WHERE THE BOYS ARE: SCHOOLING, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, AND GENDER REFORM

by

Elizabeth Tuck

B.A. (Hons.), University of British Columbia

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Faculty of Education

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Author: ________________________________
 (signature)

Elizabeth Irene TUCK
 (name)

December 1, 1993
 (date)
APPROVAL

Name: Elizabeth Irene Tuck

Degree: Master of Arts

Title of Thesis: Where the Boys are: Schooling, Violence against Women, and Gender Reform

Examining Committee:

Chair: Michael Manley-Casimir

Suzanne deCastell
Senior Supervisor

Stephen Smith
Assistant Professor

Celia Haig-Brown
Assistant Professor
Faculty of Education
Simon Fraser University
External Examiner

Date Approved December 10, 1993
Abstract

Recent government commissions and panels in Canada have called on schools to play a greater part in preventing violence against women. This thesis examines the ways in which schools might undertake this work, and starts from the assumption that true violence prevention must seek to undo violence at its sources, one of which, it is argued, is the construction of hegemonic masculinity. Feminist theory and practice first brought violence against women, and its maleness, into view. Some feminist work on violence, however, treats men as an internally undifferentiated group, and as being uniquely susceptible to violence. Men are seen to be all-powerful, or as biologically pre-disposed to be violent, and thus the possibility that men can change, or that we can educate boys to be non-violent, is ruled out. This view is unnecessarily despairing and pedagogically pernicious.

R.W. Connell's (1987) explication of gender as a socially constructed set of relations allows for a more nuanced view of masculinity, in which some men occupy hegemonic positions, and others are subordinated. Postmodern and poststructural accounts of difference also expose rifts and fissures that might be exploited by an anti-sexist politics: feminists fighting to end violence against women might find allies among men critically examining masculinity. In schools, this view potentially allows teachers to get over their fear of boys by seeing that boys occupying subordinated masculine positions simply have no safe way to express their disapproval of male violence.

Schools are both sites of gender formation and gender violence, and sites where gender can perhaps be reformed. Before this can occur, educators must acknowledge the school's role in promoting a gender order that privileges boys' subjectivity and relegates the concerns of girls to the margins. In order to prevent violence against women, we need to de-romanticise male adolescence and its actual violence while keeping individual boys in our pedagogic sympathy. By addressing sexual politics in the high school curriculum, educators might afford boys both the language and the safety they need to begin to refuse the discourse of hegemonic masculinity. We might thus contribute in significant ways to preventing violence against women in intimate relationships.
for Jim, Hilary, and David
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Introduction

November, 1989. At a Vancouver Playhouse production of *A Streetcar Named Desire*, attended by secondary students, boys begin to cheer during the rape scene. "Yeah, get her!" "Rape her!", they hoot. School personnel are unable, or unwilling, to control the outburst in the darkened theatre. The play continues.

This incident crystallised my concern that violence against women is, among other things, an educational problem. Not only does violence against women occur in schools, as it did on this presumably educational outing, but, if it is to abate, there is obviously much educational work to be done. At the time I had just had my first child, and was full of the joys, and worries, of a new parent. I was also a high school teacher with ten years' experience in the classroom. I was appalled at the callous behaviour of the boys, and recognised that there was nothing the girls could have done to prevent being subjected to this violence. Despite the worthy project of empowering girls and women that the women's movement had begun, it was painfully obvious to me that educational work on violence with boys was desperately needed.

The thesis that has grown out of my initial concerns thus examines violence against women with a view to gaining understandings that may help in designing educational curricula in the area of violence-prevention. Numerous government panels and commissions have called on schools to play a greater part in preventing violence. While I agree that schools can and should take up this issue, I am concerned that such programs be founded on realistic assessments of the extent and nature of violence against women, and that gender, rather than being elided as in the literature on "youth violence," be centrally considered, since I believe that violence is in part an issue of gender.

The month after the Playhouse incident, of course, was the Montreal massacre in which fourteen young women, engineering students, lost their lives. My despair deepened. I looked at my own infant girl and felt deeply for the bereaved parents in Montreal. Almost two years later, after the birth of my son, it was time to get down to thesis-writing. I began by sifting through the literature on violence against women, and discovered several literatures. Battering, rape, stalking, violence perpetrated by police, psychiatrists, re-
victimization through the court system, date-rape, child abuse: each had its own extensive literature. In addition, violence was analysed in many different academic disciplines: criminology, psychology, sociology, law, anthropology. It was clear that I had to delimit this discussion somehow. I decided to distinguish between violence perpetrated by an intimate other, and that committed by a stranger. I felt that while schools perhaps could do little to prevent extreme acts of violence committed by the most egregious offenders, they could potentially have some effect on how students relate to each other. I suspected that the boys' behaviour at the Playhouse had something to do with the particular effects of male peer-groupings, which schools until now have not only regarded as being quite unproblematic, but have actively encouraged.

As I read my way through the feminist literature on violence against women, my anger that women have endured so much, and men have said so little to support feminists in their struggles to end the violence, found expression. This is perhaps evident in the tone of the first chapter. Why won't the men simply join us, I wondered. Why doesn't every man wear a white arm band on December 6? What is their problem? The more I read the feminist literature, though, the more I began to have difficulty with what Connell (1987) terms "categoricalism": much of what might be termed "radical" feminist writings—and here I am thinking of people like Catherine MacKinnon, but also others who are not nearly so bright and persuasive—seems to allow no correct male position at all, and certainly not a correct heterosexual male position. Men as a category, and not simply because of their social power, were to be condemned. If, as some of these writers seemed to suggest, heterosexuality is inherently and irredeemably violent, that is, if penetrative sex necessarily victimises women in and of itself, then there could be no possibility of non-coercive relationships between men and women.

And yet my own experience in heterosexual relationships does not feel that way. Despite reading about the most horrific violence done by men to women, most frequently to women they know and supposedly love, I was still not prepared to accept that this violence was the way things had to be. I was not prepared to write off heterosexuality holus-bolus as being hopelessly implicated in perpetuating violence against women. Rather, I felt that it was
masculinity as a set of social relations and as symbolic meaning that was problematic and at the heart of much gender violence. Qualitative work done with assaultive men (Vogelman, 1990) reveals that these men frequently feel inadequate as men. Far from being the all-powerful patriarchal monsters conjured up in some accounts, they are often attempting to shore up their sense of manliness at women's expense. Thus in chapters two and three I look at masculinity (or rather masculinities) and the role schools play in its formation.

Finally, in chapter four, I speak primarily as a teacher. It was during the writing of this chapter that I felt on firmest ground. While drawn to feminism, I have no history as an activist; while intrigued by theoretical questions, I am not an "academic." I do feel qualified, though, to judge how students can be reached, how teachers can engage their interest and sympathies and even bring them to adopt points of view that may work against their self-interest (narrowly defined). These are not, I feel, merely questions of technique but speak to teachers' engagements with students. If we as teachers (and throughout the thesis I use "we" to refer to teachers, unless otherwise indicated) are to try to bring boys to a careful consideration of violence, gender, and sexuality, as I feel we must, it is imperative that we do so in ways that are not only theoretically correct, but pedagogically sound. If we can find ways of engaging boys' interest in what, until now, has been a "woman's problem," then perhaps when they are adults they will not maintain a hurtful silence in the face of violence against women as too many adult men now do. Then, perhaps, men and women can be, as Ehrenreich (1983) puts it, "rebels together" (p. 188) in the fight to uproot the cultural evil of violence against women.
Chapter 1

Feminist groundwork: bringing violence into view

There is no area where androcentric bias is more visible and systematic than that of male violence toward women. (Anne Edwards)

And where the truth is harsh, and of human origin, and avoidable, bitterness is a form of moral accounting, of naming the losses, that we can condone both in ourselves and others. (Lynne McFall)

What is needed is a commitment nonetheless to real social change, a recognition that monological and militantly certain discourses are often strategically necessary if people's lives are to be bettered. On some local fronts we need to believe that there are wrongs to be righted and real forms of progress to be achieved. (Cary Nelson)

I disagree profoundly with the idea that masculinity is an impoverished character structure. It is a richness, a plenitude. The trouble is that the specific richness of hegemonic masculinity is oppressive, being founded on, and enforcing, the subordination of women. (Bob Connell)

Feminist accounts of violence against women in recent years have successfully challenged the notion that most violence is committed by demented strangers. While the popular press concentrates on horrifying incidents of rape and slaughter of women and children by unknown others, feminist theory, drawing on work done in the battered women's movement, has uncovered the more pervasive danger that lurks in the supposedly inviolable space of the home. Violence has been uncovered as a common, everyday occurrence (Stanko, 1990a). Intimacy, it turns out, poses problems for women: wife-battering, sexual coercion, mental cruelty, and even murder as revenge for wanting to end a relationship are regularly committed by men who are ostensibly normal. "What is this pathology of normality?" asks Nel Noddings (1992). She refers to Arthur G. Miller's (1986) analysis of the famous experiments done by Stanley Milgram on obedience to malevolent authority. Miller's "normality thesis" posits that

people who would not ordinarily be described as unusual, deviant, sick, mentally ill or pathological are capable of
committing acts of unrestrained violence and evil. (Miller, p. 184)

That many women live with men who are violent only to them and who are otherwise upstanding citizens no longer surprises some of us.

When we start to listen to women's stories of domestic violence, and to realize in what numbers women are being victimised, a "pathology thesis" becomes harder and harder to credit. If we believe these stories, as government commissions appear to be starting to do, we are forced to conclude either that a high percentage of men are "abnormal" (which seems unreasonably to strain the meaning of the term), or that the current gender order is such that normal men in fairly high numbers are violent to their intimate partners. This leads us to ponder why. What is this pathology of normality? Since we are considering male violence against women, it seems fair to re-cast the question: What is this pathology of normal masculinity?

What prompts this thesis is my belief, as a teacher, that schools should take seriously both feminist work uncovering violence against women in intimate relationships and the recommendations by various government panels and commissions that violence-prevention be undertaken by schools. I am worried that naive understandings of the causes of this violence may lead us to design programs that are at best ineffective and at worst harmful.

In this first chapter, I begin by critiquing the prevailing discourse of "public education" about violence which, I claim, genders the victims, but not the offenders; in doing so, it reaffirms women's vulnerability while doing nothing to decrease the incidence of actual violence. This is not, I suggest, the route school programs should take. Instead, I argue, before we as educators can help "prevent," and not simply try to contain, violence, we will need to examine closely the connection between masculinity and violence. I then set out the limits of this discussion, which will not try to account for the seemingly "random" acts of violence perpetrated by strangers, but will concentrate on violence within relationships. Since violence by known others is far more common that "stranger danger," this seems a good place to start. Additionally, schools already arbitrate relationships to an extent-how students should treat each other, and their teachers-so preventing violence in intimate relationships might not be seen by educators as outside their
purview. Finally, I try to flesh out the conceptual framework of this discussion, pointing to places where feminist understandings of violence and gender could be helped by recent postmodern and poststructural accounts. In chapter two, I explore the social construction of gender and the ways in which violence is constitutive of masculinity itself; chapter three moves into the school context which, I claim, also helps to "police" gender formation in ways we ought to question, particularly in the support it lends the enactments of masculinity referred to as "hegemonic" by Connell (1987) and other theorists. I rely on poststructural accounts of the inscription of masculinity onto boys' bodies to speculate that boys increasingly try to overcome their bodies and, in so doing, overlook the consequences of their actions. Thus, girls and women who are victimized by male violence are "other"-in that they are both instrumental and incidental-to boys' developing gender identities. Finally, in chapter four, I offer some suggestions for what violence-prevention based on a realistic assessment of the gender order and its violence might look like.

For the purposes of this discussion, I shall use the proposed United Nations definition of violence against women as

...any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty whether occurring in public or private life. (cited in Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, 1993b, p.6)

**Public education about violence against women: the terror of 'Woman Alone'**

The "normality thesis"-that masculinity itself is in some ways "pathological"-implicit in feminist theory on male violence has led me to a radically changed reading of media accounts of violence against women. Let me give a current example. The first homicides (sic) of 1993 in the Vancouver
area were all murders of young women. A Vietnamese restaurant worker was found stabbed in her East Vancouver apartment; the 20 year-old daughter of a wealthy Hong Kong family was shot with a cross-bow in the parking lot at B.C.I.T. where she had been a student; a young Surrey woman was murdered in her basement suite, allegedly by a 39 year-old man out of prison on parole. Prior to my research for this thesis, reports of these killings would have confirmed my feeling that the world is not a safe place for women. My fear, however, would have been diffuse, unfocused: the fear of parking lots and violent strangers. Now, however, in each of these cases, my first suspicion is that these women have perished at the hands of lovers or former lovers who have lashed out in jealous rages. The actual circumstances of these violent deaths are not yet known. Perhaps none of these women was killed by a violent partner. The point is that the scenario these reports conjure up for me is drastically different from what it would have been before this research. The question this change raises for me is what women can do about intimate danger.

Women are only too familiar with what they should do to protect themselves from "stranger danger": walk in well-lit, busy areas only, take self-defense courses, appear self-assured, keep doors locked and bolted. The fact that poor women cannot afford to take self-defense courses, and may have to take buses or walk in obviously dangerous places does not seem to deter well-meaning people from thus advising women. As Stanko (1990b) points out, police publications advising women how to protect themselves from crime often proceed from the false assumption that all women can choose how and when to travel, have the funds to install expensive lock and alarm systems, and so on. Even more objectionable is their gender-neutral language. Stanko reports that in "Practical ways to crack crime," published by the Home Office in 1989, women are advised to "sit near the exit on a train and in a compartment where there are other 'people' (note the avoidance of the mention of men as presenting the danger)" (p. 178).

Stanko's severest criticism is aimed at the essential dishonesty of such publications, which necessarily ignore the high incidence of violence against women by known others in aiming "to reassure women that crimes against them are rare...and that the proposed precautions can (emphasis in the text) reduce the risk of victimization" (p. 178).
The B.C. Ministry of the Attorney-General has produced a similar document, "Woman alone." The word "man" does not appear once. Instead, the publication uses the passive voice ("if you suspect you are being followed") and several other nouns to describe threatening men: "unknown persons," "a stranger," "a stranded motorist," "someone," "criminals," and "assailants." Even more noteworthy is the extent to which women are encouraged to constrain themselves. Imagine being a man while reading the following list. Pretend you are being told, beyond the common-sense advice to draw your curtains at night and lock your doors,

- never to remain alone in an apartment laundry room, mailroom, or parking garage
- not to put your full name in the phone book or on your mail-box
- not to overburden yourself with packages on the street
- to view the inside of your vehicle before entering to assure no one is hiding inside, even if the doors were locked
- to use caution in conversation with strangers; to avoid giving your name, address or place of employment
- to sit near the aisle in theatres

(all from "Woman alone," undated)

It is clear, from reading "Woman alone," that a woman alone is unsafe. It is obviously preferable, from the perspective of the Ministry of the Attorney-General, for a woman never to be alone and always to suspect strangers. I want to suggest that this document, like the one Stanko criticizes, is a misguided attempt at public education. In fact, it exemplifies what public education about violence against women should not look like. First, there seems to be no awareness on the part of the authors that women are being asked to take sole responsibility for male violence. Men, as I have pointed out, are missing from the text. Second, there is absolutely no commentary on the fact that women are expected to give up what men would likely consider basic human freedoms in order not to be assaulted. Surely there is not much more women can do to protect themselves from "stranger danger" and still lead lives which are even marginally autonomous. (Since a young woman was raped by two men pretending to be police officers in Washington last
year, presumably, to be comprehensive, this publication should caution
women against trusting authority figures and guys in uniform.) There is also
no sense that this document could not be revised later, including more
precautions women should take, based on later catalogues of horrors against
them. In other words, this kind of public education will only serve to restrict
women's sense of personal safety and freedom. It assumes that we can do
nothing to actually prevent the stranger from lurking somewhere, suggesting
a kind of lottery mentality, where women should try to reduce their own odds
of being attacked; the inevitability of the attacks happening to someone else is
assumed. Third, and most importantly, it is highly selective in its account of
the violence to be avoided. Indeed, the title "Woman alone" distracts readers
from the more dangerous case of "woman in relationship" since, as Stanko
points out, "women's lovers are more dangerous than the stranger on the
street." She explains:

Available evidence from the Home Office itself (for example,
Smith 1989a and 1989b), from police statistics (for example,
Dobash and Dobash, 1979), and from feminist research (for
example, Stanko, 1985; Kelly, 1988) tells us that women should
protect themselves from their friends, acquaintances, husbands,
boyfriends, relatives and former intimates much more than
from the anonymous man. (1990b, p. 174)

This has recently been acknowledged by the B.C. government.
Attorney-General Colin Gabelman reported March 26, 1993, that in this
province the incidence of intimate violence is thirteen times higher than that
of violence by strangers. The Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women
(1993), citing a survey done by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics,
reported that

in 1991, 270 (Canadian) women were murdered. Two hundred
and twenty-five of these murders are solved. Of the solved
cases, 210 women died at the hands of men. One hundred and
twenty-one were killed by intimate partners. (p. 10)
Additionally, police are called to intervene in domestic violence more frequently than for any other reason, with the exception of car accidents. Protection from intimate violence is obviously much more difficult than protection from strangers. The discourse of "public safety" or "self-protection for women" has nothing to say about how women might protect themselves from being battered or murdered by their partners. The fact that, in the wake of the B.C.I.T. parking-lot slaying, campuses are beefing up their "walk-safe" programs does not offer any solace to college women assaulted on dates or regularly beaten by their boyfriends. The distinction I am trying to draw here is between the case of the violent stranger and the violent partner, since I feel that the educational implications differ for the two. Despite the shortcomings of the pamphlets examined above, I would probably still want my daughter to be aware of strategies she should employ to protect herself from dangerous strangers. We should be offering self-defense courses, if these can be shown to be effective, free of charge in high schools and at community centres. We must encourage municipalities to follow the lead of Toronto in instructing bus drivers to let women off between bus-stops. And so on. However, effective public education will never truly take place until we can be more explicit about the fact that these dangerous strangers have a gender, and until we become more appropriately outraged by the restrictions on her freedom that "woman alone" is so blithely (and doubtless uselessly) expected to accept.

So, I argue that in its current guise, public education about violence against women is woefully inadequate. It does not actually aim to educate the "public," but to alert women to the dangers that full citizenship may cost them. I do not argue here that we should not inform the public about crime, but rather that in the case of violence against women, official discourse has been monopolized by the view of women being terrorised by strangers. Women should be notified if there is reason to suspect that they are particularly at risk for this kind of violence; last year, women were justifiably outraged when the police delayed letting the "public" know about a series of rapes of women living in ground-floor apartments occurring in a particular area of Vancouver. However, since women are in more danger from their intimate others than from unknown others, it makes sense to concentrate more resources on the prevention of intimate violence. It also seems sensible
not to confuse the simple reporting of facts or risk factors with educational initiatives which, no matter how one defines education, at the very least must attempt to enlighten, challenge mistaken or harmful views, and increase understanding of the problem at hand.

What would crime prevention and public education based on a realistic assessment of violence against women look like? As Stanko (1990b) suggests:

Crime prevention from a feminist perspective necessarily includes a direct challenge to men's dominance in all spheres of life. Preventing the victimization of children and women, therefore, entails crime prevention strategies aimed at boys and men. In part, this means challenging traditional notions of masculinity, which are so interwoven with women's experiences of threat and victimization. Looking ahead, good crime prevention would demand that all aspects of community life, especially the institutions which might assist women to escape and complain about the violence of men, promote women's economic, sexual and political independence. (p. 181)

Note the contrast between the rhetoric of "self-protection for women," which emphasises how unsafe it is for women to be alone (how much safer it would be to have a man to protect them!), and Stanko's insistence on women's right to independence. In order to challenge men's violence, we need to understand the connection between it and "traditional notions of masculinity." This investigation is fundamental to any educational work we might wish to do on the subject of male violence against women. Stanko suggests that all anti-sexist initiatives ultimately, if not explicitly, work toward the prevention of violence against women. Obviously, only when women in large numbers began in feminism's second wave to claim equality did male violence against them even come into view. A necessary step in ending male violence against women is in promoting women's independence. For some, this will mean shunning compulsory heterosexuality; for others, it will entail gaining the financial means and emotional support they need in order to leave abusive men (Barron, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1991); more generally, it will require raising and educating boys with much less rigid ideas on gender and sex "roles," so that the next generation of men do not perceive women's independence as a threat to their masculinity. If we can do this, then
equitable, non-coercive relationships between men and women may become more possible.

What this thesis will explore, then, is the possibility that educators can consciously intervene to help prevent violence against women in intimate relationships. Such a project assumes that violence is at least partially a learned behaviour, that gender is socially constructed, and that the gender order, while influenced by early childhood and family experiences, is susceptible to change. It also assumes that the struggle for women's political equality is a necessary but insufficient step in reducing such violence toward women. We can all hope that the male judges who continue to pronounce in assinine ways on sexually provocative three year-olds, the mitigating influence of alcohol in sex-crimes, and the racially-dependent experience of sexual assault will soon be replaced by powerful, non-sexist women. The fact is that women are only slowly gaining access to state institutions, and there is no guarantee that when they do that they will advocate for women, particularly marginalized women. I argue that we need to fight this war on women on three fronts: in continuing to help and support the victims of male violence and their children; in pursuing the feminist struggle for political and economic equality; and, as I propose in this thesis, in challenging the "gender order" and local "gender regimes" (the terms are from Connell, 1987) and their harmful notions of masculinity. What this means for schools, I suggest, is an educational program that will question the pathology of male normality.

In this thesis, I will be looking for influences in the lives of "normal" men that could explain the turn to violence. That is, I will be interrogating the harmful norms of masculinity in our society. One of the striking characteristics of men who batter women is how normal they seem. This theme is repeated often by therapists and social workers working with batterers:

When we first began working with men who batter women, we kept waiting for the monster to come through the door. Seven years later we're still waiting. Most of the men we've seen, whether self-referred or mandated by the courts or the military, seem normal to most of the people who know them. They just happen to be committing criminal offenses at home. FBI crime
statistics tell us that close to 40 percent of all men living intimately with women have battered their partners during the course of the relationship. By "battering" we mean the use of and repeated threat of physical force to dominate and control a woman. From this definition and these statistics we might conclude that battering is "normal" behaviour in this culture. Seventy-five to ninety percent of rapes are committed by male acquaintances: family members, co-workers, classmates, dates, boyfriends, husbands. (...) Women are most often victimized by men whom they once trusted and loved. Why? (Bathrick & Kaufman, 1990, p.112)

It is difficult to reconcile the popular media's tendency to view such men as freaks and criminals with the everydayness of these crimes. I will try for such a reconciliation through both a feminist and a postmodern reading of masculinity.

However, I want to maintain some distinctions among men, at least for the purpose of analysis. I have already distinguished between the dangerous stranger and the dangerous known other. This distinction is important since, as I have indicated, while women can protect themselves to a degree against stranger danger, it is hard to achieve protection against a man with whom one is already in a relationship and who usually has more physical (and other) power. Whereas in the first case, crime-prevention would reasonably include measures of self-protection for women, in the case of prevention of intimate violence, it would obviously be preferable to seek ways to teach men to be less violent to their partners. Since masculinity in its hegemonic form is so closely tied to physical threat and the eroticisation of dominance, preventing sexual crimes means, as Stanko indicated, challenging accepted conceptions of masculinity.

The other distinction I want to make is between the kinds of violence that educators can hope to try to prevent, and those that are clearly beyond the scope of schools and educational interventions. Perhaps this is faint-hearted; perhaps it realistically acknowledges the defensiveness of men who are offended at the very idea of a "continuum of violence." But I think that we would go in wrong directions if, in designing curricula to prevent violence against women, we aimed at the most egregious offenses. I think we have to recognise that "man" is not completely perfectible. There will always, I am
afraid, be individuals who are not educable. There will always be violence, and male violence against women. But this should not discourage us from designing programs for the large majority who are educable, or from trying to challenge the norms of masculinity that encourage and allow violence.

Marc Lépine is a case in point. In the debate that raged following the Montreal massacre, I was, and am, on the side of those who maintained that his actions were not only a result of a "sickness," but of a particular sickness, rampant in our society, which blames women for men's failures. Lépine was not only psychopathic. He also fiercely resented women for usurping a man's (his) place. Every man raised in our society has been exposed to similar cultural influences as Lépine. Not every man massacres women. Schools cannot, I venture, reach the Lépines of this world. They can, and must, reach most men.

The idea that we can raise our boys to be less violent conflicts with two themes in feminist writings. The first is that men enjoy the benefits of the current arrangement, and will be loathe to give them up. According to this argument, an intractable power inequality exists between men and women, and to expect men voluntarily to give up power reveals an excess of naivety. The second is the trend, in some lesbian separatist work, to treat men's masculinity as an unsolvable problem: masculinity, according to this view, inherently oppresses women by defining itself in relation to the female "other." Thus, while men retain the social power that accords them this privilege of naming and defining themselves, masculinity cannot be reformed. I will discuss each of these themes in turn.

Early radical feminist work suggested that all men "benefit" from some men who rape: the rapist is the foot-soldier of patriarchy (Brownmiller, 1976). I think this is a mistaken view. It is clear that men generally have more power than women. It is also undeniable, and very possibly unforgivable, that men's reaction to the high incidence of violence against women has largely been a silence which appears to give it consent (when not taking the form of angry denial, or ad feminam attacks on the strident feminist messengers bearing the news). As Ruth Bleier expressed it:

...while rape profoundly affects all women, it has been of little or no concern to all men, a curious fact. With rare exception, all
men have some intimate relationship with a woman who can be raped at any time, yet it is not a subject that engages the theoretical or active imagination of men except for those who rape and some engaged in law enforcement and a few others. Men will write to the newspapers endlessly on every aspect of the subject of abortion, but rape seldom appears to be an issue worthy of liberal notice, except perhaps to defend the civil rights of a judge threatened with recall because of his callous treatment of juvenile victims of rape. (1984, p. 185)

Bleier identifies men as the inheritors of a system which, through compulsory heterosexuality, "acknowledges, permits, and requires men's unquestioning access to, ownership of, and authority over women's bodies in the service of the bodies and minds of men" (p. 184). However, men do not benefit equally from this system, and it is from the perspective of subordinated positions that the possibility of male resistance to it can be seen.
bell hooks eloquently describes how dangerous "phallocentric" masculinity is, not only to women, but to black men. She suggests that black men in popular culture have bought into white supremacist culture's phallocentric values, which have "commodified" black male sexuality:

Black people must question why it is that, as white culture has responded to changing gender roles and feminist movement, they have turned to black culture and particularly to black men for articulations of misogyny, sexism, and phallocentrism. In popular culture, representations of black masculinity equate it with brute phallocentrism, woman-hating, a pugilistic 'rapist' sexuality, and flagrant disregard for individual rights. (...) Popular figures such as Eddie Murphy, Arsenio Hall, Chuck D., Spike Lee, and a host of other black males blindly exploit the commodification of blackness and the concomitant exotification of phallocentric black masculinity. (p. 102)

hooks suggests that black men who accept white culture's construction of their sexuality are on a mistaken path. Black men who rape black women (the most common rape scenario in the U.S.) have perhaps used sexism as a defense against their relative lack of power, as an expression of their own victimization by white supremacist culture. This is ultimately self-defeating,
as well as morally wrong. hooks laments that, while "most black men will acknowledge that they are in crisis and are suffering...(they) remain reluctant to engage those progressive movements that might serve as meaningful critical interventions, that might allow them to speak their pain" (p. 112).

hooks' analysis is a corrective to critiques like that of Robert Staples (1990), who claims that black men have been denied a "satisfying manhood." Rather than critically exposing the sexism and sexual violence inherent in what constitutes such a manhood, Staples argues that the black male is "in conflict with the normative definition of masculinity":

Masculinity, as defined in this culture, has always implied a certain autonomy and mastery of one's environment. It can be said that not many whites have achieved this ideal either. Yet, white males did achieve dominance in the nuclear family. Even that semblance of control was largely to be denied black men. During slavery he could receive the respect and esteem of his wife, children and kinsmen, but he had no formal legal authority over his wife or filial rights from his children. (p. 104)

Unfortunately, Staples does not turn out to be against "the normative definition of masculinity" in white culture, which includes respect and esteem from, and legal authority over, his family; he sees black male violence as an expression of the anger black men feel at having been denied their rightful power over women:

Students of the subject (rape) suggest that it is a long-delayed reaction against authority and powerlessness. In the case of black men, it is asserted that they grow up feeling emasculated and powerless before reaching manhood. They often encounter women as authority figures and teachers or as the head of their household. These men consequently act out their feelings of powerlessness against black women in the form of sexual aggression. Hence, rape by black men should be viewed as both an aggressive and political act because it occurs in the context of racial discrimination which denies most black men a satisfying manhood. (p. 109)
As hooks comments, "Ultimately, he is suggesting that if black men could legitimately dominate women more effectively they would not need to coerce them outside the law" (p. 98). In the light of what women's stories of domestic abuse have taught us, this is, of course, absurd.

One way out of this mutually re-inforcing cycle of the construction of black male as sexual predator, and his acceptance and active promotion of this definition (to his, and women's, detriment), is for black men who question phallocentrism to start speaking out. hooks grew up in a black community "where there were individual men who critiqued normative masculinity, who repudiated patriarchy and its concommitant support of sexism":

I fully appreciate that it is a tremendous loss that there is little known of their ideas about black masculinity. Without documentation of their presence, it has been easier for black men who embrace patriarchal masculinity, phallocentrism, and sexism to act as though they speak for all men. Since their representations of black masculinity are in complete agreement with white culture's assessment, they do not threaten or challenge white domination, they reinscribe it. (p. 98)

So while at the moment, the black male voice that is heard endorses sexism and violence, there is space, hooks seems to say, for resistance.

Another such space for male resistance to "normative masculinity" arises from the gay-liberation perspective. Carrigan, Connell & Lee (1987) point out that this perspective

emphasised that the institutionalization of heterosexuality, as in the family, was achieved only by considerable effort, and at considerable cost not only to homosexual people but also to women and children. (p. 174)

The authors argue that, like feminist theory, the gay movement's early theoretical work clearly understood the "reality of men's power over women, and had direct implication for any consideration of the hierarchy of power among men" (p. 174). They develop the useful concept of "hegemonic masculinity" as
a particular variety of masculinity to which others-among them young and effeminate as well as homosexual men-are subordinated. It is particular groups of men, not men in general, who are oppressed within patriarchal sexual relations and whose situations are related in different ways to the overall logic of the subordination of women to men. A consideration of homosexuality thus provides the beginnings of a dynamic conception of masculinity as a structure of social relations. (p. 174)

The authors go on to explain how gay theorists have contributed to the debunking of the conception underlying all of sex role theory that "the history of masculinity is the story of modulation, through time, of the expressions of a more or less fixed entity" (p. 176). Instead of there being a monolithic or authentic masculinity (which Staples' "satisfying manhood" seems to appeal to), an ultimate male essence, which becomes expressed in a variety of ways over time, what emerges is a view of masculinity "as being constantly constructed within the history of an evolving social structure, a structure of sexual power relations." The history of homosexuality, they say,

forces us to recognize the importance of violence, not as an expression of subjective values, or of a type of masculinity, but as a constitutive practice that helps to make all kinds of masculinity. (p. 176)

Other theorists see gay men as generally affirming, rather than resisting, the norms of hegemonic masculinity. Hester et al (1980) in their study of gay men on the left, whom they had expected would have questioned a sexuality based on male power, concluded that for these men "sex is still essentially about power, and specifically about power in relation to other men" (cited in Hester, 1992, p. 102). Kimmel & Levine (1990) wonder why some gay men appear reluctant to practise safe sex, despite what is now known about the transmission of HIV. They conclude, somewhat condescendingly, that AIDS patients "are not 'perverts' or 'deviants' who have strayed from the norms of masculinity, and therefore brought this
terrible retribution on themselves. They are, if anything, overconformists to destructive forms of male behaviour" (p. 101). However, in the scheme of Carrigan et al, hegemony is "a question of how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power and wealth and how they legitimate and reproduce the social relationships that generate their dominance" (p. 179). Despite the similarities of attitudes and behaviours between hegemonic and subordinated masculinities, few of which at the moment seem to be working in the directions we as feminists might desire, the analysis offered by Carrigan et al is useful because it exposes rifts and fissures which might be exploited by an anti-sexist politics. For example, it remains the case that it is hegemonic masculinity which has the power to define the terms on which masculinity itself is understood. But the increasing visibility of the "margins" of masculinity will, we can hope, expose the fragility of the centre, and provide a standpoint from which to critique it. Since the concept of hegemony includes the requirement that the subordinated consent to their subordination (as Willis' lads helped reproduce their status as working class by refusing the school's academic curriculum, Willis, 1977), the work of gay male theorists may begin to interrupt hegemony. However, if we accept that "violence is a constitutive practice that helps to make all kinds of masculinity," such gay theorists must also acknowledge the violence that constitutes their own masculinity.

To summarise, while radical feminism has tended not to distinguish among men, but rather to demonstrate how all men benefit from sexism, it has, I suggest, largely overlooked the possibilities that some men inhabit subordinated positions in the gender order. There exists the possibility of a radical male critique of masculinity already begun by feminism if, and only if, men within these groups challenge hegemonic masculinity rather than seek to share in its benefits. This will require that, for example, the voices of gay and black men who reject the paradigm of dominance are heard over those who adopt a discourse of male victimisation which, like Staples', ultimately excuses and justifies violence. How this critique might be taken up by schools in order to reduce gender violence is the subject of subsequent chapters.

I said above that the possibility of reforming masculinity appears to contradict two trends in feminism. I have just discussed the first, the radical feminist idea that all men benefit from a system which is, in part, constituted
by violence against women. The second is the theme of separation in lesbian feminist writing. Let me first admit that this is not a literature I am very familiar with, or that, as a married heterosexual, I understand well. However, it is a completely understandable strategy, in fact, perhaps the only entirely logical one, if one accepts the premises of the radical feminist argument outlined above. That is, if compulsory heterosexuality is an institution, as Adrienne Rich eloquently argued, that relies on and reproduces the subordination of women, then lesbianism represents both a sexual and a political choice which may empower women. Although my personal project supports trying to reform, rather than reject outright, heterosexuality so that it is neither compulsory nor disempowering to women, I applaud those women who find a sense of safety and community somewhere.

But, although I support the resistance to masculinist culture which lesbian separatism in part expresses, I do not feel that it offers a model for institutional violence-prevention. On a purely practical level, only a minority of women identify as lesbians, and not all of them endorse separation. More importantly, other than for some individual women, there is the possibility that separating the sexes would increase dangers to women. Of course, how separation is conceived is an important consideration. Lesbians who would prefer not to work with men but must do so may be leading lives that are otherwise "separatist." But since a vision of what kind of community we would ideally inhabit is crucial to any program for change, let us consider the consequences of lesbian separatism on a larger scale. Peggy Reeves Sanday's (1981; 1986; 1992) cross-cultural studies of the socio-cultural configurations which encourage or discourage rape indicate that societies in which the sexes are separated have a higher incidence of rape:

There is considerable evidence supporting the notion that rape is an expression of a social ideology of male dominance. Female power and authority is lower in rape-prone societies. Women do not participate in public decision making in these societies and males express contempt for women as decision makers. In addition, there is greater sexual separation in rape-prone societies as indicated by the presence of structures or places where the sexes congregate in single sex groups. (1981, p. 25)
We cannot predict in what ways men would change if women in large numbers did choose separatism, but work such as this surely calls into question whether that course of action would be good for women generally. It is likely that at least some recent male violence against women is motivated by resentment of women's improving status, that it is the backlash against feminism expressed in its rawest form (the Montreal massacre is one example; see also Vogelman, 1990, on motives for rape). Gays and lesbians are already the objects of horrifying gang attacks (Comstock, 1991). In the short term at least, short of living in protected fortresses, there is no guarantee that women who choose separatism will not be more frequent targets of backlash violence.

Logically, increased separation by women would also mean that there would be a higher proportion of boys and men elsewhere. Remy (1990) has documented the recurrence of a form of the "men's hut" in various societies, which he claims is emblematic of fratriarchy, his preferred term for male dominance which does not depend entirely on family or kinship structures. "Unlike patriarchy," he explains, "fratriarchy is based simply on the self-interest of the association of men itself. It reflects the demands of a group of lads to have the 'freedom' to do as they please, to have a good time" (p. 45). He describes features of the men's hut:

The men's hut traditionally excludes women. This reflects its function as the actualization of the desire for separation from women and children and their world. But entry to the hut is not automatic, even for adult males. A man in this context is someone who has been awarded an honorific title bestowed on those who, being of male biological sex, have passed the requisite rites de passage, a precondition for becoming a fully-fledged member of the masculine community. (p. 49)

In some tribal cultures, the men's hut stored sacred fertility symbols which were to be seen only by men. The penalty for women who intruded on this male secrecy was sometimes gang-rape (Sanday, 1986). There are many contemporary versions of the men's hut: the college fraternity, the company board room, perhaps the porn movie house. It is an evocative metaphor. The point I wish to suggest here is perhaps best made by Barbara Ehrenreich:
A careful study of the world's great religious and military hierarchies would show, I am sure, that men alone, whatever their stated ideals, are in bad company. (1990, p. 140)

If separatism is a positively sustaining vision for some women, so be it. But if it resulted in a parallel separatism by men in "huts" (an interesting counterpoint to Camille Paglia's charge that "if civilization had been left in female hands, we would still be living in grass huts"), as pointed to in Remy's frankly distopic but disturbingly familiar view, then it would work against positive social change. For even when (heterosexual) men separate themselves in groups, these groups are seldom completely self-contained, as lesbian communities might like to be. Jeffords (1992) shows that, although soldiers in the Vietnam War narratives create a masculine community which appears to transcend class boundaries, this is accomplished by retaining the crucial boundary between themselves and women, or between what she terms "the masculine point of view" and anything which poses a threat to it. The soldiers tend to "feminize" whoever angers them, whether the American government that, in their opinion, has supplied them with inadequate arms and provisions, or the American public that reviles them on their return home. Unfortunately, this symbolic construction, this "mythos of male bonding," has tragic consequences for actual women. Both Jeffords and Sanday (1986) recount how the male bonding associated with the "men's hut" can lead to gang-rape. Sanday stresses the obvious homo-erotic element of gang-rape: since the men "bonded" through the men's hut cannot express this bond sexually in the homophobic atmosphere of masculinist culture, they instead act out their "bonds" by using women. Jeffords points out the importance of display in gang-rape, which both expresses and reinforces the male bond:

...the collective becomes the spectacular, as the sexuality that confirms the masculine bond is displayed with insistence and, on occasion, with a vengeance. (...) The very frequency of accounts of gang-rape in soldiers' narratives of the war is only one symptom of the force of the spectacular, of how spectacle functions through violence to release tensions of difference.
Soldier after soldier remarks that he was aware that others were watching him commit the rape. (....) Gang-rape combines collectivity and display as the masculine bond performs as a group... raping and watching others rape *leaves no position for any other action within the bond.* (p. 69, emphasis added)

This is confirmed by the following account of gang-rape in the Vietnam War:

They were supposed to go after what they called a Viet Cong whore. They went into her village and instead of capturing her, they raped her—every man raped her. As a matter of fact, one man said to me that it was the first time he had made love (*sic*) to a woman with his boots on. The man who led the platoon, or the squad, was actually a private. The squad leader was a sergeant but he was a useless person and he let the private take over his squad. Later he said he took no part in the raid. It was against his morals. So instead of telling his squad not to do it, because they wouldn't listen to him anyway, the sergeant went into another side of the village and just sat and stared bleakly at the ground, feeling sorry for himself. But at any rate, they raped the girl, and then, the last man to make love (*sic*) to her, shot her in the head. (statement by Michael McLusker in "The winter soldier investigation: an inquiry into American war crimes," cited in Kokopeli & Lakey, 1990, p. 10)

This passage reveals how the male bond functions to disallow refusal. The squad leader cannot be part of the unit *and* refuse to rape. So he distances himself, physically and morally, from the group's actions, bemoaning his own, rather than the victim's, powerlessness. This entire passage is saturated with male denial: of the victim's pain, of the homoeroticism of the sexual display, of the rape itself. Even the narrator, obviously troubled enough by this incident to give testimony, cannot break its discursive structure, which constructs rape as "making love."

So, let us admit, there are real problems which can result from the "bad company" which (heterosexual) men often keep together. This is certainly not a good reason to argue against lesbian separatism: after all, violent, woman-hating behaviours on the part of men are what some separatists must surely be trying to resist. But it is why I do not think we can rehabilitate masculinity, at least at this historical moment, on a model of increased sexual
separation, since I do not feel it would succeed in subverting the subject/other dyad, and the mystification and violence to which it can lead, but help reinforce it.

Let me make a final point about the men's "hut." Sanday (1986) theorises that the culture of the hut grew out of male jealousy at the reproductive power of females. Among the Mundurucu of South America, for instance, it is believed that women once ruled, but that since they did not hunt, they could not make "ritual offerings of meat" to the spirits of the ancestors, thought to inhabit sacred "trumpets." Thus, the men were able to take the trumpets from the women, "thereby establishing male dominance" and placing men "in control of female fertility" (p. 87). The men now guard these fetishes, and any woman who sees them "risks gang rape, an act that defiles the female body in order to sacralize its man-made counterpart" (p. 86). Sanday draws a parallel between this kind of symbolic appropriation of female reproductive ability and the way pornographic imagery functions:

These images place men in control of the feelings of the body, enabling them to live autonomously without vulnerability or dependence. In rejecting the knowledge of the body derived from early experience and by replacing this knowledge with control of bodily forces, men communicate with each other through fantasized images of the feminine. (...) The prostitute and pornographic images remake the feminine in a safe image by placing knowledge of the body beyond a man's emotional reach at the same time that experience of the objectified female body satisfies sexual desire. (p. 86)

By contrast, in rape-free societies, Sanday says, "women are respected and influential members of the community. The maternal features of nurturance and child-bearing provide models guiding the nature of human interaction. The attitude towards nature is one of reverence as opposed to dominance and exploitation and the relationship between the sexes tends to be symmetrical and equal" (p. 85). She later makes a crucial point about rape-free societies:

Although the sexes may not perform the same duties or have the same rights and privileges, each is indispensable to the activities of the other. Sex role separation may be as extreme in
rape-free as in rape-prone societies. Of importance is not whether sex roles are similar or different, but whether the sexes have access to balanced power spheres. (p. 93)

If the sexes had equal power, Sanday seems to suggest, then it would be difficult for men to control, symbolically or otherwise, women's reproductive power. Our society, of course, is increasingly committed to the sexes' (if not the various genders') having the same rights and privileges, and thus the tribal model is not fully satisfactory. But Sanday's work shows that there are cases when different does not mean unequal, and this cultural value seems to be correlated with an absence of sexual violence.

What, then, can we derive from Sanday's description of rape-free societies? First, I think that this finding from cultural anthropology is an important example to cite whenever we encounter functionalist arguments about the inevitability of rape and the "raging hormones" (Whatley, 1991) that supposedly drive the urge to rape. While cultural arrangements act on the body, including the hormones, Sanday shows how thoroughgoing social values and habits are in structuring the shape of sexual relations. Second, her analysis affirms trends in cultural feminism which re-value the feminine, including the experience of bearing and raising children, and resist the male tendency to appropriate and devalue feminine experience. Third, it provides the basis for articulating a view of society in which difference is not only tolerated, but necessary to the health and functioning of the community. The dangers of normatively prescribing what form such "difference" should take are obvious. As Thomas (1990) points out, "the principle of equality in difference...can itself serve as a justification for existing gender roles, on the grounds that each sex should be valued for its specific contribution to society" (p. 157). Recognising and valuing difference without prescribing what necessarily follows from difference is a tricky balancing act; we do not want the differences of race/class/gender to be seen to express "essences" which can easily be construed as deviance from a white/middle class/male standard, nor do we want differences to function as intractable boundaries or as justification for unfair treatment of the "other."

I suggest that whereas lesbian separatism cannot provide a model for violence prevention, the political marking of sexual difference, on the other hand, may be helpful, if it leads away from the rigid hierarchy of male/female
which underlies gender violence. As hooks (1990) points out, it is the ability to "represent and make certain knowledge available" which makes resistance to domination possible. Marginality, whether racial or sexual, is a location from which to represent "the authority of experience":

One exciting dimension of cultural studies is the critique of essentialist notions of difference. Yet this critique should not become a means to dismiss differences or an excuse for ignoring the authority of experience. It is often evoked in a manner which suggests that all the ways black people think of ourselves as "different" from whites are really essentialist, and therefore without concrete grounding. This way of thinking threatens the very foundations that make resistance to domination possible. It is precisely the power to represent and make certain knowledge available. (p. 130)

hooks applauds the trend away from defining individuals as different/inferior, but cautions against eliding differences which are grounded in experience. This seems a promising distinction, one that seems to imply letting difference define itself. Being black, or being lesbian, has meant inhabiting positions of marginality, and while these experiences do not derive from any "essence" we can meaningfully get at, they do ground cultural identities. As hooks says, representations of these identities open up critique of hegemony. However, hooks also seems to say, it is important that representations from the "margins" reach the centre. While, ideally, the burden of reforming the centre should not fall to the marginalized, in practice, this is the way positive change often begins. It was women who started to tell the story of male violence against them. Representation of subordinated knowledges, then, ideally includes, but is not confined to, a reflection to the oppressor of what domination has meant to the oppressed. It is in this sense that I will argue for a "pedagogy of the oppressor" in chapter four.

I thus support a vision of community in which a multiplicity of identities can co-exist. One example of such a vision is the case Iris Young makes for city life "as a vision of social relations affirming group difference" (1990a, p. 227). The "normative ideal" that city life instantiates for Young is "social relations of difference without exclusion" (p.227). This seems an ideal
worth taking seriously. Perhaps the way to begin to achieve such a goal is through a dialectical process of representation of marginality/oppression and subsequent reaction from the centre. The most challenging aspect of this process is to ensure that the reaction from the centre moves beyond defensive posturing, threatened anger, and attempts to re-assert control. This is where we find ourselves at the moment with the issue of violence against women. Women (marginalized through violence) have told their stories. Most men have reacted defensively or maintained silence. In order for us to move beyond the impasse, the centre will have to begin to deconstruct itself; in order to hear what the margins say, the centre will have to move in their direction. Perhaps this is impossible. As Bob Connell explains:

Despite promising beginnings, it has proved difficult to find or create a base for a consistent countersexist practice. The contrast with the political mobilization of gay men in gay liberation, and more recently around AIDS issues, is striking. The structural problem is obvious. Heterosexual men are the dominant group in the gender order of contemporary society; propping up patriarchy, rather than demolishing it, will advantage them. In a quite basic way, trying to mobilize a countersexist politics is asking men to act against their social interests. (1993, p. 205)

Connell has also said, however, that "what the debates about 'men's liberation'...showed is that there are costs for men in their social advantages, sometimes serious ones. It also showed that there are some groups of men who can recognize injustice when they see it and are far from comfortable with the position they have inherited" (1987, p. xi). As I have suggested, men in the "margins" of masculinity (gays and members of ethnic minorities) are potential allies in feminist educational interventions to challenge hegemonic masculinity and its violence. Connell points to two reasons heterosexual men in dominant social groups might be persuaded to join this cause: enlightened self-interest and their sense of (in)justice. It is unlikely that men in large numbers will actively undermine their own advantaged position; if this is what they perceive joining the crusade against male violence will result in, then Connell's pessimism is realistic. If, however, through educational programs, men begin to examine male behaviour honestly, we
can hope that what will follow such an examination will be a change in consciousness such that more equitable social arrangements will not be seen as an incursion into their privilege, but a necessary step toward a more peaceful society that will ultimately advantage them as well as the women they love. In the long run, there will be limits to what we can achieve in violence-prevention if we do not seek alliances with pro-feminist, anti-violent men. I share Jane Kenway's (unpublished paper, 1991) attitude toward men who want to join what she calls the "feminist conversation in schools":

I (...) believe that for many reasons all women have a strong interest in the destruction of certain forms of masculinity—particularly those forms that inflict symbolic and other violence on women, children and the environment. We also have a strong interest in reconstructing masculinity in ways which enhance our lives in all respects. It is therefore absolutely crucial that we lend our support to the men who are working on this project and that we encourage them to expand the political possibilities of their educational work. (p.31)

hooks similarly speaks of the need to 're-conceptualize masculinity':

The most visionary task of all remains that of re-conceptualizing masculinity so that alternative, transformative models are there in the culture, in our daily lives, to help boys and men who are working to construct a self, to build new identities. (1990, p. 64)

Ruth Bleier, like Kenway, believes it is crucial that men combat male violence, although she seems much less sure that this will actually happen:

Men who are truly concerned that the feminist movement is not sufficiently 'humanist' (i.e., male-oriented) and inclusive have the opportunity to be included by producing insightful analyses of the links between rape, male violence, and sexuality, misogyny, and the appropriation and control of women's sexuality and women through sexuality. Such analyses could provide the bases for changed consciousness and behaviours. At
present the male voice that dominates celebrates rape and violence. Only men can change that voice. (p. 185)

I both sympathise with Bleier's impatience with male posturing and agree with her argument that simple justice dictates that men must take responsibility for their own violence. I do think, though, that since 1984 when she wrote this paper, some men inhabiting the "centre" have begun to admit to the importance of violence in the construction of their own gender, particularly the way their bodies (or denial of their bodies) become implicated in this process. The "white ribbon" campaign in Canada is an example of an opportunity for other such men to express their solidarity with their threatened sisters, lovers, and friends. Let us hope that its momentum continues. I will examine this question of men's self-assessment more thoroughly in chapter two, concluding that perhaps the most fruitful course of action would be to pursue Kenway's notion of feminist conversation in schools. Adult heterosexual males who inhabit the "centre" may not as a group yet be willing to acknowledge the centrality of violence in the construction of masculinity. Last year, for example, the trial lawyers' association of Ontario complained that new legislation removing the defense of "assumed consent" in rape trials was trying to change centuries-old sexual arrangement by fiat. Why, I wanted to ask, should it offend the trial lawyers that men could not simply offer their interpretation of the woman's point of view as justifying their actions? What is so unsexy (for heterosexual men) about overt consent? To the extent that the "men's literature" honestly confronts this question, as in certain cases it does, then it will help the deconstruction of hegemonic masculinity. But it remains an academic literature and thus of little impact so far. If the pattern of defensive resistance to change demonstrated by the trial lawyers is not to repeat itself endlessly, then we need to get to boys before their views on women and sexuality ossify, as theirs seem to have done.

Thus far, I have suggested that most violence against women is committed by men who by all other standards are considered normal, and have drawn some distinctions between "stranger danger" and intimate violence. I have indicated that public education about crime prevention for women has erroneously, perhaps even dishonestly, concentrated on the
former, where the latter is clearly the greater threat to women. I have hinted that something is wrong with normal masculinity in that it so often violently expressed, and have pointed to how this violence is constituted in, and constitutes, the mythos of male bonding. In stating that one aim of this thesis is to seek an understanding of the pathology of masculinity, I have suggested that women will best be served if we target boys and men in designing prevention programs, and have suggested ways in which the knowledge of subordinated masculinities can be used to critique hegemonic masculinity; men who inhabit more privileged positions would perhaps have to be appealed to less directly. Finally, I have indicated the necessity of forming alliances with men working to change an oppressive gender order which supports male violence against women. I will now sketch the theoretical framework of this thesis, outlining how viewing male violence from the standpoint of women may be aided by postmodern theory.

**Male violence in feminist theory**

In a review of feminist literature on violence against women, Anne Edwards observes that the "classic texts" of feminism's second wave did not specifically address male violence since "they all adopted the position that in the modern Western world force is no longer a major technique for patriarchal control over women" (Edwards, 1987, p. 16). In the light of what we now know about the incidence of male violence under patriarchy, Kate Millett's words sound cruelly ironic:

We are not accustomed to associate patriarchy with force. So perfect is its system of socialization, so complete the general assent to its values, so long and so universally has it prevailed in human society, that it scarcely seems to require violent implementation. (Millett, cited in Edwards, p. 14)

The current feminist thinking on male violence against women is perhaps exemplified by Jalna Hanmer (1990):
Why do men beat their wives? The feminist theoretical position that has emerged from paying close attention to women's experiences is that they can do it because they can get away with it. In the words of the old music hall joke: 'Do you beat your wife?' 'Of course, I can't beat anyone else's!'. (p. 33)

There are, of course, many feminisms, but Hanmer points to what makes an analysis of male violence a feminist analysis, and that is an awareness of the power men continue to have in our society, both actually over individual women, and symbolically over all women. Against Millett and earlier feminists who assumed that men were so powerful and privileged that they did not need to use violence against women are amassed the countless stories of intimate violence which seem to have no explanation other than that men can get away with it.

Hanmer's stance seems to imply that it would be fruitless to theorize women's oppression beyond recognising power differences between men and women. However, as I argued earlier with the case of Marc Lépine, although all men enjoy at least symbolic power over women, not all men are violent to women. What explains why some men are violent, while others are not? Whereas I believe that a recognition of male power is the place from which any coherent analysis of this problem must begin, I do not take the position that once we have recognized that fact, no more need, or can, be said about male violence. First, as we will see later, violent men are often plagued by a sense of their own powerlessness. Frequently, these are quite pathetic, weak, and confused individuals. It is not accurate to say that these men have power; in fact, they are frustrated by their lack of power. What we will need to examine is the negotiations men make with the norms of masculinity, including the notion that to be male is to be powerful. This task will be helped by adopting some of the tools of postmodernism. Second, women are oppressed, certainly, by their position in the gender order, but that oppression is experienced by individual women in relationships with individual men as well as through a general cultural climate which oppresses and excludes them. There may be structural and institutional props to male violence against women, props which justify and perpetuate violence, but even institutional violence is acceded to and carried out by individual males who, I claim, need to be educated to refuse such collusion. Since the violence we are
interested in occurs in relationships, we will need a more nuanced view of
the structure of violent relationships than the basic feminist position allows.
Although the dominant trend in the mental health professions is, as clinical
psychologist Susan Hanks (1992) says, to "disavow a feminist analysis" (p.158),
there is some psychological work on violence against women which takes the
standpoint of women's experience, and to which I will refer in later chapters.
Now, though, I will explore the question of the compatibility of feminism and
postmodern theory in considering male violence against women.

Feminism and postmodernism

As Seyla Benhabib (1992) points out, "feminism and postmodernism
are often mentioned as if they were allies; yet certain other characterizations
of postmodernism should make us rather ask 'feminism or postmodernism?'
" (p. 203) I will argue here that feminism is compatible with what Benhabib
terms postmodernism's "weak thesis." Indeed, these two perspectives as they
have influenced each other form the theoretical framework of this thesis. I
agree, however, with Benhabib that the "strong thesis" of postmodernism
actually "renders incoherent feminism as a theoretical articulation of a
struggling social movement" (p. 211). Specifically, as regards violence against
women, it can lead to a dangerous conflation of world and text
(Hawkesworth, 1989) that threatens to deny the personhood of the women
whose oppression feminism wants to challenge. The issue of violence against
women illustrates how much there is left to accomplish on the feminist
agenda. I argue here that the project of ending male violence against women
will be better served if we season feminism with postmodernism than if we
take postmodern theory to be the meal itself.

Benhabib uses Jane Flax's framework in Thinking Fragments:
Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West
(1990) to elaborate a strong and weak thesis of each of three central positions
of postmodernism. Flax identifies the death of Man, of History and of
Metaphysics as characterising the postmodern position. When I refer to the
"weak" and "strong" versions of postmodernism, I will be drawing from Benhabib's reading of Flax.

"The western philosophical tradition," states Benhabib, "articulates the deep structures of the experiences and consciousness of a self which it claims to be representative for human beings as such" (p. 212). She continues:

The deepest categories of western philosophy obliterate differences of gender as these shape and structure the experience and subjectivity of the self. Western reason posits itself as the discourse of the one self-identical subject, thereby blinding us to and in fact delegitimizing the presence of otherness and difference which do not fit into its categories. (p. 212)

Postmodernism rejects the concept of the authorial, colonising, liberal self of Western philosophy. It replaces this "sovereign self" with a subject situated "in the context of various social, linguistic and discursive practices" (p. 214). This view of the subject as situated has been taken up by feminists for whom gender "and the various practices contributing to its constitution are one of the most crucial contexts in which to situate the purportedly neutral and universal subjects of reason" (p. 212). Recognising that gender is only one of a number of crucial contexts in which subjects are constituted has had a dramatic effect on feminist theory. A whole literature on the meaning of difference has meant the end of an era when middle-class heterosexual women could unselfconsciously speak for women of colour, poor women, and lesbians. It has also, as writers such as Linda Alcoff (1988) and Bronwyn Davies (1992) have pointed out, posed a radical challenge to the central assumption of feminism, which is that female experience is, at least at some level, unitary. As Franklin, Lury and Stacey (1991) put it:

The challenge remains, at both a theoretical and political level, for feminists to be able to hold on to certain commonalities in women's position in relation to oppressive patriarchal social structures, without denying the very real differences between women and the resulting specificities in the forms of their oppression. (p. 4)
Thus even the weak thesis of postmodernism calls feminism's foundational truths into question. However, concerning violence against women, it is possible to profit from the "weakly" postmodern view of the subject by analysing how institutions such as schools take a male subject position. Dawn Currie (1992) discusses such an approach to a critical examination of how the law operates:

...deconstruction is useful as a method of critique because it illustrates how dominant meanings are constructed and how these meanings, when claimed as Truth, suppress alternative meanings. From this perspective, deconstruction points us in the direction of looking for other meanings upon which to base subversive discourse. In the case of feminism, this search leads us to women's experiences, in life and law, as sources of excluded alternatives. In discovering this suppression, discourse analysis identifies the subject position of the law as masculine. This identification is not the same as saying either that 'law is male' or that law represents an ideological view. Thus, deconstruction explains why feminist law reforms have failed. (p. 77)

I will be doing just such a deconstructive reading of schools in chapter three, suggesting that schools have, in fact, a masculine subject position that buttresses practices that are harmful to girls. The knowledge and experience of girls in schools, on the other hand, will be seen to be "excluded alternatives." Additionally, I will use Connell's (1987; 1993) analysis of masculinity to show that not only do schools privilege the male subject position, but that boys in groups exert a powerful influence on each other to "do" masculinity in certain ways. A postmodern reading of masculinity will allow us to see it as a practice or performance, rather than as a biological imperative, and thus as being, in principle, susceptible to change. What feminism supplies, I will argue, are the criteria which will allow us to determine which performances of masculinity will, in fact, hurt women the least.

The strong thesis of postmodernism is problematic for feminism generally, and for the grounding of particular social problems such as male violence against women. Whereas in its weak version, postmodernism
wants to reformulate "the traditional attributes of the philosophical subject of the West, like self-reflexivity, the capacity for acting on principles, rational accountability for one's actions and the ability to project a life-plan into the future, in short, some form of autonomy and rationality...by taking account of the radical situatedness of the subject" (Benhabib, p. 214), the strong version dispenses with the subject altogether. The liberal, modern self that in postmodernism's weak thesis gave way to a radically situated subject becomes, in Flax's words, "merely another position in language" (cited in Benhabib, p. 214).

In one way, the death of the subject is an attractive concept for feminism, in that it potentially subverts official knowledges which tend to fix women in static, essentiaлизed, normalised identities. But, on the whole, I think that this kind of analysis may do more violence to women than some of the thinking it seeks to subvert. First, as Benhabib points out, it is hard to know "how in fact the very project of female emancipation would be thinkable without such a regulative ideal of enhancing the agency, autonomy and selfhood of women" (p. 214). Nancy Harstock (1987) has pointed to the irony of the fact that just as women and other marginalized groups are starting to be considered to be autonomous, rational beings, a view that questions the possibility or desirability of rationality and autonomy is gaining sway. Is this the epistemological equivalent of the ghettoisation of careers that occurs when women enter them in large numbers? As Mary Hawkesworth puts it,

At a moment when the preponderance of rational and moral argument sustains prescriptions for women's equality, it is a bit too cruel a conclusion and too reactionary a political agenda to accept that reason is impotent, that equality is impossible. Should postmodernism's seductive text gain ascendancy, it will not be an accident that power remains in the hands of the white males who currently possess it. In a world of radical inequality, relativist resignation reinforces the status quo. For those affronted by the arrogance of power, there are political as well as intellectual reasons to prefer a critical feminist epistemology to a postmodernist one. (1989, p. 557)
Second, although much has been written by postmodern theorists on the near impossibility of dialogue across difference, I think that the issue of violence against women illustrates why it would be premature to dispense with the ideal of intersubjective understanding which, of course, assumes the existence of subjects. As Burbules and Rice (1991) argue, in the strong thesis of postmodernism,

...the celebration of difference becomes a presumption of incommensurability, a denial of the possibility of intersubjective understanding, and an exaggerated critique that any attempt to establish reasonable and consensual dialogue across difference inevitably involves the imposition of the dominant group's values, beliefs, and modes of discourse upon others. (p. 401)

Intersubjective understanding is a difficult goal. Indeed, the politics of inclusion, consensus-building, and giving voice are arguably as problematic as the politics of exclusion, domination, and silencing. The goal of women's equality is similarly contested. However, I believe that a wholesale rejection of intersubjective understanding as a social ideal holds real dangers, especially for women. Claiming that we cannot communicate across differences seems to me to risk exacerbating the conditions which often lead to and justify violence against women. One of the psychological features of convicted rapists and other violent offenders appears to be the failure to recognise their victims' personhood (or subjectivity), a general inability, or refusal, to empathise with others. (Vogelman, 1990) It seems to me that what we should do in the cases where men have been violent to their intimate partners-and perhaps have a emotional motivation to understand and end their violent behaviours-is try to increase the offenders' intersubjective understanding. Therapeutic programs that have had some success in rehabilitating these kinds of offenders appear to be attempting just that. Hanks (1992), for example, points to the batterer who has a history of childhood violence and who "as a child utilized the defense of identification with the aggressor" (p. 162). Although this type of batterer "will be unable initially to empathically recognise the frightening impact his behaviour has had on his partner and/or children," this situation can change:
This initial identification...can be modified as the man comes to recognize (through the therapist's empathic mirroring) his own terror during these episodes of childhood abuse. He can begin to identify with his own experience as a victim, and, thus, with the experiences of those he victimizes. (p. 163)

If the batterer did not have a sense of himself as being continuous in the modernist sense, this kind of approach would not be effective, since it is through the memories of the hurt done to his inner "self" in childhood that he can appreciate the consequences of his violence to other "selves."

Emphasising the incommensurability of differing points of view, in the case of male violence against women, would not, I suspect, lead to women's empowerment, but to increased victimisation. I will argue in later chapters that intersubjective understanding, despite the difficulty of ever fully achieving it, should be one explicit goal in violence-prevention programs; if young men are taught to respect the personhood of others, and are themselves respected (in that they have some reasonable chances of leading productive lives), perhaps the violent usurping of others' human rights will not become a way of life. In a culture that, I will argue, both mystifies gender and celebrates dominance, it is hard to see what social benefits could actually accrue from a postmodern abandonment of the goal of equitable communication. Postmodernism is in part a reaction against the "speaking for" others that often passes for intersubjective understanding, and a postmodern sensibility quite reasonably rejects all forms of colonization, including appropriation of the voices of the oppressed. In offering versions of "the truth" which contradict, challenge, or provide a counterpoint to official discourses, postmodernism provides welcome relief from the self-satisfaction of those who control these discourses. Feminist history could thus be thought of as "postmodern" to the extent that it uncovers or discloses the experiences, perspectives, and contributions of a previously unrepresented population. As Hanmer says of the feminist project generally:

Feminism has long been making the invisible visible, speaking of problems that have no name, decentring the centre, recentring the other, making the private public, challenging and changing consciousness, recognising and deconstructing
patriarchy, celebrating sisterhood, and opposing the power, domination, oppression and violence of men. (1990, p. 17)

However, I think that most writers of feminist history probably hope to be read beyond a feminist audience, and want feminist history to be recognised not only as "women's" history, but as history, full stop. After all, the oppressed do not speak merely to each other (although, as we have seen in the women's movement, this was an absolutely crucial feature of consciousness-raising, and continues to be). They also, as I argued earlier, represent the experience of their oppression to the oppressor, and not only to actual oppressors, but also to the bystanders and witnesses of oppression. There would be little reason beyond catharsis for people to write (or sing or dance) about their oppression if they truly believed that no one but an individual in their exact circumstance could understand them. Perhaps the person most touched by Eli Danica's Don't: a woman's word is the survivor of child sexual abuse. But this does not mean that her account has not changed lives, raised awareness, or caused women, and men, to weep for the child she was. Perhaps the judge who presides over the case concerning sexual abuse in a Martensville daycare will recall her work as he or she writes a judgement; perhaps the book will have a more diffuse effect. Still, it is hard to understand the welling-up of sympathy and emotion for victims of oppression in people whose life circumstances have little in common with these victims if one believes that we have no common humanity, or that we cannot ever really get beyond our differences.

Feminist accounts of violence against women thus rely on the very kind of intersubjective understanding that postmodernism brings into question. Unless such accounts can actually lead to a change in men's behaviour, they will have amounted to little. It would be a cruel joke indeed to play on our daughters to raise them with an acute awareness of the perfidy of men, but with no hope that it can ever end. It is crucial, therefore, to bring this feminist conversation about gender and its violence into the school curriculum where violence against women has the potential to be not a problem "for" and "about" women, but a central consideration for boys as they construct their masculinity. As I will discuss in chapter four, challenges in designing such curricular intervention include the general resistance to
feminism in schools that Kenway (1992) and Shapiro, Parssinen & Brown (1992) document. Even at the university level, Lewis (1990) found that her attempts to run a "feminist" classroom were subverted not only by men, who perceived certain readings and discussions as threatening, and thus to be disallowed/silenced, but also by women students for whom "the 'good news' of the transformative powers of feminist consciousness turns into the 'bad news' of social inequality and, therefore, a perspective and politics they want to resist" (p. 468).

I have mentioned two potential dangers that a strongly postmodern approach to subjectivity poses for women: the disappearance of the self/subject into a mere "subject position" that threatens women's tenuous and hard-fought claims to full personhood, and a nihilistic abandonment of intersubjective understanding at a moment in our history when such communication seems imperative. A third danger also merits consideration, that of the disappearance of individual responsibility for behaviour that may follow from the position that subjectivities are radically situated. Bronwyn Davies (1989b) distinguishes between social construction theory and poststructuralism. In the latter approach,

the individual is not so much a social construction which ends in some relatively fixed end product, but one who is constituted and reconstituted through a variety of discursive practices. It is the recognition of the ongoing nature of the constitution of self and the recognition of the nonunitary nature of self that makes poststructuralist theory different from social construction theory. (p. xi)

In chapter two I outline Connell's (1987) theory of gender. His is a social construction theory according to which, once individuals are "constructed," they remain more or less the same way. This may be why Connell believes that changing men is such a daunting prospect. However, it is equally possible to examine how individuals are "constituted and reconstituted through a variety of discursive practices" without holding to a view that not only admits of, but celebrates, the "nonunitary nature of self." Davies herself sees poststructuralism as potentially liberatory, since individuals who accept this framework can position their subjectivities in various ways:
One liberating aspect of poststructuralist thought is that it allows me to recognize the multiple discourses in which I participate and to see myself differently constituted through each of them. It allows me to imagine a discourse in which I can position myself as neither male nor female, but human. It also allows me to see fully, for the first time, the extent of my entrapment in known discourses. (p. 139)

In a sense, Davies' account here is not incompatible with the sort of unitary view of the self she claims to reject. There is still an "I" behind the perception of discursive practices, some consciousness that allows her to understand her own entrapment. Without a sense of some sort of continuity of the self, or, less contentiously, of one's own consciousness, how would one even know that one was "entrapped" within discourse? I do not see postmodernism/poststructuralism as, in itself, liberatory; I would argue that it is rather Davies' sense of the injustice done to her (female) self that allows her to perceive poststructuralism as liberation. Without this guiding principle, it is hard to see how the poststructural conception of the person as a series of multiple subject positionings is in any real way liberating.

So I do not see social construction theory and poststructuralism as being incompatible, as long as we can retain (as I have suggested Davies implicitly does) at least a minimal notion of the unitary self, a self which emerges, though, through social relations. The reason I think it is crucial to hold to this idea of the self is that, otherwise, fully poststructural accounts obscure the actual choices individuals have to resist or accede to various discourses. If individuals are only or entirely subjectivities "positioned" through discourse, how, then, can society hold them individually responsible for their actions? What this might mean, from the perspective of a consideration of male violence against women, is the disappearance of the offender into a mere subject positioning over which he had no choice. The victim's victimization would, similarly, lead inevitably from her powerless position in discourse. Poststructuralism thus risks reifying the very "structures" it wants to argue against. Without a view of the world which acknowledges "real bodies" (Currie, p. 77), individuals' sense of the continuity of their own consciousness, and moral standards of justice and equality, as
contested as those might be, poststructural/postmodern approaches to subjectivity may turn out to excuse the mistreatment of marginalised people. Like the "hoods" who, in West Side Story, moan sarcastically to Officer Krupke that the reason for their bad behaviour is that they are "misunderstood," perpetrators of violence against women may exculpate themselves by appealing to the notion that their behaviour does not express some authentic, autonomous "self" who can be held accountable for their actions, but emerges from the way their social situations have "constituted" them. It seems to me that we must sympathise with the importance of the various oppressions of race/class/gender without falling into the kind of absolute determinism that postmodernism appears to allow.

The strong thesis of postmodernism also appears to be at odds with feminism in its view of knowledge. The weak thesis of postmodernism may be characterised as seeing all knowledge as being incomplete or partial, mediated by many factors (race/class/gender), technologies, and conceptual frameworks; recent postmodern theorists (Lave & Wenger, 1991) have coined the term "situated" to refer to these aspects of knowledge(s). Again, this conception has much to offer feminism: the partiality of historiography is what feminist historians have successfully disclosed, for example. In its strong version, the postmodern literature on knowledge also considers knowledge to be partial, but the use of this word shifts from meaning "incomplete" to "prejudiced": these theorists seem to ask principally in whose interest knowledge is constructed. The conception of knowledge as being saturated with power, and inevitably acting in someone's interest while oppressing others, it seems to me, draws away from the crucial task of examining how knowledge comes to be, what collective social practices sustain it, and what grounds there are for contesting truth claims. Although there are instances when men's views on women are clearly conspiratorial (as, for example, in the men's hut), and form part of a discourse intended to preserve male privilege, more often they probably arise from fear, ignorance, or habit than from the kind of planned assault on women and other subordinated groups that postmodernism seems to seek out. I believe that it is preferable to challenge the production of false knowledge (or, in a less modernist formulation, to seek less partial versions of "the truth") than to claim that nothing is knowable; in the case of gender knowledge and
schooling, I will argue in chapter two that students need an explicit theory of
gender formation to replace mystified accounts of sex difference. In bringing
issues of sexual politics into the curriculum, we should, of course be prepared
for the defensiveness and anger that inevitably arise when boys find
themselves decentered; if we examine failed attempts at anti-sexist and anti-
racist classroom interventions, as I shall do in chapter four, we may be better
prepared to avoid hegemonic voices’ dominating these discussions.

Certainly, social power is a location from which to know, rather than be
known. But the view that all knowledge serves the interest of the knower
and oppresses the other/known will not get us very far in our fight to end
male violence against women, since ultimately such accounts end up
conflating knowledge and power. Therefore, to fight against power and
arrogance means to promote unknowability. To an extent, this is an
understandable strategy on the part of the oppressed. The history of modern
Western philosophy indicates that men have arrogated to themselves the
right to define "woman," to set out the limits of her development and rights,
and to prescribe the kind of education that suits her "temperament." In other
words, men have assumed the right to "know" woman. It is understandable
that many women, fed up with being defined by men, are drawn to a
postmodern view that knowledge of the other depends on an unequal power
relation, and is itself inevitably oppressive.

I agree, however, with Hawkesworth’s contention above that "for those
affronted by the arrogance of power, there are political as well as intellectual
reasons to prefer a critical feminist epistemology to a postmodernist one." In
intellectual terms, feminism necessarily relies on the possibility that less
partial versions of "the truth" can be advanced and debated; politically,
feminism proposes that these less partial interpretations ought to ground
social and educational policies. In fighting male violence against women,
feminists must be able to justify their position by citing evidence, for example,
of the incidence of sexual violence in intimate relationships. Feminist
researchers can use a variety of methods to gather such evidence (quantitative
surveys, ethnographies, case-studies). Recently, a backlash against feminism
generally, much of it by women "scholars," has brought close scrutiny of
feminist work on violence against women. Without a commitment to the
possibility that some representations of reality are better than others,
feminists would have no way of rebutting this critique, which in its extreme version questions whether women are, in fact, oppressed at all. (For a good example of the use of evidence and a realist epistemology to refute a "backlash" argument, see Katha Pollitt's review in the October 4, 1993 edition of The New Yorker of Katie Roiphe's recent The morning after: sex, fear, and feminism on campus. Roiphe's substitution of a personal, impressionistic account of what she sees as healthy sexual relations at two Ivy League colleges she has attended for the "substantial body of research, by no means all of it conducted by feminists, or even by women" that "supports the contention that there is a staggering amount of rape and attempted rape in the United States" leads Pollitt to ask, "Don't they teach the students at Harvard and Princeton anything about research anymore?", p. 221) Clearly, feminism relies on the possibility that some things can be researched and known with a fair degree of assurance, and that knowledge can not only potentially oppress, but also can potentially liberate.

I referred earlier to feminism's normative vision. Here is perhaps where feminism and the strong thesis of postmodernism part company most radically. Currie argues that

in the extreme, postmodern critiques lead to a rejection of theory, positing instead nominalism and the position that coherence, by necessity, reflects a dominant position and suppresses diversity. (1992, p.64)

Bauman's (1989) critique goes further:

...postmodernity means a resolute emancipation from the characteristically modern urge to overcome difference and promote sameness...In the plural and pluralistic world of postmodernity, every form of life is permitted on principle; or rather, no agreed principles are evident which may render any form of life impermissible. (p. 23)

If this is an accurate account of postmodernism, then it clearly is incompatible with a concern with violence against women, or with any other social justice issue. In fact, I do not believe that "every form of life" would be
"permitted" by theorists writing from a postmodern perspective. As Suzanne deCastell points out, "You don't deconstruct your friends" (personal communication). Postmodernism evidently has criteria by which to judge what is worthy of deconstruction, and what is not. But, as Burbules and Rice argue, postmodernism "relies on an implicitly normative vocabulary of liberation, empowerment, and issue-specific critique that is much clearer in specifying what it is against than what it is for and why" (1991, p. 397, emphasis added). This is the crux of my difficulty with the strong thesis of postmodernism: for feminism, implicit or submerged normative standards are simply insufficient for accomplishing social goals. Whereas feminists can use the tools of postmodernism to, as Currie puts it, "bring into awareness alternative meanings, which, although necessary to dominant meaning, remain suppressed within established discourses" (p. 72), their goals must be explicitly normative in order to remain "feminist" at all.

Although feminist activism lacks the playful elegance and wit of postmodern theory (Frug, 1992), to my knowledge, no one has yet been seen carrying banners promoting nominalism or the incommensurability of difference! Linda Alcoff expresses the dilemma clearly:

As the Left should know by now, you cannot mobilize a movement that is only and always against: you must have a positive alternative, a vision of a better future that can motivate people to sacrifice their time and energy toward its realization...How can we ground a feminist politics that deconstructs the female subject? Nominalism threatens to wipe out feminism itself. (1988, p. 419)

So, with much yet to accomplish on the feminist agenda, we must retain an explicitly normative vision of the gender order. Ending violence against women is such a vision.

Before leaving this discussion of feminism and postmodernism, I would like to state my position on the relationship between the self/subject and the discursive realm. Currie argues that "deconstruction does not supplant the need for generalized theories of women's oppression" (p. 77). She explains:
...real bodies with multiple identities lie behind the discursive Subject. I take the position that identities are formulated through relationships which become expressed through discourse. Thus, I argue, postmodernists have mistaken the expression of this formulation as being the source, or cause, of the problem. (p. 77)

I agree with this position generally, but would add that discourse does not simply "express" relationships, but in a very real sense, helps shape relationships and subjectivities. Thus, I see a fluid interplay between the a priori subject (which strongly postmodern theorists deny) and the various discourses with which the subject comes into contact, and helps express. I find Alcoff's concept of the "positionality" of the subject compelling:

...the concept of positionality includes two points; first, (...) that the concept of woman is a relational term identifiable only within a (constantly moving) context; but second, that the position that women find themselves in can be actively utilized (rather than transcended) as a location for the construction of meaning, a place from where meaning is constructed, rather than simply the place where a meaning can be discovered (the meaning of femaleness). (1988, p. 434)

This view allows both a commitment to the real (women's) bodies which are violated and the possibility that close attention to the discursive practices in schools, for example, may lead to positive changes in how boys choose to "do" masculinity. At the same time, it represents a resistance to some of postmodernism's excesses, among which are, as Hawkesworth says, "the slide into relativism that results from too facile a conflation of world and text" (1989, p. 555).

Bronwyn Davies (1989) suggests that adolescents need access to an "alternative authoritative discourse about homosexuality" (p. 48). Not only homosexuality, I think, but masculinity in all its enactments (and here, following Kimmel & Levine, 1990, I consider gay and straight male sexuality to conform in some significant respects to similar sexual scripts) needs to be examined in schools, both as sites of its construction and, potentially, as loci
for its critique. Victor Seidler summarises nicely what taking a weakly postmodern feminist view of male violence means:

It has been an enduring influence of radical feminist work to place issues of male violence at the centre of an understanding of social relations, although often this has been done in a way that forecloses the possibilities of men to change. In this context, it is crucial not to treat masculinity as a unified and homogeneous category, fixed within particular relations of power, but to explore the emergence and experience of different masculinities. This has to be done in a way that can recognise the centrality of masculinity within an Enlightenment vision of modernity that has largely been cast in its image. (1993, p. 142)

Changing how we speak about sexuality, gender, and violence may not reduce violence against women. Equally, we will not have served women’s purposes if a postmodern deconstruction of masculinity takes us too far away from considering the unequal power relationships in which masculinities evolve. But schools must, I believe, undertake a reflexive look at their role in producing harmful masculinities. Connell (1993, p. 191) correctly argues that "one of the cultural supports of men’s power is the failure to ask questions about masculinity." It is not surprising that feminist theorists have not paid much attention to masculinity. As Smart (1990, p. 81) suggests:

...Standpoint feminism has not taken masculinity as a focus of investigation. Precisely because standpoint feminism in (the area of criminology) has arisen from a grassroots concern to protect women and to reveal the victimization of women, it has not been sympathetic to the study of masculinity(ies). Indeed, it would argue that we have heard enough from that quarter and that any attempt by feminists to turn their attention away from women is to neglect the very real problems that women still face.

I hope that I have made it clear why I do not share this point of view. I feel that women have more to lose by leaving men to their own devices than
by seeking to promote changes to the discourses and practices of masculinity. As regards schooling, this will mean, as Connell says,

"...introducing (pupils) to the whole truth about an important area of their lives. That means introducing them to gay sexuality as well as straight, to the range of gender patterns across the world, to issues of rape and domestic violence as well as happy families. To do this requires prioritizing the experiences of those who are usually silenced or marginalized, especially women. This is not likely to be easy to do with many adolescent boys, but it is at least a coherent educational goal and one that may call on motives of curiosity and sympathy to expand horizons." (1993, p. 206)

In this part of the chapter, I have tried to sketch my theoretical position in this thesis. I have suggested that a concern with violence against women will locate itself most readily within feminist theory, and that feminist theory can be aided by the view of subjectivity and discourse that a weakly postmodern thesis supplies. Specifically, I have indicated that women can benefit from a postmodern view of gender as situated, multiple, and open to change. I have also acknowledged that most men may, in fact, resist changing since they are now beneficiaries of an unequal gender order, but have indicated that looking at the construction of masculinity from the standpoint of women is a reasonable place to begin the project of preventing intimate violence against women. Finally, I have claimed that feminism is incompatible with the strong version of postmodernism, both in the latter's rejection of the self/subject, and in the undecidability of social action which I believe it leads to. In the next chapter, I will explore masculinity as social construction, looking particularly for theoretical insights into the connection between masculinity and violence.
Chapter 2

Masculinity, evil, and gender mystification

...there's a way in which the sensitive man is the androgynous figure, the figure who is even more complete than the macho figure. That's my resistance to the fact that I do like sensitive folks of all ages. But the image of the sensitive man calls up, for me, the male person who, while enjoying the position of unbelievable privilege, also has the privilege of gentleness. If it's only added privilege, then it's a version of male feminism of which I am very suspicious. (Donna Haraway)

...I do not think, even less claim, that these are feminist writings; it is just that they depend on learning from feminism. This is, I believe, the most any man can do today: to learn and so to try to write or talk or act in response to feminism, and so to try not in any way to be anti-feminist, supportive of the old oppressive structures. Any more, any notion of writing a feminist book or being a feminist, is a myth, a male imaginary with the reality of appropriation and domination right behind. (Stephen Heath)

If we are ever to construct a feminist movement that is not based on the premise that men and women are always at war with one another, then we must be willing to acknowledge the appropriateness of complex critical responses to writing by men even if it is sexist. (bell hooks)

An important purpose of education should be to combat mystification. (Nel Noddings)

In Women and evil (1989), Nel Noddings undertakes a phenomenological analysis of evil, identifying pain, terror, and separation as the three central ways in which human beings experience evil. She claims that violence is evil, since its victims experience both pain and terror; she wonders "why (...) violence came unstuck, as it were, from evil" (p. 13). She documents the tendency of Western cultures to redeem evil, that is, to find theological and moral reasons for human suffering. She refers to this process as one of mystification, a process in which, she argues, more men than women have indulged. She correctly claims that such mystification is in itself a moral evil and that in order to fight evil, we must develop a "tragic sense of life." This view would allow us to see the pain, separation and helplessness which abound in the world without resorting to abstract schemes leading away from the problems to be solved. Connell (1987) similarly refers to the seductiveness of Hegelian thought, whereby "there is an origin, a dialectic of
necessary stages and a culmination" (p. 278). This kind of view, he explains, justifies evil in the name of ultimate good, giving us the comforting reassurance that past oppressions "may have been nasty but were in some sense historically necessary" (p. 278). I agree with Noddings and Connell that this is a dangerous way to view human history. Noddings points out that it has led us to be blind to the fact that "our culture has institutionalized practices that actually endorse great evils" (p. 155). Connell outlines a similarly existential perspective on history:

The present we live in was no more a historically necessary development than any of our possible futures is. Human practice produced it, not the operation of a mechanism, whether cosmic, logical or biological. (p. 278)

One of the great contributions of feminism has been its refusal to redeem the evil of violence against women. It has made public the violence that countless women live with every day, understanding this evil as experience which cannot be redeemed or justified. It has, in short, started the process of demystifying male violence. In this chapter, I apply the notion of mystification to gender. I argue against what I will call "gender mystification," our culture's habitual ways of forming young men and women and of denying the harmful effects of this process itself. I suggest that one of our gravest denials has been our refusal to acknowledge the constructedness of gender, and the close association of masculinity with violence. This denial is what underlies the failure of public safety campaigns, discussed in chapter one, to be truthful about whom women should actually fear; societal denial also allows male responsibility for such violence to go largely unnoticed.

I begin with Ruth Jonathan's (1989) discussion of the "all nature" and "all culture" views of gender, agreeing with her that both of these explanations have serious shortcomings. Connell's (1987) theory of gender, which I consider a dialectical constructivist one, allows a more nuanced understanding of how gender and power intersect. While Connell identifies "structures" that hold gender together, these are constituted by social practice and thus can, and increasingly will be, themselves the objects of practice.
Thus, while the gender order seems firmly entrenched, it is not impervious to change at a local level at least (referred to by Connell as "gender regimes"). This will not, as I point out toward the end of the chapter, be helped by much of the literature on masculinity by men: this literature too often rhapsodises about what masculinity means to men while overlooking what it unfortunately means to many women. Connell's explication of the set of social relations that constitute masculinity is helpful, as it includes the notion of "hegemonic masculinity," to which other men are subordinated. Without setting up falsely parallel male and female oppressions, Connell does point to rifts within masculinity itself that anti-sexist teachers may be able to exploit. I conclude by claiming that gender theorising of this kind should not be confined to the academy, but must be brought into schools; without a theory that can take gender "apart," students may be left with the same mystified notions of gender that have too often been used to blind us to and justify, rather than question and prevent, violence against women.

The social construction of gender

Since men have historically been, and largely still are, in positions of greater public power than women, their tendency toward denial and mystification is understandable: it helps perpetuate the current order. If the reasons why men have more power than women are taken to be too mysterious to understand or be revealed, then efforts to change the social order are obviously misguided. Similarly, if historical power inequalities are genetically encoded, then the present moment is, contrary to Connell's claim, in some ways inevitable.

In the area of male violence against women, however, we will probably never know with any degree of certainty the part played by genes. Retrospective studies often have design flaws (see Kaufman and Zigler, 1987, in the related area of child abuse; Box, 1983 on the problems of generalizing from prison populations), but even if this were not the case, they do not allow for isolation of the genetic variable. Prospective studies might not suffer from this problem, but would obviously be unethical in the area of violent behaviour. For example, it would be theoretically possible, although unethical, to find sets of male twins separated at birth, and compare the
degree to which they are violent throughout their lives. A higher degree of violence in both members of many such sets than in the general population might indicate that violence is in some way a genetic predisposition. A psychologist might be able to devise an ethical study which addressed these questions, using behaviours correlated with violence, rather than actual violent episodes, as data. But I want to suggest that we do not have the benefit of time to wait for the development of such research. Nor would it be likely to tell us much about violence against women. Let us assume that in the hypothetical twin study suggested above, it was found that both members of many sets of twins turned out to be violent to women. It would be, I venture, unreasonable to conclude that such behaviour had been genetically encoded. That human beings may have a genetic tendency toward violence or aggression is possible. But it seems uncontroversial to argue that at the very least violence against women results from the ways in which men have been allowed and even encouraged, or have freely chosen (because they could), to channel this tendency, if inherited, in certain socially sanctioned ways.

Ruth Jonathan (1989) argues convincingly that both the "all nature" and the "all culture" views of gender are founded on false dualisms. She claims that "gender traditionalists," often referred to by other writers as "biological determinists" or "biological conservatives," subscribe to a "normative dualism":

...by selecting particular biological features for attention, [they] suggest outcomes of the body's claimed inevitable influence on disposition which have quite different implications for the two sexes, giving rise to enabling conditions in males (dominance, drive, aggression) and handicapping conditions in females (submissiveness, receptivity, vulnerability). (p. 42)

These conclusions, Jonathan suggests, rest on "the bedrock premise of liberalism (...), that mankind is defined solely by the capacity for rational autonomy." Biological "fact," Jonathan seems to say, has been interpreted in the light of cultural value; since rational autonomy has been valued, and since men have had the privilege and power to name, define, and interpret,
gender becomes "a female issue-a dispute about how far, and why, females differ from the human norm." We are thus led, she says, "to de-emphasise all that is non-mental, including our own embodiment" (p. 42). Much feminist theory has commented on this contradiction between the seeming invisibility of the male body and the body-as-destiny view of female existence.

Additionally, the "all nature" argument fails to notice glaring "natural" similarities between men and women. As Gayle Rubin pointed out almost twenty years ago:

...from the standpoint of nature, men and women are closer to each other than either is to anything else-for instance, mountains, kangaroos, or coconut palms. The idea that men and women are more different from one another than either is from anything else must come from somewhere other than nature. (...) The idea that men and women are two mutually exclusive categories must arise out of something other than a nonexistent "natural" opposition. (1975, p. 180)

I agree with Rubin's suggestion that "far from being an expression of natural differences, exclusive gender identity is the suppression of natural similarities" (p. 180). This, she points out, is accomplished through repression, a form of denial which functions to maintain rigid gender separation. Connell (1987) echoes Rubin's point, finding psychology's obsession with sex difference curious:

The logic of the genre focuses on 'difference' and its explanation. In fact, the main finding, from about eighty years of research, is a massive psychological similarity between men and women in the populations studied by psychologists. (...) If it were not for the cultural bias of both writers and readers, we might long ago have been talking about this as 'sex similarity' research. (p. 170)

At the levels of both biology and psychology, then, men and women are more similar than they are different. What, then, explains the huge discrepancies in behaviour between men and women? Ninety percent of perpetrators of child sexual abuse, for example, are male. At the level of social
practice, of course, men and women's experiences have historically been largely divergent. If violence toward women cannot be explained in terms of how "naturally" different men are from women, perhaps a more useful tactic would be to explore how men are, often to their own detriment and to women's, differentiated, and, particularly during adolescence, seek to differentiate themselves, from women. As Ron Thorne-Finch (1992) argues, men who are violent toward women are clearly not simply at the mercy of their genes or hormones:

If activated brain centres and increased testosterone levels caused male violence, offenders would be randomly violent. Yet most offenders are not violent at random. They are far less likely to hit their boss than assault their wives. Furthermore, most sexual assaults occur between acquaintances. If offenders had no control, it seems unlikely that they would be so selective. (p. 50)

Thus, the logic of male violence cannot be gotten at through appeals to "natural" differences between men and women, which ultimately become justifications for violence. Rather, we will need a theory of gender which emphasises the centrality of social practice to human identity, and can suggest how such practice is connected to power.

On the "all culture" side of Jonathan's equation are theories which rest on metaphysical dualism, an implied "discontinuity between humanity and the rest of the material world, as well as between our consciousness and that material object in which we are embedded" (p. 41). Thus the anti-essentialist theme in feminism

is in harmony with many of the most powerful philosophical, psychological, and social theories of our time which imply that man-and a fortiori men and women-has no essential characteristics beyond the capacity for rationality which is the defining characteristic of human kind. (p. 41)

Metaphysical dualism underpins both "active" and "passive" models of "indeterminate man" (sic): on the active model, "we create ourselves by our own choices," and, on the passive one, "our selves are formed in response to
our social experiences" (p.41). Jonathan rejects both models of indeterminacy, the former on the familiar anti-liberal grounds of materialism (clearly, not everyone has free choice about many of the material conditions of life), the latter on two counts: first, a unidirectional socialisation model cannot account for "resistance and radical change;" second, we still have the problem "of explaining how such a process could initially have got underway" (p. 41).

Jonathan is grappling with many of the very vexing issues in theorising gender, and her conclusions go some distance toward recognising complexities which neither the "all nature" nor "all culture" views can capture. She suggests that to get beyond crippling dualisms,

we do not need to start from the assumption that consciousness is quite separate from embodiment in a material world, nor do we need to rule out the possibility that embodiment, and also material and social environment, may combine with the mental to result in disposition. (p. 42)

Jonathan reasonably posits both the mind and the body as "products and parameters of culture," and points to recent advances in the physical and social sciences which support a dialectical, rather than dualistic, relationship between the two:

we begin to rehabilitate the idea (taken for granted in primitive societies) that states-of-mind, beliefs, and expectations can powerfully influence our physiological processes. 'Scientific medicine' has until recently been reluctant to acknowledge this, but mounting evidence, from androgens to endomorphins, reinforces the pre-rationalism insight. (p. 45)

As an example of the influence of states-of-mind on physiological processes, Jonathan offers studies of testosterone levels. Whereas previous studies assumed that high testosterone levels explained male dominance, "subsequent enquiries show that testosterone levels in individuals are substantially governed by expectations and anticipated opportunity" (p. 44). Not only in men, I would note, but also in women. According to Ehrhardt
higher testosterone levels in women managers do not have to be interpreted as determining career choice. Whereas the gender traditionalists might see such women as hormonally aberrant, and thus explain their career choice, Ehrhardt suggests that it is just as plausible to interpret their practice as managers as causing a rise in testosterone. Davies (1989b) similarly notes that recent studies on hormones indicates that they "are to some extent produced by gendered activity, rather than the other way round" (p. 11).

Jonathan does not discuss the other side of the dialectic, the influence the physical body has on consciousness, but this has been a central focus of gynocentric, lesbian, and French feminisms. The fact that all these forms of feminist writing have been charged with "essentialism" illustrates, I think, Jonathan's point about the limits of dualistic thinking. What these theorists seem to have done (and their charge that men are way behind on this issue is a useful one, which I will discuss more fully later) is to bring back into focus the body as the site of our consciousness; human life is not "thinkable" outside the human body, which both expresses and is inscribed with the limits and possibilities of human culture. The body is thus an important constraint on the plasticity of human identity, or, put in a more postmodern formulation, is itself an object of practice, an object of discourse. The fact that we live in, as Dorothy Smith expresses it, "sexed bodies" (1975) matters; how bodies become "sexed" is an empirical question.

Contentious questions remain about the meanings of the sexed body. Gynocentric feminism has re-claimed the dignity of the female body, but perhaps at the expense of a limiting determinism. Jonathan, for her part, ultimately stops short of a completely dialectical view of mind/body and culture/nature in her insistence that at the heart of human existence there is the inescapable fact of gender dimorphism and, she seems to imply, the psychological need to categorise by gender:

It seems prima facie implausible to suppose that social androgyny is a feasible goal, when both social organisation and personal identity are based on processes of differentiation or categorisation. One might ask (if sex and gender were thought to be distinct categories) why differentiation should be sex linked, but since sex is the only human distinction which is both given and wholly dichotomous (unlike, say, age, class or ethnicity) and
since it matters crucially to us, some process of categorisation on that basis seems inevitable, though its content may be radically modifiable by cultural choices. (p. 46)

While I concede that sex is given, it is less clear that it is wholly dichotomous. Infants are sometimes born with both sets of genitals, or genitals which doctors have difficulty assigning to either the female or the male sex. Research indicates that it is how these infants are raised (that is, it is the sex which is culturally, not "naturally," given) that gives them their sense of sexual identity. And the way bodies are "sexed" varies enormously across cultures, limiting the extent to which we can generalise about the experience of living in a male or female body.

I also challenge Jonathan's curiously gender-neutral claim that "social organisation and personal identity are based on processes of differentiation or categorisation." One of Nancy Chodorow's central insights in *The reproduction of mothering* (1978) was that traditional psychoanalytic theory normatively prescribes a model of psychological development which does not reflect how girls in our culture achieve personal and sexual identity. Whereas in the Freudian tradition, differentiation results from successful resolution of the Oedipal conflict, Chodorow and other feminist object relations theorists emphasise the pre-Oedipal phase of childhood development. As Chodorow shows, it is the relation to the "object" (mother) which allows the child to develop a sense of self. Chodorow's aim is to show what follows from the fact that women are usually the primary care-givers in a family. She claims that mothers are likely to treat their daughters as extensions of themselves. This results, she argues, in the female psyche's sense of relatedness to others, and capacity for nurturance (which in turn reproduces female mothering). Boys, on the other hand, must rely on a "positional" rather than "personal" influence from the absent father to achieve a masculine identity. Since they are not treated by the mother as an extension of herself, they internalise this distancing, and seek differentiation from the female as part of their gender identity.

One does not need to agree with all of Chodorow's argument to see that, at the very least, it raises the question of the centrality of differentiation to human identity. If girls and women often suffer from problems arising
from too close an identification with their mothers (which is often claimed in psychoanalytic theory, and which Chodorow also discusses), is it not also possible that differentiation, uncritically posited as an "accomplishment" of personal development in traditional psychoanalysis, is at the heart of many of the dysfunctions men currently manifest in our society? I want to suggest that Chodorow's theory points to the possibility (surely one she did not intend) that the positional identification of the boy with his (absent) father may lead to an unhealthy differentiation, a male tendency toward distancing himself from his mother/the "other" which can become obsessive and violent. And, of course, in a homophobic/mysogynistic culture, since the boy is not only rejecting his mother, but expunging the feminine from within himself, the male identity is constantly being challenged. Oglov (unpublished M.A. thesis, 1991) argues that in patriarchal culture, what she terms "normal ambivalence" is split apart, becoming "destructive containment," whereby

women contain the frightening bodily feelings of powerlessness, need, fear, and desire, and men contain the mental capacities to deny and control these feelings. Normal ambivalence thus becomes destructive, because the institutionalized splitting of ambivalence prevents the authentic resolution, or tolerance, of ambivalence in patriarchal cultures by individuals and groups. (p.1)

Should we be surprised that it is the same people, generally insecure young men, often in groups, who rape women, seek out and bash lesbians and gays, and harm members of ethnic minorities (as in the recent attacks on Turkish immigrants in Germany)? The theme of distance from and fear of the feminine is constant when one examines the literature on youth cultures; we saw in chapter one how the "men's hut" expresses and perpetuates this fear. One of the burdens of feminist consciousness is that the connection between the "petty rape" of sexist commentary and the brutality of gang-rape is so obvious: both require a psychological distancing from the victim/other (so that she is defined as less than human, or not male, and therefore deserving of abuse); both temporarily function to stroke the insecure male ego; both deny the human rights of the victim/other; and both express fear on the part
of men of the kind of vulnerability and relatedness which women (and their own "femininity") represent.

Arguably, one way to reduce violence against women is to counteract, rather than uncritically promote, male differentiation. Put differently, it is perhaps time to ask whether male violence stems in part from those aspects of male psychosocial development which previous generations have considered entirely normal, but which feminism has brought into question. This is, I think, the kind of concern behind some of the literature on "caring" in education. The problem is that although these writers, and the general public, observe that many young people do not seem to care very much about themselves, other people, or the environment, their observations are usually gender-neutral. If we know that girls have been brought up to be, sometimes to their detriment, excessively "caring," why have we not noticed that many of the masculine character ideals-coolness, detachment, independence, sexual athleticism, autonomy, risk-taking-all require not caring, whether it be about the personal consequences of an act of bravado, or the harm to others which may result from seeking to "score" sexually? Any program to reform schools using the "care" paradigm is unlikely to succeed unless it can resolve the contradictions between such a model and the model of "normal" masculinity.

Lyotard (1984) describes postmodernism as "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Psychoanalysis, feminist or otherwise, is nothing if not a meta-narrative, and we should perhaps exercise some incredulity toward it. Connell takes Chodorow to task for positing a "normative standard case" (the heterosexual family in which the mother is the primary care-giver) and falsely generalising homogeneous sexual characters (masculine and feminine psyches) from it (1987). I raised Chodorow because her theory, among other things, re-invents Freud's meta-narrative, and opens up a radical questioning of gender, its formation and reform, which traditional psychoanalysis disallows. Of course, if one is to believe the psychoanalytic story, unless interventions take place in early childhood, they will be of little consequence; Chodorow herself recommends co-parenting by mothers and fathers as the only way to stop forming male and female psyches such that women mother and men do not, and, by extension, such that women care, and men do not. It is reasonable to assume that boys raised in egalitarian families will be less likely to have the kinds of rigid ideas about gender roles and "women's place"
that men who are violent to women often have. And there is evidence indicating that "father absence" is harmful for girls as well as boys. Recent work by Williams and Finkelhor shows that fathers who are more involved in the care of their daughters are less likely to abuse them sexually. The researchers speculate that caring for their daughters both develops fathers' sense of protectiveness and gives them the opportunity for non-sexualized pleasure which men rarely have (reported in The Globe and Mail, November 19, 1992). But, given the slow pace of reforming the work-place to accommodate mothers, the vision of two parents happily sharing both paid work and parenting (no mention here of daycare as a fact of life) is excessively utopian. It seems to omit the strategic necessity of sexual politics in order to get us there. And as at any rate the two-parent family is rapidly becoming an anachronism, we cannot pin our hopes for reform on its rehabilitation. We do not need, I suggest, a return to "family values;" the problems inherent in the patriarchal family are, in part, what have brought us to the current crisis. We need, instead, a vision of positive social change that can be brought about within the context of a variety of families, be they headed by one parent or more, by heterosexuals, gays, or lesbians. Although I find the psychoanalytic story told by feminist object relations theorists suggestive, it is, like traditional psychoanalysis, a totalizing one that does not allow for or explain resistance to its scheme, or why children raised in non-traditional families apparently have similar gender identities to those raised in traditional ones. As Joan Wallach Scott puts it:

How can we account within this theory for persistent associations of masculinity with power, for the higher value placed on manhood than womanhood, for the way children seem to learn these associations and evaluations even when they live outside nuclear households or in households where parenting is equally divided between husband and wife? I do not think we can without some attention to signifying systems, that is, to the ways societies represent gender, use it to articulate the rules of social relationships, or construct the meaning of experience. (1988, p. 39)

Finally, in its insistence on pre-Oedipal character formation, psychoanalytic theory renders all conscious gender learning, including that done in schools
and in adolescent peer groups, irrelevant (adolescent boys' creeping, extra-
familial awareness of the extent of male privilege is an example). I hope to show in the next chapter that this is not the case.

Let me return briefly to Jonathan's paper. I said above that I felt she moved us in useful directions, but that she stopped short of a completely satisfactory sketch of the dialectical relationship between mind and body, culture and nature. This is, I believe, because of her insistence on her own "false dualism," that of male/female binary opposition, which she claims has become "socially adaptive":

...whatever the origins of gendered attributes, once these have been culturally endorsed, they become socially adaptive for individuals, whether personally constraining or not. (...) Males and females constitute two mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive categories where the members of each define themselves in relation to members of their own group and in contradistinction to the members of the other group. What is more, since we are not just sexed but sexual beings, the individuals who make up each category are in competition with each other for desirable members of the only other category. (p. 47)

Such a statement is surprising on many counts. First, it is the kind of functionalist argument (the system, whether harmful or not, "works") which does not seem to allow for change or resistance. It cannot explain why gendered attributes have, in fact, changed historically, and will likely change again. Second, it discounts everything that has been written from a gay or lesbian perspective on gender. If sex is "given," in Jonathan's scheme, gendered identity and sexuality cannot be so easily dispensed with, and simply instructed, like Madeleine and her boarding school sisters, to march along in two straight lines. I argued in chapter one that we should be moving away from this kind of rigid definition of gender, balancing the benefits which could follow such a conceptual relaxation (less gender violence) with a concern not to elide difference (thus doing violence to the lived realities of marginalized people). Third, Jonathan reverts to the kind of terminology ("males" and "females") in which the whole concept of gender disappears.
Instead, let us complete the picture of Jonathan's dialectic in a less normalizing and mystifying way, and in a way which will allow us some grip on the problem of male violence against women. I see human identity, including gender identity, as largely the result of human practice; in this constructivist view of things, changing practice in significant and consistent ways means changing the "nature" of identity. I see no particular need for enquiring into the ultimate causes of human social practice. The fact that cosmologists will probably never know with any degree of certainty how the universe started does not prevent scientists from studying the formation of glaciers, or the migration of birds. So we do not need to know how the current gender order "got underway," as Jonathan says, in order to see how it works, how it perpetuates itself in certain locations, and in what ways it could change in directions we could recognize as being progressive. Biological sex is clearly part of the overall scheme of gender. But gender cannot be reduced to sex, or we would long since have abandoned the term. (Wendy Brown, 1988, says succinctly, "either humans are more and other than their physiological sex, or gender and culture are not worth talking about," p. 18). As Connell proposes, "relations of gender are not determined by biological difference but deal with it; there is a practical engagement rather than a reduction. (...) 'Gender' means practice organized in terms of, or in relation to, the reproductive division of people into male and female" (1987, p. 140).

Connell's Gender and power (1987), already cited several times in this thesis, is the most satisfactory account I have read of gender. Connell's is a thoroughly historical theory, which recognizes the centrality of practice to structure. Unlike theories of social reproduction, in which "history enters the theory as something added on to the basic cycle of structural reproduction," and which require an invariant originating structure, in Connell's view history is "organic to theory" and "social structure must be seen as constantly constituted rather than constantly reproduced" (p. 44). Connell borrows Jill Matthews' (1984) term "gender order," which he defines as "a historically constructed pattern of power relations between men and women and definitions of masculinity and femininity" and which he adopts as the "structural inventory" of an entire society. A "gender regime" is "the structural inventory of a particular institution" (p. 98). Connell identifies the division of labour, the structure of power, and the structure of cathexis, all of
which overlap, as the major elements of any gender order or regime. These structures both emerge from practice and can become the object of practice, and thus are not monolithic or universal; they are social structures to the extent that they "become a constraint on further practice" (p. 99).

Connell draws on socialist feminism in his discussion of the division of labour. The division of labour describes not only how "prior work becomes a social rule allocating people" to particular kinds of work in specific workplaces, but also "the activity, the social labour" that sustains this allocation itself. At a wider societal level, gender divisions in labour were not added on to a "class-structured mode of production," but are "a deep-seated feature of production itself" (p. 103). Thus, capitalism was, and continues to be, "partly constituted out of the opportunities for power and profit created by gender relations" (p. 104). In addition, a hegemonic pattern of masculinity partly created through the kinds of work men do "becomes an economic as well as a cultural force" (p. 104). Connell gives the example of men's collective refusal to do child care, which reinforces their predominance in the labour market. Certain occupations come to be "gendered" in particular ways. Daphne Spain (1992) has documented the self-reinforcing spatial segregation that is a feature of the division of labour:

my hypothesis is that initial status differences between men and women create certain types of gendered spaces and that institutionalized spatial segregation then reinforces prevailing male advantages. (p.6)

Connell gives the example of technical occupations like engineering, which require long hours of training and do not easily permit the kinds of interruptions characteristic of family and personal life; this both helps constitute a particular kind of work competence which becomes male-identified, and provides a structural barrier to women's entering the field, which, the more male-identified it becomes, the less it allows female incursions. As Ursula Franklin (1990) puts it:

When certain technologies and tools are use by men, then maleness becomes part of the definition of those technologies. It
is for those deep-rooted reasons that it is so very difficult for women to enter what are now called "non-traditional" jobs. If engineers are male and maleness is part of engineering, then it is tough for men to accept women into the profession. The apparent ease with which women acquire the knowledge necessary to practise only seems to increase the perceived threat to the male engineers. And so year after year, engineering faculties go through initiation procedures that are crude, sexist and obscene in order to establish that the profession is male, even if some of the practioners are not. (p. 16)

It is important to remember that when Connell speaks of "structure," this is what he means: a pattern with an identifiable logic, tending to reinforce itself, but also, potentially, the object of practice. Women are, despite structural barriers, becoming engineers, although at a slower rate than they are entering other professions, for exactly the reasons already laid out. Engineering is a more gendered profession than most. However, despite the sophomoric resistance to change that undergraduate engineers regularly display, the presence of women will change the practice of engineering. This does not mean that women will bring a specifically feminine, "caring" temperament to engineering, that bridges will be more curved and sewers more user-friendly. It simply means that engineering firms will increasingly have to accommodate the features of many women's personal lives, such as responsibility for children, and offer, for example, flexible hours to attend to child care; this, in turn, will start to "ungender" engineering. On a more pessimistic note, the fact that men still have more power than women might mean that professions that become "ungendered" in this way actually become female ghettos, while men carve out career spaces that more efficiently protect male privilege.

Connell's account of the structure of power is similar to that of some radical feminists, except that he emphasises, again, the practices that produce and sustain power rather than seeing power as an absolute demarcation between men and women. He correctly claims that "sex role" theory had no grip on male power, and thus could not explain why women would adopt their given "role," while what he calls "categoricalism" treats men and women "as internally undifferentiated general categories" (p. 55). Categoricalism, he explains, "takes the categories for granted while it explores
the relationship between them" (p. 55), and is thus a feature of many theories of gender. This relationship can be thought of as one of "direct domination," as being simply "unequal," or as part of a normative model of the family. These theories do not all stem from biological determinism, but "categorical thinking about gender is most obvious when the categories can be presumed to be biological and the relationship between them a collective or standardized one" (p. 56). While much of the literature using this approach has been successful (Connell lists the writings on sex inequalities in income, education, occupation and health), "the trouble starts," says Connell, "when the first approximation becomes the end of the analysis; when the categories 'women' and 'men' are taken as absolutes, in no need of further examination or finer differentiation" (p. 57). For example, when radical feminists (e.g. MacKinnon, 1987) focus on a "representative" man in discussions of "male sexuality" and its part in violence against women, they miss "the social arrangements that give a particular kind of masculinity a hegemonic position in sexual politics and that marginalize others" and miss "the social processes that construct this kind of masculinity in the first place" (p. 58). They also, I would add, tend simplistically to "read off" the meaning of heterosexuality from a representative couple, rather than look for the alternate, apolitical or lived meanings that sexuality may have for the individuals involved.

Politically, categoricalism is problematic because it either leads to a politics of access (as in liberal feminism), without generating "any particular reasons to question the social arrangements" that create divisions between men and women, or to a politics of despair:

Rather like the 'big bang' theory of revolution implicit in Marxist structuralism, categoricalism projects a distant future and a distant past where there is no oppression, but tends to assimilate everything in the grim present to manifestations of male power and female subordination. The effect is to offer women a metaphysical solidarity ('all women...'), an omnipresent enemy ('all men...'), and a strong implication that struggle in existing relationships is pointless, since the structure and the categories are universal. (p. 61)
Unlike some of the "men's literature" writers, Connell does not deny power inequalities between men and women, or set up falsely parallel men's and women's oppressions. Connell speaks of the "multiple character of social power," which sustains the privilege of men and the subordination of women. The ideology of male superiority is sustained sometimes by the use of brute force, but more often through institutionalized violence and unequal access to resources in workplaces and households. This helps sustain the connection between masculinity and authority, a connection that is, however, not straightforward:

If authority is defined as legitimate power, then we can say that the main axis of the power structure of gender is the general connection of authority with masculinity. But this is immediately complicated, and partly contradicted, by a second axis: the denial of authority to some groups of men, or more generally the construction of hierarchies of authority and centrality within the major gender categories. (p. 109)

Connell identifies a "core" in the power structure of gender, a "complex of institutions and milieux where the power of men and the authority of masculinity are relatively concentrated," while peripheral arrangements involve more open contestations, and sometimes reversals, of power (p. 109). Comprising the core are four familiar components:

(a) the hierarchies and work-forces of institutionalized violence—military and paramilitary forces, police, prison systems

(b) the hierarchy and labour force of heavy industry (for example, steel and oil companies) and the hierarchy of high-technology industry (computers, aerospace)

(c) the planning and control machinery of the central state

(d) working-class milieus that emphasise toughness and men's association with machinery. (p. 109)

While the first three components have often already been linked under the term "military-industrial complex," Connell claims that it is the connection
with (d) that gives the ideology linking masculinity, authority, and technological violence "a mass base of support for militarist beliefs and practices that might otherwise be so repellent as to destabilize the governments that rest on them" (p. 109). There is, he seems to say, a complicity between working-class and elite men that rests on their shared subordination and exclusion of women, as well as their agreed-upon denigration of homosexuality as "not masculine." This complicity, of course, helps keep in place the hierarchy which actually exists among them. Comprising this hierarchy, Connell claims, are hegemonic masculinity (from whose ranks come the "shock troops" of male dominance), conservative masculinities, and subordinated masculinities (p. 110). While hegemonic masculinity is the most visibly exploitative variety, conservative masculinities are complicit in what Connell terms "the collective project of oppression":

Conventional masculinity is, to an extent, hegemonic masculinity in bad faith. Men can enjoy patriarchal power, but accept it as if it were given to them by an external force, by nature or convention or even by women themselves, rather than by an active social subordination of women going on here and now. (p. 215)

Connell remarks that the family "as an institution might now best be regarded as part of the periphery rather than the core complex" (p. 110). He feels that domestic patriarchy is so widely contested that it is no longer a major force in sustaining male power. I am not sure that I agree. While women have won many local battles, the incidence of wife battering and child sexual abuse does not seem to be diminishing. The consequences of these are dire, even if some women manage to escape abusive relationships. A growing literature on the effects on children of witnessing wife abuse supports the contention that it teaches boys that abusing women is normal (Jaffe, Wolfe & Wilson, 1990); child sexual abuse is singled out by Koss & Dinero (1989) as the most important factor in re-victimization in later life. Haskell & Randall's (1993) survey showed that 69 percent of the women who had been raped as children were raped again after age 16. Where women have often "won" the right to work outside the home, too often this has not
meant a significant increase in shared domestic responsibilities; lack of adequate day care is still not a major male preoccupation. We are, on the other hand, starting to understand the conditions which will allow women to leave abusive relationships (Barron, 1991), and public pressure to garnishee wages of the shockingly high percentage of husbands who renege on child support obligations is growing. But the family is not, I think, as peripheral to issues of male power as Connell might like to believe.

In Connell's description of the structure of cathexis, or the social patterning of desire, he follows Foucault in The history of sexuality and others who see sexuality as socially constructed. In Connell's words, sexuality's bodily dimension does not exist before, or outside, the social practices in which relationships between people are formed and carried on. Sexuality is enacted or conducted, it is not expressed. (p. 111)

Connell uses the word "cathexis" to designate the "construction of emotionally charged social relations" (p. 112) with other people; following Freud, however, Connell uses "cathexis" to mean hostile or ambivalent as well as affectionate attachment. The overall social pattern of desire "is a joint system of prohibition and incitement": certain sexual relationships are prohibited at any given time, while others are socially hegemonic. In the currently socially hegemonic arrangement, "cathexis presupposes difference" (p. 113). In the heterosexual couple, difference can be "emphasised as a means of intensifying pleasure"(p. 113); more problematic is the eroticisation that occurs when the inequality of the two individuals becomes cathected. Sexualization of the female body and standardization of feminine appeal both operate to maintain inequality, and thus connect the structure of cathexis to the structure of power.

Hegemonic heterosexuality, says Connell, is "not a natural fact but a state of play in a field of power and cathexis, at best an ongoing accomplishment" (p.161). Connell suggests that another "practice directed toward structure" is possible: "the attempt to rework patterns of attachment in
an egalitarian direction" (p. 115). Gay and lesbian relationships, he suggests, are potentially such a reworking.

This is perhaps the least explicated structure in Connell's theory, but it at least attempts to give a psychodynamic account of gender within a social context. On the whole, I think Connell's theory of gender, incompletely represented here, helps to demystify gender. What I have called gender mystification is described in the following way by Connell:

Gender relations involve the structuring of social practice around sex and sexuality. The commonest process in sexual ideology involves collapsing that structure, merging the elements into one by 'naturalizing' social practice. The interpretation of gender relations as natural facts is extraordinarily widespread. (p. 245)

Since the kind of position I am taking in this thesis is one that, were I to present it to a school board, might readily be called "ideological," Connell's approach is one I find refreshing. He terms naturalization "not a naive mistake about what biological science can and cannot explain," but "a highly motivated ideological practice which constantly overrides the biological facts" (p. 246). It not only sanitizes nature in the process, but implies a "cognitive purification of the world of gender" (p. 246). The public/private dichotomising of the world and the treatment of homosexuality as dysfunction are two examples of such purification; romanticism (as in the Broadway musical and in women's magazines) and the heroic narrative (which justify privileges "which happen to be shared by the unheroic majority of men," p. 293) are two devices which represent an ideology of sexual dichotomy.

I have discussed Connell at length not only to lend theoretical weight to the position I take in this thesis. I also want to suggest that demystifying gender needs to be an explicit part of the school curriculum. This is, I think, the kind of theorising that should not be confined to sociology or women's studies classes at universities. I argue that a satisfactory theory of gender is, potentially, part of a liberatory pedagogy for schools, for the following reasons. To the extent that educators and school curricula are blind to the way gender
is made, they will be perpetuating myths about the natural basis for women's oppression. Particularly in the context of contemporary schooling, which has made it its business to attend to such social issues as sexuality, child abuse, and dating safety, it leaves totally unexamined how things got this way, and in what specific ways our practices form gender, in what ways gender "deals with" biological sex. Since schools have started to address these very complex issues, and, I feel, will increasingly be mandated to do so, while at the same time not having a sophisticated critical grip on them, they will potentially be doing more harm than good. Faced with overwhelming evidence of the universality of male violence from television, movies, and school "contemporary issues" curricula, but without the techniques with which to analyse gender as socially constructed, students will likely draw very unfortunate conclusions. Girls may see boys and men as "jerks," while at the same time receiving powerful messages from these same institutions that boys are superior. Therefore, girls may, in effect, be taught to comply with, rather than fight, male violence against them, to resign themselves to their own oppression. Boys, on the other hand, may uncritically enact harmful masculinities, since these are obviously "just the way men are," and have always been, not questioning their own, or their peers', oppressive practices. Rather than taking gender apart, schools will be presenting sex and gender as a seamless whole, apparently impervious to change. As chapter four will illustrate, without a theory of gender, school violence-prevention programs will be more likely to take the form of the "prevention" materials critiqued in chapter one: they will concentrate on how girls should avoid boys' malevolence, brought into view in increasingly disturbing ways, but they will not demonstrate how boys take on masculinity in a manner that can lead to violence, or how they could make choices individually and collectively that would lead to an improved gender order. For girls, violence-prevention would then mean further restricting their freedom, while for boys, rejecting behaviours associated with hegemonic masculinity would seem to contradict what is "normal" for boys to do, and thus be even more stigmatised than it already is.

So, while painting boys (and possibly sexuality itself) as threatening and dangerous, schools would not offer any practical strategies for change. Official school discourse on sexuality and violence would remain both highly
ineffective and profoundly despairing. I propose, therefore, that schools start believing their own rhetoric, and promote thinking "critically" about all areas of curriculum, including sexuality, and introduce gender as a formal component of certain subjects. I will address what specific forms this might take in later chapters. If, as I believe, gender violence is as the heart of many of the dysfunctions of contemporary society, this approach also has a certain economy. Rather than devising separate prevention programs for child abuse, date-rape, substance abuse, and racism, perhaps we should honestly confront a denominator common to all these problems which, I argue, is hegemonic masculinity.

An immediate objection may be that, just at the time when students are trying to establish their sexual identities, and when they have an apparently desperate need to conform, schools should be providing clear masculine and feminine roles, from which they can "deviate" later if they wish. I think that such a suggestion denies the painful reality of many, if not most, adolescents, few of whom naturally conform to the grotesque exaggerations of sexual difference embodied in current Hollywood-endorsed masculine and feminine ideals. Conformity exacts a heavy price in many cases. I think that if most adult men were to examine their adolescence honestly, they would admit that they either participated in, or unprotestingly witnessed, practices which violated the human rights of others, particularly women and effeminate men. They might also recognise how relieved they were to emerge from an environment where physical threat was a daily reality. And can there be an adult woman who never during adolescence felt humiliated, threatened, or silenced by her male peers? Or who, at the very least, did not feel the need to defer to the male ego ("talk about his interests on your date, dear, and you'll be asked out again") and deny her own needs?

An adequate theory of gender would not excuse these experiences as the way things must be. Additionally, we know from gay and lesbian writings that many adolescents are homosexually active. It is perhaps time that schools examine to what extent they endorse the homophobia which is rampant among adolescent boys (less so in girls) by omitting these sexualities from consideration, as if there were only one way of being sexual in the world. Theorising the construction of gender might also, in other words, give students a non-biological context in which to develop an understanding of
sexuality. Finally, as Davies (1989b) notes, the notion that "contradictions are bad for children, that we should be presenting them with a non-contradictory world" (p. 29) ignores the strategies that girls, in particular, use when trying to make sense of subject matter in schools. Davies says that "the diversity of human experience is filled with contradictory truths, since each of the subject positionings we take up does not have the same coordinates as the last" (p. 29). In order to make sense of curricula which have been unrelievedly androcentric, the pre-school girls Davies worked with positioned themselves variously as male or other:

Those positioned as female, in particular, have learned in reading stories for example, both to position themselves as male hero and to see themselves as other, as outside male reality. That is, they have been both viewer and viewed, insider and outsider. Learning to be both and to make that opposition unproblematic is the way many girls have coped with their educational experiences. (p. 29)

Davies' example is instructive. The coping strategies of the girls Davies studied indicate more than the necessity of designing curricula to "include" girls, and thus to alleviate the contradictions between being a girl and understanding stories with male heroes; they suggest to me that coping with contradictions is perhaps something we should be asking of boys as well, making their world-views a little less certain, less rigid, and alleviating the necessity for strict boundary-maintenance which, I will argue in the next chapter, is the "purpose" of much gender violence.

Men and change

Once we see how the gender order and local gender regimes work, we can seek to undo some of their more harmful effects. Ultimately, I believe that gender distinctions will matter less and less. Along with the recognition that there is a multiplicity of genders (which Jonathan might have noticed, had she looked around) will come a lessening of not only the content of
categories, but of the process of categorising as well. However, I am a pragmatist. It is not the abolition of gender which is my project (that I will leave to those with more imagination than I have), but its reform. And reforming gender means re-"forming" men.

Changing our social practices also appears to be our only real hope for ending violence against women. The constructivist view is thus a pragmatic one. The courses of action following from biologically determinist assumptions of gender are bleak. Gayle Rubin summarised them in "The traffic in women":

...the analysis of the causes of women's oppression forms the basis for any assessment of just what would have to be changed in order to achieve a society without gender hierarchy. Thus, if innate male aggression and dominance are at the root of female oppression, then the feminist program would logically require either the extermination of the offending sex, or else a eugenics project to modify its character. (1975, p. 157)

Neither of these is likely to meet with wide approval. A dialectical constructivist view, such as Connell's, is at once more hopeful and more realistic: hopeful, because structure can become the object of practice (however slowly), and realistic, because it recognises that there are structures in the gender order that constrain practice, and that individual "nice guys," however personally blameless they may feel, must confront if they want to help in the project of ending violence against women.

There is, however, a downside to the social construction view. Recently, in North Vancouver, where I live, a group of girls attacked another girl, for the alleged purpose of taking from her a desired piece of clothing. If we accept a social construction argument in our analysis of violence against women, then we must also accept that if we as a society allow violence to escalate, it is likely that girls, too, will turn in increasing numbers to violent behaviours. Although girls and women still commit far less crime than boys and men, a commitment to equal opportunity for women may, ironically, expose girls to the same influences that produce the kind of young men educators and parents fear. If, for reasons stated above, a biological
understanding of the causes of violence is unconvincing to feminists, then we must look seriously at the implications of social construction theory. To the extent that women are made, not born, there is nothing essential in the "female psyche" that will protect women from becoming just like men, given the same cultural influences. All we have is our history as women, the understandings that we have developed historically, but which, as postmodernism has shown, are contingent and not universal in any case. What, after all, might a middle-class stay-at-home mother have in common in her way of perceiving the world with a poor immigrant woman, or a lesbian of colour? If women's lives changed as radically as most feminists would like them to, our female history, our historically arrived at identity as women, tenuous as it is, would be hard to maintain. This is an idea that would alarm cultural feminists, of course, but that appeals to postmodern theorists who want to deconstruct all binary oppositions, and move "beyond" gender. I, too, think that gender has in serious ways harmed us, as should be obvious by my argument to date, but I also think that before we can advocate the abolition of gender itself, we have to be pretty clear about what principles we want to foster in our society, the kinds of values we want to inculcate in young people, and how best to bring these about. It is crucial for educators to make a commitment to non-violence concurrently with a commitment to equality for girls and boys. Otherwise, programs intended to make girls "equal" to boys may lead to behaviour that is "as bad as" that of boys. Unless one believes in an essential female nature that is non-violent, or espouses strict separation of the sexes (a strategy which I argued above would not help women in the long run and which is at any rate impractical on a large scale), violence-prevention will have to include educational programs that initially focus on boys, but that carefully monitor the behaviour of girls as the social, familial and cultural influences of girls and boys become more alike.

A dialectical constructivist view helps put into perspective much of the literature currently being written by men on men and masculinities (to which I will subsequently refer as the "the masculinity literature"). This work, by and large, claims to document the ways in which men are changing in response to feminism. The feminist analysis of the masculinity literature remains, on the whole, suspicious of such claims. Ramazanoglu (1992) comments that too much of the masculinity literature concentrates on men's
change as a personal rather than a political project, and cautions that the concept of hegemonic masculinity "needs to be treated with care because of the ways in which it could be developed":

If the oppressiveness of masculinity is confined to its socially dominant form in the public sphere, it brings the danger of reducing masculinity to other sources of power, such as class, and leaving men as a gender unaccounted for. (p. 344)

While some of this literature has begun a useful counter-discourse, whereby "men are at risk of child abuse, violence from other men, and rape," and "wimps, wallies, and wankers" are reconstructed as "real men" (p. 345), Ramazanoglu is afraid that what masculinity does to women is lost when what masculinity does to men is the primary focus.

Canaan and Griffin (1990) similarly wonder whether "the new men's studies" (TNMS) "is being constructed as a new baby brother for women's studies" (p. 209), a birth, the authors imply, that is bound to draw attention and already-scarce resources away from big sister:

It is not enough that adherents of TNMS and men who are interested in developing anti-sexist work simply support women's academic endeavours and political work. They need to develop strategies which start from their own experiences and relate these to a wider transformative politics which operates at the personal, ideological, and structural levels. If adherents of TNMS fail to take feminist insights on board, if they try to make men feel better about themselves without also considering the effects that their power might have on others, then we have grave doubts about the viability of this perspective. (p. 210)

Canaan and Griffin's central concern is that TNMS "operates at the relatively safe level of academic analysis," that, while claiming its blood relation to feminism, it has ignored feminism's central injunction, that the personal is political (p. 212).

Banner (1989) applauds the problematising of masculinity which the men's literature is finally undertaking (she asks," Has there ever before in
history been a group of men who have so self-consciously articulated a critique of male-ness?", p. 705), but is troubled by the romantic view of "domestic men" that emerges:

If we are to view men as shaped by domesticity, then let us investigate the role of that domesticity as it interacts with men's public lives. Let us first deconstruct men's public postures before we romanticize about their private interactions. (p. 707)

This recalls Haraway's comment in the epigraph about the "added privilege" of male sensitivity. Not only do men get public power, they also get to wear the face of softness and domesticity. Contrast that with the fact that for women, feminism as an understanding of the world puts them at a social deficit in most instances. For men, sympathy toward feminism, in the form of actually changing diapers or of the "added privilege" of gentleness, almost certainly will enhance their "charm" in the eyes of women. Thus Jackson (1990) was able to use his new-found (theoretical) feminism as a way into women's hearts (and beds).

Banner succinctly states that "masculinity is not just an experience, as the men's studies theorists too often seem to view it, it is also an institution...and masculinity as an institution, we call patriarchy" (p. 708). Indeed, masculinity conceptualized as only "experience" results in some pretty woeful writing. Connell (1987) laments that the men's literature has "lovingly dwelt on the penis" (p. 292); the so-called "mytho-poetic movement" has produced tracts such as "Eros and the male spirit" (Moore, 1990). Gender, claims Moore, "is one of the grand metaphors of the human condition." In order to appreciate the metaphor, one must have a "poetic sensibility":

Without a taste for image, the mind slips quickly into literalism. Not catching the poetry in gender, we tend to place all our gender talk onto actual men and women; so that no matter how hard we try to resolve the war of the sexes, antagonism and polarization remain. (p. 125)
This is quite a neat trick. If gender is a metaphor, that means it is used to stand for something else, something which actually exists somewhere, but which we, as human beings, cannot directly apprehend. The reader, who surely does not want to be taken to be a literal-minded, unpoetic boor, is invited to imagine a poeticised, personified, transcendent male essence behind the metaphor:

I find my manhood and masculinity not by identifying with some faddish notion of what a male is, but by letting this male spirit course through my being. I am male through my being in him. (p. 126).

If men could get in touch with their male essence, Moore suggests, they would not need "symptomatic masculinity," which he sees as being the cause of most of the destruction in the world. They would enjoy the "mystery of male sexuality" which is not to be found in "literal gender" or "literal sex" (p. 132), but in discovering and sharing the "male spirit":

Men have the opportunity, being male, to radiate ritually the male spirit needed by both men and women. Women need the male stuff from the man. Men also need it from each other. (...). On their part, men require the woman's opening, the eternal wound, the flow of blood, the moon-friendship, the vegetative strength that comes from the vulnerability to the rhythms of the stars and seasons. (p. 129)

It would take a better satirist than I am to do Moore's work credit, but this quotation conveys the flavour of one branch of the masculinity literature. This is emphatically not the writing of male "experience" that Canaan and Griffin want to encourage, precisely because it does not have a connection to transformative politics. In fact, Moore has belittled any such connection in the terms he has set out: in Moore's view, feminism is, presumably, guilty of placing its "gender talk" onto (gasp!) "actual men and women."

Lynne Segal aptly entitled her recent (1990) book about men and change Slow motion. There is, these feminist critiques of the men's literature have pointed out, a reluctance to connect analysis with practice, to set the
"experience" of masculinity in the socio-political context that forms it. Thus decontextualized, masculinity easily flies off into metaphor, and the masculinity literature approaches the status of an apologetics that actually works against change. There are, however, examples of writings by men who attempt to do what Canaan and Griffin suggest, who write about masculinity as experience, but set that experience within a feminist (or feminist post-structuralist) framework. I agree with Heath in the epigraph that men cannot be in feminism without colonizing it. Gayatri Spivak's comment that "feminism in its academic inceptions is accessible and subject to correction by authoritative men" is apt (cited in Heath, 1987, p. 18). Nonetheless, we surely must support the men who have learned from feminism. David Morgan (1992) asks, "What can men say or write about men that has not already been said by women, or could not be said about them in the future?" (p. 189). This is an attitude many feminists probably share. But I worry less about men's appropriating the feminist voice than I do about their remaining silent about male violence. The modesty of Morgan's question may too easily be turned into complacence: why, after all, should men do the housework/gender work if the women are already tending to it? Since my interest is in education, I believe it is crucial that men, too, talk about men, masculinity, and male violence, since, when we learn, it matters who speaks. In a gender order in which feminist women are regularly cast as "angry," "strident," or "not real women," it would help if men would take on some of the burden of remembering, of bringing to light injustices and the need for redress. As Cary Nelson says:

How (these) passages will be read is (thus) partly a question about the connotative effects produced by a gendered signature, connotative effects which are an inescapable part of our history. Put simply, the words will mean something else if a woman says them. (1987, p. 172)

By extension, "feminist words" will mean something else if a man says them. Whenever I read a letter to the editor that laments violence against women, I am relieved when I see a man's signature. This is not, I think, a sign of defeat, an indication that women will not have said anything of importance
unless validated by men. Rather, it recognises that meanings are socially constructed, and that men will listen differently to the words of other men. This is also true in schools, and why we desperately need male teachers to join, but not appropriate or correct, the feminist conversation.

The masculinity literature I find most promising, then, both acknowledges feminist theory and practice and sheds light on the construction of masculinity from the lived experience of being male. If the above argument is sound, that the way forward is to prevent violence by attempting to reconstruct masculinity, then it is crucial that we have some first-hand accounts of the practices which are formative, literally, for boys. Thus, I am interested in what David Jackson (1990) refers to as "critical autobiography," in which, from the anti-sexist perspective of his maturity, he critically reflects on the construction of his own masculinity. bell hooks (1990) refers to the "politicization of memory" that occurs when the past is recollected in a way which can transform the present. She is talking about reclaiming a suppressed history of black, especially black female, experience in a way that gives it dignity and highlights the courage of black women. Obviously a different kind of politicization must occur in the memory of a white male, one that, if it is to be useful to feminism, must critically examine the effects his own particular construction of masculinity had on women and subordinated men. Undertaken in the spirit of demystifying rather than commemorating the past, perhaps such autobiography will come close to being to a politicization of memory "that distinguishes nostalgia, that longing for something to be as it once was, a kind of useless act, from that remembering that serves to illuminate and transform the past "(bell hooks, p. 147).

In the writing of such autobiography, it is crucial to keep the body in view. As Connell (1987) has said:

The body-as-used, the body I am, is a social body that has taken meanings rather than conferred them. My male body does not confer masculinity on me; it receives masculinity (or some fragment thereof) as its social definition. Nor is my sexuality the irruption of the natural; it too is part of a social process. In the most extraordinary detail my body's responses reflect back, like
the little mirrors on an Indian dress, a kaleidoscope of social meanings. (p. 83)

How male bodies "receive masculinity" will be the focus of the next chapter. Drawing on poststructural/postmodern accounts of the body and subjectivity, and on empirical studies of adolescent youth cultures and schooling, I will speculate that boys come increasingly to dominate the physical and cultural space of schools, and that this relentless quest to "become the subject" requires that girls become the object. It is a conceptual leap from seeing boys as subjects and girls as objects to accounting via this process for sexual and other violence done by men to women in intimate relationships. However, I believe that the accounts of the inscription of masculinity onto male bodies reveal frighteningly close links between violence and the hegemonic form of masculinity uncritically enacted by many adolescent boys. While themes of resistance to and subversion of the discourse of hegemonic masculinity emerge from some accounts, we will see that, disappointingly, adolescent boys openly question this discourse at a considerable price. I claim that we as educators have a responsibility to lower that price.
I asked myself, what do schools do when I put into parentheses their claim to educate? Perhaps only in that way will I find out what they do. (Ivan Illich)

Whatever conservative ideologues might say, schools are places where sex talk, sexual behaviour, sexual relationships, sexual abuse and harassment, sexual identity, sexual divisions and sexual politics are threaded throughout the warp and weft of interactions between students, staff and students, and staff. This reality exists alongside the cautious inclusion or the deliberate exclusion of sexuality in the formal taught curriculum. (Liz Kelly)

Schools do not simply adapt to a natural masculinity among boys or femininity among girls. They are agents in the matter, constructing particular forms of gender and negotiating relations between them. (Bob Connell)

It is to poststructuralism that I turn for an account which will allow us to examine how it is that gender difference is produced in fictional ways which have power in that they are part of the truth-effects of the regulation of children in classrooms. (Valerie Walkerdine)

...as far as the sociology of education goes, it has failed to tackle how sex is constructed and acted upon in school or school-like situations and how this is linked to power. (Julian Wood)

Schools are afraid of adolescent boys. Specifically, we (teachers, administrators and even educational researchers) are afraid of "hegemonic" adolescent boys, and with good reason. Last year, 13 year-old Ryan Garrioch was fatally stabbed in a Canadian school-yard by a male peer who resented Ryan for having told him to stop his bullying behaviour. Ryan was, physically, the kind of boy who at 13 often ends up being a scapegoat, tormented by other boys who want to prove their superior masculinity. In addition, he was a high achiever at school, another feature often singled out for abuse in male peer-groups of that age. But Ryan was not typical in that he had directly challenged his murderer; he had not passively accepted male violence in the school-yard. For that, he paid with his life.

There is every reason to believe that if schools do not respond in thoughtful and comprehensive ways to the problem of masculinity and violence, we will have an even more violent generation of adult males in the future, and more dangerous schools in the short term. Teachers increasingly observe incidents of sexual violence on elementary school playgrounds. In
May, 1992, the seven year-old daughter of Nancy and Paul Mann was surrounded by older boys who pulled up her dress and "told her in rough and graphic language about sexual acts they wanted performed" (reported in the Globe and Mail, July 17, 1992). This kind of group assault seems to be on the rise. In short, things seem to be getting worse. If we think of the young girl who at age seven has already felt threatened and humiliated because she is a girl, or the 13 year-old boy who dies because he challenges the type of behaviour we have for too long shrugged off as "boys being boys," we get, I think, a sense of the urgency of coming to grips with boys' violence. If, as educators, we dismiss these incidents as unusual or exceptional (according to the "pathology thesis" discussed in chapter one), we will have failed to examine how schools are implicated in the construction of hegemonic masculinity and its practices. If, on the other hand, we see boys' violent behaviour as natural and inevitable instead of as socially constructed—that is, as arising out of social and sexual relations expressed and shaped by language—we will continue to excuse it, thus leaving students-and ourselves-feeling powerless and threatened. Although we are surprised and alarmed by violence, in our reactions to it, I will argue, we are caught in the same discursive web that helps produce it. We must think about violence in schools, because it happens. And we must think about it in ways that go much deeper than explanations that blame single mothers, violent television shows, the moral vagrancy of our society, and youth unemployment. If these were the only factors contributing to a "culture of violence," then girls would be as violent as boys. Clearly they are not. There has been since 1986 about a 100-percent increase in (reported) violent crime by youth in Canada; 80 percent of violent young offenders are male.

In this chapter, I propose to, as Illich suggests, "put into parentheses" the claim that schools educate in order to examine their practices, in this case their gender practices. An assumption of such a move is that schooling in its current form, despite its laudable wish to increase equality through access to knowledge, provides a context for the development of beliefs and behaviours that are decidedly inequitable. Research documenting the disproportionate amount of teachers' attention boys receive, as much because of as despite the fact that they misbehave more than girls, is by now well known (Evans, 1984, 1988; Leder 1986). Smithson (1990) and Cline and Spender (1987) are among
those who argue convincingly that many factors, from male dominance in classroom interaction to the absence of women in curricular texts, conspire to undermine girls' confidence in their own abilities. In Deschooling society, one of Illich's claims was that such a feeling of defeat is the principal effect of compulsory schooling on the majority of its students. Briefly summarised, Illich's argument is that compulsory schooling harms students by upholding the liberal ideology that schooling increases equality while actually serving to "compound native privilege with new privilege" (in Cayley, 1992, p.68). Despite many imaginative initiatives to combat this trend since the appearance of Deschooling society in 1970, schooling still appears to favour children with well-educated mothers and wealthy fathers (Anyon, 1984). Students who are not successful in the school system tend to blame themselves for their failure, since the system is supposedly non-discriminatory. Illich refers to the effects of this system as "structured injustice" and calls for the "disestablishment" of schools. If schooling were not accessible and compulsory, Illich argues, then it would be recognised for what it does: organize learning "under the assumption that the means for acquiring something called knowledge are scarce" (in Cayley, p. 71). In other words, schooling presupposes a hierarchy of success and failure.

In this chapter, I start from the assumption that schooling in its current form contributes to sexism as a specific form of "structured injustice." If the "native privilege" of being a boy is compounded through schooling by the "new privilege" of receiving an education which takes an overwhelmingly male subject position, in conditions which encourage, allow, ignore, or at the very least do not actively challenge sexism and sexual violence, then schools are not likely to be places where girls and boys are likely to flourish equally. As Davies (1989a) puts it:

Access to schooling, accompanied by the maintenance of the symbolic and discursive practices which divide the world (...) leads, inevitably, to girls and women being more deeply embedded in their subordinate position, since they learn more thoroughly through their education to construe the world in male terms, that is, to see themselves as other to men, and thus outside historical and political processes. (p. 3)
Unlike Illich, I do not advocate de-schooling. Granted, schools have not re-distributed wealth or even "human" capital as some reformers had hoped, but they are still places where worthwhile things can be learned in a relatively stimulating and at times nurturing environment. It is also likely that schooling in Canada will remain compulsory until age sixteen for the foreseeable future. As a practitioner, I am therefore concerned that schools be places where the least harm is done, intentionally or otherwise, through the official curriculum or unofficial ones, such as the social organization of the classroom itself. Since much worthwhile feminist research has concentrated on the effects of the school curriculum on girls, in this chapter I focus more closely on boys and the social relations that are found in schools, relations that schools have not taken to be of real educational importance. My central questions are: Where does boys' violence come from? How might the social relations fostered in schools be implicated in the construction of masculinity and its violence? and, What sort of understanding of male adolescence could help educators devise programs to prevent violence against women? As Carrigan, Connell & Lee point out, in a passage cited in chapter one, "violence...(is) a constitutive practice that helps to make all kinds of masculinity" (1987, p. 176). In this chapter I will suggest that schools are sites where masculinity is constituted not only by the kind of playground violence illustrated above but also through the schools' own concrete, daily practices. These go largely unexamined, I will argue, because many teachers themselves have naturalised views of gender and its "roles." To the extent that schools actively promote, or passively tolerate, activities in relation to which only boys can be "subjects," they are centrally implicated in the construction of masculinity itself.

Repeatedly, in articles I have read on the possibility of gender reform in schools, I have come across the expression of a reluctance to deal face-to-face with adolescent boys. Connell's comment in chapter one that re-defining sex education by "prioritizing the experiences of those who are usually silenced or marginalized, especially women" would "not likely to be easy to do with many adolescent boys" is typical. This reluctance is understandable, given the kinds of responses to the presence of feminism in schools and on campuses that boys have made. Jones (1985) notes that in a mixed secondary school in England
one teacher reported that a 'Girls Are Powerful' poster—which had been put up to give girls support in her mixed classroom—had been destroyed by boys who'd written 'We're here to stay' and drawn erect penises on it. (p. 27)

At Queen's University, in the fall of 1989, a "NO MEANS NO" public education campaign about date rape produced similar reactions from the college men, as Lewis (1990) reports:

The reaction of a number of male students was to respond with a 'sign campaign' that made explicit their belief that women's refusal of male sexual demands could appropriately be countered with violence ('No means tie me up') or with their own definitions of women's sexual deviance ('No means dyke'). (p. 467)

This very postmodern struggle over the naming and meaning of sexual assault—who gets to name and define social experience?—indicates that many boys and college-aged men perceive feminism and the incursion of "women's issues" into the curriculum as threats to their masculine privilege; in Kenway's (1991) phrase, the presence of feminism in schools appears to place masculinity "under siege." As Kenway puts it, when feminists "bring sexual politics into the open and turn up the heat" most male teachers also react adversely:

Some go on the attack, others go on the defensive and yet others try to come on side in various ways and for various purposes. By and large, whichever way they move, they tend to mobilize the discourse of masculinity which underwrites the current gender order. (p. 15)

I believe that as educators we have a responsibility to get over our fear of these reactions, understanding that what fuels them may, in part, be an insecurity about the boys' own masculine status that an educational program about gender—such as the one I will propose in chapter four—could help to re-
focus or, even better, to obviate. As Thomas (1990) concludes in her study of the significance of gender politics in men's accounts of their gender identity:

Rather than drawing upon a political analysis of gender as socially constructed in order to question the need to conform to some masculine standard, most men continue to bolster the cult of masculinity that makes them feel insecure in the first place (something that was particularly apparent in the accounts provided by the adolescent participants). (p. 158)

One way of getting over our fear of boys is to keep in mind that, in the set of social relations that constitutes gender, there are masculinities not represented by the voices and actions of hegemonic masculinity. Boys who secretly despise the attitudes and actions of their sexist classmates may, in fact, constitute a silent majority. As I suggested in chapter one, the mythos of heterosexist male bonding defines refusal to take part in its rituals as effeminate. This explains why some boys who are sensitive and caring when with their female friends are seemingly transformed into sexist boors among their male ones: they are caught in a discourse that constructs them as unmasculine if they treat women as other than objects of sexual conquest. When I seek answers to my central questions for this chapter it will therefore be the construction of a specifically hegemonic masculinity that will concern me, and the effects that this construction potentially has on both girls and on boys inhabiting subordinated masculine positions. A key purpose will be to find ways to bring boys to an individual, if not collective, refusal of the discourse of hegemonic masculinity. This, I am convinced, can actually happen. In a unique experiment last year, Novogrodky et al (1992) organized an "anti-sexist workshop for highschoolers." They were pleasantly surprised at the willingness of the boys to broach "feminist" issues:

By the end of the three days together, even those teachers who had been skeptical were surprised at our success. The young men had risen to the occasion: instead of the maschismo and sexist behaviour we thought might break out in a group of forty adolescent males, we found genuine displays of sensitivity, awareness, and a growing desire to play their part in ending sexism. Theoretically, by 15 or 16 years old socialization has had
quite a chance to shape human behaviour, but its veneer is thinner than many of us might think. This isn't to say changing patriarchy is a simple task. Rather, as the retreat showed, we can provide opportunities to men to express elements of masculinity that are normally suppressed and, while doing so, examine their own place within a system of male domination. (p. 76)

Wood (1984) comments on the developing sexism of boys he worked with in Britain:

while the outward face of sexist sex talk is bravado, the inward face is another story. Furthermore, such talk and ideas weaken the ability to come to terms with the insecurities beneath them. The boast isolates the speaker from sympathy as well as from hurt. (p. 79).

Lees (1986) maintains that girls lack "a language through which the legitimacy of 'slag' as a way of censoring girls can be contested" (p.162); so boys who are privately dissatisfied with the violence of hegemonic masculinity need a public language in which to express their feelings, and an educational context in which it is safe, and "normal," to do so. Perhaps such a language will bring them out of the "isolation" Wood speaks of and into teachers' pedagogic sympathy. This position is one that affords the possibility that new ways of speaking as, and being, boys will emerge.

**Masculinity and schooling**

Views of the school's role in the construction of masculinities vary greatly. Traditionally, British "public" schools were promoted as "masculinity-making devices" (Connell, 1989, p. 291), while the more egalitarian rhetoric surrounding public schooling in North America in this century meant that, until recently, gender was overlooked in studies and theories of education. Similarly, most theorists of gender—notably Freudian and neo-Freudian psychoanalysts—largely ignore the importance of schools as sites of gender formation. Feminist attention to schooling, by contrast, has made it clear that, from very early ages, girls and boys receive different
treatment in schools. This is no longer, perhaps, surprising. What feminist poststructuralist approaches to gender have contributed to debates around gender and schooling is the insight that schools are also sites where gender differences are produced, and not simply dealt with. This occurs both because of educators' own consciously and unconsciously held views on gender as being natural and inevitable, and because of the nature of most schools' gender regimes—the particular form that gender relations take from school to school. A brief look at representative feminist and feminist/poststructuralist work on gender and schooling illustrates.

Clarricoates (1980) concentrates on the attitudes of teachers toward sex difference in her observation of the gender practices in four primary schools in Britain. She observes that in all four schools, "masculine" and 'feminine' are seen as immutable characteristics of normal proper behaviour" (p. 193). The categorization of behaviour by gender is consistent despite the fact that "what is considered normal in some schools is abnormal in others" (p. 193). Poor behaviour is expected, and, to an extent, tolerated from boys, but is assumed to be "deviant" coming from girls. All aspects of school-life seem to be organized around the contradictory assumptions that gender difference is at once naturally-occurring and at the same time in constant need of policing:

...no matter how small the school and how few the pupils it would seem that the all-pervasive phenomenon of gender required segregation...The children had specific lines of demarcation: boys and girls did not sit at the same table, they did not sit in the same files in assembly, they did not all play for the same football team (girls were mostly excluded). The irrationality of sex-typing the female at—ever-present at this school: it was believed that girls are weak, that they cry, that they can't drive tractors (neither can boys at that age). In contrast, it was believed that boys play football, they're tough. There was the same boring, dogmatic and seemingly endless list of arbitrary qualities assigned to the social categories of "masculine" and "feminine." (p. 204)

Clarricoates' observation that teachers repeatedly police behaviour by labelling it "masculine" or "feminine" is typical of what Scott (1988) calls the "conflictual processes that establish meanings;" for poststructuralists, Scott
explains, social meanings are not given, but rather "constructed through exclusions" (p. 7). Scott notes that

instead of attributing a transparent shared meaning to cultural concepts, post-structuralists insist that meanings are not fixed in a culture's lexicon but are rather dynamic, always potentially in flux...If the meanings of concepts are taken to be unstable, open to contest and redefinition, then they require vigilant repetition, reassertion, and implementation by those who have endorsed one or another definition. (p. 5)

Certainly gender identity among elementary and high school students appears to require "vigilant repetition, reassertion, and implementation" both by teachers, as Clarricoates observes, and by students themselves. Not surprisingly, in a gender order that privileges men, it is the boys who seem more motivated to police gender identities and boundaries than the girls; this appears to confirm the poststructuralist view of social meanings as unstable. Boys seem to sense that girls who transgress the gender boundaries that have been set for them as girls threaten the very meaning of what it is to be a boy; being a boy relies on girls' remaining-in the boy's mind-"girlish," despite glaring evidence to the contrary in girls' actual behaviour. In the worst cases, enforcement of "girlishness" becomes actual sexual violence. We have seen the fierce exclusion of the feminine and the effeminate represented by male social groupings taking the form of the "men's hut." Wood's (1984) "Groping toward sexism: boys' sex talk" likewise documents how a group of high school boys ("in a small on-site unit for 'disruptives' in a London, co-educational secondary school," p. 54) relentlessly validate a collective male subject position. This is accomplished by a variety of sexist practices, notably referring to girls in derogatory ways, based solely on looks and "sex appeal": the now-familiar dissection of women into body parts, designed, presumably, for appraisal and use by men. Wood speculates that the absurdities that can result (as, for example, the ridiculous binary opposition of girls who are "dogs"-homely-and those who are "tasty"-good-looking) may reveal the secret of the power of the category, in this case the category "female":
It relies for its power on the simplicity with which it attempts to sort out the whole female gender and, perhaps, the emotions of the speaker. How characteristic that is in fact of so much of the lack of subtlety of male sexism. If vacillation is imputed to women, then unwavering oversureness may perhaps be, by negative implication, very male. Besides which, the pose of sureness is doubly 'functional' in that it obviates the need to find out if one really does know one's own mind. Even if the boys want to introduce the subtlety of considering a girl as a 'bit of a dog' the clear, end position (dog) stands implicit and absolute behind the indecisive judgement. (p. 60)

Lees (1986) analyses British adolescent boys' use of the term "slag" (slut) in a similar way. Calling a girl a "slag" does not refer to a girl's actual behaviour, but forms part of a discourse about behaviour as a departure from in this case-male conceptions of female sexuality which run deep in the culture, so deep that the majority of men and women cannot formulate them except by reference to these terms of censure that signal a threatened violation. (p. 161)

"Slag," Lees notes, has an "uncontested status as a category" whose use the girls cannot challenge due to the power inequality between them and the boys: "Girls, when faced with sexual abuse, react by denying the accusation rather than by objecting to the use of a category" (p. 161). Lees sums up this state of affairs by citing Black & Coward (1981, in Lees, p. 156): "Being a man is an entitlement not to masculine attributes but to non-gendered subjectivity" (or, as Rousseau perhaps more elegantly phrased it, "The male is male only at certain moments," Emile, p. 361). This theme is taken up by later poststructural theorists who speak of the male "gaze" that objectifies women's bodies while the "gazer" remains somehow disembodied and uninflected by gender; I will speak more about poststructural accounts of "bodies" later in the chapter.

The sexism of Wood's boys was resisted by the girls, and the boys "had to be careful that their sexist remarks were not seen to be personally insulting a stronger girl face to face" (p. 57). Despite this resistance, boys' sex(ist) talk evolved into sexist practice during what were known as "bundles": when the
staff were called to main school, leaving the students unsupervised, "amid whoops and giggles the kids would pile on top of each other" on couches (p. 71). What began as "fun" ended in violence:

The boys simply could not draw the line, but always wanted to push it further and further. Every physical closeness afforded by the bundles became a chance for attempted sexiness which further encouraged them in their notions of female complicity, and, out of that, came the rape fantasy, and so on. If the girls thought the bundles were a bit of a laugh it was an absolute hallmark of the boys' developing sexism that they completely lost sight of their own exclusively male meanings, pushed for more and more. It they had succeeded in touching a girl's breast, they would go for her crotch. It was as if they wanted the girls to loan them their bodies on male terms. (p. 71)

Canaan (1991) elaborates the theme of young women as "tokens in a male game" (p. 120) in a study of young men in two youth clubs in Britain. She correctly identifies the "youth subcultures perspective" as lacking a focus on gender: she attempts to correct this by identifying "the links between male violence against women and violence against men" (p. 110). In an ethnographic study of mostly white working-class young men, Canaan notes that fighting is "central to the construction of the male peer group system during secondary school" (p. 113). Fighting "is the ultimate demarcator of hardness" (p. 115) and "provides the idiom with which masculinity is articulated" (p. 122). Peer status-"hardness"-is achieved through ability at fighting (although "being" but not "acting" hard confers the highest status), and enhanced through heterosexual relations, wherein the concept of "hardness" has a genital connotation:

...during high school Andrew and his mates viewed the hardest or most powerful young men as 'cocks' and now view the softest young men as 'wankers.' This indicates that the male genitals play a central role in these young men's constructions of masculinity. They constitute masculinity through two opposing sexual orientations of the male genitals: penetrative sex with a young woman and non-penetrative, masturbatory sex (where such 'hardness' is unnecessary and 'softness' prevails). (p. 121)
"Relationships with young women," summarises Canaan, "thereby presume and are affirmed by penetrative sex. Because this constitutes young women as mere signifiers of male power, young women hold a subordinate position in the male world" (p. 122). In this system of signification, young women, denied sexual agency of their own, are caught in a "contest (they) cannot win" (p. 120). Complying with male sexual demands makes them "slags," not complying leaves them respected but abandoned while the boys seek sexual experience with more willing girls.

Girls' "getting it wrong"

According to Hudson (1984), girls are not only stuck with the sexual double standard described by Canaan. They are also confronted by "conflicting sets of expectations" simply by being female and adolescent: femininity and adolescence, claims Hudson, are "subversive of one another" (p. 31). She explains:

Adolescence is a 'masculine' construct. All our images of the adolescent-(...) the restless, searching youth, the Hamlet figure; the sower of wild oats, the tester of growing powers-these are masculine images. This is the basis of many of the conflicts posed by the coexistence of adolescence and femininity: if adolescence is characterised by masculine constructs, then any attempts by girls to satisfy society's demands of them qua adolescents, are bound to involve them in displaying not only lack of maturity (since adolescence is dichotomous with maturity), but also lack of femininity. (p. 35)

Schools, in fact, seem to rely on "appropriate" displays of femininity to keep (male) adolescence in check. Hudson cites classroom observation studies in which teachers are seen to "respond positively to 'feminine' girls" (p. 39). But schools also must "keep (femininity) within bounds, must 'manage' it" (p. 40). As McRobbie points out, some girls assert their resistance to inequities in school by exaggerating their femininity:
one way in which the girls combat the class-based and oppressive features of the school is to assert their 'femaleness,' to introduce into the classroom their sexuality and their physical maturity in such a way as to force the teachers to take notice. Thus the girls took great pleasure in wearing make-up to school, spent vast amounts of time discussing boyfriends in loud voices in class, and used these interests to disrupt the class. (1978, cited in Hudson, p. 40)

Such displays make teachers uncomfortable since they transgress the very conservative views on female sexuality that teachers seem to hold. These girls are clearly exercising the only form of protest open to them in the system of sexual signification constituted by adolescence: they are in a sense deflating the power of male objectification of women by exaggerating, and appearing to revel in, its results. One of the strongest arguments in favour of single-sex schooling for girls must surely be that if girls are not faced with the constant contradictions between being feminine and being adolescent, they can perhaps enjoy-as, in retrospect, I did at the all-girls high school I attended-a degree of non-gendered subjectivity. (Ironically, "elite" private girls' schools such as the one I attended present girls with contradictory expectations of their own: we were at once supposed to be "ladylike" and accomplished, "feminine" and competitive.) As Lees (1986) puts it, describing, I think, a feature common to the gender regimes in many co-educational schools:

Boys are not judged simply in terms of their sexual activity. They have access to that world of 'non-gendered subjectivity' of sport, work, and academic achievement, which for a girl is always secondary to her sexual reputation. All her behaviour has a sexual significance, whatever she is trying to do or achieve. (p. 164)

Provided that homosexual boys do not make public their sexual orientation, they, too, can enjoy the freedom of being ungendered, whereas all girls, lesbian or straight, are, I think, contrained as Lees describes. The freedom of non-gendered subjectivity potentially available to girls in single-sex schools
would ideally reduce the need McRobbie's girls felt to marshal a subversive femininity that, like Willis' working-class lads' resistance, would ultimately limit their life-chances. Instead, the girls would perhaps find other, more constructive, ways to express their feelings of, in this case, class-based injustice. Single-sex schooling might provide an environment conducive to, in Rich's famous words, "taking women students seriously," and one that would encourage girls to take *themselves* seriously as students, and not just as "girls." As one of Hudson's subjects sees it, in the current pull between being feminine and being adolescent, "Whatever we do, it's always wrong" (p. 31).

This short journey through some of the feminist and feminist/poststructuralist literature on gender and schooling has, I hope, begun to illustrate Connell's claim that, as regards gender formation, schools are "agents in the matter." Schools not only provide a locus for the development of peer cultures in which male-dominated and sexist meanings of sexual difference are articulated, leaving girls no acceptable way to "get it right;" they also, through teachers' attitudes and practices, promote some versions of gender identity over others. Generally, as Riddell (1992) has pointed out, these conform to the unexamined normative notions of masculinity and femininity prevalent elsewhere in the culture. Policing the boundaries between acceptable masculine and feminine behaviour has decided effects on boys' and girls' subjectivity and, presumably, on their perceptions of themselves as learners. Thus, the gender practices of schools are not of incidental educational interest.

In what specific ways do schools perform as "agents" of gender? I would suggest that to a large extent, school activities encourage students to practise for, not question or resist, the prevailing gender order, and thus represent a kind of indoctrination into sexism. In many high schools, boys and girls seem to be allowed to rehearse their traditional gender "roles": just the other day, as I ran around a local school track, the boys practised soccer with two coaches while, occupying a tiny space behind one of the goals, several girls went over their cheerleading routines. Where "innovations" such as co-operative learning are taken up enthusiastically by classroom teachers, these, too, allow old patterns to re-assert themselves: how often do the girls in "co-operative" groups get stuck with the responsibility of making
sure the boys stay on task? Many school social events, from junior high dances to grad functions, still assume and re-inforce the centrality of heterosexual activity; while I suspect that no contemporary school in Canada actually elects a "homecoming queen," one might question how far we have moved from supporting the kind of norm that she, and her male counterpart, the "big man on campus," embodied. It is interesting to note that in the Canadian Teachers' Federation study on "the concerns, expectations, and barriers experienced by adolescent women in Canada," A Capella, in which there were close to one thousand participants, the authors found that "all of the girls in one group considered friends to be more important than boys" (p. 13). The girls' concerns about relationships with boys, on the other hand, were often tinged with fears about violence and frustration at boys' "lack of communication skills and ability to deal with their emotions": (p. 10). Why, teachers might ask, given the fact that girls seem to value quite unproblematically their friendships with girls, but feel conflicted about their relationships with boys, is so much of the organization of the school suffused with the importance of the heterosexual couple? The "progressive" desire to make all curricular areas fully co-educational at the high school level may, ironically, be depriving girls of the chance to be ungendered for at least a portion of their school lives. Such an opportunity would, I think, do more for girls' "equality" than a forced march with boys throughout their entire school careers. The confusion on the part of many educational researchers over girls' relative lack of academic success in high school betrays, I think, a lack of critical appreciation of the kind of atmosphere that prevails in most high schools, which too often positions girls in relation to boys' increasing subjectivity. As Lees puts it so well:

The language of 'slag' is not exercised by boys over girls, rather both inhabit a world structured by the language quite irrespective of who speaks to or about whom. (1986, p. 160)

It may be argued that boys and girls inhabit this discursive world both inside and outside schools, and that teachers and school curricula have little influence on the practices that constitute this world. I disagree. First, as Lees says, "changing the language of sexism is changing the practices of power" (p.
If teachers cannot directly intervene in the social dynamics of the classroom, we nonetheless use language as our stock-in-trade. If Lees is correct, as I think she is, that sexist language is not a symptom of sexism, but a practice constitutive of sexism, then not only can teachers challenge the sexism of their students, they can also, by their own careful use of language, influence social meanings. By the same token, when teachers allow students to use sexist terms, or themselves do so, then they actively re-inscribe existing power inequalities in their classrooms. In *A Capella*, one girl asks, for example, "How come when I correct a teacher who made a sexist remark, I always get insulted in return?" (p. 18). Second, schools that undertake any form of "sex education" program are, either through including or excluding certain topics and discourses, endorsing certain normative views of sexuality and sexual relations. I agree with Fine's (1988) summary of prevailing official school discourses on sexuality:

The authorized sexual discourses define what is safe, what is taboo, and what will be silenced. This discourse of sexuality mis-educates adolescent women. What results is a discourse of sexuality based on the male in search of desire and the female in search of protection. The open, co-ed sexuality discussions so many fought for in the 1970's have been appropriated as a forum for the primacy of male heterosexuality and the preservation of female victimization. (p. 40)

I will suggest in chapter four how schools might be able to introduce programs that allow girls a sense of their sexual subjectivity; how to temper boys' sense of sexual entitlement with a consideration of the perspective of girls is a more vexed issue, but one that I will also try to address.

Connell (1989) suggests a final way in which schools act as arbiters of gender formation. Through empirical work with adult men and their "life histories," he identifies the "authority structure of the school" as the "antagonist against which one's masculinity is cut" (p. 294). Echoing Illich's theory of "structured injustice," Connell's idea here is that authoritarian policies of streaming and failure force differentiation upon boys; boys who are academic failures seek "other sources of power." Among these are "sporting prowess, physical aggression and sexual conquest" (p. 295). He summarises:
Some masculinities are formed by battering against the school's authority structure, others by smooth insertion into its academic pathways, others again by tortuous negotiation of possibilities. (...) On the whole, it is the inexplicit, indirect effects of the way schools work that stands out in the long perspective on masculinity formation. A stark case is the way streaming and failure push groups of working-class boys towards alienation, and state authority provides them a perfect foil for the construction of a combative, dominance-focused masculinity. Equally clear is the role of the academic curriculum and its practices of selection in the institutionalisation of a rationalised masculinity in professions and administration. (p. 300)

Thus, while schools cannot be seen as straightforward agents that consciously promote certain gender enactments, they are sites where gender is both contested and enacted. This is true both at the curricular level, and at the level of the social organization of the school itself. Additional empirical work on how the gender order is maintained-or changed-through schooling is needed.

The possibility that the ways boys and girls come to experience their bodies, partly as a result of the gender practices of schooling, will be explored next. I will consider poststructural accounts of bodily inscription with a view to developing an etiology of boys' violence, an etiology that, while speculative, will attempt to bring together many of the themes around masculinity encountered thus far.

An etiology of violence: boys overcoming their bodies

Davies (1989a) states simply, "The body is highly responsive to social practice" (p. 11). Since a great deal of social practice is centred around the notion that men and women constitute opposite poles, or distinct categories, of being, we can expect to find disparities in male and female bodily comportment and perception. As a set of "idea(s) with material force" (Davies, 1989b, p. 109) discourse, in this case the related discourses of male-
female dualism and male superiority, acts discernibly on the body. As Grosz (1993) points out, feminist poststructuralists draw out ways in which power, including the power of ideas embedded in the concept of discourse, acts on bodies in sexually specific ways:

The disciplines (including psychology, criminology, sociology, psychiatry, and so on) are, as Foucault argues, formed through the interaction of disciplinary regimes and institutions-prisons, asylums, clinics, doctors' surgeries, the psychoanalyst's couch-functioning to inscribe bodies in distinctive ways. Bodies are thus essential to accounts of power and critiques of knowledge. Feminist conceptions of the body are unlike those of their male counterparts (Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, and Foucault, among others) insofar as the bodies and pleasures of individuals and groups are always sexually specific and may well entail different regimes of power and their associated knowledges. (p. 196)

Grosz outlines "two broad kinds of approach to theorizing the body" in twentieth-century radical thought:

One is derived from Nietzsche, Kafka, Foucault, and Deleuze, which I will call "inscriptive"; the other is more influenced by psychology, especially psychoanalysis and phenomenology. I will refer to this approach as the "lived body." The first conceives of the body as a surface on which social law, morality, and values are inscribed; the second refers largely to the lived experience of the body, the body's internal or psychic inscription. Where the first analyzes a social, public body, the second takes the body-schema or imaginary anatomy as its object(s). It is not clear to me that these two approaches are compatible or capable of synthesis. (p. 196)

It is well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt such a synthesis, but each approach, in my view, is incomplete without the other. Accounts of the body as "public" seem to leave out intentionality and any "inner" life; bodies appear to be strangely impersonal, compliant sites of domination. Phenomenological accounts, on the other hand, benefit when the experience of the lived body is set within an explicit social context; the lived body is a
gendered body, a body of a particular age, and so on. Iris Young (1985), for example, challenges the gender-neutrality of the "subject" of existential phenomenology in her consideration of pregnant subjectivity. Bodies, in other words, have social as well as personal, outer as well as inner, determined as well as resisted or self-determined, meanings. These meanings are, of course, interdependent. This is the sort of view of the body which I will have in mind as I look at bodies and the gender practices of schooling.

The ways people come to hold, use, experience and think about their bodies are profoundly gendered. Young's classic (1980) essay "Throwing like a girl" illustrates how bodily comportment is the result of gendered practice. Girls in our culture, she says, "are not given the opportunity to use their full bodily capacities in free and open engagement with the world, nor are they encouraged as much as boys are to develop specific bodily skills":

The girl learns actively to hamper her movements. She is told that she must be careful not to get hurt, not to get dirty, not to tear her clothes, that the things she desires to do are dangerous for her. Thus she develops a bodily timidity that increases with age. In assuming herself to be a girl, she takes herself to be fragile. (p. 154)

These practices and attitudes not only mark female bodies in certain ways, but influence female motility. Surrounding the female body is a perceived spatial constriction, which in sport manifests itself as a reluctance to move forward and extend the body; in throwing, "girls do not reach back, twist, move backward, step, and lean forward" but "tend to remain relatively immobile except for their arms, and even the arms are not extended as far as they could be" (p. 145). In addition, girls adopt an "objectified bodily existence" as they become aware of being "gazed upon as a mere body":

...the woman lives her body as object as well as subject (...) The source of this objectified bodily existence is in the attitude of others regarding her, but the woman herself often actively takes up her body as a mere thing. She gazes at it in the mirror, worries about how it looks to others, prunes it, shapes it, molds it and decorates it. (p. 155)
Bartky (1988) takes up this theme in a Foucauldian analysis of the (self-) "disciplinary practices a woman must master in pursuit of a body of the right size and shape that also displays the proper styles of feminine motility" (p. 18). Female motility which results from unequal treatment of boys and girls, Bartky seems to say, also becomes incorporated in standards of femininity, so that deviation from these gender differences based on practice is something to be remarked on. As a "girl" who has always thrown "like a boy" (which in my girlhood was the source of both pride-"throwing like a girl" is pejorative- and, eventually, anxiety-how much femininity was I willing to forego?), I find this analysis interesting.

In addition to the ways in which female bodies must be carried, "feminine faces are trained to the expression of deference":

Under male scrutiny, women will avert their eyes or cast them downward. (...) Women are trained to smile more than men, too. In the economy of smiles, as everywhere, there is evidence that women are exploited, for they give more than they return; in a smile elicitation study, one researcher found that the rate of smile return by women was 93 percent, by men only 67 percent. (Bartky, p. 17)

This is quite obviously still true, as evidenced by even a cursory examination of television news or talk shows. Women interviewees (where do American talk shows find all those female psychologists who look as if they've spent the morning at Nieman-Marcus, or just finished an appointment with their cosmetic surgeons?) evidently still feel the need to appear not only intelligent and well-informed (this is now allowed) but also ingratiating and "fresh" looking, with pearly-white, toothy smiles. Male "experts" who are interviewed on television, on the other hand, tend to stare steadfastly into the camera; smiling seems the farthest thing from their minds (which are, after all, what the interviewer is presumably probing).

Finally, Bartky lists the normalizing discourse of feminine beauty and the incredible time devoted, and technology deployed, to achieve it. Regimens of skin care, of diet and exercise, hair arrangement, the careful policing of immasculinising body hair, all express the "disciplinary project of
femininity" which, ironically, most individual women are destined to fail, since it promotes a femininity which is profoundly unnatural. The failure to properly discipline the female body adds "a measure of shame" to a woman's already keenly felt experience of her body as deficient (p. 184). Resisting or refusing the discourse, on the other hand, brings a woman even more severe sanctions, including "the refusal of male patronage".

For the heterosexual woman, this may mean the loss of a badly needed intimacy; for both heterosexual women and lesbians, it may well mean the refusal of a decent livelihood. (p. 189)

These accounts of the inscription of femininity onto female bodies and of the lived female body raise the question of what processes male bodies undergo. If, as Young has argued, the sense of her body as inferior and the lack of encouragement she receives to feel her body as a means of expressing her intentionality make a girl take up her body as "fragile" and as "a mere object" (like the "docile bodies" in Foucault's writings), is the process for boys simply reversed? Do boys take up their bodies somehow as subjects? Can we speak of masculine bodies as being the opposite of docile-"recalcitrant," perhaps? Is there a parallel "disciplinary project of masculinity", and, if so, what are the sanctions for refusing it? What might its connection be to violence against women? To look for answers to these questions, I will now consider David Jackson's (1990) "critical autobiography" Unmasking masculinity, mentioned in chapter two, in which he sets out to describe how he received masculinity. Through this process, he hopes that he and other men can demystify masculinity:

What is now needed is for more men to come out of hiding and to start excavating, in public, the sedimented layers of their own particular and diverse life histories. Men urgently need to delve much more deeply into the contradictory construction of their masculine identities. And into the hidden networks of male power that are so effectively concealed in these constructions. (p. 3)
Jackson's father enacted a masculinity which involved being a "ladies' man" and invested a lot in strict gender division:

...fearful that he might be interrogated too closely about his masculine identity, my father overcompensated by building a masculine front that shut me out. Along with that went a fierce patrolling of the boundaries between his 'masculinity' and 'femininity.' (p. 94)

Jackson's mother, with whom he had shared the only emotional closeness in his life, died when he was twelve. "It was in this shocked state," explains Jackson, "dragging an enormous, bottled-up grief behind me, that I was sent to boarding school" (p. 121). His description of the atmosphere of a British boys' "public" school is a familiar one. What he encountered was

the steely, disciplined order of the school's rules and regulations and, with the other boys, the vicious banter and teasing of a bully-boy, heterosexual culture. I remember lying in bed at night and staring up at the plaster-frieze ceiling. I couldn't sob or cry out. All I could do was keep my body rigidly still, and stare, stare at the ceiling, trying to make sense of it. (p. 121)

The "hardening" of the body and the injunction against emotionality are recurrent themes in works about masculinity, and I shall return to them later. For now, I would simply like to observe that the two are connected, that Jackson held his body "rigidly still" because he could not express his grief. Jackson found that to make friends, he had to "emphasise the robustly active parts" of himself and began throwing himself into "sporting activities, and learning the codes of verbal sparring" (p. 121). It also meant devoting a great deal of time playing with and worrying about his penis. His episodes of dormitory masturbation marked the beginning of his "gradual estrangement from (his) body":

My penis began to become detached from my heart and lovingly reciprocal relations, and instead became an illusory means of a comforting sensation of positive activity. (p. 122)
Along with his masturbatory activity went "a sexualizing of women's bodies from about thirteen onwards":

Through this eroticizing of parts of women's bodies I fantasized a more manly, dominating control over compliant women that seemed to keep my castration anxiety at bay. That's how, on one level, I became so susceptible to reproducing the traditional relations of heterosexual male power over women. (p. 122)

However, the construction of his sexual identity was not entirely straightforward. There was much homo-erotic play at Jackson's school:

In my early years at the boarding school there was sexual experimenting with other boys that developed a strange kind of intimacy and physical closeness which we kept quiet about but weren't too ashamed about either. (p. 123)

Since there was also an aggressive homophobia among the boys, this homo-erotic attraction and experimentation could be defended against by vocal affirmation of hegemonic masculinity, by constant reference to 'queers,' 'browners,' and 'nancy boys' (p. 124). Looked at poststructurally, hegemonic boys escaped being discursively constructed as homosexuals because they occupied subject positions that allowed them the power to name. Identifying the other, either the effeminate among them or the stereotypical "queer," as "homosexual" left their male heterosexual (and heterosexist) subjectivities in place, while still allowing them the intimacy of homosexual activity.

Later, Jackson's felt need to establish a heterosexual identity resulted in an obsession with "how far I could get," a goal aided by his practising a "sequence of invasion":

The whole person of the girl used to be fractured into objectified parts, as I used to go into an automated ritual of sexual advances. (p. 127)
This account is a clear example of the male construction of the "other" to affirm himself:

It was as if I had built a male ego and status from colonizing and invading the female body that kept me firm and upright from the terrors of dissolving away completely, and the fear of losing my grip on the strict boundary policing that kept me masculine. (p. 127)

Assuming himself to be a boy: throwing arms and scoring legs

Jackson's participation in sport during his childhood also influenced the way he thought about and experienced his body. A slight boy, he found his body to be inadequate in a way reminiscent of Bartky's and Young's description of female bodily self-perception:

Measuring my body, with my delicate, 'girlish' hands and frail, undersized frame against the ideal male body (...) and finding it wanting, made me prepared to try and take on some of the tough facade of the Tarzan/Johnny Weismuller type of male. Because of my culturally learned view of my body as inadequate, I urgently wanted to see it a new way-as a potential 'instrument of power'-and to develop a virile physical presence that would help me to hold my own in the street and playground. (p. 209)

His boyhood response was to work to transform his body into a tough, masculinised "instrument," a feat achieved through constant practice at sport, described as "one of those apparently trivial but significant lifetime sites where masculinity is constructed and confirmed" (p. 207). Jackson realizes that the time and freedom he had to devote to the disciplinary practices of sport were something his sisters did not share:

All through my childhood I hardened my body through everyday sporting practice. Sometimes, while my sisters were
An examination of these gender discrepancies in access to sport leads Jackson to conclude that "what seemed like innate physical superiority to girls in sporting matters like learning to throw balls becomes critically exposed as the result of very different social practices and power relationships" (p. 208). Although boys as well as girls feel their bodies to be "inadequate," differential social practices lead to different ways of resolving these felt inadequacies. While, on Young and Bartky's accounts, girls (who have the additional dilemma of being the object of another's gaze) often develop a constrained motility and undertake a disciplinary regime of feminizing their bodies, which both accepts and exacerbates their already-defined docility, boys are more likely to try to "take charge" of their bodies, to master or overcome their bodies and make them vehicles of their intentionality. Girls' growing participation in sports will likely reduce the numbers of girls who take themselves to be fragile; already, it is common for (mostly middle-class) girls and women to take strenuous aerobics classes and train seriously for competitive sports formerly thought of as "masculine." I wonder, though, whether if in many cases this is just a new, more robust "disciplinary project of femininity," whether what drives much of this involvement in sports is a sense of inadequacy of the female body similar to that behind the more passive enactments described by Young and Bartky. These aerobically-engineered female bodies may be purged of hateful, feminizing body-fat, but whether they are vehicles for female intentionality or a 1990's version of (mere) objects of the male gaze is a moot point. I personally "feel" better when I am physically fit. At the moment, after a sedentary summer of composing at the computer screen, I am becoming more self-conscious as my body reverts to the contours it naturally assumes without the disciplinary regime of sport I would otherwise have time for. Part of the feeling of well-being derived from "fitness" is no doubt cosmetic; part of it also, I think, derives from the sense of openness to activity a fit body gives one. If someone asked me to go hiking tomorrow, even if I had the time, I would refuse: I am
not "fit" for it. Obviously, some of the preoccupation with fitness middle-class women have is driven by a concern to meet a male-defined standard; striving to meet this standard may have benefits as well as disadvantages for women.

Jackson describes the effects a regime of constant sporting practice had on him. He reconstructs the period of his life between the ages of eight and ten "as a time of compulsive stone-throwing. It seems to me now that I had to have a stone in my hand, firing away at road signs, advertising hoardings, even occasionally blackbirds fussing away in a nearby hedge" (p. 209). He describes the relationship to his body that resulted from a constant disciplinary regime of sporting practice:

Despite the physical exhilaration at that time while being caught up in the furious action, I can now see other implications of what I was doing. What all this target practice added up to was an ever-increasing dissociation between my throwing hand and the results of my actions...These sporting activities contributed to my accepting a destructive relationship to my own body, to other people and the world around me. It's as if my 'throwing arm' and 'scoring legs' became mechanically detached from the humanizing web of emotional connections and social commitments in the process of striving for sporting success and achievement. (p. 209)

This is an interesting counterpoint to psychodynamic accounts of sadistic/masochistic tendencies in boys/girls. Even at early ages, it seems, girls and boys are both caught in discourses which construct their bodies as inadequate and in gender practices which do not allow them to resolve these dilemmas satisfactorily. To state the case by means of shameless generalisation, girls tend to respond by undertaking projects that can be ultimately self-mutilating; boys tend to develop an instrumental view of their bodies whereby to accomplish their ends can mean ignoring consequences to others. Contrasted with the docile female body, then, is the invisible, or the overcome, male body, a body that is paradoxically denied even while being the focus of incessant attention. Jackson, like many boys, seems fixated on his penis for a good part of his adolescence and early adulthood. He also undertakes a conscious regime of athleticism. It could be argued that in no
way is his male body, then, invisible. However, in his relations with women he clearly experiences himself as the "knower," the woman the "known;" it is her body that he invades and uses to shore up his sense of male subjectivity. His body, on the other hand, escapes notice. To borrow conceptually from Dorothy Smith (1990), less powerful individuals (in this case women) tend to become objects of documentation. Here, "documentation" could include the exaggerated boasting about sexual conquests of women that goes on in adolescent locker rooms, "rating" of girls' bodily attributes by teen-age boys (although girls also objectify boys in this way), the pin-ups of idealized and sexually available women that still appear in male-dominated work-places, and, obviously, pornography. Male bodies are remarkably underdocumented compared with women's. Although there is a growing trend toward displaying the male body in media imagery, it has not yet been as extensively objectified as the female body. Perhaps this is because men tend to be portrayed as active agents (shooting baskets, straining across finish lines) even while their bodies are on display. These images also tend to be accompanied by messages that are unrelentingly phallocentric, notoriously so in rap videos, so that talk about and display of male physique becomes a celebration of male dominance. As such, imagery of the increasingly exposed male body does nothing to reverse or disrupt the "male gaze." It just gives the gazer a chance to show himself off. Since the subjectivity of women is explicitly denied, he himself does not become a gazee.

Note that Jackson's representation of his early sexual involvement with women was a self-representation. The women involved may not have felt "invaded" at all. The meaning sex had for them may have been, and likely was, quite different than it was for Jackson. What is at stake here for Jackson, I think, is the realization that for him to feel sexy as a young man, he needed to think of his sexual encounters with young women as "invasions;" this meant an explicit denial of emotionality in a quest for "hardness," in this case erectile hardness. Earlier we saw that the boarding-house injunction against emotional display resulted in a different, but arguably related, bodily hardness, a rigidity which defended against feminising vulnerability. Later in his autobiography, Jackson discloses the difficulty he has "performing" sexually with feminist women to whom he is attracted but with whom he becomes self-consciously aware of his need for power and control.
This theme is common in the "youth cultures" literature: boys become the subjects of sexuality when they think of sex as a conquest or an invasion; girls, as its objects, are other, "knowable." Within many adolescent male cultures, sex talk is a favourite pastime, but emotional relationships with girls are not spoken about. Sabo's (1990) recollections of hanging out with other high school "jocks" is, I think, fairly typical of many boys' experiences:

We jocks would usually all sit at one table and be forced to listen to one braggart after another describe his sexual exploits of the night before. Though a lot of us were turned off by such kiss-and-tell, ego-boosting tactics, we never openly criticised them. A junior fullback claimed to have defecated on a girl's chest after she passed out during intercourse. There were also some laughing reports of 'gang-bangs.' When sexual relationships were serious, that is, tempered by love and commitment, the unspoken rule was silence. It was rare that we young men shared our feelings about women, misgivings about sexual performance, or disdain for the crudeness and insensitivity of some of our teammates. I now see the tragic irony in this: we could talk about superficial sex and anything that used, trivialised or debased women, but frank discussions about sexuality that unfolded within a loving relationship were taboo. (p. 17)

Sanday (1990) similarly demonstrates how the culture of the college fraternity in which a gang-rape occurred, but was denied both by the participants and the university administration, distinguished explicitly between girls who were girlfriends (these were the ones boys could be "close to") and those who were available sexually (and any boy becoming involved with one of these would have been an object of fraternity scorn). To recall her analysis of the function of pornography, "pornographic images remake the feminine in a safe image by placing knowledge of the body beyond a man's emotional reach at the same time that experience of the objectified female body satisfies sexual desire" (1986, p. 86, emphasis added). Repeated use of pornography may, then, contribute to the severing of emotionality from the body, such that it becomes impossible for boys and men to feel anything non-sexual for woman/body. Thus, "safe" sex, for compulsive consumers of pornography, would seem to
be emotionless sex. Pornography keeps masculinity "safe" by making sure men are its subjects.

While I am not suggesting that this is always the case for boys, it is typical, in our culture, of immature male heterosexuality. Boys seem to see power as "set against tenderness" (Formaini, 1990), emotionality as opposite to virility. As Brod (1990) puts it, the result is that men look "to sex to fulfil what are really non-sexual needs" (p. 128). The only emotion accorded a "tough enough" status appears to be anger, so that in many men (those who remain immature) anger functions as the only allowable emotional expression. While deCastell & Bryson (1992) are correct to lament that the feminist literature which points to women's ways of being in the world sometimes assumes that women's emotionality is our most remarkable achievement, women would, I suggest, benefit if men relied less on women for emotional servicing, if men could, to use a cliche, "own" their emotions. When we speak of men as being "immature," this is part of what we are referring to: the male escape from grittiness, the male estrangement from/ fear of birth and death; the denial of the consequences of their actions, the flight into fantasy and away from the bonds and commitments which constitute the pain of life, but also its deepest joys. Wood (1984) correctly retains a distinction between fantasy and action: the working class boys he writes about indulge in much more sexism in their fantasies than they ever act upon. Still, as Wood explains:

For these boys, with their attempts to live out an internally-strained masculine position, sex is an area where they can attempt to construct themselves as masterful. (...) If some fantasising is harmless, the imminent possibility of a translation into practice is not, for that brings in the crucial factor of force, which is the lynchpin of actual domination. (p. 65)

Wood adds that researchers who study youth cultures are often "too soft on sexism in our desire to understand the kids" (p. 65). "All ideas," he states, "(cannot) be excused just because they remain as ideas. That would be to invite the untenable position that all ideas are equal as ideas" (p. 65). How sexual fantasies function for adolescent males, and under what circumstances they can become translated into violent actions, is unclear. What Wood
seems to be saying is that we need to pay attention to sexist and sexual fantasies as indicative of an ideology that in some cases can lead to harm to women, and is in itself unacceptable, but that we must do this in a way that does not censor the very idea of sexual fantasy, or mistake it for a blueprint for violence against women in every case. It is possible that sexual fantasy for adolescent boys functions, in part, to defend against an emotionality that is not part of the discourse of masculinity. Since recent research suggests that the majority of consumers of pornography are males between the ages of 12 and 17 years of age (Check, 1991, as cited in Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, 1993, p. 51), it is also likely that the distinction between fantasy and reality is less clear than it should be. When boys have little "reality" against which to check their sexual fantasy, pornographic representations of women may inure boys to the feelings and perspectives of girls.

The mythos of (immature) male bonding relies on denial of emotion, using communal activity-drinking, watching sports, rating women-to keep the actual and overt signs of relation at bay. Emotion, in turn, is felt in the body. Grief seizes the body in paroxysms; fear makes us tremble; joy, too, is felt in our physical beings. Why would we want men to block these feelings out, as if their bodies weren't there? Put differently, denial of the body is denial of emotionality, since the body is where emotion is felt and lived.

An emotionless body is a pathological body. As an example, here are some of the ways in which rapists reported their "feelings" during the rape to South African researcher Lloyd Vogeelman (1990):

I was kind of excited, not sexually, I just thought I am stronger than her and she has to do what I want.

I feel strong...It feels good to make a girl scared...It feels good because she is listening to you.

I felt...I was the best, I had put her down...It made me feel even better...to know I am a man because a woman is bowing down to you.

It was nice, she was a very young cherry [fifteen years old]...I scheme it's because they are inexperienced and it is more exciting because they don't know what is happening. (p. 165)
In these men, the need to feel stronger, better, and more experienced sexually than women, the pleasure they derive from making a girl scared are, I claim, pathological features of the discourse of masculinity. As Vogelman comments:

These feelings are not only a product of the rapist's sexual and emotional insecurities. They are also an extension of what society teaches to be appropriate male emotions. The offender's feelings during the rape support the contention that the rapist is engaged in a search for validation of his masculinity. (p. 165)

What still shocks me, rereading Vogelman's account again after encountering it for the first time last year, is the rapist's utter disregard for the personhood of his victims. Rapists, like Wood's young men in the "bundles," seem to justify "borrowing" women's bodies to shore up their pathetic manhood by constructing bodies as mere bodies. Vogelman writes:

Verbal abuse adds to the emotional damage created by physical abuse. The rapists's insulting language intensifies his victim's humiliation. In his eyes she is nothing more than 'cunt', 'pig meat', or a 'juicy little bitch'. A rapist in this study reports an incident in which verbal abuse was used during a gang rape. He said, 'it was not talking-it was more like making fun of her. She was sitting in the van and five of us were laying there in the back, watching her and shouting about her body.' (p. 161)

Language used by gang rapists is, indeed, precisely "not talking": whereas "talking" can be a way of reaching out to others, and language a way of expressing our common humanity, their language is used to assault, to dissect, and to humiliate female bodies, and to incite male bodies. While the objectification of female bodies is obviously required of, and accomplished through, rape, the following passage suggests that the rapist thinks about his own body in an instrumental way:
Immediately prior to the rape, the victim was voluntarily having sex with one of the rapist's friends, while he and two other friends sat speaking in the lounge. The three then entered and proceeded to rape the woman. They were assisted by the man with whom she had been having sex who said to the victim as she was being raped: 'You can give my round to the others. I mean, it's still a cock. (Vogelman, p. 161)

Cunts and cocks—isn't this the way of thinking about the body and sexuality we usually term "adolescent"? And isn't this in effect a pornographic representation of sexuality? Recall Jackson's adolescent "detachment" of his penis from the rest of his body, as if it had a life of its own. This is, sadly, the way many boys think male sexuality works: only if cut off from emotions, if expressing male superiority and power, only as responding to immutable drives. Ironically, rapists who perceive themselves as being involved in a rape, rather than a seduction, often cannot maintain an erection. Vogelman comments:

...it is the very use of aggression and physical force that often inhibits the rapist's sexual enjoyment. To have their masculinity validated, rapists have to believe that their victims wanted them sexually. Thus when co-operation is lacking and force prevalent, rapists may feel cheated and unsatisfied. (p. 162)

Unfortunately, the anger that results from this feeling of "dissatisfaction" often means that the victim "has to endure further depredation" (p. 164).

I am not claiming that all men are potential rapists. What I want to suggest is that many adolescent boys in our culture have attitudes toward the body, women, and sexuality that are rape-supportive, and essentially pornographic. I think that this is what Jackson is, in part, trying to work out in writing his critical autobiography. Michael Kaufman (1987) recalls being told by a friend during his late boyhood about the difference between "fucking and raping":

It was simple: with rape you tied the woman to a tree. At the time the details were still a little vague, but in either case it was something 'we' supposedly did. This knowledge was just one
part of an education, started years before, about the relative power and privileges of men and women. I remember laughing when my friend explained all that to me. Now I shudder. (p. 1)

Jackson, I think, realizes now how close "normal" male sexual behaviour in adolescence comes to being rape, when it is not actual rape; male adolescent sexuality is in a sense a power struggle among boys, or a negotiation boys make with the discourse of masculine power and control. As such it is a battle waged on the bodies of women, bodies conspicuously absent from much of the literature on "youth" and schooling. This, is not, I believe, just a "stage" young men go through on their way to sexually mature attitudes; as we saw from the comments of convicted rapists, all of whom were adults, they, too, had an adolescent, pornographic view of sexuality. I am not suggesting that immature attitudes are a sufficient explanation for rape and other violences against women. While most teen-age boys may think about sex in terms of "cunts and cocks," at least for part of their youth, not all of them rape. However, Groth & Loredo (1981), Groth, Hobson, Lucey & St. Pierre (1981), Longo & Groth (1983) and Longo (1982) all note that not only is a significant amount of sexual assault committed by adolescent offenders, but also that many adult offenders begin their patterns of assault during adolescence. To quote Groth & Loredo:

Although the sexual offender is commonly thought to be an adult, such behaviour may in fact date back to his teenage years. In more than half (56 percent) of the cases referred to the Child Sexual Abuse Victim Assistance Project of Children's Hospital in Washington, DC, the offender was under the age of 18, the majority falling in the 14 to 16 age range. A recent report by the Massachusetts Probation Commission disclosed that juvenile defendants between the ages of 7 and 16 accounted for 7.4 percent of the total number of offenders arraigned for rape and rape related crimes from 1974 to 1978. A study of 137 convicted rapists and child molesters by Groth, Longo and McFadin revealed that almost half (47 percent) of these men had committed their first sexual assault between the ages of 8 and 18 with 16 being the model age. Due to the tender age of the offender and in many cases his social familiarity with the victim, such offenses are under-reported, and even when they do come to the attention of the criminal justice and/or mental health agencies there appears
to be a reluctance to regard this behaviour as serious or significant. (p. 31)

Since if left untreated, this behaviour typically escalates (Longo & Groth, 1983), the authors feel that early detection and treatment, while the offender "still may be accessible and responsive" is crucial:

It may be thought that focusing attention will stigmatize the youngster and only serve to magnify out of proportion and compound what otherwise would be an insignificant matter. Unfortunately all too often such behaviour is dismissed as merely sexual curiosity or experimentation, situational in nature, and due to the normal aggressiveness of a sexually maturing adolescent with the result that, what should be a priority in our efforts to combat the serious social problem of sexual victimization, is neglected. (Groth & Loredo, p. 31)

In Canada, the Young Offenders Act "still allows young persons (including serious sex offenders) to refuse treatment even if it is recommended by a judge, Crown Attorney, parents and independent medical or psychological assessment" (Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, 1993a, p. 232). In our apparent liberal sympathy with the rights of the accused, we are losing the opportunity to treat young people when they are still, as Groth puts it, "accessible and responsive." This puts scores of people at risk in the future, since "many adolescent sex offenders will go on to a life that creates literally hundreds of new victims of sexual assault" (CPVAW, p. 233); it also ignores the possibility that with adolescent offenders "we are often dealing with an offender and a victim at the same time" (CPVAW, p. 232). If, as is likely, many adolescent abusers were themselves abused as children, a policy of mandatory treatment for adolescent sex offenders might get at the cause of much of this behaviour.

Judith Lewis Herman (1988) elaborates an addiction model of sexual offense. She refers to Neil Malamuth's 1981 study of rape proclivity among high school and college-age men, in which "a considerable minority of male students (35 percent) admit to some hypothetical likelihood of committing rape if guaranteed immunity from detection or punishment" (Herman, p.
and to Malamuth and Donnerstein's findings in 1984 that "a significant proportion of the male population not only endorses rape-supportive attitudes and finds the fantasy of rape agreeable, but also becomes sexually aroused by depictions of rape" (p. 697). "The most widely appealing scenario," reports Herman, "appears to be one in which a female victim, after being subdued, becomes sexually excited by the rape" (p. 697). She comments:

...at the very least, these findings suggest that adolescent male subculture provides a powerful indoctrination in sexual violence. If the effects of this socialization were limited to attitudes and masturbatory fantasies, it might be possible to await the supposed maturation process with equanimity. However, there is strong reason to believe that adolescence is a critical period in the development of sexually assaultive behaviour. (p. 698)

Herman also notes that psychodynamic explanations of rape and child sexual abuse often fail to take account of the sexual pleasure the offender derives from his offense. Radical feminist accounts that consider rape to be an expression of anger rather than a sexual act (Herman, correctly I think, sees it as both) would be guilty of this misinterpretation as well:

The compulsive, repetitive quality of the sexual assaults is attributed not to the fact that they are pleasurable but to the fact that they are emotionally disappointing. This, in spite of considerable testimony from rapists and other offenders that the sexual assault often produces an intense "high." (p. 708)

Herman argues that a model of addiction for sexual offense "offers a point of intersection for the observations developed by psychologists and those of social theorists" (p. 711). This model helps explain the "virtual male monopoly on sexually assaultive behaviour" (p. 711): men are more likely to become compulsive in other anti-social behaviours (alcoholism, gambling, drug dependency), perhaps because of "the greater social latitude and tolerance accorded to antisocial behaviours in males"(p. 711); as well, Herman
points to the "impoverishment in male development of the emotional resources of intimacy and interdependence":

Lacking these resources, men may be more susceptible to developing dependence on sources of gratification that do not require a mutual relationship with a human being: the bottle, the needle, or the powerless, dehumanized sexual object. (p. 711)

This model appeals to me for several reasons. First, it combines a realistic view of heterosexuality (in that it recognizes the frequency of assaultive behaviours) with a disruption to the discourse of masculinity that sees sexual aggression as natural, rather than culturally learned. It assumes, therefore, that sexually assaultive behaviour is wrong, no matter how widespread. It is superior to the "deviancy" model, since many assaultive men are clearly unremarkable on every other count, but it does not simply do away with normative prescriptions of all kinds. It normatively prescribes non-coercive sexualities; we might extend this to prescribe a non-hierarchical conception of gender. Second, certain gender regimes, as, for example, in the fraternity studied by Sanday (1990) and in the alternate school documented by Wood (1984), could be seen as "enablers," in the sense that they provide support for the offender's behaviour. Educators should, I feel, analyse the extent to which their local gender regimes and gender codes (Riddell, 1992, uses this term to refer to the gender practices in classrooms) constitute an enabling climate for sexual assault. As Herman says:

Boys and young men might be considered a priority for preventive work, especially when they are organized in groups that foster traditional sexist and rape-supportive attitudes. Target populations might include, for example, athletic teams, college fraternities, and the military. (p. 720)

While not all athletic teams, fraternities, and military units actively promote or endorse hegemonic masculinity and its violence, we would be wise to view these as potentially harmful gender regimes. This will entail de-romanticising the popular view of such institutions as making "men" out of
boys. Herman is, I think, correct to select three examples of institutions which arguably do more to prolong adolescence than to make "men." As Sabo (1990) says of "jock" culture, the myth of the (male) "sexual athlete" is contradicted by the few thoughtful works on adult male athletes, which "depict (them) as sexually uptight, fixated on early adolescent sexual antics and exploitative of women" (p. 16). In the isolation of the male "jock" culture, Sabo explains, "sexual myths flourish":

Boys end up learning about girls and female sexuality from other males, and the information that gets transmitted within the male network is often inaccurate and downright sexist. I can see in retrospect that as boys we lacked a vocabulary of intimacy which would have enabled us to better share sexual experience with others. (p. 18)

Messner's work on masculinity and sport (1992), the Mike Tyson trial, Sanday's (1990) analysis of a fraternity gang-rape, and recent media reports of sexism and sexual assault in the military, support a view of these institutions as enablers of sexual violence toward women, not only in their overt endorsement of rape-supportive attitudes, but in the apparent sense of male "entitlement" they breed.

Third, an addiction model of sexual assault recognises adolescence as a period of high risk for the enactment of harmful behaviours, which, if unchallenged, can become life-time patterns. Against psychoanalytic understandings of gender and sexuality which emphasise the family and early childhood as the major influences on later behaviour, an addiction model combines unconscious learnings from childhood with conscious learnings from the peer-group and larger culture. The sexism that Wood's boys "grope toward" is a collective project, arrived at through mutual goading, bravado and display. It is, of course, set against and profoundly influenced by the sexism in the larger society, but it is more unrelenting, and less challenged, than in most gender regimes outside the school setting. The addiction model, theoretically, opens up the possibility that educational interventions might have an impact on the understandings of sexuality and gender that boys develop and, presumably, act upon. Specifically, it provides a rationale for rejecting an approach to sex education which Herman claims arises from a
"male-oriented, libertarian position" (p. 720). I will discuss educational interventions, including sex education, more fully in my concluding chapter.

Finally, Herman's addiction model is ruthlessly realistic in its assessment of the inadequacy of treatment models to date. Herman cogently observes that, insofar as psychodynamic explanations of sexually assaultive behaviour "minimize the sexual component of the offender's behaviour" and "reinterpret the assault as an ineffectual attempt to meet ordinary human needs," they leave unchallenged the assumptions that men have an "ordinary masculine need for 'mastery'" (p. 708). (Recall bell hooks' charge that Robert Staples uncritically accepts men's right to a "satisfying manhood.") As a result,

Treatment models based on these psychodynamic concepts tend to focus on the offender's general social attitudes and relationships or on his own experiences as a victim, but not on the concrete details of his sexual fantasies and behaviour. (...) When a treatment program minimizes the importance of the actual sexual behaviour and does not provide any concrete method for monitoring it, failures are likely to go unrecognized, sometimes with disastrous consequences. (p. 709-710)

Herman gives an admittedly extreme example of a young rapist who committed six rapes and five rape-murders while under psychiatric treatment: "His psychiatrist was entirely unaware of these crimes and could apparently detect no clues to their occurrence in the material offered by the patient in his treatment sessions" (p. 710). It is preferable, concludes Herman, to view all sexual offenders as potential addicts and admit that "our current understanding of the psychology of sex offenders is very crude, (that) any treatment must be considered entirely experimental, and (that) claims for therapeutic success should be offered with great caution and received with healthy skepticism" (p. 710).
If we view all sexual offenders as potential addicts, does this imply that, as educators, we should view all adolescent boys as potential sexual offenders? I believe that Jackson and Kaufman, and many other men who honestly confront the construction of their masculinities during adolescence, would answer "yes." The reason that Kaufman "shudders" when he recalls his friend's account of the "difference" between "fucking and raping" is no doubt partly because he can now put a face on the woman's body tied to a tree. It is also, perhaps, because he sees that this interpretation of sex as conquest is the prevailing male adolescent discourse of sexuality—a discourse that for many men persists into adulthood. Possibly also, like Jackson, he shudders that his unexamined notions of masculinity and sexuality during adolescence led to behaviours that violated the human rights of women, or easily could have.

While I applaud this honesty, and hope that more men will, as Jackson expresses it, "come out of hiding," I think that a view of all adolescent boys as potential sexual offenders, as future violators of women, is both wrong and repugnant, particularly for educators. If we accept the notion of the materiality of discourse, that power/knowledges not only interpret "reality" but also shape and even produce it, then educational and classroom discourse proceeding from an assumption of male complicity in violence against women may contribute to the problem. As I argued in chapter two, unless mystified notions of gender and sexuality are critically exposed in both official and hidden curricula, students will draw their own, perhaps unfortunate, conclusions about why people behave the way they do: if boys are always and already, or at least potentially, sexually violent, what power does an individual boy have to be otherwise? What will make some boys violent, and others not? Although violence against women is widespread, and although, as I have tried to show, such violence and the misogyny it relies on often start in adolescence, I feel that it is crucial that educators pathologize these attitudes and behaviours, and the norms and material practices that help produce them, and not male adolescents themselves as a group. We therefore need to perform a very delicate balancing act, one that has thus far eluded us. On the one hand, it is urgent, as the work of Herman, Connell and
others implies, to recognise adolescence as more or less the crucible of masculinity, masculinity which as symbolic meaning and in enactments referred to as "hegemonic" subscribes to a view of women as inferior. This means that we need to de-romanticise our notions of male adolescence as a time when oats are inconsequentially sown, heroic personae constructed, and pornographic imaginations cultivated en route to an inevitable maturity. Omission of both the actual harm male adolescents do to their female counterparts and the climate of threat and danger for girls and effeminate boys that prevails in many high schools is notable in much of the work done on "youth." Commenting on some of the academic study of boys done by adult men, Wendy Brown (1988, p. 203) notes that much of it appears to be wish fulfillment: "Manhood grown impotent reaches back for its youthful days of conquering virility. It would be pathetic or hilarious if it were not so dangerous." As Weiler (1988) explains, feminist critique of the absence of girls from Willis' influential Learning to labour pointed out that Willis was blind to the oppressive sexism of the male subculture "because of his own ideological valuing of male actions" (p. 41). This was my reaction to, for example, Gary Alan Fine's With the boys, in which the author studied the culture of a pre-adolescent boys' baseball team. Where, I wondered, was the mature, critical, adult voice in this work? Fine faithfully recorded, without editorial comment, the sexist joking, swearing, and male bonding that functioned as "team spirit." This work is uncritical in the same sense that most work on high schools has been, in that it more or less accepts hegemonic masculinity on its own terms, either because it sees it as a "stage," or as harmless. I argue, rather, that we educators can benefit from a view of hegemonic masculinity and its violence as potentially addictive.

On the other hand, we must accomplish this de-romanticising of male adolescence without treating boys as if they are walking time bombs, about to explode into violence at any moment. Such an approach is both statistically unfounded (since, despite the prevalence of violence, most boys are still nonviolent, and many do not feel particularly "hegemonic"-indeed, may inhabit subordinated masculine positions) and profoundly cynical. How could one conceive of pedagogy, of pedagogical relationships with boys, based on such a notion? I would not want my son to come near teachers with such
views: it is a cliche, but students do, to an extent, live up (or down) to our expectations of them.

What we need, I argue, is to uphold the kinds of ideals of human interaction that feminism espouses (mutual respect, equality in/ despite/ through difference, non-coercive sexuality) even while realizing that the reality of adolescent (and adult) relationships seldom lives up to these ideals. Without such ideals, without a notion of how it should be, we will have no acceptable educational reason for even talking about gender and sexuality in schools. We therefore must distinguish a mature masculinity, which does not require the denigration of women, from an immature or hegemonic one which does; a mature attitude toward sexuality, which grows out of or enhances emotional connections and commitments, from an immature one which eschews them; and an erotic imagination, which potentially celebrates the mutuality of pleasure, from the pornographic one, which buys (male) pleasure at the expense of (female) humiliation. Crucially, also, we need to find space in the curriculum to discuss issues of power in terms of a moral problem to be solved, not in terms of a male/female difference to be celebrated, exacerbated or exploited by our own discourse about it. This means that we need to take seriously feminist concerns about the constant peril of appropriation that a feminist conversation in schools will experience while at the same time finding the courage and the will to pursue it. In order to do so, we will need to find a ground, however shaky, for a dialogue across difference, some points of alliance between male and female teachers aware of the problem of violence against women and sympathetic to a feminist approach to it.

_overcoming necessity: freedom from the body_

Wendy Brown (1988) discusses conceptions of freedom in Western political philosophy. "From the very beginning of our civilization," she states, "even the most appealing formulations of freedom have been rooted in a freedom from the body and its demands, freedom from necessity in general" (p. 191). The ability to conceive of freedom in this way, rests, as
Brown points out and as feminist historians have documented, on dividing off "the activity of maintaining and sustaining life" from "the activity of creating history and meaning, with women being made responsible for the former and mostly men taking credit for the latter" (p. 192). The harm this has done to women is, by now, uncontestable:

...freedom in opposition to necessity is a praxis of freedom that necessitates colonization of others and whose partiality converts women into some of its most severe victims. While men have been busy overcoming their bodies and necessity to find freedom, something had to absorb, ideologically as well as practically, the dimension of human existence men were seeking to deny in themselves. (p. 194)

Not only have men sought to transcend necessity, those material aspects of life on which life itself relies, but, Brown correctly observes, they have also sought to transcend desire, particularly sexual desire. Again, the results for women have been dire. "Woman, labelled 'body,' has been the chief bearer of both necessity and sexuality in Western civilization, with the consequence that she is demeaned, isolated and oppressed in her work, objectified and violated in her sexuality" (p. 197). This urge to transcend, master, or overcome the body and its desires is, of course, illusion:

From Freud...we learn some of the limits to the head's erstwhile capacity for rational thought independent of bodily existence. Rationality in the form of Western reason is the ultimate attempt at mastery of the body; pure reason claims to be finally free of the body—a feat that is in the end only a miserable and immiserating joke. (p. 198)

We are after all, bodies, not "mere bodies," perhaps, as in Young's formulation, but bodies nonetheless. Human life is undeniably a bodily life, and one cannot, ultimately, "master" one's own body. Sexual violation of women, Brown hints, which is popularly thought of as the irruption of the "natural," or as the failure of reason to overcome the bodily "needs," may instead be connected to this denial of a man's own body which manifests itself
as the male regard for women as "only" bodies and, thus, violable. Certainly Brown makes a convincing case for the connection between the conception of freedom as freedom from the body and traditional notions of masculinity. Such a conception, she argues, "breeds a politics against life":

When freedom is posited beyond the body and beyond necessity, concern with life becomes an encumbrance to freedom. If freedom only begins when human beings transcend a concern with life...then mortality and mortal needs must be left at the threshold of the political realm or whereever freedom is sought. Courage becomes a willingness to risk death, heroism has as its essence placing life at risk, noble pursuits are those which have a cause higher than or indifferent to life. (...) This construction of freedom breeds a politics against life, dooms the activities and persons involved with necessity to organization under domination, and renders life an instrument rather than a cause of freedom. (p. 194)

Brown's analysis helps make it clear why the liberal state, with its mission to provide its (ungendered) "citizens" with maximum "freedom," does not easily accept responsibility for daycare, for example, and why in so many instances in Western philosophy the ideal of the "good life" seems to be a somewhat lifeless life, a bodyless life of "the mind." "Courage," "heroism," and "noble pursuits," are, of course, historically, masculine ideals; even a brief acquaintance with school-age boys will confirm, I think, that in many cases freedom does mean freedom from necessity. Jackson's life history is a fairly typical one: for a boy to be "free" to be a boy it is necessary that he not be caught up, as were Jackson's sisters, in activities which (merely) support and sustain life. Brown argues that, in addition to the unacknowledged servicing by women that these pursuits typically depend on, the masculine character ideal which has emerged from this conception of freedom is impoverishing for men:

We cannot dominate anything we are related to and find our freedom through that domination. A part of ourselves is always contained in the object of domination and is lost or estranged from us through the process of domination. (p. 195)
Read as a description of what happens to men who dominate women, this argument at first glance gives me pause. Men who are violent to women, as I have indicated elsewhere, precisely do not feel "related to" them, at least temporarily. In fact, it seems necessary for these men to achieve a psychological distance from the woman/other. Sometimes this distancing is itself a violence, as with abusive epithets and objectifying pornography; sometimes it functions as a mechanism rationalising further violence. A radical feminist argument has been that such domination of women by men is how men achieve their "freedom;" this is, I suppose, what is behind the argument that all men "benefit" from violence done to women. This is true if we accept that freedom is freedom from necessity. Keeping women in their place/"on their backs" does ensure that many men are free from the material concerns that sustain life. Domination, in the form of excluding women from the public sphere, has allowed some men a measure of freedom from necessity.

Brown obviously has a different kind of freedom in mind, a higher or more "spiritual" (for want of a better word) freedom, which is blocked to those who dominate. Paradoxically, this freedom, although of a spiritual nature, is only achievable through the body, not through denial of the body. This a conception of freedom that many men sympathetic to feminism seem to espouse. While they recognise the material benefits that accrue to men from systematic domination of women, they also see the spiritual impoverishment of men that results. In the worst cases, when this recognition comes without the companion realization of the greater injustice done to women, this leads to a quest for a pristine male "spirituality" which the excerpts from Moore (1990) illustrated at the end of chapter two; in other cases, this conception of freedom is one that men and women can potentially agree on.

Although not expressed in exactly these terms, accepting this kind of conception of freedom seems to be the aim of some of the successful programs designed for men who batter. Adams & McCormick (1982), for example, reporting on work done with batterers through the EMERGE collective in Boston, state:
When group members begin to express underlying feelings of inadequacy, fear, and failure, which do not conform to the perceived male norms, a new group consensus emerges which gives men permission to have these feelings and to talk about them with other men...This development is significant therapeutically because it indicates that these men are learning a new way of feeling comfortable with themselves and each other which does not require the devaluing of women. With this kind of self-affirmation and peer support, abusive men become more able to see and talk about their wives more positively. Beyond showing a more positive regard for their wives, (they) also begin to develop an appreciation for the care-taking roles that their wives have served. Caretaking is an alien role for most men. Therefore, men often take for granted the care that they receive from their mothers and wives and fail to recognize how critical caretaking and nurturance is for human sustenance and growth. Typically, men lay claim to the seemingly more masculine roles like problem-solving, giving criticism, and being the financial provider. (p. 189)

While we could wish for a less paternalistic view of the "roles" their wives have served, it is important to acknowledge that these men, at this point halfway through their therapy, came into this program expressing hatred and resentment of their wives, and all women, in the most appalling terms. By the end of the program, many of the men had managed to come to terms with the causes of their violence, seeing it as an attempt to compensate for "feelings of passivity and inconsequentiality by controlling and dominating their partners" (p. 193). The authors explain:

Developing closer bonds with other men (and women) helps the abuser to become less dependent on his wife's "being there all the time," as one group member put it. By the final stage of Emerge groups, members become aware that their previous expectations of their wives were not only unrealistic, but in some cases, impossible for their wives to fulfill. (...) They tend to subconsciously hold their wives responsible for their own feelings of inadequacy and failure as men. Hostility and violence toward women is the common result of this underlying dependency and envy. (One participant's) feelings of self-esteem increased as he was more able to "own" his own feelings and learn to take care of himself. Moreover, his feelings
of self-worth no longer came at the expense of his wife or others. (p. 193)

These results, I think, show how a conception of freedom as freedom from necessity must be abandoned before equitable relationships between men and women can be worked out. Inverting the "roles" of men and women is obviously inadequate, since it is the gendered division of labour which has resulted in women's taking on the burden of sustaining life, and men's estrangement from life-sustaining concerns, and a simple inversion (as overdue as many probably feel it might be) would reproduce, not lead us out of, the current arrangement, even if along opposite gender lines. Nor can one set of values, either those arising from "typically masculine" or "typically feminine" experience, suffice for social progress. As Brown says of the attempts to bring "female values" into more prominence in the public sphere:

"Female values" have not been shaped for public purposes nor under conditions of freedom but rather have been developed under conditions of oppression and bent to the service of power in the private sphere. Moreover they do not, any more than their masculine counterpart, bear our full humanity. Although we may find some of women's historically developed qualities more appealing than those of men, women cannot be called the more "fully human" gender in a history that dichotomises women and men along almost every dimension of human being and history. (p. 192)

Not only do "female values" not bear our full humanity, they are not, as many critics have pointed out, descriptive of all, or even most, women, but are part of the discourse of femininity (however noble and self-sacrificing). As such, talk of "female values" promotes a particular gendered view of how women should be; when a woman does not smile at the camera, or chooses career "over" children, she transgresses this image. Moreover, at the risk of appearing to endorse the opinions of feminist-basher Camille Paglia, "male values" are not all bad. They no more describe actual men than female values do actual women, but we can still recognise the worth of real courage, heroism, and noble pursuits, even if we could wish for a radical reconsideration of what might constitute them. To recall Connell's epigraph to
chapter two, "masculinity" (here signifying masculinity as symbolic meaning) is a sort of richness, a plenitude. The problem, as Connell correctly says, is that actual masculinity is bought at the expense of women's oppression, at women's lack of freedom.

One way forward might be for schools to examine honestly their contribution to the production of gender differences. If schools are, as I have suggested in this chapter, sites where gender identities are contested, policed and even produced, they are also sites of potential gender reform. Although a sexual politics to reform gender obviously requires radical change in the structure of our work-places and in the ways in which family life is organized, the kinds of attitudes that grow up around gender relations in schools are, I suppose, powerful influences in students' later working and family lives, whatever form these may take. To an extent, the discourse of "masculine" and "feminine" values operates in a way similar to the policing of gender boundaries we have seen in schools, and is one that I think limits rather than opens up possibilities. The more we discuss how different men are from women, the more we naturalise cultural differences, and widen the gap that separates us. Discussing our "natural" differences distracts us from what is under our noses: an array of practices in schools that subvert our professed desire for gender equity. As deCastell & Bryson (1992) remark, the term "gender equity" betrays a basic educational confusion: "gender" presupposes difference, "equity," sameness. When, as feminist and poststructuralist scholars have shown, so many of our school practices—and the male peer practices that schools seem afraid to check-operate to produce or enforce the kinds of "difference" that gender equity programs want to eradicate, it is no wonder that schools have not succeeded at ending the "structured injustice" of their own sexism. Becoming more attentive to the ways our practices help negotiate relations among boys and girls in schools, relations that have profound educational significance, is a place to start.

In this chapter, I have suggested that schools help produce and regulate gender differences both through the attitudes and practices of teachers, and through the power of male peer-groups. Teachers are right to fear hegemonic boys who are largely responsible for violence in schools, but must find a way to get over this fear. One strategy is to recognise that not all boys in schools subscribe to sexism and violence: some, perhaps even most, share teachers'
concerns. I have suggested that one of the root causes of violence against women may be the way boys tend to come to relate to their own masculinised bodies through adolescence. Hegemonic masculinity seems to include "hardness," both bodily and emotional, a pornographic attitude toward women and sexuality that appears to sever emotionality from the body and distances men from considering how their actions affect others, and male bonding which often relies on and encourages display of both of these features. This appears to be the dominant discourse of adolescent masculinity in many school gender regimes, as, for example that encountered by David Jackson, but it is a discourse that I suppose many, if not most, boys may privately dislike. Much violence against women that occurs during adolescence may arise from the need to appear "masculine." Thus the specific problem facing educators is that of providing educational challenges to the discourse of hegemonic masculinity, and school contexts in which violence can safely be confronted and resisted, and in which boys can feel supported in trying to achieve masculine identities that are not based on dominating others. I have agreed with Herman, Groth, and others that we cannot view male adolescence as a developmental stage that boys will inevitably leave as they become adult; the incidence of violence against women illustrates that, in fact, immature understandings of gender and sexuality often persist into adulthood. Sexual violence can, indeed, be addictive. Finally, I have asserted that programs designed to prevent male violence must de-romanticise the violence of male adolescence while at the same time not treating boys as if they are always and already violent. Such a strategy would not only be based on untruth (since most boys are not, in fact, violent) but would, in constructing boys as singularly susceptible to violence, contribute to the discourse of male violence that should be the object of analysis.

In the concluding chapter of my thesis, I critically examine existing violence-prevention programs and sketch an alternate approach that starts from the assumption that the cause of violence against women is in the construction of hegemonic masculinity, a construction that schools are in a unique position to begin to challenge.
Chapter 4

School interventions: possibilities and perils

We can no longer pretend that we are not sure what concerns young women in Canada. (from Canadian Teachers' Federation, *A Capella*)

We usually escape oppression not by separating ourselves entirely from the oppressor, but rather by transforming the oppressor into someone with whom we can co-exist. (Nel Noddings)

It is (equally) clear that the logic of compensatory programs has little relevance to the privileged sex. Educational work on gender with boys must take a different shape—but what that should be, no-one is very clear. (Bob Connell)

We must develop the means to address the wrongs done to us without reinvoking the basis of those wrongs. (Linda Alcoff)

What is difficult for men aware of feminism is not to imagine equality for women but to realize the inequality of their own position: the first is abstract and does not take me out of my position (naturally women should be equal with men); the second is concrete and comes down to the fact that my equality is the masking term for their oppression (women are not equal with me and the struggle is not for *that* equality). (Jeff Hearn)

In this final chapter, I will take a look at existing violence-prevention materials for use in schools, concluding that most will not get us very far in ending violence against women in that they studiously ignore gender. As with the "public education" programs about violence against women critiqued in chapter one, in which men were literally missing from the text, most of these materials lead me to ask where the *boys* (as opposed to ungendered "youth") are. Failure to recognize that, overwhelmingly, the violence schools fear is the violence of boys (a failure perhaps resulting from the misguided wish to be uncontroversial) renders these materials unable to take a critical look at masculinity itself and its hegemonic enactments in schools by adolescent boys as being deeply implicated in violence. I will then suggest an alternate approach to school violence-prevention in which gender is centrally considered.
The "youth violence" perspective: where are the boys?

Violence-prevention, as mentioned above, has been pointed to by various government commissions and panels. The Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women (1993b), for example, reports that "a clear majority of women and men told the Panel that early education is the key to preventing violence against women" (no page number indicated). However, violence-prevention is not yet a formal or mandated part of curricula in Canada. While at the elementary level, most schools teach kids how to recognise abusive behaviours, there is no comprehensive curriculum concerning gender relations, gender formation, or sexual politics at any level of schooling. The overwhelming majority of materials designed for use in schools thus far on the topic of violence-prevention present violence as a gender-free phenomenon. For example, Burnaby school district recently compiled a catalogue of violence-prevention materials for use in schools, called Youth violence project: resource catalogue (1992). In its introduction, the co-ordinator of youth services in Burnaby school district states:

Young people today face many new issues in the area of youth violence. These include exposure to weapons, intimidation, physical assault and gangs. They are increasingly having to make decisions which affect their own personal safety or the safety of others. There exists a need for school districts to be able to select violence-prevention materials for use in elementary and secondary schools-materials which will assist students in making appropriate decisions. (p. i)

This was, I thought, an inauspicious beginning. The use of the terms "young people," "youth violence," "gangs," and "students" would make an uninformed reader assume that we'd better worry just as much about violent girls as violent boys: this is what feminists refer to as men "standing for" women, and what poststructuralists mean when they speak of dominant groups occupying "the center." My worry that boys, without being acknowledged to be boys, would inhabit the center of this document and "stand for" the girls was borne out by closer examination of the catalogue,
which is divided into seven sections: youth violence, youth gangs, bullying/peer pressure, self-esteem/alienation, conflict resolution/anger management, legal system, and school security. Among its 43 pages of listings of videos, books and articles, comprising hundreds of titles, the words "boy" and "man" do not appear once. Interestingly, the word "female" does make one appearance, not, as one might expect, in an examination of sexual harassment or date-rape, but rather in reference to a book called Crime in Canadian society, in which, we are told, "chapter 5 examines the female offender in Canada" (p. 12). This appearance of girls as offenders, but not as victims of the violence of "youth," reveals an unfortunate, if common, bias. The only time the word "gender" occurs in the catalogue is in reference to this same book, whose "chapter 20 examines the role of gender and risk-taking in juvenile delinquency" (p. 12). One film, "The power to choose," addresses "the issues of power and violence in teen dating relationships" (p. 22), leaving the countless other films presumably skating around this central issue; nowhere in the catalogue is there any specific mention of rape, date-rape, gang-rape, sexism, sexual harassment, sexual inequalities, masculinity, or, as I said, even boys themselves. In fact, violence appears to be cast as a problem uniquely for boys (rather than for both girls and boys), but, strangely, not about or perpetrated by boys. The consequences for individual boys who "choose" to be members of a gang are highlighted (and this voluntarist approach to gang-membership is also problematic, ignoring as it does issues of race/racism and powerlessness that surely figure in the "choice" to join a gang), while the consequences for girls of much gang-related activity (the contest among gang-members to "score" with girls as with Lakewood's infamous "Spur Posse;" the fraternity gang-rape documented by Sanday; the use of girls' bodies to validate boys' "hardness" that Canaan observed) are completely ignored.

What would be the likely results of building violence-prevention curricula around such materials? In poststructural terms, teachers would leave boys firmly at the center of the debate while failing to problematise their behaviours as boys. The girls would remain "others" to the boys' subjectivity, absent or marginalised figures obviously not concerned with the real problems that occur in adolescence, such as choosing whether or not to join a gang, and "managing" anger. This would seem both to instantiate the
feminist concern that boys take up more curricular space than girls and to illustrate how, in our fear of boys, and in our institutional desire to contain but not actually face up to their violence, we educators seem willing to waste girls' time. It also confirms Hudson's point that the discourses of adolescence and femininity are subversive of one another: for schools, taking up "youth" issues seems to mean taking up "boys'" issues, and ignoring the meanings and actual consequences these have for girls. If girls were talked about, we would, presumably, no longer be talking about the problems of "youth" or of "adolescence." Perhaps we would, in the neo-conservative language of the day, be guilty of "interest-group" politics. I contend that this approach to "violence-prevention" certainly misses the point as far as violence against women is concerned: not only is gender formation (how boys become boys, and girls become girls) faint-heartedly ignored as a source of violence, but the particular forms gender-violence takes (sexual harrassment, rape, gay-bashing) are not even considered as violence. In taking, as they do, an unrelievedly male subject position, perhaps in a naive attempt to be "gender-neutral," these materials would also exacerbate the existing inequalities of the school curriculum of which feminism has mounted a thorough critique. As Eyre (1989) puts it, "coeducational classrooms, and gender free curricula, mask gender bias and allow discrimination to continue in more subtle ways" (p. 22). At the very least, then, this approach would waste girls' time; at its worst, it would risk leaving boys in the very subject positions that they too often seem to interpret as entitling them to objectify and violate girls. Crucially, using scarce classroom time with this kind of an approach would deprive teachers of the opportunity for a more thoughtful interrogation of how social practices and attitudes inside and outside schools help maintain a system of social relations that harms both girls and boys.

Disappointingly, the British Columbia Teachers' Federation recent task force on violence in schools has produced an interim report (untitled, June, 1993) that, it seems to me, also founders on the shoals of gender-blindness. While again using gender-neutral terms that mask the predominantly male involvement in violence ("school violence," "violent youth crimes," "children," "young people," "family violence," "certain individuals"), the task force singles girls out for special treatment...again, as "perpetrators":
Teachers are noticing adolescent females as perpetrators of intimidation, harassment, or assaulting other students-usually female. (p. 8)

While I realize that this is an interim report, and am hesitant to be overly critical of an initiative that arises out of teachers' very real concerns about the safety of students, the presence of female perpetrators-the only perpetrators who have a gender, it would seem—is jarring. The authors of this report obviously expect violence to come from boys, and do not set the issue of violence in terms that allow masculinity to come into focus as a problem. Instead, we see "deviant" girls. Again, until we educators can see the pathology of "normal" masculinity, any amount of institutional worry about the encroachment of violence into our schools is not likely to solve the problem or prevent violence in any systematic way. While the report makes a passing mention of the need to examine "issues of sexism, sexual harassment, racism, homophobia, and their relationship to violence" (p. 10), it does not step out of a male subject position long enough to pose incidents of sexual violence as explicit problems, or even worries, for girls in schools. This is ironic, to say the least, when the reportboldly states, echoing early feminist work on child abuse, that "naming the problem is the first step in addressing it" (p. 10). Unfortunately, the report does not "name" violence in ways that most girls are likely to relate to. As it stands, the report misrepresents violence as something girls are equally as responsible for as boys, and simply ignores the particular forms of violence for which girls are most at risk, and about which they (and their parents) are most worried.

Closer to the mark: materials informed by feminism

The only other substantial compilation of resources for schools I was able to find was Violence prevention materials in the schools: a national listing. (1992), published by the Manitoba Women's Directorate. Not surprisingly, considering its authorship, it does include materials that attempt to tackle the problem of violence against women head-on. While the editor of the previous volume thanks "school districts, community agencies, law
enforcement agencies and government departments throughout North America" (p. i) as well as certain members of the Justice Institute of British Columbia, the Vancouver police department, and Simon Fraser University's department of criminology, the Minister responsible for the Status of Women in the current volume acknowledges "concerned individuals in government, education, social agencies, shelters, and women's groups from across the country" (no page indicated). Thus, from the outset, there is a commitment to looking at the actual results of violence from the perspective of front-line workers rather than to developing strategies of institutional containment that one might expect from police departments and certain branches of criminology. Indeed, this volume is markedly different from the first one, which took an unacknowledged male subject position: here, the title is "violence-prevention materials in the schools," but this violence is quickly defined:

Within a generation, we have seen the level of violence in our society increase dramatically. Nowhere has this been more evident or alarming than in the increase of violent acts directed against women. (no page indicated)

The approach this compilation takes is quite promising, one that I would describe as being implicitly or potentially gender-aware, rather than gender-neutral as the one described above. Many of the materials concern sex stereotyping, sexual assault, dating safety and date-rape; two videos are actually described as dealing with sexism and violence in media imagery. The Safe teen: assault prevention program is designed "for groups of up to 30 female students, ages 14-18" and teaches "assertiveness training, body language and verbal skills, self-esteem, awareness, and physical skills" (p. 16). Manitoba Education and Training has produced Violence against women: learning activities to prevent violence against women which assists "students to make constructive changes in dealing with their feelings and attitudes concerning violence" (p. 16). A program from Victoria was put together "by women staff of the Women's Transition House and recovering men from the Family Violence Project who recognise that abusive behaviour is a serious problem that permeates our society" (p. 19). The Ontario Ministry of Ontario
is preparing a video "on sexism and violence" (p. 57). And the Manitoba's Teachers' Society "provides workshops on the issues of 'Violence: an issue of gender'" (p. 56), which, again, is the only appearance of the word "gender" in the volume.

These materials appear to move us closer to the mark, at least in recognising violence against women in its many forms. Many of them seem concerned to promote girls' awareness of strategies to stay safe in dating situations; by including materials connecting violence and sexism, the editors have acknowledged a crucial cultural support to violence against women. This volume is certainly a start (which is all, in fairness, that it claims to be) and the materials it contains may prove useful in building violence-prevention curricula. However, there is still no clear distinction between the usual perpetrators and the usual victims of gender-violence; although there are materials concerning date-rape, and violence in relationships, aside from the girls' assertiveness training sessions, the underlying assumption of the volume is that girls and boys could equally benefit from taking up these materials in class, presumably a co-educational class. There is no mention of girls' sexual agency, and being sexual is defined solely in heterosexual terms. Thus, while many of the videos in particular do take a female subject position, there is still a reluctance to promote ways of being girls that would decenter boys as the subjects of sexuality and sexual relations.

*Our wit against theirs?*

But even given superb materials with acute gender-awareness, teachers, certainly at the high school level, must carefully consider existing power relations in their classrooms before proceeding to teach "violence-prevention." I will argue here that issues of gender and violence-prevention should, initially at least, be approached in *sex-specific groupings*, awkward as that may be to arrange in most schools. To illustrate why I believe this is imperative, I will give some examples of classrooms in which attempts to address sexism (and racism) have backfired by exposing girls (and minority students) to verbal violence. Such attempts have, on the surface at least, re-
inscribed existing inequalities that were to have been critically examined. As we will see, when they unwittingly give boys a platform from which to voice defensive denials of girls' and women's realities, and allow girls to "take care" of the boys whose world-views have been assailed, well-meaning but naive teachers may invite rather than undermine violence, as they hoped to do. Perhaps also, in confronting these issues in mixed groups, they fail to bring out submerged or subordinated male voices that would start to decenter hegemony; instead, the politics of the mixed classroom encourages defensive, rather than honest and critical, responses. I do not give these examples in an attempt to "bash" the teachers honest enough to speak of their failures and frustrations, but in order to learn what kinds of reactions we can anticipate from boys and girls as these materials are taken up in classrooms. After looking at these failed attempts, I will give some examples of initiatives designed for sex-specific groupings that seem to have had a measure of success, and on which we can build in the future.

There has not, in fact, been much documented curricular work in actual high school classrooms around issues of gender (other than implicit treatments of gender in "sex education" curricula, to be discussed shortly) and I have been unable to find any systematic study of results from such interventions, be they changes in attitudes toward gender identity and gender violence, improvements to school culture or ethos, or differences in students' perceptions of school as a safe and fair place in which to discuss issues of central concern to them. Obviously, this is an area where further research is desperately needed. We are left, then, relying on teachers' impressionistic accounts of what happened in classrooms where such issues have been broached.

In a volume entitled Violence: sources and solutions, published by The B.C. Teachers for Peace and Global Education (winter, 1992), an English teacher, Jessie Kerr Halls, recounts her attempts at "exploring sexism in class" (p. 10). Since she had "been taught the principles of 'win-win' conflict resolution" (p.10) Halls felt prepared to deal with any defensiveness that might arise when she showed her grade nine class the film "Still killing us softly" (a film that illustrates attitudes and practices supportive of violence to women within the advertising industry). Leading up to the viewing of the
film, the class had read a story about sexual stereotyping. In her journal that day, Halls noted:

The kids seem enthusiastic and aware of the differences (in opportunities for males and females in the plot). There are a few tacky comments from a couple of the boys but I can handle them. My wit against theirs! I'm surprised that the girls don't speak out more clearly in response to the boys' tasteless jokes. 'What do you do when a dishwasher breaks down?' I wonder where they hear these jokes? At home? Tomorrow we will watch "Still killing us softly." (p. 10)

Boys' apparent reactions to the film were angry. As the film progressed, Halls heard rumblings among the boys and so stopped the tape for a discussion. Halls felt "momentary despair" when she heard what they had to say about the film's narrator:

'She's a dyke!'...'Can't get a man.'...'Has to put us down.' 'She's stupid.'...'It's a free world. She has no right to put guys down that way!'" (p. 10)

Halls' efforts to get the boys to understand the message of the film provoked even more abusive reactions from what she calls the "wild boys":

'The ad makes a connection where there may not be one. The ad tells women to smoke to become sexy.' 'Yeah, but they don't have to listen!'

I think I've got them. 'But they do listen-and so do men and boys. Just like they see the image of the female body or of the supplicant woman who will do whatever the man wants!' A voice interjects, 'That's what women are supposed to do!'

'What?' I ask (naively).

'Whatever a man wants!' Some boys and girls laugh. Others groan.
I realize that I've lost them again. I can pull a power play at this point but am reluctant to do so, particularly in the midst of this discussion. I secretly wish that I had never opened this can of worms. (p. 11)

Halls is clearly afraid of adolescent boys, at least the "wild" or hegemonic ones, and it is easy to see why. Her summing up of the classroom dynamic as "my wit against theirs" and her vain hope that at one point she'd "got them" certainly resonates with some of my own experience as a woman teacher of young men. Like Woods' boys in the "bundles," some of Halls' students pushed the limits until she wished she'd never undertaken the task of "exploring" sexism, a sexism that, unfortunately, was given vent to more than it was explored. Perhaps had Halls read a little more feminist theory, rather than the presumably gender-neutral material on conflict resolution that had given her the initial resolve to undertake this unit, she would have been less naive about the power relations in the classroom that left the girls without a voice. She would perhaps have realized that to expect girls to speak out "in response to the boys' tasteless jokes" assumes that they have at their disposal the same kind of "wit" that has so badly let Halls herself down in these lessons: if an adult woman in a position of teacherly authority fears hegemonic boys, how can she possibly rely on adolescent girls to put these boys in their place (or, poststructurally stated, take them out of "their" place)? Such an expectation underestimates the power inequalities that evidently permeate her own classroom and render it an inherently unsafe place for the girls to speak. The girls, in their silence, seem to know this better than Halls.

Nor is Halls able to draw out the "subordinated" boys, although she later discovers that many of them appreciated the film. After one of the "wild" boys comments that "men are superior," Halls notes,

I realize that the moderates are not going to speak, despite my prodding. I can read it in their bodies and their eyes. (p. 11)

Later in her journal, Halls reflects on students' written responses to the film:
Reading the responses, I am disturbed by the reluctance of the students who failed to speak out during the class. Their responses tell me that they understood the narrator's point of view, even though they may not have agreed with it. Others tell me that they are angered by the overtly violent responses of some of the class members but they are afraid to speak their minds. (p. 11)

Halls' observation here illustrates my point in chapter three that the abusive defensiveness teachers fear in boys may not represent the point of view of adolescent boys in general: here, some boys at least are angry at hegemonic violence, but are unable to speak their anger. We should not, I think, refer to the more sensitive boys as having "failed to speak out," but rather consider ourselves as educators to have failed to provide them with an environment in which it is safe to do so. These boys are not "reluctant": they are smart, and they are scared.

Halls asks, "Were I to do this again, would I do it differently? Perhaps I would focus on the anger. 'Why are you so angry? What are you afraid of?' Or maybe not!" (p. 11). At the very least, I think Halls' failed experiment shows that before presenting this kind of material in class, some guidelines must be established beforehand on who gets to speak, in what way, and when. Thompson & Disch (1990), for example, two "white women with a commitment to feminist, anti-racist, anti-oppression teaching" (p. 4) at the college level, use the following guidelines around use of language:

We will not tolerate insulting names for groups or individuals, will accept no jokes which make an oppressed group the object of laughter, and will interrupt nonverbal responses which seem to put down others. We also start to educate people as to the inappropriate use of language as we see it, such as referring to the United States as "America," referring to women as "girls," using the term "we" without defining it, etc. (p. 6)

Establishing guidelines beforehand would at least have made it clear that Halls' "wild boys" did not have the right to speak in the way they did. With rules for discussion clearly set up, Halls would not have had to set her "wit against theirs" when the boys became defensive. Instead, she would
have been able to choose from a variety of responses, from pointing out that they were in contravention of established classroom rules, to enforcing one of an array of sanctions for bad behaviour available to classroom teachers, including sanctions by peers. And students are certainly capable of setting these rules up themselves. The nine year-old boys Reay (1990) worked with in England came up with the following guidelines for classroom behaviour when working in their "gender groups":

1. listen when others are talking
2. share the space, equipment, and teacher attention
3. work on all your prejudices
4. take responsibility for ensuring there is a reasonable noise level
5. don't make fun of others
6. no bullying
7. no cheeking the teacher
8. no messing about
9. be polite (p. 272)

The teacher, of course, has a responsibility to ensure that the rules are fair; the rules Reay's boys devised probably reflect the kinds of values they know her to hold ("work on all your prejudices" has perhaps been prompted by Reay). Without rules governing classroom speech, the most powerful, rather than the most reflective, voices will be heard. In the case of Halls' hegemonic boys, I guess that it would have been fairly easy to get them to agree, in theory, to the rules above, or others like them. But by the time the discussion was underway, as we have seen, it was virtually impossible-without resorting to a "power play"-for Halls to subvert the sexist turn the conversation took.

Halls' account illustrates the difficulty of dealing with issues central to girls in mixed-sex groupings where boys habitually assume the right to define meanings. Since girls and boys have different tasks to perform in relation to confronting and correcting sexism it is logical to give them separate classroom space in which to do so. If, as I hope to have established throughout this thesis, there is a link between sexism and gender-violence, then providing students with time in sex-segregated groups where sexism and gender issues can be critically examined is perhaps the most effective violence-prevention
we can perform in schools. Before offering some examples of curricular interventions in sex-segregated groups that, I think, show great potential for violence-prevention, I would like to discuss briefly one other failed attempt at confronting a related oppression, racism, in the classroom.

Leslie Roman (1993) discusses her attempts at a praxis of anti-racism in the context of a graduate seminar on critical ethnography in Louisiana, a state which has a pretty woeful history of racism. Her class was made up of almost equal numbers of white and black women. Roman's central theoretical point is, I think, well taken: faced with white students' claims to be just as oppressed as the black women in her class, she quickly abandoned the sophisticated nuances of postmodern theory in order to adjudicate these claims. It was the realist epistemology available to her in feminism, not the relativism of her postmodern theory, that enabled her to show the white women that their claims were ill-founded and offensive to her black students. This illustrates, I think, the theoretical position I tried to outline in chapter one. It is not Roman's theory, but her pedagogy, that I take issue with. It is, of course, entirely appropriate to address issues of racism, appropriation of voice, and exploitation in a seminar on critical ethnography, since "uncritical" ethnography often builds a career for the ethnographer on the basis of extracting information about "exotic" others. Where this contact does not constitute an actual cultural invasion, it traditionally does nothing for its subjects. So being "critical" about ethnographic practices involves, among other things, honestly confronting the question of who it is (white middle-class men and women) that have traditionally exploited whom (marginalised "others"), devising ways of doing ethnographic work that is more sensitive to questions of power and race, and building into this kind of work provisions to benefit its subjects. And, of course, bringing these issues to the fore is bound to make some white students uncomfortable, if not defensive. If educators can exploit this discomfort in ways that lead students to transform their world-views in some significant way, then an anti-sexist pedagogy will have succeeded. Where I question Roman's approach is in her attitude to the white women once they showed signs of defensiveness, since I think this directly parallels patterns that emerge in classes where teachers are trying to confront boys' sexism. All of the white women, but none of her black students, dropped Roman's two-semester course after one semester. For the
white students at least, no apparent transformation has occurred. In the terms set out by Roman, though, I wonder whether there was ever a possibility for such a transformation.

Roman states that she "entered the classroom with the explicit aim of approaching pedagogy as an advocate of equality for different oppressed groups" (p. 188), and yet she seems surprised and annoyed that this a priori political position-taking is problematic for her white students. Roman frames the white students' reactions to the course content and her pedagogic stance in terms that seem convincing. For example, she speaks of the white students' strategies of "redirection." When the black students begin to express "identifications with colonial or racially subordinated research subjects," Roman observes of her white students:

I quickly came to realize (though) that the white students met such claims with a variety of responses that had the collective effect of redirecting the analytical energies of the class to themselves. Sometimes this redirection took the form of the discourse I now call racially-privileged incredulity, that is, time-consuming expressions of disbelief and horror that other whites had such racist attitudes or that racism still persists as a present-day phenomenon. (p. 192)

Roman seems so critical of the incorrectness of the position the white students are taking that she perhaps fails to notice an embryonic sympathy that may be emerging in some, but certainly not all, of her white students, even if stated in indirect and sometimes awkward ways. If this were an anti-sexist curricular intervention, for example, and I had brought boys to the point of being horrified at sexism itself, even that of "other sexists over there," then I would be pleased to have at least established a common emotional basis-shared horror-from which to work. And even if this were only a posture of horror, that functioned to deflect attention from the boys' own sexism, I would still count it as a minor victory that we could later move forward from.

Roman, on the other hand, seems to want, in the context of one course, to wrestle years of racism to the ground. I do not want to belittle the importance of taking on goals such as the one Roman has set for herself, but I
wonder, looking at her descriptions of the white women's reactions, whether her reach far exceeded what educators can hope to grasp. I also wonder whether she has not, with her in-your-face anti-racist stance, hemmed the white students in somewhat rather than lead them out of their racist positions. The white students, faced with stories of discrimination against blacks, recount their own experiences of "discrimination" which Roman describes:

I overheard the group composed of white women making similar claims concerning what it feels like to be a member of a racial minority. These claims suggested that in some way, as Marsha stated, 'We all take our turns at being discriminated against,' or as Susan added, 'Yeah, like you can be discriminated against for wearing this or that weird clothing, or for just acting different in school. Lots of kids get treated that way, the nerds, the latchley kids, and just about anyone who is different is a minority these days.' (p. 193)

Roman's response to this unacceptable relativizing is an educationally sound one. She describes her strategy:

I (then) asked the class to reconsider claims they had heard being made by themselves or others, during the course of their discussions, to be racially oppressed. I also posed the question of whether or not growing up as a slave, being forced to sit at the back of the bus, or going to inferior schools carried the same consequences as being left out of a social group because "people" thought one wore "weird" clothing. (p. 195)

This has the desired effect of making the white students aware that the parallels they are drawing between their own and blacks' experiences of oppression were clearly false:

The white students' nonverbal expressions of downcast eyes and heads nodding "no" confirmed their recognition that the analogies being drawn were unfair and even wrong. (p. 195)
This is not the only time during the seminar when the white students appear to be ashamed of themselves and each other. Dana, the most reactionary and, certainly in Roman's rendition, frankly stupid of the white students, is giving her presentation of an ethnographic foray, an assignment given to all the students by Roman. Her account is appalling in its naivety and lack of critical attention to the issues the seminar has presumably been addressing. Roman describes Dana's presentation:

...she began narrating her sojourn to a soup kitchen run by a parish in another inner-city neighbourhood, where she solicited the permission of soup kitchen personnel to be one of the regular servers on the line. Representing herself as a neutral observer who blended in with the homeless people she researched, she described in detail how they dressed, moved through the line, spoke to each other, and ate. The pseudonyms she chose for the research subjects were stereotypical first names usually given by whites to Afro-Americans. Noticeably absent in her discourse was any analytic interest in, or mention of, the social backgrounds of the people she had observed. This fact did not go unnoticed by the Afro-Americans or myself. Ceciley, one of the Afro-American students, interrupted her to ask, 'What were the racial backgrounds of the people you studied?' Dana replied, somewhat chagrined at the question, 'Black. Black, of course. Didn't you realize they were black?' (p. 199)

Roman is now faced with how to react to this grotesquerie. Here is where I think she goes wrong. She notices, again, the shame of the white students:

I waited briefly to see whether any white students would challenge her going slumming approach or any of her other assumptions. None did so. Their reactions were an even greater source of interest to me when I observed that the white students were not making contact with Dana or with the other white students. They appeared to be uncomfortable. One of the white students maintained downcast eyes throughout Dana's presentation. The two other whites made fleeting eye contact with the African-American students, as if to check out their reactions. (...) Judging from the stunned silence in the room, all
seemed to have been powerfully affected by the account and summation of the foray. (p. 200)

But rather than making the reasons for the "stunned silence" the focus of the class's attention, Roman chooses to implicate all of the other white women in Dana's shallowness and racism:

I asked her to consider what kind of institutional structures make it possible for middle-class whites to be unaware of, or insulated from, dire poverty or to have so little contact with the world she described in her discourse as "so real," presumably in contrast with her own. Because my comments directly responded to her work, and I did not wish her to feel singled out, I specifically mentioned that she was not alone in making such assumptions. Structural inequalities of race, class, and gender relations, I argued, made possible the discourse of her ethnographic foray. (p. 200)

In so doing, I think Roman has neglected to capitalize on the potential for alliance between the shamed, silent white women and the black women Dana has so thoroughly offended. If the Danas of this world cannot be reached in this kind of seminar, do the "downcast eyes" and concern for the reaction of the black students on the part of three white women not indicate that they are, perhaps, on the brink of appreciating the racism that underpins much ethnography? Perhaps, had Roman been less didactic, and less political (her unwillingness to "single Dana out" seems motivated by her absolute commitment to analysis at the structural, not personal, level) she could have asked the silent white women what their reaction to Dana's presentation had been. Rather than expecting transformation to occur at the level of cognition-which is one of Roman's own unexamined assumptions-she could have made explicit the emotional discomfort that was manifesting itself in her classroom. It is just possible that one of her white students might have expressed her shame and embarrassment, and in so doing, begun a decentering of whiteness that is Roman's avowed, and worthy, goal. Instead, their shame is compounded by the guilty knowledge that they, as middle-class whites, enjoy the kind of privilege that allows Dana to be so ignorant. As Kaufman (1987) says, "Guilt is a profoundly conservative emotion and as such is not
particularly useful for bringing about change" (p. 25). The fact that they later all withdraw from the course is perhaps due to their cowardice, as Roman seems to suggest; it also may be that Roman's own classroom discourse made the possibility of a correct white position, other than her own highly theorized one, seem virtually unattainable.

I feel compelled to interject a personal confession here. Roman's account of anti-racist pedagogy, in which I would be implicated as an oppressor/white person, has made me re-read my own analysis of anti-sexist initiatives from a somewhat different angle. It is possible that Roman's account has simply brought out my own latent white defensiveness. I prefer to think that Roman has made me imagine with a little more sympathy the location of male students in classrooms where anti-sexist initiatives are underway. I do not excuse the angry defensiveness of Dana, or of the college men who have reacted to women's refusal of male violence with cowardly and violent retaliations. I just think I am more aware that to be educational, and not just political, interventions, anti-sexist and anti-racist curricula must include the possibility of an acceptable white position vis-a-vis racism, and an acceptable male stance toward violence against women. Otherwise, we risk hemming our students in, even the few who may be truly open to new ways of thinking and being.

Roman's analysis of the failure of the whites to confront their own racism is highly theoretical:

Ashamed contradictory white subjects are not absolved of their responsibility to build effective social alternatives to structural racism. If white students are to become empowered critical analysts of their own claims to know the privileged world in which their racial interests function, it strikes me now that such privileges and the injustices they reap for others must become the objects of structural racism, to the effect that subjects move from paralysing shame and guilt to stances in which we/they take effective responsibility and action for disinvesting in racial privilege. (p. 207)

This is all very well, but Roman does not address the question of why white subjects should want or be motivated to move out of their privileged, if now guilt-ridden, positions. And this seems a central issue in working with high
school boys on their sexism. Again, I do not want to hammer Roman for what she is trying here. She is engaged in extremely important work. But something must be at stake to move people to change in the ways Roman, and many of us, think they should. Roman's own example demonstrates a singular lack of sensitivity to the ways in which people do experience profound change in their lives. Certainly, for the oppressed, a cognitive awareness of their oppression is often transformative. But for people implicated by their gender, race, or class in the oppression of others, I doubt that cognitive awareness is sufficient for change in most cases. Roman seems to ignore the need for a sense of connection, a sense that I detected, perhaps wrongly, in the white women's shame—an emotional relatedness whereby the oppressor can recognise the humanity that oppressed and oppressor share. She also, I think, overlooks the necessity of mobilising people by appealing to what is best in them (in Connell's words, their ability to "recognise injustice when they see it") and by communicating at the very least the possibility that, having taken a steadfast look at the way things are, change and improvement are possible. At the elementary and high school level, Roman's would not, I suggest, be a defensible way of conceiving of pedagogy.

It is inaccurate to summarise Roman's seminar as a failure on all counts. In fact, for the black students, her course may indeed have been transformative. All of them continued with her course, and supported Roman's efforts on their behalf. The course seemed to engage them in many important ways. This example, though, I think demonstrates again that dealing with oppressor and oppressed in the same classroom does not seem to be very effective. In taking as her goal advocacy of oppressed groups, Roman has not succeeded in transforming the whites who are implicated in holding blacks in their oppression. Thus, anti-racist, and anti-sexist, pedagogues must come to terms with what it is they want to accomplish in their classes. If they want to decenter the oppressor, then perhaps they need to do so in a context that can anticipate and deal with the oppressor's defensiveness, and not expose students from oppressed groups to further violence as these attitudes and practices are critically taken up. Students from oppressed groups, on the other hand, surely do not need to "confront" racism/sexism but rather would benefit from devising educational paths for themselves that will give them power over their experiences of oppression. And working on their own after
the white women had withdrawn from the course seemed to allow differences among Roman's black students to come out:

Because the classroom was not consumed by having to deal with overt racism, theoretical and political differences among the African-American women could emerge as part of thoughtful classroom dialogue without provoking defensiveness. These differences proved to serve as resources in their critiques of each other's work. (p. 208)

I now turn to examples of anti-sexist interventions that have been designed for sex-segregated groups. These do, I believe, offer some directions teachers might want to consider in their gender work in schools.

*Strategies of separation*

In Diane Reay's (1990) "Working with boys," she documents her year in an inner city primary school in North London. One morning a week was designated as "gender morning" and, for the first time, Reay had been assigned a boys' group. Originally, she explains, the idea of a single-sex project had arisen because of the girls' perceived "lack of assertiveness, their underachievement, and low self-esteem" (p. 269). This provided her with a clear, educationally sound purpose for her work with girls. Later, however, the school staff had come to focus on the work they needed to do with boys:

The boys' selfishness and monopoly of space in the playground, their lesser propensity for taking responsibility than the girls, and the emergence of pockets of resistance at third- and fourth-year stage to both teachers' authority and the ethos of the school had highlighted an equivalent need to work directly with the boys. (p. 270)

The prospect of working with boys, however, filled her with "trepidation and misgivings" (p. 269). She confesses that she "dreaded every
I felt far less confident about working with the boys than I had with the girls. First, there were inherent ambiguities in the teaching task I had been set that were not nearly so apparent when working with the girls. Then it had been clearly the girls’ needs which were to be addressed. The needs to be met through running the boys’ group were more complex. On one level, the rationale for running the project was defined as meeting the boys’ own interest—their personal self-development. On another level, the project was about meeting management needs which entailed the smooth running of the school. Admittedly, there was a substantial overlap between the two areas of need, but there were also areas of conflict. Management goals do not coalesce readily with children’s rights. (p. 270)

Reay points to very real complexities in teachers’ work with boys. Whereas the literature on feminist and critical pedagogy may give teachers some direction in their work to “empower” girls, clearly, this does not really help us deal with boys, who, in their behaviours in Reay’s school, demonstrated that they had already assumed a position of power relative to the girls. They were also pushing the limits of the school’s authority. However, despite some educators’ institutional wish to contain boys’ violence, “disempowerment” is simply not a defensible educational goal: we cannot, in our desire to redress the gender balance, be teacherly Robin Hoods, wresting power from the boys and giving it to the girls. And Reay’s boys, despite the behaviours that caused teachers’ concern, were only privileged to the extent that they were boys: over ninety percent of the pupils at the school were working-class, and more than half of the boys in her group were black or from other minority groupings. Reay, then, needed to confront issues arising from the boys’ behaviour relative to the girls and to the school ethos while, as I expressed it in chapter three, keeping the boys in her pedagogic sympathy.

Two factors, I think, made this possible for Reay. One was the decision by the head teacher that “emphasis was to be placed on what the boys wanted from the group: improved behaviour in the classroom and playground was to be seen as a desired side-effect, not a criterion for judging the success of the
project" (p. 270). The second was Reay's keen awareness of how her students were located in terms of race and class. She wanted to avoid a "situation where the boys' time and energy was channelled into resistance to my power" (p. 271). She explains:

I feel no idealisation for Willis' working-class boys, only a sense of sadness that they were duped by an inadequate educational system and an ill-informed working-class culture into wasting so much time and energy on something that did nothing to further their own and their class interest. (p. 271)

Thus Reay wanted to avoid providing the kind of authoritarian school experience that had, in their youth, given the men Connell (1989) interviewed something against which to "cut" their masculinity. At the same time, Reay was aware, as a woman teacher, of the sexist misappropriations that can be made of attempts to run "democratic" classrooms:

I was anxious that the groups be run democratically with some devolution of power, but saw taking on the role of just a facilitator in relation to the boys as an ideological minefield. It could easily reinforce widely-held commonsense views that it is only men who have knowledge and expertise. (...) Progressive, as opposed to didactic, methods of teaching too often subsume the primary school teacher's expertise within her role as facilitator of children's learning, and in doing so can subscribe to traditional stereotypes of male superiority and female incompetence. (p. 271)

So Reay set to work with her "gender group" one morning a week, with no fixed curriculum, but with the general aim of "helping the boys to develop co-operative strategies, to become more critically aware, and to value and respect those groups in society that are universally accredited with low status" (p. 272). In order to help the boys develop co-operative strategies, Reay had the boys work in groups, and do self-evaluations after every session. Reay soon realized that one reason the boys enjoyed the self-evaluations so much was the competition among the groups to get the highest score, even if self-awarded. She reflects:
The co-operation/competition divide presents many teachers with an ideological dilemma. I resolved mine by rationalising that the competitive means justified the co-operative end. (p. 273)

Part of Reay’s plan to get her boys to become more "critically aware" involved "challenging stereotypes" (p. 274). Reay, it turned out, had much to learn about her charges: not only did they flatly reject the notion that "boys don’t cry," supplying examples from their own experience that made them feel sad and upset, many of them also helped out a lot at home (perhaps invalidating, perhaps providing a working-class counterpoint to, Jackson’s description in chapter three of the domestic conditions that allowed him to "be a boy"):

a number of boys looked after baby brothers or sisters; one had regularly changed nappies; seven of them did their own ironing, while nearly all of them were responsible for making their beds and tidying their rooms. (p. 274)

A somewhat chastened Reay writes:

Much has been written about teachers’ stereotypical assumptions affecting their expectations of pupils (Clarricoates, 1983; Goldenberg, 1986). I certainly came to the group with a set of preconceived ideas about boys not being able to express their feelings and expecting female servicing. I was not entirely wrong, but like all stereotypes, my preconceptions were far too simplistic. (p. 274)

The surprise Reay expresses when she discovers that her boys are affected by friendship, love and being accepted is common to the accounts I have read of teachers working with boys in sex-segregated groups at all age-levels. One of her boys wrote, for example:
Nicky is my best friend. I really care about him, and I hope he will be for all of my life. We had a bad argument once, real bad and I cried. I hope we will never argue again. (p. 274).

At the time Reay took this boys' group, she had been a teacher for twenty years, and, from the way she evidently conceives of her engagement with students, she seems a perceptive and thoughtful practitioner. And yet, she was surprised by the boys' emotional vulnerability. As with the "destructive containment" that Oglov (1991, cited in chapter two) theorised (whereby women "carry" all the emotionality of the heterosexual couple), perhaps when girls and boys are together in class, teachers tend not to see the emotionality of the boys; perhaps, in expecting the girls to speak of what friends and love mean to them, we make it clear that we expect something different from the boys. As I have argued above, boys, even at this age, have a great deal invested in not being like girls. And yet, in their "gender group," they seem fairly unself-conscious about expressing "girlish" emotions, at least on paper. Could it be that we teachers mistake boys' apparent unruliness-contrasted constantly with girls' compliance-for a carelessness, a lack of care, that does not describe most boys? I know that I have been guilty of this in my own practice. I know that at times I have misread boys, and have mistaken their collective rough play for a toughness that is in many cases just a front, if one that seems to need constant policing.

And yet, if this is so, then why do many young boys eventually become the adolescents who seem so often to do the things that require lack of caring, a lack of concern for the consequences of their actions: the brutality of the language of the "slag," the opportunistic "groping" of the "bundles"? Indeed, it is hard to square the innocent openness of Reay's subjects with the sexism of most of the male teen-agers I have read about in this literature. What has happened in the meantime? The least hopeful way of answering this question would be to point to the sexual awareness that the older boys all have (and that Reay's boys do not yet have). By this argument, adolescent boys' nascent sexuality would propel them into sexual opportunism as they come to value sexual conquest over the friendship and love that preoccupies Reay's boys; their emotional needs would lose out as their sexual ones make themselves felt. A case could equally be made for boys' growing awareness of the social and political power men have relative to women: this recalls
Hanmer's "they do it because they can" argument explaining male violence. However, we might also be able to interpret this change as being partly due to the kind of error Reay and I as educators have made with boys: our lack of seeing beyond their competitiveness and bravado that perhaps, in the end, contributes to the way boys think they should be. If boys and girls are always in co-educational classes, perhaps boys adopt and get more or less stuck with a collective male posture that brings the distinction between them and girls into focus; in turn, teachers may, as Reay confesses to having done, "draw on traditional notions of masculinity" (p. 274) in their pedagogic relationships with boys. Eventually, boys may come to be the way we have mistakenly conceived them to be. We may also see them as an internally undifferentiated group, and, as did Halls in the example above, not see the tensions within the various masculine positions represented in our classes.

I do not want to overstate teachers' influence on gender formation: arguably, young men are more influenced by their fathers and by Hollywood and the television networks than they are directly by teachers in their gender postures. But, here again, the "positional identification" with their fathers that Chodorow (1978) described and the prevailing discourse of masculinity in popular culture also work against boys' emotional development. The sense of surprise that Reay expresses when given evidence of what really matters to her boys recalls the theme of loss of emotionality that many of the "men's literature" writers evoke. As I argued earlier, this is not a complaint that feminists should sneer at, but one we should take seriously: why wouldn't we want men to be emotionally more aware and self-reliant? John Fowles refers to the protective "carapace" that he grew around his "real" self when subjected to the brutality of boarding-school life (in Segal, 1990). Jackson, as we have seen, felt that the construction of a hegemonic heterosexuality caused him to lose the ability to feel emotions in his body. The proscription against emotionality in many male adolescent peer-groups may be helped by school gender regimes that do not question the pathology of emotionless bodies. And, as we have seen, this all-too-common emotional or empathic lack has real consequences everywhere evident: this morning's paper reports a child-abuse prevention expert as saying that "one characteristic of all pedophiles is a lack of empathy" and that the patterns typical of pedophiles can be seen "in kids as young as 12" (The Province, November 10, 1993). It is
possible that the pornographic imagination cultivated in many male peer-groups that make Jackson and Kaufman so nervous, looking back on their adolescent years, can be interrupted by conscious efforts to educate boys' emotions. Effective educational interventions might help make boys aware that their emerging sexuality does not have to result in a severing of their emotions.

If we as teachers were collectively more aware of and articulate about both the immediate and eventual costs to boys themselves, and to others, of becoming the kinds of adolescents who don't "care," then maybe we would have a clear rationale for working with, and "on," boys in groups. And, I suggest, when boys are on their own in class, they become, in a sense, their own "subjects." I think that Reay's work demonstrates the possibilities this holds for teachers interested both in anti-sexist curricula and in personal self-development for boys as well as girls. Reay's boys were allowed to choose topics for discussion by placing them, anonymously, in a suggestion box. Thus, she and her class covered bullying, racism, and the boys' hopes for the future. At the end of the year, the boys evaluated the sessions. Their answers indicate, I think, that the boys had not only been thinking about the topics discussed, but had become somewhat self-reflective. The answers to the question, "Why do you think you are working separately from the girls?" led Reay to conclude:

There were no negative comments about the girls not, I am sure, because all the boys had ceased to be sexist. Rather, I feel they had learned something girls learn far more readily-to please the teacher. I do not intend to mock them or myself. I genuinely believe, over the year, a relationship of trust and mutual respect had been built up, and, as a consequence, the boys were attuned to my needs and sensitive to my feelings in a way they had not been during the autumn term. (p. 279)

This new sensitivity on the part of the boys to the tenor of the pedagogic relationship is hopeful, as are many of the boys reflections on their year together. When asked what they had learned about other boys, Reay reports, many listed
attributes they admired and respected in certain individuals in the group. Many of the qualities mentioned were non-stereotypical ones such as helping, being kind and sharing. (...) Many referred to improving their communication skills and learning to understand how other boys felt. Four boys commented on the extent to which all boys shared the same worries and concerns, while a majority of the boys wrote about bullying, being scared and the need to look to other boys for support. (p. 281)

Reay is unsure about the lasting effects of her year with the boys. She is optimistic that this approach can help in the struggle for gender equality:

By working on attitudes and feelings in a single sex context teachers can support boys in questioning and analysing peer group hierarchies in a forum that is non-threatening and non-confrontational. Hopefully, the learning that then takes place can, in turn, permeate the mixed gender classroom and work toward undermining the inequalities there. (p. 281)

Indeed, perhaps if boys can start to develop, in a forum like Reay's classroom, a vocabulary that expresses their fears and feelings, they will learn that it is not unmasculine to have emotions. In turn, teachers working with these boys may be less likely to hold the stereotyped notions of boys as being unemotional that Reay held at the outset of the year. In terms of violence-prevention, this strategy holds promise if it can help boys to avoid neglecting or denying the emotional connections in their own lives that appears to underscore much gender violence. Reay, in having her boys become more comfortable in articulating the kinds of qualities they value in other human beings, may also have afforded them a frame of reference for viewing later peer behaviours that are harmful to themselves and others. Ideally, if the boys work on themselves as subjects, as Reay had her boys do, they will be less likely to denigrate girls when back in the mixed classroom. Having confronted their own fears of being bullied, for example, the boys might be more ready to see their own sexist behaviours toward girls as a form of bullying, and might thereby have made a connection between their own experiences of victimization, and their victimizing.
I think that Reay's account again demonstrates that, given sympathetic pedagogy and the opportunities for reflection, boys are more willing than many teachers think to address issues we often believe only concern girls. It also illustrates how Reay's refusal to "get tough" with her boys paid off eventually: she attributes the progress her boys made to the "non-confrontational" atmosphere of the all-boys' group. Finally, it shows that we can help to disrupt the discourse of hegemonic masculinity by a pedagogy that is informed by our political convictions but that nonetheless prioritises the needs of students. Insofar as we can conceive of boys' "unlearning" sexism as falling into the general area of their "personal development," as Reay's head teacher put it, then feminism's political goals are not incompatible with our goals as educators. The collision between "children's rights" and "management goals" that Reay laid out at the beginning of her discussion is avoidable only if one is given right of way. Reay has, correctly, I think, sided with her students. But this "siding with" is not uncritical: she has also sided with the school's female students who are not in the room. Reay, as a good teacher, knows that teachers have to work to win students' sympathy. In order to bring about changes in the boys' attitudes and behaviours that will ultimately benefit the girls as well as the boys, Reay offers an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect that the boys seem to respond to. She also appears to be patient with her boys, not expecting revolutionary changes in their attitudes and behaviours to occur right away, but waiting for silenced voices to emerge eventually. Reay herself is surprised by the "unboylike" responses the classroom atmosphere provokes, but she has clearly learned how to make students want to co-operate with her in the first place. At the elementary and secondary levels, pedagogic practice that builds upon trust and care is perhaps one way to ground anti-sexist and anti-racist interventions.

At the college level, it is harder to say what might motivate people to give up by then established positions of privilege. As I said in chapter one, social and political change often begins when the oppressor finally sees what experiencing oppression is really like. In the previous example, Roman has tried hard, I think, to demonstrate to her white students that their notions of being "minority members" are superficial and wrong. However, she is constantly constrained in this task by the presence of the black women, whom she does not want to make uncomfortable by appropriating/representing their
experience. I have suggested that Roman has not capitalized on the few moments where her white students seemed moved by what they were learning. However, perhaps too much "trust and care" (suggested above as being appropriate for boys "unlearning" sexism at lower levels) proffered to the white women might have precluded even the sense of discomfort and disturbance that presumably precedes radicalization. The class might then have simply served to re-confirm white solidarity. When Roman interviewed her white students to find out why they had dropped the class, one of them told her:

I just couldn't handle all that talk of the racial stuff and oppression. It's too depressing. They (referring to the African-American women) made me feel uncomfortable. Do they (referring to the African-American students) think you were being racist? Cuz, most of us (referring to the white students) thought you were very fair, always open to different interpretations? (p. 204)

Had the class been segregated, perhaps Roman would have been freer to "represent" the history of black oppression without causing black students discomfort. But how many white students would willingly have signed up for a course that they knew would challenge their prejudices and privileges?

At the secondary level of schooling, accounts of anti-sexist work in classroom are rare. One of the young men Connell (1989) interviewed, "Barry," recalls an actual course on sexual politics that was offered at his progressive private school:

The teachers at that free school were the ones who decided to implement that sexism programme and we (the students) were involved in it. I remember having to go and make a verbal submission. We got this course together. I remember having all-male groups and the women having all-women groups, and talking about sexism, and that was basically it. We did a lot of discussion about sexism and how we communicated about women. I didn't learn that much in the course itself, it just taught me that it was something I was going to have to think
about. And so from then on I was always thinking about it. (p. 300)

Unfortunately, this is all the documentation that remains from the course Barry took. An interesting initiative I have mentioned once (Novogrodsky et al, 1992) was undertaken last year by educators in Ontario (one of whom, Michael Kaufman, was a founder of the white ribbon campaign). The previous year, the Toronto Board of Education had sponsored a retreat for adolescent women that focused on their experiences of gender. After the retreat, the girls expressed interest in getting boys involved, so the authors designed parallel three-day retreats for sex-segregated groups, after which the boys and girls were to come together for one day to exchange ideas. The rationale offered for the retreats is one that this thesis supports:

...if our work on gender is to produce significant and long lasting results, we must go further than efforts to create equity between male and female students within the existing social structure. We must consider how we can help students and teachers examine the very construction of gender roles and the societal power relationships which shape their construction. (...) While we acknowledge that a four-day retreat cannot, on its own, counteract the sexist messages and the gender constructions surrounding young men and women, we felt able to develop a program which would begin the process of deconstructing gender and allow participants to begin to imagine a different way of being. (p. 69-70)

In order not to leave young men "caught in a position of guilt, unable to work towards becoming anti-sexist men," the organizers decided to focus on the ways in which "men's privileges and power are linked to the pain and alienation suffered by men themselves" (p. 70). Like Reay's attitude toward her boys, these educators have decided that a way to make boys aware of the injustice of sexism is to focus on their own loss within sexist social structures. For the women, the organizers' plan was to "encourage the young women to see their individual and collective strength to challenge sexism and to explore how they could do this in concert with anti-sexist men" (p. 71). Broadly speaking, then, the issues, although difficult and controversial, were to be
framed in ways that pointed toward individual and collective seeking of solutions.

As the authors say of their boys’ retreat, "nothing of this kind had ever been done before with young people. There were simply no models for this work" (p. 75). The boys seemed to respond favourably. Since the emphasis was on "how men can make a difference, how men individually and in groups can begin to disassemble the sexist behaviours and structures in their own lives" (p. 76), the boys did not "feel disempowered or resentful" (p. 76). The authors attribute much of this success to the work students did in small groups with teachers as adult resource people:

The knowledge of confidentiality, the role of the teachers as co-participants, and the informality of the groups allowed a tremendous amount of creative thinking and growth. (p. 77)

Drama also was key:

Drama provided some of the most surprising instances of the type of rupture of which the young men were capable. On various occasions they worked out skits about situations ranging from date rape, to locker room banter, to wife assault, to being caught by your parents while you were masturbating, to telling your parents that you were gay. Over and over again we were surprised that the men created roles that included gay men and women that were not based on crude stereotypes but which attempted to portray real people. The lack of anti-gay portrayals...was especially encouraging because of the extreme insecurities of teen-age men in our culture and because of the complex ties between anti-g;ay attitudes and the misogyny of our culture. (p. 77)

In the women’s retreat, three miles away, "the atmosphere was charged with a newfound defiance and strength" (p. 78), particularly during WenDO self-defense sessions. However, some of the women began to express concern "that male-bashing was creeping into the program" (p. 78). This showed the planners "the extent to which young women are concerned about being
labelled as anti-male when they express concerns about sexism and male violence" (p. 79).

When the two groups were about to come together, there was nervousness on the part of both the men and the women:

The young women were nervous, worried they'd be too harsh on the young men and felt protective about their feelings. But their nervousness and protectiveness were muted by a sense of strength, self-confidence, and, in some cases, anger, generated by their three days together. The young men, for their part, seemed anxious, even terrified. For the previous two days, they'd been asking, 'What's happening with the girls?' and now they were about to find out. They were nervous about being attacked but, perhaps most strongly, they were nervous that the young women would not recognise and accept the hard work and the self-searching they themselves had done. (p. 80)

The day started with skits that had been prepared by the students in their sex-segregated groups. "The most remarkable thing about the skits," the authors note, "was how similar the two sets were: the themes and approach were the same" (p. 80). There were, however, differences in tone. While the men expressed "a sense of outrage, anger, and opposition to sexism, inequality, and violence," the women showed, in addition, "tremendous strength and defiance":

This was clear at the end of a skit on sexual violence where the women actors gave a WenDo yell and punch. The room exploded with the cheers and yells of all the women in the room and brought them all to their feet. It was one of two moments of the day when the young men were genuinely stunned by the change their classmates and friends had gone through. (p. 81)

The second such moment came when, after one skit, one of the women stepped forward and related a sexist incident that had occurred at the retreat itself. As the boys' bus neared the women's retreat, one young man had yelled, "You can smell the poontang!" (a sexist word for vagina):
She said she didn't want to spoil the day, but she felt she should put some realism in the air. She wondered what all the celebration was about if people still had this attitude. (p. 81)

After some of the male students acted defensively, a young man from the woman's school, "an amateur boxer, and, in the past, not particularly known for non-sexist attitudes" (p. 81), spoke out. He said "that the guys have to take responsibility and that many of them felt ashamed at what the other boy had said" (p. 81).

For the rest of the day, students met and made plans for how to use what they had learned in the retreat back in their schools. Since the students had been selected as potential leaders in their local communities, there was an expectation that they would carry on with anti-sexist work in their schools. Two months after the retreat, they all met for a reunion. Some interesting activities had been initiated. Some schools had started "gender equity" discussion groups or clubs. At one school, retreat participants had produced a play on date rape and had presented it to the school. Other schools had participated in the white ribbon campaign. Unexpected effects of the retreat also were related. One of the participants, a school football star, had told his friends that he didn't want to hear any more sexist joking; one young woman realized during and after the retreat that her relationship with her boyfriend was abusive and had ended it: the retreat, she said, "changed my perception of who I was" (p. 83). Significant, too, were the effects on some adults. A school equity club so impressed the principal, he appeared to undergo a transformation in his attitudes toward gender and sexism and "became the most enthusiastic booster of the club" (p. 84). At other schools, students addressed staff meetings with surprising results:

They talked about addressing teachers on issues of sexism and sexual harassment in schools. During and after those meetings some teachers talked openly for the first time about how they had learned to live with sexual harassment. The students were challenging them to rethink this acceptance. (p. 83)

"The students," note the authors, "had become facilitators" (p. 83).
Unfortunately, this retreat does not seem to have been documented in a particularly rigorous way. The authors have no systematic qualitative or quantitative evidence of changes that may have occurred in students as a result of having participated. It is a useful example, however, in that it shows that, under the rubric of anti-sexist or gender issues education, educators can plan worthwhile interventions that benefit both girls and boys. A central reason the retreat appears to have been successful was the sex-segregation of the first three days. As the authors put it:

We were reminded of the importance of sex-segregated groups. Although our goal is to break down gender division and power relations between the sexes, the reality is that separate male and female groups can provide a type of safety and security that isn't always available from the start in mixed groups. (...) Participants came into the mixed group on the basis of mutual clarity and strength. (p. 85)

I find the signs of progress in both the girls and the boys encouraging. I would love to have been in the room when the girls' oppositional voices were heard after the skit on sexual violence: so rarely, it seems, do girls have a chance both to voice their central fears and concerns, and to express themselves in a collectivity that precludes their being cast as "uptight," "humourless," or "strident" individuals. Too, the embryonic forms of resistance to hegemonic masculinity on the part of boys are hopeful. The fact that boys have had a chance to reflect on sexism, sexuality, and gender in a supportive, but still unflinching, environment seems to have given some boys at least the courage to speak out. This is the sort of thing I had in mind when I spoke in chapter three of the need to make it safer for boys to disrupt hegemony.

The planners of the retreat have obviously been sensitive to the fact that girls and boys are positioned differently in relation to violence and that, for each, "confronting" violence and sexism is best done separately, at least until the "clarity" the authors refer to is established. "Clarity," in fact, seems an appropriate term to describe this retreat on at least two levels. There was the beginning of the kind of conceptual clarity I argued for in chapter two.
Students likely left the retreat with less mystified notions of gender than they arrived with. Although gender formation was not explicitly explored, gender norms were certainly challenged: the boys witnessed, and were surprised by, the girls' strength, while the girls probably had never seen boys in groups address such issues as sexism and sexual violence. Thus, the seeds of an appreciation of the practices that construct gender may have been sown.

There was also a clarity of purpose among the planners: although they expressly did not want to make boys feel guilty for being boys, the goal of the retreat was to begin a deconstruction of sexist discourse and practice that clearly starts from a sympathy with girls' and women's oppressions.

The authors re-iterate the theme of surprise that their efforts with young men have been at all successful:

We have a better chance than many of us would have thought in promoting equality, new gender definitions, and anti-sexist attitudes among both young women and young men. With a supportive atmosphere, male students are able to open up, talk about their experiences, and be vulnerable. Some young men, who appeared to be the last ones who would champion equality, surprised us again and again. (p. 85)

"Without being feminists (yuck)"

The responses of the students to this retreat, I think, lend weight to my argument that the time has come for educators to respond thoughtfully to issues of sexism and violence that are of pressing concern to adolescents. Given well-designed interventions that centrally consider the very different ways in which boys and girls are implicated in violence, and wise and sympathetic pedagogy, I believe that students not only will respond favourably. They may well ask what took us so long. The adolescent women with whom the Canadian Teachers' Federation worked in the project they called A Capella seemed, in fact, to breathe a collective sigh of relief that adult women ("teacher-leaders") were listening to them articulate their central concerns and experiences. Again, some thoughtful planning went into creating an atmosphere in which the young women could speak, assured of
confidentiality. Significantly, the girls themselves were to define the issues that concerned them. They seem genuinely grateful for the opportunity:

'Thank-you for letting me, as a female and a high school student, (see) that someone really cares and is trying to make a difference.'

'I would just like to express my appreciation of the existence of such group discussions and I think that every imaginable and possible topic concerning humanity should be dealt with in one way or another.' (p. 20)

The teacher-leaders confirm the need for frank, supportive discussion with these young women:

'I felt very privileged to hear them speak so honestly about how they felt. The girls were very open. It was almost like opening the flood gates they had so much to say.'

'There's a crying need for young adolescent women to gather for such discussion: if nothing else, the process reaffirms their personal, individual strengths, along with the recognition of their mutual fears. Dealing with fears is the strong card: girls need information and strategies about coping in this world.' (p. 19)

The authors of A Capella echo the urgent need to do work with boys I have argued for:

Our awareness of shifting gender roles has focused on expanding the assertiveness and aspirations of young women. Little has been designed to address issues or encourage change in adolescent males. Respondents reflected deep resentment towards their male peers, their apparently carefree lives and
their violence. Over and over teachers reported deep concerns about the widening gap between the realities of their male and female students. (p. 21)

They also assert that the assumption that "there (are) tangible barriers prohibiting the in-school discussion of the issues raised by the project" may prove to be "damaging and erroneous":

This project received scrutiny by teacher organizations, school administrators and system officials in every centre in which it was undertaken. Parent permission slips were obtained. Teachers volunteered. In only 2 of 139 cases was permission to proceed with the project denied. Despite the possibility that virtually any topic, no matter how controversial, could be raised, even with 11-year olds, to our knowledge there were no negative repercussions following the group discussions. Without having realized it, we may all...teachers, students, trustees, parents, and administrators, have arrived at the same place without realizing that others have been travelling there too. To assume consensus is to infer too much, but not to attempt to pursue co-operative action is to ignore the possibility that general agreement on the need to change exists. (p. 21)

I think the message from these high school interventions is pretty clear: issues of sexism, violence, gender, sexuality, and equity centrally concern our students. As I tried to show in chapter three, social relations in schools-including gender relations-are educationally crucial, since they closely inform our students' self-identities as learners. As the authors of A Capella indicate, there may also be more public willingness to support feminist work in schools than we have dared to think. In part, then, what we educators need to do is to summon the courage to respond to these young women's forthright voices. This will, as my examples have shown, cause defensiveness in young men. But perhaps the voices of the women will help us get over our fear of boys. And perhaps providing safe spaces within schools where girls and boys can discuss these issues will invite some boys at least to examine critically, and even refuse, some of the rites of passage into masculinity that have harmful consequences. In so doing, we must, as I argued in my response to Roman's class, prioritise our pedagogy. Feminism
will, of course, underpin our classroom interactions. Violence against women is arguably the paradigmatic feminist concern. But we need to recognise that, for many students, male and female, feminism is just another "f" word. As one young woman put it:

'I think learning to cope with social pressures whether it be alcohol, sex, or smoking is important. Learning to cope with discrimination in the working field without being feminists (yuck) is also important.' (p. 18)

As Frazer (1989) found, though, openness to feminism among high school girls at least seems to depend on social class. As an oppositional discourse, feminism was readily embraced by her working-class subjects who, presumably, already knew something of oppression and discrimination by virtue of their class positions. "Public" school girls, on the other hand, were dismayed at the thought of feminism, although wanted to have the same rights as their brothers. So some students may be more inclined than others from the outset to respond to feminist messages. And others may be brought to have more sympathy with them. Novogrodsy et al comment that some of the young women became more comfortable with the idea of being feminists at the retreat, while others remain conflicted:

Girls experienced the difficulty of being feminists in a milieu that often denigrates women. On the positive side, one young woman said, 'Before the retreat I thought feminism meant that women thought they were superior to men. Now I know that it means that women want equality, it makes me feel better about using the word.' Nonetheless, many young women found themselves a bit isolated or having to endure the baiting of male friends who knew they had gone to the retreat. (p. 83)

One boy reportedly was "proud to use the word feminist" after his involvement in the white ribbon campaign at his school; the retreat, he said, "had given him a chance to stop and think; it took away the pressure and intolerance" (p. 84). While this, then, is the desired end-result of anti-sexist initiatives, teachers will need to realize the kinds of conflicts that arise
around feminism for both girls and boys. As Bartky (1988) points out, in answering her own question, "Why isn't every woman a feminist?" (p. 190), feminism "threatens women with a certain de-skilling, something people normally resist: beyond this, it calls into question that aspect of personal identity that is tied to the development of a sense of competence" (p. 190):

To have a body felt to be "feminine"-a body socially constructed through the appropriate practices-is in most cases crucial to a woman's sense of herself as female and, since persons currently can be only as male or female, to her sense of herself as an existing individual. To possess such a body may also be essential to herself as a sexually desiring and desirable subject. (p. 191)

While adolescent women may, at first, see feminism as something that will "de-skill" them, as Bartky indicates, good feminist educational initiatives should, instead, offer them ways of being more comfortable with their bodies, and more inclined to be sexual subjects, rather than the objects of boys' sexuality.

**Implications from this study**

In this thesis, I have tried to develop an understanding of male violence against women on which educators can build violence-prevention curricula. Violence, I have claimed, is overwhelmingly a problem with a gender; investigating how gender is constructed is therefore a necessary step in violence-prevention. I have suggested that a mystified view of gender as a seamless continuation of biological sex is not only wrong, but holds out little hope that gender relations can ever improve. A constructivist approach to gender can, on the other hand, lead to change. Feminism has provided a worthy vision of the direction that change should take, and has challenged men to ally themselves with women in the pursuit of gender equity and in the fight against violence. Men have not, however, spoken out against male violence against women in ways that significantly displace them as the center of analysis. Thus, men have taken up studying masculinity in ways that further frustrate feminists: too often masculinity is rhapsodised rather than,
as feminists would prefer, connected to the unequal power relations that are its context and to the violence that partly constitutes it.

Rather than reforming the views of adult men, I have preferred to examine the possibility that we can educate young men to refuse the discourse of hegemonic masculinity. Taking the cue from postmodernism, I have suggested that there are suppressed masculine voices that an educational program could help draw out. Viewing the multiplicity of masculine positions that are enacted in each school gender regime would perhaps allow teachers to "listen past" the hegemonic male voices that currently dominate. They would, ideally, then see that boys are interested in and capable of the kinds of emotional engagements that might lead them away from many of the harmful peer-group behaviours that many boys may privately detest.

An examination of existing violence-prevention curricular materials showed that many do not acknowledge the predominant male involvement in acts of violence. Use of these materials as the basis of violence-prevention thus would ignore the possibility of preventing violence by deconstructing masculinity itself. Although this may appear a highly theoretical and controversial goal for educators to set themselves, a number of examples of anti-sexist initiatives in schools demonstrated what this might look like. Providing sex-segregated space for high school students to discuss these issues has, it would seem, given at least some boys the courage to speak out against their friends' sexism; it has also allowed girls to develop a collective, oppositional voice in which to express their anger at the violence that oppresses them. I have argued that since girls and boys are in a different relation to violence, they should not necessarily receive the same "violence-prevention" curricula: we should avoid the "naive feminism" of the teacher who showed a feminist film to a co-educational class and watched sparks fly. The few examples of more careful anti-sexist interventions available seem to provide some hope that attitudes supportive of violence against women can be challenged by thoughtful pedagogy and sound theory. This work can and should begin in elementary schools.

This study asks more questions than it answers. In terms of implications for further research, I hope that I have made a convincing case for the need for schools to undertake violence-prevention in a way that centrally considers gender. What is clearly indicated, I feel, is a curriculum for
gender-aware violence-prevention that could be piloted and tested in target schools (both high school and elementary). The retreat format used by Novogrodsky et al would be one way of testing such a curriculum; pre- and post-attitude surveys could be administered, and participants could have both exit interviews and follow-up interviews several months after the program to see if effects were lasting. One instrument that could possibly test the results for the boys is the one Thomas (1990) used to assess the significance of gender politics in men's accounts of their gender identity (in which adolescents, predictably, were the most reactionary). Successful results would provide a rationale for broadening the scope of the program. An action research design, in which the research team included university faculty, teachers, and male and female students might be effective.

I am undecided on just what all of the implications of this study might be. Should anti-sexist programs be compulsory, for instance, or would that set teachers up as targets of anger at "political correctness"? In which subject area would this work most readily fall? Should we introduce it "across the curriculum" and risk losing its intensity, or should it be a part of Social Studies, for example? Or should it be part of a broadened pastoral care program, as McLaughlin et al (1991) argue for? How much time should be spent in sex-segregated groups?

Certainly, anti-sexist and violence-prevention work would vary from school to school. A "gender inventory" of each school should take place, in which several factors are assessed. How safe is are the school's physical premises, for example? How much space is occupied by boys, and how much by girls? Do girls and boys have equal access to resources (athletic equipment, counselling time)? What are the students perceptions of levels of sexism in classrooms, locker rooms, and playgrounds? How attentive are teachers to the amount and type of attention they give male and female students in class? What are teachers' (students', parents') attitudes toward sexism, gender, and violence? Do the coaches tolerate sexist joking on road-trips to strengthen "team morale"? How much of the student council budget is spent on activities organized around the ideal of the heterosexual couple, rather than around the ideal of friendship and safety? Where, and in what form, does sex education take place? Is it sexist? And so on. Once answers to these questions are known, perhaps an "anti-violence" action committee on which
committed parents, teachers and students would jointly sit (and have equal voting power) could draw up a plan for their particular school.

I will close with two personal anecdotes. Both recount reactions to the work undertaken in this thesis. While doing background reading last summer, a fellow student (a woman) with whom I had many interesting talks about the violence I was reading about said, "Well, Liz, just don't fall into the trap of trying to make men more like women." Perhaps, in the end, that is the trap I have "fallen into"-or perhaps I have willingly jumped?

Another day I was trying to explain my just-begun thesis to a (male) professor. "It's about the possibility of preventing violence against women through school programs, and since we must trace violence back to its roots, I'm deconstructing masculinity," I burbled. He replied, "Are men, then, to have any say in the matter?" I couldn't answer him then, but I could now. Now, I might start with an arch reading of the history of Western civilization as the result of men's having a say in every matter, including how femininity should be conceived of and policed. But I would end by taking the high road. I would invite this professor, indeed all education professors, to have a say in the matter. If they all had a say in this matter, that is, if they took violence against women seriously as an educational problem, then the way for schools to undertake violence-prevention might become clearer.
References


