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THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION:
A STATE-CENTERED EXPLANATION

by

Pamela J. Nori
B.A., University of Guelph, 1981

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department
of
Political Science

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the conditions, both internal and external, which gave rise to the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979. It covers the period from the early twentieth century to 1979. The Spanish colonial and the post-revolutionary periods are briefly discussed. The thesis concentrates on the role of the state and the state's relationship to the upper class sectors of society. State relationships with other classes are also examined along with opposition coalitions.

Theories on the causes and processes of revolution are analyzed and incorporated into the text. Nicaraguan events are examined in light of some of these theories, and at times modifications are made to them. Several prerevolutionary factors which led to the particular type of revolution which occurred in Nicaragua, a so-called "people's revolution," are discussed. A "people's revolution" is defined as a revolution which involves many sectors of society in the overthrow of a state. These prerevolutionary factors can be used, in conjunction with the theories, to foresee potential revolutionary situations in Third World countries.

The Somoza state-estate, which was a mixture of public and private family economic and business interests, and the state's predatory role in Nicaraguan society especially with regards to the upper class sectors were major factors which led to the revolution and the type of revolution that occurred. The development of the Somoza state-estate along
with internal and external constraints on the state's power to act effectively in a crisis situation are examined. The major internal constraints consisted of the loss of state legitimacy due to the 1972 earthquake profiteering and the threat of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front) and its affiliated coalitions. Others included the threat of the upper and middle class based coalitions and the fiscal problems of the state. The major external constraints consisted of President Jimmy Carter's human rights demands and the U.S.-led mediation effort. The dictator's own actions which contributed to his isolation are also examined. These actions created a "potentially autonomous" state, one which was not dependent on the upper class sectors. The "potential autonomy" of the state led to inter-class cooperation and alliances which brought about the Nicaraguan revolution.
For Brian
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INTRODUCTION

During the summer of 1979, a regime fell in Central America. The 33 year old Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua had come to an end. Red and black flags of the Sandinistas could be seen everywhere amidst a war-torn country. The fighting was over, and the development of a new social order was to begin.

It is my intention to examine how and why this revolution occurred and to outline its characteristics. My interest in Nicaragua stems from an overall interest in understanding the chronic instability found in many Third World countries. The variety of socio-economic models adopted by Third World countries, and the ensuing foreign debt, fiscal, and socio-political problems that these countries have experienced have interested me for some time. Among phenomena in Third World countries, revolution in particular is a complex process which needs further empirical and theoretical analysis. This thesis concentrates on the Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 and offers insights into the conditions, both domestic and international, which gave rise to it.

In the thesis I examine the Nicaraguan prerevolutionary period in light of some theories on revolution and suggest modifications to them. Nicaraguan developments from the early twentieth century up to 1979 are examined. A brief analysis of both the Spanish colonial period and of the postrevolutionary period is also included.

In chapter one, I examine the psychological, political process, institutional, and Marxist approaches which have been used to explain
revolution. I found that the theorists within the approaches provide different explanations for the occurrence of revolutionary events. For example, there are dissimilar economic explanations which state that revolution occurs: a) with the immiseration of the workers, b) when the peasants begin to live below the subsistence level, c) when a long period of economic improvement is followed by a sharp decline, and d) with relative deprivation.

The basic reason for the differences between the theories lies with the uniqueness of individual revolutions and with the deductive methodologies used to explain revolution. Some of the theorists attempt to explain revolution by utilizing abstract principles about human behaviour and political processes. They then test their principles by examining various case studies.

I have used an alternative method in discussing the Nicaraguan revolution. I have analysed the Nicaraguan events in light of the theories and have made modifications to them. A state-centered approach has been taken because I found that there was a direct relationship between the type of Nicaraguan state and its activities and the type of revolution that occurred in 1979. The predatory nature of the state and the state's role in society, especially with regards to the upper class sectors, were major factors which led to the revolution. This state-centered approach is described in greater detail in chapter one.

Chapter two examines the historical development of Nicaragua and focusses on the social, political, and economic factors which contributed to the increase of political opposition against the Somoza state. Conservative and Liberal conflict over control of the Nicaraguan state is discussed along with Augusto Cesar Sandino's fight against the
American occupation. The development of the Somoza state, the agrarian transformations from coffee to cotton, the effects of the transformations on the peasantry and on the middle and upper classes, and finally the emergence of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación National (FSLN, Sandinista Front of National Liberation) are also dealt with. The chapter concentrates on the development of the Somoza state and estate, the relationship between the state and the upper class sectors, and the gradual increase of internal opposition.

Chapter three examines the events which occurred from 1972 to 1977. Internal and external constraints on the state's power to act effectively during a crisis period is the major focus of the chapter. The major internal constraints on the state's power that are discussed are the loss of state legitimacy due to the 1972 earthquake and the corruption that followed, the threat of the FSLN, and the fiscal problems of the state. State-class relationships are also discussed with the intention of illustrating the various strategies that were used to get rid of A. Somoza Debayle. The major external constraint on the state's power that is outlined is President Jimmy Carter's human rights demands. Finally, the dictator's own actions which contributed to his growing isolation are examined.

Chapter four examines the takeover of the Somoza state by the FSLN and the creation of the new Sandinista state. It covers the years 1978 to 1984. The chapter continues to describe the constraints on the Somoza state's power which prevented it from acting effectively during the revolutionary period. The development of the opposition coalitions, their strategies, aims, and future programs, are described to illustrate that the Nicaraguan revolution can not be described as a "classical"
class revolution. In addition, the development of the FSLN mass movement and the failure of the U.S. mediation efforts are examined. Finally, the chapter briefly describes the new Sandinista state, the state's relationship with the private sector and the Roman Catholic Church, and the external threats against the state.

In the conclusion, I use my findings both to support and to suggest modifications to the theories on revolution. Important factors which gave rise to the predatory nature of the Nicaraguan state are outlined. These factors can then be used to identify potential revolutionary situations in other Third World countries.
CHAPTER ONE: APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF REVOLUTION

Explanations for Revolution: A Definition

Within the matrix of "great" changes such as the advent of capitalism, industrialization, and the granting of independence by colonial powers and most coup d'états and rebellions, revolution deserves special attention. A revolution can be defined as the overthrow of a regime as a result of class struggles and limited or extensive mass mobilization. A social revolution, on the other hand, can be defined as both the overthrow of a regime as a result of class struggles and limited or extensive mass mobilization and the succeeding profound changes to the society's social, political, and economic order. Social revolutions differ from other conflicts or transformations within society because not only are the state and class structures changed, but institutionalization takes place which consolidates the new order. In contrast, rebellions, for example, do not alter the basic structures of society. Transformations such as the process of industrialization may transform social structures, however, they may not be a consequence of or bring about political uprisings or political-structural changes. Political revolutions only change the state and political structures.

Political instability and violence have characterized many of the Latin American countries since they attained their independence during the nineteenth century. However, according to many observers, revolu-
tion has only occurred four times: in Mexico (1910); Bolivia (1952); Cuba (1959); and Nicaragua (1979). Of these cases, Mexico's revolution has acquired the description of "frozen," Bolivia's as "incomplete," Cuba's as "socialist," and Nicaragua's as "people's." All four descriptions have the definition of social revolution (or "real" revolution) as their basis and are accounts of this phenomenon. In the Mexican case, mobilization and social change were stifled through "premature" institutionalization. Bolivia's revolution included socio-economic and political changes; however, the revolutionary process was halted and has since been reversed. Cuba's "socialist" revolution has gone the furthest in transforming profoundly its socio-political and economic order.

The Nicaraguan "people's revolution" is the subject of this thesis. The label "people's revolution" is not a measurement of a social revolution but instead refers to the revolutionary strategy used. The description refers to part of the definition of social revolution: to the mass mobilization process which occurred during the prerevolutionary stage and which is still being carried out today. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine reasons for the Nicaraguan revolution, from the early twentieth century to 1979, and to examine the revolutionary events in light of existing theories of revolution. Of particular interest will be the changing nature of the Nicaraguan state and the upper class forces. Questions will be asked concerning how, when, and to what extent the upper class sectors were alienated from the Somoza regime. Since the Nicaraguan economy today (1984) is a mixed economy where 64 percent of the land is privately owned, it is important to explore how this situation developed. Also included will be an analysis of the
agrarian developments, the changing nature of the opposition forces, the Nicaraguan-United States relationship, and the emergence of the mass mobilization spearheaded by the FSLN.

It will be argued that the peculiarities of the Somoza state and its "potential autonomous" relationship with the upper class sectors were major factors which led to the "people's revolution." Although the EPICA Task Force and Norma S. Chinchilla have described the Nicaraguan revolution as a "people's revolution" (or a "people's war") in their studies, their concept differs from the one used in this thesis. The authors place emphasis on the proletarian, student, and peasant nature of the rebellion and largely dismiss the role of the upper and middle class sectors as being part of the people's struggle. 11

For instance, the EPICA Task Force discusses the upper class participation in the revolution as a bourgeois struggle which is separate from the people's struggle led by the FSLN. Although the Task Force describes the upper class struggle as an independent struggle from the FSLN's--one which had different strategies, aims, and future programs--it failed to acknowledge the elements of cooperation which existed between the upper class forces and the FSLN. The authors also did not acknowledge the fact that the struggle was not a "classical" class struggle. It was the nature of the Nicaraguan state and its relationship with the upper class sectors which led to a situation in which most classes fought against the state and not with each other. Hence, the concept "people's revolution" can only be taken seriously when it includes the discussion of all of the major sectors which participated in the revolution as being part of the people's struggle.
A number of approaches have been used to explain revolution. This chapter examines the psychological, political process, institutional, and Marxist approaches and discusses the contradictory explanations for revolution. The basic inadequacy of some of the approaches is that they attempt to explain revolution through abstract principles about human behaviour and political processes, and then test the principles by examining various case studies. An alternative approach is needed—one which examines the Nicaraguan historical-political process in light of theories which have been written on revolution, and then generates new or revised theories. This chapter is divided into seven parts: explanations for revolutions, a definition; psychological theories of revolution; political process theories; the institutional approach; the Marxist approach; the potential autonomy of the state; and thoughts toward a state-centered approach for the Nicaraguan revolution.

Psychological Theories of Revolution

The reduction of the causes of revolution to the individual level has been the major preoccupation of analysts who take psychological-sociological theories of human behaviour as their basis for understanding political violence. Although there are a number of proponents in this field, Ted Robert Gurr and James Davies have made important contributions which merit elaboration. Ted Gurr's theories of relative deprivation (RD), contained in his book Why Men Rebel, are of particular interest and therefore will be given special attention here.

Gurr argues that aggression, which is a result of frustration, leads to political violence in society. Some critics of Gurr take
this simplified proposition as is and neglect to include in their analyses the complexities of Gurr's many hypotheses. Gurr is careful to note that his theory of relative deprivation is not only based on psychological premises but includes the societal conditions which affect the scope and intensity of relative deprivation.

Relative deprivation is defined as:

actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping. People become angry when a gap occurs between the valued things and opportunities that they believe they are entitled to and the valued things and opportunities they think they are capable of attaining. Values must not be viewed entirely as material or economic goods or conditions. According to Gurr, values are "the desired events, objects and conditions for which men strive." The conditions can be as diverse as opportunities which aid in the expansion of self-actualization, especially for ethnic and minority groups in society, to favourable economic governmental performances. However, the societal conditions which tend to bring about revolution are not adequately dealt with in the text, and this has a lot to do with Gurr's definition of political violence which ignores the violence waged by the state.

The definition Gurr offers for political violence is "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors--including competing political groups as well as incumbents--or its policies." The definition includes turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war. Revolutionary violence is explained as a particular type of internal war and is characterized by more organization and
intense civil strife. Both the masses and their leaders are affected by relative deprivation, and revolution is most likely to occur when the revolutionary leaders organize the expression of mass discontent in society. For Gurr,

the primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.

Although Gurr's definition of political violence seems to be all-inclusive, it is actually a narrow definition because it excludes state violence. State violence is analysed as a separate category, entitled "regime coercion," with a different framework of analysis for human behaviour. The state is portrayed as a rational structure which utilizes repressive sanctions to put down civil strife, whereas the masses are portrayed as having "innate emotional responses" to the sanctions or threat of sanctions. Gurr's analysis does not make room for the revolutionaries who are discontented, frustrated, and angry but who wait for the "objective" conditions to be right within a society before resorting to political violence. In addition, regime coercion is limited to the role of an intervening social variable which affects the relationship between discontent and participation in strife. The important question, "what does the state do to provoke the initial discontent" is not sufficiently answered. Instead, Gurr concentrates on exploring the relationship between the intensity of a regime's military response and the intensity of the civil strife. For example, one of his major hypotheses concerning this matter is that the "likelihood of internal war increases as the ratio of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality."
An important aspect of any approach is whether or not it can be effectively operationalized. One of the major problems with Gurr's approach is that the critical variable, the cognitive state of mind of masses of individuals, is extremely difficult to measure. Other indicators are suggested but these can, at best, only imply relative deprivation. For example, Gurr claims that indicators of economic performance and of governmental fiscal activity can be used as measurements of "decremental" RD, defined as the deprivation experienced by people over the loss of what they once had or thought they could have. Other patterns such as "short-term changes in inflation rates, commodity prices, or total productivity relative to rates in the more distant past" can be used as indicators for both "decremental" and "progressive" RD. Progressive RD is defined as the deprivation experienced when, after a long period of improvement in people's positions in life generates expectations about continued improvement, a decrease in value capabilities occurs. Progressive RD is a special variant of "aspirational" RD which is experienced when people feel that there are no means available to them for attaining new expectations.

The progressive deprivation pattern is a broader version of the "J-Curve" hypothesis which was formulated by James Davies. Davies demonstrated with several case studies, Dorr's rebellion, the Russian revolution and the Egyptian revolution, that revolutions "are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal." He further postulated that social and economic development is less important than the mental state of frustration over future development.
expectations and reality. Davies graphically illustrates this gap by drawing a line which represents "expected need satisfaction" and a curve which represents "actual need satisfaction." The result is a curve which represents a "J." One major problem with Davies' thesis is that countries throughout time have experienced similar patterns of economic improvements followed by sharp declines and have not undergone revolutions. 26

There have been attempts to test the psychological theories. Two such empirical tests were carried out by Ted Gurr and by the Feierabends, Ivo and Rosalind. Gurr devised a causal model of civil strife and analysed data collected for 114 polities during the years 1961 through 1965. 27 Unlike the indicators suggested for use in his book, Why Men Rebel, thirteen different deprivation measures were applied. Some of the measures included legitimacy, coercive force size, institutionalization, and past strife levels. Indicators were then selected to represent each of the measures. The Feierabends also used cross-national studies in which data were collected for 84 polities. They used eight indices (GNP, caloric intake, telephones, physicians, newspapers, radios, literacy, and urbanization). 28 Both studies found that the higher the level of frustration, as measured by the indicators, the greater the political instability. However, the indicators used to test the proposition of RD were, once again, indirect ones. The only relevant indicator Gurr has for deprivation is the occurrence of a rebellion; should a rebellion have occurred, then the population were frustrated enough to rebel. There have been other theorists who have tested the proposition of RD and have found no significant relationship between frustration and rebellion. For example, in Edward Muller's
study of political violence in America, relative deprivation was found "to be the least consequential predictor of potential for political violence."^29

Another problem with psychological theories is that they tend to analyse civil strife, rebellion, coup d'états, revolution, etc., as occurrences whereby aggregates of frustrated individuals mysteriously become aggressive in unison. Although Gurr claims that revolutions are most likely to occur when revolutionary leaders organize the masses, the struggle is not seen in the context of political processes, larger socio-economic structures, class conflicts, state structures, or technological transformations. In contrast, the political process explanations offer frameworks of analysis which further the understanding of revolution by discussing opposition group activity and prerevolutionary events.

Political Process Theories

The political process approach is best-exemplified by Charles Tilly and Crane Brinton. Although the authors stress different aspects (for example, Tilly stresses conflict and Brinton stresses uniformities and sequences of events), both theorists deal with political processes rather than sociological or psychological variables in their studies of revolution.

In *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Charles Tilly uses a conflict rather than a consensus model to explain collective action and the process whereby mobilization leads to collective action and collective action leads to revolution.^{30} The model encompasses not only contenders
for power (outside challengers and polity members) but also the govern-
ment and the variety of actions it takes. Tilly's study was written to
refute and to offer an alternative approach to the psychological
approach. He claims that the relationships between either rising
expectations or relative deprivation and revolution are "assumed" and
not "proven" relationships. Hence, he argues that no matter how
discontented people may become, they can not act on their interests
unless they are organized into collective groups, mobilized, and have
access to resources. They may even decide not to engage in collective
action after having assessed the costs, for example repression, that
they presume they are to bear.

The critical sign of an approaching revolution for Tilly is not
violence or rebellion as it is for Gurr. For Tilly, violence is only a
"by-product" of the entire scope of collective action, defined as
"people's acting together in pursuit of common interests." Since
violent collective action emerges from the same political processes as
non-violent collective actions, according to Tilly, then violent actions
differ only because they are noticed and recorded. Therefore, the use
of the measurement of only violent actions to assess the level of
discontent obscures the nature of the phenomenon under study.

In addition, the contenders for power, according to Tilly, do not
act immediately due to anger produced by either frustration or immiser-
tion. He states:

Collective violence is not, by and large, the result of a
single group's possession by an emotion, sentiment, attitude,
or idea. It grows, for the most part, out of strategic
interaction among groups.
Tilly's challengers count costs and weigh expected costs against expected benefits before they act on their interests. If the frustration-aggression theorists are criticized for placing too much emphasis on man's passionate nature, then the opposite argument can be made for Tilly; he places too much emphasis on man's rational cost-analysis behaviour.

Once the challengers decide that the situation is right to engage in collective violence, the normal struggle between contender groups and the government is escalated to the point whereby normal political processes for conflict resolution fail and society becomes split. The critical signs of a revolutionary situation, according to Tilly, "are signs of the emergence of an alternative polity... the thing to watch for would still be the commitment of a significant part of the population, regardless of their motives..." The emergence of an alternative polity is what Tilly refers to as "multiple sovereignty."

Multiple sovereignty is defined as:

the identifying feature of revolutionary situations. A revolutionary situation begins when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities. It ends when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government.

In order to recognize the onset of multiple sovereignty, Tilly claims that one must watch for a situation in which members of a polity find themselves confronted with "strictly incompatible demands" from the government. He describes two incompatible demands. The first is the abrupt failure of the government to deliver goods and services and/or to enact policies which the population regards as necessary to the functioning of society. The second is a rapid or unforeseen governmental demand for an increase of resources from the population. The best
example of the second condition is a rise in taxes. Tilly does not discuss reforms made by a government to ease tensions within society and which only make the other abuses appear all the more "galling." Since Tilly's critical variable is the existence of multiple sovereignty, this condition does not aid the analyst in the prediction of a revolution five years ahead of its time, because multiple sovereignty usually occurs in the final stage of a prerevolutionary situation. For example, in Nicaragua multiple sovereignty developed in February 1979, and the overthrow of the Somoza regime occurred in the summer of 1979.

Tilly does, however, point to long-range factors which may lead to a revolutionary situation. He lists prosperity, depression, industrialization, secularization, war, changes in ideologies, the rise and fall of states, and others. Although he claims that these long-range factors "develop incrementally most of the time," his analysis remains vague. It remains vague because these long-range factors can be considered as part of modern history. In a later study, Tilly becomes slightly more specific when he claims that such larger transformations within society only "indirectly" affect the probability of revolution "by shaping the potential contenders for power, transforming the techniques of governmental control, and shifting the resources available to contenders and governments."

Tilly does not concentrate on structural changes which occur within transformations such as capitalism, nor are his contenders for power broken down into classes whose political behaviour is seen to be largely based upon socio-economic interests and positions within society. His categories (zealots, misers, opportunists, and run-of-the-mill contenders) are found in every political system, in the government's member
groups as well as the challenger groups. Since Tilly does not state why certain people fall into his four contender categories nor does he attempt to group them any further, he overlaps the members of the state with the members of the outside challengers and refers to their leaders as either zealots or opportunists. This analysis as well as his emphasis on multiple sovereignty suggests that he views the state during a prerevolutionary situation as an "organization which competes for popular support on close to equal terms with two or more major challengers." The state is not portrayed as the central sovereign organization which becomes weak, is overthrown, and is replaced by a new socio-economic order. Furthermore, the factors which limit the state's capacity to act effectively in a crisis situation (for example, war, dependency relationships, external financial constraints, etc.) are not dealt with.

Tilly, unlike Gurr, does not use a double standard for rebels and state members, and he deals more effectively than Gurr does with the costs--repression and toleration--which are imposed by governments on challengers. Also, since his critical variable is the establishment of an alternative polity, his theory is easier to operationalize. Nonetheless, because Tilly's analysis concentrates on the latter part of the prerevolutionary situation, and his critical sign for revolution is the establishment of multiple sovereignty, we are still left with the inadequate psychological theories discussed earlier to analyse what motivates men, in the first place, to challenge the government and to establish an alternative polity.

Crane Brinton, in his Anatomy of Revolution, also examines political processes but, unlike Tilly and Gurr, he uses a comparative
historical epidemiology model. He examines revolution as though it were a disease of society which has preliminary diagnostic signs. His methodology also differs from Tilly's and Gurr's. He does not begin with theoretical propositions and then make use of selective empirical evidence to substantiate his claims. Instead, he firstly examines the so-called "great revolutions"--the British, American, French, and Russian--, develops some "tentative uniformities," and then establishes the uniformities as important factors for the typical process of revolutionary movements.

Brinton deduces five preliminary signs for an approaching revolution: economic structural weaknesses, bitter class antagonisms, the desertion of the intellectuals, a divided ruling class, and governmental inefficiency.48 Brinton notes that all four societies were "on the whole on the upgrade economically before the revolution came" but that their governments were in financial straits.49 The governments were in financial straits because war had placed strains on government finances or the governments had difficulties obtaining revenue in the form of taxes from the societies. Brinton continues, "the revolutionary movements seem to originate in the discontents of not unprosperous people who feel restraint, cramp, annoyance, rather than downright crushing oppression,"50 He quotes Trotsky, "'In reality, the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an insurrection; if it were, the masses would always be in revolt.'"51 Brinton, like Gurr and Davies, validates the notion that those who rebel are not the "starving, down-and-out, miserable children of despair," but those who have a "feeling that prevailing conditions limit or hinder their economic activity."52
Brinton claims that after the five preliminary signs of a revolution occur, the revolution then proceeds through six major stages: the financial breakdown of the government, the organization of the discontented to bring about change, the development of revolutionary demands, the attempted use of force by the government against the revolutionists, the failure of this use of force, and the attainment of power by the revolutionists. 53

Brinton also claims that once the revolutionists have gained power, the revolution then proceeds through a moderate stage, a reign of terror with radicals at the helm, and then through the Thermidorean period. The Thermidor is a return to quieter times, and a strong man usually rules with the use of force to stabilize society. Since Brinton wrote in 1938, he drew from only the Western revolutions; the Asian and Latin American revolutions were not included. Consequently, his analysis appears too rigid and prescriptive in light of the succeeding revolutions whose processes violated the chronological sequences of events found in his stage approach. For example, the Cuban revolution started off with the extremists in power, whereas the Bolivian revolution remained in the moderate period without proceeding through a radical phase.

What seems to complicate matters is Brinton's refusal to define revolution. Instead, he uses the convenient device "of declaring that since the movements with which we are concerned are commonly called revolutions, they may be called once more." 54 This does not aid the analyst in attempting to answer why certain revolutions (if they can be called that at all) proceed through certain stages and others do not. He repeatedly claims that his intention is not to elucidate the how's or
why's of revolution. However, the major criticism made against Brinton's work concerns the fact that he did not attempt to establish a sociology of revolutions. He has been criticised for listing chronological events and not explaining them, for not developing the interrelationships between the characteristics in the stages, and for not explaining how or why one stage leads to the next. All the same, Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution became a landmark in the field, and many subsequent theorists either learned from his findings or tested or expanded his theories. Samuel Huntington's theories may not have been generated by a conscious effort to expand Brinton's ideas, but Huntington did attempt to explain one of Brinton's preliminary signs for revolution. By examining political institutions rather than political processes, Huntington hoped to answer why governmental inefficiency leads to a revolutionary situation.

The Institutional Approach

Samuel Huntington is the most influential theorist who writes within the political institutional approach. His Political Order in Changing Societies not only outlines the institutional causes for instability and revolution but draws a relationship between the causes of instability and the particular world historical process of modernization which affects all countries—rich and poor. His thesis is as follows: rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions leads to violence and instability.
Huntington views instability as part of a stability-instability continuum which exists within all societies, except that some societies are less stable than others during certain historical periods. For Huntington, countries are either stable or unstable, and he claims that the "possibility exists for [Less Developed Countries] LDCs to evolve towards the American type of system." What Huntington admires in the American system is similar to what he admires in the Soviet system: the capacity of the governments involved to maintain order and stability. The form of government matters less to Huntington. As long as traditional and modernizing societies attempt to develop "political institutionalization," the functioning of stable and orderly societies will be easier to achieve.

Political institutionalization is a "process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability." The criteria Huntington offers for the measurement of the level of "institutionalization" of a political organization are: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Although he claims that the level of institutionalization within a political organization can be measured and compared to other political institutions in other systems, he does not cite indicators which can be used to measure the variables, nor does he attempt to operationalize this scheme in his book.

Huntington uses three important variables in his model--political institutionalization, social mobilization and economic development. Instead of measuring indicators for the variables for several countries to determine whether rapid social mobilization coupled with slow political institutionalization does indeed lead to political decay and disorder, he examines 67 countries and their development only in light
of modernization. For his study, he overlaps such indicators as literacy, education, cost of living, radios, urbanization, and national income which he isolates and places within the three important categories elsewhere in his text.

For example, Huntington claims that economic development can be measured through the use of particular indicators: per capita gross national product, the level of industrialization, life expectancy, caloric intake, etc. He states that there is conflicting evidence about whether or not rapid economic development actually produces political instability. He suggests that the conflicting evidence indicates that the relationship must be a complicated one. The relationship he found was the following:

The relationship between the rate of economic growth and political instability varies with the level of economic development. At low levels, a positive relation exists, at medium levels no significant relation, and at high levels a negative relationship.

He also claims that "economic development increases economic inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality." He states that, in the short run, the immediate impact of economic growth is often to exacerbate income inequalities due to the effects of inflation. In the long run, according to Huntington, economic development produces a more equitable distribution of income than that which existed in the traditional society. But this is not always the case. For example, Brazil has experienced high rates of economic growth during the 1970s; however, income distribution has remained highly unequal. Huntington's leaders must be benevolent. Not all leaders allocate large percentages of their monetary resources
to social welfare programs, housing for the poor, health, etc. Resources are often allocated to areas which aid in the continuation of the particular growth model followed by a country, to military expenses, to balance of payment problems, and/or to interest payments on foreign loans.

For Huntington, social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development. The indicators one might use for the measurement of social mobilization are given as: urbanization, literacy, education, and mass media. Again, Huntington gives no indication as to how to measure the indicators. His argument, like Gurr's, is a circular one. Since he has not developed a coherent model based on his three important variables--political institutionalization, social mobilization, and economic development--the only measurement of political instability he has is whether or not the country under study has experienced political instability. Furthermore, it has been argued especially by Charles Tilly, that there is no direct relationship between instability and modernization.

Huntington uses the same theoretical model for revolution as for political instability. He states, "Revolution, as we have said, is the broad, rapid, and violent expansion of political participation outside the existing structure of political institutions. . . . Ascending or aspiring groups and rigid or inflexible institutions are the stuff which revolutions are made of." The only difference in the criteria used to distinguish an approaching revolution from political instability is that revolution involves a "violent, rapid expansion of political participation" and that it "often occurs when a period of sustained economic
growth is followed by a sharp economic downturn." 70 The latter criterion is taken from Davies' "J-Curve" hypothesis.

In discussing revolution, Huntington does not use a class analysis nor does he examine the interrelationships between the state and the aspiring or disaffected groups. For him, it is the political institutions which are slow to develop and inefficient, not the management of them by a sector of the ruling class. For Huntington, the state has a purpose, and that is to maintain order and stability by controlling political participation. If it does this well, then one of the characteristics the state has is "autonomy." Autonomy is one of the measurements of political institutionalization. It exists when the "development of political organizations and procedures are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups." 71 For Huntington, the more autonomy a state has, the more groups it represents. If the state is an instrument of a particular class, then it is not autonomous. This analysis differs markedly from the Marxist approaches. For the Marxists, the state is an instrument of the ruling class and state autonomy from the ruling class occurs in particular circumstances. We will now turn to several Marxist analyses of revolution.

The Marxist Approaches

Karl Marx's ideas on revolution have undoubtedly received the most attention from scholars during the past century. Recently, Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship (1966), Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (1969), and James Scott's The
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (1976) have extended Marx's theories by extrapolating the structural complexities of revolutions on a comparative level, the inter-relationships between landlords, peasants and middle class forces as well as the consequences of capitalist development in predominantly agrarian societies. Since Marx's work laid the foundations of this approach, it will be analysed first.

Unlike Huntington and others, Karl Marx placed emphasis on the specific structural contradictions found within society and not on the process of modernization. Bourgeois revolution, according to Marx, would come about because of the inherent contradictions found within the feudal mode of production. Social revolution, on the other hand, would be a consequence of the inherent contradictions found within the capitalist mode of production. Within each mode of production, at certain stages of their development, the productive forces of society would conflict with the social relations of production. The existing social order would impede the further development of the new forces and revolution would begin. According to Marx:

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Revolution for Marx includes strained class relations, generated by the elements of one mode of production found within another mode: capitalism within feudalism and of socialism within capitalism. The revolutionary classes, the bourgeoisie in the bourgeois revolution and
the proletariat in the socialist revolution, lead other classes in their rebellion against the established order and the dominant class of society. The revolutionary class leads other classes such as the peasantry, lower middle class, petty bourgeoisie, etc., because it is the class which becomes a "class for itself" by attaining class-consciousness. The working class in the capitalist mode of production attains class-consciousness when it achieves a particular understanding of the social order and what needs to be done to change it. In other words, the working class attains class-consciousness when it develops an understanding that the emancipation of the working class and the liberation of society necessitates the overthrow of capitalism.

For Marx, capitalism has a built-in mechanism which leads to the increase of constant capital (capital that is represented by machines) at the expense of variable capital (workers who are employed). This leads to the "immiseration" of the workers, and consequently they are no longer able to buy goods that are produced. Over-production and under-consumption results in economic crises, and eventually the crises become so severe as to cause the breakdown of the political-economic order. As Marx states:

The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

Unlike the economic progressive theories (generated by Gurr and Davies), Marx attributed revolution to economic decline, to the immiseration of the workers. Once the workers attain unity, seize power and
introduce socialism, according to Marx, new social relations of production are introduced, a new ruling class establishes itself, and a new social order is underway.

There are a number of problems with Marx's analysis of revolution. As one theorist has pointed out, "It is one thing to identify underlying, potential tensions rooted in objective class relations understood in a Marxist manner. It is another thing to understand how and when class members find themselves able to struggle effectively for their interests." Tilly's analysis of the presence or absence of group organization and the group's access to resources supplements Marx's ideas. In addition, Marx's explanation of revolution does not adequately describe the revolutions which have actually taken place. First, not all revolutions have led to transformations from one mode of production to another. Secondly, most revolutions have not occurred in the industrialized societies but in underdeveloped nations and have been peasant revolutions. Moore's, Wolf's, and Scott's studies have become influential within the Marxist tradition because they attempt to explain this anomaly. They have generated revealing hypotheses about the historical and socio-economic conditions and the relationships between landlords and peasants in the revolutionary societies. Barrington Moore's book will be the first of the Marxist approaches to be examined here.

Moore's book contains two major themes. He demonstrates how the types of revolutions depended on the conflicts between agrarian classes, the strength of the commercial impulse in the countryside, and on the growth of the states. He also explains how class coalitions influenced the political development of countries, for example, the development of
liberal democratic, fascist, or communist regimes. Moore examines the histories of England, France, the United States, China, Japan, and India, and makes numerous references to Germany and Russia. There are three key variables in his study: whether the commercial impulse in the agrarian societies was strong, medium or weak; whether commercial agriculture was market-oriented or labour-repressive; and whether the peasant revolutionary potential was low, medium, or high. Moore randomly assigns strengths to the commercial impulse and revolutionary potential. Moore does not define commercial impulse. However, one can infer from his writings that the commercial impulse includes a numerical assessment of those who were involved in commerce and industry and an assessment of their independence from the existing governments. Commercial agriculture is described as being either market-oriented or labour-repressive. Again, one can infer from Moore's writings that market-commercial agriculture includes family farming and systems of hired agricultural labourers who have considerable freedom to move around. Labour-repressive commercial agriculture includes slavery and systems which have an imbalance between the overlord's contribution to justice and security and the labourers' contribution in the form of crops. Moore argues that each of the three major types of revolution--bourgeois, fascist, and communist--had unique combinations of the three important variables.

In the three bourgeois revolutions, which took place in England, France, and the United States, Moore found the presence of a strong bourgeois impulse at an early stage of modernization. He states that if the bourgeoisie is strong, it will set the political tone of any coalition with a landed upper-class no matter who holds office.
addition, in all three countries, commercial agriculture was market-oriented. For instance, in England, the wool trade affected the countryside during the sixteenth century, and sheep raising led to enclosures. The minority of the landed classes who raised sheep developed commercial interests and made ties with the urban bourgeoisie who exported the wool. Both groups opposed royal authority; but a solid front of upper-class opposition to royal authority did not develop because both classes competed for popular support.

In England and the United States, the peasant revolutionary potential was low. In France, the potential was high. In England, the enclosures destroyed the independent nature of the peasantry. The peasants became farmers who no longer produced for themselves and their overlords but for the market. Hence, in England, there was no mass basis for a peasant revolution as there was in Russia and China. Also, there was no mass of peasants to serve reactionary ends for the landed upper-classes as there was in Germany and Japan. In France, on the other hand, the peasants were radical. They were most radical in the areas where commercial agriculture "left the peasant society largely intact but took more out of the peasantry." The French revolution still ended up as a bourgeois revolution rather than a peasant one because there were a lot of rich peasants within the peasantry who had interests in private property and hence made allies with members of the Third Estate. This weakened the peasantry as a whole and prevented a collectivist revolutionary outcome.

Moore found a different combination of the key variables in the prerevolutionary conditions in Japan and Germany which led to fascism or
what he refers to as "revolution from above." Moore defines revolution from above as:

Now, in the course of modernization by a revolution from above, such a government has to carry out many of the same tasks performed elsewhere with the help of a revolution from below. The notion that a violent popular revolution is somehow necessary in order to sweep away 'feudal' obstacles to industrialize is pure nonsense as the course of German and Japanese history demonstrates.

He further clarifies this by stating that the German and Japanese governments were conservative modernizing ones which attempted to preserve a great deal of the original social structures. The governments promoted and protected "big agriculture and big industry at the expense of the agricultural laborer, small peasant, and consumer." They did this because they wanted to defend their nations against the superiority of Western arms and technology.

Moore also found that in Japan and Germany the bourgeois impulse was medium, commercial agriculture was labour-repressive, and peasant revolutionary potential was low. According to Moore, "labor-repressive agrarian systems provide unfavorable soil for growth of democracy and an important part of the institutional complex leading to fascism." In both countries, the landed upper-classes maintained the peasant society intact but squeezed more out of it. In Japan, the landed upper-class introduced enough changes so that the peasants would produce a surplus that they could market for a profit. In Germany serfdom was reintroduced. In both countries, the labour force was held down on the land while the transition to commercial farming was brought about, and the landed elites retained much power due to the absence of a large-scale peasant revolution.
When Moore examines the peasant or communist revolutions, he takes the Chinese and Russian revolutions as his examples. He criticizes Marx when he states:

No longer is it possible to take seriously the view that the peasant is an 'object of history,' a form of social life over which historical changes pass, but which contributes nothing to the impetus of these changes. However, he agrees with the Marxists concerning the peasant need of leaders from other classes, for example discontented intellectuals, to help make and direct the revolution.

Moore found that the commercial impulse was quite weak amongst the landed upper-classes in both China and Russia. He states that when "that happens, the result will be the survival of a huge peasant mass that is at best a tremendous problem for democracy and at worst the reservoir for a peasant revolution leading to a communist dictatorship." He also found that countries in which peasant revolutions occurred had labour-repressive forms of agriculture. The peasants' payments to the government and the landlords were found to be out of all proportion to the services received. He states:

... China and Russia, were alike in the fact that the landed upper classes by and large did not make a successful transition to the world of commerce and industry and did not destroy the prevailing social organization among the peasants. ... Hence an important contributing cause of peasant revolution has been the weakness of the institutional links binding peasant society to the upper classes, together with the exploitative character of the relationship. As a result the peasant revolutionary potential was high.

A book which specifically examines peasant revolutions is Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. The book examines the revolutions of Mexico, Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba. Wolf,
like Moore, examines the effects of capitalism, specifically commercialization of agriculture on peasant society and the structural conditions under which peasants resort to revolution. While Moore deemphasizes the importance of distinguishing the different types of peasants, Wolf claims that those who speak of an "all-encompassing 'peasantry' without further qualifications" will be less able to elucidate the reasons why specific kinds of peasants become involved in political upheavals and others do not.  

Peasants are defined as "populations that are existentially involved in cultivation and make autonomous decisions regarding the processes of cultivations." The category includes tenants and sharecroppers, so long as they make decisions on how their crops are grown. Fishermen and landless labourers are excluded.

Wolf found common characteristics amongst the revolutionary peasantry in the six societies that he studied. The poor peasant and the landless labourer were found to be less likely involved in rebellion because they depended on overlords for their livelihood and they had no independent resources to enable them to challenge the established order. The rich peasant was also found to be an unsuitable candidate for revolution because the state had co-opted him. Wolf states that it is the middle peasant and the poor but "free" peasant of peripheral areas who are most likely to rebel because they live outside the landlord's influence and because their possession of resources gives them "tactical freedom." The middle peasant rebels because, while his "social relations remain encased within the traditional design," the advent of capitalism severs the social matrix which he, more than any other kind of peasant, depends upon in order to make a living. This
line of argument is similar to Moore's idea that peasant revolution occurs when the "peasant society is damaged but intact." Where commercialization has proceeded so far as to dissolve the traditional organization of the peasant community, rebellion does not occur.\(^{100}\)

Regional distinctions are also important factors to examine, according to Wolf. He cites the example of the Cuban revolution which took place in the Sierra Maestra. He claims that the peasants who were in the mountains had gone there in search of land and that their fierce "love of land" differed from the desires of the rural proletariat who characterized most of Cuba. He also states that the mountain peasants were not only separated from the state's control, but that they differed ethnically from the rest of the population due to the large number of Afro-Cubans amongst them.\(^{101}\)

Wolf also claims that "the major aim of the peasant is subsistence" and that this distinguishes the peasant from the cultivator who participates in the market.\(^{102}\) The peasant is interested primarily in generating enough food for his household and stays away from the market place. In *The Moral Economy of the Peasant, Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, James Scott agrees with Wolf on this point but furthers the analysis by drawing a stronger link between peasant subsistence living and revolution.

Scott's argument places the "subsistence ethic," defined as "the notion that claims to resources [are] legitimate, if at all, only after local subsistence needs [are] satisfied," at the center of his analysis of peasant rebellions in Southeast Asia.\(^{103}\) He states:

This study is not primarily an analysis of the causes of peasant revolution. That task has been attempted, and with notable success, by Barrington Moore Jr. and Eric R. Wolf. A study of the moral economy of peasants can tell us what makes
them angry and what is likely, other things being equal, to generate an explosive situation. But if anger born of exploitation were sufficient to spark a rebellion, most of the Third World ... would be in flames.

According to Scott, the peasant desires a "subsistence security" from other members of his community or village and distrusts the state because it collects taxes and gives little in return. Scott finds that since the peasant seeks to avoid the "failure that will ruin him," he does not take risks by growing cash crops. The peasant is primarily concerned with maintaining a subsistence level of living rather than changing over to new techniques, systems, and crops because his food supply is guaranteed under his own method of cultivation. Profit generated from the cultivation of nonedible cash crops is a secondary concern.

The exploitation that occurs in Scott's agrarian societies differs from Marx's notion of exploitation. Scott states that the usual procedure of Marxists and others is to inquire how much the elites expropriate from the proletariat or peasantry and to use the data as a measurement of the level of exploitation. The peasant, on the other hand, asks how much remains before he asks how much is taken, and he is concerned that the agrarian system respects his basic consumer needs.

The notion of subsistence ethic is not explored by Barrington Moore. He offers an opposing interpretation of peasant revolution when he states:

It was not the English peasant society turned adrift by enclosures who rose in massive revolt but the French ones who were merely threatened by them. . . . Economic deterioration by slow degrees can become accepted by its victims as part of the normal situation. . . . What infuriates peasants (and not just peasants) is a new and sudden imposition or demand that strikes many people at once and that is a break with accepted rules and customs.
It is not just the new demand or threat on the peasants that makes them rebel according to Scott. It is the actual subsistence crisis. Scott found a link between a significant drop in the price of rice and peasant rebellion in Cochinchina and Annam in the 1930s. The drop in the price of rice meant that the Vietnam state lost needed revenue from indirect taxes. Head taxes were then increased. Scott argues that the peasants rebelled because the state forced them to pay taxes when local subsistence needs were not being satisfied. 110

Although Scott examined structural reasons for peasant rebellion in his text, his analysis resembled Gurr's frustration-aggression theories primarily because he builds his theory from the notion that anger is the motivating force behind rebellion. In a later study, Scott develops his subsistence thesis within the Marxist framework of analysis. He explains that "the moral economy of the village is a consequence of the peasant community representing a local system of action--of status, influence, and authority--that is to some degree isolated from the outside." 111 The isolation has an advantage since the precapitalist values and social structure of the peasantry protect them from the hegemony that the ruling class exercises. Scott claims that revolutions have occurred predominantly in peasant societies mainly because the urban proletariat has been exposed to the hegemony of the capitalist system and the peasantry has been less exposed to it. 112 Scott states:

The proletariat is brought into being by the mobilization of capital and technique in the form of industry; the peasantry is not created in the same sense by the growth of cities and the existence of lords. The proletariat is thus organically linked to a superior class in a way in which the peasantry is not. 113

He claims that this isolation does not mean that the peasant community is amorphous and archaic as Marx suggested. He points to the
informal connections, markets, kinship ties, communal rights, and religious sects as providing the social matrix for peasant action. He then concludes by stating:

... the very fragmentation of peasant social structure that for Marx was the key to their nonexistence as a class fur sich makes of them precisely the kind of volatile social dynamite that renders revolution possible.

All three theorists—Moore, Wolf, and Scott—have extended Marx's structural reasons for revolution and have challenged some of his propositions. When it comes to the analysis of peasant revolution, all three analysts found similar patterns even though the societies under study were markedly different. For instance, there is unanimous agreement concerning the effects of commercialization on the peasant society. Where commercialization was found to damage the peasant society but simultaneously leave it intact, peasant revolution was found to have occurred. Where there existed a weak link between the landlords and the peasantry or between the state's hegemonic institutions and the peasantry, the peasant community was found to have developed a strong revolutionary solidarity. Other common characteristics found to contribute to the development of peasant revolutions were a labour-repressive form of agriculture and a disproportionate relationship between the services received from the state and those that were rendered to it. Opposing arguments were also made. Wolf claims that it is the middle or poor but tactically free peasant who becomes involved in a revolution; Scott claims that it is the peasant who is affected by subsistence crises who resorts to rebellion; and Moore states that the mere threat of enclosures can lead to a revolutionary situation.

All three theoretical analyses can be operationalized, however with some difficulty. For a model generated from Moore's theories, one would
ask questions concerning the nature of the commercial impulse, the form of commercial agriculture and the peasant revolutionary potential. Since Moore has not given clear definitions for his crucial variables, problems would arise with such a model. For a model based on Wolf's study, questions would be centered on differentiating between peasants and non-peasants and between the types of peasants and the effects of commercialization on their societies. For a model based on Scott's premises, one would monitor the prices of basic foodstuffs for a lengthy period of time along with the changes in government taxes imposed on society. It may be possible to devise a composite model which would include questions from all three analyses and which would make allowances for the dissimilar findings.

However, such a model would not be complete. All three analyses concentrate on class relationships, socio-economic structures and the influence of capitalism in agrarian societies. The model deals with the state minimally. Since it is the "old regime" which becomes no longer satisfactory and becomes the target of destruction, it should take one of the central roles in the analysis. We will now turn to works which examine the role of the state during revolutionary periods.

The Potential Autonomy of the State

Both Marxists and non-Marxists view the state as undergoing political and economic crises during prerevolutionary periods. However, the composition of the state and its relationship to society are issues about which the Marxists and liberal pluralists have fundamentally different opinions. There are basically two opposing positions: one is
that the state has legitimate authority because it is based upon consensus; the other is that the state is able to rule society because it is organized coercion. The pluralists hold the view that society is composed of "competing blocs of interests" and that since power is diffused and balanced, no one class or group is able to influence the state more than another.¹¹⁶ Ted Gurr, Crane Brinton, and Samuel Huntington base their theories on the pluralist view of the state. All three theorists maintain that governmental power depends upon societal support or legitimacy and that the government can use force because "popular consensus" gives it the power to do so.

The Marxists, in contrast, along with Charles Tilly, see the state as basically organized coercion. Tilly defines the government as "an organization which controls the principle concentrated means of coercion within the population."¹¹⁷ Lenin views the state as, "an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression of one class by another..."¹¹⁸

The Marxists maintain that the state supports and serves the dominant class in society and moderates class conflict. But they are not in accord concerning the idea of state independence, a concept which was generated from Marx's writings. Marx states:

By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both... Only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely independent... And yet the state power is not suspended in mid-air. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the small peasants.¹¹⁹

From these passages, Nicos Poulantzas coined the phrase "the relative autonomy of the state."¹²⁰ Since then, there has been an active debate between Nicos Poulantzas, Ralph Miliband, Theda Skocpol, Ellen
Trimberger, and others, about the nature of the state and its independent role.

Although Poulantzas and Miliband argue endlessly about the state and its composition, they agree that the state has relative autonomy in capitalist societies, in the absolute monarchies of European feudalism, and during the three "Bonapartisms" of Napoleon the first, Louis Bonaparte, and Bismarck. The argument is made by Miliband that in capitalist societies "the purpose of the state's autonomy is the better to protect and serve the existing social order and the dominant class which is the main beneficiary of that social order."\textsuperscript{121} Poulantzas argues that the "state can only truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse fractions of this class, precisely in order to be able to organize the hegemony of the whole of this class."\textsuperscript{122} The importance of the two statements is that both theorists maintain that the state's function is, at all times, to preserve the class structure and capitalist mode of production and also to serve the interests of the entire dominant class.

The phrase "relative autonomy" has also been used to describe the absolute monarchies of the 17th and 18th centuries and the Bonapartisms. During those occasions, there was a balance between competing classes. During the absolute monarchies, there were equilibriums between the landed aristocracies and the bourgeoisie whereas during the Bismarkian (Bonapartist) rule, there was an equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As a result, the state, in each case, acquired a certain amount of independence from the dominant classes. Here too, however, the state's function was to serve the basic interests of the ruling classes.\textsuperscript{123}
The concept "the relative autonomy of the state" is quite different from the "potential autonomy of the state" where the state has the "potential" to pursue its own interests even if those interests are fundamentally opposed to the interests of the dominant class of society. Trimberger and Skocpol have taken the idea of "the potential autonomy of the state" and have operationalized it in their studies of revolution. Trimberger uses it to describe "revolutions from above," and Skocpol uses it to describe "revolutions from below." Both scholars have extended Barrington Moore's ideas. Trimberger's concept of "revolution from above" is similar to Moore's use of the phrase. Skocpol finds that Moore and others place too much emphasis on inter-class relationships and not enough on the state and class-state relationships. Hence, Skocpol takes a state-centered approach in her book.

The common innovating theme found in Trimberger's and Skocpol's books is the view that international pressures act as catalysts for revolution. According to Trimberger, it was only in crises situations—when the existing social orders were threatened by external forces and by upheavals from below—that bureaucrats took radical actions to destroy the economic and class orders. For Skocpol, revolutionary political crises occurred because the French, Russian, and Chinese states were threatened by foreign powers either in the form of war or economic competition. In order to meet these threats, the states increased state revenues by pursuing unfavourable national policies.124

Trimberger, in Revolution from Above, analyses four cases—the Kemal Ataturk revolution in Turkey (1923), the Meiji Restoration of Japan (1868), the coups by Gamal Nasser in Egypt (1952), and Juan Velasco's rule in Peru (1968). In all four cases, high military and
civih bureaucrats overthrew traditional rulers, instituted programs of
modernization, and destroyed the political-economic bases of the
dominant classes of society. She describes the radical processes as
revolutions because her definition of revolution encompasses two
types—revolutions from above and from below.

Five characteristics are listed which define a revolution from
above: military and civil bureaucrats take over political power; very
little mass participation is involved; the takeover is accompanied by
little violence; the new leaders initiate changes in a pragmatic-
incremental fashion; and the economic and political base of the landed
upper-class is destroyed.

For Trimberger "it can make a big difference in state policy
whether those who control state power are independent of, or closely
tied to, those who exercise control over the means of production." This analysis differs significantly from Miliband's thesis that state
officials in capitalist societies do not have to be from the capitalist
class nor do they have to own the means of production in order to serve
the interests of the dominant classes of society. Trimberger uses
the concept of "relative state autonomy" rather than "potential
autonomy" in her work; but her definition is distinct from the Marxists.
The definition that she presents is closer to Skocpol's. According to
Trimberger, a state is relatively autonomous when those who control
state power are independent of those who exercise control over the means
of production. Since those who control state power are not personally
committed (by vested interests) to the organization of the economy, they
can destroy the economic and political base of the upper class in order
to initiate change. Trimberger claims that the military bureaucrats
in the four societies were able to carry through drastic changes because they were not from the classes which controlled the means of production (the landed, commercial, or industrial classes) and were also free from the control of international class interests. Hence, the autonomy that the state bureaucrats enjoyed from the landed and merchant classes enabled the respective states to implement revolutions from above.

Since Trimberger's definition of revolution is markedly different from the definition used in this thesis, her framework of analysis is of less importance to us. Skocpol's use of the phrase "potential autonomy of the state" is more useful to us because she examines social revolutions. In her book, *States and Social Revolutions*, Skocpol examines three major social revolutions--the French, Russian, and Chinese--and makes numerous contrasts to the English, Japanese, and Prussian experiences. She defines social revolutions as "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below." For Skocpol, the revolutionary process involves the combination of political transformations and structural social changes. More important, the social revolutionary transformations can only make sense if the state is taken seriously as a "macro-structure."  

In contrast to the contemporary Marxist conceptions of the state, Skocpol's approach "refuses to treat states as if they were mere analytic aspects of abstractly conceived modes of production, or even as political aspects of concrete class relations and struggles." She claims:

states are actual organizations controlling (or attempting to control) territories and people. Thus the analyst of revolutions must explore not only class relations but also relations
of states to one another and relations of states to dominant and subordinate classes.

Skocpol's approach contains three major themes. Firstly, she claims that prerevolutionary states are potentially autonomous from direct dominant class control; secondly, she contends that it is the emergence of a political crisis rather than revolutionary group activity which weakens the state; and thirdly, she states that class-state relationships and international pressures on the state influence the course of a revolution.

Skocpol claims that a state has:

a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of member groups in the polity.

There are two central ideas within this statement. The first is that the state has interests of its own. The second, a much stronger position, is that the state may have interests which are opposed to the dominant class of a society or all forces and groups in a society. When it does, it is a potentially autonomous state.

Skocpol's second theme, that revolutions are made possible by a crisis in the polity rather than by revolutionary group activity does not totally exclude the impact of such groups. For Skocpol, it is the political crisis which weakens the state and makes possible the emergence of revolutionists or aids those already in existence.

The third theme, that revolutions are affected by class-state relationships and international pressures, involves a number of diverse ideas. Skocpol argues that the more autonomous, organized, and highly traditional the peasantry, the greater the likelihood of massive peasant revolts. She found that the French and Russian peasants lived in
relatively autonomous villages, whereas the peasant villages of eastern Prussia and 17th century England lacked autonomy and organization and were closely supervised by landlords. This idea resembles Scott's subsistence thesis which views peasant revolutions as consequences of weak links between state hegemonic institutions and the peasantry.

With respect to landed upper class-state relationships, Skocpol claims that in one sense the relationship was a partnership in exploitation of the peasantry and that in another sense the landed upper-classes and the states were competitors for control of the manpower of the peasantry and extraction of surpluses from the agrarian economies. Skocpol states:

Monarchs were interested in appropriating increased resources from society and channeling them efficiently into military aggrandizement or state-sponsored and centrally controlled economic development. Thus the economic interests of the landed upper classes were in part obstacles to be overcome; for the landed classes were primarily interested either in preventing increased state appropriations or in using state offices to siphon off revenues in ways that would reinforce the domestic socioeconomic status quo.

The monarchs were largely interested in appropriating increased resources from society because they were threatened by competition of intrusions from abroad. Thus the French, Russian, and Chinese states pursued policies that were "fundamentally at variance" with the economic interests of the dominant classes.

To take the French revolution as an example, Skocpol claims that the French monarchy's resources were strained because of two wars—-the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), and the Seven Years' War (1756-63). Because of the conflicts, France's colonial trade was disrupted by the British navy, and large parts of France's colonial empire in North America and India were lost to Britain. Thereafter, the
French monarchy made several attempts to reform the tax system in order to increase state revenues. Most tax exemptions of privileged groups were abolished, and taxes were equalized across the provinces. Angered upper class sectors then rallied popular support against the state.

Skocpol has interestingly operationalized the concept of the potential autonomy of the state in her work. The prerevolutionary states that she examined had interests of their own which were not the same as the interests of the dominant classes. In addition, the societies were precapitalist societies. An approach is now needed which attempts to examine the changing nature of Third World states during prerevolutionary periods.

Thoughts Toward a State-centered Approach for the Nicaraguan Revolution

In the approaches discussed, the theorists presented contradictory major factors which they believed brought about revolutionary situations. The hypotheses ranged from economic progression then sharp decline, multiple sovereignty, rapid political participation coupled with slow institutionalization, immiseration of the workers, damaged but intact peasantry due to the effects of commercialization in the countryside, a peasant subsistence level crisis, to a crisis in the polity. Each approach can be operationalized, although often with some difficulty. The problem lies with circular arguments, incomplete indicators, and vague definitions. Ted Gurr's analysis is an example of a circular argument because the critical variable for RD, the cognitive state of mind of the individual, is extremely difficult to measure. Hence, the only relevant indicator Gurr has for deprivation is the
occurrence of a rebellion; should a rebellion have occurred then the population were frustrated enough to rebel. Samuel Huntington's analysis is an example of an analysis with incomplete indicators. Huntington has not outlined specific indicators for each of his three important variables: political institutionalization, social mobilization, and economic development. Barrington Moore's analysis is an example of a work with vague definitions. His definitions for "commercial impulse" and "market" oriented and "labour-repressive" systems of commercial agriculture have to be inferred from his text. Although shortcomings such as these make it difficult for analysts to operationalize models, meaningful and useful discoveries have been made.

Since the revolutions in the twentieth century have occurred in predominantly agrarian economies, the revisionist theorists within the Marxist tradition offer the most pertinent theses compared to the classical Marxists. Moore's, Wolf's, and Scott's works contain meaningful theories on peasant-landlord relationships and the influence of commercialization on agrarian societies. Trimberger's and Skocpol's works have generated new theories on the state and state-class relationships. An approach is now needed which examines the state and state-class relationships in an underdeveloped country.

This thesis will examine the Nicaraguan historical-political process by using a state-centered approach. A state-centered approach is best to use for the discussion of the Nicaraguan revolution because of the relationship between the type of Nicaraguan state and its activities and the type of revolution that occurred in 1979. The type of revolution that developed, a so-called "people's revolution," was unlike the typical peasant or proletarian revolutions because it included many
class alliances, including the upper class sectors, which joined forces against the Somoza state. It was the upper class element in the revolution which precluded a predominantly collectivist outcome. For example, Nicaragua—today (1984) has a mixed economy where a large percentage of the land is privately owned.

In contrast to the Marxist notion that the state in advanced capitalist societies is the executive committee of the ruling class and is relatively autonomous from the dominant class, the analysis here will illustrate how the Somoza state became a state "for itself." Those who held state power in Nicaragua used the power for their own economic purposes. They did not wield power to serve the interests of an economically dominant class separate from themselves. The Somoza family would not allow upper class forces in society to rival itself and its own economic interests. The upper class forces had to operate through the Somoza laws and regulations. Thus, in the Nicaraguan case, the Marxist notion of economic power resulting in the wielding of political power and political decision-making was turned on its head. In Nicaragua, it was the political power—the administrators and the military officials—which created the possibilities for enrichment and which provided the economic basis for the formation of an economically powerful ruling group—the Somoza clan.

Since the Nicaraguan state pursued interests of its own, it was not "relatively autonomous" from the upper class. The type of autonomy that the state exhibited was not the type that served the interests of the entire upper class in order to protect the hegemony of that class. Hence the phrase "potential autonomy of the state," used by Skocpol, is a better concept to use in the discussion of the Nicaraguan revolution.
than the Marxist concept of "relative autonomy." Skocpol has argued that during revolutionary situations the state has the "potential" to pursue its own interests even if those interests are fundamentally opposed to the interests of the dominant class of society. In Nicaragua, the "potential autonomy" of the state was a decisive factor which brought about the revolutionary situation. As the Somoza state and Somoza estate became one, the state became a state for itself. Simultaneously, the state became more and more autonomous from the upper class sectors.

It was not until after the 1972 earthquake, however, that the state-upper class relationship became very strained. Somoza alienated the upper class sectors by excluding them from earthquake and investment opportunities, by exercising a monopoly control during the reconstruction period, and by allowing corruption to flourish. Thereafter, the upper class demanded democracy and the end to the Somoza rule. The 1978 Pedro J. Chamorro assassination was another fatal mistake made by the Somoza regime. With the leader of one of the sectors of the upper class gone, the FSLN, which had been slowly gaining prestige and a following, spearheaded the movement as the vanguard leadership of the opposition forces. It would have taken the FSLN more years to accomplish this task.

The thesis will also discuss the internal and external constraints on the state's power during the period from 1972 to 1979. Internal constraints consisted of the loss of state legitimacy due to the corruption which occurred after the 1972 earthquake, the threat of the FSLN and its mass mobilizing efforts, the upper class unity threat, and the fiscal crisis. The major external constraint on the state's power
was the U.S. encouragement of an alternative pro-American state without Somoza. It was the ineffectiveness of the opposition waged by the Guardia Nacional (GN, National Guard), the unsuccessful efforts of the Carter administration, and the popular support for the FSLN which ultimately led Somoza to flee the country in July 1979.
Footnotes

1 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4.

2 There are many definitions of revolutions and consequently the task of understanding the phenomenon also includes the inherent problems and limitations of the definitions. It would be convenient if scholars could agree on one or two definitions; however, the definitions instead of becoming similar are becoming more and more diverse. Most theorists like to start off by defining "revolution," And, in most cases, the definition can be interchanged with the definition of "social revolution" used here. For example, according to Walter Laqueur, "it is characteristic of a revolution (in contrast to a mere coup d'etat) that it has far-reaching political, social and sometimes economic or cultural consequences." See Walter Laqueur, "Revolution," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: MacMillan & The Free Press, 1975), p. 505. For similar definitions, see Alfred Meisel, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1937); Louis Gottschalk, "Causes of Revolution," *The American Journal of Sociology* (July 1944), p. 4; and Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 264.

Other definitions, especially when they refer to Latin America, are "loose" definitions. One definition includes the movements which resulted in national independence during the nineteenth century. Another encompasses the illegal ousting of presidents from office by political rivals. Those who apply the second definition of revolution to Latin America claim that many of the countries have undergone fifty to sixty revolutions since independence. See Frederick B. Pike, *Freedom and Reform in Latin America*, ed. Harold E. Davis (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), p. 119.


3 The definition of social revolution used here includes the variants of bourgeois and socialist revolution.

4 Skocpol, op. cit., p. 4.

5 There have been other Latin American cases which have been labelled "revolutions" such as Juan Jose Arevalo's and Jacobo Arbenz's rules in Guatemala (1944-54) and Salvador Allende's rule in Chile.
(1970-73). However, since the leaders came to power through elections and not by violent overthrows of their governments through mass mobilizations, the processes can not be classified as revolutionary. Although radical reform measures were implemented, they were implemented from above without a revolutionary mass mobilization to support them. Mass mobilization was attempted only after the elections and eventually both experiments were halted by internal opposition forces and the CIA.

Barrington Moore would label these so-called revolutions as "revolutions from above." He warns of the costs of not undergoing "real" revolutions, that of the ensuing consequences of fascism and wars of aggression which according to Moore "have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more." However, the Latin American experiments did not last very long and were only then followed by coup d'états which implemented repressive demobilization policies in Chile and Guatemala. At best, these two cases can be defined as "radical reformisms." Moore's ideas will be further explained in the latter part of chapter one. See Moore, op. cit., pp. 505-506.


7 In the case of Mexico, neither Emiliano Zapata nor "Pancho" Villa and their respective followings won the final victory. The final victory went to a number of succeeding civilian-military leaders whose armies consisted of forces outside of the peasantry. Although an agrarian reform was instituted in 1917, and carried out during the 1930s by President Lazaro Cardenas, there has since been a gradual reversal of the reform policies. By 1960, latifundia had again become very large. See Stanley Ross, Is the Mexican Revolution Dead? (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1966) and Evelyn P. Stevens, "Mexico's one-party state: Revolutionary Myth and Authoritarian Reality," Latin American Politics and Development, op. cit., p. 430.

8 Victor Paz Estenssoro, the leader of the Bolivian Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), nationalized the country's tin mines on coming to power, initiated an agrarian reform and mobilized worker and peasant groups. The overthrow and the destruction of the old regime was accomplished; however, the MNR was incapable of institutionalizing the new order. Rampant inflation characterized the new regime and the middle classes turned against the revolution. In November 1964, the MNR was overthrown by a military coup which demobilized the workers and peasants and ruled by force or threat of force. See James M. Malloy, "Bolivia: An Incomplete Revolution," Latin American Politics and Development, op. cit., p. 191.
The revolutionary strategy used by the FSLN differed from the "foco" guerrilla warfare strategy utilized and elaborated by Che Guevara. According to Guevara, there was a "correct" utilization of guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla foco—a small group of armed revolutionaries—were to be the vanguard and were to create the subjective conditions for victory by mobilizing a "dormant" mass. This strategy contrasts to the more flexible strategy utilized by the FSLN. According to Commander Humberto Ortega, "the mass movement is the focal point of the struggle and not the vanguard with the masses limited to merely supporting it." Ortega claims that it is difficult to take power unless there is a combination of struggles carried out in the countryside, city, town, neighborhood, and mountains. See R. Bonachea and N. Valdés, Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara (Washington: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 89, 155; Robin Blackburn, Strategy for Revolution, Regis Debray (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1970); and Norma S. Chinchilla, "Class Struggle in Central America: Background and Overview," Revolution in Central America, ed. Stanford Central America Action Network (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 13, 20.


Gurr, op. cit., p. 24.

Ibid., p. 25.

Ibid., pp. 3, 4.


Ibid., p. 238.

Ibid., p. 235.

See Goldstone, op. cit., p. 431.

Gurr, op. cit., pp. 46, 56.

Ibid., p. 52.
Dorr's Rebellion was a civil disturbance which broke out during the 1830s and 1840s in Rhode Island, U.S.A. The textile depression in 1835 led to increased demands for constitutional reforms. Against the will of the government, suffragists held an unconstitutional election and inaugurated a new government. Thereafter, violence broke out. See James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," Anger, Violence, and Politics, eds. Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted R. Gurr (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), pp. 68, 71-73.


Ibid., p. 201

Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, op. cit., p. 10.

Tilly, op. cit., pp. 7, 182, 183, 188.

Ibid., pp. 92, 177.

Ibid., p. 201.

Ibid., p. 183.

Ibid., p. 99.

Goldstone, op. cit., p. 429.

Tilly, op. cit., pp. 200, 201.

Ibid., p. 191.
41 Ibid., p. 192.
42 Ibid., pp. 204-205.
44 Tilly, op. cit., p. 207.
45 See Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?," Comparative Politics vol. 3 (April 1973), p. 447. Tilly is primarily concerned here with Samuel Huntington's notion that modernization is a potentially destabilizing process.
46 Tilly, "From Mobilization...", op. cit., p. 88.
47 Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions ...", op cit., p. 167.
49 Ibid., pp. 40, 286.
50 Ibid., p. 286.
51 Ibid., p. 44.
52 Ibid., pp. 286, 44.
53 Brinton, op. cit., p. 289.
54 Ibid., p. 35.
55 Ibid., pp. 287, 290.
57 Huntington, op. cit., p. 4.
58 Loc. cit.
59 Ibid., p. 1.
60 Ibid., p. 12.
61 Ibid., p. 45.
62 Ibid., pp. 34, 51-52.
63 Ibid., p. 53.
64 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

67 Huntington, op. cit., p. 53

68 See Tilly, "Does Modernization ...," op. cit., p. 447.


70 Ibid., p. 274.

71 Ibid., p. 20


74 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, op. cit., p. 7.

75 Tucker, op. cit., p. 218.


78 Ibid., p. 59.


80 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 13.

81 Moore, op. cit., pp. 177, 139, 481.

82 Ibid., pp. 433-435.


84 Moore, op. cit., p. 424.

85 Ibid., p. 425.

86 Ibid., p. 426.

87 Ibid., p. 421.

89 Moore, op. cit., p. 438.
90 Ibid., pp. 452, 251.
91 Ibid., p. 435.
92 Ibid., pp. 420, 438.
93 Ibid., p. 453.
94 Loc. cit.
95 Ibid., pp. 467, 478.
97 Wolf, op. cit., p. XIV.
98 Ibid., p. 290.
99 Ibid., p. 291.
100 Moore, op. cit., p. 460, Tilly, From Mobilization ..., op. cit., p. 46.
101 Wolf, op. cit., p. 293.
102 Ibid., p. XIV.
104 Ibid., p. 4.
105 Ibid., p. 5.
106 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
107 Ibid., p. 31.
108 Loc. cit.
110 Scott, op. cit., pp. 120-123.
112 Ibid., pp. 273-275.
113 Ibid., p. 276.
114 Ibid., p. 270.
115 Ibid., p. 295.
124 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, op. cit., p. 50.
125 Goldstone, op. cit., p. 439.
126 Trimberger, op. cit., p. 3.
127 Ibid., p. 7.
129 Trimberger, op. cit., p. 7.
130 Ibid., p. 4.
131 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, op. cit., p. 4.
132 Ibid., p. 29.
133 Ibid., p. 31.
134 Loc. cit.

135 Ibid., p. 27.


137 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, op. cit. p. 99.


139 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, op. cit., p. 50.

140 Ibid., p. 49.

141 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

142 Ibid., pp. 60-62.


144 Loc. cit.
Early Historical Setting

If one of my aims is to understand the breakdown of the state in revolutionary periods, then the state must first be defined. The state is a set of institutions which has a monopoly of violence and coercion and which controls territory and people. One of the more important questions concerning the state is which institutional group or individual wields state power. The government (which includes the head of state and ministerial colleagues), bureaucracy, military, police, and judiciary, make up the state. Throughout history, different institutions have come to wield state power. It is not always the government which controls people and territory. There have been many instances where the bureaucracy or military have held real control and the government has existed as a mere façade. There have also been instances where institutions outside of the state held state power, for example, the Islamic Church in today's Iran. Institutions outside the state which have major effects upon how the state is run and how power is distributed include political pressure groups, parties, religious organizations, mass media, and large corporations.

In Nicaragua, national state building did not come about until after the country's independence from Spain in 1821. From 1522 to 1821, Nicaragua was under the control of the Spanish Empire. The Spanish left
particular legacies in Nicaragua. By 1535, one-third of the Indians in Nicaragua had been enslaved and sold to Peru to work in the silver mines. This action produced a labour shortage in Nicaragua. To solve the labour shortage, *congregaciones* (centralized villages) were organized. They were developed firstly by the Dominicans, Franciscans and Mercedarians for religious purposes. The religious orders wanted to develop centralized villages so that they would not have to travel to remote areas in order to Christianize the indigenous population. Since the Indians were gathered on small plots of communal land, this process not only provided labour for the Spanish but freed land for crops and cattle.

The Indians also became the central part of the *encomienda* system. *Encomiendas* (the supply of Indian labour and tribute) were granted to colonial officials as rewards for their services to the Spanish Crown. The tributes paid by the Indians were then used by the colonial officials to pay their soldiers and to finance overseas expeditions. Indian labour was used to build shops and *haciendas*. With the reduction of the Indian population, due to disease and the exportation of slaves, the *encomienda* system ceased to play an important role. It was replaced in the seventeenth century with the *repartimiento* system. The *repartimiento*, which was the division of Indians by *alcaldes mayores* and *corregidores* (local officials), became the major supplier of labour for the colonists. Every Indian *alcalde* was legally responsible to supply a labour force which consisted of one-quarter of the *pueblo*’s male population. Indians were compelled to work in the wheat fields and on public projects, to build roads and churches, and to supply the population with lumber from the mountains.
When the system of forced labour was abolished in the early nineteenth century, the Indian population became an independent small holding class. However, the surplus extraction methods which were used during the colonial period, such as rent in labour services and rent in kind, persisted on the large agricultural estates (latifundia).

Another legacy inherited from the colonial period was the chronic economic instability which developed because of the booms and busts of several raw materials and cash crops for export. While cattle ranching and the production of subsistence foods provided for Nicaragua's internal economic needs, the colonial economy included several commodities for external trade, for example, gold and cacao in the sixteenth century, and indigo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

By the 1550s, gold ceased to be a major export commodity because of the labour shortage and the depletion of sources of gold. Cacao then grew in importance as a cash crop, but by the seventeenth century, droughts, locusts, labour shortages, primitive cultivation techniques, and the competition from cheaper Ecuadorian cacao resulted in its decline. Beginning in the seventeenth century indigo, used for natural dyes, was produced. Its decline was a result of increased competition from Asian dyes and from the introduction of synthetic dyes in the nineteenth century. The boom and bust pattern continued to characterize the Nicaraguan economy in the twentieth century with the production of coffee, cotton, as well as other cash crops for export.

Another important aspect of the colonial period was the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in the political, social and economic life of Nicaragua. The Church shared power with the conquistadores and
officials of the Spanish Crown. The Church and the colonial government supplemented each other instead of being separate spheres of interests. The Church financed and administered schools, hospitals, and charity. The clergy also encouraged loyalty to the colonial government.

When Nicaragua gained its independence from Spain, the close relationship between the colonial officials and the Church ended. However, the Roman Catholic Church continued to play an important role in society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

State building for most nations after having been granted independence is a difficult task, to say the least. A strong state did not really take hold in Nicaragua until the 1930s. From 1821 until 1933 Nicaragua had a weak and dependent state. There were several reasons for this development. There were ongoing civil wars which were waged between regional elites. The wars never resulted in a dominance of one elite faction over the other for a length of time which would sufficiently enable one faction to develop a strong state. Instead, each faction invited international actors to support its side in the struggle.

It was not difficult for either side to find a patron. The British and Americans were interested in Nicaragua for reasons of their own. The British had long had trade interests in the region, and in the eighteenth century they established a protectorate over the Miskito Indians on the East coast of Nicaragua. The British were also interested in building an inter-oceanic canal which would link the Rio San Juan River with Great Lake Nicaragua.
With the discovery of gold in California in the 1840s, the U.S. also became interested in Nicaragua as a site for an interoceanic transit route. The Americans at that time were also challenging British hegemonic control over Latin America. So when the civil war erupted in Nicaragua in the early part of the twentieth century, the U.S. sent in the marines under the pretext of saving American lives and property, although at that time private U.S. interests in Nicaragua were insignificant. The main interests that were at stake were the importance of establishing a canal and the international geopolitical importance of Nicaragua. U.S. administrators felt that Nicaragua was not only in their "backyard" and thus in their "sphere of influence," but that Nicaragua was located in a strategic middle position with regards to the rest of Latin America. Hence, international interest and presence in Nicaragua complicated the task of national state building, and when the Spanish left a political vacuum in 1821, it was not until 1933, with the Somoza rule, that a strong state was created, however corrupt.

**Elite Factional Fighting Results in a Weak and Dependent State**

Independence for Nicaragua occurred in three stages. What is today known as Nicaragua was up until 1821 part of the Spanish colony known as the Captaincy General of Guatemala. The Captaincy General of Guatemala was part of the Mexican Empire. In 1821, the Mexican Empire separated from Spain; in 1823, the United Provinces of Central America separated from Mexico; and in 1838, Nicaragua seceded from the Central American Federation.
Nicaragua seceded from the Central American Federation for several economic and political reasons. From the beginning of the colonial period, Spain had organized trade to assure a monopoly of benefits for the Crown and its subjects. Spain maintained this monopoly by developing trade flows between legally authorized ports overseas and each of the Central American provinces (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica). Few local ports were legally authorized to be involved in foreign trade. The closest center to the provinces was Panama. In addition, the provinces had been developed as "self-contained compartments." Each province produced similar commodities and had similar trade and import arrangements with Spain. Also, barriers to intraregional trade were created by the high internal duties that were imposed. Hence, when independence for the Central American provinces came from Spain and then from Mexico, the structural economic barriers to intraregional trade promoted the disintegration of the Central American Federation.

There were political problems as well. The provinces resented the exploitative practices of the Guatemalan government—the seat of colonial rule—in the area of trade and taxation. Moreover, within each of the Central American provinces, there existed liberal-conservative sectarian clashes. Each province had its own internal problems to contend with, and the violent clashes eventually led to the breakdown of the federal republic.

The civil strife was particularly strong in Nicaragua. The struggle had been going on since the early nineteenth century, but the colonial administration had arbitrated the disputes. Once the administrators had left, the struggle intensified. A bitter rivalry had
developed between those who lived in two principal cities—León and Granada. During the colonial period, the "aristocratic" conquistadores settled in Granada while the Spanish soldiers of lower rank settled in León to defend the colony from adventurers from the north. Granada developed commercial and agricultural activities and traded with Spain and the Caribbean via the San Juan River. Leon developed into the provincial capital and traded with Spanish colonies of the Pacific coast. Granada, with its wealth and aristocracy, came to identify with conservatism while León, which had no aristocracy and was a political center, identified with liberalism.

Liberal and Conservative parties were established during the nineteenth century and were centered in the two cities. Regional, family, and individual loyalties constituted the basis of the clientele of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The Liberal Party was centered in León and was dominated by the Sacasa family. It included a section of the landed criollas, who were public employees, artisans, and small businessmen, and who advocated free trade. The Conservatives were centered in Granada and were dominated by the Chamorro family. They represented the interests of another criollo faction, the merchants and the cattle ranchers. The Conservatives had benefitted under the old colonial-controlled production and export policies and felt threatened by the new liberal free-trade policies which generated new competition.

The Conservatives also felt threatened by the rise of the new cafetalero faction. The coffee producers included criollo latifundists, farmers, public employees, and foreign German and British investors. The coffee bean which was introduced in the 1850s became the principal
export by 1890. However, unlike coffee production in El Salvador, coffee in Nicaragua complemented traditional products such as indigo, sugar, cattle, hide products, and mining rather than displacing them. To encourage coffee cultivation, changes in land tenure were implemented in the countryside. The Indian congregaciones were transformed into private lands; church properties were reduced; and subsidies and credit were made available for those interested in pursuing coffee production. The resulting concentration of land ownership in the hands of the local upper class and foreign interests forced the peasants off the land or onto small productive plots. The landless then became agrarian workers for the coffee latifundia. All those who were involved either in the production or exportation of coffee preferred Liberal economic policies. As a result, there was a shift in the power balance towards the Liberal party. To complicate matters, both the Conservatives and Liberals relied on U.S. support or intervention to further their interests and to aid in the establishment of political control over the country.

U.S. intervention had been direct and had contributed to the perpetuation of civil strife. As early as 1855, an American adventurer, William Walker, ruled Nicaragua. Walker had been asked by the Liberals to help remove the Conservatives from power in exchange for land grants. Prior to this, the Conservatives had given concessions to Cornelius Vanderbilt to establish a transit route from Rio San Juan across Great Lake of Nicaragua to the Pacific coast. Associates of Vanderbilt wanted to take over the route themselves, so they arranged for the Liberals to contact William Walker. Walker became president of Nicaragua in 1856, declared English as the official language, legalized
slavery, established a vagrancy law to ensure landowners of peasant labour, and executed Conservative opponents. The Conservative governments of the other Central American countries were not only disturbed by the anti-Conservative measures established by Walker, but feared annexation by the United States. As a result, they waged war on Nicaragua, and by 1857 Walker was defeated.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Nicaragua was of crucial international geopolitical importance to the United States. Washington held that Latin American countries which were politically and economically unstable would give European powers an excuse to become involved in the area. Furthermore, the U.S. feared that an anti-American government might negotiate with another country for the construction of a Nicaraguan canal which would then compete with the U.S.-operated Panama Canal. (The U.S. had decided to build the canal in Panama in 1903.) Hence, preventative measures were continuously adopted to ensure a "stable" and pro-American government.

In 1893, the U.S. found the then Liberal dictator, José Santos Zelaya, a difficult person to deal with. Before the U.S. had decided to build the canal in Panama, Zelaya was approached. Zelaya, a nationalist, turned down two U.S. canal proposals because he feared not only the U.S. quest for exclusive canal rights, but U.S. domination over the Nicaraguan economy. Zelaya's refusal to concede right for an American naval station in the Gulf of Fonseca, his restrictions on American business interests, and his negotiations with Japan and Britain for the building of a competitive canal angered U.S. policy makers. This ultimately led to the American encouragement of Conservative opposition to overthrow the dictator.
Juan J. Estrada, the leader of the Conservative opposition in Bluefields, headed the revolt against the government. He was financed by Adolfo Díaz, who was in turn financed by the company he worked for, the Luz and Los Angeles Mining Company. Zelaya had harassed the company, and the U.S. Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, who was also a legal advisor to the company, counselled the Taft government to sever diplomatic relations with the Zelaya government.

Dollar Diplomacy and the Emphasis on Stability

In 1909, the Taft government landed 400 marines "to protect U.S. lives and property" and to support the Conservatives. The arrival of the marines resulted in Zelaya's resignation and exile to Mexico. The civil war continued, and the months of fighting damaged the national economy and disrupted agriculture and commerce. Washington had arranged private bank loans to Nicaragua, but since much of the loan money went into the pockets of corrupt politicians, the U.S. claimed that it was necessary to become involved in the supervision of customs collection and the management of foreign debt payments. (This method of pursuing "stability" became known as dollar diplomacy.)

By 1911, the "rebel Conservatives" were installed in power with Adolfo Díaz as president, and a loan agreement (the Knox-Castrillo Convention) was signed in which Nicaraguan customs receipts were to be controlled by the U.S. The Nicaraguan Assembly ratified the treaty; however, the U.S. Senate refused approval. Despite this setback, the principles of the treaty were pursued by private interests. Brown Brothers Bank and J.W. Seligman and Company of New York made a loan
agreement with the Díaz government. The loan was to be guaranteed by customs receipts collected by an official who was nominated by the U.S. Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{35} This loan agreement allowed for further U.S. influence in Nicaragua. For example, the National Bank of Nicaragua was established, and the Brown Brothers Bank owned 51 percent of it. The bankers also came to control 51 percent of the national railway; and gold, lumber, and bananas, which were the principal sources of foreign exchange, became largely U.S.-controlled.\textsuperscript{36} This development not only increased U.S. commitment to Nicaraguan "stability" but thwarted any autonomous development under national upper class leadership such as the one attempted by Zelaya.

In 1912, Díaz was faced with another Liberal revolt and requested help from the U.S. to keep himself in power. President Taft sent eight American warships and 2,000 marines. This marked the beginning of a long period of direct military intervention which lasted from 1912 to 1925, and from 1927 to 1933. The marine presence not only violated national sovereignty, but the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, signed in 1914 during Emiliano Chamorro's rule and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1916, made Nicaragua a U.S. protectorate.\textsuperscript{37} The United States was to pay the Nicaraguan government $3 million in exchange for certain concessions. These included the exclusive right to construct a canal and the right to establish naval bases at both ends of it, in the Corn Islands and on the Gulf of Foncesca, for a 99 year period. When the $3 million were paid, the U.S.-appointed commissioners allocated a large portion of it to the payment of foreign loans, and hence very little went to the state treasury.\textsuperscript{38}
During the occupation, the U.S. also promoted Dodd's law which provided electoral reforms. Both parties were to have representatives on election boards, and both were to supervise the voting returns. The Liberals considered the effort futile, because they claimed that the U.S. favoured the Conservatives and would not tolerate a Liberal government in power. Dodd's law did not lead to free elections in 1924. The Conservatives under the leadership of President Martinez nullified sections of the law, had their own forces watch the polls, and deprived the opposition of necessary communication between parts of the country.

The election was won by the Carlos Solórzano coalition ticket which included Solórzano and a Conservative faction and a Liberal faction led by Juan B. Sacasa. Carlos Solórzano became president and Liberal leader Juan Sacasa became vice president. The U.S. government, partially satisfied with the election, withdrew the marines in 1925.

Less than three months later, General Emiliano Chamorro, who believed that he had been cheated by the 1924 election, staged a coup, deposed President Carlos Solórzano, and forced him and Juan Sacasa to leave the country. This time the Liberals under Sacasa got aid, including arms and supplies, from Mexico, and the civil war became more widespread. The U.S. government then forced Chamorro to resign and turn the presidency over to Adolfo Díaz. According to the State Department, Díaz qualified as president because he was not involved in the coup waged by Chamorro. (The U.S. officials had another reason for their action; they favoured Díaz because they felt they could trust him to maintain pro-American policies.) Díaz then requested help from the U.S. to put down the Sacasa revolt. The marines returned in 1927.
During this period, the marine occupation generated public opposition in the United States. U.S. President Coolidge decided to send a special representative to Nicaragua to restore order and to allow for the withdrawal of the marines. Henry Stimson, the former Secretary of War who had previously served on special missions in Latin America and the Philippines, was selected. Stimson arranged an agreement known as the Peace of Tipitapa in 1927 to provide for the supervision of the 1928 Nicaraguan election by the U.S. and the establishment of a nonpartisan national guard. The 1928 election has been regarded as one of Nicaragua's freest elections. The commander of the Liberal forces, General José María Moncada was elected.

Ever since the early part of the twentieth century, the U.S. government valued and worked towards the achievement of political stability in neighbouring countries. Political stability meant that the government in power would be supportive of U.S. interests. If the government was not supportive of U.S. interests, the U.S. was willing to destabilize it. The way in which the U.S. tried to promote stability in Nicaragua was by discouraging rebellion, by "purifying" elections, and by intervening militarily. In 1907, President Roosevelt held a conference in Washington where treaties of peace were signed by the five Central American nations. All agreed not to recognize any government that should come to power by force, either through a rebellion, a coup d'état, or a revolution. In 1923, another conference was held in which this agreement was renewed. Also, the U.S. was behind the creation of the provision in the Nicaraguan constitution which stated that a president could not succeed himself. However one could argue that as long as the Nicaraguan upper class was divided into warring factions,
and elections were government-controlled, the only means available to the opposition to seek power was through rebellion. Rebellion became an essential part of Nicaraguan politics. A strong national state which would represent all upper class factions and the society in general did not develop because regional, family, and ideological loyalties formed the basis of the Conservative and Liberal Parties. In addition, neither party was strong enough to maintain political control for a long period without being ousted by its rival. Hence, each party tried to gain or maintain political control by pursuing U.S. approval or support. By inviting the Americans, the development of a strong independent Nicaraguan state was precluded. Furthermore, the action of allowing the marines to establish stability for the country was self-defeating. The action not only exacerbated the problem of state-building but generated strong nationalistic sentiments amongst certain sectors of the population.

**The Nationalistic Reaction to Occupation**

The strongest nationalistic figure of the period was Augusto César Sandino. He was the only military leader who refused to lay down his guns and to sign the Tipitapa Peace accord. His Liberal guerrilla army operated in the Segovias mountains and consisted of peasants with land grievances and workers of foreign-owned companies. His program was not Marxist but reformist. He called for national sovereignty, land reform, workers and peasant cooperatives, rejection of U.S. occupation, and the establishment of a popular government and popular army. He basically wanted to improve the conditions of the rural poor and to end U.S.
intervention in Nicaragua. His nationalistic, anti-imperialistic, anti-American stance was later adopted by the FSLN.

In January 1929, Sandino agreed to a ceasefire in exchange for certain conditions. His demands were that U.S. military forces in the country were to withdraw immediately; no U.S. loan was to be accepted by the Nicaraguan government; the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was to be declared null; and there was to be no U.S. interference in elections. These conditions were seen as "unreasonable" by both the American forces and President Moncada, and thereafter airplanes were used against the guerrillas. The fighting continued until the marines left in 1933. Before they left, they established and trained a National Guard which they hoped would be apolitical. Sandino then made peace with the new Sacasa government which was elected under American supervision. However, the peace accord did not last for very long. On February 21, 1934, following a dinner meeting with President Sacasa, Sandino and some of his aides were murdered by the National Guard. According to a number of sources, the members of the Guard were acting under the orders of their commander, Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza García.

The Beginnings of the Somoza Dynasty

The first part of the twentieth century witnessed the development of a state whose weakness and dependency were due to the fighting of regional-partisan elites for hegemonic control of the country and the reliance on U.S. support or intervention to aid in legitimizing either factional rule. Neither party attempted to gain support from the majority of the population—the Indians and the peasants—who derived
their livelihoods from the land. Instead, the exploitation of the rural peasants and landless labourers occurred for the advancement of coffee and sugar production and exportation. When Anastasio Somoza came to power, he, at first, did not rely on the backing of the coffee oligarchy, the landowners, either political party, nor the peasantry. And yet he came to wield more power than any other president. Somoza's constituency was the National Guard, and his capacity to rule was based on his threat or use of force and his ability to obtain political, economic, and military support from the United States. Gradually, Somoza expanded his personal estate to such an extent that his estate and the state became one. Opposition was not tolerated and was harshly dealt with, or bought off, including the opposition which was waged by factions of the upper class.

State power in Nicaragua was held by the Somoza family, its closest political and business friends, and officers from the National Guard. This group was known as the Somoza clan. The clan's economic activities consisted principally of the extensive economic interests of the Somoza family. This group was different from other economic groups in society because the clan had access to and use of political power. In addition, the Somoza clan did not serve the interests of an economically dominant class separate from itself. The upper class forces had to operate through the rules and regulations established by Anastasio Somoza García. Somoza designed regulations to enhance his own political and economic power over that of the upper class forces, and he would not allow for any rivalry.

Thus, Marx's and Engels' notion that the state exists to serve the economically dominant class and acts in the interests of the ruling
class does not fully describe the Nicaraguan situation. Neither does Marx's notion that economic power results in the wielding of political power and political decision-making. In Nicaragua, the administrators and military officials gained political power which then was used to create sources of enrichment which provided the economic basis for the formation of the economically powerful Somoza clan. Hence, the Somoza state was not a relatively autonomous state, defined as a state whose major task is to mediate the conflicts which arise within the ruling class in order to serve the ruling class as a whole. It was potentially autonomous; it pursued interests of its own which occasionally conflicted with the interests of the upper class sectors. In other words, the Somoza state was a "state for itself." The following discussion illustrates how this situation developed.

Somoza's rise to power was not based on the fact that he was a large and influential landowner; he merely owned a small coffee finca. His rise to power was based on several other factors. Firstly, he was at the head of the American-trained constabulary army, and secondly he became a trusted advisor to Henry Stimson. His business background and his admiration for things American soon earned him the trust of the American administrators. By the 1930s, Somoza was confident of his control over the Guard, and in 1936 he staged a military coup, overthrew President Sacasa, and manoeuvered his own election. He persuaded the Liberal Party to change its name to Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN, Liberal Nationalist Party), and a Conservative faction to establish itself as Partido Conservador Nacionalista (PCN, National Conservative Party). The two parties then nominated him as their presidential candidate. He won the election and assumed office in January 1937.
Once in office, Somoza became both the head of state and commander-in-chief of the National Guard. Important positions within the state apparatus were filled with members of the Somoza clan. By the 1940s, the members of the clan began to advance their wealth and prestige through appropriations of valuable property, monopolies, corruption, blackmail, embezzlement, and murder. The Guard was then used to put down any violent resistance against the clan. To ensure the Guard's loyalty, Somoza allowed officers and many of the rank and file to pursue their own means of enrichment by using similar methods as the clan's. In addition, the National Guard was given control over the trade of arms, explosives, liquor, tobacco, prostitution, the postal service, intelligence services, the national health service, the only cross-country radio network, and the collection of revenue for the government. What needs to be pointed out here is that the Guard had assumed responsibility for many bureaucratic functions. So, the 3,000 member corps was not only the Nicaraguan army or police force; it constituted a large portion of the state bureaucracy.

On coming to power, Somoza controlled the national railroad, postal service, and border traffic. There was, however, one important area of the economy over which he had little control. That was the production and exportation of coffee. The coffee upper class had gradually come to dominate the traditional Conservative traders of Granada as coffee became an important export commodity. The coffee oligarchy owned the richest soils in Nicaragua and had established financial institutions and external and internal marketing networks. The first market for coffee had been Great Britain and later the United States. Between 1920 and 1940, coffee generated 50 percent of Nicaragua's export earnings.
However, the world-wide depression produced devastating effects on the Nicaraguan economy. In 1933, coffee prices dropped to one-third of their 1929 levels and did not increase to 1929 levels until 1947. Somoza took advantage of this situation to consolidate his own dominant position within the coffee upper class by becoming a large landowner himself. He accumulated choice property by "persuading" people to sell land at half its market value. He then used the state's public resources to build the necessary infrastructure around his farms. His lands were used for coffee production, cattle raising, and then cotton. By 1944, Somoza became the largest private landowner in the country. He owned 51 cattle ranches, 46 coffee fincas and 8 sugar plantations. He was able to accomplish this within a relatively short period because he expropriated German-owned properties in Jinotega, Matagalpa and Managua during World War II. Somoza also profitted from World War II by establishing a monopoly over illegal alcohol production and contraband, by granting import and export licenses, and by having a personal control over transport and communications operations. These actions illustrate how Somoza used his political position as President of the country to increase his private financial interests. The actions also illustrate how the state did not serve the interests of the landed upper class. The landed upper class's economic interests were obstacles to be overcome.

World War II also brought wealth to the Nicaragua state via other means. With the outbreak of the war, Washington became increasingly concerned over the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Major Charles L. Mullins, the U.S. instructor for the Nicaraguan Academia Militar, requested American aid for the Guard. As a result, the U.S. government
promised Nicaragua $1,300,000 in military equipment. Although the
Guard was not involved in military combat against the Axis powers, the
force was provided with enough equipment to enable it to dominate the
internal political scene.

Opposition against the regime was waged from a variety of sectors
and became pronounced from 1944 to 1948. Opposition came from the
Liberals, Conservatives, workers, and students. The Liberal Party had
become a political institution of Somoza. The PLN was dominated by
Somoza's friends and operated the Congress, the courts and the bureau-
cracy to satisfy the dictator. Many Liberals profitted from Somoza's
presidency and collaborated consistently. Others, however, were
dissatisfied and in March 1944 formed a Liberal dissident party, the
Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI, Independent Liberal Party). The
Liberal faction was opposed to Somoza's plans for re-election in 1947
and opposed the changes which had been made to the constitution. Somoza
had increased the presidential term from 4 to 6 years. He also added
clauses to the constitution which allowed the president to establish
laws concerning the National Guard without having to consult Congress.

The Conservatives also opposed the regime. They felt threatened by
Somoza's confiscation of rich coffee and cattle farms from the German
immigrants and his gangster-like tactics. Somoza eased the tension
between the state and this faction of the upper class by allowing the
faction to benefit from the state's practices. This was accomplished
with the establishment of the pacts in 1948 and 1950 which allocated
one-third of the seats in Congress to the Conservatives and guaranteed
free economic activity.
In July 1944, the Moscow-line Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN, Nicaraguan Socialist Party) was formed. The PSN did not challenge the established order. Instead, like other communist parties of Latin America during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, it adopted a conciliatory position. It modeled its ideology after that of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. The PSN held that the objective economic conditions were not yet right for a revolutionary class struggle to be waged. Hence, after World War II, the PSN occasionally participated in elections and collaborated with opposition politicians. Despite the PSN's conciliatory stance, Somoza thwarted the party's efforts to establish a labour movement by adopting several measures. He had Congress pass a labour code which conceded many of the workers' demands. He also organized officially controlled unions.

Despite these actions, strikes continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s. For example, in 1944 students encouraged by the fall of General Maximiliano Martinez's dictatorship in El Salvador, initiated a general strike. Somoza had the American president of Nicaragua's Price and Control Board, Colonel Irving Lindberg, issue an order which stated that any establishment that closed its doors would be denied the right to engage in business. The strike did not occur, but societal protest continued.

Opposition continued well into the 1950s. Challenges to the dictator were followed by the arrest and jailing of opposition leaders, censorship of all news media, and suspension of civil rights for everyone. As long as the dictator had the backing of the National Guard as well as the U.S. government, he was guaranteed the protection of his dynasty.
In 1952, Nicaragua received a large amount of military aid from the U.S. This increase was motivated by the alleged Communist influence in Guatemala. The Americans had become angered over the progressive nationalist measures adopted by Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz when he came to power in 1950. Arbenz established an Agrarian Reform Law in 1952 which resulted in the expropriation of 387,000 acres of land owned by the United Fruit Company. Disputes arose over the amount of compensation, and in 1954 a CIA-sponsored coup was launched. An Air Force and Army Mission were sent to Nicaragua, and in 1954, a Military Assistance Program was started. Later that same year, large quantities of arms were sent with the aim of transferring them to the anti-Arbenz forces operating in Guatemala. Most of the arms, however, remained in Nicaragua and enhanced the power of the National Guard.

In September 1956, when Anastasio Somoza García was campaigning for the 1957 election, a young Nicaraguan poet—Rigoberto López Pérez—assassinated him at a reception. Somoza had ruled Nicaragua for nineteen years; he had served as president for fifteen years; and was the power behind the puppet presidents for four years. During that time, the characteristics of the state and his estate were formed. After having become the largest private landowner in the country, Somoza extended his personal wealth into the industrial sectors. He expanded into the cement, textile, and milk industries and organized the monopoly enterprises MAMENIC shipping line and the LANICA airline. By the time the dictator was assassinated, he was worth $60 million and owned 10 percent of the country's arable lands.
The Transition from Coffee to Cotton Production and the Resulting Socio-economic Changes

By the time of the dictator's death, there had also occurred many changes in the countryside. For instance, during the depression of the 1930s, the coffee upper class reacted to the decrease of coffee-generated profit in a way that produced misery for the peasants. The coffee growers accumulated more land for cultivation, decreased wages, and paid the rural workers partially in kind. This meant that the peasants reverted to a semi-feudal existence. Small holders and subsistence producers who were located on the large farms were displaced to marginal lands or had no choice but to work seasonally on the coffee plantations. By 1950, a large number of peasants had become semi-proletarianized.

Concurrently, as the prices for coffee were stagnating, world prices for cotton, stimulated by the Korean War, increased substantially. The Somoza government then promoted cotton production, and by the 1960s, 500,000 acres had been planted compared to 3,000 acres in the 1940s. This was a rapid increase of cotton expansion over a twenty-year period. The new crop was planted primarily in the departments of León, Chinandega, and Managua on the Pacific coast, and resulted in the decline of corn, rice, beans, and cereal products. Consequently, Nicaragua's reliance on imported food increased.

The socio-economic changes that resulted from the rise of cotton production were profound. Compared to coffee production labour requirements, cotton production required less labour because the harvest season was shorter. In addition, the market-derived farmer displaced the small tenants and sharecroppers who derived their source of income from grain products and cattle raising. Peasants then migrated to the northern
and eastern areas of the country as well as to the cities. By the early 1960s, the migration produced a labour shortage. As a result, landowners transformed the labour-intensive cultivation of cotton to a capital-intensive cultivation by increasing the use of machinery, pesticides and fertilizers. These changes not only worsened the condition of the rural poor but increased the polarization between the landed upper class and peasant classes.

The cotton boom also led to changes in the cities. Not only was there an expansion in the textile industry, but the new cotton wealth generated the growth of the middle class. There was an increase of white collar workers, government bureaucrats, and small businessmen. (There was an increase in government employees because the state expanded its regulatory institutions.) Perhaps the most important development was the establishment of new financial institutions. During the 1930s and 1940s, Somoza and the clan controlled the supply of capital in Nicaragua through such institutions as the National Bank, the Mortgage Bank, and others. By the late 1940s, Somoza was pressured by the U.S. to liberalize fiscal and credit policies and to reorganize the banking system. The resultant structural changes led to an increase of Nicaragua's dependency on North American financial institutions.

For example, two new non-Somoza banking groups were established—Banco Nicaragüense (BANIC) and Banco de América (BANAMERICA). BANIC had ties with the Chase Manhattan Bank, and BANAMERICA's ties were established with the Wells Fargo Bank and First National City Bank. Internally, BANIC was known as the Liberal bank, was led by the Montealegre family, and represented the interests of the cotton planters of the northwest, coffee producers and sectors of the urban upper
Because BANIC invested its cotton profits into the industrial sector and established close ties with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) during the Alliance for Progress decade, it became the dominant of the two banks. BANIC also established links with a number of U.S. transnational corporations, including Pepsi Cola, United Fruit, General Mills, among others.

BANAMERICA, on the other hand, was led by the Pellas and Chamorro families and represented the traditional Conservative interests, for example, ranching, sugar, and mercantile interests. For the Conservatives, BANAMERICA was a positive outcome of the 1948 and 1950 pacts which were made with Somoza and which guaranteed economic privileges. These privileges were rarely respected especially if they conflicted with Somoza's interests. Nevertheless, the BANAMERICA group politically depended on Somoza.

Although each financial group was seen to represent either the Conservative or Liberal interests, the animosity between the two political groups, which was quite severe during the early twentieth century, had lessened considerably with the developments of coffee then cotton production. Hence, the political distinctions made between the banks were not all that rigid. The regional-partisan dichotomy broke down because the two political parties developed similar economic interests as traditional agricultural production was geared more and more to the capitalist world market. For instance, the debate between the Conservatives and Liberals concerning the use of similar colonial-controlled production and export policies versus the use of new liberal free trade policies was no longer waged. BANIC and BANAMERICA also had economic and political ties with Somoza and the clan. However, they
were unable to rival Somoza's monopoly over certain internal economic interests.

Neither did American multinational corporations threaten Somoza's estate. There are several reasons why direct foreign investment in Nicaragua was considerably less than that in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. For one, there is a lack of strategic mineral resources in Nicaragua. Secondly, Standard Fruit had established a banana operation, but it was eliminated during the 1930s due to crop disease. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Somoza's greed was a major deterrent for many U.S. capital interests. The dictator demanded either equity participation in the new ventures, gifts, or payoffs. Despite his tactics, the policies toward MNCs were quite lenient. There were no restrictions placed on foreign direct investment; MNCs could remit profits and capital unconditionally; and there were no restrictions placed on the purchase of foreign exchange.  

The multinational corporations that did establish themselves in Nicaragua often invested in the areas where Somoza did not have operations. The U.S. companies were heavily involved in food processing, agrichemicals, lumber, and tourism. Major investors included Exxon, United Fruit, U.S. Steel, and Adela.  

The Continuation of U.S. Interest in Nicaragua

Despite the small U.S. economic stake in Nicaragua, U.S. interest in Nicaragua still prevailed. The desire to build a canal in Nicaragua lost most of its significance once the Panama canal was built in 1903. By the post-World War II period, security considerations had shifted
away from the concern of preventing European intrusions into the hemisphere to that of averting communist aggression. Thus, the post-war emphasis on the need to contain communism provided the rationale for the continuation of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. For security reasons the U.S. continued to supply military aid to Latin American allies. Anastasio Somoza García and his heirs were considered to be strong allies. A. Somoza García had been capable of maintaining close ties with Washington officials, especially with Ambassador Thomas Whelan (1951-1961). Whelan became a personal friend of the dictator and often played pro-Somoza roles in Nicaraguan politics.

When Anastasio Somoza García was assassinated in 1956, his assassination did not mark the end of the type of state that he had created. One son, Luis Somoza, ruled as president from 1957 to 1963 while the other, Anastasio (Tachito), commanded the National Guard. Luis initiated reform programs—public housing, agrarian reform, and health and welfare programs—which were similar to those proposed by the designers of the Alliance for Progress. During the Alliance for Progress era, Washington became more concerned about being identified with dictators; Luis Somoza and his successor René Schick Gutiérrez, who was a liberal lawyer, were thought to be more suitable rulers.

Cold war politics, however, allied the Nicaraguan government even closer to Washington and the Pentagon. During the late 1950s, Luis Somoza sold military equipment to the Batista government to fight Castro's forces. Following the success of the Cuban revolution in 1959, the Somozas became anxious to overthrow the new government. And in 1961, the Somozas allowed the CIA to train Cuban exiles in Nicaragua for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Most troops and air attacks operated from
Nicaraguan bases and, in return, Nicaragua was supplied with U.S. military aid.

The Origins of the FSLN

The emergence and development of a guerrilla group in a particular society does not only come about because of the existence of a group in the society which takes a different ideological stance from the one that the state takes. In Nicaragua, there were several reasons why the Sandinista National Liberation Front emerged. One of the most important reasons had to do with the Nicaraguan state itself. The Somoza family had been in power since the 1930s and had limited the chances of electoral victory for the political opposition by skillfully maneuvering its re-elections. Up until the early 1960s, opposition to the regime was waged unsuccessfully by the Conservatives, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), and a trade union movement. When the Cuban revolution occurred in 1959, Tomás Borge, Carlos Fonseca Amador and other radical students who had belonged to the PSN re-evaluated the Stalinist perspective of the PSN and decided to adopt the revolutionary marxism developed by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

In July 1961, Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga founded the FSLN. They incorporated the name "Sandino" into the name of their new revolutionary group because they wanted to associate their political struggle with the folk hero's struggle. The Sandinistas felt that the issues that had been important to Sandino during the 1930s, for instance, the abject condition of the peasantry, U.S. interference in Nicaraguan affairs, amongst others, had not been
resolved. The Sandinistas drew from the Cuban leaders' foco theory of guerrilla warfare and Augusto Sandino's guerrilla program for their own revolutionary platform. The guerrilla foco, according to Che Guevara, includes a small group of armed revolutionaries who are to be the vanguard and who are to create the "subjective" conditions for victory by mobilizing a "dormant" mass. The aspects of the FSLN program which are traceable to Sandino's program are (a) nationalism and anti-imperialism, (b) reliance on the masses for support, and (c) the development of armed conflict as the only effective means of overthrowing the Somoza regime.

From 1962 to 1967, the FSLN practised the foco strategy along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. René Schick, who was president of Nicaragua at that time, pursued liberal policies like those of Luis Somoza, but the real power contender was Anastasio Somoza. Under Somoza's command, the National Guard fought the FSLN rather successfully. In 1967, at Pancasan, the FSLN suffered a major military defeat in which twenty out of thirty-five members were killed. After this experience, the Sandinistas changed their revolutionary strategy.

The new strategy, which is known as the guerra popular prolongada (GPP, prolonged popular war), was developed and applied from 1967 to 1974—a period which is known as "the accumulation of forces in silence." The Sandinistas planned on a prolonged popular war which would include rural guerrilla activities, mass mobilization in the cities and in the countryside, and struggles over political and economic issues in the cities. One should be aware of the differences between the foco strategy and the GPP strategies because the strategies resulted in two different types of revolutions—the Cuban and the Nicaraguan.
The GPP strategy was unlike the *foco* strategy because it stressed the need to organize mass support in the cities and in the countryside. Moreover, the Sandinistas held that the mass movement rather than the vanguard movement was to be the focal point of the struggle. The Cuban revolution, based on the *foco* strategy, was waged by 500 to 1,500 guerrillas (depending on who you read) and resulted in a socialist revolution. The Nicaraguan revolution, on the other hand, was waged by the masses and resulted in a pluralist revolution.

During the late 1960s, the FSLN began to build their popular army by incorporating peasants into the revolutionary movement. As previously mentioned, the socio-economic changes that resulted from the rapid rise of cotton production had deleterious effects on the peasants. The peasants had been forced off their land by either the large estate owners or by the National Guard. They then became tenant farmers or plantation workers. Many experienced chronic malnutrition, lack of health care, poor housing conditions, illiteracy, and seasonal employment. Hence, the FSLN did not find it too difficult a task to organize the peasants.

**Weakening Support for the Regime**

When Marxists analyse revolution, they speak of class-conflicts in the prerevolutionary period with the state supporting the dominant class. They do not regard the state as a unit with its own being. Nor do they hold the view that the state can act against the interests of the dominant class. They analyse class-relationships more than state-class relationships. But if one is to understand the breakdown of the
state in revolutionary situations, then the state must be central to the
analysis, and state-class relationships must be explored.

State-class relationships are continuously changing throughout
revolutionary periods. By 1979, in Nicaragua, the classes were not so
much in conflict with each other as they were semi-united in their quest
to overthrow Somoza. In the end, it was Somoza and the Guard against
the majority of the population. Thus, it is necessary to explore the
changing state-class relationships in order to understand the particular
dynamics of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process and how it was that the
Nicaraguan revolution became known as the "people's revolution."

In 1967 the Nicaraguan state was run by Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
After a rigged election, he became the third member of the Somoza family
to occupy the presidency. His rule was similar to that of his father's.
He curtailed the political privileges of the opposition, centralized
political power under his authority and increased the use of the
military.\textsuperscript{100} The sectors in Nicaragua, which at this point openly
voiced their dissatisfaction with the way the state was run, included
the Conservatives, members of the Roman Catholic Church, officers in the
military, small businessmen, and the unemployed.

The Conservative party had long tried to get rid of Somoza through
elections. Since most elections were rigged, they found that their
chances of succeeding were unrealistic. Also, by the 1960s, most
industry in Nicaragua was controlled by the state through its fiscal and
credit concessions and privileges.\textsuperscript{101} The Conservatives were angered by
the increased identification of Somoza with the state, but at the same
time they had become dependent upon the state. For example, with
respect to their ranching interests, they had come to rely on the
National Guard to control rural unrest. So, in 1971, the Conservative party agreed to a pact which promised them 40 percent of the seats in the legislature.

The 1971 pact was negotiated by U.S. Ambassador Shelton and was signed by Conservative leader Fernando Aguero and President Anastasio Somoza. According to the Nicaraguan Constitution, a president was not allowed to run for a second term. According to the pact, Somoza would resign as president in 1972 and turn the presidency over to a three-man junta. The triumvirate, consisting of Aguero and two Somoza nominees, would rule Nicaragua for two years while a new constitution was written and an election for president was held. This pact enabled Somoza to dominate the triumvirate, control the National Guard, and run for president in the 1974 election. The pact also meant that the Conservatives remained as an opposition party and did not pose a serious threat to the political system.

Another important power force in Nicaragua was the Roman Catholic Church. The Church identified itself with the Conservatives but maintained normal relations with the Somoza governments. Up until 1971, members of the Church were silent on the subject of A. Somoza Debayle. However, after Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo of Managua issued a pastoral letter protesting the three-man junta pact and declaring Church support for a new order, relations between the Church and Somoza began to deteriorate.

Somoza's control over the National Guard also began to weaken. Disputes between the junior and senior officers of the Guard came about after the quick promotion of Somoza's half-brother, José Somoza. Drug scandals and even shootouts between officers affected the Guard's
cohesion. These developments, in conjunction with the economic crisis brought about by the *Mercado Común Centroamericano* (MCCA, Central American Common Market), eroded the General's power base and strained his links with the private sector.

The Central American Common Market was proposed by the U.S. in the early 1960s to expand regional trade in Central America. Industrialization was promoted rather than agrarian reform. Free trade zones were created in the five republics with the objective of expanding the national domestic markets.

The MCCA produced an economic boom, but in the end resulted in an economic crisis. There were several structural reasons for the failure of the plan. The local economies were dependent upon the revenue generated from agricultural exports to pay for the growth of the new industries. The extreme price fluctuations for agricultural products contributed to balance of payment problems and increased foreign debt. In addition, local firms became technologically dependent; they imported expensive machinery and parts from the U.S. for their industrial plants.

By the end of the decade, the common market experienced an economic crisis. Local markets had become saturated; world prices for Nicaragua's agricultural and beef products had fallen; and private investment had declined. These problems coincided with the war which was waged between El Salvador and Honduras. In 1969, the Salvadorean army invaded Honduras after the Hondurans had forcefully expelled Salvadoreans from their territory. The underlying cause of the war was the population problems experienced in El Salvador. Approximately 300,000 Salvadoreans migrated to Honduran towns which were located near
the border. The war lasted only four days, but the tensions that were created between the two countries contributed to the problems already faced by the members of the MCCA.

In Nicaragua, the MCCA produced different effects upon the upper class sectors. BANIC and BANAMERICA expanded into manufacturing activities, agro-industries, and construction, whereas medium and small business enterprises experienced economic problems. As a result of the expansion, there was an increase in monopoly capitalism. For example, out of the 600 industrial plants which employed 5 or more workers, 136 plants generated 72 percent of total production. In 1971, 13,000 small industries generated only 5 percent of the country's industrial output. The owners of the small enterprises did not benefit from Somoza's state-estate practices and privileges.

By the beginning of the 1970s, Somoza was confronted by limited but increased internal opposition waged by the FSLN, the Conservative Party and other political parties, the Roman Catholic Church, members of the Guard, sectors of the business community, and the unemployed. In order to strengthen his internal position, Somoza decided to strengthen his external support in the U.S. (This political action had become a tradition in Nicaraguan politics. As previously mentioned, in the early twentieth century, both the Liberals and Conservatives had tried to gain U.S. support for their own constituencies.) The dictator instructed Ambassador Turner Shelton to arrange a trip to the U.S. and to arrange a private dinner with President Nixon. Nixon's response was a friendly endorsement of U.S. support for Somoza. This response helped strengthen the dictator's position within the U.S. as well as within Nicaragua, particularly with the National Guard and upper class sectors.
However, the visit had little effect on other sectors. Unrest among students and labour groups increased throughout 1972. When the December 1972 earthquake struck Managua, it marked the beginning of the decline of the elaborate state system which had been formed after years of dynastic rule.
Footnotes


3 Ibid., p. 51.


6 Ibid., p. 13.

7 Loc. cit., p. 15.


9 Loc. cit.


13 Ibid., p. 322.


15 Stein, op. cit., p. 17.


29 Crawford, op. cit., p. 34.


33 "Dollar diplomacy" was a term created by Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State for President W.H. Taft. By this he meant that order was best established by economic forces, such as U.S. businessmen, rather than by military forces. The term also had a dual character. Diplomacy was to advance American business interests and the use of dollars was to promote American diplomacy. See Booth, op. cit., p. 28, and Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy: A Study
The U.S. government was partially satisfied with the election results. U.S. officials knew that the election, on one hand, was fraudulent and violated Dodd's law but that, on the other hand, nonrecognition of the Solórzano government was viewed as civil strife. So the decision was made to recognize the Solórzano government. See Kamman, op. cit., p. 31.

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54 Millet, op. cit., p. 182.


56 Crawley, op. cit., p. 95.

57 Jung, op. cit., p. 70.

58 Crawley, op. cit., p. 96.

59 Ibid., pp. 96, 121.


61 Booth, op. cit., p. 65.

62 Crawley, op. cit., p. 97.

63 Black, op. cit., p. 34.

64 Loc. cit.

65 Millet, op. cit., p. 199.

66 Black, op. cit., p. 55.

67 Booth, op. cit., pp. 62, 63.

68 Ibid., p. 29.

69 Ibid., p. 32.


71 Crawley, op. cit., p. 102.

72 Millet, op. cit., p. 201, and Crawley, op. cit., p. 102.

74 Millet, op. cit., p. 213.

75 Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino, op. cit., p. 28.

76 NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 11.

77 Ibid., p. 10.

78 Black, op. cit., p. 11.


81 Winson, op. cit., p. 218.

82 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 49, and Booth, op. cit., p. 65.

83 Crawley, op. cit., p. 121.

84 Booth, op. cit., p. 67.


86 Black, op. cit., p. 38.


88 AID (U.S. Agency for International Development) administered most of the U.S. foreign aid in Latin America, especially during the Alliance for Progress decade. The Alliance for Progress was an American development policy administered to Latin American countries during the 1960s. It was initiated in response to the Cuban revolution and attempted to bring about gradual social reform in Latin America to thwart other social revolutions.

89 Wheelock, op. cit., p. 156.

90 NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 20.

91 Ibid., pp. 36-38.

93 NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 17.

94 Millet, op. cit., p. 225.

95 Vanden, op. cit., p. 49.

96 See R. Bonachea and N. Valdés, op. cit., pp. 89, 155, and Robin Blackburn, op. cit.


100 NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., p. 14.

101 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 5.

102 Black, op. cit., p. 58.

103 Loc. cit.

104 Millet, op. cit., p. 236.

105 NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., p. 11.

106 Black, op. cit., p. 39.


110 Loc. cit.

111 Millet, op. cit., p. 235.
CHAPTER THREE: THE POTENTIAL AUTONOMY OF THE STATE

A Chronology of Events from 1972 to 1977

The following chronology of Nicaraguan events from 1972 to 1977 briefly outlines the gradual buildup of political and military opposition towards the Somoza regime, the state's reaction to the opposition, the U.S. government's response, and internal economic developments.

1972 Dec. 23: Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, was struck by an earthquake which killed 10,000 people, left 200,000 homeless, and destroyed 90 percent of the city's commercial activity.

1972 Dec.: Somoza proclaimed himself head of the National Emergency Committee for the reconstruction of Managua, thereby assuming absolute power. Government corruption, longer working hours, and lower wages resulted in increased opposition from business and labour sectors.

1973: Construction workers led by the Confederación General de Trabajadores -- Independiente (CGT-I, General Confederation of Labour -- Independent)
the trade union federation of the Socialist Party, went on strike.

1973-74

: Rising inflation, labour unrest, and unemployment characterized this period.

1974

: The Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP, Higher Council of Private Enterprise), a group of industrialists and commercial businessmen, along with the Instituto de Desarrollo Nicaragüense (INDE, Nicaraguan Development Institute) which was an institute of COSEP, sponsored a convention of private sector interests that demanded governmental honesty and socio-economic reforms.

1974 Dec. 15: Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, and Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero founded the Unión Democrática de Liberación (UDEL, Democratic Union of Liberation) as a non-traditional political party. UDEL represented a broad spectrum of political forces: conservatives, liberals, Christians, Social Democrats, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, trade unions, and labour organizations. UDEL wanted to get rid of
Somoza and his corruption but leave the socioeconomic system basically intact.

Dec. 27: The FSLN ended its period of "accumulation of forces in silence" with the raid on José María Castillo Quant's house, where a party was being held for U.S. Ambassador Turner B. Shelton. The FSLN took hostages, many of whom were leading dignitaries of the regime. After 60 hours of negotiation, Somoza met the major FSLN demands, including payment of $1 million, freedom for 14 Frente prisoners, and safe conduct to Cuba for the prisoners and the guerrillas. The raid resulted in the recruitment of many new members.

Dec. 28: After the raid, Somoza declared a state of siege and intensified repression against the entire Nicaraguan population.

1974-1975: During this period, Nicaragua experienced economic troubles. GDP growth was down to 2.2 percent in 1975 from an average of 10.7 percent which was reached between 1960 and 1970.

1975-1976: Somoza used the Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano (CONDECA, Central American Defence Council) forces to help the National Guard
destroy FSLN units which were operating in the northern part of the country. The Guard tortured and executed hundreds of peasants.

1975-1976: The repression by the regime and the Front's own growth split the FSLN into three factions: The Tendencia Proletaria (TP, Proletarian Tendency), the Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP, Prolonged Popular War Faction) and the Terceristas (Third Force), otherwise known as the Tendencia Insurreccional (TI, Insurrectional Tendency).

1976 Nov.: Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as president of the United States. With Carter's emphasis on human rights in foreign policy matters, the Somoza regime lost the backing it had had under the Nixon and Ford administrations.

1977 July 25: Somoza suffered a mild heart attack. He was flown to Miami for treatment, and he remained there for five weeks.

1977 Sept. 7: When Somoza returned to Nicaragua, he found that the leaders of his own Liberal Party were challenging his rule. He then purged some of his top advisors including Cornelio Hueck, who
was the president of the National Congress and national secretary of the Liberal Party.


1977 Oct. 12: The Terceristas attacked several National Guard targets located in different parts of the country.

1977 Nov.: *La Prensa*'s front page carried a political document written by twelve prominent Nicaraguan professionals, businessmen, and clergy. The twelve were known as Los Doce. They insisted that a political solution could not be found without the Sandinista participation. Los Doce then fled Nicaragua for safety reasons. From abroad, they lobbied against international aid for Somoza and organized anti-Somoza movements within Nicaragua.

1977 Nov.: UDEL and the Roman Catholic Church promoted a national dialogue to solve the political crisis peacefully. Somoza refused to relinquish his power base.
The Somoza State in Crisis

This chapter will examine the heightened internal and external threats to the Somoza state and the ineffective responses that the state took from 1972 to 1977. It will also describe the potential autonomous relationship between the state and the upper class. The events which occurred during this period marked the beginning of serious opposition in Nicaragua. The fundamental political tensions in the Nicaraguan regime were not between the landed classes, and the rising commercial classes and peasants, nor were they between the bourgeois classes, and peasant and working classes. Instead, the political tensions were centered in the relationships of the state to each class. This is not to say that there were no tensions amongst the classes: rather, the tensions that did exist were not those that bring about a revolution. Each class in Nicaragua took a separate route against the state and to some degree acknowledged or accepted the other's endeavours or even encouraged inter-class unity against the state. Those who encouraged class unity against the Somoza state were in effect encouraging a people's revolution.

There were two groups which were basically responsible for promoting a pluralistic revolution: the Terceristas of the FSLN and Los Doce. Other groups such as UDEL had a pluralistic membership but took separate routes from the FSLN. The Roman Catholic Church also acted as a linkage group between the classes. However, it was the Terceristas and Los Doce who were mainly responsible for the revolution's becoming a people's revolution. (This will be discussed later in the chapter.)
When Theda Skocpol and Ellen Trimberger examined revolutions from below or above, they found that the states experienced political crises, initiated from the international environment, which brought about the revolutions. Since Skocpol analyses revolutions from below, her findings are more useful here. Skocpol claims that the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions emerged from political crises that developed when the states became unable to meet the challenges of international situations. She writes, "The monarchical authorities were subjected to new threats or intensified competition from more economically developed powers abroad." As a result, the monarchs pursued policies which conflicted with the economic interests of the dominant classes. These policies included the taking of resources from society in the form of land, population or trade taxes, and the implementation of reforms for structural transformations.

In Nicaragua, international constraints on the state's power were not the revolutionary catalysts. It was the 1972 earthquake, a fortuitous natural event, which was the "accelerator" of the revolution. (Although international constraints were not the catalysts in the Nicaraguan revolution, a parallel can be drawn between the ideas that international constraints or forces and external crises such as earthquakes are catalysts in revolutions.) The earthquake and the reconstruction period not only exposed Somoza's greed but revealed the overlapping between the state and the dictator's estate. The state was not confronted with major international constraints on its power, for example, war or unfavourable international trade conditions, which may have led it to pursue policies unfavourable to the upper class sectors. Instead, Somoza saw in the earthquake a chance to increase his personal
wealth, and upper class interests were once again obstacles to overcome. (Although international constraints on the state's power, for example, the 1973 world recession and President Carter's foreign policy demands, were not the accelerators of the revolution, they did play an important role.)

In chapter two, I have illustrated how the Somoza state and estate increasingly became one. In order to achieve this state-estate relationship, the state became more and more autonomous from the upper class sectors.

It is difficult to measure something so abstract as state autonomy. One method would be to examine the levels of intensity or changes in state policies and state behaviour which tend to threaten upper class interests over a period of time. This would not be sufficient, however. One would also have to examine the types and extent of political opposition waged by the upper classes against the state, over the same time period. Any significant change and/or increase in political opposition would indicate an upper class intolerance towards the level of state autonomy exercised at that particular time.

This method has been utilized here. For example, throughout chapter two, I describe how the Somoza state and estate increasingly became one, how the state trampled on upper class interests in order to serve its own interests, and how the upper classes waged their political opposition. The political opposition was waged within the "rules of the game." However, operating within the rules of the game, the upper class sectors could never wrest state power from the Somoza family.

It was not until after the earthquake, however, that state autonomy reached its highest level. The evidence of this increased autonomy was
not so much changes in the rules of the game or in state policies but the increased intensity of past state behaviour, for example, a significant increase in state corruption and state greed, including taxes. Because of the increase of these factors, Somoza was no longer perceived as serving the interests of the upper classes. Another indicator of the increased state autonomy was the increase in political opposition waged outside the rules of the game by the upper classes. For instance, new political opposition groups were formed which demanded political reforms and Somoza's resignation. They were not willing to wait for the 1981 election. Before I discuss the types and extent of the political opposition waged by the upper classes, it is necessary to examine the earthquake and post-earthquake events.

The 1972 Earthquake

When the earthquake struck the capital city on December 23, 1972, homes and commercial buildings were completely destroyed. Ten thousand people were killed, and many others were injured. There were three groups, however, which benefitted from the destruction: the National Guard, Somoza, and the clan. Somoza allowed the National Guard to share with himself and the clan in the spoils. The Guardia looted the capital city, operated a black market of stolen property, and sold large quantities of food, clothing, and other goods sent by foreigners to be distributed freely. The Guardia's actions resulted in a complete breakdown of public order. Somoza decided that the situation had gotten out of hand so he had 600 U.S. soldiers and other Central American troops occupy Managua.
The destruction of homes, buildings, and commercial inventories created investment and production opportunities to replace the damaged items. Somoza enriched himself personally by becoming president of the Emergency Committee, administrator of lending and international assistance, urban planner, building demolisher, and manager of welfare. Somoza organized his own bank, the Banco de Centro América, an insurance company, and finance and construction firms. Somoza's company, Equipos Pesados S.A. (ESPESA) took charge of demolition work; Inmuebles S.A. took charge of real estate speculation; and other companies took on contracts for building materials. For example, Somoza's cement factory was the only supplier of cement to rebuild hospitals and other buildings. And the streets were no longer paved with asphalt but with adoquines (paving stones) from a factory owned by Somoza. The dictator was able to exercise a monopoly control over the reconstruction of Managua with the help of foreign aid funds which were supposed to be delivered to earthquake victims, and which by 1974, came to US $174 million.

The dictator also allowed the clan to benefit during the reconstruction phase. One of the ways in which the clan profitted was through the selling of internationally donated blood plasma, which was destined to earthquake victims, to buyers in the U.S. The clan also controlled one of the most prominent construction companies and sold cheap housing units at approximately four times their original value.

The rampant corruption that occurred during the reconstruction period alienated many Nicaraguans from the state. Longer working hours, lower wages, and a drop in living standards resulted in organized action by the working class, urban and rural. The actions included land
invasions by the peasants in the north and the 1973 construction workers' strike led by the CGT-I, the trade union federation of the PSN. When the 5,000 construction workers demanded higher pay, Somoza ordered the workers replaced by recruits from the interior of the country.

Three important, separate organized responses emerged from the aftermath of the earthquake: the upper class response headed by UDEL, the peasant and working class response headed by the FSLN, and the external response headed by the U.S. government. All three groups wanted to bring an end to the Somoza dictatorship but had different strategies to achieve their goal.

The Upper Class Opposition

By the 1970s, the upper class in Nicaragua included a mixture of groups. Some of the landed classes became involved in the industrialization efforts of the 1950s and 1960s. They now had prosperous commercial and industrial enterprises besides their plantations. Others were primarily involved in the plantation economy; and still others were mainly involved in commercial or industrial ventures.

The upper class in Nicaragua can be broken down into several sectors. First of all there were the major capitalists such as the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups, and the Somoza family and its closest business friends. Secondly, there were the owners of medium-sized firms or plantations. A third important group consisted of foreign capitalists; and a fourth sector obtained its wealth from its connections with
the Somoza state through the exploitation of public capital or political power.  

Before the earthquake, the majority of this class experienced a love-hate relationship with the Somozas. They were attracted to the Somoza state because the government pursued economic policies that favoured most of them, for example, laws which promoted infrastructure and industrial development, and laws which controlled labour unions and labour policy. However, with the ever-growing economic power of the Somozas, numerous indigenous interests were threatened, especially after 1972.

The state corruption which followed the earthquake resulted in a profound conflict between Somoza and his clan, and the other sectors of the upper class. For example, the high level of administrative and bureaucratic corruption made business transactions extremely difficult to conduct. The Somoza group excluded other sectors of the upper class from the earthquake investment opportunities. Taxes were increased on production and consumption in order to make payments on the public foreign debt. In addition, the world economic crisis of 1973 resulted in higher industrial production costs, decreased demand for traditional exports, and decreased foreign investment. There were four major upper class responses to the post-earthquake events. These included responses made by BANIC and BANAMERICA, COSEP and INDE, UDEL, and the Roman Catholic Church.

BANIC and BANAMERICA

BANIC and BANAMERICA were now the largest capitalist groups in the country. They had benefitted from the Somoza family dynasty and had
established certain bonds between themselves and the Somozas. The bonds that linked the banking groups to the Somozas were established through specific institutions, such as development banks and private sector associations. The three main groups were also affiliated in joint investments. BANAMERICA and Somoza shared joint interests in the production and exportation of sugar, the fabrication of paper and cellulose, and in the making of alcohol. BANIC and Somoza had joint interests in the exportation of wine, cotton, and sugar, the production of milk and in the Centroamericana de Ahorro y Préstamo (CAPSA, Central American Savings and Loan Institute). BANAMERICA and BANIC shared interests in a ceramic industry, Industria Cerámica de Centroamérica (INCESA). 14

After 1972, when Somoza entered the banking and construction fields, he entered an area which had been dominated by BANIC and BANAMERICA affiliates. Jaime Wheelock, today's (1984) Nicaraguan Minister of Agriculture, wrote in 1975 describing the BANIC, BANAMERICA-state relationship:

there is no branch of economic activity which the [Somoza] group does not possess interests in, and including the grounds previously exclusive of BANIC and BANAMERICA; the Somoza group has penetrated those areas very profoundly, threatening the stability of its competitors.

Many of the BANIC and BANAMERICA businessmen were angered by the increased size of the Somoza state-estate. They also resented having to pay the new emergency taxes while Somoza—who had always exempted himself from taxes—used international relief funds to increase his personal wealth. 16 Although BANIC and BANAMERICA remained wealthy, opportunities for extending their enterprises were stifled.
COSEP and INDE

After the earthquake, the upper class opposition began to unify their efforts to get rid of Somoza. It was not the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups which led the opposition against the state. Instead, it was groups like COSEP and INDE (a member group of COSEP) which represented the sectors most affected by the corruption and adverse economic conditions. COSEP and INDE represented cotton, cattle, and coffee producers, members of the Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Industries, and other upper class interests. In 1974, COSEP and INDE held a convention for members of the private sector where they promoted reformist goals. They wanted the elimination of government corruption and dishonesty, respect for the Constitution, and the reorganization of the National Guard under non-Somoza military officials. They also instructed their members not to pay the new emergency taxes.

UDEL

At the same time, UDEL was officially formed by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro and Ramiro Sacasa Guerrero. UDEL represented groups from the labour and capital sectors. Although its members came from the working, middle, and upper classes, the majority of its members were from the upper class. UDEL consisted of splinter groups from both the Liberal and Conservative Parties, for example, the Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI, Independent Liberal Party) and the Acción Nacional Conservadora (ANC, Conservative National Action) party. In 1944, some members left the Liberal National Party to form the Independent Liberal Party. The new party advocated Keynesian economics and used legal means to oppose the dictatorship. However, Somoza's use of electoral fraud frustrated
their efforts. The Conservatives also became frustrated with electoral efforts to change the political system. After the Conservative Party leader Fernando Aguero made a pact with Somoza for the triumvirate rule in 1971, the collaboration alienated many conservatives. As a result, some left to join the Social Christian party; others formed new conservative parties; and others joined UDEL.

UDEL, like COSEP and INDE, sought reform rather than revolution. The group wanted free elections, honesty in government, respect for political and trade union freedoms, and agrarian reform. Moreover, UDEL wanted Somoza to resign. UDEL's strategy was to expose the atrocities of the Somoza dictatorship internationally so that members of the U.S. government would work towards the resignation and support UDEL. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro hoped to run in the 1981 election with U.S. backing. (This Conservative stance of seeking U.S. support to augment the party's internal credibility is a familiar one, dating back to the early twentieth century.)

UDEL's relationship with the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups was not very strong. UDEL had a difficult time attracting them because the groups distrusted UDEL's pluralistic membership. Although BANIC and BANAMERICA were angered by the state's corrupt policies, they were not willing to sever their political or economic ties with Somoza. At this point, they also did not think that the U.S. would seek an alternative to the Somoza dictatorship. Hence, the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups remained on both sides; they continued doing business with Somoza, and they maintained or strengthened their linkages with anti-Somoza groups.
UDEL's relationship with the FSLN was also weak. Many of the members were sympathetic towards the FSLN because their sons or daughters or relatives had joined the Frente. However, both the left and the right wings of UDEL feared that the National Guard would become more repressive towards them should UDEL and the FSLN strengthen their contacts. 24 Moreover, many of the UDEL members feared that the FSLN would take the political initiative in the struggle against the dictatorship.

The Roman Catholic Church

Like other sectors of the upper class, the Roman Catholic Church leaders became increasingly critical of the Somoza regime during the early 1970s. 25 This change was a marked departure from its traditional political stance of supporting the Conservatives and reserving its criticism towards the regime.

The political transformation of the Church in Nicaragua took place following the 1968 Latin American Bishops Conference which was held in Medellín, Colombia. 26 One of the major proposals put forth at the conference was the goal of applying the reforms of Vatican II to Latin America. (The Second Vatican Council had affirmed the commitment of Christians to help the poor throughout the world.) 27 As a result, clerics throughout Latin America began to promote social and political justice for the poor, and a new "theology of liberation" emerged. The new theology was quite different from the traditional teaching which promoted the passive acceptance of poverty and the political order. The theology of liberation interpreted the Bible as demanding that
Christians actively work towards the liberation of the world's poor and oppressed.28

The emergence of the new teaching coincided with the increased anti-Somoza sentiment in Nicaragua. When the Catholic religious orders began organizing the poor to demand better living conditions from the government, the National Guard interpreted their efforts as subversive, and community activists began to disappear. By the mid-1970s, Catholic organizations and community groups became radicalized. Clerics who worked in urban slums, in the countryside, or with students, served as linkages between the FSLN and the Christian organizations. As state repression increased, more and more Christian groups became important resource groups for FSLN activity. For example, Catholic organizations stockpiled food and medical supplies, raised money, and allowed the Sandinistas to stock military arms in the churches.29

While the lower clergy was supportive of the FSLN, the Church hierarchy was critical of both the state and the FSLN and served as mediator in several uneasy situations. For example, Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo acted as mediator between the state and the FSLN during the 1974 Castillo Quant hostage taking and during the 1978 National Palace takeover (see chapter four). The Archbishop also promoted "national dialogues" amongst the conflicting parties. Two national dialogue efforts were made: one in November 1977 and the other in January 1978. Both efforts failed because Somoza refused to negotiate.30

The Nicaraguan Church hierarchy acted as mediator or as a linkage group between the state and opposing classes because although the hierarchy opposed the Somoza regime, it distrusted the Marxism of some
of the FSLN leaders. Hence, the Roman Catholic Church worked towards a negotiated settlement so that Somoza would be removed and replaced by moderates. Although the upper and lower clergy differed in their attitudes towards the FSLN and the Somoza state, their limited or extensive cooperation with the FSLN and their critical stances towards the state helped to legitimize the FSLN amongst the population and aided in the development of the pluralistic nature of the overthrow.

The FSLN Opposition

By 1970, the FSLN was no longer a small isolated guerrilla group. It had changed to a larger and more organized insurgent force with peasant backing. During its "accumulation of forces in silence" phase, from 1967 to 1974, the FSLN was busy recruiting in the cities and in the countryside, and the Sandinistas were successful in several of their attacks on National Guard outposts in the North Central region of Nicaragua.

The character of the Front also changed in the cities from that of a small urban force to a large and better-supported group. During the early 1970s, urban recruits came mainly from middle class student activists and urban workers. In 1971 students demanded political reforms and occupied several churches. In 1973 public demonstrations called for political reform of the regime.

It wasn't until 1974 when the FSLN launched its first major assault against the dictatorship. On December 27 the FSLN assaulted a Christmas party which was held at the home of José María Castillo Quant, a wealthy cotton exporter and former minister of agriculture. The party was
held to honour U.S. Ambassador Turner Shelton. The FSLN took many high-level politicians and members of the Somoza family hostage and requested that Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo mediate the dispute. After sixty hours of negotiations, Somoza met the major demands. The FSLN demanded the release of FSLN prisoners, a $5 million payment, and a publication of an anti-Somoza message to the Nicaraguan people. The prisoners were released, a $1 million ransom was paid, and a long communique was published in the local newspapers and broadcasted over six radio stations. Somoza also provided an airliner which flew the Sandinistas, released prisoners, and hostages to Cuba.

Shortly thereafter, Somoza decreed a state of siege, martial law and press censorship. Somoza also started to use CONDECA forces in the northern part of the country. The CONDECA forces included troops from Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras as well as U.S. military advisors from the Panama Canal zone. One of the military operations, Aguila Sexta, which occurred during the winter of 1975-76, resulted in the death of many FSLN members and the exile of others to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama.

The hostage taking, which gave the FSLN a symbolic political victory, and the increased state repression led to more public support for the FSLN. The new pressures of the state and the FSLN's own growth also led to another development—the emergence of three FSLN factions during the years 1975-76. The factions developed because the increased repression cut off the rural guerrillas from the urban forces, and because most of the leaders were either in exile or in hiding. In addition, since sectors of the FSLN were operating in different areas of
the country, urban or rural, and with different classes, several strategic methods for conducting the war developed.

- Three separate factions emerged: the Proletarian Tendency, the Prolonged Popular War faction, and the Terceristas. The Proletarians were led by intellectuals and academics who adhered to a "traditional Marxist line." Three of their important leaders were Jaime Wheelock Román, Roberto Huembles, and Luis Carrión. The Proletarians operated mainly in the urban areas. The TP believed that guerrilla warfare should be abandoned and that the FSLN should concentrate its efforts on the development of a revolutionary proletarian party. The faction worked with the urban working class from Managua's barrios, agricultural workers of the Pacific Coast, and workers in the sugar refineries and cotton-processing plants. The TP maintained that the development of a proletarian party must take place independently from the upper class.

- The Prolonged Popular War faction, on the other hand, had urban and rural operations. The original FSLN rural organization with leaders such as Tomás Borge and Henry Ruiz evolved into the GPP faction. The GPP believed that the best strategy for the war against the state was a gradual, cautious strategy aimed at accumulating a well-organized mass movement. This faction held that the Somoza regime would "crumble slowly" over a period of time and that the decisive insurrection against the state was a distant goal.

Because of the differences in revolutionary ideology and revolutionary strategy held by the TP and GPP factions, a political struggle developed between the two groups. The TP faction thought that the GPP faction was wasting its time in guerrilla warfare and instead should concentrate its efforts in developing a politically active working
class. The GPP faction criticized the TP faction for adhering to a rigid Marxist stance.

The Tercerista faction was formed outside of the country by the FSLN leaders who were in exile. The leaders acted as mediators in the political struggle which was waged between the TP and GPP factions. However, the Terceristas came to represent a "third force." The Tercerista leaders included Daniel and Humberto Ortega, Edén Pastora, and Víctor Tirado. The Terceristas did not adhere to a strict Marxist ideology. Instead, they believed that a pluralistic political line would win the support of many Nicaraguans who were against the Somoza regime but had not yet taken any side in the struggle. FSLN membership was then opened to non-Marxist Christians and members of the upper and middle classes. As a result, the Terceristas were responsible for winning the support of important sectors of the Church which had opposed the regime because of human rights violations. In addition, small businessmen, professionals, academics, lawyers, and other sectors of the middle and upper classes began supporting the FSLN.

The Terceristas also held that bold military actions would aid in the development of a mass insurrection. They also worked towards the development of powerful international support groups in Latin America, North America, and Western Europe. As a result of these strategies, the faction became the majority tendency within the FSLN. One author even identified the National Directorate with the Tercerista faction. Hence, the pluralistic emphasis in the revolutionary ideology of the Terceristas was instrumental in the development of a "people's revolution." Had either the GPP or TP factions become the major faction of the FSLN then perhaps the revolution would have evolved differently.
Without the middle and upper class elements, it may have developed into a proletarian or a peasant revolution.

From 1975 to 1976 the divisions between the factions were intense. Each faction increased its membership but did not sever itself completely from the FSLN. During this period, the membership of the FSLN had changed. The original founding members of the Front had come from the lower and middle class urban backgrounds, and many had been students. When the FSLN first recruited, it recruited students, urban workers, and peasants. By the mid- to late-1970s, new members came from middle class and upper class backgrounds. Urban lower class youth were also mobilized. Children as young as 12 to 16 years of age, known as los muchachos, along with women, played an active part in the military struggle.

Middle Class Opposition

Like the middle classes in other Latin American countries, the middle class in Nicaragua consisted of diverse segments of the population. The middle class in Nicaragua consisted mainly of middle-income professionals, small businessmen, teachers, white-collar workers in public and private sectors, and students. Such a diverse composition creates problems when one wants to examine the middle class as a collectivity. In order to resolve this, I have examined certain parties and unions which have been known for their middle class compositions. There were two major political parties which had predominantly middle class backing: the Independent Liberal Party and the Social Christian Party.
The Independent Liberals were supported by small businessmen, white-collar workers, and professionals. The party broke with the Liberal Nationalist Party in 1944 and since then became quite active in its opposition towards the regime. The Independent Liberals mobilized students and other supporters to demonstrate against the regime. On numerous occasions, party members were imprisoned, exiled, or tortured for their political activism. When in 1956 Rigoberto López Pérez, a PLI member, assassinated Anastasio Somoza García, A. Somoza Debayle jailed all PLI leaders. Tomás Borge, who was then a law student and PLI member, was tortured, and tried and convicted for conspiring in the assassination. The majority of the PLI's political opposition was waged through legalistic means, however. In 1974, the PLI joined UDEL.

The Partido Social Cristiano Nicaraguense (PSCN, Nicaraguan Social Christian Party) was a reformist party which advocated peaceful social change. It was not affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, nor could it count on the Church hierarchy's support. The PSCN wanted increased social justice for the Nicaraguans and believed that this could be accomplished through reformist state intervention in the economy, Christian labour unions, cooperatives, and community development projects. When Miguel Obando y Bravo became archbishop of Nicaragua in 1968, the Catholic Church started to back the Social Christian Party. The Archbishop believed that the PSCN offered a chance to bring about political reform in Nicaragua. This increased support did not change matters. Like the Independent Liberals, the PSCN had also become frustrated with Somoza's use of electoral frauds. In 1974, it too joined UDEL.
Teachers, private and public sector employees, and health workers were represented by middle class unions such as the Asociación Nacional de Educadores de Nicaragua (ANDEN, National Association of Educators of Nicaragua), the Federación de Maestros de Nicaragua (FMN, Federation of Nicaragua Teachers), the Unión Nacional de Empleados (UNE, National Employees Union), and the Asociación de Mujeres ante la Problemática Nacional (AMPRONAC, Association of Women Confronting National Problems).

It was only after 1972 that such unions became highly critical of the regime. Their members became angry with the post-earthquake legislation which increased the workweek from 48 to 60 hours. They were also frustrated with state legislation which demanded that all government employees pay a month's salary per year for reconstruction efforts. As a result, the unions organized strikes in 1973 and 1974. When Somoza declared martial law in 1974, many union leaders were imprisoned and tortured. These state actions had the effect of radicalizing the middle class unions. The unions then broadened their work-oriented issues to include political reforms of the state.

Another middle class grouping was the university and high school students. Since the 1930s, students waged their opposition towards the Somoza dictatorship by organizing, demonstrating, mobilizing, rioting, and plotting. The politically active students came from different party backgrounds, from the Conservatives to the Marxists, but all played a critical role as reformists or revolutionaries. For example, Pedro J. Chamorro, Carlos Fonseca, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga were quite active as students, and had experienced torture, exile, or detention for their leftist activities. When Fonseca, Borge, and Mayorga joined the
FSLN, they recruited students into their ranks. By the mid-1970s each Sandinista faction had its own student organization. These organizations conducted demonstrations, organized neighbourhood groups, raised money, and recruited for the Front. 52

By 1977, the middle class sectors were divided in their opposition towards the regime. The independent Liberals, Social Christian Party, and middle sector unions supported upper class reformist efforts. The Partido Popular Social Cristiano (PPSC, People's Social Christian Party), which was a faction which broke away from the PSCN, supported the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas also had middle class student support.

**Lower Class Opposition--Rural and Urban**

The majority of the Nicaraguan population, approximately 80 percent, belonged to the rural and urban lower classes. 53 The lower class urban and rural workers along with the peasantry became increasingly politically active during the 1970s.

**Rural Opposition**

There were three main Nicaraguan agricultural areas where the rural dwellers became active in the anti-Somoza struggle: the Pacific Coastal region, the North Central region, and the Central Eastern region. 54 The regions will be examined in light of Skocpol's, Scott's, Wolf's, and Moore's theories concerning the structural and situational reasons for peasant rebellions. The areas differed in type of terrain, type of rural dweller and his livelihood, and type of military and political activism.
Before I examine the reasons why many of the rural dwellers became involved in the struggle against the state, it is necessary to examine the socio-economic conditions under which they lived. By the mid-1970s, approximately two-thirds of the rural population were illiterate; 120 infants out of every 1,000 born, died; and only 10 percent of the homes had drinking water. In addition, Nicaragua had an extremely unequal distribution of land. With the expansion of cotton and sugar production on the Pacific Coast during the 1950s, landholdings became concentrated. By 1975, 1.5 percent of the large landowners owned 41.5 percent of the cultivated land, and 20.3 percent of medium landowners owned 41.1 percent of the land. The peasants, who represented 78.2 percent of all landowners, held only 17.4 percent of the land. 55

The expansion of cotton and sugar production resulted in an increase in the number of landless peasants who then became Nicaragua's rural wage labour force. The approximately 310,000 rural wage labourers made up two-thirds of the country's total labour force. 56 Many of the agrarian workers were seasonally employed on the plantations for only about 3 to 4 months a year. They had no rights, and they lived in constant fear of National Guard repression. Others migrated out of the Pacific Coastal region in search of arable land or work in the cities. Between 1960 and 1977, the agrarian population dropped from 60 percent to 44 percent of the total population. The barrios surrounding the cities absorbed most of the difference.

The Pacific Coastal region was a lowland region which encompassed the departments of Rivas, Managua, Granada, León, and Carazo. This was the area where the expansion of cotton and sugar production forced thousands of peasants to sell their land and become day labourers on the
Wages were low, and when the high inflation rate of the early 1970s occurred, there was an increase in food prices and the living standards for the labourers worsened. Compounding the problem was a two year drought which began in 1971 and which destroyed many of the staple crops.

In response to these conditions, the Jesuits formed the Comité Evangélico de Promoción Agraria (CEPA, Evangelical Committee for Agrarian Promotion) in 1969. CEPA was organized to help rural labourers develop self-help projects and to help them demand from their employers improvements in living conditions, health care services, and better salaries. As a result some labourers became involved in strikes for higher wages and in land seizures. From 1970 onward, CEPA and the rural labourers were under constant threat of repression by the state and the landowners. The repression was instrumental in radicalizing some of the rural labourers and CEPA members who then joined the FSLN.

In 1977, the Sandinistas formed the Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (ATC, Association of Rural Workers). It was partly staffed by CEPA members. The ATC helped organize the rural dwellers into committees which then demanded better working conditions, followed through with land seizures, and waged political demonstrations. By 1977, the most militant sector of the rural population was located in the northern part of the Pacific Coastal region. For example, in 1977, in San Antonio, there was a sugar plantation strike in which five thousand workers walked out. They succeeded in winning wage increases and improved working conditions. In Subtiava rural dwellers staged land invasions.
The types of rural dwellers and the militancy in this region defies Skocpol's, Scott's, and Wolf's hypotheses concerning the sorts of rural dwellers and rural conditions which generate political rebellions or revolutionary activity. The three theorists agree that the peasant who rebels experiences some level of exploitation and relative deprivation. However, they claim that exploitation and relative deprivation are not sufficient factors which separate the nonrebellious peasant from the rebellious peasant. What separates the nonrebellious peasant who suffers silently from the rebellious peasant who acts upon his grievances are structural conditions. 61

The theorists argue that peasants who rebel have a certain degree of freedom or manoeuverability. Skocpol proposes that a traditional peasantry which is not closely supervised by landlords and hence enjoys a high degree of autonomy is more likely to rebel; Scott proposes that a traditional peasantry which is fairly isolated from the "hegemonic rule of elites" is more likely to rebel; and Wolf suggests that it is not so much the rural proletariat which rebels but the middle peasant who makes a subsistence living and has resources which gives him "tactical freedom" who rebels. 62

A traditional peasantry is a peasantry which has precapitalist social values which it is determined to defend. Scott states that informal connections, including market and kinship ties, communal rights, religion, and patterns of trade provide social values which the peasantry defends. The peasant attempts to defend them because the precapitalist values and social structure shield him from the impact of the "hegemonic rule of the elites" and give him strength, or what Skocpol refers to as "peasant solidarity." 63
What we find in the Nicaraguan Pacific Coastal region, however, is a majority of rural labourers who are supervised by landlords, and who can no longer be considered a traditional peasantry. The majority here earn their living from their labour in the plantations rather than from subsistence farming and hence do not have the extra resources which provide for "tactical freedom." And yet they were very militant. The available research on this region suggests that a number of factors were responsible for the militancy. Many of the rural workers had lost their land to encroaching landlords; living conditions were miserable; CEPA and the FSLN were active in the area attempting to raise the political awareness of the labourers; many suffered from National Guard repression; and the increased inflation rate of the early 1970s led to increased food prices.

The second region, the North Central area of the country, included the departments of Estelí, Matagalpa, and Nueva Segovia. This area was a mountainous region, and many of the peasants were small holders who cultivated for subsistence living. There were also day labourers and share croppers on the coffee plantations. The region did not experience the changes in cultivation that the Pacific Coastal area experienced. However, it did undergo increased coffee expansion which led to increased land prices. As a result, there were peasant land sales and migrations out of the region.

CEPA and the FSLN were also active here. Since the department of Matagalpa was a thickly forested area, the FSLN found it suitable for guerrilla activity. This area had been Sandino's territory. Many of the elderly had fought with Sandino's army in the 1926-33 war, and stories of the war were still being told in the villages. The Sandino
legacy resulted in a lingering loyalty to Sandino. In addition, since this area had been Sandino's territory, the Guardia's surveillance and repression was extensive and severe. Since many of the peasants admired the efforts of the legendary hero and were hostile towards the Somozas and the National Guard, the guerrillas were able to recruit many peasants into their ranks.

The guerrilla opposition that was waged by the peasantry in this region supports the major premises of Skocpol's, Scott's, Wolf's, and Moore's arguments concerning the type of peasant and peasant society that is more prone to rebel against the established order. Since the majority of rural dwellers in this region lived outside the landlord's influence and were subsistence small holders, they experienced a higher level of "tactical freedom" and "autonomy" than did the rural dwellers from the Pacific Coastal region. Since the region experienced less dramatic cultivation shifts due to the commercialization of agriculture than had the coastal region, the effects of the commercialization here left the peasant society "damaged but intact."67

The peasant society may have been damaged, but it still enjoyed a high degree of traditionalism. An aspect of traditionalism is lack of confidence in outside forces. The FSLN at first found the peasants suspicious and withdrawn and difficult to gain confidence from. But once the Sandinistas gained an understanding of the peasant's social values and customs, the guerrillas were able to integrate themselves into the family life. The peasants in this region held family and kin relationships in high regard. Only when the Sandinistas committed themselves to live as the peasants lived were they accepted.68 This was a slow process. Each new friendship led to other friendships in the
same family clan, in the same village, and in neighbouring villages. As
the network of friendships grew, the FSLN gained support from the
peasant communities and gained new recruits.

Region three, the Central Eastern region, included the eastern
parts of the departments of Boaco, Chontales, Matagalpa, and Nueva
Segovia. The rural dwellers who migrated from the Pacific Coastal
region and the North Central region came to government land reform
projects or squatted on vacant public land.

The landless who migrated to this region did not enjoy a great deal
of independence. They were outside of the landlord's supervision but
not the state's. The jueces de mesta, who were local officials with
police powers, spied on the peasants for the government. Hence, the
Somoza state attempted to extend its "hegemonic control" over this
region through land reform projects and through the juez de mesta.

National Guard repression was severe in this area. The "Delegates
of the Word," a lay organization of the Capuchin Fathers, offered the
peasants spiritual guidance and promoted peasant organizations. The
delegates and the peasants quickly became subjected to National Guard
repression.

The Sandinistas were also active in this region. They were largely
active in the department of Matagalpa. Matagalpa was chosen for some of
their first guerrilla operations because the mountainous and populated
area offered the FSLN clandestinity and proximity to the peasants. Pancasan, which is east of Matagalpa city, was one of the first rural
areas in which the FSLN conducted its military campaigns against the
Guardia. The Pancasan campaign was unsuccessful. The Guard found the
guerrilla columns and forced them into combat. Many of the Sandinistas
were killed including one of the original members, Silvio Mayorga. In 1970, another military campaign was waged in the mountains of Zinica, also in the department of Matagalpa. The Zinica campaign, which involved several raids on Guard outposts, was successful. By 1970, the FSLN had a stronger peasant backing which enabled it to launch the attacks successfully.

The available research on the type of peasantry in this region defies Skocpol's and Scott's assumptions that the more the peasant is autonomous or isolated from the rules of the elites, the more he is likely to rebel. Since the state asserted its rule in the area through the juez de mestas, the peasants experienced limited independence and limited autonomy.

Skocpol's, Scott's, Wolf's, and Moore's theories concerning the structural reasons for peasant rebellions are not consistent with the findings for the three Nicaraguan agricultural regions examined here. The three regions differed in types of terrain and in types of rural dwellers and their livelihoods. Yet all three regions had rural dwellers who were politically and/or militarily active. Several common structural and situational conditions for the widespread nature of the dissent can be deduced from the findings:

1) a lingering admiration for the national hero, Sandino.
2) a disruption of the traditional peasant way of life due to the expansion of commercialization in agriculture.
3) organisational efforts by the Church groups, CEPA, and the Delegates of the Word.
4) brutal state repression.
5) a strong anti-Somoza sentiment.
6) political and military teachings and recruitings of the FSLN.
7) a rise in food prices due to the increased inflation rate of the 1970s.

Urban Opposition

The urban labour force's participation in the anti-Somoza struggle began in the 1970s. Prior to that decade, the level of organization amongst the workers was low. During the 1940s and 1950s, government-controlled unions predominated on the labour scene. Then, in 1949, Somoza allowed the establishment of the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT, General Confederation of Labour). The CGT was not a strong labour union. The Somoza state gained control over it by instructing state agents to infiltrate it.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, four other major unions emerged: CGT-I, CUS, CTN, and CAUS. The Confederación General de Trabajadores - Independiente (CGT-I, General Confederation of Labour - Independent) was formed in the early 1960s after it split from the official CGT. The CGT-I was affiliated with the PSN. In 1968, the Consejo de Unificación Sindical (CUS, Council of Trade Union Unification) was formed. CUS was sponsored by the U.S. government and the AFL-CIO. A third new labour union, the Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua (CTN, Workers' Federation of Nicaragua) was affiliated with the Social Christian Party, the Central de Acción y Unidad Sindical (CAUS, Federation of Trade Union Action and Unity) was formed by the Partido Comunista de Nicaragua (PC, Communist Party of Nicaragua). (The Communist Party was created after members left the PSN in the early 1970s.)

By the 1970s, the major unions represented only 5.5 percent of the work force and were not very effective in obtaining better working
conditions for the workers. After the earthquake, however, membership increased, and the unions became more active. For example, in 1973, the construction workers held a major strike. After four weeks, the workers settled for a 10 percent wage increase. Job-related demands by the unions included demands for political reforms of the state. In 1974, the CGT-I and the CTN became involved in the political struggle by joining UDEL. When strikes were declared illegal after the imposition of martial law in 1974, the unions joined anti-regime demonstrations.

In the mid-1970s, the major union goals were reformist in nature. However, by 1978 some of the unions, for example the CTN and CGT-I, took a more radical stance in favour of change and began working with antiregime coalitions which were affiliated with the FSLN. Also, by the mid-1970s, no one union dominated the labour movement. Instead, the FSLN increasingly took the lead. With its increased credibility, the FSLN was able to attract disillusioned workers. For example, the Proletarian tendency which was the FSLN faction most involved with the urban workers, created the Comités Obreros Revolucionarios (CORs, Revolutionary Workers' Committees) in factories and in slum areas. The TP also armed its members. COR harassed the National Guard in major cities such as Managua, Masaya, and Granada.

The Fiscal Crisis of 1974

There are basically two theories of fiscal crises: one which points to internal mechanisms which induce an economic crisis, and another which points to external factors which bring about an economic crisis. Crane Brinton, Ted Gurr, and James Davies speak of internally
induced economic crises which occur during prerevolutionary periods. Davies and Gurr maintain that revolutions occur after a long period of improvement is followed by a sharp economic decline. Gurr, however, adds a conditional clause to the theory. He argues that this particular economic trend is found in many Third World countries while very few experience revolutions. He believes that the more a society becomes angry, the more it is likely to undergo a revolution. He claims that the intensity of aggregate frustration must be established through the use of surveys in order to assess the probability of a revolution. 77

Crane Brinton, on the other hand, states that one of the most common events found in prerevolutionary situations is not economic decline but rather the financial breakdown of the state. The breakdown is caused by governmental inefficiency and near bankruptcy. 78

Several scholars who write on Latin America point to external factors which bring about fiscal crises. They claim that in many Latin American countries fiscal crises are partially caused by an extreme denationalization of the economy. The increase of capital outflow through multinational corporations along with the inflow of economic aid creates a process of indebtedness which results in a fiscal crisis. 79

The upper class has not been able to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable domestic capital accumulation is possible. In addition, the state uses external economic financial assistance to reward supportive segments of society and to suppress mass discontent. The use of coercive force results in social conflict and ultimately in the loss of legitimacy for the regime.
Brinton's, Gurr's, and Davies' theories taken alone or taken together with the Latin American scholars' ideas on fiscal crises are not sufficient to explain the Nicaraguan fiscal crisis of 1974.

Unlike the economies of other Central American and Latin American countries, Nicaragua's economy was not dominated by large multinational corporations. Large multinational corporations such as the International Telephone and Telegraph Co., the American Sugar Company, and Standard Oil did not have operations in Nicaragua. The coffee, cotton, and sugar plantations and most of the industrial enterprises were owned by sectors of the Nicaraguan upper class.80

The basic problem with the Nicaraguan economy was that the Somoza family maintained a personal control over it by accumulating wealth through state power. By late 1974, the fiscal crisis was imminent. Somoza's businesses had grown to an estimated $400-$500 million, while foreign debt had reached $500 million, and there was no growth in the per capita GNP.81 The inflation rate also increased from the average of 1.7 percent before 1970 to 9.7 percent between 1971 and 1975.82

Several factors were responsible for the 1974 fiscal crisis. Firstly, Nicaragua exported raw materials such as cotton, coffee, beef, and sugar whose prices fluctuated on the world market. Subsistence food stuffs (corn, beans, rice) had been displaced by the cultivation of the export crops and therefore had to be imported. By 1975 food imports amounted to 50 percent of the total value of agricultural exports.83 Secondly, there was an increase in the cost of needed imports, especially oil. As a result, the country experienced balance of payment problems, repatriation of foreign capital, and a flight of indigenous capital. Thirdly, the crisis was precipitated by the earthquake.
Somoza borrowed heavily in order to finance some of the reconstruction projects. The funds were not put to good use to generate new capital to pay off the loans because the state institutions which administered them were inefficient and corrupt. Hence the public debt increased.

Following the fiscal crisis, instability and inefficiency became manifest at the political-institutional level. Samuel Huntington suggests that violence and instability are the results of rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics along with the slow development of political institutions. Political "ungovernability" in Nicaragua was not the consequences of rapid social change and mobilization. Since the FSLN spent a great deal of time and effort mobilizing the population, the group's actions indicate that the government had spent limited time mobilizing the population to participate in politics. There was very little groundwork laid which the FSLN could redirect. Political "ungovernability" in Nicaragua was centered around fiscal insolvencies and the internal disintegration of the bureaucratic administration. "Effectiveness," the extent to which the government satisfies the basic functions of society as most of the population sees them, came into question. Consequently, the inability of Somoza and his administration to govern effectively resulted in a loss of legitimacy and increasing challenges to their power. Both the fiscal breakdown and institutional ineffectiveness brought to a crisis level the already low level of legitimacy of the Somoza rule.
Carter's Human Rights Demands

The Somoza rule was also losing its credibility internationally. Anastasio Somoza Debayle's use of state repression became the subject of the Fraser Subcommittee Hearings on Human Rights in Nicaragua which were held during the 1976 U.S. presidential campaign. The reports described the massive arrests, disappearances, and killings made by the National Guard against the peasantry. Other groups such as Amnesty International and Nicaraguan religious orders supported the reports.

With the election of Jimmy Carter in November 1976, foreign policy towards Latin America shifted from Nixon's and Ford's emphasis on power politics to an emphasis on human rights. During Nixon's and Ford's presidencies, military and economic aid to Nicaragua increased, especially from 1970 to 1975. With the beginning of the Carter administration, U.S. aid to Nicaragua began to decline, and human rights improvements were now tied to the release of aid.

Throughout 1977 the Carter administration pressured Somoza to improve his human rights image. Carter wanted change in Nicaragua but not revolutionary change. His policies to prevent a leftist takeover from occurring have been labeled as "incoherent" and of course unsuccessful. (The incoherence of his policies became more pronounced during the years 1978 to 1980. See chapter four.) In 1977, President Carter replaced James Theberge as U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua with Mauricio Solaun, who was a sociology professor. During the same period, the U.S. Congress debated an aid package which was destined to Nicaragua for the 1978 year. The position which carried was that the aid package was to be released only if Somoza made human rights improvements.
In response to this new form of American pressure, Somoza lifted the state of siege, which had been invoked for 33 months, on September 19, 1977. Shortly thereafter the State Department signed a $2.5 million arms credit agreement.

Although the Carter government, like previous administrations, continued to supply military aid to the Somoza regime, the Nicaraguan opposition was well aware of the differences in political strategy. The continued denunciation of human rights atrocities in Nicaragua by the U.S. government strengthened the Nicaraguan opposition. Somoza had always had U.S. backing, and now one of his bases of power was no longer secure. UDEL gained confidence that the U.S. would support its endeavor to get rid of Somoza. The Sandinistas held that their chances of confronting the U.S. in military combat had lessened with the new U.S. foreign policy strategy. As a result, the Front became bolder and in October 1977 launched its first major military offensive against the regime.

The Offensive Begins

The military offensive was launched against several towns at once: San Carlos, Ocotal, Rivas, Granada, Managua, and Masaya. Although the operation was a military failure, it exposed Somoza as a liar. Somoza had boasted to the Nicaraguan population that the FSLN had been eliminated by the CONDECA forces.

Meanwhile, as the October attacks continued, a statement was issued by twelve well-known and respected Nicaraguans. The statement was published in La Prensa. It was signed by two businessmen (Emilio
Baltodano and Felipe Mantica), two lawyers (Ernesto Castillo and Joaquin Cuadra), two priests (Fernando Cardenal and Miguel D'Escoto), a professor (Carlos Tunnermann), a writer and poet (Sergio Ramirez), an agronomist (Ricardo Coronell), an architect (Casimiro Sotelo), a banker (Arturo Cruz), and a dentist (Carlos Gutierrez).

The document called for a democratic alternative to the Somoza regime, one which included the Sandinistas. At this time, the FSLN and the upper class opposition (in particular UDEL) were following separate courses of action to oust Somoza from power. Since Los Doce members had professional credentials and lacked prior political activity, their efforts were taken seriously, and the document helped to establish FSLN credibility. As a result, a close relationship developed between Los Doce and the Sandinistas. The Twelve also became a linkage group between the Sandinistas and the upper class opposition. These actions were instrumental in promoting the development of a broad, pluralistic anti-Somoza front under FSLN leadership. Exposed, Los Doce fled the country and worked abroad to discredit the Somoza regime and to gain international support for its endeavors.

A political campaign initiated by UDEL coincided with the military offensive. The campaign involved a coalition of academic, business, and Church members who called for a "national dialogue" to restructure political power. UDEL promoted it; COSEP and INDE supported it; and Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo headed it. After the 43 percent drop in retail sales which took place during the October attacks, a "crisis of confidence" developed amongst many businessmen and industrialists. This crisis became evident when capital from Somoza supporters and opposition businessmen, estimated at $40 million, was transferred to
foreign banks. More and more businessmen and industrialists joined the political opposition movement and supported the national dialogue efforts. In December, Somoza agreed to the proposed national dialogue. After an initial two hour session, the dictator promised to meet again following the nationwide municipal elections to be held in February 1978. The postponed dialogue never did occur.

The State's Ineffective Response

Initially, it was the actions of the Somoza state which provoked the increasing scale of regime opposition. One of these actions, state violence, had been used occasionally beginning in the 1930s against mass discontent. After the earthquake, state violence escalated to such a level that a cycle of violence was created. Guerrilla warfare was met by state repression; state repression was met by guerrilla warfare. The state repression did not serve to destroy "the enemy." Instead, it was a self-defeating action. The state tried to justify and legitimize its use of violence against the population by claiming that it was for "national security" and "law enforcement" reasons. However, state repression only served to alienate the population further and to create an increasingly polarized situation. Somoza's repression, for example, violent acts against the peasantry and Church members, the enforcement of martial law and press censorship, and the suspension of constitutional guarantees, affected everyone to some degree. On the other hand, the violence waged by the guerrillas was discreet; it was primarily waged against the National Guard. The main thrust of the guerrillas' insurrectional strategy was to gain support from the population at
large. Consequently, the state's support bases increasingly diminished in size while the FSLN's support bases grew.

Internal and external constraints on the state's power to act effectively in the crisis period emerged. Internal constraints consisted of the loss of legitimacy due to the corruption which followed the earthquake, the threat of the FSLN, the growing alienation of the upper, middle, and lower classes along with the Roman Catholic Church, and the adverse economic effects of the fiscal crisis. Since all states exist in specific geographic positions in the world, neighbouring states create opportunities or place constraints on the state's capacity to act effectively in a crisis situation. As previously mentioned, for the Nicaraguans, the relationship with the U.S. was a special one, dating back to the nineteenth century. Parties in power and parties in opposition continuously sought U.S. backing to help legitimize their rule or attempt to rule.

The Somoza family did not experience serious problems obtaining or maintaining U.S. support until the Carter era. Carter's human rights policy was something new to contend with. Somoza thought that if he followed instructions and lifted the state of siege, he would be able to maintain or strengthen his U.S. support base. In the long run, however, the action produced the opposite effect. Not only was there a resurgence of societal protest after the lifting of the state of siege, but anti-Somoza sentiment in the U.S. government grew. One of the reasons it grew was because the renewed opposition activity exposed Somoza's weakened power position.

Another ineffective position taken by the dictator was his irreconcilable stance. He repeatedly told the upper class opposition that he
was not going to resign, that he was going to stay in power until the 1981 elections. This intransigent position made the upper class forces more determined to oust Somoza from power, but at the same time, their efforts were producing no results. Some of the moderates became more radicalized. The majority, however, wanted political reforms; they did not want the FSLN to take the lead in a revolutionary overthrow. But because of Somoza's stance, they were getting nowhere while the FSLN was making progress. The moderates wanted compromise politics; Somoza wanted a showdown; the FSLN wanted a showdown. The dictator believed that he could wipe out his enemies with the aid of the National Guard and the U.S. He tried to generate fear of the FSLN by calling them Soviet communists. He saw communists in the Catholic Church, political parties, international media, even in the Carter administration and the U.S. State Department.

Somoza's scoffings illustrated his awareness of his growing isolation. It is alleged that, in order to amend the situation, Somoza authorized the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, one of the leaders of the upper class opposition movements. However, this was another self-defeating action; it served only to broaden and intensify the popular struggle against him.
Footnotes

1 Skocpol, op. cit., p. 47.

2 Ibid., pp. 48, 50.

3 See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little and Brown, 1966), p. 91. An "accelerator," according to Johnson, is an event which catalyzes a society, which is experiencing power deflation, into insurrection.

4 Black, op. cit., p. 59.

5 Wheelock, op. cit., p. 174.

6 Black, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

7 NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., p. 14.

8 Black, op. cit., p. 60.

9 Loc. cit.

10 Booth, op. cit., p. 97.

11 Ibid., p. 98.


14 Wheelock, op. cit., pp. 184-86.

15 Ibid., p. 174.

16 Walker, Nicaragua The Land of Sandino, op. cit., p. 32.


18 Black, op. cit., p. 64.

19 See NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 30, and Booth, op. cit., pp. 102, 152-153.

20 Booth, op. cit., p. 105.

21 Ibid., p. 100.


23 NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., p. 15, and NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 28.
Leaders and members of the Roman Catholic Church came from all classes; however, since the Church hierarchy was predominantly from the upper class, I have placed the analysis of Church opposition within the context of upper class opposition.


Ibid., pp. 162-63.

Ibid., p. 163, and Booth, op. cit., pp. 135, 136.

Booth, op. cit., p. 137.

Ibid., p. 150.

EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 10.

See Black, op. cit., pp. 87-88; Booth, op. cit., p. 142; and NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 28.

See Walker, Nicaragua The Land of Sandino, op. cit., p. 32, and NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., p. 14. CONDECA was created in 1964 and was sponsored by the U.S. Pentagon. It was designed to prevent revolutionary activity from spreading throughout the Central American region.

EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 11.

See Black, op. cit., p. 91, and Booth, op. cit., p. 143.

Booth, op. cit., p. 143, and Black, op. cit., p. 92.

Jung, op. cit., p. 79, and Black, op. cit., p. 93.

Black, op. cit., p. 94, and Booth, op. cit., p. 143.

Booth, op. cit., p. 143.

Black, op. cit., p. 96.

Ibid., p. 97.

Booth, op. cit., p. 150, and Black, op. cit., p. 79.

The parties and unions which I examine have been identified as middle class groupings by John A. Booth. See Booth, op. cit., p. 104.

Ibid., p. 105.

Ibid., p. 107.

Ibid., p. 108.

Ibid., p. 113.

Loc. cit.

Ibid., p. 111.

Loc. cit.


The term rural dwellers is taken to include the Nicaraguan peasantry and the rural labourers. The peasantry includes small-holding, share-cropping, tenant cultivators, and squatters who make decisions on how their crops are grown and whose major aim is subsistence living. The term rural labourers includes migrant labourers, plantation workers, and landless day labourers. Rural labourers are also referred to as rural proletarians. See Scott, op. cit., p. 267, and Wolf, op. cit., p. XIV.

Weber, op. cit., p. 27.

Ibid., p. 28.

Booth, op. cit., p. 117.

See Black, op. cit., p. 60, and Booth, op. cit., p. 118.


Skocpol, op. cit., p. 115.


Booth, op. cit., p. 118.
65 Ibid., p. 119.
66 Black, op. cit., p. 79.
67 This is a phrase used by Barrington Moore in his description of peasant revolutions. See Moore, op. cit., p. 421.
68 Black, op. cit., p. 79.
69 Booth, op. cit., p. 120.
70 Black, op. cit., p. 79.
71 Ibid., p. 140.
72 A study, which can not be undertaken here, is needed to determine whether the Nicaraguan rural dwellers underwent what James Scott refers to as a "subsistence crisis." Indicators do, however, point in that direction. For example, the rural population experienced a two year drought and an increase in food prices.
73 Booth, op. cit., p. 121.
74 Ibid., pp. 121-23, and Black, op. cit., p. 72. Members left the PSN because they opposed any cooperation with the FSLN. They then established the PC and claimed allegiance to Moscow.
75 Black, op. cit., p. 71.
76 Ibid., pp. 71, 93.
77 Gurr, op. cit., p. 83.
80 Weber, op. cit., p. 34.
81 NACLA, Latin America and Empire Report, op. cit., pp. 10, 23.
82 Weber, op. cit., p. 38.
83 Ibid., p. 25.
84 Huntington, op. cit., p. 4.

NACLA, *Crisis in Nicaragua*, op. cit., p. 32.

Chace, op. cit., p. 42.

Ibid., p. 43.

Loc. cit.

Black, op. cit., p. 104.

Don Bohning, "Whether Liberators or Terrorists, Sandinistas are War's Leaders," *Miami Herald* (Sept. 20, 1978).


Skocpol, op. cit., p. 30.

Booth, op. cit., p. 157.

Jung, op. cit., p. 82.
A Chronology of Events from 1978 to 1979

The following chronology outlines the major events which took place during the final phase of the revolutionary takeover.

1978
Jan. 10: Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa and leader of UDEL, was assassinated. The assassination marked the beginning of a mass resistance against the dictator.

Jan. 23: UDEL called for a nationwide general strike to bring down the dictatorship. The strike lasted for 12 days and affected approximately 80 percent of the Nicaraguan economy.

Feb. 20: Spontaneous uprisings occurred in Monimbo, an Indian community within the city of Masaya. The uprisings occurred without the direction of the FSLN and lasted for seven days.

March: Alfonso Robelo Callejas, a prominent businessman and president of INDE, formed the Movimiento Democrático
Nicaraguense (MDN, Nicaraguan Democratic Movement). The MDN represented upper and middle class opponents of the regime.

May: The MDN was instrumental in forming a new anti-Somoza coalition, the Frente Amplio Opositor (FAO, Broad Opposition Front). The FAO included the MDN, Los Doce, labour groups, and opposition political parties. The FAO sought moderate reforms to the Somoza dictatorship.

July: Los Doce returned from exile in Costa Rica. The members were welcomed by thousands of Nicaraguans at the airport and during their drive through Managua. They publicly endorsed the Sandinistas and proclaimed themselves to be Sandinistas.

July 17: The FSLN was instrumental in uniting twenty-two organizations into a single coalition, the Movimiento del Pueblo Unido (MPU, United People's Movement). The MPU represented workers, peasants, and the urban poor. Its primary objective was to mobilize people for the overthrow of the Somoza regime.

Aug. 1: President Carter sent a letter to President Somoza congratulating him on his efforts at improving human
rights in Nicaragua. For example, Somoza permitted an international human rights inspection, proposed amnesty for political prisoners, and permitted the return of Los Doce. The letter led many moderate opponents to believe that the U.S. could not be relied upon to support their reformist efforts to rid of the dictator.

Aug. 22: The Terceristas attacked the National Palace in Managua and held government officials hostage. Somoza conceded to their demands. FSLN communiques were broadcast; political prisoners were released from jail; and the guerrillas were given safe conduct out of the country.

Aug.: Less than a week after the National Palace takeover, a plotted coup was reported. Somoza arrested 85 members of the National Guard for plotting against him.

Aug. 28: The FAO and the MPU planned another general strike. Business and labour groups endorsed it. The strike eroded national government revenues.

Sept. 9: The FSLN launched a series of attacks on National Guard garrisons in Managua, Masaya, León, Chinandega, Estelí, and other towns. Although the attacks were
military failures, the FSLN gained more recruits and political prestige.

Sept.: During the September uprising, the National Guard destroyed cities and massacred thousands of people. Even Red Cross workers became victims. This so-called "mop-up operation" further alienated the population and the international community from the dictator.

Oct.: The Carter administration and the Organization of American States (OAS) set up a mediation team to find a political solution that would be acceptable to Somoza and the FAO. The objective was to transfer power to a new government of moderates which excluded the Sandinistas.

Oct. 26: Los Doce left the FAO because the group did not agree with FAO's desire to retain the National Guard in a new government.

Nov.: After Los Doce left the FAO, other groups followed: the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), the social Christian trade union federation (CTN), the Popular Social Christians (PPSC), and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN).
Dec. 7: The three Sandinista tendencies drew up a "basis of unity" program. The tendencies agreed to work out their differences. Formal reunification did not occur until March 1979.

1979

Feb. 1: The FSLN formed the Frente Patriótico Nacional (FPN, National Patriotic Front). The FPN united anti-Somoza forces under the direction of the MPU.

Feb. 8: The United States suspended military and economic aid to the Somoza regime.

March 8: The three FSLN tendencies reunited. They signed a "program of national unity" which outlined basic strategies to overthrow the dictatorship and basic points which would constitute a new political order.

May 14: Military expenditures and economic decline led to an increased foreign debt. The state requested a US $66 million loan from the IMF. It was approved on the precondition that the córdoba be devalued. The devaluation led to increased prices for food and commodities.

May 21: The FSLN launched its "final offensive" against the regime. The FSLN attacked many cities simultaneously
and undermined the National Guard's tactical mobility.

June 4: Another strike was launched. It was initiated by the FSLN and the MPU. The objective of the strike was to further mobilize the public against the dictatorship.

June 16: The FSLN formed a Provisional Government of National Reconstruction in Costa Rica. There were five members: Violeta Barrios Chamorro, the widow of Pedro J. Chamorro; Sergio Ramírez Mercado, a member of Los Doce; Moisés Hassan, the leader of the MPU; Alfonso Robelo Callejas, head of MDN and representative of the FAO; and Daniel Ortega, a Tercerista commander.

June 21: ABC T.V. correspondent Bill Stewart was murdered by the National Guard. A film of his murder was shown to T.V. viewers across North America. This event lessened the remaining international support for the Somoza regime.

June 22: The OAS rejected the U.S. proposal for a peacekeeping force in Nicaragua.
June 27: The FAO and COSEP endorsed the Provisional Government of National Reconstruction.

June 28: The FSLN named a 33-member Council of State. The members were from the FSLN, FPN, FAO, and COSEP.

July 5: The FSLN gained a military advantage over the National Guard. The Front controlled approximately 23 major cities and 80 percent of the national territory.

July 8: Somoza told the Carter administration that he would resign on condition that the PLN and the National Guard play a future role in the country.

July 14: The FSLN named twelve members of the 18-member Cabinet. The members included businessmen, religious leaders, and Sandinista leaders.

July 17: Anastasio Somoza Debayle resigned and flew to exile in Miami.

July 19: The National Guard surrendered, and the FSLN gained control of Managua and of the country.
This chapter will continue to examine the internal and external threats to the Somoza state. It will also examine the constraints on the state's power which prevented it from acting effectively during the final two years of the Somoza dynasty and the role of the opposition forces. There will also be a brief analysis of the post-insurrectionary state.

The events which marked the 1978-1979 period began with the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. Pedro Chamorro was considered the most outspoken critic of the Somoza regime. He was also seen by many as Nicaragua's best candidate for the 1981 election. When he was assassinated, thousands of people demonstrated and accused President Somoza of the brutal act. Businesses and factories were burned, and people rioted in the streets. The action was spontaneous; neither the Terceristas nor the UDEL led the crowds.

UDEL and the business community did, however, try to direct the nature of the protest. A "National Committee for a General Strike" was formed by UDEL, the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industries, the Chamber of Builders, INDE, COSEP, the Chamber of Customs Agents, and the Cotton Cooperative. (The leaders of BANIC and BANAMERICA did not join the strike. They continued their business relations with Somoza.) The business community felt that Somoza had eliminated one of the few men who would be able to replace the dictator. With Chamorro gone, the private sector felt an urgency to get Somoza's resignation and to thwart any radicalization of the protest. The strike was actually a work stoppage by employers as well as employees and students. Most of the
labour unions and opposition parties supported the businessmen's endeavors. By the end of twelve days, it was apparent that the strike had failed to persuade Somoza to resign.

Instead, the businessmen found themselves having to pay a new business tax to replace the national revenue lost during the strike. When the Nicaraguan Development Institute (INDE) and the National Chamber of Commerce instructed their members not to pay the new levy, Somoza arrested hundreds of leaders of the FAO, PLI, INDE, and UDEL.3

The failure of the strike revealed the limits that UDEL and the private sector faced in attempting to remove Somoza from power through reformist measures. Since Somoza was not ruling in their interests and he did not rely on them for state support, reformist measures to remove him from power failed. The organization of the general strike was an upper and middle class reaction towards the level of state autonomy exercised by the regime. The upper class community had a parting of ways with the dictator's "rules of the game."

The FSLN also tried to direct the protest. On February 2, 1978 the Sandinistas attacked several cities in the North and South of the country. The more serious clashes occurred between Indians and National Guardsmen in the Indian barrio Monimbo in Masaya city. The people of Monimbo had organized several masses and demonstrations in memory of Pedro Chamorro. Demonstrations were also held on February 21 in memory of Augusto Sandino's murder.4 The National Guard opened fire on a peaceful group of women and children who were leaving a mass held for Chamorro. The people of Monimbo retaliated by taking over the city. They barricaded the streets and used axes, knives, and homemade bombs
for weaponry. The Guard ended the rebellion with aerial bombardment. Hundreds of citizens were killed.

Other cities and towns followed the example of Monimbo. The Indians of Subtiava, a district of León, attacked the local guardsmen. This time the rebellion was supported by FSLN guerrillas. The Indians attacked National Guard patrols, burned buses and held mass demonstrations.

In the past, those who were involved in armed resistance against the dictatorship were isolated groups of FSLN guerrillas who conducted night raids on small towns. In addition, the Sandinistas had applied the prolonged popular war strategy which included rural guerrilla activities along with mass mobilization activities in the cities and countryside. The Monimbo uprising marked the first time that violence was organized without Sandinista direction and was waged by an entire community. The FSLN learned some lessons on guerrilla strategy from this uprising. The Sandinistas decided that in the future the focal point of the insurrection would be the people themselves. The FSLN would integrate themselves into spontaneous insurrections and provide direction, and the people would be organized at the level of each barrio. Thus, the nature of the resistance can be referred to as a popular insurrectional strategy (or people's revolutionary strategy).

The Opposition Coalitions: The FAO and the MPU

In chapter three, I analysed the upper, middle, and lower class positions by examining the associations, groups, and institutions to which they belonged. By 1978 alliances were formed amongst these
groups, and coalitions were established. The first grand coalition to be formed was the Frente Amplio Opositor (FAO, Broad Opposition Front). The FAO was formed after UDEL had lost a great deal of public support. UDEL lost this support first with the assassination of one of its leaders, Pedro Chamorro, and second with the failure of the January strike. In March 1978, Alfonso Robelo Callejas, a businessman with close ties to BANIC, formed the Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense (MDN, Nicaraguan Democratic Movement). MDN was a political party which represented anti-Somoza businessmen and cotton growers of the North-West. MDN did not replace UDEL but had similar interests. The new party wanted the resignation of Somoza, democratic reforms, and the involvement of the FSLN in a future government.

In May Robelo was instrumental in forming the FAO. The organizers of the FAO were mainly from upper and middle class origins, but the coalition cut across class lines and represented groups from the left to the right. The FAO represented UDEL and its member groups, MDN, Los Doce, three conservative parties, and CUS. The coalition called for Somoza's resignation, the end of political corruption, freedom to organize, and the introduction of agrarian reform and social welfare benefits. The FAO, through Los Doce, had contact with the FSLN, in particular the Terceristas. The Terceristas were in favour of the broad-based coalition. As previously mentioned, the Terceristas had always been in favour of recruiting upper and middle class opponents to the regime. Although the FAO distrusted the FSLN, the coalition held that the FSLN should be included in any post-Somoza government. The FAO held this position because Los Doce and MDN emphasized the need to include the popular guerrilla force.
The FSLN also formed its own grand coalition: The Movimiento del Pueblo Unido (MPU, United People's Movement). The United People's Movement was formed after the three FSLN tendencies had reached an agreement for tactical unity in July 1978. The tendencies decided to work towards reunification because they saw the need to coordinate their efforts for a revolutionary overthrow of the system. Each tendency felt that a grand coalition would help prepare the pro-FSLN groups, which had developed in the 1970s as a result of FSLN urban and rural work, for the war effort. The MPU included 22 organizations which represented students and youth, urban workers, peasants, teachers, and intellectuals. There were three major objectives in the MPU program:

1. to mobilize the population for the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship;

2. to increase the level of membership in the coalition and to unify broad popular sectors; and

3. to contribute to the process of reunification of the three FSLN tendencies.

The MPU program also placed emphasis on a restructuring of the economy so that the Nicaraguan population would have a minimum standard of living.

The two grand coalitions had different methods for bringing about the downfall of Somoza. Since the FAO sought reform, the coalition resorted to strikes and U.S. pressure. The FSLN, on the other hand, sought revolution and hence resorted to mass mobilizing efforts and guerrilla tactics. Although these methods differed considerably, the coalitions did not become involved in a war amongst themselves. The nature of the Somoza state was such that all classes were to some degree alienated from the state. The major goal held by all then was to oust Anastasio Somoza Debayle from power. Polyclass and polygroup alliances
### Figure Three: Nicaraguan Opposition Coalition Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TYPE OF OPPOSITION GROUP</th>
<th>AIMS</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>FUTURE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>a guerrilla group established in 1978</td>
<td>to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship</td>
<td>political and military, legal and illegal means and mass mobilization techniques</td>
<td>provisional government of national unity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>operated in the cities and rural areas</td>
<td>to replace it with an alternative government which would profoundly transform the nation’s economic, social and political structures</td>
<td>program of national reconstruction</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>national army without the National Guard</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>foreign policy of non-alignment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>expropriation of all of Somoza’s properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFU</td>
<td>an opposition coalition group established in July 1978 and organized by the FSLN to represent workers, peasants and the urban poor</td>
<td>had the same aims as the FSLN</td>
<td>mobilized workers, peasants and the urban poor to become involved in the armed struggle</td>
<td>agreed with the basic points of the FSLN’s program</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>desired a radical restructuring of the economy under state direction so that a minimum standard of living would be maintained for the entire population</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>since the FPN included groups which defected from the FAO, its program contained less far-reaching proposals than that of the NPU</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the FPN agreed with three FSLN principles:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1) provisional government of national unity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2) national army without the National Guard</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) expropriation of all of Somoza’s properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPN</td>
<td>an opposition coalition group established in February 1979 and organized by the FSLN to represent the FSLN, NPFU and defected groups from the FAO</td>
<td>to overthrow the Somoza regime and to replace it with an alternative government</td>
<td>conducted rallies, demonstrations and strikes</td>
<td>obtained civilian support in the armed struggle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure Three: Nicaraguan Opposition Coalition Groups (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TYPE OF OPPOSITION GROUP</th>
<th>AIMS</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>FUTURE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>a reformist opposition group established in May 1976</td>
<td>to replace the Somoza government with an interim government under the direction of the FAO</td>
<td>political reformist measures including negotiations and strikes</td>
<td>emphasized the protection of civil and political rights</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>it represented upper and middle class sectors</td>
<td>the new government would prepare for the 1981 elections</td>
<td>cooperated in the mediation efforts with the U.S. to get Somoza's resignation</td>
<td>program left economic goals and reforms largely undefined</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wanted the FMLN and National Guard to be involved in a future government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los</td>
<td>a group of twelve prominent professionals with no previous political involvement</td>
<td>to replace the Somoza government with a government which would include the Sandinistas</td>
<td>worked towards legitimizing the FSLN amongst the middle and upper class sectors</td>
<td>the group was in accordance with the FPN's future program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doce</td>
<td>the group was established in November 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lobbied for international support for the FSLN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Black, op. cit., pp. 122, 138, 140, 150, 152; Booth, op. cit., pp. 154, 166, 171; and Jung, op. cit., p. 44.
against one common enemy were fairly easy to make. And there was a linkage group between the FAO and the MPU: Los Doce.

One major jointly held anti-Somoza venture was the August 1978 strike. The strike was sponsored by both the FAO and the MPU. The first strike, held in January, was led only by UDEL. Since the coalitions had different strategies and post-regime goals and were in competition for the leadership role over the opposition, the level of cooperation between the different blocs was not significant. It was not until the international mediation talks, held in late 1978, when the tensions between the grand coalitions increase, and the leadership role was determined.

The FSLN Mass Movement Stage

As the United People's Movement grew in numbers and strength, the FSLN began to develop into a mass organization. However, it was not until after the National Palace seizure and the September uprising that the FSLN obtained the support of the majority of the population.

The Seizure of the National Palace

On August 22, 1978, twenty-six Terceristas under the leadership of Edén Pastora Gómez, better known as Comandante Cero, attacked the National Palace in Managua. There were approximately 3,000 people in the building that day. Disguised as National Guardsmen, the guerrilla forces entered the Palace and went to the assembly chamber known as the "Blue Room." There, they held the members of the House of Deputies
hostage in exchange for the release of all political prisoners and $10 million in ransom.

Edén Pastora had planned the seizure in 1970. However, the plan had been postponed many times over the eight years. It was finally decided upon after a personal letter, sent by President Carter to Somoza, became public. In the letter, President Carter congratulated Somoza for inviting the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights inspection and for allowing the return of Los Doce from Costa Rica. The letter convinced many Nicaraguan moderate anti-Somozistas that they could not rely on the U.S. to support their reformist efforts. The guerrilla forces felt that the U.S. had decided to help Somoza stay in power until the 1981 elections. Hence, according to Pastora, "the hour to strike had arrived."

The FSLN seized over a thousand hostages; government officials and Somoza relatives were included. Somoza had no choice but to comply with the guerrillas' demands. The dictator agreed to release most of the one hundred political prisoners, demanded, in Nicaraguan jails and to fly the prisoners, the guerrillas, and some of the hostages to Panama. Five million dollars' ransom—half of the original amount demanded—was also granted, and a press communiqué was published. Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo once again, as in the 1974 Christmas kidnapping, acted as mediator between the guerrillas and the government.

The success of the Palace takeover had an incredible impact on the Nicaraguan population and the international community. The attack damaged Somoza's image at home and illustrated Somoza's growing isolation to the international community. It also enhanced the image of the FSLN and showed that the use of guerrilla tactics could be effective
against a perceived "invincible" Guard. The GPP and the TP sectors which had been critical of the Terceristas' guerrilla strategies came to appreciate the Terceristas' form of struggle. Furthermore, the Palace takeover gave the FSLN and the population confidence that the FSLN may be able to defeat Somoza and his guardsmen. It also gave the FSLN needed money.

The September Uprising

Three weeks after the National Palace takeover, the FSLN staged military attacks against National Guard units in several cities: Managua, Masaya, León, Chinandega, and Estelí. The local populations joined in the insurrection with stones and hunting weapons. The FSLN distributed arms, organized local supporters and established popular emergency administrations.

Somoza responded by declaring martial law in each of the cities and by having the National Guard surround them. The Guard then used artillery shelling and aerial strafing and bombing. Homes, businesses, and factories were destroyed, and the planting of cotton was abandoned. The shortages of food and other commodities caused by the August strike increased with the fighting. As a result approximately 60,000 urban refugees left the burning cities for camps in Costa Rica and Honduras.

As the National Guard retook each city, the Sandinistas escaped into the hills, and thousands of new recruits followed them. Those who remained faced terrible consequences: the so-called "mop-up operations." The Guard went through each town torturing and killing suspected FSLN sympathizers, vandalizing schools, hospitals, and churches, and attacking Red Cross ambulances and their crews. According
to the Red Cross, 5,000 people were killed, 10,000 were injured, and 25,000 were left homeless.25

Although the September uprising was a military defeat for the FSLN, it became a political victory of sorts. The FSLN lost few of its troops because it retreated into the countryside before the Guard retook the cities. Recruits, arms, money, and important battle experience were gained. Many who had been anti-Somo became pro-Sandinista. As a result, the FSLN evolved from a small guerrilla force into a mass movement. It gained the support of thousands of peasants, workers, students, and members of the upper and middle classes and the Catholic Church.26

The development of the mass movement was also aided by the Comités de Defensa Civil (CDCs, Civilian Defence Committees), the Association of Rural Workers (ATC), and the Asociación de Mujeres Ante la Problemática Nacional (AMPRONAC, Association of Women Confronting National Problems). The CDCs had been established by the MPU to coordinate military action in the urban centers. The committees concentrated largely on defensive tasks such as the building of air-raid shelters, the organizing of food and first aid distribution, the teaching of weapons' use and military strategy.27 As previously mentioned, the ATC was formed in 1977 by the Sandinistas to unite peasants for demanding better working and living conditions. Increasingly after 1978, the peasant committees armed themselves and fought beside the FSLN. AMPRONAC, which was founded by middle and upper class women following the 1972 earthquake, also contributed to the mass movement. By the late 1970s, AMPRONAC members became involved in church
occupations and hunger strikes in their efforts to gain human rights for
the population. 28

The September uprising also strengthened the bond among the three
FSLN tendencies. At this point in the struggle, the debate over
strategy became irrelevant. All three tendencies recognized that the
political and military efforts made by each had been complementary and
not conflictive. 29 After the September uprising, they made preparations
for the next armed uprising which was going to be their "final of-
fensive."

Somoza's brutality also led to international condemnation of the
regime and increased support for the Sandinistas. When the National
Guard violated Costa Rican territory, Costa Rica sought protection from
the Organization of American States (OAS) against Nicaraguan aggression.
Venezuela called for an OAS mediation of the conflict. The call was
supported by the U.S. When Los Doce travelled throughout the world,
following the uprising, governments in Latin America, Social Democratic
parties of Western Europe, and solidarity groups in the U.S. gave the
group money. 30 The money was then used to purchase modern weapons.

After the National Palace seizure and the September uprising,
Somoza was left with only the support of the Somoza clan, some members
of the upper class, and the National Guard. 31

The National Guard Remains Strong

According to Ted Gurr, "the capacity of a regime to exercise any
kind of persistent coercive control over its citizens, depends ultim-
ately on the loyalty of its military and internal security forces." 32
Generally, a dictator relies heavily upon power and force to rule. A dictator thus requires a cooperative armed force. He rules by a combination of rewards and negative sanctions, and the armed forces cooperate in order to gain the rewards. 33

In Nicaragua, ever since the 1930s, the Somozas had relied on the National Guard to support their interests and to act as their personal bodyguards. This base of support was crucial for the potentially autonomous state that developed. As the Somozas became increasingly alienated from society, they needed to rely more and more on the National Guard.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle used rewards and negative sanctions to ensure loyal behaviour. Rewards were introduced on a continual basis. They included improved equipment and training, expansion of the force, increases in the force's budget, and pay increases. 34 As previously mentioned, the Guard came to control several state services and was allowed to partake in the earthquake looting. On the whole, the force enjoyed a certain level of wealth and prestige under Somoza Debayle.

Negative sanctions were also used to ensure loyalty. If Somoza considered an officer to be too powerful or popular, the officer would be transferred, retired, or discharged. 35 Anyone who attempted to overthrow the President was sentenced to prison or to death. Somoza also tried to alienate the force from the rest of the Nicaraguan society. The National Guard was led to believe that the enemy was an internal enemy. The guardsmen developed an obsessive fear of internal opposition, and this isolated them from the rest of the population and made them dependent upon the state. 36 Another tactic was used to alienate the Guard from society. The men were exempt from the rules of
society and were given certain privileges. For example, most crimes that were committed by guardsmen against civilians were dismissed. And first priority for the earthquake relief goods was given to Guardia families.  

Through these methods, Somoza was able to maintain control over the Guard. However, after the National Palace attack, this control wavered. In late August there was an attempted coup by National Guard officers. Somoza arrested 85 members of the force for plotting against him. According to one spokesman, Somoza's assent to guerrilla demands during the National Palace attack was the main cause for the discontent. To gain control over the situation, Somoza reimposed the state of emergency. He also expanded the armed forces from 7,500 men to 10,000 men. After the September uprising, which was regarded as a military victory for the state, Somoza again expanded the forces, this time to 14,000. The new recruits were often reluctant to fight and were treated more like prisoners than as soldiers. Somoza also bought arms from Israel and Argentina financing the purchases with foreign loans for development projects. Hence, despite the attempted coup, Somoza was able to maintain control over the guardsmen. However, he was less successful in maintaining, let alone enhancing, U.S. support.

The U.S. Mediation Effort

Following the September insurrection, the Carter administration realized that Somoza's repressive response had not only eroded internal support but had seriously eroded his international image. The U.S. officials had basically two foreign policy options. They could continue
to pressure Somoza to bring about human rights and democratic reforms or they could subordinate the human rights foreign policy to efforts made to support a reliable Central American ally.

As mentioned in chapter three, in 1977 the Carter administration was successful in pressuring Somoza to improve the human rights situation in Nicaragua. However, the reinstatement of civil and political liberties in the system had a destabilizing effect. Somoza continuously lost popular support while the opposition forces were gaining it. The administration then came to fear the possibilities of another Cuba occurring in Central America, under the leadership of the FSLN. Human rights concerns then came into conflict with U.S. security interests. Instead of choosing one of the two foreign policy options, President Carter combined them. Human rights and democratic reform pressure was exerted at the same time that efforts were made to keep Somoza in power until the 1981 elections. As a result the human rights policy became incoherent. This incoherence is best described by Walter LaFeber when he states:

Carter wanted it both ways: decrease government coercion and publicly attack (and hence de-legitimize) the military regimes, while at the same time urging those regimes to fight the revolutions. . . .

From October 1978 until July 1979, the Carter administration used mediation efforts to solve the Nicaraguan political crisis. The efforts can be divided into five phases. Although these phases illustrate different methods and tactics, the goal was the same. The Carter administration wanted to prevent a Sandinista takeover. The administration wanted to preserve the National Guard and establish a pro-U.S. government without altering the political, social, and economic struc-
ture of the Somoza regime. (This is technically known as Somocismo without Somoza.)

The first phase, from October through December 1978, involved the OAS mediation efforts between Somoza and the FAO. The mediation team was made up of a Dominican Republican representative, a Guatemalan representative, and the U.S. envoy, William Bowdler. The objective in the mediation was to devise a plan in which Somoza would be replaced by a government of moderates. William Bowdler proposed an "interim government" to be composed of the FAO, Somoza's National Liberal Party (PLN), and members of the National Guard. The new government would prepare for the 1981 election. In order to obtain the FAO's cooperation, Bowdler promised economic aid to the new interim government. Obtaining Somoza's cooperation was more difficult. The dictator refused to end his presidential term any earlier than 1981.

By pressuring the FAO to concede to a new government which would include the PLN and the National Guard, members of the FAO left the coalition. In October, Los Doce was the first to leave the FAO. Following Los Doce's exit, other organizations defected: the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), the Workers' Federation of Nicaragua (CTN), the People's Social Christian Party (PPSC), the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), and middle class unions. FAO was then left with the more conservative groups: MDN, four factions of the traditional conservative party, and CUS. As a result, the FAO lost most of its political support and was in a weaker power position. Also, since the FAO supported the U.S. plan, tensions increased between the FAO and the MPU. Tensions became pronounced when the linkage group, Los Doce, left the coalition.
In November, the U.S.-led mediation team proposed a plebiscite. The plebiscite was to determine whether the Nicaraguan population wanted Somoza to stay or to leave. Nicaraguans—governed for decades by the Somozas—did not trust the use of the ballot. Somoza, too, found no favour with either side. The plebiscite plan was discarded in January when the dictator rejected its use.

Since the mediation efforts were not going well, the commission pressed Somoza for human rights concessions in order to salvage the talks. Somoza agreed to release political prisoners and to allow for a general amnesty for Sandinistas who would surrender. In exchange, he wanted direct talks with the FAO. Although the FAO had decided upon entering the negotiations not to conduct direct talks with Somoza under any circumstances, during the second week of December, the FAO leaders accepted direct talks. The decision caused internal unrest in the coalition and, by late December, the U.S.-led negotiations collapsed.

With the disintegration of the FAO, the FSLN and the MPU decided to create a coalition group which would provide an alternative to the FAO. The Frente Patriótico Nacional (FPN, National Patriotic Front) was created. The FPN included the FSLN, the MPU and its member groups, the sectors which left the FAO, and the Frente Obrero (FO, Workers' Front). The majority of organizations and groups of the upper and middle classes, the working class, and the peasants now belonged to the FPN. Since the FPN had a broader political base than the MPU, the FPN's program was not as radical as the MPU's. However, both coalitions worked towards mobilizing the population against any pacts or plebiscites.
The second phase, from January to June 1979, involved the continuation of U.S. pressure on Somoza to resign and the continuation of efforts to find a moderate solution to the crisis. During this period, efforts were made by President Carter to pressure Somoza by cutting off military and economic aid. Somoza then purchased arms from the Israelis and the Argentines. In May, Somoza was confronted with such large debts that he asked the International Monetary Fund for a $66 million loan. In spite of U.S. efforts to cut off aid in Nicaragua, the U.S. supported his requests. This was an example of how the Carter administration used indirect action to aid Somoza.

The U.S. strategy throughout this period helped to unite the Sandinista factions. The Tercerista faction came to distrust the FAO and emphasize Sandinista unity. On December 7, 1978 the three FSLN factions drew up a "basis of unity." They agreed on four issues:

1. the rejection of imperialism, Somoza and any foreign intervention;
2. the rejection of any pacts or plebiscites which are intended to betray the Nicaraguan people;
3. the dismantling of the National Guard; and
4. the support of the MPU.

These issues were based on the demands that Augusto Sandino made in the 1930s. Some of those demands were: the establishment of a popular and independent government; the annulment of all reactionary treaties that had been forced upon the nation; recovery of national resources to benefit the majority of the people; and the establishment of a popular army.

On March 8, the three tendencies reunited under the command of a nine-member Directorio Nacional Conjunto (DNC, Joint National
Directorate). The Directorate included three members from each faction: Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega, and Víctor Tirado (from the Terceristas); Tomás Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Bayardo Arce (from the GPP); and Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrión and Carlos Núñez (from the TP). An official program of unification was signed by the leaders, and decisions were made on a post-revolutionary government. Five points were agreed upon:

1. Provisional Government of National Unity;
2. Program of National Reconstruction;
3. National Army (without the National Guard);
4. Foreign Policy of Non-alignment; and
5. Expropriation of all of Somoza's properties by the new government.

All three tendencies at this point in the struggle realized the importance of creating a unified FSLN to direct the insurrection.

By April, the Sandinistas had developed many external support linkages. In the United States, a number of Senators and Congressmen denounced the Somoza regime. Representative Tom Harkin (D.-Iowa) led a ban on Nicaraguan beef. On June 13, Senator Edward Zorinsky (D.-Neb.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs, advised the Carter administration to get rid of Somoza and to use military force if necessary. On June 20, a National Guard unit murdered an ABC T.V. correspondent, Bill Stewart, in front of his camera crew. The killing was seen on television by millions of North American viewers. After the murder, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church (D.-Idaho) and George McGovern (D.-S.D.) sent a letter to President Carter strongly urging him to get the Nicaraguan dictator's resignation.
While these senators and congressmen were urging the Carter administration to get Somoza's resignation, a very powerful "Nicaraguan lobby" was trying to get the administration to support Somoza. The leader of this lobby was Congressman John Murphy (D.-N.Y.) whose friendship with Somoza had developed in the 1940s while the two men were at La Salle Military Academy in New York and continued for many years. Murphy and Representative Charles Wilson (D.-Tex.) supported Somoza until the end of his rule.58

The FSLN also won support from a number of countries. The governments of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama openly received Los Doce and supported the National Patriotic Front. The governments of these countries also wanted to see the Sandinistas included in a future Nicaraguan government.59

Some of the friendly countries supplied the FSLN with automatic rifles and other modern military weapons. When the "final offensive" began in May, the Sandinistas were in a better position to fight the National Guard. This was largely due to the financial and military support from abroad along with the military and political organizational efforts of the MPU. By June 8, the guerrillas controlled most of the rural north and some territory near the Costa Rican border.

On June 16, the FSLN formed a Provisional Government of National Reconstruction in Costa Rica. The five leaders of the Junta were: Sergio Ramirez, a representative of Los Doce; Alfonso Robelo, a representative of the FAO; Moisés Hassan, a representative of the MPU; Daniel Ortega, a representative of the FSLN's National Directorate; and Violeta Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Chamorro.60 The Junta was to begin governing as soon as it could move into a liberated city.
Phase three began with the U.S.-sponsored Organization of American States meeting on June 21, 1979. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance called for Somoza's resignation and an OAS peacekeeping force to enforce a ceasefire. This was the first time that the U.S. publicly called for Somoza's resignation. 61

The peacekeeping force was proposed because the renewed fighting in May heightened U.S. fears of an FSLN victory. However, the plan was rejected by a combination of both right-wing dictatorships and liberal and social democratic governments at the OAS. The military regimes feared that if the U.S.-initiated intervention took place, similar interventions might in the future be repeated on their own countries. On the other hand, Panama, Costa Rica, and the Andean countries had developed links with members of the Tercerista faction. They saw U.S. intervention as a threat to what they perceived to be an emerging left of center post-revolutionary government. 62 Faced with such opposition, the U.S. withdrew its plan.

Phase four followed the failure of the U.S. to obtain OAS support for the military intervention. Somoza announced his willingness to resign and stated that he was waiting for further U.S. initiatives. The Carter administration then sought to trade off Somoza's resignation for the creation of a "Government of National Reconciliation" which would include the National Guard and the PLN. 63

When Cyrus Vance proposed the formation of this new rival government, he ignored the existing Provisional Government of National Reconstruction which had been formed several days earlier by the FSLN and the FPN. Vance's plans for the rival government fell through when the FAO and COSEP endorsed the Provisional Government of National
Reconstruction oh June 27. Without the support of the two conservative sectors, the U.S. plan had no chance of succeeding. 64

Then, on June 28, the Provisional Government published a platform which outlined the composition of the government's Council of State and its platform. The Council of State included thirty-three members from the FSLN, the FPN, FAO, and COSEP. The platform called for civil liberties, human rights, a new national army, and a new foreign policy. 65

The fifth phase began during the second week of July when the FSLN was near victory. The Carter administration ended its attempts to form a government without the Sandinistas. The objective then was to minimize FSLN influence by providing economic aid to an acceptable government. An acceptable government was one which would include two additional moderate members on the Junta. 66 The U.S. also wanted a guarantee that the PLN and the National Guard would continue to operate. The Sandinistas did not accept these demands.

The Carter administration failed to prevent a Sandinista takeover. Because of the impracticality of the human rights foreign policy, the administration's actions were contradictory. Human rights and democratic reform pressures were exerted along with efforts to help Somoza stay in power. The means by which the administration pressured Somoza to improve his human rights standing were in the long-run devastating for the Somoza state. By reducing economic and military aid and political support, the U.S. government weakened the Somoza regime and indirectly aided the Sandinistas. At the same time, the administration tried to keep Somoza in power and also tried to find a moderate solution to the crisis. However, the U.S., by pressing for the inclusion of the
PLN and the National Guard in any future government, brought about the disintegration of the FAO. The moderate solution then became a no-win solution.

The War Against the State

Since revolutions are complicated events, it is not until after a takeover has occurred that analysts label the events as revolutionary. According to Charles Tilly, there is one major event which occurs during potential revolutionary situations which indicates that a revolution will most probably occur. That is "multiple sovereignty," or the emergence of an alternative polity. Tilly claims that multiple sovereignty exists when a large segment of the population supports a power contender which advances claims to control the existing government and when the existing government is unable to suppress the power contender and the segment of the population which supports it.

In Nicaragua, one can argue that the development of multiple sovereignty occurred with the creation of the FPN in February 1979. When the FPN united the FSLN, the MPU and sectors of the FAO, the FPN became a powerful power contender whose objective was to gain control, over cities and rural areas and to set up administrative functions; in other words, to create a parallel power. The basic units of this parallel power were the Civil Defence Committees (CDCs). When the Sandinistas controlled a town or city, the CDCs performed the civic duties that had been carried out by Somoza's government officials along with others, such as the maintenance of public safety and the distribution of material supplies, medicine, and weapons.
The FSLN Emerges as Leader of the Opposition

There were several reasons why the FSLN rather than the FAO emerged as the leader of the opposition and created a parallel power structure. Firstly, the FAO's reformist strategies which included strikes and negotiations failed to bring about Somoza's resignation. This was mainly because the dictator refused to relinquish his power position. Secondly, the FAO members overestimated the desire and ability of the Carter administration to aid them in their efforts and to eventually install them in power. Following the failure of the U.S.-led mediation efforts, the FAO's credibility and support amongst the population collapsed.

The strategy of the FSLN, on the other hand, was essentially to gain popular support in its efforts to replace Somoza. Furthermore, the FSLN made it quite clear that it was not only interested in replacing Somoza but in creating an alternative state by bringing about significant national social, political, and economic structural changes along the lines of Augusto César Sandino's program for a new Nicaragua. One of the major reasons why the FSLN gained the support of the majority of the population was because it drew much of its ideas on a post-revolutionary program from the ideas of the legendary hero, Sandino. Sandino's experiences with Anastasio Somoza García and the U.S. are well-known and empathized with in Nicaragua. Although Sandino lacked a well-developed program, he consistently called for the rejection of U.S. imperialism, armed resistance to U.S. occupation, the dismantling of the National Guard, peasants' and workers' cooperatives, and land reform. Another reason why the FSLN gained support of the population was because its revolutionary efforts compared to the FAO's reformist
measures were seen as being more likely to succeed in replacing the dictator.

The mobilization efforts of the FSLN also paid off. By following the Tercerista's line of action of recruiting many people across class lines, the FSLN was able to recruit not only the lower classes but those of the middle and upper classes and clergymen who may have sympathized with the FAO's efforts or who may have supported the FAO until the mediation efforts collapsed. When the FAO lost many of its member groups in late 1978, the defecting groups did not unite and form another alternative coalition. Instead, they joined the MPU and then later the FPN.

The Tercerista strategy contradicts Charles Tilly's notions of successful revolutionary strategy. Tilly claims:

The wise revolutionary who wishes to produce a large transfer of power forms the minimum necessary coalition with existing members of the polity, and forces his coalition partners to break irrevocably with other members of the polity.

Tilly makes this claim because he believes that if the coalitions are extensive, the postrevolutionary consolidation settlement will tend to return to the prerevolutionary status quo. In Nicaragua, the FPN coalition was extensive, and following the revolution the previous status quo was not restored.

The FSLN's control of its armed forces also strengthened the guerrilla group. There was high morale, discipline, popular cooperation, secure guerrilla bases, and arms.

Another reason why the Sandinistas were able to capture the political and military initiative had to do with the Carter administration's reduction of military and economic aid to the Somoza regime. Although the Carter administration strongly opposed the FSLN, when it
reduced assistance to the Somoza government, it was indirectly aiding
the Sandinistas rather than other groups because the decreased assis-
tance reduced National Guard resources which were used to fight the
Sandinistas. Also due to the U.S. administration's emphasis on human
rights in its foreign policy, the Sandinistas felt that the chances of
U.S. military intervention were minimal. As a result, they gained
confidence that they could defeat the National Guard.

The Final Offensive

The Nicaraguan war, although sporadic, lasted for approximately 18
months, from January 1978 to July 1979. However, the term "civil war"
is not an appropriate term to use to describe the Nicaraguan revolution.
The term "civil war" usually implies that there are two major national
factions involved in a military struggle. In Nicaragua, the conflict
was between a large segment of the population and the state's military
forces. It was "people's war" against the state. The "people's war"
included different groups such as men and women, young and old, peasants
and labourers, salaried workers and businessmen, and rural and city
dwellers which used legal and armed, and violent and nonviolent forms of
struggle against the state.

When the "final offensive" of the revolution began in May 1979, the
Sandinistas had established three military fronts: one in the north in
Estelí, El Jicaro, Nueva Guinea and Jinotega; another in the south in
Penas Blanca, El Jaranjo and Sapos; and a third in the west in Granada,
Masaya, and Carazo. The Sandinista military strategy was to make the
Guard operate in several areas so that its forces would be spread out.
Consequently, the 15,000-man National Guard found it difficult to control many areas simultaneously.

When the June 4th strike was called by the FSLN, it was very effective. The country was paralysed. The strike enabled the FSLN to mobilize more people in the cities. As a result, the strength of the combat units increased. There were approximately 2,000 Sandinista guerrillas, 2,500 popular militias and an unknown number of barrio residents who fought against the Guard. By early July, the Sandinistas controlled agricultural districts and 23 cities.

At this point in the struggle, the National Guard had several advantages over the FSLN: number of troops, air support and ground and air mobility. The disadvantages were reduced munitions, little discipline, low morale, and increased casualties and desertions. By July 7 the troops had decreased to 10 thousand men. In contrast, the FSLN had massive popular cooperation and excellent discipline.

By mid-July, the FSLN military victory was imminent. Most of the major Nicaraguan cities, except for Managua, were under FSLN control. The guardsmen were fighting for their lives and not for the dictator. On July 16, Somoza announced his resignation. The following day Somoza, several family members, and Guard officers flew to exile in Miami. By July 19, the National Guard surrendered, and Managua was under FSLN control.

The Somoza State Response

In a revolutionary situation, the actions taken by a state play a significant role in determining the outcome. The head of state makes
decisions on how to deal with internal opposition forces and internal and international constraints on his power. In most cases, he chooses the course of action which he thinks will be the most effective means of maintaining himself in power.

The manner in which Anastasio Somoza Debayle dealt with the internal opposition forces and Nicaraguan population at large during the last few years of his rule contributed to his downfall. In countering the opposition, Somoza used force. However, his use of force was inconsistent. Somoza used both repression and concession. Similar efforts had worked in the past to control legal and illegal opposition forces. When Ted Gurr analyses the responses made by states during revolutionary periods, he claims:

The more inconsistent the use of force in response to political violence in any respect, the greater the anger and, often, the lower the apparent risk, for the affected survivors, and consequently the less effective the coercive control exercised by the regime that uses such policies.

In the case of Nicaragua, the types of repression used by Somoza from 1978 to 1979 included the popular perception of Somoza's complicity in the assassination of Chamorro and the brutal reprisals waged during the September uprising and the state of siege. The concessions included the release of political prisoners, the permission for inspection by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the permission for the return of Los Doce. Somoza used repression in order to contain the rebellion and concessions in order to regain lost public support.

Not only was Somoza's use of force inconsistent, but the negative sanctions were indiscriminately and unjustly applied. Innocent people were assaulted and murdered during the September "mop-up operations."
According to Gurr, such indiscriminate action is counterproductive. He claims:

But it is highly likely that sporadic government terrorism against a population that harbors rebels, or the shooting of randomly chosen hostages, is thought by its victims to be less just or consistent, and creates more hostility than action directed specifically against known dissidents.

Gurr argues that a state which is effective with its use of force uses coercive measures that are consistently applied and negative sanctions that are fairly applied to everyone. Somoza did not take this particular course of action. He also did not contain the rebellion nor regain lost support. Even if he had taken this particular course of action, he may not have been successful in maintaining the continuation of his family dynasty because there were other internal and international factors which placed constraints on his power to act effectively during the crisis situation.

As previously mentioned, Theda Skocpol claims that international constraints on old regime states were the major catalysts which contributed to the revolutions that she studied. International constraints included military threats from abroad which were met when state leaders mobilized extraordinary resources from the societies and implemented unfavourable internal reforms. In the case of Nicaragua, international constraints--political, economic, or military--were not the catalysts of the revolution. They did, however, contribute to the demise of the regime. For example, up until the Carter administration, the Somozas had the support of U.S. administrations. With the introduction of the human rights foreign policy, the atrocities of the regime became more publicized. As a result, Somoza lost support abroad and at home. He also lost U.S. economic and military aid. From 1977 to 1978,
the annual average economic assistance declined approximately 75 percent. During the same period, military aid declined about 43 percent. In the 1979 budget, the Carter administration terminated all new U.S. aid to Nicaragua.

Faced with these economic pressures, Somoza had to find alternative ways to finance the military activities of the National Guard. Obtaining finances from internal resources was problematic because the political crisis had brought about economic decline and loss of support. For example, there was capital flight, decline in export revenues, increased inflation and foreign debt, and commodity hoarding. Although for two decades the average economic growth had been 5.5 percent per annum, there was no economic growth for 1978. When the IMF approved the $66 million loan in May 1979, the devaluation of the córdoba was the precondition. When the córdoba was devalued, the price of basic foodstuffs increased approximately 40 percent. As a result there was public protest and commodity hoarding.

As the political crisis developed it fuelled the economic crisis, and as the economic crisis developed it led to increased political agitation. Somoza had to rely more and more on the National Guard. In order to finance their activities and to purchase their weapons, Somoza diverted loans from private banks and international public agencies. He also diverted finances from national public agencies and programs.

Although Somoza was faced with serious international and internal constraints on his power to act effectively during the revolution, his own political actions were just as devastating. Somoza's obstinacy throughout the U.S. mediation efforts prevented an interim government
composed of FAO, PLN, and Guard Members from taking his place. Somoza had little choice but to be obstinate. In a dictatorship there is room for only one dictator. Had Somoza given the reins of power to a government composed of members from his own support groups and members from an upper class opposition group, the action may not have been to his advantage. He may not have been able to retain power by remaining head of the armed forces and then manipulating the next election. Although he may have had little choice but to remain obstinate to U.S. efforts and to continue to fight the war, his irreconcilable stance contributed to the growth of widespread public opposition.

Near the end of the war, Somoza was left with only the support of the National Guard. His tactics made the state not only potentially autonomous but isolated. He could not rely on upper and middle class support. He had completely alienated them by bombing their factories and stores. He had the support of the BANIC and BANAMERICA groups and the Somoza clan, but many of these people fled the country weeks before his resignation. They had enough foresight to realize that the FSLN was going to win the war.

The Sandinista State

The type of revolution that occurred, a so-called "people's revolution," was unlike the typical peasant or proletarian revolutions because it was made up of class alliances, including the middle and upper classes, which joined forces against the Somoza state. A common characteristic found in past revolutions has been the occurrence of class struggles. Revolutions, in general, have not included most of the
classes fighting together against the state. Hence revolutions have acquired descriptions of peasant, proletarian, bourgeois, amongst others. In Nicaragua, since the majority of the population opposed the dictator, the revolution came to be known as a "people's revolution." Since the revolution included the private sector, a predominantly collectivist outcome in the postinsurrectionary period was precluded. For example, today's (1984) new regime has a mixed economy where 64 percent of the land is privately owned.

Moreover, a significant collectivist outcome has not occurred because the FSLN made it clear in the Program of National Reconstruction, released July 9, 1979, that the new government was going to represent all major social and political sectors of the country. They agreed to reconstruct Nicaragua on a pluralistic and democratic basis. Hence, since the takeover, the Sandinista byword has been compromiso—obligation or compromise. As previously mentioned, the revolutionary period did not entail a class struggle but classes struggling against the Somoza state. Coming to power, the Sandinistas have emphasized class unity rather than class struggle. They have attempted to develop popular power through national unity. As a result, they have been able to avoid a crisis period with extremists or radicals coming to power, like the one that Crane Brinton discusses in his book, Anatomy of Revolution. Extreme rightists or extreme leftists have not taken control either reversing the changes that have been initiated or instituting extreme leftist measures.

Thus far, the Sandinista's main concern has been to consolidate their rule and reconstruct and defend Nicaragua. These tasks have not been easy. During the Somoza dynasty, there was chronic malnutrition,
poverty, disease, poor housing, and a lack of sewage systems. Compound-
ing these problems were the damages made during the military struggle.
Material damages amounted to $480 million, which was approximately 37
million fled the country. At the end of the war, international reserves
amounted to $3 million while the foreign debt was $1.6 billion. In
addition, key cash crops which had previously generated 70 percent of
export earning either had not been planted or were damaged during the
war.

Composition of the New State

To alleviate these problems, the FSLN organized the new government
to include the participation of all social sectors. Central power lies
in the Sandinista nine-member National Directorate. The DNC establishes
guidelines for the tasks of consolidation and rebuilding, while the
Junta works out the details. There is a high degree of cooperation
and coordination between the two groups. Today (1984), Daniel Ortega,
who sits on both the National Directorate and the Junta, provides the
linkage between the two units of government. In order to shape public
policy and control national defense and public security, members of the
National Directorate have taken important ministerial positions: for
example, Tomás Borge is Minister of the Interior; Humberto Ortega is in
charge of the Ejército Popular Sandinista (EPS, Sandinista Popular
Army); and Jaime Wheelock is minister of the Instituto Nicaragüense de
la Reforma Agraria (INRA, Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform Institute).
The Governing Junta of National Reconstruction is vested with executive power. It is aided by a large staff of technical, administrative, and academic experts and takes care of the day-to-day administration of the country. Membership of the Junta has changed since 1979. The change in membership has reflected, on the national level, the split between the popular forces and the private sector which developed soon after the takeover. For example, the first sign of serious political tensions took place in April 1980 when Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo resigned from the Junta. Mrs. Chamorro resigned because of personal reasons. Alfonso Robelo, on the other hand, resigned because of political reasons. Robelo represented not only his party's interests but also those interests of the private sector. When the FSLN expanded the Council of State from the original 33 members to 47, Robelo resigned in protest. The new 14 members represented organizations which had been mobilized by the FSLN and had not been included in the 1979 National Reconstruction Program. Hence, organizations which were pro-Sandinista held more than half of the seats in the Council. Rafael Córdova Rivas, leader of UDEL, and Arturo Cruz Porras, member of Los Doce and international banker, replaced Robelo and Chamorro on the Junta. By appointing two well-known businessmen, the FSLN maintained the Junta as a multi-class government unit. In 1981 when Arturo Cruz became the ambassador to the U.S. and Moisés Hassan became a cabinet minister, the Junta was reduced to three members.

The Council of State, which was created on May 4, 1980, is vested with legislative power. The Council reviews and modifies proposed legislation and sometimes initiates legislation. Despite the fact that members on the Council are not elected but rather appointed by
various governmental and non-governmental groups, the Council represents a wide spectrum of the population. The members of the Council include delegates from many of the groups which were members of the broad opposition coalitions: the FAO, MPU, and FPN. These coalitions ceased to exist after the overthrow. For the first time in Nicaragua's history, the government has attempted to obtain the widest representation of all social sectors, especially mass organizations. The Somozas had isolated themselves from the majority of the population, whereas the Sandinistas are seeking contacts with the population. Hence, the new government has attempted to set up a state which differs from the Somoza state.

A new national army was also created, the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). The EPS replaced the National Guard. The EPS consists of FSLN guerrilla and popular militia veterans. Unlike the Guard, the EPS does not have police and local security responsibilities. A separate institution, the Policía Sandinista (PS, Sandinista Police) which operates under the Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for local security matters.

Pro-FSLN Groups and Opposition Parties and Organizations

The above examination of the National Directorate, Junta, Council of State, and EPS reveals that the FSLN has extensive control of the state in executive, legislative, and military powers. The FSLN has also made a strong effort to construct and mobilize pro-FSLN mass organizations. The task has not been difficult because many of the mass organizations had been organized during the insurrection or earlier. The FSLN has not had to create numerous new organizations to consolidate
its rule; instead, it has directed the changes in roles played by the organizations. There are at least five major pro-FSLN mass organizations: **Comité de Defensa Sandinista** (CDS, Sandinista Defence Committee); **Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo** (ATC, Association of Rural Workers); **Central Sandinista de Trabajadores** (CST, Sandinista Workers' Confederation); **Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza** (AMNLAE, Association of Nicaraguan Women); and **Juventud Sandinista, 19 de julio** (JS-19, Sandinista Youth, July 19th).

The most important of the five mass organizations are the CDSs. They evolved from the Civil Defence Committees (CDCs) which assisted the FSLN during the insurrection. The Committees represent Sandinista influence in the residential areas. They assume administrative and political functions, but they are not centers of power. They are responsible for food distribution, housing, political organization, health, and local security. The CDSs provide the FSLN with a base of support which is much larger than that of any other Nicaraguan party.

The CDSs were modelled after the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, CDRs, which were formed in 1960 to defend Cuba against attack. The two organizations have similar responsibilities, for example, food distribution, housing, political organization, health, and the defense of the revolutions. The CDSs have a greater level of political autonomy than the CDRs have. This difference is perhaps due to the fact that the CDSs grew out of the armed struggle and were functioning when the Sandinistas took power. The CDRs, on the other hand, were created by the Cuban government after the takeover and did not, as an organization, participate in the struggle against Batista.
The front also promoted the ATC peasant organization and thus has a major influence in the countryside. The major objectives of the ATC have changed since the insurrection. During the war, the ATC was involved in mobilizing the peasants for the guerrilla struggle. The ATC's major objectives today are to defend and aid the agrarian reform. The ATC organizes workers, especially those on the newly-established state farms, into trade union committees. It is also active in providing credit and technical assistance to small landowners.

In an attempt to unify the labour sector, the Sandinistas have created the CST. The CST has grouped together more than 350 individual unions. Although the CST is structurally independent of the FSLN, it supports government guidelines on moderate wage demands. The CST focusses on gains in social benefits and in working conditions. Another important base-organization is the AMNLAE. It evolved out of the small AMPRONAC which helped fight for human rights during the insurrection. AMNLAE helps organize peasant women to demand for child care services on state farms, amongst other things.

Together with the CDSSs, the JS-19, the major youth movement, constitutes the broadest pro-FSLN grass roots organization. It emerged out of the pro-FSLN student movement which helped the regular forces to defeat National Guard units during the war. The JS-19 has played an important role in mobilization campaigns, especially the successful literacy campaign which was held between March and July 1980. The literacy campaign involved one hundred thousand students who taught thousands of Nicaraguans how to read and write. As a result, the national illiteracy rate decreased from 55 percent to 14 percent.
Parties and organizations function openly in Nicaragua. The parties include the Independent Liberals, Popular Social Christians, MDN, Democratic Conservatives, Social Christians, Social Democrats, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, and the Nicaraguan Communist Party. Most of these parties have remained the same since the insurrection.

The MDN is one of the more significant parties. When it was established in 1978, it was an upper and middle class anti-Somoza opposition party. In early 1980, the MDN adopted a social democratic stance. It has criticized the changes in composition of the Council of State, the postponement of elections from 1982 to 1984 and other government policies.

Labour groups also function openly in Nicaragua. Prerevolutionary union confederations still exist, for example, the CTN, CGT-I, CUS, CAUS, and FO. The level of union activity today is greater than the level of union activity which occurred during the Somoza family rule. The CST has made a major effort to increase its union membership. The 350 unions which became affiliated with the CST during the first year of the new government represented 70 percent of unionized labour. Nine percent of unionized labour was affiliated with the CTN, five percent with the CGT-I, and four percent with CUS.

While some members of the Catholic Church hierarchy assumed the role of mediators during the insurrection, many clergymen either supported the Sandinistas or became FSLN members. Today the Church hierarchy and those who were mediators, for example Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, have come to openly oppose the Sandinistas. The Church hierarchy believes that the FSLN is planning to make Nicaragua into a Marxist-Leninist state which will replace the Church hierarchy with a
"People's Church." The "People's Church" is supported by CEPA and other Churchmen, especially those who worked with the FSLN during the military struggle. Those who support the "People's Church" believe that Christianity and Marxism are compatible and that a major responsibility of Nicaraguan Christians is to support the revolution.

The FSLN has supported Christianity in its efforts to create a new political and socio-economic order. However, the FSLN views the Church hierarchy as reactionary and supports the "People's Church" by allowing those who are involved access to state communications media and by supplying resources such as staff and printing and typing equipment. The FSLN has also appointed several priests to important government positions. For example, Father Ernesto Cardenal is Minister of Culture; Father Miguel d'Escoto Brockman is Minister of Foreign Affairs; Father Edgard Parrales is Minister of Social Welfare; and Father Fernando Cardenal is Minister of Education.

State-Private Sector and State-Church Relations

State-private sector and state-Church relationships have deteriorated significantly since 1979. Many businessmen and landowners perceive the FSLN as a serious threat to their economic interests because the Sandinistas have gained control over much of the country's political economy. For example, when the Sandinistas first came to power they nationalized Somoza's property and that of his allies. As a result 50 percent of the most fertile farmland in the country was nationalized. In addition, 168 factories which produce plastics, timber, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, building materials, paper, metal, and machinery were
taken over by the state. The nationalizations also included the
financial system, mining, and fisheries.

The expropriated land has been reorganized into two forms: state
farms and productive cooperatives. Most of the nationalized farms had
been capital-intensive enterprises. Instead of breaking the enterprises
up and dividing them into private units, the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform
Institute converted them into Unidades de Producción Estatal (UPEs,
State Production Units). In 1980, there were 1,200 production units
grouped together into 170 state complexes. The units produce for the
domestic and export markets. INRA administrators manage the units while
the farmworkers operate the units.

The second form of agrarian organization is the Cooperative
Agrícola Sandinista (CAS, Sandinista Agricultural Cooperative). By
1980, there were approximately 1,327 cooperatives. Peasants organize
themselves into groups, rent land collectively from the government or
private farmers, and seek credit from the government to help them with
capital expenses. Most of the acquired income is used to pay back
the loans, and the remainder is divided amongst the peasants.

On January 14, 1980, the government published its Economic Plan for
1980, or Plan 80. Plan 80 called for a mixed economy in which the
properties of the private sector would remain within the private sector
and would be respected. Thus, the production of key export crops,
coffee (89%), cotton (85%), and sugar (85%) are in private hands. This means that most of the foreign currency earnings are dependent upon
the continuous production of export crops by the private farmers.
Although the government has provided credit and other financial incen-
tives, the farmers have remained highly skeptical of the government.
This is largely because the notions of a "mixed economy" held by the government and the private sector differ. A "mixed economy" for the private sector means that private accumulation is the foremost activity and that the growth of the public sector is limited. For the government a "mixed economy" means a planned economy whereby the private sector is subordinated to the public sector. Thus far, the private sector has been involved in the production process at the most minimum level possible. Many private entrepreneurs fear that the FSLN will someday eliminate private enterprise completely. Many government officials hold the view that the private sector members are deliberately trying to create economic problems for the country.

The tensions between the government and the private sector have increased since Alfonso Robelo left the Junta in 1980. In November 1980, COSEP along with leading conservative groups walked out of the Council of State in protest of a government ban on a meeting of the MDN and an attack on its headquarters by Sandinista youths. The state-private sector tensions increased when, on November 17, COSEP vice-president Jorge Salazar Arguello was killed by Sandinista forces when he allegedly ran a roadblock with a truck full of munitions. The government charged him with being involved in a conspiracy with counterrevolutionary groups. Since then, COSEP and INDE have left the Council of State and have started an active anti-Sandinista campaign.

The rift became even more serious when on July 19, 1981 the Sandinista government issued several decrees which included the nationalization of 14 non-Somocista private enterprises. The decrees primarily affected the sugar, milk, and cattle industries. The enterprises were nationalized on the grounds of decapitalization. The government
claims that decapitalization (which has included capital flight, rundown of equipment and falsification of accounts) came to $140 million in 1980. The annual outflow in 1981 was estimated at $30 million by non-governmental analysts. As the government intervenes, the private sector disinvests, and the trend continues creating a continuous situation of mutual suspicion.

The state-Church relationship has also deteriorated. The Roman Catholic hierarchy does not want priests to have positions in the government. Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo has now become one of the Sandinista's most outspoken critics. Bishops have published pastoral letters criticizing the military draft (the draft was instituted in January 1984 to increase the military forces in order to fight counter-revolutionaries) and press censorship (the censorship is part of the state of emergency which was invoked in 1982). Pope John Paul II has also criticized the FSLN government for creating divisions within the Nicaraguan Catholic Church. In a letter which the Pope sent to the Catholic Bishops of Nicaragua in June 1982, the Pope called for Church unity and warned of the dangers of a "People's Church."

External Threats and the State Response

To compound the state-private sector and state-Church polarizations, the Sandinistas are threatened by external forces. The United States government and the contras (counterrevolutionaries) present the most destabilizing threats. With the advent of the Reagan administration, U.S.-Nicaraguan relations deteriorated substantially. President Reagan tends to view the world in terms of a bipolar confrontation
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua is seen as a Soviet client. 127

A variety of means have been used by the U.S. to destabilize Nicaragua. In 1980, during the Carter administration, a $75 million aid package for Nicaragua was approved by Congress. There were several delays before the aid was released, and, when it was, 60 percent was marked for the private sector. 128 After President Reagan came to power, the final $15 million in aid was suspended on the grounds that the Sandinistas were supporting the El Salvadoran revolutionary coalition of the FMLN/PDR (the Farabundo Martí People's Liberation Front/the Revolutionary Democratic Front). In November 1981, the Reagan administration tried to restrict loans to Nicaragua from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The administration has also tried to stop U.S. private banks from lending to Nicaragua. 129

The U.S. government has also attempted to restrict Nicaraguan imports. For example, in May 1983, the Reagan administration reduced Nicaragua's quota for sugar imports into the U.S. by 90 percent. 130 The reduction of foreign assistance and the reduced U.S. market for Nicaraguan exports have created a shortage of foreign exchange. The shortage of foreign exchange has made it difficult for the Nicaraguan government to obtain spare parts for machinery which are produced in Western countries.

By 1982, the Reagan administration was involved in a "secret" but overt war against the Sandinistas. When the FSLN defeated Somoza's National Guard during the insurrection, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 soldiers fled the country to Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. 131 In Honduras, a contra group called the Fuerza Democrática
Nicaraguense (FDN, Nicaraguan Democratic Force) emerged. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has trained and supplied the FDN. The Department of Defense has built up the Honduras army and has constructed airstrips in Honduras. Thus far the FDN has 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas. Many of these recruits are Miskito Indians. The Sandinistas alienated many of these Indians when they tried to move them away from the war zone in 1982.  

The FDN has also been actively campaigning for U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua. This position has been criticized by another contra group, Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE, Democratic Revolutionary Alliance), which operates along the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Edén Pastora Gómez, the well-known Comandante Cero of the 1978 National Palace seizure, left his government position as vice-minister of defense in July 1981 and has led ARDE since 1982. Pastora left the government because he felt that the FSLN was "selling" the country out to Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.  

There are approximately 2,500 ARDE guerrillas based along the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border. The CIA has tried to get ARDE and the FDN to unite, but Pastora refuses to joint with a contra group which is supported by the United States. Several ARDE leaders, including Alfonso Robelo Callejas (Robelo went into exile and joined ARDE in 1982), disagree with Pastora's position. They favour a union with the FDN and have voted to expel Pastora from the contra group. However, before Pastora was to be expelled, he was critically injured by a bomb explosion during a press conference in May 1984.  

Since then, the resistance by ARDE has been minimal. Hence, the FDN now poses the greatest contra threat. But the FDN is far outnumbered by the Sandinistas who
have 30,000 regular troops, 50,000 militia, and 25,000 reserve personnel. 135

All the same, the destabilization by the U.S. and the contras has adversely affected the Nicaraguan economy. Shipping and oil storage facilities have been damaged, Managua's airport has been bombed, and infrastructure damage has been exacted along the border areas. According to Daniel Ortega, the raids by the contras resulted in $128 million in damages for 1983. 136

During the first two years after the FSLN took power, the country achieved strong economic growth rates averaging about 8 percent. 137 However, due to declining productivity, contra raids and U.S. attempts at blocking aid and loans, the Nicaraguan economy has experienced declining economic growth rates. In response to these external and internal pressures and threats, the Sandinista government has increased its control over the population. In March 1982, after the contras blew up two Nicaraguan bridges, the government declared a state of emergency. Emergency measures have included the suspension of constitutional guarantees, press censorship, the right to freedom of travel, and the right of peaceful assembly. 138 Press censorship has angered not only the editors of the opposition paper La Prensa, but the private sector and Church hierarchy as well.

The Sandinistas have also responded to internal and external pressures by militarizing the population. In January 1984, an unpopular law of military service was instituted. All men between the ages of 18 and 25 must serve in the army for two years. The military draft is expected to add 15,000 more men in 1984 to the regular force, the reserve force, and the militia. 139
As the Sandinistas extend their control over the population during the "secret war," they are deepening the gap between the government and the private sector and the government and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Like the prerevolutionary period when Somoza alienated the upper and middle classes because of his state-estate practices, the Sandinistas have also lost the support of the private sector with their state practices. However, there is one major difference. Somoza alienated not only the private sector but the masses as well. The FSLN, on the other hand, has strong mass support. The Sandinistas came to power with the masses supporting them. They have been able to retain this support by implementing an agrarian reform program, providing credit to new peasant landowners, conducting nationwide vaccination campaigns, building new schools and hospitals, etc. Although it is difficult to measure support for a government, let it be sufficient to say, as Ernesto Cardenal once did, that the FSLN has the support of the masses because the FSLN has given the population guns. However, the Sandinistas could possibly lose this support if they have to allocate more money for defense programs rather than reconstruction and social programs thereby prolonging austerity.
Footnotes

1 Jung, op. cit., p. 82.

2 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 17.

3 Booth, op. cit., p. 163.

4 Black, op. cit., p. 113.

5 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 21.

6 Black, op. cit., p. 115.

7 Loc. cit.

8 Ibid., pp. 110-112.

9 Weber, op. cit., p. 43.

10 Booth, op. cit., pp. 99, 100, 253. The three conservative parties were: the Partido Conservador Oficialista (Official Conservative Party), the Partido Conservador Auténtico (Authentic Conservative Party), and the Partido Conservador Aguereista (Aguero Conservative Party). There was a fourth conservative party which also belonged to the FAO, the Acción Nacional Conservadora (ANC, Conservative National Action). I do not mention this fourth group in the text because it was a member group of UDEL.

There were several conservative parties because divisions took place within the Official Conservative Party. The Aguero group split with the Official Conservative Party because its members became disillusioned with the Official Party's willingness to accept Somoza's co-optation. When Fernando Aguero agreed in 1971 to serve on the triumvirate government, more divisions occurred. The ANC and the Authentic Conservative Parties were then formed.


12 Black, op. cit., p. 120.

13 Booth, op. cit., p. 123.

14 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 33.

15 Guillermoprieto, op. cit.


17 Loc. cit.


21 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 36.

22 NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., p. 25.

23 Booth, op. cit., p. 164.

24 Loc. cit.


26 Ibid., p. 41.

27 Black, op. cit., p. 138.

28 Ibid., p. 324.

29 Ibid., p. 136.

30 NACLA, Crisis in Nicaragua, op. cit., p. 27, and Walker, op. cit., p. 39.


32 Gurr, op. cit., p. 251.


34 Millet, op. cit., pp. 189, 192, 238.

35 Ibid., p. 199.

36 Ibid., p. 256.

37 Ibid., p. 257.


39 Booth, op. cit., p. 167.


42 In Chace, op. cit., p. 43.

43 Petras, op. cit., p. 17.

44 Leogrande, "The United States and the Nicaraguan Revolution," op. cit., p. 68.

45 Loc. cit.


47 Loc. cit.


49 Ibid., p. 165.

50 See Black, op. cit., pp. 140, 335, and Jung, op. cit., p. 48. The Frente Obrero was formed by FSLN members who were expelled from the FSLN in 1972 after they allegedly plotted to assassinate the entire guerrilla leadership. The FO was an ultra-Leftist group.


52 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 58.

53 Ibid., p. 57.

54 Weber, op. cit., p. 58.

55 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 58.


60 EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 61.


EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 69.


Booth, op. cit., p. 145.

Ibid., pp. 146, 216.

Tilly, From Modernization to Revolution, op. cit., p. 213.

Loc. cit.

Booth, op. cit., p. 174.

Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino, op. cit., p. 34.


EPICA Task Force, op. cit., p. 69.

Gurr, op. cit., p. 256.

Loc. cit.

Ibid., pp. 256-257.

Skocpol, op. cit., p. 50.

Booth, op. cit., pp. 128-129.


Crane Brinton, in his examination of revolutions, found that a "reign of terror," whereby radicals took control of the government, followed the revolutionary takeovers. See Brinton, op. cit., pp. 289-292.


Ibid., p. 191.


Booth, op. cit., p. 185.

Sholk, op. cit., p. 258.

Booth, op. cit., p. 187.

Gorman, op. cit., p. 142.

Loc. cit.


Gorman, op. cit., p. 146.


The substantial decrease in the level of national illiteracy is questionable due to the uncertainty of the actual level of reading and writing skills attained by the population.

Booth, op. cit., p. 194.

Loc. cit.

Central America Update, Church and Revolution (Toronto: Central America Update, November 1982), pp. 3, 4.

Ibid., p. 3.


Ibid., p. 86.


Loc. cit.

Weber, op. cit., p. 87.

Ibid., pp. 69-70.

Sholk, op. cit., p. 259.

Booth, op. cit., p. 196.

Sholk, op. cit., p. 271.

Ibid., p. 260.


Central America Update, op. cit., p. 8.

Booth, op. cit., p. 213.


131. Ibid., p. 39.

132. In early 1982, the Sandinista government forcibly evacuated thousands of Miskito Indians from the Honduras-Nicaraguan border area. In doing so, property and homes were destroyed. The government claimed that the evacuations were necessary in order to thwart radicalization of the Indians by contras. See James Le Moyne, "The Secret War Boils Over," *Newsweek* (April 11, 1983), pp. 46-50; Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 60; and "Caught in the Crossfire," *Latin American Weekly Report* (March 5, 1982), p. 5.

133. In the postrevolutionary period, the government joined the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, established new relations with the Soviet Union, and developed close ties with Cuba. Pastora centered his criticism on Cuban and Soviet involvement in the reconstruction of the country. For example, Cuba has supplied hundreds of doctors, teachers, and military advisors. In 1980, the Nicaraguan government abstained on a United Nations vote to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See "Nicaraguan Guerrilla Leader Resigns," *Globe and Mail* (Oct. 27, 1983); Booth, op. cit., p. 211; and Black, op. cit., p. 302.


136. Loc. cit.

137. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 61.


140. In other words, Father Ernesto Cardenal believes that the government trusts the population enough to arm it, and the action of giving the population guns symbolizes popular acceptance of the government. Father Cardenal made this statement in a lecture at Simon Fraser University, October 14, 1983.
The major purpose of this thesis has been to examine Nicaraguan events in light of some theories of revolution. My findings both support and suggest modifications to the existing theories. By examining the political history of Nicaragua, I developed the major theme of the thesis. I found that due to the peculiarities of the Somoza state and the state's "potential autonomous" relationship with the upper class sectors, the revolution which occurred in Nicaragua did not involve a "classical" class war. The classes were not at war with each other but were semi-united, in their efforts to bring an end to the Somoza dynasty. As a result, the revolution was a "people's revolution." The "people's revolution" included sectors from the upper, middle, and lower classes, women and children, clergy, rural and city dwellers, peasants and labourers, and salaried workers and businessmen. Many of these people belonged to coalitions such as the FAO or the MPU. Although the coalitions had different strategies to bring about the end of the dynasty, and different plans for a future society and government, they did not become involved in an armed struggle amongst themselves. Instead, they recognized the value of each other's endeavours and at times cooperated. For example, the FAO held that the Sandinistas should be involved in any future government. The FSLN also claimed in its Program of National Reconstruction that when it came to power it would represent all major political and social sectors. As a result, the
Sandinista state that evolved has accommodated the anti-Somoza upper class sectors in the new political order. A large percentage of the land is still in private hands, and parties which represent upper class interests are allowed to function.

A state-centered approach was useful in the analysis because of the direct relationship which existed between the type of Nicaraguan state and its activities and the "people's revolution" that occurred. The approach allowed me to examine the nature of the Somoza state, state-class relationships, and the actions of the state when it was confronted with internal and external constraints on its power during a crisis situation.

I found that the concept "potential autonomy" of the state used by Theda Skocpol and Ellen Trimberger was a better concept to use in the analysis than the Marxist concept of "relative autonomy." Relative autonomy implies that the state is relatively autonomous from the upper class and the factions of that class in order to rule in the interests of the upper class as a whole. Potential autonomy implies that the state is an entity of its own being and therefore has the potential to pursue interests that are opposed to the interests of the upper class of society. According to Skocpol, when the prerevolutionary states that she studied were threatened by war or foreign powers, the states pursued policies which were unfavourable to the upper class in order to meet the external threats.

In Nicaragua, the Somoza state was "potentially autonomous" rather than "relatively autonomous" from the upper class sectors. However, the potential autonomy exhibited was not due to external constraints on the state's power, such as war or foreign threats as Skocpol suggests. The
potential autonomy of the Nicaraguan state came about because the Somoza presidents pursued policies which were unfavourable to the upper class sectors in order to expand their personal wealth. Hence, the Somoza state and Somoza estate became one, and the state became a state for itself.

There are several major conditions which, if present in a society, can lead to a "potential autonomous" state. Such a state does not depend on the upper class sectors for its existence, and when the upper class sectors feel that the state is no longer ruling in their interests, they wage their political opposition outside the established "rules of the game." The major conditions are: the development of a predatory state-estate which is a mixture of public and private family economic and business interests; the heavy reliance of a state on an external base of support rather than internal bases of support; and the heavy reliance of a state on the armed forces to maintain itself in power.

In Nicaragua, the characteristics of the state-estate were formed during the 19-year rule of the first Somoza--Anastasio Somoza García. Somoza came to power with little more than a coffee finca. He designed regulations to enhance his own economic power over that of the upper class sectors because he found upper class economic interests obstacles to be overcome. For example, he persuaded landowners during the Depression to sell their estates to him at half their market value, and he expropriated German-owned properties during World War II. By the end of his rule, he had become the largest private landowner in the country, had extended his personal wealth into the industrial sectors, and had controlled the supply of capital through several banks.
The state-estate practices were continued during Anastasio Somoza Debayle's rule. It was not until after the 1972 earthquake, however, that these practices resulted in a very strained state-upper class relationship. The indicators of this strained relationship were the changes in political opposition waged by the upper class sectors. Before the earthquake, political opposition was waged within the "rules of the game." For example, the Conservative party had tried to gain power through elections. Since most elections were rigged, they found that their chances of succeeding were unrealistic. After the earthquake, there was an increase in state corruption and state greed. Business transactions became extremely difficult to conduct. And the Somoza group excluded sectors of the upper class from earthquake investment opportunities. As a result, the upper class sectors waged political opposition outside the "rules of the game." They were not willing to wait for the 1981 election. Instead, they demanded political reforms and Somoza's resignation.

Following the September 1977 military offensive, the upper class sectors illustrated their discontent by transferring large sums of capital to foreign banks. When Pedro J. Chamorro was assassinated, UDEL and the business community organized a national strike to get Somoza to resign. Thereafter, the FAO was formed, and the coalition resorted to strikes and U.S. pressure. However, these reformist strategies failed to bring about Somoza's resignation. The dictator was determined to finish his term of office. In addition, the FAO members overestimated the willingness and ability of the U.S. government to help them in their efforts and to eventually install them in power. Following the failure of the mediation talks, the FAO's credibility and support amongst the
population collapsed. The leadership role of the country's discontent was then determined. The FSLN, which had been gaining prestige and mass support, spearheaded the movement.

Although the FAO and anti-Somoza upper class sectors wanted Somocismo without Somoza, the FSLN promised to represent all political and social sectors of the country. Furthermore, after coming to power, the FSLN placed emphasis on class unity rather than class struggle. Hence, the FAO and the private sector have been included in the new political order. Also, since the FSLN included the anti-Somoza upper class sectors in the new order, this arrangement has, thus far, precluded a predominantly collectivist outcome. However, since 1979, the state-private sector relationship has become very strained. A high level of suspicion has developed between the state and the private sector. Many entrepreneurs fear that the Sandinistas will someday eliminate private enterprise altogether. Many government officials, on the other hand, hold the view that the private sector members are deliberately trying to destabilize the country through destructive economic actions. This strained relationship may someday become totally unworkable should external constraints on the Sandinista state's power (i.e., destabilization efforts by the U.S. and the contras or all out war) produce a situation in which the state-private sector relationship becomes even more severely polarized.

Another major theme found in the thesis and which is interrelated with the "potential autonomy" of the state is "people's revolution." The concept "people's revolution," here, refers to the revolutionary strategy used by the FSLN.
When Marxists analyse revolution, they speak of class conflicts in the prerevolutionary period with the state supporting the dominant class. They analyse class relationships more than state-class relationships. However, in order to understand the breakdown of the state in revolutionary situations, the state must be central to the analysis and state-class relationships must be discussed.

In Nicaragua, the nature of the state and its relationship with the upper class sectors led to a situation in which most classes fought against the state and not against each other. The classes took separate routes to obtain Somoza's removal but to some degree acknowledged or accepted the other's endeavours or even encouraged class unity against the state. The Terceristas and Los Doce were the two major groups which urged class unity and were in effect encouraging a "people's revolution."

The Terceristas, who did not adhere to a strict Marxist ideology, believed that a pluralistic political line would win the support of many Nicaraguans who were anti-Somoza but not pro-Sandinista. When the FSLN first recruited in the 1960s, it enlisted students, urban workers, and peasants. In the 1970s, after following the Terceristas' line of action of recruiting many people across class lines, the FSLN was able to not only gain newcomers from the lower classes but from the upper and middle classes including clergymen. Since the Tercerista faction became the major tendency in the FSLN, the FSLN followed the faction's mobilization strategy. Had either the GPP or TP factions become the major faction of the FSLN then perhaps the revolution would have evolved differently. Without the middle and upper class sectors, it may have developed into what is referred to as a proletarian or a peasant revolution. Because
of the Tercerista strategy, the insurrection can not be considered a civil or class war but, rather, a "people's war" against the state. The armed conflict was not waged between two major national factions; it was waged between a large segment of the population and the state's military forces.

The Tercerista strategy also contradicts Charles Tilly's notion of successful revolutionary strategy. Tilly claims that if the coalitions are extensive, the postinsurrectionary settlement will tend to return to the previous status-quo. In Nicaragua, the FPN coalition was extensive, and following the revolution, the previous status-quo was not restored.

Los Doce was also instrumental in promoting the development of a "people's revolution." Los Doce members had professional credentials and lacked previous political activity. They endorsed the FSLN and helped establish FSLN credibility amongst the population. The Twelve also became a linkage group between the Sandinistas and upper class opposition sectors.

The upper and lower Roman Catholic clergy also helped to legitimize the FSLN amongst the population and aided in the development of the pluralistic nature of the overthrow. Since the Church hierarchy was critical of both the state and the FSLN, Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo served as mediator in several uneasy situations. The lower clergy, who worked in the urban areas and in the countryside, helped the FSLN by stockpiling food, medical supplies, and ammunition in the Churches. Some became FSLN members. After the overthrow, the clergymen who worked with the Sandinistas in the military struggle developed a "People's Church." The "People's Church" is supported by the Sandinista
government but is criticized by the Nicaraguan Church hierarchy and Pope John Paul II.

The FSLN also promoted a people's revolutionary strategy which differed from the foco guerrilla and GPP methods. During the 1960s, the Sandinistas followed the foco strategy by concentrating on the development of a guerrilla war in the countryside. The prolonged popular war strategy (GPP) was then utilized as an attempt to mobilize people in the cities and in the rural areas. The people's revolutionary strategy developed after the Monimbo uprising of 1978. The FSLN decided that in the future they would integrate themselves into spontaneous insurrections and provide direction.

Since the main thrust of the FSLN's military strategy was to gain support from the majority of the population, violence was waged selectively. It was primarily waged against the National Guard forces. This strategy differed from the sporadic and indiscriminate violence that was waged by the National Guard. Consequently, the state's support bases decreased in size while the Sandinista bases grew.

Another condition which, if present in a country, can lead to a "potential autonomous" state is the over reliance of a state on an external support base. For political and geographic reasons, Nicaragua came to rely on the United States. The close relationship began during the 19th century when the American filibuster, William Walker, became president of Nicaragua. During those days, Nicaragua was considered to be of crucial international geopolitical importance to the U.S. The U.S. did not want European powers to dominate any one Latin American country or region. In addition, the U.S. feared that an unstable or anti-American Nicaraguan government might negotiate with another country
for the construction of a Nicaraguan canal which would then compete with the U.S.-operated Panama Canal. Hence, the U.S. adopted measures, such as dollar diplomacy and U.S. military intervention, to ensure a stable and pro-American government in Nicaragua. When the marines left in 1933, they placed Anastasio Somoza García in charge of the American-trained constabulary force. As a result of American occupation, a fierce nationalism developed amongst certain sectors of the population.

When Augusto César Sandino fought the American and Nicaraguan forces, his struggle left a particular legacy in Nicaragua. His ideas for a new Nicaragua were later adopted by the FSLN. The Sandinistas wanted to oust Anastasio Somoza Debayle from power—a man who they considered to be the last marine.

When Anastasio Somoza García became president, he developed a pro-American stance which was continued by his two sons, Luis and Anastasio. Luis and Anastasio's rules perpetuated the "potential autonomous" state that had developed during their father's presidency. During A. Somoza García's and Luis' rule, U.S. security interests had shifted away from the concern of preventing European intrusions into the region. The protection of U.S. direct investment in Nicaragua was not a great concern because foreign direct investment was not substantial. Instead, security interests shifted towards the prevention of Communist aggression in the region. For example, during the 1950s, Nicaragua received a large amount of military aid from the U.S. which was destined to anti-Arbenz forces in Guatemala. During the late 1950s, Luis Somoza sold military equipment to the Batista government to fight Castro forces. In 1961, the CIA was allowed to train Cuban exiles in Nicaragua
for the Bay of Pigs invasion. In return, Nicaragua was supplied with military aid.

The Somozas did not experience serious problems obtaining or maintaining U.S. support until the Carter era. With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, foreign policy towards Latin America shifted from Nixon's and Ford's emphasis on power politics to an emphasis on human rights. During Nixon's and Ford's presidencies, military and economic aid to Nicaragua increased. With the beginning of the Carter administration, U.S. aid to Nicaragua began to decline, and human rights improvements were then tied to the granting of aid.

Following the 1978 September insurrection, the Carter administration feared the possibility of another Cuba occurring in Central America under the leadership of the FSLN. The human rights policy then came into conflict with U.S. security interests. Human rights and democratic reform pressures were exerted at the same time that efforts were made to keep Somoza in power until the 1981 elections. As a result, the human rights foreign policy became incoherent. This incoherence contributed to the failure of U.S. efforts to prevent a Sandinista takeover. For example, the means by which the administration pressured Somoza to improve his human rights standing were in the long-run devastating for the Somoza state. By reducing economic and military aid and political support, the U.S. government weakened the Somoza regime and indirectly aided the Sandinistas. At the same time, the administration tried to keep Somoza in power and also tried to find a moderate solution to the crisis. However, the U.S., by pressing for the inclusion of the PLN and the National Guard in a future government, brought about the disintegration of the FAO. The moderate solution was then no longer a viable one.
During the last year of the Carter administration, a $75 million aid package destined to Nicaragua was approved. However, when it was released, 60 percent of it was to go to the private sector rather than to public agencies. In 1980, when Ronald Reagan came to power, he continued to find ways to support the private sector over that of the government. Destabilization measures have been enacted to delegitimize the Sandinista government and to bring about its demise.

One crucial consistency in Nicaraguan-U.S. relations has been the activity, since the early 20th century, of parties in power or parties in opposition seeking U.S. backing to help legitimize their rule or attempt to rule. For example, during the early 20th century, the Conservatives and Liberals tried to gain U.S. support to help them maintain their power position. During the 1970s, Anastasio Somoza Debayle tried to strengthen his internal power position during a period of increased national unrest by strengthening his external support in the U.S. The dictator arranged to have a private dinner with President Nixon. Nixon's response was seen as a friendly endorsement of U.S. support for Somoza. When Pedro J, Chamorro was president of UDEL, he hoped to win the 1981 election with U.S. backing. UDEL also gained confidence that the Carter administration, with its human rights emphasis, would support the party's endeavours to remove Somoza from power. So did the FAO. Today, the contras, who are made up of ex-National Guardsmen and anti-Sandinista forces, seek U.S. political, economic, and military support in their endeavours to destabilize the country and to overthrow the government.

Somoza's irreconcilable stance was also another self-defeating action. Had Somoza stepped down and allowed an interim government to
take his place during the U.S. mediation efforts, he may not have been able to retain his control over the National Guard and manipulate future elections. Hence, Somoza had little choice but to be obstinate to U.S. efforts to replace him. However, his obstinacy contributed to the growth of widespread public opposition. Another self-defeating action was the alleged authorization of the assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro and the corresponding public perception of it. The assassination served only to intensify the popular struggle against the dictator.

There were also internal and international constraints on the state's power which hindered it to act effectively during the crisis period. Internal constraints consisted of the loss of legitimacy due to the state corruption which followed the earthquake, the military threat of the FSLN, the growing alienation of the upper, middle, and lower classes along with the Roman Catholic clergy, and the adverse effects of the 1974 fiscal crisis.

Theda Skocpol claims that international constraints on prerevolutionary states were the major catalysts which contributed to the revolutions that she studied. In the case of Nicaragua, international constraints were not the catalysts of the revolution. The 1972 earthquake, a natural fortuitous event, was the catalyst. (A parallel can be drawn between the earthquake and international constraints. Although the earthquake was not an international constraint, it was an event which occurred outside the internal political arena.) International constraints did, however, contribute to Somoza's downfall. With the introduction of Carter's human rights foreign policy, the atrocities of the Nicaraguan regime became more publicized. As a result, Somoza lost support from abroad and at home. Also when President Carter demanded
political reforms in 1977 from Somoza, the dictator thought that if he followed instructions and lifted the state of siege, he would have been able to strengthen his internal and U.S. support base. In the long-run, however, the action produced the opposite effect. There was a resurgence of societal protest.

Also, because economic and military aid was tied to human rights improvements, the Somoza government lost aid that it needed for wartime purposes. The state turned to internal resources, but obtaining finances was difficult because the political crisis had brought about economic decline. Consequently, Somoza diverted funds from national public agencies and programs to finance National Guard's weaponry purchases.

One of the major quests of the thesis has been to examine the Nicaraguan revolution in light of existing theories on revolution. I have already discussed certain findings, for example, the concepts of potential autonomy and people's revolution, Ted Gurr's ideas on state violence, Charles Tilly's ideas on revolutionary strategy, and Theda Skocpol's ideas on international constraints. Other findings which have been made concern the role of the rural dwellers, the economic aspects of the revolution, and multiple sovereignty.

When I examined the role of the rural dwellers, I found structural and situational conditions which supported and which differed from the theories developed by Eric Wolf, Barrington Moore, James Scott, and Theda Skocpol. The theorists argue that a traditional peasantry which is not closely supervised by landlords or is isolated from the rule of the elites and maintains a certain level of "autonomy" or "tactical freedom" is more likely to rebel. In the Pacific Coastal region, the
majority of rural dwellers earned their living from their labour on the plantations rather than from subsistence farming and hence can no longer be considered a traditional peasantry. Since they were supervised by landlords, they were not isolated from the rule of the elites and they did not have a high degree of autonomy. However, the rural dwellers in this region were militant.

In the North Central region, many of the rural dwellers were small holders who cultivated for subsistence living and lived outside the landlord's influence. The available research on this region suggests that they experienced a higher level of autonomy and tactical freedom than did the rural dwellers from the Pacific Coastal region. They were also involved in the military struggle.

The landless who migrated to region three, the Central Eastern region, were outside the landlords' supervision but not the state's. They did not enjoy a great deal of independence, and yet they were militant. The type of rural dwellers which were located in the Pacific Coastal region and the Central Eastern region defies Skocpol's, Scott's, and Wolf's assumptions that the more the peasant is autonomous or isolated from the rules of the elites or tactically free, the more he is likely to rebel. On the other hand, the types of rural dwellers and their livelihoods located in the North Central region, support the major premises of the theorists. Although all three regions differed in types of terrain and in types of rural dwellers and their livelihoods, and had rural dwellers who were politically and/or militarily active, there were several common structural and situational conditions for the widespread nature of the rebellion. Some of these conditions included: a lingering admiration for the legendary hero Sandino, disruptive effects of
commercialization in agriculture, organizational efforts by Church
groups and the FSLN, a strong anti-Somoza sentiment due to state
repression, and a rise in food prices during the 1970s.

When Ted Gurr, James Davies, and Crane Brinton analysed revolu-
tionary events, they found that the majority of the societies had
experienced adverse economic conditions during the prerevolutionary
periods. Davies and Gurr found that revolutions occurred after a long
period of improvement was followed by a sharp economic decline. Crane
Brinton found that the financial breakdown of the state, rather than
economic decline, was the most common trend found in prerevolutionary
situations.

The basic problem with the Nicaraguan economy was that the Somoza
family maintained a personal control over it by accumulating wealth
through state power. It was the aftermath of the earthquake which led
to the 1974 fiscal crisis. The public debt increased when Somoza
borrowed heavily to finance some of the reconstruction projects. The
funds were not put to good use to generate new capital to pay off the
loans because the state institutions which administered them were
inefficient and corrupt.

Following the fiscal crisis, instability and inefficiency became
manifest at the political-institutional level. Samuel Huntington
suggests that violence and instability are the results of rapid social
change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics along with the
slow development of political institutions. However, political "un-
governability" in Nicaragua was not so much the consequence of rapid
social change and mobilization. It was centered around fiscal insolven-
cies and governmental bureaucratic ineffectiveness. Both the fiscal
crisis and the institutional ineffectiveness resulted in a loss of legitimacy of the Somoza rule.

It is difficult for theorists to accurately predict or foresee revolutions. Charles Tilly claims that there is one major factor which indicates that a revolution will most probably occur. That is the emergence of an alternative polity or "multiple sovereignty." Multiple sovereignty did not occur in Nicaragua until February 1979, with the development of the FPN. If analysts followed Tilly's notion of multiple sovereignty, they would have predicted the revolution five months before it occurred. However, five months is not a very long time. Those who are interested in foreseeing potential revolutionary events cannot rely on multiple sovereignty as the major factor in the analysis. Analysts must have an understanding of the major theories which have been written on revolution and the similarities and contradictions between the theories. In addition, they must examine, on a continual basis, the political-historical process of the country under study, the actions of the state, state-class relationships instead of just class relationships, potential fortuitous situations, fiscal crises, the development and extent of popular acceptance of guerrilla groups and other group power contenders, and internal and external constraints on the state's power to act effectively during a political crisis. Furthermore, analysts must look for conditions in a society which may lead to a "potential autonomous" state. For example, the major conditions which led to the "potential autonomous" state in Nicaragua and which were crucial to the development of the revolution were: the development of the Somoza state-estate in which upper class interests were obstacles to be overcome; the heavy reliance of the state on the United States, an
external base of support rather than on internal bases of support; and the heavy reliance of the state on the National Guard to maintain itself in power.
### APPENDIX ONE: Glossary of Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Spanish Description</th>
<th>English Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Acción Nacional Conservadora</td>
<td>Conservative National Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDEN</td>
<td>Asociación Nacional de Educadores de Nicaragua</td>
<td>National Association of Educators of Nicaragua</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMNLAEN</td>
<td>Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses 'Luisa Amanda Espinoza'</td>
<td>Association of Nicaraguan Women 'Luisa Amanda Espinoza'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMPRONAC</td>
<td>Asociación de Mujeres Ante la Problemática Nacional</td>
<td>Association of Women Confronting National Problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARDE</td>
<td>Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática</td>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo</td>
<td>Association of Rural Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANAMERICA</td>
<td>Banco de América</td>
<td>Bank of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANIC</td>
<td>Banco Nicaragüense</td>
<td>Bank of Nicaragua</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADIN</td>
<td>Cámara de Industrias de Nicaragua</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPSA</td>
<td>Centroamericano de Ahorro y Préstamo</td>
<td>Central American Savings and Loans Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Cooperativa Agrícola Sandinista</td>
<td>Sandinista Agricultural Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUS</td>
<td>Central de Acción y Unidad Sindical</td>
<td>Federation of Trade Union Action and Unity (Communist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Comité de Defensa Civil</td>
<td>Civil Defence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Comité de Defensa Sandinista</td>
<td>Sandinista Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Spanish Name</td>
<td>English Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPA</td>
<td>Comité Evangélico de Promoción Agraria</td>
<td>Evangelical Committee for Agrarian Promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confederación General de Trabajadores</td>
<td>General Confederation of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT-I</td>
<td>Confederación General de Trabajadores - Independiente</td>
<td>General Confederation of Labour - Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDECA</td>
<td>Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano</td>
<td>Central-American Defence Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Comité Obrero Revolucionario</td>
<td>Revolutionary Workers' Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSEP</td>
<td>Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada</td>
<td>Higher Council of Private Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CST</td>
<td>Central Sandinista de Trabajadores</td>
<td>Sandinista Workers' Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTN</td>
<td>Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua</td>
<td>Workers' Federation of Nicaragua (Social Christian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUS</td>
<td>Consejo de Unificación Sindical</td>
<td>Council of Trade Union Unification</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNC</td>
<td>Directorio Nacional Conjunto</td>
<td>Joint National Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPS</td>
<td>Ejército Popular Sandinista</td>
<td>Sandinista Popular Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Frente Amplio Opositor</td>
<td>Broad Opposition Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDN</td>
<td>Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Democratic Force</td>
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<td>FMN</td>
<td>Federación de Maestros de Nicaragua</td>
<td>Federation of Nicaraguan Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Frente Obrero</td>
<td>Workers' Front</td>
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<td>FPN</td>
<td>Frente Patriótico Nacional</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional</td>
<td>Sandinista National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>GN</td>
<td>Guardia Nacional</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPP</td>
<td>Guerra Popular Prolongada</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCESA</td>
<td>Industria Cerámica de Centroamérica</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDE</td>
<td>Instituto de Desarrollo Nicaraguanense</td>
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<tr>
<td>INRA</td>
<td>Instituto Nicaraguanse de la Reforma Agraria</td>
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<tr>
<td>JS-19</td>
<td>Juventud Sandinista 19 de julio</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MCCA</td>
<td>Mercado Común Centroamericano</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDN</td>
<td>Movimiento Democrático Nicaraguenense</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MPU</td>
<td>Movimiento del Pueblo Unido</td>
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BIBLIOGRAPHY


