THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND LEADERSHIP-MEMBER RELATIONS

by

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The Reform Party of Canada: Immigration Policy and Leadership-Member Relations

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Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to examine aspects of intra-party democracy in the Reform Party of Canada (RPC). The study focuses on the party's leadership-member relations associated with the RPC's policy-making. The thesis outlines the way in which the RPC's immigration policy has developed since the Party's inception, and explores the degree to which the RPC leadership's position on immigration policy has prevailed over that of the party rank and file.

Immigration policy has been a difficult area for the RPC. Because the party advocates reducing annual immigration quotas and disbanding official multiculturalism, it has tended to attract individuals who believe the immigration of ethnic minorities to Canada has been detrimental to the country. In addition, many of these individuals feel alienated because of changes in Canada's social, ideological and economic structures.

The RPC speaks to the concerns of such individuals. A self-proclaimed populist party, the RPC garners support by evoking a world view comprised of the people versus a power bloc of unaccountable and overpaid politicians, bureaucrats, and members of government funded special interest groups.

The party's commitment to populism is, however, also a source of contention. The RPC promotes itself as a party that adheres to the wishes of its rank and file and practices "bottom-up" policy formulation. At the same time,
because the RPC's membership tends to take a relatively strident position on immigration policy, the leadership has deemed it necessary to override many of its members' policy proposals in order that the party represents a credible alternative to the other federal parties.

Utilizing organization theory, and specifically incentive analysis, the thesis concludes by offering some explanations as to why the RPC has prospered despite the inconsistencies from which it evidently suffers. It is suggested that the flexibility of the RPC's leadership in terms of policy formulation is related to the degree to which party members depend on the RPC for incentives of identity. It is also argued that the loyalty RPC leader Preston Manning inspires in party members as a result of his situational charisma further contributes to the leadership's freedom of movement.
This thesis is dedicated to
Sheila, Norman and Doug.
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Chapter One

Introduction

With the exception of First Nations Canadians, Canada is an immigrant nation. Initially, immigrants helped serve France and Britain's colonial endeavours by contributing to their quest for raw materials. Following Confederation, immigrants were crucial to the success of the government's nation building plans, which required more labour than Canada's population could provide (Baureiss, 1987, p.16).

Immigration policy continues to be of significance to Canada and has, over the years, reflected the prevailing concerns and objectives of various administrations. For example, apprehension regarding the implications for Canada's economy of an ageing population and a decreased birthrate, led to expanded immigration levels during the 1980s (Pink, 1990, p.33). These larger quotas were also the result of a 1985 government report which emphasized the need for increased immigration, particularly in the economic or independent category (Seward and Tremblay, 1989, p.6).¹

However, as many authors have noted, immigration is a difficult area of public policy. William Marr and M.B. Percy write of this policy area that:

(t)he fundamental problem in developing immigration

¹The guidelines for Canada's current immigration policy are provided by the 1976 immigration Act. This Act states that the goal of Canada's immigration programme is the fulfilment of social, economic, and humanitarian objectives (Marrocco, and Goslett, 1985, p.7).
policy is that it is selfish by its very nature. A prime objective is to limit entry of non-residents, and so protect the living standards of large groups of residents of the receiving country (Marr and Percy, 1986, p.68).

Moreover, political parties tend to dislike addressing issues with ethical and moral implications such as immigration. Accordingly, one political scientist observed that politicians "try to avoid them [such issues] like the plague" (Tanguay cited in Mittelstaedt, 1993, p.A4).

Canada's federal parties, with the exception of the Reform Party of Canada (RPC), take a similar position on immigration policy. The RPC's political counterparts tend to view relatively large immigration quotas as positive for the Canadian economy. Although the Progressive Conservative (PC) government implemented a new immigration Bill in 1993 which narrowed the criteria for admission under family and refugee categories, the government did not advocate reducing quotas. The successor Liberal government intends to accept 250,000 immigrants in 1994. This target is slightly higher than 1993's figure of 246,000. It is, however, lower than the Liberals' future target of 1% of Canada's population which would constitute approximately 289,000 immigrants annually (York, 1994a, pp.A1-A2).

In contrast, the RPC would reduce annual immigrant quotas to roughly 150,000 (Makin, 1993, p.A3). The party contends Canada's immigration policy of the last 25 years has been excessively focused on fulfilling social and family
objectives to the detriment of the Canadian economy. For its part, the RPC would prevent any extension to the family class, and would render the refugee determination process more restrictive than that provided by the PC's 1993 Bill C-86 (Harper, 1993). The party would focus immigration policy on the independent immigrant classification, and would amend the process for evaluating prospective immigrants within this class (Manning, 1992a, p.3).

The RPC's leadership claims immigration policy is not as critical to the party's project as are its proposals for fiscal, constitutional, and parliamentary reform (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992, p.373). Indeed, during an interview, chief policy officer Stephen Harper suggested the party's position on immigration is primarily a facet of the RPC's larger fiscal concerns (Harper, 1993). To support this position, he pointed to the RPC's official policy platform which states the party "supports an immigration policy that has as its focus Canada's economic needs and that welcomes genuine refugees" (RPC, 1993, p.6).²

Although immigration policy is possibly not as crucial to the RPC's agenda as some of its other platforms, the issue has been of considerable significance to the party. The RPC's position on immigration has generated a certain

²This document, as well as the other RPC "Blue Books," is the "authoritative reference guide for the official policy positions of the Reform Party of Canada as adopted by party Assemblies" (RPC, 1993, p.1).
image of the party which has influenced the nature of the RPC's membership, and provided ammunition for its opponents. Consequently, immigration policy has proven to be a difficult and sensitive area for the party.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether the RPC's leadership does indeed view immigration policy as an economic issue, or if there are other beliefs informing its position in this regard. Rather, what is of interest here is the way in which perceptions arising from the RPC's immigration policy have required the leadership to act in order that the party appears a credible alternative to the other federal parties.

Because the RPC advocates narrowing immigration criteria, reducing annual quotas, and disbanding official multiculturalism, the party has tended to attract some members with extremist or racist beliefs. As Globe and Mail

3 The RPC's opposition to official multiculturalism is consistent with its broader ideological position concerning the appropriate role of the state. In the party's view, cultural differences are properly dealt with by individuals. It should not, therefore, be a function of the state to promote culture. According to Thomas Flanagan, the party's former director of policy, strategy and communications, the RPC's desire to end federal multiculturalism subsidies is also "part of our larger concern with fiscal responsibility," thus the party "does not object to the social reality of multiculturalism in Canada" (Flanagan, 1992, p.4).

4 There have been a number of members expelled for racism during the RPC's existence. For example, in March 1992, Wolfgang Droege, James Dawson, Nicola Polinuk and Peter Mitrevski, were expelled when it was discovered they were members of the white-supremacist organization The Heritage Front ("Reform Kicks Out," 1992, p.A3).
journalist Miro Cernetig suggested during an interview, certain RPC policies push attitudinal "buttons," which appeal to reactionary individuals (Cernetig, 1994). Moreover, until the party's 1991 Saskatoon Assembly, the RPC explicitly stated its opposition to an immigration policy which dramatically alters Canada's ethnicity (RPC, 1988a, p.23). This statement presumably tapped into the resentment and insecurity of those convinced the immigration of ethnic minorities to Canada has been to the country's detriment.

As well as attracting individuals with these beliefs, this platform has prompted accusations from the RPC's opponents that the party harbours racists and a racist agenda. The party's formal opposition to an immigration policy which alters Canada's ethnicity has, then, provided the other federal parties with ample ammunition with which to attack the party. Thus, in November 1991 Liberal deputy leader Sheila Copps compared the RPC's policies to those of American white supremacist David Duke (O'Neil, 1991a, p.A1).

While Copps' position is extreme, its essence has been articulated by other members of her party. When asked to respond to Copps' comments, Manitoba Liberal M.P. John Harvard replied that he, "wouldn't use [Copps'] kind of language," however he added "Reform party policies reach out to people who I think are intolerant" (O'Neil, 1991b, p.A4).

Both Copps' and Harvard's comments were made in November 1991. At the time, the statement concerning the
RPC's opposition to immigration altering Canada's ethnic mix had been only recently deleted from the party's Blue Book.5 These M.P.s' comments can, therefore, be viewed within the context of this policy. However, the statement continues to provide grist to the mill for the RPC's opponents. The New Democrat Party (NDP), refers specifically to the statement in the party's official comment on immigration policy released in September 1993. In this document the NDP claims:

Reform would select immigrants to retain the "present ethnic makeup" of Canada. New Democrats strongly oppose immigration selection based on race and wealth, which is what Reform policy amounts to (NDP, 1993, p.1).

The RPC's early policy on immigration clearly remains problematic for the party, and has led to an impression which has been difficult to alter. Efforts at transforming perceptions of the party's agenda have been rendered particularly difficult when RPC members, claiming their comments are based on fiscal concerns, make remarks easily construed as racist. For example, M.P. Herbert Grubel stated in an all candidate forum in October 1993, that "new immigrants on average in the first few years of their lives here- all economic studies have shown this- are a burden on

5A resolution to delete the policy was carried at the 1991 Saskatoon Assembly. The RPC's position on official multiculturalism was also modified at Saskatoon. A policy approved at the 1989 Edmonton Assembly stating that the party "supports the responsibility of the state to promote, preserve, and enhance the national culture. The state may assist, and should encourage, ethnic cultures to integrate into the national culture," was removed (RPC, 1991a, p.4).
The RPC's leadership has employed various strategies in an attempt to improve the party's somewhat tarnished image. One tactic has been to reverse accusations the RPC has a racist agenda to claim that, on the contrary, it is the sole Canadian party that is not racist. The RPC argues that because it insists race should not to be a factor in the relationship between state and citizen, it is a racially neutral party (Manning, 1992a, p.3). RPC leader E. Preston Manning, declared in January 1993:

"It is necessary for us Canadians (who are sometimes very smug on the subject of racism) to admit something- and that is to admit that at present there IS a "latent racism" in Canada's constitutional arrangements, immigration policies, and cultural policies, and that those arrangements and policies need to be "reformed" to make them more racially neutral. This is a perspective on the potential for racism in Canada, and an approach to combating it, that you will NOT hear from the traditional politicians and parties, but which you WILL hear from Reformers if you care to listen to what we are actually saying and proposing (Emphasis in the original- Manning, 1993, p.2).

The leadership claims, therefore, that the RPC should be particularly attractive to ethnic groups because it is the only party that does not grant special status to

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6This argument stems from Grubel's paper in which he suggests newly arrived immigrants can burden the Canadian economy. He also notes that over the long-term,"the economic effects of immigration on the welfare of resident Canadians tend to be positive" (Grubel, 1992, p.124). The paper is a cost benefit analysis on the impact of traditional and non-traditional immigrants. While it is an exercise in economics its substance, however dispassionate, can be interpreted as racist.

Another approach the RPC's leadership has employed in attempting to demonstrate the party has no Anglo-Saxon agenda, has been to specifically address various minority groups. Manning thus told a group of Jewish community leaders in 1991 that:

I despise racism in general, and anti-semitism in particular, and frankly cannot understand the mental processes and values of people who hold and defend racial prejudices. I am prepared to do whatever it takes to remove concerns about racism and anti-semitism in connection with the Reform Party of Canada, and to make it attractive to people who may have had those concerns (Manning, 1990b, pp.2-3)

In addition, the party elite has raised the spectre of political correctness in its effort to neutralize the party's image. This term tends to be used pejoratively by those seeking to identify it as an intrusion on freedom of speech. In response to accusations in the Commons by some Liberals that the RPC has a racist agenda, Reform M.P.s complained, "the Reform Party is being persecuted for its

7Abu-Laban and Stasiulis argue, however, the RPC's denial of an ethnic base evokes the ethnocentric notion that Anglo-Saxon Canadians are non-ethnic (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992, p.382).
failure to behave in a politically correct fashion" (York, 1994b, p.A3).

Finally, the RPC has moderated the tone of its immigration policy, and the leadership has grown increasingly cautious when formulating policy in this area (Harper, 1993). Indeed, since the RPC's inception the leadership has opposed the majority of its membership's immigration policy proposals. Thus, examples of the party leadership stifling members' policy preferences are found throughout the development of the RPC's immigration policy.

The leadership's endeavours in this regard are particularly evident in the policy-making process which culminated with the RPC's 1991 Saskatoon Assembly, and the party's current immigration policy. This process saw the leadership advising members to vote against policy proposals on immigration submitted by party constituency associations. These proposals indicate RPC members generally favour a more conservative policy than that found in the party's 1993 Blue Sheet. Results of delegate surveys conducted at party Assemblies, and my own interviews with a number of RPC members, also suggest the party's immigration policy reflects the opinions of its rank and file rather poorly. 8

It would be mistaken to suggest the policy platforms of political parties customarily reflect their members' views.

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8 Please see Appendix One for details of these interviews.
with great accuracy. However, because the RPC places great emphasis on the "bottom-up" nature of its policy-making the disparity of opinion which this thesis suggests is significant. A self-proclaimed populist party, the RPC has been at pains to construct an image of itself as a party that adheres closely to the policy impetus of its rank and file. Thus, in his address to the 1991 RPC Edmonton Rally, Manning declared:

(t)he Reform Party's vision of a New Canada and the policies to take us there were mainly developed by employing the tools of a democratic populist party—hundreds and hundreds of meetings (often small meetings) organized by citizens among their own friends and neighbours, in their own communities, at their own expense. In other words, our vision of a New Canada, whatever its pluses and minuses may be, has its roots in the common sense of the common people (Manning, 1991, p.2).

Much of the RPC's literature contains similar populist affirmations. Prospective members are advised that, "(w)e are "grass roots" people who believe that political authority flows from the bottom up, not from the top down" (RPC, 1987a, p.2).

Despite the party's asserted commitment to populism and intra-party democracy, the RPC's leadership has deemed it necessary to exert considerable control over the members' impetus in the party's immigration policy. The formulation of the RPC's immigration policy is, therefore, an appropriate topic through which to examine the party's leadership-member relations.
Chapter two, provides an account of the RPC's genesis. In this chapter, I attempt to situate the party within the context of western alienation, and draw some parallels between the early Alberta Social Credit Party and the RPC. I also discuss the nature of these parties' populism.

Chapter three is a chronology of the development of the RPC's immigration policy. I examine the RPC's Assemblies dating from 1987-1991, and detail some incidents related to the RPC's immigration policy which have required the leadership to act in order to protect the party's credibility.

Chapter four is a review of some of the literature on organizational theories of political parties. In addition, I offer some explanations as to why the RPC has been largely successful at sustaining and increasing the size of its membership despite the party's apparent inconsistencies. Thus, although in 1993 the RPC's membership declined somewhat from 137,000 to 120,000 (Cernetig, 1993a, p.A), the party has enjoyed a relatively healthy rate of membership growth. In December 1990, the party's membership doubled that of the previous year to reach 50,000 (Manning, 1990a, p.1) By July 1991 it had increased to 70,000 (O'Neill, p.5), while in November of that year the membership reached approximately 95,000 (Bray, 1991, p.6). By January 1992 the party's membership had risen again to 107,000, and by the
spring it had grown to 110,000 (Martin, 1992, p.B17).

I conclude the thesis by employing incentive analysis to argue that the freedom of the RPC's leadership in terms of the party's policy formulation is related to the degree to which party members rely on the RPC for incentives of identity. I also suggest that because of his situational charisma, Preston Manning is able to inspire a high level of loyalty in party members which further contributes to the leadership's flexibility.
Chapter Two
The RPC, Western Alienation and Populism in Alberta: Introduction

Janine Brodie argues that Canadian politics continues to be inextricably linked to divisive conflicts arising from the spatial distribution of economic development, state activity, government services, living standards, and political power. Moreover, Brodie suggests that in contrast to "the experience of many advanced capitalist countries, spatially based conflict in Canada has not disappeared or diminished as the pace of development has accelerated" (Brodie, 1990, p.5).

The history of the prairie provinces bears testimony to Brodie's observations. One of the manifestations of the conflicts of which she writes has been the rise of various protest movements and political parties. The raison d'être of most of these organizations has been the redress of the political and economic discrimination to which their constituencies believe they are subject.

The articulation of western discontent is, then, a familiar phenomenon within Canadian politics. Roger Gibbins makes this point when he claims:

the west as a region possesses great continuity with the past, continuity expressed through the interlocking themes that western Canada is always outgunned in national politics and that, as a consequence, it has been subjected to varying degrees of economic exploitation by central Canada (Gibbins, cited in Braid and Sharpe, 1990, pp.17-18).
The RPC embodies this recurring expression of western protest. The party's founding slogan—"The West Wants In—" plainly articulated the sense of exclusion and discrimination which forms the foundation of the west's traditional dissatisfaction with its position in Canada's federal system. In his foreword in the RPC's 1988 Blue Book, Manning expresses this view. He writes:

the heartland-hinterland model that concentrates industry and economic opportunity in Southern Ontario and Southern Quebec, hides behind walls of protection and insecurity, and treats the rest of the country as a captive market and resource reservoir to be forever exploited (RPC, 1988, p.3).

The RPC dropped its original slogan in 1990 when the party leadership turned its attention east. Rhetoric concerning western alienation was also toned down (Sharpe and Braid, 1992, p.30). However, while the leadership has determinedly promoted the RPC as a national party, the party remains a western based organization. Although coming second in fifty-seven of ninety-nine Ontario ridings in 1993's federal election, the party won only one seat east of Manitoba ("Election'93," 1993, pp.A12-13). Moreover, Tom Flanagan points out many of the party's second place showings in Ontario were considerably behind those of the winning candidates. Indeed, Flanagan appears correct when he suggests that a possibly more meaningful measure of the RPC's strength in Ontario is whether the party received at least half as many votes in the ridings as the winner. In
Ontario the RPC achieved this in only 23 constituencies (Flanagan, 1994, p.16).

Before discussing the rise of the RPC in more detail, it is appropriate to situate the party within the broader context of western alienation. In addition, because the RPC's populism, and pattern of leadership-member relations bears some resemblance to that of the former Social Credit party of Alberta,¹ it is relevant to draw some parallels between these two parties.

**Western Alienation**

Like Gibbins, George Melnyk suggests that contemporary western regionalism exhibits considerable continuity with the past. Arguing that its expression has undergone a number of different phases,² Melnyk traces western discontent back to the fur trade era of the late seventeenth century. The Metis were the first advocates of regional self-

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¹As an aside, it is interesting that Alberta's Social Credit shared with the RPC a preference for a rather restrictive, economically oriented immigration policy. According to a Social Credit resolution in 1943, "an unrestricted influx of immigrants from war-torn Europe might cause a serious dislocation of post-war development and accentuate the problems inherited from past mistakes, unless adequate supervision is exercised in regard to the number, types and qualifications of those desiring to enter the country as settlers (Social Credit Board, 1943, p.55).

²Melnyk's phases of western discontent are similar to W.L. Morton's conceptualization of western political protest. Morton classifies this protest into three phases he labels the "bias of prairie politics." See Morton's (1955) The Bias of Prairie Politics. Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series III, XLIX (II).
determination, leading the resistance against colonial expansion in 1870 and 1885. This fur trade regionalism established the evolving character of western alienation which, for Melynk, is its fundamental characteristic. He claims that new phases of western protest emerge as the socioeconomic basis of existing forms decline (Melnyk, 1992a, pp.1-4).

According to Melnyk, fur trade regionalism gave way to agrarian protest which, following World War II, declined as agriculture became less important to the region's economy. During the 1970s the west entered into a provincial-rights movement period when Alberta and Saskatchewan engaged in "energy wars" with the federal government. Melnyk maintains this phase has more recently shifted to "continentalist regionalism." He argues that the rise of the RPC heralded this new period of western protest which stems partly from changes in the international marketplace and global geopolitical realignment. These changes have, "put a host of new ideas and forces into play around the world and in the region-forces both centrifugal and centripetal" (Melnyk, 1992a, pp.4-9).

In sum, Melnyk suggests the articulation of western discontent has manifested itself in cyclical phases which have resulted from changes in Canada's political economy. But while Melnyk may be correct in identifying a pre-Confederation form of western discontent, western
regionalism was also the result of an institutionalized hinterland-centre relationship established at Confederation. John Richards and Larry Pratt write that:

(Within) the political framework of the National Policy of John A. Macdonald's Conservative government, the prairie west was consciously settled and developed as an economic hinterland. This colonialism was no accident of history. It was imposed as an act of policy by the ambitious business-state coalition put together by Macdonald and his associates following Confederation. The political motive behind the policy of westward expansion was defensive: to offset the increasing north-south pull of American markets and to strengthen Canada's east-west axis through western settlement and construction of an all-Canadian transcontinental railroad (Richards and Pratt, 1979, p.15).

The west's sense of inequality, or as Richards and Pratt put it, the perception, "that some provinces were more equal than others" (Richards and Pratt, 1979, p.15), has resulted in the appearance of protest movements. Following Confederation, the emergence of these movements virtually paralleled agricultural settlement. One of the earliest was the Manitoba and North West Farmer's Protective Union, which was founded in 1883, but later absorbed by the Manitoba Liberal party. The Patrons of Industry, originally from Ontario, also surfaced briefly in Manitoba. In 1901, the Saskatchewan based Territorial Grain Growers Association of Assiniboia was established, followed in 1903 by the Manitoba Grain Growers Association. A similar organization formed in Alberta in 1905. It later merged with the Alberta Society of Equity in 1909 and eventually became the United Farmers of

The specific economic and political grievances responsible for the birth of these protest movements were numerous. They included freight rates which westerners found excessively high, powerful and seemingly uncompassionate central Canadian banks, and protective tariffs on farm machinery and consumer products which escalated costs to farmers whose own goods were sold on unprotected international markets (Gibbins, 1985, p.100). The movements also lobbied for the regulation of marketing practices at grain elevators as well as for the right to run their own elevator companies and grain marketing agencies (Betke, 1992, p.163).

The movements' political grievances also stemmed from the belief that the governments formed by established political parties were unresponsive to their members' demands. The conviction that they were not being represented in the political sphere steered the organized farmers towards electoral politics. The UFA entered federal and provincial politics in 1921, defeated the Liberals to win the 1921 Alberta provincial election, and remained in power until 1935 when it was defeated by William Aberhart's Social Credit Party (Conway, 1978, p.120). Aberhart's party won the election with a landslide victory securing fifty-six of the legislature's sixty-three seats (Elliot, 1978, p.38).
The Social Credit Party emerged during the crisis of the Great Depression, the effects of which were particularly devastating for Alberta. A drop in world wheat prices—the price of a bushel dropped from $1.02 in 1929 to 32 cents by 1932—had dealt a devastating blow to farmers who derived 60% of their field crop income from wheat (Pashak, 1971, pp.28-30). The province's economy was heavily dependent on agriculture, and although in 1931 non-agricultural workers constituted 47% of the labour force, the agriculture sector was primarily responsible for generating non-agricultural jobs (Finkel, 1984, p.112). The profound sense of regional injustice and exploitation felt by Albertans was reinforced when the federal government raised tariffs as the Depression deepened; once again tariff policy became a source of east-west antagonism (Pashak, 1971, pp.385-386).

Social Credit evolved from a series of groups established to study social credit theory, as developed by Major C.H. Douglas. Central to Douglas's theory was the

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3Maurice Pinard discusses the relationship between crisis and the emergence of new parties in (1971) The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics and (1973) Third Parties In Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of One-Party Dominance. Canadian Journal of Political Science 6 pp.439-460. See also, Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanquay who argue that the appearance of third parties is stimulated by "non-representation of significant social groups in the traditional party system, a sharp reversal of economic fortunes combined with the systematic blocking of the economic ambitions of important social strata (as happened with Quebec's Francophone new middle class prior to the emergence of the PQ), and the existence of strong social ties among the disaffected groups" (Gagnon and Tanquay, 1989, p.240).
assumption of the existence of an undifferentiated general will common to all people. This consisted of the desire for "individual freedom, plenty and economic security" (Macpherson, 1953, p.126). Aberhart simplified Douglas's rather esoteric doctrine presenting it as "a wonderfully simple plan." Linking this plan to the hardship of the Depression, the Social Credit Party was created in early 1935 (Flanagan and Lee, 1992, p.183, Friesen, 1984, p.413).

In addition to economic crisis, Albertans were experiencing a crisis in terms of their political representation. The UFA had become discredited by scandals (Finkel, 1992/93, p.87) and because of its inability to effectively deal with the effects of the Depression (Macpherson, 1953, p.92). The Labour Party had also grown unpopular, and had come to be viewed as a self-interested clique of conservative union leaders, who "made little attempt to involve or even appear to involve "ordinary folk" in party affairs" (Finkel, 1984, pp.116-117). The working-class in Alberta presumably experienced similar feelings of marginalization and powerlessness as the farmers. Consequently, Social Credit was able to mobilize support across class lines. John Irving aptly sums up the conditions

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4Indeed, Macpherson suggests Aberhart's rendering of Douglas' social credit theory was such that it "was not social credit at all in any sense that Douglas could recognize" (Macpherson, 1953, p.164). Mallory also describes the way in which orthodox social creditors insisted Aberhart had entirely failed to understand Douglas' doctrines (Mallory, 1954, p.62).
leading to the success of Social Credit when he writes:

(t)he provincial government, grown conservative through long years in office, offered no solution to the people's problems. Further... the representatives of the Eastern financial interests who visited Alberta to discuss the payment of loans and mortgages were insistent that the obligations of the hard-pressed farmers must be met in full; the lowering of interest rates was unthinkable; there could be no adjustment whatever of principal indebtedness. Confronted with the depression on these terms, it is not surprising that thousands of people had developed embittered and hostile attitudes towards both the government and the monetary and financial system. Social Credit was a philosophy made to order for distribution among people with such political and economic attitudes (Irving, 1959, p. 335).

Social Credit presented itself as the saviour of a despairing people, promising to represent them where the government and other parties seemed unable or unwilling to do so. In addition, the party garnered support by employing a populist strategy which championed the cause of "the people" against "the vested interests" (Young, 1978, p. 99). This discourse, which clearly delineated the villains responsible for Albertans' plight, obviously worked to give the Social Credit Party great psychological appeal. At the same time, the economic and political crisis in which Albertans found themselves, provided a window of opportunity for the success of such an approach. Indeed, writing on populism, Ernesto Laclau maintains that it surfaces in its various forms during, "a crisis of the dominant ideological discourse, which is in turn part of a more general social crisis" (Laclau, 1977, p. 175).
Alberta's economic and political grievances changed over the years, but continued to smoulder, coming to a head with the 1970s energy crisis. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, various provinces attempted to acquire more autonomy over the regulation of their financial and human resources. In Alberta, the provincial Conservatives established control of the gas and oil industry with the creation of the Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission (Brodie, 1990, pp.191-197).

The 1973 OPEC crisis at first appeared a godsend to Alberta because the dramatic increase in oil prices promised a boom for the provincial treasury. The federal government, however, froze the price of domestic oil, allowing the price of exports to rise to world levels. The Liberals then collected the difference between the domestic and export prices, and subsidized the cost of importing oil in eastern Canada (Brodie, 1990, p.198). The Liberals' endeavours undoubtedly reinforced Albertan's sense of exploitation by central Canada, and the challenge to the province's authority fuelled their sense of powerlessness and alienation.

Albertans were further infuriated by the Liberal's implementation of official bilingualism. The Liberals were already deeply distrusted, indeed Flanagan has gone so far as to call them socialists masquerading as Liberals (Flanagan, 1992a, p.1). The federal government made little
attempt to justify the legislation to Albertans, and failed to exhibit sensitivity regarding its impact on the ethnically diverse west, so distant from Quebec. The resulting, occasionally hostile, anti-bilingualism, was part of a general frustration with Ottawa's apparent preoccupation with Quebec, which appeared to push western concerns from the national political agenda (Gibbins, 1980, p.178).

Alberta persevered in its attempts to roll back federal intrusions, and as its wealth increased, clashes over fiscal and jurisdictional matters continued between it and the Liberals (Melnyk, 1992b, p.293). In 1980, the Trudeau government, following its nation-building policy, instituted the National Energy Policy (NEP). It had three stated goals: Canadianization of the industry; security of supply; and equitable distribution of resource rents (Brodie, 1990, p.209). Brodie argues a further hidden objective was the reduction of the growing economic power of the provinces.

For many westerners the NEP evidently represented:

* a massive raid by a spendthrift federal government (the Trudeau government's accumulated deficit at that point was $72 billion) on the resource wealth of western Canada, as well as a massive federal intrusion (through the use of federal taxing, pricing, and regulatory powers) into provincial jurisdiction over natural resources (Manning, 1992b, p.121).

As much as Albertans resented the federal government's incursions, perhaps greater indignation stemmed from years of minimal representation within national government.
Between 1957 and the 1980s, elected federal Liberals were rare in the West, and although repeatedly rejected there, they continued to win national office. There were, therefore, too few western MPs in the Cabinet for Albertans to feel adequately represented. This lack of representation was hard to reconcile with Alberta's status as one of the wealthiest provinces (Wiseman, 1992, p.286).

The years of frustration with the Federal Liberals led to extremely high expectations of redress when the Conservatives won the 1984 federal election. Disenchanted conservative Albertans assumed they would finally be represented in Cabinet, and, consequently, more attention would be paid to Western concerns. This optimism was short-lived, however, and disenchantment soon set in as many Albertans came to feel that the despised NEP was being dismantled too slowly. Furthermore, the national agenda still appeared dominated by Quebec's constitutional demands. This view was strengthened by the Meech Lake Constitutional negotiations and agreement (Archer and Ellis, 1993, p.5) 5.

For many Albertans, the Conservative administration seemed preoccupied with economic strategies aimed at improving central Canada's economy, as the West headed

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5The extent of the Meech Lake Accord's unpopularity within the RPC's membership is indicated by a delegate survey conducted at the party's 1989 Edmonton Assembly. 84.4% of respondents wanted the accord rejected, while none of the survey's respondents wished to see it ratified unchanged (Ellis and Robb, 1989, p.6)
deeper into recession. Disenchantment with the Conservatives was heightened when a Montreal firm was awarded a lucrative contract to maintain Canada's CF-18 fleet despite an evidently superior bid from a Winnipeg firm (Sharpe and Braid, 1992, p.5).

The awarding of the contract appears to have epitomized for westerners the federal government's approach to their region, and the incident has provided justification for the RPC's argument regarding the need for reform. References to the contract frequently appear in the RPC's early literature; for instance the party's 1988 Blue Book explains that, "Reformers believe that such radically discriminatory actions as the National Energy Programm and CF-18 contract would never have passed" [if regional fairness tests were implemented] (RPC, 1988, p.6). The contract was awarded in 1987, the year in which the RPC was officially founded.

The Genesis of the RPC

It is difficult to overstate the centrality of Preston Manning to the RPC. A great many of the party's policies and principles are the result of Manning's work of the past twenty years (Manning, 1992b, pg.147), and he has had an enormous influence on the party's platform and agenda (O'Neill, 1991, p.39).

Murray Dobbin describes the way in which Preston Manning waited until the moment appeared right to harness the energy of a wave of populist discontent and organize a
political party. This is indeed consistent with Manning's own description of his political career. Thus, when Preston Manning's father resigned as leader of the Social Credit party in 1968, it was rumoured that his son would succeed him. According to Preston, however, he preferred to wait and "rather than getting on the tail end of the populist movements produced on the Canadian prairies during the Depression, (I) would wait for the next one" (Manning, 1992b p.7). At the same time, one implication of Dobbin's account is that Manning did not wait for the next populist movement per se, but rather for the one which could be organized and nurtured by a few politically conservative and pragmatic individuals.⁶

Although not active within any formally established political parties, Preston Manning was involved in politics in one way or another over the years. He assisted his father in writing Political Realignment- A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians which was published in 1967. In 1978 he was the executive director of the Movement for National Political

⁶Some authors have demonstrated that the intentions and policy goals of party founders play a significant role in shaping party's organizational structures. Thomas Koelble, for instance, compares the goals of the founders of the West German Green Party and the British Social Democratic Party, and finds Duverger's argument that "party organization can be explained only through analysis of the origins of the particular party," to be accurate (Koelble, 1989, p.213). If Koelble is correct, then the goals of the RPC's founders— which I argue were to harness populist discontent to build a pragmatic conservative party— explain in part why the Party is controlled from the top down to the degree it is.
Change (MNPC). The Movement presented itself as a "political education movement," planned to hold regional conventions and, according to Dobbin, was reminiscent of Preston's efforts in founding the RPC. The MNPC collapsed in 1980, the same year that Alberta experienced the birth of more parties fuelled by western alienation than it had in decades. These parties included the Confederation of Regions (COR), the western Canada Concept Party, the Christian Heritage Party, and the Representative Party (Dobbin, 1992, p. 88).

By 1985 these parties had achieved little. In Dobbin's view, Manning "could have provided this group of parties with the leadership they desperately needed to solve their main problem: credibility" (Dobbin, 1992, p. 88). Manning, however, evidently viewed them as rather insignificant- and possibly extremist- fringe parties. Dobbin claims these organizations failed partly:

because their political style and imagery repulsed the other crucial Alberta constituency: the powerful oil industry whose interests were almost exclusively tied up in free-market economic policies (Dobbin, 1992, p. 93).

Dobbin proceeds to list the group of wealthy lawyers and oil executives who joined forces with Manning to establish the RPC. Dobbin's account may be faulted for its rather shrill style, however, it makes the important point that the RPC was not the result of a spontaneous coming together of large

7Please see Appendix Two for list of the founder members of the RPC.
numbers of enraged populists. Rather, as I suggested above, the party was the culmination of an organized attempt by a small group of conservative pragmatists to tap a wave of western discontent.

The RPC started life as the Reform Association of Canada. The Association's objective was to generate a "Western Agenda for Change- a short list of constitutional, economic, and social reforms required to improve the position of the West within Confederation" (Reform Association, 1987, p.1). The Association sponsored the Western Assembly on Canada's Economic and Political Future. The result of this assembly, held in Vancouver on May 29th-31st 1987, was the founding of the RPC (McCormick, 1992, p.343) at which Manning declared:

> (1)et me make clear from the outset, that when we refer to the possibility of creating a new political party to represent the west, we are not talking about another splinter party, or single-issue party, or yet another party of the strange and extreme. The west has produced too many of these in the past years and there is no need for another. Rather, we should be thinking about the creation of a new vehicle to represent the great political reform tradition which runs like a broad and undulating stream throughout the length and breadth of Canadian politics, but which currently finds no suitable means of expression in any of the traditional federal parties (O'Neill, 1991, p.37).

By the end of 1988 the RPC's membership was approaching 20,000. In the 1988 federal election, the party fielded candidates in seventy-two of the eighty-eight ridings north and west of the Manitoba-Ontario border. It received approximately 275,000 votes and came second in nine ridings.
In 1989 the first RPC MP was elected when Deborah Grey won the Beaver River by-election in Alberta (RPC, 1992a, pp.1-2), and in the 1993 federal election, the party garnered 19% of the vote to win 52 ridings ("First Past the Post," 1993, p.A17).

In sum, the emergence of the RPC is appropriately viewed within the context of traditional western discontent. The west's sense of alienation persists throughout the region, but runs deepest in Alberta where it forms a major theme of the province's political culture (Archer and Ellis, 1993, p.4). Western alienation, and intense disappointment with the PCs provided Manning and his colleagues with the opportunity to establish the RPC, and to nurture the "next" populist movement. A mounting cynicism with which politicians are viewed throughout Canada, combined with Albertans' sense of alienation to give the RPC a receptive audience for its proposals to increase politicians' accountability. The party also successfully tapped the low

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The phenomenon of Canadians' growing cynicism towards politicians and political parties is demonstrated by several studies. In their investigation of attitudes towards federal parties, Clarke and Kornberg found their respondents exhibited pervasive negative judgments towards these organizations. This negativity accelerated during the 1961-1991 period (Clark and Kornberg, 1993, p.305).
sense of political efficacy of Westerners,\textsuperscript{9} with such declarations as:

\textit{(w)e will press for the adoption of measures to provide direct public input into national policy decisions on such matters as constitutional change, bilingualism and capital punishment through citizen's initiatives and national referenda (RPC, 1987a, p.2).}

The recessionary conditions present at the party's inception strengthened its platform on the necessity of government to live within its means (Manning, 1990b p.4).

Indeed, during the course of my interviews with RPC members in 1993, it became apparent many share a profound anxiety regarding their financial future, which they believe is in jeopardy as a result of the federal deficit.

In his speech at the RPC's 1991 Assembly, chief policy officer Steven Harper announced:

\textit{Canada is today in a state of crisis. There is a crisis in the economy, a crisis of public confidence in our political institutions, and a crisis in the finances and operations of government itself (Harper, 1991, p.1).}

This discourse of crisis, reflecting the degree to which the prospects of economic and social calamity are integral to the party's worldview, aptly describes the perceptions which gave rise to, and promoted the survival of the RPC. The RPC utilized these feelings of economic and political

\textsuperscript{9}For example, in the delegate survey cited above, respondents were asked to respond, on a 1-7 scale, to the question "How much influence does the average Canadian voter have on policy." This elicited a response situated at 1.65 on a continuum where 1 was the least (Ellis and Robb, 1989, p.4).
alienation—as the Social Credit Party did—by presenting itself as the representative of those who perceived themselves to be disenfranchised.

Both parties thus emerged during what their supporters experienced as a crisis. In the RPC's case, however, the economic crisis was more subjective than empirical. In other words, while there was a recession, the economic crisis to which Harper refers is obviously not as severe as the Depression. But for the RPC's membership, the crisis also stems from changes in Canada's ideological and social structures. Evidence for this comes from an attitudinal study conducted in 1991 by Harrison and Krahn. They found their respondents who were deeply concerned about the increasingly multicultural nature of Canadian society, were more likely to support the RPC, and that the party's supporters feel significantly more politically alienated than non-supporters. The authors also claim that social groups who feel alienated because of changes in ideological, social and economic structures are turning to the RPC because of its traditional position on issues such as multiculturalism, "family values," and gender equality. This could partly explain why the party has a disproportionally

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10 The authors obtained their data from the 1991 Alberta Survey, in which a total of 1345 randomly selected Albertan residents were interviewed by phone in February-March of that year.
large percentage of older Anglo-Saxon male supporters; individuals who feel they "have lost some of their power" (Harrison and Krahn, 1992, pp. 19-20). Indeed, following Laclau, Manning can be said to have waited for "a crisis of the dominant ideological discourse," to organize the RPC.

Because the RPC advocates a more restrictive immigration policy and dismantling official multiculturalism—policy areas generally avoided by other parties because of their sensitive nature—the RPC has taken as its own, issues which provide an avenue of representation for those who have long despised the existing policies. Indeed one observer suggests the RPC "presents a chance to indulge in a kind of primal scream against the status quo" (Cernetig, 1993b, p. A1).

For these alienated individuals the RPC, with its populist discourse, is clearly appealing. Moreover, Manning seems particularly adept at discerning and speaking directly to the fears of RPC members. For instance, in an address to a 1991 party rally he noted that:

Old Canada is a house divided against itself—a country where the national government is prepared to adopt different laws (including constitutional laws) for different groups based on race, language, and culture. This is the path that led to Meech Lake, to PQ and BQ, and to Oka. The national symbol of Old Canada is not the maple leaf but the hyphen. Its federal politicians talk incessantly about English-Canadians, French-Canadians, aboriginal-Canadians, ethnic-Canadians, but rarely about "Canadians, period." It has become patently obvious in the dying days of the 20th century that you cannot hold a nation together with hyphens (Manning, 1990c, p. 2).
Populism: Alberta Social Credit and the RPC

Earlier I suggested it is possible to draw some parallels between the populism of the Alberta Social Credit and that of the RPC. As numerous authors have pointed out, however, the term populism has been used to describe so many disparate political phenomena that its meaning has been rendered vague and unclear.11

For John Richards, populist movements emerge in response to popular perceptions of a failure in the democratic representation of the people. At the most general level, populism is viewed in this thesis as a demand for democracy by the politically alienated. Fundamental to a populist critique, is that an antagonistic relationship is said to exist between people and power holders. At the same time, populist demands for democracy are manifested in myriad ways, and consequently populism may be delineated into types.

Richards classifies North American populism into left and right-wing variants. He argues these are distinguishable in several broad ways. Canadian left-wing populist

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11 For example, East European peasant parties, agrarian protest movements, McCarthyism, and the Ku Klux Klan (Mouzelis, 1985, p.329., Moore, 1990, pp.352-353) have all been characterized as populist. Also, see work on "new populism" which suggests that feminism, environmentalism, and new age spiritualism all constitute populism (H. Boyte, and H. Riessman, (Eds.). (1986) The New Populism: The Politics of Empowerment Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
organizations have attempted to organize on the basis of farm-labour alliances, while right-wing populists have sought regional alliances against eastern interests. Left-wing populisms have tended to emerge as extensions of co-operative activity espousing a critique of capitalism which in general has been aimed at corporate power. Left populists have insisted governments implement welfare reforms, and initiate countervailing power, by nationalization if necessary. In contrast, right-wing populists have viewed the attainment of competitive markets as the correct goal of government. They have had fewer connections with co-operative movements than their left-wing counterparts, and have devoted less attention to participatory democracy. Right-wing populists have directed their attacks on state power, interventionist government, and on the power of banks. They have also manifested a greater propensity towards plebiscitarianism (Richards, 1981, pp.75-76).

Macpherson used plebiscitarianism to characterize the Alberta Social Credit. He argued the failure of the UFA to implement delegate democracy led Albertans towards Social Credit and plebiscitary democracy in which "the people give up the right of decision, criticism, and proposal, in return for the promise that everything will be done to implement the general will" (Macpherson, 1954, p.233). Similarly, for Laycock, plebiscitarian populism "draws attention to the Social Credit League's anti-participatory pattern of
democratic thought and practice" (Laycock, 1990, p.203). The RPC may also be characterized as an expression of plebiscitarian populism.12

At the same time, the Social Credit and RPC parties differ in their depictions of who comprise the people and the power-bloc. This divergence obviously stems from the different political and social contexts in which the parties exist. For Social Credit, the people included small business, small producers, and "little people" who produced, but had not benefitted from their labour (Young, 1978, p.99). Conversely, the "vested interests" under whose hand the people suffered were (eastern) financiers. The party claimed that the:

people, as the sovereign authority, have lost their control over the monetary system; their sovereign authority has been usurped by bankers who have set up a financial dictatorship, and who use their control of credit to render ineffectual the voting power of the people (Irving, 1975, p.133).

Aberhart nurtured his polarization of the people versus eastern financiers, stressing that Social Credit enabled Albertans to demonstrate their abhorrence of these bankers' power. For example, following the party's victory in an East Edmonton by-election Aberhart announced the result:

was a vindication of their determination that in any

12Moreover, according to the criteria with which Richards delineates left and right-wing populisms, the RPC is clearly of the latter type. Fundamental to the party's analysis is a critique of state power, and the view that markets should go unfettered by government intervention. The RPC has also, as I indicate below, attempted to mobilize cross-class support.
true democracy the will of the people will prevail. There were many other issues involved in this election. One of these was the clear issue as to the people's desire for democracy over that of financial fascism. They have certainly spoken in no uncertain way as to their attitude regarding the Ottawa-protected bankers rule ("Conclusion Unjustified," 1938, p.2).

As well as condemning bankers, Social Credit derided political parties, politicians and, increasingly, central planners, and bureaucrats (Laycock, 1993, p.4). The party thus viewed the state with antipathy, and the party system was frustrating the will of the people because it ensured voting occurred on issues over which the people were incompetent to judge (Macpherson, 1953, pp.125-127).

Although Social Credit claimed the will of the people to be sovereign, it also maintained the people were, and should be, concerned only with results, not process. Consequently, a technocracy of "experts" was to be established. At an Edmonton meeting in 1935 Aberhart urged:

(you don't have to know all about Social Credit before you vote for it; you don't have to understand electricity to use it, for you know that experts have put the system in, and all you have to do is push the button and you get the light. So all you have to do about Social Credit is to cast your vote for it, and we will get experts to put the system in (Cited in Macpherson, 1953, p.152).

The competence of rank and file party members was similarly disparaged; they were told that "they should only concern themselves with general aims; discussion of detailed matters was outside their competence" (Young, 1978 p.99).
One corollary of the posited incompetence of the rank and file was the style of Aberhart's leadership, which was profoundly authoritarian. Potential party candidates were screened, required to fill out questionnaires, and essentially hand-picked by the party elite of the "Advisory Board." Of thirteen candidates nominated to run in Calgary in the 1940 provincial election, only the four approved by the Board—Aberhart being one of them—subsequently did so. Aberhart justified the selection system by claiming it was the only way "to ensure that the best man (sic) would run and to prevent money or "wire pulling" to dictate the candidate" (Shultz, 1962, pp.19-22). Moreover, although Social Credit passed a much vaunted Recall Act in 1936 in order to demonstrate the expendability of politicians, it was repealed a year later when a petition to recall Aberhart was circulating in his constituency (Macpherson, 1953, p.153).

It is clear, then, that Social Credit had a profound anti-participatory dimension which, in turn, directly contradicted its claims regarding the sovereign will of the people. Championing the omnipotence of "the experts," obviously challenges the people's "sovereign authority." Despite these anomalies the party prospered, and although it suffered occasional internal dissent, the party's membership appears to have generally accepted the leadership's authoritarian style.
Who the RPC's people are in the party's people versus power bloc conception of society is perhaps harder to
determine than was the case with Social Credit; the RPC
tends not to articulate this explicitly other than through
broad references to the common people. Laycock writing on
this point suggests the RPC "presents itself as the
representative of the unrepresented" (Laycock, 1993, p.6).
This is certainly consistent with Harrison and Krahn's
findings, and indeed with RPC rhetoric. In one speech, for
instance, Manning explained that the RPC was established "by
people who felt left out of Canada constitutionally," and
"by people who felt they were being driven out economically"
(Manning, 1992c, p.1).

Steve Patten claims that "as ideological subjects, the
people are constructed as white heterosexual English men of
the middle class" (Patten, 1993, p.26). Patten's conclusion
regarding the class of the RPC's people seems overdrawn,
both empirically and ideologically. Results from the 1989
delegate survey cited above, led Flanagan and Ellis to
conclude that "the party has attracted members from all
occupation groups at all income levels" (Flanagan and Ellis,
1992, p.7). Moreover, Preston Manning frequently stresses
that the party represents all classes. 13

13 On this point Manning has quoted supporters' letters
in some of his speeches. One Reformer wrote, "I am writing to
you because I want you to know how much some of us little
people need your Reform movement; and to assure you that your
supporters are not all business people, wealthy ex-
However, Patten's argument concerning the party's articulation of an antagonistic dynamic between interest group members and non-members is persuasive. A central tenet of the RPC's platform is that government has become too intrusive and costly to taxpayers. Because the federal government provides funds for minority groups, and has implemented legislation which protects minority rights, those who do not receive similar treatment are held to be tyrannised. Manning writes that:

(although Canadians need constitutional, institutional and political safeguards against the tyranny of the majority, Reformers believe that safeguards are also needed to protect Canadians against "the tyranny of minorities." As special interest groups are given more status, privileges, and public funding, they use their bargaining power to exact concessions from governments that are both economically inefficient and politically undemocratic (Manning, 1992b, p.320).

Besides opposition to government funding of interest groups based on fiscal concerns, the notion of the danger of minority rights stems from the party's libertarian belief in the equality of individuals. The RPC challenges the merits of pluralism, and because individuals are assumed to possess equality of opportunity, there is no room in the RPC's project for treating some individuals differently from others. Consequently, Patten argues that for the RPC, the people are also, "conceptualized as the silent majority of citizen taxpayers who are not identifiably attached to

Conservatives, professionals, or political opportunists" (Manning, 1991, p.4).
minority special interest groups" (Patten, 1993, p.20).

The RPC also argues that government is staffed by overpaid bureaucrats and politicians who use taxpayers' money to fund social programmes Canada cannot afford. The resulting deficit threatens the people's future. Moreover, funding of interest groups endangers Canadian unity, and has resulted in a country of "hyphenated Canadians."

Consequently, the party maintains Canada is "bankrupt, hyphenated, undemocratic, even anti-democratic at the highest level of government" (Manning, 1990c, pp.2-3). The RPC's populism, then, projects an antagonistic relationship between alienated unrepresented people and politicians, bureaucrats, and those who benefit from a system which treats some individuals differently from others.

I have suggested the RPC has found it necessary to guide its membership to a greater degree than its populist affirmations would support. In addition, the leadership maintains close scrutiny over the candidate selection process. While prospective candidates are not obliged to fill out the extensive questionnaire the RPC has developed, the party strongly encourages them to do so and to submit to interviews by Candidate Selection Committees. Moreover, like Aberhart and the Social Credit Party, Manning tends to dominate the party, and by some accounts is a strict disciplinarian with a fascination for detail. As one journalist has argued, Manning is "protective of his party's
grassroots image and inclined to wield power with an iron fist" (Cernetig, 1993c, p.A1). When challenged to explain the party's leadership style Manning has commented, "(l)ike you give them the initial power... but if it's misused or abused then, yes, there'll be some discipline (Cernetig, 1993c, p.A1). In his speeches Manning frequently states that democracy is a messy process not easily managed. In one address he noted:

(t)he voices of dissent within a new and growing party will gather their share of publicity. But I would remind particularly our media friends of the truth of that great statement that Edmund Burke once made at the very time when political parties were first being invented in Britain. He said, "Just because a few grasshoppers under a fern can make the field ring with their importunate chirping whilst thousands of great cattle reside beneath the trees, chew the cud, and are silent, pray do not believe that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field (Manning, 1991, p.2).

Manning thus employs a similar tactic to defend the RPC's leadership style as the party utilizes to deny possessing a racist agenda. The RPC counters charges that it is undemocratic by claiming that, on the contrary, it is precisely because the party is democratic that its leadership needs to exert control. In this way, the RPC is able to justify the anti-participatory dimension of its populism.

In my discussion of Social Credit, I noted the party clearly articulated its belief in the supremacy of experts. While the RPC is not explicit in this regard, the idea
occasionally surfaces within party rhetoric. Manning's discussion of constitutional affairs, quoted above, contains such a reference, as do some of his descriptions of the party's policy-making process:

At such meetings we have asked time and time again, "In what kind of country do you and your children want to live in the twenty-first century?" We then take the answers received, subject them to the scrutiny of expert opinion, and recycle the results back through more public meetings (Manning, 1992c p.4).

Implicit in the RPC's discourse, then, is the view that while the people's opinion is sought, the experts are in the best position to guide decision-making.

To conclude, I have argued in this chapter that both Social Credit and the RPC surfaced during economic and social crises. I have also suggested they exhibit similar leadership-member relations and share an anti-participatory tendency consistent with plebiscitarian populism. Although the RPC, unlike Social Credit, does not explicitly valorize the people while claiming them incompetent to judge, the idea occasionally surfaces in RPC discourse. Moreover, as will be seen in the following chapter, the notion is manifested in the party's policy formulation process.
Chapter Three


The focus of this chapter is the RPC's policy formulation. My objective here is to demonstrate that the views of the party's members on immigration are poorly reflected by the RPC's official immigration policy.

The RPC's formal policy positions have evolved from resolutions voted on by delegates at six party Assemblies. The RPC's Constitution stipulates that Assemblies are to be held at least every two years. RPC Assemblies constitute the supreme governing body of the party, and are comprised of voting delegates from Constituency Associations, members of the Executive Council, and party members who are M.P.s or Senators. To be carried, resolutions at party Assemblies require a majority of the votes cast. Moreover, since 1991:

(a) resolution establishing or amending party policy or objectives to be carried must receive not only a majority of the votes cast but must also receive a majority vote of the delegates from a majority of the Provinces (with the Territories together counting as one Province) which qualify for maximum representation on the Executive Council... (RPC, 1992b, pp.9-10).

The RPC produced a pamphlet containing a few policy ideas in late 1987, however, a comprehensive list of formalized policies did not appear until after the party's 1988 Calgary Assembly. Policy resolutions approved by delegates at this Assembly were incorporated into the party's 1988 "Principles and Policies Blue Book." Updated versions of the 1988 edition followed in 1990, 1991, and
1993. Each Blue Book emphasizes that the policies within are solely the result of votes cast by the RPC's membership. In the preface of the 1990 edition, for instance, Stephen Harper stresses that, "(n)o policies have been included that have not been debated and passed by a party Assembly" (RPC, 1990, p.iii).

The RPC's policy formulation process clearly provides an excellent opportunity for the party to demonstrate the veracity of its asserted populist commitment to the will of the people. RPC delegates are seen to be freely choosing which proposals will become official party policy. In addition, Riding Associations are invited to submit policy proposals for consideration at party Assemblies. This apparent degree of party democracy, then, bolsters the RPC's populist image, particularly for its rank and file. Thus, members were told in the party's 1993 Blue Sheet, that they "should be proud of this Blue Book which is the product of five years of bottom-up policy-making" (RPC, 1993, p.1).

It will, however, be seen in this chapter of the thesis, that policy proposals on which delegates vote are carefully monitored by the RPC's leadership. The party's claims regarding the democratic "bottom-up" nature of its policy-making are seriously undermined by the degree of influence the leadership has exerted over which resolutions actually reach the Assembly floor. Indeed, all three resolutions on immigration policy voted on at the RPC's
pivotal 1991 Saskatoon Assembly originated from the RPC's Party Policy Committee (PPC). This Committee represents the leadership's views regarding the appropriate policy for the party (Harper, 1993). As I have suggested, then, the RPC's process of policy formulation manifests the notion that while members' opinions are sought, the party's leadership is in the best position to guide decision-making.

In this chapter, I will trace the development of the RPC's immigration policy through a chronology of the party's Assemblies and policy formulation process. I will also provide details of some instances between Assemblies when the RPC has deemed it necessary to act in order to allay accusations that the party has a racist agenda. My discussion concludes with the RPC's 1991 Saskatoon Assembly, which was the most significant in terms of the party's policy formulation. Policy amendments since Saskatoon have been minor, (Flanagan, 1993), and the party's immigration policy has not changed since the 1991 Assembly.

The RPC's Immigration Policy

Once participants at the May 1987 Western Assembly on Canada's Economic and Political Future had decided a new political party should be formed, various "Policy Task Forces" established by Manning, gave presentations on economic, constitutional, political and social change. Other Task Forces spoke on the need for administrative change in the federal government (Agenda Western Assembly, 1987, pp.1-
Following these addresses, workshops were organized so that delegates could deliberate on policy platforms for the new party. Describing this process, Manning writes that:

(t)he interactions between these small groups and the task forces (also) represented the first organized attempt by the leaders of the Reform Movement to establish the cooperation between "expert opinion" and "grassroots common sense" that I consider essential to the maintenance of an informed and intelligent populist movement" (Manning, 1992b, p.138).

Of all the discussion groups, the "social issue workshops," proved to be the most contentious and, for Manning, the most disappointing (Manning, 1992b, p.139, Weatherbe, 1991, p.27). Assembly delegates expressed concerns that Canada's immigration policy appeared to be used to force the growth of the country's population. Many felt that Canada's immigration was out of control, and it was agreed that immigration was an issue which required further study (Flanagan, 1993). However, according to one observer, a number of the participants in the social policy workshops had no developed policies but only specific grievances. Manning criticized these particular workshops, advising delegates to change their approach if a broadly based political party was to be established. When the Assembly concluded, Manning and the other organizers had failed to present any specific recommendations on social policy (Weatherbe, 1991, p.27).

The limited amount of attention given to immigration policy by the Vancouver Assembly organizers is consistent
with Harper's claim that the topic is less critical to the RPC's project than are other policy areas. At the same time, because immigration policy has the potential to draw out the expression of racist opinion, the leadership may also have been reluctant to address the issue so early in the party's existence. Indeed, Ernest Manning's experience with the racism, or more specifically the anti-semitism of the Alberta Social Credit, has led Preston to be cognizant of the dangers of what he terms "the dark side of populism" (Manning, 1992b, p.24).

Following the Vancouver Assembly, the party made preparations for its official Founding Assembly. Held in Winnipeg in the fall of that year, the purpose of the Assembly was to select a name for the new party, ratify a constitution and set of principles, and elect an executive and leader. Manning suggests that the Vancouver Assembly garnered the Reform Association of Canada a great deal of publicity in the west, and as a result its membership grew to over three thousand. The Assembly steering committee sent guidelines for the selection of delegates to these members, and to those who had expressed interest in the Association. These guidelines invited Reform Association members to select up to eight delegates per federal riding (Manning, 1992b, p.145).

The Reform Association of Canada established sub-committees to prepare policy resolutions for the Winnipeg
Assembly. The party also organized a Policy Committee to evaluate policy resolutions (Reform Association, 1987, pg. 3, Dobbin, 1991, p. 10). From its inception, then, the RPC had a formal party body which examined policy resolutions to be submitted for the membership's vote. Thus Manning notes:

"If there is a lesson to be learned from the Social Credit Depression experience, it is that an ounce of prevention is worth ten pounds of cure. If a new political movement can prevent extremism of any kind, particularly racism, from taking root in the first place, it will save itself and members of minority communities an infinite amount of trouble later on (Manning, 1992b, p. 24).

Participants at the Winnipeg Founding Assembly expressed anxiety about the extent of government funding going to immigrant assistance; some evidently felt this amounted to the government paying a bonus to large families. The RPC's leadership still believed immigration policy was not of major importance to the party's agenda. However, because members continued to voice their fears and discontent with the status quo, the party leadership felt it necessary to respond.¹ A resolution was put forward on the need to study immigration policy further (Flanagan, 1993). This resolution was carried overwhelmingly (RPC, 1987b, pp. 1-2).

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¹Indeed, it is interesting that attention to this policy area, which has required such careful monitoring by the leadership, appears to have actually originated from the grassroots.
The next RPC Assembly took place in Calgary in August 1988. The policy-making process which culminated in the party's election platform "The West Wants In," and the 1988 Blue Book was considerably less formal than that guiding the party's subsequent policy formulation. Constituency Associations were not explicitly invited to submit policy resolutions. Rather, Manning and Harper established several Policy Task Forces which solicited the opinions and advice of various individuals in the party. Following the Assembly, Harper wrote the 1988 Blue Book (Warenko, 1993), in which the RPC's first formal immigration policy platform appeared.

If the RPC was reluctant to broach the topic of immigration policy at any great length during the Vancouver and Winnipeg Assemblies, this was clearly not true of the Assembly at Calgary. Kim Abbot of the Immigration Association of Canada (IAC) gave an address entitled, "Immigration Policy Must Reflect the Views and Interests of Most Canadians." Abbot began his speech by explaining that the IAC is "a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization established to promote sensible immigration policies and to stop illegal immigration" (Abbot, 1988, p.1). Claiming immigration to be the most important issue facing Canada, he told participants at the Assembly that:

(t)oday, immigration is completely out of control. We don't know who the people are that pour across our borders, and our political system has degenerated into an irresponsible power seeking morass managed by self-seekers. The interests of the man (sic) in the street, the constituent our politicians are elected to
represent, are ignored. Instead the federal government and federal political parties, knee-jerk to every immigration lawyer, special interest group, social service agency involved in the immigration movement, and the whole array of people who live off the immigration traffic, because they think that these people can deliver the ethnic vote that guarantees power (Abbot, 1988, p.1).

Much of Abbot's speech is considerably more strident\(^2\) than the RPC's immigration policy appearing in the party's 1988 Blue Book. It is thus plausible that the RPC's leadership invited Abbot to speak to reassure members of the party's position on immigration, despite the official platform that was to follow from the Assembly which was perhaps more moderate than the membership would have liked.

At the same time, the party's first official policy on immigration was based on Abbot's ideas (Harper, 1993, Flanagan, 1993). Indeed, parts of the 1988 Blue Book are virtually identical to Abbot's proposals. Abbot states, for example, that, "(m)ajor changes in immigration policy, including changes in sponsorship requirements and amnesties, will not be introduced without binding national referendums" (Abbot, 1988, p.10). For its part, the RPC recommends in the Blue Book that "(m)ajor changes to immigration, including

\(^2\)For instance, Abbot proposes people with contagious diseases who immigrate to Canada should be deported immediately. He also recommends that, "persons employed as immigration agents; immigration lawyers; people who receive multicultural grants for immigration activities; and those in directly related occupations; (will) be listed on an immigration register, so that politicians and others will know who they are and what they represent" (Abbot, 1988, p.10).
sponsorship requirements and amnesties, should not be introduced but by referendum" (RPC, 1988, p.24). The RPC's immigration policy also corresponds to Abbot's recommendations favouring the deportation of "bogus refugees." Finally, Abbot and the RPC take a similar position on the ethnicity of immigrants to Canada. According to Abbot the IAC opposes "the entry of massive numbers of newcomers, from any part of the world, if the numbers exceed our absorptive capacity and change our cultural and ethnic balance (Abbot, 1988, p.9); similarly the RPC's position in the 1988 Blue Book is that "(i)migration should not be based on race or creed, as it was in the past; nor should it be explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the makeup of Canada, as it increasingly seems to be" (RPC, 1988, p.23).

The RPC's main consideration at this time was, presumably, to be fully prepared for the upcoming federal election, which took place on November 21st 1988. Indeed, Manning points out the party's election campaign started with the ratification of the official policy platform at the Calgary Assembly (Manning, 1992b, p.168). Nonetheless, it is striking that the RPC's first comprehensive formalized policy platform involved so little input from the party membership. Although the policy resolutions presented at Calgary were "discussed, modified and approved, by some 250 delegates from across the West," "(t)he draft platform,"
was, "drawn up for the most part by Stephen Harper" (Manning, 1992b, p.168).

Two months after the Calgary Assembly, the RPC's leadership was confronted with a situation that required it to act to protect the party's credibility. It was the first time the party had been obliged to take such explicit and public action in this regard, and the event is significant in terms of the party's leadership-member relations.

Doug Collins, a columnist with Vancouver's *North Shore News* and well-known for his controversial views on immigrants and immigration policy,³ announced he was seeking the RPC candidacy for the Capilano-Howe Sound constituency (Manning, 1992b, p.167). Upon discovering Collins would run for the nomination unopposed, Manning informed the columnist he could not endorse his candidacy, and offered financial compensation for Collins' campaign expenses. Manning also

³For example, in one column Collins complains that "a negress from Trinidad was allowed to stay because she claimed her old man beat her up. You can therefore expect any fem from anywhere who says hubby threw the frying pan at her to claim similar treatment" (Collins, 1992, p.7). In the same column, he criticizes opposition to an immigration Bill which became law in 1993, writing,"(t)hey bleat that if the changes go into effect, the likes of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela wouldn't be able to get into Canada. Good! Who needs more troublemakers? One of the biggest left-wing loudmouths in the country, Bob White of the CLC, says the rules would "make Canada less caring, less compassionate and a less responsible member of the international community." What's wrong with that? Maybe our taxes would go down." Finally, Collins bemoans the fact that,"Ottawa has not the slightest intention of returning to the white immigration that made this country what it used to be...(Collins, 1992, p.3).
told Collins that if he chose to run as an independent the RPC would not field a candidate against him. Collins rejected this offer and Manning, attempting to defuse the situation, told Collins he would accept his nomination if the Constituency Association and Collins endorsed a resolution rejecting racial discrimination. Collins denounced this second offer at the Capilano-Howe Sound nomination meeting, and announced he would not run. A motion was subsequently passed condemning the offer. Reports differ regarding the number of Reformers at the meeting who voted to denounce Manning's offer; one claims that 145 party members voted against Manning's proposal (Lequire and Bunner, 1988, p.12). Another account maintains that while a third of the 1,000 at the meeting were signed up party members, all those present supported Collins' condemnation and "wanted him because he articulates loud and clear their own deep concerns about some of the paths down which they see all three mainline parties dragging the country" (Wright, 1988, p.6). In any event, the meeting erupted into chaos as those present jeered the RPC organizers. In response, Collins relented and agreed to stand for the Reform party. Manning subsequently refused to sign Collins' nomination papers explaining that, "(o)ne of the questions a lot of people have is whether the RPC can protect itself from extremism,"..."(t)his [rejecting Collins' nomination] demonstrates that it can and will" (Manning cited in Lequire
and Bunner, 1988, pg.12).

The Collins incident was short-lived, however, its impact on the RPC appears to have been quite considerable. The party received a number of letters from RPC members in support of Collins. Many of these individuals withdrew their memberships believing that the will of the grassroots had not been allowed to prevail. In addition, the incident alerted the RPC's leadership to the need for closer scrutiny and supervision of its membership, and Manning subsequently established a Task Force on grassroots/leadership relations in April 1989.

In a memorandum explaining the Task Force members' responsibilities, Manning implies that Collins' nomination amounted to a conflict between RPC grassroots and the leadership's objective to safeguard the party's reputation. Task Force members were to study how the RPC could sustain its grassroots character while nurturing its standing as a credible and moderate political party. To this end, the Task Force was to consider, first, whether the RPC's Constitution should be amended in order that individuals whose views or alliances could damage the RPC's reputation could be prevented from seeking party nominations or elected to party positions. Second, whether action should be taken to reject decisions reached at party meetings in which there were procedural errors or where a meeting had been taken over by individuals who were not RPC members. Finally, with respect
to these two areas of enquiry, Task Force members were to determine whether the power of the leader, Executive Council, or constituency executives should be modified (RPC, 1989a, pp.1-4).

When Manning initiated the Task Force, the RPC's Constitution provided—as indeed it still does—for the termination of party membership:

for just cause, including conduct judged improper, unbecoming, or likely to adversely affect the interests and reputation of the party as determined by the Executive Council of the party subject to arbitration at the request of the aggrieved party (RPC, 1987c, p.3).

Manning's intention in establishing the Task Force, therefore, was presumably to devise a process through which potentially problem members could be detected before their activities made it necessary to take the drastic and well publicised measures the Collins incident required.

The Task Force was to prepare a brief address for the Edmonton Assembly held in October 1989. However, while the relationship between the grassroots and the RPC's leadership was discussed at the Assembly, evidently no agreement was reached on the constitutional changes considered by the task force. Manning notes there was conflict between those who

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4 It is possible that one result of the Collins incident, if not the deliberations of the task force, was the RPC's Candidate Selection questionnaire. Introduced in 1991, the document quizzes prospective candidates on a broad range of issues. It seems to reflect similar concerns as those which informed the formation of the task force on grassroots/leadership relations thus it asks potential candidates if any of their associations could embarrass the
feared change and those favouring it, and following the Edmonton Assembly, competing proposals for amending the RPC constitution were referred to another Task Force on the party constitution (Manning, 1992b, pp.217-218).

Policy resolutions voted on at the 1989 Edmonton Assembly were incorporated into the RPC's 1990 Blue Book, an updated version of the 1988 edition. If the Edmonton Assembly failed to produce amendments to the RPC's constitution, neither did it result in changes to the party's policy on immigration. Thus, although the format of the RPC's immigration policy appearing in the 1990 Blue Book differs from the 1988 version, the content is unchanged (Flanagan, 1993).^5

That the RPC's immigration policy went unchanged was, party. The document also suggests that constituency nomination committees ask potential candidates how they would respond to accusations that they or the RPC are racist (RPC, 1991b, pp.28-29).

^5One major difference between the two Blue Books is, however, the inclusion of a section on multiculturalism policy. The RPC made no mention of this topic in its 1988 edition. As with the party's immigration policy its policy on multiculturalism appears not to have come directly from the membership, rather it was based on a paper written by Riis Khan, a political science professor at the University of Winnipeg (Martin, 1991, p.17). In addition, the RPC's formal position on multiculturalism probably emerged when it did because of the debate regarding the wearing of turbans in the RCMP, which had become an issue at about the same time (Harper, 1993).
however, not a reflection of the membership's disinterest in immigration policy; a number of resolutions on immigration were submitted by the rank and file for vote at Edmonton. Of approximately thirty of these resolutions that this author has examined, three proposed that immigrants assimilate and adopt Canadian customs, three expressed concern that Canada's immigration policy is upsetting the country's "cultural balance;" another proposed that the policy should not provide for reverse discrimination. Three others advocated abolishing or narrowing the family class category of admission, another suggested the Charter of Rights and Freedoms apply only to Canadian citizens. One recommended that the right to own property be restricted to landed immigrants and citizens. Two urged reducing national immigration, another suggested that a constituency-by-constituency immigration limit be set. Two proposed a moratorium on immigration until a national referendum on the subject is held, or until Parliament has amended the Immigration Act. Two more suggested extending the waiting period to which landed immigrants are subject before they may apply for citizenship. One recommended immigration quotas be set at levels consistent with Canada's population in 1968. Another registered concern that immigration policy

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6The intent of this recommendation is somewhat unclear, however, its author appears to have been advocating reducing immigration quotas. In 1968 Canada accepted 183,974 immigrants (Canada Employment, 1993, p.360); rather less than the federal government's current annual of 250,000. If, on the other hand,
is used by government to garner support from ethnic minorities who, in turn, are manipulated by politicians and advocates of a more liberal immigration policy. Several noted the need for Canada's immigration policy to be based more on economic considerations than is presently the case. Finally, many of the resolutions reflected the belief that Canada's immigration policy is too easily abused by those seeking to immigrate to Canada illegally (RPC, 1989b, pp.1-7).

The RPC's leadership appears to have been reluctant to encourage discussion of these policy resolutions at the Edmonton Assembly, and the following resolution was presented to delegates:

The Resolutions Committee received a number of substantive resolutions pertaining to immigration, several of them quite lengthy.

The Resolutions Committee notes that the general thrust of these resolutions focused on halting illegal immigration, basing immigration on Canadian requirements, and providing more opportunity for public involvement (including referenda) in the formulation of immigration policy.

In that immigration is likely to be a priority area of policy study in 1990, and in that the immigration resolutions submitted by several constituencies deserve more serious consideration and debate than can be given to them at this Assembly.

the author was envisioning immigration quotas as a percentage of Canada's population his or her proposal would result in smaller quotas, but the reduction would be considerably less. In June 1969 (the closest date for which figures are evidently available) the Canadian population was 21,061,000; 1991's census figures show Canada's population to have reached 27,296,859 (Colombo, 1994, pg.42).
RESOLVED that the immigration resolutions submitted to the October 27-29 Assembly be referred directly to the Chief Policy Officer and Policy Committee for detailed consideration and review in 1990 (RPC, 1989c, p.8)

The tone emanating from most of the members' immigration policy resolutions presumably resulted in the Committee's preference to defer open discussion of this policy area until the RPC's leadership had considered the topic further. Delegates at the Edmonton Assembly were presented with a great many policy resolutions, and consequently there was little time to debate each one thoroughly. Virtually all the resolutions introduced at Edmonton were carried, including the one on immigration policy cited above (Warenko, 1993).

However, it is likely that had they been voted on, several of the memberships' policy resolutions on immigration would have met delegates' approval. In the 1989 delegate survey I referred to in chapter two of this thesis, delegates were asked whether newly arrived immigrants should be assimilated into the Canadian mainstream. 60.6% of respondents agreed strongly with the statement, 34.4% agreed, 3.9% disagreed, and 1.1% disagreed strongly (Ellis and Robb, 1989, p.2). A delegate survey conducted at the party's 1992 Winnipeg Assembly recorded similar responses. 46.5% of respondents agreed strongly with the immigrant assimilation statement, 44.1% agreed, 4.8% were uncertain, 3.2% disagreed, and 0.7% strongly disagreed with the statement (Archer, 1992, p.5-7).
When the Edmonton Assembly took place, the RPC's membership numbered 26,000 (Manning, 1992b, p.215). Eighteen months later, when the party held its 1991 Saskatoon Assembly, the membership had reached 62,000. Moreover, the RPC's popularity in Alberta had surpassed that of the other federal parties, and was growing throughout the west (Cernetig, 1991a, p.A7). While this increase in popularity was obviously welcomed by the RPC, it brought with it certain disadvantages which had a distinct impact on the party's preparations for the Saskatoon Assembly and, in turn, the policies that resulted from it.

One outcome of the RPC's gain in support was stronger attacks from the other federal parties, leading Manning to remark that the RPC had been denounced by its opponents "as the repository of all political evils" (Manning, 1992b, p.258). Commenting further on this, Manning said that "(o)ur best defence was a good offence, so we continued to hammer away on the main points of our platform which had proven so attractive to disenchanted voters" (Manning, 1992b, p.258). However, when Manning was acclaimed candidate for Calgary Southwest on the eve of the Saskatoon Assembly, he warned RPC members that if the party was to continue to prosper it would have to appear more moderate when presenting itself and its policies (Cernetig, 1991a, p.A7). It seems that recognizing the mounting criticism to which the RPC had become subject threatened its credibility, the leadership
was cultivating a more moderate policy stance.\textsuperscript{7}

This strategy was particularly evident in terms of the party's immigration policy, an area which was proving increasingly sensitive for the RPC. As a result, Manning believed the party's policy needed to be rendered less extreme (Harper, 1993), and a month before the Saskatoon Assembly RPC Chair Diane Ablonczy announced the party would soften its position on immigration policy (Dobbin, 1992, p.161). The policy was subsequently amended after the Saskatoon Assembly, and the section outlining the undesirability of an immigration policy which alters Canada's ethnic makeup, was removed (Harper, 1993).

The RPC's caution in the face of its growing visibility and concomitant criticism from other parties is apparent not only in the changes made to the party's immigration policy, but also in precautions the leadership took to control the RPC's policy-making process. When the RPC was preparing for the Saskatoon Assembly, the party leader disbanded the party's Policy Task Forces. These bodies were comprised of

\textsuperscript{7}The change in tone the RPC began to take evidently worried some party members. Ron Gamble, who had been on the RPC's Executive Council, complained publicly the party had gone fundamentally astray. He pointed out that the RPC "was formed as an alternative to the power from the top exercised by the old-line parties. It's supposed to be governed from the ground up. Yet Mr Manning has amassed a worrying degree of power. The intent of the RPC was to be heard in Ottawa by electing some M.P.s and maybe by winning the balance of power. But Manning is saying these left-wing things in order to appeal to Liberals in Ontario" (Koch, 1990, p.18).
rank and file members responsible for formulating policies that were subsequently placed directly on the RPC's policy agenda (Koch, 1991 p.12).

According to a RPC memorandum, Manning eliminated the Task Forces to guard against "often times unorthodox and most times extreme policy options" (RPC Memo cited in Johnsrude, 1991, p.24). Evidently, "a lack of control by Manning and party executives" had led to the failure of the Task Force chairs to sufficiently guide the policy-making of these groups (RPC Memo cited in Harder, 1991, p.24). The memorandum thus indicates that "the Chairperson does not control the policy direction of the task force but rather acts as facilitator and feels obligated to incorporate all views expressed by the task force members" (RPC Memo cited in Dobbin, 1992, p.164). This, then, had resulted in the RPC's leadership intervention.

The Task Forces' responsibilities were assumed by the PPC which, according to the same party memorandum, "is headed by the Leader, and all appointments to the Policy Committee must be approved by the leader" (RPC Memo cited in Dobbin, 1992, p.164). In addition, the memorandum apparently specifies that new members of the PPC are required to be in "100% agreement with existing party policy as written in the Blue Book." (RPC Memo cited in Dobbin,

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8Please see Appendix Three for a list of PPC members during the formulation of policies for the Saskatoon Assembly.

The party leadership defended its abolition of the Task Forces suggesting this would ensure more, not less, "bottom-up" policy-making since it would prevent the Task Forces from placing their policy options directly on the party's agenda (Koch, 1991, p.12). However, replacing a process which permitted some RPC members direct input into policy-making with one by which policy formulation was administered solely by the party elite, would seem to have ensured the leadership greater control over policy at the expense of the rank and file. Moreover, in addition to formulating policy, the PPC functioned as a filter through which all members' policy proposals were passed.

A further result of the RPC's growing support was an escalation in the number of policy resolutions received by the party's national office. By late 1990 policy proposals submitted for vote at the Saskatoon Assembly were so numerous the leadership found it necessary to develop a process by which these resolutions could be reduced to a more manageable size. The Executive Council decided policy proposals received by the national office would be incorporated into a single document -known as the "Exposure Draft-" and sent to Riding Associations for vote. The proposals would be ranked by the percentage of support they received. Those garnering only minimal support would not reach the Assembly Floor (Harper, Warenko, 1993).
The 172 page Exposure Draft was reviewed by a relatively small number of members; just over 2,000 from 54 constituencies voted on the policy proposals it contained (Harper, 1991, p.1). Indeed, resolutions were screened by the PPC prior to their inclusion in the Exposure Draft, thus some members' proposals did not survive past this stage of the procedure and were omitted from the document (Dobbin, 1992, p.156). Nevertheless, the Exposure Draft was invaluable for the RPC because it permitted the leadership to demonstrate to participants at Saskatoon- and indeed to the entire membership- the party's commitment to "bottom-up" policy-making. The RPC accordingly said the process exemplified the party's loyalty to its grassroots.\(^9\) Stephen Harper, for instance, began his address to delegates at the Saskatoon Assembly by pointing out that:

(t)he 60 resolutions and assorted amendments on the floor today represent the culmination of 10 months of input and debate. The final selection and ordering of these resolutions has been done by the grassroots through the Exposure Draft (Harper, p.1).

One of the effects of the Exposure Draft was thus to legitimize the RPC's policy-making process at a time when its leadership was intent on moderating the party's

\(^9\)It is worth noting here that Angelo Panebianco suggests a crucial factor in the success of political parties is leaders' ability to present ritualistic endorsements of their party's ideological objectives (Panebianco, 1988, p.27). To the extent that a goal of the RPC's leadership is to convince members that the party is an internally democratic organization, Panebianco's argument appears to aptly describe the Exposure Draft process.
immigration policy.

Although the process did enable party rank and file to vote on 159 policy resolutions, the Exposure Draft was designed to ensure members were fully aware of the resolutions the leadership supported and opposed (Warenko, 1990, p.1). Each resolution in the document is followed by a section entitled "Policy Committee Remarks," which included the PPC's opinion of the proposal, and indicated whether the Committee felt the resolution could damage the RPC's image (Warenko, 1991, p.2). The Exposure Draft was, therefore, more than a list of policy proposals submitted for the consideration of RPC members. It also informed the party's membership of the leadership's position on a range of issues.

Of the 34 policy topics addressed in the resolutions submitted by Riding Associations, the section on immigration policy is the largest and elicited the greatest number of proposals from members. The document contains a total of 22 immigration policy resolutions; 18 from Riding Associations, three from the PPC\textsuperscript{11}, and one prepared by the Multiculturalism Task Force before it was disbanded.

\textsuperscript{10}All resolutions submitted by Riding Associations also included a section entitled "Rationale For Resolution." It is, however, indicated in the Exposure Draft that most of these proposals did not include a rationale.

\textsuperscript{11}Please see Appendix Four for the PPC's Exposure Draft policy resolutions.
In directions accompanying the Exposure Draft, the RPC's leadership indicated to its rank and file that it would be acceptable, if not preferable, to avoid considering the immigration proposals submitted by Riding Associations. Members were told that all resolutions bearing a cross were opposed by the PPC and could, therefore, be by-passed in view of the length of the document (Warenko, 1991, p.2). All 18 of the immigration policy resolutions were so marked. Moreover, members were advised in the "Policy Committee Remarks" section against accepting any of the 18 proposals submitted by Riding Associations.

The Riding Associations' proposals on immigration were all rather controversial. One, for example, proposed maintaining "Canada's ethnic/cultural balance as of September 1990" (RPC, 1991c, p.114). In response, the PPC warned that the party "cannot avoid the "racist" label if we adopt immigration policies that make ethnicity/culture a key element. This resolution is extremely ill considered and must be rejected" (RPC, 1991c, p.114).

Another Riding Association recommended that "all immigrants and refugees be exempt from protection under the Charter of Rights until becoming Canadian citizens" (RPC, 1991c, p.121). The PPC commented on this proposal that it:

believes strongly that current policy provides for limitations to the Charter of Rights where absolutely necessary. This resolution proposes that all civil rights of all non-citizens be revoked, and offers no justification for the proposal. In our view, this
A final resolution suggested, "all offices set up for the placement of refugees or immigrants be precluded from any government assistance including federal tax deduction" (RPC, 1991c, p.116). The PPC rejects this recommendation because:

its intent is unclear and not thought through. As it now reads, it could be interpreted as meaning that federal Immigration offices should not receive government funding (which is clearly nonsensical) and that the immigration aid agencies of churches might be subject to business taxation. One implication would be the denial of support to legitimate agencies which support efforts to integrate immigrants into Canadian society (RPC, 1991c, p.116).

In one of its own resolutions, the PPC suggested:

that our Constituency urge the Reform Party to retain the basic direction of its immigration policy - that our immigration policy be balanced and positive, that Canada welcome genuine refugees, and that the Reform Party support an immigration policy which has as its focus Canada's economic needs without regard to race or creed (RPC, 1991c, p.107).

In the "Policy Committee Remarks" section below this proposal, the PPC again advised members that they did not need to bother voting on the majority of immigration policy resolutions:

(t)he Policy Committee received a large number of immigration resolutions which were not well drafted or considered, negative in orientation, or very different from current policy directions. Constituencies may not want to bog down debate on those resolutions. An affirmative vote on the resolution above will therefore be considered a rejection of Immigration Resolutions #7 through #19 unless indicated otherwise (RPC, 1991c, p.107).

All resolutions submitted by Riding Associations were rejected by a vote of the members to whom the document was
sent (Warenko, 1993), while the three immigration proposals formulated by the PPC were accepted and later ratified at Saskatoon (RPC, 1991a, p.5). Of these, the most significant was one moderating the RPC's immigration policy. The leadership appears to have been cautious in introducing this policy, necessary as it may have been to strike a balance between the opinion of its members and the need for political pragmatism. In the Exposure Draft the PPC proposed that the "Reform Party oppose any immigration policy based on race or creed, whether designed to deliberately retain or to deliberately alter the ethnic makeup of Canada for political purposes" (RPC, 1991c, p.108). Explaining its policy recommendation, the PPC commented:

in the view of the PPC, the suggested change is a change of wording only and not of substance. However, this change was felt to be essential due to the misinterpretations being put on current policy, particularly by "cut and paste artists" in the media. As an example we are anxious to avoid interpretations that the Reform Party has a "French-Canadian quota in mind, to deliberately retain that group's ethnic share of the population (RPC, 1991c, p.108).

Both the RPC's wording of this policy resolution and the PPC's comments, appear to have been designed to assure members that the party's proposed more moderate immigration platform was cosmetic and not substantive.

An effort by the RPC's leadership to reassure its members the party was not wavering on its immigration policy was also manifested at the Saskatoon Assembly. Stephen Harper, in his speech declared:
we will be asked whether the Reform Party's agenda is free from extremism, especially on issues like language and immigration. Later today you will be asked to reaffirm our positions on these issues. Preston Manning has stuck with those policies, under intense criticism, because they are sensible and defensible (Harper, 1991, p.8).

At the same time, Harper cautioned delegates on the necessity for pragmatism when they considered the party's immigration policy, warning:

we must also distance ourselves from those who are really focused on the race or ethnic background of immigrants. Do not back down on the party's insistence that issues like language and immigration be addressed. Just the same, do no allow the party to be shot in the foot on these issues by radical elements, as has happened far too often to new parties (Harper, 1991, p.8).

Harper's argument appears to have been sufficiently persuasive that a move to further moderate the RPC's immigration policy was accepted. Thus, a motion that all words following "race or creed" should be deleted from the resolution cited above was carried (RPC, 1991a, p.5).

I have suggested that one reason the RPC invited Kim Abbot to address the 1988 Calgary Assembly may have been to reassure members of the party's position on immigration. The party's invitation of William Gairdner12 to speak at

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12Gairdner's book, *The Trouble with Canada*, articulates the fears which many supporters of the RPC appear to share. Gairdner's book is a polemic on a range of issues of concern to the author. In the preface, the author writes, "(l)ike so many citizens of this country I became upset over the past two decades to see this great country rush headlong into the embrace of sweet-sounding but inherently destructive political, economic, and social policies. Like them I felt helpless. How, after all, can one person affect the course of the nation, especially when the three major parties are all
Saskatoon may have been similarly motivated, particularly since the RPC was advising its membership to ratify the party's most moderate immigration policy to date. Gairdner's position on immigration policy, like Abbot's, is evidently more extreme than that formally articulated by the RPC. Gairdner's views are, however, reflected in many of the policy resolutions submitted by RPC members, and they are also comparable to the opinions expressed in the delegate surveys I described above. Writing on immigration, for instance, Gairdner argues "(i)migrants to Canada should be instructed in the core heritage and culture of this nation, which is Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and Anglo-European. And they should be expected to assimilate to that culture" (Gairdner, 1990, p.419).

Discussing Gairdner's appearance at Saskatoon, Dobbin remarks:

\textit{(t)he media paid very little attention to one of the speakers at the Assembly. Had they listened to William Gairdner they would have indirectly heard the political sentiments of the 1,200 Reformers gathered in Saskatoon at the peak of the party's success. They had just pleased their leader by endorsing his carefully crafted, moderate-sounding package of policy resolutions. Requested not to express any extreme views themselves, they were, nevertheless, permitted to cheer those expressed by someone else (Dobbin, 1992, p.175).}

As I have noted previously, Dobbin's account of the RPC

\begin{quote}
but identical in their political and moral philosophies?" (Gairdner, 1990, p.vii). The Trouble with Canada was popular at the Saskatoon Assembly, and hundreds of members evidently waited in line to purchase autographed copies (Cernetig, 1991b, p.A2).
\end{quote}
tends to lack balance, nevertheless, the implications he draws concerning Gairdner's presence at the Saskatoon Assembly are compelling. Gairdner's attendance at Saskatoon does seem to have been part of an ongoing strategy in which the RPC's leadership implies to members that the party takes one policy position while advising them to support another.

To conclude, I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter of the thesis that the RPC's leadership has carefully controlled the formulation of the party's immigration policy. While the party elite has always maintained the RPC's policy originates from its grassroots, I have endeavoured to show that, contrary to these claims, the party's immigration policy has consistently been derived from its leadership.

The RPC's position that all policies in the party's Blue Books have been ratified by the membership is not disputed here. However, the members' voting choices have been significantly narrowed by the RPC's leadership. Furthermore, the membership has been guided as to how to vote on the policy resolutions presented to it.

The party has, nonetheless, pursued a strategy of reassuring members the party's policy reflects their will. This strategy culminated with the Exposure Draft. Although this document has the appearance of facilitating party democracy, as Dobbin points out, it, "more than any other single party document, demonstrates the limited role that
the membership was allowed on policy matters" (Dobbin, 1992, p.183).

From the RPC's inception Manning was aware of the difficulties immigration policy could present the party. Consequently, the party's leadership has attempted to avoid discussion of the policy area. Indeed Manning has commented that he discourages discussion of immigration policy at party Assemblies (Oziewicz, 1991, p.A6). As the number of immigration policy resolutions submitted by RPC members indicates, however, this topic is of considerable interest to the party's rank and file. Thus it became necessary to address this issue.

The RPC's increasing visibility and the growing criticism to which it was subjected, led the leadership to recognize the party's immigration policy needed moderating if the party was to remain credible. The reasons why the RPC was able to do this, despite the fact its membership generally appear to favour a more extreme immigration policy, is addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter Four
Political Parties: Theories and Analyses

Introduction

In this thesis, I have explored aspects of the RPC's leadership-member relations associated with the party's policy-making. A fundamental assumption underlying my analysis is that political parties can be effectively studied if viewed primarily as complex organizations. However, as Angelo Panebianco laments in Political Parties: Organization and Power, the analysis of political parties as organizations has, for the last thirty years or so, been largely abandoned by political scientists.¹ Panebianco considers this amounts to a loss of:

the awareness that whatever else parties are and to whatever other solicitations they respond, they are above all organizations and that organizational analysis must therefore come before any other perspective (Panebianco, 1988, p.xi).

The paucity of this type of analysis is certainly evident within the literature on Canadian political parties. This is an unfortunate deficiency because an organizational theory of parties is a valuable means with which to understand the internal power relations of these organizations.

¹Other authors have made similar observations regarding the demise of the study of parties as organizations. See, for example, Gibson, J., Cotter, C, and Bibby, J. (1983) Assessing Party Organizational Strength. American Journal of Political Science Vol 27 (2), 193-222.
In this chapter, I will, therefore, examine organization theory. The chapter comprises two parts; the first consists of a critical review of some of the literature on the organization of political parties. My discussion outlines the work of several authors and the theoretical models stemming from their work. In the second section I conclude the thesis by utilizing aspects of organization theory in an attempt to explain why the RPC has prospered despite the degree to which the party's leadership appears to have limited the realization of its membership's policy preferences in official party policy. I also very briefly apply organization theory to the Alberta Social Credit Party in an effort to explain why that party survived in spite of the anomalies from which it suffered.

Organizational Theories of Parties

Panebianco's book is a relatively recent contribution to a body of literature finding its origins in Roberto Michels' *Political Parties*. First published in 1911, that seminal work introduces Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," and his sociological law of political parties. This "law" states that:

(1) it is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy (Michels, 1962, p.365).

Michels examined the German Social Democratic Party to develop his thesis that all political parties evolve into
oligarchies. For Michels, oligarchies follow from two interrelated phenomena. As parties mature, the tasks they are required to perform become increasingly complex and specialized. Because of this "technical and practical necessity" (Michels, 1962, p. 72), a division of labour develops which leads to a hierarchical bureaucracy. As a result, parties become oligarchies comprised of a minority elite wielding power over a member majority (Michels, 1962, pp. 72-73).²

A second cause of oligarchy, according to Michels, is the psychology of party leaders and members. Leaders gradually come to view their position as a right; this process is facilitated by the rank and file who, Michels argues, are politically indifferent, apathetic, and dependent upon the guidance of leaders (Michels, 1962, pp. 153-166). Furthermore, he claims, "(t)he masses possess a profound need to prostrate themselves, not simply before great ideals, but also before the individuals who in their

²The work of sociologist Max Weber exhibits similarities to Michels' ideas. Weber writes that all political parties comprise, "a central group of individuals who assume the active direction of party affairs, including the formation of programmes and the selection of candidates. There is, secondly, a group of members whose role is notably more passive (Weber, 1947, p. 411)..."
eyes incorporate such ideals," and "(i)n the object of such adoration, megalomania is apt to ensue" (Michels, 1962, pp. 96-97). Michels, therefore, maintains that the maturation of political parties, and bureaucracy's concomitant appearance, signifies the end of democracy within these organizations (Michels, 1962, pp. 61-72).

Michels has been criticized for vagueness and for failing to explain his methodology. John May discovers, for instance, that Michels uses the terms "oligarchy," "organization" and "democracy," inconsistently and incoherently (May, 1965, pp. 417-418). Other authors find Michels' conception of bureaucracy overly restrictive, and point out bureaucracy can be a means by which groups achieve objectives (Lipset, 1962, p. 27). E. E. Schattschneider argues that Michels' criteria for assessing the internal

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Authors who have attempted to clarify Michels' work include, Cassinelli, C.W. (1953). The Law of Oligarchy. *American Political Science Review* (3) 773-784; Dahl, R.A. (1958). A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model. *American Political Science Review*, 52 463-469, and Hands, G. (1971). Roberto Michels and the Study of Political Parties, *British Journal of Political Science* Vol 1 (2), 155-172. At the same time, when considering Michels' ideas it is clearly important to bear in mind the historical context from which they arose. For example, while Michels' conception of the rank and file seems severe, it is consistent with the rather elitist political outlook which prevailed when he wrote *Political Parties*. 
democracy of political parties are too severe and protests:

(t)o call them [parties] oligarchies and thus to identify them with undemocratic tendencies is unfortunate. If it is true that the democratization of the parties is impossible, what is to be gained by insisting on it? (Schattschneider, 1942, p.59).

However, perhaps the greatest flaw in Michels' thesis is its determinism. Because he views oligarchy as the inevitable fate of political parties, Michels denies that the power relations within parties can vary. He appears to disregard any contributing factors in the internal dynamics of parties other than the impact of party bureaucracy, and the psychology of members and leaders. Michels' generalizations, therefore, ignore the possibility of other variables which may influence the degree of power and freedom party leaders have in relation to members.

Other authors tend to characterize political parties' internal dynamics in less absolute terms. These theorists do not assume parties will always manifest the purely oligarchical pattern of leadership-member relations predicted by Michels. William Wright, for instance, outlines two paradigms of party organization found in the literature: the "rational-efficient" and "party democracy" models.

Wright suggests these formulations appear at polar opposites on a continuum along which parties range (Wright, 1971, p.18). In other words, they are "ideal types" which isolate the most distinctive characteristics of the phenomenon Wright seeks to explore (Scott, 1992, p.41).
Moreover, the models are essentially normative, thus both comprise "potent value premises concerning what political parties should be like which significantly affect the research and analysis that is done" (Wright, 1971, p.17).

Wright notes the rational-efficient and party democracy models correspond respectively to Maurice Duverger's cadre and mass parties. Wright, however, finds the formulations

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4 An important and related point is that these models are, to a considerable degree, a product of the authors' nationality. The rational-efficient model more aptly describes parties of the United States than the party democracy perspective, which is more consistent with European—particularly socialist—parties. For Wright, this "geographic-theoretical cleavage" hinders the comparative analysis of political parties (Wright, 1971, p.18).

5 Duverger, a proponent of the party democracy model (Wright, 1971, p.19), distinguishes parties by their internal structures. He characterizes cadre parties as organizations run by elites whose leadership selection and policy-making processes permit little or no membership input. In contrast, mass parties endeavour to attract large memberships who participate in policy formulation and leadership selection (Duverger, 1966, pp.61-64). Contrary to Michels' view on the inevitable oligarchy of parties, Duverger argues cadre parties were the forerunners of the more modern mass parties. He contends that, "(t)he distinction between cadre and mass parties corresponds to a difference in social and political substructure. In the beginning, it coincided on the whole with the replacement of a limited franchise with universal suffrage. In electoral systems based on property qualification, which were the rule in the nineteenth century, parties obviously took the form of cadre parties: there could be no question of enrolling the masses at a time when they had no political influence" (Duverger, 1966, p.65). He thus suggests that with the introduction of universal suffrage came the gradual appearance of mass parties (Duverger, 1966, p.66). In addition, Duverger speculates on the existence of a third type of party: the "devotee" party which is more open than cadre parties, but more closed than mass organizations. While Duverger cautions the extent of the devotee party should not be exaggerated, his third model seems more realistic than his other two, the delineation of which he admits, "though clear in theory, is not always easy to make in practice" (Duverger,
Integral to the rational-efficient perspective is the notion that organizations operate to realize specified objectives. For political parties, the goal is electoral success, and participants are united in this "common cause" (Panebianco, 1988, p.7). The rational approach is consistent with a pluralist notion of democracy (Wright, 1971, p.20). Parties are, therefore, only one of a variety of participants competing in the political marketplace, and party leaders are self-interested entrepreneurs (Schlesinger, 1984, p.381). Anthony Downs argues, for instance, that the ultimate aim of those running for office, is the acquisition of income, prestige, and power. Downs maintains political leaders do not seek office to implement particular policies, but view policies as tactical means to their private ends. Political parties, then, are comprised of rational actors who devise policies to win elections,

1966, pg.64). The British Conservative Party is perhaps an example of this hybrid; although this party attracts a large membership (Ware, 1979, p.194), its structure is closer to Duverger's cadre model. Similarly, the organization of the mass based British Social Democratic Party has been shown to be highly centralized and inhibiting to grass-roots participation (Pridham and Whiteley, 1986, p.217).

Downs defines rational behaviour as efficient behaviour, or attempting to realize goals using "the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output" (Downs, 1957, p.5).
rather than win elections to implement policies (Downs, 1957, p. 28).

Advocates of the party democracy model, on the other hand, consider parties to be the principal actors in political systems. These "programmatic" parties advance democracy by providing a means of communication between party leaders, members and supporters (Wright, 1971, p. 24). Contrary to Downs, proponents of the party democracy model contend that policies are more than strategic means to ends; indeed in this paradigm policies are viewed as the raison d'être of parties. Leon Epstein, while himself of the rational-efficient school, writes of programmatic parties that their policies are not:

merely general, designed to please everyone in the electorate. They must have a special meaning in terms of the program to which members are presumably devoted and for which they joined the party and continued to work in it (Epstein, 1967, p. 264).

According to Wright, a fundamental difference between the two paradigms is the "anti-policy, anti-member participation, and anti-intraparty democracy" (Wright, 1971, p. 23) orientation of the rational model. Since parties of

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7It is interesting to note here the degree to which this view of parties differs from that of Ostrogorski for whom permanent political parties were a major impediment to democracy (Ranney, 1962, p. 126).

8James Q. Wilson takes a similar view, and indeed goes further to contend intraparty democracy impedes interparty democracy. Wilson delineates between "amateurs" and "professionals"; these parallel proponents of Wright's party-democracy and rational-efficient models respectively. He argues, "amateurs believe that America's governing
this model are held to promote democracy through competition with political opponents, internal party democracy is of little relevance; decision-making is thus centralized and undertaken by the leadership (Wright, 1971, p.30). This arrangement is justified by rational system theorists as serving the primary objective of goal attainment (Scott, 1992, p.49). In contrast, because proponents of the programmatic party model maintain the major role of parties is to democratize political systems, it is crucial that parties practice internal democracy, and closely reflect the rank and file's opinion in decision-making (Wright, 1971, pp.47-48).

While both models provide a more nuanced conceptualization of the internal dynamics of political parties than that afforded by Michels, they too fail to consider variables which can influence the degree of institutions are best served if there is democracy within the political parties as well as between them; the adherents of the alternative view argue that while interparty democracy is essential, intraparty democracy is not and, indeed, that the success of the former is reduced by the extent of the latter" (Wilson, cited in Wright, 1971, p.30). This notion is also reflected in Joseph Schumpeter's writing on the responsiveness of governments to citizens. Schumpeter argues, "(a)n electorate that is of necessity ill-informed, will make demands of government that might well be counter to the interests of the groups making them and the interests of the community as a whole. These latter interests are better promoted when the government is freed as much as possible from pressure from the electorate. It will then be able to evaluate policy alternatives purely in terms of their "technical" merit, and will subsequently implement those ones that further a wide range of interests" (Schumpeter cited in Ware, 1979, p.34).
flexibility party leaders have in relation to their members. Indeed, by suggesting participants in organizations work towards shared goals, proponents of the rational model of analysis appear to deny the possibility that party members may have different aspirations from leaders. Similarly, the emphasis the rational approach places on the instrumental nature of organizations implies parties have only one set of goals. It is, however, more accurate to view parties as having a multiplicity of objectives (Panebianco, 1988, p.7).

A further shortcoming of the rational perspective is its assumption that parties' declared goals constitute their

9For example, Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing claim the leadership of the British Conservative Party sought not only to win office, but also to transform the values and beliefs of both its members and the British electorate. According to these authors, "Mrs Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph believed that they had a mission to save Britain from itself and therefore embarked on a pedagogic crusade to win public support for the difficult road ahead. One of the few positive roles that Thatcherites give to the state is that of changing public expectations and values. Mrs Thatcher's own behaviour is important in this respect. Not since Gladstone has a prime minister held so many personal political convictions and sought to use the office to persuade the electorate of their truth" (Crewe and Searing, 1988, p.375). In addition to demonstrating that the Conservative leaders aspired to make these changes, the authors show that Thatcherism, as an ideology, was held by only a minority of party members and British voters. This is clearly contrary to the spatial model of ideological construction predicted by the rational approach, and Crewe and Searing thus note of the party's behaviour that ",strikingly does it depart from spatial models that its performance must convince us all of the existence of very important cases where politicians are more interested in moving electorates toward themselves than in moving themselves towards electorates (Crewe and Searing, 1988, p.378).
true aims. In contrast, Lee Anderson argues that political parties may have motives quite disparate and unrelated to claimed objectives (Anderson, 1968, p.377). Panebianco also points out "the "real" aims of an organization are never determinable a priori" (Panebianco, 1988, p.7). The latter author, therefore, finds the rational approach suffers from a teleological prejudice; by claiming "parties are groups that pursue goals, and a party's ideology is the best indicator of its goals" (Panebianco, 1988, p.5) the model assumes what needs to be verified. Thus, although these paradigms are ideal types, the rational approach leads to an oversimplified depiction of the behaviour of parties.

The party democracy model, for its part, contains a similar weakness. Because it embodies a profoundly normative conception of political parties, the resulting portrayal of parties' internal relations is an uncritical simplification with limited theoretical utility. As the rational approach seems flawed by the degree of pragmatism it attributes to parties and their participants, the party democracy approach can be faulted for the level of internal democracy it accredits to parties. Similarly, since the democracy model presumes party leaders articulate the opinions of their rank and file, like its rational counterpart, this perspective implies a singularity of attitude and purpose among leaders and members which negates the possibility of diversity between them.
Another paradigm, developed in large part as a response to the inadequacies of the rational perspective, is the natural systems model. A fundamental difference between the rational and natural systems approaches is their conceptualization of organizational goals. Natural systems theorists argue that organizations are not merely instruments for attaining specified objectives. Rather, proponents of this approach suggest the principle goal of organizations is their own survival (Scott, 1992, pp.51-52). Therefore, as Panebianco notes, the natural systems approach inverts the relation between organizations and their objectives. In the rational model, organizations are the dependent variable, and the independent variable is the goals; in the natural systems perspective, organizational aims constitute the dependent variable (Panebianco, 1988, p.8).

Rather than evaluating these approaches in order to select one to the exclusion of the other, Panebianco incorporates them into a three phase model of organizational evolution. He claims political parties, at their inception, experience a first phase during which they exhibit many of the traits described by the rational model. A second phase follows when parties undergo a period of institutionalization. Panebianco characterizes this as "the consolidation of the organization, the passage from an initial, structurally fluid, phase when the new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which the organization stabilizes, develops stable survival interests and just as stable organizational loyalties" (Panebianco, 1988, p.18). The third and final stage which follows this process is, then, characterized by the natural systems approach. Thus, Panebianco argues that "(i)nstitutionalization designates the party's passage from a system of solidarity oriented to the realization of its official aims (corresponding to the "rational model") to a system of interests oriented toward its own survival.
The natural systems perspective comprises a number of diverse viewpoints regarding the notion of organizational survival. Some theorists take a functionalist perspective and regard organizations as analogous to biological systems having various needs that must be fulfilled to ensure survival. Demonstrating that a particular structure serves a functional need amounts to a functional explanation of that structure, thus the presence of an organizational component is defined in terms of the functions it performs. This approach is, however, problematic, since it is difficult to connect specific structures with particular needs, and to specify clearly the essential needs of organizations. Moreover, a given function is not necessarily performed by a single structure (Scott, 1992, pp.55-56). James Wilson also draws attention to the tautological tendency of functionalist approaches noting, "(s)aying that organizations seek to survive is not very different from saying that organizations exist..." (Wilson, 1973, p.11).

Natural systems theorists such as Wilson take a less anthropomorphic view of organizations, and find it unnecessary to posit a survival need for organizations per

(corresponding to the "natural systems model")" (Panebianco, 1988, pp.18-19).
On this view, it is more appropriate to simply assume members of organizations have an interest in their associations' maintenance (Wilson, 1973, p.13). Organizations, then, are held to be cooperative systems whose existence depends on the contributions of individual participants (Scott, 1992, p.62).

The characterization of organizations as cooperative systems stems from Chester Barnard's *The Functions of the Executive*, in which incentive analysis was first systematically developed (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p.130). According to Barnard:

> an essential element of organizations is the willingness of persons to contribute their individual efforts to the cooperative system. The power of cooperation, which is often spectacularly great when contrasted with that even of large numbers of individuals unorganized, is nevertheless dependent upon the willingness of individuals to cooperate and to contribute their efforts to the cooperative system. The contributions of personal efforts which constitute the energies of organizations are yielded by individuals because of incentives (Barnard, 1971, p.139).

Barnard argues participants in organizations are motivated by material and non-material incentives, the latter of which he holds to be the most crucial for securing participation (Barnard, 1971, pp.142-144). For him, the pivotal ingredient to organizational success is the development of a collective purpose to which participants become committed. This is attained by:

> the process of inculcating points of view, fundamental attitudes, loyalties to the organization or cooperative system and to the system of objective cooperative authority, that will result in subordinating individual
interest and the minor dictates of personal codes to the good of the cooperative whole (Barnard, cited in Scott, 1992, p.63).

Barnard's is a normative argument; he claims it is the responsibility of executives—or leaders— to generate a moral code to "bind the wills of men (sic) to the accomplishment of purposes beyond their immediate ends..." (Barnard, 1971, p.283). Barnard has been accused of naivete and of exhibiting "moral imperialism" (Scott, 1992, p.63). Indeed, to the extent that he believes leaders should develop a collective purpose which is morally binding on participants, he appears to sanction a type of moral oligarchy.

Nevertheless, incentive analysis has several advantages over the approaches discussed above. While Panebianco argues convincingly that rational and natural systems models are applicable to different stages of organizational development, it is appropriate to briefly contrast the various perspectives.

Because the incentive approach characterizes political parties as complex incentive-distributing mechanisms, their success is not measured by goal attainment alone, but also by the degree to which they obtain incentive-based

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11At the same time, as with Michels' work, it is important when considering Barnard's thesis to note the period in which he wrote. *The Functions of the Executive*, originally published in 1938, appears to reflect a similar political outlook as that which prevailed when *Political Parties* was published.
contributions from members (Roback, 1980, p.182). The model, therefore, avoids the instrumentalist bias of the rational approach. Similarly, although members of organizations are viewed as sharing a common purpose, they are also held to be motivated by various organizational incentives. The incentive approach, then, does not imply, as do the rational and democracy models, that party members are motivated by identical goals. Incentive analysis, therefore, is a more effective theoretical framework for studying the leadership-member relations of political parties than the other models I have examined.

Political theorists have refined and utilized Barnard's model in their efforts to understand the motivations of party participants, and to assess the impact different types of incentives have on the internal dynamics of political parties. Like Barnard, they argue organizations use tangible and intangible incentives to motivate individuals to become, or remain members and perform certain tasks.

According to Panebianco, parties provide selective and collective incentives. The former are enjoyed by only a few individuals, while the latter are benefits, or assurances of benefits, that parties dispense to all members (Panebianco,
Although he notes that in practice party members garner both types of incentives, the author claims most members are generally motivated by one or the other. Members who benefit primarily from selective incentives are "careerists" whose participation is motivated by material and/or status-oriented rewards. Careerists will necessarily be outnumbered by "believers" who are principally motivated by collective incentives (Panebianco, 1988, pp.26-30). Panebianco maintains that, "leaders must above all safeguard the believers' identity with constant and ritual references to the ideological goals" (Panebianco, 1988, pp.27).

Panebianco labels collective incentives "incentives of identity," while other authors term them "purposive incentives." Incentives of this type reward members with the satisfaction of having contributed toward a cause they value (Wilson, 1973, p.34). For Panebianco, they are the sense of identity stemming from membership, from a shared ideology, or from participation based on mutual social or political goals (Panebianco, 1988, p.10). Alan Ware describes these incentives as "those collective benefits that arise from the organization's commitment to particular public policies" (Ware, 1992, p.81).

 Panebianco synthesizes organizational incentives into his three phase model rather than exclusively associating them with the natural systems phase. He suggests that in phase one collective incentives prevail; in phase two selective incentives are more significant (Panebianco, 1988, pg.20).
Panebianco suggests collective incentives are associated with activities directed towards the realization of official goals. Solidarity and identity are reduced if faith in the attainment of party aims is upset. Panebianco, claims, therefore, that the first internal function of ideology is that of maintaining the identity of the organization for its members and supporters. Thus, organizational ideology is the principal source of collective incentives (Panebianco, 1988, p.11).

Ware suggests a continuum to explain the acquisition of labour by parties, with gifts and exchange at either end. While most labour is generated through a combination of both, gift based labour leads to greater freedom for party leaders, since little is expected in return. Exchange-based labour, on the other hand, obliges parties to compensate members, particularly when these individuals are motivated by material or purposive incentives (Ware, 1992, p.91).

Ware explains that solidary incentives motivate members by affording them "the fun of participation and companionship" (Ware, 1992, p.81). He argues political parties are becoming increasingly dependent on exchange, rather than donations, as a source of labour. One reason for this is that parties are less able to facilitate the provision of habitual work by members. Ware suggests this is a result of decreased outlets through which parties are able to offer habit forming solidary incentives. He concludes
that parties will increasingly rely on purposive incentives to acquire volunteer labour. Leaders, consequently, may enjoy less freedom in relation to their membership, and parties could become less manageable (Ware, 1992, pp.90-92). For Ware, parties in the future will not resemble the "catch-all" parties envisioned by Otto Kircheimer,\textsuperscript{13} rather, they will become more "policy-seeking," and more sensitive to their memberships' policy preferences.

Wilson distinguishes purposive political parties from purely ideological ones. Ideological organizations such as Marxist parties tend to espouse radical critiques and possess clearly defined ideological doctrines. In contrast, purposive parties, are generally composed of individuals concerned about public policy. Members of these parties rarely seek to transform the political system, but rather believe problems can be solved by taking the appropriate position on issues (Wilson, 1973, pp.101-102).\textsuperscript{14}

Wilson argues purposive parties are commonly reluctant to vest discretionary authority in leaders. Thus, members of these parties "are frequently concerned with repealing the


\textsuperscript{14}Purposive parties, to some degree, parallel parties characterized by the Party Democracy model. However, the former are generally portrayed in less normative terms than the latter.
iron law of oligarchy" (Wilson, 1973, p.107). He suggests leaders of purposive parties will be powerfully constrained in their actions by the need to conserve and enhance the supply of incentives (Wilson, 1973, pp.101-108).

Clark and Wilson similarly claim the leaders of purposive parties will have little room to manoeuvre in terms of policy-making. They also contend, however, that "tactical flexibility may be developed if members can be made aware of the crucial distinctions between purposes and tactics" (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p.148). Thus, these authors suggest the leaders of purposive political parties may be able to modify party goals if they are able to convince their members of the advisability of such action.

Clark and Wilson note purposive incentives typically stem from objectives implying change. They argue that while purposes are the principle unifying force of purposive parties, they are also a source of internal conflict. The authors claim disputes over purposive goals will generate heated internal struggles (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p.146).

According to Wilson's criteria, the RPC may be defined as a purposive party. The party's members are plainly concerned with the goals of public policy, and while the RPC aims to render government more accountable, the party does not seek to fundamentally transform the political system. At the same time, consistent with Clark and Wilson's view that purposive parties have goals implying change, many of the
RPC's stated objectives express such a notion. Manning's book, *The New Canada*, clearly articulates this idea, as does much of the leadership's discourse. In one speech, for instance, Manning asked:

would we be willing to give up some of our cherished "hyphens," if that was the price of doing away with hyphenated-Canadianism in other parts of the country? If we answer "no" to this question on a personal level, then the idea of a New Canada replacing the Old Canada will be nothing but a pipe dream. But if our answer to these questions is a resounding "yes," then nothing can prevent the New Canada from prevailing over the Old (Manning, 1990c, p.10).

Because the RPC is a purposive party, the party's leadership depends on purposive incentives, or incentives of identity, for its members' support. Clark, Wilson and Ware would, therefore, predict the party's leadership to have only limited flexibility of movement in terms of its memberships' policy preferences. Thus, these authors would expect the RPC's leadership to have experienced considerably more difficulty in overriding the policy preferences of its members than was apparently the case. Clark and Wilson would also presumably envision the party's moderation of its immigration policy to have led to widespread party dissent. However, while some individuals have left the party— for example following the Doug Collins incident— the RPC, as I have indicated, has been successful at sustaining and increasing its membership. Therefore, Ware, Clark and Wilson's conclusions that organizations utilizing purposive incentives tend to be membership driven appears overdrawn in
This does not mean, however, that incentive analysis should be discarded as a useful theoretical framework. Ware seems correct in arguing that political parties have grown more dependent on purposive incentives. A decline in solidary incentives—those incentives which motivate members by providing them with companionship—and, indeed, material incentives, plainly suggests that individuals who join and work for parties will be increasingly motivated by incentives of identity. Moreover, Ware's prediction that parties will be more policy-seeking is born out by the RPC; the party has clearly differentiated itself from the other federal parties. Indeed, the RPC has evidently reconciled the dilemma Clark and Wilson argue purposive parties face, since it has clearly distinguished itself from other federal parties without severely dividing its membership. However, it appears it is precisely this differentiation that has enabled the RPC's leadership to override the policy preferences of its membership to the degree that it has.

Ware, Clark and Wilson apparently do not consider the impact that the existence, or non-existence, of other organizations may have on parties' incentive systems and leadership-member relations. In contrast, Panebianco argues these factors have a significant effect on the internal power dynamics of political parties. He suggests unequal leadership-member relations can be explained by a:
low substitutability of organizational incentives. The sligher the followers' chances of obtaining elsewhere benefits comparable to the remunerations distributed by the leaders, the more the vertical power games favour the leaders...Every party or movement that monopolizes a collective identity privileges its own leaders in this way (Panebianco, 1988, p.31).

While I have argued in this thesis that the RPC's immigration policy poorly reflects the views of its members, I have also noted the party is alone in its position on this issue. In other words, the RPC is the only federal party which seeks to decrease immigration quotas. At the same time, Canada's changing ethnicity is of deep concern to many RPC members distressed by the transformation they see Canada undergoing. This apprehension is reflected in the proposals on immigration policy formulated and submitted for Assembly vote by the party's rank and file. In addition, these rather traditional and conservative individuals are convinced their views have been consistently ignored by the other federal parties which are perceived by these members to be united in a welfare, or left-leaning, liberalism they do not support (Harrison and Krahn, 1992, pp.19-20, Greenspon, 1993, p.A4).

Because the RPC's platform accommodates more traditional values than the other mainstream parties, the party's membership is deeply dependent on it for incentives of identity. Thus, the collective incentives the RPC's leadership offers through its policy goals provides a means through which its members' political alienation is ameliorated. It is, therefore, possible that the RPC elite
is able to act with a considerable degree of freedom because of the extent to which its membership depends on the party for incentives or identity. Consequently, one explanation for the RPC leadership's flexibility is that the party, in Panebianco's terms, has "no equivalent on the external market" (Panebianco, 1988, p.31).\(^\text{15}\)

Panebianco's argument, also appears to explain in part why the leadership of the Alberta Social Credit was able to maintain members' loyalty, despite such obviously contradictory acts as Aberhart's repealing of the 1936 Recall Act. As I have suggested, the Social Credit garnered support by capitalizing on the sense of powerlessness engendered by the Depression. The party promised to represent Albertans where the government and other parties seemed unwilling or unable, and to implement a credit system which the party claimed would alleviate their poverty. In addition, Social Credit capitalized on Albertans' perceptions that other parties had failed to represent them,

\(^\text{15}\)Indeed, despite the fact Manning refused to endorse his candidacy, Doug Collins instructed readers of the North Shore News in May 1994 to "(f)orget the Liberal Party. It is more concerned about what is going on in Somalia and South Africa than in Canada. It doesn't matter a damn to Marchi & Co. if this country becomes a cultural conundrum and wasteland provided they get the ethnic votes. The Reform Party is this country's last hope" (Collins, 1994, p.7). Similarly, Heritage Front leader Wolfgang Droege, despite having been ousted from the RPC, evidently still attends party meetings. Said Droeg, "Of course we still have many members within the Reform Party. We still feel, even though we don't care for the leadership, it's still the party that most closely reflects the beliefs of our organization ("White-Supremacist Front," 1993, p.A2).
by advancing the claim that these parties were agents of the people's adversaries. Social Credit could, therefore, claim to be Albertan's only hope. The party thus successfully presented itself as the only channel through which Albertans would be represented. As with the RPC, then, the membership of the Social Credit was deeply dependent on it for incentives of identity.

Another plausible explanation for the RPC leadership's high degree of flexibility of movement is the loyalty which Manning inspires in the party's members. Writing on the extent of this loyalty, Sharpe and Braid claim:

(t)he bond of trust between Preston Manning and his party is unique in Canadian politics today. He proves this time and again by performing a feat of on-stage magic that shows how eager his followers are to trust him even against some of their own cherished beliefs (Sharpe and Braid, 1992, p.15).16

Panebianco argues party leaders can be charismatic without necessarily possessing messianic qualities. He suggests situations of severe social stress can cause individuals to perceive those offering salvation from distress as uniquely qualified. This "situational charisma,"

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16Sharpe and Braid's observations are certainly born out by one delegate's reminiscences of the RPC's 1987 Vancouver Assembly. This delegate, "wrote Manning off right away. He's just a little guy, kind of owlish and fidgety, not very inspiring face to face. He's smart enough, but he just didn't seem like a leader. But then he got up there Saturday afternoon and started talking. Well, I closed my eyes and heard Tommy Douglas. Someone else heard Bible Bill Aberhart. When I sat down with my friends again Saturday night, we'd conceded everything to Preston and were wondering if anyone would bother challenging him" (O'Neill, 1991, p.25).
may inspire enthusiastic loyalty from party members, which will, in turn, provide leaders with a relatively high degree of freedom of movement (Panebianco, 1988, p.52).

I have suggested that both the Alberta Social Credit and the RPC arose during crises. If Panebianco is correct, William Aberhart was able to draw a charismatic response by offering leadership at a time when Albertans were experiencing social and economic disaster. This perhaps further explains why Aberhart was able to maintain both the leadership and the credibility of Social Credit, despite the inconsistencies from which the party suffered. Indeed, Sharpe and Braid argue:

observers of Alberta Social Credit noted long ago that the Socred movement was not truly populist, but a massive delegation of trust by voters to revered leaders, first William Aberhart and then Ernest Manning. The same dynamic appears to be at work today in Preston Manning's leadership of the Reform Party. Audiences hang on his words with rapt attention, applauding every point and laughing at every joke. (Sharpe and Braid, 1992, p.17).

Manning, like Aberhart before him, has been able to take advantage of a crisis. In the RPC's case the crisis is one of political and social alienation experienced by party members as a result of changes in Canada's ideological and social structures. Thus, the RPC leader possibly inspires the loyalty of the party's membership as a result of situational charisma. This, in turn, has facilitated Manning's attempts to persuade members to acquiesce to the leadership's position on such sensitive issues as the RPC's
immigration policy.

I noted above that Clark and Wilson suggest the goals of purposive political parties can be modified by leaders if they are able to convince their members of the importance of tactical strategy. As I attempted to demonstrate in chapter three of this thesis, the RPC's leadership informed its members through the Exposure Draft, that a number of the rank and file's policy proposals submitted for consideration at the Saskatoon Assembly could lead to accusations of racism from the party's opponents. I also pointed out the RPC's leadership suggested alterations to the party's immigration platform were cosmetic rather than substantive. In other words, the leadership appears to have intimated to its membership that tactical strategy is an important enough consideration to modify the party's purposive goals. To the extent that the RPC's members followed the guidance of the leadership and voted against the policy proposals as they were advised, it is apparent they were persuaded of the strategic advisability of such a move.

To conclude: I have argued that the RPC's leadership, in proclaiming its commitment to democratic populism, has encouraged party members to submit policy resolutions, the tenor of which it ignores. The RPC has prospered despite this, and the fact that the party has amended its immigration policy from one which seems to have reflected its membership's opinion, to the current policy, which
according to the evidence I have presented, has departed from it.

Clark and Wilson argue the ability of leaders to make members aware of the distinction between tactics and purposes will be a function of the size of the elite, degree of inculcation and training of party members, and disciplinary control of the party (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p.148). In the case of the RPC, however, I would argue that the ability of the RPC's leadership to convince its members of the importance of tactical strategy was facilitated by Manning's situational charisma, and the dependence of the RPC's membership on their party for incentives of identity.
Appendix One

I interviewed ten Reform Party of Canada members during the spring and summer of 1993. These members reside in the British Columbia lower mainland, and do not include the three party members listed in the References section in this thesis.
Appendix Two

Founder Members of the Reform Party of Canada

E. Preston Manning (Business Consultant)
Stanley Roberts (Former vice-president of Simon Fraser University)
Robert Muir (Lawyer)
Francis Winspear (Accountant)
Doug Hillard (Lawyer)
Marvin McDill

Appendix Three

Members of the Reform Party of Canada Party Policy Committee During the Exposure Draft Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Preston Manning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Stephen Harper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Ken Warenko</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aboriginal Issues</td>
<td>David Berger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Perry Kirkham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Reform</td>
<td>Deborah Grey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal</td>
<td>Peter Holle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Policy</td>
<td>Tam Deachman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Policy</td>
<td>Brenwyn Cooley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Victor Burstall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resolution #1
RESOLVED that our Constituency urge the Reform Party to retain the basic direction of its immigration policy- that our immigration policy be balanced and positive, that Canada welcome genuine refugees, and that the Reform Party support an immigration policy which has as its focus Canada's economic needs without regard to race or creed.

Resolution #2
RESOLVED that the Reform Party oppose any immigration policy based on race or creed, whether designed to deliberately retain or to deliberately alter the ethnic makeup of Canada for political purposes.

Resolution #3
RESOLVED that the Reform Party support a policy accepting the settlement of genuine refugees who find their way to Canada. A genuine refugee is one who has a well-founded fear of persecution and qualifies under the strict requirement of the United Nation Convention.


Pink, R. (1990, October). The Immigration Crisis: It is not that we have too many Immigrants- But too few. *Policy Options Politiques* pp.33-35.


White-Supremacist Front Claims Reform Party Link. (1993,


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Manning, E. P. (1990c, November). The New Canada Notes from a public address.

Manning, E. P. (1991, November 30). Notes for a Public Address to the RPC Edmonton Rally


Reform Association of Canada. (1987, June 15). Strategic Plan: Reform Association of Canada


Reform Party of Canada. (1989b, October 27-29). Resolutions to be Submitted at the Edmonton Assembly

Reform Party of Canada. (1989c, October 27-29). Resolutions voted on at the Edmonton Assembly


Warenko, K. (1990, December 22). Memorandum from Policy Development Coordinator to Party Policy Committee Members


Interviews


