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Wayne C. Nelles

Archaeology, Myth & Oral Tradition: A Problem of Specialization, Consciousness and the Sociology of Archaeological Knowledge.

Simon Fraser University

Master of Arts

1984

Dr. Richard Shutler, Jr.

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ARCHAEOLOGY, MYTH, AND ORAL TRADITION:
A PROBLEM IN SPECIALIZATION, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE.

by

Wayne C. Nelles
B.A. Simon Fraser University, 1979

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Archaeology

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June, 1984

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Archaeology, Myth & Oral Tradition: A Problem of Specialization, Consciousness and the Sociology of Archaeological Knowledge

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ABSTRACT

This thesis suggests that archaeologists often ignore or discount the use of myth and oral tradition due to an inadequate understanding of their potential contribution to archaeology, and that this is a condition directly related to problems of ideology, specialization and fragmentation within archaeology and related disciplines. Concomitant with specialization is the fact that knowledge systems such as archaeology exist in, and are constrained by, a sociocultural context. This context insures a systematic selection of material data and theoretical frameworks which both define and limit archaeology. As a result, other bodies of knowledge such as myth and oral tradition are often precluded or ignored.

Examples are drawn from the literature to illustrate these problems, and to show that archaeologists and other scholars often assume and reinforce false or misleading dichotomies between myth and history or archaeology, and myth and science. It is suggested that such dichotomizing is an incorrect premise on which to engage in archaeological or historical work. Some discussion is provided on approaches which counteract this premise. As well, some examples are given which suggest successful correlations between myth, oral tradition, and archaeological or historical data.

Although some particular approaches or interpretations are provided for illustration, this thesis argues that an understanding of problems resulting from specialization,
socialization, and ideology, is fundamental and requisite to any
discussion of methodology or support for specific interpretations. To this end this thesis provides a critique of
contemporary archaeology through concepts in the sociology of
knowledge, mythology, ethnohistory, and philosophy. It points
critically to many of the mythic dimensions, origins, and
functions of archaeological thought and to a philosophy of
archaeology generally, beyond a narrower approach in the
philosophy of science adapted to archaeological method. It also
points practically to the use of myth and oral tradition in
hypothesis testing, site survey and discovery, and generally in
archaeological interpretation for outlining or explaining both
culture history and culture process. This thesis suggests that
these perspectives can and should be better integrated into
discussions and applications of archaeological theory and
method, and more formally in the socialization of
archaeologists.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the unfoldment of Infinite Light, Love, Truth and The Plan on Earth.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was made possible by the gracious help and encouragement from a number of people. My thanks go first to Dr. Richard Shutler who allowed me the freedom to explore and write in areas that were unique to S.F.U. Archaeology's Graduate Program and its traditional concerns, and to introduce a subject which I felt was relevant and necessary for further development in archaeological theory and method. Thanks are also due to Dr. Steve Sharp for feedback and discussion regarding my general concern for archaeology as a sociocultural phenomenon and a culturally specific system of knowledge.

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I. Introduction

The central concern of this thesis is to illustrate that disciplinary specialization, fragmentation, and socialization has contributed to a lack of understanding and appreciation for the utility of myth and oral tradition in archaeological theory and method, and that this greatly impedes our study of the past from a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective. It briefly discusses some of the practical applications of myth and oral tradition by exploring questions of historicity. As well, it points to critical applications of mythology to some of the ideas and structures affecting the discipline of archaeology. It touches on the relevance of a number of perspectives on myth for contemporary archaeology and how specialization, socialization, and ideology have inhibited their application.

More generally, this thesis is a critique of contemporary archaeology through a discussion of mythology and oral tradition in the context of a sociology of archaeological knowledge. It is also a critique of the way myth is implicitly used in archaeological discourse. It is a sociology of knowledge in that it explores some of the relations between thought and its social context by examining some attitudes towards, and applications of, myth and oral tradition. It focuses on beliefs, attitudes, and consciousness in conjunction with an examination of the problem of specialization and socialization in archaeology and
related disciplines. It recognizes the great gains that have been made in archaeological theory and method in the Twentieth Century, but emphasizes that archaeology is only one very limited way of knowing which by convention only deals with material remains to reconstruct the past. These material remains are usually incomplete, differentially preserved, and selectively excavated, so can never be fully representative of a given society or culture in space and time. We must necessarily deal with a limited data base, upon which interpretation and inference is applied. Given the inherently biased and incomplete nature of our data base and interpretative frameworks, it behooves us to explore alternative disciplinary models and data to supplement archaeological reconstruction from just material data. So it may be useful to entertain perspectives on the past from traditions or myths in recent ethnographic or ethnohistoric data and ancient literary sources. By doing so our sense of what it means to do archaeology may be broadened, and our ability to reconstruct the past may be increased. But we should also be able to examine these sources critically by understanding method and theory in oral tradition and myth analysis.

An exposure to myth analysis for archaeologists will not only help them evaluate historicity in traditions or myths, but will also aid them in recognizing the mythical quality of their own historical perspectives and the cultural relativity of archaeological knowledge. The format for discussing these concerns is first to provide a brief conceptual and historical
background to such concepts as myth, oral tradition, the sociology of knowledge, and ethnohistory, as well as the historical development of disciplinary specialization in Chapter One. Conceptual and definitional problems are important to address as a way of communicating the complexity of the problems discussed in the thesis, and providing a practical base from which to work. The second chapter examines in more detail some perspectives on the use of myths and traditions for archaeological and historical purposes, and a number of problems that have resulted because of specialist approaches. It draws from examples in many regions such as Oceania, Africa, and Palestine from Biblical times. It points as well, to a number of other regions and literature that can be examined if the reader chooses to pursue the subject further. Examples are chosen to show some similarities and variety in the kinds of problems involved and the range of time depth possible or potential in myths and oral traditions. The third chapter discusses some more general and interdisciplinary considerations, issues in the relationship between myth and history and myth and science, and some critical views on strictly empirical or positivist assumptions in archaeology that need to be addressed. It also suggests there is a need to deal with a broader philosophy of archaeology rather than a narrower philosophy of science in archaeology that deals primarily with method. Furthermore, it identifies two main types of applications of myth and oral tradition to archaeological research, the practical and the
critical.

Generally, this thesis addresses some of the problems in the sociology and philosophy of archaeological knowledge as they pertain to myth and oral tradition, and closes by pointing to the need for an awareness of the utility of myth and oral tradition to be more formally incorporated into the socialization of archaeologists.
II. Conceptual and Historical Background

This chapter provides a conceptual and historical backdrop for examining the relationship between archaeology, myth, oral tradition and the problems of specialization consciousness and ideology. A concept which is central to the thesis, yet the most elusive at times is that of myth.

The study of myth is a very complex subject which has been reflected upon and written about since the early pre-Christian Greeks, where the concept of myth was first conceived and defined in contrast with history. This period from about 800 B.C. to about 400 B.C. has been depicted variously as a transition from myth to history (Vernant 1980: 190) or from Religion to Philosophy (Cornford 1912), indicating a presumed shift in consciousness amongst the Greeks. It is this kind of distinction between myth and history that has implied notions of untruth in myth with that of truth in history. The problem with these distinctions, however, is that they are not absolute. What we may conceive as myths may in fact contain history, and what we define as history may contain aspects of myth. It is this kind of uncertainty of what myth actually is that has made it the subject of such wide and controversial discussion. There are problems in definition, classification, and interpretation which cannot be treated separately from one another as very often the act of defining what a myth is (such as it being nonhistorical
or untrue) provides an a priori interpretation.

Since the early Greek period, descriptions, definitions, meanings, and interpretations of myth have been manifold. They range from quasihistorical tales of gods and heroes typical of traditional Greek myths, to current popular usage referring to untruths, in addition to images and ideals one can live up to, strive for, or identify with psychologically and socially. Throughout this thesis the terms myth, oral tradition, and history should be viewed with these complications in mind, and interpreted accordingly within the context of the discussion.

Archaeology exhibits an explicit concern for history in that it is directly concerned with reconstructing the past. Myth and oral tradition, on the other hand, may or may not be concerned with historical reconstruction specifically or explicitly although they arise out of a socio-historical context and reflect history in some way. Interpretations are therefore required to evaluate historicity or historical accuracy and specificity.

To aid interpretation and for operational and heuristic purposes it will be useful to define or describe some characteristics of oral tradition in relation to myth. Oral traditions as Vansina (1965: 1) proposes, are "historical sources of a special nature. Their special nature derives from the fact that they are 'unwritten' sources couched in a form suitable for oral transmission, and that their preservation depends on the powers of memory of successive generations of
human beings." He has proposed a typology of oral traditions (Ibid. 144) with five main categories including Formulae, Poetry, Lists, Tales, and Commentaries. He also lists a number of other subcategories, and types belonging to these subcategories. Myths are included as one of several types of oral tradition. Vansina also points to other attempts to divide oral tradition into such categories as rumours, sagas, legends, anecdotes, proverbs, folk-songs, and narratives with various interpretations of historicity. But it is important to note that although one can see myths as historical sources, they are not often considered as history or as being historically meaningful. Schmidt (1978: 4), for example, initially saw mythology and folklore as the least likely forms of oral tradition to be useful for historical purposes, but found them in the end to be much more useful than royal and clan histories. Our concepts of myth may very well, then, be inhibiting our appreciation for them as historical sources.

It is also possible to see myths beyond just aspects of oral tradition. There have been numerous attempts to classify, define, and interpret myth as well, in written sources and in popular culture. A discussion of myth today could overlap with a number of other subjects, particularly with the sociology of knowledge where the concept of ideology is used to describe many of the features of myth common especially with respect to socio-political conditions in the modern industrial world. Mannheim (1936) and Tudor (1972) are helpful sources for
comparing myth in relation to politics and ideology. Larrain (1979: 141) also says that within the structuralist style of thought, myth and ideology can be seen as comparable on some level when they are dealing with the importance of unconscious phenomena in social life, although they are not necessarily equivalent concepts. Larrain (p. 146) points to Levi-Strauss (1972: 209) saying that he "explicitly relates myth to ideology" and notes that "for him myth appears in modern societies to have largely been replaced by politics." It is in discussions of the sociology of knowledge that these observations are meaningful for those who are critically examining the knowledge system in which they are functioning.

The sociology of knowledge is a broad subject, potentially covering all knowledge systems, and overlapping with philosophy especially, as it deals with questions of epistemology. Epistemology primarily examines the problem of how we know, and the limits of our knowledge, albeit very often in the abstract. The sociology of knowledge examines these questions in the concrete realm of social conditions or constraints that affect how and what we know. Although there have been many definitions and attempts to delimit the scope of the field, Berger and Luckmann (1966: 4) point out that "there has been general agreement to the effect that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises."
Socialization is an important concept for the sociology of knowledge. It refers to the development of individuals within the context of the larger society, or within specific social groups. Selznick (1970: 84) has defined socialization as "the way culture is transmitted and the individual is fitted into an organized way of life..." She points out that socialization is a lifelong process and that new disciplines and values are developed as the individual participates in new social forms and institutions. She points out the psychological implications of socialization in that it molds the personality, and under normal circumstances, regulates behaviour and provides individuals with a sense of identity. Berger and Luckmann discuss the concepts of primary and secondary socialization to emphasize the way knowledge is acquired or developed in different social circumstances. Socialization is not seen strictly as a determinism for individuals, but as a process and conditioning in which individuals participate.

In the context of archaeology, not enough attention is paid to the sociology of knowledge, although Childe (1949, 1956) and Clarke (1973) have provided precedents. Hodder (1982a & b ), Rowlands (1982), Kus (1982), Wylie (1982) and Miller (1982) have also recognized the importance of the sociology of knowledge and philosophical issues for archaeology, and some of these concerns are implicit in the views of those such as Kehoe (1981), Miller (1980) Schmidt (1983), and Flannery (1982), yet such discussions are not highly profiled in the discipline.
Before proceeding with a discussion regarding contemporary problems and perspectives in using myth and oral tradition in archaeological research—a brief note on the Nineteenth Century context will be useful, as it was then that archaeology as a distinct discipline was born, and mythology was also beginning the process of specialization and fragmentation. There were at that time, not as many clearly defined disciplinary boundaries, and scholars freely drew from material and theoretical orientations where they saw fit. Specialization is largely a late Nineteenth Century phenomenon in mythology and archaeology, although one could also argue for compartmentalizing of knowledge earlier, as far back as the pre-Christian Greeks, where classification of various forms of knowledge including myth and history began.

Interdisciplinary programs and methodologies have been increasing in the last few decades (Sherif & Sherif 1969). They appear to be a necessary return to some of the latitude available in earlier approaches with the increased depth available from the specialists's perspective. But there are many problems in implementing an interdisciplinary program of research, and often there is a great deal of distance between the ideal and the real. This has been aptly discussed by Sherif and Sherif (1969), Wax (1969), and Campbell (1969). In archaeology, specifically, there may be a significant difference between a multidisciplinary effort utilizing methods and techniques from various disciplines, to an interdisciplinary
synthesis of the results, or of theoretical orientations. One entails the utilization of methods from many separate disciplines, the other can add to it a holistic dimension of theory and paradigm sharing. It is this second dimension especially that can break down a number of the barriers created by specialization. The discussion that follows is an attempt to integrate some of both specialist and interdisciplinary concerns in the utilization of myth in archaeological research.

Until the Nineteenth Century, the study of myth was influenced by Christian religious "truth" viewed in contrast to pagan "myths", as well as by conceptions of history versus myth coming out of the Greek Intellectual tradition. But as Feldman and Richardson (1972: xxii) point out

"a most interesting shift took place as the Nineteenth Century came to respect or approve the nature-based polytheism of the now noble Greeks instead of treating it as 'heathen idolatry'. Myth also meant -or involved-the study of myth, or mythography. And increasingly during the first half of the Nineteenth Century, myth came to take on two additional meanings. Myth came to be thought of as a creative process, a mode of the imagination usually expressed via art or literature. Myth also came to have a religious quality. No longer simply derogated as pagan or false, myth came to be seen as the inner vivifying principle in all religion, and that inner life became, happily, accessible to art again for perhaps the first time since the Renaissance."

These views to some extent had their effect on the relationship between myth and history. Myth increasingly could be seen to have qualities of value and function independent of its truth as history. There was still, however, a good deal of fundamentalist faith in Judaeo-Christian traditions. They were not "myths" to most people, but history, in spite of growing theological
arguments that justified it in other than historical ways, and the increased conflict between the "truth" of science and the dogma of religion. The study of myth, however, assisted in releasing the dependence on history in various forms as the only way to view myth, be it pagan or Christian.

It is also important to note the significance of Mythology for the Nineteenth Century and the bearing it had on numerous forms of scholarship. As Feldman and Richardson (Ibid: xxi) write,

"...from the Enlightenment down through the first half of the Nineteenth Century, myth was widely and increasingly thought of as a primary subject, even as a synoptic one, a master field of the first importance. Myth was taken up because it was thought of as a key variably, to history, to linguistics and philology, to religion, to art, to the primitive mind, and to the creative imagination"..."yet in our time myth has less and less been treated as a subject in itself...from the mid-Nineteenth Century to the present: myth has formed part of the modern fields of anthropology, literary criticism, folklore, psychology, and history of religion."

Feldman and Richardson continue to discuss the increasing fragmentation in the study of myth, which by 1860, led to all the distinctive or specialized perspectives that anticipated modern approaches and applications of mythological theory. As myth studies developed within a particular disciplinary framework, they adopted the frame of reference common to the new discipline, and a specialized, often competing, rather than a generalized and holistic knowledge of myth, became the trend which is typical today. This fact has had both positive and negative effects for the development of a unified understanding.
of myth and the past, as well as for the historical approach particularly in relation to archaeological knowledge. In order to remedy some of the problems that have resulted in contemporary mythological perspectives, Feldman and Richardson (p. xxvi) suggest that "...modern mythology -recent and earlier- is in urgent need of radical philosophic and historical examination of its own tradition, accomplishments, and presuppositions." Archaeology too, should be examining critically its own tradition, accomplishments, and presuppositions in relation to the native myths it has ignored, as well as the new "myths" it has created in the process of its specialized and culturally specific knowledge and developments.

Another useful observation of Nineteenth Century uses of myth can be found in the origins of "scientific" archaeology based on excavations, and the analysis and classification of material data. One could point, for example, to the conceptual origins of the Three Age System of Thomsen and Worsaae in Denmark as being traceable to a model which was in use as early as Hesiod in Eighth Century B.C. Greece. Hesiod, writing in poetic form, from myth and oral traditions, spoke of five "ages" or generations which included the classic Danish division into stone, bronze, and iron (Lattimore 1959, Elton n.d.). With the Renaissance and the transmission of Greek and Roman culture throughout Europe some knowledge of this scheme was no doubt extant (Myres 1946, Rhind 1856). There was also an outline of these ages implicit in the Bible identified by Mercati in the
Sixteenth Century (Clarke 1978: 5). Clarke also traces a number of ideas by Merchati and others from Renaissance Italy to France, to Nineteenth Century Denmark.

Hester (1976: 13) has suggested that "the Three Age System was the first truly archaeological theory and that it represented the "foundations of the true discipline of archaeology". This sentiment is echoed in Trigger (1968: 527) and Daniel (1975; 51). The development of the Three Age Concept in the Nineteenth Century was probably the most important one as far as prehistoric archaeology is concerned, and it is significant that a model based in myth and oral tradition may have played a part in its inception. One could also view the Three Age System and its subsequent revisions as a new myth, even with its further refinements and subclassifications. Most important is that it has the quality of myth, in that the three ages have no substantive existence other than to serve as a way of ordering, explaining, symbolizing, or classifying the past. The ages of Hesiod and Thomsen are both mythical as they are based on a need for order and a concept, rather than on something with an objective material existence. This is true regardless of historical veracity in either of the concepts. This ambiguous relationship between mythical and historical thought should be kept in mind as it will be stressed elsewhere, and is important to recognize if we are to understand that archaeology is a cultural phenomenon, not simply an objective scientific pursuit.
Another important development in the Nineteenth Century for the history of archaeology was the work of Heinrich Schliemann. Almost every introductory textbook on archaeology or prehistory has something to say of his contribution to the history of archaeology, either discussing his use of the Homeric epics to discover and excavate the legendary Troy, or in regard to his use of systematic excavation techniques. It is often pointed out though, that Schliemann's initial identification of the historical Troy was inaccurate. He has also been accused of falsifying his autobiography and a post facto story of his search for Troy on the basis of a childhood dream (Herrmann 1981: 128-129), and that it was only after he had journeyed to Greece and Asia Minor in 1886 that he was able to discover the historical realities of the Homeric world. Regardless of when he developed the idea, at the time, as Herrmann points out, "classical archaeology in the style of Winkelmann hardly concerned itself with archaeological fieldwork...It had dismissed the mythical period of Greek antiquity as an unreal legendary era..." Schliemann changed both of these approaches to archaeology. He has been criticized for being unprofessional, a gold seeker, and a mythomaniac, but with his excavations and literary excursions into fabled Troy, Tiryns, and Mycenae he was able to put Prehistoric archaeology "on the map" as Daniel (1975: 140) says. In spite of the numerous problems associated with identifying the historical details of the legendary or mythical figures cited in the Homeric epics, as has been
outlined very well in a representative collection of views in *Homer's History* (Thomas, G.G. 1970, editor), it is held by a number of scholars that historical and archaeological realities were reflected in some form or another in the Homeric epics. The foundations for archaeological and literary scholarship that Schliemann made, and the stimulus he had on work to follow was profound. He affected both scholarly research and the general public with his equally scientific and romantic approach to archaeology. It is important to recognize in the history of archaeology that the foundations and inspiration for the subfields of Greek prehistory and Classical Archaeology, were primarily in myth and tradition.

One further note could be mentioned in regards to the use of myth in conjunction with Nineteenth Century archaeology, from the New World. Before archaeology was to become increasingly specialized and focused primarily on material remains as its primary data for research, other scholars were still utilizing myths in various ways to examine historical questions as well as being aware of psychological, sociological, and other approaches. Brinton, for example, who founded a department for teaching archaeology and anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1886 and remained as chairman of American Linguistics and Archaeology until his death in 1899, was not only an archaeologist, but also a scholar who wrote on the subject of myth and primitive religion (Brinton 1886, 1897). At that time it was respectable for an archaeologist to be engaged
in studies outside the material domain, but as archaeology grew in sophistication in the Twentieth Century a focus on material culture and the development of departments and university programs that focused more on archaeology as a specialized subfield of cultural anthropology became the norm. It may be more difficult to find a chairman of a department of archaeology today who is also a writer of monographs and a specialist in myth and primitive religion. Departmentalizing of knowledge has resulted in good work being done in both areas of expertise, but not enough interdisciplinary feedback between the two as was possible in the Nineteenth Century with scholars such as Brinton.

As we move into the Twentieth Century definite theoretical and methodological trends tended to severely question the value of using myths and traditions for historical purposes. These reinforced distinctions between myth and history generally and emphasized disciplinary views which were bounded and constricted by conventions and unique developments.

These trends could be seen in the early work of Robert Lowie (1916: 598) who expressed agreement with an analysis of Goddard and Hartland on a non-historical interpretation of some African traditions, and infers from this particular case, that he "...cannot attach to oral traditions any historical value whatsoever under any conditions whatsoever." He discusses some American traditions which show misrepresentation of historical facts, such as hero-trickster tales, pointing to the fallibility
of traditions generally. His criticisms overall were a response to a then recent attempt by Swanton and Dixon (1914) to use origin and migration traditions in the reconstruction of native history. Lowie's assertion, however, is reductionistic towards traditions so cannot and should not be applied a priori in all cases. It implies that this perspective is the only way of viewing these traditions, and precludes any use of traditions as history at all. A Western European cultural bias may condition Lowie's assertion. Such a bias was a very strong implicit or explicit element in many Twentieth Century disciplinary interpretations, and was reinforced by specialization which limited the scope for appreciating alternative perspectives.

One can also point to the work of other anthropologists such as Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown who were influential in the questioning of the use of traditions for history or speculative reconstructions. Malinowski, as Mercer (1979: 130) has pointed out, saw traditions or myths serving as sociological charters which denied them validity for historical reconstruction. This idea of a sociological charter now is a fundamental tenet in many anthropological analyses of myth or tradition. To Malinowski's credit, however, he was interested in native views of their own history and how they classified their own traditions, but his interest was not in the truth of their histories as much as how they functioned in social circumstances. Radcliffe-Brown though, was generally sceptical of historical explanations of any kind in anthropology. He
contrasts, for example, two methods for studying kinship systems (1952: 49-50), that of conjectural or theoretical history, and that of structural or sociological analysis, and describes the "...pursuit of this method (conjectural history) as one of the chief obstacles to the development of a scientific theory of human society..." This emphasis stressed on sociological or structural explanation synchronically, took many anthropologists away from asking historical questions at all.

As well, Evans-Pritchard (1962: 172) suggests that "in spite of appearances, on the whole anthropology in the United States, as Kroeber has said, had been fundamentally 'anti-historical in tendency':...and even the Kulturkreislehre school in Germany and Austria, though historical in form, took its concepts in large measure...not from history but from the natural sciences, for example, its basic concepts of Schichten (layers or strata)." Evans-Pritchard in discussing these trends laments the separation between anthropology and history. He points out that "anthropologists have seldom made very serious efforts to reconstruct from historical records and verbal tradition the past of the people they have studied. It was held that this was an 'antiquarian' interest and that it was irrelevant to a functional study of institutions to know how they changed..." (Ibid: 176). A problem with this orientation was that antiquarians or archaeologists were concerning themselves with new questions as well, that were functional in nature and looked at material remains more than historical
records or verbal traditions. Although ethnohistorical studies were to remedy some of these problems, the trend was to specialization in the area of synchronic social analysis in anthropology and diachronic material analysis in archaeology. This was in spite of the fact that in the New World, archaeology and anthropology were closely aligned. With the close relationship there was an influence on archaeologist's perceptions of native people's which no doubt reinforced notions of an ahistorical or "timeless" native from anthropology. Rosaldo (1980: 27) has suggested that the presumption of primitive societies as timeless has been "a systematic bias in anthropological method that inhibits access to their histories." Furthermore, the relationship between the two disciplines was not always harmonious; in fact a good deal of conflict could be seen, as evidenced in the 1960's debate in American "anthropological" archaeology as opposed to culture history. Willey and Sabloff (1980: 83-180) refer to the period from 1914-1960 as the classificatory-historical period, the first part of which dealt with problems of chronology, typology, classification, stratigraphy, and seriation. During the second part scholars began asking more functional questions of the archaeological data. But the primary focus throughout was on material data analysis rather than on traditions, or myths.

One could identify numerous trends in anthropology and detailed developments in archaeology, but as they both grew as professions there was increasing diversification in approaches
and schools of thought as Garbarino (1977: 44ff) has outlined, and unique perspectives in British social anthropology in contrast to American cultural anthropology. With diversification was specialization, which provided a narrowed focus for problems, but also limited perspectives or alternative approaches. For example, influences from Freudian psychology affected interpretations of myth and other aspects of cultures examined by anthropologists. Myth was seen not in light of history, but as a product of a particular psychological state. Such alternatives implied less potential for historicity in the analysis of myths or traditions, and usually were seen as mutually exclusive to historical analysis.

When looking at theoretical trends in Twentieth Century anthropology, they need to be seen in this kind of light. And although one could possibly identify other influences, it is understandable why, in mentioning the views of Lowie and Malinowski towards myth and tradition and their affect on later scholarship, that Mercer (Ibid: 130) says, "clearly this protracted and frequently acrimonious debate was integrally related to the development and professionalization of the disciplines of history and anthropology..." One could also add to this or underscore specific developments in archaeology and mythology.

One area of study which attempted to maintain some kind of positive relationship between history and anthropology was ethnohistory. In many cases this approach offset a number of the
divisive trends occurring in the specialization and professionalization of anthropology, history and archaeology, but at the same time it grew to be fragmented in its approaches and perspectives and developed its own problems. Yet it has dealt directly with the problems of native traditions and myths and has been taken up not just in the New World, but beyond to Africa, the Pacific and elsewhere. It has to some extent defined or has the potential of defining the problems of dealing with myth and tradition more clearly. Ethnohistory can be seen then as one forum for discussing the problems of interpreting myths or traditions from historical and archaeological perspectives. But due to specialization and the socialization of archaeologists there appears to be a lack of integration of this knowledge amongst archaeologists as a whole, and a need for greater understanding of the potential of this aspect of ethnohistory and its future for archaeology and myth studies.

The concept and scope of ethnohistory has changed over the years, but it has been primarily an outgrowth of an Americanist anthropological-historical approach to culture. Schwerin (1976:323) has suggested that "ethnohistoric research goes back at least to the time of Lewis H. Morgan (1877) who drew on a variety of historical records in writing Ancient Society", but that "recognition of ethnohistory as a discrete methodology, or linking topics and problems of concern both to history and anthropology, or as a specialized endeavour within history seems to have occurred only since the end of the Second World War."
Ethnohistory gained recognition in 1954 when a journal was established to deal with the subject, the contributions initially being oriented generally towards problems in culture change, culture contact and acculturation, for American Indians.

The journal *Ethnohistory* as Schwerin (Ibid: 324) points out, changed the name of its society in 1966 from the American Indian Ethnohistoric Conference to the American Society for Ethnohistory, and broadened it geographic scope, which began to include articles from Australia, Africa, and elsewhere beyond the North American continent. As well, the articles on theory and method began to include more specialized approaches and analyses. But the data of ethnohistory remained primarily documentary in nature, dealing with records left by missionaries, explorers, conquistadores, and the like, and were not "professional" ethnographies or histories. As well, documents were used that were written by natives themselves who either learned to write with the help of their white conquerors, or from writings which were more pictorial in nature such as the various codices found in Mesoamerica. Whatever the case, the data required reinterpretation by anthropologists or historians of the Twentieth Century for more precise ethnographic or historical information. In some cases the documents such as the Mayan *Popul Vuh*, were originally oral in form, but later written by natives at the time of contact. Ethnohistory became then, a technique or method for organizing and analyzing already existing oral or written, ethnographic or historical data.
By the early 1970's ethnohistory was still considered by many to be "an approach rather than a distinctive discipline" (Euler 1972: 205). And Euler calls for greater recognition of ethnohistory in the curricula of anthropology and history departments. There is some indication that this has been taking place, but there should be a stress on such courses for archaeology programs in particular. Spores (1978: 300-201) also has noted efforts at developing an ethnohistory program in the University of Pennsylvania which is one of the the facts which presumably leads him to say (1980: 575) that "ethnohistory experienced enormous growth during the 1970's and finally came into its own as a recognizable and respected methodological subfield of the disciplines of anthropology and history."

Still, however, there is a lack of integration within archaeology specifically, and an interdisciplinary model which would see archaeology and ethnohistory as necessary adjuncts of one another. There are perspectives which could be drawn upon though, such as Baerreis' (1961: 57-58) discussion of Frederica de Laguna's contributions through her study of a Tlingit community; her conclusions he quotes, saying, that this study "has demonstrated that archaeological, ethnological, and historical data, if combined and analyzed together, can give a deeper insight than any one type of material or one methodology alone." He continues by emphasizing that

"it is indeed this methodological consideration, the appraisal of the factors involved in coordinating a multi-faceted approach, that enhances the significance of the study. Laguna has raised some basic questions as
to the degree of congruence in pictures of a society obtained through (1) archaeological excavations, (2) ethnological descriptions of how 'our people lived at that place in grandfathers time,' (3) early museum collections derived from a region, and (4) the contemporary records of missionaries, explorers and traders. Certainly we should become aware of how and why these pictures differ, but it is precisely because they do differ that we need to consider all of them to gain a better understanding of a people...

Such a perspective is of vital importance for developing some concept of 'rounded' history which has been considered by some to be the primary goal of ethnohistory (Cohn 1968: 440).

But one could also point to many specialized uses of ethnohistory that attempt to solve particular problems. A key factor for archaeology is its concern for integrating or applying ethnographic data to archaeological problems even if it is not primary data collected by the archaeologist. In this interface between ethnography and archaeology, it shares some relationship with the recent developments in ethnoarchaeology. Dunnell (1982a: 518) suggests however, that interaction between the two fields appears limited.

Regardless of the many particular or specialized areas of study that could be undertaken within an ethnohistoric framework (Spores (1978: 201) has broken down a group of 323 articles which appeared in twenty-three volumes of the Journal of Ethnohistory, for example, that addressed at least sixty topical categories), "folk history", myth, and oral tradition, need not be treated simply as one topical area, but one which can provide information on others such as economics, intergroup relations, demography, reconstructing cultural history, or explaining
The study of oral tradition in the framework of ethnohistory began to be recognized as a legitimate focus of inquiry in the 1960's, primarily with the work of Vansina and McCall. Both Africanists examined the ways in which traditions could be used to understand history. Vansina's work as West (1966: 348) states, was the first systematic examination of questions involved in using traditions for historical purposes. Euler (1972: 204) also points out, it was Vansina and McCall's work which applied to the American situation, erased some of the stigma on the validity of oral history especially when applied to Indian land claims cases, and raised the stature of oral history studies within the profession of ethnohistory. Vansina (1965: 176) was also in favour of the integration of archaeology with studies of oral tradition as well as other disciplines to attain a more complete perspective on the past. He suggests that "archaeology is the most necessary and the most useful of the auxiliary disciplines that the historian of oral traditions can make use of", although his concern is for an interdisciplinary approach also utilizing cultural history, linguistics, and physical anthropology, in addition to oral tradition. Many studies followed, some criticizing as well as utilizing Vansina's methodology, and developing it further in their own situations. Brown and Roberts (1980), for example, have edited a collection of essays entitled "Vansina and Beyond". Some archaeologists in particular took to examining problems of cultural process.
historicity in myth and oral tradition following Vansina's lead, applying them to more complex archaeological situations.

There is still the problem, however, of recognition for historicity, and much debate on the use and abuse of traditions for historical purposes. So it may be that we need to be clear as Hudson (1966: 53-54) states, that "the aim of ethnohistory is to explain what happened in terms that make sense to us...", whereas "the contrast in folk history is that one attempts to find out how the members of a society explain why things happened the way they did." In this regard many of the concepts and approaches of ethnohistory are inadequate for dealing with native approaches to the past, or belief systems as a whole. They often ask questions or pose problems that are irrelevant or in opposition to native views. We need, as Hudson (p. 66) suggests, to closely examine the cognitive and belief systems of natives to give us better criteria of relevance and credibility. This could include their articulation of time reckoning, or models for historical classification, critically comparing these with our own systems of classification, which are often preconceived, already defined judgements of historicity in concepts, such as myth, legend, folktale, or saga. We obviously need concepts or classifications, but in so classifying we limit and often preconceive. This is not to say that native views are always clear; distortions occur as they do in our own historical concepts and reconstructions, but without an adequate understanding of native beliefs and systems of thought we cannot
adequately appreciate the nuances in their concepts, and the
types of history that are often represented implicitly as well
as explicitly. These may include forms of symbolic history, to
very accurate specific accounts of the past.

The next chapter places ethnohistory within the context of
recent developments in archaeology, then examines some examples
of, and problems in, the application of myths and traditions or
"folk histories" to historical and archaeological problems from
several disciplinary perspectives. By doing so it shows how
archaeologists and anthropologists or historians can often
misrepresent or misjudge the value of traditions by limited, or
specialized perspectives, and that this bias is often reflected
in the writing, or avoidance of writing, by archaeologists on
the subject of myth and tradition. Much of this bias is also a
further reinforcement of cultural distinctions between 'myth'
and 'history', or myth and science.
III. Some Applications of Archaeology, Oral Tradition and Myth in Light of Twentieth Century Specialization, and Fragmentation

Archaeological theory and method has progressed markedly since 1950. This has been particularly true along the lines of the physical sciences being used in archaeology. With the development of radiocarbon dating for example, many problems of chronology that were so important in the first part of the century diminished. By the onset of the 1960's this left room for new vistas to be explored in theory and method. 1960 has been called the beginning of the Explanatory Period in American Archaeology (Willey and Sabloff 1980: 9) which turned away from strictly chronological and functional concerns to a study of cultural process which was to explain human social and cultural behaviour of the past. This way of looking at the past dealt more in theoretical constructions of how the past changed and cultures adapted, and generally proposed the use of both scientific and anthropological methods.

Since the mid-1950's, there has been a re-emergence of Cultural Evolution approaches generally (Dunne 1980: 35; Garbarino 1977: 87ff; Willey and Sabloff 1980: 181), which focused on process and causation, leading to a wider acceptance of cultural ecology and cultural materialism as models for explaining patterns of change in the archaeological record. As well one could point to a general trend towards "scientific"
explanation attempting to develop deductive approaches and testable hypotheses. Parallel to greater orientation towards an "explicitly scientific approach" (Watson, LeBlanc and Redman 1971), drawing from models in the philosophy of science, there was the insistence on a closer association with anthropological goals and theory to the point that it was argued that "archaeology is anthroplogy or it is nothing" (Willey and Phillips 1958: 2, Binford 1962: 217). In addition to this change in theoretical orientation from culture history to culture process, there emerged an increasing number of specialized studies from the natural sciences, with methods that could be applied to the archaeological record. Archaeologists moved away from studying just material culture, and attempted to illuminate other non-cultural aspects of the record that could be useful within a larger explanatory framework, such as cultural evolution and ecology, and systems theory. Specialties arose like geoarchaeology, bioarchaeology, zooarchaeology, and paleoecology. Incredible advances have been made in the understanding of the past as a cultural and environmental system of adaptation through time as a result of these kinds of studies.

But there are dissenting views to actual "progress" that has taken place within archaeology as a whole, and the ability to integrate these findings into a non-jargonistic framework that provides general understanding. Daniel (1975: 371-372) suggests the reason for this is that
"American archaeologists, dismayed by their archaeological record, have sought refuge in the theory and methodology and spend their time talking about the 'elucidation of cultural process' and the production of 'laws of cultural dynamics'...This new movement of the 1960's needs to be absorbed into standard thought and work: at the present moment it is, especially for non-American workers, bedevilled by jargon and by people who, apparently unable to speak and write in clear English, use such phrases as 'the logicodeductive-evolutionary systems paradigm'...".

Hawkes (1968) also laments the growing "scientism" of archaeology versus the "humanism" that characterized many archaeological studies of the past, paralleling C.P. Snow's (1959) discussion of the "Two Cultures". She sees a lack of clear communication about the past growing with scientific specialization. She also suggests that there is a need to integrate again those areas of humanistic study: "The nature of the expert advice that we seek is an unconscious exposure of our values. We regularly turn to the chemists, physicists, botanists, zoologists. Why seldom or never to the art historians, the depth psychologists, the authorities on religion, folklore, magic?". Since Hawkes' writing, some developments have occurred such as in the study of prehistoric religion and symbolic and structural archaeology, (Hodder 1982, et al, for example) but these are certainly not mainstream, although they may exhibit a trend. As far as folklore and myth studies in archaeology, again there is a need to integrate, and they can bridge a gap between both the humanistic and scientific concerns.

There have been other attempts to characterize the state of development or fragmentation in archaeology today. Willey (1977:
83) has suggested that "the separation between anthropological and humanistic archaeology has never been more clearly emphasized than it is now." Renfrew (1980) also has viewed a number of problems with what he has called the Great Tradition versus the Great Divide. He sees this primarily as the Great Tradition of classical, Old World, historically and monument oriented archaeology, with the prehistoric and anthropologically oriented archaeology of the New World. He suggests other divisions too, such as in Britain (p. 292) where "archaeology is not traditionally counted part of anthropology and anthropologists (generally of the social variety) have to muster greater reserves of patience in order to talk with archaeologists than they generally seem to have at their command". Renfrew suggests both the Great Tradition and anthropological archaeology have much to learn from one another.

It would seem, as Dunnel (1983: 521) has implied, that the Great Divide is being bridged in some respects between "Americanist" and British archaeology with a less strictly "anthropological" approach to one which is more "behavioural". Dunnel points to Gumerman and Phillips (1978) who discuss archaeology outside the standard approach of the "new archaeology" as anthropology. They focus on the idea of archaeology primarily as a technique and as an interdisciplinary science. Renfrew (1980:291) also suggests that geographically the Great Divide is being bridged by comparative research into the origins and development of civilization, as well as by
archaeologists such as Adams, Flannery, Binford, Coe, Trigger, and others who have worked in both the Old World and the New World generally.

But there is still a lack of understanding or integration of the humanistic or classical elements within the "Americanist" new archaeology, and this is where a study of myth, folklore and oral tradition could greatly serve in conjunction with ethnohistorical perspectives. With the awareness of ethnohistorical problems, our concepts of prehistory and history can take on different connotations. Schmidt, for example, suggests that viewing myths and traditions in a historical way, verified by archaeology, can lead us to use the term "Historical Archaeology" to designate the study where normally only European or Western written history was taken as the defining factor (1978: 6). The myths he studied in conjunction with archaeology took him far beyond the range of conventional colonial historical records.

Such an approach is not normally considered in mainstream prehistoric archaeology, and indeed there is much stigma against the use of myth and tradition as a whole in the Americanist archaeological literature. Some of this stigma results from general preconceptions of myth versus history which condition western intellectual thought which is in turn entrenched in the archaeologist's cultural system or subculture. Other problems exist because of the critical attitude towards speculative or non-scientific thought as a whole, where "myths" are seen not
only as non-historical but non-scientific. As a result, one thing seems quite apparent in the Americanist archaeological literature and academic curricula: a lack of discussion, and/or understanding of the positive role myth can play in archaeological research. Yet much of the literature exists in specialist journals such as *Ethnohistory*, and those entertaining regional concerns, as well as in monographs such as Schmidt's. This fact points directly to the problem of specialization and compartmentalization of knowledge which inhibits our awareness and practical applications, and to the socialization of archaeologists.

Looking at introductory archaeology or prehistory texts in recent years, one finds a tremendous paucity of references to myth or oral tradition, much less any discussion of its value in method and theory. The references of a positive nature such as in Thomas (1979: 73-94) are exceptional. But he focuses on myth and tradition mainly to illustrate the beginnings of hypothesis testing and scientific method in archaeology by Heinrich Schliemann in the Nineteenth Century. Other textbooks such as Knudson (1978), Hole and Heizer (1977), Sharer and Ashmore (1979) and Hester (1976) make little or no reference to the use of myths and traditions for archaeology. They are usually only considered pejoratively, either discussing some speculative uses of origin and migration myths of American Indians and researchers as in Wauchope (1962), or in similar more recent discussions in regards to the now called "pseudoarchaeology" or
"cult archaeology" which focus on the use or misuse of myths by those such as Von Daniken and others. Discussions of these ideas can be found in Cole (1980), Sabloff (1982), White (1974) and Sharer and Ashmore (1979: 540-545). Another text, (Wallace 1983: 172-174) entertains a brief discussion of Toynbee's use of myth in understanding the origins of domestication, on the basis that some mythological conflicts, are echoes or symbols of actual events. With some difficulties Wallace finds in Toynbee's conclusions, he makes the statement that "existing tales of heroes and gods were never meant to be a substitute for science. It is reckless to think that they accurately mirror the past" (Ibid: 173). Such a statement reveals a very non-scientific attitude and a lack of understanding for the academic research in myth and oral tradition which can use tales in conjunction with the methods of "science" to understand the past, not as a substitute.

The above examples have been pointed to, particularly those in introductory texts, as this is the reading material that must be absorbed, understood, and accepted at the first level of archaeological socialization. It is unfortunate that there is little or no positive discussion in reference to myth and oral tradition. These textbooks generally reflect the course material seen to be the basics of archaeological knowledge. Kuhn (1970) discusses the notion of the textbook tradition which tends to reflect the body of accepted theory in any scientific discipline. He suggests that this tradition supports what one
could call 'normal science', which closely relates to his idea of paradigms. The concept of paradigm, is elusive at times but when Kuhn (1970: 175) discusses it as "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" and as "one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science", he comes close to defining what one could call culture in the broadest normative sense. It is important then, to see scientific communities such as the one we share as archaeologists, as cultures in anthropological terms, subject to the same sociocultural constraints represented in any other group we might study past or present. The current archaeological paradigm provides very little exposure to prospects in the use of myth and tradition, thereby reinforcing our distinctions between myth and history and an ethnocentric view of the past.

Even the discussions of contemporary archaeological theory and method reserved for higher levels of socialization such as those in Leone (1972), Renfrew, Rowlands and Segraves (1982), Moore and Keene (1983), Clarke (1978) and others, lack discussions in the use of myth or traditions. One of these, (Furst 1972: 353), does point to the use of ethnographic analogy, however, to provide a mythical basis for the interpretation of some Olmec iconography, although it is not attempting to look at the myths as history. Such work is
important nonetheless and one could point to many other instances where an understanding of myth is essential to the interpretation of prehistoric art, iconography, architecture, religious or belief systems, as well as culture history and process. It is for this reason that Thompson (1960: 9) states that in Mesoamerica "a knowledge of Maya theology and myth is essential to the student of Maya epigraphy".

On the positive side, it is also encouraging to see the use of oral history discussed in a collection of essays designed to give an overview of substantive and theoretical perspectives in Historical Archaeology. Brown's article originally published in the journal *Ethnohistory* in 1974 discusses the use of Colonial or Western "folk" traditions about the past and attempts to integrate these within an interdisciplinary approach. The Mott Farm project was an attempt to combine "the discipline of archaeology, folklore, architectural history, social history, and economic history in the investigation of three centuries of life on a rural farmstead located in Portsmouth, Rhode Island..." (Brown 1978: 278-283). The article has been placed in a section entitled "Future Trends" which seems to indicate an approach not of the norm, a case in which Western "myths" or oral traditions are being used for historical research.

It is encouraging as well to see positive discussion in a text of field methods in archaeology. Hester, Heizer, and Graham (1975: 262) have a short note in a section on methods for absolute chronology. They suggest that "still another kind of
recovery, which might be called quasi-documentary, is that of folklore and legend...Several archaeologists have suggested that legendary accounts may derive from actual events in the past but says, "it is impossible to generalize about this..." Moreover, critical discussions do exist such as the one by Trigger (1968b: 74-76) who discusses the methods of prehistory with particular reference to the reconstruction of Predynastic Egypt. He distinguishes between four types of evidence used in addition to archaeology: geology, linguistics, oral traditions, and physical anthropology. Referring to oral traditions specifically, he suggests that archaeology can often be used as an independent source for checking or evaluating stories and that used in this way they can be valuable for understanding the not too distant past, but "used uncritically however, they can be a source of much confusion and misunderstanding in prehistoric studies." Generally though, Trigger suggests (p. 70) that "prehistorians cannot narrow their theoretical perspectives, but rather must cope with the problems of using findings from fields that lie outside their own sphere of competence", supporting a generally interdisciplinary approach to the past.

Other discussions of archaeology and myth or oral tradition can be found in some regional texts, such as in Bellwood (1977: 382-384), who writes on the prehistory of Oceania. He focuses particularly on some origin and migration traditions, and points to a number of problems with earlier assumptions about the
validity of some of the traditions as representative of New Zealand prehistory. But he says that some of the dates of origin correlate quite well with approximations reached by archaeology. And concludes that "these traditions do undoubtedly contain some valid historical information... The traditions in themselves are not automatically wrong, and the fault lay far more in the interpretations of them by European scholars." He also mentions (p. 305) that "many traditions, particularly those relating genealogical information, can have considerable 'historical validity, and ...are well supported by archaeology". Such optimism in the use of traditions in archaeological research is not shared by all those in the field of Oceanic or Polynesian prehistory, or anthropology. And in fact, there has been much scepticism.

The scepticism often comes from Western or academic expectations about what constitutes "real" history, or chronology. But this is an inadequate approach to oral tradition. It is well known that conflicting accounts or traditions about the past exist in the oral traditions of native peoples, and that they can often serve social or political functions of a particular group, time, and place. As well they can have religious or symbolic functions and meanings. But the same observations can be true of Western written accounts of history from practically any period or place. Academic historians today, or prehistorians will often write very conflicting accounts or interpretations of the past while
agreeing on essential details. Very often they are trying to support a particular ideology or method of interpretation using the same "facts" of history. And very often certain facts are ignored or downplayed to emphasize a particular version of history or prehistory.

Related to these concerns, Ford (1973) has discussed problems with nationalistic and political uses of archaeology which selectively interpret the archaeological record to support national myths and racist ideology, a striking example of which was the notion of "Aryan supremacy" in Nazi Germany. Fowler (1983: 3) too has criticized the use of archaeology for "nationalistic, chauvinistic and imperialistic purposes," and that "since its inception in the Renaissance...archaeology...has been intertwined formally and informally on various ways with the aims and purposes of nation states." He discusses examples from Scandinavia, Germany, Britain and China, and says that "the real subject of this paper is myth-making: how archaeology has been used in the formulation and perpetuation of nationalistic mythologies: Gothic and 'Aesir-ian' myths (Scandinavia); the Aryan (Nordic) myth (Germany); 'Druidolotry' and latterly, primitive-astronomy myths (Britain); and an Evil Past - Glorious Future myth (China)."

The myth-making process is not necessarily confined to such obvious cases as in China where a form of Marxist ideology is used in conjunction with archaeology to support the idea of a class struggle and the political ideology of communism. Although
there is an obvious contrast with most Western academic approaches, there is myth-making nonetheless, yet it is often more subtle. Very often the approaches amongst Western academics are widely varied to include various Marxist assumptions, for instance, in forms of cultural materialism. Other theoretical perspectives such as cultural idealism have presuppositions which are almost diametrically opposed to cultural materialism, but need not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive. They do, however, represent different conceptions or explanatory systems for the past, and as a result provide different histories in essence, or different "myths" about the past.

This is not to say that written or academic history or nationalistic histories can be compared to primitive oral history on the same level of sophistication or conscious articulation. But it is possible to appreciate that differences can coexist, and that perception and hence traditions can change over time. As well it is possible to analyze a tradition or myth from several levels which need not be mutually exclusive. But this is not always considered. Orbell (1975: 341), for example, in discussing migration traditions, says in regard to stories of ancestors coming from Hawaiki that "although they are full of supernatural occurrences, these stories, have, until quite recently, been generally thought to be historical. Some people still consider them to be so, but as archaeologists, anthropologists, linguists and others begin to put forward the outlines of a very different history, belief in the historicity
of the migration traditions has been eroded." In support of her argument along these lines she mentions that Andrew Sharp's theory of accidental voyages for the settlement of the Pacific has been a major influence. Orbell makes some useful observations on the concept of Hawaiki, directional symbolism and ritual associated with the myths, as well as variations and alterations of the myths due to European influences which appear to undermine historical interpretations. She has not addressed, however, any of the archaeological or linguistic support in favour of varying degrees of historicity in the migration traditions. Even Sharp (1956a: 122, 1956b: 158-9) has suggested that the traditions may not be totally false, but that they need to be restored to their pristine form before European influence, to provide a better picture.

Suggs (1960: 770-771), when discussing Sharp's theory of accidental voyages, suggests that although some expeditions could have been made accidentally, "the evidence of archaeology seems to indicate in at least two, and possibly three major island groups of Polynesia, settlement was effected by well-planned expeditions of some size, bringing the necessities of life with them" and that "the data of archaeology seem at this time...to reinforce rather than negate views of Polynesian migration held by the old traditional students: that the Polynesians were able to voyage with some accuracy and undertook planned expeditions or migrations in search of new land." Orbell, however, has not shown that she has carefully addressed
the historical interpretations of the traditions other than to
denounce them, or the work of the archaeologists such as Suggs.
Her interpretation is ahistorical. It utilizes structural and
functional concepts from a specialist's perspective in
anthropology which provide insightful comments on the symbolic
quality of the traditions, but errs by mutually excluding
history and function.

Suggs, on the other hand, is at least aware of the
limitations of the traditional evidence, and suggests that
although they may not always be without errors they can, and
have been used profitably as valuable planning aids for
archaeological strategy in a given area, for example, with oral
data used in the study of settlement patterns and village
migrations in Samoa and the Marquesas.

Mercer (1979: 131) takes up Suggs' challenge of 1960 that
there was a general dearth of methodological acumen in the use
of tradition in the Pacific and states that his paper, "through
a comparative analysis of some of the common problems in
evaluating oral testimonies in Africa, North America and the
Pacific, aims at providing a background for future
methodological development." He attempts to provide by way of
comparison and classification some of what Vansina (1965) had
done for African traditions. Mercer's discussion of oral
traditions and archaeology is minimal, but he does include it as
an ancillary study to oral history, and gives it top billing. He
says (Ibid: 150) that the oral historian "seeks assistance from
the findings of other disciplines, principally archaeology, anthropology, geology, ecology, historical linguistics and biology", and he goes on to support Suggs' interpretation.

Numerous other examples could be provided from around the world that have attempted to evaluate the historicity of myth or oral tradition, some of which relate directly to archaeological concerns. Before continuing with the discussion of problems or conflicts arising as a result of specialization and socialization, it may be useful for the reader to have a broader sense of the applicability and utility of traditions and myths in conjunction with archaeological research. The first example that follows simply illustrates a straightforward correlation between archaeological realities and historical memories preserved in the oral traditions of native peoples in the Melanesian New Hebrides. The value in this particular case should be kept in mind while examining the potential in other archaeological sites or research problems.

In discussing the archaeology of the New Hebrides, Garanger (1982: 15-16) has noted that Guiart's work in 1966 on myth cycles and legendary history was extremely valuable in the field for studying the more recent past. Garanger stresses generally, that for the New Hebrides "archaeological enquiry into the more recent periods should attempt to check the validity of certain oral information. More than in any other sphere it is in this pre-literate period that the collaboration of archaeologist and ethnologist is indispensable for research into the past..." (p. 44.
Garanger discusses one tradition in particular which spoke of a culture hero, Roy Mata, who was well known throughout the central New Hebrides, and was responsible for organizing chief's installation ceremonies and administering territory for other chiefs (p. 55). He was also supposed to have introduced the matrilineal system into the New Hebrides and to have organized large cultural events such as the Matawate feast (p. 66). Traditions also held that he lived before the arrival of Christianity, and was buried on the island of Retoka. At the time of contact Retoka was uninhabited, and was apparently abandoned since the burial of Roy Mata. This tradition was initially collected by Guiart at Lelepa, one of the islands in the New Hebrides, and later told to Mr. Ernest Henry Reid, the contemporary owner of the island, by some of the elders of Lelepa. It was Mr. Reid who pointed out to Garanger the probable site of Roy Mata's grave, which was marked by two standing stones.

According to the tradition about Roy Mata's burial (p. 71-74), he had asked specifically to be buried at Retoka after his death, and that several members of his court as well as some representatives of other clans were buried with him along with other individuals that had been sacrificed. The island was then declared taboo. This type of burial practice was also known in nineteenth century ethnographic records of the New Hebrides. Garanger excavated the site and found a collective burial of some thirty-eight individuals, with associated grave goods.
including necklaces of disc beads, fish vertebrae, sea shells, pendants, waistbands, armbands, pig tusks and broken bones, red ochre, and megapod eggshells. The deepest burial, (which was an elder adult male placed above a young female buried symbolically at right angles below his feet indicating chiefly status, and presumed to be Roy Mata by Garanger) was dated by bone collagen to about 1265 A.D., which accords well with the date presumed by tradition. It likely represents an oral tradition that remained intact for some 700 years, pointing out that archaeology, myth, and oral tradition can be used profitably together in discovering and reconstructing the prehistory of one site in Oceania. The implications for other sites, regions, and interaction between different areas are obvious, not to mention an affirmation for the accurate historical consciousness of some "pre-literate" peoples.

As well, Garanger, using the same approach excavated a burial presumably of another legendary chief, Ti Tongoa Liseriki, recorded in epic myth, tied to genealogies and oral tradition about a volcanic eruption dateable to that same period. It also dovetailed with the genealogical succession of Roy Mata, but occurred about 200 years later (p. 81-97). This research was conducted on Kuaee and Tongoa, of the Shepard Island Group in the New Hebrides.

Other sources could be cited which have utilized myth or oral tradition for historical reconstructions in the context of archaeology. These often take various forms and come to
different conclusions of historicity for different reasons. In many cases a straightforward correlation is not as suggestive as in the case of Roy Hata in the New Hebrides. Sometimes it is necessary to be aware of more than simply direct archaeological correlations with distinctly "historical" traditions. Many times all one has is a relative chronology with a lack of detail in the tradition, or a story that is highly symbolic and in need of structural or functional analysis before or in conjunction with historical reconstruction. If the reader wishes to explore further the question of historicity in myth or tradition from the perspective of archaeology, prehistory, or geological and zooarchaeological memories a sampling of references follows. Some are more controversial than others, but are mentioned because they have been discussed by archaeologists and anthropologists primarily, and have been associated with archaeological excavations or data. Many more could be noted from less strictly archaeological or material correlations where reconstructions are based on convergence with other data such as written historical records, but are not discussed here. Some indication is provided throughout this thesis however, of the potential in these forms of analysis as well.

A wide range of applications are possible in conjunction with archaeology. Buckendorf and Knight (1981) have discussed the use of oral history in site survey, conservation, and interpretation of historic sites in Washington and Idaho. Allaire, Macdonald and Inglis (1979) point to the value of
ethnohistoric information and oral tradition in site identification in the Kitselas Canyon on the Skeena River in British Columbia and recent excavations have utilized traditions extensively for interpretation (MacDonald 1982). Previous fieldwork under the direction of George Macdonald at a native historic period fort site in Kitwanga, B.C., in 1979 was guided by traditions as well, and participated in by the writer.

Myths and traditions have been important in Latin American archaeology. For a sense of some of the correlations that have been attempted and criticisms see Weigand (1975), Vaillant (1938), Nicholson (1955), Davies (1977: 3-23) and Shuman (1977). In Africa one should look at Posnansky (1966), Oliver (1964) and the work of Schmidt (1978, 1983) which will be dealt with more extensively in a moment. In India it may be useful to examine Murty and Southeimer (1980). Daniel (1956) has edited a collection of essays on interpretations of archaeological, historical and prehistoric realities of various myths and legends in the Old World from Ancient Classics to European Folklore, and Alcock (1972) in the New Aspects of Antiquity series edited by Sir Mortimer Wheeler has discussed excavations that are presumed to be associated with the legendary King Arthur and Camelot. Geologic events and their potential historicity in myth and tradition have been discussed in Brock and Brock (1965), Heizer and Treganza (1971) and extensively in Vitaliano (1973), who outlines theory and problems in interpretation as well. Interesting discussion and debate has
occurred regarding the possibility of North American native peoples having retained some memory of Pleistocene megafauna. Tylor (1868) was one of the first to introduce the problem theoretically, distinguishing "myths of observation" and "historical traditions", from "pure myths" although Thomas Jefferson as early as 1782 discussed these concerns. Discussions have followed such as those with Strong (1934), Speck (1935), Montagu (1944), Eiseley (1945) and later with Beck (1972) and Lankford (1980). In Australia, Campbell (1967) examined a similar situation and has argued that knowledge of prehistoric megafauna indigenous to Australia was retained in aboriginal memories, as well as information about ancient geological and climatological conditions and changes. He suggests that certain oral traditions may have been retained in memory for at least 10,000 years.

One further note could be mentioned as well in reference to Plato's famed legend of Atlantis which has received scholarly attention in recent years. Galanopoulos and Bacon (1969), Luce (1969), and Mavor (1969) all have proposed a favourable correlation with the island of Santorini in the Bronze Age Aegean connected with the Minoan civilization on Crete. Others have argued that remains of Atlantis, dating to the end of the pleistocene, have been found in the Atlantic at Bimini off the southeast coast of North America. What has been suggested as submerged megalithic remains were identified (Zink 1978) although arguments as to whether they are "artifacts" or
"geofacts" have taken place (Harrison 1971). Ramage (1978) has also edited a collection of essays examining the problem critically from literary, mythological, historical, and geological perspectives.

The range of discussion in relation to archaeology and myth or oral tradition is obviously vast, and this thesis points to only a few of many examples or references possible. It is important as well, to see the variability in problems and interpretations and how this is often related to disciplinary specialization and other social factors. Continuing with our discussion of problems and variation then, Schmidt (1978: 3) in his study has attempted in a unique way to bring together the concerns of anthropology, history and archaeology in relation to oral tradition. He states that,

"the primary goals of this study are to develop a methodology that scientifically demonstrates the ties between archaeological materials and oral tradition, and to develop new explanations for change and development of an African Iron Age culture from its earliest beginnings to contemporary times. The broader goals of the study are inherent in the spirit of 'new archaeology'... in the mid 1960's which stressed the perspective of anthropological theory and the development of ethnoarchaeology, where material culture is studied using the methods of cultural anthropology."

Schmidt (p. 6) suggests that African historians can take two basic directions in the future in regard to oral traditions, the first being "to develop better methods for analyzing historiographic systems, their development, and their indigenous function as a means of expanding our understanding about the variability of historiography." The second, he says, is that
because our own historiographic traditions often deny oral traditions veracity, we can attempt to apply archaeological means as verification, which can be "a way of influencing our own traditions, a way of altering our own concepts about what makes up historical truth." His study attempts to utilize both approaches to the traditions, focusing on functional and structural explanations, as well as archaeological correlations which can provide historical information and explanations for culture change.

Schmidt further notes that mythology in his African material has several possible roles, one being an analyzable historical form, a second being a locational device for prehistoric sites, and third, an explanatory device for prehistoric culture change. Schmidt's conclusions support historicity in the traditions of the African Bahaya, and that traditions can be maintained relatively intact for two thousand years or more. He states (p. 277) that "the dating of Early Iron Age features which falls between 500 B.C. and 200 A.D. proves that mythology in Buhaya is capable of continuity through thousands of years without distortion of its core truth when it is tied to physical features of the landscape." One of the myths includes the importance of an iron tower. He says that "the symbolic thrust of the myth is that crop surplus accompanied the mastery of iron technology but that it was preceded by famine and uncontrolled iron working. The myth then shows that mastery of iron technology leads to cultural florescence - the building
of the iron tower - which ultimately ends in disaster, the collapse of the tower to the west." Schmidt suggests that "this myth provides a symbolic, allegorical model for the history of resource exploitation in Buhaya..." and discusses the archaeological-ecological evidences which appear to support the model provided by the myth.

Schmidt's approach or conclusions may not be shared by all. Fagan (1981) for example, refused to believe that traditions could contain history and be retained from such a distant past as Schmidt proposed. This is unfortunate as Fagan in addition to being a specialist in Africanist archaeology, is also a prolific writer of introductory textbooks in archaeology and prehistory, all of which carry this bias, or non-rational belief, it would seem, against the historicity of traditions in archaeology with such time depths.

Another example of problems in appreciating the historicity of myth or tradition in archaeology can be seen from Biblical scholarship. As with other subjects or regional concerns, specialized approaches and presuppositions create problems in interpretation by tending to exclude alternatives. This can be seen in discussions about Biblical history, myth, and archaeology in reference to the rise of the United Monarchy in Ancient Israel in the period from Saul to Solomon, roughly from the late Eleventh to the late Tenth Centuries B.C. Lance (1981: 68) states that "an absolute date for Solomon in the mid-Tenth Century B.C., based on reliable biblical and other sources,
The task of the biblical archaeologist, therefore, is to reconstruct a picture of life during this period which will help in understanding the biblical narrative. McKenzie (1965: 829) has also pointed out that the keeping of annals and chronicles, and the beginning of a literary tradition in the Solmonic period were part of the developing United Monarchy. Furthermore, Albright (1960: 123-4) characterizes the mainstream archaeological position in regard to the substantiation of Biblical traditions with archaeology, as he says, "the age of Solomon was certainly one of the most flourishing periods of material civilizations in the history of Palestine. Archaeology, after a long silence, has finally corroborated Biblical tradition in no uncertain way...".

In essence the traditions although varying in the details of the development, support the archaeological realities of a new state level organization developing in a short period of time. There is archaeological evidence for widespread destruction of Canaanite towns and cities, and new diagnostic architectural styles, fortifications, pottery, and so forth indicative of the Solomonic period in accord with traditions. This is especially true for excavations atazor, Gezer, and Meggido, (Kenyon 1978:44-66; Cornfeld 1976:101-116). As well, historical records of the Egyptian king Shishak entering Palestine directly at the end of Solomon's reign over the United Monarchy are extant. With these archaeological and historical developments coincides or closely follows, the recording of
traditions about the process, and presumably less reliable, or at least less substantiable traditions referring to the earlier periods of nomadic migrations by the patriarchs, and the conquest of Canaan, as Gottwald (1979) and others have pointed out. Gottwald sees the difficulty in these Biblical traditions and their variability very much to be discerning "retrojections" back from monarchical or even later canonized versions of Biblical "history" from that which is actual history (p. 34). This relates to an old problem put forward by Wellhausen of the Nineteenth Century, which assumes simply that we cannot know the history of the early premonarchical period due to the "documentary hypothesis" (McKenzie 1965: 654). It implies that these traditions were recorded or documented several times other than at the time of the experiences that they propose to represent, and that they were recorded by different politico-religious groups using the past to justify present circumstances.

Other interpretations of the patriarchal traditions range from outright rejection (Thompson 1974: 9), to the generalized acceptance by Albright and others which Thompson calls into question. But regardless of the details of these particular arguments, recorded "history" begins at the time of the monarchy for this is when it is written and not simply oral tradition.

Given these remarks, one may wonder at other approaches by those such as Leach (1970: 449) who has stated that "Von Rad, like all orthodox Biblical scholars, takes it for granted that a fundamental core of "real history" underlies the narrative at
least from the time of David onwards. My own scepticism is far more radical: King David and King Solomon are not more likely to be historical than are King Agamemnon and King Menelaus..." Leach (1982: 76) is even more explicit about the mythical quality of the Bible and in particular the monarchical characters. His analysis caricatures the specializing tendency common to anthropology and the rest of the social sciences. He begins by saying that

"...I totally reject all those forms of historicism which assume that the future must necessarily follow the same kind of trajectory that has been patterned by the past, I regard the invention of conjectural history as a total waste of time...Now if we consider the Bible as a totality, as I urge you to do, it is quite clearly a sacred tale and not a history book. However, if you take the totality to pieces after the fashion of orthodox Biblical scholarship, it is equally clear that substantial parts of it are written 'as if' they were history, and the majority of Biblical scholars seem to have persuaded themselves that these are in fact, records of 'true' history".

He continues by pointing to the problem of identifying where

"legend ends and history begins, but mostly it seems to be assumed that Moses (probably) and Saul and David (certainly) were real people who actually existed in the period 1250 to 1000 B.C.E., that is to say five hundred years before the age of Herodotus and Thucydides...Personally I find this most implausible. There is no archaeological evidence for the existence of these heroes or for the occurrence of any of the events with which they are associated. If it were not for the sacredness of these stories, their historicity would certainly be rejected..."

A number of criticisms could be levelled at Leach's assumptions and misrepresentation of data. Firstly, his reference to the rejection of conjectural history seems to be an allusion of allegiance to the classical tradition in British
social anthropology following Radcliffe-Brown, which he then incorporates into a broadly Levi-Straussian French structuralist approach in considering the Bible as a totality. Leach's "Structural Anthropology" creates an opposition between history and structure, or history and myth. Furthermore, he makes an allusion to Herodotus and Thucydides presumably to illustrate that those "primitive" Hebrews could not possibly have recorded anything historical before "true history" began with the Fifth Century Greeks. Leach also makes a reference to the lack of archaeological evidence for the existence of heroes which is asking archaeology to do something that it normally cannot do, barring some sort of monumental or historical record and/or associated and identifiable skeletal remains. In the case of the Bible, "historical" records do exist in the form of combined written and oral traditions which require analysis from many levels, but Leach totally rejects any historical interpretations, even those which corroborate with other records. He says,

"If we ignore the rather small number of named Biblical characters whose existence is fully vouched for by independent evidence -and by that I mean archaeology rather than Josephus- I regard all the personalities of Biblical narrative, both in the Old Testament and New, as wholly fictional. They are there because they fill a particular role in the totality of the sacred tale and not because they actually existed in history...I treat the entire text as synchronic..." (p. 76 cont.)

It may be appropriate to question the nature of the kingship, how it originated, functioned, and was characterized by distortions in the telling of its own history, but one may
wonder if Leach doubts there was a monarchy at all. This is rather pushing scepticism a bit far, especially if one looks at precedents and parallels for kingship institutions throughout the Middle East and Egypt, (Frankfort 1948, Ishida 1977) which have been taken as historical, and archaeological indications for state level administration. Yet from Leach's view it is difficult to see history of any kind. The "historical" characters in the Biblical drama may appear to be mythical as Leach points out, conflicting versions of history are presented, and the succession narrative legitimizing Solomon as King may even "mediate a major contradiction" in a classic Levi-Straussian form of analysis, but regardless of the truth in any of these claims, this does not change the fact that one can view the narrative as representing some form or facts of history. Leach even goes on to say, surprisingly, after denouncing the substantial historicity of the narrative, that

"on the other hand, I share M.I. Finley's view that the distinction between myth and history is not necessarily clear-cut. It need not be inconsistent to affirm that an historical record has mythical characteristics and functions. In point of fact, von Rad's historical assumptions, when modified by his refined techniques of textual criticism, often lead to conclusions which are entirely in accord with implications of the 'structuralist' procedures exemplified in this essay" (1970: 449).

Either this reflects an ambivalence in Leach towards the problem or a contradiction. It does make sense, however, that myth and history could be expressed together. Perhaps Leach's analysis itself can be seen as a "myth" existing to overcome the contradiction that myth and history can coexist.
Other interpretations while focusing on a literary approach such as Pamment (1972: 635) have attempted to denounce history by focusing on the theme and dramatic development of Solomon's succession in terms of literary criticism, and suggest that any discussion about historical verifiability is a "red herring". Literary approaches to Biblical narrative are not unique, however (see for example Ackerman et al 1973; Frye 1982; Maier and Tollers 1979 and others). They are quite insightful in regard to the Bible as a product of Literature, in the various short stories and novels that abound, poetry, proverbs, didactic forms, and erotica, to even view the Bible as a unitary or literary whole. In many respects the theories of anthropological and literary structuralism overlap in the sense of viewing literature as a whole or a unity. There are various literary approaches to Biblical literature. Maier and Tollers (p. 5) point out a number of these, many of which conflict with one another. They have identified those such as literary history, formalist or new criticism, archetypal criticism, various structuralist approaches, phenomenological or hermeneutical, and linguistic-symbolical to name a few. They point out that a number of these have been challenging the more traditional historical interpretations. Yet once again the same trends that occurred in the development of anthropology and archaeology occurred in literary studies where specialization has tended to limit understanding of historical problems, as well as a view of the whole.
In regard to the problem of specialization as an issue in Biblical studies generally, Gottwald, (1979: 5-6) has some trenchant criticisms. He suggests that,

"The very patterns of our thinking about Israel have been imbued with religiosity, or with its defensive counterpart, anti-religiosity. It is most difficult not to think of Israel as a people wholly apart from the rest of humanity. ...Yet another root of our lack of total vision of early Israel is the myopia of academic overspecialization...

Fragmented lines of inquiry are reinforced by scholarly vanity and the encrusted traditions of learning. Students of the Bible are socialized to believe that it is "scholarly" to limit sharply the scope of what is researched. The self-restricting mentality and practices developed during graduate study tend to become hardened into lifelong career habits. Such self-limitation for tactical purposes, with a view to contributing specialized results to a total effort at synthesis, is eminently defensible. Regrettably, tactical self-limitation has become strategic self-limitation and the larger possible designs of Israel as an historic phenomenon of the first magnitude are increasingly lost to the workaday mentality and method of Biblical scholarship..."

So, contrary to specialized perspectives such as Pamment, one should see that a work of literature, Biblical or otherwise, can contain a great deal of history, as well as many other elements, or vice-versa. Hill (1966: v) suggests that "...a single work can display several structural features; for example a work we might call a history can have dramatic, narrative, philosophical, and rhetorical features; these features can partially determine the structure of that work. Similarly, plays and novels can be historical or philosophical, novels can be dramatic, and plays can be narrative." The essential point is that history is never just history, myth just myth, or literature just literature; they can contain elements or
structures of each other. One cannot, then, reduce a work, as Leach or Pamment have done, to just myth or literature on the basis of one form of analysis or literary criticism.

One could outline at length various forms of analysis but it should not be necessary to prove a point for or against historicity. Although some insights may be gained in one area they do not necessarily discount history, yet they may aid in our understanding and reliability of the history that is present and the psychological, historical and sociological conditions in which the traditions were formed. The next chapter will deal with further general considerations, some of the more philosophical issues raised for archaeologists as a result, and some suggestions for the future.
IV. The Archaeologist as Mythologist, Anthropologist, Sociologist, and Philosopher

In order to discuss effectively the application of, or misunderstandings about, myth and oral tradition in the context of archaeological research, it is helpful to utilize the framework or perspective common to other disciplines such as mythology, anthropology, the sociology of knowledge, and philosophy. This chapter discusses some broader perspectives that should be considered for a more comprehensive application of myth and oral tradition to archaeology. It also points to the need for critical examination of many of archaeology's theoretical assumptions, goals, aims and methods, and suggests that a general study of myth can provide some of the answers, or at least a context, to problems in archaeology.

As well one needs to recognize that it is specialization, reinforced by the consciousness and the socialization of archaeologists, anthropologists, and scholars from other disciplines that conditions the general problem of a false dichotomy created between myth and history or archaeology. The most significant aspect of that dichotomy as Pender-Cudlip (1972: 12-13) suggests, is that behind all the arguments and distinctions, "there lies a major assumption about the difference between 'history' and 'myth', namely that history is an account of something which did and myth an account of
something which did not 'actually happen'..." This distinction or conscious classification is a factor prior to analysis which very much can condition the outcome. As Pender-Cudlip continues,

"Most historians and anthropologists share certain ideas about possibility and probability, and it is these ideas more than anything else, that determine how they distinguish between myth and history...no story has an inherent quality which makes it historical; it becomes historical not by being true but by being accepted as true. Conversely an unhistorical story or 'myth' (in the popular sense of the word) is not necessarily an untrue story, but simply a story which is regarded as untrue. Neither myth nor history have any 'objective' existence apart from society...Historians in different societies reconstruct the past in different ways for different reasons, using different criteria to distinguish between fact and fiction which are a product of their cultural environment...

So it is important not to identify with classifications as representing "reality". There is also confusion in analytical procedures between what has been termed as myth and what has been termed as oral tradition, as Pender-Cudlip (p. 3) suggests, because traditionally they have been assigned to the provinces of anthropology, and those interested in oral history respectively:

"...little attention has been paid to the relationship between myth and oral tradition; anthropologists have not as a rule been interested in the remote past of the societies which they have studied and so have tended to ignore the significance of myths as historical sources, while historians have often failed to grasp the relevance of anthropological theories of myth for the study of oral tradition".

As well, Mercer (Ibid: 136) and Beidelman (1970: 74) both stress the need for students of oral traditions and historians to master the rudiments of social anthropology," which is often included as part of historical training in Africa. Beidelman
also criticizes African historians such as Vansina for ignoring most of the important theoretical works by social anthropologists in which attempts are made to unite historical and sociological issues (p. 75) or for oversimplifications of ethnographic and historic evidence.

The above criticisms of historians and anthropologists can obviously be applied to archaeologists too. Not only should archaeologists and historians be conversant with anthropological methods for analyzing traditions, but with literary, psychological, and other approaches as well. Archaeologists should be aware of mythology or the study of myth in general, so that they can evaluate the data of oral tradition in addition to the study of material remains, as myths represent historical data in some form very often and can be used in affirming the kind of "historical archaeology" Schmidt has advocated.

It seems that this problem of identification between myth and history is due to unique, but equally valid specialized approaches or perspectives used in opposition. As well as the opposition between anthropology and history, the study of myth as a whole is plagued with varying perspectives which oppose one another. So it is necessary to see, as Cohen (1969: 337) has pointed out, that "some of the different theories of myth might be seen not as competing but as complementary."

Furthermore, ideas of western consciousness as being superior to that of "primitives" is reinforced subtly by evolutionism and notions of progress that operate within the
western academic and cultural system of which archaeology is a part. When, for example, one examines such recent works as Hallpike (1980) who draws upon Piaget's western oriented developmental psychology to in some respects restate Levy Bruhl's "prelogical mentality" notion, there are a number of potential problems in the results. This is regardless of any value or truth in Hallpike's argument that "the thought processes of most individuals in primitive societies are arrested at the late pre-operative stage (about age five to six). Only under 'favourable circumstances', such as having to navigate vast distances, do concrete operations develop" (Howes 1980: 145). The danger goes beyond mere observation, to value, assuming that natives cannot think logically or concretely under normal circumstances. The implication is that "primitives" generally have a "mythic" consciousness that is incapable of rational thought, which expresses an implicitly evolutionary position. In this respect Bidney (1950: 16) has stated, "Cultural evolutionists speak as if there were a mythopoeic or myth-making stage of human thought in which primitive peoples have been living for untold ages" which he argues against.

As we live in the scientific world of the late Twentieth Century which archaeology shares, these mythic dimensions are not gone, but are merely submerged in consciousness and resurface in different forms. Bidney suggests that "myths are universal phenomena..." and "the so-called mythopoeic mind is... characteristic of, one at all times; all that has changed is the
form of expression." He also says "science, in turn, gives rise to its own crop of secular myths, since science, as a self-correcting quest for knowledge, tends to outmode some of its own concepts and theories..." (p. 25). He notes that cultural progress is not inevitable, and that "rational thought has proved itself quite capable of undermining its own foundations by espousing myth as a "higher" form of truth in the interests of national solidarity and by reducing all cultural ideologies to the level of fictions..." (p. 26). Bidney also warns us (p. 25) that "myth is most potent when it is assumed complacently that one is free of it." Lévi-Strauss (1966: 1-33; 1977: 5-14) has also discussed the comparability of mythic and scientific thought. So if one takes the time to examine Western and especially North American culture, it should be clear that it is virtually filled with myths and symbols in which we participate daily. Science, scientizing or scientism (the belief in the omnipotence or unlimited value of science in an almost deified manner), is only one of these, but Robertson (1980: xvi) has suggested that this image of science is our most powerful one, even though it often attempts to deny its mythical qualities.

There are a number of ways to view the similarities and contrasts between "mythical" and "scientific" thought, but it is important to note that they serve primarily the same function, that of creating or providing order in a socially, mentally, and emotionally chaotic world. As O'Flaherty (1980: 109) has suggested, "it is increasingly apparent that both science and
myth are essentially committed to the belief that there is order in the universe. The religious basis of this belief emerges from such statements as Einstein's much quoted remark that God does not play dice with the universe... and that "this thirst for order fuels the prime criteria for both a scientific theory and a myth: elegance and repetition..." The point here is that myth and science both function to provide a sense of order in the universe, which provides security. Yet at the same time they may reflect different perceptions about the world and come to different conclusions about truth, or they may coincide.

As well, it has been suggested that "it is paradoxical that the explosion of science has not increased man's sense of order and logic in his universe, but instead questioned and disrupted it..." (Cullis; 1983: 87). In this sense, with specialization, alienation, threats of nuclear war and other results of scientific and social "progress", the security of the mythical dimension is undermined to a degree, insofar as it could create a cultural picture of the world in which everyone agrees, and mutually supports; that is, a picture from science that would function like a national myth, but as a cross-cultural unifier. Archaeology, as a field of science, contributes to this fragmentation to a degree in spite of Isaac's suggestion (1981: 201) that "archaeology fulfills a need by providing modern societies with substitutes for origin myths such as are part of all human cultures." This is a noble ideal and perhaps true to an extent, but when archaeology is fragmented within its own
subculture, it fails to serve the same function. Instead archaeology creates a number of lesser myths which divide rather than unify.

On the larger scale, Case (1973: 41-42) has also noted that "within the scope of our mental categories and their requirements of verifiable data, archaeology is...a body of myth and legend for our times, as inspiring, consoling, entertaining and fugitive as those of the past." He also suggests that "this...does not question its academic standing, for even the severe pursuit of ontology finds myths eventually...And it implies an authentic social role for archaeology." In this respect "scientific" archaeology as a body and system of knowledge has purely mythical functions if viewed in the context of society, yet it lacks some of the sacred and unifying qualities in the other myths which it has replaced. The social role that archaeology serves may not be so positive as it supports competing schools of thought and ethnocentric views of the past to some degree, and in this respect undermines a larger sense of historical truth. We do need, then, to question its academic standing contrary to what Case has suggested.

Archaeology's social role in many cases often ignores indigenous histories or myths, and supports a culturally specific bias. A problem for archaeology is that it usually asks questions relevant to its own culture or subculture within the larger context of Western humanity, and that its epistemological bias is derived from positivism (Miller 1980: 709). In this
respect Miller suggests that

"it is not surprising that ideas about the nature of the subject have tended to be divorced from discussion of the social context within which it is practised and of how its results have meaning for its practitioners and for the general population. Archaeology is defined by its methodology and academic goals, which tend not to be seen as dependent upon the structure of society or the nature of academic discourse."

He discusses the need to examine the context within which archaeology takes place and derives meaning, and argues that "the social context includes the structure of employment, education, the mass media, and people's conceptions of the past and of the uses of the past in the present." Miller's discussion proceeds in reference to the use of archaeology in developing countries and among the social milieu of native groups. He points to the fact that archaeology is primarily a product of the Western developed countries and arises largely out of the colonial structure. He says,

"There is nothing in most traditional societies that in any way parallels it. Its methodology, paradigms, and context are all unprecedented. Yet, unlike many other imported ideas, archaeology, in order to become meaningful, must not only become an integral part of the developing system, but also cross the boundary to become identified with many important aspects of traditional life and outlook" (p. 710).

He points to one of the factors that can alleviate some of the problems of an archaeological epistemology and ideology derived from positivism; that is to use the oral traditions or histories in a particular area as "an important corrective to the tendency to denigrate local cultural traditions under a European-based evolutionary schema..." (p. 714). The implication here is that
archaeology, particularly since it has grown to be more and more "scientific" with the onset of the "new archaeology", has had a tendency to be more technologically and methodologically efficient or superior to many of the historical perspectives of traditional cultures. Whereas great steps have been taken in the development of archaeological knowledge in conjunction with the sciences and multidisciplinary concerns, the sense from Miller is that the bias of evolutionary superiority remains, which tends to undermine traditional views and values. From the standpoint of providing new cultural "myths", again, it does so not in a form of unification, but fragmentation.

Trigger (1980) has also expressed similar concerns in the development of American archaeology generally. He suggests that "the most important single factor that has shaped the long-term development of American archaeology has been the traditional Euroamerican stereotype which portrayed America's native peoples as being inherently unprogressive" (p. 662). Trigger suggests that this has been even more so for archaeologists than for ethnologists because of the lack of direct contact. He outlines the development of American archaeology and says that in spite of the development of processual archaeology of late, with ethnoarchaeological research and anthropological goals, relations between archaeology and native people are poor. King (1979) also emphasizes this problem of relations specifically. One way to mend this relationship would be a concern for native people's traditions and histories in conjunction with
archaeological research, and as Trigger suggests, if more native people are attracted to become professional archaeologists. Archaeologists need to develop those relationships and new research models which include native views and histories, amalgamating both western and native models of the past, rather than undermining natives' views to Western ethnocentric perspectives.

Generally we need to realize as Kehoe (1981: 503) has stated that.

"Slowly there has crept into the social sciences the realization that these disciplines, no less than religions or political philosophies, embody axioms and values which are built into ideologies. To claim that one's opinions are value-free, based on purely objective data, is to express the ideology of empirical positivism. Anthropology as a whole, and archaeology in particular, have lagged behind sister disciplines in becoming conscious of their ideological biases..."

She suggests the "time is ripe for revisionist anthropology."

Kehoe and Miller especially are generally trying to express that much of archaeology adopts a false sense of superiority. It uses a model based on the tradition of logical positivism, or its variations of logical or scientific empiricism (Giddens 1977: 43; Hune 1972: 90, 182, 285-6). This model assumes that with notions of empirical verification, logical deductive reasoning and "scientific objectivity", that it is superior to other forms of knowing. Notions of objectivity and value-free science are built into myths or ideologies which do not reflect the whole truth. They simply affirm a particular method of knowing and results which, inherent in the scientific method are
always subject to change, and hence can have no claim to final truth. There is also a natural link between empiricism and materialism generally (Jørgensen 1951:6) exemplified by the simple focus on materialist approaches in prehistory which dominate the discipline (Kohl 1981: 89). Data is selective and archaeologists tend to ignore other nonmaterial perspectives. Empirical positivism which is not inherently pernicious becomes a negative ideology when it assumes it is totally objective, and the only or best perspective.

Schmidt (1983: 62-63) supports the views of Miller,Trigger, and Kehoe and discusses the African case in particular. He suggests that Africanists generally have been more sensitive to indigenous perspectives than those such as South and Binford doing historical archaeology in North America, who define "historical" archaeology on the basis of western history and literacy. And he points out that many "Semitic" oppositional dualisms (after Kehoe 1981) "such as primitive/civilized, literate/nonliterate, prehistoric/historic, and urban/rural pervade the thought of Western anthropologists and inhibit acceptance of local historical perspectives, and phenomena that depart from this structure of thought...".

For such reasons we need to address questions of archaeological epistemology, social psychology and the individual psychology of scholars to understand what predisposes groups and individuals to adopt particular perspectives and conventions. Moreover, there is a strong need for conflict
resolution and synthesis among archaeologists, as conflicts between specialized theoretical and methodological approaches often tend to divide rather than unite the discipline. In this respect Nader (1981: 4) has argued that "with increasing subspecialization, people escape the responsibility of looking at the integrated whole or the particular conditions under which they work..." Pointing especially to an article by Eric Wolf ("They Divide and Subdivide, and Call it Anthropology") which focused on the problem of specialization, Nader suggests that anthropologists should be examining some of the myths, totems, and taboos of their own society. In this respect archaeologists and anthropologists need to be aware of the particular social conditions they operate in, and which determine or condition their work, the types of projects they choose, the models and theories they propose, and how these are reinforced by the particular subcultures that arise out of specialist concerns.

To pursue the question of archaeological knowledge thoroughly would entail examining numerous approaches to varying archaeological perspectives, sub-systems or theoretical orientations within the larger archaeological system, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. But as a whole, one can begin by examining what are presumed to be a number of common themes, goals, aims, and purposes in them all, and a common set of fundamental assumptions or community norms which are expected to be lived up to if one is considered to be a legitimate part of that academic community.
"As Kuhn points out, the scientific community is defined by the theories it accepts, which in a sense prescribe the norms and rules governing acceptable research and acceptable solutions to scientific problems. A scientist becomes 'socialized' into the scientific community by accepting the rules about e.g. what counts as an experiment, and what as an explanatory hypothesis; learning the current 'paradigms' is learning the rules of scientific life..." (Ryan 1970: 142).

So there is clearly a socialization process that occurs in the archaeological community, and that community of specialists whose concerns overlap with those of archaeologists. This process, although liberated to a degree by innovation and the development of alternative paradigms, still conditions the programs and attitudes of researchers. This has been illustrated particularly with some examples in the last chapter where communication and unity break down with implicit attitudes or specialized approaches to oral traditions and myths creating problems in holistic interpretation. Many of these attitudes both reinforce a notion of "primitiveness" and antihistorical consciousness among natives, as well as attempt to recreate new ones. The historicity of oral traditions and myth becomes then not so much a question of methodology, as one of consciousness and ideology among researchers.

Although one could go on discussing a number of aspects of this framework in the context of "the social construction of reality" as Berger and Luckmann (1966) have called it, it should be clear that knowledge grows up in social context, and is defined by it in large measure. In turn, our conception, and creation of sociocultural reality interface to produce the world we live in. The native's myths and traditions are part of a
rejected system of cultural reality and knowledge. With the rejection of the traditional system of values and culture, is a corresponding rejection of myths and traditions of the native peoples as a system of knowledge particularly about the past, which provides him with self-definition. Archaeologists have contributed to this crisis by creating a new reality of the past, one which largely ignores non-Western perspectives, in spite of a resurgence of methods and approaches advocating the use of oral traditions in historical and archaeological research.

As well as appreciating native traditions and myths, there is the need for archaeologists to understand the mythical origin of their own scientific concepts and principles, such as was alluded to in the "discovery" of the three age concept. One could also examine other notions in archaeology and related disciplines to understand their mythical and cultural foundations. Gray and Wolfe (1982: 580-594) for example, have discussed the mythical and symbolic functions of the recent vogue in sociobiology compared to creationism in American culture. They see them both as myths which have common symbols and logical patterns, and as transformations of one another, as well as sociobiology and creationism functioning to support the traditional family structure and morality, one on the basis of genetic and inclusive fitness, and the other on the basis of Biblical edict. Gray and Wolfe discuss the need for examining other such concepts and their ethnosociological functions in
American culture. They suggest that much more could be done, particularly in the area of popular or pseudoscience, and traditional science, in terms of the way symbols are used and manipulated in discourse.

There are many possible ways to approach our own culture and the scientific and pseudoscientific thought within it. If we do, it is possible to find appreciation for a mythic dimension in scientific and archaeological thought which need not be in opposition to history, but in fact allows us to investigate more hospitably the various levels of historicity and truth in myths and oral tradition. This acceptance of the mythic dimension embodied in our archaeological concepts need not be seen as foreign to "objective" research entirely, but it is necessary to be aware of it and that it is common to other sciences as well. Popper (1972: 38), although he has not discussed archaeology specifically, has suggested that "historically speaking all—or very nearly all—scientific theories originate from myths, and that a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories..." He discusses a number of instances in the history of science from the Greeks to Newton and Copernicus. Popper suggests that theories such as atomism and the corpuscular theory of light were "non-sensical gibberish in one stage of their development, and then suddenly become good sense in another" (p. 257). So myth can be subtly guiding and reinforcing our academic thought, or more explicitly can provide an essential key to scientific discovery. This could be a paradigm
for organizing knowledge and data as was the case of the three age paradigm in Nineteenth Century archaeological thought, or in more specific instances where myths or oral traditions can be used in the development of archaeological or historical knowledge in one region or one site or as starting points for research.

There are a number of issues that could be dealt with that go beyond the scope of this thesis. One of these is the further development and refinement of methodology particular to archaeological concerns, which overlap with history generally. Some of the methodological problems or issues in need of recognition and application to further studies are such things as time reckoning and structuring, or concepts of time; the art of memory or transmission of tradition; construction of chronologies and genealogies; psychological, social and political functions of tradition; syncretism and diffusion of tradition; differences of traditions among different social or religious groups, time depth in traditions and the question of world view as a whole. All have their effects on the interpretations one can give to historicity in oral traditions.

But archaeology itself can be important for the discerning of historicity. And generally, one can point to two central uses of myth in archaeological research. The first is practical, and can be applied to specific research problems. The second is critical and can apply to the discipline as a whole, its fundamental assumptions, guiding principles, and theoretical
orientations, essentially examining the "myths" of the discipline.

The practical application of myth to specific research problems can take several forms. It can be oriented towards an examination or analysis of myths or traditions that are recorded in native texts or that one can discover by doing ethnographic fieldwork. In essence, the archaeological focus is interdisciplinary, particularly emphasizing ethnohistorical methodologies. Myths can be used with ethnographic analogy or the direct historic approach, and are often encoded in art or a story told pictorially, which often coincide with those of present day ethnographic cultures. So a continuity of tradition materially, and spiritually or mythologically, can be traced, and the stability of a culture's traditions emphasized, as well as recognizing change. Such a method has its limitations, but as well has obvious potential.

Another way in which myths and traditions can be used more directly is for the finding or discovery of sites that have long since been covered, but remain in a culture's oral traditions. Corresponding to the finding of sites comes interpretation, as very often myths and traditions contain information about economic, religious, material, and general social and cultural activity at the site as well as inter-site and inter-cultural relationships, which can be seen as material for testing hypotheses about site function, culture history, culture change and process.
Essentially, we need to view oral traditions and myths as historical sources initially, not naively accepting them as history, but as historical materials in need of analysis, with anthropological, historical, archaeological and other methods that have been discussed. In some cases it may be necessary on the basis of plausibility, to fill in some of the gaps in archaeological reconstruction by myth and tradition if they make sense in the context of existing archaeological or historical data. In other cases it may be impossible to validate traditions at all, either disavowing historicity or suspending historical judgement until further data is gathered. So although myths and traditions have obvious limitations when applied to archaeological problems, it may be possible to use them, and build them into our research designs, treating them with similar respect as one would with western or colonial documents in conventional historical archaeology or ethnohistory.

The critical perspective on myth in archaeology is also practical in that it can prompt us to examine beliefs about myth versus history, or myth versus truth, and see complementary perspectives operating within the discipline of archaeology. By investigating myths or traditions we may see that some are nonhistorical. It is also possible to see myths as historical and therefore true in various ways. Or, we can see that by examining contemporary "myths" of archaeology, be they particular historical or processual interpretations or schools of thought, that a mythical dimension operates in conjunction
with history and not necessarily in opposition. If these "myths" are exposed one can see the tenuous or culturally specific nature of some theoretical perspectives or assumptions. Understanding the kinds of myths that operate in contemporary archaeology and scientific thought generally can aid us in the more objective examination of our theoretical orientations and perspectives, and the relativity of our western cultural system of thought and its subsystems within archaeological circles, in relation to other non-western systems. This is not to demean the value of our system but that it is simply relative to others and represents one knowledge system based primarily on a mythology of empiricism, positivism, and scientism. What we often fail to recognize is the non-empirical, mythical and intuitive, dimensions which operate within our own system, but are foundational to our thought.

Myths are very powerful expressions of thought in science and it could be suggested that science provides the basis for a widely accepted mythology today. Other mythologies also prevail, in both popular and traditional culture which the masses, of which the scientific community is a part, adopt, consciously or unconsciously. "The American Dream" is just one of many goal oriented mythologies that people often attempt to live, or at least strive for, and it is no accident that in academic circles, there is often that same striving for success and the conflicts that arise as a result. There is a goal or achievement to be realized which consumes the simply "rational" or objective.
reality of existence. The pursuit of economic and social security are very often tied into the pursuit of academic knowledge and specialized expertise. There is to some extent a unifying myth in the common pursuit of truth in science, yet this in itself is a "myth" not always lived to its fuls with the subtle and not so subtle conflicts in the many ways proposed to get there, and general social conditions that colour research.

In order to utilize myth more consciously and effectively in archaeology we must be prepared to move further along new lines of inquiry. We may need to re-examine some of the goals, aims, and purposes of our discipline more closely and address additional concerns. Presently, after Thomas (1979: 137-138), it has been said that

"...despite the disparate views of culture and anthropological strategy, we find a remarkable agreement among contemporary archaeologists as to the ultimate aims of archaeology... Archaeology's initial objective is to breathe life into these chronologies by reconstructing past lifeways. The ultimate objective is to determine the cultural processes that underlie human behaviour, past and present. These processes are expressed as lawlike states and consist of timeless, spaceless universals."

These goals and aims reflect what has been the "new archaeology", particularly the concern for the understanding of cultural process and the development of lawlike generalizations.

In spite of an apparently wide general agreement on the goals of archaeology, Schiffer (1978: 153-158) in a discussion of a survey taken among 188 archaeologists in Canada and the United States interested in method and theory, discovered that "defining the goals of archaeology" was one of the top twelve
most frequently cited concerns in questions on methodological and theoretical research frontiers and issues. It ranked 10 out of a possible 137 topics. If these goals and aims are so widely held as Thomas suggests, what is the concern for further defining them? One reason may be because of the fact as Dunnel (1982: 1) suggests, that "although archaeology is now considerably more rigorous, explicitly, and in some senses much more 'sophisticated', it does not seem any nearer the goal of becoming a scientific discipline than it was when the changes were initiated." Dunnel suggests that "the systematic body of knowledge -archaeology in the substantive sense- is still largely the product of the traditional approach" and that "there is less coherence and agreement on the nature, goals, and even techniques of analysis in archaeology today than was true twenty years ago." This appears in contrast with Thomas' assertion and once again represents the fragmentary and disunified nature of the discipline. Moore and Keene (1983: 3) also note that

"there is a malaise apparent among American archaeologists today - a feeling of uncertainty and indecision about the practice of archaeology, its relevance, and its future"..."the recent calls for a reassessment of the goals and trajectory of our profession... follow an unprecedented period of growth and innovation within the discipline."...(and that)"a review of the literature of the past two decades convincingly demonstrates that we have been less than explicit about what we really want to know and why, what we hope to explain and why it is important..." (p. 8).

It seems then that archaeology, in spite of increasing "scientific" advancements, lacks on the whole a sense of unity and purpose, or a common cultural myth.
If the myths and traditions of our own discipline are to be critically examined, we need to expand our perspective on the goals and aims of archaeology. One of the central goals of archaeology should be continual critical examination in the form of a philosophy of archaeology, not just a philosophy of science focusing on method in archaeology that has been in vogue since the early 1970's and has continued into the 1980's with greater sophistication (Schiffer 1981; Salmon 1982; Saitta 1983; and others). In addition, it should consider more of the general philosophical concerns of purpose and meaning within contemporary society, to more basic questions of why we do archaeology at all. Archaeology needs to incorporate and innovate notions that have been commonplace in the philosophy of history, which has at least questioned the relevance of our education about the past and the relativity of various historical perspectives (e.g. Gilbert 1972; et al).

Archaeologists rarely enter into such discussions, however, and this has perhaps contributed to the malaise that Moore and Keene have spoken of. To the extent that archaeology and history have parallel concerns with the past and its unfoldment, they are faced with similar philosophical concerns, and one of these is relevance to the discipline as well as to humanity at large. Some historians such as Gilbert (p. vi-vii) have suggested that due to a tremendous need to free themselves psychologically, from the ills and evils of the collective past, and look to better the future, there are those who see "the possibility that
history may be irrelevant," and that "historians have increasingly become aware that their own profession may have had a corrosive impact on the mythic past that once made life meaningful..." This may seem rather extreme if we can also say that history has replaced myth and now serves a similar function, but the problem is that some of the new myths of history or archaeology, as the case may be, lack the inherent unity, security and sacred quality that myths of the past once offered. In this respect prescriptive measures have been called by some historians "to direct their research to the great problems of our time..." (p. viii-ix), which comes very close to some of the concerns in applied anthropology today. This moves us into the direction, not just of objective "scientific" knowing, but beyond into the realm of applied knowledge, philosophy, and myth.

We need a continually critical examination of theoretical and social foundations of the discipline at the level of the myths that archaeologists create, are subject to, and reinforce. These are very often the myths that reject those of other cultures a priori, or create oppositions and conflicts with them because of the cultural boundaries of archaeological knowledge and method and personal beliefs. We need then a critical sociology of archaeological knowledge and a philosophy of archaeology which can lead us closer to the heart of all the social sciences. This could be summed up in a statement by Dundes (1968: 382) in an introduction to a discussion about the
anthropologist looking at his own culture: "...if the goal of anthropologists is truly the proper study of mankind then 'know thyself' really should become part of the anthropologist's credo." To the extent that archaeologists are striving to be anthropologists and contribute to the overall "study of man" this is undoubtedly necessary.

The difficulty in being able to "know ourselves" and others, or other cultures is compounded by the fact that there is still a great deal of specialization and inbreeding encouraged in typical archaeology programs or graduate schools. The criticisms of Gottwald already mentioned can be applied to many cases in archaeology. McDonald (1974) also has lamented similarly to Renfrew and Hawkes mentioned earlier, that graduate schools are not set up to encourage communication between what he has termed traditional art historical and anthropological approaches to archaeology. He has suggested that a good deal of creative interaction and innovation is lacking as a result, and that "it is precisely the most imaginative and innovative students who suffer most from such departmental and disciplinary divisiveness and parochialism" (p. 372). In order to remedy some of these concerns, McDonald and others set up a graduate Centre for Ancient Studies at the University of Minnesota emphasizing cross-disciplinary interaction and fertilization. One of the areas stressed in addition to many others was a focus on mythology and folklore that could be explored within this interdisciplinary context. Programs like this should hopefully
increase the understanding and interaction between archaeologists, anthropologists, and mythologists or folklorists.

In addition to the designing of interdisciplinary programs such as these, attention should be paid in the curricula of archaeology departments or programs beginning at the undergraduate level to some training and exposure in ethnohistory, myth, symbolism, the philosophy of history, and the sociology of archaeological knowledge. Not only should courses be required, such as ethnohistory for majors in archaeology, but exposure to concepts such as ethnohistory, and discussion about myth and oral tradition should be an integral part of every introductory course in archaeology, and included in courses on method and theory. Graduate programs, as well, should see that these concepts and ideas become part of our working knowledge, and continuing critical evaluation of archaeology, thereby bridging the Great Divide and advancing the course of the discipline.
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has illustrated that the use of myth and oral tradition for archaeological and historical purposes is greatly impeded by disciplinary specialization, fragmentation and socialization in conjunction with preconceptions about myth. It has drawn primarily from concepts and frameworks in Mythology, the Sociology of Knowledge, Philosophy, and Ethnohistory. It has also provided a brief background to some of the ways myths and traditions can be considered as historical sources in conjunction with archaeology. But it has stressed that socio-cultural constraints in archaeology create a lack of understanding and appreciation for the use of myth and oral tradition. As well it has pointed to some discussions of methodology and the support for specific interpretations. But it has emphasized the "mythical" nature of archaeological thought as important to recognize, and has suggested that easy straightforward correlations may not always be possible between myth and history, or myth and archaeology. Diverse opinions, perspectives, or interpretations occur which may not necessarily reflect the "truth" of myth versus history or the converse, but rather a focus that is a result of academic specialization, and an application of mutually exclusive approaches. This is, however, inappropriate if we are scholars seeking "truth" in the broadest sense.

To remedy some of the problems resulting from specialization and socialization, this thesis has suggested that
an interdisciplinary approach using myth and oral tradition be utilized for practical purposes in interpretation and in the designing and implementing of archaeological projects, or for critical purposes by examining the intellectual and historical foundations of the discipline and theoretical frameworks used. More specifically, individual archaeologists can help restructure the discipline by utilizing myths and traditions as much as possible in specific research problems, when writing in textbooks and general works, and in teaching. Courses could even be designed to address these concerns for archaeologists which should include some background in ethnohistory. Discussions of myth and oral tradition should in the future become more a part of the archaeological socialization process, both for practical and critical purposes.

To enhance this goal this thesis has provided a very general background to the subject of myth and oral tradition for archaeologists, and may serve as a reference for those who wish to pursue the subject further. It is by no means comprehensive but at least can be seen as a brief introduction to a very complex and important subject, and as a forum for further discussion.
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