DIALOGISM AND TEACHER RESEARCH

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Dialogism and Teacher Research

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Abstract

This dissertation is in response to Maxine Greene's challenge for teachers to become more wide-awake, that is, to consciously develop their own moral teaching practices. In it I argue that current versions of teacher research do not adequately address crucial normative questions about teaching.

In Chapter One, I use the 1994 NSSE Yearbook devoted to teacher research as an example of the current teacher research dialogue. I argue that missing from this discussion is a debate about the purposes of teacher research, which I try to capture in three key questions: What is meant by teaching practice? What is meant by research? How can teacher research contribute to the education of students?

In Chapter Two I trace how original conceptions of teacher research were framed from within the assumptions of positivist science and it was Lawrence Stenhouse who reframed the dialogue about teacher research to include moral dimensions. Stenhouse left it to others, however, to do the work that would address my concerns.

In Chapters Three, Four and Five, I explicate and critique the work of people who attempt this work as well as the hermeneutical theorists they draw from. At the end of each of these chapters I claim particular resources that I use later in chapters six and seven to supplement answers based on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin.
Bakhtin's dialogism is concerned with making each person answerable for his/her understanding of the world and acting on that understanding. Dialogism is best embodied in the works of certain modern novelists and includes concepts such as polyphony, chronotope and carnival, all checks on ideological discourse.

In Chapter Seven I combine dialogism with other hermeneutic resources to attempt answers to the three questions I posed in Chapter One, which were, in turn, drawn from Greene's challenge. What is offered is not a comprehensive theory for teacher research, but a way of thinking about teaching practice that helps teachers develop more moral practices, that is, practices that are more wide-awake.
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The opposite of morality, it has often been said, is indifference -- a lack of care, an absence of concern. Lacking wide-awakeness, I want to argue, individuals are likely to drift, to act on impulses of expediency.

I am suggesting that, for too many individuals in modern society, there is a feeling of being dominated and that feelings of powerlessness are almost inescapable. I am suggesting that such feelings can to a large degree be overcome through conscious endeavor on the part of individuals to keep themselves awake, to think about their condition in the world, to inquire into the forces that appear to dominate them, to interpret the experiences they are having day by day.

I am ... suggesting...that wide-awakeness ought to accompany every effort made to initiate persons into any form of life or academic discipline. Therefore, I believe it important for teachers ... to be clear about how they ground their own values, their own conceptions of the good and the possible.

I believe, you see, that the young are most likely to be stirred to learn when they are challenged by teachers who themselves are learning, who are breaking with what they have too easily taken for granted, who are creating their own moral lives. There are no guarantees, but wide-awakeness can play a part in the process of liberating and arousing, in helping people pose questions with regard to what is oppressive, mindless and wrong.

The movement for teachers to become researchers into their practices might be interpreted, in some sense, as a response to Greene's call for them to awaken. This claim, however, like many claims connected with teachers becoming researchers, is subject to significant qualification. Teachers were researchers long before Greene's essay and many, if not most, teacher researchers have not read Greene's work. The recent growth of the teacher researcher movement in both numbers and status is dramatic and intriguing. A number of explanations seems feasible: (1) teachers want their voices to be heard in the public dialogue about education; (2) teachers want to challenge the monopoly held by universities in the generation of knowledge about teaching; (3) teachers are attempting to develop more moral practices consistent with coherent, defensible educational values as Greene suggests. I believe that the current teacher research movement is often concerned with (1) and (2); I am interested in building a case for (3).

Ironically, teacher research is attracting the most attention when it is perhaps at its most chaotic. Or, alternatively, the issues and problems that have always been inherent in teachers "researching" their own educational
practices are becoming even more evident as teacher research attracts more serious attention. Certainly the idea is becoming respectable. Evidence abounds: publications about teacher research multiply, publishers solicit manuscripts, SIG membership in AERA increases dramatically. Perhaps the most conclusive evidence that teacher research has become "respectable": the 1994 yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) (Hollingsworth and Sockett) is devoted to teacher research.

The contradictions, dilemmas and poorly explicated constructs that I believe are characteristic of current versions of teacher research can all be found in this volume. Issues include conceptions of teaching, research, and how they are related to each other and education. The issues are not new; indeed, the concerns have been part of various notions of teacher research in its various iterations from the beginning. I want to use this yearbook, and especially one particular chapter, to uncover what I consider to be fundamental questions about teacher research. In the following section I group these concerns into three central questions that I want to address. Finally, I outline how I intend to deal with these three questions.

I. NSSE YEARBOOK

Lytle and Cochran-Smith in their chapter "Inquiry,
"Inquiry, Knowledge and Practice"

Teaching, as conceived by Cochran-Smith and Lytle, is a "professional" as opposed to a "technical" activity. Teachers access a great depth and breadth of professional knowledge in making difficult judgements in complex and
In contrast to a more technical view that teaching hinges on the use of particular techniques applied in various situations..., a more deliberative view of teaching regards teachers as professionals who use their knowledge to construct perspectives, choose actions, manage dilemmas, interpret and create curricula, make strategic choices, and to a large extent define their own teaching responsibilities (p. 37).

This professional knowledge is used to inform and construct teaching practices committed to students' learning and life chances, an effort that will entail a struggle to reform schools by "teaching against the grain".

Cochran-Smith and Lytle claim that teacher researchers form their practices from a knowledge base constructed by "systematic and intentional inquiry carried out ... in their own schools and classrooms" (p. 24). The topics that teachers may choose to research emerge from "discrepancies between intention and reality or between theory/research and practice" (p. 27). The knowledge generated forms an epistemology distinct from the knowledge generated by university researchers since "the research process is embedded in practice, the relationship between knower and known is significantly altered" (p. 29). Teacher research involves both local knowledge, specific to individual or groups of teachers, and public knowledge, which is applicable to larger school and university communities.
Students, too, are involved in this effort: "teachers and students negotiate what counts as knowledge in the classroom, who can have knowledge, and how knowledge can be generated, challenged and evaluated" (p. 30).

Teacher research is set up in opposition to university-based research on teaching where problems and questions do not emerge from practice, but from "careful study in a discipline...and from analysis of the existing theoretical and empirical literature" (p. 27). In turn, university researchers contribute to that literature by producing "findings for application and use outside of the context in which they were developed" (p. 27). This knowledge is generated through standard, relatively unproblematic methods in which the "objectivity and relative detachment of the researcher are assumed" (p. 28). While teacher research often resembles interpretive research,

the position of the researcher relative to the researched is not detachment, but long-term, intense, and direct professional involvement. This means that the goal of the researcher is not objectivity but systematic subjectivity, a position that leads to new paradigms for research on teaching and to the construction of alternative modes of discourse and analysis" (p. 28).

Cochran-Smith and Lytle claim that, by becoming researchers, teachers will no longer be marginalized; they will be in a position to challenge the university's hegemony in the generation of knowledge about teaching and at the same time
play an increasingly important role in the reform of schools. "When [teachers] change their relationships to knowledge, they may also realign their relationships to the brokers of knowledge and power in schools and universities" (p. 32). Teachers' voices will be heard.

Questions about "Inquiry, Knowledge and Practice"

In making their case for teacher research, Cochran-Smith and Lytle set up a series of stark oppositions involving their conceptions of teaching practice, research and the relationship between teaching practice and research. I want to challenge both the usefulness and validity of these comparisons.

(1) Teaching practice

Lytle and Cochran-Smith claim that teacher researchers are professionals, not simple technicians. Teachers construct their practices thoughtfully and deliberately in a myriad of situations; they do not simply apply rules independent of contexts. Their professional practices are constructed with the knowledge generated by their classroom research. This portrait begs many questions fundamental to teaching, education, and the construction and improvement of practices. The stark bifurcation is only possible by simplifying contested concepts at a very high level of abstraction.
"Teachers", "professional", and "practice" are all crucial to building a concept of teacher research. None, I believe, is explicated either in the NSSE Yearbook chapter or in Lytle and Cochran-Smith’s other work. Teachers, for example, are divided into those who are "professional" who "teach against the grain" and "technicians" who follow standard procedures. Later, Cochran-Smith and Lytle contrast teachers’ knowledge with that generated by university-based researchers. Which teachers? Those who teach with or against the grain? Can all those who teach against the grain be grouped together?

Professional is also a concept (slogan?) with varying meanings (Schon, 1983; Darling-Hammond, 1988; Labaree, 1992). What do Cochran-Smith and Lytle mean by claiming professional status for teacher researchers? Does the claim refer to a specialized knowledge base (Schulman, 1987), socio-economic status (Larson, 1977) or a complex of moral and methodological considerations (Fenstermacher, 1990, 1991; Sockett, 1993)? The call for reform and commitment to students’ life chances would seem to support a moral view of professionalism, but their concern for the ownership of knowledge seems to emphasize political aspects, especially since the particular direction for reform, the ethical underpinnings of that reform and the connection between knowledge generated by teacher researchers and reform are unclear or absent.
Cochran-Smith and Lytle's concern for epistemology is linked to a conception of teaching practice founded on knowledge, informed by knowledge and improved by knowledge. Other aspects of the construction of teaching practices are given short shrift. MacIntyre, for example, defines a practice as

any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and particularly definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (1984, p. 187).

Central to practices are virtues "which enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices" (p. 191).

Teaching practices are formed not just from a technical knowledge base, but from a morality based on the virtues or goods of teaching (as well as many other factors). For example, Sockett (1993) argues for a moral epistemology of teaching practice based on five key virtues -- honesty, courage, care, fairness and practical wisdom. This is the point that I believe that Greene is making in her call for teachers to become morally wide-awake. If teaching practice is fundamentally moral, then research into teaching practice must involve moral inquiry. "Teaching against the grain" is, I believe, an attempt by Cochran-Smith and Lytle to
capture this dimension, but they do not work out the normative aspects in their version of reform. Is, for example, simply practising in a way counter to the prevailing culture a moral practice?

(2) Research

The concept of 'research' also needs to be clarified. "Research/theory and practice", "university-based and practice-based research", "local versus public knowledge" are all oppositions that require substantial explication. Indeed, whether they are really dichotomies needs to be established. The sharp bifurcation of theory and practice, for example, seems problematic: practices are not atheoretical and theories imply practices. The suggestion that either university-based research or teacher research is of a piece seems another high abstraction that is more damaging than helpful. Finally, the distinction between local and public knowledge needs clarification and perhaps qualification. Cochran-Smith and Lytle suggest as much by discussing the generalizability of local knowledge, but do not make the reciprocal case or develop the complicated relationship inherent in this division.

(3) Teaching Practice and Research

Cochran-Smith and Lytle's notions of teaching and research come together to create teacher research which
allows teacher researchers to "position themselves in relationship
to school administrators, policy makers and university-based experts as agents of systematic change" (In Press). While they recognise that the formal and informal structures to support teachers pursuing research in classrooms and schools is missing, they call for a partnership of school and university colleagues to bring about change in classrooms, schools, districts and professional organizations. Again, abstractions are high, oppositions stark and clarifications and qualifications are needed. For example systematic change to increase "students' learning and life chances" is not a goal that many would quarrel with at this level of abstraction; what it means in context is quite another matter. For example proponents and opponents of retaining students in grade when they fail to meet the "standards" for a particular grade both claim to be increasing students' life chances (Coulter et al, 1993).

And it is in context that different versions of education will be contested, between and among teachers, administrators and policy makers. That context does not just lack supports for teacher researchers, but may actively discourage and penalize teachers who pursue research projects (Coulter, 1991). The depiction of the issue as one involving "marginalized" teachers battling the "hegemony" of those in power in schools and universities and overcoming
through "synergy" is not clear. Even if we were to accept that teacher research is about building moral practices by teaching against the grain and developing local knowledge, we lack any means of discriminating among various claims moral practice and knowledge. **Are claims made by** practitioners automatically more valid than claims from university-based researchers? **How are different claims made** by teacher researchers to be adjudicated? **What are the** norms for this critique and how are these norms developed? None of these questions is addressed by Cochran-Smith in their chapter, in their other work, in the other chapters in the NSSE yearbook, or, indeed, elsewhere in the teacher research literature.

**Other Chapters**

Using one chapter as a base for reviewing the state of teacher research can seem problematic. Concepts of teaching, research and teacher research may simply be found elsewhere, either in the other work of Lytle and Cochran-Smith, the other chapters in the NSSE yearbook or in the teacher research literature generally. This is not the case.

Other chapters in the NSSE yearbook focus on the same issues that Cochran-Smith and Lytle raise. Teacher research as a means of including the voices of teachers is perhaps the most common concern. Atkin, for example, decries the
lack of relevance of much educational research for teachers. He contrasts this with the story of how a group of teacher researchers were able to affect policy by publishing and lobbying to keep a mentoring program in California.

By conducting their research, then publishing it, they made perspectives visible that clearly are important but are seldom illuminated by the kind of studies done for and by those in the traditional decision-making roles, by those who spend their professional lives nearer the 'top' of the education system than in the classroom itself (p. 119).

Teachers' voices were heard. What is not at issue, however, is the view of teaching and education that informed the research and how it differs from competing views.

Teachers' voices are a concern in a number of other chapters (Threatt et al.; Clandinin and Connelly; Hollingsworth and Miller; Lieberman and Miller; Richardson). Often raised is the difficulty of having this voice heard in environments where supports are lacking or voices are actively silenced.

Similarly, much work involves the knowledge generated by teacher research. Lieberman and Miller, for example, argue that teacher research is a form of knowledge building that provides access to the craft knowledge that teachers develop over the course of their professional lives. Clandinin and Connelly believe that teacher research has the capacity to change the "theory-practice story" by generating
storied knowledge. Threatt and other teacher researchers believe the meaning of research for teachers has to be clarified.

Only Ken Zeichner in his chapter "Personal Renewal and Social Construction Through Teacher Research" deals with the issues that I find problematic in any depth. For Zeichner, teacher voice and teacher knowledge are not ends. He urges advocates of teacher research to "...take a hard look at the purposes to which it is directed, including the extent of the connection between the teacher research movement and the struggle for greater social, economic and political justice" (p. 67). It is not enough for teachers to "improve" their practices without a discussion of "the merits of what is achieved and whether it is worth achieving in the context of education in a democratic society" (p. 75). Teacher research might instead "further solidify and justify practices that are harmful to students..." (p. 66).

Zeichner begins to raise what I believe to be important questions about teacher research that need to be addressed. What are educational teaching practices? How can teacher research contribute to the construction and improvement of those practices? These questions are not being addressed in the NSSE yearbook, or in the contemporary literature about teacher research. These are the questions I want to address.
II. QUESTIONS

The queries I want to raise about teacher research are those I posed about the Cochran-Smith and Lytle chapter and the NSSE Yearbook and can be grouped into three broad questions. How is teaching practice conceived? How does research contribute to teaching practice? How can teacher research be critiqued? I want to briefly outline the issues that must be addressed under each question.

(1) What is meant by 'teaching practice'?

Any version of teacher research assumes a particular version of teaching and for particular purposes. Cochran-Smith and Lytle, for example, advance a "professional" conception, which involves "teaching against the grain". Like Greene, I am interested in a moral conception of teaching, concerned with particular educational values. Obvious questions follow about the selection of those values and how they are embodied in teaching practice. Indeed, 'practice' and 'teaching practice' must also be explicated.

(2) What is meant by research?

Assuming that 'teaching practice' can be clarified, what is meant by 'research' into that practice? Teacher
research presumes some kind of relationship between teaching and research. What is the nature of that relationship?

(3) **How can teacher research contribute to the education of students?**

Finally, assuming both the purposes and methodology for teacher research have been established, how can its claims to the improvement of teaching practice be judged? On what basis are competing claims to the improvement of teaching practice to be discriminated? How are ideological claims uncovered?

III. **ATTEMPTED ANSWERS**

In Chapters Two to Seven I propose to critique the answers that others have provided to the above questions and also point towards a response that I believe is consistent with Greene's call for teachers to become morally awake. This response is based on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian literary theorist, whose ideas are often grouped together and called dialogism. Bakhtin did not produce a unitary corpus; he did not articulate and develop one coherent set of ideas, but visited the same issues in somewhat different ways throughout his career. This is further complicated by disputes about which works can
actually be attributed to Bakhtin and which were written by members of his circle. In order to address the questions I pose above, I use both Bakhtin’s ideas and some of the resources claimed from other theorists concerned with language, and particularly written language, that is, hermeneutics.

Building a conception of teacher research on a foundation of hermeneutics is not unusual. Indeed I critique three attempts to do this in Chapters Three, Four and Five. While I believe that each of these attempts is in some important ways inadequate both from the perspective of the particular interpretation and the original theory, I do use resources from each theory to supplement and contrast with Bakhtin’s work in dealing with the three general questions I set for teacher research. The questions I pose about teacher research are not new, only the resources I use to address them are original. The idea of teachers researching their own practices has been debated during most of this century. I want to critique that discussion and perhaps add to it.

Chapter Two

For most of this century, the answers to the three questions I pose about teacher research have been framed from within the assumptions of positivist science. Research is exclusively experimental empirical work; practice is the
arena in which the findings of scientific research are applied; the rigorous methodology of science assures the validity of the applied knowledge and the improvement of practice.

I follow the development of teacher research from the science-in-education movement at the beginning of the century, including the work of Dewey, to the development of action research by Collier and Lewin, and its adaptation by Corey and his colleagues. I try to explain the growth and subsequent decline of action research in schools by referring to its answers to the three questions I pose about teacher research.

At the end of Chapter Two I introduce the work of Lawrence Stenhouse who points to very different answers to these three questions. For Stenhouse, teaching practice is not applied science, but the practice of extended professionalism and includes moral and artistic dimensions. While eschewing positivism, Stenhouse does not fully develop a concept of research for teaching practice, nor does he explain the basis for criticizing and improving practice. Stenhouse reframes the dialogue about teacher research, but does not attempt answers to my three questions.

In Chapters Three, Four and Five, I explicate and critique the work of people who do attempt answers to these questions -- Carr and Kemmis, Elliott and Winter -- and do so by drawing on the work of various hermeneuts. In each of
these chapters I try to develop their answers to the three key questions I pose and critique (1) their interpretations of the original hermeneutic resources; (2) the original hermeneutic theory; and (3) examples of teacher research that draw on these theories of teacher research. At the end of each of these chapters I claim particular resources that I later use for my attempted answers.

Chapter Three

In Chapter Three I critique Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis' work and especially *Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research* (1986) which develops a theory for teacher research based on their interpretation of Habermas. I try to show that their interpretation is flawed and does not provide satisfactory answers to any of my three questions about teacher research. Indeed, Carr and Kemmis' work is based on work that Habermas himself has since significantly modified and his more recent work points to better answers to my three questions. Habermas' ideas about normative discourse are very important resources for a theory of teacher research which is concerned with teaching as moral practice.

Chapter Four

In this chapter I examine John Elliott's attempts to build a theory for teacher research based on the work of
Gadamer. Elliott concentrates on answering the first of my three questions: defining teaching practice. He bases his theory of teacher research on explicating his version of Aristotle's *phronesis*, that is, ethical action in context. Research is an integral part of practice and the improvement of practice is accomplished by action that is consistent with the internal goods of practice.

Elliott does not explain, however, how these goods internal to practice are developed. If goods are principles of good practice culled from practices, he does not address two central issues: (1) how this process occurs and (2) the basis for deciding the norms of good practice. Without answers to these problems, teacher research is vulnerable to criticisms of relativism.

Gadamer does, however, provide resources that can be used to counter charges of relativism and ideological practice, specifically his ideas about dialogue and the fusion of horizons, the anticipation of completeness and *docta ignorantia*. These resources are introduced in Chapter Four and later used in a different context in Chapters Six and Seven.

Chapter Five

The final attempt to build a theoretical foundation for teacher research is that of Richard Winter, who uses a wide
variety of sources including Garfinkel, Freud, Levi-Strauss, Derrida and Ricoeur to form a theory of teacher research based on the concepts of dialectics and reflexivity. Winter is primarily concerned with answering the second and third of my three questions, that is, questions about 'research' and the improvement of practice. The examination of research into teaching practice leads Winter to the ideas of teacher research as reflective narrative; reflection is accomplished by following the principles of dialectics and reflexivity.

What is missing from Winter's work is a normative conception of teaching practice, that is, the basis for deciding whether reflective narrative really does contribute to teaching practice, or whether dialectics and reflexivity actually do uncover ideology and improve practice. Winter provides tools, but how they are to be used and for what ends is unclear.

The tools that I find are especially important are those that are based on Ricoeur's work on the abstraction of issues from experience, the ideological critique of those experiences and their reinsertion into practice.

Chapter Six

In Chapter Six I provide an introduction to the key ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin, which when grouped together, form
dialogism. For Bakhtin, the single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life -- and therefore practice -- is dialogue. He is concerned with communication in context and the varying languages -- "heteroglossia" -- that partners in dialogue bring to that context. Bakhtin contrasts his ideas about dialogue and heteroglossia with monologue, where one speaker or group is privileged, the world is forced into one pattern or system and one language can be used to characterize that world.

Dialogism is a moral theory, concerned with making each person answerable for his/her understanding of their world and acting on that understanding. It is best embodied in the novels of Dostoevsky and Rabelais with its aspects of polyphony, chronotope and carnival, all checks on monologism.

What dialogism offers for teacher research is a concept of moral practice, a way of disputing issues in practice and checks on the inevitable ideological aspects of that practice and dialogue. The adaptation of dialogism for teacher research is the subject of Chapter Seven.

Chapter Seven

Bakhtin’s work is not organized into a coherent corpus and certainly not directly applicable to a theory for teacher research; this is what I attempt in the final chapter. I use dialogism, supplemented by the resources
from the preceding chapters, to attempt answers to the three questions I pose for teacher research. Issues of teaching practice, research into that practice and improvement of practice are addressed. An example of teacher research that respects some of these principles is offered and criticized on the basis of those answers.

Consistent with dialogism, however, is the unfinalizable nature of those "answers". Indeed, dialogism would deny that definitive answers can be found. Instead a dialogistic theory of teacher research would not be a systematic, "monologic" theory at all, but a way of thinking about teaching practice that helps teachers make more moral educational decisions. Teachers would simply be more wide-awake.
CHAPTER TWO
EARLY ANSWERS

It is my firm belief that the emancipation and professionalizing of the teacher's calling rests far more on the originality, insight, and expertness which the teacher evinces than upon any considerations having to do with salary, tenure, or legal status. Society cannot be compelled to respect anybody or anything. The surest way to win respect is to be respectable....[Nothing] would so effectively obtain for the teaching body the possession of professional expertness...as the open-eyed, open-minded, scientific spirit of inquiry (Buckingham, 1926, p. iv).

Buckingham's call for the professionalizing of teaching led him to advocate that teachers become scientific researchers in their own classrooms. Beginning in the late nineteenth century educators came to see science as the way to improve educational practice. The advocates of the science-in-education movement introduced what are now very familiar themes: teachers become researchers in classroom laboratories; they experiment using well-established methods derived from the physical sciences and discover propositional knowledge which, in turn, generates rules for more effective and rational practices; armed with the authority of scientific knowledge, teachers acquire undisputed professional status, emancipating themselves from unthinking tradition and habit. The history of teachers
becoming researchers involves tracing the dialogue about some key ideas about how science and scientific research can emancipate teachers from unthinking habit and tradition, thereby improving their practices by making them more rational, democratic and educational.

Alternatively, this history involves tracing the early answers to the three central questions I raise about teacher research in Chapter One. I do this by looking at the early science-in-education movement and especially its key figure, John Dewey. Dewey's ideas about how science and "scientific method" can help teachers to understand and improve educational practice differ substantially from those of others in the science-in-education movement. But it was the work of others, like Buckingham, that influenced early attempts at teacher research. These ideas about the place of science in understanding and improving the social world led in the 1940s to the development of "action research" by Collier and Lewin. This framework was interpreted and adopted for teachers by Stephen Corey and others working at Teacher's College. After a decade of growth, educational action research went into decline only to be revived by the work of Lawrence Stenhouse in the 1970s in the U.K. This revival, I believe, was in part due to new answers being offered for the three key questions about teacher research. In this chapter I trace these developments.
I. SCIENCE-IN-EDUCATION AND DEWEY

Buckingham was one several educators who advocated the use of scientific method to deal with educational issues at the beginning of the century. Others included Mill, Bain, Boone, Thorndike and most importantly, John Dewey (for a discussion of this advocacy, see McKernan, 1988). While he championed the use of science and the scientific method and encouraged teachers to become researchers, Dewey had very different ideas about education, teaching practice and science from others in the science-in-education movement.

Dewey defines the task of research on teaching very differently from those advocating a positivist approach: the assignment is not to prescribe for practice, but to understand practice. He decries the loss of the expertise of successful teachers who do not pass on their gifts to other teachers and calls on science to help understand what makes some teachers successful, that is, "to make an analysis of what the gifted teacher does intuitively, so that something accruing from his work can be communicated to others" (1929, p.5).

What is to be understood is complex and beyond simple prescriptions. Dewey contrasts teachers "A" and "B":

Here is 'A' who is much more successful than 'B' in teaching, awakening the enthusiasm of his
students for learning, inspiring them morally by personal example and contact, and yet relatively ignorant of educational history, psychology, approved methods, etc., which 'B' possesses in abundant measure (p. 4).

To understand why "A" is successful, phenomena from practice are extracted and studied scientifically. The resulting understandings provide "intellectual instrumentalities" to inform teachers and make for more intelligent, flexible and effective practices.

Dewey is careful to distance himself from claims that scientific findings will produce rules for practice: "No conclusion of scientific research can be converted into an immediate rule of educational art" (1929, p. 9). Educational practice is too complex and dependent on context. Practice and scientific research on practice are distinct; practice both supplies the problems for inquiry and is the arena in which the findings of research are tested.

Practice is tested by its contribution to education, which, in turn, is concerned with values to promote growth in a democracy. "Education is by its nature an endless circle or spiral. It is an activity which includes science within itself" (p. 40, italics in original). Science is one means of increasing understanding of educational practice.

Dewey describes an education science beginning to establish itself, for which he has great hopes, but he
deliberately cautions against the kind of claims that others like Buckingham were making. Science is not to be valued for its legitimating authority, but for its capacity for "personal illumination and liberation" (1929, p. 7). He hopes that research findings can eventually accumulate and be organized to form a system of knowledge that will better inform the practitioner who "is emancipated from the need of following tradition" (1929, p. 10), but not from exercising judgment in context.

Educational science initially might borrow methods from other sciences, but with caution. Despite his faith in "the scientific method", Dewey has reservations about the use of strategies developed in the physical sciences being imported into educational situations and especially about what could actually be measured. "This could happen only if some way had been found by which mental or psychological phenomena are capable of statement in terms of units of space, time, motion, and mass" (p. 13). Dewey's research process is articulated as a five step procedure that includes the movement from an initial recognition of disequilibrium, through the formation and testing of hypotheses, to a final resolution (Schubert and Schubert, 1984).

For Dewey, scientific research can make important contributions to educational practices and therefore to education in a democracy. This happens when aspects of practice are abstracted, studied and then tested against
practice. But Dewey is careful to proscribe the limits of this research and its usefulness for practice. Others in the science-in-education movement (and progressive education) did not share this limited view of science and indeed, it is faith in science and scientific research that characterizes the development of action research.

II. ACTION RESEARCH, COLLIER AND LEWIN

The term action research was perhaps first used by Collier in 1945 to describe a collaborate research project involving the improvement of Indian farming practice during his term as Commissioner for Indian Affairs in the United States. Concerned with the bias in U.S. government policy towards native Americans, Collier draws parallels between the treatment of American Indians and Nazi persecution of the Poles and Jews. (1945, p. 266). The remedy for Collier includes restoring and revitalizing the very ethnic communities that Indian Affairs had struggled for so long to bring into mainstream American society. This is to be accomplished by the infusion of democracy into local communities. Collier believes that "the experience of responsible democracy was of all experiences, the most therapeutic, the most disciplinary, the most dynamogenic, and the most productive of efficiency" (p. 275).
Recognising that conflicts were inevitable in local democracies, Collier tries to provide a framework for the resolution of problems -- research-action or action-research. As communities recognise problems, they can call on outside research experts for assistance. Together -- researchers, administrators, community members -- they contribute their knowledge, experience and perspectives to a consensual resolution of whatever problems had been identified. While methodology is not specified, Collier's work is representative of a general trend toward a more "anthropological" form of study that involves respecting the local community and a support role for outsiders (Noffke, 1989).

At about the same time, for some of the same reasons, Kurt Lewin developed his formulation of action research. Like Collier, Lewin is very much concerned with issues of prejudice, including problems of assimilation versus pluralism and segregation versus integration. Also like Collier, these concerns lead to formulations of democracy that require the involvement of people in changing their own environments: "We do not want group manipulation...We want this group management to be done 'by the people, for the people'" (Lewin, cited in Graebner, 1987, p. 144). Like Collier, Lewin believes that outside researchers can assist in resolving local problems, but local control is paramount to ensure involvement, consensual resolution, acceptance of
change and therefore efficiency.

Lewin differs from Collier, however, in providing a more specific scientific methodology for action research. He prescribes a series of cycles of planning, acting and fact-finding to reach locally determined objectives, thereby achieving "rational social management" (Lewin, 1946). This action research for social engineering would be no less "rigorous" than other research and would also lead to propositional theory. But the findings that generate laws would not be about the local issues or problems, but about the change process that action research facilitates: "In regard to social engineering... progress will depend largely on the rate with which basic research in social sciences can develop deeper insight into the laws which govern social life" (Lewin, 1947, pp. 150-151). The professional outside researchers are the custodians of rigor.

Collier and Lewin develop their conceptions of action research as a means to accomplish their social agenda. "Empowerment" and "emancipation" are to be accomplished by the importation of science and scientific rigor and rationality to the problems of practice by researchers trained in action research methodology. These outside experts will: (i) facilitate the action research process in the local context; (ii) train practitioners to use these scientific methods themselves to solve future problems; and (iii) contribute to propositional knowledge about how to
bring about change in other contexts. The distinctions between the nature of practice and the rationality of science that were so important to Dewey are lost.

III. EDUCATIONAL ACTION RESEARCH AND COREY

Even more is lost in the adaptation of the Collier and Lewin idea of action research into school settings. Stephen Corey, Dean of Teachers' College, Columbia University, worked with the staff of the Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute in the 1950s to train teachers to become action researchers. Corey combines aspects of the science-in-education movement, Deweyan progressivism and action research into his vision of educational action research. In the forward to Action Research to Improve School Practices (1953), Corey explains that three beliefs motivate his work: science is changing the world rapidly, the role of the school in that world is also changing and people in schools must become involved. The result is the formation of action research as "the process by which practitioners attempt to study their problems scientifically in order to guide, correct and evaluate their decisions and actions..." (1953, p. 6).

Both the purpose of research and the relationship of research to practice is modified. Corey makes no attempt to tie practice to any overriding concept of education as
Dewey does; nor does he claim a social democratic agenda as do Collier and Lewin. Science is his guiding value: "The use of the methods of science in the solution of practical educational problems can be adequately defended for its own sake" (p. 17). Practice is what practitioners do. Problems of practice are those issues or situations that trouble practitioners. He gives examples of such problems of practice as how to improve the work of curriculum committees, score objective tests and teach history using a biographical method. Practitioners decide what counts as problems or research topics for action research.

Following Dewey and Buckingham, Corey advocates teachers becoming researchers; unlike the action research model proposed by Collier and Lewin, outside experts are not necessarily part of the research process. Teachers may choose to research on their own, with colleagues, or with the assistance of outsiders, although Corey encourages working together to increase commitment to change behaviour and prevent teachers from feeling manipulated. Methodology is generally quantitative and experimental, involving generating and testing hypotheses in controlled situations and generalizing "cautiously and tentatively from the evidence collected" (p. 143). These generalizations are "vertical" not "lateral", however; teachers may generalize to future students they may teach, and not necessarily to students taught by other teachers in other schools or
districts. Teachers benefit from solving problems now and in the future. So, while claiming a social engineering agenda like Collier and Lewin, Corey shifts control of the research agenda to practitioners in schools; local knowledge in particular contexts is produced, not propositional knowledge about social change.

Corey recognises that there are barriers to the pursuit of research in schools and lists some of the supports needed, including the freedom to admit limitations, the opportunity to invent, encouragement to experiment, as well as time and resources. He does not deal with how these conditions might be provided in a rigidly bureaucratic school system, however (Coulter, 1991).

Corey and others working at Teachers' College were influential in the spread of action research into American schools. They had some success, at least partly due to the contribution of action research towards curriculum change. But after a decade of growth, educational action research went into decline, possibly because of a growing separation of research and practice (Sanford, 1976) and increased criticism of its scientific rigor (McKernan, 1988). Sanford explains the demise of action research by pointing to the role of government funding in separating science from practice; action researchers could not successfully compete for funds.

An alternative explanation for the same phenomenon is
also possible: action research declined because it did not separate science from practice. Corey's version of action research did not distinguish between the nature of practice and science: science solves the problems of practice. The framing of problems, research methodology and solutions are determined by "the methods of science". Teaching is simply a particular form of applied science and teachers are school-based researchers, but without the time and expertise to compete with university-based researchers for funds. The growth of the research-development-diffusion model which dominated curriculum development and evaluation work beginning in the late 50s is a reflection of this view of the practice-research relationship. While educational action research did not disappear under these circumstances, it certainly had a lesser profile.

IV. TEACHER RESEARCH AND STENHOUSE

The revival of educational action research is often attributed to Lawrence Stenhouse's work in the U.K., especially in the Humanities Curriculum Project in the early 70s. Stenhouse redefined the practice-research-education relationship, taking the idea of teacher researcher back from an applied science view. Like Dewey, Stenhouse develops a case for teachers becoming researchers from
notions of education, teaching and teaching practice.

Influenced by R.S. Peters, Stenhouse works from a theory of education as cultural initiation. Educational ideas become curriculum, which Stenhouse defines as "an attempt to communicate the essential principles and features of an educational proposal in such a form that it is open to critical scrutiny and capable of effective translation into practice" (Stenhouse, 1975, p. 4). The scrutiny and translation is not to be effected by researchers or administrators, but by teachers.

The model for Stenhouse's conception of the teacher is the professional, but a professional in a particular sense. Stenhouse distinguishes between restricted and extended professionals, largely by the scope of their interests and authority; the scope of the restricted professional is largely bounded by the classroom, that of the extended professional includes the school, community and society. With an understanding of the larger context, the teacher researcher as an extended professional translates curriculum into practice in a particular situation. Teaching practice for Stenhouse, like Dewey, is an art whose purpose "is to represent to learners through social interaction with them meanings about knowledge. The succession of experiences we provide for them...our judgements of their work, our tutorial advice, even the very gestures and postures of our bodies, are expressive of those meanings..." (Stenhouse,
Stenhouse's conception of the relationship between knowledge and practice is a crucial aspect of his ideas about education, teaching and research. In a critique of schooling, Stenhouse laments: "We produce through education a majority who are ruled by knowledge, not served by it -- an intellectual, moral and spiritual proletariat characterized by instrumental competencies rather than autonomous power" (Stenhouse in Rudduck and Hopkins, 1985, p. 3.). For Stenhouse, knowledge must be used to emancipate, not control. Teachers and students must develop autonomous judgement; that is, they must reject traditional authority and ideology and develop their own critical capacities. Teachers exercise this judgement in constructing curriculum within their classrooms; they develop and strengthen this judgement and critical capacity though classroom research.

"Research...is systematic and sustained inquiry, planned and self-critical, which is subjected to public criticism and to empirical tests where these are appropriate" (Stenhouse in Rudduck and Hopkins, 1985, p. 18). This research must be educational in that it must be related to some notion of education and it must inform educational practice, not by prescribing for practice, but by informing the judgement of practitioners. There can be no technology of teaching that provides rules for practice;
teaching practice is not an applied science. "Predictions based upon statistical levels of confidence are applicable to action only when the same treatment must be given throughout the entire population. This condition does not apply in education. It is the teacher's task to differentiate treatments" (Stenhouse in Rudduck and Hopkins, 1985, p. 12).

In the place of positivistic, quantitative methods, Stenhouse advocates naturalistic or ethnographic methods which allow for a portrayal of cases. Teachers would then have access to the experience of other practitioners and be able to recognise similarities and differences between the research situations and their own. They would learn both from others teachers' problems and successes. While these methods do not easily permit generalization, Stenhouse still believed that case studies would accumulate, as in medicine, and "professional research workers" would be able to construct general propositional theory from the particular accounts.

Stenhouse recognises the concern for objectivity that would emerge from teachers' studying their own practices. His response is not the usual argument about subjective and objective research. Instead he works from his conception of practice as the teacher's interpretation of curriculum: "Thus any research must be applied by teachers, so that the most clinically objective research can only feed into
practice through an interested actor in the situation. Accordingly we are concerned with the development of a sensitive and self-critical subjective perspective and not with an aspiration towards an unattainable objectivity" (Stenhouse, 1975, p. 157).

Stenhouse's check against unmediated subjectivity is the "public" part of his definition of research. Research concerns practice and by publishing research, practice becomes public and thereby subject to critical scrutiny.

Practice is at the centre of Stenhouse's conception of teacher research. Education and curriculum are translated into reality by teaching practice; practice is criticized and improved by research, which, in turn, is tested against the experience of practice. Teaching is improved "not by clarifying ends, but by criticizing practice" (Stenhouse, 1975, p. 83).

Stenhouse recognises other formidable barriers to teachers becoming researchers besides the issue of objectivity mentioned above. The most significant barriers are bureaucratic and structural: the ethical constraints that inhibit practising teachers and the lack of time available to pursue research projects. His conclusion:

[My] estimate of the problems of research-based teaching is perhaps a little optimistic, and there are some signs of tension between the roles of teacher and researcher. I believe, however, that it is worth facing these tensions and attempting to resolve them. For in the end it is difficult
to see how teaching can be improved...without self-monitoring on the part of teachers (1975, pp. 164-165).

Stenhouse's revival of the idea of teacher researcher is due at least in some part to his attempt to reconnect education, practice and research. Education is normative, teaching practice is partly artistic and partly scientific, and research is a way of informing and improving the judgements of practitioners. Stenhouse points to very different answers to the three key questions about teacher research that I posed in Chapter One. I believe, however, that he does not provide a comprehensive answers. For example, teaching is no longer seen as an applied science, but the relationship between the complex nature of teaching and research is never explained. Research may be qualitative and may inform teachers judgements, but how? In what ways? On what basis are these individual case studies to be integrated into propositional knowledge and what will be the benefit for practice? If improvement is all about criticizing practice and not clarifying ends, on what basis are those criticisms offered and accepted?

After decades of being an applied science offshoot of "real research", Stenhouse gives the idea of teacher research new life and new direction. He reframes the dialogue so that education and teaching practice are now part of the discussion, but leaves it for others to try to
work out how all these parts are to be related. Chapters Three, Four and Five deal with attempts to put these parts together.
CHAPTER THREE
CARR, KEMMIS AND HABERMAS

I. BECOMING CRITICAL

Action researchers can examine their own educational practices to discover the ways in which they are distorted away from [values of rationality, justice and access to an interesting and satisfying life]; they can also examine the situations and institutions in which they practice to see how they are constituted so as to prevent more rational communication, more just and democratic decision-making, and productive work which provides those involved with real access to an interesting and satisfying life (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, pp. 193-4).

Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis' Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and Action Research is the first and perhaps the most influential attempt to provide a comprehensive foundation for teacher research. Based on their reading of the early work of Jurgen Habermas, they attempt to construct a guide "to emancipate teachers from their dependence on habit and tradition by providing them with the skills and resources that will enable them to reflect upon and examine critically the inadequacies of different conceptions of educational practice" (p. 123).
Emancipation

Emancipation is both the goal and motivation for teacher research. Drawing on Habermas' notion of three knowledge-constitutive interests -- technical, practical and emancipatory -- Carr and Kemmis imbue their notions of education, teaching practice and research with emancipation. Education is the "organization of enlightenment" in institutions controlled by bureaucratic values, teaching involves the uncovering of the distortions of institutional interests through the critical social science research technique of critique. Empowerment and emancipation are aligned against the forces of "sectional self-interests".

Teachers are to be responsible for both their own emancipation and that of their students. This is accomplished when they become "genuine" professionals with practices grounded in educational theory and research, with the authority to make decisions that affect their practices and with responsibility to the community at large for their practices.

Practice and Theory

Teaching practices, however, "are largely the product of habit, precedent and tradition [and] are rarely formulated in any explicit way or informed by any clearly articulated process of thought" (p. 123). Ideology contributes more to teachers' practices than educational
theory and practice.

The separation of practice from theory in current teaching is a result the idea that educational theory can be produced "from within theoretical and practical contexts different from the theoretical and practical context within which it is supposed to apply" (p.115). They argue that theory and practice are inextricably enmeshed. Theory does not determine practice, nor is theory derived from practice; educational theory must, however, deal with the problems of educational practice. "Rather by subjecting the beliefs and justifications of existing and ongoing traditions to rational reconsideration, theory informs and transforms practice by informing and transforming the ways in which practice is experienced and understood" (p. 116).

Critique

To remedy the separation of the theory of emancipatory education from actual practice, Carr and Kemmis propose that teachers become action researchers who employ critical social science to uncover and correct their distorted self-understandings. This is accomplished by making the causal mechanisms underlying these distortions transparent, which will then liberate practitioners from these constraints.

This unmasking is accomplished through "critique" or the relentless criticism of all existing conditions. According to Carr and Kemmis, Habermas combines Marxist
ideological critique with Freudian psychoanalysis "to provide a form of therapeutic self-knowledge which will liberate individuals from the irrational compulsions of their individual history through a process of critical self-reflection" (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 138). "Critique is aimed at revealing to individuals how their beliefs and attitudes may be ideological illusions that help to preserve a social order that is alien to their collective experiences and needs" (pp. 138-139).

Critique is accomplished through discourse which presupposes certain norms: what is stated is true and comprehensible, the speaker is sincere and it is right for the speaker to be speaking. Discourse presumes that these norms are being followed and can be justified; the violation of these norms makes communication problematic, a violation of the "ideal speech situation". Carr and Kemmis then claim that the promise of an ideal speech situation is "anticipated by all speech and hence provides an image of the sort of conditions required to make any consensus reached in discourse rational and true" (p. 142).

The conditions for an ideal speech situation involve discussion which is free from constraints of domination, that is, a "truly democratic dialogue" in which "decision-making is guided, not by considerations of power but by the rationality of arguments for different courses of action" (p. 146). Carr and Kemmis claim three important outcomes
from ideal speech situations. First is the formation and extension of critical theorems, which are propositions about the character and conduct of social life, that is, general statements grounded in the practical social contexts of the practitioners. Secondly, ideal speech situations also are the arena in which these theorems can be applied and tested thereby contributing to the "organization of processes of enlightenment". This testing requires that those involved "commit themselves wholly to appropriate precautions and assure scope for unrestrained communication on the psychoanalytic model of therapeutic discourse" (p. 147).

Finally, organization of action is permitted, involving the selection of strategies, and solution of practical problems. The criterion by which the organization of action is judged is that the decisions must be "prudent", which requires that "those involved in the action are involved in the practical discourse and decision-making process which lead to the action and that they anticipate on the basis of their free commitment to the action" (p. 148, italics in original).

This means that members must agree to abide by democratic group decisions and participate fully in the entire process.

The ideal speech situation is at the centre of Carr and Kemmis' conception of educational action research, which they define as "a form of self-critical inquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own practices, their
understandings of those practices, and the situations in which the practices are carried out" (p. 162). The two essential aims of action research are: (1) to improve educational practice and (2) to involve all those affected by the practice in the research process. Methodology includes a spiral of cycles of planning, acting, observing and reflecting "with each of these activities being systematically and self-critically implemented and interrelated" (p. 165).

In summary, through collaborative action research (and the ideal speech situation) theory and practice are joined in a "double dialectic" of thought/action and individual/society. Theory deals with issues of practice and practice is informed by theory. The individual's understandings and actions are influenced by group constructs, but these constructs can be transcended by the individual, sometimes paradoxically by engaging in an unconstrained dialogue with others. For educational action research this double dialectic is embodied in the idea of "...a self-critical community of action researchers who are committed to the improvement of education, who are researchers for education" (p. 184, italics in original). The result, presumably, is emancipated practitioners who, in turn, promote the liberation of their students.
Examples of Collaborative Action Research

Carr and Kemmis provide three examples of action research that meet their criteria: two Deakin studies, one involving teachers who explored inquiry teaching in science and another with teachers looking at remedial reading in a junior secondary school and Jo-Anne Reid's work of negotiating the curriculum with secondary students.

In the first study, led by John Henry, a group of science teachers examined classroom dialogue and questioning. They found that their usual teaching practices were predicated on maintaining classroom control through controlling classroom talk (p. 167). Carr and Kemmis report that by "the end of a number of cycles of action research, [the teachers] began to achieve marked differences in classroom practices which they regarded as clear improvements in the education available in their classrooms" (p. 168).

Kemmis himself was involved in the second example in which teachers analyzed how four strategies were used to teach remedial reading. The result was an expanded understanding of these strategies, especially the effects of removing remedial students from their peers and giving them special material.

Finally, Carr and Kemmis cite Jo-Anne's Reid's study of negotiating the curriculum with a year 9 English class in Perth, Australia (Reid, 1982). Working with thirty-four
students for sixteen periods over eight weeks, Reid decided the class would investigate the topic "Kids in Schools" as a class of "reflective and self-reflective community of participant-researchers" (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 172). Working in groups, students developed a list of questions for investigation and as well as strategies for finding answers including research in the community. Reid and the students kept journals; Reid helped facilitate the students' research and managed the projects. After what she saw as a severely limited time, Reid "was compelled to cut short the time for research, so that the final part of the negotiation process could begin: 'How will we know/show that we have learnt what we set out to learn?'' (Reid, 1982, p.14). The students presented their findings to year 7 students at a nearby school and also responded to a forty item questionnaire.

Reid's reflections about the study focused on what she saw as changed roles for students and teacher. Students were not passive learners to be motivated by coercion and/or reward, but "responsible and trustworthy people,...independent learners, capable of generating and following through a quest for knowledge and understanding that will prove intrinsically rewarding" (Reid, 1982, p. 22). The teacher was no longer just a disseminator of information, but "a trusted adult, co-learner and senior curriculum planner" (p. 22). The teacher is a
"facilitator", "enricher and extender"; "the teacher’s role finally becomes one of Educator, that of leading the students further on their way of understanding (p. 22). But at the same time, Reid reserves certain responsibilities for the teacher: "there are some things that cannot be negotiated, in any subject discipline" (p. 22). Teachers must use their professional judgements to assess "his/herself and the teacher’s role, the program, the students’ attitude and output, the quality of the experience" (p. 23). It is particularly important for the teacher to ensure a "'controlled', businesslike atmosphere...conducive to learning" (p. 23).

Carr and Kemmis cite Reid’s study as an example of how an emancipatory interest in schools might be provoked. Important characteristics of action research (and the ideal speech situation) are embodied: participation, collaboration and self-reflection. The study shows "how one teacher learned about her educational practices by changing them, and by observing systematically and reflecting carefully on the problems and effects of the changes she made" (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 174).

Carr and Kemmis thus develop their concept of emancipatory education facilitated by groups of professional teachers who use action research cycles to critique their own practices in a truly democratic dialogue, thereby imitating an ideal speech situation. The results of this
process include critical theorems grounded in practical contexts, enlightened practitioners and improved practices. Studies by Henry, Kemmis and Reid are given as examples of how this can be accomplished. I believe their argument works neither in theory, nor in practice.

II. CRITIQUE OF CARR AND KEMMIS

Carr and Kemmis build their foundation for action research on two pillars: the ideal speech situation and emancipatory interest. They provide "concrete examples of the organization of enlightenment". But Habermas himself describes the ideal speech situation as a "constitutive illusion" (Habermas quoted in McCarthy, 1978); while the norms of rational speech may presume certain truth claims, this does not necessarily mean that humans can ever determine the Truth. The tension between the ideal speech situation in the abstract and our attempts to develop rational practices is a dialectic that cannot be overcome. The ideal speech situation is just that -- an ideal.

Fundamental to the ideal speech situation are two criteria that can never be fully met. First is the symmetry requirement. All members of a community must have equal chance to select and employ speech; there must be absolute equality of opportunity and unlimited discourse. This is
not possible. Reid for example, mentions her frustration with time constraints. She is also very aware of the classroom hierarchy. She claims to be a co-learner, facilitator and enricher, but also the professional responsible for controlling the atmosphere and evaluating all aspects.

The second criterion is that speech must be free from distortion or "institutionally unbound speech"; language must be free of individual or group interest. Again, this is impossible. Notions of curriculum, schooling and teaching practice are imbued with power and knowledge constraints. What counts as "science" in Henry's study, "remedial" in Kemmis' project and "education" in Reid's are all central to their task. These words get much of their meaning from their local institution as well as the larger societal context. Yet none of the authors sees these terms as problematic.

Lack of conceptual clarity is a charge that might be laid against many of the key concepts in Becoming Critical (See, for example, Gibson (1985); Lewis (1987). What criteria are used to decide "emancipation", "improvement" and "participation"? Because teachers allow students to generate questions in science classes, are teachers emancipated? Are the students? Is the reading of students improved in Kemmis' research? In Reid's work, because
students have a choice in how they do what the teacher wants them to do, is this democratic participation? Does involvement mean democratic? Is majority vote the standard for making decisions? Why is the teacher more equal than others and does this make subsequent decisions undemocratic? These are substantive issues that cannot be answered by falling back on foundational claims of "emancipatory interests" and "an ideal speech situation".

Habermas himself has recognised the validity of this kind of criticism and shifted his attention away from epistemology and a theory of "knowledge-constitutive interests" that Carr and Kemmis use as a basis for their conception of collaborative action research to a theory of language and action (White, 1988). The Theory of Communicative Action (1984) is in some ways an attempt to respond to criticisms of foundationalism and a narrow rationalistic bias.

III. HABERMAS AND THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

Carr and Kemmis build their theory of action research on a conception of emancipation that involves the use of reason to liberate teachers from "dependence on habit and tradition" in developing and maintaining their practices. Once the effects of ideology and distortion have been
uncovered through critique in an ideal speech situation, practices will presumably be modified to correspond with this new understanding. Carr and Kemmis never explicate their interpretation of Habermas' concept of reason even though an original and expanded conception of reason is at the centre of his work and this conception continues to be modified as his thought develops.

Habermas, like Weber, rejects an exclusively instrumental or strategic understanding of reason -- scientism -- that has been characteristic of modernity. Theoria has been privileged over praxis and poesis; Habermas' theory of communicative rationality is an attempt to redefine this relationship. In making this attempt Habermas is trying to avoid either relativism or arbitrary foundationalism, an ambitious project in what is now a postmodern world where any attempt to develop a universal foundation seems foolhardy.

In a context of developing a theory for teacher research the issue might be best framed as the problem of how to uncover the ideological aspects of practice, that is, the uncritical assumptions based on tradition and power relationships. In making his case for critical theory and critique, Habermas dismisses positivist attempts because they ignore questions of values; he rejects interpretive attempts as being too dependent on tradition. His answer, as Carr and Kemmis point out, is critique. The problem
becomes how to then ground critique. Initial attempts using emancipatory interests and the ideal speech situation were unsatisfactory in providing these grounds for many of the reasons I used in criticising Becoming Critical. In The Theory of Communicative Action (1984), Habermas shifts his efforts from trying to build on knowledge-constitutive interests to building a theory based on the presuppositions of communication in discourse.

**Discourse**

Discourse is Habermas' suggested means of resolving normative disputes. Practice normally proceeds against a background of traditions and presuppositions based on unproblematic norms. Habermas refers to ordinary forms of social interaction as communicative action. Once this background is disturbed, however, by, for example, some problem of practice, those norms can be called into question. It is at this stage that those involved in the situation may choose to resort to discourse:

claims to validity that heretofore served as unquestioned points of orientation in their everyday communication are thematized and made problematic. When this happens, the participants in argumentation adopt a hypothetical attitude to controversial validity claims. The validity of a contested norm is put in abeyance when practical discourse begins. The issue is then whether or not the norm deserves to be recognised, and that issue will be decided by a contest between proponents and opponents of the norm. (Habermas, 1991, p. 125)
Discourse itself is grounded in the presuppositions of communication. By choosing to engage in argumentation, participants accept certain norms. There is no "escaping to alternatives. The absence of alternatives means that those conditions are, in fact, inescapable for us" (Habermas, 1991, p. 130). In their efforts to reach an understanding, parties in the discourse accept "the unforced force of the better argument" (Habermas quoted in Roderick, 1986, p. 82) as well as four presuppositions involved in discourse: (i) the discourse aims at agreement or rational consensus; (ii) a rational consensus in attainable; (iii) a true consensus can be distinguished from a false consensus; (iv) only such a rational consensus can serve to ground normative claims. The authority of the norms subjected to discourse "resides only in the discursive procedure that redeems normative claims to validity" (Habermas, 1991, p. 163).

In developing an expanded idea of reason, Habermas distinguishes three kinds of validity claims: to truth, rightness and truthfulness according to whether the speaker refers to something in the objective world, the shared social world or something in his/her own subjective world (1991, p. 58). The bond between participants in discourse is a result of the speaker's guarantee to redeem the claim that the hearer has accepted. In claims to truth or rightness, the speaker can redeem claims by producing
reasons; in claims to truthfulness, the speaker is convincing by acting consistently with the dialogue.

Assumptions

The project is based on two assumptions: (i) normative claims to validity have cognitive meaning and can be treated like truth claims and (ii) the justification of norms requires the kind of discourse that Habermas is describing. Both claims are highly controversial. The perceived emphasis on cognition has, in particular, attracted criticism (examples include Gibson (1985) and Roderick (1988)). Habermas makes strong claims for the role of cognition in resolving problems of practice: "moral-practical issues can be decided on the basis of reasons. Moral judgements have cognitive content. They represent more than expressions of contingent emotions, preferences, and decisions of a speaker or actor" (Habermas, 1991, p. 120). Habermas distinguishes normative questions from evaluative questions. The former can in principle be decided rationally; the latter can be discussed rationally only from within a particular historical tradition. Normative questions are decided in discourse; evaluative questions are part of everyday communicative action.

Those normative questions to be subjected to rational discourse must be removed from their everyday contexts to be treated cognitively. But the "cognitive advantage" resulting
from this abstraction must be undone if rational solutions are to be effective in practice:

Demotivated solutions to decontextualized issues can achieve practical efficacy only if the two resulting problems are solved: the abstraction from contexts of action and the separation of rationally motivated insights from empirical attitudes both must be undone...And these two problems can be solved only when moral judgement is supplemented by something else: hermeneutic effort... (Habermas, 1991, p. 179).

The complex relationship of the cognitive and affective is part of Habermas' attempt to fuse two streams of moral theory: one that deals with universalistic criteria of justice and one that encompasses concrete relationships. Moral theories must solve two tasks at once:

They must emphasize the inviolability of the individual by postulating equal respect for each individual. But they must also protect the web of intersubjective relations of mutual recognition by which these individuals survive as members of a community (Habermas, 1991, p. 200).

Both tasks are essential. While much is made of the cognitive aspects of communicative ethics, emotions have a critical role, both because of their importance in establishing dialogic relations in discourse and in reinserting agreed-upon solutions back into practice. Habermasian communicative ethics is crippled if it proceeds in an emotional vacuum.
The shift in Habermas' thought from critique in an ideal speech situation to a discourse model of communicative ethics may seem subtle, but it is significant. The vulnerability of an ideal speech situation (and its symmetry and undistorted speech requirements) to the constraints of actual communication is recognised by Habermas. To deal with the problems of the abstraction of issues from actual practice and the reinsertion of agreed-upon solutions back into practice, he calls for a hermeneutics of discourse. He has not yet provided this work.

IV. RESOURCES FOR TEACHER RESEARCH

In Chapter One I posed three questions for teacher research. While I do believe that Carr and Kemmis would agree with the premises behind each of my three questions -- they would concur, for example, that teaching practice inevitably involves questions of education and therefore is normative, that research brings together theory and practice and that uncovering ideology is a crucial task for teacher research -- I do not believe that they provide satisfactory answers to any of my three questions.

The fundamental problem with their answers is their reliance on their interpretation of Habermas' early work. I believe that their interpretation is flawed and further, the
work they were interpreting had serious deficiencies. These problems have caused Habermas himself to abandon these initial efforts and base his new work on communication.

In this new work, Habermas does not resolve the issue of how to settle conflicts between competing normative claims; instead he points to a procedure that may help in this effort. This process is based on what he believes to be the presuppositions of communication, including the assumptions that normative claims are cognitive and the justification of norms requires the kind of dialogue he describes. Normative questions are to be abstracted from practice, subjected to a particular kind of discourse and then reinserted into context. However, Habermas has not yet dealt with the hermeneutics of abstraction, discussion and reinsertion.

I believe that Habermas' notion of discourse is an important resource in dealing with the normative concerns of teacher research, and in Chapters Six and Seven I compare Habermas' version of this dialogue with Bakhtin's. In these chapters I also attempt to deal with the hermeneutics of abstraction and reinsertion.
CHAPTER FOUR

ELLIOTT AND GADAMER

I would argue that the widespread emergence of collaborative action research as a teacher-based form of curriculum evaluation and development is a creative response to the growth of technical-rational systems of hierarchical surveillance and control over teachers’ professional lives. Out of the still smouldering embers of the traditional craft culture the phoenix of a collaborative reflective practice arises to offer creative resistance to the hegemony of the technocrat (Elliott, 1991, p. 56).

Many familiar themes are evident in Elliott’s passage: teachers as professionals working together with other teacher researchers to develop more reflective practices in opposition to the repressive forces of technical rationality. Indeed they should be familiar; Elliott, a colleague of Stenhouse and member of the Humanities Curriculum Project, builds his conception of educational action research on Stenhouse’s work, but tries to answer the questions about the connections between education, teaching practice and research that I raised in Chapter Two. He does this primarily by drawing on the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. In this chapter I try to explicate Elliott’s attempt to provide this theoretical foundation, critique that attempt and provide my own reading of Gadamer.
Principles and Practice

Elliott's 1987 paper "Educational Theory, Practical Philosophy and Action Research" is in some sense in response to Hirst's (1983) challenge to ground educational theory in practice. The first part of Elliott's paper is his reading of Hirst's view of the relationship between theory and practice. Hirst rejects the notion that theory based on "foundation disciplines" can provide guiding principles for practice; instead the starting point must be actual practice. Practices themselves are underpinned by principles and rules, tacit and overt, which Hirst calls operational educational theories. Teachers combine these theories with assessments of their particular circumstances to construct their practices.

Critiques of operational theories can be of (i) the theories themselves (limited by the necessity of decontextualization) or (ii) assessments of practice in which theories are enmeshed. Foundation disciplines may provide criteria for testing these operational theories, but in any case considerations of practice must be taken into account. From critique -- the domain of educational theory -- principles for practice can then be developed. Hirst then looks to Habermas as a source to ground the critique of
practice. Elliott rejects Habermas and critical theory as "elitist", "absolutist" and "objectivist" and tries to ground practical discourse and teacher research in Gadamer's work instead.

Elliott explains that Gadamer is concerned with how we come to understand the world, both natural and social. While Gadamer, like other modern hermeneuts, uses textual interpretation as a paradigm example, he is primarily concerned with the development of meaning in social practices, actions, norms and values. Confronted with a text, the interpreter brings his/her previous experience, knowledge, beliefs and values to bear on the text and projects them into the situation as prejudgments or prejudices, highlighting some aspects and minimizing or ignoring others and thereby giving the text a particular meaning or significance. Meaning is a result of the dialectic between these prejudgments and the text. Elliott explains how Gadamer stresses that the interpreter must be truly open to the text: "Although our prejudgments are conditions of such openness they can, if not disciplined by the firm intention to let the objects speak for themselves, blind us to features which call for the development and reformulation of beliefs and values" (Elliott, 1987, p. 160). This interplay between prejudgments and the texts themselves results in circle of understanding that brings meaning to text and allows text to critique and modify
faulty prejudgments.

Different prejudgments result in different features of the text being featured: "Different vantage points have different horizons" (Elliott, 1987, pp. 160-1). No single interpretation is privileged; there is no definitive version or final truth. This does not mean that no criteria can be used to discriminate between interpretations. Critiques can be developed on the basis of the interpreter's attitude toward the text or on the basis of the features in the text that have been distorted or ignored by the interpretation. "For Gadamer misunderstandings are constituted by a failure to achieve an authentic conversation or dialogue with the object to be understood" (Elliott, 1987, p. 161).

Understanding is not developed in the abstract, but rather in relation to particular texts (or situations). It is not first developed and then applied: "understanding is conditioned and constituted by reflection about how to act wisely in a particular and concrete human situation" (Elliott, 1987, p. 161).

Gadamer uses Aristotle's phronesis in developing a theory of ethical understanding in context. Elliott also uses phronesis to respond to Hirst's concern for developing principles of practice:

General understandings of values tend to be encapsulated in sets of practical principles distilled from retrospective reflections on experience. Such principles guide phronesis but
are not a substitute for it. Operating as foreconceptions they help one to anticipate possible relevant features of the new situation" (Elliott, 1987, p. 162).

Elliott claims that while these practical principles can be extracted from particular situations, the beliefs and values that underpin these practical principles must be critiqued from within those situations.

Adaptation for Teacher Research

What remains for Elliott is to adapt his interpretation for education, which he does in Action Research for Educational Change (1991). Elliott chooses Stenhouse, R.S. Peters, Alasdair MacIntyre and Aristotle as part of the tradition that helps to form his own prejudgments. Elliott follows Stenhouse in drawing on Peters' concept of schooling and education, that is, schooling includes training for jobs, instruction in skills, socialization into a society and initiation into its ways of knowing. The teacher draws on all of the above, including disciplinary knowledge, in constructing his/her "professional" practice. In composing this practice the teacher is a reflective practitioner or in Elliott’s view, researcher. Research is an integral part of professional teaching practice, not an add on: "Teaching and research [have] become posited as separate activities, whereas from the standpoint of the practitioner reflection and action are two aspects of a single process (Elliott,
This process is best embodied in educational action research which "integrates teaching, teacher development, curriculum development and evaluation, research and philosophical reflection, into a unified conception of a reflective educational practice" (Elliott, 1991, p. 54).

By practice Elliott means MacIntyre’s concept of a social practice (Chapter One) and its attendant virtues, which together comprise the tradition (prejudgments) that practitioners use to make sense of their practices. The virtues or goods of practice are especially important in helping the practitioner to confront the corrupting influence of the social institutions in which they work. Institutions, important to the sustenance of social practices, are "inevitably concerned with the acquisition of external goods such as wealth, power and status" (Elliott, 1991, p. 141), and not the goods internal to practice, which are supported by such virtues as justice, honesty and courage.

Consistent with this view of practice, action research is primarily concerned with the improvement of practice. By improving practice, Elliott means the realization of central values, that is, justice for legal practice, patient care for medicine and education for teaching. "Action research improves practice by developing the practitioner’s capacity for discrimination and judgement and thereby develops practical wisdom, i.e. the capacity to discern the right
course of action when confronted with particular, complex and problematic states of affairs" (Elliott, 1991, p. 52). For Elliott, the moral knowledge that is generated by educational action research and teaching is not propositional, but specific to particular contexts.

Elliott does suggest a way of organizing this research effort to improve practice. Indeed, his suggested model for action research is a revised version of Lewin's (Chapter Two), based on a series of spirals of activities. Elliott's modifications include (i) allowing the initial general idea to shift; (ii) including analysis as well as fact-finding in reconnaissance at the beginning and all through the process; and (iii) increased care in monitoring the implementation of action steps.

Research methods suggested look very different from those Lewin would have suggested in 1947, but familiar to contemporary qualitative researchers: gathering data using diaries, photographic evidence, tape/video recordings, interviews, checklists, questionnaires, inventories and direct observation; and analyzing these data through triangulation and analytic memoing.

The importation of these models and techniques into classrooms is foreign to the experience and training of most teachers; action research therefore requires the support of university-based academic teacher educators, at least initially. Elliott recognises that there is a potential
problem in having a practice-based research movement being led and sustained from outside the classroom and recognises the frustration of classroom teachers, "but the mini-rebellions from the grassroots have so far not developed into a revolution...I also believe that [continuing] dependence is based on the need for a counter-culture to the traditional craft culture in schools" (Elliott, 1991, p. 47).

Elliott claims that the withdrawal of university-based support leads to the eventual demise of action research in schools. He cites as an example the Teacher-Student Interaction and Quality of Learning Project in which nine schools were selected, each of which was led by an experienced action researcher. Elliott views the project as an important success, but nevertheless, the momentum for institutionalizing action research in those nine schools was not maintained after the university-based facilitators withdrew at the end of the project. "It was as if the internal facilitators required their strategies within schools to be validated by a strong external support team possessing influential sponsorship" (Elliott, 1991, p. 41).

The clash between the values underlying the traditional craft culture and "the emergent culture of reflective practice" results in a number of dilemmas for the teacher researcher. These dilemmas involve encouraging students to critique teachers' practices, gathering and sharing data,
selecting research methods and finding time for research. In getting access to data, for example, the hierarchical authority of the headteacher to control access to data might be pitted against the teacher researcher's need for that data. In an illustration of this dilemma, Elliott describes how a teacher researcher who was interested in collecting information about parental views felt she had to consult the headteacher before proceeding. Elliott views this consultation as an instance of the teacher submitting to hierarchical control and censorship:

Teacher researchers...do not have to succumb to the temptation of methodologically legitimating the gatekeeping activities of the professional authorities, thereby allowing the premises of the traditional craft culture to define their professionalism as teachers (Elliott, 1991, p. 60).

This clash of cultures is integral to Elliott's conception of action research, for it is the tension between these two cultures that creates the opportunity for "creative resistance" to the traditional culture of schools. Elliott draws on Foucault (1980) and Giroux (1983) in characterizing action research as a strategy to be used to undermine the hegemony of hierarchical power arrangements in schools. Resistance to the imposition of a bureaucratic model of teacher appraisal in the U.K. is used as an example of the counter-hegemonic possibilities of action research.
Example: Teacher Appraisal

In an effort to improve the quality of teaching in the 1980s, the British government, together with local authorities, imposed "hierarchical surveillance and control over the work of teachers" in a clinical supervision model. Elliott contrasts the manner in which two local educational authorities -- Suffolk and Enfield -- implemented this scheme. Suffolk was concerned with faithfully replicating the intended top-down model recommended by the government conciliation service (ACAS) including careful monitoring to ensure the achievement of clearly determined, measurable objectives. The view of good teaching underlying this model was "an ideological construction which serves the purpose of hierarchically controlling performance" (Elliott, 1991, p. 101) with the underlying purpose of legitimating the "hegemony of the state" (p. 114).

Elliott contrasts the Suffolk approach with that taken by the London borough of Enfield, which hired Elliott as a consultant and released two senior teachers, Boothroyd and Burbridge, to conduct educational action research on possible adaptations of the ACAS recommended model of teacher appraisal. The result was the development of a two-strand model that was an example of "creative compromise" and the "removal of threat by creating ownership" (p.110).

Boothroyd and Burbridge began their development of a bottom-up model by exploiting the ambiguity in the ACAS
documentation which allowed for the possibility of establishing "a model of teacher appraisal in which managerialism is minimized and the management functions of appraisal subordinated to the purposes of professional and career development" (Elliott, 1991, p. 97). Part of the government model included the limitation of documentation available to the headteacher would consist of extracts from the full appraisal record. This provided scope for a two-tiered model, with a first tier of peer and self appraisal and a second tier of management appraisal.

Given this scope, the most important task was to restructure the dialogue from a top-down bureaucratic monologue to a bottom-up professional dialogue, which for Elliott means moral discourse. Part of this was done by redefining vocabulary. "Objective", for example, shifts from "removing prejudice, subjective/unsubstantiated comment" to "being open to critiques of one's judgement" (p. 102). The purpose of dialogue changes from how best to accomplish pre-specified ends to the improvement of teaching practice through "genuine dialogue". Moral discourse thereby "enables each person to develop capacities (e.g. of reflexivity) for self-determining improvements in the quality of their teaching" (p. 104).

Elliott contends that this discourse allows teachers to combat the ideology that perpetuates the power of the state. It does so by helping them to confront the dilemmas inherent
in their practices, that is, "the tension within the self-understanding of the teacher, between its ideologically structured elements and those elements which (s)he has constructed on the basis of classroom experience" (p. 114). According to Elliott, professional cultures are composed of both ideological elements and ways of understanding based on teachers' experience. The interaction between ideology and experience allows for continuous reformation of traditions within this culture.

Moral discourse need not result in total agreement. Those involved may reach consensus through dialogue, or may remain in disagreement but still "emerge from it having modified and changed their views" (p. 103). The success of the dialogue is thus determined by improved understandings gained by the teacher, who thereby gains "the right to self-determine his/her own future practice" (p. 104).

The two-tiered model developed by Enfield in response to a government initiative to increase hierarchical control leads instead, according to Elliott, to a strengthening of the professional culture of teaching. He claims that this is not unusual: action research has grown in response to outside pressures that "have rendered the traditional craft practices of teachers problematic" (p. 111). Stenhouse's work in the 70s was in some sense a response to the increased pressure for behaviourally defined learning outcomes and Elliott hopes that the pressure from government
to control teachers’ work in the late 80s stimulates the
development of educational action research and a
professional culture in schools. In other words, to return
to the beginning of the chapter, "the phoenix of a
collaborative, reflective practice arises".

II. CRITIQUE OF ELLIOTT’S ANSWERS

"Educational Theory, Practical Philosophy and Action
Research" and Action Research for Educational Change
together provide a rich and powerful attempt to answer the
kinds of questions I raise in Chapter One. Significant
resources are brought to these issues, especially
conceptions of education, curriculum, tradition and reason.
But, I believe, Elliott fails in his attempt to ground
action research because (i) he accepts a framing of his task
that is flawed and (ii) he is unable to provide a normative
basis for his conception of teaching practice.

Principles for Practice (1): Propositions

Elliott begins by accepting Hirst’s call for the
grounding of theory in practice. The task for theory then
is to develop critiques of the operational theories that
teachers use in constructing their practices or of the
actual practices. From these critiques principles for
practices can be generated. Hirst calls on Habermas' work as a basis for critique, while Elliott tries to work out a theoretical base for teacher research using Gadamer's hermeneutics.

The task of developing principles for practice from practice is not new for teacher research. Neither is the confusion surrounding this task. What Elliott means by principles for practice seems unclear; at least two possible interpretations seem possible and I believe that neither is sustainable. The first interpretation is examined in this section; the alternative interpretation in the next section.

In the original essay Hirst set as the task of educational theory as "the justification of what is done in any particular case by reference to knowledge, understanding and practical principles, which principles have been subject to the test of practical experience" (1983, p. 20). These "principles of action" have been culled from accounts of practice, in much the same way that Stenhouse seems to have meant when he called for developing propositional theory from accumulated case studies. This effort runs into some major difficulties especially when the nature of teaching practice and the nature of theory are juxtaposed.

In "On Writing of Theory and Practice" (1989), de Castell looks at the assumptions in the Hirst paper especially the difficulties that written theory has with the oral character of practice. Three crucial problems are not
addressed by Hirst in his call for the development of theory from practice: observation, transcription and documentation. Hirst recommends observation as one way to draw from practice, but observation by outsiders of the largely tacit understandings between teacher and students is problematic. Secondly, teaching practice is dialogic and dialogue cannot be "observed". Finally, in calling for documentation, Hirst does not address the schism between the language of practice and the language of educational theory. Hirst does not explain how phronesis becomes theoria. Neither Hirst nor Elliott deals with any of these obstacles in attempting to develop principles for practice.

Principles for Practice (2): Norms

But Elliott may also mean something different by "principles for practice" than Hirst does. While Elliott draws on the Hirst paper, Elliott sometimes uses "principles" in a different way in some contexts. "Principles" seems to have a normative meaning in, for example, "General understandings of values tend to be encapsulated in sets of practical principles distilled from retrospective reflections on experience. Such principles guide phronesis but are not a substitute for it" (1987, p. 162). If by principles, Elliott means the educational values that are at the base of professional practice, then another discussion is warranted.
At the base of Elliott's conception of teaching are the norms that determine professionalism and underlie moral dialogue. The response to the imposition of a clinical supervision model of teacher appraisal is guided by these norms: the battle is between the "ideology of the state" and "the creative resistance of professional teachers". The authority of teachers to resist is tied up in their willingness to engage in moral dialogue (Elliott, 1991, p. 104). Yet the source of this moral authority is the teachers' own practices, that is, a mix of ideology and experience (p. 114). What is at issue here is the issue that divides Habermas and Gadamer: the grounding of critique.

"There is a dangerous account of action research currently being perpetuated by certain radical theorists who have been influenced by the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas" (Elliott, 1991, p. 115). This is Elliott's characterization of Carr and Kemmis' Becoming Critical. The debate between Gadamer and Habermas about the direction of hermeneutics is reproduced to some degree in teacher research. The debate is between different participants at different levels. Carr and Kemmis use their interpretation of Habermas for a critical theory approach to teacher research (Chapter Three). Elliott rejects Carr and Kemmis, and also Habermas, in substituting his reading of Gadamer in
another approach. Chapter Three was concerned with different readings of Habermas; this chapter deals with different readings of Gadamer. To sort through this I want to begin with the debate between Carr and Kemmis and Elliott and then, in the next section of this chapter, discuss the debate between Gadamer and Habermas.

Carr and Kemmis argue for a critical approach to teacher research to deal with the ways political and social forces ideologically distort teachers' understandings of their practices. Elliott has two responses. He rejects Carr and Kemmis' (and Habermas) as being dependent on the privileged expertise of critical theorists and he also defends his approach as one that contains the possibility of uncovering ideology. He is justified in rejecting the appeal to a critical theory elite (p. 39), but so too would Habermas. In developing a conception of ideological critique, Elliott appeals to experience. He does this in a number of instances. When directly defending his approach from Carr and Kemmis he responds: "My experience has always been that teachers tend to develop critiques of the macro-context of their practices during the process of reflectively developing and testing their practical theories" (1987, p. 167). Also, in citing the example of the Enfield teacher appraisal scheme, Elliott claims that ideologically distorted aspects of teachers' self-understandings can be critiqued "in the light of [teachers']
reflections upon experience" (1991, p. 115).

This appeal to experience is not supported by my reading of Gadamer, however. Gadamer's concept of prejudgment or prejudice is not limited to ideology; all understanding is conditioned by projecting a meaning on one's perceptions. Teachers' experience is as affected by prejudice as is the state's ideology. Appeals to experience as a refuge against ideology are futile. While Elliott acknowledges that understanding is dialectically determined, that is, formed in the interplay between things-in-themselves and the historically constituted beliefs and values of the interpreter, his application seems inconsistent. For Gadamer, "all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 239) and we need to distinguish "legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome" (p. 246). My reading of how Gadamer tackles the issue of determining legitimate prejudices is somewhat different from Elliott's and involves Gadamer's conceptions of dialogue and the critique of tradition.

III. GADAMER

Dialogue

Crucial to understanding Gadamer's hermeneutics is the
idea of how prejudices condition our understanding. Prejudices formed from tradition affect how we deal with the world, including, for example, what constitutes "objective judgement", "rational understanding", or "relevant professional experience". Gadamer must distinguish between various interpretations stemming from the same tradition or interpretations from different traditions. In other words, how can we test our interpretation of a text (or situation, or experience) against the text itself, given that the way we understand the text is conditioned by our historical prejudices?

Gadamer bases his answer on the hermeneutic circle. Tradition in the form of prejudices guides our projected interpretation of the text, but the text modifies and corrects our prejudices in an ongoing questioning dialectic. This interaction between interpreter and text is the basis for Gadamer's theory of the dialogic structure of understanding. Gadamer sets certain conditions on the dialogue if it is to lead to genuine understanding.

One condition affecting the text is that it forms a coherent unity so that it may consistently inform and correct our prejudices. This "anticipation of completeness" provides the authority for the interpreter to provisionally concede authority to the text. For Gadamer this is a formal condition of understanding: "only what really constitutes a unity of meaning is intelligible" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 261).
It is important that the interpreter does not accept the authority of the text, but is open to its possible truth; the concession of authority is provisional (Warnke, 1987). Tradition thus provides a guiding image for interpretation which is modified as a result of being applied to the text which has temporary authority.

Two conditions affect the reader-interpreter. First, Gadamer posits the presumption of docta ignorantia, that is, we must presume our own fallibility. We do not have access to final Truth; we must be open to the possible truth of others. Second, each participant in dialogue must be willing to discovering the real strength of other participants. In this dialogue between text and reader, the text seems to be favoured: the text is presumed to be complete and intelligible, while the reader/interpreter must be willing to question his/her prejudices and discover the strength of the text.

The result of this dialogue is a shared understanding that reflects the transformation of initial views. This does not necessarily mean a consensus, but a genuine consideration of the views of others, that is, a "fusion of horizons":

Reaching an understanding in conversation presupposes that both partners are ready for it and are trying to recognise the full value of what is alien and opposed to them. If this happens mutually, and each of the partners, while simultaneously hanging on to his own arguments,
weighs the counter-arguments, it is finally possible to achieve...a common language and a common statement (Gadamer, 1975, p. 348).

This reading of Gadamer’s notion of dialogue would support a different translation into teacher research, one that might be illustrated by using the teacher appraisal scheme that Elliott cites as an example of educational action research. In the proposed response to the ACAS initiative, Elliott recommends establishing a two-tiered structure for discussion about appraisal of teaching; on the first tier teachers talk with other teachers and on the second tier they talk with administrators. This response is given as a model of creative resistance to the hegemony of the state.

Using my reading of Gadamer, the stark opposition between teachers’ experience and the ideology of the state would be reconceived. Both "traditional craft" and "professional" teaching cultures are part of traditions that condition teachers’ perceptions of experience. While both may have different values than the central government and LEAs, there appears to be no basis for privileging either culture. If all understanding is based on prejudice, then all understanding must be questioned.

More importantly, however, Elliott’s attempt to promote dialogue in his two-tiered model does not promote dialogue across differences. On the second tier the differing
perspectives of teachers and administrators are likely to result in different horizons. But on the first level teachers talk to colleagues only. What is to prevent the reinforcement and strengthening of the "craft culture" of teaching in a dialogue among teachers who share the same perspective? Studies of the culture of teaching often report that teachers avoid conflict with their peers and resist the injection of ideas from beyond their horizon of experience (Lortie, 1975; Hargreaves, 1989). How is the professional culture of teaching going to overcome both the hegemony of the state and the ideology of the craft culture of teaching? A discussion of the critique of ideology in tradition leads back to the dialogue between Habermas and Gadamer.

**Ideology**

While agreeing on much, Habermas and Gadamer differ substantially in their attempts to deal with ideology. Habermas charges that Gadamer's hermeneutics fails to provide a basis for discriminating between various validity claims and is unable to uncover ideological aspects in tradition. The very language used to describe an experience, for example, can be ideologically charged, that is, "institutionally bound". Two examples of institutionally bound speech can be apparent in Elliott's discussion of the teacher appraisal issue, one he
deals with directly. Elliott takes care to redefine "objective" because it reflects a particular meaning in the ideology of the state discourse. Yet he uses "professional" without dealing with its history or tradition or ideology.

Gadamer counters by claiming that hermeneutics is particularly suited to the disclosing of hidden dimensions of a text and particularly its historicity. But prejudice is not the same as ideology and "there is a critical difference between calling a perspective ideological and recognising its historical and social situatedness" (Warnke, 1987, p. 115). Ideology is entangled in language at a foundational level in subtle and complex ways. Elliott's lack of recognition of the ideology inherent in a "professional culture" is perhaps a useful example of the difficulty involved in uncovering ideology.

A number of barriers to uncovering ideology in Gadamer's hermeneutics are apparent. First, the presumption in favour of the text resulting from the anticipation of completeness and docta ignorantia may be a presumption in favour of ideology. Elliott's initial response to the ACAS document was not acceptance, but resistance. Second, the language used in dialogue may be ideologically distorted. Elliott recognised this in the ACAS document, but not in his own. Third, the conditions for dialogue may inhibit, rather than encourage genuine conversation. Elliott acknowledges that there are many barriers to genuine dialogue and
research in schools and advocates creative resistance and compromise. Fourth, dialogue depends on difference; there can be no genuine dialogue if there are no differences. The tension between government appraisal schemes and Elliott's professional culture promotes dialogue; the contradictions between professional and craft cultures and within a professional culture need to be exposed to permit genuine dialogue between teachers.

IV. RESOURCES FOR TEACHER RESEARCH

Chapter Three was concerned with outlining a procedure for deciding the norms and values for teaching practice -- Habermas' conception of discourse. Among the issues listed at the end of the chapter was the characterization of dialogue. Gadamer helps provide some important resources for any discussion of dialogue. Most significant are the hermeneutic circle, the anticipation of completeness, docta ignorantia and the fusion of horizons in developing a common language. These ideas are crucial for the answers I am trying to develop to my three questions for teacher research.
CHAPTER FIVE

WINTER AND RICOEUR

Action research writers have tended to present...issues in terms of an overarching 'liberationist' dichotomy: ideal speech v. bureaucracy, emancipation v. constraint, democracy v. hierarchy. Such formulations...[fail] to formulate action-research's possibility except as a challenge... In order to do otherwise...the inert dichotomies presented so far must be reformulated in dialectical terms, so as to provide analytically not only for opposition but also for resolution, transformation, and thus for change. (Winter, 1987, p. 98).

Richard Winter also remarks on the stark oppositions and oppositional rhetoric that characterize much of action research (Chapter One) and attempts to develop a theory for teacher research that is both comprehensive and positive. In this chapter I repeat the pattern of Chapters Three, Four and Five: I outline his attempt, critique it and suggest different interpretations of the original hermeneutic sources.

I. WINTER

Reflexivity and Dialectics

Richard Winter in Action Research and the Nature of

Winter sees the relationship between action and research, between practice and theory, as dialectical. Research

disrupts action’s taken-for-granted reflexivity; and action disrupts research’s endless seeking for the grounds of that reflexivity. Action-research’s ideal and its challenge are that it seeks (and needs) to formulate the nature of that mutual ‘disruption’ of research and action, so that this ‘disruptive’ relation can be creatively transformative of both action AND research (Winter, 1987, p. 37, italics in original).

Winter offers a questioning dialectic, where research questions action, but action also questions research. Research challenges action to examine the set of strategies and meanings selected; action challenges research and theory to determine which possibilities are feasible within a particular context. This interaction results in temporary ‘moments’ of disequilibrium which are action research’s territory.

The goal for this dialectic is not Habermasian emancipation, according to Winter, but rather a process of self-transcendence, or reflexivity. The question Winter
then needs to answer is how to distinguish this critical self-reflection from routine practical reasoning. Referring back to the theory-practice relationship, Winter argues for a theory of inquiry that calls for disruption of mundane subjectivity. It must be a theory that would permit "multiple relationships between experience and language, relationships...which would allow for exploration, play, ambiguity and transformation (p. 46, italics in original). His answer: writing. Winter tries to build a theory of writing that would "face the challenge posed by institutionalized authority systems to the possibility of individual critical reflection" (p. 48). This theory stems from an analysis of ideology and myth.

Ideology

Freedom from ideology and habit, Winter argues, is usually accomplished by an appeal to the authority of theory: theory is used to correct irrational practice. But this becomes a problem for action research; how can practice be improved without reference to legitimizing theory? Winter argues his case from an analysis of ideology, which depends on Freud, Koestler and Jung. He begins with the Freudian unconscious with its web of symbolic metaphor and ambiguity which, he claims, is not the antithesis of rationality, but its foundation. By combining Koestler's work on how metaphor contributes to theoretical work,
Jungian mythopoeic imagination and Levi-Strauss' mythic structures, Winter tries to tie myth and symbol to the structure of experience. Symbols are not signs but metaphors permitting experience to be given meaning; myths, like metaphors, allow contradictions within experience to be combined.

Winter then uses Ricoeur's work to tie the mythic to ideology, which is described as "an unsurpassable phenomenon of social existence insofar as social reality always has a symbolic constitution and incorporates an interpretation, in images and representations, of the social bond itself" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 231). Ideology justifies and rationalizes the original basis for the formation of a particular social group. Ideology thus becomes modern myth, reducing the social bond to an unreflexive orthodoxy. Thus alongside "mythic images of Helen of Troy and Mary Queen of Scots, we also install 'Princess Di' and ... Joan Collins". (Winter, 1987, p. 75).

But Winter claims that ideology, like myth, contains within itself the seeds of its own critique. Winter draws on Levi-Strauss' binary opposites to build this case. "For a myth to be engendered by thought and for it in turn to engender other myths, it is necessary and sufficient that an initial opposition should be injected into experience..." (Levi-Strauss, 1981, pp. 603-604). If the purpose of myth is to overcome this inherent contradiction, it "grows
spiral-wise until the intellectual impulse which produced it is exhausted" (Levi-Strauss, 1972, p. 229). Ideology and myth thus both contain the contradictions which they are designed to overcome: "There is an inevitable tension within ideology...: any elaborated justification implicitly 'thematizes' (makes available for analysis) the questionability of alternatives" (Winter, 1987, p. 73).

The theory of myth as contradiction thus helps to formulate dialectical and reflexive possibilities for ideology, for if the ideological context is seen as composed from conflict and only tentatively in balance, the disruption of that harmony can lead to the reflexivity, or self-critical reflection, which is Winter's goal for action research. He is therefore claiming that the process of forming myth and ideology from contradictions can be reversed.

The tool for this disruption is writing. Winter draws on Derrida for a theory of writing that disrupts ideology. Derrida's 'difference/differance' notion evokes the dialectical structure of consciousness: "Without Difference ('déference') the symbol loses its metaphoricity and thus its interpretive effect. Without Deferral ('différance') experience loses its biographical structure of references and thus its capacity for meaning" (Winter, 1987, p. 67). Writing, like ideology, thus contains within its very structure the possibility of its own critique.
But only a certain kind of writing: narrative. Linear thought and "scientific" writing are not reflexive, but are characterized by resolution and final truths. It is about puzzle solving and not puzzle formation; contradictions are glossed and disappear with artful solutions. These anomalies and contradictions quickly emerge when an historical approach to the study of science is used, that is, when the story or narrative of science is told.

**Action Research**

Winter builds his case for action research as reflexive narrative from principles of reflexivity and dialectics. He begins by separating narrative-as-theory from the assumptions of realism. The validity of a narrative is not dependent on consensus of interpretation, but rather on a "consensus of theoretic grounds for a plurality of interpretations" (p. 129).

**Reflexive** interpretation questions all interpretations, including itself, creating a "theoretic space" by means of a general withdrawal from interpretation to problematic. This space allows action to "open out developmentally" on the basis of the provisional enlightenment that has been achieved. Thus action research always invites other phases of action research itself and validity becomes a "quality of the interpretation process whose grounds are adequately theorized, rather than the quality of a particular
interpretation which itself can claim to be everyone's interpretation" (p. 125).

In discussing the quality of the interpretation process, Winter draws on Geertz' elaboration of thick description. Geertz describes how meaning is structured into layers of interpretation which are contestable. This does not mean that all interpretations are equally valid; meaning in description is public, that is, open to criticism and appraisal. Description then is a hermeneutic experience, which involves "the dialectic of question and answer". The notion that meaning is a relation between social actions and their cultural matrix means that interpretations of this relation and appraisal of interpretations are not definitive, but recursive. Linear, scientific prose is therefore inadequate for this task.

Dialectics offers the possibility of grounding validity in experience, "by formulating a principle for the structure of inquiry which is at the same time a principle for the structure of experience itself" (p. 131). Winter claims that narrative structure embodies the dialectical contradictions of meaning and action in such a way that to understand a narrative is to understand its constituent contradictions. Thus validity in action research is not determined by 'correspondence' to the world, but rather in a reflexive and dialectical process where possibilities for action are revealed.
Winter argues that description for action research is a dialectical structure of irony and metaphor. It is unlike "scientific" discourse which is unified structure of consensus and literal reference, that is, neither reflexive nor dialectical. Action research descriptions also differ from literary descriptions by being reflexive, that is, by including within the text itself "a critical commentary...which addresses directly the text's own problematic and how its processes address that problematic" (Winter, 1987, p. 145). Telling a story is not enough. Action researchers are storytellers who must be their own critics.

Action Research and Teaching Practice

But action research is interested in the improvement of professional practice in a social context. Winter therefore needs to deal with the work of teachers in bureaucratic settings. Not surprisingly, his explanation uses dialectics and reflexivity.

He begins with an analysis of the role of professional. Most views of action research set up an opposition between the teacher as professional versus the teacher as bureaucrat. Action research is then seen as a liberationist battle between the professional-as-hero against the tyranny of constraining bureaucracy. Action research is formulated in negative or limited terms, that is, as a challenge to
institutional authority and not as a positive force.

Winter reframes the role of teacher in dialectical terms. He begins by questioning the sharp dichotomy between professional and bureaucrat embraced by most action researchers:

What...action research writers...have done is to embrace the norm of professionalism and to contest the norm of bureaucracy without realizing the intimate relation between the two, constituted by the normative version of rationality which underlies both" (Winter, 1987, p. 101).

'Professionalism' and 'bureaucratization' are also seen dialectically. 'Professionalism' invokes two opposites. First, professional work is service and not trade; secondly professionals are experts and not amateurs and expect to be paid for their work. The contrast between professionalism as ethic and as expertise is at the heart of the concept or myth of professional-as-hero and like other myths composed of opposites, is susceptible to disruption of 'dialectical moments'. Action research therefore seeks to "install within professional work a moment which makes explicit the reflexivity by which alone the complexities of professional judgements are handled" (p. 108).

'Bureaucratization' contains similar contradictions. The specialization of functions that is facilitated by bureaucratic organization provides increased opportunity for discretionary judgement. This is contrasted with
bureaucracy's hierarchical arrangement. "Hence, bureaucracy's principle of hierarchical jurisdictions is a dialectical contradiction with its other principle of expertly qualified officials..." (p. 110). The tension between hierarchical authority and expert authority forms a dialectical contradiction which can be exploited by action research. Winter gives Bernstein's essay (1971) on 'open' and 'closed' systems as an example of an attempt to exploit the dialectic inherent in bureaucracy. Bernstein posits that changing the notions of knowledge can affect the structure of school organizations; knowledge, expertise, role and bureaucracy are intertwined. Winter argues that action research "improves institutionalized practices by exploring to their uttermost limits the discretionary possibilities within which they are (institutionally as well as epistemologically) constituted" (1987, p. 111).

By understanding the dialectical nature of professionalism and bureaucracy, action researchers will then be able to determine those dimensions of their work which are liable to change or improvement and those which are beyond their scope, and must be treated as constraints. Winter thus advocates a "cautious" balance between possibilities for change and limits to these projects.

Summary

Winter's version of action research is very different
from that of Carr and Kemmis. He rejects 'emancipation' as a fundamental principle for inquiry and instead substitutes 'reflexivity' and 'dialectics'.

He first describes a theory-practice relationship in which theory and practice are interwoven. Theory and practice generate and influence each other in a complex social world which is constantly changing and so must theory. Theory informs action, providing glossed possibilities; action challenges theory to provide feasible, accounts, valid for particular contexts.

The dialectic of theory-practice is used to challenge established unreflexive thought -- ideology -- which in turn is seen as another dialectic. Ideology is defined as modern myth, itself composed of contradictions which have been resolved within the mythic (or ideological structure). The balance within this ideological dialectic is to be disturbed by using writing, not linear "scientific" writing which is unreflexive, but reflexive narrative which, like the experience it attempts to organize, deals with contradictions and explores them. Winter proposes reflexive narrative as the major tool for action research.

But action researchers do not deal only with ideology, they also work within an organizational context. Winter rejects the usual answer that action researchers provide for this dilemma: the myth of the professional-as-hero battling a repressive bureaucracy. Instead he again searches for
ways to disrupt the dialectical structure of the roles of professional and bureaucrat.

**Application**

Winter proposes six principles for a reflective action research that stem from his theory: critique, dialectic, collaborative resource, risk, plural structure and theory-practice transformation. He develops these in *Learning from Experience: Principles and Practice in Action-Research* (1989) and includes three studies which embody these principles.

Reflexive critique involves three steps: accounts of experience are collected and, if necessary, put into writing; the reflexiveness of these accounts is made evident; the accounts become problematic.

Dialectics in the principle whereby the reflexiveness of the accounts is made evident.

The dialectical approach suggests that in order to understand a phenomenon we treat it as a set of relations which are different and, in some sense, opposed (i.e. 'contradictory'), and yet at the same time interdependent (i.e., form a unity).... In this way dialectics gives us a principle by means of which we can select, from the infinite number of elements and relations into which any phenomenon could be broken down, some as more significant than others: those internal relationships between constituent elements whose stability creates the likelihood of change (Winter, 1989, p. 49).
The third principle, collaborative resource, contributes to reflexivity by soliciting and using other viewpoints. The differences and contradictions both between and within these perspectives contribute to the resources used for dialectical analysis. This indicates a process of simultaneously giving weight to the understanding contributed by all members, and at the same time a process of 'deconstructing' the various contributions so that we can use them as resources for 'restructuring' new categories and interpretations" (Winter, 1989, p. 57).

This solicitation of other viewpoints for consideration and critique leads to Winter's fourth principle: risk. By submitting our own taken-for-granted assumptions to critique, we risk losing our sense of efficacy. By submitting the assumptions of others to critique, we risk even more.

Principles three and four -- collaborative resource and risk -- if followed, should be reflected in any report or document stemming from any research. Hence principle five: plural structure. This report will resemble a collage more than a description: "it will contain a plurality of accounts and also a commentary on each account" (p. 63).

Finally, the action-research project should make a difference. Theory and practice should both be affected: theory should question practice and practice should challenge theory in an ongoing "double dialectic". 
Winter provides three examples of the application of these principles: (i) an analysis of the role of a support teacher by Susan Burroughs, (ii) Winter's study of the problem of marking written work in an M.Ed. access course and (iii) an evaluation of the access course itself. The marking of written work seems like a particularly appropriate example since it is Winter's attempt to research his own practice. He describes four incidents that caused him to question his assumptions about marking student work. The incidents are presented in chronological order "so that the report has the overall structure of a narrative" (Winter, 1989, p. 79).

The first involved one student, Steve, challenging Winter's giving him a "B" for his essay, especially in contrast with Margaret's "A". Winter gave the two papers to another marker and tape recorded the subsequent discussion. As a result, he came to realize that his marking was based not so much on the quality of the student's work, but on his assessment of their development as students in his class (and his effectiveness as a teacher). The result was Winter's realization of "an authoritarianism within [his] practice which previously remained hidden" (p. 83).

In the second instance, marking Joan's paper, Winter came to realize that he emphasized the faults in student work: "out of eighteen comments, four were positive" (p. 86). Sharing Joan's work with two colleagues helped Winter
develop a more constructive, positive strategy, a better balance between being supportive and being critical. Joan did leave the course, however.

In the third incident, Winter describes reviewing Sheila's final assignment and discovering another problematic aspect of marking: confusion of audience. Comments were directed both to Sheila and to the other markers. Comments directed to Sheila were encouraging and personal; comments directed at Winter's colleagues tended to be "a demonstration of the academic competence of the marker" (p. 90, italics in original) in a "judicious" application of "standards". This confusion of audience became apparent when Sheila received a copy of the marksheet and was surprised by the apparent harshness. The split in audience reflected the contradictions within the process: "Comments addressed to examiners are intended as judgements of academic quality, and thus displays of academic competence, whereas comments for students are intended to be helpful suggestions.... Marking...involves both functions and both audiences" (p. 91, italics in original).

The final incident involving Vera is almost a reprise of that involving Joan. Receiving a student's paper that seemed to have many unclear passages, Winter did not, as he did with Joan, write a critique, but instead met with the student. The ensuing dialogue helped both Winter and the student understand and deal with issues.
The report concluded with four recommendations to deal with the tensions inherent in marking: (1) separate different audiences; (2) include written comments and tutorial discussion as separate aspects of marking; (3) separate different types of comments addressed to students; (4) separate comments to justify a judgement from comments to promote learning.

Winter tries to respect his six principles in this study. The examination of his own practice allows him to question previously taken-for-granted assumptions and therefore be "reflexive". Reflexivity is accomplished by a dialectical analysis of his practice, that is, underlying tensions in marking are exposed. Soliciting the views of students and colleagues ensures that the principles of collaborative resource and risk are respected. These views are included in the text -- plural structure-- and practice is transformed by implementing the six recommendations. And all this is described in a temporal sequence, Winter's "story" of his own practice.

II. CRITIQUE OF WINTER

Winter's theory for action-research, his six principles and his examples are important contributions to teacher research, but, I argue, ultimately fail to provide the
"rigorous principles and theoretical grounds" that are Winter's goals. Some of the problems and strengths of Winter's approach are perhaps best shown by using Habermas' and Gadamer's work from chapters three and four.

From a Habermasian Perspective

Missing from Winter's work is any discussion of how to deal with the normative aspects of teaching, research and teacher research. Winter analyses and describes, but does not provide criteria for making decisions in "moments of disequilibrium". Teaching, for example, is depicted as both professional and bureaucratic work, each pole, in turn, being further divided in a series of contradictory but interactive dialectical relationships. In his example of marking student work, Winter opposes criticizing and supporting students as an inevitable result of his educational and bureaucratic roles. He does not resolve his dilemma, however, but maintains the separateness of the roles in his recommendations.

Norms are also unproblematic aspects of the subsequent dialogue. The validity of the criteria used for the evaluation of student work is never an issue, never "negotiated", for example, between students and teacher. Winter consults his colleagues about how to apply standards, not the appropriateness of those standards. Indeed, the value of marking and grading is not an issue for debate.
Ironically, as an aside, Winter mentions having an article rejected by an academic journal as a result of its referees' judgement. He resubmitted the article to another journal and had it accepted without modification. Thus Winter was able to find judges with similar standards; his students must meet his standards. Using Winter's theory as a framework, his authority results from being a certified professional or responsible bureaucrat, neither of which would account for Winter's response to Steve's challenge.

Finally, Winter's recommendations are consistent with his analytical approach: all four involve structures that permit the separation of the teacher's role of educator and bureaucrat, by, for example, separating comments to justify a judgement from comments to promote learning.

Winter's response to these criticisms might include reference to the feasibility of questioning these roles. Is it really possible to effectively challenge these norms or would such a challenge be utopian? But this would presume the practicability of Winter's recommendations. Do they really solve his problems of practice? I suspect that they do not.

The contradictions within the role of teacher cannot be resolved by isolating various aspects and treating them as distinct. The teacher's role inevitably involves considerations of student and knowledge in a dialectic as old as concepts of education. We cannot neatly separate out
student from knowledge any more effectively than we can
distinguish helping students and judging the quality of
their work. The normative aspects of each of these issues
cannot be solved by analysis and separation; they will
require the kind of open dialogue that Habermas describes in
discourse.

**From a Gadamerian Perspective**

Someone viewing Winter's work from a Gadamerian
perspective would raise many of the same issues as listed
above, but from the standpoint of the prejudices that all --
Winter, colleagues, students -- bring to the situation. The
emphasis might be, however, in how prejudice helps provide
the divisions that are used for separation. The teacher as
professional/bureaucrat might be replaced by other images of
the teacher -- as elder, as critic, or as scholar, for
example. Winter's reliance on reflexivity and dialectics
would seem to be a futile attempt to find a methodological
route to truth.

Much of Winter's attempt to understand other viewpoints
-- for example, Steve's -- would be applauded and
characterized as an attempt at a "fusion of horizons". At
the same time, however, Winter's effort to speak for others
in a "plural text" would be robbing them of their own
voices.
III. RICOEUR

While I believe that Winter's attempt to provide a theory for action research falls short, especially in providing a normative basis for teacher research (or more accurately a procedure for dealing with questions of norms), Winter points to some important resources for teacher research, notably theories of writing, narrative and critique. While Winter draws from many sources in constructing his theory, Ricoeur is certainly a primary one and Ricoeur's structural hermeneutics is closely allied to Winter's work. But, as before, I have a different reading of Ricoeur from Winter and would like to contrast my reading with Winter's and draw different implications.

Writing and Structural Hermeneutics

In developing a theory of writing Winter stresses its correspondence with experience; Ricoeur, on the other hand, emphasizes writing's distinctiveness and corresponding advantages. According to Ricoeur, Gadamer opposes truth and method in a forced choice: "either we adopt the methodological attitude and lose the ontological density of the reality we study, or we adopt the attitude of truth and must then renounce the objectivity of the human sciences" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 131). Ricoeur tries to overcome this separation and uses the text as a paradigm case.
The text is appropriate because it reflects the historicity of human experience (Winter's point), but also because it is different from experience: "it is the paradigm of distanciation in human communication" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 131). Distanciation allows for the creation of meaning from experience. Writing, a form of discourse, emerges from language, but is distinct. Language is a system of signs which when organized into a sentence loses semiotic value and acquires semantic import. Discourse thus has characteristics of both event and meaning. It is an event insofar as to speak (and use language signs) is to realize an event; to utter a sentence is an ephemeral phenomenon. But discourse also carries meaning which remains. In the dialectic of event and meaning, "if all discourse is realized as an event, all discourse is understood as meaning. What we wish to understand is not the fleeting event, but rather the meaning which endures" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 134).

Discourse is also organized into works, which mediate between event and meaning. By being ordered into a story, poem, essay or novel, for example, the text is able to project a world into which the reader enters; the text decontextualizes the event so that it can be recontextualized as meaning by a reader. In accepting the world of the text, readers find meaning in the interaction between themselves and the text, that is, they "appropriate"
the text. Ricoeur claims that

we understand ourselves only by the long detour of
the signs of humanity deposited in cultural works. What would we know of love and hate, of moral feelings and, in general, of all that we call the self, if these had not been brought into language and articulated by literature?" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 143, italics in original).

These claims are fundamental to Ricoeur's attempt to develop structural hermeneutics, whereby he tries to overcome the truth/method dichotomy Gadamer raises and Ricoeur phrases as "understanding and explanation". The organizing of language into discourse can be undone or reversed by structural analysis: "it is possible to treat the text according to the explanatory rules that linguistics successfully applies to the simple system of signs which constitute language..." (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 153). Ricoeur, like Winter, uses Levi-Strauss's work as an example of this kind of analysis.

But unlike Winter, Ricoeur goes on; explanation is not enough. Levi-Strauss may be able to explain the Oedipus myth, but he cannot definitively interpret it. Each reader must interpret or appropriate the text for him/herself: "the interpretation of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 158).
Explanation and interpretation are enmeshed: explanation by structural analysis explains by bringing out the structure in a work; interpretation involves accepting the world of the text, "to follow the path of thought opened up by the text" (p. 162).

Ricoeur does not provide criteria for the evaluation of the quality of either explanation or interpretation. For example, he seems to accept the authority of structural analysis based on the science of linguistics without question. In developing criteria for the evaluation of interpretations, he claims that is possible to argue the merits of various interpretations in terms of "desirability-characters", which I translate as norms. How these desirability-characters are developed is not apparent. Ricoeur does invoke juridical reasoning as a model for settling disputes in interpretations: "the plurivocity common to texts and to actions is exhibited in the form of a conflict of interpretations, and the final interpretation appears as a verdict to which it is possible to make appeal" (p. 215). Unlike in court, however, there is no final appeal -- no singular correct meaning -- in the interpretation of texts or meaningful action.

Ideology and Critique

From Ricoeur, Winter claims the inevitability of ideology, that is, ideology is necessary for the formation
of a social group and that, for example, the simplification and schematization of ideology is a necessary doxic characteristic that binds a group together. Winter is interested in the structural formation of ideology which he submits to dialectical analysis leading to a supposedly reflexive view of ideology. Ricoeur, however, sees the critique of ideology as a possibility from the standpoint of both hermeneutics and critical theory, although each approaches the task from a different standpoint.

The gesture of hermeneutics is a humble one of acknowledging the historical conditions to which all human understanding is subsumed in the reign of finitude; that of the critique of ideology is a proud gesture of defiance directed against the distortions of human communication (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 87).

Ricoeur captures what I believe is the heart of the debate between Gadamer and Habermas outlined in Chapter Four. Ricoeur tries to create a dialogue between these poles by suggesting the resources that each can provide the other.

Ricoeur offers four supplements from critique for hermeneutics, each of which attempts to add to the possibility of the critique of tradition. (1) For Ricoeur again writing is not simply a fixing of discourse, but a positive distancing from both experience and the author: "The emancipation of the text constitutes the most
fundamental condition for the recognition of a critical distance at the heart of interpretation" (p. 91). (2) The dialectical relationship of explanation and understanding provides checks on subjectivist interpretation and positivist methodology. (3) Because the text opens up a world in front of it, it also can provide a critique of any given reality. The dichotomy between the world of the text and the world of experience contains the possibility of the critique of each. Finally, (4) the "worlds" (or in Gadamer's terms horizons) of text and reader interact, opening the possibility of critique of both: "To understand is not to project oneself into the text but to expose oneself to it" (p. 94).

Ricoeur also provides hermeneutical resources for critique. (1) The repression of dialogue characteristic of ideology can be discerned by a hermeneutics that reconstructs what has been suppressed. (2) The distortions of ideology are inevitable distortions of communicative capacity; thus, the "task of the hermeneutics of tradition is to remind the critique of ideology that man can project his emancipation and anticipate an unlimited and unconstrained communication only on the basis of the creative reinterpretation of cultural heritage" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 97). (3) Modern ideology -- science and technology -- channels all claims to rationality into discussions of techne, suppressing praxis and theoria. Any reawakening of
communicative action depends on the creative renewal of a cultural heritage that includes public discussion of questions of value. (4) Included in this cultural heritage is the tradition of critique itself.

**Narrative**

Winter's discussion of narrative focuses on the management of contradictions within a temporal structure. While he argues that theories are embedded in narratives, his examples are of "typical" case studies that may be projected to wider contexts. Ricoeur adds what I believe to be important resources in plot and genre.

Ricoeur seems to echo Gadamer in emphasising the connection between narrative and the organization of human experience: "the form of life to which narrative discourse belongs is our historical condition itself" (p. 288, italics in original). But a story is not simply a series of events. The meaning of an event is defined by its relation to the development of a plot, allowing for the creation of a meaningful totality or theory of the world. Episodic and configurational dimensions are bound up in narrative for both author and reader: "The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, therefore require that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession" (p. 278, italics in original).

Ricoeur uses Hayden White's work in developing the
explanatory possibilities of narrative at two levels. At the first level, events begin to be explained when emplotted. But at a second level, "a whole hierarchy of organizing schemes is grafted onto the notion of emplotment" (p. 290). Fictional and historical narratives both create worlds, making and remaking reality. "In this sense, all symbolic systems have a cognitive value: they make reality appear in such and such a way" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 293). In this dialectic of experience and narrative, "the historicity of human experience can be brought to language only as narrativity, and moreover that this narrativity itself can be articulated only be the crossed interplay of the two narrative modes" (p. 294). These narrative modes are linked by both by their projection of worlds and their interest in communication: "by opening us to what is different, history opens us to the possible, whereas fiction, by opening us to the unreal, leads us to what is essential in reality" (p. 296).

A Reinterpretation of Ricoeur

If the resources that Ricoeur supplies with his views of writing, ideology and narrative were to be applied to Winter's theory for action research they would have substantial impact. Taking his example of the problem of marking written work should help to demonstrate some of the possible ways this might happen.
Most significantly, the problem itself would be redefined. The "problem" for Winter is the tension between helping students and judging academic quality. An alternative would be to see the fundamental issue is to decide what is to be judged. Winter is judging the written work in order to assess the learning of his students (and his effectiveness as a teacher). He treats student texts as extensions of the students. If, however, we were to use Ricoeur's insistence on the "emancipation of text" from author, then the issue is changed. The text is distanced from the author and subject to the "objective" interpretation of the reader-marker; otherwise what the reader is judging the student and the text is only incidental.

The confusion of the task carries through to the interpretation of the text. If we accept that interpretation involves accepting the world of the text (or in Gadamer's terms its horizons), then the dialogue is with the text. Criticism should be addressed to the text and the world that it opens. Instead, Winter reads the text and responds not to the text, but to both its author and other readers.

Finally, Winter claims to be telling a story because he lists four incidents in chronological order, but what he really presents is a chronology and not a story at all. The story is the plot behind the incidents, the configuration
behind the events. In Winter's "story" the author as protagonist battles with the conventions of bureaucracy to help his students towards their own development as learners, that is, towards their own reflexivity through dialectics. The hero may realize his flaws (and admit them to Steve), but conquers them (and helps Vera after failing Joan) on the way to a victory in which he claims the liberation of education from schooling (and the learner from knowledge?). Winter needs to be aware of the story he is telling so that he may tell it better.

IV. RESOURCES FOR TEACHER RESEARCH

Ricoeur's work adds important dimensions to the resources I intend to use to answer my three questions for teacher research. To Habermasian discourse and Gadamerian dialogue are added Ricoeur's ideas about distanciation and appropriation. Before issues can be discussed, they must be abstracted from experience. This must be done in some way that is both consistent with the nature of experience and yet allows the issues to be shared, discussed and critiqued. In Ricoeur's terms, both event and meaning must be respected and his ideas about narrative and distanciation allow for just this kind of abstraction.

After discourse/dialogue, the results of this
deliberation must be reinserted into practice. Ricoeur's ideas of appropriation and explanation are relevant here. The dialogue is interpreted for practice and is evaluated by checks on explanation and interpretation, including considerations of the world that it opens in front of it.
The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in a dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium. Reified (materializing, objectified) images are profoundly inadequate for life and for discourse. A reified model of the world is now being replaced by a dialogic model. Every thought and every life merges in the open-ended dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293).

In searching for resources to answer the questions I raise about teacher research the work of a number of those interested in hermeneutics has been appropriated, including Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur. To date the work of one major figure has not been directly applied to teacher research, however -- Mikhail Bakhtin. Although much of his work predates Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur, Bakhtin’s ideas have attracted substantial interest beginning in the 1970s and English translations of much of his work began to appear in the 1980s. While the others write primarily from a philosophical perspective, Bakhtin develops his ideas from a
literary stance, and especially from considerations of the novel, which for Bakhtin is not solely a literary genre, but the epitome of a world view or cultural framework. Novels -- and especially the novels of Rabelais and Dostoevsky -- begin by presuming a decentering of the cultural world and claims to unitary truth. Dialogue is crucial to Bakhtin's work, but by dialogue he does not mean simply verbal interchange, but a fundamental principle of human life. For Bakhtin, the novel treats language and dialogue in fundamentally different ways from other literary genres, with concomitant implications for our ideas of reason, morality and society.

In this chapter I want to develop an interpretation of Bakhtin's work, critique his ideas and begin to suggest how they might be applied to teacher research. It is important to note that Bakhtin's work is not a unitary corpus: he does not articulate and develop one coherent set of ideas. Rather he touches on the same topics at different times in his career, sometimes contributing new ideas, sometimes contradicting his previous work and sometimes adding to it. Few of his works were published until comparatively recently and some have still not been translated. This is further complicated by uncertainty about just which works were written by Bakhtin, which by members of his circle.
I. DIALOGISM

Language and Communication

Bakhtin rejects the view of language and communication that Winter and Ricoeur endorse, and especially the Saussurean division of language into langue (the linguistic system) and parole (the individual speech act). In particular, Bakhtin objects to the view that individual utterances are constructed from units of language without regard to context. For Bakhtin, an utterance, or individual speech act, presupposes a response from an "other" and meaning is made between partners in a dialogue. As a result no two utterances are identical: while the words used may be the same, partners may be different and contexts are inevitably different. "Two verbally identical utterances never mean the same thing, if only because the reader or listener confronts them twice and reacts differently the second time. Context is never the same" (Morson and Emerson, 1990, p. 126).

This leads Bakhtin to distinguish between two kinds of meaning: the abstract or dictionary meaning and the contextual meaning or sense of a situation. Bakhtin would claim that the science of linguistics, which is so important in Ricoeur's work, is primarily concerned with the former, often collapsing contextual meaning into abstract meaning. Bakhtin claims that this distortion ignores the dialogic
nature of communication with which he is so concerned. Dialogism is based therefore on communication and not just on language.

Language is not neglected by Bakhtin, however, but redefined. Language is not language, but languages. The notion of a unitary language (e.g. 'standard English') or even an amalgam of officially recognised dialects (e.g. British, Canadian, American) is, for Bakhtin, a reified construct. The many different ways of speaking (languages) result from different social experiences, different conceptualizations and different values. Professions, classes, regions, ethnic groups and generations can have distinct languages, which are more than jargons, but reflect particular ways of organizing the world and contingent historical and social forces. Bakhtin replaces the hypothesized conception of a unitary language with his notion of heteroglossia:

at any given moment in its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between different epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form. These 'languages' of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying 'languages' (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 291).

Language is never a unified system, never complete;
instead it reflects the complexity and unsystematic
messiness of experience. Language can be ordered when life
is ordered. The cultural striving for unity is reflected in
the effort to systematize language. Bakhtin does not reject
this effort, but is concerned that we should recognise it as
an attempt to create order by imposing it: "A unitary
language is not something given but is always in essence
posited" (Bakhtin quoted in Morson and Emerson, 1990, p.
140).

The effort to unify languages into language is
countered by a corresponding effort to develop new languages
to deal with diverse and changing experience. Conflict
between centripetal and centrifugal forces are part of each
utterance: "Every utterance participates in the 'unitary
language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at
the same time partakes of social and historical
heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces)"
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272). To understand an utterance
involves understanding the "dialogue" between centripetal
and centrifugal forces.

But dialogue is also possible between "languages". All
of us belong to different groupings and learn to speak
differently in different contexts; our words can attract
meanings from each of these languages. For example,
military metaphors are used in sports ("long bomb", "field
general"), sports vocabulary is used in business ("fumble
the ball", "home run") and business terminology is used in schools ("Bottom line", "TQM"). In each case what is being appropriated is not simply particular words or metaphors, but a world view and the values that are part of that view. The ongoing dialogue between these languages is part of the development of language, communication and culture.

**Distortions of Communication: Monologism**

Bakhtin, like Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur, argues against the notion that there is one truth or any privileged methodological route to truth. Instead of targeting positivism or instrumental rationality, however, Bakhtin develops the conception of monologism which he contrasts with dialogism. Monologue distorts communication in two ways: it privileges one speaker (or group of speakers) in decontextualized communication and assumes that experience can be organized into a coherent system.

In monologism, meaning is not a product of the interchange between speakers, but the expression of one person’s (or group’s) ordering of experience. Other speakers are simply part of the world being organized:

Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another I with equal rights (thou). With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) another person remains wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another consciousness.... Monologue manages without the other, and
therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word. It closes down the represented world and represented persons (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 292-3, italics in original).

The objectification of others facilitates the attempt to organize the world into systems, that is, it promotes centripetal forces. In doing so it ignores centrifugal forces of diversity and "eventness". Completeness and resolution are forced on incomplete and unfinalizable experience. Bakhtin's reservations about the Saussurian separation of langue from parole concern the inevitable privileging of langue. Langue can be studied and organized; parole cannot.

The result of monologism is an incomplete truth that pretends to completeness. Dialectics is perhaps Bakhtin's favourite example of monologism which he contrasts with dialogism:

Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgements from living words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness -- and that's how you get dialectics" (Bakhtin quoted in Morson and Emerson, 1990, p. 57).

Winter's reliance on dialectics as a fundamental principle for teacher research would, for Bakhtin, be another example
of monologism, albeit by teachers rather than university-based theorists or researchers.

Bakhtin does not dismiss the monologic path to truth as worthless. Instead, he wants to open up possibilities for other views of truth. A forced choice between monologism and dialogism would simply be another example of binarism: "The monologic way of perceiving cognition and truth is only one of the possible ways" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 81). What remains for Bakhtin is to demonstrate dialogic ways.

II. DIALOGISM AND THE NOVEL

Epic and Novel

A Bakhtinian, dialogic conception of truth must meet two criteria: (i) it must respect heteroglossia, that is, is must include dialogue between languages; (ii) it must involve genuine communication between subjects (langue and parole), thus including considerations of context. Bakhtin does not create examples of dialogic approaches to truth; he points to them. For Bakhtin, the modern novel (and especially the work of Dostoevsky) embodies dialogism.

The novel has the same effect on the epic in literature as Galileo's ideas had on Ptolemaic astronomy, that is, world views are turned upside down.
The novel is the expression of a Galilean perception of language, one that denies the absolutism of a single and unitary language -- that is, that refuses to acknowledge its own language as the sole verbal and semantic center of the ideological world....The novel begins by presuming a verbal and semantic decentering of the ideological world, a certain linguistic homelessness of literary consciousness, which no longer possesses a sacrosanct and unitary linguistic medium for containing ideological thought....(Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 366-7).

For Bakhtin, the epic depicts a complete world. In the epic the story is told from one point of view, in only one language, outside of considerations of time and particular places: there is only one world, one reality, ordered and complete. In the novel the world is incomplete, imperfect; many languages compete for truth from different vantage points in the past, present and future and from different places in a constantly changing world. To capture the fundamental nature of the novel and its effect on world view, Bakhtin uses three concepts: polyphony, chronotope and carnival.

**Polyphony**

The destruction of epic distance and the transferral of the image of an individual from the distanced plane to the zone of contact with the inconclusive events of the present (and consequently of the future) result in a radical restructuring of the image of the individual in the novel...(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 35).
We are immediately faced with a seeming paradox: how can the creation of one person -- the novel -- be dialogic? To deal with this contradiction, Bakhtin uses the concept of polyphony, which embodies a dialogic sense of truth and includes a special position for the author.

Truth, for Bakhtin, emerges from a genuine communication between people; it is not imposed by one partner on the other. Truth is "born between people collectively searching for truth" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 110).

In a passage that sounds very much like Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, Bakhtin describes this mutual construction of truth:

...[the speaker’s] orientation toward the listener is an orientation toward the specific world of the listener; it introduces totally new elements into his discourse; it is in this way, after all, that various different points of view, conceptual horizons, systems for providing expressive accents, various social ‘languages’ come to interact with one another (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 282).

The product of this interaction is dialogic truth.

For Bakhtin, it is Dostoevsky’s work which best exemplifies the achievement of dialogic truth in the novel. Rather than creating characters from above, manipulating them in a grand design to achieve the author’s planned truth, Dostoevsky creates "...free people, capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even rebelling against him" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.
6). Bakhtin does not, of course, claim that Dostoevsky does not create the characters in his novels, but that once created, they achieve a degree of autonomy and the novel is carried by the interaction between these characters. Dostoevsky's novels thus include "a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.6). The result is no final, complete truth, but unfinalizable, partial truths generated from the interaction among characters. In Dostoevsky's novels there is not a inevitable (centripetal) movement towards a unifying systematic conclusion: "Dostoevsky -- to speak paradoxically -- thought not in thoughts but in points of view, consciousnesses, voices" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 93). Dostoevsky achieves a new kind of unity, one not based a unitary idea or theme, but a unity inherent in the relations between characters (Clark and Holquist, 1984).

**Chronotope**

The truth that develops between characters is dependent on their history and the context in which they find themselves. To reflect this Bakhtin invents a term to indicate time/space: the chronotope. Time is a key factor in the development of the novel: "From the very beginning the novel was structured not in the distanced image of the absolute past but in the zone of direct contact with
inconclusive present-day reality. At its core lay personal experience..." (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 39).

The epic's treatment of time results in time being turned upside down: the epic locates "purpose, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society and the like in the past. Myths about paradise, a Golden Age, a heroic age, an ancient truth...are all expressions of this historical inversion" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 147). In some sense, things that should/could be realized in the future are located in the past instead. The future is disconnected: "The force and persuasiveness of reality, of real life, belong to the present and in the past alone -- to the "is" and the "was" -- and to the future belongs a reality of a different sort, one that is more ephemeral..." (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 147). Characters in the epic cannot develop for there is no future to attain, only a past to regain. The novel reconnects the future to the present and past and allows characters the possibility and responsibility of determining that future.

In using the term chronotope, Bakhtin again makes an analogy to physics, this time to Einsteinian time/space. Like Einstein he hopes to redefine reality, but in Bakhtin's case a literary reality that tries to capture the "eventness" of reality. Bakhtin emphasizes the individual historicity of experience by using a term that recognises that individuals are each located in both time and space.
Thus, unlike the epic, characters in the novel can choose a future; unlike the epic, characters in the novel may choose their future. Crucial for Bakhtin is that characters accept that they are answerable for their choices.

**Carnival**

The epic with its unitary world view, unitary language and timelessness is supplanted by the modern novel with its considerations of heteroglossia, polyphony and chronotope. The transformation is not abrupt and unanticipated, however; the ideology of the epic world pictured a society stable and unchanging in which all was in pre-ordained order and dissent inconceivable; centripetal forces were ascendant. But centrifugal forces were never absent and Bakhtin claims that the novel owes its existence to the forces of counter-culture, opposition to hierarchy and centralization: a folk-festive culture best exemplified in medieval carnival and found in the novel of Rabelais.

Bakhtin claims that popular festivals and rituals claimed an alternate life for people within the official culture. In this separate world, norms are reversed, hierarchy is dissolved and humankind is renewed on a more egalitarian and radically democratic basis. **Carnival values** include celebrating openness and incompletion and mocking rigidity and pomposity. For Bakhtin, carnival "...discloses the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another
order, another way of life. It leads men out of the confines of the apparent (false) unity, of the indisputable and stable" (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 48).

Carnival is an important resource in the battle against monologic thought. The parody of official, recognised norms and behaviour helps to make the commonplace strange, to defamiliarize the accepted state of affairs. Sources for a critique of the conventional are thus found in the ordinary community; in literature, the novel supplants the epic by using resources from prosaic reality. The sources for Bakhtin's utopia are therefore not in a golden age of the past or future, but in the present.

III. APPLICATIONS OF DIALOGISM

To summarize dialogism so far, Bakhtin believes that truth emerges from dialogue between people who have different points of view about the world and different languages to express those perspectives; the truth that emerges from this dialogue is partial, unfinalizable, always subject to modification and limited to particular contexts. Monologism, on the other hand, is the attempt of one person or group to unilaterally force order on experience. The best examples of dialogism can be found in novels where polyphony, chronotope and carnival highlight the
unfinalizability of truth, its contextual nature and its resistance to systematization.

To provide a more complete view of dialogism and at the same time begin to work out its implications for teacher research, I want to suggest how dialogism might tackle two of the fundamental issues of teacher research raised in Chapter One: how to recognise the moral nature of teaching practice and combat ideological aspects in practice and research. In each case I want to try to outline how dialogism would approach these topics and apply these resources to the case studies critiqued in previous chapters.

**Answerability**

Dialogism is a moral theory. For Bakhtin, moral questions cannot be resolved by reference to some overarching system. He argues against Kant, whom he takes as the representative of all abstract approaches to ethics. Such approaches view ethics as a matter of general norms or principles that are then applied to particular contexts. Making an ethical decision is therefore a matter of selecting and applying the appropriate rule. In Bakhtin's view, this approach epitomises monologism: not only is a sense of the particular context lost when it is seen through a particular normative frame, but the frame itself is an imposed and artificial unity.
The starting point for Bakhtin is the event: understanding the particular in all its texture including dialogue with others also involved in the situation. The responsibility for developing this understanding and acting upon it rests on each person. Each of us is answerable. The novel is so important because it exemplifies both texture and the means of disputation: dialogue. For Bakhtin, ethics is a matter of praxis and not theoría or techne. None of the case studies used in Chapters Three, Four and Five meets dialogic criteria.

Jo-Anne Reid's (Chapter Three) "negotiated curriculum" is a pretend dialogue. Reid is a "co-learner" and "facilitator", an equal partner in dialogue; she is also professional responsible for a "controlled, businesslike atmosphere". Reid needs to be clearer about her role in the dialogue: she is not a facilitator, but a teacher and she has to define that role for herself and her partners in dialogue, her students. Conditions for dialogue do not require the absolute equality of the participants, but open dialogue requires that the participants acknowledge both roles and limitations on dialogue.

Elliott's teacher appraisal scheme (Chapter Four) is a limited dialogue. His two-tiered model limits the dialogue on the first tier to small groups of teachers and on the second tier to the teacher and administrator. The narrow scope of the dialogue limits possible conversations and
excludes other affected parties, notably students and parents. This would not mean student or parent appraisal of teacher performance, but it would require that teachers have discussions with their students and the parents of their students about, for example, the criteria for deciding successful teaching. Discussions with parents and students about education and teaching are not common occurrences in schools and Elliott's scheme would do nothing to encourage this dialogue. Bakhtinian dialogism would.

Finally, Winter's example of marking student papers (Chapter Five) meets all the criteria of monologism. Winter's confusion about who is actually involved in dialogue and for what purposes is compounded by an effort to develop rules to regulate communications. A Bakhtinian solution would, for example, stress the responsibility of the instructor to try to deal with each student as an individual, while recognising that each individual is affected by the "languages" he/she speaks and understands, as well as the specific context. No set of rules or procedures will absolve the teacher from making these decisions.

Ideology

The activity of a character in a novel is always ideologically demarcated: he lives and acts in an ideological world of his own (and not in the unitary world of the epic), he has his own
perception of the world that is incarnated in his action and in his discourse (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 335).

For Bakhtin, like Ricoeur, ideology is an inevitable product of our effort to simplify and order experience. Ideologies, products of what Bakhtin calls centripetal force, act as cultural templates. Centripetal and centrifugal forces are enmeshed in all communication; the dominance of centripetal forces leads to monologism, which distorts communication. Thus, for Bakhtin, an ideological critique involves the uncovering of inevitable simplifying cultural tendencies in an ongoing effort towards dialogic communication. To explicate Bakhtin's critique of monologism I want to put them in relief to my readings of Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur.

For both Gadamer and Bakhtin, dialogue occupies a central role. Meaning emerges in dialogue between two subjects who work toward a common language (Bakhtin) or fusion of horizons (Gadamer). Both reject methodological routes to an absolute unitary truth, instead emphasizing historical and cultural contingencies. Both would embrace diversity as a defence against monologism or a dominant single tradition.

Bakhtin, however, would side with Habermas in the debate about the effects of the hidden distortions of power. Gadamer's presumption in favour of the text -- even though
provisional -- privileges monologic thought.

Bakhtin shares a number of common approaches with Habermas -- at least my reading of Habermas. But Bakhtin would be suspicious of the systematizing, centripetal tendencies in Habermas and particularly the early Habermas work that Carr and Kemmis use with, for example, its triumvirate of interests. While Habermasian discourse resembles dialogism in some respects, Habermas' attempt to fuse universal and particular approaches to moral questions would be problematic for Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, normative questions are issues of individual praxis. Bakhtin would be sympathetic to the notion that critique would be guided by an ideal of unconstrained communication, although leery of Habermas' conception of discourse.

Dialogism also shares many common features with Ricoeur's structural hermeneutics, especially an emphasis on discourse as a fusion of langue and parole. Both Bakhtin and Ricoeur believe that critique, in the form of some distancing from experience, is possible. For Ricoeur distancing, or "distanciation", is achieved through the use of writing, especially narrative, and by ensuring a plurality of interpretations ("plurivocity"). For Bakhtin the novel is the particular form of narrative that respects the different points of view ("languages") that he means by heteroglossia. Polyphony in the novel ensures the diversity in dialogue that is missing from the monologic epic: "In
the epic there is one unitary and singular belief system. In the novel there are many such belief systems, with the hero generally acting within his own system" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 334).

For both Ricoeur and Bakhtin the critique of ideology includes a utopian dimension. Gardiner puts this point well: "Ideology mirrors the social order, whilst simultaneously occluding an understanding of its social constitution; utopia, on the other hand, aims at the dissolution of this order through projecting a vision of an alternative existence" (1992, p. 131). Bakhtin identifies a particular kind of utopia for ideological critique: carnival. The centrifugal force of carnival with antihierarchically, unordered world "destroys ... all pretence of an extratemporal meaning and unconditional value of necessity. It frees human consciousness, thought, and imagination for new potentialities" (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 49).

While Ricoeur and Bakhtin share a view of discourse or communication as a fusion of langue and parole, they differ substantively about the relationship between the language system and the speech event. For Ricoeur, the dialectic of meaning and event that creates discourse can be reversed, allowing for the structural analysis that he claims overcomes the separation of explanation and understanding, thereby facilitating critique. For Bakhtin, language is itself an ideology, a reified construct. There is no
unitary language, only languages. In Bakhtin's view, utterances include both centrifugal and centripetal forces and the relationship cannot be undone without privileging one over the other. When centripetal forces dominate only certain languages are valued; others are silenced (e.g. in Orwell's 1984) or devalued (e.g. Shaw's Pygmalion). Depicting the relationship as simply dialectical is just another monologism.

Each of the three examples cited in the previous section -- Kids in Schools, teacher appraisal and marking papers -- present aspects of what Bakhtin would term monologism. Jo-Anne Reid makes perhaps the most effort to counter ideology: she encourages her students to solicit a diversity of opinion by sending them out into the community and their findings are also publicly presented, again opening the dialogue, respecting polyphony. By interviewing workers, managers and other community members, the students had access to particular context, or "event"; unfortunately, though, they quickly lose this texture by collapsing responses to get generalized survey results, that is, official systematic data. Of even more importance is the narrowness of the dialogue: students rarely get past dominant ideology. They find out, for example, that in getting a job, "You did need experience. Grammar did help get a job. Work was quite satisfactory." (Reid, 1982, p.
Views which challenge the existing order are not examined: "Most people reasoned that schools were like factories, mass-producing average-level students..." (p. 15). What is missing is a challenge to the existing order that would ensure a dialogue across differences using different languages, that is, a sense of carnival. This lack of diversity is also a problem in both the Elliott's and Winter's examples: dialogue is limited in both examples to the professionals. Only one language is being spoken. Nowhere is there a discussion of "the potentiality of an entirely different world, a different order, another way of life" (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 48). In neither example is there provision for a fundamental challenge to the existing arrangements; instead the existing system is being improved by further systematization. Elliott's "creative resistance" involves the development a two-tiered teacher appraisal scheme and Winter's dialectics entails the separation of the role of teacher and bureaucrat. Both examples are monologic: certain speakers are privileged in decontextualized communication and the values of system are ascendant. The challenges of polyphony, chronotope and carnival should not be interpreted as the a call for anarchy. Speakers are not all equal; truth is not simply relative to a particular time and place; chaos is not always preferable to order and stability. Bakhtin is insisting on a dialogue
of diversity, a dialogue across differences in context, in which each of us is answerable for our interpretations and actions.

IV. SUMMARY AND CRITICISMS

Dialogism is a theory of praxis based on communication. Meaning is made between partners in a dialogue. Utterances may include both centripetal and centrifugal forces, dictionary and situational meaning, but utterances inevitably presume another person. Partners each speak many different languages (heteroglossia); understanding presumes that they can achieve a common language. Distortion of communication, or monologism, results from privileging one speaker or language or assuming that communication can be removed from context and systematically organized. This results in incomplete truth that pretends to completeness.

Dialogism is best embodied in the modern novel which decenters the ideological world; the world of the novel is incomplete and imperfect. In the polyphonic novel neither the author, nor any one character, dominates. The individual historicity of experience is recognised not only by the narrative form, but by the recognition that characters are individually located in time and space. They are affected by their environment and change as a result of their experiences. In the novel the centripetal forces of
ideology are countered by the centrifugal forces of lived experience and especially the antihierarchical, unfinalizable values of carnival. In this decentered world each individual is answerable for making meaning, finding truth in context.

These are considerable resources for teacher research, but not without problem areas. Bakhtin is most often criticized for the vagueness of his terms and the lack of clarity about how they are related to one another.

In general, centrifugal forces seem valued more than centripetal ones: dialogism over monologism; heteroglossia over monoglossia; the polyphonic novel over the epic. Similarly carnival celebrates values of incompleteness, openness and diversity. On the other hand, however, unrestrained adoption of the values of carnival may result in chaos; the chorale of polyphony may instead be cacophony; the dialogue of dialogism may produce anarchy. As Gardiner puts it: "...at times Bakhtin seems to equate the whole machinery of class rule with the suppression of unhindered dialogic communication" (1992, p. 176). Pechey accuses Bakhtin of undertheorizing the relationship between hegemonic and carivalizing forces: "The contending forces seem to be starkly polarized and to operate in abstraction from the institutional sites in which the complex relations of discourse and power are actually negotiated..." (1989, p. 52).
One explanation for this ambiguity in Bakhtin is his own time/space location: Stalinist Russia. Living in one of the most centralized societies in this century may have led to an emphasis on the centrifugal. Bakhtin recognises that both forces are necessary; indeed one presumes the other. Neither pole is an absolute. Monologism must constrain dialogic forces; dialogue is always provisional and in danger of becoming monologue.

In the next chapter, I want to create a dialogue. I want to show how Bakhtin’s ideas, sometimes supplemented or contrasted with those of Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur, can be used to address the questions raised about teacher research in Chapter One. This entails creating a conversation among hermeneuts, a particularly difficult task since, although Bakhtin’s work predates the others, it has only recently become widely read. This is further complicated by the four often dealing with the same topics, sometimes with similar vocabulary, but often with very different assumptions.
I began Chapter One by quoting Maxine Greene's call for teachers to waken, to "think about their condition in the world, to inquire into the forces that appear to dominate them, to interpret the experiences they are having day by day" (1978, p. 44). Greene believes that students' education is best promoted by "teachers who themselves are learning, who are breaking with what they have too easily taken for granted, who are creating their own moral lives" (p. 51). I believe that teacher research can respond to this challenge, that is, teacher research can and should be concerned with developing consciously moral teaching practices that help students in turn become educated people. Current work in teacher research neglects what I maintain are fundamental issues: how is teaching practice conceived, how does research contribute to a better understanding of teaching practice and how can that research be critiqued?

This work has been missing from various conceptions of teacher research from its inception. From the beginning of this century, advocates of teacher research have argued for the use of "scientific" methods and procedures to understand and improve teaching practice. This was in spite of the warnings of such a staunch champion of science as
John Dewey who cautioned about the limitations of science in understanding teaching. Nonetheless a positivist conception of science underlay initial attempts at teacher research by Corey and his colleagues at Teachers' College, influenced greatly by Lewin's and Collier's work on action research. The attempt at making teaching an applied science soon took the control of research on teaching away from the classroom; teacher research and action research went into decline.

Lawrence Stenhouse revived teacher research largely by redefining the relationship between research and practice. Practice, for Stenhouse, is based on particular notions of education and teaching. The teacher -- who is not an applied researcher or technician, but an "extended professional" -- interprets an educational curriculum for his/her students in a particular context. Teacher research involves the self-criticism of that interpretation. Stenhouse rejected the positivistic methods advocated by Lewin and Corey and instead advanced ethnographic methods that emphasized case studies. However, Stenhouse never worked out the connections between these approaches and understanding and improving teaching practice. I critique three attempts in Chapters Three, Four and Five: Carr and Kemmis', Elliott's and Winter's. Each of these bids uses particular hermeneutical resources to build a theory of teacher research. I argue that none of the attempts succeeds at providing adequate resources, but that in each
case the original sources make important contributions to teacher research.

I believe that an important and neglected resource for teacher research is the work of Mikhail Bakhtin whose dialogism helps to provide a response to Greene's call for teachers to become wide-awake, or "answerable".

Four important sets of issues are addressed by these hermeneutic resources. The first set involves the conception of teaching practice, particularly its normative basis and its strategies for organizing that practice. The second set of issues must consider how, given certain conceptions of teaching, issues of practice can be extricated from experience so that they can be studied, examined or researched. Thirdly, given previous decisions, how can practice be researched and criticised? Finally, how is practice improved by this effort?

I. HERMENEUTICS AND TEACHER RESEARCH

Practice and Language

I want to use Bakhtin's work to answer the three questions I raise about teacher research in Chapter One, but I want to supplement and contrast dialogism with the work of Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur. I have two reasons for this. While Bakhtin claims that the world is fundamentally
dialogic and points to the modern novel for examples of dialogism, his work is not a coherent theory in the sense that, for example, Habermas is attempting. Indeed the idea of a comprehensive theory sounds monologic and antithetical to dialogism. Bakhtin contributes resources for my answers, including certain ideas about language and communication, as well as concepts such as polyphony, chronotope and carnival.

Using his work as a basis for my attempted answers leaves some fundamental issues unaddressed however and to cope with those issues I want to draw from Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur. I realize that this could be problematic, especially if the resources claimed are based on ideas that are contradictory. I do not believe that this is the case, however; the resources I claim from Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur are consistent with dialogism.

My second reason is that I believe that my attempted answers can be better seen in relief to the other hermeneutic theories that have already been adapted for teacher research (even though I take issue with those adaptations).

Basic to a theory of teacher research are concepts of language and practice. Practice depends upon language. Indeed, consistent with Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, a practice must develop its own language for it to become a practice. Using MacIntyre's definition of practice, which
is "any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity" (1984, p. 187), such an activity must be language-based for it to be cooperative, for example. Practitioners share a common language, distinct from other languages.

Normal communication within a practice uses the language of that practice and proceeds against an unproblematic unifying background of assumptions and norms that Bakhtin calls monologism. The prejudices or assumptions that comprise this background and condition practitioners' understanding are formed from the historical tradition of the practice and are part of a centripetal effort to systematize or organize that practice. This simplifying effort is part of an attempt to force a cultural template on experience.

A theory of teacher research requires a conception of the language or languages of practice, an understanding of the nature of practice including its normative basis and its fundamental assumptions.

**Abstraction from Practice**

To study or research teaching practice requires (i) some way of understanding practice outside of a particular context without unduly distorting or oversimplifying that context and (ii) some way of identifying the monologic strategies within practice.
The first set of issues leads to Ricoeur’s and Bakhtin’s ideas about writing and narrative; the second set of issues uses Bakhtin’s heteroglossia, polyphony, chronotope and carnival.

To study experience means in some measure to distance oneself from that experience, that is, Ricoeur’s notion of distanciation. Being caught up in a situation is not conducive to reflection, or understanding its meaning. A major difficulty is attaining that distance without losing the essence of the event. Much educational research is rightly accused of being so distanced from experience (the "eventness" of classroom life) that validity is left behind. Certainly much of the criticism of "positivistic", "quantitative" research repeats this charge (e.g., Barrow, 1984; 1988).

What Ricoeur offers is a theory of writing that balances these criteria. For Ricoeur, discourse has characteristics of both event and meaning. Initially, language is a series of signs that signify experience, but when subsequently organized syntactically into a sentence these signs lose semiotic value and acquire semantic import. When sentences are organized into works, especially in writing, they can project a world that the reader enters. Through this process, the event is decontextualized by language and writing and later recontextualized by the reader.
Ricoeur focuses on one version of works that is consonant with experience -- narrative. Like Gadamer, Ricoeur emphasizes the connection between narrative and the historicity of human experience, thereby again connecting writing to "eventness". But the narrative adds particular characteristics of explanation of experience. Experience is in some way explained when emplotted and the process of organizing experience into a plot also allows for a world view to be applied to that experience.

Bakhtin would agree with Ricoeur's view of the importance of narrative, but with substantial qualifications. Bakhtin would be concerned with monologic or epic tendencies. First, he would worry about sharp distinctions. The bifurcation of event and meaning would be softened: meaning becomes meanings. Not only the abstract decontextualized linguistic definition, but meanings from context must be considered. Secondly, while the explanatory tendencies of narrative would be recognised, these would be seen as monologic tendencies, that is, they are attempts to systematize the centrifugal forces of human experience. This is an inevitable aspect of organizing experience, but must nevertheless be recognised as an ideological effort and needs to be critiqued.

To combat both of these tendencies Bakhtin points to a special form of narrative -- the novel. The modern novel, and particularly the work of Dostoevsky and Rabelais, more
accurately reflects the diversity of languages and experience and at the same time promotes genuine dialogue between subjects. No one language is privileged; no one language can claim truth. For Bakhtin, the modern novel with its features of polyphony, chronotope and carnival, epitomises dialogism.

Polyphony counters monologism by ensuring more than one speaker is heard. Indeed truth is not owned by one speaker, but constructed dialogically between and among speakers who use different languages or systems to deal with the world of experience. Further, that truth is dependent on the particular histories of the partners and the context in which they find themselves, a limitation that Bakhtin tries to capture in chronotope. In emphasizing the diversity of experience, Bakhtin tries to balance the centripetal forces of monologism with the centrifugal aspects of "eventness". Carnival provides yet another kind of check against monologism by valuing openness and incompletion, leading away from false unity and hierarchy. The dialogue promoted by polyphony may encourage the sharing of different viewpoints in different languages, but carnival ensures that monologic views are challenged.

Dialogue

Normal practice can be made dialogic by revealing the false unities of monologic practice. This can be
accomplished by encouraging dialogue between and among speakers who have different languages based on different experiences and revealing different worlds. The interchange between and among these separate points of view allows truths to be constructed between and among the various perspectives.

However, while Bakhtin stresses that truth is dialogically constructed, and points to examples in the modern novel, he does not translate dialogism into other arenas. I believe that Habermas and Gadamer supply important resources for that translation: Habermas points to a procedure to decide those norms necessary for dialogue; Gadamer helps in sustaining that dialogue.

Habermas develops his concept of discourse in attempt to ground critique. When communicative action is disturbed by some problem of practice,

participants in argumentation adopt a hypothetical attitude to controversial validity claims...[and] practical discourse begins. Is issue is then whether or not the norm deserves to be recognised, and that issue will be decided by a contest between proponents and opponents of the norm (Habermas, 1991, p. 125).

Habermas goes on to ground discourse in the presuppositions of communication and language.

Bakhtin would agree that the norms for communication must be decided in dialogue between those directly involved,
but Bakhtin’s discourse and Habermas' discourse are very different. In Bakhtin's dialogue a person "invests his entire self in discourse..." (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293), while Habermas's discourse is a "contest" between "participants in argumentation". I believe that Bakhtin would see Habermas' discourse as privileging centripetal forces in its very conception of dialogue as debate, thereby limiting dialogic possibilities.

Resolution

The goal of Habermasian discourse is rational consensus. Bakhtin’s dialogue, on the other hand, leads to unfinalizable, partial truths between partners. In describing this mutual construction of truth, Bakhtin talks about an "orientation towards the specific world of the listener" which "introduces totally new elements into his discourse" (1981, p. 282); I think that this is also what Gadamer means when describing the anticipation of completeness and docta ignorantia, that is, being open to the possible truth in another viewpoint and questioning our own access to truth.

For both Gadamer and Bakhtin, successful dialogue results in a fusion of horizons (Gadamer) or languages (Bakhtin). Partners may not come to agreement or consensus, but they do come to genuinely understand other points of view and account for these viewpoints in their own language.
Dialogic truth emerges from the interaction between and among horizons or world views.

II. RESEARCH EXAMPLE

Dialogism provides what I believe to be useful principles for criticising teacher research, principles consistent with the nature of teaching practice and principles that help to improve that practice by combatting monologic tendencies. In this section I want to connect the resources outlined in the last section with teacher research. While there are many examples of teacher research that exemplify some of these resources, I know of no attempts that make use of all of them. I have been involved in one research project that does embody many of these principles and will use that work to illustrate what these resources might look in practice and also to show how a consistent application of those principles would have improved that work.

Faces of Failure (Coulter et al, 1992) is the result of a study by seven practitioner researchers into an issue within their practices: the retention in grade of students in elementary school who are deemed not ready for the subsequent grade. The monograph begins by reviewing the history of the practice of failing students in the graded
school and the results of the largely quantitative research into the efficacy of the practice. In spite of overwhelming evidence about the detrimental effects of the practice, however, it continues; indeed, is even promoted as an answer to contemporary problems.

The next six chapters of the booklet are portraits of adult volunteers who relate their experience of repeating a grade as children, written by the researchers but using the words of the people interviewed. These people checked the accuracy of the stories and approved them for publication. The stories were consistent with the quantitative research initially reviewed: they capture both the trauma of the experience, and the long-term effects on attitudes towards school, self-concept, and social adjustment. In spite of these effects four of the six volunteers thought the experience benefitted them (although two subsequently changed their opinions after seeing their stories and the others in print).

Support for three possible explanations for the persistence of the practice was found, including socialization into a competitive society. No definitive conclusion is reached or alternative practice recommended; instead practitioners are urged to begin a dialogue concerning the purposes for schooling and the values fundamental to those purposes. Practices can then be judged in context using those values as criteria.
III. A DIALOGIC INTERPRETATION

Practice

Many of the principles of dialogism are evident in this project. The issue is framed consistently with dialogic principles: the centripetal forces of bureaucratic schooling is countered by the centrifugal life stories of volunteers. Requiring unsuccessful students to repeat a year of school is a bureaucratic, monologic solution. Students are treated like objects: "Those students who do not meet the specified standards when established measurement techniques are applied are returned for reprocessing" (p. 49).

The report uses different languages. Researchers are careful to use both the life stories and language of the volunteers. The work is a result of the dialogue between and among seven practitioner researchers, six adult volunteers, and the 32 authors cited in the reference list.

Finally the research is self-conscious both about the normative aspects of the issue to be studied and the methods used to do that research. Requiring a student to repeat a year of schooling without sufficient grounds is a moral concern; ensuring that those people who volunteer to tell their stories are protected and supported is an ethical
issue. No monologic epic world is depicted.

Abstraction from Practice

The world of *Faces of Failure* includes different languages projecting different worlds and representing different histories. The languages of the practitioner researchers collide with those of the volunteers and academic researchers in a polyphony of viewpoints.

In abstracting the issue from experience care is taken to respect both time and place -- chronotope. Instead of the language of meta-analysis which reduces the experience to "effect sizes on self-concept", for example, there are stories of how people were and are affected.

The values of carnival, too, are respected. Openness and incompletion are valued: no simple solution, five or six step procedure or packaged answer is offered. No new policy is recommended. The bureaucratic answer is challenged; some ideological assumptions are uncovered.

Dialogue

There is a dialogue in *Faces of Failure*: research is cited, stories are told and conclusions are drawn. But, as mentioned above, the dialogue does not funnel into one monologic answer. Much is left unresolved; disagreements remain. Linda is still certain that the experience was harmful, Mary still believes it was beneficial and Alex is
still unsure.

Part of this lack of resolution is due to the lack of consensus about how retention should be judged. Mary believes that overcoming the trauma of repeating a grade in school made her a stronger person. While she still has not finished high school, she continues to try. Linda finished high school and university studies, but viewed the experience of repeating a grade as a handicap that is always with her. Certainly part of their lack of agreement comes from their different life histories, part comes from different views of schooling and education. *Mary's concept* of curriculum is a series of objective hurdles or tests that she must overcome; Linda sees herself as capable and the school as a hindrance. Because they work from different assumptions, they can achieve no agreement.

Instead of working from common assumptions about schooling and education, *Faces of Failure* reveals the lack of consensus. Its conclusion is to "return to a discussion of the purposes that we have set for our schools and the values that underlie those purposes" (p. 54). Conclusions are tentative and cautious, with the hope that the conversation moves "the discussion about retention away from a linear cause and effect rhetoric to a more complex and complete view of how we, in schools, affect people's lives. The stories should make us humble about our actions" (p. 48). There is evidence of both the anticipation of
completeness and *docta ignorantia*.

**Resolution**

As previously mentioned, there is no neatly wrapped solution to the issue of retention in grade offered at the end of *Faces of Failure*. The issue is usually framed as a forced choice between merit promotion and social promotion, an example of the kind of dialectical division that dialogism abhors. Instead of a consensus solution *Faces of Failure* aims for greater understanding from dialogic truths. Armed with this understanding, practitioners might reexamine their practices and the values that underlie those practices and make better, more moral decisions. This understanding will make them answerable for their practices. They would be more wide-awake.

**A Dialogic Critique**

*Faces of Failure* would be improved, however, by even more attention to the character of its dialogue. Six stories are collected and then discussed from a particular standpoint: the *quantitative research cited at the beginning of the booklet forms the frame for examining the six stories that follow*. For example, the global categories that Holmes and Matthews (1984) use to group the effects on students in the individual quantitative studies in their *meta-analysis -- attitude toward school, self-concept,*
personal adjustment and academic achievement -- are used to discuss the six stories in *Faces of Failure* (pp. 46-47). So too are the possible explanations for the persistence of the practice drawn from the literature on retention: lack of teacher access to long term effects, the persistence of the school as a factory metaphor and the ideology of schooling in capitalist society (pp. 48-53). *Faces of Failure* draws from the tradition of research on retention, including positivism and needs to be more self-conscious about that heritage. What is required is a critique of its own values, its own assumptions about education, that is, a more self-conscious effort to ground its norms. While *Faces of Failure* calls for an open dialogue at the end of the study (p. 54), more attention could be given to the norms underlying its own work from the beginning.

Another assumption that needs to be questioned is the supposition that researchers can capture the language of those being interviewed. The question of just who is speaking is a problem that needs attention and is certainly the subject of much dialogue in ethnographic research (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986).

All of this dialogue should contribute towards a better understanding of practice and perhaps improved practices. While the "improvement" of practice is dependent on a conception of the norms for practice, a dialogic interpretation would involve an attempt to unmask some of
the ideological or centripetal aspects that are inevitably part of the construction of any practice. *Faces of Failure* begins to uncover the ideology inherent in the practice of retaining students in grade, but needs also to be aware of its own simplifying research practice.

IV. DIALOGIC TEACHER RESEARCH

The preceding interpretation of dialogism is an attempt to respond to Maxine Greene's call for teaching to become a practice conducted by those who are striving to be wide-awake and answerable for their practices. I do not offer my interpretation as an answer in the sense that it solves an issue. That would be monologic. What I do try to accomplish is to contribute to a discussion of how, if teaching is recognised to be a moral practice, teachers can deliberately study their practices in a manner that contributes towards their understanding and uncovers aspects of practice that are morally problematic.

This does not mean to devalue other approaches to researching teaching practices. University-based researchers can contribute empirical, philosophical and historical research towards a better understanding of teaching practice. Others may also contribute their understanding. Teacher research, however, is concerned with
the contributions that teachers can make to that dialogue. It should be a contribution based not on political considerations -- teachers voices should not be heard because they are involved as "stakeholders", or "professionals", or "workers". Teachers voices should be heard because they have important and unique contributions to make to an educational dialogue. These contributions are credible because they emerge from thoughtful research within an overt normative framework that recognises its own incompleteness and imperfection. These contributions are credible because they are made by people who recognise that decisions of practice -- moral decisions -- must be made by those directly involved in those practices, but with the recognition that they are answerable for those decisions and those decisions will inevitably be made with incomplete, distorted information.

While all of the above may seem to rest on a qualified foundation, there are considerations that have not been discussed that call the entire enterprise into question. Teacher research presumes that teachers will want to become involved in the kind of dialogue for understanding that Bakhtin, Habermas, Gadamer and Ricoeur call for. Schools, however, are organized hierarchically and many teaching practices are monologic. Particular speakers are privileged in the school: principals, teachers and parents. Students
are rarely heard. Solutions to "morally neutral" problems are sought and found as evidenced by the proliferation of five and six and seven step programs. Each new problem seems to generate a new series of policies to solve the problem. When these answers fail to resolve issues and indeed, exacerbate existing "problems", new solutions (or people) are tried.

Teacher research can also be monologic. Certain speakers can be privileged because of their position: teacher researchers who, for example, "teach against the grain". As professionals they construct their practices from a knowledge base constructed from classroom inquiry, thereby realigning their relationships to knowledge and the brokers of knowledge in the universities. Teachers will generate their own answers to problems of practice. Teachers voices may be heard, but perhaps to the exclusion of other voices, or perhaps they will be part of a cacophony of voices all with the answers. The norms for discriminating among these voices are missing.

A dialogic conception of teacher research is based on an open, ongoing discussion of practice involving all affected by that practice. No one should be privileged. Norms for this dialogue are decided among participants. Truths are incomplete, unfinalizable and valid for a particular context. Generalizations to other situations, other contexts, are tentative and provisional. Teachers
voices are heard, but as part of a dialogue for understanding among parents, students and others in a community of learners.

This certainly seems vulnerable to the same criticism that Winter makes of Habermas' ideal speech situation, that of being a disabling irony. Certainly I am not calling for the kind of practical resistance that Winter and Elliott advocate, nor do I urge the political emancipation that Carr and Kemmis propose. Dialogism is utopian, but in the same sense that education and democracy are utopian. We can accept them as ideals and work towards greater understanding in a more just and equal society, all the while recognising that we will never achieve either goal. We also can embrace the ideals of communication and understanding, knowing that we will never completely succeed. We can welcome Maxine Greene's challenge: we can agree to be more wide-awake, to think about our condition in the world and to inquire into those forces in the world that appear to dominate us. We can also recognise that there are no guarantees in the process of creating our own moral lives, our own moral practices.
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