THE IMPOSITION OF BRITISH CULTURE
AS PORTRAYED IN THE
NEW WESTMINSTER CAPITAL PLAN
OF 1859 TO 1862

by

Laura Elaine Scott
B.A., University of Alberta at Calgary, 1966.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Geography

Laura Elaine Scott 1983
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
December 1983

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL

Name: Laura Elaine Scott
Degree: Master of Arts
Title of Thesis: The Imposition of British Culture as Portrayed in the New Westminster City Plan of 1859-1862

Examining Committee:
Chairman: Roger Hayter

Robert B. Horsfall
Senior Supervisor

Edward M. Gibson

Archie MacPherson

Frances M. Woodward
Reference Librarian
External Examiner
Special Collections, Library
University of British Columbia

Date Approved: 1-24-72
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

The Imposition of British Culture as Portrayed in the New Westminster City Plan of 1859-1862

Author:

(signature)

LAURA E. SCOTT

(name)

12 December 1983

(date)
ABSTRACT

In 1859 Colonel Richard Clement Moody of the Royal Engineers designed a town plan for the proposed capital of British Columbia. This was undertaken on orders from the Colonial Secretary in London, who wished to establish British hegemony on the mainland coastal region, thereby preventing American claims to the area. The plan, and the site chosen to implement it, were intended to symbolize British dominance, in keeping with political and military objectives.

The thesis examines the effectiveness of the plans for the capital and resulting construction. These theoretical and realized landscapes are accounted for in relation to five factors including specific influences from Colonel Moody's training, his previous experience with the Royal Engineers, general cultural influences from Britain and/or other countries, controls and restraints from local politicians, and from the physical setting itself.

The data on which the thesis is based were collected from military and government archives in England and British Columbia.

iii
The findings indicate that the plans were clearly related to Victorian and military design theory, but that both local political interests and site characteristics reduced the effectiveness of the plan.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. THE MISSION OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. SITE SELECTION</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. THE NEW WESTMINSTER CAPITAL PLAN</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN DOUGLAS AND MOODY</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PLAN</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A. COMPLETE LIST OF THE COLUMBIA DETACH-</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENT OF ROYAL ENGINEERS, WHO SERVED IN BRITISH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMBIA--1858-1863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B. STREET NAMES FROM THE NEW WESTMINSTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPITAL PLAN, 1861-1862, WITH SOURCE REFERENCES</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C. LIST OF SUPPLIES, ROYAL ENGINEERS</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDER BOOK, 1859-1863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D. OFFICE BUILDING SPECIFICATIONS</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E. REGISTRAR-GENERAL'S OFFICE SPECI-</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX F. CUSTOMS HOUSE ADDITION SPECIFICATIONS</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX G. TREASURY SPECIFICATIONS</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX H. GOVERNMENT HOUSE SPECIFICATIONS</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I. HOLY TRINITY CHURCH SPECIFICATIONS 161
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................... 164
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................. 182
## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. New Westminster, B.C. Map 92G2, Edition 4  . 31
2. View of present-day New Westminster, taken from Surrey flatlands  .......... 38
3. View of Surrey flatlands and ridge from Pattullo Bridge  .......... 39
4. View of New Westminster from Pattullo Bridge  40
5. View of Surrey ridge from New Westminster  . 41
6. New Westminster, Looking up Blackwood Street from Columbia Street  .......... 42
7. New Westminster, Looking down Sixth Street from Royal Avenue  .......... 43
8. New Westminster, Looking down Sixth Street from Queens Avenue  .......... 44
10. City of Bath, 1786  .......... 69
11. Royal Crescent, Bath, England  .......... 70
14. New Westminster Capital Plan, 1862  .......... 76
15. Russel Street, Bath, England  .......... 79
16. Drawing of New Orleans, 1729, according to Vauban's model  .......... 82
17. Diagram of Neuf-Brisach  .......... 84
18. Diagram of Moody's Capital Plan, with symbolic interpretation of the names. 86
19. Government House, New Westminster, B.C. ... 97
20. Holy Trinity Church ................. 100
21. Drawing of Holy Trinity Church .......... 163
22. Plan of St. John the Baptist Anglican Church, Erith, England ................. 176
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

2. Provincial Archives of British Columbia P.A.B.C.
INTRODUCTION

The Problem

In his article "Grand Design on the Fringes of Empire: New Towns for British North America,"\(^1\) J. David Wood describes the influence of the model town on the North American continent. It is his thesis that such a model assisted the British in settling and controlling the areas under development in the late eighteenth century. This concept is not entirely new, but it has not been explored on the West Coast of Canada in any depth. New Westminster was chosen for a detailed study because of its original designation as a capital city and its development by the Royal Engineers sent out from Britain in the mid-nineteenth century. If any town in the new colonies were to be conceived on an ideal or model plan, New Westminster offered the logical site. It was developed on virgin territory, which meant it could impose its own shape on the land and direct subsequent building through an official plan. The fact that it was conceived as a capital city meant that the symbols of law and order would be present to enforce this plan.
The Literature Review

A search of the literature included, in addition to historical studies of town planning theory, histories of the Royal Engineers, discussions of military theory and fortifications, outlines of land distribution and survey practices in the colonies, and examinations of Colonial Office concepts in the nineteenth century. New Westminster was developed in anticipation of a possible American invasion, and the problems of managing the gold rush into British Columbia. This background made a broad literature search essential, which delivered some possible comparisons in the cities of Bath and Edinburgh in Great Britain, New Orleans in the United States, and New Delhi in India.

There are a number of books, theses, and articles on the development of New Westminster itself, but none of these, with the exception of a paper by E. M. Gibson and A. Miller entitled "Townscape as Metaphor," discusses the symbolic nature of the plan developed by the Engineers. A full investigation was still warranted, and involved searching manuscript collections of the correspondence and plans of the Royal Engineers, and of the Colonial Office and the local British Columbia
authorities.

The Archives

In order to peruse and organize this material, it was necessary to travel to Victoria, B.C., for the Provincial Archives holdings, and to Chatham, England, for the official archives of the Institution of Royal Engineers. This latter collection was found to consist mainly of books from libraries used by the Engineers in their training courses. The Public Records Office in Kew, Surrey, provided better source material in the form of annotated letters about British Columbia, both from the colonies and from other government departments. A final check of the records at the National Army Museum in Chelsea, London, yielded virtually no information on the colonial experience of the Royal Engineers.

The Thesis

The thesis which developed out of this research was that the Royal Engineers, under the command of Colonel Richard Clement Moody, designed a town plan for New Westminster which was intended to symbolize British hegemony in the colony. The site, the plan, and the buildings were chosen together to demonstrate to both the Americans and the new settlers that the
British ruled and administered British Columbia. The effectiveness and practicality of these ideas are examined in full in the following chapters, but the findings from the data indicate that Victorian and military design theory clearly influenced the development of New Westminster, while the changing political interests at home and in the colony retarded its growth in a difficult terrain.

The Organization of Material

Chapter I, "The Mission of the Royal Engineers," sets their task of building a capital city in the wilderness within a context of the philosophy of the British government in the nineteenth century. The individual backgrounds of the major officials of the Colonial Office, and of Colonel Richard Clement Moody and Governor James Douglas, are discussed, along with the record of the Royal Engineers in various fields. In addition, the historical incidents leading to the dispatching of the Engineers to British Columbia are outlined. Finally, the objective of the Engineers, to design a visual metaphor for British dominance in the Colony, is examined within this framework.

Chapter II, "Site Selection," discusses the reasons behind the location of New Westminster on a
hill overlooking the Fraser River. The major portion of this section examines the military factors which Moody announced as the impetus for his selection, and how these factors were shown to be secondary to his vision of a grand capital city in the new colony.

Chapter III, "The New Westminster Capital Plan," places the New Westminster design in a historical and theoretical context, through comparisons with Georgian Bath and Edinburgh, New Orleans, and New Delhi. The plan itself is examined in detail for the components which form that visual metaphor mentioned in Chapter I, from the regularity of the squares and rectangles, for example, to the crowning effect of the crescents. The names of the streets are related to their source donors, in order to understand the significance of these choices to the plan. Finally, the buildings which the Engineers erected are surveyed for their contribution to the effect intended in the total design.

Chapter IV, "The Relations Between Douglas and Moody," scrutinizes primarily the correspondence between the two British officials, and their respective standing in the Colonial Office. Through this examination, it can be seen that Moody's credibility
was being eroded slowly at the Colonial Office, and that this loss affected his grand design adversely.

Chapter V, "The Effectiveness of the Plan," analyzes the extent to which the plan was curtailed, and, concomitantly, the extent to which it was developed on the very difficult site chosen by the Engineers. Finally, the growth of New Westminster is reviewed over the following century, in order to assess the durability of Moody's ideas for his capital city in the wilderness.
CHAPTER I

The Mission of the Royal Engineers

With empire, the king's capital city stood preeminently for social order over the whole conquered territory. There were also lesser cities, the nodal points of the royal administration. If London was the capital of the British Empire in the nineteenth century, New Westminster in British Columbia was conceived and planned as a "nodal point" to represent the existing social order in a colonial setting. This was vital to the philosophy of the home government, which saw its role, after Voltaire, as a civilizing force in a savage world. As Ronald Hyam reminds us:

J. H. Newman, speaking in 1852, said that Western civilization "has a claim to be considered as the perfect representative society and civilization of the human race, as its perfect result and limit, in fact." One may disagree with this pronouncement, but one may not ignore it, as this expresses the messianic spirit prevalent in the Victorian age of Britain.

The years in the mid-nineteenth century were a patriotic time, when Britain governed a number of
profitable colonies and considered itself an enlightened ruler. As John Ward reminds us, the intention was to create colonies of settlement, not of conquered slaves. In a spirit of "confident liberalism," it was the "cultural mission of Britain" to civilize the nations through the exporting of its laws, institutions, ethics, and even that elusive quality, taste. John Cell tells us that the Colonial Office preferred its governors to be "leaders of colonial society," not merely accountants or administrators. As such, they were to personify a style or an elegance, a distinctive attitude which celebrated the British gentleman.

Hyam explains it thus:

The role of the government overseas was reduced simply to occasional political functions, based on the idea of holding power in reserve and not using it as a routine. The government would provide an initial impetus or leverage, to open up trade. It would try to designate and enlist the cooperation of an indigenous, enlightened collaborating group or elite to provide the continuing momentum for change." (Italics mine.)

In cases where an elite was not present, the Colonial Office intended to entice such a group to emigrate to the colonies and provide a foundation for the future self-governing settlement. This was the direction of
the "momentum for change," even where the home office retained the ruling hand for some time.

The Colonial Secretary from 1858 to 1859, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, was one of the new theorists in the nineteenth-century Colonial Office, an office which included the "academic" Merivale and the "religious" Rogers. Lytton himself was not only a politician, but also an author of some repute, a romanticist, an editor of the New Monthly Journal, and an instigator of the Monthly Chronicle which attempted a union of scientific, political, and literary information. His Under-Secretary, Herman Merivale, had been a professor of political economy at Oxford after a distinguished scholastic career at Harrow, Oriel College, Trinity College, and Balliol. Frederic Rogers, Baron Blachford, who succeeded Merivale as Under-Secretary, was also a prodigious scholar, a reformer and a churchman who participated in the inauguration of the Guardian newspaper. Both Merivale and Rogers were admitted to the bar, and all three were liberal in their political sentiments.

These qualities were important to the colonial theory which developed at the time, seen by Hyam to combine the "political, legal, economic, commercial,
religious, education and technological . . . in an integrated relationship.\textsuperscript{11} (Italics mine.) John Cell considers this an improvement over the earlier military days; this was a superior administration which did not decry the "martial flavor of the service,"\textsuperscript{12} but rather re-directed it toward a zeal for promoting British culture. The colonies were attracting men of promise, and the government sought to capitalize on this through a policy of deliberate settlement or, in other words, "empire as duty."\textsuperscript{13}

British Columbia at this time was in urgent need of settlement. The area was experiencing an unusual and not entirely welcome phenomenon in Western history, a gold rush. In other mineral-rich places this rapid assault on the land had left devastation behind, and Britain hoped to control the situation by preventive measures. As Howay observed in 1910:

\begin{quote}
Instantly an enormous burden was thrown upon the "mother of nations." This great inrush called for the formation of civil government; the enforcement of law and order; the raising and collection of revenue; the examination, exploration, and development of the country; the construction of roads, trails, and bridges; and all the thousand-and-one things which are necessary to change a wilderness into the abode of civilized and law-abiding people. And all of these things had to be done, not leisurely but immediately; not separately, but jointly; not consecutively, but concurrently.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}
The Governor of the nearby colony, Vancouver Island, had already taken measures to attempt to bring order into the boom society. In December 1857, James Douglas claimed the gold fields on the mainland for the Crown of England. He had also attempted to issue licences to the miners and toyed with a tariff system for a short period. Lytton later refuted his right to do this, although he formally made Douglas Governor of the mainland in 1858 to add validity to the British claim. There had been trouble earlier with the American revenue officers in the Puget Sound ports, who interpreted regulations freely to the detriment of the Hudson's Bay Company. This had led to negative feelings on both sides of the border. Indeed, the battle over the 54°40' boundary was only settled by the Oregon Boundary Treaty in 1846, and it was assumed that expansionist interests could flare up again with little incitement. The danger of violence from the miners actually culminated in the unruly invasion of Victoria, on the night of 31 July 1858, by speculators returning to California from the British Columbia claims. Douglas called in the navy at this point, but the situation cooled overnight and a policing action was unnecessary. It was not until the San Juan incident in 1859 that a
joint military occupation took place on those islands off the coast of Washington and caused an international incident, but we can see that emotions had been running high before this.\textsuperscript{15}

In its growing sophistication, the Colonial Office also recognized that trouble spots could best be handled by conciliation, a spirit of "self-restraint, of forebearance, good temper, and the discretion which avoids provocation and offence."\textsuperscript{16} Lytton considered this need for temperate government, civil order, exploration and development of the landscape, the physical growth of towns, and the maturation of commerce, and decided to call upon a group of soldiers who could encompass all of these goals as well as provide a necessary military deterrent in the unhappy event of war with the United States. He requested the assistance of the Royal Engineers, and was rewarded with the support of Colonel Richard Clement Moody and a carefully-chosen detachment of officers and sappers who were sent to perform these duties.

Loyalty to Britain was a major part of the training and natural orientation of the Royal Engineers. Sir Francis Bond-Head, former Royal Engineer, published a description of the education of the Corps in 1862.
In this, he states:

As monarchical government, and indeed, every other description of government is based on the principle that he who received from it protection owes to it allegiance, it follows that any set of students, and especially a litter of young sucking soldiers, are bound, and if necessary, should be compelled not only to obey the orders of their superiors, but, without murmur, to submit to punishment if they disobey them.\(^\text{17}\)

Not only obedience, therefore, but submission is required of the loyal British engineer. The Royal Engineers were loyal and accepted the concept, moreover, of the British settler as demonstrably superior to the rest,\(^\text{18}\) thus conforming to the goals of the Colonial Office.

Lytton wrote to Colonel Moody in 1858 concerning that union of energy and prudence, of the devotion to duty, which Englishmen so quickly blend with the attachment to freedom, and the spirit of loyalty, truth and upright dealing which signalize the brighter, and, I believe, the larger portion of our national character and race.\(^\text{19}\)

He continued with an elaboration of that image, which is judged even higher when mixed with the "courtesy, high breeding and urbane knowledge of the world which dignify the English gentleman and British Officer."\(^\text{20}\) It is clear from this letter that Lytton was searching for representatives of the best of British culture, not just for a police force. In fact, the emphasis was upon restraint, not upon a show of force. Since
the Royal Navy was already in place near Victoria under the direction of Rear Admiral Baynes, the Engineers were being sent as mere backup, while their primary purpose was the "taming" of the landscape and the development of towns. In particular, Colonel Moody was directed to establish a site for a capital city for the colony, and to design a plan for its streets and buildings. This was distinctly referred to as a capital, i.e., it was not enough to raise a flag over a piece of ground or construct a fort. The area must be designated British, with a capital city for a seat of government and the promotion of trade. It was hoped that the colony would then be settled primarily by British colonists who maintained loyalty to the institutions at home.

This loyalty, however, could be reinforced by obvious symbols of government, for example, the residence of the Queen's representative, a customs house, a treasury, a jail, churches, etc. In the case of the city plan developed for New Westminster—the name given by the Queen to the capital of British Columbia—even the street names and patterns, the comparative size of lots, factors of elevation and position, and other details were deliberately constructed or chosen to demonstrate symbolically British
hegemony in the area. Colonel Moody and his detachment were well-chosen, from training and experience, to develop this theme in the construction of this city.

The Royal Engineers enjoyed a reputation as a skilled and well-trained corps of soldiers in Britain and throughout the colonies. The Engineers as military were trained in the arts of fortification, but were also elite city planners and builders. Their talents had been used to advantage in public buildings and defence works, and in the Great Exhibition of 1851 where sappers participated in constructing the Crystal Palace. The World newspaper in that year praised them thus:

In many walks of life, other than military, Engineers have been equally distinguished. They have proved themselves valuable public servants in very various capacities, and in a dozen different departments of the State. They have been pro-consuls of broad provinces. They administer the gaols, superintend the police, the railways, the art training of the nation. They are esteemed, and hold high places about the Court. 21

The talents of such a group could be put to obvious uses in peacetime for surveying and building public works, while the military aspect remained dormant but visible. Their training was also partly directed to traversing difficult and unfamiliar terrain, to
choosing a site for defensive purposes, and constructing a viable fortified town on this site.

The founder of the School for the Royal Engineers, Sir Charles Pasley, accepted and promoted the work of his protégés in the public field. In fact, when he introduced the architecture course in 1826, he recommended that the government consider this a part of their practical goal.

Nor could they be more usefully employed in time of peace, because neither Engineer officers nor soldiers can be allowed to be idle, and therefore, when they are not attached to armies in the field, there is no alternative between making them take military duty by mounting guard, etc., or by employing them in public works. 22

In view of the cultural mission that the Colonial Office espoused, it seemed that better representatives could scarcely be found for a colony in such a delicate stage of development. The fear of American military aggression and individual lawlessness required a show of force, but, again in keeping with the times, a sophisticated and subtle demonstration of power, or power cloaked in metaphor. The Colonial Office, nevertheless, did not support its own chosen troops with money and authority, and largely ignored Moody's advice from the field.

This particular Corps of Royal Engineers was also hand-picked: "Captain J. M. Grant . . . for genius
in construction, Capt. R. M. Parsons because of his knowledge of surveying and Capt. H. R. Luard for military work."23 Colonel Moody also had valuable experience as the Governor of the Falkland Islands, where he had contended with the "inconveniences and vicissitudes of a bad and depressing climate"24 in "large barren tracts of country, softened into mud by perpetual rains."25 With his previous postings in the West Indies and Malta, he enjoyed a varied background in widely differing landscapes, and would not be defeated by the British Columbia wilderness. Moody was also an accomplished draughtsman, and took a strong interest in architecture, culminating in his plans for the restoration of Edinburgh Castle. These plans were so highly considered that he was asked to present them to the Queen at Windsor Castle. It is notable that these plans were "drawn to musical chords," in keeping with the Victorian concern for integrating the arts, and found great favour with the Queen because of this. Moody was therefore conversant with the cultural values of his day, and appeared from his skills, interests and experience to be an excellent choice for the mission to British Columbia.26

The Governor with whom Moody was ordered to
cooperate was a very different man. Born in the West Indies to a Glasgow merchant, Douglas was educated "by dint of whip and spur" in Scotland and England, and apprenticed at the age of sixteen to the North West Company. Douglas's reputation in the fur trade was that of a hard man of detail, determined to succeed in business and to "acquire knowledge of literature and history, politics and public affairs," in short, of an ambitious and partially self-made man. He married a chief factor's daughter, Amelia Connolly, officially at Fort Vancouver in 1837 and became the accountant under Dr. John McLoughlin, superintendent of the Columbia Department of the Hudson's Bay Company. Eventually, he built his way up to chief factor of the Department, and was known for his frugality and sense of responsibility. He was also considered an expert in negotiations, with the Russians over the northern boundary and with the California Governor, Juan B. Alvarado, for concessions in that area. When the far northern posts of the Hudson's Bay Company were abandoned in 1841, Douglas started construction of Fort Victoria as the new center of business. His work with the Company made him vitally aware of the American interests in expansionism, and of the British delay, or outright
neglect, in asserting claims to the West Coast. It is said by Margaret Ormsby that Lytton did not approve of Douglas, and that numerous complaints of authoritarianism and nepotism were brought to bear against him in England. He was, however, considered competent enough to become Governor of Vancouver Island in 1851 and of British Columbia in 1858, possibly just because of his determined efficiency and rapidity of action in ruling.  

The choice of Colonel Moody, as that archetypal "English gentleman and British Officer" would perhaps have been fortunate had his position been clearly defined and his authority absolute. Unfortunately, he was informed that Douglas would hold "all power and responsibilities . . . exclusively" even while Moody's duties were special and not open to interference. This would appear to be a contradiction in itself, and semantic confusion was furthered by the reference to Moody as an advisor to the Governor. The difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that the Colonel had himself been a colonial Governor in the Falkland Islands, and was now entitled Lieutenant Governor, or cultural representative of the Queen, an ambiguous position combining higher prestige with lesser authority than that of Douglas. In addition, he was Commissioner
of Lands and Works, an appropriate title, but one which is theoretically under the jurisdiction of the Governor.

The personal backgrounds of Douglas and Moody may well have contributed to their inability to share an understanding of colonial development. Colonel Moody was quite literally born into the Royal Engineers as the second son of Colonel Thomas Moody, and grew naturally into the military calling. He was a cultured theoretician, and had been a professor of fortification at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Douglas, on the other hand, was a former Hudson's Bay factor, a businessman from a business family. His father had interests in sugar plantations in British Guiana, where he fathered three children, including James, by a creole or mulatto woman. Moody's background was therefore eminently respectable, while Douglas's antecedents and his half-breed wife, were to some degree an affront to a race-conscious Victorian society. Finally, Moody was trained as a diplomat, while Douglas was more skilled at management; urbanity does not always mix well with business acumen.

Lytton referred to Douglas's "high qualities" in an exhortation to Moody to cooperate with the Governor.
I need not add that a Governor who could thus at once inspire confidence and animate exertion must have many high qualities which will ensure your esteem and add to the satisfaction with which you will cooperate with his efforts. . . . While I feel assured that the Governor will receive with all attention the counsel or suggestions which your Military and scientific experience so well fit you to offer, I would be distinctly understood when I say that he is not merely in a civil point of view the first magistrate in the State, but that I feel it to be essential for the public interests that all powers and responsibilities should centre in him exclusively. 31

This last sentence was intended to clarify the roles of Moody and Douglas. For, as he noted: "Nothing could be more prejudicial to the prosperity of the Colony than a conflict between the principal officers of Government." 32 Although one might argue that other factors might prove injurious to a new colony, the conflict between the two did impede the growth of New Westminster itself.

It should be stressed, however, that the initial relations between Douglas and Moody were promising. Moody instructed Captain Parsons from London on 1 September 1858:

You will find the Governor has been very fully instructed in the matter and from his well known character for energy and judgment I have no apprehension in my own mind that if you frankly place yourself in unreserved communication with him you will find difficulties quickly mastered. 33
On 25 December 1858, Mrs. Moody wrote to her mother:

We Called at the Governor's, he is a very polite, agreeable sort of Man, he and Richd will I trust get on well.34

Later, Moody rather effusively thanks the Governor and the Hudson's Bay Company for assisting the Royal Engineers in their re-settlement from England:

I have already had the honour, again and again, of making known to your excellency the prompt attention and valuable assistance the Royal Engineers Department has received from the Hudson's Bay Company from first to last since their arrival in the Colony, and I trust your Excellency will approve of the deep sense of the obligation I am under for the constant support rendered me being made known to Her Majesty's government.35

Moody and Douglas also shared a patriotism toward Britain, even while disagreeing about the desired character of the future settlement. Moody wrote to Arthur Blackwood of the Colonial Office on 1 February 1859 concerning the mixture of national backgrounds in British Columbia:

I was deeply moved that it pleased the Almighty Ruler of the Universe to bring these various nations together under the protection of our Queen.36

Douglas commented later on the necessity of encouraging British colonists to emigrate to British Columbia:

6. The Government have at present the great object in view, of attracting to British Columbia an industrious population for the development of its agricultural, as well as of its auriferous resources; but that object
is sought to be attained by such measures only, as will induce a loyal population attached to British Laws, Institutions and Rule to reside in the Country, as it is of far greater importance to the Empire that the character of the population should be such, even though the progress of settlement should be somewhat retarded, than that the Colony should be rapidly filled by an Alien population, expensive and difficult to govern, and who would probably seize the first opportunity of discarding their allegiance. 37

It is noteworthy that his views are in line with statements mentioned earlier from the Britain of his time. These extracts show that the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor shared a strong sense of patriotism toward the British homeland. And yet by 4 August 1859, Mrs. Moody is writing to her mother that "it is not pleasant to serve under a 'Hudson's Bay Factor,' a Man on whom you can place no reliance" 38 and finally that:

The Govr and Richd never can get on, it is impossible. "They say" he has written Home to recommend our being recalled--The Colony can't afford us. 39

The disintegration of relations between these two civil servants began almost immediately and continued to worsen until Colonel Moody left the colony to return to Britain in 1863. The reasons behind their problems are multiple: differences of class, differences of responsibilities, confusion of roles and authority, widely-divergent experiences, conflicts in cultural values, and most importantly, insufficient funds. It is possible
that, given adequate money and materials, plus the time to devote to building a capital city, the Royal Engineers might have fashioned New Westminster as a successful monument to the Empire and a center of trade.

At any rate, hopes were high when the Royal Engineers detachment set sail for the colony of British Columbia in 1858. The first group, composed of twenty men, mostly surveyors under Captain Parsons, left on the La Platta on 2 September; the second, primarily carpenters under Captain Grant, travelled by Panama Canal and disembarked on 8 November; the third, under Captain Luard, was formed of three officers with 118 non-commissioned men, plus women and children, who arrived in British Columbia in April 1859. A complete list of the detachment is reproduced in Appendix A.

The Emigrant Soldier's Gazette, produced by the Thames City ship party, demonstrated the high spirits, optimism, and dogmatic patriotism of the Royal Engineers, when they discussed their prospects in British Columbia:

The choice of a site on which to establish this Capital rests with Colonel Moody R.E. and there is little doubt that he has ere this decided on the spot, one probably on the banks of the River "Fraser." Our first business on our arrival will be to build houses for ourselves. . . . The duties of the detachment will probably be as various as the names of the
men composing it, such as clearing and levelling ground, building, draining, road-making, surveying, digging wells, building jettys, etc. . . . We shall also have our architects, clerks, surveyors, draughtsmen and photographers and be, we hope, at the bottom of all the good and as little of the evil as possible, that is done in the Colony. By and by when provisions are cheap and plentiful we shall have settlers from Old England to cultivate the Country, whose bright and happy faces will form a delightful contrast to the care-worn, dissipated, and scoundrelly physiognomies of gold diggers in general . . .

Even the Victoria newspaper looked forward to their arrival, and all seemed positive of their beneficial effects:

The detachment is composed of picked volunteers, embraces every trade and profession—surveyors, draughtsmen, artists, architects, photographers, carpenters, masons, blacksmiths, painters, miners, etc.—such as only the Royal Engineers can produce.41

It was thus in a spirit of confidence that the taming of the British Columbia wilderness began on Christmas Day of 1858 when Colonel Moody and his family landed at Victoria to take command of the detachment.

In his letter to the Colonial Office on 27 December 1858, Moody confides that he "entirely disarmed Douglas of all jealousy and neutralized any little mischievous attempts to introduce a wedge between us."42 This letter augured well for the success of the venture, but it is noteworthy that Arthur Blackwood from the Colonial Office viewed the chances of
co-existence with marked incredulity. He was to be proved right.

Arthur Blackwood was only one of the Colonial Officers who treated Moody with disbelief or scorn. The Colonel had the unfortunate task of bringing to fruition the dreams of Colonial Secretary Lytton, who did not match these dreams with funding. In addition, Moody's task was made more difficult with the replacement of Lytton with the Duke of Newcastle, a man with little respect for Moody's intentions.

Moody wanted to build a city of beauty in the wilderness, one which would personify the leading institutions of Britain. His city was to excite or impress visually the settlers with an image of authority, dignity, and command. This was to be a controlled image with neo-classical overtones, and a strong emphasis upon the church and the state. The Colonel's thoughts, plans, and activities were all directed toward this goal. He chose the site partly for military reasons, but with an eye directed to the dramatic possibilities as well. He planned his city as an icon, and argued with the Governor for a development of quality. The buildings, though simple, were styled and located with the objective of reinforcing the authority of the crown and of the robe.
Britain had a loyal supporter in the person of the Colonel; unfortunately, his supporters were centered in his troop of soldiers and in a section of the townspeople of New Westminster. The home country did not match this support. Lytton forgot the practicalities of paying for clearing and developing the site and the town. Moody's title of Lieutenant-Governor was declared dormant, and he was subjected to the will and ideas of the Governor of the Colony. He was ignored in military discussions, chastised for his actions, and abused at the Colonial Office.

Even so, the city slowly grew and prospered for a while. The Engineers and contracted labour performed miracles in the difficult terrain. Moody himself must have been pleased with the artistry of his design, and with some of the development on site. It is regrettable that conditions made it impossible for his design to be fulfilled.
CHAPTER II

Site Selection

What a grand old Park this whole hill would make! Colonel Moody was advised by Lytton on 29 October 1858 that his first duty in the new colony was to commence operations necessary to inaugurate land sales to defray costs of surveying. To this end, the choice of a maritime town near the mouth of the Fraser River, plus an inland capital, was to be of paramount importance. The Engineers were further directed to perform surveys and other public works, while the remainder of the task was to be contracted out to non-military workers.

Moody was fully aware of these duties before being formally ordered to pursue them. He had studied maps of the area in England, and on 1 September 1858 instructed Captain Parsons by letter to conduct

an extremely full and careful reconnaissance for me against my arrival devoting your attention chiefly to such distance up the River as ordinary merchant trading vessels can proceed conveniently.

Parsons was to receive assistance from the Governor and from naval officers in the region, plus any "intelligent guides" that might be available.

The Royal Engineers, and Captain Parsons in
particular, were exceptionally well-trained for this task. In addition to courses in fortification, the School offered field-surveying, contouring, sketching, reconnaissance and "the selection and survey of lines of communication by roads, railways, and canals, and in drawing up projects for their execution." Whitworth Porter gives the following description of the survey course:

The work performed at the Survey School may be ranked under two heads, viz., Technical Surveying and Military Topography. The former consists of instruction in geodesy, astronomy, meteorology, trigonometrical surveying, chain and road surveying, and defilade, or the application of permanent works to sites. The Military Topography consists of military surveying, military sketching, and elementary reconnaissance, both road and district, also eye sketching and the drawing of sections. The course for Engineer Officers extends over 154 days, and includes the whole of the above. That for Infantry Officers is confined to Military Topography, which only lasts for thirty days. For Non-commissioned Officers and Sappers of the Survey Companies the course lasts 180 days, and embraces all the operations of practical surveying, including chaining, observing angles, traversing, calculating areas, levelling and contouring, also reduction of base line, protracting angles, and triangulations, with other details.

This description of the Royal Engineers' courses was written in 1889, but should give at least an idea of the training that was offered during Colonel Moody's career. No curricula, lectures or course outlines are available at the official archives in Chatham,
England, or at the Public Records Office in Kew, England. We are forced, therefore, at this time to refer to later works.

Coupled with instruction in mathematics, geography, and in the natural sciences such as geology and mineralogy,\(^{47}\) the Engineer was well-suited to determine a site in an unsettled country.

Unfortunately, a rather delicate problem arose from Douglas's somewhat precipitate move in selecting a site near a Hudson's Bay Company property for a possible capital city (See map on page 31). Captain G. H. Richards had been sent on the H. M. S. Plumper to examine the mouth of the river, and recommended the Derby site near Fort Langley. A group of Victoria citizens had concurred with this recommendation, allowing Governor Douglas to explain his choice by the statement that the mercantile community is usually accurate in its assessment of the potential development of a new locality.\(^{48}\) Douglas took further action by approving a survey of the area, and even went to the extent of directing the layout of the town lots. At the end of November, precisely one month before Colonel Moody was due to arrive in British Columbia, a land sale disposed of
343 lots, which encourages us to suspect that the Governor wished to present the Lieutenant Governor with a fait accompli.

Uncharitable critics have intimated that his enthusiasm was generated by the fact that Derby was adjacent to a Hudson's Bay Company land reserve. In addition, the site, while possessing deep water for good anchorage, was subject to annual overflow. Problematic as this location was, however, it was not the overflow or perhaps even the proximity of the Hudson's Bay Company that led to Colonel Moody's ultimate rejection of Derby. In his instructions to Parsons, he issued a warning:

I think it would be well for you to draw the attention of the Governor to the circumstance that military considerations of the very gravest importance (seeing the nearness of the Frontier) enter into the question of determining the site of the chief town and also of the one to be laid out at the entrance of the River.

Moody already favoured the north side of the river for a capital and wished to be careful in preparing the Governor for his rejection.

Moody's first choice for a capital was Mary Hill, named after his wife (Map, p. 31). This was located two miles further down the river from Derby near the mouth of the Pitt River. But Captain Grant
advised against this, suggesting that the "'lower site being at the head of tidewater . . . made it7 easily defensible by a tête du pont on the opposite side of the river."52 Instead, he offered the alternate site of the present New Westminster, and this was accepted by the Colonel because of its superior qualities.

In his letter to Douglas of 28 January 1859, Moody explained his reasons for rejecting Derby. Moody's primary concern was military, not civil, in spite of the mention of such items as drainage and the availability of water from Pitt River for domestic purposes. The thrust of this letter is toward strategic considerations: the elevated land overlooking a flat marshy approach; the protection afforded by rivers as obstacles to attack; the positioning of earthworks for guards; the assessment of control of the Interior in event of war. As an afterthought, he recognized the prospective problems of imposing a street pattern on this topography, but only says he "could wish that the upper level had not been so high."53 This elevation, however, was one of the positive aspects of the site for strategic value and protection from flooding, along with seaport potential
and the richness of the land as evidenced by the thick forest growth and nearby meadows. The river channels could also provide communication and transportation, which would be vital during a war and in the daily requirements of trade.\(^5\)

This conciliatory and detailed letter was accepted by Douglas, who wrote to Lytton on 4 February 1859:

2.-The Lieutenant Governor has entered fully into the consideration of the military features of the position, which he believes to be of rare strength and value, and also that, apart from these advantages, the actual spot itself is well-adapted for a city of magnitude, in consequence of there being deep water close along an extended line of shore for the anchorage of sea-going vessels of any burden, an abundant supply of water for household purposes, and good drainage.

3.-The views which the Lieutenant Governor has so ably developed, generally coincide with my own impressions on the subject, and I am satisfied of the soundness of his conclusions. I have therefore authorized the immediate survey and sub-division of the site recommended in his report into building lots of the ordinary dimensions for sale.\(^5\)

This graceful capitulation was received at the Colonial Office, one suspects, with relief, as noted on the reverse of Douglas's letter by G. B. L. (George Bulwer Lytton):

I am very glad the two are agreed about it, as it is just one of the points on which a difference of opinions might have been expected.\(^5\)
Margaret McDonald reminds us that Douglas may have had little option but to surrender:

Douglas, however, must have felt that his choice was indefensible in view of Moody's powerful arguments in favour of Queensborough. Then too, Lytton had suggested that the capital should be placed on the north side of the Fraser. Moreover public opinion favoured Moody's choice and if the Governor had insisted on Derby there would have been much criticism that he was putting the interests of the Hudson's Bay Company before those of the Colony.5

In any case, the Colonial Office did not depend exclusively on the judgment of these two crown servants: they requested a review by the War Office. In the spring of 1859, Secretary Major General Peel described the site as "sensible and well-judged,"58 as far as he could determine without a sketch. After receiving a sketch, the opinion was that it was "better chosen on military grounds"59 than, presumably, civil. One suspects that the War Office may have been more cognizant of the massive difficulties awaiting the developers of this "magnificent park" than were Moody and Douglas.

From a military standpoint, the selection was indeed admirable. As the Aide-Memoire to the Military Sciences (Chatham Archives) states in volume two:

'It never was presumed that scarps could be trusted to without defenders; but it was
considered a great point gained to have rendered portions of ground of such difficult access as to be safely left to the guard of a small corps, or to unsteady troops, such as the militia and ardenanza on the lines.

Colonel Moody had scored several points by the selection of an escarpment, which could be well-defended on all sides. As he noted in his letter to Douglas (transcription below):

Immediately in front is the broad navigable River, on the opposite bank is a line of Rising Ground covering the whole front. This rising ground falls toward the Frontier and all along that base is swampy land easily inundated.

Upon this rising ground could be placed a great intrenched camp with a series of open earthen works entirely protecting the city at a distance ensuring perfect safety from any injury whatever to the city itself.

On the right flank of the position, the City would be protected by two deep channels in addition to the River itself and also by widely extended marshes which when dyked (as they will be by the Farmers) could be easily inundated.

The left flank is protected at a distance of four miles by the Frazer and also by the deep broad River Pitt—but in addition to these two obvious obstacles to an enemy is a Commanding Hill having the Pitt River Close in front.

On this Hill could be placed a strong "work" entirely covering the left flank.

At the rear of this Position and distant five miles is Burrard Inlet any access to which could be rendered most hazardous by placing a work on the Island which extends across it. There is also on that side a range of high ground from East to West on which could be placed Earthen works and intrenched camp preventing any advance.
In short, Military Defences of the least costly description and defended by Militia Forces could be quickly formed (and from time to time increased to any extent) where a necessity arose for them and which would render the site almost unassailable. Considering how near the embouchure of the great valley of the Fraser is to the Frontier from 10 to 15 miles these considerations are of incalculable weight. 61

The pictures on pages 38 to 44 give a clear indication of the steep incline on which New Westminster was built and of the landscape across the river.

The Aide-Memoire previously mentioned describes a "military position" in this way:

A Military Position is simply the extent of ground which an army occupies either for the purpose of engaging with an enemy or of advancing to a combat. The advantages which military positions should possess must have relation to some particular object; and if nature does not supply them, they should be supplied by art.

The qualities necessary are--1. That the space occupied should be in proportion to the number of troops.--2. That the flanks should be covered by obstacles either natural or artificial, so that an enemy cannot act upon the wings or rear of the order of battle.--3. The field of battle must be open, and permit the movements of the troops; and the roads and openings in the rear sufficiently clear to allow them to retreat, in the event of the position being forced.--4. The military features of the position should be chosen with such judgment, that an enemy cannot penetrate the line without running the risk of being taken in flank, and being beaten by an inferior force. 62

By this definition, Colonel Moody's choice was excellent. Front, rear, and both sides are all protected
Fig. 2. View of present-day New Westminster, taken from Surrey flatlands. This picture shows the incline of the hill, upon which the Engineers built the capital city. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by author.
Fig. 3. View of Surrey flatlands and ridge from Pattullo Bridge. Attack from the south would come over that ridge. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by the author.
Fig. 4. View of New Westminster from Pattullo Bridge. Notice the treed area at the right side of the photograph: Queens Park and the intended Albert Crescent. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by the author.
Fig. 5. View of Surrey ridge from the corner of Merivale and Columbia Streets, New Westminster, B.C. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by the author.
Fig. 6. New Westminster, B.C. Looking up Blackwood Street from Columbia Street. Notice the steep grade. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by the author.
Fig. 7. Looking down Sixth Street from Royal Avenue, New Westminster, B.C. Notice Surrey ridge in the background, the fog and the steep incline. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by the author.
Fig. 8. New Westminster, B.C.
Looking down Sixth Street from Queens Avenue. Notice Surrey ridge and the fog in the distance. Picture taken 19 September 1983 by the author.
by natural advantages, which the Colonel suggested
could be reinforced with earthworks and dykes
sufficiently distant from the city to render it
almost impregnable. In addition, the necessary
works and troops employed are minimal, indeed, to
achieve the result of keeping a superior force at
bay. The city would have sufficient water and
arable land to feed both itself and the troops
fending off the enemy on the battleground. Rivers
would afford communication and rapid transport if
necessary, and the elevation of the hill would
allow a sentry to capture signals from the distant
troops. The height is also a "commanding position"
from which to advance should the enemy manage to
overcome these odds and break through the obstacles;
in addition, the citizens could retreat up the hill
or along the river depending on the direction of
the attack.

A recent analysis of the importance of
"strategic geography" by Louis C. Peltier and
G. Etzel Pearcy describes the importance of the
"commanding position," along with attributes of the
terrain which contribute to or distract from an
offensive. A broken terrain is considered valuable
when supplying points of protection while advancing, even where vegetation and rock provide obstacles to advance. As we have seen, the hill where New Westminster was to be situated gave the initial advantage; however, the hill opposite would have to be protected as suggested by Moody to force the enemy down into the marshes along the American border. Once on the swamp, though, the troops could be inundated, as was pointed out by Moody. Thus, the rocky hills provide mostly advantages, while the terrain nearer the border would be a negative feature for an assailant.

Peltier and Pearcy summarize the principles of strategic geography as accessibility, mobility, visibility, communicability, availability, and vulnerability. Accessibility refers to the power of the enemy to reach the vital center, in this case virtually impossible because of distant works and troops for protection. Mobility means the ability of the troops to retreat or advance. For their purposes, the British would find both relatively simple, if the attack came from the south. The necessity for an offensive, however, was almost precluded by the solidity of the defences; similarly, a retreat was almost a negligible possibility. Visibility refers to positions which allow the defender to survey and monitor the enemy's movements,
easily done in this setting. Communicability, as we have seen, would be made infinitely easier by the height of the central position and the circular pattern of the troop positions and earthworks. Availability alludes to the readiness of troops in the area, and Colonel Moody's idea for a Frontier Military Settlement proposed on 10 November 1859 would lend itself to greater defence. Even though this proposal was not accepted by the Colonial Office, it was included in Moody's planning, which is indicative of a careful strategist. Finally, the term vulnerability covers the defences of the enemy, which in this case were not outlined in Moody's letter.

It is important to remember that the Colonial Office wished to downplay the military aspect and impress the Americans, as well as the miners and settlers, with a symbolic rather than an armed presence. Colonel Moody chose to achieve this goal with the layout and the buildings of his town.

The letter of Moody to the Colonial Office of 1 February 1859 which discussed the townsite of Derby said:

My objections are strong "Imperial Interest" objections to the locality--I have urged the matter very earnestly on the Governor in a military point of view.

He also objected to the American flavour of Derby
and mentioned the possibility of smuggling because of the proximity of the border. Finally, of course, the Hudson's Bay Company interests in the area were also a detriment and were so mentioned by the Colonel. One feels from his subsequent actions that the military considerations may have been secondary, used only to justify the choice of New Westminster as an alternate site to that preferred by the Governor. Moody was using his strongest guns, even while his main interest lay in the impressive spectacle a city in this setting would convey.

What a grand old Park this whole hill would make! I am reserving a very beautiful glen and adjoining land for the People's Park. I have already named it "Queen's Ravine" and trust you will approve. It divides the town well from the Military Reserve.66

I do not mean to imply that the military considerations were not important, but that Moody looked to the majesty of his city more than to its impregnable. Obviously, he never forgot that he was a soldier, and in August 1859 requested land reinforcements against the large presence of U.S. citizens in the colony as well as the dangerous line of American forts and communications routes along the border:

The Avenues of Land attack are by Trail from Semiahmoo and by Whatcom Trail from Bellingham Bay, and the extremely important line of Operation entirely open and easy--
defenceless at present—is from the Dalles and Semilkameen by Fort Colville and Okanagan, and the inner country generally.67

On 11 August, he requested the Governor to obtain information on U.S. border troops, to arrange civilian aid for constructing a military road from New Westminster to the Burrard Inlet, and to obliterate the Whatcom and Semiahmoo Trails. He recommended a trail also along the right bank of the Fraser and Harrison Rivers with military settlements along the way, and offered to explore a route from the head of Pitt Lake to Harrison and the Lillooet Trail. He ended this letter with a proposal for a brick powder magazine, plus landing piers and a blockhouse at New Westminster.68 Clearly, the menace of American invasion was never far from his mind, and 1859 was the year of the San Juan incident after all.

Yet, he was equally concerned about the construction of his capital, to the extent that he aggravated the Governor continually by this emphasis. Douglas saw the main thrust of the Engineers' duties to be surveying new land and opening up routes to settlements, while Moody wanted New Westminster to take precedence. In his letter to Arthur Blackwood, the Colonel worried over the postponement of his new
capital, just announced. It is apparent that he took Lytton's command to plan a capital for a British colony seriously; in his mind this meant a town fit to house the Lieutenant Governor with some pomp and dignity. 69

On 2 December 1859, he reproved the Governor for wishing to hurry the grading of the streets in New Westminster:

> With regard to the design for the grades throughout the town, it must be constantly borne in mind that the site itself was occupied in reference only to its becoming the bona fide Capital of a great and flourishing Colony as I have the firmest conviction British Columbia will be and that at an early date. . . . The site was not selected for, neither are the grades of the Streets designed or adapted to, a Town of Subordinate character like to be in all time limited in extent of population and wealth. 70

This letter proves that Colonel Moody was extremely concerned over the status of his new city, and many battles were fought with the Governor over the degree of sophistication to be applied to the building of the town.

If Moody's initial enthusiasm was expressed in military terms, his later excitement was related to impressions of beauty and majesty. Even though the thickets were "the closest and thorniest" Moody had even encountered, he called the hill "magnificent,
superb beyond description" in his letter to Douglas of 17 March 1859. Even the incessant rain and mists did not dampen his admiration, and he instead continued to note features such as a valley which could provide a possible feeder for water to New Westminster by gravitation (between Pitt Lake and Burrard Inlet). He had sent a reconnaissance group north to the interior, and expected great results from this particular site.71

Others have been less enthusiastic about the siting of a city upon such a difficult terrain. New Westminster is located on the eastern point of a ridge in the Burrard Peninsula, which originates at the present Point Grey on the sea. Thomas Weir described this ridge in 1944 as follows:

The average height is 300 feet and its highest point (400 feet) lies within the boundary of New Westminster. It is composed in part of bed-rock which outcrops south of False Creek and at Kitsilano Beach. For the most part, however, both in Point Grey Peninsula and in the New Westminster area, it is composed of glacial till, overlain in places by small thicknesses of marine deposits. . . . For two miles south–west of New Westminster the banks are high and consist of unconsolidated drift deposits below which the delta plain extends for about ten miles to the river-mouth.72

We have already noted the upland above the flood plain
across from the New Westminster site, and the swamp nearer the American border. The elevation of this location was both positive (protection and spectacle), and negative (difficulties of grading the streets); However, this was not the least of the problems encountered by the Royal Engineers in this area.

The vegetation of the West Coast is rain forest, supported by abundant rainfall within a narrow temperature range best summarized as "moderate," i.e., rarely freezing or sweltering. The climate produces a growing season of nine months which is responsible for a dense ground cover. The trees in this area in 1859 were eight to ten feet in diameter, and often reached three hundred feet in height. Captain Spaulding estimated the cost of clearing the area at "three dollars per stump," the roots of which formed a "close and perfect network some eight or ten feet beneath the surface." In addition to this drawback, the hillside was criss-crossed with ravines, which would obstruct the grading of streets.

Lieutenant R. C. Mayne described the problems in his book published in 1862:

Dr. Campbell and I went to examine a part a little north of where the town stands, and so thick was the bush that it took us two hours to force our way in rather
less than a mile and a half. Where we penetrated it was composed of very thick willow and alder, intertwined so closely that every step of the way had to be broken through, while the ground was cumbered with fallen timber of a larger growth. . . . The site hit upon by Colonel Moody was a little below this thick bush, where the ground was somewhat clearer.77

He continued:

At New Westminster, the present capital of British Columbia, the bank of the river rises and forms an admirable position for the future town. Mary Hill . . . rises some three or four hundred feet; and the camp, which lies at the distance of a mile east from the town itself, stands upon rising land fifty to a hundred feet above the river. As regards its position, therefore, there is no fault to be found with New Westminster; but the forest is so dense, and the trees of which it is composed so large, that its growth is likely for some years to be very slow.78

In spite of these somber prognostications Moody retained his excitement, and began to clear the site after receiving approval from the Governor.

That the terrain was exceptionally rugged was never in doubt; Captain Parsons reported to Moody on 23 September 1859 that the instruments of the Engineers had been subject to heavy damage "from the extremely rough work the Surveyors have been called upon to perform."79 The Colonel, however, continued to believe in his initial impressions and perhaps felt that nothing could equal the negative aspects of his
previous posting to the desolate Falklands. He fought throughout his term of residence in British Columbia for recognition of New Westminster as the established capital of the colony, and for the erection of buildings suitable for the representatives of the Queen in this outpost. Mayne reported that:

Indeed, had it not been for Colonel Moody's determination to make a beginning, and for the labours of the Engineers in clearing a site for the camp, New Westminster would have made little, if any, perceptible progress. 80

The Reverend John Sheepshank reminisced about the early days on New Westminster hill for D. Wallace Duthie in 1909:

I saw a bit of clearing in the dense forest. Mighty trees were lying about in confusion, as though a giant with one sweep of his mighty arm had mown them down. Many of the trunks had been consumed with fire. Their charred remains were seen here and there. The huge stumps of the trees were still standing in most places, though in others they had been eradicated and consumed. And between the prostrate trees and stumps there were a few huts, one small collection of wooden stores, some sheds and tents, giving signs of a population of perhaps 250 people. This clearing continued up river to the extent of somewhat more than a quarter of a mile. And the dense pine forest came down to somewhat less than the same distance from the river's bank. This was New Westminster. 81

Moody's choice for a capital cannot be faulted from a military point of view. Still, his detractors have
found many problems from the civilian's position. J. Despard Pemberton, writing in 1860, considered the future of New Westminster as a port to be hopeless, since the fogs and calms of the weather made navigation up the river dangerous at worst and difficult at best. Added to this were the rapid currents of the Haro archipelago, the narrow channels, sandbars, and uncertain tides. Access to the city began to look very awkward, and Pemberton did not stop with this criticism. He said:

As a town site, New Westminster is decidedly objectionable. Too elevated, expensive to grade, and heavily timbered, its progress must necessarily be slow; the extensive swamps and marshes so close to it are not an advantage, to say nothing of the music of acres of frogs in spring and the stings of myriads of mosquitoes in summer; its impregnability may be unquestionable, but if unfortunately this quality renders it inaccessible to the merchantmen of the Pacific and to the trade of Puget Sound, what object could an enemy have in attacking it?8

While it is true that Pemberton was a supporter of the original choice, Derby, he and others had concerns about the business prospects of New Westminster that are difficult to overlook. Their main anxiety lay in the speed of construction in the city. Even if one could navigate the river, or cross overland to the site, the merchants complained about the positioning
of the main street for trade and then of the delay in grading the streets. Moody met these objections first by aligning Columbia Street along the waterfront for easy delivery of supplies and transport of goods, and by explaining that this was not to be merely a commercial center. Indeed, the main purpose of building this town was to establish a government center:

Hurried plans in so grave a matter as the grades for a Capital of a Country cannot be too strongly deprecated, and I feel assured that Yr. ExV. will agree with me in this the more, as it would now appear that an exceedingly rigid adherence even to the Letter of the Law is likely to be the spirit adopted in everything relating to the City of New Westminster.

Moody's problem was that the necessity for a fortified city lessened with the decline in the gold rush. His reasons for choosing the site could not be faulted in the beginning, when the military aspect was of great importance; but as the building progressed, the emphasis was shifted to trade, so that New Westminster could pay for itself. The Colonial Office officials had changed, and the colony was not receiving the support for pomp and splendour that Lytton had supplied, at least in Moody's mind.

Moody was a visionary in a plain land. He was not unaware of the difficulties of his choice,
but he looked forward to a great city. A man who could conceive of Edinburgh Castle in terms of a musical score had no difficulty in envisioning a magnificent city where the Queen's representatives enjoyed the adoration of all Her subjects. He also recommended military settlements in the area, with troops who were fitted to ignore the heat, insects, and rain that Mrs. Moody mentioned continually in her letters home. Thus, Duthie's adjuration to depend on the commercial interests to choose a town-site was unsuitable to the inception of the colony.

Better far, one would suppose, from mercantile considerations only to choose the site, and if in time property should accumulate there, then to call upon science to fortify it. Commercial interests had focused upon Derby, which had been proven a hopeless site from military and smuggling considerations. The thrust was toward defending the entire colony from American inroads, and Moody was forced to look toward support from the sea since land troops were stationed far beyond the mountains and thus were unavailable for any rapid assistance in a crisis. This hill was the first high point upon entering the Fraser with some possibility for settlement—the opposite hill was too precipitous—and at this time Douglas was attempting to direct
transport of supplies up the Fraser. This was the best compromise, therefore, that Moody could find.

Moody was not unaware of the problems of water transport. He requested the construction of a road from New Westminster to Burrard Inlet, but was forestalled by Douglas's lack of support. The Governor forwarded this request to the Colonial Office, but his accompanying letter did not give a favourable impression. The tone of this letter was non-committal, but the officials easily interpreted his feelings.

The Governor, it may be inferred from his despatch, does not agree with Colonel Moody. I think the answer may be to decline undertaking the formation of any such road at the cost of Imperial funds.85

We have already noted Moody's recommendation that other trails be cleared, and it seems that he proposed a canal from the Fraser River to Semiahmoo Bay above the boundary with the United States. A rail line to the interior was also envisioned. In these ways, he hoped to lessen the difficulties of access to the new city.

More telling was the concern of Lieutenant
Mayne, who in 1862 presents another direction for settlement:

As it is, if as seems most probable, the tide of colonization continues to flow northward, and a route to the mines should be discovered up and from the head of one of the numerous inlets north of the Fraser, New Westminster may never repay the labour that has already been spent on it.  

It is possible that Colonel Moody had this in mind when he designed a trail from the Burrard Inlet to New Westminster, and when he suggested earthworks on the island on the inlet. Troops stationed at these points would lessen the danger of attack and control the flow of miners or colonists. In addition, it was more probable that the route to the mines would expand nearer the Okanagan Valley, or even further west. Moody might have countered these moves as well, if he had been given a larger mandate or a larger group of soldiers. As it was, he was forced to keep close to the border and in close communication with Victoria and the naval bases.

It seems that Colonel Moody made the best of a bad situation. He was certainly aware of the grandeur of the site, and also influenced by its military value. Given the urgency of his instructions, he chose well and was undermined by a change of direction in the
home government and by an unfriendly local Governor. The area was half-settled and half-wilderness, and he suffered from a lack of understanding of his difficulties and of his objectives. The difficulties of the site, plus the inadequate funding of the colony, led to increasingly bitter relations between the Colonel and the Governor, and to over-runs in the expense of clearing the ground. Moody's obsession with an impressive capital, though understandable, was unrealistic in the face of the British Columbia wilderness and colonial politics.

Nevertheless, the Engineers were capable of developing the site, given enough money and authority to hire the necessary labour. Moody's attitude was in accordance with the messianic spirit of the mid-nineteenth century, which sought to civilize the savage colonies. The Colonel understood only too well the importance of impressing the settlers, and of placing the British stamp on the land with an orderly town plan and stately buildings on an imposing site. Such was his vision, and the site was an essential part of his scheme to implement Lytton's instructions to the letter. He cannot be faulted for this, but only for his lack of political acumen.
CHAPTER III

The New Westminster Capital Plan

Cities have long been recognized as cultural as well as physical entities. Since classical times, when Aristotle and Plato toyed with the notion of ideal designs for urban areas, there have been quests for city plans which represent philosophies. Thus, we have the examples of Campanella, More, Owen and Fourier, all of whom sought to impose their respective visions on different landscapes. Of those which were eventually realized, few were successful, partly because they were outside the norms of the dominant society. In other words, without the support and contribution of the mainstream, practical application of visions appears to have become dogmatic and insular.

Helen Rosenau defines an ideal city in her book by that title as one which represents a religious vision, or a secular view, in which social consciousness of the needs of the population is allied with a harmonious conception of artistic unity.87

Within this concept, the city of New Westminster, planned by Colonel Moody and executed by the Royal
Engineers with some success between 1859 and 1865, is in fact an "ideal city," one conceived to promote a vision—in this case, the splendour of the British Empire. It was more limited in its goal than most utopian plans since it did not reflect a critical appraisal of the leading mores of Britain, but sought to implant and foster these ideas in a somewhat resistant colonial culture. Moody's vision, however, was devoted to the institutions he saw as best representative of the society he served. The Church of England, the Crown, and the forces of law and order all figure prominently in his town plan and in the buildings designed to complement this plan.

The premise that Moody intended to build a model British city in the wilderness is borne out by his letters of explanation to Governor Douglas about the quality of the works undertaken. For example, on 2 December 1859, he reminded Douglas that New Westminster was to be a capital city, not a town subordinate to any other. In their argument over the complaints of certain prominent citizens of the town, Moody asserted his willingness to consider their wishes "remembering always the original intention of the town." He resented any interference with his concept, as shown
in his rejection of titles formerly held on reserve land, in the concern that erection of buildings on water frontages would spoil his plan, and in his reminder to the Committee of the Royal British Columbia Hospital on 15 July 1862 that the smallpox building set within the government reserve at the rear of Victoria Gardens was temporary only. Moody's concern for standards is further illustrated by his refusal to permit Sunday trading at New Westminster, in accordance with British practice.

As expected, Governor Douglas objected violently to certain of Moody's assumptions, and expressed these objections most forcibly in his lengthy letter to the Colonel on 6 December 1859 where he said:

I would suggest to you that the Colony itself must first become great and flourishing before one can undertake works on a scale of magnificence in accordance therewith, and that a Town just laid out and not yet dissociated from the primeval forest cannot be dealt with as a great City that has existed for Centuries.

Douglas wanted a quick, cheap development to ensure the British claim to the area, to develop trade, and to facilitate policing. Moody's position, however, had been expressly stated in his earlier letter of 14 May 1859 to Douglas, in which he rejected Langley as a Port of Delivery:
Your Excellency is aware of the Political importance of establishing thoroughly and as early as possible the Capital so Chosen, of inducing Commercial interests to centre there, and of doing all that may legitimately lay in your power to dissuade them from rooting on the opposite or frontier side of the River.  

It is notable that he does not refer specifically to the military considerations for the site, but rather to the center of government and culture in his Queen's city. Indeed, Queen(s)borough was the symbolic name suggested by the Engineers for the new capital.  

Even Governor Douglas demonstrated his awareness of the possibilities for symbolic meanings when he requested assistance from the Colonial Office in the official designation:  

It would be received and esteemed as an especial mark of Royal favor from Her Majesty to name the Capital of British Columbia; either, indirectly, after Her Royal Self, or, directly, after His Royal Highness the Prince Consort, His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, or some member of the Royal Family, so that the friends and kindred in this their distant home, may be ever gratefully reminded in the designation of their Capital of the Power that protects their hearths, of the watchful interest that guards their liberties, and of the gentle sway by which they are governed.  

While recognizing the need for a name of distinction, Lytton and Merivale did not approve of the suggested "Queenborough" or "Queensborough." Merivale said that the word "sounds prosaic, and reminds one also of an
English borough of indifferent fame," and Lytton answered that "Queensboro is not only prosaic--it is the quintessence of vulgarity." The name finally found acceptable by all was "New Westminster," as forwarded to Douglas by Carnarvon on 5 May 1859. This choice, while perhaps not immediately representative of the throne, is still a reminder of its predecessor, the Capital of the Empire itself. As such, it would coincide with Moody's objectives for the city.

A cursory glance at Moody's plan, as executed in 1861 by Lance Corporal J. Conroy (see page 66) leaves one with the impression of clear divisions, order, and repose, all of which suggest the principles of neo-classicism in town planning. These were exemplified in the Georgian city of Bath and in New Town in Edinburgh, both of which began their Georgian development much earlier. Their builders in England were widely influenced by Ledoux, with his emphasis upon simplicity and functionality, and the classic principles of the Greek and Roman civilizations. French regularity, coupled with the inclusion of Italian gardens, was a guiding doctrine for that time, and indeed for the early Victorian years. Dixon and
Fig. 9. New Westminster Capital Plan, 1861. Drawn by Lance Corporal James Conroy. Printed by Sapper William Oldham. Lithographed at the Royal Engineer Camp, New Westminster, May 1861. Document Number 616.8 (57) c754 new 1861. P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
Muthesius speak of a "hierarchy of decorum" in the classical style of the early nineteenth century, where "symmetry, simplicity and ordering" were the objectives of the contemporary builders.100

First as a student in the Royal Engineers college and later as an instructor at Woolwich, Colonel Moody could not have been uninfluenced by this persistent theory, especially with so little development of radical design doctrine in the early years of the century.101 Unfortunately, there are no copies of lectures, texts, or materials used in the Royal Engineers' curricula to prove this, but the opinion of Major J. T. Hancock, chief archivist for the school housed in Chatham, is that the Engineers were conversant with contemporary theories, adapted to military and colonial needs when necessary.102 The officers were widely read, as evidenced by the collection of books in the archives at Chatham, and Colonel Moody's attempt to obtain books about the North American continent illustrates his concern for acquiring a firm knowledge of his objectives.103

A closer examination of the plan for New Westminster shows that the regularity lies in the dominance of rectangles and squares. The pattern is not a standard
grid design, but a variation which relies mostly on straight lines. This was not a freeform plan, but one obeying certain classical rules without succumbing to static impressions. There is no rigidity of concept, since each side of the central axis uphill through Victoria Gardens is slightly different from the other. The effect is to vary the pattern somewhat, and to give additional focus to the main avenues and squares. Thus, only Clement and Mary streets ascend the hill unimpeded by obstacles obstructing the view, while the turning of several rectangles on their sides allows the planner to lengthen or shorten the vista. This minor maze effect may have been important from a military standpoint as well, refusing easy access to the heights.

The comparison to Georgian Bath is inviting (see page 69). The use of squares and terraces is common to both, along with the crescent and circus. Both cities adjust the size of the squares according to the status of the inhabitants; thus, the largest lots combine with the most impressive landscape features. Helen Rosenau notes the attention to topography in Bath (see page 70):

By using a site crowning a hill, the Royal Crescent dominates the city of Bath archi-
Fig. 10. City of Bath, 1786. Note the circus, crescent, and squares, which may have influenced Moody's design of New Westminster. Bryan Little, The Building of Bath, 1747-1947: an Architectural Guide. (London: Collins, 1947), Fig. 88.
Fig. 11. The impressive spectacle of the Royal Crescent, Bath, England, which may have influenced Moody in his plan for Albert Crescent. Bryan Little, The Building of Bath, 1947–1947: An Architectural Guide (London: Collins, 1947), Fig. 56.
tecturally, as well as in its elegant detail. The shape of the combined Circus and Crescent achieves an effect of enclosure with variety. 104

In New Westminster, Moody applied this principle to the steepest portion of the slope, where he placed Albert Crescent around a treed circular park, with Arthur Terrace completing the enclosure. This was to take advantage of the view, and would provide a romantic walkway beside the river and away from vulgar industry. The symbolism of this image, referring to royalty, i.e., the crown or crescent round the perfect monarch represented by the circle, 105 is also important. In addition, we see irregularly-shaped lots at the edge of the crown, which are larger than the standard size. This implies that the district was intended for the upper classes, an intention which is bolstered by the addition of specially designated gardens in the area. The irregularity of the lots also adds a romantic touch to the plan, and expense to the development.

It would be overstating the case to consider this irregularity a deliberate response to Ruskin's ideas, since the lots are encompassed within an ordered geometrical pattern. Nonetheless, this was the second half of the nineteenth century, and Carlyle and Ruskin with their associates had influenced the nation with
their appreciation of "Nature as God." As a variation of this idea, Moody used the curved brow of the hill to guide his divisions. Indeed, the site for New Westminster was originally chosen in part because of its elevation and prominence into the river bed. Moody's ejaculation about the possibilities for a park formed by the hill demonstrates his esteem for the beauties of nature, as does his continued insistence on large gardens and reserves in the plan.

The effect of this plan in total was much freer than that achieved in the Georgian plan developed by Craig for a section of Edinburgh in 1767 (see page 73). His design shows us a somewhat inflexible and strictly confined street pattern compared with that produced by Moody and his Engineers. New Westminster is much closer in spirit to Bath and takes similar advantage of the topography of the area. The end result is in part a tribute to that model city in England, but one which exhibits more diversity and less conventionality in the eclectic spirit of High Victorian design theory outlined in Ruskin's works.

The 1802 development in Edinburgh, which added to Craig's New Town, is much closer to Moody's plan (see page 74). The same air of dignity and repose exists in both plans. A similar regularity is present in the
rectangular areas, and a royal circus dominates the left side. Moody could not have been unfamiliar with this design, after his work with Edinburgh Castle, and it is possible that it influenced his plans for New Westminster.

A second style apparent in Moody's plan was the neo-baroque emphasis upon broad avenues defining the axes, large squares and pleasure gardens for the aristocracy, and "goose-foot intersections." One could say that the whole vision of New Westminster was baroque-like, an impressive statement of Britain's sovereignty, but also an overstatement for the wilderness. It was a grandiose concept for a bankrupt colony with an untamed landscape and population. This was not the baroque of L'Enfant's plan for Washington, with its parade-ground avenues stretching as far as the eye could see, but a lesser display on a more difficult terrain.

The broad avenues, with the large gardens, squares and reserves in the center of the plan become more distinct in the later, expanded version of 1862, drawn by Captain J. Launders (see page 76). The extension of the north axis to St. Georges Square completes the cruciform pattern, emphasizing the importance of the
Fig. 14. New Westminster Capital Plan, 1862.
Royal Engineers, New Westminster, B.C. Drawn by J. Launders, R.E., Printed by W. Oldham, Lithographed under the direction of Captain Parsons by order of Colonel R.C. Moody, New Westminster, July 1862, Document Number 616.8 (57) R888new, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
church in Victorian thinking. It also recalls Ruskin and Carlyle once again with the equation of nature and God. The major influence, however, was that of A. W. N. Pugin, whose adjurations to return to the Gothic style were held in great repute. This suited Moody's intention to personify the second massive institution of his century, the church, besides affording a pleasing geometric pattern in keeping with the main classical influence.109

The presence of government in the colony was displayed in the Government Office Gardens and Reserves, also in the center of the plan. This focusing of attention on the primary of law and order is essential to Moody's objective: the visual depiction of the ruling institutions of Britain. As well, the convergence of law and religion in the central axis is important as a declaration of their inextricable ties in the national consciousness.

This mixing of styles of revivals—Gothic, baroque, and classical—is typical of the High Victorian period. Nonetheless, the major emphasis is upon the neo-classical, and the prevailing image is order and precision. The touches from other styles provide diversity, but are carefully confined within a larger
concept. For example, the pedestrian is not left to amble through a winding, capricious townscape, but directed to certain vistas or conclusions. The comparison with Bath is again evident in the design of streets terminating in a building or special feature (see page 79). Secondly, a traveller down river, across the Surrey flatlands, or over the Surrey heights, would be struck with the complete pattern and could not fail to be aware of the major features: the cruciform, circle and crescent, and the various gardens and squares. He would also notice the division into east and west sections. The higher ground on the east was allotted to the patrician element of the population, while trade was conducted on the lower western spaces. The western side also lacks pleasure grounds and gardens, prominent on the eastern slope where the royal presence was most visible.

Moody attempted to reserve the higher grounds for official use, and intended originally to place his residence in an elevated position when his Lieutenant-Governorship was considered active.

The site I have selected is away from the site of commercial value on the River Shore and yet conveniently near to my duties in the Town and close to the Barracks where I shall have to reside. It is about a mile and a half from the town with the public
Fig. 15. Russel Street, Bath, England. Notice how the eye is drawn to the building at the far end of the street. Bryan Little, *The Building of Bath, 47-1947: An Architectural Guide* (London: Collins, 1947), Fig. 63.
park between. The land is not at present of good quality but it would be an amusement to make it so and the site is elevated with an adequate aspect. The quantity of land is about 5 or 6 acres.110

Upon Douglas's argument over the chosen area, Moody replied on 8 September 1859 in an attempt to elucidate his good reasons:

The site selected by me for Govt. House is infinitely more worthy, and affords ample facilities for all the attendant arrangements needful to such an establishment. It is in juxtaposition to the Park, and will be surrounded by Public reserve, while from its position it would be a Camp feature in a singularly beautiful natural combination.111

Clearly, Moody was conversant with and approving of the purpose of the Colonial Office of securing allegiance by discipline, not force, by symbol, not sword. He was also undoubtedly demanding concrete evidence of the respect and recognition long denied him in the Falkland Islands. He had no intention of housing soldiers in his special city, and had placed the camp outside the planned area; however, the leader and high government official was entitled to a certain status as a member of the upper classes.

E. M. Gibson and Archie Miller, archivist for New Westminster, have demonstrated the similarities between Moody's plan and those of LeBlond de la Tour for New Orleans. They described the latter plan thus:
The streets were laid out in a gridiron pattern around a Place D'Armes open on the shoreline side, closed on the side opposite by a parish church, and flanked on the two remaining sides by the principal buildings of the government and Company. The connection between these plans and Vauban was natural for De La Tour had been first appointed to the Corps of Engineers in 1703 when it was still under the leadership of Vauban.112

When the site for the capital was relocated to the present New Orleans location, De Pauger, an assistant engineer to De La Tour, adapted Vauban's system to the different landscape—in particular, he moved the design closer to the river (see page 82). The plan was laid out simply, but in a fashion appropriate to a capital, and the naming of the streets affirmed this intention:

The principal avenue laid out at right angles to the Mississippi and to the Place D'Armes was named after the regent of France, the Duke of Orleans. Parallel to Orleans Avenue ran other major streets that were given names from the saints calendar: St. Peter, St. Ann, St. Louis and St. Philip. Crossing these at right angles was a series of streets that with those just mentioned define the characteristic grid pattern of Vauban's model. The street that bisected the rectangle was named Royal. Those parallel to Royal were named in honour of French aristocracy: Chartres, Bourbon, Dauphine and Burgundy.113

Although the New Orleans plan is more dependent on a grid, Moody's design bears certain similarities, most
Fig. 16.
notably in the naming of streets and the centering
of attention on a vertical axis above a major square.
This is still a Vauban-style plan, a system with which
the Colonel would have been familiar from his training
in the Engineers. For example, the star-shaped pattern
in the diagram from the Aide-Memoire mentioned earlier
illustrated Vauban's fortification ideas.114 The
diagram of Neuf-Brisach, also a frontier city, demonstrates
a Vauban plan in its entirety (see page 84). We are
immediately aware of the rectangular pattern which
appealed to the French, with streets at right angles
to each other. Vauban's plans included a square for
the military parade grounds, and a prominent position
for the church. He was also known for the separation
of areas according to function, a system which Moody
followed carefully. The Colonel's adaptation was not
a slavish imitation, but the principles are apparent
in the order and regularity of his design.

His intentions for fortification of the town
are unknown, but we can see from the New Orleans scheme
that it was possible to apply Vauban's jutting defence
pattern to the city next to a river. The star pattern
was most popular, but Moody did not have to encircle
the city with the river as a natural defence. From
Fig. 17. Diagram of Neuf-Brisach, showing Vauban’s city plan and star-pattern fortifications. Christopher Cooke, Clare Hennessey, and David Wardlaw, "Neuf-Brisach," R.I.B.A. Journal 72 (February 1966): issue cover picture.
his letter transcribed in Chapter II about the military capabilities of the site, it is clear that the landscape offered many natural barriers to attack. He had only to build earthworks, and possibly a series of bastions, for extra protection at the top of the hill. Nevertheless, no mention of fortification appears in his correspondence with the Governor or the Colonial Office after the initial discussion, and there are no designs on the official plans. Clearly, the danger was seen to have passed, and Moody could concentrate on his utopian vision.

It is, of course, in the area of naming that the similarities are most pronounced (see page 86). It is apparent from the table in Appendix B that Moody used five categories: royalty, Colonial Office personnel, local authorities, saints, and capitals. He has placed their names on the plan according to status, as was done in the New Orleans scheme.\textsuperscript{115} The royalty converge on Albert Crescent, with the exception of Victoria Gardens which is justifiably central. In addition, Queens and Royal avenues were major thoroughfares to add dignity and prominence to the Crown. The appellations from the Colonial Office and related parliamentary figures are situated
between the Gardens and Albert Crescent, all on the eastern side of the plan. On the western, official and commercial side, we see local people from the navy, the law, and the government. Moody himself and his wife Mary are situated alongside the main axis, perhaps as repayment for all his trials in the colony.

A certain lack of clarity exists regarding the names Agnes, Eliot, Pelham, Halifax, and the saint John. Agnes was certainly a name given to daughters of both Governor Douglas and Merivale; the connection, however, is a little distant, especially since this was the fourth daughter of Douglas. Perhaps Moody was looking for a link between the eastern and western halves of the plan, since Agnes street crossed both sides. Eliot or Elliot is appropriate to both the colonial and British areas, but the location is British on the plan. Referring to the table again, the metaphor seems somewhat inappropriate unless Moody maintained secret sympathies for the Anti-Corn Law League, whose expressions appeared in the songs of Ebenezer Elliot. The term Pelham is especially tantalizing, since it is equally fitting for a remembrance of Lytton or Newcastle. If intended for Lytton, Moody displayed more of a sense of humour than previously thought--the contemporary reviews considered Lytton's protagonist
in the novel by that name to be a "coxcomb." Was this a subtle attack on Newcastle? Halifax could refer either to the English lord with Canadian connections or to the capital of Nova Scotia; the relationship is ambiguous. Finally, the three saints listed are equal possibilities for John: one was a herald, and Moody may have envisioned the plan as a herald of better times; one was a scholar as was the Colonel; and the last was an apostle of Christ, well-known in Victorian England, especially to the Evangelical movement. Regardless of the correct reference, it is odd that Saint David, the patron saint of Wales, was not chosen to complete the pattern.

The exceptions to the scheme were Front Street and Columbia Street. Front Street is simply a wharf area, and as such did not require the adoption of a celebrity name. Indeed, it could have been construed as a slur on the individual, since the wharf area was not a desirable location. Because of this, Front Street was called what it was: a road at the front of the town. Next, Columbia Street poses a problem to the interpreter. There is no obvious person who might have begotten the name, and it appears to be a seconding of the colony's official name (probably from Christopher
Columbus). It is also the term given to the district by the Hudson's Bay Company, and may have held that significance to the Colonel, especially as it extends along the business district.

The expansion northward of the official plan in 1862 left Moody with fewer choices. He changed the pattern to incorporate family names of the Duke of Newcastle, for instance, possibly in an attempt at flattery if we reject the more diabolic interpretation, and to saints to emphasize the religious theme. As Saint George's Square completes the cruciform, the name is particularly appropriate for its religious and patriotic meanings, while the others merely add to the symbolism. Moody finally turned to capitals of other regions or countries for major names, and this reinforced the raison d'etre of the town in his mind.

This patterning is certainly reminiscent of New Orleans, which may have spawned the idea in Moody's thoughts. We note also that Edinburgh displays a strong British influence in its street names: Princes, Regent, Queen, George, etc. And Bath certainly has its royal circles, crescents, and pleasure gardens. It is no accident that Moody assigned these names to prominent features, but we should be aware that his choice was
very selective as well as deliberate. The town of Chatham in Kent, for example, where the Royal Engineers were trained, maintains a broad variety of names relating to landscape features, industries, royalty, and individuals: Alfred, High, Union, King, Military, Ordnance, Cannon, Ship, Dock, Rome, Railway, New Clover, Ash Tree, Dark, Church, Mill, Holborn, Watt's, Milton, Fullalove, Whittaker, Lyton, and Regent, to list but a few. Moody might have decided to revert to landscape features or to special activities, but instead restricted his selection to the categories outlined above, with the exception of Merchant Square and the two frontal streets.

Finally, there are also similarities between New Westminster and a much later British imperial capital, New Delhi, where the new section was developed with the clear purpose of establishing by visual means British authority in India. Lord Hardinge personally selected the site, and his depiction of his first choice is reminiscent of Moody's words:

To me personally the site of the top of the Ridge with a magnificent view over Delhi and over the whole plain, both East and West, presents very great attraction. Further, I can picture to myself the approach to Government House from the plain below with terraces and gardens.
and fountains along the hill side that should be a reproduction of Versailles and its gardens. His vision was more grandiose and baroque than was Moody's but Hardinge was not subject to the same restrictions of bankruptcy of the colony and a recalcitrant government. The intention was the same, however, to impress the population. Versailles was the archetypal regal symbol, and indeed Chandra writes of the Viceroy's house as bearing "apparent resemblance to the Palace at Versailles." Harding's dream was at least partially realized, but Moody's was never given the same attention.

In Harding's plan, as in Moody's, the eye is directed to the splendour of the significant buildings, contained in an orderly rectangular design in striking contrast to the older areas. Their central position is emphasized by adjacent open areas, and by roads approaching at varied angles. The intention is clearly the same: to control the population by displays of prestige and authority. Even today, a few of the streets in New Delhi retain British names.

Moody utilized a great many visual methods to establish his city as a capital, with definite ties to Britain and the Empire. He mixed divergent styles, but always with the same intention of eloquently portraying a major institution in his home country. The spatial
arrangement of lots, parks, and streets gives an accurate picture of the hierarchy of the ruling classes, as does the choice of names. The Colonel always considered impressions, and the patterns formed were very specific. The positioning of each geometric division, by direction, elevation and orientation, was reinforced by the assignment of the actual of intended buildings, and by their architecture.

In fact, Douglas reacted strongly against the scale of the proposed buildings, and Moody replied:

Nor are the works proposed by me at all of a "magnificent character" but merely the ordinary "digging out" and "filling-in" to bring the streets to grades convenient as a whole--in short the necessary and ordinary work in forming a city--my reference also to the large towns at Home was not to those of long existence--they are in general most inconvenient--but to the most modern towns and recently built parts of old cities.120

Moody's attempt to convince Douglas of his lack of intent to build extraordinary edifices is not altogether convincing. Douglas was overstating the case when he referred to proposed magnificence, but it is clear from the specifications outlined in the appendices that the Colonel was concerned for quality construction based on the standards of a more viable civilization.

Moody's first note to Douglas about the proposed
town suggested public buildings "constructed of wood and designed on a moderate scale such as would be appropriate to the commencement of a Colony." He continued with a list of the priorities for the work of the Royal Engineers: a small church, convertible to a school, with a residence for the Bishop; a court house; a jail; a customs house; a treasurer's office; offices for the Department of Lands and Works; barracks for the Engineers with space for stores; and a residence for the Lieutenant-Governor who also commanded the detachment. The emphasis upon these buildings once again strengthens the impression of a government capital. The forces of law and order, finance, and religion all are represented, along with the symbol of the Crown in the colony, the Lieutenant-Governor.

Moody was not only concerned that each function have a separate building, but he also watched over the positioning and the standards of construction. On 7 February 1860, he wrote to Douglas about the proposed jail. In this letter he suggested that the site chosen by the Governor was not large enough. His alternate location, said Moody, was more suitable, presenting "facilities for the construction of a permanent Jail capable of future extension and in convenient nearness
to a future Court House." Similarly, on 13 February 1861, Moody requested clarification of the Holbrook lease from Douglas. The Colonel had intended the construction of sheds, offices, and warehouses on the wharves of New Westminster, but not "dwelling Houses or Shops" which would spoil the division of function in his plan. Moody's apparent reversal of that policy when he allowed the building of the Episcopal Church in Victoria Gardens was based on the opinion that this would be "an ornamental feature approved by all." In other words, the church symbolized one of his first concerns, religion, and was not out of place in a garden devoted to the Queen. With the state irrevocably tied to the church in cruciform pattern, this location was not inappropriate at all.

The Engineers were well-equipped in training, ability, interest, and provisions (as shown by the list of supplies ordered during their tenure in British Columbia, Appendix C), to undertake the development of the colony's new and stately capital. Their only constraint was the diametrically-opposed attitude of the Governor, resulting in constant battles over their direction and the amount to be spent. Moody was popular with his troops, and they devoted their time to detailing
specifications which would ensure at least sturdy construction on the sites. A careful look at the specifications for a selection of the buildings will give us a better picture of this concern for quality (see Appendices D to I). This inspection will support my view that the Engineers exhibited an active concern for appearance in the government structures and an equally active concern for materials and solid building in the lesser structures. They intended to impress the population with the symbols of Britain's institutions, while maintaining a high standard of workmanship and materials throughout, even in edifices of little consequence.

These specifications demonstrate that Moody desired to build a permanent, strong city in the wilderness. They were not rough log one-room buildings of the sort some pioneers constructed; instead, they exemplified high standards. This was a capital city, and the buildings were designed to demonstrate this in quality and in style. The inclusion of plinths and skirting, moulded cornices and pilasters, none of which were necessary, but all of which added to the general appearance and style, is some proof of this contention.

It was the designs and the specifications for
the state church and Government House that particularly demonstrate Moody's regard for status. The Governor's anxiety over expenses did not deter Moody from building to "basic standards" for an official residence. He reassures Douglas in the letter of 18 May 1859, in which he says:

I propose to construct what in England would be considered a cottage with Bedrooms in the roof and which could be erected there for a small sum—a House not appropriate to my position in a Colony of such consequence—as we all hope this will become but suitable in some degree to its present state—I will take care to design it however in such a manner that it can be further improved and added to some future day. 

It is clear that this was not a residence similar to that designed for the Viceroy in India in 1911-12, which resembled Versailles.

Moody was able to demand at least a few comforts and special appurtenances for his residence. The design "revealed a curious mix of the classic symmetrical 'I' plan with a steep Gothic roof, bay windows, and attached veranda, characteristic of the new style" (see page 97). This style, as we have seen, was High Victorian, and demonstrates Moody's familiarity with contemporary architectural styles. The roof slopes outward in a slightly curved line over the verandah to add another touch inconsistent with either Gothic or classical, a
Fig. 19. Government House, New Westminster, B.C. Notice the mixed styles which were prevalent in the mid-Victorian age. Document Number BP3 No. 10, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
touch which is somewhat playful in appearance. The steeply-gabled dormer windows on the second storey also contribute to the irregularity popular at this time, and the varying sizes of the windows increase this effect. The overall impression of this design was still classical, until the irregularity was increased by the later addition of a stunted tower.

The specifications for Government House (Appendix H), simply referred to as a Frame Dwelling House, were extremely detailed and insistent upon the best quality of materials and workmanship. Not only this, but ornamental features were carefully added to emphasize the importance of the residence. Extra care was taken and extra materials used on the walls, for example, and the fireplaces sported mantels with pilasters. Finally, the use of local materials such as cedar and redwood was in keeping with the finest Ruskinian ideals, as well as with the budget allotted by the Governor.

The second building on which special care was lavished was Holy Trinity Church, placed centrally at the foot of Victoria Gardens. This was designed mainly in the accepted Gothic style recommended by Pugin, although the angle of the gabled roof was somewhat wide. The
building looked more squat than it should, particularly in a setting of tall straight fir trees which tended to dwarf the church (see page 100). Nevertheless, the care and attention to detail marked this building as special, as did its position in the town plan. Made of west coast materials, the church exhibited a sense of the style, beauty and symbolism which have been shown in the plan itself. As noted in the New Westminster Times, 8 December 1860, the church interior consists of a nave, two aisles, chancel, vestry, and recess for organ. The uprights and rafters are of fir, massive pillars, with Gothic arches between, a series of arches also spanning the nave and giving a rich and ecclesiastical appearance to the whole.120 (Italics mine.)

Its features, therefore mirror its purpose, as the design standards of the mid-nineteenth century demanded. This was not an anonymous building, but a Ruskinian design, and clearly representative of the powerful church that Moody symbolized in his cruciform pattern on the town plan.129

A further emphasis upon the importance of the church is shown in the transcription of the almost illegible draft of the specifications in Appendix I, with a photocopy of the equally indistinct drawing from the Provincial Archives of British Columbia. Even in
Fig. 20. Holy Trinity Church. Notice the arched windows and gabled porch, and the setting of tall trees and stumps. Picture taken from Lieutenant R. C. Mayne, *Four Years in British Columbia and Vancouver Island* (London: Murray, 1862), p. 89.
this rough and incomplete list, we see that the words "wrought, framed, and chamfered" occurred frequently, indicating a high standard of material and construction. The words "best quality" applied to both workmanship and wood. There was no intention to lower standards, but instead to allow only such rustication as would agree with Ruskin's theories, and not spoil the effect of elegance.

In rare unanimity of opinion, Douglas agreed with Moody's designs, and praised them in a letter in October 1860 to the Duke of Newcastle:

The public offices are plain substantial buildings devoid of ornament and constructed on a scale adapted to our limited means; they are nevertheless roomy and commodious, and on the whole not unsuitable to the present business of the colony.130

Douglas seems to have been unaware that these same buildings, particularly Government House and Holy Trinity Church, were designed and constructed with an emphasis upon permanency and authority, in keeping with Moody's master plan. These attributes were displayed in the care taken in detailing the requirements for excellence in materials and in standards of construction. The criteria were higher for the more important buildings in the hierarchy, but none was inferior, and this was proof of the Engineers' talents for
compromise without total loss of quality.

Colonel Moody demonstrated a talent for clever adaptation of ideas, and a thorough knowledge of prevailing styles in both his town plan and the complementary buildings. New Westminster, as designed by the Royal Engineers, has not been fully appreciated for its subtleties and meanings. This current analysis may shed light on its intricacies and on the complete concept.
Dearest Richard is very much worried and tired, the beginning, middle and end of the matter is that the Colony is bankrupt, and the Home Government won't give us any Money.\textsuperscript{131}

Mrs. Moody's weary comment about her husband's concerns over the colony of British Columbia sums up the situation very accurately. Many theories have been propounded to explain the antagonism between the Colonel and the Governor, but the most logical explanation is a lack of funding for the projects initiated by Lytton when he was Colonial Secretary for that brief period. It is quite possible that, given more tangible support from home and a more defined array of responsibilities, the two administrators might have been able to reconcile their differences and forge ahead to develop the colony in their own ways. At the very least, their negotiations might have been less acrimonious. As it was, Lord Carnarvon expressed the home viewpoint in his letter to Douglas of 12 April 1859, in which he said:
I would observe to you that in all my instructions, from the foundation of the colony to the present moment the principle on which I have proceeded, and which the /constantly developing/ mineral wealth of British Columbia has so amply justified, has been that of insisting that the colony should defray the expense of its own requirements. . . . The pressing circumstances of the case have undoubtedly compelled H. M. Government to advance funds for fitting out the party of Royal Engineers which was so early despatched to the colony; but these advances must be repaid; and it should be amongst the earliest of your financial efforts to do so.132

Douglas, therefore, was placed in a difficult situation, from which he tried to extricate himself by calling the attention of the Colonial Office to the fact that the colony was unable to support itself at this awkward stage of its growth. While the mineral wealth was certainly available, very little of it was transferred to the Treasury. In fact, the policing of the area, and the opening up of transport routes for the development of towns, were producing a drain on the finances of the administration, rather than the reverse. Douglas sent various letters to this effect to Britain, explaining that the colony "like a nurserling, . . . must for a time be fed and clothed."133 His solicitations, however, elicited little concern from Her Majesty's government. They were either unable or unwilling to accept this premise.
Douglas was not unused to negotiating for funds. He had enjoyed better success with Lytton, when he described his predicament upon being appointed Governor of British Columbia on 10 February 1859. It is noteworthy that he sent this letter on thin white paper, while his despatches for the most part were written on serviceable plain blue. The letter is a masterpiece of tact, and was received with "appreciation," with an extra grant of $200 per year for his personal income:

I assure you most earnestly that in appealing to you upon the matter of salary I do so from no sordid motive, but solely in order that I may support the dignity of my office in a manner becoming the country which I represent, without despoiling my family by making inroads on my private means, to sustain the credit of my office, and of my government.134

Douglas was no novice in the art of applying for funds, but it seemed that his skills were less well-appreciated by later Colonial Secretaries, or else their belief in the colony as a "golden goose" was too well-ingrained. At any rate, Douglas was forced to restrain any projects which might reduce the colony's thin stream of money. The Home government was willing to pay for works engaged upon by the Royal Engineers which could be termed "military," but civil or public improvements would be the responsibility of the colony.
During the years that the Royal Engineers were in the colony, Douglas felt it incumbent upon himself to write numerous letters to Colonel Moody complaining about unnecessary expenses or about inordinate sums requested for special activities. In addition, there was disagreement between the two about the definition of "military" concerns versus civil duties. Douglas's increasingly strident warnings about extra expenses were accompanied by increasingly demanding requests for a strict accounting of the Royal Engineers' spending by the Colonel. He also recommended the reduction and/or abandonment of the civilian staff employed by the Engineers on a portion of their projects. These letters were a source of continual irritation to the Colonel, who considered them time-consuming, as well as an affront to his dignity and position.

The first disagreement arose over the matter of Government House, which Moody hoped to erect in a style becoming the Lieutenant-Governor of a British colony. The Governor wrote to the Colonel on 10 May 1859:

I have duly received your Honour's letter of the 9th Instant upon the subject of the immediate construction of a Government House at the Capital of British Columbia, so that Suitable accommodation may be afforded to yourself and to your family.
2.-In reply thereto I feel it is unnecessary for me to impress upon you how anxious I am to take any step in my power that might add to the respect due to your Honour, or that might conduce to your personal comfort; but your Honour is well aware of the difficult situation in which I am at present placed. The expenditure of the Colony is now exceeding the income, and I am not allowed to obtain assistance from the Home Government except to enable me to meet the expenses incurred on Military Account. All other disbursements must be met from Colonial Funds, and the amount of Colonial Funds now in the Chest is at this moment scarcely sufficient to defray outstanding liabilities.135

Margaret Ormsby states that Moody was unresponsive to pleas from the Governor to scale down his buildings and expenses, but it is notable that Moody in his reply to this letter offers to erect a "lesser domicile." Douglas accepts this proposal, and is pleased with the further suggestion by the Colonel to give his winter quarters to his officers and construct a smaller one for himself.136

In spite of this, arguments continued. Douglas was not always diplomatic with Moody, as is demonstrated in his letter of 7 July 1859, where he pointed out that the position of Lieutenant-Governor is dormant, if not a complete mistake. Government House was to be simply that, a house for government employees, but not especially as the Residence of the Lieutenant Governor, the permission to construct such a Residence having been granted under an impression which Her Majesty's Government have pointed out
This was certainly tactless, and could even be seen as a definite attempt to depress Moody's pretensions. As it was, the two often disputed over the necessity for the Governor's approval of various works, and Moody resented what he saw as importunities upon his time and assaults upon his authority.

On 12 April 1860, Douglas was still reproving Moody for his inflated ideas of the proper capital of British Columbia:

4.-You are also well aware that the Works which I have authorized to be proceeded with, independent of the Lands and Works Department, are not solid edifices or works requiring Engineering knowledge and skill, as might be inferred from your letter, but simple wooden erections within the scope of any man of ordinary capacity to attend to, but I did not fail to request that if any assistance from your Department were necessary it should be afforded.\(^{138}\)

In the same letter he approved a temporary Assay office only, with the proviso that Moody's more permanent plan might be built later.

Part of the difficulty arose over Moody's natural disinclination for a bureaucrat's passion, paper work. If we are to believe Mrs. Moody, the Colonel was mainly interested in his engineering goals.
She wrote to her mother on 7 April 1859: "He does not like Victoria and you know, of old, that he hates 'office work.'" The Colonel was primarily a scientist, and to some extent an artist, and he was appalled at what he assumed was interference with his command over his troops.

Comments have been made also about the appointment of Moody's supposed friend and fellow Engineer, Captain Gosset, as the colony's treasurer. It has been stated that the Governor resented this appointment, and that it worked to Moody's advantage. If this were true, it is hard to account for the irritation expressed by Moody on at least two occasions, when he reproved Gosset for a lack of respect for his position. On 23 September 1859, he censured Gosset for treating him to a lecture on the preparation of accounts, and denied that the colony was even accountable for the expenses listed. And on 25 October of that year, he declared in response to Gosset's note:

I must point out to you that the tone and tenor of it was, to say the least of it, very unbecoming, and not likely to contribute to the advantage of the Public Service--This is not the first time I have received letters from you of this description and I must request you will abstain from addressing me in such a style in future.
It must be remembered that Moody was a military man, and expected obedience and at least outward deference to his wishes. In addition, the ground had been cut from under his feet, when his position as Lieutenant-Governor was nullified by the Colonial Office, and he may have been sensitive to any implied snub.

If he was occasionally irritable, he also made efforts to comply with the Governor's exhortations to refrain from unnecessary expenses. He had to balance the need and proper expectations of his troops for livable quarters and suitable duties with the need for rapid action in developing the land for settlement.

On 14 September 1859, he suggested small detached cottages for his officers "so arranged that at some future day, you may have it in your power to sell to advantage each separately with the Plot of ground on which it stands." This seems to indicate a willingness on the part of the Colonel to assist in the curtailing of expenses.

Moody attempted to explain his assessment of the situation in a memorandum of 27 August 1859 about accounts:

Your Excellency is aware of the nature of the impediments which have hitherto operated in carrying out the works, for which the above expenditure has been incurred, and can make
allowance also for the time unavoidably occupied in organizing here at the very commencement of a Settlement in a New Country under discouragements and difficulties, and under urgent circumstances, a Department of such mixed duties, Civil and Military, as This is. You are aware the arrangement of the Department is novel in Colonial Administration and may be considered experimental.144

As an experiment, it was clearly a failure in the minds of both Douglas and Moody. Moody still attempted to restore a portion of his lost autonomy, when he suggested on 2 April 1860 that all public works in the colony be placed under his direct control. This would be in keeping with his validated title of Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works, and perhaps also under his mandate which declared that his duties were special and not subject to interference. This was not a new suggestion, as his letter of 27 August 1859 requested that identical arrangement. "In a colony at our stage this freedom of action within limited total expenditure, previously discussed and sanctioned, is even more necessary."145 Douglas had replied negatively, refusing money for contingencies which might arise:

I find that my attention is again forcibly called by Her Majesty's Government to the heavy expenses of the Royal Engineers in this Country; I cannot therefore under the circumstances place any fixed sum periodically at your disposal.

2.-I do not anticipate that the inconvenience
you describe is likely to arise, if common foresight and prudence be exercised. ... I would request you to impress most strongly on the officers under your command that in awarding the rate of working pay for those employed under them, the highest rate is not to be granted except in cases of remarkable exertion, superior skilled labour, or extra work, and nothing but the lowest rate can be sanctioned for men employed as servants.¹⁴⁶

Not only was Moody shown a lack of trust, but he was expected to make do with inferior civil assistance for his projects.

It is apparent that Douglas was never amenable to this idea of a set budget under Moody's control, even though he assured Moody on 6 January 1860 that "the less delay, the fewer unnecessary forms, and the more direct and inexpensive the operations of the Land Department are made, the more gratifying will it be to me."¹⁴⁷ Moody seems to have given up hope by April of that year, when he brusquely asked, in reply to Douglas's refusal to approve one of his designs, that he be informed in advance of limited funds so that he does not waste the time and efforts of his staff.¹⁴⁸

In relation to their financial problems, the Governor and Moody experienced a difference of opinion over the purpose of the Royal Engineers in the colony. Moody was primarily concerned with the construction of the capital of British Columbia, Douglas with land
sales and the building of roads. Douglas saw the Engineers as a high-priced group of workers hired to open the way to settlement by any means possible. Moody wished to prepare a focus for that settlement, a landmark to greet the settler as he entered the colony. Both approved of the objectives outlined in a letter from a civilian surveyor, D. G. F. MacDonald:

Rapid settlement of the Colony is an object always to be fostered. . . . Every candid observer is now convinced that not giving the bona fide settler a right to land at once is a most powerful obstacle to the Development of the Colony, and that never can its progress be sure or rapid. . . . until the Colony is comparatively self supporting--and until the farmer has provisions brought to the Miner's door.149

Still, neither could agree on the method of achieving this admirable goal. Moody suggested in his Report on British Columbia lands of 7 November 1860 that there was a necessity for an attractive land scheme with definite rules for pre-emption and auction, with surveys preceding this course of action, but he remained adamant that his participation in this work would concentrate upon the New Westminster landscape.150 He also continually asserted that this was a task that could not be rushed, but which must be carefully planned and constructed. For example, on 7 December 1859, he
wrote to Douglas, asking that he correct the misapprehension of the public that the lots presently surveyed at New Westminster were the entire townsite. He wished also to resume clearing the area, and attributed the temporary delay to curtailed funds and the disturbance of the San Juan incident.\textsuperscript{151}

Douglas, on the other hand, upbraided Moody for delays and the heavy expenses of his detachment. On 29 June 1859, he expressed his concern over the priority of opening up agricultural land, as persons of wealth were leaving for the United States to purchase farms on land which had already been surveyed. At the same time, he clarified the Trutch agreement for contracted survey work as related to lands with "a known and urgent demand," not for the entire colony.\textsuperscript{152} Moody is again castigated in April 1860 for slow surveys of the reserve areas, which Douglas asserted would retard the purchase of adjacent land.\textsuperscript{153}

And on 1 August 1861, Moody wrote directly to the Colonial Secretary:

\begin{quote}
I beg you will state to H. E. that I have caused the new Suburban Lots at New Westminster to be laid out precisely in the manner approved by him after a very detailed explanation of my reasons given to himself in person when he was last at New Westminster, and when he required such explanation from me.\ldots
\end{quote}
I am particularly well acquainted with the local circumstances at New Westminster, and as Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works I emphatically protest against the arrangement not at all unnaturally sought by some few of the "informants." 154

The Colonial Office appeared to be unresponsive to Moody's considered opinion.

Douglas clearly disagreed with Moody over the necessity of employing skilled civilian surveyors, partly from the fact that they would be paid out of the budget of the colony. Even though Moody reported this requirement to him in January 1859, he continued to deny this permission. Still, he did not recognize the value of the Engineers' professionalism either, which was discussed in a report by Captain Parsons on 1 January 1861, in which he warned against the use of untrained and unskilled labour in

the laying out of Town sites in places of natural advantage along lines of communication, and where people have massed together:—the Surveys of Pre-empted Lands:—the construction of Official Maps of the above, and compilation of materials for forming a general Map of the Country. 156

This would inevitably have led to legal disputes over badly-completed surveys, in Parsons' view, and was also an affront to the Engineers themselves.

Nor did Douglas understand the high cost of replacing the instruments and other equipment damaged
or worn in the survey of the colony, or the expense of supporting the Royal Engineers in the rough work of developing the land. Moody was forced to explain this in a letter of 1 May 1860:

In an entirely new Country without the usual means and appliances and in the unusually dense forest, this has involved a vast amount of miscellaneous labour. This miscellaneous labour, performed in large part by Royal Engineers, had resulted in expensive budgets, but Moody felt that the experience gained by his men was worth the cost. It is doubtful that Douglas agreed with him.

This letter may have been in reply to the Governor's explanation of his suggestion that the Royal Engineers be freed from such duties to construct "urgent public works." Moody clearly took umbrage at such a suggestion, which he construed as interference with his responsibilities, and Douglas tried to explain that this was not his intention.

Douglas also found himself in profound disagreement with the Colonel over the building of New Westminster, and this led to the most stringent instructions about expense. His letter of 12 April 1860, quoted earlier, demanded simple structures requiring little expertise. This demand was a veiled insult to the Engineers, since
their skills were of the highest; Douglas was implying that their presence was unnecessary. The tone of this letter was scarcely calculated to enlist Moody's loyalty.\textsuperscript{159}

It was in the area of communications where opinions seemed to diverge completely. Again, it is difficult to assess the worth of either side, since the need for transport routes was universal throughout the colony. Moody was concerned about the connections with New Westminster, especially in his attention to defence requirements. Thus, on 15 February 1860, he requested sanction for a trail from New Westminster to Semiahmoo "because of so great and general a desire for some means of direct communication however rude."\textsuperscript{160}

On 26 March 1860, Douglas replied to Moody that the trail would have to be deferred as funds were short for projects which were not considered urgent.\textsuperscript{161} On 5 February 1861, Moody attempted to obtain approval for a trail to English Bay, but no action was forthcoming.\textsuperscript{162}

On 23 December 1859, Douglas had already stated his position about trails: "I am not disposed to authorize an expenditure for an object purely colonial, and which may be disallowed."\textsuperscript{163} Douglas was even unwilling to assist Moody in receiving special funds from the home
Moody's object of improving connections with New Westminster was not purely military, as on 10 February 1859 he wrote to Douglas suggesting a harbour and a dredging passage to Semiahmoo. One could infer that the reason for this passage was partly to establish New Westminster as a commercial center, but this was refused by the Governor as well.

Douglas's focus was on the mining regions. He made this clear to Moody in a letter of 4 May 1859, when he suggested:

I think it very desirable,—so far as it may be possible, without serious injury to the public works at Queensborough,—to detach a party of sappers, under proper officers, to survey and improve the Lilloet road, as at the present time the impediments existing in connection with this road, form the great drawback to the development of the mineral regions of British Columbia.

The Governor's interest in New Westminster was minimal from the start, and he felt compelled to concentrate on the commercially viable regions of the colony to bring in money for the treasury.

Douglas was not unaware of Moody's trying situation, even though he would not have agreed with Luard when he demanded detailed requisitions from the officers of the Royal Engineers, necessary "under the
very singular and special circumstances in which the Colonel Commanding is placed." It appears from this statement that this was uncommon among the experiences of the troops, and thus understandably an aggravation for the Colonel. Still, in his letter of 12 April 1860, the Governor was in accord with Moody about the "embarrassment" to the Colonel caused by his requests for plans and lists of expenditures. He also agreed that this might have been retarding the work, and when the estimates and accounts failed to arrive, he nonetheless instructed Moody to continue with the projects. This momentary truce did not continue. On 16 April of the same year, Moody is admonished for decisions taken without benefit of advice from his superiors, leading to confusion, delay, and the issuance of conflicting regulations.

Moody's reactions were various. He began his term of office as a conciliatory and optimistic associate of the Governor. His attempts to curb expenses can be seen as helpful, even when his disappointment over the loss of the titular position of Lieutenant-Governor must have been sharp. He gradually became concerned about his situation, and during this period made overtures to the Governor for control of his expenditures, and for inclusion in discussions about military matters. Moody
had expected to advise on the matter of defence of
the colony, and on 10 December 1859 wrote to Douglas
complaining that he had not been consulted along with
General Scott.169 On 2 April 1860, he reminded the
Governor that advice on police and customs practices
was part of his commission, and emphasized that he
did not wish to be excluded from such affairs.170
Finally, on 30 June 1860, a memorandum to the Colonial
Office included Moody's expression of concern over
this prohibition, but the Office notated it with "I
think that it will be better to let the subject drop."171

From reactions such as this, his concern became
anger and disillusionment, but he also showed cunning
in his subsequent actions. On 30 June 1860, he reluct-
antly bothered the Governor for £1000 for improvements
to New Westminster, a matter of "complete indifference"
to himself. He continued, however, "the feeling of the
majority as far as I can learn is in favour of the sum
in question being expended under control and at the
discretion of the L & W Department."172 (Italics mine.)
It is difficult to accept his complete indifference to
such a proposal, but the letter is a masterpiece of
bureaucratic tact. On 6 September 1859, he had already
suggested forming a municipal corporation at New West-
minster, with power to apply funds from the sale of town lots to street improvements "even at this early period of the Colony." It appears that he expected to be able to wield greater control over a town council, which was based at his headquarters, than over a recalcitrant Victoria Governor. Douglas was undoubtedly aware of this, and on 3 August 1860 advised Moody to decline civil honours in New Westminster. This was, of course, not an unreasonable request of a military and government official, but Douglas could not have been unaware of its dangers to his authority. On 28 June 1862, in a despatch to the Colonial Secretary, Douglas admitted that the colonists and the means of communication were both expanding in British Columbia; yet he continued to advise against a British-styled constitution with greater self-government. The Colonial Office agreed with his appraisal, and refused the petition of the New Westminster inhabitants.

One cannot feel that Douglas was entirely fair to Moody, but it is equally true that he was himself frustrated by the Colonial Office's refusal to contribute to the financial support of the colony in any constructive fashion. Douglas and Moody were unable to agree on the import of the mission of the Royal Engineers, however,
and Douglas pressed his advantage with the Colonial Office by refusing approval of Moody's suggestions. In fact, he made it clear to at least some of the officials that his silence damned Moody reports.

Margaret Ormsby supports the Governor against the Colonel throughout her discussion of their stormy interaction. Perhaps she has done Moody an injustice. His position was in keeping with Lytton's instructions, and he constantly balanced these concerns against the Governor's restrictions on his work. This chapter has presented a different assessment from that of Ormsby, and has viewed Moody's actions from a less negative perspective. It is doubtful, given the personalities and backgrounds of both the combatants, that harmony would have been easy under any circumstances, but the loss of Lytton's sanction essentially destroyed any of Moody's power to bargain at all. It is understandable, but unfortunate, that cooperation was impossible between the two, since both were dedicated officers and capable of influencing the direction of the colony's growth. Together they might have accomplished wonders; separately, they still achieved remarkable feats.
The Effectiveness of the Plan

It was an experience, gentlemen, a novelty, mingling thus military and civil duties. How far it has met what was sought for by the Government is not for me to say.\textsuperscript{177}

These were Moody's words during his farewell speech at New Westminster in 1863. We can detect a note of chagrin, even of bitterness, in them which was not surprising in view of the difficulties he encountered during his tenure. Not only had the Governor of the colony balked at funding his schemes, but his title had been removed as well. In addition, the Colonial Secretary who followed Lytton was as suspicious of Moody as his predecessor had been of Douglas.

A Colonial Office memorandum on the Royal Engineers in British Columbia defended the Douglas stronghold. In reference to the despatches sent by the Governor, the memorandum reads:

These afford evidence that the attempt to combine civil and military duties has not been Successful. The Governor shews that a large proportion of the Men are rendered unavailable for Surveying by the necessity of maintaining military discipline, guards, etc.--And that the amount of work done is insignificant. I believe that there has been
no Survey of Country lands accomplished as yet, and that the only reproductive Works which the Engineers have achieved is the Laying out of town sites. Before their arrival, however, Governor Douglas had succeeded (in Nov. 1858) with the aid of Mr. Pemberton in laying out the site of the Town of Langley, the sale of the lots bringing in a sum of 13,000 and I believe that both the opinions expressed by Governor Douglas and the facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the labor of the Engineers as Surveyors is neither economical nor adapted to a country where rapidity of work is the chief requirement.178

Douglas had not always criticized the work of the Engineers. He stopped short of actual praise in his reports, but on at least one occasion he implied approval in his appraisal of the New Westminster development.

2.-I was glad to observe that this City had greatly improved in appearance since my last visit, and that many new buildings have been erected, and the surface in many parts cleared of the gigantic stumps and fallen trees that obstructed the thoroughfare and encumbered the ground. The erection of a Courthouse and Buildings for the Assay Office has also greatly added to the appearance of the place and increased the bustle and activity which pervades the town. Trade is also on the increase.179

There remains, however, an implied criticism in the unspoken sentiment that the improvement was late, even if welcome.

Douglas was not the kind of man to understand Moody's vision. He was too good a businessman not to
be irritated over the delays in surveying; he was too much a realist not to be constantly concerned over the lack of funds; he was perhaps too good a Governor not to wish to hasten the development of the entire colony, rather than one site. On the other hand, there is evidence of malice in his refusal to grant funds from the sale of lots at New Westminster for grading the streets. There is evidence of this as well in the necessity of a letter from Moody asking the Governor not to make Langley a port of delivery as it took importance away from the Capital. And finally, Douglas's decision to make Victoria a free port, along with heavy customs duties, naturally impeded the growth of New Westminster.

The Governor was also a politician, who knew better than to publicly abuse Moody. He did indeed criticize the Colonel in his personal despatches to London, but in a private letter of 24 August 1860 in reply to an unknown individual, Douglas exhibited restraint through a stance of detached interest. Apparently, the writer had disapproved of the policies and work of the Engineers in British Columbia, and Douglas replied:

Your letter is full of interest, yet I do not exactly agree with your views of Sir
Edward Lytton's policy in British Columbia, nor do I see that the Colony would be a gainer by the removal of the Royal Engineers, so long as they are maintained by the Mother Country.\textsuperscript{181}

One hardly feels that he was being honest, in view of his later remarks in a confidential assessment of the officers in British Columbia of 18 February 1863:

The attainments, high moral worth, and gentlemanly qualities of Colonel Moody are familiarly known to his friends. I am in duty bound, however, to remark that his management, as a public administrator, in this colony has not been satisfactory to me. I have in fact found it necessary to exercise the utmost vigilance over his public acts, and after having narrowly escaped being involved in ruinous contracts for the survey of the public lands, which he had entered into with Mr. Joseph Trutch, a civilian surveyor, and from the utter complication of the land system by a deviation from the spirit, if not from the letter of the "Pre-emption Act," I found it necessary to issue the most precise instructions for his guidance in matters of finance as well as of general administration, though previously induced by his position in the public service, to allow him a wide discretion.\textsuperscript{182}

We need only remember the requests from Moody for precise instructions about available funds from the Governor to doubt Douglas's sincerity on this point. Indeed, while it is not difficult to believe that Trutch would be capable of inflicting a "ruinous contract" onto the Engineers, it is understandable that this could have happened to a newcomer to the area without support or advice from his superior before the fact. Finally,
complaints are dubious without the opportunity for rebuttal, and there is no record of Moody's reply to this document.

On the other hand, the notes which appeared on Douglas's memorandum tend to affirm his opinion. Obviously, Moody was not adept at winning approval from his superiors. The accompanying notes by a Colonial Office official read:

The enclosure is a curious document and worth glancing at. The remarks are cleverly expressed,--certainly not free from reserve, and convey the impression of being the work of a shrewd and observing man.

He continued:

The views conveyed both of Colonel Moody and of Capt. Gosset are not flattering, but I am bound to say that they quite accord with the result of my observations. I do not think that the officers of the Royal Engineers employed in B.C. have done themselves credit. They have shown too great a disposition to employ their time in agitation, and in attempts to show that they could manage matters better than the Governor,--than which nothing I am sure could be more remote from the truth.183

Unfortunately, the initials after this notation are indecipherable, making it impossible to assess just what his relations were with the Colonel. It is possible that this opinion merely reflected the antagonism that often exists between politicians and career civil servants. After all, Moody was Lytton's choice for
a project which was virtually impossible from the point of view of the Colonial Office bureaucracy. They were either unable or unwilling to grant funding for the development of the colony, and may have seen Moody as simply another irritation inflicted upon them by the Minister in hard times. Once Lytton was replaced, their attitude hardened, and Newcastle was ultimately convinced of the impracticality of the Lytton scheme, whether by the Governor or by his advocates at the Colonial Office.

In support of this, we have the Colonial Office memorandum to the Duke of Newcastle from 1860, which stated:

From all we know of the Engineers and of what they have done, and from all the information I can obtain—I have no doubt that they are an extravagant failure. The greater part of their time—when not taken up by the requirements of military discipline, has been spent in laying out Town Sites of very doubtful utility, and preparing their own quarters at New Westminster. They have done nothing in the way of laying out country lands and very little in the way of road making. They are hardly to be blamed for this—the fact being, I believe, that they are above their work, and unfit for the rough process of cutting roads through the forest . . . the miners and backwoodsmen can do infinitely better. 184

The only evidence of support at home for Moody appeared in an assessment of Douglas's complaint that the Royal
Engineers were too costly an encumbrance, and that Moody was withholding information on technical points. The Colonial Office agreed that Moody was wrong, but felt that Douglas had not supplied him with adequate reasons for his queries. There was no questioning of Douglas's concern over the great expense of mixing military and civil duties in the detachment. They were judged expensive, difficult to monitor, and over-qualified for the job.  

This opinion was shared to some degree by the commentators of that time. We have read Douglas's reply to an irate colonist, whose criticisms appear to have been shared by an editor of the newspaper by that name on 2 March 1863:

The policy of Sir Edward Lytton, in sending out the Engineers to engage in civil duties, was a blunder—an egregious blunder that no practical colonial statesman would have committed.  

On the other hand, the Colonist was based in Victoria, and it was no secret that the two colonies were bitter rivals, politically, economically, and theoretically. Victoria was understandably aggrieved at the attention suddenly being showered upon a townsite on the Fraser River, when the Island citizens had managed to create their own city with hard work and natural growth over
time—or so they believed.

The opinion from the British Columbian, based at New Westminster, was naturally opposed to this. John Robson, the editor of this newspaper, was a supporter of Colonel Moody and a vociferous enemy of Douglas. On 25 February 1863, he expressed himself thus:

Victoria, Vancouver Island, has, from a combination of pecuniary interests, been the favored political and commercial locality of Governor Douglas. From this radiates the "ukases" of despotic power. . . . It is there that the government of British Columbia is conducted by a gentleman pre-eminently disqualified, by a life's association with a company of adventurers in the wilds of North America to exercise despotic rule over thousands of British subjects possessing no voice or power to offer resistance to any measures however oppressive. It naturally follows that the invaluable services of the Royal Engineers have, like the energies of the colonists themselves, been sacrificed to further and consummate the end in view, viz., that the one Colony may flourish at the cost and injury of the other. 187

The battle on the British west coast was rapidly becoming sectarian and Moody and Douglas were the personalities around which the quarrel raged. The irony is that confusion became rampant in the process. Moody was the man of foresight, the developer, in the eyes of the New Westminster contingent, and Douglas the cautious businessman who obstructed their plans. In fact, Moody was the
purveyor of British culture, the conservative, and Douglas the developer, albeit on a colony-wide scale. Either man was whatever the supporter or detractor wished to see at that moment.

This difference of opinion remains today. The author of *Men and Meridians* asserts that Moody and his Engineers accomplished a remarkable amount of work in their term in the colony. \(^{188}\) Cail, in *Land, Man and the Law*, points out that the surveys "made by the Engineers on the mainland revealed that their work required no corrections of any kind,"\(^ {189}\) contrary to those performed on Vancouver Island by civilians. Barry Downs commends the Engineers on the high standards of their town plans and public works, as well as their superior draughtsmanship.

Some 29 maps, plans and charts are known to have been produced at Sapperton, and they represent the high standard of draftsmanship for which the Engineers were famous. Their work continues to have relevance today. Not only did their town planning policies establish the settlement patterns for a major city and many towns in British Columbia, their architecture reflected the Victorian style of the day, and its important attributes of utility, functional expression and rugged beauty.\(^ {190}\)

Margaret Ormsby, however, is adamant in her dislike of Colonel Moody and his deployment of the men. She especially criticizes the development of New Westminster,
the focus of the Colonel's efforts:

From its very foundation, New Westminster spelled trouble for the Governor. The immense labour involved in clearing the site necessitated the withdrawal of the services of a large number of the Royal Engineers from road-building in British Columbia, to him the essential work. Continuous political agitation undermined his popularity . . . with the Colonial Office. He had constant trouble with Colonel Moody over his requisitions and the greatest difficulty in eliciting an accounting of expenditures from Moody's friend, Captain Gosset, who, in addition to being Treasurer of the Colony, had charge of the commissariat for the corps.191

The evidence of Moody's own problems with Captain Gosset make the claim of favourtism somewhat difficult to accept. In addition, the political agitation of Douglas himself appeared to draw the Colonial Office into his camp, contrary to the impression that Ormsby seeks to convey. And finally, road-building was only a part of the work that the Engineers were required to perform. Indeed, and more important here, the capital was seen by Lytton to be a major influence in the colony, and Moody dutifully sought to impose this stanchion of British sovereignty on the wilderness and symbolically upon the population.

Ultimately, the appraisals vary according to the stance of the critic. The expectations of Moody
and his Engineers were many and diverse, making it impossible to assess his contribution accurately. The constraints upon both Moody and the Governor, particularly in the financial area, influenced the results as well, and the question of priorities then intrudes into the situation to complicate it still further.

What exactly did Moody accomplish in New Westminster? The Engineers under his direction drew up two master plans, or two versions of the same master plan, visualized by Conroy in 1861 and extended by Launders in 1862. This plan was developed to some extent and followed for some years after the departure of the Engineers, even after the capital was moved to Victoria. The public buildings suggested by Moody on 17 February 1859 were draughted and constructed by 1863. Specifically, in 1859 the Customs House and Treasury, Survey and Magistrate's offices, and the government dock were built. The first sale of town lots occurred on 10 May, and was considered successful. In October of that year the surrounding country lands were surveyed and placed on the market for sale. In December, Moody requested funds to clear the underbrush and trees from the streets, and was refused by Douglas.

In 1860, the government Assay Office, Court House and Jail were built. The Colonial Hotel appeared
as a landmark, and the Officers' Quarters were completed. In January the pre-emption law opened up the adjacent farm land. In March the Royal Engineers were ordered to construct two bridges across Columbia Street ravines on either side of Lytton Square. The piers and wharves also received some attention. On 2 May, the delayed sale of town lots took place, and on 16 July New Westminster was incorporated. In December 1860, Holy Trinity Church was consecrated in Victoria Gardens to general approval, and the waterfront was leased at auction.

The first year of incorporation, over 1860 and 1861, was extraordinarily active at New Westminster, because of the increased income available from the sales. Specifications were issued and streets and squares cleared of vegetation and rocks. Alice, Louisa and Government Gardens, Albert Crescent, and Lytton Square were chopped; Mary, Douglas, Agnes, Royal, Blackwood, Bushby, Hall, Carnarvon, Spalding, and Begbie Streets were cleared of timber, as were Victoria Gardens, Merchant Square, and Market Place. Lytton Square was also graded, and a road was cut from Holy Trinity Church to Columbia Street. In August 1861, former reserves were opened for sale, and town and suburban lots between Queens and Fifth Avenue were sold. The town had begun
to take shape. Residences and shops were springing up and individual styles were beginning to be noticeable. In 1862 the Royal Columbian Hospital completed the list of public buildings of importance; the specifications were drawn up by the Engineers in spite of their prolonged absences on survey trips.  

All of this, including the designing and building of Government House, was accomplished amid great difficulties of terrain, equipment, inadequate or untrained labour, inadequate financing, and personal and political quarrels. The Colonial Office must bear the brunt of the blame for their conflicting instructions and refusal to fund the necessary construction. Colonel Moody was certainly recalcitrant in refusing to accept the Governor's direction, but he had some justification for his actions in his perception of the commander's role developed from past training and Lytton's directions.

The critical question, however, is whether his plan for the development of the colony's capital was acceptable. It can be demonstrated that this type of activity in a new colony was not unprecedented. Indeed, as J. David Wood explains in a recent article, the model town was an important aspect
of imperial policy for Canada. It was to provide the functions thought necessary to the smooth working of a rural hinterland and thus to expedite the successful settling of the colony.\textsuperscript{193}

In particular, Charlottetown illustrates the principles of this genre to perfection: "It is a grid, it has a symmetrical array of spaces for public purposes, and it has a defensive capability."\textsuperscript{194} Wood has traced the history of the model town to the seventeenth century Board of Trade and Plantations in Britain, which set up a secretariat to develop its ideas into instructions for colonial governors—thus ensuring continuity into the next centuries. The very orderliness of these plans was a statement of British regularity, of phlegm, in the face of the wild landscapes surrounding the towns. For that reason they were potent enforcers of the British presence. Wood assesses the plans as impractical, however:

In effect, all the plans proposed were impractical in an untamed, forested land, and the more ambitious were glaringly irrelevant.\textsuperscript{195}

Moody's plan obviously fits this definition of the model town for the development of British culture. He deviates from the grid only in imitation of the royal crescents and circles of Bath and Edinburgh, and that only in an area where the grid would have been
virtually impossible to impose on the terrain. Still, his clever reversal of rectangles assured a varied and more vivid pattern, even without that aristocratic section of town. The Moody plan retained a life or vitality which is singularly lacking in many of the other town plans. He had, of course, the examples of New Town, Bath, and New Orleans to stimulate him, and extensive training and expertise in this area, as well as a natural inclination for the artistic. There is no question that the plan would have been striking on that impressive hillside, and might have become a landmark for the colony if development had proceeded in the expected fashion.

Unfortunately, New Westminster was doomed in its growth by various factors, not the least of which was the removal of the Engineers and the defeat of Colonel Moody by the Governor. The city was envisioned partly as a defence against American aggression, and that aggression became less threatening over the next few years. The miners developed other routes to the gold fields, as Mayne had warned they might, and indeed the gold rush itself began to wane quite rapidly of its own accord. Those settlers and miners who remained were being serviced and supplied directly from Victoria,
especially when her status as a free port was assured by the Governor. This made profits from trade more difficult in New Westminster, and discouraged the speculative element from remaining, probably to the town's ultimate benefit. Finally, the capital designation was transferred to Victoria in 1868, ensuring the decline of New Westminster's importance.

During his tenure, Moody was reasonably popular with the townspeople, and sympathetic to their concerns as long as they did not interfere with his plan for development. In spite of support from many of the local settlers, however, these immigrants derived mainly from Nova Scotia and the two Canadas, and were used to a less oppressively British atmosphere. They were quick to request representative government, partly in defence against Victoria and the Governor's authority, and showed a defensive pride in a desire to make the area their own. This led to gradual changes to the original plan, to the patterns, the names, and especially to the cruciform symbol.

A 1910-11 map of New Westminster, drawn by L. Hjorth, confirms the Canadian flavour of the town, with Ontario and Manitoba place-names, and numbered streets replacing some of the British titles. Moody
and his wife lost their defining position, although the Colonel's last name was used for a short connection between Eighth and Tenth streets. Queens and Royal avenues were retained, but Albert Crescent was left undeveloped, probably because of the extra expense of working on the steep slope. The gardens so carefully laid out by the Engineers had become ordinary housing developments. The open areas of Tipperary Park and around Frederick Howay School were all that remained of the cruciform, and Toronto and Clinton Place had not yet been subdivided or cleared for formal parkland. Carnarvon street slashed right through the memorial to Victoria, her Garden in the center of town, instead relegating her name to a lesser street. Consequently, the east/west division organized by Moody was lessened, and the city became more egalitarian.

By the second half of the twentieth century, the New Westminster of Moody's formulation had virtually disappeared. Frederick Howay School had given way to a large hotel, and Albert Crescent had been reduced to a tiny area at the top of the hill (still undeveloped) with a reversal of the original semi-circular pattern. Ironically enough, though, the former Tipperary Park now housed the City Hall. The principle of locating
public buildings in gardens at prominent sites had been sustained. Finally, Queens Park remained in the original position.

It is questionable to assume that loyalty can be induced by symbols of the crown and the church. It is possible that such metaphors merely reinforce the feelings of the committed. To those dedicated to other ideals, or simply indeterminate in their opinions, these emblems might be seen as an irritant, or even an inflammation to antagonism toward the sponsoring body. In the case of New Westminster, time and the indifference of the population has erased many of the initial concepts. It is doubtful that these would have remained in the face of the provenance of its settlers. Those who had grown up in an Eastern Canadian culture were less likely to relish so British a presence in this new country.

The remaining argument concerns the efficacy of building a new town according to preconceived plans—aside from using borrowed symbols from a distant culture. The unfortunate experiences of the British new towns, and of Brazilia, which have been stigmatized as sterile and enervated, are pertinent. Moody's town might have evolved into a lovely emptiness, a center of artificiality
in an intemperate wilderness. Since he was frustrated in the implementation of his designs, that fate will never be confirmed, and it is impossible to assess the degree to which the plan might have succeeded in its objective.

Nonetheless, New Westminster's early years provide a case study of the planning process with its constraints and battles over design, money, and location. The very fact that the setting was a virgin forest with an endless range of possibilities makes the history exciting and illuminating. That Colonel Moody intended to foster and define the British power and authority in the area is indisputable; the worth and practicality of such a scheme is not. Still, we cannot help feeling a reluctant admiration for a man secure enough in his own loyalties and expertise to attempt such a feat. And it is difficult not to fault Douglas for dampening this enthusiasm, regardless of the provocation. New Westminster was not a success, but it was to some degree a noble failure. There remains today on the site Moody selected a city called New Westminster and it belongs to British Columbia still.
APPENDIX A

COMPLETE LIST OF THE
COLUMBIA DETACHMENT OF ROYAL ENGINEERS

WHO SERVED IN BRITISH COLUMBIA—1858-1863.

OFFICERS:

COLONEL .................................................. RICHARD CLEMENT MOODY, Commanding

CAPTAIN ...................................................... JOHN MARSHALL GRANT

DO .......................................................... ROBERT MANN PARSONS

DO .......................................................... HENRY REYNOLDS LUARD

LEUTENANT ............................................... ARTHUR REID LEMPIERRE

DO .......................................................... HENRY SPENCER PALMER

STAFF-ASSISTANT SHERIFF ................................ JOHN VERNON SEDDALL

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN:

PANY—

Acting Sergeant-Major Carr, George

- Qtr-Master-Sergeant, Constable, David S

Squad—

Lieutenant, Richard

- Sergeant, Lewis P

Hawkins, William

Lindsay, James (k. a.)

McGill, William

McKenna, John

McKenna, William

McKenna, John

McKenna, William

McKenna, Henry (1st Honour)

Woodcock, John.

Sergeants—

Bowers, Alfred B

- Wadsworth, Richard

Borland, William (k. a.)

Bigley, James

Birrell, Robert

Birrell, James

Birrell, Andrew

Birrell, John

Birrell, James

Birrell, Henry (4th Honour)

Woodcock, John.

Lance Corporals—

Bowers, James

- McComb, James

Lafferty, George

Harvey, William

Lambe, Peter J

Conolly, Charles

White, John G

Lance Corporals—

Hawkins, William

Hawkins, James

Hawkins, James

Hawkins, John

Hawkins, John

Hawkins, John

Hawkins, Henry William

Hawkins, John

Hawkins, James

- Turner, George

Buckley—

- Butler, Robert

Harris, Daniel

Hornsby Corporal—

Hawkins, Henry William

Hawkins, William

Hawkins, Lewis II

Hawkins, Philip

- Jeffery, John

- Jeffery, John

- Jeffery, John

- Jeffery, John

- Jeffery, John

Those marked * are still residing in British Columbia, as this date, 7th November, 1907.

- I am residing in Great Britain.

Source: Denys Nelson, Complete List of the Royal Engineers in British Columbia, November 7, 1907, Pamphlet File, no number given, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
Street Names from the New Westminster Capital Plan 1861-62

With Source References

1. Royalty:

Albert: Prince Consort and Heir, Albert Edward

Alfred: Duke of Edinburgh, second son of Victoria

Arthur: Duke of Connaught, third son of Victoria

Alice: Princess, second daughter of Victoria

Leopold: Duke of Albany, youngest son of Victoria

Louisa: Duchess of Argyle (Louise), fourth daughter of Victoria

2. Colonial Office:

Blackwood: Official at the Colonial Office, correspondent of Colonel Moody

Carnarvon: Fourth Earl of, Colonial Secretary in Palmerston's ministry

Elliot: Reference obscure; may refer to Ebenezer Elliot, famed as the Corn Law Rhymer

Lytton: Colonial Secretary who commissioned Moody to develop British Columbia

Merivale: Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office during Moody's commission
3. Local Authorities:

\[\checkmark\] Mary: First name of Moody's wife

\[\checkmark\] Clement: Second name of Colonel Moody

\[\checkmark\] Douglas: Governor of British Columbia during Moody's commission

Gosset: Royal Engineer (Captain); later treasurer of the colony during Moody's commission

\[\checkmark\] Begbie: Sir Matthew Begbie, first judge of the new colony

\[\checkmark\] Dallas: Douglas's son-in-law; succeeded Douglas in the Hudson's Bay Company as head of the Western Department

\[\checkmark\] Ellice: A Hudson's Bay Company official

\[\checkmark\] Prevost: Naval officer stationed in coastal waters; friend of the Moody family; Captain of H. M. S. Satellite

Richards: Captain of the H. M. S. Plumper; Naval officer as above

4. Capitals:

Dublin: Ireland

Edinburgh: Scotland

London: England; also of British Empire

Halifax: Nova Scotia

Montreal: Lower Canada (Quebec)

Melbourne: Australia

Auckland: New Zealand

5. Saints:

St. George: Patron saint of England
St. Patrick: Patron saint of Ireland
St. Andrew: Patron saint of Scotland
St. John: The Baptist: herald of Christ coming; of Rochester: scholar and martyr; the Divine, apostle of Christ, and best known of the possible candidates

6. Oddities:

Agnes: Fourth daughter of James Douglas, Governor of the colony, also daughter of Herman Merivale

Clinton: One of the family names of the Duke of Newcastle

Elliot: Major G. H. Elliot, Royal Marines on the West Coast, 1856-60; if spelled with a double "t", could be A. C. Elliott, magistrate at Lillooet who also took part in explorations of the colony

Fortescue: Baron Carlingford, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for England

Halifax: Possibly Sir Charles Wood, influential in Canada and India

Pelham: One of the family names of the Duke of Newcastle; also the hero of one of Lytton's novels, commonly referred to as a coxcomb

Footnotes


2Ibid., p. 160.

3Ibid., p. 155, 162.
Ibid., p. 168.

5Ibid., p. 162.

6Ibid., p. 162.


8Ibid., p. 178.


12Mary Susannah Moody, Correspondence, 1858-61, Collection Number Add. MSS. 60, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

13Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 556.

14Ibid., p. 547.

15Ibid., p. 157, 172.

16Ibid., p. 156.

17Ibid., p. 155.

18Ibid., p. 156.

19Ibid., p. 152.

20Ibid., p. 173.


22Ibid., p. 230.

23Ibid., p. 264.
24 Ibid., p. 242.
25 Ibid., p. 274.
26 Ibid., p. 270.
27 Ibid., p. 204.


29 Ibid., p. 547.
30 Ibid., p. 58.


32 Ibid., p. 195-96.
33 Ibid., p. 189-90.

34 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 126.


36 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 557.


38 Ibid., p. 76.
39 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 156.


41 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 557.
List of Supplies
Royal Engineers Order Book
1859-1863

13 March 1859:  Kettle, axes, auger, files
chisel, planes, hammers.

5 May 1859:  Stationery supplies, varied.

6 May 1859:  One large beam scales and weight,
six barrels tar, six chests carpenters' tools, two dozen handsaws,
six dozen felling axes, three dozen
shingling axes, two dozen bill hooks,
three dozen felling axe handles, one
set miners' tools, six miners'
hammers, two copper needles for above,
one maddock, one large and one small
 garden rake, one Canterbury hoe,
two potato forks, one round dung
fork, three water cans, one iron
reel, one garden line, one Dutch
hoe, twelve pick axes, twelve
maddocks (axe and hoe), twenty-four
spades, two long handle tar brushes,
one cast iron tar pan, one ton coal.

16 May 1859:  Military supplies.

20 May 1859:  Nails, spikes, brads, powder, fuses,
locks, bolts, knobs, fastenings,
hinges, screws, paint, turpentine,
linseed oil, buckets, tin plates,
wire.

6 June 1859:  Gardening seeds.

8 November 1859:  For public works: bricks, lime,
sashes, rod iron, doors, casements,
lead, zinc, salts, planes, paper,
wallpaper, calico.
27 February 1860: Flat iron, plate iron, axes, spare helves, rope, boat kedges.
29 February 1860: Rope, blocks, glass.
6 March 1860: Rivets, gauge.
17 March 1860: Tarred rope, leather, spikes, wedges.
28 March 1860: Iron blocks, axes, helves, rope.
10 April 1860: Bellows and iron, steel, spikes, carpenters' pencils.
1 May 1860: Nails, planes, hammers, blasting powder.
2 June 1860: Miners' drills, iron piping.
3 October 1860: Rope, stove, picks, borax.
27 October 1860: Boiler.

All entries are taken from the Royal Engineers Order Book, contained within: Royal Engineers, Correspondence Outward, July 1861 to June 1863, Collection Number C AB 30.6 J1 to J3, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
Listed as an "Office building to be erected on the Government reserve," this structure was 14 feet by 28 feet, and one storey high (8 feet). It was to be divided into two rooms of equal size, with a fireplace in each. Three doors and four windows, all cored inside and out, were to provide light and access. The main emphasis is upon the roof, composed of rafters "seamed with collars of 1 x 6-3 iron plates" battened like the walls, but also covered with shingles laid 5 and 1/2 to the weather. The double-joisted doors were to be 1 and 1/2 inches thick, the walls 1 inch thick, and even the partitions were to be made of 1 inch boards. The inside ceiling was to be boarded with 1/2 inch board.

This summary is taken from Document Number F 963a 4, Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
The Registrar-General's office was to be a balloon-framed building with sills "well-squared to posts and halved together at joints and angles." The flooring is to be of tongue-and-groove construction, the walls weather-boarded with rough boards "properly nailed." All rafters were to show a 6 inch or larger projection at the eaves "to be notched with the wall plates." The whole building was to be fitted with a "neat cornice of wrought boards 6 inches in depth." Ceiling joists were to be "notched into the wall plates and securely nailed" to rafters. The roof boards were to be covered with "good red-wood or other shingles" nailed 5 inches to weather. The ridges were to be covered with zinc to prevent leakage and a "plinth 14 feet by 2 inches" was to surround the building. Rooms were to be skirted inside with wrought boards of 6 inches by 1 inch dimensions. The front entrance door was to be a folding three-panel 1 and 1/2 inch type with arched tops, wrought and moulded, and door margins of plain wrought 1 inch boards "fitted on both external and internal faces." Wall paper was to be of good
quality, and "bordered throughout," and three coats of the best oil paint were to be used where indicated. The mantel of the fireplaces was constructed of the "best seasoned red-cedar." A trellis portico, arched and waterproofed, completed the structure.

This summary is taken from Document Number F 963h 8 and F 963b1 11, Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
APPENDIX F

Customs House
Addition
Specifications

The excavation of this addition was expected to finish at a distance of 20 feet at the base of the slope, and the cutting was to extend 30 feet from the edges of Begbie Street. The slope of the cutting was not to exceed an angle of 45 degrees. The building itself was to be balloon-framed with tongue-and-groove flooring, "wrought on one side and edge-nailed." Collar ties were to be nailed securely to the rafters, and once again good redwood shingles were to be used. The walls were weather-boarded with boards wrought on one side. The plinth was 9 inches by 2 inches of wrought plank. The drawing room was to exhibit French wallpaper, the halls "good passage-paper," and the ceiling a "white water pattern." All were to be bordered. The bricks used in the chimney were to be "free from imperfections to be laid old English-bond with mortar of the best fresh burnt lime and clean sharp sand well and thoroughly mixed together." The mantel-piece of the fireplace was also "best-seasoned red cedar." A cupboard was to be "roofed and weather boarded and painted, outside and in, to match the present building."
The lumber used throughout was to be of the best quality.

The specifications for the original customs house were less well-itemized, although everything was to be of the best quality materials. This was a double-gabled structure with "1 and 1/2 inch wrought and moulded window boards of 2 inch pine wrought chamfered and throated solid sills."

The summary for the Addition to the Customs House is taken from Document Number F 963h 5, Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C. The summary for the original Customs House is taken from Document Number F 963a 7, Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
The Treasury specifications focus on the excavation, which was to be bolstered with good earth, and on the vault and chimney of the best quality bricks and workmanship. The foundations for the vault and chimney were to be laid in "good rubble masonry with large stones, well grouted on top" and carefully lined for the reception of the brickwork. The entire building was "to be executed in the most skillful, efficient and substantial manner." The front was weather-boarded with 1 inch wrought boards, while the rest used 1/2 inch rough boards. Wrought, tongue-and-grooved 1 and 1/4 inch floor boarding was employed throughout, edge-nailed to joists. The ends of the rafters were to be covered with 1 inch casings, and all rooms were to be skirted. A wrought and framed counter, with a 1 and 1/2 inch wrought and moulded counter top and two tiers of drawers with turned wooden handles, was to be placed in the front area. Windows were to have 1 and 1/4 inch wrought and beaded redwood sash frames. The main entrance opened with a 1 and 1/2 inch wrought and moulded four frame door, 7 feet 6 inches high and
4 feet 6 inches wide, with fan lights and transom.

Finally, a frame verandah of "good clear wrot Lumber"
with a gable over the center, completed the building.

This summary is taken from Document Number F 963a 8,
Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864,
P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
Referred to as a "Frame Dwelling House", the framing was to be done so that the ground sills, 6 feet by 6 feet, were halved and pinned at joints and angles. All corner and other posts, including the door and window posts were to be tenoned and morticed into plates and sills. Tenons were to be dipped into white lead paint previous to fixing. All studs were placed at a distance not over 16 inches from center to center. Posts of cedar not less than 1 foot in diameter, stripped of bark, were to be placed at distances not over 8 feet from center to center for the support of all ground sills.

The roof was composed of rafters 2 feet by 9 feet well-notched in the "birdsmouth" fashion, nailed to plates, and halved at ridge pieces. Dormers were framed in the "best and most substantial manner," and the entire roof was to be covered with 1 inch shingle battens 6 inches wide properly nailed to the rafters. Over this would be laid the best wrought cedar shingles, nailed 4 and 1/2 inches to the weather. The ends of rafters and eaves were to be encased with 1 inch wrought
boards, with 1 inch wrought barge boards applied to all gabled. Lead, 20 inches in width, was to be laid where necessary.

On the verandah, the posts were to be 6 inches wide, planed and chamfered, with handrails and lattice work neatly framed of the best red wood. The verandah flooring was to be of the best wrought tongue-and-grooved 1 and 1/4 inch white cedar from San Francisco, edge-nailed to joists.

The upper floor joists were to have "three rows of herring bone strutting. All joists against trimmers were to be tenoned, morticed into, and nailed to the trimmers." The entire flooring on both levels, plus staircases and landings, was to be of the same wood used on the verandah.

The bricks were to be of the best description, "hard well burnt bricks free from imperfections," and laid with mortar of the "best lime and sharp, clear granular sand" in the proportion of one to three. All fireplaces were to have 8 inch brick arches, in two thicknesses of brick, and wrought iron cambered chimney bars.

The external walls were to be covered twice, first with rough 1 inch diagonally-nailed boards, and
second with the "best-wrought redwood weather boarding."
In addition, 2 inch wrought weathered plinth board was
to be placed around the building to a height of 2 feet. The interior walls were to show good lathing, and wood
free from sap, the laths not to overlap but to "abut
against each other." The walls, partitions and ceilings
were to be finished with fine stuff "fair and smooth, all
projecting corners to be protected by a rounded beading."
Three coats of whitening would complete the work.

The ornamental features inside were also better
and more numerous than those of the other buildings. For
example, the stairs were to have panelled balustrades
and moulded cappings on the main staircase. The mantels
were to show pilasters, caps and bases. Wrought and
chamfered 1 and 1/2 inch mantel shelves and bed moulds
were attached to all fireplaces. Doors were to be
double-moulded with four panels each, and 6 inch plain
redwood architraves in the main area. All other doors
were wrought and beaded, with plain 6 inch redwood
architraves on both faces. The main entrance door also
had a fan-light and a transom. The windows were similarly
specified, and glazed with the best glass. Finally,
the skirting boards of 1 inch wrought and chamfered
redwood were placed in all rooms and passages of the
main building, and on the principal staircases, to a height of 10 inches on the first floor and 6 inches on the second.

This summary is taken from Document Number F 963b 4, Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
APPENDIX I

Holy Trinity Church
Specifications

. . . frames and stud . . . 89.0 long, 52 feet wide, 17 feet 6 inches height . . . 39.0 to ridge consisting of a nave, chancel, recess for organ, Vestry Porch . . . Belfry as shown in accompanying plan--rooftop in rows of . . . with laminated . . . rafters and . . . to be covered with tongue and groove boards and shingles. Site to be on . . . to be cleared and levelled sufficiently for the sills (?) 1.6 above the ground line . . . to be of cedar not less than 12" in section and 10 feet from center, and all which may be exposed to view to be squared above ground --Sills to be of squared timber not less than 1" in section . . . the whole to be well-spiked . . . porch outside to be 12" in section, wrot framed and chamfered . . . and framed into . . . porch inside--ditto . . . shingles . . . 8" wrot framed and chamfered . . . Rafters--fir 9" x 3" and 10 feet from center--5" x 4" wrot framed and chamfered . . . Laminated Arches 9" x 4 1/2" made of four . . . framed with joists and chamfered and springing corbels. Roof to be covered with 1 1/4" wrot one side . . . nailed to . . . and laid in the rafters. Shingles of best quality red cedar laid
with a 5" lap. Spandrels to be filled (fitted?) in ... Joists to be ... 9" x 2" and 1.6 from ceiling (center?) and well- ... in ... rows. Flooring 1 1/2 tongue and groove flooring with ... and nailed. Walls of 1 1/4 tongue and groove boarding wrot both sides and nailed to ... Boards placed perpendicularly as described in ... which also ... the mode of ventilation. Studs 4" x 4" wrot framed and chamfered. Frames 8" x 8" wrot framed and chamfered. Windows to be ... and open inwards with proper fastenings. The whole of the materials and workmanship to be of the best quality--the wood free from sap (?) ... and knots ... The plans and specifications enclosed more particularly describe the ... of the works ... and should anything be omitted which is seriously required for the proposed construction and finishing of the building, the ... 

This transcription is Document Number F 963h 7, Lands and Works Department, Specifications, 1858-1864, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C. The original is almost illegible, but this gives the gist of what the Engineer had in mind. I have included it with the appendices because of the importance of Holy Trinity Church in the Capital plan of New Westminster.
Fig. 21. Drawing of Holy Trinity Church, designed to accompany the specifications. Document Number 616.8 (57)ekb R888h, Plan 2, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.
LIST OF REFERENCES


7Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, p. 63.


11 Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, p. 59.

12 Cell, British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, p. 48.


14 Frederick W. Howay, The Work of The Royal Engineers in British Columbia, 1858-1863, an address delivered before the Art Historical and Scientific Association of Vancouver, 8 February 1909 (Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1910), p. 1.


17 Francis Bond-Head, The Royal Engineers (London: J. Murray, 1869), p. 15.

18 Emigrant Soldier's Gazette and Cape Horn Chronicle, published by the Royal Engineers, Columbia Detachment, on board the Thames City, November 6, 1858 to April 2, 1859, Collection Number NW 358.2 E53, Provincial Archives of British Columbia (P.A.B.C.), Victoria, B.C.

19 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Lytton to Moody, 29 October 1858.

20 Ibid.


25 Ibid., 1:389.


28 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Lytton to Moody, 29 October 1858.


31 Idem, Lytton to Moody, 29 October 1858.

32 Ibid.

33 Richard Clement Moody, "Instructions to Captain Parsons," 1 September 1858, Document Number F1148-1, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

34 Mary Susannah Moody, "Letter to Mother," 25 December 1858, Correspondence, 1858-1863, Collection Number Add. MSS. 60, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

35 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to James Douglas," 17 February 1859, B.C., Royal Engineers, Correspondence Outward, Collection Number C AB 30.6 J2, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


Mary Susannah Moody, "Letter to Mother," 4 August 1859, Correspondence, 1858-1861, Collection Number Add. MSS. 1101, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

Ibid., 16 April 1860.

Emigrant Soldier's Gazette, 29 January 1859, NW 358.2 E53, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

Victoria Gazette, 20 November 1858.


Moody, "Instructions to Parsons," F1148-1, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

Bond-Head, Royal Engineers, p. 97.

Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, 1:184-5.

Bond-Head, Royal Engineers, p. 4-5.


50 Ibid.

51 Moody, "Instructions to Parsons," F1148-1, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


54 Ibid.


56 Ibid.

57 McDonald, Thesis, p. 22

58 Major General Peel, Secretary of the War Office, "Letter to Colonial Office," 30 April 1859, CO 60.4, P.R.O., Kew, England.

59 Ibid., 14 May 1859.

60 Aide-Memoire to the Military Sciences, framed from contributions of officers of the different services, and comp. by the Corps of Royal Engineers, 2d ed., corrected, 3 vols. (London: John Weale, 1853), 2:23.


64 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to James Douglas," 10 November 1859, B.C., Lands and Works Department, Correspondence Outward to Governor Douglas, Collection Number C AB 30.7 J5, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

65 Ireland, "First Impressions," p. 105.


69 Ireland, "First Impressions," passim.


73 Ibid., p. 31.

74 McDonald, Thesis, p. 29.

76 McDonald, Thesis, p. 29.

77 Mayne, Four Years, p. 72.

78 Ibid., p. 87-88.

79 Captain R. M. Parsons, "Letter to Richard Clement Moody," 23 September 1859, B.C., Royal Engineers, Letter Book, 1859, Collection Number C AB 30.6, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

80 Mayne, Four Years, p. 88


83 Moody, "Letter to Douglas," 2 December 1859, C AB 30.7 J5, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

84 Duthie, Bishop in the Rough, p. 23.


86 Mayne, Four Years, p. 88.


90 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to C. Brew," B.C., Lands and Works Department, Correspondence Outward, Collection Number C AB 30.7 J4, p. 48-49, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

92 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to Royal B.C. Hospital Committee," 15 July 1862, C AB 30.7 J4, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


102 Interview with Major J. T. Hancock, Institution of Royal Engineers, Archives, Chatham, England, 15 April 1983.

104 Rosenau, The Ideal City, p. 108.

105 Gibson and Miller, "Townscape as Metaphor," p. 4.

106 Ibid.


108 Gibson and Miller, "Townscape as Metaphor," p. 3.

109 Ibid., p. 4-5.

110 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to James Douglas," 8 April 1859, B.C., Lands and Works Department, Correspondence Outward, Collection Number C AB 30.7 J1, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


112 Gibson and Miller, "Townscape as Metaphor," p. 9.

113 Ibid., p. 10.

114 Aide-Mémoire, 2:Plate I (French or Bastion System).

115 Gibson and Miller, "Townscape as Metaphor," p. 9-10.


117 James Presnall, Chatham: The Story of a Dockyard Town and the Birthplace of the British Navy (Chatham: Corporation of Chatham, 1952), passim.
118 Lord Hardinge, quoted in Jay Parvesh Chandra, Delhi: a Political Study (Delhi: Metropolitan, 1969), p. 32.

119 Ibid., p. 35.


123 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to James Douglas," 13 February 1861, B.C., Lands and Works Department, Correspondence Outward to Governor Douglas, Collection Number C AB 30.7 J6, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


125 It was perhaps unreasonable to expect the Engineers to design and build edifices which were below the standards expected from their training. In 1889, Whitworth Porter described the inclusion in their courses of "Estimating and Building Construction." The description reads: "This course includes the quality of the various materials used in building operations, the science of engineering and building construction, sewerage, drainage, ventilation, gas and water supply. Also designing for military buildings, such as barracks, hospitals, stables, etc., measuring, and estimating, and a course of instruction in architecture." Whitworth Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, 2 vols. (Chatham: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1889), 2:189.

Thus, the Engineers were well-educated in both the tools of their trade, and features of design from current architectural theory. The Practical Section of the School for Construction included lectures, models and detailed drawings of buildings. The officers were "supplied with printed copies of notes and extracts
collected by Colonel Collinson, R. E. . . . 'on the practice of building' and on 'military buildings' of every class and description. And as an encouragement and assistance, each officer is presented by Her Majesty's Government with a costly and valuable series of 44 large copper-plate engravings (each 1 ft. 10 in. by 2 ft. 6 in.) containing descriptions of the details of buildings, with numerous lithographs and printed tables, to be paid for by the officers, comprehending details of construction, most of which have been approved of by the War Office." Francis Bond-Head, The Royal Engineer. (London: J. Murray, 1869), p. 198-9. Short and/or long tours were then granted to the worthy to inspect at first hand the designs of model buildings.

Even though these writers were reporting in 1889 and 1869 respectively, it is reasonable to assume that the same standards had been active during Moody's tenure at the School. The founder, Sir Charles Pasley, fought hard for an education of quality which would allow the Engineers to be useful in public works in times of war and of peace. In 1826, the new course in "practical architecture" was introduced, and it appears to have prospered, judging by the course descriptions just quoted.

An attempt to obtain a copy of the engravings discussed by Bond-Head was unsuccessful. The School Archives at Chatham haven't a copy, nor have other researchers, including the Historic Research Division of Parks Canada and such eminent local historians as John Spittle. The discovery of even one set would be an extremely valuable proof of the breadth of their education. In lieu of this, we must depend on descriptions such as those mentioned above.


128 New Westminster Times, 8 December 1860.

129 As Warren Sommer described in his thesis on early B. C. churches, the periodical called the Ecclesiologist promoted five particular English examples
of appropriate architecture for colonial churches. Of these, St. Michael's Church from Long Stanton, Cambridgeshire, was the model most likely used in frontier situations. "St. Michael's consisted of a nave with aisles, a chancel, a southwestern porch, and a western gabled bell-cote. The church had a single-sloped roof, lacked a clerestory, and had an eastern Trinity window." Warren Sommer, "Upon Thy Holy Hill" (M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1977), p. 223. Holy Trinity certainly bears a resemblance to this church. Barry Downs suggests that a bell tower and higher roof were contemplated at one time, and we can agree with him that these changes would have "improved the building aesthetic," and increased the similarity to Long Stanton. Barry V. Downs, "Royal Engineers in British Columbia," Canadian Collector 11 (May-June 1976):45.

It is also possible that a different English church may have served as a model for those built by the Royal Engineers. The Times (London), in an article on page nine of their 22 September 1858 issue, referred to the sending of a group of Engineers to "Frith church" to make working drawings for their churches in British Columbia. Sources in Chatham and at the Kent Archives Office all agree that "Frith" is a misprint for Erith, a community on the Thames between Chatham and London. Interview by letter with Major J. T. Hancock, Institution of Royal Engineers, Archives, Chatham, England, 9 August 1983; Interview by letter with A. J. Harding, County Archivist for the Kent Archives Office, Maidstone, England, 28 September 1983. John Chinery, Honorary Secretary to the Friends of St. John the Baptist Anglican Church in Erith, forwarded to me a local history of the building. Interview by letter with John Chinery, Friends of Erith Parish Church, Erith, England, 18 September 1983. As this was the only Anglican church in existence in that area in 1858, we can be reasonably confident that this would have been the model for the party of Engineers. Although the proportions are not exactly the same, the drawing on page 175 indicates that it is similar in style to Holy Trinity, if somewhat more elaborate.

130 James Douglas to the Duke of Newcastle, 9 October 1860, Colonial Office Correspondence, Despatches, British Columbia, 1860, Collection Number CO 60.8, P.R.O., Kew, England.
Fig. 22. Plan of St. John the Baptist Anglican Church, Erith, England. This building is thought to be the model used by the Royal Engineers for churches designed in British Columbia during their tenure from 1858-1863. Drawn from the Historical Plan in A Guide to Erith Parish Church (Erith: Friends of Erith Parish Church, 1983), p. 47.
Mary Susannah Moody, "Letter to Mother," 7 April 1858, Add. MSS. 1101, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


Ibid., 12 April 1860.

Mary Susannah Moody, "Letter to Mother," 7 April 1858, Add. MSS. 1101, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 177.

Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to Captain Gosset," 23 September 1859, B.C., Lands and Works Department, Correspondence Outward to Treasury, August 1859 to June 1864, Collection Number C AB 30.7 J9, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

Ibid., 25 October 1859.


Ibid., 27 August 1859.

Ibid.

147 Ibid., 6 January 1860.


149 D. G. F. MacDonald, "Letter to Richard Clement Moody," 23 March 1859, C AB 30.6, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

150 Richard Clement Moody, Report on Lands in the Colony, 7 November 1860, Document Number C AB 30.7 M771, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


153 Ibid., 16 April 1860.

154 Richard Clement Moody, "Letter to Colonial Secretary," 1 August 1861, B.C., Lands and Works Department, Correspondence Outward to Governor Douglas, Collection Number C AB 30.7 J7, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

155 McDonald, Thesis, p. 27.

156 Captain R. M. Parsons, "Letter to Richard Clement Moody," 1 January 1861, Document Number F1313-6b, P.A.B.C., Victoria, E.C.


159 Ibid.


Captain H. R. Luard, "Memorandum to Officers," 16 December 1859, C AB 30.6 J, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.


Ibid., 16 April 1860.


180 Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 179.


183 Ibid., (Notation on letter - initials indecipherable).

184 Great Britain, Colonial Office, GR 319, P.A.B.C., Victoria, B.C.

185 Author unknown, "Notes on a letter from James Douglas to the Colonial Secretary of 17 June 1863," CO 60.15, P.R.O., Kew, England.
186 British Colonist, 2 March 1863.


190 Downs, "Royal Engineers," p. 46.


194 Ibid., p. 248.

195 Ibid., p. 253.

196 Map of the City of New Westminster, British Columbia, L. R. Hjorth, Draughtsman. Scale: 1:4500. (Vancouver: Cleveland and Cameron, 1912). University of British Columbia, 624.9a 1910-1911c.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

Aide-Memoire to the Military Sciences. Framed from contributions of officers of the different services, and comp. by the Corps of Royal Engineers. 2d ed., corrected. 3 vols. London: John Weale, 1853.


Mather, Barry, and McDonald, Margaret. New Westminster, the Royal City. Vancouver: Dent, 1958.

Mayne, Lieutenant R. C. Four Years in British Columbia and Vancouver Island. London: Murray, 1862.


A Simple Practical Treatise on Field Fortification for the Use of the Regimental Schools of the Royal Sappers and Miners. Chatham: Establishment for Field Instruction, Royal Engineers, 1823.


Journal Articles:

Downs, Barry V. "Royal Engineers in British Columbia." 

Ireland, Willard Ernest, ed. "First Impressions of 
Colonel Richard Clement Moody, Royal Engineer, 
to Arthur Blackwood, February 1, 1859." British 
Columbia Historical Quarterly 15 (January-April 

North, M.; Holdsworth, D.; and Teversham, J. "A 
Brief Guide to the Use of Land Surveyors' Note-
books in the Lower Fraser Valley, British Columbia, 
1859-1860." B.C. Studies 34 (Summer 1977): 
45-60.

Wood, J. David. "Grand Design on the Fringes of 
Empire: New Towns for British North America." 
Canadian Geographer 26 (Fall 1982): 243-55.

Woodward, Frances M. "The Influence of the Royal 
Engineers on the Development of British Columbia." 

Woodward, Frances M. "Very Dear Soldiers: Royal 
Engineers in British Columbia, April, 1860." 

Newspapers:
British Columbian (New Westminster), 1860-1864.
British Colonist (Victoria), 1858-1864.
New Westminster Times, 1860-1864.
Times (London), 1858.
Victoria Gazette, 1858-1864.

Unpublished Material: (Arranged by Collection Number)

Held by Individuals

Gibson, E. M. W., and Miller, Archie. "Townscape as 
Metaphor: New Westminster, B.C." Paper presented 
at the 1974 Annual Conference of the Society for 
Victoria, B.C. Provincial Archives of British Columbia (P.A.B.C.) Moody, Mary Susannah. Correspondence, 1858-63. Collection Number Add. MSS. 60.

Moody, Mary Susannah. Correspondence, 1858-61. Collection Number Add. MSS. 1101.

Moody, Richard Clement. Correspondence, 1858-1863. Collection Number A-E-Or3 M77.1.


Vancouver Island, Governor. Correspondence outward, 1850-59. Collection Number C AA 10.4-1.

Vancouver Island to Colonial Secretary. Correspondence Outward, 1859-1863. Collection Number C AA 30.1 J1, J1A, J2A, J3.

B.C. Despatches to London, 1858-1863. Collection Number C AB 10.1 A5 to A7.

B.C., Governor. Correspondence Outward, November 30, 1859 to December 8, 1863. Collection Number C AB 10.4 A2.


B.C., Royal Engineers. Memoranda and Notices, 1859-1861. Collection Number C AB 30.6 J.

B.C., Royal Engineers. Correspondence Outward, July 1861 to June 1863. Collection Number C AB 30.6 J1 to J3.

B.C., Lands and Works Department. Correspondence Outward, March 1859 to May 1865. Collection Number C AB 30.7 J1 to J4.
Individual Documents:


_____ Moody, Richard Clement. Instructions to Captain Parsons. 1 September 1858. Document Number F 1148-1.


Colonial Office Correspondence, Despatches,
British Columbia, 1859. Collection Number CO
60.4, 60.5.

Colonial Office Correspondence, with War
Office, 1859. Collection Number CO 60.6.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Despatches,
British Columbia, 1860. Collection Number
CO 60.7, 60.8.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Offices and
Individuals, 1860. Collection Number CO 60.9.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Despatches,
British Columbia, 1862. Collection Number
CO 60.13.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Offices and
Individuals, 1862. Collection Number CO 60.14.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Despatches,
British Columbia, 1863. Collection Number
CO 60.15.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Offices and
Individuals, 1863. Collection Number CO
60.17.

Colonial Office Correspondence, Despatches,
British Columbia, January-June 1864. Collection
Number CO 60.18.

Colonial Office Correspondence with Other
Departments, 1858-1859. Collection Number CO
338.1.

Colonial Office Correspondence with Other
Departments, 1859-1864. Collection Number CO
338.2.

War Office Correspondence, 1858-1864.
Collection Number WO 6.212, 6.213.
Interviews:


Maps: (without illustration in the text)