NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.
NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR  Christiane Paponnet-Cantat

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE  Agrarian Reform and Corporate Clientelism
The Case of Peru: 1968-1975

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ  Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE  M.A.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADE  1985

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE  Dr. Marilyn Gates

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

DATED/DATÉ  August 2, 1984

SIGNED/SIGNÉ

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXÉ  #3-2740 W. 4th Ave., Vancouver, B.C., V6K 1R1
AGRARIAN REFORM AND CORPORATE CLIENTELISM.

THE CASE OF PERU: 1968-1975

by

Christiane Paponnet-Cantat

B.A. University of British Columbia (1978)

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the Department

of

Sociology/Anthropology

Christiane Paponnet-Cantat 1983

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

1983

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
NAME: Christiane Paponnet-Cantat

DEGREE: Master of Arts

TITLE OF THESIS: AGRARIAN REFORM AND CORPORATE CLIENTELISM
THE CASE OF PERU: 1968-1975

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

CHAIRPERSON: MICHAEL KENNY

Marilyn Gates
Senior Supervisor

BEVERLEY GARTRELL

ALBERTO CIRIA
External Examiner
Political Science Department

DATE APPROVED: Nov 22nd, 1983
I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Agrarian Reform and Corporate Clientelism

The Case of Peru: 1968-1975

Author:

Christiane Paponnet-Cantat

August 2, 1984 (defence: November 22, 1983)
ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that, in Peru, the 1969 land reform passed by the Velasco military regime gave rise to production cooperatives of the corporate clientelistic type. Corporate clientelism is an authoritarian mode of social organization which incorporates traditional structures into a bureaucracy according to a patron-client mode. That is, it inculcates subordinate groups with a sense of vertical dependence, thus discouraging the formation of class based, autonomous organization. In Peru, this corresponded to a modified form of clientelism which had, for centuries, kept peasants dependent upon landlords for subsistence.

By basing the argument on material drawn from library sources and field observation, the clientelistic nature of the reform is explained with reference to Peru's political and socio-economic structures and historical development. The impact on the peasantry is evaluated in light of the experience of the Chirapa cooperative - a production unit in the department of Ayacucho.

The conclusions reached are that while the reform was successful in eradicating traditional clientelism via the breakdown of the landlord-peasant bond, it nevertheless created a type of patron-client dependency between peasants of different classes as it failed to bring economic security to cooperative members and discouraged broadly based political participation.
This new cross-class patronage which now takes place within the peasantry itself is characteristically less stable than the pre-reform system. The upward linkages that it has generated could, thus, be too weak to prevent poor peasants from organizing and expressing themselves concretely as a class in the near future.
DEDICATION

A mes chers parents,
Odette et Jacques,
et à mon ami,
Christopher Erickson.
Acknowledgements

With special thanks to my two supervisors Dr. Marilyn Gates and Dr. Beverley Gartrell for their generous contribution of time and knowledge; to my friend Christopher Erickson for his unending patience and moral support and to Dr. Bernardo Berdichewski whose advice and friendship facilitated my orientation in Peru and my understanding of Latin America.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Maps and Figures</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Clientele and Patron-Client Relationships</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Methods</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. LAND REFORM: THE LITERATURE</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Latin American Agrarian Problem</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency Theorists</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Reform in Action</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. DEPENDENCY AND CLIENTELISM IN PERU</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Conquest</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Independence Period</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. CORPORATE CLIENTELISM</strong></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Political Changes Prior to 1968</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military as Social Reformers</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievements of Agrarian Reform</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V. CASE STUDIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacienda Yanayacu</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirapa</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI. CONCLUSION</strong></td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY</strong></td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Value of Agricultural Product Imports in Seven CIDA Study Countries: 1959-1962 .................. 29
Land Tenure in Peru 1961 .................. 110
The State of Land Reform of June 1976 .................. 111
Forms of Land Distribution .................. 112
Production of Principal Agricultural Commodities .................. 114
Statistics on Average Land Size, Quinua: 1965 .................. 126
Percentage of the Statistics on Average Land Size .................. 126
Orde-Ayacucho or Zone XVI .................. 137
PIAR Huamanga: Land Size and Type of Production .................. 138
Days of Work for Chirapa Members .................. 142
LIST OF MAPS

MAP I: Location of Ayacucho Within Peru ............... 122
MAP II: The Seven Provinces of Ayacucho ............... 123
MAP III: Location of the Study Area ............... 127

LIST OF FIGURES

Diagram I ............................................... 10
Diagram II .......................................... 11
Statement of the Problem

This thesis argues that, in Peru, the 1969 land reform introduced by the Velasco military regime, combined two modes of organization - clientelism and corporatism - both of which emphasize relationships of subordination and domination. The repercussions of this particular combination and resultant mode of land reform are here analysed according to patterns of internal dependencies at both the local and national level.

Prior to this period of reform, clientelistic relations were the major underlying political structure in rural Peru. For centuries, this structural mode was instrumental in the maintenance of a landed patron elite. The peasantry as such remained economically and politically marginal. The 1969 land reform undermined this structure by dislodging the local landlords from the rural sector. To achieve this, the military established a nationally based corporatist system which turned expropriated estates into state run cooperatives. This way, land and sierra labour came under the common control of the government.

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, by using a historical perspective clientelism in Peru is examined in relation to a process of colonial domination and ultimately of dependent capitalism.
Second, it is argued that clientelistic principles were integrated into a nationalized corporatist infrastructure to form an indigenous model of agrarian development. The cooperative enterprises that the reform created are here regarded as the building block of this corporate clientelistic mode of socio-economic transformation. The characteristics of the new production system point to its fundamental clientelistic nature. These are: a centralised vertical organization, an organization which inculcates into its members a sense of upward reliance, and a system which discourages the formation of class-based autonomous groups.

The present work primarily focusses on the national level, the point from which corporate clientelism was initiated and, then it discusses the impact of the reform on the socio-economic position of peasants in one of the cooperatives of the department of Ayacucho - a predominantly agrarian area of the Peruvian Andes. The conclusions reached stress that this new rural infrastructure succeeded in extending bureaucratic control into all aspects of the rural sector in that the land-ed elite was supplemented by agro-experts or 'técnicos'. Nevertheless, it is argued that the reform has fallen short of its objectives on several fronts. This is due, on the one hand, to improper financial support for the agro-enterprises of the sierra, and on the other hand, to a poor democratic participation of the peasantry in the political decisions that affect their livelihood. Within this context, personalistic ties and clientelistic relationships persist for reasons of economic security. Whereas prior to the reform, clientelism was based
on cross-class relationships, the new form tends to develop among peasants of differing socio-economic status rather than between the administration and the membership. Consequently, the hierarchical character of relationships is reduced and substituted by a more horizontal pattern. Weakened cross-class clientelistic networks could, in effect, encourage new differentiation within the peasantry.

Research Concepts

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to elaborate on some of the concepts used in this work.

The term 'land reform' implies a deliberate rural transformation by a government committed to far reaching change in the land tenure system and farming structure. The intent is to bring about greater social equity, the redistribution of political power, and improvements in the economic performance of agriculture including increased income for the peasantry (Feder 1971: 178; Olson 1974: 7).

'Counter-reform' refers to a process initiated by the landed elite which, through the use of political or military pressures, attempts to maintain traditional agrarian structures and to prevent the successful implementation of land reform programs (Feder 1971: 255-258).

'Clientelism' means a social structure based on informal, particularistic exchange networks between people of unequal power and status. As a conceptual model it is used as a tool to explore micro-level and supra-local dependency.

'Corporatism' is a mode of integration based on the organization of marginal social groups along non-competitive lines which are defined officially and sanctioned by the state.

'Corporate clientelism is a mode of social organization which
incorporates traditional structures into a vertical bureaucratic apparatus based on mechanisms similar to that of clientelism.

'Populism' is a multi-class, nationalistic political movement which appears when industrialization brings on rapid social change. Populism channels the political participation of the masses through charismatic leadership in order to incorporate them into the existing social structures.

'Peasants' can be identified as rural residents who gain their livelihood primarily from subsistence farming. Wage labour is often only a part-time occupation. Peasants do not refer to an autonomous category of people because they are integral to and controlled by the nation/state. As a social category, peasants are internally differentiated in terms of power and access to land resource. Several classes can, thus, be identified. According to Berdichewski (1979: 25-26), these are: first, a class of well-off peasants who produce mainly for the market; second, a group of small or medium parcel owners who live at the subsistence level. Others, known as 'minifundists' have plots too small to meet the needs of the household, thus, they have to rely upon wage labour for survival; third, wage labourers and semi-proletarians who are landless and sell their own labour in order to gain their livelihood.

Research Objectives and Approach

The notion of corporate clientelism is here used to show how social and economic processes are set in motion by authoritarian governments in order to bring politically marginal peasant classes into the mainstream of society. In a highly centralized political system, it demonstrates how clientelism can be expanded in scale and transformed into a new framework which perpetuates internal dependencies. As applied to Peru, the concept 'corporate clientelism' helps us understand some of the inherent contradictions in
Velasco's approach to reform and how these affect the relations between peasant classes.

However, in order to understand the structural constraints within which this mode of organization is operating, it is necessary to apply a historical approach so that the relations of dependence are placed within the economic context of an underdeveloped society. This enables us to analyze the basis of Peru's dependency, the role of the agricultural sector in the country's economy and the constraints that external forces generate.

Peru: A Case Study

The case of Peru is of interest to both the student of land reform and of political clientelism for in this agrarian society patronage has been for centuries the underlying principle of political and social life, particularly in the highlands.

Peru is typical of a fragmented society where, prior to the reform, power was dispersed among locally based individuals who for centuries, enjoyed considerable political and economic autonomy. In the sierra, local patrons have maintained supremacy over land and the peasantry through the use of clientelism. This type of power structure was greatly encouraged by Peru's natural topography - a factor which played an important role in national politics. Not only has the influence of the government over the sierra been compromised, but so have the efforts of the peasantry to unite along class lines from one region to the next.
The land of Peru is conventionally divided into three distinct regions. The coast is a desert interrupted by some 50 fertile valleys. This region is very dynamic as it is the center of the industrial sector. The selva or jungle is scarcely inhabited and sparsely cultivated. The sierra, meanwhile, is a vast region which lies from about 600 to more than 4000 meters above sea level. This part of Peru still accounts for about half of the country's population with the majority of its inhabitants being Indians - Quechua or Aymara speakers - the two main languages of the former Inca Empire. While there exists major urban centers such as Arequipa, Cusco, Cajamarca and Puno, overall, the highlands remain predominantly rural, and isolated from national life. In order to integrate the marginal sierra into Peru's economy the military government implemented its broad ranging program of reform. Sufficient time has elapsed for us to examine some results of this attempt.

CLIENTELE AND PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

The study of the extended patron-client-relationships or clientelism has, over the last two decades, emerged as a major field of inquiry in the social sciences. Prior to that, the concept was more restricted to social anthropology where it was initially formulated.

In anthropology, clientelism and its closely related fields, such as exchange theory and network analysis, have, for a long time, been important domains of exploration. Earlier work on patronage
reflects the concern of the time for micro-level studies. Focussing their interest on human behaviour in small scale situations, anthropologists oriented their investigation toward the importance, at the local level, of networks of dyadic relationships which individuals built around themselves as against the formation of corporate organizations. Such studies treated patronage ties as distinctive sets of customs, and commonly they were related to work on ritual kinship or friendship dyads. Among the most notable work of that period, we find Mintz and Wolf (1950), Pitt-Rivers (1954); Kenny (1962); Foster (1953; 1961; 1963).

**Nature of the Patron-Client Relationship**

Patron-Client systems are types of non-corporate groups which consist of 'sets of dyadic relationships linked together for limited purposes over limited periods of time' (Lande 1977: xiii). At the core of such structures we find, however, distinctive features which set the patron-client nexus off from other types of social interaction.

Patron-Client relations can be defined as informal, 'vertical dyadic alliance' (Lande 1977: xx) between two parties with differing assets. It involves face-to-face contacts which often bring a personal attachment of the two individuals to each other. The bond is created for the purpose of exchanging benefits. The reciprocal supply of goods and services is what gives true character to the relationship.
The precise meaning of reciprocity contained in patronage is still a matter of some debate because of the difficulty of determining equivalence in the exchange of benefits between patrons and clients. Unlike in a simple barter transaction, the prestations in clientelism are not alike and do not have a market price that make them commensurable. For example, the patron usually provides economic aid and protection to his client while the latter returns the favour with personal services, an indication of esteem and loyalty or even political support such as voting. To stipulate that amount in any reciprocal exchange becomes difficult or even misleading because the exchangeables have no common measures. To paraphrase Szwed (1966: 152) and Paine (1970: 10), it should be kept in mind that the main purpose for both the patron and client 'is to gain access and control over resources not otherwise available'. Examined from this angle rather than from the view of 'objective values' of the things exchanged, we can see how both parties complement one another. In the patron-client contract, reciprocity is not a 'one-for-one exchange' which requires that returns for benefits received be equivalent to those given. It is more appropriate to regard it as a 'process' whose 'balance' 'rests in a series of mutual expectations' (Paine 1970: 12). However, if we accept that both parties find benefits from the arrangement we are faced with the problem of determining what the terms 'patron' and 'client' really imply. Pragmatically, one of the more obvious facts about this type of relationship is that one of the two parties is usually more powerful than the other and is,
thus, considered as the patron. Although patrons as well as clients are dependent upon one another, the client is usually from a more disadvantaged economic position than the patron and the resources that the latter controls are often essential to his livelihood. Thus, the dependence of the client on the patron is greater, as his needs are more critical, while those of his partner are more marginal (Powell 1970: 413). As a result the bargaining position of the patron is definitely stronger allowing him to establish the terms of the exchange and to manipulate the situation within the relationship to his advantage.

Examining the conditions of internal domination of the Andean peasantry, Cotler (1976) shows the structural characteristics of a patron-client system which prevents mobility. In the Peruvian Highlands there exists an acute landownership concentration, which allows landlords to use patronage to strengthen the landless peasants' dependence upon the tenure system (Diagram 1). As Cotler comments:

Because the Indian has no other possibilities of livelihood within his reach he must accept the asymmetrical ties of reciprocity proposed by the landlord. Toward this end he seeks to establish paternalistic ties with the boss and also with the figures of authority in general, so as to commit them to a situation which might place him in a preferential status with respect to other tenants (ibid: 43).
This model shows how mutually exclusive patron-client blocks develop. It points to the monopolistic position of the hacendado who controls all the resources of his clients' needs as well as their lines of communication beyond the estate. In diagram I, the lack of a base to the triangle indicates that the client group or peasantry is atomized and unorganized. The paternalistic relationship which exists between the landlord and his clients discourages the formation of social bonds amongst peers.

Diagram II, on the other hand, indicates that externally generated changes lead to the creation of alternative alliances which would substantially undermine the position of the patron. A result of any external influence could be the closing of the base of the triangle as peasants shifting from one patron to another develop
consciousness by establishing outside and upward linkages. Thus, the traditional patterns of internal domination which characterised the patron-client system of the Peruvian haciendas are modified. They are new, more complex structures distinguished by several apexes representing dominant patron groups operating in diverse fields of action.

**DIAGRAM II**

(3) Patron (2) Patron (1) Patron

Complex Pattern of Domination

From Patronage to Brokerage

It has been frequently pointed out in the literature how cliente systems change over time. As new political and social forces are set in motion, traditional patrons are transformed into brokers. For 1. these models have been used by Fuenzalida and Alberti to analyse the differences between haciendas, Indian communities and smallholder settlements in the Chancay Valley, and also by F. Lamond Tullis in a study of peasant movements in Central Peru. See F.L. Tullis LORD AND PEASANTS IN PERU. Cambridge: Massachusetts (1970).
example, Silverman (1977) shows how prior to Italian national unification, the patron-client system was basically the exclusive domain of landlords who acted as direct benefactors (loans, employment, land access, gifts etc....). Following unification, they added to their functions those of brokerage on behalf of peasants dealing with 'outsiders'. Silverman adds that 'the most valuable patron was neither the wealthiest nor the most generous, but the one with the best connections (ibid: 302). To her, patrons are well-suited 'gatekeepers' to use Kenny's term (1962) because 'they have a distinctly defined status in both systems and operate effectively in both' (ibid: 297).

This case, thus, illustrates how small scale patrons may become transformed into brokers in the course of changing circumstances. However, not only do traditional patrons become brokers but other groups also begin to assume such functions. When these functions are followed over time, it is found that there are changes with regard to the groups performing the role of brokers. For example, in looking at the history of Mexico, Wolf identifies three phases in the post-Columbian period during which brokerage was carried out by different social groups (1956: 50-63).

The emphasis on brokerage processes has been extremely useful in verifying the applicability of the patron-client model to the study of supra-local phenomena. Like patronage, the brokerage relationship is reciprocal, based on proximity, and is between unequals. But, whereas the patron-client nexus is dyadic in nature, broker-
client networks are 'multi-dyadic' (Schmidt 1977: 306), with the broker being the middle element. However, the crucial distinction between 'patron' and 'broker', as Paine (1970: 20-21) states, is that the patron is 'responsible' for the values put into circulation and which he expects the client to embrace in order for the latter to benefit from his favour. On the other hand, the 'broker' builds his clientele from individuals 'who believe him able to influence the person who controls the favours' (Mayer 1967: 168, cited in Paine ibid.). To Paine the concept of 'broker' as opposed to others such as 'go-between', 'mediator' or 'intermediary' is that of 'processing' information or messages. Dyck (1977), agrees with Paine that this aspect is at the core of the relation. He considers the broker as being a 'middleman plus' - that is the broker is 'more than a middleman by virtue of the special way in which he sometimes (author's emphasis) performs his duties as a middleman' (ibid.). This emphasis on manipulation as an aspect of the activity of brokerage is contrary to the way such a phenomenon has generally been treated in the literature. Traditionally, the most wide-spread view was to regard brokerage as a 'linking' or 'bridging' of the local level to the larger social system. For example, to Wolf the basic function of brokers 'who stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole' is to 'mediate' between those two levels. Though they may seem to 'bridge' the gap, it is in the inte-
rests of brokers to maintain a certain social disjunction so that their power and role in society are not threatened. Through a maintenance of social division, brokers are thus in a position to manipulate the external environment according to their powers of negotiation to ensure certain 'power domains' that might serve their interests. Therefore, analytically speaking when we drop the notion that brokerage has a system-integrating function, the divisive nature of the broker's social role becomes apparent. As a result, the processes by which relations are negotiated, strategies employed and decisions taken are better understood in terms of their political interests.

Clientelism and Macro-Level Analysis

An examination of brokerage demonstrates that the patronage model can be stretched beyond a dyadic exchange relationship to encompass phenomena at a higher level of organization.

One interesting way to test the usefulness of the concept for the investigation of supra-local structures was to ascribe the clientelistic notion to corporate entities. The question whether groups or units such as the state or political parties could fill the role of patrons or clients has been raised by the observation (Clapham 1982, Lemarchand 1981) that these often exhibit basic features of clientelism like monopoly over the allocation of resources and a hierarchical
order. From this standpoint, political processes which characterize electoral politics in many underdeveloped countries can be explained in terms of patronage and clientelistic networks. For example, the process of development which occurred in such nations—industrialization, the growth of national markets, the expansion of communication—has not led to the integration of the majority of the population into the political system. The uneven penetration of capitalist forces in a region such as Latin America has not been conducive to the emergence of autonomous interest groups and class association (Kaufman 1977: 111). Thus, clientelistic relationships persist as a mode of social organization over and above that of classes. As a result, political parties have little contact with the general public and thus play a limited role in representing their interest. Within this context, the masses tend to look at the government as a potential agency from which transactional benefits may be obtained. Their demands are filtered through power brokers of a large political machine the interest of which lies in the maintenance of their control over public votes.

1. Historically, the capitalist market has been a very powerful agent in the dissolution of particularistic ties because market relations which are anonymous, general and abstract depersonalize all human relations. Luigi Graziano 'Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy', in S. Schmidt et al. eds. FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS AND FACTIONS. Berkeley: University of California Press (1977: 360-378).
Corporate systems which tie social groups to the state apparatus embody some of the structural characteristics of clientelism by perpetuating internal dependencies and by becoming arenas for political manipulation. However, the analogy between these two modes of social organization is not meant to imply that corporatism is a perfect replica of patron-clientage. As Lemarchand argues, the point is that as 'analytical structures ... they (corporate systems) reveal some of the traits and relationships derived from the behaviour of individual patron and client' (1981: 140). To illustrate the argument, we see state agencies acting as patrons in control of critical military, political and economic resources that may be used in order to obtain the continued political support or economic services of their clients.

As 'political systems', corporatism and clientelism find similar expression; while both form an essential part of the society concerned, each interferes with the restructuring of society along associational lines and encourages the persistence of verticalties of dependency. Moreover, examined from the standpoint of political participation, these patterns of organization integrate groups into the policy making process in a selective manner thus excluding a large part of the population. An examination of corporatism from a clientelistic perspective should help in our understanding of rural policies in Latin America.
METHODS

This thesis is based on both library research and field observation. The study on Ayacucho reported in Chapter IV includes data that I collected in Peru during a period of two months in June and July of 1981. One month was spent in the Province of Huamanga during which time several visits were paid to the community of Santa Rosa de Cochabamba. Frequent trips to the district of Quinua also allowed familiarity with the Chirapa area, but due to the extreme shortage of time it was impossible to conduct research in that cooperative.

In the field, all work was done using Spanish and Quechua. One of my Peruvian assistants - a trained anthropology student from the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga - conducted most of the interviews with Quechua monolingual informants.

The research techniques relied on some field observation and interviews supplemented by student theses, government documents as in the case of Santa Rosa de Cochabamba and research monographs. Observations were recorded in field notes which were transferred on to file cards. Interviews were tape-recorded. They ranged from a few minutes to one or two hours. Most were partially structured where specific questions relating to land reform and agricultural activities were asked.

On several occasions, I had opportunities to exchange ideas with
Peruvian anthropologists from the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga. All were helpful, providing useful information on the area and, thus, contributing to my understanding of this Andean region.

My short visit to the field did not permit any ethnographic research in Chirapa, hence my reliance on others' work. Doctor Contreras Villar's study which I am using for my case investigation was conducted in 1977 and 1978 as part of a regional project conceived by the university of Huamanga. His anthropological research focussed on the agrarian problem in the provinces of Huamanga and Huanta. The objective was to evaluate the economic performance of rural cooperatives with a particular emphasis on PIAR Huamanga—a new institutional zone and one of its earliest established units—Cooperative Chirapa. Although I am using his quantitative and qualitative data, the interpretation is my own.

The argument of this thesis is based primarily on library material reinforced by new data. Its attempt is to analyse material from secondary sources adding some field observations from my experience of Peru and from conversations with Latin American specialists.

The organization of this thesis is as follows. The first chapter develops the concept of clientelism and gives a description of my research methods.

The second chapter reviews the literature on land reform in Latin
America. Several important questions are considered: first, it develops a concept of land reform and establishes the criteria used in evaluating projects; second, it presents the problem of rural poverty in Latin America and examines the types of economic policies that were devised by governments to deal with the agrarian sector; third, it discusses scholars' reactions to the failure of certain economic development programs in the region; and finally, drawing upon some concrete examples, it points to the overriding importance of the political factor in securing meaningful land reform.

Chapter III uses a historical approach to search for the roots of clientelism in the rural sector. The emphasis is on the formation of social classes and how their interplay with changes in the economy created networks of dependency.

Chapter IV evaluates the changes brought about in the countryside since the Velasco administration took office in 1968. It argues that the implemented cooperative system was based on a corporative-clientelistic approach to land reform that attempted to integrate the lower social classes into the national economy. This chapter also examines the agricultural performance of Peru since the reform.

Chapter V discusses the rural economic structure of the Province of Huamanga prior to and after the land reform. The case study of Santa Rosa de Cochabamba illustrates peasant reaction to an oppressive patronage system as it traditionally existed in the area until 1969.
Through an analysis of Cooperative Chirapa, we evaluate the changes and argue that the poor economic performance of the estate is partly due to the patterns of structural and interpersonal dependency which have, to this day, prevailed.

The last chapter concludes the argument of the thesis stressing that a clientelistic approach to land reform may lead to produce more turmoil than benefit.
CHAPTER II

LAND REFORM - THE LITERATURE

As the literature attests, much has been said about land reform. The study of this field of inquiry has been, over the years, the work of anthropologists, rural sociologists, agricultural economists and political scientists amongst others. Consequently, the following presentation is, by no means, exhaustive. Its main purpose is an attempt to synthesise the wealth of ideas and data relating to land reform as a basis for ordering the argument of this thesis.

With regard to Latin America, this chapter focusses on the following major aspects: first, it develops a concept of land reform and establishes the criteria used in evaluating projects; second, it presents the problem of rural poverty in Latin America and examines the types of economic policies that were devised by government to deal with the agrarian sector; third, it discusses scholars' reactions at the failure of certain economic development programs in the region; and finally, drawing upon some concrete examples it points to the overriding importance of the political factor in securing meaningful land reform.

Defining Land Reform

To Latin America's observers, land reform has been a dominant theme for the economic development of the region and the general improve-
ment of rural living conditions. However, the term encompasses a variety of interpretations which point to a need for clarification of its meaning.

In 1951, the United Nations observed that the existing systems of land tenure in most poor countries were an obstacle to growth. This primary concern for growth has brought into focus capital formation, employment and investment. Within this context, the concept of land reform means that policies are implemented to improve exclusively the economic environment within an existing agrarian institutional framework (1951: 5).

From the standpoint of this thesis, a definition of land reform centering merely on developmental programs is unsatisfactory as it confines the issue to the economic argument of incentives for efficiency in farming. The underdevelopment of the rural sector occurs in Latin America because there exists wide inequalities of land ownership, absentee landlordism and fragmentation of land into uneconomic units - factors which are at the root of the agrarian problem. Consequently, in order to be meaningful, land reform necessarily implies a fundamental change in land ownership to eliminate the large estate and the landed elite's control over agriculture. Thus, the distribution of land to its tiller can only be achieved through a shift of power to the likely detriment of the landlord. As Huntington remarks:

Land reform ... does not mean just an increase in the economic well-being of the peasant. It involves also a fundamental redistribution of power and status, a re-ordering of the basic social relationships which had previously existed (1970: 4).
The inherent political character of land reform explains the reluctance of many governments to go ahead with such a program since property ownership is, particularly in Latin America, the underpinning of political power. Not surprisingly, effective land reform is restricted to governments that feel a deep ideological commitment to the welfare of the peasantry.

While land reform needs to take into consideration the particular economic and political circumstances of the society concerned, here, it nevertheless, implies a deliberate change introduced into the system of land tenure and the farming structure (Sidhu 1976) in order to achieve greater social equality, the redistribution of political power and improvement in agricultural output (Feder 1971). Land tenure changes might be: the redistribution of landed property into individual viable units with assured water supply; cooperatives, collectives, or a combination of all of these.

In themselves, changes of land tenure are not sufficient to guarantee greater output and better living conditions for the peasantry. These must be supported by adequate lines of credit, soil improvements and reliable communication and transportation systems. Policies for better housing, social security benefits and schooling are essential to the well-being of the rural population. The raising of educational level of farmers will increase their chance of employability outside the agrarian sector - an aspect which in the long
run, might considerably help reduce farm unemployment.

To put land reform programs in perspective within the Latin American context, it is necessary to be clear about the rural economic situation of the region. A brief historical review is, therefore, necessary.

THE LATIN AMERICAN AGRARIAN PROBLEM

Latin America's food and agricultural problems are typical of many dependent economies characterised by low food production, widespread rural unemployment and under-employment which leads to high internal migration. Barraclough (1977: 10) reports that, in the mid-1970's, of the 300 million Latin Americans, 40% of the total active population were living directly off the land and were among the poorest, least educated and most disadvantaged of groups. The extent of the problem is dramatically illustrated by the fact that one-sixth to nearly one half of the population are undernourished according to internationally accepted standards (Barraclough ibid: 2). For the most part, these are small cultivators and landless farm labourers. Their extreme poverty and the increasing pressure on the land through population growth - which is higher than the per capita increase in food production - highlights the difficult challenge of rural development. That is, to raise productivity and provide employment in order to improve the living conditions of the peasantry. All these point to the problems of current land tenure structures.
Historical Background

There is ample ground for singling out the traditional land tenure system as being a primary cause for Latin America's poor agricultural performance. The concentration of land in the hands of a small elite with little interest in the issue of agriculture per se had led to the wasteful use of land and labour resources as well as flagrant social injustice in rural areas.

To be fully understood, Latin America's agrarian problem needs to be located within its historical context. Its roots are in the colonial period beginning nearly five centuries ago when land tenure took shape following European conquest. At that time, a system of grants was instituted by the Crown to put the native population partially under the control of the conquerors. Although the Indians could retain their land and customs, in practice this colonial system led to abuses with peasants losing their rights over land.1

Beginning in the 18th Century, two types of estates emerged out of the process - the intensively worked plantations with high capitalization for valued export products (cotton, sugar, coffee etc.); and the extensively cultivated hacienda - a livestock and cereal producing enterprise involving small capital investment, traditional technology, and low labour/land ratio. Haciendas provided little incentive for development, as their owners, in order to ensure low wages, kept at their disposal a large labour force. Thus, an incredible reserve of land and labour was underused. Many peasants were either unemployed or

1. This system of control was known as the encomienda system.
forced to seek access to small parcels of land on these estates in exchange for their labour on terms dictated by the landlords. This gave rise to forms of tenancy or share cropping based on payments in wages and kind.

Next to the large estate or latifundio, the minifundio, which is a tiny landholding held by individual peasants, tended to be insufficient to satisfy the needs of a family unit, or indeed, to allow the full utilization of family labour (Barraclough 1973: xviii). A report by ICAD² relating to this latifundio-minifundio complex revealed that in the 1960's in Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru, more than 80% of the farm units were not large enough to provide employment for two people (Barraclough and Domike 1970: 47-48). In Peru alone, holders of minifundios and landless farm workers constituted nearly nine-tenths of the rural population before 1968. Meanwhile, in that same country, the land/man ratio was estimated at .21 hectares of land for cultivation or pasture per peasant - one of the lowest ratios in the world, approximately half that of Bolivia, Chile or Ecuador (McClintock 1981: 73).

Over the years, minifundios have greatly increased in number becoming even smaller through inheritance and subdivision, putting tremendous pressure on land in the rural areas and ultimately forcing small proprietors and tenants to leave the countryside. This process has given rise to waves of internal migration whereby displaced peasants come to concentrate in shanty towns near the urban centres.

The Latin American tenure arrangement or latifundismo gave birth to a rigid social hierarchy in the rural sector - which had an almost

2. Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development.
caste-like aspect (Barraclough 1973, Cotler 1968). The agricultural population, often of Indian origin, depended for employment upon the estates. They never enjoyed status or political power. Control within the hacienda was autocratic with the landlord making virtually all key decisions regarding the functioning of the enterprise and the living conditions of the workers. Owners acted as judges, governors or even priests on their properties usually prohibiting any outside interference in the exercise of their authority.

Many estate owners also enjoyed considerable power in the wider society. Through their contacts with the urban elite they were able to influence local, regional and national politics. Over the years, this land tenure system and political organization acquired great stability and prevailed through Latin America with hardly any change well into the middle of the twentieth century.

**Economic Policies**

Although traditional land tenure patterns have been identified as major obstacles to Latin America's development, other factors related to the region's economic dependence upon the Western world should

---

also be given some consideration.

Until the 1940's the region followed a development strategy referred to as 'desarrollo hacia afuera' (an outward-oriented development path). That is, stemming from colonialism and extending into the post-independence period, export became the main force for the region's economic growth. The capitalist countries turned to Latin America as a source of raw materials for their industries and of food for their urban masses which further increased the dependence of the region upon external economic forces. In Peru, for example, export crops created an agro-industrial complex centered around the sugar industry. Along with this export base and mono-culture economy, there was a decrease of agriculture for local consumption. Migration toward the cities was encouraged, accompanied by escalating population growth which put greater demand on domestic food production and forced Peru to import most of its food supply.

Because this development strategy was based on the export of primary products and the importation of manufactured goods, Latin America experienced a severe crisis following the breakdown of international trade during World War I and the depression of 1929. Most countries at the time faced a chronic deficit in their balance of payments as the price of their export commodities fluctuated while not keeping pace with the continually rising cost of imports.
During the 1940's, regional commissions set up by the United Nations played an important role in the economic development of Latin America by taking the position that the future of the region lay in industrialization and 'desarrollo hacia adentro' (an inward-looking development path). ECLA, one of these commissions, which had a strong 'developmentalist' and 'nationalist' leaning, emphasized the role of import substitution to create a national industry and called for state-run infrastructures in order to expand home markets. This shift towards an import substitution development was expected to lessen Latin America's dependence on foreign trade and to allow for greater local control. According to the view of ECLA economists, industrialization would weaken the power of the landed oligarchy and generate a process of democratization. That is, there would be a more equal distribution of income along with an integration of the peasantry into a dynamic capitalist system such that rural people would become potent consumers as well as producers. However, to achieve such goals, the

4. ECLA was the United Nation's Economic Commission established in Chile in 1948 and whose work was closely related to the thinking of Raul Prebisch. Their approach rested on the observation that there existed unequal transactions between 'centres' and peripheries - two concepts that they first developed. According to ECLA, under-development in the region was the result of lopsided economic exchanges in the global trade system. That is, policies based on the concept of 'equal treatment' ignored the structural differences between modern and agricultural countries whereby the prices of Latin America's commodities are doomed to fall relative to those of manufactured goods. This comes from the observation that technological progress tends to reduce the importance of primary goods upon which less developed countries are heavily reliant. The result is a net outflow of capital from the poor nations and a concomitant deterioration of their economies. To offset this process it was proposed to stimulate and protect national economies through protective tariffs and a planned use of scarce financial resources.
financial and technological support of rich nations was required.

This view, developed under the auspices of the Western countries, led local governments to devote their efforts entirely to growth in industry at the expense of domestic agriculture. With foreign capital flowing into Latin America's agro-industrial sector, traditional latifundios were transformed into modern capitalist enterprises increasingly integrated into the export market. Meanwhile, many countries were experiencing a chronic shortage of agricultural supplies and, as Table I shows, were forced to import more foodstuffs.

VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT IMPORTS (millions of dollars) IN SEVEN CIDA STUDY COUNTRIES: 1959 and 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>120.1</td>
<td>124.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>218.3</td>
<td>278.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>111.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pressure of population and the rapidly rising need for food compelled politicians to shift their attention to higher agricultural production for their domestic sector. To the United Nations, the answer to the problem was 'integral reform' which aimed at improving the institutional framework of agriculture without changing the land tenure structure. Proponents of this approach did not perceive agrarian reform as yet being an essential part of economic development. They attacked land reform on the grounds that it was an obstacle to short-term growth. Such a measure was considered a risky and unfeasible endeavour - a view most clearly expressed by a U.S. member of the Agency for International Development:

> Of course, land reform is a risk because you're going to disrupt the marketing system etc... and perhaps even suffer a drastic drop in production (cited in Petras and Laporte 1971: 415).

Committed to develop the agricultural sector within the existing structural framework of the land tenure system, governments which engaged in reforms, concentrated their efforts mainly around agricultural modernization, community development and colonization schemes.

**Agricultural Modernization**

Agricultural modernization refers to the application of technological innovations and capital investment to increase farm productivity. It includes new techniques of farming, particularly through the use of inorganic fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds and mechanization.
Imported machinery have been highly efficient in the large sugar estates of Colombia and Peru and in the irrigated farms of Northwest Mexico (Gilbert 1974). Unfortunately, within the existing structures of Latin America's rural sector, many problems have also been generated by the use of modern technology. The most serious is that new mechanical equipment is labour saving, and its adoption often causes an increase in rural unemployment. (Gilbert 1974, Jacoby 1971, Barraclough 1977). This inevitably furthers labour displacement into an already saturated industrial sector - for example, Browning (1971) has noted that in El Salvador the modernization of the coastal latifundios led to a blooming of the cotton industry in the 1960s but also forced ex-hacienda tenants and share croppers off the land to become as a result, landless labourers and squatters. The new mechanical equipment if used in underdeveloped economies must be appraised in terms of its capacity for creating jobs. In a context where there exists a superabundance of labour, mechanization needs to be applied with caution so that it does not decrease employment potential.

The penetration of modern technology into the subsistence sector tends, under the prevailing social and structural setup, to have a limited effect on the peasantry. For subsistence farmers who lack the necessary capital to invest in modern agriculture, as well as the knowledge to make proper use of new methods, the adoption of technological innovations is risky and costly, thus the peasants are apt to resist such changes. Where new agricultural practices are adopted,
the process of diffusion often impinges upon the social organization of the local community resulting in the confusion and disruption of normal patterns. As Pearse notes: "... previously the process through which equilibriums were upset, regained or transformed were local. Today, conditions of modern life have set in motion a total attack on the traditional system" (1966: 14). Although technological progress has the potential for considerably improving the living conditions of the rural population, its implementation requires a fundamental change in the tenure system. Adequate agrarian structures and institutions will create the socio-economic preconditions necessary for the integration of advanced technology into a context of rural development.

Commenting on this point, Jacoby remarks:

Just as fertilizers without water result in serious crop failures and irrigation without drainage leads to salination of the soil, the application of modern technology without reorganization of the administrative and institutional framework leads to the bottleneck that prevents social and economic progress (1971: 52).

Instead of examining the socio-economic structures of the rural sector, policy-makers often feel that agricultural growth is impeded by the inability of subsistence farmers and landless labourers to adjust to modern life. Holmberg, an expert involved in programs promoting social change in the Peruvian Sierra, says:

... the success of new developments in industry and agriculture ... will depend primarily on the ability of the Indian and mestizo subsistence
farmers, often landless, to make a reasonably satisfactory adjustment to a new way of life based on commercial agriculture and industry (1960: 77).

Thus, efforts have been made at the community level to guarantee the integration of the rural population into the economic mainstream.

**Community Development**

The 'community development' approach was a reaction to the isolation and poverty of the rural population in underdeveloped countries. Western powers believed that it was possible to improve peacefully the living conditions of the peasantry by bringing scientists, officials and farmers together to collaborate on improving conditions at the local level. The idea was that once peasants had acquired the knowledge and skills pertinent to modern farming, they would be able to transform their established ways and integrate themselves into national life. Prototypical projects such as the well-known Vicos program in Peru were devised to promote the use of new technology in the countryside and to improve the health, education and economic opportunity of farm people. Many 'community development' projects were developed throughout Latin America. The Vicos experience as shown below shared common features with many other similar programs.

---

5. These projects received the support of national governments as well as that of international and private agencies, notably the Rockefeller Foundation.
In 1952, Cornell University with the support of the Peruvian government and in collaboration with the Indigenous Institute of Peru undertook a program of research and development devised to prepare sierra peasants to react positively when confronted with the challenges of modern life.

The community selected was Vicos - a hacienda situated in an inter-Andean valley, Callejón de Huaylas, about 250 miles northeast of Lima. This hacienda was chosen because of extremely low standards of living of the population. Health and education facilities were lacking and cooperation among its members was rare. This hacienda had no school, no modern technology and no adequate system of communication. As a result of poverty and isolation, its residents exhibited attitudes of 'fear, suspicion and even hate' towards the outside (Holmberg ibid: 78-79). Vicos was of interest to the projects since it was representative of many haciendas in the highlands where similar conditions prevailed.

Changing this state of affairs and raising the standard of living of all Vicosinos without a large investment of resources was one of the aims of the program. Its other intent was to demonstrate that by replacing the hacendado by technicians, the peasants would gradually

6. According to Holmberg, all the families of Vicos consumed less than 75% of the recommended amounts (ibid: fn 81).
feel encouraged to take over the running of their enterprise. That is, once freed from their exploitative condition, and provided with better food, medical care and education, these 'fatalistic' and 'apathetic' peasants could become dynamic farmers showing a spirit of independence, responsibility and leadership in community affairs (Holmberg ibid: 83).

This experience of the Cornell-Peru project did indicate that if allowed to share responsibility, male workers were generally willing to take part in the decision making process. But, what the findings also revealed was that it tended to favour the individuals who already occupied a dominant position in the community, thus accentuating social differentiation. Moreover, it had adverse effects on the position of women i.e., increasing sexual inequalities as reliance upon the national system grew. One reason for this state of affairs was that men were the focus of 'modernization' and women became involved in the project only indirectly. For example, modern farm techniques were taught to men and not to women. Consequently, female agricultural production remained low relative to that of their men - which had a negative effect upon the status of women in the community.

Furthermore, project personnel emphasized wages for labour which made the Vicosinos much more dependent upon cash economy. The trans-

formation of the labour process also meant the substitution of machinery for human labour. As a consequence, during the 1960's we see an increasing number of Vicos men leaving the community to find work in forestation programs or in dairying for wages.

Perhaps, the most critical aspect of such a project is that if launched in isolation, it has a very limited impact upon the rural sector. That is, an approach to social and economic development on such a small scale will not alter the man-land relationship. In Latin America, it is practically impossible to improve agriculture without increasing the amount of land resources per family so that small producers can fully use their own household labour supply. To palliate this shortage of land available to peasants, many governments proposed the colonization of virgin areas as a solution to the land problem.

**Colonization**

For believers in 'soft' reforms, internal colonization is considered to be a very realistic solution to the question of population pressure on land in rural regions. Resettlement programs in unexploited jungles and disputed border areas became extremely popular during the 1950's and 1960's presenting an alternative to the expropriation of privately owned lands. These schemes,
which involve a planned transfer of population from one area to another, allow large numbers of people to be relocated in new regions. In Latin America, there have been substantial colonization movements in Southern Brazil, Eastern Colombia, Northern and Southern Peru and in Bolivia. In both Brazil and in Colombia, planned migration considerably helped the development of the coffee growing industry (Gilbert 1974:170).

However, past experiences show that there are many problems involved with colonization projects. They are usually slow and costly because they require clearing, drainage and road building. Often they lack sufficient funding and settlers are left with no credit facilities, poor communication systems and no support services. Even when these schemes have been relatively successful, the expenses involved have remained high. For example, the Alto Beni project which resettled 1,500 Bolivians on a tight budget still ended up costing some 1,300 dollars per family (Gilbert ibid:173). Usually, in such projects the financial outlay is high, but the results are meager.

Numerous scholars (Feder 1971, Lipton 1974, Carroll 1961) have maintained that the advantages of colonization have been greatly exaggerated. Barraclough (1973:42) cites the case of Guatemala where between 1954 and 1962 only 5,900 families, largely from the urban middle-class, received lands in colonization zones. This represented only 7% of the increase in the rural population. During this period, 240,000 landless families would need to have been given land in order
for colonization to significantly transform the agrarian sector of Guatemala (ibid.).

The most critical view of resettlement policy comes from writers (Toynbee 1962, Horowitz 1971, Lipton 1974, Feder 1971) who consider this measure as a strategy supporting the interests of the landed elite. Colonization schemes are desirable where there is an acute under-utilization of land resources. But, in Latin America, the crucial problem is the monopolistic and inefficient way in which the land is cultivated rather than a shortage of open land. For this reason, such projects have little value for the agricultural development unless accompanied by changes in the land tenure system. Thus, as Feder concludes, the motivation behind land settlement schemes are often that of maintaining the status quo.

Emphasis on colonization, in theory and in practice, achieved what is intended: divert attention from land reform and confuse it with it ... Colonization schemes are the tranquilizers of the landed elite and counter-reformists in the Americas. In contrast, expropriation of latifundios for real land reform are about as scarce as skeletons of the Neanderthal period (1970: 216-17).

Thus, the evidence suggests that the measures so far discussed (modernization, community development projects and colonization) offer limited potential for rural development. Although such strategies appear inadequate in comparison with the magnitude of the agrarian problems, they nevertheless were very
much part of the policies laid down by the Alliance for Progress.

The Alliance for Progress

In 1961, at the Punta del Este conference, the United States set up an economic program as part of its assistance to its southern neighbours. The Alliance was devised as a direct response to the changing political climate of the region. In the late 1950's, the United States expressed considerable alarm over the threat posed by the Cuban Revolution which, to them, was a warning as to what might occur throughout the region. Consequently, in Washington, the administration preferred to support rural changes than risk more peasant unrest. To promote reform was seen as a way to secure political stability and enhance the confidence of U.S. investors in Latin America.

Initially, the Alliance for Progress promoted the idea that social transformation could be achieved within a capitalist and democratic framework without recourse to revolution as had been the case in Cuba. With this goal in mind the Alliance placed agrarian reform and progressive taxation programs high on the lists of priorities. Social welfare concerns were expressed as "the effective transformation of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land tenure" (Cited in Gilbert 1974: 161).
The redistribution of land introduced by constitutional action was expected to strengthen the socio-economic position of the peasant population and encourage, among beneficiaries, the formation of a new middle class of rural owners who would have a more dynamic economic impulse than the landholding oligarchy. This measure called for fundamental changes as its design was to transfer power, property and status from the landed elite to the tiller.

Similarly, the use of a general property tax, levied on large properties and spent locally to support essential services, was a step towards altering the existing power structure of the rural sector.

Not surprisingly, the Alliance encountered strong resistance from the landlord class who still maintained considerable power in most Latin American countries. Some governments did set up land reform institutes - notably Colombia (1961), Venezuela (1960), Peru (1964) and Chile (1962), and accordingly passed land reform laws. However, such legislation was generally disregarded and pressure was put on the United States to reconsider its position. As Flores notes, an acceptance of such policies by Latin American leaders was unlikely for the Alliance was hoping to gain the support of the very class it wanted to destroy:

... the position of the U.S. government is tragic, and perhaps absurd: it wishes to entrust what is nothing less than a revolution to the very group - the safe conservative element - which in its own interest must block it, as it always has. In other words, it is the same as if Abraham Lincoln
had expected the Southern slave owners to expropriate themselves (1963: 12). As time went on, it became clear that the Alliance would not favour fundamental change in Latin America. On the contrary, it tacitly came to accept that a transformation of the regime of property was secondary to the creation of an apparatus which would encourage better land use and economic growth. This could be achieved through providing tax incentives, favourable credit policies and the creation of an infrastructure for marketing products. Thus, by the time of the second Punta del Este conference in 1967, the U.S. position had completely shifted from a 'redistributionist' to a 'gradualist' view with a new emphasis upon 'technical' reform and a focus on improved farm practices. As Feder points out, however, 'technical' reform aims at reversing the process of land reform. Instead of solving the political issue first through large scale expropriations and the replacement of latifundia (as the charter states) it postpones it until all the elements for proceeding with the reform are known - sometimes ad infinitum (1970: 211).

Once U.S. officials recognized that fundamental land reform would challenge the power structure of entire societies and make it difficult for foreign investment to take place in the region, the Alliance goals shifted towards supporting traditional elites and preserving the status quo. This way, order and stability were guaranteed and the economic interests of the U.S. could not be endangered.
In order to implement a development policy consistent with the 'technical' reform approach, increased cooperation was required between the United States and the recipient Latin American countries. This called for reliance upon experts well acquainted with the conditions of the region. The need for technicians and training facilities gave birth to the Land Tenure Center - a creation of the University of Wisconsin and the Agency for International Development. The role of this institute was to ensure a good supply of experts on Latin America whose skill and knowledge could be used for policy recommendation and implementation. Focussing its efforts upon efficiency in farming, the LTC tended until the mid-1970's to treat the land tenure structure as a given and worked on how to improve agricultural production by providing new technical incentives to farmers. It gave priority to issues such as 'optimum farm size', 'income distribution' and 'population growth'. Its analyses emphasized aspects such as 'trade balance', 'indices of production' or research on 'distribution of major crops'. For a long time, its economists paid little attention to the political reality of the Latin American agrarian problem, often disregarding any sociological argument for reform centering upon issues of equitable land tenure.

8. The tendency of the LTC to focus on economic analysis can be seen in the titles of some of its publications. For reference consult AGRARIAN REFORM AND TENURE, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, Madison (1971).
Following the recommendations of technocrats, large sums of money have been poured into the agricultural sector of the region. Unfortunately, the goals of economic growth are yet to be fulfilled. Petras and Laporte report that Latin America's productivity taken as a whole actually declined to between 0.6 and 1 percent, which was lower than the 1961 levels. By 1968, more than one third of the countries in the region had a 10% loss in production, but had increased their imports of agricultural goods by 40% since the beginning of the decade (1971:397-8). Moreover, eleven nations were suffering of inflation two years after the Alliance for Progress with their foreign debt attaining grave proportions.

Technical assistance and bilateral aid have also been disappointing in terms of creating jobs in the rural sector. Barraclough (1977:12), for example, projected that in the 1980's the export-oriented agro-sector would account for over 17% of the labour force because of its reliance upon high technology. Meanwhile, the subsistence oriented sector would involve more than 70% of the labour force most of whom would be unemployed or underemployed. The appropriateness of technical assistance programs is further jeopardized in the context of a population who lack both the education and the practical experience to advantageously exploit modern techniques. Such inadequate policies combined with heavy foreign debts incurred by Latin America have only succeeded in making the entire region more dependent upon the Western world. It is such dependence of peripheral nations upon the industrial centers that has become the focus of attention of dependency theorists.
DEPENDENCY THEORISTS

The theory of dependency which emerged in the 1960's was an attempt at remedying the deficiencies of the previous approaches to development. The cause of the Latin American agrarian problem became perceived as the result of deeply embedded dependency relationships reflected in economic, financial and political structure between the 'metropolis' and 'satellite' nations.

Unlike their predecessors, dependency theorists did not believe that industrialization, technological development, and foreign investment were the answers to Latin America's predicament. On the contrary, for them, the region's ties to Western economic centres worked to its detriment. That is, the international system of unequal exchange and the vulnerability of peripheral mono-cultures to the fluctuations of the world capitalist market reduced the chances for development of subordinate partners like countries in Latin America. In their view, the penetration of a dominant international economy via multinational corporations both in agriculture and industry, could only perpetuate dependence in the periphery. Basing the argument on the point of view of Latin American countries, this perspective defined dependence as follows:

It is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between the two or more economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship
when some countries can expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have a positive or negative effects on their immediate development (Dos Santos 1973: 76).

This attempt at characterizing the type of relations that exist between advanced industrial and underdeveloped economies was also extended to cover exploitative patterns at national and regional levels. Frank (1967: 150), who applies the center-periphery notions to the urban versus rural sector, believes that the process which generated underdevelopment is that of satellitization - that is, "a whole chain of metropolises and satellites integrating the sectors of dependent economies to the international capitalist system". It is along this chain that economic surplus is mobilized from the satellites to be accumulated into the metropolises. The drainage of such large proportions of economic surplus creates increasing polarization between dominant and subordinate groups. As it penetrates peripheral economies it causes internal structures of underdevelopment.

To Frank, external dependence is thus what causes 'an internal structure of underdevelopment' within Third World societies:

... in chainlike fashion the contradictions of expropriation/appropriation and metropolis/satellite polarization totally penetrate the underdeveloped world creating an "internal" structure of underdevelopment (1967: 115).

Using a similar type of analysis for his study of Peru, Cotler examines how the dominant economic system of the coast reaches the
remote backward areas of the sierra. Via Frank own's words this author stresses in the sierra, that"the 'marginal' or 'floating population' is in process of becoming, or in some instances, is fully integrated into the society in a way which prejudices its welfare and opportunity to develop .." (1976: 37). Another attempt to use the concept of structural dependency and internal domination to the Peruvian agrarian problem is that of Matos Mar (1969), who argues that the pattern of external domination which was established during colonial rule still prevails in that country and characterises the relationships which bind the rural/peasant sector to the urban/modern region. Such relationships are seen in terms of complex networks which are at the basis of what Matos Mar calls a 'plural society'.

Unlike the Frankian model of metropolitan-satellite relations, the notion of 'plural society' emphasizes other forms of domination unique to Peru's history and culture that take into consideration the external factors which shaped the country's internal structure of dependence. It allows for the identification of a variety of social systems, how these inter-relate at the local level and are tied to a pattern of domination at the national and international levels. As important as it is, the international transfer of economic surplus cannot, however, satisfactorily explain underdevelopment. For Weaver, it is the use of economic surplus which must be the centre of attention, and this calls for a class analysis of dependent societies (1971, cited in Booth 1975: 71).
Although the loss of reinvestable surplus is of importance in explaining underdevelopment, to Cardoso the crucial point is the transformation of internal economic structure in Latin America under the impact of the multinational corporations. To him, the focus is no longer 'dependence' as an 'external variable' but the relations between the different social classes within the dependent nations themselves (1974).

While there is much disagreement among dependency theorists about the causes and mechanisms of underdevelopment in Latin America, a consensus exists on the detrimental effects of import-substitution which has only succeeded in creating new forms of dependency with the Western world as national policies for industrialization have succumbed to the multinational corporations.

Inspired by dependency theorists on dependent industrial development, particularly the work of Cardoso (1974), some authors (Alschuler 1981, Chossudovski 1981, Petras 1981) have centered their attention on the contradictions generated by the development of agriculture in the context of dependent economies. That is, their concern is to identify how relations of dependency are manifested concretely in rural social relations; the relations of agricultural production; and in the circulation of agricultural products (Alschuler ibid: 2). The restructuring of agriculture via multinational corporations has had a number of negative implications for the rural sector. The consolidation of capitalism inevitably means that the expansion of modern
enterprises in the agricultural sector tends to restrict or even reduce employment opportunity because of mechanization. Furthermore, cash crop production increases at the expense of domestic food production. This process consolidates the subsistence nature of domestic food production as a growing number of unemployed must rely upon traditional farming for survival. To quote Stavenhagen (1972: 17), the effect of modern commercial farming on peasant economy has been:

the increasing marginalization of the peasantry and the emergence on a wide spread scale hitherto unknown of a sub-proletariat which is being pushed out of agriculture but cannot be incorporated in the non-agricultural sector due to the characteristics of underdeveloped dependent and peripheral capitalism.

The Redistributionists

Speaking from the dependency perspective, redistributionists argue that only drastic institutional change, including the redistribution of large estates could bring about desired structural transformations and put an end to rural poverty. Land redistribution is thus regarded as the primary step toward establishing the basis for development.

Small Farms versus Large Farms

Once the large estates have been successfully expropriated, the difficult question which remains to be solved is of how to find an adequate model for a new land tenure system. It could either stress
family size farms or cooperative farming systems. As Barraclough and Domike (1970: 92-93) point out, in areas of minifundio, it would be difficult and very unpopular among farmers to reshape property boundaries. The alternative proposed by the Velasco regime in Peru was to incorporate individual peasants into the agrarian reform via the cooperativa agraria de integración parcelaria. Members were allowed to keep part of their land, the remainder to be worked communally through a cooperative system. As Smith adds (1976: 103): "it is difficult to envisage any land being available for cooperative farming if peasants are to be allowed to retain a plot of minimum proportions for their own working". Whatever the aim is of either subdividing the land into family units or creating collective enterprises, the crucial problem is that of guaranteeing a viable farm size.

For a long time the concept of 'optimum farm size' has been a matter of debate. However, it is becoming widely accepted that its usefulness is limited in agriculture. Flores observes, "(E)mpirical evidence shows that the scale of successful agricultural units varies widely from country to country and even regionally and that the size of the unit is not the variable that counts for success" (1970: 141). What is essential, however, is that the size of the new farms meet the requirements of the demographic and technological situation of the area concerned. As Jacoby rightly points out, factors such as efficiency of farm use and infrastructures are more important than farm size (1971: 176).

9- Small Holders Agrarian Cooperative
The question of who should benefit from reform is often difficult to resolve since a large portion of the rural population could qualify to receive land. Prior to 1968 in Peru, close to one million rural families were in need of land (Smith 1976: 92-3), while the achievements of agrarian reform to mid-1976 included about half of those families. In most cases, a large discrepancy exists between the number of people that qualify for land and those who can be accommodated - simply on the basis of availability of land.

Within Latin America, collective farming has gained some support from government officials as it offers a promising alternative to the problems of land scarcity. Usually, two types can be distinguished: 1) Production-oriented cooperatives in which productive resources - mainly land - are held and operated communally; 2) Service-oriented cooperatives in which farmers continue to farm independently but share credit, marketing and processing (Eckstein and Carroll 1976: 235).

Within the context of a 'reformist' approach to land reform, collective farming offers a relatively convenient solution to agricultural development and peasant integration. That is, changes are implemented faster because the setting up of a cooperative avoids the problems created by complex bureaucratic processes which are usually part of major redistribution programs. Also the cost of the operation does not rest entirely on the state as members are required to pay for the land and the equipment they receive. Cooperatives can be particularly important in the provision of essential services to small farmers, who can have
more easily access to credit, training and the dissemination of new farming technologies.

However, one of the major drawbacks of collective farming is that peasants are nominally the owners of the land and yet are not always encouraged to fully participate in the functioning of the enterprise. Production, marketing and credit are outside their control, these operations being handled by government officials. Moreover, decision-making is seldom shared by the membership. Leadership remains confined to hired administrators who work on the behalf of the state. As a result, peasants tend to resent this form of organization and would rather put their efforts into their own plots than into the cooperative. Thus, the reality of collectives in Latin America is that they are subject to a considerable degree of government control and consist of members who have lost their economic independence (King 1977: 59).

Controversy over Land Redistribution among Dependency Theorists

Because of the failure of many redistribution programs, there is a trend among dependency theorists to argue against the redistributionist stand. According to Petras (1981), to focus on land distribution is bypassing two important problems: 1) the rural population, not incorporated into new units, is subject to exploitation and expulsion, 2) the beneficiaries are dependent on manufactured input, and export-oriented processors can extract surplus without risk. Rather than land redistribution the issue is, thus, the particular forms of exploitation in agriculture where workers are in a subordi-
nate position within the larger exploitative society (Ibid: 30-31).

Thinking along similar lines, Chossudovski (1981:17) points out that changes in the structure of landownership obscure the fact that it "invariably leads to the development of new relations of exploitation", for redistribution does not in itself "modify the fundamental social relations of the capitalist system".

The disagreement which exists among dependency theorists on reforms of oligarchic structure comes from the fact that this type of strategy is considered as not able to solve the contradictions of a dependent agricultural sector. To them, a change of property tenure will improve the condition of the rural masses only if it is based upon popular mobilization aimed at the destruction of foreign controlled monopoly capitalism.

Dependency theorists stemming from the Marxist tradition generally agree that genuine land reform can only come about through a broadly-based revolution because the government that would take power is ideologically committed to rapid fundamental change. Under such circumstances expropriation and redistribution are executed shortly after the promulgation of the law. This aspect of speed or lack of speed is considered to be the key element in the success of the reform.

AGRAARIAN REFORM IN ACTION

Actual experiences show that the factor of 'timing' depends mainly on the government's motivation for reform (Frank 1969). Three types of reform can be distinguished taking into consideration the speed of the process.
If a reform of the rural sector is carried out by a government which is concerned primarily with serving the political interests of a powerful landed group rather than the economic and social needs of the peasantry, the implementation of the legislation will be extremely slow. Most likely, expropriation and redistribution will be secondary to technical innovation and to the development and colonization of new lands. Venezuela (1959) illustrates the case of a reform which was so slow that it became almost ineffective.

In that country, a military/clerical/landlord coalition passed a law in 1959 for the development of new land, the consolidation of agrarian settlements already established, and parcelization. In order to redistribute lands, government agencies bought estates from private owners who were paid in cash and in medium-term bonds. Then, these same lands were subdivided and resold as private properties to landless peasants and small cultivators at cost price, which, in this case, included the value of improvements and the wages of the officials in charge of the transaction (Delgado 1967: 390): As a result, resettled farmers were burdened with debt. Moreover, with their compensation payments, large landowners were able to reinvest in the industrial sector without suffering any loss of political power or social prestige. Furthermore, by burdening the legislation with lengthy provisions and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, the government was able to retard the reform process. As a result, four years later when the program came to a close, only 7% of the active rural population had benefited (as opposed to 32% in Cuba and 41% in Mexico). In addition,
21.5 million hectares out of the 22 million of privately owned land prior to the reform had been left untouched. In this instance, the law was so moderate that it had a limited impact on the power configuration of the agricultural sector. On the contrary, it consolidated a traditional structure based on large estates.

The second type of land reform is supported by governments that are committed to improving the living conditions of the rural population without having to create too much inconvenience to the powerful landowners. In this case, the reform is implemented at a rate which varies between five to fifteen years, thus providing ample opportunity for conservative groups to hinder further progress. Such was the case in Mexico where the revolution in 1910 gave way to the first important land reform in Latin America. The statutes enacted in the 1917 constitution contained three basic aspects. First, it aimed at distributing land to the peasants. Second, a great deal of land was to be parcelled as small-holdings. Third, the remaining land was granted to communities as ejidos. Most ejidos were created during the period of the Cardenas administration (1934-40) and it was only then that they received credit facilities. From 1940 to 1950, the private sector increased by 91% in terms of the number of proprietors (Gilbert 1974: 151). In the late 1960's, 106 million hectares remain in the hands of private owners with 71 percent of them holding more than 1000 hectares each (Deigado: 1968: 387).

Finally, reforms that are carried out rapidly are usually inten-
ded to bring about a radical transformation of the rural structures as they are, at least for a time, part of an ideological and political program committed to help the farm people. As far as Latin America is concerned, Cuba is an important example of a land reform which brought about fundamental agrarian change. By quickly implementing two reform laws (1959 and 1962), Cuba succeeded in breaking the power of its oligarchy, in reducing its dependence on the United States and in eradicating its rural unemployment problem (King 1977, Jacoby 1971).

From the outset, top priority was given to the elimination of the latifundio-minifundio system. Two years after the passing of the first law, 3,800,000 out of 5 million hectares of land had been expropriated and were organized in peasant cooperatives and state farms. Rapid confiscation and redistribution were possible because the National Land Reform Institute whose aim was to centralize the management of the estates, was also entrusted with powers to effectively inhibit sabotage. Through the use of complex legal formalities, it prevented large landlords from fraudulent actions against the process of redistribution. The power of the oligarchy was eradicated and the state became the owner of over 70% of the country's land; the highest degree of collectivization in the world (King ibid: 137). What this reform and no others in Latin America has achieved was to greatly reduce the economic disparity between the rural and the urban sector, to upgrade rural income and to stabilize the population of major cities by putting a halt to internal migration. Moreover, the emphasis upon
scientific farming and investment in agriculture has led since 1965 to an increase in both crops and livestock (ibid: 142).

Although Cuba is still searching for new solutions to solve some of its current agricultural problem - the main one being consistency in production - its reform program has nevertheless profoundly affected the whole rural sector. One of its major characteristics has been to generate full employment and permit land to be used effectively.

Summary

As we have seen, land reform can contribute greatly to agricultural development. To make agriculture more productive is a process which requires that peasants are given new incentives. Evidence shows that land reform is meaningful when it ensures a more egalitarian distribution of wealth through the establishment of a just tenure system. Thus, far-reaching alteration in land ownership and in the political power structure are the key to improve economic performance.

Most of the land reform programs recently conducted in Latin America did not enter into this essential process of redistribution. With the exception of Cuba, the majority failed to significantly raise agricultural production, to increase employment and to improve the
life of the peasantry.

To successfully carry out a land reform, strong emphasis must be placed upon rationality and pragmatism. One must take into consideration not only the technical aspect of the question, but also view such a process as a continual adjustment to the particular conditions of the society concerned and to the changing needs of the people.
CHAPTER III

DEPENDENCY AND CLIENTELISM

One of the fundamental characteristics associated with the notion of 'clientelistic structure' is that of vertical ordering. Such a structure is most likely to be found in a social context which exhibits a strong hierarchy. Within Peru, the presence of this organizational mode is best identified via a historical analysis of the emergence of a stratified society in the region.

Pre-Conquest Peru

Long before the arrival of the Spaniards to the New World, the Peruvian highlands of the Andes were able to support large populations. Subsisting on agriculture, these egalitarian societies were based on the ayllu as their fundamental organizational principle. This ayllu was both a kin and a political unit (Murra 1956; Silverblatt 1980).

Within the ayllu, ownership of land was communal. Its distribution depended upon a system which involved the periodic reappportioning of parcels according to household needs and to usufruct rights as defined by inheritance (Murra 1956: 57, Silverblatt 1980: 152). Work was also communally organized with kinship being the basis of claims for the carrying out of economic activities. Mutual cooperation and reciprocal obligation between ayllu members which were referred to by Blas Valera as 'the law of fraternity' characterized this pre-Inca mode of production. Communities were autonomous, and maintained a low degree of social stratification (Godelier 1977: 64).
This developed only to a limited extent from the fact that the Kuracas or village leaders could make a greater claim on the wealth and labour of their ayllu.

In the first half of the fifteenth century, however, these groups underwent profound changes under the yoke of the Inca state. The Inca were a relatively small and well-organized group from southern Peru. Through wars, they rapidly expanded, establishing their rule from Ecuador in the north to Chile in the south, and from coast to jungle.

By claiming rights to all lands in the kingdom, as a means of controlling surplus, the Inca put an end to the communities' former autonomy. Moreover in order to ensure a stable surplus which could support the empire's administrative apparatus, the nobility and the priest class, the Inca state initiated a tribute system whereby peasants were subjugated to a regime of forced labour. It was the system of community reciprocal obligations - the basis of the ayllu organization - which was transformed into a means of directly extracting labour from the peasantry (Murra 1958: 32). Thus, although production continued to assume a communal form, a new mode of production had emerged (Godelier 1977: 64).

The village chief or Kuraka who used to make claims on the labour

1. As the basic unit of labour required for the reproduction of the Andean society was conceived in terms of male and female complementary occupations, it was the household, and not the individual member which was assigned labour service to the state. See J. Murra ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF THE INCA STATE. Chicago (1956).
of his ayllu members was now liable to the state for enforcing labour on the ayllu households. By taking advantage of former social and political relations, existing at the local level, the Inca state transformed local leaders into intermediaries mediating the demands of the larger society on the peasantry. These new brokers came to occupy a strategic political position, as traditional links with the land and kin groups were destroyed and as the local community developed a greater dependence on the state. This middle class saw its power increasing with the expansion of the Inca empire and of its concomitant administrative apparatus, whose control over new territories relied on the loyalty of traditional leaders. Kurakas became crucial to the Inca 'indirect' rule (Murra 1958: 36), as they provided the main link between the ayllus and the state bureaucracy. Rapidly, they took advantage of the situation by exploiting both the state and the peasantry. Not only were they granted Kumbi cloth and land, but also human beings or yanás. These yanás were people who had been cut off from their original communities and were completely dependent for survival upon the personal ties they established with their new masters.

Thus, in the Andean region, we see the emergence of an absolute and centralised theocracy overthrowing existing institutions and establishing 'hierarchies of social interaction' (Chalmers 1977: 405) to vertically integrate conquered communities into the new Incaic order. Within this elite-centered pyramidal structure, a patron-client system is rising with the Kurakas in the middle acting as brokers and thus linking the various level of Inca society.
SPANISH CONQUEST

The Inca empire was quickly dismantled following Spanish conquest in 1532. By imposing an alien economic ideological structure on the region, the Spaniards further disrupted the internal process of development of this Andean society.

In the early sixteenth century Spain, orienting its economy toward the European market, saw in the New World an opportunity to extract maximum surplus. Due to its rich mineral resources, Peru came to enjoy a particular favoured position among Spanish colonies. Silver was extracted from the mines of Potosi and later from Pasco in the central sierra. Mercury was discovered in Huancavelica which became one of the largest producers of quicksilver in the world.

Within the historical context of emerging capitalism in Europe, a new system of social relations was transferred to the Americas. This system was still, in terms of its internal structure, closely related to a feudal mode of production found in Spain (Godelier 1977:66). Because political power was in the hands of a colonial state, the economic system of that period was referred to by some authors as 'colonial capitalism' (Frank 1967) or 'colonial feudalism' (macera). The question of whether or not it was a capitalist mode of production which developed in the New World after the arrival of the Spaniards has been

2. This area was known in the sixteenth century as Upper Peru. It now constitutes the Republic of Bolivia.
part of heated debates between the dependency school (Frank 1967) and Marxist scholars such as Laclau (1971). This historical period, characterised by the 'primitive accumulation of capital' (development in the production of gold, silver, and other products) gave rise to a system of social relations typical of a colonial society created while capitalism was still in a formative stage.

The economic and political framework imposed on colonial Peru by the Spaniards was geared to extracting tribute and labour services out of the indigenous population for the benefit of the metropolis. It resulted in the rapid destruction of the Andean social system and of the ideology of 'law of fraternity' which molded it.

3. - To Frank, only the capitalist mode is assumed to have existed in Latin America. Conquest placed these societies in a situation of economic dependence in the world system of expanding capitalism. This relationship to the capitalist metropolis has shaped the economy and the class structure of such colonial societies. Laclau's criticisms of Frank's approach could be summarized as follows:

1) to define social systems such as capitalism and feudalism as exchange relationship rather than mode of production is to depart from Marxism.
2) this approach does not allow for an account of the different forms of the transition between feudalism and capitalism.
3) to affirm the feudal character of the relations of production in the agrarian sector does not mean that one reverts to the 'dualist' theory.
4) the existence of various modes of production within the world capitalist system is the basis of an important 'set of explanatory hypotheses' relating to the 'specifically capitalist epoch' of European expansion.
It should be remembered that 16th-Century Spain was a feudal society ruled by bureaucratic absolutism. This meant that at the local level, the concentration of power was in the hands of landlords whose control over the system of land tenure and agricultural production was through the establishment of patron-clientage that bonded peasants to the estate. At the national level, a strong civil, military and clerical administration functioned as a way of limiting the power of the 'lords' (Chalmers 1977: 404) and of protecting the interests of the Crown. Within the bureaucracy, each official owed his position "to either direct nepotism or to conscious use of a patronage group" (Kenny 1977: 357). This system which had a long tradition in Spain was perpetuated in the New World. From the outset, a high level of patronage existed within the Spanish bureaucracy. Then, in reaction to the crown mercantilistic policy, the whole system became extremely corrupted. That is, within the context of commercial goals, Spain conferred privileges on a small merchant class known as the consulado who exercised monopoly over manufactured exports to the Americas. This class ensured maximum profit for itself by creating an artificial scarcity of goods sold at exorbitant prices to the colonists. This fraction of privileged individuals were to lay the roots for the emergence of a comprador bourgeoisie - that is, "part of the big native merchant bourgeoisie in the colonies and dependent countries who acted as intermediaries between foreign capital and the local market" (Stalin 1975: 151 cited in Dore and Weeks 1977: 5). Meanwhile, in reaction to such commercial practices, land and mine owners, priests and coopted royal officials
resorted to massive contraband trade with the support of the administra-
tive apparatus which Spain introduced to Peru. In fact, this
hierarchically organized bureaucratic framework provided the vertical
channels through which all types of material and non-material resources
could be controlled and selectively distributed. Within this rigidly
stratified society clientelism became the means to compete over scarce
resources and services and to achieve social mobility.

The patronage system which prevailed at higher levels of govern-
ment was continually reinforced by official Catholicism with God being
'the final patron and the ultimate source of all patronage' (Kenny
1977). Thus, the spread of this religion in the Andes reinforced ver-
tical ties and superior-subordinate relations by preaching the 'natural
helplessness of mankind' and the need for protectors both spiritual
and temporal (Hall 1974: 507).

a) Encomiendas

With conquest vast tracts of land were taken over by the Spanish
colonists. These were royal grants to conquistadores in reward for
services under arms which entitled their holders to extract compulsory
labour from the Indians occupying the land. This system, known as the
encomienda, served the purpose of obtaining a cheap labour force needed
in mining, agriculture and obrajes or sweatshops. An essential feature
of this institution was that it conferred no landed property. Thus,

4. In Chile, the encomienda was combined with landownership from the
start of the colony. See Arnold Bauer: CHILEAN RURAL SOCIETY FROM
'the Indians though liable to the demands for tribute and labour during the effective period of the grant, were regarded as free for the reason that they were not owned as property by their encomenderos (Gibson, 1964: 58).

The encomienda system initially allowed the Indians to remain in their original settlements, but each year one-third (or one-fifth) of them had to work on newly established estates. The remaining two-thirds (or four-fifths) were permitted to farm their communal lands or their own plots. They could also hire themselves out to other encomenderos (Weeks 1947: 159, Kay 1974: 79).

Some land grants or 'mercedes de tierras' dedicated to mining and commercial agriculture, particularly livestock breeding, also drew upon the encomienda for unpaid Indian labour services.

The colonial state also modified older forms of economic servitude such as the Inca mita system in order to fit its needs and to ensure surplus production. Mita service (a form of corvée service) on public work projects and in the mines was revived in 1556. Combined with obligatory work for wages this system caused the dislocation and death of a large number of people, leading eventually to the uprising of Tupac Amaru II in 1780. Furthermore, some forms of Andean communal organization were allowed to exist on the reducciones despite the fact that former community relations had been destroyed. 5 In these

5. The reducciones were townships created as an attempt by the crown of Castile to reestablish its supremacy over Indian taxes and labour as its power was constantly challenged by the church and the growing landed class (encomenderos).
settlements, *mita* service was the major form of labour appropriation. Each year one-seventh of the male Indian population was sent to labour in mines in exchange for small wages. Frequently, a day's work could not be completed without hiring helpers with money loaned by the company. Then, burdened with debts, peasants could not leave the mines. The creation of such ties, which limited the mobility of peasants, formed a basic part of the system of mining and, later, agricultural production.

In order to impose a system of indirect rule on the communities, the crown recognized the Kuracas as being part of the European nobility, released them from tribute and gave them the right to hold private property (Silverblatt 1980: 170). In return, such local leaders insured that the demands made by the colonial power on the peasantry were carried out. As was the case under Inca rule, this same class was able to take advantage of its critical position to build up its power.6

By virtue of their new status, which entitled them to own land, these local leaders rapidly became integrated into the mercantilistic economy of colonial Peru. Soon they began to compete for office in the state bureaucracy and in the organizational framework of the church.

Many became compadres (cosponsors) to espouse the religious ideology of the dominant Spanish class, in this way becoming more acceptable to their colonizers (Godelier 1977). Thus, by preserving some 'traditional' aspects of Andean organization within European social structures, the Spaniards were able to subjugate the native population without completely disrupting production.

b) Haciendas

In the mid-sixteenth century, the encomienda system declined as mining became less profitable. As a result, agriculture was given greater attention and land passed into the hands of individuals and organizations—a process which led to the emergence of haciendas or manor estates which hired Indians for labour. When an estate was owned by an institution, the land was rented in toto or in parcels according to bid. An example of such a system was found on Hacienda Espíritu Santo near Ayacucho. This estate belonged to the Madres Mercedarias who rented their land at the highest bidder on a five year basis. The renters, in order to extract suitable profit, paid very low wages to members of the 104 households attached to the hacienda. This hacienda, as well as the majority of the majority of the institutional estates of the sierra, dissapeared in the 1970's under the provision of the agrarian law.

Individually owned estates generally had absentee landlords with managers or mayordomos in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the hacienda. One of the predominant features of this type of economy was its poor productivity. To keep farm wages low, owners allowed only a
small portion of the land to be farmed—a culture based upon primitive technology and intensive labour. As Feder notes 'when landownership is concentrated in the hands of a few large landowners, there is little incentive to cultivate all the land or to employ all the available labour power' (1971: 12).

Haciendas generally included three types of land: 1) 'demesne' or estate land dedicated to either cattle raising or to some specialized commercial crop; 2) 'chacras' or small plots rented out in usufruct to the peasants (these were usually unproductive lands); 3) pastures or communal lands.

Hacienda types varied according to the ecological zones in which they were found. For example, in temperate valleys such as that near Quillabamba, estates were dedicated to coca or sugar cane production as early as 1610. In the sierra, at an altitude of between 1,800 to 3,500 meters, haciendas cultivated small crops farmed under the colono system. That is, in return for subsistence tenure, poneos provided unpaid labour services under conditions set by the owners. By tradition and because of cash loans or perpetual debts colonos were bound to the estate. According to Martínez-Alier (1973), this debt-peonage system developed as a result of labour scarcity in the region. On the other hand, in the southern sierra where there was a particularly acute shortage of agricultural land, landless peasants were forced into the arrendaire system. In this case the renter worked 180 days a year on the estate, plus extra hours only when required by the landlord. Unlike the colono, the arrendaire was not tied to the manor and could
leave as soon as his contract expired (Gade 1975: 31). This system existed until the 1960's.

In the altiplano, the area above 3,500 meters, most estates confined themselves to animal husbandry with large herds of sheep, llamas, alpacas and a small number of cattle. Tenants were usually held responsible for any loss of animals. In exchange for their work, herders were allowed to feed their own animals on the estate land. Although not bound to the haciendas many Indian shepherds would remain for generations on the same estate. Although haciendas were often isolated, traditional, and technologically outmoded, they were by no means some sort of closed systems untouched by market forces. In fact, as Wolf (1959) observes, the principal function of this type of enterprise 'was to convert community oriented peasants into a disciplined labour force able to produce cash crops for a supra economy market'. Thus, with the penetration of the world market, these enterprises could expand production using their tenants' labour services. Lehmann cites the emergence of the labour rent system in the Peruvian valley of La Convenció in response to opportunities for growing and selling coffee on the world market in the early 20th-century (1976:19).

The development of the hacienda system took place to the detriment of the Indian communities which, left with the poorest agricultural land, gradually became incorporated into these estates (Cotler 1970; Matos Mar 1967). The small independent peasant was also placed in a similar position as he had very limited possibilities to buy land from the large estate and was, consequently, forced to join the hacienda...
labour force. In discussing how the 'decomposition' of the tenant farmers occurs in Latin America, Kay (1974: 30-31) identifies several stages involved in the process. These are: 1) at the beginning rents were low and mainly payable in kind or money so as to attract settlers; 2) rents were increased and a process of 'backward commutation took place; 3) the allocation of new tenancies within the hacienda system diminished; 4) as labour services continued to increase the landlords had to pay some monetary compensation for the increased labour rent; 5) the number of labour service tenancies diminished because tenancies were no longer renewed upon the death of the tenants or expulsions took place; 6) the proportion of wage income within the total income of the tenant increased as he worked more days on the hacendado's land, receiving a daily wage and a smaller tenancy, fewer grazing rights and often fewer consumption fringe benefits and 7) the hacienda enterprise cultivated all arable land of the estate with pure wage labour. While this process of proletarianization of tenant farmers occurred to a great extent in Chile, in the Peruvian highlands it did not reach such extremes because of the resistance of tenants to the modernization of estates. However, in the Indian communities such a process developed

7. This means that money-kind rents were replaced by increasing labour services.

8. In J. Martínez-Alier LOS HUACCHILEROS DEL PERU. 'Paris (1973), the author cites the case of the hacienda shepherds whose bargaining power was effective in resisting attempts at proletarianization as well as encroachments on their surplus through increases in rent.
out of the uneven distribution of power which enabled some to exploit others by forcing the latter to sell their land and work as wage labourers.

Kay mentions that the increase of labour rent was possible mainly because of overpopulation on the land outside the hacienda which was created artificially by landlords taking over community land (ibid: 83). Then, by using the threat of expulsion the landlord could enforce such a rent over his labour force which lacked any other alternative of livelihood.

Mechanisms of Domination on the Haciendas

The Indians, who were incorporated into the encomiendas, and later the haciendas as colonos, peones or yanaconas (terms differ according to the region), became totally dependent on the landlord, for access to survival resources, through linkages of patron-clientage. The extent of the tenants' dependence was considerable. Within the estate, peasants were given small parcels of land or 'chakras' for subsistence farming, a house, and credit in exchange for work. Each colono household was required to fulfill a number of obligations, which consisted in giving free labour to fulfill the hacendado's needs, whatever these might be. It included basic labour service on the hacienda or on any other estate owned by the landlord, offerings in kind, personal domestic services, loyalty in inter-faction feuds and expressions of deference and respect. It also meant giving a certain number of the best animals
each year, and selling any products grown on the chakras to the hacendado who, then, acted as broker between his estate and the town merchants. In this way, the landlord maintained a monopoly over commercial connections with local, national or even international markets. Had the peasant been allowed to enter into direct business relations with the outside, the patron's power would have been greatly affected.

It is difficult to categorize the various types of clientelistic relations because of the diffuse nature of the phenomenon. However, Hall (1974:507) identifies two forms—patrimonial and repressive. Both were found on the Peruvian haciendas. Patrimonial relations—defined as the acceptance of traditional authority by the subordinate—provided a framework for vertical dependence based on highly personal ties of loyalty. As head of the estate, the owner was regarded as the legitimate authority figure (Hall ibid., Greenfield 1972).

Traditionally, peasants considered the landlord to be indispensable for their own security, as it was his responsibility to offer shelter and ensure protection to all members living on the estate.


10. The concept of 'patrimonialism' was introduced by Max Weber. He associated this notion with 'traditional' form of authority with the use of personal power. See Talcott Parsons ed. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. New York (1947:347).
This exaggerated importance attributed to the landlord and the isolation of the peasantry, which reinforced the colonos' "feeling of dependency on the patron", were the basis of paternalism (Petras and Merino 1972: 62). This form of particularistic, authoritarian power structure was often reinforced by fictive kinship ties or 'compadrazgo', in a manner by which a powerless peasant could hope to find some protection against daily uncertainties. According to Scott (1976: 29-30), as long as the patron helped the peasant to survive economic crises and guaranteed his tenant 'the right to subsistence', the relationship would remain stable. However, in many instances, peasants did not passively accept the 'quasi-absolutist rulership' of the estate, and fought the arbitrary conduct of their landlord.  

Attacking the 'myth of the passive peasants' some authority noted:

Over the years and long before land reform had become a political catchword, the peasants of Latin America had resisted and protested (often violently) the process whereby the expanding haciendas robbed them of their lands and turned them into oppressed peonés. (Huizer and Stavenhagen quoted in Vanden, 1970: 198).

A number of measures adopted by the hacendados did not rely on the use of force, but trapped tenants in a circle of poverty leaving

them with virtually no access to alternative forms of existence. For example, as mentioned previously, in some parts of the sierra where there existed more people than available parcels of land to support them, numerous peasants were forced to accept the arrendiré system. The majority had less than 1/3 hectare of poor, non-irrigated land on steep slopes to sustain themselves and their families. Thus peasants enjoyed no social or economic security whatsoever, remaining always dependent on the good offices of their landlords.

Through the monopolization of essential resources such as land patrons have been able, for many years, to control their workers and, consequently, counteract any challenge to the status quo. This concentration of power in the hands of a small landed elite, increased, nevertheless, after the collapse of the colonial bureaucratic authority and the coming of Independence.

POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Caudillismo

The authoritarianism and paternalism characteristic of the patron-client pattern as found on the hacienda came to be representative of the type of political system that followed Independence. The 19th century caudillismo regimes were based on charismatic leadership with the new leaders retaining a strong sense of paternalistic authority and personal loyalty.
After 1822, following the withdrawal of the Crown administration, Peru found itself in a state of internal anarchy with no central authority to unify a country torn apart by factionalism. Hard hit by the Independence wars, this society had to rely on military men to take hold of the presidency until a civilian elite gained enough strength and cohesion to take over the state. These 'caudillos' were officers who, by force of arms and through the support of their followers, achieved some semblance of order and authority in the region. The leadership style they created became known as 'personalismo' or 'caudillismo'. That is, these leaders were supposed to embody the male values of heroism and self-confidence which were major factors in attracting a following and acquiring personal prestige. The relationships that tied a leader to his supporters were based on trust and loyalty where clientelism was used as a social bond between the two parties. Caudillos were predominantly of humble origin, but, as Guasti notes (1977: 432) they never seriously competed with upper class groups as "they operated within a modus vivendi with upper class families" controlling governmental orientation. However, if some degree of vertical mobility was possible, it was not as a result of an opening within the class system but, rather, as a consequence of an expanding clientelistic structure where followers were rewarded with political favour and opportunity (Van Niekerk 1974: 173).

Post Independence Change in the Resource Base of the upper class

Shortly after Spain withdrew from the Latin American continent,
England became Peru's dominant trading partner. With the guano boom of the 1840's, a new elite arose, gaining greater control over the state to protect its interests. This was particularly evident under the leadership of President Ramón Castilla beginning in 1845. Furthermore, to consolidate its position this new upper class purchased large coastal plantations devoted to cotton and sugar for the world market and in the 1860's expanded its economic base into banking and light manufacturing industries.

Thus, while Peru was a source of raw materials with guano being used to accelerate Europe's agro-industrial revolution, it was also able to reinvest 70% of the guano revenues into coastal agri-business to the advantage of an emerging capitalist class (Bollinger 1977: 30).

To establish a climate favourable to export, at a time of political instability following Independence and the War of the Pacific, the various fractions of the Peruvian upper class formed a political coalition whose first accomplishment was to oust the military from power in 1895. This grand alliance was comprised of the old merchant class, the traditional landed elite, and the commercial classes involved in banking and export industries. Such an 'unholy' alliance ruled over Peru until 1968 but was fraught with internal conflicts as the capitalist class fought against its rural landed counterpart to maintain hegemony over the state (Bollinger 1977, Weeks and Dore 1977).

Unlike industrial economies where machinery and modern techno-
logy increase productivity while labour time is saved, in countries like Peru; the productive processes are far less efficient. Where there exists a lower level of development, more labour power is needed to produce commodities which therefore cost more than in advanced capitalist societies. As these countries depend upon foreign capital to maintain their system of production, their dominant classes are forced to compete over the lowering of labour costs in order to preserve international markets. In the case of Peru, it was this disadvantage which compelled the agro-mining exporters to ally with their rivals, especially hacendados, so that political stability would be maintained and export facilitated. This rapprochement was devised to gain control over the state and ensure the protection of the interests of a few while appropriating labour through various measures of coercion, including forced military conscription, enslavement for the production of rubber in the Amazon regions and 'conscripción vial'.

The most immediate result of the 'conscripción vial' was to increase the number of people who left their homes to live in Lima, accelerating the process of expulsion of the peasantry from the land. At the same time, by creating better communications throughout the sierra, it allowed expansion of capitalism within the Andean society.

12. Labour for highway construction during Leguía's oncenio.
However, to further expand capitalism in the interior of the country the industrialists continually encroached upon the spheres of influence normally associated with the rural landowners. It is thus that the power of the rural sector waned in the affairs of the state. By reducing the material base of the hacendados, the industrialists were hoping to seize state power in order to adequately protect their interests. For example, in order to achieve such ends, President Leguía incorporated a number of articles into the 1920 constitution to prevent the encroachment of private landowners on Indian communities. This allowed communities to receive official recognition as corporate bodies with inalienable rights to their land (Orlove 1977: 168). Another measure devised by mine owners to control Indian labour was the creation of the enganche system which confined workers into a fixed-term labour contract by keeping them in debt. It put landlords and miners in fierce competition over sierra labour forcing the former group to improve conditions in order to prevent peasants from leaving the estates (Bollinger 1977: 42). However, when some hacendados came to realise that modernization of production was more economical they introduced machines and began to expel their colonos.

In the highlands, such actions encountered strong resistance from the peasantry and a process of refeudalization started to occur. This expressed itself through the use of debt peonage by sharecroppers who resisted removal from the lands they were cultivating (Gibson 1964: 252-5, Bollinger 1977: 41). According to Martínez-Alier (1977: 73) the persistence of non-capitalist relations of production in some
Andean haciendas was the result of a successful struggle on the part of peones who managed to hold to their plots. That is, these peasants intentionally burdened themselves with debt beyond their capacity for repayment in order to ensure their relation to the estate so that they would not be expelled. This way they helped to prevent modernization.

As the world market slowly penetrated the highlands, there were cases of hacendados able to accumulate capital on the basis of servile labour for investment into industrial capital. However, most landowners were unable to manage modern farming operations; they were not entrepreneurs interested in making a profit from their land. Rather, they were absentee landlords who preferred to hire managers to run their estates or to rent the land to tenants who had little incentive to improve production because contracts were for short-term periods.

Managers often acted as brokers between absentee owners and workers. Their dominance over the Indians came from the fact that they occupied formal positions of authority at the local level and were backed by their influential patrons at the national level. By maintaining networks of dependent relationship, brokers could exploit the peasantry and exclude them from access to social resources and decision-making power.

While new industrialist groups were gaining strength with the thrust of capitalist enterprise into the region, the traditional power structure of the sierra was inevitably being altered...Conse-
quently, the decaying rural elite had to adopt a different political behaviour in order to still exercise some influence in national politics. This was achieved by an overt formalisation and strengthening of clientelistic arrangements. For example, landlords who were powerful regional patrons were capable of becoming brokers between the sierra and the coast because of their connections and networks of 'friends' in the rural areas that could be mobilised whenever needed. Thus, the industrial elite on the coast could be sure of support in the sierra. In exchange, these new landlord-brokers and some of their 'friends' would expect political favours such as holding a position at higher level of government. Thus, we find, as Guasti notes (1977: 427), a disproportionate number of landlords over-representing the sierra departments in the legislature. However, it was via the hacendados that members of the Grand Alliance were able to control the interchange between urban centers and periphery and, as such, consolidate their power over rural resources.

Rise of Populism

The clientelistic structure which developed as a result of the process of external domination within the Andean society gained strength during the twentieth century with the emergence of populism.

In Latin America, populist movements are urban phenomena based upon the working class but led by members of the ruling elite. Their rhetoric emphasizes economic nationalism, state enterprise and an equitable distribution of resources. However, by not questioning the role of workers as producers and also by exclusively focussing on distribution rather saving and investment, populism usually collapses leading to anti-labour governments.
In the early 1900's, Peru's urban popular classes emerged to play an important role in national politics. The growth of the working class was concomitant with the increase of foreign capital in industry. Following World War I, Peruvian products were in high demand and the export sector held a prominent position in the country's development. The expansion of American participation in Peru's economy reached its apex during the 1920's under Augusto Leguía's presidency. As he once declared: "during my administration foreign capital will be given facilities and opportunities for the development of Peruvian resources which have never heretofore been accorded and which may never be accorded again" (quoted in Stein 1980: 53). Even after the Great Depression of the 1930's and the Second World War, Peru did not initiate import-substitution policies to replace her model of export-led-growth, as other Latin American countries which depended on monocultures, had to do. The reason for pursuing export-led-development was that Peru's export-economy exhibited substantial diversification: It included copper, silver, lead, sugar, wool, cotton and fishmeal.

One direct consequence of increased foreign investment and greater Peruvian participation in world trade was the rapid urbanization of coastal cities, mainly Lima, since the development of a modern infrastructure encouraged internal migration. That is, an improved communication system up-graded the value of property for profitable exploitation. As a consequence, many peasant communities were forced to sell their land, with the result that comuneros had no other alternative but to seek work in the capital city, and join the urban
proletariat.

During Leguía's oncenio and the years of world depression, Peru benefited from its ties to the world market. However, following the depression there was a sharp drop in export prices (cotton, wool and sugar) and a cutback in imported manufactured goods. In Lima, the working classes were particularly hit by the economic crisis and many workers found themselves unemployed. In the midst of these times of hardship, the Sánchezcristista and Aprista populist parties came to dominate national politics. Both were vertical movements which fused middle and upper-class leaders with working class followers. Through such movements, workers emerged as a social and political force whose demands could no longer be ignored. Though they were numerically important they still represented a largely unorganized population who saw in populist leaders such as Sánchez Cerro and Haya de la Torre sympathetic leaders sensitive to their suffering. Stein reports the comments of one participant in the events of the 1930's who said: that "the country was like a giant hacienda and the patron on the hacienda (referring to President Sánchez Cerro) did everything possible to provide benefits for his people so that they should be content" (1980: 204-205). Thus, paternalistic populism arose in the 1930's and again under Manuel Odria in 1948 as a replication, in the urban context, of patron-clientage which for centuries had connected the lower classes to the national social structure. Modern populism sought to close the gap between rich and poor, under capitalism, while mobilizing the

13. It refers to the eleven years of the Leguía's administration (1919-1930).
vote of the new proletariat along clientelistic lines. Stein had
the following comments to make on Peruvian life in the 1930's:

The political clientelism inherent in these early, populist movements paralleled in many ways the kind of patron-client relationship that has permeated Peruvian and Latin American social life since colonial times. Like the archetypical dyadic contract between the rural hacendado and the peón, the political tie between populist leader and follower was an individualistic decidedly personal association between men from distinct social strata. Basic to the relationship was the reciprocal exchange of services and/or goods between those involved. For the political patrons, the exchange meant support in the streets and at the voting booth. For the clients, rewards could come in various forms from personal favors to material handouts (1980: 204).

Conclusion

Clientelism has been central to Peru's social and political life ever since Inca times. It was introduced to the region following a process of colonization, first Incaic, then Hispanic, and maintained by the penetration of foreign capital. At the local level, it ensured servile obedience from the peasantry to a patron class who could use cheap labour to exploit resources in exchange for loans and land. At the national level, clientelism was a political structure created by the imposition of a rigid bureaucracy at the service of the colonial power. The function of this type of politics was to first coopt the indigenous elite, then keep a tight control over the landed class and finally to extract as much tribute as possible from the Indian population.
After Independence the political struggle, which revolved around the control of the state, encouraged greater use of manipulative links among the various classes fighting for power. Such links were crucial for maintaining some sort of political stability while a capitalist economy was developing in the export sector. Through clientelism, connections could be formed to articulate the interests of modern and traditional groups into the national system.

However, in situations in which socio-economic structures offer relatively little scope for development, clientelism often finds expression in populist movements. In Peru, populist politics provided the framework to handle workers' demands without putting too much pressure directly on the state. Moreover, this type of clientelistic politics was a strategy used to temper class discontent at the urban level.

Thus, over the year, the patron-dependent relationship became a pattern of continuing and enduring importance in Peru penetrating all levels of social and political life. In fact, one of the main goals of Velasco's land reform program was to displace the landed elite from the agricultural sector by transforming the haciendas into cooperatives. This was achieved by establishing a corporate political system of a clientelistic nature. It is the impact of this process on the rural sector that will be next examined.
From the moment the armed forces seized power in October 1968, they stressed the importance of establishing a new socio-economic order. The action of The Revolutionary Government is inspired by the necessity of transforming the structure of the state in such a way as to permit sufficient action by the government; to transform the social, economic and cultural structures, and to maintain a definite nationalistic attitude, a clear independent position, in defense of the national sovereignty and dignity, in reestablishing fully the principle of authority, respect and observance of the law and the rule of justice and morality in all areas of national activity. (The Manifesto of the Revolutionary Government, Oct. 3, 1968, Quoted in Jacquette 1971: 224).

As stated, the Velasco government proceeded to implement an extensive program of reforms to enhance the role of the state and increase productivity. The result was the creation of a multi-level apparatus which, in the rural sector, took the form of a cooperative system.

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGES PRIOR TO 1968

Peru was undergoing a profound internal crisis at this time. Shortly after the Second World War, rapid economic changes led, in the region, to massive waves of social unrest.
Until 1948, the foreign control of Peru's economy was almost exclusively limited to its agro-extractive resources with export agriculture being most important followed by petroleum and mining (Quijano 1971: 12). Beginning in the 1950's, Peru's economic dependence assumed a new form with North American capital strengthening its control over the national industrial sector. Urban manufacturing industries started to dominate the economy of the country causing agriculture, in particular, to be of less importance. While most of the food production was destined for export, products for the domestic market began to deteriorate rapidly. As a result, importation of agricultural products rose from 40 million dollars in the early 1960's to more than 134 million dollars in 1965 (Ibid: 294).

Industrial expansion relied on a small, skilled labour force. As a result, the urban sector was unable to absorb all the available unskilled active population in the cities following the disintegration of agriculture which had led to massive waves of rural migrations towards the urban centres.

Rural Mobilization in the Sixties

The crisis of the economic and political system during the Prado administration (1956-1962) was most obviously expressed by the peasant mobilization of the early sixties which, in the highlands, reflected the weakening of traditional power.

This widespread rural unrest, which ultimately led to the passing of the 1964 Agrarian Law, was caused by numerous factors among which was high rural unemployment partly generated by the extremely skewed land tenure system that could not absorb the large number of agricultural labourers. Prior to that, legal proceedings against owners had

1. From 1940 to 1965 the urban population grew from 1.7 to 4.9 million.
been frequently used by campesinos to defend their lands. As the rural problem became more acute peasants felt that the patient use of lawful means was insufficient to accomplish the necessary changes. Land invasions, thus, became an important way for peasants to voice their grievances and to regain control of land they felt was rightly theirs.

Peasant movements swept the sierra involving a massive, heterogeneous rural population, estimated to have comprised some 300,000 people (Manedalman 1975: 86-123). Their activities followed three main lines of action: 1) unionization, 2) land invasions, 3) association with militant groups based in the cities.

In Pasco, unionization was a decisive factor for peasant agitation. This small department had a large Spanish speaking peasantry well integrated into the national economy. Rural mobilization started peacefully with the occupation of hacienda lands shortly after a number of strikes took place in the Cerro de Pasco corporation in response to the introduction of labour saving measures. Land seizures continued throughout the department until March 1962 when the military forced peasants to vacate the land they had seized. However, these lands were, for the most part, regained a year later when the region was declared zone for the implementation of agrarian reform.

In two valleys of the coffee growing part of the department of Cuzco - La Convencion and Lares - peasant mobilization was

2. Among them were peones from haciendas, minifundistas, landless agricultural labourers and even traders.
more radical, having been sparked by a decline of coffee prices during the years of 1954 to 1961. This led to a general strike of peones in La Covención and Lares that lasted two months and which was won by the workers. This successful outcome encouraged the regional peasant federation headed by Hugo Blanco, a young Trotskyist leader, to invade lands in over one hundred haciendas in La Convención valley and Lares.

As a result of massive military repression followed by the arrest of Blanco, the movement started to decline, to be replaced by a form of warfare under the leadership of MIR (the Movement of the Revolutionary Left) headed by Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Labatón. MIR was originated by a group of students and young militants who had been expelled from APRA and inspired by the Cuban Revolution were committed to armed struggle.

Rural unrest rapidly spread from La Convención to most of the highlands leading to a wave of invasions and peasant strikes. This resulted in growing violence particularly in the departments of Cuzco and Ayacucho where guerrilla fronts opposed the regular army for several months during 1965. However, in spite of the efforts of urban based organizations to lead guerrillas in the southern and central regions of the countries, these groups failed to gain the total support of the peasantry. As a result of the killing of its urban leaders, the movement ceased to exist.
These radical peasant movements forced the military government in 1963 to carry out a few expropriations and community development projects. In addition, the army initiated a program of road building and provided better medical and educational services to the most remote areas in the highlands. In the departments where the largest number of invasions had occurred, the government expropriated a few haciendas in order to try to satisfy some of the demands of the peasants.

It was the acuteness of the political crisis created by the situation in the sierra which had led to a military coup in 1962. A year later, as promised, the army called for elections. The head of Acción Popular (AP) - Belaúnde Terry - came to power with the support of the peasantry to whom he had assured an agrarian reform during his electoral campaign. However, it was under his administration that the bloodiest of repression against peasants occurred. His land reform, known as Law 15,037, passed in 1964 forced landowners to pay salaries to their workers and guaranteed work regulations and tenancy contracts to renters. However, the law was by no means radical. First, it exempted the large sugar plantations because they were efficiently operated. Second, it permitted owners of farms registered as companies to keep more than the reform-based limit of 150 hectares by increasing their number of shareholders (who tended to be family members) with each receiving an amount equal to the unexpropriated limit.
Under Belaúnde, the government expropriated only 0.37 million hectares of land. Forty cooperatives with 8,686 members were created and some 11,000 families received 380,000 hectares, leaving a large part of the rural population completely untouched. Thus, one can say that the initiative for the real tenure change came about because of land seizures by frustrated peasants rather than because of Belaúnde's reform law.

However, peasant militancy was not the only problem that Belaúnde had to face in the sixties. Serious internal conflicts plagued Acción Popular which, between 1963 and 1968, lost considerable popularity. The image of its national leader had been badly damaged after the failure of his reform program. One of the reasons for the government's lack of control over the political situation was that national policies collided with the interests of the Grand Alliance which, although deeply divided, had made a deal with the populist APRA party to rule over congress and to effectively obstruct any moves towards peaceful reform (Jacquette 1971). In addition, Belaúnde's administration had to face a drastic increase in the cost of living following devaluation of the sol. Furthermore, it could not reach a settlement in the long-standing controversy with the International Petroleum Corporation (IPC) over the La Brea y Pariñas oil lands. Meanwhile, labour unions, APRA and other political parties were gaining considerable strength. This lack of competence and an inability to govern directly contributed to the overthrow by the military of the Belaúnde regime.
THE MILITARY AS SOCIAL REFORMERS

It has been customary in Peru that the military take power whenever a civilian government, faced with profound problems, has proven itself incapable of dealing adequately with the situation. The military's right to intervene in Peruvian state affairs was legitimized in the 1933 constitution whereby the armed forces were granted the function of 'national arbitrator'.

Under Velasco, Peru experienced the coming to power of a progressive leadership emerging from the military. This stood in contrast to the conventional image of Latin American armed forces. Generally speaking, officer corps seldom address themselves to long term socio-economic reforms since, with their monopolistic control over the use of force, they can establish order through repressive measures without upsetting the status quo.

The strongly reformist position that Peruvian army officers adopted could be partly explained by the way these men view their role in politics. Their attitude is that the military are the most efficient and disciplined of technicians. They are therefore responsible for leading the country towards development within a system defined on the preservation of morality and social order (Einaudi 1976). This attitude found its way into the army through the CAEM (the Center for High Military Training) which prepares officers to deal with development

3. Stepan considers Peru's military as one of the most professional establishments in Latin America. According to him, this ideology of new professionalism is what contributes to the expansion of the army's role in Peruvian politics. See Alfred Stepan, The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion', in A. Stepan, AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL: ORIGINS, POLICIES AND FUTURE. New Haven (1973).
problems in order that they may be able to safeguard the social well-being of their nation.

By 1968, there existed major splits among the dominant groups creating a power vacuum where no party was able to establish its hegemony. Given this context, it became apparent that the military were the most unified group with their strong nationalistic ideology of the CAEM and were thus the best prepared to form a government. Committed as they were to rapid economic development, some officers saw the need to establish long lasting stability through the reorganization of internal structures. Once in power, they set out to implement a progressive program of reforms in order to deal with the urgent economic problems that had been left unresolved. In their claim to be without dogma, the junta hoped to gain the massive support of a divided civil society. In the name of social harmony and class reconciliation, they introduced a wide range of policies to broaden the political participation of the public. Their most radical measure was the Law of Social Property in 1974 which would restructure most of the national economy under a new system of self-management. That is the reform centered around types of enterprises whereby workers would

---

4. The CAEM is a type of war college founded in 1950 which gives great attention to development problems. CAEM is heavily influenced by the writing of ECLA promoting nationalistic economics and emphasizing the fact that it is a military responsibility to defend Peru's national sovereignty.

5. Under self-management, workers and managers would develop more harmonious relations as each member of the social property sector would share some of the surplus generated by each productive unit and would take part in decision-making.
have a progressively increasing share in the ownership and profit of an enterprise. This new type of venture was supposed to lead to autogestion, or worker self-management.

In order to gain greater control over the economy the junta implemented a program designed to recover from foreign companies Peru's natural resources. The state was given a more autonomous role to play in investment, production and distribution. The agrarian reform which was enacted in June 1969, was seen as imperative to stall rural unrest and prevent any future renewal of insurgency. With regard to its stated goals, this reform was expected to increase rural incomes, develop commercial farming and raise production by rationalizing the ownership structure (North 1981: 117). This law - D.L. 17,716 - brought fundamental changes in the land tenure system of Peru, mainly through cooperatization of agriculture. Shortly after implementation of the law, the junta expropriated the sugar plantations of Northern Peru and the haciendas of the highlands, transforming both into various types of cooperatives. In return, their former owners received payments in cash and bonds. Above a certain ceiling (270,000 soles) bonds had to be exchanged for shares of stock in state industrial enterprises (Quijano 1971: 17).

6. It involved nationalization of foreign enterprises in the primary sector.

7. Article I of the reform law states that the intent of the reform is to eliminate both latifundio and minifundio and to replace them with a production system of the cooperative type.
The other important measure taken by the new government abolished the National Agrarian Society which, prior to the reform, had played a leading role in representing the interests of the agro-exporters and the traditional landowning class.

The object of both these provisions was, first, to strip the Grand Alliance of its economic power and second, to force its members to support the industrial sector (Bollinger 1977, Dore and Weeks 1977).

Exactly what type of society the junta was trying to build has been the subject of much controversy. At first, many observers including Fidel Castro, endorsed the military program, and even suggested that the Peruvian experience was one which should inspire other Latin American countries. However, the military program contained a number of ambiguities and its true populist nature was often obscured by the rhetoric of its leaders. On the one hand, the junta expressed a desire for a radical reorganization of Peruvian society so that the country could move toward a 'full participatory social democracy'. On the other hand, the officers were constantly stressing concepts like 'rule of morality' or 'principle of authority', codewords for control and order, thus revealing the authoritarian bias of their regime.

Similar contradictions were apparent on the questions of development and foreign capital. The government asserted its national independence by denouncing U.S. domination and then nationalizing foreign owned corporations. For example, six days after the coup, it confiscated without compensation most of the assets of IPC, a subsidiary
of Standard Oil of New Jersey. Simultaneously, however, the Junta assiduously searched for new foreign investments. In the words of President Velasco:

The Revolutionary Government declares its respect for the international obligations of Peru; that it will be faithful to the principles of our Western Christian tradition, and that it will encourage all foreign investment which enters subject to the laws and to the national interest (quoted in Jacquette 1971: 224).

Also, while it announced its intent to control all basic industries, the military repeatedly reiterated that they had no intention of ending major private economic activity. Such reassurances to private business took the forms of tax incentives and tariff breaks.

All rhetoric aside, what the regime seemed to be aiming at, was the establishment of state enterprises destined to eliminate class conflict, which was condemned as both socially destructive and economically costly (Jacquette ibid: 27). By setting up an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus, the various sectors of society were to be integrated from the top down and tied directly to the government executive.

The regime thus desired to build up a highly centralized, hierarchically organized, decision-making apparatus dominated by state

8. The proportion of North American capital investment in oil since the IPC expropriation has been almost equal to the level of investment prior to expropriation.
initiative. Patterned on the corporate model, the new Peruvian society would achieve bureaucratically, rather than politically, the integration of marginal social sectors.

In dependent economies, the imposition of a corporatist framework integrating the marginal social groups to the system is also a device used to control the participation of the masses in politics. This is achieved by hierarchically organizing individuals from diverse classes into a powerful governmental bureaucracy where the state is the major regulator of all political processes. This mode of organization is segmented and highly centralised. The administration exercises full power in the name of public interest. Meanwhile, a citizen's participation in decision-making remains indirect and limited to the grass-roots level.

**Corporate-Clientelism**

As a mechanism of social and political integration, corporatism presents strong similarities with clientelism. For example, one of the most salient characteristics of corporatism is that it imposes hierarchies - that is, structures of domination whereby groups of individuals of conflicting interests become the building blocks for 9.

---

elaborate chains of vertical integration. Thus, while we have clientelism emphasizing the dependence of an individual to a patron, we similarly find corporatism encouraging people to rely upon the national community. Both operate in ways which serve to discourage autonomy by inculcating the subordinate classes with a sense of reliance, whether it be upon a patron or a bureaucratic apparatus.

As Kaufman points out (1977:113), at first the personalism of clientelistic relationships seems to contradict the bureaucratic and impersonal style of corporatism. However, he argues, the two are highly symbiotic and are part of a single developmental process. By this, Kaufman means that in not allowing the development of autonomous group competition, the corporate system sets the stage for particularistic forms of problem-solving behaviour:

... Clientelistic ties constitute mechanisms whereby a relatively large number of individuals can make demands upon the state, manipulate the political game, and acquire some degree of resources and security (ibid: 114).

Hammergren - a theorist of Latin American corporatism - recognises the personalistic element that this political model generates and explains it as follows:

Such upward channelling of attention may have a cohesive effect, but it does not seem to be translated into a recognition of the authority of central authority. It may instead increase loyalty to certain central factions and actors seen as facilitating individual and group demands, and so increase the personalistic element in politics (1977: 451).
Although under corporatism older patron-client bonds may lose their legitimacy, the system provides alternative linkages in the form of new vertical networks whereby subordinate classes have access to the essential services of the older relationship.

Corporate clientelism is the hallmark of many authoritarian regimes because it promotes imposed patterns of private interests which, carried out in a highly centralised framework, tie people to the tutelage of the state. To achieve this mode of organisation, regimes advocate a community of interests among the various societal groups and encourage identification to the national family not in 'class' terms, but more likely in 'emotional' terms, with the state playing the role of protector along traditional and paternalistic lines. This perpetuates authority-dependency relationships that promote the passivity of the masses.

The trend towards an authoritarian form of corporatism can best be seen as a part of a pattern of economic development and economic dependency responding to delayed dependent capitalism (Schmitter 1974, O'Donnell 1976, Manolesco 1936, 1937). Other explanations attribute this type of political control to a Hispanic-Catholic tradition (Wiarda 1973). Although this factor could be of some importance as a cultural perspective it does not take into account the patterns of economic domination which have persistently prevented the development of more pluralistic forms of political participation. In peripheral economies, dependent capitalism has led to an acute concentration of
resources in the hands of an economic elite tied to international capital with a resulting marginalization of the masses. Under such conditions, corporate governments create state apparati that allocate government assistance and resources according to favours and patronage because the existing state of the economy cannot afford a pluralistic distribution of wealth, as too much of it remains in the hands of a few. For this reason, the creation of class-based autonomous groups in pursuit of their interests is prevented. Rather, mobilization is arranged "through amorphous grass-roots organizations that selectively filter demands upward to the pre-designated state agencies" (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980: 58). The corporate clientelistic model suggests that government bureaucrats are grouped with workers in order to coopt a few of the lower class leaders such that the unions are impotent and the transfer of power to the disadvantaged is avoided.

The Velasco leadership's refusal of the notion of class conflict and its emphasis on a strong bureaucracy to contain the political actors suggest that the military set themselves the task of constructing a corporate clientelistic society with the state monitoring all major decisions. By assuming a community of interests among all groups the government encouraged the creation of bonds of loyalty among people with the regime being the 'new patron' in a system of 'bureaucratic' clientelism. Consequently, paternalistic forms of politics, including various mutual aid programs and profit sharing schemes were devised. Among them, we find concepts of the aforementioned 'social property'
and 'peasant cooperatives'. Both had a populist appeal that functioned to conceal contradictions between labour and capital and to cushion the coercive aspect of corporate clientelism.

Corporate-Clientelistic Institutions

During the Velasco administration the most typically corporate-clientelistic agency was SINAMOS (The National System for Social Mobilization). This organization, founded in 1971 to gain support for the regime among peasants, workers, students and professionals, sought to institutionalize political clientelism via welfare programs, and play a leading role in the organization of mass mobilization. According to Stein (1980: 216), "SINAMOS translated classic face-to-face patron-client relations into individual bureaucratic terms such that its offices were characteristically filled with individuals seeking material aid for their settlements, or pleading for the legal recognition of their land titles". Thus by opting for corporatism as a state model, the junta established a bureaucracy which embodied principles that were very compatible with the maintenance of a clientelistic structure.

10. The authoritarian nature of the Velasco's government is apparent in the following statement of his minister of interior, General Artola: "Artola's finger appoints the mayors. Time has proven me right. The finger of Artola has given better results than the political elections that were a failure" (quoted in James Petras and Robert Laporte CULTIVATING REVOLUTION. New York (1971: 325).

11. SINAMOS was not allowed to strike against state-owned industry nor express any views which contradicted government policies.
In order to achieve peasant participation, the Velasco government carried its corporate structure to the highlands by advocating cooperative farming. Such a system was expected to accomplish two major functions: 1) economically, it would control production and commercialization and transform the peasantry into a 'consumer class; 2) politically, it would contain potentially explosive forces by preventing horizontal class-based associations from developing, while encouraging vertical, economically-oriented units to organize.

Thus, my argument here is that under Peruvian corporatism, the cooperative system was used to break down traditional clientelistic solidarities by removing the hacendado and by incorporating the peasantry into a broader institutional framework. With no alternative political structures available, such as class-based parties or unions, the collectivist formula integrated people of all sectors via an elaboration of vertical dependencies. By this method, resources were allocated. While the older patronage system of the hacienda was characterised by one-to-one relationships, the cooperatives created a more modern form of clientelism based on a 'mass' concept of patronage under the control of the state bureaucracy.

In order to encompass the majority of the rural population into the corporatist structure of the state, the regime devised a system in which agriculture was to be organized into various functional collectives, all formally integrated by the bureaucratic apparatus of SINAMOS.
At the local level, the Cooperativas Agrarias de Produccion (CAP) now constitute the key economic unit of rural reorganization. Ownership is collective and responsibility is supposed to be shared by all members. Except for small parcels allocated to individual families, all land is to be collectively owned and the profit equally shared among members.

The standard cooperative structure is made up of three levels of organization. At the bottom, we find peasant cooperative members, who are paid according to work done, and must reimburse the state for the cost of land and equipment which they receive. The administrative and vigilance councils, located at the intermediate level of organization, consist of delegates elected from among the various units of the cooperative to administer the day-by-day operations. The upper level of organization, the most important decision-making body, is composed of administrators and advisers from government agencies who are responsible for the annual work plan that sets long term policy and priorities. Once the agricultural production plan obtains the approval of SINAMOS the agrarian bank can consider requests for loans. The administrator who heads the cooperative is chosen by the ministry of agriculture from a list of three names presented by the administrative council. These nominees cannot be members of the same cooperative and are often selected from among former functionaries of the ministry (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980: 223).
The Sociedad Agraria de Interes Social (SAIS) is a particular type of cooperative created for the cattle raising haciendas, which includes land from expropriated haciendas and that from adjacent communities. Both ex-colonos and comuneros are SAIS members. As such the latter must help pay for the purchase of the hacienda even though they never, in the past, had access to this land (Bourque and Palmer 1975: 188).

The reason for this particular organization of SAISs was that such institutions might reduce conflicts between comuneros and hacienda workers over land boundaries, but neither the communities, which saw an end to their land claim, nor the colonos, who find themselves under-represented in the cooperative council, seemed satisfied with the arrangement (Cleaves and Scourra 1980: 251).

Both CAPs and SAISs are integrated into the national agricultural sector through the intermediary of the PIAR (Proyecto Integral de Asentamiento Rural). The cooperativa de servicios is the unit within the PIAR which is responsible for the distribution of loans to the collectives and the organization and supervision of agricultural planning. One of the purposes of the PIARs is to decrease dependence on the state for credit and financial aid. This means that the rural sector is to finance its own development without benefit of financial...

12. The SAIS are subject to the law on cooperatives 'in so far as it is applicable', beyond this point, it means that they will be governed by the code of civil societies which regulates the operations of capitalist companies.

13. One vote per settlement gives the communities a better representation.
assistance from the central government' (Smith 1976: 102).

The central government took hold of domestic agricultural production by creating in 1969, the Empresa Publica de Servicios Agropecuarios (EPSA). EPSA's task was to handle all of Peru's agriculture with the exception of sugar and fishmeal exports. Food was obtained from the cooperatives, and, with more difficulty from small and medium sized farmers who, accustomed to selling to middlemen, were suspicious of EPSA agents.

Pricing policy, which could have been a key element in the prosperity of the rural sector if used as a way of encouraging agricultural production, was, instead, geared to satisfy the urban consumers. That is, official prices paid to the farmers were kept very low so that foodstuffs remained accessible to the urban population as the government was concentrating its 'aid' efforts on the highly visible poor of Lima. Meanwhile, sierra peasants - mainly small farmers - could not improve their income, as wheat and rice - two cash crops grown on the coast - were the only products to increase in price. Also, price policy was discriminatory: food imports were exempted from tariffs while the local price on Peru's products increased from about 30% in 1961 to over 70% in 1970. This applied to beef and wheat imports which competed with

14. These were managed by state agencies called CECOAAP and EPCHAP, respectively.

local products (Webb 1975:111). What state control of domestic agriculture achieved was to limit the expansion of national food supply, lessen the income of the rural poor and accelerate internal migration (Table I).

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEASANT INCOME SHARE: 1966-1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peasant income as % of national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants as % of total workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of income per head</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While EPSA among other things, was supposed to control internal markets of essential foodstuffs including rice, wheat, milk and meat to supply urban centres, it rapidly became an inefficient state enterprise which generated no savings (see Table II). It led to an increasing domestic food deficit requiring importation of wheat, milk, vegetables, oil and rice (Fitzgerald 1976). This situation, combined with administrative mismanagement and financial irregularities, led
to its dismantling in 1974.

TABLE II

| EPSA sales and subsidies, 1970 - 75 (in millions of current soles) |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Annual Sales    | NA    | S/2596 | S/8517 | S/11626 | S/12138 | NA |
| Surplus (deficit) | (S/351) | (137) | (492) | NA | 232 | NA |
| Government Subsidies | NA | 97 | 231 | 1602 | 2913 | S/3695 |
| Subsidy Index   | NA | 100 | 238 | 1652 | 3003 | 3809 |

Note: NA not available
Sources: EPSA, Memoria 71-72; EL PERUANO, October 5, 1974/July 2, 1976 Banco Central de Reserva. (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980: 218)

Beside SINAMOS and EPSA, other agencies were created to deal with the agrarian sector. For example, the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) was established by the government as an interest agency registering all the SAISs and CAPs, whose function was to organize rural participation. Though it replaced the SNA (National Agrarian Society), which had been dominated by big landowners for decades, it supported the campesinos only so far as their demands were compatible with the interests of the

16. Financial irregularities were often exposed in the press. For example, in 1974 in Ayacucho one EPSA employee was jailed and the public enterprise was sued for selling illegally. See LA PRENSA, August 15, 1974 and September 5, 1974.
military government. Moreover, in the process, all other peasant associations lost recognition as legitimate representatives of the peasantry. Agricultural unions were not eliminated but 'left without a role in the new scheme of things' (Bourque and Palmer 1977: 191). Theoretically, the CNA was supposed to articulate the interests of the newly formed cooperatives, but, in practice, it was expected to organize peasant support of the government thereby checking the activity of the marxist Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP), (McClintock 1981: 260).

This corporate institution relied heavily on patron-clientelism. Peasant leaders maintained control by demonstrating loyalty to their clientele - the member peasant-organizations of the CNA. Within this institution, campesinos were more clients than participants. In no way were they involved in decision-making processes, and their demands came more in the form of request although they often saw their concerns being rejected by the government. In addition, through their condescending attitude, the CNA officials allowed no bargaining to occur.17 Alienated by the CNA, member peasants turned towards the CCP (Confederación de Campesinos del Perú) - a union which still enjoyed

17. This attitude found expression in the constant theme of having to instruct campesinos how to participate in the revolution: 'We peasant leaders want to motivate the peasants to greater productivity and the most effective way to do so is for them to learn about the revolutionary progress and undergo a profound 'concientization' (Conscious raising). In Peter Cleaves and Martin Scurrah: AGRICULTURE, BUREAUCRACY AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN PERU. Ithaca (1980: 183).
strong peasant backing and which in the 1970's continued to organize successful land occupations to protest governmental policies. Over time, the CNA came to realise that it had to face competition from the CCP. The following comment by a CNA representative clearly expresses the resentment and lack of trust which existed between these two organizations:

The CCP claims to do more for the landless peasants than we do. Well, we have learned that the CCP is lined up with the APRA party and the Vanguardia Revolucionaria, who want to divide the land into private property. Some cooperatives have been infiltrated by the CCP, and CIA, and conservative priests who are working against the revolution. (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980: 188)

To undermine the power of the CCP, the CNA needed to improve its services to peasants.

However, typical of corporate institutions, the CNA had little influence on national politics as its role was limited to transmitting state directives to the countryside without putting pressure on the government for concessions. This lack of independence and power led to a growing dissatisfaction among CNA leaders who had hoped for a greater role to play at higher echelons of the political apparatus. In addition, as it was not within their mandate to collaborate with peasant organizations, CNA officials realized that they would never gain peasant support. Out of frustration the CNA started to adopt

18. In 'Peasant Participation in Agrarian Reform: Mexico, Bolivia and Venezuela', Huizer shows how important it is for peasant organization to participate in reform programs. Such peasant organizations, if active in the process of transformation, will likely support the government and help stimulate national development.
a more independent stance, and ran into open confrontation with the government which, by June 1978, finally decided to suppress the organization. While the CNA was designed as a corporatist structure, it failed to play the political role it was assigned to, that of organizing the peasantry and of winning its political support. For the government this organization represented a threat to its own control and thus had to be dismantled.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The New Structure of Land Tenure

In terms of expropriation, the land reform appears to have achieved a considerable breakthrough. That is, prior to 1969 farm ownership was highly concentrated in favour of large haciendas. Statistics from Table III show that 3680 families owned all properties over 500 hectares with 0.4% of land holders possessing 75% of the total farm land. Meanwhile 78% of the independent farmers were trying to survive on plots of less than 5 hectares making up only 5.8% of all pasture and cultivable lands (Alberts 1976: 4).
Expropriation and adjudication of the agrarian reform was a long term process which continued well into 1976. In 1969, the ministry of agriculture calculated that that some 10 million hectares of land were liable for reform. By 1976, not less than 74% of that figure had been expropriated with 6.31 million adjudicated to campesinos (See Table IV). Meanwhile, only 53% of the potential beneficiaries had been allotted land, an amount which represented some 18% of the total rural population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size (Ha's)</th>
<th>Production Units</th>
<th>Area Covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>202,920</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>406,507</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-20</td>
<td>107,853</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-100</td>
<td>24,638</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-500</td>
<td>7,684</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-2500</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>843,240</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The State of Land Reform of June 1976 in Relation to Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expropriation (1000 Ha's)</th>
<th>Adjudication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td># of Farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1- Target</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- As of June 1976</td>
<td>7,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- As % of I</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Constructed from figures published by the Ministry of Agriculture.

From Table IV, we can clearly see that in terms of the reform's stated targets the success of the undertaking seems considerable in comparison to previous achievements.

One important objective of the regime was to maintain the basic production structure intact. This had implications for the way that land was adjudicated. As can be seen from Table V little importance was assigned to individual ownership of property. For example, two thirds of the allotted land was concentrated in SAISs and CAPs with 60% of the total beneficiaries being incorporated into the cooperative system. At the lower end of the scale, the distribution of land parcels by size had not changed significantly since 1969 and the minifundio was left untouched (Cleaves 1977: 29).
TABLE V

LAND DISTRIBUTED IN VARIOUS FORMS AND FAMILIES BENEFITING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Award</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPs</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>99,152</td>
<td>2,084,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAISs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57,617</td>
<td>2,543,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comunidades</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>55,899</td>
<td>590,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grupos Campesinos</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>26,913</td>
<td>960,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,790</td>
<td>136,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>258,371</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,316,105</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thus, as seen from Table V, the reform was more 'collectivist' than 'redistributive'. The objective of the government to support cooperatives is also apparent in the amount of credit that became available to small holders as compared to state enterprises. According to George Turner of the FAO, independent peasants in 1973 received 1758 million soles as opposed to 1014 million in 1968. Meanwhile, cooperatives were granted during the same period by the Agricultural Development Bank 3,468 million soles rising to 8,790 million (cited in Lehmann 1976: 97). Thus cooperative members were much better supported by the state than small holders despite the fact that the latter group producing for the market lost heavily from price policies. Of the 117,000
When considered from the viewpoint of economic performance, the implementation of agrarian reform was disappointing. Even though agricultural output, half of which was generated by cooperatives, grew at an average rate of 2.7 percent from 1970 to 1975, versus an average annual rate of 1.3 percent from 1965-1968 (McClintock 1981: 247), the smaller, poorer highland cooperatives actually saw their production decline. In fact, most of the increase can be attributed to the industrialized agriculture of the coast (Horton 1973, McClintock ibid.). Table VI indicates only moderate gains with regard to agricultural commodities for the domestic market. A much higher production in agriculture would have been necessary in order to solve Peru's agrarian problem because, over the last decade, the population growth rate has greatly surpassed the country's agricultural output. As a result, in 1975 about 25 percent of Peru's imports was for food, versus 15 percent in 1972 (McClintock ibid.: 249).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area (1,000 Ha's)</th>
<th>Production (1,000 mt.)</th>
<th>Yield Per Ha. (Kg/Ha in 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7,288</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8,612</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>8,792</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many factors contributed to poor performances in agriculture in the highlands including difficult weather conditions. However, more basic aspects of government policies should be examined to obtain an overall picture. Committed to achieving higher productivity for the foreign market, the regime preferred to sponsor the most modern enterprises like those dedicated to the production of cotton, milk, sugar or wool. In 1968 these farms received 44% of the 3.5 billion soles credit granted by the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario. In 1973, the large coastal cooperatives obtained 62% of the 5.5 billion issued for that year (Fitzgerald 1976: 105). Giving priority to crops grown for the international market, and not for food consumption, the state engaged in long term irrigation projects such as the Chira-Piura Project on the coast. Meanwhile, little was done to improve the infrastructure of the sierra.

In addition, financing of the reform was geared to encouraging landowners to support urban-based investment. That is, former owners could redeem their agrarian bonds for shares in industrial enterprises. On the other hand, beneficiaries of reform did not receive their lands free of charge. They had to pay considerable amounts of money for land and equipment. Smith points to SAIS Tupac Amaru where the capital debt per family amounts to some 53,000 soles, with an annual repayment of interest on debt of some 3,300 soles per family, after 1976-1977, a figure which should be compared to the 20,000 soles a year paid as wages to shepherds (1976: 109).
Disincentives for collective work achievement

The idea of using collectives to increase productivity depends to a large extent upon the collaboration of workers and managers. With a cooperative system based on a corporatist model, the government seems to assume that officials, when grouped with lower class individuals, could train and work together with campesinos. The sharing of profit on the basis of membership is expected to be a major incentive for harmonious relationships between workers and technocrats. In Peru, this expectation has frequently been undermined either by poor profit and/or by the attitude of government officials towards workers, neither of which left peasants with a desire for collective achievement (Guillet 1979, McClintock 1981).

The relationship between cooperative members and administrators can suffer from a lack of understanding on both sides. For example, former bosses of ex-haciendas have been elected to positions of responsibility in the new units because of their local connections and their experience in the social environment (Guillet ibid.). However, in many cases they have maintained their contempt for the peasantry. Their attitude still reflects racial prejudice and a paternalistic view towards the workers. Sean Conlin points to this fact when he depicts the formation of a cooperative in the department of Cuzco in the early 1970's. The author shows how the peasants' long experience with local conditions is disregarded by their administrators who, in their choice of crops, prefer to rely on the expertise of técnicos. Being aware of the fact that their knowledge is not respected by engineers, peasants
remain aloof and show no more interest in the cooperative:

They (the peasants) no longer took an interest in the discussions in progress, except, that is, for the local man whose local knowledge was required by the engineer, but they just sat in the sun until it was time to move to the next field. This lack of activity confirmed the bureaucrats' view of peasants, buried just under the surface of the revolutionary gloss of belief in participation. Rather than considering the peasants as thinking human beings, they are seen as lazy and unable to concentrate on a task for more than a moment even when it vitally concern them. This view was evident in side glances — peasants were 'indios' (1974:35).

The problem of relationship between members and the administration is aggravated by their continuing discrepancy in income. Smith (1976) mentions the case of SAIS Cahuide studied by Montaya and others (1974) where the monthly salaries of the shepherds are of some 1,500 soles while that of managers are close to 40,000 soles. On that estate, a few years ago, salaries for the 34 senior officials were 8,000,000 soles in the year 1971-1972 or four times greater than the net surplus of 2,168,000 soles available for redistribution at the end of the working year. Such disparities in wages were extremely resented.

Other conflicts have been identified within the cooperatives between rich peasants and poorer farmers. By creating or perpetuating inequalities among members, the cooperative system maintains its lower sector in a posture of personal dependency upon wealthier individuals (Smith 1976).

19. Cahuide is a large SAIS based on cattle raising. It is comprised of one expropriated hacienda and 29 highland communities. Its large size and the divergent interests of each component part have reduced both productivity and participation. The history of this SAIS is replete with conflicts between members and bureaucrats.
Evaluation and Conclusions

Under Velasco, the apparent commitment of the Junta was to create a stronger state and to change Peru's class structure in the countryside. With these goals in mind, the regime implemented a land reform designed to break the power of the rural oligarchy and to extend, through the establishment of cooperatives, the government bureaucracy into the agrarian sector.

Unquestionably, the land reform was successful at weakening the political power of the former land owning class without, however, crushing it entirely. Rich landowners were still welcome to invest into the industrial sector. While Velasco eliminated the symbolic strength of the hacendado, he never managed to win the support of the rural population who benefitted from the reform. From the beginning of its implementation, anti-government protest marches and land invasions were carried out by both permanent and casual labourers. Land occupations began in the North, mainly in the Department of Piura. Important ones included San Francisco y Chocan in September 1972, La Golondria in November 1972, Buenos Aires in January 1973 and Rinconada y Limonal in January 1973.

One consequence of the reform is that a new class of privileged peasants has emerged. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable on the coast where cooperatives experienced significantly greater productivity, profits and wages than in the sierra. Thus regional in-
equality is reinforced to the point that the coastal sector receives two-thirds of the financial resources allocated to agriculture.

In the highlands, poor campesinos, smallholders and temporary wage labourers have gained little from the reform as it did not deal with the problem of the minifundio. After the reform, there was still 60 percent of the rural population trying to survive on plots smaller than 5 hectares that could not ensure a livelihood. Furthermore, 15 percent of the peasantry had become seasonal workers and as such were excluded from the benefits of the cooperative system (Fitzgerald 1976: 31).

Within the highland cooperatives, a social commitment to collective work, popular participation and trust towards the new management is still to be achieved. In the following chapter, the example of Chirapa will illustrate how cooperatives tend to discourage the interest of peasants in politics while encouraging a subservience typical of clientelistic relations.
So far, we have discussed how, in Peru, clientelism developed as a major underlying political structure of social control in the rural sector and how it influenced the shaping of a corporate model of agrarian transformation under the Velasco regime. In this chapter, two case studies from the province of Huamanga in the department of Ayacucho are used to illustrate aspects of internal dependencies.

The first study shows the coercive character of patron-clientelism within the context of a hacienda where peones used legal means to fight abuses of power by the owner. At Hacienda Yanayacu, data were provided by abundant correspondence exchanged between peasant leaders, the hacendado and the Ministry of Labour and Indian Affairs from 1946 to 1964. These documents come from the haciendas archive in Ayacucho.

In the second case, we discuss the impact of the reform at the local level and examine its effects upon internal dependency relationships within the structure of a newly formed cooperative. Data on the Chirapa cooperative are taken from a field project conducted in 1977 by Contreras Villar of the University San Cristóbal de Huamanga.

For reference, it should be noted that Map I indicates the location of the department of Ayacucho within Peru; Map II shows the
seven provinces of the department and Map III presents the location of the study area.

The sierra department of Ayacucho lies in the southern part of Central Peru, bordering on the department of Cuzco, Arequipa, Ica and Huancavelica, situated within the drainage of the Huarpi River and its tributaries (see Map I). In its northern part the topography is imposing, with communities perched on summits more than 5000 meters above sea level. The extremely rugged topography limits the availability of usable land. However, the south where the province of Huamanga is located (see Map II) presents a smoother terrain and a more moderate and hospitable climate better adapted to cultivation and husbandry.

As is the case in most of the sierra, the economy here is basically at the subsistence level. Lower valleys are used largely for agricultural purposes whose warmer zones provide corn, sugarcane, coca and grapes. Between 2000 and 3500 meters above sea level fields of small grains, tubers and corn are cultivated, while the upper parts of the department (above 3500 meters) are almost exclusively used for grazing. In these altiplanos, alpacas and sheep exploit the natural pastures of the mountain slopes. In the few arable lands available potatoes and ocas are grown.

1. A province is an administrative unit within the department.
MAP I: LOCATION OF AYACUCHO WITHIN PERU (Drawn by the author).
Geographical isolation has deeply affected the nature of development in Ayacucho. Physical attributes such as deep valleys and very high passes make overland communication extremely difficult. This work to separate Ayacucho economically from other major trading centers. As a result close ties have not been maintained with the coastal region and more particularly Lima.

Shortly after conquest, at a time when the intermontane valleys were the sole routes of communication through the sierra, the Province of Huamanga and its major centre - Ayacucho (which is also the capital city of the department) became culturally, religiously and commercially renowned. Their decline can be traced to the construction of a railway in the highlands at the end of the 19th-Century which, by not extending its services into the department, destroyed the economy of the region. Thus, due to a difficult topography and inadequate communications, this part of the Andes remained for years an economic enclave poorly integrated into the rest of the country.

Ayacucho is representative of the underdevelopment which characterizes the highlands. In 1961, this department had one of the highest rate of illiteracy; 72% of its adult population could neither speak nor write Spanish (Cotler 1976: 48). This lack of knowledge of the national language has prevented Quechua speaking people from taking part in most aspects of the institutional life of Peruvian society. Prior to the reform, the majority of them resided in peasant communities or on haciendas.
Some were independent farmers with tiny holdings of no more than two hectares per family, while others were landless and forced to sell their labour to the large estates.

In this secluded part of Peru, the impact of colonialism had been most pronounced with the hacendados and their clientele dominating the local power structure. For example, the economy of the province of Huamanga, where our two case studies are located, was until 1968 controlled by large landowners residing in the district capitals. Most of the land was concentrated in the hands of six families who each owned over 10,000 hectares amounting to a total of 122,853. Only 41,751 hectares belonged to peasant communities while a majority of the rural population had to contend with tiny holdings or no land at all. These landless families had no choice but to work on haciendas.

In the district of Quinua which borders the ex-Hacienda Yanayacu and the recently created Chirapa Cooperative, 97% of the population owned 19.7% of the total tillable land, with holdings averaging less than 2 hectares per family (see Table I). Meanwhile .5% of the district population controlled 75.3% of the land available for cultivation. This situation prevailed until 1969.

TABLE I

STATISTICS OF AVERAGE LAND SIZE: DISTRICT OF QUINUA, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Landholding</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
<th>Land/Has</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>1008.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>161.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-1000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First line: size of landholding
Second line: number of farmers
Third line: the total amount of land for each category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of the Figures Above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has 0-2 2-5 5-10 10-20 20-50 50-100 100-500 500-1000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/o of Farmers 89.3 8.2 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 - 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/o of Land 17 2.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.5 25 - 50.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The form of debt-servitude which prevailed on the haciendas of the Province was referred to as 'colonato', that is, the hacienda usually offered his workers a plot of land for crop cultivation (colonato-arriendo) or for grazing (colonato-yerbaje) under an agreement that the latter would fulfill a number of obligations and pay cash rental fees. This fee could vary from one estate to the other. For example, in Quinua, Hacienda Parajay charged S/0.20 per yagada, per year while on Hacienda Vista

3. yagada: a native land measurement which indicates how much a yoke of oxen can accomplish during a day of work.
MAP III: LOCATION OF THE STUDY AREA (Drawn by the author)
Alegre, Colonos paid S/.40.

For centuries, this part of the department experienced very little change. However, by 1940 a process of social transformation was triggered by the development of an infrastructure which began with the road building program of Leguía in the 1920's. Social repercussions included the rise of union activity via the influence of APRA and the penetration of the market economy into the sierra. It was followed by a wave of internal migration whereby rural populations moved towards urban centers in a search for employment. As a result, the population of the city of Ayacucho tripled from 1941 to 1972.

During the 1940's within this context of structural transformation a number of silent and unnoticed struggles were already taking place on haciendas as peones were using legal means to advance their economic position. In Santa Rosa de Cochabamba, a group of peasants held captive by the hacienda system tried to obtain independence through the courts. This community was, until 1964, part of Hacienda Yanayacu, located some 10 kilometers from the city of Ayacucho in the province of Huamanga (see Map III).

HACIENDA YANAYACU

Hacienda Yanayacu existed in an apparently unchanged state for many years under the benevolence of its patron, Don Jesús Fasce - an hacendado well respected by his people. However, in the early

4. In 1941, Ayacucho had 19,582 inhabitants and 57,085 in 1972.
1940's, he transferred the ownership of his estate to his son-in-law, Don Abdón Pacheco. From the moment he took over the hacienda, Pacheco fundamentally altered the living conditions of his peones as he tried to extract as much surplus as possible out of the peasants. Not only did the tenants have to provide labour services including mita, pongaje, semenaje and verbaje\(^5\), but men were also obliged to go and work without pay to the selva on another estate where they were exposed to malaria. By 1946 several peones had died and a number of them had come back with Paludism\(^6\). However, the most extreme measure was the expulsion in 1945 from Yanayacu of 26 families who had nowhere to go. It was in reaction to this measure that the peasants organized themselves to fight their repressive landlord through legal means. With the aid of a lawyer from Ayacucho, the peasant leaders sent a petition to the Ministry of Indian Affairs and even made a direct appeal to the president of the Republic calling for the application of Item 211 of the constitution. That is, they wanted the expulsion of the landowner and a redistribution of his land to the peones who would buy their own parcels. In their letter to the President (June 8, 1946), the peasants say:

Quiere decir que la situación de los indígenas de 'yanayacu' es desesperada e insostenible. Y, por lo mismo, al Supremo Gobierno, que Ud.

---

5. \textbf{Mita:} Women and children in charge of full time animal care; \textbf{Pongaje:} Share cropping rent; \textbf{Semenaje:} women's work as servants; \textbf{Yerbaje:} rental system commonly found with the herding of animals.

dignamente preside, ocurrímos para suplicarle, en nombre de la Humanidad y la Justicia, se serva ordenar, conforme al artículo 211 de nuestra constitución política vigente y a la ley de 12 de noviembre de 1900, la expropiación forzada del fundo 'Yanayacu', para lotizarlo y adjudicarlo a los indígenas residentes, previo pago de la respectiva indemnización justipreciada.

Pacheco's response to the peasant challenge was to increase his use of force. Benefitting from connections with the local police (his uncle was a civil guard), he sent troops in to re-establish order, as the colonos, by that time, had refused to do any further work for him. In one of their letters to the Ministry of Indian Affairs (October 11, 1946) the workers, faced with starvation, appealed for some recognition of their right to subsist:

Quiere decir que Pacheco intenta de matar de hambre a sesenta y tantas familias de indígenas, con alrededor de trescientos individuos. Esto es algo clamoroso e inaceptable en un país democrático y civilizado como el Perú.

'However, the use of force did not break the resistance of the people. On the contrary, the community contacted some union leaders in the department to formulate their claim in spite of Pacheco's opposition.

7. We want to say that the situation of the Indians in 'Yanayacu' is desperate and unbearable. For these reasons, we ask that our government, in the name of justice and humanity, implements Article 211 of the Constitution and the Law of the 12 of November 1900, and expropriates the 'Yanayacu' estate for redistribution of its land to the peasants.

8. We want to say that Pacheco tried to starve some sixty Indian families or some 300 individuals. This is outrageous and unacceptable in a democratic and civilized country like Peru.
Commenting on his peasants involvement with the Communist Party, the landlord states this following in a letter to the Inspector of Indian Affairs:

Abdon Pacheco Medina, propietario del fundo "Yanayacu", a U. con debido respeto digo:

Que habiendo paralizado de manera total i radical los trabajos agrícolas de la cosecha, los yanacones del nombrado fundo, con el claro propósito de hostilizarme i de causarme crecidas i apreciables perdidas. a pesar de haberse obligado a seguir laborando de conformidad con las normas consuetudinarias, los indígenas de mi fundo Yanayacu. ante su despacho i en la Subprefectura de la Provincia; obedeciendo a insinuaciones de algunos miembros del partido Comunista i de cabecillas que reciben consignas de aquellos, no obstante ser personas absolutamente extranjeras al fundo a que tantas veces he hecho referencia (July 10, 1946) 9.

Under the influence of union leaders and in reaction to Pacheco's abusive attitude, the workers sought to contractually pursue their demands in the form of a signed agreement between them and the landlord. It included the following wage and working conditions: 1) no more servile labour; 2) payment in cash for agricultural labour (S/.3.00 per day); 3) the right to payment for any other services; 4) the right to

9. I, Abdon Pacheco Medina, owner of the farm 'Yanayacu' declares that the colonos of the above mentioned-estate are totally paralyzing the harvest in spite of their customary obligations and I claim that they are obeying instructions from Communist members from the outside as I have mentioned on numerous occasions.
rent or to buy land from the hacienda; 5) the right to sell produce directly, by-passing the hacendado.

In March 1947, the Ministry of Justice and labour granted tenants - 1) right to usufruct of land; - 2) remuneration for their work on the estate which amounted to S/.1.20 for men, S/.0.60 for women, and S/.0.50 for members under 15; - 3) water rights for the irrigation of their land; - 4) freedom to sell produce outside the hacienda; - 5) remuneration for the use of pack mules for the hacendado. Six months later, the landlord had not yet complied with the decision of the ministry as the inspector of Indian Affairs in Ayacucho was his godfather who refused to enforce the law against Pacheco.

For over 15 years, tenants did not give up their resistance and finally received their independent status in 1964 when the government promulgated an agrarian reform law. In the process, however, peasants gained confidence in dealing with national institutions and established links with local lawyers, union leaders and officials in the Ministry of Labour and Indian Affairs. As a result, they developed a dynamic and politically experienced attitude which they have preserved to this day.

For example, at the present time the community is involved in another legal claim. In 1973, Santa Rosa became part of CAP Sinchi Rocha but pulled out of this cooperative in 1979, because productivity was too low and benefits abysmal. The state is now trying to get compensation, but in spite of strong pressure, Santa Rosa has, so far, successfully refused to make any payments.
What this demonstrates is that the hacienda clientelism is a coercive institution generally deeply resented by the peasants. In Yanayacu, the patron-peón bond was originally stable because the former owner guaranteed his tenants 'the right to subsistence'. However, the arrival of a new hacendado determined to make full use of his power completely altered the situation. Pacheco's abusive attitude was instrumental in depersonalizing the peasants' bonds to the hacendado and pointed to the weakness of a system which offered no protection or rights to the workers. The peones felt that Pacheco wanted to enjoy the privileges of being a patron without fulfilling his customary obligations. To counterbalance the owner's power, tenants sought security through the legal system only to find that their justified claims were being ignored due to corruption. Nevertheless, they eventually gained enough support among lawyers and union leaders that the Ministry of Labour and Indian Affairs was forced to take some form of action. These new vertical links to the larger society slowly undermined Pacheco's power within his own hacienda and, finally, led to the peasants' success. In this case, the landlord had triggered a mechanism which created an irreversible shift in peasant attitude away from paternalism. Once this form of clientelism was eradicated peones became more united and ready to develop internal solidarities gaining, in the process, a sense of their own direction. However, as there was no central coordination this type of action neveropened theway to larger peasant mobilization because they were carried out on an hacienda-to-hacienda basis, thus generally remaining atomised. It is only under the influence of syn-
indicates that peasants' frustration and resentment were more successfully channelled resulting in the outburst of rural unrest that swept over the department in the mid-sixties.

Violent Uprisings

In Ayacucho, peasant uprisings did not appear overnight. On the contrary, most of the communities involved had been trying for years to regain their lands from hacendados through the courts. Under the protection of the peasant unions which, at the time, were spreading throughout the area and also with the support of urban left-wing intellectuals, comuneros and peones began to organize in order to invade lands and fight with arms against the powerful landed elite. Violent confrontations took place in the mountains of Ayacucho lasting until late 1965 when these groups were hunted down and wiped out by the military. Part of the failure of this movement could be attributed to the fact that many guerrilla leaders were urban dissidents of the Communist and APRA parties with little understanding of Quechua-speaking Indians in the altiplano. Nevertheless, they won the support of the Spanish-speaking peasantry of the lower valleys, but never succeeded to unite the rural population behind a common cause.\textsuperscript{10} Subsequently, until 1980 peasant movements were headed off through partial land redistribution combined with a justified fear of police reprisals.

Although peasant unrest was symptomatic of decaying archaic systems of production and the social relations associated with them, it never-

\textsuperscript{10} For a detailed account of what took place in Ayacucho, see Héctor Béjar, \textit{PERU 1965}. New York (1969).
theless failed to remove the **hacendado** class and thus to completely eliminate clientelism which remains to this day the major underlying political structure in the region.

**Impact of the 1969 Land Reform on the Province of Huamanga**

Like the rest of Peru, the Huamanga province was greatly affected by the military government. The agrarian reform reached the region in 1970 when it was incorporated into Agrarian Reform Zone X which depended upon Huancayo. Subsequently, the region became autonomous with the creation of Zone XIV. Then, a year later in 1973, it was restructured into Zone XIII extending as far as Huancavelica on the one hand, and Aparimac and La Convencion on the other. Since 1979, it became Orde-Ayacucho or Agrarian Zone XVI. As Table II indicates this zone involves three PIARs: Huamanga, Huanta and La Mar representing only one portion of the department of Ayacucho. In total, it covers an area of 1,791,800 hectares and includes some 341,550 inhabitants (Contreras Villar 1981: 59). Like Huanta and La Mar, PIAR Huamanga is a sub-zonal state institution. It administers one SAIS and seven CAPs one of which is Chirapa. As Table III shows, most of its land was organized into production cooperatives (CAPs) - a form of adjudication which is predominant in the department of Ayacucho. To examine the impact of these new structures at the local level and how they affect clientelism we will consider the case of Cooperative Chirapa.
CHIRAPA

Chirapa, officially created in December 1972, was one of the first cooperatives to be established in the province of Huamanga (see Table II). It is located 29 kilometers from the city of Ayacucho along the Ayacucho to Huanta highway, at an elevation averaging 2500 meters. Chirapa includes 2774.74 hectares of mostly barren mountainous land covered with molle trees and prickly cactus. The cooperative accommodates 156 families within five units. These units or 'nucleos laborales de base' work and act independently of each other. They are Orcastas (566.28 hectares), Huyallapampa (582.89 has.), Pongora (251.70 has.), La Vinaca (207.74 has.), and La Vega which is the administrative centre and covers an area of 1164.34 has.
## TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIAR</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BENEFICIARIES</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>HEAD QUARTERS</th>
<th>RECOGNITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUAMANGA</td>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>Huamangua</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>Huamanga/Ocros</td>
<td>Pajonal</td>
<td>01/10/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Libertadores</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>Huamanga/Vinco</td>
<td>Casa Canca</td>
<td>29/03/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Basilio Auqui, no. 270</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>Huamanga/Chiara</td>
<td>Chupas</td>
<td>28/03/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Mariscal Caceres, no. 248</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Huamanga/Ayacucho</td>
<td></td>
<td>21/12/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Sinchi Roca, no. 194</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>Huamanga/Socos</td>
<td>Yanayacu</td>
<td>28/03/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>San José de Parco, no. 8-4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Huamanga/Acos Chupas</td>
<td>Parco</td>
<td>30/12/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Asunción del Sr. de Urpay, no. 194</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Huamanga/Acos Víchos</td>
<td>Urpay</td>
<td>16/11/76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Chirapa, no. 249</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>Huanta/Pacaica</td>
<td>La Vega</td>
<td>21/12/72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUANTA</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Gervacio Santillana, no. 2-8-VI</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Huanta/Huanta</td>
<td>Porvenir</td>
<td>21/06/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Huamanguilla</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Huanta/Huamanguilla</td>
<td>Cordova</td>
<td>26/08/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA MAR</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>San Martín de Porras</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>La Mar/San Miguel</td>
<td>MisquiBamba</td>
<td>23/09/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>María Parado de Bellido</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>La Mar/San Miguel</td>
<td>PatinBamba</td>
<td>23/09/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Nuevo Horizonte</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>La Mar/Tambo</td>
<td>Tambo</td>
<td>11/12/75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE III
PIAR HUAMANGA: LAND SIZE, TYPE OF LAND PRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ADJUDICATED LAND</th>
<th>LAND UNDER INDIVIDUAL CULTIVATION 'ENFEUDADA'</th>
<th>LAND UNDER COLLECTIVE FARMING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n.s.a.</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS Huamanga</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Libertadores</td>
<td>4482</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilio Auqui</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariscal Caceres</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinchi Roca</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose de Parco</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asuncion de Urpay</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirapa</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8275</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>4489</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 'n.s.a.' means not suitable for agriculture. Land sizes are in hectares.

'I' means irrigated land

'D' means dry land

'P' means pasture land

Chirapa is a productive cooperative of the 'mixed' type (Horton 1973: 95) in which members possess parcels in private usufruct for their own subsistence and collectively work the land of the estate. Like many sierra CAPs, Chirapa is heavily 'enfeudada' (with private plots) as members have been conferred ownership of the land they had been working before. Consequently only a small part is used communally. That is, 301 hectares are worked collectively as opposed to 2041 hectares cultivated individually (see Table III). Pongora, in fact, has no cooperative land only private parcels.

Beneficiaries in Chirapa have 20 years to repay in cash the estate and former owners for their land. They are charged interest on their loans and receive definite title only when payment is complete.

Commenting on the situation in the province, Jose-Sabotal Wiese rightly points out that:

Among the bureaucrats no one remembers that the parents as well as the grandparents of the grandparents of these runakunata made payments to the past landlords three days a week for centuries (1979: 388-9).

Economic Performance

The economy of Chirapa is primarily based on agriculture. The cooperative produces wheat - its main crop - corn, brewing barley, potatoes, wine, beans and some vegetables and fruits. La Viñaca is also engaged in livestock (51 headsof cattle in 1977) and sells its milk to Ayacucho.
The members have nominal collective ownership of the land, but they do not control production nor marketing. These aspects are left to government technical advisors who, in conjunction with the cooperative administrative committee, work according to a yearly plan dictated by the state. Theoretically, only when the cooperative meets the prerequisites of the plan, will credits and loans be secured. However, so far the cooperative has been behind schedule in cultivating, sowing, harvesting and marketing. For example, the projections for 1977 to 1978 anticipated that 222 hectares would be under wheat production while only 190 hectares were actually utilized (160 hectares in La Vega and 30 hectares in Orcasitas). A propaganda campaign which had been carried out on some of the cooperative's experimental lands, had apparently demonstrated that 3950 kilos of wheat per hectare could be produced. Despite such estimates, productivity remained low, averaging 1500 kilos per hectare in La Vega and 1200 kilos per hectare in Orcasitas. In La Vega, part of the harvest was destroyed by a severe hailstorm and problems occurred with a threshing machine which could not be repaired on time. Similarly, Orcasitas saw its production cut in half as a result of heavy rains.

Wheat is not produced for local consumption. Except for twenty kilos distributed to each family in La Vega, the remainder is sent to Lima through EPSA - the public enterprise for agricultural services that was discussed in Chapter IV.

Members cultivate their own land primarily for maintenance of
their families. For this reason, they prefer to concentrate efforts on private parcels first and cooperative land last. Most people live at subsistence level on unproductive land as small as 0.25 hectare. To survive they have had to find ways of supplementing their income through such means as selling prickly pears at local markets and cochineal for dyes to weavers in Ayacucho. Although a chart on land distribution per household is not available (Contreras 1979: 206) Villar discusses the fact that some members are privileged to possess larger plots and are, as a result, more prosperous than their fellow workers. He cites the case of a wealthy member - Jacinto García - the holder of 13 hectares of land from which he was able to collect, in 1977, three trucks of prickly pears that he sold at a good price to local markets.

It must be pointed out that membership does not exclude the possibility of owning land outside the cooperative. In Chirapa, a few families have land in neighbouring communities (Quinua, Macachacra, Huamanguilla, etc.) or in the selva which enables them to receive a substantial outside income.

The claim that cooperatives provide permanent work for all members - "ser fuente de trabajo permanente para sus socios" - tends not to be true in practice. So far, Chirapa has been unable to use its full labour force throughout the year. For example as Table IV shows, in 1977 wheat cultivation between January and July, which was supposed to provide work for 180 days, for 80 members, only allowed one person 101 days while
others received as few as five over the same period.

**TABLE IV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Work</th>
<th>0-10</th>
<th>11-20</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-60</th>
<th>61-70</th>
<th>71-80</th>
<th>81-90</th>
<th>90-101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Members</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of this lack of employment on the cooperative, the majority of peasants on small holdings must either participate in the labour force as peones or seek sporadic work outside agriculture. In Huyallapampa, the majority of its male workers are employed in a privately owned brick factory located on the premises of the community. Wages amount to 500 soles for every 100 bricks which represents approximately one day of work for two persons. Despite legislation which prohibits such practices one member was granted the right to work full-time for the factory without having to perform any communal labour.

Although it is not within the scope of this work to go into detail about financial problems at Chirapa, experience strongly suggests that the cooperative is working at a loss rather than making the expected profit: "No se nota acumulación de capital, al contrario, hay mayor adeudamiento y dependencia a las instituciones crediticias" (Contreras
Chirapa's poor economic performance can be traced back to a number of factors among which are traditional farming methods and an inadequate irrigation system. For example, most of the agricultural land is on slopes that can be cultivated only with a foot plow. For its flat lands, La Vega uses a tractor and a threshing machine, but in La Viñaca threshing is carried out by indigenous methods involving the use of the 'huaccaaca' or long flexible rod. Yield is limited also because Chirapa is almost entirely dependent upon crucial rainfalls at planting time. As it appears in one of the record books of the cooperative, the enterprise is exposed to the vagaries of weather. An early drought was responsible for a loss of 50% of wheat production in 1976.

Las lluvias se presentaron en forma regular a partir de la segunda semana de enero de 1976 fecha en que se sembró el trigo, la sequía se hace presente los primeros días de abril sorprendiendo al cultivo ... en pleno inicio de espigado lo que ocasionó una pérdida del 50%. Maíz, arvejas, papas no se negó a sembrar las 3 hás ... por razones de sequía. (1979: 210)

Formally, the hacienda had permanent irrigation for its important crops.

12. No profit has been noticed. On the contrary, there exists larger debts and greater dependence on credit institutions.

13. Rain fell regularly after the second week of January 1976 - the time when wheat was sown. Drought began early in April just as the crops showed spikes, resulting in an ultimate loss of 50% of the harvest. The planting of 3 hectares of corn, arvejas and potatoes was cancelled because of the drought.
but the new administration neglected maintenance of the water ditches, which are not functioning properly anymore. Conflicts with the University of Huamanga, which owns adjacent property, have arisen over water rights. According to officials in Chirapa, the University is monopolizing the water supply by diverting channels to its land. As a result, 10 hectares of land in La Vega and some in Huyallapampa cannot be irrigated. Orcasitas, on the other hand, was able to work out an arrangement with the University whereby every other week one property has priority over the other. Meanwhile the last three days of each week, the town of Pacaicasa has rights over the water supply. Needless to say, this kind of rationing system is not favorable to consistent production.

Overall, the cooperative is producing less than under the hacienda system. Prior to the reform, the former hacendado of La Viñaca and Orcasitas - Maximo Morales - could produce 1200 kilos of grapes per hectare. In 1977, the average yield per hectare amounted to 640 kilos due to inadequate watering, pruning and disease control. This poor performance was noticed by comuneros who, on numerous occasions, commented on the inability of technocrats to manage their enterprise:

Deben ser como los de Muyurina o Chacco que producen hortalizas y otros alimentos todo el año. Con los antiguos dueños, entre ellos, Don Maximo Morales había en abundencia frutas: uvas, limones, naranjas, lombardas, zanahorias, arvejas, maíz morado, zapallo, calabaza, jawinca. Hasta papas cultivaba. Tenían vacas y
elaboraban queso. (218). 14

Others, like to praise Morales's efficient management:

Don Máximo fue un hombre muy trabajador y emprendedor. Las uvas eran grandes no chiquitas como ahora. Ya no producen como antes (ibid.). 15

Another problem which limits agricultural production is that some of the flat irrigated low lands are not being cultivated. 7.5 hectares, (see Table II), located on the banks of the Ocopa River are not used because of administrative problem - a factor which leads to peasants' contempt for the bureaucracy: 'Los de la cooperativa no saben trabajar, mire Ud., muchas tierras desocupadas' (ibid.).16

While poor agricultural productivity can be partly explained by yields on barren mountainous lands, the low economic performance is also caused by the inability of técnicos to properly administer the enterprise. For example, prior to the reform, in Huayllapampa there

14. They should do like those of Muyurina or Chacco who produce vegetables and other produce all year round. The ex-owners among whom Don Maximo Morales had a lot of fruit; grapes, limes, oranges, lombardas, carrots, peas, corn morado, squash, pumpkins, jawinca. They even cultivated potatoes. They also had cows to make cheese.

15. Don Máximo was a hard working man and a good entrepreneur. Grapes were large not tiny like nowadays. These days they do not produce as much as before.

16. Those from the cooperative, they can't work properly. Look at all these uncultivated lands.
was a limestone quarry from which clay bricks were made. In recent years, the quarry has not been active and its oven has fallen into disuse.

Aside from exhibiting bad managerial skills and a lack of knowledge of cooperative farming, the administration has no experience in bookkeeping. From the start, members have complained about repeated irregularities over wage payments, leading to increased tension between managers and workers. Technicians have frequently been accused of not keeping a careful record of the number of days worked by individual members. Moreover, because of bureaucratic delays, payments are most irregular, neither daily, weekly or monthly, but dependent entirely upon the marketing of production. Sometimes workers have to wait for several months before receiving any money whatsoever. Then, when payment finally arrives, the amount is negligible because of fines and sanctions of all sorts, resulting from offences as trivial as failing to show up at a meeting. This has generated mounting peasant distrust for bureaucrats who are unwilling to consider the conditions under which peasants have to work. Here is what a member says about the way meetings are announced:

La notificación para las asambleas es entregada indirectamente a través de un programa radial que se difunde de 6.00 a 7.00 a.m. desde Ayacucho.
Muchos no nos enteramos porque no tenemos radio o porque las pilas están bajas (1979: 215). 17

Each fine amounts to S/150. Contreras Villar (ibid.) reports that this situation is met by some members with derisive laughter, while others bitterly resent being ordered about by técnicos showing no respect for their workers. The peasants' feelings toward their cooperative is expressed in the following comment:

La cooperativa nos explota más, se están portando peor que los de la hacienda. Antes teníamos más ahora ya no (ibid.), 18

Naturally, this creates a climate of distrust and suspicion within the cooperative, which affects the level of participation. Members - mainly small farmers - lose interest in working collectively and drift away. Confronted with this lack of enthusiasm, the attitude of management is likely to be similar to that reported by numerous observers: 'Those workers who say they are unhappy here are just lazy and don't want to work' (Cleaves and Scurrah 1980: 229).

17. Meetings are announced on the radio between 6 to 7 a.m. broadcast from Ayacucho. Many of us do not have a radio, or if we do, it may not work because it needs new batteries.

18. The cooperative is exploiting us a lot - They (the administrators) are worse than the hacendado. We used to have more than we do now!
Chirapa's Economic Dependency

Undoubtedly, Chirapa's chronic shortage of funds has been its most important constraint. An official document on PIAR Huamanga identifies three causes of the cooperative's organizational and financial problems. These are: 1) an excess and a poor use of the labor force; 2) bad financial administration; 3) a scarcity of well trained technicians. However, like most cooperatives in the sierra, Chirapa was, from the outset, in a difficult position because it never received sufficient funds to effectively develop a local economy. Moreover, its members, being ex-peones, were too poor to provide their enterprise with a working capital of any substantial size. Consequently, the cooperative has become increasingly dependent upon loans as its productivity is too dismal to allow credits to be transformed into capital for investment. So far, it has had to face high debt repayments and has not been able to collectivize its production. In fact, Contreras Villar (1981) points out that whenever a profit is made from crop production (mainly wheat), it goes to the PIAR which sends it to Lima to feed the industrial sector. Thus, in order to survive, this CAP, like many


20. PIAR HUAMANGA received a total of S/.134.367.509 or some U.S. $60,000 for 1 SAIS and 7 CAPS.
others in Ayacucho department, depends upon state subventions. Given the condition of the Peruvian national economy, the government is extremely selective in its extension of credit. Loan allocation is basically determined by what the national government considers to be politically most advantageous. As Palmer points out, the department of Ayacucho never figured among state priorities. (1979: 203). It is very likely that some day, poor cooperatives of the Chirapa type will see their financial support completely cut off unless their representatives have strong connections at higher levels of government. For, to paraphrase Cleaves (1977: 26), agencies express slight interest in these unproductive farm units which require enormous capital and operating subsidies, but can provide little short-term productivity.

It appears, then, that it will be the ability of Chirapa's técnicos to manipulate state agencies like PIAR Huamanga or Orde-Ayacucho, which will determine the future of the cooperative, for these are the main government institutions which influence the allocation of agrarian loans to CAPS.

**Social Structure in Chirapa**

For the people of Chirapa, a number of changes have taken place since the creation of the cooperative. The most important one was to receive the status of 'member' which has meant considerable security.

---

21. 50% of the farm population of the prosperous coast department of Lambayeque were scheduled to receive land compared to 8% in the poor department of Ayacucho.
of tenure. Prior to the reform, entire families faced constant threat of expulsion, but the new leadership has no right to eject members.

Although obligations are still imposed on peasants, ex-colonos have more time to dedicate themselves to the cultivation of their own plots, or work part-time. As members are not required to sell their surplus production to the cooperative at a fixed price, selling in the market means they are in a much better position than before to increase their exiguous incomes.

Another considerable improvement over the hacienda system is that council members who have replaced the 'old' patron are themselves employees subject to expulsion, and, as such, do not occupy the same powerful position as the former landlord. Thus, they are forced to temper their exercise of power on the cooperative. For example, in Chirapa, on several occasions peasants have refused to comply with the administration's orders to go ahead with some agricultural activities. As bosses have no mandate to fire members, they can only use sanctions such as reducing salaries or delaying payments against those who refuse to cooperate.

However, within the cooperative bureaucracy, traditional work hierarchy is being maintained, and political leadership is unquestionably in the hands of those at the top. Authority is held on the basis of technical expertise, education and higher socio-economic background. In spite of the fact that leaders are authority figures they are seen by peasants as lacking common sense, which to them explains why the
cooperative is doing so poorly. To gain some support, técnicos have been known to coopt influential members. This is achieved by allocating jobs to friends or distributing favours. As a result average members with no connections among the leadership have shown little incentive for cooperative work as they realize that their chances for promotion are rather slim.

Thus, to date, the cooperative remains a highly stratified social system wherein some members are able to enjoy greater privileges than others. Differentiation in status and income resulted because peasants were allowed to keep the plots allotted to them by the ex-hacendado. Therefore, the former inequalities in land distribution which existed on the hacienda prior to the reform have been preserved on the cooperative to perpetuate economic differentiation among peasant members.

Equally important is that some units are still subjected to servile labour while others are not. For example, faenas are still performed in Arcasitas where peasants provide the community two days of labour services per week. Although members have noticed a slight improvement in their present condition: "Desde antes en la época del hacendado, damos tres días de trabajo gratuito, ahora sólo damos dos." (1979: 214) 22, they nevertheless resent the fact that the land reform did not keep up with its initial promise of abolishing servile labour.

22. At the time of the Hacendado, we had three days of free work for the estate - nowadays we have only 2.
In Huyallapampa, delays in payment have alienated workers who had expected to receive their share of the unit's profit and months later, are still to be paid for their work.

While some neighbouring communities pay up to S/.200 per day for agricultural work, Viñaça and La Vega offer respectively S/.70 and S/.80 to men, and half this amount to women, in spite of legislation which provides for an equal minimum wage for both sexes. In fact these units do not even comply with the minimum wage of the province which is S/.124 (in 1977). Not only do women receive substantially less than men for their agricultural work, but in all units they are also expected to serve visitors such as technocrats, government delegates or professors without remuneration. Thus, women are not keeping pace with men. The cooperative has created greater sexual inequality because cash economy is penetrating the region and men are the ones who earn more in the current situation. As a result, women have become increasingly dependent on their husbands for economic survival.

Although in Chirapa, changes in production have brought tenure security to its members, it has failed, so far, to achieve full autonomy for the peasantry. For workers, this cooperative does not

23. The minimum wage is set by districts within the provinces of the different departments. It is higher on the coast than in the sierra; higher in sierra districts closer to the department capital than in more rural districts and higher in the industrial sector than in agriculture.
belong to them, or serve their interests but rather is controlled by a handful of agro-technocrats who, according to the peasants, exploit them more than their previous hacendado. This resentment and sense of exploitation implies that members feel more powerless now than in the past. On the hacienda, colonos were more familiar with the system. They had, over the years, learned to manipulate the environment to their advantage. This confidence in their own ability to deal with certain types of power structure has been completely undermined by the creation of a new institutional framework, of which they have no knowledge whatsoever. So far, members show suspicion towards management and total indifference to the future of the enterprise. As Contreras Villar states 'Ellos (los miembros) se preocupan por su propio sector y no por el conjunto que componen la empresa (Ibid: 220). With decision making power in the hands of management, no opportunity exists for bottom-up influence. As a result, a dynamic and cooperative spirit is missing. The economy drifts and both bureaucrats and cooperative members have lost a sense of purpose. While members show little interest in the cooperative and feel uncertain about its fate, their economic insecurity forces them to enter into personalistic relationships with peasant members of higher socio-economic status. Rich peasants are preferred over administrators because of the negative image members have of the técnicos' performance and the general lack of trust which exists between both sides.

24. They (members) are interested in their own unit, but not in that of the cooperative.
To summarize, in the department of Ayacucho, hacienda peasants had traditionally remained in a situation of total dependency through the coercive power of clientelism. As the case of Yanayacu shows, when conditions in the larger society allowed peones to use moderate actions to fight back the arbitrariness of the patron's power, peasants did not hesitate to challenge such abuses although their chances of winning were poor. At the same time, it is evident that moderate as well as violent movements also failed to reduce the presence of the hacendados. The removal of the elite class from the land only succeeded with the Velasco reform law which turned haciendas into cooperatives. This resulted in the eradication of traditional clientelism. However, the creation of cooperatives does not automatically eliminate the need for personalistic dependency. Chirapa demonstrates that the poor productivity and non-egalitarian power structure has discouraged a workers' commitment to the enterprise. Moreover, the members' lack of political and economic autonomy leads to a dependence upon the assistance and protection of other peasants of higher class. From evidence available (Guasti 1981, Quillett 1979, McClintock 1981), it appears that this type of relationship is developing in many coastal and highland cooperatives. However, rather than having to rely only upon one clearly defined patron—the hacendado—the ex-peon now depends upon many relationships in order to gain the same services. This mutant form of clientelism between peasant-patron and peasant-client may offer greater opportunity for the development of class consciousness. That is, their weaker and fluctuating ties to their patrons can encourage, among ex-hacienda workers, the awareness of class interests.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that, in Peru, a clientelistic structure has emerged out of a process of combined political domination and economic dependency to become a crucial principle for ordering cross-class interaction. Within the context of a dependent society, where wide economic disparities exist between sectors and among social classes, clientelism is a mechanism whereby the disadvantaged resort to personalistic ties with higher placed individuals in order to reduce their vulnerability to the system. In the Peruvian Andes, clientelism gave tremendous power to the rural elite who, for centuries, were able to keep the peasantry atomized and subservient.

However, after 1968, the Velasco regime deliberately attempted to offset the political base of the landed class, whose attitude towards agriculture was seen by the military as hindering economic development. To reestablish its hegemony over the large sierra labour force, this government removed the peasantry from the control of the hacendados to place them under the tutelage of the state. This was achieved through their integration into a corporate political system of a clientelistic nature. This approach was regarded by the regime as well-suited to Peru's past and present. Its implementation was justified by a tradition of highly centralised forms of government (i.e., the Incaic theocracy and the Hispanic colonial state) together with a strong tutelage system which kept the lower classes dependent upon those above for subsistence.
The combination of clientelism and corporatism at the national level - two principles which stress centralisation and verticality - was used to install an authoritarian structure of power. By bringing together individuals of diverse classes under a corporate clientelistic apparatus the government thought that it would discourage the membership to think in class terms. That is, it would diminish competition between corporate groups and ultimately prevent class antagonism. Vertical ordering through bureaucratic structure would also guarantee allotment of scarce benefits within a dependent economy.

Undoubtedly, the implementation of this program of reforms was successful in challenging the power of the agrarian elite. For the first time in Peru, the economic basis of the hacendados - control over land - was removed forcing this group out of the agricultural sector.

However, as the data suggest, numerous problems have arisen with the reorganization of the rural sector. To maximize productivity, government financial efforts were concentrated in areas where the possibilities for short-term profits were most likely to occur. Consequently, the military junta chose to support the wealthy coastal enterprises which were better able to meet national demand for commercial crops. Meanwhile, highland cooperatives were not given the sound resource base which could have allowed them to be economically viable and politically independent. The immediate consequence of such a policy was to reinforce previous
regional inequalities: the coastal export economy dominated production at the expense of domestic agriculture. This reflects on the value of the land which varies greatly ranging from 300 soles per acres in the sierra department of Ayacucho to 31,000 soles on the coast near Lima (Alberts 1976: 10). By confining its efforts to the modernized export sector, the government has left the numerous and poverty-stricken sierra minifundios untouched - the relative size of landholdings remained below five hectares, an amount which allows at best subsistence farming. In general, highland comuneros, small holders and temporary wage labourers gained little or nothing (Fitzgerald 1976, Alberts 1976, Guillet 1979).

Agrarian Reform and Sierra Cooperatives: Citing the Case of Chirapa

In this study, special attention has been given to sierra cooperatives for they represented the first serious government attempt at reorganizing the rural sector of that country. In accordance with the military's requirements, corporate clientelism did extend its capabilities to the most isolated parts of the highlands as has been demonstrated in the case of Ayacucho. However, while the reform was expected to increase productivity, redistribute income to the campesinos and provide them with job security, the study of Chirapa suggests less than successful achievement of such objectives. In that production unit, reorganization has so far failed to bring the worker's economic level above the survival margin. One reason for the cooperative's poor performance is that the production process has not been improved due to a lack of substantial technical and credit assistance from the
government.

Another aspect of importance is that in Chirapa, cooperative farming has yet to alter the structure of inequality which characterised pre-reform times. Data show that internal social differentiation still prevails on this estate. As Contreras Villar (1981) observes, land remains unequally distributed among members as people have been allowed to keep the plots they were working prior to the reform. Moreover, unrenumerated work has not been abolished throughout the enterprise. Some units are to this date subjected to faenas while others like Pongora did not retain any form of servile labour. Figures also indicate that wages received for communal farming are not standardized. Under the new system, income differentiation still functions along sex lines with women receiving half of what men get for a day of work. The effects of such discrepancies on cash value for female labour is that women will become economically dependent on men. Whereas women traditionally held a leading role in the control of the Andean economy (Nunez del Prado Bejar 1975), they will now suffer a substantial decline in status as differences between the sexes are translated into a system of differential worth. Moreover, the Chirapa cooperative like many other highland CAPs and SAIs (Guillet 1979, Skeldon 1974) does not provide opportunity for full employment. Consequently, members are forced to earn most of their income outside the production unit - a factor which will eventually lead to increasing occupational differentiation. As we saw, such economic inequalities developed a cynical attitude towards the purpose of the cooperative
leaving peasants skeptical about the fate of their enterprise. With
the serious economic crisis that many hacienda cooperatives are
facing (Guillet 1979, McClintock 1981) many observers have noted that
members have no incentive towards collective work effort preferring
to focus their energy towards their private plots.

Often, workers think that incompetent leadership is largely res-
ponsible for their state of economic uncertainty (Guillet ibid: 171).
Such was the case in Chirapa where members' mistrust for officials
was supported by numerous irregularities and delays in the payment of
wages. From the perspective of the beneficiaries, risk was increased
by the nature of the leadership that the reform brought about. Thus,
low agricultural productivity and unreliable leadership had been
contributing factors in encouraging peasants to seek economic security
in personalistic relationship with peasants of a higher class.

Chirapa is not a unique case of a cooperative not being able to
achieve relative harmony and efficiency. Studies conducted on the
SAIS Cahuide as discussed in Chapter IV, also indicate that conflicts
between the interests of the advisers of the unit and those of the
component parts have created deep-seated tension between the member-
ship and officials and led to an unstable situation within the enter-
prise. The large size of this SAIS made it particularly difficult
to articulate the interests of the cooperative with those of each
production sector and community. This became a major obstacle to
generating a long range production plan.
So far, sierra cooperatives have seldom generated excess revenue. To survive, many of them have been forced into a brokerage role with the government. By subjecting cooperatives to official patronage, the state maintains political as well as economic control over these units which would, otherwise, lose considerably if they were to actively oppose national policies. This tendency to extend the bureaucratic arm of government into the sphere of cooperative management further acts to depersonalize relationships within those productive units and leaves little chance for organizational input from the workers.

Thus, the reform program has evidently succeeded in liquidating the latifundia system and liberating peasants from the landowning class that had dominated rural Peru for centuries. But, by creating peasant cooperatives vertically tied to the state bureaucracy, the government never did provide a framework that would, in practice, allow peasants to participate in the local administration of the reform projects. Thus, one can say that scepticism about using corporate clientelism as a model for achieving 'social democracy of full participation' is justified.

**Class Clientelistic Relationships**

The introduction of cooperative farming and other related processes such as commercialization of agriculture, cash payments, greater communication among peasants and the removal of the hacendado,
have had a significant impact on sierra interclass relations. The penetration of market forces into the region, where traditionally such forces were slow to develop, has encouraged the development of a cash economy throughout the region, transforming in the process, ex-colonos into wage earners. The shift from a status of colonos to that of salaried labourers is crucial to the future development of these newly created estates. That is, cooperative workers will deal with their leaders in a very different manner than with their ex-patrons; the personalism and familiarity which was typical of the hacendado-colono nexus, has disappeared as have other stabilizing factors such as deference to the landlord or attachement to the estate. This old patron-client bond tended to be very stable when the system of mutual obligations and responsibilities was respected by both sides. As long as the system guaranteed the peasants some basic security, the structure of authority was unlikely to be challenged. Furthermore, coercion and isolation which characterized clientelism in the pre-reform Andean society and which often acted as a barrier to horizontal ties among hacienda peones were efficient in maintaining the status quo. Thus, prior to the reform, the role of the patron and the power structure of the hacienda were crucial in inhibiting class unity and in maintaining a strict control over campesinos' political activities.

By removing the hacienda, cooperatives have brought considerable changes in the way peasants relate to leaders and to each other.
A closer look at the evidence shows that beneficiaries have gained little economic and political autonomy. Chirapa members, for example, have a relatively limited capacity to influence management with respect to policy making and allocation of resources. Members with no real power still perceive that personalistic assistance from peasants of a higher class is important to ensure some sort of economic security. As such, these richer rural residents act as brokers. Although they have access to fewer resources than the hacendados had, they are nevertheless regarded by their clients as best able to provide some of the needed goods and services.

Some authors (Guillet 1979, Guasti 1981) show that clientelistic relations are unlikely to occur between poorer cooperative members and agro-bureaucrats because of the nature of the social relations between the two groups. First, contacts are ephemeral, impersonal and are based upon a certain amount of distrust. As previously mentioned, Chirapa members do not refer to their boss in a particularistic manner and openly show their lack of respect for the new management. To use Greaves' words (1976:194), in order to maintain social distance técnicos have "depersonalized their bonds with workers" and "repudiated a morality of obligations to them". They have removed the particularistic character of the patron-peon bond on which the paternalistic power structure of the hacienda was based. Then, these bureaucrats are often recruited from outside the region, therefore, are not well known to the local population, a factor which increases members' suspicion.
In addition, bureaucrats do not hold a permanent position, thus, may have to leave the enterprise at any time. This aspect makes clientelistic relationships with them highly tentative and unpredictable; no one really knows how long any particular técnico will remain in the favour of the government.

Thus, not only did cooperatives fail to eradicate dependency relations, they actually provided an environment in which such phenomena could develop and grow. The particular form that clientelistic relations are taking in response to this change in structural context departs from the traditional hacienda mode. It is the inability of the cooperative and its officials to guarantee security for members that has tended to encourage workers to rely upon well-off peasants for support. However, whereas the former mode was very stable because of the strong economic and political position of the patron, the new clientelistic bond is weaker as the peasant-patron does not have the same pervasive influence over the life of his client. By de-emphasizing upward linkages, the land reform may have generated conditions favorable to the formation of class consciousness among the client group.

Another factor of importance which may be potentially instrumental in increasing class action is that cooperatives have, in many ways, encouraged ex-peones to broaden their social environment. By not providing full employment, cooperatives force these campesinos to establish contacts beyond the boundaries of the estate in their search for work and for patrons. Once outside the enterprise, they are more likely to be exposed to new ideas
and gain in the process a greater political awareness, through ties with unions, the justice system and other campesino organizations.

**Aftermath of the Reform**

Since implementation of the reform, a level of expectancy has been aroused by its promises, which, so far, are yet to materialize. The Peruvian regime, by emphasizing economic development without being able to achieve it has undoubtedly, created frustration among a substantial number of rural people, preventing wide support for the government to occur and resulting in the fall of Velasco in 1975.

In the midst of growing economic difficulties, such as devaluation of the sol and budget restrictions, the military had to step down from power in 1980 returning Peru to civilian rule and constitutional processes. Since his return to the Presidency, Belaunde has had to face massive rural and urban opposition to his economic policy and to the passing of two laws - The Law Governing Municipalities and the Anti-Terrorist Law. Both were proclaimed by the Governmental Executive without any reference to Parliament. While the former centralizes revenue-gathering powers in the national government, the latter prepares the way for a more generalized repression. At the present time, constitutional guarantees have been suspended and a state of siege was declared in the highlands in response to rural unrest.

The current guerrilla outbursts in Ayacucho are symptomatic of the reform's failure to deal effectively with the peasant problem. Here, the stage was set for rural violence once traditional power structures had decayed and the cooperatives appeared unable to bring
the expected benefits and economic security. Consequently, the richer and more politically sophisticated class of the peasantry – those living in the lower valleys, who are literate – found in a group of young Marxists known as Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) some ideological strength to guide their struggle and exert pressure on the national system by using terrorist action. Since 1980, Sendero Luminoso has successfully challenged the government. However, socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions among the rural population have led to tragic events confronting different strata among the peasantry.

Fearing government reprisal and not sure of what they had to gain through joining the guerillas, the Quechua-speaking peasants of the alti-planos preferred to remain pro-government in order to protect their land as well as their lives. As a result, they are frequently coerced by the pursuing army troops to fight against the Sendero movement. Such events have led to widespread bloodshed. For example, the Uchuraccayan villagers, a pro-government community acting under the instruction of the police murdered, on January 26 of this year, eight journalists who were believed to be guerrilla members. In retaliation, 80 persons of the same community were massacred three months later by Sendero Luminoso's sympathizers.

Peasant unrest is rapidly worsening with guerrilla support spreading throughout the highlands where impoverished peasants are tending towards increasing militancy. However, as the events in Ayacucho demonstrate it is far too early to predict whether such unrest will lead to full fledged revolution.
To conclude, under Velasco we see a government committed to prevent a violent revolution through carrying out a corporate clientelistic mode of reform imposed from top down in order to overcome class conflicts. This reformist approach was insufficient to deal with Peru's rural reality. One of its most significant consequences was to sharpen class differentiation within the peasantry and to increase potential violence. As we saw, some peasant groups have already chosen to exert pressure on the national system through terrorism since no other avenues were open to them to influence government policies. The intensity of this civil violence suggests that the system has been incapable of responding adequately to popular demands generated by a reform which has aroused the level of expectancy without being able to fulfill promises.

Explanatory Value of the Concept: Corporate Clientelism

Corporate clientelism as a conceptual apparatus helps us to relate to the way a military establishment concerned with pursuing a policy of socioeconomic reform addresses itself to the question of popular political participation. In dependent societies where available resources are scarce and political stability difficult to maintain, corporate clientelism becomes a secure path for articulating atomized and economically marginal groups into the center of power while economizing on the need for overt coercion. By maintaining a vertical ordering of social relations, corporate clientelism prevents the formation of horizontal solidarities, thus, acts primarily as a mechanism of internal control.

Although this concept has been very useful at explaining some of the inherent contradictions of the Velasco approach to reform, it does not pretend, however, to solve many of the most significant problems of Peruvian politics.
Books and Articles


Berdichevski, Bernardo (ed.) 1979 'Anthropology and the Peasant Mode of Production', in B. Berdichevski Anthropology and Social Change in Rural Areas. The Hague: Mouton Publisher (4-39).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Bibliography - continued

Delgado, Oscar  
1968  

Dore, Elizabeth and John Weeks  
1977  

Dorner, Peter  
1971  

Dos Santos, Teotonio  
1973  

Cotler, Julio  
1970  
'La-Mecanica de la Dominacion Interna Y del Cambio Social en el Peru', in El Peru Actual. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales. Mexico (56-100).

Contreras Villar, Victor  
1979  

Dos Santos, Teotonio  
1973  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dyck, Noel</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>'Strangers in Our Midst: An Examination of Anthropological Thought About Broke-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada (239-251).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(401-428).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feder, Ernest</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>'Counter-Reform', in R. Stavenhagen ed., Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Press.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster, George</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>'Cofradía and Compadrazgo in Spain and South America'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson, Charles</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>The Aztec under Spanish Rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography - continued

Graziano, Luigi  
1977

'Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy', in S. Schmidt et al. eds. 
Friends, Followers and Factions. Berkeley: University of California 
Press (360-378).

Greaves, Thomas  
1976

'The Patron-Proletarian Nexus', in J. 
Nash et al. eds. Popular Participation 
in Social Change. The Hague: Mouton 
Publishers (187-197).

Greenfield, Sidney  
1972

'Charwomen, Cesspools and Road-building: 
An Examination of Patronage, Clientelage, 
and Political Power in Southern Minas 
Gerais', in A. Strickon and S. Greenfield 
eds. Structure and Process in Latin 
America. Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press (71-89).

Guman, Poma  
1936

'Mueva Cronica y Bueno Gobierno', in 
Travaux et Memoire de L'institut 

Guasti, Laura  
1977

'Peru: Clientelism and Internal Control', 
in S. Schmidt et al. eds. Friends, 
Followers and Factions. Berkeley: 
University of California Press (422-439).

1981

'Clientelism in Decline: A Peruvian 
Regional Study', in S.N. Eisenstadt and 
R. Lemarchand eds. Political Clientelism, 
Patronage and Development. London: 
Sage Publications (217-249).

Guillet, David  
1979

Agrarian Reform and Peasant Economy in 
Southern Peru. Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press.

Hall, Antony  
1974

'Patron-Client Relations', in Journal of 
Peasant Studies. No. 1. Vol. 4 
(506-509).
Hammergren, Linn  

Handelman, Howard  

Holmberg, Allan  

Horowitz, Irving  

Horton, Douglas  

Huntington, Samuel  

Huizer, Gerrit  
1979 'Peasant Participation in Agrarian Reform', in E. Berdichewski Anthropology and Social Change in Rural Areas. The Hague: Mouton Publisher (497-521).

ICAD (CIDA)  
1966 Land Tenure Conditions and Socio-Economic Development in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru. Washington: Pan-American Union.

Jacoby, Erich H.  

Jacquette, Jane  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Tenure Center</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agrarian Reform in Latin America: Annotated Bibliography.</td>
<td>Land Economics Monograph. No. 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title and Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title and Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matos Mar, José</td>
<td>Las Haciendas del Valle de Changay. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Mayer, Adrian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Wolf</td>
<td>Montaya, Rodrigo; Amelia Guido; Yolanda Ramírez; José Lombardi; Ruperto Pérez Albela y Raúl Rojas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography - continued

North, Liisa
1981

Núñez Del Prado Bejar, Daisy
1975

O'Donnell, Guillermo
1976

Olson, Gary
1974

Orlove, Benjamin
1977

Paine, Robert (ed.)
1971

Palmer, Gary
1979

Parsons, Talcott (ed.)
1947

Pearse, Andrew
1966
Bibliography - continued

Petras, James
1981

Petras, James and Robert Laporte
1971

Petras, James and Hugo Zemelman Merino
1972

Pitt-Rivers, Julian
1954
The People of the Sierra. New York: Criterion Book.

Powell, Dunca John
1970

Quijano, Aníbal
1971

1982

1969
'Situación y Tendencia de la Sociedad Peruana Contemporánea', in Pensamiento Critico. Havana (3-23).

Sabogal Wiese, Jose
1979

Sais Guillen, Rosa
1965
Bibliography – continued

Schmidt, Steffen (ed.)  
1977

Schmitter, Philippe  
1974

Scott, James  
1976

1977

Scott Palmer, David and Kevin, Jay Middlebrook  
1976

Sidhu, B.S.  
1976

Silverblatt, Irene  
1980

Silverman, Sydel  
1977
'Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy', in S. Schmidt et al., Friends, Followers and Factions. Berkeley: University of California (293-305).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skeldon, Ron</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>La SAIS como un Modello para colonización:</td>
<td>El Caso de la SAIS Tupac Amaru. Lima:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centro Nacional de Capacitación e Investigación para la Reforma Agraria.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Clifford</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>'Agrarian Reform and Regional Development in Peru', in R. Miller et al.</td>
<td>Social and Economic Change in Modern Peru.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre for Latin American Studies. Liverpool: The University of Liverpool. Monograph Series No. 6 (87-120).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Bibliography - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weaver, Stirton F.</td>
<td>'Positive economics, Comparative Advantage, and Underdevelopment', in Science and Sociology, Vol. XXXV. No. 2 (165-179).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whyte, William F.; Matos Mar, José; Julio Cotler; Lawrence K. Williams; J. Oscar Alerś; Fernando Fuenzalida and Giorgio Alberti</td>
<td>Dominación y Cambios en el Perú Rural. La Micro Región del Valle de Chancay. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whyte, William F.; Matos Mar, José; Julio Cotler; Lawrence K. Williams; J. Oscar Alerś; Fernando Fuenzalida and Giorgio Alberti</td>
<td>'Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition. The Corporatist Model', in World Politics. Vol. 25 (January, 206-236).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wolf, Eric
1956

1959
Sons of the Shaking Earth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Newspapers

Archival Sources