one sees in Giriama the same waste of time in grinding flour by hand - the same old method of shelling maize as existed hundreds of years ago and the semi-antiquated hoes for tilling the land.

McClellan added the comment that perhaps the reason for the unpopularity of the Giriama was that they refused to be forced out to work for the Europeans.

Certainly the Giriama failed to supply the labour needs of the local plantations, which were forced to depend upon imported up-country labour. Then, later in the period, they did leave the reserve to work in increasing numbers, they preferred occasional work at Malindi or Mombasa at the docks so that they were able to satisfy their immediate money needs and return to their life in the reserve. Plantation labour usually required a six month contract. Perhaps the truth of the matter was that the Giriama were a fairly prosperous tribe who could satisfy their slowly growing needs by their own industry within the reserve unless the rains failed. This forced migration to the coast in order to earn money for food and tax. But Hobley was incorrect in anticipating success for the coast planters for if the Giriama had, as Hobley suggested, tied their fate to that of the planters they would have been in an even less enviable state than they were at the end of the period.

And McClellan was surely correct in suggesting that the Agricultural
Department cared little for the progress of the Giriama. When they did put in an effort in the mid twenties it was insufficiently energetic and inadequately financed.

J.M. Pearson and T.R. Tate, both District Commissioners in 1913-14, felt that progress would only come to the grain producing peoples if better seed were distributed to replace the poor varieties then in use. These views were still being echoed at the end of the period when the District Commissioner, Kilifi, in 1930 noted that there was not a great deal to show for the agricultural programmes in his district. He urged concentrated efforts on seed bulking plots in order to provide for the cultivators an adequate supply of reliable and high yielding maize seed. Fazan, at Malindi, had seen the same need at the end of the war, but his ambitious attempts to supply seed by encouraging a number of communally run shambas soon proved a failure and had to be abandoned. Government did distribute some seed in the area, but the quantities were usually too small, sometimes too expensive, and often they arrived too late.

The livestock owners in the southern part of the area away from the coast, who kept substantial numbers of sheep, goats and cattle, were completely ignored. At the end of the period, one quarter of Mombasa's meat supply, amounting to over 8,000 sheep and goats and close to 1,000 cattle, derived from this area. Despite repeated outbreaks of east coast fever and rinderpest, the veterinary services consistently refused in the twenties to either
station an officer in this area or even to instruct an officer to visit. Veterinary activities were restricted to setting up a quarantine station at Mariakani to ensure that Mombasa received no diseased meat. Nothing was done to reduce cattle disease in the reserves, though the local population were, apparently, quite willing to have animals treated. In the final years of the decade the newly created Local Native Council took steps to help livestock owners by voting Shs. 2,000 for the establishment of hide curing sheds and dairies at Kakoleni, Bamba, Mariakani and Rabai. By this date sales of African cattle were in decline, due to the importation from up-country of grade beef.

As in Kwale District to the south, the local administrators complained that, in view of the large amounts paid in tax by the African population, too little was spent in the area on essential services. Communications were particularly slow to develop. One explanation for this was that between 1912 and 1920 the entire area was divided into a series of narrow districts and a large interior reserve area. Roads built for administrative reasons, therefore, tended to run north-south, whereas the roads that were most urgently required by producers and traders were those that would run from the grain producing lands in the west to the ports in the east. Indian traders in 1913 at a meeting with the provincial Commissioner requested that a road be built from Valindi to the interior in order to allow the easy transportation
of grain. This need was also felt by Tate and Champion, who both emphasised the necessity for easier access to the interior through the construction of metalled roads and the encouragement of trading centres along them. Yet, by 1917 the whole of the Nyika reserve was served by only four miles of road capable of carrying wheeled vehicles. Not until 1924 was the road inland from Malindi finally carrying lorries, but even then the far side of the River Sabaki remained distant for want of a bridge. It was to remain so throughout the period, though it was regarded as an absolute essential by one district commissioner if the area was to develop economically.

The trade and prosperity of the area was dependent largely upon the grain crops of maize, millet and sim-sim cultivated in the interior by the Nyika. This basic dependence did not change, despite the apparent disadvantages of grain cultivation in inland areas where rainfall was so unreliable. Parts of the old coastal plantations were cultivated by Giriama squatters. Only one of the European plantations, Powyslands, which produced sisal, could be called a success. Rubber succeeded briefly until the drastic fall in world prices in 1918-19 destroyed its prospects, and cotton failed to establish itself as a major product by the end of the twenties.

W.T.A. Fitzgerald, who was employed by the Imperial British
East Africa Company to travel along the coast of British East Africa and report on the agricultural resources and prospects of the area, felt that the future of Kilifi-Malindi lay not in the production of grain but in the cultivation by Africans, with the aid of Indian advisers, of cotton and rubber. In Fitzgerald's time, and with his assistance, an experimental plot was started at Magarini just north of Malindi and another recommended for Jelori on the south bank of the Sabaki. The Giriama at Jelori gave Fitzgerald a very warm welcome and appeared "keenly interested," provided a sale for cotton could be assured. But, probably because a sale could not be assured, cotton did not develop quickly as a popular crop. Towards the end of the 1910's the British East Africa Corporation set up a ginnery in Malindi and began, in earnest, to encourage African cultivators to adopt cotton. The Corporation did not itself cultivate the crop, but it did distribute seed and exercise some supervision over its growth. The endeavour failed for reasons outlined by O.F. Watkins:

The natives were encouraged to plant by monetary advances. They were then left to their own devices until the crop was nearly due, when periodic inspections were made. Meanwhile the seed had in many cases been planted too late or under wholly unsuitable conditions. When the crop was finally ready the recipients of advances found themselves bound to dispose of it at a rate below market rate, payable on delivery at the nearest port, and the contract was in many cases enforced by legal process or threats thereof. It is difficult to reprobate too strongly an attempt which has been made in the face of all known laws of business economy to make a profit on an infant industry in its first year. It will in my opinion be no easy task to reintroduce confidence in this industry.
Further difficulties were pointed out by the District Commissioner, Malindi, who observed that the Corporation had distributed poor seed and that due to short rains and high winds there had been no second picking. The crop was stained, of short staple, and not cleanly picked. And yet, despite all this, there was still a demand for seed for planting for the following year. Lack of confidence in the saleability of the crop persisted among the Giriama. The infant was not throttled until the succession of poor rains from 1915 forced the cultivators to concentrate once more on food crops. In 1916-7 the seed which was issued was received "without enthusiasm."  

In 1923 attempts were made to revive the crop's popularity. Seeds were distributed by the administration to ascertain the areas to which the crop was best suited. Despite the experimental nature of the programme, a partial rain failure, and the inability of the administration to distribute a quarter of the available seed, 150,000 lbs of seed cotton were yielded. The coast Africans were enthusiastic, but the Giriama, with memories no doubt of recent food shortages, reinforced by continuing doubts about the marketability of the crop, would not plant it. The attempt to revive cotton cultivation took up much of the time of the newly appointed coast agricultural supervisor, yet his efforts were inadequate to the task. In neither 1927 or 1928, both of which were normal agricultural years, did cotton exports from Malindi port exceed Shs.40,000 in value, and virtually
all of this came from the coastal strip.  

The basic problem was still one of the reluctance of the cultivator to adopt cotton as a crop. He could not expand the area he cultivated without the use of more advanced tools and techniques than those he was using. Without demonstration and instruction he was unlikely to do this. Alternatively, he could replace his grain acreage with cotton. In a bad year, if the rains failed, enough grain would probably be harvested to feed himself and his dependents, but if he replaced his grain with cotton this might no longer be so. It could be contended that in the case of rain failure the cotton which was salvaged could be sold and maize bought with the returns. Against this, however, are two considerations. Firstly, when crops failed the price of maize rose sharply, due to an inelastic demand for it as a staple food, whereas the price of cotton tended to fluctuate beneath a ceiling set by world prices for ginned cotton. A ginnery could not sell its product in either India or Britain at a higher price unless there was a world-wide failure of cotton crops. Secondly, the grower could not be sure of a price or even a market at all for his cotton.

It is hopeless to preach increased production to natives and especially such crops as cotton, which they know very little or not at all, unless one can tell definitely what they will get.  

The Malindi traders were hopelessly short of capital and could not in 1923, for example, raise sufficient funds to purchase coconuts at a rock bottom price of Shs. 3 for 100. Hence, the return
on a poor cotton crop might be insufficient to purchase enough
grain for the growers' needs. Further, due to the inexperience
of the Giriama with cotton, failure of the crop was possible
for a wide variety of reasons, including that of the distribution
of poor seed. Irrigation of the Sabaki to ensure a constant
supply of water would have substantially removed this danger.
The money for such a scheme was not available, and without
irrigation the replacement of grain acreage by cotton was "a
very risky process" which the District Commissioner, Malindi,
in 1928 felt he could not encourage without close supervision.
Staff shortages, of course, did not permit that.

Unlike cotton, the coconut palm had flourished on the
coast for centuries. It provided two of the staple articles
of trade, toddy or tembo and copra, both of which yielded
consistently high profits to both tree owners and traders.
FitzGerald in the 1890s criticised the poor use to which the
cocoanut palms of the coast were put. The trees were tapped for
toddy and the fruit was eaten locally, but very little attempt
was made to use the flesh or the husk of the coconut for the
production of copra, coir or oil. Further, he found many of the
trees in a sad state of neglect. Noting that coconut palms needed
a great deal of care and attention, he quoted a saying heard in
Ceylon: "A coconut will not grow out of the sound of a human voice."

In 1914 the administration still shared FitzGerald's feelings about
the poor use made of the coconut palms and set up the Coconut Commission to investigate means of encouraging the production of copra. One of the major problems of coast life was the large scale consumption of toddy, regarded by most of the administrative officers as a serious barrier to development. More directly, the tapping of a coconut tree for tembo reduced the trees' capacity to produce nuts and thus, the greater the production of tembo, the lower the output of copra. Attempts to stop the trade in tembo proved abortive for the trade in tembo was closely connected with so many aspects of Nyika life, including the production of maize and indirectly with the illegal trade in ivory. The major producers of tembo were the Africans of the Rabai area and the mixed population of the coast. The land of the Rabai was cultivated to only one fiftieth of its potential productivity because of the preoccupation of the tribe with the production of tembo. In 1912-3 the two leading Indian merchants of Rabai town sold 30,000 lbs. of maize and 5,000 lbs. of beans, as well as Rs.20,000 worth of imported piece goods. The Indians acted as middlemen purchasing the grain from the Giriama and Duruma and selling to the Rabai. The Giriama used the returns from grains sales for the purchase of tembo. Those Rabai who did not own trees grew maize or beans to barter with those who did. In the same period half of the value of the Giriama grain which went to the coast returned in the form of tembo, not in cash or in other products of European civilization.
But in the early twenties the price of copra revived and large quantities began to be carried by head load to Mombasa, much of it from the Rabai area and the coastal strip. Another market for approximately 350 cwt. per month was created with the opening of the Jetabhai Oil Mill at Kilifi towards the end of the decade. Almost one million shillings worth were exported from Mombasa in 1924 when the price had reached its peak of Shs. 7 per frasila. As the price dropped towards the end of the period so did the output. A calculation made by the District Commissioner, Kilifi, at the end of the period on the income and expenditure of the WaNyika within his district, indicated that over one half of their income was derived from either copra or tembo. Tembo tappers now had to be registered at a fee of Shs. 20 each per annum, and there were 1,600 licences issued in 1929, each of whom sold tembo to an average value of Shs. 30 per month. If, as in many cases, the WaNyika did not own the tree, he had to share his profits with the owner. The bulk of the tembo produced was consumed or sold within the district, but approximately one third was taken across the railway line for sale in Kwale District. There was also much illicit tapping. Without question the yield of coconut products rose in this period quite substantially, though this was not entirely to the liking or with the encouragement of the administration.

The connection between tembo and ivory was one spotted
by Hobley in 1915. He observed that the Giriama, in order to acquire money to purchase tembo, exchanged grain for ivory tusks with Sanya hunters, who inhabited the area to the west of them. These they buried until an ivory trader passed through. Trade in ivory had been illegal since 1897, when the government decreed that all ivory tusks must be sold to the government at a fixed rate far below the market value. Because of its illegal nature, it is impossible to estimate accurately the extent of this trade. Champion, on a campaign in the first three months of 1913, confiscated 49 tusks from the Giriama and probably only recovered a fraction of their holdings.

The two major traders at this time were both Baluchis from Mombasa who, aided by Nyamwezi porters, travelled via Tsavo and Voi to German East Africa where a free market in ivory still existed. The traders were probably aided by Indian merchants at Samburu, who changed their German currency for British. After the war, when Tanganyika adopted similar laws to Kenya's, the trade was redirected towards the Benadir coast and Italian Somaliland.

If not all the illicit, then the great majority of the licit trade of the district was in the hands of Indians, many of whom had been settled permanently on the coast for perhaps sixty years. In the early 1870's Mombasa, Malindi, Lambrui and Takaungu all had substantial Indian populations, the most numerous and oldest established of whom were the members of the Bohra
many of the Mombasa residents used to visit Malindi during the grain harvests staying three months or so before returning.

Hardly a loan can be negotiated, or mortgage effected, or a bill cashed without Indian agency; not an import cargo can be distributed, nor an export cargo collected of which almost every bale does not go through Indian hands. The European or American, the Arab or Swahili may trade and profit, but only as an occasional link in a chain between producer and consumer, of which the Indian trader is the one invariable and most important link of all.

What was true for 1870 was certainly true for the thirty-five years under consideration here.

The establishment of trading centres in inland areas strengthened the influence of the Indians over the agricultural development of the area. Virtually all of the shops within these centres were Indian owned, and even those outside which were run by Africans were almost always capitalized and supervised by one of the larger Indian merchants. The trading centres acted as collection centres for produce and market places for the usual range of imported goods. But, though the Indians fulfilled this range of vital economic functions, some of their trading methods were strongly resented by the administration. Particularly objectionable to many officers was their practice of advancing money to African cultivators and produce gatherers. The most common form of borrowing occurred at planting time, when the cultivator needed money to purchase seed or food if his stocks were exhausted, or at the time of the
tax collection. After a poor harvest, the demand for advances was particularly extensive and it appears that Indians, over a period of four months, often made as much as 100-200% profit on these deals, with one statement placing levels of interest as high as 1,500%. Again, Indians used to contract Africans to act as agents and buy crops for them in the reserves. Before the harvest, the Indian advanced a sum of money to his agent who agreed to supply, by a particular date, a specific quantity of grain. In default, the Indian claimed damages for the full selling price of the crop, not the purchase price paid out by the agent. A final form of advance was for work, commonly woodcutting, to be carried out. In this case also, if the African failed to carry out the work, he was sued for the market value of the shortfall in the contract.

A close check on African indebtedness in one area of Malindi District in 1919 found very few Africans free of debt. Some three hundred Africans in all owed a total of 120 tons of maize to traders, with a largest single debt amounting to over Rs. 1,000. "It is manifest," wrote the District Commissioner, S.H. Fazan, "that the natives of the district have passed into a condition of economic servitude to the traders and legislation is needed to safeguard them." Effective legislation was not forthcoming, but a series of good years did much to relieve the Africans of their indebtedness, and by the end of the period one district commissioner recorded that practically all of the
traders were refusing to advance money. There were risks involved for the trader. The Indian could demand no security for his loan, and the price of the commodity pledged could fall drastically between the dates of contract and settlement. This happened, for example, in 1928 when the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance, which prohibited the export of grain from Malindi District, was applied and in 1920-1 when the price of maize fell heavily after a very full harvest.

Unlike their Digo neighbours to the south, the Africans of Malindi-Kilifi did not even begin to move into marketing themselves prior to 1930, and they displayed a complete apathy towards the markets set up to encourage them to do so. Most of the African traders in the area were from other parts of East Africa. According to local administrators, it seems that the WaNyika feared witchcraft in the event of their acquiring wealth. They therefore avoided placing themselves in such a situation.

It was not only the African who fell into the debt of the Indians. Many Arabs owed Indians large sums of money and were, in many cases, forced to sell their land when they failed to meet mortgage payments. Salim bin Hamis, the Liwali of Takaungu and an apparently wealthy Arab, died in 1896 leaving debts of over Rs. 4000, the bulk of which was due to Indians. His assets in no way covered his liabilities. Examples similar to this abound. The effect was that substantial areas of the
coastal strip previously farmed by African slaves became the property of Indian merchants, who acquired it for speculative rather than for development purposes. 165

There is little to indicate much in the way of economic progress in the area of African production and trade. The cultivators at the end of the period were using much the same tools and techniques as at the beginning, and there is little evidence to suggest that either the agricultural output of the African cultivators or the amount of land under cultivation had risen greatly in thirty five years. The District Commissioner, Malindi, summed up the situation well in 1917 when he wrote that,

"Malindi products depend entirely upon the density of population .... If means could be found to increase this Malindi District would, I am sure, quickly become probably the most productive area on the tropical African coast." 166

To this can be added the truism stated in 1928, also by the District Commissioner, Malindi District. "In the present writer's opinion, if this district is ever to be fully developed money will have to be spent on it." 167

A staff of one part time European agricultural supervisor, assisted by seven native instructors, oversaw such progress as there was. Trading and transport became more efficient, but African demands for imported goods grew only gradually, commensurate with the slow growth of production and administrative services.
Tana River District.

The valley of the Tana River consistently impressed its visitors with its enormous potential for development. One of the first Europeans to travel the length of the river was Karl Peters on his way to find Emin Pasha in 1889. He remarked:

"The alluvial deposit, in proximity to the river, is fertile and is adapted to all kinds of culture." In the future it was, he believed, "likely to experience great development." Three years later a party consisting of four Englishmen and an African crew set out to navigate the stern-wheeler Kenia up the Tana as far as they could go, with the intention of opening the river for commerce on behalf of the Imperial British East Africa Company. Three of the Europeans, Gedge, Hobley and F.G. Dundas, recorded their impressions of the river; all three were struck by the richness of its potential. Hobley's comments were typical. He saw the Tana as "a miniature Nile". If certain improvements could be carried out,

...one could safely prophesy that the prosperity of the Tana Valley would exceed that of any other area in our East African possessions...There is a large tract at the mouth of the river up to Ngao, and across to the Ozi, where the country is flooded on either side for miles at the season of high river...There is here ready at hand a large area eminently suited for native agriculturalists for the production of rice....

In confirmation of these first European impressions, the annual reports for the district contain a large number of similarly laudatory descriptions, referring to the fertility of the soil.
and its potential for production. Yet Hobley, writing in 1929 with reference to the journey he had undertaken thirty seven years before, noted that the Tana was in exactly the same state economically as it had been in 1893.171

In explaining the limited amount of cultivation found on the Tana, many observers gave prominence to the thinness of the population. Estimates of the number of Pokomo living on the river banks varied widely, and there was some dispute as to whether the population was rising or falling in the period under consideration. Slowly rising Hut Tax figures indicated that it was about stable. Only towards the end of the twenties did large numbers of Pokomo begin to leave the district to take up casual work at Malindi and Mombasa. Earlier in the period they consistently failed to supply adequate quantities of labour for the European run plantations set up on the lower river. Kavirondo and Kikuyu labourers had to be imported from up-country in order to satisfy the demands of the plantations. The sparseness of the population was not then a result of emigration from the river. Hollis and Ainsworth had noted in their Commission of Enquiry Report of 1909 that lack of population in Tanaland had stultified progress, and J.H. Clive, writing twenty three years later, noted that nothing had been done to remedy this.172 Numerous suggestions had been made that migration to the river should be encouraged, though none were ever put into practice. The closest any attempt came to implementation was in 1918, when the District Commissioner,
Nyika, informed the Giriama in his district that they could move to the Tana River, but as the north bank of the Sabaki had again been thrown open for cultivation to the tribe, very few took up the offer. Much of the vacant land in the lower valley had been parcelled out to European planters, though little of the land was actually taken up, and there were frequent suggestions that Indian cultivators be brought in to settle the area. Unquestionably there was no rapid growth of population along the Tana during this period, but this does not account for the failure of the ten thousand or so Pokomo inhabitants to develop a substantial surplus product, bearing in mind the apparent availability of large areas of fertile land.

The failure of the European settlers on the Tana, due in part to the shortage of inexpensive local labour, was also a consequence of the unreliability of both the rains and the floods. Fazan, in his 1922 report on the possibilities of agricultural development along the river, felt that the greatest barrier to development was not climatic irregularity, but the smallness of the Pokomo population. By the use of appropriate techniques, the available water could be used far more effectively. He observed that cultivation extended no more that one hundred yards away from the river, whereas he believed that, by the use of trenches to increase the flow of water to the shambas on the upper river and embankments to protect the shambas on the
lower river, there was enough suitable land available to produce all the rice required by the Colony. His view, and those of other optimists, was founded not on long experience of the river, but on fleeting and fitful glimpses of the district. Fazan's report was written in one of the very few years between 1915 and 1930 during which rains and flooding could be described as "normal." Most seasons they were either excessive, causing severe flooding on the lower river, or too sparse, which resulted in no flooding at all. On the average, perhaps one season in three was "normal." Consequently there was constant and great uncertainty as to the amount of land which would produce a crop in any one season. Darroch, writing twenty years after Fazan, doubted whether, on the average, more than one cultivated acre in four on the upper river bore crops. The solution which Fazan suggested of channels and embankments provided no simple answer to the problem because of the enormous variation from season to season in the height of the river. There was little point in the Pokomo constructing earth works if there was every likelihood that the floods would sweep them away; conversely, if the river failed to rise at all, the effort would also be wasted. The only satisfactory method of regulation was by damming the river, an enormously costly job, the expense of which the administration could not and would not bear. This fact was appreciated by Montgomery, the Commissioner of Lands, and Watts, the Commissioner of Public Works, who had in 1908
surveyed the Lower Tana with a view to assessing its suitability for European settlement. Watts believed that an expenditure of £100,000 on flood control would release 100,000 to 150,000 acres of land between Ngao and the coast for cultivation. He advocated that, as a first step, £10,000 be spent on a survey and the preparation of engineering schemes. His request was refused. A.D. Lewis, the South African irrigation engineer who visited Kenya in 1925, might have been able to provide some useful advice on the problems of the river, but his visit to the district was cancelled. The difficulties of flood control and the related shortage of population, go far towards explaining why an area so apparently promising failed to fulfil its alleged potential. These basic conditions remained unchanged through the early colonial period.

Within the limitations they imposed on economic development, there was ample room for the application of new incentives and techniques which, in other parts of Kenya, resulted in changes in the scale and method of cultivation. Along the Tana the incentives were certainly ineffective. Taxation acted as a sure but limited stimulant. Very few Pokomo before the mid-twenties reacted to it by going out to work; they could produce a surplus adequate to meet tax demands. Missionaries were present only in very small numbers along the river. In 1912, when Girouard visited the area, the German missionaries had been established for fifteen years, yet they had exerted "very little influence." Their mistake had
apparently been to concentrate too heavily on religious instruction. One district commissioner commented: "If instruction in elementary handicrafts and improved ways of agriculture had been given it would have been of great advantage to the converts, and stopped the tendency to return to the old ways of living."<sup>183</sup> As they were German, the mission stations closed down on the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Their post-war replacements were hardly an improvement. "The missionairies at Ngao," wrote one observer in 1932, "might spend less time on the Bible and the three R's and more on better methods of living and husbandry."<sup>184</sup>

For many of the Pokomo their only exposure to European products came with the occasional visit of Arab agents of the Indian merchants of Lamu to the river. In 1921 there were only a dozen shops established along the entire length of the river, and all of these were poorly stocked.<sup>185</sup> Eleven years later the situation had barely improved at all. The Deputy Director of Sanitary Services and an agriculture officer on safari on the Tana explained the poor standards of agriculture:

...An outstanding factor in the situation is the lack of inducement to produce even if the folk knew how. Throughout the hundred and twenty miles of river which we traversed there is not a single duka which displays its wares in an attractive manner, while for the moment the folk are still ignorant of any need, save, so far as they can, to avoid grave shortage in their staple food supply.<sup>186</sup>

The trade in imported goods that existed was confined largely to cloth; agricultural implements, spades, hoes, and axes, for example, were not offered for sale.<sup>187</sup> The fairly rigid pre-war
isolation of the Pokomo from the pressures of the outside world was partially broken down by substantial war time conscriptions into the Carrier Corps. For the first time, Pokomo left their district in sizable numbers. Certainly in the post-war period the consumption of trade goods grew more rapidly than in the pre-war period, and from the immediate post-war period dates the small beginnings of the increasingly large Pokomo exodus to Malindi and Mombasa. But, overall, compared with most other Kenya tribes, the needs of the Pokomo were, at the end of the twenties, very limited, and the usual incentives which might have enhanced them were largely absent.

It could be argued, however, that the Pokomo, with sufficient encouragement and help from the government to compensate for the relative absence of the usual incentives, could have produced a sizable surplus crop. For most of the period this huge district was in the charge of a single administrative officer, though for brief spells, the longest of which was one of six months in 1926, a district clerk ran the administration. With his burdensome general administrative, revenue collecting, and judicial duties, the district commissioner had little time to spare for agricultural assistance. Yet, it was individual administrators rather than the specialist departments who were in the van of efforts to improve agriculture. Fazan, Oldfield and Cooke were outstanding in this regard.

The Agriculture Department occasionally provided seed for
the district and rarely sent officers on what were invariably brief tours of the district. The European agricultural officer assigned to the coast in 1925 made a positive decision to concentrate his efforts in the southern coastal districts and declined to help at all on the Tana. He decided that, if his work was to have any effect at all, he should concentrate his energies, and sensibly he cut out the area which would have drawn most heavily on his limited travelling fund. In June 1926 the Director of Agriculture paid a one day visit to Lamu. Resignedly the district commissioner observed: "He declined, however, to hold out the slightest prospect of his department affording any substantial assistance towards the agricultural development of Tanaland for some time to come." The frustrations of the district commissioners were summed up by S.V. Cooke and Oldfield in the late twenties. "In glancing at old reports one realizes how district officers were hampered in the past and how all their constructive proposals were either at once turned down or completely ignored." And again, 

During the eighteen months I have spent in the district I have put Agriculture before everything, with surprisingly little help from the other Departments who are in a position to help. The Department of Agriculture refuse further help and speak of past failure. These circumstances drew from Cooke a statement almost unique for a colonial officer working among "backwark savages." "The Government," he wrote, "is more apathetic than the people." Cooke was referring not only to the Department of Agriculture, but also to the Medical Department which provided the barest minimum of services for the district. A European medical officer was stationed at Lamu between 1901 and 1916 and
between 1919 and 1922. His time was largely taken up with the European and Arab population of Lamu town and he consequently had little opportunity to treat the inhabitants up-river. But at least they had access in extremis to a medical officer. From 1922 they were served by one over-worked African dresser who, in 1929, dealt with 2,836 cases. A further indication of the need for medical services was given in Ainsworth Dickson's Report on Coast Production and Trade. "There are villages now where one half of the inhabitants are excused Hut Tax, some through age, and the rest through sickness (mostly yaws). A safari would pay for itself very soon even in hard cash gained in Hut Tax." At the time only five Pokomo patients were being admitted for hospital treatment each week. The lone African dresser often had no medicine, and when he did it was often too expensive; a patient suffering from yaws had to pay three shillings for a single injection. The District Commissioner explained:

The last time I wrote for aspirin I got it in a pill box. Of the quinine which is supplied, I think I can say truthfully that I swallow half, the rest of the district gets the other half. The supply of bandages and ointments is equally ludicrous."

Because these comments were quoted in Ainsworth Dickson's Report, they were followed up. The Chief Native Commissioner raised the matter with the Chief Medical Officer who accepted no responsibility for the shortage of drugs and bandages as this was the affair of the Principal Medical Officer at Mombasa. The major cause of the difficulties, he argued, was the shortage
of staff, for which he was not to blame. Nothing was done to improve the situation and, at the end of the period, the medical needs of the district were still served by one native dresser stationed at Kipini. A request to the Medical Department for a small sum of money to erect a two bedded room for sick African patients at Kipini was refused. Throughout, the Pokomo on the upper river remained many days travel away from any medical facilities. As one officer put it: "Sick natives on the upper Tana find it much less trouble to die than to make the journey of five to six hundred miles to Lamu." 

Though the departments offered little or no encouragement, individual district commissioners pressed on with plans to improve both the standard and scale of Pokomo agriculture. S.H. Fazan, who believed that rice would be the best paying of the crops which could be grown on the Tana, started a campaign in 1922 to extend its cultivation and improve the quality of the yield. In Lamu town the Pokomo had a ready market for their produce close at hand. Fazan selected two strains of rice, known locally as Finu and Kisuke, as best suited for cultivation in the long and the short rains respectively, and set about eliminating the existing twenty two strains by distributing five tons of selected seed received from the Department of Agriculture. Two and a half tons of the seed was planted in thirty eight communal shambas, which successfully yielded sixteen tons of seed for planting out, surplus to what was required to replant
the existing shambas and raise their number to eighty nine. These communal shambas, in turn, raised over fifty tons of surplus seed. Lest the local traders were unable to purchase such large quantities of rice, Fazan apparently reached an agreement with Smith Mackenzie, whereby they signified their willingness to purchase all rice surplus to seed requirements at twelve shillings per bag, a price considerably higher than that which the Africans usually received from the local traders. The sale proceeds were to be distributed amongst the planters, with a proportion going towards the provision of improved boats. This agreement broke down. In 1923 the district commissioner reported sales of rice very depressed, with Kisuke paddy selling at seventeen to twenty pounds for one shilling and cleaned rice at twelve to fourteen pounds for one shilling.

Fazan's initial aim was to provide every village with a communal shamba, always of less than one acre, planted alongside the ordinary shambas. He recognised that, if he was to succeed, he must approach each departure from traditional practice with great caution. The original introduction of selected seeds had been eased by the fact that the famine of 1921 had greatly reduced the supply of seed available for planting. The Pokomo method of planting seed by broadcast, he realised, was inefficient and wasteful; it used 115 pounds of seed per acre against 28 pounds recommended by the Department of Agriculture. "But, he wrote, "the time is not yet ripe for any interference in this respect. In fact all innovation must be made with the
free consent of the elders, or we shall create an atmosphere of passive resistance. Fazan also believed that communal efforts could be used effectively to increase yields. Characteristically, he began with two schemes at Anasa and Kosi, the specific objects of which were to introduce a proper system of irrigation trenches. The trenches, constructed communally, were so arranged as to mark off a series of one acre plots, which would eventually become privately owned, only the trenches themselves remaining communal property. Working individually a man might construct embankments or channels to serve his particular plot, but working communally the village could concentrate its efforts and construct a total and far more rational system to serve the whole village. Fazan again stressed the dangers of alienating the goodwill of the local people by, for example, using over-zealous headmen.

Fazan, though he made fairly wild predictions about the likely success of his scheme, was prepared to wait for a few years before pronouncing a final verdict on it. He was transferred from the Tana before any conclusive judgement could be arrived at. His work there represents an outstanding example of an imaginative, yet careful and hard-working, administrative officer working without the time, the resources or the necessary kinds of information to effect substantial changes. Above all, Fazan had less than two years in the district in which to put his ideas into practice. Verdicts on his work by administrative officers who worked on the river in subsequent years were rather critical. Certainly his efforts seem to have
had very little effect in the short term. From October 1923 through to November 1925 abnormally dry conditions prevailed, and the Tana failed to flood. By July 1924 the Pokomo were experiencing a serious famine. A.W. Sutcliffe, who was by then district commissioner, implied that Fazan's work exacerbated the extent of the famine. He felt that Fazan had placed too much emphasis on the cultivation of rice, at the cost of other crops which were not dependent on the floods. He thought that rice was bound to fail as a commercial project until flood control on the Tana was achieved. In 1924 and 1925 he pressed for the cultivation of maize, with the result that more maize by value was exported from the Tana River in 1925 than the total of all grain crops in any previous single year. The crop was so heavy that the existing transport and marketing facilities could not cope with it. After Sutcliffe's departure the size of the maize crops fell off quickly.

The problems of transportation and marketing constantly bedevilled the efforts of the administrative officers. Communications up the river depended entirely upon water transportation. The first road to carry wheeled traffic, that from Kipini to Witu, was not opened until 1929. On the face of it, the river provided an ideally cheap transportation system, but the difficulties were sizable. The river ran a very circuitous course to the sea, about double the mileage of a direct route, the extreme variations in height and direction made navigation difficult, and the only means of transportation
available to African producers was the canoe which, though rapid downstream, was very slow for the return journey. The relatively low prices paid for the Pokomo grain crops were inadequate compensation for a journey taking anything up to two weeks. Obviously, the further away from Kipini, the less likely were the Pokomo to market their surplus. As Fazan's concern to increase the number of canoes illustrates, in abundant years they were too small and too few to cope with the entire crop. 203

Compounding and compounded by, the problems of communication and transport was the unsatisfactory nature of the marketing facilities on the river. The trade of the district was in the hands of a small number of Indians, who owned small scale businesses, or who were agents of larger merchants in Lamu. 204 Prices paid for produce were low, due to lack of competition and to the traders' shortage of capital. This was particularly apparent in the abundant years of the mid twenties, when there were clearly not enough traders with enough capital to cope with the flow of produce. 205 The produce trade, though in the best years bigger than the local merchants could handle, did not maintain a sufficiently large volume to attract larger traders from Mombasa or Nairobi. 206 The district was caught in a vicious circle. In abundant years the traders were able to form a ring and offer prices considerably below those prevailing in Lamu and Mombasa, less transport costs. The Pokomo responded by producing a smaller surplus the following year. The large crop, which may have attracted the larger merchant,
was thereby reduced, and the larger merchant stayed away.

When the district commissioner's exhortations yet again resulted in a larger crop the process was repeated. The range within which prices fluctuated was already depressed due to the high cost of transportation. The district commissioners in Tana River District, as in all other coastal districts, complained that the traders advanced money to cultivators on coming crops. They took advantage of their position as creditors and, because many of the Pokomo depended upon their grain sales to pay their Hut Tax, the traders depressed the prices they offered to exploit the Africans' immediate need for cash.

Sharing the district with the Pokomo were the Galla, a pastoral tribe which herded cattle, sheep, and goats in the area to the south of the river. Their cattle were widely admired as being amongst the best in Kenya. One historian has noted that: "Even before the Europeans came they were culling stock, castrating bull calves, and noticing that white cattle are not so attractive to the tse-tse fly, they have of their own eliminated all the darker beasts." Certainly they received almost no assistance from the government veterinary service; the visit of a senior veterinary assistant in 1926 was the first of its kind in the century. He found infections of rinderpest, foot and mouth, blackquarter, and trypanosomiasis to be common. The ghee they produced was the
finest in Kenya, but the milk yields of their cattle were low, and he felt they could benefit greatly from instruction on the need for cleanliness in its preparation. The hides they produced were second class and could be improved by more careful branding and by shade drying. Hassan believed that the Galla needed two veterinary scouts trained at Nairobi or Mombasa for general instruction work; the three at present at work among the tribe were of no use because they did not speak the Galla language.

Despite this lack of contact with veterinary services, the Galla developed a substantial trade in livestock with Mombasa and Malindi, rising from 450 cattle and 700 sheep and goats in 1916-7, to 3,438 cattle and 737 sheep and goats in 1928. It was periodically interrupted by quarantine restrictions. Also, by 1924 they were making excellent profits from the sale of ghee. This was however, only a sideline. S.H. Fazan wrote in 1923: "The Gallas could easily pay all of their taxes with ghee, but ivory is far less trouble so they do not bother themselves." 212

By value the most important item of trade of the Tana River District in the early period of colonial rule was neither Pokomo grains or Galla livestock or ghee, but ivory. The trade was, of course, illicit. Since the Game Ordinance of 1906, possession of, and trade in, ivory had been illegal, except under the provision of the Ordinance, which allowed those holding
Sportsmen's or Public Officers' Licences to shoot elephant.

Following the enactment of the Ordinance, the provincial commissioners pointed out to the government that there were considerable quantities of ivory still in the possession of Africans, and instructions were duly issued which allowed administrative officers to purchase ivory from Africans at fifty percent of its market value. As it was illegal to shoot elephants without a licence, Africans could only be in possession of tusks legally if they had found them on a dead carcase. Owing to long delays in determining the value of the tusks brought in, and, therefore, the payments which could be made to Africans, the amount of ivory brought in to government offices began to decline. To counter this trend further instructions were issued in August 1909, which allowed administrative officers to pay Rs. 4 per pound on the spot for found ivory. Large quantities of ivory were brought in as a result of this measure which, though originally intended as a temporary one, remained in force throughout this period.

The game regulations concerning elephants and the sale of tusks had the effect of reducing the amount of ivory exported legally from Kenya. Undoubtedly, in the more closely administered and heavily populated areas of the country away from the borders, where there were substantial herds of elephants, the regulations afforded some protection to the animals. In the Tana River District, however, which had some of the richest elephant runs in Africa, and where the Game Department was inactive until the
early twenties, the regulations had very little effect. After the end of the war, perhaps partially as a result of the series of disasters which struck African agriculture, sales to the government of found ivory, as well as the illegal trade, increased sharply. The Boni and the Sanya, who traditionally hunted elephant for its meat, were joined by the Galla and the Pokomo, who undoubtedly found it easier to pay their greatly increased Hut Tax by the sale of ivory than by growing grain crops or raising livestock. Most of the ivory, particularly after the cession of Jubaland in 1924, found its way not to government offices, but through the hands of Somalis to Italian Somaliland, where it could be sold openly at its full market price.

The extent of the illegal trade is impossible to assess with any accuracy. Three agents of the Game Department posing as dealers bought thirty seven tusks on the Tana in six weeks in 1922. In 1923 the Acting Game Warden reckoned that anything between 100 and 300 frasalas per month were being exported from Borowa in Italian Somaliland. In 1925 Zanzibar, then a minor market for ivory, imported tusks worth £6,855 from Italian Somaliland. Ethiopian tusks were shipped down the Nile, Italian Somaliland had very few elephants of its own, and there was no legal ivory trade between Kenya and Italian Somaliland. The great bulk of the ivory exported to Zanzibar, which was only a small fraction of the total exported from Italian Somaliland, came illegally from Kenya, largely via the Somalis who
inhabited the north bank of the Tana. The illegal trade was very profitable and carried few risks; in 1923 Somalis at Sankuri were offering Shs.12 per pound for ivory and selling for over Shs.20 across the boarder. The government offered Shs.4 per pound and the possibility of difficulties should they decide to investigate the origin of the tusks.

Until 1925 the district administration in the Tana River had accepted 'found' ivory without question. "This had, through the years, become such an established custom that tusks were taken to the dukas beforehand and weighed, value at four shillings per pound calculated, and credit obtained for the prospective sale!" Sutcliffe felt that the government's ready acceptance of 'found' ivory provided the Africans with an easy way to earn their Hut Tax money, and thereby reduced the likely effectiveness of any measures to encourage them to improve their agriculture. He imposed the Outlying Districts Ordinance and began to pursue a vigorous anti-poaching policy. By 1927 the amount of ivory bought by the District Office in Lamu fell to one tenth of its level in 1922. A brief revival of both the grain and cattle trades was noted, but by 1927 it was clear that Sutcliffe's efforts had merely resulted in the re-direction of the ivory to Italian Somaliland. To what extent the trade in ivory affected the growth of production and trade in agricultural products in the Tana River District is impossible to estimate. In the two years of 1923 and 1924 the Kipini office paid out Shs. 71,000 for over 18,700 pounds of ivory and over the same two years collected substantially less
than this amount in Huit Tax.

Colonial rule in its first thirty five years brought no substantial changes to Tana River District. Administrative officers were thwarted in their efforts to increase African cultivation by the physical difficulties of controlling the river, by the relative lack of the usual incentives for increased production, and by the apathy of the government departments towards the district. The one form of trade which they were intent on suppressing boomed, to the detriment of their efforts to improve African agriculture and animal husbandry. The apparent promise of the district, so frequently commented on by early European travellers remained unfulfilled.

Table 19: **Ivory exported by weight from Lamu and Kipini. Cwt.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lamu</th>
<th>Kipini</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-7</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>c. 50</td>
<td>22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* To Lamu only.

Source: Tana River and Lamu District Annual Reports, 1911-1930.
Table 20: Value of grain crops exported from Kipini, 1911-1930.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Millet</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Paddy</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-2</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>17,774</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>5,219</td>
<td>Rs. 25,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-3</td>
<td>9,912</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>10,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-6</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>9,067</td>
<td>13,838</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>25,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1</td>
<td>6,694</td>
<td>14,945</td>
<td>40,388</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>64,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5,187</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Fls. 6,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>6,637</td>
<td>33,563</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>Shs. 49,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>6,659</td>
<td>8,501</td>
<td>36,794</td>
<td>20,658</td>
<td>72,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>13,949</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>13,677</td>
<td>59,126</td>
<td>90,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>7,027</td>
<td>96,586</td>
<td>2,284</td>
<td>17,158</td>
<td>123,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4,041</td>
<td>36,230</td>
<td>3,856</td>
<td>23,710</td>
<td>67,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>4,988</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>47,930</td>
<td>54,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>6,125</td>
<td>25,591</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>6,015</td>
<td>38,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>13,805</td>
<td>22,250</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>20,237</td>
<td>58,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>17,467</td>
<td>16,673</td>
<td>5,351</td>
<td>10,554</td>
<td>50,045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tana River and Lamu District Annual Reports, 1911-1930.

Table 21: Number of Galla livestock sold in Malindi and Mombasa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep and Goats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916-7</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,006</td>
<td>3,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,811</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tana River and Mombasa District Annual Reports, 1911-1930.

Over the period between 1870 and 1914 the general level of prosperity of the coast of the East African Protectorate declined to a very marked extent. Before the construction of the railway the coast was the base of the very extensive and lucrative caravan trade into the interior, founded upon the exchange of trade goods for ivory and slaves, and organised and financed by Arabs, Swahilis and Indians, resident in the major towns. At
least as important as a source of wealth was the production of grain by slave labour on the coastal plantations around Malindi, Mambrui, and Mombasa, and on Lamu and Pate Islands. During the eighteen seventies an average of fifty dhows left Malindi harbour annually with grain for Arabia. The prosperity was undermined and then destroyed by the abolition of the slave trade and then of slavery itself in the Ordinance of 1907, by the construction of the railway, and finally by major changes in the system of land ownership. The caravan trade collapsed, and the fertile estates of the coast fell out of cultivation. The twin pillars of the wealth of the Arabs and Swahilis, who had dominated both economic and political activity of the coast had, by 1914, been almost totally wrecked.

In Kilifi-Malindi District African farmers selling their produce to Indian traders replaced the coastal Arab estates as producers of the grain needs of the coast. Attempts to emulate the achievements of the Giriama producers in the outlying Tana River District failed to achieve consistent results before the onset of the depression.

Certain similarities emerge from these two district studies. Most clearly, the African populations reacted, and were seen to react by their European administrators, to economic stimuli as "rational economic men." Reference to African "conservatism" and resistance to change can be found in the official records. It is not this element, however, that was
regarded as critical in explaining the failure of the coastal areas to advance economically during the first thirty five years of colonial rule. African producers apparently responded to changes in price levels by changing crops and expanding or contracting production. The failure of cotton growing, due to the uncertainty of the market, was perhaps the clearest example of this phenomenon. With the possible exception of the Pokomo before the First World War, the Africans of these two districts appear to have been responsive to the demands of the market, not only in order to pay their tax, but also to satisfy their growing demand for the expanding range of products available to them through the agency of Indian traders.

In explaining the relatively slow growth of the coast economy, the rapid collapse of the bases of the pre-colonial economy must be considered a central feature. Clearly, the coast was experiencing, between 1895 and 1929, major changes in its economic and social structure without parallel in the rest of the Colony. Blame also attaches to the trading system. The activities of Indian traders on the coast were subject to far more frequent, extensive and damning criticism than those of their upcountry compatriots. It is clear that certain practices damaging to the prospects of growth did develop that were almost totally absent inland. The traders of the coast appear to have been more intimate with African producers, yet less dynamic, and less effective as agents of change. A variety of factors, environmental, historic, and cultural, account
for the differences. The atmosphere of the coast was
generally more relaxed, less charged with racial tension.
The Indian population there was more secure; it had been longer
established and, obviously, its members had chosen not to accept
the greater rewards, or face the greater risks and challenges,
offered by the expansion of administrative control into the
interior.

That the growth of African production did not take a
more dynamic form can be attributed, in substantial part, to the
paucity of numbers of administrative officers and the failure
to develop the essential services of transportation and medical
care. The department responsible for agricultural and veterinary
services must, however, bear the brunt of the criticism. It
chose to concentrate its efforts elsewhere. There was undoubtedly
a great deal of truth in Hobley's assertion that:

The development of the highlands and the growth of
a vociferous and energetic white population upcountry
has absorbed the attention of the central government
to an undue extent. The interests of the coastlands
have therefore suffered.
Footnotes. Chapter 3.


3Ibid., p. 1.


8Kenya Land Commission, p. 1149 et seq. and 1165.

9Hollis, p. 120.

10Peristiany, p. 4.


13Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1905-06, PC/PIZA 1/1.

15 See above, pp. 146-147.


18 Ibid., p. 2460. C. N. Dobbs quoted by Tomkinson.

19 Maize is considerably less resistant to drought than finger millet. Wimbi requires only about fifteen inches of rain during its growing season; maize needs about twenty inches. A. M. O'Connor, 'An Economic Geography of East Africa' (London: Bell, 1966), pp. 30, 50.

Kericho District Political Record Book, 1924-28, DC/KER 3/14. There is no indication as to whether these distributions were paid for or not.

21 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1908-09, PC/NZA 1/4.

22 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1909-10, 1910-11 and 1919-20, PC/NZA 1/5, 1/6 and 1/15.

23 Orchardson, pp. 91-92.

24 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1915-16, PC/NZA 1/11.


26 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1906-07, PC/NZA 1/2.

27 Hayes Sadler to Elgin, 28 July 1906, C.O.533/16.

28 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1906-07, PC/NZA 1/2.

29 Girouard to Harcourt, 2 September 1911, C.O.533/94.
30 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1909-10 and 1919-20, PC/NZA 1/5 and 1/15.


32 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1915-16 and 1916-17, PC/NZA 1/11 and 1/12.

33 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1919-20, PC/NZA 1/15.


36 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1910-11 and 1919-20, PC/NZA 1/6 and 1/15.

37 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1910-11 and 1916-17, PC/NZA 1/6 and 1/13. The figure for the number of shops in 1919-20 is not given in the annual report.

38 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1919-20 and 1929, PC/NZA 1/15 and 1/24.


40 Manners, p. 226 and Kericho District Annual Reports, 1927 and 1930, DC/KER 1/2.

41 Kericho District Annual Report, 1928, DC/KER 1/2.

42 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1919-20, PC/NZA 1/15.


44 District annual reports record exports of sheep and goats from the district as: 1920-21 - 19,223, 1921 (eight months) - 13,238, 1922 - 16,500, 1923 - 23,700, DC/KER 1/1.

Bowring to Milner, 8 June 1922, C.0.533/232 and Moore to Passfield, 31 October 1929, C.0.533/399.


Kericho District Annual Reports, 1925, 1928 and 1930, DC/KER 1/2.

Kericho District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KER 1/2.


Ibid.

See above, pp. 225-252.

Kericho District Annual Reports, 1920-21 and 1921, DC/KER 1/1.

Kericho District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KER 1/2.


Monthly Diaries of Provincial and District Commissioners, PC/NZA 3/26/2.

Kericho District Annual Report, 1929, DC/KER 1/2.

Kericho District Annual Reports, 1920-21, 1922, 1928 and 1929, DC/KER 1/1 and 1/2.
60 Kericho District Annual Reports, 1923 and 1930, DC/KER 1/2 and Kericho District Political Record Book, 1915-30, DC/KER 3/6.


63 Nandi District Annual Report, 1906-07, DC/NDI 1/2.

64 Nandi District Annual Report, 1907-08, DC/NDI 1/2.

65 Nandi District Quarterly Report, 31 December 1909, DC/NDI 1/1.

66 Nandi District Annual Reports, 1906-07, 1907-08 and 1911-12, DC/NDI 1/2.

67 Nandi District Annual Report, 1906-07, DC/NDI 1/2.

68 Nandi District Annual Report, 1908-09, DC/NDI 1/2 and Nandi District Quarterly Reports, 31 December 1909 and 31 March 1910, DC/NDI 1/1 and 1/2.

69 Nandi District Quarterly Report, 31 December 1909, DC/NDI 1/1.

70 Ibid.

71 Nandi District Annual Report, 1907-08, DC/NDI 1/2.

72 Nandi District Quarterly Report, 31 December 1909, DC/NDI 1/1.

73 Nandi District Annual Report, 31 March 1910, DC/NDI 1/2.

74 Nandi District Annual Reports, 1907-08 and 1908-09, DC/NDI 1/2.
75. Nandi District Quarterly Report, 31 December 1909, DC/NDI 1/1.

76. Nandi District Annual Report, 1907-08, DC/NDI 1/2.

77. Nandi District Annual Report, 1908-09, DC/NDI 1/2.


79. Nandi District Quarterly Reports, 31 December 1909, 31 March 1910 and 30 September 1910, DC/NDI 1/1 and 1/2.


81. Nandi District Quarterly Report, 31 December 1909 and 31 March 1910, DC/NDI 1/1 and 1/2.

82. Nandi District Annual Report, 1912-13, DC/NDI 1/2.


87. Nandi District Quarterly Reports, 31 December 1910 and 31 March 1911, DC/NDI 1/2.


89. Nandi District Annual Report, 1921, DC/NDI 1/3.

90. Nandi District Annual Reports, 1916-17, 1918-19, and 1921 DC/NDI 1/2 and 1/3.
91 Nandi District Annual Report, 1919-20, DC/NDI 1/2.

92 Nandi District Annual Reports, 1914-15 and 1916-17, DC/NDI 1/2, and Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1916-17, PC/NZA 1/12.

93 Nandi District Annual Report, 1921, DC/NDI 1/3.

94 Nandi District Annual Report, 1922, DC/NDI 1/3.

95 Ibid.

96 This is suggested by Ng'eny, p.123.

97 Nandi District Annual Reports, 1927 and 1929, DC/NDI 1/3.

98 Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1928, PC/NZA 1/23.


100 Nandi District Annual Report, 1927, DC/NDI 1/3.


102 Ibid., p.118.


104 Ibid., evidence of Guy, p.2069 and Nandi witnesses, p.2075.

105 Ibid., evidence of Guy, p.2067.


109. The figures do not represent the total quantity of maize exported from the area. Considerable quantities were taken south to the railway at Yariakani and Mazeras and, in the 1920's increasing amounts were taken southwards to Mombasa by lorry. There are no estimates of the quantities moving out of the district via these routes.

110. C.W. Hobley to Acting Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 26 November 1917, in Malindi District Political Record Book, 1913-16, DC/MAL 1/2.

111. J.W.T. McClellan to Chief Native Commissioner, 7 November 1921, in Coast Province Diaries and Inspection Reports, 1918-1930, CP 2/417.


113. District Commissioner, Rabai to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 18 November 1920, District Commissioner, Kilifi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 19 November 1920 and Assistant District Commissioner, Malindi to District Commissioner, Kilifi, 15 November 1920, in Cost of Living of Africans, 1920-21, CP 54/1401.


116. Malindi District Annual Reports, 1919-20 and 1920-21, DC/MAL 1/1.
had very little effect in the short term. From October 1923 through to November 1925 abnormally dry conditions prevailed, and the Tana failed to flood. By July 1924 the Pokomo were experiencing a serious famine. A.W. Sutcliffe, who was by then district commissioner, implied that Fazan's work exacerbated the extent of the famine. He felt that Fazan had placed too much emphasis on the cultivation of rice, at the cost of other crops which were not dependent on the floods. He thought that rice was bound to fail as a commercial project until flood control on the Tana was achieved. In 1924 and 1925 he pressed for the cultivation of maize, with the result that more maize by value was exported from the Tana River in 1925 than the total of all grain crops in any previous single year. The crop was so heavy that the existing transport and marketing facilities could not cope with it. After Sutcliffe's departure the size of the maize crops fell off quickly.

The problems of transportation and marketing constantly bedevilled the efforts of the administrative officers. Communications up the river depended entirely upon water transportation. The first road to carry wheeled traffic, that from Kipini to Witu, was not opened until 1929. On the face of it, the river provided an ideally cheap transportation system, but the difficulties were sizable. The river ran a very circuitous course to the sea, about double the mileage of a direct route, the extreme variations in height and direction made navigation difficult, and the only means of transportation
130 Takaungu Sub-District Annual Report, 1908-09, DC/MSA 1/1.

131 Malindi District Annual Report, 1909-10, DC/MSA 1/2.

132 Malindi District Annual Report, 1916-17, DC/MAL 1/1.

133 Malindi District Annual Reports, 1924 and 1925, DC/MAL 1/2.

134 Malindi District Annual Reports, 1927 and 1928, DC/MAL 1/2.

135 District Commissioner, Malindi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 11 November 1924, in Coast Native Trade and Production, CP 56/1525.


137 Malindi District Annual Report, 1926, DC/MAL 1/2. The total failure of the cotton crop in Malindi District in 1926 was due to the distribution of poor seed.

138 Malindi District Annual Report, 1928, DC/MAL 1/2.

139 Fitzgerald, "Proposals...." p.3 and "Planting...." p.31. Toddy or tembo (Swahili) is a strong alcoholic drink made from the fermented sap of the palm tree.

140 Fitzgerald, "Planting ......" p.31.

141 Kilifi District Annual Reports, 1925 and 1926, DC/KFI 1/2.

142 See Coconut Commission, CP 7/115 and District Commissioner, Malindi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 19 March 1917, in Encouragement for Growing Coast Products, CP 39/1625.

143 Almost every Giriama ceremony involved the use of toddy. See Champion, The Giryama.

144 Rabai Sub-District Annual Report, 1912-13, CP 8/157.


147 Export of copra from Mombasa port:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity (cwts.)</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>8,748</td>
<td>Fls. 128,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>6,892</td>
<td>Fls. 76,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>22,260</td>
<td>Shs. 423,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>13,460</td>
<td>Shs. 270,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>38,893</td>
<td>Shs. 921,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>31,292</td>
<td>Shs. 718,303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mombasa District Annual Reports, 1920-25, DC/MSA 1/3.
No figures are given for the period from 1926 to 1930, but it is clear from comments on the copra trade that it declined after mid-decade.

148 Kilifi District Annual Report, 1930, DC/KFI 1/2. Total annual income was £29,000 of which tembo made up £10,000 and copra £6,000.

149 Ibid.

150 Hobley, "Political Aspects ....".

151 District Officer, Malindi to Acting Commissioner, Mombasa, 12 February 1897, and Malindi District Quarterly Report, 31 December 1901, in Malindi Inward Correspondence, CP 7/25.


153 See below, pp. 337-338.

154 In 1875 Mombasa had 96 Indian owned houses (Hindu 14, Bohras 52 and Memons 30); Takaungu had 8 (Hindus 3, Bohras 4 and Memons 1), and Malindi and Hambrui together 49 (Hindus 12, Khojas 2, Bohras 30 and Memons 5). See Euan Smith to Earl of Derby, 2 July 1875, House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1876, Slave Trade No. 4 of 1875, C.588
155 Kirk to Cranville, 6 November 1873, House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1874, Slave Trade No. 8 of 1873, C.1064.

156 To Cranville, 5 July 1873, House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1873, Correspondence respecting Sir Bartle Frere's mission to the East Coast of Africa, 1872-73, C.820.

157 Malindi District Annual Report, 1918-19, DC/"MAL 1/1.

158 District Commissioner, "Malindi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 22 September 1929, in Advancing Wages to Natives against Coming Crops, CP 52/1277.

159 District Commissioner, Kilifi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 17 June 1920, in CP 52/1277.

160 Malindi District Annual Report, 1928, DC/"MAL 1/2.

161 Malindi District Annual Reports, 1920-21 and 1928, DC/"MAL 1/1 and 1/2.

162 District Commissioner, "Kilifi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 17 July 1926, in Food Shortage, 1926-27, CP 54/1409.

163 Malindi District Annual Report, 1924, DC/"MAL 1/2 and Kilifi District Annual Report, 1924, DC/KTI 1/2.

164 District Officer, Takaungu to Sub-Commissioner, Mombasa, 8 January 1896, in Malindi Correspondence Inward, 1895-96, CP 75/46.

165 Malindi District Annual Report, 1918-19, DC/"MAL 1/1.

Also District Commissioner, Takaungu and District Commissioner, Mombasa to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, September 1917 and Hobley's evidence to the Economic Commission of 1919, both in Commission in connection with the Paris Economic Conference, 1917-19, CP 50/1240.

166 District Commissioner, Malindi to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 19 March 1917, in Encouragement for Growing Coast Products, 1917-27, CP 39/625.

167 Malindi District Annual Report, 1928, DC/"MAL 1/2.


173. Provincial Commissioner, Tanaland to Chief Secretary, 22 August 1917, Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa to Chief Secretary, 7 January 1918 and District Commissioner, Nyika to Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, 7 March 1918, in Encouragement for Growing Coast Products, 1917-27, CP 39/625.

174. The last European estate, Belazoni's, closed down in 1925.


179. Ibid., minute by Watts on Mr. Fawkes' application for land on the Tana River.

180. Lamu District Annual Report, 1925, DC/LMU 1/1. Also, see above, pp.186-187.
District Commissioner Cornell wrote the following: "The younger members of the tribe are no longer content, as their fathers were, to stay in the villages, marry and settle down and cultivate their shambas. They prefer to seek casual work at Mombasa, where wages are comparatively high, excitement and new sensations ever present, and where they are able to enjoy or endure all the deteriorating influences of modern civilization." Tana River District Annual Report, 1930, DC/TRD 1/1.

182 Girouard to Harcourt, 9 February 1912, CO.533/102.


184 "Notes on a Safari to Tana River, Lamu and the Coastal Districts, September 1932", by the Deputy Director of Sanitary Services, in DC/MSA 5/2.

185 Tana River District Annual Report, 1920-21, DC/TRD 1/1.

186 "Notes...." DC/MSA 5/2.

187 Tana River District Annual Report, 1916-17, DC/TRD 1/1.

188 Lamu District Annual Report, 1926, DC/LMU 1/1.

189 Lamu District Annual Report, 1927, DC/LMU 1/1.


191 Lamu District Annual Report, 1927, DC/LMU 1/1.

192 Clive, DC/LMU 3/1.

193 Tana River District Annual Report, 1929, DC/TRD 1/1.


195 Ibid., Dickson quoting the District Commissioner, Tana River.
Acting Chief Medical Officer to Chief Native Commissioner, 6 October 1923, CP 56/1525.

Tana River District Annual Report, 1929, DC/TRD 1/1.

Tana River District Annual Report, 1926, DC/TRD 1/1.

Tana River District Annual Report, 1922 and 1923, DC/TRD 1/1.


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213 Girouard to Crewe, 30 November 1909, C.O. 533/63.

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215 Acting Game Warden to Chief Secretary, 28 May 1926, enclosed in Grigg to Amery, 26 July 1926, C.O.533/361.

216 Tana River District Annual Report, 1925, DC/TRD 1/1.

217 Lamu District Annual Reports, 1926 and 1927, DC/LMU 1/1 and Tana River District Annual Report, 1925, DC/TRD 1/1.

218 For detail, see Salim, Chapter 3.

The most fundamental question facing Kenyan administrators in the early colonial period, both those in London and East Africa, was that of whether Kenya should develop its economy on the basis of settler agriculture or of peasant production. These two systems were, and were seen to be, in competition for the resources of the Colony. In order for it to succeed, settler agriculture needed land and labour as well as the construction of an economic infrastructure of communications, medical and educational facilities, and technical services aimed at assisting it to overcome the transition to the unaccustomed soil and climatic conditions of the highlands of Kenya. If African land was alienated, if African labour was drawn out of the reserves, if revenue collected from Africans was spent in substantial part on assistance to European based agriculture, then the prospects for success of African agriculture were diminished. The history of the period before the depression indicates very strongly that Europeans were successful in acquiring the resources necessary to establish their dominance of the Kenya economy. By the late twenties the settlers had guaranteed and exclusive control of about twenty percent of the fertile land of the country. Just over two thousand settlements covered five million acres, of which almost two-thirds of a million were cultivated. The total value of their exports, primarily coffee, sisal, and maize was close to £2 million. European farms by the late 1920's were no longer short of labour; between twenty and thirty percent of the adult male population worked, for at least a short period,
each year on a European holding. Roads and railways, hospitals and schools, agricultural and veterinary services had been developed primarily to assist the growth of European agriculture. The main tax burden fell on Africans and yet the bulk of the expenditure assisted projects for primarily European benefit.

Though the conflict looked as though it had been resolved in favour of European agriculture, the advantage had not been won without a struggle, the most critical period of which had occurred between 1920 and 1923. By the beginning of the First World War, the settlers had by no means established a dominant position in Kenya. Their farming enterprises had experienced severe difficulties in establishing themselves. Many were undercapitalised to begin with, experiments with crops and livestock had been bedevilled by pests and diseases, and they had faced, but not overcome, the problem of severe labour shortage. In 1914 they produced less than a quarter of Kenya's total exports. On the other hand, African production, particularly in Nyanza Province under the stimulus of John Ainsworth, had displayed a considerable capacity for growth. With the evident sympathy and support of the last two pre-war governors, Girouard and Belfield, the settlers had pressed energetically, though with little success, for concessions which would have strengthened their hand, both economically and politically, in the struggle for resources. They demanded the introduction of either pass laws on the South African pattern or of compulsory labour, easier terms for longer leases, elected representation on the Legislative Council, a reduction in the size of lands held
by Africans and an increase in African taxation. What they achieved was far less dramatic; their only major success was the second Masai move, undertaken without the approval of the Colonial Office. It was London that restrained, though it did not halt, the drive of the settlers towards ultimate control. Crewe, Elgin, and Harcourt refused to commit the East African Protectorate into the hands of the small and unproductive European community.

As elsewhere in the Empire, war proved to be the handmaiden of constitutional advance in Kenya. The Crown Lands Ordinance and the Native Registration Ordinance of 1915 went a long way towards easing settler anxieties about the availability of land and labour, a soldier settler scheme was agreed to which would considerably increase their numbers, and elected representation was conceded. Under the first post-war Governor, General Edward Northey, settler gains continued unchecked for a year and a half. Indeed, the settlers advanced their interests so far and so fast that they stimulated an intense and widespread reaction, encompassing humanitarian and commercial interests in London, the newly founded Indian and African political associations in Kenya, and elements within the administration of the Colony. Measures to implement the Native Registration Ordinance, raise the Hut and Poll Tax, amend the Native Authority Ordinance, and issue the Northey Circulars marked further rapid advances of settler influence. Each was aimed at forcing Africans out of the reserves at a time of greatly increased labour demand and, as a result of the effects of the war, considerably reduced voluntary supply. Settler ambitions extended further to
additional and substantial land alienations, compulsory labour regulations, and responsible self-government along the lines of the existing dominions for the near future.

Commercial interests, represented forcibly and effectively by Leggett, feared the impoverishment of the African population on which their prosperity depended, and Oldham and the Archbishop of Canterbury led the humanitarian elements, which raised moral objections to both compulsory labour and the extraction of greatly increased taxes from Africans, without any matching return to them in the form of expenditure on the reserves. Africans in Nairobi rioted against the introduction of the kipande, forced labour, raised taxes, and reduced wages. Members of the Native Affairs Department expressed their strong displeasure at the attempt to subjugate African to European interests. The major source of income of the Indian community was endangered by the effect of the measures to increase both the labour supply and the revenue yield of the reserves, though of more immediate importance to the Indians was the threat of the creation in Kenya of conditions similar to those experienced by Indians in South Africa. They had been denied the franchise, and settler Europeans were petitioning strongly for limitations on their right to enter the Colony. These disparate groups, with sets of common interests, converged to exert pressure on the Colonial Office to reassert its authority in matters which, since the outbreak of the war, it had been inclined to leave in the hands of the local administration.

The extensive public and private reaction generated by the precipitate speed of the post-war advance of settler power, resulted in what
seemed to be a serious setback to settler ambitions. The Hut and Poll Tax was reduced by a quarter, the Northey Circulars were withdrawn, the amendment to the Native Authority Ordinance was modified, and finally the settlers' friend, General Northey was abruptly recalled. The financial crisis stimulated officials in Kenya to abandon extensive plans to assist European agriculture, and to look for cheaper ways, more acceptable to London, to encourage production and trade and to revive the flagging economy. The Colonial Office declared the interests of the Africans to be paramount and announced its backing for the first substantial programme of support for African agriculture. Under Coryndon, Northey's replacement, firm foundations were laid for the expansion of aid to peasant production, and indeed between 1922 and 1925 African export earnings tripled from £180,000 to £565,000.

The promise that African interests would be paramount was not kept. In the economic sphere many features of the immediate post-war arrangements survived. The Native Registration Ordinance remained in force, district commissioners were still expected to encourage adult males in the reserves to work and, though there was no more significant land alienation in the twenties, Europeans retained their hold over a substantial proportion of Kenya's fertile land, despite the fact that most of it remained uncultivated and ungrazed. Through their close co-operation with Grigg, the settlers maintained their position as minor contributors to, and major beneficiaries from, Kenya's revenues.

Analysis of the activities of the government departments, covering veterinary, agricultural, medical and educational services and public works, indicates very clearly that the commitment of 1922-1923 to
African interests in general, and to African agriculture in particular, was worth very little in terms of the quantity or quality of resources directed to sustain them. Meanwhile, settler agriculture had become indispensible to the increasingly export oriented economy. In the twenties the number of settlers doubled, the area under cultivation almost quadrupled, their holdings of livestock doubled, and the value of their agricultural exports quintupled.

Table 22: Development of European agriculture, 1920-1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of occupiers</th>
<th>Area occupied '000 acres</th>
<th>Area cultivated '000 acres</th>
<th>No. of livestock</th>
<th>Value of four principal exports £ '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>5,031</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures for coffee, sisal, tea and maize. One fifth deducted from total value of maize exports to allow for African production. Export figures are for 1928.

Source: Kenya Colony and Protectorate, Agricultural Census; 1920 and 1929.

There is no doubt that the development of African production and trade was hindered by the policies of the Kenya Government which, in their effect, channelled resources away from the reserves and into the settled areas. The alienation of land, the extraction of labour, and the inequitable incidence of taxation and distribution of revenue and services, delayed the emergence of the reserves as a significant element in Kenya's economy. In pastoral areas the preoccupation with the need to protect European herds, and the reluctance to invest government funds to provide a market for African livestock, seriously
restrained any possibility of the effective commercial exploitation by pastoralists of their herds.

These conclusions must, however, be qualified. African production and trade, despite these handicaps, did grow very substantially in the early colonial period. Government policies favouring European agriculture were not, as they have been described elsewhere, a totally effective deterrent to the growth of peasant production in Kenya. Contemporary critics of government policy in the twenties, Leys and McGregor Ross, laid the foundations for this belief, later developed and elaborated by Dilley, Wrigley and Wolff. McGregor Ross described the three tasks set the Africans by the dual policy, feeding themselves and their dependents, producing crops for export and supplying labour for the European farms, as "impossible." The declining percentage of exports deriving from the reserves provided Leys with evidence of the success of the government's policy of directing the productive efforts of Kenyan Africans away from the reserves and into the European sector. Wrigley's "basic explanation" for the failure of African production of marketable crops to make headway in the twenties is that, as a result of Government policy, the choice of which sector the African could work in was not a free one. Wolff refers to the "systematic suppression of an African peasant agriculture" and, like Leys, uses figures which show that Africans produced a declining percentage of Kenya's exports from 1913 through to 1929, as evidence for his assertions.

The declining African share of the value of Kenya's exports is
an unreliable index of the growth of African agricultural production. A survey of the total value of African exports reveals a different picture:

Table 23: Value of African Exports, 1907-08 to 1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value £ '000</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value £ '000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909-10</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Agriculture Department, Annual Reports, 1907-1929.

The estimates show a steady rise in the value of exported African production prior to the First World War, a slump during the war, followed by a recovery to the mid-twenties as the effects of wartime disruption wore off. The amount of African produce exported is not a very accurate guide to the total value of the African agricultural surplus. Comprehensive figures indicating the African share of the growing internal market in the twenties are not available, but there are many indications that the domestic market for African agricultural produce expanded rapidly with the growing concentration of European agriculture on the external market and the increasing demand for grain from reserve areas, such as the Northern Frontier Province and the Masai districts.

The growth of European agriculture in the twenties provided a new and large market for African production:
Table 24: Production by European settlers of crops requiring large labour inputs, 1920-1928.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>71,970 cwts.</td>
<td>246,292 cwts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal</td>
<td>102,460 cwts.</td>
<td>294,740 cwts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>1,341 lbs.</td>
<td>33,403 lbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure for 1925.


Kericho District, for example, produced over 4,000 tons of maize annually by the late twenties for sale to the newly established tea and coffee estates on its borders. Kikuyu cultivators provided the European farms in central Kenya with over £140,000 worth of produce during the same years.8 As early as 1924 the Coffee Planters Union was expressing fears lest too much African produced maize was exported, with the result that insufficient would be available to feed their labour.9

The Masai who, at the beginning of the colonial period, lived on a diet almost exclusively derived from their cattle were, in the early thirties, consuming maize to the value of about £12,500 in a year of normal rainfall.10

For Central Province the agricultural census provides a very rough guide to the rapid expansion of production in the twenties. Comparing districts in which climatic conditions were similar for the first and last years of the twenties, and which retained the same boundaries throughout the decade:
Table 25: Maize production in Kikuyu districts, 1920-1 and 1929-30, tons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1920-21</th>
<th>1929-30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embu and Chuka</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>4,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>4,764</td>
<td>27,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyari</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The rapid growth of production railed from Nyanza Province in the years before the First World War has already been noted. It is difficult to assess how far and how fast this advance continued after the setbacks of the war. Comparable figures for railed African produce are not available for the post-war period. The district and provincial records point to a continuation of pre-war trends. Despite the vastly increased domestic consumption of maize, the lower proportion of maize exported compared to other, more valuable crops, the growth of lorry transport, and the increase in the local settler and African market for the agricultural surplus of Nyanza Province, country produce railed from Kisumu and Kibos in 1929 weighed 24,700 tons, compared with 14,290 tons in the best of the pre-war years, 1912-13. The development of processing of agricultural produce in Nyanza Province in the twenties almost certainly means that the product exported in 1929 was more valuable per ton. One mill company alone in Kisumu in 1929 crushed 1,500 tons of sim-sim and ground nuts, and ground 1,500 tons of maize. Figures for the quantity and value of African produce bought by the members of the Indian Association in 1929 indicate that the total value
of the agricultural surplus of the province was close to Shs. 9 million:

Table 26: Quantity and value of African produce bought by members of the Indian Association, 1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Produce</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Total value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>250,000 bags</td>
<td>Shs.10</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sim-sim</td>
<td>50,000 bags</td>
<td>Shs.45</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground nuts</td>
<td>30,000 bags</td>
<td>Shs.35</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides and skins</td>
<td>15,000 fras.</td>
<td>Shs.10</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>55,000 bags</td>
<td>Shs.20</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 6,060,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To this figure must be added the value of cotton and ghee, which these traders did not purchase. Over 2,250,000 lbs. of cotton were sold at 19 cents per pound, and the value of ghee sold in the province can conservatively be estimated at Shs. 750,000. Sales direct to settlers and to African traders perhaps totalled another Shs. 1,500,000. Five years earlier, in 1924, the Provincial Commissioner estimated that the sales of surplus African produce realized about Shs. 6 million.
In the light of these figures of increased productions, some consideration should be given to the frequently repeated assertions that African agriculture could not develop because large areas of land were alienated to the European sector, and Africans were pressured to work on European farms rather than develop their own areas. In a popular history of East Africa, Bethwell Ogot argues that, when most of the reserves were delimited in 1926, they were already inadequate for African needs, and several of them were overcrowded. Van Zwanenberg specifies Kiambu and North Nyanza as two of the areas that had become overcrowded by the late twenties, and in a more recent work Wolff sees the alienation of land and the subsequent overcrowding as one of the chief means used to create the labour force for European agriculture. The central problem with the contention that the alienation of land to Europeans created overcrowding is that there is no body of substantial evidence to support it. The figures that Wolff quotes, from Leys, tend to prove the very reverse:

Table 27: Population and acreage per head in Nyanza and Central Province, 1929-31.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African area</th>
<th>Pop. '000</th>
<th>Acres per head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kavirondo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meru</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embu</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assuming a community living entirely on maize (and diets in both Central and Nyanza Provinces consisted largely of maize by the late twenties), and an average yield of 900 pounds per acre, an African, if he only took one crop per year from the soil, would require the yield of only a half of an acre to fulfil his calorific needs of 450 pounds (equivalent) of unmilled grain per year. Using figures from a survey of Central Province by S.H. Fazan, it is clear that Africans in those districts (excluding Kerugaya) were producing their own food and a substantial surplus from an average of less than one acre per head:

Table 28: Population, total cultivated acreage, cultivated acreage per head and total surplus product of three Kikuyu districts, 1928.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population '000</th>
<th>Cultivated acreage '000</th>
<th>Cultivated acreage per head</th>
<th>Surplus product Crop</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>14,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pulse</td>
<td>3,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>11,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>16,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pulse</td>
<td>2,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>3,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>6,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pulse</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>16,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pulse</td>
<td>2,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>3,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Including both cultivated and necessarily fallow land, Fazan's survey shows that only one half of the cultivable land in these three districts was being used at the end of the 1920's:
Table 29: Cultivation of land in Kiambu, Fort Hall, and Nyeri Districts, 1928, acres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Cultivated</th>
<th>Necessarily fallow</th>
<th>Cultivable, not cultivated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>77,467</td>
<td>16,070</td>
<td>78,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>113,052</td>
<td>23,363</td>
<td>160,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>62,636</td>
<td>12,654</td>
<td>67,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>253,155</td>
<td>52,087</td>
<td>304,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fazan.

The concentration of commentators on Kenya's economic history on the alleged effects of alienations on the areas of densest population has led them to underemphasise the seriousness of overcrowding of a different kind, which began to emerge in an acute form in the twenties. The accumulation by the pastoral tribes of vast numbers of cattle and small livestock, far in excess of the carrying capacity of their land, created a grave problem of erosion and demands for the addition of further acreage to their reserves. The Kamba problem was typical. It could be solved either by allowing them more grazing land so that the reserve could be rested and refurbished, or by creating a market for their cattle so that the numbers could be reduced. The Government of Kenya refused to respond to the pleas of local administrators to gazette part of the Yatta Plateau as part of the reserve or to subsidise the establishment of a cattle processing factory. The result was twofold. A proportion of pastoralists left the reserves to squat on local European farms where they considered the grazing to be superior to that available in the reserve. Secondly, the erosion
problem in the reserve became progressively more serious as overgrazing resulted in erosion, which reduced further the carrying capacity of the land. Generally, it was the pastoral rather than the agricultural people who suffered more from land alienation. The confinement of their cattle within boundaries meant that they were unable to rest grazing land as livestock numbers grew. Particularly after the First World War, the quarantines resulted in the rapid growth of numbers, but the land available for grazing was stable or shrinking.

Yet it was not the pastoral tribes which provided the labour for European farms - land alienation and government policy inimical to the commercial exploitation of their herds, combined with government pressure of a more direct nature, was not generally effective in bringing the pastoralists onto the labour market. The bulk of the labour for European farmers was provided by those very tribes who could best afford not to work, by the recipients of what government assistance there was to African agriculture. There was a clear correlation between the level of surplus production per head and the percentage of its population that the reserve supplied to the labour market. The most productive districts for labour were, in order, Kiambu, Nandi, Kericho, Fort Hall, North Kavirondo and Nyeri:
Table 30: Africans in registered employment per district, 1929.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Estimated no. of able-bodied males, 15-40</th>
<th>Monthly average employment</th>
<th>Percentage of able-bodied males in employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu-Nairobi</td>
<td>18,178</td>
<td>14,081</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandi</td>
<td>6,267</td>
<td>3,780</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kericho</td>
<td>12,726</td>
<td>6,792</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>28,407</td>
<td>13,275</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kavirondo</td>
<td>53,518</td>
<td>23,913</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>34,066</td>
<td>14,273</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kavirondo</td>
<td>59,504</td>
<td>21,621</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teita</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moore to Passfield, 31 October 1929, C.0.533/387.

This also represents, with the exception of Nandi District, an approximate ranking of the value of their surplus agricultural product per capita. The two most labour productive provinces, Nyanza and Central, both produced a surplus crop for sale worth considerably more than their total annual tax bill. Indeed, it appears that the better the ability of a reserve to meet its tax bill from agricultural production the more labour it supplied to the market. In Nyanza Province the annual reports clearly indicate that the most productive district was North Kavirondo, followed by Central and then South Kavirondo. This was also their ranking for supply of labour per capita. This phenomenon is repeated in Central Province:

Table 31: Tax, surplus agricultural product, and labour for three Kikuyu districts, 1928-29.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Tax bill per family</th>
<th>Value of surplus per family</th>
<th>Percentage of able-bodied males in employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hall</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyeri</td>
<td>31.50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fazan and Moore to Passfield, 31 October 1929, C.0.533/387.
The figures suggest that, while tax may have been a factor in stimulating both the supply of labour and the flow of agricultural produce, Africans were not forced out of their reserve just in order to meet tax demands. In most years, most reserves could meet their tax bills from sales of produce alone.

For whatever reason, whether voluntary or by pressure, between a third and a half of all adult able bodied African males were absent each month from the reserves. But it has already been noted that those areas which produced the most labour also produced the largest surplus products. During the Ainsworth period in Nyanza, before the First World War, while African production for export grew so rapidly, Nyanza was the most significant supplier of labour in the Colony. The rapid increases in output by the Fort Hall and Nyeri Districts in the late 1920's were not accompanied by any diminution of the labour supply. As Kipsigis maize production grew in the 1920's, their export of labour also increased. Two considerations might be entered here to explain this apparent paradox. Firstly, the level of production in the reserve depended upon the efforts of women rather than of men. Among most Kenyan African people the males were responsible for the clearing and breaking of land at the beginning of the season. It was the female who planted, weeded and harvested. It is likely that most males were still able to perform, and even to extend, their economic function in the production of crops. Secondly, it might be tentatively suggested that Ainsworth's "zoo theory" has some validity, that the provision of labour generated the production of a surplus crop. Perhaps tastes acquired
through labouring outside the reserve could be satisfied on return to the reserve only by producing a cash crop to provide a money surplus. Due to the lack of statistical data relating to the years before 1929, it is difficult to carry these arguments further.

The allocation of the larger share of government services to the settler areas significantly delayed the building of an economic infrastructure for reserve production. Funds were channelled away from the reserves:

Table 32: Revenue collection and recurrent expenditure in African areas, 1929. £Sterling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total expenditure</th>
<th>Hut and Poll Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>89,858</td>
<td>221,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>71,834</td>
<td>149,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukamba</td>
<td>56,224</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>43,792</td>
<td>35,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerio</td>
<td>25,945</td>
<td>21,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masai</td>
<td>18,847</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.F.P</td>
<td>32,981</td>
<td>2,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td>22,841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Provincial Estimates for 1928 in respect of Services in Reserves by Various Departments, CP 59/1815

Of the services withheld none were more important to the prospects of reserve growth than those related to communications. The pattern of development of cash crop production can be related directly to the distribution of the investment in communications. The areas which produced the first surpluses were those closest to the markets. North Kavirondo developed before Central and South Kavirondo; Kiambu's production grew quicker than that of Firth Hall or Nyeri. Most African agriculture products, particularly maize and beans, were low value goods which could not bear heavy transport costs. South Kavirondo's
difficulties in the early twenties may be cited to illustrate the problem. The slow development of the potentially productive South Luo and Kisii areas may be accounted for by the high costs of transportation to the market at Kisumu, despite the existence by the early twenties of dry weather roads capable of carrying wheeled traffic from the interior of the district to the ports on the lake that were serviced by steamers.

Table 33: Prices paid for produce in South Kavirondo, 1922.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Sim-sim (fras.)</th>
<th>Ground nuts (fras.)</th>
<th>Maize (100lbs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homa Bay</td>
<td>4/50</td>
<td>4/25</td>
<td>2/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendu Bay</td>
<td>4/-</td>
<td>3/50</td>
<td>2/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>3/50</td>
<td>3/25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karungu</td>
<td>3/-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Agricultural Supervisor, Kisumu to Director of Agriculture, 3 October 1922 in Agriculture Department file 1/180.

With transport costs from Kisii to Kisumu at Shs. 4 per 200 lbs, Indian traders at Kisii would not buy maize, millet or sorghum.

Rapid increases in production tended to follow rapidly on the heels of the introduction of more efficient means of communication. Fort Hall and Nyeri Districts in the mid twenties provide a clear example of this with the opening of the Thika to Nyeri branch railway. With the Nairobi market now more accessible, both districts experienced a very rapid expansion of both trade and the area under cultivation. In 1928 in Fort Hall District the local administration calculated that the area under cultivation increased by at least 100% and perhaps as much
as 200;\textsuperscript{21} and the previous year in Nyeri District had been described as the "\textit{annus mirabilis}" for trade.\textsuperscript{22} The construction of roads capable of being used by wheeled traffic usually heralded a rapid improvement in the production and trade of districts away from the major routes. An untailed motor road reached Kabarnet, the administrative centre of Baringo District in 1928, cutting the travelling time from Naivasha from four days to six hours. As a direct result, production and trade boomed. Within a year applications for trading licences rose from 22 to 42.\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, the creation of a substantial market close to the reserve area also produced a rapid African response, as exemplified by production in the Kipsigis reserve in the mid twenties.

Because of the unreliable nature and the general inadequacy of statistical information relating to Kenya's economy in the early colonial period, it would be unwise to reach anything other than very tentative conclusions. It appears that the influence of land alienations and measures to encourage Africans to leave the reserve on the growth of surplus agricultural production was not as drastic as is sometimes supposed. With the exception of the war years, African production appears to have risen steadily through the period, and particularly rapidly in response to improvements in the size and availability of markets. It has been demonstrated that the concentration of resources on the settled areas considerably hindered the growth of peasant production. The presence of these difficulties highlight all the more clearly the keen desire of the Kenyan African to take up the economic opportunities opened up to them by the imposition of colonial rule.
Footnotes. Chapter 9.


3 See below, table 23, p. 367.

4 McGregor Ross, p.450.


6 Wrigley, p.245.

7 Wolff, pp.137-144.


9 "Report of the Second Maine Conference, 1924," enclosed in Northcote to Amery, 5 May 1925, C.0.533/331.

10 Southern Province Annual Report, 1934, EC/SP 1/2/1.


12 Ibid.

13 Nyanza Province Annual Reports, 1924 and 1929, PC/NZA 1/19 and 1/24.


17. Kikuyu yields were probably higher than this - the average yield per acre for the entire Colony was over 700 lbs. per acre. "A Decade of Agricultural Progress."


19. The value of the Nyanza Province surplus product was in the region of £500,000, Hut and Poll Tax £220,000. Central Province produced a surplus worth about £200,000 and paid taxes of £150,000. For tax figures see table 32, below p. 377, for value of produce see above p. 370, and Fazan.

20. See Moore to Passfield, 31 October 1929, C.0.533/387. Only 18.4 percent of able bodied adult males in South Kavirondo were registered for work.


23. Baringo District Annual Reports, 1928 and 1929, DC/BAR 1/2.
Appendix 1. Senior Officers of the Colonial Government.

Commissioners and Governors, East Africa Protectorate and Kenya Colony, 1895-1929

Sir Arthur Hardinge, 1895-1902.
Sir Charles Eliot, 1902-1904.
Sir Donald Stewart, 1904-1905.
Sir James Hayes Sadler, 1905-1909.
Sir Percy Girouard, 1909-1912.
Sir Henry Belfield, 1912-1917.
Sir Edward Northev, 1918-1922.
Sir Robert Coryndon, 1922-1925.
Sir Edward Grigg, 1925-1931.

Chief Secretary

F.J. Jackson, 1902-1907 (Deputy Commissioner).
1907-1911 (Lieutenant-Governor).
C.C. Bowring, 1911-1921 (Chief Secretary).
1921-1922 (Colonial Secretary).
E.B. Denham, 1923-1928 (Colonial Secretary).

Director of Agriculture

A. Linton, 1903-1906.
A. C. MacDonald, 1908-1920.
A. Holm, 1920-1929.

Chief Veterinary Officer

R. J. Sturdy, 1903-1922.
W. Kennedy, 1923-1924.
A. G. Doherty, 1924-1929.

Chief Native Commissioner

J. Ainsworth, 1919-1921.
G. V. Maxwell, 1921-1929.

Provincial Commissioners

J. Ainsworth, 1895-1919.
K. MacDougall, 1895-1907.
C. W. Hobley, 1902-1921.
S.L. Hinde, 1902-1915.
C.R.W. Lane, 1904-1923.
C.S. Reddell, 1910-1914.
H.R. Tate, 1915-1923.
P.S.F. Traill, 1918-1926.
J.O.W. Hope, 1921-1926.

* Denotes still in service in 1929.

R.W. Hemsted, 1924-1929.
O.F. Watkins, 1921-1929.
E.B. Horne, 1924-1929.
C.M. Dobbs, 1925-1929.
G.H. Osborne, 1924-1929.
E.C. Crewe-Read, 1925-1929.
W.F.G. Campbell, 1926-1929.
Appendix 2. Biographies.

John AINSWORTH C.M.G., D.S.O., C.B.E., F.R.G.S.; 1864-1946; educated privately; 1884-1889 employed on the west coast of Africa; 1889-1895 employed by the Imperial British East Africa Company; 1895-1907 Sub-Commissioner, B.N.A.P., Ukamba Province; 1904-1905 Acting Deputy Commissioner; 1906-1907 Sub-Commissioner, Naivasha Province; 1907-1916 Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza Province; 1917-1918 Military Commissioner for Labour, East African Expeditionary Force; 1918-1921 Chief Native Commissioner, Member Legislative Council, Member Executive Council; Retired 1921; 1924 Special service on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea.

Sir Harry Pegg BATTLEBEE C.M.G., K.C.V.O.; born 1880; educated Faversham Grammar School and Wartford College, Oxford; 1905 Colonial Office, Second Class Clerk; 1917 First-Class Clerk; 1912-1919 at various times Private Secretary to Lord Harcourt, Lord Islington, Sir A. Steel-Maitland, Walter Long; 1920 Principal, Colonial Office; 1923 Acting Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office; 1924 Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office; 1925-1930 Assistant Secretary, Dominions Office; 1930-1938 Assistant Undersecretary of State, Dominions Office; 1939-1945 High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand.

Sir Henry Conway BELFIELD K.C.M.G.; 1855-1923; educated Rugby School and Oriel College, Oxford; 1880 Barrister-at-Law, Inner Temple, practising Western Circuit and Devon and Exeter Sessions; 1884 Magistrate, Collector of Land Revenue and Inspector of Schools, Selangor; 1888 Chief Magistrate and Commissioner of Lands, Selangor; 1892 Chief Magistrate, Perak; 1892-1893 Acting Secretary to the Government, Perak; 1896 Commissioner of Lands and Mines, Federated Malay States; 1901 British Resident; Negri Sembilan; 1902-1912 British Resident, Selangor; 1911 British Resident, Perak; 1912 Special mission to the Gold Coast on Land Tenure; 1912-1917 Governor, East Africa Protectorate; retired 1918.


Sir Charles Calvert BOURNE K.C.M.G., K.B.E.; 1872-1945; educated Clifton College; 1890 Colonial Audit Branch of Exchequer and Audit Department; 1892 Auditor, Hong Kong; 1895 Local Auditor, British Central Africa; 1899 Local Auditor, B.E.A.P. and Uganda Protectorate Railway; 1901 Treasurer, B.E.A.P.; 1907 Member, Legislative Council, Member
Executive Council; 1911-1924 Chief Secretary; February to October 1912 and April 1917 to January 1919 Acting Governor, B.E.A.P.; 1924-1929 Governor, Nyasaland.

Sir Donald Charles CAMERON G.C.M.G., K.B.E.; 1872-1948; educated Rathmines School, Dublin; 1890-1904 British Guiana Civil Service, started as Fifth Class Clerk rising to Principal Clerk in the Secretariat; 1900-1907 Assistant Colonial Secretary, Mauritius; 1911 Assistant Secretary, Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria; 1911 Principal Assistant Secretary, Southern Nigeria; 1912 Acting Colonial Secretary, Southern Nigeria; 1914 Secretary, Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria; 1921-1924 Chief Secretary, Nigeria; 1925-1931 Governor, Tanganyika Territory; 1931-1935 Governor, Nigeria.

Sir Robert Thorne COWYDON G.C.M.G.; 1870-1925; educated Cheltenham School; 1897 returned to South Africa to study and practise law; 1899 Bechuanaland Border Police; 1892 professional big game hunter; 1894, Private Secretary to C.J.Rhodes; 1897 British Resident and representative of the British South Africa Company with Lewanika, paramount of Barotse tribe; 1900 Administrator, North West Rhodesia; 1907-1914 Resident Commissioner, Swaziland; 1914-1915 Resident Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia; 1914 Chairman, Royal Commission on Native Policy, Southern Rhodesia; 1916 Resident Commissioner, Basutoland; 1917-1922 Governor, Uganda Protectorate; 1922-1925 Governor, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya; died February 1925 during an appendicitis operation.

Sir Edward Brandis WILIAM G.C.M.G., K.B.E.; 1876-1938; educated Malvern School and Harrow College, Oxford; 1899 Cadet, Ceylon; 1905 Second Assistant Colonial Secretary; 1914 Principal Assistant Colonial Secretary; 1916 Director of Education; 1920 Director of Food Production, Ceylon; 1920-1923 Colonial Secretary, Mauritius; 1923-1928 Colonial Secretary, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya; February to October 1925 and January to August 1927 Acting Governor; 1926-1930 Governor, Gambia; 1930-1934 Governor, British Guiana.

Sir Charles Norton Edgcumbe ELIOT G.C.M.G., C.B.; 1862-1931; educated at Cheltenham School and Balliol College, Oxford; 1881 Hartford Scholar; 1883 Boden Sanskrit Scholar; 1884 Syriac Prize; 1886 Derby Scholar; 1886-1892 Third Secretary, St. Petersburg; 1892-1898 Charge d'Affairs, Morocco; 1893-1898 Second Secretary, Constantinople; 1898 Secretary, Washington; 1899 British High Commissioner, Samoa; 1900-1904 Commissioner, British East Africa Protectorate and Agent and Consul-General at Zanzibar; resigned 1904; 1905-1912 Vice Chancellor, University of Sheffield; 1912 Principal, University of Hong Kong; 1913-1919 High Commissioner, Siberia; 1919-1926 Ambassador, Japan.

Colonel Sir Édouard Percy Granville GIRONAULT G.C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.; 1867-1932; born Montreal, Canada; educated Royal Military College,
Kingston, Ontario; 1888 entered Royal Engineers, rising to the rank of Major in 1899 and Colonel in 1904; 1896 Dongola Expeditionary Force; 1897 Nile Expedition; 1890-1895 Railway Traffic Manager, Woolwich Arsenal; 1896-1898 Director of Soudan Railways; 1898-1899 President of Egyptian Railway Board; 1899-1902 Director of Railways, South Africa; 1902-1904 Commissioner of Railways, Transvaal and Orange River Colony; 1907-1908 High Commissioner, Protectorate of Northern Nigeria; 1908-1909 Governor, Northern Nigeria; 1909-1912 Governor, British East Africa Protectorate; 1915 Director General of Munition Supply.

Sir Edward William Macleay GREG P.C., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C., 1st Baron Altrincham; 1879-1955; educated Winchester School and New College, Oxford; 1903-1913 editorial staff, Times newspaper, with Leo Amery; travelled extensively throughout Empire; 1914 joined Grenadier Guards and rose to rank of Lieutenant-Colonel; Military Secretary to Prince of Wales during visits to Canada, Australia and New Zealand; 1921-1922 Private Secretary to Lloyd George; 1922-1925 Liberal Member of Parliament for Oldham; 1925-1931 Governor, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya; 1933-1945 Member of Parliament for Altrincham; 1939-1940 Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Information; 1940 Financial Secretary, War Office; 1940-1942 Joint Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, War Office; 1944-1945 Minister Resident, Middle East.

Ernest HARRISON C.M.G.; born 1886; educated Holmes Chapel and Edinburgh University; 1904-1913 Lecturer, School of Agriculture, Grootfontein, Cape Colony; 1913-1917 Principal, School of Agriculture, Cedara, Natal; 1918-1920 Land Manager, South Africa Township, Mining and Finance Corporation; 1921-1930 Deputy Director of Agriculture, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya; 1930-1937 Director of Agriculture, Tanganyika Territory; 1938-1947 Professor of Agriculture, Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad.

Alexander HOLM C.M.G., C.B.E.; 1878-1943; educated University School, Reigate and Croy College, Kent; 1903-1909 General Manager, Government Experimental Farm, Pofchefstroom, Transvaal; 1909-1912 Principal and General Manager, School of Agriculture, Pofchefstroom; 1912-1919 Undersecretary for Agriculture, Union of South Africa; 1919-1933 Director of Agriculture, British East Africa Protectorate, Member Legislative Council, Member, Executive Council, Member, Economic and Finance Committee; 1927 Chairman, Labour Commission; 1929 Chairman, Food Control Board; 1933 Vice Chairman, Joint East Africa Board; 1939 Chairman, East Africa Group, Overseas League.

Major Sir Edward Humphrey Lanisty LEGGETT D.S.O., R.E.; 1871-1947; educated Clifton College and Royal Military Academy, Woolwich;
1892 employed by London and North West Railway; 1895 Board of Trade Delegate, International Railway Conference; 1899-1902 Headquarters Staff, South African War; 1902-1905 Director, Burgher Camps and Settlements, Transvaal; 1907-1910 Special duties for Colonial Office, B.E.A.P. and Uganda; 1908-1909 Member Legislative Council, B.E.A.P.; 1914-1918 attached to Belgian War Office; 1919-1930 Chairman, East Africa Section, London Chamber of Commerce; 1925-1931 Chairman, Dominion and Colonies Committee, Royal Society of Arts.

Gerald Verner MAXWELL C.N.G.; 1877-1965; educated Bedford Grammar School and Peterhouse College, Cambridge; 1893 Cadet, Fiji; 1900 Stipendary Magistrate; 1904 Assistant Native Commissioner; 1906 Native Land Commissioner; 1912 Chairman, Native Lands Commission, Fiji; 1921-1931 Chief Native Commissioner, Kenya; Member, Legislative Council, Member, Executive Council; retired 1951.

Major-General Sir Edward NORTHEY G.C.M.G., C.B.; 1868-1953; educated Eton and Sandhurst; 1888 joined British Army; 1891-1892 Hazara, Miranzai and Isazai expeditions; 1899-1902 South African War; 1915 A.D.C. to the King; 1916-1918 Brigadier-General commanding Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field Force; 1918 Governor, British East Africa Protectorate; 1922 resigned; retired 1926.

Sir Herbert James READ G.C.M.G., C.B.; 1863-1949; educated Allhallows School, Honiton and Brasenose College, Oxford; 1887 Clerk, War Office; 1889 Second Class Clerk, Colonial Office; 1896-1898 Assistant Private Secretary to Joseph Chamberlain; 1899 First Class Clerk, Colonial Office; 1905-1916 Principal Clerk, Colonial Office; 1906 Delegate on the Commission of the Anglo-German Frontier in East Africa; 1905-1924 Chairman, Colonial Survey Committee; 1909-1924 Chairman, Colonial Advisory Medical and Sanitary Committee; 1909-1924 Chairman, Bureau of Hygiene and Tropical Diseases; 1911-1912 official visit to East Africa and Soudan; 1916-1924 Assistant Undersecretary, Colonial Office; 1924-1930 Governor, Mauritius.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir James Hayes SADLER K.C.M.G., C.B.; 1851-1922; educated privately; 1870 Joined British Army; 1870-1876 service in Ireland, Canada and India; 1877 Political Department, India; 1877-1893 duty as Agent in Baroda, Kotal, Jhalawar and Muscat; 1893 Resident and Consul General, Persian Gulf; 1895 Assistant Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India; 1898 Political Agent and Consul, Somaliland Protectorate; 1901-1905 Commissioner, Uganda Protectorate; 1905-1909 Commissioner and Governor, British East Africa Protectorate; 1909-1914 Governor, Windward Islands.

Captain Sir Donald William STEWART K.C.M.G.; 1860-1905; educated Clifton School and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst; 1879 joined the
Gordon Highlanders; 1879-1880 Afghan War; 1881 Transvaal War; 1882-1884 A.D.C. to Commander in Chief India (his father); 1884-1888 Soudan campaign; 1896 Political Officer, Ashanti Expedition; 1897-1904 Gold Coast; 1904-1905 Commissioner, British East Africa Protectorate.
Appendix 3. A Note on Interviews.

A standard questionnaire was not used during the interviews with Indian traders. Owing to the politically sensitive nature of my enquiries relating to prices, profits and trading practices, and bearing in mind the precarious state of African-Asian relations in Kenya in 1969-1970, I thought it wise to treat each respondent individually. The general pattern which the questions followed is outlined below:

date and place of birth
father's place of birth and occupation
date of arrival in east Africa
reasons for departure from India
extent of knowledge of east Africa prior to arrival
expectations and financial situation on arrival
outline of career as trader in Kenya
outline of family connections in east Africa
place and nature of trade, with dates
value of trade, buying and selling and their growth
prices and their movement
effect of war and famine on trade
transport, costs and difficulties
currency and barter, credit
rings and price fixing
bankruptcies
relationship with local Africans, particularly chiefs and headmen
relationship with administration, and local Europeans, if any
relationship with other traders
knowledge of agricultural reform and its effects
trading regulations and their effect
licences and taxation and their effect
grading, particularly with reference to hides and skins.
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   b) In Kenya.

2. BOOKS.

3. ARTICLES.

4. PAMPHLETS.

5. UNPUBLISHED WORKS.

6. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS.
   a) Great Britain.
   b) East Africa Protectorate/ Kenya.

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Series C.0.542 Kenya, 1908-1950, Government Gazettes, 45 volumes
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Series C.0.628 Kenya, 1904-1939, Register of Correspondence, 34 volumes
Series C.0.629 Kenya, 1904-1925, Register of Out Letters, 9 volumes

ii) Rhodes House, Oxford

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Private papers of E. D. Morel

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South Kavirondo District DC/KSI
Central Kavirondo District DC/CN
Lambwa/Kericho District DC/KER
Nandi District DC/NDI
Central Province FC/CP
Kikuyu/Kiambu District DC/KBU
Fort Hall District DC/FH
Nyeri District DC/NYI
Meru District DC/MDU
Lamu District DC/LMU
Machakos District DC/MKS
Kitui District DC/KTI
Coast Province CP
Malindi District DC/MLD
Lamu District DC/LMU
Tana River District DC/TRD
Kilifi District DC/KFI
Teita District DC/TTA
Kwale/Vanga District DC/KWL
Southern Province FC/SP
Kajiado District DC/KAJ
Narok District DC/NRK
Rift Valley Province FC/RVP
Elgeyo-Marakwet District DC/ELM
Eldama Ravine District DC/ER
Baringo District DC/BAR
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7. INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
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