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Democracy's Interest in Groups. Interest Group Corporatism and Democratic Theory

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15/11/92

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Abstract

Governments around the industrialized world are increasingly suffering from a lack of citizen confidence. There is increasing disenchantment not only with politicians and the policies they produce, but as well with the political processes by which policy is developed. This alienation between the state and the civil society is in part a product of the inadequacies of the pluralist system, the dominant paradigm in most industrialized democratic nations. Pluralist democratic theory, however, has done little to address this problem. Nevertheless, since the 1960s, certain states have increasingly adopted limited forms of what is today known as neocorporatism, veering away from the strict pluralist approach. Neocorporatism provides for the inclusion of overarching interest group representation and intermediation in state policy formation. While most "corporatist states" have limited this form of policy participation to economic functional interest associations such as business and labour, some countries do incorporate at a very basic level other social-interest groups into their corporatist procedures.

This thesis examines the democratic potential of corporatism within both the industrial-interest and the social-interest field for enhanced inclusiveness, participation, responsiveness, civic consciousness and versatility. By combining the literature on comparative corporatism (and related fields) with the new deliberative and associative democratic theory, this project will attempt to provide a framework for a corporatist theory of interest group democracy.

The thesis begins with an introduction on the present ills afflicting modern capitalist democracies and how they are pertinent to democratic corporatism. Chapter II presents a brief history, conceptualization, and critical review of the literature on corporatism and related fields. The potential fusion of corporatism with democratic theory and its inherent difficulties is explored in Chapter III. The theoretical gaps in the literature are addressed in Chapter IV with the introduction of the theory on deliberative and associative democracy. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the viability of a corporatist deliberative
democracy, and how corporatist structures should be adapted to incorporate both existing industrial-interests and more basic social-interests. This thesis concludes that a deliberative corporatist scheme, according to the proposed democratic criteria, is both feasible and preferable to the present pluralist model.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is the product of several graduate courses and manifold discussions with the students and faculty of the department.

I am grateful to David Laycock without whom this satisfying endeavor would not have taken place. Through his course on New Social Movements and democratic theory, he introduced me to the fascinating realm of normative theory. He not only encouraged me to pursue the topic of neocorporatism and democratic theory, but as well helped me articulate my interests and positions throughout the process.

Thanks to Michael Howlett who provided me with many challenging questions which allowed me to solidify my arguments and in the end strengthen the thesis.

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Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROVAL</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION: THE CRISIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE AND A WINDOW OF HOPE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis of the State and Social Alienation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem of Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Window of Hope</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatism and Democratic Theory</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Thesis</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II - THE RISE AND FALL (AND REBIRTH) OF CORPORATISM</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical and Philosophical Origins</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Neocorporatism</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Neocorporatist Literature</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatism and the Policy Communities</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III - DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND NEOCORPORATISM: COMPATIBILITY AND CONTRADICTIONS</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dearth of Literature on Corporatist Democratic Theory</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Democracy: Liberal and Corporate</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Democracy: The Viability of a Concept for Corporatism</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The Concept of Representation</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Pluralism and Liberal Representation</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Corporate Representation</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist Democratic Theory</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-An Embryonic Corporatist Democratic Theory: Sketchy, Skeptical, and Instrumental</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Whither Corporatist Democratic Theory?</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1- Introduction:
The Crisis of the Democratic State and a Window of Hope

Crisis of the State and Social Alienation

For decades now a majority of non-Marxist political theorists have seen a pluralist democratic polity as the definitive answer to the problem of governing a modern capitalist nation-state in the twentieth century. This view no longer commands the widespread adherence the political establishment of these countries once triumphantly flaunted. Despite a temporary reinforcement of this view following the abrupt collapse of the Marxist project, it is generally recognized that the health of capitalist democracies is in serious condition. There are many symptoms of illness. They range from the crisis of the welfare-state and the ever-so-frequent cyclical economic recessions, to the increasing specialization of policy issues and a growing sense amidst the population of the unaccountability of their political élites. All these indicators of ill health have a further and more critical repercussion: the alienation of civil society from established systems of governance. This political malaise should convey the urgency for a serious reconsideration of what it means to constitute a democracy, and what is required to effectively govern a country.

This thesis will offer a proposal for a theoretical reorientation of political representation and decision-making procedures utilizing the theory of corporatism as a foundation. Corporatism integrates major societal interests into associations with policy-making authority, supplementing the traditional territorial electoral channels. Moreover, corporatist governance is not confined to a theoretical netherworld, it has been practiced to
various degrees and at various times in several West-European states. Nevertheless, this has not prevented the persistence of the crisis.

To adequately identify the problem at the source of the crisis, it is important to understand this prevalent social or societal alienation. Alienation springs in part from the fact that there is little potential for citizen involvement in the activities that determine or have an impact on their lives. The notion of societal alienation is similar to Durkheim's concept of "anomie" where there is a breakdown in the meaningful social interaction among individuals and consequently a collapse of any understanding of political community (Hearne, 1985, 165). A more recent but equally relevant account of this social malaise is the more abstract "colonization of the lifeworld" propounded by Habermas. The lifeworld is the complex of networks for social interaction that have been destroyed through processes triggered by the institutionalization of instrumental rationality as the driving force of socio-political projects (Dryzek, 1990, 12). Indeed, social alienation in part is a perceived inability to act. This has ominous repercussions not only for society but as well on the rules and procedures that govern it. It is a loss of motivation, a breakdown in the faith in an institution, in a process, or in the ability to achieve an ultimate desirable end. Such widespread beliefs do not tend to be the product of metaphysical dicta, or paranoid delusions. There is a tendency for these feelings to be rooted in material and procedural realities. To understand societal alienation one needs to go beyond the socio-psychological dimension and examine the institutional bases for such pervasive popular disenchantment.

Most citizens' political participation is confined to voting in elections once every few years. Frequently they become dissatisfied with the performance of their representatives, claiming that the latter do not adequately represent the interests of the electorate. Otherwise, their quarrel is one of a question of the lack of leadership of their representatives. Many times, blatant incompetence or corruption plays a role in

---

1While anomie and the colonization of the lifeworld are not identical concepts, their particularities will be further explored in Chapter III.
discouraging faith in a system plagued with endless afflictions. While these perceptions fluctuate according to a variety of factors, and may not place into question the global legitimacy of the government, other symptoms are more persistent and consequential.

The growth of bureaucracy and administration is a common element in almost all democracies (or any other régime for that matter!). Indeed, Weber's thesis of the technocratization of governments has been vindicated to a great extent. There is a tendency in government to depoliticize issues, and because of their technical intricacy, to relegate them to the workings of the civil service. Not only are citizens unaware of the policy options of certain more cryptic issues (or rather issues complicated by obscure terminology and alien frames of reference), but the legislators themselves normally lack the technical know-how to deal with them. At times popular hostility towards a government policy (and hence towards the party in office) stems from this mystification of political questions. Had there been societal consultation (or even some form of dialogue between the citizenry and the state) such legitimacy concerns would not have interfered so greatly with effective policy outcomes. However, according to political theorist Norberto Bobbio the paradox of the modern state is that participatory democracy is increasingly incompatible with a state augmented in size, functions and specialization (Bobbio, 1978, 19-22). This increases the perception that government and the issues dealt therein are beyond their reach. This is exacerbated when a society does have a certain understanding of a deeply controversial or divisive issue but is denied a say in the outcome. At times, the legitimacy of the government may even be questioned. Under such conditions neither the valid democratic concerns of a society nor the efficient management of the state will benefit.

Popular disenchantment is increased when socio-economic issues are combined with these political and administrative gripes. Indeed, the crisis of the welfare state is a universal phenomenon in western industrialized states. States can no longer provide unlimited social security as deficits have surged to unprecedented levels. At the same time, unemployment and underemployment are reaching serious levels as economic growth
stagnates. Recessions are becoming a mainstay of the economic order. When the material aspect of citizen's lives is attacked, they are increasingly reluctant to tolerate the inadequacies of the political realm.

However, the welfare state (prior to the dawning of the "crisis") was itself already a source for social alienation. Rather than attempt to attain a lasting degree of equity through the redistribution of wealth and the opening of opportunities, and hence the means for political empowerment, the system of centralized universalized social services became more a symbol of a cold, distant, paternalistic provider. Even though the conception of the twentieth century welfare state may have originally been focussed on the elimination of major economic disparities, from the 1960s on its role assumed a more encompassing function of individual and collective determinations of destiny. While the mitigation of poverty is a necessary element in the equation for this enhanced notion of the welfare state, it was by no means sufficient. However, rather than being an authentic instrument for self-determination, often the social security system made people's potentially humiliating dependence on the system perpetual. Rather than addressing issues particular to certain communities in need, often it produced nothing more than generalized programs insensitive to local needs. The welfare state now is characterized by many of the problems it was expected to address.

A final economic factor affecting this social disorientation is the increasing lack of control that national governments maintain over their economic sovereignty, as a consequence of the rise of the globalization of the economy. Increasingly, government macro-economic policies are constrained by external market forces beyond their control. For such crucial policy areas to be beyond the reach of states entrenches individual citizen's belief that they are even more helpless, caught in the grips of a distant, insidious, and omnipotent system.

It appears that the combination of shattered popular expectations concerning the accountability, responsiveness, and effectiveness of their political institutions, along with
the economic woes suffered by these societies, provides a formula for a more vocal and active expression of this societal anxiety. The rise since the 1960s of the New Social Movements is a direct and early indicator of the disenchantment of certain sectors of society that yearn for an increased popular voice governing themselves and their environment. Unlike the traditional social movements, these social forces do not have material demands at the center of their claims. They do not simply question the direction of the state, but as well the entire spectrum of relations governing society (Dalton & Kuechler, 1989).

However, this is no longer an issue specific to certain beleaguered or disadvantaged communities. The frustration is also expressed by the citizenry at large in less conscious ways. Recent manifestations have taken on an array of incarnations: some logical, some irrational, at times ingeniously constructive, and often naively regressive. In France, the United States, as well as in Canada the electorate expressed their dissatisfaction by ousting the incumbent party from office after many years in power (i.e.: voting against someone rather than for someone). In other countries constitutional change was demanded, isolating the electoral system as the key problem: in referenda, New Zealanders opted to throw out their plurality system in favour of proportional representation, while Italians opted for the contrary, a plurality system to replace their corruption-ridden PR system. In many cases referenda questions were defeated because of the support granted by the political establishment. The Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, and the Charlottetown Accord in Canada are but two of the most salient cases. The rise of extreme right-wing hate violence in Germany and other European nations is the most heinous expression of this social despair. Meanwhile in much of Eastern Europe there is a great deal of disillusionment regarding the Western-style systems they so promptly aspired to emulate in the wake of the fall of communism.2 Regardless of the character these manifestations assume, there is an unquestionable call for substantive change.

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2It can be argued that social alienation is too broad a phenomenon to link causally to these many distinct events. Indeed, there are a multiplicity of particular factors which have triggered such social behavior in the
The Problem of Liberal Democracy

It is arguable that much of the social crisis identified above can be attributed to institutional defects in the political realm. While certain economic impediments may seem beyond the reach of political agency, this may not be as clear as it appears. However, let us set aside for a moment the more daunting economic factors contributing to the social malaise, to isolate what will be identified as the problem of liberal democracy.

The political system in modern capitalist states has liberal individualist foundations. Liberalism arose as a challenge to absolutist dynastic régimes controlled by a privileged few, where laws were arbitrarily passed and enforced, and where the notion of individual rights was unfathomable. Liberalism also came about as a new mode of economic production began to take root across Europe supplanting the old feudal system. Capitalism found much of its philosophical justification in liberal theory. The tenet of the primacy of the individual stipulated not only the right to private property but the right to participate in political affairs. However, because of size and complexity of the state, participatory rights of individuals were largely relegated to voting periodically for representatives. The authority vested in the individual was delegated to the elected representatives. Elections developed into a competition between different ideological factions under party banners.

Despite its emphasis on the individual as the basic unit of society, liberalism nevertheless generally construed the objective of democracy as attaining the common good within a political territory. At the same time, there is a conscious acceptance that the primary underlying motive of the individual is self-interest. This allows individuals to choose the most appropriate path for the satisfaction of their needs. Self-interest is not only the driving force behind the accumulation of capital, the cornerstone of the present economic system, but it also allows for governments to be loyal to the wills of the respective societies. Nevertheless, many of the institutional and economic problems raised at the outset are central to the explanation of these instances.
electorate, since government officials (both appointed and elected) are also driven by their own self-interest — to stay in power. This analysis is derived from a more modern incarnation of liberalism, often termed public choice or rational choice. The common good can only be reached through the aggregation of individual wishes. Since the party that obtains a majority is granted the legitimacy to rule, a majority of individual wills determines the so-called common good.

There is no consideration of collective rights to be represented in this facile formula for the determination of the "public good". Minority rights are at times entrenched in special protective constitutional clauses; however, minority input is most often overwhelmed by the "majority position". Depending on the structure of electoral systems and coalitions, a majority position can also be no more than a plurality position which may in fact be objectionable to another majority within the population. Nevertheless, there exists an avenue for indirect input from collectivities of individuals under the banner of the interest group. The influence attained by such groups often corresponds with their economic and at times numerical weight in society. They can be sporadic and even harmful to the effective functioning of the state. According to most democratic criteria, they often fail miserably as an alternative form of representation. Those with meager resources, little organization, or few numbers are once more under- or unrepresented in this system.

Liberalism is very much a part of the Enlightenment and the Modern Age. This is a period where not only democracy and capitalism flourished, but also science. The quest for reason was of fundamental import. The precepts of positivism and the need for objectivity in the study of all things became dominant, and instrumental rationality the modus operandi. Instrumental rationality is defined as the ability to implement an effective means to realize a pre-determined objective. It was supposed to purge subjectivity, irrationality, obscurantism, and traditions from social life. It was to herald a new era where all problems could be solved through purposive-rational means. Action would no longer be guided by social norms but rather by instrumental means for a further end (Elster, 1989). Capitalism
was guided by instrumental rationality insofar as enhanced technical efficiency (purposive-rational means) would result in increased productivity from which profits would accrue (distinct end).

The logic of democracy is not obviously the same as the logic of capitalism. Nevertheless, since the development of democratic norms of governance was tied to that of an instrumentalist mode of production, instrumental rationality became the dominant logic governing capitalist nations. Democratic tenets such as liberty, equality and participation do not necessarily guarantee efficiency or stability. In other words, a state that provides for maximum participation can result in the most unstable and unworkable system possible.

For a democracy to exist, there must be a minimum adequate standard of living (i.e.: economic efficiency)—the lack of which has often been the primary obstacle to efforts at democratization in the Third World (Sørensen, 1993). Since modern democracies are all capitalist, the logic of instrumental rationality prevails. Even if in some of its theoretical origins (particularly Rousseau and the early socialists) the concept of democracy was not overly constrained by this functional tenet, in its modern practical incarnation, instrumental rationality has taken precedence over the more fundamental democratic principles.

This is the course most democratic states have taken over time. While many citizens are clamoring for change they do so without exactly knowing what to change and how to change that which is not functioning, aiming their frustration at times at innocent, easy targets. It is in this context that the symptoms of an ailing system as described above can be explained.

Many schools of thought which challenge contemporary politics do not however provide for an adequate alternative. Marxist theory has incessantly called for the toppling of the system, starting from a radical transformation of the mode of production. However, Marxists recognize the incredible strength and not only the persistent but the expansive nature of capitalism (Wallerstein, 1976). While they offer a great many potential insights, their larger normative theory is neither clear nor popular in western democracies. Anarchist
or anti-statist theories provide a less feasible working framework than the Marxist project. Other theories such as the elitist school spawned by Schumpeter do not even accept the notion of an expanded democracy as a desirable end.

Modern liberal political theory has often ignored pressing problems. Pluralist theory was constructed in the 1950s in the United States, originating as a supposedly empirical descriptive theory with the pretence of positivist objectivity. Democracy as a concept took on a new meaning. Schumpeter, in his classic treatise, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* limited the understanding of democracy to a method for arriving at policy minimally constrained by certain pre-requisite standards of liberty and political equality (Pateman, 1970, 4). American pluralists built on this foundation to create, among other things, a legitimizing theory of democracy in the U.S.A. They went further than simply describing majoritarian electoral democracy, to actually justify it using the criteria enunciated by Schumpeter. The stability of the system became their prime objective, to the point that the resulting apathy within the larger part of society was deemed a valuable asset of democracy, since it prevented such dangerous perverse effects as systems overload or social chaos. While more recent pluralist accounts do not subscribe to such extreme apologetic analyses, they do not sufficiently question the normative foundations of pluralist democracy (Sartori, 1962).

**A Window of Hope**

Democratic theorists are coming to share a general recognition that conventional pluralist democracy no longer suffices when people are increasingly knowledgeable and demanding a larger input in the affairs of the state. Many question whether majoritarian territorially-based democracy has exhausted its potential for both substantive democratic principles, and effective state administration.

In quantitative terms, within the practice of political science there are few theoretical sources for the expansion or rethinking of democracy in advanced capitalist states.
However, some pockets of dissent and originality provide starting points towards significant new perspectives on democratic theory and practice.

One of these is corporatism (along with its myriad prefixes and qualifiers, neo, quasi, social, democratic, liberal...). Its pre-war intellectual origins are dubious given that its original raison d'être had more to do with social order and economic efficiency than democratic notions such as equality or participation. Nevertheless corporatist theory after the early 1970s has provided a useful spring-board from which to examine an alternative to the present theoretical impasse. Ironically, corporatism, both in theory and as practiced in many European states, is also in crisis and thus shares blame for citizen alienation and democratic-institutional atrophy.

In the 1960s certain European countries began to experiment with new forms of social management. A political will emerged to bring major segments of society directly and openly into policy-making, spurred in part by pressure from powerful trade-unions and the continued strength of social-democratic parties. Such segments were predominantly confined to the two economic producer or social classes, organized business and labour. Undoubtedly, there was a more attractive logic behind the implementation of such measures: corporatism offered an alternative means of combatting the twin economic evils of inflation and high unemployment. It was in fact the resulting economic success that provided the momentum for the spread of corporatist arrangements at different levels of the economy throughout various countries.

Corporatism was not immediately recognized as a means of enhancing democracy in most save perhaps the Scandinavian states where democratic concerns have been at the fore of national political agendas since the 1930s. This non-normative perspective on corporatism can also be explained by experiments conducted in the fascist states of southern Europe in the first half of the century. Authoritarian corporatism was utilized to co-opt primarily organized labour, and to imbue their régimes with some semblance of social legitimacy. In its democratic transformation, corporatism has been narrowly linked with
the welfare state and hence has lost much of its original appeal. This is in part due to its
ominous centralization of interests, but especially since economic results have not always
followed so clearly. Moreover, in certain instances, states grant a representational
monopoly to peak organizations of labour and capital, and exclude all other interest
associations with claims to participate in economic policy development. A whole array of
other organizational demands adversely affect the internal governance of such supposedly
democratic associations.

Despite its checkered past and its present afflictions, the concept and practice of
corporatism offer alternatives to the standard form of majority rule based on numerical or
geographic electoral representation. Moreover, it has the potential to alleviate the disparities
between opposing or diverging interest representatives within many pluralist competitive
policy communities.

**Corporatism and Democratic Theory**

While many political analysts have studied these arrangements, corporatist theory has rarely
explored its democratic prospects. Philippe Schmitter is credited with initiating the revival
of neo-corporatist theory, and he is one of the few to have ventured into the field of
democratic theory (Schmitter, 1983; 1988). It has only been in the last few years that
corporatist democratic theory has been reconsidered seriously under a new incarnation
which does not stem from the socio-economic corporatist structures that initiated the
discussion (Cohen & Rogers, 1992). This new branch coming from the United States has
assumed the name of associative democracy. There is indeed little value in attempting to
categorize "schools of thought" in this debate since it really is only a matter of a few major
names. This thesis hopes to look at the potential and the problems with corporatist
democracy, to fill in some of the gaps, but primarily to raise the more critical issues which
have still to be adequately addressed in the literature.
The concepts of inclusive functional representation, interest intermediation, and concertational decision-making make up the essence of corporatism. Functional representation is based on the notion that interests can be aggregated according to employment position; interest intermediation refers to the necessity to balance the needs of seemingly antagonistic groups; and concertational decision-making can be defined as a process of collective negotiation to achieve consensus on policy. These three standards provide the basis for a reconsideration of corporatism's potential and for a re-evaluation of both its theoretical construction and its practical application.

The logic of corporatism is in many ways very much the opposite of that which fuels pluralism. The first major difference is in the implicit assumption that individualism is no longer absolute. In certain cases there is a provision for collective representation, albeit most often a restricted one (the social classes are privileged to the exclusion of other interests). Nevertheless, these provisions are nowhere guaranteed since they are not constitutional agreements (although one could argue they have become de facto political conventions). Furthermore, the legislative chambers in "corporatist countries" do have primacy over agreements reached among the "social partners", hence re-investing the territorially-based individually elected institutions with the primacy that pluralist states had guaranteed (Rokkan, 1966). It must be reiterated that the corporatist state is nothing more than a pluralist political system with certain corporatist arrangements. Only a few countries have attempted to extend corporatist policy-making to non-economic policy fields. Nevertheless, corporatism provides some potential for enhanced democracy and a partial solution to the crisis of the liberal state.

Functional interest representation could well be expanded to provide for other interests which involve not merely occupation and other social-interest but also express notions of group identity through ethnicity, culture, gender, sexuality, age, disability or other characteristics which do not have to do with the definition of the self (such as environmentalism). This is one of the many unanswered questions: how is collective
interest representation conceived? Consequently, one of the many issues corporatism forces one to examine is the problem of political community. As stated earlier, much of the problem of liberal democracy is the disintegration of political community. Indeed, this poses a challenge to any democratic theory of the state. Without addressing this concern a corporatist democratic theory would be incomplete.

Discussions of collective identity and political community have once again become prominent since postmodern theory has challenged the empiricism, positivism and universalism (among many things) propounded by the early pluralists. Postmodernism has also seized on New Social Movements as a liberating social force which has the power to question hegemonic conceptions of interests and goods. As mentioned above, the New Social Movements provided much initial momentum for the reconsideration of such pressing questions. They have also made prominent demands for collective participation in governance.

Significant participation shifts the democratic paradigm from a separation of means and ends, to a unity of means and ends. In other words, the value of participation is more than purely procedural (purely functional-instrumental); it is a fundamental goal for fostering a necessary democratic culture. Underlying the dynamic of corporatist structures is the notion of collective action. Unlike typical individual action in pluralist competition, collective action is not grounded exclusively in terms of self-interest. Democratic corporatism is at least potentially not confined by the absolutism of instrumental rationality either. At the core of corporatism lies the notion of negotiation which is driven by the logic of a discursive social rationality. While this objective is shared by postmodernists, they tend to be suspicious of all forms of rationality. However, casting out rationality would leave one in the midst of an oppressive relativism which could delegitimize any project for collective representation based on consensual rules of process (Micheletti, 1991).

Here the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas will provide an alternative. He argues that the crisis of modernity is due to the excesses of instrumental rationality. Pluralist
democracy's "take-over" by the logic of instrumental action is a major facet of this crisis. However, the culprit is not Western Enlightenment's notion of reason in its entirety. Habermas believes that social or communicative rationality was part and parcel of this tradition, but had been historically ignored. Communicative rationality assumes that rationality can be obtained through just processes whereby deliberation is upheld as the *modus operandi*. Within the context of corporatist democratic theory, Habermas' communicative rationality can establish some guidelines for incorporating collective action into democratic decision-making.

Democratic corporatism provides a basis for an arrangement which could transform not only the political constitution of society and the means of social governance, but also regenerate and re-orient the genuine democratic values upon which modern day liberal states were formally established.

**Structure of Thesis**

This thesis will essentially attempt to fuse insights from comparative corporatist literature and democratic theory. The fundamental question to be addressed is: Can the corporatization of economic and social policy communities provide for enhanced democratic structures and procedures as well as improved policy outcomes?

Chapter II will examine the concept of corporatism in the existing academic literature, identify the historical emergence of corporatism, and propose a consistent definition. Schmitter's definition will provide a frame of reference from which adaptations and deletions will be made to attain a workable concept. The various branches in the corporatist literature will be surveyed along with other relevant literature. From the intersection of corporatist literature and organization theory, along with the insights derived from the policy community literature, it is possible to better appreciate the relations existing firstly within interest groups, and secondly between various collective interests in society
and the state. This will allow for identification of a variety of options open for group input and policy formation.

Following this, adaptations of democratic theory applied to corporatism will be analyzed in Chapter III. In this section, the concept of democracy will be considered in relation to collective interests in society. Pluralist individualist notions of democracy will be contrasted to collectivist conceptions of democracy. A critique of the pluralist theory will follow, along with a discussion of socialist and syndicalist precursors to corporatism. The philosophical origins of a modern corporatism found in G.D.H. Cole and Émile Durkheim, will be appropriated to help regenerate a contemporary corporatist democratic theory. The contemporary debate on corporatist democratic theory will be examined and critiqued. Finally, a new understanding of political community will be considered to address the issues of social fragmentation. The logic of instrumental rationality will be re-evaluated and contrasted with a conception of social rationality derived from the theories of communicative ethics and discursive democracy. This social rationality will be posited as the primary (yet not exclusive) logic in a democratic corporatist model.

Because of the severe lacunae in the literature on corporatist democracy, Chapter IV examines another embryonic theory of interest group democracy that has surfaced from the unlikely milieu of American political science. This current distances itself from conventional pluralist interest group theory, with notions of deliberative and participatory democratic politics. This new scheme is often designated the associative democracy or deliberative associational governance model, and provides a foundation upon which a democratic framework can be elaborated. The framework will utilize the fundamental democratic criteria of accessibility, participation, responsiveness, civic consciousness and versatility. Two conceptualizations of corporatism, each with their respective logics, will be introduced to demonstrate how one might apply the democratic framework. The first consists of the traditional economic-producer model involving the state, business and labour, and has attracted virtually all the attention in the literature on corporatism. The
second conceptualization of corporatism is more novel and controversial. It involves the state and other social-interest groups concerning policy which is not directly related to the central dynamics of the national political economy. While it will be termed *non-economic* social-interest corporatism, this is not to imply that there are no material variables involved in these issues. The economic aspects of social policy discussions are not necessarily always central to the political debates on these policies. For example, issues of gender may or may not have economic class factors attached, yet the social interests involved must invariably go beyond simple class lines of business and labour.

This framework for conceptualizing corporatist intermediation will allow for a general application to particular cases (both real and hypothetical) in each of the two ideal types, the economic-producer (or industrial-interest) model, and the non-economic social model. There will be a discussion in the industrial-interest model of the problems inherent in capitalist democracies. The examination of the clout that each party carries will be considered to underline the different nature in the organization of capital on the one hand and labour on the other. Organizational queries will prevail in the examination of the internal governance of the functional associations. Furthermore, this section will also briefly address the issue of the globalization of the international economy. The following section on non-economic social-interest corporatism will initially tackle much more basic questions concerning the validity of such forms of governance. Of particular salience are the problems with the legitimate organizational constituency, or policy network, with respect to an issue-area; the authority of the various parties in terms of scope of jurisdiction; the difficulty of aggregating consumer interests; and the challenge posed by ethical issues and wide-ranging policy.

In the concluding chapter critical judgements and generalizations regarding democratic corporatism will be presented. The proposed deliberative corporatist democratic theoretical model will be reiterated. Finally, the separate parts presented in the previous chapters will be assessed as an integral whole. In the end this thesis will attempt to provide
an overall theoretical evaluation of corporatism and look at the feasibility of this model in industrialized liberal states.
Chapter II  The Rise and Fall (and Rebirth) of Corporatism

Historical and Philosophical Origins

Corporatism, both in practice and in theory, has a long and at times even suspect history. The term corporatism has been plagued with controversy primarily because of conceptual ambiguity. It has been used by a diverse group of social and political thinkers and analysts in ways that are often contradictory inasmuch as they are derived from divergent ideological ends. Much of the ambiguity is caused by the fact that the word "corporatism" has been used at times to identify unconnected phenomena spanning centuries.

It may be more consistent to speak of corporatism in the plural to more adequately address its problematic conceptual diversity. If there are no links between the various instances that have been labelled corporatism, why is the same term used to denominate distinct philosophies/practices? The strongest link is probably etymological. Corporatism is derived from the word corpus signifying body in Latin. This presumes an organic conception whereby corporate sub-units function as vital organs for the body: separate but integral parts for the whole. For the corpus to function, there is a crucial need for institutionalized cooperation (as opposed to competition, or non-competitive but independent action) between the distinct, autonomous yet related sections (Winkler, 1976, 105). In most instances this conception is applied either to society or to the state at different levels of complexity. Hence the social and (or) the political realm are composed of typically functionally differentiated yet interrelated segments.
This organic understanding was first expressed in Catholic social thought: corporatism was the expression of the effective balance in the terrestrial realm of the different estates of society that were ordered both hierarchically and vertically according to function.\(^3\) In the Middle Ages, the social relations existing in the feudal mode of production between serfs and lords were upheld by the Church as a harmonious corporatist model of society where tasks were functionally delineated and hierarchically constructed.

The demise of feudalism and hence of the core of the material basis of a corporatist conception within its unique social fabric was caused by another historical phenomenon: the growth of an embryonic market economy and the urbanization of European society. Despite its apparent obsolescence, the old corporatist terminology was reformulated to identify a new social conjuncture. Corporations (also known as guilds) of craftsmen and women, manual labourers and merchants appeared in the emerging urban conglomerates of Europe, precursors to the modern cities. The initial purpose of corporations was one of an insurance policy or a safeguard against damages incurred to merchants' products and their property in general. However, with time corporations became equivalent to unions in certain cases, and to marketing boards in others. Furthermore, in these burgeoning social and economic centers, such a division of society was entrenched in what may be labelled the first charters of rights (Mundy and Riesenberg, 1967, 79). No longer were corporatist societal divisions determined by divine law, and the absolute rule of God and the feudal lord respectively. Rather, these documents gradually formalized in law a series of rights and obligations which were necessary for a consensual corporatist network to function.\(^4\)

Despite the awesome democratic advances, the social demands imploded and gave way to

\(^3\)For a thorough account of Christian corporatist philosophy see C.H.R. La Tour du Pin's *Vers un Ordre Social Chrétien* (1907).

\(^4\)While it is arguable to what degree such arrangements were consensual, there is little doubt that this began a process of medieval democratization. The prince's power was slowly contained by such charters, and even if the original beneficiaries were a small sector of society (e.g. the up-and-coming merchant bourgeoisie), such entitlements were gradually extended to less affluent or prominent segments of these urban communities.
the rise of absolutist nationalist régimes, hence terminating another chapter in the history of
corporatism.

From the late nineteenth century until the early twentieth, corporatist thought
experienced another revival. However, this time it was a secular rebirth triggered in large
part by the advent of industrialism. The rapid social and economic changes in Europe and
America caused much distress among certain intellectual circles. Marxism was one of the
theoretical forces to challenge the free-market, *laissez-faire*, industrial capitalism, yet it was
not alone. Certain theorists both of the aristocratic Right and the non-Marxist Left believed
there was a "third way" to the problems bedeviling industrial democracies: corporatist
representation. These theorists did not so much question the capitalist mode of production
but rather the liberal theory that underpinned it (Williamson, 1989, 26). They were quite
skeptical of majoritarian parliamentary democracy, and advocated the integration in the
political system of the two main productive forces of the newly-industrialized society.
They included everyone from French elitist, Auguste Murat, to British syndicalist, G.D.H.
Cole.5 These were the precursors to the modern theoretical understanding of the notion of
corporatism.

Around the same time, throughout Latin America corporatism in its more medieval
Christian incarnation was evoked to legitimize absolutist dictatorial *hacienda* régimes. Such
political systems were not only a throwback from the legacy of colonialism, but also
retained many of the rural feudalistic assumptions that characterized such archaic corporatist
relations in the past. The ubiquitous corporatism assumed an obvious authoritarian hue in
this historical context.

Although its ominous origins can be traced back to the Middle Ages and are
reflected in the Latin-American corporatist political culture, its most infamous manifestation
came with the European fascist régimes of the inter-war period (Schmitter, 1974, 86;

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5 For an assessment of G.D.H. Cole's work on modern corporatist democratic theory within a syndicalist
setting see Chapter III.
Grant, 1985, 5-6). This militaristic corporatism derived its moral foundation from Catholic social theory and fused it to the modern industrial conception of corporatism. The appeal of corporatism to this right-wing political force is two-fold. First, it provided both a pretext and a structure for an ardent patriotic nationalism. In other words, Christian corporatist thought assumed the natural unity of the social realm through cooperative differentiated social segmentation; hence, fascists could oppose dissent and opposition to policies of the régime via the corporatist national unity pretext. Secondly, rather than enlisting the genuine cooperation of business and labour, the state often created puppet peak organizations which would serve the ideological interests of the party. This was primarily the case with labour associations, as often underground labour movements formed to contest the authenticity not only of the co-optive arrangements, but as well of the overall political régime. Such structures served to create a false sense of legitimacy for the fascist parties that had typically come to power by usurping democratically elected governments. After the Second World War, few vestiges of the authoritarian brand of corporatism remained in effect.6

It was not until the 1960s that the resurgence of corporatism took place, the first manifestations being the growth in certain central and northern European nations of producer-interest associations representing labour, business, and agriculture and their integration in the political system. Historically, corporatism has been conceived as a means for the structural-institutional regulation of society. While its origins begin with retrograde religious feudal relations, it eventually becomes an avenue of change in the medieval communes. Theorists of the past century saw it as an alternative to the unfettered market allocation of resources and services. Latin American caudillos and European fascists interpreted the regulationist character of corporatism to serve their ideological and class purposes. Only in the latter part of the twentieth century can corporatism be conceived in

6The exceptions may be the dictatorial régimes of the Iberian peninsula which lasted until the advent of parliamentary democracy in the seventies. However, even in these cases, the authoritarian corporatism advanced was not very central to the political system of these countries. Certain authors have attempted to conceptualize a Communist State Corporatism. Some have utilized it to explain the Soviet system under Brezhnev, while others have done the same for Eastern Europe (Ost, 1989).
terms of a democratic system, even if certain pre-conditions must exist in each case to support such a contestable claim. It is this particular form of corporatism and its present development that shapes the normative parameters of this thesis.

Defining Neocorporatism

Even in its latter twentieth-century form, what is typically called neocorporatism has myriad definitions. Nevertheless, it is useful to adopt a certain "ideal type of neocorporatism", to construct a working definition of corporatism with which to examine its modern conceptual development.

Theoretically, the use of corporatism in its early modern sociological understanding can be traced to theorists such as Comte and Durkheim (Hearn, 1985) (especially in terms of the context of the normative social appeal of corporatism). However, one of the most in-depth conceptual analyses of corporatism (and one of the least known) is Romanian scholar Mihail Manoilescu's *Le siècle du Corporatisme*, published in 1934. Manoilescu utilized the concept of corporatism primarily as what is today known as state or authoritarian corporatism (equated with dictatorial régimes). While this may appear incompatible with democratic corporatist structures and procedures, he laid the groundwork for future theorization pertinent to modern capitalist democracies. His theory will not be examined in detail because that which is relevant has already been appropriated by more recent corporatist theories. Little was written on corporatism following this until the 1970s.

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7 This is especially the case with Marxist critiques of corporatism that see it as a further stage of capitalism, and where labour's interest articulation is either coopted or severely compromised. For further discussion see the literature review section.

8 The term *corporatism*, rather than *neocorporatism*, will be used throughout this paper to designate the present form it assumes. It is historically incorrect to speak of these recent political arrangements as "neo." Indeed, it would be just as valid to refer to them as post-corporatism, or proto-corporatism or devising some other linguistically absurd prefix combination. Why bother even keeping the root, corporatism? There are several other appellations such as "tripartism", "social partnership", "codetermination", "corporate liberalism", "concertation", however these are equally if not more constricting and even less common in usage. Corporatism will be kept for now; it will only be in the construction of a normative democratic framework that a more theoretically sensitive replacement will be proposed.

9 For an assessment of the justification for corporatism provided in Durkheim's sociology see Chapter III.
with the long lull being attributed to the disrepute the concept had fallen into through its association with fascism (Schmitter, 1974, 85).

While there is evidence of the study of modern-day corporatism prior to this, the academic regeneration of corporatism in the 1970s can be attributed almost single-handedly to Philippe Schmitter with his article "Still the Century of Corporatism?" (1974). This is a response to Manoilescu's contention that while the nineteenth century was dubbed "the century of liberalism", the twentieth must be pronounced "the century of corporatism." Schmitter inquires into the recent phenomenon of corporatist structures in Western European parliamentary democracies, and attempts to theorize these developments using Manoilescu as a point of departure. Schmitter's piece triggered a considerable amount of new work in this field. Much of the literature was driven by the concern that pluralist democracies were not capable of overcoming the "governability crisis" and of alleviating socio-economic tensions. Questions such as those of political overload from societal demands on the state figured quite prominently in empirical theory as did others tied to this conjuncture. Hence corporatism arose as a direct challenge to the pluralist theorization of the voluntary group-based articulation of interests to the state in liberal capitalist societies. Corporatism was conceptualized, both empirically and normatively, as a superior means of mitigating the interest-articulation generated contradictions of capitalism and democracy (Cawson, 1986, 26; Anderson, 1977, 140).

It is useful to begin with Schmitter's original definition of neo-corporatism as a base from which additions or adjustments can be made in a revised typology:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. (Schmitter, 1974, 91)
Schmitter emphasizes the aspect of corporatism which concerns "interest representation". While this may seem at first glance to provide for a participatory model of corporatism, representation in the "representational monopoly" is lacking in substantive significance. Indeed, in a subsequent revision of his ideal type model, Schmitter replaces "interest representation" with "interest intermediation" (Schmitter, 1979, 65). His mode of interest intermediation provides for a "buffer" between society and the state, rather than establishing a substantive link between the two sectors. Furthermore, Schmitter's definition posits corporatism primarily as a static structure. It is primarily a description of the interest aggregation within such intermediate social spaces. There is reference to the "constituent units", its articulated composition ("singular, compulsory, non-competitive... categories...") , and its status ("recognized or licensed by... the state..."). With respect to its function, all that is stipulated is the "representational monopoly" of the corporatist association without reference to any power or jurisdiction. Moreover they are conceptualized with built-in internal imperatives of membership "control" and other measures of internal governance.

This definition, as Schmitter identifies further in his analysis, involves interest intermediation between two or more groups with potentially conflicting agendas on the same issue. The most common example of this is negotiations between labour and management on socio-economic policy (primarily incomes policy). There is no set form assumed by these concertational arrangements. At times the state is involved as a mediator, while at times it is a third party altogether with its distinct position to negotiate (often labelled tripartism).

A major critique of Schmitter's definition is his unwillingness to elevate these arrangements to full decision-making structures. One of the first critics was Gerhard Lehmbruch. In Lehmbruch's revised conceptualization of corporatism, Corporatism is more than a peculiar pattern of articulation of interests. Rather, it is an institutionalized pattern of policy-formation in which large interest organizations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in
the articulation (or even "intermediation") of interests, but — in its developed forms — in the "authoritative allocation of values" and in the implementation of such policies. It is precisely because of the intimate mutual penetration of state bureaucracies and large interest organizations that the traditional concept of "interest representation" becomes quite inappropriate for a theoretical understanding of corporatism. (Lehmbruch, 1979, 150)

Corporatism in its ideal type can be seen essentially as a form of representation within policy making circles since it guarantees the association not only a de facto vote on policy related to its interest field, but also the exclusive privilege of full participation in the debate on formulation and implementation of policy. Hence a liberal parliamentary policy-making structure is what corporatism replaces, or more appropriately complements. Lehmbruch's definition is no longer static as it provides for a reasonably delineated function in the debate and establishment of policy options. However, while he rehabilitates one of the major contentious elements of Schmitter's original notion, he relegates the issue of intermediation as secondary to the essence of corporatism.

The problem of whether to conceptualize corporatism as a form of policy making as opposed to interest intermediation was quite central in the early literature. To adequately define corporatism, neither of these two aspects must be overlooked or overemphasized. Corporatism must be seen as a combination of modes of interest intermediation and policy formulation. According to Alan Cawson, "[w]hat makes corporatism distinctive is the fusion of representation and intervention in the relationship between groups and the state" (Cawson, 1986, 39). Corporatism rejects a priori a zero-sum equation involving opposite factions in the interactive process (i.e: the interests of labour do not have to be antithetical to those of management and vice versa in the long run) (Cawson, 1986, 23). Hence, for policy formation to be feasible, a necessary first step is concerted intermediation, through state recognition of each group, and the acceptance of long term compromise to the benefit of most parties represented.

10 For a theoretical description of the logic behind cooperative efforts and positive-sum outcomes refer to Chapter III.
Because corporatism should not only be regarded as a form of interest intermediation, but as a public policy-formation process as well, the organizations involved must implement and enforce the decisions upon which they have agreed. This responsibility ensures that each respective group that holds a monopoly on representation in a specific policy-field will not renege on their obligations in accords. While there is strong pressure among the various groups to implement the policies they have collectively formulated, the system can nevertheless collapse.\footnote{There have been cases where tensions may have been exacerbated after the collapse of corporatist negotiations because of increased comparative expectations.} If all goes as expected, the state relieves itself of an additional administrative burden. The corporatist state should be classified only as indirectly interventionist (with respect to public policy in corporatized policy areas) as its responsibilities in the corporatist framework are limited to facilitating group-formation, intermediation of negotiations, and monitoring the outcomes (Grant, 1983, 8).

As Schmitter stipulates in his definition, interest representation must be amalgamated into "umbrella" groups (whether at the meso or macro-corporatist levels) to facilitate both processes of negotiations and implementation of decisions. From the perspective of a defensible democratic theory, the definition must be altered to remove the possibility of the state actually creating the interest organization in the absence of one. Interest association must emanate from below.\footnote{This adaptation tends toward the pluralist end of the conceptual spectrum according to Schmitter, nevertheless the facilitation of group formation would definitely reposition this definition in the corporatist field.} Their emergence may be facilitated via incentives and organizational aid to encourage collective interest constituencies that face daunting obstacles of aggregation (such as consumer associations). Nevertheless, that should remain the extent of state intervention. This adaptation is necessary because the norm in authoritarian state corporatist régimes was to "create" the participating interest associations. Government creation of recognized groups ensured the cooptation of official
interests. Interest organizations created autonomously within civil society are granted privileged monopoly status by the state (due to their strength, following, social imperative or other criteria), in exchange for the organization's institutional support of the system (Ost, 1989, 160).

Another influential definition of corporatism came from Jack Winkler two years after Schmitter's preliminary analysis. He viewed corporatism essentially as an economic system distinct from capitalism and socialism (Winkler, 1976, 103). There are two faults with this definition. First, it reduces corporatism to the realm of the economic when, as it has been argued, it is above all a concept which deals with political intermediation and decision-making. While economic policies are the most salient in such arrangements, they are not the exclusive focus. Corporatism is primarily a political tool, whether serving economic ends or not. Secondly, Winkler raises it to a metatheoretical level, characterizing corporatism as a global systems alternative to the other two major modes of production. The ideal type postulated for the thesis will maintain corporatism's compatibility and complementarity with a modern capitalist political economy.

Corporatism must not be considered a unique political system unto itself, either different from, or equal in status to, other régimes such as democracy or authoritarianism. Social corporatism should be conceived as a subsystem completely compatible with, and complementary to the larger system, in this case capitalist democracies (Lehmbruch, 1983, 153). As mentioned above, corporatism arose as a theoretical and practical alternative to pluralism at a subsystemic level. The framework employed here will incorporate Alan Cawson's thesis of dualism which rejects the exclusive character of corporatism. Dualism enables certain sectors of group interest to be contained within a corporatist arrangement, while other sectors or associations participate in a pluralist scheme of interest intermediation (Cawson, 1986, 139). A certain amount of competition between non-corporatized interest

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13 This, however, did not eliminate a more authentic yet unofficial spokesgroup for a certain interest. Nevertheless, these groups were often driven underground and their activities rarely went beyond the clandestine. This was particularly the case with rival labour organizations in Southern Europe.
groups is, in any case, necessary to ensure democratic challenges to the status quo. It also allows for the same interest area to be involved in corporatist and pluralist modes of interest advancement at different times or even simultaneously. 14

It is difficult to create an ideal type that accommodates corporatist experiences in all countries, all policy sectors, and levels of interest aggregation. Schmitter's initial ideal type may have provided a useful base, but it no longer suffices; (Schmitter has adapted it throughout more than twenty years). The changes proposed above offer a more useful ideal type. Nevertheless, the historical development of corporatism demonstrates that one must assess national and cultural contexts prior to making cross-national comparisons.

**Extent of Neocorporatist Literature**

Research on corporatism has been substantial since Schmitter's 1974 article. Schmitter pursued his work in this field independently, or with others such as Wolfgang Streeck and Gerhard Lehmbruch. As more and more political analysts grew interested in this emerging field, it was labelled "a growth industry" by one of its prominent critics, Leo Panitch (Panitch, 1980).

The earlier literature documents negotiations between labour, business, and the state on socio-economic policy which began in the 1960s in Europe (Schmitter, 1974; 1982; Anderson, 1977; Nedelman and Meier, 1977; Winkler, 1976; Lehmbruch, 1979; 1983; Jessop, 1978, 1979; Panitch, 1980). The initial literature was driven by a need to identify these new procedures, and understand where they were to be located in the political system. Should they be seen as a challenge to pluralism as a particular but not vital element of modern democracies? Or did they challenge democracy *tout court*? Should it be conceived as a subsystemic variant in policy-making procedure, or should it be classified as an altogether independent social order (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985)?

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14This can be extremely problematic, with the potential to undermine and destroy corporatist negotiations, since it allows for a potential shift in the balance of influence of each group.
While there was no universal consensus on how to approach the corporatist phenomenon, most analysts adopted Schmitter's definition in its many transformations throughout time. Others used his definition as a basis for their own re-conceptualization (Lehmbruch, 1979; Crouch, 1983; Cawson, 1986). Corporatism is generally considered to compete against the explanatory model of pluralist interest group lobbying in certain limited sectors of policy (i.e.: economic/social). Different views as to the relation of corporatism to pluralism emerged. Schmitter conceptualized corporatism as a replacement to pluralist interest intermediation (Schmitter, 1979). Crouch, on the other hand, placed corporatism and pluralism at two ends of a continuum (Crouch, 1983). Gradually a loose consensus grew that this phenomenon was not a new régime type, and is completely compatible with modern democracies, if not co-existing along parallel forms of interest group pluralism (Cawson, 1986).

Once the conceptual debate had lost its initial momentum, subsequent research focussed on sketching the institutional relationships between interest associations and parliamentary government, and identifying policy outcomes as a consequence of these new processes. The new research took the form of sectoral studies of corporatist policy-making (Helander, 1982). This was followed by individual country studies (Kriesi, 1982; Johansen and Kristensen, 1982; Traxler, 1985). The study of comparative corporatism was not a very popular area of research (Katzenstein, 1984) since the national variations in corporatist arrangements, the differences in terms of the participant organizations, and the variance of breadth and depth of participation were too great to generalize in most instances. This can be illustrated by the discrepancy in the degree of corporatization per country found in different empirical typologies (See table 5.2 in Cawson, 1986, 99).

Critics of corporatism came from all sides of the political spectrum. Adherents of both pluralist politics and Marxist theory attempted to discredit the challenge posed by corporatist productivity and social peace (Therborn, 1988) by arguing there was no significant difference in economic figures between predominantly pluralist states and
corporatist states. Marxist analysts questioned whether corporatism should be conceptualized as the end of class conflict (as certain champions of corporatism originally postulated), or as a development in advanced capitalism where class compromise was articulated as the "selling-out" of workers to the owners of the means of production (Jessop, 1978; Panitch, 1980). Others have attempted to show the distinctive patterns of influence manifested by business and labour in corporatist processes, rejecting the pluralist characterization of interest group/state relations without taking the traditional Marxist ideological hard-line (Offe, 1985a). The Marxists were also at the center of another related debate which concerned the locus of corporatism. The debate persisted between those who adopted a class-theoretical approach (the Marxists: Jessop, Therborn, and Panitch; along with non-Marxists such as Winkler, Cawson, and Coleman) and those who proposed a more flexible group-theoretical orientation. Among the latter was Schmitter, who used a class-based explanation to account for the development of corporatism while not making it central to his definition of corporatism (Schmitter, 1979).

Much of the literature on corporatism takes an excessively economistic orientation (Therborn, 1988; Grant, 1985; Katzenstein, 1984). However, specialists on corporatism in the Scandinavian countries were increasingly drawn to questions of interest articulation and representation within these now-institutionalized structures (Rokkan, 1966; Christensen and Egeberg, 1979; Offe, 1981; Olsen, 1983; Pestoff, 1983; Micheletti, 1990; Rothstein, 1990). Most of their analyses adopt a group-theoretical approach rather than the more prevalent one that focuses on industrial-interest tripartite structures. These studies are typically imbued with concerns that go beyond those of social stability and the question of welfare redistribution. From the very beginning (Ruin, 1974) corporatism was viewed in Scandinavia as an extended form of governance whereby the private and the public realms increasingly became interrelated, and boundaries more difficult to draw.

15This is a major issue which is essential to the feasibility of corporatism for democratic theory. For an assessment on the debate of whether corporatism matters in a political economy refer to Chapter IV.
Most of the Nordic countries experimented with corporatist decision-making beyond the traditional economic producer model involving employers and the workforce. Their broader meaning or more flexible system of corporatism included limited consultative and administrative functions of interest group participation. It allowed other social groups to extend these limited responsibilities to more effective roles in policy making. These arrangements included the remiss and committee systems of roundtable negotiations, along with other regulatory agencies' arrangements for mediation (Heisler, 1974; Kvavik, 1974). This channel of policy-making is comprised of a series of boards and committees which deal with specific issue areas and incorporates an array of participants ranging from politicians and civil servants, to representatives of interest organizations. There exists a clear division of labour among the committees. Some function for policy proposals, the most important committees determine policy, and the rest are concerned with policy application. The remiss network of policy serves as a last measure in the policy process. After policy has been developed, it proceeds to interest organizations which are directly related to the issue-area in question. The representatives of the participating organizations then submit their approval or revisions to the policy (Christensen and Egeberg, 1979, 252). Accessibility was conferred to groups with everything from environmental preoccupations, educational concerns, consumer qualms, cultural demands, to native claims (Christensen and Egeberg, 1979; Olsen, 1981). This wider network of corporatist intermediation broadened how comparativists conceptualized corporatism. The Scandinavian experiments pushed the issue of functional and political interest representation to the center of corporatist theory.

Other approaches that diverge from the political economy of corporatism (or the economistic orientation) also include a more theoretical analysis of the democratic political dynamics of corporatism. However, English language literature in this field is scant. The pursuit of a normative democratic theory of corporatism would not have been possible
without the Scandinavian empirical studies. A critical assessment of the scant literature on corporatism and democracy will be presented in the following chapter.

Most of the current material on corporatism takes an emphatically skeptical if not altogether fatalistic line on the merits and viability of these structures and procedures. Much of the recent literature is imbued with an "end to corporatism" line (Schmitter, 1989; Erikson, 1990; Rothstein, 1991) if not proclaiming its outright failure (Therborn, 1988). In part, this loss of prestige can be attributed to a poststructuralist analysis, and to the apparent incapability of neo-corporatism to respond to the claims of New Social Movements (Sainsbury, 1988; Wilson, 1990; Micheletti, 1990; 1992). These reservations primarily concern the fixed and rigid character of corporatist participation, and the exclusivity of group entrance into the system. They will be addressed in a normative democratic model in which a more flexible and expanded corporatism will be sought.

While research in corporatism has not ceased, it seems to have assumed a more skeptical emphasis. For those who still hold to the promise of corporatism, namely Schmitter, the almost desperate tone in their work calls for progressive transformation (Schmitter, 1988; 1990, 1991).

**Corporatism and the Policy Communities**

Conceptual and comparative corporatist theory has not had the exclusive rights on the study of institutional interest group governance. Another separate (but related) field of literature that has offered some insights on its structure and dynamics is organization theory which extends from business administration, to psychology, to sociology. With the decline of corporatist theory, and the discrediting of pluralist theory, there was a demand for a different conceptualization of how interest groups functioned in society and related to the state. This niche is being filled by the policy communities literature which has sprung from pluralist analysis. This literature will help clarify some conceptual ambiguities that still haunt students of corporatism.
One of the areas of corporatist theory that had considerable shortcomings concerns the format and the actors in negotiations. Did corporatism designate tripartism exclusively? Much of the literature generalized the arrangements as to state-business-labour negotiations. However, as indicated earlier, there is ambiguity as to whether the state played the role of interlocutor, or whether it was an independent party to the negotiations. Furthermore, what of negotiations without one of the producer groups (Pempel and Tsunekawa, 1979)? Can agricultural marketing boards be considered participants in corporatist processes? Can groups which serve a purely consultative function be lumped under this definition? This is what the policy community literature intends to redress, by disentangling the various configurations of interest association relations with the state.

The policy community school is really a disparate set of analyses with diverging foci and at times conceptual contradictions. Most of the literature is predicated on the idea that the state is a relatively autonomous actor which can be influenced by other social groups with an interest in certain policy areas. Their most substantial contribution has to do with the introduction of the concepts, "policy communities" and "policy networks". A problem encountered by analysts attempting to operationalize these terms is the lack of agreement as to their accurate meaning. According to Atkinson and Coleman (1992) a policy community refers to "a commonly understood belief system; code of conduct, established pattern of behaviour..." (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992, 158). However, Wilks and Wright define it as the group of actors which have a common interest in a policy area along with a similar policy focus. A policy network, on the other hand, is the interaction of actors within a policy community (Wilks and Wright, 1990, 299). Policy network for Wilks and Wright seems similar to policy community according to Atkinson and Coleman. The Wilks and Wright's definition has gained the upper hand in terms of widespread usage, but related concepts have yet to be fully developed. Wilks and Wright recognize that the so-called "rules of the game" in the policy network have yet to be conceptualized as cross-
national and cross-sectoral comparisons have proven problematic (Wilks and Wright, 1990, 305).

While the policy community literature arose in part as a challenge to the corporatist model of explaining interest group/state relations, it does not necessarily invalidate it. The policy community literature has introduced a more sensitive conceptual language of use to comparative corporatism, especially where different policy-areas are discussed, outside of the conventional tripartite structures. The more participants and issues included into the policy process through integrated institutionalization, the greater the need for a more accurate nomenclature.

**Conclusion**

The theory and the practice of corporatism has experienced a rich, diverse, and turbulent history. The main thread of continuity over time has been a vague organic conception of society divided into corporate sub-units. The relevance of this term has to do with its incarnation as a form of collective interest policy making that became entrenched in Europe over the past few decades. Much of the modern corporatist literature has struggled with its conceptualization.

In this chapter, a working ideal type has been identified using the contributions of Schmitter, Lehbruch, Cawson and others. Some of these will provide illustrations into the logic and the dynamics of corporatism in relation to democratic theory, despite the fact that few have established this link. To complement the corporatist body of literature, policy theory provides insights into the internal processes in the represented groups and their interaction with other groups and the state. The terminology utilized by the policy communities school supplements the conceptual flexibility of corporatist theory. This theoretical amalgam can serve as the basis upon which to construct a democratic theory of corporatism.
Corporatist research has primarily focussed on questions concerning political economy, industrial relations, or other structural-institutional issues in national or sectoral case studies. What has been for the most part ignored is the development of the democratic theory of corporatism. Questions central to such a theory would include how corporatism fits into a democratic system, understanding the democratic processes existing in corporatist structures and its organizational components, the allocation of representative status to existing organized interests, and the process of tripartite or multipartite (inter-associational and governmental) policy development.

To assess the relevance of this literature to the thesis it is important to begin by examining the context in which this gap is situated. This context includes an understanding of the normative concept of democracy, an inquiry into the notion of representation, identification of deficiencies in pluralist theory, and consideration of how previous pseudo-corporatist options offer a basis for a normative corporatist democratic theory.

The foundations for a corporatist theory which will be examined are those of Emile Durkheim and G.D.H. Cole. These will provide a contrast with the limited post-war discussions of the normative implications of corporatism for democratic systems of governance. The recent literature is unfinished, poses more questions than it elucidates, and at times seems overwhelmingly driven by the logic of instrumentality. The final section of the chapter will examine certain issues of social theory which will provide a partial explanation for the inadequacies of the modern literature on corporatist democratic theory.
These deficiencies are based on more general shortcomings of existing corporatist arrangements in particular, and present political systems in general. By re-examining the nature of social rationality, citizenship and the concept of political community within a corporatist context, a new direction can be set for the elaboration of a normative democratic theory of corporatism.

The Dearth of Literature on Corporatist Democratic Theory

The paucity of research in these areas can partially be explained by the fact that corporatism's recent historical application is anything but democratic (Panitch, 1979, 120). It did not seem logical to use traditionally authoritarian models to devise democratically enhanced systems of governance. By the time neocorporatism gained widespread recognition as legitimately distinct from its antecedent, another obstacle arose. In the countries that had conducted experiments in corporatist policy-making, recessionary cycles were not being overcome, and social and economic tensions were on the rise. Corporatism's efficacy as a mode of political management of the economy was now being put into question. The stability and efficiency that were once synonymous with corporatist countries was breaking down and the corporatist links loosened. So why bother assessing the democratic worth of something that is apparently in decline? The "century of corporatism" was, after all, soon coming to a close.

Other factors hindering the development of a corporatist theory of democracy include the overwhelming acceptance of the pluralist status-quo among non-Marxist political theorists (Schmitter, 1983, 886). Many democratic theorists were content with the way interest group politics functioned in a territorially based majoritarian democracy. Critics of the pluralist paradigm were most often Marxists with little tolerance for "class-compromise corporatism" as an alternative to pluralist capitalism.

The meagre output of corporatist democratic theory came from those working within the field of corporatism itself. Once more, Schmitter's influence is pivotal, perhaps
not so much with initiating this discussion, but certainly with advancing it, if not keeping it alive altogether. In "Democratic Theory and Neocorporatist Practice" he sets out to examine the impact that neocorporatist arrangements have had in the practice of democracy, and to propose how they could be adjusted so as to accommodate them to the "enduring principles of democracy." (Schmitter, 1983, 887). Schmitter's more recent work demonstrates his commitment to the democratic theory of corporatism as well as his anxiety over its decline (Schmitter, 1988, 1989, 1990). This is best illustrated by his 1988 draft article with the quirky title, "Corporative Democracy: Oxymoronic? Just Plain Moronic? Or a Promising Way Out of the Present Impasse?"

Prior to Schmitter's work on democratic theory and neocorporatism, a key piece appeared in 1977 by Charles Anderson. His article, "Political Design and the Representation of Interests," set the stage for a re-evaluation of interest group politics, contrasting the pluralist model to the emerging neo-corporatist paradigm. Anderson's main priority was to establish a legitimate link between democratic theory and corporatist arrangements. His work was followed by Alan Cawson's attempt to incorporate functional representation in democratic politics (1983), followed by his influential Corporatism and Political Theory (1986), where he provides a more comprehensive analysis. Corporatism is taken up at a very general level in overviews of democratic political theory (Held, 1987; Hirst, 1990) and other works on corporatism in select countries (Coleman, 1988). It appears as though corporatism has been deemed inadequate for democratic theory. The intent of this thesis is to prove otherwise.

Much of the problem with attempts to fuse democratic corporatist relations with a pluralist parliamentary context is the refusal by such analysts to accept any substantial erosions on the latter to enhance the democratic potential of the former. For any democratic paradigm to succeed, there must be a coming to terms with the inadequacies of the status quo, and a flexibility within the existing system that will allow for alternatives to fit into a
future democratic project. However, before proposing such an abstract system; a viable notion of corporatism must be grounded in a pragmatic understanding of democracy.

**Representative Democracy:**

**Liberal and Corporate**

**Democracy: The Viability of a Concept for Corporatism**

Establishing the democratic validity of corporatism begins with several basic questions. Firstly, is corporatism compatible with the present modern liberal democracies based on a territorial majoritarian competitive electoral system? Secondly and more essentially, can corporatism be conceptualized as a system of democratic governance?

In defining democracy does one use the modern liberal definition? Is one constrained by the narrow interpretation given by pluralist theorists? What of the Marxist, anarchist or libertarian variants? It is obvious that certain constraints would automatically eliminate the validity of certain variants. The existence of a state eliminates the anarchist perspective, and the fact that one is dealing with capitalist economies would practically invalidate the Marxist option. This does not constrain a viable alternative to the traditional liberal line. Indeed, according to democratic theorist Giovanni Sartori,

"... political systems pose a problem of choice; that choice presupposes comparison between better and worse (not between good and true or between bad and false in the absolute sense); and that relativity of values calls precisely for their relative (comparative) weighing. Hence it is perfectly possible to warrant preferences. Political choices do allow a rational argument, and political alternatives are—even when value related and value hinged—subject to warranted advisability. (Sartori, 1987, 274-5)"

While he is referring specifically to political choices, choice must also be fundamentally applied to policy processes. A corporatist model of democracy must be considered a legitimate option if it satisfies certain criteria of democratic performance.
Most theorists trace the development of democracy to the Greek city states of the fifth century B.C. This pre-modern conception of democracy whereby all citizens were involved directly in a highly participatory form of governance cannot easily be applied to the modern era. It was based on a notion of citizenship highly distinct from that known to us now. Only male citizens (a privileged minority within a minority) could participate. The citizen typically had the option to participate in politics due to his slaves' (or non-citizens') labour. The citizen had to abide by the will of the collectivity whose expression was found in the *polis*, and incarnated in the notion of civic republicanism. Because there existed no notion of individual rights, if the citizen was in disagreement with the *polis*, he could easily be legally stripped of his citizenship, ostracized and even persecuted at the whim of the collective (Sartori, 1987, 285).

The concept of democracy did not arise again until the dawn of the liberal age (with certain ambiguous exceptions). Its philosophy was quite distinct from that of the Greek system. No longer was the *polis* supreme; the state only acquired its legitimacy through recognizing the inherent political equality of citizens and more importantly the freedom of the individual. These rights were only formal in nature, and often still serve to mask discriminatory practices based on gender, race, class and other ascriptive characteristics. According to Schmitter and Karl, citizens are unique to democracies since citizenship is the criteria for inclusion in the state (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, 7). All citizens are granted the "legal entitlement... to participate in the determination of the policies to be executed by the state in its capacity as sovereign legal subject" (Jessop, 1978, 13).

It is this "legal entitlement to participate" which becomes the subject of debate. Because democracy is a system of governance it automatically involves a structure with delineated procedures. What form will this structure and its underlying procedures take? One option is direct democracy as in the Greek city states. The arguments opposing such a form of governance are well known. According to Sartori, individual direct participation in government is fine for what he labels microdemocracies (small scale bodies to be
governed), but quite unfeasible for the macrodemocracies with which we are concerned (Sartori, 1987, 234). Hence if direct democracy does not qualify in the quest for a working definition, representative democracy is the only remaining viable alternative.

The Concept of Representation
Since there is no one procedure to attain democracy via representation, it is necessary to establish some parameters for determining who or what is represented and how they are to be represented. The concept of representation demands then two levels of analysis. Representation can be conceived according to the type of constituency (i.e.: territorial, economic, demographic, cultural, functional...), or according to the relationship between the constituents and the representative (i.e.: delegate, trustee, mandate...), often termed the role definition (Johnston, 1985, 108). Both are fundamental to an analysis of representation. It is convenient to look at the most common form of representation first: liberal representation according to pluralist theory. This will be followed by consideration of alternate corporate forms of representation. Prior to examining liberal and corporate representation, it is necessary to see how the concept of representation pertains to democratic politics.

Examination of the two analytical types of representation is fundamental to an understanding of any democratic theory. The notion of representation did not emerge politically either in practice or in theory until the Middle Ages. In political theory a general pattern of polarization can be found with respect to the conceptualization of representation. The two interpretations are commonly labelled the independent "trustee representative" and the "mandate representative." The former can be attributed to Burke, who believed that interests were not linked specifically to individuals, and that representatives had the responsibility and the prerogative to act according to what they saw as the constituents' "best" interest, regardless of articulated interests. The mandate representation on the other hand can be traced to John Stuart Mill. This particular role definition is founded on the
notion that a representative has the duty to actively consult the constituency and reflect the interests faithfully according to each issue of import. This form affirms the involvement of the populace in politics to the degree that a representational procedure permits (Pitkin, 1969, 13). Hence the trustee and mandate models are at two extremes of the democratic participatory spectrum.

A more common type in Western political systems involves a constituency voting for the representative according to their political (independent or party) platform. There is an implied recognition that the mandate representative adequately reflects the views of the represented, however this is not out of any explicit design. It is the responsibility of the electors to match their general political orientation with one of the available options on the ballot. This role definition will be labelled "platform representative" for lack of a better term. A fourth, less prevalent variant of representation binds the representative to a set of instructions derived at the outset of election from the electors. This is often termed delegate representation (Cole, 1920b, 110), and forbids the "delegate" autonomy when the need for compromise arises.

While these are ideal types and therefore do not describe real scenarios, there are, however, discernible tendencies among representatives (albeit these are not a fortiori determined according to the political system). Nevertheless, many liberal democratic systems tend to produce platform or even trustee type representatives. Corporatist representation is compatible with both types of representation. Nevertheless, according to Paul Hirst,

In fact the critique of 'representation' proves one thing, that there is no 'true' form of representation of the interests of the represented. All schemes

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16 In modern popular political parlance this notion of representation would most likely be identified with a political mandate. A mandate is usually granted to a political legislator or party by citizens who consciously opt for the political representative they feel is most apt to satisfy their individual or collective objectives. However, the use of the term mandate representative is most common in political theory as defined by John Stuart Mill. Because of a lack of an academic conceptual consensus on the role definitions of representation, the original concept of mandate representative will remain intact, and the one described herein will be referred to as platform representative.
of representation involve some element of substitution, and all such schemes have distinct political effects. (Hirst, 1990, 12)

Forms of representation can still be deemed more desirable according to specific criteria. The mandate and the delegate types of representation correspond to criteria appropriate to normatively enhanced democracy. What is essential to recognize is the implicit link between democratic participation and representation. While the purpose of representation is to supplant unfettered direct individual political engagement, participatory democracy and representative democracy are not incompatible (Pateman, 1970, 109). Liberal democracy has tended to shun the participatory element in political representation, while corporatist representation carries the possibility of reinvesting representation with participation.

Pluralism and Liberal Representation
It is the legacy of liberalism that has determined the course of the democratic systems of governance in the industrialized world. Liberalism heralded the primacy of the individual. Since direct participation has been deemed unworkable, individuals delegate their sovereignty to a representative. The function of a representative in liberalism is to aggregate the wills of individuals. To obtain this aggregation, a competition among factions takes place in periodic elections. There are various procedures to tabulate and translate votes into representatives (the merits of one over the other are not of major import to this paper)17. In many countries the procedure for aggregating individual interests

17It is important to note, however, that almost all countries which are considered highly corporatized have a proportional representation electoral system for their legislative assemblies. This seems a more adequate form of translating individual representation than the first-past-the-post mechanism which delivers majorities to a party that has obtained no more than a simple plurality of the vote on most occasions. The more accurate individual representation is obtained through P.R., the more a collective form of representation provided by corporatist structures seems more relevant and complementary. Nevertheless, this is not the reason why such a linkage between the P.R. system and corporatism came to be, even if it is not coincidental. The causality can most likely be explained through the development of a political culture of cooperation caused by the need for coalition building in an electoral system which does not frequently produce majority governments, and the advantage given to labour parties in this system and their platforms for a co-operative social-democracy.
grants more or less equal number of individuals in a territorial unit one representative. The only explicitly shared value among the designated aggregation of individuals is geography. While geographical proximity in the case of a riding may be one valid criterion for representation, electoral maps rarely reflect social communities. In many upper chambers or senates, a fixed politico-geographical subdivision (such as a province or a state) determines the criteria for representation (not even the number of citizens per constituent unit!). The rationale behind this latter form of representation is that individuals particular to specific geo-political subdivisions manifest distinct social or cultural needs which can only be satisfactorily addressed via this alternative representational procedure. Therefore, the unit of representation departs from the individual (aggregated by geography nevertheless) and becomes explicitly geographical.

So far the discussion has been limited to official institutional procedures. But representation in a liberal democracy is not limited to elections and parties. Competition among factions takes place in the civil society among interest groups, voluntary amalgamations of individuals with a specific common interest. The groups mobilize support among citizen voters, and more commonly lobby elected officials and bureaucrats. They attempt to persuade voters to favor certain parties or certain policies, while concentrating most of their efforts directly where the power is wielded, by pressuring politicians and government officials to introduce, modify, or kill certain pieces of legislation or regulation. Hence, "civil society provides an intermediate layer of governance between the individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts and controlling the behavior of members without public coercion" (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, 80). This is the main thrust of the pluralist paradigm, as advocated by most democratic theorists and to which most modern definitions of democracy are connected.

Territorially-based electoral systems do not adequately reflect individual interests since they subsumes individuals to geography. Much of the justification for a corporatist
democratic practice\(^{18}\) is that there are certain "individual" interests which are shared due to certain common traits among a \textit{de facto} "collectivity of individuals". Individual interests are not all distinct and unique. The pluralist paradigm already implicitly recognizes that individual interests are aggregated territorially (via a constituency or federal senate), and functionally (through competing pressure groups). Hence, a territorial collectivity and a functional interest collectivity is tolerated under the guise of the reducibility of all complex units to individual wills (Alford and Friedland, 1988, 88).

This lack of emphasis on political community and collective entitlements has been a concern of many political theorists. While pluralists contend that parties provide for the efficient collective unification of wills at the institutional level, their argument has been exhaustively refuted. Elections do not reflect particular policy preferences of voters, but rather only a general tendency. These interests are lost in the "promised package" of the specific party through platform representation. Moreover, minority interests tend to be overruled by the privileged majorities produced by the party and electoral systems.\(^{19}\) In any case, parties are no longer the primary intermediaries between citizens and the government (Schmitter, 1983, 916; Olsen, 1983, 32).

Pluralism assumes the existence of two political spheres: the electoral market place, the domain of parties; and the private political market place, the arena of pressure groups. The public realm is also responsible for the intermediation of the demands from pressure groups. This naively assumes the neutrality of the state in the face of antagonistic pressures (Cawson, 1986). If the government mandate is favored by the majority or the plurality that elected them, then how can the state-cum-government satisfy the role of neutral arbiter when they are bound to their mandate? While it can be assumed that the government was

\(^{18}\)It must be kept in mind here that corporatism is never conceptualized as a replacement to electoral democracy, rather as a supplementary and equally valid sub-system. This is discussed in Chapter II.

\(^{19}\)Pluralist theorists assert that minority-group interests are guaranteed constitutionally through the entrenchment of minority protections within a bill or charter of rights. This is not always the case; however, let it be assumed that it is a normative ideal among pluralists. What they do not recognize is that there is a substantive difference between the protection from discrimination and the advancement of minority group demands; the latter are precarious in a majoritarian system.
elected on the basis of a neutral procedure, and that the implementation of policy is overseen by a *de jure* neutral civil service, it is difficult to maintain that the political party in office can act in a non-partisan fashion *vis-à-vis* all of the interests of society.

Pluralist democratic theory also contends that political equality (of opportunity) exists in both private and public spheres, and that demands are regulated through invisible mechanisms of social interaction. Interest groups compete for political resources such as finances, information and members. While economic inequalities are acknowledged, their impact is minimized. In Robert Dahl's early work, an unequal distribution of political resources is claimed to be not cumulative; and counterbalancing forces tend to emerge which mitigate against the influence of oligarchical interests (Dahl, 1965; 1956). This would ensure that representational equality in the private sphere of interest groups is not undermined in the long-term.

Can competing pressure groups affect this interest amalgamation democratically, and make up for the lack of satisfactory intermediation between individuals and the state? Contrary to the pluralist paradigm, the answer is clearly no. Schmitter sums up the anti-pluralist argument concerning pressure groups well:

> ... the fact [is] that where the freedom to associate is equally accorded but the capacity to exercise this freedom is unequally distributed, those that most need to act collectively in defense of their interests are the least likely to be able to do so. (Schmitter, 1983, 916)

It is unreasonable to assume that an interest group will always have an oppositional equivalent which will act as a check and adequately voice the alternative position on an issue to the "neutral" government. It is unrealistic to believe that the existing interest groups and their respective political influence is reflective of non-aggregated interests of individuals. There are more than simply economic or political resource obstacles as cited above; there are also organizational privileges inherent in certain interest types. While economic hurdles are particular to the capitalist system, the question of organization is also
influenced by the division of labour and the modes of production and exchange. It is not difficult to conceive that some interests lend themselves to the formation of a collective pressure while others must overcome major barriers. According to Cawson,

The recognition that interests are structured, and not voluntary, and that producers can more easily combine to exercise power than can consumers, has played an important part in discrediting pluralist theories and preparing the ground for a more satisfactory alternative theory. (Cawson, 1986, 49)

Moreover, pluralists do not tend to focus on issues which question the democratic nature of liberal representation. Rather than attempting to increase participation within representational limitations, they justify the actual reduction of participation within society. Most of the concerns of pluralists were driven by the fear that increased involvement of the populace in political matters would lead to populism, demagoguery, and ultimately totalitarianism (Sartori, 1989, 27). The need for cultivating a consensus on political norms figured prominently in their normative prescription for democracy. However, rather than striving for consensus through inclusiveness and deliberation, pluralists were content with reducing individual political participation and increasing the prerogative of representatives (as conceptualized in the trustee model). Pluralists, among others, typically are skeptical as to the ability of individuals to rule themselves and to contribute to their collective governance (Pateman, 1970, 18). The extreme emphasis on consensus and the preoccupation with containing participation does not completely overshadow other democratic concerns, but it tends to reduce the democratic process to a set of determinants for the stability and survival of its structure. This leads to the conclusion that the notion of individual representation in pluralist theory does not further the individual, let alone the collective interests of the citizens that delegated their authority to the representative.

The ills of social alienation manifested by apathy and citizen political inaction are theorized as necessary in the most extreme cases (Berelson et al, 1954), while deemed
"normal" and acceptable in moderate pluralist theory (Almond and Verba, 1965). This is justified by arguing that most citizens do not have a rational grasp of most political issues, and the sufficient cognitive ability to tackle them (Schumpeter, 1943). According to Sartori,

...we can only really understand, and take an active interest in matters of which we have personal experience, or ideas that we can formulate for ourselves, neither of which is possible for the average person where politics is concerned. (Sartori, 1962, 87)

This is assuming politics does not concern any part of an average person's personal experience, and that an average person cannot formulate any coherent ideas regarding politics. Sartori is partially correct in saying that citizens do not possess the ability to address all political issues at all times. However, that is not to say that all citizens will not have an educated position on certain political questions some of the time. This is increasingly true when these citizens have direct personal experience or interest in certain policy fields. The argument against increased participation through individual-based territorial representation leads to the need for examining other forms of representation which do take into account personal experience and interest.

Corporate Representation

Prior to the advent of post-war pluralist theory, a non-liberal model of democracy was proposed that encompassed an alternative mode of representation based on functional interest. Two of the most prominent theorists of this group-interest representation are G.D.H. Cole in the early twentieth century, and prior to this, French sociologist Emile Durkheim at the turn of the century. 20

Cole's theory is founded on the modified Rousseauian premise that a representative cannot substitute for an individual or even a series of individuals (Cole, 1920b, 107). Each

20There have been other theorists to have elaborated a model of governance revolving around the concept of functional interest. For a Canadian perspective on group government (as well as a specifically agricultural view) see William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (1920).
citizen has a multi-faceted will and interests. The reproduction of such a complex and fluid individual may be possible but very impractical and not extremely useful. However, a representative has the duty to convey the will of a whole constituency of individuals. The faithful reproduction of the wills of the territorial constituency is not only impractical but impossible because a constituency will tend to gather a group with diverging interests on a whole slate of issues. This common form of representation within liberal polities fails on most of the basic democratic representational standards.

For a political agent to adequately represent a constituency, according to Cole and Durkheim's functional representation, this unit must be comprised of individuals with a similar general set of interests or objectives. This is not possible within the strict parameters of a territorial electoral system. Rather than depending on a majority of individuals within a territory opting for a representative which most closely approximates the tendency within which their interests are oriented (a liberal "platform representative"), constituencies should be conceived a priori with a functional commonality. The political motto would change from one person one vote to "...one man [sic] as many votes as interests but only one vote in relation to each interest" (Cole, 1920b, 115). This would imply that certain individuals may carry more weight on a particular policy outcome than others. Those that do are justified insofar as they have a legitimate link/claim with the political issue in question.

The criteria for such legitimacy can be found in the natural social divisions provided by industry. Industry is comprised of various producer groups each with an interest in their particular manufacturing sector. Cole adhered in part to the syndicalist conception whereby workers would assume all responsibilities of managing their local factories.\(^ {21} \) However, Cole considered that functional representation would be unbalanced were the

\(^{21}\) Unlike neocorporatism, Cole's brand of Guild socialism did not include business as a functional group. Since workers were to replace management, "business" as a differentiated representational category would be eliminated. This is neither feasible nor desirable in neocorporatist designs within capitalist political economies. The problem incurred by capitalist relations within corporatist social processes will be examined in Chapter IV.
interests of producer groups to be conveyed but not those of the consumers. Hence his
criteria for inclusion in the collective process of governance were common vocation and
indirect link of shared interest (Cole, 1920a, 25). This allowed for goals and objectives
within society to be put forward without the interference caused by territorial aggregation of
wills; the aggregation was complete prior to the election of political agents for that group.
Durkheim opted for a more neocorporatist approach with respect to the represented
constituency. He believed that not only labour, but also business should constitute
legitimate functional groups within a democratic space (Durkheim, 1957, 39), but there is
no mention of consumer interests.

Cole believed that such a corporate representational system should not supplant
altogether territorial modes of interest aggregation. He also devised a system of local,
regional and national communes which would act as a safeguard to mitigate any perverse
effects incurred from functional representation. However these communes remained
explicitly a secondary representational mechanism (Cole, 1920a, 103). This went flatly
against what Durkheim conceived as the contradiction between collective-interest
representation and individual territorial representation. Durkheim went to an extreme where
he not only advocated the introduction of functional corporatist arrangements, but
suggested they altogether replace territorially defined constituency representation
(Durkheim, 1957, 39).

Despite the fact that the case for functional representation is pitted against territorial
representation, it does not attempt to quash the individual wills comprised in the corporatist
constituencies, nor isolate the individual against the collective. Rather, what these
normative representational models advanced by Durkheim and Cole are intended to produce
is an increasingly faithful reproduction of the individual wills pluralist theory is formally
founded on. According to Durkheim,

...if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it
has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other
collective forces, that is, by those secondary groups... And it is out of this conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born... [These groups'] usefulness is not merely to regulate and govern the interests they are meant to serve. They have a wider purpose; they form one of the conditions essential to the emancipation of the individual. (Durkheim, 1957, 63)

This goal was also integral to the logic behind Cole's Guild Socialism. Functional representation was incomplete in Cole's prescribed paradigm without reference to a role concept of representation. Cole believed that various relationships could develop within this system, although only one could do justice to the normative democratic intent of the venture. In electing a representative a functional group may opt for any of the four representative roles delineated earlier. Both the trustee and the platform representative are possibilities; however, the nature of the collective standpoints in such functional groups militates against such an autonomous form of representation. Trustee and platform conceptions of representation lend themselves to constituencies that do not manifest a distinct interest-objective: aggregated wills are most difficult to reproduce in these cases, and the representative is responsible for determining the political direction for the represented.

The two remaining ideal types are delegate and mandate representative. These are at the increasingly participatory end of the representational range introduced above. Functional representation is intended to prevent policy conflicts and enhance cooperative behaviour through functional collective deliberation. In a negotiated process, representatives need to place on the table the political options expressed by their functional constituencies with respect to particular policies. The logic behind a deliberative negotiation demands the adjustment of the respective party's positions, due to new previously ignored information, other unsuspecting viable alternatives, or the simple need to compromise for a consensus to be attained. The delegate representative is bound by a set of commands or directives written up by the constituents. This form does not allow for much representational manoeuvring, and negotiations do not go very far when the parties assume
a rigid "all or nothing" stance. Hence, Cole specifically called for the mandate form of representation to permit some degree of representative autonomy. At the same time, it would bind the representative to frequent periodical consultation with the functional constituency, hence increasing constituent representation, in order for the latter to respond to the developments of policy concertation (Cole, 1920b, 111).

Carole Pateman's evaluation of industrial functional politics sums up the participatory potential for this corporatist representational alternative:

...where a participatory industrial system allowed both higher and lower level participation then there would be scope for the individual directly to participate in a wide range of decisions while at the same time being part of a representative system; the one does not preclude the other. (Pateman, 1970, 109)

It is constructive to begin with the notion of the interest group as a viable form for creating collective standpoints, but corporatist democracy would differ significantly from rugged interest group pluralism. A group-based democracy would reinvest individuals with viable political alternatives, and grant a stronger, more focussed voice to citizens than in the majoritarian pluralist representation. It would permit a narrowing between the private and public spheres (as opposed to pluralist separation) insofar as representation would be more sensitive to private individual concerns by their identification through collective constituencies. Moreover, it has the means to substantially deliver on political equality insofar as it could advance equitable resource distribution, mandate associational expenditure caps, allow for pro-active organizational incentives, provide a deliberative forum, and guarantee inclusive accessibility to this process of governance. This range of potential advantages reveals the existence of political contradictions in the pluralist paradigm. As well, it lends credence to the possibility of, and need for, alternative forms of representation, especially in a constructive adaptation of the existing system through a conscious corporatist political design.
Corporatist Democratic Theory

An Embryonic Corporatist Democratic Theory: Sketchy, Skeptical, and Instrumental

Before constructing a framework for evaluating corporatist democracy it is relevant to look at the fragments of corporatist democratic theory elaborated by Charles Anderson, Alan Cawson and Philippe Schmitter. This review will point out their inability to provide a new conception of democracy which neither centres on the primacy of territorial politics, nor is driven principally by the logic of instrumentality.

Charles Anderson was one of the first theorists to tackle the issue of the compatibility of corporatism with liberal democracies. He found that the only way to justify "interest group process" (as he labelled corporatist governance) was a) if the final policies derived through this process are in the larger interest of the public; b) if the inclusion of groups in the process of representation is in no way biased or discriminatory, preventing the supremacy or dominance of one or a roster of groups or interests; c) if it supplements rather than replaces individual sovereignty based on electoral constituency representation (Anderson, 1977, 134). It is taken for granted that if such groups are to have a say in policy-making their internal structures must be subject to some degree of democratic accountability. Hence, periodic elections within the functional groups themselves are considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition for political legitimacy. Anderson raises a more critical and basic question:

... it is extremely hard in democratic theory to find grounds for investing the interests of capital and labor with the authority to make what are in effect public decisions. This is the flaw of any corporate theory of representation. How can one legitimate the legislative authority of powerful and contending interests over popular consent? (Anderson, 1977, 143)
This tendency to reify popular consent, to imbue it with absolute authority, and to resist any alternate configurations of the public will underlying it is perhaps one of the most daunting obstacles facing normative democratic theory. The essence of corporatist representation is about moving away from such rigid and inaccurate measures of public choice. Are the interests of capital and labour (to use Anderson's example) not a distinct and integral component of that theoretical popular will? The functional interest groups of capital and labour, that are vested with such authority, resolve conflicts and legislate rules and regulations within their own interest arena: they represent a segment of the popular will acting within a delineated field in the political space. The remaining individuals or collective groups within the larger political space do not participate in this process because they do not possess an interest or a concern in this field. Because popular consent is not theoretically required for such decisions (although the ratification of such decisions by legislative assemblies is very much a common practice in corporatist states, due to the fact that corporatist processes are rarely constitutionally enshrined), Anderson finds it difficult to legitimize. Would it not be more difficult to legitimize the overruling of a political decision obtained through certain specific parties (i.e.: functional groups) affected by it, by a different larger party (i.e.: the popular will) that was not affected by their political choice?

The problem that Anderson most likely intends to underscore is the fact that many policy-areas may be dominated by certain groups, yet at the same time other collective interests may be affected by the policy outcome. Indeed, excluded groups must find a means of expressing their concerns for corporatism to be democratically validated. At the moment, the secondary ratifying procedure within the nationally elected legislature is the only recourse.

Most countries with corporatist arrangements have justified the institutionalization of business-labour-state policy-making on the basis of its complementarity to territorial representation, as well as on the basis of instrumental reason (i.e.: it is functionally efficacious, provides stability and ensures productivity). This criterion is inimical to
Anderson's three factors for democratic legitimacy. However, even if the motives for group representation were based on some principle of distributive justice, this would not legitimate its democratic pretensions (Anderson, 1977, 144). He argues that the only way to defend such a process is through the electoral legislative stipulation of the public objective. Corporate processes must be the public's a priori aim before its inception. Indeed, not only must corporatism as a process be ratified through the legislature, but so must the goals of such group concertation (Anderson, 1977, 148). Hence, the participating groups would not have a determining say in their overall objectives.

By granting supremacy initially to individual electoral representation in the determination of corporatist ends, much of the raison d'être of group participation is distorted. Anderson's first democratic criterion, the need to satisfy an elusively synthetic "common good" is not acceptable. Rather than viewing a "common good" as something which can only apply to a larger collective, the logic behind corporatist theory as advanced by Cole and Durkheim, suggests that smaller collectivities can be the recipient of a good without it doing harm to a larger societal good. The argument is similar to the one used to refute the need for popular consent. Negotiations among various groups with an interest in the outcome establish a good which is in accordance with their particular constituencies; hence making this good (or bad) not as pertinent to those constituencies which are not directly affected, as well as to the national populace. Anderson's liberal conception of the "common good", or will of the people, which can apparently only be discovered through traditional competitive electoral systems is based on antiquated notions which have masked prevalent discriminatory social relations. It is only in the achievement of democratic collective representation, where a group logic is fundamental, that such relations can be subverted.

Alan Cawson, on the other hand, identifies the problem in reconciling traditional democratic procedures with corporatism in the existence of two distinct logics. The territorial electoral fusion of individual demands provides for determination of the "public
interest" via a "legal-rational" basis. By contrast, corporatist procedures are based on a "purposive-rational" criterion that is upheld insofar as it delivers the desirable end-result effectively. Unlike Anderson, Cawson believes that the purposive-rational basis for corporatism is not only an acceptable norm of governance but an absolutely necessary one for the proper functioning of a modern capitalist democracy. This necessity is derived from the fact that parliamentary structures have limited means of obtaining expedient outcomes (Cawson, 1983, 179). Here, Cawson is referring exclusively to socio-economic producer groups while Anderson does not specifically make this distinction (even if his examples are limited to business and labour). Therefore, Cawson does not require the legitimacy of corporatist structures to be derived from the territorial parliament, nor that their course be delineated or their objectives circumscribed by this primary representative institution.

The greatest challenge for Cawson lies in the pressing need to accommodate two potentially antithetical democratic provisions. The first has to do with extending democratic control over the private sector of the political economy, while the second entails the preservation and promotion of civil liberties and fundamental freedoms (of particular relevance being the freedom of association).

But concentration and centralisation within the economy have given to corporations a public character and a public purpose. The challenge for radical democrats is to give them a democratic character and a democratic purpose, not to undermine, but to underwrite liberal democracy. (Cawson, 1983, 183)

Cawson does not provide a comprehensive argument which could underwrite status-quo democracy. All that is proposed is what Anderson already advanced as the *sine qua non* for democratic legitimacy —internal democracy within each official participating association. However, Cawson maintains that the original justification for corporatism does not primarily come from any democratic claims (neither distributive, nor more
generally justice-centered) but rather a functional prerogative which cannot be adequately addressed in a territorial legislature.

Schmitter developed a more elaborate conceptualization of the democratic dilemma in corporatism which goes beyond Cawson's logic and is more sensitive to non-individually-based interests than Anderson's argument. He centers his argument on the premise of the inviolability of citizenship and establishes two standards which must be upheld for any democratic procedures to be valid. The first calls for the equality and freedom of individual citizens to act and participate in accordance with their volition. The second standard requires that citizens' acceptance of the collective choice determined by a majority of elected representatives should not be undermined. This, then, guarantees the inreplaceable function of parliament (Schmitter, 1983, 895).

Schmitter conceptualizes association at another level. Not only does he acknowledge the importance of the associative order in politics (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985) but he stresses the need for its regulated incorporation into existing democratic structures. Schmitter's framework is heavily influenced by the writings of French liberal theorist Alexis de Tocqueville. De Tocqueville argued that freedom of association is not only a fundamental tenet of liberal democracy, but that a positive relation existed between the two. He recognized that freedom of association and the notion of freedom of individual electoral expression are nevertheless two antagonistic concepts embodied in liberal democratic theory (Schmitter, 1983, 908-913). Hence if the concept of individual citizenship should be entrenched as the basis for democracy, and the notion of association in itself constitutes a legitimate form of "secondary citizenship" (Schmitter, 1983, 912), then institutionalized association could be justified in a democracy. This justification would go further than the pluralist apology for interest group competition since associations formally take on the status of "pseudo-citizens".

How are these two forms of citizenship reconciled if they originate in potentially contradictory principles? There are ineluctable democratic antagonisms in corporatism.
Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that all political schemes, including the parliamentary system, involve concessions and trade-offs with a whole array of conflicting practices.

The problem, I believe, is not the organization of interests per se, but their skewed patterns of systematic under- and over-representation. The answer lies not in eliminating the organizational component in interest politics —any more than it lies in trying to encourage individual participation in decision-making— but in trying to make associations behave like better citizens. (Schmitter, 1988, 15)

By subjecting corporatist procedures to a set of democratic rules, such practices need not be incompatible with either the principles of liberal democracy, or existing parliamentary structures. Schmitter's two levels of citizenship can be met and individual citizen participation can be enhanced through this secondary mode of interest articulation.

Whither Corporatist Democratic Theory?
This paucity of literature on corporatist democratic theory demonstrates a lack of confidence in corporatist procedures, and very little innovative normative insight into how existing arrangements might be reformed to more adequately meet the challenges posed by the crisis of the liberal state. Schmitter was the only one to tackle these issues in depth when, several years later, he once again attempted to rekindle the corporatist democratic debate with his unpublished piece "Corporate Democracy: Oxymoronic? Just Plain Moronic? Or a Promising Way Out of the Present Impasse?" (1988). While he is still hopeful for an overhauling of the present system of governance using corporatist-inspired arrangements, Schmitter has become more skeptical as to the democratic potential of such a scheme. To salvage the framework he has virtually given up on the individual participatory capacity of corporatism and, it will be argued, even on the collectivist representational tenets found in the original works by Cole, Durkheim and their contemporaries.

Schmitter's recent argument is focussed primarily on a new scheme of political support to corporatized associations by way of economic resource distribution through a
preferential voucher system. His innovative procedure is based on an extension of what he introduced in 1983: to make organizations (the basis of secondary citizenship) "act in a more prudential, "other-regarding", and "self-regulating" manner" (Schmitter, 1988, 13). His intent is to mitigate the inequalities of voluntary collective action so frequently the target of theoretical attacks on the pluralist paradigm. However, the solution he offers ends up redirecting these inequalities back into the system of governance, and undermining the democratic foundation of corporatism.

Many of the democratic constraints are introduced by way of what he labels "requisite rigidities" (Schmitter, 1988, 17). He establishes certain reasonable guidelines, for example, the acceptance of common rules and norms of conduct, or the need to imbue organizations with a conception of encompassingness to encourage other-regarding courses of action. However, with his demand for a professionalization of representative negotiators for the various organizations, his model begins to veer away from increased participation at intermediate levels.

In effect, the intermediation of interests becomes a sort of service industry for politics, rather than a site for personal participation and self-expression in politics, as it has heretofore been conceived in democratic theory. In the process, it certainly loses in individual appeal and heroic stature, but it can gain in collective efficacy and equality, both of which may be more important for advancing democracy and compensating capitalism in the longer run. (Schmitter, 1988, 27)

It seems Schmitter is more concerned with the instrumentalism of corporatism than its democratic procedure. To what extent his corporatist governance procedures would increase equality is doubtful in itself. Nevertheless, while distributive justice is not the exclusive measure for a democratic system, it is still ironic that Schmitter seems so concerned with "compensating capitalism", as if the locus for distributional imbalance was located in capital's terrain to begin with.
Schmitter identifies the main problem in the way interest groups function within a pluralist state. The main problem is the inequality of political influence which he links to disparities in economic resources among organized interests. Indeed, most of his article is a discussion on his proposed voucher system for resource redistribution.

The voucher system would grant each citizen the right to allocate a nominal monetary contribution to a limited number of organizations they desire to support, chosen every two years on a list of major monopoly interest associations (Schmitter, 1988, 42-50). Individuals would not have to belong to any of the organizations, let alone participate in their internal decision-making process, nor would they need to have any functional links to their preferred choice. This destroys the logic behind functional representation as formulated by Cole and Durkheim. While citizens still have the right to join any organizations they choose, their main source of participation is through monetary allocation since a "service industry" elite is already in place to establish functional positions and organizational decisions. While Schmitter speculates that empowering citizens with the voucher system would encourage them to join corporatized organizations (Schmitter, 1988, 47), he offers little evidence to support this.

Simple numbers of individuals cannot be a satisfactory criteria for establishing the legitimacy, and hence the influence, of a particular interest collectivity in national decision-making. Schmitter uses the individualistic majoritarian-based system to determine the "electability" of interest groups. One of the initial purposes of corporatist governance was to empower underprivileged social groups, which include minorities. Minority interests would obviously be outweighed by the allocation of greater resources and salience to the interests of various pluralities.

Furthermore, Schmitter factors in the need to allow (as a basic democratic freedom) voluntary contributions, in addition to the voucher allocation, from citizens to associations of their preference. He justifies this with the argument that because the voucher system would be sufficient to adequately finance all "representative" groups, additional
contributions would not have a serious skewing impact (Schmitter, 1988, 43). His "evening-out of resources" strategy is doubtful since business would structurally have access to a larger capital base than labour despite the latter's greater numbers.

Schmitter predicts that, "eventually, the logic of competitive appeals for vouchers would have the effect of either revivifying moribund groups or displacing them by more authentic others" (Schmitter, 1988, 48-49). He does not attempt to prove this claim. If any individual's voucher is subject to interest competition, then the demand for vouchers will be increasingly competitive. Corporatized groups will aim at attracting support from the largest sub-portion of the national population to which they can appeal. Schmitter's logic goes full circle reverting back to pluralist politics where parties compete for the votes of individuals. In an extreme scenario, associations will tend to become less functionally specific to attract more votes (vouchers), and minority groups and the interests of the structurally disadvantaged will remain marginalized. In effect, he applies a slightly tempered version of the logic of the marketplace for the distribution of (economic influence which he directly links to) political power.

Despite these inconsistencies with his revamped model, Schmitter is genuinely struggling with the problem of public support for interest associations. This is a central question posed by corporatism to democratic theory; there must be safeguards for insuring that a publicly invested group is representative of the overall interest constituency within society. And if this is not the case, the state must be able to identify the existence of such a constituency and facilitate creation of groups for constituents with inherent organizational disadvantages. While these are outstanding questions which corporatist theory does not adequately address, some suggestions will be examined in Chapter IV.

So to answer Schmitter's question: no, a corporatist democracy need not be oxymoronic; there is compatibility. However, his solution is inadequate. The voucher system renders irrelevant the essence of functional corporatism. It redirects inequalities towards other areas, and yet it provides a semblance of greater political accessibility where
in fact few inroads are guaranteed to those groups most in need. A democratic corporatism should accentuate the participatory input found in the analyses of Durkheim and Cole, and should reorganize representation on the basis of substantive collective interests, while at the same time providing for a more efficient means of political decision-making.

**Corporatism, Citizenship, Community, and Social Rationality**

**Associative Citizenship and the Problem of Anomie**

At the basis of a democratic corporatism are two concepts not yet fully elaborated: political community and citizenship. These notions have been for the most part neglected in the corporatist democratic literature. The cardinal component in corporatism is the group or association. This association is one which functions within the realm of politics, hence it is more than a loosely defined collective unit with little or no articulated *raison d'être*—it is a political community, contrary to what Schmitter stipulates in his limited democracy model (Schmitter, 1988, 34). Because this association has a legitimate and justifiable role in the articulation of its goals and the raising of political claims, it is entitled to rights of secondary citizenship (as mentioned above in de Tocqueville's writings). These two notions of political community and citizenship need to be overhauled to imbue corporatism with a democratic imperative.

It is in Durkheim that political community was first related to corporatist measures. Durkheim identified a rupture in the fabric of society which begat a loss of individual direction and social purpose to institutional political action (Schmitter, 1988, 18).

According to Frank Hearn, Durkheim maintained that,

> The crisis of our time is a moral crisis, Durkheim maintained, and the state of normlessness or anomie from which this crisis originates is a pathological social fact which impedes both the harmonious operation of society and individual freedom. (Hearn, 1985, 164)
This so-called anomie was a direct result of alienation triggered by the breakdown of individual social interaction (Durkheim, 1957, 63). According to Durkheim the only means by which anomie can be eliminated is through direct interaction among citizens. Due to the large populations of modern countries, this interaction would have to take place through the state, through indirect interaction among representatives. Because the state has developed into a faceless bureaucratic machine, neither individuals nor their distant representatives can constructively relate with such an apparatus. To correct such perverse effects, it is necessary to prompt a "collective nomos" by some other means. Durkheim advocated making the occupational corporation the axiom for a new concept of community whose members interact frequently with one another and which provides a sense of collective identity (Durkheim, 1933, 397).

While Durkheim conveys an authentic desire to create a more receptive notion of political community and conception of citizenship, it is limiting since a) he believes that it must be arranged according to the division of labour, and b) that parliaments which represent individually-based interests should be abolished altogether. As will be shown in Chapter IV, there are interests which extend beyond simplistic lines of occupation, and certain national needs can not be met through interest group deliberation.

The Malaise of Modernity: Rational Choice, Instrumental Rationality, and the Pursuit of Self-Interest

It is useful to look at another more recent critique of modern society which highlights many of the points raised a century earlier by Durkheim. Political philosopher Charles Taylor identifies what he labels as the three "malaises of modernity". The first malaise is the direct product of liberalism, the omniscience of individualism. The individualism he criticizes is based on the notion of a self-centered, self-interest seeking individual who has obliterated any other-regarding horizons. The second source of anguish can be attributed to an obsessive fixation on instrumental reason as the modus operandi for societal ventures.
Projects are measured on the basis of an economic model of high efficiency and maximization of productivity output. There is a growing neglect of other criteria based on a more humanistic compass. The third social ailment is the product of the previous two set in the domain of the political. When one combines an atomistic, self-regarding individualism with a cost-benefit rationale to all forms of action, the consequence is a tendency to disengage oneself from an increasingly unresponsive state machine. This self-induced loss of connection results in a decrease in political participation which in the end is detrimental to the basic individual freedom such societies were founded to pursue (Taylor, 1991, 10).

One of the critiques of pluralist democratic theory, as described above, was its theorization of individually based interests as the foundation for the establishment of a common will through territorial channels of representation. A complementary theory to pluralism, which neglects many of the disturbing effects in Taylor's critique of modernity, and which centers specifically on social action and the individual determination of public options, is rational choice theory.

Rational choice theory, first introduced by Anthony Downs in his *Economic Theory of Democracy* in 1957, is, in essence, a theory of democratic action based on the premise that individuals seek to maximize their particular interests through a rational cost-benefit assessment process. Hence, it is based on the assumption that all individuals act rationally, that their overriding motivation is self-interest, and that they will achieve this via the most effective practical (i.e.: rational) route. Hence the two pillars of rational choice, self-interest and instrumental rationality, are in turn the focus of a modern communitarian critique of the democratic order. Rational choice theorists attempt not only to justify, but eulogize such a democratic analysis. The failings of such a theory are ultimately the same shortcomings of our present system. The critique of rational choice will serve to elucidate why such a paradigm is illogical, if not detrimental, to a healthy political system.

Rational choice shares with pluralist theory a common belief that the individual pursuit of self-interest in political action will most effectively achieve a common goal, or at
least efficient policy. It is a market driven process transposed onto the political realm (Sen, 1990). It is rational for citizens to maximize their demands regardless of their needs. Self-interest was deemed the predominant force behind the determination of a public choice. Recently, much empirical political psychology research has been conducted to identify the motivations behind different types of social action. These studies refuted the view that self-interest was the sole or even the predominant determinant, and contended instead that principles had more to do with the rationale behind voting and other political activities (Mansbridge, 1990b, 15). Moreover, the data suggested that individual decisions were often taken on the basis of affective and normative inclinations (Mansbridge, 1990b, 17).

Even the premise that a rational choice is necessarily a self-interest motivated decision has been debunked. While there is little doubt that all behaviour is not driven by the desire to maximize personal gain, and that other factors such as sympathy and love or commitment and duty are equally present, it appears that under certain conditions, non-self-interested forms of motivation will indeed provide for personal gain. Through the use of game-theoretical typology, Mansbridge is able to conclude that cooperative forms of social action, encouraged by a sense of duty, will produce the ultimate mean pay-off if cooperation is reciprocated. Were the two (or more) players to defect, the pay-off would be at its lowest. On the other hand, if only one were to defect, the defector comes out with the greatest advantage. However, cooperation from the loser would not be secured a subsequent time around, hence delivering the lowest pay-off for both players. The rational outcome can only be achieved consistently through cooperation (Mansbridge, 1990a, 141-143).

Self-interest and duty or love can and do co-exist as prime motives in social choice. This not only places rational choice theory into doubt but creates a rationale for the natural potential for cooperation in democratic corporatist structures. According to Mansbridge:

...arrangements that generate some self-interest return to unselfish behavior create an "ecological niche" that helps sustain that unselfish
behavior. Arrangements that make unselfishness less costly in narrowly self-interested terms increase the degree to which individuals feel they can afford to indulge their feelings of empathy and their moral commitments. (Mansbridge, 1990a, 137)

Corporatist structures may not necessarily require the initial disinterested commitment of participants to the process, but in the end their commitment through an eventual payoff may foster other-regarding inclinations. This is supported by empirical claims that corporatism delivers results precisely because many issues which had been thought to be zero-sum are not. Furthermore, the critique of corporatist representation, that functional or social-group interests are nothing but factional interests with no concern for the need to establish a common-good, is easily refuted. In other words, self-interest and a commitment to cooperation will in the long term establish political choices which are acceptable and advantageous to the various groups in society.

The second pillar upon which rational choice theory rests is instrumental rationality. It is also one of the cornerstones of the Enlightenment, and according to Taylor and other theorists, an illness which permeates all institutions, public and private. It is its presence within public processes that is relevant here. Instrumental rationality is a mode of action which entails the capacity to produce and implement an effective means for a further identified end. It is a logic that will deliver the most effective results through a rationalized, technical process. Jürgen Habermas identified this malaise as the colonization of the lifeworld. He conceived the problem as the obliteration of the Aristotelian concept of praxis, in favour of techne. In other words, it moves away from the "realization of practical goals" towards "the solution of technical problems" (Habermas, 1989b, 252).

Habermas breaks down the concept of activity into purposive-rational action (or labour), and social interaction (or communicative action). Instrumental rationality is focussed on the former. The problem with political systems (whether present pluralist or even corporatist procedures) is that the purposive-rational predominates over communicative action. This prevents the development of a sense of self and of community,
and especially of desirable and desired political objectives (Dryzek, 1990, 5), as well as a reestablishment of the bond between means and ends. The logic of instrumentalism in political terms is to achieve the most effective technical policy outcomes. But without social interaction, the process will be devoid of the social concerns that surface in the exchange of collective standpoints. Habermas insists that "political emancipation cannot be identified with technical progress" (McCarthy, 1978, 23). Taylor's third societal dysfunction is what Habermas previously labelled the colonization of the lifeworld: the hegemonic power of instrumentality in the relations between society and the state, causing a withdrawal of citizens from politics.

[The technocracy thesis] can also become a background ideology that penetrates into the consciousness of the depoliticized mass of the population, where it can take on legitimating power. It is a singular achievement of this ideology to detach society's self-understanding from the frame of reference of communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic interaction and replace it with a scientific model. Accordingly the culturally defined self-understanding of a social lifeworld is replaced by the self-reification of men under categories of purposive-rational action and adaptive behavior. (Habermas, 1988, 253-254)

The theory of rational choice not only legitimizes but promotes the existing tendencies of individual self-interested motivation via purposive-rational means. This theory epitomizes the problems of existing political systems and is at the heart of problems in most institutional procedures in democracies, especially those producing depoliticization of the citizenry. Indeed this final malaise, the loss of individual political motivation, is related to the anomie Durkheim spoke of in his critique. While Taylor does not advocate a form of corporatist representation, it is useful to keep these pressing problems in mind with respect to an assessment of corporatism. Indeed corporatism's concertation model of policy-making should attenuate excessive self-regarding individual interests. In terms of the third malaise, corporatism has the potential to instill an awareness of the need to
participate through structures which create smaller, more reasonable, units of interest aggregation, and public fora of engagement.

Taylor's second source of disenchantment, the primacy of instrumental rationality, seems to prevail in writings such as Cawson's which limit corporatism to socio-economic producer groups due to economic imperatives. Habermas proposed reinvesting political action with communicative rationality, while at the same time attenuating instrumental logic. This prospect will be examined in Chapter IV. While neither Cole nor Durkheim use this reasoning, the latter advocates a similar corporatism based on strict occupational interest. Political community must go beyond occupation to be democratically legitimate, for there are legitimate social spheres that are not covered in such a narrow framework.

**Corporatist Associations: Dynamic Political Communities of Interest**

The school of "radical democracy" may offer a working definition of political community which could meet the democratic criteria that would legitimate corporatist participation. The concept of citizenship should presuppose more than an intangible formal legal status, and embody an actual political identity. Chantal Mouffe rejects the two generic forms of citizenship found in modern societies: the instrumentalist-individualist configuration which she associates with the development of liberalism; and the pre-modern, civic republican inspired view, which sets forth a notion of the common good over individual wills, and which she links to the communitarians (Mouffe, 1992b, 227). There is a need to escape such entrenched dichotomies, between the liberal and communitarian conception, the former emphasizing the primacy of individual will over collective needs, and the latter stressing shared communal values above individual rights.

... what we are looking for is a way to accommodate the distinction between public and private, morality and politics which have been the great contribution of liberalism to modern democracy without renouncing the ethical nature of the political association. (Mouffe, 1992b, 231)
Mouffe finds inspiration in the mediaeval concept of *societas* which designates an association linked not by common goal or purpose but rather by a formal acceptance of a code of rules. In other words it is "...a relation in which participants are related to one another in the acknowledgement of the authority of certain conditions in acting" (Mouffe, 1992b, 232). Therefore the community would not have a predetermined or fixed identity, but rather a flexible and dynamic organization. Both the individual and collective imperative can be preserved by establishing a form of political community which simply requires the determination and adherence to a procedural minimum. By limiting the stable bond to rules of agency, the individual subject positions and social relations are guaranteed the possibility of open allegiances without the burden of collective constraints (Mouffe, 1992b, 236).

This concept of citizenship and political community responds appropriately to Taylor's malaise of modernity. Mouffe's normative concept would eliminate the amoralism of hyper-individualism by providing for an adequate forum for political participation. While both Mouffe and Durkheim shared a common goal in the reconciliation of the individual with the community, Mouffe's conception of citizenship is much more sensitive to the individual than is the proposed strictly occupational arrangement of corporatism advanced by Durkheim.

Mouffe would most likely be averse to the idea of any form of corporatism which reeks of rigid institutionalization of fixed artificial communities, let alone of Durkheim's socio-economic functional corporatist construction. Nevertheless, Mouffe's notion can be partially adopted to justify certain corporatist arrangements. There is no doubt that the democratic corporatism envisaged must go beyond functional criteria. Corporatism's institutionalization, concertation and intermediation would constitute the procedural rules that would have to be adhered to by citizens. The configuration of the political community would not necessarily be restricted to complex units of individuals with *a fortiori* a multiple
set of common attributes. When utilizing the term political community there is an understanding that there exist certain shared bonds among the members of the collectivity but no total overarching commonality. It is more appropriate to speak of dynamic political communities of interest, where membership was flexible, and individuals manifest a multiplicity of decentred standpoints. Furthermore, individuals would be eligible to join such political communities not exclusively on an occupational basis, but rather according to their particular "subject positions". For corporatist structures to be practical and applicable, they must incorporate certain collective constraints. The challenge for a normative democratic theory of corporatism is to be effective and still satisfy a series of criteria beyond how these would fare in existing pluralist polities.

Conclusion

There are numerous reasons why corporatism has not been the preferred home for a new democratic paradigm. While in their present incarnation in most Western European countries corporatist structures provide a valuable secondary forum for decision making, there are certain theoretical obstacles which militate against such a normative design. Nevertheless, corporatism is not a priori incompatible with a democratic politics. It provides a different representational approach, but one equally valid (and more accurate), than pluralist territorial representation.

The few instances of corporatist democratic theory, however, provide limited insight. Anderson is caught up vainly trying to square pluralism with corporatism. Cawson validates the "democratic" in corporatism via an instrumentalist justification. While Schmitter originally provided a valuable discussion on the advantages and

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22The term "subject positions" does not naturally correspond to collective interests based on identity (functional, cultural, biological, or otherwise). As Mouffe explains, "...the social agent [should not be conceived] as a unitary subject but as the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions, constructed within specific discourses and always precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject positions. This requires abandoning the reductionism and essentialism dominant in the liberal interpretations of pluralism, and acknowledging the contingency and ambiguity of every identity, as well as the constitutive character of social division and antagonism" (Mouffe, 1992b, 10)
shortcomings of a democratic corporatist theory, his latest piece appears as a desperate attempt to salvage corporatism in the face of pluralist attacks. Hence, he goes full circle to a corporatism that is driven by a similar market logic of influence to that of pluralism. The original functional group democracy propounded by Durkheim and Cole provides a more adequate foundation (even if it is dated and in need of considerable transformation) for a corporatist democratic theory.

Much of Anderson's, Cawson's and Schmitter's analysis is constrained by obsolete notions of self-interest in political choice, an obsession with instrumental rationality, and a lack of a conceptualized political community, which is an integral part of any group-based process. Despite these theoretical impediments, corporatism should not be abandoned altogether. However, it is necessary to look beyond the corporatist model to other fields of democratic theory which have recently grappled with establishing a more effectual and sensitive framework of collective-interest governance.
The practice of corporatism in many Western states has illustrated the potential for an alternative means of political decision-making which is congruent with the fundamental principles of their democratic constitutions. However, corporatist theory, while having delved into such concerns, has scarcely explored the democratic implications of such a model of collective interest governance.

If corporatist theory in its present state of disarray does not lay claim to all the answers then necessity dictates looking elsewhere. It is in the school of deliberative democracy that the roots of a similar approach to democratic governance can be discerned. Deliberation among individuals as a cardinal tenet of democracy can be traced as far back as Aristotle. And it is successful deliberative designs in conflict resolution that participatory democrats tend to exploit in legitimating their "classical" approach to politics. Such modern designs have been proposed using a combination of Hannah Arendt's conception of political discourse and Jürgen Habermas' communicative ethics. The most notable example is found in Dryzek's *Discursive Democracy*. This form of deliberative democracy is not merely another procedure for the establishment of some common will, but more specifically an end unto itself, which allows for self-transformation, and value change. It may seem *prima facie* that there is no way such an individually-based participatory politics can converge with a collectivist, functional and representational scheme like corporatism. Yet corporatist associations need not be antagonistic to political deliberation.
Recent re-evaluations of interest group politics in the United States have produced several frameworks which emphasize the importance of the role such social units play, and which call for their further (regulated) integration into the policy process. One such novel proposal is that of an associative democracy propounded by Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (1992). It is in essence an American theoretical version of a more comprehensive corporatism. While its authors do not explicitly espouse a deliberative approach in their discussion of interest group governance, it is implied. Moreover, Joshua Cohen has at the same time, but independent from his work on interest groups, been at the forefront in rekindling the notion of a deliberative democracy (although this he has done primarily in the context of a socialist project).

The "jump" from an individually-based to a collectively oriented deliberative format is more explicitly established by Jane Mansbridge (1992). It is this formal "deliberative associative democracy" that resembles the democratic corporatism proposed in Chapter III. Indeed, the logic of deliberation has always existed in corporatism since the core procedure within such structures is the negotiation itself (both within organizations and among them). Hence the insights derived from these recent group political paradigms (along with others such as the policy community, and policy learning literature) will help fill the gaps of a corporatist democratic theory. This will assist construction of criteria derived from pluralist, corporatist, and the new deliberative interest group theories that can provide foundations of an expanded corporatist democratic model.

**The Concept of Deliberation and Democracy**

**Politics and Deliberation**

At the core of the concept of deliberation lies the notion of interpersonal communication intended to realize some form of collective decision. Politics always involves deliberation (even absolute monarchs and dictators do not formulate decisions without consultation of some sort). Yet despite its pervasive character, the concept of deliberation does not take a
prominent position in most theories of politics; rather, it is often taken for granted as a minor procedural characteristic with little inherent value. This is true of political theories of both the Left and the Right. Many Marxist theories are still burdened with scientistic methods of determining the welfare of society. In liberal democratic theory, which comes from a staunchly positivistic tradition, there is a proclivity to shun the (deliberative) participation of the subject, the citizen, in the determination of the object, political choice. Since most of these theories relegate deliberation to elite representatives, professionals, and bureaucrats, arguably a positive relation between a more participatory form of politics and an expanded notion of deliberation can be established.

Deliberation finds its source in Aristotle and the Greek *polis*. According to Aristotle a genuine politics was based on practical reason which in turn originated in collective life. Within a social environment, reason could only be achieved through the medium of free discourse: persuasion, argumentation, pondering, and judgement (Dryzek, 1990, 9). If practical reason can only be derived through deliberation, and an authentic political will must be imbued with practical reason, then individual volitions can only stem from a process of reasoned discussion. This link has often been misinterpreted in political theory. According to Bernard Manin, Rousseau (and other contemporaries) equated deliberation with choice, hence Rousseau's notion of a pre-conceived will in each individual. Manin interprets Aristotle's conception of deliberation as consisting of "the particular moment that precedes choice, and in which the individual ponders different solutions before settling for one of them" (Manin, 1983, 345). This line of thought, when given emphasis in modern democratic theory can result in the self-transformation thesis which affirms that the concept of the self is not pre-politically constituted but rather dialogically developed through social and communicative interaction (Warren, 1992, 11).
Authentic Politics, Communicative Ethics, Deliberation and Democracy

Therefore it is essential to resurrect the classical meaning of deliberation for a consistent theory of deliberative democracy. The relationship of democracy to deliberation lies primarily in the fact that an open discursive process can constitute the means of resolving social disputes through some final compromise on conflicting interests or norms existing in the concerned constituency (Miller, 1992, 55). Assuming that all interested individuals/parties are granted the right to participate free from coercion to establish the "collective will"\(^\text{23}\), the source of legitimacy is not derived from individual wills but rather from the process of deliberation itself, which democratically shapes such wills (Manin, 1983, 352).

What distinguishes deliberative democracy from traditional procedurally-based political systems is that it is not only the process of deliberation that is significant but rather the content of the decisions derived from such procedures. Participants, *de jure*, do not simply agree on a procedure but more significantly, they are party to the outcome which they create collectively and ratify independently. David Miller distinguishes between two broad conceptions of modern politics: interest aggregation (which he associates with pluralism), and dialogue (which he links to a socialist tradition). In the former he criticizes the inequality of interest representation, the indifference to the quality of interests, and the impossibility of accurate aggregation (Miller, 1989, 256-257). In the latter he advocates an inconclusive participatory system which paradoxically elevates the interests of individuals over those of groups as a basis for politics as dialogue (Miller, 1989, 266).\(^\text{24}\) Such an

\(^{23}\text{This term is used metaphorically here. This thesis assumes that the notion of a "collective will" is an artificial construct which does not infer the possibility of a common good, or an optimal course of action acceptable to a global constituency.}\)

\(^{24}\text{Miller does recognize the issue of the size of the polity and the problem of accurate representation. Nevertheless, he tentatively answers these practical problems via the solution of a possible random lottery for participants as practiced in Antiquity. This resembles in part John Burnheim's concept of demarchy (in *Is Democracy Possible?*, 1985) which proposes a sortition for representatives. However, the main difference between the two is that Burnheim's democracy is based on the amalgamation of collective interest representatives and not the more individualistic aggregation which Miller appears to promote in his politics as dialogue.}\)
individualist deliberative notion, it must be argued, would be irreconcilable with the most flexible conception of corporatism. What is important here, however, is to identify some common roots of deliberative democracy which are often founded on individualist notions, and at whose core lies the concept of dialogue as both procedure and end.

While certain modern theorists have obfuscated the notion of deliberation in politics, two philosophers often credited with its renewal are Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas. Arendt conceived the political realm as one in which individuals could fully realize their own identities through the disclosure and the formulation of their interests and positions as political subjects (Arendt, 1958, 180). Her notion of an authentic politics, which heralded the plurality of individuals, was set in a specifically discursive context. Speech and the public confrontation of conflicting ideas was the essence of politics (Miller, 1987, 262). Furthermore, communication had the purpose of holding individuals together. However, according to Margaret Canovan, Arendt did not believe in the attainment of an ultimate end or the development of a common will, let alone the establishment of universal truths, among those engaged in political discourse. Political disputes cannot be resolved by purely rational means (Canovan, 1983,108-109). Arendt's authentic politics (which actually excludes socio-economic issues) in the end had more to do with a process of deliberation than with political choice: "Indeed, it is not clear that Arendt regards politics as having an outcome at all; the debate itself is what matters" (Miller, 1987, 261).

Jürgen Habermas was influenced by Arendt's writings, but has adopted a strikingly antithetical position to her authentic politics of deliberation. His theory is founded on the premise that present industrial democracies suffer from the phenomenon of the colonization of the lifeworld due to the hegemony of instrumental rationality in the means and ends of the body politic. The lifeworld can be metaphorically equated to that public space in which society and the state interact. These parameters of political exchange are "colonized", or dysfunctional, because purposive-rational criteria (based on efficiency and technical expedience) prevail over social or communicative rationality (based on a discursive social
exchange) in the determination of courses of action. In other words, there is a breakdown of meaningful communication between the state and the various players in society (individual and collective) (Habermas, 1989).

Habermas developed a normative theory of communicative ethics since his primary concern was establishing legitimate moral norms. It is only subsequently that other thinkers have extrapolated his theory on the consensual determination of a code of ethics on procedures of political choice. In his communicative ethics, the ideal speech situation entails a dialogue among equal participants whereby each individual proposes alternatives to an issue at stake and justifies such a course through reasoned argumentation. There should exist no coercion in such a deliberative process, and a consensus must be reached based on the best argument and only that (Habermas, 1984). Arguments should address the concerns of other participants, not just defend the legitimacy of one’s own interests. Hence, Habermas is in the end affirming that a common position based on generalizable values can be attained if ideal speech is guaranteed (Canovan, 1983, 111; Miller, 1987, 263).

While Habermas and Arendt’s theories do not seem *prima facie* reconcilable, they temper the extreme assumptions of each other’s model. Arendt is skeptical as to the potential for any common political goal among a plurality of individuals, while Habermas is formally utopian in his deliberative logic of rational, consensual communicative action. She espouses deliberation as end, while he adopts the position of deliberation as means. As will be demonstrated below, in the partial fusion of an authentic politics with communicative ethics, one can salvage the disclosure of a plurality of positions and the potential for self-transformation with the normative attempt to mitigate the use of power in such fora of political negotiation. Moreover, this blend aids attempts to reach agreements based on social rationality and respect for otherness. This is the basis of most deliberative frameworks which aim not at recreating some ideal philosophical scenario, but at attempting to strive realistically toward the achievement of those archetypal means and ends.
These means and ends should be constituted around democratic criteria of political evaluation. There are five basic criteria which will be elaborated throughout the deliberative theory and, in the end, within the corporatist democratic framework. The first concerns the internal participation of the membership of the institutionalized associations. The second refers to the accessibility of such associations to the corporatist schemes of decision-making. The third criterion is the responsiveness of the elite representatives of these associations towards the needs and conscious demands of their membership. The civic consciousness instilled within the players is the basis of the fourth criterion. The last criterion concerns the versatility of such corporatist arrangements to prevent stagnation and maintain a certain degree of competitive participation.

*Associative Democracy and Deliberative Politics: Where Interest Aggregation Meets Dialogue*

**Deliberative Democracy: Liberal Individualist Foundations**

The deliberative model brought about through a fusion of Arendt and Habermas has recently inspired the theoretical development of deliberative democratic frameworks. The most elaborate is John Dryzek's discursive democracy (1990), but one also finds these proposals in the works of David Miller (1989, 1992), Bernard Manin (1983), and Joshua Cohen (1989, 1992) among others.

According to Dryzek, these discursive designs are not driven exclusively by social rationality, but rather by a normative mix between the instrumental and the communicative (Dryzek, 1990, 30). While social rationality is imperative for ensuring that a communicative process takes place, purposive rational criteria may be invoked to clarify means without necessarily obliterating final objectives. Hence, Dryzek strives for a more holistic approach (combining subject and object in the pursuit of a political settlement or decision) integrating both criteria of democracy and of efficiency. This process should take place in public spaces between citizens and the state, a regeneration of the social relations
within the context of the lifeworld as envisioned by Habermas. Dryzek affirms the need to maintain flexible systems of dialogue and decision. His basic institutional pre-requisites attest to the need for virtual ad-hoc arrangements: 1) Hierarchy should be avoided as much as possible; 2) Participation should not be limited to any parties; 3) Rules or formal institutional regulations should not exist (Dryzek, 1990, 41). The deliberative arrangements proposed by others do not tend to express such a post-structuralist adversity to institutionalization. However they rarely venture into the realm of practical propositions, offering mere abstract designs.

As to the deliberative process itself, Dryzek believes interests should be argued on the basis of their generalizability. If particular, the expressed interest is legitimate if and only if 1) it can be argued on the basis of a generalizable interest; or 2) it does not infringe on one (Dryzek, 1990, 54). His hostility to particular interest is manifested by where he situates the locus of interests. Despite his view that New Social Movements are natural recipients of discursive designs (Dryzek, 1990, 49), he argues that interests should be individually rather than collectively articulated. "Individuals should participate as citizens, not as representatives of the state or any other corporate and hierarchical body" (Dryzek, 1990, 43).

The similar individualist focus for ideal deliberative processes is expressed in the work of Miller, Manin, and Cohen. Miller goes so far as to demand the separation of the individual from the interest advocated. In other words, a participant should not enter the deliberative forum with an expressed claim no matter how general; hence an individual cannot be a representative of a delineated interest (Miller, 1989, 271). While Cohen does not venture so far, he does argue that the purpose of deliberation is to identify the common good espoused by a majority of participants (Cohen, 1989a, 18). His earlier conception of deliberative democracy may not be individualist in a participatory sense, but it is liberal in its mode of interest aggregation. National political deliberation should not be overtaken by
associations representing certain interests because of the threat that deliberation may be perverted by a specific interest focus:

...deliberative arenas which are organized exclusively on local, sectional or issue-specific lines are unlikely to produce the open-ended deliberation required to institutionalize a deliberative procedure. Since these arenas bring together only a narrow range of interests, deliberation in them can be expected at best to produce coherent sectional interests, but no more comprehensive conception of the common good. (Cohen, 1989a, 31)

Both Cohen25 and Manin (1983, 357), believe that political parties are essential to a deliberative democracy, in which the product of such a process is legitimized by the electorate which has the "ultimate" (yet indirect) say in the configuration of the deliberative processes. This individualistic party-centric conception of a deliberative democracy stems from an antagonism toward liberal interest group pluralism as Miller has conceptualized it in his dichotomy between interest aggregation and dialogue.

**Associative Democracy: Interest Groups as Law Makers and Law Enforcers**

Interest groups have since the 1950s been a central theme in political science in the United States. Rather than seeing these collective units as constructive aggregators of the wills of individuals that provide a legitimate alternative means to electoral party politics, pressure groups have been predominantly viewed with derisive skepticism. Much of this is due to the professionalization and technocratization of the "lobby industry" in the US, along with the extensive economic inequalities which in turn perpetuate the inherent political inequities of power. It can be argued that one of the reasons for the lack of success of corporatist arrangements in the US is due to this hostility toward the institutionalization of interest

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25 As mentioned above, it appears contradictory that here Cohen rejects interest groups as ideal candidates for a democratic deliberative process, while underscoring political parties as the prime holders of a genuine political deliberation. In another article entitled "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance," co-authored by Joel Rogers (1992), they argue for an interest group democracy. While they do not stipulate the importance of the deliberative process in this framework, it can be assumed it is implied; hence the seemingly disjointed nature of Cohen's proposals.
groups (especially labour). Nevertheless, this conjuncture has not prevented several American political scientists, including Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (1992), from proposing new avenues through which to incorporate secondary interest associations in the formation of policy.26

Their framework for an associative democracy also stems from a predictable "reaction to faction", but their approach is clearly Madisonian in that they view it as essential not to quash collective political formations but rather to steer them away from their potential harmful social effects towards beneficial ends (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 416). Much of the theoretical justification of their model is also based on the premises used to justify a corporatist democracy, primarily drawing on de Tocqueville’s belief that associations play a vital part in the social and political development of a state; the latter therefore should be granted a more enhanced role.

Their associative democracy entails enlisting democratic associations into the fold of policy formation. Whether through commissions, round-table discussions, or industrial concertation, Cohen and Roger believe that a flexible incorporation of groups that constitute civil society would benefit not only these group's interests, but governments responsible for policy and society at large. The core of their ideas is that interest groups provide vital information to the decision-making process, extend the principle of representation based on collective interests, and allow for greater citizen education and participation. Associative democracy is an alternative mode of governance different from the logic of the market or of bureaucracy (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 424-5). To encourage the advantageous aspects derived from interest group participation, Cohen and Rogers argue for normative promotion of the organizational representation of excluded or marginalized interests, for the promotion of other-regarding actions by groups, and for autonomous control or self-determination of these dynamic political communities of interest.

26 The assessment of Cohen and Roger's proposal stems from their article "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance", which is drawn from a book-in-process entitled Associative Democracy: Democratic Renewal Beyond the Mischiefs of Faction.
The art of associative democracy consists of matching group characteristics with assigned functions and —now admitting the fact of artifactuality— cultivating those characteristics appropriate to functions consistent with the norms of egalitarian democracy. (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 428)

They seize on the notion of the "artifactuality" of secondary associations to legitimate their normative democratic project. However, Cohen and Rogers tend to minimize the deliberative angle to their brand of interest group governance (this despite Cohen's interest in deliberative processes!). Their lack of deliberative consideration notwithstanding, as will be demonstrated below, thrusting a deliberative focus on associative democracy is not problematic.

A Preliminary Collective-Interest Approach to Deliberative Democracy

Miller's typology of politics pitted "dialogue" or a participatory deliberative approach against a pluralistic conception of "interest aggregation". But interest aggregation, in very general terms, does not have to be incompatible with, let alone antagonistic to, the notion of dialogue proposed by the theorists of deliberation. Indeed, the narrowly individualistic focus of the vast majority of the literature on deliberation can most adequately be redressed through the process of amalgamating into collective units the claims and concerns of individuals who share a particular fate or focus.

There is a dearth of literature attempting a coalescence of interest representation with deliberative decision-making. Nevertheless, a preliminary deliberative interest group politics has been proposed by Jane Mansbridge. Much interest group literature is given to the adversarial model of politics with little, if any, focus on the deliberative processes existing among the groups even within normative schemes (Mansbridge, 1992b, 497). Mansbridge combines her work on political choice and game theory with interest intermediation. A political conflict is not necessarily about power in a zero-sum game
between antagonistic and narrow self-interests. The potential for compatibility between "opposing" sides on a determined issue, and the fact that rational persuasion as well as power (and altruistic motives as well as selfish demands) are part of the process of political resolution, renders associative deliberative democracy possible. Politics is not exclusively about force. After all, democracies are founded on principles of justice which attempt (however ineffectively) to mitigate such blatant abuses.

An associative deliberative democracy would seek to "maximize deliberative benefits and minimize rent-seeking costs," (Mansbridge, 1992a, 32) striving for increased cooperation and decreased coercion. Mansbridge believes that such arrangements should seek to equalize power, and increase consideration of the public interest among representative interest associations. For this to become possible it is necessary to promote the participatory formation, articulation and transformation of interests within the interest groups themselves (i.e.: the deliberative process), prior to the final negotiation between interest groups representatives. Hence, she emphasizes the need for two levels of deliberation, internal and external (Mansbridge, 1992b, 502). The complexity of dealing with representational authenticity, and the problems arising from the need for flexible negotiation while maintaining accountability, will be addressed further on. This critical issue (along with other outstanding elements) will be discussed by integrating the work of Cohen and Rogers with that of the deliberative school and some relevant policy analysis literature. This synthesis will serve to justify and complement an associative deliberative democratic model. In general terms, what will be presented are the issues at the junction of dialogue with interest aggregation.

**Associative Deliberative Democracy: Outstanding Theoretical Issues**

In their preliminary model of associative democracy, Cohen and Rogers present a series of advantages and controversies inherent in their prescriptive theory. Five important concerns that arise from this model will be addressed in this section: the problem of complexity and
the provision of information; the debate over civic consciousness and self-transformation; the issue of the choice of participants at the final negotiation; the various internal organizational problems arising from such a scheme; and last, the question of the final outcome procedure.

**Complexity and the Provision of Information**

One of the ill-fated predicaments of the welfare state is that its tasks have increasingly become specialized to tackle those political questions which have grown in complexity. The political system has adopted a Weberian approach to resolving policy problems, featuring bureaucratization, and the depoliticization of issues. In other words, the policy field is permeated by the logic of instrumental action to the detriment of social rationality.

An associative deliberative democracy does not preclude instrumental rationality in the resolution of policy conflict, since there are always crucial technical questions to address. But rather than appropriating an overly scientistic method such as a Popperian piecemeal approach (Dryzek, 1990, 34) for devising rules and regulations, a deliberative model would incorporate social or communicative rationality as a central element in the formulation of public choice.

> The locus of problem solving therefore shifts away from the instrumental manipulation of systems by would-be policy engineers and toward cooperative efforts on the part of a wide range of participants...
> Communicative rationality is oriented toward intersubjective understanding and the generation of action-oriented consensus. (Dryzek, 1990, 70)

This intersubjective understanding is only possible because the participating interest associations bring valuable informational baggage to the resolution of issues. Indeed, the provision of otherwise inaccessible information is one of the major advantages of interest group governance. Interest groups with relevant claims, it can be assumed, possess more knowledge for two reasons. First, these interest associations are typically composed of
members who tend to be directly (and to a lesser extent indirectly) immersed in the political issue under consideration. Hence, they live the problem, they have a more in-depth understanding of its many facets, and they possess first-hand experience which cannot be reproduced in a policy laboratory. Secondly, they have a deliberate incentive to gather the facts for two subsequent reasons. If one assumes that individuals act in accordance with a combination of altruism and selfishness (Mansbridge, 1990a, 136), the motivation to collect pertinent information will be based a) on a commitment to the cause, and b) out of self-interest to advance their particular position.

Whatever the reasons, this presentation of knowledge is legitimizing through the rational exchange and verification of the exposed data. This is similar to the notion of epistemic communities advanced by the policy community and policy learning literature. Policy communities highlight the spectrum of participants within a policy area, and their interaction (or the policy networks) (Coleman and Skogstad, 1990). While the cases studied using this model do not place into question the imbalances of power existing in a system driven in large part by a market logic, they do show the value of provision and exchange of information that interest group participation can bring to the development of policy solutions (Pross, 1990). An associative deliberative model would mitigate the imbalances through increased accessibility and participation creating an even more favorable forum for the exchange of information and debate of alternatives on complex issues.

For Cohen and Rogers, the provision of information is one of the crucial advantages in their associative democratic paradigm. It not only allows for the surfacing of essential information for the resolution of complex problems, but also provides for alternative solutions, and finally additional enforcement of the terms of the consensual solutions. While formulation of policy is possible in many areas, Cohen and Rogers identify certain circumstances where it is absolutely crucial since neither the market nor the bureaucratic state is able to cope. These three areas are the establishment of nonmarket standards (where a flexible approach is required according to time and space), the
enforcement of public standards (where the state cannot possibly monitor), and finally the
determination of uniform public standards (where deliberation is imperative for a
legitimized solution) (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 426). They present these three scenarios
as preliminary areas where only their model would function adequately. However, an
interest group deliberative design would allow for the articulation and exchange of
information for any policy area. In the end, an associative democracy provides a more
holistic approach for arriving at a policy even in a field of high complexity.

Self-Transformation and the Pursuit
of Civic Consciousness

While the presentation of information pertinent to a political issue is helpful, it is in the
dynamics of what follows this transfer of knowledge that the communicative interest group
model holds its greatest potential. Deliberation is not only about the aggregation of interests
manifested by individuals, but more fundamentally it is about their formation (Mansbridge,
1992a, 43). As mentioned above, for deliberation to function one must assume that
interests are not exclusively pre-politically determined. That is, an individual does not
possess a set of fixed rational positions on every subject that has yet to become a political
issue. Even among those political questions affecting an individual in the present, final
articulated claims do not arise monologically or independently. It is only in the interaction
with other individuals/groups, and only after their concerns are articulated and transformed
from the debate between all concerned, that a more subtle, thorough, and reasoned interest
position arises. To use an obvious example, when a significant number of individuals are
confronted with two prominent issues such as taxes and social security, a typical response
is a demand to reduce taxes and increase social security. While this dual response does not
have to be ipso facto contradictory, in most cases it is considered unreasonable since social
services are funded by taxes. Deliberative processes would clarify these and other less
obvious inconsistencies in the articulation of interests (Manin, 1983, 350).
Hence the dialogical articulation of interests occurs through a process of education which can only be achieved through such deliberative exchanges. This phenomenon has been studied by the Policy Learning school, with similarly encouraging results. Sabatier identifies three types of policy learning which occur in interest group deliberative forums. The first type has to do with generating a greater understanding of why certain aspects of one's position are central to one's interest. The second promotes refining the participants' conception of the causal relationships between various elements of the issue. And finally the third has to do with responding to challenges to the party's "belief system", meaning the fundamental criteria and values upon which a group's position is based (Sabatier, 1988, 149-150).

Sabatier identifies the optimal conditions under which such policy learning can take place. The first has to do with capability: all parties must have sufficient resources to be technically equipped to challenge the opponents' arguments. The second, and more problematic condition has to do with the type of conflict in question. According to Sabatier's findings, the conflict should only be between "secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems" (Sabatier, 1988, 155). In other words, zero-sum conflicts are not considered optimal for policy learning; however, as has been stated before, most political questions do not have to be framed in such a win-lose dichotomy, and most active issues are not essentially zero-sum (Quirk, 1989, 907).

Cohen and Rogers believe that such an exchange of interest claims fosters a broader articulated position within each group which, in turn, promotes more other-regarding or at least less particularistic points of view (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 446). While certain authors averse to interest groups have argued against such a method because it promotes

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27In very general terms, the core of a belief system is comprised by the fundamental principles of claims, while the secondary aspects have to do with instrumental methods at achieving the envisioned end. In order for a more elaborate understanding of core and secondary aspects of belief systems refer to Sabatier, 1988, 145.
factionalism and undermines the attainment of a common good, they have often ignored the results of deliberative negotiations. If groups have to justify their positions to other competing interest associations, they will have to do so in such a way as to convince the opposing factions that they have nothing to fear from such a standpoint. They will thus indirectly generate not so much a collective will, but a norm compatible with other existing norms. Subsequently, this helps to nurture a civic consciousness.

This process of education does not exclusively serve the function of discovering an individual's interests or a group's positions. It also encourages the development of a political consciousness (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 424). Associative deliberative processes do not merely constitute a means to deliver one's claim, but also foster education in democratic participation, provide for practical intellectual stimulation, and promote a new political culture. One of the fundamental reasons for the social alienation identified by twentieth century philosophers is this lack of social and political purpose of individuals within their communities. Self-transformation is therefore equally about self-government, autonomy and self-development (Warren, 1992, 11).

Despite the enormous potential of deliberative interest group governance with respect to self-transformation and civic-consciousness, there must always be a conscious normative attempt to promote such forms of regulated interaction to strive for the optimal and most practical conditions for their success (Mansbridge, 1992b, 493). Certain authors, such as Sabatier, have indicated certain general conditions conducive to positive sum outcomes. Mark Warren has also begun to look at the type of goods (rather than interests linked to such goods) that are given to such fora of dispute resolution (Warren, 1992). Nevertheless, this is an area which has only recently attracted any academic interest, and it must be acknowledged that much is hypothetical. However, associative deliberative democracy appears promising as a bearer of self-transformation and the promotion of civic consciousness.
The Choice of Participants and the Limits to Democratic Inclusion

While the deliberative paradigm calls for unfettered individual participation at all levels of decision-making, an associative adaptation proposes individual participation through collective interest associations that send representatives to deliberate on their behalf. While this narrows down the number of participants significantly, the issue now shifts to one of the legitimacy of interest organizations, and the problem of which criteria should be advanced for bestowing the group with the authority to help formulate policy.

Conventional conceptions of corporatism do not have to face this query since "voice" is typically conferred to the two producer groups, business and organized labour, or is granted on the basis of sectional and professional differentiation. By enhancing the scope of corporatism to incorporate a whole array of other questions which will be tentatively formulated as "non-economic", a democratic corporatism will have to face the same choices as an associative deliberative democracy.

Cohen and Rogers do not contribute much to this crucial debate. To go beyond an abstract theoretical presentation, it is necessary to propose practical criteria which maintain both standards of democracy and efficiency. As they advocate the inclusion of underrepresented groups, or interests which do not manage to adequately receive proper representation within territorially aggregated political systems, Cohen and Rogers limit their discussion to their model's potential for representing a number of heretofore excluded groups. These include functional interests, "categoric" interests (those advanced by the New Social Movements), low intensity interests (those who do not register to vote due to a variety of social obstacles), and minority interests (which are stymied by majority configurations) (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 424).

As to the problem of which groups participate around a policy round-table, they propose that groups be accorded (and revoked) public status based on review boards, yet they mention no standards that these boards are to utilize. Even after a sincere attempt is made to advance the predicament of underrepresented interests, they argue that despite the
inadequacies it beats any other system which is not group-centric (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 450). While they seem to promote peak organizational representation, they leave the issue of representational inclusion exclusively up to the conventional territorial legislature (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 451). They do not grant the issue prime importance if they are willing to subjugate it unconditionally to the territorial political assembly and risk it being at the whim of the party in power.

Those that do tentatively provide actual criteria do not, in the end, deliver much more insight. Mansbridge believes this is an issue which has yet to be adequately answered. Two possible standards could be, a) groups that possess pertinent information to the policy field or the more obvious b) groups that have crucial interests which are affected (Mansbridge, 1992a, 48). While his approach is not clearly group-based, John Burnheim offers two criteria similar to Mansbridge's but broader: a) people whose interests are affected; and b) people who are motivated by an issue (i.e.: active in a cause) without it affecting them directly (Burnheim, 1985, 13-14). These standards would allow for the provision of necessary information, and offers citizens an opportunity to participate in a deliberative process in which they have a stake.

Other interpretations emphasize the need to represent a certain group over others. Iris Marion Young distinguishes between the notion of interest group and that of social group. She argues that a social group is much more inclusive and hence possesses more than just a narrow desire to influence policy (Young, 1992, 531). Social groups constituted on the basis of gender, race, culture, sexual orientation, religion, age, health and other determining characteristics, have an interest in the promotion and self-development of the individuals within their respective communities. Since they are structurally disadvantaged, she claims that they deserve overrepresentation to compensate

\[28\] Mansbridge, (as does Cohen and Rogers in passing), does advance Schmitter's criteria of inclusion via the voucher system as an attractive means of dealing with the problem in the most democratic avenue that has yet to be proposed (Mansbridge, 1992a, 41). For a critique of Schmitter's corporative democracy refer to chapter III.
for the social and political obstacles they face. They should not only be conferred participant status, but their position should carry more weight than conventional interests, that should not be deliberately represented (hence avoiding an overload of participants!) (Young, 1990, 187).

If it is exceedingly difficult to determine requisites for inclusion in the participatory process, perhaps looking at the other end of the spectrum—the standards for exclusion—may provide some understanding as to who should merit a quasi-public status. According to Dryzek's all-inclusive model, the only barrier to participation should take the form of the American First Amendment freedoms. In other words those groups which would inhibit freedom of expression, tolerance, or participation would be excluded unless they submitted "an exceptionally substantial burden of proof" (Dryzek, 1990, 39), thereby protecting the deliberative setting from such anti-democratic elements in society. Despite these "reasonable" limits on inclusion, they do not further clarify who can legitimately be accorded the right to participate.

Turning to the literature on policy learning, Sabatier has indicated that most policy subsystems contain 20 to 30 organizations, and these in turn tend to coalesce into two to four advocacy coalitions (which tend to remain stable for at least a period of a decade) (Sabatier, 1988, 139-140). These advocacy coalitions do not take the shape of peak organizations in the corporatist manner; however, they do underscore the tendency for similarly-oriented interest groups to pool resources in a pluralist setting.

In an associative deliberative democracy, while a fair distribution of resources (financial, organizational or otherwise) would guarantee some degree of equality among associations, the question still arises whether all groups that have slightly differing positions on issues should be equally represented. Or should there be encouragement towards peak organizational representation as in traditional corporatist régimes? If there is a limit on the number of groups participating, does one allow only the groups with the largest membership, with the most affected interests (notwithstanding the difficulty to make such a
normative judgement), with the most informational resources? How does one democratically accommodate minorities, groups only indirectly affected by the effects of policy, or fringe groups whose sole purpose is to bog the system down? These questions still need further research. But there is little evidence to indicate that there would be an overload of participating interest groups in such processes, or that a review board could not democratically limit or confer the quasi-public status to the appropriate associations. As Cohen and Rogers affirm,

...[the] threat is posed not by groups per se but by particular kinds of groups interacting in particular ways with the more traditional processes of public decision making. In thinking about groups, recognition of this is the beginning of wisdom and of the hope that group energies might be enlisted without ruinous faction. (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 428)

**Internal Issues of Interest Group Governance**

The main problem facing interest groups participating in an associative deliberative scheme is in the representation of members demands vis-à-vis the élite representatives. Because it is associative, and no longer individually-centered, the deliberative processes must adjust to a representational scheme. As noted in Chapter III, the optimal type of representation in a collectivist framework is the mandate form. This becomes even more pressing since the negotiators within a deliberative forum need flexibility to allow for policy learning, self-transformation, and hence for making positive-sum outcomes feasible. A mandate representative would allow for periodical consultation with his interest constituency, but how far should this consultation extend? To what degree should centralization predominate? And how does one reconcile accountability with results?

Once again this is an issue that does not lend itself to a clear answer. Cohen and Rogers recognize the problem of potentially disparate interests of the rank and file and their representatives. However, they claim that centralization does not have to be averse to democratic accountability. The iron law of oligarchy, whereby the elites control the
masses, can be attenuated through normative agency. Mechanisms can be implemented to enhance internal responsiveness, such as the institutionalization of elections to various positions, procedures for internal debate, and special plebiscites on key issues (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 448). Indeed, Mansbridge makes internal deliberative processes the central element of an associative democracy, in the absence of which one can claim no genuine democratic credentials (Mansbridge, 1992b, 502).

The treatment of representation in the existing literature remains for the most part unsophisticated, very general, and tentatively hypothetical. If a mandate representative is to have flexibility, it is imperative to identify general parameters of her discretion. Mansbridge believes that it is necessary for a participant to place herself in the shoes of her adversaries. In order for this to be possible it is necessary that the adversary's interest is clearly identified (Mansbridge, 1992a, 42). However, often in negotiations a participating group does not always present its interests but rather its position on an issue. According to negotiation experts Roger Fisher and William Ury, for a deliberative process to succeed it is crucial to present one's interests and to disassociate them from objectives:

Interests define the problem. The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fears... Such desires and concerns are interests. Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide. (Fisher and Ury, 1981, 42)

The need to dissociate interest from objective, to identify the problem as separate from the solution, will temper the rigidity of fixed claims. It would be even more appropriate to distinguish between a) interest, b) goal (or position), and c) the means (of arriving at the goal). While goals, and the means for attaining them should take a back seat to the articulation of pure interests, they should not be altogether ignored. This categorization of the demands of interest groups could arguably determine the trade-off
between contributions of the rank and file versus their representatives' need for flexible discretion.

Perhaps the internal membership of the organization should be limited to identifying the interests of the organization, by which the representative is bound. Goals should also figure prominently in the internal deliberation of the association; however, the representative should possess discretion on this point. The same can be said of the advancement of the means for attaining the goal: the mandate representative should consider propositions from the floor, but at the same time be willing to change the position if needed during the external negotiation. This potential arrangement would provide a significant voice to the constituency, while at the same time bestowing the necessary autonomy onto the representative during inter-group deliberation.

Perhaps a revision of goals by the representative should demand a membership vote of approval. While these are merely tentative suggestions for dealing with the issue of the relations between grassroots and representative elites, they show the possibility of overcoming some of the more daunting obstacles to reconciling representative autonomy with membership responsiveness.

**Procedural Outcome: The Determinants and the Dilemma of Consensus**

Even if there were some simple path to attain acceptable standards for interest group participation in these deliberative processes, it would not resolve all the difficulties inherent in the proposed model. From the problem at the source of deliberative processes (choice of participants), it is now necessary to turn to the issue that arises at the end of the negotiation: how to ultimately decide on a policy option. This question involves two distinct aspects. First, it is helpful to discern what conditions would be favorable to the achievement of some common ground. Second, it is important to identify a procedural mechanism for obtaining a legitimate policy solution.
Paul Quirk identifies certain determinants of cooperation such as 1) the need for benefits from cooperation should be significant; 2) the reduction of obstacles to reaching agreement should be encouraged; 3) losses from a failed attempt should be moderate; and, 4) gains through conflict should be small. While many of these factors are determined by circumstance, it is necessary for intermediaries to directly encourage such conditions where possible. Quirk also identifies the range of possible solutions to negotiations and the degree of difficulty for their acceptance. In order of increasing complexity and decreasing probability these are: 1) Compromise, which involves significant but not insurmountable concessions; 2) trade-off, which consists of major concessions by all parties; 3) agreement by compensation, where one faction reluctantly concedes on a crucial matter in exchange for indemnification; 4) agreement by re-orientation, where all parties concede their original claims in exchange for a less favorable alternative (Quirk, 1989, 913).

The probability of there being a more advantageous outcome for all depends in great part on the role of the mediator. A mediator oversees the claims of the represented groups and relates their interests to each other. In other words, the mediator should be capable of orienting the deliberative process towards a consensus agreement. However, a mediator is different from an arbitrator, or legal adjudicator, since these impose an outcome whether there is agreement among the parties or not (Dryzek, 1990, 46).

Consensus is a fundamental characteristic of the deliberative process. Communicative rationality aims at attainment of convergence on an ethical question, in ideal terms. However, real associative deliberations will not take place under utopian conditions. If unanimous consent cannot take place, is majority rule acceptable? While it quite blatantly contradicts an action-oriented communicative rationality, most authors agree that if

29Quirk also concludes that participating interest organizations should not be based on a left-right cleavage, otherwise the probability of agreement decreases (Quirk, 1989, 915). This is inconsistent with corporatist instances which are typically comprised of two ideologically antagonistic partners, namely business and organized labour. Not only do these two organizations reflect respectively the right-wing and left-wing political tendencies in society, they are often in tight conjunction with the Conservative (or Christian Democratic) party and the Socialist (or Social Democratic) party respectively in many European states.
If a certain group did not manage to convince the other participants of the value of their position, and an agreement was reached on the basis of the most acceptable position to the majority, then the group(s) not party to the majority may not accept and hence not abide by the outcome. Furthermore, if a deliberative process is to include all interested parties, if a majority decision mechanism is in effect, and if no party possesses a veto, then there may be a tendency towards amalgamating the quickest majority position without the need to listen, debate and consider (the essence of deliberation) strategically marginal minority interests. If an associative deliberative democracy is to mitigate the exclusion of minority interests, majority rule cannot be the end objective. However, if agreement is to be crafted, meaning more than the lowest common denominator (or the status-quo due to a probable stalemate) then some more effective form of outcome mechanism is required.

Is there a way out of such a dilemma? Habermas' communicative ethics provides for a mechanism to reach agreements. If it is too utopian for a consensus on the substantive content of policy, it may be a more realistic model for reaching an agreement on procedure at the outset of the deliberative process. This would allow participants to accept the outcome as legitimate even if they opted for a majority rule and minority positions were refuted. Nevertheless, there may not be consensus on procedure if the position of all parties are pre-determined and the stakes of each position well known. For those who would care to block the process where compromise was too costly, a veto would be preferred; while for those that foresee a predictably large interest coalition, majority rule would be the preference—hence no agreement on how to agree. Another potential alternative, yet a more complicated one, is to accept a majority vote, but with the possibility of minority interests appealing the decision to a judicial board on the basis of the unjust exclusion of fundamentally vital interests. Once again, this begs the question of how to establish standards for defining and compensating a "vital interest".
These and many more questions are left unanswered. An associative deliberative democracy may offer much promise as an alternative model, yet many issues are yet to be thoroughly assessed theoretically and empirically.

**Corporatism and Associative Deliberative Democracy**

Is an Associative Deliberative Democracy Corporatist?

An associative deliberative democratic model offers hope for practical alternative forms of governance. With the prospects of such a promising theoretical framework is there any longer a need to salvage a corporatist democratic theory, especially considering its manifold shortcomings? Why bother with a problematic phenomenon when a new model based on similar premises is taking off?

Rather than viewing the combination of associative and deliberative approaches as presenting a challenge to corporatism's "monopoly" on interest group governance models, it should be seen as a vindication of those seemingly futile, but in fact insightful, attempts at elaborating a democratic theory of corporatism. Despite its origins in pluralist North America, the associative literature makes valuable theoretical contact with corporatist literature.

Cohen and Rogers, however, make a point to distinguish their associative scheme from corporatist procedures in Europe. They claim that corporatist arrangements are burdened with fixed monopolies, and limit the types of interest groups eligible for inclusion (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 441). While it is true that the bulk of corporatist instances are closed to non-producer groups, Cohen and Rogers have overlooked the more inclusive corporatist arrangements in Scandinavian countries. The definition of corporatism should not be bound to conventional tripartite negotiations on incomes and social policy, but rather should encompass the wide variety of structural and procedural variants in theory and practice. Indeed, Mansbridge, who more solidly makes the connection between the associative paradigm and the literature on deliberation, has argued that this model may be
legitimately labelled *neocorporatism*, where the "neo" brings into the fold non-traditional interests, beyond the socio-economic and sectoral organizations (Mansbridge, 1992b, 495).30

**Is Corporatism Dead?**

The associative deliberative model may be compatible with corporatism, but a more crucial query is whether corporatism is compatible with late twentieth century welfare states. The decline of corporatist practices is in part due to the fluctuating economic performance of many European states with corporatist structures. The problem that must be overcome initially is the practicality of such arrangements.

Any modern theory of democracy must address questions of political governability and stability, an indispensable requisite of which is economic efficiency.

The question "does corporatism matter?" has been broached quite frequently. However, as is the case with almost any broad and controversial issue, the answer depends on who is addressing the question. According to Schmitter, corporatism can be narrowly conceptualized as a further stage of advanced capitalism. He stipulates that corporatist arrangements developed gradually according to the need for rationalization in an increasingly competitive and specialized economic arena (Schmitter, 1979, 77). According to Bob Jessop, while it was an essential tool for a post-Keynesian state's purpose to optimize capital accumulation, corporatism seems to favour monopoly capital over the interests of small or medium business. Nevertheless, corporatism is definitely consequential (Jessop, 1979, 44-45).

Panitch contends that corporatism is a manifestation of an advanced capitalist economy in which capital has to adapt to the emerging realities of a dynamic system (Panitch, 1979, 123). He identifies several reasons for the emergence of corporatism

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30This is not the conventional use of the term *neocorporatism*. "Neo", in the European literature does not specifically signify the inclusion of non-traditional corporatist participants; this is Mansbridge's personal conceptualization. For a history of the development of the term *corporatism/neocorporatism* refer to chapter II.
which could explain its significance. Among these he includes the need in certain countries
to successfully commit to full employment (Panitch, 1979, 132), and a desire to control and
coordinate incomes policy (Panitch, 1979, 135). However, these structures are precarious
despite their serving the purpose of fostering stability and efficiency by mitigating
unforeseen consequences via concerted negotiations. On more than one occasion
corporatist negotiations have deadlocked and broken down, forcing the government to
adopt extreme measures to prevent social chaos. Nevertheless, Panitch reiterates that
despite this ominous potential, deadlock crises are merely short-term, and corporatist
negotiations tend to reconstitute themselves once the crises have subsided (Panitch, 1979,
145).

In 1982, Manfred Schmidt published an article measuring the rates of economic
success of several corporatist and non-corporatist countries during the recession of the
1970s. He concluded that rates of employment depended positively on corporatism along
with two other factors (the balance of power between the left and the right outside of
parliament, along with the structure of labour markets) (Schmidt, 1982, 252). In general,
corporatist countries fared better and were able to weather the recession with less
discomfort than those countries lacking corporatist arrangements or the other requisite
variables.

Schmidt's work was challenged in 1988 with Göran Therborn's analysis of the
relevance of corporatism in the economy. He did not find any link between corporatist
structures and levels of unemployment and inflation. The data collected showed no
correlation, positive nor negative. Therborn concluded that the classification "corporatism"
was much too broad and unclear to be able to establish any causal relations of any kind
(Therborn, 1988, 280).

The debate over whether corporatism matters was once again addressed in 1992, by
Alan Siaroff. By pointing to the problem of categorization and degrees and variations of
arrangements existing in what is generically labelled "corporatism" in different countries,
Siaroff was able to clarify this controversial question. To establish whether corporatism has any effect on the economic productivity, level of employment, and rate of inflation of a country, it is necessary to re-conceptualize the issue. Corporatism alone is insufficient for the basis of comparison. Hence Siaroff classifies nations according to a new term, the "Stable Integrated Political Economy" whereby corporatist arrangements are a fundamental characteristic along with other variables (Siaroff, 1992, 18-19). As the concept indicates, stability and efficiency are a hallmark of this qualified corporatist régime.

It is obvious that this controversy will never be fully resolved. Perhaps there is no guaranteed "economic" benefit to corporatism, and perhaps stability is in no way increased due to these structures. Nevertheless, nothing points to a necessary infeasibility of corporatist arrangements compared to non-corporatist pluralist democracies. According to Therborn,

In a sense, the corporatist problematic has functioned as an important scaffold for erecting a more adequate watchtower of the intricate dialectics of classes and states in contemporary advanced capitalism. But the scaffold should not be mistaken for the tower or the vistas from it, and probably it is now time for the scaffold to be dismantled. (Therborn, 1988, 281)

Precisely because it has offered this more adequate watchtower, rather than dismantling the scaffold, it would be more constructive to build on by readjusting it. Using corporatism in democratic theory will eventually permit strengthening of the tower and perhaps even enhance the scope of the vistas.

**Globalization and the Shift Towards Meso and Local Corporatism**

Adjustments to the scaffold have permitted the adaptation of corporatism in the face of the ominous challenges posed by the changing international economy. Globalization has eroded the consequentiaity of national borders and hence undermined peak corporatist arrangements.
According to Wolfgang Streeck, associative democracy or traditional nationally-centralized corporatist concertation is in effect obsolete. This he attributes to the crisis within financial markets experienced in the 1970s and early 1980s. The subsequent "flight" of capital into deregulated economic zones with low levels of taxation caused a stir within the industrialized world:

With capital able and ready to leave, and with governments having lost the capacity to tax capital for full employment through a "going rate" of inflation, monetary stability became the foremost economic objective even in the "bargained economies" of Western Europe. (Streeck, 1992, 518)

This problem is based on the fact that corporatism requires the elimination of free-riding for its success. Therefore, "exit" from such arrangements should translate into a lack of "voice". However, in an increasingly borderless context, "exit" from one system does not necessarily penalize a free-rider. Instead, the organization that leaves (i.e.: financial capital) has the option to reap more benefits elsewhere where such restrictions do not exist, hence undermining macro-corporatism.

While it is true that this factor has chipped away at the integrity of corporatist structures in Western Europe, corporatist structures are still in place; not all interest organizations have the power to "exit" from their collective responsibility. There is a need to distinguish between peak producer corporatism and other configurations of associative interest group governance. Schmitter in his latter work is also skeptical of the permanence of this "supreme" corporatist model, but he is not fatalistic:

Especially when viewed from the macro- or national-level, it [corporatism] looks too small in scale to have much influence over transnational forces and too large in scale to be of much help in the restructuring of sectoral and regional patterns. The notion of setting up a new neo-corporatist dynasty at the global- or meta-level is positively frightening, given the transaction costs involved and the potential decisional perversities... The prospect of a proliferation of meso-corporatists seems less thrilling, but also a good deal less threatening. (Schmitter, 1988, 72-73)
Therefore, not only can corporatism survive this challenge from transnational forces, but it tackles the issue of increasingly localized interests which cannot be universalized (even within the context of a nation). Political issues will have to be dealt with on a case by case basis rather than through comprehensive umbrella negotiations which cover a larger constituency with greater latitude of compromise. However, more negotiations will be required to develop the same policy coverage, and while the stakes will not be as high, decisions will be no easier to reach.

The fact that micro and meso-corporatism naturally address issues which cannot be elevated to a national level may be theoretically opportunistic. However, if such macro-corporatist schemes are not being replaced by lower levels of corporatist concertation then corporatism may as well be pronounced defunct. There is, however, a substantial amount of literature documenting the rise of meso-corporatism, (and to a lesser extent micro-corporatism) (Hernes and Selvik, 1981; Cawson, 1985, 1986; Schmitter, 1988). The dynamics and the results of regional and sectoral levels of corporatism do not appear to differ substantially from the macro national arena (Williamson, 1989, 161). The major difference is that corporatist instances at the lower level tend to be less class polarized as industry and labour will often stand with a similar position (Cawson, 1986, 108-109).

Despite the many challenges with which it has had to battle, corporatism has proven resilient, positively consequential, and more importantly, versatile. In the end, this versatility makes corporatism not only feasible, but adaptable to an associative deliberative democracy.

**The Two Logics of Agency in a Corporatist Deliberative Democracy**

The prospects of deliberative processes to accommodate a large range of policy arenas suggest the need to open the concept of corporatism beyond traditional socio-economic functional lines. A corporatist democratic theory must accommodate the non-producer interests in civil society such as those originating in notions of social identity as well as
those derived from other non-economic standpoints. The two corporatist types, industrial interest and social interest, will be assessed independently to adequately address their inherent differences.

**Industrial Interest Corporatism:**

Democracy in no way implies *a fortiori* either economic productivity, competent management, or even state governability. In other words, "[d]emocratization will not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or 'the end of ideology.'" (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, 87). Hence, the introduction of democracy may well produce conditions which will eventually destroy the requisite factors for its existence. It is evident that democracy can be self-contradictory to sustain and reproduce itself.

This contradiction is aggravated when placed in conjunction with capitalism as a socio-economic system. Capitalism can be identified as a mode of production characterized by the existence of private property and a free market for purchasing and the selling of goods, services, and labour. Furthermore a market economy also entails that "...most decisions regarding employment, technology, investment and other matters of clear social importance are in the hands of private individuals." (Brooks and Stritch, 1991,4)

Nevertheless, Brooks and Stritch identify capitalism and democracy as two antagonistic distributive mechanisms represented by the market and the state respectively. The market places a vast range of distributive choices in the hands of a few yet the resource allocating mechanism is exceedingly efficient for capital accumulation. On the other hand, the state is a resource allocating system which is democratically accountable but pits the interest of the collective against the interests of individuals working within the market (Brooks and Stritch, 1991) Democracies have tended to forsake economic equality for formal political equality (i.e: equality of opportunity rather than equality of condition). The
state abates the undesirable effects of the market by limited capital redistribution which antagonizes the market.

It is the antagonism between individualism and collectivism, freedom and equality, the private and the public, the employer and the employee, the producer and the consumer, the market and the state, as well as participation and governability that constitute the dichotomies within capitalist democracies. In no way is it suggested that corporatism would significantly reduce, let alone resolve such historical tensions. However, it is necessary to go beyond such reductivist polarizations and surpass the simplistic logic of opting for one or the other within each pair, or attempt an "objective mix" of the two. It would be constructive to examine how much of each is more beneficial to which interests. That daunting task remains out of the reach of this thesis. The purpose here is to justify a choice of actors which could effectively and justly negotiate and implement this "compromise" of interests within the context of capitalism.

Capitalist relations of production and exchange within liberal states create a class polarization which inflicts contradictory tendencies within national democratic governance. The welfare of a liberal state depends on constant economic growth which in turn depends on continuous capital accumulation by business. This relegates labour to a subservient position, since one way for business to optimize profit is by cutting back on the costs of labour (i.e.: cutting back wages, benefits, and even workers). But the welfare of labour is in large part dependent on income, job security, and especially employment. Marxist analyses of social relations in capitalism identify basic inequalities among the two antagonistic "social partners" in democratic corporatist structures. Much of the corporatist literature accepts the centrality of this antagonism as the justification for confining corporatism to arrangements involving socio-economic producer groups (Jessop, 1979, 43; Panitch, 1980, 171; Schmitter, 1983, 918).

Due to the predominant "productivist logic" of corporatism, business and labour qualify as the two eligible participants in such structures. It is vital to identify the
characteristics of each interest-association to evaluate whether business and labour are each homogeneous interests, have equal resources, and possess comparable procedural accessibility.

It is much too simplistic to claim they are each but one of a plethora of interest organizations. They must be, from the outset, identified as comprising a class in the Marxist sense of the term. This is especially the case with business (as it would be more reticent than labour to adopt such an identity) which is often perceived as a special interest with the same rights and opportunities as any other group (Offe, 1985a, 175; Coleman, 1990, 264). However, to simply accept the class designation for business and labour and assume equal representation is also naïve.

The two classes, even if they are accorded an equal vote in negotiated solutions to economic policy, are by no means equal. Offe identifies two distinct logics of collective action which shatters that myth (Offe, 1985a). He found that labour and business manifested a significant difference in terms of function and performance which created inequalities despite nominally equal representation. These disparities include the fact that unions have to organize workers in each firm to become a united collectivity, while business/management constitutes a unit from the outset (Offe, 1985a, 178) if conceived at the firm level. Business can attenuate its reliance on labour, however the opposite is not true, for labour is intrinsically linked to capital. Offe believes that,

> [...] because of this asymmetrical dependency relationship, the collectivity of all workers must be, paradoxically, more concerned with the well-being and the propensity of capitalists than the capitalists are with the well-being of the working-class. (Offe, 1985a, 180)

Offe's analysis is limited, since he is primarily interested in the single firm and factory union. Relational differences arise when labour-business exchanges are elevated to a larger corporatist arrangement. Labour may indeed be disadvantaged, however there are other organizational impediments which do not necessarily affect labour but can in turn be
crippling to capital. Business is often considered a monolithic interest, however it is important to note its highly fragmented nature (Brooks and Stritch, 1991, 13). Business is divided by region, size, sector and the logic of competition. Hence small and medium business are often pitted against big business, manufacturing against resource based industries, foreign firms against national firms, and industry against industry. Despite these immense divisions, corporatism has developed at different levels to account for this fragmentation.

According to Cawson, corporatism should not be conceptualized exclusively at the national level. Many issues which involve industry and labour do not need to be resolved by the central governing bodies. Mesocorporatism (as introduced above) deals with sectoral policy, and microcorporatism with smaller organizational units (right down to the single firm) (Cawson, 1986, 75). However, at this echelon of corporatist intermediation class interests may take second place to functional or professional differentiation. For example, capital and unions may (or may not) share a common interest in trade policy by opening new markets, or protecting their own. Moreover, interests may cut across class lines in the demand for industrial state subsidies (Williamson, 1989, 161). While the different levels of corporatism may respond to certain incongruities in organizational unity, they cannot account for all.

Another problem arises with respect to the internal governance of the two class-based organizations. Offe identifies two types of interaction, the monological (which entails no democratic consultation) and dialogical (which corresponds to a collective decision-making process). While business typically exhibits the monological pattern, labour tends to manifest a mix of the two depending on the particular structures of the union. This creates a problem since internal democracy seems to be sacrificed for more efficient forms of decision-making by both participants but especially business (Offe, 1985, 205-206).
It is indeed problematic to devise a scheme whereby more or less weight was attributed to each of the group participants according to their original privileges or disadvantages. While there can be no question that labour is the clear underdog in the partnership, the contradictions within business should not be underestimated. For Cawson, the only solution that seems reasonable is to understand these corporatist relations not in terms of degree of input, but rather by outcome (hence he stresses the criteria of responsiveness over that of accessibility) (Cawson, 1986, 147). Nevertheless, the intent here is to demonstrate certain salient proclivities which can be drawn from the empirical evidence, and from that knowledge derive adjustive measures for a prescriptive formula which will mitigate the perverse effects of existing corporatist practices.

**Social Interest Corporatism**

To meet reasonable standards in democratic theory, corporatist structures must go beyond such a reductionist view of politics. Oppressive social relations are not exclusive to relations of production. The creation of economic surplus in conditions of class domination is not the sole driving force behind all social relations. There are social inequalities in democracies which do not pertain directly to capitalist relations of production, even if these generally serve to perpetuate them (Young, 1990, 39-63). The rise of New Social Movements demanding a more democratically responsive state to address rights-claims of gender, race, ethnicity/culture, sexual orientation, physical/mental disability, and other less group-specific issues of concern such as the environment or militarism, highlights logical and practical breaks from traditional class-struggle. The concept of "progressive struggle" advanced by Laclau and Mouffe (1987) contends that "...politics must abandon its narrow productivist logic and adopt a cultural politics that struggles over the discursive conditions of identity formation as a precondition to a radical democratic movement" (Best and Kellner, 1991, 198).
Rather than seeing workers as one of a plethora of social groups in the struggle against capitalism, it is necessary to separate the predominantly "productivist logic" from the "new social movement logic." Here, it is fundamental to part from the radical democracy school. Since the interaction and intermediation of interests in corporatist arrangements will differ substantially from one logic to the other, it is necessary to conceptualize these logics separately.

It would be much too simplistic to assume that democratic evaluation of industrial interest corporatist procedures applies identically to all those corporatized interests that are not immediately identified as economic. While much of the internal logic of corporatized interest associations is valid regardless of the type of interest, certain specificities must be examined for those interests not aggregated along class, sectoral or professional lines. The purpose here is to justify such a social-interest corporatism, to identify the similarities and to pinpoint where there is rupture.

Why does so much of the literature on corporatism shun this form of integrated organizational governance? In much of Schmitter's work there is a total contempt for the corporatization of non-economic "marginal interests" as he labels them (Schmitter, 1983, 918). He believes that the incorporation of such groups would induce the paralysis of the entire system of governance. By limiting them to the pluralist mode of interest intermediation, they can more easily be ignored and prevented from bringing in their complex and conflicting demands onto a confined, structured, and potentially precarious system of economic group concertation. Schmitter stated that one of the principle reasons corporatist channels have survived is the exclusion of such entitlement demanding social-interest groups31 (Schmitter, 1982, 271).

31 Here Schmitter distinguishes between entitled organizations and single-issue movements. The former involves groups which are composed of a common fate, such as "tenants, renters, pensioners, pedestrians, taxpayers, foreign workers, motorists, students..."; while the latter entails a formation with one unified purpose pertaining to a single policy area and issue. He does not dispute the validity of the claims presented by the social groups, but he does not believe they should settle their claims through corporatist concertation. Single-issue movements, on the other hand, he qualifies as potentially devitalizing either way
It is only recently that he has acknowledged the hypothetical potential of such non-economic pressure groups in corporatist structures (although this he states only in passing) (Schmitter, 1989, 64). Even Offe, who generally regards such associations with more sympathy, labelled them "policy takers," implying they have little if any influence on the policy making process, let alone in corporatist negotiations. They are but passive recipients of decisions formulated elsewhere (Offe, 1985b, 139) because individuals with such collective interest affinities have not traditionally been organized as have labour unions. Even when they do amalgamate and form a group with a unified voice, unless their numbers or resources warrant attention, they pose no threat to a state more preoccupied with fundamental economic matters.

The lack of participation by the policy-takers is linked to the critical role played by the so-called strategic actors in society (Magagna, 1988, 421-22). Labour and especially business representatives hold key roles in the functioning of the economy even when they do not engage in corporatist negotiations. They are strategic because they wield direct power. Non-economic social groups must search for their influence elsewhere. Moreover, corporatist structures were not intended at their origin to tackle such a broad spectrum of political questions. Magagna believes that the language of corporatism is confined to the "discourse of efficiency" (Magagna, 1988, 437). The question of efficiency with respect to other policy areas has not been seriously addressed due to the overwhelming instrumental logic that determines policy orientation. Consequentially, the theoretical argument for incorporation of social-interest associations would rest primarily on the presumption of a discursive social rationality emerging in their exercises in concertation.

Much of the literature rejects such groups as corporatist players on the basis that unlike classes, they are not "constituted in terms of a contradictory relation to one another" (Panitch, 1980, 176). Because labour and business are often seen as natural "class
enemies", pitting them against one another is considered legitimate in the formation of incomes policy. The so-called policy-takers on the other hand do not fit into such easily identifiable opposing interest group camps. If there are no immediate natural antagonists in a certain social-policy area, then why attempt to establish corporatist procedures when there is also a lack of pre-existing valid norms for the attribution of public status?32

To legitimate such interests it is necessary to reject such simplified binary polarizations. Interests are not identified in society as either "black or white"; even class interests. Many comparativists working within the corporatist field acknowledge this and find no reason to limit corporatism by design to class. Rather, they encourage multi-interest participation in deliberative negotiations (Christensen and Egeberg, 1979; Hirst, 1990, 34; Nedelman and Meier, 1977, 43).

According to Nedelman and Meier, there is no basis for exclusion of non-economic groups. They believe that the criterion of inclusion based on some economic justification is misleading. If applied, such criteria would not obviously exclude "non-economic" interest associations from corporatist participation based on the ambiguity of the criterion. Most social groups have a material dimension linked to their claims (Nedelman and Meier, 1977, 45; Warren, 1992, 10). The example of women's groups illustrates this point quite precisely. Discrimination against women is based on historical and sociological factors that are not centered on material goods. However, financial redress may be a fundamental aspect of their claim based on the fact that the discriminatory tendencies are reproduced within the labour market. While women's groups may stake claims which are economic, their complaints are not originally derived from the capitalist system. Hence, all social interest groups, whether they possess economic claims or not, are justified in the integrated group decision-making structures.

32The theoretical question of criteria to establish norms of legitimizing the incorporation of interest groups has been discussed briefly in Chapter IV. While no conclusive mechanism was proposed, this does not automatically rule out the possibility of discovering standards that would be socially acceptable.
Determining why there are so few existing cases of non-economic social corporatism involves consideration of many factors. Very few countries actually incorporate non class, sectoral or professional interest collectives in their group representative procedures. Those countries which are more receptive to a broader range of issues and group representation are the Scandinavian states. This can be attributed primarily to political culture, since Scandinavia has always shown a tendency not only to increased democratization but also towards an accent on collective group formation and public recognition. Despite such a history, even in Norway, which is considered to be one of the more inclusive corporatist nations, 68% of all national corporatized organizations are economic interest groups. The remaining 32% are divided among groups comprising interests ranging from sports and culture, to religion and the environment (Christensen and Egeberg, 1979, 241).

The reason most often cited for this lack of representation is that such groups are typically ideologically based, and that compromise (the *sine qua non* of corporatist decision-making) is anathema to the set principles upon which these groups are founded (Offe 1985a, 831; Olsen, 1983, 159). The logic behind this argument would suggest then, that an environmental group which demands the elimination of effluent emissions into a river would not accept a solution which would simply curb such emissions or terminate them gradually. Given that there are many examples to the contrary (Amy, 1987; Bingham, 1986), the logic here is flawed. While this may be the case with all radical groups (even class-based), there is nothing inherent in such a situation which would prevent a more moderate environmentalist group from accepting such a compromise.

Another argument for their lack of compromise potential is that these groups are more likely to emphasize individual participation within their unit; hence the reticence to "delegate discretion" to representatives negotiating on their behalf (Olsen, 1983, 176). While this may be the case with certain types of associations, not all groups demonstrate such dynamics (Pestoff, 1983, 108).
Other reasons for their lack of appeal in corporatist arrangements include the fact that non-economic associations are typically not strong interest groups. They often lack in numbers, motivation, and/or resources (Olsen, 1983, 171). Moreover, they exhibit "asymmetrical conditions for exchange". In other words, while labour and business each have bargaining power (i.e.: they each have something to offer in exchange for something else), other social interests have nothing more than a stipulated position (not even retributive power). Retributive power may exist in more subtle incarnations. A social-interest group, because it lacks the assets of producer groups, has to innovate and find new ways to exert the pressure that leads to recognition as a legitimate participant. It holds the threat of public protest, if anything. While it is much more cumbersome to mobilize a group's membership to rally for a cause than to call a wildcat strike, it nevertheless can be effective. While non-producer groups influence may be reduced because they are not directly economically strategic, their ability to disrupt economic and political activity may yield similar results in the end.

Another factor working against them is political culture. The state, (whether working through corporatist arrangements, or directly) is seen as encroaching increasingly into the private sphere. Indeed, many non-economic social-groups believe that this division between the private and the public is an artificial construction built in to keep their interests unregulated (i.e.: left to the instrumentalist logic of the market) (Erikson, 1990, 358). This is especially the case today where government implication into otherwise private domains and the growing bureaucratization of many facets of individual's lives is seen as one of the major normative failures of the welfare-state. Social corporatism thus can be perceived as an instrument of state intrusion in citizen's private affairs.

Social welfare corporatism, however, has served to slow the bureaucracy's regulation in the realm of the provision of social services. A major manifestation identified with the crisis of the welfare state (in Chapter I) was the growing awareness of the lack of social input by the "clients" of services provided by the ailing system (Bélanger and
Lévesque, 1992, 2-3). While self-determination did not figure prominently as one of the primary goals in the implementation of a social security network, its increasingly technocratic and bureaucractic nature has become a serious problem. Citizens have grown increasingly impatient with a system in which they have no say, and in which accountability is not a fortiori required.

Most of the authority in the social services resides primarily in the hands of the political administration and in those of the professionals which operate within the system. This came about specifically because social provisions are not readily situated either in the market system or the state system. Previous to the implantation of the welfare state, these services were in private hands subject to the market laws of supply and demand. When the state took over these tasks, the authority shifted towards a bureaucratic and professional administration. While a democratic government is considered accountable with respect to general policy, the actual function of social services is more in the hands of professionals than of consumers/citizens (Godbout and Paradeise, 1988, 100).

Corporatized social service systems have always favored the producers of those services before the consumers. Professionals in the role of producers are granted a voice in the provision of social services, but the users of such services are left without a voice. This creates a democratic negative sum balance. Social services have predominantly been shaped by what are labelled fordist and providentialiste modes of regulation. In other words, a tendency exists towards a rationalization of the division of labour, while at the same time the state is responsible for providing for its citizens, but is not directly responsive to the needs of its citizens (Bélanger and Lévesque, 1988, 54).

While this is the case in most social services, some corporatist experimentation has occurred in this area. Following the general productivist orientation of other corporatist structures, many existing cases grant representation to professionals such as doctors and other medical staff for instance while marginalizing the voice of consumers (Cawson, 1982, 91). Nevertheless, there are instances where consumers are conceded a
representational status along with the service producers. Such cases have been labelled "corporatisme des usagers", or consumer corporatism (Bélanger and Lévesque, 1988, 62).

There are many daunting obstacles to the incorporation of non-economic interests in corporatist structures. Many of the arguments against implementation convey a bias for class-based interest which is driven primarily by an instrumentalist logic of necessity and efficiency, rather than justice and inclusion. The Scandinavian cases, while exceptional, do demonstrate the feasibility of such expanded group interest representation within the policy making apparatus. For corporatist structures to be fully legitimized within democracies, they must not exclude a major bloc of interests based on their nature.

**Democratic Criteria of Evaluation**

It is essential to identify specific standards which have informed much of the theoretical discussion above, to provide the basis for meaningful evaluation of democracy in corporatism. The basis for these criteria derive primarily from three sources. The first is the work of Philippe Schmitter (1983) who identified general concepts for the analysis of democratic governance in corporatist institutions. The second work is a draft piece which remains unpublished entitled *Varieties of Democratic Experience* by William Lafferty (1988). His concepts are a synthesis of Robert Dahl's work on procedural democracy and Carl Cohen's on participatory democracy. The third is taken from Cohen and Rogers' associative model. Lafferty's detailed indicators, a modified version of Schmitter's general concepts, and Cohen and Rogers' standards, will be blended to formulate evaluative criteria for corporatism.

It should be reiterated that these criteria should apply both distinct levels of interest intermediation. *Macro-intermediation* refers to that between a) the state and organizations, as well as b) between the various participating organizations themselves. *Micro-intermediation* refers to the relationship between individual members of corporatized associations and the representatives of the same association (Pestoff, 1983, 92). These are
equivalent to the two levels fundamental to Mansbridge democratic deliberative process (Mansbridge, 1992a).

The first criterion is participation; specifically, individual participation in the decision-making process. Pluralist democratic theory has always constrained practical application of this norm largely to the practice of voting in periodic elections, so participation does not serve as an ethical value in their framework (Macpherson, 1977, 79). To escape this narrow conception of participation, Schmitter restricts the concept to direct individual engagement in the final policy decision-making process (Schmitter, 1983, 889). Instead, it is necessary to place this criterion on a continuum from direct individual participation to progressively less direct individual participation to a final extreme of no participation. The concept should also distinguish, whenever possible, between the breadth of participation (or the amount of involvement in different stages of the process), and the scope (or the quantity of issues to which individual input is granted) (Lafferty, 1988, 5). Cohen and Rogers express this criteria in terms of popular sovereignty; to avoid confusion, the participation terminology will be retained.

Participation is relevant in a democratic evaluation of corporatism since tripartite negotiations have often diminished the role of individual members, especially workers, within peak organizational decision-making. Labour representation often takes the form of a "three-tier pattern": the local union, the industrial or national union, and the umbrella organization encompassing all intermediate trade-unions (Olsen, 1980, 503). Centralization is one of the strongest forces against individual engagement in the internal political process. The iron law of oligarchy is also quite prevalent within large interest groups which require representative discretion for concertational flexibility (Ruin, 1974, 181). At times this has even resulted in "...members [that] have become to an even higher degree clients or customers outside the organization rather than participants in it" (Streeck, 1982, 70).

Despite these discouraging signs, participation can also be traced to more incipient configurations such as ad-hoc committees created by demand from the rank-and-file for
greater involvement (Streeck, 1982, 72). Moreover, not all corporatist arrangements reflect tripartite structures, hence abating the harmful effects of centralization and professionalization and increasing the salience of participation (Christensen and Egeberg, 1979).

*Accessibility* is the second measure. Like participation, accessibility is not a standard that figures prominently in pluralist democratic theory. This factor should not be limited to individual participation (as in Schmitter, 1983, 889), but should refer primarily to organized interest associations. Once again it should be placed on a scale which takes into consideration inclusiveness or eligibility, and the degree of representational equality in the process (i.e.: are all affected groups represented and do they have an equal vote?) (Lafferty, 1988, 13). Cohen and Rogers emphasize the notion of political equality within accessibility. Economic and other obstacles should be taken into consideration when assessing accessibility in empirical studies.

The criteria of accessibility is important in corporatist practices for two main reasons. The first reason has to do with the diversity of configurations corporatism has adopted. Tripartite negotiations pre-establishes the eligibility of business and labour as equal players. However, their equality is only formal: representation does not always determine equal access to policy formation. This becomes more evident in the corporatist committee and remiss systems in Scandinavia in which round-table boards and advisory councils offer a variety of levels of decision-making from policy development to policy implementation (Johansen and Kristensen, 1982, 196; Olsen, 1981, 504). Different groups are represented at different levels, hence accessibility is dependent on more than one variable.

The second reason accessibility is pertinent to a corporatist deliberative framework is that social-interest corporatism raises to the forefront the bestowal of quasi-public status on interest groups. In the case of environmental mediation, a vast array of groups may demand a voice. They may range from environmental groups, citizens' associations,
business, and labour, to native bands. However, there is no guarantee that they will all figure around the table (Bruton and Howlett, 1992, 27-28). In the case of consumer corporatism, consumer groups may be represented within decision-making structures, however, their power tends to take second place to the authority of professional and administrative representatives (Godbout, 1983, 123). Because there is no simple formula for inclusion, the measure of accessibility is fundamental in assessing the democratic validity of such practices.

The third democratic standard for evaluating corporatist procedures is responsiveness. This indicator should be applied at the level of organizational representation. Responsiveness has to do with how well representative élites represent the interests of the group membership at the outcome end of the policy process. Do concerted policies adequately reflect the demands of the individual members? At what stage does consultation occur where direct participation is not possible? In the end, it involves the assumption of responsibility on the part of the group representatives (Schmitter, 1983, 890).

The measure of responsiveness in corporatist practices often assumes greater importance wherever direct participation is decreased. In peak associations, when centralization has diminished or distorted the articulation of interests from the rank-and-file, the representative élites often lose touch with their member's demands (Micheletti, 1990, 270). Nevertheless, there is a tendency for ad-hoc groups to develop for expressing and informing members' interest to their representatives. They are often effective in producing responsive decisions (Streeck, 1982, 72; Pestoff, 1983, 108). Where the criterion of participation does not fare positively, a democratic corporatist evaluation should critically assess the distinct schemes utilized to ensure a degree of responsiveness within organizations.

Civic consciousness, the fourth criterion, concerns not only whether interests are adequately articulated, but also whether they are formulated so as to not infringe on
generalizable interests (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, 423). Part of this process involves securing conditions for enlightened understanding at the negotiating table, or promoting political consciousness (Lafferty, 1988, 17). Moreover, civic consciousness involves group representatives justifying their action both to their members and to the national community at large, on the basis of their actions (Coleman, 1988, 264). Corporatist representatives should be held accountable for implementing the accord reached through negotiation. The degree to which this standard is met is crucial for corporatism's legitimation.

Civic consciousness should be considered specifically where interest groups with participatory claims do not figure in the decision-making process, since their interests may not automatically be part of the deliberation. Civic consciousness appears more prevalent among groups which do not pursue material goods, namely those within the social-interest arena. Nevertheless, checks on all decisions derived through corporatist channels exist in the need for legislative approval. In the committee system throughout Scandinavia, the government reviews all decisions, and where no compromise is reached, legislators will amend the policy accordingly (Christensen and Egeberg, 1979, 251). The criterion of civic consciousness should primarily assess whether interests are argued on their appeal to the interests of others within the deliberative processes.

One final concept which should be taken into consideration is versatility. This concept should not be central but rather ancillary. Schmitter's definition with its emphasis on competition is much too ambiguous to follow (Schmitter, 1983, 890). Because competition is integral to the pluralist democratic model, and corporatism is presumably the antithesis of interest group pluralism, competition will not automatically feature prominently in this alternative procedure. Furthermore, the notion of competition often implies the practical acceptance of large inequalities of influence favoring those with greater resources. Because all actors are not on a level playing-field, a notion of versatility which would instill
some degree of competitiveness, without undermining the other criteria enunciated above, is more adequate.

Competition can be redefined so as to emphasize the potential to challenge static interest monopolies. This criterion is increasingly relevant to social-interest corporatism where interests within civil society are more difficult to delineate, and hence representative monopolies more difficult to establish. The measure of versatility can best assess the corporatist committee system which takes on a variety of structural incarnations. While strict tripartite concertation was seen as lacking in versatility, other forms of industrial interest and social interest corporatism have managed to counter tendencies toward rigid ossification (Erikson, 1990, 358-359; Johansen and Kristensen, 1982, 216; Olsen, 1981, 512). Indeed for corporatism to be democratic, it must guarantee some versatility to prevent bureaucratic stagnation, ensure representational variety, and ultimately value change.

Conclusion
Corporatism is not a thing of the past. Theoretically it is reconcilable with the emerging literature on deliberative and associative democracy. The above analysis of deliberative processes helps to highlight the primacy of this key factor in corporatist concertation. Without the study of deliberation, none of the crucial requisites or results of the process, be it the articulation of interest, the transformation of those interests, understanding complexity, or approaching a consensus, would figure prominently. Traditional corporatist theory has often ignored or cavalierly treated these fundamental questions.

Recent proposals for associative democracy, in combination with those regarding deliberative practices, can be used to revitalize, and legitimate democratic corporatism. Corporatism as practiced in many European states is undergoing a considerable transformation due to both internal political, and external economic, structural shifts. This versatility will allow for the
normative alteration, for the "artifactuality" of existing systems, towards structurally expanded and democratically enhanced configurations.

Each of the proposed criteria for democratic evaluation should be regarded as standards which vary in intensity. How does one determine where the democratic threshold resides? This thesis does not seek to place numerical values on each criterion. Because what is to be identified is the quality of democracy, the purpose here is to suggest that corporatism can and must effectively meet these standards in the inevitable context of trade-offs and compromises. Corporatism will by no means fare positively on all accounts. It is important, however, to gauge whether the trade-offs demanded, and the gains accomplished by corporatist deliberative democracy are in the end more desirable than those produced by exclusively electoral pluralist systems.
Chapter V - Conclusion

The problem of social alienation was identified at the outset as a manifestation of the acute failings of contemporary liberal political systems. The prevalent malaise, attributed to a critical erosion of the social relations between state and society, has reached a stage which demands a serious reconsideration of the institutions established to create democratic political norms. It has been years since the preliminary signs were detected and the first warnings issued. What is most disconcerting is the lack of alternatives within democratic theory and political practice to tackle such pressing issues. Does an interest group democracy as elaborated through the intersection of corporatist theory and a deliberative and associative democratic theory respond to any of these social and political concerns?

The concept of corporatism itself has not resounded very positively in the ears of either western democratic theorists or political establishments. The association of the corporatist terminology with theology, feudalism, and fascism has served to marginalize debate on the democratic prospects of corporatist representation within a liberal polity. Indeed its origins are problematic, however its modern transformation can hardly be said to derive from its more odious manifestations.

The specific corporatism in question has to do with systems of interest intermediation, which, while budding since the turn of the century, only really took off in the 1960s in certain West European states. Most of these arrangements took the shape of concerted negotiations between peak organizations of capital, labour, other industrial and agricultural groups, and the state on economic policy. These strategic interest organizations were given a representational monopoly in exchange for membership compliance with agreements reached at these fora of policy development. However, certain Scandinavian states experimented with more versatile arrangements through committees which incorporated more than just industrial groups.
Comparative corporatist theory assessed a significant shift in the relations between the state and interest organizations in certain European countries. The pluralist paradigm where pressure groups competed (on a formally equal but substantively unequal footing) for political influence no longer provided an accurate picture of politics. Corporatism had replaced the strict pluralist interest group approach in several policy areas. However, corporatist literature was overly consumed in its first stages with the conceptualization of this new channel of interest group intermediation. While the content of the literature broadened, it often assumed an economistic emphasis, concerned primarily with efficiency in both the economic and the political realm. Democratic considerations were peripheral.

Despite the silence on this dimension, there have been a few disparate attempts at generating some understanding of corporatism as a form of democratic representation. Those that dared venture into this domain, such as Schmitter, Anderson and Cawson were overly driven by the "discourse of efficiency" so prevalent in standard corporatist literature. Most democratic concerns were overlooked or written off as incompatible with the conventional territorially-based electoral politics.

Despite the lack of initiative in this domain, the late nineteenth century produced several authors who developed an initial theory of corporatist democracy (prior to the advent of contemporary neocorporatism). Two of the most prominent philosophers in this regard were G.D.H. Cole and Émile Durkheim. Their theories, while incompatible with liberal democracies for different reasons, are founded on general principles that have proved helpful in an attempt to construct a modern democratic theory of corporatism. Both Cole and Durkheim conceived of liberal electoral politics as distorting the democratic will and as being severely unrepresentative of major interests within society, leading to a breakdown of a "collective nomos". The crisis found its roots in the manifestation of extreme self-interested individualism, which abraded vital conceptions of community. In the justification for individual representation in politics, liberal régimes not only eroded the
representation of collective interests but furthermore mitigated individual participation through the growth of bureaucratic channels, and catch-all parties.

Cole envisioned a state with direct representation from consumers and producers (i.e.: labour), two crucial groups in society with marginal voices. Durkheim conceived the expression of collective interests as possible only through one's functional standpoint in society (i.e.: occupation). He thus proposed abolition of individually-based representation and creation of a chamber of business and labour representatives. The integration of key principles of their theories into a neocorporatist conception of politics assists development of a democratic theory of corporatism.

Corporatist theory propounded the fusion of individual participation and collective interest representation. De Tocqueville's notion of a secondary citizenship of collective interests recognizes the importance played by organizations within civil society. Individual's interests are best availed if aggregated into collective units. Collective interest groups would be confronted by other collective associations where the need to cooperate would arise to attain a consensus regarding policy related to their interests. While cooperation is precarious, corporatism has been shown to provide for positive-sum outcomes, where it becomes in the interest of all associations to participate.

Interest group cooperation would also mitigate the abuses of instrumental rationality since corporatism entails certain elements of what Habermas identified as communicative action in social rationality. Social rationality as opposed to purposive-rational or instrumental rationality fosters the identification of common desired goals through discursive means. Rather than conceiving problems as mere technical puzzles with a series of effective means to attaining pre-conceived ends, communicative action would encourage a measure of collective re-articulation of both end and means.

The conjunction of self-interested individualism with instrumental rationality has furthered the destruction of a conception of community in politics. The basic unit of corporatism is the collective association, a group of individuals with common bonds,
through similar interests and objectives. However, it is crucial that such an association's
goals do not become overly pre-conceived: an association must reflect the wishes of the
individuals that bring meaning to it. The criteria for membership should rest on an
adherence to general rules of procedure. An association should incorporate internal fora for
the articulation of distinct individual and sub-collective standpoints within the general
parameters of a "unified" collectivity. For a reconciliation of individual and collective
needs, it is best to conceptualize corporatist groups as dynamic political communities of
interest.

Corporatist political theory has often ignored the internal democratic politics of
associations that participate in decision-making negotiations, as well as the dynamics that
arise from inter-associational concertation. The recently rekindled deliberative democratic
theory, along with the new literature on associative democracy propounded by Cohen and
Rogers helps address some of the gaps left by corporatist theory by bringing collective
interest group governance back to its participatory *modus operandi*.

Deliberation is based on the Aristotelian concern for reason through discourse. As
in social rationality, at the core of deliberation lies the notion of communication among
political participants. While deliberation is often assumed to be a mere procedural element
of policy-making, it is in fact the essence of a democratic politics. From a combination of
Arendt's conception of authentic politics and Habermas' communicative ethics, a viable
definition of deliberation can be distilled. Arendt recognized that political debate served to
disclose and forge an individual's political interest. Habermas' ideal speech situation
served as a means to establish consensus on ethical norms (in this case political choice)
among equal participants via reasoned argumentation with respect to otherness.

A deliberative democratic theory as introduced by Dryzek, Miller, Manin and
others, utilizes the norms displayed by these two configurations of deliberation to create a
context which integrates dialogue as both means and end. However, deliberation in an ideal
discursive democracy would take the shape of a highly participatory individualistic and
flexible politics which is unrealistic in a modern liberal state. Miller and Cohen attempt to reconcile the nature of contemporary states with the requisites of deliberation by providing parties with the role of interest aggregation. Neither a party-focused nor an individual-centered deliberative politics is satisfactory to a corporatist conception of governance.

Parallel to this deliberative program, Cohen and Rogers have introduced a model of associative democracy which re-evaluates the utility of group input in politics and proposes a new sub-system of governance different from both the market and the bureaucratic mode. Their approach would siphon the beneficial contribution of interest groups (pre-existing in a pluralist universe) towards decision-making processes, while at the same time abate the destabilizing tendencies created by social sectarianism. Their goal is to regulate rather than eradicate interest group pluralism, hence approximating a corporatist framework that promotes a higher degree of versatility and integrates a larger range of participants.

While the associative democratic paradigm stops short of articulating a deliberative decision-making process within the parameters of interest group governance, it can be nevertheless inferred. It is fundamental to elevate a deliberative politics to an associative format, as Mansbridge has implied in her cooperative approach to politics. Since cooperation necessitates deliberation and corporatism or associative democracy requires cooperation, deliberation must be central to a corporatist democratic theory. Indeed, all of the democratic criteria for corporatist decision-making proposed in this thesis require deliberative processes for their advancement in this associative context.

The democratic standards for a corporatist deliberative model should focus primarily on individual participation, accessibility of interest groups, responsiveness of representatives to members within associations, civic consciousness as a product of internal deliberation and group concertation, and versatility of schemes to accommodate different policy contexts and new demands for access. A normative corporatist democratic theory should identify optimal conditions for maximization of such standards. This model has the potential to restore dynamic political communities of interest, re-establish meaningful bonds
between the civil society and the state through the intermediation of groups, advance individual political participation, and provide for efficient policy outcomes.

A corporatist deliberative framework would not only break the omnipotence of purposive-rational means in favor of social rationality, but would also create a context where instrumental rationality could be utilized more effectively. Discursive interaction among corporatized groups would allow for the provision of valuable insights into policy development, since they are the purveyors of valuable information acquired through experience and need. Hence, not only would new options be engendered, but further relevant technical data could be uncovered to increase the levels of goal achievement. Individuals working through their interest groups would no longer be shut out of the political process on the basis of the complexity of issues. This could potentially alleviate some of the sense of powerlessness that triggers social disenchantment with the government and the system.

Deliberation, specifically communicative action in a corporatist context, would distill individual's interests within their organizations, and assist articulation of organizations' interests when in contact with other organizations facing the same political questions. Since interests are neither pre-politically nor monologically conceived, internal participation and organizational accessibility in corporatist policy-making will allow for the self-transformation of interests. Moreover, due to the need for consensus and cooperation, representatives of groups will be exposed to interests which they will have to accommodate or reconcile. In turn, this could increase the civic consciousness of representatives reflected in other-regarding inclinations in the transformation of their interests.

Instances of a democratic corporatist deliberation would increase accessibility beyond traditional industrial groups. Business and labour do not represent all interests within society, hence the need to expand the notion of corporatism to social-interest policy fields. Such an enhanced model could also provide for the inclusion of minority groups so often marginalized in a liberal majoritarian electoral system. While it is difficult to establish
standards for conferring public authority to groups, there are a variety of options with which to experiment. Once again, an increase in accessibility would reduce the relegation of minority and other social-interests to the periphery, would aid in repoliticizing civil society, and help political life avoid the pitfalls of factionalism via a regulated procedure of conduct.

A deliberative emphasis could redirect present corporatist practices to avoid most drawbacks such as centralization and technocratization. Enhanced internal participation is crucial for the articulation of interests and hence for authentic representation. Since a mandate form of representation would be most conducive to better results due to the imperatives of elite negotiations, where direct participation was not possible, increased responsiveness could restore the discretionary gap. Furthermore, the versatility of such processes could not only accommodate particular policy contexts, but via the increase in instances towards meso and local corporatism, it could also decrease centralization of organizational authority. This would further help alleviate societal alienation.

Deliberation among participants for the purpose of cooperative policy development requires prior agreement on procedural matters. Corporatist negotiations are driven by the need for consensus; however, many deliberative processes have been conceived with simple majority rule options. A final policy agreement by all participants may prove to be arduous, especially if radical groups are brought into the fore, or the issue is simply too controversial. Majority rule may once again exclude the voice of genuine minority interests. Consensus is governed by the logic of social rationality insofar as it prevents interests from being overlooked, and existing standpoints from being ignored. While an *a priori* agreement among participants on procedure may at times resolve the dilemma, no procedural consensus can be guaranteed.

As demonstrated above, the associative and deliberative democratic models strengthen a corporatist theory of democracy. Corporatism is viable in democratic theory, but the same can also be said of corporatism's suitability in contemporary political practice.
Corporatism still remains a widely practiced form of interest governance in many western states, despite the lack of overwhelming economic benefits compared to more pluralistic régimes. Corporatism has not succeeded in eliminating the twin evils of inflation and unemployment, but it appears that corporatist practices have enhanced accommodation to the incredible structural transformations ushered in by the globalization of the world economy. This is especially true of meso and local corporatist arrangements, which approximate to a greater degree than macrocorporatism the associative deliberative models considered in this thesis.

Exclusive producer-group tripartite corporatism is not satisfactory for an enhanced democratic framework. A corporatist deliberative scheme should incorporate various interest associations at multiple levels of policy-making along the line of Scandinavian corporatist instances. Furthermore, social interests should assume a more salient role within an increasingly flexible structure. Environmental dispute resolution mechanisms and schemes of consumer input in the provision of social services are two areas which can be integrated into this framework. Despite the need for inclusion of industrial as well as social interest, both interest models should be assessed independently as they conform to two distinct logics—the "producer" or "class logic" and the "new social movement logic" respectively.

The need now in corporatist theory is to identify how demanding democratic criteria can be implemented. Individual participation has often been problematic in highly bureaucratized peak organizations of industrial interests. With respect to accessibility, certain standards to insure equality of inclusion and effectiveness of procedure should be proposed and assessed, identifying the merit of the criteria utilized in social-interest instances of corporatist policy-making. Returning to the internal governance of an organization, deliberative schemes should be assessed to identify the degree to which representatives are responsive to the needs of their members where they lack direct input. Identifying civic consciousness may be more difficult since there are few indicators to
accurately gauge its degree. Civic consciousness could be assessed by identifying how other social groups perceive policy outcomes (i.e.: if they are adversely affected by a so-called consensual policy). The versatility standard should be assessed by examining less conventional group governance cases such as environmental mediation and consumer corporatism in the welfare sector.

A corporatist deliberative democracy does not suggest the end of ideology or the end of politics; rather, it advances a regeneration of politics, where deliberative debate will re-politicize civil society. However, it also provides mechanisms which will prevent such a politically informed social discourse from producing a chaotic exchange of irreconcilable fixed standpoints. Corporatist procedures can channel interest group contributions to successfully resolve social disputes, and advance efficient policy outcomes.

At a time when demands for interest group input is incessantly hammered by pitting the pejorative "special interest" argument against a more noble individual or public interest conception of politics, it is crucial for democratic theory to demonstrate the positive contribution of associations within a regulated corporatist deliberative framework as advanced in this thesis. Future empirical research should highlight the potential and the shortcomings of existing corporatist instances and the prospects associated with expansion of corporatist practices to the social, environmental and other policy fields.
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