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AMERICAN GEOPOLITICS AND THE SOVIET THREAT: THE CASE OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

by

Simon Dalby
B.A. Mod., Dublin University, 1979
M.A., University of Victoria, 1982

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
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of 
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American Geopolitics and the Soviet Threat

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This dissertation in political geography draws on contemporary social theory to develop a critical methodological approach to geopolitics. In particular it draws on the importance of the theme of Otherness in political discourse. It identifies four "security discourses" - Realism, Sovietology, Geopolitics, and Nuclear Strategy - as providing the essential practices of the American cold war policy of containment militarism. In these discourses, security is understood as a process involving the spatial exclusion of Otherness; the most persistent Other in this case is the Soviet Union.

The dissertation examines the arguments used by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a prominent lobby group in Washington in the late 1970s, which made a case for the presence of a massive geopolitical "Soviet threat" to American national security. The literature examined is the CPD's policy statements and the published writings of its key thinkers.

The analysis shows how the CPD used the security discourses, specifically the Realist concern with power in international politics, the Sovietological analysis of the Soviet system as inherently expansionist, the Geopolitical concern with control of the Eurasian heartland, and the Strategic literature concerning the possibility of winning a major nuclear war, to formulate their position. The central argument of the analysis is that it is the specific articulation of these discourses used
by the CPD which provides their position with its ideological power. The limitations and contradictions of these discourses and the CPD articulation of them are examined and criticised.

The conclusions drawn from this analysis suggest that a critical approach to geopolitics requires a reconceptualisation of security in terms of social relations, rather than in terms of state power and spatial exclusion. The audiences for this critical work are in the emerging discourses of dealignment, and the new social movements, rather than with the traditional geopolitical audience of state policy makers.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ............................................................... ii
ABSTRACT .................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................... v

1. INTRODUCTION: SECURITY DISCOURSE ..................... 1
   1.1 GEOPOLITICS AND THE SOVIET THREAT ............... 1
   1.2 SOCIAL THEORY: DISCOURSE ............................ 3
   1.3 SOCIAL THEORY: IDEOLOGY AND HEGEMONY .......... 12
   1.4 THE HEGEMONY OF SECURITY DISCOURSE ............. 16
   1.5 METHOD: APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS ............... 21
   1.6 DISSERTATION OUTLINE AND SOURCES ............... 27

2. THE DISCOURSE OF OTHERNESS .............................. 33
   2.1 THE OTHER .................................................. 33
   2.2 THE OTHER: TIME AND SPACE ........................ 36
   2.3 THE OTHER AND WORLD ORDER ...................... 43
   2.4 POWER AND THE OTHER ................................. 47
   2.5 ORIENTALISM ............................................... 50
   2.6 THE INDIAN AS OTHER ................................. 55
   2.7 OTHERNESS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ....... 57
   2.8 OTHERNESS AND THE CPD ............................ 62

3. GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY ............................. 64
   3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................ 64
   3.2 POLITICAL THEORY, STATES AND SECURITY ....... 65
   3.3 GEOPOLITICS, SPACE AND POWER ..................... 72
   3.4 CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS .............................. 76
   3.5 GEOPOLITICS AND CONTAINMENT ..................... 81
1.1 GEOPOLITICS AND THE SOVIET THREAT

The vociferous criticisms of superpower detente heard repeatedly in Washington, and to a lesser extent in other NATO capitals, in the 1970s, were supported by arguments concerning a massive political and military "Soviet threat" to Western security. Among the highest profile proponents of the "Soviet threat" was the Washington based Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), many of whose members subsequently attained important policy making positions in the first Reagan administration. The CPD advocated dramatic increases in defence expenditures and the adoption of a "nuclear war fighting" strategic posture which, they argued, could use a rebuilt nuclear superiority, to deter what they perceived as dramatic and dangerous Soviet Geopolitical expansion. Their arguments have had a major impact on the U.S. foreign and military policies in the last decade. To date, while the CPD's political campaign has been examined in some detail (Cox 1982, Sanders 1983, Scheer 1983, Wolfe 1984a), no examination has been made of the detailed structuring of their arguments.

1 This is the second appearance of a political organisation in the U.S. with this name. The first CPD existed in the early 1950s with similar concerns about a Russian military threat (Sanders 1983). Although some people who were connected with the first CPD became involved with the second CPD, there is no formal institutional connection between them. Unless specifically designated as such below, in this dissertation CPD refers to the organisation founded in 1976.
This dissertation examines the structuring of their arguments from a geopolitical perspective. It shows that the CPD's advocacy of the cold war policy of containment militarism, premised on the understanding of the need for "security" from the "Soviet threat" is related to the more general conceptualisation of "security" as a geopolitics of spatial exclusion. More specifically the dissertation examines the way that the CPD drew on a series of "security discourses", namely Sovietology, the Realist literature in International Relations, Nuclear Strategy and Geopolitics to construct an understanding of the Soviet Union as a dangerous "Other". It argues that the ideological strength of the CPD position depends on their articulation of these discourses.  

As a dissertation in Political Geography the subject of Geopolitics is important because it provides a key dimension to the formulation of the Soviet threat by the CPD in particular, but also more widely in the U.S. foreign policy making establishment. This dimension is often overlooked in academic 

2 The term "geopolitics" is used in capitalised and uncapitalised form in this dissertation. When capitalised it refers to the academic and policy literature of Geopolitics, drawn from the classic Geopolitical texts, in particular Mackinder (1904, 1919) and Spykman's (1942, 1944) writings. The uncapitalised form refers to the more general concerns of international affairs and the relations of space and power. Thus Geopolitics can loosely be conceived as a special case of geopolitics, simultaneously it refers to a particular discourse drawn from the classical Geopolitical texts. A similar convention is used with International Relations, the discipline, and international relations in the sense of global politics. Likewise with "Strategy" etc. However, where spellings in quotations are inconsistent with this convention, the original spelling used by the author being quoted has been maintained.
and political debates concerning international security. Of particular relevance to the later stages of this dissertation is the argument that the Geopolitical dimension has been omitted in many of the criticisms of the influential nuclear war fighting theories of the 1970s which were associated with the CPD. This dissertation also introduces the theme of the discourse of Otherness to geopolitical inquiry. This introduces a long neglected ideological dimension to geopolitics which suggests that a critical geopolitics requires a theoretical investigation of geopolitics in terms of discourse.

The rest of this first chapter elaborates on theoretical and methodological issues, turning first to the question of the relations of power and knowledge, that is to "discourse", "ideology" and "hegemony", and then to the importance of security discourse in modern political arrangements. The final section provides a brief overview of the organisation of the dissertation. The historical review of Political Geography and the reconceptualisation of Geopolitics in terms of discourse, is held over to the third chapter, where it best fits into the development of the overall argument of the dissertation.

1.2 SOCIAL THEORY: DISCOURSE

Recent social theory is particularly concerned with issues of power and knowledge, with the role of language and particularly, discourse, in the maintainance of political arrangements. Current writers are especially concerned with the
relation between knowledge and power and have extended their concern with literary theory into a broader critique of both the social sciences and the cultural practices of modernity (Said 1982, Shapiro 1984, Klein 1986). This dissertation draws on these approaches to examine the operation of security discourses, and in particular their use by the CPD for its political purposes.


This shift of focus from positivist approaches involves conceptualising social existence as human practice. Social life is then understood as a process of active creation, albeit within historically generated frameworks of custom, economy, power and language. Social life is grasped in and through language, and hence the structures of language are analysed in terms of the ways that they both reflect and create social life.
But language practices are integrated in specific ways of articulating together linguistic formations; language is socially structured as discourse. In contrast to hermeneutic approaches, these writers are concerned with matters of power, how texts and discourses are exercises in power and repression, in addition to just significations (Thompson 1984).

In Foucault's terms, discourses are much more than linguistic performances, they are also plays of power which mobilise rules, codes and procedures to assert a particular understanding, through the construction of knowledges within these rules, codes and procedures. Because they organise reality in specific ways through understanding and knowing in ways that involve particular epistemological claims, they provide legitimacy, and indeed provide the intellectual conditions of possibility of particular institutional and political arrangements.

The rules governing practices, often implicit and not clearly articulated, but understood sub-consciously by practitioners, are socially constructed in specific contexts. Hence discourses have institutional origins and commitments. The knowledges they produce and encompass are thus political products; discourses are implicated with power. Kress (1985:85) goes so far as to define discourses in terms of institutions: "Discourses are systematically organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution. Beyond that they define, describe and delimit what
it is possible to say and not to say...". If for example, one takes an academic discipline as an institution, then the term discourse can apply to the oeuvre of that discipline's practitioners. In summary:

Discourse refers here to something more encompassing than mere language; it refers to a web of activities that are united by their adherence to certain rules of interpretation guiding normal behaviour. To speak of discourse is to speak of how people are enabled to act in meaningful ways and to orient their behaviour appropriately. The actions of those who share in a discourse cannot be reduced to a purely material or economic base which determines what they do; nor does discourse refer to an autonomous realm of linguistic interaction severed from historical and political relations of power. Rather, discourse entails the rules governing specific practices. To be engaged in a discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence. (Klein 1987:5-6)

Foucault has analysed the discursive practices of medicine, sex and penology, showing how the conception of madness is created in antithesis to reason, deviance to normalcy and delinquent to reformed. His concerns are often with the structuring of identity against the boundary of an external Other.

Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designates its exclusions and choice. (Foucault 1977:199)

These "regularities" transcend single texts or writers works, and don't necessarily coincide with a recognisable discipline or field of study.
It is usually the case that a discursive practice assembles a number of diverse disciplines or sciences or that it crosses a certain number of diverse disciplines or sciences or that it crosses a certain number among them and regroups many of their individual characteristics into a new and occasionally unexpected unity.

(Foucault 1977:200).

Discursive practices are more than simply ways of producing texts. "They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them" (Foucault 1977:200). Discursive practices change in complex ways that are not necessarily related solely to internal developments. Thus

The transformation of a discursive practice is linked to a whole range of usually complex modifications that can occur outside its domain (in the forms of production, in social relations in political institutions), inside it (in its techniques for determining its object, in the adjustment and refinement of its concepts, in its accumulation of facts), or to the side of it (in other discursive practices).

(Foucault 1977:200)

Discourse thus involves not just language, but practices and social positions which embody power; the psychiatrist who designates who is reasonable and who is mad, the therapist who pronounces on normalcy, the parole officer who judges when the delinquent has reformed. Thus discourse refers also to the rules by which behaviour is structured, regulated and judged.

Focusing on a particular discipline in terms of its discursive practices involves examining how the discipline constructs its field of study, its object or Other, and hence
how it situates itself in relation to its Other (Fabian 1984). This also involves discussing the internal divisions of that inquiry and how the methodological conventions, and importantly the categorical devices that are used, structure the knowledge that results. These categories and divisions shape the discipline's knowledge, which in turn structures how it is possible to act by defining "reality" in specific ways.

Foucault's analysis makes clear the role of the creation of the Other as the excluded, against which behaviour is judged and defined; the mad defines the sane, the deviant—the normal. Otherness is inherent in the analysis of discourse. It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from "our" person, group and so on. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and crucially a political act; it constructs a space for the Other, distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference.

Practices function on the bases of these definitions; prisons are built to incarcerate the delinquent, mental hospitals to shut away the mad. Both operate to exclude the Other, shutting Otherness away in regimes where it can be monitored, surveyed and hence known and controlled. In "security" matters the enemy is specified in a series of security discourses, tied to the functioning of the state security and defence agencies. The practitioners of penology or medicine practice on their objects, prisoners or patients, but
they do so in socially constructed positions of authority and power; by regulating the Other they also regulate the rest.

The penologist and the therapist's positions are justified in terms of moral criteria of reform or cure, their specialised knowledge gives them power to act in positions of authority. To deal with discourses one has to deal with their political conditions, to look at their audience as well as the practitioners, to understand how the practices of the discourse also legitimise the authority of the practitioner. One looks at how the practitioners delineate their object of study, and how they create and designate the correct norms and rules for dealing with that object. Much of what follows below relates to the processes whereby the CPD attempted to establish their ways of dealing with the Soviet Union as the correct ones. In their discourse the Soviet Union is the dangerous Other that has to be contained controlled and monitored. The CPD uses their superior and their "correct" knowledge to ensure the security of the U.S.

Readers bring a series of pre-existing discursive practices to a text which are used to operate on the received text and render it meaningful. Thus for example a newspaper text on a criminal trial relies on the reader's preconstructed categories of criminal and innocent. Hence discourses also involve the capabilities, in terms of a socio-cultural background which are used by people to construct meaning. Thus discourse "is not simply speech or a written treatise on a topic but a set of capabilities, qua rules by which readers/listeners and
speakers / audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct it into an organised meaningful whole" (Agnew and O'Tuathail 1987:6). Discourses are about how reality is specified and how social practices are structured in the terms of these realities.

Foucault's focus is on the discourses themselves, in contrast to Marxist approaches to history, class struggle, ideology and, particularly, hegemony. Foucault's (1972) analysis of discourses emphasises discontinuities and ruptures, rather than linear totalising schemes. He is concerned with their structures and practices rather than their historical evolution. Indeed critics often point to precisely how dismissive Foucault is of history, how he prefers to concentrate on the epistemological conditions of languages and discourse, on the structure of order which underlies language, orders that periodically crumble and are replaced by new epistemological ordering systems, new conditions of possibility which deny necessary continuity from one episteme to the next (deCerteau 1986).

The finer theoretical points of this discussion are beyond the concerns of this dissertation, but it is important to note that Foucault's concerns, "outside history" are methodologically different from both conventional history of ideas approaches and Marxist concerns with the historical evolution of modes of production and their ideological practices. In taking this position, this dissertation adopts an analytical focus akin to
Foucault's genealogical perspective, which in Ashley's (1987:409) words "involves a shift away from an interest in uncovering the structures of history and toward an interest in understanding the movement and clashes of historical practices that would impose or resist structure".

This dissertation focuses on one specific set of practices, the operations, tactics and strategies of the CPD articulations of security discourse. It is primarily concerned with the structure of the CPD discourse rather than its history. Where it deals with history it is to show that the security discourses have long intellectual lineages, not to argue that there is a necessary historical trajectory over time. These discourses are, in Foucault's terms, available resources of power that can be mobilised for a particular political end. The fact that they have a historical pedigree may, of course, act to enhance their ideological usage by increasing their acceptance in terms of past practice providing a legitimate precedent.

The argument focuses on how the CPD mobilised the security discourses to support their political project, using their arguments to make their case, and in the process attempting to change the terrain of political debate to exclude detente and economic managerial concerns from the discussion of U.S. foreign policy. This focus on the mobilisation and utilisation of specific discourses for political purposes leads to matters that have often been dealt with in the rather different theoretical terms of ideology and hegemony. As both of these terms are
widely used, a theoretical clarification of their usage in the dissertation is necessary.

1.3 SOCIAL THEORY: IDEOLOGY AND HEGEMONY

Sometimes ideology is defined in terms of a political belief system, in other words as a neutral descriptive sociological term, which equates ideology with a political belief system or Weltanschauung. This formulation lacks the critical dimension introduced by Marx and Engels (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1977, Larrain 1979, 1983, Marx and Engels 1976, Sumner 1979) and retained in much recent social theory (Abercrombie 1980, Thompson 1984). In framing ideology as a critical concept, numerous theoretical difficulties arise because ideology bridges, simultaneously, matters of political conflict, power and domination, the social determination of knowledge and matters of truth and falsity.

The critical dimension of the concept of ideology, as used in this dissertation, refers to its function in maintaining power relations. A cultural practice or a discourse can have an ideological function when it conceals relations of power (dissimulation), presents them as legitimate, or acts to reify or naturalise them by portraying a transitory historical situation as eternal and hence natural (Thompson 1984). In part, ideology functions by limiting what can be said:

...ideology allows only certain things to be communicated and discussed. It not only 'expresses' but also 'represses', excluding certain issues from
discussion and creating a 'public unconsciousness'. Ideology is as it were, the linguistic legislature which defines what is available for public discussion and what is not. (Thompson 1984:85)

But what is available for public discussion is not necessarily accepted uncritically by the audience. They can resist the proffered discourse and reformulate it. "The clash of voices is a clash of power, and the analysis of discourse is an analysis of and an intervention in this politics" (Frow 1985:213).

Analysing matters in this way maintains ideology's critical edge. "Given that all discourse is informed by power, is constituted as discourse in relation to unequal patterns of power, then political judgements can be made in terms of particular, historically specific appropriations of discourse by dominant social forces" (Frow 1985:204). And so "Ideology can be seen therefore as the 'politics of discourse', marshalling discourses into certain alignments in the cause of larger political aims" (Kress 1985:71). Thus ideological analysis can focus on how discourses are appropriated and interconnected in ways that maintain relations of power and do so in ways that delimit what can be said in particular circumstances.

This brings us to the concept of hegemony. Like ideology and discourse, hegemony is also used in general uncritical ways, and in a more specific critical way within social theory. In the general sense it is analogous with domination and control; in political Realist terms, it refers to Geopolitical matters of
the power exercised by one state over other states (Gill 1986). In some places in this dissertation the term is used in this sense, in addition to the use in the more critical sense of the term.

The critical sense of the term derives from the writings of Antonio Gramsci (Cox 1983, 1984, Gramsci 1971, Mouffe 1979a, 1979b). Gramsci argues that at certain times in history a dominant class exercises its control over subordinate classes by social and cultural leadership rather than coercion. The establishment of hegemony involves the widespread dissemination by "organic intellectuals" of commonly accepted, ultimately "common sense" conceptions of social reality, which portray the existing economic and political state of affairs as natural, inevitable, legitimate and in the interests of all social groups or classes (Nowell Smith 1974). This ideological role performed by intellectuals is important in Gramsci's conception because intellectuals provide sophisticated rationales for political stances; they act to legitimise particular understandings of social phenomena by writing and teaching in particular ways, even when not explicitly involved in political activity.

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Throughout this dissertation the term Realist refers to political Realism, the dominant approach to International Relations, a subject for further elaboration in chapter 4. The version of Realism espoused by the CPD and encompassed by Gill's (1986) conception, is a particularly crude although often ideologically powerful rendition of this tradition. Political Realism should not be confused with the philosophical position of epistemological realism.
The concept of hegemony suggests that "common sense" is not an ontological given. It is an ideologically produced and repeatedly reproduced series of understandings of the world, ones that operate in ways that support the domination of the dominant classes. Thus in Mouffe's words a hegemonic class is one "which has been able to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own by means of ideological struggle" (1979:181). It is important to note that hegemony is never a static state, it remains a contingent process, open to disputation at all levels. It has to be actively produced and reproduced as political and ideological practice.

The concept of hegemony is a powerful theoretical tool but not one without its critics (Abercrombie et.al. 1980, Anderson 1976-7). In particular Abercrombie et.al. (1980) argue that ideological factors are often overestimated in explanations of the social cohesion of societies. The matter of their effectiveness in particular circumstances is a question for empirical investigation. Irrespective of the level of success of these ideological ploys in maintaining domination and control, it is clear that they are widely used in political struggles in attempts to render particular ideological positions hegemonic.

In critical cultural studies the term hegemonic is often used to refer to ideological formulations that are widely accepted and used to structure social and political life. It is in this sense that the term is used in this dissertation. Used in this way it is not incompatible with the formulation of
discourse offered above, although the derivation of the terms come from different theoretical approaches. Thus it is not intended to necessarily directly relate only to Marxist derived concerns of class related knowledge. Here hegemony refers to all political and ideological structures of domination, including therefore the mobilisation of discourses to render a political position acceptable, legitimate, common sense.

Particular attempts to assert a hegemonic political position can be analysed without necessarily assuming their political efficacy. This dissertation shows how the CPD attempted to render their particular articulation of the security discourses hegemonic, in the sense that they become taken for granted and widely accepted as the appropriate premises from which to discuss matters of international politics. The focus is thus on their arguments, the structure of their discourse, rather than on any detailed attempt to assess their success or failure, although a few comments on this subject are included for completeness in the final chapter.

1.4 THE HEGEMONY OF SECURITY DISCOURSE

The rapid growth of state functions in capitalist states since the Second World War, *in terms of their increased role in economic management, in the provision of the welfare state, as

*The conventional term "Second World War" is retained in this dissertation for ease of comprehension. Given the pre-twentieth century history of global conflicts among the major European powers, in chronological terms the 1939-45 conflict is not strictly the second "world" war (Modelski 1978).
well as the growth of what is appropriately called the "security state", has expanded the need for ideological justifications of the functions of capitalist states. Of particular concern to this dissertation are the emergence of semipermanent, transnational economic and political "blocs", which also make claims to the allegiance of their respective national populations, and the widespread production of highly sophisticated and brutally destructive military technology, the most important form being nuclear weapons. The perpetual military preparations require the creation of a permanent adversary, an Other whose threatening presence requires perpetual vigilance. The highest political objectives of the state are now phrased in terms of the maintainance of "national security" a security defined, as chapter 3 shows, in negative terms as the exclusion of the depredations of external "Others".

The growth of these new political arrangements and technologies has been accompanied by an expansion of the role of specialised discourses of technical expertise. These discourses act to reduce the role of political discussion by recasting political issues in terms of technical problems to which they can, by using their specialised procedures, find "correct" or "optimal" answers. These specialised discourses act to maintain hegemony by reducing politics to a matter of administrating programs devised on the basis of the definition of social situations contained in these discourses. They depoliticise issues by invoking technical expertise in the place of political
decisionmaking, in the process displacing explicit political
discussion and replacing it with expert discourse.

The political struggles of the "new social movements" in the
last few decades are often about this "politics of expertise", challeng
ing the expert discourse by revealing the political assump
tions on which their supposed neutrality and objectivity rest (Nelkin and Pollak 1981). Recently these political struggles have been particularly pronounced in matters of war, peace and international relations where an array of specialised discourses of "security" have developed. These monopolise the state political discourse on these matters, but in recent years they have been repeatedly challenged and criticised by peace movements.

Thus nuclear technologies and their political arrangements have added an important dimension to processes whereby consent is generated for the maintainance of the political arrangements of Western capitalism. The threat of complete societal annihilation renders the legitimisation of the existence of these weapons particularly necessary, while the social and cultural processes of militarisation that accompany their deployment simultaneously reduce the scope for democratic decisionmaking (Falk 1982, 1984). In the West, and the U.S. in particular, the weapons and their institutions are justified in terms of the omnipresent fear of the external enemy, present in the form of the Soviet Union (Kovel 1983, Thompson 1985a, 1985b, Wolfe 1984a).
State mechanisms as well as the organisations within civil society act to defuse such threats to the domination of hegemonic formations through what Gramsci terms transformismo, often rendered in English as "co-optation". Here dissent is channelled into existing structures or marginalised by dismissing it as "radical" or unrealistic (Chilton ed 1985). In the process the overall structures of domination are maintained and rendered secure by the attempted absorption or marginalisation of potential positions of opposition. The ideological specification of political identities and acceptable modes of political behaviour is essential to these processes.

As has been made clear by a number of writers, the numerous contemporary critiques of militarisation repeatedly run into problems of the limitations of what can be said in certain circumstances, a process revealing the hegemonic discursive structures of the nuclear state (Bay 1983, Cohn 1987, Galtung 1981, Klein 1986, Kovel 1983, Thompson 1982, 1985a, 1985b, Walker 1983/4, Witheford 1987). In response to peace movement critiques, "security intellectuals" (Luckham 1984) use, among others, the ideological device of distinguishing between legitimate "free speech" and illegitimate protest (Fowler and Marshall 1985, Moss 1985a, 1985b, O'Toole 1985, Richardson 1985).

More important for this dissertation is the use of the "Soviet threat" as an ideological device to marginalise not only peace movements, but many advocates of detente and arms control
with the Soviet Union. Dissenters from the containment militarist orthodoxy are vilified as giving support and assistance to the external enemy. The Other provides the axis on which acceptable and unacceptable political activities and identities are constructed. Related to this, as noted in the opening section of this chapter, is the particular "commonsense" notion of security as spatial exclusion; the Other as threat is specified in spatial terms as inhabiting somewhere else.

Political identity is related to geopolitical specifications of them and us, their space and our space. The CPD offers a case study of how these discourses are mobilised in ideological struggle against, in this case, both the "global managerialist" and "detente" advocates in the U.S., and subsequently those in the peace movements who would more deeply challenge the structure of U.S. global military domination. To revamp U.S. military superiority required the CPD to launch a public political campaign to reassert the containment militarist discourses of security as the appropriate premises for discussing political matters, in the process discrediting the detente advocates, and those who argued that U.S. leadership required economic management and coordination rather than military force.
1.5 METHOD: APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS

Thus in the U.S., and in a more general sense within the
"Western World", the constant preparation for war with the
Soviet Union, a perpetual condition captured in the phrase "the
National Security State", requires the consent, or at least some
degree of acquiescence, by the population to these political
arrangements for war mobilisation.

And we can understand the production of the acquiescence
by appreciating the discursive economies within which
international strategy and war are represented. As
Foucault has shown, the discourses that vehiculate
understandings are not simply linguistic expressions to
be viewed on the basis of representational adequacy;
they are power related resources. In deploying
identities for actors and producing the overall meaning
frame within which they operate, they constitute and
reproduce prevailing systems of power and authority in
general and direct the actions flowing from these
systems in particular.
(Shapiro 1987b:12)

This dissertation takes this as its methodological point of
departure, focusing on how the discourses of security are
articulated together to attempt to ideologically reproduce the
cold war political system.

It focuses on the overall logics of the positions involved
rather than on their expression in small segments of text. 5 It
uses the approach taken by a number of writers, very loosely
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5 In this it differs from the critical linguistics approach
(Chilton ed. 1985), which subjects small segments of text to
intense and detailed grammatical and syntactical scrutiny. The
limitations of such methods of "discourse analysis" are
considerable, both in terms of the logistics involved if any
sizeable text is examined, and in terms of the theoretical links
between the linguistic practice examined and its social context
and its interpretation in a larger social theory (Thompson
1984).

Specifically in terms of Foucault's analysis of discursive practices in section 1-2 above, this dissertation focuses on the operations of definition, legitimation of the norms of discourse, the exclusion of alternative formulations, and the articulation of various discursive practices. It investigates these operations by examining the overall arguments of the texts seeking out the key ideological moves of each of the security discourses. The emphasis in the detailed explication in chapters 6 through 11 is with the application that the CPD makes of the various security discourses and how these are articulated in specifying the Soviet Union as a threatening Other.

Despite the focus elsewhere in social theory on the theme of "the Other", Political Geography has not, so far, tackled matters of the creation of political identity in these terms. This dissertation begins this long overdue investigation of how a group, nation, sex, defines another group as different, set apart, in distinction from that group that thus defines "Otherness". This dissertation shows how the CPD discursively created the Soviet Union as the West's predominant "Other", and in the process elaborates a more complex understanding of geopolitics based on material drawn from social theory and
International Relations.

This dissertation thus examines the discursive strategies of the CPD arguments, how the Other is defined, how alternative formulations are rendered invalid, and how their various concerns within the security discourses are articulated in a Geopolitical scheme structured in terms of their omnipresent threatening Other. Because of the importance of this theme to what follows, the next chapter deals with discourse and Otherness leaving the suggested reformulation of Political Geography to chapter 3. The other security discourses of Sovietology, Realism and Nuclear Strategy contain important geopolitical presuppositions which are often overlooked because they are taken for granted. Among these formulations, this dissertation emphasises the spatial conception of security, which is implicit in most discussions of international security matters, and the related conception of "the Other" as inhabiting a different, spatially distinguishable territory.

This dissertation problematicises the hegemonic conception of the state as the provider of security by a process of spatial exclusion of Otherness. In doing so it distances itself from the traditional functions of Geopoliticians as advisors to state policy makers and politicians, that is from those who "practice geopolitics" (O'Tuathaill 1986:73). It does so by refusing the conventional equation of the state with the provision of security, arguing from a position that states are not natural entities but politically created practices, and their claims to
legitimacy ought to be the subject of critical investigation rather than the point of departure for analysis as has so often been the case in Political Geography (MacLaughlin 1986a, 1986b).

Theorising matters in this way also involves a reconceptualisation of the history of Geopolitics (see chapter 3), one which points to the importance of its discursive practices in American foreign policy before the term itself was coined, (Agnew and O'Tuathaill 1987) and in particular after the Second World War, when the term itself fell into disuse (Kristof 1960, Trofimenko 1986). The position taken here is that the function of a critical Political Geography is not to provide "advice to the prince" in terms of using geopolitical reasoning to advise state policy makers, but rather to investigate how geopolitical reasoning is used as an ideological device to maintain social relations of domination within the modern state system.

The history of American foreign policy is not a primary concern, although chapter five and the second section of the final chapter put this analysis of security discourse in its historical context. As the historical role of the "Soviet threat" in American politics and the historical evolution of the CPD's political campaign have been covered in detail by other writers (Cox 1982, Sanders 1983, Wolfe 1984a), they do not require detailed reiteration in this study. They are not central to this dissertation's argument which concerns the related, but analytically separable, matter of the structuring of the CPD
Neither is this argument primarily concerned with matters of whether, or to what degree, the CPD discourse became "hegemonic" in U.S. politics. Although a few brief comments are included in chapter 12 on this theme, the analysis is focused specifically on how the CPD linked together the various security discourses in ways that attempted to render their position hegemonic. They did this by constructing ideological positions that excluded all other possible discourses on international affairs from serious consideration. The focus of this analysis is how they created these ideological positions by using the security discourses.

Hence, this dissertation is not about constructing an alternative, in some sense, more "objective" or "correct" assessment of the global scene. Although later sections do point to the flaws, omissions and empirical inadequacies of the CPD case, what is of central importance is the ideological role of the CPD's discourse and how their discursive practices acted to reproduce the world of the 1950s a quarter of a century later. Its concern is rather with the power of geopolitics, the use of geopolitical reasoning to specify a particular understanding of the world, one that supports, rationalises and explains the CPD's political project. To use Ashley's (1987) phrase, the concern is with "the geopolitics of geopolitical space", how a particular discourse establishes an ideological space from which to dominate, exclude and delegitimise other discourses.
One possible alternative method to this approach, that of behavioural analysis drawn from International Relations, is excluded from detailed consideration, but should be mentioned here for completeness. There is no sustained reflection in this dissertation on the psychological analyses of matters of perception and the creation of enemies, matters of concern to the discipline of International Relations particularly in the 1970s when they were discussed in terms of images, and of perception and misperception (Boulding 1969, Cohen 1979, Farrell and Smith 1968, Jervis 1970, 1976, Vertzberger 1982), and the psychological proclivities of members of foreign policy making institutions (Tetlock 1983). This extensive literature also includes psychological and psycho-analytical commentaries on the creation of "enemies" (Hall 1983, Holsti, 1967, Kovel 1983, Shulman 1984, Stein 1987, Spruyt 1985).

Introducing these perspectives would raise a host of methodological and epistemological matters, including the transcendence of the researcher beyond the problematic that is being researched, artifically excluding the researcher from the plays of power involved in the process, and also positing the now widely discredited possibility of creating abstract "rational actor" models in the sphere of intercultural relations. As will be pointed out in regard to the discourse of Nuclear Strategy in chapter 4, it was precisely these kinds of approaches that Strategic thinkers appropriated to legitimise their analyses. Further detailed critiques of this material are
beyond the scope of this study which is concerned with a different theoretical terrain, one that avoids these pitfalls by focusing on the representational strategies in the CPD texts themselves, rather than investigating the psychological predelictions of their authors.

In addition to being a contribution to Political Geography this dissertation also contributes to the concerns within the discipline of Geography about nuclear war and the links between Geography and Peace studies (Pepper and Jenkins 1985). It draws on the literature of social theory concerned with discourse to investigate a theme in what Luckham (1984) terms the growth of "armament culture", and others term the "militarisation" of society (Wallensteen et al. 1985). As such, this focus on the discourses used by the "security intellectuals" (Luckham 1984) is also a contribution to the critical literature in the fields of International Relations and of cultural studies criticising the processes of militarisation (Chilton ed. 1985) and generally the ideological practices of modernity (Klein 1986, Said 1985a).

1.6 DISSERTATION OUTLINE AND SOURCES

Chapter 2 focuses on the overall structuring of the discursive arrangements of Otherness. In the process it emphasises the ideological dimension of Otherness, showing how discourses involve the structuring of Otherness as a move of power and domination. Chapter 3 investigates the political theory of the state in international affairs showing how security is
understood in terms of the spatial exclusion of Otherness. It reviews Political Geography's chequered history, and shows how the current concerns with social theory reviewed in this and the next chapter, and their adoption in Geography, lead to a reconceptualisation of geopolitics as discourse. In particular it points to the necessity of integrating concerns of Otherness into the understanding of political space.

Chapter 4 traces the history of the "discourses of security" Realism, Sovietology, Strategy and Geopolitics that are drawn on in the formulations of containment militarism. Chapter 5 outlines the postwar history of U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union emphasising the rationales drawn from the security discourses which are involved in the policy of containment militarism. This chapter also traces how the collapse of the hegemony of this foreign policy position in the aftermath of the Vietnam imbroglio and global economic disruptions triggered the formation of the CPD in an attempt to reassert the containment militarist approach to U.S. foreign policy. This project was connected to the wider ideological onslaught of the "neo-conservatives" and the "new right" political movement of the 1970s (Halliday 1983).

Subsequent chapters elucidate in detail the structure of the arguments presented by the CPD for this reassertion of "containment militarism", showing how the discourses are articulated in an attempt to create a hegemonic position, one which renders other arguments and foreign policy positions
politically untenable. The CPD texts used as the sources for the detailed analysis in chapters 6 through 11 are their major policy statements and position papers released in the late 1970s. 6

In addition this dissertation draws on some of the published political and academic writings of its members, Eugene Rostow and Richard Pipes, who were members of the CPD's executive committee, Paul Nitze, chairman of its policy studies, and Colin Gray. Gray is particularly important because of his comprehensive coverage of the numerous issues, his reconceptualisation of Geopolitics and his nuclear strategy arguments in favour of a "theory of victory". These writings by prominent members of the Committee, or in Gray's case, by a particularly prominent strategist who was a CPD member, are selected because they elaborate on a theme, or argument in the CPD's literature. It is not suggested that all the publications of various authors connected with the CPD constitute an entirely coherent position, but the overlap is considerable.

The level of sophistication and to a much lesser degree the type of language used, varies dependent on the intended audience. The overall discursive structure is consistent through these texts although different emphases are present. This is

5 These were subsequently collected together into one volume under the editorship of Charles Tyroler and published under the title of Alerting America. For clarity and convenience all references to the CPD papers in this dissertation are taken from this collection and are cited as CPD (1984) rather than Tyroler (1984).
explicable in sociological terms because they were to a large extent a self selected group, intellectual compatibility and the support of the CPD's objectives being the criteria of membership. But what is most important, and will be argued throughout the analysis, is that it is also the result of the use of similar discursive practices, in particular the articulation of the positions of Strategy, Sovietology, Geopolitics and Realism together to provide a consistent portrayal of the Soviet threat.

The CPD held regular meetings to draft its early statements, some of which were reworked many times (Kampleman 1984). Key members, Richard Pipes and Paul Nitze were both members of the "Team B" process which was simultaneously reviewing the intelligence estimates while the CPD was being formed and conducting its early meetings prior to going public. Thus it is not unreasonable to treat each author's writings as reflecting part of the CPD position, although they usually do not specifically identify themselves as members of the CPD (Nitze is an occasional exception). Indeed it was probably politically expedient not to do so directly, in that suppressing direct political institution affiliation probably confers greater "academic" credibility to a text, given the claims of "objectivity" upon which "expertise" supposedly rests.

The process of foreign and defence policy formation in the U.S. is by the standards of other states a surprisingly open process. Thus the media is widely used as a process of gaining
political support for a particular policy position. In addition there are numerous policy journals that deal with political matters, only the most well known being *Foreign Affairs*. Discussions in the policy journals shade into academic study and academic journals dealing with political matters often carry explicit statements of a particular stance.

The focus in chapters 6 to 11 is first on CPD statements and then on the supporting arguments in policy and academic publications. These published materials facilitate the analysis of each discourse that the CPD authors draw upon, because they include more detailed expositions than the shorter encapsulations in the CPD policy papers. The focus is on the discursive strategies of these texts, on the argumentation provided and the intellectual devices used to legitimise their stances.

Specifically chapter 6 analyses the basic CPD manifesto and its first important statement on the Soviet Union. Chapter 7 analyses the role of Sovietology in the CPD position through a focus on Richard Pipes' writings. Chapter 8 covers Realism and Geopolitics, Chapter 9 shows how the classical Geopolitical texts, reinterpreted by Colin Gray, provide a framework for understanding East-West relations. Chapter 10 draws on each of these themes to show how the Geopolitical arguments were crucial to the formulation of the Soviet threat in terms of strategic arguments.
Chapter 11 shows how each of the earlier themes was articulated together in Colin Gray's seminal "theory of victory", a key contribution to the nuclear warfighting strategies of the late 1970s, which in turn influenced the Reagan administration rationale for its military buildup in the 1980s. This chapter also draws conclusions from the earlier chapters, showing how the discursive practices of the security discourses ideologically reproduce the political organisation of containment militarism.

On the basis of this analysis, the final chapter suggests how alternative conceptions of security might act to challenge this hegemony in ways that open up critical debates on and about geopolitics. This requires an extension of geopolitical thinking to encompass a broad critique of the global processes of militarisation (Deudney 1983, Wallensteen et al. 1985), and to link critically formulated geopolitics to the political dimensions of global social change (Mendlowitz and Walker eds 1987).
2.1 THE OTHER

Discourses of Otherness are an important theme in contemporary critical social theory and provide a focus for this study precisely because they involve the questions of demarcations between realms of knowledge, how the knower relates to the known, how cultural and political identities are structured and how discourses are structured and articulated in hegemonic arrangements. How one distinguishes "Same" from "Other", the knower from the known, is an epistemological question and, in more practical terms, a question of politics; it is a relation of power. It is also a move which mobilises important structuring process of social identity. These three themes are closely interrelated in the sections that follow. The focus in this chapter is on the discursive practices of Otherness in terms of power, on how designations of Otherness are moves of exclusion, rather than on the complex philosophical issues of epistemology that can be raised from this literature (see Theunisson 1984).

The discourse on and about the "Other" is concerned with these perennial philosophical debates within the Western tradition concerning identity and difference first set out clearly in Greek philosophy. In Western thought a bifurcation of reality involves a conception of the Other as difference against...
which the "I", "we" or "the same" is defined. Aristotle's formulation of political philosophy is premised on a clear distinction between the Greeks who lived within the "political space" of the polis, and the Orientals, the outsiders, who inhabited the rest of the ancient world (Dossa 1987). This bifurcation of East and West is a theme continued to this day, a theme that runs at the heart of rationalist discourse on politics, and as will be shown later, is present in the CPD's identification of the U.S. polity with enlightenment and universal human progress, in distinction from the Soviet system, based in their understanding, on force and coercion.

Hegel's dialectical philosophy contains much of relevance to this theme. His discussion of the unity of identity and opposition in the dialectical method provides a point of entry into the discussion (Taylor 1979). In Hegel's discussion of the master / slave relationship one is defined in terms of the other, without whose joint presence neither is definable. By struggling to assert himself against the master the slave creates his identity, the master in turn creates his own identity in attempting to dominate the slave. Sartre's Being and Nothingness (1966) analyses in detail the role of the Other in the creation of the subject. Power is related to the Other, whose look turns the subject into an object for that Other, thus threatening it as subject.

It might be argued that other cultural traditions contain similar dualistic structures. The importance of what is rendered
in English as Ying and Yang is particularly apposite in this context. What is important here is the repeated theme of the interconnectedness of both Ying and Yang in any phenomena or activity. In this tradition one is not ultimately collapsible to the other. If one is ascendent, the other acts to compensate and will in turn become ascendent. In Western conceptions, difference is defined in terms of identity, to which it is ultimately reduced in some way. Identity is privileged over difference. In Derrida's (1977, 1981) terms, self-identity is defined in terms of "differance" a spatial and temporal deferment of the Other, a move which privileges identity over difference.

The Other is thus a relation of difference, but difference is tied to identity, the Other is defined in contrast to "I", "we" or the same. It is thus a relation of power; "they" are "created" as "them" by "us"; "we" can impose "our" conception of "them" as being "them" and act accordingly if "we" have the capabilities to do so. As will be elaborated further in chapter 3, these formulations of identity and difference are fundamental to the structuring of the state system, the essential political category of modernity. Thus the formulation of fundamental categories of identity and difference structure political life according to difference defined principally in the categories of space and time.

The theme of the Other repeatedly occurs in current social theory debates about epistemology and provides a clear link
between language, knowledge and power. It is essential to any
discussion of discourse, because discourses concern the creation
of objects of discussion and rules and codes for the
specification of the discussed as separate from the discusser,
for the creation of norms and rules for the dealing with the
Other. In this chapter Otherness is first presented in general
terms drawing on a wide range of literature. Subsequent sections
focus on the work of Edward Said in his seminal Orientalism
(1979), Tzvetan Todorov's (1984) analysis of the The Conquest of
America and briefly on Shapiro's (1987a) analysis of the
creation of Otherness in recent American foreign policy in
Central America. This provides a link to the following chapter
where the discourses of international politics are examined,
showing the importance of the theme of Otherness.

2.2 THE OTHER: TIME AND SPACE

As Kemp (1984) argues, the theme of the Other provides a key to
understanding Foucault's work. Thus we find in the preface to
Foucault's The Order of Things a clear statement of the role of
the Other in his conceptualisation of "madness", a study which
investigated "the way in which a culture can determine in a
massive, general form the difference that limits it" (Foucault
1973:xxiv). Thus

The history of madness would be the history of the Other
- of that which, for a given culture, is at once
interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to
exorcise the interior danger) but by being shut away (in
order to reduce its otherness); whereas the history of
order imposed on things would be the history of the Same
- of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into identities. (Foucault 1973:xxiv)

The spatial dimension of Otherness is clear in these phrases. The Other inhabits somewhere else.

The notion of distance in space can be relatively simple and somewhat arbitrary. As Said (1979:54) puts it:

...this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary. I use the word "arbitrary" here because imaginative geography of the "our land - barbarian land" variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in our own minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from "ours".

Thus identity can be formulated in a negative sense, "we" are not "barbarians" hence we are "civilised". This theme is present in numerous texts which situate themselves in a spatial arrangement to identify their space in distinction from the space of their object.

Thus, as de Certeau writes of Montaigne's essay "Of Cannibals", questions of "...the status of the strange: Who is "barbarian"? What is a "savage"? are examined. In short, what is the place of the other?" (1986:67). This relationship of text to space is complicated and multidimensional:

On the one hand, the text accomplishes a spatialising operation which results in the detemination or displacement of the boundaries delimiting cultural fields (the familiar vs. the strange). In addition, it reworks the spatial divisions which underlie and organise a culture. For these socio- or ethno-cultural
boundaries to be changed, reinforced, or disrupted, a space of interplay is needed, one that establishes the text's difference, makes possible its operations and gives it "credibility" in the eyes of the readers, by distinguishing it both from the conditions within which it arose (the context) and from its object (the content). Montaigne's essay functions both as an Index locorum (a redistribution of cultural space) and as an affirmation of a place (a locus of utterance). These two aspects are only formally distinguishable, because it is in fact the text's reworking of space that simultaneously produces the space of the text. (de Certeau 1986:67-8)

The question of the Other thus raises fundamental epistemological issues. Many scholarly investigations are premised on formulations of difference which have important implications for the study of social phenomena (Bernstein 1976). How the object is defined as Other in the search for an "objective" methodology is crucial to social theory. Indeed it goes deeper. The very formulation of an "object" of study is an exercise in the formulation of difference, a setting apart, deferment, and ultimately a technique which establishes a relationship of power by the knower over the known (Berman 1984). In terms of the positivist conception of science, it gives the knower power over the known by providing the knower with predictive knowledge and the tools of manipulation and control that flow from that knowledge (Matson 1966). In tackling the formation of the Other one inevitably tangles with the central role of dichotomising and dualism in social theory. These debates are also enmeshed in specific conceptions of space and time.
In Historiography the Other, in this case, is formulated in terms of time.

Historiography, ... is based on a clean break between the past and the present. It is the product of relations of knowledge and power linking supposedly distinct domains: on the one hand, there is the present (scientific, professional, social) place of work, the technical and conceptual apparatus of inquiry and interpretation, and the operation of describing and/or explaining; on the other hand there are places (museums, archives, libraries) where the materials forming the object of this research are kept and secondarily, set off in time, there are the past systems of events to which these materials give analysis access" (deCerteau 1986:3)

There is thus a line separating the institution and the researcher from that which is researched. There is a difference between them "established out of principle by a will to objectivity" (1986:3). The space thus constructed separates its "own" in terms of the present of historiography from the "Other" which is "its" past under study. The Other is portrayed as different because it is distant in time.

This formulation of Otherness as different because it is distant in time is much more powerful in a world of "naturalised" time, than in a world of "sacred" time (Toulmin and Goodfield 1967). Medieval conceptions of time, presented time as sacred, interrelated rather than purely linear. Causation was in terms of God's will and plan rather than in terms of the linear temporal schemes of secular theories of evolution. The "modern" time is naturalised and seen to be enormously long in human terms. It likewise is seen in uniform terms, measurable ultimately with the precision of atomic
clocks. Only around the edges, at extreme velocities, according to the theory of relativity, do things cease to be uniform.

This conception of time is important in how anthropology has constructed its object of study, its Other, in ways that ensure the domination of the observer, the Western academic, over the observed, the "primitive" non-Westerner (Fabian 1983). In part it has done this by using theories of evolution, often graphically illustrated in terms of dendritic diagrams, which have built in hierarchial arrangements presented in spatialised terms. Thus nonwestern peoples are distanced by being both earlier on the time path of "progress" and also several categories distant in the cultural hierarchy in which the researcher's culture is, of course, at the top. But a simple displacement in time does not complete this relationship. Space is also important, and a particular understanding of space is implicit in Western social and political theory.

The interpretation of things as distant in time is complicated by what is sometimes termed the "spatialisation of thought". Gross (1981-82) argues that the development of many facets of societal existence has led to a radical spatialisation of culture in modern capitalism. The rational mind is seen as spatial; the intuitive as temporal. The triumph of the spatial over the temporal is easily seen in the terms used above where one talks of the "distant" past. Technological modes of thinking are epitomised in Taylorist time and motion studies with their graphic (spatial) representations of motion. A pervasive culture
industry emphasises the immediate and decontextualises its images in urban landscapes where location is geometric. All this suggests a spatial, and also a technological sensibility.

Within Western societies conceptions of space are based on a particular naturalised, uniform Cartesian space. The importance of the Euclidian/Cartesian conception of space which underlies modern politics is very important. It is crucial to the emergence of modern notions of territorial sovereignty and the territorial state, which is the central political concept in the current political lexicon (Walker 1984b). More generally Foucault focuses on the crucial links between space, knowledge and power, and the role of concepts with a geographical dimension; "Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it's first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power" (Foucault 1980:68). But he is prepared to take this much further and link it to his epistemological concerns;

Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region, territory. (Foucault 1980:69)

He develops these thoughts further in response to additional questions posed by French geographers leading him to conclude that geopolitical concerns are very similar to his own work,
although often not explicitly so;

The longer I continue, the more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics where my preoccupations would link up with your methods. (Foucault 1980:77)

Combining these themes from Foucault provides a way of theorising the ideological dimension of geopolitics.

The exclusion of the Other and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same is the essential geopolitical moment. The two processes are complementary; the Other is excluded as the reverse side of the process of incorporation of the Same. Expressed in terms of space and power this is the basic process of geopolitics in which territory is divided, contested and ruled. The ideological dimension is clearly present in how this is justified and explained and understood by the populations concerned; "the Other" is seen as different if not an enemy, "We" are "the same" in that we are all citizens of the same nation, speak a similar language etc. These themes of difference and the conceptualisations of Otherness are important in investigations of global political and cultural arrangements, of "world orders" (Blasius 1984).
2.3 THE OTHER AND WORLD ORDER

The process of cultural dichotomising in designating identity in distinction from Others, is fundamentally important in the way a world order is viewed and constructed (Said 1979, Mazrui 1984). "Occident" is contrasted to "orient", "Christian" to "aethist", "developed" to "undeveloped", "democracy" to "communism" or "totalitarianism". Dichotomies of this kind are relationships of power: thus "we" are strong, "they" are weak, "we" are good "they" are evil etc.. This process is in part offset by universalistic tendencies, although these too are often seen in dichotomous terms. Thus, for example, the universalising principle of Christianity is often interpreted as an attempt to change all "others" into extensions of "we". Here difference is subsumed under the original identity that defined it. The privileged unity is once more imposed; difference is subsumed.

These matters are rarely dealt with explicitly in the literature of International Relations, although as will be argued in later chapters, the identity / difference theme and the privileging of identity over difference deeply structures the discourses of international politics. The material on images and perceptions that does deal with global phenomena suffers from a major failure to deal with ideological matters or to articulate a social theory. This recognition has led to increased interest in cultural and ideological investigations in the field of International Relations (Walker 1984a). Here there is a tendency towards an analysis of discourse, focusing on the
construction of categories that facilitate colonial rule or the incorporation of exotic identities within the ambit of capital under the guise of discourses of development or modernisation (Escobar, 1984/5). The political use of these ideological constructions is a theme that is repeatedly emphasised.

Thus Nandy (1980, 1983, 1984) has investigated the cultural dimensions of colonialism and identity in a number of studies focusing in particular on the Indian sub-continent and how identities are developed in political contexts. The ambivalent reactions and re-interpretations of cultural identities under political domination is a central theme of this work in cultural psychology. A recent paper extends these themes in a critique of the ideology of adulthood which links the ideology of colonial domination to the portrayal of the colonised, in this case "the Other", as infantile and hence inferior and in need of domination and enforced "education" (Nandy 1984-85). This is a variation of the use of time as distance in the creation of the Other.

Mazrui (1984) traces the theme of cultural exclusivity through religious notions of monotheism focusing on Christianity and Islam. He shows also how these notions of cultural difference have been adapted and underlie ideas of development and specifically the role of technology in international relations between North and South. Vincent (1984) has investigated the important role of race in the expansion of European society. JanMohamed (1985) explores the theme of racial
difference in colonial literature. Doctrines of racial superiority were endemic in the nineteenth century providing support for the cause of colonisation while also legitimating atrocities against indigenous peoples who were portrayed as less than fully human. The legacy of these themes remain in contemporary racism.

The discipline of Anthropology has wrestled with these problems in terms of ethnocentrism in the last two decades, its practitioners alerted to the use of their work to destroy the cultures that they had studied in South East Asia. The theoretical issues remain important in attempting to come to terms with how Anthropology has created its object in terms of assumptions and patterns inherited from the culture of its origin (Sahlins 1974, Wiarda 1981). Questions of ideology and the role of Anthropology in the process of colonialism have been raised (Asad 1979) drawing in questions of social structure and the analysis of discourse. Fabian (1983) focuses on the importance of the conception of time in the creation of the Other in anthropology, showing how the evolutionary preoccupations of Anthropology allows "primitive" people to be viewed as inherently inferior to Western culture.

Wolf (1982) has attempted to use the emergence of a critical Anthropological sensibility to support his ambitious rewriting of the history of European imperialism. Taking as a point of departure the tendency to "name" other cultures and deprive them of their history in writing ethnocentric "universal" histories
based on Eurocentric preoccupations, he draws attention to the process of dehumanisation of "different" peoples on a political level. The essence of this matter of Anthropology and Otherness and epistemology is neatly summarised by Paul Riesman thus:

Our social sciences generally treat the culture and knowledge of other peoples as forms and structures necessary for human life that those people have developed and imposed upon a reality which we know -- or at least our scientists know -- better than they do. We can therefore study those forms in relation to "reality" and measure how well or ill they are adapted to it. In their studies of the cultures of other people, even those anthropologists who sincerely love the people they study, almost never think that they are learning something about the way the world really is. Rather they conceive of themselves as finding out what other people's conceptions of the world are. (Riesman 1976:52)

Increasingly that reality from which the Anthropologists come is defined in technological terms and the dichotomy of "the West and the Rest" is understood in the language of modernisation and technology transfer (Mazrui 1984). The ideology of progress has in part replaced by the ideology of technological mastery (Gross 1981-2). Technological mastery is combined with the enclosure of designated territories in terms of "private" property and the formal sovereignty of states in the process of "modernisation" whereby capitalism expands (Smith 1978); technological control involves the incorporation of control over space. As Mandel puts it (1975:501) "belief in the omnipotence of technology is the specific form of bourgeois ideology in late capitalism." Development is discussed in terms of technology transfer, a process of universalising modernity, absorbing the Other by extending identity, understood in terms
of industrial capitalism.

2.4 POWER AND THE OTHER

The theme of the Other is also of concern to Jacques Derrida (1977, 1981) in his writings on philosophy and literature, particularly where he takes aim at the structure of Western thought which relies so heavily on dichotomies and polarities. These frequent polar opposites: good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, nature vs. culture etc. have distinct valuations built into their formulation. As Johnson summarises it in her introduction to the English translation of Dissemination, "The second term in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first, a fall away from it..." (Derrida 1981:viii). The first term has priority. "In general what these hierarchial oppositions do is to privilege unity, identity, immediacy, and temporal and spatial presentness over distance, difference, dissimulation and deferment." (1981:viii).

All this is related to Derrida's broader preoccupation with Western metaphysics based on Being as presence. It also relates to the "operation of exclusion in a philosophy that permits one group, or value, or idea to be kept out so that another can be safeguarded internally and turned into a norm" (Ryan 1982:3). Further it asks "How might one find what is excluded - something that usually is a variety of difference or repetition in metaphysics - at work determining that from which it supposedly derives" (Ryan 1982:3). This project strikes at the heart of the
Western social theory based on its privileging of the cerebral, of mind separated from the world which it apprehends through "senses"; the superiority of theory over practice.

The process of exclusion and inclusion is central to feminist concerns, an area where the analysis of the Other and difference, involving the silence and exclusion of the feminine, is particularly developed around the relation of language and power. The denial of female experience in social and political theory is a repeated theme in feminist writings (Clark and Lange 1979). Thus rationality is defined in terms of "male" criteria where knowledge is tied to domination (Lloyd 1984). This is particularly clear in the development of science, in terms of the "mastery" or domination of nature in Francis Bacon's idiom, a development which carried with it political restructuring in which male "scientific" knowledge came to dominate over female practices (Merchant 1980).

An important part of the theme of woman as Other is the structure of language; literary criticism is a sphere of increasing feminist concern (Moi 1985). Initially analysed in terms of the power to "name" experience, the argument suggests that women are powerless to name and define the terms of their own experience and consequently are forced to discuss their experience in terms produced by men (Daly 1973). The terms are imbued with a false, because only partial, epistemological significance as universals particularly within "scientific" study.
By defining experience in terms of a language that is at best only partial, female experience is denied. More important, the possibility of a separate female experience is denied by the assertion of the terms as universal (Spender 1984). The feminist experience is thus excluded by its inclusion within a systematically distorted discourse, systematically distorted by the reification of male experience as universal. Many feminist efforts have been devoted to attempting to de-masculinize commonly used terms in an attempt to restructure language to reflect the plurality of human experience.

These themes of language and power are present in the feminist analysis of militarism and the structures of power implicit in the discourse about international relations and in particular the ideological assumptions of nuclear physics (Easlea 1983). In this debate the focus is on the power relations of masculine domination of knowledge, either in the political sphere as in "international affairs expert" or in the technical sphere as scientist or weapons technician, to the exclusion of the women who don't speak the technical languages, and hence are not considered competent in the fields dominated by the discourses of security (Cohn 1987). This exclusion goes further in the militarist indoctrination of soldiers to objectify and dominate their own "female traits" as well as women in general by defining them as Other, different and inferior and hence to be dominated (Enloe 1983, McAllister 1982).
In summary this focus on the Other ties together a number of themes of modern social theory in a way which directly links epistemological concerns to matters of discourse and power. The formulation of the (separated) object of study is central to epistemological structures which are deeply rooted relations of power expressed, mediated and reproduced in and through discourses riddled with dualistic structures, each of which has hierarchial arrangements of terms which privilege certain forms of practice. The following sections explore these themes further showing how discourses of Otherness are constructed, and explicating them as structures of practice, power, and knowledge.

2.5 ORIENTALISM

The single study which most comprehensively incorporates the themes of knowledge and power as they relate to a discourse on the Other is Edward Said's Orientalism (1979). It will be discussed in some detail here as it provides a concrete example of the interlinkage of these themes.

The notion of the Orient is "...one of Europe's deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (1979:1-2). But for Said it is not simply a matter of ideas and images.

The Orient is an integral part of European material civilisation and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically
as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. (1979:2)

Its most fundamental assumption is the basic idea of an East-West dichotomy. "Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident" (1979:2). Orientalism is incorporated in the arena of popular culture as well as academic scholarship.

But much more than an idea or set of images, it is a series of practices and institutions which have power. Orientalism is a "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said 1979:3). This focus on knowledge as power is a key component of Said's analysis. "Orientalism is implicitly and from the beginning a discourse of power that characterised a particular set of social, economic and political relations between Europe and its colonies" (Mani and Frankenberg 1985:177). It is the combination of the three themes of power, knowledge and historical specificity drawn from an amalgam of the works of Foucault (1972, 1973) Gramsci (1971) and Raymond Williams (1973, 1977) that gives Said's work its strength.

However Said's outline of a methodology for his project is fairly brief. He offers a book that is structured around the themes of Orientalism as a project of domination, as an epistemological and ontological creation and part of material
culture, but without a more explicitly worked out methodological project. As Mani and Frankenberg (1985) point out, it is precisely when critics of Orientalism emphasise one of these themes to the exclusion of the others that their criticisms fall short of dealing with Said's work.

On a few points however Said is fairly clear. First, is the centrality of the notion of discourse as used by Michel Foucault. He contends

...that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage -- and even produce -- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. (Said 1979:3)

The network of interests brought to bear whenever the term "Orient" appears is the principle subject of Said's text. The subsidiary theme ..."tries to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self." (1979:3).

Said premises his analysis on a number of historical generalisations. First he starts with the assumption that the Orient is not an inert entity that is simply "there". Using Vico's assertion that men make history, and can know what they have made, Said extends it to geography "...as both geographical and cultural entities -- to say nothing of historical entities -- such locales, regions, geographical sectors as "Orient" and
 Occident" are man-made" (1979:5). In this sense Said is concerned with the creation of the discourse of Orientalism, rather than concerned with the correspondence of the Orient with the views of it constructed by Orientalism. This theme of the creation of the Other is important for this study also. It is crucial at all times to treat the conceptual categories of identity and difference as contingent PRODUCTIONS, not as ontologically given categories.

Second, Said is concerned with the configurations of power which shaped the Orientalist discourse. This took place within an overall European hegemony. "The Orient was Orientalised not only because it was discovered to be "Oriental" in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth century European, but also because it could be -- that is, submitted to being -- made Oriental" (1979:5-6). Further, it is important not to treat the structure of Orientalism simply as a tissue of lies and myths that can be "blown away". Thus it is a created body of theory and practice which has maintained itself for generations in the academies of the West. It is the hegemony of Europe that has given Orientalism its strength and durability. This ascendency of European culture is buttressed by its own structure, the principal component of which is "...the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all non-European peoples and cultures" (1979:7).

If Orientalism has a weakness it lies in the passages where Said makes generalisations about this process of cultural
dichotomising that is basic to his theme. Thus he offers a number of comments about the universality of this phenomena without arguing that it is a universal process on the basis of hard evidence: "...Said never entertains the possibility that this propensity to transform, dichotomise and become hostile is as much a social construction as is the content of images thus constructed" (Mani and Frankenburg 1985:190).

This question focuses attention on the necessity to analyse cultural practices within their historical specificity. Even if there is a universal propensity to dichotomise, as Said sometimes carelessly suggests, what is of importance is the way in which these dichotomies structure and are structured in discourse in specific contexts, and how that relates to the social structuring, and in Neil Smith's (1984) term, the "production of space", and in Foucault's (1986) phrase the production "of other spaces".

Said's analysis of Orientalism reinforces Foucault's (1977) argument outlined in the previous chapter about the importance of investigating discursive practices in many places because they frequently cross the conventional academic disciplinary demarcations. As this dissertation repeatedly argues, the practices of Otherness are widespread; they structure and are structured by the discursive practices of "security".
2.6 THE INDIAN AS OTHER

Where Said looks East from Europe to the construction of the Orient, Todorov (1984) looks West to *The Conquest of America* by the Spaniards. His analysis is on a smaller scale than Said's but his concerns are similar. Following Levinas' (1969) analysis of the theme of the Other in terms of "Alterity", Todorov makes the question of the Other the key methodological device for his investigation of how a number of leading European explorers and conquerers constructed the ontological and epistemological categories that facilitated their conquest and domination of the indigenous civilisations of the Americas.

His analysis of Columbus' writings presents a series of discursive practices that he argues (1984:42) are applicable to much of the colonial experience.

Either he conceives the Indians (though not without using these words) as human beings altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them not only as equals but also as identical, and this behaviour leads to assimilationism, the projection of his own values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference, but the latter is immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority (in his case, obviously, it is the Indians who are inferior). What is denied is the existence of a human substance truly other, something capable of being not merely and imperfect state of oneself. (Todorov 1984:42)

Each of these positions is "...grounded in egocentrism, in identification of our own values with values in general, of our I with the universe -- in the conviction that the world is one" (1984:42-3). This metaphysical assumption of a single world is crucial in the whole identity / difference formulation. It
relates to the comments of Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics as structured around being as presence, the superiority in the categorical frameworks of numerous discourses of the immediate over the distant. It is crucial because it recurs repeatedly in ways that ultimately privilege unity over difference, requiring the Other to be assimilated, subdued, overcome, ultimately in some manner reducible to the terms of the identity of the point of origin.

The results of these metaphysical conceptions of a single universe identified with the European, have been the creation of the Other, on the one hand to be assimilated in terms of Christianising equals, and on the Other simultaneously to be dominated and economically exploited on the basis of the European's superiority to the Indian. This points to the complexity of the construction of the Other; it is rarely constructed along a single axis. Todorov suggests that there are at least three axes on which the Other is constructed:

First of all, there is the value judgement (an axiological level): the other is good or bad, I love or do not love him, or as was more likely to be said at the time, he is my equal or my inferior (for there is usually no question that I am good and that I esteem myself). Secondly, there is the action of rapprochement or distancing in relation to the other (a praxeological level): I embrace the other's values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify the other with myself, I impose my own image upon him; between submission to the other and the other's submission, there is also a third term, which is neutrality or indifference. Thirdly, I know or am ignorant of the other's identity (this would be the epistemic level); of course there is no absolute here, but an endless gradation between the lower or higher states of knowledge.

(Todorov 1984:185)
Todorov argues that these three levels are interconnected but there is "...no rigorous implication; hence, we cannot reduce them to one another, nor anticipate one starting form the other" (Todorov 1984:185). Thus conquest, love and knowledge are viewed as the autonomous elementary forms of conduct. These three themes then provide a more explicit framework for investigating the Other than that provided by Said (1979), although they are clearly present in his work.

Todorov's analysis is important in that it once again shows how identity creates difference. We create the Other in specific discursive practices which structure our behaviour towards the Other in specific ways. Todorov's analysis provides the point of departure for Shapiro's (1987a) analysis of much more recent creations of Otherness in the same region, particularly the creation of Guatemala as Other in American foreign policy.

2.7 OTHERNESS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

In "The Constitution of the Central American Other: The Case of "Guatemala" " (Shapiro 1987a) many of the themes discussed earlier in this chapter are brought together. It thus offers a useful summary of this chapter's theme of discourses of Otherness and simultaneously provides the link with the following chapter's concerns.

Shapiro starts with Todorov's (1984) analysis because Todorov shows that "Central America in general and Guatemala in
particular were not so much discovered as imaginatively preconstituted by the Spanish Conquistadors" (Shapiro 1987a:1). Shapiro's concern is to show that a similar mentality underlies American foreign policy in the 1980s. He focuses on the discursive practices of foreign policy making which support the export of U.S. capital and emphasises "the modes of representation abetting this widely orchestrated form of domination by making it acceptable and coherent within the dominant ethos that constructs domestic selves and exotic Others" (Shapiro 1987a:2).

Not all Shapiro's lengthy analysis can be summarised here, but a number of crucial points are of direct relevance to this dissertation, and how discourses of Otherness are constructed. First, Shapiro notes that foreign policy specialists and academic analysts in the U.S. usually use similar discursive practices. Chapter 4 will reiterate this point showing how the political circumstances of the cold war of the 1950s shaped the academic discourses which in turn reproduce the categorisations of the cold war.

Second, Shapiro notes how the foreign policy discourse depluralises and dehistoricises Guatemalan "society" by reducing it to a "fact" where those who lose in political struggles tend to be ignored in the political code. Guatemala was formerly created in Spain's expansion, now it is meaningful in terms of superpower rivalry, never is it understood in the terms of the original inhabitants whose place it once was. Thus
The geographic "knowledge" we invoke in our naming helps, in Foucault's terms to put into circulation the tactics and strategies involved in the "demarcations" and "control of territories". Thus, to the extent that one accepts and unreflectively reproduces the security orientated geopolitical discursive practice, one engages in implicit acts of recognition of the existing power and authority configurations. (Shapiro 1987a:8)

But these authority configurations are often difficult to spot because they appear as unproblematic descriptions. Thus we have to examine the terms of descriptions, in particular being sensitive to the representational practices of cartography which designates specific bounded territories, and in the process renders a political creation "natural", "delivering up the discursive territory within which legitimate speech about bounded areas can occur" (Shapiro 1987a:8). Thus the question of who imposes meanings on space is crucial. In O'Tuathail's (1987) terms "geopolitical scripting" is a fundamentally political act, a move of power. Thus "Guatemala" in particular and the international system in general "are parts of a system that has been conjured up in policy-related speech practices over the centuries" (Shapiro 1987a:11). The point is that these are historic creations, they could have been otherwise.

It is precisely this point that is crucial in the development of a critical theory of geopolitics, this investigation of how a particular set of practices comes to be dominant and excludes other sets of practices. Where conventional discourse simply accepts the current circumstances as given, "naturalised", a critical theory asks questions of how
they came to be as they are. But this acceptance of things as they are renders states as static geographic entities rather than as active processes and practices; through this reification the U.S. becomes a static geographic entity, not the violent conquerer of indigenous peoples. "The dominant representational practice within which we have a political grasp of the international system is one that sharpens boundaries, national boundaries in this case" (Shapiro 1987a:15). Hence the "scientific code" of foreign policy discourse in these areas talks of an "international environment" providing "opportunities" for "management", in a series of practices that act to "denarrativise" the discourse.

This returns to earlier considerations in this chapter about the spatialisation of thought and the denial of history. It also links back to the theme of the Other, foreign policy portrays distant places in specific ways through its constitution of Otherness. Foreign policy thus is the process of making "foreign" or exotic, and thus different from the self, someone or thing. Given the usual esteem within which the self is constituted, the exoticising of the Other almost invariably amounts to the constitution of that Other as a less than equal subject" (Shapiro 1987a:20).

But the creation of Other in distinction from Self, can, as Todorov (1984) points out, be constructed on more than one axis. Thus the construction of Self and Other in moral terms is coupled to the discursive practices of foreign policy making ("the policy of making foreign") which constitute the
international arena as one concerned with power and crucially "security". As will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters, political identity in the U.S. in particular, and more generally the Western world have constructed political discourse in terms of "security" or "national security" and the pursuit of the "national interest" since the Second World War (Klein 1987).

The making of Other as something foreign is thus not an innocent exercise in differentiation. It is clearly linked to how the self is understood. A self construed with a security-related identity leads to the construction of Otherness on the axis of threats or lack of threats to that security, while a self identified as one engaged in "crisis management" - a current self-understanding of American foreign policy thinking - will create modes of Otherness on a ruly versus unruly axis.

(Shapiro 1987a:22)

Coupling the moral superiority dimension of Otherness to the geopolitical/ security ones, "the foreign policy discourse as a whole becomes a vindication for the U.S. intervention to seek to control another state's steering mechanism for its own moral benefit as well as for purposes of U.S. strategic and domestic interests" (Shapiro 1987a:44).

If the Other is potentially a threat then, as was noted above with regard to Foucault and the discourses of Madness and Criminality, surveillance is necessary, for this covert operations and spying are legitimated. But the construction of Otherness in the Guatemalan case goes further than this. Thus the Kissinger (1984) report on U.S. foreign policy in Central America represents Latin America as a "rough draft" (Shapiro 1987a:50) of the U.S. bourgeois culture, an Other which is
nearly the same. It suggests that with further economic development it will emerge as the same as American bourgeois society. This move allows the attribution of any "revolutionary ideas" to "outside interference" and hence provides the legitimation for intervention and intense surveillance.

This outside interference can only come from across the geopolitical divide, in terms of the Soviet Union and Cuba. The geopolitical dimension thus structures the discourse on Latin America, precisely because of the specification of Otherness as nearly "like us", but not quite. "To show how such a discourse works requires the assumption that the world does not issue a summons to speak in a particular way but rather that ways of speaking are implicating in world-making" (Shapiro 1987a:56).

2.8 OTHERNESS AND THE CPD

This chapter has explicated the literature on discourses of Otherness in detail because it provides a link between the methodological considerations of the last chapter with the discursive strategies of the CPD texts that are the focus of the bulk of this study. This dissertation argues that the CPD attempted to re-articulate the hegemonic position of containment militarism, in doing so, they drew on the discursive practices of Otherness to structure their "Soviet threat".

These practices of Otherness are pervasive and deeply embedded in Western metaphysical conceptions and ideological
structures. The Other provides a useful way of illuminating the categories of time and space which so fundamentally structure the discourses of social and political theory. The discourse of political theory, in particular the theory of International Relations is the subject of the first part of the next chapter. As will be made clear there, the central political concept of security is formulated as the exclusion of Otherness, and an exclusion that is a spatial exercise of power. This in turn leads to an examination of geopolitics and to Political Geography and how geopolitics can be reformulated in terms of discourse.
3.1 INTRODUCTION

The importance of the formulations of identity and difference, discourses of Otherness, in formulating political identities and their spaces has now been explicated. This chapter extends the theme of Otherness by focusing initially on political theory and how international politics is concerned with the concept of security. As will be made clear this concept of security is understood in spatial terms, and specifically in terms of the spatial exclusion of Otherness. This provides the connection between the concerns of social theory outlined in the last two chapters and the traditional concern within Political Geography with geopolitics.

This chapter briefly reviews the various conceptions of geopolitics and the classical themes of Mackinder and Spykman before offering a reinterpretation of geopolitics based on the discourses of security, which as section 2 makes clear, are spatially structured. The final two sections enlarge on recent attempts to revive Political Geography. They link these developments with theoretical developments within the discipline that point to the necessity of understanding geopolitics as discourse. With this theoretical approach drawn from the analysis of international political theory and the reinterpreted history of the relationship of containment and geopolitics the
discussion can then proceed, in chapter 4, to set out in more detail the discourses of security involved in the policy of containment militarism.

3.2 POLITICAL THEORY, STATES AND SECURITY

The roots of the current literature on international politics and security can be traced from the writings of thinkers like Nicolo Machiavelli who marked the emergence of what, in hindsight, is considered the modern political tradition. Writing at the time when political space was being closed into many sovereign entities he recognised the possibilities of the conflict of a multiplicity of ends in human affairs. ¹ He marks in many ways the transition from medieval cosmology premised on divine planning and the ultimate compatibility of human actions to a recognition of the new state of affairs in the era in which feudalism gave way to a nascent capitalism, and in which new political arrangements finally transcended the putative authority of the emperor.

These political arrangements were finally codified later in the treaty of Westphalia (1648) which is often taken as the beginning of the modern political system of international relations. The twin developments of the emergence of capitalism and the closure of political space mark the beginning of the "modern" era, which has spread both its dominant political

¹ Machiavelli's (1962) most famous work The Prince was first published in 1532, five years after his death.
organisation; i.e. the nation state, and the interrelated economic organisations of capitalism across the globe (Anderson 1974, Smith 1984).

This form of the closure of political space in terms of territorially defined states is very important. It involves simultaneously the territorial demarcation of political space within identifiable boundaries and the extension of the concept of sovereignty to one of absolute power, the creation of an international anarchy, in the sense that there is no higher recognised and accepted authority with the power to enforce its will. There have remained transnational institutions, religious, commercial and political, but the state is empowered with final authority over matters within its boundaries. Repeated efforts have been made to establish regimes of international law to be observed by all, but the related collective security regimes are usually vulnerable to the unilateral operation of national sovereignty. This unique political creation of space is an essentially Western capitalist creation. Of course it never in fact operates quite this neatly, but the rationale of sovereignty is deeply structured into political arrangements.

The centralisation of political power in a territorially delimited state was a dramatic change in political organisation. Prior to the emergence of this "modern" system, codified, as noted above, in the mid-seventeenth century, there had been a multiplicity of authorities, lords and chieftains, bishops and cardinals, cities and empires. The feudal landscape was one of
many overlapping claims to allegiance, claims not solely related to the territory that the subject of these claims inhabited. The rise of capitalism and the rise of the modern state with absolute sovereignty were accompanied by the rise of political conceptions based on the individual, rather than social collectivities. They also related to the individual as a resident of a particular place. This combination of occurrences gave rise to the modern bourgeois notions of citizenship, the state and property, the key structuring concepts of political discourse, of which the state is predominant.

Its intellectual formulation is traceable most clearly to the seventeenth century political theories of Thomas Hobbes (1968; original publication, 1651) and it relies on a very specific formulation of political theory in terms of isolated human "individuals" related to each other in terms of contracts. The formation of states is presented in terms of the rational individual trading some of his freedom of action to the supra individual state in return for a guarantee of protection from threats external to the state boundaries, and the regulation of internal matters to maintain order. In Hobbes' terms order means the protection of the rights of owners of property to maintain their possessions. 2

2 This is not the place for an extensive analysis the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1968) or bourgeois political theory. For its relevance to international politics and security see Buzan (1983), Linklater (1982), Paggi and Pinzauti (1985) and Walker (1984b, 1987). Wight's (1966) essay in Butterfield and Wight's (1966) important collection, is seminal. See also Carnoy (1984).
Within this order the quintessential bourgeois human can then act to maximise his self-interest. It follows from this conception of humans (in fact men) as individuals living within the reification of space of private property at the small scale, and the territorial delimitation of sovereignty, that security is defined in spatial terms of exclusion; enemies are created as Others, inhabiting some other territory. States are thus a form of political container, within which the state provides security. Thus the contract theory of the state relates directly to the creation of Otherness and the political creation of the identities of Self in terms of the state on whose territory one exists.

But this conception of security, and notions of peace, are defined in negative terms. "Peace as a contract is a right that never becomes a duty - a law that never becomes a moral obligation" (Paggi and Pinzauti 1985:6). International politics is thus defined in negative terms. The sphere of diplomacy and interstate relations is the sphere of state activity, responsibility is designated to the state to defend against other states and dangers from beyond the boundaries of the state. Constituted authority becomes the arbiter of good and evil; a threat is such because it is so designated by the state. Many theories of politics "have sought to limit sovereignty but have not questioned this authoritarian mechanism resulting from the connection between property, the corresponding system of rights, and political guarantees necessary for their
maintenance" (Paggi and Pinzauti 1985:7). But this state of affairs requires that the state identify with the interests of the population it supposedly protects. The ideological guise that this identification usually takes is some form of nationalism, whereby the citizens of the state are distinguished as having a common identity (Anderson 1983, Munck 1986).

Since the Second World War these conceptions have been complicated by the predominant clash of two social systems, both claiming legitimacy in terms of inevitable historical progress, or the dialectical unfolding of history, and armed with weapons systems that threaten not only the security of each other's state structures but the very existence of humanity itself. Here, however, the negative pattern of security thinking still operates; Otherness is mobilised to support domestic control and progress. The contest between the cultural modernism of the U.S. hegemony and the "counter modernity" of the Soviet system remains tied into the bourgeois reification of political space in terms of territorial inclusion and exclusion (Klein 1986); identity is still privileged over difference. In Shapiro's (1987a) terms foreign policy still involves making foreign, only the scale has now changed.

These divisions of space in turn are predicated on the Newtonian view of absolute space, a view which is related to the analysis of the spatialisation of culture discussed in the previous chapter. The Newtonian departure theorises space as apart from matter, a pregiven existence, parts of which are
filled with matter. This requires a clean break with earlier conceptions of space which are related in some way to material events (Smith 1984:67). Newton theorised a secondary conception of relative space that was related to material events. But absolute space is constructed as the pregiven container of all events which can be designated a position in absolute space. Absolute space receives epistemological primacy, defined as true, relative space, is merely apparent. Space is made into a thing in itself, in Smith's (1984:70) terms "an abstraction of abstractions."

The primacy of this metaphysical construction is crucial to the construction of the space of states. They are understood as spatial entities, the societies of which they are composed are contained within their boundaries. This privileging of the geometric entity over the real societal practices of the region is based on the spatialisation of culture, premised on the epistemologically privileged conception of absolute space. As Shapiro (1987a) reminds us, the cartographical designation of states as geometric entities with precisely definable boundaries hypostatises states and denies large parts of social reality. This discursive practice of reification is crucial to the operation of International Relations theory and in particular to geopolitics. But these reifications are historical products, not the universal structures of absolute space in which they are construed.
This whole series of conceptualisations is related to the positivist preoccupations of social science with understanding social phenomena in mechanical terms and in terms of economic commodities (Ashley 1983, 1984). Thus international relations are discussed in terms of mechanical metaphors of equilibrium and dynamics. Power is understood in terms of projection within an environment that presents opportunities (Shapiro 1987a). The relationships between mechanics and the commodity form are not accidental. As Sohn Rethel (1978) has argued, the production of abstract space and the development of the commodity form in capitalism are interrelated. The implications of these discursive practices will be expanded below, but as well as with Geopolitics they structure the discourses of International Relations and most obviously Strategy.

These themes of security and the spatial understanding of international politics are repeatedly raised in the rest of this dissertation. The division of political space remains the basis of the debates on international arrangements, it underlies the literature of Nuclear Strategy, it is explicit in Geopolitics. It is a conceptualisation of political affairs that is clearly hegemonic, it is accepted as inevitable, assumed to be commonsense, and naturalised in that it renders eternal a transitory political arrangement, that of modernity (Klein 1986).
3.3 GEOPOLITICS, SPACE AND POWER

These considerations of space and power bring us directly to matters of Political Geography and its concern with geopolitics. The relations of space and power are the central theme of geopolitics, although the term itself presents a multiplicity of meanings, many of which are not spelt out in the numerous texts that use the term. In addition to the relations of space and power it also refers to superpower rivalry and the geographical aspects of international relations. It is sometimes equated with the term "power politics", and it also involves the ability of military technology to traverse territory. The term geopolitics thus has many meanings, often merging one into another, but all have in common a general concern with the interrelationships of space and power.

Thus as Brunn and Mingst (1985) argue, providing a clear definition of the term geopolitics is probably impossible; but many authors have tried nonetheless. McColl (1983:284) suggests that the term geopolitics "...simply refers to geographic factors that lie behind political decisions." The historical meaning of the term derived from Ratzel's early conceptions of Political Geography is tied into debates about geographical determinism and geographical "influences" (Kristof 1960, Peet 1985). Sprout (1968:121) suggests that the term geopolitics can "denote the areal aspect of any political pattern" and that it can be applied to "hypotheses that purport to explain or to predict areal distributions and patterns of political potential
in the society of nations.

Further, "Geopolitics is concerned with the conditions of "order" in a world of sovereign states." (Falk 1983:106) This "order" "... has been largely created and sustained by the role great powers have played outside their territories. Thus the geopolitical perspective emphasises inequalities among states, zones of domination, patterns of intervention and penetration, alliances, conflict formations, and the role of military force" (1983:106-7). This conception of order is often in conflict with the notions of order in international law and the normative expressions of International Relations theory and the theory of security outlined in the last section. International law is premised on the principles of territorial sovereignty, the state as the sole subject of the system, the equality of states, nonintervention and the right of self-defence. Geopolitics also refers to matters of power politics; the finer points of international etiquette are often ignored in the struggle for power and influence between major powers.

Geopolitics is intimately tied into questions of technology, power over territory requires some ability to traverse the terrain and, if necessary, to fight for control over it. While some have argued that distance is no longer a factor (Bunge 1983, Wohlstetter 1968) and it is clear that technological changes including the utilisation of space have drastically altered military matters (Deudney 1983), in international affairs the impact of geography on superpower behaviour is still
I/a factor for consideration (Pepper and Jenkins 1984).

Collins (1981) argues that the old Geopolitical notions of the importance of land remain valid because the modern high technology weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, are instruments of obliteration and destruction rather than weapons which allow their possessors to control territory. Ultimately land provides the bases and resources on which power is built and the logistical complications of friction of distance still remain (O'Sullivan 1986). As O'Sullivan remarks (1985:30) "The heavy cost involved in long military supply lines was clear in the Falklands dispute and is the key issue in the why and wherefore of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force."

Taylor (1985:36) distinguishes between Imperialism, the dominance relation of major powers over peripheral states, and geopolitics viewed as the rivalry of major powers. Thus the term geopolitical is used as a synonymn for international superpower rivalry. This practice of geopolitics tends to reduce the complexity of the world into a bi-polar competition between the superpowers and obscures the importance of distance in providing security. As O'Sullivan (1985:29) puts it "The received wisdom in matters geopolitical reduces human intercourse to a two sided fight. The maps of Mackinder and his successors are invariably of two classes of territory with a no-man's land between them."

Thus we read the following in Foreign Affairs, the leading journal of U.S. foreign policy discussion and debate:
Geopolitics is, definitionally, the art and the process of managing global rivalry; and success, again definitionally, consists at a minimum of consolidating the strength and cohesion of the group of nations which form the core of one's power position, while preventing the other side from extending the area of its domination and clientele. (Jay 1979:486)

Geopolitical reasoning of this sort ignores the regional complexities and the geographical circumstances of global affairs.

One of the most common geopolitical concepts in the cold war is that of "dominos". The argument has repeatedly been used to legitimise U.S. intervention in conflicts around the globe on the assumption that "communism" is a phenomenon that spreads from one area to adjacent territories (O'Sullivan 1982). Thus when one domino "falls" (to the communists) it threatens the next adjacent country. Some variations (see Cohen 1963) complicate this picture introducing minor poles and a complicated series of minor power struggles with "shatterbelts" interposed between them. DeBlij's (1981) textbook credits the domino effect with substantial explanatory power. The domino argument is all based on the assumption that the world is a bi-polar political arrangement where one "side" is either expanding or shrinking its "sphere of influence".

This consideration of geopolitics as global superpower rivalry leads the discussion into a consideration of the classical Geopolitical texts. As noted in chapter 1, this dissertation draws a distinction between the original texts of
Mackinder, Haushofer and Spykman and the the loosen uses of the term to refer to the meanings reviewed in this section. As will be shown later, in particular in chapter 9, the classical Geopolitical texts have had an important influence on the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in particular since the Second World War. They draw on MacKinderian concepts of Heartland and Rimlands to structure ideas of containment, superpower rivalry and the concern with dominos is explained within a MacKinderian framework of the Soviet domination of the Heartland and American attempts to limit Soviet domination of the World island, or Eurasia as it is usually rendered.

As is pointed out in section 3-5, these concepts relate to the recurrent themes of the conflict of land power and sea power in British and subsequently American military thinking. In this sense MacKinder simply codified, and rendered these themes into geographic language. Nonetheless, by doing so, he gave them a specific formulation which has been repeatedly drawn on since. MacKinder is essential to the history of Political Geography, as well as to the understanding of U.S. foreign policy. In particular he is important to the formulation of containment militarism and the deterrence of perceived Soviet expansionism.

3.4 CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS

As Parker (1985) clearly points out, Geopolitical thinking came on the scene at the time of the final closure of political space as the imperial powers of Europe carved up the remaining
un-colonised world at the end of the nineteenth century. The Geopolitical schemes of the various practitioners reflected their respective national preoccupations in detail, but overall there were a number of common features.

First, in recognition of the facts of the final expansion of colonialism and the European state system (Bull and Watson eds 1984) to enclose all the world's territory, the Geopolitical vision of MacKinder encompassed the globe as a totality, all humanity as one, interconnected in one fate by a history shaped, if not quite determined, by the facts of geography. The globe was viewed as a whole, the closed frontiers of the new colonies presented a series of new international relationships, humanity was a whole (Kearns 1984). That was not to see different races and nationalities as in some manner being equal, just their interconnectedness in the global order of things was realised.

States were conceptualised in terms of organic entities with quasi-biological functioning. This was tied into Darwinian ideas of struggle producing progress. Thus expansion was likened to growth and territorial expansion was ipso facto a good thing. This organicist metaphor was later to appear in the cruder Nazi versions of geopolitics and the argument that vigourous nations were justified in expanding and growing at the expense of less vigourous ones (Paterson 1987).

In addition Victorian ideas of progress in terms of mastery of the physical world coexisted, uneasily at times, with the
ambivalent streams of environmental determinism (see Peet 1985) and the possibility of freedom of agency to shape the course of events. More generally prior to the First World War, the current European Geopolitical vision linked the success of European civilisation to a combination of temperate climate and access to the sea. Temperate climate encouraged the inhabitants to struggle to overcome adversity without totally exhausting their energies, hence allowing progress and innovation to lead to social development. Access to the sea encouraged exploration, expansion and trade, and ultimately to the conquest of the rest of the world (Parker 1985).

The Darwinism of the pre-war days lost its appeal in the carnage of trench warfare. At least in British thinking the pre-war pessimism of the possibilities of the survival of European dominance were displaced by the historical theme of the victory of the maritime powers over continental powers and the emphasis came to rest on attempts to maintain that recently reasserted supremacy. Parker (1985) argues that Lord Curzon's foreign policy was an attempt to apply his Geopolitical ideas on the global stage by establishing a series of buffer zones to protect the British Empire from the encroachments of continental power. The French concerns with international politics emphasised the international diplomacy of the era of the League of Nations.

That league as the institution maintaining the supremacy of the victorious powers was to become the target of the new
Geopolitik of Karl Haushofer. The wartime commentaries on the role of Geopolitics credit Haushofer as the director of a Munich "Institute fur Geopolitik". This organisation allegedly produced many tracts which gave support to the Nazi goals of territorial expansion. In the U.S. it was portrayed during the war as the source of a Nazi master plan for world domination by some of the plethora of wartime commentators (Strause Hupe 1942, Weigert, 1942, Whittlesey 1942). Recent scholarship has concluded that the institute was a fiction of wartime propaganda and argues that Haushofer's ideas were often at odds with Nazi actions (Bassin 1987, Heske 1987, Patterson 1987).

This New World fascination with Geopolitics has shaped American foreign policy in terms of theories of containment, doctrines of military strategy (Earle 1944) and perhaps more indirectly the literature on extended nuclear deterrence ever since. In the last decade the term geopolitics is again in vogue and geopolitical rationales for American foreign policy are frequently invoked, following in part Kissinger's rehabilitation of the term.  

The classical Geopoliticians wrote with an audience of policy makers and politicians in mind but did not limit their concerns solely to these people. Many of their ideas have been popularised and widely disseminated. They all wrote primarily for 

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3 It should be noted that Kissinger's use of the term geopolitics relates to his idiosyncratic perspective of global political equilibrium, hence he uses the term in ways that are often at odds with other uses of the term, and in which the references to geography are at best obscure (Hepple 1986).
national audiences and in the hope of influencing national policies in ways that enhanced national, or more specifically, state power. Most had an imperial vision which portrayed national survival in terms of territorial expansion, and the development of colonies as a sign of national virility.

Above all Geopolitics privileged the European state as the key factor in analysis. Individual states in turn were subsumed under a concern with the overall supremacy of the European, later "Western" culture. The imperial theme and the rivalry between European powers are sometimes in conflict, but the overall superiority of "civilisation" is unquestioned. This theme in particular has returned recently to Geopolitical thinking.

An additional concern to classical Geopolitics was the matter of access to resources. This raises the crucial point that the basis of European expansion lay in its technological achievements, its mastery of nature through the application of science gave it a putative superiority over other cultures. The resource question is an important theme in the revived interest in Geopolitics in the last decade reiterating the earlier concerns for access to resources to fuel European economies and their military machines. In its new guise it is concerned with security of oil supplies from the Middle East and minerals from Southern Africa (Haglund 1986).
The specific dynamism of capitalism which propelled the expansion of European imperialism is not central to either the original Geopolitical writing or the new concerns. The national interest is, of course, identified with that of the ruling groups, all submerged in turn in the nation-state. Internal political matters were not of significant concern precisely because the key term in the geopolitical lexicon is the state. It is understood in territorial rather than political terms. Increased power is to be attained by territorial acquisition. Internal conditions are important in some circumstances, but often in terms of national psychological moods or national character rather than in terms of sociological analysis. Thus national will matters, the class structure of that nation is a minor concern, the nation is all, nationalism is the secular religion of the age (Anderson 1983) and Geopolitics is a favoured tool of ardent nationalism.

3.5 GEOPOLITICS AND CONTAINMENT

As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, the U.S. rose to global predominance very rapidly in the Second World War. In its aftermath there followed major political debates as to what to do with this predominance, a debate which quickly became caught up in the emergent cold war and the containment policy.

A key text which emphasised the role of power in international affairs was Nicholas Spykman's America's Strategy...
in World Politics (1942). This was, as Hoffman (1977:44) puts it, "more a geopolitical treatise of the tradition of Admiral Mahan or MacKinder than a book about the principal characteristics of interstate politics". Spykman's subsequent Geography of the Peace (1944) made the Geopolitical theme even more explicit. In a series of global maps he outlined possible future configurations of power in the struggle for the Eurasian "Rimlands".

This Geopolitical dimension is not always clearly rendered in the "security" discourses of containment militarism. There are a number of pertinent points here. First, the term geopolitics was tainted by the association with Nazism, and Haushofer in particular. Hence there was some reluctance to use it (Kristof 1960). Geopolitics is associated with the cruder forms of realpolitik, and balance of power politics which were blamed for the repeated European wars into which the U.S. became embroiled. In addition the territorial control focus, central to the geopolitical conception of power in spatial terms, is reminiscent of imperial policies which the Idealist and moral exceptionalist tendencies in the U.S. foreign policy discourse denigrated (Agnew 1983). Explicitly talking of post war politics in terms of Geopolitics was thus, at least in the early Truman years, potentially politically risky.

But as Deudney (1983), Walters (1974), Parker (1985) and Trofimenko (1986) make clear, the Geopolitical understanding of international relations remains a powerful influence. It
underlies strategy, and as will be demonstrated later, Sovietology, as well as shapes the understanding on the U.S. "national interest". The doctrine of containment was explicitly formulated in spatial and territorial terms. If one understands hegemony as relating to the accepted, taken for granted elements of political organisation, as suggested above, this makes sense.

The U.S. came to world predominance in the Second World War by military conquest (Ambrose 1985). The Second World War was marked by the continuous front line, and success in military campaigning was related to the conquest of territory. "Liberation" from the Axis was a spatial process of the advance of U.S. power, a process given frequent cartographical support in the popular press coverage of military actions. In the process of cartographically representing the military events whole new regions were created by these operations (Emmerson 1984).

Coupling this understanding of the representation of U.S. power in terms of the control of territory, with the concerns in the post-war period with the necessity of preventing the possibility of a repeat of a Pearl Harbour type surprise attack, led to the formulation of "national security" in terms of forward military defence, understood in territorial terms. Thus the relations of space and power came to be understood in terms of distance providing security, influence requiring the military occupation of territory. Otherness was spatially constrained by containment.
Thus it can be argued that Geopolitics didn't lose favour simply because of the taints of Nazism, but rather that the fundamentals of its perspective became so commonly understood, i.e. hegemonic, that explicit reference to them in terms of Geopolitics was simply irrelevant. Power was understood in terms of the filling of political spaces which are organised in specific territorial configurations. Hence Gaddis (1982) can discuss American foreign policy in terms of "geopolitical codes", but reject assumptions that MacKinder was the direct source of containment ideas.

In addition the containment theme has more distant resonances in the recurrent theme of the balance of power in Europe (Blouet 1987). This theme is important in the rationales provided for American intervention in international affairs, and the debates between the isolationists and the interventionists that permeates U.S. diplomatic history (Añew and O'Tuathail 1987, Williams 1959). Also involved in this traditional concern of U.S. foreign policy is the idea of a "Western Hemisphere" (Whitaker 1954). Geographical considerations were important in the assessment of the threat posed to the U.S. by the rise of Fascism in Europe, the argument for supporting Britain was often related to the spread of fascist influence in Latin America in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Haglund 1984).

Thus the silence of Geopolitics in the period of containment can be understood in the sense of it having a key structuring role rather than it disappearing from the stage as some
histories of Political Geography suggest (Brunn and Minst 1985, Hepple 1986). In particular the key American military strategy textbook of the period is heavily influenced by Geopolitical themes (Earle 1944). From this perspective there is no need to try to trace the details of the lineages of Geopolitics from MacKinder to Kennan, links which cannot be found directly (Blouet 1987). What is more important is that in its militarised versions containment was understood as geopolitical, even if reference to the Geopolitical texts was not made. In O'Tuathail's (1987) terms, the foreign policy of the period was replete with exercises in "geopolitical scripting" even if the term Geopolitics and references to its texts were much more rare.

Reinterpreting the historiography of containment in these terms requires that Political Geography inquire into the broader formulation of security rather than limiting itself to inquiring into the direct lineages of MacKinder or Spykman's writings. The point is that the policy of containment involves security defined in spatial terms. This dissertation shows that spatial concepts are essential to the structuring of the security discourses of American foreign policy. MacKinder is explicitly present in a few places, and usually implicitly present in discussions of containment and foreign policy, but an approach that limits itself to merely tracing these presences misses the essential point that security discourse is spatial.
This dissertation takes this as the essential point of departure for a revived critical Political Geography of international affairs. In doing so it draws on the themes of discourse and Otherness outlined in the last chapter which have been overlooked in the recent attempts to reformulate Political Geography. It argues (in parallel with Agnew and O'Tuathail 1987 and O'Tuathail 1987) that Political Geography needs to take social theory seriously and use its insights and methods to redefine its purposes, methods, approaches and audiences.

3.6 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS

Following the Second World War the term and the field of inquiry in International Relations was more or less abandoned by mainstream Geography. There are exceptions among geographers (Cohen 1963, Jones 1954, 1955, Kristof 1960, Sprout and Sprout 1965), but political scientists were preoccupied by the approach of the relatively new field of "International Relations" and by "Realist" frameworks which were partly drawn from Geopolitical notions (see chapter 4).

As noted above, the term "geopolitics" had unsettling connotations derived mainly from the distortion of the term into a "pseudo-science" by some of the German geopoliticians who attempted to provide a "scientific" justification for the territorial ambitions of the Nazis. This use of the term as a justification for territorial expansion continues to raise the ire of Soviet commentators (Vitkovskiy 1981). In addition the
worst excesses of U.S. wartime Geopoliticians discouraged scholars from exploring the field (Kristof 1960). An additional factor in accounting for the abandonment of geopolitical concerns was the fascination elsewhere in the discipline with quantitative methods, none of which could be obviously applied to Political Geography.


As has been argued above, traditional Geopolitical thinking of the MacKinder, Spykman and Haushofer's variety has attempted to serve the interests of ruling national classes, in directing their thinking in terms of power and in terms of control of territory, conquest and military interactions, but above all in terms of power acquisition for state governments (Parker 1985). Much of traditional Political Geography explicitly accepts the concept of the state as portrayed in conventional political theory and has thus played its part in legitimating state
doctrines of national interest and "defence" (Cohen 1982). As Agnew (1983:131) puts it "Political Geographers became the handmaidens of politicians and propagandists on behalf of 'active' foreign policies."

The legacy of the tradition of Geopolitics as rationalisation for imperial conquest sits uneasily within current Political Geography which attempts to distance itself from that geopolitical tradition. The problem of how to talk in "policy relevant" terms about matters of international politics, without drifting into using geographical arguments to support policies that will inevitably be viewed, by their victims at least, as advocating expansion or injustice in the tradition of Geopolitik, remains unanswered (Paterson 1987) (and unanswerable when formulated in this way), Kristoff's (1960) attempt to distance political geography from Geopolitik notwithstanding.

In the tense international climate of the second cold war, a number of geographiers have called attention to the destructiveness of modern warfare (Bunge 1973, 1983, Curry 1985, Lacoste 1977, Openshaw and Steadman 1982) and others have called for a more active investigation of the field of peace studies (Bradshaw 1985, Pepper 1985, Pepper and Jenkins 1983, Pepper and Jenkins eds 1985, van der Wusten 1984). There has been an interest in the question of the "mental maps" of decision makers (Henrikson 1980), and early forms of U.S. foreign policy under the heading of "national exceptionalism" have also been studied (Agnew 1983, Hoffman 1982). But so far, despite the current
revival of Geopolitical thinking (Brzezinski 1986, Hepple 1986) there have been few attempts to critically examine the nature of contemporary Geopolitics (O'Tuathail 1986:73).

Some recent writing in Political Geography offers a more complex understanding of matters of power and space than is the case in the classical Geopolitical texts, or indeed in the more recent attempts to update and rethink Geopolitics. These more critical approaches attempt to avoid the worst excesses of traditional Political Geography's positions. They develop approaches which recognise the historical evolution of the international state structure and the possibilities of its transcendence (Hudson 1983, Taylor 1982, 1983). They also recognise the existence of numerous international links and conflicts other than those neatly covered by the state and the preoccupations with "high" politics. Archer and Shelley (1985) have reviewed methodological and theoretical matters while Pirie (1984) has urged geographers to take the literature on political theory seriously in reformulating Political Geography. O'Tuathail (1986) has called for an explicitly critical geopolitics; one which gets beyond the "Mackinderian research tradition" which emphasises policy recommendation and its practitioners who "wish, in essence, to practice geopolitics" (1986:73).

To do this will require changing the focus of inquiry and the methods used to interrogate geopolitical texts. It requires an enlargement of focus to investigate the political and
cultural creation of places and boundaries, and a challenging of
the conventional categories of politics and its relationship to
states. Recently a number of geographers have tackled matters of
identity and the political creation of space, drawing on recent
trends in social and political theorising (Agnew 1987, Gregory
Gregory and Urry's (1985) book, Social Relations and Spatial
Structures contains a number of papers which elaborate on the
title theme. These provide focus to the debate around the social
structuring of space and the importance of space in
understanding concrete social developments.

Nigel Thrift (1983) has analysed the relations between
literature, cultural production and the political importance of
place, reminding us once again that culture is a production,
places have identities created by writers who broadcast their
interpretations of the meaning of landscapes within particular
political situations. War creates very special places, in the
First World War its participants created "the front", a new
place with a terrible ecology and a social organisation of small
groups of men bound by interpersonal loyalties. Cosgrove (1978,
1983, 1985) is also concerned with culture and symbolic
production; both writers emphasise the need to look at the
production of place within specific cultural and political
circumstances.

Thus they try to retain some distance from the state and
this, in part, enables them to penetrate the ideological
dimensions of Geopolitics which have been part and parcel of traditional Political Geography. One approach in particular of relevance here concerns the links between Political Geography and "humanist" concerns with regional identity and sense of place. One notable precursor to this, in subject matter, if not in theoretical approach, is Kristof's research on the Russian self-image which shows the complexity of images of nationality and cultural heritage and how they are steeped in political symbolism (Kristof 1967, 1968). The recent literature which has focused on "place" and "identity" (Knight 1983, Williams and Smith 1983), has ignored the political dimensions relating to how these are constructed in contrast to the Other.

On the same theme of regional identity, William's (1984) concern with the expression of regional identity through cultural activity points towards an analysis of the conflict between political systems related to cultural identity which a critical Political Geography has yet to encompass. He also emphasises the point that political geography has been "ideologically committed to the conventional wisdom of the legitimacy of the centralised state" (Williams 1984:105) and has hence downplayed the significance of movements of regional autonomy that are not coterminous with the nation state. To this criticism could be added the necessity to also consider international extra-state political action as an essential part of a comprehensive Political Geography. Again this paper explains landscape and identity solely in terms of internal
criteria. There is no concept of the Other against which identity is formulated.

Sack's (1981, 1983, 1986) reconsideration of the idea of territoriality provides a theoretical link between these themes of cultural identity and Political Geography. Defining territoriality in terms of attempts to control actions "by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographical area" (1981:55) he argues that territories appear to be "filled with power, influence, authority or sovereignty" (1981:55). In this conception territory is a crucial dimension of the symbolisation of power. Thus Sack provides a theme which links power, space and cultural production offering a focus for a critical Cultural / Political Geography. Social reality is not independent of our conception of its existence and an understanding of the spatial structure of society requires us to understand the conceptions of space and territory which inform its existence.

A crucial point in this discussion is that territory is not itself an operating entity as some biological formulations of territoriality have suggested, (Ardrey 1969) and as some geographical theories of the "spatial fetishist" variety have sometimes suggested (see Peet 1981, Smith 1981, Soja 1980). In Sack's (1981) terms, territoriality is a strategy of power, involving relations between things and people in space, but within spaces that have been socially created, not relationships between one "space" and another. It is determined to a large

92
degree by the existence of a boundary, a principle of inclusion and exclusion (Hogan 1985). On a larger scale, in the international arena, this is a primary concern of Geopolitics. While many of Political Geography's traditional concerns have been with inclusion and the administration of states within boundaries, this dissertation is concerned with the other function of boundaries, i.e. exclusion, and the ideological uses of the creation of Others to be excluded as an important device in the formulation of identity.

Here the point of departure is to argue that international political structures are in part determined by the discourse of which they are a constitutive part. This suggests a more critical Geopolitics in which the interpenetrations of knowledge, space and power are clearly formulated. This study also addresses the questions raised by Pepper and Jenkins (1984) and offers a contribution to the rethinking of traditional Geopolitical ideas and how they "inform and infuse current strategic thinking" (1984:426), taking seriously, but also going beyond O'Tuathail's (1986) call to focus on the "language of geopolitics".

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The omission of the "exclusion" aspect of the inclusion/exclusion function of boundaries, is particularly clear in the review of Political Geography offered in Jordan and Rowntree's much used introductory Cultural Geography text The Human Mosaic. The fourth edition (Jordan and Rowntree 1986) introduces the discussion of Political Geography in terms of the creation of boundaries and divisions between "them" and "us". But this theme is only in the first two paragraphs of the relevant chapter (1986:108-9), thereafter it remains implicit, at best, in the discussion.
Thus current writers recognise the need to look outside Geography for inspiration to reformulate space as socially created. In particular Agnew and O'Tuathail (1987) and O'Tuathail (1987) draw on recent debates in social theory to tackle geopolitics in terms of discourse. This dissertation takes a similar approach in focusing on Geopolitical discourse, but one that focuses on the theme of bipolarity, of "them" and "us", identity and difference, in the discussion the "Soviet threat".

3.7 GEOPOLITICS, HEGEMONY AND DISCOURSE

It is crucial to note this focus in recent social and political theory as well as in recent Geographical writing, on the active creation, or "production" of space and place. Thus society is seen as active process, in the process of production by human practice, rather than as an abstract series of given "natural" events or facts. Geographical space is produced, not "given" naturally (Smith 1984).

Nation states are not natural entities but politically produced territorial demarcations, a point often obscured by the cartographical representations of regional studies (Shapiro 1987a). Thus geopolitics can no longer be taken as a crude form of the geography of international relations, but has to be understood as practice and as discourse. It involves the political production of geopolitical scripts, texts and procedures that create ways of describing and acting in the

Geopolitical "scripting" is an ideological exercise, which in the case of war or the preparation for war, pits geographically delimited political organisations against one another. Images of places are crucial to such geopolitical scripts. As Hewitt (1983:253) puts it,

War also mobilises the highly charged and dangerous dialectic of place attachment: the perceived antithesis of 'our' places and homeland and 'theirs'. Sustained in latent if not overt forms in peacetime, this polarisation has produced unbridled sentimentalising of one's own while dehumanising the enemy's people and land. That seems an essential step in cultivating readiness to destroy the latter and bear with progressive devastation at home.

These in turn involve discourses of the Other, how "their" place is different from "ours", and as such they operate to situate places in political space, creating other places in specific political relationships to "our" place (Shapiro 1987a).

Crucially the Other is the external threat against which internal identity is formulated.

With these specific delineations of space come political implications, how "we" act in terms of "our" geopolitically created knowledge of "them". How "we" are identified, is a direct product of how "they" are differentiated. This is not just a matter of perception which can be compared against some objective knowledge of political reality, but the political creation of the terrain of political debate and crucially of action. Spatial relations are political constructions, and the
practices of geopolitics are of central importance to the political construction of space. As such geopolitical processes are plays of power, central to the hegemonic political discourses of the states and societies in which they occur.

Thus international politics relates directly to internal politics within the boundaries of, in the case considered in this dissertation, the American state, and more broadly the "Western System" (Klein 1986). Traditional Geopolitics, like the current CPD version, hypostatises the state, treating states as autonomous spatially defined entities struggling with other similar entities in attempts to enlarge their power by increasing their control of territory. The formulation of Geopolitics offered in this dissertation expands and simultaneously criticises the traditional conceptions. Thus Geopolitics simultaneously concerns itself with the relations of geography to the conduct of international relations, in terms of the struggle for power, while also understanding the ideological role of such a discourse in the creation of external enemies and the related mobilisation of domestic political constituencies against the boundary of that external antagonist.

This approach problematicises the state, rather than taking it as a given, it treats the state as a politically constructed series of practices, including discursive practices, of which the Geopolitical creation of Otherness is an important facet. This allows the consideration of the state, the predominant category in political discourse, as a relation of power in a
contested political system where fundamental questions of the internal structure within a state are directly related to matters beyond the ambit of a single state. To problematicise the central category is to "decentre" the dominant discourses of politics and open up the discourses of politics to critical analysis. Thus political identity is separated from state identity allowing a critical investigation of matters of state power, which does not presuppose the existence of the state.

Here the argument links up with recent developments in International Relations theory that are critical of the predominant themes in both the traditional "Realist" approaches and the crude economic interpretations of international affairs (Ashley 1983, 1984). "What one needs is a different conception of social reality, a conception which not only recognises the ultimate unity of what we term 'political' and 'economic', but recognises how this unity is signified and expressed in different human practices" (O'Tuathail 1986:83). This forces one to investigate the ideological dimension, not just in terms of "perceptions" but in terms of how the institutions, in particular the foreign policy bureaucracy, what Barnet (1972) calls the "national security managers" and the political "foreign policy establishment" (Sanders 1983), come to understand their roles.

This reconceptualisation posits geopolitics as discourse (Agnew and O'Tuathail 1987, O'Tuathail 1987). The analysis thus focuses attention on how these discourses are used in politics,
it thus focuses on their "discursive practices", or, in other words, how the discourse is constructed, and used. Here geopolitics is understood in terms of discursive practices, "as part of a series of reasoning processes by which the intellectuals of statecraft constitute world politics and a world political geography" (Agnew and O'Tuathail 1987:5-6), and as "an innately political process of representation by which these intellectuals of statecraft "designate a world and "fill" it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas" (Agnew and O'Tuathail 1987:8).

O'Tuathail (1987) distinguishes geopolitical reasoning from the more general ideological process of geographical reasoning, of which it is a special case. Thus geographical reasoning is a "pervasive common sense activity" involving "the use of places (cities, states, regions) as signs in the constitution, organisation demarcation and recognition of a world" (O'Tuathail 1987:4). Beyond this there lies the more specific form of "geopolitical reasoning" which is "the use of practical and formalised forms of geographical reasoning in a particular domain, namely that of international politics" (O'Tuathail 1987:4). But O'Tuathail's crucial point, as far as this dissertation is concerned, is that these commonsense activities of geographical reasoning contain within them many unremarkable and unproblematicised elements. It is these elements that render them hegemonic, precisely because they are widely and uncritically accepted.
Put in these terms the central theme of this dissertation is to examine the use of geographical reasoning in the discourses used to portray the Soviet Union as a threat. It shows how "their" place is constructed as different from "our" place, and specifically how their place is constructed as threatening because of its geographical circumstances. In the CPD discourse on the Soviet Union, Geopolitical themes were retheorised and mobilised for use politically by welding them together with arguments about Nuclear Strategy, International Relations and Soviet history to portray the Soviet Union in a discourse of Otherness.

The Soviet Union was portrayed as different, threatening and crucially as threatening precisely because it was inherently geographically expansionist. The discourse of the Soviet threat thus provided the external antagonist against which domestic political identity was formulated and mobilised. "They" are constituted as different, threatening, requiring "us" to act in specific political ways, in this case to militarise international politics through a massive weapons building program and an interventionist foreign policy.

This discourse of the Other is geopolitical in the sense that it creates an external antagonist in a particular way vis a vis domestic political concerns. It is also geopolitical in that it is a particular exercise in geopolitical "scripting" which draws on the traditional texts of MacKinder and Spykman to explicate a particular geography of the Other, a geography which
is interpreted in deterministic terms. This discourse of the Other is also geopolitical in the sense that it accepts the reification of political power in the particular relation of power and space of territorially defined states. In addition, this dissertation shows how the overall logic of the discourse of the Other as constructed through texts on Nuclear Strategy, International Relations and Soviet history is structured on the classic Geopolitical conceptions of Spykman and MacKinder, a crucial point missing from other analyses of the CPD and of the Reagan administration foreign policy.

The interplay of each of these themes reinforces the whole text of the Other. This dissertation explicates these structures of discourse, arguing that each of these "security discourses" is essential to all the others, and in the process pointing to the interconnectness of these themes as essential to the practice of geopolitics. The following chapters are a detailed examination of the interconnectedness of these discursive practices, of the practices of "security discourse", each of which are formulated in geopolitical terms. Reformulating geopolitical enquiry, an essential task in the revival of Political Geography, requires that geopolitics be sensitive to the interconnectedness of these discursive practices.
4.1 INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Second World War the U.S. military, economic and political capabilities were globally preeminent. Much of the rest of the world lay devastated; industrial production was seriously disrupted by wartime requirements, where not destroyed by military action. The political arrangements of the pre-war era were outdated by the emergence of Soviet and American military power. Major tasks of reconstruction had to be faced world wide, and new political arrangements devised under the shadow of the American possession of the atomic bomb.

Within the U.S. itself, numerous adjustments were made in defence postures and the bureaucratic administration of foreign policy was revamped as part of the demobilisation process. Despite detailed planning during the war by the Council on Foreign Relations, in conjunction with the State Department (Shoup and Minter 1977), there was no clear consensus on what role the U.S. was to play in the post-war world, and how the economic system was to be reconstructed. Some who supported isolationist tendencies were reluctant for the U.S. to play an active international role, but the Atlanticist and internationalist positions won out; U.S. capital and military power were to dominate the post-war world.
The overall direction of American foreign policy crystallised out of these debates around the two key themes of "Atlanticism" and "Containment". "Atlanticism" refers to the global economic system built by the U.S. and its multinational corporations in alliance with Western Europe, which asserted the supremacy of the Euro-American political, cultural and economic arrangements, loosely the political economy of liberal capitalism, through the Bretton Woods arrangements, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the various agencies of the United Nations. This involved extensive intervention in what became known as "the Third World" to promote "development" or "modernisation".

This was nearly universally accompanied by "security assistance", designed to incorporate the military structures of Third World states into some form of alliance with the U.S. in their self proclaimed global political and military campaign to "contain" the USSR and more generally "communism" within the geographical boundaries that demarcated the "Second World". This was to be accomplished by deterring it from expanding through military opposition and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Containment was the formal term given to the overall military and political campaign against "the Soviet threat", NATO its most important military and political component.

Successive U.S. administrations built the post war U.S. global hegemony on these twin ideological pillars. This system of international economic, political and military domination is
often termed, following Dean Acheson's ambitions (Acheson 1970), "Pax Americana", or the "Western System".

Deterrence, security, indeed the whole postwar network of military bases, alliance-building and security assistance were part of this attempt to erect globally a stable framework for trade and the internationalisation of capital under the watchful eyes of a whole host of institutions: the IMF, World Bank, GATT, NATO, ANZUS and the like. This is what we call the Western System. Its focal point was the trans-Atlantic network embodied under the auspices of NATO. (Klein 1986:4)

NATO and the military alliances were to provide for the security of this arrangement, providing the military power to "deter" any aggressor from upsetting the smooth functioning of international capitalism. Deterring aggressors requires, so the logic of nuclear strategy says, a convincing military capability to either destroy the aggressor's invading forces or, at least, do damage disproportionate to any possible gains that the aggressor might hope to achieve as a result of military action. Thus security is gained by deterrence, which requires perpetual military preparedness, and the everpresent political will to counter the external antagonist, in this case the Soviet Union and its satellites, with all means up to and including global nuclear war.

This chapter focuses on the discourses that were mobilised to describe, explain and legitimate the doctrines of "Containment", "Deterrence" and the provision of "National Security" around the portrayal of the Soviet Union as a dangerous antagonistic Other. It shows how the discourses of Sovietology, Nuclear Strategy and a "Realist" approach to
International Relations, were mobilised within an implicit geopolitical framework to create the categories of Security which dominate political discourse within the "Western System". The economic discourses of Atlanticism and development (Escobar 1984/5) are beyond the scope of this study.

The formulation of U.S. foreign policy as containment and deterrence in the late 1940s, and in particular in the early 1950s during the Korean war in military terms, is termed "containment militarism" by Sanders (1983). The term is used here because it accurately encompasses both the geopolitical dimensions of geographical encirclement, as well as the use of military alliances, bases, and the continuous U.S. military mobilisation which marked the following two decades of U.S. foreign policy. The four sections of this chapter examine in detail the discourses of Realism, Strategy, Sovietology and Geopolitics showing how each operates in the context of the concern with the Other in the form of the Soviet Union.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND REALISM

It is only in this century that a specific discipline of International Relations has emerged. Prior to its emergence matters of international politics were dealt with principally by diplomatic historians, scholars of international law and military writers. International Relations as a separate academic discipline emerged first in the U.S. The reasons for this are at least threefold. Hoffmann (1977) suggests that the combination
of suitable intellectual predispositions, political circumstances and institutional opportunities explain the preeminently American nature of International Relations.

The political circumstances of the U.S. supremacy on the world scene attracted scholars to the study of international relations because the U.S. was playing the preeminent role on the international scene. Foreign policy formulation involved effectively all of the international scene; former interests in domestic politics, in particular in the formation of foreign policy, became translated in the new circumstances into interests in the global scene. A scholarly fascination with power was provided with a vast canvass for investigation. Institutional opportunities were provided by foundation grants which were forthcoming for research. Access to the policy making process was also available as academics gradually took over many of the roles previously performed by career diplomats and lawyers. Unlike many other foreign policy establishments academics were able to move between government and academia on a regular basis, both as office holders and consultants.

Of particular importance in the immediate post war years was the coalescing of prewar concerns with defence and foreign affairs, formerly considered in separation, into an overarching consideration of national security. The military emphasis has been pervasive, but it subsequently incorporated within its ambit concerns of geopolitics, economics as well as intelligence activities and traditional diplomacy. This concern for "national
security" has ensured the maintainence of the U.S. in a partly mobilised military stance ever since the Second World War. Its concerns with protecting the "national interest" have been used in justifying numerous military interventions in the Third World. In this cold war environment International Relations as a specialised field of study made its appearance in the U.S.

The discipline has been preoccupied with policy matters, and the overlaps between the disciplinary pursuit of international relations and the study of U.S foreign policy as well as the field of "strategic studies" have influenced its formation and history. But despite all this, or more probably because of its genesis in these conditions, the central tenets of international relations have a poorly developed theoretical tradition. Security studies in particular have concentrated on the empirical and the immediate policy questions to the exclusion of more theoretical reflections (Buzan 1983). Foreign policy issues also suffer from similar deficiencies, but the dominant theoretical framework of International Relations in the U.S., and consequently around the world is that of Realism, usually distinguished from a loose collection of concerns and approaches labeled Idealism.

The approach of Idealism emphasises peace and international cooperation often linked to concerns of international law. Notions of collective security and international institutions are also more important here than in a Realist focus on the distribution of power between states. The Idealist approach
argues that more than power motivates states, indeed war is seen as an unfortunate, and preventable condition. Power struggles are interpreted in terms of security and fear of attack rather than simply attempts to gain and maintain dominance in the international arena. The Idealist approach is more explicitly interested in the possibilities of international organisations in regulating inter-state affairs. In addition its analysis emphasises the international security system as an appropriate level of analysis rather than an exclusive focus on national policy alone. Hence it operates with wider concerns than the Realist focus on the fuzzy conception of "national security" (Buzan 1983).

The U.S. foreign policy establishment has effectively used these themes to base a foreign policy on ideological principles as well as on Realist concerns with power politics and the national interest understood in economic terms. Thus the creation of the post-war world were based on the overall needs of the U.S. political economy, but they were also powerfully motivated by ideological premises. U.S. foreign policy is riddled with Idealist elements, from Wilsonian principles of self-determination and non intervention to notions of "moral exceptionalism" (Agnew 1983). They interact with ideas of isolationism and with U.S. interventions abroad in a complex series of historical and policy situations (Hoffmann 1982). These ideas also often provide the ideological legitimacy for U.S. foreign policy.
The detailed conduct of foreign policy, in particular military interventions in other states cannot be simply explained by narrow questions of economic vested interests nor in strict Realist power political terms (Krasner 1978). In O'Tuathaill's (1986) terms it has to be understood as a "geopolitical culture". Vietnam is the classic case where there were negligible economic interests and hardly any credible military interest in the U.S. intervention. Thus a self-confessed Realist can write:

However a state that is so powerful that it no longer need be concerned with its territorial and political integrity, and all of the ancillary policies that follow from these basic goals, such as preserving the security of raw materials supplies, can make ideological goals the most important aspect of its foreign policy. For two and a half decades after the Second World War Lockean liberalism was the key to American foreign policy; it was the desire to create a world order in America's image that led to the use of force. (Krasner 1978:347)

This ideological urge tied into the anti-communist theme which remains an important key to U.S. state ideology (Miliband et.al. 1984), was of course related to the Realist discourses in terms of the power political and specifically military interpretation of the Soviet threat. The universalisation of a particular interest is a key ideological move in many discourses. The U.S. moral exceptionalist argument, and more generally the broader Idealist approach is a particularly important example of this process. Thus the concerns for peace are identified with the U.S. foreign policy, and international organisations are supposedly supported to accomplish this aim.
However the Realist logic is used to justify international militarisation on the grounds that the USSR acts as a Realist power, advancing its self-interest at the expense of all others, deterred from further expansion only by the might of the U.S. global military presence. Indeed often Idealism and Realism meld together into a single entity, power politics is based on Idealist principles and these in turn legitimate power politics. Thus the distinctions between Idealism and Realism are usually blurred in the practice of international politics, although the focus of Idealism on peace and Realism on power remain as useful distinguishing factors (Buzan 1983, 1984).

This Realist doctrine, a doctrine of power seen often in military terms appeared at precisely the time when the U.S. had gained preeminent power on the global scene. It provided a perspective through which U.S. interests could be interpreted in terms of power, and which provided a framework for interpreting Soviet actions in terms of attempts to extend Soviet power. From there it was but a short step to the geopolitical doctrines of containment. Modern Realism's most famous opening statement came in the form of a critique of the Idealist tenets of Western policy makers in the aftermath of the First World War.

Carr (1946) argues that it was the impact of the First World War that finally aroused widespread public concern over the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy in Western states. With the enthusiasm of the "utopian" schemes of Wilson and the League of Nations there came a need to develop scholarly interpretation
of the international system. Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939* (1946) originally published in Britain at the outbreak of the Second World War was a polemical critique of the "utopian" school which emerged in the aftermath of the First World War.

His critique focuses on the naivety of these approaches which in his opinion emphasised international legal arrangements to the virtual exclusion of power. Thus it was a doctrine for the satisfied powers, i.e. the winners of the First World War. By ignoring the interests of the defeated powers, and proclaiming the universal validity of the international system focused on the League of Nations this tradition laid the seeds of much of the conflict which emerged when the defeated powers, in particular Germany, regained their power in the international arena.

By focusing on international legal and administrative arrangements to the exclusion of the interests and, crucially, the power of aggrieved powers, Carr blames this utopian tradition for many of the failures of peacekeeping in the twenty years crisis. Although Carr's text contains many other points, it is the insistence on the focus on power that was picked up after the Second World War by the school that became dominant particularly in the U.S. -- the so called Realists. But it was from the tradition of European international legal scholarship that International Relations as a separate discipline became codified in the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau. What he actually
wrote was far from the international law tradition, it was preoccupied with the question of power.

Morgenthau's seminal text *Politics among Nations* (1978) first appeared in 1948 and provides something approaching a codification of the Realist credo as well as the founding text of the discipline of International Relations. In the first chapter he outlined six principles of political Realism in international relations which succinctly summarised the Realist position: First, the Realist believes that society is governed by objective laws with their roots in "human nature", this "tragic view of history" provides the Realist with the epistemological terrain on which a rigorous theory can be built. Second, the principle most often remembered, is the conception of interests defined in terms of power, Third, this concept of interest is universally valid, indeed the key term in politics, Fourth, the tension between moral action and the expedient requirements of political action are noted, Fifth, Realism refuses to "identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe" (1978:11), Sixth, the Realist argues that its perspective is distinct from other perspectives, maintaining the autonomy of the political sphere, and in the process subordinating other standards of thought to the political.

This approach is based on many of the precepts that the earlier utopian or "idealist" thinkers had tried to refute. It rejects the idealist postulate of a changeable human nature, and
the possibility that the "right" institutions could bring out the best in humanity. Where the League of Nations postulated a community with common interests the Realists argued that the international system was a brutal anarchy where power was exerted in the promotion of national interests, a position reminiscent of Hobbes' rather different concerns with the state of nature.

International law, morality and opinion count for little, at best tempering the excesses of power politics, but not seriously constraining the usually brutal practice of power. Martin Wight (1979) argued that international politics is the arena of recurrence and repetition, the "modernist" project of societal improvement is limited to national boundaries. This clear separation of the international sphere from the considerations that apply to domestic politics is a hallmark of the Realist school where it is often raised to the status of a methodological device (Walker 1980), a point to which we will return below. Thus different parameters are taken to operate in the international sphere, justifying different approaches.

Where the Realist school thinks in terms of power and interest and tends to define national security in terms of the power to promote a state's interests in an international anarchy, the Idealist approach, focuses on war as the central issue. War is the major threat presented by the international system and solutions to the problem of war are its prime concern. These two schools have dominated International
Relations through its history. While other concerns have imposed themselves on the international scene, International Relations has remained preoccupied with matters of peace and power (Buzan 1983, Holsti 1985).

In the late 1950s and early 1960s some writers in International Relations turned their attention to matters of nuclear strategy. Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* published in 1957 is a key text, in part for its early suggestion of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. The search for alternatives to the doctrine of massive retaliation spurred intellectual developments of deterrence theory and the concept of assured destruction, as well as discussions of nuclear war fighting theories (Herken 1985). Here International Relations tangled with the nuclear strategists from the Pentagon and in particular the Air Force and its RAND corporation thinktank, many of whose members were fascinated with quantitative methods, quasi-economic applications of operations research and the apparatus of systems analysis.

4.3 NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE

In starting a discussion of Nuclear Strategy, a few remarks on the term strategy are in order. The term is widely used to mean a number of different things. Classical strategy as discussed by Clausewitz basically meant the use of military forces in battles

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1 The acronym RAND came from "Research AND Development". The corporation was set up to provide a research organisation for the U.S. Air Force in the late 1940s. See Kaplan (1983).
designed to promote the aims of the war being fought (Clausewitz 1968). The political goals were considered paramount; strategy was the organisation of military force to pursue these aims. In a militarised world situation obviously military forces play a role in international diplomacy and international relations even if they are not engaged in active hostilities.

Thus the definition of strategy needs to be expanded to include the role of military force in non-combat roles. Basil Liddell Hart's (1968:338) definition of strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil ends of policy" covers this additional use. Thus strategy in the Clauswitzian sense encompasses more than just the battlefield skills of generals, it refers crucially also to the domestic mobilisation of populations and economic resources in the service of the state (Klein 1987).

The term strategy is also used in a number of other senses. In common parlance it can simply refer to a plan for accomplishing some specified goal. In international affairs it is sometimes used to refer to a combination of military, economic and political policy, becoming a term synonymous with broadly defined foreign policy. In nuclear parlance "strategic" has taken on a specific meaning of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the adversary. Thus a weapon becomes "strategic" solely because of its range or location.
Further confusion enters the picture when distinctions are drawn between "declaratory policy" that is the official publicly declared policy on the use of weapons, and the actual operational planning assumptions used in organising nuclear forces (Aldridge 1983, Pringle and Arkin 1983, Kaku and Axelrod 1987). The term "Nuclear Strategy" encompasses all the above. As will be argued later, the debates over detente and Strategy repeatedly confused these distinctions, sometimes deliberately for political effect (Leitenberg 1981, MacNamara 1983).

As nuclear weapons became more powerful and more numerous in the years after the Second World War new concepts were devised to discuss their use and their role. Given their enormous destructive power serious doubts have been expressed since 1945 about whether they are "usable" in military terms.

The question has been whether any useful purpose could be served by the employment of devices which invited discussion using words such as 'holocaust', 'doomsday' and 'armageddon', and whether any employment could be sufficiently deliberate and controlled to ensure that political objectives were met. Which means at issue has been whether a 'nuclear strategy' is a contradiction in terms. (Freedman 1983:xviii)

The answers given to this question determine the approaches to foreign policy advocated by the academics and "experts" in defence and foreign policy. The answers to this question have shaped U.S. policy for four decades. But it is not posed in isolation; it is posed in conjunction with the "What about the Russians?" question. The fear of Soviet Geopolitical advance is viewed by some as a greater threat than nuclear war. For many
the awesome power of nuclear weapons has made the avoidance of all out war the primary consideration of policy (Beres 1980). The contrasting policy recommendations flowing from the relative importance of each of these perspectives underlie the debates about nuclear strategy (Jervis 1984, Snow 1983).

Those who argue that nuclear war has made avoidance essential sometimes turn to international arms control agreements as a way forward. Others agreeing with the sentiment that it is essential to avoid it turn to deterrence, argue in classical Realist style that the only way to deter is to be strong, without strength, measured in nuclear weapons, war will inevitably come, because the Russians will come unless deterred by nuclear weapons. This stance, in McCGwire's (1985-6) terms "the dogma of deterrence", the priority given to the necessity of deterrence above all other considerations, is the essential discursive move of the American discourse of nuclear strategy.

The nuclear strategy discussions of the 1950s that followed Brodie's initial formulation of deterrence theory (1946, 1965) are particularly important because they laid the groundwork on which just about all subsequent thinking on these topics has operated (Kaplan 1983). The discourse of deterrence has dominated discussions of foreign policy in the U.S. since the original formulations of containment militarism. It has also shaped the conduct of international relations in areas where nuclear weapons were not clearly present.
This discourse has constructed a series of rituals of discussion, the assumptions of which were raised to unquestionable aprioria. It has a clear institutional expression in the thinktanks, of which RAND is just the most famous (Kaplan '1983). The language is distinct, often obscure, operating to reinforce the premises of the discourse; it has moved to monopolise discussion of military matters in ways that limit what it is possible to discuss. The basic formulation of its texts, and its self stated raison d'etre, is the clear designation of the Other in the totalitarian Soviet Union, which had to be deterred from carrying out its expansionist program.

The study of strategy in the 1950s was preoccupied with the problems of nuclear weapons, deterrence doctrine and theories of limited nuclear war (Halperin 1962, Kaufman 1956, Kissinger 1957). The traditional sources of strategic thinking in the disciplines of political science and military history were soon replaced by people from the "axiomatic disciplines like mathematics, physics and economics" (McCgwire 1985-6:56). These strategists took for granted the assumption that the Soviet Union had a relentless drive for territorial conquest. The concept of the communist bloc being monolithic went unquestioned. They were convinced that it was determined to seize Europe.

This assumption provided the basis for most strategic theorizing. The field developed a new breed of self-styled 'tough-minded' strategic analysts, who liked to think through problems abstractly and in a political vacuum. To this new breed, the opponent was not 'Soviet man', not even 'political man', but an abstract
'strategic man', who thought, as they did, in game-theoretical terms.  
(McCwire 1985-6:56)

"Flexible response" in an era of ICBMs and instant global communications is very much the field of the "nuclear strategist" where military considerations are overtaken by the arcane rituals of systems analysis derived for operations research and applied to political situations. The language of operations research, complete with its reduction of policy matters to questions of "the efficient management of resources" was applied to nuclear matters in particular by the "whiz kids" McNamara brought with him from the RAND corporation when he became Secretary of Defence in 1961.

The preoccupation of the axiomatic thinkers was with rigorous analysis of quantifiable data drawn from a situation reduced to manageable proportions by simplifying assumptions. The tendency in the analyses was towards worst case situations. In particular the focus on surprise attacks encouraged a policy of overinsurance. This dovetailed nicely with the bureaucratic power struggles between the missile advocates, the manned bomber service and the nuclear navy all of whom were happy to have analyses that justified larger arsenals (Herken 1985).

These operations research approaches are sometimes distinguished from the "formal strategists" (Freedman 1983:181) who attempted to rethink the whole nuclear situation from first principles. They drew on developments on game theory to
elaborate theories of superpower behaviour. In particular they ran repeated games of "chicken" and "prisoners dilemma" attempting to elucidate the psychological dynamics of binary competition. These simplifying assumptions squeezed out many of the political factors and reduced international politics to a technological zero-sum situation where what counted was what could be counted, in other words nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Thus the world was reduced to two sides engaged in a complex series of games. Tied into this was a series of assumptions about how the actions of one side sent "signals" to the other side. Also underlying these game theory models were the assumption that both sides evaluated the rewards of certain outcomes equally, an ethnocentric assumption which is rarely accurate (Plous 1985).

This was not the only ethnocentric assumption. More serious was the assumption that the Russians saw themselves as the U.S. portrayed them, namely as expansionist aggressors. Thus the logic assumed that the Russians would understand the force postures of the U.S. as defensive, because they supposedly could do strategic analysis. At times during the arms control talks in the 1970s the Americans argued that the Soviet positions showed that they were "behind" in the development of their thinking because they operated on different assumptions. The assumption was that there was only one way of developing nuclear strategic thinking -- the American way (Booth 1979).
The assumption of the superiority of theoretical modes of reasoning was again present. The strategic discourse "certainly did appeal to the American habit of seeing the world in black and white, and the tendency to believe that problems should (and can) be solved — rather than managed or even avoided" (MccGwire 1985-6:59). Added to this is the prestige of a "scientific" approach complete with computerised models of conflict situations. Coupled with this is the focus on the enemy's military capabilities and assumption of hostile intentions. This is often called the "colonel's fallacy". Useful as a starting point for contingency planning in military operations, these procedures are inappropriate at a political level of national policy.

Three features of this "deterrence dogma" as MccGwire terms it are crucial in understanding its role. First is the abstract style of reasoning, favouring definitions of rational behaviour conjured up from investigations of "the prisoners dilemma" rather than investigations of political psychology. Second was a remarkable absence of Sovietologists from the debates. Soviet expansionist and malign intentions and reactions were simply taken as a given. 2 These two factors led to analyses focusing on worst case scenarios and hence to ensuring that there were enough weapons to ensure that whatever happened the U.S. arsenal would always be big enough to carry out its mission of destroying the USSR.

2 One notable exception from the RAND social science department is Leites' (1950) The Operational Code of the Politburo.
Third, deterrence was formulated in punitive terms, the Soviet Union was evil by definition and would be punished if it refused to comply with the rules of international behaviour established by the U.S. The language of the U.S. as global magistrate and enforcement agency inherent here is very important in the ideological structuring of the post-war global situation (Chilton 1985). These intellectual practices have become so entrenched that it proves difficult to talk of strategic matters in innovative ways (Walker 1983/4, 1986). The modes of strategic thinking thus exclude practices which would fundamentally challenge their presuppositions, reproducing the world of the 1950s in the 1980s.

Even though the strategic analysis practitioners did not include amongst their ranks many Sovietologists, their views of the USSR as expansionist and as a military threat dovetailed with the popular cold war ideology of the Soviet Union, and also with the view of the Sovietologists who were writing in the 1950s. This discourse of "totalitarian Sovietology" is the subject of the next section.

4.4 SOVIETOLOGY AND TOTALITARIANISM

Sovietology as a recognised field of academic specialisation in the U.S. dates, like Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations, from the late 1940s and early 1950s. The field of Soviet studies which spread to over one hundred campuses in the U.S. in the form of Russian-Soviet area studies, drew on
Political Science and History. These two disciplines shaped the study of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Methodologically the emphasis was on the political developments of the Communist party, in particular in the upper levels of its leadership. The broader social and economic contexts were down played, merely offering a backdrop for the real explanation which lay in the internal nature of the political development of the communist movement (Cohen 1985:23).

Sovietology was created at the time of the McCarthyist crusades in the U.S. when considerations of loyalty and security were important. There was also an intellectual backlash against the new deal and many academics were vilified as communists (Caute 1978). This was not an era where critical perspectives flourished. The fear of being seen as "soft on communism" undoubtedly shaped the subsequent development of scholarship in this field.

The field quickly came to a broad academic consensus on the overall framework within which the Soviet Union could be understood. Scholars "embraced as axiomatic a set of interrelated interpretations to explain both the past and present (and sometimes the future) of the Soviet Union" (Cohen 1985:4). This was the totalitarianism school which dominated, to the virtual exclusion of any other interpretative scheme, the field of Soviet Studies well into the 1960s. These scholars were drafted into government service repeatedly as consultants and

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3 For a recent reiteration of this approach see Schapiro (1985).
advisors and hence shaped foreign policy and in turn brought
corns of government policy directly back into the academy.

The basic tenets of the totalitarianism school's account of
Soviet society included the following: In 1917 the Bolsheviks,
an already, or at least nascent, totalitarian party usurped
power and betrayed the Russian revolution. The totalitarian
dynamics of the communist party, personified in Lenin, of
monopolistic politics, ruthless tactics, ideological orthodoxy,
discipline and centralised bureaucracy then inevitably shaped
the subsequent history of Russia. They won the civil war by
ruthlessness and organisation. Exhaustion forced a tactical
retreat in the 1920s and the liberalisation of the New Economic
Policy allowed the party to reorganise. Then the party under the
leadership of Stalin reassumed the totalitarian agenda. This
took the form of enforced collectivisation and industrialisation
through expanded bureaucratic control and terror. The party
totally took over the state apparatus. The war of 1941-45 forced
some relaxation but it reemerged full blown in the late 1940s as
a monolithic terroristic society.

Historical analysis came down to the thesis of an
inevitable "unbroken continuity" throughout Soviet
history, thereby largely excluding the stuff of real
history - conflicting traditions, alternatives, turning
points, and multiple causalities. Political analysis
fixated on a regime imposing its "inner totalitarian
logic" of an impotent, victimised society, thereby
largely excluding the stuff of real politics - the
interaction of governmental, historical, social,
cultural, and economic factors; the conflict of classes,
institutions, groups, generations, ideas and
personalities.
(Cohen 1985:7)
The predominance of policy concerns in Sovietology seriously limited the intellectual possibilities. All research took on the quest for "lessons" and the search for knowledge that would predict Soviet policy. Thus there was a political scholarship, overly utilitarian, with a built in attitude of hostility towards its object of study. Interpreting the Soviet experience in these terms led inevitably to a foreign policy of resistance and a politics of punishment; massive retaliation was justifiable morally, and certainly intellectually, by this image of unrestrained evil. If it was so monolithic and impervious to normal political considerations then obviously the only thing that could possibly control its actions was the threat of massive violence.

The denial of history has had serious political repercussions (Cohen 1985). By portraying the totalitarian ethos as unchanging and as inevitably successful, once the initial Bolshevik takeover of power was complete, it denies the multiplicity of the themes in the Russian revolutionary process. The New Economic Policy of the 1920s is dismissed as a tactical retreat, its potential as a possible model for other social formations is ruled out; the upheavals of the Khrushchev period can also easily be dismissed as insignificant. Related to this is the assumption that any socialist revolution will inevitably become totalitarian. This has been a powerful ideological weapon in the repression of national liberation movements in the Third World.
Crucially this denial of history removes from serious consideration any possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union to reform the international order. If the system is as the totalitarian conception says it is, then the system will not change by inducement or contact with the West. Any apparent changes are either dismissed as cosmetic, not substantive, or else as a ruse to lull the West into complacency, hence making it more vulnerable to plots to subvert it. The totalitarian interpretation thus contains within it a crucial ideological move that delegitimates all other interpretations. It defines other interpretations as false by requiring the totalitarian state to attempt to dupe Western leaders into accomodations that it will exploit to its unilateral advantage. Thus totalitarian discourse contains as a central tenet a move that precludes other discursive practices about the Soviet Union. This crucial point will be returned to below in the analysis of the CPD texts.

The notion of totalitarianism was used widely in popular and political discussions. It was a mainstay in the anticommunist ideology of the 1950s. The intellectual climate of the 1950s was one of fear and suspicion; the academy was no exception (Caute 1978). Different opinions were to come to the fore later in the 1960s and 1970s as critical perspectives on the totalitarianism schools developed in the light of the experiences of the 1960s and longer perspectives on the events of the 1920s emerged. The policy preoccupations and the political intrusions in the field
were criticised.

But simultaneously academic interest, and crucially foundation funding, moved away from Soviet studies. Despite these revisionist efforts of the 1960s, Welch's (1970) survey of academic views of the Soviet Union found them heavily skewed towards the "hard" perspective on the USSR. There were of course exceptions in Western scholarship, Isaac Deutscher (1960a, 1960b) being an obvious example, while in Britain E.H. Carr (1966) was at work on a mammoth history of the Soviet Union that was more sympathetic. But the old notions of totalitarianism never left the field, they were to reemerge to prominence in the late 1970s in the critique of detente, notably in the CPD literature.

The unchanging nature of the Soviet Union fits well with the worst case analyses of the nuclear strategists as well as with the Realist assumption of power as the crucial dimension of international relations. But the Sovietological interpretation also requires that the Soviet Union be inherently expansionist, totalitarianism is after all about absolute control, which requires in the final analysis global hegemony at least, if not direct military domination. This leads us to matters of Geopolitics.
4.5 CONTAINMENT AND GEOPOLITICS

As discussed above, Realism came to dominate many discussions of international relations in the post-war period, and the key concept of interest understood in terms of power is important in the post-war political discourse. Interests are intimately related to security, understood in the sense of preventing the potential adversary invading one's (territorially understood) space, which in turn relates to physical protection and political alignments at, in the American case, the global scale.

Thus in a major statement on the post-war role of the U.S., Walt Rostow (1960) defined the term of national interest in an explicit statement of Geopolitics, although the term as such never appears in the relevant passage. In it Rostow argues that the U.S. has been in danger since the late eighteenth century because of

the simple geographic fact that the combined resources of Eurasia, including its military potential, have been and remain superior to those of the United States — Eurasia being here defined to include Asia, the Middle East, and Africa as well as Europe. The United States must be viewed essentially as a continental island off the greater land mass of Eurasia.

(Rostow 1960:543)

There are two threats that Rostow identifies as stemming from these facts of global geography. First:

Since the combined resources of Eurasia could pose a serious threat of military defeat to the United States, it is the American interest that no single power or group of powers hostile or potentially hostile to the United States dominate that area or a sufficient portion of it to threaten the United States and any coalition the United States can build and sustain.
Second, modern communications technologies mean that whatever the military situation might be, a Eurasia coalesced under totalitarian dictatorships would threaten the survival of democracy both elsewhere and in the United States. It is, therefore, equally the American interest that the societies of Eurasia develop along lines broadly consistent with the nation's own ideology; for under modern conditions it is difficult to envisage the survival of a democratic American society as an island in a totalitarian sea. (Rostow 1960:544)

This statement reflects the classic Geopolitical concerns of Mackinder and Spykman with global domination based on the supposedly inaccessible Heartland of Eurasia in Siberia, updated to include the opposition to "totalitarian" communism. On the basis of this there follows a detailed discussion of the American "ideological interest" in working to prevent the accession to power of "totalitarian" regimes in Eurasia. 

At its simplest the post war American Geopolitical view of the global situation is one of bipolar competition within which "the free world" attempts to prevent, deter, dissuade the expansion of the Soviet bloc into the Rimlands of the Eurasian landmass through its policy of containment. Thus territorial expansion is the key to the geopolitical viewpoint, control of the resources and military potential of these areas as well as

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* In addition to being a clear statement of the U.S. national interest in Geopolitical terms, this formulation is significant because it was written just prior to Rostow's joining the Kennedy administration as an advisor who dealt with matters in South East Asia. His brother Eugene, who later served in the Johnson administration, reiterates many of these themes in his later writings and incorporated these ideas into the CPD literature in the 1970s.
the potential for hostile "bases" is the "prize" for which the superpowers are supposedly struggling in these arenas. As this dissertation argues in later chapters, it is precisely this emphasis on the Geopolitical dimension of the literature on the Soviet threat that provides the key to understanding the political discourse of the CPD.

The key terms of containment and deterrence are widely understood in spatial terms. The formulation of the overall plan for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in NSC68 (see chapter 5) advocated a military buildup to forestall the military expansion of the USSR. Containment is a spatial metaphor, and it was understood in those terms in the explicit formulations of the Truman Doctrine, NSC68 and the domino theory.

The domino theory argues that due to political and military pressure, often in the form of "subversion" and guerrilla warfare, states adjacent to existing "communist" states will "fall" to the "communists" unless military intervention on the part of the "free world" occurs to support "democratic" regimes. The domino theory originated explicitly in the first cold war and has influenced subsequent political thinking (O'Sullivan 1982, 1985). It has influenced most subsequent presidential administrations in the U.S. despite repeated criticisms which argue that mere proximity is not an adequate indication of the potential for a domino to "fall".

NSC68 refers to National Security Council document number 68, Report by the Secretaries of State and Defence on "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (1950).
The idea of dominos is related to the view of a Soviet Union which is expansionist and totalitarian, which, once it has gained control anywhere, will not relinquish it. It is usually seen as the mechanism whereby the USSR expands its control without direct military invasion, although that is always a possibility. The domino idea is sometimes stretched to extremes and extended to issues of superpower influence in the Third World in areas that have no geographical proximity to other "communist" states (DeBlij 1981).

The domino theory is the most geographically explicit form of geopolitical reasoning, the others include discussions of political will and determination, essential parts of the formulation of deterrence doctrine and the more overt propaganda war that never ceases between the superpowers. To these the language of "geopolitics" provides a "credibility" by supposedly providing intellectual justification by appealing to the "objective" because geographically established, facts of power politics. But they explain the superpower confrontation in spatial terms, if "they" gain control over territory, then they become stronger. But the geopolitical theme concerns matters of internal "security" as well.

In addition to being an external threat in terms of territorial expansion in the Third World or Europe, the Soviet threat is also conceived as an internal threat, "subversion" is its other face. The two aspects of the threat to "the free world" are closely linked, an external threat is used to justify
internal political policies of repression and social control. Here the history of repression of socialist and progressive movements in the Western countries as well as the Third World is central (Miliband et al. 1984). Thus the "Communist Threat" is grafted onto the notions of "the Russian threat", now Geopolitics is about, in Rostow's (1960) terms, "The American ideological interest".

The use by the USSR of communist parties within the capitalist world as agents of its foreign policy added to this dynamic. Thus any movement that can be linked to the Communists can be portrayed as a part of a global plan for the expansion of the Soviet system (Whitaker 1984, Zeebroek 1984). Internal repression of "subversion" is linked to a more overtly nationalistic discourse of threat from external sources. The Geopolitical division relates directly to internal political hegemony and the control and marginalisation of competing political discourses. An adequate conception of geopolitics has to include this dimension, in terms of how the external Other is portrayed in terms of domestic political threats. The external Other becomes a key mobilising factor in domestic politics.

As was argued in chapter 2, the creation of the discourse of the Other is a political act, its "knowledges" are modes of domination and control on behalf of the existing power structure, and in turn the discourses shape the reproduction of that power structure. But these knowledges are not independent things that mysteriously float in a culture. They are intimately
bound up with the institutional structures which produce and reproduce them and the power relations of these institutions.

4.6 SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed the discourses of containment, reviewing the "security" discourses of relevance to the containment militarist position. Realism defined International Relations in terms of a struggle for power, Strategy defined the power contest in terms of nuclear coercion and the policy of deterring the aggressive totalitarian Soviet Union which is theorised as unchanging by the Sovietological literature. All these are structured within understandings of political power in spatial terms, within an implicit division of political space into territorially demarcated states. These states in turn are strategically important because of their location in terms of Geopolitics.

Thus operational foreign policy is structured in the terms of an implicit Geopolitical understanding of global events in which the motive force is the bilateral competition of the USSR and the "free world" led by the U.S. This competition, and with it deterrence as the key to Western survival, necessitates a global militarisation to contain the expansion of the totalitarian sphere led by the USSR. All the principle aspects of the political discourse of post-war U.S. politics are present here. In combination they acted to limit the fields of discourse, asking ultimately "but what about the Russians?" to
close off potentially counterhegemonic formulations.

But the ascendance of the containment militarist position was not uncontested; it was a political creation in the Truman administrations. In subsequent decades it has been contested, in the early 1970s its premises were seriously questioned, a process which in turn led to the formation of the CPD to reassert its necessity and in the process reformulate the security discourses on which it drew. By 1987 this position was once again slipping from unquestioned adherence as arms control once more dominated the political agenda, and some of the most ardent containment militarist advocates left the Reagan administration. This historical evolution of the containment militarist policy is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
THE PRACTICE OF CONTAINMENT MILITARISM

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The complex formulations of containment militarism have played a key role in the structuring of post Second World War American foreign policy. But the consensus on containment militarism was not established easily, it was vigorously contested in the late 1940s by supporters of isolationism and by fiscally conservative Republican politicians. Crucial in the consolidation of the containment militarist position is the debate over NSC68, drafted in the spring of 1950, which is probably the most important single post war statement of U.S. foreign policy. This chapter traces the history of this document and the subsequent developments that led containment militarism's demise and subsequently to calls for its renewal by the CPD and others in the 1970s. In doing so it inevitably raises numerous questions as to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy which space precludes dealing with. Only matters salient to the central argument of the dissertation are considered here.

Once firmly established in the early 1950s, the containment militarist hegemony remained effectively unchallenged until its policies led to practical difficulties in Vietnam and Cambodia. However it should be noted that the full program of containment militarism was only really put into practical operation with the arrival of the Kennedy administration in the White House. In the early 1970s the domestic political situation presented alternatives in terms of detente and later the shift of focus from military matters to the economic management of international capitalism.

In the aftermath of OPEC and the collapse of the gold standard, in part under the strain of the military operations by the U.S. in Asia, the economic aspects of Atlanticism became more pronounced, particularly in terms of tri-lateralism etc. and the institution of regular economic summit meetings among Western governments. Later sections of this chapter discuss this collapse of the containment militarist position and the political campaign by groups of intellectuals including the CPD promoting its reconstitution.

5.2 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND "THE RUSSIAN THREAT"

The history of the fear of the Russians did not originate in 1917 with the Bolshevik revolution, although a new dimension was added on in the aftermath of that event, namely the "communist" dimension. Far from all U.S. historical texts are hostile to Russia and subsequently to the Soviet Union (Anschel 1974,
Grayson 1978, Halperin and English eds 1987). But the security discourses discussed in the last chapter combine to specify the Soviet Union as Other in hostile ways, it is the operation of these discourses that are of concern here.

The "Soviet threat" has waxed and waned in American political life since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The reasons relate probably more to domestic U.S. political affairs, than to Soviet policies (Cox 1985, Mack 1981, Miliband et.al. 1984). Obviously external developments are not irrelevant, but internal ideological matters (Wolfe 1984b, 1984c) and the bureaucratic infighting amongst the armed services (Wolfe 1984a) are important factors in understanding the varying salience of concerns about the Soviet threat in American politics.

Electoral politics inevitably involve discussions of the Soviet threat as the preeminent concern of U.S. foreign policy, and the "politics of defence contracting" (Adams 1982, Kaldor 1982, 1986) ensures that defence intellectuals will always be found to raise the alarm about some new Soviet military technology (Cockburn 1983). All these factors are important in understanding the evolution of the "Soviet threat". The detente period involved the temporary demise of the "Soviet threat" (M. Cox 1984, Williams 1985) which the CPD and other new right groups attempted to reinsert at the centre of U.S. political debate. This section offers a brief review of the salient historical factors of relevance to the dissertation.
The U.S. was not slow to respond to the events of 1917 and their aftermath in what became the USSR. American troops were sent to aid the "whites" in the civil war (Maddox 1977) and it took until 1933 for Washington to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Soviet regime. Relations were not friendly until the Second World War when events led both states to war on the same side against the Axis powers. True to DeToqueville's famous prediction they emerged as the two dominant powers on earth, each "called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world" (DeToqueville 1969:412-3).  

The "cold war" occurred quickly after the cessation of hostilities. This series of interconnected events through the civil war in Greece, the "Berlin airlift", the victory of Mao's forces in China and the outbreak of the Korean civil war were in many senses a continuation of the events unleashed by the Second World War. At the end of the war Europe lay in ruins and the economic disaster in the aftermath of the war lasted into the 1950s. Rationing in Britain, a country that had "won" the war continued for years. In what later became "the Third World" decolonisation took its course initially encouraged by the U.S. because it loosened European economic control and provided new opportunities for the expansion of U.S. capitalism rejuvenated by the war. This was complicated by U.S. attempts to mould Europe according to its design. The U.S. supported the French  

\[\text{2See Draper (1983) on the history of DeToqueville's frequently quoted prediction.}\]
efforts to subjugate the Viet Minh in part to influence developments in Europe, subsequently getting involved in its own wars in South East Asia.

The Second World War had left the U.S. with global responsibilities and a military presence in Europe and the Far East although much of the area it presided over was in economic disarray. The USSR had troops in occupation of much of Eastern Europe where they kept social organisation running in the remains of the devastation. Both powers remained in a state of partial military mobilisation but "the U.S.A. and the USSR had little in the way of common traditions, no common political vocabulary, precious few links. They looked on themselves as rival models for the rest of mankind. They shared little except distrust" (Yergin 1977:7).

The complex political, economic and diplomatic events of the emerging cold war cannot be discussed in great detail here. For this chapter it is the interpretation of Soviet intentions by the U.S. foreign policy makers that is of concern. These intentions were surmised from very little. Prior to the exchange of diplomatic missions in 1933 the U.S. monitored internal

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3 For a summary and overview of the complex historical and historiographical debates on the emergence of the cold war, see in particular Black (1986), and also Alperowitz (1985), Gaddis (1978, 1982), Herken (1980), Pollard (1985) and Yergin (1977). This chapter draws particularly heavily on Yergin who provides a "revisionist" account focusing on the U.S. actions rather than on the actions of the Soviet Union. Given the thrust of this dissertation the focus is appropriately on the formation of U.S. policy, rather than on providing a comprehensive historical account.
developments from its embassy in Riga, and developed an understanding of the regime that has remained the dominant interpretation ever since. Yergin (1977) has termed this view the "Riga Axioms", in contrast to the more accommodating and friendly "Yalta Axioms" developed principally by the Roosevelt administration during the Second World War, and named after the summit meeting held in the Crimea in the spring of 1945. The U.S. had little experience of dealing with the USSR, which had been nearly excluded from international society in the 1920s and 1930s.

As pointed out above there has not been a consistent evolution of the Soviet-American relationship since the cold war; there have been fluctuations between periods of intense antagonism and periods of relative calm. Halliday (1983) suggests a periodisation of post-war Soviet-American relations into four phases. The first from 1946 to 1953 he terms the first cold war. This is followed by a long period of what he calls "oscillatory antagonism" stretching through the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnston eras to 1969 when the decade long period of detente commenced. Following this comes the fourth phase from 1979 to the present occurs, which Halliday terms the second cold war. Many of these fluctuations are due to what Kennan (1983) calls the "instability" of the U.S. Soviet policy. There have been a number of attempted accomodations with the USSR and also periods of greater hostility, accompanied by the ideological mobilisation of various themes of the "Russian threat" (Wolfe
The improved relations of 1987 and 1988 suggest the possibility of another period of accommodation and cooperation in the near future.

Foreign policy making in the U.S. is a complex process. The division of powers in the U.S. state between executive and legislature is further complicated by the presence of powerful economic interests and more general interests reflected in the amorphous term "public opinion". The executive branch draws on unelected officials to staff the many policy making positions, hence academics and more recently staffs from the "think tanks" are drawn into the process to provide specialised knowledge in addition to the traditional source for the foreign policy "elite" which has drawn heavily from East coast law firms and Wall Street banking firms. In addition, of particular importance to the making of foreign policy towards the Soviet Union is the presence in the U.S. of emigre intellectuals from the Soviet Union and East Europe (Nye 1984). Many of these people hold very hostile views toward the Soviet Union.

The central institution for the formation and discussion of foreign policy was the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) initially set up in the aftermath of the First World War "to equip the United States of America for an imperial role on the world scene" (Shoup and Minter 1977:3). Perhaps best known for its journal *Foreign Affairs* most high level policy makers have been members. But since the Second World War foreign policy has been intimately entangled with defence policy, under the overall
rubric of "national security" and defence policy involves complex technical policy debates, brought into sharp relief by congressional budget debates over defence appropriations. All of this has been coupled to the vast postwar expansion of the U.S. role on the global scene involving an expansion of the political process involved in foreign policy making.

Contrary to simplistic conspiracy theories of American foreign policy, corporate wishes among the ruling class of the U.S. are not usually straightforwardly turned into policy by a process of manipulation because of easy access, although neither is a naive democratic view that public opinion determines foreign policy accurate (Leigh 1976). The actual process involves complex political manoeuvring, bureaucratic infighting, and appeals to "public opinion" as a way of gaining leverage for particular views. This latter process, including the frequent use of the technique of "leaking" materials to the press at crucial moments, involves the mobilisation of various discourses to provide legitimation to a particular position. In the contentious realm of Soviet-American relations this is particularly relevant ever since the acrimonious debates in the Truman administration at the end of the Second World War.

Within the Truman administration the policy debate on Soviet intentions and U.S. policy responses to the Soviets started immediately upon Truman's accession to the Presidency following Roosevelt's death (Alperowitz 1985). Roosevelt had operated on the assumption that the Soviet regime, and in particular through
his personal relationship with Stalin, could be dealt with through direct negotiations. Truman, coming to power with no experience in foreign affairs, not even knowing of the existence of the Manhattan project prior to his swearing in, was quickly assailed by conflicting advice on the conduct of America's Soviet policy.

Yergin (1977) argues that the outcome was a complicated political matter based in the political debates within the U.S. In this analysis Roosevelt is seen as playing a double game, talking the language of "Wilsonianism" domestically, promoting the United Nations and international politics based on the universalisation of U.S. notions of democracy, while thinking and acting in terms of the "balance of power" and "spheres of influence" Realist perspective on the international scene, in particular in his dealings with the British. Yergin (1977) argues that Truman never understood the nuances of Roosevelt's thinking, not being privy to the inner discussions of his cabinet, and was inevitably drawn to the Wilsonian approach because of the politics of the Democratic Party.

The consequences were serious in terms of East Europe, where, in the post war diplomatic meetings the U.S. stood on the principle of free elections in Poland and elsewhere in areas under Soviet occupation which the Russians viewed as their sphere. In terms of spheres of influence the Soviets acquiesced in the creation of American institutions in Italy and were excluded from any say in Japan. Thus, Yergin argues, they were
puzzled and suspicious of the U.S. insistence on elections in Poland. In turn the Wilsonian interpretation of how things should work out suggested that the Soviet Union was being expansionist by its refusal to comply with all Western wishes outside its borders. The scene was set for confrontation. The cabinet and foreign policy advisors to Truman quickly interpreted these developments in terms of Soviet threats, the theme that was to dominate Truman's administration.

There were additional institutional reasons within the U.S. for the development of the "Soviet threat". These related to the immediate post war question of unification of the forces under a single department of defence, and the question of budgetary allocations in the restricted fiscal environment of demobilisation. In particular, the Navy and the Air Force were each pushing their own views of their future roles, and having a credible foe was seen as improving one's arguments in the budgetary and bureaucratic infighting.

The "Turkish crisis" of the spring of 1946 coupled with George Kennan's (1946) famous long telegram on Soviet conduct, and a series of major media presentations of the Soviet Union as an expansionist threat, Winston Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech combined with the Wilsonian framework of the democratic party rapidly pushed policy towards the Riga Axioms. Important also in this was the increased intervention by the armed forces in foreign affairs and the emerging doctrine of "national security", the essential components of which were a
Geopolitical conception of world order related to the Wilsonian perspective and a military interpretation of the Soviet Union.

The political struggle within the Truman administration was complex as numerous policy positions were argued and bureaucratic rivalry played its part in the struggle for policy direction. But by September 1946 the die was cast, within the administration at least. A memorandum by Clark Clifford entitled "American Relations with the Soviet Union" which drew heavily on Kennan's telegram outlined the new viewpoint. Also that month Henry Wallace, the last holdout for the Yalta axioms still left in the Truman cabinet, was forced to resign over his outspoken views on the subject. The Yalta axioms were dismissed:

Excluded now were assessments keyed to the nature of a particular problem or suggesting that the Russians were confused or crudely reactive. Interpretations and assessments from this point on derived from the axiomatic construct that the Soviet Union was not a Great Power operating within the international system but rather a world revolutionary state bent on overturning that system. These axioms and the doctrine of national security coalesced to create a permanent crisis mentality among the Americans. (Yergin 1977:235)

Thus in all but name the U.S. had adopted the policy of containment.

5.3 KENNAN AND CONTAINMENT

But it was George Kennan (writing as "X") in Foreign Affairs who usually gets the credit, or the blame, for coining the term "containment" to summarise the geopolitical views of many who feared the expansion of Soviet power (Kennan 1947). This article
is a public airing of the ideas he formulated in his famous diplomatic "long telegram" from Moscow the previous year (Kennan 1946). He penned this statement as a warning against what he perceived as a simplistic tendency within the state department policy planning fraternity to assume that the Soviet Union could be dealt with simply.

He argued that there were tendencies in the USSR which led its political structure to exert pressure outwards to expand its areas of influence. The absolute authority of the communist state internally, supported by a fear of externally based subversion, which drew on traditional Russian fears of invasion, combined with their version of Marxism which predicts the ultimate collapse of capitalism, provides the parameters of their thinking on international matters. Socialism is identified with the interests of the USSR, thus the Soviets in this perspective see all non-socialist countries as ultimately antagonistic, hence there will remain conflict.

However Kennan warned that the policy of "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" that he advocated "has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness" " (1947:575). Ever the diplomat he continued:

...it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too
detrimental to Russian prestige. (Kennan 1947:576)

In the years that followed his advice on these points was to be widely ignored, Kennan himself was removed from key policy planning posts in the Truman administration at crucial moments when his views were not hawkish enough. U.S. policy in dealing with the USSR became a variant of containment which increasingly emphasised military and strategic matters to the exclusion of the political. In Jerry Sanders' terms it became "containment militarism" (Sanders 1983). The military dimension was not important in Kennan's formulation, he saw no possibility of the USSR deliberately provoking a war, having been through the carnage of the "Great Patriotic War" no Soviet leader was in his opinion likely to to contemplate seriously an invasion of Western Europe, rather he saw the European situation as a political contest requiring U.S. leadership in reconstructing European political power.

To maintain the military posture that containment quickly assumed, and the doctrine of national security that developed as its justification it was essential to portray the USSR as a threat. The 1948 crisis over Berlin, the Soviet Atom bomb test in 1949, the communist victory in China and the Korean war soon provided justifications but the doctrines were in preparation before these events. Indeed by the end of 1946 the foreign policy establishment had concluded that the USSR's intentions were "aggressive, expansionist, devious and unlimited" (Yergin 1977:275).
The Truman Doctrine was enunciated in March 1947, reflecting the tendencies present in the administration which were coming to understand their policies in terms of military build up, intervention, containment and economic reconstruction. These policies are intimately tied into Dean Acheson's plans to construct a "Pax Americana" in which the U.S. ran the world's affairs and in which what matters is power, not negotiations (Yergin 1977) and the economic initiatives under the rubric of the Marshall plan. This inevitably involved a dramatic shift in political attitudes from the pre-war isolationist sentiments. The U.S. was assuming large imperial responsibilities. To justify extensive troop deployments it was necessary to identify a threat against any outpost of this empire with a threat to the national security of the U.S.

Establishing and maintaining this relationship is the key ideological task for the proponents of containment militarism. To make the threats plausible it was helpful to invoke a Soviet hand "behind" the "unrest". If this could be related to a systematic Soviet policy of expansionism with the ultimate intention of world conquest by communism, then it grew stronger still. All opposition or political upheaval could then be portrayed as a campaign to support the free world against "communism". What started in Greece in 1947 set a pattern that was repeated until it led to the morass of involvement in South East Asia. A whole series of bureaucracies developed in the state and defence departments and within the intelligence and
covert action agencies, staffed with what Richard Barnet (1972) has termed "national security managers", who adhered to this basic conception of global politics.

As suggested above the ideological mobilisations that have been central to the peaks of hostility towards the USSR have focused on a series of key policy documents drafted at the upper levels of the foreign policy establishment. The first of these is The Report by the Secretaries of State and Defence on 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security' usually known as National Security Document "NSC68", drafted by a group of policy staff led by Paul Nitze in the spring of 1950. Its ominous conclusions are phrased in terms that are virtually identical to those used by the Committee on the Present Danger thirty years later (Wells 1979).

5.4 NSC68 AND CONTAINMENT MILITARISM

The argument presented in NSC68 was provocative and alarmist. It developed a distinctly different interpretation of the nature of the Soviet threat and argued that containment should be a primarily military policy. In this it differed sharply from Kennan's formulation which argued for a political campaign dedicated to building viable political and economic societies that would be impervious to Moscow's influence. However Kennan's position was open to the militarist variant in that he had not specifically stated that containment was not a military matter. It also differed from the earlier NSC20 formulation which had
guided policy up to that point in its emphasis on military matters (Etzold and Gaddis 1978).

This document was drafted early in 1950 in a context of international tension following the Berlin blockade, the explosion of a nuclear bomb by the Soviets, the declaration of a People's republic in East Germany, the communist victory in China, a number of espionage incidents in the U.S. and Britain, and the formation of NATO. In the U.S. the stage was set for the emergence of McCarthyism, the advocacy of a militant foreign policy and an acrimonious debate over the development of the Hydrogen bomb. But there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of the aggressive foreign policy that took shape. It emerged from a long and acrimonious political debate and in the process defeated the still influential isolationist tendencies in the U.S. polity (Sanders 1983). There was an ongoing review of U.S. foreign policy within the state and defence departments in late 1949, but the impetus for NSC68 came from Truman who called for it in January 1950 when he ordered the production of the Hydrogen bomb.

Its key point was that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian power. The model of totalitarian applied to the Soviet union was closely akin to the Nazi model. Thus totalitarian internal policies were linked inevitably to expansionist foreign policy goals. This denied that the USSR would behave like traditional powers and follow the traditional patterns of diplomatic accommodation in a balance of power scheme. More specifically it
tied together notions of political ideology with foreign policy. The Soviet ideology postulated unlimited goals of world revolution therefore it followed that its foreign policy must directly promote these aims in terms of political subversion and military conquest. Coexistence was thus impossible. These notions of the "concentration camp" society were grafted onto notions of traditional Russian imperialism. In combination, a revolutionary ideology, a totalitarian dictatorship in a Geopolitical context with a history of imperialism suggested an ongoing political and military threat to the U.S. The key point is expressed in classical Geopolitical terms:

One the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

(NSC68 as quoted in Etzold and Gaddis 1978:386)

NSC68 was fraught with internal contradictions and oversimplifications. These were not considered important because the main purpose of the document was to evoke a political response. Although the post war Soviet foreign policy had been basically conservative in terms of great power politics, concentrating on securing territories adjacent to its borders, the document argued that this traditional Russian caution was irrelevant because the Soviet Union would undoubtedly seize any opportunity to invade the rest of Europe if it were presented. (Etzold and Gaddis 1978:394).
Further NSC68 made the assumption that totalitarianism, Russian nationalism and international communism all worked together without any real or potential contradictions. It ignored the major contradiction between repression at home and expansion abroad, the suggestion that the need to divert resources into domestic repression limits expansionist possibilities was ignored (Sanders 1983). What resulted was a simple scenario of a malevolent police state waiting to pounce on an unwary world. The analogy with the recent Nazi experience was nearly exact.

The military threat was emphasised; in the aftermath of the Russian test of a nuclear weapon in August 1949 it was argued that the Russians would have a nuclear strike force in a few years capable of threatening the U.S. The document reported that technological developments have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States... In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defences to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives". (NSC68 as quoted in Wells 1979:116)

The new policy of containment militarism encapsulated in NSC68 went much further than Kennan's original notion of containment as a defensive political strategy. It incorporated elements of the "rollback" position arguing for an aggressive
policy towards the Soviet Union which would roll back the boundaries of its influence. In other words it opposed existing communist states not just their expansion. Further, it suggested that any notions of roll back would be regarded as bluff without a military presence to make them appear credible. The NSC68 document introduced a conception of the world in which all was reduced to a zero sum game between the U.S. and the USSR. Earlier formulations (Kennan's included) had recognised the multiplicity of centres of power in the world. Not in NSC68, all political manoeuvres were seen in terms of losses by one power and gains by the other. In Sanders' terms (1983:29) the U.S.'s "purview of vital interests" was greatly expanded by this reformulation.

NSC68 also broke with the economic orthodoxy of post war thinking which tended to fiscal conservatism, limiting military budgets. This linked with the Republican isolationist sentiments that were widespread in Congress at the time. NSC68 argued for a radical departure, a form of military Keynesianism, with drastic increases in military expenditures. It advocated expanding both nuclear and conventional military forces. The interpretation of the Soviet threat in military terms provided the rationale, but there were other economic and political reasons why this policy was advocated. There were fears of another depression in the late 1940s, politically the Marshall aid plan was under attack, a neutralist tendency in Europe was feared because it would threaten the long term economic possibilities for U.S.
capitalism in a reconstructed Europe. Further there was a serious "dollar gap" between the U.S. and Europe in the form of a large U.S. trade surplus. NATO was still effectively only a paper alliance, largely without military might other than the still fairly limited U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Containment militarism was to be the solution to all these dilemmas of U.S. policy. Increased arms spending in Europe was seen as a way of reinvigorating European economies and hence narrowing the "dollar gap". Increased militarisation at home would prevent another depression by putting government money into circulation. It would also galvanise European political activity away from neutralism as the U.S. was the only possible counter to the Soviet threat. With this would come closer economic ties to the U.S. which would ensure growing foreign markets. European support was effectively bought by U.S. aid much of it tied to the redevelopment of arms industries needed for the conventional rearmament process. Portraying the Soviet Union as a global threat justified interventions in Latin American politics as well as Asia. Thus a "pax Americana" could be created which directly challenged the Soviet Union, while asserting U.S. hegemony over the rest of the world. The whole key to this internationalist program was provided by the interpretation of the Soviet Union as an immanent and perpetual military threat.

Many of the wider ramifications of the NSC68 policies were lost in the debate that followed its drafting. These debates
concentrated to a large degree on the key question of to what extent the Soviet military threat really existed and as to whether the Soviets really had plans for world conquest. Dean Acheson subsequently argued that the purpose of NSC68 was to "so bludgeon the mass mind of top government" (Acheson 1970:488) as to allow presidential decisions to be carried out to create this new order. But there remained a logistical problem of gaining widespread public support for a top secret report to which few political leaders were allowed access. Leaks to the media helped but more was needed to legitimate these policies.

Part of the solution to this problem came in the form of the first CPD which was created in this period as a quasi official body of "distinguished citizens" to support the effort to develop this U.S. foreign policy committed to intervention overseas and the establishment of a global "Pax Americana". It was a group of academics, policy advisors and politicians involved in publicising the findings of the NSC68 document and developing its doctrine of "containment militarism" (Sanders 1983), which was known simply as "Containment". It expressed the aim of preventing the spread of communism around the globe and developed a global political and economic system relying often on military intervention or at least the threat thereof. The committee advocated large increases in conventional weapons and many members favoured the introduction of the draft.

The debate over U.S. foreign policy in the early 1950s was long and acrimonious. Numerous splits and factions emerged in
the debate which ended up imbroiled in the 1952 presidential race. The increases in the military budget which were justified by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea involving U.S. troops were used by the Truman administration to send troops to Europe. This infuriated many Republican senators who claimed that this was close to treason. The firing of General MacArthur and the resulting controversies over Far East policy complicated matters further. The heavily Republican 1950s CPD found itself in many contradictory positions although its concerns were broadcast widely in radio programs and through the media (Sanders 1983). Despite these internal problems the committee did raise the general level of concern about "the Soviet threat" and in the end many of its members supported Eisenhower's presidential bid.

He was identified as an Atlanticist, although once in power he did not sustain the expansion of U.S. forces started under Truman and did little to implement the comprehensive program advocated by the NSC68 process. He presided over a fiscally conservative administration relying on the "New Look" military posture of nuclear weapons and J.F. Dulles' nuclear strategy of massive retaliation coupled to the CIA's covert actions to promote U.S. policy. The assumption that the country could not afford massive military expenditures was deeply ingrained in his and his advisor's thinking. Thus conventional forces were not dramatically increased in the 1950s. This assumption of limited means ruled out many of the extravagant proposals that the national security bureaucrats dreamt up. The full implementation
of the NSC68 program had to await the arrival of less fiscally conservative approaches to national policy.

5.5 THE RISE AND FALL OF CONTAINMENT MILITARISM

The NSC68 program was ultimately fully introduced only when John Kennedy came to the White House in 1961. Matters of nuclear strategy were to play a key role in his election bid. In 1957 another high level commission on U.S. foreign policy had assessed the overall military situation of the U.S. strategic forces. Drawing heavily on the work of the RAND corporation and in particular on Wohlstetter's (1959) studies of the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, this report concluded that the Soviet Union would probably be in a position to launch a decisive nuclear assault by the early 1960s unless the U.S. accelerated its ICBM program and ensured that its SAC bases were protected (Halperin 1961). It also talked of the need to develop Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defences, a matter that was to cause considerable public debate later in the 1960s.

Like NSC68 this was a highly secret report, but enough of it was leaked to create a public furore and provide Kennedy with the issue of the "missile gap" which he exploited in his election campaign. This is the second "peak" of anti-Soviet hostility identified by Wolfe (1984a). The Gaither Report's

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Deterrence And Survival in the Nuclear Age Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, November 1957. ("The Gaither Report")
pessimistic conclusions were instrumental in generating the issue of "the missile gap", which was given dramatic public support by the series of achievements of the Soviet space program in the late 1950s. The argument ran: if they can put satellites into orbit, then they can send nuclear weapons to the mainland United States. It turned out to be a totally "mythical" gap. The early Russian attempts to develop ICBM's were technical failures. The U.S. maintained its massive nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union until the late 1960s.

However the U.S. Minuteman ICBM program was rapidly set in motion to provide the U.S. with an "assured destruction" capability according to the predominant wisdom of the time subscribed to by McNamara and his "whiz kid" technocrat advisors, many of whom came from RAND. This argument was that superiority was destabilising in that in a crisis it encouraged firing pre-emptively in the hopes of destroying the opposition's weapons. Assured destruction supposedly reduced this risk because whatever one side did it would not escape destruction by the other. McNamara as Kennedy's, and later Johnson's, defence secretary initially advocated a strategic policy of "assured destruction" (subsequently embellished to "mutually assured destruction" (MAD)).

The idea of assured destruction is related to a posture of minimum deterrence in which each superpower maintains enough invulnerable warheads to ensure the destruction of the other's urban centres and the economic structure of its society. It has
a serious flaw from a military point of view in that it is only a policy of revenge, a variation on the early counter city variant of "massive retaliation". Despite public policy statements about MAD it has never been incorporated into military preparations in terms of targeting policy which has remained some version of the counterforce doctrine (Leitenberg 1981) tied into a declatory policy of "flexible response" which became U.S. policy in this period and was subsequently adopted by NATO in 1967. This supposedly means that, in the event of Russian military actions, NATO would retain numerous options, not just the option of massive retaliation favoured by Dulles. Thus there were conventional or limited nuclear options in theory available to the NATO countries.

But there was more to the Kennedy program for the prosecution of the cold war than the calculus of overkill, assured destruction and flexible response. Under his administration the cold war was also prosecuted in the form of counterinsurgency strategies which tackled "communism" in the Third World. This involved the development of conventional forces for active involvement that the NSC68 drafters had dreamed of a decade earlier. The results were that the whole panoply of technological warfare was grafted onto the initial counterinsurgency campaigns in South East Asia in a war that was run on technocratic lines.

Here the technical means developed by RAND analysts were put into practice (Kaplan 1983). In defining the "problem" in purely
military terms, and providing for solely military solutions the political dimensions were often completely excluded. In addition each service involved in the war struggled to carve out a niche for itself leading to massive duplication. Without clear geographical "front lines" or regular combat the "success" of the forces involved came to be measured in numerous, usually arbitrary or fictional, statistical indices which further divorced the political context from military actions (Luttwak 1984). The results for South East Asia were devastating (Shawcross 1979), for containment militarism less so, but the carnage of Vietnam and Cambodia triggered a domestic reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy which challenged the hegemony of containment militarism.

5.6 KISSINGER, CARTER AND DETENTE

In the early 1970s, detente and a major rethinking of the role of the U.S. military in the Third World caused the basic notions of containment militarism to be challenged. The basic assumptions were recast in the context of the crisis in Vietnam and the declining global economic position of the U.S. relative to its unparalleled supremacy in the post war years. Kissinger's intellectual training in the Germanic tradition of international affairs is widely claimed as the source of the new departures in U.S. policy. Obviously there are wider structural reasons for the reassessment.
The fundamental challenge to the containment militarism approaches brought about by the Cuban missile crisis, following which the USSR started a large missile building program, the imbroglio in Vietnam which brought into question the effectiveness of U.S. arms, and the economic disruptions, partly contributed to by the Vietnam war, set the scene for new and innovative departures. There were a number of attempts, particularly in connection with the Tri-Lateral Commission (Gill 1986) to rearticulate a series of discourses to reassert U.S. global hegemony in terms of a managerial framework in which military considerations were less prominent. Three elements of this process are worth noting; they mark departures from the containment militarism approach.

First is the tentative acceptance of the notion of nuclear parity and the acceptance of the reality of mutually assured destruction as a fact of superpower relations. Thus the earlier assumptions of massive retaliation and flexible response were transcended at the political level in a recognition that global nuclear warfare was not a meaningful policy option. Deterrence was maintained, but it now no longer offered any sort of military victory, it operated as deterrence only through the mutual suicide of MAD. With this acceptance came the SALT process. The focus of nuclear strategic discussion shifted to detailed analyses of the relative strengths of arsenals and the questions of treaty compliance or "verification". Part of this shift was inevitable given the Soviet nuclear weapons
construction program which was sooner or later bound to mean that the Soviets could destroy the U.S. with ICBMs.

Coupled to this in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the contentious debate about ABM systems. Many found the position taken by McNamara, who viewed the vulnerability of the U.S. as strengthening the stability of superpower relations, to be absurd. Thus arguments were made that defences against ICBMs were necessary. The arms controllers won the first round of this debate with the signing of the ABM treaty which limited deployments of land based ABM systems to two and subsequently one site for each superpower. The argument to support this was simply that installing these systems would trigger even larger expansions in offensive systems designed to swamp the defenses, causing yet further expansions of the superpower arsenals.

Second, and perhaps the most basic change was the shift in emphasis from the assumptions of the USSR as expansionist to a position which recognised it as a conservative power, primarily concerned to protect its interests, rather than interested in major adventures beyond its sphere of interest. In Yergin's (1977) terms the "Yalta Axioms" were once again taken seriously. Thus this model of global affairs suggested that the traditional methods of diplomacy and political accommodation on matters of mutual interest would work in superpower relations.

The third element in the Kissinger era of détente and the subsequent early years of the Carter administration, was the
recognition that other centres of power, apart from the superpowers, existed, albeit in a dynamic pattern of linkages between them. This allowed some recognitions of the subtlety of international events without the reduction of everything to simple zero-sum calculations of superpower rivalry. Related to this was the major change in American policy on China. Here Nixon and Kissinger pulled off a major diplomatic coup by taking the Sino-Soviet split seriously. By recognising China and establishing diplomatic and trade links the old mould of the "communist bloc" as a monolithic entity was broken (Chomsky et.al. 1982). This fundamentally shifted the basis of the cold war Geopolitical view which had been concerned with a monolithic totalitarian domination of Eurasia.

The widespread use of U.S. troops in fighting Third World insurgencies was clearly unpopular as the anti-war movement gathered steam in the U.S. The Nixon administration sought a solution to this unpopularity by introducing ideas of Vietnamisation as part of its attempts to extricate the U.S. from South East Asia. This approach involved a reduction in the direct combat role of the U.S. military, to be replaced by troops from "friendly" powers who would be supplied and trained by the U.S. The most infamous application of this policy came to a shattering end in the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979.

The Carter administration was elected with an international perspective of "global managerialism" often directly connected to the policies of the Tri-Lateral Commission (Sklar 1980). This
emphasised economic policies as the means to "manage" global problems. The contradictory foreign policies of the Carter regime, tied into rhetoric about human rights, were easy targets for the gathering forces of the "new right". In particular some of the old hands in the foreign policy elite, in particular Paul Nitze, who were passed over for appointments in the Carter administration, mobilised against the Panama Canal treaty, and with greater success against the SALT II treaty, that was negotiated but in the end never presented to Congress for ratification.

Carter attempted to enlarge the detente process but he was vulnerable to charges, from the militarists, of ineptitude and indecisiveness when the U.S. didn't massively intervene in the Angolan civil war and in the horn of Africa when Cuban and Soviet troops acted to support regimes they perceived as friendly (Halliday 1982). With the hostage "crisis" in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter's drift towards the second cold war was accelerated. In fact most of the weapons programs that were subsequently built during the Reagan regime were initiated by Carter, and the doctrines of nuclear war fighting and military intervention in the Middle East were encapsulated by the Carter Doctrine and "PD59" (Richelson 1983). The second cold war was well underway before Reagan was elected, conducted from a White House where Brzezinski gradually asserted control over an increasingly hard line foreign policy.
Detente and the policies of Kissinger and Nixon upset the foreign policy consensus by challenging the zero-sum assumptions and the conception of the USSR as an ever present military threat with designs on world conquest. The simplicity of this view provides it with tremendous mobilising power. Complex understandings with multiple causes are less useful for political mobilisation and military action. Further, under the Carter regime the talk of human rights and the emphasis on economic management tended to discredit some U.S. allies providing yet more complications in dealing with international politics.

This collapse of the foreign policy hegemony of containment militarism within the U.S. caused a reaction from the "hawks", many of whom found themselves in the unusual position of being outside the policy making process. They organised a second CPD and through this organisation and a number of related institutes and groups devoted themselves to forcing U.S. foreign policy towards a more militarist approach against what they described as the "Soviet threat". In many ways it was a return to the first cold war although the arguments were updated and China had ceased to be a threat.

Instead the villains this time were the USSR and its military "buildup", its "proxies" in various parts of the Third World, and domestically the arms control lobby who were involved in the SALT process. The second cold war lacked the domestic anti-communist witchhunt, but instead has a "fundamentalist"
religious dimension (Halsell 1986) and a widespread series of political organisations and "think tanks" promoting the neo-conservative agenda (Saloma 1984). A key part of this new right ideological position was the updating and reintroduction of the "Soviet threat" to reshape the foreign policy agenda.

Their targets were both the foreign policy of Ford and Kissinger, and later of Carter and Brzezinski, as well as the intellectual developments which offered non-totalitarian interpretations of the Soviet Union, complex interpretations of international politics and research procedures that focused on matters other than the crude Realist agenda of power seeking in an international anarchy. The MAD and arms control positions also came under intensive attack, based on the reasserted totalitarian interpretation of Soviet conduct and assumptions that it was seeking a nuclear superiority with which to support its expansive policies.

5.7 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND TEAM B

The crucial focus which crystallised this process of reintroducing the "Soviet threat" was the "Team B" process of external review of the CIA's estimate of the military strength of the USSR, the so-called "National Intelligence Estimates" (NIE). Under political pressure in the 1976 presidential primaries from Ronald Reagan, President Ford, in conjunction with George Bush, then the director of the CIA, established an external review of the estimates under the chairmanship of
Richard Pipes. Also on this "Team B" were Paul Nitze, Foy Kohler and William van Cleave who became members of the soon to be launched CPD.

Thus differing viewpoints within the defence community and the more general foreign policy community mustered evidence and estimates to support their viewpoint, causing interagency, as well as intra-agency strife. The Team B experiment came as a result of political manoeuvrings within the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and as a result of the recalculation of the Soviet defence expenditures forced on the CIA by DIA estimates which directly challenged the CIA figures. Freedman (1986:196) also suggests that Wohlstetter's series of articles in *Foreign Policy* (1974a, 1974b, 1975) arguing that the CIA had a history of underestimating the dangers presented by the Soviet Union had an effect on initiating the rethinking of the Soviet threat in the mid 1970s.

The Team B review coincided with this major reinterpretation of the NIE. In particular the CIA substantially increased its estimate of the percentage of the Soviet GNP spent on the military from between 6 to 8 percent to between 11 and 13 percent. They also announced the discovery of a major Soviet civil defence program, (see Goure 1976) which supported the emerging theory that the USSR was actively planning a nuclear war fighting strategy. Despite sophisticated counter arguments (Aspin 1978, Cockle 1978), the impression that the CIA had underestimated the degree of Soviet military effort quickly
spread. As Holzman (1980) and Cox (1980) point out, the explanation by the CIA that this in fact meant that the Soviet defence production industries were in fact much less efficient than was previously thought, got lost in the scramble to announce a new version of the Russian threat.

The Team B review criticised the existing CIA analysis as being far too cautious and reinterpreted the evidence and calculations to emphasise a growing threat, particularly in terms of the growing Soviet ICBM warhead delivery capability which was growing because of the introduction of MIRVs in the mid 1970s. Although there is some doubt about the precise influence of the Team B process within the intelligence community (Prados 1982), subsequent NIEs were substantially more alarmist than those prior to the Team B review. As Freedman (1986) argues the intelligence estimates process became highly politicised at this period precisely because there was a lack of overall political consensus on the intentions of the USSR.

The Team B analysis, subsequently leaked to the press and discussed widely, argued that the CIA's analysis of the Soviet military and political situation was far too optimistic. They painted a bleak picture of Soviet military superiority and made headlines with reports to this effect. 5 The new Carter administration tried to shrug off this direct challenge to its more detente oriented positions, but the controversy over the

intelligence estimates continued to dog it as critics raised repeated objections at the Congressional appointment ratification hearings for administration personnel. The fight over Paul Warnke's appointments was particularly severe, complete with anonymous memos being circulated in Congress to smear his credentials (Sanders 1983). The Carter administration, anxious for success in arms control, tried to put the whole Warnke affair and the repeated challenges to its estimates of Soviet intentions behind it, but the expressions of alarm over the Soviet buildup continued, in particular from the now publically launched CPD.

5.8 THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

The CPD was instrumental in this process, including within its membership key members of Team B. This time round the CPD was acting in a very different political context from its predecessor in the early 1950s. This time round the "hawks", advocating the reassumption of the containment militarism position, were outside the administration challenging a democratic presidency from the right, rather than attempting to overcome isolationist objections from a right wing congress. They were attempting to force a moderate administration to adopt, once more, the agenda of NSC68, to publically strive for nuclear superiority, and build a large conventional military force capable of military intervention in the Third World.
The CPD was organised during 1976 at a series of meetings between the key members. At these meetings drafts of the initial policy position paper written by Eugene Rostow were discussed. Meanwhile Charles Tyrolder drafted a short summary of operating principles subsequently entitled "How the Committee on the Present Danger will Operate". Members were recruited from the ranks of former top officials at the state, treasury and defence departments as well as leading academics. According to the Committee's own history, the committee was to "be bipartisan with liberals and conservatives, but the principal qualification for membership would be expertise and experience in the areas of foreign and defence policy" (Kampleman 1984:xvi). They selected these people because they were striving for "credibility - the essential ingredient in the process of persuasion" (Kampleman 1984: xvi). 6

"How the Committee on the Present Danger Will Operate -- What it Will Do, and What it Will Not Do" lays out clearly the agenda for the Committee.

Our Basic purpose is to facilitate a national discussion of the foreign and national security policies of the United States directed toward a secure peace with freedom.... Our organisation will concern itself with broad principles and policy objectives.... Our concern is with strategies and goals, with the broad thrust and direction of policy, not with all the ramifications and details of the day-to-day implementation.... We will concern ourselves with the relatively few major proposals that are unmistakably critical to our basic objective."

6 As noted in chapter 1, the collected papers of the Committee were edited by Charles Tyrolder and published in 1984 by the CPD. All references to CPD documents below are taken from this volume and cited as (CPD 1984).
Their principal activity was to be "educational". They proposed to provide speakers and materials for "the rational exchange of views based on facts and history" (CPD 1984:2). The dissemination of their "findings" were seen as crucial to their operation; "We will avail ourselves, to the maximum extent consistent with our time and resources, of all media of communication for the exposition and consideration of our findings." (CPD 1984:2). Recognising that this ideological campaign was a "big task" they justified it thus: "But, as concerned citizens, we feel an obligation to speak out in support of our convictions and in reflection of the lessons that we have learned together. For us there is no higher priority than peace with freedom and security for our country." (CPD 1984:2).

The Committee "went public" on November 11, 1976 with a press conference at which its first major policy statement "Common Sense and the Common Danger" was presented. Despite its claim to be "educational" and its non-profit status, many of its members actively lobbied and made repeated appearances to testify at congressional hearings, although usually without an explicit institutional affiliation to the CPD. In an attempt to appear non-partisan and uncontrolled by vested interests, they limited individual financial contributions for regular operations to $10,000, although donations for specific projects were allowed under their funding rules. Rothmyer (1981:41)
reports that Richard Scaife's (a CPD member) tax returns reveal that he directed $260,000 in foundation funding to the CPD. Its membership was limited to its board of directors, numbering one hundred and forty one at the time of its launch, but subsequently augmented.

The CPD provided the high profile personalities and foreign policy expertise for the new right political movement of which it became an integral part. Following its initial presentation the committee published a series of position papers (see CPD 1984) including "What is the Soviet Union up to?" (4 April 1977), "Where we Stand on SALT" (6 July 1977), and "Is America Becoming Number 2?" (5 October 1978), its major analysis of the strategic balance between the superpowers. In addition it provided a series of analyses of SALT II many of them written by Paul Nitze which were highly critical of the Carter administration's positions.

By the standards of the new right political machinery it was a streamlined and frugal operation, relying on the voluntary academic services of its members rather than on a large staff to produce its statements. According to Max Kampleman the first luncheon meeting that raised money for the enterprise "raised $37,000 over coffee" (Kampleman 1984:xvi). During all of 1976 as it was being planned the organisation got slightly less than $80,000. "We started in business on the proverbial shoestring" (Kampleman 1984:xvi). It received much less from Richard Scaife, whose foundations fund numerous political organisations (Saloma
1984), than other organisations like The Heritage Foundation, The Hoover Institute, The National Strategy Information Center and the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies who were also active in the foreign policy field, particularly in the campaign against SALT II (Sanders 1983:228).

Combined with these "thinktanks" (Easterbrook 1986) and the rise of many "new right" political organisations the CPD was instrumental in changing the course of the Carter administration's foreign policy to a more militarist stance. It provided the intellectual rationale to support the Reagan election campaign's arguments about U.S. military "weakness". In the latter part of the Carter Administration the CPD was joined by many other political organisations including the American Security Council and the "Coalition for Peace Through Strength" which undertook grassroots political mobilisation on a large scale, and used, among other media efforts, a slick movie "The SALT Syndrome" to widely broadcast its message of alarm (Gervasi 1986).

This was a direct political intervention aimed at changing the political discourse from an Idealist preoccupation with international security, the lynchpin of which was arms control and SALTII, to a Realist agenda concerned with U.S. military power as the guarantor of "security". Central to their ideological assault was the reinterpretation of U.S. security as the reassertion of post war hegemony, security being equated
with the maintainance of a U.S. dominated status quo.

Crucially the CPD provided a detailed image of the Other against which the new right could mobilise. A diverse coalition of forces from the new right through the CPD and fundamentalists concerned about school prayer coalesced behind Reagan in the 1980 election. As is so often the case in political mobilisation, it is easier to define what one is against in political terms than to suggest a coherent articulation of all that one is for. In this sense foreign policy is crucial to domestic party politics. "A unity of negatives based on making a bogey out of some foreign power can usefully cover a multitude of domestic disagreements" (Buzan 1983:234). Thus the Reagan rhetoric included frequent references to the Soviet Union and linked this to the failures of the liberals within the U.S. to prepare the U.S. militarily.

In the context of the powerlessness of the Carter administration in the face of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iran "hostage" crisis, Reagan argued for the reassertion of U.S. strength in military terms and in ideological terms as a reassertion of American identity in contrast to both external enemies, principally the Soviets, although they were often upstaged by the Iranian embassy occupiers. In the terms of earlier chapters, identity was defined in terms of difference. This ideological moment of geopolitics was clearly evident in Reagan's election campaign and in his political rhetoric since (Dallek 1984, Erickson
As of 1984, according to the CPD, at least sixty of its members including the President himself, had gained positions in the Reagan administration and have set the course of U.S. foreign and arms policy ever since. They are a small self-selected and clearly identifiable group that have had a huge influence on U.S. policy and the development of international relations in the last decade; thus they provide the subject for this dissertation. More specifically the CPD incorporated the key intellectuals who provide the ideological rationales for the Reagan administration's foreign policy and its military buildup.

The emergence of the CPD was part of a larger ideological shift against humanistic concerns and modes of thought (Said 1982, McMurtry 1984) which marks the rise of the new right, and the neo-conservative ideological onslaught of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this attempt to change the terms of political debate notions of welfare, equality and justice are sacrificed to power. Freedom is redefined in terms of free enterprise. Amid the fragmentation, expertise has been reinstated to legitimate political policies which draw on the classical liberal attack of government as well as a reinterpreted doctrine of progress cast in terms of reindustrialisation and "innovation" (Dickson and Noble 1981).
In International Relations the reactionary mood of neoconservatism is reflected in the much more sophisticated "neo-Realist" literature (Gilpin 1981, Waltz 1979). This in turn has been criticised for its failure to account for the historical conditions of its object of study, the international state system (Ruggie 1983) and in more strident polemical terms as "a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments" (Ashley 1984:228) which operates to "naturalise" the international status quo and severely limits the discourse on international politics. "What emerges is an ideology that anticipates, legitimises, and orients a totalitarian project of global proportions: the rationalisation of global politics" (Ashley 1984:228).

The neo-conservative world view is not particularly new or internally coherent (Ajami 1978) but it has attracted considerable following often outside the universities. Most noticeable in the U.S. has been the emergence in the 1970s of a number of well funded private "think tanks" which have attempted to shape the international policy of the U.S. government in line with the neo-conservative agenda (Saloma 1984). The largest and most prestigious is the Centre for Strategic and International Studies situated in Washington and associated with Georgetown University (Easterbrook 1986).

The "think tank" emphasis is on strategy and an oldfashioned Geopolitics which combines with a global militarisation of
international politics and in places an unabashed championing of political Realism in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy (Gray 1976a). These discourses of power politics and Geopolitics were important to the CPD and its attempt to reimpose the containment militarist hegemony in Washington.

5.9 READING THE CPD DISCOURSE

Finally, prior to turning to these rationales, a methodological note is called for to reiterate the key elements of the method outlined in Chapter 1. Ideology refers to the politics of discourse and the mobilising of discourses for particular political purposes. Hegemony refers to a political state of domination where that political domination is legitimated by ideological actions, including the political struggle to define discourses as "common sense", hence legitimate. Thus discourses can be articulated together and hence act to support hegemony in terms of how they delimit what it is possible to talk about; hegemony involves the ideological articulation of these specific limitations in ways that legitimate its particular structures of political domination.

Foucault's analysis of discursive practices provides us with a method of examining the discourses structured into a hegemonic formulation by subjecting the texts to a series of examinations. First, discursive practices delimit fields of objects, define a legitimate perspective to analyse this field, and then fix the norms for elaborating theories and concepts. Crucially these act
as moves of exclusion. The definition of the object of study is an exercise in the creation of Otherness. Discursive practices usually extend beyond a single discipline drawing characteristics from each and positing them in a new articulation. The first half of this dissertation has shown how the security discourses are articulated together around a common theme of the Soviet Union as Other understood in a Geopolitical framework.

The CPD texts are examined in detail in the following chapters to show how each of these discourses is interconnected in the CPD's specification of "the Present Danger". The texts are examined to identify each of these textual operations and their ideological functions exposed. Specifically they investigate the reformulation of the four "security discourses" discussed in chapter 4 around a series of discursive practices of Otherness which were articulated to attempt to reassert the containment militarist hegemony. The basic policy statements of the CPD are focused on in the next chapter, showing how the overall position of the CPD is constructed. The chapters that follow explicate the argument by focusing on a number of key texts that present the detailed working out of a particular argument.
6.1 INTRODUCTION

The CPD "went public" at a press conference on 11 November 1976, just after Jimmy Carter's election as U.S. President. At the conference the CPD presented the text of its major policy statement "Common Sense and the Common Danger", a document that Kampleman (1984:xv) calls "our manifesto". Coupled with their second (4 April 1977) statement "What is the Soviet Union Up To?", these two documents outline the basic concerns of the committee.

According to Kampleman (1984:xv) "Common Sense and the Common Danger" went through thirteen drafts during the organisational phase of the CPD in 1976 prior to its "going public". Gene Rostow undertook the drafting of this document, and his drafts were the first item on the agenda of each of the early organising meetings. This suggests that this is a very well worked through position representing an agreed consensus of opinion among the CPD's founders. These drafts were produced during the period of the Team B intelligence review. "The intellectual basis for the Committee grew out of the work of the now famous Team B which presented its view that the CIA had consistently underestimated the massive Soviet military effort" (Kampleman 1984:xv). As noted above, Pipes, Nitze and Van Cleave were all members of Team B, and key members of the CPD executive
committee.

The decision to prepare the second paper, "What the Soviet Union is Up To" was taken at the first executive committee meeting after the launching of the CPD (Kampleman 1984:xv). This in turn provided the overall direction of much of the subsequent CPD effort. Kampleman (1984:xix) states that Dean Rusk (former Secretary of State and CPD member) contributed the third last sentence to this paper, which refers to credible deterrence being the essential sine qua non of effective arms control (CPD 1984:15). Kampleman says this particular sentence triggered the subsequent CPD preoccupation with SALT. In their major later statements on the Soviet American military balance the themes of their first two statements are reiterated and in places elaborated, but the key rationale of their overall position are present in their first two papers. Hence the extended commentary and analysis of these documents which the rest of this chapter provides.

Their later papers are referred to in subsequent chapters where their themes are discussed in detail. In particular chapter 8 deals with their geopolitical concerns in some detail. The numerous statements on SALT negotiations are not dealt with as many of them are repetitive and deal with the military

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1 The sentence that leads into Rusk's is "We live in an age in which there is no alternative to vigilance and credible deterrence at the significant levels of potential conflict." The text of Rusk's sentence is "Indeed, this is the prerequisite to the pursuit of genuine detente and the negotiation of prudent and verifiable arms control agreements that effectively serve to reduce the danger of war."
balance in terms of the statistics relating to specific weapons systems. These debates on the relative strength of the superpower arsenals are the subject of extensive review elsewhere, and hence will not be dealt with in this dissertation (Kaplan 1980, Gervasi 1984, 1986). Since the election of Ronald Reagan as president, and the entry of many CPD members into the administration, there has been a sustained campaign by the administration to emphasise the supposed superiority of Soviet arms. Much more important for this dissertation are the much less rarely focused on ideological constructions that were used to render these assessments of Soviet strength so alarming to U.S. foreign policy. These are the subject of this chapter, which deals with the first two CPD statements. The final section of this chapter provides an outline of how these themes are expanded upon in subsequent chapters which show how the CPD case depends on the articulation of the security discourses of Strategy, Sovietology, Geopolitics and Realism.

2 The most authoritative annual global assessments of the London based Institute for Strategic Studies in *The Military Balance*, and in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's annual *Yearbook* dispute these assertions. Gervasi (1986) has attempted a comprehensive refutation of the claims of Soviet superiority which, despite the, at times, simplistic attribution of guilt for "threat inflation" to the machinations of the military industrial complex, remains a useful and comprehensive empirical account.
The opening statement in this "manifesto" is a blunt warning to the audience. "Our country is in a period of danger, and the danger is increasing. Unless decisive steps are taken to alert the nation, and to change the course of its policy, our economic and military capacity will become inadequate to assure peace with security." (CPD 1984:3) The audience is the wide readership of mainstream news media, the policy statement is presented at a press conference with the specific aim of reaching that audience through the intermediaries of the press. It attempts to capture the audience's sympathy in a series of ideological moves in the rest of the opening section.

Key among these is the explicit use of "common sense", a term placed in the title. As was pointed out in chapter 1 above, common sense suggests both being common, i.e. widely prevalent and sensible, in the sense of thought out and reasonable (Nowell Smith 1974). But it also refers in the Gramscian sense to hegemonic ideas, conceptions of how the world is that contain implicit structures of power which are naturalised, taken for granted, hegemonic precisely because they are unchallenged, often unconscious. In Thompson's (1984) terms they are ideological because they are dissimulated, moves of power hidden from view. The focus of this section is on these ideological moves that structure the statement in terms of the discursive practices of the security discourses outlined earlier.
Given the title the whole document claims to be common sense. By positioning itself as such it suggests that other viewpoints are neither common nor sensible. It thus appeals to a conception of global order that will be shown below to be the received wisdom of containment militarism, which as has been outlined in chapters 3, 4 and 5 is far from a natural or inevitable state of affairs, but a politically constructed arrangement to assert American global hegemony. Now a quarter of a century after its initial formulation in NSC68 this particular formulation is rendered as "common sense".

The second paragraph of "Common Sense and Common Danger" starts with a device to reassure the audience that the analysis presented isn't too alarmist, and yet provides the possibility to the audience that it is not at fault for being unaware of the threat. Thus "the threats we face are more subtle and indirect than was once the case". This is why "awareness of danger has diminished in the United States" and elsewhere. It clearly suggests that the audience probably shares this (common sense) assumption.

The remedy is available through a mobilisation of "political will" to revive alliances and to "restore the strength and coherence of our foreign policy" and on the basis of this revival to "seek reliable conditions of peace with the Soviet Union, rather than an illusory detente." (CPD 1984:3). It goes on to argue that only on these conditions can a "just and progressive world economy" be developed. The framework within
which these things can be made possible is crucial to understanding the ideological position of the discourse on the Soviet threat, and it will be returned to later.

The final sentence of the opening section carries a direct attack on the then perceived future agenda of the forthcoming Carter administration. "In that framework, we shall be better able to promote human rights, and to help deal with the great and emerging problems of food, energy, population, and the environment." Thus it identifies the CPD's goals as similar to the "liberal" agenda which Carter advocated during his election campaign. This is a double ideological move, simultaneously suggesting that these are desirable ends and hence diverting possible criticism on the grounds of stated political ends while arguing that the methods advocated by the Carter campaign are naive and misguided.

This move puts the CPD in a space of superior knowledge. It is aware of the real state of the world, not taken in by an "illusory detente". Reality is thus defined as a military strategic one. Political detente is unreal, illusion. The CPD alone understands the presence of the as yet unnamed "threat" which lurks unseen on the world stage. The implication is that those currently in charge of government policy are likely to make serious blunders, because of their failure to appreciate the impending threat to the U.S. The only solution is the adoption of the CPD "common sense" perspective.
Those who do not see the "danger" are not portrayed as deliberately malevolent, this is impossible given the implication that many of the audience accept the "liberal" perspective and its goals, which the CPD have also aligned themselves with, but rather they are in need of education and a change of political direction. Having suggested that a problem exists, that it is solvable, although those in power may be incapable of doing so without being pushed into doing so, and having made a clear attempt to identify itself with the concerns of its audience, only then does the document turn to specify the threat that is alluded to in the opening sentence. Thus the policy statement carefully cultivates the position of being politically "reasonable" by phrasing its arguments in terms of "common sense" to an audience to which it attempts to ingratiate itself.

Having accomplished this the second section starts with a dramatic statement of the problem: "The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup" (CPD 1984:3). No equivocation here; this sentence stands alone as the opening paragraph of the second section of the text. The critique of detente is immediately added to by an assertion that "The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world dominated from a single center -- Moscow" (CPD 1984:3).
The evidence presented points to the classic concerns of the Geopolitical perspective with the domination of territory beyond national boundaries. "It (i.e. the USSR) continues, with notable persistence, to take advantage of every opportunity to expand its political and military influence throughout the world: in Europe; in the Middle East and Africa; in Asia; even in Latin America; in all the seas." (CPD 1984:3). Not only does it continue "to take advantage of every opportunity" but the "scope and sophistication" of its "campaign" has "increased", "and its tempo quickened". It encourages divisive tendencies while acquiring a network of positions "including naval and air bases in the Southern Hemisphere which support its drive for dominance in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the South Atlantic" (CPD 1984:4).

Worse than this the USSR has been "enlarging and improving" both its strategic and its conventional forces far more rapidly than the United States" (CPD 1984:4). This, we are told is not explicable by interests of self-defence, presumably a legitimate activity, but rather is part of what "its spokesmen call "visible preponderance" " which their spokesmen explain will "permit the Soviet Union "to transform the conditions of world politics" "(CPD 1984:4). The device here is simply to use the words of the unidentified Soviet spokesmen and take them at face

1 The term "spokesman" is used in the CPD texts. Its specifically masculine form is maintained in this dissertation because the CPD uses that form, and as the feminist critics of militarism point out, security intellectuals are nearly all male (Cohn 1987). Hence the retention of the specifically male form of the term is doubly appropriate.
value. This legitimates the CPD assertion of their aims by shifting the burden of proof onto the Soviets.

Not only are the interests and political independence of allies and friends threatened by direct attack, but they are also in danger from "envelopment and indirect aggression". The danger of a Soviet dominated Middle East is of special concern to Europe and Japan as well as to the US. "Similarly, we and much of the rest of the world are threatened by renewed coercion through a second round of Soviet-encouraged oil embargoes." (CPD 1984:4). The association of the two concerns of Soviet domination and of oil embargoes is hardly accidental. Although the CPD is careful not to directly charge the USSR with causing the OPEC oil embargo three years earlier, they manage to get tarnished simply by the association of these ideas. This adds to the unacceptability of Soviet "domination" of the Middle East.

In summary, the third section of this statement offers the following encapsulation; "Soviet expansionism threatens to destroy the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends" (CPD 1984:4). There follows a dramatic ideological shift which links up with the opening paragraph thus: "If we see the world as it is, and restore our will, our strength and self confidence, we shall find resources and friends enough to counter that threat" (CPD 1984:4). Presumably after the last few paragraphs outlining a global threat that is accelerating and expanding, the reader will have forgotten that in the opening sentences this phenomena was described as "subtle
and indirect. There is little subtle about the threat that the CPD describes.

How the "awareness of danger" could possibly have "diminished" in the U.S. as the CPD asserts it has, if the threat is as massive as they portray it to be, is ignored. This gaping hole in the logic of the argument is simply left aside. There appears to be a political calculation here suggesting that investigating this too closely prior to building a firm constituency might alienate potential support by challenging too directly the integrity and intelligence of that potential support. In other words, you don't call potential friends "dummy" until they are firmly on your side. Having first brought them onside you can only then inform them of the errors of their ways. Nonetheless this major logical contradiction remains in the text, common sense may be common but in this case in it is not sensible in terms of being coherent.

The logical contradiction provides a dramatic example of what Kress (1985:74) talks of in terms of texts providing opportunities for intervention at points of unresolved discursive difference. Here the differences between the theme of massive threat essential to the urgency of the CPD appeal to action runs counter to their textual strategy of addressing the audience in the first few paragraphs. Either the audience was blind to the obviousness of the threat or else the whole status of the threat is exaggerated, either possibility gets their text into trouble. Their solution is simply to ignore the
The appeal to action is not made simply as a self interested defensive reaction to an external threat, that presumably would be lowering oneself to motivations not entirely unlike those of the enemy. Rather "There is a crucial moral difference between the two superpowers in their character and objectives". Having just outlined the USSR's global ambitions, in contrast, and using in Barthes' terms the rhetorical device of "the innoculation" (Barthes 1973:154) we are informed that "The United States -- imperfect as it is -- is essential to the hopes of those countries which desire to develop their societies in their own ways, free of coercion" (CPD 1984:4). In Todorov's (1984) terms the Other is different on the axiological axis.

This is a restatement of the traditional U.S. position of moral exceptionalism which runs through so much of U.S. thinking on international affairs (Agnew 1983, Williams 1959). The statement of difference could not be clearer, they are expansionist and power hungry, the U.S. is simply an uninterested observer now compelled out of the moral supremacy of its vision to support the freedom of other countries to develop "in their own ways".

The suggested remedy for the "danger" of the Soviet threat lies in a revamped foreign policy, economic and military strength, and a "commitment to leadership". More specifically we must restore an allied defence posture capable of deterrence at each significant level and in those
theatres vital to our interests. The goal of our strategic forces should be to prevent the use of, or credible threat to use, strategic weapons in world politics; that of our conventional forces, to prevent other forms of aggression directed against our interests. Without a stable balance of forces in the world and policies of collective defense based on it, no other objective of our foreign policy is attainable. (CPD 1984:4)

The military is seen as the lynchpin on which all else rests. But it is a complex and diverse military build up that is needed. The balance of forces is primary, the collective defence can only be built up once that balance is assured. Thus leadership doesn't lead to improved collective defence, rather U.S. forces restore the balance and the rest follows according to the CPD.

This will require an expansion of the military budget in the U.S. which they argue is at a 25 year low in terms of percentage GNP. As a sop to those who criticise the Pentagon for wasteful spending they insist that with "feasible efficiency" this is "well within our means". Here the rhetorical device is the use of the domestic analogy, prudent household budgeting requires "living within ones means". Here domestic "common sense" is grafted onto the enormously complex matter of national economics in a way that renders the complex mundane and familiar to the average American middle class member of the audience, and so acceptable (Hook 1985), or "common sense". This we are promised will provide a strong foundation from which all other things will follow, including, of course, "hardheaded and verifiable" agreements to control and reduce armaments.
The alternative is bleak:

If we continue to drift, we shall become second best to the Soviet Union in overall military strength; our alliances will weaken; our promising rapprochement with China could be reversed. Then we could find ourselves isolated in a hostile world, facing the unremitting pressures of Soviet policy backed by an overwhelming preponderance of power. Our national survival itself would be in peril, and we should face, one after another, bitter choices between war and acquiescence under pressure.

(CPD 1984:5)

The Geopolitical theme of gradual retreat in the face of increasing Soviet gains is the old stuff of the cold war ideology, making a clear reference to the experience of appeasement in the 1930s now identifying the Soviet Union rather than the axis powers as the aggressor. Here it is rehearsed once again with the sonorous phrases of "unremitting pressures" and "overwhelming preponderance" inserted to assure the predicament is understood in all its seriousness.

The CPD ends its manifesto with a call to educate public opinion so that it can "reach considered judgements and make them effective in our democratic system". Finally, a few sentences from the end, the document is placed in its political context by its authors in their call to rebuild the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy weakened by "Time, weariness, and the tragic experience of Vietnam". In conclusion the CPD announces to the world that it has established itself to promote a better understanding of the main problems confronting "our foreign policy". The use of "our" and particularly "we", the word that opens four of the last six sentences in the text,
cements the process of ideological identification between the audience and the authors of the statement begun more circumspectly in the opening sentences. This repositioning is clearly present in an attempt to invite support and promote this ideological agenda.

This ideological agenda is nothing less than a rebuilding of the doctrine of containment militarism and with it the reassertion of U.S. hegemony in global affairs, a situation that is common sense after all. The common sense approach to solving international problems is most clearly evident in the opening paragraphs where the committee outlines its "solution" to the danger which its hasn't even specified at this stage. It combines a large dose of moral exceptionalism with an Other constructed by its absence to provide a blueprint for the future, which is in fact a rerun of the cold war position of American supremacy within the world economy. But it is an authoritarian blueprint in the extreme. It is also very simple, common sensical, in fact, and herein lies the key to much of what follows. Here common sense is the received ideological consensus of NSC68 and the cold war.

Thus to return to the opening section of "Common Sense and the Common Danger":

There is still time for effective action to ensure the security and prosperity of the nation in peace, through peaceful deterrence and concerted alliance diplomacy. A conscious effort of political will is needed to restore the strength and coherence of our foreign policy; to revive the solidarity of our alliances; to build constructive relations of cooperation with other nations.
whose interests parallel our own -- and on that sound basis to seek reliable conditions of peace with the Soviet Union, rather than an illusory detente. Only on such a footing can we and the other democratic industrialised nations, acting together, work with the developing nations to create a just and progressive world economy -- the necessary condition of our own prosperity and that of the developing nations and Communist nations as well. In that framework, we shall be better able to promote human rights, and to help deal with the great and emerging problems of food, energy, population and the environment. 

(CPD 1984:3)

These two short paragraphs summarise the CPD position. They are based on a series of powerful ideological moves.

First, there is the division of the world into the Other, different, distant, threatening, malevolent, here unspecified, but fairly obviously the Soviet Union and "us" who wish for peace and security, despite the implied machinations of that Other. But "we" are not alone. There are friendly countries out there who can support us through our concerted diplomacy and provide support in deterring the Other. But "we" are defined in contrast to that Other. Otherness structures the discourse. Political will can "restore" the coherence to foreign policy, assuming that it was coherent in a forgotten golden age. From this one draws the conclusion that the alliances are in place, simply awaiting U.S. leadership. Nothing has really changed from the good old days, at least nothing that a bit of good old fashioned know how and common sense leadership can't remedy.

The further crucial assumption inscribed in this text is that the other nations' interests really do parallel those of the U.S. The geopolitical divide of the planet into a bipolar
arrangement of them and us is clear. The possibility that other "industrial democracies" might have interests other than supporting the U.S. in its campaign against the USSR is neatly excluded. Further it is asserted that the interests of the "developing nations" are the same, a "progressive economy" is universalised as an interest even of the "Communist nations". Hence if "we" have the political will to pull together now all will benefit. This vision of a general good is surely enough to overcome mere partial interests. The general good is simply defined in American terms. Common sense tells "us" that what is good for Americans is good for everyone else, the whole ideological structure is defined in precisely these terms. The particular is universalised to legitimate the stance taken.

This also relates to the last sentence, where global problems are to be tackled as the "liberal" agenda of ends demands. Thus we are told that military strength must come first, only with that established can all the other things be dealt with. Here the primacy of strategic over political matters is bluntly called for, giving primacy of force and military considerations over all other aspects of political relations. The discursive practices of Realist and Strategic discourse are privileged. They are defined in a clear move of exclusion. Liberal ends are secondary, the only legitimate perspective is the Strategic and Realist focus on Geopolitics and Strategy. Security is defined purely in military terms, and in terms of military control over territory.
The implication in this is that there is no possibility of the Soviet Union offering any help in terms of the problems identified by the liberal agenda. Human rights is put first here, the association with the Soviet Union as a system that is antithetical to human rights is implicit, but this association is also implied to the final concerns with environment etc. Making this move reinscribes the Soviet Union as the primary concern, first it has to be dealt with, then the other problems can be cleared up.

If any nations do continue to hold out against the CPD view of the world then they either are still suffering from illusions which will be removed by enough public education or they must be malevolently plotting with the Soviets to upset the happy state of global harmony projected in this view of world order. Except that it isn't a world order, it is an American, or even more precisely, a CPD order. By universalising their particular interests the CPD has denied any other nation or country, or for that matter their opponents within the U.S. or the "alliances", a say in how international affairs might be ordered. Other positions have been neatly excised from serious consideration by their failure to perceive the "true" nature of the present danger, one known only to the more knowledgeable and informed members of the CPD, who "know" the true nature of the Other.

But this knowledge is a knowledge specified using the discursive practices of the security discourses outlined in chapter 4 and premised also on a very specific designation of
Otherness. The ideological moves in this document are of Realism, in terms of power being the primary concern of international affairs, of understanding the Other in terms of military and strategic terms as a Geopolitical threat, the threat from its military capabilities being directly linked to its perceived Geopolitical advances. Power and the threat are understood in terms of territorial gains made albeit often with indirect aggression. In Foucault's terms, as outlined in chapter 1, the agents of legitimate knowledge are the practitioners of the security discourses of Geopolitics, Realism, Sovietology and Strategy, who through their mastery of these discourses can truly identify the state of the world and specify the "true" nature of the Other.

6.3 "WHAT IS THE SOVIET UNION UP TO?"

The nature of this Other is the topic for the second of the CPD's policy statements to which we now turn our attention. The CPD constructs this Other by explicit references to how the Soviet Union is different. "We strove to contrast the radical differences between our two societies and to illustrate the danger the Soviets constitute to the United States and to other democracies" (Kampleman 1984:xix). The logic of this statement and much of the rest of the CPD literature rests on the connections made between difference and threat.

The differences are the key to the danger; "they" are dangerous specifically because of how "they" are different. The
paper is structured around these twin themes and their interlinkage. Otherness is presented in numerous ways but Todorov's classification (section 2-6 above) of Otherness in terms of axiological, praxaeological and epistemological axes is clearly present. As pointed out at the end of the last section, the CPD relies on its expertise to legitimate its position, the epistemological dimension is emphasised, the CPD "knows" the Other. This is the central premise of "Common Sense and the Common Danger" and "What is the Soviet Union Up To?" Their argument is that the mistaken policies of detente are followed because their practitioners fail to understand the true nature of the Soviet Union, one known to the CPD.

"What is the Soviet Union Up To" starts with a brief summary of "common" conceptions of how "A rich, democratic and seemingly secure country such as the United States" conceives its "national aspirations", to which "at home and abroad, our open, democratic society, with its many centres of decisionmaking and limited constitutional government" (CPD 1984:10) is committed. These we are told tend to be focused domestically on such things as "full employment, less inflation, better health care, a higher standard of living and improved opportunities" (CPD 1984:10). These are supplemented by broadly conceived international aspirations such as "enduring peace, preservation of human rights and a freer flow of people and goods" (CPD 1984:10).
Again in the first sentence of this passage the ideological device of universalising the particular conceptions of the U.S., in this case as being just one of a number of rich democratic and seemingly secure countries, is slipped in to support the ideological position taken. In other words the U.S. is not alone, it is one of a (superior) kind. Having thus hopefully acquired the tacit support of the audience by this reiteration of standard ideological themes of the U.S. polity, otherwise known as common sense, difference is bluntly presented.

"The Soviet Union is radically different from our society. It is organised on different principles and driven by different motives" (CPD 1984:10). On the axiological axis of Otherness its "motives" are clearly distinct from the "liberal" values in the previous paragraph. On the epistemological axis, the point about failure of understanding is reiterated immediately, "Failure to understand these differences and to take them seriously constitutes a grave danger to the democratic societies" (CPD 1984:10). The danger lies in the process of "mirror imaging", that is of thinking "of others as being like ourselves and likely to behave as we would under similar circumstances" (CPD 1984:10). This habit leads "many Americans to ignore, to rationalize or to underestimate the Soviet challenge" (CPD 1984:10). Thus at the praxaeological level the CPD insists on a distancing, emphasising the need to avoid identifying with the Other.
Difference is primarily "rooted in... history and geography, its economic conditions and structure, and its political system and ideology" (CPD 1984:10). In a usage that will be returned to in detail later in chapters 7 and 9, Geography gets first mention among these factors, and in a passage that smacks of determinism, it is given an important, although not complete, role in explaining the CPD scheme;

Notwithstanding its vast territory and rich mineral resources, the Soviet Union can only with difficulty support its population. Its extreme northern latitude makes for a short agricultural season, a situation aggravated by the shortage of rain in areas with the best soil. Its mineral resources, often located in areas difficult to reach, are costly to extract. Its transportation network is still inadequate. These factors have historically been among those impelling Russia -- Tsarist and Soviet alike -- toward the conquest or domination of neighbouring lands. No empire in history has expanded so persistently as the Russian. The Soviet Union was the only great power to have emerged from World War II larger than it was in 1939. (CPD 1984:10)

Without any further discussion of the nature of the Soviet economy, we are informed, in the sentence that follows this quote, that the deficiencies in the economic system are aggravated by the regime and its attempts to maintain power. The totalitarian interpretations of Sovietology are rehearsed here. Apart from the nonsequitors and the determinism, there is no possibility of an alternative explanation, no mention of the numerous invasions of the Soviet Union in history; no possibility that the option of detente, using Western technology to overcome the transportation difficulties, to develop the mineral resources and to strengthen the economy, might be a less hazardous course for Soviet policy than building up armed forces
and threatening neighbouring countries.

Crucially in the last sentence of this passage the Soviet Union is presented as unique because of its territorial expansion. Here the Geopolitical theme in security discourse is introduced. The understanding of power in terms of territorial factors is explicit. The ruling elite it seems is caught in the same determinist geopolitical trap as its Tsarist predecessors. This is made clearer later when we learn that "it is driven by internal, historical and ideological pressures toward an expansionist policy..." (CPD 1984:14). This "ruling elite" is the key to understanding the USSR. It maintains itself in comfort "while the remaining 250 million citizens not only have few material advantages but are deprived of basic human liberties" (CPD 1984:10).

This state of affairs is maintained because the elite manages to keep the population "under effective control". But the elite sees itself as the leaders of a "revolutionary society" and their ultimate objective is "the worldwide triumph of Communism" (CPD 1984:11) which "would give the Soviet elite ready access to the world's resources, both human and material" as well as doing away "with all external challenges to its privileged position by eliminating once and for all alternative political and social systems".

The authoritarian regime in the USSR allows the Politburo to "exercise total control of the country's political institutions,
economic resources and media, and set for itself short term as well as long-term objectives, "disregarding the wishes of its own population" (CPD 1984:11). It can thus pursue its objectives in "an organised and decisive manner, taking advantage of every opportunity to enhance its power in the world." While it may have to rest content with a "polycentric" communist order in the end "the notion of a stable world order in which nations based on differing political principles cooperate rather than contend is alien to Soviet psychology and doctrine" (CPD 1984:11). Thus "peaceful coexistence" is a strategy to pursue its ends in a nuclear era when prudence is called for in the pursuit of global objectives.

To accomplish these global objectives the Soviet Union follows a "grand strategy" with the ultimate aim of isolating America and "reducing it to impotence". Their means include "economic, diplomatic, political and ideological strategies against a background of military strength" (CPD 1984:11). Thus the Soviet Union will trade with the West while simultaneously conducting "polito-military campaigns to outflank and envelop centres of nonCommunist influence". These include the "long and patient Soviet efforts to penetrate and dominate the Middle East" (CPD 1984:11-2), and the "drive, supported by client states, to establish regimes friendly to Soviet domination in Africa" (CPD 1984:12). This evidence is important to the argument. The grand strategy is encapsulated within its historical context and geopolitics is linked to nuclear war
thus:

The peoples of the Soviet Union have suffered enormously in past world wars. Their rulers would doubtless prefer to gain their objectives without another. But they believe they can survive and win a war if it comes and therefore are not unwilling to risk confrontation in order to attain their objectives. (CPD 1984:12)

Within this grand strategy four medium term objectives are itemised. They are first; the strengthening of the Soviet economy as an essential prerequisite to expanding military capacity, second; increasing links with Western Europe while attempting to cut it adrift from the U.S., third, cutting links between the Western world and the Third World, assuming that removing the raw materials sources for the capitalist economies would "throw the industrialised democracies into a series of fatal convulsions" (CPD 1984:13); and finally, attempting to isolate and contain China, feared as a long term threat. As a backdrop to these moves is Soviet military power.

In another reiteration of a vintage NSC68 theme, we are told that although the USSR is behind the U.S. in overall productive capacity and is less technologically sophisticated in weapons production, it is not inhibited internally in how it deploys its forces and consequently it can effectively use them to intimidate potential opponents and influence the actions of "client states". Further because of the nature of the Soviet system the USSR can devote larger proportions of its resources to military uses. All of these "inherent advantages cause the Soviet leadership to rely heavily on military policy as an
instrument of grand strategy" (CPD 1984:13) and to invest heavily in a military buildup. By focusing on the Soviet armed forces as players in the international arena the debate is shifted into the terms of military strategy.

We are informed that "The Soviet buildup of all its armed forces over the past quarter century is, in part, reminiscent of Nazi Germany's rearmament in the 1930s" (CPD 1984:13). It reaches to all branches of the armed services, and "in addition Soviet Nuclear offensive and defensive forces are designed to enable the USSR to fight, survive and win an all-out nuclear war should it occur" (CPD 1984:13). In italics they state that the SALT I agreements have not had any visible effect on the buildup, omitting to mention that the negotiated ceilings on weapons were much higher than the existing Soviet arsenal at the time of the negotiations. They further argue that the U.S. has restrained itself in areas where it held an advantage while the Soviets have not apparently restrained themselves. "Neither Soviet military power nor its rate of growth can be explained or justified on grounds of self-defense" (CPD 1984:13).

But they take the argument further into nuclear matters, arguing that "by its continuing strategic military buildup, the Soviet Union demonstrates that it does not subscribe to American notions of nuclear sufficiency and mutually assured deterrence" (CPD 1984:13). From these assertions the CPD concludes that "Soviet strategists regard the possession of more and better strategic weapons as a definite military and political asset,"
and potentially the ultimate instrument of coercion" (CPD 1984:13). Added to this are "intensive programs of civil defence" and the "hardening" of command posts against nuclear attack, all of which suggests "that they take seriously the possibility of nuclear war and believe that, were it to occur, they will be more likely to survive and to recover more rapidly than we" (CPD 1984:14). This is the third mention of this point, in as many pages.

All this leads to a consideration of what was to become a key point in subsequent CPD materials; the role of nuclear superiority. Arguing that in real terms the USSR had been increasing its military expenditures by 3 to 4% while the U.S. had been decreasing its by 3% per annum. If past trends continue, the CPD warns, "the USSR will within several years achieve strategic superiority over the United States" (CPD 1984:14). This superiority could "enable the Soviet Union to apply decisive pressure on the United States in conflict situations. The USSR might then compel the United States to retreat, much as the USSR itself was forced to retreat in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis" (CPD 1984:14). Thus,

Soviet pressure, when supported by strategic and conventional military superiority, would be aimed at forcing our general withdrawal from a leading role in world affairs, and isolating us from other democratic societies, which could not then long survive. Thus conceived, Soviet superiority would serve basically offensive aims, enabling the USSR to project its power in various parts of the globe without necessarily establishing a major physical presence in any single country. Soviet strategic superiority could lead the USSR to believe that should it eventually succeed in isolating the United States from its allies and the
Third World, the United States would be less likely, in a major crisis, to lash out with strategic nuclear weapons, in a desperate attempt to escape subjugation. (CPD 1984:14)

The CPD then reiterates that despite major internal difficulties the Soviet Union's goals are global in scope, and detente has not provided any reasons to suppose that their drive for global hegemony is in any way reduced. Thus they conclude that "there is no alternative to vigilance and credible deterrence at the significant levels of potential conflict. Indeed, this is the prerequisite to the pursuit of genuine detente and the negotiation of prudent and verifiable arms control agreements that effectively serve to reduce the danger of war" (CPD 1984:15).

The implication, also clearly drawn earlier in "Common Sense", is that the U.S. has to impose its set of conditions on the global scene. Given the unchanging nature of the Soviet Union, bent on world domination, there is no other logical possibility, the U.S. has to strive to impose its conceptions and order on the rest of the world. All this is premised on the nature of the Soviet Union as expansionist, devious, ultimately immoral. All the pieces of the global scene fit together around this theme. The geographical pressures of the Russian location coupled to a power seeking political elite not subject to internal political restraint are coupled to a view of Soviet

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* As was made clear in the introduction to this chapter, this passage was important in the subsequent focus of the CPD on arms control and the campaign in particular against SALTII.
foreign policy with a distinct agenda of geopolitical expansion to be helped along by the immanent attainment of nuclear superiority.

There is no possibility of political compromise here, the whole notion of a stable world order is ruled out by asserting that the Soviet Union does not recognise the possibility of such a situation other than by the triumph of its system. The possibility of internal change within the Soviet Union is not given serious consideration, although internal problems are allowed for, as are temporary setbacks. Consistent with the bi-polar dimensions of geopolitical thinking social change elsewhere in the globe is defined in terms of whether it helps or hinders the Soviet Union's plans for global domination, the possibility of non-alignment doesn't appear anywhere in this scheme.

Thus there is only one possible response to this global situation, a military and political offensive by the US. The ideological straightjacket is seamless, indigenous conflict and internal contradiction defined out of existence, by being collapsed into the context of a bi-polar contest. It is this reduction of complexity which provides the CPD ideological position with its mobilising power. The reduction of complexity to a two sided fight suggests an analogy with a sports contest, with two sides and an eventual winner, a zero-sum game in which one side's gain is the others loss. This oversimplification of political conflict is a recurring ideological formulation in
American political discourse (Shapiro 1987b).

The whole exercise is inscribed within a manichean portrayal of axiological difference, we are virtuous, they are evil, we are responding to an evil threat and therefore even if in fact we are doing exactly what we accuse them of, i.e. intervening around the world and building massive military arsenals, it is legitimate for us to do these things. Our ends are after all justified in the cause of freedom; theirs are evil and even when apparently noble they are a cover for the real goals of power. Thus the CPD draws on the theme of Otherness in many ways to construct their Other in the Soviet Union.

In Todorov's (1984) scheme they use all three axes, the axiological, in terms of the manichean contest, the epistemological, in terms of how well the CPD "knows" the Other, and the praxeological in that the CPD supposedly advocates a policy of distancing themselves from the Soviet Union. Except that their logic drawn from the other two axes prevents them from doing that. In fact their distinctions lead them to policy recommendations that are identical to that which they object in the Other. In psychological terms projection operates with a vengeance (Shulman 1984), forcing them to advocate a massive arms buildup and an interventionist foreign policy. In praxeological terms they are in fact exceedingly close to the Other, a position the axiological rhetoric strains to obscure.
This chapter has surveyed the principal points on which the CPD built their position. They argue for a common sense position, one that takes for granted the inevitable "natural" order of political affairs to be one of international strife. Specifically they represent the themes of containment militarism as "common sense". This reality is defined in terms of a military and strategic situation. This reality is one that the CPD is uniquely privileged to enunciate. Because of its expertise, the experience of its members in policy formulation and academic study of these matters of strategy, foreign policy and Sovietology, the CPD knows the "true" nature of the Soviet Union. Its position is free from the "illusions" of detente.

They argue that the Soviet Union is involved in a campaign for global supremacy, searching out influence in the Third World to gain military bases with which to threaten Western interests. It is morally different, motivated entirely by power sought in its own interest, set it apart from the U.S. which is defined as a morally principled actor in the tradition of "moral exceptionalism". Not only this but the global interests of humanity are invoked as the rationale for U.S. policy. But because of these high moral standards, the U.S. is in danger of appeasing the Soviet Union, repeating the mistakes of the 1930s because it is lulled into complacency by the illusion of detente. The clearest signs of this are in the Geopolitical retreat of the 1970s and the imminent danger of the Soviet Union
gaining strategic superiority.

The agenda of neorealism is clearly present in the CPD writings, all "liberal" agendas are deferred until the military threat is dealt with first. This deferment is implicit in all the literature on the Soviet threat that the CPD was involved with, all other political agendas are subsidiary. The necessity of this is constantly reiterated by the CPD, because it "knows" the true nature of the Other. The Other however is known in the discursive practices of security discourses. The knowledge of the Other depends on these practices. As will be argued in the rest of this dissertation, the discursive practices of security produce an Other that is threatening.

These security discourses produce a Soviet Union whose actions are at least partly determined by its geographical location and the major influence this has had on its history. Totalitarian regimes strive for total control, the Soviet Union seeks global control by a long term well thought out grand strategy which privileges military power as a key player. Nuclear weapons, as the weapons of greatest power are the lynchpin in all this. Hence the necessity to focus on the strategic implications of the SALT process. If the Soviet Union gains an undeniable strategic superiority, so the argument continues, then it will be able to expand its Geopolitical reach, gradually taking over a series of strategically important states and in the process unravelling the U.S. alliance system and eventually isolating the U.S. Thus the whole concern for
military supremacy is tied into the primary concern for Geopolitical control over the Third World as well as Europe.

The two initial statements by the CPD reviewed in this chapter contain the key elements of the CPD position and the themes that they were to reiterate repeatedly in the following years. The position is one that ties the themes together within a framework whose central organising theme is Geopolitical. The other parts of this position are all organised through the Geopolitical framework of an expansionist Soviet Union which can only be thwarted in the last resort by military power. Much of the CPD's later arguments were over the minutae of military statistics, they were to play "the nuclear numbers game" repeatedly, but the overall coherence of their case is held together by their Geopolitical theme.

The following chapters investigate this theme. But the essential prerequisite of this is the nature of the Soviet Union. Otherness and Geopolitics are intertwined at all stages of the argument. As was made clear in chapter 4 this is inevitable in that the political theory of the state that underlies international politics and security discourse is a negative one, security is defined as the territorial exclusion of Otherness and in its modern guises in neorealism as the management of threats (Shapiro 1987b).

Chapter 7 investigates the nature of the Soviet Union as understood through the analysis of totalitarian Sovietology.
Chapter 8 investigates the themes of appeasement and geopolitical progress showing how the concern over the "present danger" is intimately concerned with geopolitical developments. Chapter 9 discusses the themes of geographical determinism in Russian and Soviet history and shows how the MacKinderian tradition of Geopolitics was updated to add strength to the CPD's geopolitical arguments. Finally chapters 10 and 11 deal with the CPD arguments about SALT and nuclear strategy, which it will be shown, are only clearly decipherable if their Geopolitical premises are understood. Each chapter includes a detailed critique of the CPD position, showing how alternative formulations are possible if the discursive practices of the security discourses are challenged.

More specifically each chapter focuses on how these discursive practices use ideological moves that define security and Otherness in Geopolitical terms and use structuralist interpretations to ideologically reproduce the political patterns of the past. Each of the discourses of security thus acts to perpetuate its institutional arrangements supporting the militarisation of politics. The discourses in toto act to reinscribe politics within the U.S. and elsewhere in the West into the categories of containment militarism.

Chapter 7 shows how Richard Pipes, the CPD's leading Sovietologist argues for the superiority of a "historical method" focused on internal developments within the Soviet Union and tsarist Russia, in interpreting Soviet activities and
crucially their intentions. The historical approach Pipes takes is determinist and draws on geographical formulations to justify his interpretation of Russian and Soviet history in terms of "patrimonialism". This construction of patrimonialism is congruent with the interpretation of Soviet behaviour in terms of totalitarianism, both interpretations suggest the impossibility of political compromise with the Soviet Union. This conclusion is Pipes' essential contribution to the CPD.

Chapter 8 shows the more detailed working out of the CPD's Realist logic, a position that excludes all except military power from consideration in international politics. Crucially the CPD does this by conflating this concern with power with an explicitly Geopolitical understanding of the global situation. Defining power in terms of military control over territory is coupled to the collapse of the world into a bipolar struggle, one which reduces all matters solely to their significance in the geopolitical rivalry of the USSR and the U.S.

The CPD attempt to reassert its military and Geopolitical viewpoint as the hegemonic position in Washington is supported by the updating of MacKinder and Spykman's theories of Geopolitics. This theoretical justification for their position is clearly present in Colin Gray's writings. Chapter 9 shows how this spatial preoccupation is relevant to their concerns of "present danger". Later Gray links up these Geopolitical writings with Pipes' concerns with the "Patrimonial" interpretation of Russian history in deriving his "imperial
thesis" of Soviet behaviour. This determinist account is an explicitly geographical model of the functioning of the Soviet state apparatus. Here Patrimonialism, Geopolitics and Realism are interlinked, each discourse supports the others.

Chapter 10 shows how the strategic rationale developed to support the CPD call for a military buildup is premised these discourses of Geopolitics, Realism and Sovietology. Coupled to these are the arguments that the Soviet Union was planning to fight and win a nuclear war, presented most forcefully by Pipes, and arguments by Paul Nitze, in particular, that the U.S. was moving into a situation of strategic inferiority vis a vis the Soviet Union and hence would be "self-deterred" in a crisis. Colin Gray drew on each of these and on his "imperial thesis" to develop his "theory of victory" which is the focus of chapter 11. This theory of victory is an important part of the literature on nuclear warfighting strategy which has provided the rationales for the Reagan administration's nuclear weapons procurements.
7.1 INTRODUCTION

The CPD's foremost Sovietologist is clearly Richard Pipes, who has had a distinguished academic career as a historian at Harvard; among his many publications are a number of volumes on Russian and Soviet history (Pipes 1960, 1963, 1964, 1974). He directed the Harvard Russian Research Centre from 1968 to 1973; currently he is Baird Professor of History at Harvard. During the 1970s he broadened his academic interests to include concerns with contemporary U.S. foreign policy and in addition to serving as a consultant he chaired the Team B intelligence estimate review panel. He is most notorious for his 1977 Commentary article whose editor, Norman Podhoretz, titled "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War" (Pipes 1981:xvi).

Subsequently in the Reagan administration he served as director of East European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council in 1981 and 1982. He has continued to write political papers since, and a major book on these themes titled Survival is Not Enough appeared in 1984. Eight of the most important of his political papers from the 1970s, were collected as U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Detente (Pipes 1981). 1

1 All citations to these essays below are from this collection. The date of their original publication is noted in the text where appropriate.
These papers provide a clear picture of the thinking of the CPD's leading Sovietologist. His influence is clearly present in the CPD interpretation of Soviet foreign policy and its geographical roots discussed above in section 6-3. Prior to analysing Pipes' work some comments on the development of Sovietology in the 1960s and subsequently are needed, so that his texts are placed within their broader intellectual and political context.

7.2 SOVIETOLOGY AND THE CRITIQUE OF TOTALITARIANISM

Chapter 4 outlined the formation of Sovietology as an academic discourse in the period of the cold war. In the 1960s and 1970s perspectives shifted, the totalitarian approach was challenged and more complex interpretations were developed. These changes in the perceptions by Sovietologists of the Soviet Union, and more particularly of its political practice, have a strange mirror image quality to them when compared with the Soviet perceptions of the U.S. As the worst of the cold war receded tensions relaxed and scholars on both sides started to view the other side as less monolithic and as more complex. Griffiths (1985) argues that, at least in terms of political scientists, this occurred in three distinct phases.

During the cold war, both sides were gripped by a totalitarian image or model of the other side. In the Soviet view the U.S. state apparatus was wholly dominated by the super rich monopoly and finance capitalist stratum of the ruling class
who used the state to ensure their profits. Militarism and aggression were part and parcel of this process. The totalitarian school of Sovietology was in turn peddling a view of the Soviet Union as completely dominated and controlled by the Politburo. The totalitarian thesis was used in both superpowers to mobilise support for cold war policies and legitimise the economic costs of military buildups.

This was later complimented by a "conflict" model of either side where the basic tenets of the totalitarian image were retained but the role of factional strife amongst parts of the financial elite in the U.S. and in the Politburo in the USSR was added. Although this model still had clear propaganda uses, in the domination of the other side by a small group, it muted the conflict between the superpowers by allowing a consideration of policy options. The Americans came to distinguish between "hawks" and "doves" while the USSR distinguished between "militarist-aggressive" and "sober- moderate" (later "realistic") Americans.

The assumptions that both states were controlled by small groups came under attack in the 1960s and 1970s. Griffiths terms the resulting images a "quasi-pluralist" perspective. The field of participants in policy formulation was widened. In the Soviet conception of the U.S. the state was no longer seen as directly controlled by the interests of finance capital, but within a looser framework with some autonomy to control the social system in the general interests of the bourgeoisie. The interest group
analysis on the American side argued that there were a number of professional and bureaucratic interests in the USSR which engaged in the political process, making for a more complex analysis of Soviet policy.

Obviously in cold war terms the propaganda uses of these approaches are minimal, however they are useful approaches for the "operational requirements of collaboration among adversaries" (Griffiths 1985:11). This was the era of detente and these more complex models heightened hopes that each side could mobilise "allies" on the other side to further cooperative behaviour. ²

Despite these developments in Sovietology the theme of the USSR as totalitarian remains potent in political discourse. The term totalitarian has been used by the Reagan administration frequently to justify foreign policy interventions in the Third World (McMahan 1985). In the literature of the new right the term is repeatedly used in connection with the USSR. It is present in the CPD texts in many places, and as will be shown later in this chapter Pipes has a particular interpretation of Soviet history that is consistent with the totalitarian theme.

² Griffiths postulates that there is a fourth set of matching images in the wings, awaiting its moment on stage. This seems to suggest a break from earlier models with the suggestion of a state-centric situation in which the state apparatus is autonomous in policy formulation. Thus the struggles over policy formulation are seen as internal to the agencies of the state and less governed by the pressures of interest groups external to the state apparatus.
Pipes introduces an element into the analysis that is sometimes played down elsewhere, that of the continuity across the 1917 revolution, arguing that there are historical themes that run back into early Russian history that are important in understanding current developments. This provides him with a way to criticise the developments in Sovietology that are reflected in the policy of detente. Although he limits himself to criticising the policy aspects rather than engaging in debate with the newer Sovietological perspectives, these are clearly also his target.

Prior to the detailed analysis of these papers a few preliminary comments are needed. Pipes has a reputation as a Russia-phobe (Scheer 1983:55), his Eastern European origins from a Polish emigre family are undoubtedly a factor. However while this dissertation is concerned with the structure of the discourse on the Soviet threat, not with the details of Pipes' biography, these predilections are worth remembering. Pipes' position draws on his academic experience with Russian history developed as part of this discourse on Sovietology, to which he later adds concerns with nuclear strategy.

Indeed it is precisely his prestigious position as a Harvard scholar that elevated him to prominence in policy making circles. His ideas of the USSR as expansionist, often discussed in terms of a global Soviet strategy, rather than specifically in terms of geopolitics, have a distinct geographical
This chapter focuses on a number of his key papers which elaborate on the themes that are present in the CPD statements reviewed in the last chapter. Written over a period of a decade these papers are necessarily repetitive in places, the focus in this chapter is on the themes raised in the CPD literature, and how they reflect Pipes' interpretations of the Soviet Union. Kampleman (1984:xx) notes that Pipes made a "major contribution from 1977 on." His pen can clearly be seen in the CPD documents, nowhere more so than in "What is the Soviet Union up to?".

Specifically the following sections deal with his construction of differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, differences that lie deeply in their respective histories and their cultural traditions. Crucial in Pipes' opinion to these factors is the geographical position of Russia and subsequently the USSR. This is the subject of section 7-4, a theme which will be further elaborated in chapter 9.

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Over the course of the eleven years when the essays in question (Pipes 1981) were written Pipes has (as he notes in the preface to the 1981 volume) changed his emphasis in a few places, and on a couple of points reversed himself. These changes are worth noting for completeness, although the overall logic of much of his position remains intact. Specifically in early writings Pipes argues that he overestimated the "amount of trouble the Chinese would cause the Russians", took for granted in his early writings the conventional U.S. views of the USSR on nuclear strategy, and he subsequently thinks that the internal nature of the Soviet system is more important than in his 1976 interview with George Urban, which is also included in the 1981 volume, although not discussed here because its material is duplicated in the other essays.
Drawing on these historical factors and the crucial geopolitical tendency to expansion, Pipes then constructs a series of arguments about the conduct of Soviet foreign policy and uses these to criticise American advocates of detente. This material is the subject of section 7-5. This chapter closes with a summation of the ideological positions created by Pipes' interpretation of the Soviet Union. It shows how the ideological moves he uses structure the Other in specific ways and act in Foucault's terms as moves of exclusion legitimating his particular series of discursive practices.

7.3 SOVIET-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES

The expression of the "radical differences" between the superpowers' was the central purpose of the CPD's "What is the Soviet Union up to?" (see section 6-3 above). Pipes' writings repeatedly reiterate variations on this theme which he usually traces to some historical difference, and which in turn is used to explain differing approaches to foreign policy. Two aspects of his approach are particularly important. First is the assumption of a continuity of political organisation through the events of the Bolshevik revolution. Second is the focus on this organisation in terms of a "patrimonial" political system. Both these themes are clearly delineated in the preface to Russia under the Old Regime (Pipes 1974).

Pipes' analysis of Russian history suggests that the old feudal regime had by the late nineteenth century effectively
been superceded by a police state form of ruling apparatus; the Bolshevik movement simply continued this mode of ruling when they had consolidated their power. The patrimonial system in Russia operates in terms of state sovereignty being unlimited. Pipes points to the relationship of sovereignty and property as being crucial here.

Anyone who studies the political systems of non-western societies quickly discovers that there the lines separating ownership from sovereignty either do not exist, or are so vague as to be meaningless, and that the absence of this distinction marks a cardinal point of difference between western and non-western types of government. One may say that the existence of private property as a realm over which public authority normally exercises no jurisdiction is the thing which distinguishes western political experience from all the rest.

(Pipes 1974:xxi)

Pipes argues that the distinction has not emerged clearly in Russia to this day. Hence the conflation of the spheres of sovereignty and ownership in the Soviet Union suggests to Pipes that the patrimonial system is still intact. In it all privilege and material benefits are held by individuals at the pleasure of the state, this mechanism of the granting or withholding of these privileges continues to provide the key to how the Soviet Union is ruled. These historical positions underlie all that follows in Pipes' political essays.

They draw on this essential specification of the difference between "the West and the rest", the West as modern, liberal enlightened, the rest as, if not primitive then despotism of some variety. Thus in Pipes' terms the theme of patrimonialism
is a form of what has often been termed "oriental despotism" (Wittfogel 1957). Specifying Otherness in these terms brings with it the axiological assumption of Western superiority, the premise of most Western social science and consequently the rationalisation for intervention and imperialism (Wolf 1982).

Pipes' first essay in the 1981 collection is from Encounter in 1970, a paper originally prepared for an audience of historians titled "Russia's Mission, America's Destiny". The basic division of the world into us and them, the omnipresent feature of the later CPD literature, is present here in rehearsal, it might seem, for the later criticisms of detente. At this time Pipes' particular target was the "convergence" thesis that underlay some conceptions of detente. But this paper is worth commenting on in detail because it reveals many of the arguments that were subsequently to appear repeatedly in CPD discourse.

In various versions the convergence thesis argues that both superpowers have histories that derive from Europe, but have strong elements in their makeup that reject crucial aspects of their European heritage. But Pipes argues that the differences outweigh any superficial similarities that might be deduced from this historical commonality. "Specifically, that which Americans and Russians reject in European civilisation is more significant than the insistence of each having created a new and distinct civilisation" (Pipes 1981:2).
The Russian rejection of Europe, Pipes argues, is traceable to the adoption of Christianity from Byzantium rather than Rome. "From Byzantium, Russia absorbed a singularly conservative, anti-intellectual, and xenophobic ethos" (Pipes 1981:2). Viewing Christianity as a perfect achievement, the Byzantine church was inherently conservative. This cultural legacy lasted in this interpretation until just prior to the accession of Peter the Great to the throne. Following this there was an era in which Russia was Europeanised, at least to the extent of the adoption of military techniques and social customs among a sizable portion of the nobility. The other social groups in Russia remained hostile to the European ways.

Pipes argues that the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the subsequent civil war meant the end of the Westernising influence in Russia. Along with the monarchy and private property went "the Westernised elite which for two centuries had served as Russia's link with the West, and through it, with the world at large" (Pipes 1981:5). The administration of the country was taken over by the petty bourgeoisie which had been excluded from power prior to the revolution, "elements characterised by resentment, conservatism, antiintellectualism, and xenophobia" (Pipes 1981:5). Because of this Pipes argues that the regime fell back on old Muscovy as the cultural base for its new orthodoxy of "communism".

Thus as Pipes puts it later in "Detente: Moscow's View" the government, and its service class see the land as belonging to
them and that they administer it as they see fit without accountability to anyone. The communist regime has in Pipes' view simply reverted to this traditional pattern, albeit dressed up in a new language, and despite somewhat different intentions on the part of its founders.

In communist Russia, as in Muscovite Rus, the government as represented by the bureaucratic and military elites owns the country. No comforts or privileges in the USSR can be acquired save by favor of the state; and none are likely to be retained unless that state remains internally frozen and externally isolated. (Pipes 1981:68)

Thus the ruling elites in Russia are traditionally illiberal and anti-democratic, an inevitable result of their patrimonial heritage. Pipes argues that in capitalist countries the state operates as a break on the propertied elites' enjoyment of property through regulation, taxation and the threat of nationalisation, while in the USSR the state owns all the property which it dispenses at will, hence the elite has a direct interest in maintaining the power of the state. Hence it is suspicious of all but direct state-to-state interactions. Democratising impulses and the private ownership of property are a threat to the state structure and elite privilege.

In contrast, Pipes argues, the U.S. has isolationist sentiments, although not among those who make foreign policy. The rejection of the European heritage in the U.S. is limited to the rejection of feudalism, and reliance on landed wealth as the source of authority. The U.S. policy in foreign affairs is the logical outgrowth of the values of the liberal middle class. "It
derives from the religious-philosophical conviction that there is a right and wrong in every action and that man must constantly make a choice between the two" (Pipes 1981:7). The isolationist tendency in the U.S. is one that is based on an assertion of nation's rights to try to solve their own problems.

It is an isolationism qualitatively different from that sense of exclusiveness pervading the Muscovite and Soviet ruling elites, which tends to confound nationality and historic mission: as different as Liberal Protestantism is from Greek Orthodoxy from which the two isolationisms, respectively, derive. (Pipes 1981:7)

Having outlined the cultural bases of the difference between the two powers' political systems, Pipes turns to the historical roots of the conduct of foreign policy. These he likewise asserts are fundamentally different, based on the sharply different histories of the states. Thus the Russian way of dealing with international affairs is based on their historical isolation from the rest of the world state system coupled to their imperial administration of the many colonised peoples that made up the empire. Pipes argues that the process of nation building and empire building were one and the same in the Russian experience, as opposed to the separate stages that European states supposedly went through.

Thus the Soviet foreign policy is established in a way very different from that of the U.S., which is based on its "commercial and manufacturing background" (Pipes 1981:8).

A country whose governing apparatus has learned how to deal with foreign peoples from what are essentially colonial practices is not predisposed to think in terms
of "a stable international community" or of "the balance of power." Its instincts are to exert the maximum force and to regard absorption as the only dependable way of settling conflicts with other states especially those adjoining one's borders. There is little need here of theory, because the options available concern tactics rather than strategy or objectives. (Pipes 1981:9)

Pipes also argues that the Soviet system continues the patrimonial system of administration. This applies also to foreign policy where it is pursued solely to benefit the privileges of the service elite. The granting of privileges to sections of the administered populations has, Pipes argues operated as an effective method of cooptation and integration. He argues that this is the policy used to incorporate the Eastern European states after the Second World War, in this case by entrusting power and privilege to a new "class", the communist administrators. This is a key to Pipes' geopolitical argument which we will return to below in the next section.

Pipes argues that another apparent similarity between the two superpowers lies in their rejection of the idea of balance of power arrangements as an acceptable basis for the conduct of international relations. However Pipes argues that the U.S. in fact conducts it policy on precisely these grounds, interventionism is simply the operation of a restorative measure in the context of an upset in the balance. The faith in this principal is proved to Pipes' satisfaction by the decision to allow the USSR to attain strategic parity with the U.S. on the assumption that once it had done so it would "play the game", an
unprecedented voluntary renunciation of superiority, according to Pipes.

The final difference which Pipes draws is one between agrarian and commercial societies. In this conceptualisation the U.S. is the latter, the USSR the former (Pipes tells us that half its population lives on the land). The commercial ethos implies bargaining and division of profit. Producing goods does not teach the art of compromise, disputes over land are settled to one side's gain and the other's loss. "It is not the production of goods, in other words, but their exchange that infuses the habits of civilised life, that teaches individuals and nations alike to respect the rights of others on the ground that their well-being is the precondition of one's own prosperity" (Pipes 1981:16). Thus it follows that until Russia trades "in earnest" internally and with the outside world it will not learn the value of compromise (Pipes 1981:17).

In conclusion Pipes argues that there is not much hope for agreement between two such fundamentally different political traditions. "The notion of what is "good" and what is "self-interest" is not the same for those who make policy in both countries" (Pipes 1981:17). Hence the international arrangement of equilibrium, which was codified subsequently as detente, did not come about as a result of some acceptance of the world order by the Soviet Union. The axiological differences ensure an incompatability of conduct.
As seen from there (Moscow), the cosmos consists not of majestic planets revolving according to the laws of nature, each in its allotted orbit, in the midst of which man has been placed on earth to prove his worth. The vision there -- when it is not drowned in cynicism -- is one of chaos in which wondrous and terrible things happen, and God, in the guise of History, renders implacable Final Judgement. (Pipes 1981:17)

With such dramatically different histories the implication is clearly that conflict is inevitable. The Russian/Soviet system is antithetical to what Pipes argues are the central themes of Western culture, it cannot be assessed in Western terms and hence the conceptualisation of it that underlies detente is fundamentally flawed. The xenophobia and the lack of internal political freedom combine to present a threatening system which only really knows how to deal with outsiders by conquering them. Each part of this analysis suggests that the Soviet foreign policy is inherently expansionist. Each distinction that Pipes draws relies on the construction of a menacing Soviet Union facing a benign United States.

But the crucial ideological move in all this, which is repeated over and over again later in Pipes' writings, is to argue the Soviet foreign policy is a matter of historical determination, not a matter of policy choice by the holders of high office in the Kremlin. By making this move Pipes excludes the legitimacy of the detente position, he constructs an epistemological terrain where such considerations are excluded. Here we find the roots of the argument used by the CPD that only they are competent to provide foreign policy guidelines because
they alone know the truth of the Soviet system, a system beyond the possibility of fundamental political change, one compelled by the historical logic of its geopolitical condition to attempt to expand.

The failure of "liberal" thinking to understand this nature of the Soviet Union was a target in a paper written some years later for the Stanford Research Institute. It appeared as the introduction to a collection of papers edited by Pipes in a book titled *Soviet Strategy in Western Europe* which appeared in 1976. While Pipes observes that probably all cultures are inherently ethnocentric to some degree he argues that the liberal perspective assumes a particular culturally-blinkered approach that prevents it from understanding other cultures. What follows deserves lengthy quotation, as it is a stinging attack on the basic assumptions of liberal thinking, and provides Pipes with a position from which to develop his critique of detente. Specifically;

> The idea of human equality, the noblest achievement of "bourgeois" culture, is also the source of great political weakness because it denies a priori any meaningful distinctions among human beings, whether genetic, ethnic, racial, or other, and therefore blinds those who espouse it to a great deal of human motivation. Those differences that cannot be ignored, the commercial-liberal mind likes to ascribe to uneven economic opportunity and the resulting cultural lag. (Pipes 1981:64)

This is related also to the need to provide legitimation for the liberal political order and its trading and profit arrangements.
The most probable cause of this outlook, and the reason for its prevalence, lies in the contradiction between the "bourgeois" ideal of equality and the undeniable fact of widespread inequality. Such an outlook enables the "bourgeois" to enjoy his advantages without guilt, because as long as all men are presumed to be the same, those who happen to be better off may be said to owe their superior status to personal merit. (Pipes 1981:64-5)

In turn these ideas and outlooks spill over into intellectual matters and into practical political relations with the rest of the world.

The various theories of "modernisation" that have acquired vogue among American sociologists and political scientists since World War II, once they are stripped of their academic vocabulary, say little more than that when all the people of the globe have attained the same level of industrial development as in the United States, they will become like Americans. (Pipes 1981:65)

These assumptions have direct impact on the conduct of American foreign policy because

It is probably true that only those theories of international relations that postulate a fundamental convergence of all human aspirations with the American ideal have any chance of acceptance in the United States. It is probably equally true that no major power can conduct a successful foreign policy if such policy refuses to recognise that there exist in the world the most fundamental differences in the psychology and aspirations of its diverse inhabitants. (Pipes 1981:65)

That being the case then it is incumbent upon foreign policy practitioners to examine closely these different psychological and aspirational factors, specifically the U.S. foreign policy makers need to examine the roots of the Soviet system to understand the motivations of its foreign policy and how to respond. In Pipes' analysis, reflected in the CPD statements
above, the geographical factor in Russian history is preeminently important.

7.4 GEOGRAPHY AND PATRIMONIALISM

The geographical determinism referred to in section 6-3 (CPD 1984:10) is a recurring theme in Pipes' writings. His major history of Russia, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (1974) starts with a chapter titled "The environment and its consequences". Pipes argues that environment is the essential factor in the formation of preindustrial societies. From this all else follows.

Men living in the pre-scientific and pre-industrial phases of history had and continue to have no choice but to adapt themselves to that nature which provides them with all they need to sustain life. And since adaptation implies dependence, it is not surprising that the natural environment, the subject matter of geography, should have had a decisive influence on the mind and habits of premodern man as well as on his social and political institutions. (Pipes 1974:2)

The Russian environment with its mismatch of rainfall and soil type (good soils either get too little rainfall or get it in the wrong seasons for reliable crop production) provides a particularly precarious situation we are informed, poverty reduces the social and political options to a very narrow band.

Hence in "Detente Moscow's View" Pipes argues that the patrimonial system is "accounted for" if not completely "determined" by geographical factors.

Climate and topography conspire to make Russia a poor country, unable to support a population of high density:
Among such causes are an exceedingly short agricultural season, abundant rainfall where soil is of low quality and unreliable rainfall where it happens to be fertile, and great difficulties of transport (long distances, severe winters, and so on). The result has been unusually high population mobility, a steady outflow of the inhabitants in all directions, away from the historic centre of Great Russia in the taiga, a process that, to judge by the census of 1959 and 1970, continues unabated to this very day. The movement is partly spontaneous, partly government sponsored. It is probably true that no country in recorded history has expanded so persistently and held on so tenaciously to every inch of conquered land.
(Pipes 1981:70)

And further: "It is estimated (Pipes does not specify by whom), that between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth, Russia conquered territory the size of the modern Netherlands every year for 150 years running" (Pipes 1981:70). This is followed by the assertion that the USSR was the only imperial power that refused to give up its colonial possessions but increased them "by the addition of new dependencies after the war in Eastern Europe and the Far East. Nothing can be farther from the truth than the oft heard argument that Russia's expansion is due to its sense of insecurity and need for buffers (Pipes 1981:70). Still on geographical themes Pipes continues:

Thanks to its topography (immense depth of defence, low population density, and poor transport) Russia has always been and continues to be the world's most difficult country to conquer, as Charles XII, Napoleon, and Hitler each in turn found out. As for buffers, it is no secret that today's buffers have a way of turning into tomorrow's homeland, which requires new buffers to protect it.
(Pipes 1981:70)

He argues that East Europe is just the latest buffer, acquired
with Western acquiescence, but that "it is far better to seek the causes of Russian expansionism in internal impulses springing from primarily economic conditions and the habits that they breed" (Pipes 1981:70).

A final point on the theme of expansion is that the migrating populations have learned how to subjugate and dominate the populations that they came in contact with through exploiting the political weaknesses of their neighbours prior to annexation. "No other country has a comparable wealth of accumulated experience in the application of external and internal pressures on neighbors for the purpose of softening them prior to conquest" (Pipes 1981:71). Pipes makes the link particularly clear in his later paper (1980a) in Daedalus on "Militarism and the Soviet State". The paper begins with another warning against the dangers of mirror-imaging by Western scholars, in which the argument is presented that the USSR arms massively in defence of its territories as a result of insecurity and fear of invasion.

Thus Pipes argues that the assumption that economic resources spent on military expenditures is wasted, as Western economics might suggest, is not true because of the historical experience of Russia, as well as because of the exigencies of Marxism-Leninism. Pipes argues that historically the vast majority of the Russian state budget was spent on the military, and it often operated to conquer adjacent territories. There is a cycle of poverty necessitating conquest, involving large
military forces, which impoverish the state.

At the root of this poverty is geography, as the CPD texts reviewed above have also argued.

Russia's traditional expansionism and the militarism to which it gave rise were primarily caused by economic factors. The northern forest zone (taiga), which was the homeland of Russians in the formative period of statehood (thirteenth to sixteenth centuries), is an inherently poor area with a substandard soil and an extremely brief agricultural season.

(Pipes 1981:197-8)

This results in low crop yields.

And then in a passage which provides an essential key to the whole geopolitical conception that underlies Pipes' (and as chapter 9 shows, Gray's) position, we read that:

A prominent nineteenth century German geographer has estimated that the natural conditions in a region like northern Russia permitted, on the average, a population density of twenty five inhabitants per square kilometer, whereas the countries of industrial Western Europe were able to support a density ten to thirty times as great. It is a consequence of mounting population pressures, and the related tendency to cultivate the available soil to the point of exhaustion, that the Russian people have exerted constant pressure on their neighbours.

(Pipes 1981:198)

The prominent German geographer is none other than Friedrich Ratzel. Thus population pressure led to Russian expansionism and militarism. The military also provided a crucial internal service to the Tsarist regime; that of ensuring internal order.

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This material, or at least Richard Pipes, is most probably their source; see Chapter 6, in particular section 6-3, and CPD 1984:4.

Pipes gives the second volume of Anthropogeographie (Stuttgart, 1891) pp. 257-265. as the source of his calculations.
As Pipes hastens to point out it was the defection of the troops in Petrograd at the end of February in 1917 that finally led to the demise of the Tsar. While the communist state that came later had different ideological concerns they "inherited the same land with the same traditions and many of the same problems: it would be surprising, therefore had it entirely discarded that or any other legacy of Russia's past" (Pipes 1981:200).

Much later Pipes returns to these figures for agricultural production, in his *Survival is not Enough* (Pipes 1984). Rejecting arguments that Russian expansionism can be explained in terms of defensive reactions to foreign invasions Pipes suggests that "More serious explanations of Russian expansionism take account of concrete economic, geographic and political factors" (Pipes 1984:38). Under the heading of economic factors we read that

> Scientific estimates indicate that the soil of northern Russia, the homeland of the Russian state, cannot support more than 25 inhabitants per square kilometer; this figure compares with some of 250 inhabitants per square kilometer for the climatically more favoured Western nations. Population growth has made it necessary to acquire ever new land to accomodate the surplus peasantry, and this requirement, in turn, called for a large army, first to conquer territory and then to protect the settlers who colonized it.  

(Pipes 1984:39)

This passage could not be clearer. Here Pipes has reiterated the link between a cold climate, poor soil and military

6 No reference is given to the sources of these "scientific" figures, but they are consistent with those derived from Ratzel in the 1980 paper.
expansion. But he does so in a quasi determinist fashion, one which excludes liberal concerns with international harmony, international trade etc. It is quasi determinist because Pipes does not suggest that all northern peoples are militarist, although that implication is clearly present in some of the passages above, but he interprets it as a process of militarisation that established itself early and has developed a self-reproducing dynamic since.

The focus on military expansion and an aggressive foreign policy is a repeated theme in CPD writings, Pipes has developed a series of arguments that connect the patrimonial nature of the Soviet regime with the geopolitical tendencies to expansion, through which he attempts to alert American policy makers to the inherent dangers of not understanding Soviet policy in his terms. These he has assembled in a number of writings where he talks of the "operational principles" and the "grand strategy" of Soviet foreign policy and in 1980 simply "Soviet Global Strategy" (Pipes 1980b).

In these writings on the geographical factors we see the roots of the CPD position concerning the geographical roots of Soviet foreign policy which were discussed briefly in section 6-3. This was a recurring feature of their texts, and as will be shown in chapter 9 it is very important in Colin Gray's analysis of the Soviet Union in terms of his "imperial thesis". But prior to dealing with these matters the next section continues the discussion by focussing on the importance ascribed by Pipes to
militarism in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

7.5 MILITARISM AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

This theme of militarism in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy is a repeated focus in Pipes' writing. "Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy" (Pipes 1973) starts with the Soviet concept of operations in warfare to develop its argument. He argues that the language of Soviet politics is riddled with military terms, and that this notion of operations is important. He traces its origins to the analysis by the Soviets of the campaigns of the German general Ludendorff in the First World War, "whose masterful conduct of "total" war seems to have exercised a greater influence on Communist political practices than the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels combined" (Pipes 1981:21). Hence war involves the successive conduct of a series of operations designed to destroy the enemy's forces by constant uninterrupted pressure.

Pipes uses this as his point of departure for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy arguing that the use of military terms and the language of struggle is not accidental but essentially reveals how the USSR conducts its foreign policy. "The whole concert, with its stress on coordinated, uninterrupted assault intended to bring mounting pressure on the enemy, admirably

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7 As Pipes notes Soviet military writers use the conception of operations to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics, neither of which they consider complete enough to encompass the complexities of military "operations".
describes what is probably the most characteristic feature of Soviet foreign policy" (Pipes 1981:22). Thus diplomacy is only one part of the overall operation of Soviet foreign policy, and it must be seen in terms of the larger context of Soviet activity.

Pipes extends the argument about the importance of operations and the militarisation of politics by arguing that Lenin was attracted to Marx and Engels because of their conception of class war. He argues that Lenin was the first statesman to amalgamate politics and military activity and that Clausewitz's insistence that politics and warfare are not antithetical was an important part of Lenin's thinking. He argues that Lenin's ideas are important because the Soviet leadership finds itself (in the early 1970s, the time of writing) in a similar situation to that which Lenin left at his death, "that is devoid of a popular mandate or any other kind of legitimacy to justify its monopoly of political power except the alleged exigencies of class war" (Pipes 1981:23).

The leadership of the Soviet Union is a self-perpetuating group isolated from new ideas by its own bureaucratic interests in the perpetuation of its control. There is little possibility of change without a major upheaval. It follows what Pipes calls a "total" foreign policy which draws no distinction between diplomatic, economic, psychological, or military means of operation" (Pipes 1981:24). The Soviet Union does not differentiate between foreign and domestic policy which is why
in Pipes opinion the foreign affairs minister is not normally a member of the Politburo, where all important decisions are made, and why there is so little Soviet literature devoted to the analysis of international relations per se. In addition agencies like the KGB and the GRU have a greater role in foreign affairs than the foreign ministry. There is thus a "total" foreign policy which is seen as a direct extension of domestic policy conducted by a multiplicity of agencies, not a single foreign affairs ministry.

Pipes moves on from there to discuss the central theoretical notion of the "correlation of forces" which refers in his reading to the "actual capability of the contending parties to inflict harm on each other, knowledge of which allows one to decide in any given situation whether to act more aggressively or less, and which of the various means available to employ" (Pipes 1981:26). While the USSR maintains a militant foreign policy in the sense that it is active and vigilant, assuming expansionist aims where possible, although usually unprepared for reverses, military force is only applied when the risks are minimal and the chances of success large, when the correlation of forces in the particular sphere is strongly in favour of the Soviet Union. Military force is preferred as a method of blackmail rather than as a direct threat. It is this overall militant stance that Pipes argues those in the West overlook when searching for piecemeal solutions to international problems in which the USSR is involved, and more generally in its dealings with the USSR in
terms of detente.

While Lenin learnt from Clausewitz, Pipes argues that Stalin learnt his international politics from a study of Hitler's treatment of France and Germany. Pipes suggests that in Stalin's opinion the failure of Hitler's policies came because he did not know when to stop, and because he failed to analyse the correlation of forces adequately. Thus "the quality common to Nazi and post 1946 Soviet methods of waging political warfare is the practice of making limited, piecemeal encroachments on Western positions to the accompaniment of threats entirely out of proportion to the losses the West is asked to bear." (Pipes 1981:29).

The primary target of such threats is public opinion, to so disorient it that "it refuses to follow the national leadership and by passive or active resistence forces the government to make one concession after another" (Pipes 1981:29). A recent addition to the Soviet threat techniques is, Pipes argues, the use of the line that Third World friends and allies are volatile and likely to go to war despite Soviet wishes. This has been used in the Middle East in particular, Pipes argues to good effect because it allows the Soviet Union to appear like a responsible mature world power but the threats can be delivered anyway. The case of Egypt is mentioned in particular, but the implication is clearly that their allies are under Soviet domination and that they are incapable of acting against Soviet wishes.
Threats are also related to deception; Khruschev's deception with the number of strategic bombers and later ICBMs being the classic cases, which helped undermine the U.S.'s sense of invulnerability and force it into accommodations with the USSR, a significant advantage to the Soviet Union. The existence of the massive Soviet arsenal has not succeeded in the dismemberment of NATO but Pipes argues it has led to a paralysis of will among Western public opinion, while within the Soviet Union the leadership by depriving its population of "the good things of life", keep it "lean, hungry and alert" (Pipes 1981:31).

Putting all the above together Pipes argues that the multifaceted nature of the Soviet foreign policy can be likened to the role of military reconnaissance, probing strength, and drawing fire to assess dispositions and intentions. But above all the Soviet foreign policy has a single priority: "The very first objective of Soviet foreign policy is to make certain that all the territory which at any time has come under Russian or Communist rule remains so: in other words, that whatever changes occur in the world map affect the holdings of the other camp" (Pipes 1981:39).

This is a continuation of the historical policy of subjugation and incorporation that Pipes argues marks the development of Muscovy into the Russian empire. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 9 this argument can be extended to provide the basis for a more comprehensive theory of geopolitical expansion. Thus what the Soviet Union holds is
territory that is not up for discussion, "what is mine is mine, what is yours is negotiable" sums up the position for Pipes. He argues that it has applied particularly recently to East Europe and East Berlin where the Soviets have taken over what they controlled and negotiated on everything else.

In the later paper, "Detente, Moscow's View" Pipes pulls together his analysis of the key factors that shape Soviet foreign policy, somewhat playing down the militarist interpretation he relates the overall conduct of Soviet foreign policy to four internal factors within the Soviet Union, which when combined, he argues, go a long way to explaining the expansionist and combatative foreign policy stances, and reveal detente to be a convenient tactical ploy rather than a genuine attempt at a superpower rapprochement.

First he emphasises the patrimonial theme in Soviet politics, the argument outlined in "operational principles" and earlier in this chapter (section 7-3), that the Soviet elite maintains itself in power by granting and withdrawing privileges and in maintaining a monopoly on all political decisionmaking. The second crucial historical factor is the geopolitical one (section 7-4), the "persistent tradition of Russian

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8 Pipes emphasises internal Soviet factors here. In criticising the Nixon Ford Kissinger policy of detente he charges that "The administration appears to assume the primacy of international politics (that is the decisive impact of international relations on a country's domestic politics) and to ignore historical experience in favour of a "behavioural" response to the immediately given situation" (Pipes 1981:67). This is a repeat of his argument that the Soviet Union is effectively immune to political negotiation at the international level.
expansionism", whose sources lie not in a cultural tradition of "imperial fantasies" but in "the economic and geopolitical factors that account for Russia's peculiar tradition of government" (Pipes 1981:69).

The third and fourth historical factors necessary to put the detente policy into perspective are really a single factor; the peasant background of the current Soviet elite and their training during the worst of Stalin's purges which ensured that only the most brutal survived in positions of power. The peasant background supports this assertion because Pipes argued that the vast majority of serfs only survived by "exercising extreme cunning and single-mindedly pursuing their private interests" (Pipes 1981:72). Combined these experiences blend to create a very special kind of mentality, which stresses slyness, self-interest, reliance on force, skill in exploiting others, and, by inference, contempt for those unable to fend for themselves.

Marxism-Leninism, which in its theoretical aspects exerts minor influence on Soviet conduct, through its ideology of "class warfare" reinforces these existing predispositions.

(Pipes 1981:72)

The argument continues with Pipes suggesting that only a major cataclysm can change these historical traditions and force a new way of approaching the world on Russian society. "Unless and until that happens, one can ignore Russia's historical tradition only at great risk" (Pipes 1981:73). What kind of great cataclysm might be needed is not specified but it can be inferred from the text that neither of the world wars in this century accomplished the task. This historical tradition is one
of military conquest, subjugation and conquest, what Pipes asserts remains the long term trajectory of the Soviet Union.

It is with these matters in mind that Pipes joined political debate on the theme of detente. Given the position he outlines here, one which argues that the Russian experience and the insecure political position of the elite in the Soviet Union inevitably drives the Soviet Union to be expansionist, his opposition to detente is entirely predictable.

"Detente: Moscow's View" presents a long summary of the history of detente since Khruschev's initiation of the policy of "peaceful coexistence" in 1956. In summary Pipes argues that despite the expressions of "peaceful coexistence" and the diplomatic and trade agreements of the early 1970s the long term goals of the "total" Soviet foreign policy remain expansionist; detente was forced on the Soviet Union as a necessary policy to exploit the contradictions in the West from its position of relative weakness in the correlation of forces. Thus there is no contradiction between the detente policies and the continued involvement of the Soviet Union in an arms race and proxy wars in the Third World. They are all parts of the same attempt to exploit weaknesses in the West.

As clearly visible evidence of this assertion he enumerates continued Soviet involvement in Third World events; propaganda offensives linking the Soviet Union with the concepts of peace; economic initiatives with the West, necessitated by the relative
backwardness of Soviet technology but directed in ways that attempt to make Europe dependent on the Soviet Union and distance it from its crucial raw materials suppliers in the Third World.

Pipes charges that the West consistently underestimates the Soviet willingness and ability to pay for a large and up to date military establishment. This is because the military is the only tool that the USSR has that has a clear record of winning for the regime. The economy is not likely to inspire emulation, the political doctrines of Communism have lost much of their ideological appeal, only the military is untarnished. The regime's survival in the early days and its ultimate emergence has been determined by the success of the Red Army. Its continued buildup is, it seems, central to the Soviet system.

The Soviet leadership seems to strive to obtain a marked superiority in all branches of the military, in order to secure powerful forward-moving shields behind which the politicians can do their work. To reach this objective, the Soviet Union must have open to it all options -- to be able to fight general and limited conventional wars near its borders and away from them, as well as nuclear wars employing tactical and/or strategic weapons. (Pipes 1981:94)

Finally Pipes suggests that the detente policy has had two clearly unfavourable outcomes for the Soviet rulers. The break with China is a major loss, the Chinese refused to play second fiddle to the USSR as it elevated itself to superpower status leaving China out in the cold. The second debit has been some loss of internal control, by reducing the danger of the external threat.
But overall Pipes argues that the Soviet Union has gained superpower status, "smashed" the alliances forged by the U.S. during the Stalinist period of cold war, NATO now being in "disarray", continued support for national liberation movements and proxy wars with reduced risks, legitimated, through the Helsinki accords, its conquests in Eastern Europe and gained considerable economic benefits. Thus the Soviet Union will continue its policy of detente, "because as now defined and practiced, detente primarily benefits the Soviet Union" (Pipes 1981:102).

7.6 TOTALITARIANISM REHABILITATED

Thus Pipes argues in a fashion that is typical of the totalitarian school of analysis, but he emphasises the historical continuity across the events of 1917. As will be argued further in chapter 9 this supports the whole contention that the totalitarian system of Soviet communism is unrefordable by any means than by that of confronting it with so much force that it is compelled, hopefully without a major nuclear war, to turn inwards and address internal matters in ways that will fundamentally alter the nature of its political system, and the resulting political arrangements will hopefully be more amenable to genuine "peaceful coexistence".

The "Russified" version of the totalitarian thesis leads directly to military concerns. International politics is thus reduced to military force. Politics is denied in the process,
those who seek to change the USSR by policies of detente are thus dupes if not worse. Internally the Communist Party is compelled by the logic of its position as an insecure patrimonial structure without internal legitimacy among the populations of the empire to maintain itself. Reform is impossible because it would admit the lack of legitimacy of the status quo and unloose social tendencies that would be impossible to control.

They are evil and beyond compromise. Power is the only goal of the party, but even if it wanted to change, because of its historical development it cannot do so. Choice is removed, the current political position is inevitable, determined, and consequently can only be lived with, not changed in any way except by brute force. Detente is truly an illusion because the USSR is incapable of reform. This is the central ideological move of Pipes' contribution to the "present danger". But it goes further than this, crucially he offers the next key element in the ideological position, the link to Geopolitics. Precisely because of the historical determinations of the Soviet system it is not just unreformable by political methods but it is also inherently expansionist. The Geopolitical premises are part of Pipes patrimonial interpretation of totalitarianism.

Hence the USSR is a monolithic system, the possibilities of internal reform are discounted because of the economic interests of the Soviet leaders in the maintainance of their economic privilege. This view of history and politics in the Soviet Union
denies internal bargaining and power struggles between parts of
the system (Cohen 1985). Internal tensions within the CPSU and
the structural economic problems within the Soviet economy are
simply ignored in their political implications by the model of
iron control from the centre. Pipes does argue that the policy
of "peaceful coexistence" somewhat complicates this picture, but
he argues that it is only a tactic forced on the Soviet Union by
the exigencies of the cold war and the "spiritual exhaustion" of
Stalinism. But the overall trajectory is one of expansion and
the impossibility of change other than by external pressure of
which the military aspect is crucial.

But there is nonetheless a very important political element
to Pipes' and the other CPD writings on the Soviet Union. This
is the separation of the nomenklatura from the larger Russian
population. But the distinction between state and society is
clearly demarcated in ways that argue that conflict between two
separate spheres is inevitable. Cohen's (1985) critique of the
totalitarian thesis provides the key to unravelling all this. He
argues that the Soviet system has a party of millions of members
and an economic structure that not just the nomenklatura at the
top of the structure have a vested interest in maintaining. Thus
the economic and political structure of Soviet rule is widely
dispersed through the society. The argument suggests that a
complex industrial and urbanised society cannot be run by a
small police apparatus unaided by at least a fairly widespread
tacit consent.
More specifically political policies will benefit some groups at the cost of others, hence there is a genuinely political process of social struggle within the system (Colton 1986). If the totalitarian assumption of a small political elite running a vast society with an apparatus of repression as its main mode of rule, a model possibly plausible in understanding the Stalinist 1950s, but hardly appropriate for the 1980s, is relaxed, then politics is allowed back into the picture and the possibility of reform is open in terms of the struggles between different interests within the society causing social change. With this comes the possibility of political compromise with sectors within the Soviet system that are open to accommodation with some aspects of Western arms control and detente policy (Holloway 1983).

Given the absence of potential alternative political institutions within the USSR capable of serious political action it seems inevitable that in the immediate future political compromise is essential with the existing power structure in the Soviet Union. The totalitarian thesis coupled to Pipes' and Gray's more specific Geopolitical interpretation of the formation of Soviet policy excludes by definition these kinds of political compromises necessary if any form of detente or political relaxation of tensions is possible. It acts here as a crucial ideological weapon against arms control by defining the USSR as a political system that by its very nature cannot compromise. The bleak alternative is a continued military
buildup and nuclear warfighting strategies.

But Pipes extends his argument further than many of the "totalitarian" positions commonly take. He does this by arguing that the roots of the Soviet system are more Russian than Marxist. His announcement in the preface to *Russia Under the Old Regime* (1974) makes this eminently clear. The modern Soviet system is simply the Tsarist patrimonialism plus police state apparatus with a new ideological rationale, albeit one that is important to maintaining what very limited legitimacy the regime has. Thus the internal development of the USSR from a peasant agricultural system with a small capitalist industrial sector at the time of the 1917 revolution, to an industrialised and much more urbanised society under communist organisation, is effectively dismissed as not having any serious consequences. The patrimonial system is simply reimposed and history develops nearly as if the revolution hadn't occurred.

Within this approach Pipes sees no problem of arguing that late nineteenth century calculations of agricultural productivity can be used a century later to argue that this is still a relevant consideration in the expansionist nature of the Soviet system. No more recent evidence on the agricultural potential of this area is referred to, apparently it is irrelevant, or at least unnecessary. ⁹

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⁹ Hence Pipes quotes Ratzel as a source of agricultural productivity calculations in his 1980 paper. In *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974) Pipes uses a 1963 German source of figures on agricultural production to make the same point and refers the reader to Parker's (1968) historical geography of Russia for
In Pipes' version history is after all about continuity. Innovation, change, the stuff of political life is mere surface appearance, and not real. Here is the deep structure argument; the distinction between reality as permanent and deep in contrast to transient circumstance. Reality is defined as structure, practice is mere epiphenomena. The use of this division is important in all that Pipes writes, its ideological power clearly revealed in how he uses the argument to exclude all positions that are different. This structuralism is the key to its ideological function. As will be shown this is also the case in other parts of the arguments mobilised to support the "present danger" argument.

In Foucault's terms what Pipes does is to draw on a series of historical interpretations of the Soviet Union in ways that define the legitimate approach to international relations and the Soviet Union in particular, in terms of history. But it is a history in which deep determining structures are at work, structures that are far too powerful to be changed by mere transient political initiatives. This is a classic move of exclusion, other approaches are invalidated on both their ontological and epistemological bases. Not only are they inadequate conceptions of reality but their knowledges can not be legitimate because they derive their positions from false

(cont'd) background on the Russian environment. Other more recent sources available to Pipes in Harvard would surely provide more convincing evidence. But whether the source of his calculations is from this century, or the last, is apparently of no concern to Pipes, preoccupied, as he is, with the long term determinants of Geopolitics.
assumptions about how the world really is. The superiority of
the historical method is invoked, its permanence relied on to
give it certainty, and to disallow the claims of all other
positions.

This move of exclusion brings with it the fatalism of
perpetual conflict because it "knows" the Other as a perpetual
adversary, forced to be so by its history. Once one "knows" the
world in this manner the evidence for Soviet behaviour to
confirm this knowledge is easily "found". This "tragic" view of
the Soviet Union dovetails nicely with the Realist assertions
that what is eternal, (hence real, please note) in international
political affairs is power and conflict. Thus the Sovietological
discursive practices are easily articulated to the Realist
concerns with power and international developments as military
events.
8.1 INTRODUCTION

As argued in chapter 4 the containment militarist formulation draws on the four security discourses of Sovietology, Realism, Strategy and Geopolitics. The last chapter dealt with the Sovietology of Richard Pipes, and his creation of an evil and threatening Other. This chapter deals with the Realist critique of the Idealist elements of detente, a critique which links Realism and Geopolitics in the attempt to reorientate political discourse to deal with the threatening international situation, one that is threatening precisely because of the presence of the threatening Other.

The CPD's whole raison d'être was, after all, to mobilise concern domestically, the formulation of the threat in the form of the totalitarian Other, its crucial device. A part of the call to arms is the use of the historical analogy with the 1930s, the USSR is now the expansionist aggressor, the U.S. in the grips of appeasers who are apt to repeat the British failures to head off the slide towards war.

The call to arms also required the formulation of the Soviet Threat in terms other than those of detente, it required an ideological shift to the terms of containment militarism, and crucially to the language of "power politics". CPD members
repeatedly asserted that this was necessary to understand the "present danger". In the terms of International Relations they advocated a replacement of Idealist elements by a concern with power, the approach of Realism. This theme in the CPD discourse, and its critique from a Realist perspective is the subject of this first part of this chapter.

But, as argued in chapter 4, the Realist discourse of International Relations, when applied to American foreign policy matters is implicitly structured within the frameworks of classical Geopolitics. The CPD statements that review the state of the "present danger" as a matter of "power politics" repeatedly present it in Geopolitical terms. This is the subject of the second half of this chapter. The following chapter then shows how Colin Gray reinterpreted the classical Geopolitical texts in an attempt to update the theory and make the CPD's geopolitical concerns of the 1970s comprehensible in the terms of Spykman and Mackinder.

In terms of the overall articulation of the "security discourses" Pipes' concerns with the Soviet system as a totalitarian state, interested only in extending its own power, acts as a powerful support for this attempt to reassert the primacy of the Realist perspective. Thus he provides the argument in favour of Realism with support by specifying the Other as acting in a Realist manner, providing a series of threats that require a response in kind, and which can only be properly responded to if understood in their own, "power
politics", terms. Thus he provides the evidence to claim that the detente policy is fundamentally flawed because the Soviet Union is not playing by the Idealist rules of international cooperation. This is the connection between Sovietology and Realism.

8.2 DETENTE AND APPEASEMENT: REASSERTING REALISM

One of the key founding members of the CPD was Gene Rostow. As mentioned above he was responsible for drafting the initial "Common Sense and the Common Danger" policy statement. Rostow spent many decades within the foreign policy establishment and the CPD was sometimes viewed as Rostow's organisation (Sherrill 1979). In books, articles and interviews (Whitworth 1970) Rostow had long argued that containment militarism was the essential task of U.S. foreign policy. His earlier arguments, in particular in Peace in the Balance (1972) and Law, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1968) are less shrill and much more measured in tone than later texts which were written with more particular political tasks in mind.

The argument he used repeatedly in correspondence (Sherrill 1979, Wolfe 1984a), as well as in public statements and publications, is that the U.S. is unready to deal with the threat posed by the USSR. He argues that its state of

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Rostow has had a career as a practicing lawyer, has been Dean of the Yale Law School, and served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1966 to 1969. As one of the key members, who chaired the meetings of the CPD, his influence makes his statements important.
unreadiness is analogous to the British position in the 1930s when it attempted to appease Hitler. This argument was not his alone, Walter Laquer (1978) argued a similar case in his "Psychology of Appeasement" and CPD member Richard Perle (1979) wrote in terms of "the lessons of the 1930s", as did Norman Podhoretz (1980a) whose book The Present Danger (1980b) took both its title and theme from the CPD.

Gene Rostow's basic argument is that in history weak leaders and ideas of appeasement led ultimately to many wars, including the American civil war and in the case of British leaders to both world wars. This argument is put bluntly in Rostow's article in Strategic Review in 1976, titled "The Safety of the Republic: Can the Tide be Turned?". The whole article is premised on a more general critique of recent U.S. foreign policy and in particular of the executive branch. Opening the article with an assertion that open dialogue is essential to democracy, he adds that for a democracy to carry out effective foreign policy, it requires "candor and discipline in that dialogue, on the part of both the government and the people. But candor, discipline, and responsibility are qualities which have been in short supply among us in recent years" (1976:12). Rostow argues that this shortage has obscured the growing danger of the Soviet threat.

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2 This article also appeared as the opening essay in a book edited by Rostow for the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the Middle East (1976).
The bulk of the article reiterates many of the themes that were subsequently to become staple fare of the CPD. First is the isolationist sentiment generated in Rostow's eyes by the "tragic setback" in Indochina. This has led to the belief that there must be an "easier way to defend the nation" (1976:13). There is he argues a yearning to return to the isolation of the nineteenth century aggravated by governments that refuse to tell the people the truth.

One cannot expect the nation to take the threat of Soviet policy seriously when our leaders tell us that things are getting better; when they argue about how much to cut the defence budget, and fire the best Secretary of defence we had for years because he balked at accepting the cuts proposed by the president, nor equally can we expect Congress or the people to carry out executive functions which only the Presidency can perform.
(Rostow 1976:14).

Overcoming this and returning to the traditional state of affairs with a bipartisan support for a consensus foreign policy is the situation that Rostow advocates. To "turn the tide" in Rostow's view requires that the American culture's peaceful attributes and puritanical guilt be set aside in favour of a clear recognition of the need to view the world in terms of power politics. Thucydides' warning that the growth of Athenian power rather than the episodes of conflict prior to it was the cause of the Peloponnesian war is invoked. Here is a clear call to Realism, power politics is the only acceptable way of understanding international affairs.
Immediately after Thucydides, Rostow invokes Solzhenitsyn's warnings that the Soviet Union is well on its way to taking over much of the world. More specifically he adopts Solzhenitsyn's terminology which posits that the USSR has effectively won the "Third World War" in that "Europe, the Middle East, and many other parts of the Third World are passing inevitably into Soviet control" and that the "Fourth World War, for America itself" was already underway (Rostow 1976:15). Thus power politics is a matter of control over the Third World, it is about Geopolitics.

In a section titled "the balance of power", we are told that Solzhenitsyn's prognosis can be reversed if "the leaders of Europe, China, Japan and a few other countries including Israel" do the right things. But they will be decisively influenced by what the U.S. does. Rostow argues that the European peoples have not abandoned their "will for independence" and quotes "the extraordinary assertion of will of the people of Portugal, who are struggling -- thus far effectively -- to insist, despite massive Soviet efforts, ... that the Portuguese revolution must evolve in the direction of European pluralist democracy (Rostow 1976:15). The Soviet challenge can be met, we are assured, but time is very short.

Rostow thinks that the American public are concerned that something is badly wrong with American foreign policy. He argues that the beliefs of the American people that underlie this current are deep and strong. "They are the silent faith of
patriotism, the deepest and strongest force in our public life" (Rostow 1976:17). These can, he argues, be mobilised to counter the exercise of the absurd which he designates the whole operation of the policy of detente. "The claim that detente with the Soviet Union has been achieved is an absurdity from start to finish, half public relations and half wishful thinking" (Rostow 1976:18).

This is true because "Soviet policy is exactly what is has always been, except that its pressures are greater and more diverse than ever, more sophisticated in style, and more difficult to deal with" (Rostow 1976:18). He criticises President Ford for saying that detente is a working relationship and that problems arise because both the U.S. and the USSR are superpowers, to which Rostow retorts that the problems are because the USSR is expansionist, not because it is a superpower.

Second he argues there is no working relationship to reduce tensions, and avoid confrontations. On the contrary he argues that the Soviet Union broke pledges to Nixon and has been involved in international affairs at points of tension. Third Rostow argues that a genuine detente is desirable, what is at issue is the assertion that the international relationship can be termed detente. Finally Rostow takes issue with the whole notion of the dangers of "going back" to the cold war. "Alas, the Cold War has never stopped. We have simply stopped talking about it. Its pressures today, in Lebanon, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Angola, and a good many other places are far greater and
more important that those of the Berlin Airlift" (Rostow 1976:19).

Rostow points to the fate of Israel as crucial in all this. He argues that the Arab world are acting as Soviet proxies in the Middle East, Israel has to be supported because it is the last democratic state left in the Middle East. The Israel situation is important for the neoconservative position with its strong Jewish support particularly present in *Commentary*. It relates directly to the cold war arguments because of concerns with both the emigration of Soviet Jews and the survival of Israel. The themes are connected in these arguments, the common thread being Soviet and Arab anti-semitism. Although rarely directly mentioned in the CPD literature (Rostow's 1976 paper is an exception) this political concern was undoubtedly present in some CPD members thinking.

In March 1978 the CPD provided a panel to discuss their perspectives before a lunchtime meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in Washington. The transcript of the proceedings was subsequently released as a CPD statement under the title of "Peace with Freedom". The panelists were Richard Pipes, Eugene Rostow and Paul Nitze. In their statements and the responses to the questions from the audience the three panel members emphasised differing aspects of the global situation from their personal positions but argued a consistent case.
In his contribution to the CPD panel Rostow summarises his argument and applies the analogy of the 1930s British appeasement of Hitler to the 1970s. Here he issues a warning that the same historical mistakes are likely to be repeated by leaders in the U.S. unless drastic changes are made. In Rostow's view this historical interpretation was one of the reasons the CPD was formed. The others were the weakening of the bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy devised by Truman and Acheson. A third factor was the perceived need to "arrest the slide toward chaos before it explodes into war". This may happen if we feel ourselves threatened and coerced; if we sense that the last vestige of our power to govern our own destiny is slipping out of our hands; if the Soviet Union takes control of one strong point after another, and achieves domination in Western Europe or Japan, or in a number of places whose power in combination spells hegemony. We can never recall too often Thucydides' comment that the real cause of the Peloponnesian War was not the episodes of friction and conflict which preceded it, but the rise in the power of Athens, and the fear that this caused Sparta. (CPD 1984:29)

Again the reference to Thucydides is made. We are left in no doubt that "Soviet imperial ambition, backed by a military buildup without parallel in modern history, are threatening the world balance of power on which our ultimate safety as a nation depends." (CPD 1984:29). And later, "The pressures of Soviet policy have been greater since 1970 or so than ever before. The agreements for peace in Indo-China were torn up and disregarded. The Soviets supported aggressive and large scale war in Bangladesh, in the Middle East, and in Africa. There has been an alarming slide toward chaos." (CPD 1984:30). Turning to the
British experience in 1913 and 1938, Rostow concludes his remarks by arguing that the British could afford to be weak and fail to provide firm leadership, because the Americans were the ultimate guarantor that they would win in the end. But the U.S. in the 1970s "has no sleeping giant to save us from our folly" (CPD 1984:31).

Two years after this panel the CPD reiterated this argument when they turned their attention to the Carter presidency's record in "The 1980 Crisis and What We Should Do About It". They argue that the Carter administration "has, by words and acts of restraint, taken one unilateral step after another in the hope that the Soviet Union would accept such a policy of restraint for itself" (CPD 1984:172). But they state that the Soviet Union has continued its expansionist program and supported "flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations" in episodes including "support of North Vietnam's attack on South Vietnam, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Palestine Liberation Organisation's attacks on Israel, the use of poison gas against the Meo tribesmen in Laos, and the Soviet direct and inspired attacks on Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia and North and South Yemen" (CPD 1984:172).

All of this is likened again to the 1930s and the policies of appeasement of Hitler, except that the Soviet Union's expansionist program is "even more ambitious than that of Hitler" (CPD 1984:176). The final paragraphs of this statement read like a Ronald Reagan election speech, as they soon,
indirectly, became;

The tides of war are once again rushing the world toward general war. The United States and its allies still have time to protect their vital national interests by the methods of peace, but that time is growing short. The American people are ready to answer a call to action and, where necessary, sacrifice. Will their leaders chart an adequate program -- and will they do so in time? The answers to those questions will determine whether the 1980 crisis is the forerunner of catastrophe for the non-Communist world or whether it marks a turning point toward restoring peace with security and freedom. (CPD 1984:177)

Later still the arguments of the CPD were rehashed by Normon Podhoretz. In the March 1980 issue of Commentary Podhoretz published his own expression of concern about the then currently perceived malaise in U.S. foreign affairs, under the title taken from the CPD (1980a). Written a few months after the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a topic for much geopolitical commentary in itself (Halliday 1982, Kazanzadeh 1980, Laquer, 1980, 1983, Luttwak 1983), it sounded a warning in keeping with its title. The strident tone is in keeping with the CPD positions and underlying his analysis is the same Geopolitical view of the world.

The article was revised and lengthened with the addition of material from his earlier Commentary article "Making the World Safe for Communism" (1976) in a book published later that year by Simon and Schuster (1980b), which added the subtitle "Do we have the will to reverse the decline of American power". This book contains the critique of detente and what became known as
"the Vietnam Syndrome", in Podhoretz's terms the rise of a new isolationism and a new pacifism born out of the frustration of the Vietnam imbroglio.

The arguments were substantially the same as those made by Rostow and Pipes as well as in the CPD materials. There was a call to view the world in terms of power politics, and a critique of the "culture of appeasement". Issued in 1980, this book which took its title from the CPD, was effectively an election manifesto, concluding with a call for a return to policies of containment, a serious focus on the nature of Communism, and a military buildup to ensure that the U.S. would never be intimidated in a crisis in the Third World. In combination these themes were a clear call for a return to a form of Realism as the bases for discussing U.S. foreign policy, and prominent among the advocates of Realism was Colin S. Gray.

8.3 COLIN GRAY AND REALISM

Since 1970 Colin Gray has published a constant stream of papers, monographs and books on military affairs and particularly on nuclear strategy, in Canada, the U.S. and Britain. 3 The

3 Colin Gray received a D.Phil. in International Politics from Oxford in 1970 for a dissertation on the defence policy of the Eisenhower administrations. In the 1970s he was in turn Executive Secretary of the Commission for Strategic Studies of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Visiting Associate Professor in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, a Ford Fellow at the War Studies department of London University and Assistant Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Following this appointment he joined the professional staff of the Hudson Institute in New York state, subsequently becoming the director
significance of Colin Gray's work for this dissertation lies in a number of areas. His writings include technical papers in nuclear strategy, more general articles in the military and arms control press, academic writings on international politics, nuclear strategy, the policy making process and arms control, and of relevance to this chapter in particular a championing of Realism. As will be seen later Gray often conflates Realism and Geopolitics, in particular arguing that Spykman is an important Realist. A clear statement is present in his 1977 monograph on geopolitics The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era which will be reviewed at length in the next chapter.

He was in the late 1970s, along with Paul Nitze, one of the leading proponents of nuclear war fighting doctrines or "nuclear utilisation theories (NUTS). His articles, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory" in International Security in 1979 (Gray 1979a) and (jointly authored with his colleague Keith Payne) "Victory is Possible" in Foreign Policy in the Summer of 1980, (Gray and Payne 1980) are the seminal statements of the NUTS position, although these themes run through much of his writing in the late 1970s and 1980s. The following two chapters expand on these themes, here we are concerned with Gray's Realism.

3(cont'd) of its National Security Program. In 1981 he left the Hudson Institute to become the President of his own newly formed research organisation, the Washington based National Institute for Public Policy. He has been a consultant to the RAND corporation and the U.S. State Department, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, and since 1982, a member of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
The argument in favour of a Realist perspective on foreign policy was strenuously made in "Foreign Policy—There is No Choice" Gray (1976a), where he focused his attack on a series of what he argued were fallacies of liberal foreign policy. The article was published as a critical response to an earlier article by Thomas Hughes (1975) on U.S. foreign policy. Gray argues that there are three fallacies running through Hughes' and the Foreign Policy editors views of U.S. foreign policy. The fallacies are those of variants of Idealism, the response is to make an appeal to Realism, the only possible interpretation of events.

Gray's first target is the assumption that the U.S. is "a uniquely principled actor in international politics". Gray asserts that the Americans are no better or worse than any other nation in their international affairs. Political actions are thus the product of necessity, not moral choice, except for those states that are marginal to the overall patterns of global power, who can act according to the dictates of their moral standards because they are protected by larger powers. Thus tensions between expediency and morality are not a uniquely American phenomenon. "The major reasons why the problem of mutually accommodating practice and principle appears to be a very American dilemma, are the facts of geopolitics and the unwillingness of many American intellectuals to come to terms with the nature of the world in which they live" (1976a:116).
While different states in different geographical locations and reflecting different historical memories have different policy styles, "International politics comprises one game only, with rules common to all foreign policy players" (1976a:116). This game is Realism in which countries do what they have to do and morality rarely is a major consideration. "The creed of realpolitik is often brutal and unattractive, yet it remains the only creed appropriate to the conduct of foreign relations. Power politics, to resort to a quite unfairly denigrated term, is the only game in town. The only choice open to the United States is between playing it effectively or ineffectively" (1976a:120).

The second fallacy to which Gray draws our attention is the demand that the United States establish some harmony between the values of domestic life and foreign policy. This is related to the first fallacy and is dealt with in a similar manner. We are reminded that "a substantial number of people continue to deny the fact that foreign politics is really quite unlike domestic politics" (1976a:121). In particular Gray takes issue with Hughes' assertion that the U.S. has indulged in confrontation politics arguing that in places like Korea and Vietnam the only alternative to confrontation was acquiescence in military conquest.

On the related charge that the U.S. has followed narrow self-interest in its foreign policy Gray argues that the West Europeans have been supported at tremendous cost to the U.S. in
their folly of refusing to take their own defence seriously. Further the activities of the KGB provide the rationale for U.S. counter intelligence activities of dubious legality in that the "KGB and other illiberal and non-populist agencies" have to be opposed by effective counter measures. International politics is "an arena where no holds are barred" (1976a:123-4). Ultimately the argument comes down to this: "If democracies are not prepared to slay and maim the innocent, then they had better accept the logical consequence -- that they are surrendering their values to any state willing to do these things." (1976a:125)

The third fallacy that Gray wishes to attack is that there is an alternative to realpolitik. In a polemic against the trends in international relations that had, by the mid 1970s pushed Realism aside, as a serious method of analysis in the discipline he argues that "power politics, or realpolitik, is not merely one approach -- and a very unfashionable one at that -- among many. Realpolitik, for all its ambivalences of the central concepts of power and interest, is the enduring condition of international politics" (1976a:125).

In case this point is not clearly enough made Gray continues his tirade against the academic study of International Relations in the following observations: "To secure a measure of empathy for the problems of those conducting foreign policy, students would be better advised to read Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* that a dozen tomes on system, cybernetics, and other dadist
concepts purportedly relevant to an understanding of international political life" (1976a:125-6). Global institution building is dismissed as "globaloney", the U.S. has to realise that its uniqueness lies in its "global power balancing potential" not in its high moral character or purpose, because "power must be balanced, interests must be secured, and -- if necessary -- force must be threatened and applied." (1976a:127).

The arguments presented are sharply worded, and thrown into relief by the polemical phrasing. The reassertion of realpolitik could not be clearer. The focus on power as all that ultimately matters in the global order of things underlies all of Colin Gray's writing. In this position of realpolitik considerations of morality are at best subsidiary, at worst actively ridiculed. In a rejoinder Hughes argues that Gray has established a series of straw men and missed the point repeatedly (Hughes 1976). He may or may not be correct in this counter accusation, the point of the above analysis is to show clearly where Gray stands in regard to the Realist tradition. The answer is that he is right in the middle of the cruder versions of its position, unashamedly promoting a view of an amoral international anarchy of competing states regulated solely by matters of power principally in terms of the use or the threat of the use of military force. But, as will be made clear in the next chapter, like the rest of the CPD members he understands Realism as Geopolitics.
8.4 THE CPD, REALISM AND GEOPOLITICS

The CPD focus on "the present danger" in terms of power politics phrases the international political situation in terms of military confrontation and Geopolitical expansion. These themes were constantly stated at the Foreign Policy Association panel in March 1978. Richard Pipes' strategic arguments will be returned to later (in chapter 10), but here it is necessary to point out the reiteration of the Geopolitical strategy that Pipes asserts underlines the Soviet foreign policy. First is the buildup of strategic nuclear missiles, particularly the SS-18, which Pipes argues is a first strike weapon. Second is the threat to Europe intended to sever its links with the U.S.

The most effective form which this threat takes is first, an enormous military buildup on the European frontier, which has the psychological effect of intimidating European public opinion and creating a sense of helplessness; and, secondly, through a flanking movement, via the Middle East and Africa, which endangers European oil supplies and a large proportion of European mineral supplies from South Africa. These measures can bring Europe to its knees without any shots being fired.

(CPD 1984:26)

In response to a question from the audience Rostow elaborated his views on the geopolitical "threat" presented by the Soviet Union. This section encapsulates the CPD concerns incorporating the nuclear, conventional and political aspects of the containment doctrine within the framework of their Geopolitical thinking.

...certainly the centerpiece of the Soviet strategic view of world politics has always been that if Russia could control Western Europe and bring it under its
dominion, and the areas upon which Western Europe is dependent in the Middle East and Africa, that it would thereby control the world. There can be no question that Soviet reduction of Western Europe or equally China, but more emphatically Western Europe, either envelopement or through direct attack, or through coercion and political influence, would be read in Japan and in China and in many other parts of the world as a clear political signal that the balance of power had shifted disasterously against the United States, that American guarantees were no longer effective or credible and that China and Japan would correspondingly make the best deal they could with the Soviet Union.

(CPD 1984:33)

If this should happen then the consequences would be severe. Without credible deterrents the constructive relationship with China could evaporate and the alliances erode. "Then we would face the world alone and isolated in a position of total military inferiority" (CPD 1984:33).

The final question to this forum involved a question about a remark attributed to Brzezhinski, that the primary threat to world peace lies not with the Soviet Union but with unrest in the Third World. Paul Nitze's reply to this linked "North-South" issues to "East-West" issues arguing that you couldn't separate them because, "...the point of Russia's interest in Africa is to do what the Chinese say, and that is to create positions there which will outflank the Middle east. Why are they interested in the Middle East? Because that will create positions which will outflank Europe and Japan and that, in turn, is of great strategic interest to the United States" (CPD 1984:34).

The reference to the Chinese refers to Paul Nitze's visit there a few weeks previous to the Foreign Policy meeting that he was addressing, where he apparently found Chinese views of the
The use of the term "outflank" borrowed from military parlance stretches its meaning to absurd lengths, calling into question Nitze's understanding of either the term, or of the geographical arrangements of the continents. Rostow (1976) also uses this geographical allusion repeatedly. However, it also suggests the use of the logic of dominos to which O'Sullivan (1982) draws attention. This suggests that an increase in influence by the USSR in one part of the globe is automatically followed by other increases in noncontiguous areas, by mechanisms that are left unexplained. It reduces the complexity of international politics to a spatially homogenous arena like a chess board where pieces act in purely geometric terms. Local considerations are simply ignored. The moves are military, any economic influences are solely in terms of the denial of minerals or oil to Europe and Japan.

In October 1978 the CPD released the first of a series of lengthy analyses of the U.S. USSR military balance. "Is America Becoming Number 2?" started its analysis with a section entitled "Facing basic facts" which deals with the CPDs overall conception of the global situation. The first basic fact Americans have to face is that the historical situation pertaining to American security prior to 1917, "when, behind the screen of the British fleet, we enjoyed something close to immunity from the fact or the threat of external attack." (CPD 1984:39) no longer holds. This situation arose from the

*(cont'd) political situation attuned with his:
remoteness of the U.S. from any possible locus of hostile attack "and Britain's success in maintaining the European balance of power". Now "it is an unwelcome novelty for Americans to have to pay sustained attention to military factors as the ultimate basis of national security" (CPD 1984:39). Again the Geopolitical theme is present.

Now the U.S. and the USSR are the two major forces in international politics, European nations are only important "as allies and partners of the United States or as satellites of the Soviet Union" (CPD 1984:40). The difference in status between East and West couldn't be more clear, in the East they are "satellites" under domination and control, held in orbit, by the USSR, in the West they are allies and partners. Japan is in a largely similar position "because of the logic of nuclear power" (CPD 1984:40). Not surprisingly the next sentence reminds us once again that the two superpowers have utterly opposing conceptions of world order. The United States, true to its traditions and ideals, sees a world moving toward peaceful unity and cooperation within a regime of law. The Soviet Union, for ideological as well as geopolitical reasons, sees a world riven by conflict and destined to be ruled exclusively by Marxism-Leninism. (CPD 1984:40).

The superpowers are the only countries powerful enough to confront each other militarily, and this confrontation has been the primary consideration for U.S. national security since the Second World War. This conflict "also deeply affects the relationship between the industrialised democracies as a group
and the developing nations of the southern hemisphere" (CPD 1984:40). This is a crucial dimension of the global struggle according to the CPD because

The Soviet Union has sought to exploit difficulties among the developing nations, and between them and the industrialized nations, in order to gain positions of strategic importance in its drive for global dominance. The Soviet Union, driven both by deep rooted Russian imperial impulses and by Communist ideology, insists on pursuing an expansionist course. In its endless, probing quest, it attempts to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its influence. (CPD 1984:40)

As an essential part of its program the Soviet Union "seeks to outstrip the United States and its allies in every category of military power" in order to "maintain and increase the momentum of its expansion". This is followed by a short passage which graphically portrays the binary nature of the cold war discourse.

The strategists and political planners of the Soviet Union are trained to understand that military power is the essential guarantor to expanding political influence. It is the first object of their policy to assure that guarantee. Thus, it would be irrational as well as imprudent to ignore the military element in the Soviet-American relationship. Although the political, economic, and human aspects are each important, the military dimension is fundamental and potentially decisive. (CPD 1984:40)

As argued at the end of section 6-3 the specification of Otherness in the CPD literature leads it to a praxaeological specification of Otherness which leads the CPD to advocate precisely what it deprecates in the adversary. Thus we have to comply with the instructions of those in the Soviet Union who
teach their political planners and strategists. The viewpoint of the expansionist planners who view the world in conflictual terms is thus elevated to the rational view, those who advocate the pursuance of America's goals of a peaceful world order in a regime of law are thus, despite the ritual obeisance to these themes further up the page, delegitimised as irrational. Ultimately to the CPD what counts is military might, all else is secondary.

The implication from all this is clear; all those hated reviled Russians are really right, the arms controllers, all who work for other goals are dupes or suffering from naivety. Realism is back with vengeance; there is only power defined in military terms. The most important factor in military matters is strategic nuclear weapons, and the means of delivering them to their targets. This is the ultimate power in international affairs.

From this all else follows in the CPD conceptualisation. Thus the Soviet Union's goal is to translate this preponderance in nuclear weapons which they are attempting to acquire, into political predominance without having to fight a nuclear war. Having a preponderance of nuclear power will limit the diplomatic and political possibilities of any adversaries, forcing them to concede in a crisis. From this the argument points to the need for the U.S. to have enough forces "to deter military aggression throughout the spectrum of armed conflict with forces appropriate to the threat" (CPD 1984:41). Thus a
strategic nuclear arsenal is not enough on its own.

Consistent with their doctrine, the Soviets have long maintained non-nuclear, or conventional, superiority in the European theatre and may well be more willing to use that superiority either for war or for coercive diplomacy in the event they achieve significant strategic nuclear supremacy. The Soviets are moving toward a capability, if diplomacy fails, to prevail in Europe without destroying it, using more accurate weapons of lower nuclear yields (CPD 1984:43).

Moreover, they have built up chemical weapons as well in Europe, "again, a potential means of winning battles and taking territory without destroying its assets" (CPD 1984:43). In contrast the U.S. neglects chemical weapons, and pursues "unenforceable agreements to outlaw chemical warfare" (CPD 1984:43). In contrast the U.S. "appears to be retreating for both policy and budgetary reasons to a posture of "finite deterrence", perhaps even to a "fortress America"." (CPD 1984:43).

"Is America Becoming Number 2?" then proceeds to itemise the roles of the Soviet Union's "formidable standing array of forces" against China and Western Europe. They argue that the USSR assertion that their large conventional and nuclear forces in Europe are to prevent any repeat of the historical pattern of invasion from there. The CPD asserts that these forces cannot be explained in terms of defence, but rather present "a clear and
present danger to the political independence and indeed to the territorial integrity of Western Europe" the principal strategic goal of Soviet Policy being "to bring Western Europe under its control" (CPD 1984:43). If this were done "they believe, China and Japan would draw obvious conclusions. The global balance of power would be transformed to Soviet advantage, and the United States would be left isolated in a hostile world" (CPD 1984:43).

Likewise the forces facing the Chinese are rationalised by the Russians, according to the CPD as "necessary because China is traditionally antagonistic and currently revisionist in Soviet eyes." Thus the Soviet union "claims its huge deployment of forces against China is essentially defensive. To the Chinese, of course the Soviet deployment is threatening." (CPD 1984:44). Note the phraseology, the Soviets claim the weapons are defensive, they are of course threatening to the Chinese. The possibility that historical claims by the Chinese to parts of what is now the USSR and the presence of a growing Chinese nuclear arsenal, with no obvious enemies except for the Soviet Union, might be taken seriously as a long term threat by the Soviets is simply defined away.

The remaining concerns are the maintainance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, which they regard as their "most important geopolitical target. They believe that control over the space, the waterways, and the oil of the region would be a major and even decisive weapon in permitting them to dominate Europe, Africa, and large parts of Asia" (CPD 1984:44).
The denial of oil supplies or the threat thereof, is a desired means of putting pressure on the U.S. and Europe. Finally the USSR supports "wars of national liberation" and therefore requires the capability to "project power throughout the Southern Hemisphere" being "particularly interested in positions which out-flank the Middle East or China" (CPD 1984:44).

This notion of "outflanking" is again present and is elaborated later in this statement thus:

If the Soviet Union gained control of a small country in Africa, that fact might be a matter of concern to us, but not in itself a threat. If Soviet control spread throughout a large part of Africa, however, and began to outflank the Middle East and raise questions about our capacity to control sea lanes leading to the Persian Gulf, to obtain access to raw materials, and to project power where necessary, our security problem would greatly magnify. (CPD 1984:66)

Finally the CPD takes aim at the interpretation that the USSR is now (in the mid 1970s) a conservative power run by an elderly bureaucracy which is inherently conservative, arguing that this view is falsified by Soviet behaviour.

In recent years, the elderly bureaucrats of the Kremlin have undertaken programs of expansion far beyond Stalin's dreams. Stalin probed toward Turkey, Greece, Berlin and Korea, and pulled back when the risks became serious. His successors have sponsored wars of far greater magnitude -- the breach of the 1973 agreement for peace in Indo-China, for example; the Arab aggression in the Middle East of October 1973; and the current campaign in Africa. It is an illusion to suppose that the Soviets do not mean what they say. It is folly to ignore how they act. (CPD 1984:44).

Thus in conclusion this section argues that the USSR is convinced of the use of military power in international affairs.
and diplomacy and uses it whenever it can. Thus with its strategic buildup and its plans to fight and win a nuclear war, it presents a grave threat to U.S. security.

There are other significant references to the geopolitical theme in this paper, which link the notion of theatre nuclear deterrence and naval power to the larger scheme. In a sentence worthy of Spykman we are told "Theatre deterrence must also be maintained because continued Soviet encroachment could isolate the United States from the political and military affairs of a Soviet-dominated Eurasian landmass" (CPD 1984:87). This is also of concern in the naval sphere, where "the Soviet navy has developed into a major threat to vital sea lanes and as an important diplomatic instrument to expand and consolidate Soviet power" (CPD 1984:91).

This naval presence is seen as offensive because the "Soviet Union is a continental power with secure interior lines of communications and an autarkic economic system." (CPD 1984:90) This is in contrast to the U.S. being a power based on sea trade routes and raw materials supply routes. The Soviet navy therefore is seen as offensive and supported by Soviet landbased airpower is assigned the tasks of destroying the U.S. navy and disrupting its global maritime communications. Other roles are not considered. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, Colin Gray took these concerns further attempting to update Spykman and MacKinder to give these arguments a theoretical formulation.
Seven months later Paul Nitze was to return to these Geopolitical themes in his policy paper "Is SALT II a fair deal for the United States?" released by the CPD on 16 May 1979. Again the concern with power projection as it had come to be called in the area of the Rimland was prominent in Nitze's concerns. Since World War II the U.S. navy had enjoyed "unchallenged control of the seas. This assured we could project our power, wherever needed, on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass." (CPD 1984:159). Nitze expresses alarm that the Soviet buildup of intermediate range nuclear weapons is on its way to developing such a capacity. Reiterating the now familiar refrain that the Soviets do not wish for nuclear war but rather wish to expand their influence under the threat of superiority, Nitze provides a much more specific portrayal of the details of the CPD's geopolitical scenarios than the earlier papers which were all short on specifics.

It involves a series of outflanking manoeuvres thus:

By achieving dominance over the Middle East, they aim to outflank Europe. They propose to outflank the Middle East by achieving controlling positions in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq on one side, South and North Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mozambique on the other, and by achieving the neutrality of Turkey to the north. Concurrently, they are attempting to encircle China by pressure on Pakistan and India, by alliance with Vietnam, and dominance over North Korea. The United States is the only power in a position potentially to frustrate these aims. It is therefore seen as the principal enemy. (CPD 1984:160)

The discussion then goes on to argue, as before, that Soviet nuclear supremacy at each level of escalation in a potential
conflict in these zones, confers on them unsurpassable diplomatic leverage, thus ensuring that they can continue to expand their influence because if the U.S. interferes it will in a crunch be forced to back down. Strategic superiority, the level of ultimate force, helps at all lesser levels. Thus strategic superiority is seen again in its relationship to Geopolitical expansion. This theme is repeated in subsequent policy statements, and will be returned to in chapter 10.

In "The Crisis of the 1980s" released in January 1980, in the aftermath of the Soviet military incursion into Afghanistan and the "hostage crisis" events in Iran is one of the CPD's most alarmist statements. In it the CPD asserts that the expansionist trends that it has repeatedly documented "have continued with accelerating momentum. From the Persian Gulf, Africa, and the Middle East to the Caribbean, South East Asia, and the approaches to China and Japan, the Soviet military presence and the strategic threats it represents are more obvious and more ominous than three years ago" (CPD 1984:170-1). The Soviet Union can now "dominate Western economic and military lifelines through the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean" (CPD 1984:171). Asserting that the U.S. had by now become second in military power to the USSR, they conclude that "This country no longer has the capacity to protect its interests and American citizens abroad" (CPD 1984:171).

The CPD remains particularly concerned about the Persian Gulf situation, arguing among other things that the Soviets were
responsible in part for the overthrow of the Shah. "The violent of social and religious protest of the last few years in Iran were actively promoted by the Soviet Union from the beginning" (CPD 1984:172). Further at this point there is a real danger of the USSR seizing control of Iran and hence the whole Gulf area and the West's oil supplies, which "would expose the non-Communist world to the danger of strangulation" (CPD 1984:172). They also charge that the Soviet position is "steadily improving" in Cuba and elsewhere in the Caribbean with Soviet combat troops in Cuba and "military assistance" to revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Nicaragua and other unspecified countries. This could lead to a situation in which "the Soviet Union can threaten our Atlantic sea-lanes, our communications with Central and South America, and the territory of the United States itself" (CPD 1984:172).

The Geopolitical themes remain constant through these papers, although the degree of specificity and the relative emphasis shifts from paper to paper. The danger from the Soviet Union is ultimately seen in terms of their expansion or political domination into Western Europe primarily. Their most likely avenue of approach is through the "outflanking" of the Middle-East via bases in Africa. Thus they can gain control of large areas of the Euro-Asian landmass and hence by threats and the decline in U.S. influence remove Japan and other nations from their friendships with the U.S. and thus gain hegemony which will leave the U.S. powerless and isolated.
Behind all this lies the buildup of military force which provides the ability to intervene in areas beyond their traditional sphere and behind that the buildup in military forces and in particular the nuclear weaponry which the CPD is so concerned will deny the U.S. the possibility to stand up to the Soviets in a crisis. These ideas of nuclear superiority are crucial to understanding the CPD's consistent vehement opposition to SALT II, the subject of chapter 10's analysis. What is crucial however is the CPD's understanding of nuclear superiority as being essential to extended deterrence, necessary to stop the Soviet Geopolitical momentum.

8.5 CONCLUSION

Historical analogy is important to the CPD position. Thus they rely on the argument that the U.S. is appeasing the USSR. They argue this by conflating the totalitarian foreign policy tactics of the USSR with those of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The parallels include the use of threat by the USSR to accomplish expansion. Military intimidation is a key tactic. All this assumes that the U.S. is really militarily unprepared, beset by Podhoretz's "culture of appeasement", the inevitable result of which would be retreat and the USSR gaining of global domination.

In contrast to this, other commentators (Kahler 1979) have pointed to the historical analogy of 1914 as more appropriate. This analogy points to a situation of complex alliance
structures with numerous foreign entanglements and interests facing each other; accidents waiting to happen to drag them into a war that neither side wants but which the logic of events compels them to fight. The consequences of adopting this historical analogy are fundamentally different, pointing to the need to negotiate a series of agreements that limit the possibilities of entanglement and escalation, and also limit the overall number of nuclear weapons.

This is a conclusion that the CPD cannot accept because of their axiological specification of the Other as evil and threatening, and the U.S. as purely defensive. With this specification the only possible source of war, accidental or deliberate is ultimately traceable to the actions of that Other. This is because in Realist terms the Soviet Union is a revisionist power, one attempting to change the international order to its benefit. The alternative is the CPD solution; build such a formidable force of weapons that the USSR could not think of contemplating war. Faced with such military power its Geopolitical campaign would be stalled.

The Geopolitical perspective of the CPD is conflated with their Realism. Politics is understood as power politics, which relates to military control over territory. The point needs to be made that this is a very crude form of Realism indeed. The tradition of Realism associated with Morgenthau (1978), Carr (1946), Kennan (1983) as well as writers like Bull (1977) and Wight (1979) is open to much more subtle readings on power in
international affairs. Ideas of international community and the respect for the perceived national interests of all actors are essential to this tradition. Balancing power and maintaining international order are delicate matters in which diplomacy and politics is important, not everything is reduced to the crude calculus of overkill capabilities.

But what is essential here in the CPD formulation of the international situation is the specification of the Soviet Union as evil and crucially expansionist. The whole specification of the USSR as evil on the axiological dimension of Otherness denies the applicability of the classical concerns of Realism with international order and stability. Because the USSR is expansionist, and because the CPD "knows" its true nature by the application of its superior "historical method" the "interests" of the USSR can be dismissed as illegitimate.

Thus Kennan can denounce the militarist policies of the 1980s while remaining entirely consistent with the original Realist formulation of his position in the 1940s when he clearly advocated a firm policy towards the Soviet Union, but one which recognised that it had legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe (Kennan 1947, 1983, Mayers 1986). Likewise Morgenthau can remonstrate against the "pathologies of American power" (1977), criticising the failure of many policy makers to take seriously the importance of nuclear weapons.
The CPD's Geopolitical perspective can be critiqued on both theoretical grounds in terms of its conceptions about the relations of space and power, and in empirical terms by assessing the relative increase or decrease in relative influence of the superpowers in terms of their control of global resources and in terms of its failure to deal with the particular circumstances in the Third World where the geopolitical contest is played out. The theoretical critique will be dealt with later, this section outlines the empirical limitations of the CPD's geopolitical discourse.

In simple empirical terms the CPD arguments are vulnerable on two grounds. First is simple arithmetic, the CPD litany of Soviet takeovers in the 1970s only considers those cases that can be interpreted in terms of a unilateral advantage. Thus the ambivalent changes in their position in the Horn of Africa are ignored, in strategic terms the changing of sides in the Ethiopian - Somali conflict lost them bases on the Indian ocean in Somalia which were potentially important to their monitoring of the U.S. Polaris SLBM carriers operating in North West Indian Ocean.

The Centre for Defence Information (1979) attempted a summary although crude assessment of the global balance of forces which argues that far from a Soviet geopolitical momentum in the 1970s the Soviets had in fact lost influence globally from the late 1950s. The major decline in influence in the Mid
East in part as a result of the Egyptian disenchantment with the USSR and the efforts of Kissinger's diplomacy and subsequently the Carter administration's "Camp David" process were overlooked by the CPD. Rostow (1976) even went so far as to try to argue that the U.S. diplomatic initiatives after the Yom Kippur War resulted in a decline in U.S. influence in the Middle East and was to the USSR's advantage. More sophisticated evaluations of the geopolitical developments of relevance to the Soviet Union (Kaplan 1981, Steele 1985, MccGwire 1987a) show the Soviet Union as a major military power but one constrained internally and externally, certainly not one with a grand design for global domination on any time scale.

The second empirical problem is the reduction of all developments in the Third World into matters of superpower conflict. Thus the indigenous developments are overlooked, all causes of political and economic change are reduced to the machinations of the adversary or the benign assistance of the U.S. This gross oversimplification is clear in the Mid East and the so called "Arc of Crisis" (Halliday 1982). It operates to heighten concern over foreign developments because everything not immediately identifiable as a benefit to "our" side is portrayed as a potential opportunity for the USSR to gain

(cont'd) the Centre for Defence Information's (1979) assessment shows clearly that the neo-conservatives reduced influence and power to solely matters of military power. Thus he argues that Cuba has been able to project power in the Third World where the U.S. has been unable to. Economic influence or political and cultural domination in more complex patterns are simply excluded in these formulations.
influence. The result enhances the paranoid style of foreign policy.

Paranoia in the context of military definitions of national security encourages further militarism which in turn feeds the dynamics of the security dilemma. In terms of academic Political Geography this kind of focus is precisely the kind of equation of "science" with imperialism that geopolitics has been long associated. Its premises deny indigenous factors and are hence insensitive to the geographical diversity of political developments. As will be argued in the final chapter of this dissertation a critical Political Geography has a role to play in unmasking this type of argument and exposing its political operation in the cause of imperialism and militarism.

Coupled to this is the key ethnocentric ideological assumption that "we" being moral and upholding the universal aspirations of the human race for freedom and so on are justified in involving ourselves in the affairs of the world whether invited or not. As was pointed out long ago (Franck and Weisband 1972) the verbal strategies used to justify this kind of action by both superpowers are effectively identical. They function by conceptually identifying "us" as good and the Other as evil. The merits of the individual case are of secondary importance to the overall imputation of evil intention to the other side. Once that has been established then the details can be placed aside, intervention is justified when you are on the side of the angels.
In the case of the CPD, Geopolitics was grafted onto existing ICBM vulnerability concerns within the intelligence community. The technical arcana of ICBM vulnerabilities and the possibilities of first strikes given the unknowns of missile accuracy were in some cases for public consumption reduced to a comparison of the relative sizes of nuclear missiles in the superpower arsenals. While ideological mobilisation around these kinds of issues was possible it was even more so around the theme of the geopolitical expansion of the USSR. This was because the expansionist theme coupled to the critique of the appeasers of detente rendered complex international developments coherent around a simple axis of explanation: it was all part of the Soviet quest for global domination.

Thus U.S. setbacks were blamed on the machinations of the Other. The KGB, if not the Cubans, could always be blamed for adverse developments in the global arena even if their direct hand was not visible. Threatening developments, particularly in the Middle East were implied to be the work of the USSR. Their increased military buildup, and in particular the development of the naval forces which gained a global presence in the 1970s, fit simply into an overall image of Soviet expansion first given concrete expression in the 1947 Life graphics of a red amoeba-like growth spreading its tentacles across the globe (O'Sullivan 1986).

Here the CPD forged a link between the two themes, the Soviet expansionist theme and the strategic theme that the
Soviets were developing a nuclear supremacy and a strategic doctrine of fighting a nuclear war. The two come together in the coercion thesis, where the USSR could supposedly compel the U.S. not to intervene in a crisis in the Third World because of its potential ability to win any confrontation.

Thus extended deterrence is brought into the picture. The U.S. has an obligation to defend any and all countries from the predations of the USSR, to do so requires deterring the USSR in any field in the Third World. Thus a nuclear war fighting capacity is needed that can "project power" anywhere on the globe. The U.S. is justified in being there because of its interests in saving the world from Communism, but it has to have a nuclear force capable of compelling the USSR from backing down in a crisis. Only then will it be able to contain the Soviets.

If it fails to contain the Soviet Union gradually the Soviet Union will encroach on Africa and elsewhere and the U.S. will decline in global influence. What worries the CPD about this is not really the fate of various countries in the Third World, but that its influence will decline in Europe, Japan and China. In these circumstances Europe might allow itself to be Finlandised and Japan would drift beyond U.S. dominance. In these circumstance the U.S. would lose its global hegemony and cease to be the dominant power on the planet. To maintain its dominance the CPD argued that a major military buildup was needed. It is here that the particular controversy over new missiles in Europe comes into focus (Johnston 1984). The so
called Euro-Missile controversy is best understood as an attempt
to reassert U.S. political control over an increasingly restive
Europe with ideas of detente and political cooperation.

In all of this the Third world is reduced to a playing field
in which the superpowers play out the great game of influence,
the prize to the winner is the global influence over Europe and
Japan. Thus the traditional cold war theme of containment as a
political device to mobilise European societies in the service
of global capitalism is rerun. Here the major conflict is not
about political and military control in the Third World for its
own sake, but is secondary to maintaining the Europeans in Pax
Americana.

But this specification of the Third World as a playing field
again suggests a physical model of the area as a politically
empty part of "absolute space" waiting to be "filled" by
"projected" power. What matters again in global terms are not
local cultures or politics, it is the abstract clashing of
military power in spaces that can be used to outflank the West
if not filled with Western "power". Again the assumption of
space as the container of political activity is present,
security is defined in terms of spatial exclusion and
territorial control.

Underlying these themes was the old Geopolitical theme of
the Heartland land power attempting to wrest total control over
the Rimlands from naval powers. The expansion of the Soviet
Union into the Rimlands is of serious concern in all of the CPD texts. Although they rarely explicitly use Geopolitical language, Soviet domination of the Eurasian landmass is referred to. The most explicit statement of the Geopolitical theme, and the utility of its overarching conceptualisations of the global political scene, is found in Colin Gray's attempt to update the work of MacKinder and Spykman, the subject of the first half of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 9
GEOPOLITICS AND SOVIET EMPIRE

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Colin Gray is unique among his fellow members of the CPD in the extensive and the comprehensive nature of his writings. The overarching theme of his conception is a consciously articulated Geopolitical vision; he makes explicit what is often implicit in the CPD materials. In particular he rewrites Spykman and Mackinder to present an argument that their ideas of Geopolitics are not only still relevant to the understanding of the international politics, but that they are the essential basis to any adequate understanding of global affairs.

He draws from the discourses of Realism, Strategy and Sovietology to construct a global perspective of world affairs structured explicitly in the terms of Geopolitics. His arguments provide the theoretical framework for the CPD's concerns outlined in the last chapter, as such they are central to the argument presented in this dissertation that the key to understanding the CPD security discourse is the articulation of Realism, Sovietology, Strategy and Geopolitics together in terms of spatial exclusion.

This chapter discusses Gray's reinterpretation of the classical Geopolitical texts and traces his conception of the Soviet Union as an expansionist empire, drawing together his
Geopolitical writings with the geographic rationale for Russian and Soviet expansion provided by Richard Pipes (See section 7-4 above). It is precisely because it provides a framework for his thinking and the overall views of the CPD that this reinterpretation of the classical Geopolitical texts is important. Gray provides the theoretical interpretation of the CPD's Geopolitics. In addition it leads into his conception of the Soviet Union as an expansionist empire, the key political assumption in his subsequent nuclear "theory of victory", an important strategic argument in support of the Reagan administration's buildup of nuclear weapons, and as argued in chapter 11, the key articulation of all the CPD's arguments.

There is a final consideration here, of importance for the overall argument of this dissertation, in terms of the attempt by the CPD to reassert the hegemonic formulation of U.S. security in the terms of containment militarism. As was argued in chapter 4, the conflation of Realism and its concerns with the "national interest" with the military concerns for forward defence against the Soviet Union immediately after the Second World War, subsumed security into a hegemonic Geopolitical framework. Power was equated with the military domination of territory; containment was a Geopolitical strategy. The detente and arms control approaches to international affairs challenged this hegemony, because they emphasised other concerns.

Gray's rationale for reassessing the literature on Geopolitics is clearly to attempt to rearticulate these themes
precisely because the Geopolitical premises of foreign policy were no longer accepted by the detente advocates and the arms controllers. "The primary intention is to outline an appropriate framework of assumptions for the analysis of East-West relations" (Gray 1977a:2). Thus his document is an attempt to reconstruct the premises of containment militarism as an attempt to redirect the concerns of security discourse back to matters of military domination of territory. Enough of detente and economic issues, security is to be once more understood in terms of space and power.

Gray's formulation provides the theoretical rationale for the CPD's Geopolitical arguments discussed in the last chapter, and for understanding the strategic arguments in the next two chapters. More specifically Strategic arguments about limited nuclear war, and the possibility of winning such a war, are premised on Geopolitical assumptions that such a conflict would be triggered by superpower conflict over control of part of the Rimlands. Extended deterrence, in the CPD formulation, is about denying the Soviet Union the possibility of militarily seizing territory in the Rimlands.

Other recent writers of Political Geography have passed Gray's 1977 monograph over, failing to understand its significance, because they are apparently unaware of its connections to the revived literature on the Soviet threat, and the connections between this type of Geopolitical thinking and nuclear war fighting strategies. For both these reasons this
chapter offers a detailed reconstruction of Gray's analysis, a reconstruction essential to the logic of the CPD position, and one that focuses on the perhaps most overlooked theoretical dimension of their position.

9.2 GEOPOLITICS AND SUPERPOWER RIVALRY

Colin Gray's intellectual debt to the writings of Nicholas Spykman is clear. Recently in an article in the Washington Quarterly Gray calls him a "great Geopolitical theorist" (1986a:64), but references to his writings appear periodically throughout Gray's work. In the Foreign Policy article on Realism, discussed in the last chapter, Gray terms his book America's Strategy in World Politics (1942) "the outstanding work on 'realpolitik" (1976a:125). Spykman also wrote The Geography of the Peace which was published in 1944.

Gray's The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era (1977a) starts with four long quotes from these two works. These outline Spykman's credo of power and territorial control as the essence of international politics. In this Realist conception, sovereign states are in never-ending competition to enhance their relative security, which is defined in terms of power. Power is, in the last resort, the ability to wage war in a world where the most fundamental factor in foreign policy is geography, because it is the most permanent of the factors. This notion of permanency and enduring relations is important in Gray's perspective.
In a reiteration of the Realist theme discussed in chapter 8, Gray's monograph opens with an assertion that American foreign policy analysts are operating on the bases of inadequate analyses, having succumbed to "fashionable shibboleths that do not speak to the vital interests of Western societies" (1977a:2). In particular the "pseudo-sophistication" of International Relations teaching in American universities is criticised with the principal journals called "scholarly monuments to irrelevance" (1977a:3). This is coupled to an expression of regret that Spykman's texts are not on many university book lists. This observation is justified by an assertion that "-- for all the admittedly dated details -- Spykman directs the student toward the important and the enduring as opposed to the trivial and the transient." (1977a:2). We are then informed that the only approach to the field of International Relations that "enables the student to appreciate the essence of the field" is the approach best termed "power politics" (1977a:2).

Other approaches may be of value but they all tend to lead away from "what one must call the real world" (1977a:3). In contrast

This study focuses upon the most pressing, dangerous, and potentially fatal fact of the contemporary world -- namely, that we are at the mid-stage of a shift in relative power and influence to the Soviet Union that is of historic proportions, and which promises, unless arrested severely, to have enduring significance. This easily demonstrated fact does not detract from the importance of other processes, sometimes only distantly related, that are eroding familiar structures in international relations. ... But the rise in Soviet
standing in the world, which may be traced almost exclusively to the increase in relative Soviet military capabilities, both dwarfs other concerns in its immediacy and seriousness, and renders other problems far less tractable. (Gray 1977a:3)

Thus the argument is not that he deals with the totality of international relations. Rather, in keeping with the traditional tenets of Realism, he suggests that there are other aspects of international relations, but that the military-diplomatic aspects are the most important. He charges that International Relations practitioners have forgotten that the central concern of their craft is with relative influence and physical survival, ultimately a matter of power. In particular he argues that the central role given to arms control and international diplomacy has caused the preeminent importance of constructing a defence policy that can guarantee foreign policy success to be neglected. The rationale for Geopolitics as a framework for understanding international relations is reintroduced in terms of "directing attention to matters of enduring importance" (1977a:5).

More specifically Geopolitics is defined in Saul Cohen's (1963) terms as "the relation of international political power to the geographical setting" (Gray 1977a:5). Denying any deterministic implications we are assured that the "Geopolitical factors -- that is to say, both the operational environment (the world as it really is) and the psychological environment (the world as seen by conditioned and fallible human beings) -- do
Governments may or may not pursue the policy options presented by their geopolitical situation. But a clear understanding of Geopolitical matters, in Gray's estimation, will lead to better foreign policy. This monograph is his contribution to the cultivation of such a geopolitical sensitivity, motivated by a fear that the "historical bid for world hegenomy on the part of the Soviet Union is not appreciated for what it is by Western publics" (1977a:6-7).

This bid for hegemony (understood in the Realist sense of domination) is central to his concerns, and it underlies the central fact of political life on the global scene. Thus the East -- West rivalry is a permanent feature of the international scene. "In the very long term, Soviet-American rivalry may wither away after the fashion of the Christian-Muslim competition, but such a prospect can play no sensible part in the policy making of the late 1970s" (1977a:8). Soviet ideology is very important in Colin Gray's conception of things; the Soviet system defines all non-socialist countries as "enemies" and hence he argues there is no distinction between the Soviet Union as a unit of power and as a bearer of ideology ("a church") (1977a:8).

In Gray's analysis the central tenets of communism involve a long term struggle between communism and the West so there is no possibility of any genuine endeavour to stabilise East-West relations. The rest of the argument in this section is predictable from CPD material discussed in the last three
chapters. Thus all views to the contrary are myths, the ideas of detente and common interest are not valid. The myths of detente are as result of psychological projection of Western humane views on an alien culture. Time is not on the West's side as the Soviet Union remains a command society, ultimately prepared to use the threat of military force to pursue its foreign policy objectives. To understand all these factors and their implications the only adequate framework is that of Geopolitics. He continues, in a manner consistent with Mackinder's understanding of Geopolitics (Parker 1982),

"...geopolitics is not simply one set of ideas among many competing sets that help to illuminate the structure of policy problems. Rather it is a meta- or master framework that, without predetermining policy choice, suggests long term factors and trends in the security objectives of particular territorially organised security communities. (Gray 1977a: 11)"

The leitmotiv of Geopolitics, we are informed, is the struggle of land power against seapower. Nuclear weapons and their methods of delivery have, Gray argues, led to the abandonment of geopolitical thinking. Thus a major war between the superpowers is now conceived as a matter of immediate massive nuclear attack by nuclear missiles. Gray argues that much international history is also forgotten but that the major geographical features of the planet continue to pose unresolved problems of nuclear strategy for Western officials. ¹ He argues

¹ In another article published the same year Gray elaborated on the theme of lessons of strategy from the pre-war era being forgotten in the nuclear age (1977b). The Realist / Geopolitical perspective relies on these continuities.
that the global situation is best seen as a long-term struggle between the "insular imperium" of the U.S. and the "heartland imperium" of the USSR (1977a:14). In this Mackinderian conception, Eurasia and Africa comprise the World Island and America and Australia comprise the outer crescent of islands. "As of the mid 1970s, in geopolitical terms, superpower conflict may be characterised as a struggle between a substantially landlocked Heartland superpower, and a substantially maritime dependent (in security perspective) insular superpower for control / denial of control of the Eurasian - African "Rimlands"." (Gray 1977a:14).

More specifically, in an argument consistent with Nitze's concerns with Soviet "outflanking" of the Middle East and Europe discussed in the last chapter, we are offered the following essential credo:

1. Control of the World Island of Eurasia - Africa by a single power would, over the long term, mean control of the world.
2. Land power and sea power meet/clash in the Eurasian - African Rimlands and marginal seas. Control of those Rimlands and marginal seas by an insular power is not synonymous with control of the World Island, but it does mean the denial of eventual global hegemony to the Heartland power (that is, the Soviet Union). (Gray 1977a:15)

Again in line the CPD position, we are informed that the "proximate stake" in this conflict is the control of Europe which the Soviet Union might gain by military conquest, "Finlandisation", or by control over the oil production areas of the Middle East. Gray argues that the second option would be
difficult and risky, as a result of the "ideological infection" that would result within the Soviet sphere. The whole key to the long run Soviet foreign policy is thus one of "hemispheric denial" (see Atkeson 1976) in keeping the U.S. from access to the Rimlands of Eurasia. In particular, echoing the CPD concerns discussed in the last chapter, the Soviet interventions and "proxy wars" in Africa are viewed with alarm as their gains there supposedly provide them with future bases of military action and undermine U.S. credibility in the support of regimes opposed to the Soviets.

But Europe remains the key to limiting Soviet expansion. Gray further argues that it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that a European defence arrangement will be forthcoming. Thus there will be, in his Geopolitical scheme, a continued need for the U.S. to maintain forces there to defend its interests. Gray notes that no president of the U.S. has ever spelled this out for the American people. He argues that a familiarity with Geopolitical ways of thinking would remove the difficulties in seeing this. In other words, it will be rendered acceptable, common sense, and hence to some degree at least, hegemonic. Once this Geopolitical scheme is familiar all else will follow. Hence the necessity to review and update the theoretical literature of Geopolitics.
Having laid this argument about growing Soviet military and Geopolitical power before the reader, only then does Gray turn to review in detail the writings of the earlier Geopoliticians. He carefully distances himself from the geopolitik of Haushofer vintage and the too enthusiastic emulations of it in wartime America by writers like Strause Hupe (1942). Gray argues that Halford MacKinder is the most influential of the Geopoliticians, the key idea of the land based invulnerable "pivot area" on the World Island is reviewed, along with the Outer Crescent, of Japan, Britain and North America, being invulnerable to land power. MacKinder's argument that railroads had rendered the premises of sea power's supremacy outdated, and that there was a possibility that an alliance of Germany and Russia could take over the World Island is reviewed and Gray is careful to note the changes in his arguments over time as he rethought his theories.

The term Heartland was borrowed by MacKinder from Fairgreave (1915) for his 1919 book 'Democratic Ideals and Reality' and Gray emphasises that MacKinder never argued that the Heartland takeover of the World Island was inevitable. Thus it is possible for a combination of Inner and Outer Crescent powers to stop its expansion. MacKinder's later writings argued that there was a possible counterweight to the expansion of Soviet power in the

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2 In later life Strause Hupe joined the CPD and was appointed Ambassador to Turkey by the Reagan administration.
formation of a Midland Ocean basin power grouping in the North Atlantic. In Gray's estimation Spykman's modifications of MacKinder's scheme overestimated the power of the Rimlands to resist Heartland power. However,

... looking at the world of the late 1970s the theories of MacKinder and Spykman yield a common logic for policy. The United States cannot afford to tolerate the effective control of Eurasia - Africa by the Soviet Union. It must serve, in its own vital interests, as the functional successor to Great Britain as an active balancer of power on, and bearing upon, the Rimlands of Eurasia. Such a geopolitical task is as essential as it should - given steadiness of purpose and an appropriate popular understanding of that purpose - be successful. \(^3\) (Gray 1977a:28)

Gray argues that the case against Geopolitical thinking, in the sense that the presence of long range nuclear armed bombers and ballistic missiles deny the invulnerability thesis of the pivot area, is countered by the presence of the growing Soviet counter-deterrent which would easily neutralise the use of the U.S. nuclear arsenal against this territory by promising a devastating riposte. Thus with the strategic arsenals effectively neutralising each other the matter of controlling territory and resources again takes on primary importance. Hence the need for the focus on Geopolitical thinking. Thus Gray argues that the Soviet Union is very far from gaining "real-time

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\(^3\) Frank Barnett, the director of the National Strategy Information Centre, who wrote the preface to Gray's monograph, later issued an appeal for a "tri-oceanic alliance of the imperilled Rimlands" expressed in these Geopolitical terms (Barnett 1981). Although there are no references in this paper, the commonality of approach and the fact that part of his 1977 preface to Gray's monograph is reprinted in this appeal, suggests that Grays' ideas were at least part of the impetus to his argument.
control over the policies of all states in Eurasia -- Africa" but it does not need to accomplish such a task. "in order to secure for itself predominance over the World Island, and the ability to deny American access." (1977a:32).

The third chapter of this monograph outlines in some detail Gray's views of Russian history drawn significantly from Richard Pipes' writings in particular. This takes the position that there is a historical continuity through the events of 1917, the non-liberal "patrimonial" social system merely acquired a new controlling apparatus which faced the same political and social problems as the tsars, and crucially, as the next section makes clear the same Geopolitical situation.

There follows a discussion of the Soviet increase in military forces in the late 1960s and through the 1970s and an alarmed account of the Soviet presence in Africa, seen as significant because it allows Soviet naval activity to outflank "the Eurasian-African Rimlands" (1977a:52). Again this CPD theme is reiterated, now the logic of it is more clearly spelled out. Gray points to the compartmentalisation of military expertise in the U.S. as a major problem in understanding this buildup and its implications. Specifically he argues that overly technical analyses have failed to place the specific elements of the buildup in overall (Geopolitical) perspective. Thus

Much defence analysis suffers from a seeming inability to appreciate that geography imposes different tasks upon the armed forces of the rival alliances. Many Americans appear to have difficulty understanding that if they wish to deny hegemony over the Eurasian Rimlands
to the Soviet Union, either the maritime alliance must sustain a very robust local denial capability, or the United States must invest in a significant margin of strategic superiority. To recap in question form, how are the Eurasian-African Rimlands to be defended against the Heartland power, if strategic parity (or, more likely, parity-plus) is conceded to that power? If Superiority in the European theatre is conceded?" (Gray 1977a:53)

Here the Geopolitical theme is directly linked to the matter of strategic superiority, a precursor to Gray's later arguments about the "theory of victory" discussed in chapter 11. Gray argues that the West may become aware of the danger too late to make the appropriate military response.

The fourth chapter of this monograph deals with the U.S. containment policy following the Second World War in terms of defending the Rimlands against the Heartland power. In these terms the U.S. is seen as taking on the defensive role formerly undertaken by the Germans and the Japanese prior to their defeat in the war. "The compelling logic of geopolitics has indicated to any American capable of reading a map and drawing fairly elementary policy lessons from recent history that Heartland and Rimlands on the World Island must never be organised by a single political will." (Gray 1977a:54). As argued in chapters 3 and 4 above, containment is understood in Geopolitical terms.

Despite this, and what he terms, the "MacKinderesque writings" of George Kennan, Gray argues that the post war policy was far more the result of reacting to events than the outcome of an overarching conceptualisation of a Geopolitical plan. The overall policy objective of the U.S. must in this
conceptualisation remain the containment of the USSR well short of a hegemony over the World Island. While the U.S. might survive this hegemony it could only do so as an isolated fortress, not as a global power. The assumption that the Communist Bloc is not monolithic is also contested. Specifically Gray argues that the Sino-Soviet split might not outlast a decline in U.S. power as he argues the Chinese would probably be unable to continue an independent foreign policy without a U.S. counterweight to the Soviet Nuclear arsenal.

Gray is concerned that the U.S. political culture is not suitable to the long term containment role forced on it by geopolitical circumstances. The "neo Mahanian" analytical perspective (see Wohlstetter 1968, Collins 1981) argues that transportation economics make it easier for the U.S. to project power onto the Rimlands than it is for the USSR to do so; oceans connect rather than divide because of the cheapness of sea transport and the relative ease of navigation. But Gray argues that geopolitics is more than a matter of transportation economics and that in the case of the U.S. the psychological dimension of distance is important but overlooked by analysts like Wohlstetter. The example given is Neville Chamberlain's dismissal of Czechoslovakia as a "faraway country" at the time of the Munich agreement (Gray 1977a:58).

The next assertion is logical in Gray's scheme; if they had read their Mackinder the British would have known that "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland" and consequently
recognised that a strong tier of East European states were essential to limit German ambition. Further however is the argument that if geopolitics were only a matter of transportation economics that the U.S. would have quickly won in Vietnam. "Our minds carry psychological maps, not ton-mile cost analysis maps" (Gray 1977a:59). Further psychological dimensions of this are the tendency because of the Oceanic distances between the U.S. and other major powers for isolationist sentiments to become prominent in policy debates. The standard version of this is in terms of the "credibility" of the U.S. guarantee to defend Europe in the event of Soviet attack.

Here Gray introduces a repeated theme in his writings that specifically links the notions of style that relate to psychological factors and Geopolitics. His argument is the standard Realist one, used by other CPD writers (see chapter 8), distinguishing between revisionist and status quo powers. The U.S. is the latter or a "satisfied" power, assuming that the stable world order is viewed as a desideratum by all other powers also and that peace is the normal order of things. Thus he argues that the SALT process of the 1970s has allowed the Soviet Union to acquire a nuclear supremacy by building up all the weapons systems that it was allowed and fudging at the margins of arms control agreement compliance.

Here the crucial link in the whole nuclear superiority argument is directly related to the Geopolitical vision that underlies Gray's and indeed the whole CPD position. Thus the
argument follows that parity, let alone inferiority puts the U.S. in a position where it has "no margin of nuclear strength which could be invoked on behalf of endangered friends and allies in Eurasia." (Gray 1977a:62). A further complication of the neo-Mahanian scheme is the widespread presence of the Soviet Navy in many Oceans, a navy whose function is obviously to buy time for the conquest of parts of the Rimland by Soviet ground forces operating in a "blitzkreig" mode. To do this all it must do is to seriously hinder trans-Atlantic resupply or sink a sizable portion of the world's supertankers plying from the Middle East to Europe and Japan.

Thus the whole Soviet arms buildup (and Gray assumes that it is between 13% and 15% of the Soviet GNP) is interpreted as an attempt to develop a credible military threat to conquer Rimland territory, while its navy interdicts U.S. responses, and its central nuclear forces act as a counterdeterrent to the use of the U.S. strategic arsenal in the event of the escalation of conflict to the level of limited (theatre) nuclear war. In the worst scenario (the "window of vulnerability" argument) the USSR could launch a counter force strike against the U.S. destroying its ICBM force and leaving the U.S. "with no sensible strategic options" (Gray 1977a:62). Thus we are reminded that in Geopolitical terms the forces of the superpowers have very different roles to play and that therefore, because of these roles the tolerance of the parity principle in SALT is a recipe for disaster.
In summary Gray argues that a global perspective on political affairs is greatly helped by "the MacKinder - Spykman view that the world, reduced to its power related essentials, consists of a Heartland superpower that is locked in a permanent struggle with the offshore, insular continental superpower, the United States, for effective control of the Rimlands and the marginal seas of the World Island" (Gray 1977a:64). Within this grand scheme the Soviet's goal is power and then more power. The widespread deployment of the Soviet fleet indicates a developing strategy for global influence, which tied into Soviet nuclear superiority and local ground force superiority in the Rimlands bodes ill for the U.S. But

If the maritime alliance can deny the Soviet Union hegemony over Western Europe, by whatever means, and if American strategic nuclear power offers some options that are useable in extremis, and are not negated by the Soviet strategic counterdeterrent, then Soviet gains in the Rimlands outside Europe are either tolerable or reversible - with the exception of the reforging of a very solid Sino Soviet alliance. (Gray 1977a:66)

Gray concludes his study by once again arguing that there is a lack of Geopolitical understanding in the foreign policy making circles in the U.S. He also restates his contention that the Soviet intentions are indelibly written in the long course of Soviet and Russian imperial history. In a position consistent with Richard Pipes he argues that these expansionist tendencies can only be met with the credible threat of the use force to stop them. These expansionist tendencies, drawn in part from Pipes' writings, are key to the Geopolitical scheme advocated by
These ideas of the inherent Geopolitical expansionism of the USSR are the subject of a series of later articles all of which examine superpower relations in terms of Gray's "imperial thesis" of Soviet behaviour. The imperial thesis is derived from Pipes historical writings and his Geopolitical arguments discussed here. As chapter 11 will make clear, the imperial thesis is essential to Gray's formulation of his influential nuclear war "theory of victory". Gray's argument about Soviet behaviour and its attempts to expand and to, at least deny the U.S. access to the World Island, are the most explicit working out of the Geopolitical theme in the CPD literature. It provides a theoretical clarification of their concern about increased Soviet influence in Africa "outflanking" Europe.

9.4 THE GEOPOLITICS OF SOVIET EMPIRE

Empire is Gray's preferred term for the Soviet system; he wrote a number of papers and reviews which expand on this conceptualisation of the Soviet system and which build on his earlier ideas of Geopolitics in the early 1980s (Gray, 1981a, 1981b, 1982a, Strode and Gray 1981). In between these themes are connected by a number of papers that deal explicitly with the questions of crisis management (1978a) and as mentioned above, the "theory of victory" in Geopolitical terms (1979a, 1979b, 1980a). The imperial perspective articulates these points into the overall Geopolitical framework, hence its importance. Gray
goes so far as to state that the Soviet Union is continually misunderstood in the West because it is not appreciated specifically as an empire (Gray 1981a:13), and consequently Western policies towards the Soviet Union are inappropriate.

As noted above, scholastic sophistry concerning "social science" definitions is one of Gray's most frequent targets for criticism in his ongoing critique of non-Realist academic pursuits in International Relations. Hence, on this idea of empire, Gray argues that one has to have recourse to "common sense" in the definition of an empire. Thus an Empire will have the following attributes: Rule of one nation over many nations, a sense of duty or mission authorised by some "mandate of heaven" to exercise authority over ethnically different peoples, and a profound sense of insecurity since the domination of the subject peoples implies that they have other loyalties than to the empire. "Imperial rule fundamentally implies a relationship of authority founded on the power to coerce" (1982b:4). The final important point is that often military adventures and the expansion of empires are undertaken with primarily defensive measures in mind. The examples used to support this contention range from the Roman conquest of Britain to the history of the Russian empire whose geopolitical problems the Soviet regime has inherited.

Gray's appeal to common sense, in other words to widely prevalent conceptions of empire opens him up to critique. Thus these arguments on what an empire is are simply given, it is
unnecessary, precisely because they are designated as common sense, to justify them, although Gray offers some examples in this outline. What Gray thus does is to create a series of factors that are useful to his discussion and use them to define this entity of empire. These factors then conveniently support Gray's analysis.

It is the specifics of the Geopolitical predicament facing the Soviet empire that are of particular importance. These arguments about the dynamics of expansion are central to the argument that both Pipes, and subsequently Gray make. According to Gray (1977a:34) the Geopolitical problems are tied centrally to the Russian tradition of "patrimonialism" and to Russian, and subsequently, Soviet militarism. "The conquest of the black earth belt of the steppe, and later of the entire Eurasian Heartland, by a state that had its origins in the northern taiga must be explained in terms of reactions to physical geography, rather than imperialistic impulses" (Gray 1977a:34). But this expansion required constant military protection. Gray is careful to note that the subsequent expansion of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union is not simply attributable to any one factor, but the historical link between physical geography, Russian militarism and imperial conquest is clearly made drawing on Pipes' 1974 book and from his 1976 article "Detente: Moscow's View".

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*A footnote provided at this point refers to the first chapter of Pipes' *Russia Under the Old Regime* (Pipes 1974), See chapter 7 above.*
Gray's later arguments expand on the geographical theme arguing that it is crucial to understanding the structure of the Soviet Empire. In the opening pages of his article "The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission, Legitimacy, and Dynamics of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s" in Orbis, Gray argues that the key to the Soviet Empire is geographical, in terms of territorial control; "As with all empires, the Great Russian has a core area (Muscovy, Byelorussia) and succeeding layers, each protecting the others. Time after time since the early 1950s the Soviet Union has shown that it is trapped in the dynamics of empire" (1981a:14).

This dynamic is a situation in which the outermost holdings protect those nearer the centre, a failure to hold onto control over the outer areas in turn calls into question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the central control over inner areas. This requires that for long term maintainance that at least the empire must not shrink, preferably to shore up internal legitimacy and support it should expand, at least in visible influence if not in physical dimensions. Gray argues that outside the central Muscovy-Byelorussia core "it is improbable that the Soviet state has any popular roots worth mentioning" (1981a:14).

Further to this point is the increased internal control that follows from increased influence outside the imperial boundaries. Thus the domination of Western Europe can, within the imperial logic, be seen in purely defensive terms as a
removal of a threat to Eastern Europe. "The USSR is not merely a
country surrounded by potential enemies, it is an empire that
virtually by definition can have no settled relations of
relative influence with its neighbours" (1981a:14). Then in a
phrase borrowed indirectly for Haushofer, Gray continues that
the geographical inheritance of the USSR is to believe that
"boundaries are fighting places", this being the "natural belief
for a country without natural frontiers" (1981a:14).

Gray's elaboration of this theoretical formulation of empire
can be read as a clever interpretation of the debate over
whether the Russian/Soviet expansion can be explained in terms
of acquiring defensive buffers or not. Gray integrates both
positions by arguing that there is an internal logic within the
empire that requires expansion. Thus the Soviet empire doesn't
just expand when the opportunity is presented and hope to
benefit by increased territory, as the buffer argument sometimes
suggests.

The reason that Gray devotes a series of articles to
analysing the "imperial thesis" is that if the thesis is valid,
which he attempts to show repeatedly, then it follows in a
determinist fashion that the problem in Western policy making
circles of attempting to predict Soviet intentions is answered
because they can be inferred from the empire's own dynamics
independent of what the Soviet leaders might wish. "The imperial
thesis is vital because it settles, persuasively, arguments
about Soviet intentions" (Gray 1981a:14-5). It relates to the
composition of the leaders of the Soviet Society and particularly to the history of the Russian Communist Party. He paints a very unflattering picture of the Soviet experience, the following not being untypical:

The legitimacy of the Soviet State has nothing to do with a social contract of any kind; it rests instead upon the bizarre facts that a handful of adventurers, having turned some nineteenth century political economic theorizing on its head, seized a historic opportunity to acquire a country as the vehicle for their Historic Mission. Their right to rule rests on the validity of the Historic Mission. If the Historic Mission, to effect socialism worldwide, comes generally to be seen as misconceived, then what right has the CPSU to be obeyed? The domestic authority of the Soviet government, today, depends upon the habit of obedience, fraud, force when needed and, to the extent to which such a dangerous sentiment can be invoked in a severely multinational country, national pride. (Gray 1981a:15)

Thus, in an expansion of Pipes' arguments (in chapter 7) the Soviet empire is fundamentally insecure, only expansion to gain territories beyond its borders and hence increase the degree of external control offers any increase in security. The whole structure rests on force, usually latent, the leaders know that they cannot rule a universal empire even if they could create one, "but they are condemned by circumstance to try" (Gray 1981a:15) They must in this scheme attempt to reduce other centres of power that abut their borders because as long as any alternative sources of power offer alternative models of society the rule of the CPSU will remain insecure.

Having stated such a blunt position Gray then counsels caution on the theme of whether the USSR views nuclear war as a
usable policy option, to reduce its insecurity. He concludes
with the position that the Soviet Union would only launch a
nuclear war in circumstances where the integrity of the empire
was seriously imperilled. Under those circumstances the leaders
would launch a first strike to attempt to cripple the U.S. in a
pre-emptive strike. In Gray's phrase they would "go first in the
last resort".

The rest of the Orbis paper presents the crucial links
between his geopolitical analysis of the dynamics of the Soviet
Empire and matters of nuclear strategy. Thus he argues that the
West has allowed the USSR to gain military supremacy through
neglect on its part. Supremacy measured not in the "largely
meaningless counts of defence inputs (men under arms, missile
launchers, warheads, megatonnage, and so forth) but, rather, to
the potential defence output; the ability to prevail in arms
competition, acute crisis, and even war itself." (Gray

Gray then argues that there will be a decade long period of
intense danger as the military supremacy of the USSR is used to
check the power of NATO and the U.S. and the superiority is used
to exploit other areas of the globe where gains are to be had
that a combination of factors explain the evolution of the large
military forces of the Soviet Union in the 1970s; first the
Russian tradition of large forces as befits a continental power,
second, more is better in the Soviet mind, third, the Soviet
system constantly reproduces its military capability out of institutional inertia, fourth, awe of the power of the state is crucial to its hegemony, fifth, military power is the one part of the inter superpower rivalry where the USSR can match the U.S., and finally there is sheer pride in military forces.

With this as background Gray paints a scenario of limited and temporary military advantage that will hold through the 1980s. After this the rearmament program of the Reagan regime and the inevitable increase in NATO defences that Gray expects will reduce the Soviet lead. China is modernising, a process inevitably challenging as it will have military spinoffs. The domestic economy is slowing down and is unlikely to expand quickly because of increasing energy costs and demographic factors. Finally there is the possibility of political paralysis as a result of the anticipated power struggle over succession in the post Brezhnev period, but a period of dangerous instability when an adventurous clique might exploit military power to gain a major foreign policy success to ensure their supremacy in the internal political struggle. Thus a move in the Middle East is seen as a possibility in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan.

A more drastic scenario might anticipate an invasion of West Europe and an attack on the Chinese which would set their modernisation program back generations. The latter scenario comes about as an assessment of temporary superiority and long run pessimism, thus the argument would suggest that the USSR
should seize the only chance it was likely to get historically and act to drastically shift matters in its favour, using the military strength built up over two decades. This scenario could only work in Gray's analysis if the U.S. was unable to launch effective nuclear strikes in response because its forces were effectively "counterdeterred" by Soviet counterforce capabilities. This is the link between the Geopolitical analysis and Nuclear Strategy which is crucial to the CPD position.

9.5 IDEOLOGY AND GEOPOLITICS

Gray's analysis relies on his self-proclaimed Realist perspective. In this he draws on Spykman, more than any other writer. He effectively conflates Geopolitics and Realism, and he does so by arguing that the key to both is the focus on the long term and enduring factors of international affairs. The most enduring of all are those of geography. *Ipso facto* Geopolitics and Realism are one and the same. This, as was noted in the last chapter, is not necessarily consistent with others of the Realist tradition, Morgenthau, one of the founders of the Realist tradition in International Relations includes a warning against the use of oversimplified Geopolitical notions in assessing the dynamics of power politics in his seminal text *Politics Among Nations* (1978).

But this conflation is a very powerful ideological tool. Added to this is the whole quasi-determinist theme of the cold climate forcing a militarised southward expansion, drawn from
Pipes' writings. Here geopolitical arguments are used as a lever against political moves of compromise with the Soviet regime. They rely on their credibility in terms of this long term trend, a matter which is obviously deepseated and hence not likely to be fundamentally disturbed by transient political arrangements such as detente and the SALT process. In the CPD's geopolitical discourse, the Soviet Union is driven by harsh geographical facts to expand. Against this only a committed military posture can work.

Reading Colin Gray's extensive writings, in particular his later works where he addresses in an academic way the matters of security studies, one detects an unease in the whole operation. Being overly cautious is a necessity in this kind of analysis, but Gray comes very near to demolishing his own case in a number of places, only to fall back on his Realist credo in terms of there not being any other possible way of operating in the international arena, other than in terms of power understood in military terms. In a number of places he comments that until some other political conditions arise the game of power politics will continue to be played according to the current rules.

This is the first Realist move that he uses. Thus international politics is an autonomous sphere, one that we are stuck with. Except, that where the new political arrangements are to come from is not clear. But, apparently it comes, if at all, from somewhere beyond the Realist world. There are a number of implications in this position. First the Realist does not
need to concern himself with the possibilities for change that might occur. Not being concerned with the possibilities of changing the game there is no incentive to work to change the game. As Gray makes very clear in his earlier article on Realism (1976a) discussed in the last chapter, only how one plays the game matters, one has to play to win.

But further than this, there is no consideration in Gray's world about how it might be possible to initiate change. Here the contradiction in the whole scheme comes to the surface. Thus the Western world is economically much more capable than the Soviet bloc and consequently it can with a mobilisation of political will contain the Soviet ambitions in the Rimlands, but it is incapable of taking any initiatives other than passively accepting the necessity of defensively responding to the bully on the block, in the hopes that eventually he will reform himself.

As McCGwire (1984, 1985-6) points out, the doctrine of deterrence is one that eschews any higher political policy or vision of a global order which might guide political action. The decades of acceptance of deterrence as the essential fact of global politics has led to a situation in which U.S. policy makers do not attempt to develop plans for the reform of international relations by the reduction of the most dangerous military element (Johansen 1987). Thus the most powerful social system (in terms of the U.S. and NATO) is reduced to fatalistically preparing for sui/genocide, rather than
developing a political plan for world order in which priorities other than military technology and strategic planning are available.

Thus Realism is, as Ashley (1984, 1987) argues, a discourse of power which operates to perpetuate its practitioners in their institutional positions overseeing its rituals. The Realist perpetuates the military nature of politics by arguing that their is no choice but more military buildup. The spiral of armaments continues. Military buildups operate to maintain the Realist credo, they provide the very tokens of the Realist competition.

But Gray is also aware of the need to break out of the narrow technical preoccupation of the strategic vision of national security. That is precisely why, in many of his writings (Gray 1971a, 1971b, 1975c, 1977-78, 1982b, 1982c, 1986b), he looks beyond the technical strategic literature to larger concerns of the formation of political policy and the role of thinktanks etc in the process. In this he joins critics like Herken (1985) and Kaplan (1983) in his criticism of the formal strategists and the operations research approaches to strategy although he draws different conclusions. He comes back to the fascination with the technical details of nuclear war fighting strategies because of his reliance on the "totalitarian thesis" and the Geopolitical framework which he constructs. Thus, as will be shown in the next chapter, he constructs a political rationale for defeating the Soviet Union which
requires a whole panoply of technical calculations.

Thus he argues in effect that there is no choice, the attempt to get beyond the limits of technocratic strategic planning to some larger political purpose is vetoed because of the nature of the Soviet Union. This is his second crucial move; he takes the critique of the technocratic preoccupations seriously, but evades the consequences because he argues that the Soviet Union is inherently expansionist, and beyond our influence because of its historical experience and rigid internal controls. Because of this huge arsenals are required and the technical analysis of "thinking the unthinkable" must proceed. We have no choice because of the nature of the Other.

He relies on the Realist distinction between status quo powers, those whose interest is in the maintainence of the global order, and revisionist or revolutionary states, whose international policies are designed to change that order. Revolutionary states are thus a threat to peace because their actions in attempting to change the international arrangements are likely to unleash social forces that lead to war. There is thus no way out of these Realist rituals. Unless, of course, the whole geopolitical scheme he and Pipes rely on is fundamentally inaccurate. This is why the Geopolitical premises of the CPD foreign policy perspective are so crucial. They provide the ideological keystone to their whole position. If it is possible to construct an alternative analysis of the geopolitical arena then the rationale on which the whole nuclear war-fighting
edifice which imperils us all is built will be removed and the justifications for ever increasing militarisation become untenable.

But Gray is also vulnerable to a critique from within the Realist tradition himself. As Carr (1946) made very clear in one of the key texts on international affairs that provided the groundwork for the Realist tradition, idealist understanding is also needed at times in international relations to allow change to occur. Gray has carefully constructed an intellectual universe in which change is not possible. The utopian vision is dismissed as fantasy and irrelevant in the ongoing historical game of great powers. Gray suffers a failure of intellectual courage in failing to seek the new political vision that he says is needed. Hence the inevitably of the arms race. This is his crucial failing.

Thus his conflation of Realism and Geopolitics privileges once again structuralist elements which emphasise historical continuity to the exclusion of change. Historical determinants are given overarching importance. This construction operates as the background to the arguments on nuclear strategy that the CPD repeatedly presented. As an expansionist power, driven by the geopolitical necessities of its position the possession of large numbers of nuclear weapons would presumably be fitted into the overall scheme of political and military strategy. The nuclear strategy arguments link up with these underlying geopolitical conceptions to present a particular representation of the
"Soviet threat", and crucially to provide a specific rationale for nuclear targeting in Colin Gray's "theory of victory" (see chapter 11).

Finally there is a theoretical concern with Geopolitics linked to the ideological force of the CPD argument. It relates directly to Gray's conceptions of geopolitics in Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era and his later conceptualisations of the dynamics of the Soviet Empire. Thus Gray argues in a comment on the old theme of whether geopolitics determines political behaviour or merely operates as one among a number of factors (See Brunn and Mingst 1985), that geopolitics is not simply one set of ideas among many competing sets that help to illuminate the structure of policy problems. Rather it is a meta- or master framework, that, without predetermining policy choice, suggests long term factors and trends in the security objectives of particular territorially-organised security communities. (Gray 1977a:11)

This appears to run counter to his assertions in the imperial thesis argument that the Soviet leadership is compelled to attempt to expand their empire and gain a global hegemony because of the internal political and historical factors which are based in turn on the geographical determinist view of Soviet History that Gray takes on board from Pipes. "Many Western commentators have yet to understand that "the Soviet threat" in the 1980s flows from the dynamics of empire, from geopolitics - and fundamentally from weakness" (Gray 1981a:14). Here as also in Pipes (1984), Geopolitics is used in its determining sense,
not simply as a meta framework for policy.

This is an extension of the determinist framework to encompass the whole globe. Geopolitics is defined clearly here as the only legitimate perspective from which to view the matter of the Soviet Union. It operates to delegitimise other perspectives because it claims to be the only perspective that can accommodate all the factors that are essential to understanding the global situation. The Geopolitical view is the view of the long term, permanent operating factors in international politics, and hence is the only legitimate perspective to base policy decisions upon.

Gray implies that the Soviet Union is compelled by the geopolitics of its empire to expand, the West has policy choices. Except of course the argument is thus phrased in terms of a choice to acquiesce to the Soviet expansion or to resist it. This restores consistency to his argument in that there is nothing determined about whether the Soviet expansionist drive will succeed, all that is determined is that it will occur. Thus the Western leaders must understand Geopolitics to understand the Soviet threat. Geopolitics doesn't determine the West's response, just the Soviet challenge. Gray has it all ways, Geopolitics determines when it is convenient for his scheme for it to do so, it is a framework for understanding the long run development of events when it relates to the West. Thus the term covers multiple meanings articulated to lead to one particular policy response, that of military buildup and military
containment of the Heartland power.

Sustained over a long period Geopolitical containment can break the momentum of Soviet expansion and then, and only then, will real change come to the Heartland. Here is the essential link of the classic Geopolitical texts to the CPD scheme. The USSR is destined by geography to expand, the oceanic alliance, if it is to survive has to intervene in the Rimlands to prevent this expansion. This intervention is understood as military containment, a spatial exercise in limiting the spread of influence, power is spatially understood. To militarily contain requires a plethora of nuclear weapons and other military hardware to make the threat of intervention militarily credible. As the next chapter explains, this requires sufficient numbers of weapons to ensure that the U.S. will not be self deterred in a crisis.
10.1 THE CPD AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The containment of the Heartland power, seen as essential to the survival of the U.S. in the CPD texts reviewed in chapter 8, and in a more theoretical manner in Colin Gray's writings in chapter 9, requires a massive military capability for intervention in the Rimlands. Here the theme of containment links to militarism. In the CPD discourse, as in the arguments of NSC68, containment is a military matter, a matter of using military force to spatially limit the (spatial) extension of the Soviet Union.

The "present danger" involves the reduction of U.S. forces relative to the Soviet forces to such a degree that the Soviets could take over the Rimlands, and the U.S., with its strategic nuclear arsenal limited by SALT, would be unable to exert military force to compell the Soviet Union to withdraw. This "compellance function" requires a U.S. strategic superiority to support any U.S. military intervention in the Rimlands. The CPD thus link Geopolitics directly to Strategy in their vehement rejection of the SALT II treaty. This articulation is often overlooked in the strategic arguments concerning arms control, which focus on numerical comparisons and technical considerations.
As discussed in the last two chapters, this is why the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops in Africa is viewed with such alarm, their presence there is presented as nearly irrevocable, bringing with it a military threat to the U.S. in terms of a threat to the Middle East oil supplies and the minerals in Africa, but more importantly, in the CPD estimation, challenging U.S. military credibility as an agent of containment. Without this credibility, the CPD argues, the U.S. will be gradually forced to retreat in a series of crises. The CPD argued that the Soviet negotiating posture in SALT was merely an attempt to negotiate unilateral advantages in crucial weapons systems, in particular "heavy" ICBM's with their potential to carry numerous warheads on a single missile.

The Geopolitical perspective discussed in the last two chapters is here linked to the strategic discourse; in particular to the debates over Soviet strategic doctrine, which supposedly revealed the intentions behind their SALT negotiating positions. Thus military supremacy is seen, in particular by Pipes, as the key to Soviet geopolitical expansion; their military doctrine focuses on the use of military threat to achieve political gains, if necessary they are prepared to fight a nuclear war to achieve their goal of global domination.

The CPD based a considerable amount of its campaign on detailed criticism of the SALT process and in particular the Vladivostok accords and the subsequent SALT II agreement negotiated by the Carter administration. In July 1977, they
released the first in a series of statements that dealt directly with the SALT negotiating process. "Where We Stand on SALT" argues that the U.S. and the USSR have differing objectives in the SALT process, the U.S. position being to use the SALT process to "reduce the weight of nuclear weapons in the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union" (CPD 1984:16).

Specifically the CPD argues that agreements were designed to assure that both sides have "essential equivalence in nuclear capabilities" and that neither side could hope to gain more than it would lose by striking first. "The U.S. hoped to slow down the brutal momentum of the massive Soviet strategic arms buildup -- a buildup without precedent in history." (CPD 1984:17). Thus we are told that the U.S. has restrained its research, development and deployment of weapons, a move not matched by the Soviets. Thus the Soviets are using SALT as a means of "impeding the adversary's momentum while maintaining its own" (CPD 1984:17).

In addition the USSR is charged with trying "to use public opinion and Congressional pressure to induce Washington to agree to unequal compromises unfavourable to the United States" (CPD 1984:17). Horror of horrors, the Soviets are trying to pressure Congress into usurping the powers of the National Security managers!! Thus an additional factor "of some value to the

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1 As Cervasi (1986) makes quite clear, the precedent that is an appropriate analogy in numerical terms is the U.S. buildup of strategic weapons a decade earlier.
Soviet Union is the unrealistic level of expectations stirred by the optimistic statements of successive U.S. administrations. Inevitably, SALT has become enmeshed in domestic politics and popular hopes for detente, and "progress" has seemed a political imperative (CPD 1984:17).

The final part of this argument is that the USSR was under no time pressure to come to any agreement because it was using SALT to limit U.S. developments while it continued to develop and deploy its new missiles. Finally, "the Soviet side ignored the U.S. interpretation of their ambiguities and stretched the agreed language to its full limits or beyond" (CPD 1984:17). More specifically "The Soviet view is that the best deterrent is the capability to fight and win a nuclear war -- and survive in the process. It is our task to deny them that capability" (CPD 1984:21).

Three broad themes are interrelated here. First is the basic denial that the USSR was taking arms control and detente seriously. This relates more directly to material covered in chapter 8 above, but the buildup of their strategic rocket forces is repeatedly brought to the forefront of discussion. Evidence of this comes from the period of the Team B process when the CIA revised its estimates of Soviet defence expenditure sharply upwards. During this period concern grew that the USSR was also building a large and effective civil defence system (Goure 1976). This was of particular concern to Paul Nitze, whose assistant T.K. Jones specialised in the area.
The second theme is the non-acceptance in the USSR of U.S. concepts of war deterrence; specifically the argument is made that the USSR believes in the possibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war. The key article that triggered a wide public debate in the strategic and policy communities is Richard Pipes' "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War" published in *Commentary* in 1977. In this article Pipes argues that nuclear war fighting is part of the Soviet global strategy for world domination.

Third, both these themes require an American response in terms of nuclear strategy. This chapter elaborates the first two of these themes. It outlines Pipes' concerns over Soviet nuclear strategy and the questions raised by Nitze in terms of how the U.S. should respond. Both of these arguments are widely prevalent in many CPD statements. These are also referred to in this chapter, but the details of the resultant "theory of victory" drawn up by Gray are held over to chapter 11.

Although Nitze introduced them early, in particular in his paper "Deterring our Deterrent" published in *Foreign Policy*, Colin Gray is a key figure in spreading ideas of new strategic departures, in particular in his theory of victory (1979a). In this theory Gray develops a series of arguments that suggest how the U.S. can deny the Soviet Union any plausible theory of victory in a nuclear war. As will be shown in the next chapter, the key to Gray's theory lies with his conceptions of Geopolitics and the "imperial thesis" derived from his
Geopolitical writings and Pipes' theory of the patrimonial nature of the Soviet system. Here Gray pulls together the themes of each of the security discourses.

The nuclear strategy arguments provide the direct rationales for the Reagan administration's massive strategic weapons procurement policy (Knelman 1985) and the complete lack of progress in arms control negotiations in its first term of office (Talbott 1985). This dissertation demonstrates that a more comprehensive understanding of these debates requires the articulation of each of the security discourses together to show how they interconnect and support each other.

10.2 SOVIET NUCLEAR WAR FIGHTING STRATEGY

The theme of the importance of understanding Soviet military doctrine is present in many places in the CPD literature. In "Is America Becoming Number 2? (released 5 October 1978) the CPD argues that an understanding of "Soviet Military Doctrine" is essential to the wider appreciation of the military balance. "The Soviet literature -- not propaganda written for the West but Russians talking to Russians -- tells us that the Soviets do not agree with the Americans that nuclear war is unthinkable and unwinnable and that the only objective of strategic doctrine must be mutual deterrence" (CPD 1984:42). It goes on to argue that they see that "war is an extension of diplomacy; that nuclear superiority is politically usable and that the Soviets must prepare for war fighting, war surviving and war winning"
Soviet strategy, the CPD argues, calls for a preemptive nuclear strike in the event of preparation of a nuclear attack by the "imperialists" in the West, followed up immediately by a land offensive by conventional forces, presumably principally in Europe, although this is not specified. "They believe the best deterrent is the capability to win and survive were deterrence to fail" (CPD 1984:42). The CPD goes on to argue that the Soviets recognise that nuclear war would be awfully destructive, but using nuclear weapons is not "unthinkable" to them.

Nevertheless, the doctrine described above is that of a nation that does not rely solely upon the theory of deterrence. The crucial difference from a common U.S. approach lies in the Soviet recognition that deterrence might not succeed and that the Soviet Union must be prepared to fight, survive and win, even in a nuclear conflict.

(CPD 1984:42)

Further the CPD argues that Soviet doctrine affirms the importance of defence in a nuclear war, in contrast to Americans who see them as destabilising. Thus we are assured that the USSR only signed the ABM treaty in 1972 because the U.S. had a long technological lead, not because the USSR had been converted "to the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the mutual hostage theory" (CPD 1984:42). We are told that the Soviet Union has maintained its research and development program in the field of ballistic missile defence "with apparent emphasis on systems that would be rapidly deployable should they, or we, decide to abrogate the ABM treaty" (CPD 1984:43).
Their strategic nuclear weapons compliment these developments, by "moving toward a counterforce damage limiting capability" which involves improving the accuracy on their large ICBMs to "permit high confidence in "hard target kills" against U.S. ICBM silos" (CPD 1984:43). In other words they are developing the technology to inflict a first strike on the U.S. ICBM force. The consequences of such a situation are the major concern of a number of Paul Nitze's papers as well as his contribution to the CPD. But it was Richard Pipes who provided the crucial article where these themes were most explicitly stated. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it can Fight and Win a Nuclear War" (Pipes 1977) was crucial to the public debate about SALT II and the emergence of the Nuclear Utilisation Theories (NUTS) debate in the strategic literature.

Pipes is important because he clearly states the "Clausewitzian" position on Soviet military doctrine. He effectively argues that nuclear war is the continuation of the Soviet Union's policy of global domination by nuclear means. His strategic arguments are thus a continuation of his earlier papers on the essential expansionist and militarist tendencies in the Soviet Union, and the essential interlinkage between the two.

In Pipes' estimate, drawn from his then recent work with Team B (see chapter 5), the Soviet Union is aiming at achieving a nuclear superiority which will effectively paralyse American
political actions in the 1980s.\footnote{This is in the long tradition of the "worst case" analyses of American strategic thinking (MccGwire 1985-6). In the late 1940s the "Dropshot" plan for nuclear war with the Soviet Union anticipated a Soviet offensive in 1957 (Cave Brown 1978), a little later the NSC68 document anticipated Soviet superiority in the mid 1950s. The RAND vulnerability studies and the subsequent Gaither committee investigations (Halperin 1961) also followed the pattern of suggesting an imminent Soviet nuclear superiority (Freedman 1986). Gray (1981a) was to repeat and enlarge on this theme later in connection with the "imperial thesis". Subsequently Lee and Staar (1986) have updated this argument suggesting that the period of greatest danger will occur in the 1990s.} Pipes begins, following the pattern of earlier articles, with an analysis of the differences between the U.S. and Soviet doctrines.

The prevalent U.S. doctrine holds that an all-out war between countries in possession of sizable nuclear arsenals would be so destructive as to leave no winner; thus resort to arms has ceased to represent a rational policy option for the leaders of such countries vis-a-vis one another. The classic dictum of Clausewitz, that war is politics pursued by other means, is widely believed in the United States to have lost its validity after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Soviet doctrine, by contrast, emphatically asserts that while an all-out nuclear war would indeed prove extremely destructive to both parties, its outcome would not be mutual suicide: the country better prepared for it and in possession of a superior strategy could win and emerge a viable society. (Pipes 1981:136)

As Pipes puts it, Clausewitz is ignored in the U.S. while he is revered in the USSR.

The differences between the superpower positions are traceable once again to the commercial culture in the U.S. where mistrust of the military professional is combined with "a pervasive conviction ... that human conflicts are at bottom caused by misunderstanding and ought to be resolved by
negotiations rather than by force" (Pipes 1981:137) has mitigated against a serious strategic tradition in the U.S. The historic experience of war has been of quick wars with relatively small loss of life. Once involved in a war the U.S. mobilises its vast industrial resources and wins by the application of tremendous technological capabilities, which inflict tremendous suffering on the enemy.

This "American Way of War" (Weighley 1973) coupled to the rapid demobilisation of the U.S. forces immediately after the Second World War is crucial to understanding the acceptance of the Atomic bomb as a potential war winning weapon immediately after the war. In the 1950s fiscal measures in the U.S. more or less guaranteed its role, it provided the means for a massive retaliation strategy at little cost relative to the alternative of conventional forces. This changed in 1957 with Sputnik which led the way to the acceptance in the U.S. of the doctrine of mutual deterrence, first argued by Bernard Brodie in 1946. This doctrine was worked out by civilian practitioners, not military thinkers. In Pipes' language "Current U.S. strategic theory was thus born of a marriage between the scientist and the accountant. The professional soldier was jilted." (1981:142).

Pipes argues that by absolutizing the atomic bomb, this doctrine argued that all earlier military theory was outmoded. Nuclear wars could not be fought, they had to be avoided. These arguments remain in the literature of nuclear strategy and
influence the U.S. declaratory doctrine.\(^3\) Pipes argues, as Gray was to repeatedly also do, that it is doubtful that this is a strategy in any sense, it fails at precisely the moment when strategy is most needed, at the outbreak of hostilities. All it supposedly offers is the possibility of lashing out blindly in the event of hostilities.

Here is the assumption that American thinking about nuclear war involves beliefs that it is unthinkable and unwinnable. Much of the history of U.S. nuclear strategic thinking is concerned about using nuclear weapons in various limited scenarios, (Freeman 1983) and much of the crucial operational planning, as opposed to declaratory policy, is based on counterforce considerations (Kaku and Axelrod 1987). There are also plans for first strike scenarios (Aldridge 1983, Gervasi 1986), the U.S. has always asserted that should war start in Europe it will use nuclear weapons to prevent Soviet conventional attacks succeeding, this is the basis of the NATO reliance on the U.S. nuclear "umbrella". Pipes has effectively ignored the operational planning of American strategic forces by conflating political discussions of MAD with operational planning.

\(^3\) Although not its operational planning, a crucial point Pipes is not clear on. Declatory doctrine is not concerned with the nuts and bolts operational planning. The policy of assured destruction was, in part, introduced in the 1960s by McNamara to attempt to restrict the huge expansion plans of the U.S. strategic forces. As Gray makes clear (see next chapter) the U.S. operational planning on counter economic (counter value) targets is partly based on these premises, but Pipes' argument is a gross oversimplification.
For Pipes the sources of the differences in thinking are
deeper, related to the differing conceptions of the nature of
contlict in both societies and the different functions that the
military performs in both societies. This returns us to the
argument (see chapter 7) about the peasant background of the
Soviet leadership, and the marriage between Marxism and
Clausewitz, in comparison to the commercial middle class
approach in the U.S. The Soviet leadership regards violence and
conflict as "natural regulators of all human affairs: wars
between nations, in its view, represent only a variant of wars
between the classes, recourse to the one or the other being
dependent on circumstances" (Pipes 1981:147).

In Pipes' reconstruction of Soviet strategic thought, the
initial Soviet reaction to the Atomic bomb was that it had not
significantly altered the science of warfare or rendered
obselete the principles that the Soviet Union used to defeat the
Wehrmacht.

These basic laws, known as the five "constant
principles" that win wars, had been formulated by Stalin
in 1942. They were, in declining order of importance:

As an example of the differences, Pipes points to a comparison
between a leading American commentator on war, Melvin Laird, who
provides a four fold division of war based on what Pipes calls
engineering criteria, which relates to the scale and technology
used, and a fourfold classification of war by Marshal Grechko in
the USSR, who relies on sociopolitical criteria to develop a
typology all of which are variations on the overarching conflict
between capitalism and communism. (The reference is apparently
to Laird (1972:9), Pipes does not provide a citation. Melvin
Laird was secretary of defence in the Nixon administration.)
Pipes argues that U.S. middle class intellectuals are simply
incapable of assimilating this type of mentality, although he
attempts an explication of Soviet Nuclear doctrine for their
benefit nonetheless!

338
"stability of the home front," followed by morale of the armed forces, quantity and quality of the divisions, military equipment, and finally, ability of the commanders. There was no such thing as an "absolute weapon" -- weapons altogether occupied a subordinate place in warfare; defence against atomic bombs was entirely possible. (Pipes 1981:152)

He asserts that the strategic guidelines that were formulated late in the 1950s following a brief interregnum in the post Stalin years remain the overall framework for Soviet strategic planning. Pipes takes Sokolovskii's (1963) edited volume, titled in translation Military Strategy, to be the key Soviet strategic text. Pipes argues that Western strategists have ignored this work and others because of the presumed superiority of American strategy.

As argued above in chapter 7, Pipes thinks that the military is the one winning weapon in the Soviet system. In addition here Pipes points out that a strong military force, offers the possibility of expansion and also ensures domestic tranquillity. If the omnipotence of the Red Army were ever called into serious question then the whole legitimacy of the regime would be open to challenge. Thus there are compelling political reasons for the USSR to maintain and expand its military forces.

Along with this must go a credible doctrine which offers the Red Army a role in any potential conflict other than as a target for nuclear annihilation. Its social role requires this and hence some theory of nuclear war-fighting is essential. The novelty of nuclear weapons is in the speed with which they can
accomplish what previously took sustained sequential tactical and operational actions. Nuclear weapons can now obtain strategic results immediately. Their destructiveness is not a matter of great concern in Pipes' view.

In one of his statements on this theme which was to subsequently cause outrage (Scheer 1983), he summarises the argument thus:

The novelty of nuclear weapons consists not in their destructiveness -- that is, after all, a matter of degree, and a country like the Soviet Union which, as Soviet generals proudly boast, suffered in World War II the loss of over 20 million casualties, as well as the destruction of 1,710 towns, over 70,000 villages, and some 32,600 industrial establishments to win the war and emerge as a global power, is not to be intimidated by the prospect of destruction. (Pipes 1981:156)

In case there is any doubt, Pipes quotes the following "Clausewitzian" argument from Sokolovskii: "It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and armament" (Pipes 1981:156). Thus nuclear war is not suicidal, it can be fought and won, the exact opposite, he argues, of the current doctrinal position in the U.S.

Pipes comments, as does the CPD (1984:42) quoted at the beginning of this section, that what literature comes from the Soviet Union on the impossibility of winning a nuclear war is intended solely for Western consumption, it does not reflect official thinking. This distinction relates to Pipes' totalitarian assumptions of complete control of information by a
centralised elite. The distinction between what the Soviets write for themselves and foreigners is a neat move to exclude all counter arguments. Again the totalitarian move excludes all contradiction, all Soviet statements that do not agree with Pipes' position are dismissed from consideration by relegating them to propaganda.

Pipes continues from here arguing that the Soviet doctrine calls not only for the defeat of the enemy but his destruction. Their nuclear doctrine calls for prompt and massive nuclear attack at the beginning of a war. "Limited nuclear war, flexible response, escalation, damage limiting, and all the other numerous refinements of U.S. strategic doctrine find no place in its Soviet counterpart" (Pipes 1981:158). Specifically, their doctrine consists of five key elements:

1. Preemption.
The Soviet Union learned the costs of passive defence by its losses in 1941 when attacked in an unmobilised state by the Nazis. The importance of surprise is not lost on them. In nuclear terms with ICBM flight times of thirty minutes, preemption means firing first to prevent the other side using its weapons. The USSR claims it would never attack first, but would attack preemptively if it concluded that an attack against it was imminent. All this requires a high state of combat readiness, there is no possibility of mobilisation in a nuclear war, forces will fight where they are, with what equipment they have at hand.
2. Quantitative Superiority.
The more the better seems to be the Soviet approach to nuclear weapons. This is based on the premise in their planning that despite the speed at which the initial strikes are likely to occur a major war would take months to conclude, a large supply of weapons would be useful in these conditions of prolonged conflict. It also provides a useful counter to the technical instabilities introduced by MIRVing ICBMs. Their large ICBMs with many warheads are also useful for a potential anti silo counterforce strike.

3. Counterforce Targeting.
The Soviet doctrine has, in part Pipes argues, as a result of close study of the post war strategic bombing studies in Japan and Germany which U.S. strategists have ignored, never given much emphasis to countervalue targeting, preferring to emphasise the destruction of the enemy's military forces, its ability to wage war. This is in contrast to the U.S. declatory policy of retaliatory counter value targeting.

The long war view of superpower conflict requires that the Soviet Union have non-nuclear naval, air and ground forces to follow up the initial nuclear attack, to take control of areas including Western Europe in the aftermath of the initial nuclear exchange, and to destroy the remains of the navies and merchant fleets of the U.S. and other adversaries, to prevent their use against the USSR.
5. Defence.
In contrast to the U.S. notion that no meaningful civil defence is possible the USSR has developed a sophisticated air defence system and civil defence preparations are taken seriously. The ABM treaty was only agreed to because the Soviets were having serious technical problems and they were afraid that the U.S. would gain a tremendous lead in the necessary technology. Pipes reiterates his assumptions that the USSR would be prepared to risk millions of casualties, on the basis of its historical experience.

In conclusion Pipes argues that the differences in doctrine are significant, but that "The point lies not in our ability to wreak total destruction: it lies in intent. And insofar as military doctrine is indicative of intent, what the Russians think to do with their nuclear arsenal is a matter of utmost importance that calls for close scrutiny" (Pipes 1981:167). Pipes' scrutiny of these matters, from his totalitarian perspective, has led him to conclude that the Soviet Union is not likely to forgo the chance to achieve global preeminence by nuclear war if it is presented. The implication of his position is the CPD concern that without a U.S. awareness of Soviet doctrine, the U.S. will underestimate the threat, finding itself at best, intimidated in a series crisis confrontations with the USSR, at worst, defeated by a surprise counterforce nuclear attack.
10.3 SOVIETOLOGY AND STRATEGY

The totalitarian Sovietological discourse is essential to Pipes' approach to strategic matters, it provides the key discursive move to his whole position. While critics of nuclear warfighting strategies have demolished the empirical and interpretative claims of Pipes and Gray, the articulation of totalitarian Sovietology with strategic matters has been substantially ignored. As this dissertation repeatedly reiterates, it is the articulation of the security discourses that explains the CPD position. Here we see how Pipes' Sovietology leads him and the CPD to their position on Soviet warfighting strategies.

In the patrimonial interpretation, the Soviet Union is expansionist, militarist and totalitarian in the sense that all aspects of society are regulated by the central government. Because the Soviet Union is defined as a monolith, it follows that learned military journals will produce the central line of official policy. Hence when officers discuss military operations in their journals this can be interpreted as statement of political intention. Because of the monolithic assumption there is no distinction here between the institutional requirements that officer corps discuss military eventualities and the actual intentions of political leaders.

In the subsequent "Gartoff-Pipes debate" in Strategic Review Garthoff (1982b) has charged Pipes with repeated misuse of evidence, selective quotation and failure to consider material
in its historical context. These arguments (see also Weeks 1983), although directed at Pipes' later (1982) criticism of Garthoff's (1978, 1982a) position, are apposite here too. But rather than rehearse these empirical inaccuracies in detail, what is important to emphasise here is how Pipes' overall conception of the Soviet system, as Patrimonial and totalitarian, leads to the interpretation of Soviet strategy as deliberately developing the capabilities to intimidate the West. Alternative interpretations, relying on more complex political analyses, are delegitimised by the discursive practices of Sovietology and Pipes' "historical method". The totalitarian interpretation of Sovietology thus provides Pipes with the Soviet theory of nuclear warfighting. This articulation is essential, although rarely understood.

The critics of these simplistic interpretations rely on a more complex sociological understanding of the Soviet Union. As Holloway (1983) and McCGwire (1987a) make clear, there are major institutional differences within the armed services, and the relative importance of the various tasks assigned to different services has varied considerably in the last few decades. Serious political debates have occurred in the military press and scholarly journals on these issues with each service staking out its respective position. An analysis of selected writings which neglects either these debates or the historical evolution of the overall strategic discussions about nuclear war is inadequate.
In particular, the assumption that a major war would inevitably escalate to a nuclear exchange is, MccGwire (1987a) argues, no longer held in Moscow. However Pipes (1977) and Douglass and Hoeber (1979) show no recognition of this change in doctrine which MccGwire dates to the mid 1960s, although more sophisticated contemporaneous analyses were aware of nuances and changes in Soviet positions (Ermath 1978, Garthoff 1978). Pipes, as well as Douglas and Hoeber (1979), rely on documents from the 1960s and assume a continuity ever since. Pipes (1981:153) argues that the "war winning doctrine" which was in force in the 1970s was developed in the 1955-7 period. In a totalitarian system the assumption is of very long term planning and little change therefore it is a fair assumption. Pipes argues that statements that nuclear war would be suicidal were only intended for export to the West but not taken seriously in Russia (1981:158).

In a continuation of this line of argument the obvious silences and changes in the materials published in the USSR in the 1970s from the 1960s line is subsequently attributed by Lee and Staar (1986) to a Soviet disinformation effort to confuse Western scholars and military analysts as to the facts that their war winning strategy remained intact. While this may "flout common sense" (MccGwire 1987a:359) it is entirely consistent with the CPD "common sense" totalitarian interpretation of the Soviet Union as a society where everything is controlled and manipulated by the ruling Politburo. Thus the
Soviet Union could supposedly orchestrate all military publications to lull the West into complacency and an acceptance of SALT, a move which would ultimately constrain U.S. weapons in ways that guaranteed Soviet nuclear supremacy. Thus internal bureaucratic dynamics and audiences can be ignored in the analysis of the Soviet texts. Subsequently, the Soviets have admitted that Sokolovskii (1963), in particular, is outdated (McCGwire 1987a:358).

The Patrimonial/totalitarian assumptions of Pipes' analysis also lead to the assumption of an aggressive use of military power to promote Soviet expansion, nuclear weapons are just another tool of totalitarian empire building. What is important here is the assumption by Pipes that being Russian is more important than being Marxist. The implications of this are fundamental to the analysis of Soviet military positions, Pipes is led to his position by the assertion of long term continuity in Russian history.

The alternative position is one that argues that the Soviets are convinced that capitalism as a social system is doomed to be transcended by a socialist system. Thus so long as the Soviet Union maintains a strong defence, so that imperialist capitalism in its death throes does not attempt to eradicate socialism in a war, in a last attempt to save itself, then socialism will triumph. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union will play a leading role in the new global political arrangements, ones that will occur without the use of nuclear war fighting strategies by
the Red Army's strategic rocket forces. The implications of this understanding are diametrically opposite to Pipes' views. This dissertation cannot further explore this theme, what is of crucial importance to the argument here is the consequences of Pipes' patrimonial "historical" analysis that leads to a position that the Soviet Union has to expand, the risks of nuclear war are merely another obstacle in its historical bid for domination.

But Pipes does not argue that the Soviet Union intends to fight a nuclear war. This bid for domination involves the building of a massive ICBM force and in the CPD literature this is interpreted unambiguously as an attempt to gain such a nuclear supremacy that any American consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in a contest over the Rimlands would be self deterred in the face of Soviet supremacy. This connection between Geopolitics and strategy is the focus of many of the CPD texts and in particular the writings of Paul Nitze.

10.4 PAUL NITZE: GEOPOLITICS, STRATEGY AND SALT

Paul Nitze was not alone among the CPD authors to criticise the SALT process, but having been intimately involved in the process for years under the Nixon administration, his voice carried authority. Rostow (1979) wrote against SALT II and Gray has produced a stream of critical articles on the process (1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1976b, 1976c, 1977c, 1977d, 1979c, 1979d, 1980b) but Nitze succinctly summarises the case, and his contribution
on this theme is particularly important given his position as chair of policy studies for the committee. 5

Following his resignation from the SALT process in mid 1974 Nitze wrote a series of articles outlining his criticism of the details of the process (Nitze 1974-5, 1975, 1976, 1976-7). In these we can trace clearly the strategic concerns that motivated the CPD. Nitze subsequently wrote a series of technical briefing papers for the CPD on SALT II outlining his ideas and updating them as new proposals came to light. As chairman of policy studies for the committee, Nitze had a central role in its deliberations and provided expertise in the drafting of the policy statements.

Paul Nitze, presented the kernel of his arguments in his discussion, as part of a CPD panel at the Foreign Policy Association meeting in March 1978. Here he outlined the problems of SALT and argued that the Soviets were gaining a tremendous

5 While Paul Nitze was involved in the SALT negotiating process in the Nixon administration his technical assistant was T.K. Jones, who subsequently joined Nitze in the Reagan administration. As Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineering, Jones became famous for his statement on civil defence that "...if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it" (Scheer 1983:18). Nitze first became involved in matters of the capabilities of nuclear weapons and the possibilities of civil defence when he visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki as vice chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey after the war (Rearden 1984). Their relationship is important, because T.K.-Jones is the author of a number of technical studies that purport to show that the Soviet Union has a massive civil defence program (for a published summary see Jones and Thompson 1978), a position which is important in the assumption that they seriously plan for a nuclear war fighting capability. Nitze bases his estimates in a number of places on Jones' calculations.
superiority in strategic nuclear potential measured in terms of prompt countermilitary potential and megatonnage, seen as "the best index of population vulnerability to fallout" (CPD 1984:27). He went on to argue that nuclear superiority was crucial in international confrontations with the USSR, contrary to many arguments that it was irrelevant. Here the link between Geopolitics and the nuclear strategy is restated bluntly.

To those who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, the last and key judgement in this chain of reasoning -- that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences -- comes as quite a shock. In the Berlin crisis of 1961 our tactical theatre position was clearly unfavourable; we relied entirely on our strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khruschev's ultimatum. In the Cuban crisis the Soviet Union faced a position of both theatre inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theatre and the strategic nuclear balances were roughly equal; both sides compromised. (CPD 1984:28)

In the following paragraph, we see these roots of the CPD strategic view once again as Nitze argues that it "is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect international politics and diplomacy from a consideration of the underlying balance of the real factors of power. The nuclear balance is, of course, only one element in the overall power balance" (CPD 1984:28). Then, in the light of the quote above, Nitze makes the following statement which reveals the key to the whole ideological position of the CPD. "But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence -- military, economic, or political -- rest. Can we be confident
that there is not at least a measure of validity to that viewpoint?" (CPD 1984:28).

Nitze has made it abundantly clear that he does subscribe wholeheartedly to this viewpoint. Nitze believes the Soviet view, or rather his creation of the Soviet viewpoint. The contradiction is obvious. They are evil, but we better share their understanding of interests and power as ultimately sought by any methods. Such are the canons of Realism coupled to Geopolitical thinking and this logic is where it leads. We had better arm ourselves to counter this threat, and start seeing the world as ultimately being about means. Once again, the contradictions between the axiological and praxeological definitions of Otherness, first discussed in chapter 6, appear.

These ideas are clearly laid out in greater detail in Nitze's published articles. In Foreign Affairs in 1976 he contended that the SALT process was failing to accomplish its avowed goals, at least from the American perspective. Specifically if failed to assure strategic stability.

On the contrary, there is every prospect that under the terms of the SALT agreements the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitative but designed to produce a theoretical warwinning capability. Further, there is a major risk that, if such a condition were achieved, the Soviet Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would undermine the present detente situation, with results that could only resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation or, alternatively, increase the prospect of Soviet expansion through other means of pressure. (Nitze 1976:207)

This theme, as seen above, was to become a familiar refrain in
Nitze (1976) traces the origins of detente to the Chinese fears of the Soviet military buildup in the period of the late 1960s and their consequent approaches to the U.S. in search of a counterweight to the Soviet buildup. In response to all this the USSR moved to a policy of "detente" to limit the U.S. support for China, and which involved a series of agreements including the 1972 SALT I, ABM and Interim agreements and the 1973 "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union" and subsequent documents. In parallel with Rostow (1976), (see chapter 8) Nitze argues that these agreements had no effect on restraining Soviet involvement in the Middle East, where they encouraged the initiation of hostilities and then threatened to intervene in the Yom Kippur war when the Egyptians were losing, and in South East Asia, where the USSR helped the Vietnamese violate the Paris accords. All this assumes very considerable control by the Soviet Union over its "proxies" in the Third World.

In addition he cites a number of Soviet writers who boasted of the favourable shifts in the correlation of forces in the early 1970s made possible by the policies of detente and the arrival of nuclear parity. Nitze concludes that detente is no different from peaceful coexistence, in other words there has been no shift in basic Soviet intentions. He further argues that a clear indication of their seriousness should be visible in the negotiation process on strategic weapons, if they are serious
then they will move towards a stabilising posture, if not they will follow other strategies in the negotiations.

He argues that the USSR spends up to a billion dollars per annum in civil defence planning, showing a serious appreciation of the possibility of nuclear war. Like most other analysts Nitze argues that, after the Cuban crisis in 1962, the Soviets probably concluded that strategic superiority was a crucial factor in superpower confrontation, and commenced a concerted military development program in its aftermath. Thus he concludes, in a slightly less alarmist position than Pipes', that the USSR is striving for a war winning capability as the ultimate deterrent, and having acquired it they would probably use its influence, in a crisis, to promote the global advance of socialism. 6

Nitze presents two graphs which portray a growing Soviet strategic advantage, and he concludes that after 1977 the Soviet Union will increasingly improve its relative position after a counterforce strike against the U.S. forces. This theoretical

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6 The bulk of the rest of his (1976) paper is a rehearsal of the litany of complaints that later formed the technical case on which the CPD rested its case against the subsequent SALT II negotiations in the Carter administration. Specifically Nitze itemises the following: 1. the exclusion of the Backfire bomber, despite its potential use as an intercontinental delivery system, 2. the inclusion or exclusion of cruise missiles issue, 3. verification difficulties, 4. the failure to limit the throw weight of Soviet missiles, 5. the Soviet asymmetrical advantage in air defences. Further concerns include the Soviet civil defence program that Nitze charges has substantially accomplished the same effects as an ABM system. In addition he charges that the Soviets are building new factories in smaller centres thus improving their industrial survivability in a war by increasing and dispersing potential targets.
calculation is the basis for subsequent "window of vulnerability" concerns which were so important in the 1980 election campaign. It also relates to the matter of self-deterrence (Nitze 1976-7), in which the Soviets could threaten a preemptive strike against the U.S. ICBM force which would leave them with a tremendous preponderance of strategic forces after their first strike, and also after a retaliatory U.S. second strike, leaving the U.S. president with few options but capitulation.

The results of this analysis required, according to Nitze, a policy to increase the survivability of the U.S. forces and compensate for the Soviet civil defence program. These include accuracy improvements to compensate for the lack of throw weight in the U.S. arsenal. But he argues that it is necessary to go much further than this and construct a multiple basing mode mobile ICBM. This would remove the potential instability of the current Soviet throwweight advantage by offering too many targets for a possible counterforce strike. With this system in place, the argument went, there is no possible advantage to be gained by firing first and consequently stability is restored. In conclusion Nitze suggests that the Soviets have shown no inclination towards unilateral restraint in their

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7 This was the rationale for the MX missile the development of which the Carter regime debated at length. The MX was to be placed on a "race track" system of multiple protective shelters, hence the acronym MX/MPS. Gray (1980c, 1981d) later provided an extensive argument for the development of this system, but it was abandoned after the findings of the Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (1983) suggested that it was unnecessary.
weapons procurement policies nor have they shown any inclination to abandon a view that strategic superiority is useful in a crisis situation. The implication is simple; if they think that strategic superiority is essential in a crisis then the U.S. had better make sure they do not get it.

The necessary force structures for fighting a nuclear war are clear, they include a counterforce capability that can reduce the enemy's forces by a greater number of weapons than it takes one to accomplish the task, dispersed and protected forces which makes them a difficult counterforce target, reserve forces to threaten the enemy's population and industry, active and passive defensive measures to minimise damage should the enemy respond with a countervalue strike, and finally, the means to preempt if necessary. Nitze argues that the USSR nuclear weapons buildup initiated in the early 1960s seemed designed to fulfil these criteria.

Assessing the force capabilities of the superpower arsenals, Nitze (1976), argues that all indicators are moving against the U.S. and toward Soviet superiority. More seriously he argues that the arrangement is becoming more unstable, in that the relative advantage to the USSR of a first strike is growing. In other words their relative advantage in forces is greater after a first strike against U.S. forces than before a strike. This encourages them to preempt in a crisis, because they would be better off after initiating a counterforce first strike and hence could further intimidate the U.S. into acquiescing to
Nitze then asks if any of it matters, a position that would seem to be the logic of MAD. Thus if the U.S. is still capable of doing "unacceptable damage" to the USSR, principally with its invulnerable submarine based weapons, then no matter how much the relative advantage swings to the USSR's favour they will still not be tempted. But Nitze argues that the Soviet Union's leaders may not assume that the damage will be unacceptable, principally because they have a comprehensive civil defence program which should be capable of limiting the casualties to a few percent of their population.

In this they are helped Nitze argues by the changes in the U.S. arsenal towards smaller more accurate warheads. Thus these weapons in countervalue mode are designed to be airburst for maximum blast damage effects. But this reduces the fallout to the level of relative insignificance (groundbursts produce most fallout) in a situation where civil defence shelters are planned for a large percentage of the population. "The usual assumption that the U.S. possesses a vast population overkill is in essence, without foundation" (Nitze 1976-7:206).

Crucially, all of these considerations are related to the different defence requirements of the superpowers due to their differing Geopolitical positions. Here the notion of extended deterrence is raised although not in those specific terms.

The defence problems of the United States and the Soviet Union are quite different. The United States must be
able to project its power over many thousands of miles to support allied defence structures on lines close to the concentrations of Soviet power. The Soviet basic defensive task is much simpler; that is, to maintain military preponderance on the exterior lines of its relatively compact land mass. (Nitze 1976-7:206)

This also links the possession of the strategic superiority by the Soviet Union to Geopolitics in the Third World where traditionally the U.S. was able to intervene with conventional forces knowing that if it came to a showdown with the USSR its nuclear superiority would ensure that the USSR would back down. He argues that in the context of the USSR building a series of weapons and developing forces capable of "projecting power" that the loss of U.S. strategic superiority implied the removal of the U.S.'s ability to intervene in the Third World in a direct military way with impunity. Indeed he argues that the situation was moving to a position where the USSR would be able to do so. The implication of this is that the U.S. can no longer effectively intervene to support "allied defence structures". This reveals the essential role of nuclear superiority in the whole geopolitical scheme, it provides the assurance that U.S. forces can intervene in the Third World.

But in the strategic logic a decline in nuclear capability would also lead to a position in which the Soviet Union could militarily defeat the U.S. Thus the military position has, or shortly will, even under SALT II, deterioriate to the situation in which the President, in a major crisis in which the USSR launches a counterforce strike, in the absence of a survivable
countervalue, much less counterforce capable arsenal, has to make a decision whether to fire the U.S. ICBM force in a few minutes in a launch under attack situation, or else surrender immediately, without any other option of being able to mount a credible threat to destroy the USSR. In this crucial sense the USSR was in the process of gaining strategic superiority.

This being the case, Nitze argues for an immediate introduction of the B-1 bomber program, and emergency program to build road mobile transporter/launch vehicles for the Minutemen III missiles and the development of the MX in a multiple basing mode. This program could ensure that the Soviets could not preempt in a way that would allow them to survive a countervalue retaliatory strike. Hence the Presidency would have a variety of options available to it, and the USSR would once again be deterred from launching a first strike because it could not gain a military advantage by doing so. This massive buildup would prevent the President from being self deterred in a crisis, and in the event of a Soviet first strike would leave numerous weapons intact to allow a variety of strategic responses.

This is effectively a strategy of victory denial, which in various forms became central to the war fighting strategy debates under the acronym "NUTS" which Gray elaborated in greatest detail. The conclusion of Nitze's argument was that only in terms where the U.S. could credibly guarantee to deny a plausible victory to the USSR would the USSR come to the arms negotiating table with a willingness to make the drastic mutual
cuts in the nuclear arsenals that were the ostensible rationale of the arms negotiation process.

All this assumes a remarkable faith in the technological capabilities of the weapons systems on both sides. While Kaplan (1983) may be only partly correct in his assertion that Nitze has taken the strategic analysis to yet new levels of abstraction, he is assuming that the whole nuclear counterforce strike is a technically feasible operation because one can rationally develop a hypothetical scenario for such an eventuality. In Tonelson's (1979) terms, Nitze's world is one of clarity and crusades; it is not one in which the complex compromises of politics sit comfortably. In the chaos of a wartime situation it is highly unlikely that strikes could be cleanly distinguished between counterforce and countervalue. Whether first strikes could be cleanly executed in a short time span is extremely doubtful, and unknowable in the absence of the possibility of testing the whole procedure.

But the core of the CPD case against SALT II rests on precisely these abstract strategic calculations. This is particularly clear in the CPD's major statement "Is America becoming number 2?" which was released in October 1978. Here the CPD considers a scenario of a Soviet nuclear attack in which their putative superiority in counterforce weapons is used to attack the U.S. ICBM's and airforce bases in a first strike, which leaves the Soviet Union with a larger number of warheads surviving than are present in the remaining U.S. submarines and
aircraft.

The argument then proceeds, in lockstep with Nitze's analysis to suggest that the U.S. president would be forced to either negotiate or retaliate with an attack on Soviet cities, in the knowledge that the Soviets could respond in even greater force on U.S. cities. This is a situation of a Soviet third strike superiority which would come about as a result of a large nuclear superiority. The alternative presented by the CPD is that a U.S. president would have to negotiate in a crisis from a position of weakness and thus gradually be forced to concede to the Soviets their demands.

Under such circumstances, we would be vulnerable to the scenario of a Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse -- a confrontation in which we should have to yield in the face of overwhelming force. A clearly superior Soviet third strike capability, under the assumption of clear Soviet strategic nuclear superiority, would undermine the credibility of our second-strike capacity, and could lead us, either to accommodation without fighting or to the acceptance of unmanagable risks. (CPD 1984:41)

They go on to argue, again following Nitze, that the president should have a series of options in a crisis that prevent him being presented with only the options of "retreat or a nuclear war under grossly unfavourable circumstances".

Thus the "United States must be able to deter military aggression throughout the spectrum of armed conflict with forces appropriate to the threat" (CPD 1984:41). Thus extended deterrence and some form of escalation dominance is called for, in which the U.S. can outmatch the Soviet Union in all spheres
and levels of possible military confrontation. Strategic superiority is directly tied into matters of Geopolitical confrontation, strategic superiority is needed to guarantee that the Soviet Union cannot use nuclear weapons at the local level against U.S. interventions for fear of losing at the theatre or ultimately at the strategic level. Strategy and Geopolitics are mutually interconnected in the CPD's argument.

10.5 SUMMARY

To undertake the strategic force posture that the CPD advocated to simultaneously deal with the Strategic and Geopolitical concerns of extended deterrence requires a massive buildup of weapons and forces right across the spectrum. Thus not only must the buildup be sufficient to avoid the supposed predicament of self deterrence in a central nuclear war; it must also provide the necessary weapons to enable the U.S. to intervene anywhere in the Third World to challenge and effectively militarily defeat either Soviet forces or "proxy" Soviet forces attempting to expand the Soviet's Geopolitical control. These in turn require the ability to deter the Soviets from escalating the conflict to larger levels of destruction in the event of their losing on a local level. This requires nuclear superiority at tactical (battlefield or local) and theatre (regional), in addition to at the strategic (global) level.

Hence what is required is a massive weapons buildup and the creation of forces capable of intervention globally at short
notice. This is precisely what the CPD repeatedly advocated. They were particularly concerned with the SALT process because they thought that it would hamstring the development of new strategic weapons and with that ensure a Soviet "superiority" which would be used to force political concessions from the U.S. and lead to its gradual isolation in world affairs. In particular this lack of U.S. superiority would ensure that the U.S. would have to back down in conflicts over the Middle East and elsewhere where resources essential to the U.S. economy are located.

As Pipes makes clear the CPD did not accept that the Soviet Union was serious in its assertions of the existence of a state of mutual deterrence. Consequently its military objectives were pieced together by analysing Soviet military writings and assuming that the totalitarian regime that dominated the Soviet military was bent on global domination if necessary by the use of nuclear weapons, preferably by the use of proxy forces to expand its Geopolitical influence under the shadow of a nuclear superiority. Hence the need for U.S. weapons to counter the perceived Soviet buildup, weapons that supposedly will remove dangers of the U.S. being self deterred. Here the Strategic, Totalitarian and Geopolitical discourses are linked together in a manner that each supports the case made by the others.

But the strategic arguments do not stop there. Assuming that these weapons are built there is a further requirement for worked out strategies for their use in conflict, and, so the
argument goes, the coordination of these to bring about political defeat of the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. If this can be accomplished, in a way that the Soviets believe to be a credible, then the argument suggests (in a direct rerun of the early 1950s case made by NSC68) that they will believe themselves to be ultimately deterred, and hence incapable of continuing their Geopolitical campaign of expansion. The final step in the argument is that only then will they come to the bargaining table in good faith and negotiate drastic reductions in nuclear arms.

This theme of nuclear strategy brings us to the "theory of victory" associated with Colin Gray. His arguments link the strategic concerns with American self-deterrence with the concern with Soviet Geopolitical expansion, and Pipes' reading of Soviet strategic doctrine. In linking all these themes together we come to the final articulation of the security discourses: the Nuclear Utilisation Theories and Strategies (NUTS), and specifically to Colin Gray's "theory of victory".
11.1 INTRODUCTION

The logic of the security discourses used by the CPD leads inevitably to a consideration of how to fight a nuclear war, to matters of "Nuclear Utilisation Tactics and Strategies (NUTS). This chapter outlines Colin Gray's "theory of victory" in detail because it is the ultimate logic of the CPD position. The theory of victory provides an articulation of all the elements of security discourse that the last four chapters have examined, and is a central theme to the discussion of strategy that provides arguments for the massive nuclear weapons build up of the Reagan administration.

Gray argues that the Soviet Union, being an insecure empire, both because of the nature of its regime, discussed above in the terms of totalitarian Sovietology and the "imperial thesis", and because of its Geopolitical situation with no obvious natural frontiers, may feel compelled to act aggressively and attempt, in a crisis, to export its problems by going to war. Being a Realist he further argues that the state of competition and antagonism between the superpowers is likely to continue and the possibility of war, should deterrence fail, has to be taken seriously. Gray devises a "theory of victory" for the U.S., precisely by defining the Soviet Union in the terms of his imperial thesis. He thus connects Strategy, Geopolitics, Realism
and Sovietology together to argue that nuclear superiority is useful and that it can be used to ensure that the Soviet Union will be defeated in a war. His argument spells out the rationale for building the superiority that the CPD sought in its campaign for massive military expenditures.

The following sections of this chapter review the strategic critiques of Gray's theory, showing how they fail to adequately understand the central theme of Gray's argument which draws on the imperial thesis. This discussion leads into a final overview of the CPD practice of security discourse, and to a summary discussion of the relationship of security, space and Otherness.

11.2 NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND THE THEORY OF VICTORY

The key papers in which the "Theory of Victory" is outlined are in *International Security* (Gray 1979a) and in a more polemically phrased argument coauthored with Keith Payne in *Foreign Policy* (Gray and Payne 1980). These theories have come in for much popular criticism, notably by Robert Scheer (1983), but the strategic argument that they present is less well understood. Rarely does Gray actually argue that nuclear war should be initiated, rather he argues that should deterrence fail, and a major conflict occur then there need to be plans on how to conduct that conflict. He also argues that the force structures of the U.S. forces should be organised in such a way that they are usable and that escalation does not run into the problem of self-deterrence.

In "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory" (1979a) Gray argues that the debate over the recently negotiated SALT II treaty would "cast as much shadow as light because much of the argumentation will avoid reference to truly fundamental issues" (1979a:54). He argues that debates over specific weapons systems and the need for civil defence etc. are reflections over a fundamental disagreement as to what a nuclear strategic posture should be for. The thrust of his paper is to develop a clear argument of what this posture should be and consequently how it should be structured.

He argues that the only effective deterrent which will guarantee Western security is one which denies any possible plausible theory of victory to the other side. Thus in a moment of crisis within the Soviet Union, he argues, the U.S. military posture should be such that there is no way a group of Soviet generals could brief the Politburo on a possible plan of attack.
that could disarm the U.S. in a preemptive strike. The denial of the possibility of a plausible theory of victory to the Soviet military is thus the key in Gray's argument.

The second point is that even if one buys the MAD position, which argues that the mere prospect of a nuclear war is enough to deter any leader from initiating it one still needs a more detailed series of guidelines for force acquisition around the question of how much destruction is enough. Gray's final point in the argument for a coherent strategic position is that nuclear war may occur and that in that event a leader would require that the military planners have a workable war plan ready. In parallel with Pipes' he argues that the doctrine of MAD only works prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Once hostilities commence simply killing people and destroying buildings is not a strategy. "Unless one is willing to endorse the proposition that nuclear deterrence is all bluff, there can be no evading the requirement that the defence community has to design nuclear employment options that a reasonable political leader would not be self-deterred from ever executing, however reluctantly" (Gray 1979a:57).

Much of his argument is a criticism of existing U.S. strategic thinking which he contends fails to think strategy through fully. Gray divides the schools of strategy into the MAD school and the revisionists. The latter argue that the MAD preoccupation has caused the serious failure of strategic thinking that plagues U.S. reasoning on matters of international
politics. This he traces to the abandonment of the notions of damage limitation (counterforce) in favour of the notion of strategic stability providing a strategic statement, in which security was defined in terms of mutual vulnerability and consequently systems of BMD were seen as a destabilising threat of that putative security. Gray, in contrast to Pipes, is careful to point out that operational planning has never reflected the MAD reasoning. Thus Gray's target is arms controllers who argue on the basis of MAD positions and advocate reduced nuclear weapons acquisitions programs, not the operational planners in the Pentagon who develop SIOP options (Pringle and Arkin 1983, Kaku and Axelrod 1987).

The revisionist school, of which Gray is a self declared member argues that the Soviet Union does not appear to accept the logic of the MAD and that the technical posture position on which it was argued has significantly changed. "To state the central concern of this article U.S. official thinking and planning does not embrace the idea that it is necessary to try to effect the defeat of the Soviet Union. First and foremost the Soviet leadership fears defeat, not the suffering of damage -- and defeat... has to entail the forcible demise of the Soviet State" (Gray 1979a:61). Gray then argues once again that the lingering effects of the deterrence through MAD school by focusing on pre-war deterrence have prevented the analysis and preparation of workable operational strategies.

Incredible though it may seem, it has taken the United States' defense community nearly twenty five years to
ask the two most basic questions of all pertaining to nuclear deterrence issues: these are, first, what kinds of threats should have the most deterring effect upon the leadership of the Soviet State? -- and, second, should pre-war deterrence fail, what nuclear employment strategy would it be in the United States' interest actually to implement? (Gray 1979a:62)

The logic to all this is that it is impossible to plan for a war if one has no conception of war aims, without which there can be no guidelines as to what criteria would determine a successful termination of hostilities. Gray argues that this has historically been a problem in the U.S. conduct of war, Vietnam being the classic case of a failure to develop a theory of war conclusion. Relying on strategic assumptions of escalation in response to threat, and without a clear theory of victory the U.S. found itself in a position where defeat was inevitable eventually.

Without a conception of ultimate war aims planning cannot take place for operational strategy, without which force acquisition procedures remain incoherent and inefficient. The MAD position avoids all this by arguing that given the extraordinary destructive power of nuclear weapons and their likely modes of use it is impossible to plan rationally for the fighting of a nuclear war. Gray argues that that assumption is questionable, in that limited uses of forces could be rational and that one may happen anyway and if so some targeting planning will have to be done in advance, and should be so done that it incorporates a specific strategic conception of winning the war.
The Nixon administration's flexible response position, and Schlesinger's pronouncement of flexible targeting options (Richelson 1983) as operational doctrine is not sufficient for Gray. This he argues is obvious given the inadequacy of the weapons systems for countermilitary attacks, and the lack of an overall framework which makes the limited strikes sensible in terms of a theory of war winning which the Soviet Union's leaders would believe as a credible strategy to inflict a defeat on them. The war recovery targeting policies in place are not adequate either, he argues, simply because there is inadequate knowledge as to how the Soviet economy actually works, and consequently it is difficult to devise a credible series of attack scenarios.

Thus he argues that it is impossible to talk convincingly of a counter recovery strategy in the absence of an overall conception of war aims which would determine how much damage was necessary. A counter recovery strategy that was aimed at setting the economy back a decade is obviously very different from one that aims at setting the economy back a couple of generations. But causing extensive economic damage may only lead to retaliation against Western economic targets, and further it may well not succeed in ending the war on terms favourable to the West.

Gray argues that this might well be the case because the Soviet Union, like Czarist Russia, knows that it can absorb an enormous amount of punishment (loss of life, industry, productive agricultural land, and even...
territory), and recover, and endure until final victory -- provided the *essential assets of the state* (original emphasis) remain intact. The principal assets are the political control structure of the highly centralised CPSU and government bureaucracy; the transmission belts of communication from the centre to the regions; the instruments of central official coercion (the KGB and the armed forces); and the reputation of the Soviet state in the eyes of its citizens. Counter-economic targeting should have a place in intelligent U.S. war planning, but only to the extent to which such targeting would impair the functioning of the Soviet State. (Gray 1979a:67-8)

While Gray admits that the problems of dividing the state apparatus from the rest of the society and the economy would be formidable, nonetheless targeting the Soviet Union with the avowed aim of destroying the political apparatus and control mechanisms would at least provide a coherent war aim which would provide a potentially desirable state of affairs in the post war world. While not easy to operationalise, at least a theory of this sort offers some guidelines as to how to plan to fight a war in a way that the Soviet leadership would consider credible, and such a risk to their survival that they would be deterred from initiating a war.

Stated directly, the Soviets should know that if they prosecute a major war against the West they stand to lose *(in their own terms)* (original emphasis). In a conflict over the most important political stakes, our principal war aim should be to effect the demise of the Soviet state: It should not be to kill Soviet postwar economic recovery. (Gray 1979b:10)

This raises the question of precisely what targets would be essential to the strategy of destroying the Soviet state. Gray argues that five key facts are crucial to devising this kind of
a strategy. Each of these is drawn from Richard Pipes' work on Russian history, specifically from *Russia Under the Old Regime* (1974) and "Detente: Moscow's View" (1976) which was reviewed in detail above. Specifically the imperial thesis (section 9-4 above) is crucial.

Thus we are told first that the Soviet peoples have no affection for their political system; second, the colonial peoples within the empire have no love for the Soviet Union; third, the state is very careful with its domestic respect and reputation because it is so fragile; fourth, the overcentralisation of the system suggests that it can be paralysed if the lower levels of political command are severed from the central "brain"; and fifth, the peoples of Eastern Europe are only likely to maintain respect for the Soviet Union so long as its armed forces are not defeated or tied down in a long and interminable war. Thus Gray argues that the war fighting strategy of targeting the Soviet apparatus would, in the context of conflict that could not easily be defined as self defence of Mother Russia, seriously undermine the legitimacy of the system. It would also work to undermine the legitimacy of the regime if it were fighting a war in distant parts, and the domestic devastation were limited to clearly identifiable political targets.

Precisely because the Soviet Union is an empire, without legitimacy in the peripheral areas, it would be vulnerable to this kind of strategy. Because the imperial structure is
essential to the survival of the state, the highest value in the Soviet calculation being the self preservation of the regime, upon which the nomenklatura depends for its power and privilege, then a declaratory policy of attacking the Soviet imperial administrative apparatus, backed by a clear technical ability to do so, offers the U.S. a potentially war winning strategy. Faced with this the Soviets will realise that they face an impossible situation. If they initiate a war they know that their system will not survive it. Hence they will be deterred effectively from initiating hostilities. Further, faced with the longterm impossibility of winning a nuclear confrontation with the U.S. they will finally come to the bargaining table and negotiate a SALT regime that reduces the nuclear threat.

What is crucial to all of this is Gray's amalgamation of the imperial thesis, drawn from Pipes' writing, with the strategic considerations of the 1950s concerning counter force and nuclear war doctrines. Critics of the NUTS positions have not so far, in any detail, incorporated the links between the Geopolitical and specifically the "imperial thesis" formulation of the Geopolitical situation in the Soviet system. This dissertation argues that this interconnection is precisely what is the lynchpin of the whole CPD discourse on the Soviet threat.

While it might be objected that the imperial thesis, while present in "the case for a theory of victory" (1979a) was only elaborated subsequently in Gray's writing, the crucial passage in the 1979 paper does refer to Pipes' analysis of Russian
imperialism. The five key factors that Gray draws on are taken directly from Pipes' formulations, the relevant footnote (1979a:68), refers to these writings as "the imperial thesis". Here the totalitarian thesis, taken for granted as the backdrop of nuclear strategising in the past, is directly inserted into nuclear planning. The key to Gray's theory of victory thus resides on Pipes' interpretation of Russian history. If this view is fundamentally flawed and oversimplistic, as argued in chapter 9, then the theoretical basis for the nuclear strategy that Gray argues is likewise flawed.

The crucial critique of the MAD position is also rehearsed in this paper. In this line of argument mutually assured destruction self deters because if conflict did develop, there would be no way in which the U.S. could initiate the use of nuclear weapons if the logical consequence was the certain destruction of American cities. If the strategic forces are poised to strike at Russian cities in the event of a nuclear war, then the only option facing a U.S. president is the initiation of genocide.

Reliance on some version of this deterrence through punishment line and the reduction of strategy to numerical interactions between isolated missile fields considered in the

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1 Gray's later elaborations of the theory of victory theme in terms of a prevailing strategy (Gray 1984a, 1984b) were written subsequent to his own "imperial thesis" articles (Gray 1981a, 1982a, Strode and Gray 1981). Hence there is no problem with drawing the connections directly between the imperial thesis and the later prevailing strategy arguments.
abstract is partly responsible in Gray's estimation for the focus on essential equivalence as the cornerstone of the SALT II negotiating position. In Gray's line of argument, following Nitze's analysis, mutually assured destruction self deters because if a conflict did develop, there would be no way in which the U.S. could initiate the use of nuclear weapons if the logical consequence was the certain destruction of American cities. If the strategic forces are poised to strike at Russian cities in the event of a nuclear war, then the only option facing a U.S. president is the initiation of genocide. Thus the MAD posture, and also an only partly thought through revisionist position focusing on targeting the Soviet command structure, leaves huge holes in the logic of a war fighting strategy.

The key villain in the piece is, according to Gray, the concept of stability (see also Gray 1980c) which, he argues, was premised on a serious mis-reading of the Soviet system and its goals. This refers to the criticism of the U.S. policy makers of detente in assuming that the Soviets are serious in their pursuit of detente policies discussed in chapter 8. Thus the policies of the U.S. in the late 1960s and 1970s have provided a situation in which the USSR will have a strategic superiority in the 1980s. This, in part, was premised on the concern that, in developing a large arsenal of counterforce capable weapons that would threaten the other side's retaliatory capabilities, one would increase the incentives to go first in a crisis, to prevent being caught on the ground and disabled by the other
side's forces. But Gray argues that because of unilateral U.S. restraint the U.S. is now vulnerable to just this danger.

The discussion of counter military strategies brings Gray back to his earlier arguments about the fragility of the Soviet empire and here he offers a clear statement of how the strategic targeting suggested above might fit into the larger political and military scheme of a global conflict.

A theory of victory over the Soviet Union can be only partially military in character -- the more important part is political. The United States and its allies probably should not aim at achieving the military defeat of the Soviet Union, considered as a unified whole; instead, it should seek to impose such military stalemate and defeat as is needed to persuade disaffected Warsaw Pact allies and ethnic minorities inside the Soviet Union that they can assert their own values in very active political ways. (Gray 1979a:80)

The implications of this are directly linked to the assumptions of the possibility of a limited nuclear war being possible and of course to the assumption that in these circumstances the USSR could not escalate to a full scale nuclear war. But also if the U.S. escalated there might be no possibility of political victory. "It is possible that a heavily counter-military focused SIOP might have the same insensitivity to Soviet domestic fragilities as may be found in the counter-economic recovery orientation of the 1970s" (Gray 1979a:80). But, and here again there is a notion of limited warfare in the background, "With a clear war aim -- to encourage the dissolution of the Soviet state -- much of the military war might not need to be fought at all" (Gray 1979a:80). Gray's
repeated criticism of the failure of the U.S. strategic community to think things through in political as opposed to purely military terms is again operating here.

The final section of the "theory of victory" points to the need for defence as a means of reducing the dangers of self-deterrence. Gray concludes that the U.S. has done itself a disservice in failing to protect its societal assets in terms of a BMD system and civil defence preparations which, he argues, the Soviet Union has developed. The U.S.'s greatest asset is its ability to mobilise its industrial potential to defeat the USSR, but without a BMD system such possibilities are likely to be denied. Anticipating the subsequent debate about SDI and the so called "defence transition" (Gray 1984c, 1985a, 1986a, Payne and Gray 1984) he argues that the balance between strategic defence and offence has to be rectified because "If escalation discipline is to be imposed upon the Soviet Union, even in the direst of situations, potential damage to North America has to be limited" (Gray 1979a:84). This damage limitation has to be both due to passive defence and counterforce action. ³

Gray argues that with defence the strategic forces are credibly usable in that the self-deterrence limitations are partly removed. On the question of civil defence, which would

² This follows from T.K. Jones, see Jones and Thompson (1978) and also Goure (1976).

³ Given Gray's earlier contentions that the Soviet's do not accept the Western strategic notions of escalation dominance and limited nuclear war the status of this remark is questionable.
improve this situation further, Gray includes two sentences on the disparities between the superpowers that can be read as being self contradictory. Thus:

among the more pertinent asymmetries that separate the U.S. from the Soviet political system is the acute sensitivity of the former to the personal (original emphasis) well being of its human charges. It is little short of bizarre to discover that it is the Soviet Union and not the United States, that has a serious civil defence program" (1979a:84).

By definition of course it has to be bizarre given the apriori definitions of the natures of the two regimes in question. It is simply not possible for an insecure empire of the sort Gray, following Pipes, depicts, to have any concern for the welfare of its population, despite the evidence that Gray musters that suggests that this is the case.

Gray concludes his "Case for a Theory of Victory" with a call for a reinstatement of strategic superiority as a desirable criteria in strategic planning. This assurance would deny the Soviet Union any plausible theory of victory and hence ensure that no adventurist policies were likely to be forthcoming from Moscow. Given, in the language of Realism, that it is a revisionist state which has little vested interest in the status quo and hence it is a danger to the principle status quo power, namely the U.S. (Gray 1981c), then the only way to produce with certainty a position where, in a crisis, one could face down the Soviets and "win" the crisis without a shot being fired, is to be in a position of strategic superiority. But the possession of enough weapons is not enough on its own, it requires a plausible
theory of victory to be completely convincing; the provision of this has been Gray's self appointed task.

11.3 NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING STRATEGIES: NUTS TO DEAD

There are a whole string of strategic counter arguments to the nuclear war fighting strategies of the Reagan Administration, and to Gray's ideas of a theory of victory in particular (Howard 1981, Hanson 1982, Lambeth 1982). Here they are simply enumerated briefly, the point of this dissertation is that the NUTS position is tied to a particular Geopolitical formulation; detailed strategic analysis belongs elsewhere, although for completeness a few crucial points on it need to be discussed here. In a number places Gray's critics have missed the point of his argument precisely because they have not taken the crucial Geopolitical dimension, and in particular his "imperial thesis" argument (drawn from Pipes), into account.

Gray is concerned to emphasise the political differences between the superpowers, and the consequences that this may have for strategy. This point relates to his consideration of limited war, either entirely non-nuclear or limited to very selective strikes on both sides.

It should not be forgotten that damage wrought against the Soviet military machine translates, in Soviet perspective, into threats to the political integrity of the Soviet Union. This is one of the very healthy assymetries in the Soviet- American competition, and its importance should not be undervalued. Gray (1980a:16)

This argument suggests that a limited conflict could militarily

379
defeat the Soviet Union to a degree sufficient to cause internal disintegration without causing a major nuclear exchange. The problem of how, in these circumstances, the Soviet leadership would be deterred from gambling on a massive use of nuclear forces remains. Even if this limited scenario did not hold Gray is still concerned to develop scenarios and strategies for fighting a long, partly nuclear, war.

Gray and Nitze notwithstanding, there remain serious doubts that it is possible to fight a nuclear war in any rational way. The argument relates to the problems of survivability of communications systems, both in terms of whether it is possible to protect them from the disruptive effects of nuclear weapons, and crucially whether it is humanly and technically possible amid the chaos of war and reaction times of minutes to assess the situation, the damage caused by enemy action and the effectiveness of your side's actions, in a way that allows militarily useful decisions to be taken and a decision forced in military terms. The doubtfulness of this is central to the arguments against nuclear war fighting (Ball 1980, Bracken 1983, Blair 1985). The only logical way out of this is to do a first strike against the other side while your communications system is still intact. The pressures to preempt in a crisis are indeed great.

Developing the counterforce capable weapons systems that could preempt adds tremendously to these pressures. In the terms of International Relations these developments aggravate the
security dilemma (Buzan 1983). In the search for absolute security, here in the terms of Gray’s theory of victory they render other countries less secure. Except in the CPD’s universe the argument is inappropriate. Knowing the nature of the Soviet Union to be what it is, "we" know that it threatens us. The counter argument that we are making it more insecure is taken as a bonus, ensuring that its behaviour will be curtailed. All this is premised on the Realist assumption of revisionist powers "interests" being illegitimate coupled to the particular version of totalitarianism that Pipes applies to the Soviet Union. That external threats might make the Soviet Union more dangerous thus can not be a consideration, given the "facts" that it endeavours to take advantage of all opportunities to weaken the West already.

The whole notion of controlled escalation present in the NUTS extended deterrence arguments also relies on there being Soviet interpretations of the U.S. use of nuclear weapons in a manner that the U.S. predicts in advance. The Soviet strategy, as interpreted by the CPD school of strategists, suggests that the Soviet Union rejects notions of limited nuclear war, precisely what they need to accept to operate in the escalation dominance pattern. While more recent work suggests that the Soviets may indeed accept notions of limited superpower warfare that does not escalate to strategic interchanges (McGwire 1987a), the analysis offered by Douglass and Hoeber (1979) in particular argues that they do not accept this position. Thus
the logic of extended deterrence once again becomes inconsistent with the strategic position advocated by the CPD.

Colin Gray's theory of nuclear targeting aimed at destroying the CPSU is also vulnerable, as he admits in places (1984a, 1984b), in that in the chaos of war it would be improbable that the Russian inhabitants of a town could distinguish the subtlety of a nuclear explosion on a Communist Party headquarters in the centre of the town from an attack on the town itself. But even more important than all this, is the assumption that they could make the distinction, and then form some sort of political organisation that could emerge to challenge the CPSU, overthrow it, and make peace by contacting the U.S. leadership. If the CPSU, and its repressive apparatus, the KGB, is as efficient as the totalitarian model requires, then the possibility that alternative political organisations would suddenly appear, gain local popular legitimacy, and communicate with the U.S., is implausible (Richelson 1980). Amid the chaos of nuclear war the scenario is at best far fetched.

It is however premised on the assumption that the CPSU is a reviled organisation somehow separate from the people. Gray repeatedly asserts that the CPSU has few genuine roots in the population outside the Moscow region. The state - society separation, central to the patrimonial / totalitarian viewpoint and to the imperial thesis is again operating here to influence Gray's strategic vision. In particular Gray is anxious to promote the dissolution of the Soviet state by targeting the
CPSU presence in an unambiguous manner which will force ethnic divisions to the surface. Thus the targeting could undo the imperial structure by geographically splitting the empire up along its fringes. Once the imperial structure unravels, all else follows. This point is crucial to Gray's whole scheme.

Freedman (1983:393) argues that in advocating a targeting policy directed against the Soviet political structure Gray and Payne (1980) have come full circle, back to the crude political science of the early air power theorists. Douhet (1942) and Fuller argued, prior to the Second World War, that a massive aerial bombardment would detach the societal elite from the population and force a termination of hostilities due to social breakdown. By attributing Gray and Payne's (1980) argument to the discredited airpower theories Freedman (1983) misses the specific history of their argument drawn from the "imperial thesis".

In a similar vein Herken (1985:310), without providing a citation, attributes Gray's interpretation of the Soviet political structure as fragile to the early RAND study The Operational Code of the Politburo (Leites 1950). But in "The Theory of Victory" Gray cites Pipes in the crucial passage, Leites is never mentioned. Herken apparently has also missed the importance of Pipes formulations for Gray's strategy.

Howard (1981:14) in particular charges that Gray fails to clarify the political object of his strategy of victory; the
imperial thesis provides just this missing link. Thus the USSR is not viewed as a homogeneous political society in which most of the politically capable people are somehow incorporated within the CPSU structure, but as an empire that can be dismantled by judicious targeting triggering the internal political forces of dissolution which are present precisely because the CPSU presides over an empire, rather than any other form of political organisation. Thus Gray is consistent in his claim to seek a political end for his strategy. Whether this is operationally feasible is another question of importance which requires a detailed empirical assessment that is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but there is evidence that ethnic nationalism is an overestimated threat to the Soviet State (Colton 1986, Motyl 1987, Smith 1985).

If one takes the other interpretation of Gray's targeting policies, effectively a decapitation strategy, (as Hanson 1982 does) in which one targets the Soviet leadership, then there remains the old problem in nuclear war planning of not having any political leadership left on the other side to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. Reconstituted in these terms the theory might be made to make some sense in terms of selective nuclear targeting promoting factionalism in the CPSU itself. Its dissolution would present the possibility of parts of it being able to organise to present a political alternative capable of negotiating a peace. But how U.S. military decision-makers are supposed to be able to know all these possible developments in
the midst of nuclear warfare is unclear (Richelson 1980).

A further critique of the whole war fighting argument is the lack of specificity of the scenarios in which the U.S. could win, or "prevail" (Hanson 1982). This is a variation of the "chaos" argument against nuclear war fighting theories presented above. Thus Gray argues that it should be possible to limit U.S. casualties to a mere twenty million in a major nuclear war by a combination of passive defence (civil defence and crisis relocation etc.) and damage limitation counterforce strikes. There are two aspects of this that are important. First, one needs to show how such a counterforce strike can be accomplished, presumably it has to be a first strike. There will always remain crucial technical imponderables on that score, including missile reliability, doubts about accuracy, the impact of fratricide, the "C3I" problem, damage assessment and follow up targeting etc. which render the whole exercise extremely dubious on technical grounds. ¹ The only way to test the system is to fight a nuclear war.

Second is the crucial matter of the scale of damage involved in 20 million casualties to the U.S.. As has been pointed out by this author (Dalby 1985) and other geographers elsewhere (Openshaw and Steadman 1982), the possibilities of accurately

¹ C3I refers to Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence, all particularly vulnerable to electronic disruption by the effects of high altitude nuclear explosions and their resultant electro-magnetic pulses. Part of the Reagan administration modernisation program involved attempts to "harden" the C3I network to prevent its destruction by these means.
predicting what even the immediate consequences of a nuclear attack would be like are extremely difficult. But the longterm and indirect consequences in economic and social terms (Peterson 1983) let alone the ecological factors (Turco et al. 1983, 1984) are likely to be at least as severe as the short term impacts which are partially calculable. Thus there remains tremendous uncertainty about the whole enterprise of a theory of victory in that the essential parameters for advocating it remain essentially unknowable. Thus it fails where all other nuclear strategies fail, it constructs formal logical scenarios, surrounds them with terminologically dense defences but ultimately fails to convince.

Despite all these objections Gray persists. He does so because he has to by the logic of his own Realist position. Political solutions to international conflict are not plausible except in the very long term. He has nowhere to go in the interim except to dreaming up war winning strategies that are increasingly implausible as each assumption is worked in and the logic developed. The dogma of deterrence leads inevitably to these positions.

Because of the CPD portrayal of the USSR as expansionist, driven by its Geopolitical logic to try to expand, it follows that mutually agreed arms control can never work because the USSR will never use it as a means to genuinely stop military buildups, merely as a device to make a first strike temptation irresistible. Thus Gray, Rostow, Pipes and Nitze all argue
against the dangers of "mirror imaging" and yet end up perpetrating these types of ethnocentric fallacies, in particular they exhibit projection on a vast scale. These fallacies are based on the articulation of axiological difference between the moral defensive U.S. and the machinations of an evil empire. But it is coupled to the presumed epistemological superiority of their specification of Otherness.

Thus they go the next step in the argument. The Russians really do understand their activity in our terms, denial of it is mere propaganda. If "we" hang tough then they will be forced to admit that "we" are right; they have been peddling propaganda; the political crisis engendered by this admission will force reform on the CPSU; a less threatening regime will be the long term result. The possibility that forcing the USSR to the wall might produce a really aggressive military state determined to resist and fight rather than undergo internal reform is taken seriously, at least by Gray. That is the whole point of the theory of victory, to prevent the possibility of their being able to fight in such circumstances, particularly in the circumstances of "the most dangerous decade" of the 1980s. Unable to export the crisis the USSR will be compelled to reform is the final rationale of this position. This is nothing less than military coercion on a grand scale.

A final critique can be made in terms of the whole NUTS argument being a massive case of psychological projection (Lambeth 1982). Thus Pipes and the other analysts of Soviet
nuclear strategy point to the Soviet possession of a nuclear war winning strategy and in turn advocates a U.S. policy that mirrors images the Soviet one. This, as was pointed out above in chapters 6 and 7, is the result of the specification of the Other in ways that ensure an adoption of precisely its methods to counter its activity, i.e. to build up a nuclear arsenal and adopt a nuclear war-winning strategy, precisely what the evil Other is imputed to be doing.

But it is a theory of military power that fits into a broader scheme for reasserting U.S. hegemony in world affairs, and hence is useful in a blind assertion of U.S. power, derived from an attempt to deny the Soviets the ability to do precisely that (Halliday 1983, McMahan 1985). Here the dynamics of the superpower arms race really do lead to the "Logic of Exterminism" (Thompson et al. 1982). Thus the two superpowers are locked in a spiral of technological "progress" from which there is no escape. The U.S. has led in nearly every stage of this process, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) just being the latest manifestation. But it is a manifestation based on the definition of "security" in terms of the spatial exclusion of Otherness, an exclusion relying on ever more expensive and sophisticated military technologies (Connell 1986).

This technological competition may well lead to our destruction automatically if the spiral continues and the NUTS ideas and the new generation of counterforce weapons contribute to this spiral. A dangerous possibility is the adoption of a
"launch on warning (LOW) posture as an alternative to the MX/MPS basing scheme providing assured survival for U.S. ICBMs. This is a logical response to perceived vulnerability in a crisis situation. The converse of the argument is the case against the Pershing II deployment in Europe which would likely lead to the Russian adoption of a high alert LOW posture as the only possible way of avoiding the decapitating counterforce capabilities of this very fast and accurate weapon. Thus Soviet missiles would be launched as soon as radar detection (correct or not) of the incoming Pershings was made. 5

The final twist on this move from NUTS to DEAD (Destruction Entrusted Automatic Devices) is the U.S. SDI program. 6 Reaction times for the proposed technologies require that they be fired automatically in the event that the sensors detect an attack. Politics is finally completely removed from the decision to initiate hostilities. This is the ultimate rationale of technological development and the deterrence dogma. Politics is denied in the beginning by the totalitarian assumptions about the Soviet Union, it is denied in the ultimate end by DEAD, weapons fired automatically without human intervention.

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5 The Theatre Nuclear Forces negotiations in 1987, will probably lead to the removal of the Pershing II threat, however the American decapitation threat remains with the introduction of the Trident D5 SLBM's potentially capable of launching short warning time strikes by using suppressed trajectories. It remains to be seen if the START process will reduce the numbers of these weapons.

6 "DEAD", the rarely used, but all too apposite acronym, is taken from Deudney (1983).
In summary, this dissertation has focused on the discourses of Realism, Geopolitics, Strategy and Sovietology and has elucidated their operations as discourses which support the policies of containment militarism. Each of them operates to define their object of study by excluding other approaches and by defining as legitimate a particular ensemble of practices. These in turn are deeply conservative operations reproducing the past of the cold war and attempting to defer all other considerations to some future time when the cold war has been resolved in favour of the U.S., a resolution understood by Gray and Pipes to be the internal reform of the USSR to make it more acceptable to the U.S., a redefinition of Otherness to more of the same, i.e. more like the U.S.

Realism is traditionally structured in terms of the difference between domestic and international politics. The enlightenment project of progress and community is constrained within the boundaries of domestic politics, the international anarchy is constructed as the realm of power, unmediated by moral concerns (Ashley 1987). The task of the crude version of the Realist foreign policy practitioner preferred in the CPD conception is cast solely in terms of the maximisation of power by the state he represents; this is the only moral course in a world of competing states.
In the context of the CPD the Realist move is usually constructed at a larger scale, that of the Western system, beyond which is the expanding USSR imperial threat. Enlightenment and progress are now constrained within the boundaries of the non-Soviet world. Power is all that matters, all political concerns with development, human rights, environmental problems and so on are deferred until after the "Soviet threat" is removed. It can only be removed, according to the CPD by massive military confrontation.

But here the CPD steps beyond Realism's focus on power and interest. It does so by relying on another device of Realist discourse, the distinction between revolutionary and status quo powers. The Soviet Union is a revolutionary state, challenging the global order, hence it is defined as such as the threat to order which in the Realist lexicon often equates with peace. Thus change is defined as a threat to peace, understood as the status quo. Once again the difficulties of the encompassing political change within the Realist discourse are encountered (Walker 1987).

This move distances the CPD position from the position of the traditional Realists, Carr, Morgenthau and also Kennan. The latter has always argued that a peaceful arrangement between the superpowers is possible provided the West is prepared to take seriously the interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring its security (Kennan 1983, Wolfe 1986). But the CPD position, based on Pipes' conception of patrimonialism excludes the Soviet
Union's interests as legitimate political concerns. It does so by discounting their interests, arguing that their only interest is world domination, an interest that history and Geopolitics determines, and one that the rest of the world has to face up to and deal with through armed preparedness, which in the nuclear age means nuclear weapons and the dogma of deterrence.

Nuclear strategy is an arcane enterprise that has had inordinate importance in the formulation of U.S. policies since the Second World War. Premised on the Geopolitical view of the Soviet Union as expansionist and totalitarian, it argued through much of its early development for a policy of punishment, or deterrence, as the basic strategy. Using abstract reasoning and "scientific" methodologies it acquired an aura of plausibility which combined potently with the aura of power that the nuclear technology, of which it spoke, possessed. In the CPD argument against SALT II their case ultimately rested on a theoretical inferiority because of potential vulnerability to a third strike.

In strategic discourse politics is in many ways reduced to technologism; all questions have rationally computable solutions. The whole ethos within which the debates occurs is one of the primacy of technique; all problems are solvable, all matters of concern reducible to quantitative measures; any which cannot be so reduced are avoided or ignored. Politics, in the sense of social arrangements in the context of power, is neatly evaded in preference for a narrow conception of two monolithic
"rational" actors engaged in a "struggle" for superiority defined in mathematical terms. The ultimate, so far, development of this line is the SDI. All political considerations are removed, the answer to the "Soviet threat" is purely technological.

But the CPD position also critiques the failure of strategists, at least those of the arms control inclination in the U.S., to think through the political dimensions of the deterrence posture. But their reformulation of the Soviet Union as inherently expansionist and an imperial structure enhances the power of the strategic logic. As developed by Colin Gray the strategic task is to develop a series of weapons systems that could deny the Soviet Union any possible way of conceiving of a victory in a nuclear war, and simultaneously devise a series of nuclear utilisation tactics that would focus targeting on the imperial apparatus of empire, supposedly guaranteeing that in the event of a war the Soviet apparatus could be destroyed by a series of "surgical strikes". As argued above this Geopolitical interpretation provides the key to Gray's theory of victory, a key that most commentators have missed.

All this follows from the apriori assumption of the evil nature of Soviet society which came to Nuclear Strategy from the political climate of the cold war. The Sovietology literature developed around a conceptualisation of the Soviet Union and all other communist societies, conceived as a block directed from Moscow, as a totalitarian society. This suggested that the
society was unchanging, dominated by a small powerful elite whose power rested on the apparatus of terror that they yielded without restraint. This social machine was inherently expansionist, resisted only by force; perpetual vigilance was needed so as never to make a mistake which would undoubtedly be exploited to the full by the Soviets.

The CPD added the geographically determinist theme of the expansion of Russian militarism to the totalitarian theme reinforcing it by linking Russian history to the communist regime. In Gray's formulation this simultaneously provided a rationale for the targeting options in the theory of victory. The determinism had ideological force because it relied on assumptions that the long term trajectories of history were the only adequate guide to the future; its structuralism precludes change.

The traditional Geopolitical texts, MacKinder in particular, have a theme of the fear of the Other as the Asiatic hordes threatening European civilisation. The fear of the triumph of land power, over the seapower of the British empire is important, sometimes in terms of the Russian empire, other times in terms of the alliance of the German with the Russian system as a dominant Heartland alliance which could impose its will over the Rimlands. The CPD arguments update this theme, embellishing the Heartland as the territorial bastion of totalitarianism, a political formation compelled by its internal nature and its Geopolitical circumstances to expand to try to
exercise global dominion. Its threat lies in this proclivity to expansion, in contrast security is formulated as the spatial containment of that threat.

All these formulations have a number of things in common. First they reduce the world into simplistic dualisms which contain powerful constraints on how the world is understood. The Nuclear Strategy and Sovietology perspectives reduce the world to a zero-sum game in which one side always gains at the others expense. The Geopolitical discourse squeezes out of consideration the complexity of international interaction, the "Third World" is reduced to a playing field on which the superpowers play out their rivalry. Any indigenous interests are removed from consideration in the global space of superpower rivalry, a space filled only by projected power. The object of the Geopolitical discourse is the enhancement of security by the spatial limitation of the domain in which the adversary can project power.

The state is privileged by the Realist discourse as the only actor in the international arena which is worthy of consideration. The term International Relations itself defines matters in terms reminiscent of diplomatic procedures. Economic, cultural, historical and political factors are removed from the foreground, unnecessary clutter in the exercise of the rituals of Realist power; in Ashley's terms a "pure positivity" reigns. Any wider considerations of social theory are excluded from the realm of International Relations. As far as the CPD is
concerned, power is about the ability to militarily confront the Soviet Union, economic, cultural and political developments are all secondary to the overarching need for nuclear supremacy, the ultimate arbiter of everything else.

The totalitarian conceptualisation denies politics and history by creating an Other as perpetual adversary. Key to its understandings of the USSR is the specification of it as monolithic and unchanging. This denial of history reduces the possibilities of politics, by erecting the spectre of the permanent adversary, against which perpetual vigilance is needed. It denies the possibility of an alternative vision of the future on either side of the great divide, hence perpetuating the political status quo. The device is simple and in ideological terms hugely effective. The responsibility for all "our" problems is neatly encapsulated in the creation of the Other. Thus the particular specification of Otherness in terms of a Geopolitical expansionist threat is the key element which articulates all the security discourses together. It provides the point of articulation for the CPD version of U.S. hegemony. It reinforces its position in blatantly ethnocentric fashion, but an ethnocentrism that reinforces its arguments precisely by how it specifies the Other.

Thus the CPD argues that by analysing the USSR in terms of its internal historical and crucially Geopolitical makeup we will understand what their society is like and hence we will understand the threat. Having understood the threat we will act

396
accordingly and move to counter it by developing appropriate nuclear strategies. The crucial ethnocentric move is related to the totalitarian formulation in which all information and writing is designed to further the purposes of the political leaders. All arguments that purport to be conciliatory to the West must be dismissed as disinformation.

The additional step is then easy. They really do know that their society is as we now understand it, i.e. it is totalitarian and bent on world domination. Here the possibility that there might be other thinking in the Soviet Union is excluded by the "superiority" of the "historical method" which focuses on the "real" factors rather than those dreamt up by political scientists concerned with abstract models, or strategists who ignore the societal dynamics of the USSR. Thus the whole matter is a neatly circular argument, any possible bases on which one might construct a critique are disallowed in advance. It is precisely these series of exclusions that gives their arguments their coherence, and hence, when articulated together, their ideological power.

This series of ideological moves, discussed here in terms of the articulation of the security discourses supports the overall hegemony of American modernity. Within the West the language of politics is, as argued in chapter 2, inscribed within discussions of modernity, rationality and specific references to time and space. As Said (1979) goes to great length to point out, the process of European imperial expansion was coupled
with, and defined in terms of, the expansion of enlightenment, whether in religious terms of salvation of the heathen or in terms of the scientific enlightenment. With this went the incorporation and administration of the primitive (distant in time) and ignorant. The same pattern of domination, exclusion and incorporation is present in the CPD discourse.

Modernity comes with universal space and time, within which the great drama of development unfolds. There is continuity in the development of progress, a continuity through time that ultimately marginalises, subsumes, negates or destroys that which is the Other, primitive, different. Progress is identified with the West, rationality, science, the expansion of civilisation. The ultimate triumph of reason is equated in the U.S. in particular with the triumph of that particular polity. The purported reason and rationality of social existence, postulated by the U.S. in particular, after the Second World War was encapsulated in technocratic approaches to "solving" "social problems" using "scientific" methods: nowhere more so than in Nuclear Strategy. U.S. manifest destiny combined with operations research and the result was the technologisation of politics, coupled to a linear view of societal development in which American reason was bound to triumph.

The Soviet Union as the dominant image of the malevolent Other is always present to constantly ensure greater efforts. But the Other is also unchanging in its evil nature. Here the USSR is portrayed in Pipes' patrimonial scheme as the inheritor
of the primitive slav nomads of the northern tundra. They are not quite European, not quite part of the Western cultural sphere. The theme of continuity and progress coexists with the Manichean theme. The contradictions are only temporary however, for good will triumph over evil in the end; if good just builds enough nuclear weapons to prevent the Other expanding, the Other will collapse as a result of its own failures. Reason will triumph over superstition; the West, scientific, will triumph over the ideological usurper.

These universalisations of Western modernity, the Cartesian and Newtonian assumptions of uniform space and time allow the extension of the European culture and politics globally. Development is ultimately understood as more of the same, adopted universally (Kumar 1978). Progress underlies all this as a central theme, new is better, old is intrinsically inferior and hence disposable. In this context the Other in a different space has to be marginalised and ultimately colonised. This theme reinforces the formulation of security as spatial exclusion and limitation.

The Other is at the same time a disgrace, a challenge to the supremacy of the Western universalising culture, one that ultimately undermines the legitimacy of its project. It has to be shut off in a separate space to be kept under observation and controlled. With reference to Foucault's concerns with the discourses of madness, the medical analogy is apt in the link between power, observation and control. Communism is often
likened to the spread of a contagion (O'Sullivan 1982). A Geopolitical threat requires a response in territorial terms; as was pointed out in detail in chapter 4 security is understood in these terms, a move of spatial exclusion.

The CPD discourse is concerned with the maintenance of the American hegemony over Europe and Japan and the spatial exclusion of Soviet domination from these areas. Conflict in the Third-World is seen in these terms. At a very general level the discourse suggests that the Third World is really only a playing field for the superpowers, but it also suggests that "our" interventions there are justified as legitimate, in the name of enlightenment and economic development. The assumption that it really is "our" space, was the rationale of Truman and Carter doctrines.

In the mythical structure of the discourse, the Other is the barbarian, because he is not enlightened. Not being enlightened justifies our intervention to enlighten, "for their own good" of course. The discourse on communism and the Soviet Union is not the same as that of Orientalism (Said 1979) where the Other is primitive, to be dominated. True the Other in this case is partly that, but more seriously the Other has false science, technologically capable, but "possessed" of demonic intentions. In this sense the religious metaphor is tied to a spatial representation of the Other's place as cold, forbidding, alien, tundra.
Combining this geopolitical concern with nuclear weapons and with the denial of politics in Realism, and also with the totalitarian approach to the USSR, provides a powerful inhibiting framework for the evolution of broader conceptions of security and international relations. In the U.S. the hegemonic understanding of the global Geopolitical arena, involves an acceptance of the necessity of extended deterrence, and Third World intervention.

If one examines, for example, the terms of the current debate, liberals argue for the preservation of the SALT arms control regime; conservatives argue that the regime is basically immoral and has been a failure, and advocate instead a transition to defenses. In fact, beneath the rhetoric, many in both camps seem to assume that first use and extended deterrence are both necessary and legitimate...

(Arbers and Sahaydachny 1987:98)

Thus underlying the many debates on nuclear weapons within the U.S. is the overall assumption of the geopolitical divide of the globe into them and us, requiring that we must always be prepared to intervene in distant lands and in order to do so must be prepared to use nuclear weapons to ensure a local victory. To do this requires a constant edge in nuclear technology, and the ability to develop a damage limitation capability that allows extended deterrence to be credible. But "... in an era of parity, the attempt to develop the degree of damage limitation required to restore credibility to extended deterrence will invariably subvert not only the SALT process, but arms control in general" (Arbess and Sahaydachny 1987:97).
It is a central argument of this dissertation that this "overall assumption" was no longer hegemonic after the Vietnam war, detente, the Nixon doctrine, and the global managerialist approaches to international affairs promoted by the Tri-Lateral Commission (Gill 1986). The CPD led the ideological assault in an attempt to ensure that the security discourses were reasserted such that the consensus on the basic necessity of extended deterrence is no longer seriously open to political debate. The technical details of NUTS are the logic of this reassertion, but the Geopolitical dimension is ultimately more important because it underlies the technical arguments, and it is ultimately more important in that it sets the terms of political debate.

But it is a political debate that excludes politics by reducing the possibilities of discourse to a number of intellectual specialisations, the discourses of security, which monopolise that which may be discussed. The expert, equipped with the theoretical knowledge derived from intellectual work, versed in its techniques and competent in the rituals of the discourses, is the only competent participant in the process. Wider political participation is denied or coopted within the strategic discourses (Walker 1983/4). Learning the specialised languages is not unduly difficult, but having learnt them they in turn delimit what it is possible to discuss (Cohn 1987). Thus the security discourses act in a profoundly conservative political manner, delimiting the possibilities of discourse by
the categorisations they impose and the rituals and methodologies they legitimate. These discursive practices reproduce the cold war in a series of categorisations which limit the possibilities of political intervention precisely by how they categorise.
CHAPTER 12

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND SECURITY DISCOURSE

12.1 INTRODUCTION

This final chapter starts with a brief consideration of the influence of the CPD position on the conduct of the Reagan administration's foreign policy and its attempts to reassert U.S. hegemony over global affairs. This raises further theoretical questions about hegemony, global politics and the spatial and security assumptions of discussing global hegemony in terms of imperial developments. These are the subject of necessarily brief discussion in the third section of this chapter.

Drawing on this material and the conclusions on the limitations of security discourse summarised above, the fourth section of this chapter explicates some tentative possible roles for a critical Political Geography in offering alternative formulations of security discourse, ones which transcend and challenge the political limitations of the current practices. These are not intended to be a single reformulation of the discourse of security, but rather a series of heuristic theoretical devices, to critically grapple with security discourse.

By way of a final conclusion this theme is enlarged to suggest some further directions for critical Political
Geography. An argument is presented that its focus should be on revealing the hegemonic processes of global politics, and simultaneously avoiding the worst pitfalls of theoreticism and ethnocentrism by extending the critical analysis of geopolitical discourse in a theoretically informed manner.

12.2 THE CPD AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

As of 1984 the CPD claimed that over sixty of its members had served at some time in the Reagan administration in a senior capacity. The focus on military buildup and aggressive anti-communist rhetoric, including the dubbing of the USSR as "the evil empire" fit with the CPD agenda (Booth and Williams 1985). So does the focus on "dominos" in the Caribbean and Central America, the Reagan doctrine of active measures against "communist" regimes, and more generally the administration's plans for global warfare (Record 1983-4).

Richard Pipes served as the director of Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council in 1981 and 1982, issuing a statement early in his tenure to the effect that the USSR had to choose between changing its internal political arrangements or fighting a nuclear war (Sanders 1983:324). Subsequently he has continued to write opinion articles. In 1984 he published *Survival is Not Enough* which updates and elaborates his articles from the 1970s.
Gene Rostow was appointed head of the Arms Control and Disarmament agency in 1981 and had a stormy career of bureaucratic infighting in the administration before finally being fired early in 1983, apparently because his abrasive style angered Reagan (Talbott 1985:168). His colleague and nominal subordinate, Paul Nitze undertook the task of negotiating in Geneva with the Russians on so called "Theatre Nuclear Forces" in Europe. He remains a member of the administration as a special representative for arms control. Max Kampleman subsequently took over some of the negotiation tasks in Geneva.

Colin Gray joined the administration in an advisory capacity in 1982. The adoption by the Reagan administration of strategies influenced by the ideas of nuclear war fighting, ultimately led to a massive buildup in nuclear weapons; 17,000 new warheads were central to the Reagan arms buildup initiated in 1982. Since then SDI and the "maritime strategy" have come to the forefront of U.S. nuclear thinking, both "high-tech"

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1 Since the formulation of the ideas of the theory of victory and the imperial thesis, Gray has continued to write a stream of papers and books on strategic studies (1980c, 1981c, 1981d, 1981e, 1982b, 1982c, 1984a Gray and Payne 1983), on Star Wars (1981f, 1982f, 1983, 1985a, Payne and Gray 1984), on nuclear winter (1985b,) and has weighed in to defend the administration in its assertion that the Soviets are cheating on arms control (1984d). In 1986 he published Nuclear Strategy and National Style (1986b) and updated his ideas on Geopolitics as they relate to the theme of the Maritime Strategy (1986c). He also contributed to the debate on whether the U.S. had underfunded military programs in the 1970s, an argument repeatedly made to legitimise the Reagan military budget (Gray and Barlow 1985, for a rejoinder see Komer 1985).

2 As usual these plans were leaked to the media: "Pentagon draws up first strategy for fighting a long nuclear war" New York Times 30 May 1982, pp. 1, 12. See also Knelman (1985).
solutions to render the Soviet nuclear weapons vulnerable, the latter returning to the traditional Geopolitical theme of land and seapower rivalry. In 1985 and 1986 the U.S. continued its nuclear arms testing program despite the unilateral Soviet test ban.

Some variants of the "maritime strategy" (Brooks 1986, Gray 1986c, Mearsheimer 1986) are an attempt to project U.S. power into the coastal waters of the USSR to destroy their SLBM launchers and so render all of the Soviet strategic arsenal vulnerable in a wartime situation. This is a logical extension of the earlier concerns with a theory of victory, the invulnerable submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces of both superpowers have traditionally rendered nuclear warfighting strategies implausible. If, however, through advances in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technologies, the Soviet fleet of missile submarines could be made theoretically vulnerable, then that objection could be removed.

This inevitably has increased fears of the accidental outbreak of a nuclear war, a Soviet strategic posture of preemption in a crisis only becomes more dangerous as the U.S. strives towards a technical capability to launch a counterforce or decapitation first strike. The U.S. lead in ASW technologies and its development of very accurate decapitation capable weapons like the Pershing II and Trident D-5, countered in part by the forward basing of Soviet SLBMs, has rendered the strategic competition between the superpowers more dangerous.
The "Pipeline debate" of the early 1980s, an attempt ostensibly to wean Europe away from reliance on Soviet fuel is understandable in terms of Pipes' interpretation of detente strategies as Soviet attempts to undermine the independence of Europe by supposedly gaining an economic stranglehold over its fuel supplies. The failure of the U.S. to prevent the building of the pipeline and the crisis engendered by the "Euro-missile" debate in the early 1980s presented difficulties in what Richard Burt termed "alliance management" (Talbott 1985:62).

The presence of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe was undoubtedly an attempt to exert political influence over Europe (McMahan 1985, Johnstone 1984). The subsequent acceptance in 1987 by the Soviet Union of the original Reagan administration "zero-option" on "Euro-missiles" has further complicated matters. Having endured the political difficulties of ensuring deployment of the missiles, they are now being withdrawn, without the original problem of American nuclear credibility in a European war apparently being addressed.

In the Third World the Reagan administration initiated a series of military interventions in Nicaragua, Libya, Grenada, on the basis of a broadly conceived "Reagan doctrine" where the U.S. reserves the right to intervene to destroy regimes it deems as hostile (McMahan 1985). This is also a logical outgrowth of the CPD Geopolitical perspective, as is the revamped CIA and the support for increased covert activity around the world.
The Reagan administration has not been able to carry out its program without restrictions and curtailments from congressional opposition and, in the military sphere, without vehement opposition to its militarist preoccupations from the European peace movements and the short lived "freeze" movement in the U.S. The MX was not placed in an MPS arrangement, principally due to intense domestic political pressure against the development of such a scheme on economic and environmental grounds, coupled to determined local opposition in the states where the "race tracks" were to have been located. The Scowcroft commission finally fudged the vulnerability arguments used by Gray and others to advocate the building of the MX and one hundred of them are being placed in superhardened Minutemen silos. The B-1 bomber program has been plagued with technical shortcomings.

The contras have failed repeatedly to destroy the Sandinista regime, the U.S. was forced to withdraw, amid much confusion, from its attempts to shape Lebanese politics by military force. The focus on military spending in the U.S. economy has caused economic disruptions (Markusen 1986). The budget deficit used to finance the military buildup has also caused international alarm. The economic repercussions in terms of interest rates and international exchange rate fluctuations continue. Critics have pointed to the mismatch of the available conventional forces with the ambitious strategic tasks that the Reagan

3 Colin Gray had his say on this issue too (Gray 1982d, 1982e, Payne and Gray eds 1984).
administration's Geopolitical containment strategies for worldwide warfare call for (Record 1983-4).

Arms control was effectively on hold for most of the Reagan administration's period in office despite furtive attempts to negotiate TNFs in Europe which the administration was never serious about (Talbott 1985). Political developments in Reagan's second term, both in the Soviet Union with the accession of Gorbachev and the reformist tendencies in the Kremlin, which has resulted in major new departures in Soviet security policy (Evangelista 1986, MccGwire 1987b), and in Washington in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, have moved the arms negotiation process forward, changing the political landscape increasingly in directions distant from CPD concerns.

All of these developments point to the limits of the Reagan administration's attempts to reassert U.S. global dominance, and simultaneously to the impossibility of the CPD's program as a blueprint for U.S. hegemony (Gill 1986). In Sanders (1983) terms the CPD program "foundered on the shoals of reality", as the limits of American power, and the limits of military policy were revealed. The Reagan administration, despite much talk of "supply side economics", has not provided any clear or coherent economic policies that would enable the U.S. to reassert its global hegemony in economic terms (Moffitt 1987). As this dissertation shows the CPD agenda interpreted U.S. global supremacy as being primarily a matter of military power and the spatial containment of Soviet influence as the sine qua non for
all other political programs.

12.3 GEOPOLITICS AND HEGEMONY

This leads into the concerns of contemporary literature in International Relations, with the relations of hegemony, empire and territorial control, and in particular with possible emergent global orders in the wake of the declining U.S. hegemony. Of particular concern to the theme of this dissertation is the focus on the factors involved in the decline of a hegemon's control and the role that the increasing costs of empire play when a hegemon attempts to maintain control over the global system by using territorial strategies. In Gill's (1986) terms the attempt to define and then enforce hegemony in Realist terms of military power and direct political control over specific areas.

This argument suggests that attempts by a declining hegemonic power to ensure its continued dominance in global affairs will be made by imposing direct political and military control over colonies or territories. Thompson and Zuk (1986) show how this is the case in terms of the relative decline of British hegemony in the nineteenth century. While the problems of leadership in a world where economic innovation may be occurring faster outside the hegemon's domestic economy, than

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internally, are more than just matters of imperial costs, nonetheless these costs are important. In the late twentieth century security understood in territorial terms involves the application of advanced technologies to "defend" that territory. Drawing on advances in scientific exploitation of nature, high technology weapons are exhorbitantly expensive which aggravates these tendencies.

In terms of the inevitable U.S. decline from its hegemonic position in the post Second World War world following European and Japanese reconstruction, this is of some significance. It is possible to interpret the CPD fixation on territorial matters and their reinterpretation of Geopolitics, as an ideological statement of the attempt to reinstate the U.S. hegemony by the classic imperial device of imposing political control over territorial units. Thus the U.S. build up in armed forces, advocated by the CPD, which is draining the U.S. economy and reducing its long run economic competitiveness by diverting capital into military expenditure, is in fact, aggravating the long term security of the U.S., not to mention inflicting serious economic hardship on the Third World (Kaldor 1986, Marcusen 1986, Schwenninger and Sanders 1986, Sanders and Schwenninger 1987). Thus the attempt to reassert a Realist hegemony in military terms, is in the long run, counterproductive. Nonetheless the Raeagan administration has attempted to reassert American domination in precisely these terms, and repeatedly provided ideological rationales for doing
so in geopolitical terms.

The USSR may also be trapped in a cycle of expanding imperial costs which are aggravating its internal economic difficulties (Wolf 1985) as it attempts to ensure its security through perpetual high military expenditures. In Rosecrance's (1986) terms the superpowers are territorial states in a world of trading states. The relationship between territory and power is thus not one in which more territory means more power, as the spatial preoccupation might suggest (See also O'Sullivan 1986). This theme remains to be further developed in Political Geography as does the critique of territorial strategies of imperial power. This argument suggests also the possibility of understanding the Geopolitical perspective as an ideological representation of imperial drives in a period of declining hegemony. The spatial representation reflecting in addition to the desire for territorial control, an attempt in psychological terms to corral the usurper, and in so doing to remove the threat and reassert hegemony.

This is the imperial stuff of classical Geopolitics. In the Geopolitical formulation, power is in terms of military control of territory, autarchy implied invulnerability, although this is complicated by the extensive communication difficulties of empire. The resources for war came from the territories under one's control, the more territory the more power. Underlying these are the key factors of a complex societal organisation around a technological mode of the domination of nature and a
series of mutually exclusive territorially defined states with absolute sovereignty over that territory.

In the nuclear period the technologisation of political control has accelerated the technical means for asserting centralised state control and developed technologies of information gathering with tremendous power (Virilio 1986, Virilio and Lotringer 1983). But simultaneously with this "transparency revolution" in Deudney's (1983) phrase, nuclear weapons have shifted the geopolitical situation into a position where the ultimate levels of this technological force are not utilisable in combat situations, this is the point of nuclear weapons as deterrence to their own use. The whole enterprise of nuclear war fighting is an attempt to circumvent these restrictions.

The most recent addition to the panoply of military technology, and the linchpin in Reagan's ideological argument for securing American hegemony, is the discussion concerning space based anti-ballistic missile systems and the SDI. The formulation of security in terms of spatial exclusion is here once again linked to the technological solution to political problems. Nowhere is the spatial exclusion formulation of security clearer than in its formulation of the SDI as a "peace shield" that would keep out incoming Soviet missiles. This time the barbarian is kept out by high technology weapons of mindboggling complexity, but the premise is once again of spatial demarcation as the key to security.
The SDI also distances the deployment of the technology of the military state from local politics of the kind which derailed the MX/MPS scheme, and has proved a powerful mobilising force in a number of Western countries around the opposition to civil defence planning (Leaning and Keyes 1983, Zeigler 1985) and through the formation of nuclear weapons free zones (Barnaby 1985). Deployment in space is the answer to the local politics of dissent, and local nuclear weapons free zone developments within the U.S. allowing military buildups without, in the Political Geography jargon, LULUs and the politics of the NIMBY syndrome. 5

Power is once again technologically divorced from practical politics. In Visvanathan's (1987) terms the Hobbesian project of subordinating both sovereign and state to the dictates of scientific rationality takes one more fateful step towards completion in the inevitable development of automatic technological warfare and DEAD. Underlying this is the domination of nature in terms of the heightened technological exploitation. The domination of space by high technology devices using techniques drawn from the scientific domination of nature are very clearly interlinked here. But as Smith (1984) has made clear, these two forms of domination are in fact merely

5 "Locally Unacceptable Land Uses" and the "Not In My Back Yard" syndrome respectively. In the U.S. in the late 1970s and early 1980s persistent local opposition in the areas in western United States designated for the proposed "racetrack" deployment of the MX/MPS was important in the decision to abandon it. More famous is the persistent site specific opposition to the siting of cruise missiles on Greenham Common in England.
different facets of the same political relationship of domination.

The rationality of these technological developments is premised on the specification of the Other as dangerous, as in this case, the evil empire. Thus the metaphysical structuring of the world into them and us, with us as superior, functions to ensure that militarisation continues. Security understood as force breeds more insecurity for both the possessor of the technology of violence, and more directly for its intended victims. As argued in chapter 2, these geopolitical formulations simultaneously act to ideologically incorporate disparate elements in a common "us" versus a spatially excluded Other. They do so by using a series of geopolitical discursive practices, representing security in terms of absolute technological control over territorially demarcated sections of space, understood in terms of absolute space. Others are spatially excluded, to be feared, ostracised, and ultimately reduced to extensions of an imposed identity.

12.4 CHALLENGING HEGEMONY: GEOPOLITICS AND DE-ALIGNMENT

This dissertation has explored the interconnections of Geopolitics, and Otherness in terms of a series of "security discourses" each of which in turn is structured by and structures the understanding of politics in terms of space, and difference. Security is identified as identity, unity and an imposed order. Difference is a threat, Otherness has to be
spatially coralled, contained, ultimately reduced to an extension of sameness, security implies a reduction of difference, making their space like ours. Inherent in all this are conceptions of absolute space, and the metaphysical construction of a universalist epistemological position where true knowledge triumphs, gradually extending through absolute space. As has been repeatedly shown above each of these are powerful ideological moves, sustaining the power of the ideology of modernity and Atlanticism.

To challenge these practices raises the question of alternative discourses of security, discourses which require a respecification of Otherness, a recognition of the reality of the social existence of Other cultures as legitimate not as axiologically inferior, a praxaeological identification that operates in ways other than the coercive. In other words what is needed is the separation of security from identity, the recognition of a plurality of cultural realities, each requiring their formulation in their own spaces. But an adequate reformulation of security has to involve more than military and metaphysical concerns. It also involves the economic and social existence of people in specific political circumstances. Thus it requires an ecological approach, sensitive to the specific local conditions but linking these to global concerns.

This questioning strikes at the heart of the political theory of the state, which as outlined in chapter 3, is a theory that premises the state as a spatial entity, within which a
state of security is provided. To reformulate security thus requires a reconceptualisation of geopolitics and hence a rejection of the model of security in terms of spatial exclusion. The rejection of security as power and exclusion forces a consideration of power as social relations not as abstract physical considerations of force understood in terms of the interactions of spatial entities.

In terms of Geopolitics it challenges the essential formulation of its terms by pointing to the presupposition of absolute space on which the theory is built. Geopolitics in its modern guise essentially privileges the military power of the superpowers to the exclusion of other political and social groups. It assumes a pregiven territorial space, in Gray's terms (taken directly from Spykman (Gray 1977a:1) the most permanent factor in international relations, and then fills the pregiven arena with superpower rivalry. Thus this language can use the terms of physics, "balance of power", "power vacuum", and the latest "power projection", because of its assumptions of absolute space as inherently empty. The ethnocentric assumptions of this premise are powerful, all that is of concern is the support or denial thereof to other social groups in the great contest of superpower rivalry (Shapiro 1987b).

A critical Geopolitics can challenge this presupposition of space as a pregiven container of politics by focusing on power in terms of social relations rather in terms of physical domination of abstract space. If the critical Geopolitics that
this chapter advocates is to develop this theme of absolute space will have to be challenged directly. Smith (1984) has suggested some steps in this direction but the detailed critique of the spatial presuppositions remains to be worked out. Thus it has to investigate how the categorisations and cultural creations through which we come to understand and write, in turn shape our political existence. In particular a theoretical engagement with the political implications of the reification of space is long overdue; Lefevre (1976), Sack (1980), and Smith (1984) have pointed the way, but the task remains to reconstruct concepts of space and link them to the inquiry of Political Geography in more sophisticated ways than the concern with scale and ideology (Taylor 1982, Kirby 1985).

Further it needs an elaboration of the interrelations of concepts of political and social space, socially produced spaces, ones not grounded in assumptions of absolute space as political container (Bourdieu 1985, Foucault 1986). A promising point of departure lies in the literature focusing on the reconceptualisation of "peoples' space", understood in Esteva's (1987) terms of locality and horizon, in contrast to the modern formulation of absolute space and rigid boundaries. Here security can be linked to the politics of locality, not to the abstract spaces of state administration and rule. Thus security is extricated from the prerogatives of state rule and analysed in terms of people's control over their own social space.
These theoretical considerations parallel more concrete political critiques of geopolitics, particularly in Europe, and here too, Political Geography can also make a contribution. The reconceptualisation of security in nonspatial terms is essential, if rarely expressed in quite these terms, to the emerging European political discourse on dealignment. This literature challenges the hegemony of the superpowers and their geopolitical discursive practices directly.

The Geopolitical concerns of the CPD and in the Reagan administration, have fed the state centric military domination of discourse about security. The CPD were "doing geopolitics", in the traditional manner, providing geographical arguments to support the expansion of military forces, and the increased militarisation of the domestic political sphere of their respective states. The Geopolitical writings have addressed themselves to those concerned with enhancing political power of those states, principally for the politically active elements within the ruling classes who align themselves closely with the expansion of state power.

The possibilities that there may be other interests within the nation state whose security might be better served in other ways is neatly excluded by the simple ideological operation of universalising the particular interests of a narrow segment of the population within the ambit of the concept of "national security" (Buzan 1983). This provides us with the key point to both the theoretical critique of security as a practice of
spatial exclusion of Otherness, and to the literature on dealignment. Decoupling the concept of security from state security simultaneously raises the fundamental issues of politics and citizenship (Gallie 1978, Linklater 1982) and also provides political and intellectual space for the development of different conceptions of geopolitics and security.

Nuclear weapons are so enormously powerful, that they render all humans vulnerable and in this sense permanently insecure. The more they are accumulated, together with their methods of "delivery" the more insecure humanity in general, as well as in particular, becomes. This recognition underlies the peace movement in industrialised countries. While states stockpile these devices supposedly to bolster "national security", their citizens and those of every other state become progressively less safe. There is thus a link between individual and global security that is an important theme in the emerging European political discourse (Smith and Thompson eds 1987).

By displacing the state as the sole focus of analytic attention critical research allows consideration of the broader aspects of politics, seen properly as a broad conception of how society is organised. Doing this also gets beyond conservative definitions of Political Geography as the search for political order or strategic stability (Gottmann 1982, Segal 1986). Thus Political Geography can lose itself from its historic role as the handmaiden of imperial policies of the state (Hudson 1977), and also distance its analyses from the traditionally
state-centric preoccupations of the social sciences (MacLaughlin 1986a, 1986b).

The links between these preoccupations and the more traditional concerns of Geopolitics are clearly present in the expanding research literature on what can broadly be termed "alternative security". Here various approaches have been developed recently, in particular in the European context by researchers interested in examining alternative defensive arrangements which might provide credible defence systems without the inclusion of nuclear weapons or other weapons of massive destruction. These include proposals for political strategies as well as various possible strategies of civilian defence (Kaldor 1983, Alternative Defence Commission 1983, Tatchell 1985, Sharp 1973, 1985) and range to Yugoslavian ideas of total national defence as well as Swiss and Swedish models of armed neutrality.

The obvious importance of this research is that it provides practical alternatives to European reliance on NATO nuclear weapons as a method of "defence" against "the Russian Threat". Alternative defence provides just one obvious starting point for a Political Geography distancing itself from the state-centric preoccupations of Geopolitics. It offers this possibility because it inevitably will raise questions of the status of the

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state. In the process investigations of alternative security policies raise the fundamental political question of "security for whom?", and hence raise the question of the relationships between centralised command structures in the modern state, and the possibility for community defences and security policies controlled at the local level. Security is focused on social relations rather than the abstraction of state security understood in spatial terms.

This concern with security as social relations and social space links security with common security, which points to the interconnectedness of the fates of peoples in different places. Thus in Europe the emerging discourse on dealignment points to the common insecurity of all Europeans due to the presence of the division of the continent between the Soviet Union and the Americans and the consequent presence of numerous nuclear weapons on its soil (Kaldor and Falk eds 1987). The argument is that all Europeans would be more secure if the political division and its weapons technology can be transcended (Smith and Thompson eds 1987).

But it is also clear in this literature that this transcendence will have to occur in terms of new political sensitivities, ones that transcend and avoid the power plays of the state systems on both sides of the divide. This is not to once again announce the imminent demise of the territorial state (Herz 1957), but the link between new discursive practices and the political practice of social movements is clearly understood.
here as elsewhere (Mendlowitz and Walker eds 1987). From both left (Smith and Thompson 1987) and right (May 1984) as well as from East Europe (Konrad 1984), there are renewed calls for rethinking Europe's political future in ways that reduce its subjection to both superpower's military hegemony.

The move for de-alignment involves more than a disarmament campaign or a wholesale dismemberment of either of the blocs, but debates how Europeans can best move to increase their own security by reducing the threat posed by the bloc confrontation in that continent (Kaldor and Falk eds 1987). The equation of military (nuclear) weapons with security is no longer accepted as the premise for political discussion. While these approaches critique the Realist agenda, however this is not to underestimate the monopoly of power and decision making currently held by states.

The possibilities for change outside the state system should not be overestimated (Bull 1977). But the crucial point is that pressure for state change and adaption will be impossible without the kinds of linking of the local and the global dimensions of the security problem that are outlined here. Diplomacy is not immune to domestic or international opinion, it will be less invulnerable as alternative centres of discourse and empowerment develop, in the process causing shifts in other political agendas, which in turn restructure the political contexts within which states operate. These debates link up with wider global concerns for ecological survival development and
justice, all endangered by the process of global militarisation (Mendlowitz and Walker eds 1987).

These debates are direct challenges to superpower hegemony, which represents security as spatial exclusion, not as political decentralism and de-alignment. Thus they have an essential geopolitical dimension to which critical Political Geography can make a contribution. But a critical approach to Political Geography requires in addition a sensitivity to the methodological and cultural limitations of such projects and also a clear identification of the audiences for its work.

12.5 CHALLENGING HEGEMONY: CRITICAL POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

By way of a final comment on the potential further role of Political Geography in challenging the hegemony of security discourse, this section offers a series of cautionary theoretical reflections; a crude map of the paths that the above analysis suggests probably should be avoided in the further development of critical geopolitical analysis. First, it turns to the limitations of a Western conception of security. Second, to the related dangers of ethnocentric International Relations theory, and the dangers of grand theorising. Finally it turns to the necessity of relating critical work to the available audiences; the theme of "Geography for Whom?".

Where peace is defined as the ultimate objective by Western international scholars, for those writing from the
underdeveloped areas, peace and security are often of concern in terms of the reduction of poverty, social justice, the development issues and human rights. To poor people in Third World countries security is more likely to mean a regular supply of food and a roof, rather than a relaxation in the pace of nuclear arms development. In this conception peace in the narrow sense of avoiding nuclear war is very much a parochial concern of the West's. It is only in the Western industrialised world that the defence dilemma is so pressing, in that the armed forces cannot be used in a direct sense in combat (Buzan 1983). It also points to the inevitable failure of any attempt to reconstruct global hegemony in terms of U.S. economic leadership of a trilateralist sort. The unreconstituted economic arrangements of modernity cannot provide the kinds of security required by numerous Third World societies.

Thus security as a concept is not universally applicable in terms of military protection. The nuclear arms race and consequent insecurity for all of the human species is only one facet of this larger tendency. Thus a genuinely critical Geopolitics has to incorporate the larger issues of technological societies' challenge to global ecology as part of its problematic. In the Third World context violence and war are not necessarily viewed as the primary problem of global order and security. Development, justice and human rights in numerous cultural contexts and interpretations loom large and occupy a central place in political discourse. Neither is an uncritical
adoption of modernity a foregone conclusion, although aspects of
technology may be deemed desirable, and indeed actively promoted
by the ruling classes in developing states (Shiva 1986).

Thus, in addition, critical Political Geography will need to
avoid the ethnocentric limitations of politics defined in terms
of Western progress, of the universals of modernity. The
cultural resistances to modernity, and with it the Western
socialist preoccupations with technological progress, are an
important theme (Nandy 1986-7, Visvanathan 1986, 1987). Here the
incursion of the science and technology of advanced
industrialisms into the Third World bring with them genocidal
implications, not any form of salvation; ecological destruction,
not development (Shiva 1986). This critique extends to numerous
Marxist and world systems schemes for global transformation,
their ecological viability, and the human costs of their
implementation. A critical Political Geography should be
sensitive to the often genocidal impacts of the expansion of
unreconstituted modernity (Visvanathan 1987), as well as alert
to the ethnocentric limitations of the Marxist project (Dumont
1977, Turner 1978), and the whole question of whether modernity
is not premised on a simple will to power that ensures
enslavement (Levi 1979).

For Geographers a specific avenue of inquiry suggests itself
in terms of an ecological conception of security, relating
matters of local environmental conditions to the vulnerability
of populations to political, economic technological, as well as
military threats. These are obviously interconnected, related aspects of the local societal situation. But phrasing it in this way allows a focus on the political aspects of the situation and also the clear links to the politics of technological hazards that are increasingly a matter of concern to geographical research (Zeigler et al. 1983). A comprehensive formulation of security in these terms prevents its easy articulation with state power and the security discourse that this dissertation has examined.

The political debates over nuclear power and hazardous chemicals have focussed attention on the vulnerability of technologically sophisticated societies to technological disruption (Nelkin and Pollak 1981). The vulnerability of modern centralised energy systems to warfare are particularly noteworthy (Clark and Page 1984, Lovins and Lovins 1982). The concerns of the peace movement raise very clearly the dangers to security in the more explicitly political sense of the term which links these concerns with the domestic political implications of nuclear technology in general (Jungk 1979). It is no accident that the links between the consequences of the Chernobyl reactor accident and the arms race were so often drawn. As pointed out above, the links between the technological mastery of nature and the political institutions of the sovereign state are intimate.

These concerns link with concerns within Western countries about the needs for democratisation of the technological sphere,
both in terms of enhanced work place democracy and citizen input into siting and technological development decisions, covering the whole gamut of social and environmental agendas. The alternative technology and local initiatives for community economic development offer some interesting points of departure for Political Geography incorporating the challenges to the state that transcend national boundaries. These point to a way forward through the critique of the discourses of the technological state, recognising the limitations of each discourse to which it brings its attention. Thus the implicit ideological functions of these discourses of security are the focus, in challenging them the concepts of power and sovereignty are revealed and challenged rather than accepted and used.

The most obvious place to seek further theoretical insights into these concerns is within the critical literature of International Relations (Coate and Murphy 1985), although much International Relations literature remains trapped within the Realist categories of the state and security. In Ashley's (1984) terms it contributes to the rationalisation of global power politics. Ashley (1984) warns of the dangers of objectivist theories which become closed and mechanical and in the process reduce politics to economics and exclude the social basis of power from consideration. He also points to the exclusion of practice from theory leading to theoreticist preoccupations which lead away from issues of social change and tend to universalise particular historical experiences into an
ahistorical conceptual scheme (see Ruggie 1983). Such schemes often work to support hegemonic arrangements by granting eternal natures to transient and contingent historical phenomena. Critical theories in Political Geography must be constructed in ways that avoid these pitfalls.

International Relations as a definable field of study is very much dominated by English speaking practitioners, the principal academic journals are American and to a lesser extent British. Political Geography is similarly constrained (Perry 1987). What research is done elsewhere within the parameters of International Relations is often nationally orientated and preoccupied with national policy (Holsti 1985). Little general of theoretical material in the area has been generated by scholars outside the AngloSaxon mainstream, although exceptions like Raymond Aron (1966) do exist.

The dangers of this ought to be very clear given the ethnocentric concerns of this dissertation and the discussion of security in this section. This hegemony of Anglosaxon approaches is important in terms of providing intellectual props to the continued Western geopolitical culture. The assumption that International Relations will be conceptualised in similar terms globally remains a major problem for any attempts to generate a critical geopolitics. It seems essential for theorists of Political Geography to always bear this ethnocentric assumption in mind, Geopolitical matters in the non-Western societies are likely to have other preconceptions (Abdel-Malek 1977).
The traditional concerns of International Relations focused pre-dominately on European peace and balance of power questions. This is the principal concern of classical Geopolitics, and for that matter its more current versions. Matters of imperialism or the horizontal extension of power were at best a secondary concern. This suggests the need for caution against simplistic appeals to universal subjects and imagined human communities that may not exist to carry out the programs and correctives advocated by culture bound Geopoliticians. More specifically we need to treat with care appeals to a universal humanity that easily take off into idealist abstractions. Such universalistic claims are all to often appropriated by one state to justify its agenda in international politics. The traditional U.S. ideological rituals of moral exceptionalism appropriate human universals to an imperial project with little apparent difficulty. The CPD used this device blatantly in its policy statements.

There is also the related consideration that grand theorising is inherently authoritarian, imposing roles on "Others" in a grand scheme of things. Theorising of this type is of the kind traditional Geopolitics relished and its current reinterpreters also enjoy. It provides legitimation for the worst excesses of militarist policy and authoritarian rule by providing expert knowledge, in some "scientific" or "objective" manner, identifying its position as above sectional interest. Resting usually on some quasipositivist conceptualisation of
investigator as separate from the investigated it defines experience as other to be manipulated, changed and reorganised into patterns which suit the ultimate good of society with which the investigator identifies.

Traditional Geopolitics was just the sort of grand theorising that provides blueprints and policy advice to foreign policy specialists and strategic thinkers. In contrast a critical geopolitical consciousness needs to appeal to audiences beyond the narrow confines of state security bureaucracies. Indeed given their proclivities it will be unlikely to receive favourable hearing within these boundaries anyway, although the exceptions will prove important if national security policies are to take different courses in the future. A critical geopolitics, as with a critical social theory, must have different concerns, with in some form or other, human emancipation. Thus its focus has to be on exposing the plays of power of grand geopolitical schemes, and in the process, challenging the categorisations of discourses of power.

A related problem is the type of research into global problems which in its final stages appeals for reform on the basis of moral exhortation but without identifying the constituencies that might be empowered to carry out the reforms. Thus a prescription needs an analysis of who is to carry out the desired course of action. Political projects for reforming the national security state abound, but few have a worked out political strategy for accomplishing their ends.
Leaving aside the dangers of prescriptive efforts, critical approaches to geopolitics and security require the identification of the constituencies interested in these matters and in a position to challenge the current monopoly of security matters in the nation state. This call relates to the seemingly interminable debates about the relevance of geography, but more particularly to some of Harvey's writings on what kind of geography for what kind of public policy (1974), and more recently to his concerns with the role of, and audience for, a critical Human Geography (1984).

One obvious audience is the amorphous political entities known as peace movements, which are, among other concerns, attempting to engage political discourse in the links between the local and the global which transcend the narrow formulations of political concerns in statist modes. This encompasses more than just the protestors and pamphleteers, it includes an audience of concerned intellectuals and political activists as well as local government agencies, various organisations at the fringes of state structures, international agencies and quasi-official organisations. As pointed out above, there is also a wide variety of political organisations concerned with matters of human rights, justice, development and environment that are concerned with these issues.

At the local level in many Western states there is a rising awareness of security issues at a municipal or local government level, most visible in the campaigns to have areas declared
nuclear weapons free zones and in their refusal to participate in war preparations and civil defence exercises in preparation for nuclear war (Barnaby 1985). In addition there are numerous initiatives of "citizen diplomacy" aimed at bypassing the ritualistic exchanges of international diplomacy. In the Third World the potential audience may often be concerned with somewhat different although related matters of development and human rights (Mendelowitz and Walker eds 1987).

All these audiences are concerned with the issues of security and survival in ways that bypass and indeed to certain degrees challenge the state's monopoly on issues of international affairs (Falk 1982, 1984, 1986). These in turn raise the deeper questions of the nature of sovereignty and the state, challenging the very basis of political organisation of the modern state in terms of the twin themes of domination of nature and the control over a precisely defined territory. While obviously this challenge is as yet often peripheral it is important for the argument being made here to recognise that it is at these intersticies that political debate and empowerment are occurring. Hence they are sites for contributions that challenge the bases of the modern security dilemma. They provide focii for the "discourses of dissent" (Walker 1983/4).
A critical geopolitics thus asks, as this dissertation has done, how the discourses of geopolitics function politically. These concerns stretch beyond the narrow confines of academic Political Geography and address the broader concerns of culture and the production of place and identity. But contrary to the traditional concern of much "humanistic" Geography it has to do so fully informed of the importance of political arrangements, specifically of relations of power in these productions.

Discourses limit what it is possible to talk of and about, the agendas of Political Geography research will in turn limit what it is we talk of and about, and how we proceed to conduct our research and writing. With discourse come matters of political power, geographers face these choices directly in their work, political geographers have to choose whither their efforts will lead, to grandiose schemes with totalitarian consequences or towards more critical pluralistic endeavours empowering new political subjects.

This dissertation has argued for the latter approach. Focusing on the rituals of power in the discourse of international politics allows their demystification and contributes to the counter hegemonic projects of critical inquiry (Said 1985a, 1985b). In Georg Lukacs' (1973) terms, intellectuals are responsible for their products, perhaps even more so than the engineers and physicists who often get much of
the blame for the current crisis.

To tackle the hegemonic discourses of power politics requires taking seriously the multiplicity of critiques of existing political discourse,

...all of which take for their point of departure the right of formerly un- or misrepresented human groups to speak for and represent themselves in domains defined, politically and intellectually, as normally excluding them, usurping their signifying and representing functions, overriding their historical reality. (Said 1985a:4)

In doing so it rejects the politics of grand detachment, the illusion of the Archimedean point from which the whole world can be grasped, in favour of critical disputations of the designations of reality specified by hegemonic discourses.

The nuclear bomb may have changed the realities of political power but it is the practices of geopolitical discourse, that have come to terms with the enduring possibility of mass destruction. It is precisely these discourses of security that define and delimit the bounds of political discussion, acting to reproduce the militarisation of culture and politics that this dissertation has attempted to challenge. By starting from a critical recognition of the role of geopolitical discourse, and then exploring the possibilities of alternative formulations of security with a potential for social transformation, this chapter has shown that Political Geography can offer some contributions to the quest for survival, peace and justice, and in the process, shed its ignominious past.
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