FREEWAY PLANNING AND PROTESTS IN VANCOUVER 1954 - 1972

by

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"Freeway Planning and Protests in Vancouver 1954-1972"

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ABSTRACT

Unlike most other North American cities of comparable size, Vancouver did not build an elaborate freeway system in the three decades following World War Two. Rapid growth changed the city in significant ways and produced a number of serious new urban problems for civic authorities, not the least of which was that of transportation planning. The overwhelming popularity of the automobile in the metropolis strangled traffic circulation and authorities felt that freeway construction was the only practical solution to the problem. But freeway plans were unsuccessful in Vancouver because the city did not create political institutions capable of coping with the new realities of a changed urban environment.

City planning documents and newspaper clippings have served as the main sources for this thesis. In addition, other published and unpublished government documents, city council minutes, and published secondary sources have been consulted. A few interviews with leading actors in the freeway debates were also conducted.

By looking at two decades of freeway planning for the city of Vancouver, and citizen protest against that planning process, this thesis demonstrates that a comprehensive modern transportation system was not implemented because the metropolitan region lacked the administrative, technical and financial resources to achieve such a goal. Although the civic administration made constant attempts to implement specific parts of a master plan, these efforts were unsuccessful because the scope of planning was not
broad enough to consider the impact of freeway construction on the metropolitan region as a whole. This ad hoc planning process, weak and fragmented from the start, alienated many significant individuals, groups and organizations in the city and consequently produced a storm of protest that erupted in 1967 on the occasion of the Chinatown freeway controversy. The inability of civic authorities to control or direct metropolitan highway planning became evident. Senior levels of government stepped in and tried to direct metropolitan planning with the proposal for the construction of a third crossing, yet even these efforts ended in confusion and acrimony and freeway planning was shelved in Vancouver. Freeways were not built because an autonomous metropolitan agency of sufficient stature to direct planning did not exist in the city.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My special thanks to Robin Fisher for his patience in the direction of my work, and to Allen Seager and Don Kirschner for their helpful guidance. My appreciation also extends to those fellow students of history with whom I shared many trials and satisfactions during the course of my M.A. work.
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I. Introduction

Dynamic urban growth following the Second World War changed the character of Canadian cities in a fundamental way. This growth brought with it new and exciting possibilities but it also produced serious urban problems for the city and the political authorities who had to cope with the changes. One of the most perplexing problems civic authorities had to contend with was that of transportation.

The transportation problem originated in the dramatic increase in automobile use in cities. The automobile's popularity transformed the metropolis in significant ways by its tendency to disperse development. The changes produced a severe problem of traffic circulation. To solve the problem civic authorities turned to freeway construction as an answer. Since 1950, Canadian cities have followed the ambitious designs of their American counterparts in planning major new urban transportation systems based on downtown freeways. Similarly, authorities in Vancouver planned a vast network of freeways to accommodate the sharp rise in traffic volumes.

Vancouver, however, was an exception to the trend towards freeway construction in North American cities. After fifteen years of ad hoc planning the only concrete product was a large stack of transportation studies. The problems encountered by civic authorities were compounded in 1967 by stiff political opposition
that was to continue for the next six years. A freeway system was never built in Vancouver because the city failed miserably in its attempts to cope with the range of problems inherent in the process of rapid urban development.

City planning documents and newspaper clippings have served as the main sources for this thesis. Other published and unpublished government documents, city council minutes, and published secondary sources have been consulted. Also, a few interviews were conducted with academics who both participated in and wrote on some aspect of the controversy. Setty Pendakur's book Cities, Citizens and Freeways was helpful as a primary source. In 1972 Pendakur was both a leading anti freeway advocate and an eminent professor of planning from the University of British Columbia.

The freeway debate was the most contentious civic issue of its day. In the nineteen sixties, controversies such as freeways, urban renewal, neighbourhood preservation, and high rise construction, challenged the growth ethic of urban decision makers. Freeways represented a major public development that would determine the character of the city and its future. The debate pitted the proponents of automobile orientated development at city hall against citizens groups that were frustrated at their inability to influence decision making at the local level. Citizens demanded a say in the direction in which their city and neighbourhoods were to evolve. The debate not only represented a dilemma for the city in the choice of either public or private
transit, it also challenged the growth ethic of the non partisan form of civic government in Vancouver.

Why did Vancouver, unlike other North American cities in this period, not build a downtown oriented freeway system to solve its transportation problems? In an effort to answer that question this study examines the development of ad hoc freeway planning in Vancouver from 1954 to 1972 and the impact that citizens' groups had on that process.

Until recently historians have neglected the importance of the Canadian urban heritage (although, in the twentieth century, Canadians have become a highly urbanized people.) This gap in awareness has meant that urban politics generally have been passed over for the study of federal and provincial politics and subjects such as regional variations in Canada's political economy. Little has been done to compare and contrast municipal politics in Canada.

During the last half of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth century, such Canadian cities as Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto developed from intimate, closely knit communities into expanded and diversified urban areas. Between 1871 and 1901 the population in Canadian urban centres doubled. By 1921 that figure, in turn, almost tripled, reaching 3.6 million. 'Tremendous strains accompanied this initial period of rapid urban growth. Overcrowding, decaying housing and

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transportation, and poor sanitation were characteristic of the urban centre. Growth also meant a sharply increased demand not only for the extension of existing services but also a wide range of new services to assist economic expansion. A vastly increased role for city government was necessary to provide for these important new urban services, yet administrative responses were often inadequate to meet the new challenges. In response to this inefficiency in local government, a business led urban reform movement in the nineteen twenties and thirties campaigned on the platform of regulating rapid urban growth with an expanded and more efficient municipal government.

Following the Second World War, rapid growth again strained the capacities of urban governments. Vancouver had changed little physically from the late nineteen thirties, yet, over the next two decades growth accelerated phenomenally and Vancouver mushroomed into a metropolitan centre. Development was so dramatic the city doubled and redoubled in area. Such rapid growth was largely due to the automobile's tendency to disperse growth. Low density suburban sprawl created new problems for the city. By the late nineteen fifties many of the economic functions of the business core were lost to the suburbs, growth of the central business district stagnated, and access to downtown for people who had to work there was clogged by peak hour traffic jams that strained the existing road system. Like the first period of rapid urban

\(^2\)For example, see A.F.J. Artibise and G.A. Stelter eds., The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979), pp.1-10
expansion in Canadian cities, post Second World War expansion created problems, not the least of which was that of transportation planning.

A co-ordinated central urban authority was needed to solve the transportation problem created by rapid urban growth. Whereas formerly the city of Vancouver was dominant in urban decision making, by the nineteen sixties it had lost much of its status. The metropolitan region had grown into an area of more than one million people, less than half of whom lived in Vancouver. Unlike other cities in Canada such as Toronto, Edmonton and Winnipeg, Vancouver's attempts at the formation of metropolitan government were thwarted partly by a provincial government that took little interest in the creation of such an agency.

Without a central administrative authority, civic officials in Vancouver responded in the only fashion they could by instigating a process of ad hoc transportation planning. From the start, freeway planning was destined to become ever more narrow in scope since the ad hoc committees exercised no real powers to co-ordinate and administer a comprehensive transportation plan for the entire metropolitan region. The result was that for fifteen years authorities were repeatedly frustrated in their attempts to construct freeways. Eventually even the priorities of universal planning were abandoned for a piecemeal approach to freeway construction. The ad hoc freeway planning process indicated that there was no real political control of the laissez-faire nature of urban development in Vancouver. It also meant that the civic
administration was left very vulnerable to the political protests which followed.

Freeway protests, like planning, were reactions to the process of rapid urban development. In the nineteen fifties the assumption that the automobile was the only desirable form of transit in cities was virtually unquestioned by urban authorities and the general public alike. As the negative effects of the automobile became apparent that assumption was increasingly attacked. The opposition to freeways that grew in the nineteen sixties represented a natural reaction of people who, living in the older, residential inner city neighbourhoods, were subjected to the most adverse effects of rapid development. Labour, rate-payer, community, ethnic and small business groups comprised a good part of the freeway protest movement and focussed on freeway plans as yet another dangerous intrusion into their environments. The lack of central urban authority and the ad hoc planning process explains the involvement of other groups opposed to freeways in Vancouver. Many academic, professional and business groups joined the ranks of freeway protestors, not necessarily because they were entirely against freeway technology itself, but because they were appalled at the unco-ordinated planning process. Freeways were seen by such groups as a bad example of piecemeal planning and a system that was therefore inappropriate. When the concerns of such a large number of groups from across the city were ignored, opponents challenged city hall's authority to promote freeways. Citizens demanded to know how and why such
decisions were made. In so doing, many opponents questioned not only the wisdom of freeway construction, but also the legitimacy of non partisan politics at a city hall that refused to allow citizen input into decision making.

Freeways were not built in Vancouver because the civic administration proved unequal to the challenges imposed on it by transportation problems that were regional in scope. The 1967 Chinatown freeway debates demonstrated that city hall could not direct metropolitan planning on its own and the ad hoc process it initiated to do so was completely unacceptable to many groups in the city. The 1972 third crossing debates demonstrated that even with the financial and administrative aid from senior levels of government, the planning process in Vancouver was sadly outdated and badly in need of reform.
II. THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM AND CITY POLITICS

As in other cities, the transportation problem in Vancouver following the Second World War was caused by the overwhelming popularity of the private automobile. The car became the dominant form of transit for urban dwellers. It was so popular it transformed the city in significant ways. The metropolis’ size, its population density, and patterns of development, were all changed by the car. While the new environment offered considerable advantages, it also produced a set of serious urban problems due to its tendency to disperse development. Low density suburban sprawl and high density downtown growth strained transportation systems to their limit and caused a major problem in traffic circulation. Freeways were adopted uncritically as the only practical answer, yet their construction could not address the root cause of the problem for freeways still meant increased automobile use, further traffic congestion and more dispersed development. Opponents in the freeway debate demanded a stop not only to freeways but also the worst effects of the automobile in the city.

In Vancouver the debate frustrated the chances of freeway construction because it applied strong political pressure on civic authorities at a time they were already coping poorly with the worst effects of rapid urbanization. The debate aggravated and reflected the unique characteristics of local city politics. In
Vancouver authorities considered transportation as simply a technical matter and not one to be exposed to the political arena. Transportation, like land use and zoning practices, was to be left in the hands of experts at city hall. This attitude was due to the growth of a non partisan tradition in North America that in many ways took politics out of civic affairs. In the nineteen twenties and thirties, a conservative, business led urban reform movement campaigned to eliminate party politics at city hall. The considerable success of that movement had a lasting and profound impact on the nature of decision making in the city. The elimination of the ward electoral system and the professionalization of civic government meant that decisions about freeway construction were not to be discussed in a public forum. The freeway debate challenged such notions for the first time in 35 years. The freeway issue was not only a discussion of the merits of private or public transit for the city but also a revival of democratic civic politics in Vancouver.

The private automobile became the most popular form of transit in Canadian and American cities following the Second World War. Indeed, the decade of the nineteen fifties saw the rise of a veritable auto-industrial empire in North America. The number of motor vehicle registrations in the United States, for example,

doubled in the decade following the war from 34 to 68 million. The annual production of motor vehicles more than tripled from two to seven million. By 1960, 70% of all American families owned at least one automobile and spent more than ten percent of their total family income on automotive transportation. In Canada less than 10% of Canadian households owned a car in 1945. By 1950 this increased to 42% and in 1965, 75% of households owned a car. Driver licences increased by more than 300% between 1950 and 1970.

The automobile became the most conspicuous symbol of affluence in a booming post war consumer economy. Young and old, rich and poor, all perceived the automobile as the most desirable form of transport, one that allowed for the maximum amount of freedom and privacy. The motor vehicle offered convenience (door to door movement and constant availability), flexibility (a variety of goods could be carried on any form of road surface), comfort (air conditioning and radios), reliability (little affected by weather or strikes), high speed and, in the nineteen

\[\text{References}\]

fifties and sixties, low cost characteristics. From the nineteen
twenties the motor vehicle became an increasingly important form
of urban transportation, and, as the prosperity of urban
populations grew following World War Two, it became the dominant
form of transport in cities.

The automobile became so dominant that it forced the city to
shape patterns of urban development around it. The extent of
change that the automobile created need only be compared to the
kind of influence other transit technologies had on the
metropolis. Hans Blumenfeld, for example, contends that
transportation technology both determines a city's size and the
kind of urban development that occurs. Blumenfeld states that a
city's size is determined by the distance that can be reasonably
covered in daily commuting, a distance which changes according to
technology. 6 For example, in the nineteenth century an individual
could cover a three mile radius in 45 minutes either by walking or
riding. The maximum radius of a city was no more than three miles
and its area no more than thirty square miles. 7

At the end of the century the streetcar increased the size of
a city to a six mile radius, thereby increasing the area to one
hundred square miles. More recently the automobile and rapid

6Hans Blumenfeld, The Modern Metropolis. Its Origins, Growth,
Characteristics : and Planning: Selected Essays (Cambridge: M.I.T.

7See also N.D. Lea, "Toward Understanding Urban Transportation" in
Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, First Canadian
Urban Transportation Conference: Study Papers (Toronto: Institute
of Public Administration of Canada, 1969), p. 68
forty miles "or an area of 100 times as large as that of the
nineteenth century 'big city'."* In urban North America, most of
that growth occurred in the two decades following the Second World
War.

Interrelation Between City Size
and Transportation Technology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transportation Mode</th>
<th>Line Speed m.p.h.</th>
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<th>Area in sq. miles accessible within 45 min. from centre</th>
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<td>Autos on Freeways</td>
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Transit technology influenced not only the size of cities but also the kind of urban environment that evolved. The metropolis changed considerably with the introduction of the streetcar. As the city grew it was possible to accommodate an ever larger population at lower densities. Once streetcar lines were built

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*H. Blumenfeld, *Modern Metropolis*, p.123

*N.D. Lea reports that New York in 1860 had a population of two million and an average density of 65,000 persons per square mile in a thirty square mile area. The streetcar changed the city so that by 1900 the population of New York had increased to five million but the overall density dropped to 40,000 per square miles. N.D. Lea, "Urban Transportation," p.70*
population at lower densities. 9 Once streetcar lines were built to outlying areas they encouraged residential growth, for it was possible for people from these distant areas to travel downtown as easily as people from areas within walking distance of the core. Streetcars produced a "ribbon" pattern of growth that encouraged the development of a densely settled central city with ribbons of residential development extending outwards along the streetcar lines. 10 This pattern of suburban growth lasted until the more widespread use of the automobile brought about a complete change.

While the streetcar produced high density development, the automobile had the opposite effect on urban growth. 11 The automobile produced lower and more uniform densities at the same time that it replaced the ribbon patterns of development characteristic of the older city. 12 N.D. Lea notes that "from 1941 to 1961 under the impact of the automobile, the density of Montreal declined from 15,000 to 9,300 people per square mile and

9N.D. Lea reports that New York in 1860 had a population of two million and an average density of 65,000 persons per square mile in a thirty square mile area. The streetcar changed the city so that by 1900 the population of New York had increased to five million but the overall density dropped to 40,000 per square miles. N.D. Lea, "Urban Transportation," p.70


11H. Blumenfeld, "Urban and Social-Economic Development," p.31

12Ibid., pp. 12, 20-23
that of Toronto declined from 12,500 to 8,200." The automobile's decentralizing impact produced a substantially different metropolitan environment. Cities doubled and redoubled in size while densities decreased.

The transformed metropolis was characterized by new suburban developments that were of such a low density that the automobile became a virtual necessity. In Canada, the expansion outwards saw suburban districts spread over large tracts of former farmland, and in Vancouver's case, even the lower mountain slopes to the north of the city. The new mode of transport allowed the open spaces between the older residential corridors to be filled in and broad new areas up to twenty or thirty miles from the central city were now brought within commuting range and so opened to residential use. Industries as well developed in new locations in the suburbs and along highways, serving new suburban markets. The cheaper land values in the suburbs attracted manufacturers and wholesalers who followed the outward migration and brought a

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13 N.D. Lea, "Urban Transportation," p. 70


15 The boom in automobile use and the introduction of government support for housing in the mid-thirties set the stage for post-war suburban explosion. In Canada, the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, like its American counterpart, the Federal Housing Administration, encouraged the development of detached homes on large lots in low density suburbs.
percentage of their workforce with them. 16 The new suburban district was characterized by uniform land use patterns within each neighbourhood or area. Residential, commercial and industrial land uses were confined to specified areas, unlike the older city where land use functions were mixed.17 Its effect, again, was to make automobile ownership a necessity for anyone living in a suburb. Suburbia was built with the automobile in mind.

Urban growth stimulated by the automobile had a dramatic impact on the economic functions of the city as a whole. By the late nineteen fifties many central business districts were stagnating and solutions had to be found to arrest the alarming process of decentralization underway in the city. Stagnation meant that the business district had lost many of its traditional economic functions. The character of the business core was forced to change from a diversified area accommodating a wide variety of different kinds of development to a specialized commercial area that sought to compete with the suburbs through the construction of large scale developments. 18 Threatened by the loss of business to the suburbs, downtown developers intensified their efforts to capitalize on the value of their central locations and hopefully

16 Hans Blumenfeld, "Urban and Social-Economic Development," p. 31
17 Ibid.
stabilize downtown real estate values. This meant building new office complexes, convention centres, entertainment facilities and shopping malls on a scale that could not be supported in the suburbs. Business interests in the central core felt that it was only by the construction of a downtown orientated freeway network that the mobile populations of the suburbs could be funneled downtown and thus re-establish the dominance of the central business district in the metropolitan region.

The entire process strained urban transportation systems to their limit. One of the difficulties of the post war urban spread was that it separated people from their work places so that everyone had to drive. Prosperous suburbanites had to get to their central office buildings downtown, while many factory or warehouse workers who could not afford to live in the suburbs, often had to make their way to a plant on the fringes. If private vehicles had remained in the suburbs where low densities could accommodate their use, they would not have posed serious problems. The problem was that automobiles did not remain in the suburbs, but descended in droves on the central city in peak hour rushes. Every morning a flood of traffic rushed to the city centre and every evening reversed itself. It was the morning and evening rush hours that burdened the transportation system the most and caused the worst problems for authorities.

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The boom in automobile use caused the older radial street systems within cities to be strained to their limits. By the mid nineteen fifties the existing highway facilities in cities were unable to handle the increased numbers, sizes and speed of motor vehicles. Automotive travel was plagued by poor highway surfaces, increased problems of congestion and climbing accident rates. The millions of vehicular trips every week that a large city generated could not easily be accommodated in a street system that was inherited from the early twentieth century. The traffic problem of the modern city became a paramount one for urban authorities.

Freeways became the structural answer to move these volumes in and out of downtown and central city areas. Serving the suburbs by public transport was seen as extraordinarily expensive due to the spread of low density settlement. Since low density development favoured the automobile, it is not surprising that vast increases in the rates of automobile ownership occurred while transit use declined steadily. In Toronto, for example, the 1945 ratio of vehicles to persons was one to six. By 1959, it was one


21 Rapid transit technologies require clusters of high density development in order to justify their operations. As the street car needed a concentration of development along its lines so do subway or surface rapid transit technologies. Hans Blumenfeld estimates that a rapid transit line requires a population density of 12,000 to 15,000 persons per square mile, not over the entire city, but in the areas served by the line. See, The Modern Metropolis, p. 119.
to 2.9. 22 In Vancouver transportation planners calculated the 1955 ratio at one to five and predicted that by 1976 it would be one to three. 23 As transit declined it became a greater financial liability; fares increased while service was cut back. The decline in transit use affected everyone who did not have access to a car, especially the urban poor, the old and the handicapped. Lea notes that "the Canadian average transit usage in urban area declined from 220 rides per capita in 1945 to 70 in 1967." 24

The irony involved in the process of freeway construction was that it not only failed to solve metropolitan traffic problems but it also created new political problems in the central city. Given the mobility of the automobile, freeways only stimulated further low density spread and caused increased congestion downtown. The problems of metropolitan transportation were not solved as governments improved highways and built freeways. What is more, road improvements and freeway construction severely disrupted established central city neighbourhoods which were not planned, like the suburbs, to accommodate intensive automobile use. The environment of the central city became a zone of transition to accommodate the large volumes of suburban traffic pouring into the

22 Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, "Official Plan of the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Area," Toronto, 1959,(typescript),p.147


24 Lea, "Urban Transportation," p.80
downtown area. As a consequence, noise and air pollution increased, existing residential properties devalued along major routes which had to be widened, and houses were torn down. Once the threat of freeway construction became apparent to denizens of the area, popular protest occurred. Freeways were designed as high speed facilities completely orientated towards the automobile; rarely was any attention paid to their sociological or environmental impact. Citizen protests occurred because freeways meant that existing neighbourhoods would be divided or completely destroyed. Thus the most adverse effects of post war expansion became magnified in the central city areas of metropolitan centres.  

The freeway debate became a contentious civic issue because it challenged the authority of urban decision makers precisely at a time when they were finding it difficult to cope with the effects of rapid urbanization. The debate thus aggravated the antagonisms inherent in, and reflected the unique characteristics of, local city politics. On one level opponents asked simply that alternative transportation plans be considered. A more efficient, planned public transportation system was desired that did not

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slavishly cater to the needs of the automobile. The fight pitted groups that favoured public transit against the proponents of increased automobile use. Once citizens' concerns were ignored, however, opponents challenged civic government's authority to promote an automobile orientated vision of physical growth and development in the city. Opposition groups not only questioned the validity of development projects themselves, but demanded to know how and why such decisions were made; what factors were used in the decision making process and whose interest did development projects benefit? Urban transportation, like high rise construction and urban renewal schemes, suddenly became a subject of intense political dispute.

Civic governments did not consider development projects such as transportation facilities to be political issues. Across Canada, municipal governments to some degree operated under the assumption that transportation, like land use and zoning practices, was strictly a technical and not a political concern. From the turn of the century to the nineteen thirties, an elitist, conservative, business led urban reform movement organized on the local level to restructure civic politics. It became evident to businessmen that growth in the city was a double edged sword. On the one side growth indicated a desired path towards sustained profits but on the dark side it caused a series of socio-economic and political problems that could not be ignored. Businessmen saw
politics at city hall as a threat to their downtown interests. 27

One of the first goals of the reform movement was to take partisan politics out of city hall, for it, reformers believed, lay at the root of patronage and bossism in city government. Policy directives should be made along technical lines through scientific means, reformers argued, if the management of a modern city was to advance along efficient, orderly lines. 28 To achieve their goal the establishment of a strong executive that could operate with a greater degree of independence from council was necessary.

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27 Samuel Hays, for example, postulates that business interests and their professional allies came together in an effort to control the rapid expansion of the geographical dimensions of the city. With the development of electric tramways, upper class residence increasingly shifted from the central city into the suburbs. The businessman now realized that his downtown business interests would have to be protected since city politics under a ward system were increasingly influenced by the working class now that his class had fled the central core district. Businessmen discovered as well that a more orderly physical environment controlled through the efficiency methods of the new planning profession could greatly improve the performance of their companies downtown. Businessmen therefore saw that economic growth could better be predicted through the control of political institutions. The control of civic politics became extremely important. See Samuel Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, vol. 55 #4 (October, 1964), pp. 3-26. This thesis is substantiated in more depth by Sam Bass Warner Jr., "If All the World Were Philadelphia: A Scaffold for Urban History, 1774-1930," The American Historical Review, vol. 74 (1968), pp. 26-43; and J. Wienstein, "Organized Business and the City Commission and Manager Movements," Journal of Southern History, vol. 18 (1962), pp. 166-182; and P.F.W. Rutherford," Tommorrow's Metropolis: The Urban Reform Movement in Canada, 1880-1920," in A. Artibise and G. Stelter eds., The Canadian City: Essays in Urban History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), pp. 368-383

The creation of a council manager system in which a professional manager and his staff ran the city administration while a non partisan, at-large-elected council initiated policy, had a significant impact on decision making in municipal affairs. The addition of a powerful executive body and a professional civic civil service resulted in anti-democratic tendencies. The effect was to distance the electorate from the decision making process. In many ways this new form of government shifted the balance of power away from politicians and placed important decision making responsibilities into the hands of administrators and the fledgling urban professions of planning and architecture at city hall. As Peter Lupsha states, "all too often the professional manager in daily contact with the city system, with more complete information than the council, both administered and initiated policy while the council simply ratified it. Now expertise rather than political utility, reality or compromise could be used to justify decisions."\(^{29}\) Citizenship was no longer the focus of civic politics. The encouragement of growth and development became the most important function of the civic administration. The at-large election served to make representation less democratic. With the abolition of the ward system, aldermen were no longer responsible to specific groups of voters. Councils remained small while the population grew, with the result that individual neighbourhood representation throughout the city was less directly and

\(^{29}\)Peter Lupsha, "The Politics of Urban Change," Current History, p.330
effectively served at city hall. According to Lupsha, the abolition of wards produced a number of anti-democratic side effects. "First, by removing the party label, this reform often took away one clue a voter had to a candidate's policy orientation. Second, by removing in an overt way the political party's role in city politics, this reform took away the best mobilizing force for informing and involving the electorate. Third, in placing the responsibility for discovering a candidate's merits squarely on the individual citizen, it greatly raised the time and information costs of participation."  

These changes to the structure of civic politics had lasting effects for they set a mould for urban decision making in those cities that adopted some form of the system. In Vancouver, all the ingredients of the non partisan reform movement were gradually incorporated into the civic structure. Amalgamation in 1929, the adoption of the non partisan, at-large electoral system in 1936, and the gradual establishment of a city manager system in the nineteen fifties, all tended to take politics out of civic affairs and enhance the power of the executive at city hall. The city of Vancouver assumed its present shape, both geographic and social, in 1929 when Point Grey and South Vancouver were amalgamated with

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30Ibid., pp.330-31

31For a good summary of the various forms of civic executive, see Thomas Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government, pp.1-14

32Paul Tennant, "Vancouver City Politics, 1920-1980," B C Studies, number 46 (Summer, 1980), pp.3-28; and Fern Miller, "Vancouver Civic Political Parties: Developing a Model of Party-System Change and Stabilization," B C Studies, number 25 (Spring 1975), pp.3-31
Vancouver, bringing into the larger city the professional-managerial class which lived in Point Grey. This elite consolidated its position in the new Vancouver with the abolition of the ward system and the formation of the Non Partisan Association. The changes meant that civic politics in Vancouver were dominated by the Non Partisan Association for over 35 years. The abolition of wards meant that elected politicians were almost entirely drawn from the professional-managerial class on the west side while working class membership on council was almost non existent. It created an east/west split which became a structural feature of Vancouver civic politics. 33

The creation of a city manager system within the civic administration occurred in the nineteen fifties. A series of changes transformed the civic administration into a more streamlined, businesslike corporation, not the least of which was the establishment of a new professional planning department, a technical planning board, and a city manager form of government. In December 1950, city council resolved that a planning department be established as a separate department within the civic organization. The outside consultant, Harold Spence-Sales from Montreal, strongly urged that along with the new planning department, an interdepartmental body be established to co-ordinate the workings of civic government. 34

33Paul Tennant, Political Science Professor, University of British Columbia, in an interview, March 21, 1983

34Harold Spence-Sales, "Report Upon the Establishment of a Planning Department in the City of Vancouver," Vancouver, 1951, (typescript), pp.1-2 The Technical Planning Board would advise
Formerly, city council made administrative decisions and had direct control over planning through its standing committees. As bureaucratic influence increased, the standing committees declined in importance and were even regarded as obstacles in the path of smooth operations at city hall. In 1955 another investigation of the civic administration was commissioned. In their report, the Public Administration Service of Chicago strongly recommended that a city manager be appointed to handle the business of the city. City council was divided over the merits of the city manager format, and finally recommended the establishment of a two-man Board of Administration. On June 1956, despite a strongly worded petition from the Vancouver Ratepayers' Association opposing the appointment of the Board, the first Board of Administration was named.

The Board of Administration concept was similar to the city manager form of municipal government. Its inception meant that an appointed executive would run the affairs of the city. Although the idea was generally acceptable to council, a few aldermen were opposed to giving so much power to a single executive, so a two

\[(\text{cont'd})\] council on the technical and administrative aspects of planning. Board members would consist of the heads of departments concerned with the physical development of the city. [Ibid.], p.2


Vancouver City Council Minutes, 5 June 1956, vol. 65, p.470, 1.9

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man Board of Administration was appointed instead. Council members
desired the change as their increasing involvement in the day to
day administration was making a position on council a full time
occupation. Included also in the rationale for change was the fact
that aldermen were insufficiently specialized to perform
administrative and planning functions. In addition, it was agreed
that inadequate coordination among civic departments had prevailed
in the past. The Board was reorganized in 1962, when a By-Law was
passed reducing the membership on the Board to the two permanent
commissioners, John Oliver and Gerald Sutton-Brown. By the
nineteen sixties, the Board had become the centre of decision
making at city hall. Although the two commissioners were
officially equal, Gerald Sutton-Brown was the more powerful
personality. Vancouver had, in effect, adopted a city manager
system.

The major transformation after all these changes was the rise
of the civil service to a dominant position in civic government.
Increasingly, leadership was assumed by senior administrators.
Certainly reforms meant improved accounting procedures, the
introduction of modern methods and the reliance on technical
expertise, but they also meant that decision making became elitist
and the structure of government hierarchial. Aldermen maintained a

Vancouver City Council minutes, 5 June 1956, vol. 65, p.470 1.9 and
p.473 7
City of Vancouver, By-Law No. 4017, 2 October, 1962
See Paul Tennant, "Vancouver City Politics," B C Studies, number
46, 1980, pp.12-13
conservative, fiscally responsible stewardship, seeing themselves in the non partisan tradition as trustees of the public purse. In so doing, they felt they were serving the best interests of the community as a whole. City politics amounted to a system where elected officials did not see themselves in a representative role, and a powerful bureaucracy made decisions on a technical basis with only very indirect public input, so that it lost touch over time with the interests of important sectors of the community. The freeway debate brought together civic groups who were angry not only with the negative influences of automobile oriented development in their neighbourhoods and city, but also with the policies of an autocratic civic administration that promoted such growth. It represented a revival of democratic politics in Vancouver after an absence of over 35 years.

The popularity of the automobile transformed the North American city following World War Two. Transportation technology determined the size of a city and the kind of urban development that occurred. In the classic development of the North American city, the automobile caused a combination of low density development in the suburbs, high density development in the downtown core, and produced traffic circulation problems that seemed to defy solution. Urban authorities opted for freeways as the only practical answer to their problems. Yet, the option of freeways was only a short term stop-gap response because it did not alleviate the traffic problem it was trying to address. By constructing freeways authorities only perpetuated and reinforced
the automobile's impact on the pattern of development. By the mid
nineteen sixties the wisdom of pursuing such a course was
increasingly attacked by people who felt the worst effects of
rapid development.

Civic government in Vancouver did not consider freeway
construction as a political issue. Transportation was seen as
strictly a technical matter. The enduring effects of conservative
reforms took politics out of civic affairs and did not allow
citizen input into major decision making developments such as
freeways. The freeway debate not only questioned the wisdom of
increased automobile use but challenged the legitimacy of non
partisan civic government in Vancouver.
Vancouver was an exception to the North American trend towards freeway construction in cities. As elsewhere, Vancouver in the nineteen fifties was burdened with major transportation problems as a consequence of a sharp rise in automobile use and rapid urbanization. Civic officials worked intensely through the years 1954 to 1967 to implement a metropolitan-wide freeway network that would move the large volumes of intracity traffic volumes and, hopefully, revitalize the downtown business core. The freeway solution to transportation problems, however, proved unsuccessful in Vancouver.

The problem was that rapid urban growth had weakened the capacity of municipal government to respond to the new set of problems it created. Rapid growth had caused the central municipality of Vancouver proper to lose much of its former decision making status. Metropolitan Vancouver had grown into Canada's third largest city, comprising fourteen municipalities, yet no central authority was created that could co-ordinate and execute a metropolitan-wide freeway network. Federal, provincial, and civic governments had conflicting priorities for transportation in the region. Metropolitan highway policy was left by default in the hands of the weak and fragmented municipalities that had neither the financial resources nor the political will to co-ordinate a regional freeway network.
Vancouver city hall responded to this situation by initiating a process of ad hoc planning. After several intermunicipal committees pointed to the need for freeways in the early nineteen fifties, the city of Vancouver in 1954 established along with a few neighbouring municipalities, and the provincial government, the Technical Committee for Metropolitan Planning. Though it lacked metropolitan-wide representation and authority, the committee nevertheless undertook extensive traffic surveys, predicted future automobile demands that excluded the possibility of a rapid transit system, and in 1959 submitted a final report based on years of work. Entitled Freeways with Rapid Transit, the report represented a $450 million master plan for freeway construction in the Vancouver region. The freeway plans had cost the city taxpayer $1 million, though no formal public approval had been secured by the committee. Much discussion and study ensued, mainly regarding ways of financing the scheme, but the lack of central authority meant that the plans were altered according to senior government priorities in order to qualify for aid. The planning process thus slipped away from and finally abandoned the priorities of universal planning. What was left was a piecemeal agenda for building freeways that became vulnerable to the attacks of a strong anti freeway protest movement in 1967.

The approach to freeway planning in Vancouver was flawed in many ways. For Gerald Sutton-Brown and his Technical Committee staff, the metropolitan transportation problem was naturally seen in the non partisan tradition as only a technical issue. Traffic
demand estimates were the sole criteria in the formulation of the plans. The socio-economic ramifications of such plans entailed for the city were never evaluated. Neither was the possibility of implementing a transit system fairly considered. Moreover, the emphasis on a technocratic approach to planning made the process short sighted. The necessity of securing the administrative and financial details that accompany such large public projects was forgotten in a maze of statistics and cost/benefit analysis. If the metropolitan region were to set its own priorities in transportation, civic government would have to adapt to new realities. The non partisan approach to planning proved incapable of coping with a changed urban environment.

Vancouver's growth following the Second World War parallels the patterns of other North American cities. Following the war, economic development accelerated with additional port and industrial expansion. Population increased dramatically as war veterans, rural and small town Canadians and immigrants strained the city's housing resources. The disposable income within the city had grown through the war and demand for land for residential accommodation rose considerably. This pent up demand for housing was alleviated by the automobile which allowed middle income groups to flee from the crowded central city. Development was most substantial outside the city. After the war the provincial government developed the province by building roads and bridges and new facilities across Burrard Inlet and the Fraser River, which opened up vast new tracts of easily serviced farmland.
Department stores relocated facilities in new shopping centres instead of expanding their downtown facilities. In suburbia the outward migration was followed by the construction of major new regional shopping centres - Park Royal, Oakridge and Brentwood - which symbolized the maturing of Vancouver's suburban structure. Low density urban sprawl by the late nineteen fifties reached out to encompass much of the fertile delta of the lower mainland. By 1959, Vancouver's metropolitan area consisted of more than 650,000 people in ten municipalities. The municipality suffered a relative decline in political power the more the region expanded.

Expansion left Vancouver in a vulnerable position and generated the same kind of traffic problems common to other cities. The city was not able to capture the new growth. By the late nineteen fifties, the central business district stagnated as the construction of office space ground to a halt and the retail sector suffered a decline. The kind of industrial, warehousing and storage facilities characteristic of the older Vancouver, the six storey building, became less competitive as new modern facilities were built in suburban Burnaby and Richmond. Few new buildings were built downtown and the erosion of wholesaling and manufacturing employment occurred. The central business district was no longer the geographical centre in the rapidly growing metropolitan region. As the region expanded quickly to the south


See Walter Hardwick, Vancouver (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 44-46
and east, the central business district, located on a small peninsula jutting out into Burrard Inlet, became less accessible as its downtown streets became clogged with traffic during business hours, especially at peak hours. Business and municipal leaders thus became alarmed at the relative loss to the suburbs. A period of readjustment was called for and new proposals, it became apparent, had to be offered.

Vancouver city hall was called upon to rectify the problems since there was no metropolitan government to oversee regional planning matters. City hall soon realized that Vancouver would need a more professional administration to deal with the opportunities and problems of the post war years. In the nineteen fifties the professionalization of the civic administration transformed it into a more streamlined, businesslike corporation. In effect, the civic administration grew to assume many of the functions of a metropolitan government although it lacked the sweeping powers of metropolitan status. The renewed political interest in the downtown was such that the administration increasingly generated a number of proposals in the late nineteen fifties and early sixties that called for major public intervention to stimulate growth in the downtown.

The essence of civic policy in the nineteen fifties was the promotion of automobile oriented physical growth and development. The single most important proposal generated was a major new

Ibid., p.49

Ibid.
radial freeway system designed to capture the mobile populations of the suburbs and arrest the alarming decentralization process underway in the Lower Mainland. Although the freeway plans were drawn up in co-ordination with several other municipalities and the provincial Department of Highways in special ad hoc committees, city hall's influence in shaping them is very clear. The city administration also called for several other proposals that were designed to accommodate increased automobile use. A large scale publicly subsidized Downtown Parking Corporation and the upgrading and widening of major arterial routes and street capacities were proposed to accommodate the new traffic volumes. In the nineteen sixties, the city became increasingly interested in using its powers in land use decision making to create new public and private urban renewal projects so that the central business district would be more attractive to investors. These projects came from an emphasis on seeing the automobile as the answer to making the business core more accessible when, in fact, the automobile had made it less so in the nineteen fifties.

City hall was destined to be frustrated in every attempt to implement freeways because of the unco-ordinated nature of the metropolitan planning process. It was this obstacle of overcoming the fragmentation of authority that prevented the development of a clear, unified planning process and the early construction of freeways. Equally important was the need to establish control over

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Ibid.
finances. The city would not be capable of raising sufficient funds so as to set its own priorities in regional planning. Even within its own boundaries, the city could not exercise control over transit priorities, since such action would conflict with the interests of the privately owned bus system.

The provincial government balked at accepting responsibility for metropolitan highways. Under the stewardship of Highway Minister Phil Gaglardi the government committed itself in the nineteen fifties and sixties to build a vast highway system to open up the resource rich interior and northern stretches of the province. The metropolitan highway system received low priority and certainly in these years the Social Credit government's electoral support was greatest outside the metropolitan region. The provincial government did build a series of notable facilities within the metropolitan region in this period. The Department of Highways constructed the Deas Island Tunnel, a freeway southward to connect to the U.S. Interstate Highway No. 99, and the Second Narrows Bridge to connect with the Upper Levels Highway. These facilities however were seen as extensions of a provincial highway system and not, necessarily, a metropolitan one. Although efforts were made by many groups in the metropolitan area to convince the provincial government to lead the way in the formation of a metropolitan political executive in this era, their requests fell

on deaf ears.

In most Canadian cities, the process of integrating municipal functions into a single metropolitan body was well underway by the mid nineteen sixties. In Vancouver the idea had been studied for a long time but was never acted upon. A regional planning authority was finally established in 1967, the Greater Vancouver Regional District, however it lacked the political and financial clout to be effective and its creation came too late to be of any use in aiding the ad hoc planning process pursued by city hall. In

See, for example, "Canada Turning to 'Metro' But Vancouver Lags Behind- B.C. Unwilling to Force Issue," The Vancouver Province, 23 June 1966, p.1; and Vancouver City Archives, "Vancouver-Metro Government," Pacific Press Clippings (Newspaper Dockets)


The regional district concept evolved in British Columbia in 1965, coming out of discussions between the provincial government and the Union of British Columbia municipalities. The Greater Vancouver Regional District was created in 1967. The body was composed of representatives from 17 communities that made up metropolitan Vancouver. The body's role was designed to tackle problems and provide essential regional services and facilities. It was an association of communities, but the communities retained full autonomy. It assumed responsibility for regional planning, regional hospital planning, parks, water supply and distribution, solid waste disposal, sewage disposal, air pollution control and housing. The body agreed in 1970 to assume a role in regional transportation planning. The problem was that members had the option of participating or not in the assumed functions. Functions could be taken on only if two-thirds of the district Board Directors approved. In other words, regional planning did not carry with it any real powers. Neither did it have the power of taxation. See Paul Tennant and David Zirnhelt, "Metropolitan Government in Vancouver," Canadian Public Administration, vol.16 (1973), pp. 124-138
financial matters like those of administration, Vancouver's situation was different from other metropolitan regions in Canada. The province assumed responsibility for highway construction in eight of the ten municipalities, while Vancouver and New Westminster were left on their own to decide policy and pay for costs of highway construction. Although the province would share the cost of studies, it had no stated policy for the metropolitan area nor a financial apparatus in place to help in the construction of facilities.

Neither was the federal government much help in allowing the municipalities to set their own priorities in metropolitan highway planning or financing. The federal government in this period was committed to building the Trans-Canada highway across the length of the land and had no authority to contribute directly to metropolitan highways. If monies were to come from the federal government, specific requirements would have to be met to link any downtown freeway system to the 401 Trans-Canada highway that ended in Burnaby. Any additional funds would be contributed only if freeway plans coincided with plans in other federal jurisdictions in the city such as its urban renewal policy or the National Harbours Board. A great deal of money was available but it had to be used for specific purposes.

As a result, Vancouver's first attempts at framing a regional transportation plan were conducted by ad hoc committees. Traffic

congestion strained the grid arterial network first laid out by the American planner Harland Bartholomew in 1929. The initial need for freeways evolved out of a concern that Vancouver's downtown streets would be inadequate to handle the projected increase in commuter traffic volumes. To solve this problem, the first ad hoc transportation committee, the Committee on Burrard Inlet Crossings, was established in March 1953 by the city of Vancouver, the North Short District, West Vancouver District, and representatives of the First Narrows Bridge Company. In a report submitted the following year, the Committee recommended that two additional bridges be built across the Burrard Inlet and major improvements be made to Vancouver's street system. The committee's recommendations were of long term importance not only because they called for a third crossing of Burrard Inlet, a basic assumption in every succeeding freeway report, but because they also pointed out the need for comprehensive transportation plans for the metropolitan region.

The impetus of this initial report fostered the idea that what was needed for Vancouver was a comprehensive metropolitan highway system to be planned and executed as soon as possible lest metropolitan development be impeded and traffic volumes become


Ibid., pp.1-3

Ibid.
unmanageable. Other groups in the city agreed. For example, Vancouver city council was advised by its own newly created Technical Planning Committee that the improvements that the city had planned for its major streets would not be sufficient to deal with projected traffic demands and that there should be a 20-year transportation plan for the city. Influential business interests downtown, such as the Board of Trade, vigorously urged the administration to act quickly on the growing transportation problem and its anticipated effects on the central business district.

The city was therefore eager to set into motion the apparatus needed for long range transportation planning. It led the way in the formation of another ad hoc committee, the Technical Committee for Metropolitan Highway Planning, with representatives from Burnaby, New Westminster, Richmond, as well as the provincial

See "City Needs $55 million for Road Plan," The Sun, 21 January 1955, p.6

As early as 1951, the Civic Bureau of Vancouver's Board of Trade urged Council to create a new Planning Department that would conduct long range planning in traffic engineering. A priority of the Department should be to move all types of traffic freely in and out of the downtown area, so that shoppers' dollars could be attracted back to the central business district. The Civic Bureau felt that increasing urban sprawl was having detrimental effects on the central business district. Large stores were expanding into outlying areas, thus causing residential and business property tax dollars to be lost to the suburbs. The suburbanites, meanwhile, demanded improved highways, parking facilities and other amenities in town, causing increased expenditures for the city. See City of Vancouver Archives, Pamphlet 1951, Civic Bureau of the Vancouver Board of Trade, A Brief to City Council, (typescript), pp.1-2

See "City Planners Prepare for Master Plan Start," The Province, 29 March 1955, p.9
Department of Highways and the British Columbia Electric Railway Company, owner and operator of the bus system. Although the Technical Committee conducted traffic, land use and population studies of the total metropolitan region, it was limited in its authority to recommendations that would affect only the participating municipalities. Despite these limitations, the committee represented the only political agency that tried to function as a formal metropolitan planning body in the nineteen fifties. From 1955 to 1957 the committee, spearheaded by the planning department of the city of Vancouver and its Director, Gerald Sutton-Brown, undertook extensive traffic surveys, and predicted future automobile traffic demands for the area in two major research reports that concluded with a final report in 1959, Freeways with Rapid Transit. This final plan served as the master


Gerald Sutton-Brown was a notable English planner before he came to Vancouver when the Planning Department was being established in 1952. He played a major role in the push for freeways over the years. His principal ambition from 1952 to 1959 was directed at long range freeway planning. He was responsible for convincing the British Columbia Department of Highways to agree to start the series of Metropolitan Highway studies, along with neighbouring municipalities, through the Technical Committee. Gerald Sutton-Brown became chairman of that committee and its 1959 master freeway plan for the city was dubbed by freeway critics as the 'Sutton-Brown' Plan. In 1956 he became Vancouver's first Director of Planning and he was appointed as Commissioner of the Board of Administration when it was established in 1962. While members of City Council with their varying ideas about transportation came and went over the years, freeway plans lived on with Sutton-Brown's special attention. When The Electors' Action Movement swept into office in 1972 with plans for rapid transit, it was necessary to fire Sutton-Brown in order to rid the city of old freeway plans.
freeway plan for Vancouver for the following ten years. It was the last major report of its kind that tried to formulate a universal plan for the area.

The recommendations of the 1959 freeway plan were similar to other North American freeway designs of the era. The system was planned to circulate traffic as freely as possible throughout and around the city. Vancouver's plans were unique to the degree that they had to be squeezed to fit the city's unconventional geography. The committee proposed four freeways to converge on the Burrard Inlet Peninsula, its central business district. The freeways would center on a grid of four north-south and two east-west freeway links located in the downtown peninsula. In addition, the congested downtown peninsula would be emptied by a loop that would direct traffic along the western edge of the peninsula northward to the First Narrows crossing. The committee's plans thus offered a massive North American freeway system that was only slightly changed for geographical reasons. It is obvious the network would seriously affect every area in the central city, an area already very cramped for space.

The system was meant to connect with the Deas Island Thruway to the south, the 401 Trans-Canada to the southeast, the Second Narrows Bridge and the First Narrows Bridge to the North Shore.
Source: Setty V. Pendakur, Cities, Citizens and Freeways, p. 5
The committee's recommendations are important to consider for they set a mould for all future plans and implied a great deal for development in the city. Such recommendations clearly indicated that future urban development would follow the existing pattern of high density core and low density suburban sprawl. The plans also assumed that other transit technologies were not appropriate for Vancouver. In the decade of the supremacy of the automobile, such assumptions should come as no surprise. "Future traffic demands," the report stated, "have been based on the desires of the public." Yet such desires depended on what choices of transit technologies were made. If a city desired an efficient public transportation network, a blueprint for development had to be planned to complement such a system. A degree of political control over the process of rapid-urban development was needed; such was not the case in Vancouver. The committee could, therefore, easily justify the conclusion: "No form of transit can be devised which will be a realistic substitute for a freeway system." Rail rapid transit was rejected because, the committee felt, sufficient traffic volumes could not be generated along lines to low density residential districts. Yet in their estimates the assumption that most people would travel by car (on freeways) clearly biased the estimate of demand for other kinds of public transportation technologies. Instead of rapid transit the Committee recommended

Technical Committee for Metropolitan Highway Planning, "Highway Planning for Metropolitan Vancouver, Part 2 (Freeways with Rapid Transit)," p.4

Ibid., p.xii
that a fleet of buses operate on the freeways. It was the nature of these assumptions that predisposed city hall to reject other forms of transit later, since the data compiled around the freeway estimates was the basis for subsequent studies. Transportation needs, it was clearly expressed, would be entirely met by the motor vehicle.

Interestingly enough, the committee anticipated the problems that lay ahead. It emphasized that if a metropolitan plan were ever to be successful: "as it must certainly be, then it becomes evident that some administrative machinery at the political and technical levels must be found to implement a detailed programme of co-ordinated development." Unfortunately, from 1959 onwards a "co-ordinated" political effort to construct freeways proved impossible in Vancouver. For the next eight years freeway advocates at city hall tried to implement freeway plans, but were frustrated in every attempt. Over and over again new studies would be commissioned, either to seek new solutions or to revise and update the 1959 plan.

From 1959 onwards, authorities felt that the need to raise monies for the master plan was the most important consideration. The necessity of first laying out an administrative and technical infrastructure was lost in the chase for monies to pay for

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Ibid., p.68

The 1959 study was the basis for all subsequent reports that were intended to update the conclusions of the 1959 study, design small segments of the entire system, or raise monies to finance the system.
specific parts of the system. The economic recession in the years 1960 to 1963 only accentuated this emphasis on fund raising. Both municipal and provincial governments were forced to take a more restrained look at all fiscal matters, including the staggering cost of the 1959 freeway plan.

The Department of Highways, disturbed at the high cost of the proposed freeway system, commissioned the British Columbia Research Council to further study the feasibility and advantages of a rail-rapid transit system. But using the technical data from the 1959 study as its basis, the new report entitled Rail Rapid Transit for Vancouver concluded that rail-rapid transit was not justifiable because commuter volumes would not be great enough. The study reinforced the freeway concept by arguing that there was no reason for rail-rapid transit to attract any more passengers than the bus system. Yet the study used data at least six years out of date and assumed that freeways would be built in Vancouver, thus distorting estimates for rail-rapid transit. If one facility was built (i.e. the freeway), it had to affect the estimation of demand for other kinds of transportation.

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Ibid., p.20

Researchers assumed that an east-west freeway would be built by 1980 and, therefore, concluded that the cheapest rapid transit solution would be buses on freeways. Ibid., pp.3-4

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The concern over financing freeways continued in 1964 when the municipalities and the provincial government agreed to continue economic feasibility studies of freeway potential in the city. The two levels of government jointly commissioned a consortium of consultants to review Vancouver's transportation plans. The group tabled their study A Review of Transportation Plans in September. The report essentially reinforced the 1959 plan, agreed with the conclusions of the 1962 Rail Rapid Transit study and called for a 20-year financial formula for freeways to be agreed upon by all three levels of government. The consultants used the same data and assumptions as the 1959 plan, so therefore produced a 1964 version of the 1959 plan.

Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, and Wilbur Smith and Associates, San Francisco, California, "Review of Transportation Plans," Vancouver, City Planning Department, 1964, (typescript), p.x
Source: Setty V. Pendakur, Cities, Citizens and Freeways, p. 5
What is interesting in the report is the subtle criticism of Vancouver's transportation planning process. "A transportation plan," the consultants stated, "represents only one aspect of community facility planning - the circulation element affects other aspects of community life. Other goals of the community should be explicitly delineated by a community master plan." A master plan should allow the public to evaluate the impact such a system would have on the community as a whole. Without it "it is necessary that the present evaluation confine most of its attention to user benefits." In other words, factors other than anticipated traffic demand were excluded in Vancouver's transportation planning process. Any attempts at evaluating the social, economic or aesthetic impacts such plans had on the community as a whole were not considered because they were not contained within the consultants' terms of reference.

Professional advice reassured city officials that freeways were needed to solve the transportation problem. What appeared to be most important was a compromise agreement between senior levels of government to defray the cost of a system. The planning process thus entered a new stage. The civic administration felt impelled to alter specific alignments of its master freeway plan so that it could meet the requirements of the senior levels of government, thereby qualifying for financial assistance. The problem was that all three levels of government had different priorities concerning

Ibid., pp.x-xi
Ibid., p. xi

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the role of transportation in the city. Contributions to metropolitan highways would only be made on the construction of those facilities which enhanced projects within specific federal jurisdictions in the region. Likewise, the province would only make contributions towards facilities that extended its provincial highway system into the metropolitan area. These conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions were a testament to the confused metropolitan planning process in Vancouver.

The city did its best to take the lead in establishing a means of financing the first stage of its updated master plan—a freeway from the North Shore through downtown Vancouver and eastward to connect to the Trans-Canada Highway in Burnaby. Other parts of the system would have to be built later when funds were available. Private negotiations were carried out with cabinet members of both provincial and federal governments in 1964-65. These negotiations culminated in a council submission of a formal request for financial assistance to the provincial government in October 1965. The city thought that finally a cost sharing agreement could be secured with the new up-dated version of

See, for example, The Board of Administration, City of Vancouver, "Report to Chairman and Members of the Civic Development Committee, Georgia Viaduct Replacement, A Recommendation," Vancouver, 17 January 1966, (typescript), p.2

This strategy to endorse an east-west freeway had been reinforced in the two previous studies. Board of Administration, City of Vancouver, "Information Report to City Council, Transportation and Planning in the City Core Area," Vancouver, 4 February 1969, (typescript), p.6; and "Studies and Decisions 1959-67," Vancouver, 4 February 1969, (typescript), Appendix A
freeways. It sweetened the formal request for funds to the provincial government with the offer from federal Liberal M.P. Jack Davis (Coast Capilano) of $120 million for metropolitan highways if the province would match the same. Highways Minister Gaglardi had not promised direct financial aid for the development of freeways inside Vancouver. The city hoped that his department would contribute monies for facilities that linked municipalities and which were, therefore, outside municipal jurisdictions. The province refused the city's request for contributions. The metropolitan area of Vancouver provided an exception to the provincial highway system. The province refused to acknowledge that though the facilities they built were part of their own provincial system they were, unavoidably, part of a metropolitan system as well.

Failure to secure financial support from senior governments for the construction of the first stage of the city's master plan caused the planning process to deteriorate rapidly. The civic administration felt impelled to embark on an ad hoc strategy of begging monies for specific parts of the system. This is evident because the city and the province now went in different directions in freeway planning. The city focussed more on the Georgia Viaduct

See "Waterfront Freeway Endorsed," The Province, 5 October 1965, p.1

Ibid., p.7

Board of Administration, City of Vancouver, "Information Report to City Council, Transportation Planning in the City Core Area," p.6; See also "Gaglardi Refused Aid," The Sun, 17 March 1965, p.2; and The Province, 15 October 1965, p.1
and east-west freeway routes since these coincided with those federal programs that offered substantial monies. The province began studying an additional First Narrows crossing which would tie in with its own Upper Levels Highway.

From 1965 onwards even the notion of a universal plan for the metropolitan region was abandoned. As the issue of financing freeways became paramount, the nature of the plans changed substantially. In an attempt to appease senior governments, freeway consultants altered the master plan according to the priorities of those who would pay for specific parts of the system. Such a method might help ease the financial problems of constructing freeways, but it also meant that the planning process would become increasingly fragmented and narrow in scope. Not only was the process failing to consider the impact of the proposed freeway network on the community as a whole, it was even failing to consider the metropolitan highway system as a whole.

The ad hoc planning process restricted city hall's options to such a point that it was forced to adopt a secretive approach to freeway construction by implementing segments of the system a 'piece' at a time. Planning was reduced to a pay as you go process. One part of the system could be implemented and, hopefully, funds would arrive later to pay for the rest of a system. The city focussed on those routes leading east out of downtown that would connect with the Trans-Canada in Burnaby. The federal government not only offered substantial monies to the city to tie in freeway segments with its national highway system, it
also offered urban renewal funds and contributions from the National Harbours Board if civic freeway plans enhanced federal plans in these jurisdictions. The 1964 amendments to the National Housing Act authorized senior government contributions to the transportation costs of urban renewal projects. The city felt that an east-west freeway leading straight from the Georgia Viaduct along a Venables Street alignment would cross an area considered ripe for urban renewal. If so, 75% of property acquisition funds would be paid by senior governments. It consequently contracted consultants to study a new alignment for the Georgia Viaduct replacement and to advise council on major street planning in the urban renewal areas of Chinatown and Gastown. The safety of the viaduct had been questioned for a long time. It was an unsafe, older structure that even required closing at times. The terms of reference given to the consultants restricted the study so it dealt only with very specific freeway requirements. It was quite obvious, however, that the viaduct would be a critical part of any future freeway system. The consultants were asked to "consider" certain freeway components when designing the new viaduct - an east-west freeway along Venables and/or Prior Streets and a waterfront freeway along Main Street. "Consider" here obviously

Board of Administration, City of Vancouver, "Report to Chairman and Members of Civic Development Committee, Georgia Viaduct Replacement, A Recommendation," p.2

Board of Administration, City of Vancouver, "Transportation and Planning in the City Core Area," p.6


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meant that freeways would be built. Yet none of the components were officially adopted by city council. By setting these guidelines, council was committing $10 million of civic tax dollars to a project which was expected to fix Vancouver's transportation system permanently in the direction of freeway system without public discussion.

Encouraged by the apparent smoothness and efficiency of implementing freeway segments a piece at a time, city council hired another firm of consultants in August of 1966 to evolve yet another general transportation plan for Vancouver. It became obvious to the civic administration in the previous study that the approaches to the viaduct could not be designed without an entire review of downtown freeway plans. The viaduct study took into account regulations concerning urban renewal areas to qualify for aid from senior governments. Likewise, the new study was designed with that goal in mind. The terms of reference of the study were to locate a waterfront freeway and to prepare a general transportation plan that would accommodate urban renewal regulations in the Gastown and Chinatown areas and serve as a comprehensive transportation plan for the entire city.

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See Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade and Douglas, "Vancouver Transportation Study," Vancouver, City of Vancouver Planning Department, 1967,(typescript), pp.2-3
1967 VANCOUVER TRANSPORTATION STUDY
CONTROVERSIAL LINKS

Source: Setty V., Pendakur, Cities, Citizens and Freeways, p.35
On 1 June 1967, the consultants presented the plan to city council. Named the Vancouver Transportation Study, the recommendations called for a waterfront freeway that would connect to the Georgia Viaduct via a route cutting through Chinatown and from there to a north-south freeway and an east-west freeway extending to the city boundaries. Council's intention to accept the recommendations of the study created one the largest and most vocal public protests in Vancouver's history. The freeway connection between the waterfront freeway and the Georgia Viaduct was to be an eight-lane, 200-feet wide, 30-feet high wall slicing into the western segment of Chinatown. From this point onwards, the administrative, technical and economic obstacles that had prevented the civic administration from implementing freeways before 1967, were compounded by major new political ones.

City-wide freeway plans conceptualized and elaborated upon since 1955 were never implemented in Vancouver primarily because a regional political authority that could co-ordinate the administrative, financial and technical matters necessary for the implementation of a metropolitan plan did not exist. In its place, freeways were conceptualized by an ad hoc planning process that became ever more constricted over time until finally the priorities of metropolitan planning were abandoned altogether. This meant that the highway system was being designed without consideration of its effects on the city's overall development and freeways were being designed only on the basis of anticipated traffic demand.
After many frustrated attempts to start a master freeway plan, the pro freeway administration decided in 1965 that the best means of attracting senior government aid would be to alter the master plan in order to accommodate specific requirements. Ad hoc planning left city hall vulnerable to the political protests that occurred when it decided to commence construction of a first freeway segment through Chinatown.
IV. THE 1967 FREEWAY DEBATES - CHINATOWN

Freeway protests in Vancouver, as in other cities, represented an attempt by a variety of civic groups to stop freeway construction and, at the same time, to arrest the worst effects of rapid development that threatened their interests. In the nineteen fifties the assumption that the automobile was the only desireable form of transit was virtually unchallenged. As the negative effects of the automobile in the city became more evident, however, that assumption was increasingly questioned. Labour, ratepayer, community, ethnic and small business groups who were affected by such rapid changes as urban renewal projects, the widening of arterial roads, high rise construction and the possibility of freeway construction in their inner city neighbourhoods, organized to protect their interests. Other groups joined as well due to the slipshod nature of planning in the city. A great many academic, professional and finally, downtown business groups, became alarmed at the lack of central metropolitan co-ordination in planning and so threw their support behind the movement that opposed freeway construction.

The Chinatown freeway protests in 1967 were the first round in the public debates surrounding freeway construction in Vancouver. The freeway debate brought together a wide range of individuals and organizations in the city whose ideas of the city's future differed from the official public policy of
automobile oriented physical growth and development. For 35 years the Non Partisan Association governed in Vancouver. Integral to the apolitical nature of the city's constitution was the notion that transportation planning, like other major civic government responsibilities such as land use and zoning practices, was solely a technical concern. These issues were to be in the hands of experts in the planning department at city hall.

The subject of freeways was never treated in any serious way in a public forum. Neither was the Non Partisan dominated city council even fully aware of the implications that freeway plans represented for the city. Once freeway plans ran into serious political opposition, city council proved incapable of making decisions and repeatedly flip-flopped on the issues. Moreover, once the secretive method of implementing freeways a piece at a time became public knowledge, citizens' groups in the city began to organize to change the Chinatown freeway decision. An intransigent bureaucracy proved unwilling to alter the Chinatown freeway plans, or even expose the basis for decisions to public scrutiny. In the battle that erupted, independant alderman Harry Rankin led the attack within council while citizen groups organized and fought within the community against freeways for the city and the arrogance of autocratic decision making at city hall.

Opposition to freeway planning in Vancouver was initiated by academics in the early nineteen sixties. Discontent with the plans continued in the following years as traffic congestion grew, the planning process deteriorated, and an increasingly negative image
of urban American freeway construction was presented in public forums and in the media. In 1967, opposition to the Chinatown freeway was started by Chinese businessmen and local architects, who sought to convince council to realign the first segment around the district. A movement encompassing a wide variety of groups from across the city formed into an angry coalition once the secretive piecemeal method of planning freeways became known to the general public. At the public hearings called to discuss the issue, oppositional groups agreed that the city should establish a co-ordinated, metropolitan-wide planning process that could gauge the social, economic and environmental impacts of any new transit system. Citizens groups were also highly critical of civic authority that denied them input into important decision making at city hall.

Throughout North America in the late nineteen sixties and early nineteen seventies there were repeated battles over plans to build freeways through populated areas. It was common to most metropolitan regions where the plans for major freeway systems represented a drastic change to social and economic relationships in the urban environment. This rash of protests occurred at the end of the great freeway construction era when Canadian cities followed America's example in planning major new downtown freeway networks. Protests against freeway construction occurred in at least twenty-six American cities, including New York, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco. Opponents fought freeway plans in no less than twelve Canadian cities including Toronto, Montreal,
Calgary, Winnipeg, Ottawa and Hamilton. Citizen protests occurred so frequently that it became necessary for freeway advocates to consider them very seriously in their drive to construct freeways in central districts of major cities.

In certain cities, anti-freeway groups were able to stop segments of downtown freeway networks. In San Francisco, for example, mass protests were instrumental in stopping the construction of the Embarcadero Freeway along the city's historic waterfront. Similarly, in Toronto protests stopped the completion of the Spadina Expressway. In Vancouver citizen protest was so successful that the entire downtown freeway system was scuttled.

Opposition to freeways in Vancouver grew in the nineteen sixties with the realization of the negative impact that the automobile was having on North America's urban environment. Whereas the emphasis on freeway planning in the nineteen fifties can be seen as a consequence of both decision makers and the public's uncritical fascination with the automobile, this phenomenon was less pronounced by the mid nineteen sixties. Urban America had just been dramatically altered by the introduction of downtown freeways. The United States federal government kicked off the great freeway construction era with the completion of its

See "Freeways Destroy Cities," The Sun, 2 October, 1971, p.3


ambitious interstate freeway system. The American freeways were designed as high speed facilities oriented exclusively around the needs of the automobile. Little was done to judge their social or environmental impact. Freeways produced high speed efficiency but also produced noise and air pollution, central city neighbourhood disruption, human dislocation, and the destruction of thousands of homes. The American choice of freeways meant that urban transit systems declined in importance, car ownership soared, city centres became extremely congested and environmental problems developed. The drastic changes accompanying the construction of downtown freeways in Seattle became a vivid example for critics in Vancouver who worried over the negative impact that this new technology would have on their city.

The United States federal government made an offer to the cities and states of the Union that could not be refused. The federal government assumed a large role in the formulation, financing and construction of American urban freeways. In the nineteen fifties the United States Bureau of Public Roads, with the authority of the United States Congress, conducted a National Highway Needs Study. In 1958, it became the basis for the United States Interstate Highways Act which authorized the building of 42,000 miles of high quality, high speed freeways. During the next ten years more than $70 billion was spent on building the interstate freeway system; a substantial portion of the funds came from the federal government in the form of a Highway Trust Fund composed of receipts from taxes on motor fuels, tires, new buses, trucks and trailers. Freeway construction became a national priority and was successful largely due to the vast sums available in the trust fund. The fund paid for ninety percent of the construction cost of the interstate highways. See Ann F. Friedlander, *The Interstate Highway System: A Study in Public Investment* (Amsterdam, Holland: North Holland Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 1-15. For a fascinating account of the politics behind, and rationale for building American freeways, see Mark Rose, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956* (Lawrence Kansas: New Press, 1979), pp. 55-65
Academics were the first to focus on the negative potential involved in freeway construction as well as the unco-ordinated planning process that was incapable of judging the impact of the technology on the city. Criticism of transportation planning and the role of freeways began in the early nineteen sixties at the University of British Columbia. The subject of the role of transportation in the greater Vancouver region became an important focus in such departments as geography, planning, architecture, political science and sociology. Such leading figures in the freeway debates in the years 1967 to 1972 as Walter Hardwick of geography and Setty Pendakur from planning sought to analyze the changing relationship of the downtown core and the lower mainland region and the consequence for transportation planning. A good deal of research was initiated on the subject at the University of British Columbia following the publication in 1964 of the Stanford Research Institute's *A Review of Transportation Plans*. An alternative view of the whole issue of freeways was offered as early as 5 November 1964 by Walter Hardwick in a *Vancouver Sun* article. Hardwick attacked the Stanford Report on the grounds that statistics used for the study were ten years out of date, and were the same as those used for the 1959 *Freeways With Rapid Transit* report. Hardwick denied the report's claims that freeways would revitalize Vancouver's central business district and solve transportation problems. He believed that rather than implementing

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freeways on a city-wide basis, the approaches to the bridges entering downtown should be improved, while longer range planning was needed to consider alternative modes of transport.

The negative impact of freeways and the automobile in the city had meanwhile become a popular theme for academics across the continent. A number of academics and intellectuals came to Vancouver to deliver lectures and several academic forums were organized to discuss the issue. For example, at a three day conference at the University of British Columbia, sponsored by the British Columbia Society of Landscape Architects, Dr. A. Grey, Professor of Planning at the University of Washington, advised Vancouver freeway planners to learn from the mistakes made in Seattle and San Francisco. Freeways slicing through neighbourhoods into the downtown core, Grey advised, had had severe environmental, social and economic impacts in those two American cities. These views were echoed by other American urban specialists such as Jane Jacobs and Lewis Mumford.

While freeways were an important topic for research at the University of British Columbia, a number of academics, architects and planners took their concerns outside the confines of their professional guilds at the University and expressed opinions on the role of freeways to such influential groups as the Civic Affairs Committee of the Board of Trade, the Community Arts

Council and the Community Planning Association of Canada. From 1964-67, they delivered speeches on the issue to many rate-payers' groups and community clubs. By 1967 organizations that would be affected by freeways thus had access to information from which they could form alternative perspectives to freeway planning in the city.

The gap between freeway planning and citizen opposition widened in the years 1964 to 1967. The spark that ignited the great freeway debates and brought these divergent views into conflict occurred on 1 June 1967 when city council gave notice that it would accept the recommendations of the Vancouver Transportation Study which called for a first freeway segment to be built through Chinatown. Council's intention to accept the recommendations provoked one of the strongest public protests Vancouver had ever witnessed.

The campaign to save Chinatown was initially led by the Chinese Benevolent Society and local architects. Following Council's decision local architects and Chinese merchants and property owners met at the Chinese Benevolent Association building along with concerned citizens and one city council member, Harry Rankin. It was decided that a public hearing before city council should take place as soon as possible. Among the grievances cited,

Setty V. Pendakur, Cities, Citizens & Freeways, p.59

Ibid., pp.59-60

"Businessmen Start Drive to Save Chinatown," The Sun, 10 June 1967, p.1
Chinese businessmen stated that the freeway segment would suffocate the business life of Chinatown; local architects Bud Wood and Rudy Kovak stressed that the routing would kill chances of revitalization in historic Gastown; and the Chinese Property Owners' Association emphasized that the segment would result in the direct loss of one of Vancouver's most important tourist attractions. Wood noted that the restoration of the area would breathe new life into the city's dying core as it had done in cities such as San Francisco. Alderman Harry Rankin told reporters, "If the freeway is allowed to go through the area as planned, it will destroy Chinatown." The alderman said he would ask Council at its next session to ratify a public hearing on the issue.

The Chinatown protests served to put a temporary halt to freeway construction. Council reluctantly agreed to send the issue to a full-scale public hearing on 15 June. Some 70 spectators jammed a city hall committee room for the meeting and aldermen Rankin and Alsbury fired probing questions at project manager, Henry D. Quinby, on what alternatives there were to the Chinatown

"Study Halted," The Province, 12 June 1967, p.1

Ibid.

"Businessmen Start Drive to Save Chinatown," The Sun, 10 June 1967, p.1

Surprisingly, the gathering was supported by the Downtown Business Association, the Business Owners and Managers Association, as well as the Chinese Merchants Association, the Townsite Committee, the Community Planning Association, the Community Arts Council, and the Visitors Bureau. Ibid., p.1
routing. Council members were surprised to learn of the narrow
terms of reference that had been given to the consultants by city
hall commissioner Gerald Sutton Brown. The consultants had not
been authorized to consider any alternatives to the Chinatown
freeway. Quinby could only reply that the Chinatown segment was
the only answer. Freeway opponents received further ammunition
when at that same meeting of council, Quinby went on to say that
he had made no detailed evaluations or studies of the overall
system, either within the city or the greater Vancouver region.
This, he said, was outside his terms of reference.

The special meeting was a disaster for freeway planners. In a
front page article covering the meeting, city hall reporter, Bud
Elsie damned the Chinatown proposals. He noted that many of the
consultants' findings were based on information compiled from
previous studies. City council was not aware that its June 1st
decision meant that it had adopted an entire freeway plan and it
was shocked to learn how little it actually knew when ratifying
its original decision. Quinby was not concerned with a regional
plan nor did his terms of reference include the role rapid transit
might play in an overall system.

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"Study Halted by City," The Sun, 15 June 1967, p.1
Ibid.
"Civic Groups Fault Plans for Freeways," The Province, 15 June
1967,p.1
"Study Halted By City," The Sun, 15 June 1967,p.1
City council thus bowed to public pressure after hearing these revelations and decided to allow a full public hearing on the issue which it scheduled for 5 July. At the hearing, rate-payer, community, small business and Chinese organizations the most directly affected by the decision, appeared to submit briefs on the $460 million freeway scheme. A survey of the 17 briefs shows that almost all urgently requested council to extend the consultants' terms of reference to include all possible routes. The delegations attending the meeting were disappointed, however, when Mayor Tom Campbell attended less than one-half hour of the proceedings and left with four Non Partisan Association aldermen before the briefs were finished.

Public pressure persuaded city council to authorize consultants to undertake a further study of the Chinatown route that would include extended terms of reference to choose an alternate route if possible. Controversy immediately arose, however, because city hall's chief bureaucrat Gerald Sutton Brown had refused to expand the consultants' terms of reference beyond the choice of either one of two routes, both still located in Chinatown, because to do so would interfere with larger freeway plans that the Board of Administration still hoped to implement.

"City to Give Wider Scope on Freeways," The Province, 6 July 1967, p.1

Ibid.

Ibid.

Gerald Sutton Brown stated in framing the references for the new study, that the only matter facing council was to choose an alternative to Carrall Street for connecting the waterfront
"Council's action is incredible", Alderman Broome commented. "The study needed to be expanded but council made it narrower." The new study in effect would do nothing to appease those groups who feared that freeways would destroy Chinatown. Both alignments would cut through and destroy the social unity of the closely integrated community. A freeway along Carrall Street would destroy much of the commercial section and the Gore Avenue option would cut between the commercial district and the remaining residential neighbourhood of the Chinese community in Strathcona. However, the new study did serve in temporarily holding off public pressure on city hall and council to abandon their ideas for a Chinatown freeway.

The decision to commission another study halted all progress on downtown development. Progress was held up not only on the Chinatown segment, but the proposed Georgia Viaduct replacement and waterfront freeway segments as well as major commercial developments planned for downtown. Stuck in the middle of a most contentious issue, Quinby and Associates could not alter the basic outline of their freeway blueprint without another large study being done on an alternative system. Council thus received proddings from city hall staff to make a firm commitment on the

(cont'd) freeway to the Georgia Viaduct. This meant that the consultants could only consider a Gore Street alignment because other streets in Chinatown were previously rejected and any other alternative further east was outside the study's terms of reference. "Council Refuses to Expand Study," The Sun, 12 July 1967, p.1

Ibid.
Chinatown segment once the time came to do so. Bill Graham, the city's planning director, repeatedly urged Council for a decision on the Chinatown connector so that development downtown could continue.

The ad hoc planning process was extremely vulnerable to freeway protests because the secretive method of implementing freeways piece by piece depended on the complicity of both council and its administration. Once it became evident that council had not initiated the Chinatown plan nor even fully understood the significance of the route within the larger designs for freeways, the weakness of Vancouver's planning process became evident. The pressure on city council to explain its freeway plans was increased in the months leading up to the freeway debates of November and December 1967. The renegade alderman Harry Rankin fanned the flames of opposition by focussing on the narrow scope of the planning process in Chinatown. At a meeting sponsored by the Community Planning Association on 10 September 1967, for example, Harry Rankin laid blame at the door of city hall "mandarin" Gerald Sutton Brown. Rankin charged that city council was manipulated by senior city bureaucrats and he demanded that planning policy decisions be returned to elected representatives. Rankin felt that every council decision was made on the basis of

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"Freeway," George Peliquin, The Sun, 17 October 1967, p.3

"Manipulation By City Bureaucrats Charged," The Sun, 11 September 1967, p.1
what issues City Hall put on council's agenda. For example, the day council decided on the Chinatown freeway several aldermen expressed surprise to see the issue on the agenda. Rankin felt that aldermen could not prepare nor could interested parties attend, out of lack of knowledge. Rankin argued that by this method, "City officials can give piecemeal the outlines for whatever transportation system they have already decided upon - then it is only natural their future proposals will be the only possible solutions to fill in the gaps".

Protests escalated when the consultants reported back in October that the Carrall Street alignment in Chinatown was after all the best route because it was the least expensive. Confused council members, put in a dilemma of either stopping all progress on downtown development proposed by planners, consultants and city hall or facing the wrath of a growing political opposition, chose to re-endorse a Chinatown freeway route. Chinatown officials reacted furiously. Angry protestors swept through Chinatown on the day of the decision and hung black banners from balconies in the quarter to announce the community's opposition to city hall's

Ibid.

Ibid.

"Consultant Defends Basis for Choosing Corridors," The Sun, 23 November 1967, p.1

"Chinatown Freeway Route," Vancouver Province, 18 October 1967, p.1
proposal. Chinese businessmen and property owners heatedly charged that council had reneged on a promise to consult with them before deciding on the route. "The reaction among the Chinese merchants and businessmen is very bad", said Harry Fan, spokesman for the Chinatown Property Owners Association. "It's not only the question of the freeway, but the fact that Council acted in bad faith in not allowing a hearing." According to Fan, council had promised more than two months previously not to make any decision until it had consulted the Chinese community. Over 100 people representing most Chinese groups attended a Chinese Benevolent Association meeting on Saturday, 22 October, and nominated a 17-member committee to spearhead a campaign to save Chinatown. The gathering represented Chinatown's professional and business people, from the proprietor of the largest import house to the manager of the smallest grocery store. The committee decided it would send briefs opposing the decision to civic, provincial and federal governments in an effort to force the city to change its plans.

The intransigence of city hall's decision infuriated other groups who either feared freeway construction through their

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"Council Reneged on Promise - Chinese Seethe Over Freeway," The Sun, 18 October 1967,p.1

Ibid.

"Black Banners Proclaim Chinatown Freeway Fight," The Sun, 23 October 1967,p.1

Ibid.

See, Chinese Benevolent Society, "A Brief to City Council," Vancouver, 26 October, 1967 (typewritten)
neighbourhoods or were unhappy with the ad hoc planning process in Vancouver. A group of students of architecture, planning and geography from the University of British Columbia marched through Chinatown on October 19th in sympathy with the Chinese organizations and angrily denounced the decision with placards reading: "Undemocratic" and "Irresponsible" and "Is Sutton-Brown God?". A front page article in the *Vancouver Sun* capsulized the grievances of anti freeway critics wherein Professor Hardwick charged that city council had been 'duped' over freeways. Hardwick stated that city commissioners (Sutton-Brown and Graham) wrote the terms of reference for the consultants' study of the freeway locations without consulting with council or with the Vancouver Town Planning Commission, the body that was supposed to receive public input into planning decisions. He said the terms of reference made several assumptions about Vancouver's transportation needs that should have been discussed by council and been the object of cost/benefit analysis. Hardwick felt that the recommended location of the Chinatown route was virtually predetermined by the narrow terms of reference. In establishing these terms, Hardwick said, city commissioners had chosen an east-west freeway through Chinatown to connect to the Trans-Canada so as to qualify for federal funds. The final location, Hardwick

"Professor Blasts Chinatown Route - City Council 'Duped' Over Freeways," *The Vancouver Sun*, 19 October 1967, p. 1


stated, was still in the hands of the federal government, so that the commissioners made an arbitrary decision without any analysis of the social and economic implications. Council, therefore, "thought they were voting for only a small item and they have in fact given their approval to a whole system arbitrarily decided upon by officials. The democratic process has been thwarted... by people who are planning a city that I don't want to live in and that I believe the majority of citizens don't want to live in. It is a city whose downtown would have to house several tens of thousands of cars a day." He suggested that the city needed an overall transportation study to ensure that it received a system embodying a mix of freeways and rapid transit systems to meet public needs without destroying the beauty of the city. Professor Hardwick spoke for a group of academics from the University of British Columbia who were equally concerned about council's recent decision. This group, consisting of twelve professors from various departments, signed and dispatched a special brief to city hall protesting the Chinatown route, as well as reiterating Professor Hardwick's concerns in other press interviews. The group from the University indicated that they were planning to appear as a delegation before council to protest against the Chinatown freeway.

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Ibid.

See, "Slash Into City Core?," The Vancouver Sun, 9 November 1967,p.1

"City Council 'Duped'," The Vancouver Sun, 19 October 1967,p.1
Opposition was not limited to Chinese organizations and academics following council's October 17th decision. A chorus of groups, institutions and individuals spoke out to denounce freeway construction. What had been a campaign to save Chinatown now became a large popular coalition against the freeway planning process itself. It is important to note the large number of upper income groups that supported the protests. The issue cut through traditional class lines and aligned many professionals concerned about the role that planning should take in the city's future. For example, the Vancouver chapter of the Architectural Institute of British Columbia called an emergency meeting on the freeway issue and fully supported the student demonstrations in Chinatown as well as the views expressed by professors. The chairman of the chapter, Randle Iredale, told reporters: "Secret planning by the administration of city hall makes necessary this kind of demonstration. Authoritarian planning by civic officials is not accepted in a democratic community. A fresh and broad look should be taken at this entire freeway system. The terms of reference of the entire highway planning process should be broadened in scope. It is a matter of extreme importance." Victor Parker, executive director of the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, agreed

See "Chinese Seethe Over Freeway," The Vancouver Sun, 18 October, 1967,p.1

See Appendix A

"Helleyer refuses freeway cash," The Vancouver Province, 21 October 1967, p.1

Ibid.
with Walter Hardwick and other University urban specialists. He requested a halt to the Chinatown segment and asked for a metro-wide survey of the area's future transportation needs. The regional planning executive criticized the Chinatown study saying: "...the report did not do an essential thing. It did not test what is needed in the way of land use changes. It is merely based on the extention of the present into the future." The planner repeated the need to halt the ad hoc planning process in the city and urged longer range comprehensive metropolitan planning.

Protests over the Chinatown freeway decision soon began to be felt within municipal government. The Town Planning Commission agreed at its first meeting following council's decision that there was something wrong with the communication between it and city hall. Hyman Corday, one of the commissioners stated: "The city council ought to throw the commission out if it was not going to let us have a say. Either we're a body or we're not a body. We had to read of a major planning decision in the newspapers". Other commissioners stopped short of censuring council but said they would strive for more effective communication between the commission and council.

"Planner Backs Freeway Critic," The Vancouver Sun, 21 October 1967,p.1
Ibid.
"Helleyer Refuses Freeway Cash," The Province, 21 October 1967,p.1
Ibid.
Ibid.
The freeway protests had substantial effect on the federal government as well. On October 20th Federal Transport Minister Paul Helleyer came to Vancouver and was met outside the Hotel Vancouver by freeway protesters from both the University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University. He announced later that day that the federal government would not contribute towards Vancouver's proposed freeway link through Chinatown nor any other freeway construction. The Minister's statement was a serious blow to city hall since the current plans were designed to qualify for federal funds. It appeared that the federal government would renege on promised funds for the other two integral parts of the downtown freeway plans, a waterfront freeway and a third crossing. Helleyer stated that neither the Chinatown link nor the proposed waterfront freeway would be designated segments of the Trans-Canada highway to qualify for federal funds. Helleyer also stated that he was in sympathy with the Arts Council and architects and planners in the city who sought to preserve Chinatown as a tourist attraction and historical location.

The protests against the Chinatown freeway route shook the resolve of city council. Doubting aldermen again re-examined the 17 October Chinatown freeway decision. At the end of October Non

Ibid.

Ibid., p.2

Ibid.

"Chinatown choice hasty - Rankin says he goofed in backing freeway route," The Vancouver Sun, 31 October 1967, p.1
Partisan Association alderman Hugh Bird, normally a staunch supporter of the Mayor, now expressed doubts regarding the Chinatown decision. He suggested that the impasse could be overcome by appointing a new advisory committee made up of planners, sociologists and traffic engineers to study a new overall transportation policy. A few days later, another Non Partisan Association alderman Ernie Broome surprised Mayor Campbell in agreeing with Harry Rankin, normally a foe on civic issues, to send the issue to a public hearing. In a vote following Broome's motion only Mayor Campbell and two aldermen opposed the idea of another public meeting on the issue. Mayor Campbell labelled the about face by council a sham and a farce. "The calling of the meeting is a public disgrace and a tempest in a Chinese teapot." Campbell nevertheless tentatively called a public meeting at the Queen Elizabeth Playhouse adding: "Do we have to hire a playhouse to put on a puppet show for objectors? All we'll hear from are a few groups with vested interests who oppose the freeway. The expert advice is overwhelmingly in favour of the Carrall Street link."

Criticism of the planning process continued unabated in the days preceding the debates. In articles printed in the The

"Freeway Meet called by Council," The Vancouver Sun, 1 November 1967, p. 3

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.
Vancouver Sun, George Dobie, a city hall reporter, carried criticism to a new level. He wrote that "city hall planners had decided on Vancouver's two main freeway routes (through Chinatown) before a San Francisco consultant was hired to fit the pieces together around a new Georgia Viaduct. Consultant Henry Quinby's terms of reference have nothing to do with picking the freeway routes. His chief assignment is to locate and plan connecting highways or expressways within the routes picked by city hall officials." Mayor Campbell later that week seemed to confirm the suspicions of the journalist and doubting members of the council when he agreed that city council had spent $200,000 on a freeway study by Parsons Quade simply to confirm what city hall staff had already decided. Mayor Campbell in effect gave substance to the allegations in admitting that the study to consider alternatives to the Chinatown route following the June and July debates had never taken place.

Campbell received further criticism after rescheduling the public hearing to 23 November in the confined spaces at city hall rather than the more spacious Queen Elizabeth Theatre. On 10 November when he made the announcement he also denounced those aldermen who chose to re-examine council's decision. Mayor Campbell charged the aldermen with raising false hopes in public.

"How to Pick a Freeway," The Vancouver Sun, 4 November 1967, p.1

"Second Opinion on Freeway Defended," The Vancouver Sun, 6 November 1967, p.3

"Cambell blind, deaf or ignorant," The Vancouver Sun, 9 November 1967, p.1

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statements that they might reconsider their original decision if convincing arguments against the Carrall Street alignment were presented at the public hearing. The aldermen defended themselves and it became obvious that council was severely split on the issue.

Three of the most influential leading business interests in the city who had formerly backed freeway planning now chimed in and blasted city hall for the lack of co-ordinated regional planning and its ad hoc planning process. The Board of Trade said the planning and development of a good transportation system was the most important issue facing the metropolitan area. The Board said the city could not afford piecemeal progress and urged it to take the initiative in development of a Greater Vancouver transportation authority. It should encourage other municipalities to join in a petition to the provincial government for establishment of the authority. The Building Owners & Managers Association agreed with the Board of Trade. The association was concerned that businesses interested in investing in Vancouver would not be impressed by a local government incapable of making

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Alderman Hugh Bird retorted: "I think the mayor with his brash and unfounded statements has misled the public more than any alderman." Alderman Broome replied harshly: "He's just stupid. I don't like the use of Carrall, but the experts proved it was the best answer. This situation would not have developed if Campbell had made arrangements for interested groups to be present when council made its decision."See "Freeway Palavar Draws Critical Blast, "The Vancouver Sun, 10 November 1967, p.1

"Hot Freeway Parley Looms, "The Vancouver Province, 22 November 1967, p.1
basic decisions affecting the city. The Downtown Business Association agreed with the two other business organizations, stressing the need for long term regional transportation planning in the area.

The public hearing on the Chinatown connector, billed as the "Great Freeway Debate" in the press, was scheduled for 23 November in the cramped confines of city hall conference chambers. The nature of the opposition had changed substantially. On the surface it appeared that the discussions would be similar to those held on the Chinatown route the summer previous. The differences between the two hearings, however, are important to note. Whereas in the first hearings, groups centred in the Chinatown area were anxious to persuade council to re-align the freeway route, in the new hearings the arguments focussed on the nature of the freeway plans themselves, and the methods being used by officials to implement them. Not only had the subject of discussions changed but the number of briefs submitted to council had increased from fifteen to over thirty. These new groups whose interests lay in jurisdictions other than Chinatown increasingly called council and the civic administration to task to explain and justify freeways.

The 23 November freeway meeting was explosive. City hall reporter Bud Elsie described it as the "wildest, most stormy meeting ever seen at city hall." Over 500 people crammed into the

Ibid., p.2
"Storm Erupts at City Hall," The Vancouver Province, 24 November 1967, p.1
council chambers and two committee rooms for the occasion. After three and a half hours, only 1 of 20 delegations had been heard and council was forced to schedule another meeting to hear the rest of the briefs following insistent demands and shouts from the crowd. The first one and a half hours were spent on official delegations from city hall, San Francisco consultant Henry Quinby and the city's traffic director John Vaughn-Birch who outlined the factors leading to the Carrall Street choice. After this period Mayor Campbell adjourned the hearing for coffee and it was at this point that the meeting was derailed. The decidedly anti freeway audience took the meeting into its own hands and conducted discussions while council members and city staff officials retired for coffee. Critics later blamed Mayor Campbell for preparing a strategy whereby only pro-freeway spokesmen would be allowed to speak at length thus using up time to delay criticisms of the alignment until much later in the evening. In any event, the meeting turned into a shouting match and was adjourned by Mayor Campbell after he felt it had reached "near-riot" proportions.

The following meeting took place two weeks later at the Eric Hamber Secondary School where a capacity crowd of 800 met to continue the debate. Of the remaining 26 briefs nearly all

Ibid.; see also, "Freeway Foes Heap Scorn on Campbell," The Vancouver Sun, 24 November 1967,p.1; and "Freeway Meet 'A Gang Up'," The Vancouver Province, 25 November 1967,p.1

See Setty Pendakur, Cities Citizens & Freeways, p.68

See also "Freeway Foes Heap Scorn on Campbell," The Vancouver Sun, 24 November 1967; and "Freeway Meet a 'Gang-up'," The Vancouver Province, 25 November 1967
delegations condemned the consultants' proposals and city council's actions in relation to the study except for the city's own Town Planning Commission and the British Columbia Institute of Traffic Engineers. Even such original supporters of freeways in the nineteen fifties as the Board of Trade, the Building Owners & Managers Association and the Downtown Business Association withheld their support for the freeway system and stressed the need for proper long range planning.

The biggest surprise of the evening occurred when the Town Planning Commission chairman, Dr. Peter Oberlander, resigned his post after delivering his brief. Oberlander was given a standing ovation when he said he could not agree with the commission's support of the city's freeway plan. The commissioner's observations succinctly summarized Vancouver's problem in transportation planning. He indicated that he felt that the planning process had broken down since the public had lost confidence in city planning. He contended the decisions were being made that would greatly affect the city without first determining what kind of city the people wanted. "Planning is too serious a matter to leave solely to professional civic officials. Too many authorities appear to have given priority to transportation instead of overall city and regional planning. The overall plan must come first, and transportation filled into it, not the other.

"Hot Freeway Parley Looms," The Vancouver Province, 22 November 1967, p. 1

"Oberlander resigns over freeway plan," The Vancouver 8 December 1967, p. 1
way around. There must be a realistic and practical approach to
the financial aspects of the freeway system", Oberlander said.
"The city must review its role in planning, it must take planning
closer to the public."

Oberlander's resignation and the near unanimous condemnation
of freeway plans struck a serious blow to city hall's
determination to implement freeways. City council debated the
matter over the next few meetings but postponed a decision until
after Christmas. City officials strongly recommended that council
approve the consultant's report and continue with the current
studies. Council, however, rescinded its previous motion on 9
January 1968 and scrapped the Carrall Street alignment plans, thus
saving Chinatown from the path of freeways.

Freeway protests in Vancouver were aided by a planning
process that was weak and fragmented from the start. The debates
showed that the non partisan nature of traditional civic
government in Vancouver was incapable of coping with the problems
it faced in transportation. As in other cities, freeway protests
in Vancouver represented a natural reaction of people living in
the central city who were subjected to the worst effects of
development in that zone of transition between a high density core

Ibid.

"Freeways Become New Year Issue," The Vancouver Sun, 15 December
1967,p.3

Ibid.

"Council to Scrap Freeway Plans?,"The Vancouver Province, 10
January 1968,p.1
and low density suburbs. A diverse range of civic groups threatened by the rapid changes in their environment focussed on the plans for downtown freeway development as a gross example of negligent urban planning. Local groups such as rate-payers, tenant associations, small business associations, ethnic associations and labour groups were threatened by development and so organized to protect their interests. Such groups saw freeways as representing another dangerous intrusion into their neighbourhoods made by insensitive civic officials and planners. They increasingly criticized not only freeway construction, but the assumptions of traditional civic government as well.

Freeway protests in Vancouver grew to encompass groups which were angry for other reasons. For example, architect and planning associations in the city lamented Vancouver's lack of metropolitan corporate unity. An increasing number of upper middle class professional groups and individuals spoke of the need for corporate planning under the aegis of a strong political executive. The functions of local government should be unified in a metropolitan government; the municipalities in the Lower Mainland should develop in relation to one another in light of a clear idea of the corporate good. Freeways were seen by these professionals as a bad example of Vancouver's ad hoc urban transportation planning and a system that would firmly set a mold for metropolitan development in the wrong direction. Geographers, planners and architects led the way in criticizing city hall's plans, using their expertise to challenge freeway assumptions and
eventually helping convince downtown business groups that freeways were not desirable for the city.

The opposition to freeways demonstrated that the narrowness of the freeway decision making process in Vancouver was inappropriate for the metropolitan region. Authorities responsible for transportation planning had from the beginning been known for their unwillingness to let factors other than anticipated traffic demand enter into their calculations. Critics stressed the lack of any social, economic or aesthetic analysis of the impact of freeways on the future urban development of Vancouver. Opposition to freeways did not grow from a single, isolated consideration. Rather, it evolved from an open system of communication between a wide variety of individuals and community organizations. In so doing, the protest movement transcended traditional socio-political lines and ideologies.

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Walter Hardwick, Chairman of the Geography Department, University of British Columbia, in an interview, March, 1983
Freeway planning continued after 1967 in Vancouver because the three levels of government finally came to a cost sharing agreement for the construction of a third crossing of Burrard Inlet. In Vancouver, civic authorities were not capable of implementing freeways, so Ottawa assumed the lead in transportation planning for the region. The third crossing plans still represented older political priorities that did not take into account overall metropolitan needs. These new plans did not take into account the effects that transportation planning would have on land use development in the city. Neither were the plans conducted by the newly created planning authority for the Vancouver region, the Greater Vancouver Regional District. Rather, the federal government, through the auspices of the National Harbours Board, led the way in another ad hoc planning process.

Without a universal idea of transportation needs, the new studies were again left wide open to criticisms. The crossing, its location and approach routes were arbitrarily chosen, despite the implications for urban development and transportation on downtown Vancouver and the North Shore (and for that matter the metropolitan region generally). Moreover, given the charged political atmosphere in Vancouver around freeway issues, citizen input was limited to a relatively insignificant choice of either a bridge or a tunnel. In fact, the real issue at stake was that the
bridge and its approaches were meant to tie in with a larger freeway network.

Although freeway planning continued, no break was made in the deadlock that existed in 1967 between city hall and anti-freeway groups. From 1968-1972, anti-freeway groups continued to organize and to lobby the three levels of government that were busily planning freeways. With the threat that construction might actually begin, opposition to a third crossing organized a campaign and formed into two powerful coalitions that represented not only the 1967 anti-freeway groups but many new groups as well. The opposition was able to divide high ranking Liberal support in Ottawa, discredit the secretive funding formula of Vancouver city council and cause the provincial government to re-examine its reasons for funding the project. The third crossing was successfully defeated. The two newly elected Electors Action Movement aldermen Art Phillips and Walter Hardwick and the Committee of Progressive Electors alderman Harry Rankin led the attack within council while citizens' groups formed and fought within the community against the proposal. The Mayor and most Non Partisan Association aldermen supported the project, although finally, under pressure of losing their seats on council in the upcoming civic election, two Non Partisan Association aldermen sided with the citizens' groups to provide an opposition majority

The four years from December 1968 to December 1972 were critical years in Vancouver politics, marked by a half-a-dozen major political battles over urban renewal and development. Strathcona, Project 200, Jericho, Four Seasons and Arbutus Shopping Centre became the rallying cries for reform.
on council.

The Chinatown freeway debates demonstrated that municipal authorities were incapable on their own of constructing freeways to solve the problems they faced in urban transportation. Yet freeway planning continued in the city after 1967 due to an unexpected breakthrough in negotiations between federal and provincial governments to share in the costs of constructing a third crossing of Burrard Inlet. As in other freeway matters, civic authorities had proved incapable of raising the necessary funds, though a third crossing had been in the freeway plans for Vancouver as early as 1954 and was an integral part of every succeeding downtown freeway plan.

These negotiations, carried on at a level above municipal politics, came at a time when the city's own plan for freeways was being blocked by stiff public opposition. Just at a point when anti freeway groups felt that they had forced city council to abandon its freeway plans, the push for freeway construction received further backing by senior government contributions and the responsibility for metropolitan planning was taken out of the hands of municipal authorities. The formula for funding the construction of a third crossing took six years to finalize and offered freeway consultants yet another spree of work as they proposed a new system of freeways for Vancouver.

In 1965 funding for a third crossing became a top priority of the federal government. Coast Capilano M.P. Jack Davis stated, in a pre-election promise, that the federal government would contribute to a new crossing if the bridge became part of the TransCanada Highway system and was connected to it. Vancouver's Mayor Bill Rathie was much in favour of a new freeway system, including a
The cost of the project, estimated in 1970 prices at roughly $190 million, was to be divided between the city, the north shore municipalities, the provincial government and the federal government, with Ottawa providing most of the funds. The acceptance of the greater part of fiscal responsibility meant that metropolitan transportation policies would now be decided by the federal government under the auspices of the National Harbours Board. Up to this time, a third crossing had been an integral part of a downtown freeway system proposed by city hall, plans that had had as their kingpin the construction of the Chinatown segment. With the lack of decision on the part of city council in 1967, the emphasis in the new year shifted to the crossing design as top priority, and the rest of the freeway system would be contingent on the construction of this most expensive segment.

Early in the new year the Harbours' Board Technical Committee hired Swan Wooster Company to design the crossing at first narrows and the necessary approaches and freeway links. The consortium of

(cont'd) proposed third crossing. See "Fifty Million Seen for Crossing,"The Vancouver Province, 9 November 1965, p.1. In search of funds Rathie was enthusiastic about the federal offer and felt that the contribution could come through the National Harbours Board to boost waterfront development as it had already done in Montreal and Saint John. See, "Six-Lane Freeway is Rathie's Plan,"The Vancouver Province, 21 October 1965, p.1 The municipalities of Vancouver, the North Shore District, and West Vancouver unanimously endorsed the federal proposal and demanded that Premier Bennett co-operate. See "Aldermen will Ask Bennett to reroute Trans-Canada,"The Vancouver Sun, 21 January 1966, p.3. Finally in 1967 the federal and provincial governments agreed to share in the costs of the structure which set the stage for another spree of freeway planning.

See "Freeway Study Continuation Proposed by City Officials,"The Vancouver Sun, 8 January, 1968, p.3
consultants worked discreetly. They were instructed to produce a plan that would offer several alternative approaches that would fit in with a six lane bridge or a tunnel, and that would later be submitted to the municipal councils on the south and north sides of Burrard Inlet. The consultants most sensitive political issue, then, was to design approaches and alignments that would be readily acceptable to all the municipalities concerned. The project as a whole was to be conducted under a tight schedule, with the approach studies completed early in 1969 for quick ratification.

The studies' terms of reference were broader than former Vancouver freeway plans. The consultants were to be more sensitive to aesthetic and environmental considerations. In addition, they offered alternative plans for a bridge or a tunnel, each containing six highway lanes and a provision for a rapid transit corridor. But it was still transportation planning that did not consider its effects on land use development in the city. Since there was little difference between the cost of a bridge and that of a tunnel, the consultants recommended: "...that all available factual information on both schemes be laid before local civic bodies and citizens' organizations with the request that, after


Ibid., p. 74

study, these groups express their views on the choice in formal briefs to the National Harbours Board or to the Board's consultants. In this way, a consensus of local opinion may be developed before a final crossing selection is made." In other words, the crossing, its location and approach routes were predetermined and citizen participation would be limited to a choice of either a bridge or tunnel. Moreover, the study outlined extensive systems of highway approaches on either end of the crossing, that could be tied in with a revived freeway system.

The first signs of political controversy began in the summer and fall of 1968. The National Harbours Board insisted that the consultants obtain a final decision from city council on the location of at least the first stage of a link between the third crossing and the Trans-Canada Highway, so that all other study proposals would be kept on schedule. Thus, the crossing was being used as a lever to force a bewildered city council to make a decision on a route for a downtown east-west freeway. Council had taken a public battering on the former Chinatown freeway plans and so, a mere six months later, was unwilling to accept such conditions.

The suspicion of certain members of city council about where freeway planning was headed was heightened further in September 1968 when Mayor Campbell, on his own initiative and without

Swan Wooster, "Burrard Inlet Crossing," Vol. 3, paragraph 1.44

See The Vancouver Province, 3 July 1968, p.1

Ibid.
approval by council, hired N.D. Lea and Associates, a firm already acting as sub-consultants on the third crossing, to study the best means to link the crossing with the Trans-Canada and Deas Island Expressway. Aldermen Rankin and Alsbury remarked the next day in the press that they felt that something was seriously amiss since, at the first of the year, after rescinding the Chinatown freeway decision, council had allowed studies to continue on the understanding that they were for study purposes only. Council, the aldermen argued, was not being kept informed on freeway decisions.

The freeway plans became a public issue again in the spring of 1969 when city council was requested to ratify specific approach routes to a third crossing. The National Harbours Board consultants completed their studies in March 1969 and offered a choice of 30 alternative alignments for the Vancouver approaches. After a preliminary briefing, the consultants asked council to make a decision on one approach by 15 May so that other freeway plans could continue on schedule. The consultants also favoured and advised council to approve it. A week before the 15 May deadline, council met for a lengthy discussion of the proposals.

"Mayor Hires Firm to Study Freeways," *The Vancouver Sun* 18 September 1968, p.3

Ibid.

Swan Wooster, "Burrard Inlet Crossing Project, City of Vancouver Approaches," p.38 and detailed routes, p.2

Ibid., p.38
but was unable to reach a decision. After the meeting, Mayor Campbell stated that council would need more time. The consultants, however, were angered by council's latest indecision. Frank Leighton, project manager, stated that the project was already two months behind on a strict schedule set by the federal government, and that consultants' pampering of council could not continue. "The last thing we want Council to think is that we are putting a squeeze on them," Leighton stated, "but we feel we can't afford to mess around much longer." Having realized the delicacy of freeway issues in Vancouver, Mayor Campbell was quick to retort "We're dealing with 300 to 400 million dollars and the future of Vancouver. I think it's best to take the time to make the right decision. Council is making the decision of where, when and why. The engineering firm is simply supposed to advise us, not tell us what to do and when."

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"Council rapped for Delay in Picking Approach Route," The Vancouver Sun, 9 May 1969,p.1

Ibid.

"Campbell Criticizes Criticism," The Vancouver Sun, 10 May 1969,p.1 and "City Taking Preliminary Look at Freeway Plans," The Vancouver Province, 16 April 1969, p.1
1969 THIRD CROSSING APPROACHES IN VANCOUVER

Sources: Seety V. Pendakur, Cities, Citizens and Freeways, p.42
Council's hesitation was based on the belief that certain interested civic groups should be allowed to voice their concerns. It agreed that a final decision would be made after hearing from the Vancouver Board of Trade, the Chinese Benevolent Association and the Citizens Council on Civic Development. This strategy to include consideration from groups outside government only increased the acrimonious atmosphere. At the 22 May council meeting, not three but twelve delegations appeared to voice their grievances. The Chinese Benevolent Association made it clear that it was opposed to any freeway routing in the Chinatown area and therefore objected to the Gore Avenue segment in the new plans. The Citizens' Council on Civic Development also condemned the new plans. The Citizens' Council had grown to encompass many of the leading anti freeway groups of 1967. In its brief it stated that

"Council to decide Thursday on Route to Inlet Crossing," The Vancouver Sun, 16 May 1969, p. 3

"Decision on New Crossing Delayed By Council," The Vancouver Province, 23 May 1969, p. 1

Opposition continued to organize in the years 1968 to 1972 and pressure the three levels of government to abandon their plans for freeways. The group calling itself Vancouver Tommorrow represented many of the academics who opposed freeways in 1967 and continued to hold forums into 1968. Its original purpose to seek better input of citizen opinion into public decision making became larger in focus in 1968 and took on the trappings of a political party. At a conference called in March by the group, a great variety of interest groups met for three days to draft responses to what they perceived as authoritarian policy planning at city hall. Out of these proceedings the Citizens Council on Civic Development was born. See City of Vancouver Public Archives, Pamphlet 1968-108, Vancouver Tomorrow Conference: Proceedings (typescript), 1968. The proceedings called for sweeping changes in the city's civic structure that would allow more emphasis to be put on aesthetic, social and environmentalist concerns.
at a recent gathering called to discuss the Burrard Inlet crossing, over 300 citizens had attended, representing a wide variety of groups who were all opposed to the crossing. The group called on city council to delay its decision and urged the federal and provincial governments to reallocate funds away from the project and into others that provided "transportation along routes of the greatest demonstrated need."

Other groups that attended the special meeting of council also opposed the project. Ratepayers groups were especially upset at the cost of an entire freeway system. The Downtown Business Association backed off from supporting the new freeway plans. The association's brief stressed that the city should examine the total transportation needs of Vancouver and region in all its facets and with total costs clearly stated and explained. After such an examination, development of rapid transit and new arterial routes should be financed regionally. The Vancouver and District Labour Council, representing thousands of trade unionists in the city, urged council to defer its decision until after a rapid


Spokesmen for the Cassiar Ratepayers lamented the large cost which would mortgage future government spending on transportation facilities rather than other public services. The Central Council of Ratepayers agreed and stressed the alternative to freeways: "Rapid transit must have the first priority. City council must not commit itself to spending such a vast sum of money on schemes designed to serve, at best, some 35,000 to 40,000 people on the North Shore." See, The Vancouver Province, 23 May 1969, p.1

Ibid.
transit system was in operation. The Labour Council endorsed a resolution that called for a delay until rapid transit was established, cost-sharing agreements were finalized on the approaches to the new crossing and public hearings had been held on these issues. The executive director of the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board accused city council of failing to co-operate with other planning boards on a comprehensive master development plan for the metropolitan region. Victor Parker claimed that it was council's obsession with freeways which had caused it to lose sight of long term strategy in favour of day-to-day ad hoc decisions. Parker called for an end to short term decisions without a master plan since council had no criteria for judging such projects. Only the Vancouver Board of Trade and the British Columbia Automobile Association agreed with the new plans at the special council hearing.

Despite the many groups that opposed the idea of a third crossing, city council finally accepted in principle the new design on 26 June 1969. Ottawa's pledge to deliver a third crossing appeared to inch that much closer to reality and consultants were freed to complete all aspects of their studies of a freeway system based around a third crossing.

"Delay Suggested on Freeway Plans," The Vancouver Sun, 7 May 1969, p.1

"Top Planner Points Finger At City Council," The Journal of Commerce, 28 June 1968, p.1

Ibid.
The next hurdle for the ad hoc planning process was a decision from the municipal councils on whether they favoured a tunnel or a bridge as the third crossing. In March 1971 the mayors of Vancouver and North Shore municipalities decided that they preferred a tunnel and that they would be seeking ways of raising funds for their shares from municipal funds. In late 1971, all that was left to be done before actual construction of the crossing was devising a politically acceptable method for participating municipalities to raise their contributions for approaches. The $1.5 million needed by the North Shore municipalities was quickly raised, yet Vancouver's share of the $12.2 million proved to be much more difficult to come by.

Vancouver city council was in a dilemma because the required sum could not come out of general revenues. Precedents on special road construction stipulated that any large expenditures had to be approved by taxpayers in a special money referendum. Considering the mounting opposition to a third crossing in late 1971, the prospect of attaining the approval of 60% of property owners appeared unlikely. The issue of how to raise monies provoked controversy in council. Alderman Hardwick stressed the sum could not be raised out of general revenues and council had a moral

See Bridge or Tunnel for Third Crossing?," The Vancouver Province, 24 February 1971,p.3

See "Third Crossing Decision Set," The Vancouver Province, 20 March 1971,p.3

"Stand on Tunnel Payments Approved for Districts," Lions Gate Times, 2 December 1971,p.1
obligation to present the question in a plebiscite. Alderman Rankin accused Mayor Campbell of planning to obtain the funds "out of general revenue in bits and pieces over the next several years." Rankin felt that city council would sneak the decision through while people were busy with pre-Christmas activities. Rankin promised to press the issue at the next council meeting and to demand a money by-law plebiscite as required by the city charter if a decision were made to use the general revenue avenue.

Rankin's signal of the Mayor's intent served as an alarm to all organizations in the city that opposed freeway construction. Anti freeway forces in the city again organized a campaign to defeat the project. At least 16 requests were presented to council in December demanding a public hearing on the proposal. These groups included the Citizens' Council on Civic Development (a group representing all areas of the city) the West End Community Council, the Vancouver and District Labour Council and the newly formed Citizens' Committee for Public Transit. The principal

See The Vancouver Sun, 25 November 1971,p.1
"Council Will Sneak Third Crossing Through," The Vancouver Province, 16 December 1971,p.1
Ibid., p.7
"Crossing Plans Face Growing Opposition," The Vancouver Province, 18 December 1971,p.3
Ibid.
organization to lead the way in opposition in the weeks and months ahead was the Citizens' Committee for Public Transit.

The Citizens' Committee for Public Transit was formed at the behest of the Vancouver Tenants' Association and the Citizens' Council on Civic Development. The group was formed following a successful meeting held at the Vancouver City College, Langara Campus, in late May when groups from across the city met over the issue of public transit. The immediate objective of this group was to start a campaign in the Greater Vancouver region to accept public transit as a priority in regional transportation. The group was subsequently joined by other community groups in the central city, mainly representatives of the city's ratepayers associations. Another conference was called at the Grandview Community Centre on 2nd October 1971. That conference proved a success once again as over fifty organizations sent delegates to discuss the need for public transport. Key speakers at the conference included Alderman Harry Rankin, Dr. Setty Pendakur, outspoken freeway opponent from the 1967 Chinatown debates, and John Lecky, Chairman of the city's own Town Planning Commission. The most influential speaker at the conference was Toronto Architect, Colin Vaughn, who came especially to address the conference on the means by which Toronto citizens were successful in stopping the partially completed Spadina Freeway after $60 million had been spent on the project. Vaughn's advice to the

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See "Battle Launched Against Freeway," The Vancouver Sun, 4 October 1971, p.3
delegates provided a political format for the Committee. He told those present "to keep opposition factual and unemotional, do lots of research, keep the organization unstructured and non-partisan and stick to one issue." Vaughn's seminars called attention to the example of freeways in the United States. They destroyed downtown areas as places where people could decently live. "Take Detroit - an entire city has been turned over to the automobile. In Los Angeles, 70% of the downtown land area is devoted to streets, parking, gas stations, and other automobile-oriented uses. Only 30% is left for people."

The conference finished with a policy statement on public transit. The proposals called for an end to freeway plans from north, east and south that lead into and through Vancouver's downtown area, as well as the east-west freeway, as proposed in the 1971 N.D. Lea's East Approach Route Report, and the third crossing of Burrard Inlet. The policy statement also demanded that "all public transportation in the Greater Vancouver Area be provided by a single agency, that the agency should have authority over the entire region and that it should be responsible to the regional level of government." By December 1971 the Committee

See "Freeways Destroy Cities," The Vancouver Sun, 2 October 1971, p.3

Ibid.

See City of Vancouver Archives, Pamphlet 1971, Bruce Yorke, President, Citizens' Committee for Public Transit, (typescript) 2 October 1971, p.1

Ibid.
represented more than fifty community organizations in the city.

At the 21 December council meeting, pro and anti freeway forces squared off in city hall chambers to discuss the third crossing proposal. The public galleries in the council chamber were packed when Mayor Tom Campbell called the meeting to order. Sixteen requests from groups and individuals were received before council met in the regularly scheduled meeting. After an angry two hour debate council formally approved to allocate $3.4 million in the first year toward the approach routes by a narrow vote of 6 to 5.

The decision provoked the opponents of the crossing into organizing a concerted public relations campaign to win back its losses suffered in the Council chambers. The Vancouver and District Labour Council sped off a telegram to Transport Minister Don Jamieson, asking him to settle the dispute over the crossing by calling a series of public debates and to determine the

Of the groups opposing the crossing The Sierra Club of British Columbia, The Committee of Progressive Electors (C.O.P.E.), The Electors' Action Movement (T.E.A.M.), The Community Planning Association of Canada, British Columbia Division Community Council, The Citizens' Council on Civic Development, The Citizens' Committee for Public Transport, and the District Labour Council of British Columbia, all wanted the decision to be put off and a plebiscite called. See,"Rathie Asks Silent Majority to Save Inlet Crossing Plan," The Vancouver Sun, 22 December 1971,p.1. In favour of the decision were the five Non Partisan Association council members and the Mayor. Those opposing were NPA Aldermen Linnell and Calder, TEAM aldermen Hardwick and Phillips and COPE's Harry Rankin. By the same margin, council decided not to hold a plebiscite on the issue and not to have a public hearing, despite formal requests from sixteen community groups who opposed the project. See,"City Gives Green Light to Tunnel," The Vancouver Province, 22 December 1971,p.1
feasibility of the entire crossing project. Secretary Paddy Neale stated that the District Council would seek legal aid in an attempt to overturn the decision to go ahead with the $3.4 million approaches. At the same time, a group of more than thirty architects and planners, including senior University of British Columbia professors, sent a telegram to Prime Minister Trudeau, Vancouver city council, Premier Bennett, and Federal Ministers Robert Andras, Arthur Laing and Jack Davis. The telegram stated that the crossing was insensitive, ill-advised, made only to assure Jack Davis' re-election, and that social unrest would ensue in Vancouver. The group felt that public hearings should be called immediately.

The Citizens' Committee For Public Transit became the leading co-ordinating organization for the forces opposing the third crossing. It announced that it would start a drive to gather more than 20,000 signatures for a petition to demand a plebiscite. Along with the signature drive, spokesman Bruce Yorke said the organization along with other groups would sponsor a public

"Labour Out to Upset Decision on Crossing," *The Vancouver Province*, 22 December 1971, p.3

Organized labour, composed of largely East Side residents, opposed the scheme on the basis that it would divide the City with freeways and benefit only North Shore residents. *Ibid.*, p.3

See "Inlet Crossing Faces Big Fight," *The Vancouver Province*, 21 December 1972, p.1

"Tunnel Attackers Dig In," *The Vancouver Province*, 8 January 1972, p.1
meeting on the issue. On Sunday 17 January, more than 800 opponents of a third crossing filled the Queen Elizabeth Playhouse, but the politicians and consultants invited to speak in support of the scheme were notably absent. As the two and a half hour meeting progressed, the crowd listened to a dozen speakers call for a Lower Mainland plebiscite on the proposed crossing and public hearings designed to examine a total rapid transit scheme for the area. Elated by the high spirits of the meeting opponents took to downtown streets, gathering signatures for a petition to federal, provincial and municipal governments urging a plebiscite.

As petitions grew and opinions on the cost, viability and need of a third crossing became ever more polarized, differing opinions surfaced among Liberal Cabinet Ministers in Ottawa. At the end of January just before a federal cabinet reorganization for the election year, Urban Affairs Minister, Robert Andras, made non commital statements regarding the project. Andras stated that the federal government was not committed to building the proposed third crossing. "There has not been a federal policy decision with regard to the...crossing and that is a fact....we were committed

Co-sponsoring the meeting were the new municipal political party TEAM, the Community Planning Association of Canada, the West End Community Council, Architect Geoff Massey and other groups. Ibid.

See "Mayor, Aldermen Stay Away from Third Crossing Critics," The Vancouver Sun, 17 January 1972,p.1

A week after the forum, 6,500 names had been gathered for the petition. See "Petition Grows," The Vancouver Province, 31 January 1972,p.3. By the 15 February deadline over 21,000 signatures had been gathered and signatures continued to accumulate.
only to the study." Andras stated that his office had received extensive correspondence about the project from Vancouver groups and "we are telling them that the decision has not been made."

Andras, at the same time, remarked that Transport Minister Don Jamieson, whose department would spend the money, had stated that no federal financial commitment had yet been given, and that the decision depended on fund appropriation in cabinet. Andras stunned local advocates of the project further by stating that his staff was currently studying urban transportation needs that de-emphasized the automobile. "General Motors, Chrysler and Ford have done more to shape the North American city than any level of government until now," he said. Several days later Public Works Minister, Arthur Laing, hinted that the proposed new crossing of Burrard Inlet lacked enough public support to justify it. "It is a split", Laing said, "look at the city council vote, it was very close, only 6-5 in favour." There is "no heavy consensus" in favour of the $177 million project. Following a cabinet reshuffle in Ottawa, Ron Basford, the new Minister of Urban Affairs and M.P.

"Ottawa Report Crosses Up Crossing Advocates," The Vancouver Province, 27 January 1972,p.1

Ibid.,p.3

"Laing wonders who wants crossing," The Vancouver Province, 29 January 1972,p.1

Ibid. He went on to say, "I have heard an engineering expert from the United States say here that the last thing we need is another crossing. We are considering here a tremendous amount of money. There is a rising view that premier attention should be given to rapid transit. People are beginning to think that unless rapid transit comes in for the large numbers of people, we are going to choke our city."
representing Vancouver Centre, a riding in which all of the south approaches to the crossing would run, declined to support the crossing. Basford stated that a plebiscite was needed before construction of the Burrard Inlet Crossing and a system of feeder freeways. Basford went on to say that although he had supported the project he was now "re-examining" his thought.

The non-committal comments from Ottawa had their effect on local crossing advocates. On 28 January, Bill Rathie, co-ordinator of the crossing for the National Harbours Board, stated that he thought it was now necessary to hold a plebiscite in order to "clear the decks" over the issue. "For heaven's sake", Rathie commented, "unless we're going to get along with this scheme we're just going to be sitting around twiddling our thumbs." Asked whether the federal cabinet would go ahead with the crossing without a plebiscite, Rathie stated "I'm very much afraid they won't. I don't see how they can. Would you, as a Member of Parliament or a Cabinet Minister, without a clear expression from the people? I wouldn't. I would simply say, well, what do the

See "Basford Favors Plebiscite," The Vancouver Province 3 February 1972, p.1

Ibid.

Rathie felt that the three North Shore municipalities as well as Vancouver should be included in a plebiscite wherein a simple majority of the combined vote would win. See "Crossing Plebiscite Needed," The Vancouver Sun, 28 January 1972, p.1

Ibid.
people want?"

The comments from fellow cabinet ministers infuriated Jack Davis, the original political advocate of the scheme and the only remaining Member of Parliament from Greater Vancouver who favoured the crossing. The federal government did not require a plebiscite in Vancouver and the three North Shore municipalities as a prerequisite for funds, Davis stated in Vancouver on 5 January. Transport Minister Jamieson, in charge of spending for the project, indicated the federal government would only make a decision following an agreement by the three British Columbia cabinet ministers on the issue.

Having driven a wedge between high ranking Liberal support for the crossing, opponents in February stepped up their campaign to influence municipal and provincial governments to hold public hearings and a plebiscite. Strengthened by a steady flow of signatures, the Citizens' Council for Public Transit prepared plans to influence Vancouver aldermen to place notices of motion in council to allow for special night hearings on the issue. The committee as well as the North Shore Transportation Committee planned to take the signatures they had accumulated to Victoria on

Ibid.

See "Ottawa Won't Require Crossing Plebiscite, Says Davis," The Vancouver Province, 5 February 1972,p.1. Davis was in the City to attend a meeting on the third crossing convened by Mayor Campbell and the other municipalities involved in the project. Campbell called the special meeting in response to Bill Rathie's comments that a plebiscite was needed before Ottawa would contribute.

"Night Hearing Sought on Crossing," The Vancouver Sun, 1 February 1972,p.1
21 February to put pressure on the provincial cabinet.

The strategy to influence council was given another boost on 3 February when Alderman Bird, who had voted in council against the holding of a plebiscite on the proposed third crossing, said that he had changed his mind. He said he had been forced into the new stance by the remark of Port Authority Bill Rathie that federal funds would not likely be granted without a plebiscite. A few days later Alderman Hardwick put a motion to council to reopen the debate on the proposed third crossing. Non Partisan Association aldermen were split over the issue. Council endorsed Hardwick's motion by another narrow vote of 6-5 which called for an evening meeting of council at which "substantive information" on the question would be presented by National Harbours Board Consultants and professional planning and engineering groups. The packed public gallery at city hall burst into applause as the result of the vote was announced. The Vancouver Sun hailed the decision as a "tactical victory" for opponents of the crossing. Thus, the strategy of delaying as long as possible on a decision to

"Petition for Crossing Vote 'Totals 14,000 signatures'," The Vancouver Sun, 15 February 1972,p.1. The organization grew in numbers of groups as well. By 1 of February it was comprised of representatives from 35 organizations. "A Super White Elephant," The Vancouver Province, 12 February 1972,p.1

"Bird swings to back vote," The Vancouver Province, 3rd February 1972,p.1

"Moral Victory for Opponents - Council Okays Debate on Crossing," The Vancouver Sun, 8 February 1972.,p.1

"Third Crossing Hearing Gets Council approval," The Vancouver Province, 9 February 1972,p.1
start construction of the project so that pressure on the various
governments would mount received further endorsement.

The following day Mayor Campbell, frustrated with the
setback, helped torpedo the entire project with verbal overkill
when he announced that a third crossing was being sabotaged by
"Maoists, Communists, pinkos, left-wingers and hamburgers."
Campbell stated that the project would flounder unless the entire
city council rallied in support. The Mayor was obviously shaken by
the vote the night before when an unexpected combination of
Aldermen, including Alderman Broome, on whose support he had
counted, supported the motion to re-open discussion on the
project. Broome is "very unpopular around here," commented the
Mayor. He added, "If I was the federal and provincial governments,
with the amount of dissent evident in Vancouver, I'd back off. I
think the opponents of the crossing have been successful. It's
been wrecked. It's a sinking cause." The Mayor went on to say,
however, that a public hearing would be held within the following
three weeks at the Queen Elizabeth Theatre.

Crossing opponents scored another 'moral' victory in North
Vancouver's city council a week later. On 15 February the council
reversed a December 1971 vote that rejected a crossing plebiscite
and voted unanimously to submit the issue to a public hearing. The
reversal came after council heard from several anti crossing

"Maoists, pinkos, hamburgers," The Vancouver Sun, 9 February
1972, p. 1

Ibid.
groups, most notably the North Shore Transportation Committee, the North Vancouver Tenants' Association, the North Vancouver branch of the Society for Pollution and Environmental Control, the New Democratic Party's North Shore Community Action Committee, and a crowd of 120 supporters. The council's reversal came after the results of an election in the new year that added two new aldermen, both opponents of the crossing, thereby splitting the council down the middle on the issue. In the same week the West Vancouver city council decided to open up the issue of the crossing to a public hearing scheduled for 4 March.

While municipal councils rescinded earlier decisions not to hold public hearings and a plebiscite on the issue, crossing opponents next prepared for their campaign in mid February to deliver their message to the provincial government. Bruce Yorke, chairman of the Citizens' Committee for Public Transit, asked the Vancouver District Labour Council at its regular meeting to help organize a mass rally in Victoria for 22 February where the crossing opponents would lobby municipal councils and order a plebiscite on the crossing.

The opposition organized the day long trek to Victoria. Bruce Yorke took with him a petition signed by 21,631 people asking for a mandatory plebiscite, a provincial contribution to the Vancouver Regional District Transportation Authority and reconsideration of

"North Shore Hearing on New Crossing OK'd," The Vancouver Sun, 15 February 1972, p.3

"Government Order Sought on Tunnel Plebiscite," The Vancouver Sun, 10 February 1972, p.1
the provincial government's agreement to provide $41 million toward the crossing. In Victoria the petitioners spread out and approached key cabinet ministers, members of the Liberal party, and the New Democratic caucus. The protests were again successful. Three days after the demonstration Social Credit Highways Minister Wesley Black said that in his personal opinion a downtown expressway would destroy Vancouver but rapid transit would benefit it. Given such an admission, the scales tipped suddenly and sharply in the legislature against the third crossing plans. Black's statement followed sharp attacks on the proposed crossing from both New Democratic and Socred backbenchers who demanded that the government withdraw the money offered for the project and transfer it to rapid transit. Government whip Hunter Vogel also denounced the third crossing. He thought that the provincial government had boarded the third crossing bandwagon when public sentiment had demanded it, but that now the situation had changed. Vogel said the public could see that automobile traffic was strangling North American cities "and the pattern of motor travel has got to be changed if we want to save the city of Vancouver. A

"Socreds, N.D.P. Hit Third Crossing - Crossing Labelled 'Boondoggle'," The Vancouver Sun, 8 March 1972,p.1

Ibid. The highway minister went on to say that officials in his department had discussed freeways in cities with American officials who had tried those techniques "and they admit quite freely that they made a mistake. I would hate to see a city like Vancouver destroyed by unsightly freeway patterns. I personally would like to see some approach at this time of a transit nature. As far as showing some leadership, I believe common sense will win out. I think the people of Vancouver will solve this problem and they're the people who should."
third crossing would overwhelm Vancouver with congestion and pollution and spread the West End's highrise nightmare to the North Shore."

While opponents continued to lobby various levels of government to obtain public hearings and a plebiscite, their ranks swelled with new supporters from across the city. The large range of institutions and individuals critical of the project was a testament to the chaos into which the ad hoc planning process had fallen. By mid-February the Citizens' committee for Public Transit was supported by over 35 groups in the city.

As in the Chinatown debates, many professional groups interested in the role of planning threw their support behind the opposition movement. In a special vote on the subject on 16 February, the Greater Vancouver Chapter of the Architectural Institute of British Columbia decided to oppose the crossing. "The

Such groups included the Vancouver Labour Council, the Vancouver Tenants' Council, the Committee of Progressive Electors, the Vancouver Central Council of Ratepayers, the United Fishermen and Allied Workers, the Letter Carrier's Union, the Office and Technical Workers' Union, The Amalgamated Transit Union, the Citizens' Council on Civic Development, the University of British Columbia Students' Association, the North Shore Transportation Committee, the North Shore and Pemberton Heights Ratepayers' Association, the Society for Pollution and Environmental Control, the Committee for Transportation Alternatives, the North Vancouver Tenants' Association, the Mount Pleasant Information Centre, the New Democratic Party, the United Jewish Peoples' Order, the Communist Party of Canada, the Mount Pleasant Area Committee, Locals 258 and 213 of the Electrical Workers, Cassiar Ratepayers' Association, the British Columbia Inter-Project Housing Council, Neighbourhood Services Association, the Burnaby Citizens Association, the First United Church, the University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society... See "A Great White Elephant," The Vancouver Province, 12 February 1972,p.1

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feeling is that the crossing would be a threat to our urban environment and that if this kind of development continues we will wind up with an environment that is hostile to man," said chapter chairman Terry Tanner. "Our feeling is that more automobiles won't improve the situation. The crossing is a solution from the nineteen fifties and would perpetuate the problems we have today." In an open letter to all levels of government, the Planning Institute of British Columbia asked for federal funding to be delayed until all other alternatives had been studied. Victor Parker, the Institute's president and chief planner of the Greater Vancouver Regional District, also stressed the need for the federal government to consider the plans of the Greater Vancouver Regional District instead. "If after this review all parties decide on a crossing as a part of its development plan, then the federal government should reaffirm funding," he said.

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"Architects Oppose New Inlet Crossing," The Vancouver Sun, 16 February 1972, p.1

"Planner Group Urges Crossing Funds Delay," The Vancouver Sun, 21 February 1972, p.1

Ibid. At the same time opponents were aided by the statements of unlikely allies. Phil Boname, British Columbia general manager of Marathon Realty Ltd., a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railroad and the largest real estate company in Vancouver, stated that he was opposed to the third crossing: "both as a developer seeking to maximize his profits and as a private citizen of Vancouver." Boname spoke for other large business interests in the downtown core who had begun to favour the idea of rapid transit. "If we (Marathon) are to make money over the long run, as opposed to the quick buck tomorrow, then I can't see any advantage in providing greater access to downtown by the private automobile. To turn over substantial acres of land for parking, roads and other automobile-related services is not good for the big developers, and it's not good for the taxpayers. I would think that the major capital expenditures in the near future should be in rapid transit," he said. See "Third Crossing Costly Mistake," The
The ad hoc planning process in 1972 suffered the same fate it had in 1967. The public hearing that would decide the fate of the third crossing proposal was scheduled at the Eric Hamber Secondary School on 15 March 1972. Over sixty briefs were handed to council from organizations, groups and individuals who represented Vancouver's top professional people, its most influential bodies and dedicated community groups. Crossing consultant Frank Leighton of Swan Wooster was scheduled to open the meeting with a detailed explanation of the project. Following his report, it was scheduled that the floor would be turned over to delegations, each of which would be given five minutes to speak. It was also reported before the meeting that council members would have the opportunity to ask questions after each presentation. The marathon six hour session

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(cont'd) Vancouver Sun, 3 February 1972, p.1. In other words, a rapid transit system would make downtown more accessible to people, make the limited supply of downtown land more desirable for development, and hence increase its value for large downtown interests.

The municipalities to the south and east of the metropolitan region also opposed the crossing project. The emphasis on a third crossing was seen as political favoritism by those municipalities who had been left out of the decision making process. Mayor Vander Zalm of Surrey representing the Delta councils, sent telegrams to the federal and provincial governments urging them to build a third crossing of the Fraser River rather than across the Burrard Inlet. "There is so much controversy over the Burrard Inlet Crossing that we agreed (with the other municipalities) we would take it while everyone is arguing about it." "Delta Councils Seek Third Fraser River Crossing," The Vancouver Sun, 4 February 1972, p.3

"60 Briefs For Airing On Crossing," The Vancouver Province, 15 March 1972, p.3. See also the Vancouver Public Library, "Briefs Presented at Public Hearings on Third Crossing of Burrard Inlet," 1972 (mimeographed)
started in proper fashion but ended in confusion and acrimony. The proceedings started as scheduled with a slide presentation by Frank Leighton that lasted thirty minutes, but ended in jeers and catcalls when Leighton observed that the crossing was "designed to hit motorists a double blow by charging a toll rising to $2 per crossing and then using the toll to pay for rapid transit." The sixty delegations listed to deliver briefs that were to follow Leighton's speech were overwhelmingly opposed to the crossing by a six-to-one ratio. By 11 p.m., after four hours of debate, 29 speakers had been heard, roughly half of the delegations wishing to speak. Because Mayor Campbell had stated previously that the crossing hearing would occupy two nights, Alderman Harry Rankin moved adjournment once the halfway mark was reached. The audience applauded Rankin's motion but a solid Non-Partisan Association vote defeated the motion by a vote of six to five and the auditorium erupted with the noise of angry protests.

The scandalous public hearing continued until 1:40 a.m. After midnight only the most dedicated opponents and advocates remained. The crossing opponents, lead by Bruce Yorke, were enraged by Campbell's tactics and decided to keep the aldermen on the stage


"Arguments Six-to-One Against Proposal," *The Vancouver Sun*, 16 March 1972. The first seven briefs presented by Vancouver's principle architectural and planning institutes, solidly opposed the crossing. Opponents included individual planners, architects, a variety of consulting engineers, planners and marine architects and professors from both Simon Fraser and the University of British Columbia.
until dawn with a filibuster strategy. The meeting ended in acrimony and was nearly universally condemned by the various media representatives on hand.

The ad hoc planning process fell apart in the months following the debate because the level of opposition to it was so great in Vancouver. The Vancouver Regional District voted to postpone indefinitely a plan to make the crossing part of a regional study. A month later, the strongest supporter of the project, Jack Davis, now federal Minister of the Environment, indicated in a letter to the Planning Institute of British Columbia, that the federal government could not make a final decision on the project because the provincial government would not make a formal request for funds. A month later, in May, 1972, a senior federal civil servant indicated that the federal government had decided against the project and would not make its decision public until after the upcoming federal election. In June, the federal cabinet appointed a new task force to study the feasibility of the project. Urban Affairs Minister, Ron Basford, stated that Ottawa had agreed to participate in the re-evaluation after a request from the Greater Vancouver Regional District. Federal Minister, Arthur Laing, indicated that, due to inflation,

"Planner Left in Doubt," The Vancouver Province, 30 March 1972, p.3

"B.C. Made No Requests for Funds, Says Davis," Vancouver Province, 25 April 1972, p.1

Ibid.

Ibid.
the lack of support from Victoria, and the inability of municipal governments to make up the difference in costs, Ottawa was unwilling to assume further responsibility to fund the project. The New Democratic Party had swept into power provincially and stopped funding for the project. A leading issue in the provincial election for the Vancouver region had been transportation. The Party was committed to rapid transit and party spokesman on transportation, Bob Williams, described the crossing proposal as a Liberal "boondoggle". In September 1972, the new government formally struck down provincial commitment to the project and indicated that the $41 million dollars set aside for the crossing would now be spent on research and development of a rapid transit system for Vancouver. Gradually the third crossing idea disappeared from the public agenda and was forgotten.

The third crossing debates demonstrated that the crossing and the idea of freeways was altogether unpopular in Vancouver. The third crossing studies still represented older ad hoc planning. The plans did not evaluate the impact transportation would have on metropolitan development, nor were they conducted by an agency that had the legitimacy or authority to undertake a project of such magnitude. The third crossing debates made it painfully clear to local authorities that even with the help of senior governments the planning process in Vancouver was seriously flawed and civic government's ability to cope with the problems that accompanied

The Vancouver Province, 27 April 1972, p.1

Ibid.
rapid urban development was limited.
Vancouver did not follow the example of other cities in North America and implement a modern network of downtown freeways in the years 1954 to 1972. This was due to the fragmented state of local urban government, a government ill prepared to cope with the problems that arose as a result of rapid urban development. As in earlier periods in Canadian urban history, dynamic urban growth was accompanied by problems that defied solution because of the limited capacities of traditional urban authorities.

After the Second World War, urban development was largely determined by the transit technology of the private automobile. Automobile technology became so popular that it transformed the city. The nature of low density suburban development and the loss of the economic functions of the business core to the suburbs caused problems which urban authorities in Vancouver and elsewhere felt could only be rectified by the construction of downtown freeway systems to capture the mobile suburban populations and arrest the alarming decentralization process. The urban transportation problem of growing intracity traffic volumes that strained the older transportation network to its limits posed a major dilemma for the city and demanded a forceful political response.

In Vancouver, however, little effort had been made to design and update municipal structures to handle the financing, administration and construction of a new transportation network. In other Canadian cities such as Toronto and Winnipeg, the new era
of rapid urban development was accompanied by the creation of some form of metropolitan government. In Vancouver, no such regional authority existed.

Without a central administrative authority, civic officials in Vancouver attempted to take metropolitan planning into their own hands by starting a process of ad hoc transportation planning. In retrospect it appears that freeway planning in Vancouver was destined to fail from the start since the ad hoc planning committees had no real power to co-ordinate and administer a comprehensive plan. The lack of authority meant that gradually the priorities of universal planning were abandoned. After many frustrated attempts to start on a master freeway plan, the provincial transportation administration decided in 1965 that the best way of attracting senior government aid would be to alter the master plan in order to accommodate specific federal requirements.

The approach to freeway planning was flawed in many ways. For Gerald Sutton-Brown and his staff at city Hall, the transportation problem was seen in the non partisan tradition as solely a technical issue. The ad hoc committees from 1954 to 1967 planned a transportation system that only took into account the factor of anticipated traffic demand, excluded the possibility of rapid transit, and neglected the social, economic and aesthetic aspects of such plans. The emphasis on technical concerns was so short-sighted the city did not anticipate the administrative and financial details that accompany such a large public project. If Vancouver desired its own regional transportation system, civic
government had to adapt to new realities. The non-partisan
approach to planning failed to cope with the negative consequences
of a changed urban environment.

This piecemeal planning process meant that city hall was ill-prepared
to deal with the political protests that occurred once it
decided to commence construction of a first freeway segment
through Chinatown. The Chinatown freeway protests of 1967
represented a first round in the public debates surrounding that
freeway construction in Vancouver. The protests demonstrated that
both the limited scope of the decision making process and the city
freeways themselves were unacceptable in Vancouver in the late
nineteen sixties. The protest movement was made up of a diverse
range of community groups that were threatened by changes in their
established inner city neighbourhoods and so banded together to
protect their interests. Such groups as ratepayers, tenant
associations, small business associations, ethnic and labour
groups, focussed on the piecemeal plans for freeway development as
a gross example of negligent urban planning made by insensitive
and autocratic civic officials and planners. The ad hoc planning
process explains the participation of other groups in the
Vancouver protest movement. Freeway protests grew to encompass
groups which were angry for reasons other than the fact that their
neighbourhoods were changing. An increasing number of upper middle
class professional groups and individuals spoke of the need for
corporate planning under the aegis of a strong political executive. Such groups as architects, planning associations and
university professors spoke of the need for Vancouver to abandon ad hoc planning and adopt instead a co-ordinated effort that would unify the functions of local government into a metropolitan agency. Altogether the anti freeway protest movement represented a unique consensus of opinion that cut across traditional lines of politics and class. Opponents were able to argue convincingly against the narrowness of the freeway decision making process in Vancouver and demanded that authorities allow factors other than anticipated traffic demand to enter into their calculations. Once the demands of such a large number of groups from across the city were ignored, opponents attacked the nature of decision making at city hall. Citizens demanded to know why freeways were planned in the first place and resented the insular technocratic emphasis in transportation planning that did not allow other concerns to be addressed.

The Chinatown debates demonstrated that municipal authorities were incapable on their own of handling the problems in transportation that arose from the process of rapid urban development. The third crossing debates again made this basic observation painfully clear. Even after the federal and provincial governments assumed the bulk of responsibility in a renewed process of ad hoc freeway planning, the plans were bitterly opposed by many citizen and professional groups in the city and proved inappropriate for the metropolitan region. The third crossing freeway plans again did not evaluate the impact freeways would have on land use development. Rather than allowing the
Greater Vancouver Regional District, the newly created planning authority for the Vancouver region, to lead the way in the creation of a master metropolitan transportation plan, the new studies suffered the same fate as their predecessors and finally only served to aggravate the transportation problems in the city.

The defeat of the third crossing showed the weakness of municipal government in Vancouver. Freeways proved extremely unpopular. Even within its own boundaries, the city could not decide transit priorities. Transit concerns were still in the hands of the provincially owned British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority. The civic administration lacked the power to control urban growth in a way that might solve transportation problems.

It was necessary to change public policy to address such pressing problems as transportation. The creation of the Greater Vancouver Regional District in 1968, representing the fourteen municipalities, offered the hope of better co-ordination in metropolitan planning. The newly formed organization assumed responsibility for regional planning but that did not mean it had the power to actually construct a metropolitan transportation system. Nevertheless, in 1969 it commissioned a study of the feasibility of rail rapid transit. A year later it submitted its findings and decided that rapid transit was indeed feasible and should become a top priority in planning analysis. Vancouver, however, would have to wait the outcome of the third crossing debates before the ad hoc nature of transportation planning could be re-evaluated. In the end, neither a freeway nor a rapid transit
system was implemented in Vancouver in this period, a consequence of a planning approach that was flawed from the start.
APPENDIX A

Briefs Presented to City Council at Hearings on the Chinatown Freeway Dispute - 1967

Architectural Institute of British Columbia, Lower Mainland Chapter
Board of Administration, City of Vancouver
British Columbia Institute of Traffic Engineers
British Columbia Society of Landscape Architects
Building Owners and Managers Association of Vancouver
Cassiar Rate-Payers Association
Central Council of Rate-Payers of Vancouver
Chinese Benevolent Association
Chinese Merchants Association
Citizens Council on Civic Development
Communist Party of Canada
Community Arts Council
Community Planning Association of Canada
Downtown Business Association
Geography Club, University of British Columbia
Grandview Rate-Payers Association
Hastings Chamber of Commerce
Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board
Planning Institute of British Columbia
Project 200 Properties
Town Planning Commission
Urban Research Group
Vancouver Board of Trade
Vancouver and District Council of Churches
Vancouver Parents and Teachers Council
APPENDIX B

Briefs Presented to City Council for Hearings on the Third Crossing of Burrard Inlet - 1972

Individuals

Alden, T.H., Associate Professor, Faculty of Engineering, University of British Columbia

Buckland, Peter, Consulting Engineer

Denile, Kenneth, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia

Eldridge, G.S., Consulting Engineer

Eliot Hurst, M.E., Acting Chairman, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University

Kane, Julius, Professor of Mathematical Ecology, University of British Columbia

Kennedy, Warnett, Planning and Architectural Consultant

Kiss, Zoltan, Architect

Kuun, Zoltan, Consulting Engineer

Lamont, Kenneth, Consulting Marine Engineer

Lauk, Gary, Barrister and Solicitor

McKinley, Kenneth, Architect

Pearson, Norman, Planning Consultant

Roer, Paul, Assistant Professor of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia

Wong, S.T., Engineer

Wiesman, B., Associate Professor, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia

Organizations

Alma Mater Society

Architectural Institute of British Columbia, Greater Vancouver Chapter
Association of Landscape Planners
British Columbia Society of Landscape Architects
Canadian Institute of Steel Construction
Citizens Committee for Public Transit
Citizens Council for Civic Development
Committee for Transportation Alternatives
Committee of Progressive Electors
Communist Party of Canada
Community Planning Association of Canada
Downtown Business Association
Dunbar Home Owners Association
Grandview Woodland Area Council
Kitsilano Area Council
Liberals for Effective Transportation
New Democratic Party, Vancouver Area Council
North Shore Transportation Committee
Pemberton Heights Rate-Payers Association
Planning Institute of British Columbia
Property Owners for Mass Transit
School of Architecture, Students, University of British Columbia
Sunrise Rate-Payers Association
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, Local 452
United Jewish Peoples Order
Urban Design Group
Vancouver and District Labour Council
Vancouver Board of Trade
Vancouver Central Council of Rate-Payers
Vancouver City Planning Commission
Vancouver Tenants Council
West End Community Council
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