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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIVE ASPECT OF ART IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF ART: JEAN DUVIGNAUD AND ARNOLD HAUSER

by

Diane Charbonneau
B.A., Université du Québec à Montréal, 1978
B.F.A., Concordia University, 1980

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Communication

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the work of two sociologists of art, Jean Duvignaud and Arnold Hauser, who speak of an imaginative power of an epoch as a critical element. This imaginative power, they argue, leads to a capacity of individuals to develop self-awareness; art plays a critical role in social communication. For both Duvignaud and Hauser, the study of art and of the social relations within an epoch are intrinsically related and their positions regarding the central role of the communicative aspect of art are assessed.

Duvignaud's and Hauser's arguments are critiqued from the point of view that both art and its interpretation are socially and historically conditioned. The contention is made that the communicative aspects of art, which today are often neglected, should be a central part of the study of art. If modernism is to be assessed, it should be approached not only in terms of what is produced as art, and not only in terms of the social relations of the society of the modernist artists, but also in terms of its cultural implications and its system of meaningful referents.

It will be shown that the approach taken by Duvignaud and Hauser goes at least part way in correcting tendencies to interpret art as an autonomous segment of culture. The thesis concludes that neither Duvignaud nor Hauser deal with the full connotative aspects of art.
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I would like to acknowledge the particular emotional or intellectual (or both) contribution and support of the many individuals who have participated in many ways in the writing of my thesis. Because of the inherent and immanent characteristic of a text, I believe that the only way I can fully express my gratitude to these people is by giving them the opportunity to pass into posterity by having their names printed:

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'Art and Society', a term which refers to the production and integration of art in society, has grown in popularity in the last thirty years. In art theory the sociology of art is one of the major aspects of the social investigation of art. This thesis examines the works of Jean Duvignaud (French 'homme de lettres', b. in 1921) and Arnold Hauser (Hungarian art historian, 1892-1978). The works I have chosen to discuss are the writings of these authors that pertain to the sociology of art: Duvignaud's *Sociologie de l'art* (1967) and Hauser's *Soziologie der Kunst* (1974).

When I became familiar with their essays, I noticed that between social and aesthetic considerations, they both address the correlation between art and society in terms of the communication processes. As a student in communication, I was interested in the issue, and decided to investigate it further. The thesis unfolds from the premise that, like any other system of signification which can be studied in terms of its communicative aspect, art is a key element in culture:

A special part of culture is the communication system. Art provides a special kind of communication and the analysis of how it works leads us to consideration of social relationship. It also leads us to a consideration of the meaning in art and the ways in which it influences human behavior. Art is used to educate, as propaganda and advertising. It may even lead us to a consideration of the deeper structures influencing human experience. (Foster, 1979:325)

Of three sections of my thesis, two are reserved for the examination of Duvignaud's and Hauser's writings on the
sociology of art. The last section is devoted to the appraisal and evaluation of their works. The literature survey may seem lengthy and cumbersome for some, yet it offers a rather comprehensive explication of their works. This, I feel is essential, owing to the lack of critical appraisals of their work.

Prior to my discussion of Duvignaud and Hauser, I have chosen to present a summary of the historical and social context of the social investigation of art: the setting in which the sociology of art has originated. I believe that this excursion into the past and present of the sociology of art is necessary, especially since surveys which discuss the subject in a comprehensive manner are rare. In addition, it gives us a chance to locate Duvignaud and Hauser in their respective intellectual traditions. In this introduction, I too am concerned with the significance of considering the communicative aspect of art, an issue which, formerly has been relegated in the shadow of other social and aesthetic considerations.

I have learned from Duvignaud's and Hauser's discussion on the communicative aspect of art that at least three disciplines have influenced its formulation: structuralism, psychology and media studies. Structuralism, which is essentially a theory of communication, has contributed largely to the conceptualization of the communicative aspect of art. A new perspective on art results from the establishment of art as language. However significant the structuralist approach may have been initially
in the sociology of art, its direct influence has been restricted to the French intellectual tradition (Jean Duvignaud).

Psychology is another theoretical source which has shaped the concept of communication in the sociology of art. Following a psychological argument, Duvignaud and Hauser assert that the essence of creative activities resides in the need for people to communicate with each other. Both emphasize the intersubjective nature of the process, and claim that a sense of community arises through this social exchange.

In response to the growing use of radio, television, and cinema in the making of art, media studies have recently been a point of departure in the interpretation of art. Duvignaud and Hauser refer to McLuhan's work in their interpretation of contemporary art. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that in no instance is art thought of in terms of information, but always as a form of communication, of expression.

The last part of the thesis is crucial and reveals my contribution to a different reading of the sociology of art, and the communicative aspect of art. Since secondary sources on the sociology of art hardly exist, I have chosen to explore the field through an interdisciplinary approach, which has given me the possibility to apprehend the influence, implication and limitation of the sociology of art.

This perspective gave me the opportunity, not only to present Duvignaud's and Hauser's interpretation of the sociology
of art, but to underscore the ideological bias of their argument. Therefore, I claim that the sociologists of art have consolidated the aesthetic and social values of the modern era. In this light, their concept of communication needed to be assessed.
1. Introduction: Language, Image and the Sociology of Art

Subject to bombardment by a multiplicity of images, our generation has come to realize the importance of visual experience in everyday life. Contrary to McLuhan's assumption that the emphasis on visualization brought by the invention of the printing press during the fifteenth century has yielded to acoustic and tactile phases, the invention of new technologies (especially film and television) has meant that visual images are more than ever at the centre of human relations. In 1970, Pierre Francastel reflected upon the subject:

Il est fragrant que notre époque ne mesure pas du tout l'ampleur de la révolution culturelle qui est en train de se produire. Il ne s'agit plus, depuis une cinquantaine d'années, des développements ou des modifications d'un équilibre établi à l'intérieur d'un système de connaissances et de représentations conservé dans son intégrité. Il s'agit si notre époque se montrera capable de substituer, comme moyen de liaison le plus répandu entre les individus qui forment notre société et dans une mesure qui d'ailleurs reste à déterminer, l'image au langage: ce dernier terme étant ici employé dans son sens étroit de langage verbal, éventuellement fixé par l'écriture. (Francastel, 1970: 13)

---

'McLuhan argues that the printing press was the strongest stimulus to the mechanization, rationalization and depersonalization of our life because of its imposed visual homogeneity and linearity.'
Since the eighteenth century, language theory has become an important element in the history of social thought and has led to the elaboration of new fields of investigation in the study of society. Linguistics—the study of the structure of language and human speech—has moved to a central position in the human sciences. Linguistics has recognized the significance of language in daily life interaction by stressing that both language and the medium embodying it contribute interdependently to the formation of concepts and to the internalization and communication of facts. This emphasis, which may have been first a preoccupation for the French theorists, spread over other intellectual traditions during the first part of the twentieth century.

However, for the French, language study is an important field since it is often used as a paradigm of analysis in social theory. During the nineteen fifties, with structuralism—which is essentially a communication theory—the notion of language, usually confined to speech, is enlarged to include other systems of signification such as art, myth and religion. Parallel to these developments, in art theory the pertinence of images as a legitimate substitute for speech was discussed, therefore challenging the primacy of speech as the sole medium of

communication.

La valorisation du langage ne confère pas aux arts du langage verbal la primauté et la puissance motrice, qu'avait détenues la musique dans la période préromantique et romantique avec la grande théorie de l'Harmonie. Ce ne sont pas les arts du langage qui passent au premier plan, mais le langage comme tel, de sorte qu'il devient le paradigme de tous les arts. Ceux-ci se conçoivent à l'instar du langage, comme des langues partielles et techniquement spécialisées, peinture, musique etc. (Lefebvre, 1962:176)

The growing interest in communication, which follows from the structuralist study of language is not only the result of this approach, but also derives from interest in the communication processes - the mechanism of how a message is given and received. While the first interpretation emphasizes the correlation between constituent elements necessary for meaning to occur, the second stresses the way people impart messages to each other. The latter, which was primarily introduced as an explanation of interpersonal relations, rapidly extended to the field of media studies.

Since the fifties, especially in France, there is an intellectual trend that covers the communicative aspect of art: the so-called 'sociologie de l'art'. At that time - for lack of an approach that could study art from a communicative and aesthetic perspective - it was felt that sociology should take up the task.

Or là théorie de l'information et de la communication appartient à la sociologie, puisqu'elle postule l'établissement de réseaux entre les individus. Une nouvelle sociologie de l'art est donc possible; mais il faut avouer qu'elle n'est pas encore faite et que, pour le moment, l'esthétique de l'art-langage se situe au niveau des lois cybernétiques de la communication plus
While the French may have been the initiators of this perspective, other intellectual traditions have approached the communicative aspect of art from different viewpoints. In a rare survey that covers the ensemble of efforts to approach art from a sociological point of view, Arnold W. Foster mentions that one focus is communication. This emphasis is illustrated in the works of Marshall McLuhan, Arnold Hauser, Wilhem Wundt, George Mead, John Dewey, Jane Harrison, and Claude Levi-Strauss.

**Intellectual Roots and Historical Contexts**

The intellectual background of a sociological perspective on art is rooted in the European intellectual tradition of the nineteenth century. The first attempt to emphasize the relationship between art and society goes back to the turn of the century with the work of Mme de Staël (French writer, 1766-1817). In *De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales* (1800), she discusses the correlation between race, climate, literary style, and the implications of women and religion in art.

---

The other themes mentioned by Foster are the following: 1) the biological and psychological emphasis 2) the focus on art as part of culture 3) the stress on the metaphysical sources of art 4) the emphasis on the non-aesthetic aspect of art. (Foster, 1979:301-332)
Throughout the nineteenth century, her attempt is echoed in other writings. Karl Marx (German philosopher, economist, and politician, 1818-1883) drew together art and society as early as 1845 (The Economic andPhilosophic Manuscripts of 1844). He was followed by Herbert Spencer (English philosopher, 1820-1903) who thought that his evolutionary theory could account for the origin and persistence of aesthetic emotions. In The Beginning of Art (1895), Ernst Gross (England) applied his materialist interpretation of art which emphasizes art as a reflection of the various economic stages of society, and which stresses the change in the function of art from the early stages to modern civilization.

Although no sociological book about the subject of art or aesthetics was written during the nineteenth century, references to the social context of art are made in the work of Max Weber (German sociologist, 1864-1920). Hippolyte Taine (French literary critic and historian, 1828-1893), in his Histoire de la littérature anglaise (1871) elaborates on the thesis that the development of mental functions and historical facts ought to be explained by surrounding circumstances such as race, environment and historical movement, and art was part of his consideration.

With L'art au point de vue sociologique (1889), Jean-Marie Guyau (French philosopher and poet, 1854-1888) formulated, for the first time, a sociological approach concerned with art. He defended a thesis that social integration is embodied in works of art.
However, in spite of the many efforts to comment upon the social nature of art during the nineteenth century, early twentieth century art theorists were more concerned with developing purely historical viewpoints. Yet, during the first half of our century, some attempts were made to stress the social character of art in the works of American, European, and Soviet intellectuals.

In America, the investigation of the relationship between art and society was rare. The concern with the social nature of art was far greater in Europe and the Soviet Union where Marxist thought is the common ground of most theoretical approaches. One American sociologist stands out who is interested in the social context of art production: Pitirim Sorokin (Born in Russia, 1889-1968) who wrote Social and Cultural Dynamics; volume I, Fluctuations of Form of Art (1937). First interested in the sociology of behaviour, he came to study the specificity of sociocultural facts through a comparative and statistical investigation.

In Europe, the most well-known and recognized attempt to deal with the issue of art and society was made by György Lukács (Hungarian philosopher, critic, and politician, 1885-1971) who developed a sociological analysis in two major works: Soul and Form (1911) and The Theory of the Novel (1914-1915). In Germany, his endeavour is reflected in the early works of the Frankfurt School with Theodor Adorno (German philosopher, 1903-1969) and Walter Benjamin (German philosopher, 1892-1940). In England,
during the 1930's, Christopher Caudwell (1907-1937) was concerned with the same issue. Meanwhile, the Soviet attempt arises from the need to define an aesthetic which corresponds to the rising socialist state.

Sociological Approaches: America vs Europe

The use of a sociological rationale to explain artistic activity came to flourish during the 1950's and 1960's. It was felt that in order to speculate on present artistic preoccupations, a suitable theoretical framework was necessary. The emergence of such an interpretation, emphasizing that art is not produced in a vacuum, corresponds to the integration of daily life into works of art initiated by pre-World War II movements such as cubism, Dadaism, and surrealism, and followed during the fifties and sixties by a second generation of art movements - Pop art and its offshoots.

Although there is a consensus about the significance of assessing the correlation between art and society, there is no sense of cohesiveness between the various sociological practitioners (they are not all sociologists or 'sociologues') of different theoretical bias - positivism, materialism, idealism have produced studies in that genre. While they share in common the need to elaborate on the sociological nature of art, they are not concerned with the definition of a particular discipline of study and their efforts often remain isolated.
In America, the sociological interpretation of art is supported by empirical studies endeavouring to systematize the relationship between art and society. However, precise and objective these studies can be, they fail to demonstrate the specific character of creative activity. Facts may provide a certain kind of information but they do not explain the emergence of cultural forms. The principal reason for the lack of interest in artistic activity characteristic of the writings of most American sociologists, resides in their relative lack of expertise in art history.

In Europe, the efforts to elaborate on the correlation between the social experience and the experience of art reflect the influence of the Marxist tradition upon intellectual discourses (Critical theory, Marxist aesthetics, Situationists, social history of art, the sociology of art, and reception theory). The main contributions, mostly in France and Germany, are characterized by a common concern "with the ideological significance of art, the nature of ideas, values and beliefs expressed in art in terms of the socio-historical context and in the manner by which they are expressed by the artist." (Sydie, 1981:16) In France, the attempt to link society and art is found in the works of Pierre Bourdieu, Roger Bastide, Jean Duvignaud, Pierre Francastel, and Lucien Goldmann.

The names of Alphons Silbermann, a German sociologist, and of Arnold Hauser, a Hungarian social historian of art, are mentioned with respect to their efforts to discuss the social production of art. The extensive scope of Hauser's work makes him an important figure in the field. In England, the speculation on the social nature of art is rather a recent phenomenon. The concern for such an enterprise came to flourish in the 1970's, while in other countries it had a tendency to decrease or even disappear. Recent attempts to define a sociological perspective based on a Marxist tradition are pursued by the social historians of art and literature: John Berger, T.J. Clark, Terry Eagleton, Raymond Williams, and recently Janet Wolff.

The dissonance between the American and European sociological approaches to art lies in variations in the definition of sociology as set by the English, French or German languages. In French and German, sociology is more comprehensive (focusing on human social human relations and representational systems); therefore the determination of knowledge or of the


6The peculiarities of this distinction are well illustrated in Canada where the two intellectual traditions co-habit. While English Canada is more or less preoccupied by a social interpretation of art, French Canadian 'sociologues' have shown a greater interest in the subject. The influence of the Europeans is well represented in the writings of Fernand Dumont (1964), Maurice Lemire (1969), Gilles Marcotte (1964), and Marcel Rioux (1971).
imaginary is understood as part of the formation of social reality. In English, the sense of sociology is narrower (stressing organizations and institutions); thus art and artists are relegated to a subsystem status expressive of symbolism. The following definitions will help to illustrate where the differences lie between the main intellectual traditions.

**Sociologie:**

n.f. (1830; mot créé par Comte; de 'socio' - et -logie). Etude scientifique des faits sociaux humains, considérés comme appartenant à un ordre particulier, et étudiés dans leur ensemble ou à un haut degré de généralité. (Robert, 1972:1658)

**Sociology:**

n. (F sociologie, fr. socio- + -logie -logy) 1. The science of society, social institutions, and social relationships; *specific:* the systematic study of the development, structure, interaction, and collective behavior of organized groups of human beings. 2. the scientific analysis of a social institution as a functioning whole and as it relates to the rest of society. (Webster,1979:1095)

**Soziologie:**

The science of society; i.e. of the forms of appearance of phenomena initiated and transmitted by social contacts. In a narrow sense sociology is understood as a systematic interpretation of the sequence and the effects of social activities (Max Weber), as science of the social relations and forms (L. v. Wiese), or as a systematic analysis of the general order of social life, its laws of movement, and its relationships to the natural environment and to culture (R. König).7

Investigations carried under the label 'the sociology of art' are surprisingly few. Contrary to the ensemble of the sociological approaches concerned with the social production of art, the practitioners working within the sociology of art are concerned to define their object of study. While there is a debate over the existence of such a field, sociologists of art who have elaborated individually on its definition agree and insist on the pertinence of creative activity to our existence. They are mostly concerned with the social roots of knowledge, and with the manner in which the social is manifest in cultural forms. Europe is the cradle par excellence for such a sociology:

...ce que la sociologie intéressée par les institutions ne peut voir; les métamorphoses de la sensibilité collective; les rêves de l'imaginaire historique, les variations des systèmes de classification, les visions du monde enfin des divers groupes sociaux qui constituent la société globale et leurs hiérarchies. (Bastide, 1970:203)

In retrospect, it can be assumed that the focus of the sociology of art was whether art and society are related. Once the relationship between art and society is established the question arises of how the correlation takes place. The sociologists of art who have chosen to investigate the

'It appears that an 'imaginary' impediment walls off intellectual traditions from one another. While similar efforts are carried on in different countries, exchanges are rare occasions.
communicative aspect of art have stressed the need to better understand the relationship. Therefore, the focus on communication processes becomes necessary in order to understand the role of the imaginary, disclosed explicitly or not, as a central component of the sociology of art. The imaginary is the point of convergence from which communication emanates. In its centre, the producer and the recipient of language meet and participate to the construction and perpetuation of this system of signification.

In order to discuss communication within the sociology of art the writings of Jean Duvignaud and Arnold Hauser are respectively presented. They are both concerned with the elaboration on the relationship between art and society, and the discussion of the communicative aspect of art. When compared, their writings show similarities and distinctions. As proponents of the same cause, they discuss the social meaning of art, while stressing the importance of seeing art as a system of signification.

9 "Rappelons que le sens courant du terme imaginaire, qui pour l'instant nous suffira: nous parlons d'imaginaire lorsque nous voulons parler de quelque chose d'inventé - qu'il s'agisse d'une invention absolue (une histoire imaginée de toutes pièces), ou d'un glissement, d'un déplacement de sens, où des symboles déjà disponibles sont investis d'autres significations que leurs significations normales ou canoniques ("qu'est-ce que tu vas imaginer là", dit la femme à l'homme qui récrimine sur un sourire échangé par elle avec un tiers). Dans les deux cas, il est entendu que l'imaginaire se sépare du réel, qu'il prétende se mettre à sa place (un mensonge) ou qu'il ne le prétende pas (un roman)." (Castoriadis, 1975:177)
In a short essay entitled *Sociologie de l'art* (1967), Jean Duvignaud lays out the significance of the imaginary as vital to human existence. He claims that art is a positive activity initiated by the artist which brings individuals to participate in the making of social reality. By emphasizing the imaginary, Duvignaud is more concerned with the productive end of art. In addition, his interest resides in a sociological observation of the phenomenon, and puts aside any aesthetic considerations. From a theoretical viewpoint, his essay embodies elements of Marxist philosophy; his work is informed by structuralism and Lukács' work.

In *Soziologie der Kunst* (1974), Hauser claims that art is a vehicle of expression, an 'address and discussion'. He suggests that the dialectical relationship between production and reception have to be looked at in order to understand the on-going historical process which characterizes the creation of meaning in art. Although his concern lies in the correlation between art and society, he goes into great detail to emphasize the aesthetic quality of art. He tries to delimit the field of the sociology of art within the context of a non-orthodox Marxist perspective.
I. The Sociology of Art: Duvignaud's Interpretation
1. Toward a Sociology of Artistic Expression

Under the title *Sociologie de l'art*, Duvignaud develops a sociology of artistic expression, a concise outline of a larger project called 'sociologie de l'imagination'. In this book he uses the terms sociology of art and sociology of artistic expression, interchangeably. This absence of distinction does not necessarily confuse the issue of a proper sociology of art as Duvignaud endeavours to define it; rather, it shows one of the possible directions that the sociology of art can take. I will argue that this effort to understand art is far from being comprehensive, because it looks at only one aspect of art—its production. In addition, I contend that his effort to describe the notion of the imaginary and artistic creation is worth considering seriously, but it cannot be regarded as a final statement about the totality of art.

The Imaginary

Artistic creation, creative imagination, art, and the imaginary are almost synonymous terms in Duvignaud's *The Sociology of Art*. Without doubt, among these ideas the imaginary is the central concept in Duvignaud's notion of the

'The English translation of Duvignaud's *Sociologie de l'art* has been used each time a quotation is presented.'
sociology of art; he fails, however, to offer a comprehensive definition of it. The reader is left to improvise an interpretation based on various clues found in the text, and on the connotations of this word in the French intellectual tradition. The imaginary is characterized by a principle of totality (echoing Lukács's concept of totality) which transcends individuals, social groups, and classes. It is a tenet of social cohesion through consolidation and communication. Artistic creation is rooted in the thread of collective existence: through the imaginary, mankind finds its raison d'être. The imaginary is more than the capacity to invent images - it is a vital substance where humanity creates social reality. Thus, art is perceived as a dynamic phenomenon, the aim of which is to carry on social energy. The work of art is the carrier of this social substance, which reveals the potential future; art is a form of anticipation of the social hereafter, a

\[2\] In the French intellectual tradition, the imaginary has been the focus of many writers for some decades. Its psychological connotation is rooted in Lacan's works, but other intellectuals have used it in different contexts; G. Bachelard, La poétique de l'espace (1957); C. Castoriadis, L'institution imaginaire de la société (1962); H. Lefebvre Introduction à la modernité (1975); and J. P. Sartre, L'imaginaire (1940). In addition, it seems that the French intellectuals are concerned with the development of a 'sociologie de l'imaginaire'.

\[3\] "La totalité dont il est question chez lui n'est pas l'être en devenir de la totalité du monde, mais la totalité du processus de l'expérience sociale et historique telle qu'elle se constitue et se dévoile dans et par la praxis sociale et la lutte des classes. C'est l'assemblage de tous les faits connus, et en dernière analyse produit par nous qu'il appelle totalité. in Lukács, Georg. Histoire et conscience de classe. Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1960. p.6."
wager on eventual reality:

In turn, when the artist creates his work, he seems to incorporate into it an invisible community, the spirit of a society in which the social substance, the 'mana' which holds the secret of our future existence, is crystallized. Perhaps he can do this because we will never know absolute joy. (Duvignaud, 1972:20)

The specificity of artistic creation is found in artistic practice, which takes place within the social context of daily life. Artistic expression is concerned with the present and does not represent eternal or past forms. This tight relationship between art and social existence, however, is not a plea for a type of realism in art. On the contrary, artistic practice is seen as autonomous and free of any tie to the political, economic or ideological. Moreover, the validity of a work of art is measured by its force of conviction, itself related to the message it expresses. Art is rarely the representation of social order but is rather, a permanent contestation of it. Each work is a new datum which is taken from the artist's experience, but also suggests a landscape unrealized until now. The imaginary, an intellectual construction, re-orders in its own manner an intellectual representation of social events. The artist creates his own landscape, but from a mental structure rooted in a collectivity.

For Duvignaud three characteristics define the creative imagination: first an unrealizable participation; second, a 'leap' from real experience to possible experience; and third, a human capacity to invent new relations and emotions. The imaginary competes with the essence of social groups and offers
a sense of total communication or total cohesion? "The work of art creates anew behind us an order which brings together the separated fragments of mankind." (Duvignaud, 1972:19)

Art transcends social divisions and reunites, through appropriate signs and symbols, a humanity which would remain otherwise divided. As anticipation of real experience, creative imagination is an existential attitude that captures the experience of mankind in its totality in order to foresee from present emotions to future ones. "We are as much what we have been as what we are able to imagine." (Duvignaud, 1972:149)

To say that art cannot be seen as a form of entertainment should occasion no surprise here. Duvignaud suggests that artistic creation is a form of incitement that encourages participation within society. He recognizes that such participation is possible only if the groups unfamiliar with such a form are introduced through education, especially through a proper sociology of art, to such an enlightened culture which would shake them out of their 'entertainment sleep'. The work of art is conceived of as a stage where future existence unfolds, and it may be the only place where such a future can exist. In many cases, it seems that Duvignaud understands art as being able to release tension, especially in times of radical changes, when social energy is channelled through the imaginary.

According to Duvignaud, all significant imaginative activity is a "communication from a distance" between two subjects. Its actuality is explained by the necessity to
communicate that characterizes mankind. Regardless of time or space, creative imagination transcends groups and classes in order to reach the individual. Here, it is important to stress the significance of rooting the imaginary in the thread of collective experience:

... every significant imagined action is a communication from a distance which is never reconciled to this distance. We say 'from a distance' because if men did not have to reach out to one another, separated by space and time, through the barriers created by groups and classes, they would not need to rely on signs any more than on the imaginary. (Duvignaud, 1972:52)

The imaginary is intersubjectively constituted. Nevertheless, in spite of its psychological connotation, the intersubjectivity of the imaginary is rooted in collective experience. In this sense the role of the artist is to establish a dialogue, a new communication, and to incite people to participate in the making of social reality.

The Sociology of Artistic Expression

Duvignaud suggests that a psychology of art cannot represent art adequately because of the biased way in which it distinguishes particularities from the totality. Only the sociology of art can achieve a comprehensive analysis. Further, a true sociology of art is not meant to reduce the individual to a collectivity, but rather to understand the place of the individual within the collectivity. A proper sociology of art concerned with the totality of social experience, must keep a
certain integrity and see that the dynamism of the imaginary is extended to the totality of social existence. Under such a sociology, any partial analysis is eliminated. Therefore, the sociology of art must be concerned with art as such and not with the arts, art institutions and others.

Duvignaud presents certain aesthetic ideologies or mystifications that must be questioned by a sociology of art concerned with creation rooted in collective existence. He denounces ideologies because they create beliefs which do not correspond to man's authentic existence. He discusses four myths - the essence of art, the primitive origin of the art, the submission of art to reality or 'nature', and the relation of art to religion - which veil the real purpose of a living practice of art which is to continue social dynamism. Therefore, artistic expression, a social experience, has to be perceived in its totality and not through its possible particularities as the different mystifications would try to imply.

The myth of the essence of art attributes creative imagination to an absolute mental function that transcends bodily conception - art as a pure ideal, a spiritual activity. Duvignaud argues that to attribute art to spiritual factors fails to comprehend that art arises from a concrete situation full of real meanings rooted in human experience. Therefore, in

*For example, in later years the advance of technology, radio, television, and cinema results in the expansion and vulgarization of art. The idea of a 'museum without walls' reinforces the belief that beauty can be experienced by everyone.
order to define a proper sociology of art, the work to be done is more complex than simply ascribing to art a spiritual function outside human experience. The specificity of art resides in its affinity with the thread of collective experience.

In his attack on the myth of the primitive origin of the arts, Duvignaud questions the notion of continuity in history. He dismisses the 'evolutionist' and 'historicist' tendencies in art theory which originated in the thought of Spencer, Comte, Durkheim, and Bergson. Duvignaud does not reject history, but more specifically its concept of perpetuation. He believes that history is made up of breaks because societies - being dynamic - do not progress continuously. Further, he denies the possibility of man, the universal and unique subject, as the central focus of such tendencies:

It is, finally, doubtful whether one can prove any real continuity between different societies which seem foreign to us now on account of their very antiquity. And it is highly unlikely that we will ever succeed in projecting ourselves to the other end of history which, after all remains ill-defined and only an extension of our present time. (Duvignaud, 1972:27-28)

Duvignaud stresses the importance of the present. History is an intellectual construction which is conceptualized from the present. Harmony in history can only be created through such conceptualization. Duvignaud's emphasis on the present challenges our nostalgia for the past: the past has to be recognized, but it is not something we should long for. The experience of the present is more pertinent because it is the
source of our creative anticipation. The past acts like a veil and does not stimulate individuals to participate in society. A proper sociology of art should be concerned with the present because it prolongs the path of the existing work of art.

The submission of art to reality or 'nature', the third myth under consideration, is characterized by the reduction of artistic creation to a mere function of the imitation of nature. This aesthetic mystification does not take into account that the nature we experience is already transposed by social and intellectual representation. The artist inverts it a second time. The artist presents us with a socialized nature; it is impossible to get a pure rendition of nature without a mediator:

What is this 'nature' or 'reality', if not the system of images which a group or a society constructs in order to mirror its mastery over the universe, if not sometimes the triumphant vision of a world completely organized by man's social instincts, and which the artist then transforms strictly according to his own individuality? (Duvignaud, 1972:31)

Mental structure, classification, and codification of nature or reality are key notions in Duvignaud's idea of sociality. Because man lives in groups, he has to appropriate the cosmos in the same manner in order to give an appearance of harmony. The artist functions within this system by enriching it with artistic signs and symbols that are also intellectual conceptualizations.

A last interpretation of art relates creation to religion; the sacred is emphasized as opposed to magic, and this contributes, with the mystifications examined above, to hinder
the elaboration of a proper living art practice. For example, in modern society, the belief in the sacred has taken a new dimension which hides the symptoms of a divided humanity (larger public, multiplicity of milieux, communication technologies). The artist has to find new justifications in order to explain the inconsistency and relativism of modern life. Only an absolute definition of his position is possible. In many cases, he acts like a man 'inspired', a representative on earth of a religious force who has to express sacro-saint themes.

According to Duvignaud, therefore, it is important to cover these mystifications about artistic practice. These ideologies tend to split the totality of experience, accentuating certain aspects, and thus mutilating experience. A living art practice, implanted in social experience, would not base its essence on such illusions, even if the individual needed to search for reasons, apologies or justifications in order to account for his artistic practice. Artistic expression is a specific activity which cannot be explained away by concepts of sacredness or primitiveness.
2. The Application of the Sociology of Art

In this chapter, the issue of defining a theoretical framework and tools of analysis, necessary to what Duvignaud believes to be a suitable sociology of art, will be considered. First, in search of his theoretical framework, Duvignaud looks upon the works of G. Lukács and his followers (Benjamin, Adorno, and Goldman), and of the Warburg School (Panofsky) as interpreted by P. Francastel. But, notwithstanding their notable attempts to root art within a social existence, he believes that they have failed to eliminate certain philosophical explanations. Second, in order to understand fully the totality of creative experience within the totality of collective experience, he proceeds to define some operative concepts. These serve as tools of analysis, and are meaningless unless they are set properly within a social context. They allow us to examine the various situations in which art can be identified as a component of different types of society.

G. Lukács and P. Francastel

From Lukács, Duvignaud retains the idea of establishing correlations between the totality of social experience and the vision of the individual who, through imaginary representation conceptualizes his period. Lukács had recourse to the notion of a world vision that unites the work of art, as a system where
feelings and emotions are experienced, along with collective feelings and emotions. Art is perceived as being as valid as any other activity of the community. Lucien Goldmann, a follower of Lukács, was inspired by this concept when he juxtaposed the literary world to a world vision:

...the idea of 'vision of the world' becomes a model of life and existence by uniting disparate artistic expressions in a common inspiration. In contrast to popular materialism, which superimposes arbitrary concepts on an already dogmatic and rigid interpretation of reality, this idea enables us to place a work of art in its existential, everyday human perspective. Similarly, we can juxtapose different 'visions of the world', thereby including a number of artists within the framework of a single era. (Duvignaud, 1972:38)

Duvignaud disagrees with the notion of world vision because of the internal cohesion needed in order to join the style of a work of art with a world vision. In addition, it is problematical that an individual be taken to represent an entire era. To assert that Leonardo da Vinci is the sole representative of the Renaissance is to limit the range of human experience. He reproaches Lukács for having idealized the work of art as a form of knowledge of the world - knowledge in the sense of the nineteenth century humanistic ideal. According to Duvignaud, artistic knowledge is only one of the possible directions that can be chosen by the human psyche. The notion of art as a dominant repository of knowledge is rejected.

Duvignaud accuses Lukács of having concealed the active part of art: the potential to anticipate the future. Lukács alleges that the work of art is a translation and reconstitution of themes prior to its existence. Duvignaud calls this pure
'academism', and refuses to acknowledge the a priori in art. The artist is never an academic, or maker of images, but a creator of anticipation originating from human reality. Lukács' attempt does not locate the work of art in the present. His endeavour to correlate art practice and social experience falls into the traps of philosophical reasoning. In other words, Lukács's effort might be perceived as another kind of mystification where art is a sort of universal and spiritual force; the world vision being a model of life.

The next effort that Duvignaud undertakes is to study the Warburg School, mostly the work of Erwin Panofsky (Art historian, 1892-1968) who has recognized that any form of intellectual representation is rooted in collective existence. He acknowledges the artistic capacity to stimulate social experience in groups or collectivities; in short, the potential to effect situations through communication. Lukács and his followers have underestimated this communicative aspect of art. For them the artist as a mere academician cannot be interested in communication.

Panofsky and Francastel have developed what Duvignaud designates as an 'archeology' of the fundamental structures of imaginary life. They have concentrated their effort on the genesis of the art object. Francastel has analysed the formation of mental structures, especially through his study of space in painting. He has shown that space is an intellectual representation, far from being an immediate response to daily
life, which has evolved through the years. In other words, reality is constructed and not immediately given. The painter conceptualizes his view of nature. Accordingly, Francastel believes that a proper sociology of art must be concerned with art as an intellectual speculation rooted in the real and simple elements of our living existence.

Francastel has endeavoured to show that artistic creation is an individual and collective action acting upon human experience. This action helps man to define himself in a world that he is trying to conquer; thus giving rise to the need for creating intellectual structures. Again, Francastel believes that a suitable and dynamic sociology of art must be concerned with the present. Francastel's attempt to integrate art and society supports Duvignaud's effort. Both are convinced of the totality of artistic and living experience and suggest a sociology of art that will take into account this totality.

Duvignaud describes the work of Francastel as being an important contribution to a 'Marxist' conception of the sociology of art. Francastel has illustrated Marx's notion of man's appropriation of nature (nature becomes socialized nature under human domination) in studying space. According to Duvignaud, Francastel has extended Marx's idea and given it a new meaning:

Space becomes a problem because through it man gains a social solidarity which is independent of that mystical intuition of reality which materialists claim exists. The origin and growth of creative activity are the same as those of social life, and social life rediscovers in the creative individual the principles and driving force
through which it is transformed. (Duvi
gnaud, 1972:45)

However, Duvi
gnaud's appra
sal of Franca
estel's work is not
without reservations. He reproves Franca
estel for having confined
his study to mental structures. He raises two criticisms: that
space is more pluralized than Franca
estel concedes; and that
Franca
estel adheres too closely to the separation of form from
content. Firstly, in privileging space in painting, Franca
estel
has ignored the existence of space in other records of creation:
in other words, he has failed to recognize its plurality. A
sociological analysis of space shows many more social
experiences of space and refutes the assumption of its relevance
in one aspect of social experience only. Further, this
relativity of living space that Duvi
gnaud proposes would include
not only its experience but its treatment as a sign where space
becomes a projection on possible experience. It should not be
forgotten that space as treated and thought by the artist
implies a second appropriation of human substance by a period of
history. It is important to attribute this appropriation to
proper social structures and to locate it in

the context of a continuous demand made by the whole
society, springing from the aggressive co-existence of
groups and communities within the framework of
collective life. (Duvi
gnaud, 1972:46)

Secondly, Duvi
gnaud fears that Franca
estel's approach to the
sociology of art can recreate the old distinction between form
and content. In limiting his study to the archeological side of
creation - the genealogy of mental structures - Franca
estel and
Panofsky fail to recognize the potential of the work of art
after its creation: i.e., the communicative aspect. Open signification and communication are primordial elements in Duvignaud's discourse if art is to be located within a living existence.

**Definition of Operative Concepts**

In order to explain the totality of artistic experience within the totality of collective existence, Duvignaud has designed five operative concepts: drama, the polemic sign, structures of different classifications, anomie, and the atypic. These concepts are tools of analysis that permit identification of the various situations and characteristics of human experience. However, these forms are meaningless unless they are grounded in the living society that is the canvas of all description. It is important to emphasize that the perpetual transformation of society is an underlying principle in Duvignaud's discourse. It is only through the living presence of society that all aspects of human existence take their meaning. Moreover, it is imperative to postulate an appropriate image of social creation in order to understand artistic creation.

Drama takes from psychology the notion of a concrete situation. It proposes to divide human experience in an ensemble of behaviours which might seem separated, yet are integral parts.

'Duvignaud takes the meaning of drama from Georges Politzer's 'Pondements de la psychologie'. *Revue de la psychologie concrète*, no 1, 1929.
of a totality in progress. It suggests that human experience is involved in a conflict, a struggle against an obstacle and that most of the 'actors' participate to define their own place in the collectivity. In the sociology of art, drama is a combination of behaviours, emotions, attitudes, ideologies, actions and creations which, for the creative individual, crystallizes the whole of society and places the genesis of a work of art within the complex of those contradictory forms which make up collective life. (Duvignaud, 1972:49)

The work of art becomes the expression of such a conflict. Each individual creator gives shape to collective experience by engaging his creation in the various contradictory forms of society. Dramatic experience is more a perception than a comprehension of the state of the collectivity. Thus, as in the case of Shakespeare, the unusual and individual factors that have influenced his writings can be explained:

...the poet's position in a society which was affected by real, if hardly perceptible, changes - the power-orientated ideologies of the bourgeois, the Latin and Italianizing education of artist, as well as his personal singularity as an artist, the relationship between psychological themes (which psychoanalysis can detect if it re-integrates them into the working of the whole) and the existing literary forms. (Duvignaud, 1972:49)

The first advantage of such a concept is that it avoids reducing the work to biography or vice versa, because the artistic activity is perceived as an attempt to exteriorise and to objectify the latent themes found in individual and social existence. Another advantage derives from locating the work of art in a living social constituency where the artist momentarily embodies society. It allows for the rejection of the idea of
subjective and objective viewpoints because drama covers, analytically, all aspects of creation. Furthermore, the separation between form and content is evicted; a division created by theorists unaware of the heterogeneity and universality of creative experience. Form is understood as a particular attempt of the imagination to discover the common origin of certain elements to which everyone can respond emotionally ('the genetic structures' of Francastel), and content as the imaginary attempt to create immediate meanings which refine a spontaneous mental response from an audience. (Duvignaud, 1972:50)

Another of Duvignaud's conceptual tools is the polemic sign which embodies aspects of total communication. The work of art, as a partial element designating the totality of experience is understood, more or less, as a coherent system of explicit activities directed towards real communication. The sign has a double activity: on one hand, the presupposition of an obstacle to overthrow, on the other, a real or imaginary attempt to overcome it. The idea of polemic, or intentions, suggests the nature of the obstacle confronted by the artist in creative activity. This obstacle varies according to different situations. It can be a reaction to a physiological reality which has more profound psychological implications (deafness in the case of Goya) - which results in an interruption of communication. It can also take the form of a conscious effort from the artist to use his means of expression in order to transcend his class (use of poetry by Jean Racine), or to proclaim the rise of individuality in a divided society by the creation of heroes (Julien Sorel, Frederick Moreau).
addition, this obstacle can be an obstacle in itself which refers to its transformation and sublimation by metaphysics: the attempt at non-communication, the absurd, solitude (Kafka).

Structures of different classifications constitute the third item of Duvignaud's conceptual scheme: the conjunction of the systems of cosmic classifications with the systems of social classifications. This concept introduces the idea of integration of mental and social systematization as a fundamental element of individual and collective experience. Durkheim said: "It is because men have established groups that they were able to group things." (Duvignaud, 1972:53) For Duvignaud, the effort to classify is a factor of social validity. Man needed to give order to his society; social categories were thus established on the basis of gender, labour, religion. As a result man felt the necessity to categorize things. Such classification of things becomes an attempt to socially recuperate the cosmos. Thus, a double activity of classification was constituted, which from then on allowed man to comprehend the cosmos and to master it.

The conjunction of cosmic and social classifications is often located in primitive societies and is an aspect of some developed societies. The necessity to classify in these cases acts as a derivative to writing in most developed countries; a means to survive. It is from this merging that art (as we know it) finds its origin in primitive societies. Art becomes a group of meanings bearing the two systems of classification and also carries a new significance created by the artist. However, the
different classifications and artistic signs meet within a same structure not because of their continuous thread in history, but because they share the same features - contrary to the explanation of evolutionist or primitivist points of view. Moreover, the aesthetic figures created by this junction have open meaning. This means that out of their original existential structure they become 'signifieds without signifiers' and they are infused with new meaning when industrial societies integrate and transform them in their own art.

The last two of Duvignaud's concepts, anomie and the atypic, are complementary, and privilege the comprehension of individual facts by sociology. The concept of anomie was established by Durkheim. Duvignaud gives us his interpretation:

The concept of anomie derives from this, for it refers to the overall state of disorders caused by the continuous process of change in the social structure. Whether such changes are sudden or gradual, whether they are spread over two or three centuries or occur in few decades, the important factor is that people, separated from the norms which until then controlled and ordered their desires, suddenly find themselves confronted with unrestricted aspirations. (Duvignaud, 1972:59)

According to Duvignaud, the scope of this concept is such that it enables us to understand phenomena we would be hard-pressed to explain without it. He believes that anomic periods are intense moments because they can be the recipients of imaginary activities unknown to other periods: the

2 Evolutionist and primitivist theories agree to say that societies contribute to the ordering of the natural world by giving themselves different classifications systems and artistic signs.
representation of crime in Elizabethan theatre properly illustrates the intensity of the relationship between the imaginary and the social. This is not to say that only these periods of disturbance are prolific in artistic activities; even during periods of harmony the imaginary can be fruitful. Yet, the greatest periods of artistic creation correspond to periods of changes and ruptures. Duvignaud implies that the imaginary is a tremendous positive activity, which by its invention of new forms and relations, can pull the individual out from a dissolving society.

The concept of the atypical is more limited. It makes sense only in the context of societies which legitimate and tolerate only one value system, whereby a social homogeneity is established (for example, certain archaic and early industrial societies). This concept has the advantage of explaining the attribution of artistic forms in individual existence. This encounter is necessary because it demonstrates how a style (personal and arbitrary interaction) alters common representation. The distinction between normal and non-normal behaviour has no place here.

Art in this context does not belong to the level of collective life where we find common ideas or a 'collective unconscious'. Rather, it involves the questioning of human relationship by an individual whose isolation has made him likely to evolve new forms of relationship and alternative social groupings.

(Duvignaud, 1972:63)

This concept helps to understand artistic expression in societies where art has no separate meaning and where religion,
magic or politics are used in order to represent symbolic elements. Nevertheless, these individual representations are as much creations of possible participation or anticipation.
3. The Role of Aesthetic Attitudes in the Imaginary and Collective Experience

It is important to restress Duvignaud's assertion that human relations, emotions and feelings are defined by each collective existence, and that the work of art is closely related to the intentions of an epoch, a group, an individual or a collectivity. In order to comprehend the creative imagination within such a structure, it is crucial to define it in relation to aesthetic attitudes that are explicit or implicit, and in relation to the function of art in specific types of society. As Duvignaud suggests, the sociology of artistic expression finds, here, its raison d'être.

Aesthetic attitudes are directions that have been circumscribed by intelligence in order to understand the role of the imaginary in its integration within a collective existence. Usually, an epoch will acknowledge only one possible attitude, when in reality the same period is characterized by a diversity of directions. In each society, it is possible to find a variety of these attitudes, with the exception of the most recent one, art for art's sake, a nineteenth century intellectual invention. It must be stressed that only in industrial societies do all attitudes co-exist.

Three elements can help to identify these attitudes: a stimulating factor, a will to group, and ideological
justifications. These creative directions are ideological justifications because they are related to the mental representations of artistic creation to which the artist adheres. They describe genuine situations as much for the artist as for his contemporaries. Yet they cannot be reduced to these partial representations because they are as much in relation with the imaginary as they transcend daily life in order to offer an eventual future. This introduces the effort to group that characterizes these directions. This grouping takes place because the attitudes propose a new order of aesthetic and social signs that suggests an hypothetical solidarity. This solidarity remains always a project (anticipation) which is never experienced by the actual society — an individual and collective expectation.

A key principle is that creative activities not only invent new forms but, at the same time, fashion sociality. These attitudes participate in the formation of social structures. This is where they derive their validity. Thus, they cannot be perceived as 'world visions' or psychological attitudes based on the affective. Duvignaud notes, here again, the importance of locating the imaginary within the thread of existence. He puts an emphasis on its existential vocation; the imaginary as a force of incitement and not of entertainment. However, there is a limitation to these attitudes, which in turn erodes the influence of artistic experience in a collectivity, as opposed to the influence of social experience. This limitation
originates from the fact that these directions are found in small numbers, mostly combined and exposed in most societies. They characterize the different vocations of art as attributed by man throughout history.

The first attitude under discussion is the aesthetic of total communion; it implies an immediate dialogue between an individual and the group. The artistic experience is shared and understood by all. In such situations, art, as we understand it, is nonexistent. The signified suggested by the creator is immediately filled with signifiers by the receptive group. Any foreign element that cannot be known by all is rejected. This attitude is mostly found in what we have named archaic or primitive societies, and in the first urban manifestations (urban societies which are in the process of growing out of a powerful rural civilization like in the case of ancient Greece and modern Japan).

Theatre, dance, festivals are the forms of expression privileged by these societies. Furthermore, it is essential to consider this attitude in its context. It would be easy to lose the meaning of this attitude if it is not properly set in time and space. Attempts were made by Nietzsche and Rousseau who tried to reanimate the sense of total communion, yet their effort is only reminiscent of this attitude.

In the Social Contract, Rousseau ponders over societies which are isolated from the rest of the world by a common belief or a religion.
The nostalgia of a lost communion emerges when fraternity becomes a forbidden dream. Essentially this attitude is a romantic one. It is found in the works of Europeans like Schiller, Goethe, Hoelderlin, Nietzsche (lost Greece), Hugo, Wagner (evocation of a legendary Middle Ages) and within the works of Japanese aesthetes preoccupied with the 'Great Past'. The frustration that these creators feel is a double nostalgia; on one hand, the longing for past traditions inherent in modern society, especially when they emerge, on the other the pathos of powerlessness vis-à-vis an effective intervention in social life. The principle of such a frustration reflects the atomization of human life in modern society. The artist attempts to overcome this in trying to reconcile a humanity divided in groups, classes, ideologies - creative activity represents his search for a lost unanimity. Yet, the reconciliation is impossible to realize because it is based on a myth (unanimity in primitive societies), which does not correspond to modern societies.

The sacred is the foundation of the next attitude. Here, sacred art and the sacred are confused. The artist is seen as the priest of the absolute - the representative of God on earth. His supernatural power is known and respected by all. Like all others, the attitude of sacredness is specific to certain societies. It occupies a limited space and time in artistic experience and cannot pretend to explain it in its totality.
Two distinctions characterize this attitude; on one hand, art which expresses religious feelings, and on the other, art influenced by sacred spirituality. In the first instance, the artist lets himself be fascinated by 'primordial forms', which in the meeting of human and non-human signs give birth to fantastic figures. From this fascination, creative experience is characterized by a non-human will to sacralization using figurative representation; the core of charismatic mental societies as in Ancient Egypt, and in the Inca Empire for example.

In the second instance, the artist proposes a religious passion by expressing his own consciousness which is represented by a well calculated humanization as in the case of Christian and Buddhist art. Here this attitude does not serve spirituality but interprets a sacred situation in societies where different religious hierarchies established in institutions and/or groups compete with other social hierarchies.

The direction labelled "sublimation of daily life" is an attitude corresponding to the dynamism of an ensemble of individuals linked together by a common interest; either caste, group, class. They share a common reflection upon society:

...the group is looking at itself in a mirror, and it uses the system of classification on which its economic activity is based (as in Holland), its equilibrium, its momentary security (Persia) to provide a means of exaltation, of contentment, of comfort, of consolidation and of confirmation, in order to support its way of life, its 'destiny'. (Duvignaud, 1972:76)
The ensuing deliberate illustration of daily life is a necessity for this group because it serves as an element of consolidation and of protection. It establishes a sense of security and of duration which is necessary to these groups particularly when they feel the threat of their decline. In spite of the existence of such an attitude in various types of societies, each group responds in the same manner, either by escaping in the spectacle they provide for themselves or, by extension of daily life to its possible magnification.

The art of reservations of closed doors takes form within a small circle of artists, priests, and educated men. Far from being the active group of the previous described attitude, these individuals are preoccupied by art of an esoteric nature which could satisfy their own entertainment needs. The art produced is often hermetic and has a tendency to reproduce itself. Further, the language used is understood only by its 'members' - an exclusivity of meanings belonging to the artist and a specific audience.

With the "'We clerics' or 'We artists' becoming 'We man'" (Duvignaud, 1972:78), we have a symptom of this attitude. For example, most of the pre-nineteenth century definitions of humanism have taken their origin from such a belief. Through the centuries, this attitude has been known to fascinate people by its esotericism and has been given an importance that is more apparent than real. Under this esoteric nature hides a system of protection which allows intellectuals to live in an enclosed
shelter, a 'reserve'. Like any mythical sect, these educated men are interested to preserve their refined values during periods of troubles (e.g. wars) or to maintain their esotericism during peaceful periods. Nevertheless, in spite of its nature of 'reserve' this attitude can be the centre of artistic fertility as in the case of the salons where Proust and other intellectuals met to discuss political events.

The next attitude, art as expenditure of wealth, is reserved to a specific milieu where artistic production is characterized by its superabundance expressed in an exalted manner. Oriented toward God or many gods the imaginary imposes an exchange (a giant potlatch) in which individuals are asked to participate within certain limits - by approval and applause. This is the case in Latin America where traces of this potlatch devoted to God are found. However, the sumptuousness of gifts is not only specific to godly offerings but also to another type of exchange found in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Characterized by its terrestrial delight, the art commissioned by the aristocracy is as much voluptuous and a part of a rivalry process (exaltation of prestige); either the wealth of conquest and looting is exposed, or some aristocratic attempt to dominate a town, or a nation. In modern societies, this expenditure of wealth takes form, yet with less emphasis on its religious and mystic aspect; universal exhibitions and some forms of contemporary cinema are most recent examples of this.
The opposition on ethical grounds to the traditional culture of society and to its established values has taken a certain importance in Europe during the infiltration of the modern economy. This aesthetic attitude is of importance for Duviqnaud because of its relation to the concept of anomie. Here, the imaginary is used to free social tensions and to offer possible solutions during times of intense social changes; either the passage from one type of society to another which succeed in time or the establishment of new set of values that does not annihilate the old ones. Far from being a form of literary rebellion or romantic anarchism this attitude is the instigator of intense creativity which proposes new human relations to dissolving society.

The theatre and novel are the cradle of the imaginary during these intense periods. Throughout his creative activity, the artist offers imaginary figures (Rameau's nephew or Julien Sorel) that are new signifieds yet without signifiers. It is important to realize that the artist's conception of an imaginary world is part of an eventual experience which does not have to be objectified. Julien Sorel, Robinson Crusoe, Hamlet and Faust were never realized as characters but became symbols. Thus, the 'literary space' created is the core of eventual actions, where the existential and real universe of emotions and lived experiences - possible or real - is constituted.

The last attitude, the doctrine of art for art's sake has taken different connotations from one period to another.
However, it has acquired its full meaning during the growth of industrial societies. The principle of art for art's sake is based on a sacrifice—the artist's commitment to creation. This attitude represents the will to detach one's self from all relations with public life. The artists who espouse such an aesthetic direction are believed not to deal with politics and history. Yet, this attitude is not loneliness for the sake of it, but a form of struggle against alienation. Political involvement is another aspect of it; for example, the Surrealists and the Russian revolutionary intellectuals after 1917 vowed themselves to art, but were also politically active.
4. Communication: Meanings and Contexts

To ascribe one universal function to art is inconceivable in Duvignaud's mind because of the diversity and contradictory nature of its functions. In order to understand the role of art in a social context, Duvignaud elaborates a typology of societies that integrates society and art to the same context. His typology is an operational construction rationalizing the explanation but not the experience itself. Further, it is a conceptual classification which groups together varying functions in distinctive societies with similar particularities. History is too concerned with filling the gap of discontinuities and ruptures to be interested in seeking the relations. In addition, the operative concepts described earlier here take their full meaning.

The Functions of Art

Duvignaud emphasizes that creative expression is alive and exciting, predominantly in epochs of change from one social type to another, as a result of war or conquest, change in politics, change in mode of production or the imposition of a new 'technique' on traditional society (the case of Third World countries). Yet an equal value on creative activity produced during calmer periods has to be acknowledged. They are two
experiences of the same research, but are located differently in relation to collective existence.

As described previously, primitive societies distinguish themselves by their secondary function of art - the search for total communication and a will to classify. The conception of art is tied to the conjunction of cosmic and social classifications and the principle of total communication and participation which gives to art a comprehensive significance within the totality of human existence. The plastic figures thus created, become the recipient of sociality.

In theocratic societies (Ancient Egypt, the Inca, Ancient Mexican and Middle Eastern civilizations), the symbolic expression is greater than in primitive societies. An accentuated hallucinatory value shades the already frightening world of the hereafter. In these societies, menacing figures are created in order for man to remember that the after-life world is more actual than the present. In spite of this fascination with death these cultures were rich in imaginative speculation; the hallucination about the hereafter being its motor. The function of art, here, is to intercede between society and a transcendental power which has constituted its own hierarchy.

Patriarchal societies are located in the middle of a transfer of values; from traditional classifications (mythic beliefs) to individual classifications (human content). Man becomes the focus of attention and a transfer of authority can be witnessed in the change from the god-king figure to the
father-owner-priest figure. The family becomes the centre of all activities on which society itself finds its foundation. Ulysses' character in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is an excellent example of this transfer of value; in spite of Ulysses' encounter with various deities, he returned to a human destiny by the end of the *Odyssey*.

The function of art in patriarchal society is to immobilize and to consolidate man in his human nature. These societies, ignorant of plastic and dramatic representations, use language as a principle of cohesion for the collectivity. Nowhere else has oral tradition ever taken such an importance. The *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* and, the Old Testament are vivid examples.

Within the city-state societies (Greek cities and Italian Trecento cities), a new definition of man is necessary. The sudden concentration of population affects man's existence. The gathering of men in an enclosed space gives rise to a new social form which sets a genuine kind of artistic expression unknown until then - the passage from myth to book. With the birth of the poetic space, of literature, and a plastic concern with space, art takes its full meaning. Until that period, Duvignaud asserts that works of art produced were no more than an ensemble of representations. Furthermore, a change occurs in the relationship between the sign and its meaning; from the cohesive nature of sign and signification of the mythic system, the sign of the symbolic system does not necessarily find a meaning.
For the first time, art has a genuine function because of its orientation to the imaginary; it constitutes an exploration of experience. Here, the imaginary, creator of sociality, takes its full meaning. Man discovers the possibility to create from living experience. Here, art contributes to the exaltation of communication and participation which became possible in the city. However, this emphasis upon communication (freedom and participation) will disappear at a later stage of the city. Communication is then replaced by a will to power as embodied in kingship or imperial sovereignty.

Contrary to the common opinion that assumes that the Middle Age is no more than a Dark Age period, it must be pointed out that feudal societies were rich in contradictions. The recognition of the multitude of possibilities within these societies challenges the concept of 'world vision' which favors one singular view. To describe feudal societies by their harmonious nature can only be illusory and imposed by modern theorists in search of continuity.

Never before has a society used the imaginary this systematically in order to create forms. Its various forms of artistic expression are a reflection of the brewing state of these societies. In no other type of society can we find such a challenge to all aspects - anticipation, participation, and communication - of the imaginary rooted in real life. However, the notion of art within these societies does not correspond to our idea of it because the individual who participates is not
totally involved.

Here, the function of art is multiple because of the rivalry of different and contradictory conditions. The multitude of interventions may be too various to be actually understood. Yet the rivalry is the principal motor of art; through it man gives order to things with possibilities that are not necessarily realizable — deferred victories or absolute defeats.

Three peculiarities shape the medieval imaginary which is transcribed into sculpture, architecture and theatre: the birth of a religious and mystical art imposed by the Church, which pretends to be universal, the mystical art of the 'trobar clus' representing interpersonal communication (exaltation of love in poetry), and the illustration of daily life (high in colour and sound) directed to all levels of population.

So far, all the societies which have been surveyed were similar in that the change of value they imposed on the previous societies is not total. With monarchic societies, radical mutations in economic life question every aspect of human existence, and are followed by a phenomenon of multiple ruptures represented in psychic life. Here, the phenomenon of anomie, the main characteristic of modern society, takes its full meaning.

In artistic creation, Duvignaud assumes that impacts and multiple contradictions are beneficial. Theatre is a privileged form of this period of ruptures. Murders and crimes found in Elizabethan theatre supposed different directions:

...new tendencies which are still individualized and apparently negative, and which were as much protest
against an order, as a nostalgic desire for relationship based on values not as yet known. (Duvignaud, 1972:119)

The first function of art is tied to the concept of anomie where psychic life is liberated and previous life and former culture are protested. The representation of crimes and murders in theatre is one aspect of this concern to unveil human nature in its totality. The introduction of nudity in painting (the case of Durer) is another manifestation of this desire; an affirmation of the terrestrial existence of the body so far denied. The second function is one of justification. The rise of royalty imposes centralization with the conspiracy of the growing administrative and commercial middle class; it asks for an art which can consolidate its power and establish a schema of unification and homogenization. The third function, art as confirmation, is a sequel of the second. Yet, this time, it is oriented more directly towards the rising middle class which tries to constitute itself as a social and independent entity. The English theater, The French moralists and political thinkers from Rousseau to Diderot express this middle class aspiration.

The last two functions, justification and confirmation, are also found in liberal societies. Another function should be added here which is identified with the dynamism of liberal societies. Instead of reflecting upon the state of things in these societies, the novelist (the novel being the privileged form) presents his astonishment at belonging to such a society where human relations are so diverse. Confronted by diverse possibilities of intervention in such a milieu, the artist
explores them. Characters like Julien Sorel; Rastignac and Moll Flanders are vivid examples of this.

Industrial societies are limited in location. Only societies that have a real industrial growth and where this development produces major modifications are considered. Taking this definition into consideration, only modern societies like the USSR, USA, Japan, and Europe belong here. Because of the technical development associated with these industrial societies, all forms and functions of art are possible. This advance of technology is important, along with the fact that technology continuously provokes changes which become the centre of human existence.

On one hand, through mechanical reproduction man has access to all works of art around the world (principle of the 'museum without walls'). However, the meaning of these objects is lost in this context: a new meaning is given by the context of the reception. On the other hand, with the rise of consumerism, the problem of communication appears to be essential to creativity. Art is granted to all instead of to a privileged circle; it allows everyone to participate.

Duvignaud suggests that the need for consumerism is a desire to participate:

One does not, however, discover how much this need to attend is above all a desire to participate, which at the same time accentuates all the emotions which belong to the individual's situation in society and also to integrate him into a wider human perspective. Two processes are involved: the first serves to enrich a framework of given experience through a creative identification with imagined characters, and the second
produces homogeneity, the fading away of distinctive features as a result of identifying with common stereotypes. (Duvignaud, 1972:126)

We are far from the common belief in media studies that consumerism stupefies more than generates activities. On the contrary, Duvignaud, echoing McLuhan, believes that consumption creates a sense of integration for the individual within society and a sense of intense communication (the technological means help to give meaning to the work of art).

This last observation is related to the work of art and the modification in its perception. The reference is made to the increasingly nebulous boundary between event and spectacle. The work of art, closer to daily life than ever, has the potential to confound the public. The world, as presented through the viewing of television, takes the form of a spectacle. This new perception of the event causes stupefaction from the public to its real and spectacular experience. This phenomenon is part of the social rooting of art in concrete life. The imaginary, immersed deeply in social existence is far from realizable because social stratification increases in modern society. Here, the imaginary is confronted by an obstacle greater than ever. In order to counteract the imposition of the banal and a common homogeneity, an authentic creation will have to search for new meanings.
Duvignaud has suggested earlier that a proper sociology of art should begin with the present artistic practice. Under the title *Art Today*, he discusses the development of modern art (1900 - 1968). He argues the impossibility of determining the function of art in industrial society because of the lack of distance: because of the immediacy of today's art practice, it is difficult to reflect comprehensively upon it. According to him, this difficulty has an advantage: freedom of creation which would be impossible if we knew the function of art. The imaginary is nurtured and kept alive.

The event and collage help to clarify the significance of artistic creation in the contemporary industrial world, but they do not define its function. This would be impossible: those actually living in society cannot be aware of the real functions exercised by the activities of that society. Ideologies clarify, to a certain extent, these functions, but this is to anticipate the explanation which only history at a later date can give. Fortunately for us, creativity in a living society does not completely explain itself to us. To be left in doubt is part of our freedom.

(Duvignaud, 1972: 141)

Industrial societies are characterized by the existence of various groups, classes, the intensity of social mobility, and the development of new communication techniques. Modern society has undergone many changes since the time it evolved from traditional preindustrial modes of living. The imaginary has felt the consequences of such a tumult and, as never before,
finds itself rooted in the thread of collective existence. The notion of art has been modified. It is no longer a charismatic and exclusive activity; yet the declaration of its death is premature. Due to a new and larger distribution system, art is now seen as a commodity which implies the weakening of human substance and poses success and wealth as new cultural problems for the artist. Furthermore, according to Duvignaud, there is no proof that the extension of the public has caused the lowering of the quality of art. On the contrary, he believes that new techniques of diffusion, the extension of the public, and the emphasis on certain stereotypes have created the appearance of new modes of expression relevant to modern societies. He dismisses the distinction between low and high art.

For the first time, within industrial societies, the meeting of all aesthetic attitudes and functions of art is possible. Furthermore, the change in collective perception of new media (cinema and television) has created a generalized dramatization of these facts. Two consequences are drawn from this alteration. On one hand, there is a negative result by which the spectator of television violence becomes unable to recognize and react to actual events. On the other hand, there is a positive effect by which the dramatization of event has drawn the work of art (as event) even closer to the historical event (rock stars are given the same attention and respect (generally speaking) as that traditionally directed towards statesmen).
This valorization of the event and the tight relationship of art to it has been felt in cinema (actors and actresses), visual arts (Pop Art and Op Art), the novel ('nouveau roman') and, theatre (happening). Daily life, invaded by the dramatic sign, becomes a spectacle. Yet, these signs are expressions of an action which is an attempt to represent events as manifestations of partial or impending liberty. Through cinema, the most meaningful form of expression of our times, elements never reached before are now represented.

This expansion of art into daily life takes another form in modern visual arts. Collage is a technique which juxtaposes reality and fiction in one form of expression. This technique originated during the nineteen thirties in painting, poetry, photography, and cinema. The Surrealists are believed to be the instigators of the juxtaposition of reality and fiction. The meeting of these two different entities creates a shock which is as full of creative energy as the meeting of cosmic and social classifications was in primitive societies. Here again, Duvignaud points to the generating power of elements confronting each other.
II. The Sociology of Art: Hauser's Interpretation
1. Fundamental Assumptions

Hauser's *The Sociology of Art* (1982)¹ is a comprehensive essay on the relationship between art and society. He is concerned with developing a proper sociology of art, one that emphasizes the intricate and paradoxical nature of the subject. The importance he accords to dialectic which aims at an exhaustive, holistic comprehension of things, calls for such an approach.² The theoretical structure of his book is based on Marxist principles, especially historical materialism, which he reinterprets according to his own convictions.

There is one peculiarity that gives Hauser's essay an especially original touch: his stress upon the communicational aspect of art. In this he is responding to the increasing concern with communication studies that has resulted since the 1950's. He is concerned with the growing influence of new means of expression (radio, television, film) in art practice which threaten the existence of more traditional modes (painting, sculpture, architecture, music).

¹For the purpose of our discussion, the English translation of *Soziologie der Kunst* will be referred to.

²Hauser believes that most phenomena take place in a dialectical manner: contradictory determinations and attitudes are essential factors to our existence. Thus, in order to fully understand social existence the contradictions need to be unveiled.
Hauser claims that art is the 'substratum of normative aesthetic behavior' (Hauser, 1982: 4) as long as it is related to the totality of our life experience. It is relevant to our existence as a vehicle of expression and as a medium of empathy for the whole person. Art must be able to embrace the totality of life experience and to translate its essential aspects into meaningful forms. An authentic aesthetic phenomenon is tied to human experience as a receptacle, where the creative and the perceiving subjects meet to communicate and participate in the ordering of existence.

'Totality of Life and Totality of Art'

The principle of the totality of life refers to man's actual relation of sense and being in which all his inclinations, tendencies, interests and endeavours take part in human actualization. Totality is found in two categories of human activity: in the complex nature of everyday life; and in the homogeneous forms of art. In both cases, the striving for spontaneity and immediacy is in constant opposition to the growing development of systematization, abstraction and generalization found in other human spheres (social, political and other). Human existence is constituted of facts, questions and difficulties that need to be meaningfully organized in order to give meaning to an otherwise chaotic life. Hauser suggests that the problem-solving aspect of our existence is meant to be
a better way to understand reality. Because our survival is dependent on our ability to solve problems, the accuracy of our judgment of the conditions of existence, and our evaluation of the problems posed, is of prime necessity in order to keep a unified existence.

Art and science, as intellectual structures share the same struggle for existence in coming to terms with reality. The solution of problems takes shape within their concern with mimesis (imitation of reality). In both cases, reality is transformed, stylized and idealized. They form an indissoluble configuration through which they participate in the formation of reality. Art, as a source of knowledge, completes and continues the works of science and locates the limits of its competence and territory. As with science, art derives its elements from life experience. However, the two distinguish themselves by the fact that art is specifically concerned with human activity while science is interested in more abstract phenomena.

Art, as an active force struggling to take possession of the world, always remains realist and activist. It uses the instrument of magic, ritual and propaganda, and is by no means the product of a purely contemplative attitude. Peace and harmony may be the product of art but are rarely its source. The rooting in human existence and the concern to alter life explain the realism of art. The common distinction made in art theory between naturalism and realism and the attendant debate over
which one is closer to reality is here insignificant. Art reflects reality and expresses its totality, which is found in every part of the work and not in the sum of its parts. So whatever modifications or truncations are made to the work of art, it remains total and unified.

Since the Renaissance artistic attitudes have been explained in terms of their immanence and autonomy. The separation of art from the totality of life was stressed even more during the romantic period when the principle of the flight from reality was given definitive form. Art became the centre of pleasure and enjoyment for those who lack such sensation in their life. With the principle of l'art pour l'art, art is pushed further from reality. As a sociohistorical phenomenon, this doctrine is the symptom of the progressive specialization and atomization of vital tasks.

According to Hauser, this principle is disappearing as the result of the emergence of sociology. The appearance of sociology represents a recent stage of development in the history of culture. It has the potential to break up the false autonomy of art that has prevailed since the Renaissance, and to integrate different intellectual attitudes within the totality of life. This integration is quite different from the one prior to the separation; nevertheless, life and culture would be

\[\text{It is pointless to distinguish between them because, at best, it is a question of degree. They are both part of a movement that rejects what is classical, formalistic and strictly stylized, and favours what is more freely unified and closer to real experience.}\]
meaningless if one was to ignore the role played by unity and totality of society in all human efforts.

Spontaneity and Convention

Hauser considers that a sociology of art which claims to be a true science, must revolve around the concept of spontaneity. He stresses the importance of the notion 'nothing will come of nothing' and that everything which exists has its roots in previous existence. Artistic activity, like any other act, cannot be explained by spontaneity itself. Artistic activity is a dialectical process formulated on the basis of two principles: spontaneity and causality.

But where everything is improvised, there is no 'history': this only starts when improvisations change into institutions and spontaneity functions within the limits of conventions. The first convention is the first constitution, the first assured possession of mankind, and the foundation of its future history. (Hauser, 1982:39)

The primacy of the concept of spontaneity originates and is interpreted by the resistance of its negative counterpart: convention. The dialectical process of artistic creation based upon these two principles reaches its full significance in the discussion of art as a form of 'language'. Yet, there is nothing universal about language, it is mostly a 'dialect'.

In other words, art is a form of communication which, in order to be understood, needs convention and schematization. Any art forms devoid of convention are uncommunicable. The most
significant element of convention resides in the fact that the forms of expression themselves shape partly the content of what is presented. As in thought formation, the dialectical nature of art dwells not only within the use of conventional forms to express oneself but within the source of their creation. As Hauser suggests, 'we only want to express what can be expressed'.

Social causality is the foundation of the grounding of artistic activity in human existence. However, the correlation between social forms and stylistic forms is not based on strict logic, but on a sense of a common denominator. This unity of outlook does not mean that a uniform spirit of a people or an age is thinkable. Rather, Hauser stresses the concept of correspondence as more appropriate. The connection between Versailles baroque and French absolutism or the Naturalist novel and the modern bourgeoisie are examples of this simultaneity of phenomena which is significant and informative. These encounters cannot be called either necessary or coincidental.

The meeting between artistic forms and social forms is not a necessity, it just happens that social changes occur that are followed more or less intensively by artistic changes. The reverse may be more difficult to assess. Hauser argues that "everything is not possible in every sociohistorical situation and under all possible social conditions". (Hauser, 1982:24) A social situation is an opportunity for an artistic activity to happen, not a necessary reason. Because societies are
stratified, the appearance of different art forms and stylistic trends varies from one to another according to the specific social order; certain seemingly obvious artistic solutions may be ignored altogether.

Sociology and Psychology

Hauser suggests that men are born social beings before they can be distinguished from one another. Their individual characteristics rise out of their relationship with others. Their reciprocal relation is not based upon a simple antithesis—confrontation of an individual with another one. As much as society is constituted not only by, but also in the individuals, the latter are conditioned by society from without and are inhibited by social principles within themselves. A social collective is, simultaneously, more than the sum of individuals and differs from them in a qualitative way. This totality gives to its components a new dimension which, in return, affects them. Individuals are not necessarily eliminated during the process; they keep their own integrity, yet, are enhanced by the new amalgamation. No one individual can be entirely the recipient of the totality, even if social forms are represented by specific individuals.

The actual relation of sociological and psychological motivation is based on total reciprocity, and essentially consist of the fact that a social modification of psychological invariables on one hand corresponds to a psychological differentiation of social constants on the other. Such a relationship excludes the
possibility of the continuation or the abolition of one order by the other. (Hauser, 1982:53)

Therefore, a one-sided perspective, either psychological or sociological, cannot account for an objective explanation of the complex correlation between society and individual. Because society is never completed - but becomes - it remains a system of relations which is constantly in the process of being constituted. The individual and the collective participate simultaneously in its definition. Men act upon the course of history, but, without being aware of how much they serve as an instrument of direction. Marx emphasizes this in an appropriate manner in The German Ideology when he says that 'Men make their history but they do not know they are making it'.

Social realities or rationales are constituted by individuals in order to give direction to an existence otherwise chaotic. Class consciousness and ideology are examples of such realities. Class consciousness arises with

the concurrence of spontaneous, individual attitudes which seem as though the same feelings of mutual solidarities and distance from the classes are awakened in all their representatives, all of whom seem intent on nothing but the success of their own class. (Hauser, 1982:60)

Yet these individuals who determine this social reality may not acknowledge or express exhaustively this class consciousness. This social construction has to be thought in terms of a common denominator with an emphasis on a collective force and, not as emanating from an single individual. However, in the strict sense of the word, only an individual possesses a consciousness.
Social rationales are constructions that are potentialities, not actualities. Historically constituted, they are constantly in movement and never fixed a priori. They exist as long as the individuals who formed them assert themselves within a class position. Obviously, all social rationales are formed sociologically rather than psychologically. The conscious/unconscious issue is raised in terms of a sociological context. In ideology, the standards that give a context of meaning to individuals are not manifest within the individual. The difference between ideology and class consciousness lies in the fact that the influence of ideology on individual will and thought is more obvious, and that ideology serves as an instrument to class struggle and class consciousness.

In artistic creation, the relation between individual and society is just as complex. More than in any other human activity social and extra-social factors are difficult to differentiate. The artist, product and producer of society, expresses emotions, feelings and ideas similar to the ones shared by the society he lives in. He acts and speaks on behalf of others. The individuality of the artist emerges during the accomplishment of the task he has assigned himself to complete; i.e. to solve and interpret, in his own manner, the historical and social conditions of his time. Even though during the course of history the principle of individuality (individualistic and anti-individualistic periods have been recognized in culture) has played a more or less important role in the elaboration of
artistic creation, the work of art, product of an individual, takes its significance against a specific social background.

The concept of style follows the premises attributed earlier to class consciousness. Like other social structures, a style "is neither a single, concrete thing nor a collective concept; it cannot be derived from characteristics of its exponents, either by additions or abstractions."

(Hauser, 1982:68) Style is a dynamic and dialectical concept that cannot be defined in terms of a single individual, or a single period. It is always changing according to the historical and social conditions of the time. The notions of ideal type or universality are inconceivable.

A style is the result of individual production in a given time, but which never materializes in the consciousness of its creator. The common stylistic characteristics of a period do not have to be consciously manifested in individual creation in order to be real. As much as social totality comes about not only as the result of the summation of individuals, but as the product of their interaction, the totality of the work of art rises with the differentiation of the details within the work itself: in dialectical and dynamic relationship of words, notes, or brush-strokes.
Art and Historicity

The historicity of art lies in its novel, unique and unrepeatable quality. Art is the product of experiments, changes and modifications; the phenomenon of change is nowhere else felt as intensively as in art, because the paradoxical nature of art lies in the fact that, as an historical phenomenon, it is always transitory. However, art has to renounce this transitory state in order to become an object of an immediate, evocative and microcosmic experience related to the totality of life.

Since every image of the past is oriented toward a consciousness of the present and we only see as much of art of the past as is visible from the present, the retrogressive force of the actual developmental tendency is no less powerful than the impulse which drives it forward. The new arises from the old, but the old is always changing in the light of the new and takes on features which were not visible at any former stage. (Hauser, 1982:76)

Art is an artificial, cultural product, historically conditioned; nothing is natural or organic about art. Works of art cannot escape contingency; their reproduction and their renaissance are limited by circumstances. Like societies, they are always in a state of becoming. Never completed, they take new meaning during their birth, apparent death and renaissance. They never disappear totally from human sight. It becomes clear that the true historical nature of art is not found in the work of art but in the actual artistic experience, which includes the production, renaissance and reception of art objects; thus rejecting the notion of the immutable nature of art. In other
words, art acquires meaning through its practice.

Because the totality of art is closely related to the totality of life, different attitudes or solutions toward the same object, event or problem are possible. Every subject discovers and interprets its own reality and cannot be contradicted by the representation created by another. There is no such thing as a correct or true representation. Validity in art differs from the one in science because the only valid form is the one discovered by a single subject. The aesthetic value of the work is found in the work itself, where this value has to be realized.

In different stylistic periods or generations, the similarities and continuities which seem to illustrate these epochs are art historical contructions that differ from reality. In actuality, if one aspect might hold together a stylistic period, it is a technical one. Otherwise, each artist follows his own path and inspiration. As much as the production is characterized by its diversity, a proper receptive aesthetic experience must respond to the same diversity. No singular interpretation is possible. The greater the artist is, the more significant the points of contact between artistic creation and historical conditions.
2. Interaction between art and society

The mutual relationship between art and society is based upon a mutual dependence. Art and society exist like two distinct realities, though not isolated. Their mutual relation is interactive and not dialectical. Antagonisms are found within each constituent, but not between the two. Their interaction rests upon simultaneity and reciprocity. Like body and soul, they are indivisible, yet, they share no common aim or meaning. They cannot contradict or correspond to each other; they cannot divide or unite. A proper sociology of art should consider the mutuality and contemporaneity of social and artistic effects, because as much as art influences society, the reverse influence determines the nature of the relationship more than the former. However, there is no doubt that art cannot exist without society, but we can imagine a society without art.

According to Hauser, a suitable sociology of art has to take into account the fact that only a method oriented toward interaction and cultural process can adequately study artistic creation. Artistic creation is the result of the interaction of mutually dependent variables. To reduce the analysis of art to one of these variables would be to ignore that "the result of every historical development is often a multifariously mediated by-product of forces at work in the process." (Hauser, 1982:97) Hauser emphasizes three variables: natural factors, generation
factors and cultural factors.  

Elements of Artistic Creation  

Discussion of history and society is possible only if based on the assumption that there exist extrahistorical conditions of existence. Nature, in spite of its ahistorical and asocial essence, is essential for the conception of history and society. It is the foundation upon which culture as superstructure resides. While culture is based upon natural conditions, nature does not produce culture but conditions it. The interaction between culture and nature resides in that which is natural and given as a construction of our intellect. The character of nature is conditioned by how we define it. In other words, though natural conditions are known to remain the same, their meaning changes: "they more or less historicize themselves." (Hauser, 1982:136)  

The generation factor can be seen as a transition between the natural and cultural factors. It is constituted of variable and invariable components. The invariable element is a natural fact which in itself has no historical meaning. Identity of age or community of age (same birth date) are not a genuine and significant bond. The importance of the generation factor originates in the various roles that members of a generation are  

1Only the cultural factors which are directly related to our discussion will be mentioned: the concepts of tradition and intelligentsia.
called to play. In other words, the concept of generation becomes relevant when social and cultural elements are attached to it. Its sociological structure is represented by a system of relationships which remains valid without its members having to account for their homogeneity (no sense of consciousness).

The cultural process is formed by generations which are characterized by change and interaction factors biologically and sociologically conditioned. No single historical element can account for one single generation. The dialectical nature of the cultural process lies in the cooperation and competition of all the bearers of culture within an historical moment. Moreover, the rhythm of succession of the generations makes the generation factor a principle of continuity otherwise nonexistent in the erratic course of history.

The essence of cultural factors resides in their emergence out of natural (physical and psychic) data and of social needs. Distinct from the natural elements, the cultural components have to be fulfilled; thoughtfully constituted, they need to develop and to be protected. They form the content of history, a substratum in which consciousness and will are expressed as principles of mobility and dynamism. Cultural factors participate with the natural elements in the formation of historical process. Yet, in spite of the mutability and freely chosen means of solving practical problems, it remains that the cultural factors transform themselves in fixed, autonomous and quasi-logical forms which claim to be timeless. Nonetheless, the
cultural factors are produced by free, more or less spontaneous subjects whose intellectual mobility is limited by material reality.

Every cultural process is characterized by a dialectical movement where progress and regression are at play. As in the totality of society, change is the foremost principle where continuous and discontinuous factors interact. The tension between tradition and innovation is mostly felt in art because:

- art in a stricter sense is 'language', remains more strongly attached to its particular form of expression, and makes more generous use of its collected store of means of communication than other forms of culture. Conservatism and conventionalism are essential characteristics of all 'linguistic' communication and thus of tradition in art. While the principle of continuity comes into play more here than elsewhere because for the significance of the medium, its influence diminishes because in the sphere of art, continuous progress in the sense of scientific or technological development is hardly the question. (Hauser, 1982: 148)

Tradition is perceived as an imperative without which communication and recognition are otherwise difficult. Tradition itself is not static; it takes a new meaning whenever confronted or used simultaneously with an innovation. The idea that a new form (in terms of tradition, it is mostly a matter of form rather than content) arises from nowhere is irrelevant. In most cases, the traditional conceptualization of an innovation is rejected or not acknowledged. The role of tradition acts upon the artist in two ways: on the one hand through his artistic formation, on the other as an innovator, he uses convention in order to communicate. His ability to master techniques is
two-fold; first, the learning of the tradition and second, the faculty to surpass it and create a new one.

Hauser supports the Marxist premise that the social consciousness of an individual is principally defined by his class situation which is determined by his wealth and his means. However, the artist cannot be categorized in terms of his class situation, because he has an affinity to a class rather than a commitment to it. The artist has ramified social roots, divided sympathies, and changing interest. It is significant that he is generally not faced with the alternatives of the Marxist two-class systems and so does not feel pressured to choose, with an "either, or" between capitalists and proletarians, but rather lays claim to a tertium datum. (Hauser, 1982:136)

The ambivalence of the artist's social position lies in his artistic production. It is conditioned on the one hand by the demands of a specific audience, whose interests and aspirations may differ from his, and on the other hand, by the artist's own class consciousness. It is difficult to foretell which interests the artist will decide to serve. However, no matter how far he distances himself from his class and for whatever reason, he never severs his link to it. Furthermore, the class situation of the artist is never static because, like society which continuously changes, the social position of the artist evolves, either more slowly or more rapidly than the changes occurring in society as a whole. However, the evolution of his position takes place during the course of history. Three agents partake in the formation of the social and artistic position of the artist: the
family, artistic education, and social tradition.

With the concept of the intelligentsia (prestige, genius and intellectual property are attached to this concept) Hauser promotes further the peculiarities of a cultural stratum. He suggests that a sociology preoccupied only with classes would not accept the presence of such a concept. However, by choosing to use this concept, Hauser meets certain obstacles in trying to define it. The concept revolves around two premises: intelligence and class.

On one hand, to be an artist does not necessarily mean that one is an intellectual. "The problematical relationship between the creative intelligentsia in general and the artist in particular points to a fundamental lack of clarity in the concept of intelligentsia." (Hauser, 1982:169) The intelligentsia is composed of professionals and higher civil servants, and possesses neither the traits of an institutional structure, community nor of a family. However, if the concept is applied to artists and writers, it would be necessary to make a distinction between creative and receptive intellectuals.

On the other hand, its class situation is not determined. There is a common belief that the intelligentsia is 'socially floating' (class originates from its supposed rootless social position). Yet, as much as any social subject, the intellectual belongs to a specific class and has more than one affiliation with others. The floating situation of the intelligentsia reflects the many-sided and complex relations of the
intellectual's dependence on various class interests and ideologies discussed earlier. Moreover, to assume that the intelligentsia is a critical body, is as much a myth as to suggest its potentiality as ideology maker. There is no doubt that criticism is part of the intelligentsia, yet, it is not a generalized tendency; it is mostly the mouthpiece of ideology.

Propaganda and Ideology

Each artistic period distinguishes itself by the different task it assigns to the artist. In each case, the purpose of art is to raise and to evoke emotions and simulations that stimulate the spectator to act (reaction or opposition). This evocation is more than an exchange of feeling and form from a productive subject to a receptive one, because the production of art is conditioned by the artist's servitude to a particular organisation more or less governed and extensive - ruler, government, party, state, church, etc. Therefore, the artist's task takes either the form of an explicit utterance or one of mere allusion.

In both cases, it is a question of bias; on one hand, in propaganda, the tactic is blatant and direct, on the other, in ideology, the attack is veiled and indirect. Propaganda is characterized by its conscious falsification and intentional manipulation of truth. Ideology identifies itself by its self-deception and its preservative nature, which is commonly
perceived as a concealment of truth. Moreover, the social and political effect of a work is more effective when its goal is hidden than when it is exposed. Art of a propagandistic nature distinguishes itself by the separation of its political message and its formal elements, while the political motifs and formal components are integrated in the work of art produced with an ideological bias. However, in both cases, their aesthetic value, artistic validity and suitability of the means of production are never questioned.

The legitimacy of tendentiousness in art is based not only on the constant involvement of artistic creativity in practice; it rests upon the fact that art never wants just to represent but always wants to persuade at the same time. It is never entirely expression, but always address as well. Rhetoric is one of its essential elements. The most simple and objective enunciation of art is already evocation, provocation, subjugation and often violence ... In his way there was always only an activist art and form from the end of the prehistoric period to l'art pour l'art, one which was only conditioned panegyrically, apologetically, and ideologically. (Hauser, 1982: 219)

The issue of tendentiousness in art has been discussed many times in sociological and aesthetic investigations. Yet, Marxism was the first approach to elaborate comprehensively on the subject. However, the ideological nature of art was often overlooked while its propagandistic nature was constantly referred to. Hauser undertakes to stress the importance of the concept of ideology in artistic activity. He believes that ideology is characterized by a sublimated and sophisticated essence, but at the same time, by a veiled propagandistic feature. He rejects the notion of a lie which has been tied to
ideology since the emergence of historical materialism - the liar does not think falsely, he only tries to deceive others. Here again, Hauser makes himself conspicuously different from traditional Marxism, which emphasizes the concept of 'false consciousness'.

The Marxist interpretation of the concept of ideology is based upon sociohistorical forces and leaves no place for psychological motives. The concept of ideology derives its essence from the conditions of social existence. The individual represents the society in which he is rooted whether he accepts or rejects it. One does not have to belong to a class in order to represent its ideology. The individual is the subject of ideology and does not participate in its conceptualisation. In spite of the social bias of historical materialism, the existence of an empirical psychological subject is recognized. The individual participates in the creation of historical process. Yet, he does it blindly. The subject knows nothing of the goal of his act because of the existence of a social distortion ('false consciousness' principle).

In Marxist thought, man is first and foremost a social being. Ideology is defined in terms of class stratification and determination. The individual is not free but always tied to his socioeconomic position. "In Hegel's terminology we could here speak of a 'cunning' of class reason, which asserts itself over

\[\text{The Marxist dictum, "they don't know that, but they do it" could be the motto of the whole doctrine of ideology.}\]

[Hauser, 1982, 231]
the heads of its representatives." (Hauser, 1982:231) The concept of class is based upon itself and develops according to its own logic and laws; the subjects cannot act upon it. In addition, in certain interpretations of the Marxist doctrine, ideology and class consciousness are reduced to one principle: the emphasis on social order over the individual one.

Hauser makes two essential observations while discussing ideology: on one hand the limits of knowing the influence of ideology upon us; on the other hand, the application of the principle of ideology to its own assumptions. He notes: "all thought is ideological even if ideological thinking is unconditionally erroneous, and correct thinking does not merely mean freedom from ideology." (Hauser, 1982:223) In the first instance, the critique of ideology must recognize the one-sidedness and the bias of thought without being able to eliminate it. The issue at stake is to find out the depth of the affection; how rooted is the ideology in our lives. Any correction or modification is as much an ideological construction as ideology itself. In the second instance, the critics of ideology have to recognize that they think ideologically themselves. A proper critic has to be conscious of the limitation of his discourse. 'A mode of thought is ideological because it is confined to a particular view' (Hauser, 1982:225) Thus, ideology is far from being a rigid formula, it modified itself according to various conditions.
In Hauser's definition of ideology the connection between the social and individual nature of man is based upon the dialectic of his existence; neither the sociological factors or the psychological elements dominate. Man finds himself in a constant tension between the two; on one hand, he creates ideology, on the other, he is affected by ideologies; thus, actual people are making ideologies on the basis of prior conditions. He stresses that subjects cannot create ideologies the way they would like them to be because they would turn to be mere speculative constructions or inventions. Furthermore, he asserts that ideology is actualized in every subject as opposed to class consciousness, which does not exist in every individual.

Hauser takes a step further from historical materialism when he asserts that not only economic motives but, class situation itself determines ideology. To stress the material basis of artistic creation and scientific theories is to forget that they are representations and interpretations of a sphere beyond the economic one. However negative it may sound, the concept of ideology in Hauser's *The Sociology of Art* is not totally a negative principle because it is only possible to understand the relation between art and society within the limits of ideology.

The wish for freedom from ideology is only a variant of the philosophical idea of redemption which is supposed to open to man access to a world of absolute and eternal values, a world that is beyond history, is beyond the super-art history - the relationship of the interpretation of historical phenomena with the practice
of actual aspirations - that there is no access to such a world for us, that ideology is not only error, disguise, and deception but at the same time a challenge, a desire, and a will, a view of the past as a reflex of the present with a view toward the future. (Hauser, 1982: 242)

The sociology of art is confronted with a delicate task when it studies the relationship between forms of society and art styles because a reduction of one component to the other would be a rather simplistic solution and false interpretation. The conjunction of a style and a form of society emerging at a given moment is only possible because of the existence of precise factors (social and stylistic) which give momentum to the meeting.

Hauser assumes that art is produced within a specific ideological and social moment, and that art interpretation is just as much conditioned by the same factors. The issue of relativism is raised, here, in relation to art interpretation. Is there any correct or false interpretation of art? As Hauser has suggested earlier, the idea of truth in art cannot be retained. Therefore, art history (or any other interpretation) is pragmatically and ideologically, as opposed to logically and empirically, conditioned. We perceive today's art and art of the past from our present point of view. The reoccurrence of styles or appraisal of past works of art are in tune with contemporary goals.
Social Effect of Art

Hauser stresses that only art that aims at a social order can be considered in terms of its social effects. The part that art plays in the formation of society might not be as apparent as the influence of society upon art; yet, as minimal as it can be, it is always perceptible. Its social effectiveness may take various directions, according to the historical conditions of a specific society. However, no matter how art reveals its social effect, either positively or negatively, critically or apologetically, it remains that art not only reflects reality but criticizes the society, thus forming it.

The function of art is not only concerned with opening the eyes of individuals, it has to help to prevent the closing of the eyes when they are confronted with difficult tasks. Art is normative and exemplary for society in its validation of humanistic ideals and norms, and in its consolidation of new social behaviours (attitudes, habits, morals) by making them acceptable. Two roles are attributed to art; on one hand, a revolutionary force in time of changes, on the other, a stabilizing effect that establishes harmony between heterogeneous social elements. It would be false to assume that only great works of art can influence society, the contrary seems to be the rule. Moreover, it would be wrong to think of the beneficial role of the artist only in time of peace.
Hauser rejects previous and on-going beliefs that art intoxicates man; a notion that was first initiated during the Greek period of classicism, especially since Plato's discourse on art. Since the Renaissance, the tendency to deny the domination of art over life has been growing, even if some attempts to reconcile them have occurred (e.g. alliance of naturalism with socialism). Furthermore, the more aesthetic Western culture becomes the more the intoxication of life by art is opposed. This rejection of art that characterizes the discourse of the iconoclast, shares, with the aesthete's point of view (predominance of art over life) about artistic activity, a common belief that art and social existence do not belong together, thus creating a social vacuum.

Since the Romantic period the tendency for artists and intellectuals to isolate themselves from society has increased. The principle of l'art pour l'art emphasizes the asocial character of the artist while it challenges any sociological interpretation because of its presumption that art can only exist and grow within its own parameters. Hauser suggests that this principle is a big challenge to any sociological analysis if proven to be true. However, he undertakes to prove its social nature.

According to Hauser, a work of art has two functions which are fulfilled equally; a self-sufficient form and a message. He claims that art cannot be only a mass of forms, but has to constitute meaningful communication as well. An authentic art
object always reaches beyond its aesthetic dimension. It is concerned with questions and answers rooted in social existence. Thus, art reflects reality but takes its distance from it in order to act upon it. An art object does not necessarily seek to be an homogeneous entity if it is the product or the producer of reality; homogeneity of form being part of the theory of l'art pour l'art. In addition, Hauser rejects the principle of autonomy of art as prescribed by this doctrine, and emphasizes the practical, moral and social functions of art.

The aim of artistic effort is apparently the total immediacy of content and form, the absolute merging of the thoughts and feelings to be communicated in the medium of communication. Nevertheless it remains a mark of what is artistic that form is not content and content is not form. The merging of the one principle with the other is nothing more than a figurative, metaphorical expression for their mutual accommodation.

(Hauser, 1982:320)

Hauser stresses the dialectical process (dialectic of aesthetic) that unites form and content; their indivisible nature - no work of art can be pure form or content - and the tension between them - a change in one means a change in the other. However, in spite of their correlation they remain separated entities. Their dialectical relationship is based on a paradox that emphasizes this mutuality, but at the same time stresses the importance of a formal element. A work of art, in order to be communicative presupposes a formal effectiveness. It is not a one-sided formalist perspective but it is suggested that all forms are not present at all times and that only certain forms are suitable in precise social and aesthetic
conditions. Furthermore, the primacy of content over form does not reduce the necessity of a formal element but suggests that only one form can express adequately such a content.

The answers to the problems of life which transcend art—questions about the meaning, value, and aim of human existence—and the path to their solution are not only inseparable from the formal criteria of artistic achievement they are often presupposed by the form itself. (Hauser, 1982:323)

Therefore, every work of art refutes the principle of l’art pour l’art because of its double ‘order’: an aesthetic value and a moral achievement. Every work of art is a humanistic message that represents a utopia, an ideal of life. However, the artist may not be aware of the practical effects of his art and he may not be consciously aiming at one. Not only aesthetic motives lie beyond artistic creation, but reasons beyond the sphere of art are potential impulses to create works of art. It might be more difficult to decipher the more or less explicit message lying outside of the aesthetic motives of certain fine arts (music, dance or painting) than it is to understand the clear sense of the discourse of literature (explicit form of utterance); nevertheless, every work of art refutes the principle of l’art pour l’art.

The common ground on which the meeting between the producer of art and his receptive public occurs is larger than the one of a particular class, ideology or political party. Just as the artist’s link to a specific class is never established, how is the receptive public attached to a particular position; unless the artist chooses to serve a specific situation. However, it is
impossible to assess the universality of art.
3. Historical Materialism

Hauser discusses the relevance of historical materialism as the theoretical framework par excellence for the sociology of art. As a non-orthodox Marxist theorist he develops his interpretation of historical materialism in order to explain the situation of cultural production (superstructure) within society. Rejecting the one-sided economic determinism, characteristic of an orthodox interpretation of historical materialism, Hauser undertakes to stress the dialectical correlation between infrastructure and superstructure:

The thesis not only that it is the infrastructure which determines the superstructure, but also that this takes part in the formation of the infrastructure, is thus not to be viewed in the light that a completed superstructure affects a completed infrastructure by way of modification and extension but rather that both develop and change hand in hand. Ideal forms change while the economic form changes, and this, too, changes to some extent according to the change in spiritual structures. (Hauser, 1982: 191)

According to Hauser, the only way to explain the superstructure/infrastructure relationship is from a dialectical viewpoint; otherwise the two factors are either seen as two independent variables, or the primacy of the infrastructure over the superstructure is assumed. He emphasizes the materiality of the superstructure and the spirituality of the infrastructure, and assumes that the notion of pure essence in both cases is impossible. The dialectic is subject to change in harmony with
the historical process which consists in the fluctuation of indivisible variables dependent upon one another.

Hauser's investigation starts with the principle that only 'historical' dialectic exists and that the historical process is 'dialectical', thus breaking the intellectual tendency to discuss materialism in terms of its historical or dialectical bias. Reaction and interaction, which take shape in the conflict of individual efforts, are the essence of the historical process; the forces at play are of a traditional and revolutionary order. However, to assume the dialectical relationship between superstructure and infrastructure does not resolve the problem of how the transition from one to the other occurs.

According to Hauser, the concept of mediation (system of intermediaries), which accounts for the transition in traditional Marxist perspective, is a fiction that tries to explain the tortuous and complex road from economic circumstances to spiritual forms. Hauser suggests that the notion of a leap (direct passage) can interpret adequately their relationship.

Yet, the concept of leap is to be used carefully in order to avoid the creation of another myth: the reduction of one order to another and/or the causal correlation between the two structures. Transformation in one does not necessarily mean an immediate modification in the other; it is a matter of simultaneity more than causality. If one assumes that the
transformation of social existence into art is evident and that the two phenomena differ in essence, and that the latter is not a customary replica of the former, the issue of the sociological significance of art within an art historical and sociohistorical process has to be examined.

In Hauser's opinion, the apparition of ideal forms is not only based upon the socioeconomic structure, but on their own immanent laws. The history of art does not only represent the material conditions of artistic production, but has to account for the formal development that is characterized by its 'history of form', individual spontaneity and social convention.

Of course it is conceded that material circumstances can hinder the assertion of certain ideal forms, but by no means that they are in a position to bring about the genesis of such forms or to determine their particular nature and the change of their structure. (Hauser, 1982:204)

Throughout his discussion of historical materialism, Hauser constantly reminds us of the weaknesses of an orthodox approach in respect to the relationship between art and society. Again, historical materialism fails to explain properly the recurrence or appeal of past phenomena such as Greek art. Opposed to historicity and timelessness which suggest the imperishable charm of 'the childhood of man', Hauser rejects such a naive interpretation and stresses that works of art do not absolutely lose their artistic value after their time of production is passed, and moreover, they cannot be appreciated and rediscovered by every period. They may reappear under certain circumstances: on one hand, when the socioeconomic,
artistic and politico-cultural fashions of a period are the same as the time of their original production; or, on the other hand, when traditions of certain technical and artistic methods or re-evaluation of aesthetic standards are carried by historical research or education.

Hauser raises a last failure of the historical materialist position which teaches that all art is historically conditioned. Historical materialism is a genetic theory that can expose the genesis of any social structure but when it comes time to discuss values, it makes nothing out of them. Hauser claims that artistic values do not have any sociological equivalent. He stresses the incommensurability of social and artistic values. However, the independence of these values, one from another, does not mean that artistic attitudes are free from social links but that in no instance can an artistic value be qualified in terms of political causes.
4. Dialectic

The notion of 'double-truth' in art and philosophy can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages. However, it is only with the writings of Hegel and Marx that the fundamental principle of dialectical thinking was established in Western philosophy: that contradictory determinations and attitudes are essential, not mutually exclusive. Contradictions are related and reveal their nature only through their antagonism. Hauser claims that since the establishment of dialectical thinking, of dialectical logic, the principle of noncontradiction has lost its primacy and validity. However, in spite of his recognition of the necessity of the dialectic, he has certain reservations about its universality. Yet, in stressing its limit, he acknowledges that unquestionably dialectic remains the most typical law of the historical process.

Principles of Dialectic

We live, work, struggle, produce and create art objects in a world where the interplay of opposing forces is a common denominator. In The Sociology of Art, Hauser emphasizes that existence is foremost constituted as a conflict-laden relationship between object and subject. The hope of all dialectical process is to overcome this obstacle: to overthrow
the resistance between opposite forces. However, the conflict of contradictions existing side by side as part of the same phenomenon is the main stimulus of existence. Therefore, the structure of existence based on a dialectical correlation takes the form of a dialogue—question and answer, tension and release—between the conflicting components at play: transformation of role and meaning of the conflicting forces and principles instead of their destruction.

For Hauser, dialectic is a twofold doctrine; the first step is a negation and the second step, Aufhebung (negation of negation) without which the first stage would remain mere negation. As much as history and thought need the negation in order to be set in motion, the concept of Aufhebung is the most fruitful and creative moment of the dialectical process. On one hand, as a decisive final act of the dialectical operation, it contains the substance of the logical or historical process. On the other hand, it means the substitution of a thing to a higher level. Moreover, the Aufhebung of a condition conveys the idea that elements of a previous stage remain alive in the new phase created while other elements dissolve and fade—constancy in change. The inherence of the past in the present is a vital aspect of the historical process without which its development would appear discontinuous.

The sense of Aufhebung of an 'old idea') into a topical one, from the actualization which an effete form undergoes as a result of the forces overtaking it, in short, from the functioning of conditions which resulted from their earlier function. The preserved 'idea' differs from the "old one" by hiding the gap between
past and present, the juncture of actuality with the antiquated. The process begins with the double nature of historical phenomena, continues with the dissolution of one form by the other, and finally leads to their merging rather in the sense of Marx's words that man, while 'affecting nature outside himself and changing it, changes his own nature at the same time'. (Hauser, 1982:364)

Tradition takes its full meaning through the concept of 'Aufhebung'. Threatened with extinction, traditions - the bond between past, present and future - have to defend themselves against discontinuities, which arise with the introduction of new elements. The conflict between tradition and the new forces give the historical processes its movement. The historicity of a phenomena is understood through this concept whereby elements, during their dissolution, have an ongoing effect within the new stage. Their actuality remains as long as they are alive; afterward it is our relationship to them that changes. However, the quintessence of dialectic is that Aufhebung functions without any one acknowledging it or wanting it - in the Marxist sense, "no one knows what everyone is doing".

Discarding Hegel's notion of totality, which consists of its pursuit and realization through the 'absolute spirit', Hauser presents totality as being more than the sum of its parts. The totality informs every part with a new meaning, something previously non-existent in any of the parts. An authentic work of art illustrates, more than philosophy, the totality because the juncture between the particular and the general eliminates the apparent conflict between them while maintaining it. Philosophy antagonizes the totality and the
particularity. However, the seeking of the totality should not endanger the significance of the particular. The particular and the general assume each other. In order to understand the whole, the place of the particular has to be determined. While investigating the totality of a phenomenon, the concepts of analysis and synthesis are relevant because they help to understand the notion of the particular and the general which will change through the various interpretations.

...the fact that the unified organization of the material at one's disposal and the formation of a total notion cannot be postponed until relevant facts have been investigated, collected, and ordered, primarily because the collection and ordering never ends, but also (and mainly) because we cannot start the analysis of a body of fact before there is a system of relationship and the assumption of a synthesis. However, the anticipated system demands continuous modification and revision to the extent that the previously unknown facts become visible and capable of investigation. (Hauser, 1982:368)

In other words, there is a tension that exists between what we know and what we want to know, which is the motor of every perception. As for example, in art, the process of cognition is constituted by the basic knowledge that the artist has a definite goal in order to arrive at its completeness, no matter how many detours he may take to achieve it.
The relevance of dialectic rests upon its essence as a pragmatic and theoretical process. As a methodological tool (Hegel), the validity of dialectic is undoubted, yet it is one suitable mode of analysis among others to find the truth. With the help of its investigation, reality can be explained, yet it overlooks the content of truth, or the political or moral values of the conclusions. As a mere formula, it cannot comprehend the totality of reality; only through its relation to history is it realized as an actual process. Furthermore, dialectic, as a speculative instrument cannot be applied automatically upon a phenomenon; its suitability depends on the presence of conflicts.

The application of the dialectical apparatus is thus conditioned by the real processes, but whether a process can be thought of dialectically depends on the presence of the corresponding conceptual apparatus. (Hauser, 1982:371)

The thought of a dialectic of nature is inconceivable and fictitious because nature is not a conflict-laden structure. Polarities (possessing of two contrasted principles/tendencies) are present, but they are far from being antagonistic forces (e.g. tradition and innovation). On the other hand, a dialectic of history, where all occurrences are pregnant with antagonistic forces, is possible. However, history is not always driven by dialectical principles; antimonies and antagonisms may be the most common events, yet they are not necessarily the most
prevalent factors.

In addition, it would be false to assert that history develops in a predictable and constant manner or achieves a definite goal; thus, Hauser rejects Marx's and Hegel's notion of discontinuity in history. Marx suggests that the notion of a new history lies in a classless society freed from capitalism, while for Hegel, the conquest of alienation of the world spirit signifies the end of history (creation of a void). According to Hauser, only a typology of the contradictions and their reconciliation can be drawn; however, the latter does not deny the significance of dialectic as a self-perpetuating operation.

Other false assumptions are made by Marxist practitioners about the dialectical movement of history. On one hand, it is a mistake to think of it as a spontaneous motion because a change only happens when a particular need affirms itself, and on the other, it is an error to consider its continuous character. The transition from one stage to another occurs through an unpremeditated leap (gap in the chain of mediations).

It is most unlikely that a dialectical movement can be produced twice in the same manner, even if a resemblance of social conditions is identified. Therefore, it is impossible to assume that the dialectical movement rises from a preconceived, repeatable formula. The problem of identity between concepts (mostly in Hegel - philosophy of identity) is another distortion which generates the tendency to overlook their interdependence - as in the case of object and subject, society and individual -
and reduce them to a common denominator: the differentiation being part of the realization of 'consciousness'.

With Marx, the ontological nature of dialectic was revealed through his notion that every dialectic is 'Realdialektik' and everything real is dialectic. He believed that dialectic was meant to carry out a process or to engage in direct activities. The foundation of dialectic in the concrete existence of human beings is the basis of the meeting between the ontological and methodological aspect of dialectic. Hauser assumes that both factors are decisive:

Dialectic, as an intersystematic process of thought and history which integrates the most diverse, even antithetical, factors and aspects of reality, proves that substratum of the rational activities also changes with thoughts, desires and actions and that history becomes what people make of it. It is always a question of an act of thought and not a mere method of thinking. (Hauser, 1982:373)

In Hauser's idea of dialectic, there is no doubt whatsoever that it contributes to circumscribe any phenomenon. However, what is problematical is its pretention to universality; its application to the whole of reality. Its methodological value is questionable because of the impossibility of perceiving and drawing a complete image of the world; what is really expressed is the will to grasp this totality. Its ontological counterpart which asserts the precedence of totality over partial elements might be properly justified because "the fact that the individual moments of all human attitudes point beyond themselves and are directed toward accomplishment, whether or not this can be achieved". (Hauser, 1982:425)
Yet the totality of relationships is still denied. The 'dialectical totality' of the orthodox Marxism which stresses that individual elements bear within themselves the whole, is only present in works of art where individual moment and unity are of the same nature. In Marxist theory, especially in dialectical materialism, the ideal of totality represents a utopian state of an existence where alienation, fragmentation, depersonalization, specialization (characteristics of capitalism) are overcome. Hauser does not go as far as to eliminate the philosophical aspect of totality because he recognizes the necessity and the function of philosophy in times of lost unity. What is under attack is the validity of the Marxist terminology which, in Hauser's mind, has fetishized and transformed certain terms into a mere formula; alienation, identity, totality, negation and Aufhebung.'

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'According to Hauser "Nothing remains completely secure in the linguistic acrobatics of the dialecticians intoxicated with Hegel's virtuosity except the fetishistic terminology itself, which revolved around the magical solutions of negation, Aufhebung, identity, alienation, and totality. There was and still is a "word-magic" at work which scorns to examine concepts whose usefulness counts as sacrosanct. The sluggish entity of words prevents thought from coming into contact with the facts." (Hauser, 1982:426)
The Dialectic of Aesthetics

In The Sociology of Art, Hauser endeavours to establish the specificity of art. On one hand, the art object originates from a particular social context, on the other, artistic codes and conventions determine its formation. The difficulty of interpreting a work of art resides in the paradoxical nature of art where antimonies mutually affect each other. All impulses, regardless of their antagonistic character, are entitled to recognition. It goes without saying that a dialectical relationship is found between the subject's will to and his means of expression. The work of art symbolizes adequately this dialectic because its completion does not rest upon the result of a power relationship where the will to expression wins over the means of expression, but rather a compromise between the two. A fundamental form of art is the recognition of the incompatible.

The paradoxical nature of art goes back essentially to the contradiction that it is on one hand mimesis, reflection of reality, reproduction of experience, the expression of feelings and spontaneous impulses, on the other the quintessence of artifacts, illusion, imaginary pictures, illusions and ideals. (Hauser, 1982:394)

As in no other intellectual construction, the various aspects of art, such as 'the genesis of art as an objective form, the structural formation of the work of art, the phases of artistic creation and the development of historical styles' (Hauser, 1982:390) are dialectical phenomena of the purest kind. Here, every distinct phase of the process - negation, ensemble
of conflicting forces and Aufhebung - remain discernible and influence each other. In other words, a true work of art keeps traces of its origin.

At first, the genesis of art reveals itself as an objective form wherein its dialectical nature is established through the mutual relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. It is true that the kind of objectivity associated with art differs from the one claimed by science. Nevertheless, in order to be effective and relevant, an art object cannot be reduced entirely to its subjective moment or, in the same manner, to its objective one. A proper reflection of reality is induced by the tension between the two instances.

Subjective inwardness and objective expression, depth of feeling and worldly breadth, spiritual immediacy and formal communication not only are indivisible in art but also achieve their mutual limitations. (Hauser, 1982:391)

Furthermore, the antagonistic forces at play in the subject itself need to be accentuated. On one hand, the art object is simultaneously an expression of the will to be in the world - acceptance of the rules of the game, an affirmation of existence and agreement over enduring human conditions; on the other hand, it constitutes a critique and rejection of it. At the same time, it is both a representation of the world as given to us, and a flight from reality. It is dialectical because of its capacity to reveal the facts and to transcend them at the same time.

In the strict sense it becomes dialectic not even as a result of this opposition but through the fact that, for all its steadfastness to the factual, it has something in view which transcends the factual, something new which has never existed before, completely
incommensurable, that on the other hand even its imaginary castles in the air are built from the bricks of reality. The dialectic of its being goes so far that its castles in the air have such a fantastic effect because they are built of such materials, and their realism amazes us only because conscious self-deception plays such a decisive role in the process. (Hauser, 1982:392)

The relationship between the art object and its creator is another product of dialectic. Marx has suggested that production creates an object for the subject while at the same time constituting a subject for the object. In art, this inverted relationship is illustrated by the concept that not only the art object is a creation of a producer, but the product fashions its creator as well. In other words, the creator is by no means a complete person at the start of a project but rather develops gradually through the process of creation.

Hegel's idea of a work of art is another prototype of the paradoxical nature of art. On one hand, the art object is the result of individual and social impulses; on the other the creator's ownership over his product is limited. In this last instance the property of the object is questioned because, in most cases, the producer has no idea of how the work acquires the form it bears, and answers to social and artistic questions posed are not necessarily found.

In artistic creation, the mutual correlation between the individual moments - the needs and their satisfaction, the will to expression and the means of expression, the contents of representation and the forms of depiction - is so tight that it is difficult to isolate one of them as the precondition of the
choice of motif or subject to be presented. In other words, because of the dialectical limitation of the elements, the ideal to be communicated is not a ready-made construction which arises before the artist already knows how he will say it. Furthermore, as long as the work is not completed, the dialectical energy between objective and subjective moments is in a constant state of flux.

The on-going process of artistic creation lies in the fact that the initial idea of a work of art is not the most determinant factor of its completion. It seems that an idea in art can only assert itself in conjunction with its realization. On its way to be a 'fait accompli', the art object goes through phases where all steps - especially the introduction of a new direction - determine ensuing ones. This operation is not dialectical but of an evolutionary nature. At every new phase, the old elements take a new meaning and the totality of the work is redefined through changes in structure resulting from this modification. Moreover, it is difficult to assert with certitude which moments are spontaneous or which are intentional. The conflict between conscious and unconscious decisions is as clear-cut as any other antagonistic correlation within the artistic process.

In art history, the concept of a collective style of an epoch is another prototype of dialectic. The different elements of the dialectic are found - antitheses, eliminations and Aufhebung - the latter being the motor of the operation. The
dialectic of style is only conceivable in terms of something in a 'state of 'becoming' - emphasis on the notion of continuous movement. A style acquires its meaning and relevance through its encounter with other moments and tendencies; particularly through a productive and lively present (principle of Aufhebung). In addition, a style is the result of the dialectical relationship between a new formal principle and a new technical achievement. In no instance is it possible to assert the establishment of one over the other because of the reciprocity between artistic forms and technical means, or to predict the next step of a style. This contingent nature is reinforced by the fact that a style never develops in a straight line.
5. The Production and Reception of Art

In *The Sociology of Art*, Häuser claims that the sociological quintessence of a work of art resides in the notion that its existence is corollary to its production and reception; the latter being anticipated by the former. The work of art gains its objective quality, its aesthetic reality through reception. An art object is more than expression and release of tension; it is essentially communication and information. Its success is situated under a necessity to be understood.

As an 'address and a discussion', the significance of the work changes through the hands of the producer and the recipient. The production of meaning, an on-going process, stresses the active participation of both creator and spectator, and emphasizes the actuality of the work of art while it rejects the passivity of the receiver and the premature death of the art object after its production.

As an utterance through which an artist communicates with a public, no work of art is a monologue; an ideal witness is always assumed. However, this imaginary spectator is deficient in giving the work of art its sociological significance. The private realm of an 'I' (producer), and a singular 'you' (receiver) is irrelevant; only through the interaction between an 'I' and a plural 'you' can an art object assume its social character.
A sense of community, of collectivity emerges through the process of production and reception of a work of art. The creative activity is as much based upon individual feelings and will to expression as it is influenced by social factors, the receptive subjects experience the works of art from their individual and social position. Not only the artist and its creation inform and alter each other through their formation, but the audience transforms itself through the experience of a work. The public of a concert is not the same before and after the performance.

However, in spite of the apparent tight correlation between the producer and its public, in no instance does an homogeneous audience exist. This is the case in high art, and popular or populist art. The artist may have in mind a particular class: yet, the chances that this may happen are quite low because the so-called audience for art is a mixed group and the boundaries between individual classes are fluid. No matter how large the public is, the experience of art remains an individualistic process, even when similarities of reaction are found in social groups.

The social nature of art rises from the notion that to be communication, a common formal language is sine qua non.

Language here means simply an instrument of communication, not only of logically discursive process of thought, but also of spontaneously discovered irrational signs and symbols, even if these are based upon practice and are tacitly agreed upon. (Hauser, 1982:518)

The establishment of art as a language is not only tied to its
social roots, especially the need for interaction, it is also
restrained by the use of grammar and stylistic principles. An
artist needs to use conventions in order to be understood, yet
spontaneous impulses are also required. No matter how an artist
tries to undermine the prevailing taste of his epoch, it is
always present in his art practice.

Therefore, the artist is constantly preoccupied with
finding the proper form of expression that will illustrate
adequately his experience, feelings and emotions. As opposed to
language and consciousness which come into being with the
necessity of intercourse with people, perhaps in art, for the
first time, the phenomenon of consciousness is objectified
before the development of an articulated language. Moreover,
this assertion about the linguistic formalization of art
clarifies a notion, mostly rejected by artists, that art itself
is an institution.

The most primitive and embryonic artistic idea is
already concerned with communication, and every
comprehensible communication presupposes for its part a
more or less developed system of signs which is the
common property of a social group of media. The media
are conditioned by the urge to communicate, the
communication by the means of expression available.
(Hauser, 1982:436)

The dialectical relationship between production and
reception rests upon the notion that reception is not an exact
reproduction of the creative process, but rather has its own
momentum and goal. Through the various and subsequent
interpretations that a work undergoes after its reception, not
only is its initial emotional elements and aesthetic meaning

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transformed, but the criteria of their social functions are also
dected. While it is assumed that reception is presupposed by
production, yet it is impossible to assert that the original
intent is the only one conceivable. An ensemble of social and
artistic forces, not intended initially, influence every
experience of art, thus allowing for various responses to
emerge.

Hauser emphasizes the importance of recognizing that just
as the production of art happens under certain aesthetic and
social circumstances, the reception of art is also conditioned
by certain aesthetic and social factors. The apparent simplistic
relation between production and reception is only illusory
because a series of mediators - art galleries, art criticism,
libraries, museums, art trade - are needed to initiate the
recipient to the language of the artist. The assumption of a
common language between artist and public is not immediately
given. The traditional and new language of art has to be
constantly interpreted, therefore modifying the experience of
the work itself and stressing the complex nature of its
completion.

In other words, the work of art that we experience is
already mediated. Its interpretation may be formulated either
through technical means or with the help of a critic, teacher or
interpreter. In the first case, the recipient feels more
alienated from the art object because, through mechanical means
of reproduction, the work loses its aura and uniqueness. In the
second case, while the recipient may still feel alienated from the work, the art specialists may increase his involvement in the completion of the work. Only in rare cases, can a work be received without mediation. In most instances only a connoisseur can appreciate art without further intervention. In popular art, the relation between production and reception is more immediate because in most cases the artist and his public belong to the same social stratum.

In addition, Hauser promotes further the contingency of the mediation by assuming that not only is interpretation a necessity, but no reception - and as a matter of fact no production - can take place without an appropriate institution. He emphasizes that the courts, salons, art trades, academies and schools, museums and art galleries, theaters, concert halls, artists' associations, prove once more that the receptive and productive experience of art is a social process. At the same time, it demystifies the notion that we may have about the relatively simplistic nature of communication processes. An unmediated exchange between a speaker and a listener is impossible because there is always something between them, if nothing other than the language itself.

Hauser claims that a public is not constituted but 'becomes' one under certain circumstances. He stresses both that works of art are intended not only for connoisseurs, and that one does not have to be a specialist in order to reconstruct and complete the creative process, or to have a normative
relationship to art. Art becomes a need, a task.

Art is, however, not first and foremost for artists but for laymen, for people who at first have nothing to do with it even if they eventually learn to have a great deal to do with it. It should be within reach if people have a need for it, but it cannot be forced upon anyone. It is neither a duty nor a virtue to love art, but a test of strength and a triumph. (Hauser, 1982:460) However, Hauser assumes that art can only be perceived by one who can demonstrate an ability to complete the work of art; one who has the discipline of thought - sensibility and sense of quality. Nevertheless, in spite of the apparent irrational character of these qualities, a certain training and reasoning is needed in order to understand and appreciate conventions and traditions. The interpretation of art is not a simple operation, and misunderstanding and understanding are a normal form of reaction. Any reading of art objects of the past is subject to this issue. In these cases, it is important to take into account these basic questions: "for whom? and in what sort of context?". (Hauser, 1982:526)

The appropriate interpretation of the meaning content of works of art is a question of intelligence, maturity, experience of life, and the proper assessment of problems of existence, social points of view and humanitarian problems. The ability to judge formal aesthetic values is a question of feeling for quality - and the sensibility which underlies it. The two aspects and abilities are completely distinguishable, but they are by no means independent. There exist between them an interdependence and reciprocity, but they cannot be reduced to the same principle. (Hauser, 1982:474)

In other words, Hauser suggests that art is intended for practical people who have an aesthetic sense and a feeling for quality: this closes the gap between art and life and stresses
its humanistic nature. The problems of the relation between art and life rest upon the concept that love and understanding of art is a matter of art revolving around life and not the converse. The function of art in this context is twofold: on one hand, the producer experiences art as an articulation and definition of chaotic mental states; on the other, the receiver perceives it as a means of catharsis, a better way of understanding himself and the world, and a proper guide to a meaningful life.

Again "no work of art exists purely for our own pleasure." (Hauser, 1982:440) It is misleading to presuppose that an authentic work of art can only be entertaining and hedonistic, when in actuality its reception is a difficult task. Not only does the reception demand a certain accuracy, but the recipient has to confront the difficulty of sorting what is good from what is inferior in everyday production.

The enjoyment and completion of a work of art cannot be attached to a monetary value. Hauser affirms that art transcends the market and cannot be reduced to the principle of commodity:

Of course a work of art does not belong to the person who buys the canvas on which it is painted. Anyone who appreciates a painting with understanding, with a feeling for its quality, and with insight into its structure can possess it more completely than the purchaser who puts it into his collection as a new acquisition. (Hauser, 1982:541)

It is clear that, for Hauser, a work of art is an intellectual experience that cannot allow itself to be measured in terms of money. With the overemphasis on the monetary value
of present-day art, Hauser questions whether it is still possible to find pleasure in art at all.
6. Art and Cultural Stratification

It becomes more and more evident toward the end of The Sociology of Art that Hauser's discussion of art and its social context is far more liberal and humanistic than any orthodox Marxist perspective can ever pretend to be. In this discussion, he establishes the idea that a cultural stratum is a more appropriate concept than the one of class with its rigid properties. Yet he recognizes that the category of cultural stratum is not a fundamental form of organization:

However, to the extent that - specially in the sociology of art and culture - the economic and social community of interests proves an insufficient motive for integration, so the cultural factors - with the corresponding reputation and the intellectual influence associated with them - acquire more and more significance. (Hauser, 1982:547)

The use of this open category allows Hauser to adequately frame the artist's position as well as the situation of his public. In no instances, is it possible to discuss the direct relation between a class and a specific artistic activity, because Hauser assumes the mobility of the intelligentsia - the principle of the 'free floating intelligence'; social privileges and artistic abilities are not the same as one another. Moreover, as much as the artist wants to create for his peers, there is no certainty about who will receive his product. However, the artist never produces art for "mankind", but always for a specific group or class.
Hauser implies that "national spirits" or "spirits of the age" are unthinkable concepts because every society has as many different sorts of art as it has cultural strata. In the present state of cultural development, Hauser distinguishes what he calls three "authoritative strata of culture": folk-art, which is threatening to disappear, if indeed it has not already been extinguished in Western civilization; art of the cultural elite, which has been deprived of its exclusive dominance since the nineteenth century; and popular art, which has been transformed the in mass art which seems to be prevailing. These forms of art are historical and cultural categories that emerge and change according to the social conditions of the time.

They are ideal types, contingent upon historical conditions, which do not exist as pure forms. They influence each other in many aspects; folk-art and popular art borrow from high art, while the latter includes elements of the former. This correlation between the various arts reinforces the concept, discussed earlier, of the different attitudes and reactions of a public vis-à-vis the same event. The difficulty of the notion of an homogeneous public is the result of a work of art always being received by an individual. In order to understand properly the multiple connections between two forms of art themselves and their relation to their public, only a cross section analysis is possible; a longitudinal interpretation of cultural strata would overlook the complex nature of art.
Art of the Cultural Elite

Hauser's position on art lies within the realm of artistic activities supported by the cultural elite. However, it has to be conceded that his position is contingent upon the historical circumstances of our time where art of the cultural elite is the most enhancing experience compared to the anti-cultural feature of popular art. It has been proven by modern research that folk songs were mostly 'art songs in the mouth of the people', thus suggesting that works of high, great or authentic art do not originate only at the highest level. Yet, art of the cultural elite seems to be the only one which can enhance human experience.

The art of the cultured is a forum where discussion of life's problems and directions are canvassed. The inadequacies of folk-art and the banal entertainment characteristic of popular art can, in no instance, be as satisfying. Hauser goes so far as to declare that only one art is possible and suggests that non-art can be its unique counterpart.

Whoever knows the emotional shock which is bound to the experience of a true work of art will not be taken in by the cheap effects employed by popular art. Indeed, the more one feels the former experience to be threatened, the more one inclines to the view that there is only one art, with unalterable criteria, which if diluted, leads to non art. (Hauser, 1982:554)

The art of the cultural elite is definitively the richest artistic experience according to Hauser. The works of art created within this category revolve around 'la condition
humaine'; they have the potential to change our lives. Immanent principles are the driving force behind their existence. They ask pertinent questions that permit us to better understand our surroundings because they are concerned with giving meaning to our existence; their comprehension becomes a moral and intellectual test. Yet they can be pleasurable. Because of their pretension to revolve around the human condition they should be able to reach anyone who is willing to decipher their message.

The works of art produced are characterized by their complexity: a centre of antagonism, of conflict, where the resolution of continuous and discontinuous development takes place. The notion of simplicity, and of a common and naive sense of art is an Enlightenment invention that tried to democratize and popularize art to the detriment of its real significance. The art of the cultural elite distinguished itself by the richer variety of types than the artistic products of lower strata. The real works of art are heterogeneous in their artistic effect; they are stylistically advanced and often unpopular. They rely on their traditions, nevertheless they need progressive elements in order to evolve. Another feature of high art is its appeal to an individual reader, listener or spectator even if it is cast within a specific social stratum. "Folk-art in contrast only expresses spiritual feelings which are common property or which can become common property." (Hauser, 1982:573)
Without doubt, everybody has a vague idea about what is meant by folk-art. However, Hauser suggests that in many cases our notion of folk-art is based upon misconceptions. In no instance, is it possible to discuss the equivalence of folk-art to peasant or provincial art, or to assume the possibility of a folk soul. The latter originates from Romanticism which has deprived folk-art of its real identity and created a myth. The primitive communal practice of folk-art lies in the distinction between the producer and the consumer which is not as clear-cut as in other forms of art. In all other forms of art, an individual is the source of the artistic activity, and the concept of class or group producer has to be dismissed.

Another error is made when folk-art is looked upon as a natural phenomenon. In reality, there is nothing natural about it; it is bound by time and history and arises from cultural needs. Furthermore, Hauser assumes that the existence of folk-art is contingent upon high art. "Folk-art is mainly only a copy of high art, and the value it creates stands in proper relationship to the loss of artistic quality which the prototypes suffer in the process." (Hauser, 1982:563) Therefore the concepts of folk art as naive, completely individual, without guiding principles or critical approach, must be questioned. However, it is possible to assert that folk activities are taking place without the people being conscious...
of them. They create art without being aware that they are producing something which goes beyond their daily life routine.

It seems that folk-art creation lies in the hands of dilettanti who borrow elements from high art and give them another meaning without having a sense of originality. As opposed to high art, they are never interested or preoccupied by formal problems. The folk-art people do not know what art is, and do not have the ability to differentiate between good or bad taste. Their creation is governed by something other than taste, yet it is difficult to discern the qualities a work of high art must have in order to be adopted and varied by the folk artist. Nevertheless, this does not mean that their art is inferior; what is lacking are "the abilities which are inspired by a higher power and intelligence." (Hauser, 1982:570-571)

The appropriation, transformation, and popularization of high art through folk-art may seem to be a menace to the integrity of high art. Yet, folk-art takes great examples from works of high art while popular art dilutes and corrupts them: folk-art remains faithful to the original intentions. In addition, the relation between high art and folk-art takes place in a form of a double exchange where the former may borrow motifs of the latter for the sake of originality which is, in reality a recuperation of an idea which was previously its own.
Popular Art

Folk-art and popular art are contingent concepts because they both originate from high art. However, their contingency is limited to their point of origin. While they both transform high art according to their needs, it is an error to assume that popular art replaces the subdued folk-art. Popular art is a product of the "restless sensation-hungry urban form of life" (Hauser, 1982:580) - ideologically associated to petit and middle bourgeois taste - which has to be entertained continuously in order to fight boredom. Art becomes a habit wherein the creation and satisfaction of a need are the main factors of its existence. The compulsive and passionate habits to read novels, see films, play radio full blast are only recognized when the need is not satisfied.

The 'debased' nature of popular art does not lie in the fact that this art is entertaining and appealing. Nevertheless, Hauser claims that entertainment and relaxation are a practical necessity, while pure art, even if it represents self-fulfillment for many people, is not.

Entertainment, relaxation, pointless, even capricious, play are indispensable conditions of life; they belong psychologically and physiologically to the preservation and renewal of vital forces and to the stimulation and enhancement of flagging activity. (Hauser, 1982:581)

Exertion and relaxation are compatible: artists like Molière, Cervantes and Mozart were eager to amuse as much as to offer quality. Therefore, the degrading of quality in popular art does not stem from its entertaining feature, but lies in the
readiness of the artist to offer a product of a lower quality, regardless of his abilities, "in order to achieve success." (Hauser, 1982:581)

Another misconception that Hauser rejects is the one put forward by Hannah Arendt, which suggests that only popular art can be interpreted in economic terms; i.e. as goods to be consumed. Hauser refutes this argument because, in the industrial-commercial era, every form of art is consumed as goods. However, there is a difference between the role of the market and trade in high art and popular consumption; while it is veiled in the former, it is more blatant in the latter. The commercial character of popular art is emphasized and revealed through its blunt expediency. It is mostly interested in creating a kind of 'fantasy island' where one's problems are annihilated.

Instead of producing desires of action which high art motivates, popular art has an anesthetic effect that causes a sense of self-satisfaction and passivity. However, not only the underprivileged (culturally and economically) are inspired by this escape art in order to avoid duties and responsibilities.

The fear that conditions this sort of attempt at escape inspires not only the classes which are threatened from above but those which are threatened from below as well. The ruling middle class - with the exception of those parts of its intelligentsia which are uprooted regards the future with just the same anxiety as the lower classes they dominate. It is one widespread nature of this fear which explains the unusual extent and the irreducible mixture of the audience which is interested in popular art. It is patronized because of the anesthetic effect which emanates from it in all directions. (Hauser, 1982:582-583)
The public of popular art is an undemanding one. It can be said that they determine artistic creations by nonartistic viewpoints. They do not react aesthetically and they cannot judge between what is good or bad. Their response originates from the easiness or uneasiness they feel vis-à-vis a work of art that may reflect, or not reflect their feelings, emotions, hopes and fears. Yet, it is impossible to state unequivocally that these people get what they want—popular art being a response to a demand—or that they are trained to be satisfied by what is given to them.

Popular art is not completely a manipulation of taste and does not correspond to a spontaneous need. The difference which exists between high art and popular art is that high art exceeds every wish and expectation, while popular art does not. Furthermore, popular art has a public among the intelligentsia—a more demanding, critically and aesthetically oriented audience (an audience which, for example, could praise Charlie Chaplin).

Therefore, popular art can appeal as much to a higher stratum while, in some cases, high art may be attractive to lower strata. The boundaries between the different arts are fluid and constantly shifting. The distance between high art and popular art is immeasurable, yet they are not completely walled off from each other. The question which needs to be raised is whether popular art is an art form or not. According to Hauser, popular art cannot be dismissed as an 'art' because of its use of formulas which are often used in more successful art, e.g. the
The question of whether it is "art" at all is pointless. If we can establish the principle - vis-à-vis the problematical artistic efforts of the current avant-garde - that art is what counts as art, then we must show the same tolerance toward the less demanding forms of popular art... However strongly we may deny that we can judge popular art - which may serve merely for entertainment and diversion - by the same criteria as we can the art which demands for its proper understanding a feeling for quality, sensibility, maturity, and seriousness, we must still insist that even the most modest form of sensually concrete reflection of reality - which in its effect, even if not its origin, is autonomous and immanent - contains something of the special quality which distinguishes and sets off all art from the rest of the world. (Hauser, 1982:585)

Hauser assumes that the problematical issue of popular culture is caused by the lowering of standards of quality, especially in the modern period where rubbish and kitsch objects are produced in a more skillful manner. An attempt and a belief in the possibilities of raising the standards of quality would be more appropriate. A true popularization of art means that the lower strata are given the means to understand more demanding art forms and not that art has to descend to a level of stupidity. There is always a danger, a problem of misinterpretation, when high art is popularized (e.g. through distribution), even if the creator wanted it.
Mass Art

Hauser establishes his investigation of art as one that is concerned with artistic creation as an intellectual and spiritual activity. His notion of the sociology of art does not allow space for a preoccupation with statistical data - e.g. the number of books read during a certain period. Mass art which originates from popular art - the transformation which place during the last half of the nineteenth century - is approached in the same spirit.

The democratization of culture has caused the increasing appeal for mass art objects - their colossal distribution and cheapness - which, with the lessening of educational criteria for the enjoyment of art, make this art form more accessible to a larger audience. Each time there is an expansion in the audience, there is a lowering in the level of taste. The same phenomenon happened in the eighteenth century during the transition between the courtly-aristocratic art and the end of the Rococo and the bourgeois culture of the Enlightenment. However, the improvement of the ways and means of mass art is not related to the disappearance of economic exploitation, or the democratization of culture. The industrialization and democratization of art, which favored repetitions of motifs and formulas, has narrowed to a minimum the potential of new talent; a new and better taste is possible if invention of new forms and relations is again allowed.
Works of mass art are highly standardized: clichés, formulas and conventions are determining factors. This use of prepared formulas facilitates their manipulation and their reproduction. Moreover, the normalization of patterns and the ready-made questions and solutions have a leveling effect on the public. The most well-known products of mass art are the best-sellers and works of art on film, in television and in radio. They share in common their industrial character; on the one hand, as a generation of objects created by the most up-to-date mechanical means and on the other, as consumer goods designed by the 'entertainment industry'.

The appearance of cohesion which is suggested by the term 'mass' is confusing because it does not refer to the sense of integration that could be expected from such a word. 'Mass' has more to do with its market value and the democratization of culture. In reality, the public of mass art forms is unlimited and heterogeneously composed. The public of a Jean-Luc Godard film and the audience of a Brian de Palma film differ entirely, while Chaplin's art, which integrates comedy and social comment, is received by a larger audience.

The feeling of atomization, of individuals isolated from one another, reflects more the attitude of the receptive subject. As there is no folk-art soul, a mass art soul is unthinkable: individuals still produce and receive the works;

1 French filmmaker known for his political films in the sixties.
2 American filmmaker known for the use of horror and gore.
however, the relations between the artist and his public has altered and has become more problematic. Moreover, the larger the audience is, the less critical it becomes; the more passive and aesthetically indifferent it becomes.

Something has to be said with regard to the technical aspect of mass art. Every artistic work presupposes a technical process, therefore suggesting that a mass art technical feature is nothing new, yet the ends and use of this characteristic by mass art alter the meaning of art in some ways. The invention of mechanical graphic reproduction has challenged the individual, irreproducible and inexchangeable nature of most works of art—painting, sculpture, architecture. This loss of 'aura' was extended further with the extension of technology; the same film can be shown to a million people gathered in different locations. The trace of the artist's hand is no longer recognizable, yet the works of art gain a larger public.

The issue raised here is that unless uniqueness is the determining factor of artistic creation—artist's intention—there should be no problem whatsoever in using a technique which implies reproduction. The artistic value and quality of a work is not dependent on the nature of the technique but on its use. Therefore, the work of art does not suffer its application. Hauser assumes that some artistic criteria may be lost through the process, yet some other norms take shape at the same time—film creates new artistic effects.
However, in spite of Hauser's attempt to give mass art a certain credit, he maintains that the influence of the modern culture industry and its products is of a doubtful value. The narcotic and saturation effect of mass art is impossible to deny. He argues that the freedom of choice, which people had a century ago, is now left to the only plausible alternative to switch on or off; thus suggesting that the public is submitted to production.

Interpretation of Mass Art

In spite of the many shortcomings of Marshall McLuhan's doctrines on mass culture — mainly due to his uses of metaphors and somewhat confused statements, Hauser maintains that McLuhan was the first person to point out the different effects of radio and television, and their influence on our outlook and way of life. McLuhan's argument is that we experience things through a simultaneous combination of all our senses (acoustic, visual, olfactory, tactile and gustatory). Reality is depicted in a truthful manner as long as the ambiguity of the senses is kept alive in the art form, and that no means of expression acts as an homogeneous catalyst; this is the case with printing which stressed visual experience. He favored the spoken or audible word which is the perfect example of the complexity of communication, while the written word homogenizes by eliminating the spontaneity of living language.
The spoken work generates a sense of belonging to a "tribal community" which is opposed to the notion of individuality emphasized by the written or printed word. McLuhan suggests that the electronic media have revived this sense of community, of participation—the notion of the "global village"—which existed during the pre-Gutenberg era. According to Hauser, such a concept mysticizes past and future culture in differentiating, in a strict manner, the spoken and the written word. He rejects the mythical and mystical utopian character of McLuhan's argument.

With the thesis of the Gutenbergian atrophy of the senses—which he sees as following one epoch of sensual development and as being the precursor of another—he falls into a double romanticization of the historical process. He constructs a golden age which should be lost and an utopian one in which the lost unity is to be found in different form. (Hauser, 1982:615)

Another faux pas in McLuhan's thought lies in his belief that all evils of modern man have sprung from the visual homogeneity imposed by Gutenberg's invention and his disregard of the fact that Western culture may have gained a sense of cohesion. Moreover, McLuhan is wrong in assuming that with television there is an end to the era of the visual. On the contrary, Hauser asserts that in spite of the heterogeneous character and simultaneity of impressions, with television one can talk about the victory of the visual and not of its defeat. In addition, Hauser argues that McLuhan is not right in assuming that television was the first means of expression to break the homogeneity; film, theater and most primitive dance were
accompanied by music or sound.

Hauser claims that McLuhan raised some important questions. He has introduced the concept of "technical reproductibility" in the realm of culture. He argues that the first mass produced object was the printed book. The concept of monotony associated with multiple reproduction will only disappear with the introduction of the electronic media. Yet, as much as he praises the heterogeneous and "tribal" elements of these media, McLuhan holds them responsible for the intellectual passivity of industrial society.

McLuhan discusses the new media as electronic extensions of our nervous system. On one hand, these new media are coordinated to achieve a multidimensional effect regardless of the various cultural strata, on the other, our whole urban environment is shaped by the sensory and multiplicity of these media. In other words, we cannot escape them as much as they are foreign to our intentions (as is our nervous system).

The dictum "the medium is the message" is quite controversial, taken seriously or not. According to Hauser, this thesis has confirmed his own notion that the medium is not only the bearer of communication but a constituent element of the message to be communicated; thus reinforcing the dialectical relationship of form and content. Yet this does not prevent, in

certain cases, the form or means of expression influencing people more than the message itself.

In addition, Hauser claims that McLuhan's statement may have been a reflection of the actual message which is not only content, but a comment about the diversity of our media as inadequate tools of communication. Hauser asserts that we may have a vast number of techniques, means of expression, but we are lacking in ideas worthy of being communicated.
7. Present-day Art: Assumptions and Symptoms of Crisis

In present-day art, one controversial principle is at the centre of many debates: "the demise of art". (Hauser, 1982:657) First introduced by Hegel, the collapse of art, a sign of the dissolution of culture, is discussed by Hauser; however, he argues that any reasoning about an actual end to art misses the point because art remains alive as long as it has a function in society. At the most, it is possible to canvass the symptoms of a crisis which threatens the apparent continuous development of culture. "However long it has to stop, there can be no talk of the final existence of art as long as it appears problematical to itself and can formulate its questionability as a lack of articulation". (Hauser, 1982:666) Hauser asserts that he would contemplate the end of art only if it were possible to assume that art could be functionless. Present-day art, even with its anti-art features is still functional.

Hauser emphasizes an important misconception which is often made about present-day art: the presumption that it is the first time that the existence of art is problematic. Through the course of history, evidence of the reoccurrence of this phenomenon is found: through the Neolithic era, at the birth of Christianity, and during Mannerism and Romanticism. Therefore, it is implied that crises are not timeless and intransitory; in other words, that which has a beginning has an end. According to
Hauser the apparent pause in art gives it a special significance. The continuation and rejuvenation of art is not only contingent upon a uniform and harmonious progression; breaks may be equally significant - thus stressing that the form and function of art are called upon to change through history.

The discussions about the collapse of art revolve around two principles: a new definition of art and the emphasis, in contemporary society, on nonartistic productivity. Our notion of art is quite different from its nineteenth century meaning based on Naturalism, Impressionism and Aestheticism. On one hand, the anti-art movement - characteristic of the first half of our century with movements like Futurism, Cubism, Expressionism, Dadaism and Surrealism - and the relatively recent attitude which is translated adequately in the dictum "art is what is counts as art" (Hauser, 1982:702) are indications of the possible end of art - at least in its nineteenth century version.

Another threat to the existence of art is technology. In this context, the significance of the finality of art is attached to its failure to be able to compete with the continuous chain of scientific and technological achievements. However, according to Hauser, science is what it is because it exists in relation to art. They may differ in substance and purpose, yet they are both needed.
Main Assumptions

Hauser claims that our modern era originates from the aftermath of World War I. This event was the first of a series of traumatic perturbations - Hitler and Auschwitz, Stalin, Hiroshima, Guernica - which have shaken our age and have left us with a sense of hopelessness. During the thirties, social discomfort reaches its culmination and the symptoms of discontinuities become more apparent. An increase in social criticism is noticeable and is no longer confined to the Left. Positivists, idealists and spiritualists - mentors of the bourgeoisie - recognize the shortcomings of the capitalistic system. For Hauser, in the philosophical sphere, Existentialism, psychoanalysis and Marxism emerge as the most important doctrines which try to give meaning to a drifting humanity.

In art, artistic values cherished by nineteenth century aesthetes are rejected by a new generation of movements. They represent a turning point in the continuous history of art. However, in spite of their breakthrough characteristic they have not lost their ties to previous traditions. Notwithstanding this, they have some distinctive peculiarities which favor deformation of natural phenomena, a pluralistic point of view, a flight from decorative and pleasing effect and an aversion to hedonism. Their anti-aesthetic attitude translates itself in their art practice which has introduced the concept of anti-art. Furthermore, they have adopted, following Dadaism, a negative
note reflecting the lost hope characteristic of this period.

If these tragic happenings have not (yet) put an end to art (and our lives), they have influenced it extensively. In this context, Hauser raises the issue, previously formulated by Adorno - in relation to Auschwitz - of the probability of producing art (and of procreating) after these events. He arrived at the conclusion that because of the limited capacity of our imagination to think of a second Auschwitz or Hiroshima, art is still flourishing. Yet, one may ask what kind of art? "Everything which was left of art in the authentic sense is filled with a foreboding of a danger which threatens the existence of every more or less peaceful society, indeed the whole civilized mankind." (Hauser, 1982:664)

'Age of anxiety', 'lack of consciousness of guilt', 'alienation' are symptoms of the modern age which have been formulated by Existentialism, psychoanalysis and Marxism. In many instances, art has responded to these doctrines by adopting some of its principles. The flight from plot, the depersonologization of narrative and dramatic literature, the negation of traditional and conventional values which prevailed for a certain period are indications of the close link between social, philosophical and artistic spheres. However, the emphasis on sorrow and distress, the focal point of these art movements, is for Hauser problematic because, instead of lessening them, it enhances the ability to suffer. How long can this kind of work of art can be produced and reproduced?
Hauser alleges that an authentic work of art needs to be committed to life as a bearer of a valid message or a pioneer of a promising future; a role which cannot be entirely carried out by this generation of art movements, and which is totally ignored after the sixties - the apogee of the crisis in art. Commitment in art means that the work of art is not only the conveyor of better conditions of life during a hopeless period, it must also not be content with a lie which veils actual catastrophe: "that is not behave after Auschwitz as though there had been no Auschwitz." (Hauser, 1982:671) Art can contribute to the salvation of mankind as long as humanity is itself on its way to redemption.

Hauser claims that the last remnants of authenticity in art lie within the confines of Expressionism and Surrealism. He suggests that Surrealism has given a positive tone to modern art, otherwise gloomy, by introducing a new form of composition. A dualism is created by the use of empirical experience and supernatural and unconscious forces. "Their combination first of all alienates, and then illuminates, an affinity which would otherwise be hidden." (Hauser, 1982:701) The montage and the metaphor are the most significant techniques which express this dualism. Art which is produced on this dualistic principle is an effective means of expression which "reveals and conceals" (Hauser, 1982:701) simultaneously our experience. The metaphor is a particularly efficient way to break out of the reality of experience.
Symptoms

Since World War II, the dehumanization and destruction of art initiated during the debut of modern art is carried out more intensively by the avant-garde. Two circumstances undermine our belief in art as "a means of delivering people from sorrow and as a vehicle of aesthetic distance". (Hauser, 1932:719) On one hand, it appears that present ideology is in no position to find a solution to the nihilistic and pessimistic feeling of life; on the other, the claim of art as an appropriate means of communication is threatened by technics and scienticism, which appear to be more suitable means of expression.

Hauser alleges that the crisis of present-day art is mostly a problem of communication. (Hauser, 1902:709, 711, 753) He maintains that all flights from the past, hedonism, beauty, subjectivity, credibility, sincerity, plot and hero are symptoms of the flight from the communication of messages and rules of conduct that characterize modern art. Literature suffers extensively from the consequences of the crisis.

During the course of our century, linguistics, which moved at the central position of the science of thought, was able to emphasize the dialectical relationship between language and linguistic medium as equal constituents in the internalization and communication of facts. However, it appears that the modern era is unable to keep the balance between the two elements. Our
century has realized the inadequacy and limitation of speech in expressing the totality of our experience; but, more significant is the discovery that language is by no means a neutral medium of communication.

Present-day art is preoccupied with presenting reality in a less counterfeit and mediated manner. The concepts and techniques that privilege beauty, illusion, subjectivity and fiction are rejected by the avant-garde on the basis that they falsify reality. The need to reinforce truth and objectivity in art is the result of the fear that art may be overturned by technology or science as more valid means of communication and of experience. Therefore, in order to offer a 'real' picture of reality, the avant-garde uses the techniques of documentation, and of reportage. The old media — painting, sculpture, music, epic — unable to support this attempt to reach veracity are eliminated, while the newest media — pseudoscientific film, scientific novel, radio and television — seem fit to express the need to break the illusion, yet, their value is never questioned.

However, the artist, who is confident that it is possible to give a faithful account of reality, forgets that:

Perceptions can only be formed and received with the help of a formal system, of a linguistic, musical, visual or haptic apparatus. The media of expression, however not only are essentially different from the material being represented and not only adulterate, from the beginning, the uniqueness and purity of perceptions, but also are highly artificial and at best form a dialectical unity with these perceptions in which the original quality of the perception is no longer present. (Hauser, 1982:708-709)
Therefore, an unmediated depiction of reality can only be an idealistic concept. The apparent absence of aestheticism, the use of the ugly and unattractive in principle are in no instances a rejection of art because no matter how the artist includes reality in his work it is still done in an artistic manner. Art may seem problematic, yet is still alive as long as it has to legitimize (and does so) its position vis-à-vis the growing concern with technology. (Hauser, 1982:657-660) Hauser claims that only art which is best at criticizing itself, can put an end to its own development.
III. A Last Salute to 'Art'?
1. The Sociology of Art: Misunderstanding and Understanding.

There is no consensus whatsoever among sociologists of art about what the 'ideal' sociology of art might be. In addition, the impossibility of arriving at a comprehensive definition of the sociology of art is hindered by the belief that such an approach does not exist. This is because it has failed to define its object and to prove its scientific validity. Yet, the real problem of the sociology of art resides in that, despite its sociological foundation, it is set apart from the main contentions of sociology. Therefore, in order to understand properly the sociology of art, it is necessary to look upon it as an interdisciplinary rather than as a disciplinary approach. In many cases, as for example in Duvignaud and Hauser, the label 'the sociology of art' is misleading: they both synthesize components of sociological and non-sociological disciplines such as history, philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, and communication, thus making their venture unique.

History and Sociology

According to Nicoș Hadjinicolaou, the sociology of art is non-existent because it has failed to prove the scientific validity of its subject-matter. He argues that only a social history of art based on historical materialism is suitable to examine the relationship between art and society. He defends the
legitimacy of such an approach on the basis that only an
interpretation of art which inserts artistic activity into
"ensembles of the practices of classes in struggle" is capable
of circumscribing the correlation.¹ He is rather reticent
(rightly so) about accepting the notion that artistic activity
can be grounded in an ensemble composed of "all human
activities", and over "the problematic of the imaginary", thus
making reference to Duvignaud, Francastel, Goldmann, and Lukács.

Hadjinicolaou claims that the sociology of art has
overridden art history in order to establish itself as the sole
interpreter of artistic activity. He maintains that the
sociology of art is no more than a disguised social art history
because the former has not been able to differentiate itself
from the latter. While he suggests that the best systematic
exposition ever written on the subject, Hauser's *The Sociology
of Art* comes closer to a real sociology of art, he considers the
book an excellent treatise on art history. As much as
Hadjinicolaou's critique of the sociology of art is pertinent
and consolidates his premises, he has failed to see the
peculiarity of such a sociology.

Art history grew out of a need for classification and order
characteristic of the nineteenth century. Therefore, its purpose
lies in a concern with past events and their chronological
relevance; a social history of art is not exempted from this

¹For a discussion about the relevance of the social history of
art prevailing over the sociology of art see
Hadjinicolaou, 1978:50-56.
task. Traditional art history is characterized by its aristocratic attitude: the hierarchical order of the arts, and its non-critical nature (of historical events or of its own discourse). Contrary to the viewpoint of its traditional counterpart, the social history of art pretends to unveil the economic, political, social and ideological conditions of artistic production.

The sociology of art takes into account two considerations: on one hand, how art and society are related; on the other, the analysis of a contemporary situation. Because there is no one distinct definition of the sociology of art, every practitioner elaborates differently on the correlation. For Duvignaud, a proper sociology of art is the continuity of actual art practice: an active participant in its creation. He argues that:

Or il faut rappeler: une sociologie de l'art suppose une intervention directe dans les groupes que n'atteint pas la 'culture' (et qu'elle n'atteindra jamais) non pour y diffuser des produits connus, mais pour inciter ou provoquer ces groupes, momentanément endormis, dans la 'société de consommation', la misère ou simplement la torpeur sociale, à s'engager dans l'expérimentation imaginaire. (Duvignaud, 1967:6)

For Hauser, the sociology of art represents an arena of sociological investigation which, like the social history of art, is interested in unveiling the social conditions of art production, but he is careful to establish that the major problem which the sociology of art found itself confronted by:

Class position and ideological derivation of the different aesthetic forms is based on a fundamentally and generally valid concrete relationship between the two, though in particular cases it is often arbitrary and purely metaphoric. It is presently here that the
sociology of art runs most risk of equivocation. (Häuser, 1971:144)

It is suggested here that the sociology of art should avoid the reduction of the artistic sphere to the social. This kind of relationship is found in Hadjinicolaou's social history of art, in Marxist aesthetics (which emphasizes the role of the base over the superstructure) and to a certain extent in Duvignaud's *Sociologie de l'art*. For Hauser, not only the social order influences the making of an art object, but the inner logic of the artistic sphere needs also to be taken into account.

The concept of history is another element which makes art history and the sociology of art associate in a concern to interpret art in its proper context, but simultaneously makes them eminently distinct. On one hand, it is impossible to ignore the active part of history in any sociological investigation. Meanwhile it is possible to assert that history can exist without sociological considerations; however, this should not be perceived as an ideal situation.

On the other hand, art history and the sociology of art have a use for history that is rather different. Laws of continuity, of tradition govern art history. Art history not only imposes a sense of uniformity and homogeneity, but, by making 'high art' the focus of its discussion, it veils important distinctions between the arts. It favours more traditional forms of art such as painting, sculpture, and architecture. In addition, art historians have a tendency to forget that the factual research and the criteria of objective
truth that they have recourse to in order to interpret art are what Hauser calls ideological claims. Hauser suggests that a proper sociology of art needs to be not only critical vis-à-vis art, but should question its own position:

...the teachings of art history can neither be completely objective nor absolutely final. As the interpretation and judgments they essentially are, they do not correspond to any real knowledge, but express certain ideological claims, desiderata, wishes and ideals considered to have been realized in the past and to be realized in the future. (Hauser, 1971:150)

For the sociology of art, history is an important element; Häuser, and less so Duvignaud, spend some time discussing and denouncing the notion of continuity imposed by history. They claim that a change is more likely to occur through a 'leap' than through the gradual modification of a phenomenon. They both argue, but again Hauser elaborates further on the subject, that history is an intellectual construction which, created from the present, gives light to past experience. "The artistic tendencies and achievements of the past are valued, overestimated, or ignored according to the aspiration and standards of the present." (Hauser, 1971:150)

The Sociology of Art: A Scientific Model

Attempts have been made to define the subject-matter and the scientific validity of the sociology of art. In 'Aesthetic Neutrality and the Sociology of Art', Elisabeth Bird raises the question of method in the sociology of art. In reference to a
suitable sociological model, three premises are enunciated: the 'formulation of general laws', the 'necessity of aesthetic neutrality', and the 'socio-economic model'. However, Bird comes to realize that the sociology of art based on these principles is an impossibility because they reflect only the anxiety to define properly such a sociology and not actual preoccupation. According to her, the sociology of art is 'passé' because the issue is no more a matter of whether art and society are related but how they are related.

The problem is not whether art or literature is related to society, but how they are related. The question whether culture is determined, or determining, or both, is a sociological question, but is not one which sociology has to answer, for it is a question which transcends the boundaries of any one discipline. (Bird, 1979:48)

She claims that three factors make the sociology of art irrelevant during the seventies. First, while positivistic theories are challenged, the sense of objectivity, the scientific study of facts and the destiny of theories against the accumulation of evidence are proven ineffectual. Secondly, is the convergence of disciplines by which more traditional forms of art theories become concerned with social and scientific circumstances: e.g. the influence of structuralism or semiology (Barthes) on art criticism or the influence of economics on art history (T.J. Clark). Third, is the rapid growth of cultural studies that permits a cross disciplinary analysis wherein culture is analysed in its totality.
Since the 1970's, rare are the people who are interested in carrying further the social investigation of art under the label of the sociology of art. Janet Wolff's contribution to the field appears to be more of a rhetorical nature: Wolff does not seem to be preoccupied with verifying her theory whereas Duvignaud and Hauser are interested in applying their theoretical framework to actual art practice. However, her effort follows previous concerns of other sociologists of art, in that she acknowledges the importance of considering the specificity of art (its creative and innovative nature) while studies such as cultural studies, the sociology of culture or communication studies, whose object of study is culture instead of art, may not take this aspect into consideration.

As Raymond Williams suggests in 'The Sociology of Culture', looking at art as a cultural product brings about new sets of relations and questions:

The modern convergence, which the contemporary sociology of culture embodies, is in fact an attempt to rework, from a particular set of interests, those general social and sociological ideas within which it has been possible to see communication, language and art as marginal and peripheral, or as at best secondary and derived social processes. A modern sociology of culture, whether in its internal studies or in its intervention in a more general sociology, is concerned above all to enquire, actively and openly, into these received and presumed relations, and into other possible and demonstrable relations. As such it is not only reworking its own field, but putting new questions and new evidence into the general work of the social sciences. (Williams, 1982:10)

Although the sociology of culture, cultural studies and communication studies, are worthy of notice, it is believed that
a significant problem may arise during the process of integrating art within a larger category (culture): there is a danger of cultural determinism. As opposed to the sociology of art, which has been accused, many times, of specialization or of reduction, these studies may have a tendency to generalize the signification of art more extensively: art becomes one derivative of culture or is simply described as a cultural complex among others. This issue is not a new challenge: the sociology of knowledge was in the same position decades ago. Moreover, one should not forget that one of the emphases of the sociology of art was art as part of culture (Duvignaud).

Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity

Since the nineteenth century, it is reasonable to affirm that the practice of art and its interpretation is divided between two camps: on one hand, a sociological position, on the other an aesthetic one. Attempts to bring the two together have been made over the last one hundred and fifty years. Without doubt, the Marxist doctrine has partaken in the development of a sociological investigation concerned with aesthetic considerations. Notwithstanding this, most attempts have more or less failed to consider properly the setting of art within the two orders. It appears that Hauser is one of the few people who has endeavoured to avoid the reduction of the one sphere to the other, thereby suggesting an almost perfect harmony of both
arguments.

By making the imaginary its central focus, the sociology of art needs to cut across more traditional forms of analysis (art history, philosophy of art or aesthetics) in order to explain the totality of artistic experience and the totality of life experience. Duvignaud and Hauser have gone beyond established disciplines in order to explain the particular nature of artistic creation. This brings about another accusation which may be made in reference to the validity of the sociology of art: its incapacity to rely solely on sociological paradigms (sociology itself has been discriminated against more than once with this same argument). Nevertheless, the convergence of borrowed elements makes the sociology of art a unique approach.

Concerned a priori with whether art and society are related, both Duvignaud and Hauser rely on a sociological model as the starting point of their analysis: Durkheim influences Duvignaud's work, and Hauser formulates his sociological theory mostly from Lukács, Weber, Marx and Freud. Although they both recognize the impossibility of a pure sociological investigation, they take rather different paths. For Duvignaud, who borrows elements from anthropology, psychology, archaeology and art history, it is important to denounce the mysticism of philosophical and aesthetic explanations. In Hauser, aesthetics, along with the study of communication processes, plus philosophy (Hegel), rather adequately inform his conception of the sociology of art.
The interdisciplinary essence of the sociology of art not only resides in its comprehensive nature but in its faculty to perceive its own development and renew itself according to particular situations. Both Duvignaud and Hauser use the essay as their form of expression. This form of writing permits them to elaborate on a subject without making a final statement, thus allowing them the possibility to reassess in the future their viewpoints.

For Duvignaud, *Sociologie de l'art* represents another step toward a more comprehensive sociology that would embody the imaginary itself. Because of a shift in concern in social theory which has occurred since the 1960's, one wonders if this project will ever be completed. In *The Sociology of Art*, Hauser develops further the argument he previously formulated in *The Philosophy of Art*.² Conscious of the possible existence of hiatus and insufficiencies in its elaboration of the sociology of art, he confesses "that the sociology was for me always an excuse to look at art from one point of view, in the process of which new or insufficiently considered characteristics would appear."

(Hauser, 1982:XX) In *The Philosophy of Art History*, Hauser foretold the possible dissolution of the sociology of art.

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² It is interesting to note that *The Philosophy of Art* (1957:English translation) is one of Hauser's pieces of writing which is often overlooked. Allusions to Hauser are mostly made in reference to *The Social History of Art* (1955:English translation), and recently *The Sociology of Art*. Without *The Philosophy of Art History*, the theoretical counterpart of *The Social History of Art*, the latter remains more or less an excellent nomenclature of art events.
2. The Sociology of Art: Last Preserve of the Humanists

However pertinent the sociology of art may have been two or three decades ago, at the height of its glorious years, it carried the seed of its dissolution. Yet, it is false to attribute this obsolescence to its incapacity to renew itself in order to interpret contemporary art. Not only the sociology of art became problematical, but modern art, the focus of its discussion, came to an end. Historically and socially conditioned, the origin of the sociology of art lies within a larger social entity: "...La sociologie est née avec la modernité, est née d'un regard sur la modernité..." (Bellavance, 1983:30) As a speculative approach, it perpetuates and consolidates the predominant artistic values of this era in its interpretation of art. Therefore, its influence, limitations and viewpoint have to be taken into consideration.

For the purpose of our discussion, modernism covers a period whose genesis is located at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and which most controversial completion may be situated around the 1960's.
From the Enlightenment to Modernism

The main preoccupation of the Enlightenment was a concern with human nature. As practitioners of humanism, the philosophers of the eighteenth century were careful to develop principles of life such as objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art, which were meant to enrich everyday life. While they insisted on the inner logic of these spheres, they were careful to tie them to the fulfillment of practical needs. However enlightening this project may have been, by the end of the eighteenth century, its validity was already questioned. With the twentieth century, all optimism is gone. As Habermas argues: "The differentiation of science, morality and art has come to mean the autonomy of the segments treated by the specialist and at the same time letting them split off from the hermeneutics of everyday communication." (Habermas, 1983:9)

Walter D. Bannard describes modernism as follows: "In spirit, modernism is aspiring, authoritarian, hierarchical, self-critical, exclusive, vertically structured, and aims for the best." (Bannard, 1984:69) Translated in artistic terms, the universal nature of art, the differentiation between high and low art, the fascination with the new, the duality between life and art (emancipation of art), the art/language dilemma are characteristics of modern art. With the nineteenth century, art became progressively autonomous, and needed to be treated in a special manner:
Raymond Williams has pointed out how the closing decades of the eighteenth and the opening decades of the nineteenth centuries the word 'art' changed its meaning; when written with a capital 'A' it came to stand not for just any human skill (as previously) but only for certain 'imaginative' or 'creative' skills; moreover, 'Art' (with a capital 'A') came also to signify a special kind of truth, 'imaginative truth', and artist a special kind of person, that is a genius or purveyor of this truth. (Fuller, 1980:44)

The Paradoxical Nature of the Sociology of Art

One can assume therefore, that the paradoxical position of the sociology of art lies in its capacity to support simultaneously, on one hand the universal nature of art — every individual is entitled to the experience of art (Duvignaud) or art is a vehicle of expression and a medium of empathy for the whole person (Hauser), and on the other, only 'fine art' can enhance human experience. Sandor Radnoti's discussion of the universal concept of art, which emerged during the second half of the eighteenth century, clarifies the position of the sociology of art.

The autonomous and universal concept of art essentially takes into consideration only the arts at the top of the hierarchy. Its expectation is that an art work adequate to the concept of art should evoke a peak experience, have a cathartic impact, and alter the recipient's life. (Radnoti, 1981:45)

With the concept of the imaginary which transcends all caste, group or class divisions in order to establish total communication, Duvignaud tries to eliminate the dualistic

"La création est plus vaste que les arts particuliers." (Duvignaud, 1967:6)
correlation between high and low art. However, he only manages
to conceal possible and actual differences between distinct
productive and receptive artistic attitudes. From Hauser, we
learn that while artistic creativity is intended for all,
distinctions between the types of arts have to be drawn, because
no one art can pretend to respond to the needs of all cultural
strata. Yet, only art of the cultural elite is able to enrich
human existence. Hauser's concept of art is closely related,
more so than Duvignaud's, to the significant difference made
between aesthetic and artistic products: "All autonomous,
universal concepts of art entail the claim of an aesthetic
universe." (Radnoti, 1981:31)

There is no doubt whatsoever that Duvignaud's and Hauser's
attempts to define the sociology of art originate from the
meeting of modernism and the humanism of the Enlightenment. As
humanist representatives, they are concerned with establishing
the significance of the imaginary (Duvignaud) or creative
activity (Hauser) as a utopia, an ideal of life which does not
have to be realized. As modernist promoters, they are far more
interested, from their respective perspectives, in discussing
the peculiar nature of 'art' thus making art a special field of
interest. Without doubt, yet more so in Hauser than in
Duvignaud, their preoccupation is to legitimize their modernist
viewpoints.

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3It has to be reiterated that art of the cultural elite, folk
art, popular art, mass art and pop art are ideal types.
Vytautas Kavolis claims that the sociology of art remains 'the last preserve of the humanists'. (Kavolis, 1968:4) It is evident, if we take the case of Duvignaud and Hauser to illustrate his claim, that the establishment of the necessity of art is more important than any statistical considerations. However Kavolis fails to see that the utmost contention of the sociology of art is to preserve the humanistic notion of art— not only in its eighteenth century version (its universality and significance in everyday life practice), but in its nineteenth century interpretation. From comments made by Marx through some of his major works (The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Critique of Political Economy, and Capital) has sprung a humanistic perspective on art.

The question of the values and range of these ideas, as well as the possibility of constructing an aesthetic using them as starting points (rather than as fully developed system), requires an understanding of Marxism as a philosophical praxis: more precisely of a praxis which aims to transform human capitalist system of society, so as to establish a society in which humanity can give rein to its essential powers, frustrated, denied, postponed and emasculated for so long ... Aesthetics cannot be alien to this humanist Marxism ...

(Vázquez, 1973:10)

Following Marx's influence on aesthetic considerations, one of the concerns of modern art, with respect to its necessity, is its redemptive quality: art can initiate social change. However the scope of this rationale is known to oscillate between the
distinct intellectual positions: from a more idealistic position (Duvignaud and Hauser) which holds that the creation of social reality is sufficient to explain the relationship between art and society, to a more materialistic viewpoint (Arvon and Vázquez) where the issue of human and artistic praxis cannot be separated.

Contrary to Arvon's and Vázquez's suggestion that art can be a tool of revolutionary practice, neither Duvignaud nor Hauser allude to the overcoming of capitalism. For example, Hauser has definitively abandoned the golden rule of Marxism, which puts class struggle at the centre of all activity, by giving away the concept of class for one of cultural stratum. In addition, by affirming that the art of the cultural elite is the most enhancing and liberating human experience, Hauser makes himself more conspicuous from a revolutionary position.

The diffusion of present-day art into culture has challenged the redemptive aspect of art - art has lost its aspirations to project into the future, which was the dominant characteristic of modernism. Daniel Bell rightly summarizes the situation:

"Douglas Davis offers another version on the same theme: "But here again we find the familiar assumption that art must exhort us to idealism or stand convicted of disinterest in the world - the reverse of the coin that finds Utopianism in movements like radical Constructivism and any body of work charged with social content. Unlike its critics, art oscillates with ease between these two simplistic extremes; art can also employ them both at once: it can utilize otherworldly means directly to deal with the world. Like language, art can state, use, and resolve paradoxes." (Davis, 1977:135-136)"
A nineteenth-century tradition, one deeply impregnated with Marxist conceptions, held that changes in social structure determined man's imaginative reach. An earlier version of man - as homo pictor, the symbol-producing animal, rather than as homo faber, the tool-making animal - saw him as a creature uniquely able to prefigure, what he would later 'objectively' or construct in reality. It thus ascribed to the realm of culture the initiative for change. Whatever the truth of these older arguments about the past, today culture has clearly become supreme; what is played out in the imagination of the artist foreshadow, however dimly, the social reality of tomorrow. (Bell, 1976:33)

Bell argues, like many art theorists, for the effectiveness of art as an instrument of social change; he thus deplores its loss. However not everybody believes in this redemptive aspect of art. Hans Haacke\(^5\) came to realize how it is utterly naive to believe that the production of art can make life more humane. "Nothing, but really absolutely nothing is changed by whatever type of painting or sculpture or happening you produce on the level where it counts, the political level." (Haacke, 1975:130) However, one can assume that Haacke's position does not challenge the tendentiousness of art, as proposed by Hauser. Propaganda and ideology are the centre of Haacke's artistic activity and they are an active part of any creative act or any form of art interpretation.

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\(^5\) A visual artist whose art works have denounced and shown the functioning of the art world.
'Not Until Humanity Itself Dies Will Art Die'

Following the assumption made earlier about the concern shown by the sociologists of art to perpetuate the modernist conception of art, it comes without surprise that their interpretation of contemporary art (and of art throughout history) has to include a discussion about the significant change in its conceptualization. From Duvignaud and Hauser, it is reasonable to assert that from the Paleolithic age onward, images have never failed to be produced. However, the same argument cannot be applied to the social meaning of art throughout history from its prehistoric conception to 'Art'. Notwithstanding that, a distinction has to be made between Duvignaud and Hauser. Duvignaud, whose viewpoint is optimistically colored, stresses the danger of the supremacy of the realm of art over everyday experience. Meanwhile, Hauser's discussion of present-day art reflects upon the possible demise of art, an issue which came to its full meaning shortly after 1970.

In spite of the different paths taken by Duvignaud and Hauser, one can assume that they would fully support Ernst Fischer's statement about the necessity of art:

Man who became through work, who stepped out of the animal kingdom as transformer of the natural into the artificial, who became therefore the magician, man the creator of social reality, will always be Prometheus bringing fire from heaven to earth, will always be Orpheus enthralling nature with his music. Not until humanity itself dies will art die. (Fischer, 1963:225)
Duvignaud claims that our epoch might be one of these chaotic moments par excellence in which the imaginary plays an important role: "And so this individual or collective spiritual life, which can no longer be expressed or fulfilled within the structures of an already disintegrating society, moves towards the imaginary and the creation of new forms."

(Duvignaud, 1972:59) Hauser, who devotes his study of present-day art to the investigation of its crisis, claims that even if art is produced in the name of anti-art, it remains that the inclusion of reality in a work of art is always done in an artistic manner.

The End of Art

According to Hauser, we learn that it is an error to believe that the problematical nature of art is raised for the first time. He argues that, until recently, the end of art has been discussed in terms of the demise of a certain period, movement or function of art. However, following Hegel's discussion about a possible end to art, assumptions made about its collapse are thought of as a "symptom of total cultural development which has apparently come to an end."

(Hauser, 1982:657) He suggests further that the continued existence of art is related, not to changes in taste or style, but rather is connected with the emphasis on civilization's
nonartistic production. Two factors threaten the evolution of art: on the one hand, technology is more than ever a threat to art (the failure of art to compete with the continuous change of technological achievements); on the other, the dictum 'art is what counts as art' is destroying every sense of privilege and purity attached to 'Art'.

From Hauser's discussion of the collapse of art, it comes to light that the debate over the subject is often misleading. Nuances have to be made in order to properly frame the question. Actually, the concept of the demise of art is concerned with the notion of 'Art'. Therefore, it is impossible to detach Hauser's elaboration on the subject from this context. In fact, Hauser deplores the loss of this art. His discussion about the various ideal types reveals his elitist position. In other words, he supports the idea, claimed by aesthetic movements, that 'Art' is a sphere of its own which, in order to be efficient in its role of salvation, should not be contaminated by debased elements of popular art, mass art, pop art or folk-art. Thus, he perpetuates the hierarchical order of the modern era.

The problem of access to 'Art' is never directly addressed by the people who hold the position that the distinction between high and low art has to be maintained. Hauser's ideal notion

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*His stress upon civilization's nonartistic production can be read in terms of the difference which can be made between aesthetic and artistic production. Hauser's simultaneous use of artistic and aesthetic may confuse the issue of what he really means by 'nonartistic'. From his position vis-à-vis the ideal types of art, it can be suspected that artistic should be understood as aesthetic.*
that everyone is entitled to experience art conceals the distinction. The examples that he uses in order to illustrate his viewpoint clearly identify his position: the influence of popular art on the art of the cultural elite can only be detrimental; the influence of the art of the cultural elite can enlighten anyone who is willing to put an effort into understanding it.

His concern is echoed by many, and since the 1970's a sense of cynicism and nostalgia has tinted the discourse and practice of art. The debate over the end of Modernism and the rise of a new epoch called Postmodernism is characteristic of this phenomenon. The use of the term Postmodernism suggests that, once more, the old and new spirit cannot be dissociated. Hauser explains this phenomenon rather adequately when he discusses the dialectic, especially its principle of Aufhebung.

Since the 1970's a pluralistic perspective seems to prevail in the production and interpretation of art. The boundaries between the various types of art appear (and simultaneously are reinforced) to be more fluid than ever. However not many people have looked upon the diffusion of 'Art' in a positive manner. Achille Bonito Oliva's comment about the 'trans-avantgarde' may be perceived as an antidote to the predominantly dim appraisals of present-day art.

The artists of the trans-avantgarde have shifted things, replacing the myth of a unitary vision of the world, assured by an ideology designed to explain all contradiction and antimony, with a more open position and readiness to drift along any number of tangents and advocating a fragmentary vision and unique, nomadic
experience. (Lischka, 1984:25)

Gerhard J. Lischka confirms Oliva's assumption by affirming that perhaps, once the hierarchy of values and unitary vision of the world imposed by the modernist has been shaken up, an alert mind can find its stimulus everywhere.

'L'imagination au pouvoir'

As mentioned earlier, aesthetic preoccupations are, for Duvignaud, a form of mystical screen which have to be avoided in order to understand the role of the imaginary. The emphasis of the imaginary permits him to avoid the dilemma between high and low art. His discussion of the change in meaning of art is approached in terms of a change in function. He claims that the real threat to art does not lie in the use of new means of communication (radio, television and cinema), but in the blurring of the distinction between art and life which has arisen since their emergence. Related to this issue are the concepts of **collage** and the dramatization of the event.

For Duvignaud, as for Hauser, the shock created by the encounter of the two realms - art and life - within an art object is an appealing and positive principle of creative value. On the one hand, Hauser perceived the use of the metaphor by the Surrealists as an excellent example of what a work of art ought to do: to simultaneously conceal and reveal. However, Hauser's positive appraisal of the meeting ends with Surrealism. On the other hand, Duvignaud has a more optimistic attitude towards the
meeting of art and life; the dramatization of the event is perhaps just as liberating. He claims that one of the consequences of the invasion of the artistic realm into our life has been to modify our relationships with each other. Therefore, he suggests that the encounter is bound to affect our habits and morals.

And doubly affected, in sexual relations, feelings or passions, because this predominance of the event gains an importance as a result of a rediscovery of man's basic requirements, his basic needs, at least in their dramatic form. A certain rhetoric dissolves under our eyes — that which for too long has permeated our feelings and collective representations, so that our affections and our relations with one another were guided more by abstract justifications than by real experience. (Duvignaud, 1972:136)

In the French intellectual tradition, Duvignaud's perspective on the valorization of the event has been looked upon as a major issue of the present-day situation. However, not many intellectuals share Duvignaud's optimism. For Guy Debord, the transformation of everyday life into a spectacle is a step closer to total alienation. "The entire life of societies in which modern conditions of production reign announces itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into representation."

(Debord, 1970:1)

Debord's argument puts the weight of the problem of the spectacle on material production. Meanwhile Jean Baudrillard and Henri Lefebvre seem to mourn the distinction between art and life which reflects a longing for past values. Baudrillard appears to deplore the loss of utopia: "L'imagination est au
pouvoir, la lumière, l'intelligence est au pouvoir, nous vivons ou nous vivrons bientôt la perfection du social, tout est là; le ciel est descendu sur terre, le ciel de l'utopie, et ce que se profilait comme une perspective radieuse se vit désormais comme une catastrophe au ralenti." (Baudrillard, 1983:101)

While Baudrillard's comment reflects social concerns, Lefebvre's appraisal of the situation is directly related to contemporary art.

Le pur spectacle dissout les formes de l'art, toutes réalisées jadis pour obtenir la participation (émotive, affective, concrète) de l'individu à l'œuvre présentée et au monde de ces œuvres, pour mettre fin à l'extériorité (des hommes et de la nature, du créateur et du récepteur). Devenu extériorité et spectacle, le monde esthétique n'est plus un monde.

(Lefebvre, 1962:329)

Lefebvre's comment echoes, in a different manner, Hauser's idea about the shrinking state of the aesthetic sphere. Therefore, it has to be stressed that not only has the distinction between low and high art been an issue for modern art, but the distinction between art and reality has been a focus of attention as well.

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3. Conclusion: The 'How' and 'What' of Communication Processes

During the 1950's and 1960's, the sociology of art came forth as the major proponent of the communicative aspect of art. The purpose of the sociology of art, which is to study whether art and society are related, was reinforced when it proposed to look simultaneously at this correlation and to analyse the role of art as communication. Duvignaud and Hauser have illustrated this concern, yet in different ways. Duvignaud is interested in discussing the productive end of art (imaginary), whereas Hauser claims that the meaning of art takes place not only in the hands of the producer, but in the hands of the receiver. However, their treatment of the communicative aspect of art is similar because they both locate the normative value of art within the concept of universality (everybody is entitled to art).

The Production and Reception of Art

The reference to the communicative aspect of art made by Duvignaud rests upon his discussion of the imaginary. According to him, any significant imaginative activity is a communication from a distance between subjects. Therefore, he claims that the imaginary is intersubjectively constituted, yet rooted in collective experience. A sense of community emerges from the necessity to communicate; thus, the art object arises from the
efforts to establish total and real communication. However, the experience of art is simultaneously an individualistic and universal one because, as Duvignaud argues, regardless of group, class or caste, art reaches individuals.

Duvignaud's discussion of communication processes is rather rudimentary. He is far more concerned with showing the role of the imaginary as a system of signification than to analyse the functioning and consequences of the process. He asserts that the role of the artist is to create a dialogue in which people are invited to participate in the creation of social reality. However, it appears that the weight and responsibility of the dialogue is entirely carried by the artist.

Without doubt, Duvignaud assumes that only an homogeneous social response to the art object is possible: incitement to participate. He thus rejects any other form of reaction, especially an aesthetic one which, according to him, would veil the real purpose of the work of art. His approach is not only reductive from an aesthetic viewpoint (social determinism), but by making the imaginary the central pivot of total communication, he definitively secures the artist in the dominant role.

In *The Sociology of Art*, Hauser argues that a comprehensive outlook on an art object is only possible if the work of art is perceived as an 'address and discussion'. Contrary to Duvignaud's idea of dialogue, which appears to be more like a soliloquy, Hauser asserts that an ideal witness is always
assumed. Like DuVignaud, Hauser claims the intersubjectivity of the communication process. However, he suggests that the social character of the work of art arises when the artist 'speaks' to more than one person; the sense of collectivity arises through the production and reception of the work of art. He emphasizes that the creation of art does not end with the producer, but continues with a first interpretation and subsequent ones, regardless of time and space. He stresses that not only the production of art, but also its reception is conditioned by aesthetic and social factors.

By putting the accent on the relationship between production and reception, Hauser tries to correct the overemphasis on production which characterizes most Marxist analysis of art (such as DuVignaud's). He simultaneously denounces the stress upon reception which is advocated by reception theory. Hauser is, here, influenced by Marxist philosophy. His notion of the creation of artistic meaning not only corresponds to Marxist principles, but his discussion of communication processes reveals a knowledge of structuralism (sign and language), psychology (intersubjectivity) and media studies (McLuhan).

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1 This 'ideal witness' is found in psychological literature. This 'spectator within' acts as a normative controller by which an individual sets his/her behaviour according to social standards.

2 Hauser never directly mentions structuralism as his source of inspiration because, by the 1970's, the terms sign and language were already given in art theory.
Hauser claims that a common language must be assumed in order for communication to occur. Language is divided by two principles: on the one hand, a need for interaction, on the other the use of conventions (grammar and stylistic principles). Through the use of conventions (tradition) and spontaneity (innovation) the artist expresses himself. Another type of dialectical relationship exists between what has to be said (urge to communicate), and how it will be expressed (the means of communication available).

While the artist masters the language, it is not immediately given to the recipient who rarely experiences the work of art without mediation. Unless one is a connoisseur, mediators (art critics, art teachers, art galleries and museums) are required: a first-hand experience of an art object is reserved for the few. It is to be understood that the reception which is discussed here takes place within the realm of the cultural elite. In folk-art, popular art and mass art, mediators between producer and audience are not a necessity because they are often of the same social origin.

By accentuating production and reception in reference to the communicative aspect of art, Hauser makes his approach distinct from more traditional types of sociology of art. In addition, his presentation of the different types of art, by which he recognises the existence of other kinds of art other than high art (the art of the cultural elite), is another point of departure and reformulation for further interpretation of
However crucial the two sections of the book addressing these two points may be for further research, their impact is jeopardized by Hauser's own confusion. This reflects the ambiguities and contradictions found in *The Sociology of Art*. On the one hand, Hauser is able to recognize that other types of art exist outside the art of the cultural elite, while on the other, all assumptions about the communicative aspect of art are carried under the label of 'Art'.

'The Missing Link'

One can assume that in the sociology of art the communicative aspect of art cannot be dissociated from the universal concept of art. We learn from Duvignaud and Hauser that communication is only conceivable in terms of its universality, thus implying that each individual holds and has access to the means of understanding. Radnoti argues that this way of thinking reflects the position of "the art of the bourgeois world epoch [which] calculates on an abstract (open) and free reception that is capable in principle of integrating recipients from totally alien cultural-intellectual backgrounds". (Radnoti, 1981:36) Or as Martha Rosler frames it:

It can be meaningfully claimed that virtually the entire society is part of the art audience, but in making that claim we should be aware of what we are saying. The widest audience is made up of onlookers - people outside

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"En Route from Author to Public" and 'The Differentiation of Art according to Cultural Strata'.

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the group generally meant by the term 'audience'. They know of high culture mostly through rumor and report. (Rosler, 1982:10)

Most arguments about the communicative aspect of art revolve around an intellectually safe, but significant question: 'how communication occurs'. Duvignaud and Hauser do not escape this intellectual trap. A more pertinent issue is rarely alluded to which could unveil the actual social implications of communication processes: 'what is being communicated'. Both Duvignaud and Hauser overlook the ideological essence not only of the messages, but of the means of communication as well. Notwithstanding this, Hauser hints indirectly at this issue in his argument about the tendentious nature of the work of art, but fails to make the connection between ideology and communication.

By assuming that ideology and communication cannot be disassociated, it can be assessed that through communication processes each individual is bound to embrace an ideological viewpoint which may or may not be his/her own position. Therefore, the maintenance of the capitalist order is guaranteed through the work of art; whether the individual is incited to participate in the making of social reality through art (Duvignaud), or meant to understand a work of art after a great intellectual effort (Hauser).

Nevertheless, to suggest the deficiency of Duvignaud and Hauser in these terms is to overlook their own position within the ideology of modern art and its critical discourse. In other words, significant questions such as 'Whose idea of art?'
'Whose realm of aesthetic discourse?', and, 'What is being communicated?' are issues which are crucial to understanding the kind of communication which is discussed by Duvignaud and Hauser. Their viewpoint is similar in that they both look at it from an idealistic perspective which reveals a lack of concern with real situations.¹

Duvignaud's and Hauser's use of concepts such as universality, redemptive quality, and communicative aspect of art, partakes of the consolidation of dominant ideology. It is not that these concepts are necessarily wrong, but their implicit ideological meaning needs to be identified. In this light, the formation of social utopia in art works which they defend so eagerly is not only problematic, but inconceivable as a real instrument of social change. Haacke was right when he assumed that no work of art can actually change the social environment; because, in most cases, established values are reinforced even while they are questioned.

¹Hauser alludes to the ideological implication of art interpretation (art history), yet he fails to apply it to its own discourse.
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